Secession and Conflict: Iraqi Kurdistan in Comparative Perspective 9780228015246

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S e c e s s io n a n d Confli ct

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Secession and Conflict Iraqi Kurdistan in Comparative Perspective

Z h e g e r Hassa n

McGill-­Queen’s University Press Montreal & Kingston • London • Chicago

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©  McGill-Queen’s University Press 2023 ISB N 978-0-2280-1424-9 (cloth) ISB N 978-0-2280-1524-6 (ep df ) ISB N 978-0-2280-1525-3 (eP UB) Legal deposit first quarter 2023 Bibliothèque nationale du Québec Printed in Canada on acid-free paper that is 100% ancient forest free (100% post-consumer recycled), processed chlorine free This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Canadian Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences, through the Awards to Scholarly Publications Program, using funds provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

We acknowledge the support of the Canada Council for the Arts. Nous remercions le Conseil des arts du Canada de son soutien.

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Title: Secession and conflict: Iraqi Kurdistan in comparative perspective / Zheger Hassan. Names: Hassan, Zheger, author. Description: Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: Canadiana (print) 20220417156 | Canadiana (ebook) 20220417296 | ISB N 9780228014249 (cloth) | IS BN 9780228015246 (eP D F ) | I SB N 9780228015253 (ePUB) Subjects: LC S H: Kurdist n (Iraq)—History—Autonomy and independence movements. | LC SH: Kurds—Iraq— Politics and government—21st century. | L C SH : Iraq— Politics and government—2003- | L CS H: South Sudan—History—Autonomy and independence movements. | L CS H: Kosovo (Republic)—History—Autonomy and independence movements. Classification: L CC DS 70.8.K 8 H 37 2023 | DDC 956.7/2044—dc23

This book was typeset by Marquis Interscript in 10.5/13 Sabon.

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This book is dedicated to my mother and her memory of my father.

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Contents

Acknowledgments ix 1 Introduction  3 2 Kosovo  21 3  South Sudan  40 4  Iraqi Kurdistan I  62 5  Iraqi Kurdistan II  81 6  Iraqi Kurdistan Moves Toward Independence  97 7 Conclusion  116 Appendix 1: Economic Performance of Kosovo and Serbia (1990–2016) 133 Appendix 2: Economic Performance of South Sudan and Sudan (1994–2012)  135 Appendix 3: Economic Performance of Iraqi Kurdistan and Iraq (2004–2013) 137 Notes 139 Bibliography 167 Index 187

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Acknowledgments

This book would not have been possible without support and guidance from Sam Clark. For more than fifteen years, Sam has helped me find my own path while providing constant guidance and unwavering support. He has been a mentor to me in every capacity. For this, I will always be grateful. His insights and suggestions were indispensable in completing the book. It did not hurt that he also managed to tame my unruly sentences. Adam Harmes was my PhD supervisor at Western University. He willingly took on this project, along with me, even though it was not his primary field. As a testament to his commitment to my doctoral thesis, Adam travelled to Iraq with me in 2014 to conduct fieldwork. I will always treasure the memories we created during our time in Iraqi Kurdistan. Several other individuals were instrumental in the completion of this book. They include Peter Ferguson, Bruce Morrison, Joanna Quinn, and Tim Donais. I would also like to thank Jim Freedman and Tim Spence for their feedback. Tim painstakingly edited the manuscript in whole. My family, the Kurdish clan, has always been there for me with unconditional support. In particular I would like to acknowledge my mother who, as a single parent, fled war-torn Iraq in the late 1980s with five children to settle in Canada. Even during our time in a refugee camp, her strength and love gave my siblings and me a safe and happy life. My brother and three sisters have all provided me with encouragement and support for as long as I can remember. My grandparents, aunts, and uncles, based in both Canada and abroad, have also supported me throughout this journey.

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x Acknowledgments

A special and warm acknowledgment goes to Renas Jano, who walked me into the offices of more than a dozen officials and academics in Iraqi Kurdistan. He generously dedicated two months of his time and resources to assist me during my first extended trip to Erbil. I cannot thank him enough. My uncle, Ali Jamil Bamerni, provided me with a home during my stay in Dohuk. During my time in Iraqi Kurdistan, he explained the many intricacies of the social, religious, and political life of Iraqi Kurdistan and arranged numerous interviews with politicians and academics. Said Bamerni facilitated introductions and arranged interviews with the governor of Dohuk and other officials and former peshmerga. He also generously offered his home and time to Adam and me in April 2014. To the many people in Iraqi Kurdistan who, in one way or another, supported me by providing accommodations, resources, and guidance during my trips to the region, thank you for your kindness and hospitality. Mohammed Jano provided me with a home for two months during my time in Erbil and made my stay memorable by holding small concerts in Ainkawa. I want to recognize the following people for going out of their way to help me: Rebaz Bapiri, Shno Ayub Mohammedamin, Rezan Bamerni, Izzet Bamerni, Armanj Ahmed. I am indebted to all the officials and individuals who gave their time for interviews and patiently answered my questions. To the individuals at McGill-Queen’s, thank you for your eternal patience and guidance in helping me publish this manuscript. Thank you, Philip and Joanne. I am grateful for the work of the two anony­ mous reviewers who provided insightful feedback and criticism that helped to improve the overall qualify of the book. To my Pavlinka, without your encouragement, this book would have gone unpublished for another ten years. You have opened my eyes to a world that I have come to adore. Thank you for being by my side.

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S e c e s s io n a n d Confli ct

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1 Introduction

In the heart of the capital of Erbil, before a crowd of thousands of hopeful nationalists, Massoud Barzani promised that he would deliver independence to the Kurds of Iraq – that the time had come to establish a Kurdish state. For over a century, Kurds in Iraq have been dreaming of the day an independent Kurdish state would be declared. They were made to believe that an independence referendum, held on 25 September 2017, would pave the way for the imminent declaration of that independence. Instead of opening the door to independence, however, the referendum triggered more misery for a people that had become accustomed to suffering. It is in this context that we try to understand the factors that have to this point prevented the creation of an independent Kurdistan. The Kurdish tragedy, if one may call it that, has been unfolding for over a century. Since the end of World War I, the Kurds have been subjected to political and cultural oppression and, at times, indiscriminate violence at the hands of regimes that have historically been hostile to Kurdish appeals for political and cultural rights. More specifically, over the past century, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey have resorted to draconian measures and violent repression to suppress Kurdish demands for basic rights. These measures, however, did not have the desired effect of extinguishing Kurdish nationalism or the call for political rights. Indeed, the heavy-handed response from the respective central governments may have in fact emboldened and rallied the Kurdish populations to oppose the regimes and their oppressive policies more vociferously. This is particularly evident in the case of the Kurds in Iraq. In response to Kurdish nationalism, successive Iraqi governments employed the

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Secession and Conflict

twin policies of political repression and military domination. Yet the Kurds became more determined in their cause. As a testament to the Kurdish spirit, Iraqi Kurdistan emerged as an autonomous region in Iraq in 1991, and it has since functioned as a de facto state – an entity with all the features of a state except recognition. Following almost three decades of autonomous status, in September 2017, Iraqi Kurds organized an independence referendum to pursue the longstanding goal of establishing an independent Kurdish state. The referendum asked voters if they desired independence from Iraq. Although the response was a resounding “yes,” Iraqi Kurdistan continues to function as an autonomous region within Iraq. What accounts for this puzzling behaviour? On the one hand, Kurdish nationalism has been resolute, even zealous, in defending Kurdish rights and in the calls to establish an independent Kurdistan, but when the Kurdish leadership was given the mandate to declare independence, it wavered. The aim of this book is to explain the Iraqi Kurdistan puzzle. I hope to identify and explain the conditions under which Iraqi Kurdistan would pursue independence and when it would not do so. To this end, this book undertakes a comparative analysis of Iraqi Kurdistan against Kosovo and South Sudan. These cases share similar historical and political trajectories, but have diverging outcomes. A comparative analysis will therefore allow us to identify the factors responsible for pushing Kosovo and South Sudan, but not Iraqi Kurdistan, toward independence. The book raises two related questions. First, why has Iraqi Kurdistan not pushed for independence? (In answering this ­question, we also contribute to the broader understanding of de facto states.) Second, what are the conditions under which a de facto state will take concrete steps to achieve independence or alternatively preserve the status quo? Put simply, why do some de facto states push for independence while others do not? I argue that Iraqi Kurdistan has not declared independence for two reasons. First, it possesses such a high degree of political autonomy that it is effectively independent and, as a result, attempting secession is not worth jeopardizing the existing autonomy. Second, Iraqi Kurdistan faces staunch opposition to its independence from neighbouring and other regional countries as well as the United States. In more general terms, I argue that de facto states will forgo independence when they possess sufficient political autonomy and they do not have international support. In this work, I define sufficient political autonomy as an entity’s capacity to exercise political authority over its jurisdiction and a constitutional recognition of its autonomy from the

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parent state. In most cases, the de facto state clearly outlines the type of political autonomy it desires – as Iraqi Kurdistan, Kosovo, and South Sudan did. In addition to the two factors outlined before, the book also highlights other important factors, such as economic incentives, the domestic environment of the de facto state and the parent state, and the presence or absence of the ‘old regime’ of the parent state.

N o t io n s o f S tatehood The state has long been the primary political actor in the international political system and the principal object of analysis in comparative politics and international relations (i r ). The primacy of the state can be explained by two factors. First, it possesses legal standing under international law and second, since its emergence in the mid-­seventeenth century, it has been the dominant political actor in the international political system. A simple and common definition comes from Max Weber who defines the state as a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. From this definition, we can note that a state possesses a population, territory, government, and recognition from other states. Recognition is particularly important because it furnishes the state with a legal standing under international law and grants membership into the exclusive international system and international organizations. A growing number of political entities with all the above criteria – except for recognition – highlights the importance of recognition as a quality of statehood. These de facto states first emerged in the 1960s and have become increasingly important actors in the international system. De facto states often appear following the outbreak of violent conflict between a nationalist movement and a parent state. Although the number of cases may be considered relatively small, they play an important role in regional security and stability. These entities often possess stable political and economic systems and sometimes aspire to de jure statehood.

Back g ro u n d o n D e F ac to S tates: Explai ni ng t he Or ig in s a n d E vo l u t ion of De Facto States De facto states emerged from the decolonization period of the 1960s and the 1970s when these regions failed to secure political autonomy, economic development, and, in some cases, independence.1 The late

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1980s to the early 1990s produced the greatest number of de facto states following the collapse of the Soviet Union.2 In total, as of 2021, twenty-four de facto states emerged since the 1960s. They are presented in the tables below.3 Table 1.1 categorizes them according to their geographical region and table 1.2 displays their outcome and indicates whether or not they meet the conditions outlined in this book. Some have graduated to full statehood, while some have reintegrated with the parent state, and others still continue to function as de facto states. Because these entities were historically marginalized and ignored by the international community, the academic literature was rather scarce on de facto states. This has changed over the past four decades. Scott Pegg was the first to systematically bring the term “de facto state” into the political science lexicon.4 It should be noted, however, that political scientists were using the term before Pegg’s 1998 article. For example, Sean Randolph used the term to describe Taiwan in a 1981 article, and, in a 1993 article, Michael Gunter used the term to announce the formation of a de facto state in Iraqi Kurdistan.5 There are also several competing definitions in the literature. Scott Pegg offers what is perhaps the most useful starting point. He says that: “A de facto state exists where there is an organized political leadership, which has risen to power through some degree of indigenous capacity; receives popular support; and has achieved sufficient capacity to provide governmental services to a given population in a specific territorial area, over which effective control is maintained for a significant period of time. The de facto state views itself as capable of entering into relations with other states and it seeks full constitutional independence and widespread international recognition as a sovereign state.”6 Several other definitions highlight features such as legitimacy, democratization, and membership in the international community. 7 Existing definitions provide a useful base, but do not capture the essence of de facto states. To remedy this shortcoming, I adopt the following definition: A de facto state controls a defined territory, provides an array of services to the population, and possesses the capacity to enter into diplomatic and economic relations with other states, but it does not possess de jure recognition.8 This definition intentionally avoids the claim that de facto states always strive for independence given that the literature has not validated this claim.

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Table 1.1 List of de facto states by geographical region De facto state Eurasia Abkhazia Chechnya Nagorno-Karabakh South Ossetia Middle East Iraqi Kurdistan Palestine Africa Anjouan Biafra Eritrea Katanga Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic Somaliland South Sudan Europe Gagauzia Kosovo Montenegro Republika Srpska Republika Srpska Krajina Transnistria Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Asia Bougainville East Timor Tamil Eelam Taiwan

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Parent state

Time period

Georgia Russia Azerbaijan Georgia

1990–present 1991–94, 1996–99 1991–present 1990–present

Iraq

1991–present 1988–present

Comoros Nigeria Ethiopia Democratic Republic of the Congo Morocco

1997–2008 1967–70 1991–93 1960–63 1976–present

Somalia Sudan

1991–present 2005–11

Moldova Serbia Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Bosnia and Herzegovina Croatia

1991–94 1999–2008 2000–06 1992–95 1991–95

Moldova Cyprus

1990–present 1983–present

Papua New Guinea Indonesia Sri Lanka China

1975–97 1992–2002 1997–2009 1949–present

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Table 1.2 De facto states and the factors that influence their outcome De facto state Eurasia Abkhazia Chechnya Nagorno-Karabakh South Ossetia Middle East Iraqi Kurdistan Palestine Africa Anjouan Biafra Eritrea Katanga Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic Somaliland South Sudan Europe Gagauzia Kosovo Montenegro Republika Srpska Republika Srpska Krajina Transnistria Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Asia Bougainville East Timor Tamil Eelam Taiwan

Political Economic International support Declaration of autonomy benefits (recognition) independence Yes Yes Yes No

No No No No

No1 No No No2

Yes – 1999 No Yes – 1992 Yes – 1991

Yes Yes

Yes No

No Disputed3

No Yes – 1988

Yes No No Yes No

No No No No No

No No4 Yes No Disputed6

Yes – 1997 Yes – 1967 Yes – 1993 No5 Yes – 1976

No Yes

No No

No Yes

Yes – 1991 Yes

Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes

No No No No No No Yes

No Yes Yes No No No7 No8

No Yes Yes – 2006 No No No Yes – 1983

Yes No No Yes

No No No No

No Yes No Disputed11

Yes – 19919 Yes – 200210 No No

1 Abkhazia is recognized by Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Nauru. 2 South Ossetia is recognized by Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Nauru. 3 Currently, more than 130 states recognize Palestine, but it is not recognized by Israel, the US, France, Germany, and Canada, amongst other countries. 4 Biafra was a short-lived de facto state and it was reincorporated into Nigeria in 1970. 5 Katanga declared independence in 1960 but it was militarily defeated in 1963 and reintegrated as a province of the dr Congo. 6 Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic is recognized by approximately eighty states. 7 Transnistria is recognized by Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Nauru. 8 Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is recognized by Turkey. 9 Bougainville and Papua New Guinea held a non-binding independence referendum on the future of Bougainville in 2019. 10 East Timor previously declared independence in 1975 but it was immediately invaded and conquered by Indonesia. 11 Taiwan (or the Republic of China) is recognized by twenty countries.

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9

The empirical record raises questions about the existing literature’s assumptions regarding the behaviour and evolution of de facto states. For example, Nina Caspersen argues that some de facto states gain recognition and secure independence (e.g., Eritrea and Kosovo), but most (e.g., Chechnya and Tamil Eelam) are forcefully reintegrated into the parent state.9 The record, however, does not support this argument. In fact, from the twenty-four de facto states listed in this work only five have been forcibly reintegrated into the parent state. This is often achieved with a thorough military defeat of the de facto state. The most recent example of this was the military defeat of Tamil Eelam by Sri Lanka in 2009. Other examples of forced reintegration include Chechnya (1999), Serbian Krajina (1995), Biafra (1970), and South Katanga (1963). Peaceful reintegration has also been rare (Anjouan 2008, Bougainville 1997, Gagauzia 1994, Republika Srpska 1995). Additionally, the existing literature argues that gaining independence is very difficult for de facto states. But the empirical evidence suggests that graduating to independence is as common as a military loss or a negotiated settlement. To date, five de facto states have graduated to full independence (i.e., Eritrea 1993, East Timor 2002, Montenegro 2006, Kosovo 2008, and South Sudan 2011). The most common outcome for de facto states is a stalemate. That is, in most cases de facto states maintain the status quo and are neither defeated nor reintegrated into the parent state. Eiki Berg and Raul Toomla argue in favour of maintaining the status quo when it comes to the question of de facto states.10 They note that “the status quo may offer various forms of normalisation even when legal recognition has not been granted. Especially, when the political nature of the ‘recognition game’ leaves no space for evolving opportunity structures and does not enable de facto states to legalize their practices.”11 Svante Cornell dispels the long-held notion that autonomy can mitigate ethnic tensions between a minority and its parent state. Cornell examines the role of an autonomous framework in reducing conflict between Eurasia’s de facto entities and the parent states. He concludes, “autonomy has been a source of conflict and not a solution to it  … secessionism is likely to be significantly higher among autonomous minorities than among nonautonomous minorities.”12 Aside from Berg and Toomla, much of the emerging literature overlooks the idea of the status quo as a potential solution. This book demonstrates that de facto statehood, or the status quo, can be a real medium- to long-term solution for some de facto states. Given the international community’s reluctance to recognize these entities and

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the parent state’s inability to forcibly reintegrate them, it is possible for these entities to continue to function as de facto states. NagornoKarabakh, a de facto state in Azerbaijan, for example, has turned its focus away from gaining recognition in favour of internal development. Its leadership believes that its de facto “status is sustainable and can fulfill [its] goals of security and independence.”13 The case of Taiwan is also illustrative. Taiwan has functioned as a de facto state for four decades with a functioning democracy and a strong economy. In a poll conducted in Taiwan in 2009, more than 60 per cent of the population over the age of twenty voted for maintaining the “status quo.”14 Taiwan is not the only case in which the status quo is appealing. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has functioned as a de facto state for over three decades, while Iraqi Kurdistan, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh have done so for over two decades. Under the right conditions, de facto statehood can provide stability for the parent state and neighbouring states. To be sure, some de facto states will aspire to independence and others will exhibit varying degrees of the features stipulated in the above definition. Using this definition, the main aim of this book is to explain why Iraqi Kurdistan has not become an independent state. As a starting point, in an effort to better understand Iraqi Kurdistan, Kosovo, South Sudan, and other de facto states, the book draws on theories from IR to examine the emergence and behaviour of these entities.

T h e o r iz in g D e F ac to States: Reali s m, Con s t ru c t iv is m , a n d L ib e ral I nsti tuti onali sm The central premise of all realist theories is that “the existence of several states in anarchy renders the security of each one problematic and encourages them to compete with each other for power or security.”15 As a consequence of this insecurity, international politics is viewed as a “self-help” system where states cannot rely on others for protection. Power and its acquisition are essential for political actors to survive in an anarchic international system.16 In the international system, states are functionally similar in that they defend their territory, provide services, and engage in political and economic relations with other states, but differ in their capabilities. The relative distribution of power is therefore a key variable for understanding issues in world politics.

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Under these conditions, the behaviour of de facto states would be very similar to the behaviour of sovereign states. They will prioritize security and survival. These imperatives are thrust upon them by the self-help system. Thus, according to realist assumptions, de facto state preference for statehood is a necessary response to the anarchic international system. Institutional arrangements such as federalism and autonomy are unlikely to produce cooperation between the de facto state and the parent state. As a response to these challenges, a de facto state must possess sufficient capabilities to simultaneously defend itself against the parent state and pursue independence. Constructivism largely accepts the statist approach of realism but disagrees with the implications of anarchy for the preference formation and interests of states.17 Alexander Wendt argues that the notion of self-help is a result of the interaction between states rather than a condition of anarchy.18 Wendt notes that “structure has no existence or causal powers apart from process. Self-help and power politics are institutions, not essential features of anarchy.”19 Constructivists view identity through the lens of Benedict Anderson’s notion of “imagined communities.” Anderson argues that modernization, including advancement in technology and a modern economic ­system, made it possible for individuals to conceive of a larger and imagined ethnic community. Modernity provides groups with a wider communal base and institutionalizes ethnicity.20 Although these communities are constructed, constructivists recognize that ethnicity is an enduring idea and difficult to dismantle once it grows deep roots.21 Constructivists also view identity and ethnicity as an instrument that can be exploited by elites. From this view, ethnicity can be a purely instrumental tool used by elites for political or economic goals.22 Constructivist assumptions offer valuable insights into the emergence of de facto states. In particular, the idea that leaders of ethnic groups use nationalism as a pretext for advancing their personal interests is helpful for understanding the relationship between political groups and their leaders. Still, constructivism, as it relates to ethnic conflict and de facto states, has two primary weaknesses. First, nationalist identities cannot simply be created without a historical foundation with which to work. That ethnic groups have deep-rooted cultural and historical beliefs demonstrates that nations have ancient ties that bind their members. Consequently, while realism ignores the role of agency, constructivism overstates its impact. Similarly, like realism,

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constructivism overlooks the role of interests and material factors in explaining the behaviour of ethnic groups and the emergence of de facto states. Ethnic entrepreneurs would not be successful at mobilizing ethnic groups for war or secession if those groups are economically and politically content. Institutionalism also sheds light on the origins of de facto states. Like states, ethnic groups cannot ignore institutions, interests, and the preferences of their members. To explain ethnic conflict and the origins of de facto states, institutionalists emphasize the institutional demands and material interests of groups. They maintain that when ethnic groups face an oppressive parent state and they do not possess the political and economic institutions necessary for protecting their interests, they will often turn to violence. In other words, according to institutionalists, ethnic groups view violence as a last resort and as a response to the parent state’s unwillingness to make concessions.23 The basic institutional argument is that political institutions play a significant role in either mitigating or causing ethnic conflict.24 Institutionalism argues that ethnically diverse societies require political institutions that can manage the differences and mitigate tensions. That is, ethnic pluralism requires political institutions that lessen tensions related to sharing political power and economic resources. The crux of the argument is that there are clear links between ethnic conflict or peace, on the one hand, and political institutions, on the other. For example, Arend Lijphart argues that consociational power-sharing can reduce ethnic conflict by instituting compromise between elites.25 Others, including Brendan O’Leary and John McGarry, have argued that some form of federalism can mitigate ethnic conflict and the demand for secession.26 Secession is defined as “an attempt by an ethnic group claiming a homeland to withdraw with its territory from the authority of a larger state of which it is a part.”27 Although there are cases of groups demanding full independence (e.g., Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia), there are also cases of groups demanding autonomy. One of the reasons that autonomy is more desirable than secession is that secession is much more difficult to achieve. One barrier to secession is the high costs associated with it. For instance, Robert Young argues that seceding from an advanced industrial economy could impose heavy economic costs on the secessionist entity.28 In such cases, secession is a matter of costs and benefits and secession becomes

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13

unattractive when the government can impose “large costs on citizens” (including those who want to secede) and “all citizens and firms must be fearful of transition costs.”29 It is also worth mentioning that independence is not the goal of all nationalist movements. Michael Keating notes that independence is “only one possible outcome of the national claim and that there are many other constitutional formulas that can accommodate it.”30 In its place, a number of formulas have emerged, including autonomy and independence lite, which maintain the unity of the parent state. Another impediment to secession is that the domestic and international traditional paradigm in dealing with secessionist movements is governed by a “disapproval of secession.” A possible explanation is that a lowered threshold for secession would motivate an inordinate number of discontented minorities to seek independence.31 This would produce serious consequences. Governments fear that they too could face the threat of secession and therefore oppose unilateral secessions. In addition, they recognize that unilateral secessions would create international instability, particularly in view of the correlation between secession and violence.32 Disapproval of secession is particularly strong when it is unilateral; that is, without the consent of or an agreement with the parent state.33 The disapproval against unilateral secession is highlighted by domestic and international laws, which emphasize the indivisibility of state sovereignty.34 Stéphane Dion notes that although there is not an international law against unilateral secession, this does not suggest that there is a “positive right to secession” that would compel governments to accept or recognize a unilateral secession.35 In addition to the domestic laws and international norms against secession, Dion notes that states are “extremely reluctant” to recognize unilateral secession unless it falls under decolonization.36 Given the challenges associated with secession, it is not uncommon for ethnic groups to request/ demand political autonomy. As mentioned earlier, there are alternative political arrangements other than independence that can settle the status of de facto states. This is supported by the empirical data. Liam Anderson identifies three possible outcomes for de facto states: independence, forced reintegration, and peaceful reintegration.37 A fourth possible resolution to de facto states is the status quo – continuing to function as a de facto state.38 One proponent of this solution is Scott Pegg, who argues that

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“one distinct possibility for these entities is a continuation of the status quo.”39 The status quo is also implicitly outlined by Pal Kolstø who suggests a federal arrangement with the parent state as a way for resolving the conflict.40 Kolstø argues that a federal arrangement tends to foster the least tension between the various factions. John McGarry, meanwhile, proposes “a negotiated re-entry resulting in a decentralized federal system combined with consociational power-sharing.”41 Others such as Eiki Berg argue that the federal structures put in place to preserve a state, often encourages the “formation of territorial administrative structures which lack democratic governance and/or do not represent the will of sovereign people.”42 Martin Dent counters Berg and calls for the decentralization of states that encompass a region/group of people who wish for independent statehood. That is, secessionist groups must be afforded with a “status” that is something like statehood. He argues that “this status must have something of the same discrete nature as independent statehood, it cannot be just a bit more autonomy.”43 For instance, Dent argues against the breakup of Iraq. Instead, he calls for a federal or “super-federal” system, which, according to him, is “entirely compatible with national unity.”44 De facto state behaviour is a reflection of the interaction between domestic pressures, economic interests, and political institutions. Such states must possess a certain degree of security, but it is not the main consideration. The case studies in this volume demonstrate that de facto states are willing to forgo independence if their economic and political demands are met by the parent state. Institutional frameworks such as autonomy, power-sharing, and federalism can encourage otherwise secessionist groups to reconsider independence. Economic interests also contribute to a de facto state’s behaviour vis-à-vis the parent state and its decision regarding independence. The appropriate institutional arrangement and economic incentives from such an arrangement can convince the de facto states to reintegrate with the parent state. Finally, the governments of de facto states must, to some degree, consider the demands and interests of its domestic population and groups. De facto states’ political parties and governments cannot ignore the feedback from citizens, elites, and other interest and societal groups. These factors can facilitate cooperation between the de facto state and the parent state to preserve the unity of the state. Democracy and its associated institutions are significant in maintaining the unity of

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15

ethnically divided states. Research has demonstrated that secession from well-established democracies (i.e., states with “at least ten consecutive years of universal suffrage”) is rare.45 The reason, according to Stéphane Dion, is that well-established democracies are unlikely to engender fear in the union and confidence in secession simultaneously.46 Fear refers to a group’s concern for its culture, language, and economic and political situation in the union and confidence is a group’s belief that it will be better off by seceding from the union.47 According to institutionalist assumptions, therefore, preferences are neither predetermined nor fixed. Instead, preferences are contingent on and shaped by economic interests, institutional design, and domestic and international politics. De facto state preferences, therefore, are not fixed and, as with other political entities, de facto states behave in a rational way to advance their interests within the framework of the anarchic structure of the international system. Neither nationalism nor the dream of statehood will compel de facto states to behave in a way that is counter to their interests and long-term objectives. We can conclude by saying that under the right political and economic conditions de facto states will cooperate with the parent state and shelve the goal of independence. In addition to these general I R theories, it is also worth discussing the literature on paradiplomacy as it relates to de facto states. The concepts of paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy provide insights into the practice of the foreign policy activities of non-state actors such as regions, provinces, territories, states, and entities such as de facto states. The former can be defined as “a sub-state’s international ­policies that could be parallel, coordinated, or complementary to the central government’s [policies], but could also conflict with the country’s international policies and politics.”48 In other words, the entity ­possesses formal authority to engage in diplomatic activities abroad. This form of diplomacy is common and has become a more or less permanent feature of the international system. Examples include Scotland, Catalonia, and Quebec. It differs from protodiplomacy, which describes the activities of subnational governments that are attempting to lay the groundwork for separation and recognition from governments.49 Paquin defines protodiplomacy as “international strategies designed to promote diplomatic recognition as a way of preparing the establishment of a sovereign country.”50 The two can co-exist simultaneously – the three examples listed earlier have all expressed

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their aspirations for independence. In other words, they engage in paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy along parallel tracks. In examining advanced industrial societies (i.e., Europe and North America), Panayotis Soldatos notes that a subnational unit may pursue its own foreign policy when it has become disenchanted with the central government’s foreign policy.51 When confronted with such a scenario, the federal government could further decentralize power to remedy the potential crisis between the subnational unit and the central government and to promote efficiency and unity.52 This process can reduce conflict and promote cooperation between the central government and the subnational government. But what about cases of paradiplomacy in non-advanced industrial societies where parallel foreign policies are at odds and spark conflict? The actions of Iraqi Kurdistan in this regard constitute non-­ traditional diplomacy – that is, paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy. Since 2005, Iraqi Kurdistan has officially, and within the framework of the Iraqi constitution, forged foreign relations with sovereign states. Iraqi Kurdistan’s paradiplomacy, exercised with tacit approval from Baghdad, includes forging economic and political relations with corporations and governments. This includes oil contracts with companies such as Chevron, ExxonMobil, and Gazprom, and diplomatic relations with countries such as the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), Turkey, China, and Russia. At the same time, Iraqi Kurdistan engages in what we have described as protodiplomacy. It is host to more than twenty permanent offices of foreign governments and the Kurdistan Regional Government (krg) has an official presence in more than one dozen countries. This protodiplomacy is often at odds with the foreign policy of Iraq and indeed undermines the authority of the central government’s foreign policy objectives. The conventional view is that Iraqi Kurdistan is engaging in protodiplomacy to secure international support for independence. But according to Yoosef Zadeh and Sherko Kirmanj, Iraqi Kurdistan’s paradiplomacy is not driven by the desire for independent statehood.53 They note that “secessionist rhetoric is more for domestic end: for gaining local support or perhaps for redirecting public focus away from internal issues and crises that face the Kurdistan Regional Government (k r g ).”54 The conclusion is that the k r g ’s foreign policy is aimed at promoting the Kurdish identity and creating a clear distinction between Kurdish history, culture, language from the rest of Iraq. Zadeh and Kirmanj conclude that Iraqi

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17

Kurdistan faces too many obstacles to achieve independent statehood. They include internal divisions between the two key political parties in Iraqi Kurdistan: The Kurdistan Democratic Party (k d p ) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (puk), its struggling economy, opposition from Baghdad and regional powers such as Turkey and Iran, and opposition from key countries such as the US, the UK, and the European governments.55 These ideas are explored in greater detail in the subsequent chapters.

M e t h o d o logy This book combines a detailed case study of Iraqi Kurdistan with a comparative historical analysis of South Sudan and Kosovo. Given the small number of cases, the aim of this book is to identify probabilistic rather than universal generalizations. The ultimate objective is to understand and explain the case of Iraqi Kurdistan by drawing comparisons and insights from the other two cases. This book uses within-case analysis and the comparative method of the most similar systems design.56 This method allows researchers to identify and thoroughly measure the pertinent indicators and concepts, it allows for the identification of new variables, and it identifies the causal mechanisms or intervening variables responsible for an outcome.57 The book also includes primary research in the form of interviews. The persons interviewed in this work are all officials in Iraqi Kurdistan. In total, I completed four fieldwork trips to the cities of Dohuk, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah in Iraqi Kurdistan and conducted interviews with over thirty governmental and nongovernmental officials. Interviewees included cabinet ministers of k r g, members of the regional parliament, leaders of political parties, journalists, academics, and officials from nongovernmental organizations (ngos). In addition, I observed the Kurdish regional election held in September 2013 and the Iraqi federal elections held in April 2014 and May 2018 as an official observer for the Independent High Electoral Commission of Iraq. The fieldwork provided me with valuable insights into the political, social, cultural, and religious issues and attitudes in Iraqi Kurdistan. The interviews provided me with the opportunity to raise direct questions about Iraqi Kurdistan’s political status and independence ambitions to the leaders and decision-makers of Iraqi Kurdistan. Iraqi Kurdistan is selected for two reasons. First, although the existing literature has produced valuable insights into the emergence and

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evolution of de facto states, there is a growing but still relatively modest literature on the political status of Iraqi Kurdistan.58 Specifically, the literature has not explained why Iraqi Kurdistan has not declared independence. It is an outlier of sorts and as such, it warrants closer examination and analysis. Given the similar historical experiences as South Sudan and Kosovo, the Kurds of Iraq should be equally ­committed to independence. This book attempts to shed light on this seemingly puzzling behaviour. Second, since the emergence of the Islamic State (is) (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant [isil] and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria [isis]) in 2014, Iraqi Kurdistan has become an important and strategic political player in the Middle East. It was one of the key political and military actors that repelled the expansion of is in Iraq and Syria. As an indicator of its strategic standing, Iraqi Kurdistan has become a regular attendee at regional and international economic and security forums.59 It is therefore important for researchers, analysts, and government policymakers to understand the behaviour of Iraqi Kurdistan. Kosovo and South Sudan are selected because they share important similarities with each other and an important difference with Iraqi Kurdistan. In addition to having relatively recent declarations of independence, both cases represent economically poor regions with ineffective security and political apparatuses. Both territories are landlocked and economically weak, factors that contribute to challenges associated with independent statehood. South Sudan’s infrastructure is ruined, its economy is one of the weakest in the world, it relies solely on oil for its revenue, and it has been embroiled in a civil war since 2013. Kosovo’s infrastructure was damaged during the 1999 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (n ato ) bombings against Serbian forces and the nascent state faces issues of corruption, poor management, and weak economic and bureaucratic systems. Despite these economic and political weaknesses, both Kosovo and South Sudan declared independence but Iraqi Kurdistan has not. What accounts for these differing outcomes?

O u t l in e o f t h e Chapters This book consists of six more chapters. In chapter 2, the book examines the case of Kosovo. It outlines the conditions that were necessary for Kosovo to remain with Serbia and Serbia’s failure to meet these conditions. I also explain Kosovo’s decision to unilaterally

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declare independence in 2008. The chapter begins by tracing Kosovo’s early history and then examining the political relationship between Kosovo and Serbia from the twentieth century. Next, it outlines the international community’s decision to intervene in the conflict, which led to the emergence of Kosovo as a de facto state. I then examine the factors that shaped Kosovo’s decision-making during its de facto status and led to its ultimate decision to unilaterally declare independence. In chapter 3, this book examines the case of South Sudan. It identifies the conditions that allowed South Sudan to break away from Sudan through a constitutionally sanctioned referendum. The chapter also outlines the political and economic factors that initiated the breakup of Sudan. It opens with a historical account of Sudan and South Sudan. I then discuss how the early history and political makeup of Sudan played a major role in the conflict. Specifically, I try to show that the early political and economic institutions of Sudan were responsible for the discontent in the South and the outbreak of the first civil war in 1955. I argue that South Sudan ultimately seceded from Sudan because of flawed political institutions, too few economic incentives, and the presence of the old regime in Khartoum. In chapter 4, I introduce the case of Iraqi Kurdistan. It begins by providing a summary of Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan’s early history. Like Sudan, the early history of Iraq highlights the importance of institutional design in a multiethnic society. Iraq’s political and economic institutions excluded the Kurdish population and successive regimes in Baghdad adopted oppressive and heavy-handed policies in response to Kurdish requests for political rights. Next, I examine the emergence of Iraqi Kurdistan as a de facto state in 1991 following three decades of political and military conflict between the Kurds and Baghdad. I illustrate that the intervention by the US and the UK, and the role of the United Nations (u n ) and its Oil-for-Food Programme, were imperative for the emergence and survival of Iraqi Kurdistan as a de facto state. In chapter 5, the book examines the behaviour of Iraqi Kurdistan during two time periods: The first period covers 2005 to June 2014 and the second period covers June 2014 to the end of 2016. The chapter outlines the reasons for Iraqi Kurdistan’s decision to forgo independence in favour of a continued union with Iraq during these periods. In doing so, I argue that Iraq’s post-2005 constitution furnished the Kurds with sufficient autonomy, significant economic

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incentives, and a democratic political system that provided the Kurds with a forum for advancing their interests. In chapter 6, the book provides an explanation for Iraqi Kurdistan’s decision to hold an independence referendum in 2017. It begins by outlining the political and economic factors between June 2014 to November 2017 that propelled Iraqi Kurdistan toward the referendum. I then examine the ways in which Baghdad’s policies, in particular those of the former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, generated fear in Iraqi Kurdistan. The Kurds were suspicious of Baghdad for failing to implement the Iraqi constitution and for reneging on promises to treat the Kurds as partners in a democratic Iraq. I contend that the independence referendum was not a genuine effort to separate from Baghdad. Instead, I argue that the referendum was a political tool to gain leverage over Baghdad with the objective of renegotiating the union between Iraqi Kurdistan and the rest of Iraq. Chapter 7 provides a conclusion for the book. This chapter begins by summarizing the main questions and arguments of this book. That is followed by an examination of whether the model outlined in the book explains other cases of de facto states. Lastly, I examine the implications of the findings for Iraqi Kurdistan and ask whether these factors could shape Iraqi Kurdistan’s flirtation with independence.

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2 Kosovo

Kosovo presents interesting comparative insights into the behaviour of de facto states. It is a landlocked entity with weak political institutions and an anemic economy. Yet it unilaterally declared independence in 2008. This raises a number of questions, beginning with the factors driving Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence. What explains Kosovo’s decision to declare independence when it did not possess the institutional or economic capacity to function as an independent state, and why did it do so even though, in 2007, Serbia offered considerable political autonomy? These questions become more interesting when Kosovo is compared to Iraqi Kurdistan. Kosovo’s decision will be explained by examining the role of political institutions, the lack of economic incentives, and international factors. The existing literature argues that the goal of independence in and of itself is sufficient for explaining the decision-making of de facto states. A close examination of the case reveals that, although this explanation provides important insights, it does not fully explain the outcome of Kosovo. After all, Kosovo did not always seek outright independence. Indeed, it was willing, even if reluctantly, to participate in a federation with Serbia until the early 1990s. In this chapter, I make the argument that Serbia’s unwillingness to furnish Kosovo with sufficient political autonomy and eventual support from the international community influenced Kosovo’s decision to declare independence. Kosovo emerged as a de facto state following an international intervention in Serbia by the United Nations (un), the European Union (e u ), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (n ato ). In the 1990s, the international community hoped to resolve the increasingly violent dispute between the Kosovar Albanians, including its Kosovo

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Liberation Army (k l a ), and Serbia.1 In 1999, n ato presented the then Serbian President Slobodan Miloševi´c with an ultimatum: to withdraw Serbian forces from Kosovo or to face n ato military forces.2 Despite international pressure, Miloševic´ refused to accept the terms of a negotiated settlement. n ato intervened militarily and established a protectorate in Kosovo.3 These events were followed by negotiations between the EU, the US, and Russia, intended to resolve the future status of Kosovo. It was revealed in February 2007 that, in an effort to prevent the secession of Kosovo, Serbia would be willing to concede significant autonomy to Kosovo.4 Such an arrangement would have provided Kosovo with a high degree of autonomy under the framework of a federal Serbia. It meant that the Assembly of Kosovo could govern the province autonomously, but Belgrade would reserve the right to oversee foreign and defence policy.5 Kosovo rejected this offer. This refusal demonstrated that it was committed to the goal of independence and its political leadership identified the lack of mutually acceptable terms as the reason behind its unwillingness to continue with a political arrangement with Serbia.6 Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence divided the international community on the issues of international law and secession. Close to a hundred un member states conferred recognition, but over eighty u n member states refused to recognize Kosovo. Many states such as Cyprus, Argentina, Spain, Greece, and Singapore feared that Kosovo’s secession and recognition could set a dangerous precedent for future secessions, especially by their own secessionist groups. Brazil, Vietnam, China, and Russia cited the principle of territorial integrity and the breach of international law for their unwillingness to recognize Kosovo. States that conferred recognition argued that Kosovo was a unique case and therefore it did not establish a precedent for future secessions. These states further noted that Kosovo’s secession was justified based on its unique historical experience and the human rights violations it suffered.

K o s ovo ’ s E a r ly Hi story Kosovo is a territory in southeastern Europe bordered by North Macedonia in the southeast, Albania in the southwest, Montenegro in the west, and Serbia in the north and east. There are competing narratives for the historical ownership of Kosovo. Kosovar Albanians

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trace their ancestry to the ancient Illyrian tribes who inhabited the territory before the arrival of Serbs.7 This historical connection allows Kosovar Albanians to lay claim to modern-day Kosovo. At the same time, Serbians trace their origins to the fourteenth-century medieval Serbian Empire, which included Kosovo. The Serbian Empire absorbed and converted many Albanians to the Serbian Orthodox Church, and Albanians and Serbs fought together against attacks from the Ottoman Empire. The “Battle of Kosovo” in 1389 signalled the decline of the Serbian kingdom and, more importantly, paved the way for Ottoman expansion into the Balkan region.8 For Serbians, the Battle of Kosovo represents a symbolic threat to their identity and nationalists often reference this battle to mobilize support for maintaining the unity of Serbia.9 Kosovo is significant for Serbia because of the presence of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Serbian view that it is the “cradle of Serbia.”10 Kosovo was under Ottoman control from the fifteenth to the twentieth century. During this time, its religious and demographic makeup was altered in favour of the Albanian population.11 As a consequence, in response to the Serbs’ historical claims to the territory, the Kosovar Albanians pointed not only to their version of history but also to their majority population and changes in the demographics.12 Under the Ottoman reign, a significant number of Serbs, estimated at 185,000, migrated north into Serbia proper – a move that significantly reduced the Serbian population in Kosovo.13 The demographics shifted again in the late nineteenth century with the arrival of approximately 155,000 Albanians to Kosovo.14 These demographic changes became significant when the Ottoman Empire was defeated and Kosovo fell under Serbian rule.15 The contemporary conflict between the Kosovar Albanians and Serbia emerged in the early twentieth century.16 Kosovo remained under Serbian rule following World War I and after the creation of Yugoslavia in 1929.17 By the end of World War II, the Albanian population viewed Kosovo as its native homeland and believed that its proper place was with greater Albania.18 In 1939, Benito Mussolini’s Italy invaded and captured a large ­territory in the Balkans to form Greater Albania, which included Kosovo and western Macedonia. From 1939 to1943, large numbers of Albanians settled in Kosovo, while large numbers of the Serbian population were forcibly expelled from their homes, further widening the demographic disparity.19 Italy’s capitulation in 1943 led to the

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collapse of Greater Albania and paved the way for the emergence of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (s f ry) under Josip Broz Tito. In 1945, Kosovo became a constituent of the sfry and was recognized as an autonomous region of the republic of Serbia, a position which the Kosovar Albanians found unacceptable. They believed that Kosovo ought to possess the same degree of sovereignty as the six republics – that is, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia – that constituted the s f ry. Kosovo’s minority status in the federation meant less political and economic power than the officially recognized republics.20 Throughout the 1950s, this unequal status prompted the Kosovars to request recognition as a nation equal to the other republics.21 These appeals were rejected on the grounds that republic status would pave the way for Kosovo to secede from Yugoslavia in order to join neighbouring Albania.22 Although some Kosovars desired a union with Albania, others hoped for independence, while many preferred a republic status within the sfry.23 From the early 1960s until the implementation of the Yugoslav Federal Constitution of 1974, Yugoslavia underwent political reforms that provided the republics with increased indepen­ dence. While Kosovo was granted more autonomy, its demands for republic status were ignored.24 Extended autonomy was insufficient from Kosovo’s perspective as it did not include the right to selfdetermination and more autonomy did little to improve Kosovo’s poor economic position.25 As a result, Kosovo’s political and economic grievances intensified in the early 1980s.

K o s ovo In t e n s if ies Demands f o r R e p u b l ic S tatus This section outlines the emergence of Kosovo’s preference for independence and the conditions that were necessary, but ultimately not present, for Kosovo to remain with Serbia. Granting republic status to Kosovo could have reduced political tensions and the violence between the Kosovars and Serbia. Rather than accommodating Kosovo’s requests for republic status, in 1989 Serbia repealed Kosovo’s autonomous status and thereby pushed Kosovo to view independence as the only viable solution to the political conflict. One of the main consequences of the instability brought on by Tito’s death in 1980 was the rise of Albanian nationalism and the backlash against the Serbian population in Kosovo. The ethnic tensions forced

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many Serbians in Kosovo to leave and resettle in Serbia proper. Once again, this dramatically altered Kosovo’s demographics in favour of the Albanian population.26 While the Albanian proportion of Kosovo’s population soared from 67 per cent in 1967 to 84 per cent in 1991, the Serbian population decreased from 27 per cent to 10 per cent during the same period.27 This demographic shift fuelled fears of the disintegration of Serbia.28 Kosovo’s renewed demands for autonomy and republic status were initiated by student demonstrations in 1981.29 The unrest was exacerbated by the worsening economic conditions of the Kosovar Albanians.30 The protests were initially conducted by students demanding improved conditions at the universities, but they also included miners, teachers, and civil servants.31 When the demonstrations turned violent, the federal government declared a state of emergency and arrested the suspected leaders of the protests.32 According to Julie Mertus, the demonstrations were organized by a group of educated Kosovar Albanians that demanded greater political autonomy for Kosovo.33 The main grievance was Serbia’s unwillingness to bestow republic status on Kosovo.34 From Serbia’s perspective, there was a fear that recognizing Kosovo as a republic would set a precedent for the other federal units and that this would ultimately lead to the collapse of the federation.35 In addition, as we have seen earlier, Kosovo’s historical significance to Serbia should not be understated. Most Serbs view Kosovo as Serbian land and believe it must remain so. Political and ethnic tensions between Kosovar Albanians and Serbs increased during the mid- to the late 1980s. Serbian president, Slobodan Miloševi´c, exploited nationalist sentiments and the political crisis in the former Yugoslavia by arguing that Serbia deserved more power within Yugoslavia. Miloševi´c played a prominent role in the deterioration of relations between Kosovo and Serbia. He was the president of the Socialist Republic of Serbia from 1989 to 1991, president of Serbia from 1991 to 1997, and the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1997 to 2000. Academics generally agree that Miloševi´c was a political opportunist who exploited the Kosovo issue for his personal power.36 For their part, Serbian officials accused the Kosovar population of using terror tactics, including murder, rape, and the desecration of Serbian churches and cemeteries to drive the Serbian population from Kosovo.37 In response to the violence, Miloševi´c and his government

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continued policies that, from the Kosovar Albanian perspective, were intended to weaken Kosovo’s autonomy. Beginning in the late 1980s, Miloševi´c replaced Kosovo’s provincial leadership with his own representatives, undertook reforms that rescinded Kosovo’s right to pass legislation, and finally, in 1990, placed Kosovo directly under Serbian rule by abolishing its constitutional powers.38 These measures were accompanied by a strong police presence and the legal repression by the Serbian state as well as Serbian oversight of political and economic decisions in Kosovo.39 Instead of furnishing Kosovo with more political autonomy and promoting economic development, Miloševi´c imposed further centralization.40 This is the period in which the preference of many Kosovars begins to shift from a high degree of autonomy to outright independence. This is evidenced by the emergence of the Democratic League of Kosovo (ldk or Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës in Albanian). Founded in 1989 as a pan-Albanian nationalist movement, the l d k initially called for autonomy for Kosovo and, by 1990, demanded equal status to the other republics.41 The leader of the ldk, Ibrahim Rugova, was a Paris-trained academic and regarded as a Gandhi-like figure for his unrelenting but peaceful efforts to secure Kosovo’s political rights.42 Rugova established a non-violent movement to achieve Kosovo’s independence and worked to establish ties with Western Europe and the US.43 In 1990, Rugova and other Kosovar leaders, including elected officials from Kosovo’s provincial assembly, responded to Miloševic´’s policies by unilaterally declaring Kosovo a republic within Yugoslavia – separate from Serbia but still a constituent of Yugoslavia. 44 In a subsequent 1991 referendum on the issue of sovereignty and indepen­ dence, boycotted by the Serbian population in Kosovo, over 99 per cent of Kosovars supported independence.45 This was followed by a ­declaration of independence by Kosovo’s parliament, a move that was rejected by Serbia and Yugoslavia.46 All of this unfolded in the midst of Yugoslavia’s disintegration. Following the secession of Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the s f ry collapsed and was succeeded by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, renamed Serbia-Montenegro in 2003. The new republic, formed by Serbia and Montenegro, did not recognize Kosovo as a republic nor did it furnish Kosovo with self-governance over its political, economic, or cultural affairs.47

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In 1992, Kosovo organized and held parliamentary and presidential elections and, under the leadership of the l d k, it began to establish its own political and social institutions.48 At the time, the international community was unwilling to recognize Kosovo’s independence. After all, Serbia’s cooperation was necessary for resolving the Balkan wars and the e u did not want to destabilize the Balkans any further by recognizing Kosovo.49 Despite this rebuff, the Kosovar Albanians began to view independence as the only viable solution to their conflict with Serbia.50 The disintegration of Yugoslavia further heightened Serbia’s trepidation and, at the same time, intensified Kosovo’s desire to follow the path of the other republics toward independence. In response to the deteriorating situation in Yugoslavia, an “International Contact Group,” comprising the US, Russia, France, Germany, Italy, and the UK, was established to manage the conflict. This group would later mediate the final status negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia from 2004 to 2008. Despite the violence and unrest in the Balkans, the situation in Kosovo and Serbia was largely contained in the early 1990s. Kosovo’s political parties, led by the l d k , adopted a peaceful approach to achieving their political objectives.51 There were primarily two reasons for this. First, the Kosovo leadership understood that it did not possess the military capabilities to seriously challenge Serbia. Second, as mentioned earlier, the Kosovars were inspired by the notion of peaceful resistance and democratization taking hold in Eastern Europe.52 This peace, however, was short-lived. The Dayton Accords, signed in 1995, ended the war in Bosnia, but ignored Kosovo’s demands for a political solution to its conflict with Serbia. Many Kosovar Albanians viewed this as unacceptable and did not believe that the status quo of Serbian dominance could be overcome with Rugova’s peaceful approach. By the mid-1990s, ethnic and political tensions turned violent in Kosovo and sparked the emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army (kl a or Ushtria çlirimtare e Kosovës [u çk] in Albanian).53 In 1996, the k l a attacked Serbian security forces stationed in Kosovo, initiating a period of violent struggle between Kosovo and Serbia. The kla did this in part to attract the attention of the international community in an effort to garner political and military support. The k l a further escalated its activities in 1998 in response to the killing of Adem Jashari and his family by Serbian police.54 Jashari was a founding member of the k l a and a popular figure amongst the

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Kosovars. This event encouraged more Kosovars to support the kl a and led to a backlash against Serbia from the international community.55 The effectiveness of the k l a was that the international community came to view it as a “legitimate representative of the Kosovo Albanians,” rather than a terrorist organization.56 One of its major activities was to lobby the European community and the US to intervene in the war – a war that was marred by accusations of ethnic cleansing by the Serbian forces against the Kosovar population.57 Some political parties within Serbia voiced their willingness to provide Kosovo with extensive rights and even autonomy, but Miloševi´c was unwilling to make such concessions. In other words, “Miloševi´c’s central aim was to avoid really weakening Serbia and the federation through either serious autonomy or independence [for Kosovo].”58 In 1998, the U N passed Resolution 1160, which stated that the Kosovo conflict posed a threat to international peace and security, and condemned both sides for their use of violence.59 This move was followed by nato’s call for the cessation of violence and autonomy for Kosovo. While much of the international community’s focus was on the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, the situation in Kosovo deteriorated to the point that Kosovo accused the Serbian military of massive human rights violations and war crimes. The growing number of civilian casualties, such as those in the massacre in the small town of Račak in 1999 where forty-five Kosovar Albanians were killed, highlighted the brutality of the conflict. The violence resulted in a large-scale refugee exodus that prompted a response from the international community.60 Key EU members and the US held the Rambouillet Conference in France, which culminated with the Rambouillet Agreement. The accord was signed in 1999 by the UK, the US, and Albania, but importantly it did not include Serbia or, its key ally, Russia. Under the framework of the agreement, Kosovo would become a nato-administered province within Serbia. Miloševi´c and Serbia rejected the proposal as a violation of Serbia’s territorial integrity and instead called for the presence of unarmed un observers.61 Serbia’s refusal to accept the nato mandate prompted military action to end the war between the kla and Serbian forces. The goal of the three-month nato campaign was to expel Serbian forces from Kosovo and bring in international peacekeepers. The end of the bombing ­campaign brought with it the UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which established a joint body – the Kosovo Force (kfor) and U N Mission in Kosovo (unmik) – to maintain peace in the province.62

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Passed in 1999, Resolution 1244 effectively suspended Serbian administration in Kosovo in favour of the internationally mandated k f o r and u n m i k . Resolution 1244 included a clause outlining the long-term resolution of Kosovo’s status. The resolution was ­contradictory as it simultaneously supported Kosovo’s right to ­self-determination while calling for the preservation of Serbia’s sovereignty.63 Russia and Serbia argued that Kosovo’s secession would be a violation of both international law and Resolution 1244, which called for Kosovo’s autonomy and self-determination but not independence.64 The Kosovar delegation, on the other hand, argued that Serbia had forfeited its right to sovereignty over Kosovo by systematically targeting violence at the civilian population. In addition, the proponents of independence argued that Resolution 1244 and its call for autonomy and self-determination referred to the interim arrangements following Serbia’s expulsion from Kosovo but not the future status of Kosovo.65 From 1999 to 2008, there was little progress regarding the status of Kosovo.66

K o s ovo a n d the Role o f t h e In t e r n at io nal Communi ty Despite the formation and activities of the k l a , Kosovo possessed limited military capabilities from the mid- to the late 1990s. Such capabilities were inferior against the larger Yugoslav army comprising Serbia and Montenegro. However, much like the Iraqi Kurds in 1991, Kosovo was the beneficiary of an international intervention that removed the Serbian military threat and created a de facto state. Following the international intervention in 1999, Kosovo fulfilled all the criteria of de facto statehood. Recall that a de facto state: (a) controls a defined territory, (b) provides an array of services to the population, and (c) enters into diplomatic and economic relations with other states, but (d) does not possess de jure recognition. Under the administration of u n m i k , Kosovo met these criteria. It subsequently held elections for the Kosovo Assembly and formed a unity government. Although Kosovo did not possess the capabilities to achieve de facto statehood and independence, it was successful at garnering international support from the US, EU, UN, and NATO. The actions of the  international community allowed Kosovo to build political ­institutions that would ultimately serve as the foundations of an

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independent state. In addition, the presence of international organizations prevented Serbia from exercising political or military action against Kosovo. These events lend support to the realist assumption that capabilities are important. Without capabilities – albeit in the form of support from the international community – Kosovo could not have established a de facto state in 1999 and it could not have defended its status against a more powerful Serbian military. There is a general consensus among academics that military and political support from the international community encouraged Kosovo to insist on secession from Serbia. Some argue that the decision of the international community to intervene in Kosovo and establish a de facto state helps to explain Kosovo’s intransigence on the independence issue.67 The Kosovars interpreted the intervention and subsequent actions by the international community as tacit support for Kosovo’s right to self-determination.68 For instance, during a US 2005 Senate Committee hearing, the then Senator of Delaware, Joe Biden, indicated that a solution to the conflict would require difficult negotiations and compromises from both sides. He noted that “Serbia … will find a future of frustration and isolation if it persists in clinging to the territorial artifacts of its bloody past. Serbia does not have the political stature or practical ability to govern Kosovo … Independence for Kosovo, when it comes, will come because of Kosovars’ willingness to  seek compromise.”69 In other words, the  Kosovars would be expected to negotiate a divorce with Serbia, but that ultimately Serbia would have to accept the secession of Kosovo. Following repeated breaches of trust on the part of Serbia, the Kosovar leadership overwhelmingly preferred independence to de facto statehood or a federal arrangement with Serbia. In a 2000 interview with the German magazine, Der Spiegel, Ibrahim Rugova indicated that Kosovo would not settle for a political arrangement short of independence, that Resolution 1244 did not preclude Kosovo’s independence, and that “anything other than independence is inconceivable for us.”70 When asked how Kosovo would respond if the international community preserved the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia with Kosovo as an autonomous province, Rugova replied that “there will be another war. All of us, the entire population of Kosovo, will go take up arms.”71 The firm position taken by Rugova and other Kosovars was a response to Serbia’s flawed political institutions, which, from the Kosovar Albanian perspective, were in place to oppress them. Parent

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states that furnished separatist entities with autonomy fared much better in eliminating violence and demands for independence. The political, social, and economic institutions in Serbia were unresponsive to Kosovo’s requests, and Serbia exercised total control over the political status of Kosovo. The combination of these factors coalesced and encouraged Kosovo to demand independence. There was no turning back from this demand despite Serbia’s newfound efforts to persuade Kosovo to forgo independence with offers of extensive autonomy. Kosovo received little economic benefit from the union with Serbia and, in addition, Kosovo’s demands for economic development during protests in 1981 were ignored. As a result, seceding from Serbia did not pose any economic costs to Kosovo and its future economic viability did not depend on Serbia. The international community expected that negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo would settle Kosovo’s uncertain status following a few years of unmi k ’s administration. However, no such progress was made and, instead, unmi k focused on improving the internal conditions of Kosovo while waiting for negotiations to begin.72 In its search for a permanent solution, the international community initiated the Kosovo status process in 2005, led by former Finnish President and un Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari. Negotiations were led by the u n but organized by the contact group (France, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, the UK, and the US), which provided Russia with the ability to play an important role in the final settlement. It was clear that Serbia’s main objective was to preserve its territorial integrity even to the point that it was willing to accept Kosovo’s autonomy and the presence of nato in Kosovo as outlined in the aforementioned Rambouillet Agreement. 73 During the negotiations, Serbia believed Kosovo would be furnished with significant autonomy, but that it would remain in a united Serbia. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, Serbia was willing to equip Kosovo with all the prerogatives of a state except national defence and foreign policy.74 By this point, however, Kosovo was no longer willing to settle for autonomy and insisted on its right to full independence. Although Kosovo willingly participated in the negotiations, it did so regarding issues related to its internal governance and especially the presence of the Serbian population in Kosovo. The opening rounds of negotiations concentrated mainly on technical issues such as minority rights and the powers of municipalities, with little progress related to the status of Kosovo.75

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Serbia pushed for talks on the status of Kosovo and offered “wideranging autonomy for 20 years.”76 A July 2006 meeting scheduled for negotiating Kosovo’s status illustrated the hardened positions taken by Serbian and Kosovar representatives. The former insisted on a decentralized framework and the latter maintained that progress could be achieved only through secession.77 Facing a deadlock, the contact group requested Special Envoy Ahtisaari to prepare a comprehensive proposal regarding the status of Kosovo in order to encourage the negotiations to move forward. Kosovo’s status settlement, therefore, would now be decided largely by the special envoy. Ahtisaari was tasked with presenting an acceptable solution to the conflict. On 26 March 2007, un released his report, entitled the “Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement” also referred to as the “Ahtisaari Plan.” In it, Ahtisaari provided a framework for Kosovo’s political, social, and economic future and encouraged the international community to oversee the implementation of the settlement.78 Although the plan required Kosovo to create a constitution that recognized its multiethnic population and adherence to the rule of law, the proposal also granted Kosovo supervised independence. In the proposal, Ahtisaari said: “I have come to the conclusion that the only viable option for Kosovo is independence, to be supervised for an initial period by the international community. My Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, which sets forth these international supervisory structures, provides the foundations for a future independent Kosovo that is viable, sustainable and stable, and in which all communities and their members can live a peaceful and dignified existence … The international community shall supervise, monitor and have all necessary powers to ensure effective and efficient implementation of this Settlement.”79 Unsurprisingly the plan was rejected by Serbia and Russia and created an impasse at the UN Security Council. Ahtisaari defended his recommendations for Kosovo’s eventual independence by arguing that “Kosovo is a unique case that demands a unique solution. It does not create a precedent for other unresolved conflicts. In unanimously adopting Resolution 1244 (1999), the Security Council responded to Miloševi´c’s actions in Kosovo by denying Serbia a role in its governance, placing Kosovo under temporary United Nations administration and envisaging a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future. The combination of these factors makes Kosovo’s circumstances extraordinary.”80

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He added, “A return of Serbian rule over Kosovo would not be acceptable to the overwhelming majority of the people of Kosovo. Serbia could not regain its authority without provoking violent opposition. Autonomy of Kosovo within the borders of Serbia – however notional such autonomy may be – is simply not tenable.”81 Ahtisaari’s recommendation for supervised independence satisfied Kosovo’s short-term demand for independence given that full independence was regarded as merely a matter of time. The period of international supervision was meant to provide Kosovo with the time to develop its political institutions and to allow for Kosovo and Serbia to negotiate the transition to Kosovo’s full independence. Few were surprised when in February 2008, Kosovo unilaterally declared independence. Although the Ahtisaari Plan did not provide a definitive timeline regarding Kosovo’s supervised independence, it was understood that Kosovo and Serbia would engage in negotiations to find some middle ground before Kosovo’s secession. From Kosovo’s perspective, however, Serbia would never agree to Kosovo’s secession and therefore a mutually acceptable outcome was never within reach. Kosovo’s leadership was undoubtedly buoyed by Ahtisaari’s recommendations and was confident that the US and major EU powers would recognize its declaration of independence. Many of the states that conferred recognition did so based on the notion that Kosovo is a sui generis example.82 The Assembly of Kosovo officially declared independence 17 February 2008 by declaring that “Kosovo is a special case arising from Yugoslavia’s non-consensual breakup and is not a precedent for any other situation … We, the democraticallyelected leaders of our people, hereby declare Kosovo to be an independent and sovereign state. This declaration reflects the will of our people and it is in full accordance with the recommendations of u n Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari and his Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement.”83 Serbia responded by pressuring the u n General Assembly to refer Kosovo’s secession to the International Court of Justice (i c j ) to ­provide an advisory opinion on the legality of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence (u d i ) under international law. The i c j  determined that its task was to resolve only “whether or not [Kosovo’s] declaration of independence is in accordance with international law.”84 The i c j made clear that its decision was about the legality of secession and not the political implications attached to the u d i . By a ten-to-four majority, the i cj concluded that “the

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adoption of the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 did not violate general international law, Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) or the Constitutional Framework. Consequently, the adoption of that declaration did not violate any applicable rule of international law.”85 In making its decision, the i c j did not compel any state to recognize Kosovo and left the political act of recognition to individual governments. The first month of independence highlighted the major issues confronting Kosovo. To date, some of the world’s major powers, including China and Russia, have withheld recognition from Kosovo and tensions between Kosovo and Serbia persist. The main domestic issues were a poor economy, weak political institutions, and the Serbian minority (approximately 70,000) in north Kosovo.86 Serbia’s unwillingness to recognize Kosovo as an independent state also blocks Kosovo’s efforts to join the un.87 By December 2021, more than 110 states had recognized Kosovo, including 108 un member states and 23 eu member states. But more than eighty states, including Russia, China, Spain, Brazil, Argentina, and Greece, had withheld recognition. Given recognition from the large number of governments, one could argue that Kosovo’s independence bid was a success. However, one could also argue that the US’s and the EU’s diplomatic efforts to bring Kosovo into the international community failed given that over 80 states withheld recognition and Kosovo was shunned from large international organizations such as the u n .

E x p l a in in g K o s ovo ’ s I ndependence How did a militarily, institutionally, and economically weak Kosovo secede from Serbia? Despite all the challenges and obstacles, Kosovo unilaterally declared independence in 2008. Without sufficient capabilities, de facto states should not be able to secure independence, and yet Kosovo managed to do so. This book explains that Kosovo acquired the necessary capabilities by securing international support from powerful states such as the US and key EU member states. As a result, its internal weaknesses were less consequential. From 1999 to 2008, Kosovo’s leadership lobbied and worked with the international community to secure the support necessary for Kosovo’s independence. The leadership pursued this policy on two tracks. It made it clear to the international community that a union with Serbia was not an option. It convinced the international

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community, including the U N and its Special Envoy Ahtisaari, that independence was the only real solution to the conflict in Kosovo. And, the Kosovar leaders cooperated with the international community and participated in the negotiations intended to resolve Kosovo’s uncertain status. In doing so, they demonstrated their commitment and willingness to participate with the international community’s efforts at resolving the longstanding issue and persuaded other governments that independence was morally justified and favourable to the instability and violence of the 1990s. We see later that this strategy is a key difference in explaining the diverging outcomes between the case of Kosovo and Iraqi Kurdistan. The Kosovo case partially supports both arguments advanced in the Introduction. Argument one states that a de facto state will pursue independence when the parent state is unwilling to offer sufficient accommodation in the form of autonomy. Secession then becomes a last resort after the parent state has demonstrated an unwillingness to provide the minority group with autonomy. It is true that Kosovars had declared their desire for independence, but they also indicated that they would settle for republic status in a united Serbia. This was true even after Serbia rescinded Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989. However, following a decade of repressive political and economic policies, Kosovo viewed independence as the only way to attain the political and economic rights it desired. Following Serbia’s decision to revoke Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989 and its subsequent decisions to further alienate it, Kosovo could not trust Serbia to uphold its promise of granting it political autonomy. At the same time, the Kosovo case also raises some questions about the validity of this argument if we consider Kosovo’s behaviour post1999. Serbia earnestly offered Kosovo broad autonomy within a federal Serbia during negotiations following the 1999 nato intervention. As we know, Kosovo rejected this offer and it was unwilling to compromise on its status. From Kosovo’s perspective, there was little incentive to settle for autonomy within Serbia when the US and major EU powers were willing to support its bid for independence. In short, independence was more appealing than extensive autonomy within a federal Serbia. We also note that the international community emboldened Kosovo to demand independence. As such, we can conclude that when political autonomy is not granted and international support is present, a de facto state will push for independence. Political support from the US and major EU powers equipped the Kosovar leadership with the political

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support to reject Serbia’s offers of autonomy. In addition, the presence of the un, eu, and nato forces in Kosovo provided the military backing necessary to fend off potential Serbian advances or aggression. On the economic front, because Serbia did not provide much by way of economic benefits, again Kosovo had little incentive to stay in a federal Serbia. Using data collected from the un and the World Bank, appendix 1 presents the economic performance of Kosovo and Serbia from 1990 to 2016.88 Based on these economic indicators, Kosovo stood to gain little from a union with Serbia. Kosovo’s gross domestic product (gdp) grew at an annual rate of 4.1 per cent and 3.4 per cent in 2015 and 2016, respectively. Although these figures were impressive, it did little to improve to Kosovo’s gdp per capita of usd 3,574 and usd 3,661 in 2015 and 2016, respectively. Serbia, meanwhile, experienced modest economic growth and did not possess the economic means to assist Kosovo and thereby entice it to remain in the union. In fact, the data reveals that Kosovo’s g d p per capita was always significantly lower than the rest of Serbia. Unemployment data also show that Kosovo had little to lose by leaving Serbia. Between 2002 and 2007, Kosovo’s unemployment rate was an average of 48 per cent per year.89 During the same period, Serbia’s unemployment rate was less than half of Kosovo’s.90 Because Kosovo functioned under the u n m i k administration, it is difficult to know with certainty what the economic outcome would have been in a union with Serbia. Based on the past, however, we know that one of the main grievances of the Kosovars was that Serbia failed to provide economic development for the region. Under such political and economic conditions, it is difficult to imagine Kosovo being satisfied in a union with Serbia. Finally, we can note one additional contributing factor that pushed Kosovo toward independence. Although Miloševi´c was removed from power in 2000, his successors could not be trusted because former key officials who were responsible for the war against Kosovo retained their positions in Serbia’s secret police and military.91 In short, although moderates replaced the Miloševi´c government, the Kosovars were uneasy about an administration that they felt was “little different from the previous regime.”92

Ko s ovo a n d S e r b ia : L ooki ng Forward Events since the declaration of independence suggest that it may have been a political and economic miscalculation. In an effort to escape the political corruption and poor economic conditions, beginning in

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January 2015, Kosovar Albanians migrated en masse to neighbouring countries.93 There are also challenges associated with Kosovo’s relationship with Serbia. Although the two sides have reached an agreement on border management and Serbia recognizes Kosovo’s vehicle licence plates, tensions remain because of the presence of the Serb minority and the Serbian Orthodox churches and monasteries in Kosovo.94 In resolving Kosovo’s status, the US and the EU had hoped that independence would lead to stability in the Balkans.95 Yet Kosovo’s borders have remained volatile and this continues to impede Kosovo’s economic and political development.96 Ultimately, Kosovo’s independence may have created more problems than it solved. Much of the tension between the two sides was related to the Serbpopulated region of north Kosovo. While it tacitly conceded the areas south of the Ibar River to Kosovo, Serbia hoped to maintain influence over and, if possible, to annex the north. Kosovo, meanwhile, hoped to consolidate its control over the north and secure its border. 97 Kosovo’s northern municipalities therefore represented one of the most serious areas of contention and insecurity between the two sides. By 2011, Kosovo did not possess effective control over the north and the Serb-majority population in the region opposed integration into Kosovo.98 As a result, the north possessed parallel institutions that were Serb-controlled, and Serbia exercised influence over the north largely through financial support.99 Any subsequent attempt to integrate the north into Kosovo’s institutions could exacerbate these tensions. In 2011, a violent clash between the Kosovo police and Serbs at the Kosovo-Serbia border in the north highlighted the potential for instability.100 The eu, for its part, offered Serbia a candidate status in exchange for concessions toward Kosovo. Despite discussions and meetings aimed at improving bilateral relations, Serbia and Kosovo remained divided over the issue of sovereignty and the northern area. The eu -facilitated bilateral talks led to Serbia’s willingness to open its borders to Kosovar documents and goods. In practice, however, Serbia did little to change its behaviour toward Kosovo.101 The e u continued to push for high-level talks in an effort to resolve the ­political impasse. The central issue in these talks would be Kosovo’s status (and its north) and its ability to join regional and international organizations.102 The concern for the e u and Kosovo and Serbia’s neighbours was that the isolated incidents of violence in northern Kosovo could spark widespread ethnic conflict between the Serbs and the Kosovars.

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From Kosovo’s perspective, the political dialogue was meant to complete the process of independence by achieving membership in the un and obtaining recognition from more states. In addition, Kosovo hoped to integrate the northern municipalities into its administration and receive recognition from Serbia.103 Serbia, meanwhile, was willing to accept Kosovo’s administration of the northern territories, if they were furnished with “broad self-governing powers” within a de facto Kosovo.104 In effect, Serbia was attempting to weaken Kosovo’s sovereignty by demanding the establishment of autonomous communities with Serbian majorities. According to its officials, Serbia was unwilling to recognize Kosovo’s udi .105 Despite the challenges, there has also been progress. On 19 April 2013, following meetings chaired by the e u ’s foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton, Kosovo’s Hashim Thaci and Serbia’s Ivica Dacic signed a historic agreement. It was aimed at normalizing relations between Kosovo and Serbia and it was a precondition for Serbia’s eu accession and Kosovo’s partnership with the eu.106 As a result of the landmark agreement, the e u opened accession talks with Serbia in January 2014. Although the e u’s enlargement commissioner, Stefan Fuele, indicated that the Kosovo factor would not be a roadblock, it was largely understood that one of the conditions for Serbia’s admission into the e u would be its recognition of Kosovo,107 an offer that could prove to be the game changer for this relationship. Serbia’s desire to join the European bloc may ultimately shift its stance on Kosovo’s independence, or at least provide a basis from which normal relations could be forged.

C o n c l u s ion This chapter argued that Kosovo’s decision to declare independence from Serbia was the product of Serbia’s unwillingness to make concessions to Kosovo. It made the argument that institutions had a significant effect on the relationship between Kosovo and Serbia. Following the disintegration of Yugoslavia, there emerged an institutional vacuum, which provided Serbia with the opening to impose its political will on the remnants of the former Yugoslav confederation. Kosovo’s demands for political autonomy and the right to self-determination were incompatible with Serbia’s desire to expand its influence and political power in the Balkan region. Without the N ATO -led intervention and political support from the US and the EU, Kosovo could not have established a de facto state

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and it certainly did not possess the capabilities to secede from Serbia. In this case, the role of the international community was particularly important given that Kosovo did not possess any political or military advantage over Serbia. By intervening and governing in Kosovo, the international community sent a signal to both Kosovo and Serbia that it would not tolerate escalation of the conflict. Like the case of Kosovo, the next chapter highlights the importance of institutions and the international community in shaping relations between the de facto state and parent state. The chapter on South Sudan also shows that economic factors played a larger role in the case of South Sudan than Kosovo.

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3 South Sudan

In 2011, as soon as its compact with Sudan ended, South Sudan held a referendum on secession. The South Sudanese voted overwhelmingly for independence. From this, we might infer that the South Sudan’s primary goal was always independence. Upon closer examination, however, it can be argued that certain leadership factions of South Sudan were willing to preserve the unity of Sudan on the condition of a democratic and federal constitution and economic development for South Sudan (also referred to as the South). For decades, leaders of the South requested more autonomy and a federal structure within a united Sudan. Understanding the South’s secession, therefore, requires a careful reading of Sudan’s historical and political turmoil and the relationship between successive regimes in Sudan and the population of the South. South Sudan shares several parallels with Kosovo. Like Kosovo, South Sudan endured a turbulent and bloody history under a central government accused of being oppressive and unresponsive to the South’s political and economic grievances. South Sudan was also poor and underdeveloped and, although it discovered oil reserves, it did not possess the infrastructure to reap the benefits. South Sudan is landlocked, and therefore faces a daunting geopolitical and economic challenge without access to a waterway. Both entities were institutionally weak, and did not possess the capacity to govern effectively. Finally, South Sudan followed Kosovo’s path by seceding from its parent state and declaring independence. Yet, there was an important difference between the two cases: where Kosovo appeared to be determined to gain independence, factions in South Sudan’s leadership made a concerted effort to preserve the unity

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of Sudan. One of the goals of this chapter, therefore, is to identify the reasons for the willingness of some in the South to stay in a united Sudan, for as long as they did, despite decades of civil war. South Sudan also shares similarities with Iraqi Kurdistan. Historically, the South Sudanese and Kurds endured successive oppressive regimes, and both responded with military action to secure political and economic rights. In 2005, both South Sudan and Iraqi Kurdistan agreed to constitutional arrangements with their respective parent state. Much like Iraq’s constitution, Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement (c pa ) outlined broad political autonomy and economic security for South Sudan and provided the South with representation in the capital of Khartoum. South Sudan emerged as a de facto state in 2005 with the signing of the cpa.

S u da n ’ s E a r ly Hi story Sudan is located in northeast Africa and bordered by Egypt, Libya, Chad, the Central African Republic, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. It also has access to the Red Sea on its northeastern border. Sudan is geographically and politically divided between two distinct parts: North and South. It is also culturally and religiously divided between the Arab and Islamicized North and the African and largely traditional South.1 Today, the official language of South Sudan is English, but the people could be categorized into three linguistic groups known as the Sudanic, Western Nilotes, and Eastern Nilotes.2 The South could be described as self-contained tribes divided along linguistic and traditional ties. The 1956 population census of the whole of Sudan, conducted by the British, found that 39 per cent of the population had Arab ancestry, while 30 per cent were Southerners, 13 per cent were Westerners (including Darfur and Kordofan), and the remaining 18 per cent were made up of Nuba, Beja, Nubians, and foreigners.3 Some have referred to South Sudan as a case of “regional nationalism” as opposed to a movement based on ethnic or linguistic nationalism.4 Although the division between Northerners and Southerners is certainly cultural, the key difference is that “one group [North] looks primarily towards the Arab Middle East (i.e., Egypt) and the other [South] mainly towards Africa south of the Sahara.”5 Northerners and Southerners were distinguished by “a sense of belonging which has its roots in history and is conferred by birth.”6 As such, the perception of the Sudan conflict as a struggle between the

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“Arab-Muslim North and the Christian/animist South” is inaccurate.7 Instead, it is argued that the origins of conflict lie in socioeconomic disparities between North and South and the relationship between the Sudanese state and the population in the South.8 Sudan became a Turko-Egyptian colony in the nineteenth century when Muhammad Ali Pasha, the then viceroy of Egypt and later Sudan, conquered much of what is modern-day Sudan. Motivated by the slave trade and hopes of discovering the source of the Nile, Ali Pasha also located the South but he was unable to gain full control of it during his reign.9 From the early- to the mid-nineteenth century, Egypt and European powers vied for influence over the South, establishing trading forts and military and commercial networks there.10 European traders, however, abandoned the South and they were replaced by Northern Sudanese and Egyptian Arabs.11 It soon became clear that compared to the North, the South was disadvantaged. Although Ismail Pasha, Ali Pasha’s successor, eventually abolished the slave trade following an agreement between Egypt and Britain in 1877, the agreement was largely ignored in the South because its inhabitants were viewed as “infidels.”12 European powers reentered the struggle for South Sudan when Great Britain, France, and Belgium began to compete for control over the White Nile. Britain’s conquest of Egypt in 1882 meant that it inherited Sudan and its divisions.13 Britain hoped that by conquering Egypt, it could control the Suez Canal and prevent its European rivals from gaining passage to India and the Far East.14 The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1899 effectively divided the region into the North and the South and outlined joint authority over Sudan and the regions.15 The British administration subsequently divided the South into three administrative states: Bahr al-Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile. These three historical states were the administrative basis for the ten states in South Sudan.16 Under British administration, the North got developed considerably in economic, political, and educational terms, while the South got neglected.17 British policy in the South focused on maintaining law and order rather than on education and economic development.18 During the period of British rule, the North and South existed as almost two separate entities. Beshir Mohammed Said, a journalist from the North, suggested that unrest in the South became a feature of the region since the presence of European traders and missionaries.19 Said contended that British policy in the South was to “build up a series of self-contained racial or tribal units based upon

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indigenous customs, traditional usage and beliefs.”20 Such a policy ensured that the South remained politically and economically behind the North – this included its level of political activism and its sense of nationalism. By the 1940s, Sudanese nationalists in the North began demanding independence from Britain. Spearheaded by the intelligentsia, this nationalism first manifested itself in the 1920s and then became a powerful force by the end of World War II.21 By then, Britain faced tremendous pressure from Northern political parties – such as the National Unionist Party (nup) and the Umma Party – to grant Sudan independence.22 Partly as a result of pressure from Sudanese nationalists and partly to prevent Egypt from regaining control of Sudan, Britain eventually acquiesced to Sudanese nationalists.23 Initially, the British envisioned two separate Sudans to accommodate the differences in culture and development between North and South. But pressure from both Egypt and Northern Sudanese nationalists, coupled with geographic and economic considerations, convinced the British to preserve the unity of Sudan.24 In 1947, the British Civil Secretary of Sudan held a conference in Juba, the capital of South Sudan, to ascertain the position of the South regarding its status in an independent Sudan.25 The representatives of the South – local chiefs, governors, and elites – were persuaded by the British and representatives of the North to approve a proposed legislative assembly for an independent Sudan with little information about the nature of the arrangement.26 The South’s representatives were hopeful because the North had also agreed to “specific safeguards for the South” following the Juba Conference.27 With the belief that federalism would be constitutionalized, the South’s representatives willingly agreed to the union.28 Abel Alier, a Southern lawyer who was instrumental in building the peace agreement between the North and the South in 1972, noted that Southern representatives at the Juba Conference asked that the South be given the “opportunity to prepare herself before joining hands with the North.”29 Rather than providing the South with such an opportunity, the proposed union moved ahead with the formation of a 93-member legislative assembly, with 13 members from the South.30 At the 1951 Constitutional Amendment Commission the South had a single representative, Buth Diu Thung of the Liberal Party, whose proposals for Southern safeguards were deleted at a later conference held in Egypt.31 The agreement between Egypt and Sudan excluded

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Southern representatives on the grounds that only organized political parties could be invited. Parties such as the nup and the Umma Party successfully lobbied for the removal of the special safeguards to ensure that a strong and centralized Sudan would emerge following independence.32 Elections were held in 1953 to elect the first governing parliament and to implement the Sudanization policy – the process of replacing all foreign governmental and military officials with Sudanese officials – in the lead up to Sudan’s independence. Among the parties to compete in the elections were the newly formed Liberal Party, the Umma Party, and the nup.33 Although the Liberal Party won a majority of the seats in the South, the nup won the largest number of seats and the mandate to form the government.34 Throughout this process, the Liberal Party called for the federalization of Sudan.35 The unwillingness of the North to accommodate Southern appeals for federalism contributed to growing tensions in the country. This was exacerbated by the implementation of the Sudanization policy wherein the central government appointed an overwhelming majority of Northerners as officials and administrators – even in the South. This prompted many Southerners to view Sudan’s independence as the start of the South’s subjugation.36 These developments added to the discontent brewing among Southerners. It also resulted in violent demonstrations from Southerners who feared economic and social exploitation.37 The combination of repressive policies and Southern fears paved the way for the first civil war between the government in Khartoum and rebel groups from the South.

T he F irs t S u da n e s e C ivi l War (1955–72) South Sudan’s political demands were clearly laid out by its representatives prior to and immediately after Sudan’s independence. As already noted, they requested federalism and economic development as a precondition for their union with the rest of Sudan. The first civil war was a direct result of Sudan’s unwillingness to furnish the South with political autonomy. According to some, however, one of the root causes of the First Sudanese Civil War dates back to the role of European traders and the presence of the British in the Sudan. Richard Gray argues that “much of the violence which afflicted South Sudan in the nineteenth century was caused originally not by Northern slavers but by European traders – some of the present difficulties also stem not from Northern attitudes but from British policy.”38

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British administrators adopted two different policies of development for the two regions. In the South, tribalism was reinforced and education was offered in the various mother tongues along with English. In the North, Islam and the Arabic language prevailed.39 Such a policy reinforced the economic gap and political divisions between the two regions.40 Because the British believed they had plenty of time to create more equal levels of development before unifying North and South, little was done to mitigate the differences and to attenuate the antagonisms. The onset of World War II and the pressure from Egypt and the Northern Sudanese for independence prevented the British from achieving a level of parity between North and South.41 A second cause of the conflict was the aforementioned creation of an independent Sudan without a political framework that accommodated Southern demands. In protest, Southern politicians boycotted Sudan’s first parliament. One of the results of this was that Northerners, who viewed the North as “inherently superior to the South,” dominated Sudan’s governmental apparatuses.42 These two factors provided the necessary conditions for conflict. As a striking example, of the eight hundred administrative positions ­recommended for Sudanization, only six minor positions were given to Southerners. Such a policy naturally fostered an environment of mistrust and hostility.43 From the government’s perspective, Southerners were “not qualified and experienced enough for these posts.”44 Said believes that the “political elements” in the South used Khartoum’s Sudanization policy as propaganda to “agitate” and instill fear in the Southern population.45 Dunstan Wai, however, noted that Southerners viewed their exclusion from administrative posts as a “deliberate and malicious plot” to maintain North’s superiority over the South.46 While these issues laid the foundations for conflict, several specific incidents sparked violence and rebellion in the South. In July 1955, newly appointed Northern officials dismissed three hundred textile workers in Yambio, a city in southeastern South Sudan, and this led to widespread protests that incited gunfire from Northern soldiers.47 Subsequently, there appeared a telegram, allegedly from the Prime Minister Ismail al-Azhari, which outlined his plans for the South. It read: “To all my administrators in the three Southern provinces: I have just signed a document for self-determination. Do not listen to the childish complaints of the Southerners. Persecute them, oppress them, ill-treat them according to my orders. Any administrator who fails to

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comply with my orders will be liable to prosecution. In three months’ time, all of you will come round and enjoy the work you have done.”48 Although its authenticity has not been verified, this telegram and the events in Yambio contributed to apprehension in the South and, in particular, at the military garrison in Tori, Equatoria. Suspicious and fearful, soldiers of the Equatorial Corps refused to board lorries to ship them North as part of a policy to integrate Southern soldiers into the Sudanese army. The mutiny resulted in the killing of Northern officers in August 1955.49 At the same time, there were military mutinies in the Southern towns of Juba, Yei, Yambio, and Meridi resulting in the deaths of 75 Southerners and 361 Northerners.50 The mutinies were eventually defeated by the Sudanese military. Many of the Southern soldiers surrendered and were subsequently tried and killed, but many fled to the bush or crossed international borders.51 Britain also played a role in deescalating the conflict. Although it was reluctant to intervene, British officials eventually provided military assistance to al-Azhari’s government to restore order in the South.52 Joseph Oduho and William Deng, former South Sudanese politicians and leaders of the Sudan African National Union (sanu) during the First Sudanese Civil War, placed a large burden of the blame for the civil war on British shoulders. According to Oduho and Deng, Southern grievances toward the British stemmed from two events: The first was Britain’s intervention in the 1955 mutiny, which did nothing to resolve the tensions between North and South; and the second was that British planes transported Northern troops to the South, which Southerners interpreted as British approval of the Khartoum’s crackdown against the protests and mutinies.53 The decision to occupy the South with troops from the North exacerbated hostilities and precipitated the conflict.54 The civil war undermined al-Azhari’s n u p government at a time when it faced fierce opposition from the People’s Democratic Party (pdp) and the Umma Party. In response, al-Azhari moved to officially declare Sudan’s independence, but his government continued to face strong opposition from the other political parties who demanded a national government.55 Al-Azhari was forced to resign in July 1956 following a vote of no confidence. This political crisis precipitated the 1958 election in which the Abdallah Khalil-led Umma Party won the most seats and formed a coalition government with the p d p. Although the Southern Federal Party (sfp) won 38 out of the 173 seats, all of its members resigned from the assembly to protest the

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government’s unwillingness to consider the South’s requests for federalism. Their spokesman, Saturnino Ohure, addressed the assembly with the following remarks. The South has no intention of separating from the North for had that been the case nothing on earth would have prevented the demand for separation. The South claims to federate with the North, a right that the South undoubtedly possesses as a ­consequence of the principle of free self-determination, which reason and democracy grant to a free people. The South will at any moment separate from the North if and when the North so desires, directly or indirectly, through political, social and ­economic subjection of the South.56 By the summer of 1958, Sudan’s parliament faced dissolution because of fractures within the coalition government. In anticipation of the collapse, Prime Minister Khalil had arranged to hand over control of the government to the military.57 According to Oduho and Deng, because the civilian government of Sudan could not implement a unitary constitution, it relinquished power to the military to do so.58 On 17 November 1958, General Ibrahim Abboud declared a state of emergency, and subsequently announced that the parliament and all political parties would be dissolved and that political gatherings and the media would be banned until order was restored in the country.59 General Abboud’s objective was to Arabize and Islamize the South through education and social policies, and to eliminate demands for federalism.60 From 1960 to 1962, high-profile Southern politicians, including Saturnino Ohure, Joseph Oduho, and William Deng, fled the South to join other exiles in the bush.61 These exiles, led by Ohure, Oduho, and Deng, formed the Sudan African Closed Districts National Union – later renamed the Sudan African National Union (sanu) – to represent the South’s economic and political interests.62 sanu’s main objectives were to organize a guerrilla movement to challenge Sudan’s policies and to appeal to the US and the Organization of African Unity (oau ) for international support.63 The sanu did not openly voice its desire for independence. Instead, it proclaimed “self-determination” as its objective in order to avoid political backlash from neighbouring states and regional organizations that wanted to maintain the existing borders for stability.64 In 1963, the S A N U announced the formation of the “Anya-Nya,” bands of

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freedom fighters whose aims were to educate and free the South from the North.65 Faced with a military regime, strict political censorship, and Sudan’s repression of the South, the Anya-Nya began its assaults on government positions in the South in 1962.66 The Anya-Nya’s activities proved effective at disrupting Sudan’s political and economic progress and its activities prompted Abboud to launch an inquiry into the conflict.67 The instability and violence led to increased criticism of and dissatisfaction with the military regime, triggering mass demonstrations (especially by students) and a general strike in the capital of Khartoum, which ultimately brought down the government.68 The Revolution of 1964 forced General Abboud to step down to be replaced by a transitional national government comprising the n u p, the p d p, the Umma, and the Islamic Charter Front (i c f ), the last-mentioned of which was a student organization formed in the 1960s. The fall of the military regime marked the founding of the Southern Front Party by Southern intelligentsia living in Khartoum.69 The new government of Sudan attempted to resolve the conflict with the South by offering amnesty to all Sudanese in exile and calling for a conference to settle Sudan’s political issues.70 The Round Table Conference of 1965 included all Southern political parties and associations, Northern political parties, and observers from neighbouring states. Its objective was to “discuss the Southern Question with a view to reaching an agreement which shall satisfy the special interests of the South as well as the general interests of the North.”71 However, because of intractable differences regarding the status of the South and the actions of the Anya-Nya, the conference abruptly ended after two weeks. In 1965, Saturnino Ohure and Joseph Oduho broke away from the sanu, then led by Aggrey Jaden, and established the Azania Liberation Front (alf).72 Pressure from South Sudanese intellectuals and students (most notably, the Southern Sudan Students Union) compelled the alf and the sanu to merge into a single entity under the alf banner. It was to be led by Oduho and Jaden.73 In 1967, Jaden toured Equatoria to secure support from chiefs and other influential South Sudanese officials. Jaden then convened a meeting of three hundred delegates from the South in order to form a new government that would lead South Sudan.74 This produced the Southern Sudan Provisional Government (sspg) and merged all the rebel factions under a single entity called the Anya-Nya National Armed Forces (anaf).75

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Disagreements within the s s p g necessitated a second national convention to discuss the way forward for South Sudan. The s s p g was renamed the Nile Provisional Government (npg) and its mandate would be to protect and advance Southern interests.76 The election of Gordon Muortat as president led to internal divisions over the inequitable distribution of cabinet posts to individuals from the three Southern states.77 Despite some progress, internal disagreements and rivalries – this time between Muortat and Joseph Lagu – continued to weaken South Sudan’s liberation movement.78 Ultimately, Muortat dissolved the np g in 1970 to make way for Lagu’s Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (sslm).79 The frequent turnover of the South’s political and military leadership speaks to the movement’s ineffectiveness and instability. Much of it was a result of personal rivalries and ethnic differences between Ohure and Oduho from the Latuko tribe, and Joseph Lagu from the Madi tribe. At the same time, North-South relations worsened following the failure of the Round Table Conference and the inability of the North and the South to come to terms on a political settlement. General elections in Sudan produced a coalition government between the Umma Party and the nup, led by Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoub.80 The government of Mahgoub adopted draconian policies aimed at “annihilating” the South’s educated class.81 These policies, however, only encouraged more Southerners to migrate into the bush and into neighbouring countries to join the other refugees and fighters. The continued violence and political instability in the capital of Sudan once again pushed the military to intervene and overthrow the government. The bloodless coup d’état of 1969 led to the formation of the Revolutionary Command Council (rc c ) under the leadership of Colonel Jaafar Mohammed Numayri who also served as the president.82 Numayri subsequently banned all political parties, suspended the constitution, and dissolved the Supreme Court.83 Despite Numayri’s peaceful overtures and calls for amnesty for Southerners abroad, few Southerners trusted the government in Khartoum. These suspicions were heightened by the delay in the implementation of the local autonomy policy and by political instability in the capital. Numayri’s regime survived three attempted coups d’état in less than one decade.84 The failed coups and the general unrest in the North pushed Numayri to consider a peace settlement with the South in an effort to avoid a two-front war.85 Furthermore, it became increasingly clear to Sudan and the s sl m that neither side would secure a military victory.86 To

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this end, Numayri appointed Abel Alier as the minister responsible for Southern affairs and tasked with initiating a peace settlement. The peace talks were held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 1971 between the s s l m and representatives of Sudan’s central government.87 As a precondition, negotiations were to be conducted with a united Sudan as an end goal. The Southern representatives requested a federal Sudan that would grant the South a regional government and control over other policy areas such as education and trade.88 Despite some outstanding differences, the Addis Ababa Agreement was signed in March 1972 and included the following terms: The three Southern states were recognized as a self-governing region with legislative and executive bodies. The legislative organ, the People’s Regional Assembly (p r a ), would be elected by Southerners and responsible for legislating issues outlined in the Addis Ababa Agreement. The executive organ, the High Executive Council (hec), was to be led by a president appointed by the President of Sudan on the recommendation of the p r a . Juba was recognized as the capital of South Sudan and the seat for the pra and the hec. English was to be the principal language of the Southern region. Finally, the South’s standing army would comprise 6,000 soldiers (including the former Anya-Nya) from the South and 6,000 soldiers from the North.89 Prominent Sudanese and South Sudanese experts reacted to the Addis Ababa Agreement with cautious optimism. Mohamed Omer Beshir, a Sudanese intellectual and chair of the 1965 Round Table Conference, acknowledged that both sides were looking for peace, but warned that the agreement “was just the beginning of a more ­difficult and complex task – the promotion of economic and social development in the South and the consolidation of the political unity of the Sudan.”90 Others noted that Southerners remained distrustful of Khartoum and that the “advantages of the Addis Ababa Agreement are withering away, and its legitimacy disappearing.”91 Bona Malwal, a Southerner and minister of culture and information under the Numayri regime, was less optimistic. He argued that the role of Islam in the government could not work in the long term, that Sudan must allow for a multi-party political system, and that the economy was not benefiting the whole of Sudan.92 Others criticized the agreement for furnishing the South with “qualified legislative authority, poorly defined economic powers, and an ambiguous understanding of the security forces.”93 Furthermore, the agreement was

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unpopular with Northern elites who thought it granted too much autonomy and would encourage separatism in the South. Despite the reservations, the agreement was welcomed following, as it did, a costly civil war. Abel Alier, the architect of the agreement, revealed that the civilian population suffered the majority of the deaths during the first civil war. Alier estimates there were 170,000 to 500,000 civilian casualties compared to 500 to 600 soldiers killed on both sides.94 The Addis Ababa Agreement ended the civil war and provided an opening for a political settlement to the North-South conflict. Despite the optimism for a lasting peace, it turned out to be a ­temporary ceasefire that failed to address the fundamental problems in the Sudan. The period following the agreement was expected to provide the South with autonomy and to promote economic development.95 Instead, the autonomy was limited and the South received only fractions of the development budget promised from the central government in Khartoum.96 Rather than fostering reconciliation and progress, the period following the 1972 Agreement was characterized by more broken promises and the unwillingness of Sudan to adhere to the agreement. These issues were exacerbated by the discovery of oil in the South, which, as we see further, contributed to the outbreak of the second civil war.97

T he S e c o n d S u da n e s e C iv i l War (1983–2005) The discovery of oil in South Sudan in 1978 heightened the central government’s fear of Southern secession. Abel Alier noted that “oil became a considerable factor in Sudanese politics and contributed in no small way not only to the intensification of North-South conflict but also the internationalization of that conflict.”98 President Numayri paid a visit to the US to strengthen diplomatic relations and to meet with Chevron’s officials to discuss the construction of a pipeline. It would be connected to Port Sudan, located in the north of Sudan on the Red Sea, to transport the oil from South Sudan to international markets.99 Demonstrations erupted in the South as most Southerners believed that the pipeline ought to be connected to Mombasa Port in Kenya. The demonstrations infuriated Numayri and most Northerners.100 The discovery of oil and the issues associated with its extraction and revenues contributed to the collapse of the Addis Ababa Agreement and the resumption of violence between the central

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government in Khartoum and groups from the South in 1983. The underlying issue can be traced back to the financial details outlined in the Addis Ababa Agreement. In the agreement, all central government revenues from the South, including those generated from natural resources, would go to the Southern government.101 Alier noted that Khartoum could have requested the South to revisit the issue of ­revenue sharing, but instead it chose to pursue a dishonest policy by altering boundaries so as to annex the oil fields into the North’s jurisdiction.102 Sudan began to export oil in 1999 and significantly increased its production by 2002.103 The South was aggrieved for numerous reasons. They included Khartoum’s interference with its political affairs, including the selection of its leadership and meddling in the regional assembly, neglecting the South’s economic development, connecting the oil pipeline to Port Sudan, and redrawing the South’s boundaries.104 An exacerbating factor was Numayri’s decision to impose Sharia law during an economic crisis in Sudan.105 In the midst of the political turmoil, John Garang, a US-educated Southerner and a former Anya-Nya officer, rose to prominence. As early as 1982, Garang and other Southern officials began assisting the Anya-Nya II rebels by providing them with weapons.106 Soon thereafter, Garang fled to Ethiopia following a clash between the Sudanese army and Southern soldiers in 1983 in the city of Bor, South Sudan.107 Like the original Anya-Nya, the new movement faced internal divisions. Garang’s bid to lead the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Sudan People’s Liberation Army (splm/spla), his Marxist undertones, and commitment to a united Sudan were supported by Ethiopia and prominent Southern officials in exile.108 Opposition to Garang’s leadership came from the old order of the splm, which believed that the movement ought to have a political wing and a military wing. The term Anya-Nya II initially referred to different rebel groups operating in the South in the early 1980s.109 It originally comprised the soldiers who were suspicious of Khartoum and strongly opposed to integration into a common army with Northerners.110 Many of these former Anya-Nya fighters went into exile in the early 1980s, and by 1983 Southern police and soldiers abandoned their units to join them.111 It is important to note that Garang and the splm were not demanding independence, but rather the liberation of the whole of Sudan.112 The second civil war began in April of 1983 with clashes between s p l a and the Sudanese army along the Sudan-Ethiopia border.113

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Garang gave his version of the primary cause of the second civil war during a speech following the signing of the c pa by Omar al-Bashir and the splm in 2005: “In our view the attempt by various Khartoumbased regimes to build a monolithic Arab-Islamic state to the exclusion of other parameters of the Sudanese diversity constitutes the Fundamental Problem of the Sudan and defines the Sudanese conflict. The Sudanese state has excluded the vast majority of the Sudanese people from governance, and therefore their marginalization in the political, economic and social fields. This provoked resistance by the excluded.”114 These unfavourable conditions were worsened by Sudan’s stagnant economy, ongoing political repression, and the escalating civil war. As a consequence, in 1985, Numayri’s regime was overthrown in a military coup d’état that installed Sawar El Dahab.115 The military established the Transitional Military Council to rule for a one-year period until elections could be held. The s p l m , however, refused to end its activities or to participate in the scheduled elections without a constitutional conference.116 In a memorandum to oau in 1985, Garang explained the South’s position with the following words: “[T]he Central Problems in the Sudanese war are the dominance of One Nationality; the Sectarian and Religious Bigotry that dominated the Sudanese political scene since Independence; and the unequal development in the country … unless the Nationality Question is solved correctly, the Religious bigotry is destroyed and a balanced development for all the regions of the Sudan is struck, war is the only invited option in the Sudan.”117 Garang and the South were promised a constitutional convention but it never materialized. The elections of 1986 propelled Sadiq alMahdi to power following the formation of a coalition government comprised of the Umma Party, the National Islamic Front (n i f ), the Democratic Unionist Party, and other smaller parties. Al-Mahdi failed to convene the constitutional convention, refused to repeal Numayri’s Sharia policy from 1983, and moved closer to the creation of an Islamic state.118 When the s p l a shot down a Sudan Air airplane, which killed all sixty civilians, it only contributed to al-Mahdi’s unwilling­ness to negotiate peace with the South.119 Like the governments before his, al-Mahdi’s administration was fraught with corruption and came under increased criticism by the Sudanese population. Despite its weakness, however, in 1989 the alMahdi government and the splm were moving toward negotiating a

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peace settlement. But, in the same year, it was thwarted by nif and a group of army officers who staged a coup against al-Mahdi and installed Omar al-Bashir as president.120 The new regime was characterized by strong Islamist leanings and continued the effort to implement Sharia law in Sudan.121 Bashir formed the National Congress Party (n c p ) following a split with the N I F in 1999, but preserved the NI F ’s Islamist ideology for continuity.122 In the South, Garang, the splm, and the spla had come to rely on support from neighbouring Ethiopia, which was then governed by the communist Derg (Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, Police, and Territorial Army). The Derg was a Soviet-backed military junta, led by former soldier Mengistu Haile Mariam, which governed from 1974 to 1987.123 The fall of the Derg regime had severe consequences for s p l a’s unity and its ability to wage a war against the government in Khartoum.124 The effects were felt immediately as rival factions within the spla, that is, spla-Nasir led by Riek Machar and Lam Akol, began to break away and challenge Garang’s movement. Machar and Akol disagreed with Garang’s objective of securing Southern autonomy within a united Sudan rather than demanding outright independence. In addition, Garang faced opposition from factions who perceived the spla as Dinka-dominated and a threat to their tribes.125 To this end, the Nasir faction allied itself with Khartoum in order to defeat Garang and the sp l a. The factionalism within the spla resulted in tribal rivalries and violence between Machar and the  Nuer tribe, on the one hand, and Garang and the Dinka tribe on the other hand.126 These divisions and rivalries exploded into a civil war in the South between the Dinka and the Nuer.127 A combination of infighting between Southern groups and instability in Khartoum stalled the peace process between North and South.128 For example, during Nigerian-held negotiations in 1992, the government of Omar al-Bashir rejected Garang’s proposal for a secular Sudan and a referendum on the South’s future.129 One year later, Bashir and his regime offered a federal constitution that did not explicitly refer to Islam as the state religion, but the s p l m rejected this proposal in favour of a secular and confederal framework.130 The issues of religion and autonomy were the main obstacles to a permanent solution. Sudan’s civil war and the threat it posed to regional security prompted the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (igad), a regional trade bloc that included Sudan and its neighbours, to initiate peace talks between the two sides in 1993.131 igad’s initial resolution was

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accepted by sp l m, but the central government in Khartoum argued that its principles were unacceptable.132 In 1997, the government of Sudan signed the Khartoum Peace Agreement with Riek Machar’s South Sudan Independence Movement and the Fashoda Agreement with Lam Akol’s s p l m -United under the auspices of the “peace from within” initiative. This initiative was an attempt by the central government in Sudan to unilaterally establish peace agreements with groups from the South. Both agreements recognized the South’s right to self-determination and would serve as the basis for the c pa .133 The peace process was then taken up by the US, Britain, Norway, and Italy, referred to as the “Quartet,” with the appointment of US Senator John Danforth as a special envoy.134 Danforth’s involvement produced immediate results, beginning with a ceasefire agreement that paved the way for negotiations and deeper US involvement.135 This was soon followed by a 2002 meeting in Machakos, Kenya, where the two sides came to an agreement on the role of religion in Sudan and the issue of self-determination.136 Under this protocol, the North would adhere to Islamic laws and the South would be secular.137 Some have argued that the involvement of US and international parties was driven by the increased production of oil and the desire to isolate Sudan from terrorist organizations. Whatever the motivations, the US’s involvement encouraged negotiations and produced the peace agreement.138 The Machakos Protocol on the role of religion was followed by the Agreement on Wealth Sharing of 2004. It and other protocols, including the Power Sharing Protocol, were finalized and signed into the cpa in Nairobi, Kenya on January 9, 2005.139 The cpa was to be monitored by the United Nations Mission in Sudan (u n mis). With the signing of the c pa, South Sudan emerged as a de facto state. Its status from 2005 to 2011 fits the definition of a de facto state as an entity that controls a defined territory, provides an array of services to the population, and enters into diplomatic and economic relations with other states despite missing de jure recognition. During this time, the government of South Sudan exercised administrative authority over the political and economic affairs of the three historically Southern provinces, Bahr al-Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile, which were divided into ten states.140 The cpa granted South Sudan autonomy for a six-year transitional period that was intended to convince the South that a federation with Sudan was the most attractive option going forward.141

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The cpa included six protocols that outlined the political, economic, and security arrangements of Sudan, South Sudan, and other conflict areas in Sudan, including Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. The Machakos section of the cpa called on all parties to defend the unity of Sudan under a democratic framework that would lead to a “comprehensive solution” to the political and economic crises in Sudan and to address the grievances of the South.142 The two subsequent clauses equipped South Sudan with self-government and the right to selfdetermination in the form of a referendum to decide its future.143 This process was to be undertaken and implemented during the six-year interim period. Under the power-sharing arrangement, Sudan was to establish the Government of National Unity with a “decentralized system of government with significant devolution of powers.”144 The section on wealth sharing outlined the principles for distributing Sudan’s wealth and in particular the revenues generated from the South’s oil reserves. Sudan and South Sudan would divide those oil revenues equally.145 Ultimately the c pa was a failure.146 Explanations for its failure include the lack of mutual trust between Khartoum and the South, the exclusion of other groups in the negotiation process (e.g., the negotiations were conducted exclusively with the ncp and the splm), and the lack of implementation of the articles of the c pa.147 The period from 2005 to 2011 was marred by hostility between Sudan and South Sudan, including military clashes and a political boycott of the Government of National Unity by the South.148 By 2011, South Sudan was on the brink of seceding.

S o u t h S u da n under t h e C o m p r e h e n s iv e P e ace Agreement Following a referendum that overwhelmingly supported secession from Sudan, South Sudan’s Legislative Assembly declared indepen­ dence on 1 July 2011. This declaration of independence was preceded by the January 2011 referendum that asked the voters of South Sudan to “confirm the unity of the Sudan by voting to adopt the system of government established under the peace agreement; or vote for secession.”149 The results of the referendum, monitored by the u n and the African Union, tells us that Khartoum had failed to convince the South that unity was the best way forward. Approximately 98.8 per

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cent of voters voted in favour of secession with about 97 per cent of eligible voters participating. South Sudan seceded in 2011 – but if we look back to its history with Sudan, that outcome was not inevitable. John Garang, for one, had believed that the solution to Sudan’s instability was an inclusive political system that provided the various regions with autonomy. The demands of Garang and splm indicated that some in the South were willing, under the right conditions, to forgo independence. From the 1980s to the 1990s, Garang called for economic and political equality for all the people of Sudan.150 In his speech following the cpa signing in 2005, Garang said: The solution to the fundamental problem of Sudan is to evolve an “all-inclusive Sudanese state” which we have called the New Sudan, a “new Sudanese political dispensation” in which all Sudanese are equal stakeholders irrespective of their religion, race, tribe or gender, and if this does not work, then look for other solutions, such as splitting the country … As is the case in the South, the events in Darfur, Eastern Sudan and elsewhere have made it clear that we must have an “all- inclusive Sudanese state” at the national level and full devolution of power to the various regions of the Sudan, for otherwise it is unlikely that the country would stand any chance of remaining united.151 The central government in Khartoum, on more than one occasion, squandered the opportunity to persuade the South that unity was more attractive than independence. Rather than accommodate the South’s request for autonomy and economic assistance, Khartoum pushed the South toward independence. The decision to secede was strongly influenced by the internal politics of both Sudan and South Sudan. On the Sudan front, as mentioned earlier, Khartoum’s inability or unwillingness to implement the important provisions of the c pa contributed to the secession of the South. These key provisions included the implementation of federalism, the fair allocation of resources, a more representative civil service, and a functioning democracy with free and fair elections.152 Few of these reforms were implemented and, consequently, the cpa served only as a ceasefire.153 Khartoum’s intransigence and the continued violence deepened the mistrust and convinced the South that unity would not

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work. In other words, the breakup of Sudan could be attributed at least partly to Khartoum and ncp’s unwillingness to democratize.154 This conclusion is supported by splm’s suspicions about Khartoum’s inclination to democratize and establish a federal and pluralistic Sudan.155 Khartoum’s actions had the effect of pushing the South’s potential federalists toward becoming committed secessionists because they believed that Khartoum would not accommodate their political aspirations.156 This impasse was manifested by the failure of both sides to form a coalition Government of National Unity.157 Most federations function under a democratic political system. Since independence, democracy has had little chance to thrive in Sudan. According to one scholar, “there are serious doubts about the n cp ’s democratic credentials and its commitment to advancing a democratic transformation of the country.”158 After all, n c p is a military regime that overthrew a democratic government, it committed human rights violations, and it was accused of genocide against the people of Sudan.159 In addition, Sudan has been plagued by a troubled and unstable political system. Since its independence in 1956, Sudan has experienced three civilian parliamentary administrations, 1956–58, 1965–69, and 1986–89, all preceded by a transitional period, and three military regimes, 1958–64, 1969–85, and 1989–2019. The parliamentary governments were troubled by internal disputes to a degree that governments were more concerned with survival and advancing their supporters’ interests than delivering effective governance.160 As a consequence, the government in Khartoum was unable to implement policies that could encourage political development.161 Another domestic factor that shaped the South’s preference for independence was the unexpected death of John Garang. A federalist, he had promoted the unity of Sudan under the appellation of a “new Sudan,” following the signing of the cpa. Garang believed that South Sudan could function in a united, federal, and democratic Sudan that treated all regions and groups fairly. His death paved the way for those – such as his successor, Salva Kiir, the former head of the s p l a  – who favoured independence.162 Kiir became the leader of South Sudan and Sudan’s first vice president, but he showed little interest in the unity of Sudan and instead focused on the development of the South.163 Kiir promoted South Sudan’s independence to ensure the protection of its religious, economic, and political rights. He urged Southerners to vote for independence in order to end Northern domination. In

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a 2009 speech in Juba, he proclaimed: “When you reach your ballot boxes the choice is yours: [if] you want to vote for unity so that you become a second class in your own country, that is your choice … If you want to vote for independence so that you are a free person in your independent state, that will be your own choice and we will respect the choice of the people.”164 A final factor that shaped South Sudan’s decision to secede from Sudan was the presence of the “old regime.” The case of South Sudan demonstrates that political autonomy may be insufficient if the “old regime” – i.e., the regime responsible for oppressing the de facto state and with which the de facto entity fought a war – holds power at the national level. The presence of the old regime is a bitter reminder of the past, which poses obstacles to the development of trust between the de facto state and the parent state. The idea of an autonomous framework for the South was not attractive given that the Omar al-Bashir regime was in power for much of the second civil war and it repeatedly reneged on promises of autonomy.165 In addition to the domestic explanation, the international factor was critical in facilitating the secession of South Sudan. Like Kosovo, South Sudan garnered support from regional and international actors, including neighbouring governments and the US. Since independence from Britain, neighbouring states had played a role in shaping and influencing Sudan’s political trajectory. In the early stages of the first civil war, the international community largely supported the government in Khartoum. Both oau and the Arab League recognized Khartoum as the legal and legitimate representative of Sudan. These organizations were particularly keen on preserving the territorial integrity of Sudan. The former had an interest in discouraging other secessionist and nationalist groups, which were quite prevalent in Africa, while the latter remained loyal to its Arab brethren in North Sudan. The major powers also sided with Khartoum in the early stages of the conflict. For instance, the Soviet Union provided substantial military aid to Khartoum. The US publicly stated that it would refrain from becoming directly involved in the conflict, but privately provided support to Khartoum in the form of economic and military aid.166 The South, meanwhile, received clandestine support from neighbouring states sympathetic to its cause.167 sa n u was successful in establishing branches in neighbouring Kenya, Ethiopia, and the Congo and an office in the u k .168 The base in Ethiopia became the most effective. Ethiopia supported the splm/spla and played a significant

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role in contributing to the breakup of Sudan.169 Once it was formed, the sa n u initiated a diplomatic effort to garner support from neighbouring African countries and established lobbies in Europe to procure political and financial assistance.170 When the communist Derg came to power in Ethiopia in 1974, the US took a stronger interest in preserving the stability of Sudan, which it viewed as a regional counterweight to Ethiopia.171 By the 1980s, the US saw Sudan as an important strategic ally against Soviet interests in Africa.172 By the late 1980s, however, the US became less interested in Sudan as Soviet interests in Africa waned.173 Under the George W. Bush administration, the US became heavily involved in negotiating a peace settlement to bring an end to the second civil war as part of its broader war on terror.174 During the negotiations, headed by John Danforth, the intractable differences between Sudan and the South became apparent, as both had become entrenched in their respective positions. Though some argued that there “is no evidence that Washington’s involvement was accompanied by an agenda favouring partition,” US involvement in the conflict is widely seen, especially by those in Khartoum, to have facilitated the eventual dissolution of Sudan.175 The regional and international support meant that Khartoum could do little to prevent the South from holding the referendum and moving ahead with independence. Khartoum had to, even if reluctantly, accept the South’s independence. Under the cpa, the South was entitled to hold a referendum on independence in January 2011. In addition, the regime in Khartoum was under intense pressure from the international community for its human rights abuses, and for its support of terrorism.176 Finally, the US’s and broader international support for the South meant that Khartoum had few options in responding to the secession.177

C o n c l u s i on This chapter argued that South Sudan’s secession from Sudan was in large part the product of poor policies by successive regimes in Khartoum. Empirically, the historical and political accounts suggested that a political solution was viable in the Sudan, but that the unwillingness of successive governments to furnish the South with autonomy or to provide economic development, led to Sudan’s breakup. The chapter concluded that preferences and behaviour in South Sudan

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were shaped by the absence of political institutions, poor economic development, and regional and international contexts. Furthermore, institutionalism and realism were helpful for understanding the course of events in Sudan as it was for Kosovo, indeed even more so than in the case of Kosovo.

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4 Iraqi Kurdistan I

In an effort to identify whether the factors that shaped the preferences and decision-making of Kosovo and South Sudan also influenced Iraqi Kurdistan, this chapter examines the historical context of the latter case. It provides a summary of Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan’s history beginning in the early twentieth century. Like Sudan, the early history of Iraq highlights the importance of institutional design in multi­ ethnic states. Iraq’s political and economic institutions largely excluded the Kurdish population from the politics of Iraq and successive central governments in Baghdad generally adopted oppressive policies and harsh tactics in response to Kurdish requests for political rights. Owing to an intervention by the US and the UK and the role of the UN, Iraqi Kurdistan emerged as a de facto state in 1991 following three decades of political and military conflict between the Kurds and the government in Baghdad.

Ir aq i K u r d is ta n ’ s Hi story from t h e E a r ly T w e n t ieth Century Iraq was cobbled together at the end of World War I from three former Ottoman Empire provinces: Mosul, Basra, and Baghdad. During World War I, the British had seized control of Basra and Baghdad from the Ottomans and devised an arrangement with Hussein ibn Ali (also known as Sharif Hussein, a Sunni Muslim), the Sharif of Mecca (in the modern-day Saudi Arabia), in an effort to destabilize the Ottoman Empire. In return for orchestrating an Arab revolt against the Ottomans, Hussein was promised an Arab state that turned out to be Iraq.1 Although Mosul was not mentioned in this

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agreement, it was ultimately included as part of modern Iraq.2 There is speculation regarding Britain’s decision to include Mosul in the Iraqi state. Some academics argued that British policymakers did not believe a nascent Iraqi state would be viable without the predominantly Kurdish Mosul province. It is also worth noting that Turkey was disgruntled with the loss of Mosul to Britain. For its part, Britain initially believed that the large Kurdish population of Mosul could be furnished with some degree of autonomy.3 Indeed, Ghareeb notes that during the negotiations for the Treaty of Lausanne, Kurdish representatives petitioned the British to establish an independent Kurdish state.4 The Treaty of Lausanne, however, did not resolve the Kurdish question or the fate of Mosul, and instead, following a commission by the League of Nations, and with Turkish consent, the British decided that Mosul would be included in the creation of modern Iraq.5 The League had also recommended that the nascent Iraqi state furnish the Kurds with political autonomy.6 This latter recommendation was never implemented, and the Kurdish question was largely ignored. Mosul was significant for two reasons: first, its population would counteract the majority Shiite population in Baghdad and Basra, and second, Mosul’s oil provided Iraq with economic viability.7 In exchange for their continued support for British activity in the Middle East, Faisal bin Ali, the third son of Sharif Hussein, was appointed king of Iraq. The territorial state of Iraq came to comprise a majority Shiite population in the south, a large Sunni minority in the west, a large Kurdish minority in the north, and other minority groups (i.e., Christians, Jews, and Turkoman) scattered throughout the country. Upon its creation, these divisions presented immediate problems for Faisal because the process for forming the country had failed to satisfy the political needs of the Shiites and the Kurds. From the beginning, there was little in common among the three major groups and their ruler. In the early 1930s, Faisal lamented this lack of an Iraqi identity. He believed that this missing identity and the divisions between Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds would make governance difficult. In his words: This government rules over a Kurdish group most of which is ignorant and which includes persons with personal ambitions who call upon this group to abandon the government because it is not their race. [It also] rules a Shia plurality which belongs

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to the same ethnic group as the government. But as a result of the discriminations which the Shiis incurred under [Sunni] Ottoman rule which did not allow them to participate in the affairs of government, a wide breach developed between these two sects. Unfortunately, all of this has led Shiis … to abandon a government which they consider to be very bad … I say with my heart full of sadness that there is not yet in Iraq an Iraqi people.8 Faisal and his administrators believed they could ignore Kurdish demands for linguistic and political rights because of the apparent disorganization and division in Kurdish society.9 This was largely true until the 1930s, at which time a class of educated Kurdish professionals emerged and actively promoted Kurdish nationalism.10 The central government’s oppressive policies encouraged young Kurdish professionals to organize into groups and societies.11 Although the educated class was small and its societies were unable to attract the larger tribal and rural Kurdish population, many Iraqi Kurds became increasingly vociferous in the 1930s and the 1940s in opposition to the government’s policies and called for political self-determination.12 These developments coalesced in the early 1940s with a standoff between the Barzani tribe and the government in Baghdad. (The Barzanis were a large and influential tribe in Kurdistan’s Barzan region in the north of Iraq.) One of the key figures was Mulla Mustafa Barzani. Along with his family and other tribe members, the Barzanis engaged in violent skirmishes with the Iraqi military until he was placed under detention in Sulaymaniyah (a culturally and historically important Kurdish city in Iraq’s northeastern border with Iran). After Barzani escaped, the Iraqi government issued an ultimatum for Barzani to turn himself in.13 After several failed attempts at rapprochement from 1943 to 1945, the government decided to launch a military assault against Mustafa Barzani and his alliance of tribes.14 Although the government was unable to capture Barzani, it did succeed in driving him out of Iraq and into exile in Mahabad, Iran. Barzani’s two-year exile in Iran was formative for both his development as a leader and for Kurdish nationalism. Following the Soviet occupation of northwestern Iran in 1941, Mahabad, a city in Iran with a majority Kurdish population, with Soviet backing, fell to Kurdish nationalists.15 The Kurds of Mahabad established the Kurdistan Democratic Party (kdp) of Iran in 1945, and with Soviet support, the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad was declared in 1946.16 Although Mahabad’s independence was short-lived (less than one year), its

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establishment was nonetheless significant for Kurdish nationalism. The struggle for Mahabad encouraged the formation of a kdp in Iraq as well. The kdp in Iraq, originally called the Kurdish Democratic Party, was established as a branch of the Irani k d p after the collapse of the Mahabad Republic in 1946.17 The k d p of Iraq held its first congress in Baghdad on 16 August 1946 and elected Mustafa Barzani as its president-in-exile.18 Although it functioned without the leadership of Barzani for more than a decade, it grew in popularity and attracted a large membership, including leftist elements, under the leadership of Ibrahim Ahmed.19 Along with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (puk), it has been one of the principal political parties promoting Kurdish nationalism in Iraq. During his time in Mahabad, Barzani emerged as a key figure for defending the republic and established his credentials as the leader of the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq. For his involvement in the Mahabad Republic, however, the Iranian government charged Barzani with treason. As a result, he and his close followers were forced into exile in the Soviet Union in 1947.20 Despite his absence, Barzani maintained a strong grip on his position as the president of the kdp. It is not clear how he spent his time in the Soviet Union, but he became increasingly popular in Iraq and his movement gained significant support during his absence.21 During Barzani’s exile in the Soviet Union, Kurdish intellectuals, such as Ibrahim Ahmed and Jalal Talabani, led the newly formed Iraqi kdp.22 Initially, Barzani faced some internal opposition from top party officials, but his reputation and strong following allowed him to consolidate control over the organization and Ahmed, Talabani, and other members of the party eventually acquiesced to Barzani’s firm grip on the party. Barzani’s desire for total dominance of the kdp would lead to discontent and ultimately a split between those who supported him and those who supported Ahmed and Talabani. At the time, Barzani needed an organization and the k d p needed a strong leader, which led to a “marriage of convenience” between the intellectuals on the one hand, and Barzani and his followers, on the other.23 In any event, the k d p seized upon the economic discontent of the 1950s to increase its size and support base.24 At this time, Iraq was increasingly generating revenues from oil extraction, but little of it reached the lower segments of society.25 Hoping to improve their socioeconomic position, many Kurds from the rural areas joined the  kdp. In 1958 Barzani returned to Iraq from exile to a transformed k dp and political upheaval in the country.

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On 14 July 1958, a group of military officers known as the Free Officers overthrew the Iraqi monarchy and declared Iraq a republic. The Free Officers, including Brigadier Abdul Karim Qassem and Colonel Abdul Salam Arif, hoped to rebuild a democratic and more tolerant Iraq that was no longer vulnerable to British influence. Although the group was mostly Sunni, its members cut across ethnic and religious lines to promote pan-Arab nationalism in line with the pan-Arabists in Egypt and Syria. Despite their apparent pan-Arabism, the Free Officers had been in contact with the kdp before the coup d’état to further strengthen their support base.26 Kamiran Berwari, an academic based in Iraqi Kurdistan, noted, in a 2013 interview with the author, that with the declaration of the 1958 republic, Kurds were hopeful that Iraq would provide them with the political space and freedoms necessary to participate in the political system. He claimed that “the 1958 revolution changed the Kurdish situation in Iraq. Iraq transformed from a monarchy to a republic and this change opened the political space for the Kurds to openly debate political issues, Kurdish officials returned to Baghdad, and Mulla Mustafa Barzani returned to Iraq from the Soviet Union.”27 Indeed, the new republic recognized the Kurds and Arabs as partners. And as a sign of goodwill, Karim Qassem pardoned Barzani and released many Kurds from prison.28 The period of cooperation between Baghdad and the Kurds was short-lived, however, as relations between the kdp and Qassem soon deteriorated. Perhaps the main reason for the fallout was Qassem’s uneasiness about Barzani’s and the k d p ’s mounting popularity and Kurdish demands for autonomy.29 By 1960, Qassem sought to impede Barzani’s increasing strength by arming Barzani’s tribal enemies and encouraging conflict between them.30 In 1961, when Qassem rejected Barzani’s autonomy request for the Kurdish region, war broke out between the two groups and paved the way for decades of conflict and on-again, off-again violence.31 This violence placed considerable strain on both Iraq as a whole and on the Kurdish region specifically. Its impact is outlined in the next section.

T h e O r ig in s o f Ir aqi Kurdi s tan as a D e F ac to State This section traces Iraqi Kurdistan’s history from the early 1960s to the early 1990s in an effort to address the following question: what were the factors that shaped Kurdish preferences during this period?

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The September Revolt of 1961, also known as the Shoresh-e-Aylul in Kurdish, was initially sparked by clashes between Kurdish tribes and Karim Qassem’s government. Landowners and tribal aghas (leaders) in most of Iraq opposed Qassem’s Agrarian Reform Law, which was aimed at reducing the wealth and power of the landowning tribes.32 Unsurprisingly, landlords and aghas in the Kurdish areas also rebelled against this law. Barzani and the kdp were eventually pulled into the conflict following inter-tribal fighting between the Barzanis and government-­backed tribes.33 Barzani’s involvement in the revolt was more circumstantial than calculated.34 His forces attacked Qassem’s weakened tribal allies and secured control of areas of the Kurdish region. In response to an ambush on an Iraqi military convoy by one of Barzani’s allies, Qassem retaliated with airstrikes against Kurdish rebels, including against Barzani and his village.35 Over a period of three years, there were intermittent clashes between Barzani and Iraqi forces without producing a decisive winner. In an effort to break the deadlock, Qassem offered full amnesty to Barzani and his fighters and economic assistance for the Kurdish region.36 Barzani countered that as a precondition to a ceasefire, Kurdish autonomy must be entrenched in the Iraqi constitution.37 He publicized his demands in order to demonstrate that the Kurds were requesting autonomy – not independence.38 Qassem refused Barzani’s demands. Consequently, the war continued until Qassem’s regime was overthrown in 1963 by the emerging Arab Socialist Baath Party (henceforth the Baath Party). The Baath Party in Iraq was an offshoot of the Baath Party in Syria, which was founded by Michel Aflaq, a Syrian Christian, and Salah Baitar. The party was founded on the ideology of pan-Arab nationalism and socialism and its objective was to unite all Arabs regardless of their religion or ethnicity. The Baath Party emerged in Iraq in the late 1940s and grew significantly in the early to mid-1950s. Its first major political undertaking was a small part in the aforementioned 1958 revolution that overthrew the monarchy, but it soon disapproved of Qassem’s policies and turned its efforts to overthrowing him as well. The Kurds agreed not to attack the Iraqi army while the Baathists, units of the army, and pan-Arabists plotted to overthrow Qassem.39 The 1963 coup propelled the Baath Party into power with Ahmad Hasan al Bakr as the prime minister and a young Saddam Hussein as an emerging figure of the party. The Baathist’s first tenure as the government of Iraq was short-lived, however, as

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Abdul Salam Arif, with the support of the military, ousted it from power in November of 1963.40 In the midst of this political instability, Barzani unilaterally negotiated a ceasefire with Arif without consulting with the other leaders of kdp, including the likes of Ahmed and Talabani. This unilateral action split k dp between Barzani’s faction and those who wanted greater consensus in the party’s decision-making. These disagreements were exacerbated by differences between the tribal elements, led by Barzani, and the urban intelligentsia, led by Ahmed and Talabani. The divide was deepened by their linguistic differences. Whereas Barzani originated from the Kurmanj (or Bahdinan) region and spoke the Kurmanji dialect, Ahmed and Talabani were from the Soran region of Sulaymaniyah and spoke Sorani. Barzani and his supporters hoped to create a party that would be loyal to the leader and therefore could not tolerate individuals such as Ahmed and Talabani, who hoped to create a party that would be more modern and consensual. The split was a consequence of a more fundamental power struggle between traditional and modern elements in the kd p. It was serious enough that Ahmed and Talabani attempted to remove Barzani as party leader.41 By that time, however, Barzani had a firm hold on the kd p to the point that he was able to expel Ahmed and Talabani and their followers from the party.42 On the national front, Barzani was unable to reach an agreement on the Kurdish question with Arif. As a consequence, the Kurds and the central government in Baghdad engaged in skirmishes throughout the 1960s. In 1966, Arif died in a plane crash and was succeeded by his brother Abdul Rahman Arif. With help from military officials, the Baath Party removed Rahman Arif from power in a bloodless coup d’état in 1968.43 Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, a leading Baathist in Iraq, replaced Arif as the president of Iraq. It should be noted that although the Baath Party in Iraq came to be dominated by Sunnis, this had not always been the case. In fact, the early Baath Party in  Iraq  included members of all religious and ethnic groups. It became Sunni-dominated over time as Shiites associated pan-Arabism with Sunni Arabs. As a result, there is a mistaken tendency to view Baath rule in Iraq in terms of Sunni ideology. The party’s official ideology was always pan-Arabism and socialism. Indeed, the Baathists believed that their socialist, humanitarian, and non-ethnic and non-sectarian principles provided the foundations for negotiating peace with the Kurds.44 More practically, however, the

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Baath Party understood that it had to settle domestic issues in order to effectively confront regional threats (i.e., Iran and Israel) and to promote its vision of pan-Arab nationalism.45 Following several rounds of negotiations and provisional agreements, the kdp and the Baath government signed an accord on 11 March 1970, known as the 1970 March Manifesto, that ostensibly met the demands of the Kurds. The 1970 March Manifesto – negotiated by kdp officials and Saddam Hussein, who was the assistant secretary general of the Baath Party – outlined the political and social rights of the Kurds in Iraq. The most important articles of the agreement included Kurdish ­linguistic rights, governmental posts for the Kurds, constitutional recognition of the Kurds as an official nationality, and Kurdish self-government in areas with a majority Kurdish population.46 In short, the agreement provided the Kurds with political autonomy, assurances of cultural and linguistic protection, and financial assistance to help with development of the Kurdish region. Despite the hope of a lasting peace, broken promises from both sides ultimately led to the collapse of the 1970 March Manifesto. Barzani insisted on increased military and political freedom for the Kurds and demanded the removal of all Iraqi army contingents from the Kurdish region.47 The Baathists refused to implement the Manifesto because of the kdp’s close ties with the Iranian regime, its reluctance to allow the Iraqi government to have a presence in the Kurdish region, and the Kurdish region’s territorial demands. 48 The most significant dispute centred on the city of Kirkuk. Kirkuk, then, just as now, was a main source of tensions between the Kurds and the government in Baghdad. In the 1970s, the Baathists altered the demographics of Kirkuk, a campaign known as Arabization, by replacing the populations of Kurds, Turkoman, Assyrian, and other minorities with an Arab population. In addition, in September 1971, a first assassination attempt was made on Barzani by the Iraqi government, which, according to Edmund Ghareeb, was intended to destroy the 1970 agreement.49 Although unsuccessful, the assassination attempt did create suspicion on both sides.50 A subsequent assassination attempt on Barzani and a series of attacks against Kurdish interests sealed the fate of the 1970 agreement.51 Furthermore, as Edgar O’Ballance noted, while the central government accused Barzani of collaborating with Iran, Barzani, in turn, accused the government of increasing its army presence in the Kurdish region, an act that violated the agreement.52 Edmund Ghareeb argued in his

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1981 book on the Kurds in Iraq that the prospect for a permanent peace and the implementation of the 1970 accord did not come to fruition partly due to the meddling of Iran, Israel, and the US, all of whom aided and encouraged Barzani to capture all Kurdish territories and to secure further concessions from Baghdad.53 The US – with encouragement from its ally, the Shah of Iran – supported the Kurds against the Baathist regime, which was hostile to US interests in the region and received support from the Soviets. Iran, in particular, was heavily involved in aiding the Kurds against Iraq to weaken the regime in Baghdad. Iran and Iraq shared a mutual animosity for each other and Iran hoped to use the Kurds in Iraq as a proxy to destabilize the country. In 1972, Iraq and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty of Friendship agreement, which raised concerns for Iran, the US, and Israel. The animosity between Iraq and Iran provided Barzani and the Kurds with an opportunity to secure external aid from Iran and the US. Uneasy about the rise of a socialist Arab nationalism and animosity for its allies Israel and Iran, the US agreed to provide the Kurds with clandestine support. Iran’s suspicions had increased when the Baathists, who wanted to spread their idea of pan-Arabism in the Persian Gulf, seized power in Iraq.54 Iran’s ambitions were to establish itself as the major regional power and as a means to this end it aided the Kurds to weaken Iraq.55 Iranian support to Barzani and the Kurds angered the Iraqi government and generated fear amongst the Baathists that the Kurds would secede.56 Ghareeb suggested that ­military aid and ­diplomatic support from Iran and other governments (i.e., Israel and the US) likely influenced Barzani’s decision to jeopardize the peace with Baghdad in favour of demanding more concessions.57 In an effort to salvage the peace, in 1974 the Baathist government offered Barzani and the Kurds the Autonomy Law, which Barzani rejected because it effectively stripped the Kurds of the self-rule promised to them in the 1970 March Manifesto.58 The 1974 Autonomy Law did not include control over Kirkuk and it omitted important articles outlined in the 1970 March Manifesto.59 Barzani later revealed that the Kurdish decision to reject Baghdad’s offer of autonomy was largely shaped by the promise of weapons from the US. He asserted that “without American promises, we would not have acted the way we did. Were it not for the American promise, we would never have become trapped and involved to such an extent.”60 As it was, the Kurds were left to their own devices and were militarily weak compared to the government in Baghdad. They were easily

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defeated when, in March 1975, Iran and Iraq negotiated the Algiers Agreement on border issues and other disputes between the two sides, including an end to the Shah’s aid to the Iraqi Kurds in exchange for Iran’s control of the Shatt al-Arab boundary.61 Several consequences followed.62 First, the defeat allowed Baghdad to establish and extend its control over the Kurdish region. Second, Barzani was exiled to Iran before he moved to the US to receive ­medical attention for lung cancer. (In March 1979, Barzani passed away in a hospital in Washington, dc.) Third, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (p u k ), co-founded in June 1975 by Jalal Talabani, Nawshirwan Mustafa,63 and others, emerged as a key political party in Iraqi Kurdistan, initiating a long period of competition between k d p and p u k . Last, the Kurds suffered large casualties and devastation to the Kurdish areas.64 As David McDowall notes, as many as 1,400 villages were razed from 1975 to 1978, at least 600,000 people were deported to resettlement camps, and there were thousands of casualties on both sides.65 The government in Baghdad effectively maintained control over the Kurds from 1975 to 1980 and hoped to assimilate them in order to prevent future rebellions.66 It attempted to assassinate members of the Barzani family, including the son of Mulla Mustafa, Massoud Barzani. In addition, the government moved large numbers of Kurds from the Kurdish region to Arab villages to indoctrinate them with a sense of Iraqi identity.67 There is disagreement regarding the exact number of displaced people. Whereas Iraqi officials claimed that 30,000 to 50,000 Kurds were forced from their homes and villages, Kurdish officials claim the number was 200,000 to 300,000.68 The Kurdish situation in Iraq was quiet until the government in Baghdad was confronted by the Islamic Revolution in Iran, which it interpreted as a threat to its security. The Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran ushered in significant changes in that country, which also greatly affected Iraq and the Kurds. The revolution replaced the Iranian monarchy with a theocratic (Islamic) government and altered the dynamics between Iran and the Kurds of Iraq. Regionally it was significant because Saddam Hussein viewed the turmoil and instability in Iran as an opportunity to retake the Shatt al-Arab territory that Iraq had relinquished in the 1975 Algiers Agreement. To this end, in September 1980, Hussein launched a surprise attack against Iran with the hope of scoring a swift victory.69 Instead, Iraq and Iran became embroiled in a drawn out and bloody war.

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Kurds, both in Iran and in Iraq, viewed the onset of the Iran-Iraq War as an opportunity to exploit weakened governments in order to extract political concessions. In their fight against Saddam Hussein’s government, Iraqi Kurds received material support from Iran; the Iraqi government, likewise, used the Iranian Kurds to fight Tehran. Diverted from their objective of securing political and economic rights from their respective governments, the Kurds became pawns in a proxy war. It is true that by 1982 the Kurds in Iraq were able to liberate and seize control of Kurdish areas from the Iraqi military.70 At the same time, however, k d p and p u k were fighting each other for control and influence in the Kurdish areas of Iraq. This infighting in the 1980s pushed Jalal Talabani and his p u k to negotiate a ceasefire agreement with the government in Baghdad. 71 In exchange for Kurdish autonomy, which never materialized, Baghdad called on puk to cease its assault against the Iraqi army and instead to turn its forces against k d p.72 The Iran-Iraq War was a brutal war of attrition that dragged on for eight years. The 1987 un Resolution 598 called for a ceasefire with little effect. Then unexpectedly, in July 1988, Iran and Iraq accepted the ceasefire and ended the war.73 The peace with Iran allowed Hussein to focus his attention on the Kurdish insurrection. Prior to the implementation of the ceasefire, Hussein had launched an operation, known as the Anfal Campaign, against the Kurdish region. His objective was to reclaim control of Kurdish territories and to punish the Kurds for treason. The operation culminated in the gassing of the town of Halabja on 16 March 1988, where approximately 5,000 civilians died.74 Human Rights Watch, the authoritative source on the Anfal Campaign, noted that over 4,000 villages were razed to undermine support for the Kurdish peshmerga.75 (Although there was little condemnation from the international community at the time, it was cited by the George W. Bush administration as one of the justifications for the 2003 invasion of Iraq.) The Human Rights Watch report notes the execution and disappearance of tens of thousands of civilians, the use of chemicals weapons against dozens of villages other than Halabja, the destruction of villages, and the forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of people.76 Baghdad’s assault on the Kurds, and in ­particular the gassing of Halabja, gave impetus to k d p, p u k , and other political parties in the Kurdish region, to form the Iraqi Kurdistan Front (i k f ) to more effectively challenge the government in Baghdad.77

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S e t t l in g f o r Autonomy Despite the ongoing conflict and the brutal treatment of the Kurds at the hands of the governments in Baghdad, Kurdish leaders, including Barzani and Talabani, insisted that they were pursuing autonomy rather than independence. Although independence has been the dream of Kurdish nationalists, the leadership stressed that political and economic autonomy would be sufficient for protecting Kurdish political interests. Were the Kurds settling for autonomy because they did not possess sufficient capabilities to secede from Iraq? The Kurdish preference for autonomy over independence could be further substantiated by Kurdish activities in the early 1990s. Following elections in the Kurdish region, the Kurds unilaterally declared the Kurdish area a federal region of Iraq.78 Moreover, in 1992 the Kurds hosted the Iraqi National Congress (an umbrella organization that included most of the groups that opposed Saddam Hussein) at a conference in the Kurdish region. During the conference, Barzani and Talabani signalled that the Kurds would settle for federalism, which would furnish the Kurds with autonomy and preserve Iraq’s territorial integrity.79 Capabilities, although important, were not the main factors shaping Kurdish preferences. The Kurds consistently requested political and economic autonomy within a federal Iraq and although Kurdish nationalists desired independence, they always maintained that they were willing to stay in a unified Iraq under the right institutional framework. From the 1940s and through the 1980s, Kurdish leaders – including Mustafa Barzani, Massoud Barzani, and Jalal Talabani – regularly presented political autonomy and economic development as Kurdish objectives. Indeed, they explicitly stated that independence was not their goal even though it was the Kurdish dream. The demand for autonomy was a response to the Iraqi central government’s oppressive policies against the Kurds. From the Kurdish perspective, political autonomy was essential for protecting not only the Kurdish identity, but also the political and economic interests of the Kurds. Iraq, meanwhile, was still reeling from the long and terrible war with Iran. That war took a heavy financial toll on Iraq. In an effort to recuperate the financial losses, Hussein mistakenly believed he could occupy Kuwait and control its vast oil reserves.80 Hussein believed the US would accept the annexation of Kuwait because the American public would not tolerate a long war and military casualties.81

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However, Hussein’s decision to invade and occupy all of Kuwait instead of only the Rumaila oil field prompted a quick response from the US and the international community. Sanctioned by the UN, a US-led coalition launched Operation Desert Storm to end Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on 17 January 1991. Security Council Resolution 687 ended the war and imposed UN sanctions on Baghdad. The Kurds believed they could extract political and economic benefits from a weakened Baghdad. And they thought they would receive support from former US president George H.W. Bush to rise up against and overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime. 82 Heeding the encouragement of former president Bush, the first two weeks of the uprising were successful, as the Kurds reclaimed control of Kurdish territory, namely the provinces of Duhok, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah, from the Iraqi military.83 A counteroffensive from Baghdad was inevitable. Hussein initially hesitated because he believed, like the Kurds, that the US would provide the Kurdish uprising with assistance.84 Once he was confident that the US would not support the Kurds, he countered with brutal force.85 He was able to put down the uprising with relative ease, but following the exodus of over two million Kurdish refugees into Iran and Turkey, the international community, led by the US and the UK, imposed a no-fly zone over the Kurdish region of Iraq.86 In doing so, they inadvertently furnished the Kurds with autonomy and created the opening for the Kurds to establish a de facto state. The u n ’s Oilfor-Food Programme, established in 1995, also provided the Kurds and the rest of Iraq with the opportunity to sell oil in exchange for food, medicines, and other necessary goods for providing basic services to the population. The Kurds benefited from the newfound autonomy and, in 1992, the i k f held elections, with the support of Barzani and Talabani, for the formation of a parliament to govern the Kurdish region.87 Post-1991, Iraqi Kurdistan fulfilled all the criteria of what I have called de facto statehood. Recall that a de facto state controls a defined territory, provides an array of services to the population, and enters into diplomatic and economic relations with other states, but does not possess de jure recognition. In 1991, Saddam Hussein’s regime ­withdrew from Iraqi Kurdistan and thereby handed the newly formed Kurdistan Regional Government (k r g ) with administrative control of the region and its population. The krg set up a functioning government that provided the population with services, including education and health care, and established diplomatic relations with foreign

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governments. Yet, Iraqi Kurdistan did not declare independence nor did it seek recognition as an independent state. Following the elections, the government in Baghdad condemned the Kurds for conspiring to break away from Iraq – an accusation which Barzani and Talabani denied. Talabani, for one, declared that the Kurds “do not want to break away from Iraq; we want a democratic Iraq.”88 kdp and puk agreed to share power following elections that resulted in fifty seats for each party.89 Despite issues of corruption and voter fraud, the process was considered “fair and free.” After the elections, the k r g unilaterally proclaimed the Kurdish area a federal region within Iraq.90 Massoud Barzani explained that the Kurds were not moving toward secession, but rather securing federalism for the Kurds. He did note that independence was on the table but only in the case if Hussein’s regime were to revert to its old policies of repression and hostility toward the Kurds. He said, “what leads to partitioning Iraq is the use of chemical weapons, genocide campaigns, racial discrimination and similar racist and chauvinistic (blind ethnic bigotry) measures.”91 Since that time, the krg maintained that it is satisfied with its de facto status.92 Despite these assurances, neighbouring Iran, Syria, and especially Turkey were on high alert following the emergence of a de facto Kurdistan and the elections that followed. The United States also voiced its opposition to an independent Kurdistan. The official US position was and is for a united Iraq. The policy, at least in the official sense, remains unchanged in this regard. The krg, for its part, maintained that it would not break away from Iraq.93 The US insists that it prefers a united Iraq for at least two reasons. First,  US officials are concerned that a partitioning of Iraq would lead to instability in the Middle East and in particular with Iraq’s neighbours Turkey and Iran. The fear is that an independent Kurdistan would inspire Iran’s and Turkey’s sizable Kurdish populations to demand more political autonomy. In addition, the secession of Iraqi Kurdistan would further strengthen the Shiites in Iraq and, it is believed, increase Iran’s influence in Baghdad. Second, the US supported a unified Iraq in line with the policy and interests of its longstanding nato (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) ally, Turkey.

E vo l u t io n o f Ir aq i K u rdi stan: 1994–2003 Before we examine Iraqi Kurdistan’s preference formation following its emergence as a de facto state, it is necessary to provide a brief outline of its evolution during this period, a period in which internal

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turmoil and rivalry between k d p and p u k aggravated the already tense political environment. By 1994, tensions between kdp and puk boiled over into armed clashes. The longstanding divisions between Barzani and the kdp, on the one hand, and Talabani and the puk, on the other, engulfed the Kurdish region into a four-year-long civil war.94 As mentioned earlier, k dp was divided into two factions: (1) the urban and educated intelligentsia, led by Ibrahim Ahmed and Jalal Talabani, from the Sulaymaniyah region; and (2) the largely traditional and tribal members, led by Barzani, from the Duhok region. The 1994 civil war was a result of the administrative and economic divisions of Iraqi Kurdistan. A series of skirmishes between groups and tribes affiliated with k d p and p u k deteriorated into open warfare.95 In response to puk victories and control over the (Iraqi Kurdistan) capital of Erbil, Massoud Barzani called on Saddam Hussein for military support to retake Erbil from p uk .96 At the same time, Talabani and puk requested military support from Iran. The offensives and counteroffensives continued until a 1998 agreement came into force, mediated by the US. In addition to the role of the US, the UN Oil-for-Food Programme also contributed to the peace settlement in Iraqi Kurdistan. The program was designed to provide funds to Iraq, including the Kurdish region, in exchange for oil. Under this program, u n agencies and programs were funded to deliver humanitarian aid and services to the Iraqi population.97 The aim of the program was to allow Iraq to sell its oil in exchange for humanitarian goods and to receive u n -­ mandated activities and services. Between 1996 and 2003, Iraq received usd 65 billion in exchange for more than three billion barrels of oil under the auspices of the program. The program was instrumental in providing Iraqi Kurdistan with aid, food, and the funds to sustain the k r g from the mid-1990s until the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime. Indeed, in Iraqi Kurdistan a “flourishing economy emerged” despite the un sanctions against Iraq.98 Many observers in Iraqi Kurdistan criticized kdp and puk for starting the civil war, which ultimately undermined the Kurdish nationalist movement. They accused kdp and puk of using Kurdish nationalism to advance their party interests. A common view was expressed by Kamiran Berwari, a professor at the University of Duhok, during an interview with the author in 2013: “If these parties represent the Kurdish people and genuinely want to advance the Kurdish cause then why did they initiate a civil war that killed thousands and destroyed

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the Kurdish region?”99 The later sections in this chapter show that many critics firmly believe that puk and kdp are self-serving political parties with little interest for the well-being of Iraqi Kurdistan and its population.

Ir aq i K u r d istan and t h e U S In vas ion of I raq From the end of the Kurdish civil war in 1998 to the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Kurds functioned with a high degree of autonomy and with little interference from neighbouring countries. During this period, there emerged political institutions for administering the Kurdish territory and governing the population. Economically, however, from 1998 to 2003, the Kurds were under a double embargo: one from the central government in Baghdad and a second from the un sanctions against Iraq. Although Iraqi Kurdistan’s economic position improved in the early 2000s, political instability and economic issues continued to trouble the de facto entity as it increasingly developed into a rentier state characterized by corruption and nepotism.100 Kurdish political and economic fortunes changed dramatically in 2003 with the US-led invasion of Iraq. It is beyond the scope of this book to evaluate the legitimacy and merits of the US motivations for invading Iraq. Our concern is with the events that took place in the lead up to the invasion and with its consequences for Iraqi Kurdistan. The invasion was supported by certain groups of Iraqi exiles. Formed in the early 1990s with US assistance, the Iraqi National Congress, led by a wealthy and influential Shiite, Ahmed Chalabi, lobbied the George W. Bush administration to remove Saddam Hussein from power.101 Although a Shiite Muslim, Chalabi was portrayed as a liberal and more self-serving than a proponent of Shiite interests.102 There is no doubt, however, that Iraqi Shiites welcomed the prospect of regime change and a democratic system that would propel them to power given their demographic advantage. Sunni Arabs were one of the few groups that did not look favourably upon the potential removal of Saddam Hussein. This is understandable given that they stood to lose the most and would find themselves as a minority after almost a century of being in power. Sunni trepidations about post-Hussein Iraq were seemingly confirmed by their perception that they were excluded from the drafting of the Iraqi constitution (this is discussed in greater detail later in the chapter).

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The Kurds had also lobbied for the removal of Hussein. Prior to the 2003 invasion, the US approached the Kurds, in a meeting between George W. Bush and Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, about the possibility of overthrowing Hussein.103 Setting aside their differences, Barzani and Talabani offered assistance in the form of providing intelligence and permitting the US military to use the Kurdish region as a front to attack Hussein’s regime. The Kurdish offer of support became particularly significant when on 1 March 2003, Turkey’s parliament blocked a motion to allow the US to deploy combat ground troops into Iraq from Turkish territory. Iraqi Kurdistan’s willingness to lend support for the US invasion provided the US with a northern front and strengthened the Kurdish-US relations.104 Following the swift overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the US took on the difficult task of rebuilding Iraq’s political system. The Americans found it difficult to create a political system that could balance the demands of the three major groups (i.e., Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds). Historically mistreated by regimes in Baghdad, political power was now in the hands of the Shiites. In an effort to ensure that the Kurds and the Sunnis were not excluded from the political process, the US created a political system that required consensus and participation from all major groups. For instance, to this day the post of president is customarily reserved for the Kurds and the speaker of the Iraqi parliament is customarily a Sunni. In addition, the Kurds were able to secure several high-profile positions in the central government during the creation of Iraq’s new political system. The Kurdish success was largely a result of the willingness of kd p and p u k to set aside their rivalry and form a united front during negotiations for the rebuilding of post-Hussein Iraq.105 The parties signed what they called the “unification agreement” of 2006, which effectively divided the administration of Iraqi Kurdistan and the krg equally between them.106 This agreement originated in 2005 when Kurdish factions united under a single list for the 2005 Iraq elections and captured 26 per cent of the overall vote in Iraq.107 The drafting of the Iraqi constitution was criticized by many academics and analysts for its hastiness, its reification of ethnic and religious divisions, and the perceived exclusion of the Sunni population in negotiating the constitution.108 David Ghanim, for one, noted that the constitution was “written under highly charged political atmosphere, sectarian divide, and ethnic animosity, which is hardly a proper condition for drafting a constitution that can be considered an anchor

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for the future.”109 What emerged, according to the critics, was a constitution negotiated between the US and the Kurds, which was then imposed on the Arabs.110 Much of the criticism against the drafting of the constitution was directed at the Kurdish bloc for taking advantage of their inexperienced and disorganized Arab counterparts.111 Some suggested that the Iraqi constitution was a power-sharing pact between the Kurds and Shiites given the absence of the Sunnis in the negotiation process.112 In particular, they argue, Kurdish demands for federalism exacerbated the disadvantaged position of the Sunnis. According to Henri Barkey and Ellen Laipson, Kurdish demands “complicated the quest for a unified, stable, and peaceful Iraq.”113 The question of federalism was a main source of tension between the Kurds and other factions in the negotiating process.114 Many critics noted that the constitution not only disenfranchised the Sunni bloc, but also weakened the central government in Baghdad. Feisal Istrabadi, for example, described the notion of federalism as the “most emotionally charged issue, bar none” in Iraq, leading up to the constitutional negotiations, and he stressed that the Kurds were the principal instigators in pushing for its adoption. He suggested that the Kurds could have continued to practice autonomy as “no one wanted to turn the clock back and reassert centralized control over Iraqi Kurdistan.”115 There was no reason, in his view, for making federalism an issue. Such criticisms, however, fail to consider the Kurdish perspective. Following decades of repression and broken promises at the hands of successive governments in Baghdad, the Kurds feared that a central government would (even if incrementally) take away their autonomy. From the Kurdish perspective, a constitution with a loose federal structure was imperative for their participation in the post-Hussein Iraq. Even a decade following the overthrow of Hussein and the Baath regime, the Kurds were uneasy about Baghdad’s centralizing tendencies and political rhetoric vis-à-vis Kurdish autonomy. Entrenching federalism in the constitution, rather than relying on the goodwill of Baghdad, provided the Kurds with the legal framework with which to safeguard their rights and protect their interests. Despite criticisms and accusations that they would secede, the Kurds continued to support a united Iraq until the summer of 2017. During my interviews with Kurdish officials from kdp and puk in May and June 2013, they clearly indicated that the Iraqi constitution and the notion of a partnership between Arabs and Kurds were particularly important for them. They cited the unwillingness of the

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central government to treat Kurds like partners as a source of tension. Indeed, most Kurdish officials regarded the post-2003 Iraq as a voluntary union between two nations (i.e., Arabs and Kurds). This point was most clearly articulated by Omed Sabah, the speaker for the presidency of the Kurdish region. “If Baghdad wishes to preserve the unity of Iraq, it must treat the Kurds as real partners. There is a difference between being a partner and a participant. Currently, the Kurds are only participants … If Iraq is run like a dictatorship, it will not last. The only reason Iraq would disintegrate is if it returns to dictatorship. Nothing else.”116 Furthermore, although Nezhat Hali, Iraqi Kurdistan’s director of intelligence, did not believe that the government in Baghdad would make an effort to solve the Kurdish issue, he indicated that the Kurdish region was willing to stay with Iraq if Kurdish interests were protected.117 This is a common view held by Kurdish officials and leaders – as long as Baghdad abides by the constitution and respects Kurdish autonomy, Iraqi Kurdistan would continue to function in a united Iraq.

C o n c l u s i on This chapter traced the history of Iraqi Kurdistan beginning in the early twentieth century. It illustrated that the relationship between the central government in Baghdad and the Kurdish population was fraught with political and military conflicts. The Kurds faced successive regimes that adopted oppressive policies aimed at debilitating Iraqi Kurdistan’s political and economic development. In response to such policies, the Kurds requested political and economic autonomy as measures to protect their interests. Following decades of conflict and two major rebellions from 1960 to the late 1980s, the Kurds acquired de facto statehood in 1991 and embarked on what they saw as the road to political and economic development. Iraqi Kurdistan’s position was further improved with the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq and the subsequent removal of Saddam Hussein. Given the Kurdish aspirations for independence and a nonexistent central government in Baghdad, many observers expected the Kurds to declare independence. Instead, the Kurds willingly participated in the rebuilding of post-Hussein Iraq and locked themselves into a union with the rest of Iraq.

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5 Iraqi Kurdistan II

During Iraq’s 2005 national elections, Iraqi Kurdistan also held an unofficial referendum in which voters were asked if they preferred independence to a union with Iraq. Approximately 98 per cent of those who cast a ballot voted in favour of independence. This unofficial referendum demonstrated the degree to which Iraqi Kurds, in principle, supported independence. There was also near consensus amongst governmental officials, including members of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (kdp) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (puk), regarding the question of independence. Omar Hawrami, kdp member of Kurdistan parliament during 2009–13, declared, in May 2013, that independence was the principal objective of the Kurdistan Regional Government (krg). Within the Kurdish region, the krg was working to establish good governance. But as a grand strategy, revealed Hawrami, the “objective is to establish an independent Kurdistan. The Kurdish people will always feel incomplete without a Kurdish state. My belief is that the people will continue to demand independence.”1 Given the unequivocal position on independence, why has Iraqi Kurdistan not declared it? What accounts for the krg ’s decision to forgo independence and thereby preserve Iraq’s unity? The Kurds have, on more than one occasion, saved Iraq from the brink of collapse. Since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the rebuilding of Iraq’s political system, Iraqi Kurdistan had two openings to secede from a powerless Baghdad. This chapter discusses these two openings and explains Iraqi Kurdistan’s decision to preserve Iraq’s unity. The first section discusses the opening from 2005 to 2014 and outlines the positions of Kurdish officials with respect to independence and the justifications given by

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politicians for their positions. It will show that the predominant, though not the only, view is that Iraqi Kurdistan should remain a part of Iraq and the conditions they give for this. The second section discusses the opening from 2014 to 2017 when the Islamic State (i s ) invaded and seized Iraqi territory. This opening posed an existential threat to Iraq and the Kurds, but it also presented Iraqi Kurdistan with a golden opportunity to secede from Iraq. The section asks why the Kurdish leadership did not seize on this opening, and offers an explanation for Iraqi Kurdistan’s decision to cooperate with Baghdad in the fight against i s.

P o l it ic s o f t h e Ir aqi Kurdi s tan D e F ac to S tat e , 2005 to 2014 A survey of the political developments from 2005 to June 2014 will help shed some light on the Kurdish decision to participate both in rebuilding the political system and maintaining the unity of Iraq. From 2003 to 2006, the challenge for US and Iraqi officials was how to accommodate the competing demands of Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds. As mentioned in the previous chapter, many academics criticized Iraq’s constitution for being hastily drafted and for disproportionate Kurdish influence.2 According to this argument, the drafting of the constitution in 2005 was largely dictated by the Kurds, who had found an ally in the Shiite political party, Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (sci r i , later renamed the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq). The Kurdish objective, according to Reidar Visser, was to “destroy Baghdad as a capital that the territorial fragmentation of Iraq would become inevitable.”3 The Kurdish negotiators’ primary constitutional demands were aimed at protecting the Kurdish region’s political autonomy, including its economic development and security against a centralizing and aggressive central government in Baghdad. As a Kurdish official noted, the Kurds “decided to be a main pillar, along with the Sunnis and Shiites, for rebuilding Iraq.”4 The Kurds secured most of their demands, including federalism, the right to maintain their separate standing army, the recognition of Kirkuk as a disputed territory, and the right to develop the region’s natural resources.5 From 2005 to 2008, the Kurds continued to push for a decentralized agenda, but non-sciri Shiites in Baghdad began to push back against Kurdish insistence on its natural resource development and the issue of Kirkuk.6 The pushback was initiated by Nouri al-Maliki, prime

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minister of Iraq from 2006 to September 2014, who sought to strengthen Baghdad’s powers in governing the oil sector and the administration of disputed territories. Until then the Kurdish-Shiite alliance was expedient for both groups for achieving their political objectives in Baghdad. The Kurds could push through their demands with the support of the Shiites and, in turn, the Shiites could rely on the support of the Kurdish bloc to form the government in Baghdad. The alliance began to unravel between 2008 and 2009 following ­al-Maliki’s attempts to expand the central government’s powers over policy areas such as natural resources and his unwillingness to resolve the issue of Kirkuk. As a result, from 2006 to 2014, one of the main sources of conflict between krg and the administrations of the al-Maliki government was the struggle over constitutional powers. Both sides pushed and pulled for influence in their respective jurisdictions. From the Kurdish perspective, the Iraqi constitution was a compromise by the Kurds to preserve the unity of Iraq. The Kurds demanded certain provisions in the constitution in order to check the central government’s powers and proclivity for centralization. Kurdish officials were clear that their constitutional demands were a precondition for participating in a unified Iraq. They were unsatisfied with the central government’s track record vis-à-vis the constitution and insisted that the future of Iraq depended on Baghdad’s adherence to the constitution.7 In May 2013, Omed Sabah best articulated this idea when he said, “If the Iraqi government wishes to preserve the unity of Iraq it must adhere to the law of the land. The last paragraph of the Preamble [of the constitution] indicates that the unification of Iraq is voluntary and its preservation depends on adherence to the constitution. To preserve the unity of Iraq, Baghdad must implement all articles in the constitution.”8 In particular, Kurdish officials insisted on their right to develop the Kurdish region’s natural resources without permission from Baghdad and they demanded the implementation of Article 140 for resolving the longstanding Kirkuk issue. During this period, Iraq became increasingly centralized as Baghdad attempted to broaden its jurisdiction and increase its influence over the k r g. Since 2005, the status of Kirkuk was a main source of tension. The dispute was set to be resolved in 2007, but was repeatedly postponed, as neither Baghdad nor the Kurds were willing to relinquish claims to the territory. The issue of Kirkuk became further complicated following the invasion of I S into Iraq and the seizure of Kirkuk by Kurdish security forces.

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Although the Kirkuk issue is beyond the scope of this book, it will receive some attention in the coming pages. The k rg’s relations with Baghdad became even more strained at the beginning of 2010. Al-Maliki, the prime minister, and his supporters hoped to regain much of the political power Baghdad had lost following the drafting of Iraq’s constitution. One of the areas in which Baghdad hoped to reassert itself was control over the aforementioned natural resources and the revenues generated from them.9 The Kurds steadfastly maintained that Article 112 of the constitution outlined the regional government’s supremacy in the development of, and collection of revenues from, oil extraction.10 The competing claims led to military posturing on more than one occasion over the disputed territories on the border of the Kurdish region.11 Many academics and analysts expected the disputes between the Kurds and Baghdad to worsen following the complete withdrawal of US forces.12 Tensions culminated in 2011 when Massoud Barzani and the Kurdish bloc in the Iraqi parliament attempted to remove al-Maliki in a vote of non-confidence following accusations from Sunnis and Kurds that al-Maliki was consolidating power following the withdrawal of US forces in late 2011. This move was ultimately rejected by the then-president Jalal Talabani because it did not have the required number of signatures from parliamentarians. Despite their differences and the seeming intractability over power and resources, Kurdish officials understood that it was more beneficial to compromise with Baghdad than to challenge it.13 The Kurdish preference, from 2005 to 2014, was to function autonomously in a united Iraq. During this period, the Kurds maintained that they would continue to support and work within a united Iraq if the central government in Baghdad respected the constitution. These were not empty words given that Kurdish actions demonstrated a genuine willingness to function as a de facto state. The Kurds supported successive Shiiteled governments following elections in 2005, 2010, 2014, and they were negotiating a coalition government with them following the 2018 election. In return for their support, Kurds were appointed to various high-profile portfolios, including the post of president, foreign minister, and other cabinet positions in the coalition governments formed in 2006, 2010, and 2014. Kurdish officials reasoned that the Kurds had too much to lose by seceding from Iraq. Susan Shahab, leader of the governing coalition in the Kurdistan National Assembly (k n a ) from 2009 to 2013,

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believed that it was a golden time for the Kurds and therefore the question of independence could be shelved. She noted that Kurdish priorities were as follows: “Economic independence and the ability to reconstruct infrastructure is the first priority. Forging good relations between the k r g and Iraq and neighbours is a second priority.”14 Shahab acknowledged that the Kurdish population desired independence, but she also recognized that it would not have been prudent to jeopardize the Kurdish region’s favourable position. Shahab effectively laid out the conditions under which the Kurdish region would be willing to stay with Iraq. She said, “First of all, Baghdad must adhere to the constitution. Second, we must be treated as partners in Iraq. Third, there are many problems in resolving disputes with Baghdad and in particular the resolution of Article 140.”15 This position was reinforced by Abdulsalam Berwari (no relation to Kamiran Berwari), a long-serving member of kd p and a member of the Kurdistan parliament from 2009 to 2013. He believed that because the Kurdish region’s position in Iraq was uncertain, economic and security imperatives were more important to the Kurds.16 He was adamant that independence was the end goal of k d p and that the Kurdish region’s position was a reflection of geopolitical realities rather than a willingness to stay with Iraq. “We believe that the conditions are not yet right for independence,” explained Berwari. “We are surrounded by three states that have their own Kurdish minorities and the international community’s [i.e., the US and the EU] interests do not align with Kurdish independence given the small territory and population.”17 This was a longstanding argument made by Kurdish leaders – independence was not practical given the unfavourable environment in which the Kurds found themselves. The benefits of the status quo, as it were, were too great to give up for the risks associated with a possible secession. Such factors, however, did not discourage Kosovo and South Sudan from declaring independence and securing recognition from the international community. Moreover, one could make the case that the period between 2005 and 2014 was a golden opportunity for Iraqi Kurdistan to secede from Iraq. Following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime, the government in Baghdad was politically and militarily impotent, and the Kurds possessed the political, economic, and military capabilities to establish an independent Kurdistan. Gareth Stansfield, for one, argued that the domestic and regional conditions were suitable for Kurdish independence.18 He asserted that “the

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combination of local cohesion, popular Kurdish development, Iraqi state weakness, and the overlapping of economic and geopolitical interests between the Kurdistan Region and one-time opponents gives the current trajectory more durability than the Kurds have enjoyed in previous times when it looked as though they could challenge the established state system.”19 krg established political institutions that allowed Iraqi Kurdistan to administer the region and deliver basic services to the population. During that period, Iraqi Kurdistan was also economically viable, given its vast oil and gas reserves, leading some analysts to call them Iraqi Kurdistan’s “most promising asset.”20 Finally, k r g possessed a military that could provide security and defence for Iraqi Kurdistan. Yet, the Kurds were unwilling to forsake all their gains for something uncertain. It is true that Massoud Barzani and other Kurdish officials – including Nechirvan Barzani and President Barzani’s chief of staff, Fuad Hussein – maintained that the Kurds reserved the right to determine their political future. Academics and analysts incorrectly interpreted these statements as a move toward independence.21 Michael Gunter, for example, did not believe that a decentralized Iraq, with an autonomous Kurdish region, would be a long-term solution. He maintained that it was only a matter of time before the majority Arab population of Iraq organized itself and imposed its will on the Kurds.22 Yet, Kurdish officials insisted that Iraqi Kurdistan would maintain the status quo under the right conditions. In a 2008 opinion editorial in the Wall Street Journal, Massoud Barzani called Iraqi Kurdistan a model for the rest of Iraq. Barzani affirmed that the Kurds were “committed to a federal, democratic Iraq that is at peace with its neighbors.”23 In addition, Barzani responded to critics who accused the K R G of operating outside its constitutional limits by developing the Kurdish region’s oil resources. He argued that the k r g was “proceeding entirely in accord with the Iraqi constitution, implementing provisions that were brokered by the U.S.” 24 Similarly, Jalal Talabani and his p u k opposed independence in 2005 because it was not “practical.”25 The long-serving p u k member and k r g ’s minister of finance and economy from 2009–13, Bayiz Talabani, indicated that Kurdish gains should not be risked with imprudent policy based on emotion. He added, “We must carefully consider whether or not the Kurdish region is ready to take the step in becoming a state. We should not rush this decision. We have a territory that has a parliament, a

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government, and stability and security to serve the Kurdish region and its people … We have built a strong foundation for a future state.”26 Talabani and the other pragmatists mentioned earlier stressed the importance of achieving independence in a democratic and peaceful manner in order to safeguard the Kurdish region’s political, economic, and diplomatic progress. The Kurdish officials maintained that independence was a natural right of the Kurds and that the dream of independence would not disappear. Even asymmetrical federalism and other political concessions on the part of Baghdad would not persuade “soft-secessionists” to stay in a federal Iraq. “If there is an opportunity to separate from Iraq peacefully, we would go for it without thinking twice,” noted Bapiri.27 Mohammed Ihsan offered a simple, but insightful way for understanding the Kurdish mentality. He declared, “Look, our policy is to work for the best, prepare for the worst. This is the Middle East. When you wake up in the morning, you should have plan A and B.”28 Critics in Iraqi Kurdistan retorted that kd p and p u k were using the dream of Kurdish independence to preserve their positions of power. As evidence, says Kamiran Berwari, one ought to look at the track record of kdp and puk, which, according to him, demonstrated their unwillingness to push for independence.29 Kameran Mentik echoed these sentiments. He added, “If you study our history, especially in the last fifty years, you will see that the leader [Barzani] has fought all other Kurdish groups. For example, the kd p has fought Kurds in Iran, Turkey, and even Kurds in Iraq … There is a difference between what one says and what one does. They always talk about indepen­ dence and building a state, but in practice it is a different story.”30 This criticism was a common one amongst those who questioned the Kurdish leadership’s desire for independence. The critics argued that kdp and puk used the rhetoric of independence to appease the population’s desire for a Kurdish state, but in practice neither party made Kurdish independence a policy priority. During my observations of the 2014 and 2018 federal elections and the 2013 Kurdistan regional election, neither puk nor kdp offered a specific plan for achieving independence. In fact, the question of independence was a non-issue during these elections. Massoud Barzani raised the issue during a campaign speech in Duhok, but he refused to explicitly mention independence. In vague and uncertain terms, Barzani suggested that, although K R G had made significant progress in the economic and security spheres, it would continue to work on

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achieving “something greater.” It was widely believed that Barzani was referring to independence, but he stopped short of using that word. Instead, the central issues of the election were security, the economy, and improving governance in Iraqi Kurdistan. Similarly, during the 2014 federal election, Kurdish political parties did not mention independence as an objective and instead the major political parties, including kdp, puk, and Gorran (also known as the Change Movement and the Change List), promised to advance Kurdish interests in Baghdad and to ensure that Baghdad continued to provide Iraqi Kurdistan with the 17 per cent revenue of Iraq’s budget to which it was entitled. Others criticized k r g, and k dp in particular, for advancing and protecting its own interests rather than broader Kurdish interests. These criticisms came from opposition political parties, including Gorran and the Kurdistan Islamic Union (kiu). Gorran was founded in 2009 in response to the (real and perceived) corruption and nepotism in Iraqi Kurdistan. The aforementioned 2006 strategic agreement effectively divided the administration of Iraqi Kurdistan between kdp and puk.31 The agreement served as the basis of krg’s cabinets from 2006 until the regional elections of September 2013 and contributed to the emergence and electoral success of Gorran. Nawshirwan Mustafa, who was second to Jalal Talabani in p u k, broke away and formed Gorran in opposition to Talabani’s decision to forge an alliance with Massoud Barzani’s k d p.32 Kardo Pirdood Muhammed, Gorran’s caucus leader in kn a from 2009 to 2013, criticized k r g for neglecting the Kurdish region’s institutional and social development. In particular, Muhammed contended that the policies of k dp and p u k led to politics of exclusion where members and supporters of other parties felt like second-class citizens. 33 In this way, Gorran was the alternative to the exclusionary policies of k d p and p uk . “Gorran is calling for an effective government that works within effective and accountable institutions. We must make all Kurdish citizens feel a part of the nation and the political system,” argued Muhammed. “The main difference between Gorran and the puk and the kdp is that they create an environment wherein membership in a political party is more important than ­citizenship in the Kurdish region,” he claimed.34 Gorran and its members were less firm than their kd p and p u k counterparts on the question of independence. One of Gorran’s main objectives was to improve Kurdish relations with the central

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government in Baghdad through mutual cooperation in the areas of security, territorial disputes, implementation of the Iraqi constitution, and the economy. Whereas representatives of kd p and p u k claimed to be unabashedly pro-independence, Gorran’s members were more reserved on this issue. They stressed the importance of institutional reforms to develop the economy and to improve governance in Iraqi Kurdistan. They did not explicitly reject the notion of Kurdish independence but rather insisted that internal reforms must take place to lay the foundations for a potential Kurdish state. When asked how Gorran would respond to the Kurdish population’s desire for independence, Muhammed replied that, “if the people want indepen­ dence, we must first reform our government to achieve independence … I believe that the internal reforms will be helpful in leading to Kurdish independence … Kurdish people have long struggled for national autonomy, but once we [have] achieved political autonomy we must fight corruption, inequality, and establish an effective judicial system to strengthen our democracy.”35 Ali Hamah Salih was a leading member of Gorran and was elected to kna in the September 2013 and the 2018 regional elections.36 Salih contended that puk and kdp divided the administration and budget of the Kurdish region between themselves, leaving few opportunities for those who are not members of their parties.37 He acknowledged that although kdp and the Barzani family were popular with the population, he maintained that average citizens were also becoming increasingly unhappy with the corruption and the few economic opportunities. He noted that more citizens are raising questions about unaccounted for revenue generated from the Ibrahim Khalil crossing on the border of Turkey. (The Ibrahim Khalil border crossing is controlled by krg on the Iraqi side in the city of Zakho in the Kurdish region. kdp effectively controls the border crossing and all the revenue generated from it.) Salih also raised an important issue regarding the undefined borders of Iraqi Kurdistan. He said, “How can it become a state if it does not have a clearly defined territory and borders?”38 This point is in reference to the territorial dispute around the city of Kirkuk and other outstanding territorial and border disputes between Iraqi Kurdistan and Baghdad. As we have discussed, the existing three provinces – Dohuk, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah  – have functioned autonomously (i.e., effectively independent according to Salih) for about three decades. In other words, there would be no sense in declaring independence without Kirkuk and before establishing a clear border with the rest of Iraq.

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Other Gorran members, including Evar Ibrahim and Barzo Majeed, emphasized the importance of further developing the Kurdish region’s economy, passing a regional constitution, and implementing widespread change to the region’s political and social structures. Ibrahim, a member of k na since 2014, noted that Gorran believed reform to be necessary before independence could be achieved. She said, “Gorran is happy to have an independent Kurdistan, but first we need to organize ourselves.”39 Ibrahim described krg as corrupt and nepotistic. “It is obvious that the k d p and the p u k have failed to meet people’s demands. As always, they look out for their own interests first. Until now they haven’t been able to solve their own problems, they’re still divided over the security and intelligence administration,” she noted.40 Gorran’s objective, according to its members, was to uncover the injustice in society and to make krg’s financial decisions transparent. Ibrahim’s criticism of k r g reflected Gorran’s core principles and objectives in trying to identify and expose what they believe is rampant corruption in the Kurdish region. Majeed, member of Kurdistan parliament since 2014, noted that prior to the emergence of Gorran, krg passed legislation without opposition. Such legislation, in his words, “was in the interest of two parties [k d p and p u k ]. There was no opposition in the parliament. The expenditure of the budget was also problematic as the two parties were dividing it between themselves and there was little transparency.”41 Kurdistan Islamic Union also criticized the policies of krg. kiu was officially formed in 1994, but its roots can be traced back to the 1970s. Its formation in 1994 coincided with the onset of the kdp-puk civil war. k iu identified the rights of Kurdish people in Iraq as one of its main objectives, including the right to self-determination and the return of the disputed areas under Kurdish control.42 ki u ’s general principles emphasized the need for Islamic values and in particular the implementation of Sharia as the ultimate guarantor of those ­values.43 It was on these grounds that kiu criticized krg. It attacked k d p and p u k for nepotism, corruption, and lack of transparency. Bayan Ahmed Hasan, kiu member of the Kurdistan parliament from 2009 to 2013, criticized krg for failing to advance Kurdish interests. She stated: “First, we still have two administrations [kd p and p u k], two ruling parties that have not been able to accept other political parties and our people continue to suffer as a result. They don’t ­recognize other parties, they prop up puppet political parties whose job it is to support them in the parliament.”44 Ismaeel Ravendi, a

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member of k i u’s leadership council, meanwhile, characterized krg as ineffective, c­ orrupt, and undemocratic.45 Non-partisan interviewees emphasized that Iraqi Kurdistan could function within a united Iraq. Abdulhakeem Khasroo and Ali Kareem provided balanced analyses of the political situation of the Kurdish region, on the governance of k r g, and on the practices of kd p and puk. Khasroo, professor of political science at Salahaddin University – Hawler (Erbil), indicated that independence was not the top priority for the Kurdish population despite what some politicians and political parties suggested. “In terms of public opinion, independence is not at the top of the list, especially if Kurdistan continues to function as a de facto state. The most important thing for us is to maintain good relations with Baghdad and build a strong economy … The Kurdish population desires security and economic growth,” he contended.46 Khasroo supported this point by suggesting that Kurds would be willing to work within a democratic and federal Iraq. “If we maintain our current status, we would not have any problem as long as we are safe and secure and economically viable.”47 He further noted that kdp’s and puk’s apparent appeal and strength were tenuous. Indeed, he argued that voters desired change, but viewed the opposition parties (i.e., Gorran and k i u) as less capable than the governing parties.48 k d p ’s and p u k ’s undemocratic practices were an open secret in Iraqi Kurdistan. Ali Kareem, the head of the Kurdistan Institute for Human Rights, suggested that it was difficult for opposition parties and their members to secure positions in the Kurdish region because of the policies of k d p. He asserted that “Sometimes if one is loyal to or a member of the opposition it is difficult to receive governmental positions and one cannot participate in any governmental activities. Generally, [opposition] parties are ignored. There are very few members of opposition political parties holding official positions in public institutions.”49 He criticized k d p and p u k for perpetuating the region’s tribal and traditionalistic society. “We have a negative culture and tradition of dealing with political parties. For example, the tribal system is often viewed as an alternative to the government. The k r g (and the p uk and the k d p ) are viewed as a special instrument or tools for the use of its members and not as general public institutions. This creates bad relations between the government and other political parties.”50 The Kurdistan Communist Party, which had one seat in kna in 2013, also believed that Iraqi Kurdistan’s development was more important

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than independence. Barevan Abdulrahman, the Communist Party’s Duhok representative, outlined his party’s broad goal as protecting the “new reality in Kurdistan.” This entailed the implementation of democracy, the development of civil society, an effective institutional administration in Iraqi Kurdistan, and good relations between Iraqi Kurdistan and the rest of Iraq.51 Abdulrahman suggested that independence had taken a backseat to political and economic development in the Kurdish region.52 Mohammed Amed, former member of parliament in kna and a high-ranking official in the Communist Party, indicated that his party hopes to see a “free, democratic, and pluralistic Iraq.”53 Although the population wished for independence, it also wanted jobs, social services, and an effective government.54 The period from 2005 to the summer of 2014 was a critical one for Iraqi Kurdistan. Instead of pushing for independence, Kurdish officials contributed to the rebuilding of Iraq. Iraqi Kurdistan’s main reason for preserving the status quo was that post-Hussein Iraq had largely accommodated the political and economic goals of the Kurds. These findings call attention to the importance of economic assistance and political accommodation – as opposed to the dream of independence – in shaping de facto state behaviour. Without such political framework and economic incentives, Kurdish officials clearly indicated that the Kurdish region would push for independence. In fact, Massoud Barzani, on more than one occasion, declared that without federalism and respect for the democratic process, the Kurds would seek independence. In a 2011 interview, Barzani said, “I repeat it once again, as I always have, as far as Iraq follows the current constitution, we would not think of division and establishing an independent state. Abiding by this constitution is for the benefit of Iraq and the Kurdistan Region, particularly in this current situation.”55

P o l it ic s o f t h e Ir aqi Kurdi s tan De F ac to S tat e , J u n e 2014 to June 2017 Iraqi Kurdistan’s second opening for independence materialized following the seizure of Iraqi territory by the is in the summer of 2014. This section explores whether the presence of i s in Iraq changed Kurdish preferences with respect to independence. It will briefly outline the emergence of i s in Iraq and the Kurdish reaction to the shifting geopolitics in Iraq and the broader region. It will argue that, although

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the presence of i s posed significant political, security, and economic challenges to the Kurdish region, the preference regarding independence did not change until the summer of 2017. IS was a terrorist group that emerged following the 2003 US invasion of Iraq and the Syrian civil war that erupted in 2011.56 From the early 2000s to 2006, it operated under the banner of al-Qaeda in Iraq. It developed into a large and well-funded terrorist organization that posed a serious threat to Iraq and Syria. Its ultimate objective was to establish an Islamic Caliphate (i.e., an Islamic state) in the greater Middle East. To this end, the group attacked and seized large swaths of territory in northern Iraq from the Iraqi army. Iraqi Kurdistan found itself surrounded by IS. From June to September 2014, is overran the Iraqi military in northern Iraq and captured Iraq’s then-second largest city, Mosul. Initially, the situation looked favourable for the Kurds, who were able to seize territory abandoned by the Iraqi military, including the disputed city of Kirkuk. Kurdish forces (both k d p and p uk peshmerga) took over Kirkuk and its oilfields in an effort to prevent I S from capturing the city.57 It was not clear whether the peshmerga seized Kirkuk unilaterally or if officials in Baghdad sanctioned the move. Dexter Filkins noted that there may have been some coordination between Iraqi Kurdistan’s Massoud Barzani and the then prime minister Nouri al-Maliki. Filkins suggested that, “Maliki all but gave him [Barzani] permission. On the evening of the tenth, [Fuad] Hussein [Barzani’s chief of staff] told me, he received a phone call from Hamid al-Musawi, Maliki’s personal secretary, conveying a request to secure the disputed areas before I S could: ‘It would be a good thing if you moved in.’”58 Others suggested that the Kurdish takeover of Kirkuk was unilateral. Gareth Stansfield did not mention any coordination between the Kurds and Baghdad. He noted that, “President Barzani ordered the deployment of the peshmerga forces to the disputed territories … it now was the proud owner of most of the disputed territories it had claimed.”59 Indeed, some reports suggested that the Kurds all but forced the Iraqi army to abandon its bases in Kirkuk. On 7 July 2014 Abdul Amir al-Zaidy, the military commander of the Iraqi forces in Kirkuk said, “The peshmerga offered to help the Iraqi army in Kirkuk to fight i s , but after they reached Kirkuk, the peshmerga besieged Iraqi army bases and seized weapons and ammunition.”60 Shortly thereafter, 1 July 2014, Massoud Barzani announced that krg would hold, first, a referendum to decide whether Kirkuk would

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remain a part of Iraq or be annexed by krg and, second, a subsequent referendum on Kurdish independence. He defended krg ’s decision to hold the independence referendum by highlighting the Kurds’ efforts at preserving Iraq’s unity: “We spared no effort to help make this new Iraq work. But unfortunately it has failed. So our question to our doubters is just that: How much longer should we wait, and how much longer should we deny our destiny for some unknown future?”61 Academics, analysts, and pundits quickly declared that Kurdish independence was imminent.62 The referendums, however, were ­postponed after IS attacked Kurdish territory and the Kurds, even if reluctantly, agreed to participate in the formation of the central government in Baghdad. Rather than breaking up Iraq, the threat posed from IS initially provided a common goal and strengthened relations between Iraqi Kurdistan and Baghdad. In a November 2014 forum in Erbil, the then prime minister of k r g , Nechirvan Barzani, downplayed Iraqi Kurdistan’s independence plans, and suggested that independence was not a top priority. Instead, he reiterated k r g ’s commitment to Iraq. He added, however, that the Kurds would ask for more autonomy. “Federalism has failed and if we can’t establish federalism, we are asking for additional autonomy, not for the destruction of Iraq.”63 The invasion of Iraq by IS and the subsequent military clashes with the Kurdish peshmerga revealed that Iraqi Kurdistan’s military capabilities were limited. IS’ modern and heavy weaponry, captured following the withdrawal of the Iraqi military from northern Iraq in June 2014, proved to be superior to the peshmerga’s light and outdated artillery. As a consequence, IS made advances into the disputed territories on the border of the Kurdish region, only to be stopped by a combination of US-led airstrikes and counterattacks on the ground by the peshmerga. Certainly, the peshmerga demonstrated a commitment to defeating the IS threat, but it would have proven difficult to do so without military support from the US and several other states, including Canada, Germany, and the UK. I argue here that Iraqi Kurdistan did not push for independence in 2014 because at that time Iraq possessed the institutional framework to meet Kurdish demands for political autonomy and economic incentives. Moreover, that the Kurds occupied high-profile posts in the central government allowed them to protect and advance their political, economic, and cultural interests. Baghdad’s “history of bad acts” remained top of mind for the Kurds, but two factors mitigated

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this issue. Saddam Hussein’s regime, which was responsible for much of the violence perpetrated against the Kurds, was removed. Although it still faced serious challenges, Iraq appeared to be undergoing meaningful democratic reforms. Second, the union with Iraq provided Iraqi Kurdistan with economic benefits that it would otherwise not have. Economically, Iraqi Kurdistan was better off in a union with Iraq than as an independent state. The economic benefits from a union with Iraq were not insignificant. k r g was entitled to 17 per cent of Iraq’s annual budget based on its population. (It is entitled to 13 per cent as a proportion of its population and an additional 4 per cent as reparations for Baghdad’s historic mistreatment of the Kurdish population.) Kurdish officials contended that k r g received only 12 per cent of Iraq’s budget. In 2018, this 12 per cent translated into about ten billion US dollars. At the same time, k r g possessed access to and control over vast natural resources from which it could generate additional revenues. In this way, Iraqi Kurdistan received a significant sum of money from the central government and had the autonomy to pursue its own economic initiatives. Iraq’s economy plummeted in 2014 as a consequence of the war against is. It experienced a strong recovery in 2015 and 2016 with annual gdp growth of 4.8 per cent and 11 per cent respectively. Iraqi Kurdistan’s economy also suffered due to the war against IS. (Economic data was unavailable for Iraqi Kurdistan from 2013 to 2016.) However, the point here is to show that the overall economic picture for Iraq was positive. That is, since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, Iraq’s economy experienced strong growth (see appendix 3). The strong growth is expected to continue.

C o n c l u s i on This chapter relied on empirical and theoretical insights to make the argument that Iraqi Kurdistan’s decision to maintain its de facto statehood was deliberate. Empirically, the chapter showed that Iraqi Kurdistan’s relationship with the rest of Iraq, and especially with governments in Baghdad, was shaped by a dark history of political and military conflicts. The Kurds endured decades of oppression and engaged in two civil wars against regimes in Baghdad in an attempt to secure political autonomy. Iraqi Kurdistan inadvertently gained de facto statehood in 1991 and it has since functioned as such. This behaviour challenges the notion that the desire for independence is

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predetermined. We know that since 2003, Iraqi Kurdistan passed on two opportunities to secede from Iraq. Theoretically, the chapter argued that realism and institutionalism provide an explanation for the preferences and behaviour of Iraqi Kurdistan. Still, on 7 June 2017 Massoud Barzani announced that Iraqi Kurdistan would hold an independence referendum on 25 September 2017. On the face of it, this decision challenges the arguments presented here. A closer look at the motivations behind Barzani’s announcement, however, showed that Iraqi Kurdistan’s decision to hold a referendum lends support to the explanatory framework ­presented in this book. The next chapter outlines the motivations for the referendum and offers an explanation for its failure.

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6 Iraqi Kurdistan Moves Toward Independence

In many ways, Iraqi Kurdistan’s decision to hold a referendum mirrors South Sudan’s own referendum following the breakdown of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (c pa ) of 2005. South Sudanese leaders such as Salva Kiir argued that the government in Khartoum had failed to live up to its commitments under the cpa and that it did not undertake meaningful democratic reforms to persuade the South to stay. Like the c pa, one of the aims of the 2005 Iraqi constitution was to convince the Kurds that a continued union with the rest of Iraq would be politically and economically beneficial. By most accounts, the constitution had achieved this goal. So, why did the Kurds insist on holding an independence referendum? In an effort to identify the factors that drove the Kurds to hold a referendum, this chapter examines the period from June 2014 to November 2017. Kurdish officials would contend that, though Iraq possessed a democratic and federal constitution and Iraqi Kurdistan functioned with autonomy, they were alarmed by the tenure of Nouri al-Maliki and Baghdad’s desire to curtail Kurdish autonomy. The Kurds argued that Baghdad could not be trusted to uphold democracy and respect Iraqi Kurdistan’s autonomy. This is only one part of the explanation. In this chapter, I argue that the real motivations behind the referendum were to extract concessions from the government in Baghdad and to divert attention away from the political unrest and economic downturn in Iraqi Kurdistan.

T he M o t ivat io n s b e h ind the Referendum In the months leading up to the referendum, some political parties and segments of the population argued that it was ill-timed. Gorran and the Kurdistan Islamic Group, for instance, released a joint statement

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calling for the referendum to be postponed to a date to be set by the regional parliament. In addition, there was a campaign, concentrated in Sulaymaniyah province (the hotbed of supporters of Gorran and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan [puk]), that also urged the Kurdish leadership to postpone the referendum. The “No for Now” campaign, led by the media organization Nalia Radio and Television (n rt ) and its owner Shaswar Qadir, accused the leadership, and specifically Barzani and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (kd p ), of using the ­referendum to exploit Kurdish nationalism for their own political purposes.1 During a rally held in Sulaymaniyah, Qadir declared that the referendum was a ploy to “distract people from the real problems, such as the ongoing financial crisis and shortage of basic services.”2 Those who opposed the timing of the referendum argued that Iraqi Kurdistan was not politically or economically ready for independence. Jamel Kocher, federal member of parliament for ki u, supported the referendum in principle, but he believed that it was mistimed. In a May 2018 interview with the author, he argued that the regional and international environments were not favourable for holding the referendum.3 (He believed that the appropriate time for the referendum was prior to the retaking of Mosul from IS in 2016.4) In a follow-up interview, Kamiran Berwari (May 2018) indicated that Barzani’s insistence for holding the referendum was a response to the political unrest in Iraqi Kurdistan. In this way, he said, any political opposition to the referendum would be labelled treasonous and blame for its failure could be placed on the opposition.5 Some, including Kocher and Berwari, argued that another key objective of the referendum was to alter the relationship between Iraqi Kurdistan and Iraq. There is merit to the idea that the referendum was more about resetting the relationship with Baghdad than independence,6 that Iraqi Kurdistan’s aim was to establish a confederation with two parts (some even suggested three parts) made up from the Kurdish region and the rest of Iraq.7 (The three components would comprise a Kurdish state, a Sunni state, and a Shia state.) This idea received support from high-ranking Kurdish officials, including Massoud Barzani and Nechirvan Barzani. On more than one occasion, they expressed their desire for a confederal arrangement with Iraq. In April 2014, Massoud Barzani asserted that if relations with Baghdad ­continued to deteriorate, the Kurds would consider pushing for ­confederalism.8 Similarly, Nechirvan Barzani noted that one way to

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preserve the unity of post-i s Iraq was to establish a confederation between an independent Kurdistan and Iraq.9 This idea was reinforced by Berwari, who noted that “it was clear that the referendum was not for independence. They wanted to use the referendum as leverage with Baghdad to gain concessions.”10 An insightful explanation comes from Djene Rhys Bajalan, who argues that the Kurdish decision to hold a referendum may have been shaped by Iraq’s political and military weakness and Iraqi Kurdistan’s capture of the disputed territories.11 In short, Bajalan argued, this was an opportunity for independence that the Kurds could not miss. Bajalan argued that the failure of the Kurds to secure independence is the result of the “broader geopolitical architecture of the Middle East and the reluctance of the Great Powers to make adjustments to that order in favor of the Kurds.”12 Bajalan concluded that “factors beyond the control of Kurdish political activists and leaders will continue to shape the fate of the Kurdish community in the Middle East.”13 Similarly, Adam Raafat argued that the decision to hold the referendum was made in 2014 and several factors influenced this decision.14 The factors outlined by Raafat are similar to the ones outlined in this book and by others. They include the perceived failure of the post-2003 Iraqi constitution, the increasingly hostile rhetoric of Baghdad, the emergence of the Islamic State (IS), and the rise of the Shiite militias – the Popular Mobilization Units.15 Palani et al. offer a very insightful explanation for understanding the behaviour of de facto states and behaviour of Iraqi Kurdistan in ­particular. They argued that in order to understand the decision-making of de facto states as it relates to securing recognition and pushing for independence, we must understand the internal and external dynamics of the de facto entity.16 Regarding Iraqi Kurdistan, the authors raised an interesting point about its precarious status as a de facto state. According to them, this uncertain status was one of the main motivations behind Massoud Barzani and the Kurdish leadership decision to hold the referendum.17 But as the authors correctly highlighted, Barzani and Kurdish leaders who endorsed the referendum never offered a plan for the day after the referendum. Palani et al. concluded that Iraqi Kurdistan’s strategy for recognition is a reflection of the internal and external realities it is facing.18 A final explanation for the referendum was the desire of Massoud Barzani to cement his personal legacy as the father of Kurdish independence.19 The idea is that even though Barzani would not

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declare independence, he would be remembered as the Kurdish leader responsible for holding the independence referendum. Qubad Talabani, the son of Jalal Talabani and a high-ranking P U K official, suggested that “political legacy” was a factor in pushing ahead with the referendum.20 This suggestion was echoed by a puk member of the Kurdish parliament, Rahi Rahbar, who noted that “the referendum was more about the personal legacy of Massoud Barzani rather than the broader goal of Kurdish aspirations.”21 Rahbar argued that if Barzani were serious about independence, the path to independence should have been cleared before the referendum. After 25 September (referendum day), Rahbar noted that “we understood that we could not declare independence” without seeking the consent of Baghdad.22 kdp officials, meanwhile, maintained that the referendum was held in order to secede from Iraq. But they also confirmed that they were hoping for negotiations with Baghdad following the vote. In May 2018, Renas Jano, former k d p federal member of parliament, said that the main motivation for holding the referendum was the central government’s failure to implement the constitution.23 According to him, Iraqi Kurdistan planned to enter into negotiations with the central government after the referendum. These negotiations, said Najeeba Najeeb, were aimed at discussing with “Iraq, neighbouring countries, and the international community the Kurdish desire for independence. The main objective was to conduct all of this peacefully and democratically. Even if the negotiations took years.”24 That the Kurdish leadership had revealed its commitment to negotiations weakened its position vis-à-vis Baghdad. Officials in Baghdad were firm that they were unwilling to negotiate secession. Under such conditions, if independence were the objective, a declaration of independence was necessary immediately after the referendum results were announced. Yet, such a declaration did not come and, as it turned out, Barzani had never considered unilaterally declaring independence. If independence were the end goal, then why not declare indepen­ dence and then enter into negotiations with the central government, similar to what Kosovo did in 2008? In this way, you establish a fait accompli and force the hand of Baghdad. The Kosovo leadership, unlike the Kurds, understood that it had to officially declare independence, and worry about the final negotiations with the central government after that fact was established. The Kurdish population’s view of the referendum was that it would be binding, and the declaration of independence would soon follow the vote. In the lead-up to

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and on the day of the vote, many voters, in a public display of confidence in the referendum, destroyed their Iraqi passport and other pieces of documentation with the expectation that they would no longer need them because they would soon be citizens of an indepen­ dent Kurdistan. When asked why Barzani did not declare independence after the vote, Jano said, “because he didn’t want to spill blood.”25 Berwari, for one, argued that “spilling blood for independence may be necessary. We would not have lost if we had to fight a war for independence. The problem is that they did not have a clear idea what they were doing.”26 Najmaldin Karim, former governor of Kirkuk and influential Kurdish nationalist, meanwhile, noted that “from the beginning, Barzani made it clear that the referendum was not intended to declare independence immediately and instead it would lead to renegotiating the constitution (such as a federation). It was clear that Barzani and myself declared that the referendum was not about drawing the final boundaries of Kurdistan. The disputed territories were not to be annexed.”27 Neither Barzani nor any other Kurdish official ever clearly articulated what the negotiations were intended to accomplish, whether Baghdad had ever agreed to negotiate, or why Iraqi Kurdistan did not move ahead with a declaration of independence. It is clear that Barzani and the supporters of the referendum were ill-prepared for the day after the vote. It seems unbelievable that Barzani reached out to then prime minister of Iraq, Haidar al-Abadi, after the vote to renegotiate the Kurds’ relationship with the rest of Iraq.28 This partly explains the mixed signals from Barzani and other Kurdish officials concerning the desire and intentions with respect to the referendum. On the one hand, in June 2017 Bayan Sami Abdul Rahman, representative of the Kurdistan Regional Government (krg) in Washington, dc, maintained that the referendum was nonbinding and that the objective behind the vote was to reach “a negotiated settlement with the government of Iraq.”29 Shortly thereafter, however, in an editorial published in the Washington Post, Barzani described the vote as a “binding referendum.”30 Then in September 2017, in a televised speech, Massoud Barzani asserted that a “yes” vote for the referendum is in itself a declaration of independence.31 Yet, during the same speech, he suggested that like the u k’s exit from the e u, Iraqi Kurdistan’s exit from Iraq will take long negotiations in order to resolve “hundreds of problems with Iraq on the subject of water, border, gas, and oil.”32

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In the lead up to the referendum, Barzani added more confusion to the situation by declaring that the “referendum is not for defining borders or imposing a fait accompli. We want a dialogue with Baghdad to resolve the problems, and the dialogue can last one or two years.”33 The ambiguity was deliberate. It was intended to provide the Kurds with leverage in the post-referendum negotiations with Baghdad. As it turned out, the ambiguity was also employed to dismiss questions about whether the referendum was a failure. This last point was most clearly articulated by Najmaldin Karim. In response to a question about the failure of the referendum, Karim firmly declared that “I don’t believe the referendum failed. Although the events of October 2017 by some elements of the p uk betrayed the Kurdish movement, the referendum achieved some of its intended motivations.”34 It is not surprising that Kurdish leaders such as Massoud Barzani and Karim maintain that the referendum was not a failure. After all, they staked their political legacies and all the gains (political and economic) that Iraqi Kurdistan had made in the preceding decade. It was a gamble that backfired, and the leadership responsible for the mistake must continue to defend the move in order to save face with the Kurdish voters. Despite the defeat, Kurdish leaders maintained that the referendum furnished them with a mandate to pursue negotiations with the central government in Baghdad – even if those negotiations took place at a later date.

J u s t if y in g t h e Referendum The referendum was justified on the grounds that the constitution was a voluntary partnership between the Kurds and the Arabs. Barzani and other top officials often reference the Preamble of the constitution in making the latter point. It says: “We, the people of Iraq, of all components and across the spectrum, have taken upon ourselves to decide freely and by choice to unite our future, to take lessons from yesterday for tomorrow, and to enact this permanent Constitution, through the values and ideals of the heavenly messages and the findings of science and man’s civilization. The adherence to this Constitution preserves for Iraq its free union of people, of land, and of sovereignty.”35 Kurdish officials argued that the Kurds “freely and by choice” joined the Iraqi union, implied that they could freely divorce from that same union. Baghdad disagreed with this interpretation and instead argued that Iraqi Kurdistan’s unilateral referendum was illegal and

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unconstitutional. The international community sided with Baghdad, which meant that the referendum was ill-fated before it was held. On the legality of the referendum, Iraq’s Supreme Court agreed with former prime minister Haider al-Abadi and the Iraqi parliament. On 18 September 2017, the court ordered Iraqi Kurdistan to suspend the referendum to give the court time to examine and deliberate the issue.36 The court’s ruling, delivered after the referendum on 6 November 2017, declared that no region or province in Iraq could unilaterally secede.37 The ruling bolstered Baghdad’s position and its argument that the constitution precludes the right to secession and, as a precondition to negotiations, Iraqi Kurdistan must concede that separation would be off the table. In a surprising move, krg accepted the Iraqi Supreme Court’s ruling that the independence referendum was unconstitutional.38 There were two reasons for this move. First, krg hoped to relieve some of the political, economic, and military pressure that Baghdad had placed on the Kurdish region. (This has been discussed in greater detail in the coming pages.) Second, by capitulating, the Kurds believed they could persuade Baghdad to enter into negotiations concerning the Kurdistan-Baghdad relationship. In a statement, krg said: “We believe that this Decision must become a basis for starting an inclusive national dialogue between Erbil and Baghdad to resolve all disputes through implementation of all constitutional articles and in a way that guarantees all rights, authorities and status mentioned in the Constitution, since this is the only way to secure the unity of Iraq, as Article 1 stated.”39 The statement from krg explicitly mentions preserving the unity of Iraq. One is compelled to conclude that the referendum was not really about independence. Instead, one of the motivations behind the referendum was to furnish the Kurds with leverage in their political and economic dealings with Baghdad. Barzani and other proponents of the referendum maintained that the motivation behind it was Baghdad’s failure to adhere to the constitution and the security threat posed to Iraq by the i s . They argued that the tenure of former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki was evidence that Iraq was neither federal nor democratic. And the presence of is exacerbated the existing poor relations between the Kurds and Baghdad. Iraqi Kurdistan’s war against is produced military support from Western countries (e.g., Germany, France, and Canada) that the Kurds misinterpreted as tacit political support for independence. In an effort to exploit this perceived clout, the Kurdish leadership fashioned the pretext for organizing the referendum.

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In a June 2017 editorial in the Washington Post, Massoud Barzani highlighted the central government’s failure, prior to and post-2005, to uphold the constitution and to treat the Kurds as equal partners. Referring to Baghdad’s record with the 2005 constitution, he said, “Baghdad has failed to implement key provisions of that constitution, and we have good reason to believe that it never will. This failure of the political system is also responsible for the drastic deterioration of relations between Sunnis and Shiites that led to the rise of the Islamic State, with disastrous consequences for all Iraqis, including Kurds.”40 It was Baghdad’s actions and not the Kurdish desire for independence that was offered as the main justification for the referendum. In a subsequent interview with Foreign Policy magazine, Barzani reiterated that argument by declaring: “A long time ago I reached the conclusion that it was necessary to hold a referendum and let our people to decide … For a long time I have had this belief that Baghdad is not accepting real, meaningful partnership with us.”41 Former Iraqi prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, received the bulk of the blame. According to Kurdish officials, al-Maliki’s tenure as prime minister confirmed Kurdish suspicions that a partnership between Baghdad and Iraqi Kurdistan would not be possible. Massoud Barzani accused al-Maliki of committing crimes against the Kurds similar in scale to the atrocities committed by Saddam Hussein.42 In an interview, Barzani said, “Maliki committed another version of the Anfal operation, but in another uglier way … We sought to establish a democratic federal Iraq, but Baghdad refused and we reached a conviction that we are not wanted there.”43 From Barzani’s perspective, the behaviour of al-Maliki validated the Kurdish view that little had changed in Iraq since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. The Kurds expressed concerns that they were being treated like second-class citizens in what was touted as a federal and democratic Iraq. Although al-Maliki had undemocratic tendencies, he was certainly not the brutal autocrat Barzani and the Kurds suggested. The former prime minister’s shortcomings were that, at times, he attempted to circumvent the constitution and rule of law to achieve his policy objectives. These actions included trying to acquire more power for the executive, undermining the autonomy of the Kurds, and a general contempt for the rule of law. This type of behaviour is certainly undemocratic and it was counterproductive coming from the head of government of a fledgling democracy. It also worsened the existing tensions between the Kurds and Baghdad. It was not, however, similar

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to or on scale to the crimes of Saddam Hussein. Such a comparison diminishes the human rights violations and mass killings committed by Hussein and his regime. Moreover, al-Maliki was ultimately held accountable through Iraq’s democratic institutions – he was removed from office following the 2014 federal election. Still, it is worth noting that under Nouri al-Maliki, the Kurds felt alienated and there grew a perception that Baghdad was becoming increasingly authoritarian.44 Al-Maliki’s actions were highlighted by his combative rhetoric and policies aimed at strengthening Baghdad’s position not only vis-à-vis the Kurds, but also the rest of Iraq. Some of al-Maliki’s actions included tightening his grip on the Iraqi military by creating the Office of the Commander in Chief and provincial command centres, institutions through which he could exercise control over the army.45 Al-Maliki also targeted the Kurds by reducing or withholding the Kurdish region’s annual budget and ignoring Kurdish autonomy as outlined in the constitution.46 Massoud Barzani and krg believed that al-Maliki’s actions represented a larger trend in which the central government in Baghdad was attempting to reassert its dominance over the Kurds. Al-Maliki’s power grab (whether perceived or real) prompted Barzani to declare, in a meeting with al-Maliki, “you smell like a dictator.”47 Indeed, Massoud Barzani highlighted these concerns during a visit to Washington, dc, where he told the Barack Obama administration that “Iraq is facing a serious crisis … it’s coming towards one-man rule.”48 Recall that in 2011 there was a push, led by Barzani and Sunni politicians, to remove al-Maliki from office in a vote of non-confidence because they believed that he was expanding his powers at the expense of Kurdish and Sunni interests. Al-Maliki’s political aspirations can be likened to a “strong man” who provided Iraqis with stability and security, but whose rule depended on “patronage and an iron fist.”49 “To anger him is to risk endless harassment, exile, or imprisonment. To strike an alliance with al-Maliki is an opportunity to mass power and protection from ­enemies,” wrote Ned Parker.50 This type of behaviour was best demonstrated by al-Maliki’s actions of 15 December 2011 when he ordered the arrest of Sunni politicians, including Tariq al-Hashemi, Iraq’s then vice president; Rafi al-Issawi, the then finance minister; and Saleh alMutlaq, the then deputy prime minister.51 The accusations against these men were never proven. It was suggested that the incriminating evidence against them was collected from individuals who were tortured and that the arrests were politically motivated.52

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During the post-2014 federal election negotiations, the Kurds were adamant that al-Maliki could not serve another term as prime minister. After some political jockeying, al-Maliki was replaced by Haider ­al-Abadi. Al-Abadi struck a conciliatory and temperate tone with Kurdish officials. However, he did not have time to deliver on his promises of treating the Kurds as partners and adhering to the constitution. IS controlled large parts of Iraq by the time Abadi assumed office in September 2014 and, consequently, his tenure was focused on defeating it. This left little room for improving relations with Iraqi Kurdistan.

T h e C o n s e q u e n c e s o f the Referendum The referendum generated opposition from Baghdad, Iraq’s neighbours, the international community, and from within Iraqi Kurdistan. Most significantly, it was met with strong political opposition from the central government in Baghdad and neighbouring Turkey. On 12 September 2017, Iraq’s parliament voted against the referendum, arguing that “This referendum lacks a constitutional basis and thus it is considered unconstitutional.”53 In addition, the parliament furnished Iraq’s then prime minister, Haider al-Abadi, with the power to “take all measures” necessary to preserve Iraq’s unity.54 The President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, declared that “if Barzani and the Kurdish regional government do not go back on this mistake as soon as possible, they will go down in history with the shame of having dragged the region into an ethnic and sectarian war.”55 He also threatened the Kurds with economic sanctions. He proclaimed that Turkey would punish Iraqi Kurdistan – “when we close the oil taps, all [their] revenues will vanish, and they will not be able to find food when our trucks stop going to northern Iraq.”56 The Americans also discouraged the Kurds from moving ahead with the vote. Two days before the referendum, in a letter addressed to Massoud Barzani, former US Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, asked Barzani to postpone the referendum and proposed an “alternative” course of action. Tillerson referred to the alternative as “accelerated framework for negotiation with the central Government of Iraq … [The] accelerated framework carries an open agenda and should last no longer than one year, with the possibility of renewal. Its objective is to resolve all issues outstanding between Baghdad and Erbil and the nature of the future relationship between the two.”57 Perhaps most significantly, Tillerson offered to “address” Iraqi Kurdistan’s “fiscal

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and security needs” and pledged that should the talks fail, the US would “recognize the need for a referendum.”58 In exchange for this, the Kurds would enter into negotiations with the government in Baghdad, while continuing to support the coalition against is, and the boundaries of Iraqi Kurdistan would be determined by negotiations with Baghdad and through the implementation of Article 140.59 This was always the best deal that Iraqi Kurdistan was going to receive. Barzani and his supporters ignored the repeated and unambiguous requests from the international community to suspend the referendum. He refused these appeals on the grounds that holding the referendum was the Kurds’ inalienable right. In doing so, he believed that Iraqi Kurdistan could enter into post-referendum negotiations with Iraq and extract political and economic concessions. The postreferendum negotiations did not materialize and the fateful decision was a miscalculation that pushed Iraq to brink of civil war. On 25 September 2017, Iraqi Kurdistan moved ahead with the referendum, and asked: “Do you want the Kurdistan Region and the Kurdistani areas outside the administration of the Region to become an independent state?” Iraqi Kurdistan voted and by overwhelming majority, 92.7 per cent of the citizens voted in favour of separating from Iraq.60 Approximately 72 per cent of all eligible voters cast a ballot, which, according David Phillips lent legitimacy to the vote.61 Similar to the events in 1974, the Kurds misread the intentions of the international community and the outcome was therefore costly. The international community largely ignored Iraqi Kurdistan’s referendum results. Perhaps the biggest diplomatic blow came from the US, an ally from which the Kurds expected support. Tillerson released a press statement denouncing the referendum. Tillerson’s statement read: The United States does not recognize the Kurdistan Regional Government’s unilateral referendum held on Monday [25 September 2017]. The vote and the results lack legitimacy and we continue to support a united, federal, democratic and prosperous Iraq. We remain concerned about the potential ­negative consequences of this unilateral step. Prior to the vote, we worked with both the k r g and the central government in Baghdad to pursue a more productive framework and to ­promote stability and prosperity for the people of the Kurdistan region. These aspirations, ultimately, cannot be advanced

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through unilateral measures such as this referendum. We urge calm and an end to vocal recriminations and threats of reciprocal actions. We urge Iraqi Kurdish authorities to respect the ­constitutionally-mandated role of the central government and we call upon the central government to reject threats or even allusion to possible use of force. The United States asks all ­parties, including Iraq’s neighbors, to reject unilateral actions and the use of force. The fight against i si s/Daesh is not over, and extremist groups are seeking to exploit instability and ­discord. We urge our Iraqi partners to remain focused on ­defeating i s i s /Daesh. We encourage all sides to engage c­ onstructively in a dialogue to improve the future of all Iraqis.62 Turkey and Iran, traditional rivals and countries who disagree on many issues, expressed their unity in opposing Iraqi Kurdistan’s referendum and independence aspirations. As mentioned earlier, although it did not materialize, Turkey and Iran had threatened to impose economic and political sanctions on the Kurds.63 The international community (both regional and international actors) played a decisive role in thwarting Iraqi Kurdistan from achieving anything meaningful from the referendum. Raafat also argued that the US played the decisive role by withdrawing support for the Iraqi Kurds in the leadup to and immediately following the referendum.64 He believes that Iraqi Kurdistan’s referendum was based entirely on the belief that “the US would act as their patron and protector.”65 Like others, Raafat argued that the Iraqi Kurds did not believe that Baghdad would respond with force and expected US backing.66 As discussed earlier, this belief defies the unambiguous messages sent to the Kurds by both Baghdad and the US to discourage them from holding the referendum. The Kurds had to persuade the US, Turkey, Iran, and other international powers (e.g., France, UK, and Germany) that an independent Iraqi Kurdistan would not lead to instability in the region.67 The policies of Turkey, Iran, and the US converged on the question of the unity of Iraq. All three states promoted, albeit for different reasons, Iraq’s territorial integrity. krg worked to reassure these governments that Iraqi Kurdistan was not on the path to independence. As noted earlier, Nechirvan Barzani reiterated that Kurds would not seek independence if Baghdad adhered to the Iraqi constitution. He said, “We have a constitution in this country. We will not take any

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other step until we lose hope in that constitution. There is no doubt if and when we lose hope that the constitution is not adhered to, certainly there are other options.”68 He further noted that Kurdish independence had never been so viable, but there remained challenges. According to Nechirvan Barzani, Kurdish independence would be unlikely and, indeed, impossible without support from a regional neighbour (referring to Turkey) and the US.69 Turkey, therefore, would play a major role in the future of Iraqi Kurdistan. Turkey fears that Iraqi Kurdish autonomy would ultimately lead to independence, which would instigate unrest with its own Kurdish population and threaten Turkey’s territorial integrity. Turkey has been engaged in a decades-long conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (pkk). pkk’s political and military headquarters are based in Iraqi Kurdistan’s Qandil Mountains (on the border with Iran). Turkey has long accused the Iraqi Kurds of harbouring pkk – a group that it and other countries (e.g., the US and the EU) consider a terrorist organization. The Iraqi Kurds have a complicated relationship with Kurds in Turkey and, specifically, pkk.70 On the one hand, when it is beneficial, Iraqi Kurdistan turns a blind eye to the presence of pkk on its territory. On the other hand, Massoud Barzani and his kdp have, on more than one occasion, confronted pkk for its activities in Iraqi Kurdistan that have triggered a military response from Turkey.71 Turkey, therefore, is apprehensive about the prospect of greater autonomy for Iraqi Kurdistan. According to David Romano, the Turkish détente with Iraqi Kurdistan was driven primarily by Turkey’s economic and energy needs.72 Romano says, “The attraction of oil and gas resources in neighbouring Iraqi Kurdistan was simply too good for Ankara to pass up or even jeopardize.”73 However, from Turkey’s perspective security imperatives trump everything else. As such, Turkey’s Erdoğan was “outraged” by Barzani’s announcement regarding the 2017 referendum and viewed the planned referendum as a betrayal of the relationship that had been cultivated by Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan.74 Iran was similarly fearful that an independent Kurdistan on its ­border would lead to instability amongst its own Kurdish population. Iran is host to about six to seven million restive Kurds and its government is confronted with sporadic military clashes with the militant Kurdish group, the Free Life Party of Kurdistan (p ja k ). Iraqi Kurdistan’s autonomy prompted neighbouring Kurds in Iran to make similar political and economic demands from Iran. As a result,

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Iran was on high alert and wary of the prospect of an independent Kurdistan on its border. As mentioned earlier, Iran has close ties with puk, and in exchange for military and political support, Iran expected the puk to promote a united Iraq.75 It was no surprise then that puk’s party program underscored the need to “maintain and promote the democratic, federal and parliamentary systems of Iraq.”76 p u k has the difficult task of balancing its alliance with Iran and its own interests and appearing to be opposed to Iraqi Kurdistan’s interests to its supporters. As expected, Baghdad’s response was the fiercest. It reacted to the vote with firm resolve. Al-Abadi demanded that the Kurdish authorities relinquish control over the Kurdish region’s two international airports – Erbil and Sulaymaniyah – or face consequences. Immediately following al-Abadi’s order, international airlines, such as a EgyptAir, Turkish Airlines, and Royal Jordanian, cancelled flights into and from the Kurdish airports, and 700 jobs linked to the airports were jeopardized following this sanction. In addition, Baghdad insisted that it would not allow Iraqi Kurdistan to continue administering the disputed territories, including Kirkuk. As mentioned in chapter 5, after the capture of Kirkuk, Barzani declared that the Kurdish annexation of Kirkuk could not be reversed. “We waited for 10 years for Baghdad to solve Article 140. Now it’s accomplished because the Iraqi army pulled out and our peshmerga forces had to step in. So now the problem is solved. There will be no more conversation about it.”77 Iraqi officials, meanwhile, insisted that Kirkuk belongs to Iraq and that Baghdad must have administrative control over the city. Nouri al-Maliki, in his capacity as the vice president, demanded that krg return Kirkuk and the other disputed territories to Baghdad. “We will not stop until we control the areas that were seized from us.”78 To this end, Haider al-Abadi ordered the Iraqi military to retake the city of Kirkuk and other disputed territories. The international community’s strong condemnation of the referendum emboldened Baghdad to adopt a heavy-handed response. The central government deployed the Iraqi military and Shia militias (the  Hashd al-Shabi or the People’s Mobilization Units) on 16 October 2017 to retake the disputed territories. Iraqi forces marched into Kirkuk with little resistance from Kurdish forces. The fall of Kirkuk represented an important loss for the Kurds, not least because it highlighted the weaknesses of the peshmerga and Iraqi Kurdistan’s political disunity. Following its seizure by Iraqi forces, there emerged accusations

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of treason from rival Kurdish factions. Two theories emerged to explain the fall of Kirkuk. Some argued that the Kurdish withdrawal from Kirkuk was coordinated between a faction of puk and Baghdad. Led by Hero Talabani, the former first lady of Iraq and the wife of Jalal Talabani, and her two sons, Bafel and Qubad, this puk faction had opposed the referendum and supported joint administration (i.e., Kurdish and Iraqi) of Kirkuk.79 In an interview with France 24, Bafel Talabani rejected these accusations by arguing that puk’s peshmerga withdrawal from Kirkuk was a tactical decision made by the puk commanders in the face of a “vastly superior enemy [Iraqi forces].”80 Others believed that Massoud Barzani’s kd p and p u k agreed to relinquish control of Kirkuk in response to mounting pressure from Turkey and Iran.81 The truth is likely somewhere in the middle. It would be difficult to believe that Barzani was unaware of any plan to handover Kirkuk to Baghdad. At the same time, in an interview with the New York Times, Bafel Talabani acknowledged that he unilaterally negotiated with Abadi and Baghdad to relinquish parts of Kirkuk to Baghdad.82 This is substantiated by Najmaldin Karim’s son, Sierwan, who has suggested that the infiltration of Kirkuk could have been enabled only by the p u k security forces that were responsible for protecting the city’s checkpoints.83 Following one week of violent clashes between the Iraqi forces and the peshmerga in Kirkuk, krg issued a statement calling for an end to the military clashes, freezing the results of the referendum, and entering into negotiations under the framework of Iraq’s constitution.84 The statement did not clarify what krg meant by “freeze the results of the referendum conducted in Iraqi Kurdistan.” Did it mean that the referendum would be null and void? Alternatively, the statement “freeze the results” could mean a temporary suspension of the referendum process. It is possible that krg was intentionally vague on this point. More likely, however, k r g recognized that the referendum was a miscalculation and this declaration was the best way to nullify its results without political backlash from the Kurdish population.

S im il a r it ie s a n d Di fferences: I raq i K u r d is ta n , K o s ovo, and South S udan One of the clear and important differences between Kosovo and South Sudan, on the one hand, and Iraqi Kurdistan, on the other, was the strategy adopted for resolving the respective conflicts. Kosovo was

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unambiguous about its ambitions – it would not settle for anything short of independence from Serbia – even if this meant it would not secure recognition from Serbia and other key countries. Similarly, South Sudan set a firm timeline on its union with Sudan and ensured that an amicable separation would take place if it so desired. Iraqi Kurdistan, on the other hand, has not demonstrated an unbending commitment to independence and it did not set clear conditions (such as a firm timeline) on its union with Iraq. It appears that Iraqi Kurdistan has deliberately chosen not to take advantage of either of these two proven strategies, nor any countless others which may exist, to find a solution to its status. Instead, Iraqi Kurdistan oscillated between various strategies to take advantage of domestic and wider geopolitical circumstances. When things are going well in Iraq, the Kurds benefit by remaining a part of Iraq. When things are going poorly, the Kurds raise the spectre of independence. Geopolitically, opposition from neighbouring countries and the US has also discouraged the Kurds from taking a firm position on pursuing independence. This important difference in strategy helps explain the diverging outcomes between the three cases. Iraqi Kurdistan has vacillated between requesting asymmetrical federalism, autonomy, confederalism, and, of course, from time to time, there is talk of secession and independence. The rationale behind this strategy is a pragmatic one. As discussed earlier, Iraqi Kurdistan’s commitment to independence is a reflection of the internal dynamics in Iraq and the geopolitical realities of the region. The Kurdish strategy shifts with the local and regional circumstances with which they are confronted. This argument is articulated very well by Palani et al. who note that the Kurdish strategy changes with the domestic and international opportunities or constraints they face.85 This strategy is in contrast to the one adopted by Kosovo. As mentioned in chapter 2, during the period 1999–2008, Kosovo and its leadership were adamant that independence was the only viable solution to its status and to stability in the Balkans. They did not waver, and the international community ultimately acquiesced to Kosovo’s position. On this point, we can also observe a difference in strategy between Iraqi Kurdistan and South Sudan. Whereas South Sudan demanded an exit strategy that would be entrenched in the 2005 c pa , Iraqi Kurdistan did not petition for such a clause in the Iraqi constitution. Instead, Iraqi Kurdistan is making arguments for its right to

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self-determination based on the interpretation of a section in the preamble of the constitution. The relevant section is introduced and discussed in chapter 5, but it will be useful to share it here as well. The section says: “We, the people of Iraq, of all components and across the spectrum, have taken upon ourselves to decide freely and by choice to unite our future, to take lessons from yesterday for tomorrow, and to enact this permanent Constitution, through the values and ideals of the heavenly messages and the findings of science and man’s civilization. The adherence to this Constitution preserves for Iraq its free union of people, of land, and of sovereignty.”86 As I have discussed earlier, Kurdish officials interpret this language to mean that the union is voluntary and that Iraqi Kurdistan can unilaterally choose to walk away from it. Unsurprisingly, Iraqi officials take a different interpretation of this language and are equally adamant that no entity can unilaterally breakup the Iraqi union. The cpa , meanwhile, explicitly furnished South Sudan with the right to selfdetermination. It says, “That the people of South Sudan have the right to self-determination, inter alia, through a referendum to determine their future status.”87 Part B, Section 2.5 also noted the following: “At the end of the six (6) year Interim Period there shall be an internationally monitored referendum, organized jointly by the GoS [Government of Sudan] and the splm/spla [Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/ Army], for the people of South Sudan to: confirm the unity of Sudan by voting to adopt the system of government established under the Peace Agreement; or to vote for secession.”88 When the six-year interim period ended and South Sudan called for a referendum, Sudan and the international community had to respect and abide by the terms of the c pa and respect South Sudan’s decision. Iraqi Kurdistan does not possess such a clear legal standing to hold an independence referendum without Iraq’s agreement and, indeed, consent. This puts Iraqi Kurdistan in a very precarious position in terms of making a constitutional argument for secession. One of the conspicuous similarities is the role of the international community in intervening in the three cases under consideration here. In Kosovo, as outlined in chapter 2, the international community, namely the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (n ato) and the u n , intervened in 1999 to end the violent conflict between Serbia and the Kosovo Liberation Army (k l a ). That military intervention was important for furnishing Kosovo with de facto statehood status and for emboldening its leadership to demand independence. Kosovo

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understood that the international community would not abandon it despite its intransigence on the independence question. From the outset, Kosovo was clear that negotiations for a continued union with Serbia was off the table. This strategy effectively compelled much of the international community to acquiesce to this reality. In 2008, when Kosovo unilaterally declared independence, the US, the UK, France, Germany, and dozens of other countries conferred recognition upon Kosovo. In South Sudan, as outlined in chapter 3, the role of the US and African states was important for ending the long civil war in Sudan and for negotiating the 2005 c pa . The c pa ushered in the period of de facto statehood for South Sudan, outlined the terms for a temporary union between the South and the North, and paved the way for a South Sudan to hold an independence referendum under the auspices of the international community. In 2011, when South Sudan decided it would follow through with the referendum, Sudan, the US, and the rest of the international community recognized the legitimacy of the referendum and South Sudan’s declaration of independence. Finally, in Iraq, as outlined in chapters 4 and 5, again the international community, specifically the US and the UK, played an important role in initially establishing the no-fly zone over Iraqi Kurdistan in 1991 and subsequently overthrowing Saddam Hussein in 2003. The no-fly zone furnished the Kurds with the opportunity to building a nascent democratic entity in Iraqi Kurdistan. However, as we have discussed, the international community has not been amenable to the idea of Kurdish independence. This has undoubtedly influenced Iraqi Kurdistan’s decision regarding its union with Iraq, on the one hand, and pursuing independence, on the other. Iraqi Kurdistan’s vacillation has made it easy for Baghdad, neighbouring countries, and the international community to oppose its independence aspirations. This leads us to one of the important differences regarding the strategy of the cases under consideration here. That difference will be discussed in the next chapter.

C o n c l u s ion This chapter examined Iraqi Kurdistan’s decision to hold an independence referendum. It made the argument that the referendum was held as a response to political discontent in Iraqi Kurdistan and it was

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an attempt to restructure its relationship with the government in Baghdad. It also examined the justification given by Massoud Barzani and other Kurdish officials for holding the referendum against regional and international opposition. Like South Sudan, Iraqi Kurdistan asserted that the project to build a democratic and unified Iraq had failed. The failure, charged the Kurds, could be attributed most of all to the governments of Nouri al-Maliki. According to Kurdish officials, the policies and conduct of al-Maliki validated Kurdish suspicions that Baghdad could not be trusted to adhere to the constitution and to respect Iraqi Kurdistan’s autonomy. Although al-Maliki was eventually replaced by al-Abadi, the latter’s tenure was occupied by the war against I S . Given that Massoud Barzani had hoped and expected to cement his legacy as the father of an independent Kurdistan, in a cruel twist of irony not only did the referendum backfire politically, it also ended his presidential tenure and de jure political career. Following the fallout of the referendum and the loss of Kirkuk, opposition political parties put immense pressure on Massoud Barzani, whose tenure as president of Iraqi Kurdistan had expired in August 2013, to step down. His tenure was subsequently extended by Iraqi Kurdistan’s parliament to allow continuity in managing the economic crisis and then the war against i s . Barzani ultimately succumbed to the pressure and announced on 30 October 2017 that he would not be seeking reelection as Iraqi Kurdistan’s president.89

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7 Conclusion

This book offers some insights into the decision-making and political outcomes of the nationalist movements of Iraqi Kurdistan, Kosovo, South Sudan, and other de facto states. The primary question I have tried to answer is: what are the conditions under which Iraqi Kurdistan (and other de facto states) would either take concrete steps to achieve independence or preserve the status quo? I argue that the most important condition appears to be the interaction between political autonomy and international acceptance or support. Political autonomy refers to a constitutional arrangement with the parent state wherein a subregional entity is furnished with autonomy in the form of federalism or regional autonomy. International support refers to the recognition that is conferred on the aspiring state by neighbouring states, regional powers, and the US. Specifically, de facto states that possessed political autonomy but did not have international support were unlikely to declare indepen­ dence. This explanation, although derived from the cases of Iraqi Kurdistan, Kosovo, and Sudan, is also supported by other cases. I refer back to table 1.2, which provides a list of de facto states that meet the definition outlined in this book. It shows whether or not they meet the conditions that influence their outcome. A declaration of indepen­ dence means independence was declared after a region became a de facto state. Including Iraqi Kurdistan, there are eight de facto states in this table that have not declared independence. To this list we can add Gagauzia, which declared independence in 1990 but subsequently rescinded it. Of these nine states, five enjoy some measure of autonomy, do not have international support, and have not declared indepen­ dence. These are: Chechnya, Gagauzia, Iraqi Kurdistan, Republika

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Srpska, and Taiwan. It is worth noting that Chechnya and Gagauzia emerged as de facto states and simultaneously declared independence in 1991.

In t e r n at io n al S upport In the following pages I outline the role of international support in influencing de facto states by discussing cases wherein international support is a sufficient condition, cases wherein international support is not a necessary condition, and cases wherein strong international opposition has prevented a declaration of independence. Although the presence of international support is important in the decision-making of de facto states, table 1.2 suggests that it is a sufficient but ultimately not a necessary condition for a de facto state to declare independence. All five de facto states that enjoyed international support (i.e., Eritrea, South Sudan, Kosovo, Montenegro, and East Timor) declared independence and have effectively become full members of the international community. But of the sixteen de facto states that did not have international support, eight of them still declared independence. As mentioned earlier, in addition to Kosovo and South Sudan, Montenegro, Eritrea, and East Timor have declared independence and received international recognition to become de jure states. In an effort to shed light on the conditions that precipitated the declarations of independence, the subsequent paragraphs will examine Montenegro and Eritrea. Montenegro is a state in the Balkan region that borders Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Albania, and the Adriatic Sea. It was a member of the Yugoslav Republic and it declared independence in 2006. It was annexed by Serbia in 1918 and became a member of Yugoslavia in  1943. In 1992, when the other Yugoslav republics declared independence, Montenegro joined Serbia in a union to create the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (fyr).1 By 1997, however, Montenegro became disillusioned with the union and with Slobodan Miloševi´c’s presidency and it began opposing Serbia under the presidency of Milo Djukanovic.2 It adopted independent foreign and economic policies from Serbia and expressed its desire for independence.3 By 2000, Montenegro was functioning as a de facto state and Miloševi´c’s electoral loss in Serbia gave Montenegro the political opening to demand independence. A political agreement was reached in 2002, known as the Belgrade Agreement, in which Montenegro agreed not to pursue

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independence for at least three years and the republic would be renamed Serbia and Montenegro.4 Sanctioned by the eu and with conditions imposed on the referendum, Montenegro and Serbia agreed to set the referendum for 2006. The key condition for the referendum was that more than 55 per cent of the votes cast had to be in favour of independence.5 The turnout for the 21 May 2006 referendum was over 86 per cent and the “yes” side met the eu threshold of 55 per cent with a slim margin of 55.5 per cent. On 3 June 2006, Montenegro’s parliament declared independence, which was met with international recognition. The divorce from Serbia was smooth and peaceful. The experience of Eritrea was neither smooth nor peaceful. Although Eritrea did not receive material or political support from the US or other major powers, its declaration of independence was importantly recognized by the international community. Eritrea is located in the Horn of Africa, bordered by Sudan in the west, Ethiopia in the south, and to the east it has a long coastline along the Red Sea. It is host to a diverse ethnic (there are nine ethnic groups) and religious population that includes Christian Tigrinya speakers (the largest group), who possess cultural ties to their ethnic brethren in Ethiopia, and Muslims who speak Arabic and Afar.6 Eritrean nationalism surfaced in 1952 with the creation of the Eritrean-Ethiopian Federation, wherein Eritrea was to constitute “an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian Crown.”7 Although initially there was strong support in Eritrea for union with Ethiopia (in 1948 approximately 48 per cent of Eritreans supported the union), it eventually produced discontent amongst the Eritrean population, which felt its autonomy was being violated by the Ethiopian Imperial Government. Eritreans began to openly criticize the federation when it failed to meet Eritrea’s economic and political requests. On the economic front, Eritrea argued that Ethiopia was not paying its fair share of the customs duties; and on the political front, Eritreans protested that governmental departments did not adequately represent the Eritrean population.8 The foundations for civil war were laid when Ethiopia abolished Eritrea’s autonomous status and excluded Eritreans from power.9 In 1962, Ethiopia used its army to seize the Eritrean assembly and annexed Eritrea, following the Ethiopian parliament’s decision to rescind Eritrea’s autonomy.10 Organized Eritrean opposition had formed in the late 1950s with the Eritrean Liberation Movement

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(elm), comprising Christian and Muslim Eritreans.11 In 1965 the elm was defeated and replaced by the Eritrean Liberation Front (e l f ), which was a more militant and organized group and it mainly comprised the Muslim community in the lowlands.12 From its beginning in 1961, the e l f was engaged in a bitter civil war with Ethiopia on one front and, at the same time, it faced internal opposition from dissident Eritreans who split from the e l f and formed the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (e p l f ). The civil war with Ethiopia ended in a stalemate in 1974 and coincided with the coup d’état by the Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces (Derg) that overthrew the emperor of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie. The e l f and the e p l f launched a joint attack on the Eritrean capital of Asmara that was met by a fierce Ethiopian response that killed hundreds.13 Ethiopia’s heavy-handed actions had the unintended consequence of encouraging Eritreans in the military and police forces to defect from the government and join the ranks of the guerrillas.14 Prior to the overthrow of Selassie, the Americans viewed Ethiopia and Selassie as a strategic partner in the Horn of African and in exchange for access the Ethiopia’s Red Sea ports, the US provided over two decades of support.15 That support and aid to Ethiopia ended by the late-1970s when Ethiopia and the Soviet Union became allies. From the mid-1970s to the late-1980s, the Soviet-backed Derg government in Ethiopia was unable to defeat the eplf and following the withdrawal of Soviet support, the Derg was defeated by the eplf and Ethiopian groups that opposed the regime.16 Following the collapse of the Derg regime in May 1991, Eritrea emerged as a de facto state and the subsequent peace talks with Ethiopia included the right of Eritrea to hold an independence referendum. Following two years of de facto statehood, Eritrea moved forward with the referendum under the auspices of the U N and with support from the US, UK, and the Organization of African Unity (oau ).17 On 27 April 1993, it was announced that 99.8 per cent of eligible Eritreans had voted in favour of independence. Its declaration of independence was recognized by the US, Ethiopia, other neighbouring countries, and u n member states. Although a sufficient condition for some cases, there are cases that demonstrate that international support is not a necessary condition for declaring independence. These include Abkhazia, NagornoKarabakh, Palestine, Anjouan, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Bougainville, South Ossetia, Biafra, and Somaliland. We now

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examine the case of Bougainville to demonstrate that international support is not necessary for de facto states to declare independence. Bougainville consists of a group of islands in the South Pacific, neighbouring the Solomon Islands, with a population just over 230,000. It is constitutionally a part of Papua New Guinea (p n g ). Nationalist sentiment emerged in the 1960s with the impending independence of p ng from Australia, a process during which many in Bougainville expressed a desire for local autonomy. When Bougainville’s requests for autonomy were ignored in 1975, it declared independence from png.18 International recognition did not materialize, but following months of negotiations, p n g and Bougainville arrived at a settlement that provided Bougainville with constitutionally entrenched autonomy.19 This arrangement became strained and violence broke out in 1988 when the central government of png and the provincial government of Bougainville quarrelled over the rights to land and natural resources (mainly copper) in Bougainville.20 The main cause of tension was a lucrative mining pit, which was the main source of revenue for the central government.21 The fighting ended in 1997 and the 2001 Bougainville Peace Agreement officially ended the civil war and established the Autonomous Bougainville Government in 2005. The key articles outlined in the agreement included increased and asymmetrical autonomy, the constitutional right to hold a referendum on independence, and the disarmament of Bougainville forces.22 A tentative date of June 2019 was set for the referendum. The government of png agreed to the terms of the peace, and the referendum, because Bougainville cannot proceed with a referendum without the endorsement of the central government. In addition, Bougainville must meet two conditions of weapons disposal and good governance before the png would consent to a referendum.23 The term “good governance” is ambiguous and could be interpreted differently by the government of p n g and that of Bougainville. In a September 2017 interview, the prime minister of pn g , Peter O’Neill, indicated that Bougainville had not met the conditions for holding the referendum. He said, “proper establishment of rule of law, proper establishment of a government structure on Bougainville, proper disposal of weapons – so all those issues are yet to be met.”24 These conditions furnish the government of p n g with a veto against Bougainville’s independence attempts. We will turn to political autonomy in a moment, but it is appropriate now to ask what we can say about the de facto states covered in

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table 1.2, that have not declared independence even though they do not possess political autonomy. These are Republika Srpska Krajina (rsk), Tamil Eelam, and Transnistria. Although Transnistria declared independence from Moldova by proclaiming itself a republic of the Soviet Union in 1990, it was met by international opposition that prevented it from securing independence. Whereas the earlier cases highlighted the important role of international support, these three cases highlight the importance of international opposition. Although they do not have the political autonomy that the others enjoy, they have not declared independence because the opposition of external parties has been so strong that independence is simply not a possibility. Strong international opposition, therefore, will almost always prevent a declaration of independence. rsk and Tamil Eelam are good examples. rsk occupies a strip of territory along Croatia’s border with Bosnia and Herzegovina. It emerged as a de facto state in June 1991 and it was militarily defeated by Croatia in 1995. In response to Croatia’s move to secede from Yugoslavia and declare independence, the Serbian population in Croatia organized itself politically and militarily in order to remain a part of Yugoslavia and eventually to be annexed by Serbia. To this end, the assembly of the rs k passed legislation that declared its status as a republic of Yugoslavia.25 The e u recognized Croatia’s independence but refused to accept rsk’s status as a republic on the grounds that it violated international law and Croatia’s territorial integrity.26 These events triggered the war between the Croatian army and Serbian forces in Croatia.27 In 1992, the e u once again rejected the rsk’s appeal for republic status in favour of maintaining Croatia’s borders. In 1995, Serbia pulled its support for rs k . As a consequence, it was eventually defeated by the Croatian army.28 It was clear for rsk that a declaration of independence would not garner support from the international community. It could not even count on its big brother in Serbia. Sri Lanka is an island nation, located south of India. It is host to a population of majority Sinhalese and minority Tamils. Under British control, the policy of divide and rule, which favoured the Tamil minority in governmental and administrative positions, generated feelings of competition and resentment between the two groups.29 Although Tamils and Sinhalese collaborated in securing independence from Britain in 1948, the cooperation was short-lived when, in 1956, the government of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike (more popularly known as Solomon Bandaranaike) followed through with a campaign promise

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to legislate – despite opposition from Tamil and Sinhalese groups in Sri Lanka – Sinhala as the only official language.30 The next decade ushered in more policies that promoted Sinhalese dominance over the Tamils. Tamil requests for equal treatment and some form of devolution were ignored by the government of Sri Lanka and this ultimately promoted the formation of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (ltte – originally called the Tamil New Tigers) in 1972.31 ltte was a militant group that hoped to establish an independent Tamil Eelam state. It was engaged in a civil war against the government of Sri Lanka from 1983 until its defeat in 2009. During its time as a de facto state, from 1997 to 2009, Tamil Eelam did not declare independence. Like rsk, Tamil Eelam found it difficult to garner support from the international community and it was simultaneously engaged in a civil war with the Sri Lankan army.32 lt t e received military training and weapons from India in the 1980s, but this support ended in 1987 when India attempted to broker a peace agreement. India withdrew its support for the Tamils when lt t e refused to accept the agreement and became embroiled in open conflict with Indian forces.33 The US placed lt t e on its terror list in 1997 and after 9/11, it put its political support behind the government of Sri Lanka. lt t e continued to fight for Tamil independence until it suffered military defeat 2009. It has since abandoned the demand for independence in favour of autonomy.34 Tamil Eelam did not receive international support and rs k faced firm strong opposition from the  international community. The lack of international support decided the fates of both de facto states and prevented them from taking steps toward independence.

P o l it ic a l A u tonomy In contrast to international support, political autonomy is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for declaring independence. Nevertheless, we see that it too is an important factor. The effect of political autonomy, and its interaction with international support, also varies. The first observation we can make is that de facto states that possess both political autonomy and international support are certain to declare independence. From the data in table 1.2, these include South Sudan, Kosovo, and Montenegro – three cases that have been discussed already. The second observation is that political autonomy, even in the absence of international support, may not be enough to

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dissuade a de facto state from declaring independence. This may be a result of three factors: First, the lack of political and economic benefits of the de facto status (e.g., Palestine and Bougainville); second, in some cases, the parent state may be too weak to prevent a declaration of independence (e.g., Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus [trnc]); and third, there may be a lack of strong international opposition (e.g., Anjouan and t r n c ). To demonstrate the role of a weak parent state and the lack of strong international opposition in encouraging a de facto state to declare independence I now examine the t r n c. From the 1570s to the late 1870s, the Ottoman Empire controlled Cyprus and settled Turkish soldiers and peasants on the island. The island was leased to Britain in 1878 following the Russo-Turkish War and it remained under British control until its independence in 1960. The constitution that was inherited from the British distributed ­governmental offices along ethnic lines and it furnished the Turkish community – about 20 per cent of the population at the time – with 30 per cent of the administrative positions, strong political guarantees, and a veto power over decision-making.35 Such a political system created discontent and resentment on both sides as a result of disagreements over foreign policy, communal integration, and military integration.36 The political instability and quarrelling pushed the Greek Cypriots to undertake constitutional reforms aimed at resolving the political impasse. The proposed reforms included the abolition of many Turkish Cypriot constitutional safeguards such as the veto and the right to have separate municipalities.37 The Turkish community rejected the proposals, and between 1963 and 1964 intercommunal violence erupted.38 One of the consequences of all of this was that Turkish Cypriots no longer participated in the bureaucracy or state institutions. The question of whether the Turkish Cypriots voluntarily abandoned their positions or if they were prevented from continuing in their positions remains hotly contested.39 During this time, the Turkish Cypriots built parallel institutions tasked with governing their community. Moreover, the violence and political crisis pushed the Turkish Cypriot community to believe that it could not coexist with the Greek community.40 In 1974, the Greek military overthrew the Greek Cypriot president and appointed a pro-unification nationalist in his position. Turkey responded by launching its own military invasion of the island by

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seizing and consolidating control of about 37 per cent of the island.41 Since 1974, therefore, the t r nc functioned as a de facto state and, despite international opposition, it unilaterally declared independence in 1983. It received substantial support and recognition from Turkey. Although the international community remained engaged in the ­conflict through the United Nations Force in Cyprus, the t rn c was shunned by the international community.42 Since its unilateral declaration of independence, a u n -led effort, headed by former secretary general Kofi Annan, failed to unite the island in 2004.

T he I n t e r ac t io n b e t w e e n Poli ti cal Autonomy a n d In t e r n at io nal S upport A final observation regarding the interaction between political autonomy and international support is that political autonomy does not lead to a declaration of independence when there is strong international opposition and when there are advantages to the de facto status. In addition to Iraqi Kurdistan, examples from table 1.2 include Gagauzia, Republika Srpska, and Taiwan. Gagauzia is a region in southern Moldova, bordering Ukraine to the east. It is host to a Turkic-speaking population that was Russified over the decades. The population of Gagauzia identifies itself as a distinct people with a separate language and culture from the rest of Moldova. Moldova’s 1989 language laws, which banned non-­ Romanian languages and paved the way for the use of Romanian in the administration of government, education, and other societal spheres including in the minority regions of Transnistria and Gagauzia.43 The laws provoked fear in the minority communities that they would face political and cultural persecution and that Moldova would be annexed by Romania.44 This fear and uncertainty prompted the Gagauz and Transnistrians to demand political and cultural rights from the government in Moldova. Gagauzians believed that their traditions, culture, and history were threatened by the rise of the pro-Romanian Popular Front political party, which sought to transform Moldova and to bring it close to Romania.45 These laws were enacted despite requests by the Gagauz Khalky (Gagauz People) organization for cultural and political rights in the form of political autonomy for the region in southern Moldova.46

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Previously, Gagauzia’s central grievance was that a centralized Moldova did not offer Gagauzians political, economic, or cultural rights and protections. The spark that initiated Gagauzia’s declaration of independence came in 1989 when the above-mentioned language laws were passed in Moldova.47 In November 1989, the Gagauz Khalky created administrative structures and demanded autonomy for Gagauzia within Moldova and obtained local support for Gagauz autonomy after negotiations with the Moldovan authorities collapsed.48 Gagauzian demands for autonomy were ultimately denied by the Moldovan Supreme Soviet and, in response, Gagauzia declared itself an independent Soviet Republic and later declared independence from the Soviet Union in August 1991. It did not receive recognition from any state and as a result one faction of its leadership sought rapprochement with Moldova.49 From 1991 to 1994, Gagauzia functioned as a de facto state until relations improved with the central government and there was an opening to find a political settlement. Following the 1994 parliamentary election in Moldova, the Popular Front of Moldova was dealt a severe blow when it won only nine of out 104 seats. This provided an opening for the newly elected Moldovan government to enter into negotiations with the Gagauz in an effort to resolve the conflict. Following the negotiations and amendments to Moldova’s constitution that were passed in 1994, Gagauzia rescinded its declaration of independence and has since functioned with special status as an autonomous region. The key amendment to the constitution recognized Gagauzia as a special autonomous region with political and cultural rights. Gagauzia possesses a parliament that is responsible for the administration of education, taxation, and other administrative responsibilities of the region. Finally, the 1994 constitutional amendment furnished Gagauzia with the right to self-determination if there were a major change to Moldova’s political system (e.g., unification with Romania or centralization). Republika Srpska emerged as a de facto state in 1992 during the Yugoslav Wars. Its autonomous status was officially entrenched by the Dayton Agreement (also referred to as Dayton Accords) that ended the Bosnian War in 1995. It has a population of just over one million, the majority of which are ethnic Serbs, and its territory straddles Bosnia and Herzegovina from the north and east. It is one of two – the other is Bosnia and Herzegovina – constitutionally recognized entities

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of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Like Iraqi Kurdistan, it has representation in the parliament of Bosnia (Serbs are represented in both houses of the bicameral legislature) and it possesses its own president, parliament, and executive with a prime minister and a cabinet. It functions with considerable political autonomy. Milorad Dodik, president of Republika Srpska from 2010 to 2018, declared that the Dayton Agreement was an imposed settlement, and he has indicated a desire to hold an independence referendum.50 There were growing fears that Dodik was arming the police force with the aim of creating an army with the ultimate objective of reunification with Serbia. According to some, Dodik’s rhetoric is more about appeasing his voters and staying in power than a concrete policy.51 Its primary challenge is that most of the international community remains resolute about preserving the territorial integrity of Bosnia.52 Although it possesses ties with Russia and Serbia, it is not clear whether this would translate into support for independence. In 2017, the president of Serbia, Aleksander Vuči´c, made the following statement regarding the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina: “I came to say that Bosnia and Herzegovina has a true friend in Serbia. We show that friendship through respect for the territorial integrity of Bosnia, and through strengthening economic and political bonds.”53 And Russia has approved UN resolutions endorsing Bosnia’s territorial integrity.54 Taiwan, officially known as the Republic of China, was a recognized state and a member of the un until 1971, when this status was revoked and most governments conferred recognition on mainland China (i.e., the People’s Republic of China). In 1979, the US recognized the government in Beijing as the legitimate government of China. Seventeen states continue to recognize Taiwan as the government of China.55 The central issue in the case of Taiwan is not political autonomy or economic development. In these respects, it is different from the other cases outlined in this book. In fact, regarding political autonomy Taiwan is an extreme case because it possesses autonomy that is as good as independence and it faces both strong international opposition along with international acceptance. The central issue in this case is the principle of one China – this policy holds there is a single China and Taiwan is an essential part of it.56 The Chinese position is that it would tolerate Taiwan’s existence under the auspices of Deng Xiaoping’s “one country, two systems” model as long as it does not push for independence. China’s longstanding policy is that a

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declaration of independence from Taiwan is unacceptable and it would provoke a military response. As a result, most governments, including the US, support the one China policy and the status quo. Taiwan itself is divided on the question of its status. One faction, led by the Kuomintang political party, maintains that Taiwan represents the legitimate government of all Chinese and, although it has abandoned the idea of reunification in the short to medium term, it continues to promote pan-Chinese nationalism.57 Instead of focusing on reunification, this faction promotes the status quo. A second ­faction, led by the Democratic Progressive Party (d p p ), argues that Taiwan ought to move away from Chinese culture and identity and instead promote its own Taiwanese identity and de jure independence.58 These two competing visions are a reflection of the domestic political divide in Taiwan and, as a result, the two factions continue to compete for support and votes without diverging too far from the status quo. The international environment is not favourable to an officially independent Taiwan. In many ways, Taiwan is in an enviable position relative to other de facto states. It possesses all the trappings of a de jure state, it is geographically separated from China, and it is developed and democratic. These factors have allowed it to function as a de facto state for decades with little opposition to its existence. Although at times China uses bellicose rhetoric and threatens military action, the status quo is acceptable to it. Like Iraqi Kurdistan, the cases of Gagauzia, Republika Srpska, and Taiwan highlight the importance of institutions (i.e., political autonomy) in mitigating political competition and violent conflict. Although the institutional frameworks may not be permanent solutions, they have the potential to moderate enduring conflicts and pave the way for a long-term resolution. Perhaps the key similarity and institutional agreement between these cases and Iraqi Kurdistan is that political autonomy is entrenched in the constitutions of the respective parent states. In this way, their autonomous status would be difficult to repeal. The other important similarity between all three cases and Iraqi Kurdistan is the role of international support or lack thereof. Without support from other states, these four de facto states have settled for something less than full independence. An additional factor that has helped convince Iraqi Kurdistan to maintain the status quo is economic benefits. Iraqi Kurdistan’s status as a constituent of Iraq provides it with significant economic returns

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in the form of cash transfers. As mentioned in chapter 5, it is entitled to 17 per cent of Iraq’s annual budget, which translates into billions of dollars and, at the same time, it pursues an independent economic agenda with its own vast natural resources. If we contrast this with Bougainville, which incurs costs as a consequence of the union with PN G, one could argue that economic benefits play a role in de fact state decision-making. There are also hybrid cases that highlight the importance of political autonomy and economic benefits in discouraging a declaration of independence. Even with the absence of strong international opposition, Scotland and Quebec have not declared independence.59 Although they are not classified as de facto states, the regions of Scotland and Quebec function with considerable autonomy. Quebec possesses a provincial parliament that exercises control over education, health care, and immigration. The Canadian constitution guarantees that Quebec will have no less than seventy-five members of parliament and the Supreme Court Act ensures that three of the nine judges must come from Quebec. Scotland functions under a devolution system in the uk, which furnishes it with political autonomy in the areas of education, health care, and some taxation and it has the autonomy to pursue its own economic policies. Since 1999, the Scottish Parliament has been ­furnished with more autonomy over policy areas in Scotland. As a result, separatist leaders have failed to persuade enough of their populations that independence is preferable to the status quo. In 2014, Scotland held a referendum that asked voters “Should Scotland be an independent country?” More than 55 per cent of voters voted against independence. Quebec has held two failed ­referendums: The first in 1980 and the second in 1995. The 1995 referendum was decided by a slim margin of 50.58 per cent of voters against independence. We know that in well-established democracies it is difficult for aspiring secessionists to convince their ethnic group that independence would be politically and economically wise. In addition, the populations of entities such as Scotland and Quebec would be unwilling to absorb the economic costs associated with secession.60 In Quebec, support for independence is weaker as voters believe that independence would lower their standard of living.61 In Scotland, one of the reasons for the failed referendum was the uncertainty around Scotland’s economic future after independence and its ability to thrive

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economically. In retrospect, the decision to stay with the U K was a wise economic decision given that oil prices plummeted following Scotland’s referendum.62

L e s s o n s f o r Ir aq i Kurdi stan From this study, a few lessons follow for Iraqi Kurdistan. The first lesson that emerges for Iraqi Kurdistan is to move forward with prudence. Landlocked, surrounded by states that oppose Kurdish independence, and strong international opposition present Iraqi Kurdistan with seemingly insurmountable challenges for achieving independence. The ill-advised 2017 referendum is an example of what Kurdish leaders should not do. The Kurds set in motion a reckless policy that backfired spectacularly. The political and military events that followed the 2017 independence referendum attest to this. As  Michiel Leezenberg notes, Iraqi Kurdistan remains a weak, ­conflict-ridden, and tenuous political entity.63 The challenges associated with an undefined territory, internal division, weak institutions, and the presence of foreign militaries will continue to undermine Kurdish aspirations for independence.64 As such, Iraqi Kurdistan must more carefully read the signals from its neighbours and the international community on which it depends for political, economic, and military support. A second lesson is that Iraqi Kurdistan is inextricably tied to its neighbouring countries. Strengthening economic and political ties with these neighbours will increase stability and furnish Iraqi Kurdistan with leverage in their relations. Although Iraqi Kurdistan has some political and economic ties to neighbouring Iran and Turkey, these relations are often ad hoc and short term. By strengthening and deepening economic and political ties with Iran and Turkey, Iraqi Kurdistan may gain some influence over their policies in Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan. The third lesson is that there are alternative models to full independence. Given that Iraq already functions as “one country, two systems,” the Taiwan case represents a unique model that Iraqi Kurdistan could follow. Although Iraqi Kurdistan would have to be constitutionally linked to Iraq, this model would allow it to effectively function as an independent state without provoking the government in Baghdad and neighbouring countries. One of the key lessons from this study is that under some conditions, political

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autonomy could be a more pragmatic political arrangement than outright independence. Finally, Iraqi Kurdistan must adopt a clear policy and pursue it, even if incrementally. As it is, the policies are dictated by Massoud Barzani and his family. The Barzani family has firmly established itself as the leader of the Kurdish nationalist movement. We should of course recognize the contribution and importance of Jalal Talabani to Iraqi Kurdistan as well. For more than five decades, Talabani was a monumental figure in promoting and fighting for Kurdish rights and protecting Kurdish achievements. However, outside of Sulaymaniyah, Iraqi Kurdistan is governed by the Barzanis. Specifically, since the passing of his father, Mulla Mustafa Barzani, Massoud Barzani has been the principal leader of Iraqi Kurdistan. As we have discussed, Barzani has expressed his dream for Kurdish independence, but he has also, on many occasions, conceded that Iraqi Kurdistan would settle for a union with Iraq. I have described this as a policy of vacillation, where, depending on conditions, Iraqi Kurdistan becomes more or less inclined to move toward independence. Barzani is in an unenviable position as it relates to this question. Pushing for independence and ultimately falling short would be humiliating for him and the Kurds. Even worse, such a move could plunge the Kurds into a bloody war against Iraq and its neighbours. Conversely, maintaining the status quo, leaves Barzani vulnerable to criticisms that he has failed to achieve the Kurdish dream of independence. This would be a blow to his legacy and that of his father. The point here is that Barzani has not been decisive when it comes to Iraqi Kurdistan’s policy on independence. This is understandable given the serious challenges confronted by Iraqi Kurdistan and everything that is at stake for the Kurds. However, in an effort to create political stability and to promote economic development, Barzani must make a decision regarding Iraqi Kurdistan’s future and follow that path. It is also worth noting that since 2003, Barzani and Iraqi Kurdistan have gained considerable political capital with the international community. As mentioned earlier, Iraqi Kurdistan welcomed the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and this provided the Americans with material support and intelligence for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. The Kurds were also willing participants of the post-Hussein reconstruction of Iraq. Without Kurdish goodwill and support, the US and its allies would have faced an even more difficult task of rebuilding Iraq and its political system. Between 2014 and 2017, Iraqi Kurdistan was

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thrust into the international spotlight during its war against I S . The Kurds were on the frontlines of the war against the terrorist organization, and Barzani and the Kurdish peshmerga did not shy away from the fight. Indeed, the Kurds demonstrated their resilience and willingness to defeat the terrorists. This bravery and sacrifice was recognized by the international community that furnished the Kurds with military and political support. By helping to defeat IS, Iraqi Kurdistan underlined its importance as a force for stability and progress in a volatile Middle East. It occupies a strategic position in the broader region and it is an important element of Iraq’s democracy and development. Barzani and the Kurds squandered this clout and capital to strengthen their position in Iraq and the region by holding the referendum ­without seeking the support of the US and other members of the international community. Iraqi Kurdistan’s existing strategy of vacillating will impede its political and economic progress. The existing strategy is impractical. Surely, Iraqi Kurdistan cannot prepare for separation from Iraq by holding a referendum every few years, stopping short of independence, and then suffering blowback from Baghdad, its neighbours, and the international community. Barzani and other leaders of Iraqi Kurdistan will often resort to independence rhetoric when they are dissatisfied with Baghdad and the way it is treating the Kurds. Undoubtedly, the Kurds have legitimate grievances as it relates to the Iraqi federation and they should raise concerns when they arise. But when things are going well in Iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan is willing to work in a union and continue with its de facto status. This is equivalent to taking two steps forward, one step back. Iraqi Kurdistan’s political stability, its economic development, and its relations with Baghdad and neighbouring countries suffer from this strategy. Michael Gunter provides some sobering wisdom in understanding the fallout from the referendum. As per him, the failure of the referendum and the humiliating military defeat following it does not mean “that Kurdish hopes for eventual independence were forever crushed. More likely, it was simply another setback along the road to that eventual achievement.”65

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Appendix 1

Economic performance of Kosovo and Serbia (1990–2016) K o s ovo 1 Year 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990

gdp

(usd)

6,682,832,632 6,295,820,482 7,074,657,898 6,735,731,173 6,445,201,981 6,636,703,418 5,750,799,437 5,634,824,257 5,771,473,142 4,743,437,689 3,918,176,308 3,743,116,980 3,639,935,348 3,355,083,117 2,702,427,047 2,535,333,632 1,849,196,082 1,909,129,923 2,826,937,025 3,198,955,565 3,465,043,853 5,382,372,119 2,484,741,820 2,433,830,382 3,164,182,744 4,136,797,027 4,489,386,272

gdp

per capita (u s d ) 3,661 3,574 3,902 3,704 3,568 3,706 3,239 3,199 3,303 2,736 2,279 2,194 2,135 1,970 1,588 1,490 1,088 685 1,006 1,137 1,241 1,960 933 958 1,319 1,830 2,443

gdp

annual growth (%) 3,4 4.1 3.3 5.3 2.7 4.5 3.2 3.0 7.2 8.3 3.4 6.0 2.6 6.0 –0.7 27.0 2.7 –22.8 –8.5 7.7 8.7 8.1 0.0 –24.7 –25.3 –11.0 –

1 The data for the years 2000 to 2012 is from the World Bank and the data for 1990 to 1999 is from the United Nations.

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S e r b ia 1 Year 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990

gdp

(usd)

40,692,643,373 39,655,958,843 47,062,206,678 48,394,239,475 37,488,935,010 43,291,846,196 36,990,001,284 40,249,479,880 47,760,580,366 38,952,093,544 29,221,081,587 25,234,408,773 23,649,854,234 19,550,781,969 15,102,567,925 11,390,468,619 6,082,791,506 17,632,705,913 16,204,161,184 21,380,951,576 18,662,409,858 17,498,398,432 16,220,248,574 15,486,053,510 21,781,363,485 29,607,638,155 32,369,820,042

gdp

per capita (u s d ) 5,765 5,589 6,600 6,755 5,190 5,964 5,073 5,498 6,498 5,277 3,943 3,391 3,169 2,614 2,014 1,518 809 2,338 2,141 2,795 2,448 2,294 2,128 2,034 2,864 3,898 4,099

gdp

annual growth (%) 3.3 1.8 –1.6 2.9 –1.7 1.6 1.0 –3.5 3.8 5.4 3.6 5.4 9.3 2.7 4.1 5.3 5.3 –11.2 0.7 10.1 7.8 6.1 2.5 –30.5 –27.2 –9.8 –8.0

1 The data for gdp and the gdp per capita from 1997 to 2012 and the gdp annual growth is from the World Bank. The data for gdp and gdp per capita from 1990 to 1996 is from the United Nations.

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Appendix 2

Economic performance of South Sudan and Sudan (1994–2012) S o u t h S udan 1 Year 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008

gdp

(usd)

10,220,256,857 19,145,887,852 15,178,973,598 11,853,474,305 15,264,618,786

gdp

per capita (u s d ) 943 1,844 1,527 1,245 1,674

gdp

annual growth (%) –47.55 1.57 4.24 4.31 –

1 All data is from the World Bank. gdp data was not available earlier than 2008.

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S u da n 1 Year

gdp

(usd)

2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994

58,768,800,833 63,997,129,027 64,849,930,758 52,839,990,731 54,082,389,393 45,456,460,335 35,159,250,985 26,524,992,225 21,457,886,199 17,646,271,397 14,803,423,335 13,182,872,555 12,257,299,163 10,682,027,627 11,250,220,583 11,681,179,553 9,018,303,154 13,830,369,880 12,793,798,349

gdp

per capita (u s d ) 1,580 1,538 1,422 1,191 1,253 1,083 862 669 557 472 407 373 356 319 346 369 293 462 440

gdp

annual growth (%) 8.43 8.58 5.86 5.81 6.61 1.38 1.38 –0.70 46.50 –41.30 –7.80 –6.60 –4.30 24.80 34.80 – – – –

1 All data is from the World Bank.

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Appendix 3

Economic performance of Iraqi Kurdistan and Iraq (2004–2013) Ir aq 1 Year 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004

gdp

(usd)

222,879 355 403 210,279,947,256 180,606,795,374 135,488,471,368 111,659,988,889 131,611,819,294 88,837,727,881 65,141,035,028 36,743,640,204 25,509,364,916

gdp

per capita (u s d ) 6,670 6,455 5,687 4,376 3,702 4,472 3,091 2,321 1,342 956

gdp

annual growth (%) 3.95 8.43 8.58 5.86 5.81 6.61 1.38 1.38 –0.70 46.50

1 All data is from the World Bank.

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Ir aq i K u r d i s tan 1 Year 20133 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004

gdp

(usd)

– 29,500,000,000 23,600,000,000 22,000,00,000 19,250,000,000 17,350,000,000 8,500,000,000 6,250,000,000 3,750,000,000 2,000,000,000

gdp

per capita (u s d )2 – 4,600 4,452 4,300 4,100 4,200 2,000 1,500 800 500

gdp

annual growth (%) – 12 – – 4.3 1.5 – – – –

1 gdp annual growth data was not unavailable for 2004–07 and 2010–11. 2 Data for the gdp per capita were was collected from the krg’s Statistics Office. 3 Data was not available for 2013.

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Notes

C h a p t e r O ne   1 For example, South Katanga in the Democratic Republic of Congo emerged as a de facto state in 1960 and Biafra in Nigeria emerged as a de facto state in 1967.   2 During this period, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Chechnya, Gagauzia Transnistria, Republika Srpska, and Republika Srpska Krajina emerged as de facto states in Eastern Europe and the Caucuses region.   3 See Bahcheli, Bartmann, and Srebrnik, De Facto States; Caspersen and Stansfield, Unrecognized States; Geldenhuys, Contested States in World Politics; Pegg, International Society and the De Facto State.   4 Pegg, “De Facto States in the International System.”   5 See Gunter, “A De Facto Kurdish State”; Randolph, “The Status of Agreements.”  6 Pegg, International Society and the De Facto State, 26.   7 For these definitions, see Caspersen and Stansfield, Unrecognized States, 3–4; McGarry, “Forward,” x.   8 This definition borrows from Bahcheli, Bartmann, and Srebrnik, De Facto States; and Pegg International Society and the De Facto State.   9 Caspersen, “Playing the Recognition Game,” 47. 10 Berg and Toomla, “Forms of Normalisation in the Quest for De Facto Statehood,” 29–30. 11 Ibid., 44. 12 Cornell, “Autonomy as a Source of Conflict,” 75. 13 Caspersen, “States without Sovereignty: Imitating Democratic Statehood,” 87.

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140

Notes to pages 10–13

14 Taiwan Matters (blog), “Poll statistics regarding Taiwan’s independence vs. unification,” 14 December 2009. Available at: http://taiwanmatters. blogspot.ca/2009/12/poll-statistics-regarding-taiwans.html. 15 Walt, “The Enduring Relevance,” 200. 16 A significant difference between the classical realists and the neorealists is the role of power. Where the classical realists believe that power is an end in itself, the neorealists say power is a means and not an end; security/ survival is the highest end. The first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their relative position in the system. States therefore prefer to join the weaker of two coalitions and we do not expect to see the strong combining with the strong. 17 Constructivism can be divided into the “conventional” and the “critical” strands. Ted Hopf notes that conventional constructivism shares ­methodological and epistemological assumptions with traditional theories such as neorealism and liberalism. Conventional constructivism grew out of first-wave critical theory but differs in an important way: conventional constructivism accepts and indeed adopts empirical analysis. Critical ­construc­tivism, on the other hand, rejects the fundamental epistemological and methodological assumptions of traditional IR theories. This volume focuses on the assumptions and utility of conventional constructivism to the study of de facto states. See Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism.” 18 Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make.” 19 Ibid., 395. 20 Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life, 31. 21 Ibid., 34. 22 Ibid., 29. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid., 35. 25 Ibid., 37. 26 McGarry and O’Leary, “The Political Regulation of National and Ethnic Conflict,” 94–115. 27 Horowitz, “Irredentas and Secessions,” 11. 28 Young, The Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada. 29 Ibid., 242. 30 Keating, “Rethinking Sovereignty,” 10. 31 Buchanan, “Uncoupling Secession from Nationalism,” 94. 32 Dion, “Secession and the Virtues of Clarity,” 408. 33 Ibid., 406. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid.

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Notes to pages 13–22

141

36 Ibid., 407. 37 Anderson, “Reintegrating Unrecognized States,” 187. 38 Pegg, International Society and the De Facto State, 209. 39 Ibid. Italics as per original. 40 Kolstø, “The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-States,” 735–7. 41 McGarry, “Forward: De Facto States and the International Order.” 42 Berg, “Merging Together or Drifting Apart?,” 468. 43 Dent, Identity Politics, 17. 44 Ibid., 104. 45 Dion, “Why is Secession Difficult in Well-Established Democracies?,” 269. 46 Ibid., 271. 47 Ibid. 48 Paquin, “Paradiplomacy,” 49. 49 Duchacek, “Perforated Sovereignties,” 27. 50 Paquin, “Paradiplomacy,” 51. 51 Soldatos, “An Explanatory Framework for the Study of Federated States as Foreign Policy Actors,” 41. 52 Ibid, 41–2. 53 Zadeh and Kirmanj, “The Para-Diplomacy of the Kurdistan Region.” 54 Ibid., 596. 55 Ibid. 56 The most similar systems design, along with the most different systems design, were first proposed by John Stuart Mill and have now become standard methods for conducting research in comparative politics and other social science fields. 57 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, 20. 58 See Caspersen, “Playing the Recognition Game”; King, “The Benefits of Ethnic War,” “Eurasia’s Nonstate States”; Kolstø and Blakkisrud, “Living with Non-recognition”; Lynch, Engaging Eurasia’s Separatist States. 59 Examples include attendance at the Halifax International Security Forum and the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.

C h a p t e r T wo   1 King and Mason, Peace at any Price.   2 Malazogu, “When Doves Support War.”  3 Ibid.   4 International Crisis Group, “Kosovo Countdown,” 8.   5 Ibid., 10.

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142

Notes to pages 22–5

 6 Ibid.  7 Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian.  8 Ibid.  9 Geldenhuys, Contested States, 108; Malcolm, Kosovo, 58. 10 Warbrick, “I. Kosovo,” 675. 11 Pavlakovic and Ramet, “Albania and Serb Rivalry,” 78. 12 Ibid. 13 Daskalovski, “Claims to Kosovo,” 13. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid., 8–9. 16 Ker-Lindsay, Kosovo, 8. According to Serbian officials and nationalists, tens of thousands of Serbians were expelled from Kosovo during the 1940s. 17 Ibid., 9. 18 Daskalovski, “Claims to Kosovo,” 14. 19 Calic, “Kosovo in the Twentieth Century,” 20; Daskalovski, “Claims to Kosovo,” 14. 20 Pavlakovic and Ramet, “Albania and Serb Rivalry,” 82. 21 Ker-Lindsay, Kosovo: The Path to Contested Statehood, 9. 22 Ibid., 10. 23 Pavlakovic and Ramet, “Albania and Serb Rivalry,” 82; Perritt, Kosovo Liberation Army. 24 Pavlakovic and Ramet, “Albania and Serb Rivalry,” 83. 25 Ker-Lindsay, Kosovo, 10. 26 Daskalovski, “Claims to Kosovo,” 15. 27 Babuna, “The Albanians of Kosovo,” 70; Gulyas, “A Brief History,” 143. 28 Gulyas, “A Brief History,” 144. 29 Pavlakovic and Ramet, “Albania and Serb Rivalry,” 83. 30 Mertus, Kosovo, 27. 31 Ibid., 30. 32 Ibid., 30–1. 33 Mertus, Kosovo, 18. 34 Ibid., 19. 35 Rusinow, “Nationalities Policy,” 146. 36 Gordy, Culture of Power in Serbia, 7; Judah, “Kosovo’s Moment of Truth”; King and Mason, Peace at any Price; Malazogu, “When Doves Support War”; Pavlakovic and Ramet, “Albania and Serb Rivalry.” 37 See David Binder, “In Yugoslavia, Rising Ethnic Strife Brings Fears of Worse Civil Conflict,” The New York Times, 1 November 1987, http:// www.nytimes.com/1987/11/01/world/

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Notes to pages 26–9

143

in-yugoslavia-rising-ethnic-strife-brings-fears-of-worse-civil-conflict.html; and Marvine Howe, “Exodus of Serbians Stirs Province in Yugoslavia,” The New York Times, 12 July 1982, http://www.nytimes.com/1982/07/12/ world/exodus-of-serbians-stirs-­province-in-yugoslavia.html. 38 Koeck, Horn, and Leidenmuehler, From Protectorate to Statehood, 36; Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 78. 39 Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, 235. 40 Ibid., 241. 41 Babuna, “The Albanians of Kosovo,” 76. 42 Phillips, “Comprehensive Peace,” 823. 43 Miftari, Rugova: The Symbol of Independence. 44 That is, Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia and declared itself as a member of the Yugoslav republic. 45 Kubo, “Why Kosovar Albanians,” 1138; Pokalova, “Framing separatism as terrorism.” In a 1991 referendum in Kosovo, 87 per cent of eligible ­voters produced a 99 per cent vote in favour of independence in response to Serbia’s repressive policies. 46 Pavlakovic and Ramet, “Albania and Serb Rivalry,” 86. 47 Warbrick, “I. Kosovo,” 676. 48 Corrin, “Developing Democracy in Kosova,” 99; Kubo, “Why Kosovar Albanians,” 1138. 49 Geldenhuys, Contested States in World Politics. 50 Ker-Lindsay, Kosovo, 11. 51 Pavkovic, “Seceding by Force of Arms,” 103. 52 Kubo, “Why Kosovar Albanians,” 1138. 53 Perritt, The Road to Independence, 2. 54 Pavkovic, “Seceding by Force of Arms,” 103. 55 Carmichael, “Brothers, Strangers and Enemies,” 55. 56 Pokalova, “Framing Separatism,” 443. 57 Warbrick, “I. Kosovo,” 677. 58 Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, 296. 59 Koeck, Horn, and Leidenmuehler, From Protectorate to Statehood, 3. 60 Weller, “The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo,” 221. 61 Ibid., 223. 62 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, 10 June 1999, https:// digitallibrary.un.org/record/274488?ln=en. 63 Judah, “Kosovo’s Moment of Truth.” 64 Perritt, The Road to Independence, 121. 65 Ibid., 123. 66 Warbrick, “I. Kosovo,” 678.

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144

Notes to pages 30–6

67 Economides, “Kosovo, Self-Determination,” 834. 68 Ibid. 69 US Senate, “Kosovo: A Way Forward?,” 4. 70 Flottau and Ihlau, “Vir sind ein geteiltes Volk [We are a Divided People],” Der Spiegel, 16 April 2000, https://www.spiegel.de/politik/wir-sind-ein-­ geteiltes-volk-a-e0447d3e-0002-0001-0000-000016215423. 71 Ibid. 72 Weller, “The Vienna Negotiations,” 661. 73 Ibid., 666–7. 74 International Crisis Group, “Kosovo Countdown,” 8. 75 Weller, “The Vienna Negotiations,” 671. 76 Ibid. 77 Ibid. 78 Koeck, Horn, and Leidenmuehler, From Protectorate to Statehood, 40; Konig, “The Effects of the Kosovo Status,” 39. 79 United Nations Security Council, “Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement,” United Nations, 26 March 2007, https://www. securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Kosovo%20S2007%20168.pdf. 80 Ibid. 81 Ibid. 82 Warbrick, “I. Kosovo,” 679. 83 B B C , “Full text: Kosovo Declaration,” 17 February 2008, http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/europe/7249677.stm. 84 International Court of Justice, “Accordance with International Law,” International Court of Justice, 22 July 2010, https://www.icj-cij. org/en/case/141. 85 Ibid., 53. 86 International Crisis Group, “Serbia and Kosovo,” 10. 87 Ibid., 5. 88 The data presented in appendix 1 is gathered from the World Bank and United Nations. 89 Trading Economics, “Kosovo Unemployment Rate,” https://trading​ ­economics.com/kosovo/unemployment-rate. 90 Trading Economics, “Serbia Unemployment Rate,” https://trading­ economics.com/serbia/unemployment-rate. 91 Bochsler, “The Party System,” 101. 92 Ker-Lindsay, Kosovo, 17.

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Notes to pages 37–42

145

  93 Matthew Day, “Kosovo ‘to wipe citizens’ debts’ in Bid to Stop Exodus to e u,” The Telegraph, 6 February 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ worldnews/europe/kosovo/11397051/Kosovo-to-wipe-citizens-debts-inbid-to-stop-exodus-to-EU.html.   94 International Crisis Group, “Kosovo and Serbia.”   95 Bardos, “The Regional and International Implications,” 56.   96 Ibid., 63.   97 International Crisis Group, “Kosovo and Serbia,” 8.  98 Ibid.   99 International Crisis Group, “North Kosovo,” 4. 100 International Crisis Group, “Kosovo and Serbia.” 101 Ibid., 2. 102 Ibid., 3–5. 103 Ibid., 6. 104 Ibid., 9. 105 Ibid., 10. 106 European Union External Action, “Serbia and Kosovo,” http://eeas.­ europa.eu/top_stories/2013/190413__eu-facilitated_dialogue_en.htm. 107 Valentina Pop, “Serbia to Start eu Membership talks in January,” ­euobserver, 18 December 2013, http://euobserver.com/enlargement/122519.

C h a p t e r T h ree   1 Ruay, The Politics of Two Sudans, 12.   2 O’Ballance, Sudan, Civil War, and Terrorism.    3 Sidahmed and Sidahmed, Sudan, 29.    4 Gray, “The Southern Sudan.”   5 Ibid.    6 Oduho and Deng, The Problem of the Southern Sudan, 1–2.    7 Sidahmed and Sidahmed, Sudan, 136.   8 Ibid., 137.    9 Gray, “The Southern Sudan,” 111.  10 Alier, Southern Sudan, 12.  11 Ruay, The Politics of Two Sudans, 25.  12 Ibid.   13 Ibid., 31.   14 Alier, 13.  15 Johnson, African Issues, 22. Although Britain recognized the Sudan as Egypt’s colony, it retained control over the administration of the Sudan.

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146

Notes to pages 42–5

16 Said, The Sudan, 33. Fashoda was the original name for Upper Nile and Mongolla was the original name for Equatoria. 17 Poggo, The First Sudanese Civil War, 25. 18 Alier, Southern Sudan, 18; Oduho and Deng, The Problem of the Southern Sudan, 12. 19 Said, The Sudan, 29. 20 Sir John Maffey, governor-general of the Sudan 1926, quoted in Said, The Sudan, 34. 21 Sidahmed and Sidahmed, Sudan, 24. 22 Poggo, The First Sudanese Civil War, 31. 23 Johnson, African Issues, 22. 24 Said, The Sudan, 36; Johnson, African Issues, 25. Another reason for Britain’s decision, according to Richard Gray, was its desire to control the Suez Canal. 25 Said, The Sudan, 46. Eighteen spokespersons and chiefs represented the South. 26 Gray, “The Southern Sudan,” 115. 27 Gray, “The Southern Sudan”; Johnson, African Issues, 26. 28 Said, The Sudan, 72. 29 Alier, Southern Sudan, 20. 30 Ibid., 21. 31 Johnson, African Issues, 26; Ruay, The Politics of Two Sudans, 66. 32 Akol, Southern Sudan, 44; Johnson, African Issues, 26. 33 The Liberal Party was originally called the Southern Party. 34 Johnson, African Issues, 27. 35 The Liberal Party held a conference in Juba in 1954 to discuss Sudanization and other issues related to the South. It hoped to continue pressing the North for the adoption of a federal system in Sudan. 36 Ibid., 27. 37 Gray, “The Southern Sudan,” 118. 38 Gray in Oduho and Deng, The Problem of the Southern Sudan, 2. 39 Ibid., 3–4. 40 Sidahmed and Sidahmed, Sudan, 39. 41 Gray in Oduho and Deng, The Problem of the Southern Sudan, 4. 42 Gray, “The Southern Sudan,” 117. This belief is revealed by the social and political practices in Sudan. Gray notes that it is very uncommon for a Northern girl to marry a Southerner, but it is acceptable for Northerners in the South to marry Southern girls. In terms of the political sphere, the North ignores the political aspirations of the South and has refused to

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Notes to pages 45–7

147

reconvene any conferences that treat political parties from the North and the South as equals. 43 Oduho and Deng, The Problem of the Southern Sudan, 25. 44 Said, The Sudan, 74. 45 Ibid., 79. 46 Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 56. 47 Akol, Southern Sudan, 57; Poggo, The First Sudanese Civil War, 36; Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 63–4. This incident led to eight deaths. 48 Ismail al-Azhari quoted in Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 58. Wai admits that its authenticity could not be established, but it did not matter because Southerners believed it was authentic. 49 Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 65. 50 Akol, Southern Sudan, 58; Johnson, African Issues, 29; Poggo, The First Sudanese Civil War, 37–42. 51 Akol, Southern Sudan, 60. Said, however, argues that the mutineers were all given fair trials in open courts. See Said, The Sudan, 82. 52 Johnson, African Issues, 28. 53 Oduho and Deng, The Problem of the Southern Sudan, 31. 54 Poggo, The First Sudanese Civil War, 52–4; Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 68. 55 Akol, Southern Sudan, 73. 56 Ohure quoted in Oduho and Deng, The Problem of the Southern Sudan, 36. 57 Akol, Southern Sudan, 74. The former prime minister, Khalil, was quoted as saying, “My experience has shown me that this country is not yet ready for democracy; I have therefore decided, at the suggestion of my advisers, to hand the reins of this country to the army; though political parties have now been banned I still believe that the Umma people and the people of the South will work in close co-operation.” In Oduho and Deng, The Problem of the Southern Sudan, 37. 58 Oduho and Deng, The Problem of the Southern Sudan, 38. 59 Akol, Southern Sudan, 75; Poggo, The First Sudanese Civil War, 59. 60 Akol, Southern Sudan, 76; Johnson, African Issues, 30; Poggo, The First Sudanese Civil War, 92; Sidahmed and Sidahmed, Sudan, 40; Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 85. 61 Johnson, African Issues, 31; Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 90. 62 Akol, Southern Sudan, 79. 63 Ibid., 80; Johnson, African Issues, 3; Poggo, The First Sudanese Civil War, 63; Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 90.

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148

Notes to pages 47–51

64 Johnson, African Issues, 31–2. It should be noted that the Anya-Nya was not without its own internal divisions. Saturnino’s leadership of both the sanu and the Anya-Nya was challenged by Oduho. 65 Akol, Southern Sudan, 81; Gray, “The Southern Sudan,” 119. The term “Anya-Nya” refers to the poison of the Gabon viper. The First Sudanese Civil War is also referred to as “Anya-Nya 1” or the “Anya-Nya Rebellion” after the name of the rebels. 66 Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 92. 67 Akol, Southern Sudan, 87. 68 Ibid., 88; Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 94. 69 Poggo, The First Sudanese Civil War, 119. 70 Akol, Southern Sudan, 90. 71 Quoted in ibid., 94. 72 Ibid., 101. 73 Saturnino Ohure was killed in Northern Uganda in 1967 by the Uganda government, who viewed Ohure as a threat to its Christian base. 74 Poggo, The First Sudanese Civil War, 123. 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid., 126. Oduho and Jaden did not attend the convention. 77 Poggo, The First Sudanese Civil War, 127. 78 Ibid., 128. 79 Ibid., 130. 80 Akol, Southern Sudan, 95. 81 Ibid. 82 Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 121. 83 Poggo, The First Sudanese Civil War, 171. 84 Ibid., 176. 85 Ibid. 86 Omer, The Southern Sudan, 129–30; Wai, The African-Arab Conflict,162. 87 Alier, Southern Sudan. Abel Alier notes that Addis Ababa was an ­appropriate venue for the peace talks given that it was the seat of the oau and the delegates could come and go without much attention. 88 Ibid., 99. 89 Ibid., 124–45. 90 Omer, The Southern Sudan, 120. 91 Kasfir, “Southern Sudanese Politics,” 166. 92 Malwal, People and Power in Sudan, 250–67. 93 Johnson, African Issues, 40. 94 Alier, Southern Sudan, 261.

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Notes to pages 51–4

149

 95 Rolandsen, Guerrilla Government, 25.  96 Ibid.   97 Huliaras, “The Unanticipated Break-up,” 257.  98 Alier, Southern Sudan, 222.  99 Ibid., 217. The oil wells were called Unity Wells. 100 Ibid. Chevron ultimately sided with the central government to protect its interests. 101 Ibid., 223. In 1972 when the North agreed to this stipulation there was ­little indication that the South would be the source of vast natural resources. In fact, Alier argues that Khartoum agreed to the proviso because the South was poor and it believed it would remain poor. 102 Ibid. 103 El-Battahani, “The Post-Secession State,” 33. In 1999, oil exports made up about 7.6 per cent of the government’s revenue but sharply increased to 44.8 per cent by 2002. 104 Johnson, African Issues, 64. 105 O’Ballance, Sudan, Civil War, and Terrorism, 131. O’Ballance argues that the issue of Sharia and its application to the South is one of the main barriers to Sudan’s unification. 106 Johnson, African Issues, 61. 107 Alier, Southern Sudan, 244–5. Alier reveals that Khartoum used force rather to manage what it perceived as disobedience from Southern soldiers. 108 Alier, Southern Sudan, 251–4; Johnson, African Issues, 65. 109 Johnson, African Issues, 60. 110 Ibid., 41. 111 Alier, Southern Sudan, 251; Johnson, African Issues, 61. 112 Sidahmed, “Institutional Reform,” 29. 113 Johnson, African Issues, 69. 114 Garang, “s plm Chairman’s Address.” Available at: http://www.splmtoday. com/docs/statements%20and%20speeches/2005%20Garang%20Speech​% 20CPA%20Signing%20Ceremony.pdf. 115 Johnson, African Issues, 70. 116 Ibid., 71. 117 Garang quoted in Johnson, African Issues, 71. 118 Johnson, African Issues, 80. 119 O’Ballance, Sudan, Civil War, and Terrorism, 156. 120 Johnson, African Issues, 84–5. 121 El-Battahani, “The Post-Secession State in Sudan,” 32. 122 Young, The Fate of Sudan, 44.

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150

Notes to pages 54–6

123 Johnson, African Issues, 91. 124 Ibid., 95. 125 O’Ballance, Sudan, Civil War, and Terrorism, 162. 126 Johnson, African Issues, 114. 127 As a consequence of the split, the South experienced its own civil war between the Dinka and the Nuer tribes. 128 Young, The Fate of Sudan, 79. 129 Sidahmed and Sidahmed, Sudan, 75; Young, The Fate of Sudan, 82. 130 Young, The Fate of Sudan, 82. 131 Sidahmed and Sidahmed, Sudan, 76; Young, The Fate of Sudan, 83. Omar al-Bashir promoted the i g ad’s peace initiative in order to avoid a un-sponsored solution. 132 The resolution called on Sudan to establish a secular and democratic ­constitution and if it failed to do the South would have the right to self-determination. 133 Young, The Fate of Sudan, 87. 134 Sidahmed and Sidahmed, Sudan, 80; Young, The Fate of Sudan, 121. 135 Sidahmed and Sidahmed, Sudan, 80. 136 Ibid. 137 El-Battahani, “The Post-Secession,” 36. 138 Ibid., 35; Sidahmed and Sidahmed, Sudan, 80. 139 El-Battahani, “The Post-Secession State,” 36. 140 The three provinces were subdivided into states as follows: Bahr al-Ghazal was divided into Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Lakes, and Warrap; Equatoria was divided into Western Equatoria, Central Equatoria, and Eastern Equatoria; and Upper Nile was divided into Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile. 141 Christopher, “Secession and South Sudan,” 128. 142 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army, Sections 1.1 and 1.5.2. http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/ Documents/General/cpa-en.pd. 143 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Sections 1.2 and 1.3. 144 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Section 1.5.1.1. 145 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Section 5.6. 146 Kunda Komey, “Back to War in Sudan,” 181–2; Young, “Sudan.” 147 Salih, “Conflict and Nation Building,” 193; Sidahmed, “Institutional Reform,” 26. 148 Salih, “Conflict and Nation Building,” 193.

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Notes to pages 56–60

151

149 150 151 152 153

Huliaras, “The Unanticipated Break-up,” 259. Sidahmed, “Institutional Reform,” 29. Garang, “s plm Chairman’s Address.” Huliaras, “The Unanticipated Break-up,” 261. Aalen, “Making Unity Unattractive,” 174; Huliaras, “The Unanticipated Break-up,” 261. 154 Huliaris, “The Unanticipated Break-up,” 264. 155 O’Leary, “The Federalization of Iraq,” 511. 156 Ibid. 157 Woodward, “Towards Two Sudans,” 5. 158 Sidahmed, “Institutional Reform,” 28. 159 Ibid. 160 Ibid., 30–5. 161 Sidahmed and Sidahmed, Sudan, 29. 162 Aalen, “Making Unity Unattractive,” 183. 163 Huliaras, “The Unanticipated Break-up,” 262. 164 Reuters Staff, “South Sudan President Makes First Call for Independence,” Reuters, 31 October 2009, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-­​ south-independence-idUSTRE59U1FT20091031. 165 O’Ballance, Sudan, Civil War, and Terrorism, 206. 166 Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 135. 167 Ibid., 125. Uganda openly supported Sudan’s breakup in response to Khartoum’s support for Uganda’s separatist Lord’s Resistance Army. 168 Poggo, The First Sudanese Civil War, 116. sa nu, however, faced stiff ­resistance from Uganda. 169 Yihun, “Ethiopia’s Role.” 170 Poggo, The First Sudanese Civil War, 114. 171 Johnson, African Issues, 58. 172 Sidahmed and Sidahmed, Sudan, 69. 173 Ibid. 174 Following September 2011, the US undertook a broad mission against ­terrorism in Afghanistan, the Middle East, and North Africa. Sudan became heavily criticized for its purported support of terrorism. 175 Huliaras, “The Unanticipated Break-up,” 263. 176 Natsios and Abramowitz, “Sudan’s Secession Crisis. 177 Rebecca Hamilton, “U.S. Played Key Role in Southern Sudan’s Long Journey to Independence,” The Atlantic, 9 July 2011, https://www. theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/07/us-played-key-role-insouthern-​sudans-long-journey-to-independence/241660/.

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Notes to pages 62–6

C h a p t e r F o ur  1 Entessar, Kurdish Ethnonationalism, 49.  2 Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, 21.  3 Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question, 29.   4 Ibid., 30.  5 Ibid.  6 Ibid.   7 See Edmonds, Kurds, Turks, and Arabs, 400; Gunter, The Kurds Ascending, 13; Pelletiere, The Kurds, 58; Stansfield, “The Kurdish Question.”   8 Faisal quoted in Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question, 2.  9 McDowall, A Modern History, 288. 10 Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question, 33; McDowall, A Modern History, 288. 11 McDowall, A Modern History, 289. 12 Stansfield, “The Kurdish Question.” 13 Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question, 34; McDowall, A Modern History, 290. 14 McDowall, A Modern History, 293. 15 Entessar, Kurdish Ethnonationalism, 17. 16 Ciment, The Kurds, 65. 17 The name was changed to the Kurdistan Democratic Party to encourage non-Kurdish citizens in the Kurdish region to participate. 18 Kurdistan Democratic Party, “Founding of the Kurdistan Democratic Party,” translated from Kurdish, http://www.kdp.info/p/p.aspx?p=15&l= 16&s=040100&r=365. 19 McDowall, A Modern History, 297. 20 Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question, 36. 21 Some believe that Barzani undertook military training and sent propaganda broadcasts to Iraqi Kurdistan. A more conspiratorial belief holds that Barzani became a kg b (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti – Committee for State Security) agent acting covertly in the interest of the Soviet Union. See Qadir, “The Kurds and the k gb .” 22 Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan, 66. 23 Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question, 39. 24 Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan, 66–7. 25 Ibid., 66. 26 Ibid., 67. 27 Author interview with Kamiran Berwari, 31 May 2013. 28 O’Ballance, The Kurdish Struggle, 36. 29 See McDowall, A Modern History, 302–3; Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan, 68. 30 McDowall, A Modern History, 307; O’Ballance, The Kurdish Revolt, 69.

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Notes to pages 66–71

153

31 Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question, 38. 32 See McDowall, A Modern History, 306; Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan, 69. 33 O’Ballance, The Kurdish Revolt, 74. 34 Ibid., 47. 35 McDowall, A Modern History, 310. 36 Ibid., 312. 37 O’Ballance, The Kurdish Struggle, 51. 38 Ibid. 39 McDowall, A Modern History, 313. The Baathists failed to assassinate Qassem in 1959, but continued their assault on the government in Baghdad until the 1963 coup. 40 Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question, 40. 41 Gunter, The Kurds of Iraq, 40–1. 42 Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan, 73–4. 43 Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question, 71. 44 Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq, 34–5; Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question, 82. 45 Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question, 83. 46 McDowall, A Modern History, 328. 47 Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq, 54; Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question, 105. It should be noted that Iran and the US also encouraged the Kurds and Barzani to make greater demands against Baghdad in order to protract the conflict. 48 Entessar, Kurdish Ethnonationalism, 72. 49 Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question, 109. 50 McDowall, A Modern History, 330. 51 Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question, 109. 52 O’Ballance, The Kurdish Struggle, 92. 53 Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question, 105. See also Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq, 65–81. 54 Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question, 137. 55 O’Ballance, The Kurdish Struggle, 93. 56 Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question, 135. 57 See ibid., 145; O’Ballance, The Kurdish Struggle, 94. 58 McDowall, A Modern History, 336. 59 Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq, 116; Gunter, The Kurds of Iraq, 18. 60 Barzani quoted in Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question in Iraq, 159. 61 Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq, 142–3; O’Ballance, The Kurdish Struggle, 97. 62 Casualty estimates of the two revolts place the figures at 50,000 deaths on both sides and about a quarter million refugees who fled into Iran. 63 Mustafa later split from the pu k and founded his own political party in 2009.

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Notes to pages 71–4

64 Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question, 174; McDowall, A Modern History, 338–9. 65 McDowall, A Modern History, 338–9. McDowall adds that civilian ­population suffered the most and that thousands were forced to flee their homes and face winter without food and shelter. 66 Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq, 155. 67 Ibid., 157. 68 Ibid. 69 The author of Saddam Hussein’s biography, Fuad Matar, argues that the main reason behind Hussein’s invasion of Iran was to recover Iraq’s losses in the Algiers Agreement. See Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq, 169–70. 70 O’Ballance, The Kurdish Struggle, 129; Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan, 90. 71 Gunter, The Kurdish Predicament, 72–3; O’Ballance, The Kurdish Struggle, 136; Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan, 90. 72 McDowall, A Modern History, 349; O’Ballance, The Kurdish Struggle, 137. 73 O’Ballance, The Kurdish Struggle, 171. 74 McDowall, A Modern History, 358; O’Ballance, The Kurdish Struggle, 169. It is estimated that the chemical weapons killed or injured at least 5,000 people. 75 Human Rights Watch, “Genocide in Iraq – The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds,” July 1993. Exact casualty figures of the campaign are difficult to ascertain; conservative estimates range from 50,000 to as many as 100,000, while others place the figure well over 150,000 victims. 76 Ibid. See also McDowall, A Modern History, 360–1; O’Ballance, The Kurdish Struggle, 170–1. 77 O’Ballance, The Kurdish Struggle, 176–7; Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan, 92. 78 The first parliament of the Kurdish region, formed following elections in 1992, declared that it would be a federal entity in a united Iraq. 79 Gunter, The Kurdish Predicament, 41. 80 Lando, Web of Deceit, 100. 81 Nye, Understanding International Conflicts, 194. 82 George H.W. Bush made the appeal to the Kurds and Shias on 15 February 1991, to Raytheon Missile Systems Plant Employees. However, as David Romano notes, the message was received on “virtually every ­television and radio station in the world.” Romano, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement, 204. 83 Stansfield and Resool, “The Tortured Resurgence,” 101. 84 Romano, The Kurdish Nationalist, 206.

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Notes to pages 74–8

155

  85 Ibid. David McDowall reveals Turkey, an important US strategic ally in the region, pressured the US to withhold support for the Kurds.  86 Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq, 200; McDowall, A Modern History, 373; O’Ballance, The Kurdish Struggle, 186–7.  87 Gunter, The Kurdish Predicament, 67.   88 Talabani quoted in Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq, 93.  89 Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq, 202; Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan, 96. k dp received 50.22 per cent of the vote and puk received 49.78 per cent. The two parties decided to distribute a hundred seats equally between themselves and allocated the remaining five seats to minority groups in the Kurdish region.   90 Gunter, “A De Facto Kurdish State,” 308–9.   91 Barzani quoted in Gunter, “A De Facto Kurdish State,” 309.   92 Ahmed, “Laying the Foundation,” 150.   93 al-Din Kakai, “The Kurdish Parliament,” 119.   94 In addition to the civil war between the Kurds of Iraq at this time, k dp was also fighting the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (pk k ) from Turkey. The p k k posed a threat to the kdp’s territorial control over parts of Iraqi Kurdistan that bordered Turkey. The war between pk k and the Kurds of Iraq will not be discussed here as it falls outside the scope of this ­project. More importantly, a brief discussion here will not be sufficient to uncover the dynamics of the conflict between pk k and the Iraqi Kurds.  95 Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan, 97.  96 Gunter, The Kurdish Predicament in Iraq, 98.   97 Office of the Iraq Programme Oil-for-Food, “$9.978 Billion Transferred to Development Fund for Iraq,” United Nations, 5 April 2019, https://www. un.org/Depts/oip.   98 Leezenberg, “Contours of a Post-Civil War,” 632.   99 Author interview with Kamiran Berwari, 31 May 2013. 100 Gunter, “Iraqi Kurdistan’s Two Contrasting Economic Images,” 90. 101 Hall, “Chalabi, Ahmed Abd al-Hadi,” 82–3. 102 Ibid., 83–4. 103 Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq, 266. 104 Gunter, “Turkey’s New Neighbor, Kurdistan,” 225. 105 Stansfield, “From Civil War,” 137. 106 Ahmed, “Kurdish Spring, Iraqi Kurdistan,” 95. 107 Romano, “Iraqi Kurdistan,” 1349. 108 See al-Istrabadi, “A Constitution without Constitutionalism”; Arato, Constitution Making Under Occupation; Ghanim, Iraq’s Dysfunctional Democracy; Visser, “The Kurdish Issue in Iraq.”

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156

Notes to pages 79–85

109 Ghanim, Iraq’s Dysfunctional Democracy, 161–2. 110 Arato, Constitution Making Under Occupation, 136. 111 Ibid., 144. 112 Barkey and Laipson, “Iraqi Kurds and Iraq’s Future,” 66. 113 Ibid., 74. 114 Danilovich, Iraqi Federalism and the Kurds, 51. 115 al-Istrabadi, “A Constitution without Constitutionalism,” 1630. 116 Author interview with Omed Sabah Othman. 117 Author interview with Nezhat Hali. Hali was rather pessimistic about the future of Iraq. In addition to the insecurity in the rest of Iraq, Hali believed that Baghdad was either unwilling or unable to resolve the issue of territorial disputes. Without implementation of the constitution, the Kurdish issue cannot be adequately resolved.

C h a p t e r F ive    1 Author interview with Omar S. Hawrami.    2 See al-Istrabadi, “A Constitution without Constitutionalism”; Arato, Constitution Making Under Occupation; Visser, “The Kurdish Issue in Iraq.”    3 Visser, “The Kurdish Issue in Iraq,” 81.    4 Author interview with Omed Sabah.    5 Visser, “The Kurdish Issue in Iraq,” 82–3.   6 Ibid., 85.    7 Author interview with Hemen Hawrami.    8 Author interview with Omed Sabah. The last paragraph of the Preamble reads as follows: “We, the people of Iraq, of all components and across the spectrum, have taken upon ourselves to decide freely and by choice to unite our future, to take lessons from yesterday for tomorrow, and to enact this permanent Constitution, through the values and ideals of the heavenly messages and the findings of science and man’s civilization. The adherence to this Constitution preserves for Iraqi its free union of people, of land, and of sovereignty.    9 Gunter, “Arab-Kurdish Relations,” 1625–6.   10 Ibid., 1626.  11 Ibid.   12 See Ahmed, Iraqi Kurds and Nation-building, 197–200; Romano, “Iraqi Kurdistan: Challenges of Autonomy.”   13 Natali, “The Politics of Kurdish Crude,” 117.   14 Author interview with Susan Nouri Shahab.

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Notes to pages 85–91

157

15 Ibid. 16 Author interview with Abdulsalam Berwari. 17 Ibid. 18 Stansfield, “The Unravelling,” 270. 19 Ibid., 282. 20 Hiltermann, “Revenge of the Kurds.” 21 See Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq, 302; Gunter, “Canvassing the Kurdish Spring,” 21. 22 Gunter, “Arab–Kurdish Relations,” 1624. 23 Masoud Barzani, “Kurdistan is a Model for Iraq,” The Wall Street Journal, 12 November 2008, http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB122645258001119425. 24 Ibid. 25 Gunter, The Kurds Ascending, 16. 26 Author interview with Bayiz Talabani. 27 Author interview with Abdulkhaliq Bapiri. 28 Author interview with Mohammed Ihsan. 29 Author interview with Kamiran Berwari, 26 May 2018. 30 Author interview with Kameran Mentik. 31 Kurdistan Regional Government, “Kurdistan Regional Government Unification Agreement.” 32 Ahmed, Iraqi Kurds and Nation-Building, 15–16. 33 Author interview with Kardo Pirdood Muhammed. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. 36 Ali Hamah Salih hosted a program on a regional tv station Kurdish News Network and is known as “The Calculator” in the Kurdish region for his meticulous itemization of krg ’s alleged corrupt practices with the budget. 37 Author interview with Ali Hama Salih. 38 Ibid. 39 Author interview with Evar Ibrahim. 40 Ibid. 41 Author interview with Barzo Majeed. 42 General Manifesto and Code of Practice of Kurdistan Islamic Union, ­official website, “About Us,” http://www.yakgrtw.net/en. 43 Ibid. 44 Author interview with Bayan Ahmed Hasan. 45 Author interview with Ismaeel Ravendi. 46 Author interview with Abdulhakeem Khasroo. 47 Ibid.

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158

Notes to pages 91–8

48 Ibid. 49 Author interview with Ali Kareem. 50 Ibid. 51 Author interview with Berevan Abdulrahman. 52 Ibid. 53 Author interview with Mohammed Amed. 54 Ibid. 55 Kurdish Globe, “Translation of interview.” 56 The objective here is not to explain why the is emerged, but rather to ­provide a timeline for its growth. For a helpful explanation on the origins of i s , see Martin Chulov, “i s i s : The Inside Story,” The Guardian, 11 December 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/11/ -sp-isis-the-inside-story. 57 Stansfield, “The Islamic State,” 1334. 58 Dexter Filkins, “The Fight of Their Lives,” The New Yorker, 22 September 2014, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/29/ fight-lives. 59 Stansfield, “The Islamic State,” 1336. Emphasis as per original. 60 Qanon, “Crisis Scandal,” Translated from the original in Arabic. 61 Filkins, “The Fight of Their Lives.” 62 See Namo Abdullah, “Richard Haass: A Unified Multi-Ethnic Iraq May Be Over,” Rudaw, 16 December 2014, http://rudaw.net/english/interview/ 16122014; Micha’el Tanchum, “The Kurds’ Big Year: The Political Conditions that Favor Kurdish Independence in Iraq,” Foreign Affairs, 12 January 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middleeast/2015-01-12/kurds-big-year; and William A. Galston, “Now is the Moment for Kurdish Independence,” The Wall Street Journal, 24 June 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/now-is-the-moment-for-kurdishindependence-1403650500. 63 Sharmila Devi, “Kurdistan pm Downplays Prospect of Independence Now,” Rudaw, 5 November 2014, http://rudaw.net/english/ kurdistan/05112014.

Chapter Six   1 “Hundreds Stage ‘No for Now’ Rally Against Kurdistan Referendum,” Rudaw, 9 September 2017, http://www.rudaw.net/english/ kurdistan/090920173.  2 Ibid.   3 Author interview with Jamel Kocher.

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Notes to pages 98–101

159

 4 Ibid.   5 Author interview with Kamiran Berwari, 26 May 2018.   6 Mohammed A. Salih, “Iraqi Kurdistan’s Referendum Isn’t Just About Independence,” The New York Times, 6 September 2017, https://www. nytimes.com/2017/09/06/opinion/iraq-kurds-referendum.html.  7 Ibid.  8 “Barzani: kdp Will Retain Interior Ministry; Kurds Considering Confederation,” Rudaw, 22 April 2014, http://www.rudaw.net/english/ kurdistan/22042014.   9 Trudy Rubin, “Worldview: Rubin: Time for Kurdish Independence?,” The Philadelphia Inquirer, 23 March 2017, https://www.inquirer.com/ philly/­columnists/trudy_rubin/20170323_Worldview__Rubin__Time_for_ Kurdish_independence_.html. 10 Author interview with Kamiran Berwari, 26 May 2018. 11 Bajalan, “The Elusive Quest for a Kurdish State,” 1–2. 12 Ibid., 4. 13 Ibid., 14. 14 Raafat, Kurdistan in Iraq, 199. 15 Ibid., 199–203. 16 Palani et al., “Strategies to Gain International Recognition.” 17 Ibid., 417. 18 Ibid., 420. 19 Author interview with Jamel Kocher. 20 Qubad Talabani quoted in Phillips, The Great Betrayal, 114. 21 Author interview with Rahi Rahbar. 22 Ibid. 23 Author interview with Renas Jano. 24 Author interview with Najeeba Najeeb Ibrahim. 25 Author interview with Renas Jano. 26 Author interview with Kamiran Berwari, 31 May 2013. 27 Author interview with Najmaldin Karim. 28 Phillips, The Great Betrayal, 118. 29 Ishaan Tharoor, “The Quest for an Independent Kurdistan Enters a New Phase,” The Washington Post, 21 June 2017, https://www.washingtonpost. com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/06/21/the-quest-for-an-independentkurdistan-enters-a-new-phase. 30 Masoud Barzani, “The Time has Come for Iraqi Kurdistan to make its Choice on Independence,” The Washington Post, 28 June 2017, https:// www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2017/06/28/thetime-has-come-for-iraqi-kurdistan-to-make-its-choice-on-independence.

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Notes to pages 101–5

31 “Barzani: Committing to Iraq post-Saddam was Mistake, Now is Time to Leave,” Rudaw, 6 September 2017, http://www.rudaw.net/english/ kurdistan/060920173. 32 Ibid. 33 Barzani quoted in Robin Wright, “Kurds Voted, So is the Middle East Breaking Up?,” The New Yorker, 27 September 2017, https://www.­ newyorker.com/news/news-desk/kurds-voted-so-is-the-middle-eastbreaking-up. 34 Author interview with Najmaldin Karim. 35 Constitution of Iraq, Preamble. 36 “Iraq Supreme Court Steps in to Block Kurdish Independence Vote,” The Guardian, 18 September 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/ sep/18/iraq-supreme-court-steps-in-to-block-kurdish-independence-vote. 37 Ahmed Rasheed, “Iraq Court Rules no Region Can Secede after Kurdish Independence Bid,” Reuters, 6 November 2017, http://www.reuters.com/ article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-kurds/iraqcourt-rules-no-region-cansecede-after-kurdish-independence-bid-idUSKBN1D617O. 38 Ahmed Rasheed and Raya Jalabi, “Abadi says Iraq to Act Soon Over Border Areas in Stand-Off with Kurds,” Reuters, 14 November 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-kurds/abadisays-iraq-to-act-soon-over-border-areas-in-stand-off-with-kurds-idUSKBN1DE0XD. 39 The Kurdistan Regional Government, “krg Statement on the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Article 1 of the Constitution,” The Kurdistan Regional Government-Iraq Representation in Austria, 14 November 2017, http://austria.krg.org/en/krg-stellungnahme-zurinterpretation-des-irakischen-foederalen-obersten-gerichtshofes-vonartikel-1-der-irakischen-verfassung. 40 Barzani, “The Time Has Come.” 41 Campbell MacDiarmid, “I Want to Die in the Shadow of the Flag of an Independent Kurdistan,” Foreign Policy, 15 June 2017, https://­ foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/15/i-want-to-die-in-the-shadow-of-theflag-of-an-independent-kurdistan. 42 Ghassan Charbel, “Barzani: Maliki’s Crime against Kurdish Region Worse than Saddam’s Anfal Operation,” Asharq Al-Awsat, 30 August 2017, https://eng-archive.aawsat.com/ghassan-charbel/interviews/barzanimalikis-crime-kurdish-region-worse-saddams-anfal-operation. 43 Ibid. 44 Gunter, “Arab-Kurdish Relations”; Stansfield, “The Unravelling”; Sullivan, “Maliki’s Authoritarian Regime.”

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Notes to pages 105–8

161

45 Dodge, “Iraq’s Road Back to Dictatorship,” 152. 46 “Is it Really Coming?,” The Economist, 29 November 2008, http://www. economist.com/node/12678343; Gunter, “Arab-Kurdish Relations. 47 Ibid. 48 Barzani, quoted in Dodge, “Iraq’s Road Back to Dictatorship,” 149. 49 Parker, “Machiavelli in Mesopotamia.” 50 Ibid., 17. 51 Dodge, “Iraq’s Road Back to Dictatorship,” 150. Hashemi fled to Turkey, al-Issawi resigned from his position in 2013, and al-Mutlaq served as ­deputy prime minister until 2015. 52 Dodge, “Iraq’s Road Back to Dictatorship,” 150. 53 Ahmed Rasheed and Raya Jalabi, “Barzani Vows to Press on with Kurdish Referendum, Defying Iraq Parliament,” Reuters, 12 September 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-kurdsidUSKCN1BN11T. 54 Ibid. 55 “Iraqi Kurds must give up on independence or go hungry – Erdogan,” b b c , 26 September 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east41398199. 56 Martin Chulov, “Iraq: Kurdish leader Barzani claims win in Independence Referendum,” The Guardian, 26 September 2017, https://www.­ theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/26/iraq-kurdish-leader-barzani-claimswin-in-independence-referendum. 57 Eli Lake, “Tillerson Letters Show U.S. Nearly Averted Kurdish Referendum,” Bloomberg, 13 October 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/ opinion/articles/2017-10-13/tillerson-letters-show-u-s-nearly-avertedkurdish-referendum. Emphasis added. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid. 60 Eligible voters must be Iraqi citizens, eighteen years of age or older, and residents of Iraqi Kurdistan and the disputed territories under Article 140. 61 Phillips, The Great Betrayal, 116. 62 Tillerson, “Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government.” 63 Ted Regencia, “Kurdish Secession tops Erdogan’s agenda in Iran Visit,” Al Jazeera, 4 October 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/kurdishsecession-tops-erdogan-agenda-iran-visit-171003060210611.html. 64 Raafat, Kurdistan in Iraq, 204–6. 65 Ibid., 208. 66 Ibid., 208–9.

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Notes to pages 108–11

67 Gunter, “Federalism and the Kurds,” 252. 68 Jay Newton-Small, “An Interview with Nechirvan Barzani: Will There Be an Independent Kurdistan?,” Time, 21 December 2021, http://world.time. com/2012/12/21/an-interview-with-nechirvan-barzani-will-there-be-anindependent-kurdistan. 69 Ibid. 70 Fehim Tastekin, “Turkey Seeks to Exploit Claims to Iraqi Kurdish Village,” Al-Monitor, 22 April 2020, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/ 2020/04/turkey-iraq-zini-werte-rift-between-groups-pkk-kdp-puk.html. 71 Ibid. 72 Romano, “Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey: Temporary Marriage?,” 92–3. 73 Ibid., 95. 74 Gunter, “Erdogan’s Backsliding: Opposition to the k r g Referendum,” 99. 75 Shelley Kittleson, “US, Iran woo Rival Kurdish Factions in Battle Against I S ,” Al-Monitor, 22 September 2014, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ originals/2014/09/Peshmerga-iraq-iran-kurd-isis-krg.html. 76 Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, “Program: General Objectives.” 77 “Iraq’s Kurds Not Giving up Kirkuk,” Al Jazeera, 28 June 2014, http:// www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/06/iraq-kurds-rule-out-retreatingfrom-kirkuk-20146271440878594.html. 78 Sofia Barbarani, “Iraq Divided Over Control of Kirkuk,” Al Jazeera, 11 July 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/07/iraqcontrol-kirkuk-20147772054115995.html. 79 Marc Perelman, “Kurdish Referendum a ‘colossal mistake,’ says Son of Late President Talabani,” France 24, 20 October 2017, http://www. france24.com/en/20171020-interview-bafel-talabani-kirkukbarzani-sulaymaniyah-puk-abadi-baghdad-referendum-turkey. 80 Ibid. 81 Patrick Cockburn, “Kurds Face Transformation of Iraq’s Political Map as they Lose Territory in Face of Government Advance,” Independent, 17 October 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/ iraq-kirkuk-battle-withdrawal-peshmerga-baghdad-latest-advance-­ disaster-a8006036.html. 82 Margaret Coker, “With Iraqi-Kurdish Talks Stalled, Phone Diplomacy Averts New Clashes,” The New York Times, 12 November 2017, https:// www.nytimes.com/2017/11/12/world/middleeast/iraq-kurds-autonomousborders.html. 83 Sierwan Karim, quoted in Phillips, The Great Betrayal, 133. 84 Kurdistan Regional Government, “Statement from Kurdistan Regional Government.”

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Notes to pages 112–21

163

85 Palani et al., “Strategies to Gain International Recognition,” 417. 86 Constitution of Iraq, Preamble. 87 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Part A: Agreed Principles, Section 1.3. 88 Ibid. 89 “US welcomes Barzani resignation, to work with pm Barzani in ErbilBaghdad dispute,” Rudaw, 30 October 2017, http://www.rudaw.net/­ english/world/301020171.

C h a p t e r S e ven   1 Strategic Comments, “The Future of Montenegro,” 1.  2 Ibid.   3 Vukicevic, “Foreign Relations,” 108.   4 Fawn, “The Kosovo,” 276.  5 Ibid.   6 Gebrewahd, “Nation-Building Challenges,” 24.   7 Gilkes, “National Identity,” 164; Negash, Eritrea and Ethiopia, 70.  8 Teklu, The Eritrean Struggle for Independence, 90.   9 Gilkes, “National Identity,” 165. 10 Teklu, The Eritrean Struggle for Independence, 94. 11 Ibid., 98. 12 Gilkes, “National Identity,” 165. 13 Ibid., 166. 14 Ibid., 167. 15 Warren and Warren, “The U.S. Role,” 51. 16 Teklu, The Eritrean Struggle for Independence, 136. 17 Ibid., 138–9. The referendum asked voters: do you approve Eritrea to become an independent sovereign state. 18 Ghai and Regan, “Unitary State,” 593. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Boege, “Peacebuilding and State Formation,” 29. 22 Bougainville Peace Agreement. 23 Ibid., Article 312. 24 Peter O’Neill quoted in Eric Tlozek, “Bougainville Independence Referendum ‘May not be Possible’ With Key Conditions Not Met: png p m,” a b c, 26 September 2017, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-09-27/ png-pm-casts-doubt-over-bougainville-independence-referendum/8990692. 25 Radan, “Republika Srpska Krajina,” 22. 26 Ibid., 23.

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Notes to pages 121–6

27 Ibid. 28 Radan, “Republika Srpska Krajina,” 29. 29 DeVotta, “The Liberation Tigers,” 1025. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid., 1027. 32 Tamil Eelam’s main source of support was funding from the diaspora community of Tamils. 33 DeVotta, “The Liberation Tigers,” 1030. 34 Charles Haviland, “Sri Lanka Tamil Party Drops Statehood Demand,” b b c , 13 March 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8566114.stm. 35 Laipson, “Government and Politics,” 167. 36 Ibid., 168. 37 Ker-Lindsay, The Cyprus Problem, 33–4. 38 Laipson, “Government and Politics.” 39 Bahcheli, “Under Turkey’s Wings,” 167; Ker-Lindsay, The Cyprus Problem, 35; Laipson, “Government and Politics,” 170. 40 Michael, Resolving the Cyprus Conflict, 27. 41 Ibid., 37. 42 Bahcheli, “Under Turkey’s Wings,” 164. 43 Ciscel, The Language of the Moldovans, 42. 44 Bobick, “Sovereignty.” 45 Roper, “Regionalism in Moldova,” 117. 46 Zabarah, “Opportunity Structures and Group Building,” 184. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid., 186. 49 Batt, “Federalism vs. Nationalism,” 40–1. 50 Mark Mackinnon, “In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Fears are Growing that the Carefully Constructed Peace is Starting to Unravel,” The Globe and Mail, 24 May 2018, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-inbosnia-serb-nationalists-see-putin-and-trump-as-their-tickets-to. 51 Srecko Latal, “Bosnian Politics for Dummies,” Balkan Insight, 13 August 2018, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/ bosnian-politics-for-dummies-pre-election-campaign-08-13-2018. 52 Fawn and Richmond, “De Facto States in the Balkans,” 215. 53 Filip Rudic, “Vucic Pledges Serbia’s Respect for Bosnia’s Integrity,” Balkan Insight, 7 September 2017, https://balkaninsight.com/2017/09/07/ vucic-voices-support-for-bosnia-s-territorial-integrity-09-07-2017. 54 Ker-Lindsay, “The Hollow Threat of Secession,” 18. 55 They include Nicaragua, Paraguay, Haiti, and Swaziland. 56 Bartmann, “Between De Jure and De Facto Statehood,” 115.

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Notes to pages 127–31

165

57 Cho and Ahn, “Taiwan’s International Visibility,” 80. 58 Ibid., 81. 59 A unilateral declaration of independence from Scotland would face ­political opposition from the European Union and its members such as Spain and Greece that have their own secessionist entities. 60 Young, The Secession of Quebec. 61 Ibid., 143–4. 62 Merryn Somerset Webb, “Scottish Independence: Aren’t you Glad the No Vote Won?,” Financial Times, 24 March 2016, https://www.ft.com/­ content/ad96780e-f1c0-11e5-9f20-c3a047354386. 63 Leezenberg, “Iraqi Kurdistan: A Porous Political Space,” 8. 64 Ibid., 9–15. 65 Michael Gunter, “Erdogan’s Backsliding,” 100.

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Index

Abboud, Ibrahim, 47–8 Abdulla, Barzo Majeed, 90 Abdul Rahman, Bayan Sami, 101 Abkhazia, 7–8, 10, 119, 123 Addis Ababa Agreement, 50–2 Ahmed, Ibrahim, 65, 76 Ahtisaari, Martti, 31–3, 35 Akol, Lam, 54–5 al-Abadi, Haidar, 106, 110 al-Azhari, Ismail, 45–6 Albania, 23; Greater Albania, 23 al-Bashir, Omar, 53–4, 59, 150n131 Algiers Agreement, 71 Ali, Faisal bin, 63–4 Ali, Hussein ibn (Sharif Hussein), 62–3 Alier, Abel, 43, 50–2 al-Maliki, Nouri, 20, 82–4, 93, 97, 104–6 Amed, Mohammed, 92 Anjouan, 7–8 Arif, Abdul Rahman, 68 Arif, Abdul Salam, 66, 68 Ashton, Catherine, 38 autonomy, 9, 12, 35, 51; political, 44, 59, 63

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Baath Party, 67–70, 153n39 Barzani, Massoud, 75, 76, 86, 92, 98, 101, 104, 107 Barzani, Mulla Mustafa, 64, 66, 71 Barzani, Nechirvan, 94, 98, 108–9 Berwari, Abdelsalam, 85 Berwari, Kamiram, 66, 87, 98 Biafra, 7–8 Bougainville, 7–8, 119–20 Chalabi, Ahmed, 77 Change List. See Change Movement Change Movement, 88–90 Chechnya, 7–8, 116 China, 126 Comparative historical analysis, 17 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (cpa ), 55–7, 60 consociational power-sharing, 12 Constructivism, 11–12 Dacic, Ivica, 38 Dayton Accords, 27, 125 Deng, William, 46

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188 Index

Derg (Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, Police, and Territorial Army), 54, 119 East Timor, 7–8, 9, 117 Erbil, 76 Eritrea, 7–8, 41, 117–19 Ethiopia, 41, 52, 59–60, 118–19 ethnicity, 11–12 European Union (eu ), 21, 27, 37–8 Federalism, 11, 12, 14 forced reintegration, 9, 13 foreign policy, 15–16; ­paradiplomacy, 15–16; ­protodiplomacy, 15–16 Free Officers, 66 Gagauzia, 7–8, 9, 116–17, 124–5 Garang, John, 52–4, 57–8 Gorran. See Change Movement Hali, Nezhat, 80 Hasan, Bayan Ahmed, 90 Hawrami, Omar, 81 Hussein, Saddam, 67, 69, 71–81, 104–5, 154n69 Ibrahim, Evar, 89 Ihsan, Mohammed, 87 Independent High Electoral Commission of Iraq, 17 Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (i g ad), 54–5 International Contact Group, 27, 31–2 International Court of Justice (i cj), 33–4 international relations, 5 Iran, 3, 64, 70–5, 108–10, 129

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Iran-Iraq War, 72 Iraqi Kurdistan: 1970 March Manifesto, 69–70; Agrarian Reform Law, 67; Civil War, 76; Iraqi Kurdistan Front (ik f), 72; Kurdish peshmerga, 93–4, ­110–11, 131; Kurdistan National Assembly, 84; Kurdistan Regional Government (k r g), 16, 74, 81; September Revolt (Shoresh-e-Aylul), 67; Treaty of Lausanne, 63 Islamic Revolution, the, 71–2 Islamic State (is/isis), 92–4 Jaden, Aggrey, 48 Jano, Renas, 100–1 Jashari, Adem, 27–8 Kareem, Ali, 91 Karim, Najmaldin, 101–2 Katanga, 7–8 Khalil, Abdallah, 46–7 Khasroo, Hakeem, 91 Kiir, Salva, 58 Kirkuk, 69–70, 82–3, 93, 110–11 Kocher, Jamel, 98 Kosovo: Assembly of Kosovo, 22, 33; Battle of Kosovo, 23; Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (Ahtisaari Plan), 32–3; Democratic League of Kosovo (Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës in Albanian), 26; Kosovar Albanians, 27–8, 37; Kosovo Liberation Army (k la ), 27, 113; Račak, 27; unilateral ­declaration of independence,

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Index

22, 33, 124; u n Mission in Kosovo (u n m i k), 28–9, 31, 36 Kurdistan Communist Party, 91–2 Kurdistan Democratic Party (kdp), 64–6, 68–9, 71–2, 75–6, 87–91 Kurdistan Islamic Union, 88, 90 Lagu, Joseph, 49 Liberal institutionalism, 12–13 Lihphart, Arend, 112 Machar, Riek, 54–5 Mahabad, 64; Mahabad Republic, 64 Milošević, Slobodan, 25, 28, 36, 117 Montenegro, 7–8, 26, 117–18 Mosul, 62–3 Muhammed, Kardo Pirdood, 88 Muortat, Gordon, 49 Mustafa, Nawshirwan, 71, 88 Nagorno-Karabakh, 7–8, 10 National Congress Party (n cp), 54 National Islamic Front (n i f), 53 Nationalism, 11, 15 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (n ato), 18, 21–2, 28, 38 Numayri, Jaafar Mohammed, 49, 51 Oduho, Joseph, 46–9 Ohure, Saturnino, 47–8 Oil-for-Food Programme, 19, 76 Organization of African Unity (oau), 47, 59, 119 Palestine, 7–8 Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (pu k), 71–2, 75–6, 78, 87, 110–11

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189

Qadir, Shaswar, 98 Qassem, Abdul Karim, 66–7 Quebec, 128 Rahbar, Rahi, 100 Rambouillet Agreement (Rambouillet Conference), 28, 31 Realism, 10–11 Republika Srpska, 7–8, 124–6 Republika Srpska Krajina, 7–8 Rugova, Ibrahim, 26–7, 30 Russia, 22, 29, 32, 34 Sabah, Omed, 80, 83 Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, 7–8 Salih, Ali Hama, 89 Scotland, 128–9 Shahab, Susan Nouri, 85 Somaliland, 7–8 South Ossetia, 7–8 South Sudan: Addis Ababa Agreement, 50, 52; Anya-Nya, 47–8, 52; Azania Liberation Front (a lf), 48; Fashoda Agreement, 55; Government of National Unity, 55–6; High Executive Council (hec ), 50; Juba Conference, 43; Nile Provisional Government, 49; Southern Federal Party (sfp), 46; Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA ), 52–4, 58–9; Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (splm), 52–9, 113 Sri Lanka, 121, 122 State: de jure statehood, 5–6, 29, 55, 74, 117; statehood, 5

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190 Index

Sudan: First Sudanese Civil War, 44–51; Second Sudanese Civil War, 51–6 Sudan African National Union (sa nu), 46–7 Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (s ci ri , later renamed the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq), 82 Taiwan, 7–8, 126–7, 129 Talabani, Bafel, 111 Talabani, Bayiz, 86–7 Talabani, Jalal, 65, 68, 72–8, 84 Talabani, Qubad, 100, 111 Tamil Eelam, 7–9, 121–2 Thaci, Hashim, 38 Tillerson, Rex, 106–8

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Tito, Josip Broz, 24 Transnistria, 7–8, 121, 124 Treaty of Friendship Agreement, 70 Turkey, 3, 63, 75, 78, 106, 108–9, 123–4, 129 Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (tr nc ), 7–8, 123–4 United Nations, 21, 32, 55, 124 u n Resolution 1160, 28 u n Resolution 1244, 28–9, 32 u n Security Council Resolution 687, 74 Weber, Max, 5 Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic, 24

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