Science, War and Imperialism: India in the Second World War 9004166459, 9789004166455

Citation preview

2008006 (Brill: 19403). Sinha. Prelims. Proef 3. 6-5-2008:15.07, page -1.

Science, War and Imperialism

2008006 (Brill: 19403). Sinha. Prelims. Proef 3. 6-5-2008:15.07, page -2.

Social Sciences in Asia Edited by

Vineeta Sinha Syed Farid Alatas Chan Kwok-bun

VOLUME 18

2008006 (Brill: 19403). Sinha. Prelims. Proef 3. 6-5-2008:15.07, page -3.

Science, War and Imperialism India in the Second World War

By

Jagdish N. Sinha

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2008

2008006 (Brill: 19403). Sinha. Prelims. Proef 3. 6-5-2008:15.07, page -4.

This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Sinha, Jagdish N. Science, war, and imperialism : India in the Second World War / by Jagdish N. Sinha. p. cm. – (Social sciences in Asia) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-90-04-16645-5 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Science–Social aspects–India–History. 2. Technology–Social aspects–India–History. 3. India–History–British occupation, 1765-1947. 4. World War, 1939-1945. 5. Imperialism. I. Title. II. Series. Q175.52.I4S56 2007 338.954’06–dc22 2008009918

ISSN 1567-2794 ISBN 978 90 04 16645 5 Copyright 2008 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. printed in the netherlands

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In Memory of My Mother and Father

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CONTENTS Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii Chapter One. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Science, War and Imperialism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 The Main Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 The Hurdles and the Riddle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 The Focus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Chapter Two. Background: Science and Empire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Early Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Curzon and Swadeshi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Impact of the First World War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Aftermath and Depression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Imperialism vs. Nationalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19 19 21 27 33 46

Chapter Three. Science for War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Technical Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 Scientific and Industrial Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Agriculture and Allied Sciences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 Medical Science and Public Health. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 Transport and Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 Chapter Four. The Sciences in the Doldrums . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 The Surveys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 Defence Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 Operational Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 Basic Sciences and Fundamental Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 Chapter Five. Science for Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 Imperial Initiative in the US Partnership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 Compulsions, Strategy and Measures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

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Industrialization under Cloud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 Scientists Rise to the Occasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154 Reconstruction in Retrospect. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158 Chapter Six. Towards Organizing Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 Efforts before the War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 Wartime Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 Rise of an Organizational Set-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172 Beginning of the Science Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 Chapter Seven. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189 India at the Crossroads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190 Opportunities Lost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 Western Science Wins over the Orient . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195 An Elusive Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198 From Bondage to Freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200 Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245

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PREFACE

The genesis of this study lies in my interest in science, especially in its application for global progress and peace. I have been intrigued by the relations between science and war and their implications for peace. As one of the greatest catalyst to the progress of science, the war is also the greatest enemy of peace. But where do the seeds of this irony really lie and what are the wider implications? The Second World War— the greatest battle of history—may provide us some clue. And since the nature of the relation between war and science appear to be more curious and complicated in countries under subjugation, India provides a classic case for study. At the time of the Second World War, India was still under colonial subjugation but she was striving hard to get out of it. However, her historical background and strategic location multiplied the complexities. Besides the pressures of the war from outside, the country passed through a period of unprecedented internal turmoil ignited by political upsurge, communal passion and a nasty famine. The World War aided these developments to expose the poverty and backwardness of the country to the world and expose India, at the same time, to the new forces of change sweeping the globe at the time. It is in this background that this book seeks to examine the impact of the Second World War on science and technology in India, in the context of imperialism, nationalism and the global progress. On account of the complexities of the contemporary developments and the official censor and wartime secrecy, this study was bound to be beset with difficulties; lack of sources and absence of any pioneering work on the subject were the most important of them. Consequently, I often had to begin with rudimentary facts and piecemeal information, and look for help to other disciplines. To Science and Culture, the noted contemporary Indian journal, I returned again and again not only for leads to events, and facts and figures, but also for analysis and opinions on them. My understanding and perspective have been further enriched through the writings of J.D. Bernal, M.M. Postan, J.H. Voigt, M.N. Saha, Rajat K. Ray, Shiv Visvanathan and Aditya Mukherjee to name just a few. Through N. Mansergh’s multivolume Transfer of Power,

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I could lay my hand on many important British documents, inaccessible until not long ago. In the course of my research for this book, I have earned the gratitude of a large number of people from India and abroad; to all of them I offer my sincere thanks. Among my teachers and colleagues in the University of Delhi, R.L. Shukla deserves special mention for his critical feedback and generous help at various stages. I am beholden to Aparna Basu for her comments on my draft and her friendly concern and generosity. As ever R.S. Sharma has been a great source of encouragement, always eager to see my work in print. D.N. Jha and Amar Farooqui offered help whenever required. Among the friends and fellow researchers, I fondly remember Deepak Kumar of Jawaharlal Nehru University who helped me at every stage in the preparation of this book. Apart from valuable comments on my draft, he also shared copies of some original documents. For their kind gesture and support, I thankfully remember friends from abroad—Roy McLeod of Sydney University (Australia), Lewis Pyenson of the Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, and Stuart W. Bill Leslie of The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore (USA). Daniel R. Headrick of Roosevelt University, Chicago (USA), was kind enough to go through the first chapter and offer valuable suggestions. In the course of my research, I visited many institutions in India and abroad. In India, I made use of the collections and facilities at the National Archives of India, Central Secretarial Library, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, Delhi University Library System (the Central Science Library in particular), and libraries of the Indian National Science Academy (INSA), National Institute of Science, Technology and Development Studies (NISTADS) of the CSIR, Indian Council of Historical Research (ICHR), Indian Council of Agricultural Research and Indian Council of World Affairs, all in Delhi. In Calcutta, I worked at the National Library and libraries of the All India Institute of Hygiene and Public Health, School of Tropical Medicine, National Council of Education and of the Indian Association for the Cultivation of Science. In Bombay, I consulted the Haffkine Institute, Institute of Science, Asiatic Society Library, and headquarters of the Tata and Walchand Hirachand industries. I am thankful particularly to Sir Dorabji Tata Trust and its Director, R.M. Lala. My initial research was supported by INSA. I am equally obliged to several organisations abroad for offering me financial support and research facilities. Some of them are India

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Office Library and Records, Public Records, Wellcome Trust Medical Library, Royal Society, School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, and the British National Committee for the History of the Second World War, in London, and Churchill College Archives Centre, Cambridge. I am grateful to the British Council and the ICHR (New Delhi) for financially supporting my visit to the UK and France. During my visit to France my host was the Maison des Sciences de l’Homme (MSHS), Paris, whose support enabled me to work also at the Institut d’Histoire du Temps Présent (IHTP) there. I am grateful especially to Maurice Aymard of the MSH and Henry Rousso of the IHTP, for their kind gesture and help. Research grants from the Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC) of Rockefeller University, and Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute, both in New York, have enabled me to consult sources at their archives. I am grateful to them, especially to Darwin H. Stapleton, Executive Director, RAC, and his colleagues for their generosity and enthusiastic support. Another research grant from the Shastri Indo-Canadian Institute (Calgary/New Delhi) made possible my visit to the Institute for the Study of Canada, and McLennan Library, McGill University (Montreal), National Archives and National Library of Canada (Ottawa). I fondly remember Desmond Morton, the grand old man of Canadian history, for his kind gesture and the Institute of Canada for the institutional support. During my visit to the USA and Canada, Ajoy, Madhu and Vinayak provided me a second home; as loving was my stay with Vashisth Dave family; and Gyaneshwar Prasad was of great help, in New York. Gautam Sachdev welcomed me in London. I am beholden to all of them. Financial support for my visits abroad came also from the ICHR and the University Grants Commission of India. I owe much to the ICHR, especially to Irfan Habib, the then Chairman, and to P.K. Shukla and Sanghmittra for their help. At home, I am indebted to Rajdhani College and the University of Delhi for granting me study leave for working on this project initially, and to my colleagues for their cooperation and friendliness. I am thankful in particular to Vijay Laxmi Pandit for her constant support and to Bhuwan Jha for going through the manuscript and offering valuable suggestions. During my lean periods many friends and relations came to help and contributed towards the completion of this project in their own ways. R. Sharma and his family, my sister Uma, Pramod Kumar, Neeraj, P.N. Tiwary and Rajhans were always there. N.K. Sinha has been a source of strength and inspiration all through; and Kishore

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Kunal, Sachchidanand Jha, A.R. Sinha, N.K. Shukla and P.K. Dubey extended a helping hand. My thanks are due also to Zaheer Babar and Nalin Sharma for their guidance and help. My association with Vineeta Sinha of the National University of Singapore, the editor of the Social Sciences in Asia series, has been truly gratifying and enriching. By showing faith in the value of my manuscript and giving me ample freedom to work on it, she has encouraged me to put in my best to enhance its quality. I owe also to the anonymous expert readers whose comments have helped me improve upon the original manuscript. Farheen Mukri has spruced up the language and contributed to the readability of the book. Indeed, I am thankful to Brill for choosing to publish my book and offer it to the international audience. I am beholden especially to Patricia Radder and Birgitta Poelmans for their prompt and encouraging response which has added to the quality of this book and ensured its early publication. Countless friends, well-wishers and strangers, who remain unnamed here, have helped me all along the long journey and have encouraged and inspired me in various ways; to all of them I bow with humility. In the end, I recall with appreciation my wife Kiran, daughter Supriya and son Rajat, without whose support and care I could not have completed this study. I dedicate this book to the memory of my parents. Jagdish N Sinha August 2007 Uttaranchal Apartments Delhi 110092

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ABBREVIATIONS ACTA Agri. BSA BSI BSIR CABA CLA CSIR CUP DVC Edu. FRI GHQ GOI GSI GTSI IAC IACS ICAR IESHR IHR IIA IIT IJHS ILO IMS INC IOL IOL&R ISC IRF IRUC IVRI MIT NAI NISI NPC OUP PWD

All India Council of Technical Education Agriculture Board of Scientific Advice Botanical Survey of India Board of Scientific and Industrial Research Central Advisory Board of Education Central Legislative Assembly Council of Scientific and Industrial Research Cambridge University Press Damodar Valley Corporation Education Forest Research Institute (Dehra Dun) General Headquarters Government of India Geological Survey of India Great Trigonometrical Survey of India Indian Advisory Committee Indian Association for Cultivation of Science Imperial Council of Agricultural Research Indian Economic and Social History Review Indian Historical Review Imperial Institute of Agriculture Indian Institute of Technology Indian Journal of History of Science International Labour Organisation Indian Medical Service Indian National Congress India Office Library India Office Library & Records Indian Science Congress Industrial Research Fund Industrial Research Utilisation Committee Imperial Veterinary Research Institute Massachusetts Institute of Technology National Archives of India National Institute of Sciences of India National Planning Committee Oxford University Press Public Works Department

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xiv RAC RAF Resol/s. Proc/s. S&C TVA ZSI

abbreviations Rockefeller Archive Center Royal Air Force Resolution/s Proceeding/s Science and Culture Tennessee Valley Authority Zoological Survey of India

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chapter one INTRODUCTION

The Second World War was a crucial phase in the history of both imperialism and the development of science and technology. The consequences of the war were manifold and multilayered. As it signalled the collapse of imperialism and disintegration of the political, social and economic systems sustaining it, the war inaugurated at the same time a new world order based on new ideas, institutions and modern science and technology. The collapse of imperialism encouraged struggles for freedom in the colonies leading to independence of many of them. Curiously, however, the war set in motion contradictory trends working in opposite directions: while the people in the colonies initially came in support of their masters to face the global crisis and the latter initiated liberal reforms for socio-economic reconstruction there, the nationalist leadership in the colonies considered it as an opportune time to step up their struggle for freedom. Paradoxically, both of them succeeded, to an extent, in achieving their goals. However, the process gave birth to complex developments and trends that were often influenced by the factors and forces operating across the globe. The wartime policies provided opportunities to the major political and economic powers of the world to adjust their position in the changing world scenario and fashion the tools for their future operations. Thus, new players emerged on the international scene and a new power structure and equation came into being. The emergence of the United States of America as a global power and its rise in the East was probably the most conspicuous and representative of the trend. In the process, imperialism appeared in the new garb of neo-colonialism, and international diplomacy refined newer tools in the strategic alliances and trade agreements that began with the Allied co-operation during the Second World War. This was the beginning of the power bloc politics of the Cold War era in which scientific and technical collaborations became essential tools of diplomacy. Science and technology played a pivotal role in these developments. By the time the Second World War came to an end, it demonstrated

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chapter one

the most destructive powers of science; but in the course of meeting the exigencies of the war and alleviating humanity from its suffering, no one was left in doubt about the great potentials of science as a means of human welfare and progress. This lent science a new import and orientation. In the belligerent states (both the Allied and the Axis), scientific breakthroughs and technical feats were achieved one after another during the war, and their economy was rejuvenated on account of the wide-ranging reconstruction endeavours. In most of these countries, it was a period of economic boom and prosperity, which fuelled their rise on the international scene after the war.1 Since India was part of the British Empire and also closely involved in the war, she felt its impact in full measure; but her experiences were quite different from those of the developed countries. Here, the war accelerated the process of her transition from colonialism to democracy and acted as a catalyst for state initiative for material reconstruction, indicating a basic shift in the colonial policy. However, the process was not as simple as it appeared at the first glance. The fierce conflict the war ignited between imperialism and nationalism released great forces of change with immense consequences. Meanwhile, the internal economy passed through a period of upheavals as it was exposed to the Western capitalist market forces; and when the British authorities and business interests started withdrawing from the country, new players entered the scene. All this had deep and long-term implications for the progress of science and technology and the state policy governing them in India.2 Seen in this background, a cursory glance at the developments in India presents a puzzling scenario. The popular memory in the country does not conjure a picture of scientific achievements, material rejuvenation and of economic prosperity as in the case of the West. No scientific breakthrough was recorded here, no technical innovation worthy of note took place; and the socio-scientific movement that gathered strength around the time here, had different goals and priorities than those in the West. For India, it was really a turbulent time full of polit1 For the global developments, I have depended on such studies as J.D. Bernal, Science in History, 4 vols., first published 1954; Harmondsworth, Pelican Books 1969; Geoffrey Barraclough, An Introduction to Contemporary History, 1964; Harmondsworth, reprinted 1975; and William R. Keylor, The Twentieth-Century World, 1984; OUP, New York, 1992. 2 Johannes H. Voigt, India in the Second World War, New Delhi, 1987, is one of my preliminary sources of information on India.

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introduction

3

ical upheavals, communal riots and human miseries perpetrated by a horrific famine. Yet it was a period of unprecedented official initiatives for organising science that led to the establishment of the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), the first all-India body to manage and promote the various sectors of science. It was also the period of hectic scientific and technical exchanges and industrial collaborations with other countries. But none of these measures apparently seem to have produced concrete results of basic value for the local society. This experience of India stands in total contrast with that of the advanced nations, including Britain which ruled over India. This fact is mind-boggling, hence the main issue to be probed in this study. This has, however, to be examined in a wider perspective which calls for a look into the various aspects of the subject before any conclusive opinion is offered.

Science, War and Imperialism A preliminary survey of the developments in the first half of the 20th century in India projects, in war and imperialism, the two factors that most influenced the progress of science in the country. So, a brief discussion on the mutual relationship between the two in a more general and wider perspective must precede any probe into the details of the related developments. Before this is done however, it is helpful to evaluate the nature and scope of science itself. It is difficult to define science and make a clear distinction between science and technology. Generally speaking, the understanding of nature is science and the means and methods of manipulating that understanding for specific purposes is technology; to put the two in more precise definitions may prove misleading. The rapidity with which science has changed its nature and scope since it began to achieve an autonomous status in the 17th century, it is almost losing its distinct existence and its definition becomes intrinsically impossible. The only way of looking at it in the context of social history, therefore, is to perceive it, in the words of J.D. Bernal, as “an extensive and unfolding description… [of] the aspects in which science appears in the contemporary world.” As such, it is better to take it “as an institution, as a method, as a cumulative tradition of knowledge”, that has been a major factor behind our material progress and evolution of beliefs and attitudes to the universe and to humanity. Again, science is not a matter of thought

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alone but of thought continually carried into practice and constantly refreshed by it; as such, science cannot be studied separately from technique.3 This distinction becomes more difficult in case of government policy and social response. By the time the Second World War commenced, this distinction blurred all the more as scientific knowledge and principles were extensively employed in the production process to meet the civilizational needs than ever before. Considering this point of view, it is difficult to overlook the relation of science with war and imperialism and their influences on each other. Science and war have been in a mutually encouraging relation for centuries, and imperialism has been one of their greatest beneficiaries. Initially, it was technology that actually aided wars,4 but gradually the new knowledge about the physical world and its forces revolutionised the modern warfare. Weapons and techniques were improved, and wars became more lethal, were pre-planned and systematically executed. The trend became more perceptible with the progress of the Industrial Revolution in Europe and the repercussions were gradually experienced in the rest of the world. This led to the conquest of new areas and establishment of the colonies, which facilitated the expansion and consolidation of imperialism across the globe.5 In the process, science helped in the rise of capitalism, by increasing the pace of production on an unprecedented scale and by giving easy access to raw materials and the market. This enabled capitalist imperialism to sustain itself through wars and multinational cartels. In fact, war and war preparations were themselves an essential outlet for the products of the powerful monopoly firms especially in the steel and chemical industries throughout the last century.6 Although discoveries and inventions have fostered wars since the beginning of civilization, their consequences were far more spectacular during the two World Wars. The First World War encouraged the development of the bombing aeroplane, tank and poison gas, and gave Bernal, Science in History, vol. I, 1969, pp. 31, 41. Martin Creveland, Technology and the War from 2000 BC to the Present, London, 1991. 5 Bernal, Science in History, vol. I, 1969, pp. 136–138, 218, 320–323, for earlier times; for 20th century developments, see idem, vol. III, pp. 831–848. For studies closer to Asia, refer to works of Roy MacLeod, Lewis Pyenson, Daniel Headrick and Michael Worboys. For a debate, see Paolo Palladino and Michael Worboys, ‘Science and Imperialism’, and Lewis Pyenson, ‘Cultural Imperialism and Exact Sciences Revisited’, both in Isis, 84, No. 1, 1993. 6 Bernal, Science in History, vol. III, 1969, pp. 705–707. 3 4

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introduction

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a foretaste of what havoc science could create in war. By bringing scientists and practical men together, with ample funds and resources, to meet its exigencies, the war demonstrated how an idea could be put into full production without undergoing prolonged experiments and trials.7 The war also made contributions to industrial production and processes, medical science, agriculture, and transport and communications. This showed how science could also be used for peacetime requirements and progress in general. This generated a wider concern for the promotion of science, which encouraged professionalization of related activities and formation of organizations to control them. In Britain, the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) was set up in 1915 and, in 1921, the National Research Council in the USA.8 The colonies could not remain unaffected by these developments. In India, for example, dozens of scientific organizations cropped up during the war and soon after, and the Indian Science Congress Association (est.1914) soon grew into the most important forum of them. But their nature and aims differed from those in the advanced and independent countries of the West. In India, the concern was not confined to purely scientific matters but it also touched socio-economic issues like racial discrimination, lack of facilities and neglect of indigenous knowledge and skill that affected the practice and progress of science. This often aligned their endeavours to the nationalist concerns and the freedom struggle. Lack of official initiative on the lines in the U.K. was, however, a noteworthy feature of the colonial policy in India.9 The role of science in the Second World War was far greater than in the First World War. In the Second World War, most branches of science were called upon for help and new ones, like operational research, came into being. Jeep, radar and long-range rockets were invented one after another; but the most spectacular feat was the atom bomb. An event of hardly any detectable effect in 1938, the discovery of atomic fission turned into a death-dealing horror in 1945, owing to the huge expenditure of more money than science had used in the whole course of human history up to that time.10 In order to meet the challenges 7 For early stage, see Bernal, Science in History, vol. I, 1969, pp. 218, 320–323; for 20th century developments, see idem, vol. III, 1969, p. 812. 8 Guy Hartcup, The Effect of Science on the Second World War, New York, 2000, esp. pp. 1–8; also see his The War of Invention: Scientific Developments, 1914–1918, Potomac, 1988. 9 Jagdish N. Sinha, ‘Science Policy of the British in India during the Second World War’, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Delhi, 1994, Ch. I. 10 Bernal, Science in History, vol. III, 1969, p. 717.

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of the war, full practical potentialities of chemical and biological sciences were also harnessed and new materials and industrial processes were developed. These included the artificial rubber by Allied chemists and synthetic oil by their German counterparts. The dreaded explosive terrorising the world today, RDX, was some of such finds.11 The need to protect the fighting men against disease and injuries led to allround advances in sanitation, medicine and surgery. DDT, penicillin and paludrin are all essentially war products.12 Likewise, the overriding concern for food stimulated agriculture and the associated industries. All this happened in the developed countries and the metropolis, but what happened in the colonies like India is the focus of this study. The advent of the Cold War imparted subsequently a further impetus to the destructive potentials of science which was to dwarf all the earlier efforts. Ever since, it has led to an unprecedented rate of growth of science with an ever-increasing emphasis on weapon research. Rockets, missiles, satellites, sophisticated machines of reconnaissance and surveillance and high-speed guns are some of the generally known offerings of war-propelled science.13 But there are scores of others which are as deadly but little known. Some of them relate to chemical and biological warfare.14 To add to the problem, many findings of science and its inventions are now progressively employed, with the aid of research in social sciences, to articulate mass behaviour and public opinion in the pursuit of geopolitical dominance and economic gains.15 Thus, any attempt to deal with the growth of science and its relation to industry and other areas of scientific application in the twentieth century should include explicitly the effect of war. War had an important influence on science in earlier centuries and was itself modified by it; together they promoted imperialism across the globe, refining the means and methods of territorial expansion and material exploita-

11 Edward M. Spiers, Chemical Warfare, London, 1986; also see David Zimmerman, review of Guy Hartcup, The Effect of Science on the Second World War (2000), sighted on LogSmart. 12 For the USA, see the multivolume official history edited by B. Coats (1955–1963); for Britain, a similar official history is by Sir Arthur S. Macnalty (1953–1968)—all listed in the Bibliography. 13 Bernal, Science in History, vol. III, 1969, p. 717, 836, 841–843. Also see Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War 1945–1971, 1976. 14 Robert Harris and Joremy Paxman, A Higher Form of killing: The Secret History of Chemical and Biological Warfare, 1982; New York, 2002. 15 Bernal, Science in History, vol. IV, 1969, pp. 1139–1148.

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tion.16 The scientific developments during the Second World War and the Cold War years discovered new avenues of destruction and dominance, leading to the beginning of an age of space colonization. To return to the colonial period, the exploitation under imperialism was confined not only to the economy of the colonies but it also extended to the realm of science. The scientists and the scientific establishments of the colonising countries exploited the resources of the colonies to advance their own sciences. Observations and experiments carried out in the colonies were routinely used to feed back scientific research at home; wherever local people were employed, as on the lower posts in the Surveys and medical services in India, it was more for the sake of economy and other considerations than any other reason. In all cases, however, the professional benefits accrued to the mother country. Thus, most of the scientific institutions established within the colonies were in reality only the outposts of the grand scientific enterprises going on in the metropolis. Wherever they addressed the local problems, as in the case of tropical diseases, their benefits for the colonizers were equally important if not more. The routine activities of these establishments within the colonies were often accentuated in times of crisis like war. Given the circumstances, the Second World War was the period when the Indian resources were likely to be most freely used in the interest of the British Empire and its Allies.

The Main Perspectives From this point of view, it is worthwhile to follow the developments in India, a classic colony, to find out how Britain used science in her imperial interest in the conditions of war there; and no war can illustrate this better than the Second World War. Many of the problems cropping up during the war in India had their roots in the past. The British connection with India had started through trade much before political control brought her under complete subjugation as a colony. Although the imperial control from London was never to end completely, the consolidation of the British authority in India gradually minimised its needs. Nevertheless, extraordinary situations warranted its activation 16 Bernal, Science in History, vol. I, 1969, pp. 136–138, 218, 320–323, for earlier times; for 20th century developments, see idem, vol. III, pp. 831–848. Also see works of Roy MacLeod, Lewis Pyenson, Daniel Headrick and Michael Worboys.

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occasionally—conditions of war being one of them. No wonder, the imperial control over India from London was the most overbearing in the 1940s as the period presented the greatest crisis for the Empire. This is why any study of the official initiatives and policy measures in India during the period has to be looked at not from the angle of India as a colony alone but also from that of the British Empire, imperialism and capitalism. Thus, imperialism and colonialism on the one hand and nationalism and indigenous response on the other constitute the most dominating backdrop for this study—a vantage point from which to look at the developments. A glance at history may, therefore, present a clearer view of the goings-on. Since the most decisive clash between imperialism and nationalism, culminating in the end of British rule in India, took place around the Second World War, an examination of the colonial attitude towards science and technology through the expansion and consolidation of British rule in the country may explain many of the issues of the period and provide them an appropriate perspective. From this point of view, the imperial concern for colonial development initiated under Joseph Chamberlain as Colonial Secretary during 1895– 1903 may serve as a starting point.17 A similar concern was noted in India under the Viceroyalty of Lord Curzon (1899–1905) around this time. Departing from the colonial policy of his predecessors, Curzon initiated a more palpable and longterm policy to promote science for the material progress of India as a source of prosperity for the British Empire.18 But the aggressive policy of the arch imperialist soon brought the Raj in a violent conflict with the nationalist forces which burst forth in 1905 into the Swadeshi movement calling for promoting everything indigenous. Although the movement failed, it was nevertheless the greatest nationalist showdown after the Revolt of 1857. With its focus on industry and on science and technology, the Swadeshi was significant as much in its success as in its failure. It saw the ungracious exit of Curzon from India, but the 17 Charles William Forman, ‘Science for Empire: 1895–1940’, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1941, appears to be one of the earliest studies dealing with science and Empire, which also refers to India. Michael Worboys, ‘Science and British Colonial Imperialism’, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Sussex, 1979, comes closer to the focus and approach of my study. 18 For the developments in India, see Deepak Kumar, Science and the Raj, 1995; New Delhi, 1997; and Daniel Headrick, The Tentacles of Progress: Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperialism, 1850–1940, New York, 1988; and David Arnold, Science, Technology and Medicine in Colonial India, Cambridge, 2000.

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happenings of the period set imperialism and nationalism in motion as rival forces to clash for the next half-a-century. Thus, by the time the 20th century began, scientific elements entered the imperial perception and policy;19 and administrative measures undertaken by Curzon largely shaped the future course of development of science in the context of further consolidation and development of the British possessions in India. Whereas these administrative measures and organisational setup provided the Raj an effective tool of control, the Swadeshi gave Indians a vision for self-help, certain goals to achieve and imparted them training to fight against the foreign rule. An intriguing aspect of these parallel developments was the presence of strong scientific elements in both of them.20 In many ways, these two factors would dictate the pattern and strategies of the struggle between the rulers and the ruled, leading to such controversies as on the choice of technology—cottage industry vs. large-scale industry—that continued up to the Second World War. After Curzon, as the imperial authority ebbed with the rise of nationalism and the struggle for freedom, colonial emphasis shifted to articulation of administrative control over technical services and scientific organizations.21 With the prospects of the permanence of British rule in India dwindling, the Raj began to lose interest in long-term scientific projects of the magnitude of the Surveys, and ad hocism dictated most of the official measures. The period before 1905 had seen the expansion and consolidation of British power and influence in every sphere of life including science and technology;22 the period between 1905 and 1939, especially after the First World War, was one of intense administrative manoeuvring and compromises with short-term goals and frequent changes in the official policy to counter the political challenges. All along, Curzon’s tools and techniques were variously used by the successive regimes through legislative measures, as in 1919 and 1935, and organisational reforms;23 but the nationalist leadership held to heart their own talisman—Swadeshi (indigenous) and Swaraj (self-rule)—which 19

R.M. MacLeod, ‘Scientific Advice for British India: Imperial Perceptions and Administrative Goals, 1898–1923’, Modern Asian Studies, IX, 3, 1975, pp. 343–384. 20 For details on Swadeshi, refer to Sumit Sarkar, Swadeshi Movement in Bengal, New Delhi, 1973. 21 Jagdish N Sinha, ‘Science and the Indian National Congress’, in Deepak Kumar, ed., Science and Empire, New Delhi, 1991. 22 D. Kumar, Science and the Raj, 1997. 23 Sinha, ‘Science Policy of the British’, 1994, Chap. I.

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continued to inspire and guide them until they won freedom. It was the constant dialogue between these two parallel trends that decided the nature and fate of many issues concerning the progress of science in India.24 This dialogue eventually came to an end during the Second World War when the colonial authorities succumbed to the local demands and international pressure, and agreed to accommodate the indigenous interest on the official agenda in a big way. We would try to find out in the chapters ahead as to how this struggle between colonial imperialism and nationalism affected the wartime happenings. The rise of socialism and decolonisation are the other angles of inquiry, because socialism gave a great momentum to the struggle against colonialism setting off the process of decolonisation which was strongly catalysed by the Second World War. In India, the impact of the Russian Revolution was felt soon after 1917 as revolutionary groups sprang up in different parts of the country and the Communist Party of India was formed in 1925. By 1930s, the indigenous opinion started visualising the country’s reconstruction using some of the socialist tools like planning and industrialization. Soon, the national leadership advocated socialism as a panacea of India’s problems and pleaded for all-round national reconstruction.25 Interestingly, many of the noted Indian scientists, such as M.N. Saha (1893–1956), thought on the same lines. This resulted in a mutual collaboration between the scientists and the nationalist leadership at the National Planning Committee (NPC), which was constituted, in 1938, by the Indian National Congress to plan for India’s reconstruction under a national government.26 Some of the consequences of socialism and the socialist experiments in the USSR ought to be immediately taken note of: First, opposition of socialism to all forms of inequality and exploitation and, thus, to capitalism and imperialism; second, the encouragement and inspiration it provided to the freedom movements all over the world; and, third, its world view of progress based on modern science and technology. Since a perceptible understanding of these facts was a pervasive reality in

Sinha, ‘Science and the Congress’, 1991. Sinha, ‘Science and the Congress’, 1991; also see his ‘Origin of India’s National Science Policy: M.L. Sarkar to M.K. Gandhi, 1875–1935’, Indian Journal of History of Science (IJHS), XXVII, 2, April 1992. 26 Jagdish N Sinha, ‘Technology for National Reconstruction: The National Planning Committee, 1938–1949’, in Roy MacLeod and Deepak Kumar, eds., Technology and the Raj: Western Technology and Technical Transfers to India, 1700–1947, New Delhi, 1995. 24 25

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India even before the Second World War started,27 effort will be made to examine how they influenced the course of history, what was their impact on the progress of science and, in fact, on the whole process of development in the country. Thus by the time the Second World War broke out, the British Empire and imperialism were on the defensive, and the process of decolonisation had commenced. Canada and Australia had already achieved dominion status. On the Indian sub-continent, in 1937, Burma ceded from India where the struggle for independence had entered its last phase. The growing pressure from the Axis powers in both the East and the West and further territorial losses during the war were sure to compel the authorities in London and Delhi to consider rethinking India’s problems. How far did these factors and the influence of socialism on the Indian leadership help them take a stand on such issues as industrialization and the choice of technology in the context of development of the country and how far did they affect the official policy in the matter? These are some of the questions that need to be answered.28 All this has to be viewed in the background of developments the world over, particularly in the former colonies. For, this war was not only the greatest war of the human civilization but also a major turning point in its evolution as it brought into being a new world order that increasingly sustained itself by relying on collective wisdom, democracy and modern science. It was no longer the brute force and violence but the mutual cooperation of nations that seemed to hold out the better prospects for human existence and progress.29 Reconstruction during the Second World War was another important factor that influenced the development of science in India. With Britain’s declaration of war against Germany, India became a party to it and was thus subjected to its demands and strains. In the process, she was exposed to the happenings beyond her borders and to the myriad of global forces that accelerated the pace of her liberation struggle. The early exigencies of the war led to a number of war supply and preparatory measures, stimulating industrial activities and the

27

Ibid. Sinha, ‘Science Policy of the British’, 1994, esp. Chap. I. 29 Barraclough, Introduction to Contemporary History, 1975; also see J.D. Bernal and M. Cornforth, Science for Peace and Socialism, London, 1949; and J.D. Bernal, ‘Science in the Service of Society,’ Marxist Quarterly, vol. I, 1954. 28

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training of technical personnel in the country. But as the war expanded and was prolonged, the situation became worse and demanded longterm measures. Responding to the situation, the colonial government launched a massive programme of all-round reconstruction based on modern lines.30 This was a drastic change in the British attitude towards India’s problems. The chapters that follow attempt to examine the real causes behind the official initiative and its ultimate goals: How and to what extent was the colonial policy influenced by imperial considerations and the happenings in Britain? How did the Allied cooperation, compulsions within India and the factors and forces from around the world affect the colonial policy? Lastly, the process of transition and globalization, set in motion in the 1940s in India and all over the world, needs to be addressed to understand why the happenings in India took place the way they did. For India, it was not only a period of transition from colonialism to democracy but also one of an unprecedented exposure to the global forces of change. This offered India happy prospects for interaction with the world beyond the colonial and imperial confines. Yet for a country still under subjugation and tied to the Allied cooperation, the situation was really puzzling and uncertain. Whilst Germany and Japan were admired in India for their progress and ingenuity, they were officially kept at bay as enemies of the Empire. How did India come out of this complex and difficult situation and to what consequences, we would try to find out.

The Hurdles and the Riddle However, to find answers to these questions is not an easy task for a variety of reasons. In fact, the study of science in relation to the Second World War has been a relatively slow affair even in the developed countries closely involved in the war, such as Britain and the United States of America. The Cold War has been one of the main reasons behind this. The rivalry between the Super Powers contributing to the power bloc politics and armament in the post-war years has generally held back nations from revealing their wartime activities, especially in the fields of armament and science.31 This is equally true of the smaller allies and 30 31

For preliminary information, see Voigt, India in the Second World War, 1987. Guy Hartcup, Effect of Science on the Second World War, 2000, Introduction.

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introduction

13

the colonies of the major powers and their diplomatic partners in the post-war years. The erstwhile colonies like India, which participated in the war actively, do have their own problems in the colonial legacies as well as the compulsions of their international relations pursued after the war and Independence. From this point of view, one would have expected that the end of the Cold War would encourage nations to throw open their wartime archives to researchers. But this prospect is not entirely free from problems. The recent revelations about war crimes have stirred strong nationalist sentiments in many countries embittering their international relations. Information regarding secret scientific plans and missions, experiments in chemical warfare and field trials of military medicines are pregnant with disturbing implications arising out of racial, religious and nationalistic discriminations and, thus, are likely to cause problems and embarrassment. This is bound to deter authorities from declassifying vital records in the near future, and in many cases oblige them not to ever do so at all. As such, the war is destined to remain a most secret war of history. All these problems have obstructed research in India too, where, like many other counties of the developing world, the subject is yet to open up adequately for historical investigation. On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Second World War a decade ago, a spate of literature on the war was produced but India’s contribution was negligible.32 India has had additional problems as well. In spite of the fact that Western science had eclipsed the indigenous knowledge and skill here, it could not draw the attention of Indian historians immediately because it was yet to address the local problems meaningfully. As a result, political and economic issues stole the limelight for decades after Independence, thanks to the freedom struggle and the Second World War. Serious paucity of sources has also come in the way of much focused research on the subject. Many of the records that could possibly have added to our information in vital areas are not open as yet; 32

The collections and bibliographical references of the Institut d’Histoire du Temps Présent, CNRS, Paris, which incorporates the erstwhile Institut d’Etudes de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale, and its Bulletin de l’Institut d’Histoire du Temps Présent, Bulletin show the nature and range of worldwide research on the Second World War, including on its scientific aspects and India. The Best of History Websites: World War II is the current update. For India, see J.H. Voigt, ‘India in the Second World War: A History with Problems,’ in Juergem Rohwer & Hildegard Muller, Neue Forschungen Zum Zweiten Weltkrieg, Koblenz, 1990, pp. 187–201.

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there are others which are not easily accessible; and fate of many is not known. Scattering of papers here and there has added to the problem. Not all the important papers are located at the Indian archives; many of them are retained by the imperial establishments in Britain and, maybe, some by its Allies. Happily, the publication of the N. Mansergh’s multi-volume Constitutional Relations between Britain and India: The Transfer of Power has, meanwhile, brought to light a range of official documents of immense value for our purpose, yet it is not all-embracing and exhaustive.33 In spite of this handicap, the sheer dynamism of the Second World War and its impact on the post-war developments in India have, however, obliged scholars from various disciplines to take note of the wartime happenings. Since, besides polity, trade, industry, transport and communications were the first to experience the impact of the global crisis, economists, economic historians and political scientists were among the earliest to take up its study in their respective fields.34 While addressing the problems arising out of the disruption and dislocation during the war, concern for security and post-war reconstruction had actively engaged the official attention. Their value for post-war progress could not be overlooked. So, as soon as the national government initiated development programmes through the Five Year Plans after Independence, planners and policy makers looked back to learn from the wartime administrative experiences.35 However, a keener perception of the social consequences of the war in India appears to have dawned later; and it is intriguing to note that it were the sociologists and anthropologists, and not the historians who first came up with studies focused on science during the war.36 But they had to work within the parameters of their own disciplines confined to individuals, groups and organisations. To the students of history, their attention to larger issues, historical forces at work and the overview

Constitutional Relations between Britain and India: The Transfer of Power, 1942–1947, eds., N. Mansergh and E.W.R. Lumby (also Penderal Moon from vol. V), vols. I–VI, London, 1970–1976. 34 Voigt, ‘India in the Second World War: A History,’ pp. 187–201. 35 Ibid. Also see A. Rahman (1972); A. Rahman and K.D. Sharma (1994); and Sukhmay Chakrbarty (1987) listed in the Bibliography. 36 Shiv Visvanathan, Organizing for Science: The Making of an Industrial Research Laboratory, Delhi, 1985, is probably the most important of them. Others are V.V. Krishna (1987), Zaheer Baber (1998); for an anthropologist, see Robert S. Anderson (1975), all listed in the Bibliography. 33

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15

appear inadequate; in that the main components of contemporary backdrop—imperialism, nationalism and the war are rather diffused. The paucity of sources, archival in particular, has often held historians back from producing broader and in-depth studies. No doubt, sharing the joys of victory of the British Empire in the war, the Government of India commissioned a massive project of the Official History of the Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War soon after the end of the hostilities.37 Unlike its British counterpart—History of the Second World War,38 the volumes produced under the Indian project confined themselves mostly to the different aspects of the armed operations. A wider view of the war with its socio-cultural consequences was yet to be taken up. The research on the wartime developments in science has an intriguing feature: While the most interesting books on science in the Second World War were written by scientists themselves in the Allied countries,39 the accounts of the war by the scientists in Germany are sparse; strikingly, the performance of the Indian scientists in this regard is no better than the Germans. Did the Indian scientists fall in the same position as the Axis scientists, in relation to the British authorities— bound by security restrictions, mutual suspicion or lack of freedom of expression? The Indian scientists, too, wrote little on the technical advances in science within the country. Was it due to the restrictions on access to research activities and censor on their expression, or was there nothing at all to write about? This has to be kept in view while probing the course of events in India. A few works in the last decade or so have made appreciable attempts in so far as the social consequences of the war are concerned; but in them too, science is addressed indirectly and from the angles that generally fail to appreciate its value fully as a means of progress.40 As a result, the relation between science and development is virtually 37

Bisheshwar Prasad, Gen. Ed., Official History of the Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War, 19 vols., Delhi, 1952–1966. 38 W.K. Hancock, Gen. Ed., History of the Second World War, 18 vols., London, 1949– 1971. 39 As by A.P. Rowe, One Story of Radar, Cambridge, 1948; and R.V. Jones, Most Secret War, London, 1978, in Britain; and Vannevar Bush, Pieces of the Action, London, 1973, in the USA. 40 Voigt, India in the Second World War, 1987; S.B. Singh, Imperial Retreat, Delhi, 1992; and his Second World War as Catalyst for Social Changes in India, Delhi, 1998. Rajat K Ray, Industrialization in India: Growth and Conflict in the Private Corporate Sector 1914–1947, 1979; Delhi, 1985; and Aditya Mukherjee, Imperialism, Nationalism and the Making of the Indian Capitalist Class, 1920–1947, New Delhi, 2002, focus more closely on the developments

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untouched, ironically in a period that marked the pinnacle of science in the 20th century. It is only very recently that the developmental aspects of science have started engaging attention of some historians.41 The official archival records are opening up gradually; meanwhile, the non-official sources assume considerable importance, as the period abounds in them. There are books and tracts which provide valuable information on contemporary developments, Indian opinion and on the colonial policy;42 and a few journals with social concern for science that braved through the war, like Science and Culture, are there to help. Likewise, proceedings of the Indian National Congress and professional organizations such as the Science Congress Association offer us a wealth of information. The private papers of scientists like A.V. Hill, S.S. Bhatnagar and M.N. Saha, and industrialists like the Tatas and Walchand Hirachand often take us beyond the dark tunnels of history and shed light on the crucial goings-on behind the scene. Leafing through these papers along with the official records, one is confronted with a fierce battle going on between imperialism and nationalism and bizarre things happening here and there: a war of wits going on between the authorities on the one hand and the Indian scientists, industrialists and the likes on the other. This sometimes led to intrigues, ganging up and official surveillance. Just on the eve of the Second World War, the colonial government hatched a conspiracy against no lesser an Indian scientist than C.V. Raman, the Nobel laureate and Director of a premier scientific organisation; and throughout the war, the British employed some of their oldest tools—‘divide and rule’ and racial discrimination even in scientific matters. The inter-war period was a golden period of science in India when her scientists like J.C. Bose, C.V. Raman and M.N. Saha earned international laurels for fundamental research, but how did the government treat them during the war when scientists all over the world were in great demand? The NPC was a unique experiment towards social reconstruction on modin the 1940s and cover industry, industrial collaborations, Allied cooperation, and planning and reconstruction. 41 Sinha, ‘Science Policy of the British’, 1994. For his earlier relevant works, see the Bibliography. Benjamin Zachariah, Developing India: An Intellectual and Social History, c. 1930–1950 (New Delhi, 2005) is a welcome addition, but he is neither exclusively focused on science nor on the War. 42 As P.C. Jain, 1943; K.T. Shah, 1943; D.R. Gadgil and N.V. Somani, 1944; L.C. Jain, 1944; and A.N. Agarwal, n.d.; and S.C. Aggarwal, 1947 (details in the Bibliography).

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ern lines in which Indian scientists worked with the national leadership but how did the colonial authorities look to it?43 It is from here—the Indian side of the account—and from the seat and portals of the Empire that I pick up the strands of my story. In the narrative that follows, we are likely to pass through many a crevasse and blind alley before we could be able to draw the contours of developments and locate certain landmarks and any shinning summits of success in the progress of science in India.

The Focus The foregoing sums up the premises and a broad understanding on which we would try to examine the colonial policy towards science and technology during the Second World War in India. In view of the complexity of the subject and other limitations, this study is restricted only to the core areas involving science, such as technical education, scientific and industrial research, medical science and public health, agriculture and allied sciences, and transport and communications. A brief survey has also been made of those sciences that could not register appreciable progress during the war in spite of the great possibilities. As indicated in the beginning, science in this study has been taken in an expansive and much popular sense and unless indicated otherwise, it also denotes technology, engineering and medicine. The probe is confined essentially to the administrative and policy measures of the Government of India and the Empire; and developments at the lower levels, i.e., in the provinces and native states, have been taken up only occasionally to corroborate or supplement a point dealing with broader developments. In the process, however, one is bound to an extent to take into account the actual performance of the colonial policy and the local response to it. This necessitates, in turn, reconstruction of a broader history of science of a period which proved to be a crucible for the test of the colonial performance over the past centuries. Working within this framework, one may like to address such questions as: how and to what extent did the Second World War affect the development of science and technology in relation, besides the war, to the economic and social progress in India? What changes occurred in the colonial 43

Jagdish N Sinha, ‘Science and Culture under Colonialism: India Between the World Wars’, IJHS, 39, 1, 2004, pp. 101–119.

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policy and what was the indigenous response to it? Finally, how far did the war liberate science from the clutches of imperialism in India and bring it into the mainstream of global progress?

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chapter two BACKGROUND: SCIENCE AND EMPIRE

The history of the British policy towards science and technology in India before the Second World War is a story of ad hocism and lack of a uniform, planned policy. The main factors influencing the official attitude during this period were the economic interests of the British Raj and the Empire and their political and military requirements. Local needs and indigenous demands counted only occasionally and that, too, only in a peripheral manner. Thus, there was little prospect of science being harnessed in the long-term interests of the local population and its promotion as a pursuit of knowledge. This had dangerous consequences as it led to the growth of science and technology in such a manner that it had little relevance to the requirements of the country and had no consideration for the scientific and technological traditions of its past. A proper appraisal of the government policy, therefore, makes it necessary to look at it in a broader perspective, especially in the context of imperialism and nationalism.

The Early Efforts Although technology had played an important role in the rise and growth of British imperialism from the very beginning,1 a conscious effort to use science and technology as a part of official policy in this regard was a later development. Railroads, telegraphs, irrigation systems and similar projects had come into being even earlier, but they aimed essentially at meeting the practical and immediate needs of the Empire—territorial expansion, consolidation of imperial authority and economic exploitation.2 The colonies were generally treated as a natural adjunct of the Empire, hence any developments in them E.J. Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire, first published 1968; Middlesex, 1984; and Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century, New York, 1981. 2 Headrick, The Tools of Empire, 1981. 1

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were taken almost as an extension of the imperial benevolence.3 It was not until 1895 that the question of developing the colonies in a longterm perspective and on modern lines became a subject of her official concern.4 An attempt in this direction was first made in 1895 by Joseph Chamberlain when he was the Colonial Secretary (1895–1903) and continued by his successors under the Liberal Government until 1915.5 Chamberlain’s initiative was born out of his desire to ‘develop’ the ‘underdeveloped’ colonies, and aimed essentially at securing a better and more solid economic base for the Empire. Colonial development in his sense, however, ‘did not necessarily imply scientific research’. The emphasis on research found a place in the policy only slowly;6 but once it did, ‘colonial development’ came to have more and more of science and research, which continued even during the period of decolonization.7 This policy had a significant bearing upon the progress of science and technology in the colonies, including India. The imperial policy enunciated by Chamberlain was embodied in administrative measures in Britain, which were followed in India, too. How far the developments in Britain and those in India were an outcome of a direct and close coordination between the two governments may need deeper investigation; their timing and circumstances, however, are of immediate relevance for this inquiry. It may be recalled that by the end of the 19th century the British Empire had reached its zenith in terms of territorial expansion in India and elsewhere in the world. It was now time to consolidate and control the possessions, exploit their resources and ensure that they remained a perennial source of supply, gain and strength for the Empire in the future. This was a fact to be constantly kept in mind by the rulers as much in India as in Britain. In order to promote the utilization of colonial raw material and meet the scientific needs of the Empire, the Imperial Institute at Kensing3 Michael Worboys, ‘Science and British Colonial Imperialism’, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Sussex, 1979. 4 Charles William Forman, ‘Science for Empire: Britain’s Development of the Empire through Scientific Research (1995–1905)’, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1941, appears to be one of the earliest studies dealing with science and Empire, which also refers to India. 5 Forman, ‘Science for Empire’, 1941, pp. 2, 11–23, and Chaps. II and III. 6 Ibid., pp. 11–12. 7 Besides Forman, ‘Science for Empire’, 1941, see D.J. Morgan, The Official History of Colonial Development: vol. 1, The Origins of British Aid Policy, 1945–1951, London, 1980; and vol. 2 by the same author, Developing British Colonial Resources, 1945–1951, London, 1980.

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ton, London, had been established as early as 1887. The changing economic needs of the Empire, the proliferation of scientific establishments and the growing concern among educated Indians for them made the government think in terms of starting a similar organization in India, though on a modest scale. In the course of the plague epidemic in 1898, the Viceroy, Earl of Elgin (1894–1899), sought the advice of the leading scientists in Britain on how to control scientific research in India. This resulted in the formation of the Indian Advisory Committee of the Royal Society; but it remained non-functional. Meanwhile, the famine and plague added urgency to the matter and Curzon’s government decided to create their own body of experts and thus the Board of Scientific Advice was set up in 1903.8

Curzon and Swadeshi In fact, the assumption of office by George Nathaniel Curzon as the Viceroy of India (1899–1905) ushered in a period of enhanced official interest in scientific matters in the country. As an arch imperialist and a seasoned administrator, Curzon was quick to realize the value of India’s vast resources and the advantages of her strategic position in the global scheme of the British Empire.9 But in order to make use of these advantages, a thorough knowledge of the country’s geography and society and of its natural resources was essential. Fortunately for him, however, significant work had already been done in this direction before he came at the helm of affairs. The landscape of the country had been surveyed, its flora and fauna studied, and most of the natural resources explored.10 Measures had also been taken from time to time to tackle such calamities as disease, flood and famine.11 What was lacking now was a coordination of efforts, planning and a better organizational 8 Deepak Kumar, Science and the Raj: 1957–1905, 1995; New Delhi, paperback edn. 1997, p. 105. 9 Rajat K. Ray, Industrialization in India: Growth and Conflict in the Private Corporate Sector 1914–1947, Delhi, 1979, p. 240. 10 For this and other related developments, refer to Deepak Kumar (1997) and David Arnold (2000); for specific areas, see R.H. Phillimore (1954), L.L. Fermor (1976) and I.H. Burkill (1965), Marika Vicziany (1986), Ray Desmond (1992), Mathew H. Edney (1997), Richard Grove et al (1998)–all listed in the bibliography. 11 On different occasions, administrative measures had been taken to deal with the problems of health and sanitation (as in 1848, 1864, 1869, 1890, 1898), and flood and famine (1880, 1898, 1901).

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base and an effective official control over all such endeavours. It was with this understanding and with a vision of making India a ‘second centre of British power’ east of the Suez that Curzon embarked upon a scheme of administrative reforms and innovations many of which also dealt with science and technology.12 But Curzon was not satisfied with the scientific activities in the country at the time. He found them “sporadic, chaotic and wholly lacking in co-ordination”. This is why when the idea of a Board of Scientific Advice was put forward, bringing the heads of all scientific departments together under his chairmanship, Curzon and his Council welcomed it as an “excellent idea”, which, when put into practice, could help the government control and coordinate scientific work in the country, and make the government departments concerned do some “practical work, in addition to pure science”. The government regretted that “undue prominence had been given in the past to pure science, to the neglect of its economic application.”13 It was with this perception that the Board of Scientific Advice came into being in 1902, with its major concern for applying science to economic and agricultural problems. Unfortunately, serious differences arose between the Board and the Indian Advisory Committee of the Royal Society, and the Board was dissolved in 1910 and the Advisory Committee in 1923.14 Coming to specific areas having bearing on science, Curzon’s government appears to have been most concerned about the problems of education. Soon after assuming office, Curzon called, in 1901, an Educational Conference at Simla, which showed interest in technical education,15 a subject long talked about by British rulers but never acted upon. However, Curzon appears to have taken the matter a bit seriously. He instituted three committees, one each to advise on technical education (1901), industrial education (1903) and engineering (1903).16 Yet, again, none of these committees appears to have yielded any significant results. This was contrary to the constant indigenous demands Dilks, Curzon in India, 1969, vol. 1, esp. pp. 71–96, 221–248. Deepak Kumar, Science and the Raj, 1997, pp. 105–106. 14 R.M. MacLeod, ‘Scientific Advice for British India: Imperial Perceptions and Administrative Goals, 1898–1923’, Modern Asian Studies, IX, 3, 1975, pp. 43–84. 15 Deepak Kumar, Science and the Raj, 1997, p. 130. 16 Report on the Simla Conference on Technical Education, 1901; Report on Industrial Education by J. Chibbon et al., Calcutta, 1903; and Royal Indian Engineering College Committee, 1903: Report, n. p., 1903. 12 13

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for technical education around this time, and the constitution by the Government of India of a scholarship to enable Indians to proceed to Europe and America for special technical training after 1901 was too small a measure to fulfil the real and vast needs of the country.17 Besides, nothing was done to promote industrial research. Instead, Curzon preferred to go for agricultural education, research and improvement in it. Incidentally, Curzon, after Mayo, was the next Viceroy with a background of agriculture. His father owned an estate in Derbyshire and his marriage in Chicago brought him in touch with American agriculture and an American millionaire, Henry Phipps, whose donation Curzon utilized to establish the Imperial Agricultural Research Institute at Pusa in Bihar.18 The question of agriculture, much like that of technical education, had always been an important issue for both the government and the people, though for different and often diametrically opposed reasons. For Indians, agriculture was the mainstay of their economy and livelihood; the government’s interest lay in its economic exploitation, as much in terms of taxes as of trade.19 By the turn of the century the subject had assumed additional importance because of the recent famines and the consequent exposure of India’s agricultural backwardness, and also on account of the British interest in promoting cash-crop farming in India.20 After the studies of the state of agriculture by J.A. Voelcker in the 1890s,21 a series of agricultural conferences were organized, to be followed by the constitution of the Famine Commissions in 1898 and 1901. Obliged to do something to prevent such famines in the future through agricultural improvement, the Government of India created an all-India Board of Agriculture in 1904 with the Indian Agricultural Services being set up two years later. From a research point of view however, the establishment of the Imperial Research Institute at Pusa in Bihar in 1905, was, without doubt, the most important event.22 Another subject, which enjoyed the support and encouragement of the government, was medical science. The subject had always been Deepak Kumar, Science and the Raj, 1997, pp. 146–147, Chap. 6. Ibid., pp. 130–131. 19 B.M. Bhatia, ‘Agriculture and Cooperation’, in V.B. Singh, ed., Economic History of India 1857–1956, 1965; New Delhi, 1983, pp. 123–127. 20 B.M. Bhatia, Famines in India: A Study in Some Aspects of the Economic History of India (1860–1945), 1963; Bombay, 1967. 21 J.A. Voelcker, Improvement of Indian Agriculture, Calcutta, 1893. 22 Ibid.; also Randhawa, A History of Agriculture in India, vol. III, 1983, Chap. 30. 17 18

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on the priority list of the British because of its vital necessity for the armed forces and the European population in India.23 After all, diseases knew no racial discrimination. Moreover, the medical services under the Raj offered lucrative opportunities of employment to the Britons. Earlier, the Sanitary Commissions (in Bengal in 1864 and in CP and UP in 1869) and inquiries into specific diseases (like leprosy in 1890 and plague in 1898 and 1905) had been set up, and a few institutions were established. The Imperial Bacteriological Laboratory was set up in 1890 at Agra and the Haffkine Institute at Bombay during 1896–1899. But the viceroyalty of Curzon was marked by a spurt in the foundation of institutes devoted to medical research. The Pasture Institute of India was established at Kasauli in 1900, followed by the Serum Research Institute (for animals) at Izatnagar (U.P.) in 1901 and the King Institute of Preventive Medicine at Guindy (Madras Presidency) in 1903–1904. The official interest in medical research eventually led to the reorganization of the Institute at Kasauli into a Central Research Institute in 1905.24 Curzon’s concern for coordination and control at the all-India level manifested more concretely in the organization of the Indian Research Fund Association in 1911.25 Whatever the motive behind the official measures undertaken by Curzon, they constitute a landmark in the history of the progress of science in India. Under him, the government for the first time made conscious efforts to promote science as a means of economic development and material progress, according high priority to its applied aspects of research and innovation. His endeavours eventually led to the rise of an all-India organizational base that served as a foundation for future developments.26 But his overriding emphasis on central control and imperial considerations, and his indifference to the local needs considerably shortened the life and undermined the value of his contributions.27 Moreover, his stress on exploitation of science for impe23 D.G. Crawford, A History of the Indian Medical Service, 2 vols., London, 1914; and Anil Kumar, Medicine and the Raj, New Delhi, 1998. 24 Central Research Institute Kasauli: Souvenir (1905–1985), Kasauli, 1985. 25 Indian Research Fund Association and Indian Council of Medical Research 1911–1961: Fifty Years of Progress, New Delhi, 1961 (hereafter Indian Research Fund, 1961). For developments in public health and medical research, see Anil Kumar, Medicine and the Raj, 1998. 26 Dilks, Curzon in India, vol. 1: Achievements, 1969, Chap. 9, esp. pp. 233–246; Deepak Kumar, Science and the Raj, 1997, p. 106. 27 For the nationalist demands, see Bimanbehari Majumdar, Congress and the Congressmen in the Pre-Gandhian Era 1885–1917, Calcutta, 1967, Chaps. XI and XII, and pp. 398– 399.

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rial gains relegated the basic sciences and fundamental research to the background. His policies soon evoked strong and widespread public reaction, which was ignited by the partition of Bengal. To begin with, an upsurge started with a boycott of foreign goods to protest against the partition. But the occasion provided a pretext to stir up other basic issues, and from 1905 onwards a powerful Swadeshi movement began in many parts of the country. It stood for self-help and self-reliance, whether it was in the field of education, economy and administration or science and technology.28 Indigenous efforts towards self-help and self-reliance in science and technology can be considered to have begun with the industrial ventures of J.N. Tata and the foundation of the Indian Association for the Cultivation of Science in Calcutta by M.L. Sarkar in 1876.29 Over the years, the spirit of Swadeshi acquired varied dimensions and gradually highlighted the basic issues—the question of the country’s material progress and the hindrance created by the foreign rule in it.30 Under the influence of economic nationalism, Indians had realized the significance of modern technology for industrial and economic development of the country; the Swadeshi underlined the necessity of freedom from the alien control in this regard. So, while the boycott of foreign goods led to demands for indigenous manufactures, the boycott of the state-run educational institutions made it imperative to build a system of national education.31 Both these streams of Swadeshi were interrelated aspects of the same striving for self-reliance; as such, both placed special emphasis on promoting science and technology for national regeneration, with the help of local resources and indigenous management.32 An Indian Industrial Association (Bengal) had already been set up in 1891, which was followed by the establishment of the Dawn Society in 1902, of the Association for the Advancement of Scientific and Industrial Education of Indians in 1904, and of the Bengal Technical Institute and the National Council of Education, Bengal,

Sumit Sarkar, The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal, New Delhi, 1973. Frank Harris, Jamsetji Nusservanji Tata—A Chronicle of His Life, 1924; Bombay, 1958; and Jogesh Chandra Bagal, History of the Indian Association, 1876–1957, Calcutta, 1958. 30 Sarkar, Swadeshi, 1973; Majumdar and Majumdar, Congress and the Congressmen, 1967. 31 Ibid.; also Haridas Mukherjee and Uma Mukherjee, A Phase of Swadeshi Movement (National Education, 1905–1910), Calcutta, 1953. 32 Ibid.; also Sarkar, Swadeshi, 1973, Chaps. III & IV. 28 29

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both in 1906.33 Unfortunately, the movement did not last long; and in the absence of official encouragement and administrative freedom, it petered out after 1910. Nevertheless, it made an important contribution towards popularizing science and in shaping public opinion on promoting it for national reconstruction. The occasional streaks of apparent revivalism at that time should not blur our vision to the strong and positive response of such Indians as P.C. Ray (1861–1944) to use modern science for social progress. The call for ‘Aryan Knowledge’ or publication of Ray’s History of Hindu Chemistry should not be seen in isolation of Ray’s own efforts to use modern science for industrial purposes.34 The official indifference to such a response and the suppression of the movement as a mere political ploy made India lose a great opportunity to revive and promote her own traditional knowledge and skill or to integrate them with modern science and technology to better their lives. The government’s indifference was effected more through inaction or indirect measures than open hostility which was not altogether absent though. The official priorities for research and improvement in agriculture, instead of industry—the main item on the Swadeshi agenda—and Curzon’s initial opposition to J.N. Tata’s proposed research institute for science, speak amply of the hostile official attitude35 This, in turn, somewhat postponed India’s industrialization further. The rise and fall of Swadeshi clearly brought into focus the clash of interest between the subject people and their masters. With the failure of Swadeshi, the cause of science received a setback for some time. It was taken up by the Indian National Congress but with little impact on the official policy.36 The government lost interest in scientific matters, except in a few areas like medical services and research (The Indian Research Fund Association was founded in 1911), and sometimes even resorted to retrograde measures to discourage industrial innovation. A despatch of the Secretary of State for India quashed all efforts to start pioneering factories in Madras and elsewhere Ibid. Also see National Council of Education, Bengal (1906–1956), Calcutta, 1956. P.C. Ray’s History of Hindu Chemistry, 2 vols., Calcutta, 1909. For a recent discussion on Ray, see Pratik Chakraborty, ‘Science, Nationalism, and Colonial Contestations: P.C. Ray and his Hindu Chemistry,’ The Indian Economic and Social History Review, 37, 2, New Delhi, 2000, pp. 185–213. 35 Curzon Papers: especially Curzon to Amphill, 30.8.1903; and Hamilton to Curzon, 25.9.1907. 36 For the Congress initiative, see Jagdish N. Sinha, ‘Science and the Indian National Congress’, in Deepak Kumar, Science and Empire, 1991, pp. 161–181. 33 34

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in India because of the objections raised by Europeans in Madras and his own opposition.37 In fact the years between Swadeshi and the First World War were a lean period for science in India. This was true as much in terms of the government initiative as in that of the indigenous response. Yet, a change in the official attitude was round the corner as priorities were shifting from agriculture to industry, hence to technical education.38

Impact of the First World War This comparative lull in the scientific activities was ended by the outbreak of the First World War. As the war raged, it revealed many a weakness of Britain and the Empire.39 It exposed India’s industrial backwardness and her dependence on others for a variety of commodities like machines and equipment, stores and prime movers, medicines, dyes and technical skill.40 Notwithstanding the severe economic dislocation and disruption in all spheres of life, the contribution of India to the Imperial war effort was impressive and crucial.41 The British realized her importance in the overall war effort and not merely in the defence east of the Suez (as Curzon had once visualized). As an important source of manpower and munitions, they thought, India deserved to be built up as an industrial country.42 Many other factors such as the Mesopotamian disaster and the ensuing developments in Britain, the German advance in the east and apprehensions of India’s direct

37 Despatch of Lord Morley, Secretary of State for India, 29 Jul. 1910, referred to in Amiya Kumar Bagchi, Private Investment in India 1900–1939, 1972; New Delhi, 1980, p. 51. 38 Report of the 4th and 7th to 13th Indian Industrial Conferences held at Calcutta, Madras, Bankipore, Karachi, Bombay, Lucknow and Calcutta respectively during the Years 1908 to 1911–1917, vol. 1–7, n. p., 1917. Also see E.H. dev Atkinson and T.S. Davidson, Report on the Enquiry to bring Technical Institutions into closer Touch … with the Employers of Labour in India, Calcutta, 1912; and reports of the Morison Committee (1913) and D. Mackpherson Committee (1913–1914). 39 Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire, 1984, pp. 207–224. 40 Morris D. Morris, ‘The Growth of Large-Scale Industry to 1947’, in Dharma Kumar and Meghnad Desai, eds., The Cambridge Economic History of India, vol. 2, 1982; New Delhi, 1984, pp. 600–602. 41 Johannes H. Voigt, India in the Second World War, New Delhi, 1987, pp. 8–11. 42 Rajat K. Ray, Industrialization in India: Growth and Conflict in the Private Corporate Sector 1914–1947, 1979; Delhi, 1985, p. 240.

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involvement in the war combined to effect a change in the British attitude favouring her industrialization.43 Though Indian troops were sent into action in all theatres of the war, their largest number was deployed in Mesopotamia. The planning of operations as well as the provisioning of the units by the General Staff and the Government of India, however, proved inadequate; and after the mission proved a disaster, the charge of operations had to be taken away from Delhi to London. Later, a Parliamentary Committee investigated the matter, as a consequence of which the Secretary of State for India, Sir Austen Chamberlain, had to step down; and his successor, Edwin Montague, had to declare a policy of granting to Indians an increased share in the government. This change in attitude can also be attributed to the enhanced bargaining position of the Congress after its electoral alliance with the Muslim League,44 and the persistent demands by Indians for self-rule and industrialization of the country.45 The two important consequences of this change in attitude were the appointment of the Indian Industrial Commission in 1916, and the assurance, in August 1917, by the Secretary of State for India, Edwin Montagu, of the gradual development of self-rule for the progressive realization of responsible government in India, leading eventually to the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1918. Ironically, however, while the Industrial Commission unfolded a bright prospect for the progress of science in the country, the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919 shattered such hopes from turning into reality as most of the subjects concerned with science were transferred to the provinces without any resources to develop them. The Industrial Commission was constituted to study the question of India’s industrialization and explore the possibility of state participation in it. It was in this connection that the Commission directed its attention to the various aspects of science and technology including education, research, application and organization. Its inquiries revealed several lacunas in the existing state of scientific development and the government approach in the matter. There was no coordination and 43 Ibid., pp. 10–11; also Govt. of India despatch to Secretary of State for India dated 26 Nov. 1915. 44 Voigt, India in the Second World War, 1987, pp. 9–11. 45 Resolutions of Indian National Congress (hereafter INC Resols.) as nos. IX, 1914; XXI, 1915; XIV, 1918.

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cooperation amongst the agencies concerned; little had been done to organize scientific services and societies; and many of the administrative arrangements were irrelevant to the actual needs of the country.46 In order to remove these drawbacks, the commission emphasised the necessity of closer coordination amongst the scientific workers, government departments, universities and institutes, and the industries.47 It recommended the creation of specialized imperial technical services to be manned gradually by Indians and official encouragement for the formation of scientific societies.48 It also suggested the creation of advanced centres of training and research at all-India level. Further, it favoured state control and central supervision aimed at bringing about uniformity in, and enhancing the standard of, industrial and technical education throughout the country.49 Thus, everywhere the emphasis was placed on the central imperial control. The commission envisaged a major shift in the government policy insofar as it wanted to relate technical education and research to the actual industrial needs of the country. Hence, it opposed the use of the existing scholarships for training in industries new to India and advised against research on Indian problems being carried out abroad.50 The greatest departure the commission made was in suggesting the government to actively participate in promoting industries through administrative measures and material support, and in emphasizing the necessity of establishing certain ‘key industries.’51 Furthermore, it pleaded for basing Indian industries on agricultural products, with an enhanced cooperation between the industries and agricultural departments. And lastly, it called for the exploration and exploitation of the new sources of power, waterpower in particular.52 This was a significant break from the then existing state policy of laissez faire with regard to promoting industries and science. This change in attitude had two important implications: first, if the government decided to go by the recommendations, it would have to formulate and pursue a definite, long-term policy in the matter; and second, in case it did so, the policy thus formulated would have to take into account the 46 47 48 49 50 51 52

Industrial Commission 1916–1918: Report, Calcutta, 1918, pp. 83–103. Ibid., also pp. 42–43, 111–112. Ibid., pp. 126–127, 175. Ibid., pp. 126, 136–138, 140–141, 242–244. Ibid., pp. 275–277. Ibid., Chaps. XIV and XX, esp. pp. 217–222; and Chap. XXI, pp. 233–244, 280. Ibid., pp. 274-5.

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local needs and welfare of the indigenous population. On both these counts, the policy envisaged was new. It is clear from the foregoing that the report of the Commission was the first major official document on the science policy of the Raj in India. Generally speaking, however, the changes suggested in the report were never translated into practice. In fact, the recommendations suffered from inherent contradictions. The needs and interests of the rulers and the ruled were incompatible; as such, the recommendations were bound to be doomed. The Act of 1919 provided the Government of India with an alibi for not implementing them as most of the subjects involving science, like education, industry, agriculture and health, were transferred to the provincial control. Rapid economic recovery and normalization of situation after the war added to the government indifference in the matter. Finally, the radical changes in the socio-economic perspective of the national leadership under Mahatma Gandhi (1869– 1948) and the new priorities of the Congress from early 1920s withdrew the pressure of public demand for industrialization.53 It may be recalled that Gandhi opposed Western technology and large-scale industrialization,54 and stood wholeheartedly for cottage industry and khaddar.55 This offered the government a reason to sleep over the recommendations. Notwithstanding the fate of its recommendations, however, the very appointment of the Commission was an acknowledgement of the need for industrializing India; and its findings were a sad commentary on how the colonial government had failed in this regard until then. The inquiry, above all, provided Indians an opportunity to express their views on the government policy towards science in relation to the progress of the country. A number of Indians challenged some of the basic assumptions guiding the inquiry. In his dissenting ‘Note’ submitted before the Commission, Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya (1861–1946), one of the Indian members on the Commission and a prominent national leader, refused 53 For the Congress, refer to the INC Resols. I, 1921; XI, 1923–1924; II, 1924. Sinha, ‘Science and the Indian National Congress,’ 1991, discusses views of both the Congress and Gandhi on S&T. 54 M.K. Gandhi, Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule, 1909; Ahmadabad, 1911; idem, Modern V. Ancient Civilization, edited by Anand T. Hingorani, Bombay, 1970, esp. pp. 22– 27, 47–48, 71, 73–76, 98–99, 107–110. 55 For Gandhi’s views on large-scale industrialization, see M.K. Gandhi, Hind Swaraj, 1911; idem, Modern V. Ancient, 1970, pp. 22–27, 47–48, 71, 73–76, 98–99, 107–110; and on khaddar, see M.K. Gandhi, Khadi, ed., Bharatan Kumarappa, Ahmadabad, 1955.

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to accept that India had been economically and industrially backward before the advent of the British, and that the West alone had the great traditions of technology.56 He also refused to accept that agriculture had been the mainstay of life in India throughout history.57 On the contrary, he maintained that India had a very long tradition of industry and technological innovation in many areas like steel making, textile, and shipbuilding;58 and that her recent industrial backwardness and the depressing dependence on agriculture was a direct consequence of British rule.59 He did not find Britain’s own past record in industrial and technical achievements very impressive and, therefore, he refused to accept her as a model for India’s industrial progress; instead, he looked to Germany and Japan for that.60 Malaviya clinched some of the basic issues intricately connected with the progress of science and technology in the country, which the Commission, like the government in the past, had tried to evade. He contended that for the success of any programme of industrialization based on modern science and technology, fiscal autonomy, expansion of elementary education and employment of local population in technical services were extremely vital.61 As to the management of scientific education and research, he wanted to keep them free from the control of the bureaucracy and place them under the care of scientists.62 He also pleaded for encouragement to training and research in the universities through liberal state grants; and placed emphasis on agricultural education. However, he did not believe that the promotion of technical education and research alone could bring about industrialization. For this, actual industrialization was the first step, which could be subsequently accelerated by appropriate training and research. Lastly, he wanted that all administrative measures, including the choice of technology and areas of initiative, be based on the local needs and traditions and aim at the welfare of the country.63 Thus, his ‘Note’ tried to show the close nexus between the imperial interests and the industrial and technological backwardness of a colony. In the words of Shiv Vis56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63

‘Note by Pt. Madan Mohan Malaviya’, in Industrial Commission, 1918, pp. 292–355. Ibid., also see pp. 295–303. Ibid., pp. 294–297. Ibid., pp. 297–303 in particular. Ibid., pp. 301–303. Ibid., pp. 292–293, 325–327, 350–355. Ibid., p. 346. Ibid., pp. 318–322, 354 ff.

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vanathan, ‘Malaviya suggested that a recovery of history must parallel a recovery of industry in India. He argued that the de-industrialisation of India and the history of the industrial revolution in the West were integral parts of one process, that colonialism preceded and helped create industrialism in Britain.’64 Therefore, he emphasised the necessity of adopting a radically fresh approach in the matter. As the report of the Industrial Commission came as one of the first important document on the science policy of the Raj, Malaviya’s ‘Note’ was by far the first major discourse on what should be the national science policy for India. The Commission was, however, not the only official initiative undertaken during the war. The sheer necessity of coping with the wartime demands kept the question of industries in the forefront. Even if the government did not extend any meaningful support to them, new industries sprang up and old ones enlarged their capacity in the midst of soaring profits.65 By the time the war came to an end, departments of industries were started in many provinces. Their performance was, however, disappointing owing mainly to the lack of resources and absence of coordination vis-à-vis the overall policy of the government.66 In the circumstances, the prospect of technical innovation did not hold much ground. Next to industry, agriculture appears to have attracted attention of the government most. This may be attributed to the increased demand for agricultural products during the war, the difficulty in procuring from abroad certain important agricultural products (as long-staple cotton from the USA) and the famine of 1918–1919.67 In 1916, two exclusive conferences, one at Pusa and the other at Simla, were organized by the Government of India to discuss agricultural improvement. The subject was taken up also by the Industrial Commission and its importance was underlined ‘in the most emphatic manner’.68 But nothing tangible came out of these administrative steps. Apart from this commission, most of the contemporary committees and con64

Shiv Visvanathan, Organizing for Science: The Making of an Industrial Research Laboratory, Delhi, 1985, p. 45. 65 For the industrial situation, see D.R. Gadgil, The Industrial Evolution of India in Recent Times 1860–1939, Delhi, 1984. 66 Bagchi, Private Investment in India, 1972; 1980, pp. 53–55. 67 Gadgil, Industrial Evolution, 1984, pp. 206–207. 68 Industrial Commission, 1918, p. 57. For its suggestions, see pp. 34–37, 39–48, 57–63, 88–90, 145, 273–275, 278, 285, 287.

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ferences, too, asked for state initiative for promoting and harnessing science and technology. But their recommendations remained unimplemented and they were eventually shelved for ever. On the other side, however, local industries registered a phenomenal growth around this time; and as if to respond to the local needs, some of the important scientific organisations were started along with half of a dozen universities during this period. They included the Indian Science Congress Association (1914), University College of Science, Calcutta (1916), Institute of Science, Bombay, and Bose Research Institute, Calcutta (both in 1917). Outside India, in Britain and the USA in particular, the war had transformed the relation between science and the state. Their short-term, makeshift mutual relation came to be institutionalised. Realizing the close relation between science and technology, these governments made conscious efforts to integrate them. This led to the establishment of the Departments of Scientific and Industrial Research in Britain in 1915, and, of the National Research Council in the USA in 1921.69 Nothing of this sort happened in India for the next twenty-five years or so; and in this way, India lost once again a great opportunity to put her science on a sound footing.

The Aftermath and Depression With the emergency of the war over, the government began to lose interest in the question of industrialization. The newly constituted departments of industries fared badly, and the wartime enthusiasm for industrial improvement waned before long.70 But the experiences of the war would not allow the matter pass off so easily. After all, they had vindicated the importance of India for the defence of the Empire. This, together with the impetus the war had spontaneously given to industries, kept the case of industrialization alive. While some of the industrial momentum of the war years continued on its own after 1918, the government now extended its support mainly to two types of industries: one exploiting agricultural products and the other that tapped mineral resources. This led to some training and research in the related fields. In 1919, the government set up the Indian Cotton Committee for promoting the production and com69 70

Visvanathan, Organizing for Science, 1985, p. 41. Bagchi, Private Investment, 1980, pp. 53–55.

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mercial exploitation of cotton. Two years later the Indian Central Cotton Committee was formed, which established a technical laboratory at Bombay (1924–1925) and an experimental station at Bikaner (1930).71 As an important item of export, sugar attracted considerable interest throughout the 1920s and 30s. Soon after the World War, the Indian Sugar Producers’ Association (Kanpur) prodded the Government of India into appointing a committee to advise on all aspects of promoting the sugar industry. As a result, the Indian Sugar Committee was constituted in 1920.72 Its recommendations, together with that of the Tariff Board of 1930s, eventually led to the establishment, in 1936, of the Imperial Institute of Sugar Technology at Kanpur. In the intervening period, the government took several administrative steps to manage and control this industry. The Indian Tariff Board reported on the sugar industry in 1931 and a Sugar (Protection) Bill was passed in 1932, followed by a Sugar-Cane Act in 1934. Meanwhile, the Government of India also convened a Sugar Conference in 1933.73 Industrial exploitation of forests also gained prominence after the war. The British interest in forestry was very old;74 it increased considerably during the 1914 war as the import of many foreign materials became difficult when the Germans stepped up their submarine campaigns. The government, therefore, wanted to substitute them with local forest products. Forest products were needed to meet the enormous demands of the armed forces, and Indian timber was utilized in great quantity in several mid-Eastern theatres of the war.75 The government, therefore, initiated measures for R&D and management, aimed at exploiting the forests, which continued till the Second World War.76 However, the endeavour was marred by the shortage of staff once they were called for war duties; the economy measures and retrenchment of staff during the Depression made matters worse. Transfer of the subject from the Centre to the provinces further lessened the need for the Gov-

Indian Cotton Committee Report, 1919, Calcutta, 1919; also see N.H. Thakkar, The Indian Cotton Textile Industry, Bombay, 1949. 72 Report of the Indian Sugar Committee 1920, Simla, 1920. 73 Proceedings of the Sugar Conference held at Simla on the 10th, 11th, and 12th July 1933, Delhi: 1933. Also see M.R. Kulkarni, Industrial Development, New Delhi, 1971, pp. 164–167. 74 Hundred Years of Indian Forestry 1860–1961, vol. 1, Dehradun, 1961, pp. 72–84. 75 Ibid., pp. 79, 81. 76 Ibid., pp. 81–83; and Progress Report of the Forest Research Work in India for 1922– 1923 including the Administration Report of the Forest Research Institute Dehradun, n. d.; and E.P. Stebbing, Forests of India, vol. IV, 1926; London, 1962. 71

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ernment of India to take interest in it.77 But one of the redeeming features of the government policy during this period was the Indianization of the Indian Forest Service (IFS) from 1922 when 40 % of the vacancies were reserved for Indians. From 1926, a training course for the superior officers of the IFS was also started at Dehra Dun, which, until then, had been carried out in the United Kingdom. And finally, some steps were also taken towards afforestation and wildlife conservation.78 As regards the government encouragement to industries based on mineral resources, it remained confined mostly to their exploitation as raw materials. Therefore, mining engaged attention as usual, and the publication of the Mackpherson Committee report on mining education in 1920 came as the first official initiative to promote technical education after the war.79 This finally led to the foundation of the Mining School at Dhanbad in 1926. The Indian Tariff Board also looked into industries like iron and steel (1934), cotton textile (1927 and 1932), heavy chemicals (1929), paper and paper pulp (1931, 1938), and glass (1932), though its interest was limited mostly to their management and control; and except in a few cases, their suggestions did not yield significant results in terms of technological advances.80 British interest in developing transport and communications also had a long history.81 The exposure of India’s backwardness in this sector during the First World War revived the official interest in it once again. The initiative came right from the top. In 1920, the Secretary of State for India appointed a committee to enquire into the working of the Indian Railways.82 Two years later another committee reported on the railway industries.83 As a welcome development, the government also showed some interest in developing the roads and mercantile marine sector. The Indian Mercantile Marine Committee was appointed in Hundred Years of Indian Forestry, 1961, pp. 81–82. Ibid., pp. 82–83. 79 D.J. Mackpherson (President), Report of the Committee Appointed to Advise on Mining Education in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, Calcutta, 1920. 80 Reports of the Indian Tariff Board: Iron and Steel, 1934; Cotton Textile Industry, 1927; Cotton Textile Industry, 1932; Heavy Chemicals, 1929; Paper and Paper Pulp, 1931, 1938; Glass, 1932. 81 J.N. Sahni, Indian Railways: One Hundred Years, 1853–1953, New Delhi, 1953; and Henry T. Bernstein, Steamboats on the Ganges, 1960; Calcutta, 1987. 82 Report of the Committee appointed by the Secretary of State for India to Enquire into the Administration and Working of Indian Railways, London, n. d. 83 Report of the Railways Industries Committee, Delhi, 1923. 77 78

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1923 upon whose recommendation a training ship called ‘Dufferin’ was established as a result in 1927. This was used for preliminary training in marine engineering from 1935 onwards.84 While the number and range of these official measures do not appear to be unimpressive, their direction and outcome were disappointing. The various inquiries and Industrial Conferences convened by the government were concerned mostly with the problems of management and protection, and aimed primarily at solving only the most pressing ones.85 Very little was done to create basic and long-term facilities for industrial growth like technical education and industrial research. There was the Harcourt Butler Technical Institute at Kanpur (est. 1920), Lac Research Institute at Ranchi (1925) and Mining Institute at Dhanbad (1926); yet the existing facilities at the all-Indian level were woefully inadequate; and the inquires on technical education in the provinces (as in Bombay in 1922 and in Madras in 1923) did not achieve much. Of course, the subject was taken up by a few academic institutions like Banaras Hindu University86 and, later, by the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore,87 but this was not a direct outcome of the policy of the Government of India. The official initiative with regard to technical education and industrial training was, however, better in the provinces even though it was of an elementary nature and at a low level.88 The rise in industrial production around the war and the expansion of industries from 1920 onwards should not be attributed to any significant technological innovation. While the increase in industrial turnover was due mainly to the maximum utilization of production capacity under the exigencies of the war, the reason for the expansion of industries can be found in the enhanced demand for industrial products, aggressive nationalism and the Depression. In reaction to the restrictive and discriminating policy of the government during the war, economic nationalism surged aggressively after 1918 and Indian business houses Progress of Education in India 1932–1937, vol. I, Delhi, 1940, p. 208. Besides the reports of the Tariff Board, see such reports as the Chemical Services Committee 1920 Report, Simla, 1920. 86 V.A. Sundaram, ed., Benares Hindu University 1905–1935, Benares, 1936, pp. ii, iii, xxxix, 4, 8–23, 68–69, 74–77, 78–79, 583–626. 87 Progress of Education, 1917–1922, 1923, pp. 176–177; Ibid., 1922–1927, vol. I, pp. 44, 205. 88 Ibid., 1917–1922, vol. I, 1923, pp. 157–162, 176–186; ibid., 1922–1927, vol. I, 1929, pp. 193–195, 203–213; ibid., 1927–1937, vol. I, pp. 202–204, 215–222. 84 85

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expanded their industrial activities.89 Walchand Hirachand started the Scindia Steam Navigation Company in 1919 and continued his fervour for economic nationalism against the British in the years to come.90 G.D. Birla expanded his industrial activities, too.91 All this had significant implications for the progress of science and technology in India. Likewise, when the agricultural prices fell in the course of the Depression, the capital involved in money lending in the agrarian population was diverted to industrial ventures for profit.92 Against these activities, introduction of multinational cartels in India and the changes in the nature of British imperialism after the war, however, proved to be a new hurdle in the progress of science in the country. Their financial manoeuvring apart, the entry of foreign cartels hampered the possibility of innovation and research. Their Indian subsidiaries would not spend on R&D as they found it easier and more economical to import expertise and technology from their parent companies abroad.93 ‘The subtle but increasing shift from the commercial to the financial (and strategic) aspects of British imperial interests in India in the inter-war period produced a profound uncertainty on the part of policy-makers with regard to the role of the government in the economy.’94 This resulted in a progressive decrease in the long-term investments in scientific and technical education and research needed for industrial growth.95 The gradual loss of governmental interest in the matter was manifested most glaringly in 1924 when the government reversed its commitment to industrialization and the report of the Industrial Commission of 1916 was shelved forever. The noted Indian scientist M.N. Saha later remarked: … from 1924, due to some mysterious reasons, the Government of India dropped all ideas of developing the natural resources of India and concentrated purely on agricultural research and agricultural industries. What high agency was responsible for this policy was not known, but India was henceforth condemned to grow potato and paddy.96 Ray, Industrialization in India, 1985, pp. 96–113, 234–237, 276–282; Bagchi, Private Investment, 1980, pp. 210–211. 90 G.D. Khanolkar, Walchand Hirachand: Man, His Times and Achievements, Bombay, 1969. 91 Medha Malik Kudaisya, The Life and Times of G.D. Birla, Delhi, 2003. 92 Bagchi, Private Investment, 1980, p. 440. 93 Ray, Industrialization in India, 1985, pp. 271–276. 94 Ibid., p. 239. 95 For data, see Progress of Education for the relevant years. 96 M.N. Saha, ‘The Fourfold Ruin of India’, S&C, V, 9, Mar. 1940, pp. 499–503. 89

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Agriculture, of course, was an easier option for the government as its development did not pose any threat to the British economic, especially industrial interests. Besides, agriculture being the greatest source of government revenue, the official interest in it was sustained due to various reasons including requirements of trade, commerce, and military and civil food supply. The opposition of Gandhi and the Congress to large-scale industrialization and their call for the regeneration of the rural economy around this time made it easy as well as necessary for the government to shift its priority from industrialization to agricultural improvement as a part of its policy for rural regeneration.97 Consistent with this policy was the official initiative with regard to a few other areas allied to agriculture like animal husbandry, dairying and veterinary science. These subjects had engaged attention of the British from the very beginning of their rule in India, mainly for meeting the requirements of the army. The First World War enhanced their importance and the government initiated effective steps to promote training and research in these areas. In 1919, the veterinary work was separated from agriculture and placed in charge of a Veterinary Advisor to the Government of India. An Imperial Institute of Animal Husbandry and Dairying was started at Bangalore in 1923, and a diploma course in dairy was introduced.98 In contrast with others, this was one of the few areas in which recommendations of the expert committees were put into practice, and significant innovation and research were carried out at the centres like the Imperial Institute of Veterinary Research at Mukteswar.99 By the mid-1920s, agriculture had assumed importance in the wider context of rural regeneration. In 1926, the Government of India appointed a Royal Commission under Victor Alexander John Linlithgow (1887–1952) as chairman. The Commission made a detailed inquiry into the exiting state of agriculture and rural economy in British India, and advised on many aspects of the subject, including organization For official apathy to industrialization, also see Bagchi, Private Investment, 1980, pp. 53– 58. 97 Jagdish N. Sinha, ‘Science and the Indian National Congress’, in Social Science Probings, Mar.–Dec. 1988, pp. 38–55; and M.S. Randhawa, A History of Agriculture in India, vol. III, New Delhi, 1983, p. 376. 98 Progress of Education, 1937–1947, Vol. I, pp. 187–189. 99 Imperial Council of Agricultural Research, Agriculture and Animal Husbandry in India 1938–1939, Delhi, 1941, chaps. VIII–X and Appendices XIV–XV. Also see Anonymous, ‘Animal Husbandry in India’, S&C, vol. VII, no. 2, Aug. 1941, pp. 88–89.

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of agricultural research, improvement, demonstration, propaganda and education.100 It also looked into the allied areas like animal husbandry, diseases of the livestock, irrigation, horticulture, plantation and forestry101 as well as the agricultural services and agricultural policy of the government in the past.102 While the findings of the commission were a reflection on the shortcomings of the official policy in the past, its greatest value lay in the fact that for the first time the commission took up agriculture as an integral and most important part of the rural economy. This is why it found it necessary to discuss such problems as those of fragmentation of holdings, finance and management of farming, rural health and primary education.103 These subjects were vitally important for the success of any scientific programme of agricultural improvement. Similarly, the report also recommended the use of statistics, modern technique and technology, and meteorology.104 And lastly, it called for a coordinated and centrally controlled research on agriculture at the all-India level.105 In comparison with the Industrial Commission Report of 1918, the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Agriculture were much more liberal and progressive, and they catered to the Indian problems in a better manner. Needless to say, the Commission was more successful in its mission. Obviously, its considerations were influenced by the contemporary political developments within the country and reflected an attitude of compromise and reconciliation on the part of the colonial government. The Simon Commission showed a similar attitude in administrative and allied matters. As such, the Report of the Royal Commission, after the Industrial Commission Report of 1918, can be considered as the second most important document on the science policy of the Raj. In pursuance of the recommendations of the Commission, the Government of India constituted, in 1929, the Imperial Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR), which was an important landmark in the progress of agricultural research and innovation in the country. The

100

Royal Commission on Agriculture in India—Report, Bombay, 1928, Chaps. III, IV, VI,

XV. 101 102 103 104 105

Ibid., Chaps. VII, VIII, IX, X and XVII. Ibid., Chaps. II, XIX. Ibid., Chaps. V, XI–XV. Ibid., Chap. IV, XVIII, XX, esp. p. 666. Ibid., esp. Chaps. III & XIV.

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Council created a central organization with considerable funds and authority to promote agricultural research on an all-India basis.106 What is, however, intriguing is the dramatic reversal of the government commitment to agricultural improvement from the mid-1930s and the priority given to industrial development. The reason for this change can be partly attributed to the socio-political developments of the period and the Depression, which, by causing a fall in agricultural prices and export trade, deprived agriculture of its enhanced significance. After the Congress called for Purna Swaraj in 1929 at Lahore, the Government of India granted Provincial Autonomy in 1935, a clear admission that the colonial government was no longer in a position to hold India under complete control. Under this scheme, the responsibilities of the Central Government with regard to agriculture were further curtailed as the provincial governments were given more effective control over agriculture which was already a transferred subject since 1919. Meanwhile, the adverse effects of the Depression on agriculture were visible and some sections of Indians started supporting the cause of industry. In the circumstances, it was not possible for the government to embark on any long-term programme for agricultural improvement. Thus, as the question of industrial development started gaining ground, the demand for promoting industrial research also became prominent. This soon led to a wider demand for coordinating scientific research at large. A beginning in this regard can be traced to the suggestions of the Imperial Conference held at London in 1926. Reiterating their support to the resolutions of the London conference, the provincial governments in India demanded the establishment of an Imperial Council of Industrial Research in India on the lines of the ICAR. But the government declined to oblige. Meanwhile, in pursuance of the proposal for India to join the International Research Council and its various unions, however, the government consulted the heads of the various scientific services and non-official scientific bodies for constituting a National Research Council. In response, detailed proposals were submitted to the government but nothing came out of it.107 However, the demand for an Advisory Board of Scientific Research or a Research Council was strengthened by the views of Sir Richard Gregory, editor of Nature. On his visit to India in 1938, Gregory drew 106 Royal Commission on Agriculture in India: Abridged Report, 1928, pp. 5–6; and Randhawa, A History of Agriculture, vol. III, 1983. 107 S&C, vol. V, 10, Apr. 1940, pp. 573–574.

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attention of the Secretary of State for India to the lack of appropriate research organizations similar to the DSIR of Britain, which could oversee the development of natural resources and new industries in India. Simultaneously, the Fifth Industries Conference (1933) and the Provincial Economic Conference (1934), too, demanded the creation of an organizational machinery to coordinate industrial research.108 But a Viceregal communication to the Secretary of State for India in May 1934 put an end to any possibility of this sort. Instead, the government decided in favour of a far smaller measure as it created, in July 1934, an Industrial Intelligence and Research Bureau (hereafter Research Bureau), which started functioning from April 1935. It was placed under the Indian Stores Department, and its administrative wing was located at Simla and the research unit at the Test House at Alipur in Calcutta. It was to act as a central clearinghouse for industrial intelligence, to keep abreast of the industrial development in India and abroad, and to provide information and advice to the industrialists. With the purpose of coordinating research among the government departments and formulating programmes and policies for the research branch, an Advisory Council for Industrial Research and Intelligence was constituted.109 Unfortunately, the Advisory Council was overwhelmingly dominated by bureaucrats and virtually no eminent Indian scientist or industrialist was included in it. Out of its 29 members, only two were technical persons and only a quarter of the Bureau’s meagre budget was allocated to its research unit. As far as the research activities of the Bureau were concerned, they hardly went beyond testing and routine quality analysis. Not unexpectedly, the Bureau was promptly criticized by both the Indian scientists and industrialists for the irrationality and discrimination it was based on.110 Whereas the official interest in agriculture and industry kept on fluctuating up to the Second World War, medical science and health care enjoyed rather a privileged position as the government continued to evince an active and sustained interest in them. The 1914 war further enhanced their importance as India’s potential in terms of medical resources—personnel, services and medicine—was proved beyond

108

Ibid. Ibid. 110 N. Bordie, ‘Industrial Intelligence and Research in India’, Current Science, IV, pp. 138–140; and M.N. Saha, ‘Technical Assistance to Indian Industry,’ S&C, IV, 3, p. 153. 109

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doubt and their prospects for the Empire were realized.111 The government, therefore, wanted to reorganize and revamp the medical services. The influenza epidemic of 1918–1919 and the enhanced indigenous demand for orientation of the medical services in favour of local interests, too, were a factor behind the government initiative. In January 1919, the Government of India appointed a committee under Sir Verney Lovett to examine the question of desirability of a unified medical service for the whole of India. The committee concurred with such a proposal and made detailed suggestions in this regard.112 However, it did not suggest anything worthy of note with regard to medical education and research. The inadequacies of facilities at the Central Research Institute at Kasauli (only medical research laboratory directly supported by the Government of India) had become so evident during the First World War that the urgency of some improvement in it was felt and a proposal was mooted for a much larger Central Laboratory. In 1920, Professor E.H. Starling of London University was invited to advise in the matter. Starling recommended in favour of a new Central or Imperial Medical Research Institute at Delhi. Though the scheme was approved at the highest level, its execution was postponed because of the suggestions of the Indian Retrenchment Committee.113 Thereafter, nothing significant was done by the government with regard to medical education and research until 1927. This can be attributed to the transfer of health administration from the Centre to the provinces in the early 1920s and partly to the effect of the general economy measures undertaken at that time.114 The restrictions imposed by the Retrenchment Committee apart, there was a shortage of personnel caused also by the failure of a large number of staff members to return to duty long after the war.115 So, only the most pressing requirements of health care were attended to, some of which also contributed to training and research. For instance, with a view

111 Speech by W.R. Edwards, Director-General, IMS, in the Legislative Council, on 10 March 1919. 112 Report of the Committee appointed by the Government of India to examine the Question of Reorganisation of the Medical Services in India, 1919 (hereafter Report: RMS 1919), London, 1920. 113 Report of the Committee on the Organization of Medical Research under the Government of India 1927, Delhi, 1927 (hereafter Report: OMR, 1927), pp. 13, 15–20. 114 Indian Research Fund, 1961, pp. 6–7. 115 Report: OMR 1927, 1928, p. 12.

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to controlling tropical diseases, inquires were instituted on influenza (1918), plague (1918), kala-azar (1924) and malaria (1926).116 Likewise, the School of Tropical Medicine was founded in 1922 at Calcutta, and a Malaria Survey of India was organized in 1926. The enhanced emphasis on nutritional research in the second half of the 1920s was, no doubt, a welcome change in the government policy. Research on nutritional diseases was taken up at Koonoor in Madras Presidency where a Nutrition Research Laboratory was established in 1925, which was converted into a Centre of Nutrition Research four years later.117 The government interest in nutrition appears to have begun during the First World War.118 In an atmosphere of general colonial apathy towards the problems of public health in the country, Christian missionaries had much to do right from the beginning. As the problems increased, others stepped in. Of them, the entry into India of the Rockefeller Foundation of the USA around the First World War was of immense importance.119 Impelled by the state of affairs after the First World War and the colonial inaction in the matter, the Foundation decided to act seriously. During 1926– 1927, it carried out an all India survey of medical education in the country,120 which finally led to the establishment, in 1932, of the first (later ‘All India…’) Institute of Hygiene and Public Health at Calcutta in the country.121 The Rockefeller initiative was significant in that it was one of the earliest measures to cater, on an all-India level, to some of the basic problems of public health in colonial India, which set a trend and provided an infrastructure for future development. The British took it with a mixed reaction: They welcomed it because what the Foundation had done should have been done by the British themselves; but they were cautious at the same time about their own authority and

E.N. White, Twenty Years of Plague in India with Special Reference to the Outbreak of 1917– 1918, Calcutta, 1918; India Malaria Committee Report, 1926, n. p., 1926. 117 Report: OMR 1927, 1928. 118 See Speech by W.R. Edwards, DG, IMS, 1919. 119 Rockefeller Foundation Papers (hereafter Rockefeller Papers): Jerome D. Green to Leonard Rogers, 28 Nov. 1913 in RF1.1, 464, Box 5, F.32, at Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC), New York. 120 Rockefeller Papers: ‘Medical Education in India,’ [Report in typescript], in RF 1.1, 464A, GEN-1, 1915, 1923–1927, Box 10, Folder 80. 121 Rockefeller Papers: ‘Summary of negotiations…of the proposed All-India School of Hygiene and Public Health,’ RF 1.1, 464A, Box 5, Folder 34; ‘The Inception of the All India Institute of Hygiene and Public Health,’ in RF 1.1, 464A, Box 6, Folder 37. 116

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public image that were likely to erode and their influence on the local population marginalized on account of the Rockefeller initiative.122 About the same time the Government of India constituted, in 1927, a committee to advise on how to promote and organize medical research in the country. How far this was prompted by the Rockefeller initiative may require further investigation; what calls for our immediate attention is the pressure of indigenous demands for this.123 The committee constituted under Sir Walter Fletcher examined Professor Starling’s scheme for an All-India Institute of Medical Research, and put forward a proposal for a Central Medical Research Department with a Central Medical Research Institute to be located at Dehra Dun (and not at Delhi as suggested by Starling) with recommendations for their organization and working.124 The report called for some basic changes in the government policy pursued until then. For the first time, it clearly emphasized the value and necessity of basic research and of research based on an interdisciplinary approach. The committee observed: In the first place research in the medical must be limited, if new progress is to be made, only to the applied sciences of preventive and curative medicine. For no sound system of medical research can be established unless living organic connection is set up and maintained between applied work on the one hand, and work of not obvious and immediate utilitarian character on the other. Medical science as such, though having always its broad utilitarian objects in view, must be rooted in and draw freely from the basic sciences of physics, chemistry and biology as well as from the sciences of such direct importance to tropical medicine as entomology, helminthology, protozoology and bacteriology.125

Similarly, it underlined the need to move from the merely curative to the preventive aspects of medical research and health care, and placed emphasis on promoting nutritional research. The committee went a step further and for the first time directed its attention to certain specific health requirements connected with the local human physiology, production activities and the climate. It emphasised in this connection Ibid.; also Graham to Carter, 28 Feb. 1928, RF 1.1, 464 A India, Box 5, Folder 32; India Office to Rockefeller Foundation, 14 [?] Mar. 1932, RF 1.1, 464 A, Box 6, Folder 37; Letter to Carter, 2 May 1932, RF 1.1, 464A, Box 6, Folder 37; Carter to Lambert, 12 Jul. 1934, RF 1.1, 464A, Box 6, Folder 38. 123 David Arnold, Science, Technology and Medicine in Colonial India, Cambridge, 2000, pp. 176–189; Roger Jeffery, The Politics of Health in India, London, 1988. 124 Report: OMR 1927, 1928, Chaps. IV. V, VII, VIII, XI. 125 Report: MRO 1927, 1928, pp. 3–4 ff. 122

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the ‘urgent need for better studies of the physiological laws of human labour and their application in the industrial and agricultural practice, of the right management of daily life and work at high temperature, and some special physiological problems, affecting women and child life’.126 This was not only remarkably generous when contrasted with the colonial character of the foreign rule but in many ways also futuristic, at least for India. In the end, it appreciated the significance of freedom from administrative control in matters of medical research.127 In contrast to this apparent openness in attitude, the silence of the committee over the question of encouraging medical education and research in the universities was, however, disappointing. In fact, it did not favour any change in other aspects of the government policy, including the existing relation between the government and the research organisations,128 though it wanted ‘to ensure suitable linkage and co-operation in medical research between India, Great Britain and other parts of the Empire’.129 Whereas one cannot deny the potential benefits of this cooperation, it may not be easy to overlook its political implications either, as they were likely to perpetuate the imperial control. Moreover, only a few progressive recommendations by a committee, with no powers other than advisory, alone could not transform the overall policy of the Raj, is evident from the government’s failure to implement these recommendations like those of many others in the past. The government fast distanced itself from the nobler goals of the report; and once the prospect of British hegemony over India became uncertain after the 1920s, the authorities started losing interest even in medical research. No major or long-term investment in this area was henceforth favoured, so much so that even the scheme of the much talked Central Medical Research Institute was dropped in favour of a smaller organization—the Institute of Hygiene and Public Health— which was founded with the help of a private charity from the Rockefeller Foundation and not by state support.130 Thus, as in the case of industrialization and rural uplift, the government went back on its promises, once again. The period of the aftermath and Depression was marked by frequent changes and uncertainIbid., pp. 4–5. Ibid., pp. 53, 55. 128 Ibid., Chap. VII. 129 Ibid., p. 59. 130 Progress of Education 1932–1937, vol. I, 1940, pp. 189–190; and Indian Research Fund, pp. 8–9. 126 127

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ties in the government policy, which lacked definite goals and long-term vision. The official interest in science and technology diminished with the growing impact of the economic Depression and the rising tide of the freedom struggle in the country.

Imperialism vs. Nationalism By the mid-1930s, India was engulfed in a crosscurrent of forces— political, economic and social—old and new. While the effects of the Depression continued, politics assumed new dimensions for the Indians as well as for the Raj. The colonial government was faced with two important but difficult tasks of immense urgency: first, to contain the rising tide of nationalism and maintain political control over the country; and second, to gear up India’s resources to meet the economic and strategic requirements of the Empire. The Indians, of course, had their own perception of the situation and they responded accordingly. Science, technology in particular, interested both, though for different and often divergent reasons. No doubt, the prospect of permanence of British rule in India was fading fast after 1935, but the bare necessity for its existence until it came to an end compelled the government to continue its interest in the material life of the country. The Depression and the changing global economic and strategic equations of the Empire added seriousness to this task. Under the new circumstances priorities changed once again, and the official interest in agriculture and allied sciences shifted to the immediate requirements of trade, industry and the armed forces. Efforts were made to scientifically exploit such products as sugarcane, cotton, jute and wood. In 1936, the Imperial Institute of Sugar Technology was established at Kanpur, and problems and potentials of cotton textile industry and jute were investigated.131 These steps, however, did not provide much impetus to research. From this point of view, veterinary sciences, animal husbandry and dairy industry received a somewhat better deal. On the invitation of the Imperial Council of Agricultural Research, Dr Norman C. Wright (of Scotland) visited India in Agriculture and Animal Husbandry in India 1938–1939, Delhi, 1941, Chap. II; B.L. Sethi et al, Cotton in India: A Monograph, Bombay, 1960; and Stebbing, Forests of India, 1962. Also see Ray, Industrialization in India, 1985, pp. 138–144, 192–196. Report of Bengal Jute Enquiry (Fawcus) Committee, 1940. 131

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the winter of 1936–1937 and reported on the development of cattle and dairy industry in the country.132 Not much fresh measures seem to have been taken as regards the exploitation of natural resources. The only step worthy of note was the appointment of the Burrows Committee on coal mining in 1937.133 As alternative sources of energy, India had considerable potential in oil and electricity. A couple of oil companies (Burma Oil Company and Assam Oil Company) had started operating by the end of the 19th century; but the development of petroleum industry was slow. The separation of Burma from India in 1937 came as a jolt for India as she was left with no oil fields of consequence.134 As to hydro-electricity, though significant endeavours were made in the private sector, the pioneering lead having been taken by the Tatas, the authorities did hardly pay any attention to it.135 The subject that attracted the official attention most, was, as usual, medical science and health care. Whereas the government initiative in many areas was slowing down, coming almost to a halt in some cases, it was not so in the field of medical science. A Biochemical Standardization Laboratory was established in 1936, followed by a Central Advisory Board of Health the next year. In 1938, the Nutritional Advisory Committee of the Indian Research Fund Association was commissioned by the Central Government to act as the National Council for India, and the Malaria Survey of India was designated as the Malaria Institute of India.136 It may, however, be noted here that most of these measures aimed at organisation and administrative control and very little was done for long-term planning and investment for research. There were many other institutions, established earlier and existing on the eve of the Second World War.137 They carried out their routine work as usual; but their number and resources were utterly inadequate 132

Report on the Development of the Indian Cattle and Dairies Industries, by N.C. Wright, n. p., 1937; also Agriculture and Animal Husbandry in India 1938–1939, 1941, Chaps. VIII–X, and Appendices X–XV. 133 Report of the Indian Coal Mining Committee, Delhi, 1937 [?]. For further details, B.M. Prasad, Second World War and Indian Industry 1939–1945, Delhi, 1992, pp. 1–63. 134 M.R. Kulkarni, Industrial Development, 3rd edition, New Delhi, 1991, p. 95. 135 Ibid., pp. 95–97. 136 Report of the Health Survey and Development Committee, Vol. I, Delhi, 1946, esp. pp. 28, 58, 165, 187. Also see Indian Research Fund Association and ICMR, 1961, pp. 10–12. 137 For details, see Scientific Institutions and Societies in India. Publication No. 69, Delhi, 1949. NPC reports like Education (Bombay, 1948, pp. 102–138) contain information on such institutions.

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for a vast country like India and the nature of their work and the priorities hardly served the local needs. Worst of all, their activities were crippled badly by the cuts in their grants and retrenchment of staff from the 1920s onwards. The period being one of shortages and financial instability, the government resorted to extreme and wide economy measures, and scientific departments and institutions were some of the first to bear their brunt.138 What was the most important factor that came to affect the government policy by the mid-30s was the surging tide of nationalism. In order to satisfy the Indian demands and political aspirations, the Government of India introduced the scheme of Provincial Autonomy in 1935. In the process, it relieved itself of the responsibility of promoting science by transferring to the provincial control most of the subjects dealing with it. But this was not the end of its problems. As the freedom struggle gathered momentum, the authorities became more and more concerned about the safety of their rule. The growing population of the country led to unemployment among the educated youth who tended to become anti-British and joined the freedom struggle. So, the government thought of nipping the problem in the bud by offering them easy avenues of employment. This required vocationalization of education at an early stage.139 The Government of India, therefore, appointed, in 1936, a committee under A. Abbot and S.H. Wood to advise in the matter. Very much in line with the official thinking, the committee examined the question of technical education as a part of vocational training leading to employment, but it did not look beyond that.140 Thus, it dealt with the subject only up to the school stage and the fate of technical education at higher level was once again left uncared for. The committee could not make any impact as its recommendations, like those of many others in the past, were not implemented, apparently because of the outbreak of the Second World War. In order to contain the growing opposition to British rule and maintain their hold over the country, the authorities resorted to some other means, too. Once they were compelled progressively to give up control over their traditional strongholds like the Assemblies and Councils, they moved to rather unusual quarters—educational institutions and scien138

Departmental proceedings of the Government of India are full of references to this intent. 139 Prog. of Edu. 1937–1947, vol. I, p. 171; and Singh, Economic History, 1975, pp. 744–747. 140 A. Abbot and S.H. Wood, Report on Vocational Education in India, Delhi, 1937.

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tific organizations. There was a long history of racial discrimination in these sectors. Even renowned scientists like P.C. Ray and J.C. Bose had to suffer because of racial discrimination. Indianization of the scientific services was extremely slow in practice, and the little progress made in this regard was considerably negated by the fact that most of the important positions were held by the British still in the 1930s.141 As the local resentment against the British rose high, the authorities injected communal and religious feelings even in educational and scientific services and organizations. A numerical account of the racial and communal composition of the students and staff of such organizations was maintained and debates in this connection were often allowed in the Central Assembly.142 When the political situation deteriorated and the British found their authority in danger, they indulged in a vicious game of parochialism and manipulation.143 This is evident from the way the government handled the affairs of the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, just before the Second World War started. After virtually manoeuvring the removal of the Director of the Institute, Nobel Laureate Sir C.V. Raman, the Government of India wanted to have a British as the new Director. The Council of the Institute, however, opposed the move and wanted to have an Indian instead.144 Knowing this, the government entered into a secret liaison, among others, with the Dewan of Mysore State, Sir Mirza Ismail—a Muslim who disliked Bengalis,145 the British Resident in Mysore,146 and the Tatas,147 the Tatas and the Mysore State being the principal founding trustees of Headrick, Tentacles of Progress, 1988, pp. 324–330. Prog. of Edu. 1927–1932, vol. I, Chap. IX; vol. II, pp. 32–35, 172–184; ibid., 1932– 1937, vol. I, pp. 226–254; vol. II, pp. 32–35, 95, 177–189; 1937–1947, vol. II, pp. 4–3, 270–280, 290–293. Also see, Proc. GOI Dept. of Edu., Health and Lands (Edu. section): FN. 68–2/39-E (Prev. Ref. F50–5/35E, F-73–40/38E); K.W. of FN. 41–10/40E. 143 Proc. GOI, Dept. of Edu., Health and Lands: Dewan of Mysore to G.S. Bajpai, 24 Apr.1939, FN 53–8/39/E. 144 Procs. GOI, Dept. of Edu. Health and Lands: Extract from a Private and Personal letter, 24th May 1938, from…Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, FN 53– 12/38E; Summary by G.S. Bajpai about the appointment of Director, Indian Institute of Science, 24 Jun. 1939, FN 53–8/39; FN 53–8/39E; and Confidential FN 53–33/40E. 145 Procs. GOI, Dept. of Edu., Health and Lands: Private and Personal. Dewan of Mysore to G.S. Bajpai, 24 Apr. 1939; and ‘Strictly confidential’, D.O. No. 89/38–39, 26 Apr. 1939, by K.V. Anantaraman, ex-member of the Council, IIS, FN 53–8/39E. 146 Procs. GOI, Dept. of Edu., Health and Lands: Unsigned telegram to the Resident, Mysore, R No. 824, 17 May 1938, Telegram from Edu., Health & Lands Dept. to Resident in Mysore, 20 May 1938, FN 53–12/38E; Conf. letter from British Resident in Mysore to G.S. Bajpai, 3 May 5 1939, FN 53–8/38E. 147 Procs. GOI, Dept. of Edu., Health & Lands: Confidential, FN. 53–33/40E. 141 142

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the Institute. While authorities received enthusiastic support from the Dewan and the British Resident, the Tatas declined to interfere with the decisions of the Council.148 The official manoeuvre failed as a result, and J.C. Ghosh, another Indian scientist of repute who espoused the cause of science for national reconstruction, was eventually appointed Director.149 This episode makes two points clear. First, the refusal of the Tatas to toe the official line proves how the Indian industrialists, despite their association with the government and the global system of capitalism, had come closer to the local scientific leadership on the question of managing science in the interests of the country. Secondly, the Indian scientific leadership was no less concerned and jealous of their rights and independence than their counterparts in politics. In fact, by the mid-1930s the different sections of Indian society had come closer to one another than ever before on some of the main national issues, and there was an unprecedented unanimity among them in this regard. As a result, their leaders came to have a common agenda for future action. While freedom from the foreign rule and independence remained their ultimate goal, they came forward with a new offensive. With the imminence of independence in sight, they became restive and decided to go ahead with a programme of all round national reconstruction even before the country became free politically. Whatever their individual or sectional approaches, they visualised a prime role for science and technology in this gigantic task. Speaking before the Indian Science News Association in 1938, Subhas Chandra Bose, the Congress President, said: Swaraj is no longer a dream. On the contrary, we are in the sight of power. Seven of the provinces of British India are now under Congress ministries. Limited though these powers are, they have yet to handle the problem of reconstruction within the irrespective domains. How are we to solve the problems? We want first and foremost the aid of science in the task.150

Apart from the First World War, a strong stimulus for thinking on these lines had been provided by the socialist experiments in the USSR. PostRevolution Russian endeavours brought into sharp focus the vast potential of science in the socio-economic transformation of human soci148 Procs Dept. of Edu., Health & Lands: A summary of the conversation between G.S. Bajpai and Tata’s representatives on the Council of the Indian Institute of Science, 30 Jun. 1939, FN. 53–8/39E. 149 Procs. GOI, Dept. of Edu., Health & Lands: FN 53–8/39E. 150 S&C, IV, 3, 1938, pp. 139–141.

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ety.151 The lessons thus derived found an enthusiastic response in India. An important section of Indians, especially within the Congress, were excited by the ideas of socialism, which appeared to hold out prospects for solutions to India’s problems. Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964), then a rising national leader, followed the developments in the USSR very closely.152 In his presidential address at the annual session of the Congress in 1936, he declared: I am convinced that the only key to the solutions of the world problems lies in socialism, and when I use this word I do so not in a vague humanitarian way but in the scientific, economic sense…. I believe in the rapid industrialization of the country and only thus I think will the standards of the people rise substantially and poverty be combated.153

In the past, Indian appeal to the authorities for material improvement had proved futile; and not long ago, Gandhi’s programme of rural reconstruction based on traditional technology had fallen far short of expectations. In the circumstances, the Russian experiment came as a ray of hope for many who cared for India’s destiny. Besides Nehru, there were others like M.N. Saha who looked to the Russian experiment for their national reconstruction with equal admiration if not more.154 However, socialism did not evoke as wide a response here as a political ideology, as some of its tools—planning, industrialization, and science and technology. Though himself not a socialist, the noted engineer and technocrat, M. Visvesvaraya (1860–1962) had called for national reconstruction based on planning and modern science and technology since 1920. This was followed by a spate of literature on the subject in the years to come.155 Soon, the Science News Association (founded 1934 at Calcutta) and its mouthpiece, Science and Culture (published from 1935) took up the cause not only of planning but also of industrialization and science.156 Under the leadership of M.N. Saha, the people associated with Science and Culture (now known as the Science and Culture Group) J.D. Bernal, Science in History, vol. III, Harmondsworth, 1969, pp. 1166 ff.; also S.I. Vavilon, Soviet Science: Thirty Years, Moscow, 1948. 152 See his Glimpses of the World History, 1934–1935; New Delhi, 1984, pp. 638–661, 843–865. 153 A. Momin Zaidi and Shaheda Zaidi, comp., The Encyclopaedia of the Indian National Congress, vol. XIII, New Delhi, 1978, pp. 95, 97. 154 S&C, IV, 1938, p. 137. 155 M. Visvesvaraya, Reconstructing India, London, 1920; idem, Planned Economy for India, 1934; Bangalore, 1936; G.D. Birla, Indian Prosperity—A Plea for Planning, Delhi, 1934. 156 The journal published scores of articles, notes and news on the subject. Examples: 151

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directed their attention to almost every aspect of life and called for an all-round national reconstruction with the help of modern science and which was to be broadly based on the Soviet model.157 A similar movement under scientists like J.D. Bernal (1901–1971) was taking shape in Britain around this time158 and many of the Indian scientists were not only aware of it but were also in touch with its leaders like Bernal who sympathized with India’s problems. However, the scientists in India knew that nothing could be done under the existing political structure and hence were always on the lookout to seize opportunities to create favourable conditions. With the introduction of Provincial Autonomy in 1935, popular Congress ministries were formed in the majority of provinces in 1937. This placed the Congress in a new responsibility, and inspired others to come forward to work for national regeneration. A conference of its industry ministers was called in October 1938, which voiced the need for a comprehensive planning on an all-India level, and authorised the Congress President to take the necessary steps in this regard.159 Efforts were also made to promote modern industries in some of the provinces, but they failed because of official opposition and lack of resources, planning and co-ordination.160 Ultimately, all such efforts ended when the ministries resigned in 1939. However, the Congress did not lose sight of the urgency of economic recovery and reconstruction, for which it wanted a comprehensive planning on all-India basis. M.N. Saha promptly took advantage of the opportunity, in the meanwhile. He met with the Congress President, Subhas Chandra Bose, and persuaded him to appoint a committee for this purpose.161 Finally, the Congress constituted a National Planning Committee (NPC) in 1938, with the noted engineer M. Visvesvaraya as chairman. He was, however, soon replaced by Jawaharlal Nehru for the sake of expediency, and a very S&C: II, 1937, pp. 281, 413, 529; III, 1937, p. 185; IV, 1938, pp. 137, 147, 365; II, 1938, pp. 440–445. 157 Collected Works of Meghnad Saha, 1986, esp. pp. 379–637; also see S.N. Sen, ‘Organisation of Science in the Soviet Union’, S&C, IX, 1, Jul. 1943. 158 J.D. Bernal, Social Functions of Science, London, 1939; also see Maurice Goldsmith, Sage: A Life of J.D. Bernal, London, 1980. 159 P. Sitaramayya, The History of the Indian National Congress, vol. II, Bombay, 1947, pp. 96–97; Nehru, Discovery of India, 1985, pp. 418–427. 160 ‘Report on the proposed Automobile Factory in Bombay’ (1939) in Confidential AICC File No. G-23/1940 (KW-18, 19, 20, 21), at NMML, New Delhi; and Nehru, Discovery of India, 1985, p. 411. 161 Robert S. Anderson, Building Scientific Institutions in India, Montreal, 1975.

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large number of Indian scientists, social scientists, industrialists and others joined the committee in various capacities.162 With its 27 sub-committees, the NPC immediately started working on a ten-year plan to be executed, with the help of modern science, by a national government when India would be free.163 Not unexpectedly, the government remained hostile to the exercise, and the outbreak of the Second World War and the subsequent political turmoil in the country disrupted its functioning so much so that the committee could not work properly and publish its report until the end of the war.164 Nevertheless, the formation of the NPC constituted a landmark in the evolution of science in India, in terms especially of the indigenous response to both the colonial policy and to science in general. Since the imperial government was still in power, the birth and endeavours of the NPC and that of such forums as Science and Culture Group manifested the desire and will of a subject nation to wrest freedom from its masters not only politically but also in the spheres of science and technology.165 By now the nexus between the colonial control and the deflected growth of economy, science and technology in the country was laid bare. The short-term and narrow considerations had had by now serious repercussions on the scientific developments. No doubt, some scientific organizations had come into existence in the past but their growth was unplanned and mostly unconcerned with the basic needs of the country. Apart from the surveys, medical science and agriculture were some of the areas in which organizational machinery was considerably developed. But neither in the recruitment of personnel nor in the priorities of research, did they have the local interest at heart. While the Indian Medical Service was a known British preserve, higher ranks in all other services were filled only by the British. Scientific organizations catered primarily to the colonial needs. Both the IMS and the veterinary institutions had been developed to meet the requirements of the armed forces. Keeping in mind the health hence the nutritional needs of the 162

Scientists included M.N. Saha, J.C. Ghosh, S.K. Mitra, J.N. Mukherjee, A.K. Shaha, S.S. Bhatnagar and Mata Prasad. 163 Apart from the reports of the NPC, see Nehru, Discovery of India, 1985, pp. 395– 402. 164 Nehru, Discovery of India, 1985, esp. pp. 401–402. 165 For a discussion on the NPC, see Jagdish N. Sinha, ‘Science and the Indian National Congress’, 1991, pp. 169–172; and idem, ‘The National Planning Committee, 1938–1949’, 1995.

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local population, research was needed to promote the production of staple food like rice and wheat, sources of protein, vitamins and minerals such as pulses, vegetables and fruits;166 but the government encouraged production of crops like cotton, sugarcane, jute, rubber and tea in order to meet the commercial requirements of the Empire. Flood control and problems of irrigation, introduction of farm implements and modern fertilisers, and industrial research remained neglected throughout.167 All this hindered the growth of science and deflected its course of development. Indian scientists realised this fact and raised voice against the neglect of R&D in many areas of prime importance for the welfare of the country such as river management, power and fuel, and, of course, industrialisation.168 If used properly, even the science and technology that came to India with the Europeans could have contributed to her progress, but that did not happen, in spite of favourable indigenous response we have already discussed. On her part, India did have a rich tradition in many spheres of science and technology. The Indians had excelled in the past in such areas as mathematics, astronomy, medicine, architecture and town planning, agriculture, water management, mining and metallurgy, ship-building and textile.169 Endeavours in these areas had generally enjoyed state support throughout history; and in the course of time, a process had evolved through which these traditions were passed from generation to generation through professional activities; and an extensive system of indigenous education continued even after the advent of Europeans in India.170 Some of the Indian rulers themselves had evinced interest in science and technology. Sawai Jai Singh showed considerable interest in astronomy171 and Tipu Sultan carried experiments in rock-

166 For the local needs and Indian point of view, see NPC Series: National Health, Bombay, 1948. 167 For Indian point of view, see NPC Series: River Training and Irrigation, Bombay, 1947; Crop Planning and Production, Bombay, 1948; Education: General Education and Technical Education and Developmental Research, Bombay, 1948. 168 Ibid. and Modern Review: 32, 1922, p. 605; 51, 1932, 163; S&C: 1, 1935, pp. 303, 367; II, 1936, p. 281; III, 1937, pp. 65, 506, 529, 574; IV, 1938, pp. 147, 365; M.N. Saha, ‘Symposium on Power Supply—Opening Address’, Procs. National Academy of Science, India, Special No. 1, 1938. 169 D.P. Chattopadhyaya, History of Science, Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilization, multivolume, New Delhi, 1998–; and D.M. Bose et al., A Concise History of Science in India, New Delhi, 1971. 170 Zaheer Baber, The Science of Empire, 1996; Delhi, 1998, pp. 187–190. 171 A. Rahman, Maharaja Sawai Jai Singh II and the Indian Renaissance, New Delhi, 1987.

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etry.172 Both of them kept themselves abreast of the developments in their respective areas of interest in the Arabian world and the West. An elaborate system of education promoting traditional knowledge and skill existed even in the remote, rural areas of the country until it was systematically destroyed by Europeans, especially the British, until much later.173 The expanding colonial control and destruction of the native states gave a serious set-back to this age-old tradition. The new rulers did not encourage the indigenous system of medicine and health care which was more acceptable to the natives. For, apart from the system being alien to the British, such encouragement militated against their effort to give employment to British doctors in India. Moreover, while they were, obviously, more familiar and adapted to their own sciences, Indian sciences and technology could not serve their immediate political and economic interests. This is the reason why they showed interest in the geography, society and culture of India, which was helpful for understanding the local society for a better political control and economic exploitation. Meanwhile, a section of Indians, from Raja Rammohun Roy to Syed Ahmad Khan, Mahendralal Sirkar and others, had been attracted to the Western knowledge and sciences.174 Of course, efforts were also made by Indians, off and on, to revive and promote the indigenous sciences and skill, and to relate or synthesise them with the modern science. P.N. Bose, P.C. Ray and B.N. Seal made valuable contributions in this direction.175 J.C. Bose (1858–1937) attempted to bridge the gap between the knowledge of the past and the present. The scientific findings that brought him laurels as a modern scientist had received inspiration from the indigenous philosophical tradition.176 Some years

172 Frank H. Winter, ‘Rocketry in India from the Earliest Times to the 19th Century’, Proceedings of the 14th International Congress of History of Science, Tokyo, 1974. 173 Baber, Science of Empire, 1998, pp. 187–190. 174 S. Irfan Habib, ‘Promoting Science and Its World View in Mid-Nineteenth Century India’, in D.K., Science and Empire, 1991, pp. 139–151; also D. Kumar, Science and the Raj, 1997, Chap. 6. 175 Ibid. Also P.N. Bose, A History of Hindu Civilization, 3 vols., Calcutta, 1906; P.C. Ray, History of Hindu Chemistry, 2 vols., Calcutta, 1909. B.N. Seal, The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, Calcutta, 1915; Delhi, 1985. 176 Subrata Dasgupta, Jagadis Chandra Bose and the Indian Response to Western Science, Delhi, 1999.

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later, Srinivasa Ramanujan (1887–1920), the noted Indian mathematician, too, remained strongly anchored to his cultural moorings.177 But it was Mahatma Gandhi (1869–1948) who really grappled with the problem. He was quick to perceive the pernicious implications of the Western technology for the country and articulated the issue into his political agenda. He declared: ‘God forbid that India should ever take to industrialization after the manner of the West. The economic imperialism of the tiny island kingdom (England) is today keeping the world in chains. If an entire nation of 300 million took to similar economic exploitation, it would strip the world bare like locusts’.178 Thus, uncovering the mutually supporting link between the Western technology and British rule on the one hand and impoverishment of India on the other, he waged a war against it and called for reviving India’s own traditional knowledge and arts as they were closer to the life and cultural ethos of the people of India and were capable of serving the national interest best. He would not accept a science that had developed in response to the needs of an alien society and which was not in tune with the Indian psyche and culture. As a matter of fact, he had expressed his views in the matter as early as in 1909 in his seminal work Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule.179 But despite his remarkable political perception and strong will, the Mahatma was fighting a losing battle. He was the last Indian leader of note who tried to stall the onslaught of Western technology on the Indian sub-continent. It soon became clear that in the pace of progress the traditional knowledge and skill had been left far behind and now they were probably too outdated and obsolete to deal with the problems India was faced with.180 Not unexpectedly, Gandhi’s programmes did not make much headway and a cross-section of Indians favoured modern science and technology for the country’s material regeneration. Thus, the Western science and technology had come to stay. What was, however, reassuring for India at this juncture was the desire of her leaders, including scientists, social scientists and industrialists, to free science, like its politics and economy, from the colonial control and use it in the interests of the local society. Clearly, after 177

1991.

Robert Kanigel, The Man Who Knew Infinity: A Life of the Genius Ramanujan, Toronto,

Gandhi wrote in 1928. For Gandhi’s views, see M.K. Gandhi, Hind Swaraj, 1911; idem, Modern V. Ancient, 1970, esp. pp. 22–27, 47–48, 55–56, 73–76, 98–99, 109–110. 180 M.N. Saha, ‘Science and Culture’, S&C, I, 1, 1935, p. 3. 178 179

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three decades since Swadeshi, the question of science and technology was, once again, inseparably aligned with politics, and politics with science. The ultimate goal for both of them was freedom, for which the long battle between imperialism and nationalism entered its last phase in India when the Second World War engulfed the world in 1939. Who lost the battle and who gained? How, how far and to what consequences? What changes occurred in the British policy towards science during the six years of the global crisis? These are some of the questions to be addressed in the pages that follow.

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chapter three SCIENCE FOR WAR The Second World War broke out in September 1939, and though far from the scene of action, India could not remain unaffected by the forces of change it unleashed across the globe. Myriad of problems of basic nature cropped up in the country; but what concerned the Government of India first and foremost were the immediate exigencies of the war. Military and strategic demands, obviously, stood at the top, and the government effort to meet them soon involved India in the overall war efforts of the British Empire and its Allies. It was in this context that science and technology assumed great importance; and, as the experiences would show later, the war exerted considerable influence both on their progress as well as the British policy governing them in India. On 3 September 1939, Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy of India (1936– 1937, 1938–1943), declared India at war with Germany, through a viceregal proclamation. Unlike in the Dominions, in India this was done without consulting the members of the Central Legislature and the Council and, not less importantly, the Indian political opinion. Under the Defence of India Rules, promulgated shortly afterwards, the government assumed sweeping powers. The Indian National Congress and others objected to the move but ultimately agreed to India’s participation in the war on the condition that freedom was granted to her as well. This was a tricky situation. So, to confuse the issue the Viceroy made what is now known as the ‘Delhi Declaration’ of 17 October 1939. The old offers of Dominion Status for India were repeated and more consultations with Indians were promised. But when this did not work, the government softened its attitude further and in order to seek the Indian support in the crisis, made the ‘August Offer’ (8 August 1940). It was a little more than a repetition of the 17 October 1939 offer, which was, of course, followed by a few administrative measures aimed at satisfying the nationalist demands.1 Indian Annual Register, Calcutta, 1939 (vol. 2, pp. 226–228) recorded the day-to-day developments during the war. Amongst the later publications V.P. Menon, The Transfer 1

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As these moves and counter-moves were played out, the government stepped up efforts to gear up the Indian resources to deal with the exigencies of the war, not only in India but also at distant war fronts. One of the first steps taken by the government was to convene the Eastern Group Conference in 1940 in Delhi, which resulted in the formation, in February 1941, of the Eastern Group Supply Committee with headquarters in India.2 It did not take long to realize the immense potentialities of science and technology for the successful conduct of a modern war. In Britain, prompt measures were initiated, at official as well as non-official levels, towards various aspects of war production, supply and mobilisation. A War Cabinet Scientific Advisory Committee was constituted in October 1940 and a British Commonwealth Science Committee the next year.3 Soon, Britain and her Allies entered into mutual consultations aimed at exploiting science for the war. Both Britain and the United States opened up liaison offices in each other’s capital. A British Central Scientific Office was established in Washington towards the end of 1940 followed by the United States Office for Scientific Research and Development in London early the following year. As the war escalated and mutual cooperation became vital, a Mutual Aid Agreement between Britain and America was signed in February 1942.4 Keeping in view the fast changing nature of the war and its gravity, the ambit of this collaboration had to be soon expanded to include the whole of the British Empire, the Dominions and beyond. This was essential also for safeguarding the long-term economic, political and military interests of the Empire.5 When the Japanese joined the war and the centre of the conflict shifted to the East, India assumed a pivotal position in the global strategy of the British Empire and the Allies, and her resources needed to be developed and exploited.6 For ensurof Power in India, Calcutta, 1957; and Johannes H. Voigt, India in the Second World War, New Delhi, 1987, are valuable sources of background information. 2 M. Greenberg, ‘Britain Mobilizes her Eastern Empire: Results of the Delhi Eastern Group Supply Conference’, Far Eastern Survey, 10, 26 Mar. 1941, pp. 58–60. 3 For the wartime activities in Britain, see W.K. Hancock, ed., History of the Second World War, multivolume, London, 1949–, esp. the vols. by M.M. Postan, W.K. Hancock, M.M. Gowing and Keith A.M. Murray listed in the Bibliography. 4 Hancock and Gowing, British War Economy, 1949, esp. chaps. 7, 9, 18. 5 Ibid. 6 The Asiatic Review: Lieut.-Col. Frederick O’Connor, ‘India’s Military Contribution to the War’, vol. 36, Apr. 1940, esp. p. 208; and Frank Noyce, ‘India as a Supply Base’, vol. 32, Oct. 1941, pp. 845–849.

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ing wider collaboration, the Royal Society, London, called a conference of scientists and others concerned from the Commonwealth countries in October 1941, leading finally to the constitution of the British Commonwealth Science Committee. This committee recommended, among other things, a comprehensive and continuous collaboration in scientific matters between the English speaking countries on a permanent basis. To achieve this it suggested to them (1) to maintain permanent scientific and technical representation in London, (2) to ensure free flow of scientific information and an easy and enhanced personal contact amongst the students and researchers of the various countries, and (3) to secure appointment of a British Commonwealth Scientific Collaboration Committee to act with the Royal Society.7 These moves set, to an extent, the tone and tempo of the activities in India. In India, realization of the value of science in the contemporary crisis came after bitter experiences. As the war raged, it badly exposed India’s technical and industrial backwardness and her dependence on others for a large variety of goods and commodities essential not only for the wartime requirements but also in the times of peace.8 Not to talk of the numerous war supplies, the country was unequipped even to service and maintain the defence equipment and such basic necessities as transport and communications system. Commenting on the situation, Science and Culture observed in its editorial in November 1939: … the outbreak of the War has found India totally unprepared not only for defence and offence, but also for maintenance of the smooth tenor of civil life, should the war be unfortunately prolonged for three years. Already the prices have soared up and if the complications further increase, some of the essential commodities for which India depends on foreign countries may be entirely stopped. It should be borne in mind that in spite of the pious intention contained in the resolution of the Government of India [of 1919 sent to the Secretary of State]… we have not developed our power resources; no steps have been taken for the manufacture of essential chemicals, metals and alloys, and commodities required for the maintenance of transport and communication services. The industries for the manufacture of scientific apparatus, glass and many other essentials are either in a backward condition or do not exist at all.9

7 8 9

Report of the British Commonwealth Science Committee, London, 1943. Progress of Education in India 1937–1947, vol. I, Delhi, 1948, p. 172. ‘The War Comes’, editorial, S&C, V, 5, Nov. 1939, p. 268.

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This showed India’s utter inadequacy, in terms of quantity as well as quality, in the technical infrastructure and know-how. There were, no doubt, a number of scientific institutions and organizations in the country, but there was no integrated central control and coordination amongst them. Needless to say, there was no uniform official policy governing science either. But the war compelled the authorities in India to have a fresh look at things and make the best use of science for victory. The understanding and activities in England and the Allied circles did have immediate repercussions in India. In response to the call for cooperation within the Commonwealth and amongst the Allies for the war, India opened her liaison offices in London and Washington; scientific and technical missions were exchanged and by 1942, a War Resource Committee was constituted. A range of activities followed in the years to come.10

Technical Education The need for immediate supply of technical personnel to the fighting machinery and scores of industries that backed up the gigantic war effort was a matter of first and foremost concern. Introduction of sophisticated weapons and machinery including the aeroplanes added urgency to the matter. This is the reason why the Government of India was jolted out of inaction all of a sudden and compelled to encourage technical education. Industrialists showed interest in it because they, too, needed more technical hands for stepping up their production. For the average middle class Indian, technical degrees became a route to better employment.11 Realizing that trained technicians were not readily available in the country, the government resorted to emergency measures. In June 1940, a War Technicians’ Training Scheme was introduced. The existing technical institutions, factories and workshops (especially those attached to the ordnance factories and the railways) were pressed into service wherever possible, and a target to train 52,000 persons by 1943 was fixed. Under the plan for technical training drawn up by the Labour 10

For organizational activities, see S.C. Aggarwal, History of the Supply Department (1939–1946), New Delhi, 1947; and N.C. Sinha and P.N. Khera, Indian War Economy (Supply, Industry and Finance), 1962. 11 Progress of Education 1937–1947, vol. 1, pp. 171–174.

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Department of the Government of India, about 300 training centres were developed and by 1945 as many as 80,000 people had been trained most of whom were absorbed into the army.12 The need was so pressing that the government did not hesitate in starting such technical training centres even at places like the College of Engineering and Technology, Bengal, at Jadavpur, which had otherwise been the citadel of the National Education, a programme of Swadeshi movement, in the country.13 Liberal allowances were given during the period of training. About a hundred special technical instructors were requisitioned from England. Under the Bevin Training Scheme, young Indians aged 20 to 30 years were trained at selected centres in England in engineering trades and in the principles of labour organization. The first batch of 50 trainees sailed for England in April 1941 followed by another four batches the next year. On their return, they were employed in responsible supervisory posts including in the army.14 The fall of France in June 1940 and the Japanese advance towards India changed the whole strategy of the war. In the new scheme of things, India assumed greater significance than ever before. Now the battle was to be fought and won in Asia, for which India was to be used as a base both for supply and operation. The British and the Allied effort were, therefore, concentrated on India in order to develop her into a strong base, sufficiently independent in resources and powerful enough to check the Axis advance. Soon India was taken into Allied planning and measures were set afoot to develop her accordingly. Two factors required urgent attention: first, the country needed to be provided with enough facilities for servicing and maintenance of military machines and equipment; and, secondly, her industries were to be geared up to cater to the war efforts and tide over the economic crisis caused by the war. In order to ensure this, expert missions from the Allies, the UK and USA in particular, visited India in quick succession. This was reciprocated by the visits of Indian technical teams abroad.15 The Ministry of Supply (Roger) Mission from Britain visited India in September 1940. But the visit of the American Technical Mission

Ibid., pp. 173–174. For details, see Report of the Technical Education Committee of the Central Advisory Board, Delhi, 1946, pp. 24–25. The Indian Information, 15 Sep. 1945, p. 253. 13 National Council of Education, Bengal, 1906–1958, Calcutta, 1956, p. 32. 14 Progress of Education 1937–1947, vol. I, pp. 173–174. 15 Sinha and Khera, Indian War Economy, 1962, Chaps. I–IV; Voigt, India in Second World War, 1987, Chaps. II–III. For details, see Aggarwal, History of Supply, 1947. 12

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in 1942 was more important in many ways and influenced the developments in India considerably. The Mission, with Henry F. Grady as chairman, arrived in New Delhi on 17 April 1942 and worked in India for the next five weeks conferring with officials of various departments of the Government of India and of some of the provinces and states. It also conferred with industrial leaders, businessmen and Chambers of Commerce in New Delhi, Calcutta and Bombay. It visited government munitions factories, railway workshops, shipbuilding and ship-repair shops, and the principal industrial plants engaged in the production of war materials in and around Calcutta. It also inspected the Tata Iron and Steel Company at Jamshedpur and major industrial plants at Bombay and the Karachi port.16 The report of the Mission emphasized the strategic importance of India to the cause of the United Nations and her great potential for industrial production because of her vast natural and human resources: The Mission believes that India is of great strategic importance to the cause of the United Nations. In its opinion this is because India can be utilised as a base for an offensive against the Japanese in Burma, because India and Burma are essential links in the efforts of the United Nations to supply China with war materials, and, finally because India possesses great natural resources which must not only be kept [safe] from the enemy, but must also be fully developed for the benefit of the United Nations. The importance of rapidly developing India’s potentialities for war production has been greatly accentuated by recent military developments in south-east Asia.17

The Mission felt that the utilization of the natural resources could be greatly developed and expanded, provided adequate tools were made available for that purpose. In this context, it appreciated the mechanical aptitude of Indian workmen who, given proper incentives and working conditions, could become skilled craftsmen within a short period of training.18 Seen in the light of the colonial policy till then, the emphasis of the report on certain facts deserves attention: India’s strategic importance apart, the Mission underlined the necessity of developing her natural and human resources. It also emphasized her ‘great potentialities for 16 American Technical Mission to India, A Survey of India’s Industrial Production for War Purposes: Report of the American Technical Mission, Washington, 1942 (This report has many versions). 17 Ibid., pp. 2, 59. 18 Ibid.

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industrial production’. And, in order to exploit the natural resources for industrial purposes, it called for making available within the country technical hardware and know-how for which Indians possessed the required aptitude and skill. This meant promoting her technical expertise and infrastructure capability urgently. To begin with, the focus of the Commission in this regard was limited primarily to servicing and repair of the military equipment and, thus, developing India as what may be called a base workshop for the Allied forces.19 Although this did not envisage any technical progress of an advanced nature, it pleaded, nevertheless, for enhancing the technical capabilities in the areas and at a scale never thought of in the past. This imparted urgency to the development of technical education in the country. Moreover, by advising import of technical personnel, including for technical education and technical training of Indians abroad, especially in the USA, it inaugurated an era of scientific and technical collaboration between India and the non-British world.20 This was bound to affect the nature and pattern of scientific progress in India in the future. On this and the allied subjects, expert committees were also constituted internally to advise the Government of India. An Industrial Utilisation Committee was appointed in 1940 followed by an Industrial Research Fund the next year. A Directorate of Merchantship Repairs was constituted in 1942, and the same year the Grant Massie Committee was convened to advise on the procurement and production of surgical instruments. The UK Machine Tool Mission visited India in July 1944. Most of these committees had a bearing on the introduction and expansion of new technology in the country, and suggestions of some of them led to increased facilities for technical education. In order to make available a sufficient number of technical personnel for the post-war needs, the government instituted an Overseas Scholarship Scheme towards the end of 1944. An elaborate arrangement was made in this regard and students were sent to the UK and USA for studies.21 Away from such emergency measures, technical education continued to be imparted as usual at its traditional centres, viz., universities, schools and at workshops of government establishments like the ord-

19

Ibid., and other pages. Procs. GOI, Dept. of Education, Health & Lands, Health Branch: FN. 53–7/42 E.; FN. 27–7/44 E; FN. 73–26/45-E.I. 21 Aggarwal, History of Supply, 1947, Chaps. III–V esp. pp. 201, 227–231, 269–270. For scholarships, see Progress of Education 1937–1947, vol. I, Chap. VI. 20

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nance factories and the railways, and at workshops of private enterprises like the one at Jamshedpur. But the state interest in these centres was limited only to such technical courses as were of immediate value for the war. Otherwise, the government was rather indifferent to the purely academic aspect of the subject. No doubt, a new polytechnic school was started at Delhi in 1941 and new technical courses were introduced or old ones reframed at the various universities in the country,22 but most of the academic centres concerned were starved of funds and staff during the war.23 However, we cannot overlook certain positive developments. When the war started, technical education was not organized in the country. This had been promoted until then only to meet the demands of such sectors as the railways, ordnance factories and a limited number of industries. There was no long-term government policy in the matter, and institutions of technical education suffered from a plurality of authority, absence of coordination and planning, and from the paucity of funds and resources. The number of courses was limited and the subject was yet to become an integral part of the education system. Most of these problems continued even later, but the war and the enhanced indigenous demand for technical education obliged the government to promote it systematically.24 Apart from the official measures discussed above, one of the first important steps taken in this direction was the foundation of the Association of Principals of Technical Institutions, India, in 1941.25 But perhaps the most important step taken by the government was the appointment of the Technical Education Committee in 1943. Under the Chairmanship of John Sargent, Educational Advisor to the Government of India, this committee was appointed by the Central Advisory Board of Education ‘to explore ways and means of developing facilities for technical education in the country as a whole’. The committee began with a discussion on the problems and prospects of technical education. It attributed the restricted demand for technically trained hands in India to the limited and uncertain job opportunities, the pracProgress of Education, 1937–1947, p. 171. Departmental proceedings are full of references to war-time cuts in finances to scientific institutions. 24 Progress of Education 1937–1947, pp. 170–172. Science and Culture, Current Science and Proceedings of the Science Congress are full of articles on it. 25 Proceedings of the 7th meetings of the CABE, Item XVII, Central Advisory Board of Education: Silver Jubilee Souvenir, New Delhi, 1960 (hereafter CABE Souvenir) 1960, p. 83. 22 23

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tice of filling more remunerative posts with imported technicians and to the traditional dislike of the middle and upper class Indians for taking industrial occupations.26 However, the committee appreciated the salutary changes brought about by the war in this regard. It noted the expansion of industries and the greatly increased demand for technicians in consequence. In the changed circumstances, therefore, it wanted to have a fresh look in the matter. Highlighting the obvious lesson implicit in these changes, it emphasised that technical instruction must be wider and more liberal form of training than it had been in the past. It ‘must comprehend the scientific principles underlying the process of manufacture as well as the processes themselves; it must link up the sciences of production and business organisation with the arts of design and salesmanship.’ Above all, the committee wanted it to ‘take cognisance also of social science in relation to the effect of industrial development on the life of previously non-industrial community’. Moreover, it advised against the ‘neglect of the provision of purely cultural and recreational facilities as an antidote against mental and moral stagnation for those workers who are destined to remain the semi-skilled servants of the machine’.27 This approach clearly indicated a transition from the colonial to the national priorities in the matter. It pleaded for sciencetizing (to develop technology with the help of the knowledge of scientific principles and processes) technology, a process that had started in the West years back during the First World War, and humanizing it at the same time. The committee made several recommendations of basic nature. It called for an immediate planning of a comprehensive system of technical education at all stages. This system was to meet the needs of industry and commerce as well as provide a suitable form of education for those whose natural abilities could be developed by instruction on particular lines. It was, therefore, to be an integral part of the general educational system of the country. With this in mind, the committee offered basic guidelines on the type of technical institutions, nature of courses and the technical staff required. Their prime emphasis was on popularizing the subject by making it practical and socially useful and by providing better facilities for both learning and teaching. This 26 Report of the Technical Education Committee of the Central Advisory Board of Education in India (1943–1946), Delhi, 1946, pp. 1–2. 27 Ibid., pp. 2–4.

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required provision of an adequate system of scholarships and increased material facilities for the teaching staff. Lastly, the committee recommended direct state initiative and control both at the levels of provinces as well as the Centre.28 This was, without doubt, the first important effort to study the subject in such a wider perspective and with regard for local needs. The committee’s perception of the subject in relation particularly to its socio-cultural obligations clearly reflected a change in the colonial attitude; but its silence over the question of promoting the traditional arts and skills of the country indicated, at the same time, how difficult it was to come out of the colonial rut completely. Yet, the report did have some repercussions. In keeping with the spirit of the recommendations, a committee under N.R. Sarkar was appointed, in 1945, to advise on higher technical education, which ultimately led to the foundation of the four Indian Institutes of Technology (IIT) later.29 A more direct result was the creation by the Central Advisory Board of Education of an All India Council for Technical Education to which we will return later.30 The other two important committees appointed by the Central Advisory Education Board that also dealt with technical education, were a special Committee on Agriculture Education and the much known Committee on Post-War Educational Development in India.31 The recommendations of both these committees were more or less on the lines suggested by the Technical Education Committee. The Committee on Agriculture stressed the importance and necessity of a comprehensive system of agricultural education.32

Ibid., pp. 14–16. An Interim Report of the Committee Appointed to Consider the Development of Higher Technical Institutions in India by N.R. Sarkar, Chairman, 1946. 30 ‘Proc. of Twelfth Meeting, January 1946’, in CABE Silver Jubilee Souvenir 1960, p. 150. 31 Reports of the Committees appointed by the Central Advisory Board of Education in India (1943–1946), Delhi, 1947, pp. 62–73; and Post-War Educational Development in India, Delhi, fifth edn, 1947. 32 Reports of the Committees appointed by the CABE (1943–1946), 1947, pp. 62–73. 28 29

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Scientific and Industrial Research However, only the repair and maintenance of weapons and machinery used in the war was not enough. The war that was expanding both in time and space required more supplies, its ferocity demanded more powerful weapons, and the wants and shortages it created obliged the government to ensure unhindered supply and search for substitutes. This became all the more urgent after the fall of France, which brought the war nearer home for Britain; and communications with India and supplies to her were badly disrupted. Similarly, the Japanese advance in the East and fall of many British possessions like Burma and Malaya blocked supplies of a large number of items to India, such as tin, cinchona, wood and rice.33 To add to the problem, the concentration of Allied troops (along with the expanded Indian army) in and around India required the supply of hundreds of items from arms and ammunition to clothing, food and medicine. The Indian army expanded in size from just over 205,000 in October 1939 to over 2,251,000 in July 1945. All this necessitated greatly increased production in factories, mines and farms. It also necessitated revamping of basic amenities like transport and communications, and health services, along, of course, with increased defence preparedness. Thus, in a situation of acute disruption in imports and dislocation of economy, self-sufficiency in production and supply was vital.34 The experiences of the First World War and the subsequent developments all over the world had underlined the role science and technology could play in this.35 The Government of India, therefore, moved forward, albeit belatedly, to accord priority to technical support for stepping up industrial output. Encouragement was given to a wide range of industries producing goods and articles needed for the war such as those dealing with arms and ammunition, machine tools, engineering, transport and communications, textiles, steel, chemicals, timber, rubber, dyes, drugs, mining and minerals, and electrical and surgical appliances. In the areas where industries already existed, the government encouraged increased

Aggarwal, History of Supply, 1947. John Springhall, Decolonization since 1945, New York, 2001, p. 66; Sinha and Khera, Indian War Economy (Supply, Industry and Finance), CIHS, 1962, Pt. I; P.N. Khera, Technical Services: Ordnance & IEME, Pt. I, India & Pakistan, 1962. 35 S&C, V, 5, Nov. 1939, pp. 265–268. 33 34

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production; where they did not, incentive and licences were given to start new ones.36 The direct involvement of the government was, however, confined mostly to industries catering to the defence needs. Establishments such as state ordnance factories and railway workshops were assigned special responsibilities and expanded to meet them. Before 1939, the Ordnance Laboratories at Kanpur had a very restricted scope and they were concerned mainly with routine testing of samples of stores to be purchased by the government. The war gave them great impetus by expanding their scope of work and making research an important part of their activities. They were now engaged on a fairly extensive scale in applied research at Ordnance General Stores, and had wellequipped laboratories for chemicals, industrial machines and tools, textiles, lubricants, fuels, surgical instruments, parachute components and allied equipment, timber and wood ware, leather and rubber, and biological problems.37 In order to boost the industrial production, the government also allowed private firms to expand and diversify. In a few cases, it collaborated with them, as with the Tatas for the production of armoured vehicles, railway equipment, steel and aircraft,38 and with Walchand Hirachand for aircraft.39 The collaboration came by way of assurance to them for the purchase of goods produced or also by holding shares. In still other cases it promoted private industries in a desired direction or controlled them by providing protection and assuring market, offering technical advice and facilities for import of machinery, and through grant of licences and control orders. While these measures led to an unprecedented industrial growth and expansion, they did not necessarily imply any significant innovation and research.40 36 Aggarwal, History of Supply, 1947 is a very useful source on the subject. Also see Statistics relating to India’s War Effort, Delhi, 1947. 37 Report of the Industrial Research Planning Committee, 1945, New Delhi, 1945, pp. 108– 109. 38 Tata Papers: Serial No. 75, Cupboard No. 1, File Nos. 8, 14, 28, 32, 34, 42, 43, 47 (Dec. 1938 – Dec. 1947); Serial No. 76, GOI Cardboard No. l, File No. IV, Items 33, 36, 39; Serial Nos. 92, 96, Cupboard No. 1, at TISCO Division., Bombay House, Bombay; and Verrier Elwin, The Story of Tata Steel, Bombay, 1958, pp. 87–89. 39 Walchand Hirachand Papers: File No. 541, Parts I & II, at Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML), New Delhi; Aggarwal, History of Supply, 1947, pp. 232– 233. 40 See S. Subramanian and P.W. Homfray, Recent Social and Economic Trends in India, New Delhi, 1946.

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When the government realized that the war was likely to continue and intensify and shortages and dislocation would get worse, it felt the need to exploit all the resources available in India. In order to obtain optimum output and quality, better scientific methods and technology had to be employed. This called for planning and organization not only of the industries and production process but also of the scientific research and technological innovation affecting them.41 Initial response of the government was rather curious, though not unexpected altogether. Austerity and economy, and not science, appeared to be their first concern. As a result, a proposal was put forward to abolish the Industrial Intelligence and Research Bureau as a measure of wartime economy. Fortunately, the Member of the Department of Commerce, Ramaswamy Mudaliar, realised the value of industrial research in wartime. He contended: ‘In wartime no economy can be too disastrous which starves industrial research and no expenditure too high which mobilizes the scientific talent of the country for the research and production of War materials.’42 So, though he abolished the Bureau but only to replace it with a far more comprehensive Board of Scientific and Industrial Research (BSIR). The Board was constituted on 1 April 1940 and placed under the Department of Commerce. As the Member of the Department, Mudaliar became the first Chairman of the Board and S.S. Bhatnagar (1894–1955), the then Head of the Punjab University Chemical Laboratories, Lahore, was appointed Director, Scientific and Industrial Research, as the next person.43 A communiqué issued at the first meeting of the Board on 1 April 1940 outlined its functions as to: (1) advise the government on proposals for instituting special researches; (2) help in the study of problems affecting particular industries and trades; (3) make proposals for the establishment of research studentships, scholarships and fellowships; and (4) receive proposals from various research institutions and universities. A sum of Rs. 5 lakhs (0.5 million) was allocated for its maintenance and expenditure.44 As the war gave impetus to the research activities of the Board, it was able to work out, within a year, several processes in its laboratories Khera, Technical Services, Pts. I–II, 1962. Shiv Visvanathan, Organizing for Science, Delhi, 1985, p. 117. 43 Commerce Dept. Resolution No. 148-S&T (I)/40, 27 Apr. 1940. For list of members, see Appendix I. 44 ‘The Board of Scientific and Industrial Research (Government of India): A Comparison of its Functions with those of the DSIR’, S&C, V, 11, May 1940, p. 649; also Report of the Industrial Research Planning Committee 1945, Allahabad, 1945, p. 109. 41 42

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for industrial utilization. They included a method for the purification of Baluchistan sulfur, anti-gas cloth manufacture, dyes for uniforms, development of vegetable oil blends as fuel and lubricant, plastic packaging for army boots and ammunition, and preparation of vitamins.45 Science and Culture, the most vocal forum of the Indian scientists, however, reacted to this administrative measure adversely, more particularly to the communiqué issued in connection with the constitution of the Board. The journal found the official measures for industrial research short-range meant only for dealing with the wartime exigencies and remarked that ‘by creating a research board without taking proper steps for planning industries…the government was ignoring a vital part of the country’s problem’.46 Meanwhile, as India’s importance in the Allied strategy increased further, the question of industrialization became paramount and industrial research important.47 By this time, considerable pressure of Indian public opinion, too, had built up in this regard.48 So, the success of the BSIR encouraged the government to put its research to actual application. In 1941, an Industrial Research Utilization Committee (IRUC) was created to advise the government on the commercial utilization of the processes evolved under the auspices of the BSIR.49 On the recommendations of the IRUC, the government decided to use the royalty received from industries in return for these processes to institute a separate fund to promote industrial research. As a result, an Industrial Research Fund (IRF) was created in November 1941 and was allowed to have an annual grant of Rs 10 lakhs (1 million) for a period of five years.50

45 S.S. Bhatnagar, ‘A Brief Account of the Activities of the CSIR’, ACC No. 361, f2–6/78-RU (undated), NAI. 46 S&C: V, 11, May 1940, pp. 649–651; also see ‘BSIR at Work’, VI, 2, Aug. 1940, pp. 103–105. 47 Voigt, India in the Second World War, 1987, esp. pp. 60–81. 48 Sample of Indian opinion: D.N. Wadia, ‘Minerals’ Share in the War,’ Presidential Address, 2 Jan.1943, Procs. Indian Science Congress; and in the Procs. National Institute of Science of India: R.N. Chopra, Annual Address., 1940, esp. pp. 26–31; ‘Symposium on Coal in India’; ‘Symposium on Heavy Chemical Industries in India’, 1943; Janan Chandra Ghosh, Opening Address to the ‘Symposium on Post-War Organisation of Scientific Research in India’, Sep. 1943, pp. 3–7. 49 Commerce Dept. Resolution. No. 148-Ind (63)/40, 1 Feb. 1941. For the list of IRUC’s members, see Appendix II. 50 Report Industrial Research, 1945, p. 109.

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But the most important step taken by the Government of India to organize and promote scientific and industrial research was the constitution of the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) in 1942. It was created as an autonomous body to administer the newly created Industrial Research Fund. Its administration was vested with a governing body nominated by the Government of India, and the BSIR and the Industrial Research Utilisation Committee were merged into it as two advisory committees.51 The Council came into operation with effect from 28 September 1942. The first Governing Body was presided over by N.R. Sarkar, Member of the Council of the Governor-General, with S.S. Bhatnagar as Director, Scientific and Industrial Research.52 The Council had comprehensive powers, scope and resources to promote research in various fields. Detailed in its constitution, its functions included: (1) Promotion, guidance and cooperation of scientific and industrial research through institutions and specific research project; (2) establishment or development of and assistance to special institutions or development of existing institutions for specific studies of problems affecting particular industries and trades; (3) establishment and award of research studentship and fellowships; (4) utilization of the results of research conducted under the Council towards the development of industries in the country and payment of share of royalties arising out of that to those devising them; (5) establishment, maintenance and management of laboratories, workshops, institutes and organizations to further scientific and industrial research, and to utilize and exploit any discovery and invention likely to be of use to Indian industries; (6) collection and dissemination of information in regard not only to research but also to industrial matters generally; (7) publication of scientific papers and a journal of industrial research and development; and (8) any other activity to promote generally the objects of the resolution.53 This agenda was an indication that the government wanted to promote and coordinate scientific and industrial research at the all-India level on a scale broader than ever before, harness it for industrial progress and sciencetize technology as well as generate and disseminate scientific knowledge. It also hinted at the desire to take research Commerce Dept. Resolution No. 148-Ind (157)/41, 26 Sep. 1942. ‘Industrial Research Fund’, Current Science, X, Nov. 1941, p. 493. For the list of members of the first Governing Body of the CSIR, see Appendix III. 53 Council of Scientific and Industrial Research in India—A Review, New Delhi, 1954, p. 2. 51 52

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out of the typical colonial establishments to a more open and liberal arena of the universities and such other places. The Council financed such schemes of research as were recommended by the Board, universities, research institutions and any other institution having facilities for research on the subjects concerned. Apart from the schemes financed by the Council and carried out in other institutions, research work of the Council itself was done in the laboratories under the Director of Scientific and Industrial Research, originally set up at the Test House in Calcutta but later shifted to Delhi in 1942 when threatened by a possible Japanese attack. The problems of immediate importance for the war, obviously, received special attention, and many of the investigations were undertaken at the instance of and in collaboration with the Department of Supply, Royal Air Force, USA Air Force, War Department and other defence organizations of the government. The Council also offered facilities to some industrial firms for conducting at its laboratories certain researches of special interest to the latter on the basis of agreed financial contribution by the firms concerned.54 By 1944 the CSIR had 53 researchers, of whom 38 dealt with chemistry, indicating the thrust of the Council on it. One of the first problems the Council faced after it started its work was the lack of information, especially about indigenous raw materials. The Council, therefore, recommended the compilation of a dictionary of the economic products of India.55 This was undertaken on the lines of Watt’s Dictionary of Economic Products of the 19th Century, resulting ultimately in what is now known as the Wealth of India. The Council also published from April 1942, the Journal of Scientific and Industrial Research, reporting on the research conducted under the auspices of the CSIR. Thus, by the middle of the war, India came to have an all-India organization of industrial research with four composite bodies dealing with different aspects of scientific and industrial research. They were the BSIR, Industrial Research Utilisation Committee, CSIR, and Directory of Raw Materials. Of these, the CSIR was the supreme body. Though chronologically the youngest, the Council held ‘a unique position by the comprehensiveness of its functions and scope’.56 Meanwhile, under this top organisational set-up scores of research laboratories and experimental stations under various departments of the Government 54 55 56

Ibid. S.S. Bhatnagar, ‘A Brief Account’, undated, pp. 24–25. Ibid.

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of India also existed, but their normal programme was often deflected to meet the exigencies of the war, or else they were starved of funds and other resources. Generally speaking, search for substitutes, testing and standardization, and repair and servicing formed the main area of their activities whether it was the Forest Research Institute at Dehra Dun, the Imperial Veterinary Research Institute at Izatnagar, laboratories connected with jute, cotton and lac, or the Indian Institute of Science at Bangalore.57 The stimulus the war provided to industrial and scientific research had some productive repercussions in the major provinces and native states. It may be recalled that the Twelfth Industries Conference held in 1940 had recommended the establishment of local research committees in the provinces and states to form a liaison with the Board of Scientific and Industrial Research.58 In pursuance of this suggestion, the Government of India directed the provinces and states, in early 1941, to institute such committees. Before this date, the only provinces which had research organizations of this kind were Bengal (since 1940) and Bombay (since January 1941). In response to the Central move, provincial research committees were formed in the United Provinces, Bihar, Orissa, Madras, the Central Provinces and Berar, and the Punjab during 1941–1942. Among the Indian States, constitution of similar organizations in Hyderabad, Mysore, Travancore and Baroda deserve special mention.59 As the importance of industries for victory in the war became clear to the government and the needs for substitutes made industrialization unavoidable, the government was obliged to consider the question of industrial research more seriously and with a long-term perspective in mind.60 Accordingly, the CSIR decided, in December 1943, to appoint a committee to undertake a comprehensive survey of the existing facilities for scientific and industrial research in the country and report on necessary measures of coordination, control, direction and development of research by various agencies necessary for the planning of such research in the post-war India. The proposed Industrial Research Planning Committee was constituted under Sir R.K. Shanmugham Chetty Ibid., pp. 102–121. ‘Proceedings of the Twelfth Industries Conference’, in Bulletins of Indian Industries & Labour No. 71, Simla, 1941, p. 34. 59 Report Industrial Research 1945, pp. 110–112. 60 Transfer of Power, vol. IV, 324; also see Proc. of the Industries Conferences. 57 58

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as chairman in the beginning of 1944 and its report was published in February 1945. The Committee was directed to make a survey of the existing facilities for scientific and industrial research existing in India including the Indian States (in the universities, research institutions and laboratories attached to industrial and other concerns); and plan a scheme of coordinated expansion of research activities by private firms, research institutions and states and other research establishments. It was expected to suggest measures to be taken to promote, direct, control and organize such research activities; and report on such other steps as might be taken towards industrial and scientific research in post-war India.61 The Committee assembled at Bombay on 20 March 1944, and for the purpose of fact-finding it issued two sets of questionnaires—one to the various universities, research institutions and government departments interested in scientific and industrial research, and the other to industrial firms, including the recognized chambers of commerce and industrial associations. In order to have personal discussions with scientists, representatives of the universities and industrial and commercial bodies, the Committee visited, in Bombay, the Cotton Technological Laboratory, Haffkine Institute, Laboratories of the Department of Chemical Technology, Bombay University, and the Bose Research Institute in Calcutta.62 During a chance meeting in Calcutta, it also held discussions with the distinguished British scientist J.D. Bernal.63 Thus after making a detailed inquiry, the Committee presented an elaborate report with specific recommendations. It held that there was lack of effective liaison and coordination in industrial research among the parties concerned, that industries in India were generally not research-minded, and that industrial research associations were few and far between. It also felt that industrial research by itself could not foster industrial development and that for best results it would have to be backed by comprehensive industrial planning.64 It advised that if scientific and industrial research was to make any headway, the government must take initiative to set up suitable machinery for the purpose. For this, it recommended the establishment of a 61

For the list of the members of the Industrial Research Planning Committee, see Appendix IV; also Industrial Research 1945, pp. i–ii. 62 See Annexures I and II. For a list of the places visited and of persons who appeared before the Committee, see Annexure III in the Appendix. 63 Industrial Research 1945, p. ii. 64 Ibid., pp. 71–72.

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central research organization to be called the National Research Council which would prepare and carry out a five-year plan. The plan would consist of building a National Chemical and National Physical Laboratory, and certain specialised research institutes, of giving grant-in-aid to universities, and training of sufficient research personnel with scholarships in India and abroad. Besides, it placed emphasis on strengthening scientific teaching and research work in the Indian universities. It wanted the industries to set up their own research associations on a corporate basis, pending which the manufacturers could be induced to avail themselves of the opportunities created by the establishment of the various national laboratories by instituting fellowships. It recommended that a network of corresponding research organizations be set up in all the provinces and major states.65 Discussing the responsibility of the state in the matter, it noted that although the industrial system in India was based mainly on private enterprise, state initiative and effective participation of the government in research was necessary. It emphasized that certain lines of fundamental research and those of national importance be the concern of the state. The part the Government of India was expected to take in the post-war industrial development imposed on them a special obligation for undertaking financial responsibility for organising and promoting scientific and industrial research side by side with industrial planning. For this, it recommended to the Central Government to make a block grant of six crores (60 million) of rupees to the National Research Council spread over a period of five years.66 Subjects like patents, standardization and development of inventions also attracted attention of the committee. Apart from this, the committee recommended the establishment of a ‘first class technological institute’ on the lines of Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) of America. And finally, it advised to explore the possibility of bringing all the research activities of the various government departments under the administrative control of the Member of Planning and Development of the Government of India.67 The Indian reaction to the report was, however, not encouraging. Science and Culture called it ‘amorphous, more a shopping list of items than an integrated picture of the forthcoming structure of industrial 65 66 67

Ibid., pp. 72–76. Ibid., 76. Ibid., 76–79.

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research in India’. Others found its approach faulty and estimates of finances inadequate.68 Nevertheless, in historical perspective the significance of the report cannot be overlooked altogether. It was the first exclusive and detailed study and by far the most important document on industrial research in British India. Its significance cannot be judged by its concrete accomplishments but by the shifts it envisaged in the government policy, particularly on the question of state responsibility in the matter, nature of the future organization and emphasis it laid on the necessity of having effective industrial planning before efforts were made to promote industrial research. But how did the CSIR fare in research at its own establishments? The laboratories of the Director of Scientific and Industrial Research at Delhi had been placed under the control of the Council since its inception. The scientific work of the Council was carried out through the Director and 20 research committees. The BSIR had already constituted 16 research committees; CSIR added four to them.69 The function of these research committees was to keep a watch over the progress of research schemes falling within their respective fields, formulating coordinated proposals for further work in them and, in general, to assist the Council in ensuring that the grants made to them were carefully utilized so as to secure the best possible results. However, these committees could not initiate research schemes on a planned basis and they generally functioned largely as expert bodies for evaluating the merits of specific schemes referred to them. This was partly due to the exigencies of the war which hindered long-term planning.70 Whatever research was carried out at the CSIR laboratories was limited in nature and scope, and its standard was not very high. The various government workshops were confined primarily to technical adaptation, repair and manufacturing.71 Three hurdles immediately came in the way of the functioning of the CSIR and adversely affected its working: first, the nature of its organizational structure and lack of real autonomy; second, its exclusion from the major war efforts of the Empire; and third, its meagre funding. The first point will be taken up in the chapter on organization; here we

68 N. Ahmad, ‘The Report of the Industrial Research and Planning Committee,’ S&C, XI, 9, Mar. 1946, pp. 455–463. 69 Ibid. For the list of these Research Committees of the CSIR, see Appendix V. 70 Industrial Research, p. 110. 71 S&C, XI, 1, Jul. 1943, pp. 6–7.

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discuss only the second and third points. If one compares the efforts made by Canada and Australia in the field of science including industry during the Second World War with those of India, the differences are glaring. Whereas British and Canadian governments placed orders for war materials with Canadian firms to the tune of Rs. 11,000 million (£ 846 million) in 1942, orders from the imperial and colonial government in India were merely for Rs. 3000 million (£ 232 million).72 Similarly, whereas India’s steel production stagnated at the pre-war level of 1.25 million tonnes a year during the war, Australia and Canada reported an increase of 2 million tonnes annually.73 The colonial policy of discrimination against India has already been discussed, we will once again return to it later. Here one may better look into the consequences of the limited funding. Leave aside the huge budget allocation to the British DSIR, the financial resources made available to the National Council of Research of Canada or to their counterpart in Australia, were far in excess of the puny budget of the CSIR in India.74 The gap between the two is all the more striking if one looks at the vast population of India, her varied problems and her role as the Allied base in the east. In the circumstances, the CSIR could not afford to play more-than-a-modest role. Therefore, instead of going in for research of an advanced nature, it concentrated generally on products in short supply and substitutes for them.75 As a matter of fact, the British apathy on the questions of technological advance in India and her real industrialization was indisputable. This was well understood by many sections of the Indian society. The reaction of the Science and Culture in a particular case in this regard is illustrative. Commenting on the report of the Exploratory Committee on Combustion Engine, the journal pointed out how the British manufacturers of internal combustion engine had refused to allow their standard makes to be manufactured under license in India and how S&C, VIII, 3, Sep. 1942, p. 105. Ibid.; also Edward R. Walker, The Australian Economy in War and Reconstruction, London, 1947. 74 For details, see M.M. Postan, British War Production, London, 1952; and British Production, 1939–1945: a record compiled by the Times, 1945; Dept. of Reconstruction and Supply, Research and Scientific Activity: Canadian Federal Expenditure 1938–1946, Presented to Parliament, by C.D. Howe, Ottawa, 1947; ‘Science in Australia’, S&C, XI, 2, Aug. 1945, pp. 63–67. For India, refer to Statistics relating to India’s War Effort, Delhi, 1947. 75 Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (India): A Review, by Director, CSIR, Jan. 1948. 72 73

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the Secretary of State for India concurred with this move. The journal commented: The disappointment was, however, a forgone conclusion. But the whole procedure has served the useful purpose of exposing the policy of His Majesty’s Government towards any developmental programme relating to industry in India. Under this policy, the manufacturer of internal combustion engine, nay the development of any heavy industry, in India will never be a practical proposition. In this connection we may also recall Lord Beaverbrook’s reply when Mr Arthur Moor, Editor of the Statesman, pleaded with him in London to let India have machine tools and experts to build up belated war industry in the East and also to send her aircraft for training on a large scale. He said, “I’d be mad to do it.” Never was the attitude of the British Government towards industrialization in India more clearly explained than on that occasion, through a short sentence of only six words and thirteen letters.76

In spite of such an attitude, however, the government was faced with a situation in which something had to be done. As everywhere in the world so in India, the post-war reconstruction was the need of the hour to which the government showed active interest. While a number of surveys of the existing state of research and technological infrastructure in the country were carried out and the need for planning and organization in this regard were emphasized, the authorities wanted to make use of the experience and expertise available in Britain, leading to the exchange of several scientific missions between Britain and India. The visit to India by Professor A.V. Hill, Secretary, Royal Society, London, and a Nobel Laureate, during 1944–1945 was one of the most important of them. On a request from the Secretary of State for India, Hill was expected to advise on ‘the organisation of scientific and industrial research as a part of the Indian post-War reconstruction plan’, and its coordination with corresponding activities in Britain.77 Hill’s suggestions and specific recommendations will be dealt with at the appropriate place later; here it should suffice to say that his views and suggestions added great significance to scientific research in relation to the all-round development of the country; they provided a framework for the organization of such research; and assigned to the government considerable responsibilities in the whole matter.78 Besides, he wanted to bring pure and academic research closer to the actual 76 77 78

S&C, IX, 9, Mar. 1944, pp. 377–378. A.V. Hill, Scientific Research in India, London, 1944, p. 6. Ibid.

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problems of the country.79 By implication, it was calling science to its social functions and persuading the government to harness it for the national welfare. Thus, Hill’s suggestions, together with the compulsions of the war and indigenous demands, made the government have a clearer view of industrialization in the country. This helped the authorities evolve a broad plan for action by the time the World War came to an end. In April 1945, the Government of India made a Statement on Industrial Policy.80 The several expert committees appointed by the CSIR and by the Department of Planning and Development of the Government of India went into the problems of various subjects involving scientific research and development. Their reports frequently pointed out the lack of R&D (research and development) and of organizational coordination, and suggested how to remove them. They also offered broad plans with estimates for future development in their respective fields.81 A broad organizational set-up of scientific and industrial research had emerged almost by the middle of the war; the all-India research laboratories that were conceived then or in the following years were established soon after. They included the National Physical Laboratory at Delhi and the National Chemical Laboratory at Poona, followed by the Fuel Research Institute at Dhanbad and the Glass and Ceramic Institute at Calcutta.

Agriculture and Allied Sciences Being a mode of primary production, agriculture could not be separated from industrial activities. Needless to say, it was the mainstay of life for millions in India, besides being the greatest source of revenue for the government and an important source for the export trade. 79 Ibid. Also refer to Hill’s public lectures on radio: ‘Science and the Public Welfare’, 5 Dec. 1943, from Delhi; and ‘India and the Sciences’, 21 Jan. 1944, from Bombay, in A.V. Hill Papers, Churchill College, Cambridge, UK; and his ‘Memories and Reflections’ (MS), in Hill Papers at Royal Society, London, pp. 279 ff. 80 Statement of Government’s Industrial Policy, New Delhi, 1945. 81 Refer to the Govt. of India Planning & Development Dept. publications: Report of Heavy Chemicals and Electro-Chemical Industries Panels (1947), Report of the Industrial Panel on Non-Ferrous Metal Industries (n. d.), Second Report of the Iron and Steel (Major) Panel (1946), Report of the Panel on Sugar, Alcohol & Food Yeast Industries (1946), and Dept. of Industries and Supplies publications: Report of the Industrial Plant and Machinery (Heavy) Panel (n. d.), Report of the Panel on Glass Industry (n. d.), etc.

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Keeping in view the fact that it was not a high priority on the official agenda until recently, the enhanced government interest in its development, during the Second World War, merits some explanation. The war, of course, was the greatest factor behind this change in the attitude. Besides the vastly increased demand for food supply to the armed forces—British Indian and Allied—in and around India, the war requirements included a variety of other agricultural and allied products, ranging from dairy products to jute, silk, wood, lac and pack animals like horse.82 Obviously, these demands were over and above the existing usual demands for the civilian population which had risen perceptibly over the past years.83 To add to the urgency in the matter, a major famine occurred in some parts of the country in the midst of the war and compelled the government to initiate administrative measures for agricultural improvement.84 The government focussed its efforts in three directions: first, to increase the financial resources for training, research and extension; second, to direct the educational and research activities towards specific war needs; and third, to improve the organization and planning for agricultural education, research and extension. When the war broke out, the financial position of the Imperial Council of Agricultural Research, the apex body dealing with agricultural sciences, was quite insecure and it was not able to plan and execute long-term research programmes. In order to remedy this, the Government of India passed an Agricultural Produce Cess Act in 1940 and the annual income of Rs. 14,00,000 (1.4 million) from this cess was proposed to be spent on agricultural research schemes.85 In response to the pressing demands during the crisis, scientific activities in the field of agriculture were directed primarily towards finding substitutes for the various materials whose import had been disrupted, demands increased or created on account of the war. Studies and experiments were encouraged to exploit agricultural products and by-products like bagasse and molasses, for producing alcohol, paper pulp and insulating materials, industrially.86 Research was also carried Aggarwal, History of Supply, 1947, esp. Chaps. LIX, LX, LXII, LXV. S. Subramanian, Statistical Summary of the Social & Economic Trends in India (In the Inter-War Period), Delhi, 1945, esp. pp. 1–3. 84 The Famine Inquiry Commission: Final Report, Delhi, 1945; and B.M. Bhatia, Famines in India, 1963; Bombay, 1967, pp. 309–339. 85 S&C, V. 10, Apr. 1941, p. 574. 86 Ibid. 82 83

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out on several plants to find substitutes for rubber and fibre.87 But a greater attention was paid to forest products. The war created an enormous demand for Indian wood. It was required for a variety of purposes but especially for the extension of the railways both in India and at different theatres of the war abroad, where a huge supply was made throughout the conflict.88 Efforts were, therefore, made to maintain the availability of wood and to add strength and longevity to it through improved seasoning and other processes. Experiments were also conducted to use wood as a substitute for metal.89 Wood, along with other plants and a variety of forest products, was subjected to investigation and research to obtain chemicals or their substitutes to be used for the production of such materials as waterproof paints and varnishes and fire extinguishing substances. These experiments were carried out at different institutes of the Imperial Council of Agricultural Research, especially at the Imperial Agricultural Research Institute at Delhi and the Forest Research Institute at Dehra Dun.90 Besides its use as paint and varnish, lac was used as insulator and so it found many applications in the field of electronics and communications which played a vital role in the global war. The Lac Research Institute at Namkum near Ranchi in Bihar, therefore, became an extremely active centre of research. It worked in close collaboration with the London Shellac Research Bureau and the Brooklyn Institute of Technology, USA.91 Similarly, as the demand for silk increased high on account of its use in the manufacture of parachutes, sericulture engaged considerable attention during this period.92 Besides using agro-forest resources for the war, attempts were also made to utilize ammonium nitrate and its mixtures with TNT from surplus ammunition stores as a fertilizer.93 However, the intentions behind the increased state interest in meteorology and locust control may not be read in isolation from the aviation requirements during air opera-

87

Report of the Director in the Abridged Scientific Reports of the Imperial Agricultural Research Institute for the Triennium ending 30th June 1944, Delhi, 1946, pp. 14–15; and Ibid., for 1945, pp. 14 ff. 88 India’s Forest and the War, Delhi, 1948; and 100 Years of Indian Forestry 1861–1961, vol. I, 1961, p. 83. 89 Ibid.; Annual Report of the FRI for the relevant years. 90 Ibid.; Scientific Reports of the IARI, 1946. 91 Report Industrial Research, 1945, p. 104. 92 Aggarwal, History of Supply, 1947, pp. 246–248. 93 Scientific Reports of the IAR, 1944, p. 16.

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tions.94 Likewise, the rise of subjects like statistics and agronomy around this time was largely due to the official concern for exploiting agricultural resources commensurate with the demands of the war.95 Here it may not be out of place to mention that throughout the war, Indian forests were exploited on an unprecedented scale leading to their fast depletion and that of the life and ecology dependent on them. The war marked a watershed in the history of ecology and conservation in India, but the government does not appear to have taken up any significant remedial measures in this regard, except afforestation in some parts of the country.96 The damages caused by the war to the ecology and environment of the country, especially in the north-east and other forest tracts, are yet to be examined properly. Meanwhile, government concern for stepping up farm production continued and was in fact heightened as the war escalated and a famine struck the country in 1943. The need to provide adequate supply of food to the armed forces was an urgent necessity. As the situation worsened when the famine started showing its effects, public demand for effective remedial measures rose high.97 The initial official response was concerned mainly with the growing military demands and the disruption in trade and supply. A beginning towards stepping up food production had been made when the government launched the ‘Grow More Food’ campaign in 1942 and ‘Food Conferences’ became a frequent affair from that year onwards.98 While the food conferences endeavoured to study and monitor the food situation and planned for improvement in the future, the ‘Grow More Food’ campaign aimed at stepping up actual production in the field. The campaign resulted in an increase in acreage of cultivated area as well as in the production of food grains, but it did not imply any direct attempt to promote agricultural science or agricultural innovation. Its objective was to increase the production of food crops only and, as far as possible, with the help of existing resources. The result was that in many cases there was not Hundred Years of Weather Service, 1875–1975, Poona, 1976.; Scientific Reports of the IARI for 1944, p. 11; the same for 1945, p. 12. 95 Annual Report IVRI, 1940–1941, p. 5. 96 Hundred Years of Indian Forestry 1861–1961, vol. I, P. 83; and S&C, VIII, 9, Mar. 1943, pp. 366–370. 97 S&C: B.C. Guha, ‘The Crisis in Food’, VIII, 10, Apr. 1943, pp. 51–55; IX, 2, Aug. 1943; IX, 12, Jun. 1944, pp. 509–512; and D.V. Bal, ‘Some Aspects of the Present and Post-War Food Production in India’, Procs. Indian Science Congress, Jan. 1944. 98 Report of the Foodgrains Policy Committee 1943, Delhi, 1944, p. 20; Procs. of the First Food Conference (Dec. 1942), Calcutta, 1944, and subsequent proceedings. 94

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only no increase in the output (despite the increase in acreage) but the yield actually came down in many others. In cases where the production went up, the increase could be attributed to favourable weather conditions or to the expanded acreage resulting from the widespread propaganda. The campaign did not address such basic issues as the improvement of the production capacity of soil or of offering incentives to the tiller.99 Later, at a certain stage, the government toyed with the idea of technological innovation and more relevant research in agriculture but nothing significant appears to have come out of it.100 From the viewpoint of scientific advancement, the official attention and encouragement to animal husbandry and veterinary sciences was impressive. Besides their routine work (which was, of course, disrupted during the war), the institute dealing with animal husbandry at Bangalore and the Imperial Veterinary Research Institute (IVRI) at Mukteswar and Izatnagar in Uttar Pradesh carried out wide-ranging activities involving R&D to cater to the war needs. This included the study of diseases, development and production of vaccines, acclimatization and high-breeding.101 In spite of the strain caused by the war on financial and human resources, the work of the IVRI continued to be diversified. This, as also the future needs, created the necessity of additional staff. Realising its importance, the Central Government showed keen interest in the matter and a plan for post-war reconstruction was considered necessary.102 Gradually, a shift occurred in the nature and scope of the work of the IVRI. The fact that the government evinced interest in veterinary sciences is evident also from the volume of financial allocation for it. Despite its limited scope of work, the IVRI annually received a larger financial grant (Rs.10.75 lakhs in 1944) than the Imperial Agricultural Research Institute (Rs. 8.5 lakhs) for the same period103 which had a far wider scope of work and activities. This may be attributed to the overriding government concern for military demands for animal food (milk, butter, meat, eggs, etc.), animals for transportation (horses and camels) and wool and leather. In order to boost dairy production, the government established an Imperial Dairy 99 100

1944. 101 102 103

P.N. Singh Roy, The Planning of Agriculture, Calcutta, 1944, pp. 35–36. W. Burns, Technological Possibilities of Agricultural Development in India: A Note, Lahore, Annual Report IVRI, 1941–1942, p. 1. Ibid., 1942–1946, p. 1. A.V. Hill, Scientific Research in India, 1944; Simla, 1945, p. 23.

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Research Institute in 1941.104 As the demand for milk for the armed forces increased tremendously, milk supply to big towns became a problem. To meet with the situation, the government decided to entrust the distribution of milk in metropolitan cities, like Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, Delhi, Karachi, Kanpur and Nagpur, to properly constituted milk marketing organizations. A Milk Marketing Adviser to the Government of India was appointed and the Chief Executive Officer of the British Milk Marketing Board, R.A. Pepperall, was selected for the post. He conducted a detailed survey and made elaborate recommendations. More administrative measures followed, which, in turn, invited the attention of the provincial governments to the matter.105 All this clearly implied precedence of this subject over the core sector of agriculture—farm production—and its allied aspects including rural development, about which government policy in the past had always been hesitant and evasive. However, the question of India’s agricultural improvement could not be postponed forever. As the war lingered and the food situation deteriorated, the material life of millions depending on the rural economy did not show any signs of improvement. The colonial government, now in a more compromising and yielding mood, was, therefore, compelled to pay more attention to the situation.106 Apart from the local demands and immediate needs, India’s economic stability and material wellbeing was vital also for Britain’s own position in the post-war world, whether India continued as a part of the Empire or parted with it. So, like many other areas, the government started looking at the question of agricultural improvement in the broader perspective of the post-war reconstruction. As a first step, the Technical Education Committee also discussed the question of agricultural education and wanted it to be regarded as an essential branch of technical education and to be closely linked up with the other branches. It further advised that education up to high school level in rural areas should have an agricultural bias. However, keeping in view ‘the great importance of agricultural education’ for India, the committee did not like to go further in the matter, instead it advised to appoint a special committee of experts to consider the

104 105 106

Progress of Education 1937–1947, vol. I, p. 187. Singh, Second World War as Catalyst, 1998, pp. 136–138. Bhatia, Famines in India, 1967, esp. pp. 321–324, 324–339.

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subject thoroughly.107 Accordingly, in January 1945, the Central Advisory Board of Education appointed a separate committee to look into the matter. This committee endorsed the views of the Technical Education Committee and held that agricultural education incorporating education in animal husbandry and dairying, ‘should be regarded as an essential branch of Technical Education and should be closely linked up with other branches’. The Committee found the existing facilities for it ‘wholly inadequate to meet the probable requirements of the country in the near future.’ Therefore, it considered it necessary to bring into existence as early as possible a comprehensive and planned system of agricultural education for which it provided a broad framework in the report.108 The report was, however, not free from flaws; and, like many other reports in the past, it evaded certain basic issues connected with the progress of agricultural education in the country. For example, it contradicted, at least partly, its own recommendations by suggesting a dual administrative control over the institutions of agricultural education and research. Similarly, its advice to deal with agricultural education separately (from technical education) for some time conflicted with the idea of integration of this branch of education with the rest of the system.109 Likewise, the committee did not consider such issues as the need of elementary education and economic wellbeing of the masses. That these issues were vital for any agricultural improvement in the country is clearly evident form the views expressed by L.K. Elmhirst, Special Advisor, Agriculture Department, Government of Bengal, who was one of the members of the committee. He believed that: Fundamental, of course, to the whole position in India, is the need for elementary education of the right kind and there will be no major progress in agriculture until every cultivator can read and write and understand the elements of the problems he is trying to cope with…. Behind all your questions lies a bigger one and, that is, the economic policy, welfare aim and social objective of the state. No private landlord or tenant farmer can any longer afford from his private pocket to install into rural areas that wide range of facilities and services, educational, scientific, economic and welfare which these rural areas need.

Report of the Technical Education Committee, 1946, p. 14. ‘Report of the Agricultural Education Committee of the Central Advisory Board of Education’, in Reports of the Committees appointed by the Central advisory Board of Education in India (1943–1946), Simla, 1947, pp. 63–64 ff. 109 Ibid., pp. 69, 511. 107 108

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He, therefore, wanted them to be provided solely by the state or in financial collaboration with the farmer and the landlord.110 By now even the government was gradually becoming aware of its responsibilities in the matter. It sought the help of experts in Britain to advise on how to promote agricultural research and production. Sir Feroz Khareghat of the Department of Education, Health and Lands, wrote to the Royal Society of London in October 1944, which in turn contacted British experts for the purpose. Some direct personal contacts were also made on behalf of the Department.111 But it is not clear whether this initiative led to any concrete results. Meanwhile, the Department of Planning and Development and the Reconstruction Committee of the Council, too, took up the question of agricultural improvement; and a comprehensive note on the technological possibilities of agricultural development in India was prepared by W. Burns, Officer on Special Duty in the Department of Education, Health and Lands.112 This document formed the basis of an all-India policy on post-war agriculture and supplied material for discussion by the Reconstruction Committee.113 Several other plans and proposals in the form of official notes and memoranda or as recommendations of the various expert committees and conferences served as the basis for official policy on agricultural planning and development.114 Towards the end of the war, Herbert Howard, Inspector General of Forests, Government of India, made out a note on a Post-War Forest Policy for India mainly in order to regenerate and rehabilitate the over-worked forests and improve their management. This resulted in a number of development schemes involving plantation activity, better research and service facilities.115 Reference in this regard may also be made to other official memoranda on subjects like agricological development, forestry and fisheries.116 The views and suggestions contained in these papers placed emphasis on research and training and expected Ibid., pp. 72–73. Royal Society [Hill?] to Khareghat, 7 Nov. 1944; and F.L. Engledow (Prof. of Agriculture at Cambridge) to A.V. Hill, 11 Dec. 1944, in MDA A6. 112 W. Burns, Technological Possibilities of Agricultural Development in India: A Note, Lahore, 1944. 113 S&C, X, 8, Feb. 1945, pp. 323 ff. 114 For example, Memorandum on the Development of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry in India, prepared by the Advisory Board of the ICAR, Delhi, 1944. 115 Herbert Howard, Post-War Forest Policy for India, Delhi, 1944; 100 Years of Indian Forestry, 1961, p. 83. 116 Memorandum on Agricological Development in India, Advisory Board of the ICAR, 110 111

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the government to follow an active policy—open, wide and forwardlooking in perspective, and responsive to the local needs. While the authorities carried on their exercise to draw plans for the future, which they were not all sure to execute, the British scientific opinion came out with a clearer vision and support for agricultural improvement in India. Hill, for instance, declared agriculture ‘by far the most important industry and interest in India’, and pleaded for its ‘great expansion’ to supply adequate food and better nutrition for India’s vast population that was likely to increase considerably in the years to come and to provide for expansion of crops required for industry and export.117 In retrospect, one is, however, compelled to note that in spite of the various plans and proposals, the state initiative in promoting agricultural research and innovation remained limited (with the exception of veterinary sciences and animal husbandry) in comparison to its record in the field of industrial research. Since basic problems affecting agricultural improvement like fragmentation of land, mass illiteracy and rural health had not been addressed, there was little possibility of any progress either in the science or the art of agriculture.118 The colonial interest in modern industry and indifference to the traditional cottage industries further contributed towards keeping agricultural improvement at a low priority. Some of the small-scale industries progressed during the war but due more to military demands than state encouragement. All others catering to the basic needs of the people were not only neglected but also faced an unprecedented challenge from the new technology the war brought in.119 State encouragement to small-scale industries, most of which were closely connected with agriculture, could have easily made the case of agricultural research and improvement an issue of interest for both the government and the people of India. But it

Delhi, 1944; Post-War Development of Indian Fisheries and Memorandum, by Baini Prasad, Delhi, 1944. 117 A.V. Hill, Scientific Research in India, 1944, pp. 23–25, 37–38; his Radio Broadcasts: ‘The National Purpose: Science and Technology in the Development of India’, 7 Mar. 1944, Delhi; and ‘Science and India,’ 30 Oct. 1944, 2170 (MSS), pp. 10 ff., A.V. Hill Papers. 118 NPC Series: Crops-Planning and Production, edited by K.T. Shah, Bombay, 1948, pp. 87–111; idem, Land Policy and Agriculture, Bombay, 1948. Also see S&C, VI, 10, Apr. 1943, pp. 403–406. 119 Gyanchand, ‘Introduction’, pp. 7–33; and V.K.R.V. Rao, ‘Small Scale and Cottage Industries’, pp. 65–88, in P.C. Jain, Industrial Problems of India, Allahabad, 1942; and P.C. Jain, India Builds Her War Economy, Allahabad, 1943, pp. 84–102.

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could not be so. Whatever was done in the name of research was often deflected to directions not of much use for the country.

Medical Science and Public Health Medical science and health care were another area that engaged the attention of the government during this period. The subject was a favoured one right from the beginning as far as state interest in it was concerned. It was one of the most organized sectors with a highly developed service cadre, a professional association and scores of research centres scattered all over the country. Yet, medical education continued to remain in a poor state and the research centres seldom went beyond collecting data to be utilized in Britain, training of technical personnel and production of vaccines.120 The hollowness of the official claims regarding its progress in India became obvious as soon as the war broke out. At the time of the war, medical education and research was still in a poor state—not as much in terms of organizational infrastructure as on account of their nature and scope. This is, however, not to suggest that their provision was adequate in any way. The condition of public health was precarious and that of health care facilities worse. The average life expectancy of an Indian was 32.5 years, only half of that in most of the developed countries.121 In 1937, the death rate in British India was 22.4 per 1,000 and for infants or children under one year of age it was 172 per 1,000 live births. In 1941, the corresponding rates were 21.8 and 158 per 1000 respectively. Comparative statistics showed the general death rate in countries like New Zealand or Australia as low as 9.7 whereas infant mortality in these countries was 31 per 1,000 as against 21.8 and 158 respectively in India.122 As regards the health care facilities, while there was one registered doctor to every 1,048 of population in Britain, this ratio was one to every 9,300 persons in India. On the scale of Western counties, India required 200 thousand qualified doctors to take care of her village popAnil Kumar, Medicine and the Raj, New Delhi, 1998; Radhika Ramasubban, Public Health and Medical Research in India: Their Origin under the Impact of British Colonial Policy, Stockholm, 1982. 121 S&C, V, 4, Oct. 1939, p. 199. 122 NPC Series: National Health, Bombay, 1948, p. 23; and Report of the Health Survey and Development Committee, vol. I, Delhi, 1946, pp. 7–8. 120

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ulation, but after 75 years of effort there were only 35 thousand doctors of whom only 15 thousand resided in the villages.123 The expenditure on public health in England and Wales was 1-0-9 d per capita per annum; in India, the different provinces spent only form 1/12th to 1/120th of the average of England.124 And from the point of view of public health planning, India stood where Great Britain stood 100 years ago and USA and USSR 75 and 20 years ago respectively. What was alarming was that whereas the vital statistics of health were fast improving in the developed countries, it was going downward in India. She had failed to make adequate use of scientific knowledge for improving her public health. There was not an all-India health policy and the basic principles of sound public health were violated. Medical education was backward and supply of technical personnel defective, not to mention the ever-present financial handicaps. Moreover, there was lack of institutional planning and coordination amongst the departments concerned. Obviously, everything was to be done in a great measure, even if it was to be the bare minimum of facilities, to restore the health of the millions in India, for which there was a persistent local demand.125 But as the World War erupted in the meanwhile, the government had little time to address the problem; instead, it hurried to deal only with those health problems which were crucial for the successful prosecution of the war. To meet the immediate emergency, the personnel working in the medical services and research organizations were called for war duties, jeopardising the routine functioning of their organizations.126 But this was not all. With the increase in their demand, the government resorted to more emergency measures. Short-term courses with lower eligibility qualifications were introduced and provision was made for medical training abroad.127 As India became an important base for Allied action after the Japanese invasion, a large number of Allied troops (British, American and Chinese) were brought into India and responsibility of their health care was laid upon the local government. S&C, IV, 8, Feb. 1939, p. 467; Ibid., V, 4, Oct. 1939, p. 199. Also see the statistical chart in the Health Survey, 1946, p. 13. 124 S&C, V, 4, Oct. 1939, p. 199. 125 A.C. Ukil, ‘Public Health and its Planning in India’, S&C, VI, 9, Mar. 1941, p. 531, 536–539. Also see S&C: IV, 5, Nov. 1938, pp. 285–287; IV, 7, Jan., pp. 408–410, IV, 8, Feb., pp. 466–468, 1939; VI, 9, Mar. 1941, pp. 535–568. 126 Report Health Survey, vol. I, 1946, pp. 179, 201–202. 127 Progress of Education in India 1937–1947, vol. I, pp. 176–181. 123

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Apart from the routine treatment in case of their illness and injury, prevention of tropical diseases and their acclimatisation in India were vital problems to be tackled with.128 This obliged the Government of India to spare the existing medical facilities for the treatment of the armed forces and for the training of medical and paramedical personnel for specific war purposes. The government was also called upon to begin or step up production of specialised drugs and vaccines at various research centres in the country. From this point of view, the activities of the Central Research Institute at Kasauli and that of the IVRI at Izatnagar deserve special mention.129 Testing of certain drugs on troops was also performed at cantonments like one at Hazaribagh in Bihar.130 All this kept engaged a large section of the health machinery and consumed vast resources, depriving millions of poor Indians of even the minimal health care. The need for making the best use of existing resources available in the country made it necessary for the government to maintain and augment the availability of various medical supplies like drugs and medical equipment which were vital for the operations of the war and civil demands alike. Short supply of drugs and other medical provisions became a growing phenomenon soon after the war erupted. This was further aggravated when some sources of supply were lost. The loss of Java in 1941, for example, deprived India of a major source of supply of quinine.131 Supplies were affected also on account of shortages of several chemicals like alcohol, which were used in abundance for nonmedical purposes in the war. Hoarding by traders, too, was responsible for the scarcity.132 To meet the situation the government initiated various measures. The question of drug control had been taken up as early as 1930 when the government constituted an inquiry under R.N. Chopra to advise in the matter.133 The war conditions compelled the government to act on 128 Report Health Survey, 1946, vol. I, pp. 93–94; J.H. Stone, ‘The United States Army Medical Service in Combat in India and Burma, 1942 to 1945’, Ph.D. Thesis, Yale University, 1947, seen at Wellcome Institute Library, London. 129 Report Health Survey, 1946, vol. I, pp. 93–94, 201–202. Also see the Annual Reports of the CRI, IVRI, and of All India Institute of Hygiene and Public Health, 1940–1944, p. 5. 130 Stone, ‘United States Army Medical Service’, 1947. 131 S&C: VII, 11, May 1942, p. 562; VIII, 2, Aug. 1942, pp. 83–84. 132 H. Ghose, ‘Supply of Drugs and Medicines for the Civil Population’, S&C, VIII, 10, Apr. 1943, pp. 417–419; S&C, X, 7, Jan. 1945, pp. 265–271. 133 India Drug Enquiry Committee: Report, 1930–1931, Calcutta, n. d.

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its recommendations. Accordingly, in 1940 the Drug Act was passed by the Central Legislature, which provided for the control of drugs imported into India as well as their manufacture, sale and distribution in the country. For this, it advised the Central Government to constitute at the earliest a Drugs Technical Advisory Board and a Central Drugs Laboratory. The Drugs Technical Advisory Board, appointed soon after, was entrusted with the responsibility of advising the Central and Provincial governments on technical matters connected with the Drugs Act. Later, it helped compile elaborate Drugs Rules which were made public, in April 1944, for discussion and debate before they were finally published and brought into effect.134 However, the proposed Central Drugs Laboratory did not come into being and the Biochemical Standardisation Laboratory (est. 1937) was used as a substitute by the military authorities and the Supply Department for testing drugs throughout the war.135 To keep the supply position easy, the government also made provisions for punishing the hoarders of drugs. But in the face of dwindling supply, it became essential to search for substitutes, in respect of suppliers, drugs as well as sources for raw materials. Government institutions and research laboratories had already been pressed into service to produce more and more of scarce drugs and equipment; now local firms were encouraged to work in this direction. In addition, plans were conceived and sometimes acted upon to indigenously produce some of the important raw materials like cinchona and pyrethrum, and production of others like opium and ipecacuanha was stepped up.136 The government interest in drugs encouraged to an extent the study of pharmacology.137 Smallpox, malaria and tuberculosis were endemic and a national scourge.138 It was difficult to save the fighting troops and other Britishers from these deadly diseases. The government was particularly alarmed at this point of time by the increase in their incidence and their adverse consequences for the military operations on the eastern front along Assam and Burma, whose humid climate and jungles bred several tropIbid., vol. I, p. 50. For Indian reaction, see S&C: V, 10, Apr. 1940, pp. 575–577; VI, 3, Sep. 1940, pp. 123–125. 135 Report Health Survey, vol. I, 1946, p. 51. 136 Ibid., pp. 51–52. 137 S&C, VII, 10, Mar. 1942, pp. 447–452. 138 Health Survey, vol. I, 1946, pp. 10–11, 90–128. Also see S&C: S.N. Sen, ‘War and Tuberculosis’, VIII, 12, Jun. 1943, 491–494; G. Ghose, ‘Malaria in Bengal—A Scientific Problem’, IX, 11, May 1944, pp. 495–499. 134

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ical diseases.139 The incidence of these diseases in the civilian population increased because of shortages of drugs, lack of proper medical help, poor food supply, malnutrition and insanitation.140 The scarcity of drugs and non-availability of adequate medical assistance was, obviously, caused by disruption in imports and internal distribution, and increased consumption of medical resources by the armed forces during the war. For poor food supply nothing could be held more responsible than the official neglect in the matter. Of course, there was a terrible famine right in the middle of the war but it could have been averted or its effects minimised, had there been a sincere and timely action by the government.141 Whatever the causes or effects of these factors, the prevailing conditions exposed the extreme backwardness of the country in matters of health care and sanitation, her dependence on others for medical supplies and, above all, the appalling official indifference and narrow priorities in the matter.142 Ironically, however, both the diseases and the World War came as great equalizers. Under the stress of the conflict, the government had no option but to act. The onslaught of epidemics could not be postponed or countered by indifference or a piecemeal approach, especially when there was the extreme urgency of winning the war in which an ill and incapacitated soldier was, indeed, a dangerous proposition. The persistent and increasingly loud demands by Indians, scientists in particular, for better health care, nutrition and sanitation also forced the authorities to take action.143 Therefore, the government thought of tackling the problem with some seriousness. Several expert committees were constituted to study and advise on how to eradicate diseases like malaria and tuberculosis, and steps at different levels—training, research and treatment—were taken to deal with them.144 Help from non-governmental agencies was also officially encouraged for this purpose. The Imperial Leprosy MisS&C: VIII, 3, Sep. 1942, pp. 132–133; VIII, 7, Jan. 1943, pp. 491–494. Famine Commission Report, 1945, esp. Part-II; also see Health Survey, 1946. 141 Famine Commission Report, 1945, esp. pp. 26–34, 59–69; S&C, IX, 2, 1943, pp. 51– 55; and M. Afzal Hussain, ‘The Food Problem of India’, Presidential Addss., ISC, Bangalore, 1946. 142 S&C: VIII, 2, Aug. 1942, pp. 83–84; VIII, 3, Sep. 1942, pp. 134–137; H. Ghose, 1943; X, 7, Jan. 1945. 143 Ibid. Also see S&C: V, 4, Oct. 1939, pp. 199–202; VI, 3, Sep. 1940, pp. 123–125; and A.C. Ukil, ‘Some Aspects of Public Health in India’, Presidential Addss., ISC, Jan. 1941. 144 Report of the Committee Convened to Consider the Measures to …Prevent …Spread of Malaria during the Construction of Roads and Railways, Simla, 1947; and Report of the Tuberculosis Survey 139 140

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sion, Dufferin Fund, and Rockefeller Foundation contributed in their own ways to alleviate the population from suffering and disease in the Indian sub-continent.145 But these endeavours were not enough to solve the vast problems related with health in India. While the continuation of the war demanded urgent steps to improve the situation, the food supply deteriorated further on account of the famine, and civilian health worsened as a result of malnutrition and increased incidence of certain diseases. Thus, by now the official neglect in the matter and lack of planning and preparedness were in full glare.146 The Famine Commission accepted the extremely bad condition of the health of the people and the poor performance of the government in this regard.147 All this produced considerable effect on the minds of both the Indians as well as the British. Indians stepped up and widened their demands for better health care, nutrition and sanitation, compelling the authorities finally to come to terms with the local needs and plan for the future on a long-term basis.148 This change in the official attitude in India was encouraged also by the developments in Britain and other developed countries of the West. In May 1943, the UN Conference on Food and Agriculture endorsed the principle that governments were responsible for introducing general and specific measures for improving the diet of the people. The conference broadly outlined the method of approach to food policy designed to improve the nutritional standards. It suggested that the state of the nutrition of the population be investigated by medical and public health workers and that crop planning, production of new varieties of seed and other such matters be decided on nutritional advice. Emphasis on nutrition became the hallmark of the new health policy. This resulted in a greater emphasis on nutrition in medical studies.149 The new concern for the people’s health and well-being soon found considerations at the League of Nations and its organs like the International Labour Organisation (ILO). These bodSub-Committee, IFRA, n. p., 1940; and Health Survey, 1946; IRFA & ICMR 1911–1961, Chap. III. 145 Health Survey, 1946, esp. Chap. Ixff. 146 S&C: V, 4, Oct. 1939, pp. 199–202; Ukil, ‘Public Health and Planning in India’, 1941, pp. 535–541. 147 S&C: V, 4, Oct. 1939, pp. 199–202; Ukil, ‘Public Health and Planning in India’, 1941, pp. 535–541; also see Famine Commission Report, 1945. 148 Transfer of Power, vol. IV, Entry 36, pp. 66–73. 149 Procs. Edu., Health & Lands, Govt. of India: ‘United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture Recommendations concerning Education’, FN. 100–1/43 E; also see Health Survey, vol. III, 1946, pp. 70–71.

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ies imposed on the Government of India a more formal obligation to maintain its subjects at a minimum level of health and sanitation which was occasionally monitored through inquires and international deliberations under the auspices of these world bodies.150 These factors apart, the sheer demands of the war prompted several measures with welcome consequences. As in other fields, the first official initiative came in the form of reorganization and revamping of the medical services of the armed forces. During the war, utter inadequacy of medical cover for the expanding Indian army was strongly felt; steps were, therefore, taken on emergency basis to train medical personnel to meet the requirements. Seven medical schools were expanded and upgraded to the level of colleges and two new ones were started to produce medical graduates. Licentiates of the IMD were put through special intensive courses which brought them to a standard level in six months. Women with a reasonable knowledge of English were given three-month basic training in nursing at specially selected hospitals, who were subsequently absorbed into other hospitals to work under qualified nurses.151 Similar steps were taken to produce radiographers, laboratory assistants, dispensers, male nursing orderlies and the like. Thus, by the end of the war India had a fairly good number of specialists who had been trained by physicians and surgeons from the UK, besides medical technicians in various categories. When discharged from military duty, many of these were employed as instructors to impart training in their areas of specialities. In the Indian military medical services, between 1940 and 1945, the number of personnel of different categories increased from 9270 to 1, 69,325. To treat about 5 million sick and wounded, hospital beds were increased from 11,100 to 1, 97,530.152 The facilities for laboratory investigation and diagnosis of diseases were also improved. Clinical pathological services were made more up-to-date and provided with specialists and skilled technicians. The establishment of the Central Military Pathological Laboratory was an important step in this direction. In an effort to cater to the needs of the war, some of the military hospitals became amongst the best hospitals 150

Ibid. Also see Annual Report of the Public Health Commissioner with the Government of India, for 1940, pp. 109–110; for 1943–1944, pp. 38–39; for 1945, p. 84; for 1946, pp. 116– 117. 151 S.B. Singh, Second World War as Catalyst for Social Changes in India, Delhi, 1998, Chap. 8. 152 Seminar, Sep. 1994, p. 30; also Report Health Survey, Chap. 13.

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in the country and set standards for others.153 Casualties and physical injuries to soldiers during fighting operations brought into focus the importance of blood transfusion as one of the most valuable procedures of treatment for saving lives. So, an Army Blood Transfusion Service (India) was set up. The blood depots at Dehradun and Poona were equipped with modern facilities for the preparation of blood products and for the assembly and sterilization of specialized apparatus used for collection and transfusion of blood.154 Another contribution of the war to medical science in India was the introduction of new medical specialities and the improvement and expansion of older ones. Not unexpectedly, the beginning in this regard was made in the army medical services. While physicians and surgeons were already available, more exclusive specialities were developed in branches such as anaesthesia, radiology, pathology, ophthalmology, neurology and oncology. Two specialities that deserve to be especially mentioned were physiotherapy and rehabilitation, and psychiatry.155 While the former was crucial in treating injuries to the limbs and bones of the fighting forces, the latter helped them keep in good mental health and morale. Once the war was over, these specialities were beneficially used to treat the civilian population.156 Similarly, special emphasis was placed on subjects like nutrition, for which concrete steps were taken. Efforts were made to boost the supply of milk, fruits and vegetables.157 Thus, by the middle of 1943 the authorities were in a mood to take up the question of health and sanitation earnestly. A thorough examination of the problem and a long-term planning were considered imperative. For this, the Government of India appointed, a high-power committee, formally called Health Survey and Development Committee, under Dr Joseph Bhore, in October 1943. It was to make a broad survey of the existing conditions of health and health organisations in British India and offer recommendations for future development in the light of the post-war reconstruction. Although the report of the committee was not submitted before December 1945 and not published until 1946, its findings and recommendations deserve a close scrutiny

153 154 155 156 157

Indian Information, 1 Aug. 1944, p. 93. Singh, Second World War, 1998, pp. 133–134. Ibid., pp. 133–135. Indian Information, 1 Aug. 1944, p. 93; and 15 Jan. 1944, p. 95. Singh, Second World War, pp. 136–137.

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as they present a picture of the state of affairs before and during the war, and they throw light on the changing outlook of the Raj in the matter.158 Apart from gathering information and suggestions in various ways, the committee worked through five Advisory committees dealing with (1) public health, (2) medical relief, (3) professional education, (4) medical research, and (5) industrial health.159 Additionally, it invited for consultation six distinguished medical workers from the UK, USA and Australia, who were later joined by a representative of the Soviet government. It also consulted Professor A.V. Hill in respect of medical education and research.160 After studying the various aspects of public health, including the historical evolution of its administration, the committee confirmed that the state of health and health care facilities in the country was dismal, and medical science was at a very low level of development. In view of the changing situation in India and the world over, the committee directed its attention to several aspects of the problem which had remained neglected until then. It took up, for example, the questions of nutrition, health of mothers and children, health of the industrial worker and problems of environmental hygiene.161 Moreover, it underlined the necessity of maintaining vital statistics on the subject and of devising adequate machinery for the purpose.162 Lastly, it recognised the necessity of promoting medical education and research to meet the health requirements of the country. In this connection, it recommended the establishment of an All India Medical Institute at a central place to make available, at one place, all the educational facilities of the highest order to promote the highest level of research in all branches of medical science. The institute would also train health personnel and inspire them with the highest ideals of the profession.163 The committee presented a comprehensive plan which was divided into two parts: a short-term plan of ten years to deal with the immediate problems and requirements of health in the country, and the other of a long period of 40 years, designed to develop an elaborate public health service based on modern concepts, knowledge and skill. In 158 For the list of the members of the Health Survey and Development Committee, see Appendix VII. 159 Health Survey, 1946, p. 3 and Appendix 57. 160 Ibid., p. 5. 161 Chaps. I–II, V, VI, VIII, X. 162 Ch. XII. 163 Ibid., Chap. XIII.

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both cases, the committee made significant recommendations, grappling with the basic problems of health and allied matters like the general standard of living, illiteracy, poverty, unemployment, population, etc. In this connection, it called upon the government to play an active role. It made elaborate recommendations regarding financial requirements, policy matters and the administrative set-up required for the implementation of the plan. In doing so, the committee suggested a basic change in the colonial policy in favour of the people and problems of India. This was a most welcome change in the British attitude which would have been unthinkable a decade earlier. Indeed, it was closer to the national aspirations; small wonder then that it provided a basis and model for future developments in the field of public health and medical science in free India. Meanwhile, A.V. Hill’s visit to India and his advice to the government also influenced the official attitude. Being a physiologist, he accorded special attention to medical science and public health. He found the standard of education and research ‘unduly low’ in medical colleges, which suffered grossly from the lack or inadequacy of resources—human and material. He pleaded for organized research of a high standard at the all-India level devoted specifically to solving local problems. For this, he called for the establishment of an All-India Medical Research Centre equipped with qualified and motivated staff and advanced equipment. Moreover, he wanted to bring the existing research institutions into closer contact with medical colleges and institutes of higher medical education.164 In addition to his report, Hill delivered several public speeches particularly on the Radio, spoke from various platforms, wrote and persuaded people who mattered to generate support in favour of harnessing science for India’s progress, in which health and hygiene occupied an important place.165 Unlike most of the British who deliberated again and again on industrialization in the context of India’s development, Hill emphasised upon the need to develop agriculture and improve the health and hygiene in the country. He called for increasing the quantity and nutritional value of food and for controlling population. His A.V. Hill, Scientific Research in India, 1944; London, 1945, pp. 13–33. A.V. Hill Papers: ‘Five Broadcasts on Science in India’ (MS), AVHL 2/10; ‘Science in India’ (MS); ‘Health, Food and Population in India’, International Affairs, pp. 40– 52; ‘Aid of Science in Indian Development’, in Times, Sep. 1944, Churchill College, Cambridge. 164 165

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endeavours appear to have softened the attitude of the colonial authorities towards India and induced them to do something for promoting health and hygiene of her people.166 Once the government took a positive stance in the matter, it showed interest in both the preventive and curative aspects of diseases. Consequently, in the years that followed, the question of nutrition became an important consideration in the government policy towards agricultural production.167 Likewise, Hill’s proposal for establishing a central institute for medical research was put into practice when the national government of free India established the All India Institute of Medical Science in 1956 in Delhi. However, keeping in view the magnitude of the problem, these efforts were small and did not yield results of immediate consequence. Everybody was bogged down by the absence of vital statistics on the subject, but the little data that existed or what could be visualised through simple observation made it clear that the problem was colossal and the official neglect serious enough to evoke strong reaction. Yet the old considerations did not disappear soon. While the government searched for substitutes in most of other areas to face the shortages and scarcity during the war, its failure to make use of the indigenous systems of medicine and hence to promote them, often militates against its nobler intentions professed at the time. India had a long and illustrious tradition of indigenous medicine,168 and many of the British themselves were impressed not only by its achievements in the past but also by its influence on the Western medicine not until long ago.169 Moreover, the system was still popular with the majority of the masses in India, besides being socially viable and cheap.170 The main line of Ayurveda apart, some of its lesser known branches like Buddhist medicine held out significant prospects for many a medical condition. Buddhist literature on mind and health is quite detailed, sophisticated Transfer of Power, vol. IV, L 438, pp. 828–833. See Famine Commission Report, 1946; also refer to Hill’s radio broadcasts. 168 R.C. Majumdar, ‘Medicine’, in D.M. Bose et al, eds., A Concise History of Science in India, New Delhi, 1971; Charles Leslie, ed., Asian Medical System: A Comparative Study, Berkeley, 1976. 169 J.D. Comrie, Max Neuburger Papers: 6171 (MS), Wellcome Institute Library, London. Also see, J.W.D. Megaw, ‘Indigenous System of Medicine and Medical Science’, IMG, vol. 62, No. 4, 1927. 170 NPC, Report National Health, 1948, pp. 190–192; Brahmanand Gupta, ‘Indigenous Medicine in Nineteenth-and Twentieth-Century Bengal’, in Leslie, 1976; and K.N. Panikkar, ‘Indigenous Medicine and Cultural Hegemony: A Study of the Revitalization Movement in Kerala’, Studies in History, 8, 1992. 166 167

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and favourably comparing with the modern knowledge on the subject, with great potentials for the cure of psychosomatic diseases and many problems of modern life.171 The silence of the government in the matter, therefore, only proved that its interest in public health was still narrow and confined mainly to the health of the armed forces and the Europeans living in India.172 Its preference for Western system of medicine may be attributed also to the pressure by the British lobby in this all-time British dominated professional service in India. This pressure might have increased further when doctors of some other European nationalities flocked to India to join medical services and to practise there, after they fled their countries during the Axis prosecution in the 1930s and 40s.173 This is why while the government took up certain concrete administrative steps to promote technical education and industrial research, it did not do anything much worthy except some surveys and enquiries in the field of medical science and public health.

Transport and Communications Transport and communications was an area which received an uneven and selective attention in the colonial period. Ships had brought the British and their European cousins to India; later they were aided by the railways to expand and consolidate the Empire. In the process, indigenous tradition of seafaring and shipbuilding was done to death. The railways spread, no doubt, but only on selective routes to facilitate the mobilization of the fighting forces and colonial trade. In the circumstances, other means of transport were badly neglected, most of all, the roads—the principal mode of mass transportation in India. This was an area in which India had had an impressive record for centuries; and it were the roads built by Indian kings like Ashoka and Sher Shah Suri that had continued to serve as an important infrastructure for movement on land almost up to the 20th century. As regards the telecommunications, telegraph had come to India with the railways, but its use and

171 Susantha Goonatilake, Towards a Global Science: Mining Civilizational Knowledge, New Delhi, 1999, Chaps. 6 and 8. 172 Raina, World War II—Medical Services: India, 1990. 173 Anil Bhati and Johannes H. Voigt, Jewish Exile in India 1933–1945, New Delhi, 1999, esp. pp. 64–84.

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expansion were guided essentially by the colonial requirements. Wireless and radios came rather late and became a matter of public concern not before 1939. Railways: The railways had been an area of prime interest to the British in India, and with liberal official support it had developed unhindered until the First World War.174 However, once the strain of the global war fell on it, it could not hide its weaknesses.175 So, in order to get it out of the crisis, the government appointed, in 1920, the Indian Railway Committee under the chairmanship of Sir William Acworth, to advise on its administrative and financial management. The committee suggested major changes in the matter. It recommended, among other things, a complete separation of the Railway Budget from the General Budget of the country, a suggestion that was introduced from 1924.176 The government also accepted the broad principles enunciated by the committee in connection with the reorganization of the railways. Yet the railways could not escape the adverse effects of the Great Depression. The government initiated remedial steps with a probe into the finances of the railways and economy measures; in addition, it voted, in 1932, a sum of Rs.150 crores (15 million) for capital expenditure on railways for the next five years. But this could not prove of much avail.177 The Second World War made matters worse. It imposed a severe strain on the railways. In addition to the movement of troops and supplies, civilian traffic and traffic of commercial goods also rose rapidly with the increasing industrial activities in the country. There was no alternative means that could be equally efficient. The traffic which used to be carried along the coast in modern steam- or traditional sailing vessels before the war had to be diverted to the railways, not because it was faster but also because of the dangers of sea transport in times when the submarine operated ruthlessly. To add to the problem, even some of the waters close to the Indian coast were mined. Available shipping space, moreover, had to be diverted to the carriage of troops and Ian J. Kerr, Building the Railways of the Raj, 1850–1900, Delhi, 1995; John Westwood, The Railways of India, Newton Abbot, 1974. 175 Vinod Dubey, ‘Railways’, in V.B. Singh, Economic History of India, 1983, pp. 327– 347. 176 Ibid.; also see Report of the Committee appointed by the Secretary of State for India to Enquire into the Administration and Working of Indian Railways, London, n. d. 177 Refer to reports of the Inchcape Committee, 1932, and the Wedgewood Committee, 1936. 174

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munitions to and from the various theatres of the war. This considerably diminished the shipping space for other ordinary freights. Another alternative, the motor transport, was equally scarce. With the passage of the war, shortages of automobiles, their fuel and accessories increased on account of the disruption in supply as well as their enhanced use for the mechanized units of the armed forces.178 All these factors and many more brought pressure on the railways. But the acute shortage of supplies of spares and exigencies of the war led to the postponement of maintenance and expansion activities, except in the most essential cases. Once India became the base of Allied military operations in the East after 1941, the fate of the Indian railways was doomed further even though it was a period of financial prosperity for it.179 The maintenance and mobilization of the Allied forces inside the Indian subcontinent put the railways under increased stress. Its workshops which could have been used for R&D to enhance its own efficiency were assigned the task of producing various war supplies, unconnected with the railways and most of them for use at overseas warfronts.180 The growing realization on the part of the authorities that their days in India were numbered led to further neglect of the railways. Not only was there no further investment (quite heavy in case of the railways), some of the existing railway networks in the country were dismantled to maintain and expand the railways in the Middle East.181 It is difficult to expect any activity aimed at technological advance in such a scenario. The government on the other hand, however, tried to coordinate road-rail relations.182 Of course, the railways, like many other areas of national life, engaged the attention of the Department of Planning and Development as soon as it was formed, but that is not our immediate concern here. Roadways: In the circumstances, the roadways held out a better option for the Raj. Large-scale road building in British India had begun in 1830 when the Grand Trunk Road and other projects were undertaken and the Public Works Department came into being.183 However, Ibid.; also see NPC Series: Transport, 1949, pp. 227–228. Dubey, ‘Railways’, 1983, p. 343. 180 Ibid., pp. 327–343; also NPC: Transport, 1949, pp. 227–233. 181 NPC: Transport, 1949, pp. 227–233. 182 Report of the Technical Sub-Committee to the Subject Committee on Transport and Road Rail Relations, New Delhi, 1943. 183 NPC: Transport, 1949, pp. 216–219. 178 179

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in the years that followed the railways received greater official attention than the roads. Yet the importance of roads in India could not be overemphasised. The Royal Commission on Agriculture rightly drew the attention of the government to the urgency of good communications in the context of agricultural and rural improvement in the country.184 In 1927, the Government of India appointed a Road Development Committee under M.R. Jayakar to advise on the development of roads. The committee emphasised the need of developing roads for the progress of the rural society.185 On its advice, a Central Road Fund was created in 1930. This Fund was used for construction and improvement of internal roads necessary for the prosecution of the war, for which other larger sums came also from other sources. A great deal of construction and improvement of bridges, particularly in Madras and Central Provinces, and of surfaced roads were also financed from this fund. From 1930 to 1945, the mileage of surfaced roads increased from 57,000 to 70,000, an increase of 23 per cent in 15 years. In 1945 there were approximately 1,45,000 miles of earth roads in the charge of different public authorities but still in a very poor state, making up 2,15,000 miles of roads of all sorts. Not unexpectedly, there were glaring disparities between the development of roads in India and the advanced countries of the world. While 75 per cent of all traffic was carried on roads in the USA, similar to those in other developed countries, in India it was not even 10 per cent.186 The urgent needs of the Second World War demanded an improvement in this condition. As a follow-up of the recommendations of the M.R. Jayakar Committee, the Indian Road Congress (IRC) was organized in December 1934, with a view to promoting exchange of ideas and information, and standardization and research. It was a private association of engineers engaged in road construction under the central and provincial governments, states and local bodies. Road research received a new orientation through its endeavours. Meanwhile, the Second World War forced the authorities to improve roadways to facilitate the operation of motor transport for military requirements. At the eighth session of the Indian Road Congress at Gwalior in October 1943, the idea of planning the post-war road development was mooted. As the war brought into prominence the necessity of an integrated road system in the coun184 185 186

Royal Commission on Agriculture: Abridged Report, Bombay, 1928. Indian Road Development Committee: Report, 1927–1928, n. p., 1928, p. 8. Asiatic Review, Apr. 1947, p. 152.

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try, the IRC passed a resolution paving the way for the Conference of the Chief Engineers of Provinces and States. It was held at Nagpur in December 1943, to prepare a road development plan for the whole of India. The conference produced the ‘Nagpur Report’ which marked the real beginning of road planning and development on an all-India basis.187 At the Gwalior Conference, the Controller of Road Transport, Sir Kenneth Mitchell, had presented a detailed survey of Indian roads and the problems connected with them in the hope that it would serve as a basis for a balanced scheme of road development in the future. He drew attention to the poor state of the Indian roads and suggested, among other things, creation of a system of national highways.188 Influenced by his ideas and experiences of the wartime difficulties, the Nagpur Plan presented an elaborate scheme of road development throughout the country, its chief highlight being a proposal for the National Highways. Accordingly, two American experts, General Fleming and Thomas H. Macdonald, were invited to help in the matter. They toured the whole country from one end to another in all directions. Fortunately, Viceroy Wavell himself placed great emphasis on the development of communications for the success of any programme of overall development for India. Ultimately, the National Highway scheme was put into operation on 1 April 1947 with the Government of India taking full responsibility for its construction and maintenance.189 Motor Transport: In the meanwhile, motor transport had steadily increased on Indian roads, especially in and around the towns. The war added to the number of the automobiles, particularly of the heavy vehicles. There were 5,000 army vehicles before the war but the number reached 50,000 in 1942. This tenfold increase in the number of vehicles may be attributed mainly to the establishment of the South East Asia Command in India. In 1943, thousands of special chassis (in parts) were obtained from the USA and Canada under the LendLease arrangement. These were assembled by Indian workmen. Thus, by January 1945, there were 2.5 lakh (.25 million) military vehicles in use in India.190 The need for mobility which contributed to the Allied victory in the African campaign and the urgency of mechanization of 187 188 189 190

Indian Information, 1 Jan. 1945, p. 38. NPC: Transport, 1949, pp. 216–227. Ibid., pp. 116–120. Commerce, 15 Jan. 1944.

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the fighting forces brought into focus the demand for various types of motor vehicles and of trained personnel to drive and maintain them. As a result, training centres and workshops were soon established in the cantonments. So, by 1945 there were 2.5 lakh (.25 million) motor driver-cum-mechanics in the army. Such training centres were started in every province, too.191 Many business firms showed interest in automobiles and collaboration with foreign companies were made, but these endeavours remained confined only to import of vehicles, or their assembling in the country.192 Shipping and Inland Water Transport: Though India had a long tradition of shipping in the past, it had slowly declined during the British rule.193 However, with the rise of nationalism and increasing commercial activities around the First World War, indigenous business houses showed interest in it and the Scindia Shipping Company was established in 1919.194 However, such endeavours had to face the official indifference and discrimination. Meanwhile, circumstances forced the authorities to initiate measures to increase the shipping tonnage and provide for the repair of ships. Therefore, the Government of India appointed, in 1923, the Indian Mercantile Marine Committee to consider the claims of Indian shipping. But the government sat over the report for three years, and it was only in 1927 that one of its recommendations was executed by establishing the training ship Dufferin. In the meantime, the local business interests kept on raising voice against the anti-Indian official policy, but the government bluffed them skilfully. Whereas Section 115 of the Government of India Act of 1935 imposed a further restriction on the Indian shipping, it offered favourable conditions to the British. As expected, the Indian shipping could not grow in the years to come. Its tonnage on the eve of the Second World War was only about 0.23 per cent of the world tonnage. India carried only 25.6 per cent of the costal traffic and did not get any share in the overseas trade.195

Singh, Second World War, 1998, pp. 119–120. Ibid., pp. 117–120; also NPC: Transport, 1949, p. 223. 193 T.N. Kapoor, ‘Shipping, Air and Road’, 1983, pp. 348–350; Satpal Sangwan, ‘The Sinking Ships: Colonial Policy and the Decline of Indian Shipping, 1735–1835’, in MacLeod and Deepak Kumar, eds., Technology and the Raj, 1995. 194 N.C. Jog, Saga of Scindia: Struggle for the Revival of Indian Shipping and Ship-Building, Bombay, 1969. 195 Kapoor, ‘Shipping, Air and Road’, 1983, pp. 348–353. 191 192

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The Second World War did not better the conditions of Indian shipping. Soon after the war commenced, all the 28 ships of 1.4 lakh GRT, belonging to 11 Indian shipping companies, were commandeered for war purposes; while foreign ships left Indian ports for better trade prospects elsewhere with the result that India’s export trade started choking her docks. About half of Indian tonnage was destroyed or lost during the war, and by 1945 it had been reduced to a low figure of 75,000 GRT only. However, the exigencies of the war obliged the government to occasionally do something to strengthen and modernize the sea transport of the country. The American Technical Mission visited the Indian ports and offered suggestions on how to develop shipping so that it could aid the Allied war effort.196 Several other committees discussed the subject with reference to their own areas of study. Later, a Port Development Committee was set up in February 1945, which emphasized the importance of improving, expanding and modernizing the general facilities at the major ports.197 The Reconstruction Committee of the Department of Planning and Development also addressed itself to the urgent need of developing shipping in the country. However, none of these official measures appears to have contributed significantly to any technological advance in the field. The neglect of inland water transport was a clear example of the colonial indifference to the local welfare. Before the railways came to India, inland water transport was highly developed. The railways proved fatal to this cheap indigenous mode of transportation, although it remained popular in certain parts of south India. In Madras, the Godavari Canals were important highways for water transport, which provided a cheap and ready mode of access to all markets. So was the case in eastern India. Important waterways existed in East and West Bengal. The largest seaport of the country—Calcutta—depended considerably for its trade both ways upon its waterway communications. About 25 per cent of the merchandise which flowed into Calcutta from the rest of India was water-borne of which no less than 63 percent came from Assam alone. About 32 percent of the exports was carried by water and of this 72 percent went to Assam. The total water-borne traffic of Calcutta amounted to approximately 45,00,000 tons of which 34 percent was carried by inland steamers and 66 percent by country boats. In 1945, passengers carried by the steamer service in East 196 197

Grady, Report American Technical Mission to India, 1942. Ports (Technical) Committee Report, 1945, N. p. 1946.

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and West Bengal numbered 1,04,00,000.198 The NPC sub-committee on transport estimated that altogether the amount of boat traffic over government maintained channels was in the neighbourhood of 250 million ton miles per annum—barely one percent of the pre-war goods traffic by the railways. Thus, even at the end of the war, water transport formed an insignificant part of the country’s transport services.199 Air Transport and Aviation: Compared to shipping and water transport, aviation received a better deal. The first flying club in the country had begun operations in 1928 and by 1933 there were seven of them. These clubs performed the dual function of promoting amateur flying as well as training professional pilots and ground engineers. After the outbreak of the war, for two years all flying clubs were used for giving elementary flying training to the candidates for the Air Force. In this way 516 persons were trained, of whom 364 were accepted for commission. As the war progressed, all civil flying was suspended and the resources of the clubs were used for defence, such as army cooperation for antiaircraft practice and other similar activities.200 Keeping in view the fact that aeroplanes were the fastest means of transport, hence crucial for the war, the government agreed to allow the assembling of aircrafts in the country,201 airstrips were constructed and flying clubs organized.202 In 1939, there were only 12 civil aerodromes with adequate staff and facilities in the country. During the Second World War, the Defence Department took over the control of all civil aerodromes and the services of all Air Traffic Control Officers were loaned to the Air Force. By the end of the war, there were several hundred aerodromes and 2,000 yards of paved runways. Gradual transfer of aerodromes and the staff to civil aviation began in 1945.203 The enormous demand for aircrafts during the war forced the government to explore the possibility of manufacturing them within the country, but the Imperial Government in London did not respond NPC, Transport Services, 1949, p. 244. Ibid., pp. 244–245. 200 Progress of Education 1937–1947, vol. I, p. 175. 201 Linlithgow Papers: L.S. Amery to Linlithgow, Letter No. 22, 20 May 1940; No. 24, 5 Jun. 1940; No. 36, 5 Oct. 1940; No. 42, 3 Dec. 1940; No. 30, 27 Jun. 1940; and No. 55, 27 Nov. 1940, in Letters Secretary of State, vol. V, at India Office Library and Records (IOL&R), London. 202 Report of the Progress of Civil Aviation in India (Govt. of India, Delhi) for the war years. 203 NPC: Transport, 1949, pp. 258–259. 198 199

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favourably. India’s resources were considered too meagre for it and the British government did not want to spare technical hands to India as they were needed at home.204 Linlithgow’s proposal to shift to India a couple of aircraft factories from Britain in the light of the increased enemy threat there, met with the same fate.205 The authorities in India, therefore, had to fall back on the plan of Walchand Hirachand to form an aircraft company with public and private capital. While the official hitch was going on, Walchand formed the Hindustan Aircraft Company with a capital of Rs. 45 lakhs (4.5 million) at Bangalore. The Government of India and the Government of Mysore became equal partners contributing Rs. 25 lakhs (2.5 million) each.206 An American entrepreneur, W.D. Pawley, who had been manufacturing aircraft in China for six years, was associated with the venture.207 India’s first plane came out for a test flight in July 1941. Assembled in India, this was a Harlow, low-winged, single-engine monoplane with the same characteristics as of later-day fighters and bombers. With the advent of the system of Lend Lease in 1942, it was, however, found undesirable to have any element of private enterprise in this concern of vital importance to the conduct of the war in Asia. So, the Government of India bought out its private partners at a heavy premium and took over the entire management in its own hands.208 Finally, on the recommendations of the Grady Mission, production of aircraft was completely stopped at this factory to concentrate on repairs.209 Meanwhile, research and training facilities in aviation and aeronautics had been set up at the Indian Institute of Science at Bangalore. A post-graduate course in aeronautical engineering was introduced there in December 1942. Its Department of Aeronautics was equipped with a wind tunnel subsidised by Government of India and with apparatus for structural research. Thus, the Institute developed into a centre for basic aeronautical research in the country.210 Later, facilities for aero204 India Office, Economic and Overseas Department to Air Ministry, 27 Mar. 1940, I.O. Lib., L/E/8/ 1711; and Amery to Linlithgow, No. 693, 6 Jun. 1940, IOL, L/PO/ 465. 205 Linlithgow to Amery, telegram. 910-S, 7 Jun., 1940, IOL, L/PO/465. 206 G.D. Khanolkar, Walchand Hirachand: Man, His Times and Achievements, Bombay, 1969; for details, see Walchand Hirachand Papers. 207 GOI, Dept. of Supply, to Secretary of State for India, tel. 2394, Simla, 6 Jul, 1940, IOL, L/PO/465. 208 NPC: Transport, 1949, pp. 253. 209 Sinha and Khera, Indian War Economy, 1962, p. 251. 210 NPC: Transport, 1949, pp. 254, 263.

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nautical communication service for training of operating and technical personnel were provided at the Civil Aviation Training Centre at Saharanpur in U.P. The Survey of India worked on preparing aeronautical maps.211 Connected with aviation, meteorology came into some prominence during this period. Meteorological observation had a long history in India, which, like several other subjects, was a part of data feedback for research in the metropolis. Military operation and aviation, no doubt, added importance to it in the course of the war,212 but beyond that not much was done to promote it as a science for other purposes. Parachute was a crucial component of air flying. So at the instance of the Department of Supply of the Central Government, the possibility of producing parachutes indigenously was explored. Materials and facilities for their manufacture being available, a special factory for their fabrication was put up in the middle of 1942, which came into full production by the end of the war. A scheme with a capital cost of Rs.18,50,000 (1.85 million) provided by the British Government was also launched in order to multiply India’s filature silk reeling capacity by changing over from the hand-reeling to machine-reeling method.213 Later, in order to look into the problems and prospects of promoting aviation in the country as an industry as well as a means of transport, the United Kingdom Aircraft Mission visited India in March 1946. It made an intensive survey, visiting the related establishments at Barrackpur, Poona and Bangalore, together with the Ordnance Factories at Kanpur, Kasipur and Jabalpur. Acting on its recommendations, the Government of India decided to establish a national aircraft industry in the country, with the aim of achieving within 20 years complete selfsufficiency for building aircrafts needed for the Royal Indian Air Force as well as for civil aviation.214 However, in spite of these developments, aeronautics and aviation were still in their infancy as far as R&D was concerned and they had yet to go a long way. Except for some efforts to use aviation for military purposes, the colonial attitude was quite discouraging towards promoting it for civilian purposes. Interestingly enough however, two of the Ibid., pp. 260–261. Hundred Years of Weather Service, 1875–1975, 1976; also see Annual Report Meteorological Survey of India. 213 NPC: Transport, 1949, pp. 255–256. 214 Ibid., pp. 253–255. 211 212

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leading Indian industrialists—Walchand Hirachand and J.R.D. Tata, who later became doyens of transport industry in the country—showed great interest in the matter, but they met with a cold response from the government.215 Nevertheless, after it had been taken over by the government during the war, Walchand’s Hindustan Aircraft Company became the sole aircraft manufacturing establishment of the Government of India after Independence. Likewise, Tata’s aviation company eventually emerged as the national carrier—Air India.216 As is evident from the foregoing, British policy in India was quite in contrast to the state policy towards similar initiatives in the White-Settler colonies like Canada and Australia.217 Telecommunications: Telegraph had been an important tool of imperial control in India up to the First World War.218 The growing need for faster communication gave a boost to wireless and broadcasting from the 1930s, more so during the Second World War.219 But here again, though the administrative steps led to the introduction of these systems in some cases and expansion in others, R&D was the missing component of the state initiative, and the elements of local welfare entered the government policy only late. Radio witnessed unprecedented expansion as both sides of the belligerents used it as a means of propaganda and education of the people. Radio broadcasting had begun on 5 May 1932 in India. Lionel Fielder of the BBC was appointed as India’s first Controller of Broadcasting in 1935 and the service was named All India Radio (AIR) in 1936. As the war escalated, a separate Department of Information and Broadcasting was created in 1941. Meanwhile, the number of licences rose from 10,872 in 1933, to 92,782 (an increase of 215 Dow, Memorandum, ‘Air Craft Manufacture in India’, 18 May 1940, enclosed with the letter of the Private Secretary of the Viceroy to the Private Secretary of the S.S.I., No. 2744, 24 May 1940, IOL, L/E/8/1711. For Walchand, see Khanolkar, Walchand, 1969; for Tata, refer to R.M. Lala, Beyond the Last Blue Mountain: A Life of J.R.D. Tata, New Delhi, 1992, esp. pt. II. 216 Khanolkar, Walchand, 1969, p. 353 ff. 217 The Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs, Toronto, 1940, pp. 415–417, and later volumes; also J. de N. Kennedy, Production Branches and Crown Companies, Canada, 1950, pp. 25–33. For Australia, see R.W. Home, ‘Science on Service, 1939–1945’, in R.W. Home, Australian Science in the Making, Melbourne, 1988, pp. 220–251. 218 Saroj Ghose, ‘The Introduction and Development of the Electric Telegraph in India’, Ph.D. Thesis, Jadavpur University, Calcutta, 1974. Also see Headrick, Tentacles of Progress, 1988. 219 Progress of Broadcasting in India: Report by the Controller of Broadcasting, Simla, 1940; and H.R. Luthra, Indian Broadcasting, New Delhi, 1986.

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753.40 per cent) in 1939 and to 2.5 lakhs (an increase of 169.45 per cent) listening sets in 1945. Initially, radio sets were imported (including 40,000 from the USA under the Lend-Lease) but later the government initiated measures to have them produced indigenously.220 This, along with other technical needs of the war, encouraged electronic industries in the country.221 These were the major areas in which the colonial government showed an active and considerable interest in an effort to make use of the Indian resources for winning the war. In these cases, the official policy was palpable and fairly sustained, though the main emphasis was on organisation and control, and R&D was conspicuously missing. But there were also certain other areas which were important in their own ways, but the official policy towards them was lukewarm and unsteady. They will be dealt with in the next chapter.

220 221

Commerce, 6 Dec. 1947, pp. 102–108. For details, see Aggarwal, History of Supply, 1947.

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chapter four THE SCIENCES IN THE DOLDRUMS

The subjects that did not receive the attention they deserved during the Second World War in India were energy (fuel and power), natural resource management, defence science, basic sciences and fundamental research. These areas were accorded great attention in the UK and other belligerent states in this period but they could not enjoy the same status in the official priorities in India. While the indigenous interest in most of them was extremely active, the attitude of the Raj towards them was generally cold, unsteady and ambivalent, often guided by considerations other than those of India’s interest. Many of these subjects were grossly neglected as, for example, the basic sciences and fundamental research, while the progress apparently made in the management and development of natural resources was deceptive and fraught with deeper implications arising out of the diplomatic and economic moves of the British Empire. This had serious and long-term consequences for the country. Yet, since it is not the official initiative or enthusiasm, rather its lack at times that may provide us a better insight into the colonial policy, a quick glance at them will complete our survey.

The Surveys Many of the older concerns of the colonial government still continued but the general tendency was to put them to the service of the war. A case in point is that of the Surveys. As the urgency of exploring the natural resources, geography and society of the country for the Empire was over by then, the Survey organizations were in a low profile. The budget allocations of the Survey of India stagnated at the prewar level and even decreased. Financial stringency severely restricted the activities of the field parties engaged in the primary programmes of the Survey.1 But once the hostilities commenced, they were called

1

Survey of India General Report 1940, Calcutta, 1940, p. 2.

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upon to cater to the military needs, exploration in particular of the land and people of the north-eastern regions of the country where British and Allied troops were locked in fierce fight with Japan. As the war progressed, the Survey collaborated closely with the armed forces, including the Survey Section of the R.A.F., in programmes of military relevance under active service conditions.2 In the process, the routine activities of the Survey were badly disrupted and dislocated throughout the period.3 Soon, a War Survey Research Institute was founded, which embraced the recent scientific work of the Geodetic Branch of the Survey of India.4 Initially, the Surveys had been set up to gain information about the geography, society and natural wealth of India with a view to help the British expand and consolidate their empire and exploit her in all the ways possible. The surveys articulated a British mastery over the Indian landscape, and from the “mythical, religious Hindu space”, reduced it to “a rational, scientific, imperial structure of space.”5 Since the Empire was coming to an end now, the Surveys started becoming redundant and were now in a process of dismantling. In the circumstances, many of the duties earlier assigned to them were now entrusted to other agencies, including the private ones. The Surveys were directed to assist business firms enjoying official patronage, such as Burma Oil Company and Messrs Shipton and Mott.6 The grant of licences by the government to foreign companies to prospect oil reserves in the Indian plains and the foothills in the 1940s, illustrates this point. This was a dangerous trend for India’s future economy. In the on-going process of transfer of power in the country, this was an attempt to make way for the more invisible collaborators of imperialism before the British finally withdrew from the subcontinent.

Ibid., 1940, p. 2. Ibid., pp. 2–4; also see the Report for 1940–1945. 4 J. de Graff Hunter, ‘Scientific Work of the Survey of India’, Procs. of the National Institute of Sciences of India, X, 1, 1944. 5 Edney, ‘Mapping,’ p. 19, quoted in David Arnold, Science, Technology and Medicine in Colonial India, vol. III.5 of The New Cambridge History of India, Cambridge, 2000, p. 43. 6 Survey of India General Report, 1940, p. 6. 2 3

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Energy The crucial role of transport, communications and industrial activities in the war brought into focus the necessity of developing the sources of energy—fuel and power—throughout the world. Soon, their value for peacetime progress, too, became clear. As a result, international conferences on the subject were organized and international agencies became involved. The First World Power Conference had been held in London in 1924 to be followed by a second conference in 1930 in Berlin and a third, in 1936 in Washington. The Fourth World Power Conference, scheduled for 1940 at Tokyo, was postponed because of the disturbed international situation during the World War. This concern for developing the sources of energy was felt with equal seriousness in India.7 In fact, the Indian opinion had started focusing on the fuel and power resources soon after the First World War and by the mid-1930s a serious debate had started. The Science and Culture Group in particular, took up the issue with a missionary zeal under the leadership of M.N. Saha.8 The National Academy of Sciences, India, organized a symposium on India’s Power Supply in 1938.9 Science and Culture published scores of articles and notes on the subject and editorially commented on the problems and prospects of the power and fuel resources of the country, their development, exploitation and control.10 In that, it bitterly criticized the colonial policy allowing reckless exploitation of coal and its failure to protect and develop the sources of fuel and power scientifically. The matter was also taken up by the Indian National Congress. The National Planning Committee appointed by the Congress placed such an emphasis on the subject that it constituted an exclusive sub-committee on Power and Fuel, 7 See ‘Fuel Economy in Policy in India and Abroad’, editorial, Science and Culture (hereafter S&C), VI, 11, May 1941, esp. pp. 620–621. 8 For M.N. Saha who was the Chairman of the NPC’s Sub-Committee on Power and Fuel, see Santimay Chatterjee, ed., Collected Works of Meghnad Saha, vol. 2, Calcutta, 1986. 9 ‘Symposium on India’s Power Supply’, S&C, III, 11, May 1938, pp. 594–601. 10 B.C. Chatterjee, ‘Safety of Electrical Installation in India’, S&C, II, 1, Jul. 1935, pp. 84–86; M.N. Saha and A.N. Tandon, ‘The Intelligent Man’s Guide to the Production and Economics of Electrical Power’, S&C, III, 11, May 1938, pp. 574–578. Editorials in S&C: ‘Electricity—its Use for the Public and Industries’, I, 6, Nov. 1935, pp. 303–307; ‘Public Supply of Electricity in India’, I, 7, Dec. 1935, pp. 367–371; ‘On the National Supply of Electricity’, III, 2, Aug. 1937, pp. 65–68; ‘Need for Power Research and Investigation Board in India’, III, 8, Feb. 1938, pp. 405–406.

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besides the other sub-committees which dealt with them indirectly.11 The Science and Culture Group joined the NPC in demanding immediate state intervention and control and in calling for a national fuel and power policy.12 Coal: Traditionally, coal had been an important source of energy and it continued to be so even during the war in India, as elsewhere in the world. It was used for a variety of purposes like generating steam power to run the locomotives, ships and industries, for producing electricity, for generating heat for smelting to produce items like glass and cement, and as a raw material in the production of steel, synthetic dyes, perfumes and antiseptics, etc. It was also utilized for producing gaseous fuel besides being used for domestic purposes.13 Thanks to its wide application, coal mining had been a major industrial activity for long with considerable impact on the Indian economy and society.14 From the beginning, coal mining had been largely in private hands and the colonial government generally avoided meddling with it. However, since coal had fuelled the imperial expansion through the steamboats and the railways, the government was never really indifferent to it. Its policy of non-interference aimed essentially at not annoying the business houses—British as well as Indian—as collaborators of the Empire;15 otherwise, the government kept an eye on it and quite often tried to control and promote this industry. Between 1920 and 1937, it had set up three committees in this regard.16 Despite the fact that these inquiries had been instituted by the colonial government with its men on them, the findings of these committees could not hide the fact that coal was a national asset of great value and that it was being mined and exploited recklessly, depleting its natural reserves dangerously. This concern was taken up and elaborated upon by the Indian scientists and professional forums, who called for urgent state intervention. But the government did not heed their demands in any appreciable manner. Its NPC Series, Power and Fuel, Bombay, 1947; and NPC Series, River Training and Irrigation, Bombay, 1947. 12 Ibid. Also see ‘Wanted a National Fuel Policy’, S&C, VI, 2, Aug. 1940, pp. 61–63. 13 Anonymous, ‘Coal Industry in India’, S&C, VI, 2, Aug. 1940, pp. 63–66; A.B. Ghose, Coal Industry in India, Part I (Pre-Independence), New Delhi, 1977. 14 Ibid. Also refer to N.C. Chatterjee, ‘Accidents in Indian Coal Mines’, S&C, III, 1, Jul. 1937, pp. 24–25. 15 Ibid. 16 Indian Coalfields Committee: Report, Calcutta, 1920; Indian Coal Committee: Report, 1925, n. p., n. d.; and Report of the Indian Coal Mining Committee, Delhi, 1937. 11

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policy did not change during the war; rather it was conspicuous by the absence of an active interest, or worse, by certain dubious gestures in the matter.17 In spite of this, however, the war initially gave a boost to coal production in India though after 1942 it was badly hampered because of the non-availability of the required machinery, difficulties in transportation and labour trouble.18 The consequences that followed incited indigenous reaction.19 While the Indian scientists and professional bodies took up the issue more vigorously, some of the sub-committees of the NPC examined the problems and prospects of coal thoroughly.20 The information that poured in on the subject was alarming and revealing. It showed how India’s coal reserve had been recklessly depleted under the British rule, and how the country had been left with only a very limited reserve for the future. Some of the Indian scientists complained that even the exact extent of the known reserves had not been fully disclosed to the public, and they suspected that probably interested parties kept it as a secret to themselves. They, therefore, registered their ‘emphatic protest’ against this and invited the attention of the government to do the needful to allay these suspicions.21 The Science and Culture Group concurred with the views of the NPC in asking the government to take effective measures to conserve the coal reserve which had badly depleted in the past and to ensure its judicious use. They called for the nationalization of the coal industry and for a national policy on fuel.22 However, the authorities did not budge. When compared to the global concern for coal and mineral oil, especially in Britain, Indians were often disappointed by the official inaction and silence at home. Mineral Oil: That the colonial policy with regard to fuel lacked sincerity and transparency, was further demonstrated by the official attitude towards natural oil. Paradoxically, in place of coal, which India was 17 For developments, see B.M. Prasad, Second World War and the Indian Industry, 1939– 1945: A Case Study of the Coal Industry in Bengal and Bihar, Delhi, 1992. 18 Ibid.; also M.R. Kulkarni, Industrial Development, New Delhi, 1971, p. 147. 19 N.C. Chatterjee, ‘Accidents in Indian Coal Mines’, 1937, pp. 24–25. 20 NPC Series: Power and Fuel, 1947; idem, Mining and Metallurgy, Bombay, 1947; idem, River Training and Irrigation, Bombay, 1947. 21 Ibid.; also A Chemist, ‘Some Fuel Problems of India: Part I—Coal’, S&C, VII, 3, Sep. 1941, p. 141. 22 S&C: ‘Coal Industry in India’, 1940; ‘Fuel Economy Policy in India and Abroad’, editorial (concluded in two issues), VI, 11, May 1941; VI, 12, Jun. 1941; and ‘Wanted a National Fuel Policy’, editorial, VI, 2, Aug. 1940, pp. 61–62.

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generally known to have possessed in large quantities, the authorities directed their attention to mineral oil, whose known reserves were meagre. No doubt, natural oil in India had attracted attention of foreign interests as early as the end of 19th century but the separation of Burma from India in 1937 gave a severe setback to India in this regard as the former took away most of her oilfields.23 The Second World War once again brought mineral oil into the limelight and attracted foreign oil interests to India. The Grady Mission which suggested that the US technical assistance be used for developing India’s industrial resources signalled the trend. M.N. Saha was alarmed at the prospect. In a detailed article entitled ‘Oil and Invisible Imperialism’ in the Science and Culture, he presented an incisive critique of the subject in its global ramifications, with focus on American, Dutch and British oil interests operating in such areas as Mexico, Middle East and the East. He was prophetic in that he clearly visualised the advent of invisible oil imperialism in India and warned of the consequences.24 Saha also pointed out how the colonial government in India was a party to that. He was worried to know that foreign companies had been granted licences for exploration of oil in the areas which had recently been indicated to have it. We have already written about the limited oil reserve in India; here it may be worthy of note that, in the meanwhile, the geodetic work of the Survey of India, together with some prospecting by interested foreign companies, had revealed the theoretical possibilities of existence of oil in the vast alluvial plains and foothills in the country. Materialization of these possibilities could go a long way in solving the problems of India’s mineral oil. What Saha, however, was worried about, was the decision of the Government of India to call upon private British and American firms to carry out exploration work in these areas, instead of assigning this task to its own Geological Survey which had a rightful claim in the matter. He visualized in this move a new form of imperialism slowly making its headway and of invisible forces active in organizing a vast scheme of economic exploitation of the country.25 Saha wrote:

Kulkarni, Industrial Development, 1971, p. 153. M.N. Saha and S.N. Sen, ‘Oil and Invisible Imperialism’, S&C, VIII, 4, Oct. 1942, pp. 150–155. 25 Ibid., p. 151. 23 24

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The Americans, as we have noted, have made no secret of their intentions so far as the securing of oil concessions in India is concerned. It is in the face of these facts that we have been watching with great uneasiness and suspicion the activities likely to follow the recommendations of the American Technical Mission which proposes American technical assistance to develop India’s industrial resources. The Government of India was positively averse to developing heavy industries like the shipbuilding and the automobile industries before the outbreak of the war and refused to patronise Indian enterprise. Now it suddenly wakes up to the necessity of developing India’s industrial resources and invites American technical assistance. Then there is the Lease and Lend Scheme applicable to India by which Britain has managed to pay for the U.S. assistance in her war effort. And here is the fact of important concessions granted to American oil companies by virtue of which they can explore the sub-soil. If we sift all these factual evidences, the picture which logically emerges will not prove to be pleasant to any body who thinks seriously of India’s future.26

Fully aware of the importance of fuel for industrial growth and development of the country at large, its depleting resources in India and of the scramble for oil across the globe, Saha and his group took up the matter forcefully almost as soon as the war broke out. The findings of the NPC sub-committees provided them fresh understanding and incentive to speak on the subject.27 It may be noted that Saha was the Chairman of the NPC Sub-Committee on Power and Fuel. They delineated the basic problems of fuel in the country and demanded nationalization of the fuel resources. They attacked the government for its flawed policy on the matter and called for a ‘National Fuel Policy.’28 Electricity: Another source of energy was electricity. As in the case of coal and mineral oil, Indians were prompt in realizing the value of electricity for the material progress of the country; but here again the colonial policy was one of inertia and laissez faire.29 Despite her abundant potential for power generation, India’s record was very poor. Ibid., p. 155. NPC Series, Mining and Metallurgy, 1947; idem, Power and Fuel, 1947. 28 ‘Wanted a National Fuel Policy’, editorial, S&C, VI, 2, Aug. 1940, pp. 61–62. 29 S&C: ‘Electricity—its use for the Public and the Indian Industries’, editorial, I, 6, Nov. 1935, pp. 303–307; ‘Public Supply of Electricity in India’, editorial, I, 7, Dec. 1935, pp. 367–371; ‘On the National Supply of Electricity’, editorial, III, 2, Aug. 1937, pp. 65–67; ‘Need for a Power Research and Investigation Board in India’, editorial, III, 8, Feb. 1938; pp. 405–407; M.N. Saha and A.N. Tandon, ‘The Intelligent Man’s Guide to the Production and Economics of Electrical Power’, III, 11, May 1938, pp. 574– 578. 26 27

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In 1943, the total electricity generated in the country was about 3578 million KW, about the weekly production of energy in the USA at the time. The per capita use of electricity in the USA was about 130 times and in the UK 100 times more than in India.30 In India, the Electricity Act had been enacted in 1887. This was modelled on the British Electric Lighting Act of 1882, but most of the terms imposing government control on a public utility of this type in the British Act were omitted. To further the economic interests of the British financers, the Indian Electricity Act of 1903 was brought into existence. Interestingly, the original draft of this act had been prepared by a British firm interested in the electrical industry in India. Subsequently, several new acts were passed (1910, 1922, 1937) or old ones amended (1923, 1925), but the main purpose remained to serve the British business interests. One of the principal advisors to the government in this exercise was the British India Electric Company which had its headquarters in London and which looked after the interests of other London-based companies. This position continued well into the war years.31 Given the circumstances, no one could think of any effort at R&D in this sector in India. Contrasted against the poor performance of the Government of India, the endeavours towards producing electricity in the native states such as Mysore, and in the Provinces, was comparatively better.32 But the problems of finances and large-scale planning apart, they were badly handicapped by the existing constitutional restrictions. The colonial government, on its part, generally avoided interfering with the activities of the power generating private firms because most of them were owned by the British.33 At the same time, however, the government was under constant pressure from the indigenous scientific community, practical necessities of development and international opinion to take effective steps for augmenting power generation in the country. For, by now power was considered one of the most essential and crucial prerequisites of progress and an index of the quality of life of a nation. As a result, the emerging 30 Ibid.; Indian Information, 15 Feb. 1945, 235; also see Kulkarni, Industrial Development, 1971, p. 150. 31 NPC: Power and Fuel, 1947, pp. 62–63. 32 Ibid., pp. 56–62; also see T.C.S. Maniam, ‘Development of Hydro-Electric Power in Mysore: Its Utilization for Rural Reconstruction’, The Asiatic Review (Great Britain), 35, 121–124, Jan.–Oct. 1939, pp. 365–369. 33 NPC: Power and Fuel, 1947.

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international concern focussed on its scientific production, utilization and state regulation. This was reflected, among others, in the proceedings of the World Power Conferences mentioned earlier. This forced a welcome change in the colonial attitude from about the middle of the World War, initiating measures for increased power generation in the context of national reconstruction. Hydro-Electricity: Coal and oil had been traditionally utilized to produce energy in different ways. But in the face of the fast depleting coal reserves in the country and the limitations of the natural oil resources, other alternatives had to be explored. Two alternatives often came up for consideration: hydro-electricity and power alcohol. While varying expert opinions on the production viability and efficacy of alcohol provided the authorities with an alibi for inaction, hydroelectric power attracted their attention for various reasons. First of all, India did have vast water resources for hydroelectricity untapped for which there was persistent and progressively growing indigenous demand.34 Second, being a new sector, it did not pose any threat to the British interests; rather, it was likely to open up new avenues for them.35 And lastly, development of hydroelectricity was a logical corollary to the plan for reconstruction announced by the Government of India, which focused on the development of natural resources, including the rivers. Since the plan involved flood control and development of the areas perpetually afflicted with flood, harvesting of hydropower came almost as a byeproduct. The Central Government had commissioned a survey of waterpower resources of India during 1919–1920.36 It set up, in 1940, a Central Water and Power Commission with a research station near Poona. In order to increase power generation and plan for post-war power development, the Electrical Commissioner with the Government of India, H.M. Mathews, convened a conference of leading power engineers in 1943. This was for the first time that the subject was considered in a S&C: ‘Hydro-electric Practice in India’, II, 12, Jun. 1937, pp. 629–631; ‘Need for Power Research and Investigation Board in India’, editorial, III, 8, Feb.1937, pp. 405– 407; ‘Symposium on India’s Power Supply’, III, 11, May 1938, pp. 594–601; M.N. Saha and A.N. Tandon, May 1938; T.C.S. Maniam, Jan. and Oct. 1939. Also see NPC Series: Power and Fuel, 1947. 35 NPC Series: Power and Fuel, 1947, esp. p. 55. 36 Hydroelectric Survey of India: Preliminary Report of the Water Resources of India, 1919–1920, by G.E. Bull, n. i., n.d. (NAI 627/H 995 P). 34

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wider perspective for the country as a whole. The conference passed resolutions, besides other things, on electrical power generation in the provinces and Indian States, constitution of a Central Power Board, investigation into prospective power projects, electrification of the railways and rural electrification.37 Accordingly, on 8 November 1944, the government constituted a Central Technical Power Board with Mathew as chairman and Voordwin, an American expert, as member. It was to act as an Engineering Planning Agency of the Government of India to advise the Central, Provincial and State governments in establishing multipurpose hydroelectric and thermal power projects. It was purely an advisory body without any mandatory powers.38 Yet, it appears to have taken its job seriously. In order to meet the immediate demands, it recommended for acquiring foreign assistance, and training of young Indians at the same time to replace foreign experts within a reasonable time.39 Top priority was accorded to hydelpower and a major official initiative was taken to develop the water resources of the country, and advice was sought from America though the country was not lacking in its own experts on the subject. Himself an expert in the field, Saha reacted sharply and created sort of a movement on the issue but to no avail.40 The Damodar River, flowing through Bihar and Bengal, was taken up for development on the models of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TWA) of the USA. This ultimately led to the creation of India’s first river valley project—the Damodar Valley Corporation (DVC) in 1949.41 But here again, the reflections of oil imperialism were seen. At a time when Britain was making a retreat from India, the American entry into the country with such projects and other economic engagements had crucial implications for the future of India, as much for her material progress as for her diplomatic position in the Cold War regime.42

Indian Information, 15 Nov. 1946, p. 336. Ibid., 15 Jan.1948, p. 95. 39 Ibid., 1 Apr.1946, p. 403. 40 Ibid., p. 156. For his views, see Collected Works of Meghnad Saha, vol., 2, Chap. 2, pp. 182–263. 41 Indian Information, 15 May 1946, p. 619. For details, see NPC: Power and Fuel, 1947. 42 Sunil Sondhi, Science, Technology and India’s Foreign Policy, Delhi, 1994. 37 38

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Defence Research Unless we have access to a wide range of classified papers dealing with military affairs, it is difficult to give a clear picture of the developments in such areas as defence research and development (R&D) in India. Here, the chief scientific and technical organization for the Fighting Services was that of the Master General of Ordnance. It was devoted mainly to inspection which had increased greatly owing to the enormous leaps in war production in the meanwhile. In the process of inspection, a certain amount of research was also done. Moreover, the Ordnance Laboratories at Kanpur (established 1943), were also capable of some research. Important ‘extra-mural’ research on war problems was also carried out in a variety of institutions outside the organizations under the Commander-in-Chief, e.g. in the laboratories of the Director of Scientific and Industrial Research, the Metallurgical Laboratory of the Tata Steel Works at Jamshedpur and Indian Institute of Science at Bangalore.43 Testing facilities were available under the Engineer-in-Chief, India, but only for routine matters; there were no facilities for engineering research. During his visit to India, A.V. Hill showed keen interest in the subject and made detailed recommendations to organize and promote it. He appears to have been informed that a project was being considered for setting up a research unit for work on soil stabilization, runways, roads, bridges, structures and the like, the work which could be of great importance to the South-East Asia Command.44 The Royal Air Force (RAF) in India was mainly under South-East Asia Command at the time, and it had set up for itself certain special R&D facilities it required. It also used the facilities available under the General Headquarters (GHQ), India.45 The Royal Navy of the Eastern Fleet did not have any research organization in India till then but some move was on in this direction. A visit of the scientific parties from the Admiralty to examine the problems affecting weapons, equipment and personnel provided an opportunity to the Royal Indian Navy to establish the nucleus of a scientific organization of its own.46 43 A.V. Hill, Scientific Research in India, Simla, 1944, p. 33; also S.C. Aggarwal, History of the Supply Department, Delhi, 1947. 44 Hill, Scientific Research in India, Simla, 1944, p. 33. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid., p. 34.

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The operational groups in India were under the South East Asian Command, one each for the army and the RAF; the Royal Navy did not have any operational research unit in India by the time Hill left the country.47 By September 1943, the Commander-in-Chief had a Director of Research, Brigadier Welsh, together with an Operational Research Section commanded by Lt. Col. Leitch.48 In his report, Hill observed that the research organization under GHQ needed tightening up, strengthening and coordination at a higher level. For that purpose, a plan was mooted in February 1943 to create a post of Scientific Advisor to the Commander-in-Chief to supervise and coordinate all the scientific activities under GHQ , India, including extra-mural work of various kinds. For this post a man of the highest qualifications would be needed, with relevant knowledge and extensive experience of the latest scientific and technical work done in the UK and elsewhere. He would have full authority to order the necessary equipment and supplies, and his position would be that of a Joint Secretary in the Defence Department. This proposal was agreed to by the Government of India. The details were to be worked out after an appointment was made.49 The proposed Scientific Advisor to the Commander-in-Chief was to be responsible, with his authority, for watching over and coordinating scientific and technical work then going on under or on behalf of GHQ , for initiating and planning new work and any new organizations required for it. He was also to provide scientific and technical assistance to the Operational Research Organization under South East Asia Command in tackling problems for which that organization had sufficient technical facilities. As an important item in his permanent setup would be a board consisting of scientists and engineers, official and non-official, in various fields (including biology) together with the Service representatives. This board was to meet only at fairly long intervals and its work was to be done chiefly by smaller committees under the chairpersonship of the appropriate members of the Board, and it was to consist of scientists, engineers and Service representatives. There would probably be a large number of such committees, and their chairpersons would be encouraged to take considerable initiative in enquiry into 47

Ibid. Unidentified (but understandably an important) person to A.V. Hill, Secret, 22 Sep. 1943, J55/BJS, in A.V. Hill Papers, Churchill College, Cambridge. 49 Hill, Scientific Research in India, 1944, pp. 34–35. 48

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matters of importance, in visiting Service and experimental stations, in making themselves acquainted with Service needs and problems, and in starting research as required. This organization was to be very similar to, though on a smaller scale than, that of the Advisory Council for Scientific Research and Technical Development in the Ministry of Supply in the UK and its associated committees. It was to constitute the War Research Board of the Central Organization for scientific research working under the Member for Planning and Development, Government of India, under the organizational set-up proposed by Hill.50 The Scientific Adviser to the Commander-in-Chief would insist on having proper arrangements made for efficient and quick liaison with all allied research organizations in the UK and elsewhere.51 Hill hoped that the organization under the Scientific Advisor to the Commander-in-Chief, suggested by him, would be of permanent value to India under the new constitution which was just in the offing. Presumably, India would then have a War Minister under whom will come the Indian Army, Royal Indian Navy, and the Indian Air Force, each with its own staff. The War Council contained the Chiefs of Staff and officers connected with training, supply, etc., and the Scientific Advisor to the War Minister was to be a member of the War Council, at the same level as others. His (Scientific Advisor’s) direct access to the War Minister and his equality with the Service members of the War Council ought to ensure that India in the future would not make the disastrous mistake of underrating the importance of scientific research and technical development in modern war.52 As suggested under Hill’s Central Organization for Scientific Research (see Ch. VI), if scientific research for India was to be concentrated under a single minister, it would probably be wise to transfer the system of Board and committees proposed above to the new organization. The Board would, thus, become the War Research Board. Similarly, the Scientific Advisor to the War Minister would also be Secretary and Executive Officer of the War Research Board and a member of the Scientific Consultative Committee of the Member of Planning and Development.53

50 51 52 53

Ibid., pp. 34–35. Ibid., p. 35. Ibid. Ibid.

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Hill drew attention especially to one aspect of War Research which was neglected until then. That was connected with the problems of human health, fitness and adaptation in fighting personnel—in relations to the conditions of their service and the equipment they employ. Flying, diving, jungle-warfare, armoured vehicles, tropical conditions, and the skilled and efficient use of modern scientific and technical equipment, on land, in the air, and on and under the sea, all posed special problems affecting the physical and mental condition of the soldier. He pointed out how these aspects were being paid great attention in the UK and the USA and hoped that its results would be of considerable value in civil life and industry. He strongly recommended the establishment of a Services Medical and Personnel Research Committee in the country. Its ultimate position under the proposed new arrangement might be that of a joint committee of the War Research and the Medical Research Boards.54 However, Hill’s elaborate plans of organization for war R&D largely remained confined on paper. In practice, endeavours in the field of defence research hardly went beyond standardization and testing of arms and ammunitions and various military provisions, or acclimatization of troops and searching of substitutes for military supplies.55 Here, one may, however, like to take note of certain activities connected with defence against chemical warfare and air raids. Worried about the possibility of a chemical (gas and bacterial) attack from the enemies, the Government of India resorted to various measures. A Chemical Defence Committee had already been created; during the war, extensive training, experiments and trials were conducted at various centres all over the country, for developing drugs and techniques to counter such eventualities. Of these centres, the most important were the Chemical Defence Research Establishment at Rawalpindi, now in Pakistan, and the Chemical Warfare School at Panchmurhi in Madhya Pradesh. The projects in this regard generally emanated from the War Department of the Imperial Government in London and carried out in India, in close collaboration with the related agencies in the UK and USA.56 Ibid., pp. 35–36. For medical research in army cantonments, see J.H. Stone, ‘The United States Army Medical Service in Combat in India and Burma, 1942 to 1945’, Ph.D. Thesis, Yale University, 1947. 56 Records of the India Office Military Department: File Nos. IOR: L/MIL/17/5/ 1798 Pt. 1&3, both secret; IOR: L/WS/1/58/WS 598; IOR: L/MIL/17/5/2200– 54 55

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Operational Research Operational research was a vital component of defence preparedness. It was an entirely new branch of defence research that originated during the Second World War itself. Born out of the urgency of managing resources at hand to achieve definite goals in the war operations in a given time span, it assumed great significance in the Allied countries,57 and some efforts in this direction were made in India also.58 As mentioned earlier, the operational research groups here were under the South East Asia Command, one each for the Army and the RAF. By September 1943, the Commander-in-Chief also had an Operational Research Section. There are indications that operational research activities were going on at different places and at the levels of the armed forces, and the personnel concerned were active at such war fronts as in Assam.59 Hill was quick to appreciate the value of operational research for post-war reconstruction in India. In his report, therefore, he advised that it would be wise for GHQ , India, to ensure that the experience of these operational research groups was not lost to the future War Department of India after the hostilities were over.60 Sources indicate that importance of operational research for the country after the war was deliberated upon in certain colonial circles, too.61 In spite of such a concern, however, the achievements in this field of research were negligible. Official secrecy regarding war operations, weapons, etc., and exclusion of Indians from information in this regard

2201 & 33; IOR: L/MIL/17/5/2363; IOR: L/WS/1/533/ WS 9582, Secret; IOR: L/WS/1/1221 WS 17198; IOR: L/W/S/1/533, Secret; and IOR: L/WS//1/98 WS 1188, at IOL&R, London. 57 For the UK, see Nuffield College, Problems of Scientific and Industrial Research: A Statement, London, 1944, esp. pp. 14–15. Also see The Origins and Development of Operational Research in the Royal Air Force, London, HMSO, 1963. 58 Unidentified person to A.V. Hill, Secret, 22 Sep. 1943, J55/BJS; Letter from Dept. of Edu., Health & Lands, GOI, to Carmichael [?], 15 Dec. 1943 (typescript), in A.V. Hill Papers, Churchill College, Cambridge. 59 Letter from Dept. of Edu., Health & Lands, GOI, to Carmichael [?], 15 Dec. 1943, p. 1. 60 Hill, Scientific Research, 1944, p. 34. 61 ‘The Post-War Importance of Operational Research, with Particular Reference to India’, by Dr C.N. Waddington, then with O.R.S., Coastal Command, R.A.F. (typescript) in E.H.T.L.A.A.V. Hill 2/8 [?], 15 Oct. 1943, Hill Papers.

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appear to be one of the greatest reasons for this.62 In the circumstances, less sensitive subjects like signals and electrical equipment, wireless communications, meteorological forecasting, mines and body traps, and food preservation and health appear to have been taken up by operational research groups in the armed forces.63 Defence research and operational research were the areas wherein India lagged far behind the UK and its allies like the USA, Canada and Australia;64 and she was blatantly excluded from their principal war research programmes. The Tizard Mission, launched by Britain to coordinate scientific research amongst the Allies for the war, bypassed India. It visited America during August–September 1940 and took in representatives from both the USA and Canada.65 The cooperation that followed introduced Canada to the secret war research projects of the United Nations and made her an active partner with the UK and the USA. This offered Canada an opportunity to participate in advanced research and make significant contributions to one of the greatest inventions of the Second World War—radar and atomic energy.66 The momentum thus gained in scientific research activities soon enthused Canada to extend efforts in several other areas that would be crucial for the development of the country in peacetime, too. They included aviation, medical science and public health, industry and agriculture.67 Nothing of this sort happened in India even though she was a part of the British Empire, while Canada was by now independent and only a member of the Commonwealth. Probably, this was essentially due to Britain’s racial and social affinity with Canada.

62 Unidentified person to A.V. Hill, Secret, 22 Sep. 1943, J55/BJS, in A.V. Hill Papers, Churchill College. 63 Ibid., esp. the enclosure, ‘Possible fields of extra-mural work in connection with the armed forces in India’. 64 For the UK, see Nuffield College, Problems of … Research, 1944, esp. pp. 14–15. Also see Postan et al., Design and Development of Weapons, 1963; Wilfrid Eggleston, Scientists at War, London, 1950, pp. 17–19, 24 ff., 82 ff.; and Guy Hartcup, The Effect of Science on the Second World War, Basingstoke, 2000, chap. 6. For Australia, D.F. Mellor, The Role of Science and Industry, Canberra, 1958. 65 David Zimmerman, Top Secret Exchange: The Tizard Mission and the Scientific War, Stroad, 1996. 66 Eggleston, Science at War, 1950, pp. 17–19, 24 ff., 82 ff.; also see Hartcup, Effect of Science, 2000. 67 History of the Department of Munitions and Supply: Canada in the Second World War, vol. I: Production Branches and Crown Companies, 1950; Report of the Minister of Agriculture for the Dominion of Canada for the Year Ended March 31, 1945, Ottawa, 1945; First Annual Report of

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Basic Sciences and Fundamental Research In the overriding concern for applying science to the practical problems arising out of the war, the basic sciences and fundamental research were sadly neglected. This was not a new feature of the colonial rule; what attracts one’s attention at this point of time, is a further deterioration in its interest in the subject. Of course, there was some effort by the government to help organize research in chemistry and physics at the University of Delhi during this period;68 but keeping in view its military preoccupations, it is difficult to believe that the attempt was essentially made to promote the subjects as a basic discipline of knowledge. These and other branches of science like botany, zoology, geology and mathematics continued to be taught at different levels in the academies, but the absence of state encouragement to them was obvious. Likewise, subjects like statistics, a newly emerging discipline, too, acquired some significance and sometimes even received encouragement from the government; but there is little to suggest that the government really tried to promote it for the socio-economic progress of the country. Fundamental research was probably the worst affected. Though this was, once again, not new in the colonial history, the failure of the subject to elicit any support during the war—one of the greatest stimuli of science—is rather intriguing, especially when it received considerable attention in many of the warring nations including the USA, UK and the Dominions.69 In India, the wartime economy measures led to heavy cuts in grants and budgets, which, in turn, badly affected the activities of the teaching and research institutions, including the publication and availability of books and journals. Quite often, the resources (human and material) of these organizations had to be spared for war purposes (see Ch. III). Thus, in a situation where there was state support to applied sciences, basic sciences and fundamental research went into oblivion. India had had, however, a long tradition of fundamental research in such areas as astronomy and mathematics (see Ch. II); and this tradition was once again revived in the 20th century. J.C. Bose (1858–1937) the Department of National Health and Welfare for the Fiscal Year Ended March 31, 1945, Ottawa, 1945. 68 Procs. Dept. of Edu., Health & Lands, GOI: F. no. 59–61/43 E. 69 S&C: IX, 1, Jul. 1943, pp. 8–10; IX, 8, Jan. 1944, pp. 312–321; and XI, 4, Oct. 1945, pp. 153–156.

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received international accolade for his research in material response, magnetic/electrical waves and plant physiology. In recognition of his work, he was knighted and elected Fellow of the Royal Society, London, in 1916.70 Srinivasa Ramanujan flashed his mathematical genius soon after and was elected the Fellow of the Royal Society in 1918. His premature death at the young age of 33, however, deprived India of a great genius.71 Bose and Ramanujan, both derived inspiration for their work from the philosophical tradition of their country. C.V. Raman (1888–1970) was another link in this chain. An M.A. from Madras University and professor of physics at Calcutta University (1917–1933), he became a Fellow of the Royal Society in 1924 and was the first Asian to be awarded the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1930. During 1933–1938, he was the Director of the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore.72 Between the two World Wars, several other Indians joined them and excelled in their respective areas of research of fundamental nature, and manifested the spirit of their time. Meghnad Saha (1893–1956) was probably the most important of them. An M.A. from Calcutta University and professor of physics at Calcutta and Allahabad Universities during 1921–1956, he had become an international name in astrophysics by the 1920s.73 In 1927, he was elected a fellow of the Royal Society and was associated with several other prestigious scientific societies of the world.74 In later years, he evinced active interest in an amazingly large number of other subjects—ranging from hydraulics and water resource management to the relation of science with society, culture and political ideology, calendar reform, antiquity and even reordering of the human societies and the Earth’s resources. An admirer of socialism and the Soviet social reconstruction, he was probably one of the most dominant voices of his time in Asia, calling for harnessing science for the welfare of the humankind. He brought out a journal Science and Culture modelled after Nature from 1935, and, like J.D. Bernal in Britain, he opposed imperialism and led a movement for harnessing science for social progress.75 His classmate, S.N. Bose (1894–1974) charted his own course of excellence in theoretical physics. Mukherjee, Visvapriya, Jagadis Chandra Bose, New Delhi, 1983. Ranganathan, S., Ramanujan, the Man and the Mathematician, Bombay, 1967. 72 Venkatraman, G., Journey Through Light, Delhi, 1991. 73 The American Astrophysical Journal published his paper ‘On Selective Radiation Pressure and its application’ in 1919. 74 Jagjit Singh, Some Eminent Indian Scientists, 1965; New Delhi, 1991, pp. 153–160. 75 Sen, S.N., ed., Professor Meghnad Saha, His Life, Work and Philosophy, Calcutta, 1954. 70 71

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He visited Paris in 1924 and worked at the Madame Curie Laboratory; later he went to Berlin and worked with Albert Einstein. For his unusual brilliance, he had once secured 110 marks out of 100 in his mathematics paper thanks to his unusual skill of solving questions in different ways. He was made a Fellow of the Royal Society in 1958.76 By the time the Second World War commenced, a new line of Indian scientists of exceptional abilities was falling up: S.K. Mitra, P.C. Mahalanobis, D.S. Kothari, K.S. Krishnan, H.J. Bhabha and S. Chandrasekhar to name some of them. S.K. Mitra (1890–1963) was a pioneer researcher in radiophysics and electronics. He was probably the first in India to organise teaching and research in wireless at Calcutta University. Thanks to the research of his laboratory, the D layer, the lowermost absorbing layer of the ionosphere was discovered in 1941. His book The Upper Atmosphere (1947) brought him international fame and decorations.77 P.C. Mahalanobis (1893–1973) started as a professor of physics at Calcutta University but became famous for his research in statistics. He founded the Indian Statistical Institute in 1931 at Calcutta, brought out a journal Sankhya: Indian Journal of Statistics, and was elected the Fellow of the Royal Society in 1945. His approach was interdisciplinary as he interacted, beyond his own specialities of physics and mathematics, with a range of subjects like economics and anthropology, and produced research of fundamental nature. His contribution was soon recognised internationally and he was appointed on the international bodies.78 K.S. Krishnan (1898–1961) was another name who worked as university teacher of physics at Calcutta University through the Second World War. His work on molecules and magnetic properties of crystals and their internal architecture was recognised by a British Fellowship of the Royal Society in 1940 and a knighthood in 1946.79 Of those born in the 20th century and active professionally during the Second World War, D.S. Kothari (1906–1993) was an important scientist who worked at the University of Delhi. He made significant contribution in the realm of astrophysics which he later applied to what was gradually known as operational research and defence science. Working on celestial bodies like the moon and stars, he earned international fame for his research on Pressure Ionization principle to 76 77 78 79

Jagjit Singh, Some Eminent Indian Scientists, 1965; New Delhi, 1991, pp. 43–52. A.P. Mitra, Fifty Years of Radio Science in India, INSA, New Delhi, 1984. A. Mahalanobis, Prasanta Chandra Mahalanobis, 1983; New Delhi, 1989. Jagjit Singh, Some Eminent Indian Scientists, 1991, pp. 102–109.

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explain the formation of White Dwarfs.80 H.J. Bhabha (1909–1966) was another physicist of great promise of the time. A Parsi from Bombay, Bhabha did his graduation and Ph.D. from Cambridge (1930–1934), and later joined the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore. He worked there as Reader in theoretical physics during 1941–1942 and as Professor at its Cosmic Ray Unit from 1942 to 45. His research interest included Quantum Theory, Elementary Physical Particles and Cosmic Radiation. He achieved international fame at a very young age. Even as a student, he had made some discoveries in electricity, magnetism, quantum theory and cosmic rays. After his stint abroad, he returned to India with great ambition to raise Indian science to greater heights. Next to Ramanujan, he was the youngest Indian to become a Fellow of the Royal Society. Right in the wake of the war, he was instrumental in the establishment of the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research in 1945 in Bombay. Later he was appointed the first chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission set up in 1948; and it was largely due to his efforts that India’s first Atomic Research Centre, now named after him, was established in Bombay. He was, indeed, quick to perceive the potentials of nuclear energy for peacetime progress after its monstrous display at Hiroshima.81 Subramanyan Chandrasekhar (1910–1995) fell in a slightly different category. An M.A. from Madras University, he received his Ph.D. and D.Sc. from Cambridge (in 1933 and 1942 respectively), but instead of settling in India after his studies, he moved to the USA to work for the rest of his life in the field of astrophysics at the Chicago University where he received the Nobel Prize for his work in 1983.82 These scientists demonstrated India’s indigenous potentials for fundamental research and favourably compared with the best in the world. Most interestingly, they were working on the same subjects as the researchers in the West were preoccupied with—atomic energy, atmosphere, radio and wireless and nature of certain metals likely to be helpful for the war operations. However, this efflorescence of Indian genius was sunned in the absence of appropriate opportunities and an encouraging colonial policy. In the presence of such a strong indigenous response, the silence of the colonial government over research on Jagjit Singh, Eminent Indian Scientists, 1991, pp. 91–101. Jagjit Singh, Eminent Indian Scientists, 1991, pp. 7–19. 82 Wilhelm Odelberg, Les Prix Nobel: The Nobel Prizes 1983, Stockholm, 1984; also Jagjit Singh, Eminent Indian Scientists, 1991, pp. 53–62. 80 81

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nuclear energy, for example, amply speaks of its real intentions and working of imperialism in its vicious operation. The colonial mindset was an immediate hindrance in the way. The British were not interested in knowledge for the sake of knowledge in India and hence did not promote basic sciences, more especially fundamental research, because its results could not be harnessed in a short span of time and to an exclusively desired end. Moreover, since colonial interest and activities were closely allied with that of the metropolis, India, like any other colony, was better used only as a source of data for higher researches carried out in Britain. As far as the Indians in general were concerned, most of them were too preoccupied with the basic problems of life to think of pure science and fundamental research. Those who could were faced with inhibiting limitations: Lack of authority and finances to execute any plan in this direction was the first and foremost obstacle. So was the question of priorities. For a hungry and poor Indian, the first necessity was food, shelter and health care, and not the delights of higher knowledge. And finally, there was the big question: Quest for knowledge for whose science, and for what? Science of the masters or that of the subject? Of the East or the West? Though mute apparently, the problem did, indeed, bother the Indian mind and affected its creativity and performance adversely.83 In the circumstances, the work and career of the Indian scientists followed varied patterns: Of them, those who were sensitive to the basic and immediate problems of the Indian life under subjugation, progressively developed radical views (some of them having admiration for socialism) and became activists. Even though they continued their research work, freedom and national reconstruction became their immediate concern. P.C. Ray and M.N. Saha were the leading names in this group. There were others who, with their liberal mental makeup and inclination for capitalism, kept themselves associated with the colonial establishment or the organisations patronised by it (like S.S. Bhatnagar and C.V. Raman). The third category and probably the largest one consisted of those who worked in anonymity at varieties of institutions spread all over the country, but in the absence of resources, free83

Ashis Nandy, Alternative Science: Creativity and Authenticity in Two Indian Scientists, New Delhi, 1980. In the context of the Orient, see Susantha Goonatilake, Aborted Discovery: Science and Creativity in the Third World, London, 1984; and his Towards Global Science, 1998; New Delhi, 1999.

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dom of work and opportunities, could not find their place in history. And there were still others who had no patience to undergo the ordeals of colonialism and, so, left India forever, S. Chandrasekhar being one of them. Irrespective of their categories or ideological orientation, however, since none of them was taken into confidence by the British and associated with the strategic research of the Empire in spite of the relevance of their research, they looked for freedom and were inclined to the nationalist endeavour for reconstruction. In that, they all manifested the spirit of the new world and foreshadowed the scientific temper of the Nehruvian era.84 They visualised a clear role for science—even for pure science—in social progress. Their contribution and vision were realised and recognised as soon as the colonial rule ended and the national government came at the helm of affairs. These scientists were placed at important advisory and executive positions of the national government of India, dealing with science and technology, national planning, education and so on. Bhatnagar continued as the head of the CSIR to later become the founding Chairman of the UGC; and Bhabha was appointed the Chairman of the newly created Atomic Energy Commission of the Government of India and later became Secretary, Department of Atomic Energy, to be rightly remembered today as the ‘Father of Indian Nuclear Science.’ Mahalanobis was appointed Statistical Advisor to the Government of India and later, Member, Planning Commission. Kothari became scientific advisor to the Defence Ministry; and Krishnan became as the first Director of the National Physical Laboratory. Professional awards aside, most of them were decorated with state honours after Independence in recognition of their contribution.85 Thus, it is evident from the foregoing discussion that the basic aim of the colonial policy towards science in India until about the middle of the Second World War was to make the best use of the Indian resources for ensuring victory in the war. This motive guided the authorities in according priority to the different branches of science and technology at the time; as a result, certain areas received considerable attention and encouragement, while interests of others were overlooked, 84

Jawaharlal Nehru, Jawaharlal Nehru on Science and Society, edited by Baldev Singh, New Delhi, 1988. 85 Jagjit Singh, Eminent Indian Scientists, 1991, is a handy reference for eminent scientists of modern Indian.

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selectively served, or just left in the doldrums. But with the slackening of political control over the country and emergence of the new forces of change that exerted pressure on the government, the authorities were compelled for change in their attitude from about the middle of the war. Though the war was still a challenge for the government, concern for post-war problems became equally engaging. Things were fast changing and global concern for reconstruction found strong echoes in India, too. Economic and material reconstruction was urgently required not only for the welfare of the people but also because it would probably ensure a place for the British in the changed conditions after the war.86 The Government of India, therefore, initiated a policy of reconstruction for the development of the country on modern lines and with the help of science and technology. This constitutes the theme of the next chapter.

‘India in the Economic Order,’ ‘Most Secret,’ No. 13, MSS Euro 0116317, T. Gregory Paper, IOL&R, London. 86

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chapter five SCIENCE FOR RECONSTRUCTION

As the Second World War brought an unprecedented destruction in its trail and dislocation in every sphere of life, it united at the same time the destinies of the peoples of the world in many ways and brought them closer than ever before. The new world order that emerged out of the global conflict could be sustained only by mutual understanding and cooperation of all. Thus, from the chaos and savagery of the war emerged a growing desire for coexistence, harmony and common good. Initially, this began with the Allied efforts for security but soon led to a range of activities of mutual co-operation at various levels, culminating in the formation, in 1945, of the United Nations Organisation (UNO). These developments had profound impact on Britain and her vast Empire including India. In India, this concern assumed significant political dimensions not only in relation to imperialism and nationalism but also for the advancement of science and technology. Here, the war and the new forces of change it released combined with the local factors to compel the colonial authorities to respond sympathetically to the national aspirations and to use science for material reconstruction of the country. This was an important shift from the colonial policy in the past.

Imperial Initiative in the US Partnership Politically, the beginning of this shift at the highest level can be traced to the entry of the Labour Party into the National Government in Britain in May 1940.1 A general concern for socio-economic reconstruction was very much in the air in the UK around this time. The subject had assumed dimensions of almost a movement and a fast-growing public opinion focused on social issues and called for wide-ranging reconstruc-

1

Stephen Howe, Anti-Colonialism in British Politics: The Left and the End of the Empire 1918–1964, Oxford, 1993.

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tion with liberal state support.2 The Beveridge Report on social security was published in December 1942 and a range of government activities were directed towards planning in this regard.3 An important aspect of these endeavours was an increasing emphasis on using science and technology in this context. Finally, even Churchill found time from his engrossing preoccupation with politics and war to pay some attention to social problems. He appointed a Cabinet Committee on Reconstruction with a Cabinet Minister in charge. These developments made Linlithgow initiate measures for post-war reconstruction in India. Clement R. Attlee, the Labour member in the National Government, pleaded for making the wartime measures of planning and control a permanent feature so that Britain could develop as a socialist state.4 Given its ideological orientation, the Labour Party was prompt to express its stand on the problems of the colonies. Attlee was an expert on India and his party sympathized with her national aspirations. So, her socio-economic problems engaged their attention immediately. Soon after the formation of the National Government, Ernest Bevin, Minister of Labour (1940–1945), put up a proposal to bring young Indians to the UK for industrial training. The proposal was initially turned down by India Office as well as the Viceroy, but eventually Bevin succeeded, and under his scheme as many as 700 Indians were trained as technicians by the end of 1945. He also helped in finding technicians and instructors to be sent to India to start training schemes there.5 After reconstituting his cabinet in February 1942, Winston Churchill sent Sir Stafford Cripps, the leader of the House of Commons and the Lord Privy Seal, to India, with a draft proposal on the political problems of the country. Though Cripps had joined the Commons as an independent candidate, his association with socialism and the Labour Party had been long and close. He was also interested in India and ideologically had come closer to Jawaharlal Nehru even before the war. In fact, Cripps had been invited to attend the annual session of the Indian National Congress in 1936—a rare honour for an Englishman, though he could not make it. But Cripps could not succeed in his J.D. Bernal, Social Functions of Science, London, 1939. Also see A. Marwick, Britain in the Century of Total War: War, Peace and Social Change 1900–1967, London, 1968. 3 Lady Beveridge, Beveridge and His Plan, 1945. 4 Kenneth Harris, Attlee, London, 1982, p. 219. 5 Allan Bullock, Life and Times of Ernest Bevin, vol. II: Minister of Labour 1940–1945, 1967; London, 1972, p. 206. 2

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mission. On his return however, he, along with Bevin, submitted to the British Cabinet a memorandum for the social reconstruction of India after the war. For this, they accorded special priority to wider education, reduction in birth rate, higher productivity in agriculture and allied industries, and increase in non-agricultural employment. They called for launching a massive campaign for mass education on the lines of the efforts made in Russia and Turkey. Though this was not intended for promoting science in the country directly, its potential value for it was obvious. Likewise, they wanted to make people conscious of the problem of population, through rational ideas and scientific knowledge which, they suggested, should be thoroughly investigated by a team of experts, consisting of a medical man, an economist, a statistician and a sociologist.6 The memorandum placed great emphasis on the improvement in the productivity of agriculture and associated handicraft industries. The key to village reconstruction in India, it believed, was a greatly improved transport system for which a massive road building campaign based on village cooperation was essential.7 Keeping in view India’s dependence on rural economy, these suggestions were not only constructive and well meaning but extremely vital, too. Here, even without consciously understanding its implications, the two Britons were raising the question of what is now called appropriate technology and were supporting the use of indigenous technology and resources, which until then had constituted the principal basis of Gandhi’s programme of rural reconstruction.8 But they also wanted that India should make use of modern techniques of economic planning and industrial and financial management, and pleaded for drawing an all India programme of industrial development into which a series of provincial programmes could be fitted. These were to consist of building of the railways and roads, development of sources of power and expansion of existing industries. These and such other industrial ventures were to be managed by public cor-

6 ‘A Social and Economic Policy for India’, a memorandum enclosed with Cripps’s letter to Amery, 15 Dec.1942, in N. Mansergh, Transfer of Powers (TOP), vol. III, L 276, pp. 374–384. 7 Ibid. 8 For the contemporary debate, see Gyanchand, ‘Introduction’; J.K. Mehta, ‘Philosophy of Industrialisation’; and V.K.R.V. Rao, ‘Small Scale and Cottage Industries’, all in P.C. Jain, Industrial Problems of India, 1942, pp. 7–50, 65–88.

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porations.9 The concepts of planning and corporations indicate the influence of both the socialist system of the USSR as well as Western capitalism on the proposed reconstruction plan. By this time, even Leopold Charles M.S. Amery, Secretary of State for India (1940–1945), had begun thinking of India’s reconstruction. On 27 May 1942, he wrote to Linlithgow: And what if we ourselves, during the interval… between the War and Indian self-government, set ourselves in the same spirit to a complete overhaul of India’s national life? I am thinking not only of public works on a gigantic scale, financed by loan or issue of paper but of a wholesale re-building and replanning of villages… . Might it not be our duty after the war to put ourselves in a position of a bold, farsighted and benevolent despot, determined in a few years, in a series of five years plans, to raise India’s millions to a new level of physical wellbeing and efficiency.10

But Linlithgow did not like the idea and found it ‘administratively and financially impossible.’ However, when persuaded by the War Cabinet, he later yielded on the question and promised to welcome a Cabinet memorandum on social policy.11 Just about this time Churchill’s attitude, too, underwent a drastic change. After the failure of the Cripps Mission, he suddenly felt that the British Government should initiate a major policy of social and economic reform as an alternative to political change for India.12 Subsequently, in January 1943, Amery drafted a note on social and economic policy for India, and suggested that the new Viceroy, when appointed, might be directed to pay as much attention as he could to social and economic progress to redress the balance in Indian affair— between politics on the one hand and social and economic progress on the other.13 But why this sudden change of hearts? The reasons were many. Military and political considerations were obviously the first and foremost. While the fall of France brought the conflict closer to Britain, the German threat of advance towards India and fall of British territories to Mansergh, TOP, vol. III, L 276, pp. 374–384. Mansergh, TOP, vol. II, L 95, p. 140. 11 Mansergh, TOP, vol. IV, L 48, Linlithgow to Amery, 16 Jul. 1943, p. 86.; Ibid., vol. II, L 664, War Cabinet W.M. (42) 1119th conclusions, 31 Aug. 1942, p. 855; and L 780, Linlithgow to Amery, 21 Sep. 1942, p. 10005. 12 Mansergh, TOP, vol. II, L 775, Churchill to Cripps and Amery, 20 Sep. 1942, p. 999. Also see R.J. Moor, Churchill, Crisp and India, 1939–1945, Oxford, 1979. 13 Mansergh, TOP, vol. III, L 356, ‘Social and Economic Policy for India’, enclosed with this letter from Amery to Bevin, pp. 530–534. 9

10

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Japan in the East made it urgently necessary for the British and their Allies to chalk out a new war strategy. A safe base for military operations in the East with unhindered, independent supply and service facilities for the Allied forces was urgently required. Thanks to her geographical location, India was considered to be the best place for a base east of the Suez. In addition, the county had vast resources, but they needed to be developed before being tapped. This was all the more important as Britain was fast losing many of her sources of supply on account of territorial losses in the East, or disruption in transport and communications, especially at a time when the hostilities appeared to continue for long. By now Britain was also worried about America’s economic designs in India. Bevin suspected that the USA would try to industrialize India after the war in an effort to create for itself a market there. Therefore, he wanted to do this for Britain before America did for herself.14 In the circumstances that prevailed at the time, there was possibly no other alternative either. In the face of the growing opposition to British rule within the country and Axis propaganda against the Empire, support for the Raj could be retained not through repression but through a policy of welfare and material reconstruction alone.15 However, as the war prolonged and expanded in ferocity and area, it appeared to be too colossal to be taken up by the British singlehandedly. It was a global crisis demanding long-term, concerted efforts to solve it. It hinted at the same time at the shape of things to come after the war. Faced with a common threat, the welfare of one society could not be ensured while excluding that of others. Thus, ironically, the war had also come as a unifier and equalizer, revealing the intrinsic unity of human destiny, hence of its welfare. The colonial policy was, therefore, influenced by a variety of factors and forces working from outside the country as well as from within. Along with the urgency of developing India as a base for Allied operations, reconstruction was needed also for assuaging the world opinion progressively holding the British rule responsible for India’s poverty and backwardness. What worried Britain most was the fact that such an opinion was entertained by her chief ally—the USA which was fast emerging as a rival to Britain, not only in international diplomacy but also in trade and business. The Axis propaganda of British atrocities and the poverty Mansergh, TOP, vol. III, Bevin to Amery, 21 Sep. 1942, Entry no. 5, pp. 8–9. Mansergh, TOP, vol. II, Entry no. 678, Note by Cripps entitled ‘INDIA’, 2 Sep. 1942, pp. 882–885. 14 15

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and backwardness caused by the foreign rule in India, too, needed to be countered by a gesture of goodwill towards her.16 There was also a growing pressure from international organizations and professional groups for reform and reconstruction in the country. Ever since the devastation and disruptions of the First World War, international concern for global progress and peace had increased. The League of Nations, International Labour Organisation (ILO), Institute of Intellectual Property and others kept a watch over human conditions across the globe. Their surveys and reports on social and material conditions in India highlighted in turn the poverty and backwardness of the country. In the process, they also focused on various aspects of life and on the potential of science to improve them.17 Added to these was the longstanding indigenous demand for progressive measures for development. In the circumstances, a constructive response from the Raj for reconstruction became almost unavoidable. Consequently, from about the middle of the war, the government decided to develop India in a more open manner and on a long-term basis in which science and technology would be required to play an important role. This led to a massive programme of surveys and planning. To meet the immediate requirements of the war, the colonial initiative began with efforts to organize and develop the technical capabilities within the country. But as the needs of the war and the circumstances dictated, official measures also embraced progressively such areas as scientific and industrial research, agriculture, medical science and public health, and transport and communications. This was a major change in the colonial policy. The necessity of economic regeneration was no longer the concern of the Indians alone. Apart from a section of the Englishmen, Britain’s leading ally, the USA, too, supported the cause of India’s development. Its democratic tradition and an apparently anti-imperialist stand on international issues apart, the USA did also have other interests and involvement in India. Much is known about the American contribu-

16 Sanjoy Bhattacharya and Benjamin Zachariah, ‘ “A Great Destiny”: The British Colonial State and the Advertisement of Post-War Reconstruction in India, 1942–1945’, South Asia Research, 19, 1, 1999, pp. 71–100. 17 Royal International Affairs, World Agriculture: An International Survey, A Report by a Study Group of the Royal International Affairs, London, 1932. Also see ‘United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration’, S&C, X, 4, Oct. 1944, pp. 168–172; ‘Food Situation and Agricultural Development,’ International Labour Review, 51, Mar. 1945, pp. 347–353; ‘Food Policy and Agricultural Development in India,’ International Labour Review, 52, Aug. 1945, pp. 227–229.

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tion to India’s freedom struggle,18 but not that the US interest in India’s economy and development was older and more productive. This interest was particularly evident in the fields of industry, and science and technology. Its genesis can be more clearly traced to the beginning of the 20th century, when technical expertise and personnel from the USA were procured by the Tatas for the first steel plant of the country.19 Almost about the same time a private American munificence led to the establishment of India’s first major research institute for agricultural science at Pusa. Later, financial grants for survey, training and research in various areas of science came from such agencies as the Rockefeller Foundation. With the support of the Foundation, another major research centre of the country, (later called All-India) Institute of Hygiene and Public Health was established at Calcutta in the early 1930s. Apart from the mutual trade, India’s technical collaboration with American firms had increased since the First World War; the war of 1939 gave them further impetus. Thus, the American involvement in India was considerable by now.20 However, the US interest in India had so far been largely a nongovernmental affair. But once India became the base of Allied operations in Asia, the American government came in direct contact with her problems and got an opportunity to intervene in them.21 In the process, she was seized with the urgency of developing India, for which the Atlantic Charter added to America’s moral obligations as a democratic state.22 Furthermore, as the leader of the newly emerging world order, she had various other considerations—political, economic and strategic. Politically and strategically, her involvement in Asia increased during the war and a large number of her soldiers were stationed in India and the neighbouring countries. Her economic interest in the region (as in India and China) increased on account of technical collaborations during the war.23 Thus, apart from ensuring Indian support and resources for the Allied war efforts, a developed, stable and friendly India was vital also for the US interests in Asia. This motivated AmerGuy Hope, America and Swaraj: the U.S. Role in Indian Independence, Washington, 1968. Frank Harris, Jamsetji Nusservanji Tata—A Chronicle of His Life, 1924, Bombay, 1958, pp. 159–167. 20 For details, see Chap. II and medical section of Chap. III. 21 Gary R. Hess, America Encounters India, 1941–1947, London, 1971. 22 T.N. Das, The Atlantic Charter and India, New York, 1942. 23 Walchand Hirachand Papers; also see Proc. GOI, Finance Dept.—Planning Branch: FNO. 8 (11), p/.45; Mansergh, TOP, vol. V, L 299, Wavell to Amery, p. 662. 18 19

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ica to call for India’s development and aid her technically. Also, there existed in America a lobby that supported the cause of India’s freedom and development. This became more active in the 1940s because of the wartime happenings in and outside India. The occurrence of a devastating famine in India during the war stirred this lobby to impress upon the US government to actively take up the cause of the freedom and development of India. The initiative that followed goaded the British for India’s economic reconstruction.24 This was not a happy situation for the British for whom India, after all, was a ‘colony’. But the United States persisted on its stand. In this way, despite its closeness with Britain as an ally, the US attitude towards India often alerted or embarrassed the British authorities and sometimes even irritated them.25 Yet the British could not overlook the American stand because the United States was not only their principal ally in the war but had also an impressive record of contributions towards India’s endeavour to modernize and develop in the past. Even in the ongoing war when the state aid to scientific organizations in India was drastically cut, the Rockefeller Foundation of America was among the few agencies that helped some of them financially.26 This created goodwill between the peoples of India and America. Moreover, the US initiative and the American model of progress were far more preferable for the colonial government to the Soviet model which was anti-imperialist and, in the context of India, anti-British. As a matter of fact, the fear of socialism was by now looming large in the minds of the rulers. They, therefore, gave in to the demands of developing India. Soon, hundreds of Indians were sent to the USA for training and education and many American experts in different areas were officially invited to India to help in the reconstruction programme.27 And, in fact, one of the first major development schemes of the country— Damodar Valley Project (DVC)—was envisaged, and later executed, 24 For details, see M.V. Kamath, The United States and India 1776–1976, Washington DC, 1976; M.S. Venkataramani, Bengal Famine of 1943: The American Response, Delhi, 1973. 25 Mansergh, TOP, vol. III: Bevin to Amery, ‘Secret’, L/E/8/2527: ff. 270–271, 21 Sep. 1942, pp. 8–9. 26 Rockefeller Foundation Papers: Record Grant 1.1 project, series: 464: Box No. 1, Folder 1, 464; Box 5, Folder 37–44, 464A, etc., at Rockefeller Archive Centre, New York. 27 Prog. of Edu. 1937–1947, vol. I, pp. 288–292. Also see Procs. GOI Dept. of Edu., Health & Lands, Edu. Branch, F. No. 27–27/44 E; Finance Dept.—Planning & Development Branch: F. No. 11(1) P/45. K.W.

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on the model of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) of the United States.28 This offered America a foothold in India from where she could articulate her economic cooperation into a diplomatic device to deal with the lurking problems and harness the opportunities of the postwar world. As a result, she upgraded her diplomatic relations with India significantly, which was very weak and scanty until then. And interestingly, despite the occasional ups and downs, America has not afforded to neglect it ever since. The appointment of Henry Grady, the leader of the American Technical Mission to India during the war as the first Ambassador of the USA in India was, therefore, only a natural corollary of the events and the forces at work at the time.29

Compulsions, Strategy and Measures The change in the British attitude discussed above was quite in line with the long-felt concern for national reconstruction among the Indians. As the war approached, the demand for reform and reconstruction became powerful and vociferous, receiving enthusiastic support not only of a few intellectuals but virtually every important section of the Indian society—economists, industrialists, scientists and others. The National Planning Committee (NPC) and the Science and Culture group in particular espoused the cause of reconstruction most forcefully. While the NPC prepared a comprehensive plan of national reconstruction for the whole of India throughout the war years, Indian scientists discussed the scientific and technical details of reconstruction through writings, speeches and seminars besides working on the various committees of the NPC.30 The leading industrialists of the country presented a parallel scheme of development of their own, to be popularly known as the ‘Bombay Plan’.31 This was preceded and fol-

M.N. Saha and K. Ray, ‘Planning for the Damodar Valley’, S&C, X, 1, Jul. 1944, p. 20; also Preliminary Memorandum on the Unified Development of the Damodar River, Calcutta, 1946. 29 Kamath, United States and India, 1976. 30 S&C: III, 1937, p. 185; V, 1940, p. 639; X, 1944, p. 7; Modern Review, 57, 1940, p. 540. Also see procs. of the ‘Symposium on Post-War Organisation of Scientific Research in India’, 27–28 Sep. 1943, Procs. National Institute of Sciences of India (NISI ), 1944, esp. pp. 1–93. 31 Purshotamdas Thakurdas et al., A Brief Memorandum Outlining a Plan of Economic Development for India, Bombay, 1944. 28

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lowed by several other individual studies and plans that included a ‘People’s Plan’ by the noted Communist leader M.N. Roy (1887–1954), and also a plan presented by the Planning Committee of the AllIndia Muslim League.32 Gandhian model of development once again acquired voice, and one of Gandhi’s admirers and authorized interpreters, J.C. Kumarappa (1892–1955), pleaded planning and development based on it.33 However, except for the Gandhian plans, most of these plans underlined the necessity of executing them with the help of modern science and technology and aimed at material progress, and wanted the government to take urgent measures for an all-round reconstruction of the country.34 The Gandhian plan, on the other hand, wanted to use indigenous knowledge and skill for progress with emphasis on its moral and spiritual aspects. Meanwhile, the outbreak of the Quit India movement in 1942 compelled the authorities to accept the hard political realities. The movement and the tenor and tempo of contemporary politics made it abundantly clear that it was not the question of whether but of when and how to transfer power to Indians. It was a critical situation as Britain was losing the ‘Jewel’ of her Empire. So, it was better to take things in their stride and deal with India in a friendly manner. Hence it was better to free her as a friend who could become an ally and a trade partner in the radically changed world order after the war, than to lose her as an enemy, the British felt.35 This encouraged them to divert their attention to India’s socio-economic problems and help her become to some extent, materially developed and economically self-sufficient. Such an attitude did have not only a strong element of statesmanship but also a

32 M.N. Roy, People’s Plan, Calcutta, 1943; and I. Talbot, ‘Planning for Pakistan: The Planning Committee of the All-India Muslim League 1943–1946’, Modern Asian Studies, vol. 28, no. 4, 1994, pp. 877–886. Others were Nalini Ranjan Sarkar, Economic Policy and Programme for Post-War India, Patna, 1945; A.N. Agarwala, Some Economic Issues of Transition and Planning in India, Allahabad, n. d. 33 J.C. Kumarappa, Why the Village Movement? (A plea for a village centred economic order in India), 1936; Wardha: fifth edn. 1949; and idem, The Economy of Permanence, Wardha, 1948. Also see S.N. Agarwal, The Gandhian Plan of Economic Development for India, Bombay, 1944. 34 Mansergh, TOP, vol. III, Entry nos. 114, 276, 643, 668. For a recent commentary on development, see Benjamin Zachariah, Developing India: An Intellectual and Social History, c. 1930–1950, New Delhi, 2005. 35 Bevin to Amery, 21 Sep. 1942, in Mansergh, TOP, vol. III, L. 5, pp. 8–10. Also see T. Gregory Papers: Most Secret, ‘India and the Economic Order’, MSS, Euro 11637, IOL&R, London.

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modicum of decency helpful to face the crumbling of the Empire. What was equally important, it also reflected the changing socio-political attitude in the UK and, perhaps, the world over. In fact, in India, a Reconstruction Committee had been set up by the middle of 1941, followed by a central coordination committee, with several other committees to deal with the various aspects of the postwar problems. But on account of the war and exit of some of their members, these committees could not proceed far. Yet, the interest in the subject did not die down and the Central Government decided ultimately to undertake the post-war reconstruction through a committee of the Viceroy’s Executive Council in the same way as the war efforts had been dealt with by its War Resource Committee.36 As a result, a Reconstruction Committee of the Executive Council was created with a permanent office in March 1943 with the Viceroy as its president.37 More administrative measures followed, although the efforts to plan for post-war reconstruction remained a slow affair during the viceroyalty of Linlithgow. In July 1943, however, E.M. Jenkins, Secretary to the Department of Supply, submitted before the Reconstruction Committee of the Council a memorandum for a social and economic programme for India. It placed emphasis on planned industrialization, educational reform, improvement in public health services, communications, agriculture, and on town-planning and slum clearance. Jenkins pleaded for a closer cooperation between industries in India and Britain and advised the Government of India to cooperate with industry in matters of research and training. With a view to improving rural economy and agriculture, he wanted the consolidation of small land holdings to be taken up on an all-India basis in right earnest on the patterns followed in the USSR. This was, no doubt, an issue vital for agricultural improvement in India, which had seldom been taken up seriously by the authorities in the past. Appreciating the progress in scientific and industrial research during the war, he held that India would require a first class industrial organisation. He also wanted arrangements for a mass training of Indian technicians, both in India and abroad, to be made soon after the war. These arrangements were to be an integral part of the

Ibid.; also see Sir F.E. James’ Statement, in CLA Debates, 11 Mar. 1943, p. 995. See ‘Post-War Reconstruction in India’, a note by Amery in Mansergh, TOP, vol. IV, Entry no. 336, 659–660; and Singh, Imperial Retreat, 1992, p. 138. 36 37

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general plan, and action in this regard would be taken in close consultation with the provincial governments.38 But a more genuine concern for India’s reconstruction became noticeable from October 1943, when Sir Archibald Percival Wavell joined as the new Viceroy of India (1943–1947). He was directed to take interest in planning for post-war reconstruction, in which he took special interest. In an address to the joint session of the Central Legislature on 17 February 1944, he observed: Our task is to use rightly and to best advantage her (India’s) great assets, not increase the wealth of the few but to raise the many from poverty to a decent standard of comfort. A hard task indeed, but a noble task which calls for a spirit of co-operation, a spirit of hope and a spirit of sacrifice. The present government means to prepare the way for India’s post-war development with all earnestness of spirit and with all resources, official and non-official, which it can enlist…. Our great aim must be to plan for economic and social development so as to raise our standards of living and general welfare. We must lift the poor man of India from poverty to security; from ill health to vigour; from ignorance to understanding; and our rate of progress must no longer be at bullock-cart standard but at least at the pace of the handy serviceable jeep.39

To give effect to his ideas, Wavell appointed officers to draw up outline plans for subjects like electrification, industries, road development, irrigation and agriculture, all of which involved technological application. These officers were to be responsible to the appropriate departments for preparation of all India plans and were to be assisted by panels of experts nominated by the Centre and by representatives of the Provinces and States. Besides, several committees and sub-committees, consisting of officials and non-official members from the Centre, Provinces and the States, were constituted to formulate policy and plans with regard to the different aspects of reconstruction.40 Wavell also wanted Indians from the fields of industry, health services and other areas vital for development to visit the UK and the USA to study the latest advances in their spheres of work there.41 38 ‘A Social and Economic Programme for India’, in Mansergh, TOP, vol. IV, L 36, pp. 66–73. 39 CLA Debates, 17 Feb. 1944, pp. 339–340 ff. For more details about Wavell, see John, N. Connel, Wavell, Scholar and Soldier, London, 1964. 40 Mansergh, TOP, vol. IV, Entry no. 336, pp. 659–660; and First Report on the Progress of Reconstruction Planning, New Delhi, 1944. 41 Singh, 1992, p. 140.

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The Viceroy convened a meeting of the Governors of the provinces in November 1943 and presented a memorandum of post-war reconstruction for consideration. It underlined the necessity of industrialization in the widest sense, for which he considered the development of electrical power an important prerequisite. In this connection, he expressed hope that the sterling balance India was having at the time would provide her ample sterling exchange against the rupee finance for the import of capital goods at the earliest possible. And finally, he hoped that the British Government would help India in securing experts and technicians from abroad, and in training Indians for higher supervisory posts.42 Unlike most of his predecessors, Wavell appeared to be serious; so, he called for immediate planning both at the Centre and in the provinces, based on a close coordination between the two.43 Soon he secured permission of the War Cabinet to appoint one Indian Member in his Council for post-war reconstruction. A new Department of Planning and Development was created and Sir Ardeshir Dalal (1884–1949), an ICS and a Tata associate, was appointed its Member-in-Charge (June 1944–December 1945). Dalal took charge of the portfolio on 1 August 1944. The department was responsible for preparation of an all-India plan and its presentation to the Council. It was also to stimulate and coordinate the activities concerning reconstruction of the Central, Provincial and State governments.44 The formation of this department evoked mixed feelings in the public press. While announcing its creation, the government did not declare the objective behind the step. Yet, the very fact that the portfolio was offered to Dalal, one of the signatories of the Bombay Plan, showed, as Dalal himself pointed out, that perhaps the government did have a certain amount of sympathy with the declared objectives of the Bombay Plan. The plan aimed at the raising of standard of living of the common man of India by a process of planned expansion of industry, agriculture, communications and other nation building activities, in so far as it was compatible with the interests of imperialism. Nothing more could be expected in the prevailing circumstances.45 42 ‘Post-War Reconstruction,’ a memorandum by Wavell, in Mansergh, TOP, vol. IV, Entry no. 198, pp. 423–430. 43 TOP, vol. IV, L 510, p. 970. 44 ‘National Research Council,’ editorial, S&C, XIII, 1, Jul. 1947, p. 123; Singh, Imperial Retreat, 1992, p. 141. For Dalal, refer to Ardeshir Dalal: A Memoir, Bombay, 1980. 45 ‘Department of Planning and Development,’ S&C, X, 1, Jul. 1944, pp. 7 ff.; also CLA Debates, 17 Feb. 1944, p. 340.

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Dalal took up his task with enthusiasm and prepared a plan for rapid industrialization of the country, with assistance of the state and under state control. Central control of twenty basic industries was generally accepted by the provinces. The scheme for registering import of capital goods was introduced in order to ensure a planned development of industries. The Viceroy’s Council approved the policy that as far as possible financial and administrative control over basic industries should be in the Indian hands.46 Thus, from 1943 to the end of the war and beyond, a wide range of official initiatives towards reconstruction were taken up. The official steps taken in this regard have already been discussed in the previous chapters; what is to be highlighted here, is their general trends, focus and goals. Whether it were the surveys and planning in the field of technical education, industrial research, agriculture or health, from about the second half of 1943, the focus gradually shifted from the needs of the Empire to those of India, with an all India perspective and long term goals. Economic and material reconstruction assumed wider meanings now: Self-sufficiency in education and research was emphasised; health rose higher in official priorities; and development in the country came to be viewed as rural reconstruction. So, survey and planning became urgently important; and the government paid active attention to such sectors as transport and communications, power and water management. This called for the help of science and technology in a big way, together with better management of the natural resources. No wonder, an elaborate scheme of road development with a system of National Highways was mooted (1943), a Central Technical Power Board was set up (1944), and multi-purpose river valley projects like the DVC were planned. These were far more liberal steps and well in tune with the developments all over the world. An intensive exercise in detailed planning for post-war reconstruction continued through 1944–1945. The Government of India contemplated spending Rs.1, 000 crores (10000 million) during the first five years after the war. It further estimated an investment of Rs. 500 crores (5000 million) on private account and at least another Rs. 150 crores (1500 million) by the Provincial and State governments from their own resources. Besides setting up the various boards, some of which are mentioned above, the government constituted scores of panels of indus-

46

Singh, Imperial Retreat, 1992, pp. 141–142.

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trialists and government personnel to plan for industrial development.47 Plans were made for high level technical training abroad on a large scale. Steps were also taken to set up a government fertilizer factory at a cost of Rs.10 crore (100 million).48 That the government was interested in planning and reconstruction is indicated from the budget speech of Sir Jeremy Raisman, for 1945–1946: A scheme of national development of the kind contemplated by a number of public leaders and writers, and by the government, has to be planned for, worked for and paid for. There is no easy road to big achievement in this field. It is essential therefore, that not only the centre but also the provinces should lose no time in developing to the full their financial resources, since it is clear that the combined resources of all will hardly be adequate for the great end in view.49

It also emphasized the enormity of the problem and the difficulties involved. Yet the question of India’s development kept the attention of the colonial government engaged as, of course, of the Indians, and the subject received wide publicity in the media.50

Industrialization under Cloud While all this was going on, the question of the country’s industrialization was involved in controversy and the focus on it was partly lost. The scheme of industrialization soon met with serious hurdles and criticism. Constitutional complications were first to come in the way. The Act of 1935 had provided ample safeguards to British interests in India; unless that was repealed, the new scheme could not be implemented properly. Of course, Dalal wanted to get rid of this discriminating provision and also went to Britain, in May 1945, to secure an amendment to the Act, but in vain.51 The British would not go back on their assurance of the 1935 Act (Clauses 111–121), granted to safeguard the interests of the British firms engaged in Indian trade. Though these commercial 47

GOI, Finance Dept.—Planning Branch: Confidential. Reconstruction Committee of Council: Post-War Development Policy (Draft). Several of them have been referred to in Chap. III. 48 Singh, Imperial Retreat, 1992, pp. 147–148. 49 CLA Debates, 28 Mar. 1945, p. 874. 50 Mansergh, TOP, vol. IV, Entry nos. 113, 237, 238, 454, 552, 676; and vol. V, Entry nos. 310, 383. 51 Mansergh, TOP, vol. V, Entry nos. 178, 299, 543, and 583.

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safeguards had always been resented in India, majority of the members of the War Cabinet opposed the proposal for India’s further industrialization on the ground that it was not in the interest of the Indian masses and that it would only entrench Indian ‘big business’ in a position of monopoly.52 Next came the question of control and financing of the prospective industries. While Dalal and his Department favoured limited state control, Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar, Member of Labour in the Viceroy’s Council, supported extensive nationalization of industries. The Acting Governor-General, however, thought that wide state control without previous experience would be disastrous. The issue of licensing of industries, too, raised a lot of controversy.53 Meanwhile, the need to consider the interests of the minorities added further to the complexities of the problem. While the Indian business class and a section of the bureaucracy supported private control over more and more industries, Ambedkar, the spokesman of the lower classes, stood, along with the Muslims, for nationalization of industries in as many sectors as possible because they believed that only the state controlled industries would allow the minorities a proportional allocation in jobs in the industrial sector. Besides, they feared that privatization would lead to Hindu dominance (upper caste Hindus for Ambedkar) in industries.54 In spite of these controversies, the official concern for planning and industrialization continued, though with wavering sincerity and at an unsteady pace. The biggest hurdle was the bureaucracy. It often came in the way of Dalal’s launching the new industrial policy. Frustrated and disgusted, he resigned in January 1946; so did C.N. Vakil, the eminent economist working on the consultative committee of economists. Vakil realised that there did not exist an atmosphere conducive for economic planning because the outlook of the bureaucracy had not changed as yet. By training and habit most of the bureaucrats were not suited for the work of planning and, as a rule, they were not willing to take expert advice in the matter. They wanted to sit in judgement on things they did not understand. They did not have that ‘comprehensive grasp of things which is essential for the success of planning’, nor the ‘necessary vision and determination to accomplish the task on national lines’.55

52 53 54 55

Mansergh, TOP, vol. V, L 456, p. 1052. Mansergh, TOP, vol. V, L 383, pp. 863–864. Ibid. and L 393, pp. 887–889; also Singh, Imperial Retreat, 1992, pp. 142–144. CLA Debates, 21 Mar 1946, p. 2752.

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Six months later, Wavell decided to abolish the Department of Planning and Development because it could be a bone of contention between the two major political parties if they joined the coalition government. The responsibilities of the Department were transferred partly to the Department of Industries and Supplies and partly to the Coordination Committee of the Council, under which a Development Board was set up to consider and coordinate the plans for post-war development.56 Thus, an important administrative venture to use science for the progress of the local society was abandoned. And the greatest pity of it all was that to justify its stand the government made excuses of an apprehension of a future discord (implicitly communal) among Indians, which the government itself had always tried to foment. Here, a comparison between the developments in India with those in Canada, a British colony with Dominion status, may be instructive. Like India, Canada, too, undertook a massive programme of reconstruction as many other countries did about this time.57 Not to talk only of the nature and range of her reconstruction programmes based on science and technology, the sheer volume of labour and money spent to translate them into practice leaves much to be desired for India.58 Incidentally, Canada had her own Dalal in C.D. Howe, but the status and clout of the two defy comparison. While Dalal laboured under a distressing political control and restrictions and had to resign in disgust even before he had started on his journey, Howe had ample official support and funding to do as he pleased. No wonder, he became a hero and an influential public figure who could look back with satisfaction at his achievements in national reconstruction,59 whereas Dalal almost vanished from the scene after his exit from the government. This difference between the status and achievements of the two is closely connected with the two different political environments they worked in. Nevertheless, this is not to suggest that all the official measures were a futile exercise and in no way did they contribute to the task of planning and reconstruction. No doubt, the programme of industrialization did not make much headway as far as the state initiative was conSingh, Imperial Retreat, 1992, p. 150. The Canada Year Book; C.P. Stacy, Canada and the Age of Conflict, vol. 2: 1921–1948: The Mackenzie King Era, Toronto, 1981. 58 Ibid. Also see C.D. Howe, Department of Reconstruction and Supply, Research and Scientific Activity: Canadian Federal Expenditure 1938–1946, 1947. For India, see Educational Statistics, British India, 1942–1945, Delhi, 1947. 59 Robert Bothwell and William Kilbourn, C.D. Howe: A Biography, Toronto, 1979. 56 57

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cerned; yet industrial activities in the private sector proceeded on an unprecedented scale. This could be possible because several negative government controls imposed before the war had been removed and; an environment of protection and a silent, indirect official encouragement to certain industries catering to the wartime requirements was provided.60 In other areas, if the administrative measures did not yield concrete results of great importance, they were, nevertheless, significant for understanding the shortcomings of the existing state policy and problems of development in various spheres of life, for estimating the future requirements, and for charting out a broad and basic plan of development for the country. From this point of view, the surveys and inquiries in such areas as technical education and scientific and industrial research, various branches of industries, agriculture and allied subjects, and health care were of considerable importance. What was, however, perhaps more significant at this point of time was the beginning of a desire, on the part of colonial authorities, to use science and modern technology for the development of the country, and a desire to allow India, howsoever hesitatingly, to catch up with the pace of progress the world over.61

Scientists Rise to the Occasion Beyond the compulsions of the war and the Empire, what were the other factors that prevailed upon the British to account for this change in attitude? Of these, a favourable scientific opinion in both Britain and India deserves the attention most. Mention has already been made of the growing public opinion sympathetic to India’s problems in the United Kingdom and of the demands in India for the development of the country; here we may examine as to how far the opinion of the scientific community influenced the government policy. It is interesting to note that while the British political attitude towards India softened only when the forces favourable to India became P.C. Jain, India Builds, 1943, esp. pp. 8–12 ff. For a critique of the industrial situation in India, see S.C. Chakrabarti et al, Economic Development of India, Calcutta, 1965. As later studies, see G.K. Shirokov (1973) and Dwijendra Tripathi (1987) and Aditya Mukherjee (1973, 1979). 61 A.V. Hill Papers: A.V. Hill, ‘Memories and Reflections’, 3 vols. (typescript), Royal Society, esp. p. 115 ff. 60

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too powerful to evade during the war, the British scientific opinion had started growing sympathetic much before. The scientific movement, which may be called Science for Society Movement, pleading for planned application of science to social problems that emerged in the U.K. in the 1930s, shaped out a progressive opinion on a range of issues which affected the imperial attitude towards the colonies.62 The years that followed saw growing contact between the scientists and technocrats from India and Britain, and an increasing consensus between the two on the necessity of applying science to solve India’s problems. While this movement gathered strength under scientists like J.D. Bernal in Britain,63 a similar movement was taking shape under M.N. Saha and others in India.64 The two movements had many things in common: Both of them aimed at promoting science for human welfare; both were influenced by the socialist experiments in Russia and both wanted to use science and machine to liberate society from deprivation, exploitation and inequality; and both, above all, looked to a better society and a better world order based on equality, freedom and cooperation. For both, science was the prime means to realize this dream. When the war broke out in 1939, this movement in India had already gathered considerable momentum and soon assumed political dimensions. Having forged a political alliance at the National Planning Committee since 1938, its leaders endeavoured throughout the war to prepare a plan for national reconstruction. Apart from occasional addresses at academies and conferences, they published hundreds of articles in Science and Culture and elsewhere highlighting the ill effects of imperialism on India, hence, the necessity of freedom from it. Not unexpectedly, when the leading political leaders were put behind bars after 1940, these scientists continued their battle for having a say in scientific matters. Throughout the turmoil of the Second World War and the political and communal disturbances in the country, they remained

62 Gary Werskey, The Visible College: The Collective Biography of British Scientific Socialists in the 1930s, New York, 1979; also see. J.D. Bernal, The Social Functions of Science, 1939; London, 1940. 63 Maurice Goldsmith, Sage: A Life of J.D. Bernal, London, 1980. Gary Werskey, The Visible College: The Collective Biography of British Scientific Socialists in the 1930s, New York, 1979. 64 For Saha, refer to S.N. Sen, ed., Professor Meghnad Saha—His Life, Work and Philosophy, Calcutta, 1954; also see his Collected Works of Meghnad Saha, edited by Santimay Chatterjee, 4 vols. till now, Calcutta, 1982–.

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clear in their goals and strove with considerable acumen to achieve them. When the empire started crumbling, these scientists were one of the first to wrest power in their hands—whether it was the directorship of the Indian Institute of Science at Bangalore or that of the CSIR. In spite of the opposition of the British authorities, J.C. Ghosh had joined as Director of the Indian Institute of Science just on the eve of the war. When the BSIR was set up a few years later, S.S. Bhatnagar was appointed Director, Scientific and Industrial Research, and later, Director of the CSIR. Likewise, the call for national reconstruction found its strongest expression from these Indian scientists. Under the aegis of such professional bodies as the National Institute of Sciences of India, Indian Science Congress, and Science News Association, they expressed their views in various ways on developing and exploiting the resources of the country and inaugurating an era of reconstruction.65 The British could not overlook these developments. It was at this stage that the British scientific opinion stepped in, in a more visible manner, to persuade the reluctant bureaucracy to become sensitive towards the problems of India. From this point of view, A.V. Hill’s visit to India was a landmark. His recommendations with regard to the organization of scientific research in India, his views on the problems of science and its technical application and his emphasis on new priorities were widely welcomed by the Indian scientists.66 Hill returned home ‘convinced of the extreme urgency of a new approach to the Indian problems, here and in India itself.’ He confided to the East India Association in July 1944: This is time for greatness in Indian affairs: if prejudice, shortsightedness and factions are allowed to take place of wisdom, forethought and collaboration, then I can see little but misery or disaster ahead—not in the distant future but within twenty-five years. India cannot remain as she is in a rapidly changing world: either she must go forward along the path of modern progress, or she will certainly go back. All who have been in India, even for a few months, know something of the grace and loyalty of Indian friendship—from poor and rich alike. One would be failing in friendship oneself not to make the danger as one sees it abundantly clear. It is literally true of India that where there is no vision the people perish: 65

See, for example, proceedings of the Symposium on Post-War Organisation of Scientific Research in India in Procs. Council of the National Institute of Sciences of India, vol. 10, 1944. 66 ‘Prof. Hill on Principle of Organisation of Scientific Research’, S&C, IX, 8, Feb. 1944, pp. 308–311. Also see N. Kesava Pannikar (University Zoological Laboratory, Madras) to A.V. Hill, 5 Sep. 1945, II 4/66, A.V. Hill Papers.

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vision and courage are needed in full measure if misery and calamity are to be averted and happiness and prosperity achieved.67

Hill kept the title of his lecture ‘Scientific Development or Disaster’ deliberately provocative and wanted to convince his audience that his expression was no exaggeration as those were, in fact, the alternatives; if so, he wanted them to be aware of that, he confessed before the audience. In the same address, as in many others when he was in India, Hill drew attention of the Government of India and all others concerned, to the real problems of the country little talked about until then or not comprehended at all. In place of traditionally debated issues like industrialization, he called for urgent attention to tackle the problems of health and nutrition, particularly those of women, food production and population explosion, for which he pleaded for a ‘new approach’ with planning and liberal state initiative.68 His endeavours, thus, provided new perspectives to the colonial government and created an atmosphere conducive to a range of official measures initiated in the closing years of the Raj. These included the reorganization of the government departments and scientific organizations. He was instrumental in persuading the government to create the Department of Planning and Development, and the Scientific Consultative Committee under it, to advise the government on how to promote science and technology for India’s development.69 Equally important was Hill’s call for greater cooperation between the scientists of India and the Empire, which led to several scientific exchanges between the two in the years to come.70 On his initiative and on an invitation from the Royal Society, a group of leading Indian scientists visited the United Kingdom, USA, Canada and other countries during 1944–1945. The main purpose of the mission was to familiarize Indian scientists with the latest advances in the fields of scientific research and application in those countries. This offered them an opportunity to compare and contrast them with those in India and ‘India—Scientific Development or Disaster’, The Asiatic Review, Oct. 1944, p. 351. Apart from his report, refer to his popular lectures. 69 For Hill’s advice and influence, see Wavell to Hill, 14 May 1944, Personal, Acc. no. 4/82; Hill to Mackenzie, 14 Nov. 1944, Correspondence: MDA A7, Hill Papers, at Royal Society, London. Also see TOP, vol. IV, Entry nos. 298, 381, 438, 458; and ‘Patterns of Planning in Different Countries’, editorial, S&C, XII, 1947, p. 297. 70 A.V. Hill, ‘Scientific Research and Development in the Empire’, Journal of the J.I.E., Jun. 1942, ACC, No. 6/4/517, A.V. Hill Papers, at Churchill College, Cambridge; 67 68

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to decide the future course of their own progress.71 It offered, above all, an opportunity for India to join the mainstream of worldwide scientific research. These developments contributed in liberating science from the shackles of imperialism, beginning an era in which science would be progressively promoted to achieve national goals and to add to the well-being of the people of India. The contact between the scientists of India and the Empire contributed, above all, to a peaceful imperial retreat with goodwill and a hope for cooperation in the future. The wartime scientific cooperation continued even after the British left India and British scientists were officially invited to advise in scientific matters in the crucial and formative years after India’s independence. Scientists like J.D. Bernal and P.M.S. Blackett, continued their relations with India also on account of their ideological concern for seeing India free and developed.72

Reconstruction in Retrospect However, the reconstruction initiative had its darker side, too. It was afflicted with certain drawbacks of a basic nature that was intrinsic to the colonial rule. First of all, despite their occasional reference to rural reconstruction, hence to agricultural improvement, the colonial authorities whirled essentially round the question of industrialization. Thus, agriculture and rural reconstruction—the prime sector of the national economy and the basis of the material well-being of the people— continued to remain neglected. Improvement in this sector required radical and wider land reforms, which the authorities could not afford at the time. Emphasis on industrialization, on the other hand, may also be attributed, besides other things, to the pressure exerted by foreign and indigenous business interests, which were focused on industry. British industrial lobbies had a strong hold on the colonial government in India, and the Second World War provided them opportunities to consolidate and expand it further. They also roped in the Indian indusand Hill to Mackenzie, 14 Nov. 1944, MDA A7; Hill to Oliver, 22 Dec. 1944; Hill to Prasad, 31 Jul. 1945, MDA A7, all in Hill Papers, Royal Society, London. 71 S.S. Bhatnagar Papers: Acc no. 361, S.N. 14, p. 2; and ‘Report on Scientific Mission Abroad’ (typescript) in S.S. Bhatnagar Papers, both at National Archives of India (NAI), New Delhi. 72 P.M.S. Blackett Papers and J.D. Bernal Papers both at the Royal Society, London, and at Churchill College, Cambridge; S.S. Bhatnagar Papers at NAI, New Delhi.

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trialists in their business exploits, with significant consequences for the country. However, the indigenous response to Western technology, especially in the context of industrialization and reconstruction, met with certain disastrous consequences. The Indian capitalist class had risen significantly since the First World War and had joined hands with the nationalist leaders in the struggle for independence and for national reconstruction.73 When the National Planning Committee was constituted by the Congress in 1938, many leading businessmen worked on its various sub-committees. They included Purshotamdas Thakurdas, A.D. Shroff, Ambalal Sarabhai and Walchand. Vying with the political and scientific leadership, the Indian business groups realized the urgency of reconstruction, and, fired by the feelings of economic nationalism, came out with concrete proposals in the Bombay Plan and launched many industrial ventures of advanced nature. But they appear to have failed to visualise the great hindrances in the way. In the course of the long colonial rule, recounts Rajat K Ray, the country had lagged far behind in technological development and other resources needed for industrial growth. This belied the hope of any true independence for the national economy and a breakthrough in it. In view of the great technological advances in the West, nothing short of a quantum jump in technological preparedness could bring India at a level desirable for an appreciable development. In the circumstances, the Indian capitalists were puzzled and panicked. That is why they assumed an aggressive posture and ventured into such areas as aircraft and automobile production, for which they had to depend on the West for help. This further paved the way for the entry of the Western technology and multinational corporations into India, which was facilitated by the colonial government in the country.74 This added a new and crucial dimension to the process of transition the World War had set off in India. This transition from the ‘formal empire’ to ‘informal penetration’ implied changing technological imperatives, consigning India to a new type of dependence, which was essentially technological. While this dependence facilitated the process of substituting for a ‘formal empire’ with ‘informal control’ and influence, the technological deficiency—actual and comparative— put an ‘ultimate, long-term break on India’s industrial growth beyond 73 Dwijendra Thripathi, ed., Business and Politics in India: A Historical Perspective, New Delhi, 1991. 74 Ray, Industrialization in India, 1985, pp. 362–363.

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a certain point’, bemoans Ray.75 This was bound to affect the growth of science and technology in the future. Taking advantage of the situation, the Western business interests and multinational corporations entered India with their new acumen and resources to promote and consolidate what was later recognized as neo-colonialism.76 The end of conventional imperialism during the war made way for another, more subtle and sophisticated form of exploitation. The war served as a catalyst to the process. Apart from the private industrial collaborations, there were exchanges of scientific and technical missions, development aids, trade and technical cooperation at the official level, apparently doled out to India as help to rebuild her economy ravaged by the war and famine. This was reminiscent, in retrospect, of the Subsidiary Alliance the British had used in India as a tool of colonial expansion and control over a century ago. Under this alliance of friendship and help with the native states, the British skilfully grabbed their territories ultimately. Secondly, the traditional indigenous knowledge and technical skills did not find any role in the reconstruction programme. No significant effort was made to identify and harness them; instead, the colonial choice went the whole hog in favour of Western science and technology. This was not only denying a nation’s past achievements but also overlooking its immediate needs. India did have an impressive tradition in the past in such areas as shipbuilding, architecture and textiles, and her achievements in the fields of waterworks, agriculture and animal husbandry were not insignificant.77 Howsoever crude and undeveloped this knowledge and skill might appear in the middle of the 20th century, they were still handy and helpful for a majority of the people in the country. Even today, many of the agricultural practices followed in the country have their roots in the past; and the verses of Ghagh Bhattari, a versatile Indian genius probably from the late medieval times (17th century?), still serve millions in north India as a wise man’s counsel to solve the day-to-day problems of life. His aphorisms on farming, animal husbandry, weather forecast, human psychology and social relations have survived till date through oral tradition, Ray, Industrialization in India, 1985, pp. 362–364. V.B. Singh, Capitalism, Socialism and India, 1976, esp. pp. 29–59. 77 Refer to Chap. II. Also see. Madan Mohan Malaviya, ‘Note by the Hon’ble Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya’, in Indian Industrial Commission 1916–1918: Report, Calcutta, 1918, pp. 292–355. 75 76

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having a holistic approach with unusual wisdom.78 His verses of counsel have their variants and counterparts in other regions of the country, too. Similar verses are attributed to a common name Dak in Assam, Orissa and Rajasthan, which, in turn, appears to suggest that Ghagh and Dak might be one and the same person.79 Until this confusion is resolved, one can believe for the time being that it was probably a tradition under which different persons composed verses with a common name. What is more important is that the tradition has perpetuated till now and freely used in rural India. This tradition could have been harnessed for the purpose of reconstruction in many areas of life during the World War and postwar reconstruction in the country. A similar case can be made out about the traditional practices in agriculture and animal husbandry, health care, water management and seafaring, etc. The traditional knowledge and practices in all these areas are prevalent even today, but except for their oral transmission, they are little recorded and much less studied. This is not to plead for reviving the ancient knowledge and traditional skill and crafts for the sake of patriotism. What one is concerned about here is the rationale of the decision by the British authorities to apply only their own science and technology to a country with a very different socio-cultural milieu and ethos. Ever since the Europeans came to India, they had been trying to transplant their science and technology here, which grew but in isolation from the actual needs and realities of the land and, thus, deprived of the natural growth. That the colonizers could not have acted otherwise is understandable; but that even Indians should have been so seduced by Western science and technology especially at a time when independence of the country was very much in the offing is surprising.80 In recent years this issue has been addressed by scholars and the problem of over-enthusiasm of the Indian bourgeoisie for the Western model of progress has been critically reviewed.81 This can be explained, to begin with, by the strong influence of colonialism which had, over time, uprooted a section of the Indians from their socio-cultural moorings, particularly the Western educated Ramnaresh Tripathy, Ghagh Aur Bhaddari, Allahabad, 1931. Dhirendra Verma, ed., Hindi Sahitya Kosh, Varanasi, 1985, pp. 155–156. 80 Refer to Chap. IV. 81 Dinesh Abrol, ‘ “Colonised Minds” or Progressive Nationalist Scientists: The Science and Culture Group’, in Roy MacLeod and Deepak Kumar, Technology and the Raj, New Delhi, 1995, pp. 251–264. 78 79

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Indian bourgeoisie, and attuned them to the model of progress sustained by Western science and machine. Like most wars, the Second World War came as a clash of diverse interests and forces. It rolled over many odd remnants of the olden times like autocracy, imperialism, social prejudices and dogmatism, making way for new ideas and institutions. This created situations demanding enhanced emphasis on rationality, humanism, democracy, internationalism, and modern science.82 This was true of India as of the rest of the world. In India, the origins of most of the traditional knowledge and skill lay in religious beliefs and practices,83 and, thus, they were confined to narrow, exclusive social enclaves.84 Internally, India was a complex society based on hierarchy and segregation, and politically and economically controlled by a restrictive colonial system. On the contrary, a product of the European Renaissance and the Industrial Revolution, modern science and technology were based on rationality and were favourably attuned to a free and open society. They, therefore, came as equalisers with appeal and application for a far wider segment of population than the one which used and monopolized the traditional knowledge and skill in India. In the meanwhile, the USSR had eminently demonstrated the great potential of science for material reconstruction and social justice; the World War underlined their still greater powers. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that public opinion in India strongly favoured harnessing modern science and technology for material progress.85 Seen in the light of these developments, the endeavour towards reconstruction in India was also a part of the process of global readjustment and realignment of the new economic and political forces in the troubled world. While the survey and planning of industries, natural resources, and transport and communications offered Indians a vision for future progress, for the Western business interests and multinational corporations that was a blueprint for future expansion and new markets. This is reminiscent of the Survey operations undertaken by the 82

Among others, see Geoffrey Barraclough, An Introduction to Contemporary History, 1964; Harmondsworth, 1975. 83 David Gosling, Science and Religion in India, Madras, 1976. 84 Irfan Habib, ‘Technological Changes and Society in Thirteenth and Fourteenth Century India’, Presidential Address, Procs. 31st Session of the Indian History Congress Varanasi, 1969, Patna, 1970, pp. 139–161; S. Bhattacharyya, ‘Cultural and Social Constraints on Technological Innovation: Some Case Studies,’ IESHR, III, 3, 1966, pp. 240–267. 85 S&C: ‘Indian National Reconstruction and the Soviet Example’, III, 1937, p. 185; ‘Technological Revolution in Industry—How the Russians did it?’, VIII, 1943, p. 398.

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British a century ago. Those were an aggressive intervention into the geography and society to establish British colonialism on the Indian subcontinent, whereas the wartime surveys for reconstruction in the 1940s were subtle and more penetrating operations to perpetuate imperialism and capitalism in the changed conditions. The reconstruction programme initiated by the government was based on Western science and technology and fashioned after the capitalist model of progress in a country that was still rooted in a traditional socio-cultural milieu. The scientific and technical cooperation promoted by the state was essentially pro-West and pro-capitalism, and for all practical purposes it was one-sided. The technical missions that visited India focused on how her resources could be used for the Allies and for the business interests of the West in the long run. The Indian missions going abroad were given freedom only to identify and import help, hardware and services to meet the exigencies of the war and requirements of reconstruction in India, within the Allied scheme of things. Not to talk of liberty to seek any help from Axis Germany and Japan and even Socialist Russia which was a British ally, India was denied an option to harness her own traditional knowledge and skill in the reconstruction endeavour.

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chapter six TOWARDS ORGANIZING SCIENCE

The indirect and unplanned approach of the government towards science and technology until the Second World War had hindered the growth of an all-India central organization and formulation of a longterm policy in the matter. This was more so especially in the period between the exit of Lord Curzon from India and the outbreak of the Second World War, after which conditions changed dramatically. Initially, this happened on account of the immediate exigencies of the war; but later, concern for peace and reconstruction demanded official initiative in a wider and long-term perspective. Thus, by the time the hostilities came to an end, a centralized organizational set-up on an all-India basis had come into being and the authorities had started following a consciously planned policy in the matter.

Efforts before the War The beginnings of the attempt to introduce central control over scientific matters may be considered to have started with the organization of the Surveys and the Medical Services. The earliest proposal to establish a department of science under the Government of India was made in 1884 keeping in view the need for providing expert advice and central direction for agriculture, botany, forestry and the related areas, but the idea was rejected and almost twenty years elapsed before a similar scheme came into being. The matter assumed political urgency under the viceroyalties of Earl of Elgin (1894–1899) and Curzon (1899–1905). In the course of the growing popular unrest during the plague epidemic in India, towards the end of 1898, Elgin recognised the need for scientific advice to the government, and his government asked for the leading scientists in Britain to advise on how to control scientific research in India. This resulted in the formation of the Indian Advisory Committee of the Royal Society; but it remained non functional. However, the urgency of the matter cropped up in the wake of the famine and plague, and Curzon and his government decided to create their own

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body of experts and thus the Board of Scientific Advice was founded in 1903.1 But the endeavour could not succeed in the long run. The Government of India created in the meanwhile separate departments, a bureaucratic set-up and some research institutes to deal with agriculture, industry and health. Responding to the recommendations of the Famine Commission of 1901 and the Irrigation Commission of 1903, the government embarked upon an all-India forward policy. The Imperial Agricultural Research Institute was established at Pusa in 1903, followed by agricultural colleges in different parts of the country as at Coimbatore, Poona, Nagpur, Kanpur, Sabour and Layallpur. Besides, a Board of Agriculture was set up in 1904 to advise the government in agricultural matters and bring agricultural experts working in various parts of the country in touch with each other. In order to promote medical research, the institute at Kasauli (est.1900) was reorganized into the Central Research Institute in 1905; and, in 1911, the Indian Research Fund Association was formed to administer it. However, these measures were isolated from each other and were not adequate for the vast, actual needs of the country.2 The matter once again came for consideration before the Industrial Commission during the First World War but without any consequence of note. The creation of the Imperial Council of Agricultural Research, in 1929, was, no doubt, a more significant attempt to organize science at the all-India level. But its activities were confined to agriculture and allied sciences only.3 By this time, however, the need for an all India organization under the Government of India was unavoidable as demands for it came from several quarters. But the government resisted the proposal; however, in order to appease the public sentiment, it set up, in 1934, the Industrial Intelligence and Research Bureau—a very small organization with little resources and confined essentially to industrial problems. It was placed under the Indian Stores Department and an Advisory Council was constituted to help it in coordinating research amongst the government departments and formulating its programmes and policies.4 Unfortunately, the Council was dominated

David Arnold, Science, Technology and Medicine in Colonial India, vol. III: 5 of The New Cambridge History of India, Cambridge, 2000, p. 135. 2 For details, refer to Chap. II. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid., and ‘National Research Council for India’, editorial, Science and Culture (hereafter S&C), V, 10, Apr. 1940, pp. 572–574. 1

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by bureaucrats and non-Indians. This raised criticism by the Indians for its irrationality and discrimination.5 Thus, contrasted with the efforts made in Britain and colonies like Canada and Australia,6 and in the light of India’s local needs,7 the governmental attempt to organize science before 1939 was extremely discouraging. Of course, there were several research institutes and some fairly well organized technical services like the Surveys and Medical Services, but they lacked mutual coordination and disregarded the needs of the local society. This was felt not only by the Indians but also by most of the expert committees appointed by the government during the war to inquire into the problems of education, industrial research, etc.

Wartime Measures But once the Second World War broke out, things started changing fast, though the initial response of the government was not direct. Its first concern was to meet the demands of the war, many of which involved technical applications as in the case of supplies coming from the industrial sector; whereas others like medical care involved science and research as well. Working towards this end, the government first of all geared up the administrative machinery. It armed itself with constitutional powers and administrative rules, and created new departments and more specialized administrative bodies besides reorganizing those already in existence. The creation of a Department of Defence Coordination even before the war commenced was a logical development. This was followed by the constitution of a War Supply Board and a Department of Supply just on the eve of the war, i.e. in August 1939. Two years later, a Department of Information and Broadcasting was organized in October 1941, followed by a Defence Department, and a Department of Food the next year. The same year, a Department of NAI, DIL, 1–353; DIL, 1–273 (206) 1935; N. Bordie, ‘Industrial Intelligence and Research in India’, Current Science, IV, pp. 138–140; and ‘Technical Assistance to Indian Industry’, S&C, IV, 3, Sep. 1938, p. 153. 6 ‘Organisation of Industrial Research in the United Kingdom’, editorial, S&C, I, 10, Apr. 1936, pp. 591–593; and Anonymous, ‘The National Physical Laboratory: Report for 1935’, S&C, II, 2, Aug. 1936, pp. 68–72. 7 Ibid. Also see Report Industrial Commission, 1918; Royal Commission on Agriculture, 1928; M. Visvesvaraya, Planned Economy for India, 1934; Bangalore, 1936. 5

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Posts and Telegraphs and another of War Transport were created out of the Communications Department. In order to meet the war time exigencies, in April 1943, Civil Supplies was entrusted to the Industries Department which was now designated as the Department of Industries and Civil Supplies.8 But as the hostilities ebbed and the implications of the vast destruction and dislocation became evident, the government grew aware of the problems of post-war reconstruction,9 which led to the creation of a Department of Planning and Development in 1944. Even as these administrative changes were taking place, some of the existing departments, like the Departments of Education, Health and Lands, and of Commerce and Industries, continued to deal with some aspects of science and technology in respect of education as well as research and application. While these broad changes of general nature were taking place in the administrative set-up, the Government of India realized the necessity of taking specific steps to harness the potential of modern science and technology for the war. Not unexpectedly, the encouragement for this came from the metropolis. As soon as the war broke out, deliberations on how to exploit science for the war were started in Britain at various forums—official and non-official, including the Royal Society. A War Cabinet Scientific Advisory Committee was constituted in October 1940, and offices for scientific consultations were opened by the UK and USA in each other’s capital. The British Office in Washington was later renamed as British Commonwealth Scientific Office. In pursuance of the Atlantic Charter, the Hot Spring Conference on Food and Agriculture amongst the Allied and friendly nations was held, which was followed by the Mutual Aid Agreement in 1941–1942. These developments highlighted the necessity of scientific coordination and cooperation for victory in the war.10 Soon, India was brought under the ambit of these efforts. In order to estimate the resources of the country and develop them for the 8 Guide to the Records in the National Archives of India, multi vols. (New Delhi, 1980) contains a brief history of changes in the organizational set-up of the Government of India. 9 Refer to Chap. III. Also see Reconstruction Committee of the Council: Second Report on Reconstruction Planning, Delhi, 1944. 10 See Ch. III, for these developments. For more details, see ‘Science and War-Effort in Great Britain and India’, S&C, VIII, 3, Sep. 1942, pp. 95–98; and W.C. Hancock, ed., British War Economy, London, 1949; and ‘Science and War-Effort in Great Britain and India’, S&C, VIII, 3, Sep. 1942, pp. 95–98.

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purpose of the war, several technical missions from Britain and her Allies visited India (as discussed earlier) to advise on how to step up industrial production, and a scientific and technical liaison commenced between these countries and India. These consultations not only delineated the specific areas for state endeavour but also prompted several official steps in this direction.11 Keeping in view the various demands of the war, the immediate concern of the government was to maintain and augment the supply of such items as steel, machine tools, minerals (like mica), rubber, lac, cloth and drugs, for which it resorted to regulatory measures and passed several control orders.12 These measures streamlined the supply and production of many items but their impact on technological innovation was not direct; yet, they appeared to have encouraged some amount of inflow of advanced foreign technology and expertise in production activities. This did not mean that the government was altogether indifferent to research and innovation. As discussed earlier, after the World War broke out, the Government of India established, in April 1940, the Board of Scientific and Industrial Research (BSIR). Interestingly, all of a sudden, many Indians were placed on the Board in various capacities. While Ramaswamy Mudaliar and S.S. Bhatnagar were its Chairman and Secretary respectively, a number of Indian scientists, including C.V. Raman, M.N. Saha, S.K. Mitra and J.C. Sah, were nominated to its various research committees. However, these scientists had no say in the final approval of research schemes. Besides, despite the professed goal of the Board to also promote research in the universities and elsewhere, in reality the main emphasis lay on industrial research and most of the research activities remained confined to the National Test House at Calcutta. Furthermore, its limited budget of Rs. 5 lakhs (0.5 million) was too small to meet the actual requirements of research under the 16 Research Committees. No wonder, Bhatnagar grumbled and confessed before the Indian Science News Association that the government was ‘not agile enough to appreciate the impact of science on society’.13 The Science and Culture reacted more adversely, and found the aims behind

11

Details in Chap. III. S.C. Aggarwal, History of Supply Department, 1947; and Sinha and Khera, Indian War Economy, 1962. 13 S.S. Bhatnagar, ‘Indian Scientists and the Present War,’ S&C, VI, 4, Oct. 1940, p. 194. 12

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the creation of the Board short-range and short-sighted.14 Nevertheless, the war gave impetus to the research activities of the Board. By 1941, it was able to work out several processes in its laboratories for industrial utilization but they were confined essentially to wartime requirements. Some of the examples are anti-gas cloth manufacture, dyes for uniforms, development of vegetable oil blends as fuel and lubricant, plastic packing for army boots and ammunition, and preparation of vitamins.15 In 1941, an Industrial Research Fund was set up and several expert committees were appointed to advise on the production of various items, from machine tools to surgical instruments. These committees were appointed by the BSIR, CSIR and different Departments (of Industry and Supply, and Planning and Development) of the Government of India. In order to develop the technical know-how and skill of the Indians, technical courses were encouraged and effort was made to organize technical education in the country. For this purpose, an Association of Principals of Technical Institutions was organized in 1941, which was followed by the constitution, in 1945, of an All-India Council for Technical Education.16 A Scientific Terminology Committee presented its report in the same year.17 To manage the affairs of food supply, a Central Food Advisory Council was constituted in June 1942.18 Likewise, a Scientific Advisory Committee was set up under the Department of Health. Similar Boards and Research Councils were formed in many of the provinces and states.19 Their findings and suggestions did not yield immediate results of much significance, but they definitely exposed the lacuna and shortcomings of the government policy and performance, and went a long way towards planning for the future. To deal with the exigencies of the war, famine and epidemic, the government launched various schemes. We know of the Bevin scheme for technical training; a similar short training for medical recruits, too, was started. A scheme presented by Sir Froze Kharegat advocated 14

‘The Board of Scientific and Industrial Research (Government of India)’, S&C, V, 11, May 1940, pp. 649–651. 15 S.S. Bhatnagar, ‘A Brief Account of the Activities of the CSIR’, Acc no. 361, F2– 6/78-RU (undated), NAI, New Delhi. 16 See Report Technical Education, 1946, Annexure IV, pp. 22–37; and GOI Resoln. No. F. 16–10/4 E III. 17 Report of the Scientific Terminology Committee of the Central Advisory Board of Education in India 1940, Delhi, 1947. 18 Singh, Imperial Retreat, 1992, p. 122. 19 Report Industrial Research, 1945, pp. 43–44.

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reorganization and expansion of agricultural research and education. The Grow-More-Food Campaign started by the Government of India in 1942 was perhaps a better know scheme devoted to agricultural improvement (Ch. III). While these and other official measures were being taken up, conferences and symposia—official and non-official—provided opportunities to all concerned to understand the problems of production and supply, and the whole process of development. Most of these symposia dealt not only with the technical aspects of their subjects but also with the indigenous needs and demands concerning them.20 This often helped the government in formulating its policy and sometimes compelled it to heed the local demands. From this point of view, the symposia on coal (August 1939), food planning (January 1941), and Industries Conferences,21 were, of course, important. But from the point of view of organizing science, the symposium on ‘Post-War Organisation of Scientific Research in India’ in 1944 was of great significance.22 Reference may also be made to the Price Control Conferences held during 1939– 1944 and conferences on locusts (1942, 1943) and on paper (1942).23 In order to manage the technical affairs, whether it was in the field of industrial production, supply, repair and service or resource management, the government took some more direct steps, and new posts or separate units were created under the existing departments to deal with specific problems. For example, a Timber Directorate was formed under the Department of Supply, followed by the appointment of a Wheat Commissioner for India (1947) and another of a Rubber Controller. A Rubber Production Board was constituted in 1942. To look after the affairs of shipping, a Directorate of Merchantship Repairs and a post of Directorate General of Shipbuilding and Ship Repairs were created in 1942.24 In the same year, a separate Food Department was also organized,25 together with the Utilization Branch of the Geological

Singh, Imperial Retreat, 1992, esp. Chaps. 7–8. ‘Symposium on Coal in India’, S&C, V, pp. 227 f.; Proceedings of the First Food Conference, Calcutta, 1944; and ‘Proceedings of the Eleventh Industries Conference’, Bulletins of Indian Industries and Labour, Delhi, 1940, and subsequent numbers. 22 ‘Symposium on Post-War Organisation of Scientific Research in India’, Procs. of the Council of the NISI, 1944, X, 1944. 23 A Resume of the Third Price Control Conference with Representatives of Provincial Government and Indian States, New Delhi, 1941. 24 Aggarwal, History of Supply, 1947, esp. Chaps. LXII, LXV. 25 Guide to the Records in the NAI, Part IV, p. 76. 20 21

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Survey of India, which was later retrenched for mysterious reasons.26 The various Departments, Directorates and Boards often met at interdepartmental meetings to solve problems or chalk out plans of common interest.

Rise of an Organizational Set-up However, when the war did not show any prospect of end in the near future and India became the base of military operations in the east, the colonial government was obliged to adopt a long-term planning and preparation so that India could be made materially self-sufficient. There had, of course, also been a long-standing demand for this in the country (Chap. II). Keeping pace with the developments abroad, especially in the UK and USA, the colonial government thought of making use of science and modern technology in an organized manner for this purpose. The formation of the BSIR under the Department of Commerce in 1940 was the first important outcome of this approach. The composition of the first Board was a blend of the scientific and the commercial. But what was more important was the fact that unlike the Advisory Council of the Industrial Intelligence and Research Bureau, the overwhelming majority of the members of the BSIR were Indians. It was chaired by an Indian, Ramaswamy Mudaliar, and S.S. Bhatnagar, another Indian, acted as the Director, Scientific and Industrial Research.27 The next important step was the appointment of an Industrial Research Utilization Committee in 1941. It engaged about 200 scientists under various research schemes all over the country, thus making a modest beginning of applied research for industrial purposes with state support. The constitution of an Industrial Research Fund was another step towards applying science for industrial development.28 But the most important development towards organizing scientific and industrial research under the Raj was the establishment of the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) in 1942. It was brought into existence as an autonomous body under the Registration of Societies Act XXI of 1860 to administer the newly created Indus26 27 28

GOI Finance Dept., Planning Branch: F. no. 9(6)—P/45. For the list of members, see Appendix I. Refer to sub-heading entitled ‘Scientific and Industrial Research’ in Chap. III.

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trial Research Fund. The administration of the CSIR was vested with a governing body nominated by the Government of India, and the BSIR and the Industrial Research Utilisation Committee were merged into it as two advisory committees.29 The Council had comprehensive scope and resources to promote research in various fields. It financed such schemes of research as were recommended by the Board, universities, research institutions and any other institutions having facilities for research on the subject concerned. Besides, the laboratories of the Director of Scientific and Industrial Research at Delhi were placed under the control of the Council since its inception.30 The scientific work of the Council was carried out through the Director and a number of Research Committees. There were already 16 research committees constituted by the BSIR in 1940; the CSIR added 4 to them. The new ones dealt with radio research, statistical standards, building materials and electro-chemical industries.31 The function of these Research Committees was to keep a watch over the progress of research schemes falling within their purview, formulating coordinated proposals for further work, and in general to assist the Council in ensuring that the grants made to them were carefully utilized so as to secure the best possible results. However, these committees could not initiate research schemes on a planned basis and they functioned generally as expert bodies for examining the merits of specific schemes referred to them.32 Not to talk of its meagre funding and its exclusion from the imperial war research, the CSIR was organisationally flawed from its inception.33 To return to the point of its organizational autonomy, the CSIR was an autonomous body working under the Department of Commerce, Government of India. Of all the research agencies referred to above, the CSIR was the supreme body. Loosely compared, it was the equivalent to the DSIR of Britain and the National Science Foundation of America; but it fell far short of these two organizations if we go by their financial allocation, resources, freedom of work and, obviously, achievements. Essentially, it tried to promote applied research related

Commerce Dept. Resolution No. 148-Ind (157)/41, 26 Sep. 1942. For details, see V.V. Krishna, ‘The Organisation of Industrial Research: The Early History of CSIR, 1934–1947’, in Roy MacLeod and Deepak Kumar, eds., Technology and the Raj, New Delhi, 1995, pp. 289–323. 31 For their list, see Appendix V. 32 Ibid. besides Chap. III. 33 For funding and official encouragement, see Chap. III. 29 30

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mainly to industry and that too, chiefly, with the war.34 Despite its apparent concern with the scientific aspects of development, it failed to concentrate on the real problems of the land. Thus, the development of local technology and skill, and small-scale industries remained a neglected area throughout the war years, although the Gandhian call for reviving traditional technology and skill was not dead altogether.35 Although away from his reconstruction programme, Gandhi was busy solving the communal problem; yet his followers and admirers like J.C. Kumarappa were active propagating the ideas of the Mahatma.36 Apart from local demands and a newly emerging British opinion in favour of India’s rural reconstruction, a comparison with developments in another Asian country, Japan, should be able to put this question in the right perspective. Thus, to a great extent, the CSIR was another office of the colonial set-up, which catered to the scientific and technical requirements of the Raj. By creating the CSIR, the authorities tried to serve a twofold purpose: of serving their immediate interests concerning wartime crises on the one hand, and of assuaging the demand of the Indians for freedom to manage their scientific and technical affairs on the other. It was, indeed, an extension of the political strategy and administrative manoeuvring of the Raj employed in the 1930s and 1940s, into the domain of science and technology. The grant of autonomy to the CSIR should not be read in isolation of the indigenous demand for self-rule. It was an exercise with the same purpose and in the same direction as the Act of 1935 and the grant of Provincial Autonomy. Thus, while outwardly the grant of autonomy to the CSIR succeeded in appeasing the indigenous opinion, by keeping the ultimate powers in their hands, the authorities were free to use the CSIR as another tool of the Empire. 34 J.C. Ghosh, ‘Science and War Effort in Great Britain and India’, S&C, VIII, 1, Jul. 1942; idem, ‘Opening Address to the Symposium on Post-War Organisation’ 1944. Also see ‘Department of Scientific and Industrial Research of Great Britain’, S&C, V, 11, May 1940, pp. 644–648; and ‘The Government Organisation of Scientific and Industrial Research in India’, S&C, IX, 1, Jul. 1943, pp. 6–11. 35 See ‘Introduction’ by noted economist Gyan Chand in P.C. Jain, ed., Industrial Problem of India, Allahabad, 1942. For the British opinion, refer to the Cripps-Bevin Memorandum on the social reconstruction of India after the war, in Mansergh, TOP, vol. III, L 276, pp. 374–383; also articles of F.L. Brayne in Asiatic Review, 38, 1942, p. 50; and of Apr. 1945, p. 119; and Indian Farming, Apr. 1945, p. 193. 36 J.C. Kumarappa, The Economy of Permanence, Wardha, 1948; also Devendra Kumar, ‘Kumarappa and Contemporary Development Perspective’, Gandhi Marg, Vol. 14, No. 2 Jul–Sep. 1992.

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An analysis of the composition of the CSIR Governing Body (GB) may provide us some insight into the motives and method of working of the authorities. In the GB, Indians were inducted on an unprecedented scale; but what needs to be taken note of, is their background. Out of its 15 members including the President, 13 were Indians and only two were non-Indians. The Indians can be broadly divided into three categories: First, the big businessmen and their representatives, like J.R.D. Tata, Sir Sri Ram, Kasturbhai Lalbhai and Ardeshir Dalal, who were not the enemies, if not friends, of the British. Second, the bureaucrats such as S.S. Bhatnagar, T.S. Pillay and others like Sir Abdul Halim Ghuznavi, who were part of the colonial establishment or close to it and could not afford to sacrifice its interest. And third, the Indian scientists, like M.N. Saha and J.C. Ghosh, known for their scholarly clout, international stature and nationalist credentials, who could not be ignored.37 While the induction of the last category of Saha and Ghosh was no more than a political sham to present the Raj as liberal, democratic and well-meaning, the introduction of the other two groups, especially of the businessmen, was a desperate attempt at finding supporters for the Raj, the likes of the erstwhile landlords and rulers of the native States who were fast losing their hold by the 1940s. It may be recalled that after the rise of the peasant movements after the First World War, the power and prestige of both of these collaborators of the British had badly eroded, hence a search for their substitutes.38 With the same purpose, one can find the government employing their most-often-used tool—‘Divide-and-Rule’. The choice of Ghulam Mohammad, Finance Minister of the Nizam of Hyderabad or Sir Abdul Halim Ghuznavi, Member of the Central Legislative Assembly from Calcutta, often tempts one to think of the communal cards having been played by the British, especially if we recall the episode of the appointment of the Director of the Indian Institute of Science at Bangalore, just before the war (Ch. II). The fact that the authorities succeeded in their mission far more than in their earlier attempt in the political arena of the Provincial Autonomy, is clear from the fact that they were able to create an image of goodwill without allowing Indian scientists to have a voice in tack37

For full list of members, see Appendix III. Eric Stokes, The Peasant and the Raj: Studies in Agrarian Society and Peasant Rebellion in Colonial India, Delhi, 1969; A.R. Desai, Peasant Struggles in India, Bombay, 1979; and D.A. Low, ed., 1977. 38

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ling the actual problems of the country and have any decisive say in the affairs of the CSIR. Moreover, they were able, to an extent, to garner the goodwill and support of the Indian business houses in their favour. This support was skilfully used by the British to thwart nationalist demands for development almost on the Russian model as envisaged in the NPC plan and elsewhere.39 Additionally, they used the capitalist option, as presented by Visvesvaraya and others, to find an excuse for promoting only applied research useful for contemporary industrial needs and not going for pure research of advanced nature. Interestingly, the British succeeded in their mission so much that even after losing political authority over India, they managed to carry on their collaboration with Indian business and industry after Independence. Yet, the creation of the CSIR was an important landmark. It was the first attempt to create a permanent organizational setup for research at the all-India level, with a broad spectrum in scientific and industrial research, which survived the war and has existed ever since; secondly, it also brought, for the first time, an element of administrative autonomy, howsoever limited, to the integrated and centralized scientific research in the country. And finally, it was the Council that formulated, during the war, schemes for the establishment of five National Laboratories dealing with chemical, physical, metallurgical, fuel, and glass and ceramic research, which was approved by the Government of India and a grant Rs. 1 crore (10 million) was sanctioned for the purpose.40 Thus, by the time the war came to an end, a variety of separate departments and other bodies were responsible for scientific research in India, either on their own or in cooperation with departments and institutions in the Provinces and the States. Meteorological research was conducted under the Department of Posts and Air, Geological Survey was under the Department of Labour and Survey of India, and Zoological and Botanical Surveys were controlled by the Department of Education, Health and Lands. Research in some of the core areas of science and technology was managed by specialized agencies: The Imperial Council of Agricultural Research (est.1929), with the help of its various organs, looked after research in the field of agriculture and animal husbandry, and the CSIR was active in scientific and industrial research. Research in the field of medical science was controlled 39

Ibid. Refer to Chapter III. Also see ‘CSIR: The Proposed Plan of the National Chemical Laboratory in India’, NCL Planning Committee of the CSIR, 1945. 40

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by the Indian Research Fund Association (est. 1911), but it operated on a smaller scale. Ironically, despite the fact that medical science and services were one of the earliest concerns of the British in India, the country did not have a larger body like the Imperial Council of Agricultural Research to control them, medical research in particular. Yet, thanks to the local demand and the endeavours of A.V. Hill and others, the subject assumed considerable importance during the war and the intervening famine, and an urgent need for an appropriate body was progressively felt. As a result, the problems concerned were investigated in detail by the Bhore Committee and an elaborate plan for public health and medical research was formulated.41 The Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) was constituted in 1959 after Independence. The organization of the CSIR in the midst of the war highlighted the focus, nature and scope of research and the magnitude of official initiative in research on all-India level. The official measures taken up during the war—inquiries, surveys and planning, and the creation of an organizational set up—gradually helped the crystallisation of a science policy in India.42

Beginning of the Science Policy While the first half of the war saw the rise of an organizational setup, the second half was marked by its consolidation and elaboration. But what was most important in the later phase was the beginning of a long-term state policy in scientific affairs and a growing official concern to apply science for the progress of the people of India. The various committees the government constituted in different areas in connection with the war efforts and, later, with reconstruction, often examined the existing scientific component of their subjects, including aspects of R&D in their respective fields and offered suggestions on how to improve them. They also discussed the role of the state in promoting R&D and underlined the need for a clear government policy in this regard. Almost all of them wanted the government to actively involve itself in scientific matters on an extensive scale and with liberal financial support. The state participation was meant not only for 41

1946. 42

Report of the Health Survey Development Committee, by Joseph Bhore (President), Delhi, Chap. III for details.

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promoting science but also for harnessing it for social progress.43 However, certain constitutional hindrances came in the way in this connection, which some of them were not loath to point out. For instance, education and most of the principal activities involving application of science and technology like industry, agriculture and health care fell under the control of the provinces which did not have complete administrative freedom and resources to develop them adequately.44 These expert bodies, therefore, called upon the Government of India to take the lead in the matter and create central organizations to deal with scientific and technical problems of all-India importance. These organizations were to be financed by the Centre and to work under close coordination with the Provinces and the States. Taking stock of the measures taken to promote and harness science in Britain and the USA before and during the war, the Industrial Research Planning Committee observed: We need hardly stress that if the necessity of central co-ordination of scientific and industrial research is so keenly felt in England, it must be considered even more imperative in India having regard to the obvious differences between the condition of these two countries in the field of research…. In India, where a proper beginning has to be made, a central organisation is required to build up an adequate network of research organisations in the country, to plan research on a comprehensive scale and to bring about effective co-ordination in the research activities of the country. The research activities of the Indian universities are almost universally found to be seriously handicapped for want of funds. The research activities of private firms are almost negligible…. The research institutions financed by the government remain yet to be transformed into integrated parts of a comprehensive research plan.45

For this, the committee proposed the creation of a National Research Council, delineating its organizational setup and control, functions and the financial requirements. The Committee recommended to the Central Government to allot to the proposed Council a block grant of Rs. 6 crores (Rs. 60 million) spread over five years. With this grant the Council was expected to carry out a five-year plan of research organi43 This was the common theme in most of the contemporary committee reports, departmental proceedings and policy statements in the Council and Assembly; so was the case with the contemporary committees (see for example, Report Technical Education Committee, 1946, pp. 34–45, 194). 44 Ibid.; also ‘Development of Resources and Indian Constitution’, editorial, S&C, IX, 1, Jul. 1945, p. 127. 45 Report Industrial Research Planning Committee, 1945, pp. 18–19.

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zation in the country. This would consist of creating National Chemical and Physical Laboratories, building certain specialized research institutes, giving grants-in-aid to universities for strengthening their research organizations, and training sufficient research personnel through the award of scholarships tenable in India and abroad.46 The Committee also recommended the establishment of the following specialized institutes in order of priority: (1) Institute of Food Technology, (2) Metallurgical Institute, (3) Fuel Research Institute, (4) Glass and Silicate Research Institute, (5) Oils and Paints Institute, (6) Building and Road Institute, (7) Leather and Tanning Institute, (8) Industrial Fermentation Institute, and (9) Electro-Chemical Institute.47 These committees also examined the state of technical and professional services and acknowledged the poor financial prospects for technical personnel and lack of promotional avenues for them. This condition had to be ended and services streamlined in a manner to meet the needs not only of the war but also of the post-war reconstruction. Besides, they underlined the need for bringing together such agencies of science education and research as the universities and research institutes, the users including industries and farmers, and the government departments concerned, for a meaningful R&D with focus on the local needs.48 This, indeed, was an important shift in the colonial approach in the matter. Some of these committees called for state initiative to develop the country through a massive programme of industrialization based on modern lines. Aware of the shifting background of world economy after the war and of the tough competition the advanced industrial organizations would give in the years to come, they appealed for a change in the old outlook towards science and emphasized the importance of research as an essential aid to hold one’s own in the new situation.49 For all this, they finally stressed the necessity of having a broad policy with clear goals and an advanced planning with resources and coordination at the all-India level. Similar ideas of promoting science and technology for the welfare of the local society had been part of the indigenous demands for long.50 Ibid., pp. 19–25. Ibid., p. 29. 48 Ibid., pp. 1–3, 7–9, 16–43, and Annex. X; also Report Technical Educational Committee, pp. 14–16. 49 Report Industrial Research, 1945, pp. 5–6. 50 G.D. Birla, Indian Prosperity: A Plea for Planning, Delhi, 1934; M. Visvesvaraya, 46 47

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With the passage of time, the issue acquired conceptual clarity.51 It was with this purpose that by the middle of the war Indian scientists demanded a National Research Council for India, which would have greater autonomy, freedom of work and wider participation of Indians in this organization than in the CSIR.52 But the government did not oblige. On the question of greater participation of Indians in scientific matters, however, the government allowed the principle of Indianization and progressively more Indians were inducted into professional and technical services. Soon, Indians headed many of the major Departments in the Government, including Education, Lands and Health; Commerce; and Planning and Development. The apex scientific body, the CSIR, too, was headed by an Indian, S.S. Bhatnagar. But this increasing Indianization did not carry much weight as the vast and overriding powers of the Viceroy were further expanded during the war, both in scope and strength, to curb the freedom of the Indian Members of his Council, who were even otherwise not the popular representatives of the masses. This freedom was further curtailed by the existing constitution of the government and powers of the bureaucracy which was still dominated by the British or those who could not sacrifice the colonial interest.53 To add to the problem, the government introduced certain social discriminations even within the scientific services and organizations. Racial discrimination had always been a feature of the British rule in India; now they introduced communal discrimination amongst the Indians themselves. This led to a practice of maintaining records of the communal composition of the staff of every major scientific service and organization under the government.54 While the exact implications

Planned Economy for India (1934), Bangalore, 1936. See also Jagdish N Sinha, ‘Origin of India’s National Science Policy: M.L. Sarkar to M.K. Gandhi, 1975–1935’, IJHS Vol. 27, No. 2, Apr. 1992. 51 J.C. Ghosh, ‘National Planning with Reference to the Development of Key Industries’, S&C, V, 9, Mar. 1940, pp. 504–511; editorial, ‘Proposal for Reform of the Government Organisation for Scientific and Industrial Research’, S&C, IX, 1, Jul. 1943; and M.N. Saha, ‘Basic Principles of Organisation of Scientific and Industrial Research’, Address to Symposium on Post-War Organisation of Scientific Research in India, at NISI, Calcutta, on 27–28 Sep. 1943. 52 ‘National Research Council for India’, editorial in S&C, V, 10 Apr. 1940; ‘A National Research Council for India’, editorial, S&C, IX, 7, Jan. 1944, pp. 255–258. 53 ‘Development of Resources and Indian Constitution’, editorial, S&C, XI, 1, Jul. 1945, pp. 1–7. 54 See their annual reports (as the Prog. of Edu. in India 1937–1947, vol. II, pp. 277–

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of this policy cannot be spelt out without a thorough investigation into the matter, what appears to be certain and obvious is that the practice eroded the sanctity of qualifications and professional ability as the sole criterion for appointment or promotions in the scientific and technical organizations. Moreover, the question of nationalization of industries as a part of the reconstruction programme was made complex and difficult on account of the rival responses from the Indians on communal lines (Ch. IV for details). But even while all this was going on as an inherent part of the working of the colonial apparatus, various factors were exerting pressure on the government to go for a radical change in its attitude towards the basic problems of India, which was not only logical but also a practical necessity. The volume of correspondence amongst the members of the government and the top bureaucracy in both Britain and India, an endless number of official notes and memoranda, debates, public statement and memoirs testify to this fact, and suggest that at long last the British were ready to take initiative to develop India on modern lines.55 It was in this context that the authorities turned to the Royal Society, London, for help, culminating in the visit of A.V. Hill to India. At the request of the Viceroy of India, the Secretary of State for India wrote to the President of the Royal Society: The most important matter to be discussed, I understand, is the organization of scientific and industrial research as part of the Indian postwar reconstruction plan, and its coordination with the corresponding activities here. But advice would also be welcome on current research problems and visits by distinguished scientist to universities and other research centres would undoubtedly be much appreciated. I have now been requested by the Viceroy to convey an invitation to the Royal Society to depute a distinguished scientist to visit India, and to enquire whether it will be possible for them to spare Professor A.V. Hill for this purpose…. I myself feel that such a visit would be of very great value

280, 290–293) and proceedings. Also refer to Proc. Dept. of Edu., Health and Lands, Agriculture Section: FN 15/40 A; F 15–1/40 A; F 15–5/40 A; F 15–6/40 A; FN 15– 33/40 A. 55 Besides the entries in Mansergh, Transfer of Power, see for examples, Procs. GOI, Dept. of Finance—Planning Branch: F. No. 1 (13) P. 45; F. No. 1(7)-P/45; K.W. of F. No. 1(3)-P/45; and F. No. 1(4) P/45; also GOI, Dept. of Food, Memorandum on Reorganisation, New Delhi, 1944; Govt. of India, Memorandum on the Development of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry in India of the Advisory Board of the Imperial Council of Agricultural Research, Delhi, 1944; and CLA Debates, 17 Feb. 1944, pp. 339–340.

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chapter six both generally in regard to relations between this country and India, and specially as a means of developing contacts with that country in the scientific and academic world.56

Hill visited India in 1943 and studied the problems of organization of scientific research in relation to development in the country, and presented in his report an elaborate organizational structure to be created here in the years to come. His recommendations and views expressed elsewhere were based on certain principles. Being a liberal he believed that scientific organization must represent a balance between industrial initiative and state control. He recognized the inevitability of government support for science but emphasized the importance of a buffer between governmental support and governmental control.57 Hill also emphasized the importance of a centralized organization of research outside the control of another government department. Scientific research was to constitute a department of its own, directly under its own minister. Moreover, every scientific organization was to be controlled by an advisory council which would be a source of independent scientific advice, unfettered by governmental constraint. Further, he believed that the director of a research institution should not only be an administrator but also a competent scientist. And finally, he wanted that universities, government institutes and industry should not work in ‘bureaucratically hermetized structures’. He believed that these principles were reflected in the structure of science in Britain, and his report on scientific organization for India was an attempt to create a similar set of institutions in this country.58 Scientific research in India, he believed, must make a concerted effort to bring about national development in all spheres. This was especially crucial as research in India was being conducted under a whole series of disparate institutions.59 Guided by such an idea and assumptions, Hill called for centralization of scientific research under a Department of Planning and Development. He suggested the setting up of a central organization for scientific research to be called the National Research Council. This was A.V. Hill, Scientific Research in India, 1944, p. 6. A.V. Hill, ‘The Scientific Organisation, Official and Unofficial, in the United Kingdom,’ S&C, IX, 8, Feb. 1944, pp. 315–316. 58 Ibid., pp. 316–317. 59 For Hill’s views, refer to ‘Prof. Hill on Principles of Organisation of Scientific Research’, S&C, IX, 8, Feb. 1944, pp. 308–311. I have immensely benefited and have liberally drawn from the discussion on the subject in Shiv Visvanathan, Organizing For Science, Delhi, 1985, p. 122. 56 57

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to have six Research Boards to deal with six major areas of research and to be named (1) Medical Research Board, (2) Industrial Research Board, (3) Agricultural Research Board, (4) Board of Survey and Natural Resources, (5) Engineering Research Board, and (6) War Research Board. Each of these Boards was to be chaired by an eminent scientist or a professional man.60 These boards were to be coordinated by a Scientific Consultative Committee which would also coordinate research administered through various departments. The Consultative Committee was to advise the Member for Planning and Development, who would be its chairman, on general policy in relation to scientific research.61 He also suggested the constitution of a Development Consultative Council comprising independent members from industry or profession and representative of interested departments. The idea of the Council was significant as it would work out a comprehensive plan to coordinate the research departments with the user departments and develop an organizational perspective of research in India. Besides, he consented to the appointment of a Scientific Advisor to the Commander-in-Chief.62 Hill advised the government to prepare a Central Register of Scientific and Technical Personnel, and pleaded for improving the pay and status of scientific workers in the government services. More importantly, he accepted the fact that India had been isolated from scientific developments abroad and that Indian scientists were unnecessarily cut off from association with scientific colleagues in Britain, the Dominions and the USA. To end this isolation, he pleaded for enhanced liaison between India and these countries in matters of scientific and industrial research.63 Thus, even though Hill’s structure of scientific organization was based essentially on the British model, he supported the indigenous demands on many points. By underlining the urgency of organizing science systematically for the social progress of the country, he was very much trying to take the subject out of its colonial shell. His emphasis, in the report and elsewhere, on medical science and health care, nutrition, population and agriculture gave a new meaning and

60 61 62 63

Hill, Scientific Research, 1944, pp. 40–43. Ibid., p. 34. Ibid., pp. 46–47, 134. Ibid., p. 8.

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orientation to the whole subject.64 In this way, his suggestions brought the local demands and requirements, and the colonial imperatives into a closer and constructive relation. No wonder, his suggestions were welcomed by Indians, and they impressed the government as well.65 One of the first consequences of this and other endeavours of the period was the setting up by the CSIR of an Industrial Research Planning Committee in early 1944. Still more important was the creation of the Department of Planning and Development in August 1944.66 The CSIR was brought under the control of this department, which constituted several expert panels and policy committees to advise on various industries and other sectors of development.67 Many other departments of the government, such as the Department of Industries and Supply, of Food and others, constituted similar bodies.68 Yet from the viewpoint of the government concern for harnessing science for the over-all progress of the country, the constitution of the Scientific Consultative Committee, in December 1944, was a very important event. Created under the newly organized Department of Planning and Development of the Government of India, with its Member-in-Charge as the Chairman, the Committee was expected to coordinate scientific research administered through the various departments, and advise the Member of the Department of Planning and Development, and the Government of India in general, on general policy matters regarding science and technology.69 Another official measure that pointed towards the direction and nature of scientific organization of the future was the statement by the Government of India on its industrial policy in April 1945. Though 64 For Britain, see Hill, ‘The Scientific Organisation’, Feb. 1944, pp. 312–321. Also see Hill, Scientific Research, 1944, pp. 13–25, 36–47; idem, ‘Five Broadcasts on Science in India’, Ms, Acc no. 2/10; and idem, ‘Health, Food and Population in India,’ International Affairs, Acc no. 2/11, A.V. Hill Papers, Churchill College Archives Centre, Cambridge. 65 ‘Prof. Hill on Principles of Organisation’, Feb. 1944, pp. 308–311; and Wavell to A.V. Hill, 14 May 1944, Personal, AVHL 4/82, A.V. Hill Papers. 66 See ‘Department of Planning and Development’, S&C, X, 1, Jul. 1944, pp. 7–10. 67 For the list of these committees, see Appendix V, and for their reports, the Bibliography. 68 As Industries and Supplies Dept.: Report of the Panel on Paints and Varnishes, Simla, 1948; Report of the Electrical Machinery and Equipment Panel on the Development of Electrical Industries, Delhi, 1947; War Transport Dept.: The Final Report of the Read-Lands Enquiry Committee, New Delhi, 1946. 69 L 438, in Mansergh, TOP, IV, pp. 831–832; and ‘A Central Organisation for Scientific Research’, Journal of Scientific and Industrial Research, III, 9, Mar. 1945, esp. pp. 382–383.

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the statement did not intend to project views on the organizational aspects of science in any manner, yet it expressed the government’s appreciation of the value of scientific and industrial education and research as a pre-requisite for any industrial enterprise and the official resolve to do the needful in this regard. In addition, the statement also delineated the nature and extent of state participation in the endeavour to exploit science for industrial progress.70 It was in line with such an understanding on the part of the government that the Scientific Consultative Committee considered the reports of A.V. Hill and the Industrial Research Planning Committee, and recommended the establishment of five national laboratories. They were the National Physical Laboratory, National Chemical Laboratory, National Metallurgical Laboratory, and the Central Glass and Ceramic Institute, which were established in quick succession in the years to come and have constituted ever since the core of the chain of national laboratories dealing with the physical sciences and R&D in the country.71 In addition, the Consultative Committee endorsed the recommendations of the Chetty Committee regarding grants-in-aid to the universities, the establishment of a National Trust for Patents, and inauguration of the Board of Standards and Specifications.72 Despite all this, however, the government policy continued to have certain shortcomings. Though considerably reduced, the plurality of administrative control over scientific organizations continued. The official decision to allow or put many of them under such departments as that of Commerce betrayed the basic goals and obvious colonial bias in promoting science. The authorities wanted to encourage it only in terms of certain economic and military problems, or at most, in relation to a limited development. As such, advancement of the subject for the sake of knowledge and higher goals was neglected as ever before. It was not before 1948 that a Department of Science and Technology was created after India became free. This was in sharp contrast with the government policy in Britain (or even her other colonies like Canada 70

Statement of Government’s Industrial Policy, a pamphlet issued by the Dept. of Planning and Development, New Delhi, 1945. 71 Anonymous, ‘A National Physical Laboratory for India’, Journal of Scientific and Industrial Research, III, 8, Feb. 1945, pp. 333–334; Anonymous, ‘The National Chemical Laboratory: Proposed Plan’, Journal of Scientific and Industrial Research, IV, 2, Aug. 1945, p. 137. Also see S.S. Bhatnagar, ‘The NPL, its Genesis, Origin, Scope and Function’, Current Science, XI, 2, pp. 35–38; ‘National Laboratory for Chemistry and Physics’, S&C, XI, 12, Jun. 1946, pp. 639–645. 72 Ibid.; Singh, Imperial Retreat, 1992, p. 153.

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and Australia) where science was organized in a perspective of longterm social progress, with adequate emphasis on both the basic and applied aspects of research.73 Even in respect of applying science for material wellbeing, the government policy in India was marred by discrimination and narrow goals. Compared to state allocation of funds for promoting science in Britain, for example, the finances made available in India were too meagre and insignificant, especially when we take into account the size of India and the enormity of her problems.74 This is all the more striking to recall that at that time India had an unprecedented money reserve accruing out of the sterling balance on account of her material support to the Empire during the war.75 Likewise, guided by narrow considerations, the colonial priorities were generally misplaced. Industrialization of the country was needed, no doubt, and it was demanded by Indians, too; but in view of India’s actual requirements and her immediate needs, the exercise should have focused on promoting smallscale and indigenous industries. Similarly, agriculture, hence the related sciences, should have been accorded greater preference as agriculture was the mainstay of the national economy. This was realised and advocated not only by Gandhians but also by many of the Britons themselves. The question of cottage industries, in fact that of the whole problem of rural reconstruction, had been taken up by the Royal Commission on Agriculture under the Chairmanship of Linlithgow; it was, indeed, an irony that the same Linlithgow, now the reigning Viceroy of India, remained silent on the issue. But there were others like Cripps, Bevin and Jenkins who spoke in favour of rural improvement.76 Therefore, the Official Statement on the Industrial Policy, instead of one on agriculture, was a testimony to the official bias. The primary concern of the Raj, after all, was the war and economic inter73

For comparison, see A.V. Hill, ‘The Scientific Organisation, Official and Unofficial, in the United Kingdom’, a popular lecture at the Indian Science Congress on 5 Jan. 1944; and ‘The Government Organisation of Scientific and Industrial Research in India’, S&C, IX, 9, Mar. 1944, pp. 359–364. For Canada, refer to Canada Year Book and the Annual Report of the National Research Council of Canada, Ottawa, 1939–1945. 74 Ibid.; also Anonymous, ‘Department of Scientific and Industrial Research of Great Britain’, S&C, V, 11, May 1940, pp. 644–648; ‘A National Research Council for India’, editorial, S&C, IX, 7, Jan. 1944, esp. p. 258. 75 Singh, Imperial Retreat, 1992, pp. 85–102 and p. 141. 76 Commerce, 1 Jul. 1944, pp. 2–3; Asiatic Review, Jan. 1945, p. 41; T.N. Kaul, Remembrances, New Delhi, 1982, p. 116; and Garry R. Hess, Sam Higgonbottom of Allahabad, Virginia, 1987.

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ests of the Empire. Needless to say, the Industrial Policy Statement neither referred to the indigenous industries nor to agriculture. That the colonial resolve to harness science for the country’s development lacked determination and strong political will, was soon revealed when Dalal resigned in disgust and the government suddenly closed down the Department of Planning and Development without disclosing any reason to the public. The Science and Culture commented editorially: During the short term of its existence, the department came in for great deal of criticism which, we have reasons to think, were not connected with its working, but for functions which it attempted to assume. Somehow, the department was under idea that its function was not confined only to planning, but extended also to include the execution of those plans (development). It was this idea which brought the department into direct conflict with other departments of the Government of India as each of them felt that their sphere of activity were to be very much curtailed and they were going to be bossed by a Superintendent. Naturally these departments became very critical of the former, as they felt that what was their legitimate field was being usurped by this department. One of the contemplated functions of this department was to bring, as recommended in the Hill Report, all scientific research establishments under its own fold, but with the exception of the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research which was transferred to its care from the Department of Industries, it failed to bring any other into its sphere, as that move was very much contested by other departments.77

In spite of all this, by the end of the World War, India came to have a fairly elaborate central organization to control and promote scientific research on an all-India basis, with considerable state involvement and a perceptible science policy.78 The CSIR emerged, to an extent, as an umbrella organization to promote R&D and control the organizations and agencies concerned. The Department of Planning and Development appeared as the predecessor of the Department of Science and Technology created after Independence. After the presentation of the reports of the numerous committees, memoranda and policy statements on the subject and the creation of an organizational machinery, the constitution of the Scientific Consultative Committee was, indeed, an indication that the government had at long last come to have a perceptible and forward-looking science policy favourably focused on the development of the country, when compared to earlier times. ‘National Research Council’, editorial, S&C, XIII, 1947, p. 123. For a survey of research organizations dealing with science and technology, refer to the Report Industrial Research, 1945, Annexure IV, esp. pp. 102–121. 77 78

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chapter seven CONCLUSIONS When the World War came to an end in 1945 after the dropping of the atom bomb on Japan by America, the world scenario changed overnight. The Allies had won the war and the Axis Powers had lost it. The war which had been fought almost all over the world was decided in Japan in Asia. The time of the final defeat, its location and the ultimate weapon used for it are the three factors crucial for understanding the problems and issues concerned with the development of science in India and in fact in Asia as a whole. This was a period of national upsurge against foreign rule in most of the Western colonies in Asia, and thus against imperialism and Western capitalism—a high time for the West to tame the tide in their favour. The Indian subcontinent was in the last leg of its freedom struggle and many adjoining regions were undergoing similar movements; but it was the farthest Japan that posed the greatest danger for the Western Allies. Rooted in a typical cultural tradition of the East, Japan was seething with aggressive nationalism and ready to take on the forces of the West. To add to the problem, she was calling for the unity of Asia and emerging as harbinger of a cultural awakening in the East. A national stirring was already resonant in the Indian subcontinent. Thirty years before the Second World War began, Gandhi’s evocation in his Hind Swaraj had called for reviving the traditional values of the East and for following them for social progress; between the World Wars, Rabindranath Tagore refined the idea with a modern outlook.1 Scholars like B.K. Sarkar and Rahul Sankrityayan mined the intellectual resources which nourished the idea in different ways and in its indifferent ramifications.2 Meanwhile, Japan had found in Subhas Chandra Bose a partner to fight the Allies and was knocking at the doors of the British Empire in India. With the support of the Axis Krishna Kripalani, Tagore: A Life, 1961; New Delhi, 1997, pp. 122–188. For Sarkar, see Hiradas Mukherjee, Benoy Kumar Sarkar: A Study, Calcutta, 1953. For Sankrityayan, refer to Prabhakar Machwe, Rahul Sankrityayan, 1979; New Delhi, 1990 (in Hindi). Rahul’s role in this context and in the context of a scientific study of history and society is yet to be examined seriously. 1 2

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Powers, especially Japan, Bose headed an Indian national government in exile in Japanese-occupied Singapore and with the Indian National Army in his command, he fought alongside the Japanese in Burma to liberate India.3 Obviously, Japan posed a great danger to the British and the Allies, which needed to be removed at the earliest, and the ultimate weapon of science—the atom bomb—was chosen to do the job. What followed next is history. Although the consequences of the war were horrific for all generally speaking, its impact was not uniform everywhere. The Allies were the winners and the gainers, but the Axis Powers were not the only losers. They were vanquished and hence lost in many ways; but many of those who were on the side of the Allies were also sidelined when it came to reap the gains of the war, especially in the fields of science and technology. India was one of them. The war proved to be a mixed blessing for her scientific development. While the war marked the beginning of some positive changes, it was also a period of lost opportunities and elusive hopes. During this period, the colonial emphasis was not so much on the actual advance of science as on its organization and control. This was quite in line with the political approach of the Raj at the time. As the war accelerated the pace of liberation struggle and heralded the dawn of independence, it unleashed at the same time curious forces that affected the progress of science in the years to come. Before the war, the colonial attitude towards science was one of ad hocism and the approach was indirect and casual; and whatever was done in the field of science, was geared primarily to meet the various needs of the Empire. Thus, the imperial and colonial elements were dominant in almost every field of scientific endeavour in the country. The Second World War brought about a significant change in this position as it catalysed a process of transition from colonialism to nationalism and freedom, inaugurating a period of national reconstruction on modern lines.

India at the Crossroads However, at the end of the war, India stood at the crossroads. Like the rest of the world, she was baffled and distressed by the destruction and dislocation, and quite apprehensive of what worse lay in store in the 3

Refer to Milan Hauner, India in Axis Strategy: Germany, Japan and Indian Nationalism into Second World War, Stuttgart, 1981.

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future. Yet a vista of hope unfolded before her at the same time. As the process of decolonization began and the freedom struggle launched its final assault against British rule, the country was just standing at the gates of liberty. But the transition that set in was fraught with problems: The passage from imperialism and colonialism to democracy and self-rule threw up further challenges—to decide the form of government and choose between the capitalist and socialist models of development, or to go for something else. And this, in turn, forced a choice between the Western and the indigenous knowledge and technologies as the vehicle of progress. Whatever the option, any initiative for reconstruction was obstructed by a host of internal problems, such as rampant poverty, widespread backwardness, communal tension and political upheavals. Ideological divide on the socio-economic issues within the country and the differences of opinion amongst the political and economic leadership on how to solve them made the matter intricate. The issue was further complicated by the ideological differences between some of the stalwarts and advocates of the Indian heritage and indigenous modes of progress: To begin with, Gandhi and Rabindranath Tagore differed ideologically on such issues as modernization and nationalism.4 Things turned worse when Tagore passed away in 1941, and with partition of the country, the communal riots and personal tragedies, Gandhi was virtually left with no time and energy to fight for the cause of indigenous knowledge and values. Another fellow traveler, P.C. Ray, passed away in 1944. This left the advocates of progress with the help of indigenous resources helpless and in a state of quandary, giving way to the British authorities and the Allies to proceed with their agenda of reconstruction on Western lines. These developments were bound to obscure the nationalist vision of progress, retard its pace and amply undermine the prospects of its realization.

Opportunities Lost Meanwhile, things worsened for India. The war years in Britain, the British Dominions, the USA and other advanced countries of the world were a period of extensive scientific activities in basic research and of great innovations in areas like industry, defence, medical science, trans4

1981.

Shashi B.K. Ahluwalia, Tagore and Gandhi: Tagore-Gandhi Controversy, New Delhi,

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port and communications, and agriculture. The radar, antibiotics and, above all, the atom bomb were some of the important breakthroughs. The war also rejuvenated their local economy and inaugurated massive plans of reconstruction, focusing on industrialization, and management and development of natural resources. Did this happen in India, too? Did Indian science really make a take off? Not quite, and once again, after the First World War, India lost another opportunity to boost her scientific progress. As a matter of fact, the influence of colonialism was so deep rooted and crippling that even one of the most powerful catalysts to science and technology—the war—failed to take them out of the colonial rut and put them on a natural course of progress fully. The colonial considerations often came in the way of making longterm investments in the country. The British had set up the Surveys and laid a well-organized railway network in order to establish and expand their empire; but as soon as the prospect of their rule became bleak after 1939, they almost stopped their initiative in these sectors. They no longer engaged in anything that did not serve their immediate interest. In fact, except for the last few years of the war, the British did never take care to appreciate that science, like economy, too, needed a proper planning and investment for progress. This is why the basic sciences and fundamental research languished until the end of the Raj, because they demanded huge investment without yielding immediate gains. This proved a great impediment to scientific progress of an advanced nature. Interestingly, however, by the time the Second World War started, C.V. Raman had received the Nobel Prize and many other Indians had become Fellows of the learned societies including the Royal Society of London. This could happen thanks to the indigenous intellectual regeneration propelled by nationalistic feelings and in spite of the colonial discouragement. The neglect of these sciences was due also to a plurality of purpose and ideological muddle on the part as much of the rulers as the ruled. The basic question was, what type of science and scientific organization? And for whom? The imperial and colonial considerations clashed with the nationalist interests. Meanwhile, other factors exerted influence, too. Britain’s wartime compulsions and concern for maintaining her position in the post-war world necessitated India’s progress, but Britain could not afford to go beyond a point. In addition, it was no longer possible for her to control the diverse forces at work during the global crisis: Indians asked for complete freedom and all-round reconstruction on modern lines with which Britain’s own

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partner in the war, the USA, actively sympathized.5 Moreover, the colonial policy itself had brought India closer not only to Britain and her Allies during the war but had, in fact, tied her to the entire system of global capitalism, which was no longer controlled by the British alone. This often left the authorities confused as to how to move and where. In spite of all this, the administrative measures initiated for reconstruction would probably have brought some appreciable results had the indigenous demands been sustained by a clear ideological stand by the Indians. But, after the political disturbances of the early 1940s, the national leadership was too engrossed in political matters to find time to fight for development and science. With the disruption in the working of the National Planning Committee during the war, its thrust on modern science as a tool of progress on socialist lines was diluted considerably. Rising to the occasion, the Indian scientists, however, took over the agenda of the NPC and showed a remarkable sense of unity and purpose in the endeavour of national reconstruction. However, shorn of internal freedom, material resources and official support and encouragement, they could not escape the hostile forces that eroded their grit and unanimity, and ensured their failure in the mission. After the entry of the United States into Indian affairs and presentation of the Bombay Plan, the Indian public opinion was markedly divided on whether to go for the socialist methods or to accept the capitalist model. A third group wanted progress the Gandhian way, through traditional knowledge and skill. Apparently, socialism and the Russian model held out great prospects for India’s progress, but the ideology was as yet to have deeper roots in the country; capitalism, on the contrary, had many takers in the local social groups that mattered. Thus, the capitalist model of progress found instant sympathizers in the government as well as among larger section of the Indian people. This ideological divide appears to have sapped the urgency and strength of the Indian demands for a bold state initiative for national reconstruction.6 It was in this bewilderment and the conflicting situation that the authorities In the wider perspective, see William Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay, 1941–1945: the United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, Oxford, 1977. 6 Besides the relevant writings of this author on this aspect listed in the Bibliography, see R. Palme Dutt, India Today, 1940; Calcutta, 1989, pp. 631–642; Deepak Kumar, ‘Reconstructing India: Disunity in the Science and Development Discourse, 1900–1947’, in Roy MacLeod, ed., Nature and Empire: Science and the Colonial Enterprise, Osiris, 15, Ithaca, 2000; and Benjamin Zachariah, Developing India: An Intellectual and Social History, New Delhi, 2005. 5

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proceeded with their policy measures—initially short-term, generally wavering. No doubt, they undertook certain measures probably with better intentions but they failed to yield the desired results due largely to misplaced priorities. The constant official emphasis on industrialization, and not on agriculture and health that were most important and urgent in India, was a glaring example. Occurrence of a devastating famine in the middle of the war and the ensuing miseries in the country do not leave more to explain why. The problem of discrimination was another bane of the colonial policy. It was twofold: internally, Indian scientists were still discriminated against the Whites; externally, they lacked freedom to interact with the outside world freely. To meet with the new political challenges within the country, the British tried to divide Indians along communal lines by injecting parochial feelings even in the scientific organisations and technical services. Externally, India was discriminated against Britain and her Allies, including the Dominions. In the course of their ‘goodwill mission’ abroad, the Indian scientists were not only kept off the vital scientific establishments of the Allies but they were also put under intelligence surveillance.7 The endeavours of the Science and Culture Group and the collaboration of the Indian scientists with the national leadership at the NPC were a magnificent display of the Indian genius under subjugation, unparallel in history that called for universal appreciation. But the colonial government carefully sidelined the whole exercise and consigned it to anonymity in history. The British policy with regard to scientific research in India was not comparable with the policy pursued in Britain or in the White colonies like Canada and Australia. The discrimination against India was most glaring in respect of defence research. For, whereas both Canada and Australia were not only given access to the combined secret projects of the Allies (the UK and USA in particular) but also allowed to collaborate, India was kept a distant onlooker. This provided these colonies an opportunity to speed up their progress towards new frontiers of science, while India was left to slid back or stagnate. Likewise, the British Indian government did not allow or encourage foreign scientists to visit India or stay there after they migrated from Europe on account of political and religious persecution,8 whereas they were welcomed by the Allies 7 Santimay Chatterjee and Enakshi Chatterjee, Meghnad Saha, New Delhi, 1984, pp. 52–53. 8 I learn from the noted science writer Gunakar Mule about some such scientists

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in their own countries, adding to their scientific capabilities and manpower. Albert Einstein was one of the best examples of such migration. All this offered the settler colonies an edge over others. By reining in India in her scientific enterprise, the colonial regime further added to her backwardness in the field, ensuring her increased dependence on the West in the future. Consequently, by the time the war ended, the settler colonies had a base to build upon and an impressive international status based on their achievements, so much so that when India actually started her reconstruction schemes after the war, the settler colonies came to aid and advise her.9 Generally speaking, the areas of research demanding large and long-term investment and those likely to adversely affect the economic interest and military superiority of the Empire and the Allies were not encouraged in India. This resulted in the neglect of basic sciences and fundamental research, in which India had had a rich tradition. So was the case with R&D in most areas of scientific application.

Western Science Wins over the Orient Thus, one of the most momentous consequences of the war and the colonial policy at the time was the consolidation of modern science and Western technology in the Indian subcontinent, after they had demonstrated their efficacy and prowess during the war and won victory for the Allies. The atomic explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki proved their might conclusively. Western science and technology had been percolating into India ever since the European boats sailed into her waters; during the Second World War, they made their presence felt in many ways. New weapons, new means of transport and communications, and more advanced drugs and medical skills apart, their practitioners and agents from the West thronged the country in a big way. The influx of scientific missions, technical groups and agents of industrial firms and multinational corporations further paved the way for Western science and technology on the Indian subcontinent and ensured their stay here in the future. Here again, the process retained the essential spirit of visiting India around this time. Also see Anil Bhatti and Johannes H. Voigt, eds., Jewish Exile in India 1933–1945, 1999; New Delhi, 2001. 9 A. Rahman et al, Science and Technology in India, New Delhi, 1973; Sunil Sondhi, Science, Technology and India’s Foreign Policy, Delhi, 1994.

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imperialism: Export of technology into India did not mean export of expertise and production capabilities, too. It was mainly the export of hardware in the form of tools and machines; and nothing significant was done to equip Indians with the technical expertise so that they could be self-sufficient and independent in the matter. The big cartels operating in India had had their R&D establishments abroad and the country was served only with their manufactures. The imperial objections on the question of production of aeroplanes in India illustrate the point well. Technical training of the Indians and the short medical courses imparted to them during the war did not go beyond improvisation. The future organisation of science and the infrastructure envisaged under the post-war reconstruction programme, such as the IITs, were not only inspired by the Western models but were also intrinsically dependent on the West for their realisation into practice, after the war. All this meant a fatal blow to the indigenous knowledge and skill and a crippling knock to the indigenous creativity. This subject did never receive attention in the imperial and colonial historiography; but in the recent decades, it has fast come up for scholarly discussion. Susantha Goonatilake has taken up the subject in a longer historical sweep and wider perspective, and he has challenged many notions and biases of the earlier research. In that he has identified the problems and prospects of research, and has presented an alternative scenario showing how, in the absence of negative colonial control, science could have grown out of the indigenous traditional resources of the Eastern colonies.10 His hypothesis has been vindicated also by the fact that despite the prolonged neglect under the colonial rule and the stress caused by it, many of the indigenous traditions were still in existence, as they are today, and have all along served millions in the region. In a time of acute scarcities and dislocations during the war, some of these could have been harnessed with benefit, but the government did not try. A judicious attempt to salvage and upgrade some of these could have been made and a synthesis of the indigenous and Western knowledge and skill achieved the way it was done in Japan and China.11

10

Susantha Goonatilake, Aborted Discovery: Science and Creativity in the Third World, London, 1984; idem, Towards a Global Science: Mining Civilizational Knowledge, 1998; New Delhi, 1999. Also see Ashis Nandy, Alternative Science: Creativity and Authenticity in Two Indian Scientists, New Delhi, 1980. 11 E. Baark and Andrew Jamison, eds., Technological Development in China, India and Japan: Cross Cultural Perspective, New York, 1986. Also see Joseph Needham, ‘Academia

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Unfortunately, this did not happen in India, leaving her in a perpetual dilemma on the question of appropriate technology for her progress.12 Since Western science and technology had been present in India for more than two centuries, they too could have contributed to the progress of the country; but the prospect was negated in the absence of clear goals and political will on the part of the government. This may be attributed mainly to the constant alienation of the British from the local society and its welfare. India being a classic colony, its European rulers could never reconcile their interests with that of the native population and accept India, as the Mughals had done, as their home. So, once the continuation of the imperial rule became a fragile reality after 1942, any prospect of a genuine attempt to develop the country received a serious setback. This is why when the authorities tried to rebuild the economy of the subcontinent and work for its progress, the exercise failed to yield appreciable results. The indigenous response to reconstruction on modern lines accentuating during the war presented a happy scenario. But in the course of the long colonial rule, the Indians had lagged far behind in technological advance and other resources needed for industrial growth; and nothing short of a scientific revolution could bring India at par with the West in this regard. However, all this happened in a manner that did not follow a clear, uniform pattern. In the conflicting and confusing circumstances, the authorities were often left in a dilemma on how to develop an India that was fast passing out of their control or whether to develop her at all. In the face of compulsions (internal and external), the policy makers proceeded with a hitch and vicious ambiguity. Surveys in various sectors were conducted and plans drawn, but where was the political will to implement them? The fact that the intentions of the government were largely unreal and phoney soon became evident when the constitutional hindrances came in the way of translating these plans into reality.13 The government did not do anything significant to rectify this position. Ardeshir Dalal resigned in disgust and his Department

Sinica’, S&C, XI, 4, Oct. 1945, pp. 156–163; idem, ‘National Academy of Peiping and its Wartime Activities’, S&C, XI, 7, Jan. 1946, pp. 333–342. 12 M.K. Garg, ‘Problems of Developing Appropriate Technologies in India’, Appropriate Technologies in India, 1, 1974, pp. 16–17. 13 For a hard-hitting comment on the colonial policy on reconstruction, see Dutt, India Today, 1989, pp. 631–642.

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of Planning and Development, the flagship of reconstruction initiative, was closed down. Thus, though the various plans and policy statements envisaged impressive programmes of development based on modern science and technology under a new organizational structure, little was done to execute these schemes by actually setting up laboratories or similar organizations immediately; as such the whole effort proved predominantly a paperwork. Whether the British were really serious about their promises and plans, conveniently escaped the test of history as by the time their initiative was to fructify fully, they had left India once for all.

An Elusive Transition In this way, the war ushered in a period of ambiguities and illusory and elusive transition full of, ironies and contradictions. This was a transition not only from colonialism to freedom and democracy but also from an old to a new world order emerging out of the debris of the war and imperialism. The remnants of the old world were still there, but most of them were undergoing a change. Formal imperialism was giving way to informal controls; colonialism emerged as neo-colonialism; and the means and methods of war underwent a revolutionary change.14 Against this background, unprecedented changes took place in other spheres of life as well. Internationalism and globalization were the new trends, and cooperation amongst nations for collective welfare and use of modern science for human progress were central to them.15 But if one looks closely, this transition had essentially a pro-West orientation: The process of globalization meant Westernisation of the Eastern societies, and in no way it was the Easternization of the West. The political and economic ideas and models introduced into this part of the world during the war were rooted in the West. The cooperation for post-war reconstruction implied large-scale industrialization and technical collaboration with the West. And even the so-called humanitarian measures taken up during the war and afterwards were designed and controlled by the Allies to suit their global interests. The philosophy of Gandhi and the worldview of such other savants of the East like J.D. Bernal, Science in History, Vol. III, 1954; Harmondsworth, 1969, pp. 703–724. Ibid. Also see Geoffrey Barraclough, An Introduction to Contemporary History, 1964; Harmondsworth, 1975. 14 15

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Rabindranath Tagore were sidelined and overwhelmed. No wonder it was not the Gandhi’s philosophy of love and sacrifice but the ultimate weapon of violence—the atom bomb—that decided the war, ironically, in Buddhist Japan. Most of these forces could be seen at work in India during this period, also because she was in a unique position to experience them: She was one of the oldest colonies of the greatest empire of the world; and endowed with a rich cultural heritage, she was enlightened with modern ideas at the same time.16 Most of all, she was one of the first nations to break out of the colonial shackles after the war. In the circumstances, the impact of the Second World War on science and development, and the colonial policy governing them in India, were a variegated dialogue as much with the past and the present as with the future that was yet to take its real shape. Sadly, however, this was also the time when India failed to catch up with the fast-paced scientific progress of the advanced nations, with grave implications for her future progress. In terms of technical advance, the ‘magnificent opportunity’ that had unfolded for the growth of industries with the commencement of the war in India, ‘pitifully dissipated’ at its end.17 The country emerged from the war ‘grossly unprepared for rapid industrialisation in the post-war period.’18 Now India was left in a bizarre predicament—hanging between the old world of imperialism and the old capitalism on the one hand, and the post-war world of democracy, socialism, internationalism and neocolonialism on the other. One of the greatest spectacles of the new world was opened up by science in its new incarnation: The atom bomb had shown its horrifying powers of destruction, but the friends of humanity visualized in it also a novel source of immense energy that could be equally effectively tapped for human welfare in peacetime. Antibiotics, blood transfusion, DDT and operational research were breakthroughs with immense promises.19 However, these happy 16

Besides Saha and Nehru, there were others like B.K. Sarkar and M.N. Roy who deserve attention. Apart from polity and economy, Roy wrote on the social and philosophical aspects of science (mostly unpublished). 17 Press Statement by the President of FICCI, C.S.R. Mudaliar, 29 Jan. 1940, FICCI Correspondence, p. 283; C.S.R. Mudaliar’s speech, FICCI, Annual Report, 1939, pp. 12–13; FICCI Annual Report, 1946, p. 8. 18 FICCI, Annual Report, 1946, p. 8. 19 For contemporary or semi-contemporary opinion, see J.D. Bernal, Science for Peace and Socialism, London, 1949; idem, ‘Science in the Service of Society,’ Marxist Quarterly, Vol. I, 1954; idem, Science for Developing World, London, 1962.

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prospects were deceptive and illusory for the colonies and underdeveloped countries like India, if we look at the yawning gap between the level of progress of science in these countries and that of the advanced nations. How could a country that was yet to begin its first Industrial Revolution, participate in a second or third Industrial Revolution the advanced nations had already lived through?20 India’s economic liberation did not match the transfer of political power she achieved during the war. So, as the direct colonial control started lifting, she was subjugated to an invisible, more subtle control that was more actively and closely shared by Britain’s other partners in the capitalist enterprise, who had mastered the skill of exploiting science to their advantage. This consigned India to a not-so-happy fate that all other countries of the Third World had to share after the war.21 In that, the much publicised reconstruction programme undertaken by the government in India was largely a manifestation of the process of adjustment and realignment of the politico-economic forces steered by the Allies and Western capitalism across the globe. This is evident also from the fact that the colonial initiative in India was purposely kept out of the influences of socialist Russia and Asian Japan, to both of which many Indians looked with admiration. Instead, after having lost the internal collaborators in the Rajas and zamindars in the wake of the freedom struggle in India, the British now roped in external Allies, like the USA, as new partners to carry out their politico-economic agenda.

From Bondage to Freedom Nevertheless, certain redeeming features of the colonial policy cannot be overlooked. After the two hundred years of exploitation and discrimination, at least the British eventually agreed to develop India and apply science in this endeavour. In the process, efforts were also made, howsoever limited, to sciencetize technology. Thus, one can trace to this period the beginning of a planned state initiative to harness science for social progress, leading ultimately to the birth of a science policy in the country. In this way, with the transfer of power and the end Bernal, Science in History, vol. III, 1969, pp. 712, 854; also see Barraclough, Geoffrey, An Introduction to Contemporary History, 1964; Harmondsworth, 1975. 21 Amiya Kumar Bagchi, The Political Economy of Underdevelopment, Cambridge, 1989, p. 94. 20

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of the imperial rule, science and technology started passing out of the colonial straitjacket. What they offered in the form of organizational structure, administrative machinery, survey, planning and, above all, a science policy, provided India a base to build upon and expand in the formative years of her independence.22 Despite their limitations, the scientific exchanges between India and Britain and her Allies in the 1940s helped India join the mainstream of worldwide scientific progress and inaugurated a period of cooperation among nations promoting mutual welfare and enhanced proliferation of modern knowledge and technology. Though initially meant for military purposes, gradually this cooperation opened up to peacetime reconstruction and civil needs. This cooperation was very active in the early years of India’s Independence when Jawaharlal Nehru made determined efforts, through the FiveYear Plans, to apply science to solve India’s socio-economic problems.23 So long as imperialism remained powerful as a system of control over India, use of science for the welfare of the local population was virtually unthinkable, but as soon as the system started collapsing during the war, the human cog in it did not take long to respond kindly. Many individuals from inside the system—scientists, politicians, bureaucrats and the like—started talking of the need of developing the country they had ruled so highhandedly until then. They pleaded for a new generous approach to her problems and placed emphasis on the basic needs of her people and their national aspirations (Ch. IV–V). British scientists were amongst the first to come forward and join hands with their Indian colleagues who had already been asking for making use of science for India’s welfare. In 1933, Gregory had appealed for organizing science in India; other British scientists took up subsequently the larger issue of her development. Their efforts, especially of A.V. Hill, had a very positive impact on the government policy in the matter. They also played a significant role in India’s endeavours as a free nation to organize science for national reconstruction

22 Besides the correspondence between S.S. Bhatnagar and M.N. Saha, and Hill, Blackett and Bernal, see N.K. Pannikar to A.V. Hill, 5 Sep. 1945, 17 Feb. 1946, 19 Dec. 1949; Hill to Pannikar, 27 Feb. 1946, in A.V. Hill Papers, Churchill College, Cambridge. 23 See, in particular, the private papers of Bernal, Blackett, Hill, Saha and Bhatnagar. For Nehru, refer to Baldev Singh, ed., Jawaharlal Nehru on Science and Society: A Collection of His Writings and Speeches, New Delhi, 1988. Also see A. Rahman, Trimurti: Science, Technology and Society, New Delhi, 1972; idem et al., Science and Technology, New Delhi, 1973.

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after Independence. J.D. Bernal and P.M.S. Blackett were frequently consulted by the national government under Nehru in this regard.24 And there were still others like J.B.S. Haldane (1892–1964) who liked the society and culture of India so much that they made her their home.25 Thus, the old colonial considerations started receding in the background and the goodwill they forged between the peoples of India and Britain made the imperial retreat an amicable affair, laying the foundations of future cooperation. Thus, at long last India had at least broken out of the British monopoly of exploitative control; and thanks to the war, she had now more options before her to look for help. In place of Britain, she could now seek help from America, which supported the cause of liberal democracy, and follow her model of progress, or from the Soviet Union which beckoned the poor and the backward of nations to a new horizon of hope. Many Indians were also impressed by Japan and Germany. Or else, India could fall back on her own indigenous wisdom and resources. Such a prospect was amply brightened by an enhanced international concern for global progress with the help of science and democracy.26 Even if India could not reap the fruits of these developments immediately, their long-term promises were alluring and highly consequential for a nascent democracy that would soon set its foot on the path of progress.27 It was, thus, not so much the actual research in the laboratories, inventions and innovations, as the change in the outlook of the Raj and the fast emerging socio-political ambience conducive to progress that really constituted the landmark in the progress of science in India. The essence of the contemporary scenario is well captured in the words of Sir John Woodhead, the chairman of the commission of inquiry on one of the worst famines of India in 1943, who had the opportunity to observe the miseries of her people from the closet quarters. He was so moved by the appalling conditions in the country

24 See, in particular, the private papers of Bernal, Blackett, Hill, Saha and Bhatnagar; also see Rahman et al., Science and Technology, 1973. 25 R. Clark, The Life and Work of J.B.S. Haldane, Oxford, 1988; and J.B.S. Haldane, Science and Indian Culture, Calcutta, 1965. 1992. 26 See Bernal, Science for Peace, 1949; idem, The Freedom of Necessity, 1949; idem, ‘Science in the Service of Society,’ 1954. 27 For the hopes and prospects, see the views of A.V. Hill from among the British, and of many Indian scientists like M.N. Saha already referred to in the preceding chapters. For Nehru’s views, see Singh, Jawaharlal Nehru on Science, 1988.

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that instead of looking to Britain, he looked to the Soviet endeavours and emulated them for India’s development. He was prophetic in that India after Independence was really attracted more towards the Russian experiment in social reconstruction. His views and perceptions of the Indian affairs, like that of many others, reflected a basic change in the British attitude. Evoking a ‘New Spirit’, Woodhead wrote: The tradition and philosophy of India are based on the freedom of the individual and his responsibility to work for the common weal. It is our earnest hope that, in her future development as an independent nation, India will find in her own tradition the vision and faith which will enable her to create a new life for her people.28

Indeed, an honest confession of a well-meaning Briton and a sincere wish, too; but would it be really easy for India to realize this hope under the encumbered legacies the British Raj had left behind?

28

Famine Inquiry Commission: Final Report, Madras, 1945, pp. 331–332.

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APPENDICES

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appendix i* BOARD OF SCIENTIFIC AND INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH (BSIR)

constituted: 1 april 1940

List of Members Chairman Sir Ramaswamy Mudaliar, Commerce Member, Council of the GovernorGeneral, Govt. of India Members 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Dr S.S. Bhatnagar Sir H.P. Mody Sir Syed Sultan Ahmed Sir Kasturbhai Lalbhai Lala Sri Ram Mr. P.F.G. Warren Mr N.N. Law Dr M.N. Saha Dr J.C. Ghosh

* Certain details, including the educational or professional qualifications, positions and other decorations, have been given with the names of the members of the various official bodies, wherever such information is available, so that the reader can locate them in the socio-political matrix in India under the Raj, as this had implications for the policies of the colonial government.

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appendix ii INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH UTILISATION COMMITTEE (IRUC)

constituted: early 1941

List of Members Chairman Sir Ramaswamy Mudaliar Members 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

Sir Sri Ram Sir Ardeshir Dalal Sir Homy Mody Sir Sultan Ahmed Sir Kasturbhai Lalbhai Mr. P.F.S. Warren Dr. N.N. Law Dr J.H.S. Richardson Sir Fredrick James Sir Rahimatullah Chinoy Sir Jawala Prasad Srivastava Sir Saiyed Martab Ali Shah Sir Abdul Halim Ghuznavi Mr. C.S.R. Mudaliar Mr. N.R. Sarkar Mr. F. Stones Mr. S.S. Bhatnagar

Secretary Mr. T.S. Pillay

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appendix iii COUNCIL OF SCIENTIFIC AND INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH (CSIR)

constituted: september 1942

List of Members of the first Governing Body President N.R. Sarkar, Member, Council of the Governor-General Members 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

S.S. Bhatnagar, Director, Scientific and Industrial Research, Delhi. Ghulam Mohammad, Finance Minister, Govt. of Nizam, Hyderabad. Sir Bortio Staig, Additional Secretary to Govt. of India, Finance Dept., New Delhi. T.S. Pillay, Joint Secretary to Govt. of India, Dept. of Commerce, New Delhi. Jehangir R.D. Tata, Industrialist, Bombay. Sir Ardeshir Dalal, Director, Tata Iron and Steel Co., Bombay. Sir Sri Ram, Agent, Delhi Cloth & General Mills Ltd., Delhi. Sir Abdul Halim Ghuznavi, Member, Central Legislative Assembly, Calcutta. Sir Henry Richardson, Managing Director, M/S Andrew Yule and Company Calcutta. Kasturbhai Lalbhai, Managing Agent, Arvind Mills Ltd., Ashoka Mills Ltd., Ahmadabad. Dr J.C. Ghose, Director, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore. Dr Nazir Ahmad, Director, Technological Laboratory, Indian Central Cotton Committee, Bombay. Dr M.N. Saha, Palit Professor of Physics, University College of Science, Calcutta. Diwan Bahadur A.N. Mudaliar, Vice-Chancellor, University of Madras, Madras.

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appendix iv INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH PLANNING COMMITTEE

constituted: early 1944

List of Members Chairman Sir R.K. Shanmukham Chetty, KCIE. Members 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Sir Jnan Chandra Ghosh, Director, Indian Institute of science, Bangalore. Lt.-Col. S.S. Sokhey, Director, Haffkine Institute, Bombay. Mr Kasturbhai Lalbhai, Ahmadabad. Sir J.J. Ghandy, Agent, Tata Iron & Steel Co., Jamshedpur. Prof. S.K. Mitra, Professor of Physics, Calcutta University, Calcutta. Dr K.A. Hameid, Cipla Laboratories, Bombay. Prof. M. Quereshi, Head, Dept. of Chemistry, Osmania University, Hyderabad. Sir S.S. Bhatnagar, Director, CSIR, Delhi (acted as Secretary till 26 April 1944).

Secretary Mr J.N. Sen Gupta, Industrial Economist and Research Development Officer, CSIR.

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appendix v LIST OF THE RESEARCH COMMITTEES OF THE CSIR.

constituted: during july 1940 – december 1943 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

Glass and Refractories Committee Electro-Chemical Industries Committee Industrial Fermentation and Biological Products Committee Dye-Stuffs Committee Fuel Research committee Vegetable Oils Committee Cellulose Research Committee Heavy Chemicals and Chemical Industries Committee (including Fertilizers and Salts) Pharmaceuticals and Drugs Committee Plastics Committee Atmospheric Research Committee Essential Oils Committee Metals Committee Internal Combustion Engines Research Committee Distillation and Other Chemical Plants Committee Applied Physics Committee Radio Research Committee Statistics, Standards and Quality Control Committee Leather Research Committee Building Research Committee

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appendix vi TECHNICAL EDUCATION COMMITTEE. (CENTRAL ADVISORY BOARD OF EDUCATION)

constituted: january 1943

List of Members Chairman Mr Johan Sargent, Educational Advisor to the Government of India Members 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Dr P.N. Banerjea, M.A., D. Sc. (London), Bar-at-Law, M.L.A. Mr Gaganvihari L. Mehta, M.A. Mr S.N. Moos, Director of Public Instruction, Bombay. The Hon’ble Khan Bahadur Sayidur Rahman, Minister of Education, Assam. Sir Meverel Statham, Director of Public Instruction, Madras. Sardar Bahadur Sardar Ujjal Singh, MLA (Punjab). Mr P.F.S. Warren, MLA. Dr Sir Ziauddin Ahmad.

Co-opted Members 9.

Mr R.B. Elwin, ICS, representing the Industries and Civil Supplies Department of the Govt. of India. 10. Mr W.W. Wood, Principal, Delhi Polytechnic, Delhi. 11. Dr W.A. Jenkins, Director of Public Instruction, Bengal. Secretary Dr D.M. Sen, Secretary, Central Advisory Board of Education.

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appendix vii HEALTH SURVEY AND DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE

constituted: october 1943

List of Members Chairman Dr Joseph Bhore Members 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

Dr R.A. Amesur, President, Indian Medical Association. Rai Bahadur Dr A.C. Banerjea, Director of Public Health, United Provinces. Khan Bahadur Dr A.H. Butt, Director, Public Health, Punjab. Dr. R.B. Chandrachud, Chief Medical Officer, Baroda State. Colonel E. Cotter, Public Health Commissioner, Govt. of India. Dr. (Mrs) D.J.R. Dadabhoy, Ex-President, All India Association of Medical Women, Bombay. Dr. J.B. Grant, Director, All India Institute of Hygiene and Public Health, Calcutta (1939–1945). Khan Bahadur Dr M.A. Hameed, Member, Medical Council of India, Prof. of Pathology, Lucknow University. Lt.-Genl. Sir Bennet Hance, Director General, Indian Medical Service. Sir Henry Holland, Hospital, Quetta. Sir Fredrick James, Member, Central Advisory Board of Health. N.M. Joshi, MLA. Lt-Col. (Miss) H.M. Lazarus, Chief Medical Officer, Women’s Medical Service. Pandit L.K. Maitra, MLA, Member, Central Advisory Board of Health. Diwan Bahadur Dr Sir Lakshamanaswami Mudaliar, MD, Vice Chancellor, Madras University. Dr. U.B. Narayanrao, Member, All-India Medical Licentiates Association (1939–1945). Dr Vishwa Nath, Member, Medical Council of India. Maj.-General W.C. Paton, Surgeon-General, Govt. of Bengal (1941– 1945). Dr. B.C. Roy, President, Medical Council of India (1939–1945).

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20. Hon’ble P.N. Sapru, Member, Council of State, and Central Advisory Board of Health. 21. Lt.-Col. B.Z. Shah, Superintendent, Mental Hospital, Poona. 22. B. Shiva Rao, Esq. 23. Mrs. Shuffi Tyabji. 24. Dr H.R. Wadhwani, Minister for Public Health, Sind (till April 1945). 25. Rao Bahadur Dr. K.C.K.E. Raja. Joint Secretaries 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Dr. M. Ahmed Cap. A. Banerji Dr. K.T. Jungalwalla Rai Bahadur Man Mohan Rao Bahadur Dr. S. Ramakrishnan

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appendix viii INDIAN SCIENTIFIC MISSION ABROAD

october 1944–february 1945

List of Members 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Dr Nazir Ahmad Sir S.S. Bhatnagar Sir J.C. Ghosh Professor J.N. Mukherjee Professor S.K. Mitra Professor Meghnad Saha

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———. Developing India: An Intellectual and Social History c. 1930–1950, New Delhi, 1905. Zaidi, A. Moin and Shaheda Zaidi, eds., The Encyclopaedia of the Indian National Congress, multivolume, New Delhi, 1978–, running publication. Zysk, Kenneth G., Asceticism and Healing in Ancient India: Medicine in the Buddhist Monastery, New York, 1991.

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INDEX Abbot, A., 48 Acclimatisation, 85, 92, 126 Act of 1935, 151, 174 Acworth, Sir William, 102 Adaptation in fighting personnel, 126 Administrative autonomy, 176 control, 9, 47 freedom, 178 machinery, 201 manoeuvring of the Raj, 174 measures, 9, 20, 29, 31, 59, 82, 147, 153, 154 measures for reconstruction, 34, 193 153 Advanced countries, 191 drugs, 195 nations, 3 planning, 179 Advancement of science and technology, 137 Advances in sanitation, 6 in scientific research and application, 157 Advisory Board of Scientific Research, demand for, 40 Advisory Council for Industrial Research and Intelligence, 41 Advisory Council for Scientific Research and Technical Development, 125 Aerodromes, 108 Aeronautical engineering, 109 maps, 110 research, 109 Aeronautics and aviation, 109–111

Aeroplanes, 62, 108 imperial objections to production in India, 196 Afforestation, 35, 84 African campaign, 105 Aftermath and Depression, 45 Aggressive nationalism, 36, 189 Agra, 24 Agricological development, 88 Agricultural policy of the government, 39 Agricultural Produce Cess Act in 1940, 82 Agricultural Research Board, 183 Agricultural research, 82, 88 and agricultural industries, 37 and innovation, 39, 89 improvement, demonstration, propaganda and education, 39 on an all-India basis, 40 Agricultural resources, 84 Agricultural science, 82, 84 Agricultural services, 39 Agricultural and research, 87 backwardness, 23 colleges, 166 conferences, 23 education, 23, 31, 82, 86, 87 Agricultural improvement 23, 32, 86, 87, 88, 89, 158 Agriculture and allied sciences (animal husbandry, dairying and veterinary science), 38, 81–90 Agriculture, 5, 6, 17, 23, 26, 27, 30, 31, 32, 38, 46, 53, 54, 81–90, 128, 139, 142, 147, 148, 149, 150, 154, 158, 160, 165, 166, 178, 183, 186, 187, 192, 194

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246 and animal husbandry, 176 as an integral part of rural economy, 39 as the greatest source of government revenue, 38 centrally controlled research at the all-India level, 39 post-war, 88 Agro-forest resources, 83 Agronomy, 84 Air Force, 108 Air India, 111 Air raids, 126 Air Traffic Control Officers, 108 Air transport, 108 Aircraft, 70, 80, 108 and automobile production, 159 assembling of, 108 company, 109 Airstrips, 108 Albert Einstein, 131, 195 Alcohol, 82, 92 Alienation of the British from the local society and its welfare, 197 All India Council for Technical Education, 68 All India Institute of Medical Science (1956), Delhi, 100 All India Radio (AIR), 111 Allied base, 79 chemists, 6 cooperation, 1, 12 countries, 15, 127, 168 forces, 65, 69, 91, 114, 103, 141 military operations, 103 planning, 63 strategy, 72 victory, 105 war effort, 107, 143 Allies, 7, 14, 59, 60, 62, 63, 128, 141, 163, 189, 190, 193, 194, 195, 198, 200 All-India Council for Technical Education, 170 All-India Institute of Medical Research, 44

index All-India Medical Research Centre, 99 Alloys, 61 Alluvial plains, 118 Alternative sources of energy, 47 Ambedkar, Bhimrao Ramji, 152 America, 23, 60, 77, 122, 128, 141, 202 its economic designs in India, 141 moral obligations as a democratic state, 143 American Technical Mission to India, 63, 107, 119 its leader as the first Ambassador of the USA in India, 145 American agriculture, 23 contribution, 142 entrepreneur, W.D. Pawley, 109 experts, 105 invited to India, 144 government, 143 model of progress, 144 munificence for India’s first major research institute for agricultural science at Pusa, 143 oil companies, 119 oil interest, 118 technical assistance to develop India’s industrial resources, 119 Amery, Leopold Charles M.S., 140 Ammonium nitrate, 83 Ammunition, 72, 170 Anaesthesia, 97 Ancient knowledge and traditional skill, 161 Animal husbandry, 39, 85–87, 160– 161 and dairy industry, 46, 87 Animals for transportation, 85 Anthropology, 131 Antibiotics, 192, 199 Anti-gas cloth manufacture, 72, 170 Anti-imperialist stand on international issues, 142

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index Antiquity, 130 Antiseptics, 116 Appliances, electrical and surgical, 69 Applied research, 70, 176 Applied sciences, 129 Appropriate technology, 139, 197 Arabian world, 55 Architecture, 54, 160 Archival records, 16 Armament, 12 Armed Forces, 15, 84, 92 enormous demands of the, 34 Armoured vehicles, 70, 126 Arms and ammunition, 69 Army Blood Transfusion Service (India), 97 Army, 63 boots, 72 medical services, 97 vehicles, 105 Artificial rubber, 6 Arts of design, 67 Aryan Knowledge, 26 Asia, 63, 109, 130, 143 Assam Oil Company, 47 Assam, 93, 107 Assemblies and Councils, 48 Association for the Advancement of Scientific and Industrial Education of Indians, 25 Association of Principals of Technical Institutions, India, 66, 170 Astronomy, 54, 129 Astrophysics, 131, 132 Atlantic Charter, 143, 168 Atmosphere, 132 Atom bomb, 5, 190, 192, 199 on Japan, 189 Atomic Energy Commission, 132, 134 Atomic Atomic fission, 5 energy, 128, 132 explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 195 August Offer (8 August 1940), 59

247

Australia, 11, 79, 90, 98, 111, 128, 167, 186, 194 Autocracy, 162 Automobile Automobiles, 103, 105 industries, 119 Autonomy, 78, 174, 180 Aviation, 110, 108, 128 and aeronautics, 109 requirements, 83 Axis advance, 63 Germany, 163 powers, 11, 189, 190 propaganda against the Empire, 141 prosecution, 101 scientists, 15 Ayurveda, 100 Bacteriology, 44 Baluchistan sulphur, 72 Banaras Hindu University, 36 Bangalore, 85, 109, 110 Baroda, 75 Barrackpur, 110 Base east of the Suez, 141 for Allied operations, 141 for military operations, 141 of Allied operations in Asia, 143 workshop, 65 Basic research, 191 value and necessity of, 44 Basic sciences, 25, 113, 129–135 and fundamental research, 129– 135, 192, 195 of physics, chemistry and biology, 44 Basic amenities, 69 needs, 89 problems of public health, 43 Beaverbrook, Lord, 80 Bengal Technical Institute, 25 Bengal, 75, 122 Berlin, 115, 131

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248 Bernal, J.D., 52, 76, 130, 155, 158, 202 and India’s problems, 52 Beveridge Report, 138 Bevin, Ernest, 138–141, 186 Bevin scheme, 170 Bevin Training Scheme, 63 Bhabha, H.J., 131, 132 Bhatnagar, S.S., 16, 71, 73, 133, 134, 156, 169, 172, 175, 180 Bhore, Dr Joseph, 97 Bhore Committee, 177 Big business, 152 and their representatives, 175 Bihar, 75, 83, 122 Biochemical Standardisation Laboratory (est. 1936), 47, 93 Biological sciences, 6 biological problems, 70 Birth rate, 139 Blackett, P.M.S., 158, 202 Blood products, 97 transfusion, 97, 199 Board of Agriculture, 166 Board of Scientific Advice, 22, 166 Board of Scientific and Industrial Research (BSIR), 71–75, 78, 156, 169, 170, 172, 173 Board of Standards and Specifications, 185 Board of Survey and Natural Resources, 183 Body traps, 128 Bombay Plan, 145–150, 193 Bombay University, 76 Bombay, 64, 75, 76, 86, 132 Bombers, 4, 109 Bose Research Institute in Calcutta, 33, 76 Bose, J.C. (1858–1937), 16, 55, 129– 130 and racial discrimination, 49 Bose, P.N., 55 Bose, S.N., 130 Bose, Subhas Chandra, 50, 189, 190 Botanical Surveys, 176

index Botany, 129, 165 Boycott of foreign goods, 25 Bridges, 123 Brigadier Welsh, 124 Britain, 3, 7, 12, 20, 21, 27, 33, 52, 60, 69, 80, 90, 95, 117, 119, 128, 133, 137, 138, 141, 146, 151, 154, 155, 167, 168, 181, 183, 191, 192, 194, 202, 203 British Central Scientific Office, 60 British Commonwealth Science Committee, 60, 61 British Commonwealth Scientific Office, 168 British DSIR, 79 British Electric Lighting Act of 1882, 120 British Empire, 2, 7, 8, 11, 15, 20, 59, 60, 113, 128, 189 British India Electric Company, 120 British Milk Marketing Board, 86 British Office in Washington, 168 British possessions, fall of, 69 British Raj, legacies of, 203 British Resident in Mysore, 49, 50 British rule in India 8, 9, 31, 106, 141, 191 opposition to, 48, 141 prospect of permanence fading fast after 1935, 46 British scientific opinion, 89, 155, 156 and scientists, 158, 201 British atrocities, 141 attitude, 99, 145, 203 authorities, 15, 144, 156, 161 British, 55, 63, 91, 114, 141, 151, 160, 190, 200 British policy, 19, 59, 111, 194 Cabinet, 139 changes in its nature after the war, 37 doctors in India, 55 Dominions, 191 experts, 88 firm, 120

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index firms in Indian trade, 151 Government, 80, 109, 110, 140 imperialism, 19 in India, 177 industrial lobbies, 158 interests in India, safeguards to, 151 interests, 121 manufacturers, 79 model, 183 oil interests, 118 political attitude towards India, 154 Broadcasting, 111 Brooklyn Institute of Technology, USA, 83 Buddhist medicine, 100 Budget, 129, 169 budget allocations, 113 budget speech, 151 Building and Road Institute, 179 Building materials, 173 Bureaucracy, 31, 41, 152, 156, 166, 175, 180, 181, 201 Burma Oil Company, 47, 114 Burma, 11, 64, 69, 93, 190 Burma separation from India in 1937, 47, 118 Burns, W., 88 Burrows Committee on coal mining (1937), 47 Business businessmen, 64, 159 firms, 114 houses, 116 interests, foreign and indigenous, 158 interests, 2, 163 By-products, 82 Cabinet Committee on Reconstruction, 138 Calcutta University, 130, 131 Calcutta, 25, 64, 76, 86, 107, 131 Calendar reform, 130 Cambridge, 132

249

Canada, 11, 79, 105, 111, 128, 153, 157, 167, 185, 194 Canadian firms, 79 Cantonments, 92, 106 Capitalism, 4, 8, 193 and socialist models of development, 191 Capitalist imperialism, 4 Capitalist model, 191, 163, 193. Cash-crop farming, 23 Cement, 116 Censor, 15 Central Advisory Board of Education, 66, 68, 87 Central Advisory Board of Health, 47 Central control, 62 of twenty basic industries, 150 over scientific matters, 165 Central Drugs Laboratory, 93 Central Food Advisory Council, 170 Central Glass and Ceramic Institute, 185 Central Government, 77, 85, 93, 147, 178 powers with regard to agriculture were further curtailed, 40 Central Legislature, 59, 93 address to the joint session of, 148 Central Medical Research Institute, proposed to be located at Dehra Dun, 44, 45 Central Military Pathological Laboratory, 96 Central or Imperial Medical Research Institute at Delhi, 42 Central Organization for Scientific Research, 125 Central Power Board, 122 Central Provinces and Berar, 75 Central Register of Scientific and Technical Personnel, 183 Central Research Institute at Kasauli, 92 inadequate facilities at, 42 Central Research Institute, 24, 166

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250

index

Central Technical Power Board (set up (1944), 122, 150 Central Water and Power Commission, 121 Centre of Nutrition Research, 43 Chamberlain, Joseph, 8, 20 Chamberlain, Sir Austen, 28 Chambers of Commerce, 64, 76 Chandrasekhar, Subramanyan, 131, 132, 134 Chemical and biological warfare, 6, 126 Chemical Defence Committee, 126 Chemical Defence Research Establishment at Rawalpindi, 126 Chemical industries, 4 Chemical Warfare School at Panchmurhi, 126 Chemical warfare, 126 Chemicals, 69, 70 Chetty Committee, 185 Chicago University, 132 Chicago, 23 China, 64, 109, 196 Choice of technology, 9, 11, 31 Chopra, R.N., 92 Christian missionaries, 43 Churchill, Winston, 138, 140 Cinchona, 69, 93 Civil Aviation Training Centre at Saharanpur, 110 Civil aviation, 108, 110 Civil demands, 92 food supply, 38 life, 61 supplies, 168 Civilian population, 97 Civilization, 4 Classic colony, 197 Clement R. Attlee, 138 Cloth, 169 clothing, 69 Coal, 115, 116, 117, 119, 121 mining of, 116 production of, 117 reserve of, 117, 121

Coimbatore, 166 Cold War, 1, 6, 7, 12, 13, 122 Collaboration with foreign companies, 106 with Indian business and industry, 176 Collaborators of the British, 175 of the Empire, 116 College of Engineering and Technology, Bengal, at Jadavpur, 63 Colonial government, 12, 30, 86, 112, 113, 116, 120, 151, 159, 172, 194 Colonial policy, 2, 5, 8, 16, 17, 64, 99, 113, 115, 132, 141, 142, 194, 195, 199, 200 Colonial Secretary, 8, 20 Colonial apathy, 43 apparatus, 181 attitude, 68, 190 authorities, 154, 158 character of the foreign rule, 45 considerations, 192 control, 200 development, 20 discouragement, 192 establishment, 175 expansion, 160 faced with difficult tasks, 46 government in India, 158 indifference, 107 initiative 142, 200 interest, 180 legacies, 13 needs, 53 priorities, 186 raw material, 20 rule, 158, 159, 195 system, 162 trade, 101 Colonialism, 8, 10, 32, 161 influence of 192 Colonies, 1, 13, 19, 155 Combustion engine, 80 Commander-in-Chief, 123, 124, 127

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index Commerce, 67, 180 and military, 38 Commercial goods, 102 requirements of the Empire, 54 Committee on Agriculture Education, 68 Committee on Post-War Educational Development, 68 Commonwealth, 61, 62, 128 Communal and religious feelings, in educational and scientific services and organizations, injected by authorities, 49 Communal composition, 180 discrimination, 180 problem, 174 riots, 3, 191 tension, 191 Communications Department, 168 Communications, 69, 111, 115, 147, 149 Communist Party of India, 10 Concern for food, 6 for peace and reconstruction, 165 Conference of the Chief Engineers of Provinces and States, 105 Conference of industry ministers, 52 of scientists, 61 on locusts, 171 Congress, 30, 159 and socialism, 51 and the National Planning Committee (NPC) in 1938, 52 in the provinces in 1937, 52 ministries, 50 President, Subhas Chandra Bose, 52 Consolidation of imperial authority, 19 of modern science and Western technology, 195 of small land holdings, 147 Constitutional

251

and hindrances, 178, 197 and powers, 167 and restrictions, 120 complications, 151 Constructive response from the Raj for reconstruction, 142 Contemporary crisis, 61 and political developments, 39 and politics, 146 Control of drugs, 93 Control orders, 169 Controller of Broadcasting, 111 Controller of Road Transport, 105 Controlling population, 99 Conventional imperialism, 160 Cooperation, 29, 45, 62, 155, 158, 201 among nations for mutual welfare, 198, 201 between industries in India and Britain, 147 between the scientists of India and the Empire, 157 for post-war reconstruction, 198 Coordination Committee of the Council, 153 Coordination, 29, 62, 91, 149 absence of, 32 at the all-India level, 179 of research among the government departments, 41 of scientific and industrial research, 178 of scientific research, 40 Cosmic Radiation, 132 Cottage industry, 9, 30, 186 Cotton Technological Laboratory, 76 Cotton, 46, 54, 75 and textile industry, 46 commercial exploitation of, 33–34 textile, 35 Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), 3, 73–81, 187 as another tool of the Empire, 174 composition of its Governing Body (GB), 175

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252

index

CSIR, 134, 156, 170, 173, 174, 176, 180, 184 Craftsmen, 64 Creativity, 133 Cripps Mission, 140 Cripps, Sir Stafford, 138, 186 Crop planning, 95 Crumbling of the Empire, 147 Cultural awakening in the East, 189 ethos of the people of India, 56 heritage, 199 moorings, 56 tradition of the East, 189 Culture, 130 Curzon, George Nathaniel Curzon (1899–1905), 8, 9, 21–27, 165 Cuts in grants and retrenchment of staff, 48 Dairy production, 85 products, 82 Dak in Assam, 161 Dalal, Sir Ardeshir (1884–1949), 149–153, 175, 187, 197 Damodar River, 122 Damodar Valley Corporation (DVC), 122, 144 Dawn Society, 25 DDT, 6, 199 Death rate, 90 Decolonisation, 10, 20, 191 Defence Department, 108, 167 Defence of India Rules, 59 Defence research and development (R&D), 123–126 Defence science, 113, 131 Defence, 191 defence organizations, 74 equipment, 61 needs, 70 preparedness, 69, 127 research, 126, 127, 128, 194 Dehra Dun, 35, 97 De-industrialisation of India, 32 Delhi Declaration, 59

Delhi, 11, 28, 66, 74, 78, 86 Democracy, 11, 162, 202 Democratic tradition, 142 Department of Aeronautics, 109 Department of Atomic Energy, 134 Department of Commerce, 71, 172, 173 Department of Defence Coordination, 167 Department of Education, Health and Lands, 176, 180 Department of Food, 167 Department of Industries and Civil Supplies, 168 Department of Industries and Supplies, 32, 33, 153, 170, 184 Department of Information and Broadcasting, 111, 167 Department of Labour, 176 Department of Planning and Development, 81, 88, 103, 149–153, 157, 168, 182, 184, 187, 197– 198 Department of Posts and Air, 176 Department of Posts and Telegraphs, 167–168 Department of Science and Technology, 165, 185, 187 Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR), 5 Department of Supply, 74, 110, 167, 171 Department of War Transport, 167– 168 Departments of Commerce and Industries, 168 Departments of Scientific and Industrial Research of Britain in 1915, 33 Depression, 36, 40, 46 economic impact, 46 economy measures and retrenchment of staff during the, 34 effects on agriculture, 40 Destruction and dislocation, 7, 190 Developed countries, 2, 12

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index Development Board, 153 Development Consultative Council, 183 Development, 38, 151, 185, 193 Developmental aspects of science, 16 Developments in India compared with Canada, 153 Dewan of Mysore State, Sir Mirza Ismail, 49, 50 Diagnosis of diseases, 96 Diploma course in dairy, 38 Director of Scientific and Industrial Research, 71, 73, 156, 172 Director of Scientific and Industrial Research, 74, 78, 123 Director of the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, 156, 175 Director of the National Physical Laboratory, 134 Directorate General of Shipbuilding and Ship Repairs, 171 Directorate of Merchantship Repairs, 65, 171 Directory of Raw Materials, 74 Discrimination, 106, 186, 194, 200 Disease, 21 diseases of the livestock, 39 preventive and curative aspects of, 100 Dislocation, 137 and disruption, 14, 82 of economy, 69 Disruption in imports, 94 in transport and communications, 141 Divide-and-Rule, 16, 175 Document on the science policy of the Raj, 39 on the science policy, 32 Dominion status, 11, 59, 153 Dominions, 59, 60, 129, 183, 194 Drug Act, 93 Drugs Rules, 93 Drugs Technical Advisory Board, 93 Drugs, 69, 92, 169 Drug control, 92

253

DSIR of Britain, 41, 173 Dufferin, 106 Dufferin Fund, 95 Dutch oil interest, 118 DVC, 150 Dyes, 27, 69, 72 for uniforms, 170 East and West Bengal, 107 East India Association, 156 Eastern colonies, 196 Eastern Fleet, 123 Eastern Group Conference, 60 Eastern Group Supply Committee, 60 Easternization of the West, 198 Ecology, 84 and environment, 84 Economic and material reconstruction, 150 Economic imperialism, 56 Economic interests of the Empire, 186–187 Economic nationalism, 25, 36, 159 Economic and military problems, 185 boom and prosperity, 2 cooperation as diplomatic device, 145 crisis caused by the war, 63 development, 24 dislocation and disruption, 27 exploitation, 19, 23, 55 planning, 139, 152 products, 74 recovery, 30 recovery and reconstruction, 52 regeneration, 142 Economics, 131 Economists, 139, 145 Economy 2, 7, 25 and livelihood, 23 of the subcontinent, 197 Educated Indians, 21 Education, 25, 28, 30, 67, 134, 139, 178

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254

index

in traditional knowledge and skill, 55 system, 66 Educational Advisor to the Government of India, 66 Educational Conference at Simla, 22 Educational institutions, 48 reform, 147 system, 67 Edwin Montague, 28 Electrical Commissioner with the Government of India, 121 Electrical equipment, 128 industry, 120 power generation, 122 Electricity Act, 120 Electricity, 47, 116, 119, 120 per capita use of, 120 Electrification, 148 of the railways, 122 Electro-chemical industries, 173 Electro-Chemical Institute, 179 Electronic industries, 112 Electronics, 131 and communications, 83 Elementary education, 87 expansion of, 31 Elementary Physical Particles, 132 Elgin, Earl of (1894–1899), 165 Elmhurst, L.K., Special Advisor, Agriculture Department, Govt. of Bengal, 87 Emergency measures, 62 Empire, 17, 19, 21, 27, 86, 137, 154, 156 and the Allies, economic interest and military superiority of, 195 importance of India for the defence of, 33 Employment, 24, 31, 48, 62, 139 Endemic, 93 Energy, 115–121 Engineer-in-Chief, India, 123 Engineering Planning Agency of the Government of India, 122

Engineering Research Board, 183 Engineering, 17, 22, 69 research, 123 England, 56, 62, 63, 91 Englishmen, 142 Environmental hygiene, 98 Epidemic, 94, 170 Essential chemicals, 61 Europe, 4, 23, 194 European Renaissance, 162 European boats, 195 Europeans, 27, 54, 55 nationalities, 101 population in India, 24 rulers, 197 Exigencies of the war, 2, 36, 59, 60, 78, 103, 107, 163, 165 Expansion of crops, 89 Experimental station at Bikaner (1930), 34 Experiments, 5, 82, 83 Exploration, 114, 118 of oil, 118 Exploratory Committee on Combustion Engine, 79 Explosive, 6 Export trade, 107 Export, 34, 89 of expertise and production capabilities, 196 of hardware, 196 of technology, 107 Extra-mural research, 123 work, 124 Famine Commission, 95 of 1898 and 1901, 23 of 1901, 166 Famine, 3, 21, 23, 82, 84, 94, 95, 144, 160, 165, 170, 177, 194 famine of 1918–1919, 32 Farm farms, 69 implements, 54 production, 84, 86

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index Fauna, 21 Fellow of the Royal Society, London, 130, 131, 192 Fellows of the learned societies, 192 Fellowships, 77 Fertilisers, 54, 83 Fertilizer factory, 151 Fibre, 83 Field trials, 13 Fielder, Lionel of the BBC, 111 Fifth Industries Conference (1933), 41 Filature silk reeling, 110 Finance and management of farming, rural health and primary education, 39 of the railways, 102 Financial and administrative control over basic industries, 150 and human resources, 85 handicaps, 91 prospects, 179 requirements, 178 resources, 82, 151 stringency, 113 Fire extinguishing substances, 83 First Industrial Revolution, 200 First World Power Conference, 115 First World War, 4, 9, 27–33, 38, 42, 43, 50, 67, 69, 102, 106, 111, 115, 143, 159, 166, 175, 192 devastation and disruptions in, 142 Fiscal autonomy, 31 Fisheries, 88 Five Year Plans, 14, 140, 178, 201 Fleming, General, 105 Fletcher, Sir Walter, 44 Flood, 21 Flood control, 54, 121 Flora, 21 Flying club, 108 Food Conferences, 84 Food, 69

255

Food Department, 171 planning, 171 preservation, 128 production, 84, 157 situation, 86 supply, 82, 94, 95, 170 Foothills, 118 Foreign assistance, 122 companies, 118 experts, 122 goods, 25 interests, 118 oil interests, 118 rule, 9, 142 scientists, 194 Forest products, 34, 83 Forest Research Institute at Dehra Dun, 75, 83 Forestry, 82–83, 88, 165 British interest in, 34 Formal empire, 159 Formal imperialism, 198 Former colonies, 11 Fourth World Power Conference, 115 Fragmentation of holdings problems of, 39 of land, 89 France, fall of, 63, 69, 140 Freedom struggle, 5, 13, 46, 48, 189, 191 Freedom, 25, 57, 59, 155, 180, 192 from the foreign rule and, 50 of work, 173, 180 Fruits, 54, 97 Fuel Research Institute, 179 Fuel Research Institute at Dhanbad, 81 Fuel, 54, 70, 72, 103, 113, 115, 117, 119, 170 Fundamental research, 16, 25, 77, 113, 129, 133 Funds, 66, 178 G.D. Birla, 37 Gandhi, M.K. (1869–1948), 30, 56, 174, 189, 191

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256

index

his call for reviving traditional technology and skill, 174 his philosophy, 198, 199 his programme, 56, 139 his programme of rural reconstruction, 51 Gandhian model of development, 146, 193 plans, 146 Gandhians, 186 General Headquarters (GHQ), India, 123 General Staff, 28 Geodetic Branch of the Survey of India, 114 geodetic work of the Survey of India, 118 Geography, 21, 55, 113, 114, 163 geographical location, 141 Geological Survey, 118, 176 Geology, 129 Geopolitical dominance, 6 Germany, 11, 12, 31, 59, 202 German advance, 27 German threat, 140 Germans, 34 Ghagh Bhattari, 160 Ghosh, J.C., 50, 156, 175 GHQ , 124, 127 Ghuznavi, Sir Abdul Halim, 175 Glass and Ceramic Institute at Calcutta, 81 Glass and Silicate Research Institute, 179 Glass, 35, 61, 116 Global crisis, 1, 141, 192 economic and strategic equations of the Empire, 46 forces, 11, 12 power, 1 progress, 18 readjustment and realignment of the new economic and political forces, 162 strategy, 60 Globalization, 12, 198

Godavari Canals, 107 Goodwill between the peoples of India and America, 144 Goonatilake, Susantha, 196 Government of India Act of 1935, 106 Government of India, 17, 23, 28, 32, 34, 40, 42, 44, 59, 61, 62, 64, 65, 69, 73, 75, 77, 82, 86, 92, 96, 105, 109, 110, 111, 118, 119, 120, 121, 126, 135, 150, 157, 166, 168, 169, 170, 171, 173, 176, 178 Government of Mysore, 109 Government policy, 19, 44, 66, 170, 177, 185, 201 in Britain, 185 redeeming features of, 35 Government concern for harnessing science for the over-all progress, 184 controls, 154 departments, 29, 76, 179 initiative, 42, 27, 47 support for science, 182 to mineral industries, 35 Grady Mission, 63–65, 109, 118 Grady, Henry F., 63–65, 145 Grand Trunk Road, 103 Grant Massie Committee, 65 Grants-in-aid to the universities, 179, 185 Great Depression, 102, see also Depression Gregory, Sir Richard, editor of Nature, 40, 201 Grow-More-Food Campaign, 84, 171 Gundy, 24 Gwalior Conference, 105 Haffkine Institute at Bombay, 24, 76 Haldane, J.B.S., 202 Handicraft industries, 139 Harcourt Butler Technical Institute (Kanpur), 36 Hardware, 163 export of, 196

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index Harlow, 109 Hazaribagh, 92 Health care, 94, 161, 178 Health services, 69, 148 Health Survey and Development Committee, 97 Health, 30, 97, 99, 150, 166, 194 and hygiene, 100 and nutrition, 53, 157 of mothers and children, 98 of the industrial worker, 98 minimum level of, 96 Health policy, 91 Heavy chemicals, 35 Heavy industries, 119 Heavy vehicles, 105 Helminthology, 44 Henry Phipps (American millionaire), 23 High-breeding, 85 Higher technical education, 68 High-speed guns, 6 Hill Report, 187 Hill, Hill, A.V., 16, 80–81, 89, 98– 100, 123, 156, 177, 185, 201, 100, 123–126 ff, 181–185 Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule, 56, 189 Hindu dominance, 152 Hindustan Aircraft Company, 109, 111 Historiography, imperial and colonial, 196 History of ecology and conservation, 84 of Hindu Chemistry, 26 of science, 17 Hoarding by traders, 92, 93 Holistic approach, 161 Horse, 82 Horticulture, 39 Hot Spring Conference on Food and Agriculture, 168 House of Commons, 138 Howard, Herbert, Inspector General of Forests, 88 Howe, C.D., 153

257

Human conditions, 142 health, 126 intrinsic unity of, 141 miseries, 3 psychology, 160 resources, 85 specific health requirements connected with the local physiology, production activities and the climate, 44 welfare, 2 Humanism, 162 Humanitarian measures, 198 Hyderabad, 75 Hydraulics, 130 Hydro-electricity, 47, 121–122 Hygiene, 99 Ideological concern, 158 differences, 191 divide, 191, 193 muddle, 192 orientation, 134 stand, 193 Ideology, political, 130 Illiteracy, 99 Imperial Agricultural Research Institute, 23, 83, 85, 166 Imperial Bacteriological Laboratory, 24 Imperial Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR), 39, 46, 82, 83, 166, 176, 177 Imperial Council of Industrial Research, demand for establishment of, 40 Imperial Dairy Research Institute, 85–86 Imperial initiative in the US partnership, 137–145 Imperial Institute at Kensington, 20 Imperial Institute of Animal Husbandry and Dairying at Bangalore (1923), 38

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258

index

Imperial Institute of Sugar Technology at Kanpur, 34, 46 Imperial Institute of Veterinary Research at Mukteswar and Izatnagar, 38, 75, 85 Imperial Leprosy Mission, 94 Imperial Veterinary Research Institute (IVRI) at Izatnagar, 92 Imperial policy, 20, 145–151 retreat, 158 rule, 201 war effort, 27 Imperialism, 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 16, 18, 19, 114, 118, 130, 133, 155, 158, 162, 189, 196, 201 and capitalism, 163 and nationalism, 57 and the old capitalism, 199 interests of, 149 Import, 82 of machinery, 70 acute disruption in, 69 Index of quality of life, 120 India Office, 138 India, 2, 20, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 69, 79, 90, 91, 120, 141, 147, 153, 154, 155, 156, 162, 181, 186, 192, 194, 195, 197, 199 as the base of military operations, 172 at the crossroads, 190 her actual requirements, 186 her development, 144 her economic liberation, 200 her economic reconstruction, 144 India’s freedom struggle, 143 poverty and backwardness, 141 reconstruction, 148 resources to meet the economic and strategic requirements of the Empire, 46 socio-economic problems, 146, 201 strategic importance, 64

technical collaboration with American firms, 143 Indian Advisory Committee of the Royal Society, 21, 22, 165 Indian Agricultural Services, 23 Indian army, 69, 96 Indian Association for the Cultivation of Science, 25 Indian Central Cotton Committee, 33, 34 Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR), 177 Indian Electricity Act of 1903, 120 Indian heritage, 191 Indian Industrial Association, 25 Indian Industrial Commission, 28 Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, 36, 49, 75, 109, 123, 130, 132, 156 Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), 68, 196 Indian Medical Service, 53 Indian Mercantile Marine Committee, 35, 106 Indian military medical services, 96 Indian missions, 163 Indian National Army, 190 Indian National Congress, 10, 16, 26, 59, 115, 138 Indian National Government in Exile, 190 Indian opinion, 59, 115, 193 problems, 156 psyche and culture, 56 Indian Railway Committee, 102 Indian Railways, 35, 103 Indian Research Fund Association (est. 1911), 24, 26, 166, 177 Indian resources, 7, 60, 112, 134 Indian Retrenchment Committee, 42 Indian Science Congress Association (1914), 33, 156 Indian Science News Association, 50, 169

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index Indian scientists, 10, 15, 16, 17, 41, 53, 72, 116, 117, 131, 133, 145, 156, 157, 169, 175, 180, 193, 194 Indian States, 76, 122 Indian Statistical Institute, 131 Indian Stores Department, 41, 166 Indian subcontinent, 11, 95, 163, 189, 195 Indian Sugar Committee, 34 Indian Sugar Producers’ Association (Kanpur), 34 Indian Tariff Board, 34, 35 Indian technicians training of, 147 Indian timber, 34 demand for, 83 Indian universities, 77, 178 Indian bourgeoisie, 161, 162 business class, 152 business houses, 36, 176 capitalists, 159 demands and political aspirations, 48 forests, 84 genius, 194, 132, 160 Indian enterprise, 119 industrialists, 41, 111, 158–159 industries, 73 workmen, 64 Indianization, 180 of the Indian Forest Service (IFS), 35 of the scientific services, 49 Indians, 55, 151, 180, 184, 186, 202 sent to the USA, 144 Indigenous and management, 25 and skill, 13, 146 and technical skills, 160 and values, 191 creativity, 196 demand for progressive measures for development, 142

259

demand for self-rule, 174 demands, 19, 22, 42, 44, 66, 81, 121, 179, 193 education, 54 houses, 106 indigenous knowledge, 5 industries, 186, 187 intellectual regeneration, 192 interest, 10, 113 knowledge and skill, fatal blow to, 196 manufactures, 25 medicine, 100 mode of transportation, 107 modes of progress, 191 needs and demands, 171 opinion, 10, 174 philosophical tradition, inspiration from, 55 raw materials, 74 reaction, 117 response, 8, 18, 27, 54, 117, 159 response to both the colonial policy and to science in general, 53 response to reconstruction, 197 sciences and skill, and to relate or synthesise, 55 scientific community, 120 system of medicine and health care, 55, 100 tradition, 101, 196 traditional resources, 196 wisdom and resources, 202 Industrial and scientific research, 23, 36, 40, 54, 69–81, 89, 101, 150, 169 Industrial Commission of 1916, 32, 37, 39, 166 Industrial Conferences, 36 Industrial Fermentation Institute, 179 Industrial Intelligence and Research Bureau, 41, 71, 166, 172 Industrial Research Board, 183 Industrial Research Fund (IRF), 65, 72, 73, 170, 172, 173

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260 Industrial Research Planning Committee, 75, 178, 184, 185 Industrial Research Utilization Committee, 65, 72, 73, 74, 172, 173 Industrial Revolution, 4, 32, 162 Industrial activities, 11, 37, 102, 115, 154 and economic development, 25 associations, 76 backwardness, 27, 31 collaborations, 3 development, 40, 41, 67, 76, 139, 151, 172 education, 22 enterprise, 185 exploitation of forests, 34 firms, 74, 76 firms and multinational corporations, agents of, 195 growth, 70, 119, 159 growth, basic and long-term facilities for, 36 health, 98 improvement, enthusiasm for, 33 industrial momentum, 33 industrial organizations, 179 industrial processes, 6 industrial purposes, 26, 65 initiative, 182 innovation, 26 intelligence, 41 machines, 70 needs, 176 output, 69 planning, 76, 78 plants, 64 production, 36, 64, 65, 70, 169, 171 products, demand for, 36 progress, 31 sector, 152 training, 138 ventures, 25, 37, 139, 159 Industrialism in Britain, 32 Industrialists, 16, 53, 62, 145

index Industrialization, 10, 11, 26, 28, 30, 31, 33, 45, 51, 54, 56, 72, 75, 79, 80, 81, 99, 151, 152, 157, 158, 159, 179, 186, 192, 199 government commitment to, 37 necessity of, 149 official emphasis on, 194 programme of, 153 under Cloud, 151–154 Industries Conferences, 171 Industry, 6, 14, 26, 27, 29, 30, 32, 40, 46, 61, 62, 66, 67, 70, 80, 89, 116, 128, 139, 148, 154, 166, 174, 178, 179, 182, 191 and science and technology, 143 and the armed forces, 46 expansion of, 36 Infant mortality, 90 Influences of socialist Russia and Asian Japan, 200 Influenza epidemic of 1918–1919, 42 inquires on (1918), 43 Informal control, 159, 198 informal penetration, 159 Information, exclusion of Indians from, 127 Infrastructure, 65, 90, 196 Initiative to develop India, 181 Inland Water Transport, 106, 107 Innovation, 24, 191 and research, 37, 38, 70 and research and foreign cartels 37 Insanitation, 94 Institute of Food Technology, 179 Institute of Hygiene and Public Health at Calcutta, 43, 45, 143 Institute of Intellectual Property, 142 Institute of Science, Bombay, 33 Insulating materials, 82 insulator, 83 Integrated and centralized scientific research, 176 Intellectual resources, 189 Intelligence surveillance, 194

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index International Labour Organisation (ILO), 95, 142 International Research Council, proposal for India to join it, 40 International concern for global progress and peace, 142 conferences, 115 diplomacy, 1, 141 opinion, 120 pressure for reform and reconstruction in India, 142 relations, 13 situation, 115 with the help of science and democracy, 202 Internationalism, 162, 198 Inter-war period, 16 Inventions, 4, 77 Investment, 150, 192, 195 for research, 47 long-term, 45 Ipecacuanha, 93 Iron and steel, 35 Irrigation Commission of 1903, 166 Irrigation, 19, 39, 148 IRUC, 72 Jabalpur, 110 Jamshedpur, 66, 123 Japan, 12, 31, 114, 141, 163, 174, 189, 190, 196, 202 Japan, 199 Japanese advance, 63, 69 Japanese, 60, 64 Japanese attack, 74 Japanese invasion, 91 Java, 92 Jeep, 5 Jenkins, E.M., Secretary to the Dept. of Supply, 147, 187 Journal of Industrial research, 73 Jungle-warfare, 126 Jute, 46, 54, 75, 82

261

Kala-azar (1924), 43 Kanpur, 70, 86, 166 Karachi, 64, 86 Kasauli, 24, 166 Kasipur, 110 Kasturbhai Lalbhai, 175 Key industries, 29 Khaddar, 30 Khan, Syed Ahmad, 55 Khareghat, Sir Feroz, 88, 170 King Institute of Preventive Medicine, 24 Knowledge, pursuit of, 19 Kothari, D.S., 131, 134 Krishnan, K.S., 131, 134 Kumarappa, J.C. (1892–1955), 146, 174 Laboratories, 70, 73, 76 for industrial utilization, 170 of the Department of Chemical Technology, 76 of the Director of Scientific and Industrial Research at Delhi, 173 Labour Department of the Government of India, 62–63 Labour Party, 137, 138 Labour trouble, 117 Lac Research Institute at Namkum, Ranchi (1925), 36, 83 Lac, 75, 82, 83, 169 Lahore, 40, 71 Laissez faire, 119 Landlords, 175 Large-scale industrialization, 9, 30, 198 opposition of Gandhi and the Congress to, 38 Layallpur, 166 League of Nations, 95, 142 Leather and Tanning Institute, 179 Leather, 70, 85 Legislative measures, 9 Leitch, Lt. Col., 124 Lend-Lease arrangement, 105, 109, 112, 119

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262

index

Leprosy, 24 Liberal Government, 20 Liberation struggle, 11, 190 Licences, 111 and control orders, 70 of industries, 152 Licentiates, 96 Life expectancy, 90 Linlithgow, Lord, 59, 109, 138, 140, 186 Linlithgow, viceroyalty of, 147 Local and problems, 99 and scientific leadership, 50 and society, 55 and traditions, 31 demand, 174, 177, and requirements, 184 economy, 192 human physiology, certain specific health requirements connected with, 44 industries, 33 interest, 53 needs, 33, 48, 68, 179 population, 31, 44, 54 Locomotives, 116 Locust control, 83 London Shellac Research Bureau, 83 London, 8, 11, 21, 28, 60, 61, 62, 115, 120 Long term policy, 165 long-term planning, 78, 172 Long-staple cotton from the USA, 32 Lower classes, 152 Lubricant, 70, 72, 170 Macdonald, Thomas H., 105 Machine tools, 69, 80, 169, 170 Machine, 27, 67, 155 Machinery, 62, 69 Machine-reeling method, 110 Mackpherson Committee report on mining education (1920), 35 Madame Curie Laboratory, 131

Madras Presidency, 24 Madras University, 130, 132 Madras, 26, 27, 75, 86, 107 Magnetic/electrical waves, 130 Mahalanobis, P.C., 131, 134 Malaria Institute of India, 47 Malaria Survey of India, 43, 47 Malaria, 43, 47, 93, 94 Malaviya, Pandit Madan Mohan, 31–32 Malaya, 69 Malnutrition, 94, 95 Management, 139 and development of natural resources, 192 of daily life and work at high temperature, 45 of the natural resources, 150 Mansergh, N., 14 Marine engineering, 36 Market forces, 2 Mass behaviour, 6 Mass illiteracy, 89 Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 77 Master General of Ordnance, 123 Material material wellbeing, 86, 158 progress, 8, 24, 146, 162 of the country, 51, 119 reconstruction, 2, 137 regeneration, 56 support to the Empire during the war, 186 Mathematics, 54, 129 Mathews, H.M., 121 Mayo, 23 Medical education all India survey of, 43 and research in the universities, 42, 45, 90, 91, 98, 99 short courses, 196 Medical Research Board, 126, 183 Medical research linkage and co-operation between India, Great Britain and other parts of the Empire, 45

2008006. Sinha. 10_Index. Proef 4. 13-5-2008:12.06, page 263.

index loss of interest, 45 medical research significance of freedom from administrative control in, 45 Medical resources, 41 medical skills, 195 medical technicians, 96 Medical science and public health, 5, 17, 23, 44, 53, 90–101, 128, 142, 176, 191 and health care, 47, 183 and services, 177 Medical services, 126 Medical services, 7, 24, 42, 91, 167 and research, 26 and supplies, 92, 94 of the armed forces, reorganization and revamping of the, 96 Medical equipment, 92 medical facilities, 92 medical relief, 98 Medicine, 6, 17, 27, 54, 69 Member for Planning and Development, 77, 125, 183 Member of the Department of Commerce, 71 Memorandum of post-war reconstruction, 149–155 memorandum for a social and economic programme for India, 147–148 Mesopotamian disaster, 27, 28 Messrs Shipton and Mott, 114 Metallurgical Institute, 179 Metallurgical Laboratory of the Tata Steel Works, 123 Metallurgy, 54 Metals, 61 Meteorological forecasting, 128 observation, 110 research, 176 Meteorology, 39, 83, 110 Metropolis, 6, 7, 110, 133, 168 Metropolitan cities, 86

263

Mexico, 118 Mica, 169 Middle class, 62 Middle East, 103, 118 Military affairs, 123 Military medicines, 13 Military and strategic demands, 59 demands, 84, 89 demands for animal food, 85 equipment, 65 hospitals, 96 interests of the Empire, 60 operation, 110 requirements, 19 supplies, 126 vehicles, 105 Milk and milk marketing organizations, 86 Milk Marketing Adviser, 86 Mineral Oil, 117, 118, 119 Minerals, 54, 69, 169 Mines, 69, 128 Mining Institute at Dhanbad (1926), 35, 36 Mining, 35, 54 Ministry of Supply (Roger) Mission, 63 Ministry of Supply in the UK, 125 Minorities, 152 Mission abroad, 194 Mitchell, Sir Kenneth, 105 Mobilisation, 60 Model of progress, 162 Modern science and technology, 1, 10, 11, 25, 26, 31, 52, 56, 146, 162, 198 as a tool of progress, 193 for human progress, 198 for the welfare of the local population, 201 potential for war, 168 Modern technology, 25 Modern war, 60, 125 warfare, 4 Modern ideas, 199

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264

index

industries in the provinces, 52 industry, 89 knowledge, 101 knowledge and technology, proliferation of, 201 Modernization and nationalism, 191 Mohammad, Ghulam, Finance Minister of the Nizam of Hyderabad, 175 Money reserve, 186 Monopoly, 152 Monopoly firms, 4 Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, 28 Moor, Mr Arthur, 80 Moral and spiritual aspects, 146 stagnation, 67 Motor transport, 103, 105 vehicles, 106 Mudaliar, Ramaswamy, 71, 169, 172 Mughals, 197 Multinational and corporations, 160, 162 cartels, 4 cartels in India, 37 Multipurpose hydroelectric and thermal power projects, 122 river valley projects, 150 Munitions, 27 munitions factories, 64 Muslim League, 28 Mutual Aid Agreement, 60, 168 Mysore, 75, 120 Mysore State, 49 Nagpur, 86, 105, 166 Nagpur Plan, 105 National Academy of Sciences, India, 115 National Chemical and Physical Laboratories, 179 National Chemical Laboratory at Poona, 81, 179, 185 National Council of Education, Bengal, 25

National Council of Research of Canada, 79 National Fuel Policy, 116, 119 National Government in Britain, 137 National government of India, 10, 53, 134, 138 under Nehru, 202 National Highway scheme, 105 National Institute of Sciences of India, 156 National laboratories, 77, 176, 185 National leadership, 17, 193, 194 National Metallurgical Laboratory, 185 National Physical Laboratory at Delhi, 77, 81, 185 National Planning Committee (NPC), 10, 16, 52–53, 115–116 ff, 145, 155, 159, 176, 193, 194 Sub-Committee on Power and Fuel, 119 sub-committee on Transport, 108 sub-committees, 119, 145 National planning, 134 national policy on fuel, 117 National reconstruction, 10, 26, 50, 52, 121, 133, 145, 153, 156, 159, 193 on modern lines, 190 plan for, 155 National regeneration, 25, 52 National Research Council in the USA (1921), 5, 33 National Research Council, 40, 77, 178, 182, 180 National Science Foundation of America, 173 National science policy for India, 32 National Test House at Calcutta, 169 National Trust for Patents, 185 National development, 151, 182 economy, 158, 159 economy, mainstay of, 186 upsurge against foreign rule 189 welfare, 81

2008006. Sinha. 10_Index. Proef 4. 13-5-2008:12.06, page 265.

index Nationalism, 2, 8, 9, 10, 15, 16, 19, 46, 106 Nationalist demands, 59 interests, 192 leadership, 1, 9, 10, 159 vision of progress, 191 Nationalization of industries, 152, 181 of coal industry, 117 of the fuel resources, 119 Native population, 197 Native states, 17, 120, 160 destruction of, 55 Natural and human resources, 64 growth, 161 Natural oil resources, 117, 118, 121 natural resources, development of, and new industries in India, 41 natural resources of India, 37 natural wealth of India, 114 oil and natural resource management, 113 resources, 21, 47, 64, 65, 113, 162 Nautical communication service, 110 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 51, 52, 138, 201 Neo-colonialism, 1, 160, 198 Neurology, 97 New Delhi, 64 New Zealand, 90 New materials, 6 medical specialities, 97 power structure, 1 technology, 89 varieties of seed, 95 weapons, 195 world order, 198 Nexus between imperial interests and industrial and technological backwardness, 31 Nobel laureate, 16, 49, 80 Nobel Prize, 130, 132, 192 Non-official scientific bodies, 40 North-eastern regions, 114

265

Note, 30, 31 Nuclear energy, 132, 133 Nursing, 96 Nutrition Research Laboratory (1925), 43 Nutrition, 89, 94, 95, 97, 100, 183 government interest in, 43 Nutritional Advisory Committee of the Indian Research Fund Association, 47 Nutritional research, 43, 44 Official secrecy, 127 official surveillance, 16 Official Statement on the Industrial Policy, 186 Official control, 22 initiative, 3, 32, 36, 38 official indifference, 94, 106 patronage, 114 policy, 11, 62 priorities, 113, 150 response, 84 Oil 47, 121, 114 oilfields, 118 reserve in India, 118 scramble across the globe, 119 Oil imperialism, 118, 122 Oils and Paints Institute, 179 Oncology, 97 Operational Research, 5, 124, 127– 128, 131, 199 Operational Research Organization, 124 Ophthalmology, 97 Opium, 93 Opportunities of the postwar world, 145 opportunities lost, 190 Ordnance factories, 62, 66, 70 at Kanpur, 110 Ordnance General Stores, 70 Ordnance Laboratories at Kanpur, 123 Ordnance Laboratories, 70 Organisation, 28, 38, 71, 126

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266 and planning, 82 of science, 196 of scientific and industrial research, 80, 181 of scientific research, 156, 182 of the CSIR, 177 of the Surveys and the Medical Services, 165 Organisational set-up, 9, 81, 165, 172–177 and autonomy, 173 and structure, 201 Organizations, 62, 73, 178 of scientific and industrial research, 172 Orient, 195 Orissa 75, 161 Overseas Scholarship Scheme, 65 Overseas trade, 106 Pack animals, 82 Pakistan, 126 Paludrin, 6 Paper and paper pulp, 35, 82 Parachute, 70, 83, 110 Paramedical personnel, 92 Paris, 131 Parliamentary Committee, 28 Parochial feelings, 194 Parochialism and manipulation official indulgence in, 49 Parsi, 132 Partition of Bengal, 25 Passage from imperialism and colonialism to democracy and self-rule, 191 Pasture Institute of India, 24 Patents, 77 Pathological services, 96 Pathology, 97 Paucity, 66 of sources, 13, 15 Pawley, W.D., 109 Peacetime progress, 115, 132 reconstruction and civil needs, 201

index requirements, 5 Peasant movements, 175 Penicillin, 6 People’s Plan, 146 Pepperall, R.A., 86 Perfumes, 116 Personnel Research Committee, 126 Personnel, 41, 98 Pharmacology, 93 Physical sciences, 185 Physicians, 97 Physics, 131 Physiological laws of human labour and their application in the industrial and agricultural practice, 45 Physiological problems, affecting women and child life, 45 Physiotherapy, 97 Pillay, T.S., 175 Plague, 21, 24, 165 of 1918, 43 Plan for economic and social development, 148 for rapid industrialization, 150 Planned industrialization, 147, 149 Planning Commission, 134 Planning Committee of the AllIndia Muslim League, 146 Planning, 10, 51, 66, 71, 77, 120, 138, 140, 142, 157, 177, 201 and development, 146, 170, 180 and industrialization, concern for, 152 and investment for progress, 192 and reconstruction, 151, 153 comprehensive on all-India basis, 52 for post-war reconstruction, 148, 150 of industries, 162 Plans 146 of reconstruction, 192 Plant physiology, 130 Plantation activity, 88 and forestry, 39

2008006. Sinha. 10_Index. Proef 4. 13-5-2008:12.06, page 267.

index Plastic packaging, 72 for army boots, 170 Plurality of administrative control, 185 of authority, 66 of purpose, 192 Poison gas, 4 Policy, 179 and plans, 148 for rural regeneration, 38 of the government, 32, 36 of welfare and material reconstruction, 141 Policy measures, 17, 194 policy statements, 198 Political and economic ideas and models, 198 and economic interests, 55 and religious persecution, 194 approach of the Raj, 190 control, 55 disturbances, 193 implications, 45 will, 187, 197 Politico-economic agenda, 200 forces, adjustment and realignment of, 200 Polytechnic school, 66 Poona, 97, 110, 121, 166 Popular memory, 2 Popularization of science, 26, 67 Population, 48, 89, 99, 139, 162, 183 explosion, 157 Port Development Committee, 107 Post-graduate course, 109 Post-War Forest Policy for India, 88 Post-War developments, 14 industrial development, 77 needs, 65 of democracy, socialism, internationalism and neocolonialism, 199 power development, 121 reconstruction, 14, 80, 85, 86,

267

97, 127, 138, 147, 161, 179, 181, 196 world, 86, 192 Potentials of science, 2 for material reconstruction, 162 in the socio-economic transformation of human society, 50 Poverty, 99, 141, 191 and backwardness, 142 Power, 54, 113, 115 alcohol, 121 and water management, 150 power bloc politics, 1, 12 power engineers, 121 power generation, 119, 120, 121 power projects, 122 power resources, 61, 115 President of the Royal Society, 181 Pressure Ionization principle, 131 Preventive and curative medicine, 44 Price Control Conferences, 171 Primary education, 39 Prime movers, 27 Principles of labour organization, 63 Priorities changed, 46 given to industrial development, 40 misplaced, 194 Private British and American firms, 118 private capital, 109 private control, 152 private enterprise, 66, 109 private firms, 70, 120 private industrial collaborations, 160 private sector, 154 Privatization, 152 Problems of development, 154 of education, 22 of India, 156 of irrigation, 54 of post-war reconstruction, 168

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268

index

of public health, 43 of science, 156 of the country, 157, 176 Process of development, 11 of transition, 159 Processes, 83 Production, 5, 62, 85, 88 of aircraft, 109 of food, 84 of surgical instruments, 65 of vaccines, 90 of war materials, 64 Productivity, 139 Products in short supply, 79 Professional groups for reform and reconstruction in the country, 142 Professional activities, 54 association, 90 education, 98 forums, 116 professional bodies, 117, 156 Programme of reconstruction, 153 Progress, 2, 5, 11 in scientific and industrial research during the war, 147 of science, 10, 11, 17, 190 of science and technology, 31, 37, 202 natural course of, 192 prerequisites of, 120 Promotional avenues, 179 Propaganda, 85 means of, 111 Prospects for solutions to India’s problems, 51 Protozoology, 44 Provinces, 17, 32, 36, 64, 68, 75, 120, 122, 148, 149, 151, 178 and major states, 77 and native states, 75 and states, 170, 176 Provincial Autonomy in 1935, 40, 48, 52, 174, 175 Provincial Economic Conference (1934), 41

Provincial governments, 86, 93, 148, 150 and agriculture, 40 control, 30 provincial research committees, 75 Pro-West orientation, 198 Psychiatry, 97 Psychosomatic diseases, 101 Public health, 17, 90, 91, 98, 99, 101, 128, 177 expenditure on, 91 health services, improvement in, 147 Public Works Department, 103 Public image, 44 opinion, 6, 26, 154 press, 149 statement, 181 Pulses, 54 Punjab University Chemical Laboratories, 71 Punjab, 75 Pure research of advanced nature, 176 Pure science, 22, 133 Purna Swaraj in 1929, 40 Pusa, 166 Pyrethrum, 93 Quantum Theory, 132 Quinine, 92 Quit India movement, 146 R&D, 37, 81, 85, 110, 111, 112, 120, 177, 179, 185, 187, 195 and management, 34 establishments, 196 facilities, 123 neglect of, 54 R.A.F., 114, 124 Racial and communal composition, 49 Racial discrimination, 5, 16, 24, 49, 180 Radar, 5, 128, 192

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index Radio, 102, 111, 132 radio research, 173 Radio sets, 112 Radiographers, 96 Radiology, 97 Radiophysics, 131 Rahul Sankrityayan, 189 Railroads, 19 Railways, 62, 66, 101, 102, 107, 108, 116, 139 Budget, 102 equipment, 70 extension of the, 83 network, 192 railway industries, 35 railway workshops, 64, 70 Rajas and zamindars, as internal collaborators 200 Rajasthan, 161 Raman, C.V., 16, 49, 130, 133, 169, 192 Ramanujan, Srinivasa (1887–1920), 56, 130 Ranchi, 83 Rationality, 162 Raw material, 4, 116 exploitation of, 35 Ray, P.C., 26, 49, 55, 133, 191 Ray, Rajat K, 159, 160 RDX, 6 Reconnaissance and surveillance, machines of, 6 Reconstruction Committee of the Department of Planning and Development, 107 Reconstruction Committee of the Executive Council, 147 Reconstruction Committee, 88, 147 Reconstruction on modern lines, 192 Reconstruction, 2, 10, 11, 121, 140, 141, 145, 156, 159, 161, 162, 163, 177, 191, 195 aspects of, 148 global concern for, 135 initiative, 158, 198

269

official initiatives towards, 150 on Western lines, 191 programme, 144, 153, 160, 163, 174, 181, 200 Recovery of industry, 32 Regulatory measures, 169 Rehabilitation, 97 Relation between science and technology, 33 between science and the state, 33 of science with society, 130 Religious and nationalistic discriminations, 13 Religious beliefs, 162 Reordering of the human societies and Earth’s resources, 130 Reorganization and expansion of agricultural research and education, 171 of the government departments, 157 of the railways, 102 Repair and maintenance, 69 and servicing, 75, 171 Representatives of the masses, 180 of the provinces and States, 148 Requirements of research, 169 of the armed forces, 38, 53 of trade, 38. Research organisations, relation with the government, 45 Research, 24, 28, 71, 98, 173 activities, 41, 76, 178 and extension, 82 and improvement, 23, 26 and innovation, 169 basic and applied aspects of, 186 centres, 90, 92 committees, 169, 173 in agriculture, 85 in the laboratories, inventions and innovations, 202 institutes, 71, 76, 77, 166, 173, 178, 179

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270

index

interdisciplinary approach, 44 laboratories, 93 long-term programmes, 82 magnitude of official initiative in, 177 on nutritional diseases at Koonoor, 43 organizations, 91, 179 personnel, 77 research associations, 77 research to promote the production of staple food, 54 Resource management, 171 Resources, 60, 141, 168, 173, 178 lack of, 32 Restrictions on access to research, 15 Restrictive and discriminating policy of the government, 36 Retrenchment Committee, 42 Revivalism, 26 Rice, 69 Rivers, 121 River management, 54 Road development, 105, 148 road-rail relations, 103 roads and mercantile marine, 35 with a system of National Highways, 150 Roads, 101, 105, 123, 139 Roadways, 103 Rockefeller Foundation of America, 43, 44, 45, 95, 143 Rockets and missiles, satellites, 6 long-range, 5 Role for science, 5, 134 Roy, M.N. (1887–1954), 146 Roy, Raja Rammohun, 55 Royal Air Force, 74, 123 Royal Commission on Agriculture, 38, 186 recommendations of, 39 Royal Indian Air Force, 110 Royal Indian Navy, 123, 124 Royal Society of London, 61, 88, 157, 168, 181 Rubber Controller, 171

Rubber Production Board, 171 Rubber, 54, 69, 70, 169 Rulers of the native States, 175 Runways, 123 Rural reconstruction, 139, 158, 186 British opinion in favour of India’s, 174 Rural and economy and agriculture, 147 and electrification, 122 and rural health, 89 areas, 55, 86 development, 86 improvement, 186 regeneration, 38 rural economy, 86, 139 rural health, finance and management of, 39 Rural health and primary education, finance and management of farming, 39 uplift, 45 Russia, 139 Russian Revolution, impact of the, 10 Russian experiment for their national reconstruction, 51 in social reconstruction, 203 model of development on the, 176, 193 S.K Mitra, 131, 169 Sah, J.C., 169 Saha, M.N., 10, 16, 37, 51, 52, 115, 118, 119, 130, 133, 155, 169, 175 Sanitary Commissions, 24 Sanitation, 94, 95, 96, 97 Sankhya, Indian Journal of Statistics, 131 Sarabhai, Ambalal, 159 Sargent, John, 66 Sarkar, B.K., 189 Sarkar, M.L., 25 Sarkar, N.R., 68, 73 Savants of the East, 198 Sawai Jai Singh, 54 Scarcities and dislocations, 100, 196

2008006. Sinha. 10_Index. Proef 4. 13-5-2008:12.06, page 271.

index Scholarship, 23, 29, 179 and fellowships, 71 in India, 77 School of Tropical Medicine (1932), Calcutta, 43 Science and Culture (pub. from 1935), 51 Science and Culture Group, 51, 53, 115, 116, 117, 145, 194 Science and Culture, 16, 61, 72, 77, 79, 115, 118, 130, 155, 169, 187 Science and imperialism, 3–7 Science and technology, 8, 9, 17, 19, 22, 25, 28, 33, 46, 51, 54, 57, 59, 60, 69, 134, 138, 142, 150, 153, 157, 161, 176, 179, 184, 190, 201 and nexus between the colonial control and the deflected growth of economy, 53 application of, 178 catalysts to, 192 prime role for 50 relations between 3–4 Science and War, 3–7 Science Congress Association, 16 Science for Society Movement, 155 Science in Britain and the USA, 178 allocation of funds for promoting, 186 in Britain, 182 in its new incarnation, 199 Science News Association, Calcutta (f. 1934 at), 51, 156 Science Policy, 177, 187, 201 in India, 177 Science Policy, rise of, 177–189 Science, 1, 9, 17, 18, 22, 26, 30, 62, 139, 155, 158, 193 advance of, 190 and health care, 41 and modern technology, 154, 172 and technology, 174 destructive powers of, 2, 6 for industrial progress, 185 for national reconstruction, 201 for social progress, 130

271

for the progress, 177 growth of, 54 growth of science and technology in the future, 160 its impact on society, 169 new frontiers of, 194 old outlook towards, 179 planned application to social problems, 155 relation with development, 15 scope of, 3 Scientific Adviser to the Commander-in-Chief, 124, 125, 183 Scientific advisor to the Defence Ministry, 134 Scientific Advisory Committee under the Department of Health, 170 Scientific and technical between India and Britain and her Allies, 201 exchanges, 3 liaison, 169 missions, 62, 160 Scientific exchanges, 157 Scientific Consultative Committee, 125, 157, 183, 184, 185, 187 Scientific organisations, 5, 9, 23, 33, 53, 123, 157, 180, 182 and technical services, 194 Scientific programme of agricultural improvement, 39 Scientific progress, 65 impediment to, 192 of the advanced nations, 199 scientific projects, 9 Scientific research, 7, 20, 71, 128, 174, 176, 182, 187 and development, 81 centralization of, 182 Scientific revolution, 197 Scientific service, 29, 180 Scientific temper, 134 Scientific Terminology Committee, 170 Scientific workers, 29 pay and status of, 183

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272

index

Scientific and industrial education and research, 185 and industrial research, 17, 69–81, 142, 154, 176 and technical education, 37, 62– 68 and technical affairs, 174 collaboration between India and the non-British world, 65 cooperation, 1, 163 problems of all-India importance, 178 representation, 61 requirements of the Raj, 174 Scientific apparatus, 61 application, 195 aspects of development, 174 breakthroughs, 2 capabilities, 195 community, 154 coordination and cooperation, 168 development, 22, 28, 53, 157, 190 education and research, 31 establishments, 7, 21, 194 information, 61 institutions, 7, 62 knowledge, 73, 91 leadership, 159 methods, 71 missions, 80, 195 movement, 155 needs of the Empire, 20 opinion, 154 societies, 29 Scientist, 7, 15, 31, 145, 154–158, 181, 201 Scindia Shipping Company, 106 Sea transport, 107 Seafaring, 161 Seal, B.N. 55 Seasoning, 83 Second centre of British power, 22 Second Industrial Revolution, 200 Second World War, 1, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10,

11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 41, 47, 48, 53, 57, 59–187, 189, 192, 195 and development, 199 in India, 113 Secret projects of the Allies, 194 secret scientific plans and missions, experiments in chemical warfare, 13 secret war research projects, 128 Secretary of State for India, 26, 28, 35, 41, 80, 140, 181 Security restrictions, 15 Segregation, 162 Self-government, 128, 140 Self-reliance, 25, 110 in education and research, 150 in production and supply, 69 Sericulture, 83 Serum Research Institute (for animals) at Izatnagar, 24 Servicing and maintenance of military machines, 63, 65 Shanmugham, Sir R.K. Chetty, 75 Shift from the commercial to the financial (and strategic) aspects of, 37 in the colonial approach, 179 in priority from industrialization to agricultural improvement, 38 Shipbuilding, 31, 54, 64, 101, 119, 160 Shipping, 106, 108 space, 102, 103 tonnage, 106 Ships, 101, 116 ship-repair shops, 64 Shortages of personnel, 34, 42 shortages, 100, 103 shortages and dislocation, 71 shortages and financial instability, 48, 92 shortages of drugs, 94

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index Short-term courses, 91 Shroff, A.D., 159 Signals, 128 Silk, 82, 83 Simla, 41 Simon Commission, 39 Singapore, 190 Sir Mirza Ismail, Dewan of Mysore State, 49, 50 Sir Verney Lovett Committee for unified medical service, 42 Sirkar, Mahendralal, 55 Slum clearance, 147 Smallpox, 93 Small-scale industries, 89, 174 Social and economic progress, 140 reform, 140 Social functions of science, 81 Social concern for science, 16 consequences of the war, 14, 15 discriminations, 180 history, 3 justice, 162 prejudices, 162 progress, 26, 178, 186 reconstruction, 16 science, 67 scientists, 53 Socialism, 10, 11, 130, 133, 138, 193 and world problems, 51 fear of, 144 Socialist experiments, 10, in the USSR, 50, 155 methods, 193 Russia, 163 Socio-cultural consequences, 15 socio-cultural milieu and ethos, 161 socio-cultural milieu, 163 Socio-economic issues, 191 reconstruction, 1, 137 Sociologist, 139

273

Socio-political ambience, 202 developments of the period, 40 Soil stabilization, 123 Source of energy, 115, 116, and 119 of fuel and power, 115 of power, 29, 139 of protein, 54 of supply, 141 South East Asia Command, 123, 127 in India, 105 South India, 107 South-east Asia, 64 Soviet Union, 202 endeavours in, 203 government of, 98 model, 52, 144 social reconstruction in, 130 Space colonization, 7 Specialized research institutes, 179 Specific diseases, 24 Specific health requirements connected with the local human physiology, production activities and the climate, 44 Sri Ram, Sir, 175 Standard of living, 99, 149, 148 Standardization, 75, 77 and testing, 126 Starling, Professor E.H. of London University, 42 Starling’s scheme, 44 State of technical and professional services, 179 State control, 182 controlled industries, 152 encouragement, 89 State governments, 149 aid to scientific organizations, 144 and initiative and control, 68 initiative, 157, 179 initiative to harness science for social progress, 200 intervention and control, 116 involvement, 187

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274 participation, 177, 185 policy, 154 policy in scientific affairs, 177 regulation, 121 support, 54 Statement on Industrial Policy, 81, 184 Statistical Advisor to the Government of India, 134 Statistical standards, 173 Statistician, 139 Statistics, 39, 84, 90, 129, 131 Steam power, 116 Steamboats, 116 Steel, 4, 69, 70, 116, 169 making, 31 production, 79 Sterling balance, 149, 186 Stores, 27 Strategic importance of India, 64 position in the global scheme of the British Empire, 21 Studentship and fellowships, 73 Sub-committee on Power and Fuel, 115 Submarine, 102 submarine campaigns, 34 Subsidiary Alliance, 160 Substitutes, 79, 82, 100 and local forest products, 34 for metal, 83 for rubber, 83 need for, 75 search for, 69, 75, 126 Suez, 22, 27 Sugar (Protection) Bill (1932), 34 Sugar Conference in 1933, 34 Sugar, 34 sugar industry, 34 Sugar-Cane Act in 1934, 34 Sugarcane, 54 scientific exploitation of, 46 Super Powers, 12 Supply Department, 93 Supply, 60, 141, 169, 171

index and production, 169 of food, 84 of milk, 97 of spares, 103 supply and operation, 63 Support for agricultural improvement in India, 89 for the Raj, 141 mainly to two types of industries, 33 supporters for the Raj, 175 Surgeons, 97 Surgery, 6 Surgical instruments, 70, 170 Survey of India, 113, 176 Survey organizations, 113 Survey Section, 114 Surveys, 7, 9, 53, 113–114, 142, 167, 177, 192, 197 and enquiries, 101 and planning, 150 and reports on social and material conditions, 142 for reconstruction, 163 of waterpower resources, 121 Survey, 114, 162, 201 Survey operations, 162 Swadeshi movement, 21–27, 63 and Swadeshi, 8, 9, 25, 26, 27, 57 Swaraj, 9, 50 Symposia on coal, 171 on ‘Post-War Organisation of Scientific Research in India’, 171 Synthesis of the indigenous and Western knowledge and skill, 196 Synthetic dyes, 116 oil, 6 Tagore, Rabindranath, 189, 191, 199 Tariff Board, 34 Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, 132

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index Tata Iron and Steel Company at Jamshedpur, 64 Tata, J.N., 25, 26 Tata, J.R.D., 111, 175 Tatas, 16, 47, 49, 50, 70, 143 Tea, 54 Technical education and research, 31, 48 62–68 Technical Education Committee (1943), 66, 68, 86, 87 Technical education, 17, 22, 23, 27, 29, 35, 36, 62–68, 101, 150, 154 and industrial training, 36 in the provinces (as in Bombay in 1922 and in Madras in 1923), 36 Technical laboratory at Bombay (1924–1925), 34 Technical missions, 163 from Britain and her Allies, 169 Technical expertise, 65, 143, 196 feats, 2 groups, 195 hands, 62 hardware, 65 innovation, 2, 32 institutions, 62, 67 instruction, 67 instructors, 63 technical infrastructure, 62 Technical advance, 199 and industrial backwardness, 61 application, 156 capabilities, 65, 142 collaboration with the West, 198 cooperation, 160 degrees, 62 personnel, 12, 62, 65, 90, 91, 179 progress, 65 skill, 27 technical courses, 66 technical services, 9, 29, 31 technical staff, 67 training, 23, 62, 65, 170, 196

275

training centres, 63 Technological advance, 35, 103, 107, 159, 197 application, 148 deficiency, 159 development, 159 imperatives, 159 infrastructure, 80 innovation, 36, 71, 85, 169 possibilities of agricultural development, 88 preparedness, 159 Technicians, 62, 67 Technocrats, 155 Technology, 1, 17, 19, 46, 65, 71, 73, 162 export of, 196 Telecommunications, 101, 111 Telegraph, 19, 101, 111 Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), 122, 145 Territorial expansion, 6, 19 territorial losses in the East, 141 Test House (Calcutta), 74 its research unit at 41 Testing, 75 of samples of stores, 70 Textile, 31, 54, 69, 70, 160 Thakurdas, Purshotamdas, 159 Theatres of the war, 103 Third Industrial Revolution, 200 Third World, 200 Threat to the British economic, especially industrial interests, 38 Timber Directorate, 171 Timber, 69, 70 Tin, 69 Tipu Sultan, 54 Tizard Mission, 128 TNT, 83 Tokyo, 115 Tools, 64, 70 Town planning, 54, 147 Trade, 14, 23, 160 and business, 141 and supply, 84 immediate requirements of, 46

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276

index

Tradition, 160, 161 and philosophy of India, 203 in many spheres of science and technology, 54 of industry and technological innovation, 31 scientific and technological, 19 Traditional knowledge and arts, call for reviving India’s own, 56 Traditional and skill, 56, 162, 163, 193 arts and skills, 68 cottage industries, 89 knowledge, 26, 161 of technology, 31 practices in agriculture and animal husbandry, 161 values of the East, 189 Training ship ‘Dufferin’, 36 Training, 64, 82, 90, 110, 122 course for the superior officers of the IFS, 35 of professional pilots, 108 of research personnel, 179 training abroad, 91 training and research, 31, 33, 38, 42 training centres, 63 Transfer of the subject from the Centre to the provinces, 34 Transfer of health administration from the Centre to the provinces, 42 of political power, 200 of power, 114, 200 Transferred subject, 40 Transition, 12, 67, 191 elusive, 198–200 from colonialism to democracy, 2, 12 from colonialism to nationalism and freedom, 190, 198 Transport and communications, 5, 14, 17, 61, 69, 101–112, 142, 150, 162, 191–192, 195 British interest in developing, 35

Transport industry, 111 means of, 110 transport system, 139 Transportation, difficulties in 117 Travancore, 75 Tropical conditions, 126 diseases, 7, 43, 92, 93–94 medicine as entomology, 44 Tuberculosis, 93, 94 Turkey, 139 Twelfth Industries Conference, 75 UGC, 134 UK Machine Tool Mission, 65 Umbrella organization, 187 UN Conference on Food and Agriculture, 95 Underdeveloped countries, 200 Unemployment, 99 among the educated youth, 48 Unified medical service, desirability of, 42 Uniforms, 72 United Kingdom (UK), 35, 63, 98, 113, 120, 124, 126, 128, 129, 137, 147, 148, 154, 155, 157, 168, 172, 194 United Kingdom Aircraft Mission, 110 United Nations Organisation (UNO), 137 United Nations, 64, 128 United Provinces, 75 United States of America, 1, 12, 60, 144 as principal ally in the war, 144 attitude towards India, 144 entry into Indian, 193 interest in India, 143 interests in Asia, 143 US initiative, 144 US technical assistance, 118 United States Office for Scientific Research and Development, 60 Unity of Asia, 189

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index Universities, 29, 31, 33, 65, 66, 71, 74, 76, 77, 173, 179, 182 University College of Science, Calcutta (1916), 33 University of Delhi, 129, 131 Upper class Indians, 67 Urgency of developing India, 141, 143 of reconstruction, 159 USA Air Force, 74 USA, 33, 63, 98, 105, 112, 120, 122, 126, 128, 129, 132, 141, 142, 148, 157, 168, 172, 183, 191, 193, 194, 200 USSR, 10, 140, 147 developments in the, 51 Utilization Branch of the Geological Survey of India, 171–172 Uttar Pradesh, 85 Vaccines, 85, 92 Vakil, C.N. 152 Vegetables, 54, 97 Vegetable oil, 72 Vehicles, 105 Veterinary Advisor to the Government of India, 38 Veterinary sciences, 46, 85 Veterinary work, 38 Viceregal proclamation, 59 Viceroy, 59, 138, 140, 147, 149, 180 of India, 21, 59, 181 Viceroy Wavell, 105 Viceroy’s Executive Council, 147, 150 Village reconstruction, 139 Visvanathan, Shiv, 31 Visvesvaraya, M. (1860–1962), 51, 52, 176 Vital statistics, 91, 98, 100 Vitamins, 54, 72, 170 Vocational training, 48 Vocationalization of education, 48 Voelcker, J.A., 23 Voordwin, 122

277

Walchand Hirachand, 16, 70, 109, 111, 159 and Scindia Steam Navigation Company, 37 Wales, 91 Wants and shortages, 69 War Cabinet Scientific Advisory Committee, 60, 168 War Cabinet, 140, 149, 152 War Department of the Imperial Government in London, 126 War Research Board, 183 War Research, 126, 128, 173 and R&D, 126 War Resource Committee, 62, 147 War strategy, 141 war supplies, 11, 61 War Supply Board, 167 War Survey Research Institute, 114 War Technicians’ Training Scheme, 62 War, 1, 15, 60, 62, 66, 69, 71, 141, 154, 160, 170, 174, 176, 177, 179, 180, 186, 190 as a unifier and equalizer, 141 duties, 91 effort, 62, 63, 177 means and methods of, 198 mid-Eastern theatres of, 34 needs, 82 needs of the, 142 War crimes, 13 War materials, 71 war operations, 127 war production, 60, 64 Wartime archives, 13 Wartime compulsions, 192 crises, 174 demands, 32 developments in science, 15 difficulties, 105 economy measures, 129 exigencies, 72, 168 Measures, 167–172 requirements, 154, 170 scientific cooperation, 158

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278

index

Washington, 60, 62, 115 Water management, 54, 161 Water resource management, 130 Water resources, 121, 122 transport, 108 transport, highways for, 107 Waterpower, 29 Waterproof paints and varnishes, 83 Waterway communications, 107 Waterways, 107 Waterworks, achievements in the fields of, 160 Wavell, Sir Archibald Percival, 148, 149, 153 Weapon research, 6 Weapons, 62, 69 Weather conditions, 85 Welfare, 141 of the country, 31 of the local society, 179 West Bengal, 108 West, 2, 5, 31, 32, 55, 56, 159, 163, 197 Western Allies, 189 Western science, 13 and machine, 162 and technology, 56, 160, 163, 195, 197 Western technology, 30, 159 and British rule, 56 and multinational corporations entry into India, 159 its onslaught on the Indian subcontinent, 56 Western and the indigenous knowledge and technology, choice between, 191

business interests, 160, 162 capitalism, 140, 189, 200 colonies in Asia, 189 counties, 90 medicine, 100, 101 model of progress, 161, 196 Westernisation of the Eastern societies, 198 Wheat Commissioner for India, 171 White colonies, 111, 194 Wildlife conservation, 35 Wind tunnel, 109 Wireless, 102, 111, 131, 132 Wireless communications, 128 Wood ware, 70 Wood, 46, 69, 82 Wood, S.H., 48 Woodhead, Sir John, chairman of Famine Inquiry Commission, 202 Wool, 85 World Power Conferences, 121 World War, 4, 34, 81, 91, 121, 159, 161, 162, 169, 187, 189 World economy, 179 opinion, 141 order, 1, 11, 155 view of progress, 10 Worldview, 198 Worldwide scientific progress and research, 158 mainstream of, 201 Wright, Dr Norman C., 46 Zoological Surveys, 176 Zoology, 129