Science Studies: An Advanced Introduction 9780814790953

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Science Studie s

Science Studie s

An Advanced Introduction

David J. Hes s

NEW YOR K U N I V E R S I T Y PRES S New York and London

NEW YOR K UNIVERSIT Y PRES S New Yor k and Londo n © 199 7 by New Yor k Universit y All rights reserve d Library o f Congress Cataloging-in-Publicatio n Dat a Hess, David J. Science studie s : an advance d introductio n / Davi d J. Hess, p. cm . Includes bibliographical reference s an d index . ISBN 0-8147-3563- 0 (clothbound).—ISB N 0-8147-3564- 9 (paperbound) 1. Science—Philosophy. 2 . Science—Social aspects . 3. Technology—Socia l aspects . I . Title . Q175.H428 199

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CIP New Yor k Universit y Pres s books ar e printed o n acid-fre e paper , and thei r binding material s ar e chosen fo r strengt h an d durability . Manufactured i n th e Unite d State s of America 10 9 8 7 6 5 4

Contents

Acknowledgments vii i Introductio 2 Th

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e Philosoph y o f Science: An Interdisciplinar y Perspectiv e 6

3 Th

e Institutiona l Sociolog y o f Science 5

4 Socia

l Studies of Knowledge 8

5 Critica

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l and Cultura l Studie s o f

Science an d Technology 11 6 Conclusion

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s 14

For Additional Informatio n 15

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Notes 161 Bibliography 167 Index 193 About the Author igj

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Acknowledgments

I woul d lik e t o than k Stev e Fuller , E d Hackett , Lowel l Hargens , Brian Martin , Sa l Restivo , an d student s a t Rensselae r an d th e Universidad e Federal Fluminens e fo r comment s o n variou s part s o f earlie r draft s o f th e book, an d Eri c Zinne r fo r hi s editoria l hel p i n shapin g th e fina l versio n o f the text .

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1 Introduction

Science ha s becom e a n integra l par t o f man y issue s o f publi c concern—medical, informational , an d environmental , t o nam e a few . Sci entific expert s frequentl y squar e of f o n th e evenin g news . A t work , profes sional discourse s hav e becom e increasingl y technical , an d a t h o m e w e fac e an ocea n o f competin g claim s abou t topic s suc h a s carcinogen s i n ou r foo d or th e technica l feature s o f competin g appliances . Science studie s provide s a conceptua l too l ki t fo r thinkin g abou t techni cal expertis e i n mor e sophisticate d ways . Scienc e studie s track s th e histor y of disciplines , th e dynamic s o f scienc e a s a socia l institution , an d th e philosophical basi s fo r scientifi c knowledge . I t teaches , fo r example , tha t there ar e ways o f developing soun d criteri a fo r evaluatin g opposin g theorie s and interpretations , bu t als o tha t ther e ar e way s o f findin g th e agenda s sometimes hidde n behin d a rhetori c o f objectivity . I n th e process , scienc e studies make s i t easie r fo r laypeopl e t o questio n th e authorit y o f expert s and thei r claims . I t teache s ho w t o loo k fo r biases , an d i t hold s ou t a visio n of greater publi c participatio n i n technica l polic y issues . In short , scienc e studie s provide s a foru m wher e peopl e w h o ar e con cerned wit h th e plac e o f scienc e an d technolog y i n a democrati c societ y can discus s complicate d technica l issues . Because o f that role , scienc e studie s is no t alway s a popula r field . I n th e mid-1990 s th e "scienc e w a r s " — a wave o f attack s o n som e prominen t figure s i n scienc e studies—becam e particularly intense . Thes e attack s tende d t o singl e ou t a fe w feminist s an d radical con s true tivists, subjec t the m t o distortin g readings , the n dismis s th e entire fiel d a s a hotbe d o f postmoder n irrationalism . Althoug h I a m no t i n agreement wit h th e radica l relativis m tha t characterize s a corne r o f th e science studie s community , I a m mor e disturbe d b y th e attackers ' dismissiv e caricatures an d distortion s o f a hug e volum e o f theor y an d research . I hav e experienced scienc e studie s a s a vibran t intellectua l fiel d tha t i s bubblin g with nove l researc h an d ideas . Thi s boo k present s som e o f tha t excitin g work. The issue s surroundin g science , technology , an d societ y ar e o f increasin g

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Introduction

interest i n ou r technologica l societ y no t onl y t o th e publi c i n genera l bu t also t o scientist s an d othe r researchers . Scientist s hav e com e t o recogniz e the politica l natur e o f the institution s o f science, an d thei r researc h problem s have becom e increasingl y tie d t o publi c an d privat e agenda s outsid e thei r disciplines. Likewise , a s humanist s an d socia l scientist s encounte r techno logical issue s wit h increasin g frequency , the y als o fin d themselve s draw n into th e interdisciplinar y field . However , a s newcomer s fro m al l discipline s enter th e field , the y sometime s en d u p reinventin g th e whee l becaus e the y do no t hav e a background i n it s principal concept s an d theories . There i s widesprea d need , then , fo r a concis e overvie w o f th e ke y concepts o f th e interdisciplinar y fiel d a s a whole , on e tha t point s th e wa y to th e mor e specifi c literature s o f th e philosophy , sociology , anthropology , history, cultura l studies , an d feminis t studie s o f science an d technology . Thi s book introduce s man y o f the ke y concept s an d provide s on e ma p o f a wid e range o f th e terrain . I n th e process , th e debate s tha t hav e receive d medi a attention a s th e "scienc e wars " ar e se t i n thei r prope r contex t a s onl y on e of th e issue s tha t ar e par t o f a n ongoin g dialogu e withi n th e field . W h e n outside critic s dismis s th e fiel d fo r it s relativism , the y ar e actuall y ridin g o n debates interna l t o th e field , an d no t particularl y ne w o r interestin g one s a t that. T h e boo k ha d it s origi n a s a teachin g tex t fo r graduat e student s an d advanced undergraduates . Student s w h o wer e ne w t o th e field—includin g many graduat e student s w h o wer e establishe d professionall y i n othe r fields , such a s engineering—complaine d o f confusio n whe n the y firs t confronte d the interdisciplinar y Babe l o f scienc e studies . The y foun d m y focu s o n some o f th e interdisciplinar y misunderstanding s helpful , an d the y use d th e text t o provid e a menu o f what t o stud y i n mor e detail . T h e fiel d ca n b e ver y confusin g fo r newcomers , a s I remembe r wel l from m y ow n relativel y recen t entranc e i n th e mid-1980s . Eve n th e nam e of th e fiel d i s no t uniform . Som e peopl e preferre d t o us e thei r disciplinar y designations an d cal l themselves , fo r example , philosopher s o f science . Others preferre d th e initial s HP S (histor y an d philosoph y o f science ) t o describe a position know n a s philosophica l historicism , whic h wa s consid ered quit e distinc t fro m th e mor e socia l science—oriente d studie s o f science , technology, an d society . Sociologist s w h o studie d scientifi c knowledg e a t first tende d t o refe r t o th e fiel d a s "scienc e studies " i n contras t t o th e more institutionall y oriente d sociolog y o f science . A s the y becam e mor e interested i n technology , the y bega n t o ad d a " T " fo r technology : STS . However, eve n th e acrony m " S T S " i s controversial . Ther e ha s bee n a

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debate ove r whethe r i t shoul d mea n science , technology , an d societ y studie s or simpl y scienc e an d technolog y studies . Th e firs t definitio n reflect s a tim e when socia l studie s o f scienc e an d technolog y wer e mor e separat e fro m th e history an d philosoph y o f scienc e an d technology . B y th e lat e 1980 s ther e had bee n s o much interdisciplinar y dialogu e amon g socia l scientists , histori ans, an d philosophers—no t t o mentio n natura l scientist s an d mor e recen t arrivals from anthropology , cultura l studies , an d feminis t studies—tha t ther e has been a n increasin g tendenc y t o us e th e ter m ST S t o mea n "scienc e an d technology studies. " I a m amon g thos e w h o thin k o f ST S a s a n interdisci plinary conversatio n amon g a wide rang e o f "constituen t disciplines, " rathe r than merel y th e socia l studie s o f science , technology , an d society . However , to thos e w h o cam e t o th e fiel d wit h a backgroun d i n scienc e activism , dropping th e ter m "society " signale d th e lamentabl e professionalizatio n o f the fiel d an d a wanin g concer n wit h socia l justice issues . Furthermore , t o those w h o spea k language s i n whic h "studies " begin s wit h a n " e " o r som e other lette r (etudes, estudios), th e switc h wa s a reminde r o f Anglophon e hegemony i n th e field . Man y continu e t o us e th e ter m "scienc e studies " a s a more identifiabl e phras e o r a designation fo r a subset o f ST S tha t i s paralle l to technolog y studies . I'v e use d "scienc e studies " fo r th e titl e o f thi s boo k because i t ha s com e t o b e use d colloquiall y a s a broa d an d inclusiv e nam e for th e field . Notwithstanding th e growt h o f interdisciplinarity , th e disciplinar y divi sions remai n strong , an d the y underli e th e organizatio n o f thi s book . Chapters 2 , 3 , and 4 ar e therefor e organize d a s introductions t o th e philoso phy o f science , th e sociolog y o f science , an d th e sociolog y o f scientifi c knowledge. Thes e field s stil l constitut e th e majo r source s o f specialis t terminology an d theorizing . T h e titl e o f chapte r 5 , "Critica l an d Cultura l Studies o f Scienc e an d Technology, " i s suggestiv e o f m y vie w o f wher e th e field i s moving. Thi s chapte r introduce s theoretica l concept s fro m a numbe r of overlappin g fields : anthropology , critica l socia l theory , cultura l studies , feminist studies , critica l technolog y studies , an d th e cultura l histor y o f science. The interdisciplinar y fiel d embrace s a vast literature , an d I canno t clai m to b e fluent i n al l area s o r t o cove r i t al l i n thi s shor t introduction . Rather , I hav e selecte d concept s wit h a n ey e towar d interdisciplinar y dialogu e an d with a sens e o f thei r salienc e i n transdisciplinar y theorizing . Ther e ar e introductions availabl e fo r som e o f th e constituen t disciplines , an d a guid e to th e introductor y literatur e i s included a t th e en d o f the book . Bu t Science Studies provide s th e firs t overvie w o f th e fiel d tha t i s no t restricte d t o on e

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Introduction

of th e constituen t disciplines . I n addition , I cove r importan t development s during recen t years , suc h a s philosophica l naturalis m an d realism , actor network theory , th e anthropolog y o f scienc e an d technology , an d cultural / feminist studies . Othe r introductor y book s als o ten d t o mis s th e cross disciplinary misunderstandings . I n contrast , I explor e i n mor e detai l th e interdisciplinary cross-talk , an d I occasionall y sugges t solutions . Consistent wit h contemporar y scienc e studie s theories , I d o no t clai m to dra w a neutra l o r value-fre e ma p o f th e interdisciplinar y territory . However, I d o clai m t o approac h th e projec t wit h a modicu m o f fairnes s and a spiri t o f interdisciplinarity , an d I d o provid e th e reade r wit h th e courtesy o f presentin g m y bes t understandin g o f th e position s o f other s before I giv e m y ow n position . Eve n so , ther e wil l b e som e area s tha t ar e not covered . T h e boo k ha s a n America n focu s and , a s th e titl e suggests , i t focuses mor e o n scienc e issue s tha n technolog y issues . T h e boo k als o stick s to th e majo r concept s o f th e interdiscipHnar y nexu s o f history , philosophy , and th e socia l an d cultura l studie s o f science . Consequently , othe r field s such a s the psycholog y an d rhetori c o f science, which u p t o no w hav e mad e relatively margina l contribution s t o th e mai n line s o f th e interdiscipHnar y discussion, receiv e relativel y shor t coverage . Polic y discussion s occu r i n almost al l the journals an d acros s th e discipHnes , an d polic y implication s ar e flagged throughou t th e book . M y ow n approac h t o polic y issue s i s provide d in th e conclusion . T h e fiel d ca n b e acrimonious , perhap s becaus e scienc e an d technolog y are s o fundamenta l t o th e peopl e involved . Imagin e a reHgiou s studie s conference i n whic h theologian s an d practicin g clerg y fro m a rang e o f religions, a s weU a s historian s an d socia l scientists , cam e togethe r t o discus s their ideas , an d on e ca n ge t a sens e o f why "scienc e wars " ten d t o flare up . M y hop e i s that a better understandin g o f the variou s constituen t discipHne s may hel p th e reade r avoi d som e o f th e interdisciplinar y misunderstandings . Many student s an d scholar s ten d t o dismis s everythin g abou t a n autho r o r a subfield becaus e the y disagre e wit h on e o r tw o points . I tr y t o encourag e instead wha t som e o f m y mor e open-minde d coUeague s cal l a charitabl e reading: examinin g th e othe r tex t o r discipHn e fo r wha t i t ha s t o offe r on e s own projects . Certainly , I hav e foun d a wid e rang e o f concept s an d disci plines usefu l fo r developin g wha t I beHev e i s a mor e coheren t framewor k for m y ow n specia l area s o f empirica l researc h interest . M y hope , then , i s t o realiz e th e transdiscipHnar y promis e o f a n ongoin g conversation amon g philosophers , sociologists , anthropologists , poHtica l scientists, historians , an d others , includin g natura l scientists . Eac h field ,

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even eac h theoris t an d eac h empirica l study , ha s a uniqu e contributio n t o make, i f read wit h th e prope r spirit . Sometime s I disagre e wit h th e excesse s and mor e grandios e claims , bu t m y visio n i s alway s focuse d o n findin g those moment s o f transdisciplinar y insigh t tha t occu r whe n w e pu t o n someone else' s lenses, i f only fo r a moment. B y movin g fro m th e discipline bound blinder s o f a sociology , history , philosophy , o r anthropolog y o f science t o a transdisciplinar y field , scienc e studie s i s abl e t o provid e a valuable se t o f conceptua l tool s fo r publi c discussion s o f th e rol e o f scienc e and technolog y i n a democratic society .

2 The Philosoph y o f Scienc e An Interdisciplinary Perspective

The Philosophy of Science in an Interdisciplinary Context Although ST S o r scienc e studie s i s becoming a n increasingl y interdisciplin ary conversation , ther e i s stil l a gul f o f understandin g amon g th e differen t constituent disciplines , especiall y betwee n th e philosophica l an d socia l stud ies wings . I us e th e ter m "socia l studies " t o includ e historians , cultura l studies researchers , an d socia l scientists . Followin g th e America n usage , I use "socia l scientist " t o refe r t o sociologists , cultura l anthropologists , politi cal scientist s an d polic y analysts , economists , managemen t an d administra tion scientists , an d som e othe r researcher s suc h a s geographers . (I n othe r countries th e ter m "socia l scientist " ha s a muc h mor e restricte d usage , generally referrin g t o anthropologists , sociologists , an d politica l scientists. ) In contrast , th e ter m "humanities " refer s t o field s suc h a s history, literatur e and cultura l studies , rhetoric , philosophy , an d perhap s som e o f th e mor e humanistically minde d cultura l anthropologist s an d sociologists . Sometime s "human sciences " i s use d a s a n umbrell a ter m fo r th e socia l science s an d humanities. Althoug h th e humanities/socia l scienc e divid e ha s bee n th e subject o f controvers y withi n som e disciplines , i n th e ST S fiel d th e mos t significant disciplinar y divisio n ha s bee n betwee n thos e w h o hav e som e allegiance t o traditiona l Anglo-Saxo n an d Germa n philosoph y o f scienc e and thos e w h o hav e a mor e socia l o r cultura l orientation . T h e ter m "philosophy" i s generall y adequat e t o cove r th e firs t grou p (eve n thoug h there i s a continenta l philosophica l traditio n tha t i s mor e influentia l i n technology studies) , bu t som e othe r ter m i s necessar y t o cove r th e secon d group o f sociall y oriente d socia l scientist s an d humanists . I n th e A n glophone world , "socia l studies " i s probabl y th e bes t ter m t o designat e descriptive, empirica l researc h tha t include s th e wor k o f socia l scientist s a s well a s humanities scholar s i n history , cultura l studies , an d othe r humanitie s fields. I n th e humanities , "cultura l studies " is sometimes use d a s an umbrell a

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term, bu t th e ter m woul d exclud e severa l o f th e socia l sciences . Thus , I will us e "socia l studies " a s a generi c bu t imperfec t ter m t o cove r socia l scientists an d thos e humanist s w h o ar e concerne d wit h socia l aspect s o f th e world the y study . This chapte r begin s th e surve y o f ke y concept s i n scienc e studie s b y reviewing th e philosoph y o f scienc e throug h a n interdisciplinar y lens . In troductions b y professionall y traine d philosopher s ca n accomplis h a muc h more detaile d an d inclusiv e leve l o f discussio n tha n wil l b e achieve d here. 1 This chapte r complement s thos e introduction s b y focusin g o n tw o aspect s of th e philosoph y o f scienc e i n th e genera l interdisciplinar y setting : misun derstandings an d possibilitie s i n th e sometime s acrimoniou s dialogu e b e tween philosopher s an d socia l studie s researchers , an d th e applicatio n o f th e philosophy o f scienc e t o th e proble m o f designatin g goo d criteri a fo r choice amon g majo r theorie s o r researc h programs . Followin g Stev e Fulle r (1988), I wil l see k a middl e groun d i n th e dialogu e betwee n philosopher s and socia l studie s researcher s b y beginnin g wit h th e distinctio n betwee n prescriptive an d descriptiv e approache s t o scienc e an d technology . Althoug h some philosophie s o f scienc e (suc h a s evolutionar y epistemology ) ar e de scriptive, fo r th e mos t par t i t i s helpfu l t o se e th e centra l proble m o f th e philosophy o f scienc e a s makin g clarification s tha t coul d hel p scientist s decide ho w the y should g o abou t improvin g th e way s the y thin k abou t an d do science . Fulle r ha s probabl y develope d th e prescriptiv e rol e o f th e philosophy o f scienc e mor e clearl y tha n an y othe r philosopher , an d h e ha s introduced th e ter m "socia l epistemology " fo r on e typ e o f prescriptive us e of th e philosoph y o f science . I n hi s words , th e fundamenta l questio n o f social epistemolog y is , How shoul d the pursuit o f knowledge be organized, give n that under norma l circumstances knowledg e i s pursued b y man y huma n beings , eac h workin g on a more o r les s well-defined bod y o f knowledge an d eac h equippe d wit h roughly th e sam e imperfec t cognitiv e capacities , albei t wit h varyin g degree s of access to on e another' s activities ? (1988 : 3) Although socia l epistemolog y bring s th e philosoph y o f scienc e int o th e realm o f prescriptiv e wor k fo r scienc e i n society , I wil l als o interpre t th e traditional philosoph y o f scienc e a s prescriptiv e i n a mor e narro w sense : it s contribution t o understandin g ho w t o mak e bette r scientifi c theorie s an d explanations. Fuller s wor k i s a good startin g poin t becaus e i t clearl y locate s the divisio n o f labo r betwee n philosoph y an d socia l studie s i n th e distinc tion betwee n prescriptio n an d description , o r normativ e versu s empirica l

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approaches (xi) . Although philosopher s certainl y describ e scienc e an d tech nology, an d socia l studie s researcher s ofte n engag e i n discussion s o f polic y and activis m tha t ca n b e explicitl y prescriptive , Fulle r s distinction i s usefu l as a wa y o f movin g towar d a productiv e dialogu e betwee n philosophica l and socia l studie s outlook s o n scienc e an d technology . I n othe r words , philosophy ma y b e helpfu l t o socia l scientist s an d humanist s w h e n the y ar e in th e prescriptiv e mode , an d likewis e th e researc h o f socia l an d cultura l studies ma y b e helpfu l t o philosopher s whe n the y ar e makin g descriptiv e claims abou t scienc e an d technology . This revie w o f som e concept s i n th e philosoph y o f scienc e wil l focu s o n one typ e o f prescriptiv e question : wha t ground s should scientist s us e t o justify thei r choice s amon g majo r theorie s o r researc h programs ? T o answe r this question , a s i n othe r philosophica l proble m areas , philosopher s pursu e a dialogu e o f arguments an d counterarguments . Althoug h th e dialogu e ma y never resul t i n a fina l consensus , th e back-and-fort h procedur e make s i t possible t o progres s b y findin g th e shortcoming s i n previou s solution s an d providing alternative s tha t answe r thos e shortcomings . Thi s revie w wil l cover th e followin g majo r positions : positivism , conventionalism , falsifica tionism, historicism , naturalism/realism , constructivism/relativism , an d feminism.

Positivism In th e philosoph y o f science "positivism " i s shorthand fo r logica l positivis m or logica l empiricism , term s tha t ar e no t exactl y identica l bu t wil l be treate d so her e fo r th e sak e o f simplicity . I n ST S circle s th e ter m "positivism " i s usually associate d wit h th e philosophica l position s tha t emerge d aroun d th e Vienna Circle . However , fo r socia l scientist s th e wor d "positivism " ma y also refe r t o th e though t o f August e Comte , a nineteenth-centur y Frenc h social theorist . C o m t e believe d i n th e unit y o f science s an d supporte d a n evolutionary theor y o f scientifi c progres s tha t le d t o a positiv e stag e tha t happened t o matc h hi s nineteenth-centur y understanding s o f science . I n this sens e th e ter m "positive " migh t b e glosse d a s "I' m positiv e I' m righ t because m y positio n i s founded o n science. " I n th e humanitie s an d cultura l studies, anothe r us e o f th e wor d sometime s appears . "Positivist " ca n b e a pejorative labe l fo r (i ) someon e perceive d t o hav e a simplistic an d uncritica l view o f science , and/o r (2 ) someon e w h o wishes , i n a ver y simplisti c way ,

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to bas e socia l scienc e o r humanitie s method s o n a n idea l versio n o f thos e i n the natura l sciences . I n polemica l debates , th e labe l "positivist " i s usuall y opposed t o "postmodernist, " althoug h i n debate s wher e thes e label s ge t hurled bac k an d fort h ther e i s usually littl e substance . Returning no w t o philosophica l positivism , th e Vienn a Circl e wa s a group o f philosopher s whos e wor k flourished durin g th e interwa r period . Many wer e traine d i n physic s an d influence d b y Britis h forma l philosoph y in th e traditio n o f Bertran d Russell . Becaus e som e wer e Jew s an d som e were leftists , thei r socia l positio n se t th e stag e fo r th e fragmentatio n o f th e circle whe n th e Nazi s cam e t o power . Mos t o f th e circle s member s move d to Britai n o r th e Unite d States , wher e the y ha d a n importan t impac t o n th e Anglo-American philosoph y o f science . Member s o f th e Vienn a Circl e included Morit z Schlick , Erns t Mach , O t t o Neurath , an d Rudol f Carnap ; A. J. Ayer , Herber t Feigl , Kur t Godel , an d Han s Reichenbac h wer e amon g those associate d wit h th e circle . Kar l Poppe r maintaine d clos e tie s wit h some o f th e member s o f th e circle , bu t h e wa s no t considere d a tru e positivist. Perhaps th e ke y concep t associate d wit h th e positivis t philosoph y o f science, a t leas t i n it s earl y versions , wa s th e verifiabilit y principle , whic h held tha t statement s ar e meaningfu l i f verifiable . ( A weake r versio n o f thi s principle hel d tha t statement s ar e meaningfu l i f confirmabl e t o som e de gree.) Althoug h som e statement s coul d b e verifie d b y logi c o r by definition , the mor e importan t mean s o f verification wa s experience . Fo r example , th e sentence "Crow s ar e fifteen " i s meaningless becaus e th e sentenc e canno t b e confirmed a s eithe r tru e o r fals e i n th e sens e tha t th e sentenc e "Crow s ar e black" ca n be. 2 Althoug h th e verifiabilit y principl e los t importanc e wit h the passag e o f time , th e empiricis t interpretatio n o f meanin g continue d t o underlie th e shar p distinctio n tha t positivist s ofte n dre w betwee n theoretica l terms an d observationa l terms . Theoretica l term s suc h a s energ y i n physic s can therefor e b e interprete d a s meaningles s i n th e stric t sens e becaus e the y are no t observabl e directl y o r eve n relativel y directl y throug h measurin g devices. T h e interpretatio n o f meanin g a s referenc e contrast s sharpl y wit h th e semiotic understandin g o f meanin g tha t i s c o m m o n i n th e humanitie s an d some socia l sciences . Thi s i s on e o f th e firs t majo r opportunitie s fo r cross disciplinary misunderstandings . Fo r example , unde r Ferdinan d d e Saussur e s definition o f value , th e meanin g o f a statemen t derive s fro m it s relativ e position i n variou s code s o f semanti c difference. 3 Thus , th e meanin g o f th e

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sentence " T h e coyot e i s laughing " i s understoo d throug h a serie s o f con trasts. Thes e includ e th e contras t betwee n th e coyot e an d othe r animal s (i t is no t a raven, a swan, o r a crow) ; th e contras t betwee n laughin g an d othe r activities (i t i s no t remainin g black , turnin g white , o r flying int o a wall) ; the grammatica l juxtapositio n o f coyot e an d laughin g i n a sentenc e com pared wit h othe r possibilities ; an d th e semanti c mappin g o f association s o f "coyote" an d "laughing " (fo r example , th e coyot e cla n ma y harbo r a tricksterish shama n whos e attribute s ar e lik e thos e o f th e coyot e totem) . This vie w o f meanin g ha s bee n enormousl y influentia l i n contemporar y linguistics, cultura l anthropology , history , an d literary/cultura l studie s through th e variou s intellectua l current s know n a s structuralism, poststruct uralism, an d deconstruction . Thus, on e vie w o f meaning associate s a word wit h th e thin g t o whic h i t refers, wherea s anothe r vie w open s u p a worl d o f interpretations . I n con trast wit h th e positivists ' projec t t o formulat e a universal , forma l language , semiotic approache s t o meanin g interpos e language s an d culture s a s a necessary poin t o f reference . Althoug h th e difference s betwee n th e positiv ist an d semioti c view s o f meanin g ar e profound , th e tw o ca n nonetheles s be mad e compatible . I n effect , the y ar e tw o way s o f lookin g a t th e sam e linguistic fact : referenc e an d semioti c value . Thi s i s the firs t o f the clarifica tions tha t I wis h t o mak e regardin g th e "duck-rabbit " (o r crow-coyote ) nature o f philosoph y an d social/cultura l studies . A s i s th e cas e wit h th e gestalt diagra m tha t switche s bac k an d fort h betwee n a duck an d a rabbit, i t is no t necessar y t o choos e betwee n th e tw o view s o f meaning . Rather , i t i s better t o understan d ho w eac h i s boun d u p i n a differen t se t o f question s and issues . O n e misleadin g wa y t o interpre t thi s differenc e i s t o compar e positivis t and semioti c view s o f meanin g wit h wha t ar e sometime s calle d correspon dence an d coherenc e view s o f truth . A s a roug h firs t approximation , a correspondence vie w o f trut h hold s tha t statement s ar e tru e whe n the y refer t o thing s tha t exist , wherea s a coherenc e vie w hold s tha t statement s are tru e i f the y ca n b e situate d logicall y withi n a coheren t bod y o f knowl edge. I t woul d b e a grea t misunderstandin g t o argu e tha t th e positiona l theory o f meanin g associate d wit h d e Saussur e implie s tha t thos e socia l science an d humanitie s field s tha t us e Saussurea n an d post-Saussurea n theo ries o f meanin g wil l assum e a coherenc e theor y o f truth . Becaus e socia l scientists suc h a s linguist s ar e makin g theorie s o f linguisti c observations , philosophically the y ma y hol d eithe r a correspondence o r a coherence vie w of truth . Thus , a semioti c vie w o f meanin g an d a coherenc e vie w o f trut h

The Philosophy of Science | 11 should no t b e confused , eve n i f there ma y b e som e case s o f specific theorist s for w h o m the y coincide . Consistent wit h th e vie w o f meanin g tha t wa s anchore d i n observation , positivists distinguishe d sharpl y betwee n theor y an d observation . Carnap , for example , distinguishe d simple , loca l observation s fro m genera l empirica l laws tha t remaine d grounde d i n observationa l language , an d i n tur n h e distinguished empirica l law s fro m theoretica l law s o r theories , whic h wer e not grounde d i n observationa l languag e (1995 : 27) . T h e ga p betwee n theoretical term s (e.g. , therma l energy ) an d observationa l term s (e.g. , a temperature measurement ) pose d a proble m o f translation . Positivist s at tempted t o resolv e th e proble m b y proposin g wha t wer e variousl y calle d correspondence rules , rule s o f operationalization , bridg e laws , o r a diction ary. Thes e rule s o r definition s mad e i t possibl e t o translat e acros s categories . Consistent wit h th e shar p distinctio n betwee n theoretica l an d observa tional term s i s th e doctrin e o f instrumentalism , th e vie w tha t theorie s ar e computational device s fo r predictin g o r explainin g observabl e phenomena . N o t e tha t i n th e socia l science s instrumentalis m ma y refe r t o a typ e o f analysis tha t interpret s th e motivation s fo r actio n i n term s o f gai n o r tur f protection, usuall y by usin g economi c o r militar y metaphors . I n philosophy , instrumentalism contrast s wit h ontologica l realism , whic h hold s tha t theo retical term s captur e somethin g o f th e deepe r structure s o f reality . Som e positivists wer e suspiciou s o f th e metaphysica l (an d therefor e meaningless ) nature o f realis t claim s fo r theoretica l terms . I n thi s sense , on e ca n argu e that positivist s w h o endorse d instrumentalis m wer e no t realists . I n hi s late r work eve n Carna p seeme d t o recogniz e th e powe r o f th e realis t argumen t that theoretica l term s tende d t o becom e observationa l term s ove r time , bu t he preferre d t o refram e th e debat e wit h th e question , "Shal l w e prefe r a language o f physic s (an d o f scienc e i n general ) tha t contain s theoretica l terms, o r a language withou t suc h terms? " (1995 : 256). With th e vocabular y no w established , i t i s possibl e t o tur n t o th e prob lems o f justification , induction , an d theor y choice . Han s Reichenbac h (1938) mad e popula r th e centra l distinctio n betwee n th e contex t o f discov ery an d tha t o f justification. 4 A s Ia n Hackin g explains , philosopher s ar e more concerne d wit h th e latte r issue . I n orde r t o justif y a theor y o r law , one asks , Is it reasonable , supporte d b y th e evidence , confirme d b y experiment , cor roborated b y stringen t testing ? Thes e ar e question s abou t justificatio n o r soundness. Philosopher s car e abou t justification , logic , reason , soundness , [and] methodology. (1983 : 6)

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In a simila r vein , Kar l Poppe r (1959 : n o ) use d th e metapho r o f a court room t o describ e th e philosophica l understandin g o f justification. Scientifi c knowledge i s like th e verdic t o f a jury, wherea s philosophica l justification i s like th e judgment o f a judge. A verdic t simpl y exists , wherea s a justification or judgmen t ca n b e correctl y o r erroneousl y relate d t o a genera l se t o f principles. Philosophers o f thi s persuasio n therefor e viewe d th e contex t o f discov e r y — h o w scientist s arriv e a t a theor y o r law—a s th e real m o f history , psychology, o r sociology . The y wer e quit e willin g t o admi t a rol e fo r socia l factors i n science , a s lon g a s thes e factor s wer e relegate d t o th e contex t o f discovery Fro m thi s perspective , philosopher s se e thei r tas k a s th e stud y o f the rationa l aspect s o f science , wherea s socia l studie s ar e relegate d t o th e arational aspect s o f scienc e (Lauda n 1977) . However , thi s vie w i s ver y difficult t o maintai n becaus e socia l actio n i s als o rational , an d rationalit y i s socially conditioned . I t i s possibl e t o develo p historica l an d sociologica l descriptions o f rationa l processe s suc h a s methodolog y o r logic , an d thi s characterization o f th e divisio n o f labor betwee n socia l studie s an d philoso phy i s boun d t o fail . T h e misunderstanding s ar e eliminate d w h e n th e ke y disciplinary divisio n i s see n a s descriptive versu s prescriptiv e work . Ronald Gier e understand s thi s fundamenta l point . H e note s tha t fo r Carnap, an d presumabl y man y othe r philosopher s i n th e positivis t tradition , philosophy i s "th e stud y o f how , a priori , a n ideall y logica l scientis t should think" (1988 : 24) . Thi s i s a n importan t point , becaus e som e philosopher s seem t o thin k the y ar e describin g historica l case s w h e n i n fac t the y ar e reconstructing idealize d scientist s t o deriv e prescriptiv e accounts . Gier e adds, "Fo r logica l empiricism , then , th e ga p betwee n th e psycholog y o r sociology o f scienc e an d th e philosoph y o f scienc e i s lik e th e ga p betwee n 'is' an d 'ought. ' I t i s logicall y unbridgeable " (24) . T h e fallac y o f positivis m was no t t o mak e a distinction betwee n i s and ought , bu t t o vie w philosoph ical prescription a s founded i n rationa l processe s tha t wer e someho w outsid e society an d culture . T h e choic e o f th e wor d "justification " point s t o on e comple x o f value s that underla y th e positivis t program . T h e concep t o f "justification " i n Western scienc e an d philosoph y migh t b e compare d wit h it s siblin g i n Western religion . T h e Calvinis t win g o f the Protestan t Reformatio n argue d for justification b y fait h alon e i n contras t wit h justification b y goo d works . Justification i n thi s contex t mean t th e basi s upo n whic h on e woul d b e deemed a goo d Christia n an d therefor e abl e t o pas s muste r whe n con fronted wit h th e gatekeeper s o f heaven . Prio r t o th e Reformation , th e

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pope sometime s remitte d penaltie s fo r sins , includin g thos e tha t woul d b e paid fo r i n purgatory , an d h e sometime s grante d thes e favor s i n exchang e for monetar y contribution s t o th e church . T h e doctrin e o f justification b y good work s wa s therefor e extende d t o financia l contribution s t o th e church, an d i n effec t ric h peopl e wer e buyin g a stairwa y t o heaven . I n arguing fo r justificatio n b y fait h alon e (whic h i n tur n sanctione d goo d works), Protestant s suc h a s Marti n Luthe r wer e attemptin g t o rationaliz e the justification process . In a similar way , positivist s wante d t o rationaliz e th e justification proces s in science . T o d o so , the y attempte d t o ancho r justificatio n i n logica l rules tha t wer e derive d fro m a proces s o f reasonin g aki n t o mathematics : justification b y reaso n o r logi c alone . Lik e theologians , the y viewe d thei r logical system s a s located outsid e th e influenc e o f human histor y o r culture . Although thi s positio n ma y strik e reader s toda y a s philosophically theologi cal an d anthropologicall y naive , le t u s fo r th e momen t follo w ou t thei r arguments befor e considerin g th e counterargument s an d alternativ e posi tions. O n e centra l proble m i n th e philosophica l justificatio n o f scientifi c knowledge wa s th e proble m o f induction , tha t is , ho w t o deriv e genera l empirical law s fro m observations . A s Ca r nap asked , "Wha t justifie s u s i n going fro m th e direc t observatio n o f fact s t o a la w tha t expresse s certai n regularities o f nature? " (1995 : 19) . I n deductiv e logic , conclusion s follo w with certaint y fro m premise s a s long a s the prope r logica l rule s ar e followed . For example , i f al l swan s ar e whit e an d i f thi s bir d i s a swan , the n thi s bir d is white . (Anothe r exampl e o f deductiv e logi c i s th e styl e o f mathematica l proof tha t many peopl e ha d t o lear n i n hig h school. ) However , th e certaint y of deductiv e conclusion s di d no t appl y t o inductiv e logic , tha t is , deduc tively invali d inference s fro m experimenta l dat a t o empirica l laws . Carna p defended th e ide a tha t i t wa s possibl e t o wor k ou t a n inductiv e logi c fo r th e confirmation o r justificatio n o f empirica l laws . Althoug h h e rejecte d th e view tha t thi s logi c coul d b e simplifie d t o th e poin t o f a n inductiv e machine, h e believe d tha t i t wa s "i n man y case s possibl e t o determine , b y mechanical procedures , th e logica l probability , o r degre e o f confirmation, " of a hypothesi s base d o n a se t o f observation s (1995 : 34) . Thus , h e coul d determine th e logica l probability , o r degre e o f confirmation , o f a predictio n or eve n a set o f laws o n th e basi s o f observations . A muc h large r justification proble m emerge s whe n tw o scientist s induc e two differen t theories . W h a t criteri a shoul d on e us e t o choos e betwee n two well-formulate d theories ? Thi s i s perhaps th e mos t interestin g questio n

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in th e philosoph y o f science. I f philosophers ca n hel p sor t ou t thi s question , they ca n contribut e t o makin g theor y choic e wor k bette r i n bot h th e natural an d socia l sciences . Clearly , a first answe r t o th e questio n i s that on e should prefe r th e theor y tha t correspond s bette r t o th e empirica l law s o r observations. Fin d ou t whic h theor y fit s al l th e observation s better , eithe r by examinin g th e se t o f observation s alread y availabl e o r b y performin g a crucial experimen t tha t wil l allo w a choic e betwee n th e tw o theories . I n practice, thi s approac h ofte n work s i n science , an d littl e els e i s needed fro m philosophy. However, th e situatio n i s no t alway s s o simple . I n som e case s th e tw o theories ar e evidentiall y indistinguishable ; i n othe r words , the y ca n explai n the sam e se t o f facts . I n thi s cas e th e theor y tha t ca n predic t an d explai n new law s o r observation s i s clearl y preferable . However , ther e i s als o a stronger for m o f evidentia l indistinguishability , whic h occur s whe n "tw o theories lea d i n al l case s t o exactl y th e sam e predictions " (Carna p 1995 : 151). Som e realist s argu e tha t positivist s bit e th e bulle t whe n the y fac e thi s kind o f evidentia l indistinguishabilit y T h e choic e betwee n tw o theorie s that mee t th e stronge r for m o f evidential indistinguishabilit y i s metaphysica l and therefor e no t par t o f science . However, i n thi s circumstanc e Carna p admitte d simplicit y a s a criterio n of choice . I n hi s cas e stud y o f th e choic e betwee n Euclidea n an d n o n Euclidean geometry , h e eve n distinguishe d betwee n tw o type s o f simplicity . Non-Euclidean geometr y wa s mor e complicate d bu t i t greatl y simplifie d the syste m o f physica l laws , an d Einstei n an d hi s follower s opte d fo r th e systemic for m o f simplicit y rathe r tha n th e computationa l for m (Carna p 1995: 162-64) . Th e simplicit y criterio n ha s a lon g histor y datin g bac k a t least t o Willia m o f Ockha m an d i s known a s Occam' s (Ockam's , Ockham's ) Razor o r th e rul e o f parsimony . Thi s principl e state s tha t entitie s shoul d not b e multiplie d beyon d necessity . Carna p therefor e update s a ver y ol d criterion fo r theor y choic e an d clarifie s whic h typ e o f simplicit y i s better . The proble m appear s t o b e solved .

Interlude: The Unity of Science Thesis The unit y o f scienc e thesi s provide s on e lin e o f continuit y betwee n nine teenth-century positivis m an d twentieth-centur y logica l positivism . N i n e teenth-century positivist s John Stuar t Mil l an d August e Comt e buil t gran d

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schemes o f th e relation s amon g th e science s i n whic h th e hierarch y o f scientific discipline s als o corresponde d t o a hierarch y o f phenomena . A s then, unifyin g scheme s fo r th e science s toda y usuall y involv e a defens e o f reductionism. Fo r example , th e biologica l leve l ca n b e reduce d ultimatel y to biochemistr y an d physics , an d menta l state s ca n b e reduce d t o neura l states. Fuller note s tha t ther e wer e significan t variant s i n th e unit y o f scienc e thesis, eve n durin g th e 1920 s an d 1930 s whe n th e thesi s wa s strongest. 5 I n Europe, th e unit y o f scienc e thesi s emphasize d th e mathematica l unit y o f the sciences , an d mathematic s o r th e mathematica l sid e o f physics wa s see n as th e mode l science . Fulle r argue s tha t i n Germany , wher e chemistr y an d physics wer e associate d wit h th e losin g Worl d Wa r I effort , positivist s tended t o distanc e themselve s fro m thos e fields . I n contrast , i n th e Unite d States, where technolog y wa s associate d wit h th e wa r victory , theorist s suc h as John Dewe y linke d scienc e an d technology . As a philosophica l proposition , th e unit y o f scienc e thesi s hold s tha t theories acros s differen t scientifi c discipline s shoul d no t b e contradictory , even whe n th e differen t level s o f scienc e an d observation s ar e no t reducibl e or no t ye t reducible . Thus , i t shoul d b e possibl e t o us e differen t theorie s conjointly t o predic t ne w observations . A t th e leve l o f method s an d justifi cation criteria , th e unit y o f scienc e thesi s woul d hol d tha t a philosoph y o f science a s i t i s understoo d i n on e disciplin e coul d b e transporte d t o othe r disciplines. I n othe r words , philosophie s o f scienc e base d o n physic s coul d be generalize d t o othe r scientifi c disciplines . Probably th e greates t weaknes s i n thi s positio n come s whe n th e philoso phy o f scienc e i s generalize d fro m th e natura l science s t o th e huma n sciences. Th e tendenc y fo r philosopher s o f scienc e t o us e physic s a s thei r model ha s been anothe r sourc e o f cross-disciplinary misunderstanding s wit h social scientist s an d humanists . Som e humanitie s scholar s hav e defende d a radical differenc e betwee n th e natura l an d huma n science s i n term s o f a methodological differenc e o f explanation versu s interpretiv e understanding . Thus, i n th e mor e humanisti c socia l science s an d i n man y o f th e humani ties, th e preferre d metho d i s som e typ e o f hermeneutic s o r interpretatio n rather tha n explanation . However , other s hav e hel d (an d I woul d agree ) that interpretiv e understandin g i s merel y a typ e o f explanation . Thus , i t i s possible t o maintai n a unitarian vie w i n term s o f thi s methodologica l issue , even i f on e doe s no t accep t othe r type s o f unit y suc h a s a reductionis m o f the social/symboli c t o th e neurological/biologica l ( a project abou t whic h I

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am ver y skeptical) . Still , th e emphasi s o n predictiv e explanatio n i n physic s seems impossibl e fo r muc h o f the phenomen a studie d b y th e socia l sciences . Many socia l phenomen a ar e fa r to o complicate d t o b e predictable , a t leas t at th e presen t time . Consequently , a s socia l scientist s rea d philosophie s o f science tha t dra w thei r argument s fro m physic s o r eve n othe r natura l sciences, the y immediatel y se e th e failur e o f som e o f th e argument s t o transport t o thei r ow n fiel d an d the y becom e skeptica l o f th e entir e enter prise. T h e counterargumen t o f som e philosopher s tha t th e socia l science s are merel y undevelope d o r inferio r science s onl y make s matter s wors e b y underscoring th e socia l scientists ' an d humanists ' perceptio n tha t philoso phers o f scienc e d o no t understan d thei r endeavors . Another dimensio n o f th e natural/huma n scienc e divid e i s th e cultura l meaning attribute d t o th e difference . T h e differenc e betwee n th e huma n sciences an d th e natura l science s i s a reproduction , interna l t o th e fiel d o f science, o f th e divisio n betwee n scienc e an d cultura l domain s tha t ar e understood a s no t science , suc h a s th e art s an d t o som e exten t (vi a th e tradition o f biblical hermeneutics ) religion . Thi s differenc e o f viewpoints i s often s o dramati c tha t C . P . Snow' s ol d formulatio n o f "tw o cultures " continues t o b e relevan t (1959) . Feminis t scienc e studie s analyst s hav e shown ho w th e classi c divid e betwee n th e natura l science s an d th e humani ties, an d th e associate d bu t no t identica l divid e betwee n har d an d sof t sciences, ar e lade n wit h highl y gendere d imager y (Kelle r 1985 : 33 , 77 ; Bleier 1986 : 6) . Thes e division s ar e recursive ; i n othe r words , gendere d divisions ofte n occu r no t onl y i n formulation s o f th e differenc e betwee n science an d nonscienc e o r betwee n th e science s an d th e humanitie s (wit h the socia l science s mediatin g th e divide) , bu t acros s disciplinar y division s i n the science s (e.g. , physic s versus , fo r example , biology ) o r eve n acros s divisions withi n discipline s (e.g. , molecula r biolog y versu s ecology , o r ex perimental versu s clinica l psychology) . Thus , feminis t theor y point s no t only t o on e typ e o f disunit y o f the science s bu t als o t o th e masculinis t biase s that ma y b e buil t int o som e formula s o f th e ground s fo r th e unit y o f science, particularl y th e clai m o f reductionism . A relate d divisio n i s the distinctio n betwee n idiographi c an d nomotheti c science. Idiographi c scienc e i s th e stud y o f historica l particulars , a s i n th e natural histor y o f a geologica l o r ecologica l region , o r a historical , textual , or ethnographi c stud y i n th e humanities/socia l sciences . Nomotheti c sci ence i s characterize d b y th e searc h fo r genera l laws . Thi s divisio n occur s both i n th e natura l science s (biolog y versu s natura l history ) an d i n th e social science s an d humanitie s (sociolog y versu s history) . Eve n withi n som e

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disciplines differen t phase s ar e considere d idiographi c an d nomothetic . Thus, withi n anthropolog y ethnograph y (th e descriptio n o f a people ) i s idiographic, wherea s ethnolog y an d cultural/socia l anthropolog y see k gen eral patterns . T h e differen t goals , methods , an d historie s o f th e variou s idiographic an d nomotheti c discipline s sugges t anothe r basi s for questionin g the unit y o f science thesis . Another wa y i n whic h th e socia l science s complicat e th e questio n o f th e unity o f scienc e i s throug h th e us e o f th e disunit y o f scienc e a s a usefu l research too l i n socia l studie s o f science . Fo r example , a s Sheil a Jasanof f (1990) ha s shown , th e standard s fo r judgin g acceptabilit y i n regulator y science an d researc h scienc e var y greatly . I n th e former , lega l versu s statisti cal test s o f sufficienc y pla y a relativel y greate r role . I n th e nex t chapte r I will cove r som e othe r example s o f th e disunit y o f th e science s i n empirica l social scienc e research . R o b e r t M e r t o n (1973) , fo r example , distinguishe d between codifie d sciences , o r thos e verticall y buil t o n previou s findings , and noncodifie d sciences , i n whic h ne w researc h horizontall y add s ne w empirical materia l bu t doe s no t necessaril y buil d i n a linear wa y o n previou s research. Thi s distinctio n i s simila r t o th e nomothetic/idiographi c distinc tion bu t no t quit e identica l t o it . H e foun d th e distinctio n usefu l i n formulating som e empirica l pattern s o n ag e effect s an d cumulativ e advan tage processes . Furthermore , a numbe r o f measure s sho w stabl e difference s across th e rang e o f sciences . Thos e measure s includ e som e o f th e finding s of th e institutiona l sociolog y o f scienc e t o b e discusse d i n th e nex t chapter , such a s difference s acros s discipline s i n acceptanc e rate s fo r journal submis sions an d th e proportio n o f publications i n article s an d books . Thus, socia l scienc e researc h suggest s way s i n whic h th e unit y o f scienc e thesis i s limited, an d i n thi s respec t i t ha s philosophica l implications . Man y philosophers toda y ar e equall y skeptica l abou t suc h abilitie s t o generaliz e across fields . A s Paul Durbi n ha s noted , " N o w philosoph y o f science i s itsel f a multipl y diversifie d fiel d . . . an d eac h o f th e sciences , wit h endlessl y multiplying subspecialtie s o f al l sorts , goe s it s ow n wa y i n tota l defianc e o f any unit y o f science model " (1988 : 334) . I t woul d stil l be possibl e t o defen d the thesi s o n on e o r severa l dimension s whil e recognizin g a disunit y o f science o n othe r dimensions . Likewise , i t woul d stil l b e possibl e t o formu late a prescriptiv e positio n tha t view s th e unit y o f scienc e a s a goa l t o b e achieved. However , th e empirica l researc h o n th e way s i n whic h th e sciences ar e no t unifie d ca n contribut e t o assessin g ho w realisti c an d desir able i t woul d b e t o inves t tim e i n formulatin g suc h projects .

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Conventionalism Conventionalism i s historicall y th e firs t majo r alternativ e t o th e positivis t philosophy o f science . Althoug h conventionalis m i s usuall y identifie d wit h Pierre Duhem , i t ma y b e mor e accurat e t o vie w Jules Henr i Poincar e a s th e originator o f thi s positio n (Gillie s 1993 : 67 , 90) . Conventionalis m hold s that scientifi c law s (suc h a s those o f Newtonian mechanics ) an d mathemati cal axiom s (suc h a s thos e o f Euclidea n geometry ) ar e neithe r experimenta l inferences no r a prior i knowledg e bu t instea d ar e disguise d definition s or conventions . Tw o specifi c these s associate d wit h conventionalis m ar e underdetermination an d theory-ladenness . T h e underdeterminatio n thesi s o f D u h e m an d W . V . Quin e hold s tha t a theory ca n b e maintaine d i n th e fac e o f contradictory observation s provide d that a n adjustmen t i s mad e t o th e auxiliar y hypothese s derive d fro m th e theory 6 I n thi s sens e theorie s ar e underdetermine d b y evidence . Thus , a core theor y ca n b e protecte d fro m refutatio n i f after-the-fac t change s ar e made i n auxiliar y hypotheses . A n auxiliar y o r a d ho c hypothesi s i s a modification i n a theory mad e i n th e fac e o f a refutin g instanc e i n orde r t o cover tha t refutin g instanc e bu t n o furthe r problem. 7 A n exampl e i s epicy cles, littl e circle s withi n th e planetar y orbits , whic h wer e use d i n earl y models o f th e sola r syste m t o accoun t fo r observation s o f planet s tha t violated th e idea l o f perfect circula r motion . Related t o th e underdeterminatio n thesi s i s th e thesi s o f th e theory ladenness o f observations , whic h wa s defende d b y D u h e m an d late r b y Pau l Feyerabend, Thoma s Kuhn , an d N o r w o o d Hansen . Althoug h i t i s no w generally accepte d tha t theorie s shape , constrain , o r colo r observations , i n most case s th e conditione d natur e o f observation s i s no t considere d t o b e strong enoug h t o preven t theor y choic e base d o n observation s obtaine d i n research protocol s designe d t o evaluat e o r tes t competin g theories . Regarding conventionalism , tw o limitation s shoul d b e kep t i n mind . First, underdeterminatio n an d theory-ladennes s ar e no t necessaril y a s dam aging a s the y firs t appear . I n practic e i t ma y b e possibl e t o desig n experi ments i n whic h auxiliar y hypothese s ar e mor e highl y confirme d b y existin g evidence tha n th e theor y t o b e teste d (Lauda n 1990 : 4 2 ff.) . Second , acceptance o f th e conventionalis t accoun t doe s no t necessaril y impl y tha t i t is impossibl e t o maintai n genera l prescriptiv e criteri a fo r theor y choice . O n e coul d follo w D u h e m an d accep t conventionalis m a s argued, bu t mak e theory choic e subjec t t o correspondenc e a t a genera l leve l an d coherenc e for specifi c theories . Thus , D u h e m argue d tha t a confirmatio n criterio n

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could b e maintaine d fo r a bod y o f theorie s a s a whol e tha t mus t approxi mate th e totalit y o f empirica l law s o r generalizations . Fo r specifi c theories , theory choic e criteri a shoul d includ e interna l consistenc y an d consistenc y with othe r theorie s (Duhe m 1982 : 220) . Furthermore , D u h e m di d allo w for a degre e o f disconfirmatio n t o settl e a disput e betwee n empiricall y equivalent theories . I n a descriptio n o f theor y chang e tha t sound s simila r to Kuhnia n paradig m shifts , h e wrote , "W e ma y fin d i t childis h an d unrea sonable fo r th e [scientist ] t o maintai n obstinatel y a t an y cost , a t th e pric e o f continual repair s an d man y tangled-u p stays , th e worm-eate n column s o f a building totterin g i n ever y part , whe n b y razin g thes e column s i t woul d b e possible t o construc t a simple , elegant , an d soli d system " (1982 : 217) . O f course, th e classi c exampl e i s th e heliocentri c vie w o f th e sola r syste m tha t assumes simpl e elliptica l orbit s instea d o f th e whistle s an d bell s o f epicycles . In thi s comment , D u h e m als o seem s t o b e addin g simplicit y an d eleganc e as prescriptiv e theor y choic e criteri a t o hi s mor e genera l criterio n o f consistency. N o t e tha t th e simplicit y criterio n wa s als o endorse d b y Carnap , so on e see s tha t o n thi s issu e th e tw o position s o f positivis m an d conven tionalism ar e no t a s contradictor y a s they ma y firs t appear .

Falsijicationism and the Demarcation Problem Popper i s known fo r havin g develope d a critiqu e o f positivism tha t avoide d conventionalism. Ofte n considere d a positivist, h e wa s no t a member o f th e Vienna Circl e an d hel d view s a t odd s wit h leadin g figure s suc h a s Carnap . Ian Hackin g provide s a succinct formulatio n o f thei r differences : Carnap though t tha t meanings and a theory o f language matter t o th e philosophy of science. Popper despised them a s scholastic. Carnap favore d verification to distinguis h scienc e fro m nonscience . Poppe r urge d falsification. Carnap tried t o explicat e goo d reaso n i n term s o f a theor y o f confirmation; Poppe r held tha t rationalit y consist s i n method. Carna p though t tha t knowledg e ha s foundations; Popper urge d tha t ther e ar e n o foundation s an d tha t al l ou r knowledge i s fallible. Carnap believe d i n induction; Poppe r hel d tha t ther e i s no logic excep t deduction. (1983 : 4-5 ) O n th e las t poin t Poppe r (1963 ) resurrecte d Davi d Hume' s argumen t against inductiv e inference . I n othe r words , just becaus e al l swan s observe d up unti l tim e t ar e white , ther e ar e n o logica l ground s fo r concludin g tha t the nex t observatio n wil l no t b e a black swan . H u m e argue d tha t inductiv e

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logic le d t o a n infinit e regress : I d o no t kno w whethe r on e additiona l observation will confir m o r disconfir m th e law , s o I mak e a n additiona l observation. However , I a m stil l i n th e sam e position , s o I mak e a n addi tional observation, an d s o on. I am caught in a n infinite regress . (A s will be discussed, this argument reappears in the sociological literature as an analysis of the experimenter' s regress. ) The vie w tha t scientist s induc e theorie s o r law s fro m observation s was , according to Popper, a myth. Instead, the y jump t o conclusions , conjectur e a hypothesis, an d the n tr y t o refut e i t throug h observations . Thus , the y d o not procee d b y confirmin g theorie s o r laws , bu t onl y b y failin g t o falsif y them an d therefor e becomin g increasingl y convince d o f thei r correctness . In principl e an y theor y o r la w i s defeasible , an d Poppe r therefor e als o defended fallibilism , th e view that no beliefs ar e immune fro m error . Note tha t Poppe r criticize d th e positivis t vie w o f inductio n b y usin g what appear s t o b e a descriptive argument : scientist s d o no t i n fac t extrac t theories or laws from observations . However, h e doe s not hav e any credible research fro m th e historica l recor d o r fro m socia l scienc e survey s t o bac k up th e argument . Thus , on e wa y o f defendin g positivis m agains t Poppe r would b e t o dra w o n empirica l researc h t o argu e tha t scientist s d o i n fac t reason i n a probabilistic manne r simila r t o th e inductiv e logi c propose d b y Carnap. I n turn , a Popperia n migh t counterargu e tha t recours e t o th e historical recor d o r empirica l socia l science studie s would b e largely irrele vant. Eve n i f scientist s d o i n fac t reaso n thi s way , the y should reason a s a Popperian scientis t doe s b y startin g firs t wit h a theor y o r a law an d the n attempting t o refut e it . Thi s exampl e i s on e cas e o f th e slippage s betwee n description an d prescriptio n tha t sometime s occu r i n philosophica l argu ments. Although Poppe r rejected th e positivist view o f induction, i n othe r ways he remaine d ver y simila r t o th e positivists . Fo r example , hi s accoun t o f science was still a rational one and therefore h e was still engaged in a project of justification i n a genera l sense . H e ha d merel y switche d th e proble m from ho w t o induc e goo d hypothese s t o ho w t o refut e ba d ones . Ye t th e problem o f evaluatin g theorie s o r law s stil l require d justification, an d thi s justification wa s anchored in empirical practices akin to those of the positivists. Popper stil l believed tha t testing was the key to accepting or rejecting a hypothesis (1963) . In thi s sense he was squarely aligned with th e positivists, and consequentl y hi s falsificationism positio n ha s sometimes bee n calle d an extreme for m o f verificationism. On e wa y o f expressin g thi s continuit y i s in terms of the "hypothetico-deductiv e method. " A positivist interpretatio n

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was tha t i f a hypothesis i s tru e an d i f a confirmin g observatio n i s true , the n the hypothesi s i s confirme d t o som e degree . Poppe r tweak s thi s metho d b y arguing tha t i f a hypothesi s i s tru e an d i f a confirmin g observatio n i s false , then th e hypothesi s i s no t confirmed . Popper originall y develope d hi s falsificationis t argumen t a s a solutio n t o the demarcatio n problem , o r ho w t o distinguis h scienc e fro m nonscience . From th e viewpoin t o f positivist s (o r a t leas t som e positivists) , a clai m tha t was i n principl e verifiabl e (o r a t least subjec t t o testin g an d som e confirma tion) coul d b e considere d meaningfu l an d scientific . A pseudoscientifi c statement wa s therefor e i n principl e no t capabl e o f confirmation . C o n cerned wit h wha t h e sa w a s th e pseudoscientifi c successe s o f Marxis m and psychoanalysis , Poppe r formulate d falsifiabilit y a s a bette r demarcatio n criterion. Popper s formulation o f falsificationis m a s a vali d demarcatio n criterio n is no t th e onl y possibility . Thoma s Giery n (1994 ) argue s tha t R o b e r t Merton s formula o f a set o f universalisti c norm s represent s anothe r attemp t to resolv e th e demarcatio n problem , a s doe s Thoma s Kuh n s criterio n tha t sciences hav e a paradigm. Mari o Bung e supplie d eigh t negativ e criteri a tha t served a s indicator s o f nonscienc e (1982) . Larr y Lauda n (1983 ) argue s tha t the demarcatio n criteri a o f philosopher s suc h a s Aristotle , Carnap , an d Popper wer e develope d t o rul e ou t specifi c case s (suc h a s psychoanalysi s and Marxis m fo r Popper) , bu t th e criteri a al l woul d allo w othe r case s o f nonscience t o pas s a s science . H e argue s instea d tha t a mor e hones t ap proach woul d b e t o develo p specifi c argument s agains t specifi c inadequacie s of apparen t pseudoscience s rathe r tha n t o develo p universa l criteri a fo r which exception s ar e likel y t o b e foun d (cf . Fulle r 1988 : ch . 7) . Subse quently, Charle s Taylo r (1996 ) surveye d a wide rang e o f ST S approache s t o the demarcatio n proble m an d argue d tha t the y coul d b e incorporate d int o a broader rhetorica l framework . The demarcatio n proble m ma y see m t o b e a n obscur e philosophica l issue, bu t i t ha s direc t polic y implication s i n a numbe r o f areas . O n e example i s th e lega l proble m o f determinin g criteri a fo r acceptabl e exper t testimony. I n th e Unite d State s a long-standing criterio n wa s base d o n th e 1923 Frye ruling , whic h define d th e scientifi c b y a criterio n o f genera l acceptance i n th e fiel d i n whic h th e clai m i s made . I n philosophica l terms , this amount s t o a ground s fo r theor y choic e base d o n a consistenc y crite rion. I n th e contex t o f legal disputes , ther e i s a hig h dange r o f conservativ e bias i n researc h field s tha t ar e no t ver y autonomou s an d instea d ar e mor e clearly structure d b y corporate , professional , o r othe r interest s (a s in , say ,

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research o n environmenta l carcinogen s o r pharmaceuticals) . Rul e 70 2 o f the Federa l Rule s o f Evidence , issue d durin g th e 1970s , allowe d greate r leeway i n exper t testimon y b y basin g acceptabl e expertis e o n knowledge , skill, training , o r experience . However , thi s rul e resulte d i n wha t som e considered t o b e th e proble m o f j u n k science . A 199 3 Suprem e Cour t ruling (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.) develope d fou r guide posts, whic h include d th e Frye criterio n bu t als o adde d testability , pee r review an d publication , an d a declare d (an d presumably ) lo w erro r rate. 8 O n e ca n se e ho w th e court s hav e struggle d wit h th e ver y difficul t proble m of demarcation . A s attorne y Richar d Jaff e (1996 ) ha s pointe d out , th e implications ar e enormous , give n th e fac t tha t th e Frye and Daubert criteri a may wor k agains t plaintiff s w h o rel y o n th e expertis e o f field s suc h a s environmental medicine . Popper als o provide d prescriptiv e criteri a fo r theor y choice . H e agree d with a criterio n o f simplicity , an d h e use d th e theor y o f gravit y a s th e example: " T h e ne w theor y shoul d procee d fro m som e simple, new, and powerful, unifying idea abou t som e connectio n o r relatio n (suc h a s gravita tional attraction ) betwee n hithert o unconnecte d thing s (suc h a s planets an d apples) o r fact s (suc h a s inertia l an d gravitationa l mass ) o r ne w 'theoretica l entities' (suc h a s fiel d an d particles) " (1963 : 241) . N o t e tha t thi s criterio n also include s accuracy ; i n othe r words , i t take s fo r grante d th e argumen t that th e theor y wil l explai n a se t o f fact s o r th e sam e se t o f fact s a s a riva l theory. Second , th e ne w theor y mus t b e independentl y testable , tha t is , i n addition t o explainin g accepte d evidenc e i n a better way , i t mus t hav e som e new an d testabl e consequences . Third , i n additio n t o passin g attempte d refutations, i t mus t mak e successful , ne w prediction s o f ne w effects . Thus , in developin g hi s criteri a fo r theor y choice , Poppe r pushe d th e falsifica tionist positio n t o a n extrem e b y narrowin g falsificatio n t o successful , ne w predictions. Th e criteri a ma y hav e worke d fo r th e example s fro m physic s that h e wa s thinkin g about , bu t the y ar e problemati c fo r othe r sciences , especially th e socia l science s an d othe r science s tha t wor k wit h phenomen a too complicate d t o b e predicted .

Historicism O n e majo r criticis m o f Popperia n falsification , whic h philosopher s suc h a s Imre Lakato s recognized , cam e fro m Thoma s Kuhn . I n The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuh n argue d tha t scientist s ofte n continu e t o wor k

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under a theor y o r se t o f theorie s eve n whe n face d wit h anomalie s o r refuting instances . However , Kuhn' s wor k ha d a muc h mor e importan t place i n th e philosoph y o f scienc e tha n merel y providin g a n argumen t against falsificationism . Hi s wor k contribute d greatl y t o wha t philosopher s of scienc e cal l historicism , th e perio d an d styl e tha t responde d t o positiv ism/Popperism an d antedate d naturalism , roughl y fro m th e 1960 s t o th e 1980s. Thi s tendenc y i n philosophy—epitomize d i n th e wor k o f Kuhn , Paul Feyerabend , Stephe n Toulmin , an d t o som e exten t Imr e Lakatos — rejected th e lac k o f concern amon g positivists , Popperians , an d convention alists wit h th e historica l recor d an d instea d advocate d a greate r rol e fo r historical fact s i n philosophica l argumentation . T h e emergenc e o f histori cism als o brough t abou t wha t anthropologist s cal l th e "peac e i n th e feud " between Poppe r an d th e positivists . Hackin g argue s tha t i n contras t t o K u h n — a t leas t i n The Structure of Scientific Revolutions—Carnap an d Poppe r held man y simila r views : observatio n ca n b e sharpl y distinguishe d fro m theory, knowledg e growt h i s cumulative , scienc e ha s a deductiv e structure , terminology i s o r ough t t o b e precise , ther e i s a unit y t o science , an d a distinction ca n b e maintaine d betwee n th e contex t o f discover y an d tha t o f justification (Hackin g 1983 : 4-5) . Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions ha d a substantia l impac t o n bot h the philosoph y an d socia l studie s o f science , bu t afte r th e 1970 s th e impac t was increasingl y tha t o f a foi l agains t whic h othe r position s an d theorie s were articulated . I n th e sociolog y o f scientifi c knowledge , th e variou s positions develope d durin g an d afte r th e 1970 s rapidl y replace d Kuhnia n analysis, a s di d naturalisti c an d realisti c approache s i n philosophy . Further more, a s th e alternative s wer e formulated , th e novelt y o f Kuhn' s wor k als o came int o question . Man y o f Kuhn' s sociologica l idea s ha d antecedent s i n the 1930 s studie s o f Ludwi k Flec k (1979 ) o n though t style s an d collective s (a socia l uni t i n scienc e suc h a s a discipline , network , o r community) , an d Kuhn's philosophica l argument s als o ha d predecessor s i n th e conventionalis t tradition withi n th e philosoph y o f science . Th e fina l verdic t i s tha t a s a sociologist Kuh n ha s bee n show n t o b e mor e o r les s Mertonian , an d a s a philosopher h e ha s been rea d increasingl y "pace [Dudley] Shapere , les s [as ] a revolt agains t positivis m tha n a continuation o f it." 9 By th e 1990 s th e importanc e o f The Structure of Scientific Revolutions within ST S wa s generall y see n a s historica l rathe r tha n contemporary , an d many regarde d th e historica l influenc e a s a conservativ e on e i n th e sens e that i t continue d rathe r tha n challenge d fundamenta l theorie s i n socia l studies an d philosophy . However , outsid e ST S circle s Kuhn' s wor k contin -

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ued t o hav e a lif e o f it s ow n a s scientists , popula r writers , an d other s continued t o tal k abou t hi s revolutionar y idea s abou t revolutions . Certainly , there i s stil l a plac e fo r goo d philosophica l an d sociologica l account s o f scientific revolutions , an d Kuhn' s wor k deserve s som e credi t fo r providin g a spu r t o theorizatio n o f the topic . Scientifi c revolutions , controversies , an d normal scienc e hav e sometime s bee n referre d t o a s th e thre e phase s o f scientific research . Controversie s wil l b e covere d i n th e chapte r o n th e sociology o f scientifi c knowledge , an d i f on e wishe s t o buil d a mor e thoroughly sociologica l accoun t o f scientifi c revolutions , the n th e contro versy literatur e i s probably th e bes t startin g point . T h e othe r phas e o f scientifi c researc h wa s wha t Kuh n characterize d a s normal scienc e o r puzzl e solving , tha t is , th e incrementa l addition s o f observations an d mino r theoretica l innovations . U n d e r thes e conditions , knowledge claim s ar e no t likel y t o b e controversia l an d replicatio n i s likel y to b e les s salient . Puzzl e solvin g doe s no t involv e attempt s t o refut e a theory, an d th e bul k o f scientifi c wor k involve s puzzl e solving . T h u s — a n d here i s on e philosophica l implication—th e bul k o f scientific wor k doe s no t follow th e Popperia n mode l o f falsificationism . Kuhn's theor y attribute s scientifi c revolution s t o a paradigm crisis , whic h is occasione d b y th e accumulatio n o f anomalie s tha t lead s t o th e formula tion o f a new paradigm . T h e concep t o f a "paradigm " shifte d th e discussio n on falsificatio n an d confirmatio n fro m a singl e theor y t o somethin g mor e encompassing. I n The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, th e ter m "paradigm " suffered fro m ambiguity , an d a s man y a s twenty-tw o differen t use s hav e been isolated . T h e multipl e use s o f th e term , Kuhn' s insistenc e o n it s linkage t o communities , an d th e learne d natur e o f paradigm s al l sugges t parallels wit h th e rubri c natur e o f th e ter m "culture " fo r anthropologists , and therefor e i n som e way s i t seem s tha t Kuh n wa s tryin g t o reinven t anthropologists' cultur e concept . I n subsequen t wor k Kuh n specifie d mor e concretely th e meaning s h e attribute d t o th e paradig m concep t (1977 : ch . 12). H e underscore d it s connectio n t o a scientifi c community , whic h h e thought o f i n term s o f specialtie s o r discipline s bu t define d a s havin g multiple levels . Thus, th e mos t genera l meanin g o f paradigm wa s "disciplin ary matrix, " th e interconnecte d element s associate d wit h a discipline . T h e list o f elements shift s fro m th e 197 0 postscript i n The Structure to th e versio n published i n 197 7 i n The Essential Tension, whic h describe s thre e mai n components o r element s t o th e disciplinar y matrix : (1 ) symboli c generaliza tions, o r forma l part s o f the paradigm ; (2 ) models , whic h provid e th e grou p with "preferre d analogies " o r a n ontology , a s i n th e ide a tha t a n electrica l

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circuit ma y b e "regarde d a s a steady-stat e hydrodynami c system" ; an d (3 ) exemplars, o r share d examples , usuall y concret e problem s tha t a theor y ha s solved an d tha t serv e a s guide s fo r ne w research . Fo r severa l reasons—th e fuzziness o f th e concept ; th e tendenc y fo r scienc e studie s researcher s t o think mor e i n term s o f networks , schools , fields , an d arena s tha n researc h communities; an d th e existenc e o f other , mor e generall y accepte d term s that d o muc h o f th e sam e wor k (culture , episteme , researc h program , research tradition , an d theor y o r globa l theory)—th e ter m "paradigm " seems t o hav e ha d mor e succes s outsid e scienc e studie s circle s tha n insid e them. The othe r crucia l ter m i s "anomaly, " a n observatio n tha t raise s doubt s about a theory, althoug h i t i s no t necessaril y logicall y inconsisten t wit h th e theory Thus , th e ide a o f a n anomal y put s Kuh n somewher e betwee n Popperian refutatio n an d conventionalism . Althoug h Kuh n doe s no t en dorse th e algorithmi c natur e o f falsificatio n throug h refutin g instances , h e still leave s a plac e fo r th e rol e o f negativ e instances , particularl y throug h their accumulatio n ove r tim e an d th e difficult y o f producin g an d main taining a n increasin g an d increasingl y complicate d networ k o f auxiliar y theories. 1 0 Furthermore , a ne w paradig m doe s no t merel y subsum e th e empirical evidenc e o f the previou s one . A paradigm shif t o r large theoretica l change i s no t necessaril y unequivocall y progressive ; th e par t o f th e ol d knowledge bas e tha t i s lost ha s been referre d t o a s "Kuhn loss " (Fulle r 1988 : 223). A s Hackin g (1983 : 67 ) point s out , Kuhn' s descriptio n o f theor y change i s considerabl y differen t fro m th e ide a o f theor y subsumptio n (a s defended b y Ernes t Nage l an d others) , i n whic h a successo r theor y o r paradigm explain s th e ne w phenomen a an d make s th e sam e accurat e pre dictions o f th e previou s one . The concep t o f Kuh n los s i s importan t fo r a n understandin g o f th e incommensurability thesis , whic h i s associated mostl y wit h Kuhn , althoug h Feyerabend als o defende d i t an d th e thesi s ha s antecedent s i n th e wor k o f Carnap. Originall y th e thesi s hel d tha t th e advocate s o f differen t paradigm s live i n suc h differen t world s tha t thei r theorie s ar e mutuall y unintelligible , but ove r th e year s th e thesi s ha s shifte d t o th e problem s o f translatabilit y across theorie s (Earma n 1993 : 17 ; Kuh n 1989 : 10 ; 1993) . Anothe r recon struction o f th e thesi s i s tha t th e earlie r theor y i s no t encompasse d b y th e later on e an d canno t b e derive d fro m th e late r one . Thi s i s clearl y no t always th e case , a s in Newtonia n mechanic s an d twentieth-centur y physics , and philosopher s hav e consequentl y refine d th e thesis. 11 I n socia l studie s o f controversies, th e incommensurabiHt y thesi s ha s no t prove n ver y usefu l

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because opponent s ma y b e abl e t o sideste p translatio n an d mov e t o direc t rehearsal o f procedure s an d protocols . Thi s argumen t ha s becom e mor e important a s socia l scientist s hav e studie d scienc e a s practic e rathe r tha n merely a s theor y makin g (Pickerin g 1992) . Furthermore , opponent s ofte n are quit e adep t a t understandin g th e term s o f the opposin g sid e (MacKenzi e and Barne s 1979 : 200) . O n e implicatio n o f incommensurabilit y amon g gran d theorie s o r para digms i s tha t chang e ma y b e mor e lik e a conversio n proces s tha n a chang e of mind s le d b y argumen t an d evidence . A s a result , Kuh n followe d Ma x Planck (1949 ) whe n h e argue d tha t paradig m chang e i s ofte n associate d with a shif t o f generations , i n whic h a n olde r paradig m become s extinc t a s an olde r generatio n die s off . However , Kuh n als o denie d criticism s tha t h e had reduce d th e proble m o f theor y choic e t o "mo b psychology. " Instead , he defende d a loos e se t o f mor e o r les s universalisti c criteri a fo r theor y choice, thu s headin g of f criticism s tha t hi s theor y o f paradig m chang e reduced theor y choic e t o epistemologica l relativism . Kuh n liste d th e majo r criteria fo r theor y choic e a s the following : First, a theory shoul d b e accurate : withi n it s domain , tha t is , consequence s deducible fro m a theor y shoul d b e i n demonstrate d agreemen t wit h th e results o f existing experiment s an d observations . Second , a theory shoul d b e consistent, no t onl y internall y o r wit h itself , bu t als o wit h othe r currentl y accepted theorie s applicable to related aspects of nature. Third, i t should have broad scope : in particular, a theory's consequence s shoul d exten d fa r beyon d the particula r observations , laws , o r subtheorie s i t wa s initiall y designe d t o explain. Fourth , an d closel y related , i t shoul d b e simple , bringin g orde r t o phenomena tha t i n it s absenc e woul d b e individuall y isolate d and , a s a set , confused. Fifth— a somewha t les s standar d item , bu t on e o f specia l impor tance t o actua l scientifi c decisions— a theor y shoul d b e fruitfu l o f ne w research findings : i t should , tha t is , disclos e ne w phenomen a o r previousl y unnoted relationship s amon g those alread y known. (Kuh n 1977 : 321-22) Because Kuh n referre d t o hi s theor y choic e criteri a a s values , h e evidentl y believed tha t h e wa s describin g a se t o f value s tha t indee d guide d scientist s in action . Hi s criteri a therefor e apparentl y double d a s a descriptio n of , o n the on e hand , wha t h e though t (withou t doin g an y empirica l research ) scientists actuall y hel d a s values tha t guid e theor y choic e and , o n th e othe r hand, a prescriptio n o f wha t h e though t shoul d guid e theor y choice . Subsequent empirica l researc h b y socia l scientist s ha s questione d th e Kuh nian argumen t tha t scientists ' actio n i s i n fac t guide d b y thes e o r othe r list s of universalistic values , suc h a s the complementar y lis t o f institutional value s

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known a s Mertonia n norms . However , whe n interprete d a s prescriptiv e criteria, Kuhn' s "values " n o longe r suffe r fro m th e proble m o f lac k o f empirical evidence . Thus, I sugges t viewin g Kuhn' s value s a s prescriptiv e theor y choic e criteria. Fro m thi s perspective , Kuh n synthesize s theor y choic e criteri a a s articulated b y Carnap , Duhem , Popper , an d othe r philosophers . N o t e tha t the accurac y criterio n coul d b e reconcile d wit h som e typ e o f verifica tionism o r falsificationism . Scop e an d fruitfulnes s ar e similar , an d the y coul d be interprete d a s corollarie s o f th e accurac y criterio n whe n applie d t o future predictions . Th e consistenc y criterio n i s similar t o th e theor y choic e criterion favore d b y conventionalist s lik e D u h e m , an d simplicit y wa s als o advocated b y Carnap , Duhem , an d Popper . I n fact , becaus e simplicit y mus t be judge d agains t a backgroun d o f othe r theories , i t i s closel y relate d t o consistency. I n short , Kuhn' s mai n contributio n t o th e theor y choic e issu e is t o articulat e an d synthesiz e previou s discussions . I woul d ad d tha t scope , fruitfulness, an d accurac y ar e closel y relate d a s on e group , an d simplicit y and consistenc y ar e closel y relate d a s a secon d group . D o othe r philosophi cal tradition s hel p expan d thi s lis t i n ne w directions ?

Post-Kuhnian Theories of Progress Imre Lakato s accepte d Kuhn' s argumen t tha t theorie s coexis t withi n a n ocean o f anomalie s an d therefor e ar e no t easil y rejecte d eve n i n th e fac e of potentiall y refutin g instances . However , unlik e Kuh n h e propose d a methodology o f scientifi c researc h program s tha t develope d wha t h e calle d a sophisticate d falsificationism . Lakato s argue d tha t th e "basi c uni t o f ap praisal mus t b e no t a n isolate d theor y o r conjunctio n o f theorie s bu t rathe r a 'researc h program ' " (1978 : n o ) . A n exampl e i s Newtonia n science , which a t it s cor e consiste d o f a conjunctio n o f theorie s o r conjectures : th e three law s o f mechanic s an d th e la w o f gravitatio n (4) . Thes e constitut e what Lakato s call s th e har d cor e o r negativ e heuristi c o f a research program ; they ar e th e sacre d spac e tha t mus t b e protecte d a t al l cos t fro m anomalie s or refutin g instances . Th e har d cor e o f th e researc h progra m i s defende d b y a "protectiv e bel t o f auxiliar y hypotheses " tha t diges t anomalie s (48) . T h e positive heuristi c "consist s o f a partiall y articulate d se t o f suggestion s o r hints o n ho w t o change , develo p th e 'refutabl e variants ' o f th e researc h program, ho w t o modify , sophisticate , th e 'refutable ' protectiv e belt " (50) . As description s o f th e theoretica l structur e o f som e sciences , th e concept s

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of a har d cor e wit h it s negativ e heuristi c an d a protectiv e bel t wit h it s positive heuristi c see m t o correspon d wel l t o som e cases . However, a s fo r Lakatos' s prescriptiv e criteri a fo r choosin g amon g re search programs , w h e n th e smok e clear s ther e i s no t muc h new . Lakato s wrote, "Al l th e researc h program s I admir e hav e on e characteristi c i n common. The y al l predic t nove l facts , fact s whic h ha d bee n eithe r u n dreamt of , o r hav e indee d bee n contradicte d b y previou s o r riva l programs " (5). Lakato s designate d a s "progressive " thos e researc h program s tha t ar e generating successful , surprisin g predictions , i n contras t wit h "degenera tive" programs . I n progressiv e program s ther e i s a series o f theories, eac h o f which i s better tha n th e previou s one . "Better " i s define d a s meetin g thre e criteria: th e ne w theor y ha s exces s empirica l conten t ove r th e previou s one , that is , i t predict s nove l facts ; th e ne w theor y explain s th e succes s o f th e previous theory , tha t is , i t subsume s th e previou s theory ; an d a t leas t som e of th e ne w theory' s exces s conten t i s corroborate d (32) . O n e proble m wit h Lakatos' s proposa l i s tha t th e requiremen t o f sub sumption mean s tha t hi s criteri a woul d no t appl y t o case s wher e ther e i s Kuhn loss , an d consequentl y th e real-worl d applicabilit y o f hi s secon d criterion i s limited . Furthermore , hi s us e o f successful , surprisin g predic tions a s th e criterio n fo r choic e amon g theorie s (o r researc h programs ) i s not ver y ne w an d restrict s th e applicabilit y o f th e criteri a t o science s tha t provide predictiv e explanations . O n e migh t recal l tha t Carna p an d Poppe r (as wel l a s Kuhn ) use d ne w prediction s a s a basi c criterio n fo r theor y choice, s o a t bes t th e Lakatosia n criterio n i s a clarificatio n o f wha t th e other philosopher s ha d suggested . Moreover , Lakato s doe s no t provid e fo r the stron g for m o f evidentia l indistinguishability , a s described b y Carnap , i n which tw o theorie s (o r researc h programs ) mad e simila r predictions . Here , one woul d hav e t o retur n t o othe r sort s o f criteria , suc h a s simplicit y o r consistency. Lakatos als o contribute d t o th e muddl e o f th e interdisciplinar y dialogu e when h e use d Marxis m a s his exempla r o f a degenerativ e researc h progra m (1978: 6—7) . H e compare d th e faile d prediction s an d pos t ho c explanation s of Marxis m wit h th e successful , surprisin g prediction s o f Newtonia n m e chanics. Th e compariso n wa s motivate d mor e b y hi s historica l locatio n i n Cold Wa r politics , bu t i t assume s a versio n o f th e unit y o f scienc e thesi s that i s highly questionable . I t i s unlikely tha t h e coul d fin d an y socia l theor y or socia l scienc e researc h progra m tha t provide d successful , surprisin g pre dictions simila r t o thos e o f Newtonia n mechanics , simpl y becaus e socia l phenomena ar e considerabl y mor e complex . H e suggest s a s muc h whe n a t

The Philosophy of Science | 2 9 another poin t h e refer s t o th e socia l science s a s "underdeveloped " (9) . O n e of th e reason s socia l scientist s los e patienc e wit h philosopher s o f scienc e i s that w e ar e constantl y tol d tha t w e ar e i n som e sens e deficien t scientists — we lac k a paradigm , predictiv e ability , quantitativ e exactness , an d s o o n — instead o f being see n a s divergen t o r differen t scientists . Larry Lauda n develope d a slightly differen t approac h t o Lakato s s analysis of research program s an d progres s i n science . H e propose d th e concep t o f a "research tradition " t o replac e th e Kuhnia n paradig m o r Lakatosia n researc h program: 1. Ever y researc h traditio n ha s a numbe r o f specifi c theorie s whic h exemplify an d partiall y constitut e it ; som e o f these theorie s wil l be contem poraneous, other s will be tempora l successor s o f earlier ones. 2. Ever y researc h traditio n exhibit s certai n metaphysical an d methodological commitments which , a s an ensemble , individuat e th e researc h traditio n an d distinguish i t from others . 3. Eac h researc h traditio n (unlik e a specific theory ) goe s through a num ber of different, detaile d (an d often mutuall y contradictory ) formulation s an d generally ha s a long histor y extendin g throug h a significant perio d o f time . (By contrast, theorie s ar e frequently short-lived. ) (Lauda n 1977 : 78—79)12 T h e concep t o f a researc h tradition , a s define d here , lose s som e o f th e conventionalist wisdo m tha t Lakato s retaine d i n hi s definitio n o f a researc h program a s havin g a negativ e an d positiv e heuristic . However , lik e th e Kuhnian paradig m Laudan' s definitio n o f th e researc h traditio n ha s th e benefit o f pointin g t o extratheoretica l commitments , tha t is , somethin g closer t o wha t I cal l a researc h culture . Thi s chang e represent s a n improve ment o n th e forma l emphasi s o f Lakatos' s researc h program . H e als o i s more willin g t o allo w fo r interna l contradiction s an d a sens e o f historica l evolution. What doe s Lauda n contribut e t o th e proble m o f theor y choice ? H e defined progres s a s increasin g problem-solvin g ability . Problem s ar e under stood a s either empirical , suc h a s resolving a n anomaly , o r conceptual , suc h as whe n a theor y i s eithe r internall y inconsisten t o r inconsisten t wit h another accepte d theor y (1977 : 49) . Thus , th e firs t criterio n amount s t o a type o f empirica l subsumption , an d th e secon d return s u s t o a versio n o f consistency an d simplicit y criteria . A supporte r o f Kuh n woul d sa y tha t t o the exten t tha t Lakato s an d Lauda n hav e adde d anythin g ne w t o hi s lis t o f accuracy, consistency , scope , simplicity , an d fruitfulness , the y hav e clarifie d and extende d th e lis t rathe r tha n overturne d it. 13

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T h e ter m "progress " o r "progressive " a s use d b y Lakato s an d Lauda n provides anothe r possibilit y fo r interdisciplinar y misunderstandings . Fo r example, conside r on e socia l scientist' s approac h t o th e problem , Dere k d e Solla Price' s "scientifi c doomsday " thesi s (1965) . Pric e argue d tha t worl d science ha d bee n expandin g sinc e it s inceptio n a t a n exponentia l growt h rate, s o muc h s o tha t i t wa s doublin g ever y te n t o fiftee n years . Becaus e that growt h rat e coul d no t b e sustained , Pric e predicte d a scientific dooms day, an d hi s predictio n seem s t o hav e becom e a realit y i n th e cost-cuttin g years o f th e 1990s . (Sometime s socia l scientist s d o mak e successful , eve n somewhat surprising , predictions. ) Althoug h i t i s stil l possibl e t o defin e some kin d o f "progress " i n a n er a o f cos t cuttin g an d accountabilit y t o pragmatic interests , i t i s usefu l t o injec t thi s socia l scienc e findin g int o th e philosophical debat e t o destabiliz e th e concep t o f progress . W h y shoul d one b e conten t wit h suc h a narro w definitio n o f progres s a s appear s i n Lakatos's an d Laudan' s formulas ? Ca n on e als o se t u p criteri a fo r th e progress o f scienc e a t th e institutiona l level , suc h a s th e minima l mainte nance o f wage s an d resource s a t cost-of-livin g levels , o r th e increase d amount o f diversit y an d equit y i n th e institutiona l organizatio n o f scientifi c and technica l production ? Thes e definition s migh t eve n b e linke d t o prog ress i n th e sens e o f content , suc h a s th e argumen t tha t a n increasingl y diverse institutiona l organizatio n o f scienc e tend s t o lea d t o th e weedin g out o f som e o f th e mos t egregiou s instance s o f gender , race , an d othe r biases (Harawa y 1989) . I therefor e interpre t Lakatos' s an d Laudan' s descrip tions o f scientifi c progress—replacin g on e theor y wit h a bette r o n e — a s very narrow . Socia l studie s therefor e ca n contribut e t o a mor e genera l philosophical analysi s o f th e ide a o f "progress " i n science .

Naturalism and Realism Laudan's wor k wa s influence d b y America n pragmatism , a s is eviden t i n hi s definition o f progres s throug h th e concep t o f proble m solving . I n philoso phy pragmatis m ha s sometime s bee n referre d t o a s th e Chicag o schoo l o f philosophy, an d i t i s usefu l t o paus e wit h thi s ter m becaus e i t i s anothe r example o f variatio n acros s disciplinar y cultures . I n philosoph y th e ter m "Chicago school " usuall y refer s t o th e perio d w h e n John Dewe y wa s a t th e University o f Chicago . Th e ter m probabl y wa s bor n i n 190 3 whe n Willia m James haile d Dewey' s Studies in Logical Theory a s th e birt h o f th e Chicag o

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school o f pragmatis t philosoph y (althoug h late r Carna p cam e t o Chicago , thus bringin g positivis m t o pragmatism) . T h e Chicag o schoo l i n philosoph y can b e distinguishe d fro m Chicag o school s i n th e socia l sciences , whic h influenced N o r t h America n ST S i n a differen t wa y an d wil l b e describe d later. Leadin g earl y pragmatis t philosopher s wer e Dewey , James , Georg e Herbert Mead , an d Charle s Sander s Peirce . Fo r pragmatists , knowledg e i s derived fro m experienc e an d wor k (includin g scientifi c experimentation) , and trut h i s determine d throug h practica l result s suc h a s predictio n an d control o r desire d psychological/socia l consequences . Lik e positivists , prag matists wer e critica l o f metaphysica l speculation , bu t lik e contemporar y naturalists pragmatist s tende d t o rel y o n scientificall y generate d natura l fact s as a groun d o r touchston e fo r philosophica l argumentation . Pragmatis m i s therefore a contributing curren t t o naturalis m i n th e contemporar y philoso phy o f science. 14 Naturalism is , accordin g t o on e prominen t America n naturalis t philoso pher, th e vie w "tha t al l huma n activitie s ca n b e understoo d a s entirel y natural phenomena , a s ar e th e activitie s o f chemical s o r animals " (Gier e 1988: 8) . Ofte n naturalis m i s describe d a s th e thir d phas e i n th e philosoph y of scienc e afte r th e earl y debate s amon g positivism , Popperism , an d con ventionalism an d th e secon d wav e o f historicism . Som e naturalis t philoso phers conside r th e America n pragmatist s (suc h a s Dewey, Peirce , an d James) to b e close r intellectua l ancestor s tha n th e leader s o f th e majo r tradition s within th e philosoph y o f science . However , ther e ar e als o clea r line s o f influence fro m th e earlie r school s o f the philosoph y o f science. Lik e histori cism, naturalis m tend s t o mov e awa y fro m argumentatio n grounde d o n formal, a prior i reasonin g tha t wa s characteristi c o f th e positivists , an d instead i t interject s accepte d empirica l fact s int o philosophica l argumenta tion. However , unlik e historicis m naturalis m tend s t o rel y mor e o n th e natural fact s o f cognitiv e and/o r evolutionar y processe s a s a reliabl e mode l for distinguishin g trut h fro m belief . Naturalist s als o ar e usuall y mor e deepl y involved i n th e discipline-specifi c philosophie s o f science suc h a s the philos ophy o f biolog y o r cognitiv e science , i n contras t wit h th e emphasi s o n physics i n earlie r generation s o f philosophy . Thei r dee p involvemen t i n specific discipline s tend s t o mak e th e philosoph y o f scienc e mor e continu ous wit h theoretica l debate s withi n scientifi c disciplines . Consequently , justification i s often formulate d no t agains t a n imaginar y skepti c bu t instea d against a goal o f producing approximatel y tru e knowledg e abou t th e world . Perhaps th e mos t influentia l typ e o f naturalistic approac h i n th e contem -

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porary philosoph y o f scienc e i s evolutionar y epistemology , tha t is , an y theory tha t explain s huma n an d anima l cognitio n wit h evolutionar y theor y Werner Callebu t (1993 : 286 ) argue s tha t i t i s importan t t o distinguis h tw o different programs : (1 ) biologica l evolutionar y epistemolog y (als o know n a s bioepistemology o r EEM , fo r evolutionar y epistemolog y mechanisms) , which i s th e natura l scienc e o f th e evolutionar y basi s o f anima l cognitiv e and perceptua l systems ; an d (2 ) a n evolutionar y accoun t o f scienc e o r EET, evolutionar y epistemolog y o f theorie s (followin g Bradi e 1986) . Dary l Chubin an d Sa l Restivo (1983 ) calle d th e latte r th e "mil d program " i n STS . Leaders i n th e developmen t o f a n evolutionar y approac h t o scienc e hav e been Donal d Campbell , Davi d Hull , an d Popper . Hull' s contributio n t o evolutionary theor y include s th e delineatio n and/o r elucidatio n o f th e following: a replicator , "a n entit y tha t passe s o n it s structur e largel y intac t in successiv e replications" ; a n interactor , "a n entit y tha t interact s a s a cohesive whol e wit h it s environmen t i n suc h a wa y tha t thi s interactio n causes replicatio n t o b e differential" ; selection , " a proces s i n whic h th e differential extinctio n an d proliferatio n o f interactor s cause the differentia l perpetuation o f the relevan t replicators" ; an d lineage , "a n entit y tha t persist s indefinitely throug h tim e eithe r i n th e sam e o r a n altere d stat e a s a result o f replication" (1988 : 408—9) . Hul l argue s tha t hi s distinctio n betwee n inter actors an d replicator s i s a n advanc e o n Campbell' s ter m "vehicle, " whic h does no t entai l th e distinctio n an d i s therefor e likel y t o creat e conceptua l confusion (Hul l 1988 : 414; Campbel l 1979) . These term s appl y t o biologica l a s wel l a s conceptual , scientific , an d cultural evolution , an d thu s the y hav e relevanc e fo r socia l science s suc h a s cultural anthropolog y However , i n genera l cultura l anthropologist s an d sociologists toda y ten d no t t o b e intereste d i n evolutionar y approache s t o social phenomena . Thes e approache s hav e a checkere d histor y i n th e nine teenth century , whe n the y wer e ofte n use d t o orde r societie s i n a way tha t legitimated th e "whit e man' s burden " o f colonialism . I n th e twentiet h century, evolutionar y approache s wer e linke d t o functionalism , a s in Talcot t Parsons s socia l theory , whic h i s no w discredite d fo r reason s tha t wil l b e explained. Th e differen t meaning s an d historie s o f evolutionar y theor y i n philosophy an d th e socia l science s therefor e provid e anothe r opportunit y for cross-disciplinar y misunderstandings . Usually naturalist s suc h a s evolutionar y epistemologist s ar e als o realists , a term tha t als o provide s enormou s opportunitie s fo r misunderstanding . Sev eral realist s ar e als o Marxists, an d i n Britai n th e ter m "critica l realist " usuall y is a code wor d fo r a Marxist. Hackin g distinguishe s thre e type s o f realism :

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1. ontological , i n whic h scientifi c theorie s ar e eithe r tru e o r fals e "i n virtue o f how th e worl d is " (oppose d t o instrumentalism) ; 2. causal , i n whic h "th e theoretica l term s o f the theor y denot e theoreti cal entitie s whic h ar e causall y responsibl e fo r th e observabl e p h e nomena"; 3. epistemological , i n whic h "w e ca n hav e a warranted belie f in theorie s or i n entitie s (a t least i n principle) " (Hackin g 1983 : 28). The firs t typ e o f realism i s usually connecte d wit h som e theor y o f scientifi c progress, suc h tha t theorie s and/o r method s describ e th e rea l worl d beyon d observations increasingl y bette r ove r time , o r theoretica l term s tha t see m t o be merel y instrumenta l acquir e ontologica l statu s ove r time. 1 5 The secon d definitio n o f realism involve s th e philosoph y o f explanation . Generally, tw o majo r approache s ar e distinguished : inferentia l an d causal . T h e inferentia l approac h treat s explanatio n a s eithe r a n inductiv e o r deduc tive argumen t i n a tradition develope d b y Car l Hempe l (1965 ; Hempe l an d Oppenheim 1948) . T o summarize , i f the se t o f premises (explanans ) i s true , and th e conclusion s (explanandum ) ar e logicall y relate d t o th e explanans , then th e conclusion s ar e tru e o r probabl y true . Unde r th e coverin g la w model, th e conclusion s ar e subsume d unde r a general la w o r law s an d som e antecedent conditions . Th e firs t typ e o f explanatio n i s calle d nomological deductive, an d explanation s ar e understoo d a s prediction s o f event s mad e after th e event s occu r (retrodiction ) an d base d o n universa l law s (nomologi cal). W h e n a t leas t on e o f th e law s i s o f a statistica l nature , th e typ e of explanatio n i s deductive-statistica l rathe r tha n deductive-nomological . However, som e woul d argu e tha t th e conclusion s (explanandum ) ma y als o be derive d inductively ; hence , th e thir d typ e o f inferentia l explanation : inductive-statistical. I n al l case s explanatio n i s see n a s a kind o f description . Hence, thi s understandin g o f explanatio n i s consisten t wit h th e vie w tha t one sometime s hear s fro m scientists , namely , tha t scienc e provide s onl y highly genera l description s o f the worl d bu t no t explanations . Because th e coverin g la w mode l i s subjec t t o countercases , som e philos ophers hav e defende d th e causa l approach , a versio n o f whic h appear s a s Hacking's secon d typ e o f realism . Fro m thi s perspective , explanation s con sist not o f an argumen t tha t show s tha t th e phenomeno n wa s t o b e expecte d but o f a statemen t o f cause s tha t show s ho w th e phenomeno n wa s brough t about. A classica l startin g poin t i n discussion s o f causalit y i s Humea n causation, whic h a s reconstructe d b y twentieth-centur y philosopher s i s a s follows: give n tw o event s E i an d E2 , E i cause s E 2 i f (1 ) E i happene d

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before E2 , (2 ) i t i s possible t o deduc e E 2 b y knowin g E i occurred , a se t o f laws o f nature, an d statement s o f mutual conditions ; an d (3 ) it i s not possibl e to deduc e E 2 fro m E i b y knowin g onl y th e se t o f law s o f natur e an d statements o f mutual conditions . Thi s descriptio n mor e o r les s describe s th e understanding o f causalit y implici t i n medica l researc h tha t follow s Koch' s postulates. 16 Hacking' s descriptio n o f a causal form o f realism, whic h applie s to theoretica l terms , i s a n exampl e o f anothe r typ e o f causa l explanation . T h e thir d typ e o f realis m involve s a n oppositio n t o epistemologica l relativism. Philosopher s hav e occasionall y charge d som e socia l scientist s w h o wor k i n th e constructivis t traditio n wit h epistemologica l relativism . These debate s ofte n involv e a grea t dea l o f cross-tal k an d therefor e warran t some clarification . Befor e proceedin g t o tha t issue , on e migh t as k whethe r realism contribute s t o th e basi c proble m discusse d i n thi s chapter : providin g better ground s fo r theor y choice . Probabl y th e uniqu e contributio n o f th e realist woul d b e a criterio n that , assumin g evidentia l indistinguishability , preference shoul d b e give n t o th e theor y tha t use s term s tha t ar e mor e realistic. I n othe r words , preferenc e woul d b e give n t o a theor y wit h mor e observational term s o r theoretica l term s tha t coul d b e transforme d someda y into observationa l terms . Likewise , preferenc e woul d b e give n t o a researc h program fo r whic h theoretica l term s showe d som e tendenc y towar d con version int o observationa l term s ove r time , an d t o a progra m tha t gav e increasingly bette r technologica l benefits . Fo r example , viruse s wer e theo retical term s tha t have , ove r tim e an d wit h bette r technology , becom e observational terms . Othe r tha n thi s criterion , realis m probabl y woul d no t add muc h t o th e discussion s o f theor y choic e criteria .

Constructivism and Relativism Although philosopher s ar e usuall y ver y precis e a t usin g terms , ther e seem s to b e a grea t dea l o f confusio n regardin g constructivis m an d relativism . Both label s ar e sometime s applie d t o th e wor k o f historicist s suc h a s Kuh n as wel l a s som e socia l scientists . I t i s helpfu l t o distinguis h th e variou s meanings o f both constructivis m an d relativism . In th e socia l studie s o f scienc e an d technology , th e ter m "socia l con structivism" i s ofte n use d a s a genera l labe l fo r studie s tha t examin e ho w social variable s shap e th e patter n o f choice s abou t wha t researc h get s done , how i t i s done , ho w choice s amon g theorie s ar e mad e i n controversies , an d the exten t t o whic h observations , laws , theories , an d othe r knowledg e

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claims becom e accepte d i n wide r scientifi c communities . Philosopher s ten d to us e th e ter m "constructivism " somewha t differentl y t o refe r t o th e ide a that scientist s d o no t discove r th e worl d bu t impos e a structur e o n i t o r i n some sens e "make " th e world . I n it s extrem e version , constructivis m amounts t o mor e tha n a n instrumentalis t accoun t o f theories ; i t refer s t o a social idealis m i n whic h ther e i s n o materia l realit y tha t constrain s o r structures sensor y observations . Furthermore , regardin g th e proble m o f theory choice , thi s extrem e versio n woul d hol d tha t th e worl d doe s no t i n any seriou s wa y constrai n theor y choice ; i n thi s sens e th e worl d i s mad e or constructe d rathe r tha n discovered . Som e philosopher s argu e tha t th e constructivism o f socia l studie s o f scienc e necessaril y implie s socia l idealis m and epistemologica l relativism , bu t I sugges t tha t ther e i s n o necessar y connection betwee n th e two . Ther e ma y b e som e socia l scientist s w h o would accep t th e philosophica l positio n o f social idealis m an d epistemolog ical relativism , an d i f the y exis t I woul d sugges t callin g thei r philosophica l position "radica l constructivism. " Certainl y som e sociologist s o f scientifi c knowledge hav e mad e statement s tha t sugges t the y accep t radica l con structivism o r the y di d a t on e point . An alternativ e t o radica l constructivis m i s th e positio n tha t scientifi c theories ar e realisti c map s o r explanation s o f a rea l worl d an d a t th e sam e time vehicle s tha t encod e culture-boun d linguisti c categorie s an d cultura l values (wha t I cal l cultura l constructivism) , and/o r ar e shape d b y socia l interests an d othe r socia l variables (wha t I cal l social constructivism) . I thin k of thi s hybri d philosophica l positio n a s moderat e constructivism , althoug h similar position s hav e bee n articulate d unde r th e banner s o f constructiv e realism o r realisti c constructivism . Man y researcher s i n th e socia l studie s o f science woul d probabl y accep t som e versio n o f moderat e constructivism . They believ e tha t scientifi c theorie s an d observation s ar e constraine d b y a real, materia l world , bu t no t completel y so . Socia l variable s an d cultura l values als o pla y a shapin g role . T h e mi x o f th e materia l an d social/cultura l varies greatl y acros s disciplin e an d phas e o f research . I woul d sugges t addin g ye t a thir d philosophica l position : conservativ e constructivism, whic h woul d hol d tha t socia l interest s an d cultura l value s shape scientifi c theorie s onl y b y instillin g bias . Eventuall y tha t bia s ca n b e removed, thereb y producin g a Utopia n stat e i n whic h scienc e i s objectiv e or free d fro m infusio n wit h cultura l value s an d categories . A moderat e constructivist woul d no t se e th e referentia l an d sociocultura l aspect s o f scientific representation s i n suc h a zero-su m manner . Cultura l value s ar e not weed s t o b e picke d fro m th e garde n o f scienc e t o mak e roo m fo r

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flowers; rather , the y ar e th e soi l upo n whic h th e flowers grow . I n othe r words, scientifi c theorie s participat e i n thei r genera l epistemic , national , temporal, gender , an d othe r cultures , thereb y encodin g value s eve n a s the y simultaneously represen t nature . Let u s take , fo r example , Marx' s famou s pronouncemen t abou t Darwin' s evolutionary theory , tha t i t encode s quit e nicel y th e nineteenth-centur y bourgeois orde r o f competitiv e capitalis m a s projecte d ont o nature . A radical constructivis t migh t argu e tha t evolutionar y theory , a s wel l a s th e observations Darwi n made , wer e a projectio n o f nineteenth-centur y capi talism ont o a natural worl d tha t wa s mor e o r les s a tabula rasa . W e continu e to believ e i n evolutionar y theor y toda y becaus e w e continu e t o liv e i n a capitalist societ y tha t i s permeate d b y th e sam e metaphor s an d cultura l structures a s i n Darwin' s day . Fro m thi s viewpoint , ther e woul d b e n o wa y to choos e betwee n evolutionar y theor y an d creatio n science , excep t through powe r an d persuasio n o r consistenc y wit h a surroundin g cultura l ethos an d worldview . A conservativ e constructivis t woul d maintai n tha t an y cultura l biase s i n evolutionary theor y tha t entere d int o Darwin' s mode l hav e bee n succes sively eliminate d b y subsequen t version s o f th e theory . Eve n i f Darwin di d project som e o f hi s societ y ont o natur e an d di d produc e a distorte d ma p o f nature, subsequen t development s o f evolutionar y theor y (an d observations ) have progressivel y weede d ou t thos e distortions . Lik e a progressive researc h program, evolutionar y theor y ha s improve d ove r th e years . Therefore , evolutionary theor y i s asymptotically approachin g a pure, transparen t repre sentation o f nature . A moderat e constructivis t woul d argu e tha t Darwinia n evolutionar y theory bot h projecte d Darwinia n societ y ont o natur e an d provide d a rela tively accurat e ma p o f a selecte d aspec t o f th e natura l world . Subsequen t developments i n evolutionar y theor y represente d mor e accurat e maps , pac e the conservativ e constructivist , bu t thos e development s di d no t entai l escap ing fro m culture . Instead , subsequen t change s correspon d i n par t t o genera l cultural shift s i n scienc e an d society . Fo r example , a s evolutionar y theor y developed i n th e twentiet h centur y towar d equilibriu m model s an d late r nonlinear models , thes e change s dre w o n genera l metaphor s an d structure s that wer e appearin g a s part o f the genera l cultura l shift s fro m th e nineteent h century throug h modernis m t o postmodernism . I t i s thu s possibl e t o thin k about scientifi c theorie s a s both realisticall y an d sociall y constructed , muc h as in duck-rabbi t Gestal t drawing s i n whic h tw o interpretation s ar e simulta neously consisten t wit h th e material . I n a simila r bu t no t quit e identica l

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formulation, Fulle r argue s tha t " 'th e social ' an d 'th e cognitive ' ar e no t separate part s o f th e scientifi c enterprise ; rather , the y ar e tw o relativel y autonomous discourse s tha t ar e availabl e fo r analyzin g an y par t o f science " (1993 a: 57) . Thus , I woul d prefe r t o thin k o f th e sociocultura l an d referen tial aspect s o f scientifi c theorie s a s tw o dimension s o f th e sam e p h e n o m e non rathe r tha n tw o alternativ e approache s t o it . Som e versio n o f thi s vie w is supporte d b y philosopher s suc h a s Gier e unde r th e term s "perspectiva l realism" o r "constructiv e realism " an d Fulle r unde r th e ter m "realisti c constructivism," a s well a s by som e socia l scientists. 17 To argu e tha t scientifi c theorie s o r model s ar e representation s ma y require som e unpackin g becaus e th e ter m "representations " shift s acros s disciplines. 18 Fo r realis t philosopher s suc h a s Giere , representation s impl y the ide a tha t scientifi c theorie s represen t o r ma p reality . I n histor y an d cultural studies , Durkheim' s "collectiv e representations " ar e th e share d idea s and belief s o f a community o r othe r socia l unit , a s in religiou s cosmologies . Given th e multivocalit y o f th e wor d "representation, " i t ma y b e uniquel y situated fo r th e hybri d worl d o f moderate (realistic ) constructivism . I n othe r words, scientifi c representation s ar e bot h referential—map s o r model s o f the w o r l d — a n d sociocultural—encoding s o f values , genera l cultura l cate gories, interests , an d s o forth . N o w tha t I have outline d th e moderat e constructivis t position , le t u s play devil's advocat e an d accus e i t o f question-begging . Wha t cause s scientist s t o choose amon g theories : th e fac t tha t the y accuratel y represen t th e worl d o r that the y represen t socia l interest s o r cultura l value s an d categories ? Fro m a prescriptive viewpoint , ther e ma y no t b e muc h disagreement : th e forme r should infor m goo d theor y choice . A t a descriptiv e level , however , th e situation i s mor e complicated . O n e migh t answe r th e questio n b y sayin g both, tha t theor y choic e i s overdetermined . Or , a s I woul d advocate , on e might refus e t o answe r th e questio n i n th e universalizin g term s i n whic h i t is pose d an d instea d answe r i t o n a case-by-cas e basis . B y adoptin g thes e two strategies—separatin g th e prescriptiv e fro m th e descriptiv e questio n and reformulatin g th e universa l ground s o f th e question—th e proble m o f relativism ca n b e avoided . Relativism i s fo r philosopher s a wor d simila r t o positivis m fo r socia l scientists an d humanists : i t i s better t o accus e someon e els e o f havin g it . T o make th e wor d useful , I lik e t o distinguis h fou r types . I n socia l science s such a s anthropology , cultura l relativis m refer s t o a researc h stanc e an d method tha t begin s wit h th e understanding s o f a community , actor , o r some othe r socia l unit . I n othe r words , socia l actio n i s interprete d relativ e

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to th e cultura l meaning s attribute d t o i t b y th e actor s involved . However , cultural interpretatio n o r socia l scienc e analysi s doe s no t en d wit h loca l meanings; i n tur n thos e meaning s ar e explaine d b y genera l theorie s avail able i n th e socia l sciences . Th e recours e t o theorie s an d explanatio n usuall y puts cultura l relativis m i n oppositio n t o epistemologica l relativism . Epistemological relativis m i s th e positio n tha t (i ) evidenc e an d othe r universalistic criteri a (suc h a s consistency ) d o no t pla y a crucia l rol e i n theory choice , whic h instea d i s largely conditione d b y contingen t o r partic ularistic socia l factors ; an d (2 ) attempt s t o articulat e prescriptiv e theor y choice criteri a ar e useles s becaus e scientist s wil l no t follo w them . Althoug h some socia l constructivist s ma y suppor t thi s position , man y socia l scientist s believe tha t althoug h theor y choic e i s heterogeneous , evidenc e stil l play s a crucial rol e i n man y i f not mos t controversies . Thus , th e firs t assumptio n i s violated, an d therefor e attempt s t o articulat e prescriptiv e theor y choic e criteria stil l ar e worthwhile . Metaphysical (ontological ) relativis m i s th e positio n tha t theorie s an d theoretical languag e d o no t necessaril y captur e anythin g o f th e dee p struc ture o f realit y behin d observations . Bot h positivist s (a s instrumentalists) an d radical constructivist s woul d therefor e ten d t o b e relativist s i n thi s sense , a s opposed t o realist s an d realistic/moderat e constructivists . Becaus e th e realis t position ca n ad d somethin g t o th e theor y choic e debat e tha t th e relativis t position cannot , o n thi s issu e realis m seem s warranted . Finally, mora l relativis m i s th e positio n tha t ther e shoul d b e n o univer sally uphel d values , suc h a s Unite d Nations—sanctione d list s o f huma n rights. Generally , anthropologist s an d other s w h o emplo y cultura l relativis m as a metho d toda y suppor t a politica l an d mora l stanc e o f toleranc e o f an d aid t o marginalize d groups ; thus , i n thei r mind s cultura l relativis m i s linke d to oppositio n t o mora l relativism . Peopl e w h o attemp t t o argu e tha t cultura l relativism an d mora l relativis m ar e identical , o r tha t cultura l relativis m lead s to mora l relativism , simpl y ar e confusin g th e issues . Usually , th e opposit e i s the case . N o t e tha t acceptin g on e typ e o f relativis m doe s no t necessaril y impl y accepting another , althoug h cultura l an d mora l relativis m ar e ofte n o p posed, an d epistemologica l an d ontologica l relativis m ar e ofte n linked . Furthermore, m y fou r type s o f relativis m ar e no t th e onl y way s o f thinkin g about th e topic . Fo r example , Kari n Knorr-Cetin a an d Michae l Mulka y distinguish epistemi c relativism , whic h assert s "tha t knowledg e i s roote d i n a particula r tim e an d culture, " fro m judgmenta l relativism , whic h hold s "that al l forms o f knowledge ar e 'equall y valid, ' an d tha t w e canno t compar e

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different form s o f knowledg e an d discriminat e amon g t h e m " (1983 : 5) . In m y terms , thi s i s a distinctio n betwee n moderat e constructivis m an d epistemological relativism . Harr y Collin s als o endorse s relativis m (probabl y my secon d an d thir d types ) i n hi s empirica l progra m o f relativis m (1983 , 1985). Fulle r (1993a : 66—69 ) distinguishe s betwee n realism/antirealis m an d relativism/objectivism. Th e forme r involve s th e question , "Ar e ther e legiti mate ground s fo r criticis m i n scienc e asid e fro m thos e havin g t o d o wit h judgments o f empirica l adequacy? " an d th e latte r revolve s aroun d th e question, "Ar e ther e legitimat e ground s fo r criticis m i n scienc e asid e fro m those havin g t o d o wit h judgment s o f exper t authority? " Lauda n (1990 ) provides a humorous parod y o f relativism , i n whic h th e relativis t serve s a s a philosophically uninforme d Simplicio/skepti c characte r i n dialogu e wit h a more intelligen t positivis t an d realist , an d a n eve n mor e intelligen t pragma tist. Unfortunately , th e parod y leave s th e impressio n tha t socia l scientist s ar e stupid an d incapabl e o f findin g a philosophicall y coheren t positio n fo r themselves, an d a s a resul t i t onl y fan s th e flame s o f th e cross-tal k rathe r than attemptin g t o find a wa y o f movin g beyon d it . T o b e clear , I suppor t only cultura l relativis m i n th e narro w sens e define d her e o f methodolog y in cultura l anthropology .

Social Studies and the Problem of Theory Choice It i s no w possibl e t o retur n t o th e proble m o f justifying theor y choic e an d to conside r ho w socia l studie s o f scienc e ca n contribut e t o thi s proble m i n a helpfu l wa y tha t avoid s th e tra p o f epistemologica l relativism . Socia l scientists hav e ofte n invoke d underdeterminatio n an d theory-ladennes s a s philosophical licens e fo r a descriptive accoun t tha t show s ho w particularisti c values o r socia l interest s shap e theor y choic e (e.g. , Knorr-Cetin a an d M u l kay 1983 : 3) . However, th e conventionalis t argument s ar e largel y irrelevant , not becaus e conventionalist s suc h a s D u h e m provid e othe r prescriptiv e grounds fo r theor y choice , bu t becaus e prescriptiv e argument s ar e distinc t from descriptiv e accounts . H o w scientist s shoul d choos e theorie s i s largel y irrelevant t o th e empirica l proble m o f describin g ho w the y i n fac t d o choose theories . However , i s th e revers e als o th e case ? Descriptive account s o f scientist s i n practic e sugges t tha t the y ofte n d o not follo w th e universalistic , prescriptiv e criteri a suggeste d b y th e philoso phy o f science , eve n a loos e famil y o f criteri a suc h a s thos e articulate d b y Kuhn. T o understan d thes e accounts , i t i s usefu l t o distinguis h betwee n

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private o r cover t criteri a fo r theor y choic e (thos e tha t individual s kee p t o themselves o r shar e onl y amon g network s o f allies ) an d publi c criteria , which ofte n emerg e t o legitimat e position s i n controversies . Ofte n publi c criteria (a s the y appea r i n publications , memoirs , o r publi c disputes ) corre spond t o on e o f th e philosophica l ideal s fo r theor y choice , wherea s privat e or cover t criteri a d o not . Thus , i t i s importan t t o follo w scientist s i n action—in th e laborator y an d behin d th e scenes . Empirica l studie s o f thi s sort hav e show n tha t i n additio n t o universalisti c values—suc h a s accuracy , consistency, an d simplicity—scientist s evaluat e theorie s an d observation s by referenc e t o particularisti c o r personalisti c criteria . I n th e socia l science s a universalisti c valu e orientatio n refer s t o th e situatio n whereb y actor s us e the sam e valu e syste m consistentl y acros s socia l situations . I n th e cas e o f theory choice , thi s would mea n applyin g th e value s o f accuracy, consistency , scope, an d s o on . I n contrast , particularis m mean s tha t socia l actor s shif t their valu e syste m dependin g o n th e socia l situatio n (suc h a s on e se t o f values fo r friend s an d family , o r fo r one' s ow n socia l group , an d othe r set s for othe r groups) . Philosophers w h o hav e though t carefull y abou t th e socia l studie s o f science recogniz e th e limitation s o f universalisti c value s fo r descriptiv e accounts o f scientists ' action , becaus e scientist s tur n ou t t o b e muc h mor e particularistic tha n the y ma y admi t i n public . Hele n Longin o i s on e exam ple o f a philosophe r w h o recognize s th e limitation s o f universalisti c value s in descriptiv e account s w h e n sh e discusse s th e problemati c natur e o f th e distinction betwee n constitutiv e an d contextua l values . Sh e define s th e former a s interna l t o th e science s an d "th e sourc e o f rule s determinin g what constitute s acceptabl e scientifi c practices, " wherea s contextua l value s "belong t o th e socia l an d cultura l environmen t i n whic h scienc e i s done " (1990: 4) . Fo r ou r purpose s her e he r distinctio n betwee n constitutiv e an d contextual value s ca n b e translate d (mor e o r less ) a s example s o f th e socia l scientist's distinctio n betwee n universalisti c an d particularisti c values . Lon gino argue s tha t th e traditiona l clai m o f value-freedo m i n scienc e amount s to a n argumen t tha t th e tw o type s o f value s ar e distinc t an d independen t from on e another . I n general , th e olde r vie w tha t goo d scienc e i s value-fre e or governe d wholl y b y constitutive/universalisti c values , wherea s ba d sci ence i s infiltrate d o r corrupte d b y contextua l values , no w seem s naiv e t o many researchers . Longin o argue s tha t th e traditiona l distinctio n betwee n the tw o type s o f values canno t b e maintained . Instead , ther e ha s been a shif t toward thinkin g abou t th e tw o type s o f values a s coexisting i n th e processe s of science production .

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What exactl y i s mean t b y particularisti c values ? A s the y appl y t o th e problem o f evaluatio n o f researc h an d theor y choice , the y woul d includ e the followin g somewha t overlappin g categories : 1. Favoritism : T h e perso n w h o i s proposing a scientifi c clai m o r theor y is a frien d (o r a n enemy) , o r allie d wit h network s o f friend s o r enemies, o r I ow e the m a favor (o r vengeance) . 2. Socia l prejudice : Th e perso n i s a membe r o f x socia l categor y exter nal t o science , whic h I eithe r lik e o r dislike . I n othe r words , i n th e ideal world o f science, th e perso n ha s a "functionally irrelevan t status " such a s gender , race , ethnicity , religion , nationality , sexuality , an d s o forth. (Col e 1992 : 162) . 3. Cognitiv e cronyis m o r cognitiv e particularism : Th e perso n i s writin g outside m y are a o f expertis e o r outsid e m y researc h network , s o I a m inclined t o giv e the m les s tha n a fair hearin g becaus e I a m unfamilia r with thei r researc h framewor k o r th e networ k i n whic h the y move. 1 9 4. Persona l gain : I shoul d suppor t o r bloc k th e perso n i n orde r t o hel p (or preven t damag e to ) m y career , funding , o r reputation , o r tha t o f my friend s an d allies . 5. Reputation : T h e perso n occupie s wha t I perceive a s x positio n i n th e social hierarch y o f science , accordin g t o criteri a suc h a s educationa l credentials, institutiona l location , fame , awards , an d journal prestige . These an d othe r particularisti c criteri a fo r theor y choic e ar e part o f science . Reputation i s complicate d becaus e i f th e rewar d an d gatekeepin g system s in scienc e ar e universalisti c an d fair , the n indice s o f reputatio n ar e no t necessarily particularistic . However , mos t o f the empirica l researc h suggest s that th e rewar d an d gatekeepin g system s ar e no t completel y universalisti c and fair . I n a perfec t worl d on e woul d evaluat e a scientis t wit h minimu m credentials b y ignorin g indice s o f reputatio n suc h a s thei r institutiona l location. Becaus e thi s doe s no t occu r i n practice , reputatio n ca n b e classi fied a s at leas t somewha t particularistic . These particularisti c value s ca n b e har d t o documen t becaus e whe n scientists mak e publi c o r retrospectiv e statement s abou t thei r theor y choices, the y ten d t o pav e ove r th e particularisti c criteri a wit h universalisti c criteria tha t correspon d mor e closel y t o philosophers ' "rational " criteri a such a s Kuhnian values . I n othe r words , the y ma y justify o r rationaliz e thei r decisions. However , particularisti c criteri a ar e mor e tha n dirt y laundr y tha t tends t o remai n hidden ; the y als o pla y a n importan t functiona l rol e i n science a s preliminary screenin g devices . Fo r example , eve n thoug h criteri a

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such a s reputatio n ma y b e dismisse d a s a t leas t potentiall y a d homine m an d particularistic, the y ar e widel y use d an d relativel y effectiv e preliminar y screening guides . Ca n w e therefor e sa y that particularisti c criteri a shoul d b e included i n a list o f prescriptive criteri a fo r theor y choice ? N o t necessarily : to mak e tha t lea p woul d no t onl y confus e descriptio n an d prescriptio n bu t also commi t th e naturalisti c fallac y (thing s ar e thi s way ; therefore , the y should b e thi s way) . Statement s abou t wha t i s the cas e ca n b e relevan t t o a n attempt t o formulat e prescriptiv e rules , bu t onl y becaus e the y allo w on e t o argue tha t certai n prescriptiv e option s see m unrealisti c give n ou r presen t descriptive account s o f th e wa y thing s are . Instead, conside r tw o productiv e philosophica l implication s o f socia l science researc h tha t suggest s tha t particularisti c values , especiall y cognitiv e particularism, d o pla y a nontrivia l rol e i n th e evaluatio n o f researc h pro grams, theories , an d empirica l claims . O n e argumen t i s tha t th e mixin g o f particularistic an d universalisti c criteri a i n actua l scienc e seem s no t t o hav e harmed science . Stephe n Col e take s thi s position eve n furthe r b y suggestin g that a particularisti c syste m ma y hav e benefit s suc h a s allowin g researcher s to spen d les s tim e writin g proposal s an d providin g condition s fo r mor e creative wor k (1992 : 203) . H e argue s tha t cognitiv e particularis m ma y b e ubiquitous an d a functiona l requiremen t fo r hig h productivit y i n science . Therefore, on e o f th e implication s o f socia l scienc e researc h fo r a prescrip tive philosoph y o f scienc e i s tha t i t migh t b e worthwhil e t o sor t throug h particularistic criteri a t o determin e whethe r an y o f the m shoul d b e in cluded i n a prescriptiv e lis t o f theor y choic e criteria , an d i f s o unde r wha t circumstances. A relate d argumen t i s tha t eve n apparentl y universalisti c criteri a fo r theory choic e ma y var y acros s discipline s an d ove r time . Fo r example , a n empirically derive d lis t o f universalisti c criteri a use d fo r evaluatin g a goo d theory i n lat e twentieth-centur y anthropolog y woul d no t overla p com pletely (o r necessaril y a t all ) wit h a simila r lis t use d fo r physicists ' theor y choices i n th e lat e nineteent h centur y O n e implicatio n fo r philosophica l projects i s tha t prescriptiv e criteri a migh t b e mor e usefu l i f pegge d t o th e temporal an d disciplinar y contex t o f knowledg e makin g an d perhap s als o to th e stag e o f knowledg e productio n an d consumptio n (laborator y work , paper writing , assessin g writte n fac t claims , takin g side s i n a controversy , and s o on) . O f course , thi s argumen t assume s a widesprea d disunit y o f science. Clearly, th e insigh t o f goo d descriptiv e account s fro m histor y an d th e social science s doe s no t necessaril y impl y a radica l relativis m i n whic h

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anything goes . Rather , thes e empirica l finding s ca n onl y complicat e th e prospects o f prescription . Conversely , philosopher s ar e righ t t o challeng e some o f th e descriptiv e account s i n th e socia l studie s o f knowledg e tha t may hav e underestimate d scientists ' us e o f universalisti c criteria , eve n i n controversies. 20 Yet , i t seem s precipitou s t o reasser t blindl y th e overwhelm ing importanc e o f universalisti c criteri a base d o n a few counterexamples . I f philosophers wan t t o challeng e descriptiv e accounts , the y mus t g o an d d o the researc h (a s i n Gier e 1988 ) an d suffer evaluatio n accordin g t o th e standards o f th e socia l studie s disciplin e i n whic h the y ar e workin g empiri cally. I n general , I woul d no t advocat e makin g a broa d statemen t abou t whether universalisti c o r particularisti c criteri a operat e mor e powerfull y throughout th e sciences . Rather , I suspec t tha t particularisti c criteri a oper ate mor e powerfull y th e close r th e cas e i s t o applie d science , economi c an d political interests , gender - an d race-relate d issues , th e researc h front , an d controversies. I t seem s bette r t o leav e th e relativ e rol e o f universalisti c an d particularistic criteri a ope n t o empirica l analysi s tha t allow s fo r considerabl e variation. In sortin g ou t th e proble m o f the relativ e rol e o f th e tw o type s o f values, I prefe r th e distinctio n o f particularisti c versu s universalisti c ove r tha t o f cognitive/rational versu s social/cultural . Thes e othe r distinction s ar e impre cise way s o f referrin g t o th e exten t t o whic h personalisti c o r particularisti c criteria ente r int o decision-makin g processe s tha t ar e suppose d t o b e gov erned b y universalisti c criteria . T o thin k o f thi s proble m i n term s o f th e cognitive versu s socia l o r th e rationa l versu s cultura l invite s confusion . T o begin, th e oppositio n betwee n th e cognitiv e o r rationa l o n on e sid e an d th e social o r cultura l o n th e othe r i s tenuous . Style s o f reasonin g canno t b e wholly reduce d t o psychobiologica l processe s o f cognition ; therefor e th e pattern o f rationalit y i s subjec t t o variatio n acros s tim e an d culture . Fo r example, Fulle r problematize s th e concep t o f rationalit y b y delineatin g three majo r type s i n Wester n history : Gree k telos , i n whic h reaso n i s inherent i n th e world ; Enlightenmen t raison or Vernunft, i n whic h reaso n i s inherent i n th e worl d bu t firs t ha s t o b e released ; an d moder n rationaliza tion, i n whic h reaso n i s no t inheren t i n th e worl d bu t mus t b e impose d from th e outside. 21 Certainly , thes e thre e definition s hav e clea r historica l and cultura l addresse s tha t mak e a universal clai m o n th e par t o f one versio n highly suspect . Alternatively, i f on e define s rationalit y a s cognition , i t ca n b e considere d asocial o r acultura l onl y i f i t refer s t o universa l psychobiologica l processe s that d o no t var y acros s cultures . Cognitiv e processe s o f thi s sor t exis t (suc h

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as th e abilit y t o acquir e language) , bu t ther e i s a s ye t n o widel y accepte d evidence tha t thes e psychobiologica l cognitiv e processe s ar e relevan t t o th e problem o f th e exten t t o whic h scientist s us e particularisti c o r universalisti c criteria i n evaluatin g theorie s an d knowledg e claims . Scientists , lik e every one else , hav e acces s t o th e sam e cognitiv e processe s whethe r the y ar e orienting thei r actio n accordin g t o particularisti c o r universalisti c values . I n other words , i t take s reason , cognition , o r rationalit y t o mak e decision s that follo w particularisti c orientations , jus t a s i t doe s fo r universalisti c orientations. Doe s thi s mea n tha t ther e i s n o specifi c typ e o f rationalit y associated wit h moder n science ? Man y socia l scientist s woul d argu e tha t the typ e o f rationalit y i n scienc e i s no t qualitativel y differen t fro m tha t o f other specialis t occupationa l group s i n advance d capitalis t societies . Thi s view seem s t o b e gainin g groun d amon g philosopher s a s well , particularl y naturalists w h o wor k alon g cognitiv e o r evolutionar y lines . Fo r example , Giere argue s fo r limitin g th e definitio n o f rationalit y t o th e "effectiv e us e of appropriat e mean s t o achiev e desire d goals " (1995 : 15) . M y onl y com plaint i s tha t h e tend s t o reduc e th e adaptatio n o f mean s i n scienc e t o th e appropriate selectio n o f methods . Thi s ma y b e a goo d prescriptio n fo r rationality i n science , bu t descriptivel y th e structur e o f socia l actio n i n science involve s a wide r fiel d o f mean s an d ends . Thus , scientist s ma y b e acting quit e rationall y whe n the y emplo y a s mean s rhetorica l strategies , including universalisti c ones , fo r particularisti c end s (e.g. , usin g consistenc y arguments agains t othe r theorie s i n orde r t o advanc e thei r ow n careers) . Likewise, the y coul d adap t particularisti c mean s an d method s t o universal istic end s (e.g. , divertin g fund s t o d o soun d research) . Th e assessmen t o f what scientist s se e a s their fiel d o f means an d end s i s a n empirica l issue , an d one tha t i s no t easil y resolved . I woul d sugges t thre e guideline s fo r makin g this kin d o f assessment : (1 ) d o no t assum e tha t on e cas e stud y ca n b e generalized t o al l o f science ; (2 ) d o no t confus e legitimatin g account s mad e in publi c o r i n publication s wit h hidde n values ; an d (3 ) d o no t accep t uncritically claim s fo r universalis m i n retrospectiv e account s constructe d i n memoirs fo r posterit y o r i n interview s wit h scienc e studie s researchers . To summarize , th e distinctio n betwee n universalisti c versu s particularis tic valu e orientation s i s mor e clea r tha n categorie s suc h a s rationa l (cogni tive) versu s social . Th e exten t t o whic h universalisti c an d particularisti c values shap e scientifi c decision s i s a descriptiv e problem , an d i t canno t b e resolved b y blanke t statement s designe d t o cove r al l cases , disciplines , an d time periods . W e ar e stil l lef t wit h th e questio n o f whethe r particularisti c criteria shoul d b e use d a s par t o f prescriptiv e theor y choic e criteria . Cer -

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tainly, Col e ha s raise d a n argumen t i n thei r favor . T o answe r thi s problem , we tur n t o th e feminis t philosoph y o f science .

Feminist Epistemologies Feminists hav e le d th e wa y o n th e issu e o f includin g particularisti c criteri a in prescription s fo r theor y choice . O n e startin g poin t i s standpoin t episte mologies, whic h ca n b e viewe d a s a n extensio n o f wha t I a m callin g moderate constructivism : the y hol d tha t i n orde r t o b e abl e "t o detec t the value s an d interest s tha t structur e scientifi c institutions , practices , an d conceptual schemes, " an d therefor e t o mov e o n t o bette r bu t nevertheles s ultimately fallibl e an d culture-boun d accounts , on e goo d strateg y i s t o begin researc h wit h th e perspective s o f marginalized group s (Hardin g 1992 : 581; 1986) . O f course , i n practica l term s ther e ar e no t enoug h resource s t o examine th e perspective s o f al l marginalize d groups . Eve n i f ther e wer e bountiful resources , on e woul d no t wan t t o examin e th e standpoin t o f every grou p tha t ha s a margina l status . O n e therefor e need s t o weig h thi s particularistic criterio n agains t othe r ones , suc h a s reputationa l marker s o f scientific credential s tha t woul d sugges t tha t th e argument s o f a margin alized grou p migh t b e o f some scientifi c value . Fo r example , i n m y researc h on alternativ e cance r therapies , I foun d tha t ther e ar e literall y dozen s o f alternative therapie s t o consider . O n e wa y o f usin g standpoin t theor y i n a limited bu t coheren t wa y i s (1 ) t o selec t fro m th e fiel d a series o f researcher s w h o hav e relativel y goo d scientifi c credential s an d a publishe d recor d o f empirical research ; an d (2 ) withi n thi s firs t categor y t o conside r th e wor k of a marginalized networ k o f w o m en researcher s (Hes s 1997a) . Standpoint epistemologie s therefor e represen t onl y a startin g poin t i n this discussion . "Stron g objectivity " represent s on e wa y o f developin g th e argument int o a mor e usefu l program . I n Sandr a Harding' s words , thi s program woul d specify strategie s t o detec t socia l assumption s tha t a ) ente r researc h i n th e identification an d conceptualizatio n o f scientific problem s an d the formatio n of hypotheses abou t the m (th e "contex t o f discovery"), b ) ten d t o b e share d by observer s designate d a s legitimate ones , an d thu s ar e significantl y collec tive, no t individual , value s an d interests , an d c ) tend t o structur e th e institu tions an d conceptua l scheme s o f disciplines . Thes e systemati c procedure s would als o be capabl e o f d) distinguishin g between thos e values an d interest s that bloc k th e productio n o f les s partia l an d distorte d account s o f natur e

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and socia l relation s (les s "false " ones ) an d those—suc h a s fairness, honesty , detachment, and , w e shoul d add , advancin g democracy—tha t provid e re sources for it . (1992 : 580) The ter m "objectivity " her e appear s t o mea n th e developmen t o f represen tations (theories , models , laws ) tha t captur e mor e o f th e rea l o r a t leas t th e observable, an d tha t projec t les s o f th e socia l an d cultural , particularl y a s it appear s throug h biase s introduce d b y unquestione d politica l o r socia l assumptions (als o Porte r 1992) . I n thi s sense , ther e i s mor e o f th e objec t i n the representations , an d the y ca n therefor e b e see n t o b e mor e "strongl y objective." A relate d concep t i s Donn a Haraway s situate d knowledges , which analyze s theories , theorists , an d science s b y givin g the m a socia l address o r location . "Unmarke d knowledges " ar e thos e characterize d b y a presumption o f objectivity tha t usuall y obfuscate s thei r socia l embeddednes s in white , male , o r othe r dominan t cultura l perspective s (1991 : i n , 188) . T h e concept s o f standpoin t epistemologies , stron g objectivity , an d situ ated knowledge s ar e valuabl e startin g point s fo r a new prescriptiv e approac h to th e proble m o f theor y choice . The y ar e stil l i n th e proces s o f bein g articulated, an d the y woul d benefi t fro m mor e explici t theorizatio n o f thei r limits an d o f th e philosophica l claim s tha t the y ar e an d ar e no t making . O n e possibl e limitatio n i s tha t standpoin t epistemologie s ma y wor k wel l only fo r certai n type s o f sciences . Fo r example , the y hav e alread y bee n applied t o th e socia l science s an d som e area s o f th e biomedica l sciences , where socia l biase s hav e frequentl y distorte d theorizin g an d empirica l in quiry, bu t thei r utilit y remain s t o b e demonstrate d i n th e exact , physica l sciences. The y woul d probabl y wor k wel l i n scientifi c an d technica l dis putes ove r environmenta l justice issues . Ther e i s little wor k o n th e implica tions o f thes e theorie s fo r relativel y autonomou s field s suc h a s theoretica l physics o r physica l chemistry . Moreover, standpoin t epistemologie s an d relate d framework s nee d t o b e embedded i n a n overal l theor y o f justificatio n i f the y ar e t o avoi d th e problem o f epistemologica l relativism . Standpoin t epistemologie s ca n b e valuable contribution s onl y i f the y ar e interprete d t o mea n tha t researc h does no t en d wit h th e perspective s o f marginalize d groups . I n thi s sense , a standpoint epistemolog y amount s t o a methodologica l prescriptio n tha t i s similar t o anthropology' s cultura l relativism : t o star t wit h loca l point s o f view. Anthropologica l an d standpoin t epistemologie s ar e als o simila r i n thi s respect t o Marxis t critique s o f bourgeois scienc e fro m a proletarian perspec tive (Hess e 1994) . Al l thre e begi n thei r critique s wit h loca l o r exclude d

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viewpoints, bu t i n th e bes t cas e thei r analyse s d o no t sto p wit h thos e viewpoints. I n cultura l anthropolog y thi s secon d mov e i s ver y explicit : analyses stil l hav e t o b e translate d int o socia l scientifi c theor y an d conteste d according t o th e (als o contestable ) methodologica l standard s o f the c o m m u nity o f anthropolog y researchers . Otherwise , th e metho d fall s victi m t o epistemological relativis m an d become s incoherent . State d i n thes e terms , standpoint epistemologies—o r better , th e mor e encompassin g framewor k of anthropology' s comparativ e principl e o f cultura l relativism—ar e on e means fo r achievin g ne w an d bette r scientifi c theorie s (somethin g lik e a stronger for m o f objectivity , t o us e Harding' s terms) . Anothe r mean s migh t be simpl y t o wor k o n makin g scientifi c communitie s mor e divers e sociall y and wai t fo r th e ne w theorie s an d method s t o flo w fro m tha t diversity . Haraway's studie s o f primatolog y (1989 ) sugges t tha t whe n w o m e n an d Asian primatologist s entere d th e field , the y le d significan t reform s tha t substantially improve d th e qualit y o f theories , methods , an d observations . However, neithe r cultura l compariso n no r improve d socia l diversit y pro vides a n overal l guid e t o th e proble m o f justificatio n o f choice s amon g empirically equivalen t theorie s o r researc h programs . O n e coheren t formulatio n o f a justification strateg y tha t i s friendl y t o standpoint epistemologies , stron g objectivity , an d situate d knowledge s i s Helen Longino' s si x criteri a fo r theor y (o r researc h program ) choic e tha t she ha s distille d a s implicit i n a numbe r o f feminis t scienc e studie s analyses , including thos e o f Hardin g an d Haraway . Longino' s criteri a ar e empirica l adequacy, novelty , ontologica l heterogeneity , complexit y o f relationship , applicability t o curren t huma n needs , an d diffusio n o f power (1994) . Thos e six criteri a ar e no t restricte d t o gender-base d standpoin t epistemologies ; they coul d b e extende d t o othe r dimension s o f culture/powe r exclusio n such a s class , race , nationality , an d sexuality . Thus , the y represen t a fairl y generalized extensio n an d synthesi s o f feminis t contribution s t o thi s problem. First conside r th e definition s o f th e criteria . B y novelt y Longin o i s thinking o f Harding' s an d Haraway' s cal l fo r knowledge s situate d i n th e standpoints o f wome n an d othe r categorie s historicall y exclude d fro m th e conversation o f science . B y ontologica l heterogeneit y Longin o refer s t o (1 ) a concer n wit h diversit y i n th e objec t o f study , a s i n Barbar a McClintock' s attention t o th e diversit y o f th e kernel s o f a cor n co b (Kelle r 1985 ) o r women primatologists ' attentio n t o diversit y withi n an d amon g primat e groups (Harawa y 1989) ; an d (2 ) th e rejectio n o f theorie s o f inferiority , tha t is, theorie s tha t se e differenc e a s substandard , a deviation , o r a failure . B y

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complexity o f relationshi p Longin o refer s t o th e rejectio n o f "single-facto r causal model s fo r model s tha t incorporat e dynami c interaction " (479) . Applicability t o curren t huma n need s implie s "improvin g th e materia l conditions o f huma n lif e o r alleviatin g som e o f it s misery, " an d diffusio n o f power refer s t o researc h choice s tha t favo r program s tha t ar e les s limitin g i n terms o f acces s an d participatio n (479) . Longino s justificatio n criteri a ca n b e compare d t o Kuhn' s value s o f accuracy, simplicity , fruitfulness , consistency , an d scope . A s i n th e cas e o f Kuhn, th e si x criteri a ar e subjec t t o interpretation ; Longin o als o see s the m as fallible an d therefor e subjec t t o revision . I interpre t th e Longin o criteri a as complementin g rathe r tha n displacin g a lis t suc h a s Kuhn's . Ther e i s some overlap , a s i n th e cal l fo r accurac y an d empirica l adequacy , whic h after al l remains th e ke y t o resolvin g man y difference s o f opinion i n science . Without it , scienc e woul d simpl y b e politic s b y th e sam e means . However , in othe r case s th e tw o list s appea r t o b e i n conflict , suc h a s novelt y versu s consistency an d simplicit y versu s complexity . Compariso n o f th e strength s and weaknesse s o f th e tw o list s warrants furthe r work . To begi n a discussio n o f a synthesis , conside r th e cas e o f Brazilia n Spiritism, a religious-philosophical movemen t whos e member s insis t tha t i t is scientificall y grounde d (Hes s 1991b) . Spiritist s clai m empirica l adequac y or accurac y fo r thei r observation s o f phenomen a suc h a s poltergeists , hauntings, materializations , apparitions , an d correspondence s i n message s from th e sam e spiri t acros s differen t mediums . A s wit h an y theoretica l claim, on e coul d certainl y contes t th e empirica l adequac y o r accurac y o f Spiritists' observationa l base , bu t fo r th e sak e o f th e argumen t le t u s g o on . Two alternativ e an d (le t u s assum e fo r th e sak e o f argument ) evidentiall y indistinguishable theorie s coul d b e a skeptica l psycholog y o f deceptio n o r dissociation an d a parapsycholog y o f extrasensor y perceptio n an d psycho kinesis. Let u s conside r Kuhn' s criteri a first . T h e Spiritis t theor y i s simple ; w e do no t requir e a maze o f psychological processe s o r a complex unconsciou s with extrasensor y powers . Instead , thing s ar e exactl y a s the y seem . Some times a cigano (gypsy spirit ) i s just a cigano. T he theor y i s fruitful , a t leas t t o Spiritists, fo r the y hav e develope d ne w an d differen t form s o f mediumship , from th e ol d Victoria n type s o f psychograph y (automati c writing ) an d materialization t o th e new , Brazilia n form s o f mediumisti c paintin g an d spirit surgery . I t seem s t o b e progressive . Th e theor y ha s a wide scope , an d in Brazi l I foun d tha t th e Spiritist s applie d i t t o man y problem s o f everyda y psychology. Fo r example , spiri t interventio n ca n explai n goo d luc k an d ba d

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luck, disease , menta l illness , th e up s an d down s o f love, an d an y numbe r o f issues o f grea t importanc e i n everyda y life , includin g th e Weberia n prob lems o f ultimat e meaning . Finally , th e theor y i s internall y consistent ; i t i s encoded i n si x volume s tha t la y dow n th e fundamenta l principles , th e negative heuristic . I t onl y fail s o n th e externa l consistenc y criterion . N o w le t u s conside r Longin o s criteria. Th e Spiritis t theor y i s novel , o r at leas t i t coul d clai m t o b e nove l wit h respec t t o th e curren t assumption s of materialis m an d mechanis m tha t a mainstrea m psychologica l theor y o f deception an d dissociatio n woul d rel y on . T o borro w a phras e Hardin g used t o describ e a n argumen t o f Haraway's , on e migh t clai m tha t th e Spiritist theor y show s "enthusiasti c violatio n o f th e foundin g taboo s o f Western humanism, " a t leas t o f secula r humanis m (1986 : 193) . Th e theor y is als o elaborate d i n a Thir d Worl d culture , an d wome n ofte n provid e leadership role s i n Spiritis t centers , s o fro m th e standpoin t o f standpoint s i t looks lik e a goo d candidat e t o provid e a poin t o f compariso n fo r seekin g out unrecognize d biase s i n th e accepte d scientifi c wisdom . I n fact , Spiritist s bemoan th e materialisti c bia s o f orthodo x science , eve n th e "orthodo x parapsychology" o f th e Firs t World . T h e spiri t worl d i s ontologicall y het erogeneous; ther e ar e man y type s o f spirits . Ther e i s eve n som e interestin g gender-bending i n th e worl d o f medium s an d spiri t guides ; fo r example , some o f th e well-know n mal e medium s ar e gay . O n e migh t argu e tha t th e Spiritist theor y i s wea k o n th e secon d aspec t o f ontologica l heterogeneit y criterion, becaus e i t describe s a hierarchica l worl d i n whic h differenc e i s measured agains t a standard. However , th e for m o f hierarchy i s modern an d meritocratic; al l spirit s ar e presume d t o b e equa l i n term s o f thei r huma n value an d thei r opportunit y t o achiev e hig h level s o f spiritua l development . Thus, th e theor y woul d see m t o pas s the ontologica l heterogeneit y require ment. O n th e complexit y criterion , th e Spiritis t theor y coul d b e give n a pas s because i t canno t b e reduce d t o single-facto r causa l models . Spiritist s coul d also argu e tha t thei r theor y doe s wel l o n th e criterio n o f applicabilit y t o current huma n needs . Millions o f Brazilians g o t o Spiritis t center s t o receiv e Spiritist healin g treatments . Furthermore , Spiritist s se e thei r wor k an d tha t of th e spirit s a s on e o f educating , evangelizing , an d upliftin g thei r fello w Brazilians, an d therefor e transformin g thei r countr y int o a successful, devel oped land . Finally , i n term s o f diffusio n o f power , Spiritis t mediumship / science doe s no t requir e acces s t o expensiv e resources . Nevertheless, I suspec t tha t mos t feminis t scientist s an d scienc e studie s researchers woul d probabl y rejec t Spiritis m ou t o f han d a s a n alternativ e

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research program , theory , o r successo r scienc e t o moder n psycholog y Th e "theory" coul d eve n b e demarcate d of f th e playin g fiel d b y claimin g tha t i t was no t a scienc e a t all . O n on e criterion , however , Spiritis t scienc e woul d not pas s muster : consistenc y i n th e sens e o f consistenc y wit h th e res t o f science. Spiritis t "science " (an d I a m usin g th e labe l her e onl y fo r th e sak e of argument ) i s no t a peninsula attache d t o th e mainlan d o f scienc e bu t a n island unt o itself . Yet , consistenc y i s th e ver y proble m tha t standpoin t epistemologies see k t o redress . Recal l th e revision s o f th e Frye rulin g an d the conservativ e bia s implici t i n th e consistenc y criterion . Feyeraben d (1978: 35 ) wen t eve n furthe r an d argue d tha t a consistenc y criterio n i s unreasonable becaus e i t preserve s th e olde r theory . Certainl y fro m a femi nist perspectiv e on e i s likely t o b e suspiciou s o f th e consistenc y criterio n a s a license fo r androcentris m an d othe r undesirabl e values . Kuhn an d Longin o bot h mak e clea r tha t thei r list s ar e no t complet e an d are no t intende d t o b e so . The y merel y provid e a loos e se t o f guidepost s that ca n ai d i n th e proble m o f evaluatio n o f th e gran d theorie s o f science . I have use d thi s admittedl y hol(e) y exampl e merel y t o mak e th e large r point tha t judgment i s necessar y eve n whe n clearl y articulate d criteri a ar e available, an d eve n whe n th e criteri a involv e purportedl y bette r o r mor e equitable value s tha n Kuh n s synthesis . I suspec t tha t n o lis t o f list s wil l b e complete, eve n i f th e spirit s o f Campbell , Carnap , D u h e m , Kuhn , Popper , Lakatos, an d other s hav e continue d thei r dialogue s i n th e metaphysica l world an d woul d b e willin g t o communicat e thei r result s t o u s vi a a Brazilian medium . Elsewhere I develo p an d appl y a synthesi s tha t bring s togethe r th e various proposal s fo r prescriptiv e theor y choic e criteri a tha t hav e bee n considered i n thi s chapte r (Hes s 1997a) . Thi s evaluatio n draw s o n fou r groups o f criteria : wha t I cal l th e positivist , conventionalist , pragmatist , an d feminist/antiracist groups . I argu e tha t th e bes t evaluatio n o f a scientifi c research progra m (o r a majo r theory)—whic h i s altogethe r a differen t matter fro m th e evaluatio n o f a specific scientifi c observatio n o r generaliza tion—needs t o includ e consideration s o f accuracy , consistency , socia l util ity, an d lowe r socia l bia s tha n th e alternative . M y synthesi s o f th e Kuhn , Longino, an d othe r criteri a fo r theor y choic e woul d solv e th e spiri t worl d problem bu t stil l allo w som e plac e fo r th e consideration s raise d b y Longin o and othe r feminists . M y synthesi s o f theor y choic e criteri a implie s tha t eac h o f th e philo sophical tradition s discusse d her e ha s it s contributio n t o make , an d tha t n o simple forma l algorith m ca n eve r b e develope d fo r th e evaluatio n o f a

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theory. Lik e Longin o an d Kuhn , I woul d stil l pu t accuracy , evidence , o r empirical adequac y a t th e to p o f th e list . Ther e seem s t o b e littl e disagree ment amon g anyone—natura l scientists , socia l scientists , o r philosophers — on thi s point . Still , th e othe r criteri a ar e useful , particularl y i n case s o f evidential indistinguishability . O n e ca n successfull y us e genera l guidepost s that begi n wit h Kuhn' s lis t bu t amen d i t b y consideratio n o f subsequen t philosophical traditions , particularl y pragmatis m an d feminism , a s discusse d in thi s chapter . I t i s also possibl e tha t th e lis t o f evaluatio n criteri a ma y nee d to b e revise d a s i t i s applie d t o differen t disciplines . M y lis t wa s develope d for a particularly politicize d fiel d o f medica l research , wher e consideration s of socia l utilit y an d socia l bia s wer e important . I n som e o f th e mor e autonomous an d formalize d fields , thes e criteri a ma y b e les s important , les s evident, o r les s eas y t o operationaliz e a s par t o f a n evaluatio n o f a theory . Like al l philosophica l discussions , thi s on e i s b y n o mean s closed , an d i t i s part o f a n ongoin g dialogu e i n whic h th e strength s an d weaknesse s o f alternatives ar e clarified .

3 The Institutiona l Sociolog y of Scienc e

Social scientist s w h o redevelope d th e sociolog y o f scientifi c knowledge (SSK ) i n th e 1970 s an d 1980 s di d s o i n oppositio n t o tw o other , more establishe d fields : th e philosoph y o f scienc e an d th e "sociolog y o f science" (or , perhap s mor e accurately , th e institutiona l sociolog y o f sci ence). Fro m th e perspectiv e o f the SS K researchers , th e institutiona l sociol ogy o f scienc e faile d becaus e i t di d no t analyz e "content " sociologically . I n other words , th e traditiona l sociolog y o f scienc e di d no t examin e ho w social factor s shap e o r permeat e relativel y technica l question s suc h a s desig n choices, methodologies , theories , th e interpretatio n o f observations , an d decisions abou t wha t t o observ e i n th e firs t place . Therefore , th e sociolo gists o f scientifi c knowledg e ten d t o vie w a s pass e o r undertheorize d an y analyses tha t focu s o n institutiona l aspect s o f science . Thi s dismissiv e stanc e is unfortunate . T h e institutiona l sociolog y o f scienc e deserve s t o b e recog nized a s a dynami c fiel d o f it s own , an d th e researc h o f thi s fiel d need s t o be incorporate d int o an y complete , transdisciplinar y stud y o f scienc e an d technology. A t th e sam e time , th e interdisciplinar y fiel d o f scienc e studie s may hel p pro d th e institutiona l sociolog y o f science t o as k ne w an d differen t research questions . There ar e severa l reason s wh y th e sociolog y o f scientifi c knowledg e (SSK), a s i t wa s formulate d i n th e 1970 s an d earl y 1980s , faile d t o interes t and influenc e significantl y th e institutiona l sociolog y o f science. 1 Wherea s SSK wa s largel y Britis h an d European , th e latte r wa s a largel y America n endeavor. Thi s alon e woul d no t hav e prevente d a productive dialogue , bu t the group s publishe d i n differen t journals . T h e institutiona l sociolog y o f science develope d fro m th e sociolog y o f occupations , an d fro m thi s per spective scienc e wa s see n a s anothe r occupation . Sociologist s i n thi s tradi tion tende d t o vie w wit h suspicio n th e argumen t tha t a goo d sociolog y o f science require d a n understandin g o f th e conten t o f science , jus t as , fo r

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example, on e migh t argu e tha t a n adequat e sociolog y o f religion require d a deep understandin g o f religiou s experienc e o r theology , o r a sociolog y o f medicine require d a practitioner' s leve l o f medica l knowledge . I n contrast , SSK develope d largel y i n dialogu e wit h th e philosoph y o f science , fo r which th e questio n o f th e conten t o f science—especiall y claim s o f th e unique statu s o f scientifi c knowledge—wa s central . Another facto r tha t accounte d fo r th e lac k o f communicatio n betwee n the SS K researcher s an d th e institutiona l sociologist s o f scienc e wa s tha t i n the Unite d State s th e sociologist s o f science wer e probabl y mor e concerne d with thei r interna l divisions . O n e g r o u p — t h e Columbi a "school " o f R o b ert Merton , Harrie t Zuckerman , Jonatha n Cole , an d Stephe n C o l e — h a d a favorabl e vie w o f scienc e a s a relativel y just institutio n tha t worke d well . Another g r o u p — a Wisconsin-Berkeley-Cornel l networ k tha t include d Paul Allison , Randal l Collins , Warre n Hagstrom , Lowel l Hargens , an d thei r students—produced mor e critica l studie s o f scienc e a s a n institutio n wit h significant gende r an d rac e inequalities. 2 T h e tw o network s share d a con cern wit h th e stud y o f stratificatio n an d statu s attainmen t issues , an d bot h tended t o us e th e quantitativ e method s fo r whic h th e empirica l traditio n o f American sociolog y i s known . However , th e difference s betwee n the m were significan t enoug h tha t th e SS K criticism s wer e les s salient . Perhaps a mor e importan t reaso n fo r th e lac k o f dialogu e betwee n th e American sociologist s an d th e SS K network s wa s tha t som e o f the theoreti cal argument s raise d i n th e earl y SS K studie s o f th e 1970 s ha d alread y bee n rejected b y th e America n sociologists . Fo r example , th e SS K critiqu e o f th e normative natur e o f scienc e wa s alread y ol d ha t b y th e 1970s , an d th e SS K application o f interes t theor y i n th e lat e 1970s—a s wel l a s th e criticism s that followe d i n th e SS K c o m m u n i t y — h a d alread y appeare d i n America n sociology circle s i n othe r forms , suc h a s C . Wrigh t Mills' s us e o f interes t theory (1959 ) an d criticism s o f his work. 3 Although th e analysi s o f scientifi c norm s ha d bee n supersede d i n th e American sociolog y o f scienc e circle s b y th e lat e 1950s , an d i n th e SS K circles b y th e earl y t o mid-1970s , i t i s stil l a usefu l startin g poin t fo r a review o f th e institutiona l sociolog y o f science . T h e distinctio n betwee n universalism an d particularis m ha s continue d t o provid e on e theoretica l reference poin t fo r th e stratificatio n studie s tha t characterize d th e institu tional sociolog y o f science fro m th e 1960 s t o th e present . Furthermore, discussion s o f norms an d value s provid e a common groun d for th e rang e o f ST S discipline s fro m philosoph y an d sociolog y t o anthro pology an d history . Therefore , a historical appreciatio n o f Merton' s contri -

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bution provide s a helpful backgroun d t o contemporar y discussions , includ ing prescriptiv e discussion s o f ho w scienc e shoul d b e organize d a s a n institution.

Norms, Boundary-Work, and Autonomy The adjectiv e "Mertonian, " afte r th e America n sociologis t R o b e r t Merton , is ofte n use d a s a genera l ter m fo r wha t I a m callin g th e "institutional " sociology o f science . However , th e ter m "Mertonian " i s inadequat e be cause a numbe r o f th e theoretica l assumption s o f Merto n s origina l pro gram ar e n o longe r accepted , an d th e sociolog y o f scienc e wa s mor e complicated tha n eithe r Merto n o r th e affiliate d Columbi a school . T o understand Merton' s earl y assumption s abou t norm s an d values , i t i s helpfu l to bac k u p an d examin e th e historica l plac e o f functionalis m i n socia l science theory . Merton wa s on e o f th e leader s i n th e developmen t o f America n func tionalist sociology . Hi s teacher s a t Harvar d include d Talcot t Parsons , w h o i s probably th e mos t influentia l theoreticia n o f functionalism. 4 I n anthropol ogy th e correspondin g functionalis t schoo l wa s le d b y Bronisla w Malinow ski (1944 ) an d Alfre d Radcliffe-Brow n (1952) , an d th e version s o f function alism defende d b y Radcliffe-Brow n an d Parson s ar e sometime s calle d structural-functionalism. Throughou t th e socia l science s i n th e Unite d States functionalis m wa s widel y accepte d durin g th e middl e decade s o f th e twentieth century . Theoretica l root s ca n b e trace d t o Emil e Durkheim' s work o n solidarity , Ma x Weber' s studie s o f legitimac y an d religion , th e nineteenth-century utilitaria n philosophers , an d i n som e case s earl y twenti eth-century psychologist s an d economists . I n sociolog y Parson s s version o f functionalism dominate d th e fiel d fo r a whil e (Mullin s 1973b) . Throug h his student s Parson s influence d wor k no t onl y i n sociolog y bu t als o i n anthropology, eve n i n postfunctionalis t form s suc h a s interpretiv e o r sym bolic anthropology . Fo r example , Cliffor d Geertz' s influentia l essa y "Dee p Play: Note s o n th e Balines e Cockfight " develop s a n interpretiv e analysi s o f ritual tha t i s organize d alon g th e line s o f Parsonia n functiona l system s (Geertz 1973) . Parsonian functionalis m wa s explicitl y linke d t o evolutionar y theory . Like som e othe r functionalis t account s o f society , th e tas k wa s t o explai n the proble m o f order an d survival , i n othe r words , wha t i t take s for a societ y to kee p fro m fallin g apart , t o reproduc e itself , an d t o satisf y th e basi c

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requirements o f adaptatio n t o th e environmen t o f th e natura l worl d an d o f other societies . Parson s s genera l theor y o f actio n wa s base d o n fou r basi c functional requirements : patter n maintenance , integratio n o f units , goal attainment, an d adaptation . I n huma n systems , thes e fou r function s corre spond respectivel y t o th e cultura l system , th e socia l system , th e personalit y system, an d th e organism . T h e function s ar e organize d recursively ; thus , within th e socia l syste m th e fou r function s correspon d t o th e maintenanc e of institutionalize d cultura l pattern s (a s i n school s an d churches) , th e soci etal communit y (a s i n kinshi p an d socia l structure) , th e polity , an d th e economy. I n turn , th e subsystem s ca n b e broke n dow n accordin g t o th e same function s (Parson s 1966) . Merton wa s no t a gran d theoris t lik e Parsons ; h e i s know n instea d fo r having defende d theorie s o f th e middl e rang e tha t wer e mor e relevan t t o empirical researc h problems . Lat e i n lif e h e als o abandone d th e labe l o f functionalist analysi s i n favo r o f what h e calle d "structural " analysi s (Crotri ers 1987 : ch . 4) . However , th e backgroun d o n functionalis t theor y help s i n understanding on e o f Merton' s majo r contribution s t o th e sociolog y o f science: hi s descriptio n o f wha t hav e com e t o b e know n a s "Mertonia n norms." Thi s descriptio n rest s o n a functionalis t accoun t o f norm s an d values i n society , an d i t als o entail s a modernis t visio n o f scienc e a s a self regulating socia l system . Althoug h man y socia l theorist s d o no t distinguis h between norm s an d values , Parson s did : value s connec t th e socia l an d cultural systems , wherea s norm s ar e primaril y social . A s Parson s wrote , norms "hav e regulator y significanc e fo r socia l processe s an d relationship s but d o no t embod y 'principles ' whic h ar e applicabl e beyon d socia l organi zation, o r ofte n eve n a particula r socia l system " (1966 : 18) . I n th e essa y " T h e Normativ e Structur e o f Science, " originall y publishe d i n 194 2 a s "Science an d Technolog y i n a Democrati c Order, " Merto n describe s th e ethos o f scienc e a s a comple x o f norm s an d values , wit h institutiona l values legitimatin g norm s tha t ar e expresse d a s prescriptions, proscriptions , preferences, an d permission s (1973 : 268—69) . H e the n distinguishe s techni cal norms—adequat e an d reliabl e empirica l evidence , logica l consistency , and systemati c an d vali d predictio n (somethin g lik e Kuhnia n value s fo r theory choice)—fro m "institutiona l imperatives. " Th e wor d "imperatives " seems unnecessaril y confusin g here ; probabl y h e coul d hav e use d th e wor d " n o r m s " withou t an y loss of meaning. Merto n envisione d a complementar ity betwee n technica l an d institutiona l norms , an d thi s complementarit y accounts i n par t fo r wha t Sa l Restiv o (1994b ) ha s describe d a s th e friendl y relationship betwee n Merto n an d Thoma s Kuhn .

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More generally , Merton' s complementarit y allowe d philosopher s t o pur sue thei r debate s a s a separat e endeavo r fro m th e sociologica l analysi s o f functional socia l norm s i n scienc e a s a n institution . Thes e "Mertonia n norms" includ e th e following : (i ) universalism : trut h claim s shoul d b e subjected t o preestablished , impersona l justificatio n criteri a tha t exclud e consideration o f particularisti c criteri a suc h a s a scientist' s race , nationality , or religion ; (2 ) communism : th e finding s o f scienc e constitut e a commo n heritage t o b e share d wit h th e whol e community , wit h recognitio n an d esteem th e sol e propert y righ t o f scientists ; (3 ) disinterestedness : scientist s must subjec t thei r wor k t o th e rigorou s scrutin y o f fello w expert s an d the y are ultimatel y accountabl e t o thei r peer s rathe r tha n t o la y clientele ; an d (4 ) organized skepticism : scientist s shoul d engag e i n th e "detache d scrutin y o f beliefs i n term s o f empirica l an d logica l criteria " tha t i s fre e fro m infectio n by outsid e institution s suc h a s religion (Merto n 1973 : ch. 13) . Othe r norm s have bee n added , suc h a s individualism, an d Merton' s origina l formulatio n has bee n clarified , bu t fo r th e presen t purpose s thes e fou r basi c norm s ar e sufficient (Barbe r 1952 ; Zuckerma n 1977) . Subsequent researc h faile d t o confir m th e existenc e o f Mertonia n norms, o r eve n thei r coexistenc e wit h a balancin g se t o f counternorms. 5 Although th e standar d citation s i n th e critiqu e o f norms ar e fro m th e 1970s , the movemen t awa y fro m th e analysi s o f norm s bega n a t leas t a s earl y a s J 957> whe n Merto n publishe d hi s presidentia l addres s i n th e American Sociological Review o n prioritie s i n scientifi c discovery . Th e analysi s o f norm s remained par t o f his framework , bu t th e addres s marke d a transition towar d a concer n wit h th e stud y o f th e rewar d system , whic h i n th e 1960 s becam e directed towar d th e analysi s o f statu s attainmen t an d stratification. 6 A c cording t o Josep h Ben-Davi d (1978 : 200) , a ke y publicatio n tha t marke d the transitio n wa s Warren Hagstrom' s boo k The Scientific Community (1965) , which emphasize d competitio n fo r recognitio n amon g scientist s i n whic h norms o f independence an d individualis m wer e mor e salien t tha n th e lis t o f norms Merto n outlined . Althoug h Merto n continue d t o writ e o n norm s after hi s 195 7 paper , b y th e earl y 1960 s h e ha d move d awa y fro m hi s original formulation . Instead , h e develope d th e concep t o f sociologica l o r social ambivalenc e t o describ e th e situatio n o f contradictor y demand s tha t people i n general , includin g scientists , fac e a s a resul t o f conflict s amon g values, statuses , an d role s (Merto n 1976) . Support fo r th e existenc e o f generalize d norms , no t onl y i n scientifi c cultures bu t i n al l cultures , als o decline d amon g anthropologists . Le d b y

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feminist an d postcolonia l anthropologists , b y th e 1980 s cultura l anthropolo gists wer e movin g increasingl y towar d a view o f cultur e a s conteste d rathe r than integrate d an d shared . Fro m thi s perspectiv e an y attemp t t o articulat e a share d se t o f norm s o r value s acros s a cultur e seeme d increasingl y t o represent a misinterpretation . Previou s outline s o f a society' s norm s an d values seeme d instea d t o loo k mor e lik e description s o f th e norm s an d values o f men an d th e dominan t groups . For decade s th e consensu s amon g socia l scientist s ha s bee n that , a s descriptions o f th e norm s tha t actuall y guid e scientists ' action , Merton' s norms d o no t exis t i n an y pervasiv e form . Particularisti c norm s an d value s of al l sor t pla y a n importan t par t i n th e d e fact o evaluatio n proces s i n science. Fo r example , studie s b y J. Scot t Long , R o b e r t McGinness , an d Pau l Allison documente d tha t eve n thoug h predoctora l researc h productivit y i s a goo d predicto r o f late r caree r productivity , department s pa y mor e atten tion t o wher e candidate s com e fro m an d w h o recommend s the m (Lon g e t al. 1979 ; McGinnes s e t al . 1982) . I t i s possibl e t o salvag e Merton' s delinea tion o f th e norm s o f science , bu t onl y a s a prescriptio n o f ho w scientist s should behav e ideally . A s a n alternative , Mertonia n norm s migh t b e reinter preted a s a descriptio n o f th e legitimatin g ideolog y o f science—i n Michae l Mulkay's term s (1976) , th e occupationa l ideology—t o whic h scientist s ma y turn a s a rhetorica l resourc e i n case s o f controvers y o r boundary-work . I n other words , Merto n confuse d th e ideolog y an d th e practice . The questio n o f norm s an d value s i s relate d t o theorie s abou t th e autonomy o f science . Merton' s discussio n o f norm s implie d tha t i n d e m o cratic countrie s scienc e i s and shoul d b e a relatively autonomou s institution . In othe r words , i t i s an d shoul d b e fre e fro m direc t contro l b y th e state , th e church, privat e capital , o r othe r intereste d partie s an d patrons . A s fo r other topic s i n scienc e an d technolog y studies , i t i s helpfu l t o distinguis h descriptive an d prescriptiv e claims . As a description , th e argumen t fo r th e autonom y o f scienc e a s a n institution i s base d o n th e understandin g o f modernit y a s a proces s o f differentiation. A s societie s modernize , th e variou s institutiona l domain s (church, state , science , th e legal-juridica l system , th e professions , etc. ) achieve bounde d bu t somewha t autonomou s authorit y ove r limite d area s o f social life . A s a descriptio n o f science , i t i s mor e o r les s accurat e t o sa y tha t many discipline s o f "pure " (a s opposed t o applied ) scienc e becam e mor e o r less institutionall y autonomou s i n Wester n democracies , particularl y afte r the nineteent h century . However , th e institutiona l autonom y o f scienc e i s

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by n o mean s guaranteed , an d scientist s hav e ha d t o defen d activel y thi s position. Thoma s Gieryn , a studen t o f Merton , develope d th e ide a o f "boundary-work" t o describ e th e way s i n whic h scientist s establis h an d police thei r boundarie s an d thereb y defen d thei r autonom y (1983) . H e charted ou t fou r type s o f boundary-work : monopolization , a s i n seven teenth-century natura l philosophe r R o b e r t Boyle' s clai m fo r uniqu e cul tural authorit y fo r hi s experimenta l method ; expansion , whe n insider s "push ou t th e frontier s o f thei r cultura l authorit y int o space s claime d b y others"; expulsion , whe n insider s "expe l no t rea l member s fro m thei r midst"; an d protection , whe n scientist s attemp t t o preven t outsid e invasio n of thei r resource s an d privilege s (1994 : 429—34) . I hav e adde d t o th e theor y of boundary-wor k b y examinin g th e recursiv e an d graduate d division s across a demilitarize d zon e betwee n scienc e an d nonscience , an d I hav e shown ho w debate s ove r wha t i s an d i s no t scienc e ca n b e partiall y shape d by an d i n tur n shap e genera l cultura l value s (1993) . From a prescriptiv e perspective , Merto n viewe d autonom y a s a goo d worth defendin g i n a liberal democracy . H e viewe d th e stron g universalis m of scienc e a s a "dominan t guidin g principle " o f democrac y (1973 : 273) . Likewise, th e organize d skepticis m o f science helpe d provid e societ y wit h a system o f sociocultura l check s an d balances , b y whic h scientifi c knowledg e could "invalidat e particula r dogma s o f church , economy , o r state " (278) . Merton wrot e a t a tim e whe n th e countercase s o f Naz i an d Sovie t scienc e were vivi d part s o f the contemporar y cultura l landscape . H e wa s concerne d that direc t stat e interferenc e i n scienc e coul d produc e distorte d an d inaccu rate account s o f th e natura l world . B y th e 1980 s an d 1990s , th e threa t t o autonomy appeare d t o com e mor e fro m privat e capita l an d th e increasingl y permeable boundar y betwee n universitie s an d industrie s suc h a s biotech nology an d informatio n technology . I n thi s context , stat e interventio n ma y actually pla y a democrati c rol e b y providin g a mechanis m fo r th e publi c t o be involve d i n settin g broa d researc h agenda s tha t reflec t genera l value s rather tha n specifi c industria l interests . Merton' s concer n wit h autonom y therefore remain s a n importan t issu e today , bu t i t need s t o b e recast. 7 I t i s likely tha t th e lastin g legac y o f th e Mertonia n analysi s o f norm s wil l b e th e often implici t prescriptiv e aspec t o f hi s analysis : th e questio n o f wha t socia l norms ideall y shoul d guid e scientist s an d th e questio n o f ho w differen t levels o f scientifi c autonom y shoul d b e linke d t o th e preservatio n an d strengthening o f a democrati c societ y

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Stratification Studies I: Cumulative Advantage Theory In th e 1960 s studie s o f stratificatio n an d statu s attainmen t i n scienc e cam e to occup y a n increasingl y prominen t plac e i n th e institutiona l sociolog y o f science. Acces s t o ne w statistica l tool s an d compute r analyse s helpe d attrac t new researcher s an d prope l th e fiel d int o a growth phase . T h e ter m "strati fication" wil l b e use d her e t o mea n al l statu s difference s i n th e scientifi c community. Althoug h Pierr e Bourdie u (1975 ) argue d tha t th e concep t o f class shoul d b e par t o f th e theor y o f stratificatio n i n science , clas s ha s bee n relatively unimportan t i n th e institutiona l sociolog y o f scienc e i n th e United States . Instead , sociologist s o f scienc e hav e focuse d mor e o n ques tions o f status . Probably th e mos t influentia l theor y i n stratificatio n studie s i s cumulativ e (sometimes accumulative ) advantag e theory . T h e theor y hold s tha t earl y career succes s tend s t o allo w scientist s t o accru e recognitio n an d resource s that, i n a n increasin g return s patter n mediate d b y highe r productivity , lea d to eve n greate r recognitio n an d acces s t o resources . Cumulativ e advantag e and rol e performanc e (scientifi c productivity ) constitut e th e tw o majo r determinants o f receipt o f scientific recognitio n (Col e 1992 : 165) . Cumula tive advantag e theor y i s important becaus e i t provide s a n instanc e o f appar ently nonuniversalisti c processe s i n scienc e a s a n institution . Stephe n Col e summarizes th e issu e a t stake : As pointed ou t in J. R. Col e and S. Cole (1973 : 235), because in a completely universalistic rewar d syste m qualit y o f rol e performanc e shoul d b e th e sol e criterion upo n whic h scientist s ar e rewarded , th e operatio n o f accumulativ e advantage represent s a departur e fro m th e ideal . Whethe r suc h a n idea l i s "bad" fo r scienc e depend s o n th e answe r t o th e mos t importan t questio n generated fro m th e stud y o f accumulativ e advantage : I s thi s proces s a n outcome o f th e unequa l distributio n o f talent, whic h tend s t o cluste r a t th e prestigious centers , o r i s "talent " a resul t o f th e unequa l distributio n o f resources and facilities (J . R. Col e an d S . Cole 1973 : 75)? (Col e 1992 : 165) Before examinin g thi s issue , i t ma y b e helpfu l t o flesh ou t cumulativ e advantage theory . I t i s ofte n equate d wit h th e Matthe w effect , bu t th e latte r is a specia l cas e o f cumulativ e advantag e theory . Merto n coine d th e ter m from th e biblica l passag e Matthe w 13:12 : "Fo r unt o ever y on e tha t hat h shall b e given , an d h e shal l hav e abundance : bu t fro m hi m tha t hat h no t shall b e take n awa y eve n tha t whic h h e hath. " A s Merto n applie d th e concept t o science , " T h e Matthe w effec t consist s o f accruin g greate r incre -

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ments o f recognitio n fo r particula r scientifi c contribution s t o scientist s o f considerable reputatio n an d th e withholdin g o f suc h recognitio n fro m scientists w h o hav e no t ye t mad e thei r mark " (1973 : 446) . Althoug h thi s definition focuse s o n recognition , Merto n recognize d tha t resource s als o tend t o flow uphil l t o th e scientist s i n highl y ranke d center s (457) . Merto n further develope d th e concep t b y drawin g o n Zuckerman' s researc h t o argue tha t th e Matthe w effec t appear s principall y i n case s o f collaboratio n and independen t multipl e discoverie s (Merto n 1973 , 1988) . H e note d tha t a corollar y o f th e Matthe w effec t i s tha t whe n a highl y ranke d scientis t makes a scientifi c contribution , i t i s mor e likel y t o b e notice d tha n tha t o f a lesser-ranked scientis t (1973 : 447) . Related t o th e Matthe w effec t i s anothe r ter m tha t sometime s appear s in th e literature , th e "hal o effect " (Cran e 1967) . Thi s ter m describe s th e advantage conferre d o n a scientis t b y virtu e o f havin g a superio r institu tional location . Dian a Cran e (1965 ) showe d tha t ther e i s a relationshi p between curren t academi c affiliatio n an d recognition . He r analysi s sug gested tha t locatio n i n a prestigiou s departmen t afford s ne w opportunitie s for visibilit y an d contac t tha t i n tur n lea d t o increase d recognition . Margaret Rossite r (1993 ) comment s tha t th e Matthe w effec t i s wel l named becaus e th e Christia n discipl e di d no t actuall y writ e th e gospe l fo r which h e i s give n credit . Sh e argue s tha t Merto n s analysi s misse s th e ke y question o f gende r i n science . Sh e name d th e paralle l bu t invers e "Matild a effect" afte r th e largel y forgotte n nineteenth-centur y write r an d edito r Matilda Gage . Gag e wa s a n America n feminis t an d Bibl e criti c w h o playe d an importan t rol e i n th e women' s suffrag e movement . Sh e als o wrot e Woman as Inventor (1882) , i n whic h sh e argue d tha t th e invento r o f th e cotton gi n wa s a woman . T h e Matild a effec t refer s t o th e tendenc y i n th e history o f scienc e fo r wome n t o b e ignore d o r denie d credi t i n thei r time , and subsequentl y droppe d fro m historica l account s o f recognition . A no w notorious exampl e i s th e cas e o f Rosalin d Franklin , whos e contributio n t o the Nobe l Prize-winnin g researc h o n th e structur e o f D N A wa s ignore d and "the n furthe r minimize d i n th e survivors ' distorte d autobiographica l account of'their ' discovery " (Rossite r 1993 : 329). Consisten t wit h cumula tive advantag e theory , althoug h i n a negativ e direction , th e Matild a effec t also point s t o structura l an d fairnes s problem s no t recognize d i n th e Mat thew effec t versio n o f th e theory . Bot h effect s bolste r m y argumen t i n th e previous chapte r fo r classifyin g reputatio n a s a particularisti c evaluatio n criterion, a n argumen t supporte d b y som e sociologist s o f scienc e (e.g. , McGinness e t al . 1982) .

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Consistent wit h th e Matild a effect , ther e i s a substantial bod y o f researc h on cumulativ e disadvantag e effect s fo r wome n i n science . I n a revie w essa y Mary Fo x argue s tha t researc h o n gende r an d attainmen t i n scienc e gre w rapidly afte r severa l landmar k studie s i n th e mid-1970s. 8 Som e o f th e researchers suggeste d tha t gende r inequalitie s wer e no t th e produc t o f ascriptive processe s o r particularisti c norms . I n othe r words , w o m e n occup y less prestigiou s position s becaus e the y ar e les s productiv e (Col e 1987) . However, th e consensu s move d i n th e directio n o f Barbar a Reskin' s work , which questione d th e exten t t o whic h universalisti c processe s governe d status attainmen t fo r wome n scientist s (Reski n 1978a , 1978b) . I n a stud y o f the postdoctora l experienc e o f 45 0 chemists , Reski n foun d tha t i n contras t to me n "th e femal e chemist s accumulate d n o advantag e wit h respec t t o postdoctoral experience " (1976 : 609) . J. Scot t Lon g an d R o b e r t McGinnes s (1985) documente d tha t th e mento r play s a ke y rol e i n initiatin g th e cumulative advantag e process , ofte n throug h collaboratio n wit h th e student . Long (1990 ) showe d tha t th e mentor s o f wome n scientist s ten d t o b e les s prestigious, les s productive , an d mor e ofte n wome n (thre e separat e vari ables) tha n thos e o f mal e scientists . Simila r processe s o f cumulativ e disad vantage i n scienc e wer e suggeste d b y studie s o f rac e an d caree r succes s (Pearson 1978) . The researc h o n women , productivity , an d statu s attainmen t i s relate d t o the genera l findin g tha t th e publicatio n productivit y o f scientist s a t higher ' status institution s i s greater , eve n w h e n on e control s fo r age . Thi s return s us t o Cole' s basi c question . O n e explanatio n o f th e productivity-statu s correlation i s tha t highe r statu s confer s mor e recognitio n an d resource s that lea d t o highe r productivity , bu t a n alternativ e explanatio n i s tha t scientists wit h highe r statu s achieve d thos e position s becaus e the y wer e more productive . Attempt s t o tes t th e tw o explanation s empiricall y sugges t that institutiona l locatio n i s the cause , rathe r tha n th e effect , o f productivity . Long, Allison , an d McGinnes s (1979 ) showe d tha t whe n th e prestig e o f the mento r an d th e doctora l departmen t ar e controlled , preemploymen t productivity ha s n o effec t o n th e prestig e o f th e firs t job . Eve n fo r subse quent move s t o ne w universit y jobs , Alliso n an d Lon g (1987 ) showe d tha t the prestig e o f th e doctora l departmen t an d prestig e o f th e prio r j o b continue t o pla y a n importan t rol e i n j ob attainment . However , publicatio n productivity durin g th e previou s si x year s doe s hav e som e impac t o n j o b attainment, an d publicatio n qualit y (operationalize d a s quantit y o f citation s that a perso n receives ) doe s hav e som e impac t o n attainin g raise s wit h th e move.

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Once employmen t ha s bee n obtained , productivit y level s ten d t o corre spond t o thos e o f the loca l environment . Thus , i f scientists want t o maintai n high productivity , the y nee d t o b e i n a majo r researc h universit y o r som e other environmen t wher e ther e i s a n o r m o f hig h productivity. 9 T o th e extent tha t particularisti c norm s channe l wome n an d underrepresente d ethnic group s int o lower-statu s positions , cumulativ e disadvantag e processe s tend t o wor k agains t thos e group s vi a socia l positio n effect s o n productivity . Another wa y i n whic h socia l positio n affect s productivit y i s throug h preferred treatmen t i n th e pee r revie w process . I n a t leas t som e disciplines , scientists wit h highe r socia l positio n o r statu s hav e a better chanc e o f havin g their publication s accepte d (Merto n 1973 : 489; cf . Cran e 1967) . O n e well known stud y bega n wit h a sampl e o f twelv e article s b y researcher s i n prestigious America n psycholog y departments . Eac h articl e ha d bee n p u b lished i n on e o f twelv e prestigiou s journals . N e w name s an d institution s were added , an d th e article s wer e resubmitte d t o th e sam e twelv e journals . Only thre e o f th e thirty-eigh t reviewer s an d editor s detecte d th e article s a s resubmissions. Eigh t o f th e nin e remainin g article s wer e rejected , usuall y for "seriou s methodologica l flaws. " T h e patter n applie s t o a behaviora l science, an d a physicis t respondin g t o th e articl e claime d tha t th e patter n would no t hol d fo r th e disciplin e o f physics (Peter s an d Cec i 1982) . H o w ever, th e stud y suggest s anothe r powerfu l mechanis m whereb y thos e w h o occupy a disadvantaged socia l positio n ma y hav e troubl e gettin g ou t o f it . By definition , cumulativ e advantage/disadvantag e increase s wit h time ; therefore, successfu l senio r scientist s wil l ten d t o rea p greate r reward s an d recognition. Som e hav e als o argue d tha t cumulativ e advantag e dynamic s also vary acros s disciplines . Thi s ha s led t o a combination vie w tha t cumula tive advantag e dynamic s involv e a n age-disciplin e interaction . However , th e evidence ha s no t bee n entirel y positiv e fo r thi s auxiliar y hypothesi s o f cumulative advantag e theor y (Oromane r 1977) . Cumulative advantage/disadvantag e dynamic s probabl y als o var y acros s the phase s o f disciplinar y o r subfiel d development . Henr y Menard' s mode l (1971) suggest s tha t i n fast-growin g an d relativel y youn g field s ambitiou s younger scholar s ma y b e abl e t o ris e mor e quickl y t o position s o f promi nence, wherea s i n olde r an d mor e establishe d field s suc h recognitio n i s likely t o b e delayed . Lowel l Hargen s an d Dian a Felmle e hav e extende d th e model a s follows : A highe r fiel d growt h rat e increase s seniority-specifi c citatio n rate s for indi vidual scientists , an d i t als o increases th e degre e o f inequality i n th e citatio n

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rates fo r th e fiel d a s a whole. Th e citatio n o f recent rathe r tha n olde r wor k reduces suc h inequalit y b y discountin g th e olde r contribution s o f senio r members o f a field. (1984 : 685) In othe r words , ther e ar e a t leas t tw o interactin g processes . O n e i s a hig h growth rat e fo r a field o f research, whic h benefit s younge r scholar s w h o ar e among th e founder s o f th e field . T h e othe r i s a lo w obsolescenc e rat e fo r the literature . Thi s ca n b e measure d b y Price s Index , th e percentag e o f references durin g th e precedin g five-yea r perio d (Pric e 1963) . I n general , the inde x i s hig h i n th e sciences , becaus e the y hav e a highe r rat e o f obsolescence, tha n i n th e socia l sciences . Thus , a t a n individua l leve l youn g researchers wil l benefi t mos t i f the y ar e amon g th e founder s o f a rapidl y growing fiel d wit h a literature tha t ha s a relatively lo w rat e o f obsolescence , as i n a ne w socia l scienc e field . A t a structura l level , th e sam e factor s tha t benefit a young schola r w h o i s among th e founder s o f a field wil l contribut e to increase d inequalit y i n th e citatio n rate s fo r th e fiel d a s a whole . By combinin g th e Menar d mode l wit h researc h b y Reski n an d other s on negativ e cumulativ e advantag e dynamic s fo r women , i t become s eviden t that som e socia l group s ma y b e doubl y disadvantage d whe n the y mis s ou t on opportunitie s t o becom e founder s o f rapidl y growin g fields . However , as Rossite r (1987 ) ha s argued , rapidl y growin g field s wit h a shortag e o f highly qualifie d peopl e ma y b e place s wher e wome n wil l hav e a bette r chance fo r toleration , employment , an d eve n recognition . Ther e i s som e empirical evidenc e t o suppor t thi s hypothesis , bu t Rossite r als o recognize s the limitation s o f th e evidence : " O t h e r factors , suc h a s th e vas t predomi nance o f men , rigi d entranc e barriers , availabilit y o f governmen t employ ment, o r othe r peculiarities , preven t th e m o d e l — w h i c h assume s tha t sexua l discrimination i s a functio n o f crowding—fro m workin g mor e accuratel y in al l fields" (1987 : 40) . In summary , th e dynamic s o f cumulativ e disadvantag e hel p mak e sens e out o f troublin g figure s suc h a s th e relativel y stabl e disparitie s betwee n women an d me n i n salar y an d rank , eve n whe n control s ar e include d fo r many possibl e shapin g variable s (Fo x 1994) . Researc h o n statu s attainmen t and relate d issue s provide s a basis fo r assessin g polic y issue s suc h a s affirma tive actio n an d personne l management . Clearly , cumulativ e disadvantag e dynamics magnif y th e effect s o f sexism , racism , an d othe r particularisti c values i n th e institutio n o f science , just a s th e sam e dynamic s magnif y th e effects o f affirmativ e actio n programs . A s affirmativ e actio n program s hav e become increasingl y unpopula r wit h th e electorate , th e researc h suggest s

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alternative way s o f improvin g equalit y b y modifyin g institutiona l mecha nisms tha t magnif y cumulativ e disadvantage . The researc h als o ha s implication s fo r th e genera l discussion s o f content . To th e exten t tha t particularisti c norm s gover n caree r attainmen t an d recognition i n science , an d thes e norm s ten d t o disfavo r wome n an d members o f underrepresente d ethni c groups , th e abilit y o f wome n an d other exclude d socia l group s t o pla y a role i n reformin g socia l biase s i n th e content o f scientifi c discipline s wil l b e limited . I f wome n an d ethni c minorities ar e challengin g th e negativ e heuristic s o f a research progra m an d are no t protecte d b y powerfu l mentors , the n the y ar e likel y t o experienc e very stron g Matild a effects . Thus , th e researc h o n socia l positio n effect s an d cumulative advantage/disadvantag e theor y suggest s powerfu l conservativ e forces i n science .

Stratification Studies II: Evaluation A ke y mechanis m i n th e maintenanc e o f stratificatio n i n scienc e i s evalua tion. Th e ter m "gatekeeper " usuall y refer s t o journa l editors , followin g Crane (1967) , bu t Merto n an d Zuckerma n (se e Merto n 1973 ) argu e tha t this definitio n i s to o restrictive . The y sugges t instea d tha t gatekeepin g would b e bette r understoo d a s a general evaluatio n process : "continuin g o r intermittent assessmen t o f th e performanc e o f scientist s a t ever y stag e o f their career , fro m th e phas e o f youthfu l novic e t o tha t o f ancien t vetera n and providin g o r denyin g acces s t o opportunities " (Merto n 1973 : 522) . I n this interpretation , gatekeepin g involve s thre e mai n functions : evaluatin g aspirants t o ne w positions , determinin g th e allocatio n o f facilitie s an d rewards, an d evaluatin g publications . Clearly , i f youn g scientist s ar e re spected b y thei r mentors , an d i f the mentor s belon g t o a powerful networ k and a prestigious department , th e youn g scientist s ar e mor e likel y t o benefi t from th e larges s o f th e gatekeeper s (Lon g an d McGinnes s 1985) . Ther e i s also evidenc e t o sugges t tha t particularis m i n scientifi c gatekeepin g extend s from networ k loyaltie s t o clea r case s o f socia l prejudic e o r evaluatio n b y criteria base d o n "functionall y irrelevant " statuse s suc h a s rac e an d gender . For example , i n on e stud y psycholog y departmen t chairperson s wer e aske d to ran k te n resume s i n whic h mal e an d femal e name s wer e randoml y assigned, an d mos t chairperson s ranke d th e mal e a s th e associat e an d th e female a s the assistan t professo r (Fidel l 1975) .

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However, gatekeepin g als o work s throug h les s overtl y particularisti c mechanisms. Th e previou s chapte r introduce d th e concep t o f cognitiv e cronyism, tha t is , a form o f bias tha t involve s similaritie s o f intellectual styl e or assumption s rathe r tha n merel y networ k affiliation , institutiona l location , or socia l discrimination . Thi s for m o f gatekeeping i s more comple x becaus e gatekeepers ma y thin k o f thei r assessment s a s objectiv e an d universalistic , whereas thos e w h o ar e rejecte d ma y se e th e assessment s a s th e biase d products o f th e view s hel d b y hegemoni c networks . Most researc h o n acceptanc e rat e differential s ha s examine d variatio n across disciplines . T h e genera l consensu s i s that ther e ar e consistentl y highe r rejection rate s i n th e socia l scienc e journals . I n Zuckerma n an d Merton' s words, " T h e mor e humanisticall y oriente d th e journal, th e highe r th e rat e of rejectin g manuscript s fo r publication ; th e mor e experimentall y an d observationally oriented , wit h a n emphasi s o n rigo r o f observatio n an d analysis, th e lowe r th e rat e o f rejection " (Merto n 1973 : 472) . Ther e i s les s consensus o n wh y ther e i s a n acceptanc e rat e differentia l acros s disciplines . O n e theor y hold s tha t article s i n th e humanitie s an d socia l science s ten d t o be discursiv e an d therefor e tak e u p mor e space . Usin g longitudina l data , Hargens (1988b ) challenge d th e spac e shortag e explanatio n an d develope d instead a mode l tha t attribute d th e lowe r rejectio n rate s i n th e natura l sciences t o thei r highe r leve l o f consensus . Cole , Simon , an d Col e (1988 ) argue tha t a t th e researc h fron t al l field s hav e equivalentl y lo w level s o f consensus, an d therefor e othe r variable s woul d explai n bette r th e variatio n in acceptanc e rate s acros s disciplines . Thes e othe r variable s includ e field specific publicatio n norms , variatio n i n th e diffusenes s o f journal structure s across fields , an d difference s i n trainin g practice s (als o Col e 1992) . Hargen s s reply provide s a numbe r o f reason s wh y thes e argument s ar e no t convinc ing, an d h e concludes , "Perhap s a futur e stud y shoul d examin e th e proba bility tha t a pubUshe d pape r wil l provok e a critica l commen t a s a possibl e measure o f scholarly consensus " (1988a : 160) , thu s reflexivel y usin g th e lac k of agreemen t o n explanation s o f the acceptanc e rat e differentia l a s evidenc e for hi s consensus-variatio n hypothesis . Sociologists hav e als o worked ou t othe r aspect s o f acceptance rat e differ entials. Zuckerma n an d Merto n sugges t tha t i n field s suc h a s physic s ther e may b e a n ag e effec t i n acceptanc e rat e differentials , wit h a declin e i n th e acceptance rat e a s ag e increase s (Merto n 1973 : 489) . Rac e an d gende r als o play a role i n acceptanc e rat e differentials , eve n i f one look s beyon d overtl y particularistic case s o f sexism an d racism , suc h a s rejection o f article s simpl y

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because o f the se x o r rac e o f the writer . Th e mor e subtl e mechanis m work s as follows : ther e i s a n unequa l distributio n o f socia l group s i n term s o f gender, race , an d s o fort h acros s age , professoria l rank , an d disciplin e suc h that historicall y exclude d group s ar e mor e concentrate d i n th e lower-statu s institutions an d ranks , an d th e humanitie s an d som e o f th e socia l an d biological sciences . Give n thi s unequa l distributio n o f position , acceptanc e rate differential s wil l ten d t o operat e negativel y fo r th e historicall y exclude d groups becaus e o f structura l factor s eve n whe n overtl y particularisti c crite ria ar e no t operating . An additiona l dimensio n t o gatekeepin g i s historical . Rossite r argue s that wome n ha d entere d th e workforc e an d scienc e i n increasin g number s during th e las t decade s o f th e nineteent h centur y Durin g th e 1880 s an d 1890s scienc e becam e increasingl y professionalized , an d Rossite r suggest s that "ejectin g w o m e n i n th e nam e o f 'highe r standards ' wa s on e wa y t o reassert strongl y th e mal e dominanc e ove r th e burgeonin g feminin e pres ence" (1982 : xvii) . I n som e well-know n historica l case s successfu l wome n have resorte d t o famil y finance s o r develope d a "sexless, " androgynou s persona (Ros e 1987 : 278 ; als o Abir-A m 1987) . Thes e strategie s sugges t th e power o f institutiona l sexis m i n science . Eve n today , whe n th e numbe r o f women graduat e student s i n som e discipline s i s roughl y equivalen t t o tha t of men , wome n ten d no t t o achiev e position s o f prestige . I n medicin e i n the Unite d States , 4 0 percen t o f th e student s ar e women , bu t wome n constitute onl y 2 0 percent o f th e physicians , 5 percent o f departmen t heads , and 3 percen t o f medica l schoo l dean s (Angie r 1995) . I n scienc e an d engineering fields , th e proportio n o f wome n ful l professor s ros e onl y fro m 4 percen t t o 7 percen t durin g th e fifteen-yea r perio d followin g 197 3 (Fo x 1994: 212) . Given th e succes s a t movin g officia l evaluatio n function s (suc h a s univer sity admissions ) i n mor e egalitaria n directions , bu t th e failur e t o maintai n successful startin g percentages , attentio n ha s turne d fro m forma l mecha nisms o f gatekeeping (admission , journal submissions , an d caree r evaluation ) to it s informa l mechanisms . O n e exampl e i s th e rol e o f machist a technica l cultures tha t requir e heroi c laborator y schedules , particularl y durin g pea k childbearing year s (Angie r 1995) . Thi s lead s t o th e questio n o f marriage , childbearing, an d productivity , a topic tha t overlap s wit h tw o fields : cumu lative advantag e theor y an d productivit y studies .

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General Productivity Studies Although cumulativ e advantag e an d statu s attainmen t studie s ofte n involv e productivity measures , th e productivit y o f individua l scientist s i n thei r career path s ca n b e distinguishe d fro m th e genera l productivit y o f specifi c types o f socia l unit s i n science , suc h a s ag e groups , cohorts , sexes , an d laboratories. Give n th e immediat e manageria l use s fo r researc h o n genera l productivity an d innovation , thes e studie s ten d t o b e mor e interdisciplinar y than stratificatio n studies . O n e prominen t are a o f productivit y studie s involve s ag e effects . Thes e effects ar e o f increasin g concer n give n th e agin g structur e o f th e workforc e (both scientifi c an d general ) i n th e Unite d State s an d othe r develope d capitalist nations . Researcher s hav e generall y conclude d tha t scientists ' ma j o r contribution s occu r i n thei r lat e thirtie s an d earl y forties . Contribution s probably occu r earlie r i n abstrac t discipline s suc h a s mat h an d physic s an d later i n empirica l one s suc h a s geolog y an d biology . Som e finding s sugges t a secon d pea k a t ag e fifty ; other s sugges t a gradua l ris e t o th e earl y fortie s and the n a decline . However, a s Edwar d Hacket t (1994 ) warns , th e empirica l researc h tha t underlies thes e generalization s ma y suffe r fro m measuremen t artifacts . Fo r example, productivit y ha s bee n measure d b y th e midpoin t dat e whe n Nobel Priz e researc h wa s performed , rathe r tha n w h e n i t wa s published ; another optio n woul d hav e bee n t o us e a measur e o f varianc e t o cove r th e length o f research . Furthermore , h e note s tha t th e declin e afte r pea k productivity tend s t o b e moderat e an d therefor e ma y no t hav e polic y significance. I woul d ad d tha t give n th e fac t tha t o f th e 13 1 scientist s w h o have wo n th e Nobe l Priz e durin g th e 1970 s an d 1980 s onl y fou r hav e been women , th e measuremen t choic e doe s no t spea k t o th e proble m o f productivity ag e effect s fo r wome n i n science . Furthermore , Nobe l Priz e winners ma y no t b e representativ e o f th e scientifi c researc h populatio n a s a whole o n th e issu e o f a n ag e pea k i n productivity . T h e ag e effec t i n productivit y i s also complicate d b y severa l othe r effect s in scientifi c productivit y studies . T h e cohor t effec t suggest s tha t th e oldes t cohort (roughl y th e oldes t generation ) show s a declin e ove r ag e forty , whereas th e younge r one s merel y leve l off . Furthermore , i t i s not clea r ho w the ag e effec t i n productivit y interact s a s a whol e wit h th e cumulativ e advantage/disadvantage dynamics. 10 Another well-know n findin g i s th e se x effec t fo r productivity : a s indi cated above , wome n ten d t o publis h fewe r article s tha n men . Long s stud y

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(1992) o f biochemists showe d tha t me n ten d t o produc e mor e tha n w o m e n during th e earl y stage s o f thei r career , bu t th e effec t i s reverse d afte r th e first decade . T h e overal l patter n o f lowe r productivit y fo r wome n i s du e t o their overrepresentatio n amon g nonpublisher s an d thei r underrepresenta tion amon g th e extremel y productive . However , th e qualit y o f wor k b y women scientist s ca n b e interprete d a s highe r eve n thoug h th e gros s n u m ber o f citation s i s lower ; thi s i s becaus e wome n receiv e mor e citation s pe r article tha n men . What explain s th e se x effec t fo r productivity ? O n e commo n bu t proba bly erroneou s explanatio n i s marriag e an d children . Fo x caution s agains t hasty acceptanc e o f the conventiona l wisdo m tha t "goo d scientist s ar e eithe r men wit h wive s o r wome n withou t husband s an d children " (1994 : 219) . Although ther e ar e som e well-know n case s tha t fi t th e image , marriag e an d presence o f childre n d o no t correlat e directl y wit h publicatio n productivity . In th e stud y o f biochemists , Lon g foun d tha t th e effec t o f childre n o n productivity i s muc h greate r fo r predoctora l publicatio n productivit y fo r w o m e n tha n fo r men ; however , th e initia l negativ e effec t o f childre n o n productivity decline s fo r bot h me n an d women , an d i t i s gon e fo r bot h groups b y yea r eleve n (1990 : 1 3 n ). Lon g als o showe d tha t bot h marriag e and childre n hav e n o direc t effec t o n productivit y whe n thei r effec t o n collaboration wit h th e mento r ha s bee n controlle d (1310) . Rather , a s vari ables marriag e an d childre n hav e thei r effec t throug h collaboration . Reski n (1978b) suggeste d tha t th e relationshi p betwee n wome n graduat e student s and mal e advisor s tend s t o b e mor e hierarchica l tha n th e paralle l male-mal e relationship. Althoug h Lon g foun d tha t bot h wome n an d me n i n hi s sampl e collaborate wit h thei r mentor s a t the sam e rate , th e pattern s o f collaboratio n are different . Fo r women , marriag e double s th e odd s o f collaboratio n wit h a mento r (Lon g 1990 : 1306) . O f wome n scientists ' mentor s w h o ar e male , nearly 9 0 percen t fee l tha t the y ar e limitin g th e appearanc e o f a nonprofes sional, romanti c liaiso n w h e n thei r wome n student s ar e marrie d (1307) . Having childre n ha s th e opposit e effec t fro m marriage : fo r women , "eac h additional chil d unde r si x decrease s th e odd s o f collaboratin g b y a factor o f .50" (1306) . In othe r words , th e effec t o f marriag e an d childre n o n productivit y works mainl y throug h collaboratio n wit h th e mentor . I n turn , collaboratio n and a numbe r o f othe r difference s tha t ar e relativel y smal l b y quantitativ e measures—such a s les s selectiv e baccalaureat e institution s an d les s presti gious doctora l departments—ad d u p t o contribut e t o a n overal l negativ e effect o n women' s achievemen t an d productivit y (Lon g 1990) . Throug h

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cumulative disadvantag e dynamics , thes e smal l initia l effect s ma y b e enoug h to explai n th e overal l differenc e i n productivit y betwee n me n an d women . In additio n t o age , cohort , an d sex , th e siz e o f the researc h grou p ha s a n effect o n productivity 1 1 Rikar d Stankiewic z (1979 ) develope d a se t o f fou r logical hypotheses, extende d her e t o fiv e possibl e researc h grou p siz e effects : a constan t effect , i n whic h productivit y remain s constan t ove r researc h group size ; a negativ e effect , i n whic h productivit y decrease s wit h size ; a positive effect , i n whic h productivit y increase s wit h size ; a critical-siz e effect, i n whic h ther e i s a j u mp i n productivit y abov e a certai n size ; an d a n optimum-size effect , i n whic h productivit y peak s a t a certai n size . Kari n Knorr e t al . (1979 ) foun d a negative siz e effect , bu t Stankiewic z foun d tha t productivity increase s wit h siz e i n group s wit h hig h cohesivenes s an d hig h group-leader researc h experience . I n group s wit h lo w cohesiveness , ther e i s a declin e i n productivit y fo r group s large r tha n seve n scientists , an d i n groups wit h lo w leade r experienc e th e relationshi p betwee n siz e an d pro ductivity i s weak . Grou p ag e effect s (ag e o f researc h grou p sinc e i t wa s formed) ar e stron g i n group s wit h lo w cohesivenes s an d highl y involve d leaders. Subsequent researc h b y J . E . Cohe n (1980 , 1981 ) foun d a constan t effect: th e margina l productivit y o f a n additiona l membe r i s constan t acros s laboratory sizes . Cohe n (1981 : 482—83 ) argue s tha t th e constan t effec t h e found i s consisten t wit h th e result s o f Stankiewic z (1979 ) an d othe r re searchers. Hackett s researc h (1995 ) ha s mostl y replicate d C o h e n s finding , although hi s dat a sugges t a sligh t increas e i n pe r capit a productivit y a s laboratory siz e increases . Becaus e o f th e importan t fundin g polic y implica tions o f th e research , th e Cohen-Hacket t effec t ma y no t b e th e las t wor d on th e researc h grou p siz e effect , an d continua l refinement s o f th e comple x and perhap s contradictor y result s ar e needed . Productivity studie s hav e clea r implication s fo r al l sort s o f manageria l issues: th e debat e ove r lifetim e tenur e i n th e academy , incentive s fo r move ment int o administration , parenta l leav e policies, voluntar y separatio n pack ages, an d s o on . Fo r example , i f scientist s i n som e field s hav e thei r pea k years o f creativit y befor e midlife , ho w doe s thi s affec t th e proble m o f achieving gende r equit y whe n thes e ar e als o th e year s whe n childbearin g takes place ? (I n a world i n whic h two-caree r familie s ar e c o m m o n an d me n often hav e a substantial rol e i n chil d rearing , thi s questio n i s relevan t t o th e entire scientifi c workforce , no t onl y women. ) Anothe r questio n involve s the cumulativ e disadvantag e theor y an d th e finding s o f statu s attainmen t studies fo r rac e an d gender . Researc h i n thi s are a suggest s tha t wome n an d

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historically exclude d ethni c group s woul d hav e lowe r acces s t o larg e re search groups . Ca n researc h grou p siz e b e on e are a fo r interventio n i n making scientifi c institution s mor e equitable ? T o answe r this , on e woul d need mor e researc h o n whethe r researc h grou p siz e effect s var y b y gender . It i s no w know n tha t ther e i s a n interactio n betwee n a n individua l ag e effect an d th e researc h group' s ag e (Stankiewic z 1979) . Thus , i t i s possibl e that researc h grou p siz e effect s ma y interac t wit h gende r a s well . O n e see s how complicate d th e researc h problem s are , bu t als o ho w applicabl e th e research ca n be .

The Distribution of Innovation and Productivity Related t o productivit y studie s i s research o n th e distributio n o f innovatio n and productivity . Thi s are a include s a number o f not ver y wel l documente d hypotheses a s wel l a s som e fairl y robus t empirica l laws . Fo r example , th e question o f simultaneou s discover y o r inventio n ha s receive d som e atten tion. Unde r th e Kroeber-Merto n hypothesis , simultaneit y occur s whe n a common intellectua l cultur e doe s no t correspon d t o share d socia l commu nication. 12 Althoug h frequentl y mentioned , th e Kroeber-Merto n hypothe sis should probabl y b e pu t i n th e les s documented category , becaus e simulta neous discoverie s als o occu r i n th e communication-dens e worl d o f biomedical research , wher e laboratorie s ofte n compet e agains t eac h othe r at breaknec k speed . O f mor e interes t t o researchers , probabl y becaus e th e are a ha s polic y implications, i s th e questio n o f w h o produce s greate r innovations . T h e marginality hypothesi s o f Giery n an d Richar d Hirsc h (1983 , 1984 ) hold s that majo r contribution s ten d t o com e fro m marginalize d scientists , pre sumably becaus e the y hav e les s a t stak e i n existin g theorie s (cf . Simonto n 1984). Wieb e Bijke r (1987 ) criticize s th e marginalit y concept s o f Giery n and Hirsc h becaus e the y ar e one-dimensional . "Fo r example, " Bijke r writes, "i n on e stud y scientist s ar e considere d margina l i f the y recentl y migrated fro m anothe r field , wherea s i n anothe r stud y 'marginal ' i s opera tionalized a s 'bein g young ' " (1987 : 174) . I n a discussio n oriente d towar d technology studie s bu t equall y applicabl e t o scienc e studies , Bijke r propose s instead th e concep t o f inclusio n i n a technologica l frame . A technologica l frame i s simila r t o a paradig m i n tha t i t consist s o f goals , problem-solvin g strategies, experimenta l skills , an d theoretica l trainin g (174) . Thus , th e extent t o whic h a researcher i s included i n a technological fram e i s multidi -

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mensional. Bijker' s stud y o f innovatio n i n plastic s researc h suggest s tha t researchers wit h a lo w inclusio n i n th e existin g frame—tha t is , thos e w h o are no t highl y committe d t o i t o r absorbe d i n i t — a n d a hig h inclusio n i n an alternativ e fram e ma y ten d t o b e innovators . Bijker's proposa l ha s som e similaritie s t o th e olde r role - an d idea-hybrid ization hypothesis : innovator s ten d t o b e scientist s w h o com e fro m othe r disciplines an d dra w o n idea s fro m othe r discipline s (Ben-Davi d i960) . Thi s hypothesis applie s wel l t o a number o f importan t innovation s i n twentieth century science . Fo r example , physicist s an d physica l idea s playe d a key rol e in th e origin s o f molecular biology . The polic y proble m i s tha t al l o f thes e hypothese s d o no t provid e much insigh t int o decidin g whic h margina l scientist s o r cross-disciplinar y researchers shoul d b e supporte d a s potentia l innovators . Clearly , i t woul d be a wast e o f limite d fund s t o inves t i n al l marginalize d scientist s o r al l discipline-crossers. Mor e researc h i s neede d t o specif y whic h scientist s within thes e categorie s ten d t o b e th e innovators . Another are a o f researc h relevan t t o innovatio n involve s th e genera l sentiment tha t olde r scientist s ten d t o b e rigi d an d les s receptiv e t o novelty . Max Planc k (1949 ) ma y hav e firs t articulate d thi s hypothesis , bu t i t wa s popularized i n Kuhn' s theor y tha t paradigm s chang e a s the olde r generatio n retires o r die s of f (1970) . Empirica l researc h o n a n ag e effec t i n receptivit y to novelt y i s mixed . Th e firs t studie s suggeste d tha t younge r scientist s ten d to cit e mor e recen t wor k tha n d o olde r scientists , wit h Nobe l laureate s excepted (Merto n 1973 : 514) . However , subsequen t researc h suggest s tha t the youn g an d ol d alik e ma y b e mor e resistan t t o ne w ideas , whil e thos e i n between ar e les s so . Furthermore , s o man y othe r variable s complicat e th e picture tha t i t i s difficul t t o determin e th e effec t o f age. 13 Two othe r hypothese s i n thi s genera l are a ar e th e Orteg a an d N e w t o n hypotheses. T h e Orteg a hypothesi s hold s tha t averag e o r mediocr e scientist s contribute substantiall y t o th e advancemen t o f science . Thi s hypothesi s i s sometimes contraste d wit h th e N e w t o n hypothesi s tha t grea t scientist s "stand o n th e shoulder s o f giants. " O f course , th e tw o hypothese s coul d b e reconciled i f on e define s th e advancemen t o f scienc e i n tw o ways : incre mental (Ortega ) an d revolutionar y (Newton) . Som e empirica l protocol s have faile d t o suppor t th e Orteg a hypothesis , an d thes e failure s hav e le d t o calls t o reduc e th e siz e o f science. 14 Derek d e Soll a Price , a leading figur e i n th e developmen t o f quantitativ e science studies , suggeste d anothe r approac h t o th e proble m o f innovation, a theory o f instrumentalities. Accordin g t o Susa n Cozzens , a n instrumentalit y

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is " a laborator y metho d fo r doin g somethin g t o natur e o r t o th e dat a i n hand" (1988 : 370) . Pric e argue d tha t development s i n thi s are a ofte n brought abou t majo r innovation s i n scientifi c knowledg e an d theor y (1986 : ch. 13) . Therefore , fro m a polic y perspectiv e instrumentalitie s ar e goo d candidates fo r investment . I n som e universities , facult y ma y fee l th e agon y of a versio n o f thi s perspectiv e a s i t play s ou t i n administrativ e fundin g decisions tha t favo r investment s i n technolog y ove r facult y salarie s an d development. Price als o develope d a mor e robus t measur e fo r th e distributio n o f productivity acros s scientists . Sometime s describe d a s a geometri c wa y o f measuring elitism , Price' s la w i s onl y on e o f th e man y pattern s discusse d i n Little Science, Big Science (1963). Price' s la w hold s tha t "hal f o f th e scientifi c papers [i n a give n researc h field ] ar e contribute d b y th e squar e roo t o f th e total numbe r o f scientifi c authors " (Alliso n e t al . 1976 : 270) . I n slightl y different wording , th e "squar e roo t o f n author s produc e hal f o f th e paper s made b y th e tota l o f n authors " (Eggh e 1987) . Thi s figur e suggest s tha t i n a given researc h fiel d th e bul k o f productivit y (usuall y measure d b y articl e publications) wil l ten d t o b e concentrate d i n a small numbe r o f scientists . Price's la w i s simila r t o th e olde r Lotka' s law , whic h hold s tha t th e number o f author s w h o produc e n paper s i s inversel y proportiona l t o n 2. T h e la w wa s introduce d b y Alfre d Lotk a i n 192 6 an d ha s gon e throug h subsequent reformulations. 15 T h e la w ha s als o bee n show n t o appl y acros s gender bu t wit h a greate r ske w amon g wome n i n favo r o f hig h producer s (Fox 1994) . Bradford's la w (o r distribution ) i s to journals wha t Price' s la w an d Lotka' s law ar e fo r scientifi c productivity . Thi s measur e represent s th e patter n o f unequal reference s acros s journal s i n a bibliograph y (Burrel l 1991) . L . O . Nordstrom define s Bradford' s la w a s follows : "Fo r a searc h o n a specifi c topic, a larg e numbe r o f th e relevan t article s wil l b e concentrate d i n a small numbe r o f journa l titles " (1990) . Bradford' s verba l an d graphica l formulations ar e mathematicall y different . T h e Bradfor d distributio n o r la w and th e Price/Lotk a law s hav e application s i n th e developmen t o f citatio n indices a s wel l a s i n librar y management . Fo r example , th e Science Citation Index ha s onl y one-fifteent h o f th e sourc e paper s bu t ove r three-fourth s o f the cite d literatur e (Pric e 1986 : 257) . Likewise , whe n universitie s han d ou t their annua l budge t cuts , librarian s ca n us e Bradford' s la w t o figur e ou t where th e cut s wil l b e leas t painful . Price's la w an d Lotka' s la w ar e no t necessaril y i n conflic t wit h th e Orteg a hypothesis. Th e Orteg a hypothesi s i s abou t distributio n o f contributio n

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and Price' s la w i s about th e distributio n o f productivity. However , i f contri bution i s understood a s innovation an d i f innovation i s concentrate d amon g the hig h producers , the n Price' s la w ma y hav e simila r polic y implication s t o the failure s t o confir m th e Orteg a hypothesis . I n othe r words , bot h ma y suggest tha t manager s shoul d reduc e th e siz e o f scienc e an d focu s invest ments o n th e hig h producers , w h o on e woul d hop e woul d includ e som e Newtons. O f course , thi s strateg y raise s equit y issue s i n ligh t o f th e researc h o n cumulative advantage . Furthermore , i f the marginalit y hypothesi s turn s ou t to hav e som e basis , the n focusin g investment s o n th e Newton s o r Pricea n high producer s migh t onl y reinforc e th e statu s qu o an d lea d t o mino r innovations. Likewise , i f librarie s us e th e Bradfor d distributio n t o mitigat e cuts, an d i f high-producin g journal s ar e skewe d awa y fro m w o m e n an d other historicall y exclude d groups , budge t cut s coul d als o furthe r contrib ute t o elitis m i n science . Thes e ar e onl y a fe w o f th e question s lef t unan swered b y th e curren t stat e o f researc h o n th e distributio n o f innovatio n and productivit y i n science .

Specialty Studies Another importan t are a o f th e institutiona l sociolog y o f scienc e i s the stud y of socia l unit s beyon d forma l organization s suc h a s laboratories, disciplines , departments, an d researc h organizations . I n th e 1960 s th e topi c bega n t o receive sustaine d attentio n whe n Pric e extende d Boyle' s seventeenth-cen tury ter m "invisibl e college " t o refe r t o informa l group s o f scientist s w h o work o n simila r problems . I n Price' s words , a n invisibl e colleg e i s " a sor t o f commuting circui t o f institutions , researc h centers , an d summe r school s giving [scientists ] a n opportunit y t o mee t piecemeal , s o tha t ove r a n interva l of a few year s everybod y w h o i s anybody ha s worke d wit h everyon e els e i n the sam e category " (1963 : 85) . I n th e boo k o f th e sam e title , Cran e (1972 ) refers t o invisibl e college s a s "communicatio n networks " an d use s "socia l circle" an d "solidarit y group " a s roughl y equivalen t term s (als o Chubi n 1983). T h e concep t o f invisibl e college s wa s importan t fo r ST S researc h i n subsequent decade s becaus e i t wa s a forerunne r o f researc h o n cluster s an d networks i n bot h th e sociolog y o f scienc e an d th e sociolog y o f scientifi c knowledge. From th e 1960 s t o th e 1980 s a n increasin g numbe r o f "specialt y studies " revealed th e small-grou p natur e o f science , tha t is , organizatio n vi a net -

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works o r invisibl e college s rathe r tha n larg e collectivitie s o f individuals suc h as disciplines . Base d o n a n analysi s o f th e origin s o f experimenta l psychol ogy, Ben-Davi d an d Randal l Collin s (1966 ) presente d a mode l tha t dre w on role - an d idea-hybridization . I n thei r cas e study , higher-statu s scientist s (physiologists) lef t thei r hom e disciplin e t o coloniz e a les s competitiv e an d lower-status fiel d (philosophy ) tha t ha d mor e opportunities . Th e proces s o f specialty formatio n involve d th e thre e stage s o f forerunners , founders , an d followers. An alternative , three-phas e mode l o f researc h specialt y formatio n wa s developed b y th e Starnber g group . Thi s researc h grou p coalesce d i n Starnb erg, Wes t Germany , durin g th e 1970 s a t th e short-live d Ma x Planc k Insti tute fo r th e Stud y o f th e Condition s o f Lif e i n th e Scientific-Technica l World, whic h wa s heade d b y Car l Friedric h vo n Weizsacke r an d Jiirge n Habermas. 1 6 Th e grou p i s know n i n th e Anglophon e literatur e fo r havin g developed a three-stag e mode l o f th e developmen t o f scientifi c field s tha t drew o n Kuhn' s an d Lakato s s work. Th e thre e phase s wer e a n exploratory , pre-theoretical fact-findin g phas e wit h n o definit e theoretica l o r method ological program ; a paradigmati c phas e i n whic h a theoretica l progra m comes t o organiz e a field; an d a post-paradigmatic phas e o f normal science . W h e n th e thir d stag e o f theoretica l maturit y wa s achieved , th e scientifi c field wa s sai d t o hav e reache d fmalization . T h e fmalizatio n thesi s hel d "tha t in th e cours e o f its development a science (discipline , o r fiel d o f knowledge ) reaches a stat e o f maturit y a s a resul t o f whic h i t ca n b e sai d t o hav e completed it s work " (Schafe r 1983 : 131) . Th e concep t o f finalize d scienc e was mean t t o describ e a n alternativ e t o th e traditiona l categor y o f applie d research (Bohm e e t al . 1976 : 308) . A t thi s stage , stat e o r privat e capita l could guid e scientifi c developmen t wit h mor e success . Externa l interfer ence coul d als o guid e th e firs t phase , bu t th e Starnber g grou p hel d tha t such interferenc e wa s no t justified durin g th e secon d phase , fo r whic h the y prescribed autonom y (Schafe r 1983 : 162) . T h e Starnber g mode l ha d th e advantag e o f makin g studie s o f specialt y formation relevan t t o scienc e polic y issues , bu t it s heav y relianc e o n Kuh n resulted i n a n underanalysi s o f th e rol e o f socia l relation s i n specialt y formation. Nichola s Mullin s (1972 , 1973b ) probabl y contribute d mor e t o solving thi s proble m tha n an y o f th e othe r specialt y studie s researchers . H e found tha t th e Ben-Davi d an d Collin s mode l di d no t appl y wel l t o hi s cas e studies o f molecula r biolog y an d subfield s i n America n sociology . Mullin s came u p wit h a n alternative , four-stag e mode l o f paradig m group s o r normal science , communicatio n network , cluster , an d specialt y o r disci -

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pline. I n th e cas e o f molecular biology , th e firs t stag e involve d a loose grou p of scientists , includin g physicists , w h o wer e intereste d i n studyin g phag e (viruses tha t kil l bacteria ) a s a wa y o f solvin g th e proble m o f geneti c information transmissio n (Mullin s 1972) . A t th e communicatio n networ k stage, ther e wa s increase d connectio n amon g th e scientist s workin g o n th e problem an d a correspondin g decreas e i n independen t persons . A t th e cluster stage , th e scientist s becam e mor e self-consciou s abou t thei r pattern s of communication , an d the y tende d t o spen d tim e togethe r i n place s suc h as Col d Sprin g Harbor . A share d lifestyl e amon g mentor s an d students — such a s th e campin g trip s le d b y Ma x Delbriic k a t Californi a Institut e o f Technology—helped foste r grou p solidarity . A t th e specialt y stage , th e field emerge d a s a recognize d discipline , wit h meetings , journals , trainin g institutions, an d a forma l organization . Thus , Mullin s delineate d th e phas e of developmen t fro m th e phag e grou p t o th e subfiel d o f molecular biology . In a subsequen t stud y Davi d Edg e an d Michae l Mulka y (1976 ) foun d that neithe r th e Ben-David/Collin s no r th e Mullin s mode l worke d fo r thei r case stud y o f th e emergenc e o f radi o astronomy . I n turn , the y develope d fifteen dimension s o f similarity an d differenc e tha t dre w o n thei r ow n wor k on radi o astronom y a s well a s the result s o f Ben-David an d Collins , Mullins , and othe r specialt y studie s researchers . T h e proble m o f comin g u p wit h a simple mode l t o cove r a wid e variet y o f case s o f specialt y formatio n seem s to hav e bee n abandoned , althoug h Mullins' s wor k probabl y ha s ha d th e most lastin g influence . Ther e ar e man y possibl e reason s fo r th e los s o f interest i n th e questio n o f specialt y formation . Amon g the m ar e th e failur e to com e u p wit h a singl e mode l tha t transporte d easil y t o a variet y o f cas e studies; th e emergenc e o f alternativ e researc h question s wit h th e switc h i n attention t o th e stud y o f controversie s i n th e Edinburg h an d Bat h schoo l studies an d wit h th e emergenc e o f laborator y studies ; an d th e quantitativ e solution t o th e analysi s o f specialt y formatio n tha t emerge d wit h cocitatio n analysis i n th e 1970s .

Citation Studies and Bibliometrics Scientometrics i s th e quantitativ e stud y o f science , communicatio n i n sci ence, an d scienc e policy . Foundin g leadershi p i s attribute d t o Pric e an d t o Maurice Goldsmit h o f the Scienc e o f Science Foundation . T h e institutiona l sociology o f science i s not identica l wit h scientometrics , becaus e th e forme r includes qualitativ e method s an d th e latte r include s disciplinar y orientation s

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other tha n sociolog y Fo r example , th e backgroun d o f Pric e an d som e o f the othe r foundin g figure s o f scientometric s wa s i n th e natura l science s o r library/information science s rathe r tha n th e socia l sciences . Scientometric s can als o b e distinguishe d fro m bibliometries , th e measuremen t o f pattern s in writte n communicatio n (Broadu s 1987) . Bibliometric s i s no t restricte d to scientifi c communication , an d scientometric s i s no t restricte d t o biblio metric measures . T h e mor e genera l ter m "scienc e indicators " i s use d t o describe "measure s o f change s i n aspect s o f science, " generall y use d fo r policy makin g (Elkan a e t al . 1978 : 3) . Many o f th e studie s previousl y discusse d ca n b e considere d example s o f scientometrics and/o r bibliometrics . O n e are a no t ye t discusse d wher e influential form s o f analysi s hav e bee n develope d i s citatio n an d cocitatio n analysis. Citatio n analysi s i s the quantitativ e analysi s o f research pattern s an d productivity base d o n researc h reference d i n publications , usuall y articles . In th e Unite d State s Pric e (1963 ) togethe r wit h Eugen e Garfiel d (1955 ) an d the Institut e fo r Scientifi c Informatio n (ISI ) ar e ofte n give n credi t a s found ing figure s an d location s fo r th e field . A n earl y for m o f citatio n analysi s wa s bibliographic coupling , tha t is , countin g th e numbe r o f reference s tha t a given pai r o f document s hav e i n common . Later , cocitatio n analysi s wa s developed a s a n alternativ e base d o n authors ' citin g o f tw o document s i n one article . I n othe r words , cocitatio n i s th e numbe r o f time s a give n pai r of document s i s cite d togethe r b y othe r document s (Smal l an d Griffit h 1974; Griffit h e t al . 1974) . Th e frequenc y o f cocitatio n i s a measur e o f association fo r th e numbe r o f time s tw o document s ar e cite d togethe r i n the sam e papers . Cluster s generate d b y thi s typ e o f analysi s ar e believe d t o reflect researc h network s o r specialties . A s a policy tool , cocitatio n analysi s can catalo g an d chronicl e newl y emergin g subfield s an d nationa l researc h strengths. B y pointin g t o emergin g strength s an d weaknesses , th e analysi s provides a tool t o hel p decision s abou t funding . Citation studie s hav e als o delineate d a n "immediac y effect, " th e patter n whereby recen t publication s ar e cite d mor e frequently tha n olde r one s (Price 1986 : 164) . Lik e And y Warhol' s fiftee n minute s o f fame , scientifi c publications als o ge t a limited tim e i n th e spotlight . I n Price' s terms , "Ove r the SC I [Science Citation Index] literatur e th e rat e fo r recen t reference s i s a halving i n numbe r wit h ever y fiv e year s o f ag e o f references " (1986 : 165) . In othe r words , th e immediac y effec t ca n b e operationalize d a s the citatio n half-life o f a paper . T h e numbe r o f citation s fo r mos t paper s decline s i n a nonlinear way , suc h tha t th e citation s ten d t o di e ou t a t a n increasingl y rapid rate . Anyon e w h o ha s publishe d a pape r ha s noticed , perhap s wit h

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chagrin, th e tendenc y fo r i t t o disappea r fro m th e cite d literature . Subse quently th e concep t o f a n immediac y effec t wa s extende d wit h graph s o f citation lif e cycle s tha t plotte d a publication s received citation s agains t tim e (Cano an d Lin d 1991) . O n e measur e o f th e immediac y effec t (althoug h no t limited t o it ) i s th e previousl y define d Price' s Index , th e percentag e o f references durin g th e precedin g five-yea r period . Thi s inde x ca n measur e an individua l pape r o r i t ca n b e use d o n a macro leve l t o evaluat e a journal, field, o r institutio n (Pric e 1986 : 166) . The concep t o f a researc h fron t make s sens e o f th e immediac y effect . A research front i s contraste d wit h th e genera l archive , o r th e olde r bod y o f references i n a field, suc h a s those mor e tha n fiv e year s old . A s ne w researc h is added , th e researc h fron t move s forwar d an d olde r studie s fal l int o th e archive. Pric e estimate s tha t th e researc h fron t generall y consist s o f abou t fifty papers , afte r whic h "som e sor t o f packin g dow n productio n o f a review pape r o r summar y seem s t o b e necessary , bu t perhap s that , too , varies fro m fiel d t o field " (1986 : 178) . Merto n an d Zuckerma n argu e tha t past contribution s ar e "obliterated " a s the y ar e "incorporated " int o recen t research. Thi s proces s occur s mor e clearl y i n th e highl y codifie d field s o f the "hard " science s (Merto n 1973 : 508) . T h e concep t o f obliteratio n b y incorporation i s parallel t o th e SS K theor y o f fact construction , suc h a s th e deletion o f modalitie s i n th e schem e o f Brun o Latou r an d Stev e Woolga r (1986). T h e immediac y effect—th e patter n whereb y recen t publication s ar e cited mor e frequentl y tha n olde r ones—varie s acros s disciplines , whic h have differen t rate s a t whic h th e researc h fron t i s packe d down . Fo r exam ple, i n physic s an d th e biomedica l science s th e citatio n half-lif e o f a paper i s a steepe r figur e (abou t ever y thre e years) , an d i n som e field s i t ha s becom e steeper ove r time . A n exceptio n t o th e immediac y effec t i s tha t som e publications escap e obliteratio n b y incorporatio n an d becom e citatio n clas sics. Thes e ar e very highl y cite d paper s an d book s tha t becom e mor e highl y cited ove r th e year s i n a positiv e feedbac k patter n (Can o an d Lin d 1991) . Often, citatio n classic s ar e o f a methodological nature . Another complicate d findin g i n th e citatio n studie s literatur e i s th e multiple authorshi p effect , tha t is , th e findin g tha t ther e i s a n increas e i n multiple author s ove r tim e an d tha t th e numbe r o f multipl e author s i s als o increasing (Pric e 1986 : 78—79) . T he increasin g nee d t o collaborat e emerge s from th e eve r mor e comple x laborator y technologie s an d th e gran t struc ture (123) . Price als o argues tha t "par t o f the socia l function o f collaboratio n is that i t i s a method fo r squeezin g paper s ou t o f the rathe r larg e populatio n

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of peopl e w h o hav e les s tha n a whol e pape r i n them " (128) . Fractiona l productivity i s an indicato r propose d t o solv e thi s complicatio n b y assignin g i/n o f a point fo r th e occurrenc e o f [a n author's] nam e amon g n authors o n the bylin e o f a single paper . Thu s a man wit h on e pape r o f which h e i s th e sole author, a second o f which h e is one o f two authors , and a third in whic h he i s on e o f five , wil l hav e a fractiona l productivit y o f 1. 7 an d a ful l productivity o f 3 papers. (127 ) Although Pric e appear s t o hav e solve d th e proble m o f fractiona l productiv ity, adjuste d an d unadjuste d measure s fo r productivit y ma y tur n ou t no t to b e ver y different . Furthermore , fractiona l productivit y measure s ma y not captur e th e productivit y elision s o f "salam i science. " I n othe r words , some scientist s ar e skille d a t "fractionatin g dat a fro m a singl e stud y int o several articles, " tha t is , choppin g u p thei r researc h int o multipl e report s (Chubin 1990 : 151) . Thi s strateg y ca n falsel y inflat e estimate s o f thei r p r o ductivity. 17 I n th e opposit e direction , a s Merton notes , outstandin g scientist s sometimes plac e a valu e o n publishin g a lo w quantit y o f high-qualit y pa pers (1973 : 455) . Thus , th e gros s numbe r o f publication s i s no t alway s th e best measur e o f a n individual' s productivity ; on e mus t als o tak e int o ac count quality , whic h i s usuall y operationalize d a s th e numbe r o f citation s per publication . A numbe r o f extension s o f o r criticism s o f citatio n analysi s hav e emerged. A n exampl e o f an extensio n i s block-modeling, th e scientometri c analysis o f cluster s o r network s o f researc h "no t o n th e basi s o f thei r choic e for on e anothe r bu t i n term s o f thei r choice s o f thir d partie s o r person s no t in thei r commo n block " (Lenoi r 1979 : 463) . I n contras t wit h cocitatio n analysis, block-modelin g "group s individual s togethe r o n th e basi s o f th e perception o f significan t other s rathe r tha n o n th e basi s o f mutua l aware ness" (463) . Timoth y Lenoi r argue s tha t block-modelin g ca n b e use d t o gether wit h cocitatio n analysi s t o giv e a mor e accurat e pictur e o f subfiel d development. Wherea s cocitatio n analysi s give s a year-by-yea r picture , block-modeling treat s citatio n link s a s a network i n a literature ove r time . Block-modeling an d cocitatio n analyse s ar e tw o form s o f network analy sis a s i t ha s bee n develope d i n th e quantitativ e traditio n o f America n sociology Hargen s (1978 ) trace s th e developmen t o f network analysi s i n th e institutional sociolog y o f science t o th e sociometr y traditio n tha t date s bac k to th e 1930 s an d t o th e researc h o n invisibl e college s an d specialt y forma tion i n th e 1960s . Durin g th e 1960 s sociologist s w h o attempte d t o appl y sociometric technique s t o scienc e me t wit h tw o technica l limitations : th e

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methods coul d b e applie d onl y t o group s o f fewe r tha n tw o hundre d members an d the y coul d no t b e use d t o analyz e severa l differen t sociomet ric tie s simultaneousl y Citatio n an d late r cocitatio n analysi s provide d a solution t o thes e limitations ; thus , cocitatio n analysi s ma y b e see n a s on e outcome o f th e researc h traditio n o n invisibl e college s an d specialties . Nevertheless, a s Hargen s cautions , cocitatio n analyse s provid e a limite d amount o f structura l informatio n abou t th e author s o f th e texts , an d thu s this typ e o f analysi s need s t o b e supplemente d wit h dat a o n othe r type s o f ties amon g th e author s (1978 : 130) . T h e concep t o f a networ k i n thi s literatur e shoul d no t b e confuse d with tha t i n actor-networ k theor y (describe d i n th e nex t chapter) , whic h nonetheless owe s som e historica l deb t t o th e anteceden t researc h o n invisi ble college s an d specialties . Actor-networ k theorist s hav e develope d a criti cism o f citation/cocitatio n analysi s b y arguin g tha t i t embodie s th e assump tions o f th e institutiona l sociolog y o f scienc e becaus e i t focuse s o n socia l relations an d network s a s suggeste d b y citatio n patterns . I n contrast , th e actor-network theorist s develope d a n alternativ e analysi s tha t the y believ e focuses mor e o n th e questio n o f th e "content " o f scienc e rathe r tha n it s social relation s o r institutiona l side . Thei r proposa l i s t o develo p a sciento metric analysi s o f coword s (Callon , Law , an d R i p 1986 ; R i p an d Courtia l 1984). Coword s ar e co-occurrin g ke y words , usuall y a descriptio n o f a document tha t appear s i n a n abstract , title , o r ke y wor d listing . Cowor d analysis i s use d t o describ e a networ k o f interaction s i n science , an d there fore i t doe s no t privileg e huma n actor s i n quit e th e sam e wa y tha t citatio n analysis ma y d o (Callon , Courtial , an d Lavill e 1991) . From ye t anothe r angle , Dian a Hick s (1987 , 1988 ) ha s questione d th e utility o f citatio n studie s fo r polic y analysis . Sh e argue s tha t overrelianc e o n these studie s ma y lea d t o polic y error s (cf . Frankli n 1988) . Hick s an d Jonathan Potte r (1991 ) hav e als o develope d a Foucauldia n critiqu e o f cita tion analysi s a s a mechanis m tha t ma y lea d t o self-regulatio n o f scientists . Indeed, I a m tempte d t o posi t a "scientometri c deautonomizin g effect" : a s the tool s o f scientometri c monitorin g o f scienc e increase , s o doe s th e watchful ey e o f governmenta l an d loca l management , an d th e "degradatio n of menta l labor " (t o us e Sa l Restiv o s applicatio n o f Harr y Braverman' s phrase) increase s a s the institutiona l autonom y o f scientist s decreases . Nevertheless, ther e ar e als o way s t o twea k scientometri c researc h towar d policy issue s othe r tha n thos e concerne d wit h productivit y fro m a manage rial an d polic y perspective . Fo r example , th e analysi s o f cocitatio n cluster s points t o ne w networks , bu t i t als o point s t o thos e interestin g peopl e w h o

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are wa y of f i n th e margin s o f a n x-y axis . Ca n cocitatio n analysi s b e use d a s a too l fo r explorin g bette r th e politica l econom y o f citations ? Ca n i t b e used t o locat e potentia l innovator s w h o ar e marginalize d fro m existin g citation networks ? Likewise , th e phenomeno n o f packin g dow n a researc h front warrant s unpacking . W h o doe s th e packin g an d w h o decide s wha t gets obliterated , wha t get s incorporated , an d wha t paper s ge t spurre d toward citatio n classi c status ? Thus , i n wha t wa y d o th e processe s o f packin g down contribut e t o th e maintenanc e o f powerfu l an d perhap s gendered / raced network s i n science ? Doe s th e multipl e authorshi p effec t operat e i n ways tha t permi t th e Matthew s o f scienc e t o hav e a greate r opportunit y t o slice thei r salami s i n a wa y tha t give s the m a greate r numbe r o f single authored paper s an d a highe r fractiona l productivity ? Thes e an d othe r questions ar e example s o f th e way s i n whic h institutiona l studie s o f scienc e promise t o continu e t o provid e importan t insight s int o th e mechanism s o f power i n science . Thi s researc h bas e shoul d serv e a s a valuable resourc e fo r other branche s o f ST S a s the y formulat e description s o f an d prescription s for science .

4 Social Studie s o f Knowledg e

The Sociology of Scientific Knowledge The sociolog y o f scientifi c knowledg e (SSK , sometime s als o calle d socia l studies o f knowledg e o r th e ne w sociolog y o f science ) focuse s o n th e content o f science . "Content " refer s t o theories , methods , desig n choices , and othe r technica l aspect s o f scienc e an d technology , i n contras t wit h institutional o r contextua l aspect s suc h a s thos e reviewe d i n th e previou s chapter. Kari n Knorr-Cetin a an d Michae l Mulka y us e th e ter m "method ological internalism " t o describ e th e focu s o n conten t o r th e stud y o f ho w "the 'internal ' practice s o f th e scientifi c enterpris e constitut e th e focu s o f inquiry" (1983 : 6) . Their choic e o f terminology, however , ma y b e confuse d with th e internalism/externalis m debat e i n th e histor y o f science, an d i t ha s not bee n widel y used . Sometimes th e stud y o f conten t i s describe d a s "openin g th e blac k box " (Whitley 1972) . I n scienc e a blac k bo x i s an y devic e fo r whic h th e inpu t and outpu t ar e specified bu t th e interna l mechanism s ar e not. SS K advocate s have accuse d th e institutiona l sociolog y o f scienc e o f leavin g th e blac k bo x of conten t unopene d an d examinin g onl y th e exogenous , institutiona l aspects o f scienc e an d technology . Openin g th e blac k bo x an d studyin g the conten t o f scienc e sociologicall y ha s bee n ver y controversial . Fro m a philosophical perspective , som e SS K analyse s ar e philosophically incoheren t and mire d i n epistemologica l relativism . Fro m a critica l scienc e an d tech nology studie s perspective , th e conten t o f the sociolog y o f scientific knowl edge i s itsel f a blac k bo x tha t need s t o b e examined . Fo r example , i n th e essay " U p o n Openin g th e Blac k Bo x an d Findin g I t Empty " (1993) , Langdon Winne r argue s tha t th e sociolog y o f scientific knowledg e faile d t o explore th e politica l conten t insid e th e blac k box . Thi s issu e i s take n u p better b y th e feminis t an d critica l wing s o f STS , which , I argue , ope n red , pink, purple , brown , an d othe r kind s o f boxes . Thos e studie s wil l b e considered i n th e nex t chapter . O n e wa y o f characterizin g th e socia l stud y o f th e conten t o f scienc e an d

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technology i s wit h th e rubri c "constructivism. " I n a ver y wid e sense , th e term ca n designat e an y socia l studie s approac h tha t attempt s t o trac e th e way i n whic h socia l interests , values , history , actions , institutions , networks , and s o o n shape , influence , structure , cause , explain , inform , characterize , or coconstitut e th e conten t o f scienc e an d technology . N o t e tha t thi s ver y general definitio n o f constructivis m doe s no t necessaril y impl y an y o f th e relativisms discusse d i n chapte r 2 . O n e ca n analyz e th e socia l factor s tha t influence th e conten t o f scientifi c knowledg e o r technologica l desig n an d yet als o conclud e tha t th e constraint s o f observation s o r efficac y (th e rea l world) pla y a n equa l o r greate r shapin g rol e i n wha t eventuall y become s th e consensus. As I hav e argue d i n chapte r 2 , i t i s possibl e t o distinguis h conservative , moderate, an d radica l form s o f constructivism i n th e contex t o f philosophi cal debate s ove r relativism . I n th e contex t o f socia l studie s o f scienc e an d technology, however , I wil l sugges t anothe r se t o f distinguishin g terms : social constructivism , heterogeneou s constructivism , an d cultura l con structivism. Th e term s represen t thre e analytica l framework s fo r empirica l social studie s o f th e relationshi p betwee n th e socia l worl d an d th e conten t of scienc e an d technology . Th e tw o axe s o f constructivism—philosophica l and socia l studies—d o no t ma p ont o eac h othe r i n a simpl e way . Instea d one migh t thin k o f th e thre e type s o f philosophica l constructivis m an d th e three type s o f socia l studie s constructivis m a s a n x an d a y axis , wit h a variety o f combination s possible . For thos e w h o ar e mor e attune d t o th e sociolog y o f scientifi c knowl edge, th e ter m "socia l constructivism " i s sometimes restricte d t o th e labora tory studie s an d perhap s a fe w othe r branche s o f SSK . Thi s definitio n implies tha t som e branche s o f SSK , suc h a s th e Edinburg h schoo l interest s analyses, ar e exclude d fro m th e ter m "socia l constructivism. " However , because th e Edinburg h schoo l studie s attempte d t o delineat e line s o f causal ity fro m clas s and professiona l interest s t o th e conten t o f science understoo d as side s o f a controversy , the y wer e concerne d wit h th e socia l constructio n of knowledge . I therefor e us e th e ter m "socia l constructivism " mor e broadly t o refe r t o studie s tha t trea t th e socia l worl d a s a n exogenous , independent variabl e tha t shape s o r cause s som e aspect s o f th e conten t o f science an d technology . A variet y o f SS K framework s therefor e woul d fall unde r th e banne r o f "socia l constructivism. " Socia l constructivism , particularly som e o f th e laborator y studies , i s sometime s associate d wit h epistemological an d ontologica l relativism . Nevertheless , i t woul d b e possi -

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ble t o adop t a socia l constructivis t framewor k fo r empirica l researc h an d also t o accep t a philosophical positio n othe r tha n radica l constructivism . Social constructivis m define d a s suc h ca n b e distinguishe d fro m a mor e general typ e o f constructivism , wha t I will cal l "heterogeneou s constructiv ism," whic h i s usuall y associate d wit h actor-networ k theory . Thi s positio n holds tha t th e conten t o f scienc e an d technolog y i s constructe d alon g wit h the socia l relation s an d structure s i n th e wide r society . I n othe r words , content an d contex t coconstitut e o r mutuall y shap e eac h othe r i n a patter n that i s sometimes calle d a seamless web. Unlik e socia l constructivism , whic h focuses o n th e arro w o f causalit y fro m contex t t o content , thi s secon d typ e of constructivism als o examine s th e opposit e directio n o f causality , whereb y technoscientific change s an d network s shap e an d constitut e ne w form s o f social relationships . Thi s secon d positio n i s sometimes calle d constructivis m (that is , withou t th e wor d "social") , bu t becaus e I us e th e ter m "con structivism" a s a famil y ter m fo r th e entir e rang e o f construetivisms , I suggest th e mor e appropriat e labe l "heterogeneou s constructivism. " T h e term "heterogeneous " refer s t o th e mixture s o f socia l an d nonsocia l ele ments i n th e constructio n process . N o t e tha t thi s framewor k fo r empirica l analysis ca n b e mor e easil y approximate d t o moderat e o r eve n conservativ e constructivism a s a philosophical position . Yet anothe r typ e o f constructivis m i s wha t I hav e calle d "cultura l con structivism" (Hes s 1995) . Thi s framewor k fo r empirica l researc h interpret s the cultura l meanin g an d cultura l politic s o f differen t scientifi c theories , observations, an d method s throug h a n analyti c framewor k derive d fro m theories i n semiotics , feminism , an d cultura l anthropology . B y beginnin g with th e questio n o f meanin g fro m th e actors ' point s o f view , cultura l constructivism depart s fro m th e instrumentalis t rationalit y (practica l reason ) that i s frequentl y assume d i n account s o f socia l an d heterogeneou s con structivism. Rathe r tha n vie w technoscientifi c actor s a s motivate d merel y by power , status , o r som e othe r utilitaria n goal , i t see s the m a s suspende d in web s o f meanin g tha t structur e th e possibilitie s o f thei r action . Cultura l analysis reveal s th e structure s o f th e web s o f meanin g i n whic h the y act . Clearly, thi s typ e o f analysis , whic h i s explicate d mor e i n th e nex t chapter , is complementar y t o th e other s an d ca n b e use d alon g wit h them . Thi s framework ca n als o b e linke d t o a variet y o f philosophica l positions ; m y own preferenc e i s realistic o r moderat e constructivism . Constructivist narrative s o f th e histor y o f scienc e studie s depic t a transi tion fro m th e Mertonia n sociolog y o f scienc e t o th e sociolog y o f scientifi c

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knowledge. A s ca n b e see n fro m th e previou s chapter , thi s narrativ e i s no t accurate becaus e th e institutiona l sociolog y o f scienc e i s large r tha n th e "Mertonian" sociolog y o f science . Furthermore , th e fiel d ha d alread y u n dergone a shif t i n th e directio n o f stratificatio n studie s prio r t o th e adven t of SSK , an d th e institutiona l sociolog y o f scienc e continue d o n it s ow n trajectory wel l afte r th e formatio n an d developmen t o f SSK . I t i s bette r t o think o f the institutiona l sociolog y o f science an d th e sociolog y o f scientifi c knowledge a s two paralle l researc h traditions , rathe r tha n viewin g SS K a s a paradigm shif t tha t replace d th e institutiona l sociolog y o f scienc e wit h a new sociolog y o f science . Ther e i s a lon g traditio n i n th e sociolog y o f scientific knowledg e tha t date s bac k t o th e studie s o f th e 1920 s an d 1930 s by Ludwi k Flec k (1979) , Borris Hesse n (1971) , an d Kar l Mannheim (1952) , and o n t o othe r socia l theorist s prio r t o them . Furthermore , specialt y studies an d conflic t sociology , whic h wer e als o formulate d b y th e 1970s , addressed issue s o f conten t a s well . Narrative s o f a dramati c "scientifi c revolution" i n th e sociolog y o f scienc e durin g th e 1970 s therefor e warran t some skepticism . The wor k o f th e Britis h researcher s Michae l Mulkay , Harr y Collins , Barry Barnes , an d Davi d Bloo r durin g th e 1970 s i s usuall y flagged a s th e starting poin t o f th e contemporar y perio d o f th e sociolog y o f scientifi c knowledge. Rhetorically , th e ke y theoretica l concept s o f th e fiel d wer e positioned agains t tw o Others : th e naiv e realist/positivis t philosophe r an d the naiv e Mertonia n sociologist . A s w e hav e see n fro m th e previou s chap ters, bot h th e philosoph y o f scienc e an d th e institutiona l sociolog y o f science ar e divers e an d sophisticate d field s o f inquiry , an d th e philosopher s and institutiona l sociologist s generall y reacte d negativel y t o th e innovation s and claim s o f th e SS K researchers . Althoug h th e critiqu e o f Mertonia n norms tende d t o g o unanswere d (fo r reason s discusse d i n th e previou s chapter), th e critiqu e o f th e failur e o f America n sociolog y o f scienc e t o develop a sociolog y o f knowledg e di d dra w som e responses . O n e repl y from th e Mertonia n cam p ha s bee n th e argumen t tha t i f genera l attribute s of scienc e suc h a s empiricism an d experimentalis m ar e regarde d a s content , then Merto n di d addres s conten t i n som e essays . Fo r example , i n " T h e Other Merto n Thesis " Harrie t Zuckerma n (1989 ) argue s tha t Merton' s early wor k o n Protestantis m an d scienc e anticipate d constructivis m i n hi s discussion o f shift s o f foc i o f inquir y an d problem s withi n an d amon g sciences. By th e 1990 s ther e ha d bee n severa l development s beyon d th e sociolog y of scientifi c knowledge , s o tha t SS K ha d com e t o occup y a rearguar d

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position. A majo r facto r wa s th e explosio n o f feminist, anthropological , an d cultural studie s o f scienc e an d technology , whic h ofte n bega n wit h SS K insights bu t move d beyon d th e concern s o f th e SS K analysts . T h e secon d was th e tur n t o technology , policy , th e environment , an d publi c under standing o f scienc e issue s a s th e origina l leader s o f th e SS K movemen t branched ou t int o othe r researc h area s an d cam e t o b e les s intereste d i n philosophical issues . Nevertheless , th e arguments , concepts , an d empirica l research produce d i n th e SS K fiel d remaine d a majo r influenc e int o th e 1990s. The y ar e a n importan t par t o f the theoretica l landscap e tha t deserve s to b e appreciated , critiqued , an d incorporate d int o transdisciplinar y theo retical efforts .

Conflict Theory An earl y approac h t o th e sociolog y o f scientifi c knowledge , an d on e tha t rarely receive d du e credi t i n internalis t SS K narrative s o f their field , focuse d on th e constructio n o f scientifi c theorie s a s outcome s o f agnosti c relation ships amon g scientists . T h e leadin g theoretician s o f conflic t sociolog y o f science hav e bee n Randal l Collin s (1975 ) an d Sa l Restiv o (e.g. , 1983 , 1994b). Collin s distinguishe d fou r type s o f role s fo r intellectual s an d scien tists: political , practical , leisur e entertainment , an d teachin g (1975 : 482) . From thi s sociolog y o f positionality (t o us e a ter m mor e curren t today) , h e suggested a number o f patterns, suc h a s " T he mor e tha t intellectual s occup y political position s i n th e stat e o r church , th e mor e tha t thei r intellectua l productions consis t o f argument s ove r valu e judgment s an d policies, " o r " T h e mor e tha t teacher s ar e situate d i n a large communit y o f teacher s an d students whic h i s relativel y autonomou s fro m outsid e control , th e mor e likely the y ar e t o emphasiz e knowledg e a s genera l principles , o r value s i n themselves" (520—21) . A s i n th e cas e o f specialt y studies , thi s researc h anticipated actor-networ k theor y i n som e fairl y precis e ways , suc h a s th e following: The idea s that ar e able t o sustai n th e mos t effectiv e allianc e ar e th e one s tha t will b e considere d th e firmes t "knowledge" ; th e longest-lastin g paradig m i s one which serve s to bind togethe r a n internal organizatio n o f the intellectua l community wit h a hold o n long-lastin g materia l resource s t o suppor t scien tific investigation , communication , an d careers. (505 ) Conflict sociolog y share s wit h Marxis m an d feminis m a concer n wit h the analysi s o f power i n scienc e an d th e rol e o f the socia l scientis t a s a criti c

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of th e outcome s o f scientifi c conflicts , tw o concern s tha t wer e absen t from mos t version s o f constructivism . Dary l Chubi n an d Restiv o (1983 ) formulated th e "wea k program " i n respons e t o th e SS K endorsemen t o f the idea l o f value-neutral socia l science. T he ide a o f a "weak" progra m wa s a reference t o th e wea k forc e i n physics , whic h i s actuall y stronge r tha n th e strong force . Restiv o (1988 ) an d Restiv o an d Julia Loughli n (1987 ) late r de veloped thi s perspective a s a critical, profeminist, conflic t sociology , pointin g to th e importanc e o f feminist scienc e studie s tha t ha d emerge d i n th e 1980 s but tha t wen t largel y ignore d b y mos t o f th e constructivis t researc h pro grams. 1 Ther e wer e als o similaritie s betwee n th e critica l sociolog y o f th e weak progra m an d critica l approache s tha t wer e emergin g i n anthropology , such a s the projec t o f anthropology a s cultural critiqu e an d th e emergenc e o f feminist studie s o f reproductiv e scienc e an d technology. 2 Restiv o ha s als o been responsibl e fo r maintainin g som e recognitio n of , an d interes t in , th e comparative sociolog y o f Josep h Needha m (Restiv o 1979) . Thus , conflic t sociology supporte d man y o f th e development s o f feminist , anthropolog ical, an d critica l perspective s i n ST S durin g th e 1980 s an d 1990 s tha t even tually cam e t o challeng e an d displac e SSK . Conflic t sociolog y therefor e o c cupied a n importan t positio n a s a n alternativ e t o th e dominan t researc h programs tha t wer e emergin g i n th e sociolog y o f scientific knowledge .

The Strong Program In th e mid-1970s , a grou p o f researcher s i n Edinburg h develope d som e o f the foundin g document s i n th e ne w sociolog y o f scientifi c knowledge . T h e grou p include d Davi d Bloor , Barr y Barnes , Davi d Edge , an d Donal d MacKenzie. A highl y influentia l framewor k tha t emerge d fro m thi s grou p was Bloo r s stron g program , whic h h e presente d i n 197 6 i n hi s boo k Knowledge and Social Imagery. The basi c tenet s o f th e stron g progra m i n th e sociology o f scientifi c knowledg e wer e a s follows: (1 ) causality : socia l stud ies o f scienc e woul d explai n belief s o r state s o f knowledge ; (2 ) impartiality : SSK woul d b e impartia l wit h respec t t o trut h o r falsity , rationalit y o r irrationality, o r succes s o r failur e o f knowledg e (and , presumably , technol ogy); (3 ) symmetry : th e sam e type s o f caus e woul d explai n tru e an d fals e beliefs (i n othe r words , on e woul d no t explai n " t r u e " scienc e b y referrin g it t o natur e an d "false " scienc e b y referrin g i t t o society) ; (4 ) reflexivity : th e same explanation s tha t appl y t o scienc e woul d als o appl y t o th e socia l

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studies o f science. Each o f those principle s ha s subsequently bee n elaborate d and/or criticized . Although th e causalit y principl e ha s draw n probabl y th e leas t criticis m and discussion , th e growt h o f anthropology an d cultura l studie s i n th e 1990 s has le d t o a mor e comple x understandin g o f causality . A standar d wa y o f understanding causalit y i n socia l scienc e i s t o identif y variable s tha t shap e or influenc e othe r variables , suc h a s showing ho w clas s positio n ma y shap e technical position s i n th e cas e o f publi c controversies . However , i t i s als o possible t o thin k o f technica l position s a s system s o f meanin g tha t ca n b e interpreted throug h compariso n wit h othe r system s o f meanin g o r cultura l codes, a s i n anthropologica l an d cultura l studie s i n th e semioti c tradition . This typ e o f analysi s i s acausa l i n th e sens e tha t th e meanin g o f a tex t (o r social action ) doe s no t "cause " th e existenc e o f th e tex t o r socia l actio n i n any simple , Humea n manner . However , interpretive/semioti c analyse s ar e causal i n othe r senses . Fo r example , genera l cultura l code s o r system s o f meaning hav e a causa l relationshi p t o text s an d actio n jus t a s linguisti c structures "cause " th e rang e o f possibilities o f speech. Furthermore , system s of cultura l meanin g implici t i n scientifi c representation s an d practice s ca n contribute t o thei r succes s o r failure . Thus , cultura l constructivis m help s clarify th e causalit y principl e a s subjec t t o a rang e o f application s an d meanings. T h e impartialit y an d symmetr y principle s ar e th e hear t o f th e stron g program. O f th e two , probabl y th e symmetr y principl e wa s th e mos t important a s wel l a s th e mos t controversia l philosophically . I hav e alread y considered th e philosophica l proble m o f epistemologica l relativis m tha t emerges fro m som e interpretation s o f th e symmetr y principle , an d I hav e discussed way s ou t o f the proble m throug h som e typ e o f realistic o r moder ate constructivism . Notwithstandin g it s philosophica l problems , th e sym metry principl e ha s bee n enormousl y productiv e i n th e socia l studie s o f science. Wieb e Bijke r (1993) , followin g Stev e Woolga r (1992) , character ized th e intellectua l histor y o f th e socia l studie s o f scienc e i n term s o f progressive extension s o f th e symmetr y principle : fro m Merton' s symmetr y between scienc e an d othe r socia l institution s t o Bloor' s symmetr y i n th e treatment o f tru e an d fals e knowledg e t o late r development s tha t argu e fo r symmetry betwee n scienc e an d technology , th e analys t an d analyzed , h u mans an d machines , an d th e socia l an d th e technical . Although th e impartialit y an d symmetr y principle s opene d u p som e analytical possibilities , the y foreclose d others . T h e wea k progra m provide d

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probably th e firs t sociologicall y oriente d critiqu e o f th e assumptio n o f value-neutrality tha t impartialit y an d symmetr y suggeste d (Chubi n an d Restivo 1983) . I n general , th e activist-oriente d sid e o f th e ST S communit y has foun d th e impartialit y an d symmetr y principle s wanting . Furthermore , discussions le d b y Bria n Marti n an d colleague s hav e analyze d th e implica tions o f writing a n ostensibl y neutra l socia l scienc e accoun t o f a controvers y They revea l tw o ke y aspect s o f wha t ha s becom e know n a s th e capturin g problem: 1. a n epistemologicall y symmetrica l analysi s o f a controvers y i s almos t always mor e usefu l t o th e sid e wit h les s scientifi c credibilit y o r cogni tive authority ; 2. th e sid e wit h fewe r scientificall y o r sociall y credentiale d resource s i s more likel y t o attemp t t o enrol l th e researche r (Scott , Richards , an d Martin 1990 ; Martin 1997a) . In othe r words , i n case s o f controvers y neutra l analyse s i n th e stron g program traditio n wil l ten d t o b e captured , usuall y b y th e out-group . I noticed thi s effec t i n m y ow n neutra l accoun t o f th e difference s amon g skeptics, parapsychologists , an d N e w Ager s (Hes s 1993) , althoug h i n a reverse way : notwithstandin g m y clea r articulatio n o f a fourt h voic e (tha t of th e socia l scientist) , skeptic s suc h a s Car l Saga n tende d t o dismis s m y analysis a s pro-occultist. T h e clai m struc k m e a s bizarre , bu t i t wa s consis tent wit h th e analyse s o f Marti n an d colleagues . I n subsequen t work , I adopted a mor e engage d framewor k fo r scienc e studie s analyse s (Hes s 1997b). I f the partie s o f th e controvers y ar e goin g t o rea d a neutra l stud y a s interested, i t seem s bette r simpl y t o stat e clearl y one' s preferences . The fourt h principle , reflexivity , refer s t o socia l scientists ' attempt s t o grapple wit h th e constructe d natur e o f thei r ow n researc h an d theories . O n e approac h wa s t o flag awarenes s o f th e constructe d natur e o f one' s representations throug h textua l devices . T h e ne w literar y form s o f SS K involved playfu l interruption s i n narrativ e authority . Fo r example , author s use th e secondar y voic e devic e t o construc t a countervoic e tha t interrupt s and question s thei r ow n argument s (Woolgar , ed . 1988) . Thi s for m i s parallel t o move s i n anthropology' s ne w ethnograph y o f th e 1980 s t o incorporate informan t voice s int o ethnograph y b y recordin g th e anthropol ogist/informant dialogu e o r b y grantin g larg e block s o f tex t t o informant s (Clifford an d Marcu s 1986 ; Marcu s an d Fische r 1986) . T h e technique , a s is sometimes forgotten , wa s pioneere d i n anthropolog y b y wome n an d femi nists wit h knowledge-powe r consideration s guidin g it s development , an d i t

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differs fro m tha t o f th e reflexivists ' secondar y voic e devic e b y givin g roo m to othe r people , rathe r tha n t o imagine d Others . However , bot h technique s are subjec t t o authoria l manipulatio n an d therefor e self-legitimation , an d furthermore reader s ofte n fin d th e interruptio n o f th e authoria l narrativ e by othe r voice s t o b e a n irritatin g nuisance . Fo r thes e an d othe r reasons , extensive us e o f secondar y voice s supplie d eithe r b y th e autho r o r b y informants ha s bee n o f waning interest . Another textua l strateg y fo r approachin g reflexivit y ha s bee n th e us e o f the t u quoqu e argument , on e o f th e man y informa l fallacie s recognize d b y philosophers. Thi s argumen t coul d b e regarde d a s anothe r exampl e o f th e secondary voic e device , excep t tha t th e autho r remain s unawar e o f th e secondary voic e an d th e analys t uncover s it , ofte n t o th e author s chagrin . C o m m o n t o deconstructionist s an d reflexivists , thi s typ e o f analysi s find s a n inconsistency i n th e author' s positio n (o r scientifi c consensus) , thu s pointin g to th e interpretiv e flexibilit y o f text s an d th e secondar y voice s implici t i n an apparentl y univoca l argument . Althoug h t u quoqu e argumentatio n ca n be use d merel y t o defea t a n opponent , i t i s als o usefu l i n feminis t an d othe r critical analyse s tha t wis h t o fin d a n alternative , "supplementary " voic e tha t has bee n marginalize d i n th e accoun t unde r study. 3 An alternativ e approac h t o reflexivit y ha s bee n t o examin e th e autho r and Othe r a s sociall y positione d actors . Unde r thi s approac h reflexiv e commentary i s directe d no t a t th e individua l relationshi p betwee n autho r and informan t bu t instea d a t th e author' s socia l grou p (s) o r analytica l discursive communit y i n relatio n t o thos e described . I hav e develope d thi s approach t o reflexivit y elsewher e i n m y studie s tha t discus s ho w th e group s in question—fo r example , Brazilia n Spiritists—understan d an d appropriat e social science s suc h a s anthropology (Hes s 1991a , 1993) . Woolgar (1996 ) ha s also move d i n thi s directio n i n hi s subsequen t wor k o n reflexivit y an d th e role o f evaluatio n i n academi c institutions . Th e transitio n fro m "reflexive " to "positioned " accounts , le d especiall y b y feminist s suc h a s Donn a Hara way (1991 ) an d Emil y Marti n (1987) , ha s becom e a genera l tendenc y among man y scienc e studie s analysts , an d i t inform s on e alternativ e t o th e strong progra m tha t i s outline d a t th e en d o f thi s book .

Interests Analysis O n e empirica l researc h traditio n tha t wa s associate d wit h th e stron g pro gram an d especiall y popula r durin g th e lat e 1970 s wa s th e analysi s o f

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scientific controversie s fro m th e perspectiv e o f interests . Barnes , MacKen zie, an d othe r researcher s affiliate d wit h th e "Edinburg h school " launche d this empirica l researc h traditio n (Barne s 1977 ; Barne s an d Shapi n 1979) . I n the interdisciplinar y ST S context , "interests " i s anothe r multivoca l ter m that require s som e unpacking . Accordin g t o classica l Marxism , som e sci ences (e.g. , nineteenth-centur y politica l economy ) encod e i n a technica l language th e value s an d ideolog y o f a clas s (e.g. , th e capitalis t class) . O n e therefore speak s o f th e influenc e o r expressio n o f clas s interests . Mar x claimed tha t th e tw o variable s wer e relate d causally : bourgeoi s clas s interest s had som e degre e o f causa l influenc e ove r th e technica l conten t o f th e standard, nineteenth-centur y scienc e o f politica l econom y (Th e difficult y lies i n demonstratin g ho w muc h influenc e clas s ha s i n contras t wit h othe r shaping variables , includin g "internal " variables , suc h a s disciplinar y meth odologies an d observations , whic h themselve s i n tur n ma y b e sociall y shaped t o som e degree. ) Marx' s clas s analysi s o f interest s i s encapsulate d in hi s "law " tha t th e rulin g idea s o f th e da y ar e th e idea s o f th e rulin g class . In subsequen t studies , th e analysi s o f interest s ha s bee n expande d ver y widely First , nineteenth-centur y politica l econom y i s see n a s the eas y case , and Marx' s realis m o n othe r issue s suggest s tha t hi s philosophica l posi tion wa s clos e t o wha t I a m callin g conservativ e constructivism . Othe r scholars hav e subsequentl y argue d tha t clas s interest s shap e a wid e variet y of othe r sciences , no t simpl y a nineteenth-centur y "pseudoscience. " Sec ond, i t i s possibl e t o analyz e othe r type s o f interes t i n scienc e othe r tha n class, fo r example , th e interest s o f me n i n preservin g patriarcha l socia l institutions. In additio n t o thi s expande d vie w o f interests, on e sometime s encounter s a distinctio n betwee n cognitiv e o r technica l interest s o n th e on e side , an d social interest s suc h a s clas s o r professio n o n th e othe r side . Thi s distinctio n is problemati c becaus e o f th e Mertonia n assumption s tha t ma y underli e a discussion o f purel y cognitiv e interests . A secon d classificatio n o f interest s appears i n th e post-Marxis t critica l theor y o f Jiirgen Haberma s (1972) , w h o divided science s int o thos e wit h a n interes t i n (1 ) technica l predictio n and control , a s i n th e natura l science s an d som e manageria l sciences ; (2 ) communicative understanding , a s i n th e humanities ; an d (3 ) emancipation , as in Wester n Marxism . However , thi s divisio n acros s discipline s b y interes t is workabl e onl y i f reinterprete d t o appl y t o th e way s i n whic h al l thre e types o f interes t ca n operat e simultaneousl y i n an y singl e scientifi c disci pline. I n a thir d classificatio n o f interests , Restiv o distinguishe s betwee n social interest s an d attribute d interests :

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Social interest s ar e materia l o r symboli c resource s though t t o b e relevan t t o group surviva l and necessary for gaining , sustaining , o r advancing advantage s in relativ e power, privilege , an d prestige. Attributed interest s ar e social inter ests thought t o be relevant t o an d necessar y for a groups surviva l and relativ e power b y outsiders , an d ma y b e mor e o r les s congruen t wit h inside r views . Interest attributio n i s itself a form o f social interest. (1983 ) Returning no w t o th e simpl e cas e o f clas s interest s an d th e origi n o f controversies, a well-know n exampl e i s th e analysi s o f statistica l controver sies i n earl y twentieth-centur y Britain . Barne s an d MacKenzi e (1979 ) use d this cas e stud y materia l a s a n exempla r o f th e interest s analysi s tha t cam e t o be associate d wit h th e Edinburg h schoo l (als o MacKenzi e 1983) . O n e statistical controvers y involve d Kar l Pearson' s correlatio n statisti c r T versu s the Q statisti c o f his forme r studen t Georg e Yule . Pearson' s statisti c assume d that a divisio n o f dat a int o tw o categorie s (suc h a s tal l an d shor t people ) could b e modele d a s an arbitrar y divisio n i n a normal distribution , tha t is , a bell-shaped curve . I n othe r words , i f one kne w th e heigh t o f ever y individ ual, on e coul d plo t th e height s agains t th e numbe r o f peopl e wit h eac h height. I sometime s perfor m thi s exercis e i n classroom s an d i t usuall y provides a roughl y bell-shape d curve . I n contrast , Yul e di d no t lik e t o assume tha t ther e wa s a n underlyin g norma l distributio n fo r th e kin d o f data wit h whic h h e worked . I n th e cas e o f a populatio n tha t ha s bee n exposed t o smallpox , ther e ar e onl y tw o alternatives : dea d o r alive . Toda y this typ e o f dat a i s know n a s nomina l data , an d th e controvers y ha s bee n resolved b y a pluralistic vie w tha t allow s eithe r statisti c t o b e use d dependin g on th e typ e o f data . I n som e cases , Pearso n wa s righ t tha t nomina l dat a ca n be interprete d a s a higher for m o f data . MacKenzie an d Barne s analyz e th e differenc e betwee n Pearso n an d Yul e as mor e tha n a n individua l disagreemen t an d mor e tha n a questio n o f a technical interes t i n developin g th e bes t statistics . T h e Pearso n grou p wa s associated wit h th e biometri c an d eugeni c laboratorie s o f Universit y Col lege London , wherea s Yule' s followin g wa s mor e i n th e Roya l Statistica l Society. MacKenzi e the n argue s tha t i n a general way th e differen t network s were linke d t o conflict s betwee n th e professiona l clas s an d th e establishe d upper class . Pearson wa s a n advocat e o f eugenic s an d Fabia n socialism , bot h of whic h wer e program s tha t wer e see n t o benefi t th e professiona l class , whereas Yul e wa s a conservativ e aristocra t wit h n o interes t i n eugenics . Thus, i n a genera l way , MacKenzi e claim s tha t th e backgroun d o f clas s conflict shape d thi s statistic s controvers y The Edinburg h framewor k o f interest s analysi s fel l ou t o f favo r fo r a

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number o f reasons . O n e majo r reaso n involve s th e imputatio n problem . Barnes describe d th e imputatio n proble m a s "whethe r an d ho w though t o r belief ca n b e attribute d t o socia l classes , o r othe r formations , a s th e conse quences o f thei r particula r interests " (1977 : 45) . Hi s an d MacKenzie' s analyses o f th e statistic s controversie s wer e a n attemp t t o provid e a solutio n to th e imputatio n proble m fo r th e sociolog y o f science . However , variou s critics argue d tha t th e interest s studie s stil l suffere d fro m th e imputatio n problem. I t wa s no t clea r ho w macrosociologia l clas s interest s wer e trans formed int o th e microsociologica l account s o f th e motivation s tha t shap e the actio n o f individuals . Althoug h th e critic s ma y hav e exaggerate d th e causal claim s tha t MacKenzie , Barnes , an d other s wer e making , i n genera l there wa s a sens e tha t interest-base d analyse s riske d turnin g scientist s an d other technica l actor s int o "interes t dopes " ( a ter m borrowe d fro m ethno methodologist Harol d Garfinkel) . I n othe r words , scientist s wer e reduce d to rathe r flat , puppetlik e character s w h o wer e shape d b y exogenou s interest s rather tha n a comple x se t o f contingencie s an d motivations . Althoug h Barnes an d MacKenzi e provide d response s t o th e criticism s i n thi s comple x set o f exchanges , th e controvers y weakene d th e appea l o f interest s analyse s in SS K circles. 4 O n e alternativ e t o th e Edinburg h interest s analysi s tha t maintain s inter ests a s par t o f th e analytica l framewor k involves , i n a sense , turnin g th e Barnes an d MacKenzi e analysi s o n it s head . Thi s alternativ e show s ho w interests ca n b e a consequenc e rathe r tha n a caus e o f scientists ' action . Actor-network theory , whic h wil l b e considere d i n mor e detai l shortly , examines th e translatio n o f concern s o f othe r network s (includin g thos e involving nonscientists ) int o one' s ow n interest s (e.g. , Callo n an d La w 1982). I n othe r words , " I hav e a theory, technique , o r technolog y her e tha t will hel p yo u accomplis h you r goals , bu t yo u nee d t o hel p m e i n orde r fo r me t o shar e i t wit h you. " Th e analysi s o f th e productio n o f interest s ha s proven ver y usefu l fo r a n understandin g o f ho w technologie s an d scientifi c theories ca n succee d an d fail . Afte r th e debate s ove r th e imputatio n prob lem i n th e Edinburg h approac h t o controversies , studie s o f interest s hav e tended t o switc h fro m th e proble m o f ho w exogenou s interest s shap e socia l action t o ho w technoscientifi c actor s produc e intereste d supporters . Thi s change o f focus, however , i s an overcompensation , becaus e i n man y cases — especially scienc e controversie s wit h a hig h publi c profile—i t i s stil l usefu l to invok e class , financial , organizational , gender , professional , an d othe r exogenous interest s a s preexisting variable s tha t constrai n an d structur e th e emergence an d closur e o f controversies . Althoug h th e imputatio n proble m

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emerges i n th e fine-graine d analysi s o f controversies , interest s clearl y shap e the overal l pattern s o f scientifi c fundin g an d researc h priorities . A secon d alternativ e i s to dro p a claim o f direct causa l influence between , for example , clas s interest s an d tw o position s i n a theoretica l controversy , and instea d t o analyz e th e tw o domain s a s congruen t o r paralle l cultura l codes tha t shar e a similar structure . Th e advantag e o f this approac h i s that i t also allow s a mor e comple x interpretatio n o f scientifi c controversies . I n other words , on e migh t ask , "Wha t di d th e differenc e betwee n Yule' s Q and Pearson' s r T mea n t o th e differen t researchers? " Thi s questio n ma y lea d to genera l issue s suc h a s eugenics an d clas s conflict , bu t i t i s likely tha t thes e issues wil l als o b e overlai d wit h othe r cultura l differences . I n othe r words , the controvers y ma y tur n ou t t o hav e man y meaning s t o th e researchers , and class-relate d issue s ma y b e amon g them . Beyon d th e meanin g t o th e researchers, ther e ma y b e homologie s i n th e cultura l code s o f statistic s an d class relation s tha t a n analys t ma y uncove r b y findin g a thir d cod e t o whic h the firs t tw o mutuall y translate . T h e cultura l approac h therefor e provide s a n alternative wa y o f explorin g th e relationshi p betwee n macrosociologica l divisions (class , race , gender , etc. ) an d th e conten t o f scienc e (tw o theories , etc.) wher e th e imputatio n proble m make s statement s o f direc t causa l relationship unconvincing . However , th e cultura l approac h ca n b e comple mentary t o th e analysi s o f interest s an d conten t a s causall y relate d variables ; indeed, th e tw o form s o f analysi s ma y wor k bes t whe n use d togethe r (Hes s 1997: ch . 3) . Although bot h th e actor-networ k an d th e cultura l approac h provid e useful alternativ e framework s fo r th e analysi s o f interests, ther e i s still a place for th e causa l relationship s tha t Barne s an d MacKenzi e wishe d t o dra w between interest s an d technica l position s i n a scientifi c controversy . Harr y Collins (1983 ) outline d on e extensio n o f interest s analysi s b y showin g th e possible rol e o f interest s i n th e closur e o f a controvers y rathe r tha n it s origins. Fo r example , i n th e debat e ove r gravit y waves , on e sid e ha d acces s only t o th e minima l resource s o f a university department , wherea s th e othe r side ha d acces s t o th e resource s o f a large industria l company . Th e sid e wit h access t o th e industria l resource s als o favore d th e conservativ e positio n tha t would no t thro w industria l scienc e int o a stat e o f chaos . Collin s suggest s that, i f th e empirica l materia l i s correct , thi s cas e woul d exemplif y ho w industrial interest s playe d som e rol e i n th e closur e o f th e debat e b y provid ing unequa l acces s t o resources . Another exampl e i s th e stud y o f cance r research , wher e variou s sort s o f economic an d professiona l interest s hav e shape d scientifi c researc h agenda s

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in way s tha t ca n b e documente d wit h relativel y littl e controversy . R o b e r t Proctors Cancer Wars (1995 ) aptl y demonstrate s th e rol e o f interest s i n shaping researc h agenda s o n carcinogens , especiall y w h e n industrie s hav e a financial interes t i n confusin g th e publi c an d causin g th e governmen t t o fai l to enac t regulations . I n thi s case , rathe r tha n shap e closure , intereste d parties purposel y produc e disinformatio n o r destabiliz e a scientifi c researc h consensus i n orde r t o defus e regulator y o r clas s actio n pressures . Procto r borrowed "Gibson' s law " fro m publi c relation s researc h an d introduce d the ter m "smokescree n effect " a s tw o importan t technique s fo r inducin g controversy t o promot e interests . Gibson' s la w refer s t o th e truism , popular ized i n courtroo m drama s tha t us e opposin g set s o f exper t witnesses , tha t "for ever y Ph.D . ther e i s a n equa l an d opposit e Ph.D. " T h e smokescree n effect refer s t o "th e effor t t o ti e u p scientifi c traffi c wit h tru e bu t trivia l work, t o dra w attentio n awa y fro m wha t i s reall y goin g o n " (1995 : 10—11) . The analysi s o f interest s need s mor e theoretica l wor k alon g thes e lines , tha t is, directe d towar d obviousl y intereste d scienc e i n publi c controversies , rather tha n mor e theoretica l wor k tha t fret s ove r th e imputatio n proble m for case s o f academic controvers y i n relativel y autonomou s field s o f researc h (Hess 1997a) .

The Bath School, Replication, and Controversies A secon d majo r approac h t o th e sociolog y o f scientific knowledg e i s know n as the "Bat h school. " Th e so-calle d Bat h schoo l wa s reall y onl y on e person , Harry Collins , althoug h i t als o include d hi s forme r student s Trevo r Pinc h and Davi d Travis . Unlik e th e Edinburg h schoo l interest s analyses , whic h tended t o focu s o n macrosociologica l interest s an d us e historica l methods , the Bat h schoo l studie s focuse d o n microsociologica l processe s an d use d observational methods . However , bot h th e Edinburg h an d Bat h studie s examined controversies , probabl y becaus e i t wa s easie r t o demonstrat e th e social shapin g o f scienc e whe n i t enter s phase s o f shar p interna l division . Both als o wer e empirica l researc h tradition s tha t wer e consisten t wit h th e strong program . Collins viewe d scientifi c controversie s a s neithe r norma l scienc e no r a scientific revolution , t o us e Kuhn's term s (1970) . In othe r words , controver sies represen t a phas e i n whic h scientist s an d othe r actor s "tr y t o mak e major change s i n wha t i s take n fo r grante d withou t reformin g th e whol e structure" (Collin s 1983 : 93-94) . Collin s s empirica l progra m o f relativis m

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(EPOR) ha s thre e stages : (1 ) demonstratin g th e "interpretiv e flexibility" o f experimental results , tha t is , thei r abilit y t o b e subjec t t o mor e tha n on e interpretation; (2 ) analyzin g th e mechanism s b y whic h closur e i s achieved ; and (3 ) linking th e mechanism s o f closure t o th e wide r socia l structure . T h e third stag e wa s onl y sketche d ou t fo r th e gravit y wave s case , a s discusse d above. T o understan d th e mechanism s o f closur e i n th e secon d stage , Collins focuse d o n th e "cor e set " o f expert s an d laboratories . T h e concep t of a cor e se t i s on e exampl e o f a networ k concep t i n SSK . However , Collins's cor e se t i s les s heterogeneou s tha n th e understandin g o f network s in actor-networ k theor y becaus e i t i s human-centered , an d furthermor e the cor e se t involve s a temporar y networ k o f conflictin g individual s an d networks rathe r tha n a growing, larg e networ k o f allies an d enrolle d parties . Pinch an d Bijke r (1987 ) extende d th e E P O R progra m t o technolog y studies i n thei r formulatio n o f th e socia l constructio n o f technolog y pro gram (SCOT) . The y follo w mor e o r les s th e sam e stage s a s Collins s E P O R , but the y replac e som e o f th e terms . Fo r example , th e ter m "relevan t socia l group" replace s th e ter m "cor e set, " an d "stabilization " o f a technolog y replaces th e "closure " o f a scientifi c controversy . Thei r exampl e involve s the stabilizatio n o f desig n i n th e histor y o f th e bicycle . I n th e lat e nine teenth centur y a number o f design s wer e available , an d the y mean t differen t things t o differen t group s (interpretiv e flexibility). Thes e group s wer e con cerned wit h differen t feature s o f th e design , suc h a s safety , speed , an d vibration. Eventually , th e moder n for m wit h tw o wheel s o f equivalen t siz e and balloon tire s emerge d a s the stabl e desig n tha t me t mos t o f the concern s of th e relevan t group s (stabilization) . A s i n Collins' s studies , th e thir d stage o f th e analysis—linkin g closur e o r stabilizatio n t o th e wide r socia l structure—remains relativel y undeveloped . Collins an d Pinc h (1979 ) als o distinguishe d th e constitutiv e f o r u m — which include s theorizing , experimenting , an d publishing—fro m th e con tingent forum , whic h include s joining professiona l organizations , recruitin g new members , gossiping , an d discussin g scientifi c idea s i n popula r journal s and settings . Thi s distinctio n i s mor e o r les s a versio n o f conten t versu s context. The y us e thi s distinctio n t o questio n th e vie w tha t actio n i n th e constitutive foru m i s purely rationa l an d no t subjec t t o contingen t o r socia l factors. Thus , the y contribut e t o criticism s o f th e distinctio n betwee n th e contexts o f discover y an d justification , a s wel l a s descriptiv e account s o f evaluation an d theor y choic e i n scienc e tha t assum e onl y Mertonia n norm s or Kuhnlik e universalisti c values . O n e o f th e Bat h school' s best-know n contribution s t o th e analysi s o f

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controversies i s th e demonstratio n o f th e ambiguit y o f replication . I f on e asks scientist s h o w a controvers y shoul d b e resolved , the y wil l probabl y sa y through replication . Presumabl y a goo d experimen t woul d provid e a n impersonal solutio n t o sometime s bitte r controversies . M u c h o f th e appea l of science , includin g socia l science , i s tha t w e thin k o f evidenc e a s playin g a significan t rol e i n th e resolutio n o f controversies . Collin s s sociologica l analysis o f replication i s therefore importan t becaus e i t challenge s a simplis tic mode l o f replicatio n a s a purel y algorithmi c proces s tha t coul d resolv e controversies i n a n asocia l way . Collin s s ideal-typical algorithmi c mode l o f replication ha s si x stages : (i ) rejec t al l activitie s tha t hav e nothin g t o d o with replication ; (2 ) rejec t al l activitie s tha t ar e no t experiments ; (3 ) rejec t all remainin g experiment s i n whic h th e identit y o f th e experimente r i s inappropriate; (4 ) rejec t al l remaining experiment s tha t wer e no t competen t copies o f th e experimen t tha t i s bein g replicated ; (5 ) divid e th e remainin g set int o thos e tha t generate d negativ e result s an d thos e tha t generate d positive results ; an d (6 ) decid e whethe r th e experimen t ha s bee n replicate d (Collins 1985) . Althoug h thi s algorith m sound s rathe r simple—somethin g that coul d b e fleshe d out , codified , an d writte n u p a s a se t o f bureaucrati c standard operatin g procedure s o r a s a compute r program—Collin s argue d that i n practic e replicatio n decision s depen d o n a numbe r o f nonforma l issues tha t canno t b e reduce d t o forma l rules . H e advocate d a n alternative , "enculturational" mode l t o describ e mor e accuratel y th e way s i n whic h replicating a n experimen t require d informa l knowledge , craftlik e technica l skills, an d interpretation . Fo r example , h e foun d tha t i n th e cas e o f a n attempt t o replicat e a lase r technology , thos e w h o wer e successfu l usuall y had th e benefi t o f informal, persona l communication . Collins introduce d th e ter m "experimenter s regress " fo r a problem tha t emerges i n controversie s ove r replication . Conside r tw o group s o f peopl e in a cor e set : th e advocate s o f a give n empirica l clai m an d th e critics . Advocates ca n alway s argu e tha t a failur e t o replicat e a n experimen t i s because th e replicatio n wa s a n incompeten t cop y o f th e origina l desig n an d protocol. Likewise , critic s ca n argu e tha t th e sam e experimen t i s a compe tent cop y o f th e origina l desig n an d protocol , an d therefor e i t constitute s evidence tha t th e origina l clai m i s false . Collin s suggest s tha t t o solv e th e dispute ove r th e replicatio n desig n a s a competent copy , on e need s t o kno w whether th e origina l clai m i s true o r false , bu t tha t i s what th e replicatio n i s intended t o settle . O n e coul d perfor m anothe r experimen t t o solv e th e problem, bu t a s in th e philosophica l proble m o f induction, a negative resul t

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would stil l no t prov e tha t th e origina l clai m wa s false . T h e controvers y could begi n ane w ove r th e ne w experiment . Collins argue s tha t becaus e experimenta l abilit y i s a skill-like knowledg e that canno t b e reduce d t o a n algorithm , i t i s alway s possibl e t o disagre e about whic h experiment s constitut e competen t copies . Therefore , "Som e 'nonscientific' tactic s mus t b e employe d becaus e th e resource s o f experi ment alon e ar e no t sufficient " (1985 : 143) . T h e descriptiv e clai m tha t nonscientific factor s pla y som e causa l rol e i n th e resolutio n o f a controvers y seems commonsensical . O n e migh t hypothesiz e tha t i n mos t case s a mixtur e of evidenc e an d nonevidentia l (social ) factor s play s a rol e i n th e resolutio n of scientifi c controversies ; th e mi x o f ho w muc h on e sid e o r th e othe r influenced th e outcom e woul d var y fro m cas e t o case . Thi s vie w woul d b e consistent wit h th e constructiv e realis m positio n outline d i n chapte r 2 . However, Collin s goe s o n t o mak e a second, stronge r argument . In th e cas e o f a controvers y ove r th e existenc e o f measurabl e gravit y waves, Collin s acknowledge s th e weigh t o f a string o f negative experiment s that serve d t o isolat e th e principa l advocat e (1985 : 92-96) . However , th e critics themselve s wer e no t al l i n agreement , an d man y foun d desig n flaws in eac h o f th e experiment s o f othe r critics . A s a result, th e controvers y ha d not ye t achieve d closure . The n a leader o f th e critic s emerge d w h o crystal lized th e critica l mas s o f opinio n i n th e cor e se t agains t th e proponent . Thi s leader's experimen t wa s no t particularl y wel l designed , bu t h e presente d a careful dat a analysi s an d a stron g argumen t tha t th e origina l clai m wa s spurious. T h e grou p associate d wit h th e leade r o f th e critic s als o circulate d a pape r o n pathologica l science . T h e leade r stated , "I f w e ha d writte n a n ordinary paper , tha t just sai d w e ha d a look an d w e didn' t fin d [it] , it woul d have just sun k withou t trace " (1985 : 95) . Collin s suggest s tha t th e evidenc e is importan t bu t no t determining ; instead , nonevidentia l factor s suc h a s strong rhetori c an d th e circulatio n o f th e pape r o n pathologica l scienc e were necessar y t o crystalliz e consensus . O n e migh t eve n accep t thi s secon d argumen t a s fa r a s i t goes : i n som e cases, nonevidentia l factor s pla y a determinin g rol e i n th e resolutio n o f controversies, o r a t leas t i n th e timin g o f th e resolution . However , Collin s takes thi s secon d argumen t eve n furthe r b y generalizin g it . I n th e conclu sions t o hi s stud y o n replication , Collin s extend s hi s positio n t o a stron g claim o f epistemologica l relativism . H e suggest s tha t h e ha s foun d a socio logical solutio n t o th e proble m o f induction , tha t is , th e proble m o f justification fo r deductivel y invali d inference s (inference s fro m experimenta l dat a

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to genera l laws) . Onc e th e cor e se t agree s o n whethe r o r no t th e p h e n o m ena exist , the n th e controvers y i s closed . "I t i s no t th e regularit y o f th e world tha t impose s itsel f on ou r sense s but th e regularit y o f ou r institution alized belief s tha t impose s itsel f on th e world " (1985 : 148) . O n e migh t b e incline d t o dismis s thi s secon d argumen t a s a n inconsis tency, bu t Collin s make s i t ove r an d ove r agai n i n hi s publishe d work . Fo r example, h e argue s tha t hi s framewor k extend s th e symmetr y principl e o f the stron g progra m a s follows : " O n e implicatio n o f symmetr y i s tha t th e natural worl d mus t b e treate d a s thoug h i t di d no t affec t ou r versio n o f it " (1983: 88) . I n anothe r essay , h e describe s hi s versio n o f relativis m a s th e "prescription t o trea t th e object s i n th e natura l worl d a s thoug h ou r belief s about the m ar e no t cause d b y thei r existence " (Collin s 1994a : 294-95) . Furthermore, Collin s present s a Rorschachlik e drawin g o f "reality, " whic h suggests tha t th e E P O R framewor k assume s a highl y plasti c natura l worl d (Collins 1983) . A s philosopher s hav e pointe d out , th e E P O R framewor k i s asymmetrical i n tha t th e socia l worl d i s apparentl y mor e real , mor e struc tured, an d mor e causall y efficaciou s i n th e resolutio n o f controversie s tha n the natura l worl d (Hul l 1988 : 4-5) . Thus, wherea s Collin s s first argument—tha t socia l factors o r tactic s pla y a rol e i n th e closur e o f som e o r eve n al l controversies—i s a good correctiv e to naiv e view s o f scienc e a s guided b y purel y Mertonia n norms , hi s secon d argument i s ver y problemati c becaus e i t crosse s ove r int o epistemologica l relativism. O n e ca n se e th e proble m b y applyin g i t reflexivel y t o Collin s s own claims . A numbe r o f studie s b y othe r socia l scientist s clai m t o hav e replicated hi s claim s tha t th e resource s o f th e experimen t alon e ar e no t sufficient t o resolv e a controversy . However , thos e studie s i n tur n rais e a reflexivity issu e regardin g th e statu s o f a replicatio n o f a findin g tha t problematizes replicatio n (Ashmor e 1989 ; Collin s 1994b) . O n e i s bac k t o the issu e o f prescription: ho w shoul d on e justify a claim tha t replicatio n ha s been achieved ? W h e n Collin s argue s tha t h e ha s foun d a sociologica l solutio n t o th e problem o f induction , h e confuse s descriptio n an d prescription . Eve n i f one wer e t o accep t Collin s s argument a s a vali d descriptio n o f ho w a few , some, o r eve n al l replicatio n controversie s ar e resolved , h e doe s no t answe r the questio n o f ho w the y shoul d b e resolved . T h e proble m o f inductio n a s a prescriptiv e proble m remain s unsolved , unles s h e i s interprete d t o mea n that nonevidentia l factor s shoul d b e use d t o resolv e controversie s ove r replication. I sugges t tha t a prescriptiv e solutio n t o th e experimenter' s regress—and on e tha t ma y tur n ou t t o describ e th e closur e o f man y

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controversies—is tha t i t shoul d b e resolve d b y a n iterativ e proces s o f successive eliminatio n o f desig n flaws. I n othe r words , advocate s interpre t a failed replicatio n a s incompetent , an d th e cor e se t face s th e experimenter s regress. However , th e advocate s outlin e th e purporte d desig n flaws, an d th e experiment i s performed agai n wit h th e desig n flaws corrected . O f course , advocates ma y argu e tha t a new failur e ha s new desig n flaws, bu t th e infinit e regress i s more lik e a mathematical limi t tha t converge s o n a real numbe r o f either on e o r zero . A continue d strin g o f correction s an d faile d replication s would sugges t tha t th e advocates ' interpretatio n i s increasingl y improbable . O f course , Collin s s firs t argumen t woul d hol d becaus e ther e i s a socia l dimension t o th e proces s o f negotiatin g th e nex t desig n i n th e serie s o f iterations, an d ther e i s als o a socia l dimensio n t o th e timin g o f whe n a leader emerge s t o declar e th e controvers y over . However , thi s approac h avoids th e relativis m o f hi s secon d argument , becaus e th e prescriptio n fo r the resolutio n o f a controversy focuse s o n evidence . At roughl y th e sam e tim e Collin s wa s developin g hi s analysi s o f contro versies, H . Trista m Engelhardt , Jr. , an d Arthu r Capla n (1987 ) develope d a different analysi s o f th e closur e o f controversie s tha t avoid s th e relativis m o f Collins s second argument . Synthesizin g wor k b y othe r researcher s include d in th e volum e the y edited , the y argu e tha t closur e ca n tak e plac e vi a several mechanisms : los s o f interest , force , consensus , soun d argument , an d negotiation. B y "consensus"— a ter m Collin s use s t o describ e th e outcom e of a controversy—they appea r t o b e thinkin g abou t a mechanism simila r t o Kuhnian paradig m conversion . A subsequen t typolog y b y Sharo n Bede r (1991) include s redefinition , negotiation , soun d argumen t rhetoric , an d loss o f interest . Al l o f thes e remai n sociologica l description s o f closur e mechanisms, no t prescription s fo r ho w closur e shoul d b e achieved . Unde r these approaches , ther e i s n o singl e mode l fo r closure . Collins s secon d argument o n closur e a s mainly determine d b y socia l negotiation migh t eve n be descriptivel y valid , a s lon g a s i t i s pare d dow n t o reflec t on e typ e o f closure mechanis m tha t applie s t o som e historica l cases . T h e categor y o f sound argumen t rhetori c seem s t o b e a concessio n t o philosopher s tha t a t least som e case s o f closur e ma y follo w a mode l simila r t o th e prescriptiv e one outline d above . A proces s relate d t o closur e mechanism s i s sanitization , whic h refer s les s to th e closur e o f a specific controvers y tha n t o th e closur e o f the controver sial statu s o f a n entir e fiel d o f research . R o y Walli s argue s tha t controversia l sciences tha t fac e labelin g a s pseudosciences ma y follo w a policy o f sanitiza tion, tha t is , a concerte d attemp t t o distanc e th e theor y an d practic e

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from it s mor e notoriou s proponent s b y mean s o f professiona l associations , membership tha t require s hig h academi c credentials ; incorporatio n o f th e methodology o f accepte d scientifi c disciplines ; an d directio n o f fund s t o activities tha t ma y legitimat e th e knowledg e claims , suc h a s endowmen t o f research institute s o r chair s i n establishe d universitie s (1985 : 598) . Walli s cites academi c parapsycholog y a s th e exempla r o f a controversia l fiel d that ha s attempte d t o achiev e som e academi c respectabilit y b y adoptin g a sanitization strategy . Ove r th e year s th e fiel d graduall y develope d journals , a scientifi c organization , supportin g gran t organizations , an d institutiona l homes i n universitie s suc h a s Edinburgh an d Virginia . Thi s proces s i s simila r to th e professionalizatio n tha t ha s occurre d amon g som e alternativ e medica l groups suc h a s osteopath s (Bae r 1987 , 1989) . Onc e again , th e processe s o f sanitization an d professionalizatio n poin t t o th e socia l dimensio n o f th e resolution o f controversies . However , thes e analyse s d o no t impl y th e epistemological relativis m o f Collin s s second argument .

Laboratory Studies and Other Microsociological Approaches During th e lat e 1970 s an d earl y 1980s , anothe r alternativ e t o th e retrospec tive, historica l account s o f the Edinburg h interest s analyse s wa s th e observa tional stud y o f scientists i n th e laboratory . Thi s work , sometime s mistakenl y called th e "anthropology " o r "ethnography " o f science, i s better referre d t o as "laborator y studies. " T h e socia l scientist s wer e no t anthropologist s an d their method s di d no t correspon d t o standar d ethnographi c method s i n anthropology. However , thei r observationa l method s wer e attune d t o theo retical question s i n th e philosoph y an d sociolog y o f knowledge , an d a number o f concept s emerge d fro m th e laborator y studie s tha t wer e highl y influential. Probably th e mos t influentia l concep t i n thi s are a o f SS K wa s "indexi cality," a ter m tha t Kari n Knorr-Cetin a borrowe d fro m th e linguis t C . S . Peirce vi a ethnomethodolog y Indexicalit y describe s loca l variation s i n re search decisio n criteria : "Genera l criteri a ar e pos t ho c an d e x ant e schema tizations o f highe r orde r selection s whic h becom e meaningfu l an d conse quential onl y i n thei r indexica l forms , a s circumstantiall y occasione d selections" (1983 : 125) . I n othe r words , th e actua l practic e o f scienc e i s much messie r tha n late r report s woul d lea d u s t o believe . T o translat e Knorr-Cetina int o term s I hav e bee n using , universalisti c criteri a ar e subse quent justification s tha t ofte n obscur e th e rol e o f particularisti c criteri a i n

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actual decisions . Forma l report s ten d t o glos s ove r th e way s i n whic h scientific knowledg e productio n i s anchore d i n loca l settings , wit h al l th e local variables : offic e regulations , availabilit y o f la b equipment , variet y i n the material s used , la b assistant s w h o hav e slightl y differen t procedures , an d so on . Indexicalit y include s no t onl y th e contextua l o r loca l aspec t o f research bu t als o it s "situationa l contingency " (1981 : 33) . Th e latte r refer s to ho w circumstance s suc h a s unplanne d event s (e.g. , rat s tha t escape ) shape laborator y researc h decisions , whic h Knorr-Cetin a characterize s a s tinkering. Thus , i n a genera l wa y he r wor k i s consisten t wit h tha t o f th e Bath an d Edinburg h school s b y showin g ho w particularisti c criteri a pla y a nontrivial rol e i n th e technica l aspect s o f scientifi c decisio n making . Thi s approach tend s t o sho w ho w socia l factor s ente r int o decision s abou t wha t scientific knowledg e get s produced , i n othe r words , whic h problem s ar e "doable" (Fujimur a 1987) . Knorr-Cetina als o contribute d t o th e developmen t o f a n increasin g recognition o f network s a s th e foca l socia l unit s o f scienc e studies . Sh e di d this b y introducin g th e ide a o f "variabl e transscientifi c fields, " whic h refe r to network s tha t exten d beyon d scientifi c communitie s o r specialt y groups , including equipmen t suppliers , gran t agencies , administrators , an d s o o n (1981: 81-83) . Sh e thu s helpe d exten d th e concep t o f network s fro m a limited grou p o f discipline-boun d o r problem-boun d colleagues , a s i n Collins s cor e set , t o somethin g mor e flexibl e an d heterogeneou s approxi mating th e actor-network s o f th e Pari s school . Probably th e ke y conceptua l contributio n o f th e laborator y studie s wa s the ide a o f fac t construction . T h e discussio n o f fac t constructio n ha s been th e sourc e o f enormou s misunderstanding s an d controversie s wit h philosophers (an d no w th e scienc e studie s basher s o f the scienc e wars) , s o i t may hel p t o introduc e th e topi c b y distinguishin g a fac t fro m a n observa tion. I sugges t tha t a fact i s a widely accepte d observatio n o r empirica l law ; in othe r words , i t i s a n empirica l statemen t wit h a particula r socia l statu s that ca n b e analyze d independentl y o f it s epistemologica l statu s a s eithe r true o r false . I n thi s sense , ther e ca n b e tru e fact s o r fals e facts , just a s ther e can b e observation s tha t eithe r d o o r d o no t hav e th e statu s o f facts . Th e distinction betwee n fac t an d observatio n (or , better , empirica l statement ) may hel p bot h philosopher s an d socia l scientist s se e th e complementar y nature o f thei r frameworks . Bruno Latou r an d Stev e Woolga r (1986 : 77—79 ) distinguis h fiv e type s o f fact: typ e 1 , conjecture s o r speculations ; typ e 2 , statement s tha t contai n modalities tha t refe r t o evidenc e o r lac k o f it ; typ e 3 , claim s o f researc h

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finding usuall y attache d t o researchers ; typ e 4 , claim s o f generall y accepte d knowledge, usuall y i n textbooks , bu t stil l referenced; an d typ e 5 , taken-for granted commo n knowledge , s o obviou s tha t reference s ar e no t given . A modality i s a statemen t abou t anothe r statement , i n thi s cas e a qualifie r added t o claim s abou t th e truthfulnes s o f observations . Th e transitio n toward typ e 5 fact s linguisticall y involve s th e successiv e deletio n o f modal ities. Sometime s thi s proces s i s referre d t o a s black-boxing, especiall y whe n facts becom e inscribe d i n taken-for-grante d technologies . Latou r an d col leagues (1992 ) late r develope d thi s analysi s wit h thei r sociotechnica l graphs , that is , plots o f a science controvers y o r technologica l innovatio n agains t a n axis o f successiv e statement s ove r tim e an d a n axi s o f fac t modalization . These graph s provid e a n eas y visua l representatio n o f th e deletio n an d "undeletion" o f modalities i n a scientific controversy . To ge t som e sens e o f ho w thi s mode l ca n provid e a dynami c pictur e o f the rhetori c o f science , on e migh t conside r th e gradua l transformatio n o f a fact fro m a startin g poin t a s typ e 2 status : "Researc h grou p x think s i t ha s found a linkage betwee n beta-caroten e an d cance r prevention. " Thi s claim , perhaps afte r confirmin g studies , ma y eventuall y becom e a widely accepted , type 5 fact : "Give n th e linkag e betwee n beta-caroten e an d cance r preven tion . . ." I n thi s typ e o f statement , th e fac t i s taken-for-grante d knowledg e and no t linke d t o an y researc h group . Then , a ne w researc h grou p ma y produce a stud y tha t undermine s th e commo n knowledge , an d th e typ e 5 fact ma y b e demote d t o typ e 2 status: "Researc h grou p x s propose d linkag e between beta-caroten e an d cance r preventio n i s undermine d b y . . . " Thi s way o f thinkin g abou t th e socia l statu s o f observation s seem s ver y useful , provided tha t i t i s clearl y distinguishe d a s a description o f the histor y o f th e observation, no t a n evaluatio n o f it s epistemologica l status . Fact s ma y achieve a typ e 5 socia l statu s o f consensu s knowledge , bu t i t i s stil l possibl e to com e u p wit h grounde d reason s fo r wh y tha t consensu s knowledg e i s mistaken. Susan Leig h Sta r analyze s th e simila r transformatio n fro m "loca l uncer tainties" t o "globa l certainties. " Sh e develop s no t a se t o f stages , bu t a typology o f mechanism s b y whic h th e proces s take s place : "attributin g certainty t o th e result s o f othe r fields ; substitutin g processua l fo r productio n evaluations i n th e fac e o f technica l failures ; idea l typ e substitutions ; shiftin g clinical an d basi c evaluatio n criteria ; a d ho c generalizin g o f cas e studies ; and th e subsumin g o f epistemologica l question s i n interna l debates " (1985 : 391). He r analysi s contribute s t o a n understandin g o f th e rhetorica l move s

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that scientist s mak e i n orde r t o bolste r thei r viewpoin t o n th e statu s tha t specific researc h claim s shoul d hav e i n thei r communities . A thir d typ e o f laboratory stud y wa s develope d fro m ethnomethodolog y Founded i n th e 1950 s by Harol d Garfmkel , a student o f Talcott Parson s an d Alfred Schutz , thi s fiel d o f sociolog y studie d th e way s i n whic h peopl e in everyda y lif e develo p describin g procedure s tha t produc e behaviora l regularities an d socia l structures . I n contras t t o Parsonia n functionalism , ethnomethodologists questione d th e exten t t o whic h meaning s wer e share d across member s o f a socia l unit . I n scienc e studies , ethnomethodolog y i s associated wit h laborator y studie s tha t focuse d o n fine-graine d analyse s of scientists ' conversations. 5 Ethnomethodologis t Michae l Lync h (1992 ) distinguishes ethnomethodolog y an d discours e analysis , bu t th e tw o ar e closely related . Discours e analysi s examine s scientists ' account s o f thei r work, th e descriptio n o f th e variatio n o f thei r interpretiv e practices , an d the articulatio n o f tha t variatio n wit h socia l context . O n e o f the generall y importan t finding s o f ethnomethodology/discours e analysis i s tha t th e meanin g o r interpretatio n o f th e sam e theories , observa tions, o r event s ofte n shift s acros s register s o f discourse . Fo r example , comparisons o f spoke n versu s writte n discours e o r letter s versu s forma l write-ups ofte n provid e ver y differen t version s o f th e sam e even t (Mulkay , Potter, an d Yearle y 1983) . Althoug h thi s findin g i s suggeste d i n th e othe r laboratory studies , i t i s develope d mor e clearl y i n th e ethnomethodolog y and discours e analysi s literature. T h e findin g i s important becaus e i t render s complicated socia l studie s o f scienc e tha t rel y o n on e registe r o r tha t tak e scientists' memoir s o r intervie w account s a t fac e value . Notwithstanding thes e interestin g findings , discours e analysi s ha s bee n faulted fo r bein g restricte d t o th e variabilit y o f scientists ' accounts . Conse quently, i t fail s t o develo p mor e profoundl y sociologica l o r cultura l analyses , a second-orde r mov e tha t i s essential i n critica l an d policy-oriente d project s (Webster 1991 : 28-32) . I n othe r words , a s wit h som e o f th e standpoin t epistemologies, i t remain s to o closel y roote d i n emi c account s an d doe s no t progress t o a second-order analysi s o f local representations . The laborator y studie s o f th e 1970 s an d 1980 s share d a n emphasi s o n observational researc h tha t focuse d o n wha t scientist s actuall y d o i n th e laboratory. Althoug h laborator y studie s largel y disappeare d fro m th e scienc e studies literatur e b y th e 1990s , thei r legac y o f emphasizin g wha t scientist s do wa s continue d i n th e 1990 s i n researc h o n science-as-practice . Fo r example, Andre w Pickerin g argue s tha t previou s studie s o f physics , suc h a s

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Kuhn's wor k o n paradig m change , ten d t o overemphasiz e theory . Pickerin g has worke d instea d t o sho w ho w scientifi c researc h involve s a comple x triangulation o f thre e elements : " a materia l procedur e (assemblin g an d running a piec e o f apparatus) , a n interpretiv e mode l ( a theoretica l under standing o f ho w th e apparatu s functioned) , an d a phenomena l mode l ( a theoretical understandin g o f th e phenomeno n unde r investigation) " (1995 : 48). Pickerin g argue s tha t scientist s a s actor s mus t overcom e resistance s posed b y eac h o f thes e elements . A simila r model , develope d b y historia n Peter Galison , differ s fro m tha t o f Pickerin g b y viewin g th e resistance s as mor e implacabl e "constraints." 6 Th e cultur e concept , a s develope d i n anthropology an d discusse d i n th e nex t chapter , als o bridge s th e divid e between though t an d practice . Another largel y microsociologica l framewor k tha t als o emphasize d prac tice wa s socia l world s theory . A descenden t o f th e Chicag o schoo l o f sociology, th e pragmatis t emphasi s o f thi s win g o f sociolog y lead s t o a n emphasis o n practic e an d work . W e hav e alread y encountere d th e influenc e of one Chicag o schoo l vi a th e pragmatis t win g o f the philosoph y o f science . Chicago wa s importan t i n America n sociolog y a s th e hom e o f th e firs t sociology department . T h e ter m "Chicag o school " therefor e ha s differen t meanings fo r philosopher s an d sociologists. 7 I n sociology , th e earl y twenti eth-century Chicag o schoo l o f R o b e r t Park , Albio n Small , W . I . Thomas , and Ernes t Burges s wa s influentia l fo r it s theorizatio n o f attitudes , studie s of rac e relations , an d us e o f ethnographi c method s i n communit y studies . George Herber t Mea d o f th e philosoph y department—togethe r wit h soci ology colleague s suc h a s Burges s an d Thoma s an d hi s studen t Herber t Blumer (i n th e sociolog y departmen t fro m 192 7 t o 1952)—le d th e devel opment o f th e symboli c interactionis t win g o f Chicag o sociology . I n tur n this sociologica l traditio n becam e th e basi s fo r th e socia l world s approac h used b y ST S analyst s suc h a s Adele Clarke , Joan Fujimura , an d Susa n Leig h Star. A socia l worl d i s a uni t o f discours e "no t bounde d b y geograph y o r formal membershi p 'bu t b y th e limit s o f effectiv e communication ' " (Clarke 1990 : 19) . Th e pragmatis t emphasi s o n wor k an d activit y distin guishes th e concep t somewha t fro m Collins' s cor e se t o r Knorr-Cetina' s transscientific fields . ST S researcher s associate d wit h socia l world s theor y have introduce d severa l concept s int o th e interdisciplinar y conversation . I n an analysi s o f "doable " problem s i n science , Fujimur a show s ho w scientist s negotiate disparat e demand s fro m differen t socia l worlds , suc h a s thos e o f their employe r an d thei r scientifi c disciplin e (1987) . T o achiev e success ,

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scientists must find problem s tha t crosscu t o r align differen t socia l worlds in a proces s simila r t o th e enrollment s o f actor-networ k theory . "Boundar y objects," a s scientific object s tha t "inhabi t severa l intersecting socia l world s . . . an d satisf y th e informationa l requirement s o f eac h o f them, " becom e crucial to this process of aligning different socia l worlds (Sta r and Grieseme r 1989: 393) . Fujimura als o introduce d th e ide a o f a scientifi c bandwagon , whic h occurs "whe n larg e number s o f people , laboratories , an d organization s commit thei r resource s t o on e approac h t o a problem" (1987 : 261). Mor e than a network , i t describe s a n increasin g return s phenomeno n i n th e selection o f scientific problem s suc h tha t researcher s ten d t o flock t o "hot " areas. A n exampl e i s th e snowballin g o f research , researchers , an d institu tions tha t entere d molecula r biolog y cance r researc h i n th e Unite d State s by the earl y 1980s . Fujimura argue s tha t th e succes s o f the bandwago n wa s due t o severa l factors, includin g a theory-method packag e tha t mad e "do able" problems (norma l science ) possible , the existenc e o f new DN A tech niques, th e realizatio n tha t nove l informatio n coul d b e rapidl y produced , and the support o f funding institutions . Again, the concept o f a bandwagon articulates wit h networ k theories ; a bandwago n migh t b e viewe d a s a particular typ e of rapid network growth . In summary , th e Bat h school , th e laborator y studies , ethnomethodol ogy/discourse analysis , and socia l worlds theor y al l provided alternative s t o the interest s analyse s o f th e Edinburg h school . The y als o move d scienc e studies method s awa y fro m relianc e o n historica l record s t o a variet y o f sources includin g observations , interviews , an d al l sort s o f othe r record s that ar e usuall y no t archived . Th e resul t wa s tha t thes e studie s provide d detailed insight s int o ho w particularisti c value s an d loca l contingencie s permeated th e knowledge-making process, and they provided a new vocabulary for conceptualizin g various aspects of the constructio n process . How ever, th e grea t macrosociologica l issue s opene d u p b y th e Edinburg h school—class, th e state , race , gender , colonialism , historica l transforma tions—were largel y irrelevan t fo r a kin d o f analysi s tha t focuse d o n th e making o f scienc e i n smal l groups , networks , an d shiftin g institutiona l fields. A s a result, th e critica l potential o f SSK was limited. I t i s interestin g that subsequen t analyse s by Star (1995) , Clarke (Clark e an d Montini 1993) , and t o som e exten t Fujimur a (1995 ) hav e move d awa y fro m socia l world s theory t o analyse s tha t revea l a greate r concer n wit h thes e broade r issues . Likewise, subsequen t wor k b y th e forme r discours e analys t Steve n Yearle y (1996) reveal s a chang e i n problematic s t o broade r politica l an d societa l

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issues. Fo r thi s reason , thei r subsequen t wor k coul d b e classifie d mor e a s contributing t o th e postconstructivis t wav e o f critica l an d cultura l studie s o f science an d technolog y tha t wil l b e discusse d i n th e nex t chapter . However , other SS K researcher s dismis s th e argumen t tha t ther e i s a nee d t o retai n some concep t o f societ y o r cultur e a s part o f a goo d theor y o f science ; th e actor-network theorist s advocat e instea d tha t th e analysi s shoul d focu s o n individuals an d networks .

Network Theories The networ k concep t ca n b e viewe d broadl y t o cove r a wid e rang e o f studies tha t recogniz e th e fundamenta l insigh t tha t informa l socia l linkage s play a n importan t par t i n th e makin g o f science . Fo r example , th e previou s chapter include d a discussio n o f invisibl e colleges , specialt y groups , cocita tion networks , an d othe r form s o f networ k analysis . I n thi s chapte r th e agnostic alliance s o f Restiv o an d Randal l Collins , th e cor e se t an d relevan t social group s o f th e E P O R / S C O T programs , th e transscientifi c field s o f Knorr-Cetina, an d th e socia l world s o f Clarke , Fujimura , an d Sta r ar e al l examples o f attempt s t o thin k abou t th e socia l unit s o f scienc e beyon d formal organizationa l term s suc h a s laboratories , departments , researc h institutions, an d disciplines . Likewise , som e historian s hav e develope d a n interest i n researc h schools , o r group s withi n scienc e tha t ar e usuall y large r than a laboratory, tha t ofte n bu t no t alway s includ e teacher s an d student s o r former students , an d tha t ar e unite d b y a commo n doctrine , method , o r style (Geisse n an d Holme s 1993) . I n thi s sense , on e coul d argu e tha t som e version o f a network i s a t th e cor e o f th e majo r theorie s o f the sociolog y o f scientific knowledge , just a s it ha s been a t th e cor e o f many o f the empirica l research project s o f the institutiona l sociolog y o f science . In technolog y studies , networ k theorie s hav e als o been highl y influential , and no t onl y i n th e S C O T progra m describe d above . Perhap s th e best known developmen t o f th e networ k concep t i n technolog y studie s i s th e work o f historia n Thoma s Hughe s (1987) , w h o extende d hi s researc h o n the histor y o f electric powe r system s t o a general mode l o f large technologi cal systems . Thes e system s ar e hierarchicall y organize d an d includ e divers e components suc h a s people , machines , organizations , scientifi c research , regulatory laws , an d natura l resources . Hughe s recognize s a n exogenou s environment tha t ca n influenc e system s o r tha t system s i n tur n ca n control . An exampl e o f th e forme r i s fossi l fuels , o n whic h electri c system s ar e

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dependent, an d a n exampl e o f the latte r i s a fully owne d subsidiar y corpora tion. Hughe s als o distinguishe s betwee n huma n an d nonhuma n c o m p o nents o f the syste m becaus e human s hav e "degree s o f freedom no t possesse d by artifacts " (54) . These larg e technologica l system s ten d t o g o throug h phase s o f growth . As Hughe s outlines , During inventio n an d developmen t inventor-entrepreneur s solv e critica l problems; durin g innovation , competition , an d growt h manager-entrepre neurs mak e crucia l decisions ; an d durin g consolidatio n an d rationalizatio n financier-entrepreneurs an d consulting engineers, especially those with polit ical influence , ofte n solv e th e critica l problem s associate d wit h growt h an d momentum. (1987 : 57) Systems acquir e m o m e n t u m ove r time , bu t Hughe s caution s agains t th e mistaken vie w tha t th e system s ar e autonomou s an d no t subjec t t o huma n control (76) . System s ma y als o encounte r revers e salients , o r "component s of a syste m tha t hav e falle n behin d o r ou t o f phas e wit h th e others " (73) . Reverse salient s ar e somethin g lik e bottleneck s i n a network; thes e laggin g components ofte n requir e adjustment s o r compensatio n fro m othe r c o m p o nents i n th e system . Finally , system s acquir e distinctiv e styles , particularl y national styles , whic h h e notice d i n hi s comparativ e studie s o f electri c power systems. 8 Another sustaine d an d detaile d attemp t t o theoriz e network s i s actor network theory . T h e theor y i s largely th e produc t o f Michel Callon , Brun o Latour, an d colleague s a t th e Ecol e de s Mines , an d sometime s thei r wor k i s called th e Pari s schoo l o f STS. However , man y other s hav e used , supported , or extende d actor-networ k theory . Fo r example , John La w formulate d th e concept o f heterogeneou s engineerin g t o refe r t o th e proces s b y whic h "the stabilit y an d for m o f artifact s shoul d b e see n a s th e functio n o f heterogeneous [social , natural , an d technical ] element s a s thes e ar e shape d and assimilate d int o a network " (1987 : 113) . T h e concep t o f "heterogene ity" bridge s man y o f th e approache s i n networ k theory , includin g th e wor k of Hughes , Law , Callon , an d Latour . A s formulate d i n actor-networ k theory, a principl e o f extende d symmetr y i s th e basi s fo r treatin g socia l agents, objects , an d text s a s "entities " o n th e sam e leve l i n a heterogeneous , sociotechnical network . I n general , th e ter m "heterogeneity " ha s com e t o mean an y mixtur e o f socia l an d ostensibl y nonsocia l elements , usuall y vi a a network. T h e concep t o f a heterogeneous ensembl e als o appear s i n Miche l Foucault's discussion s o f th e apparatu s o f powe r (1979) . Likewise , Donn a

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Haraway's discussion s o f hybrid s an d cyborg s als o poin t t o simila r crossing s of nature/culture o r technical/huma n boundarie s (1989) . In on e o f th e man y critique s o f actor-networ k theory , historia n o f science Yve s Gingra s argue s tha t actor-networ k theorist s ma y confus e identities an d relation s i n thei r account s o f heterogeneou s entitie s (1995) . Gingras argue s tha t i n practic e actor-networ k analyse s maintai n distinction s between technica l an d social , o r natura l an d cultural , entities , whic h there fore hav e separat e identitie s an d ar e linke d vi a networks . Gingras' s criticis m is simila r t o tha t o f other s w h o hav e pointe d ou t tha t heterogeneou s explanations o f scientifi c event s provid e a wa y o f lettin g natur e bac k i n t o constructivist account s o f ho w theorie s com e t o b e accepte d (e.g. , Gier e 1993). T h e exten t t o whic h th e constraint s o r resistance s o f th e materia l world ar e grante d a causa l rol e i n heterogeneou s account s varie s amon g th e actor-network theorists ; som e account s ar e moderat e constructivis t an d others ar e close r t o wha t I cal l radica l constructivism . However , actor network theor y ha s th e advantag e ove r earlie r frameworks , suc h a s E P O R and the laboratory studies , in that it tends to sidestep the philosophical confu sion ove r relativis m b y providin g a way fo r natur e o r evidenc e t o influenc e the outcom e o f scientific dispute s an d technologica l controversies . In actor-networ k theory , agenc y i s a matte r o f attribution ; i n thi s sens e things ca n hav e agenc y base d o n thei r positio n i n a network . Thus , actor network theor y call s fo r a ne w sociolog y tha t follow s th e attributio n o f agency. A numbe r o f term s t o describ e thi s ne w sociolog y hav e emerged . An "actant, " sometime s use d instea d o f th e "actor " o f classical socia l theor y such a s Parsonia n functionalism , i s define d alternativel y a s an y entit y en dowed wit h a n abilit y t o ac t o r "whoeve r o r whateve r i s represented " (Callon 1994 : 53 ; Latour 1987 : 84) . Representation s ar e th e designatio n o f someone o r somethin g a s a spokesperso n fo r a n actan t (anothe r person , object, institution , o r network) . The theor y o f actant s i s confusin g t o man y peopl e an d remain s contro versial. Becaus e actio n i n classica l Parsonia n socia l theor y involve s th e ide a of a goa l stat e o r intention , nonhuma n entitie s canno t b e actor s becaus e they d o no t hav e intention s an d goals . Furthermore , a s som e critic s hav e pointed out , an y theorist s w h o pu t human s o n pa r wit h thing s nee d t o b e careful o f maintainin g prescriptive/descriptiv e distinctions ; otherwise , the y might soo n ru n int o lega l argument s abou t th e right s o f things ove r people . It seem s mor e fruitfu l t o thin k o f actor-networ k theor y a s attemptin g t o give a name t o th e commo n processe s whereb y thing s ar e endowe d wit h a n ability t o influenc e huma n action s throug h delegatio n o r representation . A

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traffic ligh t i s a mundan e bu t credibl e example ; i n mos t situation s th e machine ha s "agency " i n th e sens e tha t i t "causes " peopl e t o sto p an d g o i n an orderl y way . T h e genera l framewor k o f actor-networ k theor y i s calle d a sociolog y o f translation. Th e metapho r seem s t o bridg e linguistic/semioti c analysi s wit h molecular biology . Translatio n refer s t o th e mean s b y which on e entit y give s a rol e t o others. 9 Th e fou r "moments " o f translatio n ar e problematization , interessement, enrollment , an d mobilization . Problematizatio n refer s t o th e process o f definin g th e issu e i n suc h a wa y tha t othe r actor s accep t one' s definition o f th e problem . The y graduall y com e t o accep t one s knowledg e claims o r technolog y a s an obligator y poin t o f passage, tha t is , as a necessar y means t o solvin g thei r problem . I n Callon' s terms , "W e wan t wha t yo u want, s o all y yourselve s wit h u s b y endorsin g ou r researc h an d yo u wil l have a greate r chanc e o f obtainin g wha t yo u want " (1994 : 52) . Interesse ment mean s imposin g an d stabilizin g th e role s o f th e othe r actor s define d by one' s problematization , an d enrollment , th e resul t o f interessement , i s the devic e b y whic h actors/entitie s ar e anchore d t o th e networ k i n interre lated roles . Finally , mobilizatio n i s th e achievemen t o f desire d representa tives t o ac t a s spokespersons o f othe r entitie s (Callo n 1986) . In actor-networ k theory , context/conten t ar e no t distinc t bu t instea d the mutua l product s o f networks . Fact s an d technologie s flow alon g net works, an d a s networks expan d an d becom e mor e robust , knowledg e claim s become mor e accepte d (mor e "factual" ) an d technologie s mor e successful . Likewise, socia l structur e changes . I n wha t actor-networ k theorist s vie w a s a kin d o f Copernica n shift , socia l structur e i s n o longe r a causa l shapin g factor fo r network s bu t th e outcom e o f previou s network s an d thei r con flicting relation s i n a n agonisti c field. An exampl e o f the eleganc e o f this framewor k i s seen i n Latour' s analysi s of Loui s Pasteu r (1983 , 1988) . I n "Giv e M e a Laborator y an d I Wil l Rais e the World, " Latou r (1983 ) focuse s o n on e aspec t o f Pasteur' s career , hi s successful interventio n int o th e anthra x disease . Pasteu r problematize s th e disease b y definin g i t a s a potential bacteria l infection , rathe r tha n a condi tion impose d b y ba d air s o r ba d fields. Therefore , Pasteu r propose s tha t h e may b e abl e t o find a solutio n t o th e problem . B y movin g hi s laborator y out int o th e field, Pasteu r learns fro m th e loca l knowledge o f the veterinari ans an d translate s tha t knowledg e int o hi s ow n bacteriologica l framework : For instance , th e spor e o f th e bacillu s (show n b y Koch ) i s th e translatio n through whic h dorman t field s ca n suddenl y becom e infectiou s eve n afte r

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many years . Th e "spor e phase " i s the laborator y translatio n o f the "infecte d field" i n the farmer's language . (1983 : 145 ) Pasteur the n return s wit h thi s knowledge , an d th e bacteria l pathogen , t o his laboratory , wher e h e succeed s i n producin g th e diseas e i n experimenta l animals. H e ha s no w translate d th e diseas e int o hi s bacteriologica l frame work, an d h e i s abl e t o interes t hi s potentia l allie s b y makin g hi s laborator y an obligator y poin t o f passage: "I f you wis h t o solv e you r anthra x problem , you hav e t o pas s throug h m y laborator y first " (146) . Althoug h th e labora tory i s smal l i n compariso n wit h th e scal e o f th e disease , th e veterinaria n profession, an d th e agricultura l industry , Pasteur' s translatio n o f th e diseas e serves a s a fulcru m tha t redistribute s th e configuratio n o f force s o r entities . In othe r words , th e powe r equatio n i s altered , an d th e smal l laborator y becomes mor e powerful . However , t o enrol l th e allies—t o secur e the m i n his network—Pasteu r mus t retur n t o th e fiel d an d demonstrat e th e efficac y of hi s vaccine . Pasteur' s theor y an d vaccin e no w becom e availabl e al l ove r France; th e smal l laborator y i s no w multiplie d i n scal e t o includ e al l o f France. "Frenc h society , i n som e o f it s importan t aspects , ha s bee n trans formed throug h th e displacement s o f a few laboratories " (153) . One ca n se e th e appea l an d eleganc e o f actor-networ k theor y a s a description o f successfu l scientifi c an d technologica l entrepreneurship . I t i s also possibl e t o understan d th e clai m tha t Pasteu r i n som e sens e change s French society . Indeed , toda y w e liv e i n a "pasteurized " world . However , there i s no compellin g evidenc e tha t network s ar e th e caus e o f fundamenta l aspects o f society suc h a s the clas s structure , th e patriarchy , an d colonialism . Pasteur i s les s lik e a socia l revolutionar y tha n a friendl y digestiv e trac t bacterium tha t find s a place fo r itsel f in it s host. T h e actor-networ k accoun t is excellen t a s a story o f a great ma n an d th e networ k h e erected ; i t i s als o a fine how-t o manua l fo r technica l entrepreneur s w h o wan t t o buil d a n empire b y ingratiatin g themselve s t o existin g interests . A s a theor y o f science, th e analysi s i s a luci d explanatio n o f wh y th e winner s win , eve n why would-b e winner s lose . However, th e theor y i s not ver y goo d a t explainin g wh y som e actor s ar e excluded fro m th e gam e an d wh y th e playin g fiel d i s no t level . Likewise , the accoun t provide s n o groun d fo r analyzin g pasteurizatio n a s a socia l an d technological phenomenon , considerin g it s shortcomings , an d developin g alternatives. Perhap s fo r thi s reaso n categorie s suc h a s race , class , gender , colonialism, an d industria l interest s ten d t o b e absen t fro m actor-networ k analyses. A whol e rang e o f question s remai n outsid e th e horizo n o f th e

Social Studies of Knowledge | 111 framework. Fo r example , wha t ar e th e implication s o f a cultur e o f germ s for socia l relation s betwee n in-group s an d out-groups ? D o w e wan t t o b e living i n a worl d wher e concer n wit h germ s get s translate d int o carcino genic househol d cleansin g products ? Or , fro m alternativ e medicin e circle s that I study , doe s th e pasteurizatio n o f mil k denatur e protein s an d lea d t o chronic disease ? A relate d proble m i s the tendenc y fo r actor-networ k account s t o explai n social actio n instrumentally , tha t is , withou t recours e t o th e noninstrumen tal cultura l meaning s attribute d t o actio n b y actors . I n som e actor-networ k accounts scientist s appea r t o b e relativel y unidimensiona l actor s w h o ar e somewhere betwee n power-hungr y monster s an d th e rationa l optimizer s o f neoclassical economics . I n thi s sens e th e theor y tend s t o fal l victi m t o th e flattening kind s o f account s tha t wer e originall y raise d agains t neo-Marxis t interests analyse s tha t reduce d scientist s t o interes t dopes . T h e antidot e t o this approac h i s a mor e cultura l approac h tha t begin s wit h th e web s o f meaning i n whic h scientist s ar e suspende d an d thei r ow n view s o f th e world. However , unlik e discours e analysi s an d ethnomethodology , th e anal ysis would no t en d wit h actors ' viewpoint s bu t instea d woul d connec t the m to large r structure s an d values . Thus , withou t rejectin g th e achievement s o f actor-network theory , I conten d tha t socia l studie s o f scientifi c knowledg e needs t o mov e i n a different directio n tha t grant s powe r an d cultur e a mor e prominent role : powe r a s i t i s embedde d i n historica l structure s o f class , race, gender , an d s o forth , an d cultur e a s a conteste d syste m o f meaning s for actors . Thes e concept s constitut e majo r point s o f departur e fo r cultura l studies an d critica l socia l studie s o f science an d technology .

5 Critical an d Cultura l Studie s of Scienc e an d Technolog y

Cultural studie s i s a n interdisciplinar y conversatio n that , lik e STS, defie s eas y definition . I n Britai n cultura l studie s wa s historicall y asso ciated wit h th e Birmingha m Centr e fo r Cultura l Studies . T h e ke y feature s of Britis h cultura l studie s includ e (i ) theoretica l framework s tha t firs t dre w on Wester n Marxis m (suc h a s Gramsci) an d semiotics , followe d b y feminis m and othe r frameworks ; (2 ) a focu s o n contemporar y popula r culture , sub cultures, an d th e mas s medi a rathe r tha n hig h culture , a s i n traditiona l literature an d ar t studies ; (3 ) a rang e o f socia l scienc e an d humanitie s methods (archival , ethnographic , textua l criticism) ; an d (4 ) a politicall y engaged perspective. 1 I n N o r t h Americ a cultura l studie s tend s t o dra w more o n som e typ e o f languag e theor y (e.g. , poststructuralism ) an d t o b e more concerne d wit h feminist , queer , antiracist , an d postcolonia l identit y issues. N o r t h America n cultura l studie s als o tend s t o b e dominate d b y humanities scholar s i n literatur e studies , fil m studies , an d interdisciplinar y departments suc h a s women's studies. 2 In ST S circle s i n th e Unite d States , som e researcher s vie w cultura l studies o f scienc e an d technolog y a s th e successo r t o th e variou s con structivisms considere d i n th e previou s chapter . T h e growin g participatio n of women , peopl e o f color , ne w professiona l organizations , an d ne w disci plines (anthropology , literar y studies ) support s thi s contention . However , the definitio n o f cultura l studie s o f scienc e an d technolog y i s complicate d and ambiguous . I n scienc e studies , th e participatio n o f anthropologist s an d historians i s probabl y greate r tha n i n N o r t h America n cultura l studie s a s a whole. Som e anthropologist s an d historian s rejec t th e labe l cultura l studie s because o f it s association s wit h poststructuralis t literar y criticis m an d iden tity politics. Thos e w h o accep t th e labe l o r a t least see themselves a s friendl y to cultura l studie s hav e tende d t o redefin e th e fiel d alon g line s tha t ar e similar t o Britis h cultura l studies . Therefore , socia l theor y tend s t o occup y a greate r plac e i n th e cultura l studie s o f scienc e an d technolog y tha n i n

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Critical and Cultural Studies | 11 3 American cultura l studie s a s a whole . Feminis t an d quee r theor y ofte n serves a s a bridg e betwee n th e two , a s i n th e wor k o f Donn a Harawa y Likewise, th e ST S contex t tend s t o favo r fieldwork , ethnographi c inter views, an d archiva l researc h ove r th e text-oriente d critica l method s o r impressionistic observationa l method s tha t ar e characteristi c o f America n cultural studie s i n general . I n m y opinion , cultura l studie s o f scienc e an d technology therefor e tend s t o b e mor e rigorou s theoreticall y an d method ologically—and mor e towar d th e socia l science/histor y end s o f the h u m a n ities/social science s arena—tha n N o r t h America n cultura l studie s a s a whole. Additiona l feature s o f cultura l studie s o f scienc e an d technolog y include th e tendencie s t o focu s o n question s o f cultur e an d powe r (particu larly a s theorize d fro m feminist , postcolonial , an d antiracis t standpoints) , t o problematize contemporar y scienc e an d technolog y historicall y a s par t o f the postmoder n condition , t o examin e ho w nonexpert s an d historicall y excluded group s reconstruc t scienc e an d technology , an d t o forg e alliance s between researcher s an d activist/interventionis t socia l agendas. 3 The ter m "critical " i s equally ambiguou s an d comple x i n th e contempo rary ST S context . I n th e humanitie s th e ter m "critica l theory " usuall y refers t o a theor y o f literar y o r cultura l criticism , i n othe r words , a theor y that help s guid e th e interpretatio n o f texts . I n th e socia l science s th e sam e term ofte n refer s t o th e Wester n Marxis t traditio n associate d wit h th e Frankfurt schoo l an d post-Marxis t researcher s influence d b y th e school , such a s Jiirgen Haberma s (Hel d 1980) . I n ST S th e ter m i s sometime s use d to describ e th e confluenc e o f researc h tradition s tha t include s feminist / antiracist studies , critic s o f th e technologica l society , radica l scienc e re searchers, an d variou s othe r scholar s w h o ar e concerne d wit h issue s o f social justice an d democracy . T h e categor y o f critical ST S therefor e overlap s with bu t i s no t continuou s wit h cultura l studie s o f scienc e an d technology . As is evident, th e terminolog y i s confusing eve n fo r a reasonably wel l place d native speake r lik e myself , an d eve n thi s attemp t a t a nonpolemical mappin g is likely t o b e contested . Critical scienc e studie s pe r s e ca n b e trace d t o th e radica l scienc e movements withi n scienc e tha t bega n i n th e 1930 s an d 1940 s an d gre w substantially durin g an d afte r th e event s o f th e 1960s . Som e o f th e move ments an d journals includ e th e Britis h Societ y fo r Socia l Responsibilit y i n Science (Science for People), Scientist s an d Engineer s fo r Socia l an d Politica l Action (Science for the People), an d Radical Science fournal (no w Science as Culture), a s well a s organizations suc h a s the Radica l Scienc e Collectiv e an d the women' s healt h movemen t organizations . Th e Rensselae r Scienc e an d

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Technology Studie s Departmen t i s on e o f th e oldes t ST S program s t o achieve departmenta l statu s an d ha s playe d a n importan t rol e a s a have n fo r graduate student s w h o wis h t o stud y successor s o f thi s varian t o f ST S i n critical an d cultura l studie s o f scienc e an d technology . Man y o f th e depart ment member s shar e a concer n wit h a critica l inspectio n o f scienc e an d technology fro m th e perspectiv e o f democrati c value s define d i n th e wides t sense.

Some Key Background Concepts T h e Frankfur t schoo l wa s a group o f mid-twentieth-century Germa n intel lectuals influence d b y Mar x an d Freu d an d le d b y Ma x Horkheimer , Theodor Adorno , an d Walte r Benjamin . A s i n th e cas e o f th e Vienn a Circle, man y wer e force d t o leav e centra l Europ e afte r th e ris e o f Naz i power, an d man y cam e t o th e Unite d States . T h e debate s tha t continu e today betwee n philosopher s an d socia l studie s researcher s i n scienc e studie s therefore hav e som e historica l precedenc e i n th e difference s betwee n th e two Europea n schools . Th e Frankfur t schoo l member s i n th e Unite d State s influenced th e transitio n fro m th e Ol d Lef t o f th e 1930s—whic h wa s linked t o labo r an d wa s generall y procommunis t unti l th e 1950s—t o th e American N e w Lef t tha t blossome d wit h th e civi l right s an d antiwa r movements o f the 1960s . N ew Left socia l theory generall y dre w o n Wester n Marxism t o critiqu e "bourgeois " o r functionalis t sociolog y suc h a s tha t o f Talcott Parson s an d R o b e r t Merton . Jiirge n Haberma s i s considere d th e most influentia l Europea n hei r t o th e Frankfur t school , an d som e o f hi s work informe d th e interest-base d analysi s o f th e Edinburg h school . I n th e United States , Herber t Marcus e probabl y ha d a greate r influenc e o n N e w Left socia l theory , a t leas t durin g th e 1960 s an d 1970s . Although th e Frankfur t schoo l wa s probabl y th e mos t influentia l o f th e Western Marxis t tradition s o f socia l theor y (tha t is , non-Sovie t an d n o n Chinese), tw o concept s associate d wit h Geor g Lukac s an d Antoni o Gramsci—reification an d hegemony—hav e probabl y bee n th e mos t in fluential Wester n Marxis t concept s i n contemporar y ST S analysis . Mar x analyzed commodit y fetishis m a s th e situatio n i n capitalis t productio n whereby relation s amon g peopl e tak e o n th e characte r o f relation s amon g things an d therefor e acquir e a phanto m objectivity . I n Lukac s s readin g (1968), whe n a worl d o f object s an d relation s amon g thing s come s int o being, subjectivel y th e worker s ar e alienate d fro m thei r labor , whic h b e -

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comes a commodity . Thus , Lukacs' s concep t o f reificatio n involve s th e transformation o f socia l an d huma n relationship s int o commoditie s an d things; i n othe r words , workers ' labo r i s no longe r creativ e wor k becaus e i t becomes a commodit y the y sel l in th e labo r market . Lukac s argue d tha t th e historical proces s o f mystificatio n o f huma n relationship s develope d along side capitalis m an d culminate d i n th e developmen t o f philosophica l ide alism. The concep t o f reificatio n ca n b e use d i n scienc e studie s a s a wa y o f describing ho w genera l cultura l value s ca n com e t o b e see n a s natura l afte r they hav e bee n encode d i n scientifi c representations . Fo r example , Donn a Haraway describe s gende r a s " a concep t develope d t o contes t th e natural ization o f sexual difference " (1989 : 290) . Feminist s hav e show n ho w scienc e reifies cultura l value s an d categorie s b y attributin g t o the m a naturalnes s that i n fac t ma y no t b e there . Historically , thi s ha s ofte n occurre d i n descriptions o f natura l difference s amon g huma n group s accordin g t o race , gender, an d sexuality . Biologica l o r geneti c difference s (suc h a s ski n colo r or sex ) hav e sometime s bee n use d t o explai n purporte d socia l difference s (such a s intelligenc e o r rationality) , eve n whe n ther e i s littl e evidenc e fo r such claims . A secon d ke y concep t i s hegemony . Usuall y credite d t o Gramsc i al though laten t i n Marx , th e ide a o f hegemon y provide s a n antidot e t o th e economic determinis m o f simplisti c o r vulga r Marxism . Moreover , th e concept o f hegemony help s explai n th e stabilit y o f th e unequa l distributio n of wealt h an d powe r i n apparentl y democrati c societies . Unlik e Marx' s concept o f ideology , whic h root s belief s i n clas s position , an d Weber' s legitimacy, whic h describe s a genera l belie f i n th e righ t o f th e ruler s t o rule, hegemon y describe s th e proces s whereb y th e rulin g class(es ) suppor t the creatio n an d diffusio n o f a genera l syste m o f value s an d idea s tha t percolates throug h th e majo r institution s o f society 4 Othe r belie f an d valu e systems ar e allowe d t o exist , an d therefor e a n illusio n o f democrati c plural ism ca n b e maintained , a n illusio n tha t i s usefu l t o legitimat e th e rulin g class. Th e hegemoni c syste m manage s t o achiev e suppor t fro m man y m e m bers o f th e middl e sector s an d eve n som e member s o f oppresse d classe s an d groups. Likewise , i t i s not necessar y t o delegitimat e th e syste m by repressin g its critics ; i t i s onl y necessar y t o ensur e tha t th e critic s ar e marginalize d an d ineffective. Gramsc i wa s especiall y intereste d i n th e rol e o f th e Catholi c Church i n preservin g hegemony , bu t th e institutio n o f scienc e als o play s a n important role . Althoug h Marxist s generall y se e scienc e a s a potentiall y liberating force , i t ca n als o b e use d t o suppres s counterhegemoni c politica l

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and intellectua l movement s b y attackin g the m a s pseudoscientific . Thi s side o f scienc e i s particularl y eviden t i n environmenta l conflict s betwee n communities an d larg e corporation s o r th e state . Here , th e wealth y institu tions ofte n amas s larg e quantitie s o f well-funde d an d well-credentiale d science a s par t o f a n overal l politica l strateg y t o undermin e th e claim s o f communities. In general , Marxis t socia l theor y tend s t o dra w a distinctio n betwee n science an d ideology , wit h ideolog y representin g fals e knowledg e o r fals e consciousness. Althoug h Marx' s clea r recognitio n o f the nee d t o distinguis h true fro m fals e knowledg e wa s laudable , i t seem s unnecessar y t o wast e th e term "ideology " o n thi s distinction . I t seem s bette r t o defin e ideolog y a s discourses o r system s o f idea s considere d i n thei r cultural/politica l dimen sion apar t fro m thei r statu s a s tru e o r fals e (e.g. , Lync h 1994) . Loui s D u m o n t (1977 ) provide d on e profoun d exampl e o f a n analysi s o f th e cultural dimensio n o f ideology . I n a controversia l analysi s tha t i s supporte d by a keen anthropologica l ey e fo r comparison , D u m o n t showe d ho w m o d ern economics—bot h conventiona l an d Marxist—encode d th e moder n Western valu e o f individualism . I t i s usefu l t o distinguis h ideolog y i n thi s general sense—system s o f idea s viewe d i n thei r cultura l dimension—fro m the ter m "politica l ideology, " suc h a s Thatcher ism o r Reaganism . Although th e Dumontia n formulatio n o f ideolog y provide s a profoun d cultural critiqu e o f th e universalizin g pretension s o f som e Wester n socia l sciences, i t doe s no t clearl y focu s th e analysi s o f scientifi c discipline s an d discourse o n th e questio n o f power . Fo r thi s reaso n man y researcher s hav e found Miche l Foucaul t s theorizin g o f knowledg e an d powe r t o b e mor e appropriate t o thei r concerns . Befor e introducin g Foucaul t s conceptualiza tion (1970 ) o f knowledg e an d power , i t i s helpfu l firs t t o explai n hi s concepts o f episteme an d apparatus . T h e forme r refer s t o a n "epistemologi cal grid" tha t fo r th e presen t purpose s ca n b e glosse d a s the general , implici t assumptions tha t underli e a rang e o f discipline s a t a give n tim e period . I n his terms , th e epistem e i s "th e tota l se t o f relation s tha t unite , a t a give n period, th e discursiv e practice s tha t giv e ris e t o epistemologica l figures , science, an d possibl y formalize d systems " (1972 : 191) . Examples hel p clarif y this rathe r abstrac t definition . I n The Order of Things, Foucaul t charte d a transition tha t bega n wit h th e Renaissanc e epistem e i n whic h though t wa s based o n "resemblances, " a s i n astrologica l similaritie s betwee n heavenl y bodies an d earthl y behavior . I n contrast , durin g th e classica l episteme — that o f knowledg e i n th e perio d followin g th e scientifi c revolutio n an d antedating th e industria l revolution—though t wa s base d o n "representa -

Critical and Cultural Studies | 11 7 tion" i n a table o f possibilities. Example s o f thi s styl e o f organizin g though t include th e plan t an d anima l taxonomie s o f earl y botan y an d zoolog y Finally, th e " m o d e r n " episteme , whic h bega n i n th e lat e eighteent h cen tury, brough t time , function , an d dynamis m int o man y scientifi c disciplines . Foucault subsequentl y develope d a mor e encompassin g analysi s o f th e apparatus ("dispositif") , a term fo r a "heterogeneous ensemble " o f element s that include s "discourses , institutions , architectura l forms , regulator y deci sions, laws , administrativ e measures , scientifi c statements , philosophical , moral, an d philanthropi c propositions—i n short , th e sai d a s muc h a s th e unsaid" (1980 : 194) . Fro m a n ST S angle , Foucaul t s apparatus i s very simila r to th e subsequen t formulation s o f heterogeneou s networks . I n term s o f hi s own thought , th e apparatu s mark s a shif t fro m hi s concep t o f th e epistem e toward a focus o n nondiscursiv e practice s an d th e analytic s o f power . Foucault develope d a framewor k fo r analyzin g th e moder n for m o f power tha t h e describe d a s exercise d "withi n th e socia l body , rathe r tha n from abov e it " (1980 : 30) . H e use d th e metapho r o f a "capillary " t o describe th e disperse d natur e o f moder n powe r throughou t th e society . Although Foucaul t worke d o n powe r i n th e stat e an d th e legal-juridica l system, hi s overal l corpu s tende d t o shift : attentio n t o practice s associate d with institution s suc h a s asylums , prisons , barracks , schools , an d hospital s (1980: 30-31) . M o d e r n powe r produce d ne w object s o f knowledg e an d new scientifi c disciplines , mosd y i n th e socia l an d manageria l sciences . Contra Merton , Foucaul t argue s tha t claim s fo r th e existenc e o f or eve n th e goal o f the autonom y o f science ar e naive : " T h e exercis e o f power perpetu ally create s knowledg e and , conversely , knowledg e constantl y induce s ef fects o f power " (52) . M o d e r n power , tha t is , th e for m o f powe r tha t emerged roughl y afte r th e industria l revolution , operate d largel y throug h normalization an d surveillanc e rathe r tha n repression . "Normalization " describes a process o f moving th e populatio n towar d norm s o r standard s vi a disciplinary technologies , particularl y i n th e area s o f education, th e military , public an d menta l health , criminality , an d sexuality . Disciplinar y technolog ies separate d an d confine d deviants , an d thes e technologie s acte d i n numer ous way s directl y o n th e regimentatio n an d contro l o f the bod y t o produc e docility. T h e emergenc e o f biopowe r shifte d powe r awa y fro m publi c displays o f repressio n t o a regimentatio n o f (1 ) th e socia l body , suc h a s b y segregating th e sick , mad , o r crimina l an d b y developin g measure s an d norms fo r th e population , especiall y i n th e are a o f publi c health ; an d (2 ) the individua l body , b y regimentin g behavio r throug h direc t contro l o f th e bodily habits , work , o r pleasure .

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In th e openin g page s of 'Discipline and Punish, Foucaul t provide s a m e m o rable descriptio n o f punishment prio r t o th e nineteent h century . A convic t was subjecte d t o painful , publi c tortur e tha t involve d rippin g awa y hi s fles h and pourin g molte n lea d an d oi l i n hi s wounds , befor e hi s bod y wa s finall y drawn an d quartered . Foucaul t contrast s thi s for m o f punishmen t wit h more moder n forms , suc h a s the panoptico n o f nineteenth-century utilitar ian philosophe r Jeremy Bentham . I n thi s model , priso n guard s stoo d a t th e center an d coul d se e int o th e cell s o f th e inmate s w h o encircle d them . Foucault (1979 , 1980 ) use d th e panoptico n a s a metaphor fo r a technolog y of moder n powe r tha t solve s th e proble m o f surveillanc e b y developin g disciplinary procedure s tha t ar e internalize d b y th e population , a s i n th e internalization o f publi c healt h regulation s throug h bod y car e practices . O n e migh t b e tempte d t o invok e th e metapho r o f th e surveillanc e camera s in banks , bu t probabl y a bette r metapho r fo r thi s typ e o f powe r i s th e numerous file s an d dossier s tha t ar e kep t o n individual s b y governmen t agencies, employers , an d healt h car e providers . Thus , ther e i s n o longe r a reliance o n stock s an d publi c torture—remnant s o f which ca n stil l be foun d in th e histori c site s o f colonia l America ; instead , th e populatio n i s con trolled throug h monitorin g an d evaluation . An alternativ e approac h t o th e analysi s o f powe r i n scienc e appear s i n the wor k o f Pierr e Bourdieu . Som e researcher s hav e foun d Bourdieu' s concepts o f symboli c capita l an d dox a t o b e particularl y useful . O n e migh t think o f symbolic capita l a s status viewe d throug h a political econom y lens . Symbolic capita l ca n b e save d an d spent , hoarde d an d wasted , accumulate d and invested , an d transforme d int o financia l capital . I n term s o f science , symbolic capita l migh t b e operationalize d a s a scientist' s C V an d rolodex , that is , a set o f career achievement s an d a network. I n othe r words , symboli c capital i s simila r t o th e concept s o f reputatio n an d recognitio n i n th e sociology o f science . However , Bourdieu' s analysi s (1975 ) o f symboli c capi tal i n scienc e i s somewha t differen t fro m reputatio n o r recognitio n becaus e it allow s fo r analyse s o f scienc e i n term s o f ownin g an d nonownin g scien tific classes . Bourdieu' s wor k ha s influence d som e scienc e studie s scholars , such a s Brun o Latou r an d Stev e Woolga r (1986) , w h o extende d hi s wor k in thei r analysi s o f cycle s o f credit . Nevertheless , th e concep t i s stil l subjec t to th e criticism s tha t hav e bee n mad e o f othe r economi c models ; i n othe r words, thos e model s ten d t o flatten account s o f scientist s b y portrayin g them a s optimizers (Knorr-Cetin a 1981) . O f mor e genera l us e i s Bourdieu' s analysi s o f doxa , th e presupposition s that opponent s i n a controvers y o r othe r dispute s disregar d a s self-eviden t

Critical and Cultural Studies | 11 9 and therefor e beyon d disput e (1975 : 34) . T o som e extent , th e concep t o f doxa ca n b e compare d wit h Foucault' s episteme , bu t th e purpose s an d use s of th e tw o concept s ar e different . Dox a point s t o th e undispute d assump tions i n a fiel d characterize d b y controvers y an d disagreement , wherea s the episteme—whil e ofte n undispute d an d perhap s unconscious—i s mor e historically roote d an d specifi c t o a set o f disciplines . I n general , Bourdieu' s work bring s ou t question s o f strategie s an d actors , wherea s Foucault' s wor k allows fo r a more long-ter m vie w o f historicall y emergen t structures .

Concepts from Feminist and Antiracist Theory So far , th e critica l theorist s considere d hav e bee n men , an d feminis t con cerns hav e bee n largel y exclude d fro m thei r horizo n o f inquiry . Feminis t theory intersect s wit h ST S i n a numbe r o f ways , includin g topic s alread y discussed fo r th e philosoph y an d sociolog y o f science . O n e resul t o f th e feminist contribution s t o th e critical/cultura l studie s wing s o f ST S i s tha t problem area s an d framework s a s define d b y mal e theorist s hav e bee n extended t o gender-relate d technolog y areas . Fo r example , Ann e Balsam o (1996) ha s extende d th e Foucauldia n concer n wit h th e bod y an d disciplin ary technologie s t o th e intersectio n o f thes e topic s wit h gender . I n a n analysis o f wome n bodybuilders , sh e reveal s th e crosscurrent s a t wor k i n a corporeal disciplinar y practic e tha t appear s t o confron t traditiona l mal e stereotypes o f th e wea k o r frai l femal e body . Sh e argue s tha t eve n whil e th e practice appear s t o confron t mal e stereotypes , representation s o f the practic e (such a s photos ) reinscrib e th e stereotype s o f th e sex y femal e body . A somewhat differen t extensio n o f th e Foucauldia n problemati c i s Davi d Horn's wor k (1994 ) o n reproductio n i n interwa r Italy . H o r n examine s th e emergence o f ne w sciences , professions , an d policie s tha t mad e populatio n dynamics an d reproductio n th e focu s o f stat e intervention . In additio n t o concept s tha t hav e emerge d fro m extension s o f existin g frameworks, a number o f more genera l feminis t concept s ar e als o importan t for critica l scienc e an d technolog y studies . Primar y amon g the m i s th e concept o f gender . Althoug h "gender " i s s o widel y use d toda y tha t th e term ma y no t nee d elaboration , thi s wa s no t alway s th e case . Originall y developed i n contras t wit h sex , th e ide a o f gende r wa s usefu l fo r critiquin g accounts o f gendere d behavio r tha t reduce d socia l actio n t o biology . (Not e that th e meaning s o f th e term s "sex " an d "gender " sometime s ar e reverse d across disciplines ; I a m followin g th e usag e i n anthropolog y an d cultura l

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studies.) "Gender " refer s t o cultura l difference s betwee n wha t i t mean s t o be masculin e an d wha t i t mean s t o b e feminine , wherea s "sex " refer s t o understandings o f biological difference s betwee n mal e an d female . T h e ke y development fro m feminis t scienc e studie s i s th e wa y i n whic h th e "sex " side o f th e sex/gende r divisio n ha s com e t o b e see n a s socially constructed . In othe r words , th e hierarchica l relationshi p o f se x an d gende r ha s bee n reversed, suc h tha t th e supplementar y ter m (gender ) ha s bee n show n i n some way s t o underli e th e formerl y unconteste d ter m (sex) . Whereas som e early account s lef t biologica l description s o f sexua l differenc e a s give n an d merely pointe d t o th e irreducibilit y o f th e cultura l (gender ) t o th e biologi cal (sex) , contemporar y feminis t account s o f biologica l understanding s o f sexual differenc e revea l sexis t bia s an d therefor e th e cultura l (gendered ) aspect o f som e biologica l description s o f se x (e.g. , Hubbar d 1990 ; Tuan a 1989). Other ke y concept s fro m feminis t scienc e studie s includ e androcentris m (accounts develope d fro m a male-centere d perspective) , sexis m (degrada tion o f on e sex) , an d misogyn y (discours e o r actio n directe d agains t women). Hardin g (1986 ) identifie d fiv e majo r area s o f androcentrism i n th e social sciences , som e o f whic h ca n b e extende d t o biology : (1 ) ignorin g areas o f inquiry; (2 ) focusing o n publi c an d visibl e actor s rathe r tha n privat e and les s visibl e ones ; (3 ) assumin g a singl e societ y o r a singl e biolog y (ignoring gendere d divisions) ; (4 ) no t takin g sex/gende r distinction s int o account a s a factor i n analyzin g socia l actio n o r biologica l processes ; an d (5 ) preventing th e elicitatio n o f some type s o f information du e t o methodolog ical preference s (Hardin g 1986 ; following Millma n an d Kante r 1975) . Another ke y concep t i n feminis t ST S i s "essentialism. " O n e heavil y criticized exampl e o f essentialis m i s th e argumen t tha t w o m e n o r indige nous groups—especiall y wome n member s o f indigenou s groups—ar e closer t o natur e an d therefor e hav e a n especiall y privilege d viewpoin t i n the critiqu e o f Wester n scienc e (e.g. , Shiv a 1989) . Anothe r exampl e o f essentialism i s th e vie w tha t because , fo r example , w o m e n hav e th e childbearing functio n i n th e sexua l divisio n o f labor , the y ar e naturall y associated wit h mor e empatheti c method s i n science . Althoug h feminist s now recogniz e th e strategi c valu e o f essentialis t rhetori c i n som e politica l contexts, a s a theoretica l o r philosophica l positio n essentialis m i s highl y problematic (Harawa y 1991 : 255—57). Even w h e n on e use s essentialis t argu ments t o privileg e historicall y exclude d groups , the y ca n rapidl y b e turne d on thei r hea d t o maintai n exclusionar y practices . I n othe r words , i f on e applies th e argumen t tha t w o m e n ma y mak e a specifi c contributio n t o

Critical and Cultural Studies | 12 1 science becaus e o f thei r specia l power s o f empathy , thi s ca n rapidl y b e turned agains t w o m e n b y thos e w h o wis h t o mak e th e classi c associatio n o f the femal e an d irrationality . Haraway (1991 ) ha s introduce d anothe r ke y concept : "oppositiona l groups" o r "oppositiona l practices, " whic h migh t b e viewe d i n Gramscia n terms a s counterhegemoni c movement s an d practices . T h e concep t goe s beyond th e traditiona l ide a o f coalitio n politic s becaus e i t recognize s th e contradictions amon g historicall y exclude d group s an d therefor e th e possi bility fo r a rang e o f oppositiona l positions . Fo r example , Harawa y (1989 ) reviews th e differen t way s i n whic h w o m e n hav e brought women' s perspec tives, feminism , o r gende r issue s int o th e reassessmen t o f method s an d theory i n primatology . Sh e caution s agains t th e eas y for m o f oppositiona l practice tha t merel y invert s th e existin g term s o f a relationship , suc h a s th e replacement o f a man-the-hunte r theor y o f huma n origin s wit h a w o m a n the-gatherer theory . Sh e show s instea d tha t w o m e n brough t abou t a variet y of shift s i n primatolog y tha t wer e a t time s i n conflic t wit h eac h other . I n general, sh e argue s tha t th e oppositiona l group s di d no t inver t th e term s o f the fiel d bu t instea d brough t abou t mor e profoun d change s "b y restructur ing th e whol e field " (1989 : 303) . Haraway s case stud y o f primatolog y provide s th e outline s o f a theor y o f scientific chang e tha t ca n b e pose d a s a n alternativ e t o Thoma s K u h n s (1970, 1993 ) descriptio n o f linguistic chang e i n scientifi c revolution s a s wel l as to th e actor-networ k theor y o f gradua l enrollmen t an d stabilization . Sh e suggests tha t i n orde r t o destabiliz e a field , on e mus t "writ e compute r programs, argu e fo r differen t dat a collectio n protocols , tak e photographs , consult o n nationa l scienc e polic y bodies , writ e hig h schoo l texts , publis h in th e righ t journals, etc. " (1989 : 303) . I n othe r words , Harawa y acknowl edges th e heterogeneous , network-buildin g wor k tha t th e actor-networ k theorists hav e highlighted , wor k tha t woul d encompas s th e muc h mor e vague proces s o f developing anomalie s tha t Kuh n described . Sh e als o recog nizes tha t "destabilizatio n i s a collectiv e undertaking, " tha t is , not th e wor k of a n individua l geniu s o r scientifi c revolutionary . Thi s poin t i s mor e evident i n Miche l Callon s wor k (1986) , les s s o i n Brun o Latour s exampl e of Pasteu r (1988) , an d mostl y implici t i n K u h n s paradig m concept . H o w ever, Harawa y point s t o a third , crucia l elemen t tha t th e actor-networ k theorists an d Kuh n bot h miss : "Eve n t o imagin e destabilization , on e mus t be forme d a t a socia l m o m e n t w h e n chang e i s possible , w h e n peopl e ar e producing differen t meaning s i n man y othe r area s o f life " (1989 : 303) . Fo r example, th e demis e o f th e man-the-hunte r theor y o f huma n origin s wa s

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not merel y th e wor k o f a heterogeneou s networ k o f wome n scientists , bu t part o f a broader socia l transitio n tha t involve d dramati c change s i n th e rol e of wome n i n societ y an d socia l thought . Thi s emphasi s highlight s th e cultural context s o f historica l processe s tha t ar e misse d i n th e alternativ e theories. Another issu e tha t ca n b e brough t unde r th e rubri c o f oppositiona l practices i s th e delicat e relationshi p betwee n rac e an d gende r i n science . Although wome n i n Wester n societie s an d me n fro m non-Wester n societie s face simila r issue s o f out-group statu s i n science , thei r interest s an d perspec tives d o no t necessaril y coincide . I n som e cases , suc h a s primatology , th e coincidences ar e tantalizing . Fo r example , ver y muc h lik e Wester n whit e women, Japanes e primatologist s develope d subjectiv e methods , an d the y also mad e observation s tha t highlighte d th e importanc e o f female s i n pri mate societies . Yet , jus t whe n on e ma y begi n t o spea k o f unit y roote d i n out-group perspectives , Harawa y question s a discours e o f unity . "Wha t i s the generativ e structur e o f oppositiona l discourse, " sh e asks , "tha t insist s o n privileging 'unity ' a t th e expens e o f painfu l self-critica l analyse s o f powe r and violenc e i n one' s ow n politics? " (1989 : 257). I n othe r words , sh e i s ver y conscious o f th e processe s o f hegemon y tha t occu r withi n oppositiona l groups, suc h a s tha t o f me n ove r wome n i n th e labo r movemen t o r tha t o f white wome n ove r wome n o f colo r i n th e feminis t movement . Other race-oriente d studie s hav e examine d th e egregiou s case s o f racis m that scienc e ha s legitimated . A n exampl e i s nineteenth-centur y craniome try, o r th e measuremen t o f crania l capacit y t o prov e intelligenc e difference s among th e races . T h e earl y studie s ha d hug e methodologica l flaws, an d th e consensus soo n shifte d t o th e ide a tha t on e coul d no t relat e crania l capacit y to intelligenc e i n huma n populations . T h e schoo l o f Fran z B o a s — t h e Columbia schoo l o f anthropology , whic h shoul d b e distinguishe d fro m th e Columbia schoo l o f th e sociolog y o f scienc e (Merton)—devote d substan tial resource s t o criticizin g variou s racis t assumption s i n science . Probabl y the ke y theoretica l concep t tha t ha s emerge d fro m researc h o n racis m i n science i s the incoherenc e o f race a s a biological concept . O n e ca n demon strate th e incoherenc e o f the concep t fro m a cultural approac h o r a biologi cal approach . Culturally , i t i s eas y t o demonstrat e th e variatio n i n racia l classification system s ove r tim e an d acros s cultures . Compariso n o f th e mainly bipola r N o r t h America n system—on e i s eithe r blac k o r w h i t e — with th e myria d categorie s i n th e Brazilia n syste m soo n leave s on e wit h th e insight tha t th e everyda y concep t o f race i s culturally constructed . Likewise ,

Critical and Cultural Studies | 12 3 from a biologica l perspective , rac e i s incoheren t becaus e o f th e lac k o f covariance o f gene s acros s huma n populatio n groups. 5 Environmental racis m i s anothe r ke y concep t tha t ha s emerge d fro m race-related scienc e an d technolog y studies . R o b e r t Bullar d (1990 ) ha s shown tha t i n th e Unite d State s N I M B Y (not-in-my-backyard ) struggle s often translat e int o PIBB Y (put-in-blacks'-backyard ) politics . Researc h o n environmental justice an d environmenta l racis m involve s a number o f inter esting genera l issues . O n e i s the analysi s o f the wa y i n whic h issue s o f socia l and economi c justic e ar e rendere d invisibl e an d difficul t t o contes t whe n they ar e translate d int o highl y technica l discourse . Thus , environmenta l justice studie s provid e a n opportunit y fo r a genera l stud y o f hegemon y through th e analysi s o f th e processe s b y whic h socia l an d economi c issue s are mad e resistan t t o challenge s b y becomin g highl y technica l an d difficul t to contest . I n turn , thi s topi c lead s t o th e relate d issu e o f understandin g resistance, technology , an d th e dumpin g o f unwanted technologie s o n poo r communities an d countries . T h e whol e are a o f technolog y an d resistanc e by workers , communities , an d poo r countrie s warrant s mor e researc h an d theorizing. 6

Critical and Feminist Technology Studies Critical technolog y studie s involve s a somewha t differen t lineag e o f con cepts a s applie d t o th e analysi s o f technology . Lewi s Mumfor d (1964a , 1964b) i s the grandfathe r o f critica l technolog y studies , an d o n occasio n hi s distinction betwee n authoritaria n an d democrati c technic s i s stil l invoked . This distinctio n contrast s system-centered , powerful , an d unstabl e techno logies wit h human-centered , relativel y weak , bu t resourcefu l an d durabl e ones. Mumfor d clearl y favore d th e latter , low-tec h world , an d h e worrie d about th e genera l directio n o f human "progress. " Jacques Ellu l develope d a simila r critiqu e o f th e technologica l society . H e borrowe d fro m Marce l Maus s th e ter m "technique " t o distinguis h a rationalizing, technica l principl e fro m th e machin e o r technolog y pe r se . H e define d techniqu e a s "th e totalit y o f methods , rationall y arrive d a t an d having [a s a goal ] absolut e efficienc y (a t a give n stag e o f development ) i n every fiel d o f huma n endeavor " (Ellu l 1965 : xxv) . Th e en d resul t o f th e growth o f technique , a s in Ma x Weber' s worl d histor y tha t end s i n th e iro n cage o f rationalization, i s the technologica l society .

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Both Mumfor d an d Ellu l wer e highl y critica l o f th e massiv e rus h towar d new technologie s tha t characterize d modernis t culture . O n e outcom e o f the optimisti c vie w o f ne w technologie s i s th e "technologica l fix, " tha t is , an attemp t t o fin d a technologica l solutio n t o a socia l a n d / o r politica l problem (Elliso n 1978) . T h e technologica l fi x i s usuall y doome d t o failur e or a t bes t mixe d success , a s i n th e cas e o f som e o f th e ne w biomedica l technologies o r som e aspect s o f the Gree n Revolutio n (Pfaffenberge r 1992) . Likewise, on e sometime s encounter s ros y predictions tha t a new technolog y will lea d t o a muc h mor e jus t society . Thi s vie w i s particularl y eviden t regarding computerizatio n an d th e globa l informatio n infrastructure . Davi d Hakken an d Barbar a Andrew s (1993 ) criticize d tw o essentialis t camps : th e computopians, thos e w h o believ e tha t computerizatio n wil l resul t i n a better society ; an d computropians , thos e w h o believ e tha t i t wil l contribut e to a dystopia n future . Hakke n an d Andrew s advocat e instea d a n alternativ e "computing studies " perspectiv e tha t view s th e relationshi p betwee n c o m puterization an d socia l chang e a s a topi c fo r empirica l researc h tha t recog nizes loca l variations . Thi s positio n ca n b e extende d t o a larg e numbe r o f claims o f simple causa l relationship s betwee n technolog y an d society . Technological determinis m i s th e slightl y mor e genera l vie w tha t "soci etal developmen t i s determine d b y technology " (Bijke r 1994 : 238) . Som e versions o f Marxis m (so-calle d vulga r Marxism ) hav e take n on e o f Marx' s most famou s pronouncements—th e han d mil l lead s t o societ y wit h th e feudal lord , th e stea m mil l t o societ y wit h th e industria l capitalist—an d turned i t int o a licens e fo r technologica l determinis m (Mar x 1963 : 109) . Theories o f technological determinis m ofte n res t implicid y o n th e assump tion o f what Langdo n Winne r (1977 ) ha s calle d "autonomou s technology. " This ter m describe s th e widel y hel d belie f tha t i n advance d capitalis t societies technologica l developmen t ha d take n o n a lif e o f it s ow n a s i f i t were a n out-of-contro l Frankenstei n monster . Winner develope d th e alternativ e perspectiv e tha t technolog y an d tech nological desig n ar e th e product s o f intereste d huma n decisions . Hi s wor k suggests tha t citizen s shoul d awake n fro m thei r "technologica l somnambu lism" an d explore , critique , an d protes t th e uncritica l embracin g o f ne w technologies. The y shoul d als o challeng e th e assumptio n tha t technologica l design choice s ar e no t politicall y driven , withou t economi c an d politica l consequences, an d beyon d contro l o r refashioning . I n a n often-cite d essay , Winner (1986 ) ask s th e question , " D o artifact s hav e politics? " an d answer s it i n th e affirmative . One majo r exempla r i s th e wor k o f th e N e w Yor k state publi c work s mogu l R o b e r t Moses , w h o buil t Lon g Islan d parkwa y

Critical and Cultural Studies | 12 5 bridges t o bloc k bu s acces s t o Jone s Beac h an d therefor e t o preserv e segregated beaches . B y makin g desig n decision s tha t wer e difficul t o r costl y to ge t around , producer s o f artifacts ca n construc t built-i n politic s tha t limi t interpretive flexibility (Winne r 1993) . In anothe r analysi s o f th e politic s o f design , Bria n Pfaffenberge r devel oped th e concep t "technologica l regularization, " whic h h e describe s a s follows: " A desig n constituenc y creates , appropriates , o r modifie s a techno logical artifact , activity , o r syste m tha t i s capable o f signifying an d coercivel y implementing a constructe d visio n o f a stratifie d society , on e i n whic h power, wealth , an d prestig e i s differentiall y allocated " (1992 : 291) . Pfaffen berger the n develope d a typolog y o f regularizatio n strategie s tha t include s processes suc h a s centralization , standardization , marginalization , an d dis avowal. Thi s developmen t o f th e analysi s o f th e politic s o f technolog y ha s obvious potential s fo r hybri d theorizatio n utilizin g Foucauldia n concept s such a s normalization . Technology critic s hav e sometime s bee n accuse d o f being Luddites , tha t is, throwback s t o th e worker s w h o brok e th e machine s i n Englan d durin g the industria l revolutio n (fo r contemporar y variants , se e Lyo n 1989) . O n e attempt t o g o beyon d criticis m o f th e technologica l societ y t o a mor e positive progra m wa s th e appropriat e technolog y movemen t (als o know n a s intermediate technology) . Associate d wit h E . F . Schumache r (1973 ) an d especially popula r durin g th e 1960s , thi s movemen t calle d fo r th e develop ment o f technolog y tha t wa s consisten t wit h th e loca l ecolog y an d culture , especially o f poo r countries . A s Winne r notes , th e ide a o f appropriat e technology becam e mor e problemati c w h e n applie d t o Western , industrial ized societie s (1986 : 63). 7 Mor e recently , discussion s hav e turne d towar d green technologie s o r sustainabl e technology , vagu e term s fo r appropriat e technology tha t someho w shift s huma n ecolog y towar d relationship s tha t are no t likel y t o cras h fro m unsustainabl e effect s suc h a s globa l warming , excess populatio n growth , o r rampan t pollution . Two othe r contemporar y area s o f critical technolog y studie s ar e technol ogy i n th e militar y an d technolog y i n th e workplace . Fo r example , "dua l use" refer s t o th e desig n o f technologie s t o hav e application s i n bot h military an d civilia n sectors . Generall y use d i n th e contex t o f post—Col d War budget maneuvering , suc h proposal s warran t carefu l inspectio n becaus e they ma y b e cleverl y disguise d way s o f preservin g militar y budget s withou t providing optima l civilia n benefits . Dua l us e technologie s ar e unlikel y t o have a significan t impac t o n th e economy , an d the y ar e likel y t o entangl e technology polic y i n nationa l securit y issue s (Sclov e 1994) . Regardin g

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technology i n th e workplace , Harr y Braverma n (1974 ) develope d a critiqu e of modernis t manageria l practice s b y showin g ho w Tayloris m "deskilled " workers b y breakin g dow n th e craftlik e natur e o f manufacturing . Davi d Noble (1984 ) extende d thi s typ e o f analysi s b y showin g ho w automatio n and machiner y wer e introduce d i n way s tha t enhance d thi s proces s an d therefore transferre d powe r fro m th e skille d worke r t o management . Feminist ST S analyst s hav e examine d th e implication s o f ne w domesti c technologies an d ne w reproductiv e technologie s fo r women . Critica l stud ies o f domesti c technologie s suc h a s th e wor k o f R u t h Schwart z Cowe n (1976, 1983 ) hav e show n ho w labor-savin g device s hav e coincide d wit h changing domesti c arrangement s tha t resulte d i n "mor e wor k fo r mother. " Others i n th e appropriat e (domestic ) technolog y vei n hav e examine d th e potential o f altere d domesti c spatia l desig n fo r women' s liberatio n project s (Doorly 1985) . Th e bes t studie s o f women' s reproductiv e technologie s have methodologicall y begu n wit h a n interpretatio n o f patients ' o r users ' perspectives, pointe d t o th e diversit y o f women's experience s an d therefor e the fragmente d natur e o f th e categor y "woman, " an d show n ho w techno logies ar e constructe d i n interactio n wit h healt h car e professional s i n way s that canno t b e capture d b y simpl e model s o f patriarcha l domination. 8 In short , thes e studie s brin g a cultura l perspectiv e int o th e analysi s o f technology. An exampl e o f a fieldwork-based cultura l approac h t o ne w reproductiv e technologies i s th e wor k o f Robbi e Davis-Floy d (1992a , 1992b ) o n birt h technologies. Sh e show s a range o f approaches fro m th e natura l birt h mode l with la y midwive s t o high-tec h hospita l birth . A s i n som e o f th e othe r studies o f ne w reproductiv e technologies , Davis-Floy d challenge s th e sim plistic feminis t vie w tha t th e male-dominate d worl d o f high-tec h hospita l birth i s alienating an d disempowerin g fo r women . Instead , sh e point s t o th e tremendous variet y amon g pregnan t wome n an d th e fac t tha t som e fin d the high-tec h settin g empowering . Thus , choic e i s crucia l t o th e issu e of empowerment . Nevertheless , th e broade r cultur e o f choic e itsel f i s problematic. Marily n Strather n (1992 ) examine s th e wid e range s o f choice s opened u p b y surrogacy , artificia l insemination , amniocentesis , an d othe r new reproductiv e technologies . Kinshi p ha s alway s bee n constructe d a s something on e canno t d o anythin g about ; on e i s "stuck " wit h one' s family . In contrast , th e ne w reproductiv e technologie s encompas s th e worl d o f kinship relation s i n th e entrepreneuria l cultur e o f choice . Thes e complexi ties rais e question s abou t th e natur e o f identit y an d socia l relationship s i n an increasingl y commodifie d worl d (se e als o Edwards e t al . 1993) .

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Concepts from the History of Science Although th e histor y o f scienc e i s largel y descriptiv e o r idiographic , ther e are som e crucia l theoretica l issue s tha t hav e emerge d fro m historica l studies . Consequently, th e histor y o f scienc e deserve s recognitio n i n an y revie w o f key concept s i n scienc e studies . Thre e example s o f conceptua l contribu tions ar e th e critiqu e o f whi g history , th e analysi s o f th e scientifi c revolu tion, an d th e proble m o f periodizatio n i n science . Al l thre e provid e tool s for critical , cultura l analyse s i n scienc e studies . " W h i g history " refer s t o a type o f history tha t interpret s th e pas t from th e scientific perspective s o f th e presen t an d ofte n adopt s th e teleologica l vie w that scientifi c discoverie s an d technologica l innovation s wer e boun d t o hap pen becaus e the y wer e ther e i n nature . W h i g histor y therefor e represent s a n asymmetrical approac h t o th e socia l studie s o f knowledg e fo r whic h th e strong program' s symmetr y principl e provide d on e alternative . Fro m a whi g historical perspective , on e ca n spea k o f premature an d postmatur e discover ies. Postmatur e discoverie s appea r t o b e behin d thei r tim e rathe r tha n ahea d of it, a s judged b y presen t knowledg e (Zuckerma n an d Lederber g 1986) . A related methodologica l issu e is presentism, a n approac h t o histor y tha t value s the pas t i n term s o f the present . Althoug h th e ter m overlap s wit h whi g his tory, presentism refer s t o th e attemp t t o reduc e th e tas k o f history t o provid ing lessons for th e present suc h a s policy insights . An alternativ e is to view th e past a s another culture , an d t o us e th e pas t a s a point o f reference t o develo p comparative studie s that provide th e basis for a more profoun d cultura l analy sis of the assumption s o f science i n th e present . The critique s o f whi g histor y an d presentis m ar e closel y relate d t o th e former debat e betwee n internalis m an d externalism . Internalis t account s o f science an d technolog y explaine d innovatio n b y examinin g intellectua l genealogies an d puzzle-solvin g ventures , an d the y focuse d o n th e origi n and growt h o f scientifi c idea s b y studyin g ho w idea s wer e influence d b y other ideas . I n contrast , externalis t account s examine d th e interactio n o f society an d scientifi c idea s b y chartin g th e socia l factor s tha t shape d th e origin an d developmen t o f thos e ideas . I n man y way s thi s distinctio n wa s parallel t o th e realist/constructivis t controvers y betwee n som e philosopher s and SS K theorists . Th e internalist/externalis t controvers y seem s t o hav e los t much o f it s appea l a s historian s increasingl y writ e heterogeneou s account s that sho w ho w content/context , intellectual/social , o r universalistic/partic ularistic factor s operat e simultaneousl y i n th e makin g o f knowledge , tech nology, an d society .

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Another se t o f key concept s i n th e histor y o f science ha s emerged fro m debates ove r th e interpretatio n o f th e scientifi c revolution , tha t is , th e emergence o f moder n scienc e associate d wit h th e wor k o f earl y moder n natural philosophers suc h as Copernicus, Galileo , Boyle, and Newton. Th e study o f the scientifi c revolutio n provide d on e settin g for a n interdisciplin ary exchang e betwee n historian s an d socia l scientist s i n whic h historian s contributed, ofte n implicitly , t o a general theor y o f scientific change . De bates ove r th e cause s o f an d meanin g o f th e scientifi c revolutio n impl y a theory of scientific revolution s that situates them in broader transformation s taking place i n th e societ y an d culture . A s in th e cas e o f Haraway s discussions of primatology, thes e debates suggest an alternative t o Kuhn's intellectualist emphasi s o n th e buildu p o f anomalie s a s th e drivin g forc e behin d scientific revolutions . Likewise , the y sugges t a n alternativ e t o th e actor and-strategy model s o f SSK . Therefore , studie s o f th e scientifi c revolutio n of th e seventeent h centur y {the scientific revolution ) ca n b e mine d t o provide a n alternativ e theoretica l framewor k fo r analyzin g othe r scientifi c revolutions, consensu s shifts , an d scientific chang e in general . Early sociologica l account s o f th e scientifi c revolutio n tende d t o focu s on it s locatio n i n th e emergenc e o f Western modernit y a s conceptualize d by Webe r an d Marx . Th e Merto n thesi s i s probabl y th e best-know n ac count o f the scientifi c revolutio n i n thes e terms . Rober t Merto n s analysis (1970) i s buil t o n Weber' s diagnosi s o f modernit y a s a genera l proces s o f rationalization i n whic h institution s ten d t o becom e mor e bureaucratize d and specialized , an d practice s ten d t o becom e mor e standardized . Webe r (1958) als o argued that th e ascetic , Calvinist wing of Protestantism contrib uted t o the developmen t o f the rationalized, bureaucrati c capitalis m charac teristic o f th e moder n West . Th e Merto n thesi s add s t o thi s theor y th e footnote tha t Purita n religiou s value s serve d a s a spu r t o th e value s o f modern science . Frequentl y misunderstoo d o n thi s point, Merto n di d no t claim tha t a quantitativ e tall y o f earl y natura l philosopher s i n Englan d o r other countrie s woul d sho w the m t o b e mostl y Puritans , no r di d h e clai m that Purita n value s constitute d a necessary an d sufficien t caus e for moder n science.9 Rather , h e argue d tha t Purita n value s provide d a fertile soil , o r a spur, t o th e scientifi c revolution . Fo r example , h e argue d tha t th e Purita n concern wit h goo d work s an d wor k i n genera l helpe d spu r th e us e o f th e experimental method o f early modern science . Related t o th e Merto n thesi s in term s o f its comparativ e perspectiv e ar e the Needhar n an d Hesse n theses . Joseph Needha m (1974 ) add s a diagnosis of th e comparativ e factor s tha t le d t o th e surg e o f scientifi c development s

Critical and Cultural Studies | 12 9 in th e West , eve n w h e n Chin a ha d bee n ahea d o f th e Wes t fo r centurie s prior t o th e moder n period . T h e se t o f factor s i s a comple x on e tha t changes ove r th e cours e o f thi s scholar' s prolifi c career , bu t i t include s factors o f socia l organizatio n tha t ar e roughl y consisten t wit h a Weberia n account. 1 0 T h e Hesse n thesi s (1971 ) wa s a n alternative , Marxis t accoun t developed b y Bori s Hessen , a Soviet physicis t an d historia n whos e wor k o n the scientifi c revolutio n wa s contemporar y wit h tha t o f Merton . Hesse n held tha t Newtonia n mechanic s ca n b e explaine d instrumentall y a s a re sponse t o contemporar y problem s o f wate r transport , minin g technology , and ballistics . I n a particularl y elegan t argument , Hesse n suggest s tha t th e development o f thermodynamics , especiall y th e la w o f conservatio n o f energy, ha d t o awai t th e problem s encountere d wit h th e developmen t o f the stea m engine. 1 1 Two othe r influentia l account s ar e provide d b y Stev e Shapi n an d Simo n Schaffer (1985 ) an d Margare t Jacob (1988) . T h e forme r revie w th e Boyle / Hobbes controvers y ove r experimenta l scienc e an d argu e tha t th e emer gence o f th e experimen t an d laborator y a s a social spac e contribute d t o th e making o f moder n society . Jacob showe d tha t Boyle' s corpuscula r philoso phy, whic h fro m a presentis t perspectiv e i s see n a s th e anteceden t t o th e modern atomi c theor y o f chemistry , wa s develope d i n a divisiv e religiou s context tha t include d radica l pantheisti c view s o f nature . Boyle' s vie w supported th e orthodo x religiou s doctrin e o f dualis m o f matte r an d spirit . Jacob adds , a s a refinemen t i f no t correctio n o f th e Merto n thesis , tha t b y the tim e o f N e w t o n scienc e wa s les s a n expressio n o f Puritanis m tha n o f the libera l o r "latitudinarian " Protestantis m typifyin g th e Anglica n Churc h of th e lat e seventeent h century . Sh e als o develope d a n accoun t o f th e science/society relationshi p tha t sh e call s "socia l framing, " a n alternativ e t o social constructivis m that , lik e "realisti c constructivism, " recognize s som e of th e argument s o f the realis t positio n (Jaco b 1994) . Increasingly scholar s hav e develope d cultura l account s o f th e scientifi c revolution tha t hav e expande d th e scop e o f analysi s fro m a n emphasi s o n capitalism, Protestantism , an d th e emergenc e o f modernit y t o question s o f countercultural values , gender , colonialism , an d internationa l exchanges . For example , France s Yate s (1972 ) argue s tha t moder n scienc e emerge d from th e cocoo n o f occultis t an d magica l practice s know n a s Renaissanc e magic, Neoplatonism , an d Rosicrucianism . T h e Yate s thesi s i s generall y considered overstated , bu t sh e provide s a valuabl e reminde r tha t man y o f the firs t natura l philosophers , includin g Newton , wer e no t a s moder n a s some standar d account s o f the scientifi c revolutio n woul d suggest . Eve n th e

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term "scientist " i s a n anachronism ; th e ter m i n us e a t th e tim e wa s "natura l philosopher." Likewise , som e o f th e ke y concept s o f earl y moder n science , such a s gravity, involve d quasi-occultis t notion s suc h a s actio n a t a distance . These wer e echoe s o f wha t Foucaul t woul d cal l th e Renaissanc e epistem e of resemblances . T h e Merchan t (1980 ) thesi s add s th e argumen t tha t th e origin s o f modern scienc e wer e deepl y shape d by , a s i t shaped , th e modernizatio n o f the Wester n patriarchy . Earl y moder n scientist s envisione d scienc e a s a process o f dominatin g a disorderl y nature , jus t a s me n dominate d wome n (perceived a s close r t o nature ) an d exclude d the m fro m scienc e an d th e emerging arena s o f market-base d capitalism . A ke y proponen t o f a patriar chal scienc e an d societ y wa s Franci s Bacon , whos e writing s Caroly n M e r chant analyze s fo r thei r sometime s violen t metaphor s o f science a s a projec t of masculinis t domination. 1 2 A numbe r o f othe r researcher s hav e explore d the rol e o f earl y moder n scienc e i n colonialism , an d Islami c researcher s have als o show n ho w man y o f th e apparen t noveltie s o f earl y moder n science wer e i n fac t th e resul t o f Western/non-Wester n exchanges . A s a result, th e statur e o f th e Wester n scientifi c revolutio n diminishe s th e mor e one examine s it s non-Wester n predecessors. 13 A thir d are a o f historica l researc h tha t ha s resulte d i n genera l conceptua l work i s th e discussio n o f periodization. Scienc e an d technology , lik e litera ture an d th e arts , hav e sometime s bee n categorize d historicall y wit h th e period concept . Thi s practic e ca n b e usefu l fo r gainin g a better understand ing o f th e implici t assumption s share d b y science s today , an d possibl y fo r proposing alternative s t o som e o f th e curren t fad s i n scienc e (suc h a s chao s and complexit y theory) . "Modernity " i s th e ter m give n t o th e genera l transformation o f Wester n societ y sinc e abou t 1500 . Thi s transformatio n included th e emergenc e o f religiou s pluralism , capitalism , parliamentar y democracy, th e moder n bureaucrati c state , colonialism , th e modernizatio n of th e patriarch y an d fragmentatio n o f kin-base d communities , an d th e scientific revolution . I us e th e ter m "earl y modernity " t o refe r t o th e period u p t o abou t 1800 . Th e term s " m o d e r n " an d "modernization " ar e extended t o non-Wester n societie s tha t hav e adopte d som e o r al l o f th e major feature s o f Western modernity . Foucault s vie w o f modernit y (1970 ) wa s somewha t differen t fro m th e standard usage ; h e emphasize d th e brea k tha t occurre d roughl y afte r th e industrial revolutio n an d th e Frenc h Revolution . Certainly , durin g th e nineteenth centur y ther e wa s a distinctive cultura l styl e amon g man y o f th e sciences. I t i s important t o remembe r tha t th e worl d o f Newtonia n physic s

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was i n a sens e timeles s an d reversible . I t wa s no t unti l th e developmen t o f thermodynamics i n th e nineteent h centur y tha t t i m e — i n a sense, history — entered physics . Although , a s Hesse n argued , th e emergenc e o f stea m power provide d instrumenta l reason s fo r th e developmen t o f thermody namics, th e theoretica l innovatio n wa s als o par t o f a genera l cultura l transi tion tha t conceptualize d th e worl d i n grandl y evolutionar y terms . Evolu tionary theor y an d historica l perspective s loome d larg e i n a numbe r o f disciplines, includin g biology , geology , anthropology , sociology , politica l economy, an d philology . T h e genera l societ y a t th e tim e ha s sometime s been characterize d a s th e "ag e o f revolutions, " tha t is , a n ag e w h e n refor m and revolutionar y movement s attempte d t o brin g abou t human-guide d transitions i n societ y an d th e state . Thes e politica l movement s wer e guide d by a simila r valu e syste m tha t viewe d histor y a s a progressiv e proces s tha t could b e shape d b y huma n reason . T o som e exten t thi s optimisti c vie w o f history an d politic s remaine d intac t unti l th e worl d war s o f th e twentiet h century. Elsewhere I hav e argue d tha t on e ca n als o demarcat e tw o subsequen t temporal culture s i n scienc e (Hes s 1995 : ch . 3) . I n cultura l studie s " m o d ernism" usuall y refer s t o th e perio d runnin g roughl y fro m th e 1870 s t o th e 1960s, wit h th e hig h perio d generall y see n a s between th e tw o worl d wars . In technolog y studies , modernis m i s characterize d b y th e secon d industria l revolution. Durin g thi s perio d iro n productio n gav e wa y t o steel , an d steam engine s wer e replace d b y electrica l an d interna l combustio n power . Likewise, durin g th e modernis t perio d transportatio n an d communicatio n were als o transforme d a s railroad s gav e wa y t o road s an d airways , an d telegraphs wer e replace d b y telephones , radio , an d later television . I n manu facturing, assembly-lin e system s an d Tayloris m becam e increasingl y preva lent, an d i n architectur e functionalis t project s wer e popular . O n e o f th e most influentia l studie s o f modernis t scienc e i s b y historia n Pau l Forman , w h o argue d tha t physicist s i n Weima r German y readil y accepte d th e inde terminacy principl e becaus e o f th e stron g curren t i n Germa n intellectua l culture o f th e tim e tha t wa s critica l o f th e overl y mechanistic , mechanical , and deterministi c assumption s o f science. 14 More generally , th e modernis t science s tende d t o shar e a fe w genera l patterns: the y develope d theorie s tha t conceptualize d thei r object s i n term s of close d syste m dynamics , ofte n wit h equilibriu m principles . Concept s o f equilibrium an d homeostasi s wer e centra l i n a numbe r o f fields , includin g economics, biology , linguistics , chemistry , psychology , an d sociology . Fo r example, th e emergenc e o f atomi c physic s wa s buil t aroun d fundamenta l

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assumptions regardin g equilibriu m dynamic s an d close d systems . Thes e developments di d no t occu r simultaneousl y acros s th e disciplines ; the y occurred t o varyin g degree s a t varying times . However , togethe r the y mar k a modernis t styl e i n scienc e tha t wa s consisten t wit h th e modernis t cultur e of th e surroundin g societies . As a descriptiv e term , "postmodernism " generall y refer s t o socia l changes tha t hav e occurre d durin g th e secon d hal f of the twentiet h century , accelerating afte r th e 1960 s an d eve n mor e s o durin g th e 1990s . Thes e changes includ e computerization , th e emergenc e o f biotechnologies, glob alization, an d th e demis e o f th e nation-state . I n th e economy , flexible accumulation—that is , lea n productio n an d th e us e o f ne w manageria l technologies—has com e t o replac e assembly-lin e productio n an d hierar chical management . Likewise , i n th e science s ther e i s a tendenc y fo r th e closed system s an d equilibriu m thinkin g o f th e modernis t perio d t o giv e way t o ope n system s model s an d nonlinea r dynamic s o f self-organization . Generally, th e ter m "postmodern " i n thi s sens e i s assume d t o b e equivalen t to "lat e m o d e r n " o r "postmodernist. " T h e globa l econom y remain s capital ist an d therefor e postmodernit y i s i n som e fundamenta l sens e continuou s with th e earl y moder n period . "Post-Fordism " refer s t o th e postmoder n organization o f th e workplace , includin g post-Tayloris t manageria l meth ods, flexible accumulation , an d a rhetori c o f labor-capita l partnership. 15 David Harvey' s discussio n (1989 ) o f flexible accumulatio n ha s occupie d a significant plac e i n theorie s o f th e economi c an d technica l sid e o f th e postmodern period . Emil y Marti n (1994 ) ha s argue d tha t th e flexible work ers an d workplace s o f post-Fordis t productio n ar e characteristi c o f othe r manifestations o f flexibility i n postmoder n culture , includin g ne w way s o f thinking abou t diseas e an d th e immun e system . T h e ter m "postmodern " i s als o use d t o describ e a typ e o f theoretica l framework i n th e socia l science s an d humanitie s usuall y associate d wit h cultural studie s an d poststructuralis t semioti c theory . Opponent s o f thi s approach frequentl y accus e i t o f irrationalism , which , whe n th e smok e clears, usuall y amount s t o a charge o f epistemological o r ontologica l relativ ism. However , carefu l readin g o f frequentl y cite d figure s suc h a s Jacque s Derrida an d Donn a Harawa y reveal s tha t suc h label s ar e inaccurat e an d highly polemical . I t i s possibl e tha t suc h label s appl y meaningfull y t o philosophers suc h a s Paul Feyerabend , bu t ther e i s little evidenc e t o sugges t that a so-calle d postmoder n scienc e studie s theoris t an d analys t lik e Hara way support s irrationalis m o r antiscienc e positions . Instead , sh e provide s

Critical and Cultural Studies | 13 3 interesting ne w way s t o thin k abou t th e historica l phenomeno n o f th e postmodern societ y O n e o f Harawa y s conceptual contribution s ha s been t o develo p th e ide a of th e cybor g a s th e ico n o f postmoder n culture . Althoug h th e c o m m o n use o f the ter m i s an y human-machin e hybrid , Harawa y s definition i s mor e complex: "Linguisticall y an d materiall y a hybri d o f cyberneti c devic e an d organism, a cybor g i s a scienc e fictio n chimer a fro m th e 1950 s an d after ; but a cybor g i s als o a powerfu l socia l an d scientifi c realit y i n th e sam e historical period " (1991 : ch . 8) . Sh e argue s tha t a cybor g exist s "whe n tw o kinds o f boundaries ar e simultaneously problematic : 1 ) that betwee n animal s (and othe r organisms ) an d humans , an d 2 ) tha t betwee n self-controlled , self-governing machine s (automatons ) an d organisms , especiall y human s (models o f autonomy) . T h e cybor g i s th e figur e bor n o f th e interfac e o f automaton an d autonomy " (1989 : 138—39) . However , Haraway' s wor d i s not th e las t o n th e topic ; b y th e mid-1990 s cultura l studie s o f cyborgeti c aspects o f th e postmoder n societ y ha d becom e a growt h industr y (Gra y e t al. 1995) . O n e salien t featur e o f postmoder n cultur e i s th e juxtapositio n o f pre viously separat e cultura l domain s o r th e crossin g o f previousl y unblurre d boundaries. Harawa y ha s popularized th e ter m "implosion " t o describ e thi s process (1989) . T h e ris e o f interdisciplinar y studies , suc h a s STS , i s on e example o f th e leve l o f increase d complexit y an d communicatio n o f th e postmodern world . Pau l Rabino w (1992 ) argue s tha t anothe r typ e o f i m plosion i s als o occurrin g i n postmoder n culture : biosociality , i n whic h "nature" become s a manufacture d objec t tha t i s n o longe r outsid e society , as is occurrin g wit h th e geneti c engineerin g o f plant s an d animal s (se e als o Strathern 1992) . Interdisciplinarit y an d biosocialit y ar e bu t tw o example s of th e postmoder n conditio n i n whic h previousl y stabl e boundarie s ar e transgressed wit h relativ e eas e an d frequency . In th e sciences , outline s o f postmoder n theorizin g ar e see n i n a numbe r of fields . I n biolog y th e evolutionar y theor y o f th e nineteent h centur y ha s undergone anothe r shif t fro m th e equilibriu m model s o f th e modernis t period t o ne w theorie s base d o n compute r simulatio n an d nonlinea r dy namics. Likewise , molecula r biolog y destabilize s conventiona l specie s cate gories b y focusin g o n genes , thei r recombination , an d thei r transmission . I n physics ther e i s les s sens e tha t a n ultimat e foundatio n particl e wil l b e found, an d chaos/complexit y theor y ha s provided a new framewor k fo r th e analysis o f area s previousl y see n a s merel y random . I n general , th e shif t i n

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emphasis towar d ope n system s an d pattern s o f self-organizatio n mark s a "postmodern" styl e i n scientifi c theorizing . A s i n th e past , thi s styl e i s quite i n sync h wit h th e economi c an d socia l change s i n th e nationa l an d international cultures . Viewin g postmoder n though t historicall y make s i t easier t o questio n it s applications t o socia l phenomena. Th e histor y o f socia l Darwinism an d functionalis t socia l theorie s fro m earlie r period s suggest s that thes e application s ma y obfuscat e a s much a s the y clarify . I n a sense, w e are bac k t o th e ke y concep t o f reification : changin g socia l processe s ar e projected ont o natur e i n ne w scientifi c model s (tha t ma y als o b e "true " i n the sens e tha t the y represen t par t o f th e worl d tha t ha d no t bee n see n previously), an d i n tur n thes e ne w model s ar e fe d bac k int o theorie s o f society. Thes e theorie s o f societ y ma y poin t t o ne w aspect s o f th e socia l world tha t ha d no t bee n see n previously , bu t a t th e sam e tim e the y ma y deflect attentio n fro m a mor e critica l inspectio n o f th e fundamenta l conti nuities o f modernity an d capitalism .

Concepts from Anthropology M y tweakin g o f th e perio d concep t an d episteme s towar d th e ide a o f temporal culture s reflect s m y backgroun d a s an anthropologist . Anthropolo gy's contributio n t o ST S ha s historicall y bee n see n a s merely methodologi cal: th e us e o f ethnograph y a s a researc h method . Thi s vie w o f th e field' s contribution i s doubl y wrong , no t onl y becaus e i t tend s t o reduc e anthro pology t o ethnography , bu t als o becaus e i t usuall y involve s a misunder standing o f th e ter m "ethnography. " I n scienc e studie s "ethnography " ha s historically applie d loosel y t o an y kin d o f fieldwork-based method , includ ing short-ter m observationa l studies . Thus , i n scienc e studie s circle s th e term ha s a considerably loose r usag e tha n i n anthropology , wher e ethnogra phy usuall y require s learnin g th e language , developin g ke y informants , an d spending a t leas t on e t o tw o year s o f more-or-les s continuou s participant observation i n a community , organization , o r socia l movement . Fo r thi s reason, th e ter m "laborator y studies " i s preferabl e fo r th e firs t wav e o f ethnographic studie s i n scienc e studies . T h e firs t wav e o f ethnographi c studies, o r laborator y studies , focuse d o n th e laboratory , addresse d question s about theoretica l issue s i n th e sociolog y an d philosoph y o f knowledge , and wa s th e produc t largel y o f European s wit h trainin g i n sociolog y an d philosophy. 16 Th e secon d wav e work s wit h large r fiel d site s suc h a s transna tional discipline s o r geographi c regions , addresse s question s define d largel y

Critical and Cultural Studies | 13 5 by a concern wit h variou s socia l problems (e.g. , sexism , racism , colonialism , class conflict , ecology ) tha t ar e theorize d wit h hybri d feminist/cultural / social theories , an d i s muc h mor e th e produc t o f American s wit h profes sional trainin g i n anthropology . Sharon Trawee k s ethnographi c studie s o f physicists , base d o n ove r a decade o f ethnographi c fieldwork , ar e ofte n regarde d a s a landmark fo r th e beginning o f th e secon d wav e o f ethnography. 17 He r firs t book , Beamtimes and Lifetimes (1988) , provide s a marke d contras t wit h th e olde r laborator y "ethnographies" o f th e SS K win g o f scienc e studies . Rathe r tha n focu s o n the fact-makin g process , Trawee k explore s th e meanin g o f spatia l arrange ments, machin e design , th e lif e cycl e (o r caree r cycle) , socia l groups , and cultura l change . Furthermore , b y comparin g Japanes e an d Wester n physicists, Trawee k explore s th e rol e o f nationa l an d gende r culture s i n th e shaping o f scientific institution s an d practices . Sh e als o show s ho w scientist s maneuver amon g th e cultura l difference s an d eve n us e thos e difference s a s strategic resource s (1992) . Sustained, ethnographicall y base d anthropologica l studie s o f moder n science an d technolog y ar e o f suc h recen t origi n tha t b y th e middl e o f th e 1990s a well-develope d dialogu e wit h othe r branche s o f ST S ha d no t ye t been achieved . However , severa l ke y concept s infor m curren t anthropolog ical researc h an d ar e beginnin g t o hav e som e impac t o n ST S a s a whole . O n e are a o f innovatio n i s th e tendenc y fo r anthropologicall y informe d cultural studie s an d ethnographi c analyse s t o wor k wit h a large r uni t tha n an actor-network , fiel d o f power , o r socia l world . O n e ter m fo r thi s larger uni t i s a n "arena, " tha t is , a fiel d o f interaction s amon g scientific , governmental, industrial , religious , an d othe r domain s o f societ y A variet y of anthropologist s an d som e sociologist s adop t thi s approac h a s the y exam ine th e introductio n o f a ne w technolog y o r scienc e throug h th e shiftin g lenses o f th e variou s side s involved. 18 Rathe r tha n follo w scientist s throug h society, t o us e th e SS K prescription , thi s approac h look s ove r th e shoulder s of divers e group s a t th e pris m o f scienc e an d technolog y Thi s approac h begins wit h th e divers e point s o f vie w o f expert s an d laypeople , defender s and debunkers , producer s an d consumers , me n an d women , manager s an d workers, an d s o on . Thi s for m o f ethnograph y i s therefor e mor e lik e th e E P O R / S C O T program s o f SS K an d socia l world s theor y tha n th e labora tory studies . I n othe r words , th e meaning-oriente d approac h o f E P O R / S C O T an d socia l world s theor y provide s a poin t o f continuit y wit h th e cultural approac h o f anthropologica l ethnography . The ter m "culture " ha s multipl e meaning s associate d wit h th e divers e

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disciplinary constituencie s tha t use it, and it is therefore usefu l t o preface a n attempt t o explicat e th e anthropologica l cultur e concep t wit h it s us e i n related fields . I n cultura l studie s th e ter m generall y refer s t o prin t an d electronic media , th e arts , an d othe r representation s o f cultura l practices . These representation s includ e high , lo w (popular) , an d fol k cultures , an d therefore cultura l studie s i s positione d i n contras t t o olde r disciplinar y frameworks tha t limited th e objec t o f study to hig h culture , such a s English literature. However , becaus e cultura l studie s tend s t o focu s o n mediate d popular culture , i t als o remain s continuou s wit h field s suc h a s literary an d film criticism . In sociolog y an d politica l science , "culture " usuall y mean s th e norm s and values of a social unit such as a nation-state, region, o r local community. In thi s sense , "culture " i s use d i n oppositio n t o th e state , economy , an d social structure, a s in the Parsonian distinctio n between th e cultural an d the social system. Cultura l institution s i n thi s sense are limited t o thos e institu tions responsibl e fo r socializatio n an d patter n maintenanc e suc h a s educa tion, th e arts , an d religion . Fo r sociologists , "society " i s often th e encom passing term , an d "culture " i s use d a s a descripto r fo r a narrowe r fiel d o f norms an d values. For anthropologists (a t least many in North America), "culture " tends to be th e mor e encompassin g term . I t refer s t o th e tota l learne d knowledge , beliefs, an d practices , bot h consciou s an d unconscious , o f a socia l uni t (ranging fro m multinationa l region s t o microsociologica l units) . I n thi s sense, cultur e permeate s an d include s al l socia l institution s an d practice s associated wit h a give n socia l unit , includin g th e polity , economy , socia l organization, religion , arts , and education . Th e ter m "cultura l institutions " is an oxymoro n becaus e al l institutions ar e cultural . Mor e tha n a system o f norms an d values , cultur e i s a n interwove n syste m o f symboli c meanings . Culture i s structured lik e a language; thus , i t i s possible t o delineat e sym bolic structure s tha t permeat e th e rang e o f socia l institutions , practices , discourses, an d s o fort h tha t ar e associate d wit h th e culture . Als o lik e a language, cultur e provides th e condition s o f action, th e disposition s (t o us e Pierre Bourdieu' s term ) tha t inclin e peopl e t o ac t an d reac t i n certai n ways.19 Unlike th e unitar y vie w suggested by the norms an d values formu lation, cultur e i s contested , changing , an d distributed ; thus , differen t indi viduals an d group s within a social unit hav e differen t area s of expertise an d contrasting values. Cultur e i s recursive an d crosscutting ; on e ma y therefor e speak o f culture s withi n culture s (a s i n th e cas e o f high-energ y physic s within th e cultur e o f physics ) an d cultures crossin g culture s (physic s a s a

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transnational cultur e tha t crosscut s Japanes e an d America n nationa l cul tures). Sometime s cultur e i s thought o f a s divisible int o cultura l systems , a term popularize d b y Cliffor d Geert z (1973 ) an d borrowe d fro m Parsonia n sociology. Thus, the religion, political ideology, science, and arts of a society are examples o f cultural system s or systems of symbolic meaning . Usually, anthropologist s begi n thei r account s wit h th e perspectiv e o f communities. Th e startin g poin t o f a "cultura l account " i s therefor e no t very differen t fro m a standpoin t epistemology . Ironically , anthropologist s tend no t t o us e th e wor d "culture " amon g themselves . Rather , i t tend s t o surface i n interdisciplinar y conversation s whe n the y encounte r other s wh o are usin g th e ter m i n way s tha t anthropologist s conside r t o b e overl y narrow, o r the y ar e making assumption s abou t actors ' perspective s withou t doing the necessary empirica l researc h to substantiat e thos e assumptions . Anthropologists wh o stud y scienc e an d technolog y hav e occasionall y applied th e cultur e concep t b y extendin g categorie s o f traditiona l cultura l analysis. Fo r example , Hug h Gusterso n (1996 ) examine s th e rol e o f ritual s and secrec y i n th e cultur e o f a nuclea r weapon s laboratory . B y viewin g nuclear weapon s testin g a s ritual , h e show s ho w participatio n i n th e test s changes th e socia l statu s o f th e nuclea r weapon s designers . Likewise , th e culture o f secrec y an d th e institutiona l insulatio n o f th e nuclea r weapon s community separat e scientist s fro m th e worl d an d fro m th e anxietie s o f responsibility associate d wit h nuclea r weapon s production . Anothe r cate gory o f traditiona l cultura l analysi s i s materia l culture , whic h cover s al l human-made physica l object s produce d i n a selecte d culture : buildings , clothing, machines , equipment , furniture , an d s o on. Anthropologist s hav e long recognize d tha t differen t cultures hav e differen t style s o f materia l culture. By comparin g material cultur e acros s nations, anthropologist s hav e revealed interestin g difference s i n design . Fo r example , i n Japa n high energy physic s detector s ar e reliabl e an d durable , wherea s i n th e Unite d States Trawee k (1988 ) foun d a desig n tha t emphasize d ope n architecture . She demonstrate s tha t th e differen t design s reflec t differen t fundin g pat terns, training o f technicians, and research problems and styles.

Structuralism and Poststructuralism In a goo d exampl e o f scientifi c innovatio n b y ide a hybridization , Claud e Levi-Strauss (1966 ) developed th e culture concept by applying the structur alist theor y o f linguistic s t o phenomen a suc h a s kinshi p an d myths . H e

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followed th e linguisti c mode l o f breakin g dow n phoneme s (basi c soun d units tha t listener s hear , suc h a s th e " p " an d " b " o f "pit " an d "bit" ) int o phonetic feature s tha t linguist s generalize d fro m observation s o f phoneme s (such a s plus o r minu s voice , o r plu s o r minu s aspiration) . W h e n translate d into anthropology , thi s distinctio n o f phonem e an d phoneti c featur e b e came know n i n som e quarter s a s emi c versu s eti c level s o f analysis . Erni e analyses represente d th e categorie s o f the loca l culture , wherea s eti c analyse s were categorie s produce d b y th e anthropologis t base d o n comparativ e analysis (somethin g lik e th e distinctio n betwee n observationa l an d theoreti cal terms) . The structuralis m o f Levi-Straus s an d othe r anthropologist s i s no w con sidered outdate d fo r reason s suc h a s it s excessiv e formalis m an d it s failur e to theoriz e actor/structur e relationships . Nevertheless , structuralis m ha s influenced anthropolog y an d cultura l studie s b y providin g a wa y o f inter preting th e meanin g o f action , texts , an d institution s b y mappin g on e cod e of meaning s ont o others . Fo r example , on e ca n interpre t categorie s o f nature an d cultur e i n myth s b y showin g ho w the y ma p ont o code s o f cooking. (I n mos t circumstance s ra w foo d i s natura l an d cooke d foo d i s cultural.) I n thi s analysi s wome n ofte n mediat e natur e an d culture , an d th e general argumen t wa s raise d tha t cultura l code s ofte n involv e th e symboli c equation tha t wome n ar e t o natur e a s men ar e t o culture , a cultural structur e that wa s foun d t o b e nearl y universal. 20 Althoug h Levi-Straussia n analysi s has bee n faulte d fo r androcentrism , th e basi c metho d o f interpretin g th e coding o f nature/cultur e division s agains t gende r division s ha s bee n highl y influential i n feminis t scienc e studies . Fo r example , man y o f Harawa y s analyses i n Primate Visions mak e muc h mor e sens e whe n rea d agains t th e background o f th e structuralist-influence d debate s o f th e feminis t anthro pology o f th e 1980s . A secon d importan t aspec t o f Levi-Straussia n structuralis m i s hi s analysi s of totemism . Totem s ar e categorie s o f socia l differenc e tha t ar e coconsti tuted wit h categorie s o f natural difference . T h e previou s exampl e o f gende r provides on e typ e o f analysi s o f totemis m i n th e mos t genera l sense . H o w ever, anthropologica l discussion s hav e focuse d o n totemi c relationship s i n premodern societies . Fo r example , a set o f natura l difference s (bears , eagles , wolves) i s relate d t o a se t o f socia l difference s (th e bea r clan , th e eagl e clan , the wol f clan) . Som e anthropologist s hav e suggeste d tha t totemis m ma y b e a usefu l metapho r fo r moder n societie s an d eve n science . Fo r example , Marshall Sahlin s (1976 ) argue d tha t scienc e ma y b e th e highes t for m o f totemism, a s i n th e parallel—firs t notice d an d critique d b y M a r x — b e -

Critical and Cultural Studies | 13 9 tween Darwinia n evolutionar y theor y an d capitalis t competition . Darwin' s delineation o f mechanism s o f variatio n an d selectio n i s quit e simila r t o th e capitalist worl d o f produc t innovatio n an d marke t competition . I hav e extended thi s discussio n b y arguin g tha t th e analysi s o f "technototems " — temporally an d culturall y localize d alignment s o f technical an d socia l mean ings—provides a useful alternativ e t o th e Edinburg h schoo l interest s analy ses o f th e relationshi p betwee n though t an d socia l categorie s (Hes s 1995 : ch. 2) . Yet anothe r are a wher e anthropologist s an d cultura l studie s researcher s have distinguishe d themselve s i s th e stud y o f reconstruction . O n e aspec t o f reconstruction involve s th e processe s b y whic h ne w socia l group s i n exper t communities (suc h a s wome n scientists ) challeng e existin g theorie s an d methods. However , reconstructio n ca n als o includ e th e tendenc y fo r n o n expert group s (o r group s wit h differen t professiona l expertises ) t o reinter pret an d remak e scienc e an d technolog y a s they pas s ou t o f exper t produce r groups an d int o othe r groups , eithe r i n domesti c o r workplac e settings. 21 Reconstruction i s comparabl e t o a process tha t Levi-Straus s describe d a s bricolage. A Frenc h wor d fo r a jack-of-all-trades , bricoleur entered socia l theory vi a Levi-Straus s s comparison wit h th e enginee r (1966) . Levi-Straus s argued tha t th e enginee r worke d fro m a pla n o r firs t principles , wherea s the bricoleu r worke d wit h th e object s a t han d unde r a n opportunisti c o r tinkering "logi c o f th e concrete. " Afte r laborator y studie s reveale d th e indexical natur e o f laborator y scienc e a s tinkerin g (e.g. , Knorr-Cetin a 1981), scientist s bega n t o loo k mor e lik e bricoleur s tha n ideal-typica l engi neers i n th e Levi-Straussia n formulation . Mor e generally , a s ne w group s enter int o scientifi c disciplines , o r a s scienc e passe s int o th e genera l public , theories an d knowledg e ar e sometime s subjec t t o a genera l proces s o f reconstruction aki n t o bricolage . For a bette r understandin g o f reconstruction , th e interpretiv e method s of deconstruction ar e mor e appropriat e tha n thos e o f structuralism. D e c o n struction i s ofte n introduce d vi a Derrida' s critiqu e o f logocentrism , a n ethnocentrism o f th e philosophica l subjec t tha t h e attribute d t o a long lin e of thinkers , includin g d e Saussur e (1966) . Derrid a (1974 ) argue d tha t th e logocentric primac y o f speec h ove r writin g reflect s th e erroneou s Wester n assumption o f th e primac y o f th e subjec t ove r language . I n mor e ST S terms, on e migh t translat e Derrid a a s critiquin g th e assumptio n o f th e primacy o f actor s ove r network s or , i n mor e socia l theoretica l terms , o f individuals ove r societ y an d actor s ove r structure . O f mor e importanc e t o the cultura l studie s o f scienc e an d technolog y tha n Derrida' s critiqu e o f

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logocentrism i s hi s wa y o f thinkin g abou t cultura l code s tha t depart s fro m the structuralis t analysi s o f symboli c opposition s (e.g. , mal e /female). In stead, Derrid a develope d a n analysi s o f implici t hierarchie s i n whic h on e term i s supplementar y an d th e othe r is , t o borro w a ter m fro m Loui s D u m o n t (1980) , th e encompassin g term . Thi s wa y o f thinkin g abou t sym bolism ca n b e a powerful too l fo r detectin g phallocentris m an d othe r kind s of cultural biase s i n scientifi c representations , texts , an d languag e i n general . For example , i n th e conventiona l patriarcha l us e o f mos t Wester n lan guages, th e pai r o f terms " m a n / w o m a n " i s also a hierarchy i n whic h "man " is th e encompassin g ter m tha t stand s fo r th e species . I n tur n th e specie s category "man " include s th e gendere d divisio n "man/woman, " wit h woman a s th e supplementa l term . I n turn , "woman " a s th e femal e o f th e species include s th e term s "woman " fo r th e adul t an d "girl " fo r th e child , the ne w supplementa l term . Deconstructiv e interpretation s sho w ho w a n apparently neutra l oppositio n i s i n tur n a hierarchy , whic h i n turne d ca n be inverte d b y showin g ho w th e supplementa l ter m (o r theory ) ca n b e reinterpreted a s the condition s o f possibility o f th e first . A majo r us e o f thi s strategy i s i n feminis t literar y studies , whic h provid e ne w reading s o f old text s tha t brin g ou t a n overlooke d viewpoin t suc h a s th e submerge d perspective o f a woma n character . A simila r strateg y underlie s som e ac counts o f gende r an d science , i n whic h hidde n femal e perspective s ar e brought ou t t o undermin e sexis t o r androcentri c mal e accounts . A classi c exampl e i s the critiqu e o f the maste r molecul e theor y o f D N A , with it s implici t cultura l mapping s ont o hierarchie s o f rac e an d gender . A number o f scholar s hav e pointe d ou t th e cultura l subtex t o f th e maste r molecule theor y o f earl y molecula r biology , whic h involve s a sor t o f chai n of comman d fro m th e D N A t o th e R N A t o th e manufactur e o f protein. 2 2 This vie w o f th e cel l assign s activit y t o th e nucleu s an d passivit y t o th e cytoplasm, an d th e cultura l categorie s o f activity/passivit y ar e extremel y gender-laden. A s Emily Marti n (1991 ) argues , th e genderin g o f these space s in th e cel l occur s no t onl y throug h genera l associatio n wit h assignment s o f activity an d passivity , bu t als o throug h th e traditiona l theor y tha t th e eg g i s the passiv e vehicl e tha t th e activ e sper m fertilizes . Thi s i s becaus e sper m contributes t o th e nucleu s o f th e eg g an d transform s it , wherea s th e cyto plasm remain s i n a sens e a femal e space . O f course , accurac y issue s ar e distinct fro m issue s o f cultural meaning , an d theorie s o f the maste r molecul e or th e activ e nucleu s an d sper m ma y o r ma y no t b e justifiable . However , feminist theor y an d deconstructiv e analysi s hel p t o se t of f alar m bell s tha t make i t possibl e t o questio n thos e representation s a s potentially inaccurate .

Critical and Cultural Studies | 14 1 It turn s ou t tha t th e activ e sper m mode l ha s bee n discredite d a s inaccurate , but a s Marti n shows , th e ne w activ e eg g mode l soo n accumulate d equall y gendered an d negativ e associations .

Public Understanding of Science and Technology Cultural an d anthropologica l studie s o f supplementa l term s an d reconstruc tion pu t a ne w twis t o n th e stud y o f th e publi c understandin g o f scienc e (PUS o r PUST , t o includ e technology) . I n a review essa y on PU S literature , Brian Wynn e (1994 ) divide d th e empirica l studie s int o thre e mai n groups : large-scale quantitativ e survey s o f selecte d sample s o f th e public , cognitiv e models o f la y understanding s o f science , an d fiel d studie s o f ho w peopl e i n different socia l context s experienc e an d construc t th e meanin g o f scientifi c expertise. A s Wynn e notes , survey s frequentl y "reinforc e th e syndrom e . . . in whic h onl y th e public , an d no t scienc e o r scientifi c cultur e an d institu tions, ar e problematized " (370) . I n contrast , fiel d studie s ten d t o emphasiz e the processe s o f how la y group s activel y reconstruc t science . Here , w e se e a hierarchical configuratio n o f terms—scientist s an d th e la y public—tha t field studie s ten d t o question . Scientists w h o wer e concerne d wit h los s o f taxpaye r suppor t fo r thei r research project s wer e earl y supporter s o f researc h o n th e PUS . Survey s revealed tha t la y understanding s o f most scientifi c concept s an d researc h ar e very poor . I n othe r words , "scientifi c literacy " i s low . Fro m th e scientists ' perspective th e proble m i s therefor e on e o f transmittin g scienc e t o th e public. Som e socia l scientist s shar e thi s concer n an d poin t t o th e troublin g implications o f lo w scientifi c literac y fo r a viabl e democracy . Fo r example , Merton worrie d tha t th e publi c wa s "susceptibl e t o ne w mysticism s ex pressed i n apparentl y scientifi c terms " an d therefor e subjec t t o totalitaria n ideology (1973 : 277) . Drawin g o n theorie s an d method s fro m cultura l anthropology, Christophe r Tourne y analyze s case s i n whic h "th e appearance of scientifi c authorit y ca n b e easil y conjure d fro m chea p symbol s an d ersat z images lik e a n actor s whit e coat " (1996 : 6) . Tourney discusse d th e troublin g implications o f th e "conjuring " o f scientifi c authorit y fo r a democrati c culture. Sociologist Doroth y Nelki n an d colleague s hav e contribute d a somewha t different approac h t o PU S issue s i n a democrati c cultur e throug h thei r studies o f scientifi c an d technica l controversie s (Nelki n 1992 , 1994) . Exam ples includ e feta l research , anima l rights , ozon e depletion , nuclea r energy ,

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and creatio n science . Nelki n an d colleague s ten d t o approac h thes e contro versies a s articulation s o f wide r conflict s betwee n value s an d socia l groups , not a s simpl e case s o f rationa l scientist s an d irrationa l publics . Ofte n th e clashes involv e tw o "goods, " suc h a s political prioritie s versu s environmen tal values, economi c interest s versu s healt h risks , an d individua l right s versu s social goals . Nelki n ha s als o tracke d ho w th e technica l controversie s hav e changed ove r time . Fo r example , sh e noted , "B y th e en d o f th e 1980 s protesters increasingl y frame d thei r attack s o n scienc e i n th e mora l languag e of rights " (1992 : xii) . Nelki n s research reveal s tha t thes e technica l conflict s are a continuatio n o f fundamenta l valu e conflict s i n th e broade r society . This framewor k suggest s a muc h mor e sophisticate d analysi s o f th e PU S than th e transmissio n mode l hel d b y som e scientists . A numbe r o f studies b y sociologist s an d anthropologist s demonstrat e tha t lay group s develo p fairl y sophisticate d understanding s o f scienc e whe n i t i s in thei r interes t t o d o so . Fo r example , Bria n Wynn e (1996 ) examine d th e local understanding s o f radiatio n pollutio n i n th e Lak e Distric t o f norther n England. T h e Chernoby l inciden t wa s accompanie d b y hig h level s o f rainfall i n thi s region , an d shee p farmer s subsequentl y learne d tha t thei r flocks wer e contaminated . However , th e governmen t interventio n cam e vi a a serie s o f mixe d messages , an d scientist s di d no t tak e loca l knowledg e int o consideration a s the y develope d thei r analyses . A s a result , som e o f th e scientists' recommendation s wer e ludicrou s i n ligh t o f la y knowledg e abou t grazing patterns , loca l ecology , an d loca l soi l types . Furthermore , long standing suspicion s abou t contaminatio n fro m th e nearb y Sellafiel d Nuclea r Plant reemerge d a s farmer s bega n t o suspec t tha t th e Chernoby l inciden t was bein g use d t o cove r u p a loca l radioactiv e contaminatio n problem . Thus, Wynn e demonstrate s no t onl y tha t la y group s ca n develo p a relativel y sophisticated skepticis m o f exper t knowledg e (provide d tha t i t i s wort h their whil e t o d o so) , but als o tha t exper t group s ca n fail—bot h technicall y and politically—whe n the y d o no t tak e int o accoun t loca l knowledge . I f the scientist s ha d listene d t o th e farmers , the y woul d hav e produce d bette r scientific model s o f th e radiatio n a s well a s bette r polic y recommendation s for handlin g th e contamination . Wynne's approac h i s somewha t simila r t o th e lesson s o f developmen t anthropologists w h o hav e examine d loca l response s t o technica l change . A classic exampl e i s Lauristo n Sharp' s "Stee l Axe s fo r Ston e Ag e Australians " (1952), whic h demonstrate s th e impac t o f an apparentl y innocuou s technol ogy transfer : stee l axes . Shar p show s tha t th e transfe r accelerate d th e disinte gration o f th e socia l structur e an d cosmolog y tha t wa s accompanyin g mis -

Critical and Cultural Studies | 14 3 sionary wor k an d contac t wit h white s i n general . A s i n th e cas e o f Wynne s sheep farmers , Shar p attempt s t o sho w ho w th e failur e t o tak e loca l knowl edge int o accoun t ca n b e disastrous . I n fact , Shar p founde d Cornell s anthropology departmen t wit h th e hop e tha t anthropologist s coul d hel p avoid som e o f the disaster s tha t ofte n occurre d i n developmen t project s tha t were planne d withou t considerin g loca l knowledge . In th e decade s sinc e "Stee l Axes, " som e grassroot s group s i n th e thir d world, a s wel l a s som e anthropologists , hav e com e t o questio n eve n a n enlightened pro-developmen t positio n suc h a s Sharp' s visio n o f develop ment project s tha t wer e guide d b y anthropologica l knowledge . A s Artur o Escobar point s out , " T h e author s i n thi s tren d stat e tha t the y ar e intereste d not i n developmen t alternative s bu t i n alternative s t o development , tha t is , the rejectio n o f th e paradig m altogether " (1995 : 215) . Escoba r analyze s and critique s developmen t sciences , includin g thei r history , institutiona l practices, methods , an d relation s t o alignment s o f globa l power . A relate d expansio n o f PU S vi a anthropolog y woul d b e t o rethin k th e study o f ethnoscience a s a version o f PUS studies . T h e ter m "ethnoscience " sometimes refer s t o a method fo r a relatively forma l analysi s o f classificatio n systems, usuall y loca l an d non-Western . However , th e ter m ca n als o b e used fo r th e stud y o f an y o f th e variou s non-Wester n o r fol k Wester n knowledge systems . Use d i n thi s way , whic h seem s preferable , "ethnosci ence" i s a genera l ter m tha t ca n includ e disciplinar y division s tha t mirro r those o f Wester n knowledge , fo r example , ethnoastronomy , ethnobotany , ethnomedicine, ethnopsychiatry , an d s o forth . (Hes s 1995 : ch . 7) . Stud y o f indigenous an d non-Wester n knowledg e system s ca n lea d t o a rethinkin g of som e Wester n science s fro m a non-Wester n perspective . Non-Wester n approaches hav e bee n particularl y prevalen t i n th e medica l field ; fo r exam ple, the y hav e provide d way s o f rethinkin g standar d psychiatri c categorie s and assumption s (Kleinma n 1988) . Studie s o f ethnoscience s als o hav e impli cations fo r rethinkin g developmen t project s tha t d o no t tak e int o consider ation loca l knowledges . O n e applicatio n ha s bee n th e us e o f loca l games , kinship knowledge , an d othe r forma l system s a s a mean s fo r improve d mathematics pedagog y i n school s (Borb a 1990 ; Watson-Verra n 1988) . An additiona l ste p i n PU S researc h i s t o follo w nativ e group s an d poo r communities a s they develo p thei r ow n technologie s an d articulation s wit h the globa l capitalis t system . Fo r example , on e grou p i n Indi a develope d a snake far m tha t sell s veno m t o laboratories , an d anothe r grou p ha s devel oped a wa y t o produc e pape r fro m th e po d o f a tre e rathe r tha n fro m harvesting softwoo d forest s (Hes s 1995 : ch . 8) . I n th e Unite d States , Paul a

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Treichler's researc h (1991 ) o n th e AID S communit y an d alternativ e medi cine demonstrate s ho w la y group s sometime s tak e step s towar d doin g thei r own researc h tha t pose s a direc t alternativ e t o officia l medica l research . I n the AID S movemen t thi s ha s take n th e for m o f guerrill a clinic s tha t offe r and tes t alternativ e medicines . I a m currentl y examinin g reconstruction s o f medicine i n th e alternativ e cance r therap y movement . Thi s for m o f PU S can b e particularl y powerfu l becaus e la y groups—o r mixe s o f la y group s and marginalize d scientists—ca n pu t togethe r successfu l coalition s o f alter native science . I n th e area s o f medica l treatmen t fo r chroni c diseas e an d research o n environmenta l toxins , thes e coalition s ca n provid e a n importan t impetus fo r badl y neede d reform s i n establishe d researc h agendas . More generall y PU S studie s revea l th e shortcoming s o f th e transmissio n model tha t characterize s th e la y anthropolog y o f scientist s an d medica l researchers. Th e ide a tha t th e mai n proble m i n th e publi c understandin g o f science i s tha t ther e i s no t enoug h o f i t i s simila r t o th e ol d colonialis t narrative tha t i t wa s th e whit e man' s burde n t o civiliz e th e native s an d domesticate th e females . W h e n applie d t o scientifi c literacy , thi s approac h will lea d t o polic y failures , just a s the top-dow n developmen t model s le d t o disasters i n th e field . T h e alternativ e reconstructio n mode l suggest s tha t "the public " i s ofte n th e possesso r o f profoun d knowledges . H o w wel l would scientist s d o i f they wer e give n literac y test s o n automobil e mechan ics, mai l deliver y procedures , hairdressing , an d s o on ? Th e publi c i s no t illiterate a s muc h a s busy . Researc h outline d abov e suggest s tha t publi c groups ar e capabl e o f understandin g scienc e whe n i t touche s thei r live s i n significant an d sustaine d ways . W h en thi s happens , la y group s ofte n develo p opinions an d sometime s researc h tha t ar e a t odd s wit h th e experts . Fo r example, I hav e foun d tha t cance r patient s w h o g o "off-grid " int o th e world o f alternativ e medicin e ofte n develo p ver y sophisticate d understand ings o f th e relevan t science . Althoug h th e PU S i n thi s cas e ma y b e narrow band i n th e sens e tha t i t i s restricte d t o a smal l are a o f science , i t i s ofte n very dee p an d envelope d i n a sophisticate d understandin g o f th e politic s and sociolog y o f knowledge . I n thi s situatio n a condescendin g approac h o f uplifting th e illiterate s wil l onl y lea d t o furthe r polarization . Instead , rela tively literat e la y model s o f scienc e nee d t o b e understood , analyzed , an d tested empirically , an d i n som e case s incorporate d int o exper t science . Environmental an d medica l issue s ar e tw o area s where la y knowledges poin t to substantia l shortcoming s i n officiall y sponsore d researc h programs .

Critical and Cultural Studies | 14 5

Rethinking Values The analysi s o f culture—comparativel y acros s groups , genders , places , an d times—provides on e wa y t o expan d th e discussio n o f values i n scienc e tha t was opene d i n previou s chapters . T o review , I bega n wit h th e technica l values fo r theor y choic e outline d b y Kuhn, the n examine d th e complemen tary lis t o f Mertonia n norms . However , th e sociologica l studie s o f cumula tive advantag e theor y an d th e SS K literatur e demonstrate d th e widesprea d importance o f variou s type s o f particularisti c values . Thes e value s pla y a variable rol e i n ke y decision s suc h a s th e evaluatio n o f personnel , choic e of researc h problem s an d materials , an d theoretica l an d methodologica l preferences. Subsequen t wor k i n cultura l an d critica l studie s o f scienc e an d technology ha s helpe d generaliz e th e analysi s o f value s t o sho w ho w sci ences an d theorie s ar e shape d b y genera l cultura l value s eve n a s they provid e representations o f o r instrumenta l prediction s fo r th e world . Th e ter m "general cultura l values " refer s t o value s linke d t o way s o f seein g th e worl d associated wit h particula r tim e periods , nations , classes , genders , ethni c groups, an d s o forth . Som e researcher s i n th e ST S fiel d (mysel f included ) think o f genera l cultura l value s no t a s contaminatin g force s tha t shoul d b e eliminated bu t a s productiv e resource s fo r theoretical , methodological , de sign, an d othe r innovations . T h e questio n i s no t ho w t o eliminat e cultura l values bu t instea d ho w t o fin d ou t whic h cultura l value s structur e scienc e and whethe r differen t o r bette r science s woul d resul t i f other value s replace d the one s currentl y i n place . For example , i n th e nineteent h centur y scientist s tende d t o vie w th e world i n term s o f gran d tempora l narrative s tha t wer e consisten t wit h th e expansionary industria l an d colonia l culture s o f th e time . Accordin g t o th e contemporary view , th e societie s o f th e tim e w e r e — a n d shoul d b e — expanding i n a never-ending, onward-and-upwar d flow o f progress. Value s such a s progress ove r tim e wer e no t contamination s tha t prevente d scientist s from derivin g accurat e picture s o f th e world ; instead , the y wer e productiv e in tha t the y provide d th e condition s o f possibilit y fo r suc h theorie s a s evolution, linguisti c change , an d th e secon d la w o f thermodynamics. A t th e time thos e theorie s seeme d mor e all-encompassin g tha n the y d o today , when gran d tempora l narrative s mee t wit h greate r skepticis m i n th e genera l culture an d scientist s produc e theorie s tha t ar e mor e consisten t wit h th e cultures the y liv e in . B y examinin g scienc e comparativel y acros s tempora l cultures, i t become s easie r t o perceiv e th e value s tha t underli e th e genera l contours o f theories , includin g thos e o f th e presen t period . A s a result, on e

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is i n a bette r positio n t o propos e alternative s an d t o understan d curren t technocultural phenomena , suc h a s the wa y i n whic h complexit y an d chao s theory ha s tended t o swee p acros s th e intellectua l landscape . Althoug h thes e new theorie s ma y see m particularl y attractive , i t i s exactl y a t th e momen t when the y exer t thei r attractio n tha t the y shoul d b e questione d fro m th e distant vie w o f a comparativ e perspective . T h e ke y methodologica l issu e i n discussion s o f value s i s a comparativ e perspective. I t i s difficul t t o se e th e biase s o f existin g theorie s unti l ther e i s an alternativ e t o whic h the y ca n b e compared . I n th e cas e o f primatolog y as studie d b y Harawa y (1989) , severa l o f th e mos t profoun d alternative s emerged whe n previousl y exclude d socia l categories—Sout h Asians , Japa nese, an d Wester n w o m e n — e n t e r e d th e field . The y wer e abl e t o se e wha t the Wester n me n coul d no t see , t o g o (sometime s boldly ) wher e n o whit e man ha d gon e before . Wha t appeare d previousl y a s pur e representatio n now wa s reveale d t o b e onl y partia l representatio n tha t wa s grounde d i n cultural values . N o doub t a s ne w group s continu e t o ente r th e fiel d (suc h as ga y an d lesbia n scientists) , ther e wil l b e additiona l revision s tha t wil l reveal th e dox a o f th e apparentl y ver y disparat e view s bein g debate d today . Similar insight s occu r whe n comparin g th e socia l organizatio n o f scien tific researc h unit s across , fo r example , nationa l cultures. 23 T h e organiza tional structur e o f academi c department s an d laboratorie s varie s tremen dously fro m on e countr y t o another , an d th e variatio n i s par t o f a wide r pattern o f genera l socia l structura l variation . I n th e Unite d State s th e system tend s t o b e base d o n competition , promotio n vi a mobility , an d th e emergence o f rising stars . I n othe r countrie s promotio n occur s mor e withi n comparatively rigi d hierarchica l structure s tha t ar e par t o f a wide r patter n of hierarchica l model s o f famil y an d socia l organization . Thes e difference s are no t o f mer e scholarl y interest ; the y ca n lea d t o substantia l cross-cultura l miscommunication i n internationa l meeting s an d project s o f collaboration . They ca n als o provid e th e condition s fo r differen t style s o f nationa l theor y and researc h interest s (Harwoo d 1993) . Finally, becaus e scienc e an d technolog y polic y itsel f i s par t o f a broade r political culture , value s als o structur e polic y processes . I n a revie w o f descriptive researc h o n nationa l value s an d policy , Andre w Webste r deline ated tw o ke y difference s i n nationa l scienc e an d technolog y polic y style s (1991: 62-65) . I n countrie s suc h a s th e Unite d States , th e polic y proces s i s open, competitive , an d agonistic , rathe r tha n relativel y close d an d wit h limited expert s an d limite d publi c scrutiny , a s i n Britain . Furthermore , i n the Unite d State s an d Britai n th e polic y proces s i s pluralisti c rathe r tha n

Critical and Cultural Studies | 14 7 state-planned, a s i n th e • open, competitiv e Dutc h syste m o r th e closed , limited Japanese system . I n al l cases , ther e ar e differen t style s o f democrati c participation, an d on e countr y ma y hav e lesson s t o offe r others . Richar d Scloves wor k (1995a ) i s probabl y th e primar y exempla r o f ho w t o alte r science an d technolog y polic y processe s fro m th e perspectiv e o f democrati c values. In short , th e questio n o f values remain s centra l t o STS , bu t tha t questio n has shifte d t o involv e a mor e sophisticate d an d comparativ e understandin g of values tha n i n th e Mertonia n mode l o f technical an d institutiona l norms . Contemporary ST S researc h open s u p th e proble m t o temporal , national , gender, democratic , an d a range o f othe r value s a s they groun d institutions , theories, design , methods , policy , an d othe r dimension s o f scienc e an d technology. Furthermore , becaus e value s emerg e fro m th e action s o f histor ically situate d socia l actors , value s ar e n o longe r see n a s monolithic , bu t a s contestable, contested , an d subjec t t o change . Th e wid e rang e o f values an d contexts studie d show s ho w scientifi c knowledg e i s par t o f cultur e eve n a s it represent s th e world .

6 Conclusions

What goo d i s scienc e studies , technolog y studies , o r ST S a s a whole? Wha t i s th e valu e o f al l th e terms , concepts , schools , an d frame works? I n today' s academy , thi s questio n ha s siniste r undertones , particularl y when i t i s aske d i n th e contex t o f scienc e war s an d budge t cuts . Al l disciplines—and especiall y th e ver y vulnerabl e interdisciplinar y pro grams—are force d t o justify themselves , an d no t merel y i n th e philosophi cal o r Calvinis t sens e o f th e word . W e ar e aske d t o provid e a reason fo r ou r continued existence . I t i s th e mos t bruta l for m o f justification: budgetar y justification. Perhaps th e oldes t answe r t o th e questio n i s tha t student s nee d som e appreciation o f th e histor y o f scienc e an d technology . Thi s ha s bee n th e traditional justificatio n fo r program s i n th e philosoph y an d histor y o f sci ence an d technolog y Thes e program s ar e valuabl e becaus e the y provid e al l students, no t onl y scienc e students , wit h a n understandin g o f th e basi c principles an d histor y o f science an d technology . Presumabl y course s o f thi s sort wil l hel p mak e student s becom e bette r scientist s or , i f the y d o no t become scientists , bette r supporter s o f scienc e an d mor e willin g taxpayers . Langdon Winne r (1996 ) appropriatel y call s thi s approac h "HSTS, " o r th e hooray fo r scienc e an d technolog y school . Another apparentl y uncontroversia l approac h i s th e scientometri c stud y of science , whic h ha s polic y implication s fo r th e managemen t o f science . This branc h o f scienc e studie s i s justified i n term s o f nationa l polic y goal s such a s makin g bette r decision s o n whic h area s o f scienc e shoul d receiv e public funding , rathe r tha n improvin g th e publi c appreciatio n o f science . Policy implication s ca n als o b e fine-tune d t o focu s o n loca l manageria l issues suc h a s organizin g scientifi c wor k an d worker s i n way s tha t enhanc e productivity Scientometric s als o look s familia r t o scientist s an d engineers ; it use s simila r quantitativ e method s an d style s o f presentation . Fo r th e sak e of a parallel, I wil l cal l thi s approac h MSTS : managin g science , technology , and society . However transparen t thei r justificatio n seems , bot h HST S an d MST S

Conclusions | 14 9 ultimately wil l ru n int o conflic t wit h scientists , engineers , an d physicians . As i n an y fiel d tha t professionalizes , historical , philosophical , o r manageria l studies o f scienc e an d technolog y wil l becom e increasingl y autonomou s from th e science s an d technologie s tha t the y stud y I n th e process , thei r researchers wil l com e t o hav e representation s o f scienc e an d technolog y that diffe r fro m thos e o f th e scientists , engineers , an d medica l researchers . Managerially oriente d socia l scienc e wil l becom e increasingl y intrusive , just as the philosoph y o f scienc e wil l becom e mor e irrelevan t an d th e histor y o f science an d technolog y mor e sacrilegious . Thos e w h o ar e eve n mor e extreme—the purveyor s o f SSK , cultura l studies , feminism , radica l science , or som e versio n o f a critica l STS—wil l b e see n a s dangerou s heretic s w h o should b e line d u p an d detenure d i n th e scienc e wars . A bette r wa y t o justify ST S i s t o mak e th e potentia l o f conflic t explicit , or eve n t o capitaliz e o n i t b y definin g ST S i n term s o f a widesprea d public concer n wit h science , technology , an d values . Th e concerne d publi c includes man y scientists , engineers , an d physician s w h o themselve s hav e developed organization s dedicate d t o ethics , values , an d socia l responsibilit y issues. Thus , categorie s suc h a s "scientists " an d "ST S scholars " nee d no t b e defined oppositionally . Instead , ther e ar e merel y researcher s an d citizen s w h o ar e concerne d wit h preservin g a n institutiona l locatio n fo r debat e o n science, technology , an d values . Fro m thi s perspective , ST S i s justified a s the badl y neede d sit e wher e peopl e w h o ar e concerne d wit h th e plac e o f science an d technolog y i n a democrati c societ y ca n debat e thes e compli cated issues . Th e issue s ma y focu s o n th e interna l institutiona l dynamic s o f science, suc h a s mor e equitabl e recruitmen t an d retentio n o f wome n an d other historicall y exclude d groups . Alternatively , th e issue s ma y involv e th e general plac e o f science an d technolog y i n society : H o w ca n societie s mov e toward a mor e "sustainable " ecologica l relationship ? H o w ca n democrati c principles b e incorporate d int o th e scienc e polic y process ? H o w ca n th e design o f technolog y an d urba n spac e b e reshape d i n mor e equitabl e ways ? The ver y phrasin g o f thes e question s require s a n exi t fro m th e neutralit y and relativis m o f th e constructivis t period , an d als o fro m th e dead-hors e debates suc h a s relativis m versu s realism . However , unlik e som e o f m y colleagues I believe tha t muc h o f the previou s researc h o f ST S ca n b e mad e relevant t o debate s o n values . Fo r example , th e philosophers ' concern s wit h developing goo d prescriptiv e evaluatio n criteri a ca n b e helpfu l fo r publi c debates o n whic h researc h an d developmen t program s shoul d b e funded . The quantitativ e sociolog y o f scienc e provide s a goo d empirica l basi s fo r discussions o f ho w t o refor m institutions . Eve n th e construetivist s hav e lef t

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a legac y o f resource s tha t mak e i t easie r t o fin d thos e point s i n th e histor y of a researc h progra m o r technolog y wher e on e pathwa y wa s chose n ove r another. The y als o hel p mak e i t possible t o find th e roads n o longe r travele d by an d to as k whether thos e road s deserv e anothe r try .

Intervention as Research and Action It i s als o possible—an d valuable—t o translat e th e genera l questio n o f a concern wit h value s int o concret e researc h agendas . O n e approac h i s a different kin d o f polic y studies : on e tha t focuse s o n ho w concerne d citi zens—both withi n thei r field s o f expertis e an d outsid e them—interven e to chang e scienc e an d technology . T h e man y type s o f intervention includ e the institution s o f scienc e an d technology , technolog y us e patterns , polic y processes, an d even th e "content " o f science itself . T o flesh ou t thi s alterna tive typ e o f polic y studies , I wil l focu s o n on e for m o f intervention , on e that th e lesson s o f feminism , cultural/critica l studies , an d constructivis m teach u s t o regar d a s crucial : interventio n int o th e "content " o f scienc e o r the knowledge-makin g proces s itself . I divid e researc h o n th e topi c int o three type s o f intervention : b y expert s i n thei r ow n fields , b y nonexperts , and b y socia l scientist s an d humanitie s scholars . Regarding th e firs t area , SS K researc h provide s a n importan t resourc e for strategies . Studie s o f th e rhetori c o f fac t constructio n an d th e mecha nisms o f controvers y provid e resource s fo r scientist s w h o wis h t o refor m some aspec t o f thei r field . Furthermore , actor-networ k theor y provide s a potentially usefu l resourc e fo r reformer s withi n scientifi c fields . Problemati zation woul d wel l describ e th e cas e o f primatologis t Jeann e Altmann , discussed b y Harawa y (1989) , w ho intervene d i n a strategic wa y by focusin g on methodology . I n a classi c paper , thi s primatologis t reviewe d severa l major samplin g method s an d pointed ou t whe n t o us e an d no t us e eac h o f them. Focusin g o n methodologica l reform s rhetoricall y put s th e reforme r on th e sid e o f "bette r science, " bu t i t als o serve s t o translat e potentiall y contentious theoretica l issue s int o les s dramati c technicalities . A s Harawa y describes it , " H e r feminis m wa s operationalize d a s a kee n sens e o f critica l method, wit h consequence s fo r allowabl e narrative s abou t w o m e n scientist s and abou t animals " (1989 : 307) . Altmann' s methodologica l stricture s b e came a n obligator y poin t o f passage, and , t o us e th e lingo o f chapte r 3 , her paper o n th e topi c reache d th e leve l o f a citatio n classi c befor e i t face d obliteration b y incorporation. However , Harawa y s studies of feminist recon -

Conclusions |

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1

structions o f primatolog y sugges t tha t whil e problematizatio n an d enroll ment ar e important , interventio n i s a mor e comple x process . A s discusse d in chapte r 5 , sh e point s t o th e collectiv e an d socia l natur e o f intervention , and th e importanc e o f linkages t o broade r socia l movements . Regarding th e secon d typ e o f intervention , b y la y citizens , i n severa l European countrie s citize n revie w panel s provid e a means o f direc t partici patory polic y makin g i n whic h layperson s examin e scienc e an d technolog y policy i n th e making . Althoug h th e result s o f thes e panel s usuall y ar e nonbinding, citize n revie w panel s d o provid e a potentia l mechanis m fo r direct, participator y democrac y i n th e scienc e polic y proces s an d the y d o sometimes hav e a n impac t o n nationa l agenda s (Sclov e 1996) . Environmen tal dispute s ar e anothe r are a wher e nonexpert s frequentl y develo p alterna tive account s o f science . Thes e dispute s ofte n tak e th e for m o f account s o f environmental safet y tha t ar e develope d b y well-finance d corporation s o r the governmen t an d ar e i n conflic t wit h th e knowledg e o f loca l citizens ' activist groups . Gar y Downe y (1988 ) ha s explore d som e o f th e mechanism s that la y group s ca n us e fo r developin g alternativ e scientifi c interpretation s in environmenta l disputes : reconstructin g officia l dat a an d pointin g t o internal contradiction s i n officia l accounts , recruitin g renegad e scientist s and therefor e destabilizin g scientifi c consensus , an d drawin g o n loca l knowledge t o destabiliz e officia l accounts . The y mus t als o figh t agains t what Bria n Marti n an d Pa m Scot t (1992 ) cal l nondecision-making , o r th e operation o f powe r "throug h issue s neve r bein g though t o f enoug h t o warrant forma l attention. " Probably mor e develope d tha n th e la y epidemiolog y o f the environmen tal group s i s th e scienc e tha t i s emergin g fro m alternativ e medica l c o m m u nities. Treichler' s wor k o n AID S patient s hold s ou t th e promis e o f a "democratic technoculture " i n whic h basemen t scienc e examine s th e effi cacy o f alternative s tha t officia l medicin e refuse s t o consider . I n th e alterna tive cance r therap y movement , th e outcome s researc h o f th e Gerso n R e search Organizatio n promise s a n eve n highe r leve l o f sophisticatio n i n th e making o f scienc e b y group s outsid e th e establishmen t (e.g. , Hildenbran d et al . 1995) . Regarding th e thir d area , interventio n int o scientifi c controversie s b y STS researchers , Downe y an d Juan Roger s (1995 ) hav e suggeste d "partne r theorizing." Unde r thi s for m o f intervention , ST S researcher s wor k t o gether wit h scientist s o r engineer s an d tak e thei r view s int o accoun t i n building strategie s fo r change , a s i n th e cas e o f engineerin g curriculu m reform (se e als o Woolga r 1996) . Thi s strateg y ha s grea t potential , althoug h

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it risk s appropriatio n whe n on e partne r ha s greate r prestig e an d power . I t may b e a mor e appropriat e strateg y i n th e cas e o f suppor t fo r communit y groups, an d th e Dutc h mode l o f scienc e shop s provide s a possibl y mor e productive sit e fo r partne r theorizing . I n scienc e shops , faculty , students , and othe r universit y member s provid e researc h fo r unions , environmental ists, an d othe r nonprofi t group s tha t d o no t hav e th e resource s t o d o thei r own researc h bu t d o hav e th e resource s t o ac t o n th e researc h provide d b y the scientist s (se e Sclov e 1995a , 1995b , 1995c) . Thes e partnership s hel p bridge t o w n / g o w n split s i n way s tha t involv e academi c researcher s directl y in communit y struggle s fo r improvement . Similar t o partne r theorizin g i s the wor k o f Brian Marti n an d colleague s (1986; als o Marti n 1997b ) a s activist s i n case s o f intellectua l suppression . According t o Martin , suppressio n usuall y occur s whe n th e research , teach ing, o r publi c statement s o f intellectual s threate n th e veste d interest s o f a corporation, government , o r profession . Th e direc t mechanism s o f suppres sion involv e denyin g fund s o r wor k opportunities ; blockin g appointments , tenure, promotion , courses , and/o r publication ; preventin g fre e speech ; dismissal; harassment ; blacklisting ; and/o r smearin g reputations . Th e indi rect mechanism s involv e implie d sanctions , a genera l climat e o f fear , o r pressures fo r conformity . Usuall y complaint s ar e made t o a person s supervisor rathe r tha n th e perso n directly . Marti n an d colleague s als o distinguis h suppression fro m repression , whic h involve s physica l violenc e suc h a s beat ings, imprisonment , torture , an d murder ; an d oppression , whic h the y de fine a s a n institutionalize d lac k o f justice o r freedom . I n a fascinatin g cas e study tha t reveal s a ne w typ e o f polic y rol e fo r th e ST S analyst , Bria n Martin (1996 ) ha s develope d a partnership , i n coalitio n wit h a journalis t and a lawyer , wit h representative s o f a marginalize d AID S theory . Hi s publication o f a working pape r throug h th e ST S Departmen t a t the Univer sity o f Wollongon g helpe d ge t a hearin g fo r a viewpoin t tha t h e believe d deserved mor e attentio n i n th e scientifi c community : th e theor y tha t AID S emerged fro m ba d poli o vaccines .

Aspects of a Postconstructivist Science Studies I hav e bee n developin g a n analytica l framewor k fo r intervention-oriente d research tha t take s advantag e o f th e third-part y positio n o f th e socia l scien tist t o provid e a n outsid e evaluatio n o f th e scientifi c merit s o f differen t positions i n a controvers y (Hes s 1997a) . Eve n framin g th e issu e i n thi s wa y

Conclusions | 15 3 reveals th e distanc e fro m th e classica l controvers y studie s o f th e sociolog y o f scientific knowledge . Thi s alternative , whic h evaluate s th e scientifi c merit s of differen t position s i n a controvers y rathe r tha n merel y analyzin g the m sociologically, require s spendin g a great dea l o f time t o acquir e competenc y in th e science s i n question . T o paraphras e on e o f Marx' s these s o n Feuer bach, on e mus t attemp t t o understan d ho w th e worl d i s represente d i f on e is t o attemp t t o chang e it . I n developin g thi s framework , I hav e focuse d o n one theor y i n th e hug e worl d o f alternativ e medicine : th e theor y tha t bacterial infection s pla y a n overlooke d rol e i n cance r etiology . This cas e stud y o f a n alternativ e cance r theor y provide s th e empirica l material wit h whic h I develo p a n alternativ e t o th e stron g progra m an d its successor s i n th e sociolog y o f scientifi c knowledge . I t i s fa r to o eas y t o find fault s i n th e stron g progra m an d it s successors ; muc h mor e difficul t is th e projec t o f articulatin g a n alternativ e an d applyin g i t t o a concret e research problem . Thus , rathe r tha n provid e ye t anothe r critiqu e o f th e strong program , constructivism , an d th e sociolog y o f scientifi c knowledg e in general , I develo p a n alternativ e analytica l framewor k tha t involve s four basi c step s tha t doubl e a s principle s o f analysis . Th e principle s ar e a s follows: 1. Th e analysi s i s political ; i t explore s th e operatio n o f powe r i n th e history o f a fiel d o f knowledg e tha t become s constitute d b y a consensu s and attendan t heterodoxies . Thus , I begi n wit h a n examinatio n o f th e historical recor d o n th e suppressio n o f on e theor y i n cance r researc h an d how tha t theor y becam e par t o f th e heterodox y o f th e fiel d o f cance r research. 2. T h e analysi s i s cultura l i n th e sens e tha t i t develop s a sophisticated , noninstrumentalist explanatio n an d explicatio n o f th e dynamic s o f powe r that hav e bee n describe d i n th e firs t step . Althoug h som e researcher s ma y prefer th e ter m "sociological " o r "social, " I us e th e ter m "cultural " t o flag a kin d o f analysi s tha t doe s no t reduc e th e explanatio n o f consensu s knowl edge an d heterodox y t o wha t Marshal l Sahlin s (1976 ) call s practica l reason . In othe r words , i t i s far to o eas y t o explai n th e histor y o f suppressio n a s th e result o f a coalitio n o f intereste d partie s w h o ac t i n a mechanica l wa y t o attain status , enhanc e symboli c capital , protec t thei r interests , o r simpl y gai n and maintai n power . Instead , emphasi s i s place d o n th e rol e o f evidenc e and efficac y i n shapin g th e fiel d o f possibilities ; thus , a picture o f scienc e a s a rationa l activit y i s maintained . However , withi n thi s fiel d o f possibilities , sociocultural factor s contribut e t o th e structurin g o f preference s an d th e

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crystallization o f consensus . Interes t theor y i s welde d t o a mor e comple x interpretation o f (i ) th e growt h o f th e autonom y o f researc h culture s tha t respond wit h som e interna l integrit y t o ecologica l change s i n th e politica l economy; (2 ) th e rol e o f gende r i n th e constructio n o f consensu s knowl edge; an d (3 ) th e plac e o f transcultura l movement s i n th e destabilizatio n o f a consensu s an d associate d suppressiv e apparati . 3. T h e analysi s i s evaluative ; i t draw s o n th e philosoph y o f scienc e t o weigh th e accuracy , consistency , pragmati c value , an d potentia l socia l biase s of the knowledg e claim s o f the consensu s an d alternativ e researc h traditions . This principl e assume s tha t a fully interdisciplinar y ST S analysi s step s ou t o f the traditiona l plan e o f socia l scientifi c analysis/critiqu e (her e formulate d around th e tw o strand s o f cultur e an d power ) t o a prescriptive level . A t thi s level, tw o type s o f evaluation tak e place : th e evaluatio n o f knowledge claim s and th e evaluatio n o f proposed polic y o r politica l changes . T h e firs t typ e o f evaluation i s base d o n th e standard s o f th e bes t availabl e scientifi c knowl edge a t th e tim e o f th e evaluato r s analysis , bu t i t als o assume s tha t thos e standards ma y themselve s b e biase d agains t th e researc h unde r analysi s du e to th e sam e politica l an d cultura l processe s alread y analyzed . Th e evaluatio n examines th e conten t o f the scienc e itsel f from th e philosophica l perspectiv e of constructiv e realism , tha t is , a positio n tha t recognize s bot h th e con structed an d th e representationa l aspect s o f knowledge bu t tha t base s evalua tion o n th e bes t availabl e knowledg e o f cance r research . Th e vie w o f knowledge i s neithe r relativis t (a s fo r th e idea l typica l radica l constructivis t w h o doe s no t allo w fo r th e powe r o f th e worl d t o constrai n evidence ) no r algorithmic (a s fo r th e idea l typica l naiv e realis t w h o believe s tha t th e crucial experimen t ca n generall y resolv e dispute s ove r evidence) . Rather , the natur e o f knowledg e i s assume d t o b e mor e lik e tha t o f th e lega l profession an d th e qualitativ e socia l sciences , i n whic h evidenc e ca n b e established bu t alway s withi n a social situatio n tha t recognize s th e powe r o f cross-examination an d interpretation . T o establis h criteri a fo r evaluatin g th e alternative researc h program , I dra w o n a wid e rang e o f source s i n th e philosophy o f science , includin g th e wor k o f feminist s a s synthesize d b y Longino (1994) . 4. Th e analysi s i s positioned ; i t provide s a n evaluatio n o f alternativ e policy an d politica l goal s tha t coul d resul t i n beneficia l institutiona l an d research progra m changes . A s a socia l scientist , I assum e tha t I wil l b e positioned insid e th e controversy . Th e capturin g literatur e demonstrate s that thi s situatio n i s inescapable , an d therefor e I a m bette r of f positionin g

Conclusions | 15 5 myself rathe r tha n lettin g someon e els e d o i t fo r me . I n th e terminolog y o f the ST S field , thi s leve l o f analysi s ca n b e describe d a s a typ e o f reflexivity , but on e tha t i s mor e profoundl y sociologica l o r anthropologica l tha n pre viously discusse d forms . In m y previou s book s (e.g. , Hes s 1993 ) I argued agains t a mere epistemo logical reflexivit y o f th e stron g progra m an d suggeste d a culturall y oriente d reflexivity tha t operate d a t th e leve l o f the relation s betwee n th e researcher s academic communitie s an d th e group s researched . A s a next step , position ing i s achieve d no t throug h th e confessiona l (wh y I believ e wha t I believ e or ho w I di d m y research ) o r throug h deconstructiv e literar y device s (suc h as secondar y voices) , bu t throug h th e evaluatio n o f agenda s fo r potentiall y beneficial institutiona l change s an d investment s fo r futur e research . Becaus e the analysi s evaluate s concret e polic y recommendations , a s a social scientis t I a m automaticall y positione d insid e th e controvers y an d therefor e becom e part o f it. Nevertheless , a s a social scientis t I als o bring a unique perspectiv e and positio n tha t doe s no t mea n complet e allianc e wit h an y singl e positio n within th e controversy . In th e proces s o f developin g thi s alternativ e visio n fo r STS , I foun d man y of it s constituen t disciplines—history , sociology , anthropology , philosophy , and policy—fundamenta l a s points o f reference . Empirically , th e en d resul t is a contributio n t o a growin g nationa l debat e o n th e failur e o f th e wa r o n cancer an d th e nee d fo r a reforme d cance r researc h agenda . Cance r wil l soon strik e on e i n tw o American s a t som e poin t durin g thei r lifetime , an d nearly alway s someon e amon g one' s friend s o r relative s i s facin g th e life threatening disease . I n thi s situation , decision s nee d t o b e mad e bot h personally abou t whic h therapie s t o us e an d nationall y abou t a failed polic y of researc h investments . W h e n decision s o f thi s magnitud e ar e looming , relativism i s impossibl e an d th e basi c principle s o f a politicall y neutra l philosophy, history , o r socia l scienc e ar e no t viable . Nevertheless , ther e i s still a grea t valu e i n bringin g a leve l o f discipline d inquir y t o th e man y pressing socia l issue s tha t involv e scienc e an d technology . The principle s I hav e outline d represen t onl y on e attemp t t o grappl e with th e issu e o f repositioning scienc e studie s inquir y afte r th e constructiv ist period . A numbe r o f colleague s w h o coul d roughl y b e classifie d a s affiliated wit h th e cultural/critica l studie s wing s o f ST S shar e a t leas t som e of th e principle s articulate d here . T h e futur e o f ST S lie s i n it s abilit y t o provide a sit e fo r publi c debate s o n issue s o f socia l importance , an d fo r th e

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evaluation o f major researc h programs and technological decisions . Far from the caricatur e o f postmodern irrationalis m tha t appear s amon g some o f the science wa r detractors , a t it s bes t ST S provide s intellectua l tool s an d re sources fo r injectin g researc h an d reasonin g int o debate s o f grea t publi c importance.

For Additiona l Informatio n

For thos e intereste d i n th e attack s o n ST S know n a s th e "sci ence wars, " a good plac e t o star t i s issue 46—4 7 of Social Text (1996 , vo L 14 , nos. 1 and 2) , whic h itsel f became par t o f th e controvers y Fo r a n introduc tion t o th e philosoph y o f science , I hav e foun d Fulle r (1993a) , Hackin g (1983), an d Kouran y s reader (1987 ) t o b e th e mos t useful , an d Idh e (1993 ) is a usefu l guid e t o th e philosoph y o f technology . Callebu t s collectio n o f interviews (1993 ) give s a goo d tast e o f som e contemporar y debate s i n th e field. Fo r feminis t philosoph y o f science , th e standar d startin g point s ar e philosophers suc h a s Longin o (1994 ) an d Hardin g (1986 , 1992) . T h e j o u r nals Social Epistemology an d Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science are examples o f philosophicall y oriente d journal s wher e on e tend s t o fin d a n interdisciplinary orientation . For th e sociolog y o f science , th e classi c tex t i s Merto n (1973) , bu t th e survey b y Col e (1992 ) i s mor e up-to-dat e an d i t provide s on e exampl e o f how America n sociologist s o f scienc e hav e responde d t o th e sociolog y o f scientific knowledge . T h e othe r mai n lin e o f American sociologist s include s Allison, Hagstrom , Hargens , Long , McGinness , an d Reskin , whos e wor k i s cited i n th e bibliography . Ther e i s n o equivalen t introductor y boo k fo r them, bu t thei r article s ar e reviewe d i n th e chapte r o n th e sociolog y o f science, an d Hagstro m (1965 ) ma y b e a good startin g point. T h e psycholog y of scienc e literatur e i s undevelope d an d largel y irrelevan t t o th e othe r ST S social sciences , bu t it s us e o f variable s an d quantitativ e method s overlap s i n some case s wit h th e sociolog y o f science , a s i n productivit y studie s an d creativity studies . Se e Fulle r e t al . (1989 ) an d Shadis h an d Fulle r (1994 ) fo r introductions t o th e psycholog y o f science . For th e sociolog y o f scientifi c knowledg e (sometime s calle d th e ne w sociology o f science) , on e migh t begi n wit h introduction s b y Woolga r (1988), whos e boo k i s mor e programmatic ; Webste r (1991) , whos e boo k i s more genera l an d include s polic y discussions ; o r Restiv o (1994a) , whos e introductory chapte r survey s a variety o f sociological framework s i n scienc e

T

57

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Additional Information

studies. Fo r th e SS K approac h t o technology , ke y article s ar e foun d i n th e reader b y Bijker , Hughes , an d Pinc h (1987 ) an d a subsequent collectio n b y Bijker an d La w (1992) . Ther e ar e als o detaile d review s o f wor k i n th e sociology o f scienc e an d scientifi c knowledg e i n th e hug e Handbook of Science and Technology Studies (Jasanoffe t al . 1994) . Fo r thos e w h o prefe r t o learn abou t a fiel d b y flipping throug h journals , I sugges t Scientometrics for the quantitativ e en d o f th e spectrum , American Sociological Review an d Social Forces for th e sociolog y o f science , Social Studies of Science for th e socia l studies o f knowledge , an d Science, Technology, and Human Values for a mor e general rang e o f interdisciplinary socia l scienc e articles . There ar e som e genera l survey s o f th e histor y o f scienc e an d technolog y (e.g., Berna l 196 9 o r Pace y 1990) , bu t I woul d encourag e th e reade r t o follow u p th e specialt y literatur e i n a specifi c are a o f interest . Th e concep tual debate s ten d t o occu r mor e aroun d interpretation s o f specifi c historica l events rathe r tha n aroun d genera l theoretica l issues , a s i n sociolog y an d philosophy. T h e majo r America n journal s i n th e fiel d ar e Isis an d Culture and Technology, bu t ther e ar e man y othe r journal s i n th e histor y o f science , technology, an d medicine . For critica l scienc e an d technolog y studies , on e woul d d o wel l t o surve y the pas t issue s o f Science as Culture, bu t ther e ar e sometime s interestin g articles o n technolog y i n th e issue s o f Research in Philosophy and Technology and i n Science, Technology, and Human Values. T h e reade r b y MacKenzi e an d Wajcman (1985 ) contain s a general sampl e o f technology studies , wit h som e citation classic s i n critica l technolog y studie s included . Richar d Sclove' s Loka Institut e i s a goo d wa y t o hoo k u p wit h relevan t activis t groups . I t can b e reache d a t http://www.amherst.edu/~loka/. For cultura l studie s an d th e anthropolog y o f scienc e an d technology , I have writte n a surve y boo k tha t focuse s o n cultura l aspect s o f scienc e an d technology, includin g cross-cultural , multicultural , an d tempora l cultura l issues (Hes s 1995) . I hav e use d thi s boo k i n m y advance d undergraduat e courses alon g wit h th e excellen t reade r b y Hardin g (1993) . A volum e edited b y Downey , Dumit , an d Trawee k (1997 ) bring s togethe r som e contributions b y anthropologist s an d provide s helpfu l informatio n t o n e w comers t o th e field . Anthropolog y journal s tha t occasionall y includ e STS related essay s ar e Cultural Anthropology, Current Anthropology, and , fo r mor e applied an d development-oriente d material , Human Organization. T h e journal Minerva i s anothe r sourc e o f cross-cultura l studie s o f scienc e an d technology. Irwi n an d Wynn e (1996 ) provide a survey o f public understand ing o f scienc e issues ; a journal b y tha t nam e i s als o no w available . Fo r th e

For Additional Information | 15 9 literary/postmodern sid e o f cultura l studies , th e journa l Configurations i s a good plac e t o start , a s i s th e reade r b y Gra y e t al . (1995) . Fo r th e rhetori c of science , on e migh t star t wit h scholar s suc h a s Bazerma n (1988 ) an d Myers (1990) , o r Fulle r (1993b ) o n philosoph y an d rhetoric . Fo r feminis t social an d cultura l studie s o f science , startin g point s ar e th e journa l Signs, collections suc h a s Tuana (1989) , an d genera l book s b y scholar s o f influenc e such a s Haraway (1991) , Kelle r (1992) , Marti n (1987) , an d Ros e (1994) .

Notes

NOTES T O CHAPTE R 2 i. Fulle r (1993a) , Gillie s (1993) , Hackin g (1983) , Kouran y (1987) , Lose e (1993) , and R o u s e (1996) . 2. I a m followin g Popper' s interpretatio n o f Russel l an d Wittgenstei n her e (Popper 1963 : 69). 3. Se e Saussur e (1966 ) o r Culle r (1986 ) o n semiotics , an d R o u s e (1996 ) o n contemporary philosophica l debate s o n meaning . 4. Fulle r note s tha t th e distinctio n ha s a history tha t date s bac k t o th e nineteent h century, especiall y t o Willia m Whewell , w h o coine d th e ter m "scientist " an d wa s a founder o f th e histor y an d philosoph y o f science . T h e distinctio n ha d a socia l basi s in Whewel l s attemp t t o defin e a plac e fo r scienc e an d t o ensur e a privilege d rol e for universitie s (Fuller , persona l correspondence , Januar y 2 , 1996 ; citin g Ye o 1993 ; see als o Hoyningen-Huen e 1987) . 5. Fulle r (1994 : 255 ; an d persona l correspondence , January 2 , 1996) . 6. T h e ter m " D u h e m - Q u i n e thesis " ma y b e a bi t o f a misnome r becaus e D u h e m s an d Quine' s version s ar e differen t (Gillie s 1993 : 98) . Se e D u h e m (1982) , Q u i n e (1980) , an d Hess e (1980a) . 7. Lauda n (1977 : 114) . I t i s helpfu l t o kee p i n min d th e differenc e betwee n a d hoc theorizin g an d pos t ho c analyses . T h e latte r ar e statistica l analyse s mad e afte r data com e i n an d reporte d i n th e discussio n sectio n o f a paper . Ofte n researcher s perform pos t ho c analyse s t o find ou t wh y negativ e result s wer e obtained . A s a clearly labele d explorator y exercis e fo r futur e hypothesi s generatio n an d research , they ca n b e useful . However , w h e n use d wit h pos t ho c explanation s an d w h e n multiple pos t ho c analyse s ar e mad e o n th e sam e data , pos t ho c analyse s ar e considered methodologicall y unsound . W h e n pos t ho c analyse s ar e no t labele d an d are reporte d a s "pr e h o c " hypothese s i n th e result s section , the y ar e fraudulent . 8. Se e Solomo n an d Hacket t (1996) , Yearle y (1995) , and , fo r a n applie d discus sion i n th e contex t o f alternativ e medicine , Jaffe (1996) . 9. Fulle r (1992 : 245) ; o n Kuh n a s a sociologist , se e Hess e (1980b : 32 ) an d Restivo (1983 : 294) . 10. Althoug h th e ter m "anomaly " i s widel y associate d wit h Kuhn , ther e ar e other use s i n th e literature . Fo r example , historian s hav e frequentl y pointe d ou t tha t

161

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to Chapter Two

researchers w h o pa y attentio n t o anomalie s rathe r tha n ignor e the m hav e occasion ally mad e majo r theoretica l o r empirica l breakthroughs . Anothe r exampl e i s a n o m alistics, th e ter m fo r th e scientifi c stud y o f anomalie s define d a s claim s o f p h e n o m ena no t generall y accepte d b y th e bul k o f th e scientifi c community . I n th e Unite d States, th e Societ y fo r Scientifi c Exploratio n studie s anomalistics . Probabl y th e Kuhnian theor y o f anomalie s influence d th e researchers ' choic e t o positio n an d name thei r fiel d a s anomalistics . I I . I n additio n t o th e Lakato s an d Musgrav e volum e (1970) , se e Hackin g (1983 : ch. 5) , w h o distinguishe d amon g topic-incommensurability , dissociation , an d meaning-incommensurability, an d Fulle r (1988 : ch . 5) , w h o distinguishe d betwee n textual an d ecologica l incommensurability . 12. Lauda n als o propose d a solutio n t o th e metamethodologica l proble m o f justifying justificatio n strategies . I n othe r words , justification strategie s ofte n hav e a hierarchical structur e i n whic h theorie s ar e justified b y methodologica l rules , whic h in tur n ar e justifie d b y mor e genera l aims , bu t th e justificatio n o f genera l aim s opens th e doo r t o socia l an d cultura l contamination . T o escap e thi s problem , Laudan propose d a reticulate d mode l o f a n interactin g tria d i n whic h th e thre e categories o f theories , methods , an d aim s ar e se t i n motio n t o justif y eac h othe r (1984: ch . 3) . However , th e reticulate d mode l itsel f the n face s th e proble m o f ho w to justify th e comple x triangl e o f relationships . 13. A s R o u s e (1996 ) clarifies , thi s i s th e firs t o f thre e program s develope d b Laudan, fo r whic h th e reticulate d mode l serve d a s th e secon d phase . Becaus Laudan's secon d an d thir d approache s di d no t contribut e t o th e theory-choic criteria debat e wit h th e specificit y tha t hi s firs t progra m did , I focu s onl y o n th first program .

y e e e

14. Se e Hackin g (1983 : ch . 4 ) fo r a discussio n o f th e relationshi p betwee n pragmatism an d realism . 15. Constructiv e empiricism , Va n Fraase n s repl y (1980 ) t o ontologica l realism , holds tha t instea d o f thinkin g o f theorie s a s eithe r tru e o r false , the y shoul d b e deemed onl y empiricall y adequat e o r not . 16. T h e principl e o f c o m m o n caus e hold s tha t w h e n tw o event s ar e correlated , either on e cause s th e othe r o r th e tw o ar e cause d b y a thir d event . Salmo n (1989 : n o ) defende d th e principl e o f c o m m o n caus e a s well a s an accoun t o f causalit y a s a mechanism fo r th e transmissio n o f marks o r structure s i n th e world . Kitchne r adde d the ide a o f th e unificatio n o f cause s t o a comprehensiv e theor y (Lose e 1993 : ch . 15). Va n Fraase n ha s criticize d th e c o m m o n caus e principl e an d defende d a mor e pragmatic, "erotetic " approac h t o explanation , i n whic h explanatio n i s understoo d as a n answe r t o a wh y questio n (1980) . Fo r a n introductio n tha t include s essay s b y Hempel, Salmon , an d va n Fraasen , se e Kouran y (1987) . 17. Gier e (1993 , 1995) , Fulle r (1993a : 5) , an d probabl y Harawa y (1989) . O n how evolutionar y theor y coul d b e reframe d accordin g t o tempora l cultures , se e m y discussion i n Hes s (1995 : ch . 4) .

Notes to Chapter Three | 16 3 18. Som e o f th e wor k i n th e socia l studie s o f scienc e an d th e philosoph y o f science i n th e 1990 s has shifte d attentio n fro m scienc e a s representation t o scienc e as practice (e.g. , Pickerin g 1992 ; Rouse 1995) . The genera l philosophica l implica tions o f thi s shif t hav e ye t t o b e determined . Fo r th e purpose s o f th e discussio n here, moderat e constructivis m coul d als o b e extende d t o cove r practices , muc h a s culture include s bot h myt h an d ritual . Furthermore , regardin g th e genera l issu e o f theory-choice criteri a t o whic h thi s chapte r i s dedicated, th e tur n t o practice s ha s not contribute d t o the debate by providing grounds for a n alternative se t of theorychoice criteria . 19. Th e ter m "cognitiv e cronyism " i s fro m Travi s an d Collin s (1991) , an d "cognitive particularism " i s from Col e (1992 : 184). 20. Fo r example , se e th e constructiv e realis m o f Gier e (1988 ) o r th e "har d program" o f Schmaus e t al. (1992). 21. Fulle r (1993a : 59-61) , following Redne r (1986) . NOTES T O CHAPTE R 3

i. I a m greatl y indebte d fo r thi s an d othe r backgroun d historica l information , as well as many specific comments , t o Lowell Hargens. Although h e canno t be hel d responsible fo r th e idea s i n thi s chapter , a s a n "informant " o n th e histor y o f th e sociology o f science community , h e has provided invaluabl e help. 2. Th e Wisconsin-Berkeley-Cornel l axi s ha d th e followin g genealogy : Warre n Hagstrom's student s include d Pau l Alliso n an d Lowel l Hargens , an d Hargens' s students include d Barbar a Reskin . A t Cornell , wher e Alliso n an d Rober t McGin ness wer e o n th e faculty , McGinness , Allison , an d Scot t Lon g worke d o n th e scientific career , an d Dary l Chubin , Ke n Studer , an d Car l Backma n worke d o n specialties. McGinnes s wa s th e committe e chai r fo r Lon g an d Edwar d Hackett . Merton's students durin g the earlie r period als o included Bernard Barber an d Diana Crane (Ben-Davi d 1978 : 198-200). 3. O n SS K critiques o f norms, see Barnes and Dolby (1970 ) and Mulkay (1976) ; on SS K interest theory , se e Barnes and MacKenzie (1979) . 4. Merton' s othe r teacher s include d Georg e Sarton , Pitiri m Sorokin , an d L . J. Henderson (Crother s 1987 : 25). 5. Barne s and Dolby (1970) , Long et al. (1979), McGinness e t al. (1982), Mitrof f (1974), Mulkay (1976) , and Reskin (1976) . 6. O n th e historica l importanc e o f the Merton essa y (1957 ) fo r th e sociolog y o f science, see Hargens (1978 : 124 ) and Ben-David (1978 : 200). 7. Fo r subsequent wor k o n autonomy , se e Cozzens (1990) . 8. Fo x (1994 : 205), citin g Baye r an d Astin (1975) , Reski n (1976) , an d Zucker man an d Col e (1975) . 9. Se e Lon g (1978) ; Lon g e t al . (1979) ; Lon g an d McGinnes s (1981) ; an d Reskin (1977) . See also Knorr e t al. (1979).

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10. Earlie r literatur e i s reviewed b y Merto n an d Zuckerma n i n Merto n (1973 : ch. 22), and subsequen t development s ar e reviewed b y Fox (1983 ) an d Stepha n an d Levin (1992) . Becaus e th e variable s "creativity " an d "productivity " sometime s overlap, thi s literature tend s t o overla p wit h psychologica l studie s o f creativit y (se e Shadish an d Neimeyer 1994 : 16—17). 11. Researc h i n th e 1970 s an d earlie r i s reviewe d b y Stankiewic z (1979 ) an d Cohen (1981) . 12. Se e Merto n (1973 : ch . 16 ) an d researc h note s b y Westrum, Simonton , an d Constant (1979) . 13. Se e Hackett (1994) , discussing Stephan an d Levin (1992) . 14. Th e hypothesi s a t one point receive d s o much interes t tha t a special issue of Scientometrics wa s devote d t o i t (1987 , vol . 12 , nos . 5-6) , bu t result s ar e stil l no t consistent. Se e Kretschmer an d Miiller (1990) ; Kretschmer (1993) . 15. Fo r recent discussions , see Gupta (1987 ) as well as Allison e t al. (1976). 16. Th e grou p wa s buil t aroun d thre e initia l member s (Gemo t Bohme , Wolf gang van de n Daele , an d Wolfgang Krohn ) an d thre e late r members (Wol f Schafer , Rainer Hohlfeld , an d Tilman Spengler) . 17. Fo r a discussio n o f productivit y measure s fo r multipl e authorshi p an d whether adjustment s fo r multipl e authorshi p ar e necessary , se e Lon g an d McGin ness (1982a , 1982b ) andLindse y (1982) . NOTES T O CHAPTE R 4

i. Se e Haraway' s essay s tha t late r appeare d i n Harawa y (1989 , 1991) , a s well a s Harding (1986) , Keller (1985) , and Merchant (1980) . 2. O n th e former , se e Marcu s an d Fische r (1986) ; o n th e latte r fo r thi s sam e period, se e Martin (1987 ) an d Rapp (1988 , 1990). 3. Fo r a surve y o f supplementarit y an d othe r deconstructiv e concept s an d reading technique s fo r th e recover y o f gendere d an d othe r subalter n perspectives, see Culler (1982) . 4. O n th e problem in the interests theory debate , see Barnes (1981) , MacKenzie (1981, 1984) , Woolga r (1981a , 1981b) , an d Yearle y (1982) . Ki m (1994 ) make s a more realist-oriente d critique . 5. Se e Mullin s (1973a , 1973b ) fo r a sociologica l accoun t o f ethnomethodol ogy an d Michae l Lync h (1985 ) fo r a n exampl e o f ethnomethodolog y i n scienc e studies. 6. Galiso n (1995) . See also Baigrie (1995 ) and Pickering (1992) . 7. Furthermore , i n anthropolog y th e ter m refer s t o th e mid-twentieth-centur y studies o f peasant societies , civilizations , an d th e folk/urba n continuu m associate d with Rober t Redfield , th e son-in-la w o f Rober t Park , an d Milto n Singer . I n economics durin g th e 1970 s and 1980 s the ter m referre d t o th e free-marke t schoo l of Milton Friedman .

Notes to Chapter Five \ 16 5 8. O n othe r studie s o f larg e technica l systems , se e LaPort e (1994) , an d o n macroengineering, se e Hori (1990) . 9. O f translation , Callo n writes , "Fro m mark s t o diagram , fro m tabl e t o graph , from grap h t o statement , an d fro m statemen t t o statement—eac h i s a translation " (1994: 51) . Inscriptio n i s th e reductio n o r translatio n o f comple x observabl e pro cesses to features represente d i n two-dimensional space s (Latour , Mauguin, an d Teil 1992). "Inscription " therefor e refer s t o al l written marks , whic h "includ e graphi c displays, laborator y notebooks , table s o f data , brie f reports , lengthie r an d mor e public article s and books" (Callo n 1994 : 50). NOTES T O CHAPTE R 5

i. Fo r a n introduction , se e Durin g (1993 ) an d Turne r (1992) . Oxfor d Univer sity Press now has a series of cultural studies readers for othe r European countries . 2. Se e Grossber g e t al . (1992 ) o n cultura l studie s i n general , an d Rous e (1991 ) and Traweek (1993 ) for tw o reviews oriented towar d ST S issues. 3. Example s o f thi s traditio n includ e Downe y e t al . (1997) , Harawa y (1989) , Martin (1994) , Penley an d Ross (1991) , and Traweek (1992) . 4. Se e Bocock (1986 ) for a review o f the concept . 5. Fo r a n introductio n t o studie s o f race , craniometry , an d relate d topic s i n science, see the essay s collected in Harding (1993) . 6. Fo r mor e o n resistanc e i n th e contex t o f the poo r countrie s an d indigenou s groups, see Hess (1995 : ch. 8) . For resistance i n th e contex t o f developed countrie s and controversie s involvin g nuclea r power , informatio n technology , an d biotech nology, se e Baue r (1995) . Als o watc h fo r forthcomin g researc h b y Ro n Eglas h o f Ohio Stat e University . 7. Fo r a review o f the appropriat e technolog y movemen t i n th e Unite d States , see Pursell (1993) . 8. E.g. , Davis-Floy d (1992a) , Edwards an d Frankli n (1993) , Layne (1992) , Mar tin (1987) , and Rapp (1991) . 9. Merto n (1973 : ch. 11 ; 1984); also Abraham (1983 ) and Shapi n (1988) . 10. Se e Restivo (1979 ) for a n introduction t o Joseph Needham' s massive , multivolume work . 11. Hessen' s wor k date s bac k t o th e 1930s , an d lik e tha t o f Flec k (1979 ) an d Mannheim (1952) , i s considere d a precurso r t o th e contemporar y sociolog y o f scientific knowledge . Fo r a sociological accoun t o f Hessen' s theor y i n th e contex t of Soviet science , see Graham (1985) . 12. Se e als o Keller (1985 ) o n Bacon , an d Nobl e (1992 ) an d Schiebinge r (1989 ) on women an d the earl y history o f modern science . 13. Cohe n (1994 ) review s thes e an d othe r account s o f the scientifi c revolution . See also Hess (1995 : ch. 5 ) for a review tha t emphasize s th e multicultura l aspect s o f scholarship o n th e scientific revolution .

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14. O n th e Forma n thesis , se e Forma n (1971) , Fulle r (1988 : ch . 10) , an d Hendry (1980) . 15. Se e the specia l issue of Science as Culture (1990 , vol. 8). 16. Sampl e laborator y studie s wer e Knorr-Cetin a (1981) , Latou r an d Woolga r (1986, orig . 1979) , Lync h (1985) , an d t o som e exten t Collin s an d Pinc h (1982) , although th e latter was more a study in controvers y tha t move d outsid e laboratorie s and was much mor e lik e anthropological ethnography . 17. Trawee k (1988 , 1992) . Se e Hes s (1991a , 1997b ) fo r a n articulatio n o f th e methodological backgroun d o f th e secon d wav e an d a mor e detaile d analysi s o f ethnography i n STS. 18. Example s includ e Clark e an d Montin i (1993 : 44) , Clark e (1990) , Hes s (1991b), Martin (1994) , Rapp (1990) , and Trawee k (1992) . 19. Se e Bourdieu (1991) . Because th e contemporar y anthropologica l us e o f the culture concep t i n America n anthropolog y i s flexible enoug h t o recogniz e th e dialectic o f actor s an d structures , ther e seem s t o b e littl e nee d t o clutte r u p th e vocabulary with simila r concept s suc h as Bourdieu's "habitus. " 20. E.g. , Ortne r (1974) , MacCormack an d Strather n (1980) . 21. Fo r introduction s t o thes e literatures , se e Hes s (1995 : ch. 6 ) an d Irwi n an d Wynne (1996) . 22. See , fo r example , Gilber t (1989 ) an d Kelle r (1985) . Fo r a mor e detaile d summary o f the studies , see Hess (1995 : 27-32). 23. Fo r a review , se e Hes s (1995 : ch . 5) , whic h build s o n a researc h traditio n that date s back a t least to Ben-David (1971) .

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Index

Actor-network theory , 79 , 92, 95, 105-1 1 Age effects, 59 , 62-63, 67 , 71. See also Cu mulative advantag e theor y Allison, Paul, 53 , 57, 61, 157 Anthropology, 32 , 134-40 , 142-4 4 Autonomy, 57—58 , 79, 85, 94, 117 , 133 , 149, 154; and technology , 107 , 12 4 Barnes, Barry, 84 , 86 , 90-93 Bath school , 94-10 0 Ben-David, Joseph, 56 , 71, 74 Bijker, Wiebe , 70-71 , 87 , 95, 158 Bloor, David, 84 , 86, 87 Boundary-work, 5 8 Bourdieu, Pierre , 59 , 118-19 , !36 \ 16 6 n. 9 Bradford's law , 72 Braverman, Harry , 79 , 12 6 Callon, Michel , 79 , 92, 107-9 , 121 , 165 n. 9 Carnap, Rudolf, 9 , 11 , 13-14, 19-20 , 23, 25, 27-28 , 31 Causality, 33-34 , 86-8 7 Citation studies , 75-8 0 Clarke, Adele, 104- 6 Cole, Stephen, 41-42 , 53 , 59, 61, 65, 157 Collins, Harry, 39 , 84, 93-99, 10 6 Collins, Randall, 53 , 74, 85-8 6 Conflict theory , 8 5 Constructivism: analysi s of content, 52—53 , 64, 79, 81, 95, 108 ; construction o f facts, 77, 101-3 ; postconstructivism, 152-56 ; and reconstruction, 139 , 141 , 144; typology for philosophy , 34-39 , 82 , 127 ; typology for socia l studies, 82-84 , 129 . See also Relativism; Sociolog y Controversies, 24-26 , 75 , 87-100, 141-42 , 152-53 Conventionalism, 18-19 , 23 Crane, Diana, 60 , 64, 73

Critical scienc e studies , 113-26 , 15 8 Cultural studies : additional sources , 158 ; defined, 6 , 112-13 ; key concepts, 114-23 ; structuralism an d poststructuralism, 137 4i Culture, 24 , 29, 104 , 106 , 136 ; cultural con structivism, 83 , 93; and history , 127 , 131; two cultures , 1 6 Cumulative advantag e theory , 59-6 4 Deconstruction, 89 , 139-4 0 Demarcation problem , 21-2 2 Discourse analysis , 10 3 Doomsday thesis , 30 Duhem, Pierre , 18-19 , 27, 39 Dumont, Louis , 116 , 14 0 Durkheim, Emile , 37 , 54 Edinburgh school , 90-9 2 Ellul, Jacques, 123-2 4 Empirical progra m o f relativism (EPOR) , 39, 94-100 , 13 5 Ethnography, 134-3 5 Ethnomethodology, 92 , 100 , 10 3 Evolutionary theory , 7-8 , 32 , 36-37, 54 , 131, 134 , 13 9 Experimenter's regress , 20, 96 Explanation, 15-16 , 33 Falsificationism, 19-22 , 24, 27. See also Popper, Kar l Feminism: an d anthropology , 138 ; and cul tural studies, 88-89 , 119-22 , 140 , 159; and history o f science, 130 ; and philoso phy, 45-51; an d sociolog y o f science, 60 69; and technolog y studies , 126 ; two cul tures, 16 . See also Gender Feyerabend, Paul , 18 , 23, 25, 132 Fleck, Ludwik , 23 , 84

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Index

For man thesis , 13 1 Foucault, Michel , 79 , 107 , 116-19 , 130 Fujimura, Joan , 101 , 104— 6 Fuller, Steve , 7 , 15 , 37 , 39 , 43 , 151 , 159 Functionalism, 32 , 54-55 , 108 , 13 4 Galison, Peter , 103- 4 Gatekeeping, 64 , 66 Gender, 119-22 , 154 ; an d productivity , 6 1 , 67-69; an d th e scientifi c revolution , 130 ; and scientifi c theories , 30 , 43 , 140 ; an d status attainment , 60-66 . See also Femi nism Giere, R o n a l d , 12 , 37 , 43 , 10 8 Gieryn, Thomas , 2 1 , 44, 58 , 7 0 Gramsci, Antonio , 112 , 114-15 , 12 1 Habermas, Jiirgen, 90 , 113-1 4 Hacking, Ian , 11 , 19 , 23 , 25 , 32-34 , 15 7 Hagstrom, Warren , 53 , 56 , 15 7 Hakken, David , 12 4 Halo effect , 6 0 Haraway, D o n n a , 4 6 - 4 7 , 49 , 89 , 107 , 115 , 120-22, 132-33 , 138 , 146 , 150-51 , 15 9 Harding, Sandra , 4 5 - 4 7 , 79 , 120 , 157-5 8 Hargens, Lowell , 53 , 62 , 65 , 78 , 15 7 Hegemony, 115 , 121-2 3 Hess, David , 50 , 58 , 88-89 , 131 , 139 , 144 , 152-55 Hessen, Boris , 84 , 128-3 0 Historicism, 2 , 2 2 - 2 7 History o f science , 3 , 116-17 , I 2 I > ! 27-3 4, 158 Hughes, T h o m a s , 106-7 , ! 5 8 Ideology, 57 , 90 , n 5-1 6 Immediacy effect , 7 6 - 7 7 Incommensurability thesis , 2 5 Induction, 13 , 20 , 96-9 8 Innovation, 70—7 3 Interests, 2 1 , 53 , 89-94 , I I 0 , I 2 4 , I 5 4 Internalism/externalism, 81 , 2 7 Invisible college , 7 3 Jasanoff, Sheila , 17 , 15 8 Justification, 11-14 , 20 , 31 , 4 1, 4 6 - 4 7, 95 , 97, 148 , 16 2 n . 1 2

Keller, Evelyn , 47 , 15 9 Knorr-Cetina, Karin , 38-39 , 69 , 81 , 1 0 0 101, 118,13 9 K r o e b e r - M e r t o n hypothesis , 7 0 Kuhn, Thomas , 18 , 2 2 - 2 8 , 39 , 4 8 - 5 1 , 55 , 71, 74 , 9 4 - 9 5 , 121 , 14 5 Laboratory studies , 100-10 1 Lakatos, Imre , 2 7 - 3 0 , 7 4 Latour, B r u n o , 77 , 101-2 , 107-11 , 118 , 12 1 Laudan, Larry , 29-30 , 39 , 16 2 nn . 12 , 1 3 Law, J o h n, 79 , 92 , 107 , 15 8 Levi-Strauss, Claude , 137-3 9 Long, J. Scott , 57 , 6 1 , 6 7 - 6 8, 15 7 Longino, Helen , 40 , 4 7 - 5 1 , 154 , 15 7 Lotka s law, 7 2 Lukacs, Georg , 114—1 5 Lynch, Michael , 10 3 MacKenzie, Donald , 90-9 3 Marginality hypothesis , 7 0 Martin, Brian , 88 , 151-5 2 Martin, Emily , 89 , 132 , 140 , 15 9 Marx, Karl , 36 , 90 , 115-16 , 128 , 138 , 15 3 Marxism, 2 1 , 28, 32 , 46 , 85 , 90 , i n , 1 1 3 15, 124 , 12 9 Matilda effect , 6 0 M a t t h e w effect , 5 9 M e n a r d model , 62-6 3 Merchant thesis , 13 0 M e r t o n , R o b e r t , 17 , 2 1 , 53-60 , 6 4 - 6 5 , 77 , 78, 83-84 , 87 , 95 , 117 , 122 , 128 , 145 , 15 7 Modernism, 13 1 Modernity, 13 0 Mulkay, Michael , 38-39 , 57 , 75 , 81 , 84 , 86 , 103 Mullins, Nicholas , 74-7 5 Mumford, Lewis , 123—2 4 Naturalism, 30-3 2 N e e d h a m , Joseph , 86 , 128-2 9 Nelkin, Dorothy , 141-4 2 N e w t o n hypothesis , 71-7 2 Noble, David , 12 6 Nomothetic/idiographic distinction , 16—17 , 33, 12 7 N o r m s , 2 1 , 27, 53-57 , 136 . See also Values Orgeta hypothesis , 7 1

Index | Paradigm, 19 , 2 1 , 2 4 - 2 5, 70 , 74 , 84 , 9 9 Parsons, Talcott , 54-55 , 103 , 10 8 Particularism, 38-45 , 53 , 56-66 , 100-101 , 105, 127 , 145 ; defined , 40 . See also U n i versalism; Value s Peer reviw , 22 , 62 , 6 5 Philosophy: 6 - 8 , 157 ; descriptio n v . p r e scription, 7 - 8 , 12 , 20 , 2 6 - 2 7 , 37 , 39-40 , 42, 98 ; meanin g v . reference , 9-10 ; plac e in transdisciplinar y dialogue ; 3 , 6 - 8 , 56 , 154; theor y choic e criteria , 13-14 , 19 , 22, 26-27 , 29 , 32 , 4 0 - 5 1 , 95 , 152-56 . See also Constructivism; Conventionalism ; Falsificationism; Feminism ; Historicism ; Naturalism; Positivism ; Realism ; R e l a tivism Pickering, Andrew , 103—4 , 16 3 n . 1 8 Pinch, Trevor , 9 4 - 9 9 , 15 8 Policy: 4 , 85 ; affirmativ e action , 66 , 73 ; an d demarcation problem , 21-22 ; an d d e m o c racy, 1 , 58 , 142 , 144 , 147 ; an d interven tion/activism, 150-52 , 154-55 ; m a n a g e rial policy , 67 , 69 , 7 1 - 7 5 , 79-80 , 148-49 ; national difference s in , 146—47 ; and prog ress, 30 ; technolog y policy , 124-2 6 Popper, Karl , 9 , 19-22 , 2 3 - 2 4 , 27 , 28 , 3 2 Positivism, 8-14 , 1 9 - 2 1 , 31 , 8 4 Postmodernism: a s historical period , 36 , 113, 132-34 ; a s label, 1 , 19 , 132-33 , 15 6 Power, 85 , I I O - I I , 114-19 , 125 , 153 . See also Culture; Gende r Practice, 26 , 31 , 57 , 103-4 , i : 7 > l 6 3 n . 18 Pragmatism, 3 0 - 3 1 , 10 4 Price, Derek , 30 , 63 , 7 1 - 7 3 , 7 5 - 7 8 ; Price' s index, 63 , 77 ; Price' s law , 7 2 Productivity, 61-62 , 67-7 3 Progress, 27-30 , 123 , 131 , 145 . See also H i s tory o f scienc e Public understandin g o f scienc e (PUS) , 85 , 141-44; an d reconstruction , 139 , 141 , 14 4 Race, 30 , 43 , 53 , 6 1 , 63-66, 122-2 3 Realism, 11 , 32-34, 36-39 , 84 , 127 . See also Relativism Reflexivity, 86-89 , 9 8 Reification, 114-15 , 13 4 Relativism, 1 , 26 , 34 , 37-39 , 42 , 81-82 , 87 , 9 7 - 9 9 , 108 , 132 , 149 , 154-55 . See also Empirical Progra m o f Relativis m (EPOR)

19 5

Replication, 9 6 - 9 7 Representation, 37 , 46 , 108-9 , 116-17 , 146 Research front , 43 , 65 , 7 7 Research program s an d traditions , 2 7 - 2 9 , 64, 74 , 8 4 Reskin, Barbara , 6 1 , 63, 68 , 15 7 Restivo, Sal , 55 , 79 , 85-86 , 88 , 9 0 - 9 1 , 106 , 157 R o l e hybridization , 7 1 , 74 , 13 7 Rossiter, Margaret , 60 , 66 Sahlins, Marshall , 138 , 15 3 Saussure, Fedinan d de , 9-10 , 13 9 Science studies , 3 ; anthropology , 134-40 , 142-44; cultura l studies , 112-23 ; critica l science studies , 113-26 ; feminism , 4 5 - 5 1 , 60—69, 119—22 ; history o f science , 127 — 34; institutiona l sociology , 52-59 , 83-84 ; philosophy, 7-10 ; policy , 146-47 , 150-55 ; sociology o f scientifi c knowledge , 52-53 , 8 1 - 8 3 , 105 . See also Constructivism; R e a l ism; Relativism ; Technolog y studies ; Values Science wars , 1-2 , 4 , 9 , 101 , 148-49 , 1 5 6 57; philosoph y v . socia l studies , 6 - 7 , 9 6 97 Scientific revolution , 128—3 0 Scientometrics, 75-80 , 14 8 Sclove, Richard , 125 , 147 , 151-52 , 15 8 Social constructio n o f technolog y ( S C O T ) , 95, 106 , 135 . See also Constructivis m Social studie s an d socia l sciences : defined , 6 ; description v . prescription , 7—8 , 57—58, 80, 108 ; an d unit y o f scienc e thesis , 15 — 16. See also Anthropology; Histor y o f sci ence; Sociolog y Social world s theory , 104— 5 Sociology, 2 , 52-54 , 157-58 ; institutiona l so ciology, 52—59 , 83—84 ; sociology o f scien tific knowledg e (SSK) , 52-53 , 81-83 , 10 5 Specialty studies , 7 3 Star, Susan , 102 , 104- 6 Starnberg group , 7 4 Strong program , 86—89 , 9 4 Structuralism, 9-10 , 137-3 8 STS: definition , 2 - 3 ; importanc e of , 1 4 8 49. See also Science studies ; Scienc e wars ; Technology studie s Symmetry, 86-88 , 98 , 12 7

196 I

Index

Technology studies , 3 , 6, 70 , 85 , 95, 106-7 , 119, 123-26 , 14 3 Traweek, Sharon , 135 , 137 , 158 Treichler, Paula , 144 , 15 1 Truth, correspondenc e an d coherenc e views, I O - I I

Unity o f science thesis , 14-17 , 22, 28, 42 Universalism, 26 , 38-45, 53 , 56, 59 , 61, 65, 100-101, 116 , 127 ; defined, 40 . See also Particularism; Value s Values: 53-57, 136 , 145-47, 149 ; and contro versies, 97-100, 142 ; and democracy , 5 , 58, 113-14 , 123 , 141, 147, 149 ; and hege mony, 115-16 ; theory choic e criteri a as

values, 16 ; value neutrality, 85-88 . See also Gender; Interests ; Particularism; Power ; Universalism Vienna Circle , 8-9 , 11 4 Weak program, 86-8 8 Weber, Max , 49 , 54 , 115 , 123 , 128 Webster, Andrew , 146-47 , 15 7 Winner, Langdon , 81 , 124-25, 14 8 Woolgar, Steve , 77, 87-89 , 101-2 , 118 , 15 7 Wynne, Brian, 141-43 , 158 Yates thesis, 12 9 Zuckerman, Harriet , 53 , 60, 64-65, 77, 84, 127

About th e Autho r

David J. Hes s i s an anthropologis t an d tenure d professo r i n th e Science an d Technolog y Studie s Departmen t a t Rensselae r Polytechni c Institute. H e i s th e autho r o f variou s book s i n anthropolog y an d scienc e studies, includin g Spirits and Scientists: Ideology, Spiritism, and Brazilian Culture; Samba in the Night: Spiritism in Brazil; Science in the New Age: The Paranormal, Its Defenders and Debunkers, and American Culture; Science and Technology in a Multicultural World: The Cultural Politics of Facts and Artifacts; and th e volum e coedite d wit h Lind a Layne , The Anthropology of Science and Technology (Knowledge and Society Vol. 9). H e i s th e recipien t o f variou s grants an d awards , including tw o Fulbright s an d a National Scienc e Foun dation gran t i n th e publi c understandin g o f science, an d h e i s the chai r o f the Committee o f the Anthropology o f Science, Technology, an d Comput ing o f th e America n Anthropologica l Association . Hi s curren t researc h i s on science , th e public , an d alternativ e cance r therapies . Th e firs t boo k i n that series , which i s a companion volum e t o Science Studies, i s Can Bacteria Cause Cancer? Alternative Medicine Confronts Big Science (Ne w Yor k Univer sity Press, 1997) .

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