Sayyid Ahmad Khan: A Reinterpretation of Muslim Theology

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SA YYID AHMAD KHAN

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and 1890s as being the result of his belonging to the Muslim upper cla~. Begum Ruknuddin Hassaan relates Sir Sayyid's educational efforts to his preoccupation with the Muslim upper class45 and S. Abid Husayn clearly makes Say}id Ahmad Khan's interest in his own class, i.e. the ''aristocracy and gentry of Northern India, ''46 the deciiive and overriding factor determining all aspects of his activity and thought. Francis Robinson, by following closely ''the very changes in and development of''47 Sir Sayyid's ideas has the merit of introducing a more differentiated view of Sayyid Ahmad Khan's political ideas and activities. He concludes that in the years after 1857 he ''was much more concerned about the way in 41W.C.

Smith, Modern Islam in India (1943; rpt. London: V. Golancz, 1946),p. lt. Cf.a]sopp. 19and26. 411bid., p. 12. ''K.M. Panikkar, A Survey of Indian History (1st ed. 1947; Bombay: Asia Pub1ishing House, 1954), p. 226. 4 ' Ram Gopal, Indian ..Y'uslims: A Political History 1858-1947 (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1959), p. 53. Tara Chand makes this reproach directly to the person of Sayyid Ahmad Khan. Cf. Tara Chand (ed.), A History oft~ Freedom Movement, II (Delhi, 1967), p. 354; also Rafiq Zakaria, The Rise of Muslims in Indian Politics (Bombay, 1970), p. 351. '$Begum Ruknuddin Hassaan, "The Educational Movement of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan 1858-98,'' Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, 1959, p~~lt · "The Destiny of Indian Muslims (London: Asia Publishing House, 1965), p. 32. 1 ' Separatism among Indian Muslims (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1947), p. 90.

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which the government policies were affecting the interests of the Urdu speaking elite of which Muslims were only part'' than he was ''about relations between government and Muslims. ''48 Robinson maintain, that only by the end of the 1860s did Sayyid Ahmad Khan begin to regard and treat Muslims as a political and cultural entity, making it ''his overriding aim to enable them to exert in the future the power in Indian a.ffairs that they had wielded in the past. In the 1860s, this had been his objective for the Urdu-speaking elite as a whole; it was now his aim for its Muslim members alone.''49 Finally, a number of authors, among tho~e who portray him as primarily a leader of Muslims, see him as the man who, above all others, helped the Muslims in India to emerge again, revitalized and respected after a general decline (during the late Mugbal period and the aftermath of the Mutiny and Rebellion of 1857). Various writings have emphasized different areas of S1yyid Ahmad Khan's thought and activity-social and political, educational and cultural-in which this revival occurred. But · all agree that his prime achievement was a revival of Muslim morale and prestige in British India, and that to him goe, the credit for having re-established the dynamism of the Muslims in India as a social and political force. S.M. Ikram, the Pakistani historian writing in 1950 under the pseudonym A.H. Albiruni, gave this line of interpretation (which was shared, incidentally, by Hindus like Nehru5() and K.M. Panikkar51), which was perhaps the most comprehensive expression, adding to it a significant national dimension: Syed Ahmad filled the big void created in the life of the Muslim community by the disappearance of the Muslim rule. But he did more. His long life, spanning almost a century, bridged the gulf between Medieval and Modem India. Himself, a relic of the palmy days of the Great Mughals, he ushered in a new era. He gave the Indian Muslims a new •Ibid. u Ibid., p. 105. MNehru, An Autobiography, p. 462. 11Panikkar, A Survey of Indian History, p. 225.

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cohesion, a new policy, new educational ideals, a new prose, a new approach to their individual and national problems, and built up an organisation which could carry on his work. Before him there was all disintegration and decay. He rallied together the Indian Muslims and 1;,ecame the first prophet of their new nationhood.52 There are others who share this view of Sir Sayyid. However, they tend, particularly, to underline th:culturaland educational component. Among the earliest to do so was the Lebanese Christian writer Jurji Zaidan,63 who saw Sayyid Ahmad Khan's main achievement as having been the weaning away of his · co-rtligiooists from cultural opposition to the west, and demonstrating to them that modern western science was not hurtful to their religion. Similarly, an anonymous Muslim, writing in the lndia11 Review (Madras), considered Sayyid Ahmad Khan's educational activities to have been his most important contribution. Through them ''he wished to raise his co-religionists to a position of social efficiency, moral worth, spiritual greatness and political power.''5' The doctoral thesis by Begum Ruknuddin Has.1aan is the first monograph written on th_e educational work of Sir Sayyid and the educational movement he generated. She says that if, with A.H. l:lalJ, one were to label Sayyid Ahmad Khan as ''a great educationist...the word educationist must be used in a very wide sense,'' because he looked upon education •'as a means of reform.... He restored Muslim self-respect and yet succeeded in effecting British-Muslim rapprochement.''55 Sir Sayyid's image as the reformer of Urdu writing and the initiator of the modern epoch in Urdu literature should also be ••A.H. Albiruni, Makers of Pakistan and Modern Muslim India (Labore: Ashraf, 1950), p. 60. er. by-the same author (S.M. Ikram), Munj-i Kauthar, rpt. (Lahore: Ferozsons, 1968), p. 137. 61Jurjl 7.aidan, Qaydt-i Sir Sayyid AJ.,mad, translated into Urdu from Tardjim mashahir al-sharq, the Arabic original, by M. Faruq An~arl (Aliprh: Abmadi Press, 1903), passim. 1 •A Mussalman, "Sir Syed Ahmad Khan. A Study of His Life and Work.'• The Indian Review, 10 (1909), p. 760. "Begum Ruknuddin Hassaan, "The Educational Movement, etc.," pp. 451,452.

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mentioned here. Maulana ShiblI Nu'mani (1857-1914), the distinguished historian and theologian, argued in as early as 1898, that Urdu literature is one of the areas of Indian Muslim life most deeply affected by Sir Sayyid's ''reformation and reform (i$1ah)."56 Shibli calls Ghalib07 the founder and Sayyid Ahmad Khan the ''imam and mujaddid''58 of modem Urdu prose writing. He regards this as the latter's main contribution to Urdu literature-first, to have led Urdu writing out of the confines of subjects like love and gallantry and widened its compass considerably by writing on the most diverse subjects in Urdu; second, to have brought to his own writing a clarity, purity of style and charm-the hallmark of good prose writing; and finally, to have successfully presented English thought-by its creative transference, rather than a slavish translation into Urdu. I:Iali,59 Ram Babu Saksena,60 and I:Iamid J:lasan Qadiri,61 among others, confirmed Shibli's assessment. The latter, in his pioneering work on the history of Urdu prose writing, points out Sir Sayyid's literary mastery, as shown in some of his essays in Tahdhib al-akhliiq.62 S.M. Abdullah thus sums up Sayyid Ahmad Khan's achievement in the field of Urdu literature: ' It was through the initiative of Sayyid Ahmad that the element of ''sincerity'' was .introduced into Urdu literature and conventionalism was rejected. His writings generated a spirit of freedom, gave birth to a craving for inquiry and search for truth and stimulated a desire for progress. 1 •F.

Fatehpuri (ed.), Nigtir•i Pakistan. Sir Sayyid Number (Karachi, 1966), p. 11. Urdu title of the article-"Sir Sayyid AJ:,mad Mar/:liim aur Urdu Literature," rpt. from Maqtiltit-i Shibli. 67 Mirza Asadullah Khan, surnamed Ghalib (1797-1869), the outstanding Urdu pcet of the 19th century. 68 Nigar-i Pakistan (1966), p. 12. ••HJAA, pp. 368 f. Cf. also ibid., pp. 624-26. 0 • R.B. Saksena, A History of Urdu Literature (Allahabad: Ram Narain Lal, 1927), p. 272. ' 1 Dtisttin-i tarfkh-i Urdu (Agra: Lakshmi Nara'in, 1957), esp. pp. 310-12. ''The English subtitle of the Urdu journal was The Mohammedan Social Reformer. About its history cf. Khaliq Ahmad Nizami, Sayyld Ahmad Khan, p. 92.

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Not only was the substance of literature transmuted, its form and style also underwent a profound chaoge. 63 Altaf J:lusain I:Iali's (1837-1914) asse!sment, put forward in Ifa>·dt-i Jawld (1901), his biography of Sir Sayyid, is the most comprehensive. I:Ialrs view of Sir Sayyid is basically that of the revitalizer of the Muslim community. However, l:lall is so comprehensive that his interpretation reaches well into the second section of the introductory exposition, where Sir Sayyid is viewed as the inaugurator of a new, modernized Islam. 1:Ialt writes in the awareness of a western-educated Muslim middle class growing in India. He presents Sayyid Ahmad Khan as the 19th century hero of the Muslim community in India, as the man who was able-after the trauma of 1857-to restore to it a self-respect and an honour within British lndia.64 Sir Sayyid is the exemplar for the rising Indian Muslim generation. His life and work are, more than that of anyone else, relevant to the peculiar situation of having to live under foreign, nonMuslim rule. Since the Muslim no longer rule India by physical power, they have to conquer the hearts of their rulers and compatriots in order to gain honour and respect. To further this aim they need a new solution and outlook. It is here, according to 1:Iali, that Sir Sayyid can give a unique lead. Was not this, he asks, the basic principle of Sir Sayyid's life and teaching-Qaum aur wafan ki mal}abbat ko juzw-i iman jano (consider the love of your community and homeland to be a part and parcel of your faith). 65 It was for this that Sayyid Ahmad Khan concentrated on laying the foundations of a ''this-worldly'' progress of the Muslim community. He viewed education (including the learning of English and the acquisition of western knowledge and acceptable we-stem values) as the basic means for improve;. ment. All his other activities were rooted in this one basic desire-to restore Islam in India to its pristine dignity and prestige. S.M. Abdullah, Spirit and Substance of Urdu Prose (Lahore: M. Ashraf, 1940), p. 32. 8'HJAA, pp. S2. f. 16lbid., p. S3. 13

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After presenting this overall view of Sir Sayyid, J:lali sets out to describe his various services to country, community and religion. He denotes Sir Sayyid's work 1,y the western term ''reformation," calling him a reformer. He explains that: Although the basic objective of Sayyid Ahmad Khan was the adjustment of the social condition of the Muslims, it remains true nevertheless that the Muslims always considered their religion the guide in matters of din and dunyii. They have never accepted anything-dini or dunyiiwi-until it proved to be acceptable from the point of view of religion. For all these reasons Sayyid Ahmad Khan had to remain constantly engaged in religious discussions.66

l:lali knowJ that there have been many reformers in Islamic history. But for him the vital difference between earlier reformers and Sayyid Ahmad Khan is that whilst they advocated particular reforms, stressing the need for a reformation only of certain items or aspects of Islamic teaching, Sayyid Ahmad Khan attempted a comprehensive reform of Islamic teaching. This is not to say that Sir Sayyid's teaching was radically new. In fact, says l:lali, we find ''very few singular reforms of Sir Sayyid, the root of which could not be found in the writings of former critical scholars of the Islamic community (mulµiqqiqin-i ah/-i Is/an,)."67

l:lali depicts Sir Sayyid a-i always having adamantly refused to act as the leader of a new faction in Islam. ''The sole aim of his reformation was simply to remove the obstacles in the way of 'this-worldly' progress of Muslims and to reject the criticism of the Christian nations that Islam cannot go together with progress and moral refinement. '' 68 In a special chapter on Sayyid Ahmad Khan's departure from the teachings of Islamic teachers of the past, l:lali enumerates forty-one points in his teaching were he can cite at least some traditional authorities in his support, and ten points that are po~ibly without precedent in earlier Islamic tradition.69 11

lbid., p. 508. 1 • Ibid., p. 513. •Ibid. •Ibid., pp. 519-25.

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In his day and later AN ISLAMIC THINKER

Mu])ammad Iqbal (1877-1938), stresses upon the ''inner vitality of Islam''70 which was able to produce in the 19th century (a period of utter decay), three outstanding men-Sayyid Ahmad Khan in India, Sayyid Jamal al-din al-Afghani in Afghanistan and Mufti 'Alam in Russia·. Iqbal credits Sayyid Ahmad Khan as being probably: The first modern Muslim to catch a glimpse of the positive character of the age that wa§ coming. . . . But the real greatness of the man consists of [sic] thefactthat he was the first Indian Muslim who felt the need of a fresh orientation of Islam and worked for it. We may differ from his religious views, but there can be no denying the fact that thjs sensitive soul was the first to react to the modern age.71 It is this view of Sir Sayyid-of a man deeply concerned with the fate of Islam as the inherited universal system of doctrines aud injunctions amid the challenge of his age-that emerges from the writing (and will be mentioned further in this section). The numerous comments on this theme, however, fall into two categories. One group views his contribution to Islamic thought as primarily a defensive and protective exercise, either on the pattern of theological apologetics vis-a-vis Christianity (as it challenged Islam in the form of the missionary movement), or by proving Islam to be the ''liberal," ''rational'' and ''progressive'' religion, (i.e. one which most effectively f urtbers those values propagated in India by westerners to justify their own civilization).72 The other group sees Sayyid Ahmad Khan's religious thought as mainly an endeavour in bold religious construction or destruction, and even as a new theological synthesis. Since the publication of Sir Sayyid's The Mohamedan Commentary on the Holy Bible (Tabyin al-Ka/am) in the early sixties, /slam and Ahmadism, with a reply to questions raised by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru (Lahore: Anjuman-i khuddam-ud-din, 1936), p. 21. ,11bid., p. 22. 71'fhe most recent publication in this line . is A. Maiello, "Sir Sayyid . . . Ahmad Khan and t,ie Christian Challenge'' in Ann4li del lstituto Orientale di Napoli, 36 (1976), pp. 85-102. 70

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western commentators, many of them missionaries, began to see Sayyid Ahmad Khan as spearheading a new and more sophisticated form of Islamic apologetics. 73 ~,ome European writers during his lifetime characterized his thinking as ''liberal,'' ''progressive," or ''enlightened,'' and these labels have continued even after Sir Sayyid's death. 74 Others saw in him and his movement an Islamic version of Ram Mohan Roy (1772-1832) and his Brahmo Samaj.75 ''It is not improbable,'' T.P. Hughes suggested in 1875, ''that the Broad Church Muhammadanism will occupy a similar position as that of the Brahmo Samaj amongst the Hindus. ''76 The European view of Sir Sayyid as liberal, progressive and enlightened was shared by many Indian writers-1:lali and Justice Shah Din (1868-1918), for example. Although Shah Din did not consider Sayyid Ahmad Khan a great scholar in Arabic, or a well-versed theologian, nevertheless, he maintained that:

8Cf. Garcin de Tassy, Discours a l'ouverture de son cours d'Hindustani en 1863 (Paris: Pion, n.d.), p. 13; J. Muhleisen Arnold, The Koran and the Bible (London: Lo11.gmans, 1866), p. 481; Sir Alfred Lyall, Asiatic Studies, Religious and Social (London: Murray, 1882), pp. 228-57, (eh. IX: "Islam in India," being a rpt. from the Theological Review (1872); T.P. Hughes, CMS, in Conference on Urdu and Hindi Christian Literature, held at Allahabad, 24th and 25th February 1875 (Madras: Christian V ~macular Educational Society, n.d.), pp. 19 f; Canon Ali Bakhsh in Lucknow, 1911, ed. E.M. Wherry (London: The Christian Literary Society for India, 1911), pp. 164-65; Bevan Jones, The People of the Mosque, 2nd ed. (Calcutta: YMCA, 1939), p. 250. 7 'John Strachey, India, pp. 205, 207; Sidney Low, A Vision of India (London: Smith and Elder, 1906), p. 282. 75 The personality and work of Ram Mohan Roy were a formative influence in Sayyid Ahmad Khan's life. Cf. the passage in $irat-i Faridiyah, Sir Sayyid's biography of his maternal grandfather, where Ram Mohan Roy's visit to the Moghul court in 1831 is given prominence. er. _PMaq, XVI, pp. 663-64. ''Conference on Urdu and Hindi Christian Literature, 1815, p. 30. er. Census of India, vol. XIX (1891), p. 192. Here the "Nature School" is paralleled with the "Aryas''; Rev John Morison, New Ideas in India during the Nineteenth Century (London: Macmillan, 1907), p. 146; E. Thompson and G.T. Garrett, Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India (London: Macmillan, 1934);p. 651; J.N. Farquhar, Modern Religious Mo~ments in India (1st ed. 1915; London, 1929), pp. 96 f. 7

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the fact remains, that in his power of grasping the funda=mental principles of our Islamic system of faith, and in his keen insight into such of his features as have made it a great motive power in the world, he has been hardly excelled by the most learned theologians of modern times. 77 B.A. Dar projected this image in a concise statement: ''He was the first man in modern India to realize the necessity for a new interpretation of Islam that was liberaJ, modern and prog~ ressive. '' 78 In the interpretation which follows, Sir Sayyid was appreciated and criticized as an outstanding religious thinker and theologian, who developed Islamic thought on the pattern of early attempts at its synthesis with a challenging, non-Islamic civilization. This presentation, not surprisingly, is influenced by the outlook of people who enjoy a deeper knowledge of Islam and its intellectual heritage, and who are therefore able to explain the development of Sir Sayyid 's thought in terms provided by Islamic tradition, rather than by uncritically introducing terms alien to Islam. Tanqid al-khaytiltit (1882-84), an early polemical work by the Muslim convert, Rev lmad-ud-din (baptised in Amritsar in 1866, d. 1901), criticized the theological ideas expressed by Sayyid Ahmad Khan in Tahdhib a/-akhltiq. This made a great impact on subsequent missionary thinking about Sir Sayyid, and especially on E.M. Wherry 79 and H.U. Weitbrecht.80 The latter, in his close analysis of what he calls ''the new Islam in India,'' detects, as distinctive features of Sir Sayyid's new theological outlook, the adoption of tiztidi-i rti'y {the liberty to adopt a ''Justice Shah Din, ''Syed Ahmad Khan as a Religious Re-former,'' lecture delivered in Lahore in 1903, rpt. in ~hir Abroad, Just ice Shah Din, His Life and Writings (Lahore: Feroz.sons, 1962), pp. 292-319. 78 B.A. Dar, Religious Thought of Sayyid Ahmad Khan (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1971), p. 262 (1st ed. 1957). 71 B.M. Wherry in The Muslim Controversy (London: The Christian Literary Society, 1905), pp. 36-57, gives a detailed abstract of this now rare work. Cf. The Mohammadan World of Today, S.M. Zwemer (ed.), (London and Edinburgh, 1906), p. 163. '°H.U. Weitbrecht, ''The New Islam in India,'' paper delivered at the Missionary Conference in C.airo (1906). Ibid., pp. 187-204, esp. 190-92.

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personal opinion in religious matters) as against taqlid (blind adherence). He marks out other features-a revival of the doctrines of the Mu'tazilite school, the acceptance of the (western) conceptions of conscience and nature, and last but not least, the re-establishment of pure taubid (profession of divine unity and the whole of Islamic theology under this aspect), unity of essence, attributes. and worship-in Sir Sayyid's outlook. Aligarh College and the Mohamedan Educational Conference were, in Weitbrechts's opinion, nothing but the means to give this intellectual programme a practical effect. Equally early, the image of Sayyid Ahmad Khan as an undisguised enemy of orthodox Islam was widespread and effective, whether put forward sincerely or only as a pretext for opposition on other grounds. Not only Sayyid Ahmad Khan but almost all contemporary commentators on him-Indian and European-have stressed the magnitude of the opposition he had to face. A. H. l:lali's chapter on ''The Opposition to the Reformation ''81 contains much first-hand material on contemporary opposition to Sir Sayyid, however ''slanted'' its presentation may have been in terms of idolatry. According to }:Iali, open attack on Sayyid Ahmad Khan's integrity as a Muslim started when he began a social intercourse with the English, i.e. in the early 1860s when he accepted their invitations to dinner and invited them to his home. It was considerably strengthened by the publication of the first volume of The Mohamedan Commentary on the Holy Bible, and the controversy over the Urdu translation of Mountstuart Elphinstone's Histo~y of lndia. 82 In this controversy Sir Sayyid was called a kafir (unbeliever). When Sir Sayyid went on his journey to England, the rumour spread in India that he would come back an actual convert to Christianity. The main opponents of the establi6hment of Aligarh College HJAA, pp. 526-59. 11 Elphinstone, in his book, had spoken about Mubammad as the ''false prophet.'' The Urdu translation promoted by Sayyid Ahmad Khan and the Aligarh Translation Society, had rendered it paighambar-i batil. Sir Sayyid had added a footnote refuting Elphinstone's view of the Prophet. In a letter, Maulwi Sami'ullah, not satisfied, publicly accused those translating Elphinstone's words Jiterally, of kufr and irtidlid (unbelief and apostasy). HJAA, p. 528. 81

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and its educational programme were Maulwi Imdad 'Ali, Maulwi Mul}.ammad 'Ali, and Maulwi 'Ali Bakhsh.83 They procured fatwas (legal decisions) from ulama of various Indian cities and also from Mecca and Medina, declaring Sayyid Ahmad Khan, ''officially,'' among other things, ''the khalifah (re_presentative) of the Devil himself who is intent upon leading Muslims astray,'' whose ''perfidy is worse than that of the J~ws and Christians.''84 They also attacked Sir Sayyid on dogmatic grounds, but here on the theological plane, Maulana Mu}:iammad Qaaim Nanotawl (1832-80) of Deoband was the most formidable opponent. Clarifying the religious issue at stake,85 he carefully sets out the fifteen main tenets of Sir Sayyid, and then presents a closely reasoned refutation. Sir Sayyid himself recognized, as his obituary notice on Mu}:iammad Qasim86 indicates, that in the latter he had an opponent worth his metal. Later opponents of Sayyid Ahmad Khan till the present time,87 also refer to Shaikh Jamal al-din al-Aghani's (1839-97) criticism of him. The Shaikh had attacked Sir Sayyid in various articles written in India in the late 18 70s. Yet more influential was an essay written later (1884) in Arabic. 88 There he wrote about Sir Sayyid: He appeared in the guise of the naturalists [materialists], and proclaimed that nothing exists but blind nature, and that • Ali Bakhsh Khan Badayuni was the most outspoken early critic of Sir Sayyid's religious ideas (cf. TUH, p. 344). In the tract Ta'id al-Islam (Lucknow: Newal Kishore, 1873) 'Ali Bakhsh synthesized his ideas as they had appeared in various articles in Tahdhib al-akh/aq in thirty tenets. Sir Sayyid answered them one by one in Dafi' al-buhtan, TA(]), (15. Sha'ban 1291 H.), pp. 144-51/PMaq, XIII, pp. 7-50. "HJAA, p. 541. 81 Tagiyat al-'aqa'id (Clarification of Religious Tenets), rev. abrev. English translation by P. Hardy in Self-Statement, pp. f,()..76. "Rpt. in PMaq, XII, pp. 205-08. 1 7For example Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi, Western Civilisation, Islam and Muslims (Lucknow: Academy of Islamic Research and Publication, 1969), p. 66 and Dr Mubammad al-Bahl, AI-Fikr al-lslamT al-t,adith (6th rpt. Beirut: Dar al-filer, 1973). 11Jamil al-din al-Afghani and Mul,ammad 'Abduh, 'Al-dahriyun/1'1Hind' (The Materialists in India) in AI-'Urwah al-wuthqa wa 'l-thaurah aJ. tabririyah al-kubr4, rpt. (Cairo: Dir al-'Arab, 1957), pp. 372-73.

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this universe does not have a wise God (this is clear error), and that all the prophets were naturalists who did not believe in the Ood taught by the revealed religions (we take refuge in Ood!). He called himself a neichari or naturalist, and began to seduce the sons of the rich, who were frivolous young men.89 In his Qur'an Commentary, al-Afghani maintained further that Sir Sayyid ''distorted the sense of words and tampered with what God revealed..•. He called openly for the abandonment of all religions....90 Ahmad Khan and his followers took off the garb of religion and publicly called for its abandonment, desiring discord among the Muslims and seeking to divide them.'' 91 N.R. Keddie argues that although al-Afghani open]y attacked Sir Sayyid on a philosophical and theological level and declared him to be a naturalist (nechari) and even materialist (dahri), he was in fact truly opposed only to his loyalist, political stand. Keddie states in the same study: In fact, it would have been rather difficult for Afghani to present a doctrinal argument, for his own ideas on religious reform, including greater rationalism, a return to the purer Islam of the early days, and the reopening of the door of interpretation, were very close to those of Al)mad Khan.92 The critical epithet nechari was not restricted to Sir Sayyid's Muslim opponents, but passed into public currency, as the 9Translation by Nikki R. Keddie in .An Islamic Response to Imperialism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968), p. 177. 0 • Jbid. 91Jbid., p. 178. er. also p. 73. ••.An Islamic Response, p. 70; cf. Jamal al-din al--Afghani's reply to Renan, ibid., pp. 183, 187. In her more recent work, Sayyid Jamal ad--Din ''al•.Afghiini," a Political Biography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972) Keddie does not substantially modify her view on this point, although she states there that al--Afghani was doubtless frank when in his Indian article, ''Commentary on the Commentator," he objected to Sayyid Ahmad Khan's high evaluation of human nature (ibid., p. 170; cf. also pp. 168, 158). H. Pakdaman, Djamal-ed-din .Assad Abadi dit .Afghani (Paris: Maisonneuve, 1969), independently from Keddie, comes to a similar conclusion (p. 72). 8

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census reports from 1891 onwards amply prove.93 While the missionaries judged Sayyid Ahmad Khan's work on the assumption that Christianity was the ideal religion, Islamologists did so according to their picture of the development of Islam in history. lgnaz Goldziher ( 1850-1921), in his last lecture on trends in the Muslim interpretation of the Qur'an (1920), regretted not having had access to certain Islamic writings in Urdu, for example the ''comprehensive Tafsir''which Sayyid Ahmad Khan ''has incorporated into the collection of his works destined to establish his new vision of Islam. ''94 Yet, on the basis of Sir Sayyid's works in English and Arabic translation alone, Goldziher describes him as the most qualified expert on traditional Islamic scholarship and its spirit among the spokesmen of lndo-Muslim modernism. Perhaps the most penetrating among recent studies of Sayyid Ahmad Khan by western scholars is J.M.S. Baljon's The Reforms and Religious Ideas of SaJ 1yid Al;imad Khan (1949).90 Baljon, deeply indebted to A.H. I:Iali throughout his work, presents an overall picture of the man, his political, social, and educational work; only in the second half of his book docs he deal more specifically with Sayyid Ahmad Khan's religious thought. Like I:Iali and Justice Shah Din, he divides the development of Sayyid . Ahmad Khan's religious thought into three stages, describes the character of Islamic opposition to him and views the Mohamedan Commentary on the Holy Bible and certain passages of the Qur'an Commentary as evincing· a ''fair and remarkably tolerant'' attitude towards Christianity. , In a short analysis of Sayyid Ahmad Khan's religious thought Baljon comes to the conclusion that ''Al)mad Khan's undaunted confrontation with modern thought and his original method of Qur'an exegesis inspired by Western ideas, was no less than a revolution in Muslim theology, but that probably except in three cases only, he has not actually added new theories to 13

Census of India, 1891, Report, vol. XIX; The Punjab and its Feudatories (Calcutta, 1891), pp. 191 ff.; Census of India, 1901, Report, pp. 371-73. ''lgnaz Goldziher, Die Richtungen der Is/amischen Koranauslegung (Leiden: Brill, 1920), pp. 319-20. 16 The Reforms and Religious Ideas of Sir Sayyid Al)mad Khan, (1st ed.) (Leiden: Brill, 1949); See also EJ 1 , I, pp. 287-88.

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Muslim dogmatics. ''96 Sayyid Ahmad Khan worked out ''a modem version of Islam.'' 97 But his effort in religious thinking, as Baljon sees it, was cleat ly an extension of his educational work and of his cone em for the integrity of ''the religious life and convictions of the young Muslims.'' In the last analysis, Sir Sayyid's greatness, according to Baljon, lies not in what he did for his nation, but rather in ''that he restored the Muslim to faith in himself. ,,9s · Aziz Ahmad and Fazlur Rahman have discussed Sayyid Ahmad Khan's achievement as a religious thinker in the context of what has become a standard theme-Islamic modernism, and more specifically, Islamic modernism in India. For Aziz Ahmad, Sayyid Ahmad Khan is its first representative. His theological modernism, thinks Ahmad, can be discerned as g_rappling with two broadly distinct problems, the rationalization of the minutiae of non-essential dogma, and the liberalization of Islamic law. In regard to the first of these, he shows signs of psychological pressures which occasionally result in some easily avoidable apologetics as well as certain extreme rationalist positions which are repugnant to the traditionalists. In regard to the second, in spite of some slight apologetic residue, his work is dynamic and constructive, and as such it has made a tremendous impression on Islam in general and on Indian Islam in particular.99 Fazlur Rahman100 offers an analysis of pre-Modernist Islam with the aim to establish the hitherto missing link between traditional Islam and what is called Islamic modernism. He discerns in the pre-Modernist movements '' a complex of spiritual forces,'' brought about especially by an alignment of the ulama with Sufism.101 Wahhabism ''advocated 'purification' of the faith from degrading .accretions and insisted on more or less ••The Reforms, p. 92. 11 Ibid., p. 94. 18lbid., p. 93. ''Aziz Ahmad, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan 1857-1960 (London: OUP, 1967), pp. 53-54. For bis further relevant publications the bibliography to this study. 100Fazlur Rahman, Islam (New York: Doubleday, 1968 ). 101Jbid., p. 237.

,ee

In liis day and later

2S

independent and even origi naJ judgement in matters ·of religion. "102 Rahman tends to view Wahhabism as exhibiting a group of analogous phenomena throughout the Muslim world of the late 18th and earlier 19th century. It is within this context that Rahman looks at the ''modernist Mu~lim'' as ''a direct heir of these pre-Modernist reformers in all these basic attitudes, with the difference that a further shift of emphasis towards positivism took place in his hands. ''163 Writing in 1958, Rahman sees Sayyid Ahmad Khan as making ''extensive efforts at the pure thought level to harmonize Muslim metaphysical theology-the foundation of the traditional weltanschauung-with the modern weltanschauung (insofar as he knew it), born of modern science and philosophies.''104 There are finally three scholars who, after J:lali, have made efforts to show in greater detail, how Sayyid Ahmad Khan's attempt to refonnulate Islam can be placed in the broad context of the history of Islamic thought. The first to do so was the Aligarh scholar, Mul)ammad 'Umar al-din, in a substantial article entitled Sir Sayyid kil madhhabi tarz-i fikr' (Sir Sayyid's New Mode of Religious Thought) in 195S. It is wrong, 'Umar al-din argues, to say that Sir Sayyid's foremost and only preoccupation was the progress of the community (qaumi taraqqi), or that he became involved in religious thought and controversy against his inclinations, as it were, because this was the only way to bring back the Muslim community on to a path of progress. He insists: No! The truth is that Sir Sayyid was first and last a religious man. It was the broad concept of religion he had and its true spirit that instigated him to undertake [this] work for the community and to exalt the knowledge of the public good.105 .

lff]bid., p. 243. 108Jbid., pp. 258 f. 10 'Fazlur Rahman, ''Muslim Modernism in the Inda-Pakistan Subcontinent,'' BSOAS, 21 (1958), 'p p. 82-99. 106Nas1m Quraishi (ed.), Aligarh tabrik: tighdz tti amr6z (Aligarh: Muslim University, 1960), p. 12S. As early as 1910, 'Abel al-Salim Sharar Lakhnawi, in his lecture Sir Sayyid ki dini barkatln (The Spiritual Blessings of Sir Sayyid), ed. by J:lasan al-din (Agra: 'Azizi Press, 1910) had discerned bis originality as a religious thinker and given an analysis of his religious thought, 4itressing the latter's historical sense as something new.

26

Sayyid Ahmad Khan

Sir Sayyid maintained, 'Umar al-din further states, that Islam is the only religion that can go together with changing conditions and with a new age. In short, Sir Sayyid presented a new conception of Islam and laid the foundation of a new [Islamic] theology (kalam). As in former [intellectual] movements Islam had been presented in the form of law, or in the form of philosophy, or again in the form of a Sufi SJstem [of thought], in the same way Sir Sayyid, keeping in mind the scientific spirit of the modern age, presented Islam in the form of a scientific theory.106 The scholar from Aligarh, Maulana Sa'id Akbarabadi (who was rooted in the Deobandi tradition), on the one hand disagrees107 with 'Umar al-din, in that he holds Sayyid Ahmad Khan's theological work to be clearly subordinated in motive and objective to his social and political work of reform. On the other hand, he presents a short, critical analysis of Sayyid Ahmad Khan's basic religious ideas. He shows that his whole theological work is based on formulated principles, explaining how these in turn are based on statements of the Qur'an and Hadith (Tradition), interpreted in a kind of Mu'tazilite rationalism and ?ahirite fundamentalism. 108 Referring to Mubammad Qasim Nar.otawi's review of Sir Sayyid's principles in Ta~fi;,·at al-'aqii'id, he points out what he considers the two crucial shortcomings of Sir Sayyid's entire religious teachingthe rash and crude position of reason as the only criterion of religious truth, and the neglect of a non-rational or super-

UM,AJigarh tabrik, pp. 125 f. 107 In his article ''Sir Sayyid ka dini shu'ur o fikr" (Sir Sayyid':1 Religious Awareness and Thought). Aligarh Number 1954-55 in Nasim Quraishi, (ed.), Aligarh Magazine, pp. 8S-95. 108The Mu'tazilites were a group of thinkers largely responsible for the appearance, in the 8th century A.D., of speculative dogrnatics in Islam • . i.e. the discussion of Islamic dogmas in terms of Greek philosaphical concepts. The Zahirite (from 9?,ahir, meaning apparent), position was confined originally to jurists, restricting themselves in the elaboration of Muslim law to the literal sense of the Qur'in and the Traditions. Ibn l:fazm (9931064) made an attempt to apply the Zahirite principle to matters of • dogma.

In his day and later

27

natural, but nonetheless real source of religious knowledge, so impressively restated a few decades later by Mul)ammad Iqbal. However, among all writings on Sayyid Ahmad Khan, B.A. Oar's monograph, Religious Thought of Sayyid Ahmad Khan, is the one to which the present study is most indebted. Dar underlines the importance Sayyid Ahmad Khan himself attributed to his theological work, and adverts to the influence it had on later religious Muslim thinking in the subcontinont. Dar's study is the first ''attempt to bring into relief," as he says in a more detailed exposition, the ''positive contribution of Sayyid Ahmad Khan in the sphere of religious thought. ''188 The first part of the book presents a historical context-the ''missionary movements,'' the rising ''Hindu nationalism," and the ''Muslim movements of liberation.'' The second part shows Sir Sayyid's religious thought responding to the challenges of the ''Christian polemic,'' and of ''nineteenth-century materialistic Naturalism.'' Furthermore, he not only makes claims to strong links existing between Sir Sayyid's theology and the great tradition of earlier Islamic scholarship in falsafah (philosophy), kaliim (theology), andfiqh (jurisprudence), but actually adverts to such; one of the ways he does this is by pointing out references to traditional sources in Sir Sayyid's • • own wnt1ngs. Whereas B.A. Dar includes in his exposition, Sir Sayyid's solutions to problems of fiqh-such as fasting, slavery, and jihad-the present study confines itself to considering his contribution towards a reinterpretation of Muslim theology, its sources and its underlying principles. It is hoped thus to gain in precision and depth. Sir Sayyid's life has been newly explored, although in only those aspects that prove relevant to the analysis of his key religious ideas, in their strict chronological development. This study, then, does not intend to add yet another image to the existing ones, but hopes, rather, to throw new light on an element of his . life's achievement, an element he himself deemed of crucial importance to an understanding of bis life and work as a ·whole. °'B.A. Dar, Religious Thought of Sayyid Ahmad Khan. Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture (1971), p. VIII. 1

2

''True'' Islam-Early Restatement

BACKGROUND OF EARLY RELIGIOUS WRITING

Formative influence Sir Sayyjd was born and grew up in the house of his maternal grandfather, Khwajah Farid al-din Abmad Khan (1747-1828),1 the scion of an illustrious family of M ugh al aristocrats. Khwajah Farid held the high position of lvazir at the Mughal court, and acted as ambassador to Iran and Burma for the East India Company's government in Calcutta. A well-known teacher,2 he held the post of Superintendent of Calcutta Madrasa for some time. He was also a renowned mathematician and astronomer3-a line of interest continued by his younger son, Khwajah Zain al-'Abid1n.4 In the religious outlook of the family we discern a strong Sufi trend. Two of the seven brothers of Farid al-din were in fact outspoken dervishes. The famous Khwajah Najib al-din (d. 1843),5 then popularly known as Shah Fida J:lusain, was an adept of 1 From

Sirat-i Faridiyah, Sayyid Ahmad Khan's portrait of his grandfather and grandmother, written in August 1893. a. PMaq, XVI, p. 667. It is possible that the author coloured it with his own life experience, especially with regard to Farid al-din's standing between the Mughal court and tradition and the East India Company's government and western educational influences. It is nevertheless remarkable that the grandfather prefigured the role of his grandson as mediator at the political and intellectual level, between east and west. For a short sketch of his life, cf. K.A. Nizarni, Sayyid Ahmad Khan, pp. 22-2S. 1 Slrat-i Faridiyah, PMaq, XVI, pp. 668 f. 1 lbid., pp. 639-43, 668-70. 'Ibid., pp. 676-80. 1 Ibid., pp. 636-38.

'' True'' Islam-early restatement

29

the Rasulshahis,8 a recent branch of the Suhrawardl silsilah (Sufi order). N ajib al-din strongly adhered to the doctrine of waf,dat al-~-ujud (unity of being), and taught theFu1us al-f,ikam, the al-Futu~at al-Makkiyah, and other works by Mul}.yi al-din lbn al-'Arabi (A.D. 1165-1240). Khwajah 'Ala al-din (d. 1855), on the other hand, was murid (disciple), and khalifah (successor) of ·the famous Naqshbandi Shaikh, Shah Mul}.ammad Afiq (d. 1835), a direct descendant of Shaikh Abmad Sirhindi and a close adherent of the Mujaddidl silsilah.7 Sayyid Ahmad Khan wrote of 'Ala al-din, ''Although he had married he spent his whole life in gDshah nashini (religious retirement), in remembering God (dhikr adhkar ), in renunciation (zuluJ), and acts of self-mortification (mujahidah). ''8 Khwajah Farid al-din who, Sir Say) id tells us, took a special interest in the education of his grandchildren, was disposed towards Sufism, and in his later years became known in the city for the earnestness of his spiritual endeavour.9 As Sir Sayyid himself testifies,10 it was his mother, 'Aziz al-nisa Begam, the daughter of Khwajah Farid al-din, who made a lasting impact on him. He regarded her all his life as an example in the practice of the fundamental religious virtue of tawakkul (complete reliance on and trust in God). She stressed the moral-and above all-the social injunctions of religion. She was remarkably independent, despite prevailing religious customs, taking a permanent stand against superstitious beliefs and practicesfor instance, the vows and offerings made with a view to obtain certain favours, and exorcism by means of amulets and the like. In 1892 Sir Sayyid wrote: 1

At this moment when my religious ideas are based on true and accurate principles I cannot name any among the many beliefs of my mother that could be qualified as shirk 'Initiated by Saiyid 'Abd al-Rasul (d. 1796). a. John A. Subban, Sufism, Its Saints and Shrines (Lucknow: Lucknow Publishing House, 1960), pp. 2(,()..63. 7.Athar (1st ed.), p. 28/PMaq, XVI, p. 229 f. 'Sirat-i Faridiyah, PMaq, XVI, p. 638. 'Ibid., p. 674. 11/bid., pp. 682 ff.

30

Sayyid Ahmad Khan

(associationism) or bid'at (innovation) except one. She held fast to the belief of 'ibadat-i badani, i.e. that a dead person will receive reward in return for having the Qur'in recited and alms given [on his behalf] or in return for having the Fatihah read over the deceased [for forty days after his death] and for having distributed alms and food [on his behalf].11 Sir Sayyid stresses the close connection b~tween Khwijah Farid al-din's family and Shah 'Abd al-'Aziz (1746-1824), the son of Shah Wali Allah (c. 1702-63). 'Aziz al-nisa, however, gave allegiance (bai'at) to the other outstanding religious personality of her day, the Naqshbandi Mujaddidi Shaikh Shih Ghu1am 'Ali (Shah 'Abd Allah, d. 1824), and adhered to his teaching. Shah Ghulam 'Ali took a line more strict than that of Shah 'Abd al-'Aziz on superstitious practices such as vows, offerings and amulets. In accordance with the teaching of her pir, 'Aziz al-nisa seems to have been against all forms of ''mediation,'' advocating the soul's direct contact with God. ''God alone should be approached in everything, then He will do what He pleases to do, " 12 she used to say. Sir Sayyid's father, Saiyid Mu}Jammad Mir Muttaqi(d.1838), who married 'Aziz al-nisa in 1810, was connected on his mother's side with the family of the Naqshbandi Mujaddidi Mir Oard (1721-85). He too had given his allegiance to Shih Ghulam 'Ali. There was close, daily contact between the family and the khanqah of Ghulim 'Ali. l:la1i wrote that: From early childhood onwards consideration for men of God and holy people took firm root in Sir Sayyid. Quite often he went together with his father in the presence of Shih Ghulim 'Ali. In this way he experienced personally the [special] character of the Shih Sa)).ib's belief.13 The biographical facts of Sayyid Ahmad Khan's early life and the character of his early theological writing point to three schools of religious thought and practice as being the pp. 689 f. 12 /bid., p. 687. 11HJAA, pp. 83 f; cf. pp. 67 f. 11/bid.,

'' True'' Islam-early restatement

31

main influence on his outlook and thought-the Naqshbandiyah Mujaddidiyah, Shih Wali Allah and his school of religious thought, and the Mujiihidin movement. The Ii ving tradition of Sufism which made its impact on Sayyid Ahmad Khan since early childhood, can be character• ized by the stress on a truly personal religion, and a streak of religious radicalism and independance, evinced especially in the connection with the Rasulshahis. Yet more important is the presence of the Naqshbandi Mujaddidi tradition in the lives of his parents, and throughout his own.14 Shah Ghulam 'Ali was the leading Mujaddidi Shaikh in Delhi and his khiinqiih had become a centre of spiritual and theological teaching, well known in other parts of the Islamic world. The Mujaddidi branch of the Naqshbandi order is named after Shaikh A}:lmad Sirhindi Mujaddid-i a/f-i thiini, who was initiated into this order of Sufis in 1599-1600 by Khwajah Mu])ammad al-Baqi bi Allah in Delhi. Among the various writings of Shah Ghulam 'Ali (Shah 'Abdallah), his collection of letters, Makatib-i sharifah,15 gives a vivid picture of the preoccupations of his teaching. Of the 123 letters,16 twelve, for instance, deal with Shaikh Al)mad Sirhindi. They express and defend his teaching against critics like 'Abd al-l:laqq Dihlawi (1551-1642), a contemporary of Sirhindi who is mentioned repeatedly. The general trend of the letters, even where they deal with doctrinal matters, is more towards Sufi practice than towards theory. Sufism is entirely brought back into normal, daily Jife, in complete imitation of the Prophet and his Companions, 1'Sirat-i

Farldiyah, P Maq, XVI, p. 688. Sayyid Ahmad Khan relates how he went regularly to both the Jdmi'ah masjid and the khanqah of Shih Ghulam 'Ali. By the early 1840s Shah Abmad Sa'id was the sajjadahnashin of this famous Mujaddidi centre. Cf. PMaq, XVI, pp. 226-7. The line of the jahnashins of the khanqah is as follows: (i) Shah Ghulam 'Ali (d. 1824); (ii) Shah Abu Sa'id, son of (i), (1781-1835); (iii) Shah Abmad Sa'id, elder son of (ii), (1802- ); (iv) Shah 'Abd al-Ghani, younger son of (ii), (1819-78). 15 Published by 1:la.ii Mubammad 'Abd al-Rabman (Madras: Matha' 'Azizi, 1334/1916). 1 •Makatib-i Shari/ah, letter nos. 6, 67, 68, 73, 74, 77, 80, 86, 88, 96, 111 and 121.

32

Sayyid Ahmad Khan

i.e.. a life strictly according to the sunnat-i f,abib-i Khuda. ''What is darwishi?'' Ghulam 'Ali asks. ''To believe in full accordance with one another in perfect and unceasing following of the Friend of God and to look all together into one direction. ''17 In short, the Mujaddidi spiritual tradition represented by Shah Ghulam 'Ali, had the following salient features:18 The l·ia purgativa does not proceed by harsh, ascetic exercises but bystricc and earnest moral striving. Refinement of inner attitudes and purification of the heart are placed foremost. In ascetic practices one wants to follow a path of moderation. It stressed the inner aspect of Sufi practices, taking a critical stand against mobilizing emotional, and aesthetic expressions such as music, dancing, publicly and collectively performed dhikr (recollection of Gods presence), not to speak of painting. Instead, silent contemplation (murtiqabah) and contemplation of the Shaikh in one's imagination (ta~auwur-i shaikh) were advocated as a means of conforming to the Prophet's sunnah and of meeting God as he did. In this sense the intellectual element gained, as compar~d to the emotional. Personal intercourse with the spiritual guide (sul)bat-i mur~hid) was more important than a regular participation in the ''circle.''19 Utmost care is taken in the effort to conform to the Shari'a law in its Sunnite (ideally }Janafite) form. One therefore lives on good terms with the ulama. In fact, many ulama-as prominent members of the family of Shah Wali Allah, for instance-are themselves adepts of this order. Yet, there seems to be less interest in the details of fiqh among the Shaikhs of the khtinqtih, as compared to men like Shah 'Abd al-Aziz, whose fatwas were of importance. Shah Ghulam 'Ali dwells on inculcating the right moral and spiritual attitude rather than on legal points. The esoteric aspect of following the Prophet receives greater attention in Ibid., p. 191. 18A succinct description of the essence of his teaching by Ghulam 'Ali in Makatib-i sharTfah, p. 7, lines 2-4. 1'1bid., p. 183. 11

''True'' Islam-early restatement

33

the teaching of the Shaikh than in the circles of non-Sufi ulama. The second great influence on Sayyid Ahmad Khan were the writings of Shih Wali Allah Dihlawi, and his teachings as they were carried on by his descendants in Delhi. Shih Wali Allah's achievement was his attempt at a new synthesis of all religious sciences of Islam, as they had developed throughout Islamic history. 'Abdel Hamid writes: '"The central challenge facing Shah Wali Allah was, as he himself expressed it, the need for a restatement of the Islamic religious sciences, lqamat 'ulii.m al-din. This he endeavoured to achieve through his all-suffusing principle of ta/biq. ''20 By emphasizing the method of tatbiq (harmonization) in his own, original way, Shah Wali Allah smoothcned out differences among theologians, philosophers and traditionalists. In Sufi thought he tried to harmonize the two schools of wal;zdat alwujud (unity of being; lbn al-'Arabi) and wa}µJat a/-shuhud (unity of appearance; Al)mad Sirhindi); in ftqh the differences between the four madhahib; and finally he tried to clarify the difference between the Sunnite and Shi'ite traditions, by researching upon the origins of the dispute.21 Another remarkable feature of Shah Wali Allah's thought is his sense of history and his awareness of the development of Islamic thought. In his treatment of the problems of taqlid(blind following) and ijtihad (independent judgement) for example, he offers a competent historical account of the development of these two principles of Islamic tbought.22 His interest in proving the relevance of the Shari'a law is another aspect of his work that impressed Sir Sayyid. On the one hand, Shah Wali Allah works out a method of developing t0Kbalil 'Abdel Hamid, "God, the Universe and Man in Islamic Thought: The Contribution of Shah Waliullah of Delhi (1703-62),'' Ph. D. Thesis (London, 1971), p. 47. Cf. also A. Bausani, "Note su Shah WaliUllah di Delhi'' in Annall (Instituto Universitario Orientate di Napoli), Nuova Serie Vol. X (Napoli 1960) pp. 93-147. 11Waliullah dealt with the Shi'a in lzalat al-khafa' 'a11 Khillifat alkhulafa'. This endeavour w-u continued by his son, 'Abd al-'Aziz, in TuJ.,fah ithna' 'ashariyah, chapters 10 and 12, which Sir Sayyid translated into Urdu. 1 'Cf. 'Abdel Hamid, op. cit., p. S07.

Sayyid Ahmad Khan

34

and adapting the Shari'a by practising ijtihad through a selective reference to all four schools of jurisprudence. On the other hand, he introduces into his exposition of the Shari'a, two principal, additional elements-a/-~ti/ib (salutary purposes in terms of human welfare) and al-fitrah (human nature). To quote 'Abdel Hamid again: The emphasis on the salutar:y purposes in terms of human welfare, of the Shari'a and on the scholar's capacity to exercise his own ijtihtid to achieve these salutary purposes in particular circumstances enabled Shah Waliullah to depict the Shari'a aa having an inherent flexibility. Thus, some commentators have found a modernist quality in Shah Waliullah's thinking. 23 Last, though not least, a f undamenta]ist streak is discernible .throughout Shah Wali Allah's work. ''Fundamentalist'' in the sense that his ''writings reflect clearly his profound belief in only the Qur'an and the sunnah as the sole significant sources of the Islamic Shari'a .... Even ijmti' or qiytis, or any other source, must be subjected to and guided by ihcse two sources, i.e. Qur'an and sunnah, in the final analysis. '' 24 The third school of religious thought and practice that throughout his life deeply impressed Sayyid Ahmad Khan is that of Saiyid AI:imad Shahid of Ra'e Bareli (1796-1831), and of one of his earliest disciples, Maulana Shah Mubammad Isma'il Shahid ( 1779-1831 ), a member of the house of Shah Wall Allah. The movement initiated by Saiyid Abroad Shahid is commonly kno 11 n as the Mujtihidin movement.25 It has found literary ex-

lbid., p. 444. 2 'Ibid., pp. 506-07. 15 We are much indebted, in the following, to Muhammad Hedayatullah, Sayyid Ahmad: A Study of the Religious Reform Movement of Sayyid Ahmad of Ra'e Bareli (Lahore: Mub. Ashraf, 1970). In Rah-i sunnat (1850) Sayyid Abroad Khan speaks of Wahhabi in the context of discussions around innovation, cf. TFA, I, I, .p. 95/PMaq, V, p. 359/TFA, I, I, p. 109/PMaq, V, p. 384. In the use of the term "movement of the mujahidin'' one can take the lead from Aziz Ahmad, "Le mouveroent des mujahidin dans 1' Inde au XIXe siccle,'' Orient, vol. 4, 3me trimestre (1960), pp. 105-16. 23

'' True'' Is/am-early restatement

35

pression, above all, in Mul)ammad lsma'fi's (1781-1831)18 writings. to which Sir Sayyid referred throughout his life. There are certain characteristics of the religious outlook of the two men. They want to assert pure taubid (unity) and believe this to be achieved only by a radical return to the ''Islam of the days of the Prophet." Accordingly, they emphasize the importance of the Qur'an and sunnah as a criterion of thought and conduct, and are consistently against innovation. The most . serious threat to taufiid in India comes from Hindu practices that have crept into the life and thought of Indian Muslims~ Thus to a very large extent, the fight against innovation turns out to be a fight against borrowing from Hinduism, or, as they saw it, superstitious degradations shared with Hinduism. No change or adjustment in the traditional structure of religion was envisaged in the contemporary situation. Yet, Shih Isma'il's writings are pervaded with a keen sense of the difference between Islam as practised in the Muslim India of the day, and ''pure'' Islam as in the days of the Prophet. The five pillars of Islam-assertion of unity, ritual prayer, fas ting, alms tax and pilgrimage-are interpreted strictly and insisted upon in their pristine form of implementation. As its title suggests, Tariqah-i Mul;,ammadiyah 21 discloses the Sufi character of the movement. Reform of Sufi ideas and practices-of piri-muridi (master-disciple relationship) and dhikr ·ror instance and a puritanical return to the practice of the Prophet are envisaged to bring about an ideal exoteric and esoteric Islam, understood and enacted as Tariqah-i Mul;,ammadiyah.?JJ There is a noticeable shift in moral teaching towards a more this-worldly outlook and a stress on the reform of Islamic life in society. Muhammad Hedayatullah writes: ''The moral teaching of Saiyid Al)mad [Shal)id] was more in relation to this-worldly values than to the world hereafter. '' 29 Rahman thinks that ''the result of this trend among the more enlightened strata of society was an orientation towards a positive attitude About him and his works cf. Hedayatullah, op. cit., pp. 1-2; p. 152,

16

fn. 1-3. 11 Ibid., pp. 100-06.

Fazlur Rahman, Islam, p. 254. 19 Hedayatullah, op. cit ., p. 103.

18

36

Sayyid Ahmad Khan

to this world and its moral, social and economic problems than towards eschatological issues. ''30 The two reformers Saiyid Abmad Shahid and Shah Isma'il have very little to say about the system of Muslim law. A relevant passage in $ira/ al-mustaqim explicitly states the rejection of all four orthodox schools of Muslim jurisprudence ''which meant positively,'' comments Heda_y atullah, ''that he [Saiyid A}Jmad Shahid] declared himself a ghair muqa//id (non• conformist). Rejection of taqlid means, in its positive aspect, the acceptance of ijtihiid. ''31

Early religious writings Sir Sa}yid's religious thought in bis early period, is contained in the foil owing works: (a) Ji/a' al-qulub bi dhikr al-Ma/:ibub (Polishing of the Hearts by Remembering the Beloved), 1841. (b) T11/:ifah-i lfasan (The Gift to /Jasan), 1844. Nur al-1:lasan was Sir Sayyid's teacher in Agra in the early 1884s. (c) Tadhkirah-i ahl-i Dihli (Biography of the People of Delhi, contained in the fourth chapter of the first edition of Athar al~anadid), 1846. (d) Kalimat al-/Jaqq (The True Discourse), 1849. (e) Rah-i sunnah dar radd-i bid'ah (The Path of the sunnali in Rejection of lnnoration), 1850. (f) Namiqah dar bayan-i mas'alah-i tasauwur-i shaikh ( A Letter Explaining the Teaching of ta~auwur-i shaikh), 1852. This meant visualizing interiorly the image of one's Shaikh and thus achieving unity with him and with his nearness to God. (g) Aghaz-i tarjumah-i KimiJ1d·i sa' adah (Beginning of the translation of al-Ghazali's famoug The Elixir of Happiness), 1853. The religious works listed here are only a fraction of l1is total literary output during this period. Any fame Sayyid Ahmad Khan achieved as a scholar in and outside India before 1857 was really because of bis historical writing, especially the two editions of Athar al-~anadid and that of the A'in-i Akbari.32 Fazlur Rahman, op. cit., p. 258. 11Cf. quotation from Siriif al-mustaqim in Hedayatu]lah, op. cit ., p. 144. 11For more detailed information about this cf. Christian W. Troll, ''A note on an early topographical work of Sayyid Al}mad Khan: Afar al$aniidid. '' JRAS (1972), pp. 135-46. 80

'' True'' Islam-early restatement

37

Very few of the numerous collected and published letters of Sayyid Ahmad Khan belong to this period, and none deal with his religious thought and work. Besides, contemporary comment on his thought is not known. But we do have later reflections of Sir Sayyid upon his outlook during these early years, in a number of Reviews.33 In them Sir Sayyid looks back to the time when he wrote the tract to which they are attached. He indicates the circumstances that occasioned its writing and names the doctrines with regard to which he changed his views. In June 1878, he reflects upon his theological position as a whole, viewing its development from an unreftecting, traditional position to a Wahhabi-like outlook, and from there to the present position which he describes a~ niu'taziliyat. 34 These reflections in the Reviews are, however, of a rather random and summary nature, being his interpretations at a much later stage of his thought. Ji/a' al-qulub, the first piece of religious writing by Sayyid Ahmad Khan, is a maulud writing (a biography of the Prophet to be recited at the customary monthly gatherings commemorating the birth of Mul}.ammad).35 Apart from a short Persian poem in praise of the Prophet at the beginning, and one in Arabic at the end, it is written throughout in idiomatic Urdu prose. Sayyid Ahmad Khan declares at the end of it to have made use of a maulud risa/ah entitled Surur al-mat,zun (The Joy of the AjJlicted);d6 and- to have taken a few items from

•there are three Reviews, written between 1878 and 1880, appended resp. to Ji/a' al-qulub, Tul;,fah-i [:lasan and Rah-i sunnat (TFA, I, I, pp. 19-22/ PMaq, VII, pp. 31-35/TFA, I, I, pp. 13-1S/PMaq, VII, pp. 299-304/TFA, I, I, pp. 13S-36/PMaq, V, pp. 427-29). "Review on Jilii' al-qulub, TFA, I, I, p. 20/PMaq, VII, p. 32. 15 SEI, pp. 36S-68 (Maw/id). On contemporary maulud writings in India er. William Muir, ''Biographies of Mohammad for India; and The Mohammadan Controversy," in Calcutta Review, 1852. Rpt. in Muir, T~ Mohammedan Controversy (T.T. aark, 1896), pp. . 65-101. On pp. 77-87 Muir discusses the Maulud-i shari/ by Ghulam Imam Sharif, officer at the $adr Diwani in Agra and a frequent friend of Sayyid Ahmad Khan during his years in Agra, cf. HJAA, p. 88. 11Persian t,anslation of the Arabic tract Nur al-'uyun (cf. Brock., II, p.71) which Shah Wali Allah prepared at the instance of friends. Cf. Storey, 2, pp. 178 f.

j

38

Sayyid Ahmad Khan

M adarij al-nubuwah ( Degrees of Prophethood),31 the copious

biography of the Prophet by 'Abd al-1:laqq Dihlawi(1551-1642). He further states that a certain Maulani Nur al-1:lasan corrected and improved upon his tract. In 1878 he explained why he wrote the risalah. He wanted to produce ''a short risa/ah in the form of a factual account of the Prophet's life that would omit all unreliable material. ''38 This endeavour has an interesting parallel in lbya al-qulub (Quickening of the Hearts), 39 the risa/ah (in Urdu) by 'Abd alJalll ibn ·' Abd al-Mujib, published only about ten years later. The introduction to this work suggests motives that might possibly have moved Sayyid Ahmad Khan to compose the Ji/a' a/-qulub.

'Abd al-Jalil in his risalah criticizes his contemporaries for spending ''day and night in listening to erotic tales of 'iishiqi and ma'shriqi, stories that incite them to disobedience to the Shari'a and make them rebellious against it.'' Furthermore, he states: Everywhere the Christians tell of the miracles and the superiority of Jesus, Peace be upon him, and they defame our Prophet. Although it is right to recognise His [Jesus') greatness yet the greatness of our Prophet is something differentbut the common man is not aware of it and in some people's mind there originates a devilish insinuation (waswas). This sinner [the h11mble author] has abridged the full story of the Prophet and produced it in this risa/oh so that our brother M usliros in their spare time may come together and recite this sweet story for themselves or to other people. Thus, listening to this dear story the mind may be refreshed and the faith strengthened and the longing may be born in everyone's heart to follow the sunnah and to flee from shirk and bid'at.40 17

By 'Abd al-};laqq Mu)}addith Dihlawi. Cf. Storey, 2, pp. 194 f. •TFA, I, I, p. 19. •(Calcutta: Matba'-i Al)madi, 1851-52). This maulud risalah was corrected and examined on its historical reliability by Karamat 'Ali JaunpiirI (d. 1873). Ibid., p. 242. 0 ' Ibid., pp. 240-42.

'• True'' Islam-early restatement

39

Tbere emergeg from this text a concern among Indian Muslims at this time to produce ''reformed'' maulud writings, considered a means to bring people back to the undiluted sunnah of the Prophet, and to lure them away from al) innovations to the veneration and imitation of Mubammad. The text further suggests that this endeavour was occasioned by an awareness, among leading Muslims in India, of the impact of Christian preaching on broad sections of the population. Particularly since many Protestant missionaries were influenced by the Evangelical movement, and handed out copies not only of the Bible, but also of the Gospels by different Evangelists, thus presenting the life of Jesus as exemplary. lt seems that the preachers, concentrating on the person and life of Jesus of Nazareth, and the message of the Bible, effected a new concern for the central place held by Mubammad and the Qur'an in the religion of Islam. Inde:d,_ Sayyid Ahm1d Khan'! teacher and friend in Agra, Maulana Nur al-1:{asan (d. 1868),41 was at that time-during the late l 830s and early 1840s-actively engaged in a controversy with Carl Gottlieb Pfander (d. 1869), the apologist and • missionary working in Agra since 1835. As elaborated in the next chapter, Sayyid Ahmad Khan from this period onwards was not only aware of the missionary challenge to the religion of Islam, but also concerned about appropriate ways to counteract 1·t •42 Maulana Nur al l:fasan. mentioned above, encouraged Sayyid Ahmad Khan to translate into Urdu, the tenth and twelfth chapters of Tul;ifah-i lthno' 'Ashariyah,'3 Shah 'Abd al-'Aziz's '1

Sayyid Ahmad Khan calls him ustiidhi and mulliidhT, terms that indicate an intimate teacher-pupil relationship. Nur al-J:Iasan of Kandhla (d. 1868) was, in the early 1840s, the head teacher in Arabic at Agra College. Sir Sayyid, at that time in Agra and then in Fatehpur Sikri, saw him regularly. er. HJAA, p.88; PMaq, XV, p.77. Translation of the Report of the Members of the Select Committee for the Better Diffusion and Advancement of the Learning among Muhammadans of India by Syed Ahmad Khan Babadur, Secretary (Benares, 1872), pp. 13, 15. Biographical notes in Tadhkirah, pp. 268-69. 2 ' ''Auszilge aus dem Tagebuch des Missionar C.G.Pfander," Missionsmagazin, 28 (1843), . pp. 191, 194. Shows that in 1842 Nur al-aasan was engaged in a refutation of Pfander's Mizlin al-1;,aqq. ''Cf. fn 33 above. Recent Urdu translation of 'Abd al-'Aziz Tub/ah by Sa'd J:Iasan Khan Yusufi (Karachi: Nur Mul)ammad, 1956).

40

Sayyid Ahmad Khan

scholarly work on the Shi'a. The tenth chapter answers the abuse levelled against the Companions and l:lairat 'A'ishah (one of the Prophet's wives) and the twelfth deals with the Shi'a terms tawallii and tabarrii (meaning Jove, and the enmity of one's neighbour on religious grounds, respectively). The remaining theological writings of the period 1841-53, belong to the time when Sayyid Ahmad Khan was a mun1if (judge) in Delhi (1846-55). During these eight years he became increasingly acquainted with western culture. A comparison between the first edition of Athiir a/-~aniidid (1846) and the second revised one ( 1852) gives an idea of the extent to which bis intellectual outlook had changed during this period.44 However, at the same time Sayyid Ahmad Khan had deepened his traditional religious education under the guidance of renowned teachers at the Jami'ah Masjid, and the then internationally renowned khiinqah of Shah Ghulam 'Ali and his successors. It is in this context that Sayyid Ah~ad Khan wrote Kalimat albaqq and Rah-i sunnat. Kalimat al-baqq, published in 1849,45 deals with piri-muridi. A clear structure and a direct and idiomatic style of writing mark this tract. The author aims at a wide audience, the oratorial ring betraying his close connection with traditional ulama and Sufis at this time. The first part discu~es the notion of piri, coming to the conclusion that the Prophet is the one valid pir, and that therefore all organized Sufi life must be strictly directed to following the Prophet alone, by adhering closely to the Qur'an and sunnah. The second part on muridi discusses mainly the concept and practice of ba,'at. In his Review of Rah-i sunnat (1850) 46 in 1879, Sir Sayyid tells us that in its basic approach the treatise follows l(jaJ;,. al-baqq al-$aril;, fi afikiim al-mayyit wa' 1-(jarib (Elucidation of the Plain Truth Concerning the Rules About the Dead and the Tombs), 47 Shah Mubammad lsma'il's tract in Persian. Acomparison of the two works shows that Sayyid Ahmad Khan has "C.W. Troll, ''A Note," pp. 143 f. ''TFA, I, I, pp. 18-91/PMaq, V, pp. 267-90. HJAA wrongly dates its publication as 184S. ''TFA, I, I, pp. 93-134/PMaq, V, pp. 354 426. ' 7 An erroneous title of the work is given in TF."1, I, I, p. 135/PMaq, V, p. 427.

~, True'' Islam-early restatement

41

adopted Shah Isma'il's analysis of the term bid'ah, and some of his exemplifications. Yet the introduction and the second half of the work are mainly Sir Sayyid's own composition. There is the same lucid Urdu prose, and the effort to reach a wider readership, as in Kalimat al-~aqq. The immediate cause for writing this tract was an interesting exchange of views Sayyid Ahmad Khan had (in one of the meetings at the house of ~adr al-sudiir Maulana Mubammad ~adr al-din Azurdah),48 over the licitness of eating mangoes. Sir Sayyid had defended his views, saying that to eat mangoes-though not a blameworthy actionwas a matter of doubt, since the Prophet had not decided upon it explictly, having himself never eaten them. ''I swear by God in whose hands rests my life,'' stated Sayyid Ahmad Khan, ''if a person does not eat a mango for the reason that the Prophet did not eat it then the angels will kiss his feet at bis [death] bed.'' In 1879, he recalls that ''This I had said with utter conviction ~nd much fervour. The Maulana listened to it and remained silent. It was at this period of noisy and tumultous Wahbabism49 that after the discussion just recorded I wrote this tract.'' In 1853 the Sufi 'iilim l:lajl Imdad Allah of Thana Bhavan (1815-99)50 on a visit to Delhi, asked Say.y id Ahmad Khan to translate into Urdu the Kimiyii-i sa"iidah, al-Ghazali's work in Persian, the incomplete translation survives. A year earlier, a few Naqshbandi elders, perhaps disturbed by Sayyid Ahmad Khan's earlier condemnation°1 of the practice of tasauwur-i shaikh ( the practice of visualizing within, the image of one's spiritual guide, thus achieving union with him), had urged him to write on its defence. Accordingly, Sir Sayyid wrote a namiqah in Persian,52 in which he endeavours to show the tasauwur-i shaikh being an apt and lawful means to develop 8

He was the mufti of Delhi and lived from 1789 to 1868. Biographical data TUH, pp. 247-49. ''The presence of a strong current of Wahhabism in Delhi in the 1840s and 1850s was noticed by William Muir. a. The Mahom~dan ConJroversY, p. 73. Also ''Wahhabies in D~l'1i,'' in Ledlie's Miscellan.v, I (Agra: J. Parks Ledlie, 1852), pp. 486-92. aocr. E11 , 111, pp. 1114-1s. 1 1Cf. Rah-i sunnat, TFA, p. 108/PMaq, V, pp. 382-83. 11 TFA, I, I, pp. 137-41/PMaq, XV, pp. 182-87. '

42

Sayyid Ahmad Khan

the love of God in an adept. To corroborate his view he states that Shah Isma'il, despite what he wrote in Sira/ al-mustaqim, did not cease practising tasauwur-i shaikh till his death.

MAIN THEMES OF EARLY WRITINGS

Two main themes emerge from Sayyid Ahmad Khan's early religious writings-his endeavour to bring the Prophet back into the mainstream of religious life of individuals and society, and his desire to unmask all innovations in the lives of Indian .Muslims which could be attributed to their non-Muslim • environment. The practice of the Prophet as the Straight Path It is a commonplace that Mul}.ammad, soon after or even before his death, became for his community the model of a life wholly pleasing to God-a pure and perfect human being, worthy of praise and reverence, the Friend and Beloved of God whom every man must imitate. 53 In Sayyid Ahmad Khan's early writings the two strands-of obedience to the prescriptions of the Shari'a law and of love and veneration for the Prophet as the living embodiment of this law on earth-are welded into a whole, thus giving another powerful dimension to the religious outlook of the tariqah-i Mu/.iammadiJ·ah. The introductory and final lines of Sir Sayyid's Ji/a' al-qulub convey not only the religious outlook of the believer taking part in a mau/ud gathering, but also the atmosphere marking such a liturgical occasion. The faithful believer of that period would regard these gatherings (as did Sir Sayyid), as not only facultative customs but as part and parcel of the officially prescribed rite. He would, further, even believe in a ''liturgical presence'' of the holy soul of the Prophet. During the ceremony 63

However extreme and speculative later writing on the person of the Prophet may have been, the Qur'anic basis is not completely wanting. Cf~ Q. 33, 21; 33, 46; 33, 56 and esp. Tor Andrae, Die Person Muhammeds in Lehre und G!auben seiner Gemeinde (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1918), pp. 190289; L. Zolondek, Book XX of al-Ghaztili's ibya' 'uliim al-din (Leiden: Brill, 1963), pp. 6 ff.

'' True'' Islam-early restatement

43

the angels of mercy would descend upon the congregation, more so as the participants had endeavoured to keep the liturgy simple, consciously avoiding any resemblance to the Sht'a practice of pious recitations and lamentations and the reading of marthi)1as (elegies in commemoration of l:lasan and l:lusain). This ceremony, repeated on the twelfth of every month, would earn much reward in the world to come. 54 In his Review ( 1878) of Ji/a' al-qulub Sir Sayyid states that his motive in composing this ristilah was to produce a more reliable text. In it, his account of Mubammad's life is more sober, succinct, and factual when compared to the source he indicates. Many details of the traditional sirah as it had developed from lbn lsbaq (d. A.D. 767) and lbn Sa'd (d. A.D. 845) are omitted. The ancestors of Mul)ammad, for instance, are enumerated simply-none of the various stories attached to them being reproduced. Similarly, from the great number of incidents ( which occur in traditional sirahs and maulud risti/ahs and write of Mul)ammad's unique prophetical vocation, as also his many qualities long before the actual descent of revelation), we hear of only a select number. We hear of the collapse of the fourteen pillars in the palace of Chosroes, the extinction of the sacred flame in the temple of the fire-worshippers, and Mubammad's two encounters with Christian monks in Syria, who reveal his prophetic destiny. All these events underline that Mubammad and the religion he establishes fulfil and supresede heathendom, fire-worship and Christianity. Nevertheless the risalah has a special section entitled mu'jiztit, in which a number of miracles wrought by the Prophet are enumerated. The section ends with the statement: ''There were thousands of similar miracles-to enumerate and discribe them would be impossible. ''55 The description of the Prophet's appearance, too, takes from the earliest biographies, and we can sense their influence even in the selection and phrasing of small _d etails. It is once again the traditional, popular presentation of Muliammad as the most beautiful of all men.56 "Review of Jila' al-quliib, TFA, I, I. pp. 19, 22/PMaq, VII, pp. 31-3S. For a translation of the verses in praise of the Prophet see DA, I, no.I. 56 TFA, I, I, p. 15/PMaq, vn, p. 23. 11 See ellample in DA, I, no. 3.

44

Sayyid Ahmad Khan

Thus Sayyid Ahmad Khan's risalah remains clearly within the pattern of traditional popular biography. However, along with a tendency towards sober factuality, there emerges a special interest in the moral excellencies of the Prophet, especially those socially relevant. Mubammad's perfect companionship, the mutual love and dedication between the companions a11d him, and the natural authority he enjoyed among them, are underlined. The Prophet excells in social manners and shows great attentiveness and kindness towards acquaintances and friends, especially when they face a calamity. He also preaches a positive attitude towards the nobles in the qaum, and reverence towards the ahi-i far/I o kamal. He insisted on social equality with his companions,57 and was an ideal masterto his servants. The other writings of this period confirm the impression that Sayyid Ahmad Khan's concern with the person of Mubammad is morethan merely conventional. For him, Islam means to Jove Mub.ammad personally and to follow, out of this love, his sunnah as closely as possible. ln the beginning of Tadhkirah-i ah/-i Dihli (1846) he states that the outstanding feature of Delhi is its thousands of inhabitants who have ''adopted the tariqah-i sunnat-i M~ammadi.''58 The qualities of that tariqah shine forth in the people of Delhi, in especially the first group of people presented by him in this Tadhkirah-the Shaikhs of the Naqshbandi Mujaddidi si/silah. Sayyid Ahmad Khan leaves no doubt that it is their spiritual outlook he admires most; they are, after all, the spiritual leaders of his own silsi/ah. Their single-minded love of the Prophet implies-for them at leasta meticulous following of the Prophet's practice, i.e. the sunnah. Kalimat a/-J;,aqq, the tract on piri-muridi,59 exemplifies what Say)id Ahmad Khan means by this ideal of seeing all Shari'a law personified in the life and practice ofMubammad, and of the attempt to practise it, an expression of one's sincere, personal love for him. In this spirituality the mystical path (tariqah) is seen as being identical with the way of Shari'a law -both the way of a radical inward (ba/ini) and outward 61

Jbid., pp. 9-11, 16-18. 11 Athar (1st ed.), p. 14/PMaq, XVI, p. 312. 61

On piri-muridi cf. Subhan, Sufism, pp. 88-91.

''True'' Islam-early restatement

45

(~ahiri) imitation of Mul)ammad (tariqah-i Mul)ammadiJ·ah; • shari'at-i Mul_iammadiyah).60 There is one true pirMul)ammad. Any other can be pir only in the measure in which he conforms to the Pir. To be murid is to be faithful to Mul)ammad and his sunnah, radically and wholeheartedly. Commenting on a Tradition where the Prophet addresses Ha~rat Anas b. Malik thus-''O my son, the one who has cherished my sunnah without doubt he has cherished me and he who cherishes me will be with m: in paradise,'' Sayyid Ahmad Khan writes: 0 Muslims, reflect a little, even if a thousand souls would sacrifice themselves for this word ''with me,'' it would still be little! To be together in Paradise with the Apostle of Allah is such glad tidings that verily both worlds have no value whatsoever in comparison with that reality! What a good fortune the person enjoys who is granted to be with the Prophet Mul)ammad. Alas, where do you err wandering around? Whatever gracious gift (ni'mat) there is, it is in the sunnah of the Prophet, by God, in nothing else, in nothing · else, in nothing else !61 Thus true sanctity lies in a complete dedication to the enactment of the sunnah. This conformity should be total, comprehending all aspects of life and involving the entire being of the believer. The Shari'a should become the sole object of his desire and concern.62 Such dedication becomes easy if the Shari'a is seen as nothing but the Prophet's practice of Islam. Because, as the Tradition says, man ababba sunnati faqad ababba11i (who loves my sunnah, loves me), and therefore the toTFA, I, Ip. 81/PMaq, V, P. 275: shari'at-i Mubmmadiyah as the only path to wiliiyat. In Kalimat al-1;,aqq the term fariqah-i Mul;,ammadiyah does not occur. The expression sharrat-i Muf:,ammatl;yah resp. shar' Mu/.,ammadi occurs only six times in Kalimat al-1;,aqq. Besides the common expression sunnat-i rasiil Allah~ we find sunnat-i Mu(iammadiyah and sunnat-i M,qta/wiyah. Apnl l;,abib ki sunnat appears as opposed to apni nafs ki sunnat, TFA, I, I, p. 84/PMaq, V, p. 279. There is also the simple term mutaba'at-i rasiil Allah. 11 TFA, I, I, p. 80; PMaq, V, pp. 272-73. ••Ibid,, p. 81; p. 275; ibid., pp. 79 f, 271 f •

..

46

Sayyid Ahmad Khan

endeavour to follow his sunnah becomes an act of personal love for the Prophet. Total conformity to the sunnah implies the avoidance of innovation in any sphere of life. It is Satan who calls to ways other than that of the sunnah. There is no other way to reach God but the sunnah of the Messenger of God. Sayyid Ahmad Khan insists: Our point is this, do not make every conjurer and juggler your pir, do not go for his charms and miraculous powers but consider only that person a wa/1, ghauth, qu/b and abda/63 who is a follower of the Mubammadan sunnah, although he may not perform even one miracle. . . . The only sign of a saint is whether he follows the sunnah and Shari'a of the Messenger of God. 64 His discussion of the practice of taking an oath of allegiance to a pir in a Sufi order again shows Sayyid Ahmad Khan's concern about leading people back to the pure practice of early Islam. He states, with regard to the lawfulness of taking this oath: If somebody in order to avoid sins and to follow the sunnah of the Messenger of God, in order to repent and to ask the forgiveness of his past sins-having in mind only the sunnah of the Messenger of God-gives his allegiance to some goodnatured, educated and learned person, then there is no objection to that, it is rather in accordance with tradition and . [therefore] commendable. But [the practice of] becoming a murid of such and s~ch a silsilah has no a,/ [no foundation on the Qur'an and sunnah]. Is bai'at not basically repentance (taubah)? To say therefore: we have repented in this or this Sufi family or order does not make sense at all.65 Sayyid Ahmad Khan dismisses any kind of mediation, such as the intercessory power of a pir-in life, in the hour of death,

•aon the meaning

of these terms cf. Annemarie Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975), pp. 199-202. "TFA, I, I, p. 81/PMaq, V, p. 275. 11 TFA, I, I, p. 86/PMaq, V, pp. 283-84.

''True'' ls/om-early restatement

47

or after death-as pure error. Crucial is the believer's personal • response: You must put right your book of [good] works (niimah-i a'miil). That will come in useful [when you are] 1n your grave as well as on the Day of Resurrection. On that day God will do you justice....Only this one question will be asked: ''Speak up, what . have you brought, goodness or badness? Have you practised the following of the Messenger of God or not? Through God's grace alone, then, is there salvation of both pir and murid.66

Concerning the practice of dhikr, so central to Sufi piety, Sayyid Ahmad Khan concedes that there is a form of it that does not contravene the sunnah. He suggests, nevertheless, that if a man could centre his whole attention on performing the prescribed ritual prayer (namiiz), ''he would gain such a [high] station at the court of Allah as can neither be reached by dhikr or any other devotional practice. For that reason,'' he concludes, ''one of the great men of the sunnah has said, 'Ritual prayer is the mi'riij67 for the faithful.' ''68 The special kind of ''awareness of God's presence'' which, according to some, can only be achieved by dnikr and devotional practices, is in fact reached by an intense and ~xact performance of ritual prayer. However, Sayyid Ahmad Khan does not want to abolish piri-muridi and the devotional practices that go with it. He wants to place them in a right perspective, reforming them thoroughly: In short, do not forsake the sunnah of the Messenger of God. If you become a pir become one in accordance with the sunnah alone, if a murid, then in accordance with the sunnah alone. Be ready in the service of the elders and opt for the affection of the one who is obedient to the sunnah, so that "Ibid., p. 87/p. 284. 17Originally ladder, later ''ascen," especially Mubammad's ~nsion to heaven. er. SEI, pp. 381 f. 18 TFA, I, I, p. 89/PMaq, V, p. 288. er. the Naqshbandiya teaching of qurb al-fara'id, the ''state of th: prophets" as against qurb al-nawafil, the ''station of the saints.'' Schimmel, op. cit., p. 133.

48 ·

Sayyid Ahmad Khan

you may be blessed with good company ($ub/,at) and may, at the same time, be fully obejient to the sunnah. Because good company has a tremendous impact on you ....69 The perfect murid, in the final analysis, is the one who keeps to the way of God-all the rest is idle talk.70 The most significant teaching of Kalimat al t,aqq is that the following of the Iariqah-i M ubammadiyah must be identical with the faithful implementation of the shari' at-i Mul,a,nmadiyah'> and vice versa. In this teaching Sayyid Ahmad Khan gives an answer to the religiously crucial question for Islam, and as Yohanan Friedmann puts it, ''in what way does the Muslim community maintain its contact with the Divine after Prophecy has come to an end?'' 71 With its peculiar answer, Kalimat albaqq stands in an old tradition. Shaikh A)Jmad Sirhindi, the Mujaddid·i alf-i thani-at least in the Indian environment-was the first to clearly depict the relationship between Shari'a and tariqah as parallel to that between prophecy (nubuwah) and sainthood (wilayah). As prophecy is superior to sainthoodMubammad is first a prophet called by God to convey His message and only then a model of sanctity-so Shari'a is superior to tariqah.72 It was thus one of the main objectives of

,

''Ibid., pp. 90/289. The term _subbat occurs regularly in the teaching of Shah Gbulam •Ali; cf. Makafib-i sharif, p. 175, as one of the conditions to achieve dawam-1 buziir, continuous experience of God's presence; cf. ibid., p. 180. Also in Sayyid Ahmad Khan's biographical notice of Maulana Mubammad lsbaq (d. 1846)-"On his face the traces of 1ababat were visible and, I am sure, if anybody has ever received the grace of 1ubbat with the Lord of all creation, he would look and live like him.'' Atheir (1st ed.), p. 104; PMaq, XVI, p. 320. On the teaching of Mir Dardon 1ubbat cf. Schammel, ''A 'sincere Mubammadan's' way to Salvation," Memorial volume S.F.G. Brandon (Manchester, 1973), pp. 221-42, esp. pp. 226 f. In Kalimat al-baqq Sayyid Ahmad Khan says that good company (subbat-i nek) should be sought for. But, ''if such good company is not available then there is no better company than the one of Qur' an and Hadith. It is in their company that the true 'sanctity' is achieved: inner purity (10/ti-i bdtini) and closeness to God (taqarrub ila Allah).'' TFA, I, I, p. 90/ PMaq, XV, pp. 182-87. The term again figures prominently in Namiqah. 70 TFA, I, I, p. 91/PMaq, V, p. 290. 71 Yohanan Friedmann, Shaykh Al:zmad Sirhindi (Montreal and London: McGill Univer,ity Press, 1971), p. 40. 71Jbid., p. 46.

'' True'' Is/am-early restatement

49

Sirhindi's teaching to incorporate the Sharl'a as a major Islamic concept, into this comprehensive Sufi world-view. Sirhindi's teaching and outlook lived on in the Mujaddidi branch of the Naqshbandiya. Kbwajah Mir Dard and his family were Naqshbandis of the illujaddidi branch. In his early days Sir Sayyid frequently attended the monthly religious meetings at the khlinqiih of this family. 73 They were presided over by Mir Dard·s successor, Khwijah Mul)ammad Na~Ir {17851845), who figures among the great Sufis of Delhi described by Sir Sayyid in Athiir al-$aniidid.74 Dard's thought contains many concepts singled out already in Sayyid Ahmad Khan's writings. Sul)bat, for instance-''the conversation with the master, which guarantees not only a personal control of the disciple's progress but the constant flow of spiritual energy from the Shaikh to the murid.''75 Or tahdhib a/-akhltiq-the ''polishing of the moral faculties'' leading to one of the different form~ of kashf ( disclosure) which Oard enumerates.76 Or sukr (intoxication), wherein the faithful experiences only the qurb-al nawlifil (proximity reached by works of supererogation), unlike the qurb alfard'i(j, wherein the proximity reached by legally prescribed actions is much higher, this being the state of prophets, and thus excelling that of saints. 77 Oard underlines the importance of the pir more than his predecessors. Fana' fi al-shaikh (annihilation in the Shaikh) is a concept which we meet in Sayyid Ahmad Khan's Namiqah on tasauwur-i shaikh. The ''shaikh," says Oard, ''is in his group like the prophet of his people." The office of the Shaikh is vice11

Sirat-i Faridiyah, PMaq, XVI, p. 677. 1 'Athar, (1st ed.), pp. 35-37 /PMaq, XVI, pp. 236-39. 7 'Annemarie Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions, p. 226. Cf. fn. 69 above. Cf £11 , II, pp. 137-38 (art. Dard). Sir Sayyid's father Mir Muttaqi, through his mother, was connected with Mir Dard's family. ''Ibid., p. '1.27, esp. fn. 28. Tahdhih al-akhlaq was the title of Sir Sayyid's famous journal. The concept was commonly used to designate ethics. Ibn Miskawaihi's (d. 1030) work under this title, discussed in D.M. Donaldson, Studies in Muslim Ethics, pp. 121-33. Cf. Friedmann, Sirhindi, p. 54. In the writings of Shah Ghulam 'Ali it frequently occurs as stage in the via purgativa, e.g. Makatib-i sharif, pp. 30, 79, 129. (Cf. Sayyid Ahmad Khan's introduction to his planned tran.,Jation of Kimiya-i sa'adat, wh:re the con cept occurs in a slightly altered form, TFA, p. 145/PMaq, V, p. 432. 77Scbimmel, op. cit., p. 228. 'A ''sincere Mul)ammadan's" way,' p. 228.-

a.

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gerency of the prophecy. The ascent of the seeker begins with f anii' 1-shaik_h, which leads to the f anii'fi'1-rasul-the annihilation in the Prophet-and culminates in the f anii' fi A//iihannihilatiJn in God-which then may turn into baqii' bii/iih''remaining in God,"-which is a constant life in God.78 The following quotation from Sayyid Ahmad Khan's Namiqah easily shows the continuity of this tradition in the order: And our Naq~hbandi shaikhs have ordered this [form of] contemplation. To~auwur-i shaikh [according to them] is necessary for the seeker, in the /;,al of dhikr as well as outside it, in order that through this remembering by heart and intellect the love to his 1haikh may warm up in the heart of the seeker and that, by stages, the state of /and fi-' 1-shaikh may be realized in him. Thus in the rational soul of shaikh and seeker there will come about a mutual attribution and the grace of companionship and guidance will take root in the rational soul (nafs·i na/iqah) of the seeker and, cleansed from vices, he will reach higher stages.79 Without tasauwur-i shaikh, claims Sayyid Ahmad, he would not have found the way to God, or the protection of the Messenger. The practice, anyway, is taken from the Companions and their Followers and many former Shaikhs of the order have reached, by practising ta~auwur-i shaikh, the stage ofJana' ft al-rasul. Maulana Isma'Il, for instance, who wrote Sirat al-mustaqim, practised this until his Jast breath. Without entering into a discussion of Al)mad Shahid's total teaching,80 it can be noted that Sayyid Ahmad Khan's Kalimat lbid., pp. 228 f. Sayyid Ahmad Khan, in his Tadhkirah-i ahl-i Dihli, Athar (1st. ed.), p. 27 and PMaq, XVI, p. 228, in describing Shah 'Abd a1Ghani, uses the termfana' fi 'l-sunnat,· in Namiqah, TFA, I, I, p. 141 and PMaq, XV, p. 187, he uses the term Jana' fi '1-rasiil. Nawazish 'Ali, in dea]ing with Sayyid Ahmad Khan's religiou, outlook, describes his attitude towards the Muslim quam asfana' fr 'l-quam in S. Qayat-i Sir Sayyid (1904), p. 33. 11 TFA, I, I, pp. 140-41/PMaq, XV, pp. 182-87. 80 M. Hedayatullah, Religious Reform Movement of Saiyid Ahmad of Ra'e Bareli (Lahore: M. Ashraf, 1970), p. 149. He is mistaken in stating (p. 99) that: ''Tariqah-i Mul;zammadiyah is not mentioned in any Siifl literature.'' 18

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51

al-1;,tJqq is akin to the teaching of Siral al-mustaqim. The identity of tariqah and Shari'a, of rah-i wilayah (the path of sainthood), and rah-i nubuwah (the path of prophethood), as also the call to radically conform to the practice of the Prophet and his Companions, are contained in both teachings. Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Altmad Shahid addressed themselves to every Muslim. They spoke not merely to a special group of Sufi adepts, but to the entire Muslim qaum. They did not aim primarily at a purification of traditional Sufism from within, but tried to show that Shar'ia properly understood (that is as /ariqah), provides everything necessary to attain salvation. Further clarifications and elaborations of religious life on Sufi lines are tolerable, but only if they remain within the orbit set by the shari'at-i Mul)ammadi. Whereas groups of Muslims, as those affiliated in different ways to the khanqahs of the Naqshbandiyah Mujaddidiyah, endeavoured to reform the order and its members' practice and belief towards a ''pure'' Islam, Sayyid Al).mad Shahid and his companions envisaged the awakening of the entire • qaum. The special practices and teachings of traditional Sufism act as an important ferment in the teaching of bis movement, but they do not occupy an important place. Kalimat al-l)aqq reflects the spirit of this reform movement in that it addresses the Muslim qaum as a whole, irrespective of class, language and religion, opposing all religious practices that seem against the Sharl'a. Innovation as deviation from the Straight Path The argument Sayyid Ahmad Khan had in Mufti ~adr al-din's maj/is over the lawfulness of eating mangoes (referred to earlier), shows the kind of questions disturbing Sir Sayyid's conscience in the early 1850s. What he was later to call his ''leaning towards Wahhabism,"81 was basically his search for the authentic practice of the Prophet, and his determination to imitate it. Along with many contemporaries at that time, he became more and more aware of the gulf between Islam (as he conceived of it in its original purity) and the then state of Islamic practice in India. A natural result of this was his 81

TFA, I, I, p. 20/PMaq, VII, p. 32; ibid; p. 15S/PMaq, V, p. 427.

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effort to define the concept of bid'ah, and to measure contcm-· porary Islamic practice by what the great schools of Islamic law would regard as the sunnah of the Prophet. In his introduction to Rah-i sunnat, Sayyid Ahmad Khan criticizes the religious life of the Muslims of his day. Their practice and beliefs, he felt, were so mixed with innovation, that it was just enough to remind them of the true concept · of sunnah, to be cried down as Wahhabi or Mu'tazilite.82 But since to be a good Muslim and to reach salvation it was essential to avoid innovation, its exact meaning needed clarification. In Kalimat a/-l;iaqq, Sayyid Ahmad Khan had defined bid'ah in vague terms as ''something new.'' But here, in making use of Shah Isma'il's detailed exposition, he distinguished three main types. The first was: ··rhe belief, spoken word, state of heart, worship, custom or transaction that is new. New, that is to say: neither the thing itself nor anything else similar to it existed at the time of the Messenger of God and, nei,her the thing itselt: nor anything similar to it existed at the time of the Companions and the Followers of the Companions and the Followers of the Followers. If any person does such a thing because he regards it as harmful [on that Day] or if any person practises something because he regards it as an essential element or ~ cond:tion or necessary part of a certain [act of] worship or of a transaction (mu'amalat) then this is called ''pure'' innovation (thet bid'at).83

•

Shah Isma'il defines this as bid'at-i a1liyah (genuine innovation). The second kind of innovation took place with changes in the order of things as prescribed in detail in the law. lt referred to things and matters in themselves praiseworthy, but not necessary for the action concerned to be counted valid, for example, prescriptions regarding the positions of the body during ritual p~ayer. 84 This Shah Isma'il defines as bid'at-i wa~fiJ ah (descriptive innovation). 12

/bid., p. 95/PMaq, V, p. 39S f. 11 /bid., p. 102/PMaq, V, pp. 371-72. "Cf. pp. 106/379.

•

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53

The third kind of innovation concerned religious matters or practices neither explicitly prescribed nor forbidden-tb ings which did not be1ong to the distinctive marks of Islam. These became innovation because the effort spent on their practice was the same as that on putting into practice the distinctive marks of Islam. 85 Shah lsma'il defines this as bid'at-i ~ukmi ( virtual innovation). Mohammad Taibi, in his historical analysis of the term bid'ah,86 states in his conclusion, ''on ne denoncait pas toujours la menie ,.:hose, mais on utilisait toujours le mime terme."87 Which then are the main items Sayyid Ahmad Khan condemns as bid'at in the three definitions of the term? Under genuine innovation, for instance, falls lbn al-' Arabi's theory (with its ensuing practical attitudes) of wat,adat alwujud (unity of being); reasoning about the nature of God, predestination and free will and the ''vision of God''; discus• sions about ambiguous verses of the Qur'an and ambiguous -Traditions; the reading of books produced by the madhhab of theosophy and philosophy; all these things must be regarded as having developed against the true sunnah. Further innovations are the practice of ascetic and spiritual exercises as those taught by the Sufis (insofar as they have developed against the sunnah, the employment of charms and related magical practices; the prescription of khatm prayers;88 the use of music and musical instruments in the majlis, the practice of reading the marthlyas, pious lamentations and recitations;89 and various popular rites at the tombs, 'urs festivals and dance. All this is genuine innovation because it has been added to the law of Mubammad.90 The second form-qualitative innovation-is an act meritorious in itself, such as cooking food in honour of Imam I:Iusain, and feeding the hungry from it on a fixed day (on special occasions like the month of Mul)arram for instance). Bec1use ''Ibid., pp. 111 f./388.

"''Les Bida' ," in SI, 12 (1960), pp. 43-77. '"lbid., p. 73. 11 Special prayers of a Sufi order. Cf. John Subhan, Sufism, p. 96. 81 All three Shi'a practices. 90 TFA, I, I, p. 108/PMaq V, p. 383. 1

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to fix a day, a month, or any time for a religious practice is the function of the shar' only.91 The same act would fall under the third category, i.e. virtual innovation, if the person performing it would do so without believing thereby to gain special merit. In other words, it is enough to behave as if one was believing the action to be meritorious, in order to make it an act of virtual innovation. Sayyid Ahmad Khan seems especially aware of innovations which militate against the Islamic teaching of brotherhood and equality of believers. Besides extravagant weddings, such innovations staged for reasons of social prestige,92 involved the wilful interpretation and eclectic practice of the Shari'a by maulwis and dervishes (for instance, by fixing time for visiting and receiving people, by performing ritual prayer only in the mosque of one's pir, and by practicing celibacy). Since these practices are performed as if they were prescribed, they are to be condemned as ''virtual'' innovation. As a contrast Sir Sayyid points to the example of the Prophet and his Companions, laying stres-1 on their unpretentious and brotherly conduct. The faithful believer who becomes aware of these innovations looks afresh at the religious life of his fellow Muslims, becom• ing critically aware of the many Hindu practices that have intruded into the lives of Muslims. Sir Sayyid becomes more aware, in other words, of his specifically Muslim identity.93 A crucial question arises at this point: how is one to distinguish between good and evil innovation? The distinction was made, Sayyid Ahmad Khan explains, since the earliest days of Islam. lf good innovation is taken to mean what Sir Sayyid would call sunnat-i bukmiyah, i.e. something not explicitly stated in the Qur'an and Tradition, but follows from it by the application of straightforward qiyas, then there can be no objection. But usually ''good innovation'' refers to a practice which, 1

Ibid., pp. 110/385. "Ibid., pp. 111/388. Sayyid Ahmad Khan does not yet exhort in these early writings to apply scarce resources to more profitable activities like education. 11 Jbid., pp. 115/395. '

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55

though not mentioned in the Qur'an and Tradition, is regarded as meritorious-as mu1iifal;,ah for instance (the greeting after the afternoon prayer), or l;,alqah (gathering around the tomb with the recitation of the Qur'an). Sayyid Ahmad Khan condemns a distinction between this kind of innovation, and an evil one. Because if a practice is good and meritorious, it is not an innovation in any sense, but contained implicitly or explicitly in Qur' an and Tradition, i.e. in the shar'. Neither reason ('aql) nor experience (tajribah), independent of the shar', can be a criterion for the goodneu of an action, but only the text of the shar'. To support his argument, Sir Sayyid quotes here from al-GhazalI. 94 There are, of course, shar'i practices not mentioned explicitly in the Qur'an and Tradition. Such practices are sunnah, if they have been established by the 'ulamii' .; mujtahidin to be shar'i. Only the 'ulamii'-i mujtahidin can, by critically employing analogical rcasoning95 to Qur'an and Tradition96 establish practices to be implicitly contained in the shar'. But arc the 'ulama' -i mujtahidin merely the four founders of the great legal schoolsAbu 1:{anifah, Malik b. Anas, al-Shafi'i, Abmad b. Mu).lammad b. 1:{1nbal-or later fuqaha' as well? Sayyid Ahmad Khan is not clear on this point in Riih-i sunnat. In any case, only the 'ulama'-i mujtahidin constitute actively ijmae. ' 97 Only those practices are ijmii'i, that have been consciously deduced by the ulama from the text of Qur'an and Tradition. Only those which Muslims have adopted ''because of their Islam,'' and not simply qua custom and habit _98 Certain practices of the Prophet or the ''three generations''99 are peculiar to them and have never been ratified by the ijma'-i ummah and the qiyas of the mujahhids. Other practices that did become a habit during the first three generations (and were

''TFA, I, I, pp. 123 f./PMaq, V, 408-10. 15 SE1, pp. 266-67 (article on ~iyas). "TFA, I, I, p. 125/PMaq, V, p. 412. 11 EP, Ill, pp. 1023-26 (art. ldjma'). ''Jbid., pp. 126, 413-14. This description of ijmli' is very close to that of Shah Isma'il in l~ah al-1;,aqq (Persian), pp. 50 f. "That is (i) the Prophet and his Companions; (ii) the followers of the Companions; (iii) the followers of the followers.

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considered sacrosanct) are lawful, but they have to be practised without exaggeration. Sir Sayyid's explanations do not clarify the function and competence of an 'iilim today-whether or not he was entitled to apply qiyiis beyond a decision of one of the four schools. He seems to confine himself to fighting fanatical excesses. He even warns the reader against overestimating the importance of the four imams, as compared to a direct, personal following of the Qur'an and Junnah. He expresses his disgust of a fanatical blind following-of Abu l:lanifah for example. He attacks those who consider the taqlid (blind following) of the ii'immah-i mujtohidin as part and parcel of their faith and who add to their shahiidah: wa akhtartu madhhabaal-/fanafi waal-Shii.fi'i wa al-Miiliki K'a al-]Janbali. (And I have chosen the l:lanafi and Shafi'i and Maliki and l:lanbali schools). He declares this attitude towards taqlid as shirk (associationism). It can be concluded that Sayyid Ahmad Khan was rooted firmly in the religious tradition of Indian Islam. The upbringing and early education in his remarkable family and, later on, his personal religious studies in the intellectually vivid atmosphere of pre-1857 Delhi contributed to· a genuine concern for the purity and strength of Islamic belief and practice in India. This led to his active participation in contemporary religious debate, and the endeavour for reform. His later works in the field of theology were therefore not produced for want of other, more effective means to achieve his (allegedly) secular aims. They grew out of a long-existing commitment to, and an ever-widening knowledge of, the theological tradition of Islam. Sayyid Ahmad Khan's early writings reflect and express the important strands in contemporary Indian Muslim thought as they were being nourished by the continuing life of the Naqshbandiyah Mujaddidiyah tradition, by the influence of Shah Wali Allah's works and teachings, and by the movement of the Mujiihidin. Perhaps the most remarkable feature of these writings is the fusion of the Sufi and 'tilim tradition, of /ariqah and Shari'a-a trend that had started much earlier, but which has found a remarkable expression in Ka/imat al-J.,aqq ( 1849). In his determination to ''go back'' to ''pure'' Islam the young Sayyid is acutely aware of differences between Muslim

''True'' ls/am-early restatement

51

religious practice of the India of his day, and that of the period of the ''first three generations.'' A little later this awareness was to be sharpened t·urther by the challenges he perceived by the western presence in India. This is thus an important element in the evolution of his later theological position. Sir Sayyid was a deeply committed man, who did ont adopt a fanatic position.100 Even during his ''Wahhabi'' period at the end of the 1840s and the beginning of the 1850s, he takes up a comparatively tolerant, almost reconciling position. He shares the religious aspirations of the Mujtihidin-at least as far as returning ''to the sources,'' the fight against innovation and the endeavour towards religio-social reform is concerned. But significantly, in the directly political injunctions of the Shari'a-for example, _jihad and khi/afah, matters about which Shah lsma'il had written in detail-evidence suggests that Sir Sayyid did not commit himself publicJy, or that he was opposed to Indian ''Wahhabi'' views and efforts in this field. Finally, although he strongly criticizes the blind followin1 of the four schools infiqh and advocates a return to the practice of the ''first three generations''-much in the spirit of older /Janbali reformers-he does not advocate during this period ijtihad-independent judgement in possible disregard of the teaching of the imams of the four great legal schools.

100

TFA, I, I, p. 133/PMaq, V, pp. 425-26. To my mind, Sir Sayyid's translation of parts of Tul;,fah-i ithna 'ashariyah and esp. of chapters 10 and 12, was not only meant to be a contribution to apologeti~ but also came out of a concern for fostering understanding and tolerance among all Muslims. Chapter 12 of the work evolves the concept of din ki mubabbat (affection, based on religious bonds) possible between all Muslims and dunya ki mubabbat (aff'ection of only earthly quality), practisable between Muslims and kofirs. TFA, I, I, pp. 63 f./PMaq, XVI, p. 843.

3 Islam and the Scriptures of Jews and Christians

THE HISTORICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND

· The previous chapter presented the main features of Sayyid Ahmad Khan·s religious thought, till 1854. His theological work thereafter, \\·as the bilingual The Mahomedan Commentary on the Holy Bible (Tabyin al-kalam ft to_fsir al-taurat wa 'i-injil 'ala millat al-Islam) in English and Urdu,1 published in three parts between 1862 ond 1865. The unique character of this work emerges when it is placed in the wider context of the Muslim-Christian Controversy in India. Furthermore, a closer look into Sir Sayyid's biography in the 1840s and 18 50s shows the work to be a result of the author's protracted search for a fresh theological approach to the Muslim-Christian relationship. The western presence in India led very early to disputations between theologians of different religious traditions-Hindu. 1Part

I (Ghazeepore: prjnted and published by the author at his private press, A.D. 1862, 1278 A.H.). The title page gives the Arabic and English version of Q. 3, 84. Part II (outer title page) Gen. 1-XI (Aligarh: printed and published by the author at his private press, A.D. 1865, 1281 A.H.; Q. 5, 47). (Inner title page) Genesis (Ghazeepore: printed and published by the author at his private press, A.D. 1863, 1279 A.H.). Part III (not available to the writer in its 1st ed.). 1st. rpt. in Ta$ 1844). On the tension between geological discoveries and traditional theological views cf. C.C. Gilespie, Genesis and Geology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), esp. pp. 121-48. 17

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their account of the primitive settlements of mankind, subsequently to the deluge. Forster speaks of ''the triumphant testimony ... borne to the truth of Scripture history'' by ''a consent of evidences, and a concurrence of testimonies.29 Forster's work was lavishly used by William Muir in bis Life and therefore closely examined by Sayyid Ahmad Khan in a special Khutbah. Neither the authors of the apologetic works on the ''evidences'' of the Bible, nor Sayyid Ahmad Khan, grasped fully the so-called ''historical method'' in Biblical criticism as it had begun to develop in Europe since the very late 18th century. There is, for instance, no trace of an appreciation of J.G. Herder's (I 744-1803) concept of ''Hebraic humanism.'' Herder endeavoured to read the sacred writings as the expression of Israel's experience of the divine, and saw the· Bible as a book written by men and for men. Equally, there is no awareness of J.G. Eichhorn's (1752-1827) documentary theory affirming the presence of two distinct documents in the Pentateuch, or of W.M.L. de Wette's (1780-1849) way of treating the events of the Bible as phenomena comparable to other historical phenomena, and subject to the same laws of critical research. Indeed, there were, before Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772·1834) and Thomas Arnold (1795-1842), few English scholars intelligently discussing such new approaches. Arnold's religious views were not popular among Englishmen in the India of Sir Sayyid's day. Sayyid Ahmad Khan, in Tabyin al-kalam, was at best only partially aware of certain major features of 19th century historical scholarship on the Bible-of general scepticism with regard to the historicity of accounts written after the event, of the assumption that the culture and religion of ancient peoples evolved gradually from early primitive forms, and of an awareness of the interrelation between ancient Near Eastern and Hebrew history. (b) The revealed character of Genesis and ''natural history'': Tabyin al-kalam shows Sayyid Ahmad Khan's conviction that the truth of the Bible-and this includes for him the correctForster, op. cit., p. xiii.

11

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Sayyid Ahmad Khan

ness of its historical and geographical details-could be successfully defended against the assault of scientific research, even the results of geological research. ''Natural history,'' as geology was then often termed, ea lied into question the historicity of the book of Genesis. It also questioned the account of paradise and the flood of Noah, for instance, for historically correct information. However, there is a marked difference between Sir Sayyid's stand and that of the commentary of his principal Christian authority, T.H. Home. While Home defends the literal truth (as against all allegorical meaning or the legendary character) of every sentence of the book of Genesis, Sayyid Ahmad Khan thinks that Muslim tradition can accommodate an allegorical meaning (tamthili murlid) for certain expressions.30 It was necessary, Sir Sayyid explains, that revelation should be couched partly in allegorical terms. For two reasonsfirst, the doctrines taught were in themselves so new and sublime that human understanding was unable to grasp their original and real meaning (a1liyat aur lu,qiqat). Secondly, at that early stage of historical progress human society was in a state of infancy; science (' ilm) had not yet developed. Since God, in His mercy and wisdom, meant to address his teaching to all mankind, He ''had to'' adapt it to mankind's various stages of development.31 Sayyid Ahmad Khan, then, sees mankind and its knowledge ('i/m) as developing from a state of childhood to one of adulthood. God, in His teaching through the prophets~ adapts to this fact. This does not mean, however, that the prophet and prophetic revelation are truly woven into the changing and developing pattern of human history, which-from the point of view of Muslim faith-is a hist~ry of divine interventions. God sends the prophets and it is His aim to bring about, through their message, tahd!J,ib al-akh/aq (refinement of morals) and pakizagi-i rub (purity of spirit) of mankind. The prophets refine mankind's morals and thus help it, by their teaching, to acquire najlit-i abadi (everlasting salvation). Yet the agent of revelation as well as the revealed message are not viewed as subject to the limitations of the human IOTK, II, pp. 28-31. 11lbld., p. 32.

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''Sources'' of Islam and critical historiography -

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mind as it evolves. Rather, the prophets themselves were acquainted with the true meaning of the realities of which they spoke.32 They consciously adapted this meaning to the needs of mankind by couching it in figurative and metaphorical language. In this sense they stood outside and beyond the evolutionary intellect of mankind. But how can a claim be made to the true meaning of certain passages if the subsequent progress of knowledge should prove the earlier understanding of them to be deficient? Would it not be better to retain the traditionally accepted meaning of the words of the Word of God (kalam-1 ilahi kt alfaz,) and leave • it at that? Sir Sayyid thinks otherwise. The exact meaning of the Divine Word (kalam-1 i/ahi ka daqa'iq) can never be fully understood. But whatever the results of further progress in knowledge, the Divine Word would not contradict the truth. The extent to which this knowledge is found lacking, will be . R!aJized as a fault of mankind, and not that of the Divine Word.33 Sayyid Ahmad Khan here makes the distinction (although he does not keep to it consistently), between the Divine Word (kalam-i ilahi) which does not change and its actual verbal formulation kalam-i i/ahi ke a/fa;;,), which is adapted to a certain epoch and has therefore to be scrutinized constantly for its true meaning in the light of different stages of knowledge. (c) Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Bishop Colenso's criticism: while Sayyid Ahmad Khan was writing Tabyin al-kalam the first parts of Bishop John William Colenso's (1814-83) work34 began to appear. This book only further inflamed the controversy over the ''historical character'' of parts of the Bible especially the Pentateuch. Essays and Reviews35 had 1bid., pp. 34 f. D]bid., p. 35. "John William Colenso, The Pentateuch and Book of Joshua Critically Examined. Pt. 1 of The Pentateuch was published in 1862; pts. 2-4 during 1863; pt. 4 gives an exegesis of Genesis 1-11. On Colenso cf. DNB, XI (1887), pp. 290-93 and P. Hinchcliff, John William Colenso, Bishop of Natal (London, Nelson, 1964) passim. UCf. Basil Willey, More Nineteenth Century Studies (London: Chat to and Windus, 1956), p. 139 on the importance of Essays and Reviews as an influence towards a liberalization of religious thought in Britain. a. also The F.dinburgh Review, 113 (1861), pp. 463-97. 11

Sayytd Ahmad Khan

110

•

II

appeared a little more than a year earlier, in 1860. He had become ''convinced of the unhistorical character of very considerable portions of the Mosaic narrative. ''36 In the very first instalment of his work Colenso expresses his doubts about the historical character of stories like the one on the Deluge. He sees it as his task, as a responsible theologian and pastor, to free the Church from a belief in the Bible ''as an infallible record of past history, and every word as the sacred utterance of the Spirit of God.''37 People must learn ''instead of looking to it [i.e. the Bible] for revelations of scientific and historical facts which God has never promised to disclose in this way, without the use of human powers of intellect, and without due labour spent in the research after truth,'' to look in the Bible for ''food for the inner man, supplies of spiritual strength and consolation, living words of power to speak to our hearts and consciences.''38 In part two of Tabyin, commenting on the tenth chapter of. the Genesis, Sayyid Ahmad Khan has a special discourse, ''On the Deluge," followed by ''A Refutation of the Objections of Dr. Colenso to a Partial Deluge.'' He had studied, and perhaps discussed with friends, the contents of the first instalments of Colenso's work. Commenting on Colenso's views on the Biblical account of the Flood of Noah, Sir Sayyid acknowledges the need for a critical approach. But while Colenso questions the historical character of the entire account and views it as legend or myth, Sir Sayyid maintains that it can and must be read as an historically and scientifically correct account of what really happened at one time. Apparent contradictions between the Biblical text and our present-day historical and scientific knowledge can be resolved only if the text is read critically enough. In the case of the Flood the assumption of a partial instead of a universal flood solves most problems. ''Former scholars,'' writes Sayyid Ahmad Khan, ''twisted the words of the Genesis text without any criticism of the famous story (dastiin-i mashhur) .. .we are grateful to the scholars of the science of geology by the efforts of whom we 11

The Pentateuch, pt. 1, pp. 11 lbid., p. 150. 18 lbid., p. 154.

\

\

xvn, XXI.

I

!

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have become aware of this [our] mistake [i.e. to assume, with tradition, a universal flood]. ,,39 Sayyid Ahmad Khan ia convinced of a basic correspondence • of the established results of scholarship with · the ''truth'' of the Biblical text. In reply to Colenso, and in agreement with him, he undoubtedly goes out of his way to stress that spiritual education (rii(uini tarbiyat), and not the conveying of scientific or historical information is the overriding purpose of revelation. Yet he does not arrive at a clear and consistently applied distinction between texts which are theological and those scientific or biographical. There is no hint of a theory of interpretation to maintain the religious and moral truth of a text, while knowing it to be factually or biographically incorrect at the same time. Sayyid Ahmad Khan, in the mainstream of Muslim and Christian tradition at the time, continued to read the story of the Deluge as a straigbtforward, objective, historical account. In his opinion a critical reading of the text of the Genesis must produce a view of the Flood that is possible and conceivable (mumkin aur qabil-i qiyaJ ). Therefore to believe in it [i.e. that the Bible accurately describes a partial deluge] and to make others believe that this is the original historical truth (~Ii tarikhiinah l&aqiqat) is to follow God and the truth and [at the same time] means to look at the Bible with the eyes of a respectful critic.'°

In short, Sayyid Ahmad Khan does not depart, in Tahyin, from looking at the Scriptures as providing, besides spiritual instruction, exact historical and scientific information. Sir Sayyid explicitly rejects any suggestion of legend. Replying to Colenso'a statement that in the Bible there can be found a ''mixture...of human frailty, ignorance and mistake, with the divine truth which is the eternal word of God, ''41 Sayyid Ahmad Khan writes: It is simply a wrons idea of Bishop Colenso to take these "TK, II, p. 330. '°TK, II, p. 342. a.The Pentateuch, pt. IV, pp. 209-11.

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passages (riwaytit) not as a pure account of truths but rather as legend and tale (afsanah aur qi//ah) or as a mere mixture [made up] of weak human reason and ignorance. 42 Colenso's admission of legends in the Biblical text and of different source books for the Pentateuch-like the Elohist and Jahwist-would, Sir Sayyid maintains, open the door to a wilful tampering with the truth of the texts; whatever the critic likes he will declare divine truth and what he dislikes, legend (jhutha qi11ah). Colenso, in Sir Sayyid's view, thus ends up by crediting the Biblical author with less than what one would credit a ''faithful historian."43 It would be wrong, however, to conclude that Colenso's criticism was totally rejected by Sayyid Ahmad Khan. Sayyid Ahmad Khan maintains that a critical study (nuqtah chini)44 is needed of the Scriptures, including the Qur'an. God has made to us the precious gift of reason (woh sharif chiz ya'ni 'aql). ''Can we,'' therefore, ''be Christians and Muslims without subjecting the Holy Scriptures to a very thorough critical examination?''45 We are, after all, not Christians and Muslims because our forefathers were such. Our attitude in such criticism must be marked by a benevolent and respectful independence of mind, and not by inadmissable freedom (mu'addab as against niija'iz tizadi). It is thus that Sir Sayyid claims to arrive at the distinction between matn and riwayah passages in the Bible-a distinction which, he argues, successfully accommodates the possibility of historical errors (tarikhanah ghalati) in certain passages of the Biblical text.46

RESPONSE TO MUIR'S USE OF THE ''SOURCES''

The challenge of Muir's criticism The most dramatic challenge by critical historical scholarship II, pp. 347 f. 1 ' Ibid., p. 349. ''Ibid., pp. 323, 330, 338. "Ibid., p. 338. 41 TK,

"Sayyid Ahmad Khan never stated a clear criterion for the application of the distinction. er. TK, II, pp. 340 f.

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which Sayyid Ahmad Khan encountered in the early 1860s was Sir William Muir•s (1819-1905)47 work which contained introductory chapters on the original sources for the biography of Mul)ammad, and on the pre-Islamic history of Arabia.48 A.H. l:lali in Ifayat-i Jawed describes how in 1868 (on the occasion of the annual session of the Scientific Society, when he was accompanying Mu~tafa Khan Sheftah49 to Aligarh), they found Sayyid Ahmad Khan in a restless and agitated state of mind over Muir's work and the attacks it made on Islam. Sir Sayyid, according to l:lali, used to say at that time: ''These attacks are being made on Islam, yet the Muslims are completely unaware of it. ''50 J:lali also noticed that Sir Sayyid had copied out for himself relevant passages from pre-Islamic Arabic poetry. He concludes that by then Sayyid Ahmad Khan had firmly decided to write a reply to Muir's work, against the advice of friends who thought such an undertaking imprudent, given Muir's high official position in government at that time. 51 Sir Sayyid seems to have been visibly agitated by Muir's work only in the 1860s, though it had appeared in the Calcutta Review in the form of separate articles since the early 1850s. C. G. Pfander had suggested to Muir to write a critical biography of MuJ,.ammad when the two were stationed in Agra.52 The Controversy had reached a point where positive historical research and a detailed critical presentation of the origins of Islam were being demanded. Mere rational ~heological dispute, on the pattern of scholastic medieval disputations, had reached a dead end. Cf. DNB, 2nd supplement, vol. 2, pp. 659-61 (by George Smith, ed. of The Calcutta Review). ''William Muir, The Life of Mahomet and the History of lslam to the era of Hegira. 4 vols. (London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1861); vols. 1 and 2, 1858; vols. 3 and 4, 1861. "(1806-69). Renowned Urdu poet. HHJAA, p. 426. 61PMak, p. 43. 61 From 1847-54 both C.G. Pfander and William Muir lived in Agra. 'Ibey cooperated in the establisbme11t of the Agra Christian Book Society. Muir proposed Pfander to the Archbishop of Ototerbury for the honorary degree of Doctor of Divinity. Cf. letter of (Sir) William Muir, C.M.S , North India Mission, C I 1/0 214(2). Addressed to Venn from Meerut,. 24 Feb. 1854. '

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Firstly, Muir had hoped to answer this demand by compiling a biography ''in the Hindoostanee language, from the early sources acknowledged by [the Muslims] themselves to be authentic and authoritative. ''53 But inquiring into the works available to the Indian public by both western and Muslim writers, on the biography of MW)ammad, he found all of them lacking in objectivity and critical acumen. In his view they had not made use of the oldest available source material; nor had they applied sound critical standards. 5' Addressing himself to the Christian biographers of Mu])ammad, Muir demanded that they apply the standard of scrupulous correctness: If errors be detected in them [i.e. such biographies], the effect will be positively injurious. The natives will be impre~d with the idea that our sources of information are imperfect and erroneous, and will conclude that our judgement of Mohamed and of his religion, founded upon these, is imperfect and erroneous. They will thus be fortified in their ·scomful rejection of Christian evidence and in their self-complacent reliance on the dogmas of Islaro.55 Muir's criticism of Washington lrving,56 for instance, is that besides a lack of knowledge of Arabic and of an acquaintance with early Arabian authors, it falls short of ''rigid accuracy'' and sobriety of style. Irving has wrought into his history, ''the f abricatcd stories of supernatural and miraculous events, with the pious credulity of later days engrafted on the biography of Mohammad,'' and he affords to the reader no means of discerning ''real from the fictitious events; nor amongst the latter, for discriminating which originated with Mohammad himself, and which were long afterwards without grounds ascribed to him.''57

Li/e, vol. 1, p. III.

68

""Biographies of Mohammad for India,'' Calcutta Review, 11 (1852), pp. 387 ff; rpt. in The Mohamedan Controversy, pp. 65-89. 66 Controversy, p. 68. 68 Washington Irving, Life of Mohammad (London: H.G. Bohn, 1850). 61 Controversy, pp. 69-70.

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Muir is equally unhappy with the lives of the Prophet portrayed by Muslim authors, such aa the popular Maulud sharif,58 Madarij al-nubuwah59 and Raur!ah al-af,bab.60 He considers them to be ''credulous beyond belief'' and the miracles and legends accounted therein as ''the veriest inanities, whieh by any possibility, could be imagined.''61 Their main defect is ''an utter want of the faculty of historical criticism."62 He sees it therefore as his main task to place before persons of the educated class ''the means for discriminating the grains of truth from the masses of fabricated traditions'' and to ''lead the Mohammedans themselves to true principles of criticism.'' For this purpose it is necessary to exercise ''extreme care that the historical details placed before our fellow-subjects are thoroughly correct.''63 However, Muir adds optimistically, that the situation has radically changed through the work of men like Gustav Weil (1808-89),64 A.P. Caussin de Perceval (1795-1871)65 and Alois Sprenger,66 especially through the latter's discovery of ''the invaluable Wickidi.'' Whereas the works of Luduvioo Maracci (1612-1700)67 and Humphrey Prideaux (1648-1724)68 were based ''on poor authorities," by now, Muir states proudly, ''we have free access to their [i.e. the Muslims'] most authentic sources -Ibn Ishac, Wickidi, Hishami, Tabari. And we can, 58By

Ghulam Imam Shahid, then an officer of standing in the court of ~dr Diwani, was one of Sayyid Ahmad Khan's friends in Agra in the early 1840s. 6'Storey, vol. l , pt. 1, no. 243. -Storey, vol. 1, pL 1, pp. 189-91, by Amir Jamal al-}Jusaini, compiled during 149+5. 11Controversy, p. 86. Itlbid., p. 76. "lbid., p. 87. "B. Lewis and P.M. Holt, Historians of the Middle East (London: OUP, 1962), pp. 315-29. Also J. Fuck, Die Arabischen Studien in Europa (Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1955), pp. 175-76. 11His main work: Essai sur l' Histoire des Arabes avant l' Jslamisme, 3 vols., 1847-48. Lavishly quoted by M'1ir. "Cf. fn. 6, p. 101. ''Introduction to the Qur'an, 1698. 18 The True_ Nature of lmpostJD'e Fully Dispay' d in the Life of Mahomet, 1697.

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without fear, confront them from their own armourics.''69 Muir sees his own work as an improvement upon Pfander's contributions to the Controversy. 70 He valued Pfander's books highly, but, nevertheless, regarded their preoccupation with the ''deep principles ·o r reason and faith'' and their having ''little reference to the historical deductions of modem research''71 as a deficiency. He hoped, by his studies in the Calcutta Review (published in the 1850s, but taken up and continued in his Life), to tum the attention of ''intelligent and thinking Mohammedans... to the historical evidences of their faith'' and to compare these evidences with those of Christianity.72 Muir's Life is thus more than a biography of the Prophet. In many places it goes beyond the biographical into the question of the ''historical evidences'' of Islam that is the question of how convincing the claim of Islam is when scrutinized by methods of critical historiography. The first chapter of the Life is an almost literal reprint of an article in the Calcutta Review73 on the ''Sources for the Biography of Mahomet." Muir's aim, in this chapter, is ''to enquire into the available sources of such a narrative [i.e. a uniform and consistent account of the Arabian Prophet]; and the degree of credit to which they are severally entitled.'' He considers the Qur'an and Hadith as ''the two main treasuries from which may be drawn materials for tracing the life of Mahomet and the first rise of Islam.'' The question raised is what absolute value-as historical sources-the Qur'an and Hadith have, that is ''what is their individual merit as furnishing historical evidence and what their comparative value, in relation to each other?'' 74 Muir concludes his discussion of the reliability of the Qur'an as a historical source by stating that ''every verse in the Coran is the genuine and unaltered composition of Mahomet himself. '' 75 The editions of both Abu Bakr and 'Uthman were faithful

I

Il '

••controversy, p. 67. 70 lbid., eh. 3, fn. 12. 7 1Controversy, p. 67. 71

lbid., pp. 88-89. 71 Vol. XIX (January-June 1853), pp. 1-80. 7 'Life, p. II. 76 Life, p. XXVII. For a general treatment of this question cf. W. Montgomery Watt, Bell's Introduction to the Qur'an. (Edinburgh: University Press, 1970).

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and complete ''as far as the material went."76 There were no intentional omissions on the part of compilers. Muir s~es only one serious defect of the Qur'an ''as a contemporaty and authentic record of Mahomct's character and actions,'' i.e. ''the want of arrangement and connection which pervades it. '' 77 This entails ''that in inquiring into the meaning and force of a passage, no infallible dependance can be placed upon the adjacent sentences as being the true context.'' Muir attaches great importance to the basic authenticity of the Qur'an. ''The Coran becomes the ground-work and the test for all enquiries into the origin of Islam and the character of its founder.'' The Qur'an thus represents, for Muir, ''a store-house of Mahomet's own words recorded during his life, extending over the whole course of his public career, and illustrating his religious views, his public acts, and his domestic character.'' From the Qur'an can be assessed the life and work of Mubammad, because it ''must represent either what he actually thought, or that which he desired to appear as thinking.'' While Muir thus stresses the value of the Qur'an as a historical source for reconstructing the inner world of the man Mubammad, he vehemently denies the Muslim doctrine of the Qur'an being the record of God's revelation. The Qur'an for Muir is instead a ''standard'' for the biography of Mubammad but, nonetheless, a ''standard of his [i. e. Mu)Jaromad's] own u,aking. ''78 The Qur'an: consists exclusively of the revelations or commands which Mahomet professed, from time to time, to receive through Gabriel, as a message direct from God; and which, under an alleged divine direction, he delivered to those about. 79 Muir even speaks of Mul)ammad's ''pretended inspiration.''80 In arguing for the faultless preservation of the text of the Qur'an Muir sets great store by the tenacity of the memory of ''lbld~, p. XXVI. 1 ' lbld., p. XXVII, Weil and Sprenger, more critical, had spoken of ''interpolations.'' ''Life, ibid. 11 Jbld., p. II. 80 lbld., p. III.

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first generation Muslims, and by the fact that the Qur'in was used as ''an essential part of every celebration of public worship.''· Also, according to him, ''private perusal and repetition'' was enforced as a duty and a privilege, fraught with the richest religious merit,81 and transcripts and portions of the Qur'in were common among early Muslims. He does not, however, exclude that parts of the ''revelation'' might have been lost, destroyed, or become obsolete. Furthermore, some passages now included in the Qur'in were superseded by passage& ''revealed'' later to the Prophet. Muir counts 22S verses cancelled and remarlcs:

The cancelled passages are so frequent, and so inwrought into the substance and context of the Coran that we cannot doubt that it was the practice of Mahomet and of his followers during his life-time to repeat the whole, including the abrogated passages, as at present.82 Yet Muir disagrees with ''the common idea of the Mahometans that the Coran was fixed by Mahomet as we have it now.'' It is ''inconceivable'' for him that Mul}aromad should have enjoined the recital of the Qur'an ''invariably in this concatenation,'' because the present text of the Qur'in ''follows... no intelligible arrangement whatever, either of subject or time.''83 The Muslim idea of the present order beingfixedbyMu].lammad originates, Atates Muir, in the dogmatic belief that Gabriel performed · an annual recitation of the entire Qur'in with the Prophet. But, says he, the Qur'in consists to a large extent of faithfully preserved smaller fragments of Mubammad's own composition and ''this fact stamps the Coran, not merely as formed out of the Prophet's words and sentences, but to a large extent as his in relation to the context likewise.''" The edition brought out by Abii Bakr and the recension by 'Othman did not significantly alter the text of the Qur'in. 81

lhid., p. V. 81 lhid., p. IV. PJbid., p. v. "lbid., p. VIII.

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Discussing the history of the text from a year after Mul)ammad, Muir concludes: Uthman's recension was, what it professed to be, a reproduction of Abu Bakr's edition, with a more perfect conformity to the Meccan dialect, and possibly a more uniform arrangement of its parts-but still a faithful reproduction. He holds Abu Baler's edition as ''authentic, and, in the main, as complete as at the time was possible.''85 In his discussion of the Qur'an as a source for the life of Mul)ammad and of the early history of Islam, Muir repeatedly argued from Traditions. The crucial question, therefore, is how he rates the Hadith as a historical source and which canons of criticism he formulates.86 For Muir, the Hadith: consists of the sayings of the friends and followers of the Prophet, handed down by a real or supposed chain of narra.; tors to the period when they were collected, recorded and classified. The process of transmission was for the most part oral. 87

Whereas Muslim scholarship in its critical study of the Tradi-· tions had dwelt predominantly on the criticism of the chain of transrnitte.rs, for Muir ''the technical rule of 'respectable names' used by the Collectors'' can carry ''no authority." The matn of every Tradition, separately subje=t:ed to close examination, must stand or fall upon its own merits; and ... even after its reception as generally credible, the component parts [of a matn] are still severally liable, upon a close scrutiny of internal evidence, to suspicion and rejection. ''88 This conclusion must have sounded strange-to say t~e least-to anyone trained in traditional Muslim criticism of the 85

1bid., p. XIX. NCf. article on Qadith by James Robson in £1 1 , III, pp. 23-28. 17 Life, vol. I, p. XXVIII. 81lbid., p. LXXXVII.

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Hadith. Muir arrives at it by sketching, first in a general and not very closely substantiated way, and as he conceives of it, ''the process of transmission'' at the time of the Companions. He portrays the early Muslim armies occupying themselves in their ''lazy intervals from one campaign to another,"89 ''chiefly by calling up the past in familiar conversation and more formal discourse'' and especially by dwelling upon Mubammad's deeds and sayings. As time went on they invested him with ''supernatural power,'' visualizing him as ''ever surrounded by supernatural agency.'' Also, ''the unchecked efforts of the Imagination'' would increasingly aid the memory, as time went on. When a new generation sprang up of those who had never seen the Prophet (tiibi'un, i.e. followers or successors of the Companions), they regarded the stories of the Companions with ''superstitious reverence'' and listened to the Companions' stories of him ''as to the tidings of a messenger from the other world.''90 A further reason for ''giving to the tales of Mahomet's Companions a fresh and adventitious importance''91 were the needs of the expanding empire. Although i_t was the cardinal principle of early Islam that ''the standard of Law, of Theology, and of Politics, was the Coran and the Coran alone ... new and unforseen circumstances arose ''for which the Coran contained no provision.'' The ''deficiency'' was supplied by ''the CUSTOM or sUNNAT of Mahomet, that is, his sayings an,J his practice, as a supplement to the Coran.''92 While the Prophet had never held himself as infallible, except when directly inspired of God, the ''new doctrine'' developing now, assumed that a heavenly and unerring guidance pervaded every word and action of his prophetic life. Tradition was thus invested with the force of law, and with some of the authority of inspiration. The prerogative now claimed for Tradition stimulated the growth of fabricated evidence, and Ibid., p. XXVIII. '°Ibid., p. XXIX. 1 • 1bid., p. XXX. 1 ' lbid., p. XXXI. 89

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led to the preservation of every kind of story, spurious or real, touching the Prophet.93 In any case, the Traditions we now possess remained generally in an unrecorded form for at least the greater part of a century. Therefore, the authority of Tradition rests upon the memory · of those who handed it down. However, transmission by memory entails ''the common frailty of human recollection .•• errors or exaggerations which always distort a narrative transmitted orally through many witnesses." For Muir, ''there exist throughout Mahometan tradition abundant indications of actual fabrication.'' These fabrications and distortions of the Traditions can be comprehended only with a thorough understanding of the nature and extent of: the indirect but not less powerful and dangerous influence of a silently working bias which insensibly gave its colours and its shape to all the stories of their Prophet treasured up in the memories of the believers.94 Muir sees a causal connection between the political events of • the first hundred years of Islamic history and the possible fabrication or distortion of Traditions. Muir regards the period till the death of 'Othman (A.D. 656) and that of the 'Ummaiyad caliphs (661-750), as favourable ''to the historical value of Tradition'' because the disunion between contending factions made each party fear the criticism of . the other ''in case it would profer biased records of tradition and there was as yet alive eye-witnesses of the Prophet's actions on either side." Similarly, under the early 'Ummaiyad caliphs, tendencies to invest the Prophet and his descendants with virtues and to attribute actions to· them ''which never had existence95 had but little room for play.'' 96 Consequently, during this period:

91

Jbid., pp. XXXI-XXXII. 1 'lbid., p. XXXV. 16lbid., p. XXXVI. "Ibid., p. XXXVII.

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although the features of Mahomet himself were magnified into majestic and supernatural dimensions yet the character of his friends and followers, and the general events of early Islam, were undoubtedly preserved with tolerable accuracy, and thus a broad basis of historical truth has been maintained.97 Conditions changed in the later part of the 'Ummaiyad period with the rise of the 'Alids and, later, of the 'Abbasids. In the struggle for power at these periods ''perverted tradition was, in fact, the chief instrument employed to accomplish their [i.e. the striving parties'] ends. The Coran was misinterpreted, and traditions falsely coloured, distorted and fabricated.'' 98 lbn lsl}aq's (d. c. 767) slrah was compiled shortly after the 'Abbasids acceded the throne, and al-Waqidi (d. 822), lbn Hisham (d. 834) and al-Mada'ini (d. 839) lived and wrote during the reign of the caliph Ma'mun (813-33). It is to be expected, therefore, that the former ·'seeks to stigmatize the Ommeyads'' and seeks ''to denounce as miscreants those of their forefathers who acted a prominent part in the first scenes of Islamic history''99 while the other two authors wrote in political conditions in which ''it was not possible to compose, with even the • smallest degree of impartiality, a history of the Companions of Mahomet and of his Successors. ''100 The standard collections of Hadith were produced in the same political circumstances and were compiled by the employment of ''a pseudo-political canon,"101 which is how Muir characterized the criticism of the chain of narrators. Though the materials gathered by these collectors ''embrace a vast element of truth'' it cannot be doubted ~'that even respectably derived traditions often contained much that was exaggerated and fabulous. ''102 Muir does not, however, deny that the traditionists practised ''some species of criticism,''103 and that they 17 Ibid.,

p. XXXVIII. 1 • 1bid., p. XXXIX. 11Jbid., p. XL. 100Ibid., p. XLI. lOlJbid. 181lbld., p. XLII. 181Jbid., p. XLIV.

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rejected ninety-nine out of a hundred Traditions as spurious. But there remains the grave deficiency in traditional Muslim · criticism of not having inquired at all into internal evidence, of not having made out ''the motives of the first author or subsequent rehearses of a story," nor discussing its probability, and submitting it to the tests of historical evidence. Muslim traditionists failed to do so because ''the spirit of Islam would not brook the spirit of free inquiry and real criticism. The blind faith of Mahomet and his followers spurned the aids of investigation and of evidence.'' Muir further blames the ''unity of the spiritual and political elements in the unvarying type of Mahometan government'' for ''the absence of candid and free investigation into the origin and truth of Islam.'' In short, ''the faculty of criticism was annihilated by the sword.''1M But Muir does not doubt ''the general honesty of the Collectors in making their selection," who, he says, did so ''upon an absurd principle indeed, yet bona fide from existing materials. ''105 Ordinary checks on a running narrative could not be applied to the Hadith because of the fragmentary and isolated character of each Tradition, nor was the idea ever conceived of criticizing a Tradition by the ''sifting of component parts.''106 Therefore, though the criticism of the collectors may have exposed and excluded multitudes of modern fabrications, it failed to place the earlier traditions upon a certain basis, or to supply any means of judging, between the actual and the fictitious, between the offspring of the imagination and the sober evidence of fact.107

•

With these arguments Muir tries to work out a set of truly critical tests with regard to the content and the internal probability of the Tradition. The Qur'an, which has been proved ''a

1

"lbid., p. XLV. 111lbld., p. XLVII. 1 "Jbid., p. XLvm. 187 Ibid., p. L.

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genuine and contemporary document'' for him, is the standard of comparison. Brought to this test the Tradition turns out to contain ''a large element of historical truth,'' in other words the entire Tradition is found ''to tally'' with the salient points of Mu]]ammad's teachings in the Qur'an. But ''in matters of simple narration and historical fact,'' Muir finds ''Tradition discredited by the Coran. ''108 In the effort to separate the true from the false in Tradition, Muir proposes to ask certain questions: first, whether there existed a bias among the Mahometans generally, respecting the subject narrated; second, whether there are traces of any special interest, prejudice or de~ign, on the part of the narrator; and third, whether the narrator had opport11nity for personally knowing the facts.109 He answers these questions by ''considering the Period to which a narration relates, and then the Subject of which it

treats.'' The period to which a Tradition pwports to refer is of vital importance. The dates of years during which the Companions lived, compared with those of the Prophet_ for instance, determine the extent to which they could act as trustworthy witnesses for events before or during _the early period of Mul}.ammad's life. If their information was gained through second-hand sources, then an element of uncertainty comes about, impairing the value of their testimony. Furthermore, before Mubammad became a public figure ''it would be in vain to expect a full and careful report.''110 This follows from the principle that the value of evidence depends upon the degree to which the facts are noticed by a witness at the time of their occurrence. Therefore, for events prior to Mul}.ammad's public life, circumstantiality is a ground of suspicion, i.e. ''any tradition, the origin of which is not strictly contemporary with the facts related, is worthless exactly in proportion to the particularity of detail. Muir expects from this general rule ''the leading outlines of lbid., p. LI. 109Jbid., p. Lill. 110 Jbld., p. LIV. 108

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Mahomet's life''111 as well as public events and national history, because we can here presuppose a natural tendency to remember all these, especially given a country like Arabia, with its exceptionally accurate oral poetical tradition. In a critical assessment of the reliability of subject-matter (matn) of Traditions, Muir notes the possible personal, party and national bias of the author of a Tradition, and of early ''Mahomedan'' society in general. There was the ''ambi· tion of being associated with Mahomet,''112 especially, ''with any of the supposed mysterious visitations or supernatural actions of Mahomet .... Thus a premium was put upon the invention or exaggeration of superhuman incidents.''llS Similarly there was ''exaggeration of personal merit in the cause of Islam,'' and Muir estimates as very low the ''chance of such exaggerations and fictions being checked. ''114 These considerations being equally applicable to the bias of party as to the ''prejudicial influences of the lesser associations of Tribe, Family, Patron, etc.," we must conclude ''that without doubt a vast collection of exaggerated tales have come down to us which owe their existence to party spirit.,,11s But more dangerous were the motives ''common to the whole Moslem body'' because ''here the bias was universal, pervading the entire medium through which we have received Tradition, and leaving us, for the correction of its divergencies, no check whatever.''116 Here Muir thinks, above all, of the tendency to exalt Mu]}.ammad by ascribing to him ''supernatural attributes'' such as the implications of many Traditions that the Prophet ''presented himself as being in a continuous intercourse between himself and the agent of the other world.''117 Muir finds it ''extremely difficult and sometimes impossible to decide'' which ''of these supernatural stories'' go back to Mul)ammad and which only ''to the excited imagination of his followers. ''118 111

lhid., p. LV. 111lbid., p. LIX. 111 lbid., p. LX. 11'Jbid., p. LXI. 111lbld., p. LXII. i1•1bid. 117lbid., p. LXIII. 111Jbid., p. LXV.

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Miracle stories are especially to be distrusted because they arise from ''the same universal desire of Mahomet's glorification,119 and they are ''opposed to the clear declaration and pervading sense of the Coran. ''120 Although the Qur'an witnesses to Mul)ammad having told ''tales and legends'' (like those of ''Solomon and the Genii,'' of '•the Seven Sleepers,'' or ''the Adventures of Dhul Carnein''), the Prophet is ''not likely to have given forth more than an infinitesimal part of the masses of legend and fable which Tradition represents as gathered from his lips. ''121 Further kinds of narration to be distrusted are those which contain prophecies regarding Mw,ammad, those which anticipate his approach and that of his religion, and also those which clearly betray the endeavour ''to make Mahometan tradition and the legends of Arabia tally with the Scriptures of the Old Testament, and with Jewish tradition. ''122 From all this Muir deduces the principle that tradition cannot in general be received with too much caution, or exposed to too rigorous a criticism; and that no important statement should be received as securely proved by tradition only, unless there be some further ground of probability, analogy, or collateral evidence in its favour.123 However, at the same time the historian ''will also do the utmost of his ability to preserve the elements of truth which have been handed down in their writings. ''124 In his use of the biographies of Mu];lammad the critical historian will confine himself to the works of Ibn Hisham, al-Waqidi, Ibn Sa'd and al-Tabari, and such Traditions in the general collections of the earliest traditionists as bear upon his subject. ''But he wiJl reject as evidence all later authors, to whose so-called traditions he will not allow any historical weight whatever.''125 Muir thus

lllJbid. llOlbid., p. LXVI. 111lbid., p. LXVIII. 111lbid., p. LXIX. 111 lbid., p. LXXVII. 12 'lbid., p. CIII. i1s1bid.

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concurs ,vith Sprenger's verdict on such late historians as Abu 'I-Fida (1273-1331), often referred to by Sayyid Ahmad Khan in his earlier works.126

RESPONSE TO THE CRITICISM OF ISLAMIC SOURCES

It was indeed one, if not the main, aim of Sir Sayyid's stay in England (April 1869--October 1870) to gain access to Islamic and western source material in the libraries of London, in order to write a comprehensive reply to Muir's work. Sayyid Ahmad Khan's letters from London to Mahdi 'Ali Khan-most of which were immediately reprinted in the Aligarh Institute • Gazette-bear witness to his zeal and sense of urgency in writing the life of Mohammad.121 In London Sir Sayyid spent all the free time at his avail on researching and writing the Khu/ubat, and did not hesitate to beg for information from friends and other people in India. Because of the lack of time and resources be concentrated on replying to Muir's first volume which consists of, mainly, a long preliminary chapter on the ''sources'' for a biography of Mul)ammad, and offers a detailed discussion of the reliability of the sources of Islam, Qur'an and Hadith. The biography of Mubammad in this first volume leads only to his twelfth year, and so does Sir Sayyid's reply to it.128 I:Iali correctly states as the two main objectives of Sir Sayyid's efforts to present the essence of Islam (Islam ki ~liyat) to the peoples of Christendom and to correct the mistaken ideas and

1 •Abii

'1-Fida, a main source in G. Sale's Preliminary Discourse, so frequently quoted by Sayyid Ahmad Khan. Cf. El 1, I, pp. 118-19. 117(London: Trilbner and Co., 1870). Title page gives the title in Arabic: Khutubat al-A/.1.madlyah 'ala al-'Arab wa 'l-sirah al-MuJ.,ammaiyah allafaha al-muftaqir ila Allah al-1amad Sayyld A/.1.mad 'afa Allah 'anhu, and adds: ''The original English text of these essays has been revised and corrected by a friend.'' The original Urdu text was published first in Sir Sayyid's ed. of Ta1anif-i Al;,madiyah, vol. 1, pt. 2, pp. 182-639. (Aligarh: Institute Press, 1887); rpt. PMaq, XI. The English text is shortened. We shall, throughout, follow the Urdu version. As to the [genesis of the work PMak, pp. 52, 59-60, 81-82, 62. Cf. HJAA, p. 172. 118 PMak, p. 85.

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distortions regarding the ''Founder of Islam,''129 as put forward in Muir's Life of Mahomet. For Sir Sayyid, this apologetic effort necessarily implied a review of the traditional tenets held by contemporary Muslim divines and an attack on their practice of taqlid. So he wrote from London:

I state it unambiguously: if people do not break with taqlid and do not seek (especially) that light which is gained from Qur'an and Hadith and if they are going to prove unable to confront religion with present-day scholarship and science, then Islam will disappear from India.130 Commenting upon the authority of the Hadith collections, the early slrahs and the classical works on ftqh, Sir Sayyid explains: ''He (i.e. Sayyid Ahmad Khan) has written this exhortation (wa'~)131 in the same way as Maulwi lsma'Il has written Taqwiyat al-iman in the love of taul;iid.''D2 . Thus, in Khutubat-i Abmadiyah Sir Sayyid touches upon a great number of the fundamental issues of Islam. This chapter, however, shall concentrate on how he responded to what was surely the main thrust of Muir's attack-the criticism of the reliability of ''historical evidences of Islam'' and the conclusions Muir draws from such criticism for the assessment of early Islam and the life of the Prophet.133 Khutubat deals mainly with this question in parts ·or the introduction, Khutbah Five with The Character of the Religious Books of the Muslims, Khu/bah Six with The Traditions of Islam and Khutbah Seven with The Qur'iin, the Guidance and Discrimination. The relevant

Bani al-Islam; this title of Muf.iammad seems to be a translation of •'Founder of Islam'' frequently used by Muir and taken up again and again by Sayyid Ahmad Khan in Khufubat. The expression is not used in classical Islamic writing. 1'°PMak, p. 86. 1 norigioally planned title for Khu/ubdJ was Mawa' i~-i Abmadiyah. The mention of Shah Isma'ii together with this title throw light on Sir Sayyid s understanding of his mission as he maintained it throughout his life. 111 PM,ak, p. 60. mTFA, pp. 94 f./PMaq, XI, pp. 26-28. 111

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writings of Sir Sayyid, subsequent to the Khutubat, will be taken into account in the following pages. It has already been shown that Muir does not accept the Muslim dogma of the Qur'an being the record of God's revela• tion which ''descended'' upon Mubamm ad. He sees the Qur'in as the word of Mubammad, a merely human word. His question therefore is to what extent the present-day text of the Qur'an is the authentic record of the words of M u):lammad. Sayyid Ahmad Khan must have been aware of this basic difference in belief between Muir and himself. However, nowhere in the Khutubat does he explicitly make this awareness felt. He just clearly states the Muslim belief in the divine origin of the Qur'an in traditional terminology, and refers the detailed discussion of it to that part in the proposed biography or Mubammad which is meant to deal with the first ''descent'' of the Divine Word upon the Prophet. Then he immediately begins the discussion on the Qur'an ns a historical document, raising the question about whether it is the authentic record of Mubammad's words. Sayyid Ahmad Khan is pleased with Muir's general assessment of the Qur'an as the genuine and unaltered record of the words spoken or dictated by Mubaromad himself, and grants that Muir, in contrast to earlier Christian writers on the subject-Humphrey Prideaux and Edward Gibbon ( 1737-94) for instance-''practises a reasonable method of scholarship and that in his arguments he shows himself to some extent acquainted wilh the Muslim religious sciences. ''134 Sir Sayyid rejects Muir's suggestion that a part of Mu))ammad's ''revealed words may possibly have been lost, destroyed or become obsolete. ''135 For Sayyid Ahmad Khan it is a fact established by a number of reliable badiths that all the ''material'' revealed to Mul)ammad was faithfully recorded and preserved. He moreover defends, against Muir, the traditional Muslim view of the present arrangement of the surab3 (as well as of the verses within each surah) as going \,ack to the Prophet's own instructions.136 He presents Muir's criticism of thepresent arrangement of Qur'anic material-''the •chaotic mingling of "'TFA, p. 418/PMaq, XI, p. 522. 116Li/e, p. V, fn. 1•TFA, pp. 4S0, 451, 480/PMaq, XI, pp. 471, 473-74, 525. 1

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subjects, ever and anon disjoined as well by chronology as by sense''137-as betraying a Jack of familiarity with relevant Muslim literature dealing with the particular logic of Qur'anic literary style. Sir Sayyid might well have had Shah Wall Allah's work138 in mind here-a kind of prolegomena to a ta/sir of the Qur'an dealing mainly with the peculiarities of the literary character of the Qur' an and their inner justification. This work shows bow the present style and arrangement of the Qur'an correspond to its character as a book of revelations, addressed by God to a person at different times and in different • • s1tuat1ons: One has to understand that the Qur'an is not a book composed by a writer. It is the speech of God and the very words (of God) have been written down in it. When spoken word is addressed to addressees then many things used to be in the mind of the addressees and the interlocutor omits those things from his speech whereas a person who composes a book does not do so. The Christian authors do not observe this subtle point, and, moreover, they do . not keep in mind [the fact of] the occasions of revelation (sha'n alnuzu/)139 of the [different] verses.140 Further, Sir Sayyid clearly states the dogmatic reason for his stand-it is the concern for God's transcendence (tanazzuh) and hoiiness (taqaddus). Later, in the context of developedfiqh, the terms in question were used again in a slightly different sense. But in the field of jurisprudence anyway, Sir Sayyid feels free .from any bond of earlier theological elaborations. ''In the religion of Islam,'' he states, ''the Glorious Qur'an is in reach of everyone and every person is free to search in it for the truth.''141 Li/e, p. VII.

111

188

Shah Wali Allah, Al-fauz al-kabir /i u1iil al-ta/sir (in Persian), with a final 5th chapter in Arabic. Cf. in our connection 2nd.fa1l of chapter 3, pp. 32 f. (on the arrangement of the verses) and lst/011, chapter III, pp. 28 f. (on the arrangement of the surahs). 1 •corresponds to the more frequent term asbab al-nuzul. lMJTFA, I, II, p. 480/PMaq, XI, p. 526. 1'1TFA, I, II, p. 46SJPMaq, XI, p. 498.

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Finally, Sayyid Ahmad Khan objects to Muir's reference to a second ''recension'' through 'Uthman as a ''new collation'' which was ''assimi_lated to the Meccan dialect. ''142 He holds, with tradition, that Zaid ibn Thabit pllt together on parchment the entire Qur'in without any addition or omission, and thus produced the text we have before us today. 'Uthmin did not produce a ''second recension.'' He only had copies of the holy book sent to different countries. The different ''readings'' or, more precisely, the different dialects of the Arabic language (qirii' at),143 amounted to no more than differences in pronunciation arising from imprecisions in the early form of writing.144 To conclude it can be said that while on the one hand Sayyid Ahmad Khan shows himself pleased with Muir's positive assessment of the authenticity of the Qur'inic text145-''There is probably in the world no other work which has remained twelve centuries with so pure a text''-on the other hand their basic dogmatic outlook is miles apart. It is his dogmatic outlook that makes Sir Sayyid want to prove that the Qur'in is arranged in an ordered manner, without any contradiction or mutual abrogation, and is the full account of all that Mul)ammad ever uttered as revealed to him word for word by God. Sir Sayyid is convinced that he has been successful in · proving this, by a critical and judicious use of the evidence available in Haditb, free from the taqlid of the results of early Muslim religious sciences. In the end, the assessment of the Qur'an as a full and authentic record of the revelation made to Mutiaromad, depends on how the various Traditions are viewed, and on the critical canons employed in sifting and assessing it. As in his discuuion of the Qur'inic text, so with the question of the Hadith, Sayyid Ahmad Khan starts from an outspoken theological position. The context in which he critically reviews Tradition, is that of Islamic faith as a whole, and not that of 1 1 ' 1' 1 1

Li/e, I, p. XIV. Hughes, p. 489. "Cf. TFA, I, II, p. 482/PMaq, XI, p. 529. Cf. W.M. Watt, Bell'& Introduction, pp. 40-44. 1 6 ' Life, I, pp. XIV-XV.

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Mul)ammad's bioJraphy or the early history of Islam only. The question about whether a single badith is reliable or not, touches upon Islamic revelation itself. If therefore Muir's analysis and his ensuing description of what Hadith ''really'' is, was true, its consequences for Islamic faith and practice would be grave indeed. Sayyid Ahmad Khan accepts the demand made by Sprenger and reiterated by Muir, for a criticism of all Traditions, even those contained in the six classical collections. The same critical attitude needs to be adopted towards the Traditions contained in the .s irahs, since: all the biographies of Mubammad-whether old or new-are like a heap of grain in which pebbles, stones, shells etc. have not yet been sifted, in which all kinds of traditions, the genuine and fabricated, false and true, those with ''chain'~ and the ''chainless,'' the weak and strong, doubtful and ambiguous-all are mixed up and in a jumble.146 Sir Sayyid's first rejoinder to Muir's criticism of Tradition consists of pointing out the latter's prejudice and lack of objectivity. Muir's general assumption of corruption and dishonesty by early collectors is unsubstantiated, says he, and an indication of bias. What could be thought about most of the traditions concerning Moses, and even those about Jesus, when such adverse opinions were held about the veracity of the prophets themselves and of their early followers? The Messenger of God and his followers were in fact men who had totally dedicated themselves to God and to truth, and despised this passing world. They . undertook long journeys · in order to establish a collection of Hadith and in so doing they suffered harsh afflictions from the rulers of the day. This is a clear proof that their motive in collecting the Traditions was religious (dini) and well-meaning.147 Muir's contention, that the requirements of the rapidly expanding Islamic empire and the insufficiency of the Qur'anic message in satisfying these new (and above all. legislative) needs were responsible for the creation and distor1"TFA, I, II, p. 189/PMaq, XI, p. 19. 1 ' 7Cf. ibid., pp. 413-14/pp. 407-09.

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tion of many l;,adiths, is based on wrong assumptions, according to Sayyid Ahmad Khan. To begin with, the collectors of l;,adith had nothing to do with the develop• m~nt of the empire and with the whole of politics. These people had focused their whole attention on din and bad collected the prophetic J:,adiths only for religious purposes.148 Not even a twentieth of the collected hadith material relates • to politics. Also, no collection of Hadith was officially sponsored or undertaken by command from the government. Secondly, at no point of time have Muslims ''considered matters connected with politics to be of revelatory character. The Prophet himself in his time took advice from his Companions in these matters and acted in accordance with it.''149 Later too, none regarded traditions which concern politics as revelatory in character (ilhiimi). Except for a few general principles, everything relating to politics and administration was left by the Qur'an and the Prophet to the discretion of the rulers. So, the need to complete Qur'anic teaching with that of Traditions, in order to accommodate new political situations was, Sir Sayyid explains, not even felt. If Muslims out of love for the Prophet desired to imitate him in all matters (dini and dun;,·awi) and therefore collected all available Traditions relating to the Prophet, then this is a matter entirely different from forging new ones. Sayyid Ahmad Khan similarly rejects Muir's account of the creation of the sunnah, and of the formation of the image of Mul)ammad as an infallible being. Here again he does not deny the desire of Muslims to imitate the Prophet in all matters, in the same way as they would imitate the words and deeds of other prophets.tso But one has to distinguish, he stresses, between the belief that certain words of the Prophet are free from error because they are revealed, and the belief that certain lU]bid., p. 414/p. 409. 1 9 ' /bid., p. 414/p. 410. 1 Wfhe prophets thus qualified are traditionally Noah, Abraham, David, Jacob, Joseph, Job, Moses, Jemis and Mu}.tammad. a. S. Subhan, Sufi Saints, p. 299.

134

Sayyid Ahmad Khan

actions (being in no way connected with revelation) were performed by the Prophet by way of giving advice to the Companions. Sayyid Ahmad Khan rejects the view that Muslims regard every word and deed of the Prophet as a divine guidance free from error.151 Muir's basic mistake, Sir Sayyid argues, becomes apparent when he attacks Islam and its founder by using the very evidence he otherwise endeavours to prove as unsound, for example the Traditions related by lbn Sa'd, the ''Secretary of Waqidi.'' He would have avoided such a logical pitfall, had he first verified and sifted Hadith in general, and then only, formulated his objections. Not only Muir but all European writers on the matter lack critical awareness of scholarly procedure and their own fallible choice of sources. If Muir, says Sir Sayyid, wants merely to awaken Muslims to the need to view Traditions critically, he is fighting shadows because most classical works on Tradition have been written to this very purpose.152 Sayyid Ahmad Khan concurs with Muir'a statement that the Collectors of Traditions did not apply criticism to the matn but rather only to the isniid of traditions. But, he adds, had Muir ever reflected about the aim of the work of the Collectors, would he have realized that their first task was to collect what looked to be reliable Traditions at first sight, that is Traditions with at least a reliable isniid. The vast amount of material available prevented them from doing more. The second task, that is to sift Traditions on the basis of a criticism of the matn, could only be done later by truly critical scholars. Unfortunately the Collectors and their works became sacrosanct very early. Thus the second task remained almost unheeded. Nevertheless, quite a number of truly critical scholars did undertake this work of subject criticism (fann-i diriiyah).153 They established rules for and compiled books about it. Two of the ''three crucial tests'' of the authenticity of 161TFA,

I, II, pp. 415-16/PMaq, XI, p. 411. 161Jbid., p. 417/pp. 413-14. 161Fann-i riwtiyah, technical term for criticism regarding the transmission of a f,adith;fann-i dirayah, the examination of a badith regarding its content. Cf. H. Laoust, Essai sur les doctrines, p. 74. Sub))i al-Silio, • Uliim al-1;,adith wa mu~talal)uhu, 2nd. ed. (Daroaskus: Matha ' Jam.i'ah, 1963), pp. 107-09.

a.

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Traditions Muir had stated, are acceptable to Sir Sayyid. Only the first, namely, ''whether there existed a bias among Mahometans generally respecting the subject narrated,''154 Sir Sayyid finds vague. Muir rejects any Tradition going back to the beginning of Mubammad's public life on the ground that only second-hand information could be available from those early times. Sayyid Ahmad Khan slightly misunderstands Muir here. He replies by insisting that the custom of publishing Traditions about Mul)ammad began during the Prophet's lifetime-a fact Muir did not contend with. Some of the earliest Companions, Sir Sayyid points out further, were rcrtainly old enough to have personally witn~ed events just prior to the Prophet's birth and bis early life. Apart from this Sir Sayyid regards it as being against the commonly defined and accepted rules of evidence, to consider only eye-witness accounts as reliable. Where proper evidence is lacking one does generally refer to reported evidence, taking into account the uninterrupted succession (tawatur) of witnesses, and their large number. Sayyid Ahmad Khan changes Muir's critical canon, adopted from Henry Alford's Prolegomena to the Greek New Testament, which says ''that any tradition, the origin of which is not strictly contemporary with the facts related, is worthless exact!·· in proportion to the particularity of detail'' into ''any tradition, the narrator of which is not strictly contemporary with the facts related, is worthless exactly.''155 Sayyid Ahmad Khan's view is that Muir grossly underrates the power of memory, and with it the high degree of correctness and detail a reliable narrator can be trusted to display. For this reason he values research into isnad criticism much more than Muir does. In assessing Traditions dating back to the period between Mul)ammad's entrance into public life and the conquest of Mecca, Sayyid Ahmad Kh1n opposei Muir's view that one cannot expect a reliable Tradition from those times because of the non-existence of any opposition to Mul)ammad then. To conclude from the non-existence of such an opposition that no Traditions relating to that period can be trusted, betrays a bias and a wholly negative attitude. I, p. Lill. 1 " 5lbid., p. LIV; TFA, I, II, p. 424/PMaq, XI, p. 426. 1"Llfe,

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Sir Sayyid rejects Muir's unproven assumption that the early believers, men and women, should wilfully lie and deceive.158 Is there not enough evidence to prove that the early believers were virtuous and pure, instilled with the fear of God and His Prophet's word, he asks. Sir Sayyid thus finds it impossible to accept Muir's essay on the ''sources'' as critical and scholarly. For him these are the effusions of a fanatical opponent on religions not his own. Basing himself on the principle that ''traditions, founded upon good evidence, and undisputed because notorious in the first days of Islam, gradually fell into disrepute, or were entirely rejected because they appeared to dishonour Mahomet, or countenance some heretical opinion,"157 Muir holds that the story of the cranes, famous among 19th century Christian critics of Islam as the story of the ''lapse of Mubammad," is reliable.158 Sayyid Ahmad Khan rejects the truth of this Tradition on the grounds that it is onJy of the category of mz,rsa/, that is it lacks a Companion in the isnad, and is therefore unsound. 159 Further, its content clearly contradicts the precepts of the Qur'an and the tenor of Mubammad 's entire life and teaching. This alone would establish it as unreliable. Sayyid Ahmad Khan holds that some Traditions which Muir adduces to exemplify ''capricious fabrication'' of badiths, can be explained as error on the part of the transmitter, and be assumed as deliberate forgery (for example the conflicting Traditions about Mubammad dyeing his hair or those concern. ing his signet ring). Seemingly conflicting traditions can be harmonized here. Finally, Sir Sayyid rejects Muir's contention that ''the system of pious frauds is not abhorrent from the axiom of Islam,'' and that ''the Prophet himself, by precept as well as example, encouraged the notion that to tell an untruth is in some occalHCf. ibid., pp. 426, 429. 167Life, I, p. LXXII. 111According to al-Tabari and Ibn Sa'd, Mubammad, after proclaiming Q. 53, 19. f. ''These are the majestic cranes (?). One may hope for their intercession." Cf. Life, I, p. LXXIII; R. Paret, Der Koran, Kommentar_und Konkordanz (Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1971 ), p. 461. 111Cf. TFA, I, II, p. 436/PMaq, XI, p. 447.

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sions allowable," 160 if it furthers the interests of Islam. The examples Muir adduces are based simply, argues Sir Sayyid, on unreliable Traditions or built on an imprecise and too general rendering of the text. Correctly interpreted, the first l)adith in question wants to say what tallies with the teaching of Q. 16, 106; in the words of this, ulama see the divine permission given to deny the faith outwardly (in a situation of danger) as being a practice called taqiyah. Faced with Muir's views on Hadith, Sayyid Ahmad Khan does not content himself with a passage by passage critical discussion of them. He makes the effort, in Khutubiit and later articles written till shortly before his death,161 to assess the traditional canons of criticism worked out by classical 'ilm a/-1.zadith, and define his own stand vis-a-vis the results of early Muslim religious scholarship. Whilst Muir gave short shrift to traditional isniid criticism, Sir Sayyid maintains a continuing necessity for it. The isnad of a reliable IJ,adith should have, according to him, the following qualities: (i) the tran!mitter must have stated clearly and unambiguously what the Prophet himself has said or done; (ii) the chain of transmitters must be unbroken till the Prophet of God; (iii) from the Prophet of God down to the last transmitter, every transmitter must have been famous for his fear of God, constancy in religion and good deeds; (iv) every transmitter must have received from his previous transmitter more than one /µJdith; (v) every transmitter must have been outstanding in scholarly ability and especially in.fiqh (jurisprudence) so that one can be certain that he correctly understood the meaning of the /:iadith transmitted to him, and communicated it equally correctly to others. As for the number of transmitters, only mutawiitir /.uuliths can be regarded as reliable, that is only such f,adi1hs which, 1

'°Li/e, I, p. LXXIII. 111(i) 1871, 14.12. Kutub-i a~iidith, PMaq, I, pp. 60-64; (ii) 1872, 12.1. Ahiidith-i ghair mu'tmad, ibid., pp. 78-83; (iii) 1872, 11.2. AqslJm-l lradith, ibid., pp. 65-77; (iv) 1877, 11.8. Qi1a1 wa a~iidith wa ta/iisir, ibid., pp. 8489; (v) 1895, April-May, Al;tadith, ibid., pp. 41-59; (vi) See below p. 140, fn. 170. (i) to (iii) appeared in T A(I); (iv) in T A(ll); (v) in T A(III); (vi) in Akhirl

mat/.amin.

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from the time of the Prophet onwards, the great men and 'ulama'-i din of every generation have unanimously accepted as genuine, supported firmly, and never criticized. The ulama of all ages claim that the Qur'an only qualifies fully as mutawatir, but they do qualify a few t,adiths-a mere five-as niutawiitir.162 It is obligatory to rely on such /.uldiths without criticism of their content, and to put them into practice confidently.163 Mashhur badiths, or the vast majority of badiths in the great collections, can only be accepted as reliable after the examination of their content. The ulama doubt whether any religious belief can be built on abiid Traditions (those related by one person onJy). Sayyid Ahmad Khan applies the traditional tests of isnad criticism in the strictest possible way. Only five badiths emerge as fully reliable, and even these do not provide the certainty that they relate the very words of the Prophet, i.e. that they are truly ~adith-i nabawi.164 All other l)adiths have to be examined by ratian1I analysis (dirayatan). Sayyid Ahmad Khan had studied under teachers who, belonging to the ''house of Shih Wali Allah,'' were especially well versed in the traditional study of Hadith. So he was able to explain to critics like Muir that there was a tradition of rational criticism of the content of Hadith in Islam.165 In Kl,utubat he mentions Sufar

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1n 1896, in a comment on al-Jurjani's Shari) al-mawtiqif, Sayyid Ahmad Khan explains his concept of tawatur. Tawatur-i 'amm--different groups attest to a fact without any shade of doubt. It creates certainty about the fact attested, for example the historical existence of Jesus, Mu}Jammad and Alexander. Tawatur-i kha11 relates to deeds and words of a certain person, or a certain group of people. It falls into tawatur bi 'l-riwayat, ~hich does not generate certainty and tawatur bi l'-'amal-tbe unbroken tradition, through generations, of a certain practice like the five• fold namiiz. It warrants certainty. T A(lll), Ill, p. 51. Hacf. TFA, I, II, p. 410/PMaq, XI, pp. 402-03. 1"Cf. PMaq, I, p. 77 (1872) and TFA, I, Il, p. 410/PMaq, XI, pp. 402-03. 1 • 1James Robson, in El 2 , II, p. 462; ibid., III, p. 28, mentions the widespread error that traditional criticism of Hadith is only concerned with the problem of its transll,lission. So doe~ M.Z. Siddiqi in his Uadith Literature (Calcutta: University Prc!ss, 1961), p. 200.

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a/-sa'adat,166 by Majd al-din al·Finizabidi(1329-1415) in which the author presents a long list of subjects, maintaining that any /.iadith dealing with one or more of these has to be judged as unreliable. In a later article he mentions and quotes from further works containing rules for a rational criticism of Hadith-Fatb al-mughith by Shams al-din al-Sakhl~i (1427-97), with lengthy quotations by the older critical scholar lbn al-Jauzi (d. 1200), and the recent 'Ujalah-i nafi'ah, by Shah 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Wall Allah al-Dihlawi (1746-1823). Sir Sayyid explains that such criticism of the content of Hadith was not initiated earlier by the first great Collectors, because they were f accd with so much material that they were able only to apply the first test-the ensurance of a ''sound'' transmission. The second task of examining the content of the Traditions was left by them to later scholars. Taking up this .,... line, of a criticism of the content of badiths, Sayyid Ahmad Khan states in Khu/uhat, the criteria to be applied thus: (i) the words and the style used in the matn of a badith have to be examined; (ii) the content of each badith has to be compared to the precepts, beliefs and religious teachings extracted from the Qur'an and ''sound'' ~diths; (iii) the purport and exposition of the badiths has to be examined critically and in detail, with the question in mind about whether there is any historical event related in it which is wrong from the point of view of history, or whether miracles are narrated which reason does not accept. ]fadiths in which such things are found are considered to have been forged .167 In 1895168 Sayyid Ahmad Khan again stresses the need for an internal criticism of Hadith. If one accepts that the narrative of l,adJths is not a literal report (bi'l-laf~), but gives, rather, only the meaning (bi '1-ma'ni), and that the words of the narrative are therefore not the words of the Prophet himself, there is then no reason why the contents (ma dikha'i d9ti 'thi),52 having, ''PMaq, II, pp.

239-47; 'Al-talazum

baina al-'illah wa '1-ma'lul

(1894). 1

TA(lll), notes on pp. 18-21; PMaq, XIII, pp. 239 ff. "El1 , II, pp. 1025-26. (article on al-paib). 7 ' TA(lll);III, fn. on p. 21. '8Gardet, ''Les anges en Islam,'' in Studia Misaionalia (Roma), 21 '

(1971), pp. 207-27. ''Cf. articles on Iblis and Shaitan in SEl, pp. 145-46, 523-24. 1 °Cf. article on Djinn, El', II, pp. 546-50, esp. section on India (K.A. Nizami),. p. 549. 11 rx, 11, p. 146; DA, II, nos. 20, 21. 61 TK, Ill, p. 85.

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·as he then still holds, a basic existence (aili wujud). Even in the

-early 1870s Sayyid Ahmad Khan does not seem to have completely abandoned his belief in angels as ''something over and above man,'' but he does not clarify whether he holds them as ' beings personified or powers impersonal. He maintains that the term malak has also been applied to merely ''human powers.''63 Only in his Taftir do his ideas on angels and Satan appear in their fully developed form. Commenting on Q. 2, 97 f. he contrasts the Jewish and Christian concept of angels as messengers and ambassadors, with the concept of pre-Islamic Arabs who ''used to apply the term mala'ikah to those powers by which the affairs of this world are accomplished, on the lines of the law of nature''54 and ''to those qualities of the perfect nature of God, Nourisher of all, which comes to the fore, in different degrees, in each one of His created beings. ''66 Gabriel and Michael are only a specification (takh~i~) of the generic term ''angel.'' Sir Sayyid maintains that a correct exegesis of Q. 2, 97 f. for instance, shows that the Jewish name Gabriel here stands for the habitus (inherent posession) of prophethood (malakah-i nubflwat) in the Prophet himself and thus stands for the cause of revelation.66 This radical reinterpretation of orthodox angelology has some root in earlier Islamic thought. Sayyid Ahmad Khan demonstrates this by quoting Ibn al-'Arabi and his school as these appear in Sharf, /u$ilS al-l;iikam57 and Fakhr al-din Razi's MafatilJ, a/-ghaib.ss Sir Sayyid likewise understands the notion of jinn as excluding any clash with the conception of a universe uniformly PMaq, XIII, p. 32 (Daft' al-buhtiin, 1874). Cf. PMaq, I, p. 220. ''PMaq, XIII, p. 172. ''Ibid., pp. 174, 181. HJbid., pp. 175-76. For another short and clear statement of Sayyid Ahmad Khan on his angelology cf. PMaq, Ill, p. 52 where he contrasts bis teaching with that of al-GhazalI. Sayyid Ahmad Khan's lat~st statement on what a prophet and prophetical revelation are-DA, XVI, nos. 1,S ,6. 67 PMaq, XIII, pp. 181-84. But lbn Sina, for example, operates within an entirely different world-view, i.e. that of the existential determinism of necessary emanations. ''Ibid., p. 188. 61

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governed by the law of the nature of cause and effect. He is convinced that whilst the Qur'an on the one hand does not positively deny the existence of invisible btings unaca:s.sible to our earthly sense!, it does n ~t state anything that would confirm the teaching of the ordinary 'olim on jinns-''fiery bodies'' susceptible to sensual impressions, moved by a will, appearing in various visible forms etc.59 He argues that the Qur'an-and that, he says, is the only truly reliable evidence here-means by the word jinn, bedouins and other uncivilized people and not the supernatural beings accepted by traditional theology and popular belief. 60 1 Consistent with his concept of a universe determined throughout by an inviolable law of nature or by the law of cause and effect, is Sayyid Ahmad Khan's refusal to share orthodox belief in the effectiveness of the prayer of request (du'a').61. The course of events as determined (muqaddar) in the knowledge of God does not change in this dispensation (Q. 13, :1). The true meaning of the belief that God answers prayers of request is that He is pleased with such prayer and accepts it as He accepts any other form of service ('ibadat). This performance of this prayer brings about in man's heart patience and firmneas. 62 This interpretation of du' a' is not very different from that of the Mu'tazilites who hold that ''when God, in the Qur'an, tells His servants to invoke Him, it is the attitude of adoration that He is demanding; and when He promises to hear their prayers, it is the just reward for a rationally good action that He is guaranteeing." 63 Significantly, Sayyid Ahmad Khan does not retain anything of the cosmological interpretation of the prayer of request by Ibn Sina, except the idea of du'a' as a necessity of nature or of human nature64-but nature now seen without the elements of Neoplatonic emanational cosmology. 61

PMaq, II, pp. 180 (Jinnoii ki /:,aqiqat etc., orig. Agra, 1892). Rpt. PMaq, II, pp. 150-96. Cf. also TQ, III, pp. 79-89. '°PMaq, II, p. 168. 1 • Al-du'a' wa istijabuhu (Agra: Matha' Mufid-i 'amm, 1892); rpt. PMaq, XIII, pp. SS-64. Also: TQ, I, pp. 10 f. 11PMaq, XII, p. 59. 11£11 , II, p. 618. 14 PMaq, XIII, pp. 60 f.

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PROPHETHOOD AND REVELATioN65

Sayyid Ahmad Khan thus viewed all created reality as organized into a uniform system (ni~iim) or chain (silsilah) of laws of nature, impervious to any truly supernatural or superrational agency. This affected bis restatement of the second part of the shahadah, the belief in prophecy and, more especially, in Mul)ammad, the ''Seal of the prophets.'' In outlining his ideas the present study relies on passages from his publications after 1870. His earlier published views on the subject did not differ significantly from the positions held by the schools of traditional 'ilm al-kalam. They can be described as follows: to begin with, man's reason is in need of the prophetical message in order to acquire an otherwise inaccessible knowledge of God and His will; reason is essentially limited in its capacity; only through revelation do we in fact know who and how God is and the precepts according to which we have to live in order to reach salvation. 66 Furthermore, prophetical revelation is needed to counteract the constant trend in human societies towards a depravation of morals which results when man forgets the one dln given to him by God from earliest times. The prophets inculcate the one din again and again, and institute Shari' as throughout the course of history. If the division of mankind into believers and unbelievers makes sense, the universal presence of prophets and of the prophetical message throughout human history has also to be assumed. The forms of conveying prophetical revelation do not exclude the miraculous or the miraculous form of intervention. Mul)ammad, for instance, received the divine message from an angel who appeared in corporeal form.6 7 Since, as was seen in the earlier section, Sayyid Ahmad Khan adopted from 1870 onwards a world-view that excluded the possibility of intervention from the supernatural, professing all created reality to be governed by a universal, uniform and ''un•'For a detailed exposition of the teachings of the mutakallimiin and falasifah on nubiiwah cf. Gardet, Dieu, pp. 147-215. The following texts in DA are relevant here: XI, XII, XIV, XVI. . '8Cf. DA, II, passim. This credo amalgamat~s elements of all the three main schools of classical kaliim. • 1 TK, I, p. 7.

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breakable'' system of natural laws potentially fully accessible to human reason, he had to restate the notions of prophethood and revelation in a radically new way. What would these notions mean when ''fitted'' into this natural system? Commenting on Q. 6, 37 in his Ta/sir Sir Sayyid explains that God has instilled into all created beings, animate or inanimate, a natural disposition-a ''nature'' (ft/rat); specific actions of created beings are determined by this ''nature.'' Some scholars have termed this as wadi'at-i fitrat (deposit of nature) or ilhamat-i tab'i (natural inspirations), whereas God Himself has even named it waby(Q. 16, 68-wa au{ui rabbuka ild al-nabl).68 Sayyid Ahmad Khan stresses in his explanation of the verse just quoted that waby was conveyed to the honey-bee not by the agency of Gabriel or another angel but by God alone. In the same way all the instinctive actions of 3.nimals are a gift of God, gracious gifts (karishme) of divine revelation (waby-i rabbani). As the animals-exemplified here by the honey-bee -have received this waby according to the measure of their need, so bas man for his need, which is by far greater. For compared to animals man is a helpless creature dependent for his survival on mutual help. Man has to build by his own ingenuity a structure of economic and social life and has to formulate a moral code to live by, whereas animals find these ready-made and predetermined by their instincts. So man is given, in order to fulfil his greater needs, a higher form, as it were, of this deposit. It is called 'aql·i insani or 'aql-i kulli, that is human reason.69 All specifically human activities, the world of technical, scientific, artistic and religious creation, detjve from this gift. But this gift of waby is divided proportionately to each individual. Those who have received the highest gift form the class of the intelligent ones (muftahimun). One finds them in any worldly occupation and they are regarded as the leaders or guides of their ''craft,'' 70 sometimes they are even called pro· •

18

PMaq, XIII, pp. 109 f. ••PMaq, XIII, p. ~17. 70 1n this exposition Sayyid Ahmad Khan is inspired by the chapter on the essence of prophethood and its characteristics in al-Sayyid Sabiq (ed.), I;Iujjat Allah al balighah by Shah Wali Allah (Cairo: Dar . al-Kutub albadithab, n.d.), vol. 1, pp, 176-81.

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phets. Yet in the stricter sense prophets are only those great personalities who are sent by God ''to bring people out of darkness into light." Such a person's fitrat possesses ''refinement of the human soul (tahdhib-i nafs-i instini)'' to the highest degree, and he is thereby able tto be ''a doctor of spiritual illnesses (rubtini amrtit) kti tabib).'' 71 Such a man, Sir Sayyid insists, is a prophet since hi~ very conception, not from a special call during his lifetime. Sir Sayyid states unambiguously that prophethood is, in truth, something natural (fi/ri chiz) which man possesses with other human faculties, in consequence of his natural constitution. The terms for this natural endowment vary-hidtiyat ki kamil fitrat (the perfect nature for general guidance), malakah-i nubuwat (inherent possession, habitus of prophethood), 72 ntimus-i akbar (''the great secretary,'' which is the angel Gabriel), jibr'il-i a't)am (the great Gabriel).73 But when anq how exactly does this habitus of prophethood come into action?74 In traditional Islam the angel Gabriel appears to the Prophet, conveys the message and the prophet obediently delivers it. 75 Sir Sayyid considers this notion mistaken-the prophet endowed from birth with this habitus of prophethood lives and develops as any other human being. His mind stores up countless memories, mental pictures and moral injunctions. Suddenly, at a given moment in his life, something occurs which stimulates the habitus of prophethood into action. From a mere psychological point of view the same kind of experience may happen to a non-prophet, for example to a poet in a moment of poetical inspiration. Yet, when it happens to a person with the distinctive features mentioned-a person whose Ji/rat is perfect and especially related to the refinement of the human soul-then it is truly prophetical. Its content will be in accordance with the nature of God (Jitrat Allah kl mu/abiq).76 71

P Maq, XIII, pp. 67-68, 118. 71 DA, XI, no. 4 and footnotes. 71 PMaq, XIII, p. 121. 7 t0n the question of the mode of revelation cf. PMaq, XIII, pp. 68-69, 1S, 121. DA, XI, nos. 1-4. 76 For further l)lecisioµs cf. Gardet, op. cit., pp. 157-S9. 71 PMaq, XIII, pp. 71, 121-22.

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Thus the issue of authenticity is merely the issue of the possession or non-possession of a particular natural f acuity. The content of this disclosure (inkishaf) to the prophet is not intrinsically new, or something over and above human nature and its range of insight. Prophetical revelation is concerned with the refinement of the soul and this comes about by knowing clearly and worshipping faitbfully the true origin of . human nature, its Maker. 77 Prophetical revelation guides towards the acknowledgement and service of the highest and most powerful existence. The original religious message, the din of all true prophets, therefore, can be described asfitrat Al/iih or din Allah. The prophet knows better than other men the ''nature of God'' and can therefore, in a unique way, inculcate the acceptance of taul:,id. The din proclaimed by the prophets docs not come out of the realm of the hidden (al-ghaib) but is a direct expression of the nature of God. The prophets, in addition, teach all things that are Jinked with this basic aim. The corpus of these teachings is named Shari'a. It changes with the historical situation to which it is adapted. 78 The prophets reveal nothing which would be intrinsically beyond the knowable, beyond nature, rather only what is coextensive with nature, the law of nature or ''the nature of God.'' 79 God Himself remains totally hidden. 80 Nobody can know Him except He Himself. God does not impart knowledge of His divine life as such. At the same time Sayyid Ahmad Khan disagrees with English critics who claim that reason can provide the insights that prophethood imparts and who therefore deem prophecy unnecessary. Such a view is based on a misunderstanding of the created nature of man. Man is composed of opposite powers, the angelic (malakuti) and the bestial or carnal (bayawani yii nqfsani). He must achieve a balance between the two. Experience shows that man by the effort of reason has 71

PMaq, III, p. 14; PMaq, XIII, p. 396. 71PMaq, XIII, pp. 122-23, 123, fn. 2. 71 . PMaq, III, p. 6; DA, IV, nos. 4-9. '°On Sir Sayyid's conception of al-ghaib see PMaq, I, pp. 128-43 and T A(lll), Ill, pp. 40 f. being his notes on Jurjani's Shorb al-mawaqif. the chapter on prophetho od.

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not reached a clear concept of the fundamental objective (a1li maq1ud) of human existence. 'Therefore reason demands that among men a person be born who possesses a natural habitus which can teach [the unambiguous knowledge of] his fundamental objective. Such a person alone is a prophet and his natural habitus is the habitus of prophethood. Reason itself tberefore demands the existence of a prophet. ''81 Only a prophet has the exact knowledge of these two opposing powers in man, and knows how to balance them. In theory, man's rational faculty might be able to arrive at this balance. But in fact, individual powers of reason differ considerably and this would need much time, along with the experience and research of many generations. God's wisdom demands that the needs He created in all His creatures should be met without delay and ambiguity; prophethood is therefore necessary.82 The guid;ince given by the prophets is of three kinds. Firstly, it recalls to man for gotten injunctions of former prophets. Secondly, it gives full teaching on points which were understood only partially. Thirdly, it states in the garb of analogy and trope, realities for which there is no model (be mitha/) in this world and which are beyond human understanding, as for instance the Divine Essence and His attributes, the events after death, the delights of paradise and the punishment of hell. These are things of which the famous Tradition says: ''What no eye has seen, no ear has heard and did not occur to the heart of man.''83 flow then can the prophets prove the genuineness of their message? It is in an~wer to this question that traditional 'i/m al-kalam developed its teaching on the prophetic miracle (mu'jizah) with its original meaning of ''confirmatory miracle'' and the miracle of the saint (karamah). Sayyid Ahmad Khan denies the possibility of miracles in the sense of ''supernatural events.'' He offers an explanation of how the belief in miracles and in the extraordinary powers of the prophets came about in history .84 No truly revealed text proves clearly the fact of 81

•

TA(lll), 111, p. 41 (fn.). 82 TA(lll), III, p. 41 (fn.). 88 Jbid. A well-k.no\VD Tradition. Wensinck, Concordance, IV, 451b under 'ain. CC. Isaias, 52, 15; 64, 3 and 1 Corint~ians 2, 9. ''PMaq, XII, p. 129. •

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prophetic miracles. Moreover, belief in prophetic miracles would conflict with the perfect, threefold oneness of God ; (taubid)- oneness as to His Essence, as to His attributes and as to the worship due to Him. Only unbelievers who did not understand the truth of this taul;,id challenged the Prophet to work miracles (Q. 17, 95·96; 29, 49) 85 The would· be believer wanting proof should compare the prophetic message to the law of nature, seen in accordance with the knowledge, power of reasoning and experience ('ilm, 'aql, tajribah) of the time in which it was delivered. He should judge whether both are in harmony. If this harmony exists there can be no doubt that the person who delivered it is a guide (hadi) and the message has issued from the same source from which the law of nature has originated. 86 In support, Sayyid Ahmad quotes a passage from lbn Rushd's Manahij al-adil/ahfi 'aqa'id al-mi/lah, where traditional teaching is declared as good enough only for the 'awamm (the common people) and where Ibn Rushd proves that the miracle cannot be proof for the authenticity of the prophetic message, because non-prophets too can perform miracles. There is no necessary link, lbn Rushd states, between the event of a miracle and the prophetic nature of the one who performs it with the claim to do so as a prophet.87

MUHAMMAD AND THE MIRACLE OF THE QUR'AN

Traditional Islamic belief holds that ''the miracle of the Qur'an'' lies in its inimitability, which is, throughout, the decisive argument for the Qur'an's credibility as a divine production.88 The inimitability of the Qur'an lies in its eloquent clarity, coupled with its unique composition. These qualities are either understood to be intrinsic to it-that is to say the Qur'an itself is inimitable or to be extrinsic, which is to say that men and jinn could imitate the Qur'an if God had not created an obstacle for them in doing so. 86

lbid., pp. 130-31. 81 PMaq, Ill, p. 11. 87 PMaq, XIII, pp. 99(. 11 Gardet, op. cit., pp. 219·20.

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''But,'' remarks Sayyid Ahmad Khan, ''the question whether somebody could compose something of equal quality or not, c.annot provide an argument for or against its coming forth from God. It proves only that nothing comparable [in eloquent clarity] actually exists.''89 Many a book exists in this world which, in its eloquent clarity, is unrivalled to this day. In fact Qur'anic verses cited in this context (Q. 10, 38; 11, 13; 17, 88; 28, 48) do not, in Sir Sayyid's interpretation, refer to the Qur'an's quality of eloquent clarity (falabat o baliighat), but rather to its quality of eminent guidance (hidiiyat). 90 One great marvel of this guidance of the Qur'an is that it is understood by, and appeals to all men regardless of time, class and degree of education.91 The teaching of the Qur'an is all the more astonishing when viewed against the moral and religious depravity of Arab society in Mul)ammad's time. The Qur'an appeared in this society, providing detailed spiritual education in words that were of equal value to all-educated and uneducated, believer and unbeliever. This is enough to prove its divine origin.Ba · The Qur'an comes from God; it is the reflection of the divine light in the nature of prophethood which God has placed in Mul)ammad. Yet Sayyid Ahmad Khan stresses that not only is the message which Mu))ammad was chosen to convey very unique as the clearest po•ible teaching of pure taubid-but Mul)ammad himself, likewise, is unique because he fully conformed to the message he bore. He made extraordinary efforts · to spread ''the light of the worship of the one God and of the morals that go with such worship. ''93 In thus establishing pure taubid he is the greatest reformer the world has ever seen. More recently, men like Luther, Calvin and Sir Sayyid's contem• porary, Keshub Chander Sen, have excelled in essentially the same vocation.94 In the eyes of Sayyid Ahmad Khan the politi"PMaq, XIII, p. 135. '°lbid., p. 136, Sir Sayyid's paraphrase of Q. 28, 49. 11

DA, XIV, no. 14. "PMaq, XIII, p. 137; DA, XII, no. S. ''DA, XIV, no. 12. "PMaq, XIII, p. 392. Keshub Chander Sen (d. 1883) was a personal acquaintance of Sayyid Ahmad Kban. They were in London the same year and met there. a. Sen, Diary in England (Calcutta: Brahmo Tract Society, 1886), p. SS. a. DA, XII, no. 2.

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cal achievement or aspect of Mul)ammad's life is uncoAnectcd with his prophetic vocation. Consequently, it is played down. Classical 'llm al-ka/am saw Mul)a111mad's mission marked off from the ordinary prophetical one by two privileges-the first, universality in time and apace; the second, absolute finality. The Prophet is the ''Seal of the prophets'' in the sense that the law he transmits abrogates all the previous ones without being itself abrogated. 95 Sayyid Ahmad Khan subscribes to this. teaching, clarifying that it is the unsurpassable quality of Mubammad's teaching98 of the threefold oneness of God which establishes a finality. However, the tenet of the finality of prophethood does not mean to Sir Sayyid ''the end of the habitus of prophethood in people or the end of the overflowing of divine bounty'' to man by means of this habitus. 97 God does not ever cut Himself off from created nature.98 So after Mul,ammad, men will be born with this innate gift. Nevertheless, nobody will ever be able to add anything to the universal character, perfection and truthofthecontentofMul}ammad's prophetical message-the message of perfect, threefold taubid. In his teaching on Mubammad the Prophet, Sayyid Ahmad Khan on the one hand wants to avoid any doctrine of a truly supernatural event-Mul)ammad was not chosen for his office by God. Accordingly, Sir Sayyid develops the theory of the habitus (ma/akah) of prophethood. On the other hand, in consistency with his earlier thought, he is keen to underline the unique position, held by Mu].lammad in world history, as the first teacher of perfect taubid who was universally appealing and comprehensible to all mankind. In this sense Mul}ammad is the final Messenger of God. Yet as the system of nature further unfolds, the habitus of prophethood is active in succeeding men. Men after Mul)ammad can be expected to have the gift and vocation to preach the message of tau~id in new circumstances. Nevertheless, Mubammad is and will remain ''the Seal of the Gardet, op. cit., pp. 223-24. "TA(lll), Ill, p. 71. In this context, no distinction is made between the teaching of the Qur'in and that of Mubammad. 17 PMaq, III, p. 12. · ''PMaq, XIII, p. 393; cf. also Namiqah, T A(l), V, p. 144; DA, XIII, nos. 2 and 3. 16

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prophets'' because after him nothing intrinsically new can be given. Th tough him the religion of perfect, threefold tauJ:,id has been revealed fully and cleatly to all. It is not merely the established religion of the followers of the Prophet which promotes true ''unitarian'' Islam. True Islam makes its way anonymously in most contemporary religions in. the form of reform movements, which tend towards a monotheistic, unitarian belief.99

SIR SAYYID AND ' THE CLASSICAL TRADITION ON PROPHETHOoolOO

There are three main points of contrast between Sir Sayyid's teaching on prophethood and that of classical tradition-the necessity of revelation for man and its adequacy with regard to God, its nature and mode of transmission and, finally, its miraculous character in proof of Mu]:lammad's mission. The Mu'taziJites held prophetical revelation to be morally necessary and indispensable, given the fact of the divisions which exist between men.''101 For them reason is the criterion in matters revealed but, definitely not the source for knowing them. The fa/asifah (Muslim philosophers) in contrast, taught the truths of revelation to be fully accessible to the ''people of deep knowledge,'' the ''philosophers'' whose power of reason is the source of their knowledge of all religious truths. Nevertheless, prophetical revelation is truly necessary because it alone spells out in precise detail the obligations pertaining to worship, which otherwise would not be known or, at least, would not be known universally. Furthermore, common people learn about the fullness of religious truths only through the symbolic and allegorical teaching· of the prophets who have received, as a gift (wahbi or gratuitiously, as against kasbi or by aquisition), in addition to the light of reason, a light for the ''This conviction is expressed repeatedly in Sir Sayyid's latest articles, for example, AM, p. 32. 1001n TA(lll), III, pp. 17-55, 76-90 Sir Sayyid annotated parts of Jurjani's Shari) al-1nawiiqif on nubuwat, in order to set his own teaching in a classical background. er. T A(lll), III, pp. 17-18. 101 Ciardet, op. cit., p. 159. •

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imagination which enables them to impart their higher knowledge in an adapted form.tos Though Sir Sayyid does not simply restate this teaching of the falasifah, he nevertheless identifies himself with what he calls the group (firqah) of the falasifah-i ilahiyinl«i (theistic philosophers) which figure prominently, for instance, in his review of al-Ghazali's religious ideas. They seem to hold a position analogous to that of the ''people of deep knowledge'' in classical Muslim philosophy. Helped by the results of modern science and philosophy the contemporary falthifah-i ilahiyin reach the_ truth by the law of nature, the same truth which prophetical revelation (above all the Qur'an by virtue of i'jaz) conveys in a language comprehensible to all. True, the knowledge of the fa/as ifah-i ilahiJ,·in in the concrete order of things is incomplete, but there is, potentially, nothing stated in prophetic revelation which would be outside the range of human reason, that is outside the eventual reach of the fa/safah-i ilahi. Thus Sayyid Ahmad Khan on this point renews -in a 19th century context-the teaching of the falasifah and not that of the barahimah (negators of prophecy).1 The treatises on classical kalam teach (w1th reference to Q. 2, 97 f.) that the Qur'an was revealed to Mubammad by the mediation of the angel Gabriel. Say)" id Ahmad Khan, like lbn Sina for instance, radically alters its meaning whilst retaining the term ''angel.'' Whereas lbn Sina does so in the context of the Neoplatonic, emanational and deterministic system of the universe,tos for Sir Sayyid the angel becomes another name for the habitu., of prophethood taught by the falasifah. In both cases prophethood is part of the predetermined system of creation and is as such independent of divine choice. The f alas ifah used malakah, the same term, in their teaching on prophetical impeccability ('i$mah), a teaching Sayyid Ahmad

°'

"lbid., pp. 160-61. 108Jdentical with the nlchariyin-i ildhiyin theistic naturalists, PMaq, III, p. 281; PMaq, III, pp. 86, 96, 101. 1 MBarahman (plural bardhima) is the Arabic for Brahman. In kaldm it is the technical term · for the group of those who believe in God but deny prophethood. 106Gardet, op. cit., pp. 178-79. 1

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Khan takes up only in passing.106 The barahimah make an outright denial of the existence of miracles. The folasifah take the intrinsic value of revelation to be the first and foremost motive for believing in prophetic revelation, and maintain miracles ouly as a second motive.107 Yet, they define miracle as something ''not impossible in the eyes of reason,'' and deny the possibility of a ''miraculous transformation of the substantial quality (istibalah) of a thing.'' To Sir Sayyid, events so defined should not be termed miracles because they conform to the laws of nature as discovered by reason. He clearly denies miracles and bases the credibility of revelation entirely on the intrinsic value of its content. Likewise, the unsurpassed and unsurpassable greatness of ·Mubammad is based on the intrinsic character of his teaching and on his unparalleled moral effort to spread it. However, unlike the falasifah and the ''reformist'' disciples of· Ibn Taimiyah.108 Sayyid Ahmad Khan thinks exclusively of the strictly religious (dini) aspect of Mubammad's role and not of his socio-political achievements here.109 Sayyid Ahmad Khan then revives, to a large extent, the teaching of thefalasifah in his teaching on prophethood but within the context of his own distinctive world-view.

1"Tht.

·habitus of prophethood implies the gift to understand, in an infallibly true manner, taul;,id and the way to implement it in detail, i.e. an infallible teaching different in notion from the traditional notion of 'l1mah. Sayyid Ahmad Khan speaks in this context of iadaqat T A(lll), III, p. 40. On 'i1mah cf. Gardet, op. cit., pp. 181 ff. On 'i$mah as such in Sayyid Ahmad Khan cf. DA, II, no. 20 and below, p. 209 (ref. to TQ, VI, p. 164; TQ, III, pp. 288-89). 117Gardet, op. cit ., pp. 195 f. *Ibid., p. 227. 1°'KA, p. 336/PMaq, XI, p. 274.

7

The Credo: Coherence and Structure

The previous chapters were largely the exposition of an unfolding intellectual process. This chapter, in conclusion, looks at Sir Sayyid's credo as a crystallized whole. Sayyjd Ahmad Khan affirms Islam as essentially the religion of perfect taubid. 1 Islam, when properly stated, distinguishes itself from other religions in that by perceiving reality as taubid it offers to the world a world-view not only true, but capable of being seen. At the same time it brings to perfection earlier positive contributions of the Jewish and Christian religions. In essaying a restatement of ''basic'' Islam for his time, Sayyid Ahmad Khan views himself in line with Shah Mubammad lsma'il (1779-1831), the Indian Muslim reformer of his time.a Like the latter, Sir Sayyid was convinced thc1t true progress consisted in the fullest possible enactment of the profession of unity in worship (taubidfi 'l-'ibadah). As for the early Muslim theologians, so for Sir Sayyid, Islamic theology can be summed up as 'ilm al-taul)id. 3 Sir Sayyid's work in this chapter will be placed in the context of the main themes of the classical treatises on 'i/m al-k~lam-God and His relationship to the world, man and his destiny and theological epistemology. 1DA,

XVI, no. 9/PMaq, III, pp. 12-1S. 1 See p. 35 above. 1 DA, XIV, nos. 9, 10. Sayyid Ahmad Khan does not actually use tbo term, whereas Mubammad 'Abduh called his summary of 'ilm aJ-kol4m, Risa/ah al-taul;iid.

The credo: coherence and structure

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GOD AND HIS RELATIONSHIP TO THB WORLD

Proof of His existence Sayyid Ahmad Khan holds that modem natural philosophy has firmly established that the universe is governed by the law of nature, which is identical for him with the universally valid and uniform law of cause and effect. With his firm conviction that there exists a real causal nexus between all the secondary causes, Sayyid Ahmad Khan sees himself as heir to lbn S1ni and other Muslim philosophers and opposed on this point, to their outspoken critics al-Ghazali and lbn Taimiyah. 4 Yet, Sir Sayyid argues, whatever arguments Muslim thinkers may have advanced on this point, in bis day research conducted by empirical and observational science has established beyond doubt that all events taking place in this world are necessarily linked with one or more causes for their inception (buduth). Within this nexus of causes every single cause is for its immediate effect a sufficient cause ('illah-i tdmmah). 5 In other words, ''All that exists and that we can, in some way, understand or imagine, is linked by a connecting chain. By necessity this chain ends up in a final Being or Cause or Reason-the Creator and God and the Lord of the worlds.''6 The totality of the existent needs a cause which is n61 itself contingent. An infinite regr~ is self-evidently absurd. 7 A second proof of God's existence starts from the established fact of the existence of primary matter · (hayu/d) consisting of primary particles-ajza' (atoms) or sdlimdt (wholes)-of which, in the final analysis, all existing things are made. Sayyid Ahmad Khan claims that not only natural science but also the Scriptures of Jews and Christians speak of this primary matter8 in their account of Creation. This is not self-subsistent as the materialists held, but ''was caused by some cause, that is, 'PMaq, III, p. 241. 'Ibid., p. 242; DA, V, no. 1. 'DA, V, no. 1. 'lbn Taimiyah's objections against secondary causality are mentioned summarily and rejected rather than refuted in detail. Cf. P Maq, III, pp. 240-43. 'Ibid., p. 244.

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created by the Creator. " 9 He argues further, saying that things made up of this primary matter change; the changes are a self-evident proof (badihi thubut) of the fact that primary matter is caused in its existence sjnce it cannot be itself the cause for its changes. '·Therefore," he concludes, ''we hold for certain that this Cause of causes which they call God, has created it.''16 This argument seems to jump from a proposition of the necessary existence of a Prime Mover to that of the necessary existence of a Creator who creates everything out of nothing. In his credo earlier in 1872, Sir Sayyid had developed a similar argument, but using a more technical, philosophical termino.. logy .11 He then held to the coeternity of created matter with the Creator, that is he seems to deny a ''creation in time'' of created reality. Sayyid Ahmad Khan adds a third proof, on the lines of an argument from design. The sophisticated, wondrous constellation of the primary particles that make up the great variety of creation, require man to presuppose the existence of an allknowing and all-wise Creator. 12 Sayyid Ahmad Khan thinks that the law of cause and effect, coupled with the principle of the impossibility of a regressus in infinitum, proves the existence of a Creator. He adverts nowhere to the essential difference between a law of ea use and effect established by empirical, statistical evidence and the metaphysical principle of causality which includes the proof of the contingency of all existing things. Nowhere, too, does Sir Sayyid discuss critically the two main proofs of the existence of God developed in classical Islamic thought-the proof e novitate mundi (from the newness of the world) and that e contingentia mundi (from the contin-. gency of the world).13 Nevertheless, in his proof of the existence of God, as laid out in Huwa al-Maujud14 in 1895, he applies the 'DA, VII, nos. 2, 3. 10Jbid., p. 245. 11 D.A, VII, nos. 2, 3. 12 PMaq, Ill, 246. 11 A. J. Wensinck, ''Les preuves de l'existence de Dieu dans la theologie Musulmane.'' Medeelingen d. Kgl. Akademie van Wetenshapen, afdeelin6 utterkunde. (Amsterdam, 1936), pp. 41-67. 1 'DA, XV, no. 3.

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term wajib al-wujild to God and thus, implicitly, comes close to the classical argument e contingentia mundi. The obligation to act rightly that has been placed upon man, is based on reason, gifted to men in differing degrees. The Qur'an exhorts man, in a style intelligible to all, to observe the ''signs'' of creation which mean, in Sayyid Ahmad Khan's interpretation, ''the reality of existing things,'' and from there to conclude the existence of a Creator.15 His existence is not mere speculation; it is a reality. The final Cause of what is known by experience cannot but be God Himself. Creation is a closed system of created reality governed uniformly by the law of cause and effect, a system caused by an absolute final Cause which, radically transcendent, remains totally unknown to man. Laisa ka mithluhu shai' (nothing resembles Him).16 Sayyid Ahmad Khan counts himself among the ''theistic naturalists'' or fa/asifah (n~chariyin yd f alasifah-i ilahiyin), as he describes them. Rightly so, for he believes in God's existence and tries to prove this belief to be reasonable.17 But, does the God whose existence he proves retain the attributes of the God of Qur'anic revelation?

God's oneness In the traditional treatises of Ka/am the attribute of God's oneness is counted among His negative attributes. It comprises, more precisely, of three statements-God is one in number, i.e. He is single, alone; He is one in kind, i.e. unique, incomparable; and finally, He is one, and simple (in thesense of not being complex). - Sayyid Ahmad Khan adds the proof of God's oneness to that of God's existcnce.18 Both beliefs are accessible to the common reason of man, although admittedly, the proof of God's oneness is more subtle than the proof of His simple existence. God's

ucr.

this kind of popular cosmological argument, for example, in TA (111), m, p. 110. 11 TA(lll), III, pp. 109, 114. 1 7These labei> seem to us to characterize Sayyid Ahmad IKhan's theological position better than the label ''rational supernaturalism,'' proposed by Baljon, The Reforms, p. 89. 11DA, VI. . .

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oneness becomes evident when man realizes the wisdom at work in establishing absolute harmony, the total inter-relatedness and correspondence (munasabat) of all existing·things-in other words when he realizes the existence of the one law of nature. In order to reach this insight people at lower levels of knowledge may have . to listen to the witness of others more knowledgeable. But basically they themselves can understand it. The Qur'an, in its own distinctive manner, argues in the same way. The doubt that there might exist more than one universe is based on mere speculation and, therefore, cannot undermine the factual certainty of God's oneness.19 Further propositions concerning God's oneness are stated in ''My belief in God''20-there exists no being resembling God, no favourite, no helper, no associate, either with regard to His right to be worshipped, or in creating or improving or governing. There is, further, no ''plurality'' in God, nor any incipience.

The attributes of Godll The law of nature or the universal and uniform law of cause and effect leads to the knowledge of the existence of God, the One. But that law does not convey the inner reality of His existence or the quiddity of His Essence. This basic conviction determines Sayyid Ahmad Khan's teaching on the divine attributes. To assume the existence in God of attributes such as knowledge, power and will (in addition to, i.e. separate or distinct ('alti/.iidah) from His Essence, as the Ash'arite school holds, to which most of Sir Savyid's opponents adhered) would introduce a plurality in God. To predicate the attributes such as they are known from the world of created reality, would speak against the pure transcendance of God. A Tradition of the Prophet says-''The perfection of loyalty to Him, consists in removing the attributes from Him ( wa kamal al-ikhlti1 lahu nafy al-1iftit 'anhu). 22 Sir Sayyid's teaching here D.A, VI, no. 4. •DA, VIII, esp. nos. 1, 3. ncf. main sources: DA, II, no. 1; ibid., VII; Ibid., VIII, no. 1; ibid., XV; Kai/a nu'mlnu bi Allah, TA(lll), III, pp. 109-14; Ibid., p. 181. 11TA(lll), Ill, pp. 111. 11

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is marked by tanzih (stressing God's absolute transcendence), or in the words of the western tradition, by the via remotionis. The divine attributes, as man conceives of them by his perception of the created world, are all taken from that world and cannot reach the reality of God Himself. Nevertheless mail must attribute to God, the Cause of causes, those qualities of created beings which he experiences as good. This leads him to formulate the so•called ''positive divine attri• butes'' (such as knowledge, power, will, hearing, seeing). He must, likewise, declare God free.from other qualities of created beings which lead to the formulation of the ''negative divine attributes''-such as ''without time,'' and ''without place.'' It is of no avail to introduce at this point the distinction between divine attributes, the existence of which is known by reason alone, and those known by listening to God's Word only,23 because as revelation cannot tell of the quiddity of God's Essence, it cannot similarly tell of the quiddity of the divine attributes. In this doctrine Sayyid Ahmad Khan is close to the teaching of Ibn Rushd.24 Sir Sayyid's teaching on individual attributes develops as follows-the witnessing of physical and mental power in the created universe, elicits in the heart of man the idea of power (qudrat). This idea then is attributed to God as the final Cause of all beings, as ''an exigency of His essence.'' In the same way, from witnessing purpose and will in nature man begins to postulate the divine attribute of will and the attribute of knowledge, and of ''hearing and seeing'' as its derivatives, of life and eternity etc. When man witnesses how from one thing originates another in a mode far beyond human power, he then begins to postulate the divine attribute of ''being the Creator," but H~ cannot say whether the Cause of causes creates out of free choice or by nece~ity. What he can know is that: ''There was God and nothing with Him. He created and we do not know how He created because the nature of man is incapable of knowing it '' 25 Even such divine attributes as mercy and

XV, no. S. ''Van den Bergh, Tahafut, I, p. 138. 11 D..4, XV, no. 8. 11DA,

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Sayyid Ahmad Khan

anger, insofar as they have meaning, are based purely on the interpretation of natural events. But although it is true that man does not have adequate concepts or words to express divine reality, nevertheless the certainty of knowing that the realities inadequately expre~ed by man, with words such as ''life," ''power,'' etc. in some way or other exist in God as the Cause of causes, leads to happiness in the ''two abodes," here and hereafter. Attributes can be applied to God because He in His revelation has used them of Himself, thus adapting Himself to the understanding of man. So, both the way of arriving at formulating divine attributes by starting from an experience of created reality and the names of the attributes, are sanctioned by the Qur'an.26

Key attributes: creativity, will, speech It has been seen earlier that Sayyid Ahmad Khan discarded the belief in the existence of intermediary worlds (as for example Wali Allah's 'iilam·i mithiil, 'iilam-i arwtib, etc.) as fanciful elaborations, mere assumptions of the human mind based neither on revel~tion nor on rational thought. The only tenet concerning creation which is firmly established, is that the present world cannot exist without the Cause of causes, which is named in the revealed law as God or Allab.27 The oneness of this God cannot be halved or doubled; thus the proposition Al-wabid Iii ya1duru minhu ii/ii al·wiil;,id which Muslim thinkers adopted from , Greek philosophers, and the theosophic worldviews developed according to it, are mistaken. This proposition contradicts the fact that man knows neither the quiddity of the essence of the Creator nor the inner reality of His attributes. Instead, the doctrine of God must be approached from a scientific starting point. Science today makes it possible for man to know that the entire universe assumed its present form from primary matter and that this primary matter, consisting of atoms, cannot itself cause the movement and changes which organize atoms into the manifold universe.28 The naturalist "TA(lll), III, pp. 113-14. 17lbid., p. 183.

DA., V, no. 2.

11

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philosophers who hold original matter itself to be without cause are mistaken. Science as such, Sayyid Ahmad Khan admits here, is not able to answer where primary matter emerged from, what the inner reality of its special qualities is and why these originated in it. But philosophy, or more precisely the school of ''theistic philosophers'' answers that this is so because there is a final Cause called the Creator.29 Whereas earlier, in Tabyin al-kaltim, Sayyid Ahmad Khan had stated explicitly that ''He alone brought everything into existence out of nothing (nist se),''30 he is not found precisely arguing this point in his later writings. He does indeed show why a Prime Mover has to be assumed who sets in motion primary matter-which, incidentally, Sir Sayyid holds to be coetemal with God.at But from there he ''jumps'' to the statement that this cause of movement and change is also the cause of the existence of all things. Whereas in his doctrine of the divine attributes Sayyid Ahmad Khan strips all attributes from the concept of God, he seems to except from this the attribute of causality. He uni vocally applies the attribute of ''cause'' to God and fails to advert to the essential difference between causality as observed in the contingent world and the causal relationship between Creator and creature. Majid Fakhry, commenting on Ibn Rushd's rational determinism, speaks of ''causal dilemma'' and remarks, ''We are told how God acts and how the universe develops, but not why God should act at all in the manner He freely chooses. ''32 The same remark can be made with regard to Sir Sayyid's determinism. Indeed, at one point Sir Sayyid states that God created freely, 33 and that He instituted the present predetermined order freely. 34 He quotes Q. 11, 107 in support of his statement. But his explanation of the divine attribute of will does not provide for a really free will in God. This is not surprising, because just as he 11PMaq,

III, p. 20S; TA(lll), Ill, pp. 114-lS. 80DA, II, no. 14. 11 DA, V, no. 2. n1slamic Occasionalism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1958), p. 141. aapMaq, III, p. 209. ''DA, XV, no. 12.

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does not enter a metaphysical analysis of causality, so does he not enter a similar analysis of freedom. 35 In his explanation of the divine attribute of speech (ka/am; taka/lum)36 Sayyid Ahmad Khan does not, in effect, positively state anything more than that God must be considered the final Cause of what we call ''speaking,'' or ''communicating'' between men. True, God conveys ''meanings'' which men gifted with a special, inborn faculty are capable of receiving. 37 But all such communication between God and certain men (i.e. prophets) is part of the predetermined course of nature. God docs not, and now, after creation, cannot intervene in this predetermined system in any real sense: neither in action nor in word. In bis doctrine of God Sayyid Ahmad Khan then adopts most of the essential statements of the inherited creed-God creates, is omnipotent, wills freely and speaks. Thus although his philosophical arguments and explanations do not succeed in establishing these truths convincingly, Sir Sayyid nevertheless publicly professes his belief in the doctrine of the mystery of a living and revealing God.

MAN AND HIS DESTINY38

Man's freedom One of the great problems of classical kalam is the r~conciliation of the proclamations of God's omnipotence in revelation with man's responsibility for his deeds (muka/laf; taklif), or in other words the problem of jabr wa ikhtiyar (determination and free choice). Much of Sayyid Ahmad Khan's theological anthropology is found in his Tafsir, for example where be comments on Q. 2, 7 and also in a longer article discussing the determinism of the ?ahirite lbn l;lazm (A.D. 994-1064). 11lbid.,

no. 7; TUT, princ. 7. NDA, XVI, esp. no. 4. CT. El 1, IV, pp. 468-71 (article on KallJm). 11 DA, XVI, nos. 2, S, 1. 1 'The main texts concerning Sayyid Ahmad Khan's anthropology: PMaq, XVIII, pp. 245-53/TQ, I, pp. 16 ff/PMaq, III, pp. 186-224/TA(l/l), II, pp. 78-85; TQ, VI, pp. 158-67.

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Looking at Qur'anic evidence as a whole Sir Sayyid CQmes to the conclusion that certain verses in the Qur' an must be understood as merely stressing the fact that God is the Cause of causes and that therefore all other causes exist and act only through . Him. It is a misunderstanding to assume that the Qur'an solves the problem for later theologians of how to reconcile God's omnipotence with man's responsibility. The Qur'an asks only to study scientifically, the nature of man.39 From there the problem of whether man is free or under compulsion will find its solution. This problem-Sir Sayyid claimsis to be solved by reason, for the Qur·an does not provide an answer that goes beyond what reason can know. 40 The result of rational reflection about man is the discovery that man, with all his faculties, has been created by God, the Cause of causes. God has created man ''according to~ nature'' (lk fit rat par), which He does not change. According to this nature, man performs voluntary or involuntary actions. Both classes of action accord with the will of God as the ultimate Cause. Two main f acuities in man can be observed-one inci• ting him to action, the other inhibiting him from it. Man is free to employ all his natural endowments but only within the limits set by his nature. Tak/if, that is man's being placed by God under the obligation of a binding law, becomes meaningful only when the f acuity of free choice given by God to man is fully acknowledged. God the Creator, the Cause of causes, has knowledge at all times of all states and actions in the universe. Since He is the Cause of causes, any action occurring in this created world is performed directly by 1-limself (Q. 8, 17). Man likewise can relate all actions to God, his Creator. But in so doing he does not deny his own faculty of free choice. Sayyid Ahmad Khan then states that manis-within a limited ''area''-free to choose. He holds this to be an observable fact. The ''deterministic'' verses of the Qur'an-Sir Sayyid interprets forty-one of them-are misunderstood if they are taken to contradict such a limited freedom of man. 41 Voluntary 1:tuman action, like any other action, can be spoken of as God's action, •PMaq, Ill, p. 199. '°PMaq, XIII, p. 248. 0 PMaq, III, pp. 188-98, 212-24.

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since man and his limited freedom are all created by God. God wills natural events and the actions of men as their ultimate Cause.42 Sayyid Ahmad Khan's short exposition of the freedom of man within the divinely created system of the law of cause and effect is designed to maintain God's omnipotence as the Cause of causes, and at the same time man's limited but true freedom. But in fact the argument does not seem to tackle the real issue. Furthermore, Sir Sayyid's determinism heavily obscures any awareness of the basically mysterious character of the conjunction of God's omnipotence and real human freedom. which seems to defy a merely rational understanding. His determinism also plays down the problem of theodicy, that is how a believer in monotheism can defend God's goodness and omnipotence when confronted with the reality of physical and moral evil.

Obligation43 and shar' ( law; scripture) (i) Takll/ and reason: Man has been defined characteristically, repeats Sayyid Ahmad Khan, as a creature put freely under obligation to obey the law. This is the specific difference bet• ween man and·anirnal,44 deriving from man's exclusive posses• sion of the gifts of reason and free choice. . What is the source and character of this obligation? Sir Sayyid's answer here is analogous to his opinion on the source and criterion of the truth of prophetic revelation. From Khu/ubat-i Abmadlyah ( 1870)45 onwards he states unambiguously that the source of this obligation is reason and not primarily the shar', because not only must the shar', the Word of God, not contradict reason (or nature), it must remain within the reach of its understanding. Sir Sayyid's important distinction between the capacity of human reason as such ('aql-i insani) and the rational faculty of a single individual ('aql·i shakkJi) bas to be remembered here, of course. '1

DA, Viii, no. 6. The Ash'arit, term kasb (Gardet, Dieu et la Destinle, pp. 60-64) is used, but in a significantly altered meaning. "Gardet, op. cit., pp. 94-96. Sayyid Ahmad Khan's positions as layed out in chapter 6 are presupposed here. "TQ, III, p. 168. 11DA,

III.

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Reason in fact is the source of man's recognition of the truth of taklif (obligation)46 but in a very special sense. Only insofar as reason is gifted to man in its most developed manifestation, namely in the God-given habitus of prophethood, does it spell out infallibly and in detail the guidance of God as we have it, in a perfect and unsurpassable way, stated in the shar' of Mubammad. Ordinary man, therefore, needs to be guided by the shar'-i Mubammadi, because men and their faculties of reason differ. There are those who, left to themselves, would never be able to grasp pure taut,id or the way in which to practice it. They have to listen to, and obey men endowed with a greater gift of reason.47 Others-and their number is rapidly increasing today-understand the hidayat, the tak/if made explicit in the shar'-but inertly, only when they are presented with it by the Prophet and by those who convey his teaching.48 Man, in other words, needs the shar' in order to understand and practise fully the threefold taubid. Insofar as he possesses reason he ea~ judge the genuineness of the shar' and understand its obligatory character. The progress of science and civilization, Sayyid Ahmad Khan thinks, does in fact help more and more people to advance in their rational understanding of the shar'. · (ii) Tak/if and the sources ofjiqh49: The Shar1'a as the Muslims . knew it during Sayyid Ahmad Khan's time consists of injunctions (abkam). Some of them are stated explicitly in the shar', i.e. in the Qur'an and the undoubtedly genuine Traditions (the abkam-i man#J.1ah); others are worked out by ulama and mujtahids, that is men who employ independent reasoning and . analogy.50 This latter category of abkam, the ijtihadiyat, is dismissed by Sir Sayyid as having no binding force. The explicitly revealed injunctions, on the other hand, fall into three categoriesa~/i at,kiim, fundamental precepts which fully accord with the law of nature; precepts for the safeguarding and maintaining of the ''CT. Sir Sayyid's interpretation of the mitluiq bani Adam sl, the primordial pact with the sons of Adam. TQ, III, pp. 276-77. 1 ' DA, VIII, no. 7. "DA, V,'410. S. ''DA, III, no. 7; DA, X, nos. 13 and 14. 60KA, pp. 396-97.

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fundamental precepts;ol and finally precepts built on the imperfect evidence of ambiguous (mwhtabih) verses. The last category binds only as much as the ijtihiidiyat, i.e. injunctions evolved on the basis of independent judgement. Muslims today, faced as they are with doubt from within their own community and with criticism from without, have a duty to discuss the significance of the precepts of the law.52 Sir Sayyid gives an example of how this should be done, in his explanation of the precept of ritual prayer. 53 This precept consists of a fundamental element (a~li juzw) and of arkan (supports) which are to protect the fundamental element and are inseparable from it, although they can be waived for valid reasons. Sayyid Ahmad Khan's treatment of explicit statements in the Qur'an as fundamcnt (a~/), and his acceptance of only those prescriptions which can be proved as necessary to preserve them -whilst rejecting all elaborations based on analogy and consensus of the community (ijma')-are reminiscent of the ~ahirite position.54 But from another standpoint there is a wide gulf; when it comes to an apparent contradiction between a positive statement of shar' and science or ethics, Sir Sayyid's method is first to establish the truth from ''nature'' by way of reason, and then to interpret the relevant passages of the shar' accordingll'.55 The ~ahirite, in contrast, will stand in obedience by the text of shar' and avoid any further reasoning or allegorical interpretation. The sunnah is the Prophet's entire, explicitly stated abkiim on strictly religious matters (umur-i din).56 The Prophet's teaching on worldly matters (umur-i dunyii) may be followed, but is not binding.57 In its genuine statements and prescriptions-not its later elaborations-Islamic law overlaps with the natural law of the For examples cf. PMaq, XVIII, p. 153. 61DA, XIV, no. 15. 61 lbid., no. 17. 6 'El1 , III, p. 795. This 1ahirite element was first pointed out by Sa'id Akbaribadi. 66 KA, p. 361/PMaq, XI, pp. 326-27. 61 DA, X, no. 7. 11 PMaq, XIII, p. 37. Worldly matters means, broadt., speaking. social customs, political structures, etc. KA, pp. 336 f./PMaq, XI, pp. 273-74. 11

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scientifically interpreted world of creation. Thus ''pure'' Islam emerges as the most liberal and universally valid religion.58 However, this liberalism and universalism seems to be bought at a high price: that of emptying the true meaning and importance of the ummah as the focus of Islamic identity in space and time and, in the last analysis, that of removing God from His role as the Guide of men, individu~ls and groups. The God who called the prophets and sent them with His message fades into the distant, final Cause of the predetermined law of nature. (iii) The content of taklif and its function in human life59: Man is under obligation. This obligation can be summed up as demanding of him the profession of undiluted, threefold taubid. 60 And yet, God is finally independent of man's belief or unbelief. 61 The commandment to profess taubid entails that all man's words and actions should be directed towards proclaiming the rule of the one God. The shar' does not prescribe a set of rules extrinsic to the nature of man or his faculties, or designed merely to test his obedience. On the contrary, it declares how man's innate faculties should be ordered towards his greatest possible happiness and thus in the service of God.62 The shar' guides man to recognize in himself the two natural forces-the angelic and brutish-and help him bring them into balance and: harmony.63 Good and evil (basan o qabib) emerges from the structure of reality. The shar' helps reveal existing structures, and does not add any moral truth to them.64 Man's main duty is to achieve harmony between these opposing forces. 65 Happiness and repose of the soul (rtibat) consist in achieving this harmony. The worship God wants is contained exactly in this. He does not want man to become a monk or an ascetic and thus spurn the divinely bestowed gifts.86 Rather, taufiidfi 'l-'ibadat requires man to employ all his natural forces KA, p. 367 /PMaq, XI, pp. 326-27. 11Main source: TA(lll), III, p. 123. eoKA, pp. 379-80. 68

11 TA(lll), 11

III, pp. 37 ff.

lbid., p. 124. 11 TA(lll), Ill, pp. 37 ff. ••PMaq, Ill, p. 174. ''TA(lll), Ill, p. 124. ••TA(lll), Ill, p. 139/PMaq, XIII, pp. 43 f.

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in proclaiming the One God, the Cause of causes, and as such the Cause and End of natural law. Outstanding men are needed who can clearly indicate for each region and to each generation the fundamental objective of man, who can identify in detail the forces in man which are brutish and those angelic.67 In this~ Mu))ammad is the model. The moral task of the believer can therefore be defined as an attempt to incarnate (mujassam karna) in his life the akh/aq-i Mubammadi and thus spread the light of Islam.68 Sin, reward and punishment Sayyid Ahmad Khan's conception of sin has to be pieced together from a few tangential remarks. Commenting in Tabyin al-kalam on the Story of the Fall of Adam and Eve, he rejerts the view that this historical "event constituted a sin in the sense of a disobedience to God's command. This could not have been so because the shar' did not exist yet, and man was not yet ''put under obligation.'' The fall of Adam and Eve had exactly this effect; it was for them and for the entire human race the cause of the knowledge of good and evil. Man now became free to choose the way to salvation or punishmcnt.69 Sayyid Ahmad Khan distinguishes between sin as a violation of the law (gunah-i shar'i) and sin as affecting one's interior, personal relationship with God (gunah-i 'irfani), a kind of lack of response to God's special nearness, a lack of progress in coming near to God and knowing him experientially.70 Prophets can only commit the latter category of sin. 71 The ethical teaching of Jesus goes deeper, is more radical than Jewish law.72 Indeed one can become guilty by following the Shari'a in a merely external way, as if it had the character of

17

1n the context of discussing sin Sayyid Ahmad Khan speaks of two basic faculties in man-the ''faculty of godliness'' and the ''faculty of iniquity.'' He does not indicate how he s!es these related to the faculties discussed here. ''KA, p. 313/PMaq, XI, pp. 337-38. Cf. chapter 2, fn. 75 above. ''TK, II, p. 173. 70 TK, II, p. 162. 71 Ibid.; cf. also DA, II, no. 20. 11 TK, II-I, p. 116.

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customary rules only. 73 In the Ta/Jir sin is depicted entirely in terms of the employment or non-employment of the two basic human faculties of godliness (quwat·i taqwd) and of iniquity (quwat·ifujur). ''These two [faculties],'' Sir Sayyid explains, ''exist in every man possessing reason. Man's happiness consists in defeating the second by the first and his misery in defeating the first by the second. ''74 The sinlessness (ma' #lm h~na) of the prophets, imams and other holy men in religion means that by nature they completely subdue the facuity of iniquity. 75 Whenever man fails to employ the facuity of godliness he commits a sin (of disobedience or (ma'"tiyat). Man's spiritual growth or decline consists in the growth or decline of the facuity of godliness in him. It is strengthened by various means, for instance by social intercourse ($ub/,at) with holy men, by good works and by turning one's face towards God in fear and hope.76 Repentance (taubah, lit. return) means to be truly sorry for and ashamed of one's sin, to ask God for forgiveness and to make the firm decision in future not to sin again. And ''in what,'' Sir Sayyid asks, ''does this differ from [what is meant by] employing the very faculty of godliness [mentioned]?'' Punishment ('adhab)77 for our sins consists in the misery (ahaqawat) of the soul. The sinner by his sin inflicts it upon his soul. In the case of grave sin this misery affects the soul and makes itself felt, especially at the moment of death. But only the sin of associationism inflicts misery of the kind the soul can never be freed from. It adheres to the soul eternally. In the language of shar', this is called the punishment of hell (dozakh).

Resurrection and future life78 (i) Life after death: The soul of man, holds Sayyid Ahmad Jbid., p. 39. In his commentary on Matthew 5 (The Sermon on the Mount) Sir Sayyid tries to show how Jesus' concern about an interiorized concept and practice of religion tallies with the concern of best Muslim teaching, as for example that of al-Ghazali in 1/;,ya' 'uliim al-din. 7'TQ, VI, p. 164. 71Jbid.; TQ, 111, pp. 288-89. Cf. p. 193, fn. 106 above. 71Jbid.; this shows the influence of the Naqshbandyah, esp. notion of 1ubbat 77PMaq, I, pp. 203-15, esp, pp. 205, 213. . 71 Most important relevant texts: PMaq, 1, pp. 200 ff; PMaq, III, pp. 43 ff; PMaq, XIIl, pp. 291 ff; DA, IV, nos. 1 and 2. 71

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Sayyid Ahmad Klian

Khan, lives on after death, as immaterial, as separate from the body.79 Scientific "bservation and reflection teaches us that the soul exists. But only its existence is known to man, not its inner reality, just as man does not know the quiddity of anything.80 The soul of man and animal are of the same kind (jins). In both man and animal it is the principle of volition and perception.81 The main difference between animal and human soul is that the latter is unlimited and undetermined in its '·actions''; man can cause his soul to either develop or declin= and to gain happiness or misery according to the actions he performs. He can, further, gain rational knowledge, even of things divine. In other words the human soul has been privileged by being ''put under obligation.''82 As already pointed out, it continues to live after death but in a completely changed fashion. 83 On the one hand what the Qur'an calls qiyiimah (resurrection) happens to the individual human soul and refers to the radical change at the time of death, when it is separated from the earthly body and enters a new form of existence. On the other hand it refers to the eventual change of all created reality, as against its turning back into nothingness. Not more than the mere fact of a radical change is known to man, although some results of modem science with regard to change, especially in the sphere of astronomy and over very long periods of time, . can give an idea, Sayyid Ahmad Khan thinks, of what such a change may mean.84 More important in Sir Sayyid's view is the Qur'an's teaching on the resurrection of b11man life. This teaching has to be interpreted against the background of an absence of belief, among Mu))ammad's Arab contemporaries, in the existence of an immortal soul in man. The Qur'an does not teach that our earthly bodies rise again. Rather, in order to impress the reality of punishment and reward upon the minds of his contemporaries, the Prophet had to appeal to their imagina-

71

PMaq, III, p. 233. Immaterial at least in the sense of ''in a form totally different from this material world.'' 80 lbid., p. 43. 11 PMaq, XIII, pp. 305-06. 82 lbid., pp. 306-07. 88 lbid., p. 311. 8 'PMaq, XIII, pp. 322-24.

The credo: coherence and structure

211

tion, and this prompted the idea of a bodily resurrection.85 But there will, in fact, be no resurrection of earthly bodies.88 (ii) Judgement, paradise and hell: Sayyid Ahmad Khan ·lays great stress on the ''otherness'' · of all eschatological events. They are beyond the comprehension of man. What has been said about the inability of human beings to know God and His attributes as He is in Himself, applies equally to the realities of life hereafter (al-ma'iid).8 1 It is essential to recognize the overall aim of eschatological texts in the Qur'an,88 namely to encourage men towards good action and to discourage them from evil action by showing their long-term consequences. Tnus the verses on ''promise and threat,'' i.e. on paradise and bell, aim to make man understand in figurative language the highest form of eternal bliss and repose. By employing such language the Qur'an awakens the desire in man to ot>ey commands and to respect divine prohibition.s9 The same applies, mu tatis mutandls, to other physical descriptions in Qur'anic eschatology; the ''blow• ing of the trumpet'' is a metaphor for ba'th wa /;lashr, in other words for the radical change of everything at the end of time,90 and ''the book of deeds (kitiib al-a' miil)'' and ''the weighing of the deeds on the scales (al-mizan wa' 'al-muwazanah)'' is a metonymy for God's justice.91 The ''eternal bliss and repose'' of man consists in the vision of God (ru'yah Allah) which is seen as the fundamental and highest blessing of Paradise. Paradise has indeed to be understood metaphorically. Paradise is seeing openly the Holy Essence, without a veil and without a bodily facc. 92 In a later text Sir Sayyid describes the vision of God as a ''spiritual disclosure (ru/;lani inkishaf)'' which transcends a mere rational affirmation ('aq/i t~diq). This vision cannot be described; 86

lbid., p. 332. "lbid., pp. 336, 340 ff. 87 TUT, pp. 42-46 (princ. 9). 88 PMaq, XIII, pp. 350 ff; PMaq, I, p. 198. ••Jbid., p. 353; KA, p. 380/PMaq, XI, p. 350. "PMaq, XIII, p. 282. 91 TQ, ID, pp. 102-03; PMaq, I. pp. 194-202; PMaq, Ill, pp. 86-90. 91DA, II, no. 22.

212

Sayyid Ahmad Khan

there will be only He (mab(i huwa ka maqam h~ga). 93 The term ''seeing'' is inadequate. The Ta/sir denotes what is meant here by the Sufi term iqan, which is defined as ''the perfect certainty of the inner reality that God exists in everything without bulul (indwelling) and ittibad (fusion), and to efface oneself in this certainty.''N (iii) The final status of sinners and unbelievers: The decisive difference between the believer (mu'min )-whether he is a grave sinner (fasiq) or not-and the unbeliever (kafir), is the inner, heartfelt affirmation (ta~diq-i qalbi) of the One God. All sins can be forgiven by God, 95 even without repentance, but unbelief cannot be forgiven without a return to God in repentance (taubah). 96 A person who believes in the One God, even if he does not believe in Mubammad, is not, actually speaking, an unbeliever. He is a unitarian believer (muwab(iid). Only shirk makes man an unbeliever.97 Sayyid Ahmad Khan is opposed to the facile labelling of one Muslim by another as kafir. He holds that everyone who professes sincerely the shahadah, that is he who believes in the One God and Mul}.ammad and his message (maja'a bihi)98 must be considered a believer, irrespective of the way he interprets this message.99 Sir Sayyid discusses the question of the status of the nonMuslim in the life hereafter, by reference to a passage .in alGhazali's Al-tafriqah baina 'I-Islam wa 'l-zandaqah. Al-Ghazali there distinguishes three categories-of non-Muslims, Tures (then mostly non-Muslims) and Byzantines. 100 The first are those who have never heard about Mubammad; the second are those who have met Muslims and have a perfect knowledge of 11

DA, VIII, no. S. ''Shah S. Mub. Dhauqi, Sirr-i-dilbaran. 2nd ed. (Karachi: Mabfil-i Dhauqiyah, 1388 H.). 11 Nowhere in his writings does Sir Sayyid attempt to explain God's forgiveness in terrns of the ''natural law.'' NDA, II, nos. 23 and 24. 17DA, XIV, no. 11. 11TA(lll), III, pp. 115-16: "Lii nukaj/iru ahla 'l-qiblah!' "PMaq, Ill, pp. 173-75. 100Robert Caspar, ''Le salut .. , etc.,'' in JBLA, 31 (1968), p.305; also, Gardet, op. cit., pp. 392-93.

The credo: coherence and structure

213

Mu))ammad and his message; the third are those who have heard about Mul)ammad and his message, but insufficiently.101 People belonging to the first and third category will find , salvation through God's all-embracing mercy. Al-Ghazall bases this teaching on the doctrine of Islam as the religion of human nature and on the related teaching on the primordial pact of God with Adam,102 which says that from the preeternal ''pact'' between God and the race of Adam there survives in every human being the true, innate religion (Q. 7, 172-73). Sir Sayyid considers himself close al-GhazalI on this doctrine, especially in the stress on God's all· em bracing mercy. Yet he thinks that shirk (associationism) and not tht acceptance or non-acceptance of Mul).ammad must be seen as the decisive factor. Since every human being, Sir Sayyid teaches, has been put under obligation to profess the One God-admittedly in different degrees of ''intensity,'' according to the different natural deposit (i.e. endowment or wadi'at-i qudrat) of reason-and furthermore. since all groups of men have had prophets or guides helping them to profess pure tau!,id in word and action, all men will be judged according to whether they professed shirk or tau!,id. It• is useless to object to kufr as a status established by the shar' only, and not by reason, because God states clearly in the Qur'an that ''all prophets have made the pivot of faith (iman) or of salvation (najat) to rest on the acknowledgement of God and on not associating [anything] with Him. ''103 Thus he who believes in Him is a believer. To refuse to acknowledge the Messenger is kufr-i shar'i (unbelief as to the revealed law), whereas shirk is kufr-i-mu//aq (unbelief in the absolute sense).

REASON AND FAITH: THEOLOGICAL

EPISTEMOLOGY

Reason andfaith Finally, it is proposed to examine here Sir Sayyid's concept of faith and its function in theology. The two crucial 111

PMaq, III, pp. 167-68. 10•Robert Caspar, op. cit., pp. 256-S7; Gardet, loc. cit .. , pp. 391-92. · · 101PMaq, III, pp. 174-75.

214

Sayyid Ahmad Khan

.

steps in Sayyid Ahmad Khan's intellectual development towards a full-fledged theological rationalism and naturalism have already been referred to. The first step becomes apparent in Tabyin al-kalam in the early 1860s and the second in Khutubat-i Al}lnadiyah in 1869-70. In his creed in the first chapter of Tabyin1M Sir Sayyid, in line with traditional Muslim theology, profcues belief in truths which reason alone is not able to attain. These truths reach the believer through the corpus of truly revealed texts (sam'iyat) alone.105 They may then be open to the grasp of reason, a position Sir Sayyid shares in Tabyin with the Mu'tazilites. By 1869-70 Sayyid Ahmad Khan makes a new claim-that reason alone is the instrument by which to acquire knowledge or faith i 'ilm ya imiin). Knowledge, certainty and faith 108 are now seen as merely different words expressing the same reality, and this reality is confined to the reach of reason ('ilm ya yaqin ya iman ka maddr ~irf 'aql hi par rahta hai).107 Sir Sayyid explains that this rational outlook follows from a proper understanding of taklif or of man as mukallaf-no person can be bound beyond human capacity. Therefore, if man is, for inftance, obligated to faith in the existence of the One God, then faith and its precepts for attaining salvation must remain within the reach of human reason.108 Sir Sayyid does not consider the possibility that man might have good reasons for ~ccepting the obligation to believe in a truth and to obey commandments intrinsically beyond human understanding. Instead he considers it to be simply irrational and ••against human nature'' to believe in something that is beyond the grasp of human reason. The area of what is within human reason coincides with the realm of nature,109 which is throughout governed by the law of cause and effect. One looks in vain for an analysis of the instruments, the 1

''DA, II, nos. 3 and 8. 106Gardet-Anawati, Introduction a la Thlologie Musulmane, 2nd rev. ed. (Paris: Vrin, 1970), p. 431. 10tA1ready in DA, II, no. 23 faith is defined as, above all, inner certainty. 1' 7DA, IV, no. S/PMaq, V, p. 256. DA, X,

101

1

no. 9.

"DA, III, nos. 3 and 4; DA, XIV, no. 7.

The credo: coherence and structure

215

character and the scope of human knowledge in Sir Sayyid's writings. There is, for instance, no recognition of the difference between the facuity of the human mind enabling man to engage in analytical and abstract reasoning (ratio) and the faculty to grasp a transcendent order of being and meaning (inte//ectus). Where Sayyid Ahmad Khan makes rudimentary remarks about the process of knowing, they remain primitively empiricistic.110 At no point does Sayyid Ahmad Khan enter upon a critical consideration of the capability of the human mind to reach a knowledge of essence and metaphysical principles. There is also no consideration of the alternative (or comple• mentary) way of the mystic to reach a certainty about the existence of God by the immediate, intuitive way of ''gnosis'' (ma' rifah).ui A di1emma :vvhich Sir Sayyid either fails to perceive or which he chooses to ignore can be noticed further-whilst, on the one hand, he stresses that the realities of life hereafter are outside the comprehension of man (kharij 'an f ahm alinsan), he maintains on the other hand that the shar' speaks about them, and indeed ''unfolds them by allegories which suit human understanding.'' If man can speak meaningfully about what lies ''outside the comprehension of man,''112 then the realm of meaning cannot be restricted to what the human faculty of rational comprehension is able to reach. Sir Sayyid fails to advert to the implication of his own premises.

•

Reason and revelation as theological sources How is the truth of nature (the work of God, that is the truth we obtain through the faculty of reason), related to the truth of divine verbal revelation as it reaches man through the corpus of revealed texts (naql)? Sir Sayyid answers unambiguously-'aq/ and naql, he says, yield the same body of knowledge. The revealed texts, in other words, offer exactly the knowledge that reason (at least potentially) does.113 110

DA, XV, no. 4. 1 "0.C. Anawati-L. Gardet, Mystique Musulmane (Paris: Vrin, 1968), p. 132. 111 TUT, pp. 42 46/Sel/-ltatement, pp. 30-32 (9th princ.). 111 DA, XIV, no. 7; TUT, pp. 50-51 (princ. 14); PMaq, III, p. 201.

216

Sayyid Ahmad Khan

Revelation exhorts us to tum to nature, to reflect on its ''signs'' (ayat) and thus discover the truth. In nature man will find all that Islam teaches. Prophetic revelation does not state any belief or precept transcending reason, or in principle inacce~sible to it. In practice, however, only a few men reach the truths necessary to achieve the aim of human life without the help of the teaching of specially gifted men-the prophets and refonnen of every age. But mankind definitely moves, although gradually, towards a full grasp of the truth. Nevertheless, since God created each individual with the need for happiness and ultimate fulfilment, and since it would be absurd to imagine God the Creator contradicting His own purpose, the sending of prophets to all mankind throughout history was necessary_114 On the relationship between 'aq/ and naql Sayyid Ahmad Khan explicitly follows lbn Rushd. 115 For Ibn Ruslld falsafah is a demonstrative science. It aims at a rational, organized study of the universe. As such it is not only encouraged but demanded by the shar'. lbn Rushd sees all sciences, including philosophy, as starting from indubitable first principles. In the second chapter of bis Kitab fa~/ a/-maqal he explains why Scriptural truth and phiiosophical truth are not contradictory-•' .. .we, the Muslim community, know definitely that demonstrative study does not lead to [conclusions] conflicting with what Scripture has given us; for truth does not oppose truth but accords with it and bears witness to it."116 George F. Hourani, in his analysis of the Kitab, points out that the statement quoted above is based on a ''unitary view of truth,'' that is ''factual, descriptive truth about an objective world. Scripture makes assertions about the same world of fact as that of philosophy; therefore, a conflict between theiq is conceivable if either of them has made false assertions. ''117 The basic conviction of lbn Rushd is that demonstrative knowledge (burhani as against jadali, i.e. dialectical, as practised by the mutakallimun) is of the highest kind and that 'Cf. chapter 6, pp. 186 f. above. 115PMaq, III, pp. 251 ff. 118Ibn Rushd, Kitiibf\1ammad 'Abduh here takes up a position that is more cautious than even that of the· Mu'tazilites. In case of an apparently insoluble conflict, he again and again has and advises recourse to tafwi,J, that is to ''entrusting the solution to God who alone knows,'' and he stresses that ta'wil, where necessary, must be applied strictly according to the rules and usage of Qur'inic language. But Sayyid Ahmad Khan rarely speaks of tafwij. He displays a boundless, almost native trust in the final validity of what he considers to be the firm tenets of the new natural philosophy. At the same time he is less assured in his knowledge of Arabic than 'Abduh and thus proposes, at times philologically, rather doubtful interpretations. He presents as solved almost any apparent conflict between reason and revelation and vindicates his oft-repeated principle that there never is, nor can be, any conflict between the work of God and His word. Mub.ammad 'Abduh and Sayyid Ahmad Khan both teach that the word of revelation has a specific aim-to inculcate taubid, in the sense of belief as well as practice. They reject the view held by some of their contemporaries that the Qur'in contains and teaches all science. However, they do not distinguish between, for example, ''rational'' truth as diacovered by science and ''existential'' truth as disclosed in religious experience. Instead, they maintain and try to demonstrate that the

227

l:pilogue

Qur'in contains nothing contrary to the truth, the truth understood in an entirely uniform and undifferentiated sense. Mu))ammad 'Abduh does not use any Arabic equivalent of the term ''natural law.'' But the traditional term, sunnat Allah (divine custom), as he uses it, means in effect ''the order of the universe, once and for all fixed by Divine knowledge, and thus invariable.'' Sunnat Allah, in his writings, is thus practically any equivalent of natural law. However, 'Abduh does not hold a fully deterministic view of created reality and so he makes, for example (and as distinct from Sayyid Ahmad Khan), room for prophetical miracles which occur only in association with the prophetic message and have therefore come to an end with Muhammad. • • On the issue, so prominent in Islamic theology, of the concurrence of divine omnipotence and human autonomy, Mubammad 'Abduh and Sir Sayyid fail to advance the debate. The mysterious nature of this concurrence, furthermore, is neither properly acknowledged nor explored. But 'Abduh, again, seems more a ware of the inadequacy of reason to find a truly satisfying solution, and warns against curiosity in this field. Yet, however interesting it may be to compare the particular teachings of the two reformers with the positions held by traditional schools of Islamic thought, like Ash'arism, Mu'tazilism or f alsafah, it is more important to grasp and compare the overall Gestalt of their respective credos and the spirit which permeates it. Mul)aoimad 'Abduh and Sir. Sayyid both stress the rationality of Islam, being at the same time sceptical about the ability of reason to reach a knowledge of the essence of God or any created reality, and both hold Islam to be perfectly co~patible with science. Yet whilst for Mubammad 'Abduh there remains an ''area'' of revealed truth intrinsically inaccessible to human reason, for Sayyid Ahmad Khan, in accordance with his belief in a universe governed throughout by a uniform law of cause and effect, the realm of revealed truth and the area of reason (or at least of the potential reach of reason), overlap completely. It would seem, therefore, that if with Caspar,3 Mul).ammad 'Abduh's theology 'Robert Caspar, ''Un aspect de la

pensee

Musulmane modernc: le ROouveau du Mo'tazilisme.'' MJDEO, 4 (1957), pp. 157 ff.

228

Sayyid Ahmad Khm,

was to be characterized as a kind of nco-Mu'tazilism, then Sir Sayyid's religious thought, although it revives Mu'tazilite positions on a n11mber of issues, would be most aptly described as a kind of neo-falsafah, because Sayyid Ahmad Khan, by his conviction of a fully determined, uniform Jaw of nature (not only of descriptive but normative character), shares the determinism of the/alasifah. Furthermore, as was seen in chapter five, Sir Sayyid adopts the standpoint of lbn Rushd on the problem of the relationship of ''rational'' and ''revealed'' truth, quoting him at length and following him without reservation on this point. The affinity of Sayyid Ahmad Khan with the f alasifah on these fundamental issues explains, at • least to some extent, the fierce theological opposition he met with from orthodox quarters. It does not, however, mean that his religious thought had little influence on other, perhaps more orthodox efforts in India at renewing Islamic theology. Nor has his work, one would think, ceased to challenge Muslim theologians of our day. Since Sir Sayyid's time, important theological libraries in India, like that of the Dar al-'ulum in Deoband, contain a special section on works concerned with the refutation of naturalism (radd-i nechariyah) and, _in fact, the works thus classified have largely to do with a discussion of Sayyid Ahmad Khan's ideas, and that of writers inspired by him: .In a more positive way the work of religious thinkers like Shibli Nu'manl (1857-1918), Mul)ammad Iqbal (1877-1938) and Abu '1-Kalam Azad ( 1888-1958) owes much to Sir Sayyid's writings. But the full impact of Sayyid Ahmad Khan's theological ideas will only emerge as the result of a much-needed detailed study of the development of theological thought in India, from the 1870s to the present day. In some respects, however, Sayyid Ahmad Khan's work continues to be directly relevant to Muslim theology. His fragmentary attempt, in T abyin al-kalam, at a dispassionate study and evaluation of the Jewish and Christian Scriptures and of the early history of Christian dogma till the coming of Mu}J.ammad and the Qur'an, remains unique in modern Muslim theological scholarship. A Muslim study of the Jewish and Christian theological tradition that fulfils the exigencies · of modem scholarship remains a desideratum. It will -have to

229

Epilogue

take account of Sir Sayyid's unique contribution. In the field of badith-criticism much work has been done by Muslim and non-Muslim scholars since Sir Sayyid's day. Sayyid Ahmad Khan's contribution here is to have convincingly demonstrated that traditional 'ilm al-/:,adith does not confine itself entirely to external, isnad criticism, but provides in fact a basis, however slender, for the development of true internal criticism of the Traditions according to the methods of modern historical research. Sayyid Ahmad Khan's distinct effort to view Islamic religious thought historically, that is as having originated and developed throughout the centuries in response to diverse challenges from within and without the ummah, led him to view his own bold efforts towards critically renewing it as justified by a long-standing tradition. If today the relevance and need for promoting historical theology is widely accepted by Indian Muslims, it is in no small part due to the work of Shibli N u'mani, who in his early years was inspired by Sir Say)id in Aligarh, and the work of the Dar al-mu1annijm (Shibli Academy) in Azamgarh. Finally, however coarse and superficial Sayyid Ahmad Khan's acquaintance with the ''new sciences'' and with western philosophy may have been, and however rash Sayyid Ahmad Khan was in the acceptance of what he thought to be their presuppositions and lasting results, he has the credit of having seen before any other (Indian) Muslim the necessity of accompanying a new and critical appreciation of the sources and principles of Islamic religious sciences with an openness to modern science and philosophy. Sayyid Ahmad Khan's vision of the educated, believing Muslims of the future remains as attractive as ever-''Philosophy will be in our right hand and natural science in our left and the ka/imah, 'There is no deity but God,' will crown our head." Sayyid Ahmad Khan and-as far as can be seen-Mubammad 'Abduh likewise, have failed to advance our understanding of what may be regarded as the crucial question of any theistic theology: namely, how to reconcile the teaching of God's absolute transcendance with the fact that He has spoken through the prophets and, consequently, with the assumption that one can speak validly of Him and develop a meaningful theology. But Sayyid Ahmad Khan, within his tradition, has

.--

230

Sayyid Nimad Khan

made the point effectively that in order to keep alive in our day the belief in the God of revelation, a fresh, truly openminded and critical effort is needed towards developing a new, relevant theology, and furthermore, that the great monotheistic traditions should not embark upon this task in isolation from one another.

PART TWO

Translation of Texts Relating to Sir Sayyid's Credo

--

--

I. T~xts in Praise of Mu/:,ammad (Translated from Ji/a' al-Qulub, _1841)

[(i)] Praise be to Allah, the Lord of the worlds, and blessing and peace upon our saiyid (leader) Mubammad, the Seal of the messengers and upon h~s family; the good and pure ones and upon the Co~panions, the stars of religion! The best of all remembrances is the remembrance of the Prophet, God bless him and grant him salvation! It is the best thing to do in this world to remember your beloved Prophet and to pronounce his name with every taking of breath.

Yerse: . .¥Y heart and soul, .may they be a sacrifice to you, oh Mu])ammad! My head, be it the dust for your feet to rest upon! Bless Mul)ammad -and the family of Mu])ammad, Oh God! Praise be to God! What· a pure being is the Messenger of the Lord of the worlds, _through his beauty and perfection the world has been enlightened and by the blessing of his fortunate footsteps the earth prides itself over heaven.

..

'

Na~m (Persian): • Mubammad, the universe is for him like the dust of his feet. A thousand blessings upon his holy soul. He is enlightenment of the eyes of people of insight, The adornment of creation. He is the head and commander in the field of fidelity He is the commander in chief and forerunner of all prophets. He, many a time, drew the picture of male and female. He, again and again, came to relieve those imploring for help. A morning breeze bestowing a sweet odour The key to the treasure-house containing the divine treasure.

Blessing: Why should we not be proud of our beloved Prophet? Prophets desire to belong to his ummah, angels long to do service at his court.

234

Sayyld Ahmad Khan

Verse: Not one remains sinful amQng a people That has as chief such a lord. God Almighty has given to him the name ''Prophet of mercy," and chosen him as intercessor for the ummath. At his behest ''the splitting of the moon'' occurred; through his holy being was lit the lamp of guidance. Be it Good News [to all] that the name of our Excellency the Prophet of God-God bless him and grant him salvation-is Mu1}.ammad, the Praised one by God and all creation.I And the foil owing lines conclude the risalah:

Na"6m (Persian): •

All of a sudden the collar of the earth was rent. He entered like the soul into [its] earthen form. The earth, you would have thought, was a person dying of thirst Whilst he pours down the water of life.

Verse (Arabic): Oh God, blessing be upon the pure spirit of the Prophet, The intercessor of mankind on the day of rising and judgement, The bringer of good news and the warner, the lord of all people. The generous Apostle, of good character and nature. Who is like him among the people, the progeny of Adam, His disposition grand and full of fragrance? When your light shines upon the descendants of Adam Even the good angels are altogether proud. When the face of Mubammad shines in light There remains no light that could illuminate a star. He has given drink to the company of the pious from the basin of kauthar [''The Pond of Abundance'' in Paradise] Praise be to you, 0 Lord of the world Peace be upon you, 0 best of vision. 2

I, I, p. 3/PMaq, VII, pp. 6-7. 2lbid., p. 18/p. 29.

1 TFA,

Sir Sayyid's credo: the texts translattd

23S

[(ii) There may be added the following lines from Sayyid Ahmad Khan's muna}at (supplications) at the beginning of Rah-i sunnat (1850). After having addressed God in praise and supplication more generally, he prays thus:] 0 my God, give me a burning breast. 0 my God, bestow on me weeping eyes. 0 my God, keep me utterly intoxicated with the love of A))mad. .. 0 my God, the one who is ill of love for him-he is forgiven. 0 my God, give me the pain of the passionate love of Mu~tafa and give me then the balm of communion with him. 0 my God, make me the dust of Medina, fasten my boat to its ghat [landing place]. 0 my God, free me from the negligence of time into the place of al-Mu~tafa, the Lord of the Universe. Grant me to rest in faith in his city in a grave in al-Baqi'.a [The same tract closes with this distich:] My soul is laid out on your footsteps, 0 Abmad. This station it has asked for from God.4 [(iii) Finally, a description of the Prophet's appearance in Ji/a' al-qu/ub:] The Prophet of God was extremely beautiful and attractive. He was of middle height and had a fair complexion with a touch of red. His blessed chest was well-built. He was narrow between his two shoulder-blades. His sacred hair fell down to his ear lobes. On his head and beard there were, all in a11, twenty grey hairs. His face shone brighter than the moon on the fourteenth day of the month. His body was neither fat nor really lean but rather of middle size. When you saw him from afar he would appear in perfect beauty and comeliness and when you looked at him from nearby, again he would be all elegance and sweetness. ·Between his shoulderblades there was the Prophet's mark. On it you could read the following words: ''There is no deity but Allah and Mubammad is the Apostle of God.'' 8

TFA, I, I, pp. 94 f./PMaq, V, pp. 358 f; al-Bagi' is the name of Medina's

grave,1ard.

'lbid., pp. 133, 426.

Sayyid Ahmad Khan

236

His beauty was ·enhanced by his utter moral goodness. He was not angry ever, nor revengeful, except when God's rights were at issue. He was courageous and most generous especially with the poor and with travellers; yet regarding his own needs he was parsimonious. He showed modesty in his conduct, was forbearing and humble and free from envy and lust. In short, ''Whoever saw him for the first time would be filled in his heart with reverence Jnd awe whilst a person permanently in his service would be filled with utmost affection and love for him. ''5

II.

On the necessity of the coming of prophets to save mankind (lnsan kl Najat k6 Nabiyon ka anti z,urur hai) Taby1n al-Kalam: The First discourse' • (1860)

[(i) God, the One.] The holy and pure Being whom some call Allah, some Existence (wujud) and others Word (kalam) exists

since eternity and will exist till eternity. He is entirely Himself (tip hi ap hat) and His Being (us ka h~na) is His Essence (dhat). Indeed He Himself took the very name / am. His very Being is His excellence. He is known by His Being and He is proclaimed by this excellence a.lone. He has neither beginning nor end. He does not need anybody. Nobody exists except Him. So much so that if somebody says ''He exists," he thereby suggests that ''He alone exists.'' He was not born of anybody; nor is anyone born of Him. Also, whatever came into being did not do so without Him. Nobody is like Him, neither in being, because ''to be'' is His essence; nor in any attribute (1ifat) because all His attributes are His essence. He has life not by a soul (jan) but by Himself. He knows, not through any cause (jihat) but through His own essence. He sees~ not through any agency of seeing [separate from His essence] but through His own essence. He hears not through any agency of hearing but through His essence. He speaks, not through any agency of speaking but

"TFA, I, I, pp. 1-9/PMaq, VII, pp. 13-15. 'Chapter 1 of Tabyin al-kalam, Part 1 (Ghazipur: Author's Private Press, 1862), pp. 2-6.

.

I

Sir Sayyid\i credo: the texts translated

237

through His Essence. He . does whatever He wants to, not through any motive (nah . kisi gharat) se) but through His own perfection. He does everything not through any agent but rather through His Essence. He is in every respect One and Unique (yakah) and at every -moment He does a thousand, a hundred thousand, nay, countless works. [(ii) Knowledge of God by reason.] Now, can anyone know (pahchanii) such an essence by reason? Many very intelligent

men have applied their reason to this task, have observed again and again the workshops (karkhane) of the wonders ('ajd'ib) of nature and exercised their mind in much repeated reflection upon it. Surely we can know this much, namely that there is someone who does these most wonderful and diverse works. But more than that one cannot know, and if one knows one is mistaken.

Knowledge of God by revelation.] That He is One we know only because he has told us. Also, we do not get to know how He is except through His word. It is not in the power of man to know Him as He is, by mere reason. [(iii)

of man.] In man there is not only this visible covering of flesh but another thing by which he truly can be called man. If man reflects on himself, he can become-aware of the fact that in addition to this visible body there is something else in him through which he distinguishes between good and bad and knows the inner reality (kunh) of everything according to the measure of his [reflective] ability. If one reflects upon it more closely, one realizes that although this thing (chiz) is somehow linked to the human body, it is yet basically independent of it. Man at times is so distracted that he forgets everything. Himself, however, he does not forget. From there it can be thought that though this external body of man may well turn to nothing, that which is in it [or in him] will remain exactly as it is now. [(iv) Specific quality

[(v) The human soul is immortal.] So if we were to suppose

that this thing lasts only a few days and then returns to nothing, certainly our heart would not accept that the pure and

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eternal Being should create all the wonderful things for the sake of something of such a fleeting and transitory nature; there can be no doubt, therefore, that this thing (itself) is everlasting and does not vanish: into nothing. Never shall he die whose heart was alive by love Our eternity is established on the chart of the world. [Persian] [(vi) This thing is more than the p1·inciple of sensitive life.] We should try to fathom why there is this thing in man. Were its purpose only to make man sleep when tired or to eat when hungry-well, what would then be the difference between animal and man? Thus we realize that this thing special to man is not meant for these activities but for something else.

[(vii) By reason we can know the existence of the Creator and His claim to be worshipped and served, but not His will.] If we inquire into this activity we can know at least who has made us and who has given us the ''thing'' by means of which we realize that we should do what is His will (mara(ii). Yet we cannot know what is His will-as long as He does not reveal it to us Himself. [(viii) Necessity of revelation.] Hence the coming of prophets is necessary for two reasons, namely to tell us by revelation (ilhtim) who and what our Master is. And that we must walk according to His wilJ, so that in this way we may reach our fundamental, imperishable truth, i.e. eternal life.

[(ix) The necessity, there{ore, of the coming of the prophe:s.] H this is so then the coming of the prophets is necessary for all men, wherever they may be, because without prophets man· cannot-by (mere) reason-know His Master or His will. Therefore as long as there is nobody to tell mankind [about God and His will] how can he incur the sin of unbelief and associationism? Our answer is-no doubt this is the exact truth and we believe for certain that God Most High has sent prophets to all children of the human race. They revealed to man God's unity and His will-yet gradually, after a while, men corrupted His message.

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· [(x) Each nation (qaum) had its prophet.] As far as we observe man-and however primitive and barbarous the people we may think of-we shall in fact find that man worships the Deity (m'abud) in some way or other with the idea that this worship will be of use to him in another world. This constitutes a clear proof of the fact that this idea (of the worship of the Deity] has descended into their ancestors' hearts by the teaching of the very prophet who had been sent for their sake. ''There is no group (jirqah) in which has not passed a wamer'' [cf. Q. 35, 24]. ''For each nation there has been a guide'' [cf. Q. 13, 7]. ''For each group there is a prophet'' [cf. Q. 10, 47].

[(xi) Din was the same with all prophets.] There is also no doubt that the religion of each one of the prophets that earn~ to pass was one and the same. They came to teach this one truth, and went teaching this alone-God is One and there exists none excepl Him. He alone deserves to be worshipped. Him alone worship! ''I have laid down for you in din the same way which I had told Noah, and the same ordinance I sent to you and which we have told Abraham and Moses and Jesus-that you should uphold the din in its integrity'' [cf. Q. 42, 13]. [(xii) One dln, many shari'ats.] True, to each one of them has been revealed a different shari' at, that is the prescriptions regarding the service of the One God and the way He should be worshipped. This in fact is called ''the shari'at of each prophet.'' When man's soul is afflicted by a spiritual illness the 1hari'at, the method of service ('ibadat) by which this spiritual illness disappears is given to the prophet of that age. God Almighty says in the surah al-ma'idah, ''To each one of the prophets we have given an established order and a method'' [cf. Q. s, 48). [(xiii) Mul;,ammad completes the work of the prophets.] In short there is no doubt that wherever religions have spread they have all in the first place been given by prophets. The teaching of all of them was one and the same, that is to acknowledge the One God, to adore and serve Him. But when these people corrupted this [basic] content (ma/lab) there arose the necessity for another prophet to come. For this reason thousands of prophets came,

•

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brought their books with them and propagated the unity of God and His precepts among the people. When these precepts (abkam) had spread far and wide and become known in all [possible] ways and nothing had remained hidden and nothing was able to fall into error again, then, after this prophet [through whom this situation had been brought about] no further prophet was needed. This [final] prophet is the Seal of the prophets. This work [of prophethood] was completed in Mubammad, the Messenger of God, peace be upon him! [(xiv) True taubid.) We Muslims therefore believe that God is One and He exists through His Holy Essence. He alone has brought everything into existence out of nothing (nist se). Everything needs Him in its coming into being and in remainingin it. Whilst He does not need anything.

[(xv) God's eisence and attributes.] He is One and Unique in His Essence as well as in His attributes and also in His .works. Nothing participates in any way in any of His works. His existence and His life are not our existence and our life. Likewise His knowledge is not like our knowledge, His hearing .and His seeing, His will and His nature, His word are not like our hearing, seeing, like our will and nature. The two [i.e. His action and man's] are totally different, and one only in name. [(xvi) God alone can create.] To make-and to create is · the attribute peculiar to Him. Nobody else can make or create a~ything. So much so that the work man wants to do, God alone creates. To be sure, He has made man in such a way that he can only intend or will something good or bad [but not actually create on his own] .. [(xvii) God's omnipresence.] He is not contained in anything or in anybody, nor is anything contained in Him. Rather in His Essence all things are encompassed and He is near to and with everything. Yet, how He is near to and with something-that surpasses our understanding. [(xviii) Mu/:lammad, ''the Seal of the prophets.''] All prophets, from bcgin~ing to end, are true and Mul)ammad, the Messenger

Sir Sayy id's credo:

tire texts translated

241

of God-be the peace of God upon him-is without doubt the Seal of the prophets (khatim al-nabiyin). The Lord Messiabpeace be upon him-was, no doubt, the ''Spirit of God'' (rula A.I/ah),7 the ''Word of God'' (kalimat A.lliih) and the ''Aided by the Holy Spirit'' (mu'aiyid bi-TW) al-qudus). [(xix) The holy books.] All sacred books (tauret; zubur), the books of the prophets (~uJ.,uf al-anbiya'), injil, the Holy Qur'in which descended on our Prophet, all of them are true and have been given by God. He has given them to His prophets. [(xx) Sinlessness ofprophets and ange/1.] All prophets are freo from light as well as grave sin ($aghirah aur kabirah guniih). The angels are made by God and are free from any distinction of gender. They execute without a shade of disobedience the work for which they· were created. [(xxi) Prophets and angels are God's creatures.] No prophet or angel has any power or knowledge on account of his · own essence that is independent of God. [(xxii)Final stage of man-the pure vision of God's Essence.] The rising after death, the resurrection from the dead, the last judge• ment, hell and paradise and what is mentioned [in the sacred · books] concerning punishment and enjoyment (tana''um) respectively-all this is true. The words in which punishment in hell and enjoyment in paradise are described are only used metapho· rically (bi-/aur-i mithal ke). In fact, the enjoyment and punishment of that world and the enjoyment and punishment of this world are not related to one another except by name. The fundamental and highest blessing of paradise is the vision of God. Then the believers will see openly the Holy Essence in whom they believed [here in this world] without seeing. They will see the Holy Essence without any veil, without any [material] form and without any peculiar [corporeal] face. [(xxiii) Importance of true inner assent.] To believe is only .

.

.

CT.. Q. 4, 169; 5, 110; Hughes, pp. 229 f~ (article . on Jesus Christ; Arabic: I' sa 'l-masib). 7

.

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another word for the spiritual certainty of the heart. As long as this certainty ( yaqin) does not exist we cannot speak of faith in the fullest meaning of the word. The confession of the tongue is only the sign of the manifestation of this affirmation of the heart. No action whatsoever can make man an unbeliever vis·a-vis God, provided only that this affirmation of the heart persists. This holds true, irrespective of the kind of sin such an action might be and even if the man, on account of what he ·has done, was held to be an unbeliever. On the other hand, God is angry about such things and, if He wills, shall in· tlict punishment on such a man and the punishment will not be light. . [(xxiv) Associationism con only be forgiven in case ofrepentance. J

With repentance all sins are forgiven. And however many sins there are concerning God-except associationism-it is in His power, if He wishes in His mercy, to for give even without repentance on the part of man, or if He pleases, to punish even the lightest sin. Only associationism is not forgiven without repentance. May the mercy of my Lord, when he distributes it, come [to man] in proportion to [his] disobedience. [Arabic] These are the beliefs ofus Muslims and I profess my assent to them with my whole heart and spirit. Oh God, make us to live and die in the fold (millat) of Islam! [Arabic]

III. J,itroduction to Khutubat-i Al;,madiJ,•ah, First Parts (1870)

[(i) The religions and their deceptiveness.] The strangest of all strange things in this world is the conception to which people give the name religion (madhhab ). Religion is the name of the discrimination pertaining to the actions of man. Because of it 'Khutubiit-i Abmadiyah, TFA, I, II, pp. 182-639. Rpt. PMaq, XI, pp. 6-16 (first part of the dibiichah). Tho Urdu toxt was first published in TA(l), I, pp. 49-58 (February 1871).

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the actions of man are considered good or bad, and not good or not bad. Because if this discrimination between the actions of men is not maintained then no religion will continue to exist. [(ii) What is religion?] All the ideas which are born in man's heart and any certainty he has (concerning anything) originate from factors that are different from these ideas and from such certainty, from factors that are considered the caus~ of these ideas and that certainty. And yet, the remarkable thing is that the notion of religion arises in the heart of every man without any external causes. without experience and [critical] examination and without any rational proof, so that the heart is considered the place where [the idea of] religion originates. Thereafter the religious idea is held with a degree of certainty not met with in anything visible. Even more startling is that this invisible and inexplicable thing which transcends human understanding, makes such a strong impression upon (the nature of) people that all actions and natural passions created by God in man are overcome by its influence. This idea [of religion] which arises spontaneously in man generates an unparalleled fervour and enthusiasm in him despite the fact that for other [comparable ideas] we possess excellent and conclusive proofs. If the idea of religion did not differ among all mankind, one could perhaps argue that the fact that all the world believes in it with certainty, constitutes a proof of its authenticity. It is surprising that not only in every period, people and country and in every sect but in every individual and mortal this idea appears different, so that there is no reason to believe particularly in any one [of its different forms]. It is, further, surprising that everyone is convinced that his own idea is fully sound and entirely true, to tbe exclusion of the ideas of all the others. We witness that as the Greeks believe, without a shadow of doubt, in their god and deity and the Jews in their One God, so the Hindus and Egyptians believe with full certainty in their thirty-three crores of deities. Is the doctrine true that all things are parts of the one whole or its very self, be it as soul or as body? Are all the various things we see one whole? Are light and darkness, black and white, all the same, as the gnostic ('arif) says:

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I have become Thou and Thou hast become Me. I have · become body and Thou hast become soul. So that no longer anyone could say: I am one person and you are another. [Persian] Or, is the other doctrine true that all things appear from Him alone? That He alone is the cause of darkness and likewise He alone the cause of the appearance of light? He alone makes his thunder in the heavens and He alone sends rain to the earth, He alone makes shine the stars and He alone opens the buds of flowers. The splendour of Him alone is the talk of the heavenly gardens and the wall that separates from Him is the bane of the hells. The grief of the sorrowful heart and the delight of the joyful heart both come from Him. He is nowhere and yet everywhere, He is in nobody and yet in everybody. In the luminous breast of the worshipper, in the burning heart of the transgressor, in the eyebrow of the beloved, deadly to his lover, and in the tearful eye of the lover-in all of them alike is none but He. He is in the heavens and He is on earth as He is in the finest of hairs. He sees everything and knows everything but His knowledge ''lacks'' in two respects as compared to ours-in Him there is no past, nor future. You may name this invisible Lord and incomprehensible Being in whichever way you choose, the Tradition which says: ''I am near to the thought of My servant as He thinks about Me, ''9 in any case, will throw you into further difficulties. 0 my Lord, you are in my opinion full of mercy. So have pity on me! [Arabic] Then we are puzzled by the fact that all these different ideas which are in the hearts of man and are named religion have arisen in one place: the heart. The act of the heart by which these ideas are born is called belief (i'tiqad). If therefore the cardinal point of religion is belief there can then be no means of establishing that one notion [of religion] is true and . another erroneous. What is the means to make a clear distinction between the

'.Ana 'inda ~anni 'al,di . bi.

C(. Wensinck1 Concor~, IV, 87a. .

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true and sincere worship which Abraham's father rendered to an idol and the true and sincere impulse by [i.e. in obedience to] which Abraham smashed this idol of his father into pieces'l10 The killing of Christ on Mount Calvary near the Temple is a unique instance. What the heartless killers did, they did in accordance with an utterly sincere and firmly established belief and in a fervour of faith that made the heart tremble. So what is the criterion of judgement between these two groups, one of which in_all sincerity considers the killing to be a good thing and the other who in utter purity of heart considers it as an extremely bad deed? What is the means to discern between St Paul, first in the situation when he, out of sincere and fervent conviction,11 sided with the people who stoned St Stephen, and St Paul in the situation when, with equally sincere conviction, he acknowledged Christ? What is the criterion for making a distinction between 'Umar, first in the situation when he, in sincere conviction, attached to Lit and Manat,11 attempted to kill the Faithful of the Arabs [i.e. Mubammad], and then in the situation when he declared, in all possible heartfelt sincerity: ''I testify that Mul)ammad is the Messenger of God.'' It is this same strange notion which relates equally to both sides and which people call• religion. Something therefore so ambivalent, relating equally to two opposites, cannot constitute the means for arriving at certainty about any one alternative. Certainly, the true idea [of religion] or the true religion among all the others can only be the one which is free from the defect of being related to two opposites in the same way. •

[(iii) The real nature (l;,aqiqat) of religion.] What then is reli-

gion'? It is a true principle with which man must bring all his powers of will, ~dy, soul and spirit into harmony as long as he is in control of his physical and mental powers. If therefore these principles are such· that they are built merely on some iocr. Q. 19, 42-51; 21, 52-67. 11We read is instead of; bn in P Maq. ll'fbese are pre-Islamic deities of Arabia. Cf. Q. 53, 19.

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kind of belief and if somebody for some reason believes in the contradicting principles of numerous people there is no cause for holding the one principle to be true and sound and the other to be wrong and erroneous except arbitrary judgement taf,akkum). The true religion can only be the one the truth of which is not based on one or the other belief (i' tiqad) but rather on an essential truth (haqiqi sachcha'i). Because religion is not a branch of belief, but rather truth is the root of religion. In other words truth is religion itself and belief its derivative. If we want, therefore, from among the different religions to establish critically the true religion, we should see whether it is in harmony with this true principle or not. [(iv) What is the true principle for establishing critically the · true religion?] What is this true principle? As far as man can know by his rational powers (quwa'-i 'aqli), it is nothing but nature (qudrat) or the law of nature (qanun-i qudrat). The Founder of Islam has said with regard to this-''Thou (Mul)ammad) canst see no fault in the Beneficent One's creation; then look again: Canst thou see any rifts? Then look again and yet again, thy sight will return unto thee weakened and made dim'' [Q. 67, 3-4]. And what is nature or the law of nature? It is that on whose account there exi~ts in all material and non-material things around us a wonderful connection and harmony. It is found without exception in their essence and is never separated from them. Whatever nature has brought about in whatever way, is constituted unfailingly in this manner and will be so in future. Thus this [i.e. nature] alone is true and those principles alone which are in harmony with it are true principles, not those which depend entirely on the belief of a passing being capable of error and sin-the belief of man. Nature does not only confirm its truth by its existence-its chain of order (silsilah-i inti~iim) and interconnections • (ta'alluqiit) which are found without limit in creation. We also find in it such principles by which we can know the goodness and badness of our voluntary physical and spiritual actions and since nature is true and perfect, these principles [concerning our free actions, i.e. concerning moral life], are necessarily true and perfect and only these true and perfect principles, or say only

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247

that religion whose principles are in harmony with it [i.e. nature ·and its principles], can claim to be the true religion. Do not consider that we regard nature or the law of nature , to be itself the Cause of causes or Final Cause of this whole world-the world being conceived. as without a creator, as it is in the religion of Darwin (God preserve us from that)-rather, we call nature a law for which there exists a maker. For this very reason we hold for certain that this total chain ends up in one Cause of causes and in one Final Cause on which depends . the existence of all things. He is the One, the unknown Essence whom-people call by thousands, hundred th011sands and hundred-hundred thousands of names. Oh my beloved God! Thou art verily under a veil and yet apparent to all! What is the use of such a false veil? I became jealous, otherwise I would have taken off your veil, taken you by your hand and shown you to the world. [Persian] God forbid! Taubah, taubah! What have I said? Have I become kafir (an unbeliever)? My God, you are my servant and I am your Lord-no, I ask God's forgiveness-Thou art my Lord and I your servant. [Arabic] Thus it is incumbent on man that from this karkhanah-i qudrat (workshop of nature) he may seek its Maker and the way . to Him, that is the one who tells us the way to Him, because this way alone is the Straight Path to walk on. [(v) An analogy of religion and the disagreement of t/1e ulama

in this respect.] What errors have the ulama-may God have mercy on them all-made and how much they have stumbled in giving examples of religion! Some of them have adduced the example of master and slave and have said that the concept of the ''advantages of nature'' (ma$dlib-i qudrat) is useless for religion and Shari'a, and equally, the concept of retribution (the : reward and punishment for [our] actions). Maybe the God of such people is liable to order the fulfilment of nonsensical

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actions. My God, however, does not do so. Rather, He is knowing and wise beyond measure. Nothing He does whatsoever is devoid of wisdom and useful purpose. Shah Wali Allah, too, has declared this opinion to be wrong. Thus he writes in /fujjat Allah a/-balighah:13 It may be thought that the precepts of the Shari'a have nothing to do with divine interests (ma$alib) and that there is no congruity between the action and God's retribution; that to be obligated by the divine laws (al-taklif bi 'l-shara'i') can be illustrated by the story of the master who wanted to examine the obedience of his servant and thus ordered him to raise· a stone or to touch a tree, in which actions there is no benefit except the exercise of free choice. When he obeys or disobeys he will be rewarded with the knowledge of his master. Now this speculation is wrong. The sunnah rejects it as well as the consensus of the centw-ies that are attested to have been good. Some ulama have likened religion to a master and his ailing slave, over whom the master has appointed his favourite (~abib) to heal and has determined that to obey the order of his favourite shall be the cause of [the slave's] salvation and to disobey the cause of [punishment of] hell. In /fujjat Allah a/-balighah, Shah Wali Allah also declares this opinion to be true. So he writes: It becomes clear from what we have mentioned that the truth of being obligated by the holy laws can be illustrated by a master whose servants are ill. He appoints over them a (male) member of his entourage to administer medicine. If they obey him they obey their master. He will be pleased with them and reward them and they will be freed from their illness. If they disobey their master, they will incur his anger and he will punish them and they will die of their illne~. But I do not accept this view and I ask, was the cause of U'fhe following are three quotations from the introduction to the Arabic: original.

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249

their recovery (the work of) the medicine or their obedience to the order of the favourite? If he [i.e. the master] had applied the medicine without the order of the favourite, would he14 [i.e. the slave] have gained recovery or not? Surely he would have gained recovery, because to have obtained recovery by this medicine was the law of nature which cannot change in any way. · Some ulama have likened religion to a doctor who neither declares15 anything a water of life (amrit), nor a deadly prison (halahil). Rather, he declares everything to have the effect nature has put into it, so that those people who are in good health ·may know the principles for the safeguard of health and those who are ill may know the medicine for gaining health. Religion, in this way, instead of being only for ailing slaves, becomes something general for all. It is a pity that Shah Wali Allah in /Jujjat Allah al-biilighah does not accept this view. He writes: The meaning of good and bad actions is not, as one opinion has it, that man merits reward and punishment purely on rational account and that the function of the shar' -is [simply] to tell the specific qualities of actions as they are, without telling us about obligation and prohibition, that the shar' [in other words] is comparable to a physician who describes the qualities of the remedies and the kinds of illnesses. No, this view is mistaken and the sunnah rejects it outrightly. [(vi) The true religion of the world.] Thus, as far as I was able

to investigate the concept of the true religion, I have found Islam to be the true religion. I hope that those who hold the truth dear will always in candour and sincerity investigate the truth of Islam. [(vii) Of what sum ofprecepts is Islam-if correctly viewed-the name?] Yet a difficulty presents itself: when the word ''Islam'' is

used people mean by it the sum of the injunctions which are nowadays considered to be the precepts of religion (abkiim-i 1

'The author here changes suddenly into the singular. uBattJtli (instead of PMaq text banatd).

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madhhabi). Yes, in a metaphorical sense (majtizan) one can call

[the sum of] them ''religion of Islam." But in reality the ''sum'' in the true sen~e of the word is not worthy to be called Islam. In the existing presentation of the doctrine of the religion of Islam there arc two kinds of principles and precepts. One group consists of those which the law-giver himself has stated very clearly. They are called expiicitJy revealed precepts (al)ktim-i man$iqah ). The other group has been established by the ulama and the mujtahids. In the excellence of their mind and in the light of their knowledge they have sought their proofs from the argument or indication of the text, or by analogy. The precepts thus arrived at are called ijtihiidiytit. [In my opinion] they hold no higher rank than any other opinion of a fallible being. By not distinguishing between these two kinds of propositions one falls into all kinds of grave error. When Muslims choose to abandon this distinction they give it the name taqlid and when non-religious people choose to do so they describe it by the contemptuous names of fanaticism (ta'a$$Ub), deep-seated • ignorance or error: · So pay heed, you who have sight! [Arabic] I

The first group of precepts, namely the abkiim-i ma~u.,ah, subdivides itself into two kinds-one of these being the funda• mental precepts.16 These, without any doubt, are fully in harmony with the law of nature, or rather are its life (jan); the second kind are those precepts meant to protect and maintain the fundamental precepts. Whoever, therefore, wants to examine the truth of Islam according to true natural principles must distinguish between these t\VO kinds of precepts and the grade and rank of each one of them. In addition to these two kinds of precepts there is still a third kind in the religion of Islam. The precepts of that group are established from sentences with a double meaning or from imperfect or ambiguous evidence. The first kind of this third group of precepts belongs to the [category of] ijtihadiyat and the second one enjoys no weight and credibility whatsoever in Islam, although people [usually] act according to them for the reason that there is no harm in doing so. 1

•A1li af,kam.

Sir Sayyid'J credo: the texts translated

251

Thus this true religion and the person through whom we were taught in it are [orig. is] worthy of our greatest respect and unlimited praise and, no doubt, he [the Prophet] is worthy of the following address: You are dearer to me, oh Messenger of God, than the soul within me. [Arabic] Accordingly, we are very glad and regard it as a blessing not to have regarded him as God or Son of God nor as some angel, but rather as a human being to whom revelation has been given. 17 Yet he is dearer to us than are our own souls.

Oh Messenger of God, you are father and mother to me. [Arabic] . My heart and my life an offering to you, oh Multarnmad. My head, be it dust at your feet, oh Mu)J.ammad. [Persian] Oh you who have believed, bless him and pronounce your peace upon him! [Arabic]

IV.

Tlie Ideas of Man (lnsa,i ke Khayalat)l8 (1871) .

[(i) Man's ideas differ.] Among the many wonders of divine

power the ideas of man are of extreme interest. We see that one kind of creature holds one and the same idea (khayal). 19 There are movements and actions in animals that derive form their being animate. However, you may name the mediate · or 17

Cf. Q. 18, 110; 41, 6. 18 TA(I), 15. Shawwal (1871), pp. 12-14; rpt. PMaq, V, pp. 249-S6. 1 9The terms khayal and iraddh are used here in such a wide and un precise sense that translation becomes virtually impossible. Here Sayyid . Ahmad Khan seems to take khaytil in the broad sense of something that draws towards or incites to an action, instinctive or not. So he names it also by the term mubarrik. lrtidah is will in general, irrespective of whether it is conscious or not, instinctive or not. The essav has been translated because it gives ·a unique insight into one of the guiding convictions of its author.

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immediate motive power (mul;,arrik) of these actions and movements. They are the same thing we call ''idea'' on the human level. No doubt all actions and movements of animals are volitional; (irddi); they are set in motion by the will. The direct or indirect cause of all their movements is either an idea incentive (khayiil)~ attracting it to some material advantage like food and habitation and so on, or to an on-material advantage like joy, happiness and cheerfulness, or an instinct (kha;·al) that wards off material or immaterial damage. We do not find that there is in man anything additional to this. True, there is this one difference that in the animal these khayals are limited, whereas in man they are unlimited.20 Yet we are amazed by the fact that whereas everywhere there is one kind of khayiil in one kind of animal and they all hold them to be absolutely certain, man, in spite of being a species of the animated beings, does not hold [like animals do] one kind of khayiil with one and the same degree of cerfainty. Why? At times the thought occurs that the khayii/s of all the animals [of one species] are identical because of their being limited, and that the reason for the ideas of man being devoid of this quality [of being identical] is their being unlimited. But this [explanation] cannot be accepted because in order to be unlimited it does not necessarily have to be different. So the better acquainted we are with the ideas of men, the more we know about the wonders of divine power, and this advantage is not altered by them being correct or incorrect; rather the fact of their diversity adds to it. Therefore we state the ideas of a man in what shall follow. [(ii) Man, the learning animal.] It occurred to me that I have

as much or rather more to achieve than what other animated beings have to. The Maker, I thought, has put for all animated beings except man everything they need at their disposal. They have no need to collect or produce the things they need. All the food for animals is produced without their effort and forethought. For the animals of cold climes there is the excellent clothing of wool produced on their bodies. For the animals of the air there 18

Khayti/-image in animals; idea in men.

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is a waterproof on their body to protect them from rain. For the animals of the warm regions a dress has been tailored just fitting for that climate. Only for man has nothing been made. From which it becomes clear that he has to do all this for himself. - Then I reflected that the animal has no need to learn from or to be instructed by anybody in its work. It is provided with instruction ready from its birth. Nobody has instructed the honey-bee in the knowledge of the excellent sources from which it sucks the nectar and nobody has taught it to manage to partition its ''houses'' [beehives] in a way so exquisite that it- makes even a great engineer wonder. Nobody has taught the weaver bird to make himself such an excellent and safe dwelling. And man, in contrast, does not know anything without [the process of] learning.

[(iii) Man's circle of actions is unlimited.] I further reflected that the actions of animals, be they bodily actions or actions of another kind, instinctive or acquired, are all very limited indeed, whereas man's actions are unlimited. All this made me think that man has to do for himself a good deal more than other animated creatures. [(iv) Reason, the unique means to solve man's specific difficulties.] Then, realizing the great Artisan who has made man more needy than the other living creatures and has placed him in all sorts of difficulties, I asked what in fact has He given man to do all the things by which he can overcome these difficulties. Here my heart suddenly exclaimed, ''Reason ('aql)!'' On hearing this I started thinking, is this true? And I thought, no. Reason cannot achieve this. Neither can reason by itself achieve this, nor can this difficulty be solved without reason either. Reason is, after all, a [mere] means for acquiring something else, just as gold and silver cannot themselves still our hunger but rather make accessible what stills our hunger.

[(v) Reason-knowledge-certainty-faith.] After much further searching I asked myself, what is this for the acquisition of which even reason is only a means? The answer ·was-this is 'ilm in the sense of knowledge· (danestan, meaning, in Persian,

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to know). It was then that I understood that ''the more'' I [as a human being] had to do in comparison with the other animated beings, was to inquire into the root (~liyat) of all things. I reflected that knowledge and certainty are correlatives. What I know I am, no doubt, also certain of, and what I am certain of I also know. So, certainty without knowledge and knowledge without certainty is neither true nor complete. This I understood to be absolutely true. I thought that, for instance in counting numbers, I have the knowledge of three and ten and am therefore certain that ten are more than three. If therefore someone contests this, and in order to prove this statement declares that ''to show that I am right I shall make out of this piece of wood a serpent''-and then actually does so -then this no doubt will throw me into astonishment. But it will in no.manner affect the [my] certainty of the fact that ten are more than three. Then I reflected that the tenet of the Muslim's faith, ''confession is by the tongue and affirmation by the heart [Arabic],'• is no doubt a true proposition. Yet whereas its first part relates to worldly matters only, its second part carries the fundamental purport. Although affirmation by the heart and certainty are one and the same thing, the words t~diq-i qa/bi (heartfelt affirmation) are more impressive and liable to stamp their purport more deeply upon the heart. I concluded that faith (imdn) cannot be without certainty (yaqin) and certainty cannot be without knowledge ('ilm). I also reflected that knowledge or certainty, without which faith cannot be acquired, must be like the certainty about ten being more than three, so that its truth is enduring. Because if it were not, it would not be true knowledge or certainty-it would be nothing but delusion. [(vi) Reason, the instrument for acquiring certainty and faith.]

All these thoughts agitated my mind and I began to search in all directions. What is the way to acquire knowledge or certainty, or rather faith? I saw that thousands, indeed lakhs and crores of people hold many things for certain and there is no difficulty for them whatsoever [in doing so]. Why, then, have I fallen into such diffi-

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culties? Better to ask from these people how they have acquired their certainty on all those matters. The Jew said, I have perfect certainty about the fact that God is One because Moses has said so. The Christian said no, this is wrong. God is Three and I have perfect certainty about this because [St] John has said exactly this. Such dissension perplexed me even further and I thought that if there is dissension in the knowledge and certainty about a thing then there is no certainty. Why do they disagree in their certainty? Further reflecting I understood that they are neither certain of God being One nor of God being Three. Rather, they are certain of the fact that Moses and [St] John have said so. The Jew said, Moses has conversed with God and he has changed the piece of wood into a serpent, so how could I .doubt what he said? The Christian said, Jesus raised dead persons to life and when he was slain he did not die, but rising from the tomb he went to heaven, so can there be any doubt that he was God? First I found myself in doubt because [to all appearance] these · proofs are really good. But then the idea struck me that whilst they are certain about Moses having conversed with God and about Moses changing the piece of wood into the serpent and about Jesus raising dead persons to life and himself rising from the dead, they are not certain about God being One or Three. After all these argumentations I became certain that reason alone is the means to acquire knowledge or faith. Reason is the instrument to acquire these and is an extremely good guide. [(vii) Reason, free from possible error and unfailing guide?]

Then I asked myself how reason can with certainty remain free · from error. I admitted that such certainty is not really obtainable. Only if reason is used constantly can the error of the reason of one person be corrected by the reason of a second person and the reasonings of one period by the reasonings of a second. Whereas as long as knowledge or certainty or faith arc kept outside the reach of reason, certainty cannot be obtained at any period of time whatsoever.

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[At that point] a doubt arose in my heart. I held reason to be the paramount guide. Why did I not count on the possibility that there could be a greater guide than reason, a guide that could subdue even reason? The fact that we are not a~uainted with it surely does not constitute a proof of its non-existence. But then I thought that to pres1Jme the existence of such a guide would not lead us any further. What we need is knowledge and certainty about it [i.e. such a guide that subdues reason]. Since this is lacking there is no other guide but reason alone. [(viii) Dream or reality. Reason, the only means of discrimination.] Then I thought of dreams. I told myself that we dream at the time of sleeping, and that in this state we consider what we dream to be real and genuine and we have no doubt whatsoever that it is authentic. But when we wake up we know that it was not genuine but only dream and fantasy. By which means are we to be certain that what we know and understand in the state of waking is truly genuine and factual? It cannot be ruled out that it is genuine in that state, at this time [of being awake]. But a f urthcr state might come which would be related to our state of waking in exactly the same way as our [present] state of waking is r~lated to the state of dreaming. At that time it would ~ known to us that our [present] state of waking was in reality a state of dreaming. But then I thought that the mere presumption of such a state 4oes not give us sufficient certainty. We must have certainty that such a state really exists. There is a wide gap between presumption and certainty. Thus, there remained no other criterion but reason. [(ix) Change and progress of the spirit-a principle beyond reason?] Again I reflected: it is possible that beyond reason there lies another way by which a change in the form or mode (iurat ya kaifiyat) of the spirit (rub) is effected. This could be the change or progress (tabaddul yd taraqqi) of the instrument for acquiring knowledge or certanity or faith. Between this mode and the earlier mode there may be the same difference as that between a healthy person and a person that only knows [theoretically, without actual experience] about -health.

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Then I thought that it is impossible to [L1111y] know about the state of health without having actually been healthy. Further, how could one, in a presumed process of a change of the form and mode of the spirit, make out which one of the two states is that of illness [and which one that of health]? Therefore the change of the form or of the mode of the spirit cannot itself be the criterion for discriminating between falsehood and truth [we look for]. Something else is inevitably needed and this can only be reason. So in whatever direction you go and from wherever you return, the reach of knowledge or certainty or faith remains confined to reason alone. [(x) Islam, the religion of complete harmony with reason.] All these thoughts have taught me that the generally held doctrine that reason has nothing to do with faith and religion is certainly mistaken and when I found Islam to be in full correspondence with reuon I became even more con·,inced and certain that Islam is true and this doctrine wrong.

V. 'Aqldah (/)21 (1872)

[(i) God the Creator, the Cause of causes.] Someone or other is the Creator of or the Final Cause of or the Cause of causes of all existing things. Allah is His narne. The foremost belief of the religion of Islam is that there is a Creator of all beings. All that exists and all that we can, in some way, understand or imagine is linked by a connecting chain so that the existence of one [thing] depends on a second and the second on a third. Thus, by necessity, this chain ends up in a final being or cause or reason (akhir wujud ya 'ii/at ya sabab). That at which it ends up is the Creator and God and the Lord of the worlds. It cannot be believed with certainty that the totality of that which exists should itself be the final cause of its own existence. If it was not a fact that every thing from among the existing 11 TA(l),

pp. 8-15.

(1. JamadI al-thani, 1289 H. (1872), 104a-106b; rpt. PMaq, I,

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things needs in its existence some other existence, or if one existence was not the effect of a second existence, we might perhaps be then entitled to believe thus [i.e. that the totality of what exists should itself be the final cause of its own existence]. But since we find every single thing to be caused by a cause how can we fail to consider the sum of these very things to be caused by some Cause of causes? [(ii) Eternity of matter and the existence of a Creator.] All things that exist truly (bi wujud-i baqiqi) are neither impossible (mumtani') nor capable of non-existence (qabil-i 'adam). If they · were impossible then why should they exist and if they were capable of non-existence then they at some time would also be non-existent. We see that no truly existing thing can ever fall into nonexistence; only a constant change of accidents or forms ('awiiri~ yii ~war) goes on. Water becomes air and air be~omes water. There are many things that become clay and again from clay are born the most wondrous of things. In short, nothing becomes non-existent; only the change of accidents and forms goes on constantly. So if the specific and the individual accidents of all existing things fall into non-existence, then what remains will be imperishable. God-be He blessed and exalted-says:

Everyone that is thereon will pass away; There remaineth but the Countenance of thy Lord of Might and Glory [Q. SS, 26 f.]. No doubt, it cannot be definitively decided what this imperishable existence that remains after the perishing of the · specific and individual accidents of all the existing things is, and whether it [i.e. the remaining imperishable existence] will be one or many. But the existence of a Creator cannot be denied because of the impossibility of that decision, since the existence or non-existence of the Creator has nothing to do with either the fact of this imperishable existence or with [the problem of] its unity or plurality. If they [i.e. the imperishable existence, taken here as a plurality] are multiple, one will, of ce>urse, then have to ask

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whether the power to ''receive'' (qabul karna)22 the accidents resides in themselves or comes to them from other existing things. That it [i.e. this power to ''receive''] should be in them themselves we cannot accept, since we see all existing things with their specific and individual accidents ''helping one another'' (mu' awin). Imagine that the specific and individual accidents of all existing things were non-existent; so what remains of the multiple imperishable existences will likewise most certainly be ''helping one another'' and there is no other cause for them to do so [i.e. to ''help one another''] but a common cause ('illat-i mushtarik). Thus there remains no doubt that the ca11se of their ''helping one another'' is some existence and this existence we call Allah. And if the imperishable existence is one then the question will arise, does .t he power to ''receive'' the accidents reside in it or is some other existence its cause? If in itself, then its name is God and if a second existence is its cause then the name of this Cause of causes is Allah. [(iii) The doctrine of wabdat a/-wujud and of wal;zdat al-shuhud.] On this matter the opinion of the great men of Islam has remained divided. Most of them say that in this imperishable existence there are two potencies, the potentia activa (ft'/) and the potentia passiva (infi'al), the latter being understood as the · potency to ''receive'' 'awari·aqlnl min Allah haiii faqaf). (xiv) The precepts of the religion of Islam are of two kinds.

First, those which are the basic precepts of religion. These are consonant with nature. Second, those which are meant to protect these fundamental precepts. In the matter of obedience [owed to them] and of [putting them into] practice, both [kinds of rules] are of the same standing. (xv) All actions and werds of the Messenger of God were truth. To attribute to the Prophet [the taking into account of] temporal advantage (ma1lal;,at-i waqt) means grave disrespect [to him] and borders on kufr. With the general public I understand ma1lobat-i waqt in the following sense-that on account of this principle, [the Prophet] pronounced a word or performed an action which, in truth, was out of place (bejah).46 ''The last sentence of principle fifteen reads slightly different in the text of TA, rpt. in PMaq, X, p. 10S-''By ma1laf,at-i waqt I understand with the general public to say or to do something else in the heart, that is to say or to pronounce a word or perform an action which, in truth, was out of place (bljah), (i.e. not demanded or allowed by the Shari'a at this instanc-e) but one has pronounced it or performed it, becoming [thus] a slave of temporal circumstances (bandah-i waqt bankar). The final remark, added by Sayyid Ahmad to the fifteen principles, differs slightly in the two versions. In the letter-''Although there are one or two more principles but whatever I have written up to date is, with the exception of one or two odd questions, based on these preceding principles alone. If therefore the ulama of Sabaranpur can inform me about the error in these principles I shall thank them wbolehearted1y. Signed, Sayyid Ahmad.'' In TA: ''We think that these fifteen principles are such that no Muslim can deny them or diffet from them. And when those people who hold a view different from ours reflect about these principles and, further, take into account that our writings are based on such true principles, then there is no surprise if they, too, come agree with us.''

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XI. On the Mode and Nature of Prophetic Revelation (from Ta/sir al-Qur'an ad Q. 2, 234' 1880) [(i) Traditional account of the event of revelation.] The meaning of ''concerning that which we reveal'' (mimmii nazzalnii) is the Qur'in which descended from God on the Prophet by means of revelation (waJ.,y). Therefore this verse cannot be understood here until the reality of waby and nubuwat are made clear.48 Revelation indeed is that which is given to a prophet by God. Yet the former exeg~tes have not stated conectly in what way it is given. They have compared God and the Messenger to a king and [his] minister in this world and have likened revelation to the word or order or message of the king and have taken Gabriel to be a corporeal angel, a messenger carrying messages between king and minister. Imam Fakhr al-din Rizi writes in his Ta/sir a/-kabir"' that whenever Gabriel had heard in the heavens the word of God he descended to the Lord Prophet and delivered this message. In writing about this he [Fakhr al-din) is faced with the diffioulty that in the speech of God there are, indeed, no letters nor sounds. So how will Gabriel have heard it? He [Fakhr al-din] answers that it is posiible that God Most High created in Gabriel such a [special faculty ofJ hearing that was able to hear the speech of God, and that He placed into him the faculty enabling him to express [to the Prophet] what he had heard. It is, further, also possible that God created the Qur'in on ''the preserved tablet'' (al-/auJ:, al-maJ.,ju~)50 in exactly the same arrangement in which Gabriel then managed to read and memorize it. Or, that God Most High may have made come forth from something corporeal, by specific sounds produced successively and in a special way and that Gabriel on his part was able to join voice with this very ''thing'' and that then God Most High declared to Gabriel that this is the very diction which fully renders our eternally pre-existent speech (kaliim-i qadim). 7

TQ, I, pp. 26-31; rpt. PM but rather a pure Muslim. Hence the truth of Islam, as God revealed it, is to acknowledge God and firmly believe in Him. One can have a firm belief in God and God's Unity only when one has become absolutely certain about His Essence and attributes, which are, in reality, one, and about His right to be worshipped, which is essential to Him. To believe in His Essence means to believe that He exists as eternal Essence without beginning or end, as One without associate. To believe in His attributes means to be certain that in no one else are attributes like His. The attributes like knowledge> mercy and life and so on are related to God. With the notion of these, other attributes inevitably enter our mind because they are associated in the imagination. Now to acknowledge that the attributes of God are pure and unalloyed [by other attributes associated \\ ith them in our mind] (mubarrd wa munazzah) means to believe firmly in the attributes of God. To believe in His right to be worshipped means that nothing but God deserves to be worshipped, that is, is worthy of worship. The person who in this way believes firmly in God is a Muslim. Not I, God Himself says so.

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[(x) •.• and risalat, i.e. one •vho finally preached

the acknowledgement of the taubid, Mubammad.] True, I

shall certainly maintain that a person who acknowledges exclusively the One God is not a Muhammadan (muf,ammadi). The usage of the Qur'an is what I have stated~ but in our time Muhammadan and Muslim (musalman) are used synonymously. The refore I consider it necessary to go to a certain extent into detail. For being a Muhammadan it is necessary that we firmly believe also in the person who, in his bounty, has taught us ttl1P.'id, because of whom we know God and recognize his attributes. Our reason tells us that we cannot refuse to believe him as the guide through whom we received guidance. It was Mul}.ammad the Messenger of God who guided us in Islam, the truth of which I have stated with such firmness. Therefore, to affirm him [i.e. Mub.ammad] a~

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the Prophet sent by God] is necessarily the second pillar of Islam, which cannot be separated from the first. It follows from this whole pauage that the person who acknowledges -God and accepts Him as One and without partner, and believes firmly in Him-yet does not affirm any prophet [before Mu)Jammad] nor the Prophet such a person certainly cannot be considered a Mohammadan or a Muslim, the latter word taken here as a synonym of the first. Yet according to the principles of Islam, it is not correct to call such a person unbeliever in the sense of associationist or to refuse to call him a unitarian (muwabbld). No doubt, to affirm the prophethood is the second pillar of Islam. From early on it has been a moot point among the ulama whether those who acknowledge only the Unity of God [i.e. without believing in the prophets and M ubammad] (muwabt,idin-i mabat!) will be in eternal hell-fire or not. Some maintained they would, whereas others said they would reach salvation after punishment. Leave this discussion to the ulama and let us stay with the saying of our Friend: ''Despite Abu Dharr I did so. ''85 . [(xi) The religious duties of Islam.] After the belief in the Unity of God and the divine mission of the Prophet (risalat) there are further elements in Islam which God has established as religious duty, for instance ritual prayer, fasting, pilgrimage, almsgiving, and so on. We consider those who do not perform these duties as sinners, and we regard the one who denies them like the one who denies the divine mission of the Prophet as not a Muhammadan or Muslim, both terms taken synonymously. With regard to his eternal punishment in hell-fire the same discussion arises which we mentioned in the context of the muwabbidin-i ma/Jaf prayer-why have they been established and how do they accord with human nature? My [first] answer is yes, they do correspond to human nature. Yet here I shall answer in another, a philosophical way. If we were to determine some other ''pillars'' for the performance of this [fundamental] duty, then the same question that arises with regard to the determining of the now established ''pillars'' of prayer will arise, with regard to the proposed ones and so on. And to raise an objection that refutes itself89 is unreasonable. Of course one must raise the point whether more excellent ~'pillars'' of prayer could not have been established. But I am certain that no person could name other ''pillars'' better than these in which all exoteric and esoteric, all inner and outer organs, all ways of respect and submission of body and soul find expression, and which impress man in accordance with the exigencies of nature.

[(xviii) Overall objective: restatement of Islam.] I have, in a succinct way, told you my thoughts concerning the religion of Islam. I have also explained ·to you why I have adopted this "Original 'ammat al-wuriid, i.e. an objection that falls back upon itself.

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new way of reaffirming Islam and of [defending it in] debate. I have also pointed out why I felt it necessary to take a stand different from that of the former ulama. It would need much time to state on which is.,ues the ulama differ among themselves, on which issues I have taken a stand different from theirs, on which of these latter issues some ancient ulama too had chosen the approach which is mine and how many points there are on which I am not on my own and all former ulama are against me. Yet now, after my statement here, I leave the critical as.,essment of the question whether what I have said is a reaffirmation (ta'id) of Islam or not-that, gentlemen, I leave to you. To end I want to say that the [kind of] reaffirmation of Islam I have adopted to my best knowledge has not come about for the reason that I am a Muslim, was born in a Muslim family and that therefore had willy nilly to reaffirm Islam. · I do not think highly of that [kind of motivation]. That a person born in a certain religion should quietly walk in it is one thing, and to set out to reaffirm your religion another. The latter work does not become a man who has not reached full certainty about it. I have reflected a lot, with an open mind about Islam. After considerable reflection and thought I became deeply convinced that if there is any true religion it is Islam alone, and I reaffirm Islam on the basis of this heartfelt certainty, not because I was born in a Muslim home and because I am Muslim. (Very loud cheers!)

XV. He is the Existent (Huwa al-Maujud), (1895)9() [(i Belief in God without proof] Everybody says it [i. e. that He

is the Existent] but when you ask them who He is they remain nonplussed. The best and most firm believers are those whose certainty doubt never manages to invade, those who believe firmly without proof. These are the people who are true and firm Muslims although they have put their firm belief in something without understanding [why], just like many other people '°TA(lll), I, pp. 197a-204a (1. Sha'bin 1312 H.; A.D. 1895); rpt. PMaq., III, pp. 301-18.

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have put their firm belief in the contrary without understanding. It just was the good fortune of the former that what they believed in firmly, alone happened to be true and ''the Straight Path.'' In reality the belief without understanding and thought is much firmer and more solid than the belief of those who raise questions. In the company of ignorant people a staunch (kat)91 mullah in his sermon narrates that when Imam Fakhr al-din Razl was on the point of dying, Satan came to him and asked him: '' By which proof have you known God?'' Razl enumerated various proofs but Satan demol,shed them all. Razi was near to dying as an unbeliever denying God, when the spirit of his pir came to him in flesh and blood and told him: ''Oh unfortunate! Tell him [i.e. Satan] I have known God without proof.'' When he said this Satan took to flight and so Imam RazI, with the help of his plr. found a good end. Such sermons make an impact on the hearts of people which the most brilliant proof cannot make. They understand that God is indeed not something to be known by proof. One must accept Him without proof. [(ii) The road of rational proof.] But when man goes a step further he meets the path of [rational] proof on which there are thousands of obstacles and numberless fords difficult to cross. Yes, no doubt only the certainty of the one who has covered this road and reached the sought-for stage can be properly called certainty. There is the same difference between a certainty based on understanding and a blind certainty, as between darkness and light, ignorance and knowledge. The scholars of Islam have made the greatest effort to walk this road and to even it out for men; in their understanding they have succeeded in making it very clear. Yet some people say that it has still remained uneven and difficult to pass. One great opponent to the . proofs of the scholars of Islam in this respect is a person that has become famous under the surname Ibn Kammunah. 92 The doubts he has raised concerning the proofs of the scholars of Islam have become famous under the name of shai/aniyah. Imam Fakhr al-din Razi has given many 1Colloquial for katta, s.b. firm if not stubborn in bis convictions. •scr. £11 , III, p. 815.

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answers to his doubt but they were not completed. On this the staunch mullahs have made up the story of Satan and Imam Razi which we have narrated above. Maulana Rumi has said with regard to exactly this: If religion's business were to be rational proof Fakbr [al-din) Razi would be the keeper of the secret of religion. [Persian] [(iii) The proofs of the naturalists.] In our days those among the Muslims who consider the [revealed] religion of God (din

Allah) and the nature of God (fitrat Allah) to mean the same and claim that pure Islam corresponds to nature, have set foot on this difficult road. In this article we want to discuss the proofs for the existence of God put forward by thes~ naturalists (nechariyin ). They say that the necessary Being or Cause of causes, i.e. the Divine Essence, is (usually) discussed in three ways. First, in reference to His existence, btcause He is existent. Second, in reference to His being without beginning, that is however far you remount from the present into the past you will not come to His beginning. Third, in reference to His being without end, that is however far you go ahead from the present time into the future, He will have no end. Thus the naturalists acknowledge the Necessary Existent to exist and to be eternal, without beginning or end. Their proof is as follows: according to the law of nature, that is qanun-i .fitrot and a' in-i fit rat, all beings in the world-as far as man has reached by his knowledge-are found to form one solidly knit chain of cause and effect. Whatever exists is the effect of some cause and this effect itself is the cause of some further effect. This chain [of cause and effect] works exactly in this way and it necessarily ends-according to nature-at a first cause. The proof for this is found in the law of nature and the law of nature is this: (i) with regard to (the existence of) cause and effect, be they external or in the mind [internal] the law of antecedence (taqaddum) and posteriority (ta'akhkhur) applies. The cause [always] precedes and the effect follows; (ii) the effect does not exist without the existence of a cause; (iii) as long as the cause does not actually exist, the effect will not actually exist; (iv) in order that the chain of

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cause and effect can exist, temporal extension, in other words time, is necessary. Time brings about the notion of antecedence and posteriority of cause and effect, be it in external or [merely] mental reality; (v) for a chain of cause and effect to be infinite, the temporal extension, in other words time, has also to be infinite; (vi) what is infinite cannot be contained in what is finite. From all these laws of nature we have stated, the existence of the Necessary Being is established. Because as soon as we declare the world to be existent, then till that point of time, we limit time to the existing time. Therefore if we now say that in the world the chain of cause and efJect extends infinitely, this is then against the law of nature because the infinite cannot be contained in the finite. An infinite chain of cause and effect necessitates an infinite duration of time and given an infinite duration of time no effect could really exist at any time, because as long as there does not exist in actual fact the complete chain of cause and effect, no effect will come in fact into existence. But the whole infinite chain of cause and effect cannot actually exist, because if it does it will not remain infinite. We see the world actually existing. Therefore it is, according to the law of nature, necessary that the final cause of the world should also actually exist and that it should not be the effect of some further cause. If this were the effect of another not actually existing cause, then it would itself not be actually existing. Therefore we call the very cause at which the chain of cause and effect of the world ends the Cause of causes. This alone we call the Divine Essence and the Necessary Being, the short name for which is Jehova and Allah and Khudii and God and which is [also] called huwa al-maujud. The same law of nature which proves the existence of the Divine Essence also proves its being necessarily existent and its being eternal without beginning nor end. Because whatever in its existence is not brought about by any cause, there is no hesitation but that it is necessary in being (wiijib al-wujud) and what is indisputably necessarily existent, must be eternal without beginning or end. These are the new revelations of our contemporary naturalists. [(iv) Impossibility for man to know the quiddity of God.] ''But

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to comprehend the inner reality of His existence (haqiqat wujudihi) is beyond the nature of man (ma fauqafitrati 'l-instin)'' [Arabic]. It is binding according to the law of nature or according to human nature to accept the existence, that is the being of the Cause of causes or the Divine Essence. But to know the quiddity of His existence or of His Essence transcends human nature. Knowing, dtinestan in Persian and 'alima in Arabic, is a mode (kaifiyat) which a man acquires by those means that are instntmental for its acquisition. They are the ten senses, five external and five internal. Sight, touch, taste, hearing and smell are the five external senses. Common sense, the faculty of imagination, memory, the estimative faculty (mutawahhimah) and the formative faculty (mutM.auwirah) 93 are the five inner senses. The five latter senses are based on the five first ones, that is we employ the latter five ones only after knowledge by way of the five first senses. Man has not come to know through those means which perceive; he has not come to know any existence which can be termed the Cause of causes. Therefore for a human being to know the inner truth of its [the Cause of causes'] existence or the quiddity of its essence, lies outside the law of nature or human nature although man, in the same way, does not know the quiddity of those things which are accessible to his knowledge. Not to know the inner truth (luzqlqac) of the existence of a being does not necessarily entail the non-existence of it, as we may hear a noise without knowing the existence of the one or something that produces it. Yet [hearing the voice] we will be certain that somebody exists who produces it, although we do not know the inner truth or quiddity of his existence. This is the case with the Divine Essence which we have [also] termed the Cause of causes. Following the law of nature we have accepted His94 existence but the inner truth of His exist· ence or the quiddity of His Essence we cannot know in this way, because to know this is beyond the nature of man. '·He has ''Printing mistake in P Maq. NFrom the original it is not clear whether the Absolute is taken here to be personal or not. •

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attributes by which He is described and attributes t·rom which He is declared to be free.'' [Arabic] · [(v) God's attributes.] At times the term ''attribute'' is applied to an attribute which is limited by the very euence of the thing it describes, for instance the being circumscribed, or the being three-dimensional of a body. Attributes of this kind, obviously, cannot be either in the Cause of causes or the Necessary Being; nor can they be related to Him because according to the law . of nature we cannot know the inner truth of His being and therefore we cannot attribute any attribute to Him, the attribution of which depends on our knowing the inner truth of His existence. There is no reason why this should be different in future. Sometimes the term attribute is applied to what comes into existence from tbe thing which is essentially defined by this very attribute. Since all things known have come into existence from the Cause of causes or the Necessary Being, their numerous attributes are attributed to Him. Yet the term attribute gives rise to two thoughts-that this attribute, although it is not found in His Essence, may well have originated in it and is added to His Essence as colour to something uncoloured. The other is that it would ''reside'' in His Essence like fluidity in water or weight in stone or attraction in a magnet. Although these examples are not quite exact, they do convey an idea at least of the identity of attribute and essence. Thus it is impossible that there should be in the Cause of causes any attribute added to the Essence, because He is eternal without beginning and end and not caused by any cause< Therefore it is impossible that there should be in Him any attribute which is not His very Essence. Following the second line of thought we can determine attributes for Him [i.e. the Cause of causes] and call Him ''qualified by attributes'' (mau1uf bi $i/dt), yet to know the inner truth and quiddity of these attributes is as much beyond our nature as it is to know the inner t1uth and quiddity of His Being. ''B~cause the attributes which are put into relation with Him are His very essence.'' [Arabic] In exactly the same way they declare Him to be free from a number of attributes which deny either His existence or which

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deny in any respect any of His accepted attributes, because the togetherness of two opposites is impossible. The scholars of Islam have given to the first group the name ~ifat-i thubutiyoh (positive attributes) and to the second ~ifat-i sa/biyah (privative attributes). ''These are nothing but technical terms which they have adopted without knowing their inner truth. So, ponder!'' [Arabic] [(vi) The attribute ''to be alive.''] Take for instance bayy, that

is ''to be alive,'' which is an attribute of the Cause of causes or the Necessary Being, and declare Him free from its opposite, namely death, and they say: ''He is the Living and does not die.'' [Arabic] But we have known the inner truth of ''to be alive'' [only] inasmuch as we have seen it in something possessing life, something which is clearly effected by many causes and therefore cannot be attributed to ihe Cause of causes or the Necessary Being. From these life-possessing beings, because of life, issue actions and it is for this reason that we call them ''alive.'' What has passed through the world of creation is passing through it and will pass through it-all of it are actions of that , Necessary Being which is the Cause of causes of their ''appearing'' in creation. Therefore they predicate of Him, too, the attribute of ''being alive'' and say: ''He is alive not through our life and we do not know the inner reality of His life.'' [Arabic] And they declare Him to be eternally. from ever and for ever, to be free from death, the opposite of life, because death is something privative and nothing privative can exist in the essence of the Necessary Being. Therefore they say: ''He is living, He dies not.'' [Arabic] [(vii) The attribute ''willing."] Or for instance murid, that is

''who uses his will." This attribute too they attribute to the Cause of causes or Necessary Being. Yet we have known the inner truth of this attribute only inasmuch as we have seen it in m4n or (other, animals and we understand that ''willing'' is a mode which originates in us by our thoughts (apne khayalat se) for f ulfil)ing our desires or for any kind of attraction to gain and defence from harm and thus becomes an accident ('aritl) or our essence (dhat ); in other words it is added to the essence

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and therefore the attribute [of will as] we know [it] cannot be attributed to the Cause of causes or the Necessary Being. But all things that come into being from thi~ Cause of causes are all His actions (al' al), which in their turn result from the attribute of will. Therefore they firmly believe the attribute of ''willing'' to be in Him. They do not understand the inner truth of this attribute and since all His attributes are identical with His Essence, they take it as exigence of His Essence (muqta(ia-i dhat). The dispute on whether the issuing of these actions [from the Cause of causes] was free or necessary is simply absurd and meaningless. Such a dispute is no longer possible when we have to do with something that is an exigency of His Essence. Shih Wall Allah writes in Tafhimat: 95 ''The dispute between the philosophers and the mutakallimun on whether God is Creator by free choice or by necessity is futile in the b2.ttlefield of meanings, because since the will (in the view of the philosophers) is the essence itself, creation has come about by necessity.'' But when we see that the works that come into existence through this Cause of causes are organized in a perfect structure and are interconnected with perfect order by a chain of cause and effect, and that they obey the law of nature. the nature of man testifies to the fact that all these works come into being by a will and exist only because of that will. ''He is 'the Doer of what He wills' [Q. 11, 107) and we do not know the inner truth of His will because His will is not the work of our will.'' [Arabic] [(viii) The attribute ''being the Creator."] Or for instance his ''being the Creator'' (khaliq ). This is also an attribute by which they qualify the Cause of causes or Necessary Being. This notion originated in man when he witnessed how from one -thing originates another. But in fact man does not at all know the real or the figurative inner truth of this attribute. He has not experienced its inner truth with any of his senses, nor was he in fact able to do so. Therefore to know its inner truth is beyond human nature. Rather, only because all beings came "Al-Ta/him4t al-il4hiyah, one of Shih Wall Allah's major works on mystical theology. Recent rpt. in Hyderabad (Sind).

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into existence through this Cause of causes or NeceMary Being, has man declared Him Creator and the existing things creatures. Thus man has ascribed the attribute of crcatorship to the Cause of causes or Necessary Being, without knowing its inner truth. This is the truth and therefore we say that He is the Creator of everything; but we do not know the ioner reality [of Him]. As with those who say, ''He is One and only onene• is.1ues from oneness. Accordingly, there proceeded from Him first the first intellect or such and such and from this proceeded such and such, and from this such and such and so on.'' Some of these maintain that there was God and there was with Him something which they call matter. From that He created things and then He separated the creatures. All these views are without foundation and they are held without [true] knowledge. The truth is that ''There was God and nothing with Him. He created and we do not know how He created because the nature of man is incapable of knowing it.'' [Arabic] [(ix) The attribut~ of knowledge.] Or for instance knowledge

('i/m), which is another attribute attributed to the Cause of causes or Necessary Being. Yet they do not know its inner truth. They only know what man [lit. we] can apprehend from the existing things by means of his senses. This [i.e. the knowing through the senses] is a mode by which the external or subjective existences arc disclosed to us. Therefore, in order that we may have knowledge, it is necessary that there exist external or subjective existences before (there can be) knowledges of su eh existences, that is to say we cannot know but by external or subjective eiistences. Furthermore, it [i.e. our knowledge] is necessarily [an attribute] added to the essence and it is connected with time which we express as past, present and future. And yet despite this we find the knowledge of the Creator (mujid) concerning a particular thing to be wider than our knowledge of it. He holdi the knowledge of the parts and the whole of a given thing in His mind before it comes into existence. The coming into existence of it and its special states in . the future do not add anything to His [already externally existing] knowledge of it. Not even the distinction of time regarding it matters to His knowledge. Past, present and future are equal

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as far as His knowledge is concerned. In any case we cannot ascribe to the Cause of causes or Necessary Being the attribute of knowledge which we know and which is in need of the existence of objects of knowledge (ma'lumiit) and which exists as added to the essenc.e. Yet since, acoording to natural law, we have accepted that whatever has come into existence by the Cause of causes or Necessary Being has come into existence by His will and that He is the Creator of all created things, so human nature testifies to the fact that the attribute of knowledge too belongs inseparably to Him. Further, that He is not bound by the existence of objects of knowledge and that there is no distinction of time in Him. They call Him ''the Knower of the Invisible and the Visible'' [Q. 13, 9 passim], and ''He is the Knower of every creation'' [Q. 36, 79], and we call this knowledge taqdir ( decreeing; the ordaining of Providence). [(x) The attributes of hearing and seeing.] Included in the attribute of knowledge are those of sami' wa b~ir, that is the Hearer and the Seer, because hearing and seeing are further means of knowledge for men. But since we have said with regard to the Cause of causes and the Necessary Being that ''He knows the hidden and the manifest," we do not need to discuss the means of knowledge from man's point of view. Since hearing and seeing are in man's mind numbered among the special means of knowledge, and $ince from them arises the conception of the perfection of knowledge, they have been ascribed to the Cause of causes or Necessary Being as two separate attributes with the names of hearing and seeing. But let us reflect-do we know the inner truth of these attributes? We know this to be the truth of hearing-that in our ear there is a very fine membrane and when the surrounding air is hit by a blow a circular wave is produced, as happens in water when a pebble is thrown into it. This wave reaches the membrane of the ear and is instrumental in our hearing. Hearing in this way is effected by various causes, and so is something quite unconnected from the reality of the faculty of hearing (sam') of the Cause of causes or Necessary Being. Thus, the reality of the hearing we know of is not the reality of the hearing of the Cause of causes or Necessary Being.

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We know it to be the true nature of seeing that in the eyehole on the transparent screen of the eye and the fluid on it a reflection is produced because of the light in front of us, as it happens in photography. So we can see the things before our eyes. This true nature of our seeing needs the existence of various things as a precondition and it is caused by many causes and thus it cannot be attributed to the Cause of causes or Necessary Being. But in the same way as we accept, in accordance with the law of nature, the [attribute of] knowledge of the Cause of causes or Necessary Being, a knowledge which is not linked with the existence of objects of knowledge and in which there is no distinction of time, in the same way again, in conformity with the law of nature, we are led to accept the [divine] attributes of the Heartr and Seer, which are in fact implied in the attribute of 'i/m-without our thereby having to accept the existence [in God] of a voice or of eyes.96 Therefore, they say, ''He is the Hearer, the Knower [cf. Q. 2, 137; 17, 1], He is Seer of His slaves [cf. Q. 40, 44], He is Aware of what is hidden in men's breasts [cf. Q. 3, 119] but itis beyond human nature to comprehend the quiddity of His hearing and seeing.'' [Arabic] [(xi) The attribute of ''possessor of power.''] Or for instance the attribute of qadir, that is to be a possessor of power. This too is an attribute they ascribe to the Cause of causes or Necessary Being. The common understanding of qadir is to hold in obedience to one's will, that over which one has power, and to dispose of it as one pleases. If they should attribute this meaning to man and to the Cause of causes [in the same sense] then one has to accept different things-man does not hold power over all existing things, whereas the Cause of causes or Necessary Being, who is the one that leads forth [from non-existence to existence] or brings forth or creates all existing things, present and future, necessarily has power over them all. The power of man [over existing things] depends upon his members and his external and internal forces. The power of the Cause of causes or Necessary Being, on the ''Read mu/xq~irat (lit. what causes to see).

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contrary, does not depend on these [forces which man depends on]. The power of man is limited and at times it fails, that is man cannot do what he wants to do. In contrast, the Cause of • causes or Necessary Being which is the Creator of all beings, whether they exist now or in future, is neither in His power linked with or limited by bodily members; nor can He ever fail. Jn short, therefore, it can be said that His power is not like our power. Consequently it is beyond human nature to understand the quiddity or inner truth of His power and therefore it is said, ''He has Power over all things and we do not know the inner truth of His power.'' [Arabic) [(xii) The law of cause and effect and God's omnipotence.] Yet

there persists a doubt in the heart of man-if one accepts that all beings came into existence by the Cause of causes or Necessary Being and that they are bound into the chain of cause and effect so as to obey nature and that whatever comes into existence conforms to [the law of] the chain [of cause and effect]-then one may well ask that, given these facts, is not the Cause of causes or Necessary Being simply without function? Indeed, to accept such a notion of [the function of] the chain of cause and effect means to render non-existent His attribute of power. In short, [this view holds] that what He had to do is done. Now there is not left in Him the attribute of power; nor is there left power in Him to do anything against this chain [of cause and effect]. The Jews, following this idea, have fixed the day of the Sabbath. They say that God, whom we give the name Cause of causes or Necessary Being, having done everything in the course of six days, has retired to rest on the seventh one. But this doubt ari&es because of several errors. The first is that one considers the works of the Cause of causes or Necessary Being to be limited in the same way as the works of man actually are. One imagines His works to be restricted to this tiny [lit. egg-like] world, other than which there is nothing. A humorous story has it that once upon a time a dervish, dressed in worn,- dirty and tattered garments, barefooted and with dirty hair, appeared at a royal court. He began to talk the way dervishes do. The king asked him, ''God has done what there was to do for Him. Tell me, what does God do

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now?'' The dervish answered, ''Greetings, oh king! This surely is a weighty, a royal question. Ir for a little moment you would descend from the throne and allow me to sit on it then I may answer your royal question in a royal condition.'' The king agreed and descended from the throne. The dervish mounted upon the throne, and the King stood before it, his hands folded [in obeisance]. Then from the throne the dervish gave th~ answer, ''He has put a dervish like me on the throne and put you, the king, standing before me in obeisance.'' After these words the dervish descended from the throne and took the road to the jungle. The second error is [to a"ume] that since, when man completes a task, the connection between him and the work is severed, so likewise, when the Cause of causes or Necessary Being completes a work, there too the connection with the work is broken. But in the case of the Cause of causes, of the Necessary Being, the link between cause and effect is never broken. This continual existence is in fact the reason for the existence of the caused being. If this connection of ca11sality between cause and effect was broken only for a little moment, the existence of the effect, too, would be obliterated. [No, this link of causality persists] as a lamp continues to be connected with the current of electricity after it is lit. Once the lamp is cut off from the electricity the existence of the light does not • persist. As to the third error [we must know] that the Cause of causes or the Necessary Being Himself, by His power and will, has created the law of nature (qaniin-i fitrat) and this statute of nature (a'in·i fitrat); it is the very demand of power and the perfection of nature that it remains functioning without flaw in the same way as He has put it into creation. In this way His power appears in its perfection. Now how strange to consider that His keeping nature going according to an established order should be considered a sign of his lack of power, especially since nothing prevents Him from completely changing the law of nature and from creating a new one and instituting a [new] chain of cause and effect in accordance with it ! Do we know up to what moment He has instituted the present law of nature, and when its time is over? At what moment by His omnipotence will a new la,v of nature come into being? What-

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ever law of nature He shall create, it will not change [in itself]. To think that the divine attribute of power entails that God would [for instance] at one time [allow] a fire to light and at another time not, that at one time He would let a heavy article sink into water and at another float, at one time allow the sun to move and at another to let it stand still, at one time let barley grow from the seed of wheat and at another wheat from the seed of barley, at one time to let something come to exist from nothing and at another to make an event that should come about fail to happen-to conceive of God's omnipotence in this way makes a laughing stock of the power of the Cause f causes or Necessary Being and denies [the testimony of]revealed evidence-''There is no altering (the laws of) Allah's creation'' [Q. 30, 30]. [To argue in the foregoing way] amounts to saying that since the Cause of causes or Necessary Being does not have the power to create a second Cause of causes like Himself, how can He be omnipotent? Such questions are absurd because one element of such a question invalidates the other. [(xiii) Conclusion and summary.] 1· have stated these few

attributes by way of example, but the same applies to all the attributes which are ascribed to· the Cause of causes or Necessary Being. In this way, following the law of nature, an understanding of God or the Cause of causes, or Necessary Being, or whatever name you give Him, is established in man's mind. No doubt He is Existent, because reason and nature prove His ·e xistence and its necessity with the same conclusiveness [lit. in the same way] as one multiplied by one is one and two multiplied by two are four and if I have a third equal to two equals I have three equal to one another. It is also in accordance with human nature that we do not know the inner reality of His existence. Therefore it is firmly believed that He exists neither in bodily form nor defined by any location, that is to say he is not the dweller of any dwelling place. Further, the same Jaw of nature and human nature establishes the fact that it is also necessary that there be attributes in the Cause of causes or the Necessary Being, but we do not know

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the essential reality of these attributes in the way that W4t know them [in created beings]. Therefore we must acknowledge the following and state again what we stated already earlier. 97

XVI. The Word of God (Khudii kii Kalam)98 (1897) l(i) The n1eaning and event of revelation.] The ''Proof of Islam,'' Imam GhazalJ, in his book Ma'arif al-'aqliJ·ah" has written very correctly the following proposition: the Word of God is not like the word of men. Then he writes that the Divine Word does no more than pour (ifar!ah-karna)lOO the hidden contents of its own knowledge (maknunat-i i/m)lOI into the hearts of others. Further on in one place he explains that the Divine Word is nothing else but the conveying of meaninga (ma' ani) to the intelligences ('uqul) . according to the measure of their respective capacities. And the whole Word (ka/am) meant to be recited to hearers is called speech (qaul). Baaed upon this they say that the knowledge of God is Word (kalam) and to place it into the heart of somebody or to convey it to the heart of somebody is Speech (qaul). Then they say that if a person, because of the purity of his soul or the force of his intellect, hears this Speech, he is clearly the ''bearer of revelation and apostleship'' ($tihib-i •va(iy aur risalat) and another person who bears through the faculty of thought (quwat-i fikr) Here Sayyid A}Jmad Khan literally quotes himself from TK, cf. DA. II, no. 2 above. Yet he sJightly alters the last sentence. In TK: ''Now, can anyone know such an essence by reason ('aql')''? Here: ''Now, can anyone know the inner truth of such an essence by reason-always aranted that we can know His mere existence by reason?" Then, in our text, he concludes: ''It is not such a concept (mafhiim) that it could not enter the mind of man-because its · being understood and its entering the mind are in full accord~nce with human nature." 118 TA(lll), III, pp. 184-86 (1st Sha'ban 1314 H./A.D. 1897.) 111 Full title-Ma'arif al-'aqliyah wa lubab al-bikmah (bikam) al-ildhiyah. cf. Brock., I, p. 42S, no. 54. About logic, metaphysics, speech, writing and decision. 100Lit. to make emanate out of overflowing bounty .. 101Does Sayyid Ahmad Khan use a Persian version of the work? 117

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and the superior strength of his estimative fctculty (ghalbah-i wahm) is the ''bearer of inspiration'' (~ahib-i ilhlim). The distinction the Imam makes between kalam and qaul is obviously unnecessary. The debate is concerned with the meaning of the Word of God. Since the Imam makes kalam or qau/ solely dependent on the pouring out of meanings in which there is no voice, how can it be correct to say that whereas one person bears it [i.e. the word or speech] distinctly, someone else hears it through his faculty of thought and the superior strength of his estimative faculty? Furthermore, if it was only a pouring out of meanings which the person on whom they were poured out stated in his own words, how can these words (which the person stated] have been the Word of God? [(ii) Revelation of explicit words and revelation of meanings.] In our opinion the ulama have needlessly complicated this simple, straightforward issue and thus, instead of becoming clear it has only been complicated further. It is self-evident that meanings cannot be conveyed to somebody else without [using] words or signs peculiar to them. Yet, these meanings are conveyed in two ways-first by a specified word102 or secondly by a nonspecified word. If for instance someone says to somebody else, '' Tell so and so on my behalf that I am very grateful and obliged to him for the kindness he has shown me,'' this is conveying meanings by specified word. And if for example someone tells somebody else, ''Please express thanks on my behalf to this and this person for the good he has done to me,'' then this is conve,Ying meanings by non-specified word, because [in this caseJ only the purport (ma(imun) has been conveyed whereas the [choice of the] words in readering thanks has been left to the intermediary. If the first person reproduces exactly the same words that he was told, then one can say that this word is that of the person who conveyed it to him. But suppose the person to whom this word has been delivered forgets it and does not reproduce it [euctJy] but rather gives its purport [only] in bis [ow.n] words, then one will not call these words the word of the speaker1°'hl la/~ aJ-makh,u,. Here and later, the article al seems repeatedly a (printing) mistake, or we read bl 'I-lo/~ al-makh1u,. •

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even though the purport is the same. This exactly is the reason why we cannot call ''the word of the Prophet''-God bless him and grant him salvation-those traditions which were not stated literally (bi-la/?,ihi), that is in exactly the same words he-God bless him and grant him salvation-had used but which were rather stated in their meaning (bi '1-ma'ni) only-always accepting the supposition that the import [of these words] was the same as that stated by the Prophet-God bless him and grant him salvation. This is so [i.e. those Traditions are only word of the Prophet (bi 'l-~a'ni) because they (i.e. the words of these Traditions) are not the [exact] words which the Prophet-God bless him and grant him salvation-had stated. [(iii) The revelatory character of the Qur'an.] With regard to the Glorious Qur'in we believe that the Prophet recited to the people exactly the same words in which God had conveyed the meanings to tho Prophet-God bless him and grant him salvation. Therefore we call it the Divine Word or the Word of God and we believe firmly in it. We do not accept that those [exact] words would have been forgotten or that [merely] the purport [conveyed by God] should be stated in different words, because God bas said, "Lo! We verily are its Guardian'' [Q. 15, 9] and ''We shall make thee read (0 Mub.ammad) so that thou shalt not forget'' [Q. 87, 6], except tbat which pleases God. Sometimes it also happened that the Prophet said that God bas said this, and then he stated the purport [of what God had said] in [his own] words and sentences, but did not order them to be entered into the Qur'in orto have them recited with it. Therefore it is understood that these meanings were not conveyed by express speech and so this [kind of word] is not called the Divine Word. Rather, it is called ''word of the Prophet''peace be upon him-and f,adith qudsi (holy Tradition).10.1 Accordingly it is a saying of the ulama-''As to the Qur'in, its word must be from God Most High, whereas in the f,adith qudsi the word may also be from the Prophet-God bless him and grant him salvation.'' This is the very reason why the scholars of the Arabic language can well distinguish between °'Cf. El 1 , III, pp. 28-29 (article on l.ladith qudsi).

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the Word of God and the Traditions of the Messenger of God and find a clear difference between the two. [(iv) The divine attribute of speech.] What remains to be discussed now is God as Speaker (mutakallim) and [His] conveying meanings by express speech, which is called His Word. Takai/um {speech) and kalam (word) are two of the attributes of the Divine Essence. But we have already established by rational and revelational arguments stated in. our various writinWI, that God is the Cause of causes for the existence of beings. We establish the attributes of the Divine Essence in His Essence, not for the reason that after having acquired the knowledge of those attributes and after having found out their inner truth we would then establish them in the Divine Essence. Rather, we establish them on account of the fact that in the Cause of causes, which is the ground (ba'ith) of the existence of beings, there must necessarily be an attribute somehow similar to those attributes we express by [the words] life, hearing, .seeing, speaking. And [yet] we do not know and cannot know how and why these attributes are in the Divine Essence, because these attributes, the inner truth of which we know and can know, cannot be related in any way to the Divine Essence which exists from eternity to eternity. Thus it results that we call Him mutakallim (Speaker) and [yet] do not know how this attribute is in Him, and that we believe with certainty in His word (kalam) and yet do not know bow his ''speaking'' (ka/am karna) exists. But we do know with certainty that He does not ''speak'' as we do and that His Word is not like our word. [(v) What is a prophet?] Now reflecting about the faculties

which God the Creator has created in man in different degrees, [we find that] there are in man also faculties according to which at times he bears words without anyone speaking [being present] and at times he sees somebody speaking and hears his word being [himself] either asleep or awake. Sometimes most subtle problems which were not solved even after long drawn out reflection, at some moment, without any thinking and reflecting, these problems suddenly become solved. It seems as if something has dropped from above, as it were, into the heart to solve this problem. We accept that these things (yeh umur)

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originate from the same facuities which God Himself has created in man. But we find also that these f acuities are in man in different degrees. We cannot deny that in some such person whose facuities have been created in a special way for a particular tas~ this f acuity is extremely strong. Thus the person on whom God has bestowed to the highest degree the f acuity of spiritual and moral teaching and the task of whom it is to give guidance [to men in their duty] to keep in balance the angelic and the bestial powers (quwti-i malakuti aur bahimi)1 God has created in man and [the person whose task it is] to teach men works by which these opposing powers may remain in balance -such a person they call ''prophet'' and ''messenger'' and the faculty by which such a person works, they name habitus of prophethood.

°'

[(vi) Divine revelation.] Those things which ''arrive'' (wtirid h-011 hain) because of this habitus of prophethood they call divine revelation (waby min Allah). And they believe with certainty that he [i.e. the prophet] sometimes (i] hears a word (kaltim) without any speaker (being present) and sometimes [ii] sees (either in a dream or being awake) someone speaking and that this person [whom the prophet thus sees] becomes firmly established in his memory or mind and that sometimes [iii] in the heart [of a prophet] all by itself without mediation something is communicated (kisi bat ka i/qti); these are, in fact, the three ways in which revelation descends. In the Traditions too, there are stated exactly these three ways in which revelation comes down, namely, [i] the coming of the voice, [ii] somebody addressing himself [to the prophet...... in a dream or while awake or (iii] that there is a communication in the heart. These [ ways] are in conformity with human nature.

[(vii) The divine attributes, law of nature and revelation.] The manifestation of God's attributes always proceeds according to 1

°'Two mutually opposed powtrs, the angelic and the brutish. have been put by the Creator God into man's nature_ (quwa-i mutar/ddah malakiiti aur J.,ayawdni yd nafsanl J~ us mlif rakhl ga'I haill, TA(l), IV, p. 13). This very much resembles tho teaching of Shih Wall Allah Dihlawl. Cf. A.J. Halepota, Philosophy of Shah Waliullah (Lahore: Sind Sagar Academy. n.d.), pp. 44 47.

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351

these laws of nature which He Himself has determined for the manifestation of the attributes. Thus for the delivery of the Word and the sending down of revelation, He has con§tituted as a law of nature that power which we interpret as the habitus of prophethood and which is, in the Holy Law, called Gabriel and Rul;,-1 amin. The purpose [of this divine act] is that a mah whom God has favoured with faculties of special spiritual and moral inclination, f acuities by which to guide man in the maintenance of equilibrium between (his] angelic and bestial powers, [and also to see to it] that those things shottld appear in man for which these powers in him have been created. When through these facul~ies which we call the habitus of prophethood, meanings are poured out to him [i.e. the prophet, here probably especially the Prophet] in specified word, then this is the manifestation of the attribute of Speech which the Creator God possesses. Therefore these words are called the Spf cch of God and men ascribe to God the attribute of Speech, saying: God spoke this and this because He is the Cause of causes for the creation of these f acuities in the prophets-peace be upon them-and this is the reason for the communication of meanings (ilqa' al-ma'ilni) in the hearts of the prophets by specified word for a particular aim [the conveying of meanings], which God has bestowed in a special way on the prophets-peace be upon them. But as to you and us, there are no such f acuities in us and what is conveyed to us is not the Word of God but rather our own words. We take refuge to God from the evil of our souls and the offenses of our deeds. Whom God guides for him there is no misguider and whom He misguides there is no guide for him. And I profess there is no God but He and I witness that Mub,ammad is His Servant and Messenger, and finally, our invitation:165 Praise to God the Lord of the worlds!

Text reads da'wilnt2 (our claim), printing error. The correct word Is da'K'atund (our invitation). 106

,

Bibliography

MAIN WORKS QUOTED BY SIR SAYYID AHMAD KHAN IN

TabJ in al-ka/iim ISLAMIC

I. Qur'iin Commentaries: Mafiitlb al-ghaib, commonly called al·Ta/Jir al-kablr or Tafsir•i kab'fr by Muh. b. 'Umr Fakhr al-din al-Razi (1149-1209). Anwar al-tanzll M'a asriir al-ta"wl/ by 'Abd Allah b. 'Umr alBai4awl (d. 1286/87). Madiirik al-tanzll K'a baqii'iq al-ta'K·i / by J:lafi~ al-din b. Mabmud al-Nasafi (d. 1310). Tarjumiin al-Qur'iinfi 'l-ta/Jlr al-musnad, abbrev. al-Durr almanthur /1 'l-tafs1r al-n,a'thur, by Jalal al-din SuyutI (14451505). If. Hadith Collections an,J Commentaries: Sab'fb hy Mui). lsma'Il al-Bukhari (d. 869-70) and its Commentary Fatb al·bari' Ji sharl) -a l-Bukhari by Shihab al-din alQastalanI (d. 1517). Mishkiit al-ma~iibi/.t by Wali al-din al-Khatib al-TabrizI (d, 1336). Persian version by Shah WaJI Allah al-DihlawI (1703-63). III. Ulul ~1-tasflr: AI-Fauz al-kabir Ji u$ul al-ta/sir by Shah Wali Allah alDiblawI. IV. Ka/am: . Jl)yii' 'ulum al-din by Abu l:famid M. b. M. al-Ghazal1 (1091/92-1111/2) . • Jawal1ir al-Qur' an, attributed to the same al-GhazalI.

354

Bibliography

V. Tafat1wuf: Fu1u,1 al-1;,ikam by Mu))y1 al-din b. al-Arabi ( 1165-1265). S/1arl;,/11~u~ al-bikam by ShaikhMubibb Ilahabadi(l587-1648). VI. Dictionary: al Qamus al-mubll by Abil 'l-'fahiral-Shirazi (1329-1415). JEWISH

Commentary on the Pentateuch by Solomon ben Isaak Rashi (1040-1105). CHRISTIAN

I. Bible Commentaries: Horne, Thomas Hartwell. An Introduction to the Critical Study and Knowledge of the Holy Scriptures, 1st ed. London: T. Cade11, 1818. (Cf. TK, I, pp. 47-49, passim.) Scott, Thomas. The Holy Bible, containing the Old and New Testaments, 5th ed., London, 1822. Numerous later editions. (Cf. TK, I, p. 17.) Lardner, Nathaniel. The Works of Nathaniel Lardntr D.D., 10 vols., London, 1835. This is only one of numerous reprints and re-editions. (Cf. TK, I, p. 45, passim.) D'Oyly, George and Mant, R. The Holy Bible ( with notes), 1st ed., London, 1814. Many subsequent editions. (Cf. TK, I, p. 43.) Lowth, Patrick, et al. A Critical Commentary and Paraphrase on the Old and New Testament, and the Apocrypha, 4 vols. London, 1853. (First published in 1809.) (Cf. TK. II, p. 357.) Colenso, Jobn William. /'he Pentate11ch and Book of Joshua Critically Examined. London: Longman, 1862-79. (Cf. TK, II, p. 292, passim.) l l. Other Works: Eadie, John. A Biblical Cyclopaedia.. or Dictionary of Eastern Antiquities, etc., London, 1849. Many subsequent edi1ions. (Cf. TK, II, p. 212, passim.) Anon. Ecce Homo, or A Critical Inquiry into the History of Jesus Christ, being a Rational Analysis of the Gospels, London, 1799. Many subsequent rpts. (Cf. TK, I, p. 57.) Muir, William. Ma5il)i kalisii ki tiirikh, Agra, 1848. (Cf. TK, I. P· 93)

355

Bibliography

Mosheim, Johann Lorenz von. An Ecclesiastical History; Ancient and }!odern, from the Birth of Christ to the Beginning of the Present Century. Translation from the original by A. Maclaine, 2 vols., London, 1765.

PUBLICATIONS D~LING WITH THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF SAYYID AHMAD KHAN

Abbot, Freeland. 'Abd al-1:laqq, Maulwi.

Islam and Pakistan. Ithaca (New York): Cornell University Press, 1968. Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan: ]Ja/at o afklir. Karachi: - Anjumal'•i taraqqi-i Urdu,

1959. The Influence of Englis/1 Literature · on Urdu Literature. London: Foster, 1924. Abdullah, S.M. Spirit and Substance of Urdu Prose under the Influence of Sayyid Ahmad Khan. Lahore: M. Ashraf, 1940. 'Abdur Rafi' Khan. ''Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan's Political Ideas and Activities,'' Proceedings of Pakistan H1storicol Co11ference, 2 ( 1952),

'Abd al-Latif.

pp. 255-67. 'Abid Husain, Sayyid. The Destiny of Indian Muslims. London: Asia Publishing House, 1965. al-Afghani, Jamal Maqaliit-i Jamal al-dln Afghani (ed.), al-din. Qazi 'Abd al-Gbaflar. Hyderabad: Dir al-isha 'ah al-siyas1yah, 1944. Le Mouvement des Mujiihidln dans I' lnde awe Ahmad, Aziz. X/Xe siec/,, Orient, 4 (19E0), pp. 105-16. ''Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Jamal al-din alAfghani and Muslim India," SI, 13 (1960),

pp. 5S-78. Islamic Modtrnism in India and Pakistan 1857-1964. London: OUP, 1967. An Intellectual History of Islam in India. Edinburgh: University Press, 1969. ''A1·gban1's Indian Contacts,'' JAOS, 89

(1969), pp. 476-504.

I

356

Ahmad, Aziz and

Bibliography

Musli1n Self-Statement in India and G.E. von Pakistan 1857-1968. Wiesbaden: 0. Grunebaum. Harrassowitz, 1970. Albiruni, A.II. Makers of Pakistan and Modern Muslim India. Lahore: M. Ashraf, 1950. See S.M. lkram. 'Ali Bak.hsh Khan. Ta'id al-Islam. Lucknow: Newal Kishore, 1873. Ri5ii/a/1 mu'ay)'·id al-Qur'dn. Luck.now: Newal Kishore, 187?. Tardid al-ib!iil. Luck.now: Newal Kisbore, 1874. Shihiib al-thaqib. Lucknow: Ncwal Kishore, 1873. Hidayat al ]Jaramain ( decisions of the Muftis of Mecca and Medina condemning Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan as a heretic), Lucknow, 1874. Addresses and Speeches Relating to the Nawab Mohsinul-Mulk (ed.). Mahomedan Anglo-Oriental College in Aligarh. From its foundation in 1875 up to 1898 (Urdu and English text). Aligarh: Institute Press, 1898. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan: A Select BiblioAligarh Muslim graphy. AJigarh: Maulana Azad Library, Univenity. 1971. ''Sir Syed Ahmad Khan. A Study of his Life Anon. and Work'' by a Mussalman, Th, Indian Review, 10 (1909), pp. 753-60. Indian Nation Builders, 3rd rev. ed. Madras: Ganesh Publishers, 1918. al-Bahi, Muhammad. Al-fikr a/-lslaml al-hadlth wa $ilatuhu bi 'l-isti'mdr al-' Arabi (Arabic). Beirut: Dar al-fikr, 1973. Tire Reform and Religious Ideas of Sir Baljon, J.M.S. Sayyid Af,mad Khan. Leiden: Brill, 1949. Modern Muslim Koran Interpretation (18801960). Leiden: Brill, 1968.

Bibliography Bannerjea, D.N. Beck, Theodore.

Bhatnagar, S.K. Chatterjee, Lal it Mohan and Syamprasad Mookerjee. Cragg, Kenneth.

357

India's Nation Builders. London: Headley Bros., 1919. Reviews on Syed Ahmed Khan's Life and Works. By Lieutenant-Colonel G.F.I. Graham, being extracts from English and Anglo-Indian Newspapers. Aligarh: Institute Press, 1886. History of the M.A.O. College, Aligarh. Bombay: Asia PublishingHouse, 1969. Representative Indians. Calcutta: The Popular Agency, 1936.

Counsels ;,, Contemporary I slam. Edinburgh: University Press, 1965. Cumming, Sir John. Political India 1832-1932: A Co-operative Survey of a Century. London: Humphrey Milford/OUP, 1932. Dar, Bashir Ahmad. Religious Thought of Sayyid Ahmad Khan, 2nd ed. Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1961. '' Renaissance in lndo-Pakistan (continued): Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan as a ReligioPhilosophical Thinker.'' Chapter 81 in M.M. Sharif, A History of Muslim Philosophy, vol. 2, pp. 1598-1614. Escott, T.H.S. (ed.). The Pillars of the Empire. London: Chapman and Hall, 1879. Farquhar, J.N. Modern Religious Movements in India, 2nd ed. New York: Macmillan, 1929. Fa~l al-dID (ed.). Tahdhlb al-akhlaq: A collection of essays and speeches on education and ethics (Urdu). Vol. I by Mul)sin al-Mulk, vol. 2 by Sayyid Abmad Khan, vol. 3 by M. Chiragh 'Ali. Lahore: Mujtabii 'I Press, 1894-96. Gibb, H.A.R. Whither Islam? London: V. Gollancz, 1932. Modern Trends in Islam. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1947.

358 Gol dziber, Jgnaz. Oopal,Ram.

Graham, G.F.I.

Guimbretiere, A.

Hamid, Abdul. Hampton, H.V. Haq, Mmhir U. Hardy, Peter.

Hauaan, M.R.

Hedayatullah, Muhammad.

Husain, M. Hadi. lkram,S.M.

Bibliography Die Richtungen der lslamischen Koranauslegung. Leiden: Brill, 1920. Indian Muslims: A Political History, 18581947. Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1959. The Life and Work of Syed Ahmad Khan, K.C.S.1. Edinburgh: W. Blackwood, 1885. New and rev. ed.: London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1909. ''Le Reformisme Mus11lman en lnde," Oritnt, 16 (1960), pp. 15-41; ibid., 18 (1961), pp. 35-5S. Muslim Separatism in India. Lahore: OUP, 1967. Biographical Studies in Modern, Indian Education. Madras: OUP, 1947. Muslim Politics in Modern India 1857-1947. Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1970. The Muslims of British India. Cambridge: University Press, 1972. '' Afkar-i Sir Sayyid tirikh kI rosbn1 men, '' Tarjumiln (Aligarh), vol. 1, no. 23/24 (20.10.1960), p. 19. ''The Educational Movement of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, 1858-1898,'' Ph.D. Thesis, London University, 1960. Sayyid Ahmad: A Study in the Religious Reform Mol'ement of Sayyid Ahmod of Ra'e Bareli. Lahore: M. Ashraf, 19'/0. A History of the Freedom Moverr,ent, 4 vols. Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society, 1960 ff. Syed Ahmad Khan. Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1970. Makers of Pakistan and Modern Mus/i'II India. Lahore: M. Ashraf, 1950. Mauj-i Kauthar. Lahore: Ferozsons, 1968.

359

Bioliography

'lmid al-d10 Lahiz.

lmdad al-'AII AkbaribidI

Iqbal 'All, Maulwl Sayyid.

Tanqltl al-kha1·a/at, 4 pts. Lahore: Pun-

jab Religious Book Society, 18 84. Hidayat al-Musl1mln. Lahore: Matha' MaJla' Nur, 1868. Imdad al-afaq. Kinpur: Matba'-i Ni~imi, 1290 H. Ma!,dhir al-baqq. Kanpur: Matba'-i Nur, 1285 H. Sayyid Ahmad Khan ka safarnamah·i P.unjiib. Aligarh: Aligarh Institute Press,

1884. Iqbal, Muhammad.

Islam and Ahmadism, with a reply to

questions raised by Pundit . Jawaharlal Nehru. Lahore: Anjuman-i khuddam-udd10, 1936. Jain, M.S.

JalilI, Farrukb.

Jones, L. Bevan. Keddie, Nikki R.

Kennedy, J.

Khalid, Detlev. Khan, Mustafa.

Kraemer, H. Lyall, Alfred C.

The Aligarh Movement (1858-1906): Irs Origin and Del'e/opment. Agra: Sri Ram

Mehra, 1965. ''Sar Saiyid ki angrezdushmani," Da'•vat (Delhi), Aligarh Muslim University Number, 3.8.1972, pp. 61 f. The People of the Mosque. London: Stu • dent Christian Movement Press, 1932. An Islamic Response to ln1perialism: Political and Religiow Writing, of Sayyid Jamal ad-din ''al-Afghanl'', Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968. ''Personal Reminiscences of Sir Syed Ahmad," The Imperial and Asiatic Qi,arterly Review, 6 (1898), pp. 14S-51. ''Some Aspects of Neo-Mu'tazilism," Islamic Studies, 8 (1969), pp. 319-47. An Apology for the '' Ne1v Light'' or Considerations on a Recent Movement in the Indian Mahon1edan Society. Allahabad: Pioneer Press, 1891. ''Islam in India Today," MW, 21 (1931), pp. 151-76. Asiatic Studies, Religious and Social. London: John Murray, 1882.

360

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McDonough, Sheila The Authority of the Past: A Study in Three Muslim Modernists. Charnbersburg, Pennsylvania: American Academy of Reli • gion, 1970. Mahdi 'Ali Khan, Mukiitabiit al-khullan. M. Uthman MaGNawab. bul (ed.). Aligarb: Matha' Ahmadi, 1915. A History of English Education in India, Mahmood, Syed. 1781-1891. Aligarh: M.A.O. College, 1895. Mal)miid Al)mad Sirat·i Faridiyah. Karachi: Pak. Academy, Barkatl, l:lakim(ed.). 1964. Maiello, Amedeo. ''Si: Sayyid Ahmad Khan and the Chris• tian Challenge,'' Annali de Institute Oritnta/e di Nopoli, 36 ( J976), pp. 85102. Malik, Hafccz. Moslem Nationalism in India and Pakistan. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1963. ''The Religious Liberalism of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan,'' MW, 54 ( 1964), pp. 160-69. ''Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan's Doctrines of Muslim Nationalism and National Progress,'' Modern Asian Studies, 2 (J 968), pp. 221-44. ''Sir Sa)yid Ahmad Khan's Contribution to the Development of Muslim Nationalism in India," Modern Asian Studies, 4 (1970), pp. 129-47. Malik, Hafcez and Sir SaJ,!yid Ahn1ad Khan's History of the Morris Dembo. Bijnor Rebellion (translation, with notes and introduction). Michigan: Asian Studies Centre, Michigan Univ~rsity, 1973. The Evolution ofIndo-Muslim Thought after May, L.S. 1857. Lahore: M. Ashraf, 1970. Morison, Theodore. T/1e History of the M.A.O. College, Ali· garlz: Fron, its Foundation to the Year 1903. Allahabad: Pioneer Press, 1903. New Ideas in India_ during the Nineteenth Morrison, John. Century. .Edinburgh: Morton, 1906.

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My Life, a Fragment, on Autobiographical Sketch, Afzal Iqbal (ed.). Lahore: M. -Ashraf, 1942.

Muhammad Qasim Nanotaw1. Muin-ud-din Ahmad Khan.

Mujeeb, M.

Ta$jiyah al-'aqa•id. Deoband: Kutubkha• nah-i I'zaziyah, n.d. A Bibliographical Introduction to Modern Islamic Development in India and Pakistan 1700-1955, appendix to the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Pakistan, Dacca, 1959. The Indian Muslims. London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1967.

Narayanan, N.

Modern Indian Worthies, rev. ed. Madras: Macmillan, 1926.

Tiryiiq dar JaK·ab TahdhJb, a/-akh/iiq. Delhi: Na~ir al-din, Abu ~I-Mansur . Nu~rat al-matabi', 1297 H. • Natesan, G.A. (ed.). Eminent Mussalmans. Madras: Natesan and Co., 1925. Nawazish 'Ali. HaJ·at-i Sir Sayyid. Lahore: Muh. Aslam Tajir, 1904. Nehru, Jawaharlal. The Discoi•ery of India, 2nd ed. London: Meridian Books, 1947. N izami, Khaliq Sayyid Ahmad Khan. Delhi: Ministry of Ahmad. Information and Broadcasting, 1966. ''Socio-Religious Movements in Indian Islam," IC, 44 (1970), pp. 131-46. Nu'man Khan ibn Kitiib tardid al-ibtal. Lucknow: Matba'-i • Nu'man Khan. chiragh al-hidayah, 1298 H. Hayat-i Sir Sayyid. Aligarh: Anjuman-i Nur al· Rahman. taraqqi-i Urdu, 1950. Philips, C.H. (ed.). Historians of India, Pakistan and Ceylon. London: OUP, 1961. Prasad, Siva. Strictures upon the Strictures of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, C.S.I. Bcnares: Medical Hall Press, 1870. Qadir, Abdul. Famous Urdu Poets and Writers. Lahore: New Book Society, n.d., 1947. Qadir1, l:lamid Ddstdn•i tarlkh-i Urdu. Agra: Lakshmi ):lasan. Nara'io. 19S7.

362

Bibliogrop/1y

Qamr al-din Khan. ''Sir Sayyid k1 tar1kh1 ba,1rat.'' Nigar-i Pakistan (Karachi), Sir Sayyid Number, January-February 1971. Qureshi, Ish1iaq The Muslini Community ofthe lndo-Pakistan Subcontinent., 610-1947: A Brief Historical Ht1sain. Analysis. S'Gravenha1e: Mouton, 1962. Quraishi, Nas1m Aligarh Talp1k: Aghaz ta amroz. Aligarh (ed.). Muslim University Press, 1960. Aligarh Number, 1954-55 in Aligarl, MogQzin, n.l., n.d. Rahbar, Muhammad ''Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan's Principles of Da'ud. Exegesis,'' MW, 46 (1956), pp. 104-12; pp. 324-35. Rahman, Fazlur. Islam. New York: Doubleday and Co., 1968. '~Muslim Modernism in the ludo-Pakistan Sub-Continent,'' BSOAS, 21 (1958), pp. 82-99. Rawlinson, H.G. ''Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan," IC, 4 (1930), pp. 289-96. Robinson, Francis. SepareJtism among Indian Muslims: The Politi,·s of 1/1e Unit,d Provinces' Muslims 1860-1923. Cambridge: University Press, 1974. Rushbrook Williams, Great Me11 of India. Bombay: Home L. Frederic (ed.). Library Club, 1939. Sadiq, Muhammad. A History of Urdu Literature. London: OUP, 1964. Sa'Id Ahmad ''Sir Sayyid ka d101 shu'ur wa fikr, '" • Akbarabadl. Aligar/1 Mogazin, Aligarb Numher, 1953, pp. 85-95. Sayced, Khalid B. Pakistan. The Formative Phase 1857-1948> 2nd ed. London: OUP, 1968. Schaefer, Rayniund ''Studies in Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan's use George: of some Christian Writers in his Biblical Commentary,'' M.A. Thesis, Hartford Seminary Foundation, Hartford (Connecticut). 1966.

Bibliography Shan Muhammad (ed.).

363

Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan: A Political Biogra• phy. Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1969. Writings and Speeches of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan. Bombay: Nachiketa, 1972.

Sharar, 'Abdul Sir Sayyid ki dini barkateii. Agra: 'Az1z1 l:laJ1m. Press, 1910. Sherwani, H. Khan. ''The Political Thought of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan,'' IC, 18 (1944), pp. 236-53. Shibli Nu'man1. ''Sir Sayyid Ahmad marbum aur Urdu literature,'' Nigar-i Pakistan, Sir Sayyid Number (Karachi 1966), pp. 11-16. ShirwanI, Muh. ''Ha)at-i jawed. Tab~irah," in Maqa/at-i Habib al-Rahman Shirwani. Aligarh: Shirwani Printing Khan. Press, n.d., pp. 47-68. Smith, Wilfred Modern Islam in Indio: A Soria/ Ana/;,sis. Cantwell. Lahore: Minerva, 1943. Teraw1n Sodi (Agra). Nasir Ali (ed.). Titus, Murray T. Islam in India and Pakistan. Calcutta: Y.M.C.A. Publishing House, 1959. Troll, Christian W. ''A Note on an Early Topographical work of Saiyid Abmad Khan: Athar as sanad1d,'' JRAS (1972), pp. 135-46. ''Sir Sayyid Abmad Khan, 1817-98, and his Theological Critics: the Accusations of 'Ali Bakhsh Kb an and Sir Say1•id's Rejoinder.'' JC, SI (October 1977), pp. 261-72 andIC, 52 (January 1978). Tufail Abmad Musalm4noii ka roshan mustaqbi/. Budaun MaiigllSri. Niiam1 Press, 1938. Wahid al-din Salim Mazart,in-i Sallm, I. PanipatI (ed.), vol. 1. Plnlpat1. Karachi: Anjuman-i taraqqi-i Urdu, 1961. Zaidan, Jurg1. Hayat-i Sir Sayyid. Translation into Urdu by Qazi Mubaromad Faruq An~ari. Aligarh: Matba'-i AbmadI, 1903. Zakaria, Rafiq. Rise of Muslims in Indian Politics: An

Analysis of Developments from 1885 to 1906. Bombay: Somaiya Publications, 1970.

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364

Zubairi, Muhammad Tadhkira/1-i Sir Sayyid. Lahore: Publishers Amin. United Limited, 1964. Zwemer, S.M. The Mollammadan Worldo_f TudaJ', London and Edinburgh, 1906.

THE WORKS OF SAYYID AHMAD KHAN

Sir Sayyid's works, relevant to this study, are presented here in chronological . order. For full alphabetical list, cf. Sir Sy~d Ahmad Khan: A Select Bibliography, Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh: Aligarh Muslim University, 1971, pp. 3-16 (in Urdu). The titles in transcription here, refer to works written in Urdu, if not indicated otherwise. Jam-i Jam [A short description of the royal families of the Mughal Empire], British Museum Ms., 1840. PMaq, XVI, pp. 14-73. Ji/a al-qulub bi dhik, al-mal.ibub, 184!. TFA, I, I, pp. 3-18. Tasl,J/ fi jarr a/-thaqll, Agra, 1844. PMaq, XVI, pp. 75-94. TulJ/ah-i /Jason, 1844. TFA, I, I, pp. 24-72. Fawii'id al-afkar,fl i-nziil a/firjar, 1846. PMaq, XVI, pp. 97-206. Athar al·1aniidld, 1st ed., Delhi, 1847. 4th chapter, A. Miyao (ed.), Tadlikirah-i ahl-i Dih/l. Karachi: Anjuman-i taraqq1-i Urdu, 1955. Rpt. PMaq, XVI, pp. 212-484. Qau/-i ma~ln dar ibfii/-i liarakat•i zamin, 1848. PMaq, XVI, pp. 485-500. Kalimat al-baqq, 1849. PMaq, V, pp. 267-90. Rah-i sunnat dar radd·i bid'at, 1850. TFA, I, I, pp. 93-134/ PMaq, V, pp. 354-426. Silsilat al-mu/uk, 1852. PMaq, VI, pp. 166-231. (This chrono ... logical list of the kings of India is added to the 2nd ed. of Athar.) Namiqah dar bayan-i mas' alah-i ta~auwur-i shaikh (Persian), 1852. TFA, I, I, pp. 137-41. Defective rpt. PMaq, XV, pp. 182-87. Tar_;umah dibachah kimiyii-i sa'adat, 1853.. TFA, I, I, pp. 14453/PMaq, V, pp. 430-44. Athiir al-$anadid, 2nd ed., Delhi, 1854. Sarkashl-i ~ila' Bijnor. Agra: Mofussilite Press, 1858. Mu'In all:laqq (re-cd.): Karachi: Salman Academy, 1962. Rpt. PMaq, VJ, pp. 272 ff. Cf. Bibliography II (Hafeez Malik).

Bibliography

365

Asbab-i baghawat-i Hind, Moradabad, 1858, 2nd ed., Agra, 1859. Rpt. PMaq, IX, pp. 47-124. English translation Benares, 1873. Cf. Bibliography (Hafecz Malik). Thanksgiving Offered up by the Mahomedans of Muradabad on the 28tli July, 1859, Hindustani and English. Meerut, 1859. Rpt. PMaq, I, pp. 1-4. An Accm,nt ofth~ Loyal Mahomedans of India, 3 pts, Mecrut, 1860-61. Rpt. PMaq, VII, pp. 39-194. D1bachah tarlkh Firozshdll {i>·ii' al-din Baran1 mu$annafah SayJ·id Ahmad Khiin. Rpt. from AIG (1866) in PMaq, XVI, pp. 501-12. Tab)in al-kaldm, The MohamedanCommentary on the Holy Bible, pt. I and II, Hindustani and English. Ghazceporc: Private· Press of the author, 1862 and 1865. Pt. III in Urdu only, TFA, I, II, pp. 2-129. Aligarh Institute Gazette: see AIG in the chapter entitled Abbreviations. Abkam·i ta'dm ahl-i kitdb, 1st in AIG (1866); separately in Cawnpore: 1868. Rpt. PMaq, I, pp. 298-383. Musafiran-i London (diary in Urdu on Sir Sayyid's travel to London in 1869/70), I. PanipatI (ed.). Lahore: Majlis-i taraqq1-i adab, 1961. A Series of Essays on the Life of Mohammed and Subjects Subsidiary thereto. London: Triibner, 1870. (The original English text of these essays has been revised and corrected by a friend.) A.I-Khu/ubdt al-Alimadlyah/1 a/-'Arab wa 'l-sirah al-Mubammadiyah. TFA, I, II, pp. 182-239. Tahdhlb a/-akh/dq [The Mohammedan Social Reformer]. See TA in the chapter entitled Abbreviations. Notice, 3 I st July, 1871, under the Resolution of the Committee -- for the Better Diffwion and Advancement of Education among the Ma/1omedans of India, English and Urdu. Benarcs, 1871. Syed Ahmed Bahadoor on Dr. Hunter's ·Our Indian Musalmans, are they Bound in Consci,nce to Rebel Against the Queen? English and Urdu, ''A Mahomcdan,'' (ed.). London: Henry S. King, 1872. Rpt. Bcnares: Medical Hall Press, 1872. Report of the Select Comn1ittee for the Better Diffusion and Ad•·ancement of Learning among the Muhammadans of India,

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Bibliography

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