Said Halim Pasha: Ottoman Statesman and Islamist Thinker (1865-1921) 9781463225520

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Said Halim Pasha

Analecta Isisiana: Ottoman and Turkish Studies

A co-publication with The Isis Press, Istanbul, the series consists of collections of thematic essays focused on specific themes of Ottoman and Turkish studies are brought together in Analecta Isisiana. These scholarly volumes address important issues throughout Turkish history, offering in a single volume the accumulated insights of a single author over a career of research on the subject.

Said Halim Pasha

Ottoman Statesman and Islamist Thinker (1865-1921)

Ahmet Seyhun

T h e Isis Press, Istanbul

pre** 2010

Gorgias Press LLC, 954 River Road, Piscataway, NJ, 08854, USA www.gorgiaspress.com Copyright © 2010 by The Isis Press, Istanbul Originally published in 2003 All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning or otherwise without the prior written permission of The Isis Press, Istanbul. 2010

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ISBN 978-1-61719-097-1

Printed in the United States of America

Ahmet §eyhun was born in 1958 in Istanbul. He received a law degree from the University of Istanbul in 1986. After practising law in the same city, he obtained a Master's degree in History at the Bogazigi University. He earned his Ph.d. in Islamic Studies at McGill University in 2002.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgments Note on Transliteration Introduction I. Islamism II. The Life and Political Career of Said Halim Pasha Set in a Historical Context III. The Social and Political Thought of Said Halim Pasha Conclusion Bibliography

6 6 7 15 45 129 163 170

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This book is based on a Ph.D. thesis submitted at the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University. First of all, I wish to express my gratitude to Professor Uner Turgay, my thesis supervisor, for his guidance, comments and criticisms. In every stage of my dissertation his concern with the improvement of my work had been consistent and his suggestions constructive. This work could not have been completed without the valuable contribution of Rukiye and Sinan Kuneralp who kindly provided me the writings of Said Halim Pasha in the form of manuscripts and typescripts from the family archives. I would like to thank Princess Zeyneb Halim who has kindly granted me an interview and provided me with some valuable information on her uncle Said Halim Pasha. Thanks are also due to Princess Nimet Halim Celaloglu who kindly allowed the use of family photographs. I also thank Ibrahim Zaky who helped me with my Arabic transliteration. I would also like to express my eternal gratitude to my family: without the undying support of my parents Sevin and Kemal §eyhun and my sister Ye§im Corluhan, I would not have reached this stage. Finally, this work would have never seen the light of day without the loving support of Brenda. NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION In my dissertation, I used modern Turkish spelling for all Ottoman and modern Turkish terms, names and book titles. For Arabic terms of nonOttoman context, I followed the system of Arabic transliteration accepted by the Institute of Islamic Studies. For Ottoman cities in the Balkans and Anatolia I preferred using the Turkish names like Izmir, Edirne, Selanik, tiskiib, iskodra. For Ottoman cities in the Arab Middle East I preferred using the established English names like Cairo, Tripoli, Damascus and Mecca.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This book is based on a Ph.D. thesis submitted at the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University. First of all, I wish to express my gratitude to Professor Uner Turgay, my thesis supervisor, for his guidance, comments and criticisms. In every stage of my dissertation his concern with the improvement of my work had been consistent and his suggestions constructive. This work could not have been completed without the valuable contribution of Rukiye and Sinan Kuneralp who kindly provided me the writings of Said Halim Pasha in the form of manuscripts and typescripts from the family archives. I would like to thank Princess Zeyneb Halim who has kindly granted me an interview and provided me with some valuable information on her uncle Said Halim Pasha. Thanks are also due to Princess Nimet Halim Celaloglu who kindly allowed the use of family photographs. I also thank Ibrahim Zaky who helped me with my Arabic transliteration. I would also like to express my eternal gratitude to my family: without the undying support of my parents Sevin and Kemal §eyhun and my sister Ye§im Corluhan, I would not have reached this stage. Finally, this work would have never seen the light of day without the loving support of Brenda. NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION In my dissertation, I used modern Turkish spelling for all Ottoman and modern Turkish terms, names and book titles. For Arabic terms of nonOttoman context, I followed the system of Arabic transliteration accepted by the Institute of Islamic Studies. For Ottoman cities in the Balkans and Anatolia I preferred using the Turkish names like Izmir, Edirne, Selanik, tiskiib, iskodra. For Ottoman cities in the Arab Middle East I preferred using the established English names like Cairo, Tripoli, Damascus and Mecca.

INTRODUCTION The purpose of this study is to present a critical account of the political life and thought of Prince Said Halim Pasha (1865-1921) against the political and intellectual background of his times. So why study a figure such as Said Halim Pasha? The answer lies in his important and unique standing among Muslim intellectuals in his field. The originality of Said Halim Pasha's thought can be found in its skillful combination of revivalist and modernist ideas. At the core of his ideology is the revivalist principle of islamization, which in turn was inspired by the tenets of medieval Muslim thinker Ibn Taymiyya. A junior member of the Egyptian khedivial family, Said Halim was raised in his father's mansion in Yenikoy on the Bosphorus and sent to Europe for advanced studies. Upon his return to Istanbul he secretly became a member of the Young Turk Movement. Nevertheless, although the Young Turks opposed the policies of Sultan Abdiilhamid II (1876-1909), the young prince served as a high-ranking official in the Hamidian regime and received gratifications and honors from the sultan. When Abdiilhamid's secret police finally discovered his links with the Young Turk opposition, Said Halim had again to face exile: he was first sent to Egypt and from there he went on to Europe. While in Europe he took part in the Young Turk opposition to Hamidian rule. After the proclamation of the Constitution in July 1908, Said Halim returned to Istanbul and was given the important positions of senator and President of the State Council. In January 1913 he became the minister of foreign affairs in Mahmud §evket Pasha's cabinet and was appointed shortly afterwards as grand vizir in June 1913 following the latter's assassination. Said Halim Pasha's appointment was of special significance because it was for the first time since the 1908 Revolution that a Unionist had attained the grand vizirate and headed a cabinet formed of largely of Unionist members. Prior to this and following the fall of the Hamidian regime, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) had for the most part dominated Ottoman politics. But rather than involve itself directly in the cabinet, it had chosen to exert power through its parliamentary majority. The reasons for the Unionists'

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hesitation to participate in cabinet included their political inexperience and humble social origins. In a society where only experienced and cultivated bureaucrats were considered politically trustworthy, CUP members who lacked these qualities were essentially barred from the executive branch of government. This allowed figures like Said Pasha and Kamil Pasha, who were at the service of the autocratic sultan and closely associated with the ancien régime, to maintain their authority by playing pivotal political roles. The appointment of Said Halim to the grand vizirate constituted a break with this tradition: the new grand vizir was not an old, well-settled, well connected and experienced statesman coming from the Bab-i Ali tradition, nor was he a high ranking military figure like his predecessor, Mahmud §evket Pasha. Rather, he was a high-born, princely intellectual and idealist who was completely committed to the cause of the Young Turks. He was also a skillful diplomat who took a strong stand against the Great Powers' plans of partitioning the Ottoman Empire. A respected statesman and an able diplomat, Said Halim was first and foremost an influential thinker, one of the most outspoken representatives of the Islamist school during the Second Constitutional Period (1908-1920). His stance within the Islamist school could be qualified as modernist-revivalist: modernist, not only because of his modern Western style discourse but also because of the many Western-originated institutions and concepts (i.e, parliament and democracy) which figure in his political theory; revivalist because of his advocacy of a return to a pristine Islam. In his famous work entitled Islamization (better known under its Turkish title islamla§mak), Said Halim proposes a complete Islamization of Muslim societies, including "forgetting" their pre-Islamic past and purifying themselves of their preIslamic heritage. Said Halim Pasha's works were written originally in French and most often published in Istanbul and various European capitals between 1910 and 1921. His earliest work—published in Paris—in 1910, bears the ironic title of Le fanatisme musulman. In essence it is a tract explaining how Christian Europe's hostility towards the Islamic world since the time of the Crusades caused the economic and technological retardation prevalent in Muslim countries. His second work, Essai sur les causes de la décadence des peuples musulmans (published in Istanbul in 1918), also deals with the decline of the Muslim world and is an example of the modernist-revivalist genre that characterized the Muslim decline literature of that period.

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Said Halim tended to use the pseudonym Mohammed in the above titles. However, his major work, Les institutions politiques dans la société musulmane, which expounds his social and political thought, was published in Rome in 1921 (the year of his assassination by an Armenian militant), under his full name and title: Le prince Said Halim Pacha', ancien Grand-Vézir. This last work was republished a year later in the journal Orient et Occident under the title Notes pour servir à la réforme de la société musulmane. An English translation was published in 1967 in Karachi, Pakistan by the Waqf Institution of Begoum Aisha Bavani under the title Reform in the Muslim Society. Most of Said Halim's works were translated into Ottoman Turkish and appeared during his lifetime in the Islamist-modernist periodical Sebiliirre§ad. Indeed most of the original French versions of these works are existant only in their original hand- and typewritten form and bear the author's annotations. For the purpose of this study I have relied on the original French versions which no scholar has previously examined. These invaluable sources were generously and kindly provided to me by Rukiye Kuneralp, a member of the family of Said Halim Pasha and include La crise politique, which was only partly and inaccurately translated into Turkish for two articles entitled "Me§rutiyet" (The Constitutional Regime) and "Mukallitliklerimiz" (Our Imitations). In my study, I used both the French original and the Turkish versions comparatively. Other essays are "La société ottomane" translated into Turkish under the title "Içtimai buhranimiz" (Our Society in Crisis); and "Islamization" which enjoyed fame among Islamist intellectuals in its Turkish translation "Islamlagmak." The political life and thought of Said Halim Pasha have not previously been studied by scholars in any detail. Mustafa Dtizdag's edition of his works using the Turkish title of one of Said Halim's articles, "Buhranlarimiz," (Our Crises) is merely a modern Turkish adaptation of a work that was already published under the same title in 1335-1338 (1919). A previous edition of this work had also appeared in 1332 (1916). Dtizdag's work also contains also a few pages of biographical notes on Said Halim written by various contemporary figures and by historians. The only study which offers any indepth analysis of Said Halim's political life is Hanefi Bostan's work entitled Bir islamci Diisuniir Said Halim Pasa (Said Halim Pasha: An Islamist Thinker) (1990). Despite its title, the work does not examine Said Halim's ideas but is instead an account of the life and times of Said Halim.

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The topic of Islamism in the late Ottoman Empire has been the object of many scholarly studies over the past forty years. A fundamental work on this topic was written by the late professor Tank Zafer Tunaya in 1962 and is entitled islamcihk Cereyam (Islamist Current). It consists of a critical survey of Islamist thought during the Second Constitutional Period (1908-1920), as well as the four decades of Islamist political activity in Republican Turkey. The political and social thought of Said Halim Pasha and other contemporary thinkers including Musa Kazim, Ahmed Nairn, Mustafa Sabri and Mehmed Akif (Ersoy) are briefly presented in this study in order to emphasize the continuity between the Islamism of the late Ottoman period and that of the Republican era. There has recently appeared a more comprehensive account which, although lacking critical perspective is nevertheless valuable. This is Ismail Kara's Turkiye'de islamcihk Dii§uncesi, published in three volumes between 1986 and 1989. Kara's work is merely a collection of extracts from the works of the Islamist thinkers of the Second Constitutional Period and Republican era along with short biographies of each thinker. In a more recent study entitled islamcilarin Siyasi Goriigleri, published in 1994, Kara endeavored to present the social and political ideas of the Islamist thinkers of the Second Constitutional Period from a critical perspective. Despite its angle, this work remained a general study and could only offer an overall picture of the Islamists' ideas of that period. As far as Said Halim's ideas were concerned, Kara contended himself with investigating a very limited aspect of the pasha's thought and dwelled almost exclusively on Said Halim criticism of the 1908 constitution. The first critical account of Islamism in the late Ottoman Empire in English was brilliantly but briefly presented by Niyazi Berkes in his important work The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal, 1963). Here the author also analyzed this and other contemporary social and political currents such as Westernism and Turkism while vividly presenting the ideological debate between these schools. Nevertheless, this work also was intended as a general work on intellectual history of the late Ottoman Empire and therefore could only make some sketchy references to Said Halim's thought besides the ideas of other Islamist intellectuals of his time. Another interesting study on the Islamic modernism of the Second Constitutional Period was Ak§in Somel's M.A thesis. Submitted to the Department of History of the Bogazi?i University, it is limited to the Islamist

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thinkers who wrote for the Islamist journal of Sirat-i Mustakim. Somel later published his thesis as an article entitled Sirat-i Mustakim: Islamic modernism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1912, in the Journal of Middle East Studies v.l no.l. Aksin did not include Said Halim Pasha in his study. For the political and especially diplomatic history of the last decade (1912-1922) of the Ottoman Empire (an especially important facet of this study given Said Halim Pasha's role in the politics of that period, first as minister of foreign affairs (January 1913-October 1915) then as grand vizir (June 1913-February 1917)), I consulted all relevant secondary sources available in Turkish, English and French. One of the most important of these is Ulrich Trumpener's study of the Ottoman involvement in the First World War entitled Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1918. Nevertheless, as rightly pointed out by Feroz Ahmad, the weak point of Trumpener's work is the author's "unfamiliarity with the Turkish side of the story" and his almost exclusive reliance on German diplomatic material. 1 Among the most important of the Turkish sources written during the Republican era is the colossal work by Yusuf Hikmet Bayur entitled Turk inkilabi Tarihi (History of the Turkish Revolution), which draws on all available Ottoman archival materials, as well as relevant European diplomatic sources. I also used the published memoirs and diaries of many Ottoman statesmen from this era including Mahmud §evket Pasha, Cemal Pasha, Talat Pasha, Ahmed izzet Pasha and Ali Ihsan Sabis Pasha along with those of Palace officials like Tahsin Pasha, Ali Fuad (Turkgeldi) and Halit Ziya (U§akligil), and Mehmet Tevfik (Biren) Beys. I also consulted the memoirs written by religious dignitaries of the empire including §eyhulislam Mehmed Cemaleddin Efendi and the Armenian patriarch Zaven (the latter shedding important light on the Armenian crisis and tragedy), as well as those of Amir Husayn of Mecca (particularly on the Hijazi revolt), both of which occurred during the grand vizirate of Said Halim Pasha despite his unsuccessful efforts to prevent them. Most important for my study were the political memoirs of Said Halim Pasha written by himself in Rome in the months before his assassination and published in Istanbul in 2001. In addition to the Ottoman sources, I also used the published diplomatic documents of the British, French and Russian governments which cast light on this turbulent period. The memoirs of certain Western diplomats at the Porte at the time of the outbreak of the First World War including French ambassador Maurice Bompard and the United States' ambassador, Henry Morgentau, as well as other contemporary statesmen of the Great Powers like Serge Sazonov (the last Russian foreign minister) and ^For a detailed criticism of Trumpener's work, see, Feroz Ahmad's book review in Middle Eastern Studies, 6 (January 1970), pp. 100-105.

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Edward Grey (the British foreign minister) were consulted. During May-June 2001, I conducted a laborious and thorough research in the Ottoman Prime Ministry Archives on the diplomatic activities of Said Halim Pasha and found some very interesting untapped material. I incorporated them into my work. I also had the opportunity of interviewing Princess Zeyneb Halim, niece of Said Halim Pasha, (daughter of Abbas Halim Pasha) in her residence at Salacak, a lovely neighborhood of the Asiatic part of Istanbul. During this interview, Princess Halim provided me with some very valuable information on the private and public life of her uncle Said Halim Pasha. The political career and thought of Said Halim Pasha cannot be properly examined outside the political and ideological context of his times. Consequently, the second and third chapters of my study focus on the political and ideological developments of the last three decades of the Ottoman Empire. This is done so as to provide the reader with a better understanding of Said Halim's role during this critical period. Indeed as the Ottoman Empire entered its twilight, many competing ideologies began to take shape. An Islamist thinker, Said Halim was also a loyal Unionist statesman. Despite his ideological differences with secular-minded leaders of the CUP such as Talat and Enver, Said Halim cast his political lot with them. Such actions may appear contradictory; nevertheless, as a fervent champion of Islamic patriotism, Said Halim believed that only the strong leadership of the CUP could reinvigorate and save the Ottoman Empire, the last bulwark of Islam, and preserve it from conquest by aggressive European imperialism which, according to him, was a modern version of the Crusades. Contrary to the prevailing historical view, Said Halim Pasha was not a mere figurehead of the powerful triumvirate formed by Talat Pasha, Enver Pasha, and Cemal Pasha (actually, it would be more accurate to call it a diarchy, since Cemal Pasha's influence never matched that of Enver and Talat). Instead, Said Halim Pasha served as a counterbalance in the cabinet to the manoeuvres of Enver and Talat. As long as Said Halim remained in power he was an obstacle to the secularizing reforms that the Turkist wing of the CUP was pushing for. For example, two important legislative acts, The Enactment of the Law of §eriat Courts Procedure (an essential move towards unifying the judicial procedure) and The Codification of the New Family Law, (which considerably reduced the role of the geriat in the private lives of Ottoman subjects) could only have been decreed once Said Halim Pasha had resigned

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from the grand-vizirate. The laws were signed into force in March 1917, a month after Said Halim's resignation. As for Said Halim's political thought, it is important to contextualize it within the framework of his political life and within the important intellectual currents of the late Hamidian (1895-1908) and the Second Constitutional (1908-1920) periods. The three main ideologies of this twentyfive year span—Islamism, Turkism, and Westernism—are examined in Chapter Four of this study alongside Said Halim Pasha's rigorous defense of his ideas vis-à-vis Turkist and Westernist writers. My comments focus on his dispute with Ziya Gôkalp concerning the impact of national popular and preIslamic cultures (hors) on the progress and evolution of the Muslim peoples. An examination of this dispute will help us understand the issue of nationalism and Islam which lay at the core of this ideological conflict. 1

A collection of Said Halim Pasha's works in Turkish has appeared while the present study was in press. I was therefore unable to use it: Said Halim Pa$a: Butiin Eserleri, ed. N. Ahmet Ozalp, (Istanbul: Anka Yayinlari 2003).

CHAPTER ONE: ISLAMISM

By the last quarter of the eighteenth century European colonial powers had succeeded in asserting their military, political and economic supremacy over most non-European societies. Prior to 1775 the Muslim heartlands had rarely been under a direct threat or occupation by a Western power. Indeed until that period, an equilibrium of power existed between the Ottomans, Safavids and Moguls, the three great Muslim empires of Islam, and the expanding Western powers. This precarious balance was upset during the last decades of the eighteenth century as Muslim empires in central Islamic lands began to lose ground to growing European pressure due to the rising economic and military power of the latter. For example, as a result of a disastrous war with Russia (1768-1774), the Ottoman Empire was forced to sign, on 21 July 1774, the infamous Treaty of Kii^iik Kaynarca.1 Among the conditions agreed to by the Ottomans were their being coerced into granting the Russians access to the Black Sea, an economic reserve for the Ottomans until then. Also, they relinquished control of the Crimea, a region largely inhabited by Muslim Tartars (this territory, while having gained its independence through the treaty, was eventually annexed by Russia). According to Article 2 of the treaty, the Tartars of the Crimea would recognize the Ottoman sultan as the caliph. This clause would later constitute the basis of the Ottoman sultans' claim to the universal Caliphate. The same cannot be said for the sultan's orthodox subjects: while some historians hold that articles 7 and 14 served in the past as a legal basis for an alleged Russian

For the Italian version of this treaty (one of the three original languages in which the treaty was written — the other official versions being in Ottoman Turkish and Russian), see Geo. Fred, de Martens, Recueil de Traités d'alliance, de paix, de trêve, de neutralité, de commerce, de limites, d'échanges etc et de plusieurs autres actes servant à la connaissance des relations étrangères des Puissances et Etats de l'Europe (Gottingue: Librarie de Dieterich, 1771-1779). (Hereafter cited as Martens, Recueil) See also Gabriel Noradoungian, Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'Empire Ottoman (Paris: 1903), vol.l, pp. 351-353. (Hereafter cited as Noradoungian, Recueil). For the English translation of the treaty see J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, A Documentary Record 1535-1956 (Oxford: Archive Editions, 1987), vol.l, pp. 54-61.

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protectorate over the Orthodox population of the Ottoman Empire 1 , others such as Rodcric Davison contend that they offer no such ground to the Russian tsar. 2 It was in this period that in 1798 Napoleon invaded Egypt and marched into Palestine. For the first time since the Crusades the Muslim heartland was occupied by a Western power. Even Iran was not immune: it too suffered territorial losses at the hands of the Russians and had to cede Georgia and Daghestan in 1813. Further afield in the Indian subcontinent, the eighteenth century witnessed the gradual disintegration of the Timurid Mughal Empire as a result of its weakening imperial institutions and court rivalries. Persian ruler Nadir Shah's invasion of Delhi in 1739 and the Afghan invasions under Ahmed Shah Abdali between 1748 and 1767 constituted severe blows for the Mughal Empire and accelerated its fall. The situation accelerated the centrifugal forces within the sub-continent. The Jat, Maratha, Sikh and other chieftains increasingly carved out autonomous territories for themselves and undermined the Mughal authority. 3 Nevertheless, though the disintegration of the Mughal Empire had started as an internal problem, its fall would be at the hands of the British East India Company, which had taken advantage of the political chaos to conquer India from within in a series of successful wars during the 1760s and 1820s. However, it was not until after the suppression of the Sepoy revolt in 1858, that the British were able to establish their domination over the subcontinent on a firm basis. The internal crises of Muslim societies at the end of the eighteenth century, along with the decline of central Muslim empires and their subsequent subjugation by European colonial powers led to the emergence in Arabia and India of several protest movements. The leaders of these mainly revivalist movements believed that the source of this crisis lay in moral decay and 'Article VII of the treaty of Kii9iik Kaynarca (in its original Italian version) says:" La Fulgida Porta promette una ferma protezione alla religione Christiana, e alle Chiefe di quella permette ancora à ministri dell'Imperiai Corte di Russia di fare in ogni occurenza varie rapprefentanze alla Porta à favore della sotto mentevatta eretta Chiefa in Constantinopoli, accennata nell'art.XIV non meno che di quei che la fervono, e promette ricevere queste rimostranze con attenzione, come fatte da persona considerata d'una vicina e finceramente amica Potenza". Martens, Recueil. vol. II, p. 296. 2 Roderic Davison, "Russian Skill and Turkish Imbecility: The Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji Reconsidered" Slavic Review. 35 (September 1976): p. 482. 3 F o r the disintegration of the Mughal Empire see, Sanjay Subrahmanyam and Muzaffar Alam eds. The Mughal State 1526-1750. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. See also Muzaffar Alam The Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India, Awadh and Punjab, 1707-1748. (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986).

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deviation from pristine Islamic principles. They sought the restoration of the power of Islam by purifying the religion of alien elements and by following the sunna of the Prophet. The most important of these movements emerged in the mid-eighteenth century in central Arabia, and was called the Wahhabiyya, taking its name from its founder, Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1115-1201 A.H./1703-1792 A . D . ) . 1 The latter had found in 1744 a powerful protector in Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Saud, a local ruler who adopted his doctrine and agreed to provide him with the financial, political, and military backing necessary to enable Ibn Abd al-Wahhab to spread his tenets across Arabia. Although the Wahhabi movement had emerged originally in reaction to the practices of popular Islam in Arabia, it had become by the late eighteenth century a serious threat to the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman elite had already initiated a series of modernizing reforms to improve traditional state institutions, particularly the military and the civil service. While the Ottomans used European structures as their model, the Wahhabis advocated a return to the formative period of Islam which they idealized as a pristine age. Wahhabiyya ideology was based on the doctrine of Ahmad ibn Hanbal (164-241 A.H./780-855 A.D.) and was inspired by the Hanbali theologian and revivalist Ibn Taymiyya (661-728 A.H./1263-1328 A.D.). Considered one of the most important thinkers in Islam, Ibn Taymiyya was the principal inspiration for Muslim revivalists in the eighteenth century and for modernists in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.2 Born in Harran (a town located in present-day south-eastern Turkey), Ibn Taymiyya completed his education in Damascus at the Sukkariyya Madrasa. He was subsequently appointed as a professor at the Hanbaliyya Madrasa in the same city on 17 Shaban 695 (20 June 1296). Ibn Taymiyya devoted his academic and political career to a determined and indefatigable struggle against what he called "Mushrikun" (Polytheists). His main goals were to "purify" Islam of any corruptive elements and to enhance the role of the §eriat by restoring it to its central position in Muslim life.

^D.S. Margoliouth, "Wahhabiya", Encyclopaedia of Islam. 1st edition, pp. 1086-1090. ^The most detailed and critical study of the doctrine of Ibn Taymiyya remains the voluminous work of Henri Laoust, Essai sur les doctrines sociales et politiques de Tak-id-din Ahmad b. Taimiya (Cairo: Imprimerie de l'Institut français d'archéologie orientale, 1939).

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Although Ibn Taymiyya's thought derives from Hanbali doctrine, its originality lies in the combination of diverse arguments proposed by dogmatic theologians, traditionalists, and Sufi thinkers. These, in turn, are based on kalam, hadith, and irada in order to create a new doctrine of mediation. Ibn Taymiyya condemned the practices of popular or folk Islam and considered them as a deviation from the teachings of the Qur'an and the Prophet. He stated in his Kitab Iqtida al-Sirat al Mustaqim wa Mukhalafat Ashab al-Jahim (The Book for the Following of the Straight Path Against the People of Hell) that the survival of pagan customs and habits in Islam had exercised a detrimental effect on Muslims, causing them to diverge from the essence of their religion. Ibn Taymiyya submits that holy days, such as Ashura, Mawlid al-Nabiyy and Id-Adha began to be celebrated in Islam in later periods under the influence of other religions. Indeed, the feast of Mawlid al-Nabiyy (birthday of the Prophet) was instituted as an emulation of Christmas. 1 Ibn Taymiyya equally condemned the visitation of the tombs of the saints (Ziyarat al-Qubur) in order to request their intercession. This he identifies with idol worship since the veneration of the saints' tombs would turn these places into sanctuaries. 2 Ibn Taymiyya's ideas on the visitation of tombs were adopted by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, who also considered this practice as a form of shirk (polytheism). The cardinal point of Muhammad ibn Abd-al Wahhab's doctrinc was tawhid (Unity of God), which he expounded in Kitah al Tawhid (The Book of Unity). According to Abd-al Wahhab, tawhid has three meanings which were, tawhid al-rubabiyya, tawhid al-uldihiyya and tawhid al-asma wal sifat. Abd-al Wahhab in his thought put emphasis on the third meaning of the tawhid, tawhidal asma wal sifat (the unity of God's attributes as stated in the Qur'an without interpretation). 3 He gave the definition of his creed as such: "To describe God as He described Himself in the Qur'an and as His Prophet did in the hadith" 4 The aim of Ibn Abd-al Wahhab was to purify Islam from the practices of Jdhiliyya and to reislamize the tribes of Arabia by teaching them the tenets of pristine Islam. M u h a m m a d Umar Memon, Ibn Taimiya's Struggle Against Popular Religion, with an Annotated Translation of his Kitab Itida al-Sirat al Mustaqim Mukhalafat Ashab al-jahlm. (The Hague: Mouton, 1976), pp. 12-13. 2 Ibid., pp. 13-20. •^Esther Peskes, " Wahhabiyya". Encyclopedia of Islam, new edition, p. 40. 4 H . Laoust, "Ibn Taymiyya." Encyclopaedia of Islam, new edition, p. 951.

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The ideas of Said Halim Pasha on the decline of Muslim societies are to a large extent reminiscent of those of Ibn Taymiyya and Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. According to Said Halim, the major cause of Muslim decline lay in the misunderstanding of the true meaning of the Prophet's message and its subsequent distortion by later developments in Islamic history. Said Halim explains the decline of Muslim societies with reference to their failure to renounce their pre-Islamic heritage. He argues that since the nations which adopted Islam were heirs to old and distinct civilizations, it was inevitable that their respective ancient histories would still exert a strong influence on them. To him, this phenomenon prevented Muslim nations from fully comprehending and implementing the religious tenets of their faith thus depriving them of the blessings of Islam. This situation, continues Said Halim, had led to a paralysis which left Muslim societies inert between their pre-Islamic legacy and pristine Islamic doctrine, constituting a continuous hindrance to their development. To Said Halim the only way to achieve progress was for Muslims to swing the pendulum in favor of a pristine interpretation of Islam.

REFORM IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE During the first half of the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire was faced with many external and internal challenges. Changing economic and social factors in the European provinces of the empire favored the emergence of local Balkan nationalism. Among these factors were the rise of a strong Christian (especially Orthodox) merchant class; the economic growth of Austria, which started to exert important economic, cultural, and political influences on the Balkan peoples lying south of her borders; and finally, the spread of humanist ideas such as those espoused by the leaders of the French Revolution. Such revolutionary thought played an important role in the formation of nationalist movements in the Balkans: in 1817, for instance Serbia gained her autonomy. This was followed by Greece's independence in 1830. These territorial losses were the result of a series of military defeats mainly at the hands of Russia, which emerged as a major power in the second half of the eighteenth century. Alarmed, the Ottoman sultans adopted a series of military and administrative reforms to modernize the empire. The first systematic reforms were undertaken by Sultan Selim III (1789-1807). Selim began in 1793 by modernizing the artillery. The first military reforms had been undertaken by Sultan Mahmud I (1730-1747), who

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employed a French artillery expert, Claude Alexandre, Comte de Bonneval (1675-1747). After converting to Islam and adopting the name Ahmed, Bonneval was commissioned by the reformist Grand Vizir Topai Osman Pasha to reorganize the Bombardiers corps ( H u m b a r a Ocagi)} Selim's personal initiative was to create a new army, the Nizam-i Cedid, trained in European methods and armed with modern weapons. At the same time he reformed the navy by expanding and modernizing the imperial arsenal (Tersane-i Amire) and builing a new fleet. Although priority in Selim's reforms was given to military issues, he also undertook administrative reforms. These consisted of restructuring the central government in an effort to increase its efficiency. During his reign Selim had a vacillating attitude towards the bureaucratic centralization. On the one hand, he tried to restore the eroded power and authority of the Ottoman governors (valis) in the provinces so as to curb the autonomist tendencies of the local notables (ayans) and, on the other, he had to ally himself with some local feudal lords (derebeys) and try to play them off against each other in order to consolidate his authority 2 . On this issue Ariel Salzmann wrote that: "Despite stated intentions, recentralization of fiscality and the implementation of the proposed military reforms were not accomplished without considerable vacillation, backtracking and compromise however." 3 According to Salzmann, "[djue to the urgency of military needs, the regime was forced more than once to reverse policy on provincial military and fiscal matters in order to win loyalties or to mobilize troops from strategically positioned provincial magnates". 4 If credit for initiating the modernization of the Ottoman military and administrative institutions belongs to Selim III, then the recognition must be given to his cousin and eventual successor Mahmud II (1808-1839) for allowing the reform movement to take root finally in the soil of the empire. Selim's ideas were realized on a much larger scale under Mahmud II, who ^For further information on Comte de Bonncval-Ahmed Pasha see his memoirs, Nouveaux mémoires du Comte de Bonneval, ci-devant général de l'infanterie au service de S.M. Impériale et Catholique contenant ce qui lui est arrivé de plus remarquable durant son séjour en Turquie (The Hague: Chez Jean van Duren, 1737). See also Albert Vandal, Le Pacha à trois queues. Une vie aventureuse au XVIIIe siècle (Paris: Librairie Pion, 1953); Bowen, "Ahmad Pasha Bonneval." Encyclopaedia of Islam new edition, pp. 291-292; M. Cavid Baysun "Ahmed Pa§a (Bonneval, Humbaraciba§i)." Islam Ansiklopedisi, p. 199. ^Stanford Shaw, Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III 1789-1807, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1971), pp. 283-327. (Hereafter cited as Stanford, Between). 3 Ariel Salzmann, "An Ancient Regime Revisited; Privatization and Political Economy in the Eighteenth Century Ottoman Empire." Politics and Society 21 (December 1993): p. 407. 4 Ibid., pp. 407-408.

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managed to override traditionalist opposition to the implemention of his reforms. These changes transformed the bureaucratic structure of the empire and paved the way for further secularization and Westernization of Ottoman statecraft.1 When the wars with Russia (1827-1829) and Egypt (1831-1833) ended, Mahmud II focused his energies on military, administrative, and educational reform. 2 His military reforms began immediately after the elimination of the age-old and archaic Janissary corps in June 1826. The Janissaries had proven their obsolescence once again by their failure to suppress the Greek Rebellion (1821-1829). In order to replace them Mahmud created a new army called the Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye (The Victorious Mohammedan Soldiers) whose organization was based on the Nizam-i Cedid army created by Selim III in 1792. Like his predecessors, Mahmud turned to the European Powers for military instructors. However, unlike previous reformist sultans such as Abdiilhamid I (1774-1789) and Selim III 3 who were concerned mostly with modernizing the military, Mahmud undertook a series of major bureaucratic reforms in order to restructure the outdated Ottoman administration. He reasoned that centralization of the civil service would result in a more efficient and firmer control over the provinces by the central government. Mahmud's administrative reforms not only made government structures more effective, they also enhanced the sultan's role in the empire's governing hierarchy. This second modification had the effect of limiting the grand vizir's authority. With few exceptions such as Murad IV (1630-1640), a succession of weak sultans had allowed the grand vizirs to make the policies of the government. Under Mahmud II, the grand vizir was no longer the sultan's powerful vicegerent, enjoying a key role in the decision-making process. ^Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964), pp. 91-135. (Hereafter cited as Berkes, Development). 2 For the reforms of Mahmud II, see Ahmed Lutfi, Tarih-i Lutfi, Vakanuvis Ahmed Lutfi Efendi Tarihi, (Istanbul: Istanbul Universitesi Edebiyat Faktiltesi, 1984). See also Enver Ziya Karal and Ismail Hakki Uzun?ar§ili, Osmanli Tarihi, Nizam-i Cedid ve Tanzitnat Devirleri (1789-1856), (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi 1947), vol. 5. pp.146-168. See also J. Stanford Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), vol. 2, pp. 36-51. (Hereafter cited as Shaw and Shaw, History). For the bureaucratic reforms of Mahmud II, see Carter Findley, Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire. The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 124-150. (Hereafter cited as Findley, Bureaucratic Reform). % o r a critical account of the reforms of Selim III see, Stanford J. Shaw, Between Old And New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III 1789-1807 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971). See also Enver Ziya Karal, Osmanli Tarihi, vol. 5.

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Instead, policy-drafting and day-to-day decisions became the prerogative of the sultan. It was now clear who was the head of the government. This diminution of the grand vizir's power was reflected in the new title of "prime minister" (Ba§ Vekil) given to this post in 1838. Many of the grand vizir's duties and privileges were now assigned to separate ministries, including the Ministry of the Interior (Dahiliye Nezareti) and the Ministry of Legal Actions (Divan-i Deavi Nezareti) which later became the Ministry of Justice (Adliye Nezareti). Other ministries also had to be created: for example, a Ministry of Finance (Umur-u Maliye Nezareti) took over the financial functions which had formerly been controlled by the Imperial Treasury (Hazine-i Amire) and the Imperial Mint (Darphane-i Amire)} Another important achievement was the creation in March 1836 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Hariciye Nezareti), which assumed the duties performed by the scribal offices formerly under the direction of the Chief Scribe (Reis iil-Kuttap). Mahmud II did not content himself with military and bureaucratic reforms: he also undertook the reform of the educational system. The reforms carricd out in these three domains were closely interrelated: the new schools inaugurated by Mahmud were crucial in training the personnel necessary to staff and run the new bureaucracy and military that he created. This was the only way to assure the success of his reforms. Mahmud established many modern institutions of learning; some were built on the foundations of institutions already in existence, such as the School of Engineering (first opened in 1734 and reinstituted in 1769), and the naval academy (established in 1776). Unfortunately, most of these establishments had fallen into disuse over time. A new naval engineering school and a medical school were opened in 1827, followed by a military academy in 1834. The graduates of these schools formed the Ottoman military and bureaucratic elite who continued the modernization process.2 According to Said Halim, this new officialdom created by Sultan Mahmud II, while being an efficient tool for implementing Westernizing and centralizing reforms, was nevertheless completely devoid of any social basis. ^Shaw and Shaw, History, pp. 36-38. Ibid„ pp. 48-49.

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Indeed it stood in stark contrast to the traditional Ottoman ruling class who possessed both a social basis and a certain degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the sovereign: Créé par les besoins de la centralisation et destinée à n'être qu'un instrument docile de l'autorité centralisée en la personne du Souverain, cette classe privilégiée de fonctionnaires pouvait bien avoir une valeur administrative, mais elle devait nécessairement être dépourvue d'une valeur sociale réelle. Elle n'avait ni l'indépendance ni la stabilité, ni la tradition, ni les qualités morales et intellectuelles. 1 Said Halim's harsh judgement of the socio-political aspect of the new bureacratic elite is not an accurate reflection of its true nature. Contrary to what he argues, this new bureaucratic class rapidly built its own power base and by the late 1830s became the dominant force in Ottoman politics, especially during the final years of Sultan Mahmud's reign. Unlike Said Halim, who critizicized the Westernizing reform efforts of Selim III and Mahmud II, the majority of high-ranking ulema of the time not only sanctioned and supported these reforms but also involved themselves directly in their design and implementation. 2 By the end of the Tanzimat Period (1839-1876) and with the accession of Sultan Abdùlhamid II (1876-1909) to the throne, government gradually became concentrated in the palace. Indeed, he shifted the decision-making process from the government offices at the Sublime Porte (Bab-i Ali) to the Palace Secretariat (Mabeyn) at Yildiz Palace. 3 The military and bureaucratic reforms achieved by Mahmud II were extended under the reign of his son Abdtilmecid (1839-1861). The implementation of the new reforms was, however, carried out by Mustafa Re§id Pasha (1800-1858), a prominent bureaucrat who was already very actively involved in M a h m u d ' s reform policy. His role was pivotal in designing and implementing the reforms, first during the final years of ^Said Halim Pasha, La Société Ottomane (in typescript), p. 6. For more information concerning the attitude of the ulema to the reforms undertaken by Selim III and Mahmud II see, Uriel Heyd, "The Ottoman Ulema and Westernization in the time of Selim III and Mahmud II." in Uriel Heyd ed., Studies in Islamic History and Civilization, Scripta Hieroslymitana, (Jerusalem: Magnes Press of the Hebrew University, 1961), vol. 9. 3 For the shift of the political and bureaucratic authority from the Porte to the Palace, see Findley, Bureaucratic Reform, pp. 229-231. Also see Gabriel Charmes, L'Avenir de la Turquie Le Pan Islamisme, (Paris: Caiman Levy, 1883), pp. 235-236. 2

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Mahmud's reign and later under his successor, Abdiilmecid. Mustafa Re§id Pasha was known in Ottoman history as "the Father of the Tanzimat". 1 The reforms, couched in the form of a decree, were prepared under his direction in close association with another prominent Tanzimat statesman and thinker, Sadik Rifat Pasha (1807-1857), and proclaimed on 3 November 1839 under the name of Gulhane Hatt-i Hiimayunu (Imperial Edict of the Rose Garden). This was a remarkable achievement for Mustafa Re§id Pasha; despite his grip over the affairs of the empire, at the time of the proclamation of the Tanzimat, he was only the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Tanzimat Charter was the final enactment of the ideas and principles which had been gradually developed by reformist bureaucrats like Re§id Pasha and Sadik Rifat Pasha in collaboration with the reformist Sultan Mahmud II. Nevertheless, the political ideas of Rcsid and Sadik Rifat Pashas were different from Mahmud's ideas in quite important ways. Both pashas considered the monarch too autocratic and superficial in his reforming efforts; therefore, they tried to curb his power by solidly establishing "the rule of law" into the Ottoman political system. 2 The basic principles of the Tanzimat Charter are: a) Guaranteed protection by the state of the fundamental rights regarding the security of life, honour and property ; b) Guaranteed right to a fair trial for every person accused of committing a crime; c) Application of the principle of equity in military recruitment; d) Law reform and new legislation respecting the principles of the §eriat; e) Equality of Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the Sultan before the law. 3 While the first four articles declared the principles inherent to the §eriat, the final one was a considerable radical shift from the point of view of Islamic law. According to Butrus Abu Manneh, the principles decreed in the Gulhane Charter were formulated under the direct influence of Islamic law and inspired by Muslim medieval political thinking, especially by the ideas of alGhazali 4 . Abu Manneh also criticized scholars like Berkes of seeing only the ^For Re§id Pasha's role in the preparation and realization of the Tanzimat reforms, see Re§at Kaynar, Mustafa Regit Pa^a ve Tanzimat (Ankara: Tiirk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1954). ^Berkes, Development, p. 183-184. 3 Ibid„ pp. 176-180. 4 Butrus Abu Manneh,"The Islamic Roots of the Giilhane Rescript", Die Welt des Islams 34 (1994): pp. 173-203.

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influence of Western political thought in the content of the Giilhane Charter. In my opinion the latter judgement is problematic since Berkes acknowledges that "the §eriat laws [are] embodied in the Charter as fundamentals". 1 In his analysis of Giilhane Charter, Halil Inalcik concludes that, although the charter was promulgated according to classical Ottoman tradition, it also indcniably contains some "modern revolutionary principles". 2 On the other hand, liber Ortayh and Tekin Akiilioglu argue that while it is difficult to deny the influence of French political concepts on the development of the Tanzimat Charter, these concepts were nevertheless skilfully adapted to the realities of Ottoman statecraft by the reformist bureaucrats of Mahmud's administration, especially by Sadik Rifat Pasha, and the result was a genuine political document. 3 The legal reforms promised in the Giilhane Charter began to be implemented soon after its proclamation. In May 1840 a new penal code (ceza kanunnamesi) was promulgated. The new code was a hybrid document combining both European (French) and Islamic legal principles. While it sanctioned the principle of equality between Muslims and non-Muslims before the law, it also retained the ¡¡eri rules of qisas and diya\ nor did it abolish the death penalty for apostasy against Islam. During the Tanzimat period the penal code was modified twice. The second modification in 1858 was especially radical in nature since the bill was modeled on the French (Napoleonic) penal code of 1810. Niyazi Berkes rightly concludes that this enactment marked "the introduction of Western legal formulation in the field of Ottoman public law". 4 Nevertheless, despite its provisions being almost completely drawn from French penal law, the text of the code contained many §eri principles found in former codes. Penal law reform was followed by the codification of commercial law. Here too French law, more specifically the French commercial code of 1807, was a source. The Ottoman version was enacted in 1850. 5 1

Berkes, Development, p. 145. Halil inalcik, "Sened-i Ittifak ve Giilhane Hattr Humayunu."_Be//eten. 28 (October 1964): pp 581-622. J Ilber Ortayh and Tekin Akiilioglu, "Le Tanzimat et le modèle français; mimétisme ou adaptation?", in Hamit Batu and Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont éd., L'Empire Ottoman, la République de Turquie et la France. (Istanbul: Isis, 1986), pp. 197-208. ^Berkes, Development, p. 164. 2

^For a critical account of the westernization of Ottoman public law, see Berkes, Development, 160-169. See also Jean Henri Ubicini, Lettres sur la Turquie, tableau statistique, religieux, politique, administratif, militaire, commercial etc. de l'Empire ottoman depuis le khatt-i cherif de Gulkhane (1839) (Paris: J. Dumaine 1853-54), pp. 167-174. For the French translation of the Tanzimat Charter, see Ubicini, pp. 527-537.

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All these reforms took place against a turbulent background: after the settlement of the Egyptian Crisis in February 1841 the empire faced more domestic problems. There was civil and religious strife in Lebanon between the Druzes and the Maronites (a chronic problem between 1841 and 1861)1 as well as external threats including Russian claims to the Holy Places in Palestine (May 1853). 2 These last crises ultimately led to the Crimean War (1853-1855). Moreover, conservative political forces within the empire were continually trying to hamper the reform movement. 3 These forces included old-fashioned pashas still attached to the traditional order which allowed them more power and autonomy than the newly enacted reforms; conservative members of the ulema and miiltezims (tax farmers) who built their fortunes by overtaxing the reaya\ as well as other beneficiaries of the ancien régime. All violently attacked the Tanzimat Charter and the reforms it brought. At the end of the Crimean War, Sultan Abdiilmecid, under pressure from Britain, agreed to introduce a new reform project, which was embodied in an edict called the Islahat Fermant, better known to European historians as the Hatt-i Humayun. Proclaimed on 18 February 1856, the new decree was significanly different from the Tanzimat Charter of 1839. Unlike the latter, the new reform edict did not combine Islamic and European legal maxims; rather it made a clear break from Islamic legal tradition. After reasserting the principle of equality between Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the sultan, the Hatt-i Humayun of 1856 enforced this principle by recognizing the full equality of non-Muslims and Muslims in matters of military and civil services, justice, taxation, and access to educational institutions.

REACTION TO MOVEMENT

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The discontent with the reforms which was first voiced over the Tanzimat Charter and later again with the Islahat edict was expressed by a ^For a critical account of this troubled period in Lebanese history, see the work of Leila Tarazi Fawaz, An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994). See also Caesar Farab, The Politics of Interventionism in Ottoman Lebanon, 1830-1861 (London: Centre for Lebanese Studies in association with I. B. Tauris, 2000). For the stable period which ensued, see the critical work of Engin Deniz Akarli, The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). ^For the origins of the Crimean War, see David M. Goldfrank, The Origins of the Crimean War (London: Longman, 1994). •'For a contemporary account of the opposition exerted by the Empire's conservative forces against the Tanzimat reforms, see M. A. Melik, L'Orient devant VOccident (Paris: Imprimerie de A. Guyot, 1856).

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group of Ottoman intellectuals who became known in Ottoman history as the Young Ottomans. The Young Ottoman movement began in protest against the inability of Tanzimat statesmen to restore the empire's political and economic position, and in opposition to their compliance with the European Powers whose chancelleries were dominating the Porte. 1 It was born in the famous Terciime Odasi (Translation Bureau) of the Porte, 2 where young clerks learned foreign languages, particularly French, and through these languages came in contact with European ideas. Although these liberal notions played a very important role in the formation of Young Ottoman thought, the essence of the ideology was nonetheless imbued with Islamic principles. In Islam, Young Ottomans found many of the ideas that had become prominent during the European Enlightenment, such as liberty, justice, and patriotism. 3 In their opinion, Locke's ideas regarding representative government were already anticipated in the Qur'an under the concept of mushawara.4 Also, early Islamic policy was, in theory, always drafted according to decisions made in the shura or by a representative council. These ideas were best expressed in the writings of Namik Kemal (1840-1888), a leading figure among Young Ottoman intellectuals. Kemal based his political thought on his adaptation of European liberal ideas to Islamic principles. He introduced two new concepts in Islamic political thought by attributing to the words vatari and hurriyet the Western connotations of fatherland and liberty. 5 In his article entitled Wa Shawirhum f i al Amr, Namik Kemal declares that only a constitutional regime could restore the former strength and prestige of the Ottoman Empire. 6 While earlier documents like the Tanzimat Charter, the Islahat edict and some other recent imperial decrees contained some legal principles, they were not sufficient, according to Kemal, for a civilized state like the Ottoman Empire. In his opinion, a constitutional regime was not only necessary to assure a fair administration for Ottoman subjects but also to deny Russia any opportunity of making further inroads into the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire, especially under the pretext of protecting the sultan's Christian subjects. It would also convince Europe of the fairness of the Ottoman administration.

The best study on the Young Ottoman movement is still §erif Mardin's The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963). (Hereafter cited as Mardin, Genesis). 2 T h e Translation Bureau was founded in 1821 during the Greek Revolt in order to replace Phanariote Greek dragomans with Muslim translators (the dragomans were suspected of participating in the Greek Revolution). For more information, see Findley, Bureaucratic Reform pp. 132-139. Mardin, Genesis, 8, p. 326. Ibid„ p. 333. 5 lbid„ p. 327. Namik Kemal."Wa shäwirihum fi al Amr" in Makalat-i Selanik Matbaasi 1327), pp. 176-186.

4

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ve Edebiye

(Istanbul:

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Kemal's patriotism was embodied in Pan-Ottomanism and his loyalty to the Islamic heritage. For him, the concept of fatherland was not limited to the Ottoman lands but encompassed all Islamic realms which were united by the memory of a common and glorious past. Namik Kemal's vision of a fatherland is imbued with nostalgia and steeped in romanticism. He describes it as: "not composed of the vague lines traced by the sword of a conqueror or the pen of a scribe. It is a sacred idea resulting from the conglomeration of various noble feelings such as the people, liberty, brotherhood, interest, sovereignty, respect for one's ancestors, love of family and childhood memories." 1 Nevertheless, despite his strong emphasis on Islam as the basis of his patriotism, Namik Kemal did not exclude non-Muslim elements of the empire from his construction of fatherland. He was strongly committed to the feasibility of a Pan-Ottoman union which would include the empire's nonMuslim communities. In Namik Kemal's opinion the different religions, languages, and races existing in the Ottoman Empire did not form an obstacle to the formation of an Ottoman nation. 2 He concluded that a proper education would be the key to reducing cultural differences among diverse elements of the empire. This policy would include a uniform syllabus which would instill patriotism in the minds of the new generation. The above summary shows how Namik Kemal's ideas on Ottoman nationalism were of an ambivalent nature. While asserting the equality of all Ottomans irrespective of ethnicity or religion and upholding the idea of Ottoman citizenship as a secular concept, he nevertheless considered Islam to be the glue which would hold together the empire and its diverse nationalities. Namik Kemal was the first Muslim thinker in Islamic history to advocate a parliamentary regime. Although his political liberalism was inspired by the liberal ideas of European thinkers such as Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau, it was nevertheless presented in an Islamic discourse. He believed that the concept of representative government had already found its expression in the Qur'an and its application in early Islamic history. The same observation could also be made for the political system of the Ottoman Empire before the centralizing reforms of Mahmud II.

1

Ahmet Hamdi Tanpinar, Namik Kemal Antolojisi (Istanbul: Muallim Ahmet Halit Kitap Evi, 1942), p. 61. ^Mardin, Genesis, p. 328.

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Namik Kemal regarded the classical Ottoman political structure as a precursor of the modern representative regime. The separation of powers Montesquieu argued for in his Spirit of the Laws was already in force in Ottoman politics. Indeed, it was based on a system of chccks and balances: for example, the sultan's authority was restrained by the ulema and the Janissaries.1 Another Young Ottoman thinker who took an Islamist approach was Ziya Pasha (1825-1880). Like Namik Kemal, he started his administrative career in the Translation Bureau where he came in contact with the ideas of the Enlightenment. Although a product of the same intellectual milieu, Ziya Pasha differed from Namik Kemal in many aspects. Unlike Kemal, who spent most of his life in exile, Ziya Pasha occupied important positions during his long administrative career. Besides, he was closely connected with the Palace and identified himself with the imperial administration. These characteristics had an undeniable impact on his political thought, which is conservative in nature in comparison to Kemal's ideology. One of the most striking divergences between these two Young Ottoman thinkers lay in Ziya Pasha's aloofness to the concept of liberty (hiirriyet). Notwithstanding Ziya Pasha's being convinced of the necessity of establishing a constitutional government in the Ottoman Empire, he expressed caution toward the preservation of the imperial prerogatives of the sultan. 2 In his opinion the causes of Ottoman decline had been to a large extent generated by the diminution of the sultan's power vis-à-vis the grand vizirate. The ideas of the Young Ottoman thinkers found a receptive ear among the bureaucratic elite of the Porte and the military commanders who decided to depose Sultan Abdiilaziz (1861-1876). The coup d'État which took place on 30 May 1876 came as an answer to the political and economic crises which had gripped the empire for the last five years. On the same day the reignmakers within the Porte bureaucracy, namely Midhat, Hiiseyin Avni, Siileyman and Miitercim Mehmed Rtigdu Pashas, installed Murad V (30 May-7 September 1876) on the throne in order to realize their plan to establish a constitutional regime. On March 19, 1877, the first Ottoman Parliament was convened. The new parliament was composed of two chambers, the House of Deputies (Meclis-i Mebusan) and the Assembly of Notables (Meclis-i Ayan). Members 1 2

Ibid., p. 310. Ibid., pp. 340-344.

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of the former chamber were elected by the members of administrative councils located in provincial capitals, sancaks, and districts, while members of the latter were appointed directly by the sultan. Since one of the main principles of the Tanzimat was to consider all subjects of the empire as Ottoman, regardless of their religious affiliation, establishing parliamentary quotas for membership based on religious affiliation was inconceivable. However, the problem of under-representation of the empire's non-Muslim communities had to be addressed and was eventually resolved by assigning a disproportionately high number of deputies to European provinces. Although it constituted an important milestone in Ottoman political history, the Constitution of 1876 did not alter very much the absolute character of the Ottoman monarchy since Article 3 declared that the sovereignty (saltanat) is vested in the eldest member of the House of Osman as the sultan-caliph. 1 The constitution was declared as a result of a popular demand or pressure. It was also granted by the monarch to appease mostly external pressures exerted by the European Powers. To Said Halim, "this constitution was designed by the dignitaries of the Porte as a means to check the power of the sultan and to curb his absolutism". 2 The pasha also acknowledges that the Ottoman constitution of 1876 "provides to the peoples of the Ottoman Empire, which stretches out to the deserts of Arabia and the majority of whose population lives a primitive life under the absolute authority of a religious or tribal chief, such extensive rights that even the most advanced nations of our time do not posses." 3 This argument has little validity since there is a quasi-complete consensus among scholars that the constitution of 1876 is far from being a liberal one. In reality, many of the provisions of this constitution conferred large powers on the sultan and left parliament with only limited rights which were also subject to the sanction of the monarch.

' Suna Kili and §eref Goziibuyiik, Turk Anayasa Metinleri, Sened-i ¡ttifaktan Guniimiize (Ankara: fg Bankasi Kiiltur Yayinlan, 1985), p. 31 See also, §eref Gozubtiyuk, Agiklamali Turk Anayasalari. (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1993), p. 11. 2 Said Halim Pasha, Buhranlarimiz (Istanbul: §ems Matbaasi, 1335-1338.) p. 1 (Hereafter cited Said Halim Pasha Buhranlarimiz). Also see the most recent edition of the same work, Buhranlarimiz ve Son Eserleri, edited by Ertugrul Duzdag. (Istanbul: Iz yayincihk, 1993). pp. 56. (Hereafter cited as Said Halim Pa§a, Buhranlarimiz ve Son Eserleri). 3 Said Halim Pasha, Buhranlarimiz, pp. 14-15. Said Halim Pasha Buhranlarimiz ve Son Eserleri. pp. 18-19.

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THE RISE OF ISLAMISM AS A POLITICAL IDEOLOGY During these years, Tanzimat statesmen had proven to be unsuccessful in halting the economic and political deterioration of the empire. This became especially evident during the last years of Sultan Abdiilaziz. The Ottomanism of the Tanzimat as a unifying ideology of the empire's diverse peoples did not find much sympathy among the Christian peoples of the Balkan provinces. The revolts in Crete (1866), Herzegovina (1875), and Bulgaria (1876) clearly demonstrated the failure of Pan-Ottomanist policies to fuse together diverse elements of the empire (ittihad-i anasir). The nationalist aspirations of the Christian peoples in the Balkans were the result of economic and social change and an ensuing cultural revival which had swept through these provinces during the second half of the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth centuries 1 . They were also motivated by the Pan-Orthodox and Pan-Slavist policies of Russia. Morever, these revolts fitted in with the latter's ambitions to take possession of Istanbul and the Straits as a key to the Black Sea, and to resuscitate the Byzantine Empire. 2 The Porte responded to these rebellions vigorously by sending its troops. At the same time the Muslim populations in these provinces also became involved in the upheavals and many massacres and atrocities were committed by both sides. This was especially true in Bulgaria where thousands of Christians and Muslims died. The result was an atmosphere of hatred and distrust between Muslim and Christian communities. As a consequence of the nationalist revolts in the Balkans and the ensuing war with Russia (18771878), the Ottoman Empire lost many of its European provinces. The end of Ottoman rule in these realms caused a large-scale migration of Muslims from the Balkans toward Anatolia. 3 During this same period a violent anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim campaign started in the West. Many publications expressing hostile opinions about Muslims and Turks were distributed, helping to turn Western public opinion against the Ottoman Empire. The great majority of these books and pamphlets were published in England, including Gladstone's The Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East. Although presented as an

^For the rise of the Balkan nationalism and its causes see Barbara Jelavich. History of the Balkans, Eigtheenth and Nineteenth Centuries. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 2 For an analytical account of nineteenth-century Russian Balkan policy, see Barbara Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 1806-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 3 For the migration of the Balkan Muslims to Anatolia see Kemal Karpat, Ottoman Population, 1830-1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics. (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press).

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expression of European public opinion against the Turkish oppression of Christian subjects, a very strong motive behind the campaign was the Porte's declaration of bankruptcy and its decision to suspend payment of interest on foreign loans. 1 The Ottoman financial collapse was the result of a policy of heavy indebtedness and extravagant court expenditures. The situation was further aggravated by a series of extremely bad harvests which began in 1872. The Tanzimat's political and economic failure led to the revival of Islamist ideas in the Ottoman Empire which had been favoured by Sultan Abdiilaziz since the early years of his reign. Domestic and international political events had the effect of gradually enhancing his role as the caliph of all Muslims. 2 Indeed, since the 1860s Muslim lands outside the empire had been exposed to a new wave of European colonial expansionism. In 1859, after ten years of heroic resistance to Russian invasion, Imam Shamil and his fighters were finally overwhelmed by the sheer might of the Tsarist armies. 3 Following Shamil's defeat, hundreds of thousands of Muslims from the Caucasus began to immigrate to Ottoman-ruled lands. Another Muslim region which fell under Russian rule was Central Asia, where Russian hegemony had gradually been imposed on local Muslim Turkic khanates since the mid-1860s. Tsarist rule was completely established in Central Asia with the Russian conquest of the Trans-Caspian Turkmen lands between 1881 and 1884. 4 Russian advances in the Caucasus and Central Asia represented only one facet of European colonial encroachment over the whole of the Muslim world. By the last decade of the nineteenth century, European domination was entrenched in most Muslim countries. France occupied Algeria in 1830, established a protectorate in Tunisia in 1881 and, after the partitioning of Africa at the Congress of Berlin in 1885, united most of the Sub-Saharan Muslim lands into French West Africa. Britain occupied Egypt in 1882 and the Sudan in 1898, after defeating local Muslim resistance forces that were led ' Bcrkcs, Development, p. 219, Donald C. Blaisdell, European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire (New York: 1929), p. 81. 2 F o r a recent research on the origins of the Ottoman Caliphate see, Tufan Buzpmar, "Opposition to the Ottoman Caliphate in the Early Years of Abdiilhamid II: 1877-1882." Die Welt des Islams 36, pp. 59-89. 3 For an excellent study of Shamil's heroic resistance to Russian conquest, see Moshe Gammer, Muslim Resistance to the Tsar: Shamil and the conquest of Chechnia and Daghestan (London: Frank Cass, 1994). 4 F o r the establishment of Russian hegemony over the Central Asian Khanates, see Seymour Becker, Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968); for the Russian conquest of Turkmen lands, see Mehmet Saray, The Turkmens in the Age of Imperialism: A Study of the Turkmen People and their Incorporation into the Russian Empire (Ankara: Turkish Historical Society Printing House, 1989).

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by Arabi Pasha and the Mahdi, respectively. Britain had already firmly established her rule over the Indian subcontinent after suppressing the Sepoy Rebellion of 1857, a revolt which had been led by Indian Muslims. In SouthEast Asia, the Dutch had been at work since the seventeenth century, gradually establishing their overseas empire at the expense of local Muslim states. By the end of the nineteenth century, nearly all of the Indonesian archipelago had come under direct Dutch rule, the exception being an on-going Muslim resistance movement in Aceh, which eventually fell in 1907, after a long period of fierce guerilla fighting. The culmination of these defeats and the establishment of Western colonial rule or protectorate over Muslim countries created a consciousness of solidarity among the Muslim peoples against a common menace which threatened their very existence. The Ottoman Empire, although economically and financially dependent on the West, was the only large politically independent Muslim state during the era of European imperialism, thus making its leadership in the Muslim world unequalled. Also, its capital was the seat of the caliphate and its sultan enjoyed enormous prestige for being the custodian of the two holiest cities of Islam: since 1516, Sultan Selim I (1512-1520), after his victory over the Mamluks, declared himself the "Servitor of the Two Holy Places" (Khadim al- Harameyn al-Sharufayn), a title until then held by the Mamluk sultans. 1 Thus, for the Muslim peoples living under colonial domination in Asia and Africa, the Ottoman Sultanate represented a rallying point in their struggle for independence. 2 The answer of the Ottomans to this call constituted a bone of contention among scholars of Ottoman history. During the later years of Sultan Abdiilaziz's reign, Muslim delegations from Central Asian khanates and Indonesian islands visited the Ottoman capital to solicit military assistance from the sultan. In 1874, the Ottoman government gave, in response to a request made by Yakub Beg, amir of Kashgar, substantial military aid to the local Kashgar Muslim resistance who were fighting Russian and Chinese regimes, including a contingent of officers who were experts in training. 3 The Ottoman military assistance to the amir of Kashgar was also encouraged by

^Buzpinar, "Opposition", p. 63. For the role played by the Ottoman government and the Caliphate in the Pan-Islamic resistance in the Muslim world to the Western imperialism, see also Azmi Özcan, Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain (1877-1924). (Leiden: Brill, 1997). 3 Mehmet Saray, Rus i§gali devrinde Osmanli Devleti ile Tiirkistan Hanhklari Arasindaki Siyasi Münasebetler (1775-1875). (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1994), pp. 103-115. 2

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the British who were anxious to check Russian expansionism in Central Asia. 1 Sultan Abdiilaziz's policy of Pan-Islamism was broadened in a more systematic fashion by his successor Abdtilhamid II. Much ink has been spilled about his Pan-Islamist policy; numerous books, articles, and pamphlets have been published on this subject by Muslim and Western scholars since the last quarter of the nineteenth century. However, the Pan-Islamist policy of Abdiilhamid has remained controversial. Scholars are divided on this issue: some like Orhan Kologlu and Caesar Farah do not accept the fact that Sultan Abdiilhamid II had a well defined pan-Islamic policy. This last view was put forward by Jacob Landau who argued that Pan-Islamism was the "Imperial Ideology" of the Hamidian Regime. Landau based his view on the vast body of literature by European writers, particularly French historians, who, during the reign of Abdiilhamid and shortly after his deposition in 1909, presented the Ottoman sultan and his government as the principal organizers of Pan-Islamic activities. 2 In their minds they saw their colonial lands and territories being swept away by a wave of Muslim crusades or, more accurately, crescentades,3 whose objective was to incite Muslims to revolt against European rule and to destroy colonial empires. This view has been refuted by Engin Akarli who argued that "Abdulhamid was realistic enough to know that the task of protecting all Muslims was beyond the capacities of the Ottoman State. He hoped that at least Muslims living within Ottoman borders could be rallied around the common cause of self protection". 4 According to Akarli if Abdulhamid "pretended to the leadership of all Muslims, that was only to foil foreign pressures on the Ottoman government by gaining leverage over European powers who had Muslim dominions." 5 Reflecting Akarli's view, Caesar Farah also wrote in his article entitled "Reassessing Sultan Abdiilhamid's Islamic policy" that "Abdulhamid preferred to use the sword of Islam like the sword of Damocles to frighten and intimidate his enemies, more specifically to scare off the vultures of imperial Christiandom, rather than to

*Lois Frechtling. "Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Eastern Turkestan, 1863-1881" Journal of Royal Central Asian Society 27 (1939): pp. 471-489. A myriad of European writers, mostly French and British, produced this vast literature about Pan-Islam. One of the best known examples was Gabriel Charmes's L'avenir de la Turquie - Le Panislamisme (Paris: Caiman-Levy, 1883). 3 Lee, D.E., "The Origins of Pan-Islamism." American Historical Review 47 (Jan. 1942): p. 282. 4 Engin Deniz Akarh "The Problems of External Pressures, Power Struggles, and Budgetary Deficits in Ottoman Politics under Abdulhamid II (1876-1909): Origins and Solutions." ( Ph.D diss., Princeton University, 1976), p. 60. (Hereafter cited as Akarli, "The Problems.") 5 Ibid. p. 61. 2

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combat them when his military power was far from adequate for the task." 1 Farah also severly criticizes Jacob Landau for relying "[predominantly on the assertions of Western writers" whom he calls "Catholic religious fanatics and government officials who served largely as propagandists against the Ottoman sultan while masquerading often as scholars."2 One of the most fundamental theories on the rise of Pan-Islamism in the Ottoman Empire was formulated by Kemal Karpat. According to Karpat, Pan-Islamism first appeared as a social phenomenon among the Muslim folk of the empire as a response to the military and political decline of the Ottoman power in Europe and its subsequent consequences which dramatically affected their lives. 3 Another major organ of diffusion of Pan-Islamist ideas among Muslims inside and outside the empire was the Muslim press. Since the 1870s, certain Ottoman periodicals had become the mouthpiece of Pan-Islamism. The most prominent of them, Basiret, an Istanbul daily, propagated the idea that world Islamic unity should be realized under the leadership of the Ottoman caliphate. 4 The same newspaper also urged Muslims to support Muslim resistance in Algeria and India. Under the reign of Sultan Abdiilhamid II, the Pan-Islamic press campaign continued to flourish and many additional periodicals were founded. Among them was Mizan (The Balance), which began publication in Istanbul in 1886 as a weekly magazine under editor-in-chief Mehmed Murad (18531912), called Mizanci. A native of Daghestan, and educated in Russia, Murad immigrated to the Ottoman Empire and became a professor of history and philosophy at the Mulkiye (School of Civil Service, established to train personnel for the Tanzimat bureaucracy in Istanbul on 12 February 1859). In his articles in Mizan, Murad advocated an Islamic constitutional regime where the sultan's authority would be limited by the provisions of the §eriat, particularly by those which ordained the establishment of a regime of me§veret. Although he pleaded for a constitutional regime, the concept of

^Caesar Farah, "Reassessing Sultan Abdiilhamid II's Islamic Policy." Archivum Ottomanicum 14 (1995/1996): p. 192. 2 Ibid., p. 194. J Kemal Karpat, "Pan-isiamizm ve Ikinci Abdiilhamid: Yanh§ bir GSrli§iin Diizeltilmesi." Turk Diinyasi Ara^tirmalari 48 (June 1987): pp. 11-37. 4 Ibid„ p. 57.

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hilafet was central in Murad's political thought. 1 It was apparently for this reason that he later reconciled with Abdiilhamid and shifted his focus from political liberalism to Pan-Islamism, believing that this could be realized under the aegis of the Ottoman sultan. Considering that the majority of the empire's Muslims were Arabs, the Ottoman government largely relied on the Arabic press to carry on its Pan-Islamic propaganda. Al-Jawaib was the major Arabic periodical published in the Ottoman Empire which engaged in PanIslamic propaganda. Printed in Istanbul and supported financially by the Palace, it was at the service of the Hamidian regime. This paper became especially well-known during France's invasion of Tunisia in 1881 because of its role in fostering resistance to the French. 2 To strengthen his authority in the Arab provinces and to integrate them into the Ottoman system, Abdiilhamid increasingly employed civil servants and officers of Arab origin in the Ottoman administration. 3 He also founded a special boarding school in Istanbul where the sons of Arab tribal chiefs received government scholarships. 4 Abdiilhamid also established direct and personal relations with many important Arab tribal chiefs to bring them under his control. One of the most important of these sheiks was Ibn Reshid, the amir of Shammar who had the privilege of communicating directly with the sultan by using a private telegraph code. 5 Besides certain sufi tarikats and the press, other Pan-Islamic propaganda tools used by Abdiilhamid included emissaries. During his long reign, the sultan sent many delegations and emissaries to many corners of the Muslim world in order to propagate his version of Pan-Islamism and to establish his spiritual authority over Muslims in Asia and Africa. It was for this reason that many Ottoman delegations were dispatched to Central Asia, Afghanistan, India, China, Java, and central and eastern Africa. 6

^For an extensive study of Mizanci Murad's life and thought, see Birol Emil, Mizanci Murad Bey: hayati ve eserleri. (Istanbul: Istanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Faktiltesi Yayinlari, 1979). (Hereafter cited as Birol, Mizanci). Landau, Politics, pp. 60-62. % n g i n Akarh "Abdulhamid's Islamic Policy in the Arab Provinces." in Tiirk-Arap ili§kileri: Gefmiite, Bugiin ve Gelecekte. (Ankara, 1979), p. 53. 4 Ibid„ p. 54. 5 Ibid„ p. 55. H. Fitzjohn, "The Sultan and Central Africa,'"The imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review and Oriental and Colonial Record 10 (July-October, 1900): pp. 282-299.

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In his Pan-Islamist policy, Abdiilhamid was assisted by a number of sheikhs, naqibs, amirs and other Muslim dignitaries who not only served as his counsellors but also as his instruments of policy. The most notorious and influential of them was Sheikh Abulhuda al-Sayyadi. 1 Al-Sayyadi was a sheikh of the R i f a ' i order in Aleppo who, besides organizing

the

tarikat network in the Arab provinces in an effort to consolidate the sultan's power, also wrote many Pan-Islamist pamphlets to justify Abdiilhamid II's right to the caliphate. He also publicized the doctrine of the Rifaiyah order among Muslims. According to B. Abu-Manneh there are 212 publications bearing al-Sayyadi's name, almost all of which were published between 1880 and 1908. In his writings he defended the view that the system of absolute government in Islam derives from basic religious tenets and can be cited from the Quranic verse "Obey God, his prophet, and those entrusted with authority among you." This view was the complete opposite of that defended by his much more famous nemesis, Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897) an internationally renowned Muslim political writer and activist. 2 Early in 1892 the sultan invited Jamal ad-Din to Istanbul. While Abdiilhamid's intentions were to make al-Afghani a valuable instrument in his Pan-Islamist policy, he soon became suspicious of his activities and placed alAfghani under strict surveillance and comfortable confinement. The sultan was responding to rumors that Afghani was involved in a British plot to establish an Arab caliphate in cooperation with the khedive of Egypt Abbas Hilmi. 3 Consequently, Afghani was severely restricted in pursuing Pan-Islamist activities in the Ottoman capital; he could, however, correspond with the Shi'i ulema of Iraq and Iran in order to garner their support for the sultan's policies and bring the Ottoman Shi'i population under his influence. 4 Afghani died in Istanbul in 1897 of cancer of the jaw. Rumors that he had been poisoned by the sultan were false. 5

^For a very interesting study on Abulhuda al-Sayyadi and his relations with Sultan Abdulhamid II, see B. Abu-Manneh, "Sultan Abdiilhamid II and Shaikh Abulhuda Al-Sayyadi," Middle Eastern Studies 15/2 (May 1979): pp. 131-153. 2 For an excellent study of the life and works of Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, see Nikkie R. Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani: A Political Biography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972). 3 Ibid„ p. 383. 4 For the efforts of the Ottoman government to gain the support of the Shii ulema and population in its Mesopotamian provinces but also in Iran, see Selim Deringil, "Legitimacy Structures in the Ottoman State: The Reign of Abdiilhamid II, (1876-1909)". International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 23 (August 1991): pp. 345-359. 5 Ibid„ p. 420.

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The important position that Jamal al-Din Afghani occupied was not due to his theoretical contributions to modern Islamic thought and his political activism. The anti-imperialist, Pan-Islamist ideas that he endeavored to spread across the Muslim world were engendered by Young Ottoman thinkers, especially by Namik Kemal, and adopted by Sultan Abdiilhamid II as his regime's principal ideology. Afghani first expounded his Pan-Islamist ideas in a long letter (probably written during the Russo-Ottoman war of 1877-1878) to an Ottoman statesman in the hope of its being presented to the sultan. In the letter, he proposed the formation of a defensive alliance against Russian expansionism lead by the Ottoman sultan and composed of the three major Muslim powers of Western and Central Asia, namely the Ottoman Empire, Iran, and Afghanistan. With this pact, Afghani envisioned the first concrete step towards the realization of the "Unity of Islam" (ittihad-i islamiye) and the "union of community" (ittifdq-i umma).1 Furthermore, he hoped to obtain British support for this project through the mediation of Indian Muslims, and eventually to provoke a war between Russia and Britain over Central Asia. Such confrontations would, he hoped, wear down the two imperial powers and ultimately force them to give up their domination over the Muslim world. Besides being a fervent advocate of the unity of the Muslim world, Afghani also encouraged the creation of local nationalist movements. The articles he wrote in India between 1879 and 1882 echoed his earlier teachings in Egypt in the 1870s in that they put much emphasis on a nation's culture and its pre-Islamic heritage. 2 Afghani believed that Egyptian and Indian Muslims should be proud of their pre-Islamic heritage and should treasure it because it would foster their development. On this point Afghani's teachings were in complete opposition to what Said Halim felt about pre-Islamic heritage. (Afghani strongly emphasized this pre-Islamic aspect in Indian nationalism as opposed to Pan-Islamism in order to unite all Indians — both Hindus and Muslims — against British imperialism.) This modification in his campaign is an example of his pragmatic approach to anti-imperialism.

1 2

Ibid., p. 135. Ibid„ pp. 159-160.

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PAN-ISLAMISM IN SAiD HALiM'S THOUGHT In spite of a general awakening in the Muslim world, Said Halim perceived a potential danger in the increasing encroachment of European imperalism on Muslim lands. The apprehension felt by the European powers about their Muslim colonies was caused by their misconception of the nature and aims of this Pan-Islamic revival. Said Halim asserted that, contrary to what Europeans thought, the latter movement did not harbour a belligerent character and certainly did not preach the rallying of Muslims around a despotic authority which would encourage supporters to commit massacres. PanIslamism, in his view, represented neither a political union of peoples belonging to the same faith, nor it was an occult religious sect or secret politicial association; rather, it was the leading voice of progress and liberty in Muslim societies. For Said Halim, the idea of Pan-Islam represented the desire of the intellectual elites of Muslim countries to ensure the salvation of the Islamic world through liberty and progress. Pan-Islamism represented the revival of an Islamic conscience among Muslims all over the world who were determined to liberate themselves from the shackles of ignorance and servitude by improving their intellectual prowess, their capacities and their material condition. Said Halim maintained that the oppressors of the Muslim peoples were not only their Western colonizers, but also their own despotic rulers who were directly responsible for the present degradation of Muslims by keeping them through coercion in a state of ignorance and servility and hindering their development. Therefore, he declared that Muslims had to unite not only against European colonialism, but also against despotic potentates who ruled over them oppressively, even if one of these were the caliph himself. 1 After refuting the view that Pan-Islamism preached enmity against Christian Europe, Said Halim commented on political and social revolutions in Europe and compared them with the modern Islamic revival. Since, he argued, it was accepted that these revolutions were pursued in the name of liberty and progress, the West had no right to accuse the Pan-Islamic movement of fanaticism when, like the revolutions in Europe, it aspired to establish the rules of liberty and progress in Muslim lands. 2 The Pan-Islamic revival, affirmed Said Halim, would restore to the Islamic World its former might and splendor by emancipating it from the decay of its civilization. ^Said Halim, Pan-lslamisme, Ibid„ p. 6.

2

pp. 5, 8-9.

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According to Said Halim, Muslim ulema had come into contact with the scholastic ideas during the Crusades through their dealings with Christian European clergy. Eventually, this scholasticism began to dominate Islamic intellectual life and to hinder its development. 1 Thus, whereas Afghani considered the Pan-Islamic movement primarily as a rallying ideology for the Muslim world to fight Western colonial encroachments, Said Halim believed that Pan-Islamism would lead to the regeneration of Muslim society through a revival of past accomplishments. This is very much reminiscent of Muhammad Abduh's position who sought the salvation of the Muslim World in an intellectual and religious awakening more than in an anti-imperialist political struggle against the colonial powers. Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), one of the most prominent and influential Muslim modernist thinkers of that era, had first embarked on his intellectual and political career as a disciple and collaborator of Jamal-ad-Din al-Afghani. In 1884, they published in Paris al-'Urwa al-Wuthqà (The Firm Bond), a short lived but famous Pan-Islamist journal which played a crucial role in the awakening of Muslim consciousness and the spread of Pan-Islamist ideas in Muslim lands. While they shared the same goals and ideals, Abduh proposed different methods of emancipation than his mentor. Instead of revolutionary activism, Abduh advocated gradual reform in order to heal the ills of Muslim societies and reverse their inner decay. According to Abduh, Islam is a rational religion; indeed, the Qur'an urges man to investigate Allah's creation by using his intellect. For Abduh, the real Muslim is the one who thinks and acts according to reason. In his view, Muslims had generally accepted that in case of disaccord between rational and traditional explanations of a given matter, precedence would be given to the one based on reason. Islamic teaching had for centuries been kept under restraint by the ulema who relied heavily on taqlid. In his Risàia, writing on the commentary on Chapter II, Verse 243 of the Qur'an, Abduh accused "those who believe in taqlid" to be very far "from the guidance of the Kur'an " and reproached the ulema for "infecting the hearts of the masses with taklid."2 Abduh refuted the reasoning of the vindicators of the taqlid who argued that only members of the Salaf or early generation of Muslims were able to understand the true meaning ^Ibid., p. 9; Said Halim Pacha, Les institutions politiques Imprimerie Editrice Italia, 1921), pp. 7, 18. ^Adams, Islam and Modernism, pp. 130-131.

dans la société musulmane

(Rome:

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of Qur'anic principles corrcctly and that later generations should therefore follow them without question. This argument, asserted Abduh, contradicted the real message of Islam, which "turned aside the hearts of men from exclusive attachment to customs and practices of the fathers which had been handed down from father to son." "Islam," he said, "attributed folly and levity to those who accept blindly the words of their predecessors."1 According to Abduh: precedence in point of time [in IslamJ [wasj not a mark of superiority of intellect or intelligence; but that the preceding generations and the later are on an equality so far as critical acumen and natural abilities are concerned. Indeed, the later generations have a knowledge of past circumstances and a capacity to reflect upon them, and to profit by the effects of them in the world, which have survived until their times, that the fathers and the forefathers who preceded them did not have. 2 It is evident from the above that Muhammad Abduh preferred the modern interpretation of Islam proposed by the current generation. Having said that, he urged Muslims in his writings "to understand the religion [of Islam] as the early generation understood it, before the appearance of divisions among them." 3 What Abduh was critical of was the slavish imitation of and the opinionated adherence to the doctrines of medieval Muslim jurists. According to Abduh, the reforms of Muhammad Ali had divided Egyptian society into two groups. On one side stood the conservative Muslim majority loyal to their traditions and hostile to any kind of reform and on the other side stood the Western-minded minority who wanted to Westernize and modernize Egypt and who held little respect for her traditional Islamic heritage. Since, says Abduh, the latter controlled the country's political and economic power, their influence was enabling them to gain ground at the expense of traditional Muslims. Muhammad Ali and his successors had tried to modernize Egypt by importing and "planting European institutions and laws to her soil". 4 Although Abduh did not deny the benefits that accrued from the efforts to modernize Egypt, he argued that importing foreign institutions and laws could not really work because they were alien to the country. Also, the country's citizens would not understand them and would consequentely not comply with them. These same ideas were adopted by Said Halim in his criticism of the Tanzimait reforms in the Ottoman Empire.

kbid., p. 132. Ibid. 3 Ibid„ p. 174. 2

4

Hourani, Arabic Thought, p. 137.

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Because the ideas of Abduh like those of the Afghani and Young Ottomans constituted a bridge between traditional Islamists like the ulema and Westernists, he gained the sympathy and respect of both parties. While traditional Islamists considered him to be a defender of Islamic values against Westernizing reforms, Westernists admired his patriotic and enlightened approach. Nevertheless, it is also true that Abduh was the object of severely critical attacks of a coalition of thinkers in the final years of his tenure as the chief mufti of Egypt. Many of his so-called opponents were also less Islamists than Abduh. Among them we can mention Mustafa Kamil who criticized Abduh "because he cared too much for having official influence" 1 , and Qasim Amin (1865-1908) who declared that "Sharia was the first law to provide for the equality of women with men" 2 . Although Abduh was a conservativemodernist Muslim thinker, his ideas prepared the ground, especially in Egypt, for the further development of secularism. Indeed, most of his disciples later became secularist thinkers. 3 According to Albert Hourani, by challenging the traditional interpretation of the ulema, Abduh unintentionially exposed Islam to the devastating influences of modernity. Abduh, argues Hourani, "had intended to build a wall against secularism; he had in fact provided an easy bridge by which it could capture one position after another". 4 As for Abduh's attitude toward folk Islam, it was at best ambivalent: while he believed in the existence of holy men in Islam who were friends of the Prophet (awliyâ) and recognized their extraordinary power in granting karàmas or wonders and grace-gifts, he could not accept their capacity of performing mujizât (miracles). He criticized those who expected favors and intercessions from dead saints by visiting their tombs. Another Muslim modernist thinker was Hayreddin Pasha of Tunis (1822-1889). 5 He was born in the Caucasus and brought to Istanbul as a young boy in order to be raised in the household of a high-ranking Ottoman bureaucrat. In 1840 he was recruited into the service of Ahmad Bey of Tunis where his talents allowed him to advance rapidly to prominence. In 1873 he hbid., p. 160. Ibid., p. 164. 3 Ibid.,pp. 159-161. 4 Ibid., p. 144. -'For the political career and thought of Hayreddin Pasha, see Magali Morsy, Essai sur les réformes nécessaires aux états musulmans (Aix-en-Provence: Édisud, 1987), annotated; see also Alaaddin A. Çetin, Tunuslu Hayreddin Pa§a. (Ankara: Kiiltur ve Turizm Bakanligi, 1988). (Hereafter cited as Morsy, Essai). See also Ibrahim Abu-Lughud, "The Islamic influence on Khayr Al-Din of Tunis." in Donald P. Little ed. Essays on Islamic Civilization, presented to Niyazi Berkes, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1976, pp. 9-24. (Hereafter cited as, Abu-Lughud, "Islamic Influence"). 2

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became the prime minister of Tunisia, a position which he held despite the growing interference of the colonial powers in Tunisian internal affairs and suspicions of the bey. In September 1878, following his dismissal by the bey, Hayreddin Pasha returned to Istanbul and entered the service of the Ottoman State. In December 1878 he was appointed grand vizir by Abdiilhamid II. Hayreddin submitted to the sultan many lengthy reports by proposing the administrative, financial, and judicial reforms. Although some of his reform projects had been implemented and increased government efficiency, he eventually came into conflict with Abdiilhamid on the issue of extending the power of the grand vizir and the ministers. The sultan considered this as an encroachment upon his authority. 1 Consequently he was dismissed and spent the rest of his life in retirement. Hayreddin Pasha expounded his social and political ideas in a work published in Tunis in 1867 under the title of Aqwarn al-Masàlik fi Ma'rifat Ahwal al Mamâlik (The Surest Path to Knowledge Concerning the Conditions of Countries) which has been partially translated into French and published in Paris under the title of Réformes nécessaires aux États musulmans. In his work, Hayreddin Pasha leveled criticism at Islamic civilization and compared it with the West whose progress had aroused his admiration. Muslim countries, advocated Hayreddin Pasha, should emulate Europe in their modernization. He thoroughly supported the reforms of the Tanzimat which, in his view benefitted the Ottoman Empire. 2 Here he differed from Said Halim Pasha who severely criticized these reforms as detrimental to Ottoman society. Ercûment Kuran, a modern Turkish scholar, has argued that Said Halim's political ideas were inspired by those of Hayreddin. 3 Instead, it can safely be said that in many aspects they are contradictory. Hayreddin declared that the Tanzimat reforms had been opposed by those who did not wish the Ottoman Empire to become a strong state. These opponents included the European powers and local pashas, who having been used to ruling arbitrarily, discovered that their personal interests had been checked by the new regime's centralization. 4 The major difference between the political theories of Hayreddin and Said Halim is that whereas the latter clcarly advocates a parliamentary regime under the auspices of the tseriat, Hayreddin does not require more than the establishment of a certain control and checks over the acts and deeds of the sultan's government by giving power to the ulama and ^Akarli, The problems, pp. 104-119. Ibid. Erciimend Kuran, "Osmanli Imparatoriugunda Islam dusiincesinm gelismesi." Turk KtiUuru (November 1978): pp. 275-281. 4 Morsy, Essai, p. 117. 2

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certain other influencial sectors of the society. According to Ibrahim AbuLughud, "Hayreddin was more inclined to support a certain curtailment of the absolute power of the sultan rather than to promote popular representative institutions". 1 According to Hayreddin, internal strife and divisions between Muslims caused the decline of the Islamic world, despite the rich and solid cultural heritage of Muslim nations that could help them to develop rapidly and restore them to their former splendor.2 The Ottoman sultans, said Hayreddin, had tried to check the decline of their empire by promulgating the kanunnam.es (sultanic edicts). The content and style of Hayreddin's work exhibit a quite different character from those of Said Halim. Unlike in the writings of the latter, in Hayreddin's work social and political ideas were mainly expounded on a bare theoretical basis with very little reference to a detailed historical information and with almost no citations from other thinkers; Hayreddin's Aqwam is heavily loaded with historical and encyclopedic knowledge and contains lengthy references and quotations from the works of many Muslim and Western thinkers, scholars and statesmen. The common goal of these Islamist thinkers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was to stop the internal decline of Islamdom and to resist the encroachment of European imperalism which threatened the Muslim world. These two phenomena were intrinsically connectcd to each other. Islamism was in many ways a by-product of the rise of the some Western states as a technological, economic and political powers and its subsequent domination over the rest of the globe. The ascendcnce of these Western Powers has been associated historically with the age of modernity. Islamism as a political ideology emerged as a response to the impact of modernity on the Muslim world, but is itself a modern phenomenon as well. On this issue, Ira Lapidus concluded correctly: "contemporary Islamic movements are both a response to the conditions of modernity — to the centralization of state power and the development of capitalist economies — and a cultural expression of modernity." 3 The political and intellectual career of Said Halim Pasha, which I will discuss in the following chapters, represented this Muslim response both to the threat of European imperalism and to the internal decline of Islamdom.

^Ibrahim Abu-Lughud, "The Islamic Influence." p. 22. ^Morsy, Essai, pp. 113-114. 3 Ira Lapidus. "Islamic Revival and Modernity: The Contemporary Movements and the Historical Paradigms." JESHO 40: pp. 445-457.

CHAPTER TWO: THE LIFE AND EARLY POLITICAL CAREER OF SAÍD HALÍM PASHA SET IN A HISTORICAL CONTEXT Said Halim was bora in Cairo at the palace of §ubra on 28 January 1865.1 He was the grandson of Muhammad Ali, the founder of modern Egypt. In 1869, Said Halim's father Prince Halim Pasha was forced to leave Egypt in the wake of a dispute between him and the ruling khédive, Ismail Pasha (1863-1879) over the matter of succession.2 In 1866 Prince Halim, the younger son of Muhammad Ali, had been deprived of his right to assume the khedivate by a ferman (Imperial edict) issued by the Ottoman sultan, Abdiilaziz (1861-1876), suzerain of Egypt. 3 The new law of succession was based on primogeniture, thereby depriving the other male members of the khedive's family of any claim to the throne. The real motive behind this exclusion was Khedive Ismail's desire to secure the Egyptian throne for his own son Tawfiq (1879-1892). 4 The khedive won the support of the sultan for his case by means of some fiscal concessions. Reacting to this change which excluded him from the line of succession to the Egyptian throne, Prince Halim attempted a coup d'État in order to overthrow the khedive. The coup was aborted and Prince Halim was exiled. After leaving Egypt, Prince Halim and his six-year-old son Said Halim moved to Istanbul. Upon arriving to the Ottoman capital Halim Pasha bought a yah (mansion built on the seaside) in Balta Limani.5 Halim Pasha also ^Sadr-i Azam Fehametlu, Devletlu, Prens Said Halim Pa§a hazretlerinin Terciime-i hal-i saileri. Bab-i Ali Hariciye Nezareti Terciime Miidtiriyeti. Copy found in the Private Papers of Said Halim Pasha in possesion of Rukiye Kuneralp (hereafter called Terciime-i Hal). This data is based on the information given by Princess Zeyneb Halim, daughter of Abbas Halim Pasha and niece of Said Halim Pasha, during an interview she granted me in her residence in Salacak, Istanbul. (Hereafter cited as Interview, Z. Halim, 2001). For Said Halim's birthday, different authors suggest different dates: for example Mahmud Kemal inal wrote in his famous biographical work Osmanh Devrinde Son Sadrazamlar that Said Halim Pasha was born on 1863 (11 Ramazan 1280); Bostan, in his biographical work of Said Halim Pasha, Bir Islamci Dü¡ünür, gives the date of 21 February 1864, basing his claim on records of Sicil-i Ahval. My sources are the official biography that Said Halim dictated at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the family notes, in particular, the notes of Abbas Halim Pasha which are in the possession of Princess Zeyneb Halim. 2 Ibid. G. Douin, Histoire du règne du Khédive Ismail (Roma: Instituto Poligrafico della Stato, 1933), vol. 1, pp. 218-220. For the English version of the ferman changing the order of succession, see Thomas Erskine Holland, The European Concert in the Eastern Question, a Collection of Treaties and Other Public Acts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1875), pp. 114-116. 4 Ibid„ pp. 205-207. -'(Interview, Z. Halim, 2001).

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erected a smaller residence on the edge of the forest facing his property. This one was called Siingerli Ko§k (Sponge Kiosk) because of the texture of its marble walls. 1 Halim Pasha also constructed a hunting lodge in Alemdag, near the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus. 2 Sultan Abdiilhamid immediately built a gendarme station just outside the boundaries of Halim Pasha's property in order to watch him. 3 At the mansion of his father the young Said Halim learned from his tutors, among other things, Arabic, Persian, French, and English. In 1880 when he was fifteen, Said Halim was sent with his younger brother Abbas Halim to Geneva to further pursue his education. Said Halim stayed five years in Switzerland where he studied political science. After returning to Istanbul in 1885, Said Halim and his brother Abbas Halim were presented by their father to the sultan with these words, "I brought up two slaves for your Majesty". 4 Sultan Abdiilhamid decorated Said Halim with the second rank Mecidi Order, and bestowed upon him the title of pasha on 13 May 18885. On 21 May 1888, he was appointed to the State Council. This was followed by a series of honors and decorations awarded by the sultan. In February 1889, he received the order of ali-i Osmani, second rank, (7kind rutbeden ni§an-i ali-i Osmani); on 23 April 1892, the order of ali-i Osmani, first rank (Birinci rutbeden nisan-i-ali-i Osmani); and on 17 November 1899, the jeweled medal of Sultan Mecid (Murassa Mecidi ni^an-i zi sani). On 22 September 1900, Said Halim Pasha was promoted to the rank of Rumeli Beylerbeyi.6 All of these awards and honors were bestowed upon Said Halim by the sultan because of his desire to assure the pasha's loyalty and to prevent him from joining the opposition. In 1894 the father of Said Halim, Halim Pasha died 7 . The following year in 1895 Said Halim Pasha married Princess Emine Tosun granddaughter of Said Pacha, vali of Egypt and himself son of Muhammad Ali Pasha 8 . From this marriage Said Halim had two sons: Prince Mehmed Halim (b. April 1896) and Prince Ibrahim Halim (1898-1964). 9

ilbid. 2

Ibid. Ibid. 4 ibid. ^Ibnulemin Mahmud Kemal Inai, Osmanli Devrìnde Son Sadrazamlar Matbaasi, 1940), p. 1893. (Hereafter cited as Inai, Son Sadrazamlar). 6 Ibid. "^(Interview. Z. Halim, 2001). 8 (Terciime-i Hal). 9 Ibid; (Interview, Z. Halim, 2001). 3

(Istanbul: Maarif

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After the death of Said Halim's father, Khedive Abbas Hilmi Pasha seized the property of Said Halim and his brother in Egypt. Nevertheless, Said Halim managed to get his property back with the support of Lord Cromer, the British high commissioner in Egypt. 1 During the same period, opposition to Abdiilhamid was growing, and secret societies devoted to the cause of overthrowing him were being organized abroad, especially in Paris, Brussels, Geneva and Cairo, as well as inside the empire. The most important of these societies was the Ottoman Society of Union and Progress which had been founded by a group of medical students on 1 May 1889 under the name of the Society for Ottoman Unity (Ittihad-i Osmani Cemiyeti). 2 The members of this association were known in Europe as Jeunes Turcs (Young Turks) and their ultimate objective was to bring down the Hamidian regime and proclaim the Constitution. Despite Abdiilhamid's efforts to suppress it, the Young Turk movement spread through diverse levels of Ottoman society and succeeded in extending the scope of its membership outside student circles and especially those attending modern professional schools where it had first developed. As the movement grew, it attracted new adherents from various groups in the empire including the army, the ilmiye and the civilian bureaucracy. The Young Turks experienced a setback between 1897 and 1899, due to the desertion of Mehmed Murad Bey to the Hamidian cause and the Ottoman victory over Greece in 1897, which enhanced Abdiilhamid's prestige and strengthened his position. Mehmed Murad had been the natural leader of the Young Turk movement in Europe against the Hamidian regime until he was convinced by the sultan to return to Istanbul. Murad was a Pan-Islamist and in his writings he defended the ideal of a constitutional Islamic regime. 3 Nevertheless, in the early stage of his intellectual life Murad was against the parliamentary regime and the reestablishment of the 1876 Constitution. 4 His conviction that the salvation of Muslims and the survival of the Ottoman 1 (Interview, Z. Halim, 2001). For the foundation of the Society of Union and Progress see §iikru Hanioglu, Bir Siyasal Orgut olarak Osmanli ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jon Tiirklttk vol. 1 (¡889-1902) Istanbul: Iletigim yayinlan, 1986. (Hereafter cited as Hanioglu, ittihat), also see, Doctor Ibrahim Temo, Ittihad ve Terakki Cemiyetinin Te§ekkUlU ve Hidemati Vatniye (sic) ve Inkilabi Milliye Dair Hatiratim. (Romanya: Mecidiye, 1939), pp. 16-18. According to Ahmed Bedevi Kuran, the Society of Union and Progress was founded in 1308 (1892); Ahmed Bedevi Kuran, inkilap Tarihimiz ve Jon TUrkler (Istanbul: Tan Matbaasi, 1948), p. 30. (Hereafter cited as Kuran, inkilap). 3 Biro 1, Miianci, p. 345. 4 §erif Mardin, Jon TUrklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 1895-1908 (Ankara: Ttirkiye Is Bankasi Kultiir Yayinlan 1964). pp. 62-63. 2

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Empire could only be assured by a strong caliphate eventually resulted in a reconciliation with the sultan. Another important feature in Murad's thought was his Russian-educated background. The effects of this could be seen in his ideas on Turkism which developed under the influence of the ideas of the slavophiles in Russia. 1 An equally important influence from Russian intellectualism was his defence of peasants' rigths. 2 Unlike Murad who later compromised with the sultan and returned to Istanbul, Ahmed Riza remained intransigent in his fight against the Hamidian autocracy and continued to serve as the torchbearer of Young Turk ideology by diffusing his ideas through his journal Mechveret. By late 1899, the tables began to turn when a prominent member of the imperial family, Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha (1853-1903), husband of the sultan's sister, arrived in Paris with his two sons Sabaheddin and Lutfullah to join the Young Turk opposition. This constituted a severe blow to Abdiilhamid's prestige, and in reaction he intensified his grip on the top bureaucracy and his immediate entourage. 3 Disturbed by this suffocating atmosphere, Said Halim lost interest in public affairs and started to neglect his duties on the State Council and to withdraw to his mansion (yah) on the Bosphorus. 4 There he devoted most of his time and energy to the study of Islamic history and institutions and began to reflect on the crisis which afflicted contemporary Muslim world. Even these intellectual activities did not pass unnoticed by the vigilant censors of an autocratic regime which was intolerant of any activity which raised the suspicions of the sultan. Consequently, upon a report by a jurnalci (an informant for Abdiilhamid's intelligence service), Said Halim's residence was searched and he himself was required to leave the country and not to return.5 Said Halim went first to Paris in winter 1905 6 where he officially became a member of the CUP. Later he went to Egypt where he had built a palace for himself on Champollion Street by the Italian architect Antonio Lasciac. 7 There he became the biggest shareholder of the Société Belgo-

1

Ibid, pp. 75-76. Ibid„ p. 72. 3 Paul Fesch, Constantinople aux derniers jours d'Abdul Hamid (Paris: Librairie des Sciences Politiques et Sociales, 1907), p. 358. 4 Feroz Ahmad, "Said Halim Pasha, Mehmed." The Oxford Encyclopedia of Modern Islamic World vol. 3. (Hereafter cited as Ahmad, Said Halim), p. 459. 5 Hanefi Bostan, Said Halim Pa§a (Istanbul: M a n Yayinevi, 1992), p. 22 (Hereafter cited as Bostan, Said Halim). 6 (Tercüme-i Hai), (Interview, Z. Halim, 2001). ^Information based on the private papers of Said Halim. Today Said Halim's palace in Cairo houses Nasiriya School. See also "The Grand Vezir's Palace" by Samir Raafat, Cairo Times, 7 June 2001. 2

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Egyptienne de Ezbekié founded in 1899 in Uzbekié, a district in Cairo. 1 He also established direct, close relations with the Young Turk movement and provided financial support for the journal Osmanh.2 Said Halim took on the responsibility of inspector of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in 1906. 3 Presumably, Said Halim had already been in contact with the Young Turks while living in Istanbul. 4 Indeed, his brother Mehmed Ali Halim Pasha was one of the organizers of the Young Ottoman Conference (Yeni Osmanh Kongresi) held in Brindisi, Italy in 1899 and his other brother Abbas Halim Pasha supported the Young Turks. Judging by a letter written from Paris on 24 October 1901 to §erif Pasha, Ahmed Riza mentioned that he had had a meeting with Abbas Halim. 5 Under Khedive Abbas Hilmi's administration (1892-1914), Egypt became a sanctuary for Young Turk opposition to the Hamidian regime. This was fully in keeping with Said Halim's relations with the movement and not an individual deviance from the official policy of the khedivial family vis-à-vis the Young Turks. Meanwhile in Europe, the Young Turk movement was experiencing an internal crisis. Prens Sabaheddin (1877-1948), the elder son of Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha, had decided to challenge the leadership of Ahmed Riza Bey. Unlike the latter, who believed in a strongly centralized country and the necessity of state intervention in order to encourage economic development, Prens Sabaheddin argued that only a policy of decentralization coupled with a liberal economy would rejuvenate the empire. Heavily influenced by Le Play's social theories and by the epoch-making work of his disciple, Edmond Demolins, A quoi tient la supériorité des Anglo-Saxons?, Prens Sabaheddin argued that societies based on individualism prosper, whereas those having a communal system are doomed to stagnation. The former condition was, according to him, characteristic of Anglo-Saxon countries, the latter of Ottoman society. Therefore, said Prens Sabaheddin, in order to regenerate the empire, the government should adopt an individualistic system, encourage free enterprise, and establish a political system based on decentralization whereby every province would be administered by its local government. 6 'ibid. Hanioglu, Ittihat, p. 387. Kuran, Inkilap, p. 212. 4lbid., p. 131. 5 Ibid„ pp. 165-166. "Prens Sabaheddin, Teçebbiis-i §ahsi ve tevsi-i mezuniyet hakkinda bir izah (Dersaadet: Matbaa-i Kiitiiphane-i Cihan, no date), pp. 2-5. 2

Halim Pasha, Said Halim Pasha's father.

Said Halim Pasha as a young man.

Said Halim Pasha as grand vizir.

Said Halim Pasha's wife, Princess Emine Tosun.

Said Halim Pasha's brother, Abbas Halim Pasha.

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Sabaheddin's advocacy of self-rule was strongly supported by nonTurkish groups of the anti-Hamidian coalition, especially by Armenian organizations which also advocated recourse to foreign intervention in order to depose the sultan. 1 Fearing the potential for dismemberment of the empire, Ahmed Riza categorically opposed such a scheme. These dissenting views finally resulted in a deadlock in the 1902 Young Turk Congress. Opposition was divided between two main branches, the first revolving around Ahmed Riza and the second around Prens Sabaheddin. In 1906, in order to diffuse his ideas, Prens Sabaheddin started to publish a journal, Terakki (Progress), and established an association known as the Tegebbiis-ii §ahsi-ve Adem-i Merkeziyet Cemiyeti (League for Administrative Decentralization and Private Initiative). The years between 1903 and 1908 were marked by a series of important events which made a decisive impact on the collapse of the Hamidian regime. In 1903, after declaring that their interests in the empire were threatened, Russia, Austria, and Italy resorted to gunboat diplomacy and sent their warships into Ottoman waters. 2 In 1904 an international force composed of Russian, Austrian, Italian, French, and British gendarmerie officers was sent to Macedonia in order to assist the Ottoman troops in maintaining law and order. The following year the same powers proposed to the Porte the establishment of financial control over Macedonia. Faced with Abdiilhamid's refusal, they occupied the customs and post offices of Midilli (Lesbos) and Limni (Lemnos) islands in order to compel the sultan to accept their terms. 3 All these foreign transgressions of Ottoman sovereignty and the sultan's impotence in their wake generated frustation in army circles, causing many to believe in the necessity of military intervention in order to save the empire from total disintegration. On 27-29 December 1907 various Young Turk associations held a congress in Paris, the second since 1902, in order to resolve their differences and decide upon a strategy against the common foe, the Hamidian regime. This

François Georgeon, "Le dernier sursaut (1878-1908)." in Robert Mantran éd., Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman. (Paris: Fayard, 1989), p. 572. (Hereafter cited as Georgeon, Dernier sursaut); Shaw and Shaw, History, p. 258.; see also Ramsaur, Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 71. (Hereafter cited as Ramsaur, Young Turks). 2 Ba§bakanlik Osmanli Argivi (Hereafter cited as BOA).,Yildiz Tasnifi Sadaret Hususi Evraki, Dosya no 447, sira no. 95. 3 Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Tilrk inkilabi Tarihi (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaasi, 1940), vol. 1, p. 182 (Hereafter cited as Bayur, Turk).

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time, unlike the first Young Turk Congress, Prens Sabaheddin's group and the Armenian revolutionaries managed to gain the upper hand: they obtained approval for several violent measures designed to overthrow the Hamidian regime and to restore the Constitution. 1 During this time Said Halim stayed in Egypt as inspector of the CUP and continued to provide financial support to Young Turk activities there and in Paris. In his memoirs, Ahmed Riza mentioned the name of Said Halim Pasha among other members of the Egyptian khedivial family who financially supported the Young Turk movement in exile. 2 Riza also wrote that it was only after Said Halim Pasha found the necessary money that Enver and Niyazi could start their rebellion against the sultan in Resne. 3 Meanwhile Said Halim regularly corresponded with leading members of the Committee in Paris (Ahmed Riza's group). Most of the letters he received in return were from two prominent Unionists who were struggling to give a more solid structure to the Committee, Dr. Bahaeddin §akir (1877-1922) and Dr. Nazim (1870-1926). 4 In Egypt, Said Halim Pasha received letters from Bahaeddin §akir asking the pasha to establish a CUP branch in Cairo and publish an Arabic supplement of the §ura-yi Ummet. Said Halim refused these requests on the grounds that the free-willed and non-conformist attitude of the Young Turk community in Egypt would not help the cause and that Egyptians showed a complete lack of interest in it. 5 Indeed, in his reply to Bahaeddin §akir, Said Halim also wrote that an Arabic edition of the §ura-yi Ummet would be futile since the masses in Egypt were not interested in politics and the elite was merely occupied with their national politics, which consisted of "driving the British out of Egypt". 6 In their struggle against the British, wrote Said Halim, Egyptian nationalists relied on the help of the Ottoman government and the palace; therefore, he said, they would not side with the Young Turks. 7 The arrival of the Constitutional Revolution of 23 July 1908 had been anticipated by a series of minor rebellions and mutinies across the empire. 8 The number of mutinies gradually increased from early in 1906 until they ^Ramsaur, Young Turks, p. 127. ^Ahmed Riza, MeclisA Mebusan ve Ayari Reisi Ahmed Riza Bey'in Anilari (Istanbul- Arba 1988), pp. 19-20. 3 Ibid., p. 20. 4 Kuran, Inkilap, pp. 210-213. 5 M . §ukrii Hanioglu, Preparation For a Revolution. The Young Turks, 1902-1908. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 164. (Hereafter cited as Hanioglu, Preparation) 6 Ibid, p. 165. 7 Ibid. Q °Ramsaur, Young Turks, p. 130.

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reached a climax in June 1908.1 Most of these uprisings were in fact acts of insubordination by the troops whose salaries had been in arrears for a long period of time. Moreover, riots broke out in several provinces, most of them in eastern Anatolia, because of the misrule and oppression of the governors there. A bad harvest followed by the harsh 1907-1908 winter in these regions worsened the situation. A very interesting aspect of these rebellions in eastern Anatolia was the close collaboration of the Armenian revolutionary organisation, Dashaktsutiun with their Muslim counterparts who rebelled against the sultan's government. 2 Meanwhile, the Committee consolidated its position in Macedonia. Its membership was increasing among the officers of the Third Army and among both non-Muslim and Muslim inhabitants of the province. During the period of June-July 1908 revolutionary activities in Macedonia suddenly gained momentum and the Hamidian administration lost control of the situation. On 7 July, §emsi Pasha, one of the sultan's most faithful generals who had been entrusted with the suppression of the revolutionary movement in Macedonia, was shot dead at Manastir. The Palace reacted to this open challenge by dispatching new troops from Anatolia to Selanik. These troops proved to be reluctant to fight and instead joined the rebels. 3 During the same period, the Muslim population of Manastir rioted against the sultan's administration. All of these events constituted a severe blow to the authority of the Hamidian regime. On 23 July 1908 the Constitution was declared by the Committee, first in Manastir, and then within the next few hours in other Macedonian cities including Uskiib and Serez. Informed officially about the situation in a telegram sent by his highest ranking official in Macedonia, Inspector-General Hilmi Pasha (1855-1923), the sultan, after a night of deliberation with the State Council, finally accepted the fait accompli and gave the necessary orders for the official proclamation of the Constitution on the morning of 24 July. 4 The Constitution had been restored as a result of the long-standing political struggle by the Young Turks and, more directly, because of the mutiny of the Third Army in Macedonia. However, in Istanbul and in the Asiatic provinces of the empire, people were convinced that it was granted as a ^For a detailed description of these revolts see, Aykut Kansu, The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey (Leiden: Brill, 1997), pp. 29-72. (Hereafter cited as Kansu, The Revolution). Hanioglu, Preparation, pp. 109-120. 3 Charles Roden Buxton, Turkey in Revolution (London, 1909), p. 62. 4 Ahmad, "Said Halim", p. 13; Bayur, Turk, vol. 1.

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favor by the sultan. This misconception originated both partly because of the censorship exercised by the still functioning Hamidian administration and mainly because of the deep-rooted mentality of a society which expectcd changes from above. Nevertheless, this situation did not last very long and as soon as censorship was abolished the masses became aware of the real story. 1 This revelation, however, did not create any sort of hostile feelings toward the sultan, who in a volte-face, declared his loyalty to the Constitution and managed to save face. After the restoration of the Constitution, Said Halim and other expatriates returned to Istanbul. Though he was in exile, Said Halim's membership on the State Council had continued, and it was only after the restoration of the Constitution that he was officially relieved of his position on 3 September 1908. 2 In the same year, Said Halim was elected to public office as mayor of Yenikoy under the CUP banner. His re-entering politics after the restoration of the constitutional regime did not stop him from severely criticizing the adoption of the 1876 constitution as the political charter of the new regime. According to him, this Constitution did not suit at all the realities of the Ottoman Empire. 3 The Constitution, writes Said Halim, in his article entitled Megrutiyet (Constitutional Regime), was designed for a country whose political traditions and social fabric was totally different from those of the Ottoman Empire. 4 In this respect, Said Halim's ideas contradicted those of Namik Kemal who advocated the adoption of the Constitution of the Second French Empire. 5 "To Namik Kemal, the French Constitution appeared to include the most suitable combination of checks and balances for Turkey." 6 Meanwhile, relations between the CUP and Kamil Pasha were quickly deteriorating. The old grand vizir resented the Committee's intervention in his government policy. In fact, Kamil Pasha had always scorned the Unionists while at the same time underestimating their power. He never considered them to be a serious political challenge, but perceived them as a tool he could use to counterbalance the one power that constituted the only threat to his authority, the sultan. 7

^Ak^in, Jon Türkler, p. 84. ~Bostan, Said Halim, p. 26. • Said Halim Pasha, Buhranlarmuz, p. 9 4 Said Halim Pasha, Buhranlarimiz ve son eserleri, pp. 18-19.

^Mardin, Genesis, p. 311. 6 7

Ibid. Ahmad, "Said Halim", p. 31.

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After the Bulgarian crisis of October 1908, tensions between the CUP and Kamil Pasha were exacerbated. The grand vizir then approached the recently formed Liberal Union (Osmanli Ahrar Firkasi) and became their principal candidate in Istanbul during the elections held in late November. The elections resulted in a decisive victory for the CUP, which captured all but one seat in Parliament (it went to the Liberals). The Liberals' near shutout was the result of a lack of organization and their recent entry into politics.1 At the same time, the Senate was reactivated and the sultan appointed Said Halim Pasha as one of its 39 members on 14 December 1908.2 The collapse of the Hamidian regime and the proclamation of the Constitution after thirty-three years of authoritarian rule created an environment where various previously banned political movements could flourish. During this Second Constitutional Period, three main currents battled it out in the political arena in an effort to gain control over the empire's destiny. They were Garpgilik (Westernism), Turkgiiluk (Turkism), and islamcilik (Islamism). The origins and traditions of Westernism can be traced back to reformist sultans like Selim III and Mahmud II, and even to the fun-loving Sultan Ahmed III (1703-1730) of the Tulip Age (1718-1730) and Grand Vizir Nevsehirli Damad Ibrahim Pasha, who was the brother-in-law of the sultan. 3 Their aim was to modernize the Ottoman state by initiating military and bureaucratic reforms along the European model, and that the reforms were to be undertaken under Western Europe's growing economic, military, and political impact. Nevertheless, neither the reformist sultans nor the Europeanminded pashas of the Tanzimat had any intention of extending the scope of their reforms to social issues. Unlike their reformist predecessors of the Tanzimat era, partisans of Westernism during the Second Constitutional Period were not content with modernizing the military and the bureaucracy; nor did they limit the range of their reforms to commercial and criminal law. Instead, they attacked the very

^Tank Zafer Tunaya, Turkiye'de Siyasi Partiler vol. 1, ikinci Me^rutiyet Donemi. (Istanbul: Hurriyet Vakfi Yayinlari, 1988); Hasan Kayah, "Elections and Electoral Process in the Ottoman Empire, 1877-1919." IJMES 27 (1995): pp. 271-272. (Hereafter cited as Kayali, "Elections."); Ahmad, "Said Halim", p. 28. ^Bostan, Said Halim, p. 26. 3 Nev§ehirli Damad Ibrahim Pasha, who aspired to the court of Versailles, took Louis X V ' s thriving France as a model for reviving a disintegrating Ottoman Empire.

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core of Muslim life: the family and the role of women in society. To Westernist thinkers, the main reason for the decay of Muslim civilization was the degraded status of women in Islam. One of the most prominent spokesmen of Westernism, Dr. Abdullah Cevdet (1869-1932), wrote in his journal igtihad that "women should have the exact same rights as men concerning family affairs, inheritance, and other matters." He also advocated the unveiling of Muslim Ottoman women. 1 Abdullah Cevdet also felt that the decline was due to decaying institutions, backward traditions, and an Asiatic mentality. He believed that if Muslims stubbornly clung to their old ways and did not adopt European manners, they would soon be wiped out from the face of the earth. Writing in 1912, after the defeat of the Ottoman armies during the Balkan Wars, he explained that the recent Turkish reverses were caused by the military's adversión to anything Western and by its resistance to espousing European civilization. He wrote: We lost Ishkodra, Manastir, Selanik, and Tripolitania because of our weakness, ignorance, and poverty. They were taken [from us] by power, science, and wealth. Yes, Europe is superior [...] Europe is our instructor; to love her means to love science, progress, material, and moral strength. To be an assiduous and grateful apprentice of Europe: here is our task. If we do not become their friend by our own will, they will obtain this friendship forcibly. To claim that the whole world is hostile to us and that the non-Muslim countries are against us is an indication of a mental disease called "folie de persécution." Around 1840, Europe slapped Japan. Consequently, Japan has awakened and has tried to understand the origins of this force which stroked her. In this purpose she sent to Europe and America 25,000 of her youth. If Europe slapped us thousand times and if we do not awake is this Europe's fault? We have so much contempt for non-Muslim nations that we do not even consider important their most brilliant victories over us. Because we are Muslims, the world of the hereafter [kisver-i ahret] belongs to us, Paradise is ours. As far as non-Muslims are concerned, whatever their success and position be in this world, their place in the next world is hell. If we go on with this mentality, our fate is obvious. Enough seeing ourselves under a magnifying glass... Our greatest enemy is ourselves, our own mentality. The relationship between foreigners (Westerners) and us is the relationship between strong and weak, learned and ignorant, rich and indigent. There is no other civilization, and that civilization is the European civilization. We should accept it with its roses and its thorns.2

^ ü k r ü Hanioglu, Bir Siyasal Düjünür Olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve Donemi (Istanbul: Üjdal Ne§riyat, 1981), p. 309. %bid., pp. 357-359. Translation is mine.

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The second school of thought prevalent in the ideological debates of the Second Constitutional Period was Turkism. 1 Unlike Westernism and Islamism, Turkism had no established tradition in the political history of the Ottoman Empire; rather it developed as an ideology under the influence of two European constructions: nationalism and orientalism. Nationalism developed in Europe in the first part of the nineteenth century, and inevitably had an important impact on the thought of Young Ottoman intellectuals like Namik Kemal and Ziya Pasha. They combined emerging European nationalism with Islamic principles in their writings to develop their doctrine of Islamic nationalism. Another phenomenon which had an impact on Turkism was the works of European orientalists who, since the mid-eighteenth century, had constantly studied, along with other oriental peoples, the Turks and their Central Asian civilization. The growing number of books published on this subject constituted a field what was called Turcology. This orientalist scholarship, which reconstructed a Turkic history that was distinct from Islamic history, offered a source of inspiration and a base of legitimacy for the advocates of the Turkist cause. One of the earliest examples of this literature on Turcology was a book entitled Histoire générale des Huns, des Turcs, des Mogols et des autres Tartares occidentaux. It was written by the French orientalist Joseph de Guignes and was published in Paris between 1756 and 1758.2 On the Turcs he wrote: Ces Peuples sont appelés Tou-kioue par les chinois, et Turcs par les autres peuples. Ils habitaient dans les monts Altai, qui sont situés le long de l'Irtich [...] Ces peuples étoient descendus des anciens Hiong-Nou, qui après leur destruction s'étaient cantonnés vers Irtich. Ils soumirent toute la Tartarie, une partie de la Siberie, firent des fréquents incursions dans la Chine & dans la Perse, & envoyerent des Ambassadeurs aux Romains. 3 During the nineteenth century, many other scholars studied ancient Turkish history. Among them were A. de Sacy, Radloff, and V. Thomson. Thomson rendered an invaluable service to Turcology by deciphering the runic inscriptions of Orhon in 1893.

^On Turkism, see David Kushner, The Rise of Turkish Nationalism, 1876-1908. (London: Frank Cass, 1977) and Jacob M. Landau, Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995). Joseph de Guignes, Histoire générale des Huns, des Turcs, des Mogols, et des autres Tartares occidentaux, avant & depuis J.C. jusqu'à présent. Ouvrage tiré des livres chinois & des manuscripts orientaux de la Bibliothèque du Roi (Paris: Chez Desint & Saillant, 1756). 3 Ibid., pp. 224-225.

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Elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire, the elite also began to show an interest in Turcology. One of the most prominent to do so was Ahmed Vefik Pasha (1823-1891). He wrote the first Ottoman-Turkish dictionary, Lehçe-i Osmani, and translated an important source of Central Asian Turkic history from Çagatay, Evsal-i §ecere-i Turki, written by Aboul Gazi Bahadir, Khan of Khiva in 1663.1 In 1869 Mustafa Celaleddin Pasha, an Ottoman official of Polish origin, wrote his Les Turcs anciens et modernes. He argued that the Turks were a Touro-Aryan race from which all European nations descended. 2 He considered the Touro-Aryans (people with both Turanian and Indo-European blood) to be the creators of European civilization. The most important work which made Young Turk intellectuals aware of their pre-Islamic Turkic heritage was the Introduction à l'histoire de l'Asie. Published in Paris in 1896 by the eminent orientalist Léon Cahun (18411900), it was a history of the Turkic and Mongolian peoples from the earliest period to the end of Timur's reign in 1405. His work, which was written in a colourful, popular language, praised the Turks as world conquerors who had established their hegemony over lands stretching from the Sea of Japan to the Black Sea ("De la mer Noire au golfe Persique, à l'océan Indien et à la mer du Japon, le Kaan chinois [sic] force du Ciel est bien l'empereur.") 3 The origins of Turkism as an intellectual current can be traced back to the last decade of the Hamidian regime. It first developed within a literary school called Yeni Hayat (New Life). One of the most prominent figures of Yeni Hayat was a young writer from Diyarbekir named Ziya Gôkalp (18761924). After his death, he was recognized as the father of Turkish nationalism. 4 Gokalp's ideas profoundly influenced the political thought of Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk, founder of the new Turkish Republic in 1923. According to Gôkalp, the rise of nationalism, in particular in Eastern countries, occurred in three successive stages. First, it began as a cultural revival; second, it expressed itself as a political movement; and third, it helped *For a French translation of this work see Aboul-Ghazi Behadour Khan, Histoire des Mogols et des Tatares, edited by Baron Des Maisons (St. Petersburg: Imprimerie de l'Académie Impériale des Sciences 1871). 2 M o u s t a f a Djelaleddine, Les Turcs Anciens et Modernes, (Constantinople: Imprimerie du Courrier d'Orient, 1869). 3 Léon Cahun, Introduction à l'histoire de l'Asie, Turcs et Mongols, des origines à 1405 (ParisA. Colin, 1896), p. 440. 4 F o r Gôkalp's social and political thought, see Uriel Heyd, Foundations of Turkish Nationalism: The Life and Teachings of Ziya Gôkalp. (London: Luzac, 1950) (hereafter cited as Heyd, Foundations), and Taha Parla, The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gôkalp (Leiden: E. J.' BriiI, 1985). Some of Gokalp's works are translated into English by Niyazi Berkes under the title of Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization, (selected essays of Ziya Gokalp). (LondonGeorge Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1959).

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to determine its economic policy. 1 Gokalp summarized his ideology with the slogan of Tiirkle§mek, ¡slamla§mak, Muasirlagmak (Turkification, Islamization and Modernization). These concepts did not contradict each other; they instead complemented each other. 2 He explained his maxim as "we are of Turkish nationality {millet), we belong to the Islamic religious community (.timmet) and to the Western sphere of civilization (medeniyet)".3 For Gokalp these three components of the Turkish nation were both complementary and distinct from each other: complementary because each of them constituted an aspect of Turkish society, distinct because they were not necessarily related. Adhering to the Islamic faith did not mean that Turks belonged to the sphere of Islamic civilization that Gokalp called oriental civilization. Gokalp perceived Islam as a religion (din), not as a civilization (medeniyet), which he considered to be a combination of Sassanian and Byzantine civilizations. Historically, nations evolve and change their civilizations but keep their national culture (hars) says Gokalp. 4 The Turks in their history passed from an East Asian (Chinese) to an Islamic (oriental) civilization by their conversion to Islam. But in doing so they did not change their national culture. Thus, he asserted, Turks could adopt European civilization and still preserve their religion and national culture, just as the Japanese had. Gokalp divides the material and intellectual development of societies into two: a) medeniyet (civilization); and b) hars (national culture). Medeniyet is international but hars is national. Western or Islamic civilizations have been embraced by many different nations, each with its own national culture. 5 Gokalp expounded his opinions on social, political, and religious matters in many articles which appeared in several periodicals during the Second Constitutional Period, including Turk Yurdu, Geng Kalemler, Yeni Mecmua, and Islam Mecmuasi. This last publication was founded in February 1914 by the CUP in order to disseminate its views on Islam in response to those advocated by traditionalist Muslim circles represented by the Cemiyet-i Ilmiye.

^Heyd, Foundations, p. 104. Z i y a Gokalp,"Turkie§mek, ¡slamlasmak, Muasirla§mak" in Turk Yurdu (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Hayriye vc §iirekasi 1329) vol.3, pp. 336-337. Later published in Latin script, Ziya Gokalp, Turkle$mek, tslamla§mak, Muasirla$mak (Ankara: Yeni Matbaa 1960), pp. 10-11. •®Ziya Gokalp, TiirkgUlugun Esaslan (Ankara: Serdenge§ti Negriyat, 1950), p. 50. 4 Ziya Gokalp, Hars ve Medeniyet (Ankara: Diyarbakir'i Tamtma ve Turizm Dernegi Yayinlari, 1972), p. 21. 5 Ibid„ p. 10. 2

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According to Gokalp, serial was based on two sources, nass (the sacred texts of the Qur'an and the Sunna) and or/(local custom). Unlike nass, which is immutable, drf constantly changes in response to the needs of the society which created it. From the early days of Islam, declared Gokalp, Muslim jurists interpreted Quranic principles and the Sunna in the light of drf therefore, it always played a major role in the development of Islamic law. In order to support his view, he quoted the hadith: "ma ra'ahu'l-mu'minuna hasanan fahuwa 'indallahi-hasanun" (what the believers consider as beautiful is beautiful before God). 1 The poet Mehmed Emin Yurdakul (1869-1944) was among the first writers in the Ottoman Empire to devote his pen to the Turkist cause. 2 In his poems he continued to exalt Turkic ethnic pride by glorifying TurcoMongolian history and by emphasizing Turanian unity. He wrote: O Turk wake up! O my nation! When you were living in the Altays, just five thousand years ago. God said to you: O Turkish race, fly from that place as an eagle who glides to the sunrise. Your hands which subjugate every force will sprinkle thunderbolts upon the proud heads. To you will open their arms, The thrones of China, Iran, India, and Egypt. If you want, from the source of the Danube up to China: Altay, Qiptchak, Siberia, Azerbaijan, Khwarezm, Ghazni, Khiva, Boukhara, Every place will enter into the realm of the new Turan. In every place you sang the songs of conquest Qara Khans, Oghuzs, Attillas, Gengkhis, Timurlenks, Yavuzs are your ancestors who make you proud. 3

Iflcyd, Foundations, pp. 85-87. For the life and thought of Mehmed Emin see Fethi Tevetoglu, Mehmed Emin Yurdakul: Hayati ve Eserleri (Ankara: Kiiltiir ve Turizm Bakanhgi Yayinlari, 1980); see also Mehmed Emin Yardakul'un Eserleri-l, §iirler ed. Fevziye Abdullah Tansel (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1969). J Mehmed Emin, Türk Yurduna: Ey Türk Uyan (Istanbul: n.p, 1914). Translation is mine. 2

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Turkism was the most prominent ideology among the CUP elite between 1902 and late 1907. 1 According to Hanioglu, although "the Young Turks had been inclined toward Turkism long before the Balkan wars, their self-imposed task of empire-saving for some time prevented the CUP leaders from unleashing their Turkism as a policy since they had reason to avoid stimulating other nationalist and separatist movements within the empire". 2 On this issue Kayali wrote that: "[unsophisticated about the questions of nationality, the Unionists betrayed their Turkish chauvinism, particularly by their refusal to broaden the geographic, ethnic and religious base of their core organization. However they upheld the imperial policy and multi-ethnic agendas rather than implement a Turkish nationalist program in the conduct of state affairs". 3 After the 1908 Revolution, the Turkists gained new strength with the arrival of a group of Muslim Turkic intellectuals from Russia. The contribution made by the new comers was especially important in the diffusion of the Pan-Turkist ideal throughout intellectual circles in Istanbul. One of the most influential and prolific of these émigrés was Akçura Oglu Yusuf Bey or Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935) who quickly succeeded in providing Turkist ideology with a new perspective by clearly defining its nature and aims as well as by introducing it into the political arena of the Second Constitutional Period. Indeed, his effort enabled it to compete with other established ideologies such as Islamism and Ottomanism. 4 Yusuf Akçura had already expounded his views on Turkism vis-à-vis Ottomanism and Islamism in a long article called "Ùç Tarz-i Siyaset" (Three Political Systems). It was published in the April-May 1904 issue of Turk, an émigré journal published in Egypt. Akçura compared Turkism with Ottomanism and Islamism and came to the conclusion that the only viable ideology for the Ottoman Empire was Turkism. According to Akçura, the efforts of the Tanzimat statesmen to create an Ottoman nation had failed because both Muslim and non-Muslim elements of the empire had rejected the idea. He did not completely reject Islamism, but he considered it less appropriate for the rejuvenation of the Ottoman Empire than Turkism. 5 The success of Islamism, declared Akçura, was limited because of the hostility of the Western Powers to this ideology. Indeed, since most of these European

^Hanioglu, Preparation, pp. 295-297. Ibid., p. 317. 3 Kayah, Arabs, p. 210. 4 F o r the life and thought of Yusuf Akçura, see François Georgeon, Aux origines du nationalisme turc: Yusuf Akçura, 1876-1935 (Paris: ADPF, 1980). ^Ibid., p. 103; Yusuf Akçura, Uç Tarz-i Siyaset (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1976), pp. 31-33. 2

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imperialists had Muslim colonial subjects and most of the existing Muslim states were under their control, Western nations would strongly oppose the adoption of an Islamist policy by the Ottoman Empire which, as a major Muslim power, could affect the loyalty of their colonial Muslim subjects. The third important political and intellectual current of the Second Constitutional Period was Islamism. The Islamist intellectuals of the period could be divided into two groups: traditionalists and modernists. The first group was composed mainly of members of the ulema who had in the past enjoyed connections with the Hamidian regime. After the proclamation of the Constitution they organized themselves into a society called Cemiyet-i Ilmiyei Islamiye (Society of Islamic Scholars). This society was founded in September 1908 and started to disseminate their version of Islamist ideas through a monthly periodical entitled Beyan-ul Hak, (The Statement of Truth). The most prominent figure among the traditionalists was Mustafa Sabri (1869-1954) who expounded in his writings a very conservative view of Islam. According to Sabri, the technological superiority and material welfare of the West should not have impressed Muslims since these worldly achievements were not of great value when compared to God's omnipotence. Any material progress, he argued, which contradicts Islamic principles would bring harm rather than good to Muslims. 1 Sabri asserted unequivocally that he was not against Muslims benefitting from the technological innovations of the era but that he would prefer poverty if the condition of benefitting from such innovations was cursing or discarding Islam. On the other hand, he defended the constitutional regime in his articles published in Beyan and argued that the true Islamic regime could only be representative. 2 According to Sabri the essence of the constitutional regime derives from the tenets of Islam. 3 Therefore, he said, every Islamic government governed by the laws of the geriat had to be considered a constitutional government. 4

^Ismail Kara, Türkiye'de Islamcilik Dügüncesi, Metinler, Keiler II (Istanbul: Risale Yayinlari, 1987), pp. 270-271. See also more recent study of Kara, islamalarm Siyasi Gorii§leri (Istanbul: Iz yaymcilik, 1994). (Hereafter cited as Kara, tslamcilariri). 2 Ibid„ pp. 276-274. J•3 Mustafa Sabri, Dini Mücedditler, yahud: Tärkiye igin Necat ve Itila Yollarmda bir Rehber (Istanbul: §ehzadeba§i Evkaf Matbaasi , 1338-1341), p. 81. ^Ibid.

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Another renowned traditionalist was the Islamist Babanzade Ahmed Nairn (1872-1934). He distinguished himself with his severe criticism of nationalism, especially Turkish nationalism. Nairn considered nationalism to be a "fatal disease which originated in the West and recently infected the Islamic World." 1 For Muslims, he wrote "claiming different national identities other than Islam, like Turkishness, Arabness, and Kurdishness, especially at a moment when the enemy's aggressive foot has penetrated into our heartlands would be an insanity." 2 Nairn categorically denies the existence of a distinct Turkish identity even within the Islamic one and condemns Turkist intellectuals for inventing such a fictitious concept. Here Nairn's views differed widely from those of Said Halim, who recognized the existence of different Muslim entities like Turks, Iranians, and Indians as a part of the Muslim nation. According to Nairn, there was no Turkish history independent of Islamic history. He also refused to accept the existence of a Turkish nation: "For a thousand years, by continuously intermingling with other races, the Turks have completely lost their ethnic identity except their language." 3 Nairn divided the partisans of Turkism into two categories: pure Turkists and Turkist-Islamists. The former, he says, wanted to sever themselves completely from the Islamic past in order to create a new identity with new ideals. Their aim was to create a new nation with a new faith. He equated this with atheism. The latter group claimed to be Turkist-Islamists who wanted to combine Islamic principles with Turkist ideas. This, according to Ahmed Nairn, was unrealistic since one could not be loyal to two different ideologies. The Turks could not look at the same time to the Kabe and the Turan. Therefore, they had to leave Turan behind as they did a thousand years ago and continue to direct their attention to the Kabe, "We do not need to know," wrote Nairn, "the Law of Genghis but rather the §eriat of Muhammad." 4 As for the Islamists, one of their most articulate spokesmen was Mehmed Akif (1870-1936). In his long poem entitled Sermon from the Siileymaniye Pulpit, he provided a powerful and emotional portrayal of the misery existing in the Muslim world. 5 He also presented a dark and demoralized description of the Ottoman Empire under the oppressive and corrupt Hamidian regime where only toadies could advance to high positions. •'Ahmed Nairn, /slamda Dava-yi Kavmiyet (Dariilhilafe: Sebil-ur Re§at Kiittiphanesi, 1332A.H./1916A.D.), p. 4. Ibid„ pp. 5-6. 3 Ibid., p. 12. 4 Ibid„ p. 17. 5 Mehmet Akif Ersoy, Safahat cd. M. Ertugrul Diizdag. (Istanbul: Kiiltur Bakanligj Yayinlari, 1989), pp. 139-174. 2

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Focusing on Central Asia, where local Islam had completely degenerated under the corruptive influence of local customs and had lost its pristine qualities, Akif lamented that the lands of Bukhara and Samarkand which, in the past had given birth to men such as Ibn Sina and where the best observatory in the world was built, had sunk to the most infamous degradation where only ignorance and immorality ruled. According to Akif the person responsible for this situation was the local ulema who opposed every beneficial action as bidat (impious innovation). 1 He urged decadent Muslim peoples to emulate the Japanese in order to achieve a "modern civilization". He declared that the Japanese were able to apply Islamic principles more effectively than Muslims because they cultivated high virtues such as righteousness, courage, and diligence. In Japan, Islam prevailed under the guise of Buddhism. Akif cautioned Muslims to stay united in the face of European imperialist aggression and not to adopt ethnic nationalism which is potentially as destructive as an earthquake for Islamdom. He condemned Albanian, Arab, and Turkish nationalisms as wrong ideologies, exclaiming: Wake up O Muslims! Wake up and unite, renounce your ethnic separatism; at least take a lesson from the fates of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, all lost to Islam. They (the Western Powers) are also dividing Iran now! Otherwise your destiny will be the same: you will lose your independence and your country, the last of Islam will be overrun by the enemy. 2 According to Akif, the afflictions of the Muslim world were being caused by the disparity between the intellectuals and the masses. This was the same diagnosis that Abduh, and later Said Halim, had proposed as the major cause of the ills affecting Muslim society. Like Said Halim, Mehmed Akif declared that the Muslim world could not develop by following the European path of progress. He attributed this to the fact that every nation has a different trend to follow in the course of human evolution. As aptly demonstrated by §iikrii Hanioglu in his latest work, the CUP leaders used these competing ideologies, especially, Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism interchangeably according to the political circumstances of the time to the point of reaching "political opportunism". 3

ijbid., p. 153. Ibid., p. 179. (Translation is mine). ^Hanioglu, Preparation, pp. 289-301.

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In March 1909 Said Halim Pasha was nominated to the board of directors of the National Bank of Turkey. This bank was founded by the British Foreign Office and encouraged equally by the CUP in order to counterbalance the influence of the French dominated Ottoman Bank and to curb its predominance over the financial and economic life of the empire. The National Bank of Turkey was registered as an Ottoman-British joint investment, even though ninety-five percent of its capital was British. Nevertheless, in spite of the high hopes of its founders, the place of this newly founded bank in Ottoman financial and economic life remained quite marginal. 1 On 10 February 1909, Kamil Pasha began a round of political manoeuvring in order to undermine the CUP's power. This consisted in a cabinet shuffle which consolidated his position in government; he replaced the minister of war and the minister of the navy with men loyal to him. This move was a repetition of the same unsuccessful scenario that Abdiilhamid and Said Pasha had attempted six months previously in order to curb the power of the Committee and dominate the political scene. Once again the CUP successfully outmanoeuvred the Porte's actions and the grand vizir's checkmate was voted down in the Parliament. 2 One day after Kamil Pasha's resignation, on 14 February 1909, Huseyin Hilmi Pasha, the former inspector-general of Rumelia and an important figure in the proclamation of the constitution in 1908, was asked to form the new government. The fall of Kamil Pasha constituted a severe blow to the anti-Unionist alliance and enhanced the power of the Committee. It also provided cause for concern to the CUP's liberal opponents who now strongly felt its power. Alarmed by the CUP's show of force, its opponents allied together to form the Liberal Union (Osmanli Ahrar Firkasi) on 14 September 1908. The party platform included Prince Sabaheddin's ideas such as decentralization and complete equality for non-Muslim minorities. In this way, it was able to secure support from these groups. 3 1 For the National Bank of Turkey see Marian Kent "Agent of Empire? The National Bank of Turkey and British Foreign Policy" Historical Journal 18 (1975): pp. 367-389. Also see Jacques Thobie, Intérêts et impérialisme français dans l'empire ottoman