Russian Politics and Response to Globalization 3030391442, 9783030391447

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Russian Politics and Response to Globalization Lada V. Kochtcheeva

Russian Politics and Response to Globalization “Globalization is one of the central and yet most contentious issues of our age. Kochtcheeva expertly examines Russia’s ambivalent engagement with the phenomenon, arguing that its approach is marked by the complex interplay of domestic concerns and the projection of national identity and interests in the international arena. Russian views have evolved from eager endorsement to attempts to shape globalization processes, reflecting greater confidence and assertiveness on the world stage. Russian views of globalization have become part of globalization itself. This important and timely study is an essential contribution to the study of Russian foreign policy, national identity and globalization.” —Richard Sakwa, Professor of Russian and European Politics, University of Kent, UK “Kochtcheeva addresses a largely unexamined topic in examining Russia’s adaptation to the forces of globalization. Her work contemplates the processes of globalization in Russia as an outgrowth of both domestic and external factors, relying on a wide range of source materials including extensive interviews. In Kochtcheeva’s view, Russia both contributes to and is responsive to the forces of globalization, often occupying a intermediate position as both a ‘receiver’ and a ‘sender’ society. This book is especially valuable in going beyond the neo-liberal discourse characteristic of most of the scholarship on globalization and employing a comparative historical context that offers a largely Russian, rather than Western perspective, on Russia’s domestic and international behavior. As such, it makes an important contribution to the literature on globalization and Russia, which is rich in insights and analytical assessments.” —Jeanne Wilson, Emeritus Professor of Political Science, Wheaton College, USA “This original volume provides us with a powerful interdisciplinary perspective on Russia’s attitude to globalization. Dr. Lada Kochtcheeva’s book pushes forward the conventional wisdom of Russia as outside of globalization. It makes a compelling case for understanding contemporary Russia as a state which is both contributor to and recipient of globalization, a great power balancing between adaptation to and confrontation with the current global world order.” —Stanislav L. Tkachenko, Professor of International Relations, St. Petersburg State University, Russia

“Russian Politics and Response to Globalization provides a powerful insight into contemporary Russian developments examining the nature of Russia’s involvement with globalization. Written with passion and rigor, this volume puts together not only extensive analysis of Russian politics, economy and culture based on original empirical research, but also a new interpretation of the challenges arising from a particular context of Russia establishing a new position and place for itself in the evolving global order. Kochtcheeva offers a thought-provoking exploration of Russia’s way of thinking, behavior, foreign policy, and the crisis in Russia-West relations, by highlighting some of the most important and controversial arguments. Clear and comprehensive, the book provides a needed contribution to the existing studies.” —Denis A. Degterev, Associate Professor of International Relations, Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia, Russia

Lada V. Kochtcheeva

Russian Politics and Response to Globalization

Lada V. Kochtcheeva North Carolina State University Raleigh, NC, USA

ISBN 978-3-030-39144-7 ISBN 978-3-030-39145-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39145-4 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To my husband Sean Justin Withers and my sons Maxim and Andrey, for their love and support

Foreword

Russia’s engagement with globalization following the end of the Cold War has been a reflection of the country’s historical relations with the West. Partly because of Russia’s identity of a distinctive great power, these relations have never been harmonious and experienced multiple ups and downs. At least since the sixteenth century, Russian rulers have aspired to be recognized by Western European nations as equals. Russia has greatly contributed to Europe and the West’s security, culture, and development. While interacting with Europe and the United States, Russia too has become westernized and have grown dependent on the West’s culturally, economically, and politically. Still, Russians have wanted to fit in with the outside world based on their own needs and priorities. These priorities have included unity, security, and prosperity for the people residing in the large and diverse territory spanning from Europe to Asia Pacific, the geographically largest national territory on earth. While aiming to meet these priorities, Russian have relied on a political system and a national idea that has diverged from those of European nations. As a result—long before the Bolshevik Revolution—Europeans have had difficulties accepting Russian system and political outlook. This paradox of an eternally incomplete Europeanness lies at heart of the country’s globalization story. Globalization, as Lada Kochtcheeva writes in the book, has its roots in the West. Even though she defined globalization as “a process of becoming global,” she correctly locates its source in the Western part of the world.

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Kochtcheeva appropriately analyzes Russian reactions to globalization as those of a “receiver” and in some cases “laying in between,” not a “sender.” Russia, of course, has been far from a happy receiver. In process of adapting to globalization, Russia lost its state, a considerable part of territory—much of which connected the country to Europe—and suffered from economic collapse comparable only to the one that followed revolution and civil war in the early twentieth century. The country’s preoccupation with loss of prestige in the international system, poverty, crime, and corruption degraded it from the status of a country that, under Mikhail Gorbachev saw itself catching up with the world of Western industrialized nations. These changes led to a pessimistic outlook that further complicated engagement with the West and made it more difficult to Western theories and practices of globalization to travel in the national context. As a result, rather than becoming a wide-open to Western influences—something that the new Russian leadership had experimented with during the 1990s—in the twenty-first century the country pursued a course of selective openness managed by an increasingly nationalistic state. In economic, political, and cultural affairs, the Kremlin has insisted on the need for Russia to protect its national path from outside interferences. This tension between Russia’s identity and the essentially Westcentered and US-centered globalization is documented throughout the book by Kochtcheeva. Despite publication of numerous studies on various dimensions of globalization and its impact, there has never been a study that has systematically researched Russia’s perception of the phenomenon. Thanks to Kochtcheeva, we now have a thorough documentation of Russia’s debate on globalization. Through interviews with experts and analysis of various political and intellectual writings and documents, the author addresses all key dimensions of globalization—economic, political, and cultural—as viewed from Russian perspective. In her description, Russia’s state perspective changed over time toward embracing the global order that is more diverse, decentralized, and sensitive to national and regional conditions than the one favored by Europe and the United States. Today, many Russians simply don’t believe that the West-centered globalization is stabilizing or creating favorable conditions for growth and development. Kochtcheeva takes issues with simplistic and stereotypical views of Russia’s domestic and international behavior and shows that the country’s reaction to globalization has varied across the political spectrum. Some

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Russians view their country as an essentially Western or—to be more precise—European based on geography, shared Christian legacy, and common historical experiences. Others favor a more pluralistic perspective, according to which Russia results from strong ties with both European and Asian peoples. Still others stress Russia’s cultural uniqueness and civilizational “loneliness.” There is also a great diversity in perceiving globalization across regional, demographic, and social segments. If there is a silver lining here, it is that the majority of Russians want a pragmatic globalization that provides them with new opportunities for development and preservation of their national accomplishments and values. They are willing to learn and borrow from the outside world, while keeping what has been historically important to them. For instance, Russian view of democracy includes not only political participation and civil rights, but also presence of a strong state, which should provide order, security, and stability in the country. Kochtcheeva’s interesting and important story is far from being over. In 2016 the idea of globalization has been called into question by emergence of nationalist politics in Europe and election of Donald Trump the United States’ President. The once wide-open world is now re-experiencing sanctions, trade wars, and arms races initiated by the most powerful nation in order to ensure compliance from the rest of the world. Nationalism, again, is knocking on the world’s door and it’s unclear what, if anything, of globalization’s accomplishments can be salvaged. Western nations, besieged and insecure, turn inward and it remains to be seen if nonWestern parts of the world—China, India, Russia, and others—are able to muster sufficient will and resources to keep globalization going. If they do, they will turn into globalization’s senders and humanity will open a different chapter in world history. Andrei P. Tsygankov San Francisco State University San Francisco, USA

Preface

The advance of globalization coincided with the significant changes in the world, including the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. There is much debate, but relatively little agreement about what exactly happened, and how it affected what goes on politically and economically within countries. The essence of the debate are the forces and processes of globalization and how they impact on domestic outcomes in different countries around the world. This book enters the debate through a close study of Russia’s involvement with globalization which is shaped by both internal and external calculations and pressures. It raises questions of the long-term trend of sovereignty and democratic governance, economic development, and cultural resilience and adaptation. Russia’s position in the world represents a new thrust driven by the willingness to protect its vital national interests and to strategically engage in the relations with the United States and Europe, but only an equal footing. The assertive stance of contemporary Russia is a set of measures for achieving Russia’s goal of joining the highest rank of global politics and security as an equal partner with global leaders. The strategic goal of contemporary Russia is to optimize its role in the world using its resources and geopolitical position despite unfavorable external and internal conditions, and to try to exert influence on the process on new world order formation and remain an active and influential actor in world politics.

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The debates on national aspirations and identity also emphasize that the challenge of defining Russia’s place and position in the international system has never disappeared from the country’s agenda. The globalizing forces are pushing societies to rediscover, reaffirm, and recreate their sense of national identities. Russia endeavors to regain its strength and get back to its own roots, as well as give meaning to the confounding changes in the world around. This search is still far from being complete. This is mostly due to the fact that the globalizing world is experiencing many unexpected turns, to which Russia responds by attempting to strike a balance between the necessity to rethink the old legacy, the need to respect the traditional values, and adapt to external conditions. Raleigh, USA

Lada V. Kochtcheeva

Acknowledgements

Writing this book would have been impossible without the generous support of my colleagues, advisors, family, and friends. Responsibility for the end result is my own, but I have had many helping hands along the way. I am very grateful to the School of Public and International Affairs at the North Carolina State University, and specifically its then Director Richard Mahoney and the Head of Political Science department Traciel Reid, for providing financial assistance for research trip to Moscow and Moscow region to do the interviews. For critical reaction, access to the source material, and opportunities to test ideas, I am indebted to the researches from the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), especially, Ivan Danilin, Nikolai Kosolapov, Viktor Krasil’shchikov, Vladimir Khoros, Elizaveta Gromoglasova, and Eduard Soloviev. I am grateful to Ivan Timofeev form the Russian Council on International Affairs his invaluable insights. I would like to thank Anna Velikaya and the Gorchakov Fund for organizing conversations with researches and journalists. For constructive suggestions I thank Oleg Ivanov from the Diplomatic Academy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. I much appreciate having an opportunity to talk to Yan Vaslavskiy and others from ReThinking Russia and participate in the international conference that he organized. I am grateful to professors including Irina Busygina, Igor Istomin, Denis Degterev and Konstantin Kurylev, and others

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for their excellent views and comments. Feedback, thought, and suggestions from each of them have improved both the content and the form of the book. I owe thanks to Mikhail Molchanov for supporting my book project and nominating my chapter on politics for which I received the Robert H. Donaldson Best Paper Award from the Post-Communist Systems in International Relations, of the International Studies Association in 2016. I also would like to thank Stanislav Tkachenko for support and encouragement. The book benefited considerably form the advice and comments by Andrei Tsygankov, Richard Suttmeier, Vladimir Golstein, Peter Rutland, Mariya Omelicheva, and Alexander Sergunin. I also received unparalleled assistance, intellectual guidance, and advice from my colleagues, especially Traceil Reid, Heidi Hobbs, William Boettcher, and Michael Struett. I am grateful to Cheri Lucas Jennings and Ronald Mitchell for their support and inspiration. Many thanks to Palgrave Macmillan and my editors, Alina Yurova and Rachel Moore, for their outstanding guidance, patience, and professionalism. I owe the most special thanks to my family for their unconditional love, devotion, and encouragement. My husband Sean Withers provided unmatched amount of love and support during the most difficult time. I am grateful to my mother Tatyana Koshcheeva and my sister Alina Koshcheeva, and my good friends Tanya Thompson and Natalya Benedykt.

Contents

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The Forces of Globalization Conceptualizing Globalization Approaches to Understanding Globalization Russia and Globalization A Note on Research Book Overview References

1 4 11 13 16 19 22

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Russia at Crossroads Global Stratification Russia in the Balance European Influence: The Struggles of Existential Ambivalence American Influence: “Catch Up and Surpass” Russia’s Place in the World and Its Identity Struggles Conclusion References

31 33 36 42 51 61 68 70

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Political Reaction and Global Pressures Russia’s Historical Peculiarities The Fate of the State Democracy and Democratization

81 81 86 96

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New Configurations of Power Conclusions References

109 122 124

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Economic Engagement and Transformation An Economic Portrait of Russia Historical Foundation: Punctuated Path Dependence Availability of Natural Recourses: A Resource Curse? Economic Institutions and Structural Reforms Capacity for Innovation Societal Choices and Concerns Conclusions References

133 134 142 150 158 162 171 172 174

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Cultural Impact and Societal Responses Russia’s Cultural Reaction to Globalization Official and Academic Discourses Generational Differences Patriotism, Nationalism, and Identity Conclusions References

183 184 194 204 212 216 218

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Russia’s Response to Globalization Political Changes Economic Challenges Socio-Cultural Resilience and Adaptation Prospects for the Future References

227 229 233 236 239 242

Index

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List of Figures

Fig. 4.1 Fig. 4.2 Fig. 4.3 Fig. 4.4

Fig. 4.5

Fig. 4.6

Exports of the Russian Federation, in percent to total (Source R.F. Federal Service on State Statistics [2018]) Imports of the Russian Federation, in percent to total (Source R.F. Federal Service on State Statistics [2018]) Export and Import of the Russian Federation, USD Billion (Source R.F. Federal Service on State Statistics [2018]) Main Trading Partners of the Russian Federation among non-EAEU Countries in 2017, USD billion (Source R.F. Federal Customs Service [2018]) Main Trading Partners of the Russian Federation among EAEU Countries in 2017, USD billion (Source R.F. Federal Customs Service [2018]) NSF Rating for Science and Engineering Indicators Based on the Number of Articles Published, in thousands (Source National Science Foundation [2011] and GTmarket.com [2014])

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CHAPTER 1

The Forces of Globalization

What explains the nature of domestic responses to globalization? How do the forces of globalization challenge domestic processes in politics, economy, and society? The opening of economic borders, extensive travel and communications, expanding political and cultural relationships, the information revolution, the collapse of the Soviet Union’s socialist model of development, and the progression of capitalism and democratic principles in Russia, post-Soviet states, and beyond created the conviction that the world was becoming an integrated and shared space. At the turn of the twenty-first century, scholars, politicians, economic experts, and the general public challenged the usual notions that domestic and foreign policy, as well as local activities and global trends were separate or independent. The world did not wait long, however, for the character of globalization to be called into question by uneven interdependence, increasing trends toward greater state sovereignty, unequal economic development, and cultural resistance. The mode of globalization was also changing, creating a more volatile global environment and highly various domestic responses to global forces that are sometimes unpredictable and unstable. The academic literature addressed these challenges in a variety of accounts about the impacts of globalization on politics, economy, and culture, emphasizing that it is multifaceted and that it influences societies in numerous ways (e.g., Barber 1995; Berger and Huntington 2002; Stiglitz 2002; Lechner and Boli 2004; Sassen 2008; Sparke 2013; Hebron and Stack 2017). Globalization has been

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discussed mainly in reference to Western societies and the Rest, including China, India, and other emerging economies (e.g., Friedman 2007; Jaqcues 2009; Turner and Khondker 2010; Kupchan 2012; Pierre 2013). The mainstream literature on globalization, however, has left Russia out and has produced less than a handful of focused analyses of the effects of globalization in this major world player (see McCann 2004; Blum 2008; Wilhelmsen and Rowe 2011). Russia first assumed an important role in the debates on neoliberal transition (e.g., Gustafson 1999; Aslund and Olcott 1999; Reddaway and Glinsky 2001; Kuchins 2002). Scholars also discussed the country’s identity and culture (e.g., Pilkington 2002; Neumann 1996, 2017). Later the phenomenon of Vladimir Putin, foreign policy, and the West/US—Russia relations took the center stage of the debates (e.g., Trenin 2002; Shevtsova 2005; Herspring 2003, 2007; Worth 2005; Legvold 2007; Tsygankov 2006, 2018; Clunan 2009; Laruelle 2012; Sakwa 2014, 2017). This book analyzes the nature of Russia’s involvement with globalization. Doing so challenges perspectives that do not view domestic politics and foreign policy as arenas of reaction to the global forces. This book addresses Russia as a country that is believed to be in search of forging a new place and position for itself in the evolving global order. The world is shifting with Russia developing its own vision of global politics and cultivating a pragmatic strategy, based on national interest, that aligns with this vision, supporting globalization where necessary, disapproving of it where conflict of interest and values is inevitable. The book demonstrates that in such a dynamic environment, the imperative to understand Russian interests, actions, and, no less importantly, its society, is as great as it has ever been. The urgency of this research agenda is also highlighted by the concurrence of contemporary trends toward higher interdependency and challenges that countries produce resisting the uniformity of responses to globalization to promote self-determination and asserting national path of development. Explaining Russia’s response to globalization is important in its own right and also because a more accurate analysis of the diverse aspects of Russia’s domestic and foreign policy can help resolve several puzzles of its distinctive behavior. The book argues that Russia’s adaptation to the forces of globalization, in essence Russia’s search for its place and role in the globalizing world, takes the form of a lengthy and controversial adjustment to the rapidly changing external environment in the context of domestic preferences and struggles.

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The argument has four major points. First, Russia’s goal of sovereign domestic development and promotion of its own vision of the global order became stronger over time, with the concept of strong sovereignty supported by a domestically projected path of development and protection of internal values. Russia has transformed itself from a devoted follower of the West in the 1990s to its critic, actively pursuing expansion of its influence in global decision-making, institutions, markets, and values, while at the same time trying to modify these arrangements to its benefit. Second, while Russia’s position in a globalizing world started with the uncomfortable reality of its geopolitical retreat and a lack of participation in creating the architecture of globalization, the country was never a mere receiver of Western or international impulses. Over the course of history, Russia has projected with varying degrees of success the image of a world power. As such, Russia also presents an interesting theoretical and empirical case, and this book argues that Russia should be seen as both contributing and reactive to globalization, a country laying between adaptation to and confrontation with the current global world order. Such understanding of Russia leads to important and much broader questions about the nature of state behavior, its foreign policy performance and its ability to adjust and respond to challenges. Does Russia’s behavior reflect the struggles of transitional dynamics prompted by the transformation of the global system? Or, does it display an enduring national behavior, preserving its typical characteristics in any historical setting? Answering these critical questions allows for a valuable contribution to the debates on the nature, basis, and prospects of the relationships between states in the global world. Third, although Russia is attempting to strengthen its political and economic positions by turning east, it is a country that balances its standing and image between the influences of the so-called architects of globalization, claiming European identity and entertaining some aspects of the US economic development. European and American reflections to a large degree shape the treatment of the contemporary questions of Russia’s status in the world. Analyzing the influence of these two trends on Russia separately helps achieve a more complete and nuanced understanding of globalization. Fourth, Russia’s engagement with globalization provides a new frame for interpreting not only Russia’s position in the world, but also the origins of the present crisis in the relations between Russia and the West. Using only Western points of reference may lead to a failure

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in understanding the complex and often ambiguous landscape of Russia’s strengths and weaknesses, perceptions and conducts, and history and identity. Geopolitically, Russia is a great power with the status of a permanent member of the UN Security Council. It is the largest country in the world with an enormous wealth of natural resources, and growing military capability, especially nuclear weapons. A major energy supplier to the European Union, it is also an active player in different regions of the world, including Asia and the Arctic. And through its participation in overarching global issues, ranging from dealing with terrorism and conflict management to energy security and the architecture of the global world order, Russia “makes its own proud way in regional and world affairs” (Colton 2016, p. 9), being a partner or competitor to the West by influencing the trajectory of the evolution of broader global affairs. Rather than merely viewing Russia as a country that is adapting to the global forces by using them to stimulate domestic growth and manage the accompanying threats of vulnerability, Russia often dictates the terms on which external actors can engage with it and that it even shapes the rules of the international order emphasizing the concept of new world politics based on the reinstatement of a multipolar international political system. Overall, Russia’s path of adaptation has mainly followed a course of selective and cautious receptiveness in a pursuit of national interests, rather than continuing to be fully responsive to Western economic and political influences.

Conceptualizing Globalization To understand Russia’s response requires first investigating the forces it is reacting to. Over the past several decades, globalization has acquired multiple definitions, many of them referring to the realization of extensive linkages and intensified interconnectedness. Scholars emphasize the enlargement of geographical scope and increasing interaction between world’s civilizations, the coming of a new postmodern epoch, interdependencies that link the fates of people, the new functional reality of the global economic integration, the growing transformation in the magnitude of human social relations, cultural integration, new system of global regulation and new forms of sovereignty, crystallization of institutions into a comprehensive world society, and the shrinking of the world (Modelski 1972; Albrow 1996; Giddens 1990, 1998, 2002; Ohmae 1994; Friedman 1999; Scholte 2000; Hardt and Negri 2000;

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Utkin 2002; Fedotova 2002; Panarin 2003; Held and McGrew 2003; Michie 2003; Lechner and Boli 2004; Veliaminov 2006; Wolf 2005; Wiarda 2007; Sparke 2013; Chumakov 2016). Globalization is a passionately debated complex concept, so considerably vast and varied that no single theoretical framework can explicate it fully. It cuts across several major academic discourses producing specific notions of global relations, actors, and order, which are in some ways interrelated and overlapping, but some of their essential features are different. One conception of globalization entails the understanding of modernity, and even a movement past modernity into a new world epoch (Giddens 1990; Albrow 1996; Friedman 1999). In this case, globalization involves time–space relations, where local developments in different parts of the world become connected signifying interaction across spatial dimension, which are substantially more intense than in any previous time period due to the extensity, intensity, velocity, and changing modes of interaction between and within global networks (Held et al. 1999; Held and Mafettone 2016; Tuzhba 2011). The notion of spatial–temporal changes produced a vision of globalization as “supraterritoriality,” the emergence of transborder flows and patterns of social relations that go beyond territorial spaces (Schlote 2000). At the same time, domestic events are not simply involved with one another, but are also transformed through extension of social connections. Therefore, as globalization is characterized by an intricate dynamic between globalizing trends and domestic situations, it is necessary to analyze the leading factors. Another widespread view is that of as enhanced internationalization (Sokol 2011; Caporaso and Madeira 2012). As such, globalization means the intensification of cross-country or cross-border relations, resulting in further interconnectedness and interdependence between countries and regions. Growing flows of capital, investment, trade, labor, people, ideas, services, and symbols represent evidence of globalization (Hirst and Thompson 1996). All states are exposed to the economic and political pressures of globalization, but some countries are more resilient than others (Pierre 2013; Steinmo 2012). The intensified interdependence can be taken a step further to signify true globalism via the presence of multinational systems of interdependence. Such networks are much more extensive than ever before, resulting in an “increase in globalism.” The existence of global systems and networks also reflects a new conception of power relations and world politics. Political relations acquire a deeper and

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more multifaceted character, while explicating interdependence, which is far from universal and even (Keohane and Nye 2001). The most widespread conception of globalization emphasizes westernization, and specifically Americanization of the world (Spybey 1996; Taylor 2000; Hoffman 2002; Marling 2006; Veliaminov 2006; Altman 2009a, b; Steger 2009; Pozdniakov 2011; Pierre 2013). Many scholars successfully demonstrated that the original forces of globalization were found far from the West. The ancient reach of mathematics from the East to the West, chemistry and medicine from Egypt, and gunpowder and the printing press from China, all contributed to European development (Modelski 1972; Sen 2002). Advocates of more modern accounts, dating back anywhere from 100 to 500 years ago, however (Chase-Dunn 1989; Robertson 1992), give more credit to Western civilization, claiming that European naval operations successfully reconstructed world politics and determined the speed and character of globalization (Hobsbawm 1975; Sparke 2013). Still others believe that the contemporary phase of globalization has been controlled by the United States (Tuev 2012; Shakleina and Baikov 2013; Denisov 2013), notwithstanding the growth of instability and tensions in the world due to the rise of other significant centers of power, including Russia and China. According to the westernization perspective, globalization is the spread of rationalism, capitalism, and liberalism around the world. The aims of the Western and largely US “liberal hegemony” were the spread of liberal democracies around the world and promotion of open international economy (Mearsheimer 2018, p. 1). The growth and expansion of trade, investment, capital, and financial services are recognized as significant features (Schaeffer 2003; Sparke 2013). Globalization as westernization became one of the core subjects in Western social science and “went hand in hand with the development of theory and research on postcommunism” as well (McCann 2004, p. 1). Many Russian scholars also unambiguously attribute the advent of globalization to westernization and most importantly, to Americanization. The United States became considered as an “engine of building the globalized system…[where] we can put an equal sign between modern globalization and Pan-Americanism” (Veliaminov 2006). Some argue that globalization is the victory of market economy and capitalism, benefitting the Western countries, especially the United States (Fukuyama 1992; Robins and Webster 1999). While the ideas of the triumph of Western liberal world order are contested, with the absence of another well-identified alternative, a large portion of

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the literature on globalization at least initially equated globalization with the economic integration, abolition of trade restrictions, and spread of capitalism across the globe. The optimistic idea that liberal world order brings prosperity and well-being around the globe in the long term has waned somewhat, as the realities of poverty, resentment, and conflict persist in the rest of the world. Additionally, the recognition that the consequences of globalization cannot be represented as the sole acts of an American impulse has surfaced in the discourse (Nye 2002; Marling 2006; Inozemtsev 2008). The promotion of specific political norms and cultural values, as well as the intensification of scientific and technological progress and communications have also been presented as part of the westernization wave. The spread of democratization and cultural homogenization are considered essential features (Rollin 1989; Schaeffer 2003; Dobrenkov 2005). The advent of new forms of political struggles, the fluctuating role of national sovereignty, and cultural collisions are also a product of the globalizing world (Barber 1995; Huntington 1996). The literature underscores that globalization is connected to the diffusion of the Internet, increased virtual communication, and the unprecedented growth of the information technology sector (Castells 1998; Fedotova 2002; Pozdniakov 2011). Increased possibilities for communication result in the growing number of actors that can use multiple channels of communication regarding multiple issues (Keohane and Nye 2000; Suslov and Bassin 2016), which, however, has become the field not only of cooperation and interaction but also of new threats (Trenin 2015). Another conception emerged to reflect on a self-contradictory character of globalization (Sen 2002; Dasgupta and Pieterse 2009; Gizatova and Ivanova 2006; Gizatova et al. 2016). As a worldwide phenomenon, globalization produces not only a “brighter world,” but also conflicts and hierarchies of power, unequal exchanges, and risks in “our already anxietyridden world” (Dasgupta 2004, p. 20). Globalization may deform social systems causing fragmentation of the global community, increasing the tendency of people to polarize along group lines, and leading to new conflicts. As such, globalization specifically draws attention to environmental and health concerns, social ecology, humanity, as well as challenges to culture, polity, and economic conditions. Climate change, increased migration, the threat of transborder epidemics, terrorism, asymmetrical interdependence, religious wars, interethnic conflicts, and armed separatism lead to the actualization of traditional security threats and involve

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individual countries and entire regions, pointing to the domestic source of tensions (Keohane 2002; Gill 2003; Akaev 2016; Valdai Club 2018). These developments require a fundamental rethinking of the concept of globalization and international interconnectedness. Therefore, some scholars are challenging the resilience of the current globalized world order. As Richard Haass (2018) puts it: “Globalization has had destabilizing effects… including a range of groups and people intent on disrupting the order. Nationalism and populism have surged—the result of greater inequality within countries…Meanwhile, effective statecraft is conspicuously lacking. Institutions have failed to adapt. Efforts to build effective frameworks to deal with the challenges of globalization, including climate change and cyberattacks have come up short.” The nature of instability is increasingly determined by problems within countries, by the levels of rivalry between them, and by the tensions in global and regional international political and economic orders. International contention is becoming the result of internal challenges, aggravating them, and forming a tight twist of tensions and contradictions. These contradictions between countries cast doubt on the very conceptual basis of globalization. The modern world is in a transitional state, and this is expressed not only by the fact that the rules of international relations are blurred. The new conditions, which actively intervene in the life of states and people, provoke a rethinking of self-identification in a changing environment. The world enters the era of forming a number of very different ways of managing the state and society, which are carried out simultaneously, coming into a complex, often highly conflicting interaction. These developments do not simply reflect the intersection of geopolitical interests, but also signal about the clash of completely different principles that takes roots in different cultural and historical traditions. The formation of a well-functioning international order based on global governance is passed (Lukyanov and Krastev 2015; Karaganov and Suslov 2018; Valdai Club 2018). Many debates revolve around the meaning of globalization due to the perception of the mode, character, and various contentions and affirmations of change associated with it. Advocates of globalization view it as a sign of progress, increased wealth, democracy, cultural experiences, and new opportunities. They posit that while it may be a difficult process, where inclusion into the victorious team is not automatic and immediately guaranteed, the benefits will become more widely available as globalization proceeds. Seeing world problems from a global point of view may

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also help resolve them (Urbain and Abbadi 2017). Critics, however, see globalization as disadvantageous, creating increased domination by the highly developed nations over the less developed societies, economic disparities, and eradication of cultural values and traditions (Kellner 2002; Schaeffer 2003; Staroverov 2013). The central issue of contention is the unevenness and inequity of rewards and opportunities in the increasingly interconnected world (Stiglitz 2002; Blum 2008; Khoros 2016; Hebron and Stack 2017). The most important concern is that the process of becoming prosperous and globalized continues to be skewed toward some countries, leaving others to the destructive forces of globalization. There are also multiple points of contention between those who perceive globalization as a real and substantial historical development, those who view it as a social construct, which may detract people from more important developments, and those who consider it as an ever-changing process, rather than the end of history (Held et al. 1999; Perraton 2003). The globalization of security issues, the close intertwining of domestic and international factors also lead to the formation of an extremely broad and diverse agenda, which is becoming one of the main features of the international environment (Trenin 2015). Globalization is characterized by the coexistence of multiple complementary and contradictory movements creating integration and differentiation (Pulcini 2013). Accordingly, the difficulty of coping with broad, vague, changeable, redundant, or overly narrow conceptions stems from the challenging, ambivalent, and contradictory nature of the globalization phenomenon and the ensuing lack of consensus among scholars and observers. In the words of Jan Scholte (2000, p. 1) “our analyses of globalization tend to remain conceptually inexact, empirically thin, historically and culturally illiterate, normatively shallow, and politically naïve.” An enhancement of conceptual clarity calls for multidimensional perspectives. Specifically, as this book claims, globalization as a process of intensified interaction and integration between different societies is mainly worth analyzing because it has the potential to significantly influence people’s lives and state behavior, including their political posture, economic structures, and cultural identities. This book proceeds on the assumption that, while globalization has a long history,1 this contemporary stage marked by denser and faster relationships, interconnectedness, and interdependence between localities, countries, regions, and continents2 with a significant wave of influence from Europe and the United States.

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It also draws mostly from the understanding that the features of the modern world can be traced back to sixteenth-century Europe, which in the course of subsequent intensification of internalization became characteristic of the whole global system, slowly involving more countries and undergoing a reshuffling of power configurations (Inozemtsev 2006). These global constructions include such events as the exploration of new continents, the world wars and the establishment of the United Nations, the rise of the United States, the Cold War competition between the Soviet Union and the United States, the advance of globalization and challenges to the global world order. The major goal, as with any periodization exercise that explores the scale and causation of change, is to present an explicit analysis. The salience of globalization concept impels us to explore a historical perspective in order to grasp how contemporary stage of globalization fits a wider historical pattern. This book does not view the present progress of globalization as primarily a feature of imperialism, even though the capitalist system of economic development has always depended on various patterns of long-distance interdependency. The history of colonialism, foreign occupation, and postcolonial dependence, however, have not lost their relevance in today’s international relations. The book also demonstrates that the modern wave is a special phenomenon that produces a wide variety of outcomes in the world, from the existence of extensive economic relations and the emergence of new claims for the status of world power, to the struggles for socio-economic and cultural survival. The approach here is to look at Russia’s standing in the globalizing world, and its role and identity as especially influenced by the actions and behavior of the Western countries. No notion of globalization can be exclusively unequivocal, unbiased, and permanent. “By default, globalization is a process of becoming global, and as a process, globalization denotes change and adaptation” (Kochtcheeva 2010, p. 4). Any conception of globalization, including the one presented in this book, reflects a specific theoretical view or training, a reference to a particular historical period, normative perception, and access to empirical data. Yet the difficulty of providing a single and uncontested definition does not preclude the necessity to pursue rigorous conceptualization of globalization.

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Approaches to Understanding Globalization If globalization represents extensive interregional contacts, flows, and patterns of interaction, which are accelerating in speed, volume, and range (Stearns 2003), not everybody agrees on its general effect on the world. Three schools of thought have emerged: the “hyperglobalist,” the skeptical, and the “transformationalist” or globalist approach (Held and McGrew 2003). The hyperglobalist perspective (Giddens 2002) holds that all societies were transformed by the advent of globalization, which resulted in a single economy, closely connecting all major parts of the world. The proponents of this view representing to a large degree the “the first wave of literature” on globalization (Hay and Marsh 2000, p. 4) claim that changes in technology and market strategies, the flows of information and the types of cooperation move the world toward “de-nationalization of strategic economic activities” (Perraton 2003, p. 37). Globalization is the objective process of deepening economic relations, where multinational corporations and global financial networks, and not the states that are in charge of production, trade regulation, and wealth creation and distribution (Loginova 2015). The hyperglobalist perspective, therefore, portrays the limits on the powers of the state to resist global economic progression, and welcomes state openness to global market forces (Ohmae 1994; Friedman 1999; Sklair 2002; Kuvaldin 2004). In short, the emphasis is on the neoliberal restructuring of the whole world, the weakening of national borders and state sovereignty, and the integration of capital, technology, and information across state boundaries. While hyperglobalists hold that globalization is not a mere epiphenomenon, but rather a new global system, skeptics argue that states and national economies are still influential, if not fundamental to all activity in the world. Some see the world as having a dualistic character, where the core is comprised of pluralistic differentiated international society of sovereign states, embedded in legal and political regimes (Cohen 2012). Others claim that intensified interregional contacts involve mainly the most developed countries, which attempt to promote the ideas of a unified global system (Perraton 2003). Skeptics also challenge the view that globalization presently has brought any new or alternative approach that was not present in the earlier days (Osterhammel and Petersson 2005). They propose that the last few decades are simply another stage of expanding capitalism, resulting in inequality and poverty

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(Greider 1997; McCann 2004; Kaplinsky 2005). Therefore, instead of a global market economy the world is experiencing the triumph of an Anglo-American form of capitalism among major world regions (Gordon 1988; Hirst 1997; Varenik 2012). Skeptics also maintain that the contemporary integrated economies did not merely come to be but were shaped and reshaped by the actors, forces, and institutions that take origins in the past (Hirst and Thompson 1996, 2003; Staroverov 2013), or compare how a contemporary system matches up with a previous stage in world economy (Boyer and Drache 1996). Moreover, they challenge the very concept of “global” and instead entertain a concept of “inter-national.” By doing this they ultimately question the validity of globalization as a construct for understanding or explaining recent or contemporary developments (Giddens 2002; Held and McGrew 2003). The “transformationalist” or globalist approach is accompanied by a more encompassing and dynamic discussion of what globalization actually means (Holton 2005; Martell 2007). The globalist view emphasizes authentic structural and most fundamental set of changes in the organization of world social, economic, and political relations (Giddens 1996). It is a significant remaking of world society, which originates from multiple sources, as evident in the proliferation of various forms of economic relations, intensified discourse and regulation of global arrangements, as well as diffusion of cultural norms across national borders. The “transformationalist” view portrays globalization as a process, which includes a shift in the spatial organization of socio-economic relations along with the increased spread of networks and coordination of human relations to interregional and transcontinental patterns (Held and McGrew 2003). Globalization’s future is uncertain and open-ended with the ability to take different forms. In the words of Jonathan Perraton (2003, pp. 38–39) “the growing extensity and intensity deepens [domestic activities] impact such that the effects of distant events can be highly significant elsewhere and specific local developments can have global consequences.” The globalist view represents an idea of globalization, which is multifaceted and complex, entailing a variety of economic, political, technological, cultural, and social components. The notion of globalization continues to produce discussions on multiple sets of processes leading in different directions that are happening in the world. One of the most significant trends is a reflection on the pervasiveness and depth of domestic preferences, histories, and traditions, which raises multiple questions about the character of globalization and

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the domestic reactions.3 Nonetheless, the studies of domestic responses to global forces are outnumbered by the literature on the integration of economy and international governing structures. Supporting the argument made by Anthony Giddens (1996) more than twenty years ago, this book agrees that “although [globalization] still reflect[s] an extension of Western dominance, contemporary processes of globalization are much more decentered.” The world may have accepted the notion of globalization as an intensified impact on or significant re-shaking and not merely a buzzword or a social construct. Yet, along with integration, interaction, and communication, the world is also experiencing varying degrees of discord, differences, and disconnection of numerous localities. The discussions in this book accept the transformationalist approach and contribute to the unfolding debate concerning a contradictory process of globalization that has very different consequences on domestic polities, economies, and cultures.

Russia and Globalization Russia made a strategic decision in favor of integration into the globalizing world, as globalization promised broad opportunities for economic growth, trade, scientific ties, development of technology, communications and information networks, and enrichment of cultures via the spread of ideas and norms. In the early years of the twenty-first century, the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, in his addresses to the Federal Assembly and other formal speeches underscored the role and tasks for Russia in the globalizing world. To integrate or not to integrate was not a choice, because Russia had become part of the globalizing world and the goal became “to learn to take advantage of the new state of the global economy” (Putin 2002). Domestically the challenge was to raise the standards of living in the country, uphold security, freedom and comfort” (Putin 2004). Internationally, the goal was as to promote cooperation regionally and globally, strengthen the position of Russia in the world, as well as maintain and strengthen the UN and establish a system that should allow the global community “to jointly develop a new set of rules of conduct on the world stage. Rules adequate to the challenges of our time and so necessary today in the context of globalization” (Putin 2006). With the advance of globalization, however, Russia started to face tasks unprecedented in importance and complexity, that were associated with the achievement of these articulated goals. Globalization turned out

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to be a contradictory and complex phenomenon bringing opportunities and challenges, as well as a “set of operative, supraterritorial, neoliberal economic processes linked to the global marketplace, but also a politically orchestrated process of neo-imperial hegemony on the part of the sole remaining superpower” (Hedetoft and Blum 2008, p. 22). In the words of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Sergey Lavrov, “globalization with its challenges, such as the growing interdependence of states, the aggravation of non-traditional threats to international and regional security, the growing tide of regional conflicts and much more, is becoming a serious test for the existing mechanisms of multilateral cooperation and those who are members of these mechanisms” (RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia underwent a political and socio-economic transition and incorporation into the globalizing world, adopting the Western course of transformations. The West reacted positively, assuming that Russia’s interests would be similar to most of its interests and goals. Soon many contradictions became obvious. Russia stayed the de facto heir of the Soviet state with its nuclear capacity, permanent membership in the UN Security Council, and wealth of natural resources, yet the country effectively lost almost all the advantages of a superpower (Nikonov 2004). It had become a state with open borders, an unstable economy, a weak army, an irresolute identity, and a lack of reliable allies. Different measures were formulated to bring Russia closer to the West, yet there was a continuous concern in the West that Russia would not fit institutionally, strategically, and normatively. Russia itself wanted to join the community of Western states, however, the perception persisted that it was caught in a deadlock, where the only option was to undergo changes that could lead to damages to its identity, security, integrity, geopolitical interests, nonetheless remaining an alien in the community of Western states (Sakwa 2017). Efforts to create a competitive market economy and a democratic polity collided with the historical legacy of autocracy, identity struggles, and developmental strains. As globalization continued to gain momentum based on the supremacy of technological innovation and information economy, Russia realized its technological backwardness and the weakness of the available political mechanisms for conducting an independent foreign policy. Globalization strategy became primarily associated with the “shock therapy,” the collapse of the system, and inability to preserve previously achieved living

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standards, which led to social and economic deprivation. The complexity and costs of the formation of a new political and economic system turned out to be much higher than could have been foreseen. It was also aggravated by the loss of Russia’s former geopolitical position and international image: Russia had to both overcome the painful syndrome of “historical retreat” and go through a phase of “foreign policy concentration” (Torkunov and Mal’gin 2012). The obvious influence of the West on the transformation processes with simultaneous historical ambivalence to Western values complicated the search for a new identity. At the same time, the country became disenchanted with the position of the West, which used the advantages brought by the end of the Cold War, while Russia, bore massive costs in all areas of transformation (Achkasov and Lantsov 2011). NATO’s eastward expansion made Russian politicians believe that the West was not going to give up protecting its strategic interests and it was not interested in a strong, revived Russia (Torkunov 2012). Therefore, counting on the establishment of the idealistic ideas of a new bright world order based on global governance was imprudent: “the hegemonic structures of the liberal order were extended, eclipsing hopes that with the end of the Cold War international society would become more truly universal” (Sakwa 2017, p. 68). Globalization in the Western sense did not bring the expected effects, threatening to transform sovereignty, statehood, and society. Russia chose to adhere to its own path of development, defending its own national interests and its role in the international arena in the context of both positive and negative outcomes of globalization (Tsygankov 2012). Joining globalization through liberalization and privatization was accompanied by a hostile attitude toward these phenomena, and the revival of the ideas of nationalism and patriotism. The Russians saw in globalization the growing influence of the West, and a sign of intensifying Western domination, being promoted to the detriment of Russia. It is no coincidence that political, economic, and social reforms and the inclusion in integration processes were contrasted with the ideas of a strong state, sovereignty, and the uniqueness of Russia’s own development and cultural path. Russia started to see itself as one of the most important players in the international arena, advancing its own conditions in shaping the global order, interweaving involvement with skepticism and openness with nationalism. The country assigns itself a special role in global processes, protecting its own identity, independence, and security. With the development of global relations, the Russian stance calls for multipolarity

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in the international arena. Russia’s response to globalization does not seek to isolate the country from the international society, but it challenges the prerogative of the West to define its norms and order. This view presupposes the establishment of a natural balance, sensibly taking into account the most important interests of each country in world affairs. It does not challenge the foundations of international society, but it rejects the practices of the unipolar power system. In his annual address, Putin (2018) concluded: “we must work together to respond to the most complex challenges, ensure global security, and build the future world, which is becoming increasingly interconnected, with more and more dynamic integration processes.” Russia’s response to globalization should be viewed as a result of constant adjustment to the shifting international and domestic challenges and the way Russia’s sources of power and identity have evolved. Russia’s systemic vision of the world and its own role in the world encompasses the goal to support mutually beneficial frameworks and equal partnerships guided by the principles of sovereignty, practicality, and openness, and the commitment to uphold national priorities, yet contributing to international cooperation on a non-discriminatory basis.

A Note on Research The reasoning governing the complexities of globalization is not linear. The very notion of globalization and the approaches to studying responses to globalization leave considerable room for disagreement and misperception. The literature continues to demonstrate that there is much debate, but relatively little agreement about what exactly happened, and how it affected what goes on politically, economically, and culturally within countries. The essence of the debate are the forces and processes of globalization and how they impact on domestic outcomes in different countries around the world. This book enters the debate through a close study of Russia’s involvement with globalization which is shaped by both internal and external calculations and pressures. The chapters on Russia’s place in the world, its politics, economy, and culture constitute a rich comparative analysis of Russia’s continuous struggle for political, economic, and social self-determination by constructing its own vision of strategic objectives and forms of cooperation in the world. This book goes beyond the neoliberal discourse and uses a comparative historical approach to demonstrate that Russia’s continuous quest

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for the place and role in the world, identity struggles, Soviet legacy, economic trends, and socio-cultural attitudes preclude the application of a blanket approach. The book places contemporary developments in a longterm context to underscore the sophisticated interplay of continuity and change in the effects of globalization on domestic processes. Therefore, it emphasizes the legitimacy and relevance of discussing how the handling of present-day questions are influenced by the references to the past. It specifically presents the discussion on how European and American reflections shape the treatment of the contemporary questions of Russia’s place and role in the world. In emphasizing the problem of reconciling past and present, the book brings the discussion to the end of the second decade of the twenty-first century and provides comprehensive insights into the exceptionally intricate interaction between the forces of globalization and Russia’s political, economic, and cultural response to them. The book is based on the years of research on globalization, observations, and interviews in Russia with the experts, professionals, academics, and individuals from the general population. More than sixty semi-structured confidential interviews were conducted in the summer and fall of 2016 in Moscow and Moscow region in Russia in person by the author. The research also draws on a variety of other primary and secondary sources from Russian and Western academic literature. The primary sources represent a mix of records of official declarations by the government, speeches, addresses and interviews by the prominent officials, governmental resolutions, strategies, and programs, and data from published opinion polls from well-known scientific research organizations. The book focused on scholars whose work is representative of general trends in their research in order to provide a comprehensive, and at the same time clear and understandable analysis. The narrative aims to be compelling with theory, thorough with evidence, and sensitive to social and historical context, to focus on consistency and accessibility. Producing a more elaborate understanding of Russia and how it is evolving requires a constructive reflection on the past and continued opportunities and challenges for the country, by presenting an explicit analysis referenced in the foundations of Russian identity, thinking, politics, and economy. A more nuanced and deeper analysis of Russian realities hopefully will counterbalance the overly dramatic, simplistic, stereotypical accounts of Russia’s domestic politics and international behavior. More often than not, the portrayals of Russia depend on the unidimensional interpretation and well-established historical clichés akin to the

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rhetoric of the Cold War period, which lead to the construction of outdated or invalid frames of reference. No doubt, Russia will continue to overwhelm scholars, politicians, and observers, yet the enhanced efforts to provide a deeper exploration of Russian behavior and interpret them accurately by embracing evidence may result in a development of a more sophisticated and accurate assessment of Russia, useful in domestic and foreign policy dialogues. This book aims to advance the understanding of Russia’s response to globalization that is multifaceted, alert to nuanced conceptions, and sensitive to possibilities of change. It is important to discuss some qualifications. First, the book does not claim to offer a complete or all-inclusive coverage of the notion of globalization, because such a goal would have been unfeasible for one volume to grasp. Its intent to come up with a framework for understanding and analyzing the complex nature of Russia’s involvement with globalization, as well as Russia’s search for the status and image in the world and its national identity. It provides a careful and systematic exploration of a range of issues, including state sovereignty, democracy, global order, domestic economy, and culture. Second, understanding the nature of Russia’s reaction to globalization cannot be presented without references to the president Vladimir Putin. Russia’s foreign policy actions and domestic politics, however, cannot be simply reduced to Putin and his popularity ratings. The book places Putin’s rhetoric and decrees into the wider Russian political terrain and political culture. The reductionist approaches tend to solidify existing biases, seeking fewer questions about Russia and drawing conclusions from evidence that fits. Analyzing the complex path of Russian development, appreciating its diversity and differences allows to avoid convenient dramatization of Russia’s domestic and international behavior. Third, this book is not about Russia’s regional relations, even though they are of increasing importance. With the diversity, the uneven pace of development and degree of integration, regional groups add additional significant features to the change in the geopolitical map of the world. The emphasis is on Russia’s standing in the globalizing world, and Russia’s role and identity as especially influenced by the actions and behavior of the Western countries. The literature points to Russia’s dynamic and shifting relations with the West as the most important external factor that has shaped the country’s efforts to regain its role in the world. Fourth, the book offers largely Russian, rather than a Western perspective on Russia’s domestic and international behavior. It presents

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many ideas and concepts that prominent Russian politicians, scholars, and thinkers have expressed to exemplify their perspectives and Russia’s experiences, and to make sense of Russian domestic affairs and the world during the era of globalization. Nevertheless, the book discusses various aspects of Russia’s development from different angles, reflecting on the views from the West, thus offering a more comprehensive way of analyzing Russia’s domestic policies and global standing.

Book Overview Chapter 2 analyzes Russia’s role in the world by exploring globalization as Europeanization and Americanization, as well as Russian way challenging the global world order in search for an authentic model of development. It examines the notions of “sender” and “receiver” societies, but most importantly, it draws attention to Russia’s position as a country that exhibits the elements of both, “sender” and “receiver” societies. The chapter demonstrates that Russia is a country that lies at the crossroads of influences from powerful international actors, yet it is producing its own unique and strong influence regionally and globally and rediscovering its national identity. This chapter explores globalization by looking at the forces of a more distant past, as well as present factors influencing Russia’s reactions to globalization. Some elements of globalization may reproduce qualities associated with core–periphery relations in the world economy as shaped by Europeanization of the world. The developments during and after the Cold War represent the process of Americanization, another Western influence but the one that is quite different from Europeanization. The students of globalization, however, do not always distinguish between the European, American, and generally Western influence on world affairs. To highlight the complexity of conditions globalization gives rise to or exacerbates requires us to analyze these two trends separately, and to understand how the two influences shaped Russia’s response to globalization. Chapter 3 explores the uneven and varied character of political globalization in Russia. It examines Russia’s historical political path, the role of the state, and especially the rising emphasis on sovereignty, the unevenness and fluctuation in the scope, outcomes, and public perceptions of political regime, including the opportunities and challenges of democratization, especially the development of civil and political rights. The chapter also addresses a larger idea of politics, including Russia’s view

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of world affairs and global order, the foundations and engagements of the country’s foreign policy, and the formation of new regimes in a new globalizing world. It concludes with the assessment of Russia’s complex relationship with political globalization. The issue at stake is whether and how the forces of globalization take over domestic processes and Russia projects authority at the international level in response to regional and global pressures. Russia’s relation to the outside world is strongly determined by actions of external powers toward Russia. At the same time, Russians also hold controversial views on the suitability of Westerntype democracy, representation, and individual rights for the country. The growing sense of nationalism and patriotism, supported by the government, became reinforced among the population, especially in light of the Ukrainian crisis. Russia’s strive for political, economic, and social selfdetermination leads the country to find its own path in the process of political globalization. Chapter 4 analyzes Russia’s engagement with economic globalization through the lens of domestic reforms and developments, while exploring Russia’s capacity to adapt to economic challenges and external pressures. It focuses on the mechanism of Russia’s domestic reactions to global forces, because national systems generate particular results depending on specific enabling conditions. Such conditions include historical foundation, availability of natural resources, strength of the economic and political institutions, capacity for innovation, and societal economic choices and concerns. Domestic forms of institutions, resources, policies, and preferences have a system-wide impact not only on the economic development in the global age but also on the capacity for renewal. Russia’s pragmatic response to economic globalization, is focused on enhancing Russia’s economic sovereignty through largely state-directed efforts by boosting domestic economic capabilities and by attempting to diversify Russia’s external economic relations. This chapter specifically produces an empirical account of domestic responses to globalization in a country, which is confronting virtually all distressing consequences of the domestic economic transformation and crisis, yet with an emphasis on the importance of further domestic reform, cooperation with other countries, and increase of its influence in regional and global processes. Chapter 5 enters the debate on the cultural impacts of globalization and produces an empirical account of societal responses to globalization in Russia. It analyzes Russia’s domestic socio-cultural factors that influence the country’s response to cultural globalization. It argues that the

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reactions to globalization and the patterns of adaptation are far from automatic, uniform, or universal. Specifically, the response to globalization should be understood in terms of the four following factors, including the strength of established societal paradigms, set values, beliefs, and historical legacies; official, academic, and public discourse, as globalization is managed, contested, and processed by governments, communities, and individuals; the views from different generations, as young people are major consumers of (popular) culture; and the degree of nationalism, as globalization reinforces the belief in the national, traditional, and domestic. The experiences and acquired knowledge modify cultural realms and societal perceptions as well as crystallize socio-cultural heritage in Russia. The chapter concludes by emphasizing that societies exhibit different degrees of sensitivity or vulnerability to global processes such that patterns of domestic adjustment vary in terms of their scale and duration. The efforts to generalize about the consequences of cultural globalization are flawed. Only by performing a cautious analysis of globalization’s outcomes in specific conditions, can any assessment be concluded about its character, benefits, and disadvantages. In Chapter 6 the book reinstates the main opportunities and challenges of Russia’s long-term adjustment and response to globalization. It does so by revisiting the notions of Russia’s historical uniqueness, the nature of current governmental arrangements and policies, Russian economic transformation, and the views and perceptions of the population on Russian authentic development. Ultimately, the book highlights the question of aligning past and present with strategic interests and identity, fusing Russian exceptionalism and international recognition, while simultaneously domesticating global challenges and preparing the country to face the stresses of the global market and cultural advances. With the increasing diversity of reactions to globalization, the global order may become less balanced, where the alleviation of tensions will require a coordinated long-term global strategy based on dialogue and partnership. Global interdependence influences domestic political, economic, and socio-cultural realms, and at the same time nationalization of decision-making affects the functioning of the global world order. Countries are affected by globalization resolving conflicts in global security, international trade, access to finance, technology, natural resources, and value systems. The challenges of interconnectedness reveal that while the problems have become global, the answers to them remain domestic. This circumstance will likely endure as one of the determining characteristics of the global society.

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Notes 1. Global historians view globalization by situating it in the unfolding historical events over a long time (Mazlish and Buultjens 1993; Frank and Gills 1996; Stearns 2003). A historical approach also denies globalization the deterministic nature, because the global progression is not endowed with a specific logic or an explicit and pre-programmed universal trajectory, or an end-of-history form. 2. Even though the proponents of a long history of globalization believe that it started far earlier than the second half or even the end of the twentieth century, they generally agree that in recent decades the magnitude and impact of globalization have accelerated beyond anything that ever happened in human social and economic relations. The old age of globalization is especially contested by scholars who believe that globalization is a completely new development emerging to substitute the era of modernity with a qualitatively new epoch of globality, in which humans can shape new socio-economic relations and refer to the globe, rather than individual, country, or domestic society to form values and perceptions (Albrow 1996). 3. The debate about the inevitability and irreversibility of globalization may go on, yet what is important is that we can observe two simultaneous processes of the world coming together and falling apart. Globalization is a real phenomenon, which triggers responses that can undermine its unfettered progress thus creating a powerful and sometimes paradoxical push-and-pull relationship between global forces and local reactions.

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Berger, Peter L., and Samuel P. Huntington. 2002. Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World. New York: Oxford University Press. Blum, Douglas W. 2008. Russia and Globalization: Identity, Security, and Society in an Era of Change. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press. Boyer, Robert, and Daniel Drache. 1996. States Against Markets: The Limits of Globalization. London: Routledge. Caporaso, James A., and Marie Anne Madeira. 2012. Globalization, Institutions, and Governance. London, UK: Sage. Castells, Manuel. 1998. The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture, End of Millennium, vol. 3. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. Chase-Dunn, Christopher. 1989. Global Formation: Structures of the World Economy. Oxford: Blackwell. Chumakov, A.N. 2016. Metafizika Globalizatsii. Kul’turno-tsivilizatsionniy Kontekst, 2nd ed. Prospekt. Clunan, Anne L. 2009. The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence: Aspirations, Identity and Security Interests. Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press. Cohen, Jean L. 2012. Sovereignty and Globalization: Rethinking Legality, Legitimacy and Constitutionalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Colton, Timothy J. 2016. Russia: What Everyone Needs to Know. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Dasgupta, Samir. 2004. The Changing Face of Globalization. New Delhi: Sage. Dasgupta, Samir, and Jan Nederveen Pieterse (eds.). 2009. Politics of Globalization. India: Sage. Denisov, V.V. 2013. Rol’ Geopoliticheskogo Faktora v Istorii Rossii. Filosofiya i Obshchestvo, No. 1, January–March. Dobrenkov, V.I. 2005. Globalization and Russia. The 37th World Congress of the International Institute of Sociology. Frontiers of Sociology. Stockholm, July 5–9. Fedotova, V.G. 2002. Modernizatsiya i Globalizatsiya: Obrazy Rossii v XXI veke. Moscow: Institut Filosofii. RAN. Frank, A.G., and B.K. Gills (eds.). 1996. The World System. London: Routledge. Friedman, Thomas L. 1999. The Lexus and the Olive Tree. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Friedman, Thomas L. 2007. The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century. New York: Picador/Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. London: Penguin. Giddens, Anthony. 1990. The Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press.

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Giddens, Anthony. 1996. Essential Matter: Globalization Excerpts from a Keynote Address at the UNRISD Conference on Globalization and Citizenship, December 1. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. Available at: http://www.unrisd.org/unrisd/website/newsview.nsf/. Accessed 20 January 2009. Giddens, Anthony. 1998. The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press. Giddens, Anthony. 2002. Runaway World: How Globalization Is Reshaping Our Lives. New York: Routledge. Gizatova, G.K., and O.G. Ivanova. 2006. Globaliziruyushchiysiya Mir: Rossiya v situatsii Vybora. Uchenye Zapiski Kazanskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta 148 (1). Gizatova, G.K., O.G. Ivanova, and E.V. Snarskaya. 2016. National Identity, Mentality and Character. International Journal of Humanities and Cultural Studies (Special Issue). Gordon, D. 1988. The Global Economy: New Edifice or Crumbling Foundations? New Left Review 168: 24–65. Greider, William. 1997. One World, Ready or Not. New York: Simon & Schuster. Gustafson, Thane. 1999. Capitalism Russian Style. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Haass, Richard. 2018. Liberal World Order, R.I.P. Council on Foreign Relations, 21 March. Hardt, Michel, and Antonio Negri. 2000. Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Hay, C., and D. Marsh. 2000. Demystifying Globalization. London: Palgrave. Hebron, Lui, and John F. Stack, Jr. 2017. Globalization: Debunking the Myths, 3rd ed. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Hedetoft, Ulf, and Douglas Blum. 2008. Introduction: Russia and Globalization—A Historical and Conceptual Framework. In Russia and Globalization: Identity, Security, and Society in an Era of Change, ed. Douglas W. Blum. Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press. Held, David, and McGrew Anthony. 2003. The Great Globalization Debate: An Introduction. In The Global Transformations Reader, ed. David Held and Anthony McGrew. Cambridge: Polity Press. Held, David, and Pietro Mafettone (eds.). 2016. Global Political Theory. Cambridge, UK and Maldon, MA: Polity Press. Held, David, A. McGrew, D. Goldblatt, and J. Perraton. 1999. Global Transformations. Cambridge: Polity Press. Herspring, Dale R. 2003. Inside Putin’s Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

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Herspring, Dale R. 2007. Putin, Russia, and Globalization. In Globalization: Universal Trends, Regional Implications, ed. Howard Wiarda. Boston: Northeastern University Press. Hirst, Paul. 1997. The Global Economy—Myths and Realities. International Affairs 73 (3): 409–425. Hirst, Paul, and Grahame Thompson. 1996. Globalization in Question. Cambridge: Polity Press. Hirst, Paul, and Grahame Thompson. 2003. The Future of Globalization. In The Handbook of Globalization, ed. Jonathan Michie. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. Hobsbawm, E.J. 1975. The World Unified. In The Age of Capital 1848–1875. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. Hoffman, Stanley. 2002. Clash of Globalizations. Foreign Affairs 81 (4): 104– 115. Holton, Robert. 2005. Making Globalization: Basingstoke: Palgrave. Huntington, Samuel P. 1996. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster. Inozemtsev, Vladislav. 2006. Two Faces of Globalization: Europeanization vs. Americanization. Russia in the Global Affairs, No. 1. Inozemtsev, V.L. 2008. Sovremennaya Globalizatsiya i Ee Vospriyatiye v Mire. Vek Globalizatsii, No. 1. Jaqcues, Martin. 2009. When China Rules the World. New York: Penguin Books. Kaplinsky, Raphael. 2005. Globalization, Poverty, and Inequality. Cambridge: Polity Press. Karaganov, Sergei, and Dmitry Suslov. 2018. A New World Order: A View from Russia. Russia in Global Affairs, October 4. Kellner, Douglas. 2002. Theorizing Globalization. Sociological Theory 20 (3): 285–305. Keohane, Robert O. 2002. The Globalization of Informal Violence, Theories of World Politics, and “The Liberalism of Fear”. Social Science Research Council. Available at: http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/keohane2.htm. Accessed 29 January 2009. Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye. 2000. Globalization: What’s New? What’s Not? (And So What?). Foreign Policy 118: 104–119. Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye. 2001. Power and Interdependence, 3rd ed. New York: Addison Wesley Longman. Khoros, V.G. 2016. Introduction. In Sovremennye Problemy Razvitiya, vol. 1. Moscow: IMEMO. Kochtcheeva, Lada V. 2010. Russia’s Response to Globalization: Europeanization, Americanization and Self-Determination. New Global Studies 4 (2). Kuchins, Andrew C. 2002. Russia After the Fall. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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Kupchan, Chales A. 2012. No One’s World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn. New York: Oxford University Press. Kuvaldin, V.B. 2004. Globalizatsiya i Novy Miroporyadok. In Sovremennye Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya i Mirovaya Politika, ed. A.V. Torkunov. Moscow: MGIMO. Laruelle, Marlène (ed.). 2012. Russian Nationalism, Foreign Policy, and Identity Debates in Putin’s Russia: New Ideological Patterns after the Orange Revolution. Stuttgart: Ibidem-Verlag. Lechner, Frank J., and John Boli (eds.). 2004. The Globalization Reader. Cornwall, UK: Blackwell Publishing. Legvold, Robert. 2007. Russian Foreign Policy in the Twenty-first Century and the Shadow of the Past. Studies of the Harriman Institute. New York: Columbia University Press, Columbia University. Lemert, Charles C. 2015. Globalization: An Introduction to the End of the Known World. New York, NY: Routledge. Loginova, T.V. 2015. Globalizatsiya Ekonomiki kak Zakonomerny Istorichesky Protsess. In Nauka i Obrazovaniye: Soveremennye Trendy. Cheboksary: Interaktiv Plyus. Lukyanov, Fedor, and Ivan Krastev (eds.). 2015. Novye Pravila ili Igra bez Pravil? Moscow: Valdai Club. Marling, William H. 2006. How American Is Globalization?. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. Martell, Luke. 2007. The Third Wave in Globalization Theory. International Studies Review 9 (2): 173–196. Mazlish, Bruce, and Ralph Buultjens (eds.). 1993. Conceptualizing Global History. Boulder: Westview Press. Mearsheimer, John J. 2018. The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities. New Haven: Yale University Press. McCann, Leo. 2004. Russian Transformations: Challenging the Global Narrative. London and New York: Routledge/Curzon. Michie, Jonathan. 2003. The Handbook of Globalization. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. Modelski, George. 1972. Principles of World Politics. New York: Free Press. Neumann, Iver B. 1996. Russia and the Idea of Europe: A Study in Identity and International Relations. New York and London: Routledge. Neumann, Iver B. 2017. Russia and the Idea of Europe: A Study in Identity and International Relations. London and New York: Routledge. Nikonov, V.A. 2004. Resursy i Prioritety Vneshney Politiki Rossiiskoy Federatsii. In Sovremennye mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya i mirovaya politika, ed. A.V. Torkunov. Moscow: MGIMO. Nye, Joseph S. 2002. The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Ohmae, Kenichi. 1994. The Borderless World: Power and Sstrategy in the Global Marketplace. London: HarperCollins. Osterhammel, Jürgen, and Niels P. Petersson. 2005. Globalization: A Short History. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Panarin, A.S. 2003. Globalizatsiya. In Globalistika, ed. I.I. Mazur and A.N. Chumakov. Entsiklopediya Moskov: Raduga. Perraton, Jonathan. 2003. The Scope and Implications of Globalization. In The Handbook of Globalization, ed. Jonathan Michie. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. Pierre, Jon. 2013. Globalization and Governance. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. Pilkington, Hillary. 2002. Cultural Globalization and Russian Youth Cultures. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. Pozdniakov, A.I. 2011. Globalizatsiya i ee Vliianiye na Mezhdunarodnuyu Bezopasnost’ i Voennuyu Politiku Rossii. Prostranstvo i Vremia 2 (4). Pulcini, Elena. 2013. Care of the World: Fear, Responsibility and Justice in the Global Age. Dordrecht and New York: Springer. Putin, V.V. 2002. Poslanie Prezidenta Federal’nomy Sobraniyu Rossiyskoi Federatsii. Available at: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/. Accessed 18 February 2019. Putin, V.V. 2004. Poslanie Prezidenta Federal’nomy Sobraniyu Rossiyskoi Federatsii. Available at: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/. Accessed 18 February 2019. Putin, V.V. 2006. Poslanie Prezidenta Federal’nomy Sobraniyu Rossiyskoi Federatsii. Available at: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/. Accessed 18 February 2019. Putin, V.V. 2018. Poslanie Prezidenta Federal’nomy Sobraniyu Rossiyskoi Federatsii. Available at: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/. Accessed 18 February 2019. Reddaway, Peter, and Dmitri Glinsky. 2001. The Tragedy of Russia’s Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against Democracy. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2005. Rossiya i Problemy Globalizatsii. Available at: http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/position_word_order/-/asset_ publisher/6S4RuXfeYlKr/content/id/431972. Accessed 22 August 2017. Robertson, Roland. 1992. Globalization, Social Theory and Global Culture. London: Sage. Robins, Kevin, and Frank Webster. 1999. Times of the Technoculture. London, UK and New York: Routledge. Rollin, Roger (ed.). 1989. The Americanization of the Global Village: Essays in Comparative Popular Culture. Bowling Green, OH: Bowling Green State University Popular Press.

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Sakwa, Richard. 2014. Putin Redux: Power and Contradiction in Contemporary Russia. New York, NY: Routledge. Sakwa, Richard. 2017. Russia Against the Rest: The Post-Cold War Crisis of World Order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sassen, Saskia. 2008. Territory, Authority, Rights from Medieval to Global Assemblages. Princeton, NJ and Woodstock: Princeton University Press. Schaeffer, Robert K. 2003. Understanding Globalization: The Social Consequences of Political, Economic, and Environmental Change. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Scholte, Jan Aart. 2000. Globalization: A Critical Introduction. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Sen, Amartya. 2002. Globalization, Inequality and Global Protest. Development 45 (2): 11–16. Shakleina, T.A., and A.A. Baikov. 2013. Megatrendy: Osnovnye Traektorii Evoliutsii Mirovogo Poriadka v XXI veke. Moscow: Aspekt Press. Shevtsova, Lillia. 2005. Putin’s Russia. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Sklair, Leslie. 2002. Globalization: Capitalism and Its Alternatives. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sokol, I.S. 2011. Gosudarstvo v Usloviyakh Globalizatsii Mirovoi Ekonomiki. Rossiyskiy Istitut Strategicheskikh Isssledovaniy. Available at: https://riss.ru/ analitycs/2452/. Accessed 18 October 2018. Sparke, Matthew. 2013. Introducing Globalization: Ties, Tensions, and Uneven Integration. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. Spybey, T. 1996. Globalization and World Society. Cambridge: Polity Press. Staroverov, V.I. 2013. Globalizatsiya, Globalizm, Antiglobalism i Rossiya. Sistemnaya Psikhologiya i Sotsiologiya 7 (1). Stearns, Peter N. 2003. Treating Globalization in History Surveys. The History Teacher 36 (2): 153–160. Steger, Manfred B. 2009. From ‘We the People’ to ‘We the Planet’: Neoconservative Visions of a Global USA. In Politics of Globalization, ed. Samir Dasgupta and Jan Nederveen Pieterse. India: Sage. Steinmo, S. 2012. The Evolution of Modern States: Sweden, Japan, and the United States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stiglitz, Joseph E. 2002. Globalization and Its Discontents. New York: W. W. Norton. Suslov, Mikhail, and Mark Bassin (eds.). 2016. Eurasia 2.0: Russian Geopolitics in the Age of New Media. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Taylor, P.J. 2000. Izations of the World: Americanization, Modernization, and Globalization. In Demystifying Globalization, ed. C. Hay and D. Marsh. London: Palgrave.

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Torkunov, A.V. 2012. Sovremennye Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya. Moscow: Aspekt Press. Torkunov, A.V., and A.V. Mal’gin (eds.). 2012. Sovremennye Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya. Moscow: Aspect Press. Trenin, Dmitri. 2002. The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Trenin, Dmitry. 2015. Ttraditsionnye i Novye Vyzovy Bezopasnosti v Nezhdunarodnykh Otnosheniiah. Russia in Global Affairs, May. Tsygankov, Andrei P. 2006. Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Tsygankov, Andrei P. 2012. Globalization: A Russian perspective. In Thinking the International Relations Differently: Worlding Beyond the West, ed. Arlene B. Tickner and David L. Blaney. Abingdon: Routledge. Tsygankov, Andrei P. (ed.). 2018. Handbook on Russian Foreign Policy. Boca Raton, FL: Routledge. Tuev, V.A. 2012. Rossiya i Zapad v Epokhu Globalizatsii. Izvestiya Irkutskoi Gosudarstvennoi Ekonomicheskoi Akademii. Turner, Bryan S., and Habibul H. Khondker. 2010. Globalization East and West. London: Sage. Tuzhba, E.N. 2011. Globalizatsiya: Osnovnye Izmerenija i Podkhody k Ponimaniyu. Obshchestvo: Sotsiologiya, Psikhologiya, Pedagogika, Nos. 1–2. Urbain, Olivier, and Ahmed Abbadi (eds.). 2017. Global Visioning: Hopes and Challenges for a Common Future. New York: Routledge. Utkin, A.I. 2002. Globalizatsiya: Protsess i Osmysleniye. Moscow: Logos. Valdai Club. 2018. Zhizn’ v Osypayushemsya Mire. Annual Report. Available at: http://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/reports/zhizn-v-osypayushchemsya-mire/. Accessed November 10 2018. Varenik, M.S. 2012. Rossiya v Usloviyakh Globalizatsii: Poiski Tsennostnogo Samoopredeleniya. Sociologiya i Politilogiya. Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta 18 (1). Veliaminov, G. 2006. Rossiia i globalizatsiia. Russia in Global Affairs, No. 3, July. Wiarda, Howard. 2007. Globalization in Its Universal and Regional Dimensions. In Globalization: Universal Trends, Regional Implications, ed. Howard Wiarda. Boston: Northeastern University Press. Wilhelmsen, Julie, and Elana Wilson Rowe. 2011. Russia’s Encounter with Globalization: Actors, Processes, and Critical Moments. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Wolf, Martin. 2005. Why Globalization Works. New Haven: Yale University Press. Worth, Owen. 2005. Hegemony, International Political Economy and Postcommunist Russia. Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing.

CHAPTER 2

Russia at Crossroads

Globalization is a process of accelerated transnational flows leading to changes in political, economic, and social relations, thereby enabling and constraining states. It shapes the organization of relations between states, the distribution of roles, and the exercise of power. It is related to the different forms of global stratification, including political, social, and territorial facets, producing a hierarchy of influence and uneven development (Held et al. 1999; Kulikov 2011; Sparke 2013). The stratification exposes the irregularities in the formation, management, and access to global networks and the disproportionate accommodation of interest. Asymmetry in development, being both domestic and global, reflects the lack of balance in the distribution of the consequences of globalization affecting peoples’ welfare, social position, political values, and identity. Globalization implies both flexibility and vulnerability, more pronounced hierarchies of power and new cleavages, new patterns of adaptation and new notions of regimes with differences that are much more multidimensional than before. It also pushes countries, including Russia, to reconsider their standing in the world and willingness to accept constraints on domestic developments in an array of vital areas, including political, economic, and socio-cultural sovereignty. This is especially so because the world is entering a new epoch, where the West-and-a-Rest situation now differs considerably from the end of the Cold War era, when implicit spheres of influence and roles were delineated. The global, more or less unipolar, world order, established after the collapse of the Soviet Union, is being challenged by different actors with competing visions of the global order © The Author(s) 2020 L. V. Kochtcheeva, Russian Politics and Response to Globalization, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39145-4_2

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and their role and identity in the world (Atlantic Council and IMEMO 2016; Bezrukov and Sushentsov 2015; Karaganov 2017; Mohan 2018; Bogaturov 2017; Kokoshin 2018; Trenin 2018). While there is still a debate among the scholars of global relations about the history, character, and modes of globalization, many recognize it as a purposeful phenomenon, which is increasingly regulated and carefully controlled to set a course to the intensified transborder relations (Hedetoft and Blum 2008; Varenik 2012; Staroverov 2013). Many in Russia view globalization, not only as a process of economic integration and cultural exchanges, but also as a political process that the hegemonic West seeks to impose on Russia, compelling the country to challenge and, at the same time adapt to the forces of globalization, and its attendant domestic consequences1 (Zinoviev 1995; Gadzhiyev 2008; Karaganov 2008; Tuev 2012; Krylova 2016; Tsygankov 2018). In the words on an IMEMO expert: “On the one hand, globalization is an objective process, including the spread of technologies, information, communications, and trade. On the other hand, the shape that globalization took, presents a one-sided movement. It is a movement-management from the West” (Author Interviews, 2016). Russian realist scholars perceive globalization as a process of global development where the strong enjoy the advantages of globalization and the weak endure the consequences (Kokoshin 2006, 2014; Utkin 2006). The idea is that Russia has already experienced the harms of globalization and therefore should pursue its own policies and defend its own political, economic, and social interests in the world (Volodin 2006; Chernyshova 2016). The goal is not isolationism but rather the attainment of potential benefits from globalization on conditions of preservation of own status and role in the world (Tsygankov 2012). Russian liberals while advocating the establishment of Western practices and integration with the Western states, still see Russia as a full active member of the global community (Yasin 2004a; Yavlinsky and Braginsky 2007). Other scholars consider opportunities from globalization if Russia could manage the challenges and find its own way domestically and internationally without being subjugated by the globalization forces (Ilyin 2004; Ivanov 2008). Still other scholars see Russia as making claims to be a civilizational and anti-Western state, distinctive from a nation-state that established the current world order (Dugin 2002; Coker 2018). They posit that instead of attempting to engage with globalization, Russia should resist the “imperialistic globalization” by creating a self-reliant regional order closed to influences from the West

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(Zyuganov 2002). Globalization, therefore, makes states into the agents of the globalizing world. In the words of Andrei Kokoshin (2014): “The changes in the system of world politics, above all, are connected with the roles of its individual subjects in the form of states.” Countries are, however, positioned differently in the global context, and globalization has very dissimilar consequences and implications for different actors. As one MGIMO (Moscow University of International Relations) professor notes: “globalization exacerbates the unevenness of the world development; the West was the first to start globalization and employs it to its advantage” (Author Interviews, 2016). Scholars continue to underscore that: The current globalization model is based on the hierarchical structuring of globally socialized production, the polarization of human society into the elite, which (together with those immediately adjacent to) is mainly concentrated in the group of the most developed western countries, and the rest of the world. (Kulikov 2011, p. 23)

The distinguishing feature of the global order is a division between different agents of globalization, or “senders” and “receivers”2 of globalization. This is the division between those countries that promote globalization, and those countries that become involved in the process or are greatly influenced by it. In the globalization-as-westernization view, Europe and the United States are considered to be the drivers of globalization, and therefore a more nuanced understanding of globalization demands analyzing the Europeanization and Americanization trends separately. Differentiating among the actors of globalization and responses to it becomes even more essential because Russia exhibits the elements of both, “sender” and “receiver” societies in the process of globalization (Kochtcheeva 2010). Russia is a country that lies at the crossroads of influences from powerful international actors—Europe and the United States, yet it is producing its own unique and strong influence regionally and globally and rediscovering its national identity.

Global Stratification “Sender” and “Receiver” Societies The idea of the world’s “sender” and “receiver” societies stems in part from a widespread view of globalization as global westernization. There is a considerable degree of agreement between the advocates and

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critics of globalization that the phenomenon, at least its recent phase, is driven by the Western influence (Spybey 1996; Taylor 2000; Sen 2002; Marling 2006; Hobson 2012; Karaganov and Suslov 2018). The division between “sender” and “receiver” countries are not new (see Wallerstein 1974), even though globalization often stands as a sound endorsement of the powers of contemporary free-market capitalism and/or American foreign policy (Fukuyama 1992; Robins and Webster 1999). The process of political and economic internationalization was intensified by the European countries. For five hundred years it was Europeans who determined the speed and the character of interconnectedness, they also shaped the structure of world politics (Modelski 1972; Inozemtsev 2006). The Western European system of economic development has always relied on forms of gradual incorporation and capitalization of extensive trading networks (Sparke 2013). This network of economic interconnection has grown widely and deeply in terms of geography and socio-cultural influence. More often than not it was a process of incorporating other countries and cultures into the expanding web of West-promoted world economy and politics. Tremendous concentration of military might also helped European countries to share many parts of the world among themselves. Military and political power depended equally on significant accumulation of economic might. At that time, Russia was also the so-called part of the West. “Russia’s remarkably quick conquest of Siberia, which took less than a century, was possible not just because of Cossack bravery and desire to escape the lack of freedom in core Russia, but also because of their military superiority. Unquestioned military superiority also enabled the Russian empire to easily conquer Central Asia in the nineteenth century” (Karaganov and Suslov 2018). Until the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, about 75% of world manufacturing output was produced in Asia and Africa, not accounting for Russia and Japan (Van Creveld 2007, p. 4). By the beginning of the twentieth century, Europe, the United States, and Japan began to account for 88% of world manufacturing output. By WWI, the largest American economy was followed by Britain, Germany, and France, at which time Russia, Italy, Sweden, and Japan took the path of accelerated industrialization (Medvedeva 2016). Starting in the mid-twentieth century, the major powers, led by the United States, promoted further liberalization of the global trading regime, encouraged the competence of their own multinationals and promoted the objective of greater globalization (Greider 1997). The most

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recent wave of democratization, the continuing promotion of economic openness, increased virtual communication, and cultural homogenization are also attributed to westernization (Pozdniakov 2011). The expansion of trade and the unprecedented growth of the information technology sector have been promoted by the transnational corporations, agencies, and financial institutions, originated and supported mostly by Western Europe and the United States. Viewing globalization as simply something above and beyond actual actors and subjects or as a force belonging to nobody would be a step in denying the presence of causality in the phenomenon. The pressures that emerged in the West to advance markets and satisfy the development of capitalism have led to key developments that are now associated with globalization. From the nineteenth-century railway roads that colonial powers built across Africa, India, and Latin America to today dense air transportation networks, record numerous ways in which the need of Western countries worked to overcome spatial barriers to trade and development. In a similar vein, the turbulent socio-economic and political events of the 1970s, including the end of decolonization and attempts at statecraft, the rise of the Asian “dragons,” the oil crises, and the end to the exchange rates regime established at Bretton Woods, were not a result of the new agenda of the developing and newly industrializing countries, but a reaction to Western economic and political decisions and influence in the events of the world. Transnational corporations and financial institutions facilitated the expansion of commodity production to broaden and guarantee long-term supply relations (Gray 1998; Schaeffer 2003). The distinction between the “golden billion” and the Rest only increased and the hopes of accession to social justice in world economic relations and equality proved to be illusory, with unfolding globalization processes that provided new powerful means of economic submission (Kulikov 2011). Invention, use, and spread of new technologies also belongs largely to the West due to the presence of an effective network of well-established public and private universities, research organizations, and think tanks at its disposal to venture into science and engineering (Castells 1998; Keohane and Nye 2000). Without a doubt, the micro-electronic revolution, the computer boom, the logistics advances, and the emergence of the Internet were major forces advancing globalization and benefitting the globalizers. Globalization propelled by the technological change, served the economies of the Western countries, especially the United States, very

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well (Franko and Stamos 2017). The Internet sparked a financial revolution alongside technological change. Advances in production technologies allow large producers and retailers in the West to roll back prices on goods that they source from the less developed countries in the world. In the words of an IMEMO expert: “Globalization is power of exploitation of poverty. Some developing countries do grow fast, but they are not developing” (Author Interviews, 2016). Additionally, the economic sensitivity of the developing and emerging economies, most of them being, nonWestern cultures, corresponds to cultural vulnerability via homogenization and (re)-establishment of national, ethnic, or religious identity. The pace, scale, and character of globalization produced uneven outcomes, with winners and losers both between and within countries (Kulikov 2011). In the same vein, according to an expert from a Russian Council of International Affairs: “Globalization produces front-runners, that openly participate and promote interconnectedness and laggards or more conservative states that resist globalization” (Author Interviews, 2016). Globalization does not simply mean that the world is coming together, but rather that the agents of globalization are shaping the global order, where “the transnational economic forces of capitalist development have, to a significant extent, been politically reined in and instrumentalized by powerful nation-states, in the process creating neo-imperial structures of asymmetrical linkages” (Hedetoft and Blum, p. 5). And while some correctly claim that economies and polities of Western Europe and the United States may not fully serve as models for the new types of capitalism and socio-political relations created in different societies, the globalized world is not simply a result of inherent development, rather, it has been and is being created and shaped.

Russia in the Balance While at the contemporary stage of globalization Western influence is a significant force in the world, globalization still cannot be viewed as a mere or sole reflection of Western institutions and values all over the world. The progress of globalization was influenced by a variety of countries, international actors, and forces. Some countries that experience the wave of Western influence at the current phase of globalization have played and continue to fulfill the dual role of the recipients of global signals and pressures, as well as the architects of international structure

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and relations. Such countries exhibit the elements of both “sender” and “receiver” societies. Russia serves as a perfect example. In the words of some experts from IMEMO: “Globally Russia works in different regimes or modes, and solves different problems,” “Russia balances its position in the world,” “Russia is an active player, but it learns from globalization as well,” “Russia is at the crossroads,” and “Russia is somewhere in-between” (Author Interviews, 2016). Russia does lie at the crossroads of influences of the so-called “sender” societies, claiming European identity and entertaining some aspects of the US development. Moreover, Russia’s international relations and Russia’s domestic choices have always been influenced by the developments and actions of the West. The country has historically sought to be recognized by the West, as well as engage the West, especially in relation to its technological and material development (Tsygankov 2016). Russia has always been known to measure itself against the West by choosing one Western country to be either a model for replication or a standard for rejection. Starting in the late eighteenth century it was France, England, and Germany, and after WWII it has been the United States (Shlapentokh 1988; Shiraev and Zubok 2000). Over the course of history, Russian Westernizers also pointed to the parallels with Western nations and regarded the West as the most advanced and progressive civilization in the world, advocating a Western course for the country. Some scholars note that Russia has already undergone the major influence of “managed globalization” and lost to a degree its geopolitical positions and national character (Staroverov 2013). Others consider Russia’s contemporary dynamic and shifting relations with the West as the most important external factor that has shaped the country’s efforts to regain its great power status (Leichtova 2014; Allison 2013). Still others believe that Russia is located on the periphery of globalization or barely manages it, or that it remains just a resource appendage and serves as a market for Western goods mostly due to the lack of technological innovation and economic development. Therefore, there is a tendency to view Russia at the “receiving end” of the effects of intensified process of global integration and growing interconnectedness (Veber 2003). “Either Russia will be able to ‘fit into globalization’, or it will be doomed to lag and stagnation. Globalization deepens global imbalances, accelerating the dynamics of the development of one group of countries and slowing the pace of growth and competitiveness the profitability of others” (Kamashev 2015, p. 141).

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At the same time, Russia has been one of the major players in the world. The influence of Russia, including its state exemplifying the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, established and advanced economic, ethno-cultural, and political relationships with Eurasia as well as furthered an external mission, which included the industrial development of large spaces of Eurasian territory and the spread of ideology, norms, and values (Tishkov 2005; Bezrukov and Sushentsov 2015). The historical role of Russia, according to some scholars, is to “promote more multilateral, more complete and holistic development of the world. This role in the modern world with the intensification and globalization of informational, economic, political and cultural interaction between different countries, with the danger of a ‘clash of civilizations’ increases, and becomes progressively important and relevant” (Pantin 2012, p. 106). Through history, Russia demonstrated the image of world power, demonstrating the features of the leaders of globalization (Rozanova 2003; Simonia 2001). Russia, “unlike many other countries in the international system, did not suddenly at some point in the 1990s, wake up to the experiences of globalization, as the country has been an active participant and the agent of global politics” (Hedetoft and Blum 2008, p. 20). More recently especially Russia has been transforming itself from a devoted enthusiast of the West, to its opponent, which is vigorously engaging in the enlargement of its influence in regional or global decision-making and advancing its national interests in a more assertive manner. According to many Russian experts, the primacy of security issues, sovereignty and traditional values have become central, and in the words of an IMEMO expert, Russia “refused to a be a second-level power: Russians do not like it, with Russians it does not work” (Author Interviews, 2016). Russia’s reincorporation of the Crimea, support of the rebellion in the Donbass and the victories in Syria have challenged the West and started to create a new geopolitical reality. The Georgian-Russian war of 2008 is sometimes considered a crucial moment for Russia–West relations, because it indicated Russia’s return to the global stage as a great power unrestrained by the United States, Europe, or the international community as a whole. Russia has been establishing strategic partnerships with China, central Eurasia, and the BRICs. Specifically, the relations between China and Russia have been constantly developing in the last years, with China becoming one of the significant vectors in Russian foreign policy in the area of arms and energy trade (De Haas 2011). Such Russia’s participation, on a more or less similar footing with other centers of global power, in the building of a new

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world order, make Russia also a “sender” of globalization (Karaganov and Suslov 2018; Nitoiu 2017). Russia is trying to establish a balance of power that would most effectively protect its interests regionally, and the world at large, and ensure its own economic and military-political security. In the words of an expert from the International Analytical Center “Re-Thinking Russia”: “Russia believes in international cooperation based on equality and mutual respect, otherwise there will be significant negative side effects” (Author Interviews, 2016). Besides strengthening its own capabilities for deterrence, however, Russia has not yet arrived at a coherent strategy to improve international security, which is currently under severe stress. During the precursor stage of modern globalization, that is the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union built the institutions and patterns of economic, political, and cultural relations, including the United Nations, and a variety of strategic regimes, that were later joined by multiple countries. They both promoted economic modernization and development not only for themselves, but for the postcolonial territories, and other societies. While the countries of the Soviet block did not participate in Western economic and trade arrangements, such as GATT, they created their own international trade regime through the organization of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. The end of the Cold War, however, seem to have established the system of “sender” and “receiver” societies, with the United States being the leader of the “senders” of global impulses, the only superpower able to regulate the international development. With the evolution of the international system, and the emergence of multiple state and non-state players the concept of unipolarity did not disappear and remained the core of the strategic planning by the “senders” of globalization. International behavior of the United States and its allies was based on global superiority and a global mission, while Russia as a “receiver” of globalization, was focusing on economic development and the search for national identity. As Richard Sakwa (2017, p. 23) puts it: “In the 1990s Russia was too weak to do anything except to protest against the erosion of its claimed prerogatives as a great power.” Yet, in the last ten years the strategic line of Russian international behavior has consisted of challenging the USled “senders” of globalization to secure the search for new rules of the game in global multipolar politics. A RUDN professor puts it: “For the first time in the last 25 years Russia challenged the world order” (Author Interviews, 2016).

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Currently, the relationships between Russia and the West are highly strained, particularly as the former is reasserting itself politically, and also emerging as a major regional player, which is seen as highly distressing in Europe and the United States. The liberal economic order, which was established and later expanded by the West to the entire world since the 1990s is being undermined by accumulating contradictions and a reluctance of the rising emerging powers to play exclusively by the rules of the old game. Russia, among others, has certainly used this order to progress economically, while the West has encouraged this with the goal of transforming the new powers according to Western economic and political models. This distress also spills over to other strategic realms. While the West usually discards the equality of values between their countries and Russia, Russia no longer appreciates the US or European moral authority. Russia is positioning itself from the basis of its interests and prepared to agree or to disagree with the West. Russia has continuously commanded a position of “co-designer, co-architect, and co-manager in the construction of a new international order, on parity with the West, and both Russian domestic and foreign policy, including nuclear weapons policy and policies with regard to the territory of the former USSR have clearly demonstrated Russia’s refusal to be simply a junior participant in a US-led system” (Karaganov and Suslov 2018). Russia, however, does not aim at world domination, and it is not eager to rebuild the Soviet Union, but it intends to restore itself as a great power with a global reach (Trenin 2007). What often determines the manner that Russia projects itself in the world is whether or not the actions of the Western powers are perceived by the Russian leadership as accepting Russia on an equal and just footing internationally (Tsygankov 2016). The assertive stance of contemporary Russia is a combination of measures for attaining Russia’s goal of joining the highest rank of global politics and security as an equal partner with the United States and other global leaders. Russia’s strategic goal is to elevate its role in the world using its resources and geopolitical position despite disadvantageous external and internal conditions, and to try to wield influence on the process on new world order formation and remain an active and influential actor in world politics (Makarychev 2014; Sakwa 2014a, b; Freedman 2014; Monaghan 2016; Nitoiu 2017). Russia sees itself as part of the new “senders” of global impulses. The country is striving to incorporate into the global economic and financial system and participate in the resolution of many global and regional problems together with the leading international actors. Russia needs Europe

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and the United States, like Europe and the United States need Russia: “Extremely dangerous illusions common in the West are that Europe or the United States can do without strong and independent Russia” (Pantin 2012, p. 102). Russia recognizes that the world is becoming too complex and interstate relations too layered to allow for disregard of benefits of cooperation underlying security dilemma. Russia and the main “senders” of globalization have important shared interests in issues such as preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and fighting international terrorism. They also have exceptional capabilities to influence the destinies of smaller international players. “How do we reconcile the very different concepts of world order that have evolved in Russia and the United States – and in other major powers – on the basis of historical experience? The goal should be to develop a strategic concept for U.S.–Russian relations within which the points of contention may be managed” (Kissinger as quoted in Sakwa 2017, p. 29). Being geographically stretched between East and West, having borders with a great number of states with different regimes, at different levels of economic, political, cultural development, being historically tied with many cultures and traditions, Russia projects multidimensional image (Shakleina 2002, 2010). Most importantly, Russia has vital national interests that it is ready and able to defend and promote with the same or similar means that are used by other countries, especially by the “senders” of globalization. Russia recognizes that in the contemporary world many problems become global and can be solved only by cooperation and negotiation. A RUDN professor notes: “Russia’s strategy is multivector in its nature. Russia expects true and fruitful cooperation, not just a declarative one, with mutual real benefits. And, it is strange for Russia, that others find it surprising that Russia will act out of its interests” (Author Interviews, 2016). From this point of view Russia, aims at the global component in its international strategy as a participant in creation of the norms and rules for the new globalizing world order together with other actors. Russia views this new order as polycentric where old and new “senders” of globalization participate in organizing and structuring world and regional orders, participate in global governance, and have certain autonomy/independence in conducting foreign policy, especially in the regions and with countries close to its spheres of interest. It is, therefore, important to analyze Russia’s development in the framework of globalization and specifically assess Russia’s reaction to the European and American influences. Debates about Russia’s role in the

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world and Russia’s identity survived the fall of the Soviet system, and the country’s post-Soviet behavior and identity should be understood in the historical context.

European Influence: The Struggles of Existential Ambivalence European colonialism could be considered an early wave of globalization that changed the world and shaped most of the current relations and political borders. This wave of global takeover was fueled by the Industrial Revolution, where European powers transferred products, technology, and ideas around the globe that centered on the bases of the colonial empires (Hobsbawm 1975; Acemoglu and Robinson 2017; Wallace 2000). Among current non-European UN members, 125 were, at least for a short period of time, under direct European rule (Inozemtsev 2006). Russia never experienced European colonialism but has always been involved in a complex relationship with Europe, including economic, religious, military, and cultural dimensions, that stretched over hundreds of years. Starting from the fifteenth century Russia became a significant part of European history (Clarkson 1961). The nature of Russia’s Europeanization, however, is conflicting and ambivalent, beginning with the overlying geographical realities, according to which “half of Europe is Russia; half of Russia is in Europe” with another half of the country in Asia (Baranovsky 2000, p. 1; Pantin 2012). Throughout history, the country accumulated in its culture both the archaic values of the East and the rationality of the West (Medvedeva 2016). The intermediate situation of Russia between East and West adds to the complex and contradictory attitudes of Russians toward Europe. Russians tend to either exaggerate the merits of Western European life, or, conversely, put all of the European processes into question (Belenchuk 2015). Russia has always viewed Europe in a bifurcated manner: “For Russia, Europe remains attractive and frightening, appealing and repulsive, hostile and inspiring” (Gulyaeva 2013, p. 188). Russia has been adopting European reforms and struggling with its influences (Paramonov 1996). It has sought to become a part of the European family and yet remains distanced from it. Russia would turn to Europe during its cycles of modernization, scientific exploration and administrative innovation, while at the same time rejecting European ways (Richmond 2008). The entire history of Russia is indicative of inconsistent and contradictory behaviors and

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attitudes toward Europe, where the idea of Europe serves as the principal “Other” in relation to which the idea of Russia is presented (Neumann 1996, 2017). The view that Europe was a place from which Russia could learn has been also changing historically. Awareness of backwardness has led Russia to turn to Europe as a model for reproduction, while subsequent reactions against westernization have resulted in a strong opposition to change. Those European influences that find their way into Russia are not simply adopted in isolation. Rather they are reworked and tailored to realities in Russia, sometimes with appreciation, sometimes with skepticism. Such tendencies highlight the continuing existential ambivalence of both Russia and Europe toward each other and the challenges of forming a relationship that would satisfy the hopes and requirements of the other (Monaghan 2016). The oscillation of the country toward Europe and away from it, as well as the development of contrasting views of Europe, have been a persisting theme in Russian development. The importance of accomplishments of Peter the Great for the Russian state, economy, and relations with Europe cannot be overestimated. After he opened “the window to Europe,” Russia started to experience the major flow of European influence (Chamberlin 1960; Neumann 1996, 2017; Buckley 2007). While the request for modernization using European achievements was clearly manifested in Russian society under the tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, “Peter the Great, with his talent and energy, gave this imperative an explosive character” (Lavrov 2016). His rule is often depicted as critical in bringing a “backward” Russia into the modern European world through overwhelming cultural and military reform. Those years have also been portrayed as the culmination of statism, years of progress through coercion that retained the fundamental principles of the traditional regime (Stevens 2014). Russia became a factor to be reckoned with in the European states system at large (Neumann 2017). Economic, cultural, and political reformers insisted on the Europeanization of Russia, with the introduction of a wide range of Western technologies, practices, beliefs, and traditions, in state, society, and religion (Azarov 2013). After Peter, Russian rulers presented themselves as European in culture, ideology, and political institutions as well (Wortman 2013). Catherine the Great declared in the Nakaz 3 that Russia was a European country, emphasizing the state capable of significant reform. Throughout the eighteenth century, Russia engaged in state-building in relation to Europe with the recurring question of Russia’s place in Europe.

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In an increasingly volatile international environment, Russia had to deal with military pressures from abroad and preserve state sovereignty. Russian generals, diplomats, and scholars became famous outside Russian borders (Clarkson 1961; Azarov 2013). The country was capable of responding to the growing challenges because it accumulated a sufficient amount of wealth and developed military technology and strategy. Russian tsars, however, did not seek to establish global domination in contrast to the European powers. Russian ambitions were focused on the Eurasian continent, as the country was establishing the boundaries to the West and South fighting wars with the Europeans and the Ottomans. “From the beginning of Europe’s world domination, the economically backward Russians had to become a great power and accept the realities of militarism” (Tsygankov 2014, p. 43). In the European ruling circles and public consciousness, Russia was not perceived as a typical European country. Friendly or hostile, dangerous or neutral, Russia was seen as something different, external to Europe (Azarov 2013). By the nineteenth century Russia’s economic development, technological progress, and even its prominent political and military status were undermined by the preservation of serfdom, which restricted progress for a long time. Russia emerged from the Napoleonic wars as the dominant continental power in Europe (Ziegler 2014). Russia’s victory was a triumph, yet the failure in the Crimean War revealed multiple weaknesses in the system. Economically Russia was falling behind the advanced European states. While under Alexander II, the country started changing the institutions of autocratic power, Russian efforts at modernization came from the direct influence of the state, rather than the free market or society (Trotsky 2007; Wortman 2013). In order to be able to exist among more developed countries, Russia was forced to build industrial plants, establish schools, and publish instructional texts. European economic development influenced Russian economics through the mediator of the state: “The majority of the branches of industry (metal, sugar, petroleum, distilling, even the textile industry), were originated under the direct influence of Government measures” (Mendeleyev 1906, p. 84, as quoted in Trotsky 2007). The Russian state, occupying a massive territory, however, was technologically backward with underdeveloped infrastructure, but a high degree of centralization. The state also continued to maintain a high level of defense expenditures and borrowed heavily from the European countries. Such governmental performance was met with growing social dissatisfaction regarding slow economic development, as

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well as the rise of ideas about popular sovereignty and social equality, ultimately resulting in protests and two revolutions. The advent of progressive ideas was coming not only from the Westernizers but also spreading across various layers in the population. To a large degree, Russia’s intellectual, philosophical, and cultural history has also been a likeness of Western European ideas, customs, and values, which were adjusted to local conditions and influenced by national character (Riazanovsky and Steinberg 2005; Worth 2005). Europe represented at times a superior society whose effects were to be imitated or restricted but never unnoticed. The European intellectual and cultural movement in Russia nevertheless acquired mostly a utilitarian character, where practical knowledge, rather than philosophical enlightenment were emphasized. Moreover, antagonism to foreign intellectual authority, multiple invasions of the country, and the burning of Moscow, all supported Russian nationalism and patriotism (Riazanovsky and Steinberg 2005). The Europeanization that had been forced in the eighteenth century by paternalistic rulers came to include opposition to autocracy, demands for representative government, and advocacy of a revolutionary overthrow of the government. Relations with Europe resulted in the proliferation of progressive ideas, however, Russian autocracy did not disappear for a long time, which diminished the advent of European reforms. Unsuccessful foreign policy attempts added to the increasing difficulty of maintaining Russia’s role as a great power as the country entered the twentieth century with the development of nascent capitalist industry, the diminishing economic viability, the intensifying state change from an aristocratic to a bureaucratic apparatus while remaining technologically backward (Clarkson 1961). The decision to enter WWI had further devastating effects on Russia, which already experienced a combination of failing domestic reforms and international pressures. The Marxist movement, which also came from Europe telescoped the socialist revolution in Russia. Karl Marx, however, only influenced the thinking of Vladimir Lenin, as he elaborated on his own original understanding of the international relations, advance of capitalism and its transformation. The influence of German social democracy did not take hold in Russia. The Soviet Union transformed and distanced Russia from the European influence. While Soviets still viewed themselves as successors or recipients of Western culture, they claimed that the Soviet Union had surpassed their European mentors and established a new historical community of people (Guins 1949; Tishkov 2005). The victory in WWII created a shared sense of

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achieved security for a short period, but the Cold War brought mistrust and fears. The West in general was considered to be decaying, and the Soviet socialistic development was bringing its people new culture, new way of life, and new identities. Eventually, the European discourses contributed greatly to the understanding of human rights and democracy in the Soviet Union, creating the environment for reformers and the collapse of the Soviet Union also reflected to a certain degree the country’s difficult adjustment to the international contexts (Tsygankov 2016). The restructuring of the Soviet system, and then its dismantling in the early 1990s were perceived then in the light of the perspective of a communion with the West, where the closest and most suitable form of which would be the “return to Europe” (Andreev 2010). After the fall of the Berlin Wall and with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia turned to Europe as it believed it shared the values and principles of the vast majority of Europeans. The trajectory of relations between Russia and Europe has been one of mutual influence since Russia has shared the triumphs and tragedies of Europe, by playing twice a crucial role in preventing attempts to restructure Europe by force during two World Wars. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and advance of globalization, the context of Russia’s relationship with Europe has changed significantly. Multiple formal arrangements have been established, including Russia’s membership in the OSCE, the Council of Europe and later G8 (till 2017). Formal relationships have also developed with the two main international organizations in the Euro-Atlantic area, the European Union and NATO (Monaghan 2016). The post-Soviet Westernizers, starting with Boris Yeltsin, promoted the view of the natural similarity between Russia and the West based on certain shared ideals of democracy, human rights, and market. Later Vladimir Putin (2007) also mentioned the affinity between Russia and Europe but emphasized the practical relationship: “In terms of spirit and culture Russia is an integral part of European civilization,” yet Russia is not a part of Europe, but it intends to work with Europe on a pragmatic basis with a treaty and a strategic partnership.4 While it could be claimed that Russia is a member of the European family of countries due to its geography, history, Christianity, and “common European space” (Gorbachev 1989), economy and security concerns (Medvedev 2009), shared experiences (Putin 2007), the political and economic principles and interests of Russia do not always coincide with those of Europe (Shiraev and Zubok 2000; Pantin 2012). Moreover, the

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experience of rapprochement with the West for many reasons turned out to be disappointing. The hopes that were placed on this process seemed exaggerated, and Russian society responded to this disappointment with a traditional national wave, the leitmotif of which was the departure from the complete obsession with the West. The main stages of the formation and strengthening of Russian skeptical attitude towards Europe are also discernible due to various events of regional or international significance that deeply troubled the Russians (Andreev 2010). This includes NATO’s armed action in the former Yugoslavia, plans to deploy the missile defense in Poland and Czech Republic, and the position taken by the leading European countries after the Georgian-Russian war in 2008 and the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, as well as the imposition of sanctions. This is also evident from Russia’s continuous search for identity, belonging, and individuality, its re-examining its place in history and the world, and its need to gauge itself against a typical European character and behavior (Baranovsky 2000). It is also visible as the shift from Europe to Eurasia became tangible with the establishment of the Eurasian Customs Union and further formalization of the Eurasian integration processes as outlined in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (2016). Globalization adds to this concern by emphasizing the unprecedented interdependence of countries, as well as challenges that international linkages pose: “Today relations between Russia and Europe cannot be built the same way they were built during the Cold War. Russia is open to the widest possible cooperation with Europe with respect by both sides of the vital values and interest of the other” (Lavrov 2016). In essence, Russia wants a relationship with Europe as a pragmatic business process that assumes the fundamental equality of two partners. The discourse on Russia’s belonging to Europe and Russia’s European character, such as the tension between Westernizers and Slavophiles continue; and while such conversations have become more nuanced, they still bring to light a number of contradictory perceptions. The relationship between Russia and Europe cannot be understood only as a territorial or geographic issue, or only according to a temporal dimension, such as continuous efforts to be similar to Europe or bring Russia to the level of development of more advanced societies. The issue of Russia’s Europeanization is instilled into an enduring and evolving structure of asymmetrical, contradictory, and even paradoxical relations and attitudes. Europeanization of Russia should be viewed through the lens of existential dualism, if not far-reaching ambivalence. The country’s

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religious beliefs, developmental patterns, behavioral norms, cultural tendencies, and response to European and generally Western influences are reflected in the questions of Russia’s indeterminate attitude toward Europe (Kochtcheeva 2010). Russia’s European orientation is multifaceted and complex, giving rise to several understandings or interpretations of the relationship between Russia and Europe. Debates about Russia’s Europeanness are a traditional staple of Russian intellectual life (Neumann 2017; Pantin 2012). The first perception presents a picture of Russia as a European country or a shared European area, where Russia is a part of Europe, based on the geographic connection, Christian lineage, shared and prospective economic, political, cultural, and security experiences. It is in comparison with Western Europe that Russia’s national identity is usually determined (Belenchuk 2015). Moreover, Westernizers always held Europe’s political and economic models, as well as value systems to be superior, which demanded that Russia moves closer to Europe, becomes part of Europe, or at least emulates European approaches, institutions, and values (Yasin 2004b). A national poll in Russia demonstrated that 45% of the respondents believe that the European space represents a “common home” for both Europe and Russia (VCIOM 2008). Mainly it is the supporters of the political party Just Russia, regular Internet users and residents of the North-Western and Volga districts who consider Russia as part of Europe (VCIOM 2010). The respondents also note that the deepening of trade and economic ties should be the top priority in cooperation between Russia or the EU. Many believe that in the era of globalization, militarytechnological cooperation, such as designing a system of European security and combating terrorism, should be the basis for Russia–Europe linkages. In a series of different surveys by the Levada Center, the number of Russians with a positive attitude toward the EU has changed over the years from being largely positive (more than 60%) in 2009 to somewhat negative (about 50%) in 2017. Without doubt, the change in respondents’ opinions about the place of Russia stands as a reflection to the external conditions and pressures and the country’s domestic changes. Notwithstanding the affinity with Europe, a sizable number of Russians are still inclined to believe that strengthening of Russia is not in the interests of the European states. Therefore, the second approach views Russia as a failed or an unsuccessful European power, which is revealed by the instances of struggling

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modernization, weak political differentiation, and societal liberalization. This corresponds to the position of one of the most prominent Westernizers in Russia, P. Chaadayev (1836), regarding Russia and Europe, which reveals that the Russian state seemed not only unwilling, but also not able to emulate European experiences effectively. His pessimism is seen in terms of Russia’s chances of catching up with the development, opportunities to advance, and lost fortunes within the framework of civilization choice. According to this position, Russia might never become like the rest of Europe. This idea of the civilizational identity of Russia and assessing the relationship between Russia and Europe signifies that Russia is not part of the Western civilization and not its branch, as well as it has never been and will not be (Chernyshova 2016). According to a survey conducted by the Foundation “Public Opinion” in 2005, more than 60% of respondents believed that culture and values Europeans and Russians differ significantly. The country, however, can also epitomize an alternative or different Europe, developing under the Eastern influences and other exogenous forces. Therefore, according to the third approach Russia could be seen as a Euro-Asian country or as a distinctive entity from both European and Asian cultures (Poe 2003). The Byzantine origins of Russia’s Christianity, the Mongol invasion resulting in cultural, economic, and ethnic fragmentation, the expansion of the country toward Central Asia and the Far East, the continued interests of the leaders to stabilize or seek relations with Asian countries, point to the different historical destinies of Russia and Europe. Scholars also note Russia cannot fully become the West, as well as the East, because the country is a melting pot of many ethnic groups, their traditions, and values. Not by accident, Russia maintains the status of a bridge, a specific space, a middle position between the East and the West (Ogneva 2007; Pantin 2012). Neo-Eurasianists particularly believe that Russia has a distinctive path of development, and some even stress Russia’s dominance in Central Asia and the Caucasus and claim that Russia and the West are destined to collide because of their uncompromising values (Dugin 1997). Currently, more than 40% of Russians note that Russia belongs to the special Euro-Asian civilization and as the world is becoming smaller the center of the country’s interests will be moving eastward (VCIOM 2015).

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According to the fourth perception, Russia is a unique country. This view was presented by N. Karamzin (1811) when he saw Russian uniqueness and ensuing isolation from Europe as something positive. He specifically noted that Russia’s development was different from Europe’s by pointing to the specific character of the Russian state and its relationship to society. I. Kireevskiy (1832), a prominent Slavophile, promoted the ideas of the preservation of the Russian national character, praising Russian values of collectivism and faith. N. Danilevski (1885) also considered the opposition of Europe and Russia as an opposition between two cultural and historical types with different value systems. While his views have been treated as highly controversial, he claimed that Russia needs to openly, directly, and unconditionally realize itself as a Russian polity, not European, and at the same time exclusively Russian, because opposites are incompatible. A century later, scholars pointed at the distinctive Russian character as well, stating that “Russia represents a world in itself, a microcosm that follows its own destiny and develops its own rules” (Baranovsky 2000, p. 3). In this light, cultural and historical identity of Russia interpreted not as a “curse,” but as an enduring basic value (Andreev 2010). While the image of Europe is still very attractive, and many Russians identify as Europeans, they clearly distinguish their national character from the European type and do not show the desire to “be exactly the same.” In the words of Ogneva (2007, p. 168): Russia “should remember that in addition to ‘Europeanness’ and ‘Asianness’, ‘Russianness’ remains the most important element in Russia.” According to the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM), many Russian people, (between 40 and 60% in the last decade) also considered themselves as supporters of a special national way of development, different from the path of the Western societies, and express high confidence in the status of Russia in the world. Indeed, the majority of Russian’s (75%) believe that Russia is a great power, and 88% of respondents are convinced that the country should retain this role. Another 62% of respondents note that Russians are a great people, having a special meaning in history (Levada Center 2018). The unique, peculiar Russian way, one which is opposite to the Western ones, remain very prevalent in the country, notwithstanding globalization. In the age of globalization and intensified interconnectedness isolation is not an answer, so the fifth perspective views Russia as reconciling tradition and distinctiveness with openness and innovation (Tsygankov 2012). Back in the nineteenth century, V. Belinskiy (1847) specifically argued that Russia had been able to merge universalistic and national ideas. The

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country represents a synthesis of opposites—universalism and national identity (Yakunin 2012). Russia’s endowment with natural resources, considerable ethnic and cultural diversity, relatively high levels of education, efforts at streamlined production, and the desire to become a more advanced world, or at least regional power, all contribute to the development of a model to move the country forward in the context of accelerating globalization. Europe remains an important region for Russia’s fundamental economic, security, and cultural interests, notwithstanding different assessments of the causes and nature of conflicts between Europe and Russia (Deriglazova 2019). Having experienced massive domestic changes and external pressures, an elevation of interest in economic and political relations with Europe, due to domestic demands for reforms and an aspiration to achieve a stronger position in the world market, reflects Russia’s desire to build the European facet of its international relations to strengthen its regional if not global role. For Russia, the question of relations with Europe and the problem of Russian Europeanization are not purely pragmatic though. They are deeply rooted in the notions of Russian identity and, by virtue of this, can hardly be solved on the basis of a simple calculation of mutual benefits. The image of Europe for Russian society depends on the far-reaching value systems and the archetypes found in the national mentality and in the utilitarian assessments of the relations between Russia and the leading European countries. There is always a degree of ambivalence in Russia’s relation to Europe, which manifests itself through extreme openness or isolationism, through the utmost tolerance bordering with self-denial, or the unwillingness to take into account differing arguments. That is why, when characterizing Russia’s role and place in the European processes, it is important to take into account not only the objectively existing realities in the globalizing world, but also the historically grounded cultural and psychological motivations of the parties, emotions interwoven in the specific context, stereotypes, and meaningful associations.

American Influence: “Catch Up and Surpass” Globalization as Americanization represents another predominant idea of global progression. The advancement of the principles of free-market economy and liberal democracy are linked to the Americanizing trend. While Russia began to experience the globalizing influences of the United States after the collapse of the Soviet Union very strongly, the

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United States influenced Russia’s affairs much before the post-Cold War period. Ivan Kurilla (2017) advances a notion that Russia and the United States became the constituting “Other” in mutual relations at least from the early nineteenth century. Both countries are thought to belong to the same civilizational European type, which makes it possible to compare them. The United States and Russia, however, represented two extreme and opposite options for the development of a European political system: a democratic republic and an autocratic monarchy. The history of Russia–US relations has also demonstrated a sinusoid function, oscillating between high and low in the building of international society (Jankovski 2016). The early Russian–American relations were productive and relatively friendly, where pragmatic calculations of national interests and balance of power matters prevailed, notwithstanding profound differences in political philosophy and governmental structure (Ziegler 2014). One significant impression the United States had made on Russia was during the American Revolution and the War of Independence. Since then, an important part of the image of the United States has become the idea of a country of freedom and a model of political structure. Therefore, the United States was for two centuries popular with Russian supporters of social and political reforms (Kurilla 2017, 2018). Another image of America was the idea of a country of technological progress, economic achievements, and intensive industrial development, which were highly respected by Russian leaders, engineers, and scientists (Shiraev and Zubok 2000). At that time, the Russian government realized the significant technical backwardness of the country, especially in comparison with Britain, an important European competitor, and searched for help with modernization across the ocean. A number of American engineers were invited to Russia, to consult on major projects, including railroads. Nicholas I tended to compare himself with Peter I, and his modernization efforts somewhat resembled the times of Peter the Great, where the role of the Dutch was played by the Americans (Kurilla 2017, 2018). In the middle of the nineteenth century, the Russian Empire and the United States also remained the last of the “civilized countries,” where the institutions of personal lack of freedom remained: slavery in America and serfdom in Russia. The ideas of abolitionism were then perceived by the Americans as a dangerous radical trend and Russia’s attitudes toward America continued to vary with many immigrants and visitors reflected on the United States as a country “where a very good life was reserved only for a few” (Buckley 2007, p. 109).

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Later, in Russia, the image of the United States as a partner country in the division of the world was formed. This perception of America received particular relevance in the USSR after the World War II, when both countries began attempts to divide the world into two spheres of influence (Kurilla 2017). The United States and the Soviet Union came to be considered as a type of kin in the international arena (Harle 2000). The advent of communist-socialist type of development in the Soviet Union however and resulting ideological struggles and geopolitical differences between two major countries produced a situation where the Soviet Union challenged the US authority, which developed into to the bipolar world. During the Cold War, the United States, as the superpower of the West, was politically strong and economically sound, which produced several distinct features of an American worldview. First, the United States considered itself to be the indispensable nation, “a blessed country” with “manifest destiny” and “entangling alliances” (Steger 2009). Second, the idea of America’s mission helped promote its internationalist impulse as a morally upright country (Rosenberg 1982). Third, as the notions of postmodernism and mass democracy continued to thrive in the United States, America was sharing with the world the “models that claim to realize the unfulfilled dreams of European Enlightenment and of European modernism” (Stephan 2006, p. 19). Free market and liberal ideology became the main tool for adjusting the world to the American way of life. One constant in American foreign policy has been the emphasis on trade and commerce (Ziegler 2014). The United States delivered a model of economic success, and many countries around the world attempted to accept the principles of liberal economy based on American standard-setting. Three significant differences stand out between the goals and results of Europeanization and Americanization. First, while the European powers aimed at establishing direct political control over new territories, the Americanizing trend tends to launch a particular economic or political model in other countries. Second, while the Europeans themselves encouraged the so-called Europeanization of other nations, the goals of the United States seem to be the spreading of universal principles, a transatlantic community of values, such as freedom, democracy, and market economy (Marling 2006). In the words of Stephan (2006, p. 2), Americanization “is driven by commercial interests more than tradition…and at the same time it has set off a process of democratization that makes cultural products accessible to a broader public.” Third, whereas European powers practiced clear expansionist strategy, the United States

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does not replicate Europe’s past colonial experience. While there is a tendency in the United States to promote democracy all over the world, even in the nations that most importantly need civil order based on a culture of tolerance, the global Americanization project lacks a clear aim. As Inozemtsev notes (2006, p. 5): “It is substituted by the promotion of the U.S. economic model, or by a response to any danger that may threaten its vital interests.” The American economy became an ever-present force in the world. Starting after WWI, major European powers, Great Britain, Germany, and France, were overshadowed economically by the United States (Berghahn 2007). The United States also replaced European countries as a political leader in various parts of the world. After WWII and before the collapse of the Soviet Union, many Western European countries became dependent on the United States economically, militarily, and with regard to their security policy. Free enterprise, free flow and access, and equal trading opportunities became a formula for global development. American expansion turned to an elaborate process guided by a variety of economic and cultural agencies, such as IMF, GATT, USIA, and others (Rosenberg 1982). As American capacity evolved, so did perceptions of opportunities and challenges. During the Cold War, the United States employed an approach of economic warfare against its rival, utilizing trade and investment restrictions and establishing of discriminatory trade regime (Ziegler 2014; Sergunin 1980). In this context, Russia endeavored at not producing merely an identical level of economic and military development of the United States, but also at outstripping the United States in all spheres, while not allowing American influence domestically. The Soviet Russia– US relationship during the Cold War is generally deemed as the period of confrontation and competition (Buckley 2007). The Soviet Union became a representation of the opposite side to the West in political, cultural, and scientific competition. The Cold War produced a severe test for the two superpowers of what each ideologically and socio-politically different country could do domestically and internationally. Soviet Union used the United States as a benchmark regarding economic matters and military might, at the same time as it condemned it and predicted its downfall and demise (Jönsson 1984). The 1950s and 1960s were particularly tense because both countries competed for military superiority as well as cultural prominence. The victory in WWII, confidence in the uniqueness and strength of Soviet and Russian culture, and assertion

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of the power of socialism not only allowed the Soviet Union to claim its historic significance as a Great Power, but also produced a response toward “American imperialism.” The Soviet Union demanded to be seen as an equal in international relations. At the same time, there was constant effort to show Soviet superiority and to reveal the contradictions of the American way of life (Kochtcheeva 2010). A rather difficult situation developed between the two leading countries of the world characterized by the military-political confrontation aggravated by the issues of negotiations on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe and on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons (Lebedkina 2004). The Soviet determination to emphasize military-industrial strength, heavy machinery, and natural science consequently resulted in consumer goods shortages, and made the images of Western goods and services more attractive. Because anti-American tendencies continued to be a fundamental attitude in Soviet ideology, American goods, symbols, and ideas were strictly censored or banned. The Soviet period was well-known for its far-reaching mechanisms of censorship and the people could come in contact with only such parts of the American lifestyle as the government considered “safe” or those portraying America in the negative. America was attributed many negative characteristics pertaining to the West in Russian phraseology, including cultural mediocrity, unacceptable morals, and shallow ideals (Harle 2000). “The Soviet Union may offer literally a ‘controlled’ experiment of a country attempting to prevent Americanization” (Siefert 2006, p. 188). The establishment of general agreements between the United States and the S.U., which started only after Stalin’s death, legalized exchanges in the performing arts, students, professors, and some other professionals. At the same time, the United States’ goal was to demonstrate the American way of life as equal to the European, superior to the achievements of socialist development, and accessible to Russians but shut to communists (Siefert 2006). American culture, through literature and music was introduced to the Soviet Union, but the translation, study, and critique of American novels, usually those disapproving of the worst implications of capitalism, were carefully adopted in the Soviet publishing realm. As with European cultural influences, that started in the seventeenth century, the reception of American high culture was mostly the prerogative of a certain group of people, i.e., intelligentsia. Hemingway, Twain, and Shaw were very popular authors among Russian readers of foreign literature, and especially well received by the younger generations. The Soviet youth also experimented

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with different styles in music, clothing, and attitudes. American jazz, dance, and jeans became very popular notwithstanding several waves of governmentally directed efforts to prevent foreign influence in the 1960s and 1970s (Gustafson 1999; White 2001). Out of these developments, several subgroups of the younger generations emerged: the ones that were in support of popular culture and those who were enforcing censorship. As more Soviet people, especially intelligentsia, became exposed to American culture, they became more open to American values (Shiraev and Zubok 2000). The balance between different trends was moderated by a variety of factors, including governmental policies and proclamations, living standards, security considerations, and cultural influences. Gorbachev’s foreign policy of “new thinking,” letting Eastern Europe go, and agreements with Reagan, as well as domestic reforms of ‘perestroika and glasnost ’ contributed to the Cold War’s end and started a new stage in the American influence on Russia. The huge Soviet defense budget began to undermine other aspects of Soviet society, resulting in declining economic production, decreasing state funds, and general societal change in the late 1980s. The economy’s decline reflected the diminished ability of central planning to respond to global economic change. An increasing gap between the expectations of the population and the capacity of the system to meet them further channeled public interest to the West. The availability of American commercial, cultural, and educational, elements attracted many people in the Soviet Union, and Soviet– American interchanges increased with the liberalization of bureaucratic control (Siefert 2006). The process of internal disintegration created the possibility of choice and generated increased public demand for new things, new ways of thinking, and new models of development. During the restless time of collapse and immediately after it, Russia saw the emergence of different strata in the population, including “new Russians” and oligarchs, who capitalized on the advantages of socio-economic restructuring and instability, young people who realized the benefits of pursuing careers in marketing, management, and public relations domestically and internationally, and simply those who opened the West for themselves through improved opportunities for education and travel (Kochtcheeva 2010). When the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union disappeared later on, the United States proclaimed the victory in the Cold War and assumed that it “could and should instruct Russia on how to create market economy and democracy” (Cohen in Kharabi 2010, p. 197). The United

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States was strengthened in the belief that it was destined to be the sole leader in the world, who could lead it alone into a “bright future” in an American way (Achkasov and Lantsov 2011) and took Russia’s decreasing military and international standing as a natural post-Cold War development (Safranchuk 2019). The undeniable superiority of the United States in the military, economic, and political spheres created and supported this vision. The United States also produced powerful ideological potential for influencing the formation of the foundations of the world order, rooted is enormous economic capacity for implementing their concepts and plans (Shakleina and Baikov 2013). These features contributed to the progress of West-induced globalization. At that time, Russia started to experience a great amount of American, and in general Western, influence domestically, celebrating it immediately after the collapse of the socialist system. Internationally, Russia positively viewed the US–Russian bilateral cooperation projects, especially in outer space and joint military exercises (Petersson and Persson 2011). Trade and economic cooperation between Russia and the United States started to expand slowly (Ziegler 2014). The American influence was reflected in basically all key facets of politics and economy during the early 1990s. Boris Yeltsin and his advisers welcomed the American model of economic development, attempting to rapidly adopt capitalist democracy in Russia with the help of American economic advisers and leading international financial institutions, including the IMF and the World Bank (Danks 2001; Saunders 2001; Gustafson 1999; Solovyev 2008). The rushed economic reforms, especially privatization, sparked hyperinflation, and a deteriorating living standard for many. The Soviet state property fell into the hands of a relatively small group of insiders and oligarchs, creating an extremely small wealthy class very quickly. The hasty transition, the demise of a superpower status, and colossal socioeconomic uncertainties and sufferings caused many Russians to feel frustrated, disoriented, vulnerable, or entirely resentful. The United States relatively quickly turned from a “role model” into a “source of all misfortunes,” where it was considered guilty of the deliberate disintegration of the Russian economy and industry, especially high-tech defense industries, leaking Russian intelligence and, as a result, Russia’s complete loss of its former international status (Achkasov and Lantsov 2011). Russia did not replicate the American model of the free-market economy and liberal democracy easily or evenly. Privatization reform, as well as creating of political institutions possibilities for the creation of civil society, did not result in immediate improvements. The creation of middle

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class became a difficult task and many Russians had a hard time adjusting to the realities of the free-market system and the culture of democracy. While the Americanization of society touched upon the business, cultural, and informational spheres, many Russians only saw the advent of capitalism rather than fully experienced it fully or gained from it (Nesvetailova 2004). Additionally, the disintegration of the Soviet Union as a great power overlapped with the advance of globalization, which was very soon perceived by critics as a deliberate economic and political project from the West, especially the United States. These developments resulted in an amalgamation of feelings and behaviors among the Russians: hope, enthusiasm, and fascination on the one hand; and disenchantment, Soviet nostalgia, and resentment on the other (Kochtcheeva 2010). Strong nationalist aspirations among many Russians, especially among younger people, also contributed to the questioning of the suitability of an American model for Russia, which has been strongly exacerbated by events such as the expansion of NATO, intervention in former Yugoslavia, responses to the Chechnya, Caucasian, Ukrainian, and Syrian conflicts, the Missile Defense system in Europe, criticism of Russian domestic political developments, sanctions, and a series of other events. Russians now tend to view the American model with skepticism. The country’s major concern became to be seen as an equal and legitimate player in the globalizing world. The common Soviet slogan “Catch up with and surpass the West” has been changed into a goal of re-creating the status of the country in the world with a careful, selective, and cautious approach toward the West’s perception of Russia’s role and place in the globalizing world (Tsygankov 2006). The advance of unilateral approaches in the US foreign policy, drove Russia to step back from the common agenda with the United States and strengthen the geopolitical argument in its foreign policy (Sushentsov 2017). The expansion of NATO, the constant signaling that Russia cannot have its own spheres of influence, or security and economic interests even in the immediate neighborhood made Russia perceive the US policy as being “based on an unrelenting, triumphalist double standard” (Cohen in Kharabi 2010, p. 199). Expanding vital national interests of Russia and the United States collided in many spots around the globe in difficult security, economic, and political dimensions (Safranchuk 2019). In surveys of the first decade of the twenty-first century, many Russians respondents supported the idea of building a counterbalance organization to NATO (Solovyev 2008), and perceive the United States as a threat

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to Russia5 (Rose and Munro 2008, p. 53). As relations between Russia and the United States deteriorated, Russia views the attempts by the United States to act in a manner that could potentially exclude, discount, or obstruct Russia (Safranchuk 2008, 2019). The consolidation of society around foreign policy remained high, where citizens were ready to see Russia as an active player internationally. Presently, many Russians continue to perceive the United States as a threat, especially, a war threat (63%). While a real military clash is considered to be unlikely (60%), the majority of the respondents give negative assessments for the US–Russia relations: 42% consider relations tense, 28% unfriendly, and 12% hostile (VCIOM 2017). Additionally, there is a perceived belief in a deep divergence in understanding of what is “legal,” “fair,” “ethical,” and “responsible” in global politics between the two countries (Ivanov 2016). Bilateral cooperation is therefore impeded by the problems of self-identification of Russia and the United States in matters of world regulation. Each defends the right to a different vision of the essence of the new order and methods of its construction, a strong influence in the formation of a new world order; and a different understanding of the most important problems of world development and the development of individual states (Shakleina 2008). The divergence in the vision of each other in the world system and the difference in views about global development supports the continuous bifurcation in relations between Russia and the United States. The worsening of relations between Russia and the United States at times invokes the debates about the new Cold War. Such parallels, however, look like a stretch or misrepresentation. If in the years of the Cold War the relations between the two superpowers were the main axis of world politics, in the twenty-first century they are an important but far from defining element of the globalizing international system. The world has ceased to be bipolar, and it is impossible to return it to the harsh bipolarity of the Cold War (Ivanov 2016). The realm of confrontation today is much more complex with informational, economic, political elements, which creates a high degree of interdependence when antagonisms are superimposed on the areas of cooperation (Sushentsov and Sushkov 2019). In addition, the Russian–American confrontation today lacks the ideological foundation, which predetermined the total nature of the Cold War era confrontation. Russia and the United States even continue to conceive of each other as important members of international society, but they speak increasingly different languages and use different definitions of the same notions. In terms of their potential, however, Russia remains a

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great power, but the one who still cannot compete with the United States on an equal footing in all areas, especially in the sphere of economy and modern technologies. The closest analogue of the Soviet Union, from the standpoint of economic confrontation, for the United States is China, but with the important change, which is a significant economic interdependence that has never existed between the USSR and America and which inevitably restrains the US–China rivalry as a whole (Ivanov 2016). This does not mean the current crisis in Russian–American relations is less dangerous today than the situation in the years of the Cold War, as the persisting dissonance on practical and ideational agendas strained the Russian–US relations (Safranchuk 2019). During the decades of the Cold War, the two countries were able to develop and sustain certain “rules of the game” that allowed them to reduce the risks of uncontrolled confrontation. The end of the Cold War meant the end of ideological rivalry, however, as it quickly became clear, competition in all its traditional forms, including military-strategic, geopolitical, and economic, did not disappear. In a sense, the world system returned to the familiar principles of constant struggle-interaction of key actors, but in a different format (Lukianov and Krastev 2015). The current unstable state of affairs in relations between Russia and the United States reflects this competition. “Russia and the United States have different views on each other’s status, rights, and obligations in world politics, see differently present and future world order, and differ in estimating, the role of military force in global governance” (Shakleina 2017, p. 4; Sushentsov 2018). The biggest conflict is the issue of US influence in the post-Soviet area (Trenin 2007; Tkachenko and Guillo de’Roberts 2017). The risks of conflicts arising as a result of accidents, technical malfunctions or misinterpreted actions of the opposite side are growing. Russia and the United States do not have a single vision of the fundamental trends of world development, the driving forces of this development, the future world order, the fate of leading international organizations, and the reforms of international law. Despite different ideas about the future world order, however, Russia and the United States are not interested in the complete collapse of the world order. The way out of the current crisis in Russian–American relations is not a very near-term prospect. The immediate task should be to change the dynamics of this crisis from negative to positive. This will create the necessary prerequisites for setting more ambitious goals. Equality and stable cooperation between the Russia and the United States in establishing economic, cultural, and foreign policy relations will be crucial not only

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for the future of Russia, for determining its role and place in the international relations of the twenty-first century, but also for preserving the healthy democratic principles developed as norms of international life. The influence of the United States on Russia must be perceived in the greater context of Russian historical, political, and socio-cultural experiences with the realization of the fact that Russia’s post-Soviet development exhibits its own independent and complex nature. As globalization advances, the country strives to follow its national sovereign interest, influenced by the United States, but not subordinate to the interests of the West (Tsygankov 2006, 2012). Russia is not seeking to insulate itself from the outside world but it is largely preoccupied with its own issues with a pragmatic focus on domestic affairs and reclaiming its status as a world power (Solovyev 2008; Trenin 2007; Nikonov 2015). Russia’s relations with the United States have been “strongly influenced by the degree of external validation of its self-image as a great power. Russia is striving for enhanced global recognition while at the same time retaining its national identity” (Larson and Shevchenko 2014, p. 270). Specifically, in the context of globalization, Russia continues to view itself as the embodiment of values and principles alternative to the United States, influenced by an American model institutionally and popularly, but not dependent on the interests of the West.

Russia’s Place in the World and Its Identity Struggles Russia has had a thousand-year history of growth and contraction, political consolidation and disintegration, repression and relaxation, messianism and self-definition, and varying forms of socio-economic interdependence with other nations. Russia endured multiple invasions, dramatic domestic changes, and collapses. Despite internal and external challenges Russia was able to maintain its position among the leading world players, preserving the world’s largest state amid fierce competition in a highly challenging environment (Marshall 2015). This history has had far-reaching effects on the other populations of Eurasia and beyond, as well as on every aspect of the national culture. Over the last three decades in Russian society, there has also been a process of changing approaches, values and preferences, expressing ultimately Russia’s search for its place in the globalizing world. Thus, Russia’s place in the world should be considered from two perspectives. One is how Russia sees itself and how it

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wishes other countries would see it, that is the question of an image that Russia is projecting onto the world. The second issue relates to domestic debates of Russia’s national identity, cultural adherences, and forms of domestic development. In the course of globalization, Russia’s views of itself and Russia’s standing in the world, especially in relation to the “senders” of globalization exhibits both the elements of change and continuity. The country’s strategic thinking significantly relies on its experience with the international order that was formed by Russia’s reach history of external pressures as well as domestic challenges. On the one hand, the country continues to oscillate between contradictory movements of embracing the West and supporting greater independence from it, as well as insisting on the great power status. On the other hand, Russia’s motives and behavior are quite different from the Soviet and more distant past (Stent 2007). In the words of Dmitri Trenin (2007, p. 1): “Where as the empire was predominantly about Eurasian geopolitics and the Soviet Union promoted a global ideological as well as political project backed up by military power, Russia’s business is Russia itself.” Russia’s critical opportunities and goals for development are situated within the country and its main international goal is to prevent external negative influences. In the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, the West and especially the United States enjoyed an unparalleled possibility to rewrite the rules of international engagement on their own terms. In the 1990s, the goal became to integrate Russia into the global system as a US junior partner (Tkachenko and Guillo de’Roberts 2017; Sakwa 2017). The “senders” of globalization faced little opposition to the project of redesigning the post-Cold War era strategic logic as well. The West has become accustomed to the situation where no-one challenges or disrupts the principles of Western dominance and security policy. The establishment of military and ideological dominance of the West after the end of the Cold War, however, did not make the international system more regulated and controllable. The construction of a unipolar world has demonstrated that one single power is not able to manage global politics and the number of players competing for the right to participate in building a world order is growing (Lukianov and Krastev 2015). The international order steering relations between the West and the Rest is in crisis (Bordachev 2018). According, to Richard Haass: “the fading liberal world order is neither liberal nor worldwide nor orderly” (2018), because the “balance

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of power underpinning it becomes imbalanced. The institutions supporting it fail to adapt to new conditions” (2019). Many Russian experts are firm on the point that there is a lack of a new legitimate system of regulation, and that a new global reality demands the creation of new institutions, which will manage and regulate it. A seasoned researcher from IMEMO noted: “Today globalization requires a political framing for the integrity of the world. We need formalization of global relations, which will be based on the rule of law, which will apply equally to all.” An expert from a “Re-Thinking Russia” also claimed that in the world today “there is too much integration and too little coordination, with too many double standards” (Author Interviews, 2016). In the same vein, a professor from RUDN (Russian University of People’s Friendship), stated that: “Globalization must be based on reciprocal relationships. But there is a tendency among some countries to demonstrate that reciprocity may be only among equals. Russia is not always considered as an equal, but rather as a revisionist state, together with China. At the same time, Russia and China are opening new opportunities for themselves” (Author Interviews, 2016). As such, during the last few years, Russia and China have seriously challenged this “postmodern” globalist Western order. Russia specifically brought back the traditional great power outlook, including the use of military force, and the associated concepts of spheres of influence, near-abroad, and multipolarity. In Russia’s view, the imposition is no longer possible, as the globalizing world is too complex and international environment is too multifaceted for unilateralism. Such conditions require intricate balancing and mutual recognition of national vital interests. Specifically, since the return of Vladimir Putin to the presidency in spring 2012, the strategic line of Russian foreign policy has consisted of confrontation with the US-led West to secure Russia’s strive for new rules of the game in a global polycentric world. Russia’s strategy of promoting national interests relies overwhelmingly on the ideas about the importance of the balance of power. Russia views the global system as a function of global political and military equilibrium. The post-Cold war situation is usually explained as a system of imbalances and the domination of the West, especially the United States, and its unilateral actions. Russian doctrines also communicate the conviction that global order should progress in the direction of a new multipolar system of international relations. This implies that a global system should have

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no parallels in what the world experienced before and it will have several centers of power, including regional security and economic arrangements that will support the global equilibrium. Russia recognizes that the United States and Europe will continue to be major centers of gravity in the world and envisages that strategic cooperation may help to eventually achieve the objective of achieving common goals (Sushentsov 2017, 2018). Domestically, the current view of Russia is that it is both a European and Eastern power with substantive economic and security interests in the East and compelling historical, economic, cultural, and security interests in Europe. Securing inclusion in a broader transatlantic economic and security architecture remains critically important as Russia explores a broader agenda of cooperation with its Eurasian neighbors, including China. In addition to turning itself from a peripheral European country, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, into a greater AsianPacific or Eurasian one, Russia is challenging the new system promoted by globalization, sometimes in the toughest way. In the context of unfolding globalization, and the rise of non-Western powers, Russia is reevaluating its interests and relations with the West. Russia, despite all the difficulties in the economic and social sphere, is still a counteraction for the United States and the West in asserting a unipolar world. As the world is developing further by going on a new level to the system of states interconnected by globalization, the “gap between exacerbation of the global problems, on the one hand, and nationalization of their solutions and deglobalization of governance, on the other hand,” is growing. While the West is still promoting the motto of the “end of history,… the history itself continues to go its own way” (Karaganov 2017). By the beginning of the 2000s, it had become clear that the “new” actors, including Russia and China, began to challenge the remains of the unipolar system. Their ambitions to play a prominent role in international relations are getting more obvious (Trenin 2015). However, while China emphasizes economic development and leadership, Russia focuses on the governance values, such as national sovereignty, and freedom of political and cultural choice for all countries and peoples. The geopolitical situation of Russia and its experience with Western culture and institutions have also been reflected for a long time in the complex notions of Russian identity. For many centuries, the question of whether Russia is more “eastern” or “western” has been a burning issue. Situated at the crossroads of important cultures and civilizations

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in every direction, the Slavic groups and other peoples of Russia have profoundly influenced and been influenced by them all in terms of trade, technology, language, religion, politics, and the arts. This geopolitical situation of Russia and its experience with the West have been reflected for a long time in complex notions of Russian identity, which started to manifest itself in the seventeenth century (Clarkson 1961; Neumann 1996; Shiraev and Zubok 2000; Belenchuk 2015). Westernizers, strong critics of Russian sluggish development, advocated for political and economic reforms and conflicted with the supporters of distinct values embedded in Russian culture that needed to be preserved as unique features of life. Slavophiles and statists emphasized Russian greatness and uniqueness based on Russian Christian Orthodoxy, communal values, and patriarchal family. Russian autocracy was also viewed as a peculiar symbol of Russian national development, where a Tsar was a Father of the nation, protecting and empowering it (Guins 1949; Danks 2001; Rose and Munro 2008; Gvozdev 2007). During the Soviet time this collision between the Westernizers and Slavophiles in Russia almost completely disappeared. The ideas of Soviet self-reliance, uniqueness, and superiority, however, coincide remarkably with the convictions of the Slavophiles, who, similarly to the Soviet politicians, had been certain of the decomposition of the West. On the other hand, the belief in the economic development, industrialization, and scientific progress represented the denial by the Soviet Union of Slavophile aspirations. A combination of societal changes in the USSR produced a “new” Soviet society with “all-human” culture, to which according to the Soviet government the future belonged (Connor 2003). Western culture and ideology were considered to be demoralizing and decaying. Soviet people would understand the demands of society and reject the reactionary, individualistic, and competitive spirit of the West. Some scholars assert, however, that the creation of effective means of exposure to information and unprecedented technologically advanced pressure led to a significant cultural transformation of Soviet society, which even made possible the crushing of the USSR (Tuev 2012). The collapse of the Soviet Union took a heavy toll on Russian national identity (Petersson 2001). In comparison with the Soviet Union the Russian Federation had lost a third of its territory and 40% of its population with 25 million ethnic Russians who used to be citizens of the Soviet Union found themselves outside of the borders of the Russian Federation. Russia suffered overwhelming domestic and external identity crises,

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aggravated by the difficulty of adjusting to the rapid decline in its status and loss of its position as a superpower (Larson and Shevchenko 2014). A clash of socio-cultural paradigms and antipodes was observed, where the Russian culture with Soviet modification was confronted by the modern Western Euro-American culture. A situation of cultural ambivalence arose, in which the older generation, rejected the newly introduced values, and the younger generation, having no life experience, showed interest in them, criticizing and sometimes ostracizing the values of the past era (Medvedeva 2016). Many in the Russian expert community express concern that Russia does not have a particular crystallized national idea. Others believe that Russia has a tremendous experience with the “pluralism of identity” (Fedotova 2002, p. 14). While the debate may continue, Russia needs to develop a new system of values. In search for new identity, the questions of a desirable worldview, the development of economy, and societal structure became split among several orientations. These orientations did not only resemble the controversy between the Westerners and Slavophiles, but also included a new twist associated with the socialist experience. During the 1990s, Western scholars would more often than not divide the political spectrum in Russia into different sentiments, like liberals, centrists, and Eurasianists (Petersson and Persson 2011). Some scholars proposed to view the development of Western-oriented modernizers, “traditionalists,” and ex-communist reformers as three specific socio-political movements that concentrate, respectively, on the developed West, “distant past,” and “the immediate past” (Elster et al. 1998, pp. 15– 16). All three orientations emphasize the advantages of the new system and criticize the problems of the previous establishment. In Russia, the Westernizers, having enjoyed the legitimacy achieved after an unsuccessful coup by the communist hardliners, promoted the concepts of liberal democracy and free-market economy. The “traditionalist” camp, strongly resembling the Slavophile aspirations, pushed for the reconsideration of old, well-established cultural, historical, and institutional tendencies. The ex-communist reformers, the so-called centrist movement, did not oppose the capitalist democratic turn, but criticized the shock strategy on the grounds that radical liberal reforms would undermine Russia’s productive and social base. In a similar vein, other scholars expose distinct traditions of Russia’s thinking and behavior and the search for identity. Westernist, Statist, and Civilizationalist traditions characterize Russia’s response to international pressures and opportunities, which are explained by

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“traditionally recognized manifestations of the country and the world.” Westernizers emphasize Russia’s similarity with the West as the most progressive and viable option. Statists point to the state’s ability to govern and maintain socio-political order. This trend is considered as one of the most influential, as it has the ability to explain Russia’s affinity to choose values of stability, sovereignty and order, over freedom and democracy. The Statists are not anti-Western, yet they believe that the country must be a great power capable of responding to the external threats. Civilizationists, in contrast, seek to emphasize Russian system of values and challenge the West, asserting cultural uniqueness and Russiacentered development (Tsygankov 2016). Indeed, the nature of Russian identity is often defined as a separate civilization. Being an independent civilizational entity complicates Russia’s existence and behavior but does not exclude successful interaction with European and Asian countries (Shakleina 2010). Acknowledgement of complex civilizational nature of Russia could also mean a recognition of a global nature of its international behavior although restricted by the advance of globalism. The coming of globalization did not resolve the post-Soviet identity debates. The new identity became deeply contested, as the liberal momentum did not last long, pro-Western policies were met with a strong opposition and the ideas of strong state and a more balanced and diversified approach to the international system became well accepted. Russia has a number of choices to define itself including preservation of the special Russian civilization, or integration into the Western civilization or, empire or nation-state, liberalism or paternalism, individualism or collectivism, and mobilization or modernization (Gizatova and Ivanova 2006; Likhacheva et al. 2015). Russia finds itself between the efforts to build a cohesive post-Soviet society in the process of self-determination by reflecting on the international developments and also viewing the country and society as unique state and culture (Rozanova 2003; Vodichev and Lamin 2008; Solovyev 2008). The Russian identity, therefore, epitomizes understanding not only what the Russian culture and history have to offer, but also what a global world expects of it. Russia is exploring the ways of identity construction in hopes to reconcile the past and create a form of state and society that reacts to global forces and concurrently to political, cultural, and regional diversity (Worth 2005; Kasymov 2012). While no single worldview has completely crystallized, the subtleties of Russian economy and politics reveal that the path of the country’s development is strongly influenced by the domestic tradition of powerful government

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and societal complex orientations toward international influence. Russia understands the irreversibility of change and the need to develop a new strong identity and a new model of behavior, both in the international arena and within the country (SVOP 2018). As these models are taking shape, Russia’s mode of operating remains as a situational response to constant stimuli of increasing intensity, interconnectedness, and domestic and global demands.

Conclusion Understanding the role of Russia in the world must take into account the complexity and contradictions of geographical, geopolitical, and culturalcivilizational position of the country, as well as the peculiarities of the identity orientations in comparison to other countries. Russia, by its very genesis, takes an intermediate position in relation to Europe, but also in relation to the Eastern civilization. Such a middle or “bordering” position means that Russian state and society possess the features of both West and East, making it a Eurasian entity. In the same vein, examining the international embeddedness and foreign policy component of Russia, the country takes an intermediate position between the “senders” and “receivers” of globalization, traditionally exemplifying global and regional tendencies. Indeed, the history of relations between Russia and the West is a reflection of the difficult life dialogue between the two worlds. The globalism of Russian activity signifies that it does not give up an active world-regulating role and involvement in global processes, but it sets certain limits to its activities or is limited by other international actors. This notion of an “intermediate” or “crossroads” position of Russia allows us to understand the multifaceted and conflictual development of Russia, the presence and collision of different trends throughout Russian history. This in-between situation of Russia is not only and not so much an advantage but rather as a heavy burden, a source of many problems and contradictions, which simultaneously serves as a tool for research and explanation of the history of Russia, understanding of its present and anticipating the future. With the advance of globalization, Russia has walked a rocky road, never stopping to search for answers to intricate questions that invariably arise as the state and society take shape in highly volatile international environment. The challenge of defining Russia’s place and position in the international system has never disappeared from the agenda of its leaders

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(Hale 2016). The country was trying to regain its strength and get back to its own roots, as well as give meaning to the confounding changes in the world around. This search is still far from being complete most importantly because the globalizing world is experiencing many unexpected turns to which Russia responds by attempting to strike a balance between the necessity to rethink the old legacy, the need to respect the traditional values, and adapt to external conditions. In the twenty-first century, the hierarchical structure of the world will continue to reproduce diversity, and ambivalence will remain in the positions of various leading world powers on the main issues of international order. Both traditional and ascending leading world powers will pursue a policy of “selective involvement” in solving global problems (Shakleina and Baikov 2013). Russia’s position in the world represents a new thrust driven by the willingness to protect its vital national interests and to strategically engage in the relations with the United States and Europe, but only on an equal footing. After periods of searching and probing, the country is coming back to the historically traditional way, based on sovereignty, independence in politics, and global activity. The assertive stance of contemporary Russia is a set of measures for achieving Russia’s goal of joining the highest rank of global politics and security as an equal partner with the United States and other global leaders. Russia’s view of the highly complex globalizing world entails a number of great powers whose interests have to be respected by all members of the league and could not be ignored without serious consequences for global or regional stability. Strategic goal of contemporary Russia is to optimize its role in the world using its resources and geopolitical position despite unfavorable external and internal conditions, and to try to exert influence on the process on new world order formation and remain an active and influential actor in world politics.

Notes 1. Some scholars and experts claim that globalization can be considered as having a dual character: it is a natural process, in terms of trade, economic relations, and technology advance, and an imposed project in terms of political relations and global management or regulation. Some experts strictly divide global relations into economic globalization and political interrelationships, security concerns, and issues of sovereignty. Still others view

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2. 3.

4.

5.

globalization as a period of uncertainty, without any drivers, or controls (see Inozemtsev 2008; Loginova 2015). The terms “sender” and “receiver” societies were first invoked by Peter N. Stearns in his article “Treating globalization in history surveys” in 2003. A philosophical and legal document was written by Catherine the Great under the influence of the Enlightenment. It was published in 1767 in Russian, French, German, and Latin and was modified several times thereafter. See Putin, Vladimir V. 2007. Russia Is Europe’s Natural Ally. Times Online, March 25, 2007. Available at: www.timesonline.co.uk, accessed 30 March 2009. Data are based on the New Russia Barometer (NRB) XIV nationwide representative sample surveys of the population of the Russian Federation (Rose and Munro 2008).

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Tsygankov, Andrey P. 2012. Globalization: A Russian Perspective. In Thinking the International Differently: Worlding Beyond the West, ed. Arlene B. Tickner and Ole Waever. London: Routledge. Tsygankov, Andrei P. 2014. The Strong State in Russia: Development and Crisis. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Tsygankov, Andrei P. 2016. Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Tsygankov, Pavel. 2018. A Rapidly Changing Reality. Russia in Global Affairs, October 28. Available at: https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/A-RapidlyChanging-Reality-19801. Accessed 2 December 2018. Tuev, V.A. 2012. Rossiya i Zapad v Epokhu Globalizatsii. Izvestiya Irkutskoi Gosudarstvennoi Ekonomicheskoi Akademii. Utkin, Anatoli. 2006. Novyi Mirovoiy Poryadok. Moskva: Algoritm. Van Creveld, Martin. 2007. The Changing Face of War: Lessons of Combat from the Marne to Iraq. New York: Random House. Varenik, M.S. 2012. Rossiya v Usloviyakh Globalizatsii: Poiski Tsennostnogo Samoopredeleniya. Sociologiya i Politilogiya. Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta 1 (1). VCIOM. 2008. Russian Public Opinion Research Center. Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia: Evropa i Evrosoyuz. Available at: https://wciom.ru/news/ tematicheskiy_catalog/?cat=84. Accessed 23 March 2011. VCIOM. 2010. Russian Public Opinion Research Center. Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia: Evropa i Evrosoyuz. Available at: https://wciom.ru/news/ tematicheskiy_catalog/?cat=84. Accessed 11 May 2012. VCIOM. 2015. Russian Public Opinion Research Center. Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia: Evropa i Evrosoyuz. Available at: https://wciom.ru/news/ tematicheskiy_catalog/?cat=84. Accessed 15 October 2016. VCIOM. 2017. Russian Public Opinion Research Center. Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia: Soedinennye Shtaty Ameriki i Kanada. Available at: https:// wciom.ru/news/tematicheskiy_catalog/?cat=84. Accessed 12 May 2018. Veber, A. 2003. Neoliberalnaya globalizatsiya i ee opponenty [Neoliberal Globalization and Its Opponents]. In Grani globalizatsii [The Dimensions of Globalization], ed. A. Veber, 235–271. Moscow: Alpina Publishers. Vodichev, Evgeny, and Vladimir Lamin. 2008. Russia’s Identity and Siberia’s SelfIdentification. In Russia and Globalization: Identity, Security, and Society in an Era of Change, ed. Douglas Blum. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Volodin, Andrei. 2006. Neliberal’nyye demokratiyi i politicheskaya effektivnost. Mezhdunarodnyye Protsessy 4 (1). Available at: http://www.intertrends.ru. Accessed 16 April 2016. Wallace, Hellen. 2000. Europeanization and Globalization: Complementary or Contradictory Trends. New Political Economy 5 (3): 369–382.

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Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1974. The Modern World System. New York: Academic Press. White, Stephen. 2001. Communism and Its Collapse. London and New York: Routledge. Worth, Owen. 2005. Hegemony, International Political Economy and PostCommunist Russia. Farnham, UK: Ashgate. Wortman, Richard. 2013. Russian Monarchy: Representation and Rule. Brighton: Academic Studies Press. Yakunin, V.I. 2012. Mesto i Rol’ Rossii v Processakh Globalizatsii. Mir i Politika, July 18. Yasin, E.G. 2004a. Novaya Epokha—Novye Trevogi. Politicheskaia Ekonomiya. Moscow: Novoe Izdatel’stvo. Yasin, Yevgeni. 2004b. Modernizatsiya Ekonomiki i Sistema Tsennostey. Moscow: Vysshaya Shkola Ekonomiki. Yavlinsky, G.A., and S. Braginsky. 2007. Stimuly i Instituty. Perekhod k Rynochnoy Ekonomike v Rossii. Moscow: VShE. Ziegler, Charles. 2014. Russian-American Relations: From Tsarism to Putin. International Politics 51 (6): 671–692. Zinoviev, A.A. 1995. Zapad. Fenomen Zapadizma. Moscow: Tsentrpoligraph. Zyuganov, Gennadi. 2002. Globalizatsiya I Sud’ba Chelovechestva. Moskva: Molodaya Gvardiya.

CHAPTER 3

Political Reaction and Global Pressures

Globalization and politics exhibit a complex and multifaceted relationship. In the world of profound changes, globalization takes unexpected turns and produces varied outcomes for state sovereignty, domestic policies, configurations of power, and public attitudes and behavior. The influence of globalization on Russian politics has generated opportunities and benefits, as well as significant risks and challenges. On the one hand, globalization brought advantages, such as the spread of democratic institutions and values, the rule of law, as well as greater respect for human rights. On the other hand, globalization created fears that state sovereignty would erode, many regulatory structures would become ineffective and obsolete, and negative repercussions would happen to identity and national character. The question of Russia’s place in the world is also becoming ever more acute in view of the unfolding crisis between Russia and the West, the progressing Eurasian relationships, the NATO enlargement, the protracted Ukrainian crisis, the consequences of the war in Syria, and the possible scenarios for Russia’s international standing.

Russia’s Historical Peculiarities The debate about political reforms, the role of the state, regime change and new political formations under the wave of globalization is impossible without understanding the change and continuity of historically bound type of statehood and state–society relations in Russia. Over a thousand years of history, certain principles of polity or, as some thinkers refer to © The Author(s) 2020 L. V. Kochtcheeva, Russian Politics and Response to Globalization, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39145-4_3

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it, “institutional matrix” was formed. An “institutional matrix” could be viewed as a stable, historically rooted system of basic institutions, regulating the functioning of the interconnected public spheres. An important feature of institutional pillars is their historical stability, invariant with respect to both external influences and social forces within the country (Shevchenko 2002, 2005; Ivannikov 2009). The state, however, is an evolving and adapting entity, but one that has an ability to sustain itself for a very long historical time. The state may change historically outdated forms, use some elements of foreign systems to adapt to changing external and internal conditions, but it seeks, consciously or not, to preserve interconnected stable elements of public relations, which explain the general trajectory of specific changes in society. Many of the unique features of the Russian state and political history are explained by the fact that Russia’s vast territory with diverse ethnic population occupies a middle position between West and East, geographically, politically, socially, and culturally. The initial influences on Russia were Eastern in character. While the rulers of Russia were in constant contact, through trade or war, with the Eastern tribes, an early Western view of Russia as an Asiatic country was misleading. Without a doubt, the Mongol invasion was a powerful force for more than two hundred and fifty years separating Russia from the European West and its political traditions. The conquest, however, only obstructed rather than completely changed Russia’s own political and cultural path, which originated before the invasion (Guins 1949; Clarkson 1961). Russia involved itself actively in European affairs and Russian military leaders, diplomats, explorers, and scholars gained fame outside of Russia. The country as a whole became a significant part of the European military, political, social, and cultural history (Azarov 2013). While it is important to not overlook some common roots and linkages in the European and Russian political development, there is a general agreement that the underdevelopment of feudalism and the establishment of autocracy in Russia marked critical differences between the West and Russia. The balancing forces in the West that were based on the growth of trade, the rise of bourgeoisie to economic power, and decline of serfdom made governments in the West less absolute (Chamberlain 1960; Kravchenko 2005; Colton 2016). Russia continued to be a victim of invasions, own backwardness and other problems. Russia’s fight against feudalism and serfdom was longer and more painful than in other countries of Europe; the country also failed to modernize its

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monarchy. Russia developed the traditional type of state where the domination by the “vertical power” is one of the necessary conditions for effective public administration. Large bureaucracy exists to support the centralized power (Shevchenko 2005). Traditional states are usually very hierarchical, where paternalistic attitude is geared toward the whole society, i.e., all its socio-economic and cultural layers (Yakunin 2012; Lubsky 2012). The society as a whole, in one way or another, believes in certain historical destiny of the state and its mission. The state is intended to play a prominent role in resolving problems, which determine the fate of the country (Berdiaev 1990; Panarin 2003). The traditional type of state, characterized by autocracy, continued to exist in Russia even after the establishment of industrial capitalism in Western Europe, which left a huge mark on the specifics of the Russian variant of the traditional type of state (Tsygankov 2014; Shevchenko 2005). The growth of autocracy was also rooted in the subjugation of the aristocracy to the Tsar, who would provide support for the maintenance of serfdom. Russia’s alternative centers of power, the nobles, displayed their failure to unite and create a counterbalance to the Tsar. By contrast, European states emerged as a result of complex bargained arrangements among royal power, aristocracy, merchants, and feudal lords. The historical path of the Western notion of the separation of powers took rise from these arrangements. The checks on the constantly increasing strength of the central power were, however, effectively eliminated in Russia. Even the powers of the church were severely circumvented by the superiority of the centralized secular power. The peripheral regions in Russia also became increasingly dependent on the center. Several urban areas that developed during Tsarist days were used mostly as military and administrative grounds rather than the opportunity windows for the commercial classes (Hamburg 1972). Industrial growth concentrated in a limited number of major centers that could not sufficiently meet the demands of both the state and the population. Time over time autocracy survived, subjugated its opponents, and further strengthened its rule. Russian type of traditional state, being a holistic formation, possessed a significant degree of self-sufficiency, or at least was striving toward it. A distinctive feature of the statehood was its self-reliance and the right to have its own way of development (Shevchenko 2005). Such internal conditions were further exacerbated by the constant need to defend the country from external invasions. The intense security dilemma was only strengthening autocracy. In the Russian political context, the

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establishment of a strong state, however, was a rational response to a historically determined set of domestic and international circumstances (Denisov 2013; Bezrukov and Sushentsov 2015). Located between East and West and having few natural protective boundaries, Russia was frequently attacked by the foreigners, from the Mongols, to the Swedes, to the French, to the Germans (Pantin 2012). The potential critics of strong state power submitted to state centralization. Russia continued to accumulate the resources to protect itself from the outsiders by strengthening autocracy. Even the prolonged coexistence of liberal-bourgeoisie oriented states of the West along the traditional Russian state did not aid the transformation of the latter into a liberal type. On the contrary, the state used its internal resources to respond effectively to the challenges of the West in the last few centuries, changing its historical forms, rebuilding itself, but not altering the essential principles of traditional type of statehood. The decades of the Soviet state planning and one-party rule only reinforced the centrality of the government in the country. The new autocratic state was reproduced from the old system (Tsygankov 2014). The state was in control of production, revenue and spending, foreign relations, censorship, education, and social organization in all regions and republics (Gustafson 1999). The state, as a single and only factor, carried out planned events, seeking to take into account the interests of all social groups without exception, but preventing them from expressing these interests (Baliushina 2010). Without a doubt, extensive industrialization, military might, scientific advances, mass education and strong culture have raised the country to the level of a superpower internationally. In many areas, such as steel production and agricultural machinery, the Soviet Union led the world as well (White 2001). The political priorities, economic progress, the development of infrastructure, and the consumption patterns were, however, uneven across the Soviet republics, including the Russian one. The centralization and strengthening of the state were not always optimal. Notwithstanding the attempts at equal distribution and funding of the regions, and equality in socio-cultural expenditures, many areas did not see the progress that the European part of Russia and, especially Moscow, enjoyed. Several factors usually explain a patchy developmental character. First, the European part of Russia represents about one-quarter of its land area, but is inhabited by about three-quarters of the total population. Second, the massive distances, the uneven distribution of natural resources, and the lack of transportation added to the problem of division of labor among regions (Zinam 1972). Third, sectoral

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regionalization of the country into planning units led to a separation of areas that should have been integrated. Fourth, cities and urban areas continued to exercise political and developmental advantages over the country (Nechemias 1980). More populous and industrialized areas enjoyed better social and economic conditions. More often than not, the standards of development also reflected the varying and competitive policy priorities of the government (Bielasiak 1980). The Soviet centralized system still reproduced parts of the old state system, but in a different form. It proved to be relatively short-lived and ended its existence through a combination of expressed vulnerability to external challenges and an incapacity to produce new policies to satisfy rising new demands from the society. The collapse of the Soviet Union entailed the loss of power by the ruling Communist Party, abandonment of the ideology, and a geopolitical withdrawal. The Cold War with the Western powers exerted a heavy burden of the Soviet state, which was involved in the arms race, delaying economic development and losing the support from certain sectors in society. The former republics became independent states, rejecting “Soviet” leadership (Kanet 2013). The collapse of the Soviet Union also prompted the reassessment not only of the rules of political game, but also the country’s orientation, ideology, and identity. The disintegration of the old Soviet system and the efforts to establish a democratic polity and market-based economy could not easily reverse the institutional matrix of the traditional state, hundreds of years of power centralization, and seventy years of Soviet one-party planning. Nor could newly and hastily adopted political reforms change Russia’s geopolitical situation, the entrenched statesociety relations, and the lack of liberal memory. Russia did not have the conditions of other post-socialist states of Eastern Europe, which bordered Western European countries and had a tradition of private property and/or democratic institutions. Historically powerful state, uneven development of the country, dependence of the periphery on the center, and Soviet inheritance resulted in the situation where political and socio-economic changes, as well as links to the outside world, emerged due to the external challenges, top-down reforms, and localized norms within the framework of well-established structures. While political reforms, modernization and democratization have the ability of emerging in multiple ways, and people around the world produce unique responses to change, many parts of Russia “bear little resemblance to the usual litany of globalization’s supposed benign or

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pernicious effects” (McCann 2004, p. 2). The impact of globalization on the politico-economic developments in Russia will always be moderated by the original formations and the longevity of their influence in structuring Russia’s path toward new configurations of power, state–society relations, and political identity.

The Fate of the State Globalization challenges traditional understandings of spatial relations, the role of the state, and sovereignty (Spiridonova 2005; Solovyev 2008; Blum 2008; Bochkova 2016; Hebron and Stack 2017). The global forces present the subjects of the political process with the opportunity to choose interpretations to form ideas in accordance with the interests of their states. In Russia, where statist tendencies in the development of society are traditionally very strong, the discussion of the prospects and destiny of the state in the framework of globalization is undoubtedly significant. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, which coincided with the advance of globalizing trends, preserving the territorial integrity and the power of the central state became a critical task for Russia. The advent of globalization coincided with the decline and ultimate collapse of the Soviet system, where the flawed Gorbachev’s reforms pulled to pieces a very strong state system. Politically destabilizing effects of the reforms exacerbated the growing external pressures and internal tensions (Tsygankov 2014). During the 1990s, many attempts at rapid transformations of state and society were undertaken, only to bring a quick realization of their failing nature, notwithstanding the hopes even of most radical reformers praising the “invisible hand,” increased regional sovereignty and the weakened role of the central state. The main reason for the increasing difficulties of political reforms was the inability of the reformers to accept the productive role of the state as a social institution in the process of societal transformation (Shevchenko 2002). One of the causes of the crisis that swept over Russia was the fact that over the past two decades, the role of the state in the economy has been completely unreasonably weakened, both in quantitative and especially in qualitative terms. The Russian state voluntarily gave up some of its most important functions, including strategic planning, structural policymaking and direct business activities, giving chaos to industry, agriculture, infrastructure development, personnel training, migration, and social life of the country (Shmelev in Shakleina and Baikov 2013).

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The post-Soviet changes were expected to open wide perspectives of development, both economic and technological, as well as cultural and spiritual. Russian Westernizers specifically saw a bright future for the country’s liberal and democratic transformation, a departure from a traditional state and developmental path. With the West emerging as the guiding light of globalization, powerful and cohesive, Russia under Yeltsin’s leadership was expected of and committed to radical reforms in hopes of receiving assistance from the West and developing meaningful partnerships with the West. Andrey Kozyrev was probably the foremost defender of Russia’s orientation toward the West, along with other reformists of the Yeltsin era, including Gennadiy Burbulis, Anatoly Chubais, and Yegor Gaidar. They advocated most radical reforms—“a shock therapy”—that would bring Russia in line with politico-economic standards of the West (Larson and Shevchenko 2014). The outcomes of the reforms were different from what the Russian liberal-oriented reformers expected. Although the country went through price liberalization and privatization, the proWestern course did not result in capitalist democracy, but rather in the oligarchic rule. Nonetheless, Russia changed its Soviet-type political institutions and created a basis of a new system, including the new constitution and continued elections. The expectations of the reformers that the West would recognize Russia as its own and provide necessary assistance to accept Russia in its circles, however, proved to be flawed, despite the continued support from the Clinton’s administration. Instead of the rule of law and economic modernization during the process of fundamental political, structural, and institutional restructuring, the West demonstrated its primary concern in dismantling Soviet legacy, decentralizing Russia and containing it in security issues, while Russia grew the sense of vulnerability (e.g., Brzezinski 1997). The state’s dependence on the continuation of the liberal reforms and assistance from the West was becoming a greater problem. The failure to strengthen the state was also visible in the area of territorial integrity as the wars in Chechnya demonstrated. As these attempts were failing to bring any visible success, the society was becoming disillusioned and the state was failing to demonstrate its autonomy from the oligarchs and Western financial institutions. The importance of control over the territory and establishing new parameters for Russian security were also soon widely recognized and promoted, especially as Russia was dealing with stronger centrifugal forces produced by its multiple regions, autonomous republics, and insurgent localities. These problems became the challenges of rebuilding the failing state.

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By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the country was also in dire need of a well-thought-of and theoretically grounded reform leading to a rapid increase in the viability of the state and society to effectively respond to global challenges. Otherwise, it was believed, the country would experience further weakening, multiple threats of ethnic and social conflicts, which could lead to the inevitable collapse. As such, Vladimir Putin sought to strengthen the state while pursuing opportunities for economic development. Domestically, the emphasis was on legitimacy, pragmatism, and effective state rehabilitation (Sakwa 2014a). The strategy was to rebuild Russia’s economic and military capacity as a great power with the leading role of the state in development. The developmental and modernization agenda was supposed to endow the process of state reinvigoration with a renewed legitimacy (Colton 2016). Putin was able to achieve political stability, by integrating prominent members of the security elites, unifying the divided political class, and receiving support from the population for successful economic and social policies (Tsygankov 2014). Putin’s vision featured power concentration, state autonomy, economic advance, and internationalization for Russia to play an important role in world politics and deter threats to the country. The radically transformative domestic policies and strengthening of the state power appeared to make Russia a resilient and competitive player in the eyes of the Western community (Kasymov 2012). Economic modernization and liberalization were viewed as necessary to prepare Russia to be more competitive internationally, but the state pursued greater prominence in economic affairs as well. Paternalism, which was significantly pronounced in the Soviet system, became also embedded in the operating mode of the Russian political system (Baliushina 2010). The state increased its share in the energy companies, ridded most powerful oligarchs of their economic domains, arranged investment agreements with Western companies, and increased support for other strategic sectors of the economy. The goal of the state was to present them for the successful global competition. Internationally, the idea was that Russia had to act as an effective competitive state, facing the struggle with other powers for economic and geopolitical advantage. Indeed, participation in the globalizing world was viewed as necessary to become a full member of the international community, address the economic performance problems and to deal with the security issues, especially the growing threats of terrorism. These changes and a reinstatement of the concept of a strong state supported the idea that Russia is a sovereign state, which for centuries

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constantly defended its right for own national developmental path, and the right for the country to not obey the dictates of external factors and forces (Shevchenko 2005; Blo 2016). The threat of destruction of the fundamental basis of modern societies, an idea of a Hobbesian social contract, became another serious consequence of globalization for the country. The concept of sovereignty, which is one of the fundamental features of the theory of state and social contract, creates an understanding of the state as a rational entity with rights and responsibilities in relation to its citizens within its territorial boundaries. Globalization may erode the existing concept of sovereignty, and even if sovereignty continues to exist, its meaning may be degraded to the limited control over the territory in solving certain problems, prescribed by the international law and negotiations. Thus, the concept of strong national sovereignty provided an important counterweight to identity and security challenges of the post-Soviet weak state in Russia, especially in the framework of globalization (Blum 2008). Russian analysts supported the idea that under certain conditions, the country may become a ground of interventions from the outside, especially with threats of NATO expansion, regional wars, and terrorism (Fenenko 2008). The reforms to increase capacity to govern Russia aimed at strengthening the state in an attempt to support domestic and international basis for sovereignty. Russia’s self-identity as a great, or at least regional power demanded a high level of domestic state capability, including the capacity to guarantee order and security. In 2006, Vladislav Surkov, the First Deputy of the Chief of the Russian Presidential Administration, coined the term “sovereign democracy” to argue that the main aim is to protect Russian statehood from interventionism and destruction. The introduction of sovereign democracy was also the Russian reaction to the Color Revolutions, and an attempt to reassert its status as a great power in the twenty-first century (Sakwa 2014a; Fisher 2014). The idea was to regenerate the legitimacy of state interests and increase state capacity to enforce rules, because for Russia, its state and institutions have always played an exceptionally important role. In the words of Steve Kotkin (2017): “The primary Russian value, the core Russian value is the state.” A strong, effective, sovereign state, as such is not perceived as an anomaly, but rather as a guarantor of order and security, ensuring the stability of the political system and contributing to the consolidation of scattered public interests and political forces, and an essential driving force of change (Merkulov and Dorofeyev 2016). Supporting sovereignty and state power, better

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than any other option, was supposed to allow Russia to preserve itself and manage the conditions on which to engage with different dimensions of globalization (Legvold 2011). Expansion of state capacity and preservation of sovereignty also coincided with the claims for increased geopolitical influence. In Russia these two tendencies are fused, mainly because of the manner in which domestic governance and foreign policy developed historically (Blum 2008). Even the increased globalization, traditional assumptions about the country’s sphere of influence and geopolitical standing make themselves appear inseparable from the understanding of the state strength, domestic order and security. Consequently, the underlying predisposition to maintain a high degree of state centralization and sovereignty is perceived as the foundation and epitome of national strength (Krylova 2016). In the words of Sergei Lavrov (2018), talking to the annual meeting of the Russian Council of International Affairs: “whatever the course of events, we will defend sovereignty, ensure national security, protect the honor and dignity of Russia.” Building a strong, sovereign state, however, became not only a goal in itself, but also a means for adapting to the challenges of a globalizing world and improving domestic politics and policy, and ultimately for improved well-being for the country. This strategy aimed at greater security and planning for economic and political competition internationally. At the same time, one of the prominent points of view among Russian academics, who analyzed the perspectives of growth for the Russian state, was the Western liberal idea of state, of inalienable human rights, as a basis for the institution of power, elections, and civil society control over state authority, as well as rule of law and minimal presence of the state in economy and media. Russia’s transformation into a liberal-democratic state was seen as an inevitable and most important result of the postSoviet political reform in the country. A number of political elites, sociologists, political scientists, and economists expended great effort in order to show that a liberal state was the fate and even the salvation of Russia, questioning the values of preserving sovereignty (Pastukhov 2000; Yasin 2004). However, in reality, the process of liberalization of the Russian state and society since the beginning of the new century was slowed down. There was a return to a situation, which seemed to be fated to disappear from politics. The liberally oriented minds continued to criticize the strengthening of the presidential power, which is practically, in their

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opinion, became a sole power based on a large bureaucracy, the reinstatement of the verticals of decision-making, the struggle against regional separatism, the emergence of the country’s own national interests, and patriotic themes accordingly (Shevchenko 2005). The intensification of patrimonial features of the state was exposed as the failures of the regime to embrace a more comprehensive model of development, where changes in the state are originated in engagement from the society (Sakwa 2014a). Domestic liberal forces debated the crisis of democracy and the emergence of a new dictatorship, with revived imperial ambitions. The left, while supporting the developments in strengthening the Russian state, however, criticized the state for the introduction of too many liberal reforms. It became ultimately a question of changing or maintaining not simply a particular form of the state, but essentially of transforming or preserving historically developed type of Russian statehood. In contemporary Russia, the process of reinforcing the state as an active political, economic, and social agent supporting the foundations of society is even more pronounced. The state is perceived as strong, based on two interrelated criteria, the degree of a state’s internal structure and the degree of autonomy, especially from civil society. Yet, the commitment of society to their own traditions, including the tradition of having a strong state, acts as a stabilizing factor, giving the forces of globalization affecting the state, the sense of steadiness and consistency (Spiridonova 2005). Some layers of society, however, became dissatisfied with the state that does not consistently provide the rule of law, openness, and economic stability. The opponents dislike either the system, created by Putin, or its certain elements, such as political and developmental stalemate, slow assimilation into the international economy, lack of active citizenry defended by the independent judiciary, continued corruption, failure to develop thriving modern competitive institutions, demanding gradual improvements. Nonetheless, the state is perceived by a majority as the most important actor, the basis for sovereignty domestically and globally, structuring internal transformations under globalization. The turmoil and uncertainty of the immediate years after the collapse of the Soviet Union in Russia’s domestic development made the erosion of sovereignty a particularly sensitive issue. That is why the logic of globalization, which undermines the role of the state is not well received in Russia. Additionally, globalization and its essential feature—the multiplication and diversification of flows and movements—is viewed as being able to distort and undermine all existing bases of solidarity, with a possible crisis of national

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identity. As a consequence, the foundation of the modern state can also be destroyed. This challenge of globalization, which is reinforced by the coming of new types of solidarity, including regional and international, or other than national, is seen as acute in Russia. For instance, 82% of Russians believe that foreign sources critical of Putin’s policies would collapse Russia, and the same number of respondents in the All Russian Public Opinion Research Center, believe that Russia has an important and large world influence (VCIOM 2014). The discourse about the specific scope and activities of states in the era of globalization continues. However, the problem today is that the state is faced with new challenges that transcend national territory, which does not mean the denial of the role of the state, but a quest for new forms of political action. Certain geopolitical principles emphasizing sovereign rule and strategic engagement, which were adopted as the country tried to cope with instability and the weak economy, aimed at promoting Russia’s standing and its role regionally and globally. In 2007, Putin’s speech at the Munich Security Conference announced a turn toward an independent foreign policy with a distinct role for Russia: the stabilization of the international system through a reaffirmation of international legal principles. The Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (2012) also noted: “In our deliberations about Russia’s place in the 21st-century world politics we should always confirm the independent political course of the country. The independence of Russia’s foreign policy is our achievement, gained over the preceding centuries of historical development and through the experience of the last 20 years.” The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation also stresses the notion of sovereign development, discussing the evolution of international relations, as having created new opportunities for Russia to participate not only in the implementation of the international agenda, but also in its formation. The idea is that it is hardly possible for a state to be the agent shaping an international agenda without possessing sovereignty. The Concept indicates that Russia has retained its sovereignty for centuries and intends to strengthen it, not lose it. For the Russian Federation, sovereignty is not an illusion, but a specific fact that it is not going to cede to anyone, despite globalization. Only by protecting its sovereignty, “Russia will define, together with other countries, a vector of globalization processes” (Bochkova 2016). The sensitivity to the sovereign rule and territorial issue, exacerbated by the instability in the Caucasus, Ukraine, the Caspian and the enlargement of NATO and the EU, continue to arise not only because of the

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political precedents and historical mentality of distrust of foreigners, but also because of the tremendous ethnic mosaic and diverse composition of the country itself. The concern with national security is the dimension that most profoundly embodies the underlying predispositions, historical legacy, and political preferences that set the context for Russia’s approach to globalization. National security remains the most important strategic goal of the state because the influence of the outside or foreign forces on Russian society has always been a significant factor. The level of national security, which is a fundamental value in society in comparison to all other values, could be considered as the strongest evidence of the effectiveness of the state. It is the notion that, more than any other, determined when and how an issue reaches a critical decision-making point on the Russian foreign policy agenda. While it resonates differently among the different challenges that globalization brings for the country, it is one concern that figures in all of them. Russia “has returned to the world arena as a responsible state which can stand up for its citizens” (Lavrov 2008). The concept of a special role of the state, promoting security and order, is further reinforced, especially by the Russian elites, under the pressure of globalization. The state is often pictured as the foundation and planner of public life, the initiator of economic and policy innovations, and increasingly of modernization. The state is also perceived as an entity that holds Russia and its multiple regions together. This notion is supported by the official declarations and policies, including presidential statements: “For Russians a strong state is not an anomaly, it is not something against which one should fight. On the contrary, a strong state is a source and guarantor of order, initiator and main moving force of any changes” (Putin 1999). “Sustainable development of society is impossible without a functioning state” (Putin 2012b). It is also believed that for a sovereign state with a millennial tradition there is no need to abandon the idea of independent, national development path, even in the era of globalization: “Russia’s role is important as the role of the state, which defends its values” (Putin 2013). The argument also underscores the merge of sovereignty, geopolitical standing, and national identity: “If for a number of European countries national pride is a long-forgotten concept, and sovereignty is too much of luxury, then for Russia real state sovereignty is an absolutely necessary condition for its existence. I want to emphasize: either we will be sovereign - or dissolve, get lost in the world. And this, of course, must be understood by other powers. All participants in the international life must understand this” (Putin 2014b). This concept of

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sovereignty has been standing strong over the years: “Russia was and will be a sovereign, independent state… Building relationships with us means finding joint solutions, with the most difficult issues, and not trying to dictate terms” (Putin 2019). The need for the development of strong sovereign state for Russia is dictated by the importance of bridging the gap with the leading countries of the world, by being willing to give an adequate response to security threats, and by the need to improve the standard of living, especially in relatively remote and critical regions of the country. What is needed is a modern form of the traditional type of the Russian state, which at the same time cannot entail a return to the previous historical formations. The search for the new form and goals for contemporary Russian state usually leads to some ideas of a synthesis of a traditional Russian and liberal Western models (Shevchenko 2005). Some believe in the renewal of the Russian state, with incorporation of the liberal elements into the mechanisms and spheres of socio-political life. In this case, there should exist a fine balance between a social justice realm and a liberal realm. An essential pillar of a traditional society has always been people’s support of the head of the state on the condition that domestic policy is based on principles of social justice. Among the most valued rights among Russians are rights to work, health care, education, and childcare, and according to Vladimir Putin (2012a): “The re-establishment and guarantee of these rights were pressing problems that should be solved by the state.” Over the last couple of decades, the country also has been taking measures to build an operational state structure, by strengthening the power pyramid, reforming some aspects of bureaucracy, and generally making the elements of the liberal model viable. Today, however, there is a large number of transformed features in all spheres of Russian state and society, which are the result of a process of hybridization, i.e., spontaneous, impulsive, in a sense, cross-breeding of the phenomena belonging inherently to two different types of statehood, mainly the traditional and liberal types. The debate about pseudo-elections, pseudo-market, and pseudodemocracy gives rise to many more questions about the reasons for the emergence of such forms. It could be considered that the Russian historical political development gives rise to many forms, which then later are being naturally selected. However, natural selection is a long process, during which the Russian state experiences a powerful instinct of selfpreservation, with the government understanding the full danger of the crisis and the importance of improving state viability. The country needs

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to clearly define the content of its national interests, on the basis of which to form national goals and a developmental strategy. The essence of the Russian idea has always been the protection of national interests. And while the Russian idea is not well defined yet, in its many interpretations it carries a special role of the state in its historical many hundred-year trend, especially in foreign policy, to achieve higher goals, rather than pragmatic, short-term interests: “We need a new state consciousness. In the center of which is the creation in Russia of the best, most competitive conditions for life, creativity and entrepreneurship. All activities of the state apparatus should be built with this logic in mind” (Putin 2012b). The state must also address some significant challenges that Russia continues to face under globalization. The most important of them is the challenge of development. Although the country is comparatively successful to the first decade and a half post-Soviet collapse, Russia is only modestly successful relative to the other countries in the globalizing world and the challenges that lie ahead. These trends are discernible in multiple areas. While the country has met some of its security and economic challenges, it still struggles with difficulties in the realms of diversity in the economic structure, civil society, public administration, demographic situation, social and regional inequality, guiding idea for development, and foreign policy. The country was not particularly successful in articulating ideas and values suitable for economic modernization and innovation, as well as removing the image of corrupt power, which exacerbated the problems with strengthening international economic relations. As Russia endeavors to address these challenges, the abandonment of the model of strong state, especially at the point of resource-oriented economy, which requires coordination of a complex mechanism of industrial and commercial activities will most likely not benefit the country. This is important because historically the Russian state was able to resolve multiple tasks, including deflecting foreign threats, developing the large territory, providing certain living standards for the population, and managing the enormous level of diversity within national boundaries. Russia also is involved in the competition with the powerful global actors and in a more difficult position to develop. As such, there is reliance on a strong state for assistance in achieving comparative advantages in the globalizing world. The trends to push the weakening of the state promoted by the Western countries from the 1990s are viewed as deeply erroneous (Grinberg 2006). The Russian state has rejected Western trajectory by

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appealing to national history, ideas, and cultural frames to signify Russian national values and practices (Silvius 2017). Additionally, the Russians are accustomed to the roles of strong state system, which they have historically supported. The state, however, must continue to meet significant obligations, which are valued and acknowledged by the population. As people value social order and stability, they most likely will continue supporting those political elites within the state system who promise and guarantee such services. On multiple occasions, Putin reinforced the claims that Russia is characterized by a strong state, which provides order, civil rights, reduces inequality, and violence. Preserving and reinforcing its strong state system and being successful globally requires committed leadership, well-organized governance mechanisms, as well as introducing new avenues of mobilizing forces and resources to address the key problem of the underdeveloped and poorly diversified economy. Achieving and maintaining an acceptable level of international competitiveness cannot be realized spontaneously, without rational behavior of the state. This implies the development and implementation of the relevant state structural and innovation policy. The issues of the strong state, space and borders bring together key aspects of territorial integrity, ethnic or civil unrest, historical identity, as well as security perceptions. Russia’s desire for sovereign domestic development and noninterference in Russia’s affairs from the outside became stronger over time (Tsygankov 2012). Such a concept of sovereignty is supported by a domestically oriented path of development and the reinstatement of internal values. Additionally, these issues are exacerbated by the relationship of Russia with international and global institutions. The latter comprise a multifaceted network of actors, policy preferences, and jurisdictions, which collectively produce a strong draw of advantages that is hard to disregard. At the same time, they require adaptive behavior and compromises of sovereignty. In this sense, if Russia is fully to embrace globalization, the foundation of the policy of national adaptation should rest on the mix of internal structural reforms and a gradual opening to the world.

Democracy and Democratization An enduring facet of the globalization debates is the influence of globalization on democracy and democratization in different countries. On the one hand, globalization is believed to make democratization inevitable,

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because of the more effective spread of democratic norms and values, the idea of human rights, and rule of law. Globalization through increased economic interconnectedness also induces political reform by expanding the freedom of people to exercise greater control over their choices and daily activities (Schwartzman 1998; Griswold 2006). On the other hand, globalization also represents the danger that a “one-size fits all” model of democracy can be imposed from abroad and from above the outcomes of democratic transitions are mixed at best. Moreover, some states continue to adhere to traditional practices, while still becoming more globalized, and other newly democratic states change, weaken, or reject democratic practices (Dalpino 2001; Munck 2002; Heine 2011; Nayyar 2015; Merkulov and Dorofeyev 2016; Hebron and Stack 2017). From a globalist perspective, Russia stood as one of the participants in the third wave of democratization,1 which was promoted by the United States and other Western societies. Dramatic domestic reforms and international pressures, which started with the Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost reforms, brought about new political institutions, electoral rules, and constitutional changes. Liberalization and democratization, however, did not bring an instantaneous and uncontroversial formation of Westerntype political institutions and culture, especially in a country, which is characterized by the concentration of power both in a single person or central government, and by high degree of path-dependency and a longstanding intolerance to foreign authority. Democratization in Russia coincided with the rest of political, economic, and societal changes. The collapsing Soviet Union, the international pressures for reform and societal turbulence resulted in the confrontational character of transition. Such changes have been often labeled as “imposition” (McFaul 2000, p. 161). The years of Yeltsin’s liberal reforms produced very short-lived hopes for some strata in the population, but mostly disappointments and setbacks, which for many ordinary citizens were aggravated by the country’s centrifugal forces, geopolitical retreat, and problematic relationships with the international dominant bodies. The democratic transition happened without the “revolution of values” (Petukhov and Barash 2012), as a quest for a more effective system of government. Notwithstanding these challenges, after the constitutional crisis of 1993, many political actors, who were concerned by the weakness of democracy, chose to play by the newly established rules of the game. Legislative and presidential elections, however imperfect, became the way for reaching a political office, and constitutional and statutory

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provisions contributed to the resolution of conflicts between the branches of government. Many in public also accepted elections as an undeniable feature of governmental legitimacy, despite controversial citizens’ views on the appropriateness of Western-type democracy for the country (Saunders 2001; Rosanova 2003). These uneasy political changes help explain how Russians view democracy. Noticeably there are remnants of traditional thinking, which take their roots in the Soviet period, as well as pre-Soviet history. Russia’s time-honored political culture is distinguished by a paternalistic model of the relationship between the individual and the state, by communalism, by the predominance of the spiritual values of the Orthodox Church over material drives, and by the tendency to give greater significance to public interests than to the private interests of individuals (Shevchenko 2005; Tsygankov 2014; Baliushina 2010). Since the early 1990s, Russians’ perceptions and evaluations of democracy were somewhat inconsistent and controversial. The earliest experience that shaped Russian perceptions of democracy developed during the turbulent times, which to many people associated with poverty, separatism, weakness, and political disorder. Russia faced an important and difficult challenge of creating the conditions for well-functioning state institutions, as well as achieving territorial unity, and transforming socio-economic and political systems. In a country with no legacy of democracy, it was especially a daunting task for the ordinary people to completely comprehend and internalize the culture and structure of democracy. The transition to democracy did not take place in favorable conditions of unity, security and economic prosperity. During the last decade of the twentieth century, society was divided along the issues of democracy and its institutions and culture. While Russians strongly opposed the use of force for achieving political ends, the majority of people did not prefer democracy to other forms of governance (1998 ROMIR survey results in Fedorov 2000). With the start of the twenty-first century and a new administration, more citizens tended to believe that the country went on a democratic course. For instance, 83% of respondents in the 2006 VCIOM poll were strong in their commitment to the freedom of expression, 78% highly valued the freedom of choice, and 63% stressed the freedom of movement. The 2010 VCIOM poll demonstrated that 44% of the respondents associated democracy not only with elections, but also with the freedom of speech, press and religion (47% in 2014), 21% believed that democracy comes with the economic flourishing of the country, and 28% saw

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the rule of law as the major attribute of democracy. The absolute majority of Russians (72%), however, continued to believe that order and stability should take priority over democracy (16%). These trends continue presently, with more than two-thirds of Russians (71%) in 2014 believing that order—political and economic stability and the rule of law—are much more important for Russia, even if this requires violation of democratic principles (VCIOM 2014). By 2017, 77% of Russians believed that the state should focus on protecting its sovereignty and 66% prioritized stability and order again over democratic changes. Sixty-nine percent expressed the need to strengthen the role of the state, while 22% of the respondents speak of the need to liberalize all spheres of life (VCIOM 2017). The process of democratization of society exhibits a complex dialectical character and a constant balancing between stability and democratic values (Merkulov and Dorofeyev 2016). Stability and order in Russia have traditionally been associated with the strong state (Shevchenko 2005). Russian political system is replete with the features of “managerial” democracy (Levada Center 2004), but it is definitely much more stable than twenty-five years ago. In the managed democratic semi-authoritarian regime, the state conducts structural reforms to provide the necessary conditions, including peace, order and political stability (Tsygankov 2014). The long-term stability, however, requires further political reforms, rather than simply recentralization of power and declarations of intent. Putin was firm on the position of moving toward democracy at Russia’s own pace, insisting on the right to make its own decisions on the terms and conditions of democratic transition. The notion of “sovereign democracy” especially emphasized the need for Russia to protect its domestically determined path of development. Despite its advanced nature of trying to tailor democratic transformation to the internal conditions of the country, managed democracy required further reforms in order to direct the transition from disorder to freedom by minimizing the abuses of power. The challenge was to improve the functioning and effectiveness of political institutions, especially in the executive branch without compromising the move toward increased political participation and contestation. One such effort was the proposition by Dmitry Medvedev and later the law to move the country back to the direct elections of regional governors, simplification of party registration procedures, and the return of single-ballot elections in 2011. Vladimir Putin, in 2012, advocated for the expansion of “Internet-based

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democracy,” the introduction of a citizen initiative process with a hundred thousand signatures threshold, and an improvement in the peoples’ advisory committees at the level of local authorities to move beyond the formal and declaratory character. Putin also stressed the importance of the delegation of many responsibilities to the local governments, including budgeting and taxation. The introduced and proposed reforms do contribute to political stability and political development, but stability itself is not a panacea. This is clearly explicated by the opposition forces in Russia, which consist of various political parties, citizen groups, and individuals, criticizing the functioning, effectiveness, and trustworthiness of the government or the whole state system. The opposition usually demands free and honest elections, independence of the branches of government, increase in the role of the legislature, especially over the power of the purse, control over bureaucracy, and a move away from the neo-oligarchical structure of relations. One of the prominent opponents is Alexey Naval’ny, who criticizes the president, lack of reforms in the country and corruption, calling for massive protests, employing the energies of mostly very young people. Large political actions are not new for Russia historically and especially for the citizens of large cities. Because Russians place high values on a just and protective state, they tend to protest when the state shows incapacity to perform its duties, abuses its authority, or severely degrades the freedoms and privileges, as it especially felt by the more educated layers of society. Historically, liberal western-oriented and radical protesters, who were rarely unified in their goals and tactics, were opposed by the supporters of the strong statehood. Notwithstanding protests over the last several years in some Russian cities, currently, Russians demonstrate quite a low level of protest potential in general. Protests are perceived more as a manifestation of the crisis and the destabilizing factors, rather than problem-solving tools. Three-quarters of Russians (77%) reported that they are not ready to protest, with only 16% admitting to the possibility (VCIOM 2015). Russians also view rallies more negatively than in the recent past: if in 2012, 22% of the respondents considered protests as damaging to society, by the beginning of 2015, more than 30% claim so. More than a third of respondents (38%) called rallies evidence of a systemic crisis in the society (an increase from 28% in 2012). Moreover, there are fewer of those who believe that processions, picketing, and other manifestations are real reflections of democracy and the appropriate way to solve problems (from 36 to 23%) (VCIOM 2015).

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By 2018, almost 90% of the respondents stated that they are unwilling to participate in any protests (Levada Center 2018). Even the very sensitive issue on the increase of the pension age in Russia did not produce massive protests. While 53% of the respondents in the Levada Center survey were noting that they would “most likely” join the protest against pension reform, only 4–5% actually participated in such activities (Levada Center 2018). Declarations of readiness to protest—in case something happens—from the majority of the population can also be interpreted as a form of hope for the president to intervene and change the situation. Sociologists attribute protest sentiments to a high level of trust in the state. According to Denis Volkov (2018): “people are more likely to seek the truth, they do not put forward any political demands…there are problems, but there is no tendency to blame the central authorities, especially if the authorities try to react, at least partially satisfying the demands of citizens.” At the same time, it is important to not underestimate the substantive message and intent of the protests. Traditionally, protesters in Russia were divided between those who demanded a reform from above and those who organized a mobilization against the government or the state system. Whether a protest acquires more radical forms depends on the country’s institutional conditions, external security threats and socio-economic challenges. While some protests clearly call for a reform, producing constructive criticisms and demanding concrete actions, for example “The Demands of the Russian Democratic Opposition to the President, Government and the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.” Other protests, such as Pussy Riot’s performances and a “March of Peace” on March 15, 2014, in Moscow, become the expressions of anti-Putinism. And while radical opposition in Russia strongly criticizes the president, for the majority of the country, stability and well-being depend on the stable state. As a result, the ability of the state to respond to protests becomes an important factor. In recent years, the state responded with caution and control, by abstaining from the use of force and relying on promises of change, co-optation, organization of supporters, and denigration of opponents. In general, the protests are carefully managed by the state. When the protests do not challenge the strong, traditional state system, but rather the particular policies, then the government response is usually flexible and even positive. The examples are multiple, including the demands to preserve the system of benefits (pensions, transport privileges for the pensioners, housing and utilities). In fact, the most common

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causes of protests are environmental problems, real estate and bank fraud, as well as emergencies and man-made disasters (Levada Center 2018). In the cases, where the state feels more threat from the protest, it acts in a way to reduce those threats by various means. The authorities either portray the opposition as a fifth column that wants to derail Russia as much as possible, arrest certain individuals, create support organizations and a dialogue with moderate protesters, or create the conditions for isolating the radical protesters (Tsygankov 2014; Trenin 2013). The issue of a political space and an institutional framework to accommodate protests, demands, and opposition are acute on Russia. The problem is that there are no strong societal organizations that could consolidate protest moods, mobilize the people and conduct systematic work (Gudkov 2018). The growth in social activism, however, is generally larger than protest and opposition in Russia, but the state channels the activities of the social groups to avoid unpredictable developments and threats to the state (Sakwa 2014a, b). That is why the state attempted to reduce the dependence of the NGOs on foreign funding, to increase the morals in society and to prevent the spillover of protest beyond the limits of the law. On the other hand, a number of think tanks were created to reinforce the traditionalist, patriotic thinking with the goal to preserve Russia’s national identity, as well as give some ideological underpinning and intellectual alternative for Russia’s aspirations. With the lack of public support for the liberal, plural, or Western model of societal organization, the tendencies for the larger role of state in society, especially bringing social justice are likely to continue. The solution could be a move away from controlling or managing social movement and protest to building more open, transparent and effective channels and institutions for state–society relations, reforms within power circles and transfer of power, as well as creating a favorable environment for the nongovernmental organizations to function. As such the configuration of political forces and institutions in the country become an important factor. Although there is a skewed distribution of power in favor of the president, the strength of the government is based on the relative popularity of the president and his policies in contrast to the infamous bureaucracy. Historically, the political will of the first person in Russia was considered to provide for stability and effective state functioning. It means that the state makes its priority to provide for the order and the security of all its citizens, controls all issues of social activity, including the most important but also insignificant matters. The

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people themselves expect from the leader the solution of all problems small and large. Traditional for Russia was “unity” of the first-person of the state and the people, where the first person acted in the eyes of the people as a guarantor of justice and a protector form tyrannical bureaucracy (Shevchenko 2005). Such state–society unity is based a large degree of cooperation stemming from the Orthodox Christian values, provision of the common good, and service to society, and not individual selfinterest. The criticisms of the centralizing tendencies in Russia, the lack of liberal democracy, and the increasing influence of the state on society, however, are widespread domestically and globally (Nisnevich 2012). Many are specifically concerned with the inability of the government to establish the rule of law and fight corruption. Still, the majority of Russians strongly supported president Vladimir Putin during his first term, because he demonstrated clever and pragmatic leadership, worked to restore state administration, end inefficiencies, promulgate a practical ideology, promote Russian national identity, and elevate Russia’s international standing (Nesvetailova 2004). Vladimir Putin has been specifically praised for his efforts to improve the legal framework by reforming tax and property laws, fighting oligarchs, and most importantly supporting the Russian spirit and promoting Russia’s interests in international negotiations. Many Russians conferred legitimacy on Putin during his first term even when the government undertook the measures that domestic and international actors saw as hindrances in democratization, including control of the media or appointments of the regional governors. In the years 2000– 2008, the majority of Russians approved of Putin’s policies, with the rate of approval specifically high in 2007–2008, around 80%. About 30% of Russians noted that Putin successfully managed the country’s problems and another 30% believed that he would continue to do so (Levada Center 2008). Russians saw Putin as a guarantor of stability and a majority of population preferred stability over intensifying liberal reforms, specifically because of the considerable experience of initial unsuccessful reforms. According to the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM 2007), more than half of the respondents (52%) in the national representative survey, considered Putin’s Russia as the best period to live in twentieth-century Russia, 39% wanted to return to Brezhnev’s times, while only 1% of the responded preferred the era of Yeltsin’s reforms, which sometimes called as an era of “excessive freedom.”

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During the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev, the public assessment of the office of the president still remained high with 72% of Russians approving of the actions of President Dmitry Medvedev, 76% trusting the president, while Prime Minister Putin enjoyed 60% of the population trusting him (VCIOM 2010). With the contentious 2011 Duma elections, when the country was shaken by the wave of social protests, and 2012 Presidential elections, the ratings of both Medvedev and Putin went down, but a year later President Putin still gained about 50% of the population trusting him (with only about 20% of the respondents trusting Medvedev) (VCIOM 2013). In fact, the recent tendencies in society demonstrated a certain level of disinterest in certain attributes of democracy, including electoral procedures. This is clearly linked to the experiences of the Duma and Presidential elections, which left an unpleasant “aftertaste” (Petukhov and Barash 2012). Many regard elections as a necessary formality mainly to prevent anarchy and chaos. The same can be said about the attitudes toward the opposition. Opposition represented in the legislature is viewed as a part of governmental elite that continues to channel public discontent into the direction satisfactory for the elite. The public opposition is still perceived cautiously: more than a year after the controversial elections, only 27% of the respondents in the national poll are supporting the protesters, while the original level of support was about 40% (VCIOM 2013). The Ukrainian crisis skyrocketed the evaluations of Putin by the majority of the population. After the Crimean referendum and the integration of the semi-peninsular into the Russian Federation,2 in 2014, majority of Russians, even those who previously distrusted or disliked Putin gave him high ratings, with 80% of the population approving of the actions of the president (VCIOM 2014). Putin started to be treated not as simply a leader but rather as person “who makes history.” The majority of Russians also believe that the president is conducting correct domestic and foreign policy. The PEW Global Attitudes Survey also demonstrated Russian confidence in Putin at a new high in 2015. Russians overwhelmingly supported the President’s handling of relations with foreign powers, such as the United States and the EU, as well as his handling of the Russian economy. Sixty-two percent praised Putin for his performance on corruption (PEW 2015). By the end of 2015, 62% of the respondents in the VCIOM (2015) poll state that they trust Putin to solve important political problems and 73% were ready to vote for him in 2018 presidential elections (VCIOM 2015).

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Indeed, in 2018, the level of confidence in the results of presidential elections among Russians reached a historic maximum. The overwhelming majority of Russians (87%) were satisfied with the presidential elections of the Russian Federation held on March 18, 2018. This was the maximum total figure for the last three election campaigns: in 2012— 71%, in 2008—72% (VCIOM 2018). Confidence in the voting results also reached a maximum for all periods of measurement: 60% of citizens are confident that the election results are consistent with the will of the people, another 28% admit that there were some “local fraud,” but they do not believe that they had an impact on the overall result. According to the Levada Center, the approval of the President is also high, at about 70% (Levada Center 2018). In general, Russians continue to support the institution of elections, however, there has been recently a turn toward certain trends and changes in the attitudes toward the electoral process. For instance, Russian voters speak against coercion to vote, as well as express their attitudes to elections as a whole as an increasingly routinized process, losing its sacred meaning. To a certain degree, the significance of elections in the mass consciousness is falling. As a result, the interest in elections and the motivation for participation in them are reduced. In parallel, the Russians denote unwillingness to take responsibility for the result of the vote, i.e. actions of elected authorities that may be unpopular. All of the above creates significant risks of reducing the legitimacy of the electoral and, more broadly, the political system (Mamonov 2018). There is also a concern that in Russia political order of polyarchic democracy not implemented with proper quality (Nisnevich 2012). The instances of disqualification of the candidates from participation in elections, electoral fraud, co-option or intimidation of political opponents, establishing control over media and decreasing its ability to shape public discourse did not only restricted the space for contestation, but also prevented to a certain degree future democratic improvements. Moreover, the lack of a clear and effective mechanism for transferring power delays the development of formal political institutions of power succession. Some political analysts claim that in Russia, after the presidential elections of 1996, the real change of political representation in the institution of the presidency, which has become a key actor of Russian politics and a stronghold of the ruling regime, as a result of open and public political competition in the elections, has never happened. Similarly, starting with the parliamentary elections of 2003, the party United Russia has held

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the constitutional majority in the State Duma. Political experts are firm in their belief that the most important constituent element of democracy should be “political pluralism” in all its expressions, including political competition and participation, competitive, regular elections, and the lack of a party monopoly (INSOR 2008). The political class, therefore, insists on focusing democracy on politics and electoral procedures, whereas the public at large holds a broader view of the desired democratic model. Most importantly, democracy is about functioning institutions, the effectiveness of which should be determined by changes in the level and quality of life, social security of citizens, and the extent of corruption. People want the state to focus on domestic development, specifically, 62% of citizens believe that the state should take care of all its citizens, providing them with a decent standard of living, 30% note that the state must establish uniform rules of the game and ensure that they are not violated, and only 6% believe in minimal state intervention in the life and economic activity of their citizens (Levada Center 2018). Russians want similar things as people in the West, including economic well-being, effective institutions, the rule of law, moral health of society, etc. But if some in business and bureaucracy, some in public sector, and the urban youth in major cities are ready to support the achievement of these goals through democratization and liberalization of public and political life, then the more “traditionalist” layers perceive potential changes in the strengthening of the “order,” which partly explains the rise of the protests in society. Moreover, only about 16% of the respondents are willing to be more politically active (Levada Center 2018). The main reason for refusing to participate in political life is the notion that “politics is not for ordinary citizens.” Yet, political debates and discussions are prominent in social networks on the Internet. An explosion of public activity in virtual spaces deserves special attention. The Internet and social networks (VK, Odnoklassniki, Facebook, Twitter, blogs, chats, forums), are by far the most effective tool of mass participation, discussion, and mobilization and in many ways the only really effective tool of horizontal connections in society. While some experts are skeptical of such communications and refer to them as a means of manipulation of public opinion, imitation of participation, provoking negative reactions, and dissemination of illiberal ideas (Karasin 2009), the new media enables everyday communication and shapes the way people think, talk and feel

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about politics (Bassin and Suslov 2016). Tweeting politicians and diplomats and blogging intellectuals spread their ideas online providing a significant arena for debating political concerns. At the same time, digital discussions become an inherent part of popular politics, opening up the channels of communication, and facilitating the flow of information from the policymakers, to experts, to the public at large. It enables people to participate in deliberations and resists attempts to impose one hegemonic view. Notwithstanding powerful state capacity for technological intervention and manipulation, the Internet in Russia is famous for accommodating experts, intellectuals, thinkers, observers, and regular individuals willing to discuss politics. The state of domestic politics, the crisis in Ukraine, the war in Syria, the relations between Russia and the United States are discussed daily by millions of Internet users. Social media became a platform for developing ways of thinking and perceiving politics on a truly mass scale. The new digital environment and constantly growing opportunities on the web, spread the knowledge on politics among broad layers of the population. According the 2017 survey by the VCIOM, almost 81% of Russians use the Internet, at least from time to time, and about 60% of respondents use Internet to receive the news about the country and the world (VCIOM 2017). Economic concerns in Russia, however, continue to overwhelm the population at the expense of the issues of politics, democracy, and individual freedoms, especially presently because of the struggling economy, the fall of the rouble, the challenges of sanctions, and the need to diversify and modernize the economy. In fact, for many ordinary citizens the realization that democracy in itself does not guarantee rapid improvements in the standard of living and does not ameliorate arbitrary decision-making of the administrative apparatus meant disappointment with democratic values. For instance, the proportion of people who think that democracy is jeopardized most importantly by poverty and the gap between rich and poor, rose from 30 to 45%. Some recent polls demonstrate a similar picture with 52% of the response noting inflation as one of the major problems, 51% noting low standards of life, 46% pointing to corruption and bureaucratism, and 42% noting low health care standards (VCIOM 2013). The political and socio-economic experiences of Russian people continue to demonstrate the divergence between democracy as a model, specifically Western-type regime, and democracy as a reality in Russia. Russians understand that a viable democracy is difficult to achieve without

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a level of socio-economic development that guarantees decent living standards for the majority of the population. The majority of Russians challenge western propensity to offer guidance to Russia, specifically because one of the consequences of the globalization paradigm in the US policy toward Russia was an undue emphasis on economics over politics. This may explain why the majority of Russians (73%) support the continuation of a tough independent domestic and foreign policy, without regard to sanctions (VCIOM 2018). The perceptions of democracy in the Russian society, which started to emerge in the late 1980s, were based on the notions of justice and properly organized society, which was seen as a Russian equivalent of a “state of common wellbeing,” which can organically combine, on the one hand, an active role of the state in the economy, a strong social safety net, and on the other, noninterference of the state in the private lives of citizens, and the guarantees of political and civil freedoms. It is clear that the gap between the ideal and the reality in which the people lived in those years was enormous, and it even continues into the present. According to the public opinion poll by the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Russians have a clearly expressed perception about public good and a model of democracy, which can be implemented in practice. This perception includes “social justice,” “state taking care of its citizens” and “equal rights for all, democracy, and freedom of expression.” Specifically, the majority of the population (77%) expects “equality of all before law,” and “insignificant differences in the socio-economic standing of the individuals” (40%). Currently, many Russians see democracy as a mask of a hegemonic advance by the West and devaluation of Russian culture, way of life, and morals. The crisis in Ukraine continues to bring to the surface many disagreements, misunderstandings and discrepancies in the worldviews and even perceptions of right and wrong between Russia and the West. The Western values are not considered by many Russians any more as the fundamentals of societal functioning; on the contrary, they are sometimes considered as a threat to the Russian way of life, with the traditional national values being highly praised. More than half of Russians (56%) believe that conservatism is not only conducive to the preservation of traditions and social order, but also helps the country to move forward without major stresses to society (VCIOM 2014). Without a doubt Russian democracy is far from being perfect, but the society is slowly internalizing democratic values and institutions. As president Putin stated during

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his Valdai speech in Sochi (2014b): “We definitely have a few drawbacks. They are systemic in nature. They certainly came from the past. And, we have to change many things in our lives, but not with the help of revolutions…with an evolution.” Many Russians believe that only with a sovereign domestic development the country will be able to overcome the old and emerging difficulties because the West is advocating a distorted view of societal relations and the relations between state and society. The social media networks are also replete with the proclamations that Western-type democracy is not suitable for Russia, the West is not giving valuable guidance to other countries, and that Russia has its own way in the world. Russians, nevertheless, do support freedoms and rights for the people and expect the government to guarantee and uphold such rights. Demands for equality before law stood out as main attributes of democracy for the last decade, while the demands for more socio-economic equality rose only in recent years. There is a reason to believe that the idea of “democracy of equal opportunities” may get even more resonance in society in the future because it is becoming a global trend, introducing a new twenty-first-century vision of democracy, the main purpose of which is to ensure individual rights of citizens, from the reduction of social inequality and to expanding opportunities for political participation for the general public.

New Configurations of Power Globalization inescapably pushes countries around the world to reassess the past and current world orders, reconsider their participation in regional and global relations, and conceive of new alliances, regimes and configurations of power. The end of the Cold War was supposed to bring about the transformation of the international system. The goal was the development of a new type of a universal liberal ideology and order for a global world. The powerful interlinkages, permeable borders, interdependent economies, and fusing cultures seemed to promise its permanence. At the beginning of the 1990s and even at the turn of the century few thought that an interdependent new liberal world could be significantly challenged (McFaul 2014). What had triumphed, however, were mostly the Western ideas and institutions that became considered universal. The growing discontent among a number of actors over the global politics, rulemaking, and rule-breaking, over the highly patchy distribution of material wealth, and “over when and whether might makes right”

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produced many challenges to the globalizing world, “whose worrying contours and formidable hazards are not yet quite in place, but already gnawing in unsettling ways at our consciousness” (Legvold 2017). The accumulated failures of the world system—the one that took shape in the second half of the twentieth century, after the Second World War, and then was either adapted or transformed into new realities without bipolar confrontation—gave an aggregate effect, provoking imbalances in the whole system (Valdai Club 2018). The liberal order started to exhibit “its own signs of deterioration” (Haass 2019), with liberalism submitting to nationalism and balance-of-power politics (Mearsheimer 2018). The international architecture created by the West became obsolete and unstable (Monaghan 2016). The international setting started shifting and the task for the countries became to figure out how to build foreign policy, international relations and domestic responses when key aspects of the international order are in motion. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s aspirations to join the community of the Western states on an equal footing did not realize. Post-Cold War Russia did not conform to Western expectations and hopes for its transformation, as well as the West was not able to effectively interpret Russian behavior (Torkunov 2012; Monaghan 2016; Karaganov 2017a; Bordachev 2018). At the same time, no new power arrangements were established after the Cold War and Russia remained outside the collective security setup embodied by NATO. This produced a series of negative reactions, including a sense of alienation and exclusion (Pouliot 2010). It also compelled Russia to create a new concept of global relations, determining the conditions for great powers to recognize the security and other national interests of other countries in a legitimate manner (Safranchuk 2019). As a reemerging state, Russia strived for recognition and inclusion to ensure that the post-Cold War power shift would be characterized by interdependence and interlinkages, as well as an expanded collective security system. Instead, in the words of Richard Sakwa (2017, pp. 9, 23) Russia “was trapped into a strategic impasse,” where it could be “a great power but an outsider; or a member of the Historical West, but at the price of renouncing its autonomy as a great power.” As the Cold War bipolar world was transformed into the post-Cold war unipolar one, the liberal global order was effectively claimed to be synonymous with international society. The post-Cold War period, which also coincided with the advance of globalization, was generally shaped by several important developments, including the expansion of Western

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institutions created during the Cold War, such as NATO and the EU, the promotion of the Western values and ideas, the US hegemony, and the emergence of a politics of resistance in Russia. The core of difficulties in the relations between Russia and the West was Russia’s selfperception as a great power and the West’s refusal to accept that status (Larson and Shevchenko 2014). Yet, there was also a notable continuity of Russia’s beliefs in the fundamental traditional statist order, which sees the international system as made up of a variety of states with their own interests. Prominent Russian international relations scholars developed a variety of ideas discerning between various types of the world system (Shakleina 2003; Bogaturov 1996, 1998, 2003). Alexey Bogaturov (1998, 1999, 2003) specifically suggested deeming the post-Cold War globalizing world as “pluralistic unipolarity”, where the unipolar cluster is a group of states, with Russia being an important constituent of such cluster. This approach to the global order also insisted on the establishment and promotion of the concepts of rules and norms for the world system. Therefore, Russia asserted that it was an important power in Europe and the world and that the post-Cold War move which claimed a certain universality for the liberal international order, often described as globalization was objectionable. Even Yeltsin’s administration attempted to proclaim Russia’s status as a great power, when the country was the most devoted follower of the West and dedicated to becoming part of the Atlantic system. Later Putin’s leadership made significant efforts to find a way of combining adjustment and sovereignty, which were instructed by the enduring views about Russia’s status in the world, simultaneous concerns about domestic stability, and a rebuttal to accept Russia’s marginalization (Sakwa 2017). The liberal global order was poorly prepared to accept the idea that Russia had its own national interests and a zone of influence in its immediate, especially post-Soviet neighborhood. Ultimately, the growing concerns that Russia’s interests are not only taken into account, but also are not seemingly heard, prompted the Russian leadership to speak more forcefully and determinately about the concept of multipolarity and the new world order. The concept of a “multipolar world” and a “diversity in the world” emerged as practically the official foreign policy doctrine of Russia (Fedorov 2000; Margelov 2005; Trenin 2013; Putin 2014a; Colton 2016; Silvius 2017), and it continues to be persistently promoted, notwithstanding some recent criticisms of the inability of this idea to be effective (Tsygankov 2015a; Kortunov 2019). The appeal and historical

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predestination of multipolarity are often associated with the former Foreign Affairs Minister Yevgeny Primakov. According to the “multipolarity” view, contemporary global politics should be shaped by the polycentric system of international relations. In a multipolar international political system all major powers, including Russia, have an equal and legitimate voice. As a formative foreign policy concept, the multipolarity principle shapes Russia’s attitude toward basic norms of contemporary international society (Kurowska 2014). Russian officials have continually stressed that they favor multipolarity and will help it succeed in every possible way: “The world should be multipolar. Unipolarity is unacceptable, domination is impermissible” (Medvedev 2008). During his visit to Venezuela, Vladimir Putin claimed that: “Our goal is to make the world more democratic, balanced and multipolar; and make it so that all participate in it on equal conditions” (Putin 2010). The Foreign Minister of Russia, Sergei Lavrov (2012) is also very determined on multipolarity: “Today, no one argues that the emerging international system by definition is polycentric. The leading think tanks in Europe, the U.S. and Russia take this factor into account in their analyses.” And while the world today entered the times of rapid and profound transformations, the rise of uncontrollable factors and threats “we need a new global consensus of responsible powers…with a new ‘edition’ of interdependence, …taking into account the development and growth of certain regions on the planet” (Putin 2014a). The Russian Foreign Policy Concept of 2016, signed by the President also stresses that “the world is currently going through fundamental changes related to the emergence of a multipolar international system,” and while “tensions are rising due to disparities in global development,” Russia aims to promote “bilateral and multilateral frameworks, mutually beneficial and equal partnerships with foreign countries,” “to ensure national security, sovereignty and territorial integrity,” “to ensure comprehensive, effective protection of the rights and legitimate interests of Russian citizens” and “to facilitate the development of constructive dialogue and partnership with a view to promoting harmony and mutual enrichment among various cultures and civilizations,” among others (Russian Foreign Policy Concept 2016). In his address to the Valdai Club in Sochi in 2016 Vladimir Putin reinstated: “I would hope very much […] that the world will become truly multipolar so that the opinions of all members of the international community are taken into account (Putin 2016). The support of multipolarity has now become a complex protection of multi-level pluralism as well as the pluralism of statecentric international

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relations,” however, “defending the autonomy and the universalism of international society” (Sakwa 2017, pp. 47–48). With the worsening of the relationships between Russia and the West, due to many incidents, including the imposition of sanctions, US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Action Plan to resolve the situation around the Iranian nuclear program, the stated intention to terminate participation in the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, a policy of revising the fundamental principles of the Middle East settlement, and others, Russia continues to be very concerned about the unipolar developments. The actions by the West and especially by the United States are seen in the official rhetoric as the denial of “the objective process of forming a more just, democratic, polycentric world order” (Lavrov 2018). Russia’s main foreign policy priorities, as evidenced by its actions in the Ukraine and Syria, are resisting the further expansion of NATO in Eastern Europe and confirming its status as a great power outside the post-Soviet space. The strategy is to create conditions for its partners and rivals, and above all the United States, to recognize Russia’s security interests, and the country’s sovereignty that should be considered on the world stage (Trenin 2016). Russia insists on a constructive international agenda, unifying initiatives aimed at effective resolution of common pressing problems, from creating a global antiterrorist coalition to building an architecture of peace, security, and broad cooperation in Eurasia, to ensuring equal and indivisible security in the Euro-Atlantic. Vladimir Putin (2019) emphasizes that: “The priorities of our foreign policy are absolutely open: it is building confidence, fighting common threats for the whole world, expanding cooperation in the economy, trade, education, culture, science and technology, removing barriers to communication between people.” Russian foreign policy and global views may cause a lot of controversy, but there is a definite recognition that Russia’s role and presence in the world have increased significantly. In essence, this means that an important accomplishment was achieved in the political history of the country that lasted a quarter of a century. This is the desire to overcome the consequences of the collapse of the USSR, which meant an unprecedented retraction in opportunities, status, and prestige on the world stage. Russia never sought and does not seek to occupy a niche that the Soviet Union occupied in world affairs, because the time of superpower has passed. However, the position of one of the key international players, not only a

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regional player, but also on a global scale, has been restored (Lukyanov 2018; Monaghan 2016). Russia views itself as one of the valuable facets in the polycentric world, mainly due to its geographical location, economic, resource, and military capabilities, as well as cultural and human capital. In international negotiations, Russia over the years developed its own vision and insists on the position of law, equality, and justice, which at times allows the country to play a stabilizing role with a multitude of regional and global actors, including those who could not previously imagine themselves in alliances besides the United States and NATO (Lavrov 2012). Russian determinism is also reinforced by a continued commitment to the institutions of international society (Sakwa 2017). Russia aspires to remain open to joint constructive work with foreign partners in all geographical areas and in any formats based on mutual respect, predictability, and negotiability, which also fully applies to the United States, the West as a whole, as well as to such structures as the EU and NATO (Lavrov 2018). Russia continues to struggle with the status of exclusion from European and transatlantic security architecture and as a result, “Russia began to look for a place in the international system by relying on “big ideas” emanating from domestic discourse” (Zevelev 2014). Russia’s responses to the outside challenges constitute a long-term policy change, reflecting a pattern of Russia’s more assertive relations with the West and other nations. Such a development of Russian foreign policy is not a result of recent crises, but rather a strategic development of national policy, as is evident by the Foreign Ministry report entitled “A Review of the Russian Federation’s Foreign Policy,” which was released on March 27, 2007, that portrayed Russia as capable and ready to influence regional and global relations by challenging the actions of other states if they were “unilateral” and disrespectful of international law (RF, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007). To be sure, Russia does not demand to be a global leader and does not claim its exclusivity in the world. However, the country expects that all participants in the international dialogue must respect each other’s interests: “We are ready to respect the interests of our partners, but expect the same respect for our interests” (Putin 2014b). As a consequence, Russia’s relation to the outside world, and the whole basis of foreign policy is strongly determined by actions of external powers toward Russia. In recent years specifically, Russia’s domestic policy and the reaction within the West to such policies started to interfere with Russia’s relations

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with the West and vice versa (Trenin 2013). For instance, the Russian law on nongovernmental organizations that requires foreign-sponsored or funded NGOs to register as foreign agents, became highly criticized in the West, while Russia continued a policy of domestic traditionalism, further declining from the elements of Western liberalism. Another example is Russia’s highly debated law that banned the adoption of Russian orphans by US citizens, viewed as passed in response to the US Magnitsky Act, which imposed sanctions against Russian officials who violated human rights. These actions raised some strong anti-Russian sentiments in the United States, while also producing anti-American rhetoric in Russia. With regard to global affairs, the astounding growth of China and larger presence of India and Latin American countries, the continued turmoil in the Middle East, which produced highly variable and unstable outcomes of the Arab Spring, a continuing nuclear program in Iran, disorder in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the challenges of North Korea, contribute to Russia’s understanding of not only of the polycentric nature world with the declining Western domination, but also the revival of Russia’s foreign policy independence based on internal values. As it has been argued by many scholars, Russia recently went on a path of “sovereignization” or even a “seismic” or a “paradigm shift” of politics to strengthen Russia domestically and project its influence internationally (Trenin 2013; Rutland 2014). The country’s adoption of the law that made it illegal for Russian government officials to keep money abroad is just one of many examples. The law aimed at a simultaneous solution of two problems. One is to ensure that the members of the Russian government are less vulnerable in foreign countries and to bring discipline to those in power. Besides the pursuits of national identity, domestic stability, and international security, the transformation of Russian foreign policy has included the adoption of a series of ideas about a unique Russian civilization, “the Russian world,” and the need to defend the rights of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers (Zevelev 2014). This concept takes roots more from domestic discourse about Russian identity than from existing views of the world order, which adds to the tensions in relations between Russia and other countries. Russia, however, understands that countries are dependent on each other and that the world is global and everything should be done to reduce the current level of instability, end even “chaos.” The presence and likelihood of a whole series of violent conflicts have sharply increased, today, directly or indirectly involving major global powers. In this case,

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it is not only the traditional interstate conflicts that become the generators of risk factors for the global system, but also the internal instability of individual countries, especially when it comes to countries located at the junction of the geopolitical interests of large states or on the borders of cultural, historical, economic, and “civilizational” entities. The current crisis in Ukraine is an example of such conflicts, which demonstrates how an internal problem has gained a regional scale and is becoming a global issue. The impact of the Ukrainian crisis on the existing world order is so multifaceted so that it makes it challenging to predict the consequences, regardless of its outcome (Naumkin 2014). The Ukrainian crisis also represents the outcome of the global relations, as well as the force influencing and aggravating it. New mechanisms and architecture of relations are needed to provide political leverage, financial support, and to create a diplomatic incentive to overcome the various dimensions of this crisis. The absence of understanding, respect, and mutual institutions will continue to weaken the chances to give bilateral, regional, and international relations any stable foundation. The particularity of Russian values and the pursuit of interests require many efforts to build relationships based on trust. The relative weakness of economic and technological interdependence as well as distinct political values make cooperation difficult at best and lead the countries to forgo mutually beneficial projects and promising future cooperation. Isolationism is not an option in the globalizing world, and it has been repeatedly underscored by prominent political and cultural leaders of the country. Russia continues its attempts to be integrated into global processes, and intends to move along this path: “Russia is an integral part of the modern world and wants to develop together with it… and claim its rightful place in it in areas such as the economy, security and in meeting the potential of Russia and Russian history, and its role” (Medvedev 2010). Russia’s development depends on the relationship and cooperation with the Western powers, which are expected to respect Russia’s interests. At the same time, the West expects Russia to cooperate globally and reform domestic political institutions. Such relations have always lacked necessary stability, and the Ukrainian crisis derailed what has been achieved with a “reset,” expanding differences over the strategic issues and adding to the growing challenges with the Russian domestic system. On the one hand, the West has its own global pursuits and geopolitical interests and is unaccepting of Russia’s strong traditional type of statehood. On the other hand, Russia strives for cooperation with the Western

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countries but with the foundation of respect of its own interests and values, and equality in international relations (Tsygankov 2014). And while the relationships between Russia and the West have been relatively narrow in the last couple of decades, notwithstanding the large volume of trade between Europe and Russia, Russia’s entrance into the WTO, joint attempts to stabilize Afghanistan, the cooperation on Iran and the new nuclear treaty (during the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev), joint space projects, many disagreements persisted, and new ones emerged. With the 2012 reelection of Vladimir Putin, the tensions between Russia and the West exaggerated even further, affected by the increasing criticisms of Russia’s autocratic state, domestic and foreign policy, and human rights challenges (Yaffa 2012; Sestanovich 2016). For instance, Russia’s law on the prohibition of the propaganda of “non-traditional sexual relations among minors,” which was supported by almost ninety percent of the population domestically, produced severe outcries in the West ranging from the public speeches condemning Russia’s intolerance and outdated views, to the decision of Barack Obama to not appear during the Sochi Olympic Games in 2014. The view of Russia as a hostile, antagonistic, underdeveloped, undemocratic, country, even a “mafia state” permeated the discourse in the West, especially in the United States (e.g., Diamond 2016; Ringen 2018; Gessen 2019). The media’s presentation of Russia as an autocratic state hostile to American way of life and democracy exploded the debate particularly in context of “collusion” with Donald Trump (e.g., Friedman 2017). The Western countries also continued to be critical and unaccepting of the expansion of state power in Russia, military and diplomatic victories in Syria, and regional assertiveness in Eurasia, more often than not charging Putin with everything, from controlling dissent at home to ignoring the rules of the world order (e.g., Triesman 2018; Myers 2018). Specifically, popular among the West became the pronunciations of Russia’s intent to rebuild the “Soviet empire,” launch efforts to revise the US security arrangements, and the necessity to counteract such tendencies, using a whole range of methods, not excluding the return to the Cold War policies to contain Russia (Goldgeier 2014; Applebaum 2014; McFaul 2014; Mandelbaum 2019). For instance, the creation of the Eurasian Customs Union, notwithstanding the transparency in its goals and agenda, the willingness of some countries to join it, and clear economic incentives, received severe criticism from the West, both in the United States and Europe. Confrontational rhetoric and policies toward Russia, imposition of restriction, talking from the position of power and

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containing Russia’s “expansion,” rather than discussing cooperation and shared interests dominate the West’s attitude (Ashford 2018). Most importantly, the West became concerned about the fate of Ukraine, as it was being pulled in different directions between Russia and the European Union. The West became very supportive of the government and regime change in Ukraine in 2014 and the reliance of the government on the Western assistance, without regard to Russia’s view of the situation as an unconstitutional coup by radicalized militant nationalistic forces. Yet, the epitome of the worsening of relations between Russia and the West became the incorporation of Crimea, territorial integrity of Ukraine, and the insurgency, leading to the civil war in the South East of Ukraine (Colton 2016; Larson and Shevchenko 2014). Russia and the United States have again made the other a defense priority, as in the original Cold War, treating the other as decidedly a major military threat (Legvold 2017). The “second” Cold War references are not new, as even the mid-2000, the tensions between Russia and the West were mentioned in terms of whether or not they marked the start of a “new Cold War” (Monaghan 2016). Viewing Russia’s actions as destabilizing and aggressive, the West also continues to impose economic sanctions in hopes of a domestic policy and government change in Russia. Despite these sanctions against the country’s economy, Russia stands to defend its core interests and values, as well as stress the concept of multipolarity, a balanced multi-vector approach, recognition of Russia’s interests through preferential development of economic, political and cultural ties with the Western world and beyond. As such, a big conceptual conflict of state behavior is presented. The West believes that “contained” or “pressured” Russia can become more cooperative internationally and more prone to reform domestically (Tsygankov 2015b). Contrary to such expectations, pressures on Russia and disregard of its vital interests, are likely to increase domestic anti-Western sentiments and sense of nationalism that give the government the confidence in international politics. Moreover, although Russia is experiencing a lot of domestic problems, it still has significant advantages in Eurasia and will continue to pursue them in addition to expanding the reach to other regions and countries in the world. Specifically, Russia takes opportunities to promote its interests outside Europe, while maintaining limited cooperation in the realms of mutual concern, and actively establishing linkages with Asian and Latin American countries. Only if the West and Russia reframe their priorities for the global order in general, and for

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some individual crises, such as the Ukrainian case in particular, can they attain progress. Importantly, all sides need to see it as progress for the US/West–Russian relationship to succeed. The same can be said about the problem surrounding the issue of cyber hacking. The United States, Russia, and major European countries need to rethink the ways they are currently dealing with what has become a heavy burden on the relationship in the bilateral and international contexts. Russia pursues deeper relationships globally and regionally, by promoting a specific worldview and major ideological conceptions rather than only geopolitical considerations. Russian experts note that Russia has always been open to bilateral and multilateral relationships and will continue to participate in the processes of integration and expanding cooperation. It made its choice on the priorities, including further improvement of the political institutions and an open economy, accelerated internal development, trying to incorporate positive trends in the modern world and consolidate domestic society based on traditional values and patriotism. The country’s agenda is built on the principles of mutual respect and non-exclusion, as the country works with a range of organizations, including the Eurasian Economic Union, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the BRICS, and others. This agenda is aimed at the development of relations between states, a type of integration that is being promoted by globalization, rather than separation: “We are not going to cobble together any blocks…and allegations that Russia is trying to restore some kind of the empire are without foundation… Russia itself does not require any special, exclusive place in the world…By respecting the interests of others, we just want our interests and our positions to be taken into account and respected” (Putin 2014b). Building economic and socio-cultural ties with these countries and joint integration projects play a significant incentivizing role in Russia’s own internal development. Current demographic, economic, and cultural trends suggest that the dependence on a single country is diminishing and will continue to do so. As such, one of the main goals of Russian foreign policy is fostering a global and a regional system that is “fair, democratic and, ideally, self-regulating. This goal can be reached only through truly collective and partner actions by the leading players in the international arena. It is also clear that translating this maxim, with which everyone seems to agree, into practice will be a difficult and slow process” (Lavrov 2012). Many previous attempts by Russia to move the world beyond the Cold War approaches were ignored. Russia recurrently

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requested to join Western organizations and to reformat institutions into pan-European ones. From Boris Yeltsin to Dmitri Medvedev to Vladimir Putin, Russia’s requests to build a new European security treaty or for establishing a common economic, humanitarian, and energy space were not taken into account (Karaganov 2014). The most important concern, however, is that NATO’s eastward enlargement is understood as bringing hostile forces closer to Russian borders and weakening of Russian influence in its own neighborhood. Russia sees Western interventions in Europe and elsewhere, especially in the Middle East resulting in further instability. NATO enlargement is therefore perceived not in the light of spreading peace and security, but in terms of possible intervention (Monaghan 2016; Mearsheimer 2014). In the evolving and globalizing world, where Western powers continue to variably dominate, it will take effort and time, to produce and internalize new rules of the game, “while old and rising great powers will continue to compete with the goal of shaping the international system to their advantage” (Tsygankov 2015b, p. 20). Embedded at the core of what it might entail to stabilize the global world order and improve the bilateral and international relations is a new strategic imperative. It is the recognition that the long-term solution is one in which the three militarily dominant powers—the United States, China, and Russia—work together to support global stability. The world’s three largest powers must work together to create the conditions for a transition to a new, more stable world order (Karaganov 2017b). The “transcontinental” system of security, based on the equilibrium among the great powers may produce a system tolerant of “political-ideological pluralism” and reliant on “mutual respect” (Trenin 2017, pp. 106–109). Global governance would need to depend on a combination of targeted collaborations between the world’s largest and growing economies to ensure global well-being and stability; bilateral and multilateral formats to constrain the most destabilizing developments among nuclear-weapons possessing states; and a restructured UN Security Council to manage volatile regional conflicts (Legvold 2017). Moreover, the fundamental geopolitical difference between the position of Russia and the USSR is its relations with China. For most of the Cold War, the Soviet Union resisted both the overwhelming economic and psychological superiority of the West and immense China. Now Russia and China have established de facto long-term partnerships approaching the alliance ones. Some claim that China is almost fated to be transformed in ten-fifteen years into the major global power in terms of aggregate capacity because the country

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made the most of globalization and saved its strength, as well as positioned itself as a source of development resources, alternative to the West (Bordachev 2018). Opening up a dialogue on international strategic stability, involving other nations is a necessity. This stability is being undermined by the absence of dialogue, on the background of new technological developments particularly the advent of cyberweapons (Karaganov 2017b). Given the extent and degree of the changes that are transforming the global landscape, a change to the international order is likely inevitable. However, no hegemonic force can shape the global system, and no consensus exists on what kind of new international order should be established. Nevertheless, opportunities to mitigate or avoid the risks ahead do exist. The international community’s shared interests in confronting and mastering an array of global challenges far outweigh any differences (Atlantic Council and IMEMO 2016). It is worth noting that the transformation of the global liberal world order should not aim to abolish the social, cultural, and humanistic gains that have been achieved throughout the history of Western civilization. The most important feature of the emerging world might be the absence of universal ideas about the “correct” structure, behavior and values of individual states and the legitimacy of their rulers (Valdai Club 2018). In other words, the plurality of forms of political structure and cultural views may increase, and the willingness of states and societies to orient themselves to some external patterns may likely diminish. Countering the imposition of values, standards, and ideology should not exclude the desire to conform to the best types and models of development in the interests of domestic progress and international well-being and security. Unfortunately, there is no assurance that the existing system of global and regional relations and security, as well values and standards, which is largely based on the distorted post-WWII system, is able to save the world from the turmoil. What shape could the political, legal, and economic basis of a new world order take that would ensure security and stability, and would encourage healthy competition, without allowing the formation of new monopolies that block development? Hardly anyone could answer this question readily, or give a blueprint for world development. This will require long-term efforts with the participation of a wide range of countries, global business, and civil society. However, it is clear that success is only possible if the key players in the international arena

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agree on the harmonization of the basic interests, on the reasonable selfrestraint, and show a constructive example of responsible leadership. It is necessary to define clearly what the limits of unilateral action are, and where there is a need for multilateral mechanisms, in the framework of improving international law to resolve the dilemma between the actions of the international community to ensure the security and human rights and the principle of national sovereignty and noninterference in the internal affairs of states. International norms and rules, especially the UN Charter and the Helsinki Accords, which evolved over the last centuries, are needed. Yet, the rules are usually interpreted by each nation with respect to its own vision. The certain fragility and weakness of states in the process of globalization, disappointment, and fear among domestic societies, proliferation, radicalization of politics, terrorism, severe nationalism, and other national and transnational challenges undermine the effectiveness of the international rules. Bringing the rules back by force however, cannot be an answer, with the situation in Middle East, Ukraine and some other places demonstrated. A possible answer and a basis for the global rule of law is a mutual respect of countries to one another, respect for the international law, from all sides of the world. The dignity of nations, their memory, their identity are the foundations of human history. Respect for the rules denotes the establishment of active pragmatic diplomacy and pragmatic cooperation with a political strategy that is currently lacking. Without a doubt the role of human factors—education, science, health, culture—should increase in the system of global interconnectedness and even competition. This, in turn, could have a significant impact on international relations and diplomacy, especially because the resources of softer power will increasingly depend on the progress in the formation of human capital, rather than on the sophistication of propaganda techniques.

Conclusions The above discussion provides an insight into the exceptionally intricate interaction between the forces of globalization and Russia’s political response to them. The incredible transformation of the political system after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which coincided with the advent of globalization, the emergence of new political institutions, the unfolding regional and global crises, the changing public opinion produce a

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significant impact on the Russian polity. The trajectory of political development, the quality of democratization, and state responses in Russia and its inclusion in the globalization are closely interconnected. Several conclusions emerge from the analysis of globalization in Russia. First, Russia’s strong state of a traditional type has persevered for centuries, which suggests its historical ability to survive and a tendency for revival. Diverse intellectual currents in the country have been debating the reforms for the state, yet all of them considered one or another version of a strong state to cope with domestic and international problems. As such, the issue is not whether Russia will continue as a strong state, but what type of strong state it will be during the age of globalization, and whether it will be able to adapt to rapidly changing external conditions and respond successfully to domestic challenges. In the words of Andrei Tsygankov (2014, p. 6), “Russia’s historical institutions will define its developmental trajectory. Within this trajectory, Russia will continue to borrow from other nations what its political system is able to borrow.” The strength of the state and its reforms will continue to be a reflection of domestic demands and international pressures. Second, many Russians believe that democracy means not only adopting a political system that allows fair elections, greater individual freedoms, and increased government accountability, but it also includes better life-chances, including economic well-being of the citizens and opening up their culture to different ideas. Individual citizens, not all well-educated politically, welcome greater freedoms and opportunities presented by globalization, liberalization, and democratization. However, the public at large and many governmental elites alike seem to be suspicious about the outcomes of globalization, of which democracy is part. The anxiety about globalization is boosted by the view that the global processes are not a result of impersonal forces of internationalization and integration, but controlled by the outside hegemonic project of the West. Additionally, Russians on the whole perceive the concepts of freedom, justice, and order, not as conflicting binary rivals, but as values, which are equally necessary for the normal life of the country and every individual. Finally, there is an issue of development of interactive technologies, new forms of civic engagement, and self-organization that points to the prospects of democracy in Russia. A key aspect of that is a gradual switch to becoming a “participatory democracy,” which may imply a reset not only in the institutions of power, but also in civil society, charged with

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working as a transmission belt of often contentious individual and group demands and interests to the political circles and back. Third, Russia’s responses to global challenges indicate the country’s pursuit of its interests, challenging the position of the West, and advocating a polycentric world. Russian foreign policy to a large degree reflective of the domestic political processes as much as it is a response to the global developments and events that influence the short- and long-term security interests of Russia. While Russia’s relations with foreign forces always carried a controversial character, in the recent years the country pursued the trajectory of strengthening its sovereignty, securing the power and influence of the Russian state, developing a new foreign policy doctrine and undertaking independent foreign policy largely based on domestic values. It is becoming more obvious that Russia intends to change the rules of the game that have been dictated to it for the past two and a half decades. The major question is whether Russia will be able to overcome the challenges of domestic (economic and social) development to become an even stronger participant in a globalizing world, and which route will help Russia do so: a pragmatic partnership with Europe or a shift toward the East.

Notes 1. The third wave of democratization is a term that Samuel Huntington introduced in his book The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century in 1992, analyzing democratic transitions in more than 30 countries in 1974–1990. The author specifically discusses the widespread international push toward democracy during this period. 2. Many Russians view this event as the restoration of historic injustice, committed in 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union.

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CHAPTER 4

Economic Engagement and Transformation

In the last several decades the world has begun to witness how the phenomenon of economic globalization is rapidly gathering momentum. The economic facet of globalization is usually reflected in the dynamics of production and growth rates of international exchange of goods, labor, services, and capital. The qualitative aspect of the growing internationalization is the strengthening of the linkages and interdependencies among national and regional economies. The rapid growth in the volume and diversity of world economic relations, accompanied by increasing economic interdependence of countries is the essence of the economic globalization process. Many Russian experts state that the only globalization that exists is the economic globalization, or at least that at the heart of globalization lies economic interdependence and trade. A relatively integrated economic system is being formed, which influences domestic economic systems and at times dictates its own rules of the game to the national economies. The extent and nature of such an impact and the inclusion of Russia into global economic relations, especially into the system of international trade, investment, and finance have been determined by a number of enabling or constraining factors. The most significant of these are usually related to the historical path dependence, magnitude of the economic potential, the endowment with resources, the state of innovation and technological development, and societal preferences.

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An Economic Portrait of Russia Russia has undergone tremendous changes and achieved visible economic progress since the collapse of the Soviet Union, opening up the borders and changing from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented one. Drastic reforms and rapid privatization though the “shock therapy” resulted in liberalization of economy yet with multiple inefficiencies and drawbacks. After 1991 and before 1998, every statistical trendline and economic assessment produced a negative slope. Equity ownership became highly concentrated, the protection of property rights remained weak and the private sector remained subject to state interference. However, since the 1998 Russian financial crisis1 and before the 2008 world economic crisis, the economy grew on average 7%, resulting in a doubling of real incomes, halving poverty2 and gradual emergence of a middle class. The average salary rose from 2000 rubles in 2000 to almost 18,000 rubles by 2009, with wages and benefits growing faster than inflation by 20–25% in 2007 (Vesti 2010). Food production more than doubled, industrial growth reached 75%, and investments increased by 125%3 (RIAN 2008, 2010a, b). Inflation fell from 72% in 1999 to 38% in 2000 and 15% after that. By 2011, Russia was accepted into the WTO and, in 2013 the country was labeled a high-income economy by the World Bank (World Bank 2014a). Rich in natural resources, with significant liquidity, declining poverty and unemployment, and strengthening currency, Russia was becoming a force among the global emerging market nations, taking the twelfth place in the world by nominal value up until 2013. That same year Russia ranked fourth in terms of the global inflow of foreign direct investment, and at that time just over half of its trade was conducted with European countries. In 2014, Russia in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms was the world’s fifth largest economy and Europe’s biggest, coming before Germany. In absolute terms, Russia had the world’s eighth largest economy with a GDP of $2.1 billion, representing about 4% of global GDP (World Bank 2014b). Russia accomplished significant improvement in areas such as innovation and trade freedom. Such growth was usually explained by Russia’s favorable position in the world markets as a commodity producer. In 2012 oil, gas, and petroleum products accounted for over 70% of total exports (U.S. EIA 2014). As a country, Russia is blessed with abundant and varied natural resources. It holds the world’s largest natural gas reserves, the

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second largest coal reserves, and the eighth largest oil reserves. Russia also stands as the world’s largest producer of crude oil; second largest exporter of dry natural gas; third largest oil exporter, third largest energy consumer, and third largest generator of nuclear power in the world; and fourth largest in terms of installed nuclear capacity (U.S. EIA 2016). Russia’s presence is visible as a supplier to the steel markets, raw timber, and chemical fertilizers. With 13% of the world territory and 3% of the world’s population, Russia attracts special attention of global forces for possessing 41% of world’s natural resources. This economic advance began to show its limits by 2013, when after years of strong performance, Russian economy expanded only by 1.3%. A gradual decline of economic growth was accompanied by increasing disparities in manufacturing, decreasing innovation by producers, intensification of an imbalance of technical characteristics of fixed assets and investments in fixed assets by principal economic activities. The expansion of domestic consumer demand was supported by the increasing growth of wages relative to productivity (Gaidar Institute 2014; Blinov 2015). The main features of the economic development in 2010–2014 were stipulated by the differences in post-crisis recovery of the individual components of aggregate demand. While in the years of 2010–2012, the growth rate of domestic demand outpaced the GDP growth and external demand, then in 2013 the dominant factor in the Russian economy was the sharp slowdown in consumption growth and investment demand. Massive drop in imports in 2014, as in 2009, defined some structural changes in the domestic market. With the weakening of consumer demand, household income, and the ruble there was a slight increase in the supply of domestic goods. In the 2014 with a decrease in real income by 3.5% and real wages by 2.0% (and 8.5% in 2015) compared to the previous year, the sharply increased inflationary expectations coupled with increasing cost of imported goods, significantly influenced consumer behavior (Gaidar Institute 2014; World Bank 2015). The rise in food prices up to 15.4% in 2014, and 23% in 2015 had a dominant impact on inflation. The uncertainty of the economic situation and rising inflation substantially changed the nature of expenditures among the population with more people converting savings into foreign currency. Responding to the crises and external shocks in 2008–2009 and in 2014–2016 is attributed to governmental policies, reforming tax regulations, handling oil export revenues, and producing fiscal stimulus. The government created the Stabilization Fund in 2004 to be managed by the

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Ministry of Finance. As the capital of the Fund had exceeded the level of 500 billion rubles ($18 billion) in 2005, part of its surplus was used for early foreign debt repayments, as well as to cover Russian Pension Fund’s deficit. In 2007, the fund accumulated enough for investment and some of the revenues were used for development of institutions. In 2008, the Fund was divided into the Reserve Fund, which is aimed at protecting the country from the pressures of inflation and global financial fluctuations; and the National Welfare Fund, with revenues to be used for the pension reform. By 2010, the Reserve Fund accumulated 1225 billion rubles ($40.59 billion) (R.F. Ministry of Finance 2010). Still, reliance on natural resources continues to serve as a double-edged sword for Russia. The country’s highly energy-focused economy leaves it vulnerable to credit and commodity market fluctuations. The global economic crisis of 2008 pushed Russia, which obtains a large share of its revenue from oil exports, to devalue the ruble in the midst of capital flight and a fall in global oil prices, which declined from their peak of $147 per barrel in July 2008 to around $40 per barrel in early 2009 (RIAN 2010a). Russian stock market weakened significantly: by the end of 2008 it declined almost 70% from the beginning of that year. Many of the large Russian enterprises, which had borrowed heavily from foreign banks, were forced to sell as stock prices fell. For the resource-dependent economy, oil transformed from a source of wealth to a source of weakness (Rutland 2008a). Nonetheless, Russia’s government anti-crisis expenditures (~$200 billion) were covered by the country’s international reserves, and the Reserve Fund was untouched. Yet, the crisis also fundamentally revealed that Russia has a weak banking sector and weak domestic capital markets. The Ukrainian crisis, the imposition of sanctions, falling oil prices, and continued geopolitical uncertainty created an increasingly difficult situation in the Russian economy. The stabilization of ruble and relative openness of markets have relieved some pressure in 2015. The financial dynamics depended on the ruble’s exchange rate, fluctuations in external demand and normalization of domestic financial conditions (IMF 2015; Mau 2016). Russia’s economy, however, was driven into a deep recession, which reached its peak in the second quarter of 2015 (World Bank 2016a). In managing the crisis of 2014–2015, the policy response by the government—“Anti-crisis Plan” (RUB 2.4 trillion) stabilized the economy as well (R.F. Government 2015a). The Government focused its actions on supporting the most vulnerable sectors in the economy, the

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financial sector, and the social sphere, as wells as promoted the process of import substitution in the face of extremely low oil prices and the extension of the anti-Russian sanctions. The Russian reaction was directed by the state and employed the substantial measures available to Russian government (Connolly 2018). The decision by the Central Bank to transition to a free-floating exchange rate allowed imports to adjust to 17% depreciation in the real effective exchange rate during 2015, strengthening the current-account balance. The government’s decision to utilize a shortterm fiscal stimulus in the 2015 budget, especially if followed by gradual fiscal consolidation to adjust to lower oil prices can help rebuild buffers and safeguard intergenerational equity (World Bank 2015; IMF 2015). Monetary policy prevented costly delays in relative price adjustments, highlighting the importance of the Central Bank’s commitment to inflation targeting in the context of a flexible exchange rate regime. However, measures to support the financial sector contained systemic risks. Falling oil revenues restricted the government’s ability to counter the decline in real income, and nominal increases in pensions and social benefits were below the headline inflation rate. This accelerated an already troubling rise in the poverty rate, which climbed from about 13% in 2014 to about 15% in 2015 (World Bank 2015; Gaidar Institute 2016). Rising poverty rates threaten Russia’s significant achievements over the past decade in promoting shared prosperity. The government’s ability to intervene to support consumption, in comparison to the crisis of 2008, was constrained by tight budgets and weakened fiscal buffers. Slow structural reforms, weak investment, lack of competition and concentration in a number of sectors have also contributed to low productivity growth (IMF 2015). In the words of Sergey Drobyshevsky, the Head of the Center for Macroeconomics and Finance at the Gaidar Institute (2015): “Sanctions and the fall of oil prices …only made it possible for the existing negative trends to become more apparent. … the slowdown of economic growth and investment activity were evident since 2013. The decline in oil prices basically left the Russian economy without a ‘shield,’ so the crisis erupted.” In 2016, Russia’s economy demonstrated some recovery, with tradable sectors gaining strength from the relative price adjustment and stabilizing commodity prices, which became the main causes of economic growth (World Bank 2017a). Firming oil prices and growing stability in 2017, resulted in the limited growth for the Russian economy (World Bank 2017b). Positive signs may not indicate an overall long-term recovery, and even carry risks of diverting attention away from the needed reforms.

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The restoration of a stable and global economic growth, however, creates the foundation for a positive outlook in Russia (Mau 2018). Russia faces multifaceted challenges posed by the immediate need for economic adjustment to external challenges coupled with major internal long-term changes in its economy and society. Financial markets in Russia are underdeveloped, with the weakness of credit operations being the function of the fragile banking system, and the weakness of stock market responding to the scarcity of well-run companies whose shares could be of interest to investors. The current level of investment in technological innovation is not adequate with the needs of the market and the economy. Foreign direct investment is of particular importance in the modern economic development of any country, which unlike other forms of capital imports includes not only cash flows but also a significant component of innovation. Russia had seen a steady increase in foreign investment in the economy, but with little progress either in terms of its macroeconomic role, or in terms of its potential. Among other things, this situation is aggravated by insufficient attention to the problem of the investment image of the country (Shastichko and Yakovleva 2006). Foreign investors are alarmed by the stagnation in the implementation of reforms, nationalization of the economy and trends that are interpreted as a departure from democracy (Szakonyi 2018). Russia has not seen its share of investment capital, including the technology and innovation that come with it, because investors are intimidated by the high political and governance risks (Sucher in Zubacheva 2015). In the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis, sanctions, and low oil prices, increased public investment—mostly in capital goods—could not compensate for an accelerating decline in private investment speeded by economic policy uncertainty, vanishing consumer demand, and decreasing credit access (World Bank 2015). The survey by the analytical center Expert4 of the 50 top managers of foreign companies, funds, and investment banks doing business in Russia demonstrated that their estimates of Russia’s investment climate have changed for the worse. In particular, the following factors such as investment attractiveness, the quality of law enforcement, the position of minority shareholders, and protection of property rights coupled with an increase of administrative pressure on business and increased corruption were noted. Additionally, the imperfections in the Russian legislation, lack of innovation, and lagging development of many industrial sectors strongly inhibit the economic growth of the country. A significant number of companies in manufacturing and trade focus on processing oil and marketing

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oil products, as such belonging to the energy sector, while other industrial sectors are underdeveloped or outdated. For instance, the exporting capacity of the machine building remains negligible. It has, however, acquired a more significant consumer interest, leading to the expansion in import of cars, consumer electronics, and electrical equipment.5 Consequently, Russia curbed its advantage in the international division of labor, which also negatively affected its efforts to modernize production. In the beginning of 2000s, Russia transformed from being one of the largest suppliers of agricultural goods into their consumer. The share of imported foods in Russia exceeded 40% and reached about 70% for some foods in large cities by 2008 (RIAN 2008). The crisis of 2014, however, brought an unexpected turn to food production in the country and the import of agricultural goods decreased by 33% in 2015 (Ardaev 2016). In August of 2014, Russia restricted imports of food products from countries that had imposed sanctions against it: USA, EU, Canada, Australia, and Norway. Meat, sausages, fish and seafood, vegetables, fruits, and dairy products went under the ban. In June 2015, in response to the extension of sanctions Russia prolonged the grocery embargo for a year until August 5, 2016 (R.F. Government 2015a, c; RIA Novosti 2015). On the one hand, domestic food producers received a push to increase production and revenue (Uzun 2015). Governmental subsidies via the anti-crisis plan significantly increased the chances of domestic producers to win the competition in the domestic market. Agricultural output and food production were supported not only by the counter-sanctions, but also only by the depreciation of the ruble. In addition, the devaluation increased the competitiveness of domestic products in the world market (World Bank 2015). Along with grain and vegetable oil, Russian producers became competitive on poultry meat, pork, and sugar (Uzun 2015). On the other hand, in order to take the vacated niche, domestic food growers need to compete with the new exporters, to replace the original ones. Russian consumers experienced the biggest impact of the sanctions war with the growth in food prices. The embargo created an opportunity for import substitution by domestic producers, however, despite the existing potential in the short-term implementation was limited and characterized by trends existing in previous years (R.F. Government 2015c). Despite broader problems, including geography, a lack of well-developed infrastructure, unexpected weather conditions, agricultural production has increased by more than 20% in the past several years making the country the world’s leading exporter of wheat in 2016. Export revenues from

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agriculture, which accounted to over $20bn in 2017 and over $24bn, now compete with armament sales (The Economist 2018; Putin 2019). Still an enormous territory, a fragmented population, and poorly developed internal transportation networks demand critical attention to the infrastructure to ensure that companies have access to key resources while having the capacity to quickly move extracted resources to the markets. The rapidly developing process of globalization continues to pose other challenges for Russia. One of the very important negative influences of external pressures has been increasing inequality, with a clear division into haves and have-nots. The Gini coefficient increased from 0.26 at the end of the Soviet era to 0.41 in 2015 (World Bank 2016b). A growing gap between rich and poor also remains as one of the largest concerns of the country, and the data of salaries and pension growth demonstrated above do not do the justice to it. In the very beginning of the 2000s, the incomes of the rich were approximately 14 times larger than the incomes of the poor, while the figure for 2007 was 17 times (RIAN 2008). While the number of people living below the poverty line halved during the last decade it froze at 15% in the past two or three years. The 2007 research by VCIOM demonstrated that the income of ten wealthiest persons in the country reached $145 billion, which was only 3.2 times less than the federal budget. By 2013, “Russia’s 110 billionaires owned around $10,976 billion in assets, but the median wealth is much lower, with half of the adult population owning $871 billion” (RT 2013). The intensified movement toward global economic integration did not produce an increase in labor productivity or product quality in Russia as well (Glinchikova 2007). Labor productivity in the domestic industry is only 52% of the world average. According to the 2014 OECD report labor productivity in Russia is the weakest among all European countries standing at 25.9. (in comparison to the European average of 50) (OECD 2014a, b; Rutland 2014). This is the lowest rate among all the European countries. Material and technical base of the national economy has not been updated in recent years. Depreciation of equipment in the industry reaches almost 70% and its average age reaches 16 years. Denationalization of enterprises resulted in an inefficient distribution of public resources between a limited number of participants. The capitalist project mainly consolidated around the former managers of state-enterprises, so-called “bureaucratic bourgeoisie” (Nesvetailova 2004, p. 53; Rosanova 2003), large industrial interests, and rich individual Russian investors, bankers, and shareholders, at the expense of small businesses, and people

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in general. And while the country plays a more active role in international trade and foreign investment becomes increasingly important, the conflict between domestic and foreign markets, over-reliance on net exports, as well as a lack of competition beyond the resource sector undermine Russia’s economic development and globalization efforts. In general, Russia’s economic performance before the 2014 crisis was based on sound macroeconomic management and most importantly fiscal policy reform along with high oil prices and increasing capital inflows. Russia has been more fortunate due to its reserve funds, which were financed by high oil and gas prices. It had and still has the least debt, including sovereign, business, and consumer debt of the 20 leading economies. Russia recorded a government debt-to GDP ratio of 17.92% of the country’s GDP in 2014 and 13.5% in 2019. Government debt-toGDP averaged 26.09% from 1999 until 2014. In comparison, in 2019, the US debt-to GDP ratio is 105.4%, Japan debt-to-GDP is 250%, Germany debt-to-GDP is 60.9, and Euro Area was 85.5% (Trading Economics 2015, 2019). The after-crisis situation offers a good opportunity for Russia to reflect on a new growth course based more on increases in productivity and technological innovation and on more efficient allocation and use of investment, labor, and foreign direct investments. Russia struggles to join the ranks of dominant economic powers with its share in the world GDP being only about 3.2% (Statista.com 2018). Its economic cooperation with foreign countries is also based on the distorted structure of material production, hypertrophy of heavy industry coupled with the relative underdevelopment of agriculture, textile, and food industry. Most importantly, dependent on oil prices, Russia in contrast to other emerging economies, such as India and China, which grew throughout the global downturn, was exceedingly vulnerable during the economic crisis of 2008–2009, when the country went through its worst recession with its GDP sinking 7.9%. Currently, the external shocks coupled with preexisting structural inefficiencies and lack of innovation, as well as weakened consumption and investment, impact Russia’s growth prospects. While adjusting to price fluctuations and the reallocation of productive forces to new sectors is a challenging process, policies that facilitate Russia’s economic transformation could have lasting positive effects. Regulatory discipline and policies that facilitate the macroeconomic adjustment process could facilitate the economic recovery, increase private sector confidence and promote innovation and investment despite tight financial

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conditions. Accelerating structural change is critical as the country struggles with the economic transformation and demographic dynamics driven by the weakening relative importance of the natural resource sector. The country will need to diversify its economy and advance innovations, especially in the context of adverse external conditions. According to the IMEMO experts: “for Russia globalization is first and foremost an opportunity to create an economic and technological breakthrough and become attractive for the global economy” (Author Interviews, 2016). Lacking a more competitive economic foundation, Russia’s long-term growth is likely to be slower than in the pre-crisis years. Russia’s economic development prospects will rest not only on the evolution of external factors but also on its internal capacity to adjust to an increasingly hostile fiscal context.

Historical Foundation: Punctuated Path Dependence The globalizing economy is based on the culture of liberalism, freemarkets, technological innovation, and the principles of networking and communication (McCann 2004). Economic globalization involves economic internationalization of goods, capital, labor force, information, and skills. As a powerful unifying factor, globalization pushes countries to reevaluate their attitudes of technologies for development and production (Akhmedov 2010). The supporters of the neoliberal project specifically refer to globalization as the “worldwide advance in terms of economic efficiency and human enlightenment” (Molchanov 2005, p. 397; Worth 2005). The globalization of the modern economy, however, is not a very recent phenomena, and its architecture is rather complex (Yevtushenkov 2009). Russia’s domestic economic development and its participation in the world economy historically have also carried a peculiar character, as the country went through several stages in its economic development, enjoying abundant natural resources, but lacking a strong spark or ability for continuous innovation. The basic trait of Russian socio-economic development has been its relative “primitiveness and slowness” (see Trotsky 2007), as well as the challenges of communication and information spread over the enormous territory (Akhmedov 2010). At the same time, Russia’s economy has been characterized as “traditional,” being relatively stable, difficult to reform, where an individual is not isolated from the social community and economic activity is not recognized as a primary

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value, where the stability of society is supported through the protection and reproduction of that status of the individual. The incorporation of the foreign models of development is associated with the destruction of this stability on which the society depends. As a result, the previous conditions of stability are destroyed and the new ones are not created resulting in many ongoing reforms being doomed to failure (Guseinov 1999). From highly protectionist policies of the tsarist yeas, underdeveloped state-capitalism before the Revolution, through Soviet industrialisation, to the decay of the 1970s and 1980s, and, finally, to the introduction of liberal economic reforms and opening of the economy, Russia has always experienced a pattern of tight links between domestic economic developments and struggle with external pressures. Scholars describe such a pattern in Russia’s economic relations as a continuous process of “catch up,” and attempts to play a major role in the regional economy (Gerschenkron 1962; Pintner 1995). The seventeenthcentury opened a major page in the economic history of Russia with the establishment of the All-Russian market. A number of different regions enjoyed the fruits of the division of labor, other regions specialized in agricultural production (Timoshina 2009). All this contributed to strengthening economic ties between the regions and the gradual merger of local markets into one. Moscow being the economic heart of the country gave rise to kupechestvo (the class of merchants), which played an increasingly prominent role in the economic and political life of the country (Guseinov 1999). It was also the seventeenth century when Russia became more actively involved in international trade. Trade agreements were first set with Denmark and England, and later with the Netherlands, France, Persia, and others. Russian merchants could not compete well with many mature foreign companies and continuously asked the government for protectionist policies (Timoshina 2009). The government also pursued mercantilist policies of enrichment at the expense of foreign trade. However, the benefits of Russian international economic relations were significantly hampered by a lack of convenient warm ports on the Baltic and Black seas, so getting access to these seas to become a vital necessity (Samokhin 2001). By the end of the seventeenth century, Russia also was the largest state in the Old World, especially with addition of Siberia. As such the country was exhibiting its European and Asian identity more and more, as well as its intermediate position at the junction of two civilizations (Timoshina 2009). Without a doubt, Russia attempted to join Europe, but

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it also had its interests in Asia, and all of this reflected a duality in economic and political development of Russia. At the turn of the eighteenth century, Russia had to overcome its socio-economic backwardness, especially in comparison to Western European countries, which had already reached by that time notable successes on the way to a market economy. Russia’s economy was characterized by very low level of industrial development, with cumbersome national management, and strengthening serfdom (Samokhin 2001). The country exhibited the signs of autarky, with the elements of economic seclusion and isolation from the outside world, which was all supported by the state (Timoshina 2009). The start of radical transformations in Russia’s economy is firmly associated with the reign of Peter the Great. Unsuccessful wars with Sweden and Turkey significantly influenced the course of the economic reforms. The development of domestic metallurgical production became a strategic necessity (Guseinov 1999). The country made a great effort to build manufacture with the active involvement of the state in the economic relations and promotion of private enterprise. The state assumed the costs of training workers, providing subsidies, free lands for building factories, supplying equipment, and experts to different enterprises. Emergency measures have played a critical role in the creation of a strong material base for the army, which consequently allowed for victory over Sweden in the Northern War and access to the Baltic Sea. The transformation of the Urals in the world’s largest center for metallurgy was a notable economic event in Russia at that time (Timoshina 2009). The country strongly encouraged the search for a variety of natural resources. Peter the Great also conducted many domestic reforms and in 25 years produced more 3000 laws and decrees in an attempt to bring the country up to European level, via military, diplomatic, and domestic governance sectors. The Tsar conducted a monetary reform by introducing silver rubles, as a monetary unit, which was equal to 100 kopeks. Many Western countries introduced such monetary systems much later. Significant changes occurred in the structure of foreign trade. If originally Russia exported mainly agricultural goods and raw materials, then by the mid-1720s, a larger proportion of the manufactured goods went to the market, such as iron from the Ural Demidov plants, canvas, ropes, etc. Among the imported goods were mainly luxury items for members of the royal family and nobles, as well as colonial products such as tea, coffee, spices, and wine. Additionally, due to Peter’s reforms, Russia in 1712

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for the first time in history stopped buying weapons from Europe (Timoshina 2009). As a result of reforms, Russia has managed to take its rightful place in the European system. It has become a great power with efficient economy, a powerful army and navy, highly developed science and culture. At the same time all these changes occurred often through violence and suffering of people, extremism, intolerance, unwillingness to reckon with internal conditions for reform. The establishment of the new, went in contradiction to and with a fierce struggle with old (Guseinov 1999). Russia enjoyed its significant economic and military power until the nineteenth century when Western Europe developed their economies far faster than serfdom-laden Russia. Only by the end of the nineteenth century did Russia achieve a notable expansion of heavy industry due to foreign investment and agricultural exports abroad, but at the expense of the rural areas. Railways, however played a crucial in the development of industry and infrastructure. During the second half of the nineteenth century, Russia built railway roads much faster than many Western European countries. Yet, Russia still remained a “country without roads” (local roads), which impeded commerce and trade. Russia’s foreign trade was mainly oriented toward Western European market, which accounted for 90% of the total foreign trade turnover with England being the main partner (30%) (Timoshina 2009). By the 1900s, the total volume of export– import transactions more than tripled. At the same time Russia welcomed foreign investment and became the world’s largest center for the import of capital. By the 1860s Russia established good diplomatic relations with the United States. Over several years the two countries discussed the sale of US Russian possessions in North America to the United States as it became increasingly difficult to protect these remote areas for Russia, and their maintenance costs exceed the income brought by them. Traditionally, the state in Russia consumed a large amount of the national resources, hence obstructing the progress of social stratification. The peripheral regions in Russia also became increasingly dependent on the center. Several urban areas that developed during Tsarist days were used mostly as military and administrative grounds rather than the opportunity windows for the commercial classes (Hamburg 1972). Industrial growth concentrated in a limited number of major centers which could not sufficiently meet the demands of both the state and the population.

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Under the pressure of more differentiated Western European social development, a pressure that was conducted through the military-state machinery, the state attempted to impose the development of social differentiation on a rather primal economic foundation. As the state struggled to increase the country’s natural economic development, the new sectors of industry were embedded into the economy. However, the economic strategies of the state were mostly oriented not at the industrial development per se but rather at fiscal and partially military-technical capabilities of the state (Trotsky 2007). The development of state in Russia seems to always proceed much faster than the development of socio-economic sphere. The significant reforms, including the termination of serfdom, agrarian and educational reforms could not be underestimated (Samokhin 2001). Yet in the history of Russia, many of the reforms that were introduced have not been implemented consistently or complexly to their logical end, and incomplete transformations were complicated by a variety of counter reforms where new generations were forced to start all over again. By the beginning of the twentieth century Russian economic advance was hampered by the political backwardness. The Russian grandeur military-bureaucratic and fiscal state machinery suffered significant economic losses in the WWI. Russian economy after the Revolution and the Civil War became even weaker. Soviet massive industrialization, collectivization, and urbanization efforts, however, represented a very successful attempt to modernize the country and “catch up” with the world but at the expense of millions of people and a drastic decline of living standards in the rural areas almost until WWII (Pintner 1995). Just in ten years the country transformed from an agrarian society to a major industrial one, being second to the United States in GDP (Timoshina 2009). The rapid development of heavy industry, advances in military complex, urbanization, high rates of growth, scientific advances, and mass education and health care services allowed the Soviet Union to emerge as one of the super powers (Molchanov 2005). The state also produced a sizable middle class, especially a class of state-employed workers, who benefitted from the system. Yet it was the state that held control of production, revenue and spending, foreign relations, censorship, education, and social organization in all regions (Gustafson 1999). Nevertheless, Russia led Eastern and much of Central Europe as well as influenced many countries in the world. Communist economy was sustained internationally through a system of institutions, specifically the Council for Mutual

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Economic Assistance (Comecon), which was created as a response to the set-up of the OECD and the Marshall Plan in Europe. Soviet industrial production increased from 3% of the global output before the 1920s to 20% by the late 1980s, while the whole socialist block produced one-third of the global output (White 2001). In many areas, including production of steel and agricultural machinery, the Soviet Union dominated the world. It had outpaced the United States in heavy industrial production, producing 80% more steel, 78% more cement, and 42% more oil (Walker 1986). By the 1960s, the Soviet economy grew at a remarkable 5% rate. Additionally, the discovery of large reserves of oil in Western Siberia benefitted the country and especially the international competitiveness of the Soviet economy, which went on the rise due to the high demand for and rising world market prices of Soviet energy exports. Between 1970 and 1980, the country’s total foreign trade grew more than fourfold (Muller 1990; Tsygankov 2014). The Soviet system always performed best when focused on large and urgent tasks (Colton 2016). As such, Soviet model of development represented a crucial if not the only real competitor to capitalist-style modernization. The economic advance, the expansion of infrastructure, and the consumption patterns were, however, highly irregular. Despite the efforts at equal allocation of resources and funding of the regions, many regions did not experience the progress that Moscow had benefitted from. The Soviet Union was a country, in which the center effectively controlled the decision-making of the peripheral areas. The more populous and industrialized European part of Russia experienced better economic and social conditions. The uneven distribution of natural resources, substantial distances, and the lack of transportation increased the problem of division of labor among regions. Sectoral divisions of the country into planning components contributed to the disconnection of areas that should be economically integrated. The fluctuating and sometimes competitive governmental priorities, as well as imbalances in the structure of the national economy led to the underdevelopment of certain industries (Zinam 1972; Nechemias 1980; Bielasiak 1980; Timoshina 2009). The state was heavily subsidizing its domestic needs and foreign policy by relying on rich reserves of oil and natural gas. The steady decline of energy prices, however, hit the overall Soviet economy and multiple individual regions, also reflecting inability to compete with Western rates of growth. The prices of oil and natural gas started to fall in 1982 and collapsed in late 1985 to early 1986, with devastating effects for the Soviet economy (Muller 1990).

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By the 1980s the economic performance decreased significantly with each extra unit of industrial output depending on an increased use of energy and raw materials, notwithstanding Soviet impressive achievements. Soviet planned economy was severely damaged by the lack of innovation. Heavily militarized economy was also having difficulties of sustaining arms race with the West, especially as the latter was prepared to make it even more challenging for the USSR to compete economically. While the Western industrialized countries started the scientific and technological revolution, which led them new post-industrial stage of development, Soviet command-and-control economy because of its centralization, lack of initiative and innovation, became unable to deploy widespread adoption of science and technology in production (Guseinov 1999). The transition from an “extensive” economy to a more sophisticated “intensive” industrial development was hampered by the central planning, underdeveloped infrastructure, and the lack of foreign investment and competition. Foreign trade decreased by more than a third, which affected economy considerably, already devoid of new equipment and advanced technologies. In the structure of the economy the dominant role belonged to mining and power production, which accounted for 40% of total workforce and production funds of the country. Labor productivity in the Soviet industry was two times lower than in the United States (Timoshina 2009). By the mid-1980s, the GDP per capita in the Soviet Union was only 37% of that in the United States. The heavily industrialized Soviet economy could also no longer accommodate the rising consumer demands of an urbanizing and educated society. The contraction of the economy and severe decline in living standards coincided with the loss of international status but with the gaining of “new thinking” that started with perestroika (Molchanov 2005). Soviet leaders openly admitted the pointless character of assistance provided to various regimes in the developing countries who declared themselves socialist. The weakening of the territorial unity of the country led to a sharp confrontation between the Union and a fundamental forces from the republics to the actual economic disengagement. In November 1990, the Government adopted a resolution to introduce contractual prices for some types of products, which was the beginning of a real transition to the market. At the same time the Soviet Union demonstrated some interest in the leading international economic institutions including the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, etc. With the collapse of the socialist alternative the Russian neoliberal transformation during

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the 1990s became a domestic attempt to move toward market economy, but the one which was influenced by the West and shaped by the global restructuring of capitalism. The major consequence of the transition and the effect of global influences were to decrease the role of the state and increase the role of the market. The results included domestic radical liberal reforms, aid and pressures from Western financial institutions, and decreasing state resources. The country went through a massive reduction in investment, huge inflation, depreciation of monetary savings, the collapse of the USSR, and the loss of important foreign markets. On the other hand, Russia experienced the formation of the market economy, where the state ceased to control and set the prices for many basic goods and services, foreign trade was liberalized, and the country lost many protectionist controls. The transition to market economy, greater openness to the world, and participation in wider regional and foreign enterprises could not easily reverse hundreds of years of autocracy and decades of Soviet central planning. Progressive reforms could not change Russia’s geopolitical situation and the lack of market memory. Russia did not have the historical conditions that other Eastern European countries enjoyed, including the culture and institutions of private markets. The establishment of extremely centralized system, dependence of the periphery on the center historically uneven development of the country, isolation from the outside world and the lack of confidence of surviving under Western economic pressure had led to the situation where many economic and social changes as well as international relations developed due to state initiated reforms and according to more localized patterns within the structure of well-established socio-economic preferences. In Russia, the “longevity of the effects of past- and path-dependency rendered the conjuncture between the global and national politico-economic transformations inherently problematic” (Nesvetailova 2004, p. 50). What has started out as a response to problems of economic impasse and global pressures, within the matrix of Soviet arrangements, developed into a crisis and later a stalemate. In the words of an IMEMO expert: “Russia had all the prerequisites for creating modern production, but everything was abandoned. Production was shifted to the raw materials and resources in order to generate large revenues. Just now we are starting to wake up” (Author Interviews, 2016).

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Availability of Natural Recourses: A Resource Curse? In the recent years, a number of social scientists and observers moved to consider abundant natural resources of a country as blight, because resource-based economies are more vulnerable to external shocks, the institutional drawbacks, inferior productivity due to low-tech extraction focus, and poor governance (Sachs and Warner 2001; Kim 1998; Tompson 2007; Rutland 2008b; Frankel 2010; Ip 2015; Kamashev 2015). It also goes without saying that natural resources are finite. Others claim that in certain political and economic environments the “resource curse” will not realize and a country may experience successful economic development (Ahrend 2006). The question is how to manage a resourcebased economy well. Russia has been building an altogether new kind of energy state, one with more global influence, and the energy might of Russia may only grow (Montgomery 2016; Clemente 2015). In the words of a RUDN professor: “Russia has an enormous potential. The problem is how to use the resources. Either Russia a resource appendage, or an energy superpower” (Author Interviews, 2016). Sound macroeconomic management, diversification of economy, innovation, elimination of corruption and increase in efficiency of institutions are necessary components to drive the resource-based economy in the age of globalization. The role natural resources have played in Russia’s economic prosperity is striking. The 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s could be referred to as the years of rapid deindustrialization and “resourcialization” of the Russian economy, where the increase in world energy prices since 1999 seemed to support this tendency (Popov 2008). Russia’s economic selfdetermination was built on the efforts to restore its position in the world by using its advantageous situation in the energy sector. The growth in GDP up until 2013 has been mainly explained by oil, mineral, and raw materials extraction and exports, including ferrous and non-ferrous metals and forestry. The country is the largest exporter of crude oil, second largest exporter of natural gas, and the third largest exporter of steel and primary aluminum (U.S. EIA 2017). Earnings from oil export allowed Russia to increase its foreign reserves from $12 billion in 1999 to $600 billion by 2008. The share of mineral products, metals, and diamonds in Russian exports increased from 52% in 1990 (USSR) to 67% in 1995 and to 82% in 2017, whereas the share of machinery and equipment in exports fell from 18% in 1990 (USSR) to 10% in 1995 and to about 6%

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in 2017 (R.F. Federal Service on State Statistics 2015, 2018). Hydrocarbons continue to play a large role in the Russian economy, as revenue from oil and natural gas production and export accounted for more than 64% (R.F. Federal Customs Service 2018). Countries in Asia and Europe received more than 98% of Russia’s crude oil exports (26 and 72%, respectively). As a consequence, in terms of economic globalization, Russia is seen in the West as a resource-based economy and a consumer of finished Western-made products and services, whose aggregated revenue depends on two-three main commodity groups that are highly sensitive to price fluctuations and other negative trends on the world markets (Akhmedov 2010; Krylova 2016). Figures 4.1 and 4.2 demonstrate the commodity structure of Russia’s foreign trade for the years of 2000–2017, and Fig. 4.3 demonstrates 80

Mineral resources

70

Food and raw materials for its producƟon

60

Products of chemical and related industries

50

Leather and fur industries

40

Timber, pulp and paper industries

30

TexƟle

20

Metals and gems

10 0

Machinery and equipment

2000

2005

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Other

Fig. 4.1 Exports of the Russian Federation, in percent to total (Source R.F. Federal Service on State Statistics [2018]) 60

Machinery , vehicles, and equipment

50

Food and raw materials for its producƟon

40

Mineral Resources

30

Products of chemical and related industries

20

Timber, pulp and paper industries

10

TexƟle

0

Metals and gems Other

2000

2005

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

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2017

Fig. 4.2 Imports of the Russian Federation, in percent to total (Source R.F. Federal Service on State Statistics [2018])

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600 500 400 300 200 100 0

2000

2005

2009

2010

2011 Export

2012

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2015

2016

2017

Import

Fig. 4.3 Export and Import of the Russian Federation, USD Billion (Source R.F. Federal Service on State Statistics [2018])

the overall foreign trade trends. The structure of export is firmly overtaken by the traditional dominance of mineral products. With regard to the geographical distribution of Russia’s exports, due to increased export of energy products supplied mainly to European partners, share of the European Union (EU) has been around 40–50% (mainly Germany and the Netherlands). China is becoming an important partner standing at around 15–20%. The CIS takes about 12% (mainly Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan), with EAEU is around 9%, and APEC is around 30% (see Figs. 4.4 and 4.5) (R.F. Federal Customs Service 2018). As it has been mentioned above, the reliance on commodity trade can seriously backfire during price fluctuations. One of the main factors Russia’s economy suffered so significantly during the economic downturns of 2008 and 2014 was the plunging price of oil and other commodities, which have been the backbone of Russia’s export-led economic growth. Due to the fall of oil prices, sanctions and the ruble exchange rate Russia’s foreign trade decreased in 2015 and 2016, with exports falling by about 34% and imports by about 40%; the decrease in foreign trade with the CIS countries amounted to 37%, and with the non-CIS states to 34% (R.F. Federal Customs Service 2015). These are not the only reasons, however. After 2012, the Russian economy has virtually ceased to grow (the majority of economic indicators flattened or declined) due to the lack of incentives for further development, outdated structure of enterprises, internal economic problems. The sanctions, the oil and the dollar, just

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90.0 80.0 70.0 60.0 50.0 40.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 0.0

China

Germany

Netherlands

Foreign Trade

Italy

Export

USA

Import

Fig. 4.4 Main Trading Partners of the Russian Federation among non-EAEU Countries in 2017, USD billion (Source R.F. Federal Customs Service [2018])

35.0 30.0 25.0 20.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 0.0

Belarus

Kazakhstan

Foreign Trade

Armenia

Export

Kyrgystan

Import

Fig. 4.5 Main Trading Partners of the Russian Federation among EAEU Countries in 2017, USD billion (Source R.F. Federal Customs Service [2018])

accelerated the processes of decline. Internal economic difficulties in key partner countries, Belarus and Kazakhstan, as well as the complication of relations with Ukraine led to a decline in foreign trade indicators. Russia’s foreign trade in 2017 achieved $316.1 billion, however, increasing by 26.7%, mainly due to the increase in prices for oils and metals and an increase in trade with China (R.F. Federal Customs Service 2018).

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There are, however, some reasons to believe that Russia might be able to defeat the resource curse. While Russia’s economy is not sophisticatedly diversified it still has a substantial manufacturing sector, a modern, educated society, and a strong state. The important competitive advantage is the presence in the country of a significant amount of fixed assets that are concentrated in manufacturing industries, which are mainly engaged in primary processing of all raw materials of metallurgy, chemistry, and forestry. Domestic manufacturing also reflects the presence of unique and advanced technologies, which rely on the achievements of national theoretical and applied science and the tradition of Russian scientific and technical thought. They are embodied in products, in many respects not inferior to the world analogues. These technologies belong most importantly to the aerospace and nuclear industry, shipbuilding, manufacture of laser equipment and tools, and software development. The country is the second leading world exporter of armaments after the United States. From the policy side, the government regained its capacity to impose and collect taxes on the oil and gas sector, and upheld an impressively conservative fiscal and monetary policy. Strengthening of a new economic partnership in the Eurasian continent (EAEU, SCO, and APEC), the end result of which may be the creation of a free trade zone, can also benefit Russia as a regional economic power, as it deepens its relationship with China and other countries, and promotes trade, movement of capital, and investment as well as access to the market of services (R.F. Ministry of Economic Development 2016). The presence of Russian companies in the foreign markets has also been expanding somewhat, even though this process became crippled by the volatile political environment. Severstal’, Russia’s second-biggest steel producer, had initially invested $400 million in the enterprise for the production of automotive steel in Michigan and Mississippi, but later sold the units due to the rising tension between Russia and the West and turning its focus to its domestic business. Oregon Steel Mills became a subsidiary of the Russia steel producer Evraz Group S.A. The Russian company Atomredmetzoloto, a subsidiary of Rosatom, has acquired Canadian Uranium One, which is involved in uranium mining and owns mines in Wyoming, US Digital Sky Technologies acquired stakes in Facebook, Groupon, and Zynga. Rosnano is building partnerships in American biotechnology industry. Gazprom established joint ventures to build

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natural gas pipelines, created sale subsidiaries in many of its export markets, and invested in access to industrial and power generation sectors in Central and Western Europe. Still major problems remain. First, while Russian large firms participate in global merger and acquisition activity in the oil, gas, and metals, there still is a widespread opposition in the country to the sharing of strategic resources with foreign investors. Foreign companies themselves fear political changes and weak infrastructure, but they enter in (short-term) contracts with the willing Russian oil magnates. Exxon, Amoco, and Texaco and other companies became participants in joint ventures in Siberia, Russian Far East, and the Arctic Region. In 2011, Rosneft and Exxon-Mobil entered into a strategic cooperation agreement. To establish a partnership for the joint development of the Black Sea and Arctic shelves with investments of up to $3.2 billion, the creation in Russia of the Arctic offshore development and research center, and the sharing of technologies in various regions of the world (Turkov 2016). The gas industry in Russia has also been more open to foreign relations, as Gazprom has been involved in projects with European and Asian countries for decades (Akerman 2004; U.S. EIA 2017). While ongoing consolidation and modernization of the energy sector may be viewed as a result of globalization, Russian oil sector exhibited many localizing qualities resisting external operation and management. Russia was slow to actively coordinate its actions with other major oil exporters and became relatively isolated on the international stage (Rutland 2008b). In many cases, foreign investors were not admitted to promising natural resources unless they create a joint venture and provide new equipment, technologies and know-how, localize production in Russia, or somehow share a project with a Russian partner (Kuzmishin and Amirova 2012). According to Russian experts, Russia has been open until lately to foreign capital, but the country always had a condition for localization. While Russia has projects with different industrial sectors, including projects with Boeing in titanium and construction bureau, this is a very small part. The biggest projects belong to resource companies. Currently, joint ventures with foreign investors are most popular in largescale projects often with state-owned companies that require transfer of technology and risk sharing. Joint ventures are becoming a much more common feature in other sectors beyond energy, to include automotive, financial services, IT, media, and new technologies. Second problem relates to the geographic limits of Russia’s economic potential (Fortescue 2017). Russia’s largest mineral deposits are located

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in remote areas of Siberia and the Far North, and without the appropriate investment will not pay off (Akhmedov 2010). The degree of resource exploration may bring a problem of the wise and rational use of natural resources. The geographical disadvantages mean that the country tends to adopt highly centralized approaches to government in order to make the best use of its resources (Lynch 2002). Also, according to many analysts, the problem of the depletion of mineral resources may eventually play a greater role, and the problem of ensuring their availability will have less to do with the volume of geological exploration, but rather with material and energy efficiency, internationalization of domestic enterprises and enhancing their participation in the exploration and exploitation of resources, as well as new approaches to the import and export of products. Third, for Russia the challenge of improving competitiveness at all levels, without exaggeration, has become a priority. Whether the country is going to maintain export-oriented or import-oriented strategy or even combine both directions, its success will be determined primarily by the success of improving competitiveness. National competitiveness depends on a number of factors, including combined economic potential, level of management, extent and impact of research and development, conditions and quality of financial markets, infrastructure development, state’s influence on the creation of competitive environment and others (Obolensky 2001). According to the data by the World Economic Forum (2010, 2015), Russia took the 63rd place and 38th place in global competitiveness. Such an unappealing position occupied by the country in the world market is due to the use by domestic producers almost entirely only the benefits related to the availability of natural resources and fixed assets. These advantages, as international practice shows, are short-lived. At the same time to a much lesser extent, Russia’s competitive advantages are based on factors such as effective labor productivity and advanced technologies. Meanwhile, the leading countries maintain their competitiveness on the basis of investment and innovation. Promoting competition through investment implies a willingness and ability of domestic firms to invest in modern efficient equipment and better technology and in the purchase of licenses and joint ventures. Russian companies being in an unstable or difficult financial situation are not yet ready to make leap to the new capital-intensive stages of competitiveness. Nevertheless, the development of certain important elements of investment and innovation seems inevitable.

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Fourth, national economic standing and competitiveness, however, depends not only on the effectiveness of development strategies of specific companies, but also on the relationship between the state and the economy (Grinberg 2015). It is significant that over the past two decades in industrialized countries, state involvement in enhancing the competitiveness of domestic businesses rose sharply. States develop special programs to improve competitiveness and efficiency, strategically target industry sectors, assuming a direct concern for the development of the infrastructure needed for science, communications, information gathering, as well as restructuring the tax system to promote development. In this regard, the tasks of the state include the formation of favorable business and investment climate for the activities of domestic and foreign firms and development of scientific and technological capabilities. The essential steps in this direction are the actions to address inequality of competitive conditions within the country itself, the need for which was declared from the first stages of economic transition. Moreover, there is a need to transition to a developmental path, which takes into account both business preferences and societal interests. Modern Russian economy is a market one, but it is “asocial,” being focused on the immediate profit by virtually ignoring the public interest (Grinberg 2015). The state must create a powerful initial investment impulse via public–private partnerships to stimulate modernization and the development of socio-economic sphere. Initiation and realization of structural policies by the state, defining priorities and pursuing developmental opportunities where the country retains competitive advantages, and motivating the entrepreneurial segments, would give Russia the opportunity to move to a new stage of economic development. Finally, many challenges are connected to the (in)-capacities of public and private institutions to ensure the effective operation of market mechanisms. Their weakness is leading to the expansion of shadow economy, a decline in the share of government revenue in GDP, the accumulation of debts, dollarization, and cartelization of economic links, the reduction of the share of bank credits to GDP, the absence of effective bankruptcy procedures used, the protection of rights of property owners, as well as increased crime. Strong institutions could afford to eliminate the most serious anomalies in the economic environment, including the sharp differences in profitability in the industrial, financial and trade areas, excessive tax burden on companies, and high cost of credit. While it is clear that the state has been adopting prudent policy of managing the economy, in

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the nearest future Russia will have to maintain a process of reproduction in market conditions. Tackling structural weaknesses in institutions, financial market development, and goods market efficiency will be necessary to achieve higher prosperity beyond the current downturn—for Russia itself and for the other economies in the region to which it is strongly connected (WEF 2015). Meeting this challenge requires stability and transparency of legislation on combating corruption and economic crime, and creating structural and institutional opportunities that can facilitate Russia’s advent to at a high level of development and global presence.

Economic Institutions and Structural Reforms The collapse of the Soviet system and Russia’s gradual integration into the world economy brought about many organizational and institutional changes. Particularly since 2000, significant progress was achieved on the structural side (Colton 2016). The government under Putin’s leadership pushed forward a multifaceted, articulate and rational reform strategy. Important reorganization encompassing substantial segments of the economy, including pensions, property rights, business deregulation, taxation, and land ownership, have been put into practice since then. The increase in reforms went along with the increase in institutional reorganization and the effectiveness of state regulation of the financial and economic sphere (Table 4.1). The Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM) and the National Agency for Financial Studies (NAFI), supported by the State Duma Committee on Economic Policy and Entrepreneurship presented the results of a study on government involvement in economy especially during the global crisis of 2008 and post-crisis periods. In rating the effectiveness of public institutions of economic and financial sphere the leadership was given to the Deposit Insurance Agency (DIA). The Central Bank took the second place, followed by the Federal Service for Financial Markets (VCIOM 2010). Many institutional and structural reforms, which are key to raising potential growth and economic resilience continue to be implemented. In the face of the external pressures Russia’s efforts are focused on consolidation of its banking system, establishing effective regulatory framework and maintaining macroeconomic and social stability (Medevdev 2015). In responding to 2008 economic crisis, Russia’s government stood as the single largest creditor to banks, with about 12% of all bank liabilities held

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Table 4.1 The effectiveness of state regulation of financial and economic sphere in the first quarter of 2010 Agency

Score

Deposit Insurance Agency Central Bank Federal Service for Financial Markets Federal Service for Insurance Supervision State Duma Committee on Financial Markets State Duma Committee on Economic Policy and Entrepreneurship Ministry of Finance Federal Tax Service Pension Fund Federal Antimonopoly Service Federal Service for Supervision on Provision of Human Rights

6.96 6.83 5.74 5.59 4.71 4.70 4.58 4.48 4.24 4.15 3.75

Note Minimum value is 0 points, maximum value is 10 points Source Russian Public Opinion Research Center, 2010

by the state. While consolidation within the banking sector helped stabilize the economy, the lack of infrastructure and rigorous stock market regulation remained a remarkable growth obstacle. The volatility within the Russian stock market was affected by Russia’s relatively small domestic investor base. Some major changes happened in the area of social policy, specifically in the pension system, which aimed at raising the status of pensions to a sound financial foundation. Even the crisis year of 2009 saw a significant increase in pensions with real growth of 10.7%, indexed four times (Vesti 2010). For 2014–2015 crisis, the government also shaped the structure of the economy by stabilizing the banking system and financing the most critical projects in the real sector (Zarubin 2015). More specifically, the government indexed pensions, financed infrastructure, housing construction, and transport projects in the regions, provided tax breaks from small business, and established the system of regular reporting (Medvedev 2015). According to the Head of the Department of the Eurasian Integration and Expansion of SCO in CIS, Vladimir Evseev: “The sanctions imposed by the West against Russia, reached their goal in the sense that Russia realized that it had excessive dependence on the West. And, they pushed Russia to adjust its vector of development…to introduce the policy of import substitution and development of national economy” (Evseev in

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Ardaev 2016). The country created a financial settlement system, similar to SWIFT, opened new enterprises, and significantly boosted agricultural development. The anti-inflation policy of the Bank of Russia has achieved irrefutable success created new opportunities for investment activity. This result was achieved thanks to the uncompromising anti-inflation position of the Central Bank management, supported by the president and the government’s pursuit of cutting budgetary spending (Mau 2018). The Russian reaction resulted in a distinct shift toward greater reliance on domestic assets and mechanisms and toward a more multidirectional economic policy that underscores closer relations with non-Western countries. The country is employing domestic resources in targeted sectors and is gradually moving toward new technology and capital (Connolly 2018). Many sectors of the economy, however, found themselves in a situation where the dissolution of economic linkages created significant problems. For a quarter century after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia established many mutually beneficial ties with different countries, where the breaking of such ties is costly, if not impossible in the very short run: “Participation in global economic linkages is not a sign of poor development of a country, but rather it is an imperative of our time. The development of the national economy is necessary, but the condition for success is careful calculation, and intelligent and balanced development” (Portansky in Ardaev 2016). Dealing with the crisis requires the formation of a new understanding, new development, new economic model, in particular, the new model of state regulation, with a foundation that adequately reflects modern socio-economic realities (Grinberg 2015). Russia has achieved progress in creating a more positive business climate. The government was more active in fighting corruption and strengthening the legal protection for businesses (Szakonyi 2018). Federal initiatives resolve administrative barriers and bureaucratic procrastination has been reduced. Management of state-owned enterprises has improved (OECD 2014a). The government also adopted an extensive investment program for the years 2019–2024, aimed at increasing the share of investment in GDP from 21 to 25%. This plan is aimed to help improve transport infrastructure, promote the digitalization of the economy, deepen financial markets and improve the pension system (OECD 2018). Russia is also trying to make Moscow an international financial center. The national and city authorities focus on creating foundations and proposing

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a legal basis to accelerate its securities markets, taxation system, and general infrastructure having a solid basis of funds and the human capital for Moscow to become a high-tech and financial center. Yet the ambition and funds are only a necessary but not a sufficient condition. Capital outflows and low market valuation of Russian companies does not convince business. Law enforcement is uneven, the development in the regions is weak. Overall, many of Russia’s impediments in economic developments and participation in global and regional networks arise from weak, obsolete, or entrenched governance institutions and at times a lack of political will at different levels of government for establishing a real market culture (Szakonyi 2018). “An inefficient level of professionalism and decision-making, together with an atmosphere of indolence, are commonplace factors in the present governance system. Oftentimes these factors are aggravated by the outright sabotage of the fulfillment of decisions at various levels of state power, and the merger of the latter with the financial and private business circles” (Kudrov 2007). An inefficient market economy, an overbearing bureaucracy, and widespread corruption are the so-called “trillemma” of Russian economy (Letiche 2007). In order to achieve the ambitious goals that the country faces, in the words of Putin (2019): “we need to get rid of everything that limits the freedom and initiative of entrepreneurship. A conscientious business should not constantly feel the risk of criminal or even administrative punishment.” Specifically, Russia faces intricate financial and social challenges to uphold the economic revival and mitigate the social impact in a more complex world marked by geopolitical uncertainty, continuing sanctions, and the price of oil. The new atmosphere, however, provides an opportunity to boost structural reforms that can raise economic effectiveness and efficiency and diversify the Russian economy (World Bank 2015; Mau 2018). A new cohort of structural reforms aimed at improving institutions, infrastructure, economic relations, and investment climate, could lead to more productive Russian economy, which is better able to respond to current and future external fluctuations. Without a doubt, accomplishing this demands sustaining a cautious fiscal stance improving the investment environment, ensuring greater mobility of capital and labor, making the financial sector more efficient, investing in infrastructure to eliminate key challenges to growth, strengthening governance, and fighting corruption as part of the overall effort to improve the effectiveness of the economy and its institutions.

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Capacity for Innovation Russia continues to face a challenging task of transitioning to an innovation-oriented economy. The main paradox of modern Russia is that, notwithstanding significant assets and world-class achievements in many scientific areas, the total results of Russia’s scientific and technological achievements remain very modest (Loginova 2015). The Soviet Union left a legacy of scientific achievements, high-tech developments in certain areas, such as space, defense industry, medicine, a highly educated population, and a number of other “assets” that still make it a model, for example, for India, China, Brazil. However, spending this potential without moving forward with regard to technological innovations leads to the loss of any positive beginnings. Russia is seriously lagging behind not only the USA, Japan, and the Western European powers in the development of innovative technologies, but also from China, India, Brazil in terms of investments and the pace of building scientific and technological potential (Shakleina and Baikov 2013). Russian experts are unanimous in saying that Russia needs a breakthrough in economic and technological innovations to become a true player in the economic globalization. The country has a huge potential to become an important global country, but the market is inward oriented and domestic businesses and companies are not very active with innovations. Russia needs to create leading global companies to be technologically attractive. Russia’s economic modernization and technological innovation became some of the key priorities for the leaders of the country and the population at large (Cohen in Kharabi 2010). From the beginning of his first term, Putin started to advocate the economic might of the country, claiming that the country’s power is determined by its ability to be a leader in producing and using modern technologies and to provide high living standards to its people (cited in Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 1999). Russia’s integration into the world economy became by far the most important task of the state.6 Reforming Russian productive base to increase its international competitiveness was Medvedev’s priority as well: “Instead of a primitive economy based on raw materials, [Russia] shall create smart economy, producing unique knowledge, new goods and technologies” (Medvedev 2009). The governmental plan titled, “The Concept of the Long-Term Social and Economic Development of the Russian Federation for the Period Till 2020,” became an illustration of the country’s inspiration to form a globally competitive and sovereign economy. Central to it

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is the realization of increased competition for all sectors of the economy, responsibility of the state to increase wellbeing of its citizens, and the need to develop pragmatic relations with multiple partners, starting from regional economic alliances and networks and extending to global structures. In 2015, President Putin underscored the importance of innovation, technological development, and domestic initiatives: “Russian companies must assume key positions in the industries and markets that will determine the nature of the economy, way of life for the people already in two or three decades” (Putin 2015). Russia launched a national technology initiative, which includes the participation of the leading representatives of science and high-tech business. The Government established a Plan of Implementation for the Strategy of Innovative Development in 2015–2016 (R.F. Government 2015b), and President Putin signed a new Federal Law aimed at the development of policy instruments—mostly through tax incentives up to the year of 2022—to support and finance innovation activities (R.F. Federal Law N396, 29 December, 2015). The expectation is that in the near future the country should see new science labs, companies, educational programs, and training, capable of solving modern world problem by employing advanced technologies. Putin (2019) stresses again that: “For powerful technological development, we need to build a modern research and development model.” The first phase of the implementation of the Strategy for Economic Development saw progress in restructuring the system of higher education to encourage research programs in the universities, establishing world-class high-tech enterprises, creating and attracting new companies and investors. Russia adopted programs for 15 leading universities, Presidential training program for engineers, and support program for individuals admitted to leading foreign educational organizations known as “Global Education.” The government approved programs for innovative development of 60 major companies, created 35 technology platforms, established a system of grant support and debt financing of innovative business projects in the framework of the state program “The development of industry and increase in its competitiveness.” The National Academy of Sciences was reorganized, and the Russian Science Foundation, the Foundation for Advanced Studies, and the National Research Center “Institute of N.E. Zhukovsky” were established. A state-owned nanotechnology company, Rusnano, was established with the goals of making the nation one of the global leaders for nanotechnology. A new

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technology hub Skolkovo started in 2010, near a business school in the Moscow region, on the basis of public–private partnership in the presence of a fairly large public investments (which could amount to $15 billion by 2020) with some private investment. The hub consists of research labs, universities (Skoltech), offices, and facilities to boost innovation in nuclear, space, medical, and information technology. Skolkovo Technopark boasts more than 200 startups which have access to the local infrastructure and financial and legal support that aspires to promote entrepreneurship and innovation (Zubacheva 2018). Cooperation documents were signed between Skolkovo and Microsoft, IBM, Intel, Google, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Turkov 2016). Russia is a leader in atomic energy, space engineering and defense industry, according to the experts, but these fields have been traditionally strong. In the age of globalization, what Russia needs to work on is development of new technologies, systematization and commercialization of technological innovations. The attitude toward entrepreneurship is changing in Russia as well, as more people attempt to launch a business. Russian startups currently must grapple with the United States and EU sanctions, a shortage of venture funding, general unfavorable geopolitical climate, suspicions resonant of the Cold War, which are not helped by the recent alleged cyber warfare. The companies, however, routinely overcome these challenges. Russia draws on a strong scientific and technological heritage, and some cities become homes to popular business. Moscow is home to many large technical companies that include search company Yandex, as well as global cybersecurity player Kaspersky Lab. In 2018, Moscow emerged as the No. 2 city for fast-growing private companies according to the results of the Fourth Annual Inc. 5000 Europe list (Henry 2018). The program of fundamental scientific research in the state academies of sciences for 2013–2020 was also created (Government Resolution of 3 December 2012 №2237-p). Russia established the Prize for Young Scientists in 2008. The first winners were awarded 2.5 million rubles for such projects as photochromic liquid crystal polymers, imaging with superresolution, nanostructured catalysts for new generation of biodegradable polymers and others (Vesti 2010). The country also introduced 25 pilot innovative regional clusters, located in 20 subjects of the Federation (R.F. Government 2015b). Overall, the Bloomberg’s Global Innovation Index gave Russia 1st place in percentage of labor force with a postsecondary

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degree, a 2nd place (after South Korea) in the overall education level, and a 14th place in innovation in the world in 2015. To fulfill the Strategy for Innovation Russia expects to introduce measures to improve the system of education, the set up the system of state support of scientific and technical creativity in children and young people, to ensure effective implementation of innovative development programs of companies with state participation, to develop the financial infrastructure of innovation, and increase the degree of the country’s integration into the global processes of creation and use of innovations. Specifically, the Government is discussing the establishment of an Agency for Technological Development, as a non-profit organization for supporting the development of domestic innovations and transfer and adoption of foreign technologies (R.F. Government 2016). During the meeting of the Presidium of the Council for Economic Modernization, the Head of the Government Dmitry Medvedev (2016) emphasized that leading technologies should not be simply copied but tailored to Russian realities and used to “form the basis for further development, regardless of the sentiments that exist and various external factors.” The fact that the business community in the face of “Business Russia” association was the main developer of the idea for the concept of the Agency underscores direct business interest to become a transmission belt between innovation, technology development, and application (Manturov 2016b). While there is certain progress with establishing the system for innovations, in general, technological development and innovation activity in Russia, are underdeveloped. Its share in the global market of high technology products is less than 1% (for comparison: the United States— 36% and Japan—30%) (Grinberg 2015). Business receptiveness to innovation remains critically low. By 2000, only about 5% of enterprises were engaged in technological innovations, research, development, and testing. The level of product innovation did not exceed 12% of the total production even at the most active enterprises. Only every 20th company could produce products that meet the requirements of the modern market (Obolensky 2001). By 2009, only 9.4% of the industrial enterprises introduced technological innovations. The share of the enterprises investing in the new technologies was also very low (11.8%) (Dolzhenkova et al. 2012). The number of personnel engaged in research and development is in decline and for the period 2000–2013 the rate of growth of this indicator in Russia amounted to 0.82 (Ivanova 2014). Low salaries of researchers (3 times less than in the United States) and the prestige of the

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profession do not ensure the influx of young minds (Manturov 2016a). According to the NSF rating for Science and Engineering Indicators (see Fig. 4.6), Russia takes only 15th place based on the number of academic articles published in 2011 (NSF 2011). A comparative analysis of statistical data from the World Intellectual Property Organization on patent activity in Russia demonstrates its lagging behind the world leaders on the number of applications received: China—12.7 times, the United States—12.2 times, and Japan—8.3 times (GTmarket 2014). Another problem is of intellectual and business migration, simply “brain drain,” which is directly correlated to the issue of outflow of specialists from the sphere of research and development. About 80% of the total number of people who emigrated from Russia in 2010 were highly skilled workers (Ivanova 2014). Russia is also far behind in the import of leading technologies: in particular, in 2014 Russia spent only $2.4 billion on foreign technologies, while the US spent $35 billion, Japan—$19 billion, and China—$15 billion (Manturov 2016b). In the Knowledge Economy Index by the World Bank (2012), which assesses a country’s preparedness to participate in the global economy based on efficient innovation system including the presence of research centers, universities, consultants, and other organizations that can tap into the growing stock of global knowledge, adapt it to local needs, and create new technological solutions, Russia takes the 55th place. Inadequate innovation activity and efficiency of the implementation of scientific and technological potential of the country was also noted by the large-scale study “The 250.0 200.0 150.0 100.0 50.0 0.0

Fig. 4.6 NSF Rating for Science and Engineering Indicators Based on the Number of Articles Published, in thousands (Source National Science Foundation [2011] and GTmarket.com [2014])

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Global Technology Revolution 2020.” Russia’s ability to adapt scientific discoveries was estimated at 30 points out of 100 maximum (RAND 2006). The main problem of low competitiveness of Russian Federation and Russian companies, according to experts, including the President of the Business Association in Russia, is the technological backwardness of companies (Repik 2016). Indeed, probably the major problem with lack of innovation is that business and commercial sectors demonstrate very low financial interest and activity for investing in innovations and technological development. Many Russian experts agree that there are innovations in Russia and significant scientific base, but there is no fruitful interaction between business and science, due to the lack of culture and experience of such interaction, and a lack of investment climate (Author Interviews, 2016). National R&D expenditures are considered to be one of the key indicators of scientific and technological development of the country, and, around the world, private sector of the economy covers a large proportion of these expenses. In Russia, the situation is different, since enterprises on average have very little interest in the activities related to the transformation of ideas in technologically new products considering it a risky and costly activity. According to a research associate from Moscow State University: “There is no systemic approach to innovations. Businesses are afraid or not interested in innovations because they are risky. If a plant is working, it is real profit, it is stable. If one needs to invest into a new process, then it could be considered difficult, time-consuming, and risky.” An IMEMO expert also underscores: “The psychology is such: let’s make money now, and we will leave reforms for later” (Author Interviews, 2016). Government funding is viewed as the best option, and, 75% of the innovations and technological breakthroughs are coming out of the statesponsored R&D enterprises. Expenditure on innovation activities of business and government accounted for, respectively, 22.4 and 60.1% in 2005, and 18.3 and 68.8% in 2010 (Tarlavsky 2014). This explains the governmental concern in promoting the set-up of the centers for innovation that business will not have enough motivation to produce innovations and invest in new technologies. Dmitri Medvedev claimed that the establishment of the Agency for Technological Innovation should receive a limited financial support from the state, because “business must participate in all of this…otherwise, it will be yet another governmental story” (R.F. Government 2016). On the other hand, experts domestically and in the

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West are also concerned about large governmental involvement in technology boosting and startups in Russia. During the International On-line Conference on the 5 Years of the Skolkovo Project, the participants from the West were raising questions about the lack of small scale, individualized, private-enterprise startups and the heavy role of the government in promoting, financing and developing innovation projects. The rationale behind intensive governmental involvement has historically been “to do everything, so that companies and enterprises with state participation would not find themselves on the sidelines of scientific and technological progress, but rather become invested in research and tried to apply it to real ends” (R.F. Government 2015d). While succeeding in theoretical science, mathematics, literature, and other areas that require creativity, Russia traditionally has been losing in technology development and application of science to real ends (Akhmedov 2010). Despite the Government’s attempts to create a knowledge economy, Russia remains a weak player in the global technology market, with the country’s economy dependent on exports of oil and gas and with only a few competitive high-tech world-class companies (Tarlavsky 2014). For centuries, Russia excelled at creating technology, but was unable to draw economic benefits from it, and, as a rule, did not provide long-term support to further progress in technology. Such cyclical model of technology development has been a characteristic of the country for hundreds of years. Russia was the first to build steam locomotive in continental Europe and the world’s diesel locomotive. Russia was also the first to light up the streets of Paris and London with electricity and to transmit radio waves. It was Russia that first created multi-engine passenger aircraft, carried out pioneering development of transistors and diodes, first published work on the principles on lasers and set up Europe’s first electronic computational machine (Graham 2013; Tarlavsky 2014). Yet, in general Russia plays a minor role in the international market of high technology and in no other country in the world there is such a combination of intellectual and scientific excellence and technological weakness that occur at the same time to the extent as it does in Russia. One of the most important factors limiting Russia’s efforts to develop technologies is the societal attitudes toward commercialization of scientific ideas. Social and economic conditions that encourage and support technological development play a critical role in countries, which are leaders in technology and innovation. Shortage of experienced managers, who are able to manage venture capital, undeveloped market securities, short-term planning horizon, the

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reluctance of many innovators to lose the right to their innovation management, administrative and legal barriers, and weak protection of intellectual property are some of the prevalent barriers to successful adoption and spread of innovations. Political motivation, unfavorable investment environment, and legal barriers impede and prevent successful technological development in Russia, reflecting the biggest weakness, which is inability to commercialize even the most brilliant ideas (Graham 2013). There are some signs of change, however, with regard to the internalization by society of the concepts of innovation and commercialization of technologies. It is increasingly promoted in Russian business schools and departments of economics in the universities, via government speeches, initiatives, and funding, emergence of startups, science, and technology parks, as well as “clusters” for innovation (Tarlavsky 2014). This trend is slow, but it is gradually gaining momentum in the scientific community and among the population at large. Throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century, the more than half of Russians were quite optimistic about an opportunity of turning Russia into the internationally competitive country, based on innovation and modernization (VCIOM 2007). To become a global power Russia needed to develop modern economy, improve standards of living for the population, and have a strong military, according to 61, 49, and 23% of respondents, respectively. A majority of Russians claimed that innovations would boost the country’s economy and social life, and even more people (62%) thought that innovations were indispensable for the general flourishing of the country. Russia could become a major global power, with the service or information-based economy instead of the resource-based economy, and it could happen in 10–15 years according to 30% of respondents, or by the middle of the twenty-first century, according to 20% of respondents (VCIOM 2008). With Russia’s policy aiming at strategic long-term modernization and elevation of the status of the country, focus on pragmatism for the sake of economic progress that would comply with Russia’s national development interests was especially emphasized (Isakova 2009). The crisis of 2014 brought another flavor to the population’s assessment of the economic development of the country. People are becoming more distressed about the fact that success or failure in the economy is tied to oil market conditions and the return of commodity prices to a comfortable level. A clear majority of the population is hoping for a drastic change in the economic policy via greater reliance on internal resources and

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significant stimulus and innovation in economic activity (Firsov 2016). A majority of Russians (65%) would prefer a new economic path of development, with a third of the respondents emphasizing scientific development and education above the economic and financial reforms (VCIOM 2016). The difficulties experienced by Russia in stimulating innovations, and attracting external funding through official channels, reinforce the need for increased flows of foreign direct investment. A significant impetus to this would come from the improvement of legislation regulating the activities of foreign capital in the country. It especially concerns cooperation with foreign partners in production-sharing agreements, operating enterprises with foreign participation, participation of foreign capital in the domestic banking system and in other issues. To encourage inflow of foreign direct investments in the economy and increase the number of joint enterprises in the generally poor investment climate is a rather complicated, but solvable problem. This is usually achieved in two ways: by providing foreign investors with various incentives (financial, fiscal, and other) or the guarantees of political and financial nature, embodied in legislation. For Russia it seems appropriate to use both methods, taking into account the financial capabilities of the federal and regional budgets and the scope of benefits and financial guarantees for investors. A good example is the participation in the modernization of Russian enterprises and investment even in non-strategic companies by German firms. The volume of German investments in the economy of Russia amounted to about $20 billion as of the end of March of 2010 (Miranovsky 2010). By 2015, there were more than 5500 of German companies whose annual turnover is about 45 million EUR (R.F. Ministry of Economic Development 2016). The growing concerns also revolve around the unevenness of development, economic growth, and investment in Russia’s industrial economy. The economic advance has been patchy across different regions and cities in Russia, and the attempts at reforming domestic industrial base and management structures have been uneven (Bradshaw 2008). The need for modernization of Russia’s enterprises and production lines is another primary task for a large number of companies (Repik 2016). Adoption of innovations, modernization, and commercialization of technologies, however, without changes in society, in which the need for innovation is present, may not be very fruitful. This is the flaw that haunted Russian modernization efforts for many years (Graham 2013). Russia’s focus on

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the development of new technologies will benefit from reforming society and the socio-economic sphere, so that the advanced technology can be developed and maintained in its own.

Societal Choices and Concerns The attitudes of Russians toward economic globalization have been quite stable over the first decade of the twenty-first century with some changes brought by the 2014 crisis. Recent national polls by the Levada Center demonstrated that 38% of the respondents supported globalization, 30% were its opponents, while 33% found it difficult to determine their attitudes toward it. More often than not proponents of economic globalization are managers of private enterprises (43%), younger respondents ages 18–24 (46%), with higher and secondary education (41%), as well as residents of large and mid-sized cities and Moscow (44%). Others believe that intensified economic interconnectedness brings more harm than good to Russia, among those are respondents of 25–39 years of age (34%), with higher education (33%), low income (40%), as well as residents of cities with a population of 100 thousand (37%). The external pressures and the deteriorating domestic economic situation, however, did not affect the attitudes of Russians toward economic liberalization with about 70% of the respondents acknowledging that market economy is necessary for Russia and more than 60% believing that economic integration with the West is important to Russia. The majority of Russians also think that the country should pursue its own way of development notwithstanding sanctions (~70%), and that the country could be still considered a superpower (65%) due to its economic and industrial potential, culture and science, authority and wealth of national resources (Levada Center 2015–2018). Many perceptions about the state of Russian economy and its involvement in global processes are continuously moderated by the increasing socio-economic polarization, and the growing distance between the base of society and political and economic elites. The economic crisis of 2008– 2009 aggravated the situation and represented not only a fiscal failure, but also the difficulties of the country’s admission to the globalizing world. However, many Russians (58%) claimed that the crisis year of 2009 was rather successful for them, including respondents of 18–24 years of age (74%), well-to-do Russians (71%), and residents of large cities (65), with nearly a third of Russian citizens noting that the economic downturn was unfortunate for them (VCIOM 2010). The negative consequences of the

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crisis were expressed mainly in poorer sense of personal safety and security, still one in four of the respondents believed that the country is moving in the right direction. The 2014 crisis reinforced the attitudes of sovereign Russian development with 77% of the respondents stating that Russia will become a prosperous country only by differentiating (not alienating 57%) itself from the West and taking a different path from the West (Levada Center 2014). The recent crisis also significantly increased the number of people who claim the years of 2014–15 were more difficult for them from about 30% to almost 55% (Levada Center 2016). The main problems of the country, according to many, are related with the difficulties in economy, where almost 60% say that they are, first and foremost, concerned about inflation, unemployment, the low level of production, salaries, as well as the economic situation in whole (VCIOM 2015). New industrialization and the development of science, according to the most recent estimates are considered as the most effective measures to overcome the economic crisis.

Conclusions Russia’s linkages to the global economy are significant and increasingly powerful, but are still narrowly based depending on the export of raw materials and the actions of a number of state initiatives, companies, and individuals. The country is being integrated into the global economy with a deformed structure of the economy, rapidly aging production apparatus and a competitive advantage based on natural resources. Low level of technological and economic development, low competitiveness of most branches of domestic industry and the availability of surplus extraction of natural resources in an economic downturn are the main reasons that Russia participates in the international division of labor in an unenviable status of a supplier of raw materials and consumer of finished products. The structure of the domestic foreign trade, despite an entrenched and widespread belief, is completely consistent with the current weak state of the productive capacity of the country. The success of the economic modernization and globalization will depend on engaging the leaders of all parts of Russian economy in the process of developing innovative changes, implementation of the technological breakthrough, and achieving accelerated developments in priority industries, which most clearly provide for the transition from aspirations to achievements.

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The uncertainty of the global and regional economic environment pushes Russia to maintain policy flexibility and pursue policies that can facilitate its adjustment to changing conditions of external environment. Russia was able to employ a range of instruments and resources to soften the targeted sectors from the worst effects of global challenges and most importantly sanctions. However, the country is confronted not only with complex challenges posed by the immediate economic adjustment to external changes but also to the difficulties coupled with major internal prolonged shifts in economy and society. In the near future, Russia’s changing external environment will continue to alter the internal structure of its economy, and adapting to new conditions is a difficult process, but the one that can have lasting positive effects. Facilitating structural change seems especially critical as Russia attempts to manage demographic and economic transformation. Successfully addressing these challenges will require a shift in focus toward providing highly effective regulatory institutions that foster robust competition, fostering privatesector confidence, and promoting investment despite tight financial conditions. Obviously, in the near future resources will continue to govern Russia’s export, in spite of whether or not policies intended at modernization and diversification of economy are implemented. Attaining sustained growth in a resource-based economy demands investment in the transport sector, infrastructure, and especially pipelines. Additionally, as Russia’s own energy consumption is likely to rise further in the coming years, and assuming that there is substantial economic growth, increasing trade potential will require significant production increases, which will necessitate the development of new fields. A healthy business climate and especially clearly assigned and secure property rights are therefore the key for private enterprises’ willingness and capacity to finance or participate in the large projects. Russia, which still has good, but very uneven indicators to maintain the status of a great power, is more important than ever to work hard. Much will depend on whether Russia will succeed in making a modernization breakthrough to occupy a stronger position. The most serious challenge facing Russia is not simply overcoming the recession but achieving economic growth (Mau 2016). In the group of the great powers of the twenty-first century there will be no place for economically weak states (Shakleina and Baikov 2013). Effective integration of Russia into the global system of world economic relations requires the overcoming of structural deformations and

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technical modernization of the economy. This will also lead to a higher level of competitiveness. Simultaneously, it is important to avoid errors and mistakes in economic policy of the previous decades. Experience shows that to overcome the existing strains and move to a qualitatively different type of interaction with the outside world seems very problematic without diversifying the economy, attracting foreign direct investment, improving the financial climate and business image of the country, and creating favorable conditions for the modernization and the rise of the domestic economy. The challenge for the country is to develop dynamic foreign economic relations, so that the international exchange gives additional impetus to economic growth, promotes efficiency and competitiveness of the economy.

Notes 1. The transitional years and the crisis of 1998 resulted in 45% loss of economy output, increase in income inequalities, doubling of crime rate, and dropping of life expectancy (Popov 2008). 2. The proportion of population living below the poverty line decreased from 30% in 2000 to 14% in 2008 (Russian Service on State Statistics). 3. State control of the energy sector in Russia has made many companies transparent to investors. For instance, Gazprom and Rosneft went public, liberalized its market shares, and became attractive to thousands of domestic and foreign investors, including many individuals (RIAN 2008). 4. See Reitingovoe Agenstvo Expert. Available at: http://www.raexpert.ru/. Accessed 12 October 2016. 5. Machinery and equipment accounted for only $17 billion of the $352 billion export revenues in 2008 (RIAN 2008). 6. While this belief by Russia’s leaders may sound like a cliché, it is a significant re-orientation from the rhetoric that emphasized only the military might of the country as a great world power.

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Walker, Martin. 1986. The Waking Giant: Gorbachev’s Russia. New York: Pantheon Books. White, Stephen. 2001. Communism and Its Collapse. London and New York: Routledge. World Bank. 2010. Russian Economic Report No. 22, June. Available at: http:// web.worldbank.org. Accessed 27 July 2010. World Bank. 2012. Knowledge Economy Index. Available at: https://knoema. com/atlas/sources/WB?topic=World-Rankings. Accessed April 2014. World Bank. 2014a. Gross Domestic Product 2014, PPP. Available at: http:// databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP_PPP.pdf. Accessed 20 May 2017. World Bank. 2014b. Country and Lending Groups. Available at: http://data. worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups#High_income. Accessed 14 September 2016. World Bank. 2015. Russian Economic Report: Balancing Economic Adjustment and Transformation. Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ russia. Accessed February 2016. World Bank. 2016a. Russia Economic Report. The Long Journey to Recovery. Available at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/ handle/10986/24028/rer35_E.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. Accessed 12 April 2017. World Bank. 2016b. GINI Index. Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/ indicator/SI.POV.GINI. Accessed January 2016. World Bank. 2017a. Russia Economic Report. From Recession to Recovery. Available at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/ handle/10986/27522/116237-WP-P161778-PUBLIC-RERengforweb. pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. Accessed 14 October 2017. World Bank. 2017b. Russia Economic Report. Russian Recovery: How Strong Are Its Shoots. Available at: https://openknowledge. worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/28930/30-11-2017-17-58-52forwebNovFINALRERENGfull.pdf?sequence=7&isAllowed=y. Accessed 29 January 2018. World Economic Forum. 2010. The Global Competitiveness Report 2009–2010. Available at: http://www.weforum.org/. Accessed 22 August 2010. World Economic Forum. 2015. Competitiveness Rankings. Russia. Available at: http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2015-2016/ competitiveness-rankings/. Accessed March 2016. Worth, Owen. 2005. Hegemony, International Political Economy and PostCommunist Russia. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. Yevtushenkov, Vladimir. 2009. A Global Answer to a Global Challenge. Russia in Global Affairs 7 (1): 56–70.

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Zarubin, Pavel. 2015. Putin: Nam Nuzhno Meniat’ Strukturu Ekonomiki. Vesti, January 28. Zinam, Oleg. 1972. Soviet Regional Problems: Specialisation Versus Autarky. Russian Review 31: 2. Zubacheva, Kseniya. 2015. After a Year of Sanctions, Russia Looks for a Way Out. Russia Direct, March 12. Zubacheva, Kseniya. 2018. 5 Innovative Projects from Russian Skolkovo That Can Benefit the World. Russia Beyond, February 19. Available at: https:// www.rbth.com/business/327623-russia-skolkovo-business. Accessed 21 January 2019.

CHAPTER 5

Cultural Impact and Societal Responses

Globalization invokes a remarkable degree of cultural awareness and sensitivity that are being shaped by the emerging processes of integration and particularization. It results in the proliferation of various, at times unpredictable, changes within domestic societies and cultures. Some cultures are more open to global forces enjoying and replicating global products, values, and services, some other cultures experience the rise of anti-global social movements and ideas, focusing on national development, reviving traditions, and referencing history. Within individual cultures themselves, global forces, symbols, and goods do not always find similar treatment, appreciation, or judgment, resulting in a “patchwork quilt” of adaptations to globalization. The manner and speed of progress of cultural globalization depend on a variety of factors, which are inherent to the domestic society, as well as defined by the relations with the outside world. Among such factors are geographical location, historical trajectory, regime type, ideological inclinations, the presence of ethnic and cultural diversity, different generations, academic perceptions and policy preferences, the role of education, relationship between cultural economy and the aesthetic realm (Cowen 2004; Razlogov et al. 2005; Kumaravadivelu 2008; Anheier and Raj Isar 2008; Suslova 2010; Blo 2016). Russia’s experiences and aspirations support the ideas of the hybridization model of cultural globalization, as Russia entertains many Western ideas, goods, and values and projects an image of a globalizing power, while continuously challenging and adapting them to domestic realities and local demands. After almost thirty years since the dramatic collapse of Soviet system, which © The Author(s) 2020 L. V. Kochtcheeva, Russian Politics and Response to Globalization, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39145-4_5

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shook the world for many people and affected the worldviews of many other people, the critical guiding principle became self-reflection rooted in the inherited traditions.

Russia’s Cultural Reaction to Globalization The emerging picture of Russia’s cultural and societal experience with globalization is highly complex, which is reinforced by the very character of culture being multifaceted, intricate, and contradictory, blending creativity and choice with devotion and responsibility. Culture, viewed as a mélange of traditions, religion, language, beliefs, values, and attitudes, is a pillar that defines and supports the life and contacts of individuals, communities, and the entire nations. Culture represents an “historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions in symbolic forms by means of which people communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge about and attitudes towards life” (Geertz 1973, p. 79). Russian culture creates and sustains a unique, exceptional, all-encompassing identity that simultaneously consolidates groups and peoples and distinguishes “us from them.” At the same time, “Russia is continuously represented as a question, a field of possibilities, a set of contradictions” (Franklin and Widdis 2004, p. 4). This book does not intend to cover all aspects of Russian culture and societal development as these features of Russia’s life have been discussed at length elsewhere (e.g., Chamberlin 1960; Sorokin 1967; Shalin 1996; Neumann 1996, 2017; Gerhart 2001; Dabars and Vokhmina 2002; Figes 2003; Richmond 2008; Volkov 2008; Feifer 2014). Indeed, the literature on Russia has a multitude of accounts on culture, which frequently attribute different meanings to it, such as traditional culture, Soviet culture, postcommunist culture, popular culture, modern culture, and so on. While culture represents a lasting constellation of values, beliefs, and formations that distinguishes the people occupying a particular social and historical place, there is always a degree of ambiguity in the understanding of culture, including how resilient culture is and how much diversity local or foreign it allows. The advent of globalization further underscores the necessity of exploring this interplay between tradition and transformation, between unity and diversification that has been shaping Russian culture. By investigating Russia’s response to globalization through the lens of socio-cultural establishment, domestic discourse, different generations, and national aspirations and patriotism, the emphasis will be on

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the attitudes, perceptions, and values surrounding individual and group behavior, as these are mirrored in elite culture and popular understandings, which emanate from the official dialogue, opinion polls, media outlets, in-depth semi-structured interviews, and personal observations and experiences. Socio-Cultural Establishment For hundreds of years the experiences of the Russian nation as a distinct socio-cultural entity have essentially determined the ensuing character of the Russian culture, state, worldview, and global destiny. During transformational historical moments, which are typically linked to the stresses of modernization, one of which is represented by globalization, the country was involved in the process of re-evaluating and changing its identity. The need to respond to external challenges and the difficulties of development in Russia usually produce two types of responses. One revolves around the question of “who are we?” The other encompasses the debates about the appropriate reaction to the challenges. Obviously, there are some fundamental features of the Russian nation, including its longevity, resilience, the fighting of primarily defensive war, and enormous territorial, demographic, political, social, cultural and ethnic diversity, and growth. Russian culture with its rich history also features a long tradition of excellence in every aspect of the arts, particularly when it comes to philosophy, literature, classical music, ballet, architecture, and painting, which all had a significant influence on the culture of other societies in the world. At the same time, there is its geopolitical criteria for understanding identity and the ethno-cultural framework (Pantin 2012). The country has large part of its territory in Europe and its roots in European culture and tradition “where the ideas of goodness, honour and freedom are understood as in the West” (Shulgin 1939, p. 71). Over the course of history, Russian Westernizers, as well as some Slavophiles, political leaders, and thinkers viewed Russia as part of Europe and as a state capable of modernization and westernization (Paramonov 1996). Many modern Russian leaders and observers declare Russia’s Europeanness based on history, Christianity, common experiences and strategic collaboration, economy and security concerns, and interdependence (Putin 2007, 2016a). The other significant part of Russia is located in Asia, and the other important influence on Russia was Asian, especially through the Mongol invasion, which was uneven, resulting in cultural and ethnic fragmentation on

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the one hand, and the emergence of reforms, social hierarchy, and networks, on the other. The conquest, however, only obstructed rather than completely changed Russia’s cultural path, which originated before the invasion (Guins 1949; Clarkson 1961; Tsygankov 2014). Yet, this invasion is more often than not blamed for the “the East-West gap” between Russia and West due to the prolonged subjugation and consequent underdevelopment. The enormous territory, the complexity of the ethnic mosaic, the Russian nationality questions and their political importance exacerbate many problems of governability. Russia matured into a society regulated from its center and with the uneven development of the periphery depending on the center. Internationally, the limited access to the sea and the lengthy borders lacking natural defenses made Russia vulnerable to wars and distrustful of foreigners, while deterring the development of a mercantile and commercial tradition, so native to the United States. Rich in natural resources and self-sufficient in trade, Russia found itself developing inwardly. Cruel climate, unfavorable geography and harsh history caused Russians to be more cautious and conservative, and value security, social order, stability, and predictability (Sorokin 1967, 2007; Richmond 2008). At the same time, Russians are used to a situation where everything is unpredictable and unstable. They have to adapt to new realities, rules, and laws quickly, and they continue to face this task, especially in a highly turbulent environment after the collapse of the Soviet Union and with the advance of globalization. With a tradition of a rural commune and a desire to find the common will, communal spirit, and the sense of togetherness predominate over Western principles of competitiveness and individualism (Blo 2016). Russian enlighteners, including A. F. Bestuzhev, A. N. Radishchev, A. P. Kunitsyn, unlike the European ones, valued the interests of the state and society well above personal interests, focusing on the problems of educating a respectable citizen with a high level of morality, “like educating harmoniously developed citizen-patriot” (Medvedeva 2016, p. 203). One of the large pillars that define Russia is people or “nation-mindedness” (narodnost’ ) (Neumann 2017). Russians also maintain more friendships and longer lasting friendships than Westerners and exhibit enormous hospitality. Russians are also often characterized by the greatness or “largeness of their soul,” which, as a rule, is not characteristic of either the West or the East (Pantin 2012). Statehood, collectivism, social justice, and spirituality are the main components of Russian national idea (Tuev 2012).

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In the words of a graduate from MSU: “People are proud that they Russians. And, with globalization we are trying to re-create some sort of a code with collegiality, communalism, sovereignty, Orthodoxy” (Author Interviews, 2016). Like the West, Russia saw the rise and development of Christianity. However, Russian members of the Byzantine family have always strongly opposed any threat of falling under the influence of the Western world and continue to resist to this day (Toynbee 1995). Russian culture, ethnicity, and nationalism are much stronger linked with Russian Orthodoxy—another pillar of Russian culture—and the state religion for more than a thousand years, since the conversion of Prince Vladimir to Orthodoxy in 998. The Russian sense of community and egalitarianism also has roots in Orthodoxy, which promotes the singularity of truth providing little room for a diversity of opinions. This stands in contrast to the Western, and especially American tradition of pluralism of beliefs and encouragement of diversity. The pluralism of the West was seen in Russia as a chaotic, disorderly collection of voices, disunity (Richmond 2008). Nevertheless, Russia would turn to the West during its stages of modernization, scientific innovation, and administrative improvement, yet simultaneously rejecting a complete Westernization of society. Such a contradictory and conflicting nature of Russian culture and society has been a recurring theme. In the words of Vladimir Golstein (2015, p. 80): “Russian culture – due to its historical and geographical reality – had always been forced to act dialectically, constantly trying to find the synthesis between ‘western imports’ and Russian realities.” Admiration of anything Western has been merged with the suspicion and mistrust. Russian society moved from the desire to become a part of the West to the rejection of the West to coming to terms with the West to challenging the West. Opposition to Western values has always been amazingly combined with an enticement and acknowledgment of Western ideas and symbols. Russian discourses of identity have also at times been shaped as “a dialogue with outsiders” and a relationship with “the other” (Franklin and Widdis 2004). With the advent of globalization, Russia continues to balance this position, intertwining engagement with skepticism and openness with nationalism. While Russia could be perceived as separated from the West by culture, language, and misunderstandings, the country has a long history of multifaceted interactions with Western paradigms, ideologies, and forms of societal development, especially in regards to Western scientific and philosophical models. Western culture in Russia, however, is “neither simply

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absorbed nor complexly reworked in isolation” (Pilkington et al. 2003, p. 3). Russian modern societal trajectory does not plainly replicate the stages of societal progress in Europe or the United States at a more modern stage. Russian society also does not produce many violent outbreaks against the progress of cultural globalization as well. At the same time, the concurrence of the collapse of the Soviet Union and globalization, which resulted in the transformation and loss of identity resulted in the situation, where responses to challenges were produced in a hasty manner, resulting in often negative perceptions. Dramatic responses are sometimes found in media, and social networks, official and informal proclamations, scholarly publications, local discourses, or outbreaks by ethnic nationalists against foreigners. On a large scale, however, Russians are tailoring and adjusting Western symbols, words, attitudes, goods, and values to reality in Russia, sometimes with admiration, sometimes with skepticism and criticism. National experiences, aspirations, and state-promoted worldviews, help shape highly complex themes in Russian pre-Soviet, Soviet, and postSoviet societal development. Especially relevant is the theme of a trajectory “punctuated by the conflict between old values and new” (Shalin 1996, p. 4) in the Russian cultural establishment during and after the collapse of communism. Without a doubt the disintegration of the Soviet Union affected what Russians feel, how they think, and in what they believe. For some it became a beginning of the cultural renaissance, yet many experienced a deep feeling of disorientation and loss, associated with ideological, structural, economic, and social dislocations. On the one hand, Russians continue to maintain their traditional cultural ways notwithstanding multiple drastic changes in the country’s social, institutional, and political realms. On the other hand, the breakup produced unanticipated outcomes and an atmosphere of turbulence, where old values no longer stand yet new ones are too vague or confusing to accept. This stands in sharp contrast to all former Soviet republics whose sense of post-collapse euphoria, newly gained political and cultural independence, and a return to native, in-born and instinctive produced waves of cultural restructuring. These significant cultural transformations included, among other things, reintroduction of national languages, rewriting of instructional texts, promoting local traditions and symbols, usually in contrast to all-Russian or Soviet elements, and recreating national identities. The search for a new societal trajectory, national idea, as well as identity struggles are also reinforced by Russia’s unwillingness to submit fully to

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the forces of globalization and assume the peripheral role in global societal and cultural development, which is also apparent through a discourse that concentrates on Russia’s role in the globalizing world reflecting the historical legacies, a strong national character, and perspectives for a vibrant future. With the onset of globalization and its cultural influences, the majority of Russians had very contradictory feelings toward cultural homogenization and westernization. Many people believed that the West is playing a leading role in cultural globalization because it created and spread mass culture (Suslova 2010). Some viewed cultural globalization as a deliberate project led by the West, specifically by the United States (Siefert 2006; Pilkington 2002; Zinoviev 1995; Rozanova 2003; Varenik 2012; Tuev 2012). With such a standpoint, “globalization under the conditions of economic, military and political supremacy of the USA and their allies consequently has taken a pro-Western, liberal form” especially immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union with the introduction of reforms in all sectors of society in the early 1990s (Dobrenkov 2005, p. 2). The unrestricted and unstructured liberalization and commercialization of culture and the arts produced a wave of shock and amazement in the society. The growing access to Western goods and services, entertainment and travel, ideas and values was enticing, inspiring, and engaging. At the same time, the access to Western comforts was usually the privilege of the people in the developed urban centers, and the somewhat forceful diffusion of Western behaviors and models became disturbing. The fascination with Western style restaurants, fashion, movies, and music continued to grow in the backdrop of the preservation of local traditions, stronghold values, and falling living standards for the majority during the 1990s. The emergence of new stores and flashy advertisements was tempting, yet the appearance of enormous billboards on the buildings of ancient and dearly loved architecture in multiple cities became distressing to many. The former mayor of Moscow, Yuri Luzhkov, while being an extreme modernizer, requested once that all advertisements on Moscow’s streets be in Cyrillic, rather than is the Latin alphabet. The decision to remodel one of the famous children’s department stores in Moscow “Detsky Mir” (“Child’s World”) so that it resembles a modern Western shopping center with glass and plastic walls, and commercials, instead of a two-story wooden clock with moving figurines and Russian symbols and pictures, produced a very loud outcry by the Moscowites and beyond. The store has been the most famous, popular, and loved establishment

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for many from their very childhood for decades. The introduction of the Western style food packaging and grocery items not native to Russia also frustrated many in the population. By 2005, almost 60% of the respondents in the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM) 2005 national poll agreed that globalization impeded food quality control in the country. A much lower quality of grocery items can also be blamed on the lack of regulation of food production and distribution, desire for easy gain by local entrepreneurs and even authorities, and the proliferation of shady businesses. Nevertheless, the westernization of shopping became apparent, which did not benefit many in the country, especially immediately due to severely increased and fluctuating prices—much more fluctuating than in the West—and attention paid to appealing packaging and modern supermarket floor plans, instead of food quality. Standardization of cultural and national self-perceptions and values, destruction of spiritual identity, demoralization, cynicism, consumption trends, homogenization, and spiritual exhaustion became perceived as negative signs of globalization as westernization in Russian society. In the words of V. Tuev: …globalization, in its cultural aspect, appears to create from various ethnic groups, peoples and nations a certain “gray mass”, turning them into an amorphous “human material”, into a faceless, uniform, and malleable biomass, in which all national-cultural features are erased. Ultimately, this is standardization according to the Western patterns of all forms and spheres of individual and social life: consciousness, behavior, economic structure, and state system. (2012, p. 2)

Moreover, the fears of a “surrogate of culture” grew widespread, emphasizing the ability of globalization to destroy traditional values, deprive people of belief and historical memory, devastate religious traditions, and manipulate behaviors (Dobrenkov 2005). Cultural globalization is fraught with maladjustment of individuals and their personal preferences and with the loss by humanity of a historically accumulated creative potential (Staroverov 2013). Many Russian social thinkers challenged openly positive view of globalization criticizing economic and cultural “expansionism” (e.g., Solonitsky 1996; Zinoviev 1995; Maksimychev 1997). Global society, global community, and global information networks produce the asymmetrical integration of countries into the global processes, propaganda pressure of the

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Internet, and invasion of cultural spaces, where the West practically, privatized globalization subordinating it to its own interests (Varenik 2012; Martyshin 2005). The critics of globalization contended that globalizing forces emerged on the basis of the Western value system and pursued only one goal that is to subject the world to a single superpower (Il’inskiy 2011; Kolin 2014, 2016b). The ideology of globalization in its current form was considered a natural expression of the interests of the West (Kulikov 2011). The argument was that globalization denies societies from the (semi)-periphery their sovereignty and individuality while at the same time encroaching upon the concept of law through the establishment of a new world system (Kara-Murza 1999). It was seen as a comprehensive threat to the entire system of non-Western societies, including Russia: The Russians fully recognize the fact that globalization exerts influence on national interests, and even transform their contents… While open to the economic benefits which globalization might entail, they are determined to prevent it from eliminating or replacing national interests. (Gorodetsky, 2003, p. xvi)

By the end of the first decade of this century, Russians started to experience an increase in conservative, inward-oriented and anti-Western sentiments: over 60% of Russians considered themselves as supporters of a special national way of development, different from the path of the Western societies (VCIOM 2006). A peculiar Russian way, the one which is opposite to the Western political and civilizational forces became prevalent. The majority of Russians believes that in its historical development Russia should not be similar to any other country in the world (VCIOM 2012) and the absolute majority are very proud of Russian history (90%), culture (88%), army (90%), and science (82%) (VCIOM 2016). The Russian Orthodox Church also feels strongly that promulgating traditional, inherently Russian values can help revive morality, ethics, and goodness among the people. The Church and its patriarchs are becoming very active in many aspects of the country’s social life. Because globalization carries a risk of unification of culture and spiritual life of humanity, it forces the Church, interacting with government agencies, social organizations, and international companies, fight for equal cultural and information exchange, as well as the protection of the identity of other nations and human values (Miloshevich 2011). Orthodox view on all aspects of

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the life of the globalizing world, including the economy, is based on the Biblical values. The country, the people, and the tradition cannot be subject to global corporations led by one board of directors and act as a “peripheral asset.” An important task today—to create a layer of thinking of national elite or “organic intellectuals” who would take on the burden of a new type of development. There is a need to revive own creative thinking in the economic, social, and political spheres. This is a question not only of national prestige but the historical survival of the people and the state (Shchipkov 2016). While the share of Russians who firmly support the strict separation of church and state continues to grow, from 54 to 64%, from 2007 to 2016, 47% of the respondents believe that the church should influence the morals of the people in society and that the Russian Orthodox Church had always been a very positive driving force in society (VCIOM 2016). On the other hand, for many Russians skepticism toward globalization and anti-Westernism are rather an expression of hurt or grievance toward the West, which is not treating Russia fairly, rather than a conscious and consistent rejection of Western values. Only 35% of the respondents in a national survey supported the thesis that the basis of Russia’s society must lie exclusively with national values and traditions, not the concept of individual rights and freedoms, which the West considers universal. In this case, people agree with a more conservative view, leaning toward intrinsically Russian moral traditions and especially the Orthodox faith. However, 60% of the respondents supported a Western perspective of a priority of civil rights and liberties, yet with a Russian twist. In contemporary Russia, where society is atomized and the credibility of the public institutions is low, family remains the main source of moral norms and values, according to 72.4% of the respondents. Much smaller roles are assigned to schools (15.4%), churches, (3.8%) and media (2.0%) (VCIOM 2006). Russians continue to recognize the bifurcated nature and consequences of globalization. Almost thirty years after the collapse of the Soviet Union and with the advance of globalizing forces, increasingly more people view globalization exactly in cultural terms, i.e., equating globalization to cultural linkages and exchanges in contrast to political and economic relations. Globalization now signifies the unification and integration of humankind (Kuvaldin 2003; Shchipkov 2016), while simultaneously producing rich pluralism, as socio-cultural differentiation is growing for a number of reasons. The dialogue between cultures is a possible answer to difficult questions regarding the inconvenient notion of the world’s unity.

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A paradigmatic change from economically and technologically centered worldview to the principle of culture-centrism can even result in the emergence of conscious governance (Tolstykh 2003). This idea resonates with a multitude of UNESCO promoted initiatives to understand the relations revealing the changing nature of the cultural links forged in response to economic and political circumstances of globalization. Notwithstanding the inertia of consciousness, ethnic prejudices, and the position of world powers, which are trying to determine the scope of national interests in today’s world, the dialogue among civilizations is piercing its way toward new understanding and worldview (Mosyakov and Korolev 2004). The advantages and the risks presented by socio-cultural globalization also compelled the country to employ globalizing trends to its benefit (Mikheev 1999; Simonia 2001). The increased importance of cultural and scientific exchanges, entertainment and tourism, lifestyle and engagement with the world has been attributed to globalization. This is another representation of Russia’s contradictory approach to the West and global forces promoted by the West. While Russians may not always view the West positively they still express great interest toward Europe and the United States. Many people want to visit the United States and learn from its experiences, attitudes, and insights. Many wish to copy the American or European lifestyle and enjoy the goods and services at the level that Westerners do. And while the geographical distance between Russia and, especially the United States, prevents some from easily traveling there, European countries became a place for educational opportunities, cultural tours, shopping, and annual vacations. There are also many Russians who adhere to the values of a modern (consumer) society, within which the main goal is to achieve well-being and personal satisfaction. However, the majority (70%) of Russians are not ready or eager to leave the country to become permanent residents elsewhere (VCIOM 2016). Russians continue to be very proud of being Russian and supporting culture, arts, history, and language. The self-identity of many Russians and the country was especially boosted by the reunification of Crimea with Russia and the Sochi Olympic Games (Lekontsev 2016). Pride in the country and being Russian has soared to its highest level. While the “effect of the Crimea” decreased somewhat lately, and the self-identification of the people turned to include “citizen,” “cosmopolitan,” or “just a person,” most people still prefer “I am Russian” (VCIOM 2016).

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Official and Academic Discourses For many domestic actors, including elites, policy community, academics, and the population at large globalization poses concerns on how local or indigenous cultural values can be adjusted to the progress of global influences. Societies are concerned about the impact that the globalizing forces are having on the most precious aspects of their identity. On the one hand, domestic constituencies view their own cultural values as too important to sacrifice, challenge or put a price tag on, and no amount of innovation or adaptation can be considered as beneficial. On the other hand, globalization can also be a deeply enriching process, opening minds to new ideas, and promoting the best universal values of humanity. How societal actors perceive and react to cultural globalization depends on their introduction to the global cultural commodities, personal preferences, education, affiliation, and the degree to which they stand to benefit from the spread of global culture. The progress of globalization has resulted in new official, academic, and public discourses in Russia, as themes connected to economic development, social cohesiveness, religion, and culture proliferated, notwithstanding the ongoing preoccupation with sovereignty and security concerns (Chumakov 2005; Cheshkov 2005; Fenenko 2008; Kolin 2016a). In addition to the traditional conception of military security, which was promoted by the official military thought, the notions of economic, ethnic, societal, environmental, and cultural security emerged (Kokoshin 2014, 2018). The formation of a new paradigm, as Douglas Blum (2008, p. 339) argues represents “hybridization” or the combination of acceptance of global forces, while simultaneously censoring or filtering cultural influences and emphasizing a peculiar domestic way of life. Such a balance takes its roots from a predisposition to engage global progress with creative thinking while concurrently asserting uniquely Russian ideology, historical destiny, and principles: The adoption or borrowing of some foreign elements or the elements of the world political and legal culture is inevitable, often it proves fruitful. The question is, why and for what purpose to borrow. The results of this process depend on these circumstances. After all, any attempt to transfer norms, principles, institutions from one environment to another is similar to transplantation. The borrowed element must take root, which does not always happen not only in surgery, but also in public life. (Varenik 2012, p. 88)

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To underscore this concern, the Government of the Russian Federation adopted the State Strategy on the Cultural Politics up to the year of 2030 in February 2016 (N 326-p). The basis of the Strategy is to elevate state cultural policy to the rank of national priority and to recognize it as one of the most important factors in the improvement of well-being of the population, the harmonization of social relations, the guarantor and the preservation of a common cultural space, and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. Official Discourse The Russian state, in general, and many individual representatives of government elites produce a complex utilitarian attitude toward sociocultural globalization. The government endeavors to stay competitive in the realms of values, attitudes, and soft power by creating and maintaining linkages with domestic actors and foreign constituencies (Tsygankov 2016). The adherence to conservative, traditional values as promoted by the government helps the state to gain support internally. Spiritual revival of Russia is considered to be possible only through an appeal to its centuries-old traditions of morality, diligence, patriotism, faith, and family values: “A society without these braces breaks, become atomized, and risks being dissolved in the flow of history” (Nikonov 2013). While perspectives on cultural globalization can be multifaceted, the evolution of rhetoric generally follows the unfolding of the global and regional challenges, including the establishment of the Eurasian Union, the relations with the West, the Ukrainian crisis, the sanctions, etc. Originally, the state aimed to preserve the image of Russia as a great power, which aims to cooperate with the West, avoiding to the large degree the nationalistic and civilizational rhetoric. Notwithstanding tensions, Vladimir Putin underscored the benefits of increasing linkages, interdependencies, and the promotion of universal values. Recently, however, the state in Russia started to advance the image of the country as a culturally discrete entity, strongly committed to preserving and promoting particular values and beliefs, in comparison, if not in contrast, to the West. In his address to the Federal Assembly in 2013, Putin (2013) clearly expressed the stance to protect traditional values, which “for thousands of years served as a spiritual and moral basis of whole civilizations and individual nations, including the traditional family values, true human life, religious life, humanistic values, and the diversity of the world.” Putin

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reiterated the idea of the “diversity of the world” in 2014 in his annual address, as well as underscored the strength and confidence of Russia, which will continue to promote the true image of the country abroad (Putin 2014). Domestically, Putin continued to promote the image of the country as a state-civilization by recognizing Russians as “the core that binds the fabric” of Russia as a culture and state (Putin 2012). However, emphasizing the strength and unity of the country, he warned against the mono-ethnic and mono-cultural state, stressing that “the strength of Russia [lies] in the free development of all peoples, in the variety and harmony of cultures, languages, traditions, mutual respect, dialogue and Orthodox, and Muslims, the followers of Judaism and Buddhism” (Putin 2015). Sustaining and promoting diversity is a crucial task of nation-building and every national idea strives to safeguard national unity by creating common values, suggesting convincing and socially appealing analyses of historic experiences, and spreading these values domestically and beyond. While the state continues to recommend the strengthening of institutions and processes that support traditional values, such as family and schools, the country is still in search of a grand unifying idea that can manage internal diversity and resolve the conflicts of the national identity and the outside world. The most recent effort to create a national ideology was the emphasis on patriotism and Russia’s “Greatpowerness” (derzhavnost’ ) (Krupnov 2016; Smith 2016). Putin (2016b) stresses that the uniting force of patriotic values does not come from the belief that “everything is good. There are difficulties and problems.” Patriotism comes from “an understanding of their causes, and most importantly the confidence that together we will necessarily overcome them.” Willingness to work for the sake of Russia, cordial, sincere care about it—this is what lies at the basis of this unity. The state advances the principles of fairness, respect, and trust that are universal, but most importantly that must be guaranteed domestically as related to each individual and the society as a whole. It is strongly believed that “any injustice and falsehood are taken very serious. This is generally a feature of our [Russian] culture. The society strongly rejects arrogance, rudeness, condescension and selfishness, no matter where they all may come, and all the more appreciates such qualities as responsibility, high morality, concern for the public interest, willingness to listen to others and respect their opinions” (Putin 2016a). The references to patriotism and great power status are used as a way of tying Russia into a more universal system while maintaining differences

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with the West. These notions are at the heart of today’s official discourse on cultural and political self-identification. The emphasis on patriotism is not accidental, or merely engineered, or without a strong support from the population. According to the national polls, more than 80% of the population has been feeling patriotic for over a decade (VCIOM 2006– 2016). Being patriotic is fashionable, esteemed, and appreciated. Patriotism became the only value of socio-political nature that is shared by the overwhelming majority of Russians. In the ranking of priorities in life patriotism takes the fourth place, with only family, peace of mind, and material well-being standing above it. Patriotism almost equals in priorities as having friends (81%). Moreover, a sense of duty to the Motherland in Russia is very strong: 65% would support the decision of their loved ones to defend the country in a war if necessary (VCIOM 2016). The identification with the great power status among the elites and the population is usually explained by the standing of the Russian civilization, which is more than a thousand years old, and capable of uniting the vast territory of different peoples, by coping with unprecedented difficulties and overcoming geopolitical challenges, which it had to face throughout its history, and by the ability to have impacts. Putin (2016b) points that “The most important thing is how we were able to achieve unity of Russian society and the Russian people, unite everyone around the solution of national problems.” Experts remark that “the desire to be exactly a great power, and not a ‘middle’ one is found in the genome of the nation, we have gained at least from the Peter the Great times” (Karaganov 2016). “We have a unique civilization, and our state-civilization has a unique destiny” (Krupnov 2016). In the words of the President of the Institute of National Strategy, Mikhail Remizov: “Russia has such extensive impact, which automatically makes it enter the ranks of great powers. We do not have a task to affect the whole world. We defend our interests where they really are. Sovereignty, backed by military power, and our own foreign policy” (2016). There is, however, a clear understanding that while Russia stands strongly on the military and political facets of “greatpowerness,” the country needs to address the problem of demography and economy (Kulikov 2011; Krupnov 2016; Mirkin 2016), elevate science and technology, revive education and health care, all of which contribute to a high level of human capital. “It is this capital in the world today that will eventually serve as the main source of power and influence of states” (Karaganov 2016).

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By advancing the patriotic feelings and the sense of great power the state does not only aim to institute a new national idea and build greater loyalty and unity, but also to manage vulnerability to the Western influences of “universal values” promotion and, as these are generally considered as the form of cultural pressure from those who “seek to justify the legitimacy of hegemonic and military actions toward others” (Tsygankov 2016, p. 75). Globalization as westernization is viewed as “re-facing” the global order to benefit the interests of the few (Putin 2016b). The former Minister of Culture Mikhail Shvydkoi listed threats which existed for Russian culture, including the decomposition of primary culture, the loss of cultural education, and commercialization of culture due to the market pressures (Pravda, 2003). In fact, the government clearly identified the threats to national security in the realm of culture due to the erosion of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values and the weakening of the unity of the Russian Federation, the multinational people by foreign cultural and information expansion. These include the proliferation of low-quality products of popular culture, promotion of permissiveness and violence, racial, national, and religious intolerance, and also reducing the role of the Russian language in the world, the quality of its teaching in the Russian Federation and abroad, attempts to falsify Russian and world history, and unlawful attacks on cultural objects (R.F. Government 2015). While such rhetoric and a position to protect core domestic values appear like an open challenge to the machinery of globalization, the Russian official discourse still stays flexible, appealing to different constituencies, maintaining a balance between anti-Western conservative attitudes and universal values, and promoting global cooperation. Russia’s officials discuss the importance of cross-cultural dialogue by positioning the country as respectful of many different influences. “We have learned to appreciate our identity, freedom and independence. At the same time, we do not want either global domination, or the expansion of some sort, or a confrontation with someone else… Russia calls for the harmonization of relations based on the principles of transparency and respect for each other’s interests” (Putin 2016b). In the globalizing world, the methods of influence also include the use of soft power and the use of public diplomacy (Makinen 2016; Linde 2016; Bogaturov 2017). The use of soft power is clearly addressed in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation and is considered to be the undeniable part of the global relations. The idea is to “to seek respect for human rights and fundamental

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freedoms around the world through a constructive, equal international dialogue taking into account national, cultural and historical characteristics and values of each state” (R.F. Foreign Policy Concept 2016). Russia’s position is to suggest an alternative to the world. “It is willingness to defend its sovereignty, its national dignity, self-interest and traditional values, as opposed to ‘universal values’ that the West was trying to impose on the world. And it is not about the fact that some values are better than others. We are talking about respect for all values and the inadmissibility of forceful imposing of some ideas” (Karaganov 2016). Views from Academia and Expert Community Russian intelligentsia, academics, researchers, and experts produce a multifaceted, rich, and diverse discourse on the trajectory, outcomes, and challenges of cultural globalization, but in general they are cautious about the advent of globalization. At the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, a class of Russian intellectuals with liberal aspirations welcomed globalization and westernization. The polls in 1993–1995 demonstrated that the United States was on the list of most admired countries. In the words of an expert from the Gorchakov Fund: “Russia was saturated with the Western culture, even a certain sub-culture was developed due to the influence of American culture” (Author Interviews, 2016). Antiglobalization or anti-Western attitudes did not reach the surface up until later. New Russian sentiments did not become anti-Western or were still restricted to rather a narrow sector of the elite. Yet soon some in progressive intelligentsia, who initially supported the advent of perestroika in the late 1980s and early 1990s were significantly affected by the new Russian realities of failing economy and degrading society. Already by 1997, 60% of the population rejected the Western model for Russia and believed that Russia was set on a wrong course (Danks 2001). The attitudes and perceptions were drastically affected by the Kosovo conflict and exacerbated by the Georgian conflict. The frustration of intelligentsia, coupled with antipathy of politicians, found their resonance in mass media and popular resentment. Anti-Western, but most importantly strongly proRussian, outlook among different layers of the population developed into a typical trend. Later it has mushroomed to the majority of the population (Ponarin 2004). An expert at a think tank claimed that “Russia should not simply react to the Western influence, but set the rhythm or

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an agenda itself” (Author Interviews, 2016). The conflict in Ukraine, significantly underscored such widespread attitudes, but at the same time attracted more attention to the views of the supporters of the Western liberal thought. As such some liberal experts and academics note that globalization has significant requirements for societies to adjust and if Russia resists the Western global norms, it should then demonstrate to the West the new norms, or accept the values and norms of the West. Recent profound political, economic, and societal changes all over the world generated competing and conflicting approaches to the problems of global culture and local self, which became part of the academic discourse, turning into the debate over the treatment of cultural goods and services. Cultural globalization and, especially, new possibilities and the threats to cultural security are regularly discussed by scholars (Razlogov et al. 2005; Kolin 2016b; Varenik 2012; Staroverov 2013). The building of global and local identities, the emergence of which is facilitated by cultural globalization is addressed through the lens of shifting ideologies and values, questions of belongingness, cultural sovereignty, traditionalist, and civilizational rhetoric. According to many experts, Russia is believed to have preserved its values and ideological products, it “keeps its foundational values even in the context of moral degradation of the West.” And while the country “is not opposed to globalization, Western values and normative ideas are resisted, and the globalization of values is not acceptable” (Author Interviews, 2016). Some academics note that from a range of legitimate interpretations of globalization, the traditional liberal-universalist version with its final triumph of pluralism and open society, gave way to opposite interpretations of the global process—the process of integration—which is increasingly associated with an ongoing formation of a new world empire. In a situation of the escalation of “culture wars,” the adoption of a global culture by societies, which became victims of external influence, may resemble a unilateral moral disarmament (Dobrenkov 2005; Samarin 2005). Globalization as westernization represents not only the economic expansion, but also cultural expansion, which destroys traditional national cultures of many countries, changes the souls of people, imposing their systems of values and worldviews (Il’inskiy 2011; Tuev 2012; Eliner 2013; Kolin 2016b). The process of globalization is accompanied by powerful trends of homogenization, blurring the distinction between nations and social groups, destruction of traditions, rituals, values inherent in national cultures (Lysak 2010). Global culture may prove to be effective only if it

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receives the support of many world powers, including Russia. Otherwise, all efforts “may be reduced to a large dose of futile public hypocrisy” (Samarin 2005, p. 10). These trends are advanced by the achievements of the scientific and technological revolution in the realm of communication technology and the role of new media, which challenge traditional ideologies and cultures (Rogovsky 2014). Digitalization of communications is becoming a significant force influencing culture and shaping identity (Polutsygan 2016). Communicative possibilities, opened up by globalization and advance of technology, create linkages between the elites, expert community, and the people at large. On the one hand, growing connectivity enables people to participate actively in discussions and challenge attempts to impose cultural hegemony. On the other hand, increasingly sophisticated technologies can lead to manipulation of public opinion, flame information wars, producing emotionally charged false representations and identities (Bassin and Suslov 2016). Communication technology, serving as a transmission belt for globalization, helps promote …an active and aggressive spread of so-called “Western values”, which have nothing to do with the thousand years old rich history of Western Europe; rather they are replaced by consumer-oriented “Westernized” values to generate a person who is busy satisfying his predominantly material needs, and reducing the spiritual needs to the field of entertainment, leisure and pleasant times. (Lysak 2010)

Moreover, globalizing forces continue to induce structural divisive changes within the country prompting each functional category to compete individually at the global stage. As a result, a country could lose its socio-cultural unity, producing elements of an ideological vacuum. Such vacuum tends to be filled with pro-American or pro-European rhetoric, neoliberal slogans, religious proclamations, or radical views, which can break up the fabric of society. In case of Russia scholars argue: “Final eradication of the collective spirit, which was inherited from the earlier times and somehow retained the integrity of the society, the spread of individualism and fragmentation, can backfire at the stability of the state and lead to sad consequences for the country” (Panfilova 2008, p. 46). Globalization has a strong impact on the transformation of the worldview and values, which may cause ideological and cultural identity conflicts (Ivanov 2014).

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Other academics assess the influence of globalization on Russian culture and society from a different lens. Some believe that as Russia becomes more and more involved in the process of globalization, the society is forced to rethink the universal human values and its own identity. In this view “globalization allows for development, growth and positive exchanges, however, sometimes it interferes into life, when we do not want it” (Author Interviews, 2016). Globalization does not only lead to dramatic changes in production and consumption, but also significantly transforms people’s perception of the modern world, making them re-evaluate new problems, change behavior and acquire knowledge (Kamashev 2015). As one MGIMO professor puts it: “Russian culture is very open for many influences. Russians can assimilate very well too. However, while popular culture may be changing a lot, Russia stands to defend its traditional values” (Author Interviews, 2016). Russia finds itself in a situation of choice, trying to determine its place in the world cultural space. The manner and the outcomes of this search process will have significant impacts on the future of the country: “The society and its social consciousness are in an intense search for its own identity” (Gizatova and Ivanova 2006). Others, note that with the encouragement of creative industries, with the support of the state, with proper financing of cultural programs, with the development of arts, education, and sciences domestically, Russia’s socio-cultural establishment will gain new strength, continue producing creative innovations, and support the spiritual and cultural status of the country (Zelentsova 2008). In the words of one prominent professor from MGIMO: “People need to be able to take advantage of globalization” (Author Interviews, 2016). Foreign and global influences can be employed to the benefit of domestic societal and cultural development. Globalizing world is creating new varieties of cosmopolitan creative professionalism, which is not constrained by national borders. This primarily refers to the audiovisual creativity, show business, and other varieties of mass culture. In the global mass culture, American jazz and hip-hop, British popular music, Jamaican reggae, Japanese video games, the Russian performers peacefully coexist or compete with each other. All of them together and individually undermine national cultural protectionism. Mass media and information technologies make the global cultural space even more multifaceted, creating a basis for the formation of cultural communities of different types (Razlogov et al. 2005; Razlogov 2016). One of the professors of MGIMO notes that: “We are starting to see the development of a globalizing class of people.

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It is students, IT experts, designers, artists and journalists” (Author Interviews, 2016). The overall picture of world culture is determined not only and not so much by recurrent confrontation of civilizations or specific values, but by the continuous and fruitful interaction of many different subcultures with the global culture of the mankind. In the context of cultural, political, and ideological diversity, established in the late twentieth century, after the collapse of the USSR the interaction of subcultures became one of the most important elements of modern civilization. On the one hand, in search of emotional and spiritual support people are turning to their own historical and cultural traditions forming the core of the identity of a particular country. On the other hand, the increasing mobility and the number of contacts between carriers of different cultures create “cultural diffusion” and “interculturalism” (Razlogov et al. 2005), implying various forms of mutual influence and mutual understanding between people of different worldviews, preferences, historical, and cultural traditions. The advance of cultural globalization increases human capacity to simultaneously explore different cultural traditions in their totality and cultural experiences of different countries. In the case of Russia, ethnic and socio-cultural multiculturalism is inherent due to the diversity of the peoples inhabiting the country and the hundreds of years of intercultural linkages, marriages, and relations. The Russian intellectual tradition has been recognizing these issues for a long time, proposing various competing solutions to creating socio-cultural identity, including Russification, Slavophilism, Westernism, Soviet Man, etc (Razlogov et al. 2005). Currently, in the age of cultural globalization, shifting individual and societal norms, the lack of a new national idea and continuing identity struggles stands as a significant problem (Gizatova and Ivanova 2006). The elaboration of a new social idea may become a fundamental formative component for socio-cultural initiatives (Panarin 1997). Defining socio-cultural status takes the form of new cultural ideas and new cultural politics associated with value priorities. The fascination with foreign socio-cultural experiments, presumption of trust to the experiences of others and willingness to question its own establishment have been a long-standing feature of Russian culture starting with the reforms by Peter the Great. This tendency may be a factor of cultural and intellectual growth or a risk factor. The former is possible if Russian domestic actors respect national culture. In this case, even the boldest cultural experiments would not pose problems to stability. The latter is possible if

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the elites and the public do not see any value in national, inherent, and native, thus destroying heritage and betraying shrines. Today, as well as during other challenging periods in Russia, the major problem concerns not merely the specific methods of adaptation to globalization, but rather the actors, who carry it out and the ideas that are being promoted by such actors.

Generational Differences The progress of globalization through enhanced and intensified communications and transportation has shortened geographic distances and allowed many more people access to goods, knowledge, and experiences that until recently were the privilege of a few special categories of people. However, not only different communities or socio-economic groups within a country react differently to the forces of globalization, but it is also different generations exhibiting various levels of adaptability to globalization. It is hardly a surprise that young people do not perceive globalization as world-shattering, but as a more natural process influencing their existence and their relations. For younger generations, cultural globalization, especially the advance of popular culture, has made a comparison between radically different cultural realities a matter of routine if not a choice. It is also in this context that it is necessary to seek the framework for the discussion and the connection between the role of young generations and a country’s response to globalization. The most pronounced differences in the perception of cultural and societal globalization is indeed found among different generations in Russia (Kochtcheeva 2010). The highly positive attitude toward Western models of development was vivid across Russian society immediately before and after the collapse of the Soviet Union. For many Russians, the advent of perestroika, glasnost and the processes of globalization coincided to a large degree (Spencer 2004). Many also embraced the expanded range of Western goods, services, and ideas through television programs, printed media, Internet, travel, restaurants, and shopping. The flows of Western influence, however, generated varied and uneasy attitudes among different groups in the population. While the young are mostly open and excited about the advance of globalization, others exhibit more complex attitudes. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, 33% of Russians believed that “Russia’s weakening position in the post-soviet region” is attributed to the active involvement of the United States and other

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Western countries (VCIOM 2007). In 2005, 52% of respondents in a national survey wanted balanced cooperation with the West and strengthening of Russian national identity, and 28% preferred independence from the West. Mendelson and Gerber (2005, pp. 90–91) also report that 59% of young Russians believed that “foreigners who assist Russian organizations financially are trying to meddle in Russian domestic affairs,” and 72% did not welcome foreign ideas. In 2012, only 20% believed that globalization brings positive influence to Russia, while more than 60% did have a strong opinion. By 2015, about 46% of Russians mentioned the United States (37%) and Europe (9%) as main threats to Russian culture and values (VCIOM 2015). While trying to reestablish their own identity, the Russians are concerned about the loss of heritage and culture due to the globalization. These concerns are aggravated by peoples’ distress about economic well-being, corruption, crime, and the loss of status and prestige in a constantly changing world full of challenges and crises (Gizatova and Ivanova 2006; Kolin 2016b). Without a doubt, the overrated expectations of the reforms in the early 1990s, the dissatisfaction due to the mounting problems, Soviet nostalgia, simultaneously with the excitement from new experiences and prospects can be found among the older as well as the young.1 Still, youth culture is the realm where the most visible signs of the globalization trends are established.2 In general, young people in Russia feel the influence of global forces to a degree unthinkable thirty years ago. The progress that has taken place specifically in education, travel, and communications have placed young generations in a system characterized by the intensified and expanded circulation of people and experiences. The speed of social change and social mobility creates the need for the implementation of life strategies corresponding to the conditions of the new social reality, which is rapidly changing and full of uncertainty (Gnatyuk 2016). Many young Russians perceive globalization as a natural process with some elements of control, propaganda, and domination by different actors or forces. Globalization is viewed as a “political, economic, and cultural expansion,” “integration and unification of the world,” “common structure for the whole globe,” “uniformity of the interconnected world with increased communication,” “dissolution of boundaries,” “mixing of cultures,” and “imagined equality” (Author Interviews, 2016). In the words of one young architect: “Globalization is a natural process, yet there is some governing or even manipulation of the process by those with power. They can control everything, but ideas have their own power, and they spread anyway.” Another

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young professional went as far as to mention that globalization is such a powerful natural force that it makes people “adjust or die.” A young teacher eloquently claimed that “the process of globalization started long time ago quite naturally, but after the collapse of the USSR it became a more regulated process. This process is managed and directed.” Yet others, believe that globalization leaves choice to its participants: “If you do not want a particular model of development, nobody is forcing you. One should always act out of his own and national preferences. There are no absolute decisions.” One trend though that is clear among the Russian youth is that technology, the Internet, and new communications are the drivers of globalization. One student at the Russian University of People’s Friendship put it: “Internet and cell phones swallowed all of us, made us dependent, and they are making us dumb. But whatever you do, you cannot escape it” (Author Interviews, 2016). Young people view the development of Internet as, probably, the most significant accomplishment of globalization. The usage of the Internet has also increased dramatically in the last two decades: from about 2% in 2000 to 35% in 2010 and to 76% in 2019 (Internet World Stats 2016). In Russia, Internet users are mostly young people, as they are more adaptable to fast developing technologies and various innovations. The Internet is very affordable and easily acquired, especially in urban settings in Russia. A lot of places offer free Wi-Fi, and in the streets and especially in the metro, which also offers free Wi-Fi, people are “glued” to their cell phones. Obviously, the influence of the Internet as one of the major effects of globalization has become very broad. For instance, according to data from Statista.com (2017) research company, the average Russian spends 1.9 hours social networking every day, slightly more than an average American. For young Russians, access to Internet is also a sign of “symbolic consumption” and quality of life, on a par with a possession of a car or travel abroad. Access to the World Wide Web became an element of status at first and an undeniable part of life later, and the faster Internet one has, the more functions one can use, the more connected, successful, and globalized this person is. Some young people do not imagine their lives without the Internet, others consider it as “a natural outcome of the increasing interconnectedness” and “technological progress,” and still others feel that the Internet “is the only thing that connects them to the globalized world” (Author Interviews, 2016).

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The influence of globalizing processes observed among young people in modern Russia, are directly related to the dominance of popular culture, examples of which are radically different from the content of the elite, or high culture. Young people are clearly major consumers of mass culture, which along the spread of information revolution, is one of the most prominent dimensions of international cultural commodities. The European and American music and American film industry specifically contributed to the transnationalization of Russian popular culture (Kochtcheeva 2010). One young researcher stated that: “In the 1990s we had the oversaturation American popular culture” (Author Interviews, 2016). During the 1990s, there were fewer Russian films shown in theaters with almost 74% of movies shown being “Made in the USA” (Omel’chenko and Bliudina 2002, p. 33). MTV, game and reality shows became a regular part of the Russian television. “Dancing with the Stars” is as well-advertised and watched among Russians as it is among Americans. Multiple American shows are either reworked and tailored to the Russian audience (“Nanny,” “Crime Scene Investigation”) or simply translated from English (“Friends,” “House,” “Two and a Half Men,” “Game of Thrones,” etc). The popular press in Russia demonstrates American and European lifestyles, including fashion, consumer trends, entertainment, and travel as dominant reference points. Many popular places, including clubs, bars, restaurants, performance venues have English or Anglicized names and themes. The metro stations in major cities, such as Moscow and St. Petersburg have their station names written and announced in Russian and in English. Because globalization has a tendency to reveal itself faster through visual signs, symbols, and information networks, it appears that younger generations are building global identity through the creation of style, participation in virtual interactions, and borrowing and interpretation of images and languages. In the words of one young graduate from the Moscow State University: “Our youth is open to cultural globalization. Especially, in large cities young people want to be like the youth in the West. We study, use Internet, watch movies, shop, travel.” Most young people note that Russia became more open and there is observable hybridization of cultures (Author Interviews, 2016). However, the Russian youth also recognizes the positive and negative sides of cultural globalization and emphasizes the importance of choice in cultural globalization. Modern globalizing society offers the possibility of choice, but

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this choice is generated in the conditions of domination of mass consumer culture, broadcasted by the new media to the young generation, immersed in the information realm (Gnatyuk 2016). One young Russian engineer summed it up: “If we try to blindly follow everything globalization has to offer, then we can be negatively affected and obliterate our culture. But there could be your personal choice, your own conviction” (Author Interviews, 2016). The Anglicization of the Russian language is another way cultural globalization takes place in Russia. The role of the English language in Russia is multifaceted and stems from a range of sources, including the expansion of trade and economic relations, the development of international tourism, proliferation of advanced information and computer technologies, the emergence of the Internet, and others. Russian media, especially television, also contributes to the Anglicization of the Russian language. The reinterpretation of the English language words started long time ago with the borrowing of the words and adjusting or reworking them sometimes very humorously for the local use. For instance, the word “e-mail” was transformed into the word “mylo,” which has some resemblance of the sounds from the original phonetics, easy to use, yet it means “soap.” Russian professors write: “Listening to the speech of our students, we have identified in it more than 1000 English words that they pronounce in the Russian manner, because they cannot always express the same words in the native language” (Morozova 2009). The borrowing of the foreign terms in economics, technology, and fashion is logical and even welcome, when the terms are new to the culture and are easier to employ. Such words as “management,” “broker,” “glamour,” “blog,” “internet,” “online,” “upgrade,” “browser,” “driver,” “login,” “file,” and others became very widespread and even useful in the modern language, because they provide a more convenient way of conveying the meaning. However, the greatest change is the direct transliteration and the use of the words, where there exists a direct Russian translation or a counterpart, such as, “background” (fon), “luxury” (lyuks, roskosh’ ), “creative” (tvorcheskiy), “exit polls” (opros na vyhode), “deadline” (srok), “development” (razvitie). Many of the English words are being reworked to carry the original meaning but are pronounced in a Russian way by adding a prefix or a suffix. For example, “zafailit” (to file), “priattachit” (to attach), “shopat’sia” (to shop), “draivkat” (to drive). Additionally, the use of American expressions and greetings, including “ok,” “wow,” “hi,” “bye” is becoming more popular among Russians.

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These words, according to many, while being more and more commonplace in the center and the periphery of the country, do not always fit well with Russian culture and habits, and there is a threat of losing the originality and unique beauty of the language. One student from the Russian University of People’s Friendship shared her concerns about the losses that language suffers: “Our language becomes polluted with foreign words. It especially influences little kids. They do not even understand that these words are not Russian! We should not lose our unique culture. We should preserve the core of our culture.” Most of the young people still believe that the Anglicization of the language is about fashion and convenience: “It is quick, convenient and easy.” However, young people note that always mixing the two languages together is awkward and disrespectful, and people should be able to speak his own language: “It is great to know English, but speak one or another at any particular time.” Using English words can grow into “a pretentious show-off and a disrespect to the Russian language.” An intern at a research organization perfectly concluded that: “Language and culture are connected to the lifestyle. Many people do not want too much influence, because it can drastically change the society up to the point of discomfort. It is important to know what is going on in the world, because it helps us develop and communicate, but overwhelming influences destabilize the society” (Author Interviews, 2016). Russian young people also became increasingly adaptable to new ideas and products through advertising. Many of the Western commercials from yogurt, to toothpaste, to electronics, to clothing, especially multiple European ads, are simply narrated in Russian. The number of commercials in general is increasing exponentially, and watching TV or flipping through the magazines in Russia is similar to any Western country. Many shopping centers and stores look exactly like in the United States or Europe. While Western advertisers could not ignore the peculiarities of the Russian market, they were successful in instilling the “brand name” admiration among many Russians. For many young Russians, especially for those in larger industrial cities, the matter of clothing and accessories is highly important. It is not simply how much you have, but also how fashionable it is, where it came from, and how much you paid for it. Versace, Dolce and Gabbana, Coach, Rolex, Dior, Yves Rocher, and many other designers are highly admired and desired by the young Russians. While only a few have the opportunity to have a luxurious life entertaining all aspects of modern fashion, lifestyle, and consumption levels, many

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would sacrifice seemingly necessary things, such as complete diet or fixing a small problem in the apartment, to purchase Western, fashionable goods, and services. The issue of image and presentation overrides many concerns and apparently gives more satisfaction to younger generation. It would be unfair to say that all young Russians pursue such goals, yet the trend that started about 25 years ago continues to overwhelm the minds of the younger generation. In the words of one young preschool teacher: “The world is going crazy. They are telling us what to wear, how to talk. Internet substituted critical thinking. Westernization and unification are not good.” However, globalization is still mostly viewed as “a spread of ideas,” “learning about different cultures and countries and their peculiarities of development” (Author Interviews, 2016). Russian young people also travel more, participate in joint ventures, societal movements, found businesses domestically and overseas, and increasingly link their fortunes with those from abroad. Russian youth is very much concerned about their material well-being and self-realization. In short, younger Russians adopted Western practices and started to look, and even sound like its Western counterparts. In the words of one young professional: “We are mimicking standards and practices from the West (insurance, transportation, hotels, credit cards); everyone talks the same; everyone dresses and looks the same: Shorts!” (Author Interviews, 2016). Nevertheless, the embracing of global or Western cultural and ideational symbols and values are extremely selective and varied among the young people. Youth in Russia is mainly engaged as consumers rather than producers of global identity.3 As consumers, young Russians seem to oscillate between the European and American cultural stereotypes, in fashion, attitudes, and behaviors. Mass media also does not “present any single view of America” and while America carries a significant reference point in the West, specifically in regard to work, money, and success, it is portrayed “in opposition to Europe and often in negative light.” Politics influences opinions about the United States and Europe, such as views about crises in Chechnya, Georgia, Ukraine, however, the geographical proximity to Europe, historically closer cultural links, and potential economic benefits play a greater role. Europe, however, also receives mixed assessment from the Russian society especially with regard to cultural ties or even Russia’s historical belongingness to the European space. The major reasoning behind such attitudes is a perception among Russians that the West is not interested in revived and strong Russia.

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The signs of the socio-cultural split, which reflects the features of the generational cleavages between the remnants of intelligentsia and those who were raised with pop culture, have been observable among the young Russians. For instance, the VCIOM demonstrated in July of 2004 that 29% of the respondents assessed the influence of pop culture on society as positive, while 34% as negative. Pop stars and leading businessmen are, however, among the top idols for Russian youth: 47 and 38% respectively. While it is expected that pop idols would be attractive to the young, 14% of the Russians ages 18–24 considered Vladimir Putin as their idol, and 67% would have voted for him in an election. In general, young people produce mixed and varied attitudes toward globalization. Alexandra Gezha (2006) notes that 55% of young people consider environmental challenges of globalization as the most significant, which is explained by the active work of international environmental organizations and the high demand for participation in the environmental movement. Political concerns take the second place and include issues mainly related to the position of Russia in the modern world, according to 44% of respondents. Cultural relationships and exchanges, advance of popular culture and the preservation of national cultural values are prominent features of globalization for 29% of the respondents, while natural science and humanities are critical issues for 27 and 24% of the respondents respectively. The young generation does not view Russia’s position in the globalizing world evenly or explicitly, which is reinforced by the multifaceted character of globalization. Globalization and informatization of society affect the changing values of the younger generation. On the one hand, cross-cultural interaction that occurs as a result of global movements, helps enrich the spiritual values of young people, increased interest in other cultural traditions and religions. Globalization contributes to the solution of such pressing issues as the growth of chauvinism and discrimination. Information systems maintain ethno-cultural communication and support the structures of societal and ethnic consolidation and interaction in the global cultural space. Young people develop and uphold certain characteristic values including competitiveness in the labor market, desire for personal growth, the individualization of consciousness and behavior. Globalization also receives credit for inducing a growing political liberalization of public consciousness, expanding the circle of social tolerance, and pluralization of socio-cultural views. On the other hand, the negative impacts of globalization on the value system of the youth tend to be represented

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by the “criminalization of consciousness” and a feeling that everything is allowed, which are associated with the devaluation of moral imperatives mostly due to the incredible transformations of the economic system and the growing gap between rich and poor, as well as social differentiation of society. Virtual feelings and friendships require much less moral responsibility and material costs, which also leads to the growing concerns of alienation in the social environment. The biggest threat lies in the processes of building a culture, which is transformed into a set of formal responses to problematic situations and ceases to perform its essential function: the understanding of the world and giving meaning to life. However, many Russian young people are convinced that the latter will never happen to the Russian culture. As different young people claimed: “Our culture is not dissolved,” “We are preserving the core of our culture,” “Only Russian people can perceive and adopt a foreign culture, but preserve their own culture anyway!” (Author Interviews, 2016).

Patriotism, Nationalism, and Identity The globalizing forces are pushing societies to rediscover, reaffirm, and recreate their sense of national identities. The impact of globalization on national identity is highly contradictory. Globalization changes the identity of the countries and peoples, dissolving it in global processes of economic integration, democratization, cultural standardization, and universalization of values, but at the same time it leads to the phenomena of national revival, localization, and regionalization. According to the experts, globalization brings the creation of a homogenous culture which has hybrid character. Some countries undergo the fragmentation of once certain identities and are likely to generate political and social outbreaks. Other societies view globalization as a challenge which generates uncertainties but also prospects for enhancement of experiences and the evolution of hybrid national identities. In Russia, the questions of national identity and self-expression permeate cultural debates as related to globalization. According to Belinskiy, “nationhood (narodnost’ ) is to the idea of humanity what personality is to the idea of the human being. In other words: Nations (narodnosti) are the personalities of humanity. Without nationalities (natsional’nosti) humanity would be a dead logical abstraction, a word without content, a sound without meaning” (Belinskiy 1956, pp. 28–29). The development of societal attitudes toward globalization is without doubt depends on the

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degree and type of nationalism and patriotism in the country. The evolution of Russian attitudes to globalization has been proceeding through several stages, starting with the idealistic fascination with the West to more realistic pragmatic nationalism. The forceful but rather brief wave of efforts to eliminate Soviet mentality and legacy has turned into a far more modest attempt of reconciling with the other. The wide-ranging inherent dualism and tension between the desirable and the feasible, aspirations and legacy, between persisting cultural features and changing universal values mirrors the ambivalence related to the process of reshaping national identity and feelings of belongingness. Victor Aksyuchits proposed that “Russian is the one who speaks Russian, thinks in Russian, and considers himself Russian.” The process of transformation of contemporary Russian identity and Russian nation with its immense ethnic and cultural diversity under the conditions of globalization is, however, very complex and contradictory. Nation could be understood as “the most developed type of historical ethnos; social and economic entity, which develops and is being reproduced on the basis of common territory, economic linkages, language, some prominent features of the culture, the psychological portrait and national self-awareness” (Sadokhin 2004, p. 280). In this context, national identity is seen as a self-recognition by the people of being a nation. This implies knowledge and respect for the history, national culture, territory, awareness of tradition and unique features, understanding of national interests, aspirations, goals, ideals, and needs. The fundamental component of national identity of peoples in Russia is self-determination (Ivanov 2014). The process of forming national identity is never completely achieved. It is constantly being modified with each new generation and with multiple economic, political, and cultural influences. Depending on the historic conditions the role and significance of national identity may strengthen or weaken. One the one hand, patriotism and the national pride may carry an immense divisive force. On the other hand, patriotism as a feeling of love and respect to the Motherland, culture, traditions, and language express strong consolidating tendencies and become the basis of the preservation of the nation and national identity. Pride in the country’s history, especially the focus on the centrality of the Great Patriotic War, became an important element of nation and identity-building in Russia today. The process of nation-building and the search for identity under globalization is challenging most importantly because it is a process of transformation, parting with the old, known, and traditional. Some believe, that

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the collapse of the Soviet Union simply does not leave Russians any other choice but to gradually become a nation-state (Byzov 2006). However, this trend is ambiguous. If in the 1990s, many people thought that the idea of a superpower disappeared, not only politically, which was manifested by the collapse of the USSR, but also in the minds and hearts of people, and people became more concerned with their own individual lives, rather than the grandeur of the state; then in the last decade, the idea of “derzhavnost” and being a great power is getting a second wind. For 60% of those who call themselves Russian patriots, patriotism is first and foremost, the revival of Russia as a great power, and only for 35%—it is the protection of the rights and interests of Russians in Russia itself, and beyond. The vast majority of Russians are proud of the history and strong army (90% each), culture (88%), science (82%), and Russia’s standing internationally (72%) (VCIOM 2016). Experts cite patriotism as one of the most important values of Russia: “At its core, patriotism is one of the most significant, enduring values inherent in all spheres of life of Russian society and state, characterizing the highest level of spiritual and moral development of the individual and manifested in active selfrealization for the benefit of the Fatherland” (Azarova 2010, p. 1). In the words of one student from Moscow State University: “I am a patriot. I am a citizen of Russia. Globalization is trying to obliterate uniquely Russian features, but Russia is standing and will stand. It is a center of unification. We need to return ‘derzhavnost’” (Author Interviews, 2016). Russians, however, have much less crystallized ethnic awareness and identify primarily with the state, rather than with their ethnic group,4 which was reinforced by the years of Soviet attempts to instill the concept of the “Soviet man” (Melvil 2002; Strukov 2016). This stands in staunch support to the theories of civic nationalism that explain its rise through the emergence in a modernizing multiethnic state of a single standardized entity (Greenfeld 1992). If a group of people cannot find ways to identify with such an entity or are removed from it by the dominant group, they may become highly conscious of the distinction between the standard culture and their own and develop the more extreme cases of nationalism (Gellner 1983). While Russians have always formed the dominant culture, including Russian Orthodox, Russian Imperial, Russian Supranational, or Russian Soviet (Ponarin 2004; Solovyev 2008), it can be argued that Russians still did not develop a strong ethnic identity. Almost 90% of the people consider themselves patriots, but not nationalists (VCIOM 2016). The value of patriotism today is universal. Society

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approves of and endorses patriotic behavior, while unpatriotic behavior is not supported. However, the conversations about nationalism and nationalist slogans and demands are not popular at all. As a rule, national surveys show only about 10–15% of respondents can express nationalist demands to a certain degree (VCIOM 2016). In the words of Maxim Shevchenko (2014), a member of the Presidential Council on Development of Civil Society and Human Rights: “Russian Federation is a political project of a democratic empire. It is more than just a Russian project, which is a fundamental grain of this political project, including the people of other ethnic groups, nationalities and civilizations. The Federation is cemented by the agreement, rather than suppression and assimilation by the Russians of other nations. It never happened in the past and it will not happen. Other nations will fight it to the last drop of blood.” The main thesis of the national idea is “common historical destiny of the peoples of Russia, their geopolitical interests, preservation and development of Russia as a great power, with a socio-economic achievements, quality of life, dignity and diversity of cultures” (Zyuganov 2003). Currently, some claim that there is a tendency for Russian ethnic identity to gain the status of a geopolitical category, especially during the crisis in Ukraine by referring to the notions of the “Russian World,” and “protecting ethnic Russians” abroad (Strukov 2016). The emergence of cultural self-determination and elevated patriotism, however, represents a shift from the prior tradition of the supranational or imperial identity. It does represent the move from an unconditional accord with the global forces toward the logic of national aspirations, reflecting the new stage of development of a national state and the need for an optimistic and affirmative national worldview (Bogaturov 2002). It could be argued that the regional and global challenges, such the hybrid war in the Donbass, the information war between Russia and Ukraine, the conflict between Russia and the West called to life the Russian national identity and activated in Russians a sense of certain moral principles and the concept of due and undue behavior. And, while it is still at the stage of “intuitive feeling,” which could later be coined by the intellectuals, there is a need for a new national idea. Not a state ideology, which is in fact prohibited by the Article 13 of the Constitution of the RF, but, in the words of Valery Fyodorov, the Director of VCIOM (2014), “an inclusive formula, which includes, rather than excludes from the ‘Russian world’ other nationalities, religions, people of different skin color, origin, opinions and beliefs.

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We need a kind of ‘civil religion’ that will not be encapsulated, disconnected, closed from the world, but on the contrary, which will go and attract, and culturally attach and appeal to other ethnic, religious and cultural communities, provide them with more opportunities to live and develop in our, Russian space.” The processes of globalization sharpen the questions of national identity in Russia also because of the necessity to determine the place of Russia in the modern world, as well as to prepare for the challenges of the present and the associated risks of entering into the globalizing world community with its inherent way of life and thousands of years of traditional cultural identity. About 70% of the respondents in the national poll were concerned about the loss of national uniqueness and tradition due to globalization. Some 40% of the people do not believe that Russia could lose its national qualities, while 31% concerned that the country may not evade the demise of national traditions (VCIOM 2006). Globalizing Russia incorporates a variable combination of universal, international, and historically unique Russian values. The formation of the Russian identity is viewed through the lens of searching for the ways and means of “organic combination of the principles of modernization with the imperatives of conservation of the foundations of cultural and national identity, as well as some continuity in culture. Otherwise, with significant rupture in the culture and the creation of loosely connected identities from different eras, the cultural fabric of a modernizing society is destroyed, and all the apparent successes of the transformation ultimately become its failures” (Ivanov 2014). Russian national sentiment also correlates with a sense of accomplishment, status, and prestige, but also at the backdrop of a deep internal crisis which is partly imposed by the globalization and which can be overcome. The advancement of the new Russian identity and national feelings involves a search for the means to make the demands of globalization “organically consistent with the imperatives of preserving historic forms of cultural identity” (Solovyev 2008, p. 301) and positively contributing to the development of a new national idea.

Conclusions Culture instructs, supports, and modifies order and relationships in societies (Geertz 1973). Culture offers individuals and communities psychological frameworks that guide a variety of aspects of their life. It provides

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a foundation for behavior, a lens through which to view it, and a means by which to gauge it. Culture gives people a basis for identity formation, promoting the development of a sense of unity, and shapes aspirations and attitudes toward self and society. Culture represents a “social road map” to explore the possibilities as well as limits of own establishment. While culture exhibits resilience, it thrives in part because of the links that are formed with other cultures. Such an interconnected nature of culture is a product of a contact between cultural groups and of the consumption of cultural goods. The process of globalization, supported by the information revolution, advances intercultural exchanges, yet with varied implications and outcomes, as changes do not happen instantaneously or spread evenly. Culturally diverse responses to globalization are abound, ranging from embracing the view of a world society, to reviving traditional cultural distinctions, to advocating national solidarity, to violent civilizational struggles. Even if there is hope for the creation of a global society that accepts common human interests through the development of global ethic supported by the common values, irrevocable standards, and self-restraint, it is still just a minimum basic consensus. Before any type of balance between the advance of global affairs and responsiveness to cultural differences can be achieved, we need to understand how global progression may reflect the reality of cultural diversity in specific countries. The response to cultural globalization in Russia serves as a prominent example. Russia’s attitude toward cultural globalization contains various and sometimes contradictory elements on the backdrop of highly complex and diverse historical, geopolitical, geographical, and societal characteristics. Anti-Western and isolationist views, while are still found among Russians, are not the major pillars of the country’s engagement with globalization. Many supporters of Russian “own path of development” continue to welcome economic, social, and cultural ties with the West. Younger generations especially experiment with or adopt Western styles of living. Yet, they do not aspire to fully replicate Western ways of being. There is a widespread understanding that the life in the West is more comfortable and prosperous. There is also no doubt that goods, services, music, behaviors, and style are becoming more inclusive and “globalized” in Russia. However, no single view is given to the West. Russian discourse about Western cultural influences is not equated with either solely America or Europe. The questions of values, beliefs, and features of Russian society

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usually predominate over Western traditions and values. As such, globalization in Russia appears in diverse ways, whose meaning is developed according to a context and is interpreted through the lens of Russian well-established belief in its uniqueness and difference.

Notes 1. The shift in attitudes is usually attributed to the distorted market functioning, the loss of social provisions, and extreme affluence in the background of increasing poverty and decreasing morale (Utkin 1995). 2. Scholars studying cultural globalization in Russia tend to address how global and local attitudes interact specifically among the younger generations (e.g., Pilkington 2002; Siefert 2006; Mendelson and Gerber 2005; Darcie 2016). 3. Western popular culture is usually perceived as based on consumerism, materialism, rationality, and competition, as opposed to Russian values of collectivism, emotionalism, and spirituality (Flynn and Starkova 2002; Siefert 2006). 4. In Russia, after the collapse of the Soviet Union there was a surge of national consciousness of different peoples, as evidenced by the results of various sociological data. It was mostly characteristic to the desire for non-Russian peoples, and especially for representatives of the titular ethnic Russian republics. In connection with the growth of a national identity, the identity of the non-Russian peoples and their regional self-identity also increased (Ivanov 2014).

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Richmond, Yale. 2008. From Nyet to Da: Understanding the New Russia, 4th ed. Boston: Intercultural Press. Rogovsky, E.A. 2014. Kiber-Washington: Global’nye Ambitsii. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnozheniya. Rozanova, Julia. 2003. Russia in the Context of Globalization. Current Sociology 51 (6): 649–669. Sadokhin, A.P. 2004. Entologia (Ontology). Moscow: Gardariki. Samarin, A.N. 2005. Kul’tura Mira kak Otkrytyi Mezhdisciplinarny Proiect. In Konfliktologia. Teoria i Praktika, ed. A.N. Samarin. Moscow: SPb. Shalin, Dmitri N. 1996. Russian Culture at the Crossroads: Paradoxes of Postcommunist Consciousness. Boulder: Westview Press. Shchipkov, Alexandr. 2016. Otkazat’sja ot Globalizam i Perestat’ Brat’ v Dolg u Potomkov. Available at: pravoslavie.ru. Accessed January 2017. Shevchenko, Maxim, 2014. V Poiske Natsional’noi Identichniosti. Available at: http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=115063. Accessed January 2017. Shulgin, Basil. 1939. Kiev, Mother of Russian Towns. The Slavonic and East European Review 19 (53–54): 62–82. Siefert, Marsha. 2006. From Cold War to Wary Peace: American Culture in the USSR and Russia. In The Americanization of Europe: Culture, Diplomacy, and Anti-Americanism After 1945, ed. Alexander Stephan. New York: Berghahn Books. Simonia, N. 2001. Postindustrialniy mir i Rossiya. Moscow: Editorial URCC. Smith, Hanna. 2016. Putin’s Third Term and Russia as a Great Power. In Eurasia 2.0: Russian Geopolitics in the Age of New Media, ed. Suslov Mikhail and Mark Basin. Lanham, Boulder, New York and London: Lexington Books. Solonitsky, A.S. 1996. Preuspevayuschiy nezapad i Rossiya pered litsom zapadnoi modeli Razvitiya. Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya 12. Solovyev, Eduard. 2008. Russian Geopolitics in the Context of Globalization. In Russia and Globalization: Identity, Security, and Society in an Era of Change, ed. Douglas Blum. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. Sorokin, Pitirim. 1967. The Essential Characteristics of the Russian Nation in the Twentieth Century. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 370 (1): 99–115. Sorokin, Pitirim. 2007. Russia and the United States. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Spencer, Sarah Busse. 2004. Novosibirsk: The Globalization of Siberia. In Russian Transformations: Challenging the Global Narrative, ed. Leo McCann. London and New York: Routledge and Curzon. Staroverov, V.I. 2013. Globalizatsiya, Globalizm, Antiglobalism i Rossiya. Sistemnaya Psikhologiya i Sotsiologiya 7 (1). Strukov, Vlad. 2016. Digital Conservatism: Framing Patriotism in the Era of Global Journalism. In Eurasia 2.0: Russian Geopolitics in the Age of New

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CHAPTER 6

Russia’s Response to Globalization

Countries are caught in the grid of interconnectedness tackling the problems of economic development and trade, security, access to resources, technology, and belief systems. The discontents of interdependencies expose the fact that while the problems exhibit globalizing tendencies, the answers to them stay domestic. This situation will likely prevail as one of the defining characteristics of the global community. Moreover, while many features of the “shrinking” world, including, economic improvements, communications, travel, technology, and others, brought notable advantages to many countries in the world, the costs began to rise as well. The multilateral cooperation and rivalry of the countries, most importantly major powers, proceed under the conditions of multilayer interdependence, which brings to light not only the benefits of interrelationships, but also the challenges of inability to deal with a range of problems (Valdai Club 2018). On the one hand, the interconnectedness of the world makes it necessary to take a fresh look at the concept of the universal commons, including global climate change, health, migration, and others. On the other hand, there are unresolved contradictions between the economic structure of the world, which is significantly globalized, and political, in which universal and effective mechanisms of global governance have never been established. The source of political legitimacy of any state remains at the domestic level. Domestication of decisions that affects the functioning of the global world order remains the challenge to that same order. States continue to act in a way that reflects their national interests, yet, no truly autonomous solutions seem to be possible. Any autonomous action of © The Author(s) 2020 L. V. Kochtcheeva, Russian Politics and Response to Globalization, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39145-4_6

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especially major powers leads to global implications. A critical component of adjustment between global and domestic elements is needed as a result of changing capacities, ambivalent inclinations, mounting ambitions, and the failure of current arrangements to cope with the challenges associated with globalization. The impact of globalization on Russia is enormous and increasingly controversial exposing two opposite trends. One trend is toward active participation in globalization, while the other is resistance to it. Russia made a strategic choice in favor of globalization supporting the idea of globalization as a process of intensified economic interconnectedness, accompanied by an increase in the quality of life, acceleration of political developments, intensification in the exchange of technological, scientific, and cultural achievements between different countries. Russia, however, recognizes that while globalization produces some noticeable benefits and advantages, it also stays as a political process that is compelling the country to challenge the forces of globalization and produce associated domestic responses. Russia is reconceptualizing its standing and image as an international actor and its relations with the major agents and processes of globalization. As globalization has very different implications and effects for different actors, Russia finds itself at a crossroads of European and American influences, as major architects of globalization. Not having had the opportunity for tangible input in the construction of the world order after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia struggled to rebuild its power and identity as well as its global role and recognition. The country managed to overcome the threat of collapse and the worst socio-political consequences of the disintegration of the Soviet system and stood on a path of active and assertive foreign policy, consistently emphasizing and defending its national priorities and interests abroad. It challenged the integrity of the West-promoted global order, confronting the tendency of the West to employ the global flows to its own preferences and underscoring that the country has always been a significant and active participant in global affairs. As such, Russia views itself as both contributing and responsive to the forces of globalization, oscillating between adaptation and confrontation with globalization. External challenges push the country to make difficult decisions in the economy, culture, and politics, reinforcing the attention to national interests and goals, reevaluating ideological influence, as well as preserving national value system. The changing international situation demands from Russia a flexible and timely response to new challenges, which arise in the

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course of the evolution of the entire system of global development. At the same time, Russia itself is in the process of transformation, having new opportunities for development and an adequate response to the challenges and threats, changing the structure of its national security and interests, reflected in the concepts of foreign policy, economic priorities, and cultural choices. While the country endured the overhaul of its politics, security, economy, and identity in a setting distinguished not only by the chaos of its recent past but also by the weight wielded by the forces of globalization, it continues to be a key world player, emphasizing that long-term international success can be achieved only on the basis of respectful interaction of different countries. In the words of Sergey Lavrov (2017): “A reliable solution to the problems of the modern world can be ensured only through serious, honest cooperation of leading states and their associations in the interests of solving common problems. Such interaction should take into account the multicolor of the modern world, its cultural and civilizational diversity, reflect the interests of the main components of the international community.” Russia finds itself at the crossroads of key trends, which largely determine the vector of future world development, where Russia’s problems and changes reflect the ubiquitous challenges of managing globalization.

Political Changes As the world is undergoing momentous national and global changes, assessing the significance of domestic politics and its relation to the international political processes is increasingly important. Globalization has created a new socio-political reality. States as individual actors become influenced by global forces producing a more complex system of interdependency, where the global order and international institutions and rules gain influence. Globalization uncovers not only the shift in the geopolitical role of individual states, or the transformation of strategic choices, it ultimately challenges the view of geographical space, interdependence, and power. While international actors and supranational organizations influence state decision-making, the state is still the fundamental type of political rule around the world actively pursuing their agendas in the globalization era. The Russian state exhibits its traditional strength, maintaining the country’s sovereignty, gaining the status of the major power, and supporting its authentic culture. Situated at the crossroads of East and West and their cultural, economic, and political influences, over the

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course of history Russia borrowed from them and struggled with them, developing its own national features. The attempts to reform and consolidate the state have been the rational responses to a set of powerful domestic and international pressures by becoming a politically independent nation with sovereign decision-making. Vladimir Putin underscored this notion (2017) in his speech at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum on June 2, 2017: “To reiterate, there are not so many countries that have sovereignty. Russia treasures its sovereignty, but not as a toy. We need sovereignty to protect our interests and to safeguard our own development.” Reinforcing the model of a strong yet effective state in Russia is essential to a favorable developmental path. The paternalism of Russian statehood as a state-centrist society informs the principle of interaction between the state and society, based on the perception that the state as a social institution is designed to implement social guardianship, justice, and security (Lubsky 2016). The key problem, however, is how to respond to and adapt to the external challenges by taking advantages rather than abusing the main features of a strong sovereign state. Insistence on sovereignty should come in tandem with the ability to balance the internal and external challenges to the benefit of the country. Establishing responsive and efficient institutions that are capable of counteracting threats, promoting greater openness and accountability that does not jeopardize security and stability, will contribute to the realization of the trajectory that is sensitive to Russia’s historical path, contemporary challenges and future tasks, including domestic and international opportunities for the country. In a similar vein, the Russian view of democracy includes not only participation, civil rights, and political freedoms, but also presence of a strong state, which should provide order, peace, security, and stability. This perception is based on the ideas of the country’s unique type of democracy rooted in national traditions, values and historical path dependence, and is consistent with the understanding of social priorities by the citizens. In addition to security and order, economic justice, political unity, and sovereignty serve as preconditions to freedom. Russian society holds seemingly controversial views, including favoring the strengthening of statehood and state power as the main factors of improvement of economic relations and the establishment of social consensus in the context of approval of fundamental principles of personal freedom and social responsibility. At the same time, Russians also hold controversial views on

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the suitability of Western-type democracy, representation, and individual rights for the country. The growing sense of nationalism and patriotism, supported by the government, became reinforced among the population, especially in light of the Ukrainian crisis. Russia’s relation to the outside world is strongly determined by independent foreign policy and actions of external powers toward Russia. Russia is a country in which domestic dilemmas and international politics are remarkably and traditionally interwoven. The country’s perception of itself as a great power and an equal in the management of regional and global affairs is a result of the increased readiness and ability to uphold its interests and achieve national strategic priorities. With the end of the Cold War Russia was viewed as a defeated power, which was supposed to submit to the West, and especially to the US foreign policy and global principles, including the spread of liberalism and democracy as main pillars of legitimacy (Cohen 2009; Sakwa 2017; Tsygankov 2019). Having survived at the turn of the centuries a series of devastating transformation crises in economy, polity and society, Russia became weakened and has lost its traditional rival advantages. However, Russia’s strive for political, economic, and social self-determination led the country to find its own path in the process of political globalization. Russia could not sacrifice its historic identity and great power status for membership in the cohort of Western powers especially on subordinate terms. Russia also became increasingly frustrated by the advance of the West to its borders, which was viewed not only as an attempt to take advantage of Russia’s weakness and fill the security vacuum but also as a negation of Russia’s concerns about changes in the balance of forces, including in its immediate neighborhood. Not surprisingly, the answer became the assertiveness and independence of Russian foreign policy and the realization of the strategic and political benefits that can be drawn from energy policy. In essence, Russia in its relations with the West and the post-Soviet states was able to put its own national interests in the first place and influence regional and global processes. In addition, Russia used the geopolitical factor to weaken the one-sided dependence of energy supplies on Western consumers, and participate in a number of influential international organizations, regional frameworks, international dialogue, and cooperation mechanisms. Russia and China and other countries are no longer focused on the Western/US political model and practice increasingly active policies to protect their spheres of international influence, calling for a more pragmatic,

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inclusive multilateralism. The tensions and contradictions of the global world order only contribute to the formation of alignments of Russia and China, on the basis of mutual coexistence and a pragmatic partnership, as states resistant to the overarching practices of the West, possessing a common aspiration to share in the management of global affairs. Putin specifically stressed the development of Eurasian relations in his address to the Federal Assembly (2019): “Equitable mutually beneficial relations with China today serve as an important stabilizing fact in world affairs, in ensuring security in Eurasia, show an example of fruitful cooperation in the economy. We pay great attention to unlocking the potential of a particularly privileged strategic partnership with India. We will continue to develop political dialogue and economic cooperation with Japan. We intend to deepen cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. We also hope that the European Union, the leading countries of Europe will nevertheless take real steps to restore normal political and economic relations with Russia.” There is, however, a disparity between the high degree of political confidence and relatively underdeveloped economic ties in relations with China and India and other countries. Qualitative improvement of economic foundations of these relations is required, using the growth energy of the new development centers in Eurasia in the interests of overcoming the problems of sluggish development. There is an understanding, though, in Russia that it does not seek and cannot be a superpower like the modern United States or the no longer existing USSR. Its international influence is based on fundamentally different mechanisms. However, it cannot “disappear from the radar” giving up their own historical destiny as one of the global players (Bezrukov et al. 2018). In the words of Dmitry Medvedev (2016): Russia is “not trying to play the role of the head of the world in any way. But Russia must occupy its rightful place in the world order and have equal relations with other countries. This has been predetermined by our history, and our size, and our participation in large global organizations…, however, no country, neither Russia nor the United States of America, can lay the weight of global problems solely on its shoulders.” Russia continues to promote the idea of a multipolar global system, which is based on the idea of diversity of the world and the existence of multiple development models, as outlined in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation of 2016 (R.F. Foreign Policy Concept 2016). While calling for the broader global anti-hegemonic realignment, it is still struggling, however, to identify and offer its own strategy and ideology. The success

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may depend on understanding of the current trends, recognizing opportunities and demonstrating leadership, willingness to share in responsibility for results, as well as upholding key national interests and conducting essential domestic reforms.

Economic Challenges The process of incorporation of domestic economies into global flows is usually a subject to certain tendencies. The most common of these suggest that the degree of participation in the international division of labor is related to the level of technical, innovation, and economic development and a scale of the country’s potential including its natural resources, institutions, and societal preferences. The Russian economy, at least since the end of the transitional period of the 1990s, has demonstrated a growing connection to global trends and challenges. After a significant and prolonged transformational recession, the Russian economic improvement from the early 2000s was boosted by swelling world market energy prices while political stabilization along with institutional reform progress was instrumental as well. The Russian government managed the global financial crisis of 2008 relatively successfully as it adopted various rescue and financial stimulus programs. However, heavily dependent on exports of commodities, Russia’s modernization, technological innovation, and diversification have been stagnant. The main vectors of Russia’s foreign economic policy became the liberalization of export–import and foreign exchange operations, close cooperation with international and regional economic organizations, and preferential orientation of developing economic ties with the emerging integration communities, especially in the Eurasian space. Russia continues to form common markets and strengthen external relations with the CIS, the G20, BRICS, SCO, deepen cooperation in the framework of the Union of Russia and Belarus, work to implement the already adopted decisions on the conjunction of the Eurasian Economic Community with the Chinese “Belt and Road” initiative as a prologue to the creation of a large Eurasian partnership. Through the use of targeted subsidies, protectionist policies, and procedural reforms, the government has been working to limit economic threats and uphold economic production. There has also been a consistent commitment to budget discipline and a measured allocation of resources among principal sectors, including the social and development sectors, as

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well as defense and security. Russia’s economic development and international linkages were significantly aggravated after the Ukrainian crisis with the imposition of targeted sectoral Western sanctions, magnified by the collapse of the oil price with subsequent devaluation of the ruble and Russian counter-sanctions. The pragmatic response by the Russian government, however, was able to employ a range of instruments and resources to shield the targeted sectors from the most devastating effects of sanctions. The successful anti-crisis policy minimized the decline, focused on domestic resources, exerted control over basic macroeconomic parameters, maintained reserves and suppressed inflation, as well as further oriented economic policy to closer relations with non-Western countries (Fortescue 2017; Mau 2018; Connolly 2018). While significant uncertainty remains about future sanctions and counter-sanctions, which could harm exports and cause a new wave of capital outflows and while many people still struggle along the poverty line, unemployment remains comparatively low by international standards, international investment continues to come in, and promising start-ups in various sectors give hope of an economic future, which is less dependent on hydrocarbons. Russia, nevertheless, faces a challenging phase of enhancing growth and attaining its desired parameters for economic, technological, and social performance. The key task is not only reaching economic growth at rates exceeding the world average and ensuring a stable increase in the quality of life, but also developing a strong, comprehensive, and competitive system of technology and innovation. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s technology, science, and innovation policy were oscillating between preservation, reform, and survival. The goals of the innovation strategies united the approaches intended to employ the education and technology potential through a number of legal, organizational, and functional instruments, reforming research and development system, and pursuing opportunities to survive in the conditions of poor funding and plunging prestige of science. Underlying both successes and challenges in innovation became the role of government, economy structure, business behavior, and culture. Political leadership has set course on reforming the innovation and technology sector and providing more opportunities for innovative enterprises to attract investment and pursue difficult developmental tasks. The country’s approach to technological development is deficient in some major driving sources for innovation, including the lack

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of demand for innovation, lack of sophistication and competition in the commercial sector, and lack of societal insistence on production of innovations. Russia’s inability to sustain the system of innovation reflects its political and social evolution and is conditioned by the overall contexts that can enable and foster innovation, such as effective governance, support for business and entrepreneurship, and trade and intellectual property laws (Klochikhin 2013; Sunghi and Yusuf 2018). The tasks set for the country are a serious challenge and require for their successful resolution not only large financial resources, but also the reorientation of industrial, financial, and foreign trade policies to create a competitive technology and innovation sector. The success of economic development and the ability to overcome social problems depend on how much Russian society will be able to adapt to new global realities and use them in the interests of modernization (Kamashev 2015; Bezrukov et al. 2018). Russia is trying to direct the process of state modernization and diversification of economy in such a way as to avoid traps and unnecessary costs. While globalization promotes interdependence and integration, in the absence of a sustainable political settlement, economic relations are susceptible to fragmentation and setbacks. From the Russian point of view, participation in the economic facet of globalization is unavoidable and even beneficial, yet the safeguard from the excessive penetration of transnational companies into the country, which can become a dangerous catalyst for the country’s political disintegration, is the strengthening of state power. Thus, the formula for responding to globalization domestically became the management of its challenges, which protects against shocks and painful side effects. For Russia, the strategy of diversification of production and export, and restoration of stable growth will be a long-term priority on the basis of employment of available resources, intellectual, and technological advantages. Without having sufficient own markets and a full range of innovative technologies, Russia will have to carefully select beneficial niches where its unique competencies are demanded globally, for example, in the field of IT and cybersecurity. In order to join economic globalization fully, Russia should invest more actively in the formation of a new agenda, the creation of technological innovations and standards, and promotion of alliances and integration mechanisms.

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Socio-Cultural Resilience and Adaptation Cultural globalization continues to have a significant impact on virtually all spheres of life. It can be viewed as a creative process of spreading new information, sharing values, and establishing new communication avenues, where the whole world becomes the audience of cultural influences. On the one hand, it allows individuals to enjoy the achievements of another culture without giving up their own. On the other hand, it is really difficult not to notice the loss of cultural diversity, and the struggle to preserve cultural variation. The strengthening of intercultural contacts also leads to ambiguous consequences and causes multifaceted reactions among representatives of different cultures. The concurrence of globalization and cultural distinctiveness, therefore, is one of the central problems of studying modern socio-cultural life, which meets the needs of a multidimensional understanding of socio-cultural processes. This must be taken into account when it comes to understanding the identity contradictions of the Russian society, as evidenced by the historical and modern Russian cultural consciousness, preoccupied with the definition of what the “nature” of Russia is. Russia is a multinational and multireligious country, with part of its population identifying itself emotionally and culturally with the Western, Christian civilization, while a significant part of the population identifies itself with the Eastern civilization. Russia also is a country of an evolving civilization characterized by the incompleteness of the process of self-identification. The country finds itself solving the problem of choice, the situation which persists for its almost entire history (Gizatova and Ivanova 2006; Gizatova et al. 2016). During significant historical occurrences, usually related to the periods of dramatic modernization, Russia has been changing its identity orientation, rethinking its values and personality, as well as the character of reaction to the external challenges. In the times of global crises, however, the forces of self-determination were becoming more pronounced. The local culture continued to reveal its powerful potential realized in the processes of social transformations (Malinovsky 2013). The problem is that the mechanisms for responding to external influences and regulating dynamic processes in social systems are embodied not only in their social institutions, economic, and political organizations, but they also concentrate on the level of habits, values, and behavioral stereotypes. As such, the ideas of patriotism in today’s conditions in Russia may contribute to the fulfillment of hope for the revival of national values and traditions of Russian society and for the country’s exit

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from the state of searching for new foundations of its existence (Azarova 2010). At the same time, Russia is not highly unique in that it carries the problem of identity. As elsewhere, Russians rethink, reevaluate, and analyze themselves and the world around them, trying to understand the universal and the particular in their identification characteristics. The problems of identity transformation of the Russian society in a global world stay increasingly important and relevant. Solving such problems will help forecast the country’s future development, its ability to respond to the numerous challenges of the modern world, and to carry out a full-fledged cultural, economic, social, and political modernization (Gorshkov 2013). People’s ideas about themselves, their place in the world, and about others directly influence the formation of a political and socio-cultural orientation, which mediates the mass perception of the role of Russia in the modern world, the attitude of the population to the Western countries, institutions and values. The formation of contemporary Russian identity is not a linear process. It is carried out in a complex and contradictory cultural and civilizational context of dynamic socio-economic interactions, the disintegration of the multinational state and the resulting need to get used to new frontiers and territorial outlines, a renewed ideological system of coordinates and a deformed pattern of “we,” embedding in a new system of relationships, mastering new social meanings, and rethinking emerging and withering values (Gorshkov 2013). A considerable influence on the formation of Russian identity, especially in the 1990s was provided by the promotion of Western values, conflict and the convergence of cultures, the explosion of ethnicity and national movements, the centrifugal trends in the republics, and regions. All this preconditioned the diversity of the world in which individualization of people’s identities took place. On the other hand, the need for a space where you are understood and your interests and values are shared increased and the importance of larger communities and the sense of belonging to them, including the formation of state, civil, and political nation belongingness, also increased. The idea of Russia as a unique Eurasian civilization, one of the characteristics of which is the peaceful coexistence of many nationalities and religions and the understanding of the Russian people as a historical whole and a civic nation have been a recurrent theme in the rhetoric of the president, officials, and academics. This concept was positively perceived by

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many intellectuals and politicians as the only possible for Russia and fully complying with the experiences accumulated by the world community in the context of large multiethnic states supporting the concept of civil nationalism. The atmosphere of Russian social and political life is also determined by an increasing degree of self-reliance and growing confidence accompanied by a desire to differentiate from the West. This is expressed in the need to define Russian civilization identity, for which finding adequate answers to the global challenges of a new era has a special meaning, related to the issue of a preservation of its independent geopolitical, socio-cultural and civilizational character (Zhade 2014). The prevailing crisis of Russian identity is, first of all, a conflict with new realities, entailing the process of abandoning former social roles, national self-determination and ideological images. All of this actualizes the problem of reconstructing the integrity of the Russian identity given its civilization features. While the experiences and acquired knowledge modify cultural realms and societal perceptions as well as crystallize socio-cultural heritage in Russia, “national identity is the most important core of a country, which determines its viability in today’s rapidly changing world, creates a community of the people and gives people confidence in the future” (Esen’kin 2017). That is why Russian culture and identity are also considered as one of the facets of the country’s national security. For the first time at the state level, the Strategy for the State Cultural Policy for the period up to 2030, elevated culture to the rank of national priorities as “a set of formal and informal institutions, phenomena and factors affecting the preservation, production, transmission and dissemination of spiritual values (ethical, aesthetic, intellectual, civil, etc.)”. Changes that occurred and are occurring in Russia bring to light historical experiences, inclinations, and aspirations of society, at the same time pushing people to rethink innovative and traditional trends and create a new ideology of social development. The main task for Russian society is to develop a course for the future, understand the deep contradictions of the past, respect and treasure own cultural achievements. The efforts to generalize about the consequences of cultural globalization are flawed. Only by performing a cautious analysis of globalization’s outcomes in specific conditions, can any assessment be concluded about its character, benefits, and disadvantages.

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Prospects for the Future Three prominent features of globalization stand out. One is its growing magnitude and intensification. Second is the unevenness and inconsistency in its advance. Third is the changing nature of globalization, characterized by the exacerbation of a number of global problems, conflicts, and cleavages. Globalization influences the structure of international relations, which is becoming increasingly complex due to political tensions, disparities in economic development, competition in technological capabilities, as well as clashing value systems. Globalization uncovers not only the shift in the geopolitical role of individual states, or the transformation of strategic choices, it ultimately challenges our view of geographical space, interdependence, and power. The world is facing far-reaching transformations, which are part of a prolonged period that has been developing since the end of the Cold War. These changes, however, have assumed new features recently with the system of international relations becoming more complex and volatile, adding to the serious tensions between the major powers. New cleavages emerged, with the conflict between Russia and the West is one of the most prominent examples of this new reality. At the same time, globalization opens up windows of opportunity for cooperation in exceedingly varied realms of human activity alleviating international excesses. Specifically, the conflict between Russia and the West may be mitigated by stopping to lose critical time needed to counteract common challenges, including nuclear nonproliferation, fighting terrorism, security and environmental issues, and space exploration with potential expansion of cooperation areas, and changing the spirit of relations from confrontational to mutually beneficial collaboration. Nonetheless, globalization creates pressures on socio-economic, political, cultural, and other patterns of development. The institutional system of regional and global political governance has been struggling to keep pace with the accomplishments of economic globalization. And, the economic integration projects themselves tend to get politicized, as they are being influenced by political contradictions among the major powers. This complicates cooperation between integration institutions, restricting their inclusiveness and openness. These imbalances carry the threat of intensifying political disagreements and social-economic stratification. The consequences of globalization may also be discernible over both the short and long runs in the ways in which countries and localities produce adaptations to global forces. Such adaptations, nevertheless, are far

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from automatic, uniform, or universal. Globalization is interceded, managed, contested, and opposed by states, communities, and individuals. It produces a kaleidoscope of reactions, where universalization, homogenization, and westernization are met with interpretation and adaptation to local conditions, as well as confrontation and spillover of resistance. Globalization has diverse consequences that are not easily predicted, and the principles of globalization do not apply everywhere. States and societies exhibit different degrees of sensitivity or vulnerability to global processes such that patterns of domestic adjustment vary in terms of their degree and duration. Russia remains one of the major world powers. It conducts an active foreign policy, consistently defending its interests domestically and abroad, and even challenging the global order. Russia, however, is interested in combining efforts in order to stabilize the situation in the world and find optimal solutions to many contemporary problems. Collaboration is especially relevant today, when there is a dangerous accumulation of conflict potential in the world (Lavrov 2019). Russia insists on the need for countries to be able to develop an optimal approach for obtaining the benefits of globalization in the interests of their development, while preserving the space for foreign policy maneuver and the protection of security interests and national identity. Endeavors to facilitate the resolution of conflicts and help in establishing a stable, inclusive, governable, and safe international environment should continue to represent the essence of Russia’s global positioning (Timofeev 2017). A priority task is the development of such a world order that would guarantee stability and security at all levels, helping to neutralize the current challenges and threats and preventing the appearance of new ones. There are objective prerequisites for building an inclusive international order in which each state would bear its share of responsibility for the future of humanity, and in which the world community protects international law and the legitimate interests of each of its members. The world faces a strategic challenge associated with the formation of its operational and political space filled with those institutions where countries can realize their political and socio-economic potential. Suspending the status quo for the international system based on a significantly different set of principles will not result in positive outcomes, especially because there is high political demand for multipolarity serving as a contender of the unipolar world concept (Kortunov 2019). The

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problem, however, is that the withdrawal from the current system cannot occur chaotically, by going nowhere. On the one hand, the international community can move forward by reforming, strengthening, and adapting global governance institutions to the new realities, by proposing new initiatives for cooperation to advance the concepts of global advantages and security. On the other hand, the apparent global transition will require major reevaluation of strategies, resources, and opportunities available to international actors, perceptions and values of major world players, and the character of domestic processes. The global community faces the challenge of reforming the governance basis of international politics, which is exhibiting the signs of significant destabilization, searching for mechanisms of crafting intricate balances of interests at the domestic, regional, and global levels, and developing more nuanced and adjustable formulas to manage individual facets of international engagement. While, the future global order will likely be more complicated, world actors should focus on the consistent achievement of resolving key political problems in relations with each other. Sensible response to the number of common challenges and threats should sprout from a variety of policy combinations by different countries cooperating with each other in different formats. In the context of the transformation of the international system, Russia has to secure its own position in the process of solving global problems. As states are acquiring new capabilities in an effort to gain more influence, Russia’s future depends on how adequately it will respond to the challenges and how effectively it will be able to use its advantages. Russia should not simply absorb the results of global advances, but rather employ and actively develop areas of political, economic, and cultural cooperation, by linking foreign policy strongly to the priorities of domestic development. Russia’s global role centers on preventing arms race; fighting terrorism; advancing space exploration and the Arctic research; promoting global energy, food, and cybersecurity; and advancing cooperation on climate and other environmental challenges. Russia shoulders a major part of the responsibility for the future of the global world order and its pragmatic, flexible and inclusive policies should help identify adequate solutions to eliminate the growing risks of a wide-ranging conflict and develop a strategy for managing globalization, which would allow all nations to enjoy its benefits.

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Index

A Authority, 20, 45, 53, 90, 97, 100, 171

B Balance of power, 39, 52, 63 Belinskiy, Vissarion, 50, 212 Berlin Wall, 46, 56 Burbulis, Gennadiy, 87

C Capitalism, 1, 6, 7, 11, 12, 34–36, 45, 55, 58, 83, 149 Chaadayev, Petr Iakovlevich, 49 Chechnya, 58, 87, 210 China, 2, 6, 38, 60, 63, 64, 115, 120, 141, 152–154, 162, 231, 232 Chubais, Anatoly, 87 Clinton, William, 87 Cold War, 10, 15, 18, 19, 31, 39, 46, 47, 53, 54, 56, 59, 60, 62, 85, 109–111, 117–120, 164, 231, 239

Cooperation, 7, 14, 16, 20, 39, 41, 47, 48, 57, 59, 60, 64, 103, 113, 116–119, 122, 141, 155, 164, 170, 198, 205, 227, 229, 231–233, 239, 241 Crimea, 38, 118, 193 Culture conservative, 36 contradictions, 145, 184, 236, 238 global culture and local self, 200 homogenization, 35, 36, 189, 200 hybridization, 183, 194, 207 language, 65, 184, 187, 193, 196, 208, 209, 213 morality, 191, 196 perception of, 21, 185, 202, 238 popular, 21, 55, 56, 184, 185, 198, 202, 204, 207, 211 traditional values, 195 transformations, 212 D Danilevski, Nikolay, 50 Democracy

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 L. V. Kochtcheeva, Russian Politics and Response to Globalization, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39145-4

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INDEX

culture of, 54, 58 democratic institutions, 85 democratization, 19, 53, 96, 99, 123 evaluations of, 98 individual freedoms, 107, 123 transition to, 98 values of, 67 Western model, 94, 102, 199 Digital environment, 107

E Economy, 6, 11–14, 16–19, 34, 43, 46, 53, 56, 57, 60, 66, 85, 86, 88, 90–92, 95, 96, 107, 108, 113, 116, 118, 119, 134, 136–138, 140, 142–151, 157–163, 166–174, 183, 185, 192, 197, 199, 228, 229, 231, 232, 234, 235 financial crisis, 134, 233 property rights, 134, 158, 173 Education, 51, 56, 84, 94, 113, 122, 146, 163, 165, 170, 171, 183, 194, 197, 198, 202, 205, 234 Equal partner, 40, 69 Eurasian Economic Union, 119 Europe colonialism, 10, 42 Europeanization, 33, 42, 45, 47, 51 European states, 43, 44, 48, 83 Western European ideas, 45

F Foreign policy, 1–3, 14, 18, 20, 40, 41, 45, 58–60, 68, 90, 92, 95, 104, 108, 110–114, 117, 124, 147, 197, 228, 229, 231, 240, 241 Free market economy, 51

G Gaidar, Yegor, 87 Geopolitical position, 15, 37, 40, 69 Georgian-Russian war of 2008, 38 Glasnost , 56, 97, 204 Globalization architecture of, 3, 4 concept of, 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, 39, 89, 93, 191, 192 cooperation, 11, 13, 48 domestic responses to, 1, 13, 20, 228 nature of, 1, 2, 9, 18, 21, 193, 217, 239 “sender” and “receiver” societies, 19, 33, 37, 39 unevenness, 9, 19, 33, 239 Global stratification, 31 Governance institutions, 161, 241 H Hegemony, 14, 201 “Hyperglobalist” perspective, 11 I Identity, 2–4, 10, 14–19, 21, 31, 33, 36, 37, 39, 42, 47, 48, 51, 62, 65–68, 81, 85, 86, 89, 92, 93, 96, 102, 103, 115, 122, 143, 184, 185, 188, 190, 191, 193, 194, 196, 198, 201–203, 205, 207, 212–217, 228, 229, 231, 236–238, 240 Ideological diversity, 203 India, 2, 35, 115, 141, 162, 232 Innovation business and commercial sectors, 167 competitiveness, 37, 96, 156, 167 high-tech developments, 162 stimulus for, 170, 233

INDEX

Strategy of Innovative Development, 163 “Institutional matrix”, 82 Intelligentsia, 55, 56, 199, 211 Interdependency, 2, 10, 229 Internationalization, 5, 34, 88, 123, 133, 142, 156 International relations, 8, 10, 37, 45, 51, 55, 61, 63, 64, 92, 110–113, 116, 117, 120, 122, 149, 239 Internet, 7, 35, 36, 48, 106, 107, 191, 204, 206–208, 210

K Karamzin, Nikolay, 50 Kirievski, Ivan, 50 Kozyrev, Andrey, 87

L Lavrov, Sergey, 14, 43, 47, 90, 92, 93, 112–114, 119, 229, 240

M Media, 90, 103, 105, 106, 155, 185, 188, 192, 199, 201, 204, 208 Medvedev, Dmitry, 34, 42, 46, 66, 99, 104, 112, 116, 117, 120, 159, 162, 165, 167, 232 Military power, 62, 145, 197 Mutual benefit, 51

N National interest, 4, 15, 38, 41, 52, 58, 63, 69, 91, 95, 110, 111, 191, 193, 213, 227, 231, 233 Nationalism, 8, 15, 20, 21, 110, 118, 122, 187, 213–215, 231, 238 NATO expansion, 89

247

Naval’ny, Alexey, 100 Nicholas I, 52

O Obama, Barack, 117

P Patriotism, 15, 45, 119, 184, 195–197, 213, 214, 231, 236 Perestroika, 56, 97, 148, 199, 204 Peter the Great, 43, 52, 144, 197, 203 Primakov, yevgeny, 112 Protest anti-Putinism, 101 fifth column, 102 government response, 101 Putin, Vladimir legitimacy, 88, 103, 198 political stability, 88, 99 population support, 88, 96, 103, 104 power concentration, 88 Russia’s role in the world, 19, 42

R Regime, 11, 19, 20, 31, 34, 35, 37, 39, 41, 43, 54, 81, 91, 99, 105, 107, 109, 118, 137, 148, 183 and change, 17, 101, 105, 229 Rule of law, 63, 81, 87, 90, 91, 97, 99, 103, 106, 122 Russia ambitions, 44, 64, 91, 161 autocracy, 14, 45, 65, 82–84, 149 backwardness, 14, 43, 52, 82, 144, 146, 167 borders, 1, 14, 41, 44, 65, 96, 120, 186, 231

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INDEX

competition with U.S., 10, 54, 60 corruption, 104 elections, 87, 90, 94, 98, 100, 105 European influence, 43, 45 external challenges, 61, 85, 138, 185, 228, 230, 236 great power, 4, 37–40, 44, 45, 50, 58, 60–62, 67, 69, 88, 89, 110, 111, 113, 120, 145, 173, 195–197, 214, 215, 231 liberalization, 15, 34, 49, 87, 88, 90, 123, 171, 233 middle position, 49, 82 military-industrial strength, 55 modernization, 39, 42–44, 49, 52, 67, 85, 87, 93, 155, 169, 170, 172, 173, 185, 187, 216, 233, 235–237 Mongol invasion, 49, 82, 185 paternalism, 67, 88, 230 place in the world, 16, 61, 81, 119, 134, 202, 232, 237 pragmatism, 88, 169 privatization, 15, 57, 87, 134 radical reforms, 86, 87 Russian Empire, 34, 38, 52 serfdom, 44, 52, 82, 83, 145, 146 spheres of influence, 31, 53, 58, 63 statehood, 15, 81, 83, 89, 91, 94, 100, 116, 186, 230 Tsar, 43, 44, 83, 144 Russian economy agricultural production, 139, 143 anti-crisis plan, 136 debt-to GDP ratio, 141 diversification of, 91, 150 economic adjustment, 138, 173 energy superpower, 150 export, 151, 152, 173, 235 foreign direct investment, 134, 138, 141, 170, 174

foreign trade, 143–145, 148, 149, 151–153, 172 import substitution, 137, 139 industrial development, 38, 52, 144, 146, 148 living standards, 56, 57, 108, 148 localization, 155, 212 neo-liberal transformation, 148 oil price, 136, 137, 152 property rights, 138 recession, 136, 141, 173, 233 recovery, 135, 137 structural reform, 137, 161 Russian Federation, 13, 47, 65, 92, 101, 104, 105, 151–153, 162, 167, 195, 198, 215, 232 Russian foreign policy assertiveness of, 231 constructive international agenda, 113 doctrine of, 63 Eurasian neighbors, 64 Foreign Policy Concept, 47, 92, 112, 198, 199, 232 multipolarity, 63 Munich Security Conference, 92 national security, 90, 93 polycentrism, 124 Russian national identity communal values, 65 crisis of, 141, 238 Great Patriotic War, 213 multiculturalism, 203 national idea, 50, 66, 215 ‘nation-mindedness’, 186 patriotism, 20, 215 post-Soviet identity, 67 Russian Christian Orthodoxy, 65 self-identification, 59, 193 self-reliance, 65, 238 spiritual values, 98, 238

INDEX

State Strategy on the Cultural Politics, 195 Russian national interest, 2, 4, 15, 63, 95, 111, 191, 228, 231 “sovereign democracy”, 89, 99 strategy of promoting, 63 strong state, 15, 67, 93, 96, 99 Russia-West relations bilateral cooperation, 57 confrontation, 3, 63 equal footing, 110 lack of ideological foundation, 59 “pluralistic unipolarity”, 111 points of contention, 9 rivalry, 60 Russian-American relations, 52, 60 S Sanctions, 47, 58, 107, 108, 113, 115, 118, 136–139, 152, 159, 161, 164, 171, 173, 195, 234 “Shock therapy”, 14, 87, 134 Skeptical perspective, 106 Slavophiles, 47, 65, 66, 185 Socialist system, 57 Sovereignty, 1, 3, 4, 7, 11, 15, 16, 18, 19, 31, 38, 44, 45, 64, 67, 69, 81, 86, 89–94, 96, 99, 111–113, 122, 124, 187, 191, 194, 197, 199, 200, 229, 230 Soviet Union collapse of, 1, 14, 31, 46, 51, 54, 64, 65, 85, 86, 91, 110, 122, 134, 160, 183, 186, 188, 189, 192, 199, 204, 214, 234 Soviet people, 65 Soviet society, 56, 65. See also Economy State centralization, 44, 84, 85, 90 planning, 39, 84, 85, 90 self-preservation, 94

249

social order, 96, 108 traditional, 43, 83–85, 87, 90, 94, 97, 98, 101, 108, 111, 117, 119, 123, 195, 196 Superpower, 14, 39, 53, 54, 57, 59, 66, 84, 113, 171, 191, 232 Surkov, Vladislav, 89 Syria, 38, 81, 107, 113, 117

T Technology, 7, 11, 13, 21, 35, 42, 44, 65, 138, 148, 155, 156, 160, 163–165, 168, 169, 171, 197, 201, 206, 208, 227, 234, 235 “Transformationalist” perspective, 11, 12 Trump, Donald, 117

U Ukrainian crisis, 20, 47, 81, 104, 116, 136, 138, 195, 231, 234 United Nations (UN), 10, 13, 39, 42, 122 United States (US) American economy, 34, 54 Americanization, 6, 33, 51, 54, 55 indispensable nation, 53 liberal ideology, 53 pluralism of beliefs, 187 regulation of international development, 39 unilateral approaches, 58 UN Security Council, 4, 14, 120

V Valdai Club, 8, 110, 112, 121, 227 Values equality of, 40, 47 imposition of, 47, 63, 113, 121, 234

250

INDEX

W West economic and political influence, 4, 229 liberal world order, 6, 121 moral authority, 40 trade, 6, 7, 32, 35, 39, 82, 117, 145 westernization, 6, 7, 33, 35, 43, 185, 187, 189, 190, 198–200, 210, 240 Western social science, 6 Westernizers, 45–47, 49, 65–67, 185 World Bank, 57, 134–140, 148, 161, 166

World order, 3, 4, 7, 10, 15, 19, 21, 31, 32, 39–41, 57, 59, 60, 62, 69, 109, 111, 113, 115–117, 120, 121, 227, 228, 232, 240, 241 challenges to, 10 World War II, 53

Y Yeltsin, Boris, 46, 57, 87, 97, 103, 111, 120 Young generations, 204, 205, 208, 211 Yugoslavia, 47, 58