Russian-Indonesian Cooperation: Past, Present and Development Prospects 9785907384156

Citation preview

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospect

РОССИЙСКОИНДОНЕЗИЙСКОЕ СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВО: прошлое, настоящее и перспективы развития

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospect

THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES INSTITUTE OF ORIENTAL STUDIES

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

Moscow IOS RAS 2020

УДК 327 ББК 63.3(0)63+ 63.3(0)64+ 66.4(2Рос)+ 66.4(4/8) Executive Editors: Ph.D. E. Astafieva, Dr. E. Kanaev Reviewers: Dr. V. Kolotov, Dr. M. Shpakovskaya Authors: M. Wahid Supriyadi, D. Mosyakov, E. Kanaev, E. Galchenko, P. Shaternikov, S. Paderina, M. Terskikh, N. Maletin, А. Drugov A. Popov, A.V. Vladimirova, N.Kuklin, Alfachreza Azure RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects (Collective Monograph) / Ed. by E. Astafieva, E. Kanaev, IOS RAS. – Moscow, 2020 – 250 р. ISBN 978-5-907384-15-6 The publication was carried out within the framework of a joint project of HSE University and the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences for the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR / Russia and the Republic of Indonesia. The project heads are Dr. Evgeny Kanaev (HSE University) and Dr. Dmitry Mosyakov (IOS RAS). ISBN 978-5-907384-15-6

Approved for publication by the Institute of Oriental Studies RAS © IOS RAS, 2020

РОССИЙСКАЯ АКАДЕМИЯ НАУК ИНСТИТУТ ВОСТОКОВЕДЕНИЯ

РОССИЙСКОИНДОНЕЗИЙСКОЕ СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВО: прошлое, настоящее и перспективы развития

Москва ИВ РАН 2020

УДК 327 ББК 63.3(0)63+ 63.3(0)64+ 66.4(2Рос)+ 66.4(4/8) Р76 Ответственные редакторы: к.и.н. Е. М. Астафьева, д.и.н. Е. А. Канаев Рецензенты: д.и.н. В. Н. Колотов, д.и.н. М. А. Шпаковская Авторы: М. Вахид Суприяди, Д. В. Мосяков, Е. А. Канаев, Е. А. Гальченко, П. С. Шатерников, С. А. Падерина, М. А. Терских, Н. П. Малетин, А.Ю. Другов, А. В. Попов, А. В. Владимирова, Н. С. Куклин, Алфахреза Азуре Утверждено к печати Редакционно-издательским советом Институтом востоковедения РАН

Р76 Российско-индонезийское сотрудничество: прошлое, настоящее и перспективы развития (Коллективная монография); на англ. яз. / Отв. ред. Е. М. Астафьева, Е. А. Канаев, ИВ РАН. – Москва, 2020 – 250 с. ISBN 978-5-907384-15-6 Издание выполнено в рамках совместного проекта Национального исследовательского университета Высшая школа экономики и Института востоковедения РАН к 70-летию установления дипломатических отношений между СССР / Россией и Республикой Индонезия. Руководители проекта – Е.А. Канаев (НИУ ВШЭ) и Д.В. Мосяков (ИВ РАН). ISBN 978-5-907384-15-6

© ФГБУН ИВ РАН, 2020

CONTENTS Foreword. The 70th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations: Achievements and Tasks for the Future By: M. Wahid Supriyadi, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Indonesia to the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus ........ 7 Chapter 1. Indonesian Vision of the Future in the Asia Pacific and Indo-Pacific Regions and Russia and its Presence and Interests in the Southeast Asia By: Dmitry V. Mosyakov ........................................... 18 Chapter 2. The Greater Eurasian Partnership: a Re-Energizer of Russia-Indonesia Cooperation? By: Evgeny A. Kanaev, Evgeny A. Galchenko ........... 51 Chapter 3. Russia-Indonesia Strategic Partnership: The Interplay of Institutional Foundations, Ulterior Motives and Emerging Tasks By: Pavel S. Shaternikov, Sofya A. Paderina ............. 72 Chapter 4. Russia-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership: Lessons for Russia-Indonesia Relations By: Mikhail A. Terskikh ............................................. 87 Chapter 5. Russian-Indonesian cooperation during the presidency of Joko Widodo. 2014–2020 By: Nikolay P. Maletin ............................................... 106 Chapter 6. From the History of Soviet-Indonesian Military-Technical Cooperation By: Aleksey Yu. Drugov ............................................. 137

Chapter 7. The Development of Russia – Indonesia Military-Technical Cooperation since the Period of the “New Order” By: Aleksandr V. Popov ............................................. 156 Chapter 8. Stable and Sustainable: Patterns of Foreign Trade Between Russia and Indonesia By: Alina V. Vladimirova........................................... 167 Chapter 9. Enhancing Indonesia-Russia Social and Humanitarian Cooperation: New Opportunities for Strategic Partnership By: Nikita S. Kuklin, Alfachreza Azure ..................... 184 Conclusion ......................................................................... 220 Bibliography ..................................................................... 231

Fo re w or d

M. Wahid Supriyadi Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Indonesia to the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus

The 70th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations: Achievements and Tasks for the Future Early Relations A researcher named Nikolay Mikhlukho-Maclay visited Batavia and Ternate in 1873. Mikhlukho, a Russian and an expert in ethnology, anthropology, and biology, went on an expedition to the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, and Papua. Four times visiting Papua to investigate the local tribes' culture, he wrote five books which became references in the field of Southeast Asian study for European anthropologists. The last Russian Emperor, Nikolai Aleksandrovich (Tsar Nikolai II) visited Batavia on 23 February – 1 March 1890 and appointed Russia’s first consul M. Bakunin in Batavia. Bakunin served as Vice Consul in Batavia in the period of 1894– 1899. After completing his assignment as Vice Consul in Indonesia (1894–1899), later in 1902 Bakunin wrote a 456-page memoir with the title “The Netherlands Tropika: Five years in Java”. This book also contains the first Russian-Malay dictionary, which consists of 500 words and phrases. Bakunin's book helped promote Indonesian studies in Russia. In the early 1920s, a Russian researcher Alexander Huber conducted systematic studies on several countries in Southeast Asia including Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam. Huber's work was completed in 1932 into a book titled “Indonesia,

The 70th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations: Achievements and Tasks for the Future

Socio-Economic Sketch”. Of all Western academics, Huber was the first to use the name of Indonesia in his writings. In 1945 Indonesian study was formally established at the Institute of Asian and African Studies (ISAA) at Lomonosov Moscow State University, followed by the University of Leningrad in 1950 (now St. Petersburg State University-SPBGU). Meanwhile, Russian Departments were introduced at two universities in Indonesia, i.e. University of Indonesia and University of Padjadjaran. The Soviet Union (USSR) formally recognized Indonesia’s sovereignty on 25 January 1950 and expressed its intention to establish diplomatic relations with Indonesia. In 1954, both countries opened their respective embassies in Jakarta and Moscow. Dr. Soebandrio became the first Ambassador of the Republic of Indonesia to the USSR, while Dmitry A. Zhukov became the first Ambassador of the USSR to the Republic of Indonesia. The Soviet Union also opened Consulates in Surabaya, Banjarmasin and Medan in 1962. “Old Order Period”: The Golden Era of the Bilateral Relations Following World War II, the period of 1947–1991 was called “the Cold War era” and was filled in with tension between the two superpowers: the United States with its Western Bloc and the Soviet Union with its Eastern Bloc. The two countries fought for influence in world spheres and threatened each other. This era was characterized by arms race, espionage, as well as ideological warfare. Indonesia fought against colonialism and proclaimed its independence in 1945, thus Indonesia became a resolute opponent of colonialism. This principle is enshrined in the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution, affirming that colonialism should be totally abolished in the world. Indonesia's First President, Soekarno became a prominent figure in internation8

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

al fora for advocating anti-colonialism. In 1955 Indonesia successfully hosted the first Asian-African Conference in Bandung which discussed a number of agendas, including the fight against colonialism and neo-colonialism. In 1956 Indonesia started to fight to reclaim West Irian, viewed by Soekarno as an undisputed territory of the Republic. The Indonesia’s campaign to reclaim West Irian was supported by the Soviet Union as a proof of its commitment and recognition of the Indonesian territorial integrity. Soekarno worked to seek support from the US and the USSR in order to modernize its military capability. The US was reluctant to assist Indonesia due to its close relations with the Netherland, on the contrary the USSR’s response was very positive. Soekarno visited the Soviet Union for the first time in August-September 1956, then on 5 June 1961. The Soviet Union gave its support in the form of advanced defense/military equipment supply to Indonesia, such as warships, submarines, fighter planes and tanks. Projects in the field of military cooperation between the two countries were conducted by the USSR’s loan scheme that amounted to USD 1 billion. Indonesia also sent troops and military personnel to join military technical training in Moscow and Leningrad (now St. Petersburg). Meanwhile, the USSR sent around 1,000 instructors to Indonesia (Jakarta, Surabaya, Bandung, and Madiun) to provide technical training. Indonesia's army was significantly modernized thanks to the support of the Soviet Union which made it the strongest military power in Southern hemisphere. History also recorded that Indonesian pilots and sailors joined military training in Sevastopol and in Vladivostok in April-November 1961. The close relations between the two countries and the success of Soekarno to establish a personal relation with the Chairman of the Council of Ministers Nikita Khrushchev dur-

9

The 70th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations: Achievements and Tasks for the Future

ing this time marked this period as the Golden Era of the bilateral relations of our two countries. “New Order Era” The third coup by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) on 30 September turned the Republic into an anticommunist country. The communist ideology was formally banned. The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was established in 1920 and by 1965 it became one of the strongest communist parties in the world, right behind the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and China. After its earlier tendency to follow Moscow’s line between 1956 and 1964, PKI under leadership of D.N. Aidit started to lean on Beijing between 1963 and 1964 (Beijing Axis). It was based on the idea of an agrarian revolution (villages besieges the city) to rise to power - a different concept of Moscow's relatively peaceful communism under President Nikita Khrushchev. Dr. Salim Said in his book titled “Gestapu”, said that during his visit to Moscow in 1962 D.N. Aidit was strongly reminded by the ideologist of the Soviet’s Communist Party, Mikhael Suslov that PKI had gone too far from the real goal of communist ideology. Suslov said if PKI did not change its direction, it would destroy it through its enemy. Since taking office, President Soeharto was fully determined to eliminate PKI. PKI's ideology was considered incompatible with the Indonesian Ideology of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. Communism was restricted and prohibited for discussions in various fora. The New Order government finally severed diplomatic ties with the PRC on 30 August 1967 based on a presumption that the PRC was directly involved in coup. In order to finance the country's development, President Soeharto sought long-term loans from Inter-governmental Group on Indonesia/IGGI (which then was recommissioned 10

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

into the Consultative Group for Indonesia/CGI), a group of creditor countries to Indonesia. This group was generally comprised of developed countries from the West. IGGI was established in 1967, followed by CGI in 1992. With loanfinanced development the government's debt skyrocketed, and it compelled Indonesia to rely heavily on the West. Although Indonesia's GDP grew between 6-7% during the New Order, its debt load increased significantly every year making Indonesia more dependent on the West. Meanwhile, Indonesia's relations with Eastern Bloc countries, especially with the Soviet Union, were stagnant, if not casual. At the same time relations with the Soviet Union were carefully maintained, and both agreed not to interfere in their domestic affairs. President Soeharto made his first state visit to the Soviet Union in 1989, where he met the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev to explore areas of cooperation based on mutual benefit. Both leaders signed the Statements on the Fundamentals of Friendly Relations and Cooperation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Indonesia on 11 September 1989. “Post New Order Era” With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, President Boris Yeltsin’s government tried to liberalize the economy. During the period of 1992–1998, the liberal economic experiment failed to improve Russian economy. The gap was wide and living standards were plummeting. In his New Year’s eve address on 31 December 1999, President Boris Yeltsin resigned and appointed Vladimir Putin as Acting President. He later won the Russian Presidential election in 2000. During the period of 2000–2008, thanks to the oil boom, the Russian government spent the profits from oil revenues to pay for its foreign debt and started to spend the money on economic development that had been neglected during the Yeltsin’s years. 11

The 70th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations: Achievements and Tasks for the Future

Visit of President Megawati Soekarnoputri Despite some global challenges, the Indonesia-Russia’s bilateral relationship grew stronger on the basis of a spirit of friendship, equality, mutual respect and understanding. One of the new milestones in the relations was the signing of the Declaration on the Framework of Friendship and Partnership Relations between the Republic of Indonesia and the Russian Federation in the 21st Century signed by President Megawati Soekarnoputri and President Vladimir Putin on 21 April 2003 during her visit to Russia. This document serves as the basis for strategic cooperation between the two countries at the global, regional and bilateral level. Visit of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Meanwhile, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono visited Russia on 9–10 September 2012 to attend the 24th APEC Summit in Vladivostok and the G20 summit in St. Petersburg on 5–6 September 2013. The presence of the President was important with regard to the handover of the Chairmanship of APEC from Russia to Indonesia for the year 2013. As for the G-20 summit in St Petersburg in 2013, Indonesia continued to promote sustainable development, whereas financial inclusion is a key issue for developing countries. Russia also continues to strengthen relationships and partnerships with some of the key countries in Asia such as China, India, and Indonesia. Russia is increasingly aware that Southeast Asia is an important region with huge potential, especially in the economic field. In Russia's Look East Policy improvement of economic cooperation with Asia, including Southeast Asia, would help Russian development, especially in Siberia and Far East regions. Russia also needs Asian countries to promote regional cooperation in combating terrorism, maintaining security and stability and promoting dialogue among civilizations. Therefore, Russia actively takes part in 12

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

the integration process of the Asia-Pacific region, mainly through APEC, the ASEAN-Russia Dialogue, ARF and ASEM. Visit of President Joko Widodo President Joko Widodo visited Sochi on 19–20 May 2016 to attend the 20th ASEAN-Russia Summit. During his meeting with President Putin, both leaders discussed efforts to develop bilateral cooperation in a more comprehensive manner, particularly in the fields of defense, economic trade, investment and tourism. Five MOUs were signed which include cooperation in the field of defense, national archives, Foreign Ministry archives, culture, as well as IUU Fishing. CEOs of six Russian companies met with the President to discuss investment potentials in Indonesia. They are committed to invest in Indonesia amounting to USD 20 billion. Similarly, cooperation in the political field is at an excellent level. There has been a significant increase in the intensity of contact and mutual visits of high officials of both countries. In addition, cooperation between Parliaments was also encouraging with the establishment of Friendship Group of the Regional Representative Council (DPD) of the Republic of Indonesia and the Russian Federation Council in November 2014. Towards Strategic Partnership Marking the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations, Indonesia and Russia agree to alleviate the bilateral relations into a Strategic Partnership, the highest level of relations between countries. President Vladimir Putin and President Joko Widodo were scheduled to meet this year but due to the Covid-19 Pandemic, the meeting could not materialize. The strategic partnership will provide more opportunities to reinforce the shared commitments and to broaden the levels of cooperation at the highest level. At the moment there are at least six regular meeting mechanisms that have been going on in the form of joint 13

The 70th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations: Achievements and Tasks for the Future

commission, working groups, policy planning and bilateral consultation such as: • Bilateral Consultation between Indonesian Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law and Security and Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation; • Joint Commission on Trade, Economic and Technical Cooperation between the Office of the Indonesian Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs and Russian Industry and Trade Ministry; • Joint Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation between the Indonesian Defense Industry and Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation; • Bilateral Consultation between Regional Representative Council of the Republic of Indonesia and the Federation Council of Russian Federation; • Bilateral Consultation between Indonesian and Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Legal Basis, Human Rights, Policy Planning, and Terrorism; • Indonesia-Russia Interfaith and Intermedia Dialogue The relations between Indonesia and Russia have steadily strengthened as showed by the establishment of various platforms of dialogues and mechanism on politics, economy, finance, defense and security, terrorism, cyber security, sister city/province and culture. Indonesia has more dialogues with Russia than any other Eurasian countries. Challenges and Opportunities The problem of global environment of the 21st century is more multi-dimensional and unpredictable. The world is becoming more insecure and facing new threats such as ethnorelated conflicts, the rise of radicalization and violent extremism. The pandemic of Covid-19 has created unprecedented challenges to globalization that no country is prepared to face. 14

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

Despite having considerably positive side, globalization also brings about negative impacts as in the case of corona virus. The spread of the virus in uncontrollable manner was also due to the rapid development of people’s movement thanks to the globalization. The pandemic has also created a new phenomenon unthinkable by those who believe in globalization: closed border, travel ban, paralyzed supply chains and export restriction. Many countries, including those who first championed the globalization are also becoming more protectionist, and sadly this is followed by racial abuses as if the virus had originated from a certain nationality. Unfortunately, also, many recent elections have been won by those candidates who advocated protectionist policy based on narrow-minded nationalism. This in turn promoted strong border control, tariffs and restriction on immigration, which are against the principle of globalization and WTO. Nobody knows when corona virus will end, but for sure the world will be facing the biggest recession since the World War I. In facing the pandemic, for example, Indonesia and other members of ASEAN prefer cooperation and coordination. Indonesia is encouraging ASEAN countries to closely cooperate in border control, and make sure that each member country’s policy would not disrupt medical supply chain urgently needed by all members. In the case of Russia, as I often said, there have been mutual ignorance on both sides. Many people in Indonesia still view Russia as an extension of the Soviet Union with Communist ideology, while majority of Russians still believe that Russia is part of the West despite the fact that 75% of its territory lies in Asia. Russia is the 12th biggest economy in the world and Indonesia is the 16th, but if we look at our bilateral trade, it does not reflect our true potentials. We are not com15

The 70th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations: Achievements and Tasks for the Future

petitors, instead we complement each other. Russia needs palm oil from Indonesia and Indonesia needs grain from Russia. Total trade value between Indonesia and Russia based on data from the Federal Custom Service / FCS in 2019 was 2.45 billion USD, down to 5.09% from 2018, when it reached 2.58 billion USD. Within ASEAN, Indonesia ranks third after Vietnam, which is the traditional partner of Russia, and Malaysia. The Indonesian Embassy initiated the Indonesian Festival (Festival Indonesia) since 2016 and has made it an annual event. The festival is designed to showcase Indonesian products, promote tourism, as well as presentation of cultural performances, beside organizing a business forum which could attract business people from both sides. The number of Russian tourists visiting Indonesia continues to increase. In 2019 158 943 Russian tourists visited Indonesia, their amount almost doubled from 80 514 in 2016. On the other hand, the number of Indonesian tourists visiting Russia increased six-folds from only around 5000 in 2016 to around 30 000 in 2018. In the field of education, interests among universities of the two countries are growing. Several universities in Russia have signed MOUs with their counterparts in Indonesia during the last three years. The numbers of Indonesian students who continue their higher education in Russia have been also growing in the recent years from 329 in 2016 to 645 in 2020, mostly under the Russian Government’s scholarship. Likewise, the Indonesian Government regularly grants scholarships to Russian students through BSBI (arts and culture) and Darmasiswa programs (language, arts and culture). During the last ten years, around 177 Russian students have been granted the scholarships.

16

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

Conclusion • Indonesia and Russia share many similarities as well as common interests. Both countries are built on multiculturalism based on freedom of beliefs and religions and non-interference principle. • The 70th anniversary of the bilateral relations of the two countries is the right moment to strengthen a closer cooperation and step forward to the next level of the strategic partnership. It is a perfect momentum to enhance stronger bilateral cooperation in the fields of trade and investment, tourism, defense and security, education, and culture, as well as to foster the people to people relations in order to promote more understanding between people and strengthen friendship between the two nations. The agreement will serve as the basic foundation for a greater cooperation in all fields based on mutual benefit.

17

Dmitry V. Mosyakov Doctor of Historical Science, Professor, Head of the Center for Southeast Asia, Australia and Oceania Studies, IOS RAS, Russia, Moscow, [email protected]

Chapter 1. Indonesian Vision of the Future

in the Asia Pacific and Indo-Pacific Regions and Russia and Its Presence and Interests in the Southeast Asia Today in Russia there is a serious debate about the project of the Indo-Pacific region. The problem is that the main engine of Indo-Pacific integration is the United States. From the burden of problems and serious challenges to their interests in the Asia-Pacific region, the Americans found a surprisingly simple way out: they placed the Asia – Pacific region in another, even more extensive geographical area – the so-called Indo-Pacific region. In this new configuration, the overall situation and balance of power were already completely different – China was on its periphery, and the United States received as an ally India, comparable to China in terms of population and economic growth. Thus, the confrontation with China in Asia entered a completely different phase, in which the US position looked much preferable than in the old configuration of the Asia-Pacific region. Among some Russian experts voices are being heard that the American project of “open and free” IPR is not suitable for us not only because it is anti-Chinese in nature, but also because it undermines such a global Russian project as the concept of Greater Eurasia. Greater Eurasia is the idea to form a kind of a global space around Russia with more or less gen-

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

eral rules of the game in trade and investment from the European Union to ASEAN, that is, from Western Europe to Southeast Asia. The political basis of the project will be the same principles of connectivity that are now so popular in Indonesia and the ASEAN countries. In Indonesia, they understand connectivity as the vital part of the policy in IPR when no one dictates values to connected countries. In Russia, we have the same understanding. The Indonesian government proposes to put the principle of connectivity into the basis of the entire IPR project. It is clear that the major powers and first of all the US is unlikely to support this initiative, because their goal is to promote their interests and their values in the region. But despite this opposition, the struggle to implement this principle at least partially is a noble task that will undoubtedly receive support from the ASEAN countries. In principle, Russia will probably also support this proposal, since it has been working closely with Indonesia for a long time, and the concept of connectivity is as close to it as it is to the Indonesians. Moreover, it is now clear that both countries have much in common – a common view of what the configuration of the world's political system should look like. Both Russia and Indonesia advocate that the leading role in ensuring peace, stability and security should belong to the United Nations, since the United Nations, as the only universal international intergovernmental organization, can take into account the interests of the entire world. Both countries share a common understanding that the modern world is multipolar and should be based on international law. At a time when the situation in the world is becoming more and more tense, and the contradictions between the United States and China are growing, the ASEAN countries face the problem of developing and defending their own course, their own vision of the future both in Asia and in the world. Such a confrontation between the “great powers”, on the 19

Chapter 1. Indonesian Vision of the Future in the Asia Pacific and IndoPacific Regions and Russia and its Presence and Interests in the SEA

one hand, is undoubtedly beneficial to the ASEAN countries, since it allows them to use both American and Chinese resources and opportunities for their development. But on the other hand, the risks are very high, and as the US-China differences deepen and develop into a sharp conflict, the threats to the unity and prosperity of the ASEAN countries are becoming more obvious. They face the need to keep their “hands free” and be subjects, not objects of international politics. The goals set by the ASEAN countries today are to maintain the existing balance system in the region which should allow to achieve political stability and develop mutually beneficial cooperation. But it is very difficult to achieve this to maintain the existing “status quo”, especially in a situation when it is already clear that it will not be possible to maintain the status quo in the near future. In this situation, the ASEAN countries face the need to respond to existing challenges in order to formulate an adequate plan of action aimed at protecting their interests, their central position in this region, and their predominant influence on the entire complex of international relations in East Asia and the Indo-Pacific space. In the current situation, it was Indonesia, as the largest ASEAN country, that has taken on the task of forming such a program, clearly defining the vision of ASEAN regarding the processes that are developing within the framework of the IPR project. And in Russia we see and agree with Indonesians that these events are very dangerous for global stability and international affairs which may, under certain circumstances, lead to the formation of a closed military bloc from the countries of the region, which will be directed against China. In fact, one can see the threat of dividing a huge region into a Pro-Chinese and Pro-American camps. This perspective naturally does not reflect the interests of the ASEAN countries which see the future in the Asia Pacific not as a military block, but as a broad field of international cooperation and trade, 20

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

peace and stability. As we will see later, it was Indonesia that managed to form such a plan of action, which would fully take into account all the above priorities. Indonesia's proposals, formulated in the so-called “Indonesian concept of the Indo-Pacific region”, were announced in October 2018 by Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi at the geopolitical forum in Jakarta. In her report, she presented the Indonesian view on how the IPR project should be implemented, highlighting the key point that ASEAN countries can and will participate in the IPR project but only while maintaining their Central role in Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific politics. The Indonesians also called for ASEAN countries to have the right to participate directly in setting the agenda and in discussing and resolving key issues in the future. It should be noted that in the Indonesian vision of the IPR, in contrast to the American approaches, nothing was said about the possibility of military confrontation with China, on the contrary: there was a thesis that the future IPR should be open to all countries, and China in the first place. There was no mention of any military organization based on the countries of the IPR. Indonesia pointed to the fact that “its national concept of the Indo-Pacific region promises a mutually beneficial geopolitical situation, cooperation for the common good and the creation of new economic centers”. According to the Indonesian Foreign Minister, strengthening cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region is a strategic issue for the ASEAN member countries located at the junction of the two oceans. “The unification of two large regions, she said, should create new growth centers in the countries bordering the Indian ocean”1.

Индонезия предлагает концепцию сотрудничества в ИндоТихоокеанском регионе // ИА REGNUM? 24 октября 2018. URL: https://regnum.ru/news/polit/2506524.html

1

21

Chapter 1. Indonesian Vision of the Future in the Asia Pacific and IndoPacific Regions and Russia and its Presence and Interests in the SEA

The concept proposed by Retno Marsudi became a common position of the ASEAN countries when at the 2019 summit in Bangkok the Indonesian proposals were recorded in a separate document – the “Joint vision of ASEAN in the IndoPacific region” (ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific). It stressed that ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific envisages ASEAN Centrality as the underlying principle for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, with ASEAN-led mechanisms, such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), as platforms for dialogue and implementation of the Indo–Pacific cooperation, while preserving their formats. Furthermore, ASEAN may also seek to develop, where appropriate, cooperation with other regional and sub-regional mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions on specific areas of common interests to complement the relevant initiatives2. It was particularly emphasized in this document that a perspective of viewing the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions, not as contiguous territorial spaces but as a closely integrated and interconnected region, with ASEAN playing a central and strategic role is very important; Indo-Pacific region should be the region of dialogue and cooperation instead of rivalry; space of development and prosperity for all; the importance was also emphasized of the maritime domain and perspective in the evolving regional architecture3. As we can see, the plan proposed by Indonesia and supported by other ASEAN countries comes into sharp conflict with what the Americans are proposing. The IndonesianASEAN plan does not say anything about military challenges, on the contrary, it defines the areas and directions of cooperation. Moreover, this framework does not say anything about ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. URL: https://asean.org/ storage/2019/06/ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-Indo-Pacific_FINAL_ 22062019.pdf 3 ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific … 2

22

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

China's isolation or “containment”. This is a plan for broad and open cooperation based on mutual interests. As we can see, Indonesia and the ASEAN countries are forming an agenda for Indo-Pacific project which largely meets both the current and long-term interests of Russia. For Russia, implementation of the ASEAN vision of the near future is also very important, as the plan proposed by Indonesia opens up an opportunity for Russia to develop its own project of a global Eurasian community. If the ASEAN plan is successful, it will create a situation where the rapidly developing, attractive and active world of the South Seas will be connected to the global Eurasian market. If everything follows the path proposed by Indonesia and ASEAN, this Russian project will begin to take shape. Therefore, I think that Russia should support the efforts of ASEAN to implement its plan, and to respond to their desire to get some support from Moscow, because in Moscow they hope to get an ally in the fight to reformat the American IPR project from a military bloc directed against China and without Russia's participation to a broad economic Union of IndoPacific countries with the inclusion of China and Russia. My impressions of numerous meetings with representatives of the intellectual and political elite of the ASEAN countries suggest that they clearly expect that Moscow will be able to participate in the upcoming discussions and negotiations to the maximum extent possible, put its “weight” in favor of the very option of Asian transformation that suits both them and Russia. Russia, judging by the recent talks of the Russian Federation Foreign Affairs Minister Sergey Lavrov with the Secretary General of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Lim Jok Hoi in Moscow in the early February 2020, understands this complicated situation. According to news agencies the high ranking officials discussed issues of bilateral and regional cooperation. “There was an in-depth exchange of 23

Chapter 1. Indonesian Vision of the Future in the Asia Pacific and IndoPacific Regions and Russia and its Presence and Interests in the SEA

views on the promotion of the Russian-ASEAN strategic partnership. The importance of expanding foreign policy coordination in key multilateral platforms is emphasized” – was stressed in an official statement4. This statement by the two Ministers reflects the real influence that Russia has today in the ASEAN countries. Many skeptics believe that it is minimal, that there are many words about the Russian presence and participation, but few real facts proving such participation. I think the information below will make you change this opinion. An analysis of Russia's relations with the ASEAN countries and the wider Russian presence in Southeast Asia is of considerable interest. There is a fairly widespread view that the relationship between Russia and the ASEAN countries is not of significant importance for both Moscow and the ASEAN countries. Proponents of this point of view often use figures for raw materials and investment non-participation of Russia in major infrastructure projects. In fact, the situation in Russian-ASEAN relations in the sphere of politics and in the economic sphere is much more complicated. This is not the case with the United States or China, but there are entire areas of activity where relations between Russia and the ASEAN countries are developed and significant for both sides. Actually, this is about these areas, where the Russian presence is most pronounced and the influence that this has on the general situation in Southeast Asia and in ASEAN countries. It should be noted that as soon as we begin to analyze such a sphere of cooperation between Russia and ASEAN countries as trade and investment, we will immediately face a lot of mysteries and so-called gray areas that hide the true picture. The problem is that we find ourselves in the thrall of Russian and foreign statistics which in many respects do not 4

Индонезия предлагает концепцию сотрудничества…

24

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

correspond and do not correlate with each other. If we compare, for example, the Russian data on investments in Russia from the East and then take the statistics of the other side, the result will be surprising: the figures are not similar, they will be radically different from each other. Take at least China – between the data of Rosstat (official Russian state agency) and, for example, the Chinese statistics on investments in Russia lies a huge “black” gap, and to explain its origin a special study of this problem is required. China, as we know, has been the largest Asian investor in Russia for many years. According to Chinese statistics, direct investment in the Russian economy in 2015 alone amounted to about 2.96 billion USD. At the same time, their accumulated volume by the end of 2015 amounted to 14.02 billion USD. Such indicators put Russia on the third place in the accumulated volume of Chinese investments in Europe after the Netherlands and the UK and on the second (after the Netherlands) place in attracting them for the year5. At the same time, the statistics of the Russian Central Bank show that Chinese direct investment of all kinds in Russia amounted to only 645 million USD in 2015 and went down to 350 million USD in 20166. The reason for these differences lies, apparently, in the specifics of the modern global financial system and the investment markets. Chinese money often goes to Russia through offshore jurisdictions, such as the Cayman Islands, Hong Kong or the Netherlands, the British Virgin Islands. Naturally, they are not considered Chinese in national statistics. On the contrary, in China they retain their national origin. This situation does not look quite harmless for Russia. There Кашин В. Много ли Китай инвестирует в Россию. URL: http:// ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/mnogo-li-kitay-investiruet-vrossiyu/ 6 Кашин В. Много ли Китай инвестирует в Россию… 5

25

Chapter 1. Indonesian Vision of the Future in the Asia Pacific and IndoPacific Regions and Russia and its Presence and Interests in the SEA

are estimates that Chinese accumulated investment is even more than 14 billion USD. For example, the representative of the Ministry of Commerce of China Shen Danyang in January 2016 stated the figure of accumulated investments in Russia as 34 billion dollars. At the end of 2016, the Chinese Ambassador to Russia announced the figure of 10 billion. The Minister of Commerce of China Gao Hucheng in February 2017 proclaimed the indicator of accumulated investments in Russia was at 42 billion dollars7. As we can see, even among Chinese officials, there are different estimates of the total volume of these investments. They are significant, but the problem is that here in Russia we do not have a complete picture of where and to what extent they are invested, and in fact we can talk about strategic enterprises, related to the Russian military-industrial complex. The discrepancy between the statistics of the two countries is a serious problem that has not yet been solved. As for investments from ASEAN countries to Russia, the overall picture is about the same. Singapore is the leader among investors. According to experts of the consulting company “Asia Vector”, the volume of direct investments of Singapore in Russia at the end of 2015 amounted to about 1 billion USD. In 2016, based on the declared investment projects, the volume of prospective investments in Russia increased by another 130 million USD. It should be said that these estimates are clearly at odds with the official data of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation on the inflow of Singaporean investments in Russia. As an example – at the end of 2015, Singapore's accumulated FDI in Russia amounted to only 673 million USD8. It is obvious that here we face the same situation as with China. It is also not easy with the calculation of investКашин В. Много ли Китай инвестирует в Россию… Матюхин М.В. Прямые инвестиции стран АСЕАН в Россию. URL: http://www.webeconomy.ru/index.php?page=cat&newsid= 3787&type=news

7 8

26

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

ments in Russia from Vietnam. Here the situation is no less strange, since the data of investment statistics of the Russian Federation and Vietnam are so poorly correlated with each other that any comparison simply makes no sense. For example, according to the Central Bank of Russia, Vietnam's accumulated FDI on January 1, 2014 amounted to 355 million USD, and similar figures on the same date in 2015 and 2016 have a rare “confidential” stamp. Data on FDI inflows from Vietnam by year were not published at all. There are no data on their total volume for the entire period of investment by Vietnamese companies operating in Russia. But this figure is published by the Ministry of planning and investment of Vietnam, according to which, as of January 1, 2016, the total volume of accumulated Vietnamese FDI in Russia amounted to 2.53 billion USD9. It turns out that not Singapore, but Vietnam is the main investor in the Russian economy from the countries of Southeast Asia. Moreover, it turns out that Russia is in the third place among the recipient countries of investments from Vietnam – 9.7% of the total value of Vietnamese foreign investments. 19 projects are being implemented in Russia – 1.8% of the total number of Vietnamese investors’ projects abroad. And as statistics show, the main investments from Vietnam began to arrive in recent years. Also, in recent years, the activity of Thai investors has increased significantly. In 2018, the volume of mutual trade between Russia and Thailand increased by 17% compared to 2017 and reached 2.6 billion USD. The number of tourists from Russia who visited the Kingdom in 2018 reached 1.5 million people10. The main focus of Thai investments in Russia was agriculture, where the agricultural company CP Foods, part of the giant conglomerate Charoen 9

Матюхин М.В. Прямые инвестиции стран АСЕАН в Россию… Коммерсантъ. №134. 31.07.2019.

10

27

Chapter 1. Indonesian Vision of the Future in the Asia Pacific and IndoPacific Regions and Russia and its Presence and Interests in the SEA

Pokphand Group-CPG, controlled by Thailand's richest entrepreneur, billionaire Thanin Thuravanon, in 2015 acquired for 680 million USD controlling stakes in two large Russian poultry farms. The same company, by the way, already has pig breeding complexes in Russia located in the Moscow and Kaliningrad regions11. Despite the huge amount of information, it is quite difficult to calculate the total amount of accumulated foreign investment in Russia from the Asia-Pacific countries. In addition to China and the ASEAN countries, South Korea is another major investor in the Russian economy – it adds about 2.3 billion USD12. Japan also contributes somewhat 2.5–2.7 billion dollars13. But how much you can trust these figures, too, is not clear. It should be recognized that the Russian side lacks effective tools for centralized data collection on the level of presence and aspirations of Asian and ASEAN businesses in the country14. The size of these investments in the Russian economy in reality, as we have already found out, is much larger than domestic statistics show. There is no doubt that the investments that come to Russia from ASEAN countries are extremely important and significantly help to withstand the current economic crisis and conflict with the West. The facts show that the process of real economic integration into the Asia-Pacific space continues to develop, despite the imposed sanctions aimed at economic isolaМатюхин М.В. Прямые инвестиции стран АСЕАН в Россию… «Вести-финанс». URL: https://www.vestifinance.ru/ infographics/7745 13 Ребрей С. Прямые инвестиции Японии в российскую экономику: масштабы, проблемы, перспективы // Мировое и национальное хозяйство, МГИМО МИД России, URL: http:// www.mirec.ru/2015-01/pramye-investicii-aponii-v-rossijskuuekonomiku-masstaby-problemy-perspektivy 14 Кашин В. Много ли Китай инвестирует в Россию… 11 12

28

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

tion and political weakening of Russia. These sanctions complicate the economic development of the country, but the initiators of sanctions have not achieved their goal of isolation and gradual suffocation of the Russian economy. They failed to block the flow of funds from Asia and ASEAN countries into the Russian economy. There are several reasons for this relatively positive state of affairs in Russia. The first reason is the significant potential of accumulated economic cooperation, second – the dependence of political stability in the region on Russia's political position on a number of pressing issues in the Asia-Pacific region, especially on North Korea and the South China sea, third – the obvious feeling of some isolation of the ASEAN countries from Europe and America, the desire to show that here in Asia “we have other relations with Russia”. It is necessary to mention that the first results of the FTA of the Eurasian economic community (EURASEC) with Vietnam (Russia accounts for more than 90% of the total trade turnover between Vietnam and EURASEC) show that deepening economic ties with Moscow is a promising and profitable business for ASEAN countries. Since the beginning of implementation of this trade agreement in 2016, the growth rate of trade between the two parties has increased by an average of more than 15% per year. According to Vietnamese customs statistics, for the first 8 months of 2018 bilateral import-export turnover reached 3.11 billion USD (an increase of 36% compared to the same period in 2017), of which exports from Vietnam to Russia reached 1.68 billion USD (an increase of 17.81%), and imports – 1.43 billion USD (an increase of 66.28%). Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade of Russia Vasily Osmakov in an interview with the Vietnamese press on the occasion of the international trade fair Vietnam Expo-2018, said that the trade turnover of 5.2 billion USD (according to Moscow) is a record in Vietnam's trade with Russia in the 29

Chapter 1. Indonesian Vision of the Future in the Asia Pacific and IndoPacific Regions and Russia and its Presence and Interests in the SEA

post-Soviet period15. But in fact, the scale of RussianVietnamese trade was even more significant – according to the Federal customs service of Russia in 2018, the trade turnover of Russia with Vietnam amounted to 6 081 485 664 USD having increased by 16.35% (854 473 909 USD) compared to 2017. Russia's exports to Vietnam in 2018 amounted to 2 457 473 226 USD, having increased by 29.12% (554 257 198 USD) compared to 2017. Russia's imports from Vietnam in 2018 was 3 012 624 438, an increase of 9.03% (300 216 711 USD) compared to 201716. I specifically dwell on the economic relations between Russia and Vietnam, because they are of a special nature – the first free trade zone for Moscow, the first experience of full integration with the ASEAN country, the experience that can and should be used in the formation of economic ties with other ASEAN countries and with the region as a whole. In comparison with multibillion-dollar volumes of China-Vietnamese trade and Vietnamese-American one we can say that the above data looks more than modest. Indeed, in 2018 Russia was only the 24th export market of Vietnam and the 19th trade partner of this country17. But we can see important changes in relations, we observe that the movement towards economic integration with ASEAN countries is beginning to feel more and more like a real process. Best confirmation of this is the free trade agreement that has just been signed with Singapore, which opens up opportunities for furКань Тоан Нгуен. После соглашения с ЕАЭС в торговле Вьетнама и Беларуси произошел скачок – эксперт //Евразия Эксперт. 22.01.2019. URL: http://eurasia.expert/v-torgovle-vetnama-ibelarusi-proizoshel-skachok/ 16 Торговля между Россией и Вьетнамом в 2018 г. // Внешняя торговля России. 09.02.2019. URL: http://russiantrade.com/reports-and-reviews/2019-02/torgovlya-mezhdurossiey-i-vetnamom-v-2018-g/ 17 Кань Тоан Нгуен. После соглашения с ЕАЭС в торговле… 15

30

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

ther cooperation and even competition between Singapore and Vietnam for the position of Russia's main economic partner in ASEAN. Russia’s exports are dominated by raw material, but this is natural because of the specifics of the Russian economy, the scale of which is simply incomparable with the American and Chinese partners of ASEAN. The main thing is that the process of economic integration of Russia into the ASEAN space continues, and in some areas, as with Vietnam, the trade turnover is at a record level. In order to prove that relations between Russia and ASEAN countries are now on the rise, it is enough to analyze the main areas of mutual cooperation. Even without the key military-technical sphere (it is discussed in a separate article), one can see serious changes taking place in these relations. Our analysis should begin from the high point - with an understanding what place Russia occupies today in terms of the overall alignment of forces in the Asia-Pacific region. We have already given some general information, here it makes sense to look at this problem in more detail, to see how Russia is perceived and evaluated in the region. Naturally, there are inflated and underestimated estimates but there are also balanced ones reflecting the overall objective reality. From this point of view, the data contained in the special report of the Lee Kuna Yew School of public administration in Singapore submitted on 29 May 2019 are of some interest. The report itself was prepared by the Lowy Institute, a Sydney-based think tank. It, in particular, indicates that Russia stands fifth in the aggregate ranking of countries in the Asia-Pacific region (APR)18. Россия не вошла в экспертный список супердержав АТР // РБК. 29.05.2019. URL: https://www.rbc.ru/politics/29/05/2019/5cee86889a794748146da3 5a?from=from_main 18

31

Chapter 1. Indonesian Vision of the Future in the Asia Pacific and IndoPacific Regions and Russia and its Presence and Interests in the SEA

In compiling this rating, the experts took into account such factors as the size of the economy, the level of technological development, military potential (military spending, quality of weapons), stability (stability of institutions, the level of geopolitical security, the supply of resources), diplomatic weight, as well as the degree of economic and military influence. The United States was recognized as the most influential country in the region with a rating of 84.5. Second place was taken by China with a score of 75.9, third – by Japan (42.5), fourth – by India (41). Russia's index was 35.4 – 2.1 points higher than the previous Lowy Institute rating published in 2018. Thus, Russia was ahead of South Korea (32.7), Australia (31.3) and Singapore (27.9). A total of 25 countries entered the ranking, the last two places in it were Mongolia (6.2) and Nepal (4.7)19. From the analysis of individual indicators Moscow received the highest score in the field of sustainability. According to this indicator, it took second place behind only the United States. As noted by the experts of the Lowy Institute, this result is a consequence of Russia's large reserve of natural resources and large-scale nuclear arsenal. Russia, according to experts, also became the third in military power. More powerful forces have, in their opinion, only the United States and China. From the information provided, it follows that compared to 2018, Russia has slightly improved its performance in the rating of cultural influence. If last year Moscow was on the 11th place in this indicator, this year it took the tenth place. Experts explained this by the growing popularity in the ASEAN countries of Russian TV channels aimed at international audiences.

19

Россия не вошла в экспертный список супердержав АТР…

32

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

The main vulnerability of Russia, according to experts, is caused by the low level of its economic cooperation and “insufficiently developed trade and investment relations with the countries of the region”20. According to this indicator, Moscow took only the 15th place in the list in the classification of Australian experts. It is clear that many of the above indicators are largely subjective and one can give a lot of arguments proving that Russia should occupy a higher place in this or that area. Take at least an indicator of military power – why Russia is in the third place, because in the case of a serious conflict, those forces will be involved, which are clearly not taken into account by experts, since they are located deep in Russian territory. There are questions about Russia's place in other areas as well. But in general, if we look objectively, the experts' conclusions are largely fair and reflect the real positioning of Russia in the Pacific Asia. The total volume of trade turnover with ASEAN countries remains, as we have already pointed out, quite modest, and its increase is quite slow. In the Russian “agenda” there are practically no major infrastructure projects, significant loans, and small and medium-sized businesses are poorly represented. But a simple statement of these obvious facts does not allow us to form a complete picture of Russia's place in ASEAN. A closer look reveals several important features of the Russian presence, which should attract our attention. The first thing that immediately catches your eye when analyzing Russian relations is a rather narrow set of areas of cooperation. These are national security and military-technical cooperation, energy, food trade and modern information technologies. Another feature of the Russian presence is that, unlike the United States and especially China, Russia does not act 20

Россия не вошла в экспертный список супердержав АТР…

33

Chapter 1. Indonesian Vision of the Future in the Asia Pacific and IndoPacific Regions and Russia and its Presence and Interests in the SEA

as a major investor or financial donor for the countries of the region, it is interested in investments from the Asia-Pacific region into its economy. In addition, since 2014, Russia's relations with Pacific Asian countries have been largely under pressure from the United States and Western countries which have imposed economic sanctions on Russia, as well as some of its companies and banks. Many in the region are simply afraid to deal with Moscow, fearing, in turn, to fall under US sanctions. This naturally has a negative impact on the development of economic ties. To understand Russia's current position, it should be taken into account that almost everything that formed the foundation of the Soviet Union's influence in the region was completely lost after the collapse of the USSR. Russia has not received any inheritance from the USSR, rather on the contrary sustained distrust on the part of many ASEAN countries. Dozens of projects have been lost and abandoned in Vietnam, Cambodia. and Laos. I was able to observe in 1991 in Cambodia, abandoned trucks, some dismantled mechanisms, the mountains of does not taken out production. It was a real disaster which in turn only increased distrust of Moscow, unwillingness to rely on her support. New Russia began to return to Southeast Asia at the turn of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries under the conditions of fierce competition without any support from partners. There was no trust in her politics. Some – because suddenly refused to support friends and allies, others – because of remaining inertia emanating from the Communist threat of Russia, fears of the resumption of some subversive actions. All these objective factors and subjective biases had to be overcome, and, therefore, Russia's integration into the region was very slow and happened within certain sectors and spheres of the economy. Only where Russia had the opportunity to really offer its goods and services that would be quite competitive, 34

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

there were chances to gain a foothold in the countries of the Pacific Asia. This largely predetermined the entire dynamics of the return – first we sold oil and gas, later military-technical cooperation began to develop, followed by cooperation in the field of security, even later our presence in the trade in food products and in the field of information technology became more and more obvious. Today, these five areas of cooperation with the addition of tourism, form the main platform for cooperation and integration. They do not create a significant volume of trade turnover but provide real interaction and cooperation and form the preconditions for the entry of Russian business into new areas, its gradual integration into the economic space of the AsiaPacific region. At the same time, if we consider the situation in some of these areas, we will note that Russia's place and role in them is very significant and its presence is quite tangible. Take the sphere of security. It does not really relate to the economy, rather it is a sphere of particularly important services with access to politics and the economy, and the army and the highest levels of government. This is a very sensitive area for all countries in the region, and it is in this area that Russia's presence has recently become more tangible and noticeable. Connections with ASEAN countries in this sphere began to develop due to the change in our image, when in recent years Russia has significantly increased its military forces, has established itself as the most consistent and tough opponent of international terrorism, capable of inflicting heavy blows on it, as happened in Syria. For the countries of the region all these qualities of Russian policy are an extremely important and relevant topic. After all, ISIS, and other Islamist terrorist organizations associated and cooperating with it, are extremely active here. According to the global Terrorism Index, South and Southeast Asia accounted for a third of all terrorist attacks in 35

Chapter 1. Indonesian Vision of the Future in the Asia Pacific and IndoPacific Regions and Russia and its Presence and Interests in the SEA

the world in 2018. Two ASEAN countries – the Philippines and Thailand – respectively tenth and seventeenth in this ranking, were among the twenty countries in the world with the highest level of terrorist activity21. It should be noted that other factors also contribute to the promotion of Russian security campaigns. I would particularly like to highlight the fact that relatively small amounts of aid that are allocated by Russia's main competitors in this area – the Americans – to help resolve these issues in the ASEAN countries. Afghanistan, Iraq, the Middle East are clearly a priority and what is allocated to ASEAN countries clearly does not meet the expectations of local governments and American “friends”. They need additional help and they receive it from Russia. In addition, there is an obvious unwillingness of the ruling elites of ASEAN countries to rely only on Chinese or American experts in matters of national and antiterrorist security. The choice in favor of one of them can be misinterpreted by the other side, that there is supposedly a decision to focus more on the American or, accordingly, on the Chinese political camp. And that is what local elites, building their policy on balancing between different centers of power and influence, categorically do not want to happen and are very afraid of. All these factors influence the fact that the interest of the Pacific Asian countries and, above all, the ASEAN States in cooperation with Russia in the field of national security is fully conditioned. This interest only increases now because of the multiplying conflicts and threats. In a situation of diverse threats to social and political stability, the ruling elites of ASEAN countries seek the most effective solutions and the most experienced and proven partners in the fight against terGlobal Terrorism Index 2018. Measuring the Impact of Terrorism. Sydney November 2018. URL: http://visionofhumanity.org/reports. 21

36

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

rorist evil. On their initiative, in April 2016 the first informal meeting of defense Ministers of ASEAN member States and Russia was held, where agreements were reached on mutual efforts and joint actions to combat terrorism. The continuation of this dialogue was a joint statement prepared on the sidelines of the Russia — ASEAN summit held in Singapore in November 2018. This document recognizes that Russia is an important element in the fight against the terrorist threat in South-East Asia22. The recognition of this fact was another sign of the rapprochement between the positions of Russia and the ASEAN countries that the diverse relations in the security sphere had received a high rating. Another conclusion that can be made after the summit in Singapore is that a new atmosphere of mutual trust is emerging between the ASEAN countries and Russia, the dialogue relations have moved to the level of strategic partnership within which the countries of South-East Asia are ready to accept Russian assistance in security issues and jointly fight terrorism. In practical terms, the agreements reached open the “green light” for the supply of weapons, special equipment, assistance in information support of anti-terrorist policy, as well as in the exchange of experience and specialists between the relevant structures of Russia and ASEAN countries. Already we can say that Russia's presence in the spheres of military-technical cooperation and security in most Southeast Asian countries has reached an unprecedented level which is quite comparable to the American or Chinese participation. And if earlier the Russian sphere of influence traditionally extended only to the three countries of Indochina – Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, now the Russian military busiКоролёв А. Россия — АСЕАН: поиск новых «точек роста» // РСМД, 09.01.2019. URL: https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-andcomments/analytics/rossiya-asean-poisk-novykh-tochek-rosta/ 22

37

Chapter 1. Indonesian Vision of the Future in the Asia Pacific and IndoPacific Regions and Russia and its Presence and Interests in the SEA

ness has come to a place where it simply did not exist before, and where everything has ended up in the hands of the Americans. As an example, the Philippines, where in February 2017 the first Russian-Filipino consultations on regional and international security took place. They discussed issues of “bilateral military and military-technical cooperation, prospects for cooperation in the anti-terrorist area and the fight against drugs, combating transnational crime, the General tasks of the coast guard services”23. Approximately the same issues have become the field of cooperation between Russia and Thailand. A separate agreement on military cooperation was signed during the official visit of the Prime Minister of this country Prayuth Chan-o-cha to Russia in May 201624. The fact that this cooperation is now developing “in the direction of strengthening mutual trust” was confirmed in July 2019 by Russian foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at a meeting in Bangkok with Thai foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai25. In Burma, according to Russian defense Minister Sergei Shoigu who visited it in 2017, “Russian and Burmese military personnel have implemented a large number of activities, prepared and agreed on rich plans for bilateral military cooperation for the future”26. Somewhat earlier in September 2010 the Russian-Indonesian agreement on military-technical cooperation was approved by the House of Representatives of the Indonesian Parliament27. РИА-Новости. URL: https://ria.ru/20170216/1488129384.html РИА-Новости. URL: https://ria.ru/20170320/1490368903.html 25 Коммерсантъ. №134. 31.07.2019. 26 Еженедельник «Звезда», URL: https://tvzvezda.ru/news/forces/content/9cf4072135ac019 f822fe0bebcd67929979dfbea0c5470b5f4bd8d61dc4505cf 27 Основные направления военно-технического сотрудничества России и Индонезии // Новости ВПК, 12.11.2012. URL: https://vpk.name/news/78524_osnovnyie_napravleniya_ voennotehnicheskogo_sotrudnichestva_rossii_i_indonezii.html 23 24

38

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

All these facts collected from different ASEAN countries represent only a small part of their real interaction with Russia in the field of security. After all, many events and contacts are not advertised at all and we often learn about them “after the fact”. But even without “closed information” we see that Russia has managed to gain some confidence after its return to the region, and in a number of countries its campaigns have already been admitted into the sphere of national security – a traditionally closed and extremely sensitive area. The fact that this conclusion is quite true is evidenced by the statement made by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov at the meeting of the Valdai club held in February 2019 in Ho Chi Minh city, Vietnam. He said that “for ASEAN law enforcement officials we regularly organize refresher courses on counterterrorism and counter-radicalization and extremism. Special attention, he said, is paid to the problems of foreign terrorist fighters (ITB)... To combat them Russia has invited, and ASEAN countries are positively considering it, to join the Data Bank on ITB created by the Russian Federal security service (FSS). In this Bank, according to him, the relevant information is loaded, then, with its help, it is possible to track these people when they move, for example, from Syria or Iraq to Asia Minor, Indonesia, Central Asia or Russia”28. Naturally, the Americans and their allies view this cooperation with great distrust. They are clearly concerned about the rapid development of security relations between Russia and the ASEAN countries. For example, the Australian analytical publication “Conversation” spoke about the need to even change the defense doctrine of this country, in which Russia “is not considered a significant military force”. This outdated perception of Russia stems from assumptions that emerged МИД России, URL: http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_ policy/news/ 28

39

Chapter 1. Indonesian Vision of the Future in the Asia Pacific and IndoPacific Regions and Russia and its Presence and Interests in the SEA

after the end of the cold war that "Moscow has little political influence due to the reduction of military power and limited economic interaction with our region". Perhaps these assumptions were true in the 1990s or even a decade ago. However, the current strategic realities are very different. After years of decline and neglect, this publication writes about, Russian military power in the Asia-Pacific region is taking a big step forward, especially since Russia is a key supplier of advanced military technology when... more than 60% of Russian arms exports go to Asian countries, with Southeast Asia accounting for most of this volume”29. Thanks to these arms sales and joint military activities, “Russia is increasingly bringing Asian countries into its orbit and changing the balance of power in the region, increasing their military potential”30, concludes this edition. Indeed, in the sphere of security and military-technical cooperation today, Russia acts as one of the strongest players in the vast Asia-Pacific region. Its weapons and its specialists are present in almost all countries of the region and the volume, quality and experience of the Russian companies in this field are not inferior to its main competitors. Russia just like the United States and China is able to finance transactions on credit, to take part of the payment by the goods produced in these countries, to provide the necessary repair of supplied weapons, to train local military specialists on them. Due to the specificity and closeness of the sphere of military-technical cooperation, it is difficult to say what place Russia occupies in the Asia-Pacific region. You can refer to the data of such a famous military expert as D. Litovkin. He believes that Russia Russia is a rising military power in the Asia-Pacific, and Australia needs to take it seriously, October 30, 2018 URL: http://theconver sation.com/russia-is-a-rising-military-power-in-the-asia-pacific-andaustralia-needs-to-take-it-seriously-105390 30 Russia is a rising military power in the Asia-Pacific… 29

40

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

ranks second after the United States in the export of weapons to the countries of the Pacific region31. There is no doubt that all of this shows not only a high level of Russian military-industrial complex, but the real success of Russia. The expansion in this sector was successful despite stiff competition and opposition from major competitors and especially the US who cannot bear to watch as their outdated technology and obsolete military designs in many countries of the Asia-Pacific region are changed to the new Russian ones. The scale of its supplies to the region is impressive. According to such an authoritative organization as the Stockholm international peace Institute (SIPRI) in the period 2010–2017. Russia sold arms to ASEAN countries for 6.64 billion USD. The Americans managed to sell arms accounting only for 4.58 billion USD32. It is likely that the threat of the so-called American secondary sanctions against Russian partners in the region, as well as the global transformation of the system of international relations in Asia with the formation of the Indo-Pacific Region (IPR) according to the American scenario can significantly affect the place and role of Russia's military-technical force in the South-East Asia. It is especially dangerous if the political space of the Indo-Pacific will increasingly split into ProChinese and Pro-American camps. It is clear that within such camps the dominant countries, in one case the United States, and in the other China, will make every effort to provide their Алексей Заквасин, Святослав Петров. Предоставили альтернативу: как Россия завоёвывает тайский рынок оружия // RT, 15.09.2017. URL: https://russian.rt.com/world/article/430289rossiya-tailand-postavki-oruzhiya 32 Nile Bowie, As US-China tussle and joust, Russia moves on SEAsia // Strategic Culture, 27.11.2018. URL: https://www.strategicculture.org/news/2018/11/27/as-us-china-tussle-and-joust-russiamoves-on-seasia/ 31

41

Chapter 1. Indonesian Vision of the Future in the Asia Pacific and IndoPacific Regions and Russia and its Presence and Interests in the SEA

military equipment and their weapons, their security specialists with a "green street". This can be done under various pretexts (the need to unify weapons, increase the level of complementarity of troops, etc.) but in any case, this prospect will inevitably complicate the military-technical cooperation between Russia and the ASEAN countries and will create new challenges to Russian policy in Asia as a whole. The same negative scenario is possible in the security sphere. The dominant powers, most likely, will not allow any Russian presence in this sector – sensitive and extremely important for the survival of any country. The sphere of military-technical cooperation and the fight against international terrorism remains and will remain key for a long time in relations between Russia and the ASEAN countries. At the same time, today we can see new areas of cooperation with great potential for the future. First of all, we are talking about food trade, as the ASEAN market is becoming more capacious and attractive. This is due to both the general increase in the population and a marked increase in the level and quality of life. As a result, over the past six years alone the level of cereal consumption in ASEAN countries in monetary terms (in 2017 prices) has increased more than one and a half times from 87.2 billion USD in 2012 up to 143.5 billion USD at the end of 201733. And in this growing market where previously they were almost not present Russian grain producers managed to quickly increase their sales – from 171 million dollars in 2016 up to 650 million USD in 2017 and 1 billion 179 million in 201834. The main buyer of products of Russian agricultural producers in the Asia-Pacific region is Bangladesh – for the last 2 years (2017–2018) this country has Александр Королёв. Россия – АСЕАН поиск новых точек… URL: https://wtcmoscow.ru/services/internationalpartnership/analitycs/rossiya-asean-cherez-mnogoletneesotrudnichestvo-k-strategicheskomu-partnerstvu/ 33 34

42

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

bought almost 2 million tons of Russian grain which is 1/3 of all its grain imports. Deliveries to Indonesia in 2017 amounted to 1.2 million tons which is for the world's second largest grain importer about 11% of all purchases. Russian wheat was first shipped to Vietnam in late 2016 (after the signing of the FTA agreement), in 2017 Vietnam imported 0.7 million tons which accounted for 15% of imports and for the first half of 2018 — 1.4 million tons or more than half of all grain imports. Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia bought slightly less but also with a tendency to increase the level of purchases from year to year. In 2017, for example, they bought respectively 136 thousand tons, 90 thousand tons and 53 thousand tons of Russian wheat which comprised 5%, 2%, and 4% of their cereal imports in 201735. According to experts of the agricultural market, the impressive growth of exports of Russian wheat, as well as other types of food to the ASEAN countries has good prospects. The fact is that there are currently 67 million households in ASEAN forming a class of consumers with incomes that allow spending in excess of ordinary needs. According to available estimates, by 2025 the number of such households should increase to 125 million, which means that the opportunities for further increase in the volume of exports of Russian agricultural products look extremely favorable36. But naturally forecasts are given taking into account the preservation of the existing conditions for doing business. At the same time, the issue of what might happen to Russian grain exports in the event of the development of the Indo-Pacific project is not removed from the agenda. In the Indonesian-Indian version, there is reason to assume that Russia's progress and advanceКакие страны Россия кормит зерном? (Пшеница) / Русское Агентство Новостей. 10 августа 2018. URL: http://xn---ctbsbazhbctieai.ru-an.info/ 36 The growing promise of ASEAN /Bangkok Post. 09.06.2014. 35

43

Chapter 1. Indonesian Vision of the Future in the Asia Pacific and IndoPacific Regions and Russia and its Presence and Interests in the SEA

ment in this area will continue and it will be able to increase its share in the future to at least a quarter of all grain supplies to the region. If the American scenario wins, then problems will inevitably arise, as the Americans will do everything to reduce the dependence of their partners and allies on Russia and on the supply of Russian grain. There is another relatively new area of cooperation between Russia and ASEAN which is also undergoing significant changes. We are talking about the Russian IT-business which in search of new markets and new business partners is actively going to the Asia-Pacific region and especially to the countries of the South-East Asia. The center of attraction of Russian companies naturally became Singapore which by all world estimates is today one of the most attractive places in the world in terms of IT-business and entrepreneurship in the field of high technologies. The popularity of Singapore is promoted by the developed financial infrastructure, ease of obtaining business licenses, as well as a large number of grants and programs to support startups and technology companies. Recently, Russian venture capital companies have come here among which are, first of all, software developers – Kaspersky Lab and Infowatch, technology platforms – Fresh Office, developers of cloud services – Base Ride Technologies and Ruvento. All of them and other smaller companies are actively exploring local markets and Kaspersky labs are particularly successful in this activity. Its clients today are “large small and medium-sized businesses and government agencies – the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Education of Malaysia. In addition, the Russian IT company has been cooperating with the Malaysian government for several years in the field of protection against information threats, and is an active member of the IMPACT international organization designed to combat

44

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

cyberterrorism and founded by the government of Malaysia”37. Assessing the prospects for the expansion of Russian companies in this area should take into account its close dependence on the political situation in the region. Today, as we have already pointed out, Russia has managed to create an atmosphere of some confidence in itself and its policy. And this is exactly the foundation that ensures the relationship of Russian companies with government agencies, large private entities and private consumers of the Russian IT-product. Against the background of global American, Japanese and Chinese corporations, the presence of domestic campaigns in the information and communication market of ASEAN countries remains insignificant. But on the other hand, the dynamics of increasing sales is important, as well as the fact that the Russian IT-business has clearly found its niche here and feels quite confident. The only question is how the upcoming geopolitical changes will affect this area of Russian presence. It seems that it will be about the same as in all the previously described areas – in one case there are chances for development, and in the other there is no doubt that the Americans will force the Russian IT-business to either leave or change their nationality and become part of the global American information and communication sphere. When assessing Russia's presence in ASEAN area, it is impossible to ignore the oil and gas sector. Russia is concentrating its efforts mainly on one country – Vietnam which has quite significant hydrocarbon reserves on the shelf of the South China Sea. Russian companies have been working on the Vietnamese shelf of the South China Sea for a long time, К 20-летию диалогового партнерства АСЕАН. Новый виток интеграции и позиции России // РСМД, URL: http://russian council.ru/asean-russia 37

45

Chapter 1. Indonesian Vision of the Future in the Asia Pacific and IndoPacific Regions and Russia and its Presence and Interests in the SEA

since Soviet times, despite all the protests from China which considers this territory to be its property. In response, the Kremlin recommends to resolve disputes directly with mining companies that have accumulated vast experience in oil production in this region. Today, the joint Russian-Vietnamese Vietsovpetro company alone produces more than 1 million tons annually that is more than 50% of all Vietnamese oil38. The largest companies in their field, Rosneft and Gazprom, also operate on the shelf. LUKOIL – another oil giant is also present in Southeast Asia. In 2007 it concluded an agreement with the Indonesian state oil company Petramina on “studying a number of promising blocks in Indonesia”39. In recent years, Russia's presence in the region has expanded through the development of Siberian and Far Eastern projects – primarily the Eastern Siberia–Pacific Ocean pipeline system (ESPO) and Sakhalin projects. ESPO connects the oil fields of Western and Eastern Siberia with the port of Kozmino in Primorye and provides access to the markets of Siberian oil in the Asia-Pacific region (first of all, China and Japan, as well as the Southeast Asian States). This is a very successful project with the volume of supplies which are growing all the time. In 2020 Russia plans to supply the Asia-Pacific region with more than 80 million tons of oil40. Sakhalin gas fields and the commissioning of a liquefied gas plant on their basis open up opФедоров Н.В. Участие России в нефтегазовых проектах на континентальном шельфе Вьетнама – проблемы и перспективы // Юго-Восточная Азия: актуальные проблемы развития. Том II. № 4 (41), 2018. C. 131. URL: https://sea.ivran.ru/articles?artid=12217 39 Дина Богдашова. "ЛУКОЙЛ" и индонезийская Petramina подписали соглашение о сотрудничестве // RB.RU, 06.09.2007. URL: https://rb.ru/article/lukoyl-i-indoneziyskaya-petramina-podpisalisoglashenie-o-sotrudnichestve/4790157.html 40 Расширение на Восток // Транснефть. URL: https://www.tra nsneft.ru/pressroom/rg8-7 38

46

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

portunities for Russia to enter the Asian markets with this product (Japan, Korea and Southeast Asian countries). However, the future does not seem cloudless in this sector because increasing sales of petroleum products and liquefied gas volumes which will significantly raise the overall trade turnover with the ASEAN countries rest on the uncertainty of the Asian transformation process and American presence and policy. The same applies to China's policy and military situation in the South China Sea. It is obvious how high are the stakes for Russia, how important is its presence in ASEAN area: there is a lot to lose and fight. The task of Russian policy is to be able to maintain the status quo or to find ways to influence the vector of transformation in the Asia-Pacific region. There is a chance to work within the framework of the Indonesian-Indian proposals for Indo-Pacific. But there is a significant question – to what extent these countries themselves are ready, together with Russia, to defend the principles of inclusiveness, cooperation and peace in the IPR. Moreover, the situation is such that Russia's policy in this case becomes dependent on their position, on whether they are ready to complicate their relations with the United States or agree with the American approach satisfied with some semblance of compromise. It is very difficult to find a way out of this situation, because it is obvious that Russia clearly does not have enough funds and opportunities to independently form the regional agenda, determine in what configuration the IPR project will develop. The Kremlin has several options at its disposal, both in the economic and political spheres, which can have a certain impact on the course of the ongoing processes. In politics, it can use the atmosphere of “new trust” with ASEAN countries to support their initiatives for the future of the Indo-Pacific region. Today, Russia remains in a position where most ASEAN countries would like to see Moscow as a neutral and 47

Chapter 1. Indonesian Vision of the Future in the Asia Pacific and IndoPacific Regions and Russia and its Presence and Interests in the SEA

responsible partner which would give them additional opportunities for political maneuvering. Russia, however, as well as India, Japan and even Australia are actively attracted by the ASEAN elites as a kind of counterbalance to the forces that split and divide the Asian and Indo-Pacific space. However, whether Japan and Australia, and even India, are willing to participate as a counterbalance in the “big game”, when they are already playing a difficult game with the United States is still a big question. But in any case, although Russia is not able to offer the ASEAN countries a third way, it has the confidence and influence to put its weight on the scales in favor of the scenario of future events that is more in its interests. In the economy Russia can speed up the preparation of an agreement on free trade zones with the countries of the region. In fact, this is what is happening and after the FTA with Vietnam, that has already allowed to move the volumes of Russian-Vietnamese trade and overcome the five-billion mark in trade turnover which seemed inaccessible for a long time. A free trade zone with Singapore has already been born. In addition, according to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia S. Lavrov “the work on the formation of the FTA is conducted by Russia also with Indonesia, Thailand, Cambodia, Brunei”41. The possibility of forming a much larger free trade area with ASEAN countries is also discussed. Moreover, it is planned to integrate cooperation with ASEAN countries into the global Russian project of Greater Eurasia – the formation of a free 41Выступление

и ответы на вопросы Министра иностранных дел России С.В. Лаврова на Российско-вьетнамской конференции Международного дискуссионного клуба «Валдай», г.Хошимин, 25 февраля 2019 года. URL: http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_ policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/ id/3541050; Шойгу: Россия готова поделиться с Вьетнамом боевым опытом // ИА REGNUM, 23.01.2018. URL: https://regnum. ru/news/polit/2370794.html

48

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

trade zone throughout the Eurasian continent. The implementation of these projects, which I must say, are developing slowly and still seem somewhat fantastic, will further integrate Russia into the ASEAN area, create new ties, build new dependencies and increase the overall attractiveness of Russia as an economic partner. Based on the analysis of Russian presence in SEA, we can say that Moscow has managed to return to Southeast Asia, and it can be predicted that while maintaining the existing status quo, the Russian presence will grow rapidly, because there is both political trust and economic interest on the part of the ASEAN countries. This conclusion is confirmed by recent events already in the era of Coronavirus, when we see not only the preservation, but also the strengthening of mutual ties. There are good prospects for implementing the agreement on the supply of Russian military aircrafts SU-35 to Indonesia, negotiations are underway on the supply of Russian Coronavirus vaccine to Indonesia, and intensive diplomatic contacts between the two countries are also underway. The same pattern can be observed in relations with other ASEAN countries. Russian Deputy Defense Minister ColonelGeneral Alexander Fomin held videoconference talks with Deputy Minister of National Defense of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) Colonel-General Nguyen Chi Vinh. This is reported by the press service of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. High-ranking military officials discussed issues of interaction within the framework of the “SMA plus” format (a meeting of ASEAN Defense Ministers with dialogue partners), cooperation in countering the spread of a new Coronavirus infection, as well as the current state and prospects of bilateral military contacts between the two countries. "Maintaining close and trusting relations with Vietnam is one of Russia's foreign policy priorities", Russian defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said in early 2020 during a visit to Vietnam. Ac49

Chapter 1. Indonesian Vision of the Future in the Asia Pacific and IndoPacific Regions and Russia and its Presence and Interests in the SEA

cording to him, Russia and Vietnam have strong ties of comprehensive strategic partnership. "During this period, we have accumulated a unique experience of working together, which is based on long-term friendship and mutually beneficial cooperation. It was reported that Vietnam and Russia on January 29, 2020 signed a contract for the supply of Yak-130 combat training aircraft worth more than 350 million USD. The previous contract for the purchase of at least 12 aircrafts was signed in 201942. As for ASEAN as a whole, at the meeting of Ministers of the Russia – ASEAN economic bloc in Bangkok, Russia and representatives of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries discussed five key areas of cooperation, including agriculture, energy, infrastructure, digital technologies and the financial sector, almost all of which we have explored in our work. Proceeding from the above, we can conclude that despite the global pandemic that has greatly changed our world in just a few months and a number of other international problems, Russian-Indonesian and Russian-ASEAN cooperation on key issues of the future security architecture in Asia will develop in the most favorable way. We have a common vision and multidimensional relationships as a solid foundation for the future.

Шойгу обсудил вопросы военного сотрудничества с министром обороны Вьетнама // Известия. 05.02.2020. URL: https://iz.ru/972497/2020-02-05/shoigu-obsudil-voprosyvoennogo-sotrudnichestva-s-ministrom-oborony-vetnama 42

50

Evgeny A. Kanaev Doctor of Historical Science, Professor, HSE University, Russia, Moscow, [email protected] Evgeny A. Galchenko Senior Lecturer, HSE University, Russia, Moscow, [email protected]

Chapter 2. The Greater Eurasian Partnership:

a Re-Energizer of Russia-Indonesia Cooperation?

Although Russia and Indonesia have ample reasons to make their cooperation comprehensive, nuanced and multidimensional, practice routinely falls short of expectations. Notable impediments include a large distance magnified by inefficient infrastructure, as well as lack of institutional and technological interdependence and weak people-to-people contacts, and most importantly, insufficient stimuli to expand ties beyond their present scope. Revealingly, practice demonstrated that market forces alone cannot make the Russia-Indonesia cooperation really deep, close, multi-dimensional and, by implication, strategically-oriented. Accounting for Moscow’s and Jakarta’s plans to elevate their relations to the level of Strategic Partnership, a new instrument to make them relations exactly what their forthcoming status suggests is needed. Since recently, Russia has been developing a new megaproject – the Greater Eurasia (or the Greater Eurasian Partnership – GEP). The puzzle, therefore, is the extent to which the GEP may re-energize the Russia-Indonesia cooperation and,

Chapter 2. The Greater Eurasian Partnership: a Re-Energizer of Russia-Indonesia Cooperation?

more importantly, provide it with a strong foundation upon which the Strategic Partnership may be premised. Starting from an outline of the GEP as a multilateral initiative, the chapter further proceeds with a review of relations between Russia and Indonesia to finally turn to revealing the trade potential of these relations linking it to the GEP perspective. The conclusion summarizes the foregoing analysis. The Greater Eurasian Partnership: Points of Vulnerability The concept of the Greater Eurasian Partnership was elaborated on by the Russian scholars as Russia’s relations with the “collective West” were deteriorating after the Ukraine crisis had started. India’s and Pakistan’s admission to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) added momentum to the vision of consolidated Eurasia. The establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union was followed by agreements with China on synergizing the BRI and the EAEU, as well as FTAs between the EAEU and Vietnam and other partners. As a result, Russia’s pivot to the East was incorporated into the Greater Eurasian Partnership1. Whilst conceptualizing the GEP, the Russian foreign policy scholars have written extensively on its virtues, but have fallen short of providing specific details on how it will function. Arguably, the GEP’s has substantial, institutional and ideational points of vulnerability. From the substantial perspective, the Greater Eurasian Partnership lacks carefully elaborated on directions of cooperation to the best advantage of its participants. Its potential mutual (emphasis added – E.K. and E.G.) economic, political-security and reputational benefits are unclear. In case China remains Toward the Great Ocean – 5: from the Turn to the East to Greater Eurasia. Valdai Discussion Club Report. Moscow, September 2017. URL: // https://valdaiclub.com/files/15300

1

52

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

the main benefit-provider and distributor, several points warrant consideration. Can the GEP efficiently function without India, taking into account its apprehensions about the BRI, as well as New Delhi’s participation in the Indo-Pacific counterBRI project? Can the GEP be successfully carried out in South Asia with the Afghanistan and the Kashmir problem unresolved, as well as along growing anti-China sentiments in Southeast Asia, South Asia and Central Asia? What is the EU’s interest in the GEP taking into account a range of possibilities to develop cooperation with China as part of the BRI and with ASEAN in the framework of EU-ASEAN dialogue partnership without burdening this cooperation by, for instance, negotiating separately with Russia and the EAEU? Questions like those mentioned above are numerous, and their complexity is increasing. At these complicated crossroads, excessive reliance upon China may be part of the problem rather than of the solution. Beijing is not inclined to resort to international law while dealing with emerging disputes, the latter may be both politicalsecurity and commercial. China’s reaction to the PCA decision on the South China Sea issue convincingly revealed that Beijing prioritizes its domestic law over the international arbitration. Considering that the Belt and Road Initiative is a largescale project with imminent contradictions of all sorts, China will hardly sacrifice its interests to the advantage of its partners. This has to be understood in the present global context, as China itself is vulnerable to many uncertainties. Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, China has suspended the implementation of some of the BRI projects. If so, the continuity of trans-national infrastructure development as the cornerstone of interest displayed by China’s BRI partners will be disrupted.

53

Chapter 2. The Greater Eurasian Partnership: a Re-Energizer of Russia-Indonesia Cooperation?

In the institutional realm, it is unclear which institutions (if any) can form the GEP framework. As exemplified by the Asia-Pacific region, the plethora of its multilateral dialogue venues turned out to be inefficient in terms of achieving their declared goals. For instance, at the time of preparing this chapter (as of September 2020), the establishment of the FTA regime between the APEC developing economies, as the APEC Bogor goals set out in 1994, is anything but realistic. The ASEAN-led institutions, in case synergized with the GEP, may well add to its complexity and uncertain prospects. Theoretically, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus Eight (ADMM+8) and the East Asia Summit (EAS) can be used as part of the GEP institutional foundation. The ASEAN-led multilateral dialogue platforms embrace high-level diplomats (ARF), top military officials (ADMM+8) and heads of states and governments (EAS). Among their participants, there is North Korea, which is especially significant since the presumable Eurasian security system cannot be efficient without a permanent channel of dialogue with Pyongyang. More to the point, the ASEAN-led formats add inclusivity to the Eurasian cooperation on security issues as the US is a member of the ARF, the ADMM+8 and the EAS. This allows the GEP to make its security system open and, by implication, avoid the worst precedents of the Cold War2. In practice, however, as ASEAN’s dialogue partners – both the potential GEP members and the participants of the counter-BRI initiative Quad – are slipping into contradictions, for the Association this scenario means losing neutrality and inclusivity as the key premises of its post-Cold War success stories. Канаев Е.А., Шумкова В.А. Евразийские приоритеты асеаноцентричных диалоговых форматов по вопросам безопасности // Вестник Российского университета дружбы народов. Серия: Международные отношения. 2017. Т. 17. № 3. С. 458-468. 2

54

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

Among the already existing institutions which cover the whole Eurasian area and which are presented by top-level politicians, there is only ASEM Forum. Established in 1996, ASEM was enabled with a wide range of possibilities to shape the parameters of cooperation across the Eurasian continent. But contrary to initial expectations, ASEM has been unable to carve out its niche in both economic and political-security cooperation in its territorial domain. ASEM is no more than a “club of presidents” with representative rather than substantial functions. Initial expectations that ASEM would reenergize cooperation across the Eurasian continent have not been substantiated by conclusive evidence. Prospects for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to form the institutional bedrock of the GEP are hardly inviting. By admitting India and Pakistan, the SCO burdened itself with the problems which it successfully resolved at the initial stage of its development. The territorial disputes between India and Pakistan and between India and China are good cases in point. They are further exacerbated by conflicting visions of Russia, China, the Central Asian states, India and Pakistan on what the SCO is and what it should be. But most notably, on achieving its initial goals, the SCO exhausted its agenda. At the present point in time, the central task for the SCO is to reinvigorate its multilateral cooperation to the benefit of all its participants. But the degree of their real rather than declaratory readiness to move from pronouncements to action is best exemplified by India-Pakistan fully-fledged military conflict in February 2019. Being aware that the anti-terrorist agenda is the cornerstone of the SCO cooperation, India did not find it necessary to raise the issue in the SCO format, instead resorting to a unilateral military attack. Since the Greater Eurasian Partnership was endorsed by Russia, the institutional potential of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) deserves revealing. Arguably, it is limited as 55

Chapter 2. The Greater Eurasian Partnership: a Re-Energizer of Russia-Indonesia Cooperation?

after the initial progress premised on the low base effect, the EAEU is beset with complex internal problems. They range from competitiveness rather than complementarity of the EAEU member-states’ exports, lack of their collective investment in the EAEU technologically advanced sectors and the uncoordinated tax policies to insufficient synergy between national development priorities of the EAEU member states. Strategically, that, by means of the EAEU, Russia aims to strengthen its great power status while the major objective of its EAEU partners is to diversify their possibilities for sustainable economic development. At the same time, as long as Russia as the integrator of the EAEU remains under international sanctions, for the EAEU to act as one of the GEP’s institutional pillars will be problematic at best. Last but not least, the normative part of the GEP matters. The project lacks an idea which would be able to unify, or at least synergize, the visions of its participants. The European market liberalism, the ASEAN Way and China’s Community of common destiny cannot perform this function. Russia’s stance on conservative values is not substantiated by its economic possibilities. In Russia, attempts to develop an ideational platform of international cooperation have been made3, but under any scenario, spectacular results will not appear overnight. At the present stage of its conceptualization, the Greater Eurasian Partnership lacks principal instruments to integrate the Eurasian geographical area. As argued by Russian scholars, the GEP is based on anti-Western sentiments rather than

Protecting Peace, Earth, and Freedom of Choice for All Countries. New Ideas for Russia’s Foreign Policy / S.A. Karaganov, D.V. Suslov et al. — Moscow: Higher School of Economics Publishing House, 2020. URL: // https://publications.hse.ru/mirror/pubs/ share/direct/399727482.pdf 3

56

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

on shared visions of the Eurasian states4. At the same time, however, the anti-Western sentiments alone can be just a short-term driver, while the sustainability of the project is hardly possible without a strong unifying component shared by at least the majority of the presumable GEP participants. Ample evidence suggests that, at least at the present point in time, this is far from reality. All factors considered, the Greater Eurasian Partnership is a geopolitical construct with serious deficiencies rather than an economic project. The GEP is premised on the dissatisfaction with the present-day global order rather than on a shared vision of the Eurasian actors on how to make this order more balanced and conducive to sustainable development, as well as on a synergy of their interests and possibilities. As a result, the project lacks efficient instruments to shape the international milieu across the Eurasian continent and incentivize new participants to join it. Russia-Indonesia Relations: Trends and Emerging Issues After Russia and Indonesia established diplomatic relations in February 1950, their dialogue has seen its ups and downs. The following specific points are worthy of note. First, the Russia-Indonesia relations have been developing inconsistently and depended upon the situational expediency rather than on a broad strategic vision. Possibly with the exception of the 1950s and the early-mid 1960s, Indonesia has never been a self-sufficient direction of the USSR/Russia’s policy. Similarly, relations with Moscow occupied at best a secondary place in the priorities of Jakarta’s foreign policy. Simultaneously, Russia and Indonesia traditionally tented to priЛукин А.В., Новиков Д.П. От Большой Европы к Большой Евразии: что несет миру коренной геополитический сдвиг. Восток (Oriens). 2019. № 5. С. 60-76. 4

57

Chapter 2. The Greater Eurasian Partnership: a Re-Energizer of Russia-Indonesia Cooperation?

oritize the bilateral and, to a much lesser extent, the regional vector of their cooperation ignoring its global dimension5. Second, these relations have been outside the East Asian processes of regionalization and regionalism. Russia and Indonesia have not been involved in the same manufacture and supply chains of technologically advanced production and institutionalized formats of multilateral cooperation like the Asia-Pacific network of FTAs. The only exception is APEC, but even the Russian and the Indonesian consecutive chairmanships in 2012 and 2013 respectively did not stimulate Moscow and Jakarta to enhance the coordination of their prospective plans (even despite considerable similarity of their agendas as the APEC chairs). Third, the Russia-Indonesia dialogue, at least after the end of the Cold War, lacked a big idea. From Russia’s perspective, its pivot to the East was not “specifically Indonesian” (even in spite of Jakarta’s traditionally strong influence in the Asia-Pacific region). In its turn, Jakarta has been and remains preoccupied with “not specifically-Russian” processes like the South China Sea issue or the Indo-Pacific region narrative. These factors set the broad parameters of RussiaIndonesia relations. In 1950–1965, they saw upward trends, and the rapprochement between Moscow and Jakarta was based upon, first and foremost, the anti-colonialism. As part of its anti-colonial strategy, the USSR supported the newly independent Indonesia, which was in synergy with the Soviet concept of the peaceful co-existence of states with different social systems (later on echoed at the Bandung Conference in 1955). It was even despite the reality that the Soviet ideology was not always taken positively by the Indonesian patriarchic-clergy For more detail, see: Kanaev E., Simbolon L., Shaternikov P. RussiaIndonesia Relations: Assessing Shortcomings and Framing a Response. Southeast Asia: Actual Problems of Development. 2019. № 4 (45). P. 95-106.

5

58

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

circles and westernized political elite. The Soviet support for the Indonesian position on the West Irian conflict in 1958 and the subsequent military assistance further intensified the upward trends. In the early and the mid-1960s, relations between the USSR and Indonesia deteriorated. In 1963, the Soviet leadership did not support Soekarno’s anti-Malaysian campaign. Besides, the USSR disapproved of the degree of importance which Indonesia attached to the Third World. Lastly, the Communist Party of Indonesia often supported the CCP rather than the CPSU, which added to the Soviet-Indonesian contradictions. After the military coup in 1965, the Soviet Union tried to draw a line between the ideology (taking into consideration the anti-communist course of the new Indonesian leadership) and the strategic expediency. As a result, relations between Moscow and Jakarta were relegated to the “minimum sufficiency” level. At the same time, the Soviet-Indonesian relations were a matter of degrees rather than a “black-and-white” process. Revealingly, Jakarta did not criticize the Soviet invasion to Afghanistan. After Suharto’s visit to Moscow in 1989, where he critically commented on the “American dictatorship” (which signified Jakarta’s intention to balance Washington’s influence on the Indonesian foreign policy), Indonesia started to purchase the Soviet and later on the Russian military equipment. In the post-bipolar world, relations between Russia and Indonesia have been developing in a sporadic way. The parties concluded a few agreements, among which the Declaration on the Foundations of Friendly and Partnership Relations (2003) and the Agreement on Cooperation in the Peaceful use of Atomic Energy (2011) are worthy of note. The parties are implementing practically-oriented projects like the launch of Indonesian satellite Garuda-1 or the Russian deliveries of Su59

Chapter 2. The Greater Eurasian Partnership: a Re-Energizer of Russia-Indonesia Cooperation?

khoi-Superjet-100 to Indonesia. Nevertheless, after Russia declared its pivot to the East, a notable rise in contacts with Indonesia, as well as their diversification, did not take place. Among the implemented projects, of special note is the launch of the Indonesian satellite Garuda-1 with the Russian assistance in 2000, which was followed by the Framework Agreement on the Space Exploration in 2006. Other examples include cooperation between the Russian company Petros Group and the Indonesian energy sector in the implementation of enhanced oil recovery methods, as well as between the Russian company Power Machines and its Indonesian partner PT Perusahaan Listrik Negara in the national program of the accelerated electrification of the Indonesian territory. Discouragingly, however, the pivotal project of the Russia-Indonesia cooperation – the construction of the railway in the East Kalimantan – may well be cancelled6 even despite its approval at the top level7. At present, Russia and Indonesia aim to establish the Strategic Partnership8, which means upgrading and diversifying both their cooperation and its instruments. Among the factors behind the Moscow’s and Jakarta’s motivation, the following are of special note.

Prakoso J.P. East Kalimantan Infrastructure: Relentlessly Pursuing Trains. PwC Indonesia. 6 July 2020. URL: // https://www.pwc. com/id/en/media-centre/infrastructure-news/july-2020/eastkalimantan-infrastructure-relentlessly-pursuing-trains.html 7 See, for instance: Meeting with Representatives of the RussiaASEAN Business Forum. President of Russia Official Web Site. May 20, 2016. URL: // http://en.special.kremlin.ru/events/ president/news/51951 8 Russia, Indonesia to Raise Relations to Level of Strategic Partnership – Lavrov. TASS. 2 February 2020. URL: // https://tass.com/ politics/1115513 6

60

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

From the Russian perspective, the diversification from China matters. Arguably, Russia’s pivot to the Asia-Pacific region has become Russia’s pivot to the PRC. Deepening relations with other Asia-Pacific partners, among which Indonesia bears special significance due to its territory, economic possibilities and political status, can make Russia’s Asia-Pacific policy more balanced and, by implication, efficient. Indonesia has taken the helm in elaborating on the ASEAN position on the project Indo-Pacific region (IPR)9. Taking into account the IPR politicization due to, first and foremost, its inherent anti-China component, as exemplified by the revival of the Quadrilateral Defense Cooperation group as the institutional framework of the Indo-Pacific region, Indonesia may well mediate relations between ASEAN and Russia regarding the association’s policy towards the IPR. Seen from the Indonesian perspective, more diversified cooperation with Russia is advantageous. The Indonesian elite sees the country in the cohort of global leaders, which means increasing cooperation with powers shaping the world development. Specifically, Indonesia aims to increase its influence in the world Muslim community, in light of which the Russian assistance in joining peace efforts in the Middle East might be a valuable asset. To conclude, both Russia and Indonesia are motivated by mostly geopolitical rather than economic factors. At the same time, the economic pillar should be strong enough to underpin the political initiatives. The more so since the latter are seen as embracing a vast territory, as the GEP presupposes. At this juncture, a timely effort is to explore the trade dimension as the most revealing part of Russia-Indonesia ties Weatherbee D.E. Indonesia, ASEAN and the Indo-Pacific Cooperation Concept. ISEAS Perspective. 7 June 2019. URL: https://www. iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2019_47.pdf

9

61

Chapter 2. The Greater Eurasian Partnership: a Re-Energizer of Russia-Indonesia Cooperation?

from the perspective of adopting it to a wider cooperative format. The EAEU-Indonesia and the EAEU-ASEAN Trade Pieces of the Puzzle To arrive at more nuanced understanding of the GEP factor in re-energizing the Russia-Indonesia cooperation, it is relevant to discuss the current state of the trade exchanges between the parties from the EAEU-Indonesia and the EAEUASEAN perspective. With respect to the former, May 2017 may be regarded as its pivotal point. Prospects of trade and investment cooperation between the EAEU and Indonesia were first officially discussed at a special conference hosted by Udayana University and supported by the Government of Indonesia. The Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) officials confirmed that bilateral and multilateral trade agreements were attractive to the EAEU. In their turn, the representatives of the Republic of Indonesia stressed that their country was interested in mutual participation in production and supply chains in the Greater Eurasia including in cooperation with the Eurasian Economic Union10. Later that year, the Indonesian Minister of Trade visited the EEC. He noted that the EAEU-Vietnam FTA, as well as the EAEU-Cambodia and the EAEU-Singapore Memoranda of Understanding, had proven to be necessary for enhanced cooperation. In this light, a similar Memorandum of Under10 International Seminar “Eurasian Economic Union: Challenges and Opportunities for Indonesia”. University of Udayana, Bali, 19 May 2017. URL: https://www.unud.ac.id/en/headline1902-Finding-Outthe-Potential-Cooperation-of-Indonesia-Eurasian-Economic-Unionthe-Policy-Analysis-and-Development-Agency-Ministry-of-ForeignAffairs-Republic-of-Indonesia-in-Cooperation-with-UdayanaUniversity-Held-International-Seminar.html

62

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

standing between the EEC and the Government of Indonesia would be beneficial for both parties. The Minister also stressed the salience of promoting the idea of multilateral cooperation between the EAEU and ASEAN in intra-ASEAN discussions11. Although the share of Indonesia in imports of five EAEU member states combined was just one per cent several years ago, it started to grow after the idea to formalize the EAEUIndonesia relations had been announced. Supplies from the EAEU countries were even less represented in Indonesia’s imports geographical structure, but this indicator also started to grow. This resulted in Indonesia becoming the EAEU’s fourth largest trade partner in ASEAN12. However, prospects for a marked increase in mutual trade are not realistic due to a long distance and the overall low level of EAEU-ASEAN economic cooperation. Revealingly, in 2018 Russia’s bilateral trade volumes with Indonesia experienced a decline (Fig. 1).

Figure 1. Russian Federation foreign trade in commodities with Indonesia, 1996−2018.13

Indonesia Considers to Sign an FTA Agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union. Analytical Media Eurasian Studies. 12 August 2017. // URL: http://greater-europe.org/archives/3168 12 ASEANStats Data Portal. URL: https://data.aseanstats.org 13 Based on UN Comtrade data. 11

63

Chapter 2. The Greater Eurasian Partnership: a Re-Energizer of Russia-Indonesia Cooperation?

In mid-February 2019, another set of negotiations took place. Officials of the EEC’s Integration and Macroeconomics Department confirmed that Memorandum of Understanding would be a prudent choice for a potential EAEU-Indonesia FTA as this model of cooperation had been efficiently applied by the EAEU in relations with many third countries including several ASEAN member states14. The spectrum of cooperation negotiated between the EAEU and Indonesia negotiations is expanding. Last year, the talks focused on tourism, infrastructure and energy projects as priority areas. The parties agreed to broaden the scope by including trade regulation issues like tariffs and non-tariff measures, regional integration and joint finance programs. Business is actively encouraged to participate in discussions. It was proposed to convene several business forums focusing on competition and investment areas. The direct result was the EAEU-Indonesia Memorandum of Cooperation signed in October 201915. Apart from trade-related issues, cooperation covers financial markets. Still, due to the EAEU’s specificity, the Eurasian Economic Commission’s major scope is common trade policy. The Russian officials suggested that parties should gain advantage in developing Industry 4.016. This argument sounds plausible since counter-measures to cope with potential challenges presented by the Digital Silk Road as part of the BRI is a timely step. Aisyah R. Indonesia to Cooperate with Five Eurasian Countries in Trade. The Jakarta Post. 15 Feb. 2019. URL: https://www.thejakarta post.com/news/2019/02/15/indonesia-to-cooperate-with-fiveeurasian-countries-in-trade.html 15 EEC and Indonesia Signed a Memorandum of Cooperation. Russia-ASEAN Business Council. 18 October 2019. URL: https:// www.russia-asean.com/en/news/113 16EEC and Indonesia Signed a Memorandum of Cooperation… 14

64

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

From the substantial perspective, the mutual trade structure is of note. Indonesia imports from the EAEU products ranging from potash or fertilizers to coal industry vehicles and weapons while the EAEU mostly imports minerals, palm oil, footwear, garments, etc. As for investment projects, the EAEU might contribute to developing the Indonesian maritime and energy infrastructure, as well as disaster management facilities. There is room for strengthening and diversifying trade and investment cooperation in the case of eventual FTA agreement. Nevertheless, the EAEU-Indonesia trade and economic relations are developing at a relatively low pace. This is discouraging since a more robust cooperation would be in the best interests of both parties. Amid the growing China-US economic tensions and the overall regional polarization with negative aftereffects for economic cooperation, Indonesia needs to explore alternative markets. The same priority is important for the EAEU countries due to the anti-Russian economic sanctions. Impediments to the EAEU-Indonesia trade cooperation are serious. Russia and Indonesia are among the top-5 most digitally restricted countries. According to an indicator the Digital Trade Restrictiveness Index (DTRI) developed by the European Center for International Political Economy, which covers 64 countries and measures national policy restrictions to digital trade and costs involved, Russia is ranked 2nd while Indonesia is ranked 4th. Crucially for the Greater Eurasian Partnership, China, India and Vietnam, Russia’s important partners in the presumable GEP, are included in this top-5 list as well.17 Russia mostly restricts the trans-border movement of Ferracane M.F., Lee-Makiyama H., Marel E. Digital Trade Restrictiveness Index. European Center for International Political Economy. Brussels, 2018. P. 8. URL: https://ecipe.org/wp-content/ uploads/2018/05/DTRI_FINAL.pdf 17

65

Chapter 2. The Greater Eurasian Partnership: a Re-Energizer of Russia-Indonesia Cooperation?

ICT specialists and data. Various data policies regarding localization, retention, etc., combined with and multiplied by content access infringements, incur costs on business. Restrictive measures imposed on companies by Indonesia involve content access, e-retail and intellectual property rights. In view of this, to expect dramatic breakthroughs in the EAEU-Indonesia trade relations is not realistic under any scenario, including within the GEP framework. This assessment should be placed in a broader context, namely, specifically, the EAEU – ASEAN trade exchanges. A trendy buzzword worth a careful consideration is the EAEUASEAN FTA. A milestone decision was taken at the RussiaASEAN Commemorative Summit in 2016 and extended at the 5th ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM)-Russia Consultations. As a result, a proposal to launch a joint feasibility study of a possible FTA between ASEAN and the Eurasian Economic Union was put forward.18 As outlined in the Post-2017 ASEAN-Russia Trade and Investment Work Programme, the EAEU-ASEAN cooperation focuses upon promoting transparency and information sharing on matters relevant to the flow of trade and investment, as well as upon enhancing the development of national single windows.19 At the third ASEAN-Russia Summit on Strategic Partnership held in November 2018, the officials of the Commission’s Board and the ASEAN Secretariat signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Economic Cooperation. The 18 The fifth AEM-Russia Consultations. Joint Media Statement. 5 August 2016. URL: https://asean.org/storage/2016/08/07-AEMRussia-5-JMS-final.pdf 19 Post-2017 ASEAN-Russia Trade and Investment Work Programme. URL: https://www.economy.gov.ru/material/file/ 5ec0601d3017b51582015c20869e0fea/programma_russia_ASEAN_20 19.docx

66

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

priority areas in the framework of the MOU are customs procedures, trade facilitation, non-tariff measures, e-commerce, trade in services, investment and MSMEs.20 Alongside with encouraging businesses to work together, the MOU prescribes drafting similar bilateral documents or trade agreements between the EEC and the governments of ASEAN countries. In its turn, the Joint Statement of the Summit stipulated to substantially increase trade and investment exchanges by implementing measures outlined in the respective Roadmap.21 The provisions of this document became the basis for the program of the EAEU-ASEAN cooperation for 2019–2020. It covers trade policy measures, customs regulations, law enforcement, antitrust policies and energy infrastructure projects. Also, it encourages the parties to coordinate their positions whilst attending meetings hosted by the UN-based organizations.22 This will generate the commonality of purpose and the synergy of efforts between the partners. At the Eighth AEM-Russia Consultations held in September 2019 in Thailand, the increase in trade turnover between ASEAN and Russia/EAEU was appreciated as a notable development (Fig. 2). The Ministers also stated the upward

Memorandum of Understanding between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Eurasian Economic Commission on Economic Cooperation. 14 November 2018. URL: https://asean.org/ storage/2018/11/MOU-between-ASEAN-and-the-EEC_SignedEnglish.pdf 21 Joint Statement of the 3rd ASEAN-Russian Federation Summit on Strategic Partnership. President of Russia. 14 November 2018. URL: http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5360 22 Programme of Cooperation between the Eurasian Economic Commission and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations for 2019-2020. URL: https://www.economy.gov.ru/material/ file/169a9800fa6f9234650b52919dfdf1ce/programma_2019-2020.docx 20

67

Chapter 2. The Greater Eurasian Partnership: a Re-Energizer of Russia-Indonesia Cooperation?

trend in Russia-ASEAN bilateral investment flows.23 In November, at the 14th East Asia Summit the Russian PM noted that Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines were interested in bilateral FTAs with the Eurasian Economic Union. At the discussions held in the earlyand mid-2020, the EEC and ASEAN agreed upon intensifying cooperation in the period to 2025 with the priority attached to long-term projects.24

Figure 2. EAEU-ASEAN merchandise trade turnover, 2015-2018, bln USD.25

The Eighth AEM-Russia Consultations. Joint Media Statement. 10 September 2019. URL: https://asean.org/storage/2019/09/AEMRussia-8-JMS-FINAL.pdf 24 Working Visit of the ASEAN Secretary-General Dato Lim Jock Hoi to the Russian Federation. 4 February 2020. URL: https://asean.org/ working-visit-asean-secretary-general-dato-lim-jock-hoi-russianfederation 25 Based on EEC Statistics of Foreign and Mutual Trade in Goods. URL: http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/act/integr_i_ makroec/dep_stat/tradestat/Pages/default.aspx 23

68

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

In terms of trade structure, Russia and other EAEU member states mostly export minerals, chemicals, metals and agricultural products like cereals and grains. The competitive advantage of ASEAN countries in trade with the Union covers other agricultural products like fruit, textiles, as well as footwear and machinery. Theoretically, due to a balanced regulatory framework for increasing competition, the Eurasian Economic Union may contribute to expanding ASEAN’s presence at European markets. Simultaneously, it would be beneficial for the EAEU members to broaden their access to Asian market capitalizing upon a web of ASEAN’s dialogue partnerships and FTAs. In practice, however, as long as the previously existing trade impediments between the EAEU countries and ASEAN, like lack of diasporas, brands, mass goods etc., are in place, and the anti-Russian sanctions are not lifted, the EAEU-ASEAN trade is unlikely to increase exponentially. In the latter regard, several points are worthy of note. It itself, the discussion of FTA regime between the Eurasian Economic Commission and ASEAN does not automatically guarantee a favorable outcome. The EEC discusses FTAs with many partners across Eurasia, and the trade volumes between the EAEU and those parties are higher than the trade turnover between the EAEU and ASEAN. In these circumstances, ASEAN cannot be regarded the EAEU’s privileged partner. More than that, even if successfully launched, the FTA regime does not necessarily generate a dramatic increase in trade exchanges. As Vietnam’s experience demonstrates, the trade between the SRV and the USA is approximately ten times higher than between the SRV and the EAEU, and the recently concluded Vietnam-EAEU FTA has not stimulated tremendous trade growth.26 Finally, ASEAN is not among the EEC’s prin26

UN Comtrade data.

69

Chapter 2. The Greater Eurasian Partnership: a Re-Energizer of Russia-Indonesia Cooperation?

cipal partners in the sphere of digital economy.27 For the EAEU, it means lack of progress in cooperation with Southeast Asian states in technologically-advanced sectors. On the whole, the trade dimension of the Russia-ASEAN and Russia-Indonesia relations suggests that even under the most favorable scenario the progress will be moderate at best. Although any assessments about the aftereffects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the Russia-Indonesia trade exchanges are premature, as well as details of any initiatives are elusive, its overall implications will be damaging. Prospects for the world economy, as well as for Russia, Indonesia, the EAEU and ASEAN, are uncertain, if not gloomy. In this regard, expectations should be kept low, at least in the short and midterm. At these complicated crossroads, the trade factor in cooperation between Moscow and Jakarta hardly lays a reliable foundation conducive to extending their relations to the Eurasian continent. Conclusions Although novel and ambitions in many respects, the Greater Eurasian Partnership as a multilateral initiative requires a higher specification. At the present stage of its development, it remains a broad strategic vision rather than a set of ready-to-use instruments fit for shaping the Eurasian geopolitical milieu to good advantage of its actors. Both the Russian Federation and the Republic of Indonesia realize the insufficiency of the present scale and density of cooperation, as well as the rising need to make and more comprehensive, diversified and practically-oriented. Current global and Asia-Pacific trends suggest that in the decades, if The EAEU Digital Agenda 2025: Prospects and Recommendations. Overview report. World Bank Group. URL: http://documents. worldbank.org/curated/en/850581522435806724/pdf/EAEUOverview-Full-ENG-Final.pdf 27

70

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

not years, to come, this priority will loom all the larger. If so, the establishment of the Strategic Partnership may be conducive to stimulating the Russia-Indonesia cooperation. However, as exemplified by the shortcomings of the Greater Eurasian Partnership, as well as by Russia-Indonesia and the EAEU-ASEAN trade exchanges, the GEP in its present state will hardly inject new energies in the Russia-Indonesia relations and, by means of this, provide a conceptual and substantial underpinning for the forthcoming Russia-Indonesia Strategic Partnership. In these circumstances, the new status and, more importantly, the new quality of relations between Moscow and Jakarta, at least in the short- and mid-term perspective, will arguably be premised upon resources other than the GEP.

71

Pavel S. Shaternikov, Teaching assistant, HSE University, [email protected] Sofya A. Paderina, Research assistant, Joint Department with Avtopromimport, World Economy and International Affairs faculty, HSE University, [email protected]

Chapter 3. Russia-Indonesia Strategic Partnership:

The Interplay of Institutional Foundations, Ulterior Motives and Emerging Tasks1 Introduction

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) strives to be the role player in international relations in the Asia-Pacific region. This goal includes multiple tasks, among which strengthening ASEAN’s positions as the coordinator of multilateral cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region is of special significance. To substantiate its relations with external partners, as well as its international credentials, ASEAN established special multilateral venues, specifically, the ASEAN ReThe research has been carried out under the HSE University mentoring programme implemented by the School of International Regional Studies HSE University (academic supervisor Professor E. Kanaev). Also, it is part of the project «Analysis of Scientific-technical and Marketing Information – For Project Justification of Developing an Event Identification System for a Nuclear Power Plant with PWR» implemented by Joint Department with Avtopromimport HSE University (academic supervisor Professor A. Podchufarov). 1

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

gional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit (EAS) and ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus Eight (ADMM+8). The core premise of ASEAN’s international policy is the concept of ASEAN centrality in the regional multilateralism. Discouragingly, ASEAN’s intentions to coordinate the multilateral discussions may be hampered by rising contradictions in relations among its external partners. China is implementing its megaproject “Belt and Road Initiative” which is of considerable strategic importance. At the same time, some ASEAN countries remain dependent upon China in both economic and political-security terms. The latter point is exemplified by the South China Sea issue which becomes increasingly complicated. The Asia Pacific region is covered by the network of the US military alliances (“the hub and spoke system”). The Indo-Pacific Region as a multilateral initiative further re-energizes the US regional positions. The resulting aftereffects for Southeast Asia seem to be traumatic, a decrease of the credentials of ASEAN-led institutions as a most likely scenario. This predicament, however, incentivizes ASEAN, as well as its member states, to intensify cooperation with the Russian Federation. Although Moscow is not able to offer as much economic benefits as China and the US, it has no expansionist intensions. As the present international entropy continues, a partner with a huge economic potential and peaceful regional intentions is both a prudent choice and a promising policy direction. This is especially relevant to Indonesia, since it encounters both same challenges as those outlined above and strives to make its policy diversified and eventually more effective. The immediate aftereffect has been an agreement between Moscow and Jakarta to elevate their relations to the level of Strategic Partnership. A relevant task is to assess the fea-

73

Chapter 3. Russia-Indonesia Strategic Partnership: The Interplay of Institutional Foundations, Ulterior Motives and Emerging Tasks

sibility of this step, as well as the foundations of the forthcoming new dimension of Russia-Indonesia cooperation. Russia-ASEAN Strategic Partnership: Assessing the Reasons The Association has established Dialogue Partnerships with many international actors. Among them, many are in serious contradictions. For instance, the US and China have disputes over the Asia-Pacific maritime security issues, digital infrastructure, etc. The policies of other stakeholders like Japan, India or Australia, add to the regional uncertainty. A possible deterioration of political relations between China on the one hand, and the United States, India, Australia and Japan (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, the institutional pillar of the Indo-Pacific Region) on the other, could also undermine multilateral projects in Southeast Asia and ASEAN dialogue platforms2. More than that, the Quad itself is decreasing ASEAN’s regional influence. Motivated by these developments, ASEAN is eager to develop cooperation with Russia as the changing of regional milieu can adversely affect the association itself. Suffice it to mention that an excessive bias towards a particular external partner may well detriment the Asia-Pacific system of checks and balances carefully managed by ASEAN. This is all the more important, since ASEAN partners participate in ASEAN-led multilateral institutions which operate on the basis of neutrality and inclusivity. ASEAN and Russia celebrated the 20th anniversary of the dialogue relations in 2016. In 2018 the parties established the Strategic Partnership. At present, Russia takes part in the principle ASEAN-led institutions like the EAS, the ARF and the ASEAN+8. There are also numerous specialized channels and Канаев Е.А. Экономическое Сообщество АСЕАН – новое пространство деловой активности // Юго-Восточная Азия: актуальные проблемы развития, 2017, № 37. С. 14-27. 2

74

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

mechanisms of cooperation like ASEAN-Russia Joint Cooperation Committee, ASEAN – Russian Federation Dialogue Partnership Financial Fund, ASEAN-Russia Joint Working Group on Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime, etc. Despite a number of obstacles, the institutional infrastructure of RussiaASEAN dialogue is well-developed and diversified. Developing cooperation with Russia, ASEAN can mitigate China’s growing influence in the Asia Pacific region, as well as its overdependence of some of its member states on the China’s policy. Besides, Russia could contribute to strengthening the cooperative trends in the Asia-Pacific region by providing ASEAN with new possibility for balancing, mostly by means of expanding ASEAN’s present room for diplomatic maneuver. Fostering dialogue with Russia will enable the association to increase its capacity-building possibilities in areas like cyber security, ICT, critical infrastructure protection, space exploration and energy security. Consequently, ASEAN could expand its spectrum of available instruments for sustainable development with favorable security aftereffects. Russia’s presence in the cohort of ASEAN’s dialogue partners, as well in ASEAN-led multilateral initiatives, can contribute to raising ASEAN’s global credentials. Taking into consideration the globalization of ASEAN’s prospective plans and the rise of global dimension in the Asia-Pacific economic and political-security issues, this is a valuable asset. For its part, Russia is interested in cooperation with ASEAN because of the need for the diversification of its foreign relations, to attract new resources to develop its economy, mostly its Asian territories, while hedging potential risks and ensuring peace in the region close to the Russian Far East. As compared to ASEAN’s other extra-regional partners, Russia builds relations with the Association in a unique way. Moscow does not harbor expansionist intentions in Southeast 75

Chapter 3. Russia-Indonesia Strategic Partnership: The Interplay of Institutional Foundations, Ulterior Motives and Emerging Tasks

Asia, has never interfered in the internal affairs of Southeast Asian states. The upgrade of the status of Russia-ASEAN dialogue to the level of Strategic Partnership reflects a high level of trust and the focus on the future-oriented cooperation based upon mutual benefits. As ASEAN’s centrality in Asia-Pacific multilateral venues is an important factor for keeping the interests of regional powers in a manageable state, the association needs a partner to support, and ideally to strengthen, this position. Ample evidence suggests that Russia fits this role. If so, the Strategic partnership makes sense, since it practically substantiates the convergence of Russia-ASEAN interests and makes it stronger in the years to come. Russia-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership as the Pathfinder Against this background, a timely attempt is to make an assessment of the existing experience of developing the relations of strategic partnership between Russia and the ASEAN member states. At this juncture, the Russia-Vietnam Strategic Partnership and the Russia-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership warrant consideration. Although in the Cold War period Moscow and Hanoi maintained deep and multi-dimensional cooperation, though in the patron-client form, stimuli to keep them unchanged were absent in the priorities of both sides. As a result, in the 1990s, relations between Russia and Vietnam underwent serious changes due to a number of reasons. Moscow lost its former ideological messianism and re-oriented its foreign policy to the West while Hanoi was busy preparing to join ASEAN and maintaining a hard dialogue with Beijing on the South China Sea issue. As a result, the minimum sufficiency level of dialogue was the uppermost limit of the possible. Later on, the parties established the Strategic Partnership and the Compre76

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

hensive Strategic Partnership in 2001 and 2012 respectively, but the changes were of formal rather than of substantial nature. The reasons are complex and multidimensional, but the key is lack of a clear definition of what the term "Strategic Partnership" stands for, as well as what the parties are obliged to do to meet its letter and spirit. The events of late-2016, when Russia participated in joint maneuvers with China in the South China Sea, while Vietnam cancelled the construction of power units of Ninthuan-1 nuclear power plant, which made the comprehensive strategic partners raise each other’s eyebrows, perfectly illustrate this point. However, even a declarative improvement in relations can give a new impetus to bilateral cooperation by strengthening mutual trust and, by implication, increasing the cooperative component in Moscow’s and Hanoi’s priorities. Arms transfers and energy account for important directions of Russia-Vietnam cooperation. Most of the Vietnamese weapons are purchased from Russia3 which in itself is a good basis for long-term cooperation. Strategically, supplies of military equipment are followed by contracts for its maintenance and deliveries of spare parts. As for the energy sector of Russian-Vietnamese cooperation, the dialogue goes on in the oil and gas industries. The Russian companies “Zarubezhneft”, “Rosneft” and “Gazprom” cooperate with Vietnam's “Petrovietnam” in oil supplies and production, as well as in joint gas production. The dialogue in the coal industry is also promising, particularly from the viewpoint of increasing supplies of Russian coal to Vietnam. Российско-вьетнамское военно-техническое сотрудничество: традиции и новые вызовы /Валдай: международный дискуссионный клуб. URL: https://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/ rossiya-vetnam-voenno-tekhnicheskoe/ 3

77

Chapter 3. Russia-Indonesia Strategic Partnership: The Interplay of Institutional Foundations, Ulterior Motives and Emerging Tasks

In 2018 2.6 million tons of coal were delivered from Russia to Vietnam, an increase of 15% compared to 20174. Although some elements of Russia-Vietnam cooperation in the format of Strategic Partnership and Comprehensive Strategic Partnership may be adopted to the forthcoming Russia-Indonesia Strategic Partnership, dialogue between Moscow and Jakarta has its specificity. Suffice it to say that RussiaIndonesia relations lack a commensurate background of the Cold-War period with its present-day aftereffects. Since Indonesia and Russia are promising political and economic partners, an assessment of their forthcoming Strategic Partnership to trace the specificity of their cooperation is a relevant exercise. Russia and Indonesia: beyond Trade Deficiencies Although Moscow and Jakarta declared their intention to establish the Strategic Partnership at the top level, their trade exchanges do not live up to the forthcoming status of their cooperation. To make matters worse, the foreign trade turnover between Russia and Indonesia has been decreasing since 2018: while in 2018 the decrease was 5.09%, in 2019 it accounted for 21.06%5. At the present point in time, Indonesia ranks 46th in Russia's foreign trade turnover6. This deplorable situation for bilateral trade stems from the lack of "entry points" for Russian companies to the Indonesian market. Александр Новак. Взаимодействие России и Вьетнама в сфере энергетики вышло на беспрецедентно новый уровень /Министерство энергетики Российской Федерации. URL: https://minenergo.gov.ru/node/14843 5 Товарооборот России с Индонезией /Внешняя торговля России. URL: https://russian-trade.com/reports-and-reviews/202002/torgovlya-mezhdu-rossiey-i-indoneziey-v-2019-g/ 6 Ibid. 4

78

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

While Japanese, Chinese, South Korean and American companies enjoy firm positions in Indonesia, for the Russian corporate sector, much remains to be done in order to accomplish this task. If so, the trade ties do not provide the forthcoming Russia-Indonesia Strategic Partnership with a sound foundation. Nevertheless, Russia and Indonesia cooperate, although not very closely, in the defense and energy sectors. As for military-technical cooperation, Indonesia buys Su30 MKI aircraft, Mi-17 helicopters, BMP-3F infantry vehicles, and “Yakhont” anti-ship missiles from Russia. However, the development of Russia-Indonesia dialogue in the defense sector is hindered by the American factor, since the United States, under the threat of sanctions, persuaded Indonesia to postpone the purchase of Russian Su-35 fighters, but the contract remains valid7. Once the Strategic Partnership is established, the parties will have increased motivation to foster military-technical cooperation and move from trade in weapons and equipment to joint development, especially since Indonesia aims to replace Western arms with its own production. If so, the RussiaIndonesia dialogue will probably receive an extra impetus. As a notable milestone in the history of Russia’s presence in the Asia Pacific region, in November 2018 the Third Russia-ASEAN Summit in Singapore marked the establishment of Strategic Partnership. From the Russia-Indonesia dialogue perspective, the Joint Statement on Strategic Partnership specifically mentioned the energy sector, including energy efficiency, accessibility, energy accessibility, affordability and Рособоронэкспорт: военно-техническому сотрудничеству России и Индонезии исполняется 60 лет /Рособоронэкспорт. URL: http://roe.ru/press-centr/press-relizi/rosoboroneksport-voennotekhnicheskomu-sotrudnichestvu-rossii-i-indonezii-ispolnyaetsya60-let/ 7

79

Chapter 3. Russia-Indonesia Strategic Partnership: The Interplay of Institutional Foundations, Ulterior Motives and Emerging Tasks

sustainability8. This corresponds to the Russia-Indonesia prospective plans to intensify cooperation in the energy sector. This line of cooperation is among the key, as it makes for the principal present and future priority of the Russian Federation. In light of this, Russia has to expand its reach to external markets. Concerning Indonesia, by means of partnership with Russia it will be able to acquire new experience and technologies which Russia possesses, as well as to construct energy infrastructure facilities. Russia’s energy companies are interested in magnifying their contracts in Southeast Asia. In course with this priority, the Strategic Partnership and its practical aftereffects can facilitate the access of these companies to Southeast Asian markets, including Indonesia. The normative basis for this cooperation is provided by the Memorandum of Understanding between Ministries of Energy of Russia and Indonesia signed in 2014. Examples of successful Russia-ASEAN cooperation in the energy sector are in place, and hopefully, their number will increase. Through its trading company “LITASCO SA, LUKOIL” cooperates with Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Cambodia, as well as with Indonesia. In the latter case, “LUKOIL” is interested in developing cooperation with “Pertamina” regarding the petroleum products supplies and the purchase of Indonesian oil grades. Also, it is ready to cooperate with the Indonesian partners in jointly operating infrastructure facilities. The company views the Indonesian market as a strategic direction with promising commercial prospects. Gazprom actively cooperates with Vietnam. In cooperation with “PetroVietnam”, the company established on a parity Joint Statement of the 3rd ASEAN – Russian Federation Summit on Strategic Partnership /Official Website of the President of Russia, 2018. URL: http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5360 8

80

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

basis joint operating company “Vietgazprom”, conducting geological exploration in blocks 112 and 129–132 on the SRV’s continental shelf. Since 2013 “Gazprom” and “PetroVietnam” have been carrying out commercial gas and condensate production at the Moc Tinh and Hai Thach fields9. Although “Gazprom” does not implement projects with Indonesia, it is ready to cooperate with Indonesian companies in the field of geological exploration and production of hydrocarbons. In addition, “Gazprom” is ready to organize the LNG supplies to the Indonesian market. The company is interested in negotiating this issue with “Pertamina”. “Rosneft” is also expanding its positions in Southeast Asia. The company has offshore projects on the exploration and production of hydrocarbons in Vietnam. Since 2013, in cooperation with “PetroVietnam” “Rosneft” has been drilling for oil on the coastal shelf (Block 06.01). “Rosneft” is also involved in developing Block 05.3/11. In 2016 “Rosneft” and the Indonesian company “Pertamina” established the joint venture “PT Pertamina Rosneft Pengolahan dan Petrokimia” to construct a refinery and petrochemical complex in Tuban, Indonesia. “Rosneft” claims that this project is crucial for the implementation of company’s strategy of creating goodwill and for strengthening its positions in the high-margin market for petroleum-based products in the region10. The “Pertamina-Rosneft” joint venture project company that will build and operate the new refinery was established in

Around 21 per cent of Vietnamese gas produced within Bien Dong joint project of Russia and Vietnam /Information Directorate, Gazprom, September 07, 2018. URL: https://www.gazprom.com/ press/news/2018/september/article459410/ 10 Rosneft and Pertamina JV Sign Tuban Refinery Design Contract // Rosneft Information Division, October 29, 2019. URL: https://www.rosneft.com/press/releases/item/197739/ 9

81

Chapter 3. Russia-Indonesia Strategic Partnership: The Interplay of Institutional Foundations, Ulterior Motives and Emerging Tasks

2017, with “Pertamina” holding the 55% stakes and Rosneft 45%11. “Zarubezhneft JSC” is another Russia’s company with projects in Vietnam. On the parity basis with “PetroVietnam”, “Zarubezhneft” runs the joint venture “JV Vietsovpetro” operational since 1981. Regarding Indonesia, “Zarubezhneft” signed an agreement with “Premier Oil” for a 50 per cent interest in the Premier-operated “Tuna PSC” offshore the country12. In December 2006 the governments of Russia and Indonesia signed an agreement on cooperation in the peaceful use of atomic energy. It was substantiated by a MoU between “Rosatom” and the National Atomic energy Agency of Indonesia (BATAN) in the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes signed in June 201513. Later on, “Rosatom” signed a MoU with University of Indonesia (UI) to promote education in the nuclear science and engineering14. In subsequent years, “Rosatom” organized several trainings for Indonesian specialists15. In this context, a recent Indonesian offer to construct the nuclear power plant in Kalimantan16 is of interest. Russia repeatedly emphasizes its readiness to build floating nuclear power plants like the floating nuclear station “Akademik Lo-

Rosneft and Pertamina JV Sign Tuban Refinery Design Contract… Vietnam /Zarubezhneft, Official website. URL: https://www.zarubezhneft.ru/en/operations/upstream/vietnam/ 13 History of cooperation. Asia /Rosatom. URL: https://rosatomasia.com/rosatom-in-country/history-of-cooperation/ 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 Индонезия предложила «Росатому» площадку под строительство АЭС /Вести.ру, 18 февраля 2020. URL: https://www.vesti. ru/finance/article/1266697 11 12

82

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

monosov”17. So far, “Rosatom” has conducted several training courses for Indonesian professionals18. Concerning Indonesia, Russia’s companies may undertake the construction and modernization of Indonesian energy facilities. “LLC Hevel” is interested in construction of solar power stations in Indonesia and nuclear hybrid (sun-diesel) power plants in its remote territories19. However, due to the problem of double taxation, as well as concerns about the US sanctions, Indonesia does not show strong interest in the development of the Northern Chayvo fields on offshore Sakhalin and Russkoye in Siberia in cooperation with “Rosneft”. Also, it shows restraint in fostering cooperation with some Russian energy companies. The threat of the US sanctions hinders the RussiaIndonesia cooperation not only in the energy sector. Russia is the largest supplier of arms to Southeast Asia, accounting for 26% of all deliveries of major arms to the region in 2014–2018 years20. Among the largest buyers of Russia’s arms are ViДенис Мантуров: РФ предлагает Индонезии кооперацию в строительстве плавучих АЭС /Морская коллегия, 29 октября 2018. URL: http://marine.gov.ru/events/morskaya-kollegiya/ 3465/ 18 Rosatom Tech experts conducted the training course for continuing cooperation with Indonesia /Rosatom Technical Academy, February 10, 2020. URL: http://rosatomtech.com/rosatom-tech-expertsconducted-the-training-course-for-continuing-cooperation-withindonesia/ 19 Минэнерго сообщило об интересе нефтегазовых компаний к проектам в Индонезии /Ведомости, 25 октября 2018. URL: https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/news/2018/10/25/784726proektam-indonezii 20 Siemon T. Wezeman. (2019, December). Arms Flows to Southeast Asia. SIPRI. URL: https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/201912/1912_arms_flows_to_south_east_asia_wezeman.pdf 17

83

Chapter 3. Russia-Indonesia Strategic Partnership: The Interplay of Institutional Foundations, Ulterior Motives and Emerging Tasks

etnam and Indonesia, Malaysia and Myanmar. Sometimes the deals are conducted through barter transactions like Indonesia’s orders for 11 Su-35 combat aircraft. According to the terms of these deals, agricultural and other products make half of the payment21. Nevertheless, possibilities of the US factor to undermine Russia’s arms sales to Indonesia are strong. Indonesia and some other ASEAN states have already experienced the US pressure, and, as the Philippines’ example demonstrated in 201822, are hesitant about Russia’s arms transfers. So, there is a risk that Jakarta may be cautious about future deals with Moscow. High seismic activity in Southeast Asia discourages the regional states to stake on nuclear energy, by means of this limiting the scope of future deals with Russia. Another obstacle for deep and multi-dimensional cooperation between Russia and Indonesia is their geographical remoteness, as well as underdeveloped infrastructure. Stating that Russian companies consider Southeast Asia as a prominent direction for robust cooperation, mostly in the energy sphere, Russia was only 8th major supplier of ASEAN crude oil in 2018 (in 2014, it ranked 5). Plenty of agreements signed between Russia and their partners from Southeast Asia still remain on the paper. Many Russian companies express their interest to enter the ASEAN market but still are only negotiating prospective deals or searching for commercially attractive niches. At the same time, Russia has been able to form a favorable political context conducive to making its foothold in Southeast Asia, as well as in Indonesia, firm and secure.

21 22

Siemon T. Wezeman. (2019, December). Arms Flows... Ibid.

84

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

Conclusion The forthcoming Russia-Indonesia Strategic Partnership holds promise for both parties. For Indonesia, cooperation with Russia ensures energy security and capacity-building as important prerequisites for future development. For Russia, the Strategic Partnership with Indonesia opens new markets and allows hedging potential export risks. Russia-Indonesia cooperation has ample chances to intensify. The reason stems from Russia’s increasing activity in the Asia-Pacific region as part of its “pivot to the East” policy, as well as Indonesia’s priorities to make its foreign policy more diversified as a response to the changing regional milieu. The latter point is exemplified mainly by the China’s mega-strategy “Belt and Road Initiative” and the Indo-Pacific region, as well as rising China-US confrontation over a wide spectrum of issues ranging from trade to maritime security. This emerging confrontational paradigm incentivizes both Russia and Indonesia to elaborate on safety measures which will probably be the function of Moscow and Jakarta mutual perceptions. The fact that Indonesia does not have political, economic or security contradictions with Russia is an itself a valuable asset in the present-day volatility of global politics. In its turn, Russia remembers Indonesia’s role in the Non-Allied Movement, as well as Jakarta’s readiness to take on the helm in elaborating on ASEAN’s position on complicated issues like the Indo-Pacific narrative. Against this background, Russia remains neutral in terms of its regional ambitions, but influential as an actor that can contribute to the stability in the Asia-Pacific region, including by means of strengthening the ASEAN-led multilateral venues and, by implication, ASEAN. Being ASEAN’s informal leader, Indonesia realizes it. It its turn, the Strategic Partnership with Indonesia adds value to Russia’s policy in 85

Chapter 3. Russia-Indonesia Strategic Partnership: The Interplay of Institutional Foundations, Ulterior Motives and Emerging Tasks

the Asia-Pacific region. Accounting for both the existing priorities and the long-term perspective of bilateral relations, the Strategic Partnership between Moscow and Jakarta appears both timely and promising.

86

Mikhail A. Terskikh PhD in Political Science, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russia, [email protected]

Chapter 4. Russia -Vietnam Comprehensive

Strategic Partnership: Lessons for Russia-Indonesia Relations

In the modern world, it is impossible to find absolutely identical cases of relations between two independent states. The complex of the features – from historical paths of each state to the development of interaction between them – leads to the fact that each case of relationship between two actors in world politics is unique. At the same time, in recent decades, a kind of classification of bilateral ties, depending on the intensity of cooperation, has been created, in which “strategic partnership” and “comprehensive strategic partnership” are at the top of the hierarchy (although, policymakers also try to choose a special name for each relationship case). Russia has not stayed away from this trend either, only in Asia relations of comprehensive strategic partnership have been established with three countries – China, India and Vietnam. The absence of clear criteria for determining the level of partnership, together with the desire of a number of countries to increase the profile of bilateral ties, naturally give rise to discussions about

Chapter 4. Russia-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership: Lessons for Russia-Indonesia Relations

what is actually hidden under one or another name1. In particular, a fair question arises in the context of South-East Asia. If relations between Russia and Vietnam are at the level of "comprehensive strategic partnership", while Russia and Indonesia have not yet officially reached the level of "strategic", does this mean that Russia's relations with these two countries are fundamentally different in terms of the scope of cooperation areas and their depth? And what is needed to reach one level or another? To some extent, the present work represents an attempt to answer these questions. History of Relations Despite the fact that the history of Russian-Vietnamese relations has been circumstantially studied by Russian and international researchers2, one should start with it, albeit without going into details. In the speeches of the leaders of the two countries, the formula “time-tested friendship” is fixed, which largely corresponds to reality. Unlike many other states, relations with Vietnam did not change their vector of development (at the same time, the dynamics of development sometimes changed dramatically). Diplomatic relations were established in 1950, but as the foundation of the "special partnership" served the interaction between the two countries and the assistance of the Soviet Union during the First and, especially, the Second Indochina Wars, as well as during the period of interwar and post-war construction. In 1978, against the background of the cooling in Soviet-Chinese relations, the USSR and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam signed the Treaty of Канаев Е.А. Всеобъемлющее стратегическое партнерство РФ и Социалистической Республики Вьетнам: взгляд из России // Россия и АТР, 2019, № 1 (103), С. 154-164. 2 Воронин А.С., Кобелев Е.В. Яркая история дружбы и партнерства к 60-летию установления отношений между СССР/Россией и Вьетнамом // Проблемы Дальнего Востока, 2010, № 1, С. 17-35. 1

88

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

Friendship and Cooperation. In the same year Vietnam joined the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, finally consolidating its orientation towards Moscow. The Soviet Union became a de facto monopoly partner in the field of military-technical cooperation. With the assistance of Soviet specialists, numbered in thousands3, an industrial base of the Vietnamese state was created, with many of its facilities functioning to this day. Vietnamese specialists were also actively trained in the USSR – more than thirty thousand people, including almost all of the country's top leadership received higher education. Even though the term “strategic partnership” did not come into use at that time, the level of relations between the two countries clearly corresponded to it, and, actually, exceeded it – the USSR and Vietnam were allies on the front of the Cold War. At the same time, although this partnership was extremely complex and large-scale, relations were far from equal – the prevailing Soviet aid secured for Moscow the status of “big brother”. It is not surprising that after the end of the Cold War and due to Moscow's inability to play its former role in relations any longer, the bilateral partnership noticeably sagged, and then, for some time was completely frozen. The most important “ideological” link also disappeared – there was no longer a common vision of the socialist future (and even socialist past). In the 1990s, the countries actually re-find points of convergence and common interests, re-built relations taking into account the changed external and internal conditions. In this context, the Treaty on the Foundations of Friendly Relations was signed in 1994 which recorded the mutual desire for progressive development of cooperation. This document did Кобелев Е.В. СССР/Россия – Вьетнам: фрагменты истории // Юго-Восточная Азия: актуальные проблемы развития, 2014, № 25, С. 45-54. 3

89

Chapter 4. Russia-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership: Lessons for Russia-Indonesia Relations

not lead to drastic changes in bilateral agenda, however, it allowed not to lose the potential remaining from Soviet times, postponing the problem of filling the relations with substantive content until better times. At the same time, some long-term strategic projects launched with the help of the Soviet Union did not stop even in a difficult period after its collapse, although they were slowed down noticeably. In particular, this applies to the sphere of oil and gas and military-technical cooperation. The presence of such “anchor points” and the proximity of longterm interests allowed Moscow and Hanoi to bring relations to the level of strategic partnership in 20014. This decision was largely made “in advance”, in the interests of intensifying bilateral contacts. But it bore positive results – after 11 years – the list of areas of cooperation was significantly expanded, including new long-term projects, primarily through stateowned companies. This, in turn, enabled the establishment of the comprehensive strategic partnership in 2012. Achievements in Main Spheres Russia and Vietnam maintain an active political dialogue allowing to discuss in due time topical issues of bilateral and multilateral agenda. In terms of the intensity of political dialogue with Russia, Vietnam is perhaps second only to China among Asian states – over the past three years, all decisionmakers of the two countries paid visits to each other. In particular, President Vladimir Putin, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, speakers of both chambers of parliament Valentina Matvienko and Vyacheslav Volodin came to Vietnam while General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Nguyen Phu Trong, Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc, Speaker of the Кобелев Е.В. Российско-вьетнамские отношения: реальность и перс перспективы // Вьетнамские исследования, 2015, № 5. С. 21-43. 4

90

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

National Assembly Nguyen Thi Kim Ngan visited Russia. In addition, an exchange of visits by the heads of foreign policy and defence ministries took place, and within the framework of a strategic dialogue meetings of the relevant ministries leadership are held on a regular basis. Despite the fact that the term “strategic partnership” is not fixed in official Russian foreign policy documents, some of its characteristics can be deduced from the name itself. In particular, the focus of the two countries on long-term bilateral cooperation. In this regard, the above-mentioned intensity of political dialogue makes it possible to “check the clock” on a wide range of issues, inform each other on their vision of certain problems and, in general, helps to strengthen trust between states5. Indeed, without trust and understanding of each other's interests, it is impossible to respect these interests, without this, in turn, it is difficult to build long-term ties. In addition, Moscow and Hanoi adhere to the same or similar approaches to most global and regional issues6. In general terms, the parties, while recognizing the growing turbulence of world politics, advocate the development of a more just and predictable world order based on strict observance of the norms of international law. This, in Russia and Vietnam’s Локшин Г.М. Политическое сотрудничество России и Вьетнама // Юго-Восточная Азия: актуальные проблемы развития, 2014, № 25. С. 55-63. 6 Статья Министра иностранных дел Российской Федерации С.В. Лаврова «Россия и Вьетнам: дружба, прошедшая сквозь десятилетия» для печатного издания МИД Вьетнама «Мир и Вьетнам», опубликованная 29 января 2020 года // Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации, 29.01.2020. URL: https://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/ cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4013494?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_ cKNonkJE02Bw&_101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw_languageId =ru_RU 5

91

Chapter 4. Russia-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership: Lessons for Russia-Indonesia Relations

opinion, is possible only on the basis of equal cooperation among all states, pooling their resources and efforts, and the unconditional primacy of multilateral principles over unilateral ones7. This approach is also based on respect for sovereignty and the principle of non-interference in internal affairs of other states. In this context, military actions without a decision of the UN Security Council are recognized unacceptable. Russia and Vietnam stand for comprehensive and indivisible security system, both global and regional. The main idea is the inadmissibility of strengthening the security of one tate at the expense of the security of another state. This approach is primarily relevant in Asia-Pacific which is a common area for the two countries, as well as in its very important part – Southeast Asia. In the context of the escalating US-China competition in the region, Moscow and Hanoi support the strengthening of ASEAN central role in regional affairs. This factor also contributes to the growth of Vietnam's interest in Russia's presence in Southeast Asia – the “third player”, equidistant from Beijing and Washington, is able to play a stabilizing and mediating role. It is no coincidence that it was in 2010, when Hanoi was the ASEAN Chair, Russia together with the United States joined the East Asia Summit. In addition, Vietnam provided

Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации (утверждена Президентом Российской Федерации В.В. Путиным 30 ноября 2016 года) // Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации, 01.12.2016, URL: https://www.mid.ru/ en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICk B6BZ29/content/id/2542248?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_CptICkB6BZ 29&_101_INSTANCE_CptICkB6BZ29_languageId=ru_RU; Sách xanh Ngoại giao Việt Nam 2018 (Vietnam Diplomatic Bluebook 2018 – in Viet.) // ISSUU, July 31, 2019. URL: https://issuu.com/mofa vietnam/docs/s_ch_ngo_i_giao_vi_t_nam_2018 7

92

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

substantial support to Russia on the issue of its participation in ASEM. This equidistant position of Russia is evident, among other things, with regard to one of the most sensitive and complicated problems in Southeast Asia – territorial disputes in the South China Sea. The lack of direct support on this issue, on the one hand, may irritate Hanoi, but on the other hand, it leaves Moscow an opportunity to participate in search for a mutually acceptable solution for all parties of the conflict, especially in a situation when two leading Russian partners in Asia are involved in it. In general, despite regular insinuations in the media, this approach of the Russian side finds understanding among the Vietnamese leadership. Similar positions on global and regional issues, as well as the absence of antagonistic interests determine the possibility of closer cooperation in the field of defense and security. A solid foundation for the interaction of the military of the two countries was laid during the years of the American aggression in Indochina. During this period, more than ten thousand Soviet soldiers and officers visited Vietnam as military specialists and advisers. The volume of supply of military products was impressive – in total, during the Soviet period it amounted to 15.7 billion USD in prices of that time. 2000 tanks, 1700 armored personnel carriers, 7000 mortars of different types, more than 5000 anti-aircraft guns, 158 anti-aircraft missile systems, more than 700 combat aircrafts, 120 helicopters, more than 100 warships were delivered, 117 military facilities were built8. A significant part of those military products is still in service in the Vietnamese People's Army. The heads of the defense ministries, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, the Ministry of Public Security of Vietnam meet regularly both during visits and on the sidelines of 8

Кобелев Е.В. СССР/Россия – Вьетнам: фрагменты истории…

93

Chapter 4. Russia-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership: Lessons for Russia-Indonesia Relations

multilateral events. Strategic dialogue on defense and security issues is held on an annual basis. The key areas are militarytechnical cooperation, cooperation at sea, personnel training (thousands of Vietnamese students and officers are sent to Russia every year through the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Internal Affairs). Russia is still the main supplier of weapons and military equipment for the needs of the armed forces of Vietnam, a key partner in servicing and modernizing previously supplied military products, as well as in the transfer of the latest technologies9. Russian and Vietnamese warships make calls to each other's ports on a regular basis. Since 2018, Vietnamese team have been participating in the World Tank Biathlon Championships organized by the Russian Ministry of Defence10. Taking into account Hanoi’s involvement in the UN peacekeeping operations, parties confirmed their interest in the exchange of experience in this area. From a strategic point of view, the parties confirm their intention to develop cooperation in the field of countering terrorism, transnational organized crime, illegal production and trafficking of drugs, corruption and other security challenges and threats. Both capitals share concerns about the growing threat of the use of outer space and information technology for military purposes, which is manifested in the support of relevant initiatives started by the UN and other specialized multilateral structures. Cooperation in the field of information security is a new and promising area. With the assistance of Russian leading 9 Нго Дык Мань. Перекрестный год – новый толчок вьетнамороссийскому всеобъемлющему стратегическому партнерству // Международная жизнь, 2019, № 9. URL: https://interaffairs.ru/news/show/23866 10 Международная федерация танкового биатлона, официальный сайт. URL: https://tank-biathlon.com/

94

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

companies in this area, a cyber security center has been created in Vietnam. In addition, Hanoi is interested in using the Russia’s rich experience and, in particular, Moscow in the field of creating electronic government and a “smart city” system, which provides for both the processing of citizens' appeals and wider integration of modern technologies into everyday life11. This area of cooperation is generally in line with Vietnam's guidelines for the introduction of technologies of the “fourth industrial revolution”. In general, according to the Vietnamese side, Hanoi consistently views Russia as one of the most important strategic partners in the field of national defense, security, militarytechnical cooperation, especially in the army modernization and in the process of increasing the armed forces combat capabilities12. Moscow, in turn, with a reason considers the Vietnamese side to be a leading partner in these areas in Southeast Asia and is ready to extend the experience gained in bilateral relations to other countries. One of the main pillars of the Russian-Vietnamese partnership is energy cooperation. This is primarily about the oil and gas sphere. Projects in this sphere largely determined the nature of bilateral relations in the post-bipolar period. The sides managed not to lose and even to broaden the SovietVietnamese experience which is valuable in itself. Soviet specialists began exploration work on the Vietnamese continental shelf in early 1970s, in 1981 a joint venture “Vietsovpetro” was created (the founders were “Zarubezhneft” and “Petrovietnam”, currently they own 49% and 51% of stakes, respectively) which remains the flagship of cooperation in the oil and gas sector. “Vietsovpetro” not only continues to actively work in oil В донгах и рублях // Российская газета, 24.05.2019. URL: https://rg.ru/2019/05/22/rossiia-i-vetnam-dogovorilis-o-realizaciinovyh-sovmestnyh-proektov.html 12 Нго Дык Мань. Перекрестный год – новый толчок… 11

95

Chapter 4. Russia-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership: Lessons for Russia-Indonesia Relations

production (there is an agreement on the extension of activities until 2030), but also joins new areas, a gas production in particular. Since 2008, a “mirror” project has operated in the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Region – “Rusvietpetro” (51% goes to ”Zarubezhneft” and 49% – to “Petrovietnam”)13. Other companies use this successful experience as well. Thus, in connection with the increased demand for natural gas in Vietnam, a joint venture “Vietgazprom” was created in 2002, where “Gazprom” and “Petrovietnam” were the founders. Already in 2009, a "mirror" enterprise “Gazpromviet” was established, it operates in the Orenburg region and in the YamaloNenets Autonomous Region. In 2011, Russian companies Lukoil and TNK-BP entered the Vietnamese market. During bilateral visits parties traditionally sign documents in order to expand these oil and gas giants activities. The most impressive thing in the activities of joint companies is the fact that they provide one third of oil production and two thirds of gas production in Vietnam14. A new and very promising sphere of cooperation is the supply of liquefied natural gas to Vietnam. In particular, in 2019, a memorandum was signed with “PJSC Novatek” on the supply of LNG to Vietnam and the development of relevant infrastructure, including the construction of LNG terminals

Федоров Н.В. Участие России в нефтегазовых проектах на континентальном шельфе Вьетнама: проблемы и перспективы // Юго-Восточная Азия: актуальные проблемы развития, 2018, № 4 (41). С. 129-143. 14 Статья Посла России во Вьетнаме К.В. Внукова о российсковьетнамских отношениях к 70-й годовщине установления дипломатических отношений между нашими странами // Посольство России во Вьетнаме, официальный сайт. URL: https://vietnam.mid.ru/rossijsko-v-etnamskie-otnosenia 13

96

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

and gas power plants15. The supplies of Russian coal are still in demand – in 2018 they increased by 15% and amounted to 2.6 million tons16. Cooperation in the field of renewable energy is on the list of priorities. Taking into account the growing needs of Vietnam for electricity, cooperation in the field of atomic energy peaceful use is in demand. In 2011, an intergovernmental agreement was signed on the construction by “Rosatom” of the first nuclear power plant in Vietnam and Southeast Asia as a whole. Training of Vietnamese nuclear specialists began in Russia. Unfortunately, due to the changed economic situation and increased environmental risks, in 2016 Hanoi decided to stop nuclear energy development projects (along with the Russian nuclear power plant, work on the construction of the Japanese one was also stopped17). At the same time, the very idea of cooperation in this area is not removed from the agenda – energy consumption in the country will only grow, and meeting the needs with traditional sources is impossible. It is no coincidence that the joint statement following the visit of the General Secretary of the CPV Central Committee Nguyen Phu Trong to Russia in September 2018 stated that if Vietnam returns to its plans to create nuclear energy facilities, Russia will

«НОВАТЭК» подписал меморандум о взаимопонимании по развитию во Вьетнаме проекта электрогенерации с использованием СПГ // Потал «Portnews», 23.05.2019. URL: https:// portnews.ru/news/277351/ 16 Александр Новак. Взаимодействие России и Вьетнама в сфере энергетики вышло на беспрецедентно высокий уровень // Министерство энергетики Российской Федерации, официальный сайт, 22.05.2019. URL: https://minenergo.gov.ru/node/14843 17 Цветов А. Почему во Вьетнаме не будет российской АЭС // Московский центр Карнеги, 11.04.2017. URL: https://carnegie.ru/commentary/68575 15

97

Chapter 4. Russia-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership: Lessons for Russia-Indonesia Relations

be considered as a priority partner18. Earlier, countries signed an agreement on the construction of the Center for Nuclear Science and Technology in Vietnam that includes the construction of a research reactor19. In the context of political difficulties in the western direction, the development of trade and economic ties with eastern partners is of particular relevance for Russia. In this regard, Vietnam with its rapidly growing export-oriented economy and large domestic market is an attractive trading partner. At the same time, taking into account the setback of relations in the 1990s, it is now a matter of bringing trade ties to the level of political dialogue20. Indeed, despite the impressive scale of cooperation in other areas, Russia is not even one of the ten largest trade partners of Vietnam, just as Vietnam is not included in a similar list of Russian partners. The roots of the problem lie in the missed period during which the SRV was actively integrating into regional and global value chains. In this situation, the governments of the two countries have to

Совместное заявление по итогам официального визита Генерального секретаря Центрального комитета Коммунистической партии Вьетнам Нгуен Фу Чонга в Российскую Федерацию // Президент России, официальный сайт, 08.09.2018. URL: http://kremlin.ru/supplement/5338 19 Россия и Вьетнам подписали меморандум о графике реализации проекта сооружения Центра ядерной науки и технологий // Росатом, официальный сайт, 22.05.2019. URL: https://www.rosatom.ru/journalist/news/rossiya-i-vetnampodpisali-memorandum-o-grafike-realizatsii-proekta-sooruzheniyatsentra-yadernoy-na/ 20 Мосяков Д.В. Перспективы российско-вьетнамского экономического сотрудничества // Юго-Восточная Азия: актуальные проблемы развития, 2014, № 25. С. 41-44. 18

98

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

stimulate the growth of trade mainly by administrative methods, but the effectiveness of these methods is quite limited. Despite this, in recent years, some progress has been made on the track. In 2015 Vietnam became the first country with which the Eurasian Economic Union signed a free trade agreement. The fact that the agreement entered into force in late 2016 led to a noticeable increase in trade turnover. So, if in 2016, according to the Russian customs authorities, it amounted to 3.8 billion USD, then by the end of 2018 it was already 6.1 billion USD. However, by the end of 2019, it dropped again – by 20% to 4.9 billion dollars21. This situation is explained by the lack of interest among businesses in both countries to cooperate with each other in the presence of more profitable trading partners and the two governments inability to redirect trade flows only by an administrative decision22. In addition, the trade turnover is not stable due to the fact that it also includes payments for large projects23. An interesting situation is in the field of investment cooperation. The volume of Russian capital investments in the SRV’s economy is about $ 1 billion, excluding the oil and gas sector. The main areas of their application are manufacturing, mechanical engineering, real estate. While the volume of Vietnamese investments in Russia is almost $ 3 billion. The largest projects are the “Rusvietpetro” joint company, the HanoiMoscow Multifunctional Cultural and Business Center, as well as the agro-industrial complexes of the T.H. True Milk Company in the Moscow and Kaluga regions24. 21 Справочные и аналитические материалы // Федеральная таможенная служба Российской Федерации, официальный сайт. URL: http://customs.gov.ru/statistic 22 Канаев Е.А. Всеобъемлющее стратегическое партнерство РФ… 23 Долгая дорога в Ханой // Портал «LogiRus», 21.07.2020. URL: https://logirus.ru/articles/ved/dolgaya_doroga_v_khanoy.html 24 Статья Посла России во Вьетнаме К.В.Внукова…

99

Chapter 4. Russia-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership: Lessons for Russia-Indonesia Relations

Given that Western sanctions are very sensitive to Russian businesses operating abroad, Russia and Vietnam are taking consistent steps to use national currencies. In October 2019, an agreement was signed between national payment systems and the first operation was carried out to pay for goods in Vietnam with a MIR-card. Since 2006, a Vietnamese-Russian joint bank has been operating (founders are VTB and the Bank for Investment and Development of Vietnam). Cooperation in other areas is also developing very fruitfully. Thus, since Soviet times, Russian and Vietnamese scientists have continued joint researches. A striking example here represents the Joint Russian-Vietnamese Tropical Center which is engaged in both military and civilian researches. Vietnamese specialists work at the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in Dubna. Great hopes are pinned on the already mentioned Center for Nuclear Science and Technology, which is being created with the participation of “Rosatom”. If we look at people to people relations, first we need to mention 70 000 alumni of Soviet and Russian universities. Today Russia provides almost 1000 university grants for Vietnamese students, the total number of them in Russia is about 600025. If we talk about times before COVID pandemic there were direct flights every day which helped achieve a number of 600 thousand Russian and 70 thousand Vietnamese tourists each year. A good practice is a regular mutual help in cases of natural disasters. All these factors contributed to the fact that 83% of the Vietnamese (number 1 in the world) have favorable attitude to Russia according to the Pew Research26.

Соколов А.А. Российско-вьетнамское сотрудничество в сфере образования // Российско-вьетнамские отношения сегодня: сферы совпадающих интересов, М., 2020. С. 223-235. 26 Global Publics Back U.S. on Fighting ISIS, but Are Critical of Post9/11 Torture // Pew Research Center, June 23, 2015. URL: 25

100

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

An important component of a comprehensive strategic partnership is interregional ties. There are traditional links between the capitals, as well as St. Petersburg and Ho Chi Minh City. Republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, Primorsky Krai, Kaluga and Tula regions are also active in cooperation with Vietnam. Representatives of the provinces of Binh Duong, Binh Thuan, Can Tho, Thanh Hoa, and others meet regularly with their Russian colleagues. Large-scale events are regular parts of the dialogue. For example, in 2019, the tours of the Yekaterinburg Opera and Ballet Theater and the Days of Moscow in Hanoi, the Days of Vietnamese Culture in Russian cities were successfully held. Prospects of Relations Over the past seven decades, Russia and Vietnam have accumulated a solid foundation for cooperation which is true in relation to almost any sphere. Despite the difficult foreign policy situation and internal problems in late 1980s and 1990s, bilateral relations did not change their trend towards progressive development, even during the difficult "transition" period. The countries managed to prevent the emergence of antagonistic interests in their bilateral agenda, to control the inevitable disagreements, to maintain a positive attitude and fill the partnership with new content. In this regard, the prospects for bilateral relations are seen as follows. There is no doubt that the parties will continue cooperation in strategic areas – military-technical cooperation, hydrocarbon production on the continental shelf of the two countries, implementation of projects in the field of the atomic energy peaceful use. At the same time, given Hanoi's objective desire to diversify ties and not to depend on one, albeit timehttp://www.pewglobal.org/2015/06/23/global-publics-back-u-son-fighting-isis-but-are-critical-of-post-911-torture/

101

Chapter 4. Russia-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership: Lessons for Russia-Indonesia Relations

tested, partner, Russian companies will face even more fierce competition in Vietnam. The growing US-China rivalry in Asia-Pacific and Hanoi's desire to keep balance between Beijing’s and Washington’s interests determine how important is the emergence of a “third force,” which Moscow is most likely to become. In this regard, the proximity of long-term interests and the high level of political mutual trust between Russia and Vietnam will contribute to deeper bilateral cooperation on regional issues. It seems that the situation in trade will not undergo fundamental changes in the foreseeable future. Trade turnover will continue to gradually increase, but this area will continue to lag behind other areas of cooperation. The most promising areas of cooperation are the export of high-tech products from Russia, in particular, in the field of cyber security and “smart cities”, as well as cooperation in the field of research and prevention of epidemiological diseases. What is a “Strategic Partnership”? If we compare the features above with the RussianIndonesian relations we will find quite a number of similarities. Russia and Indonesia also have a long history of cooperation with USSR’s help in the beginning of the diplomatic relations, shares similar approaches to the regional and global agenda, their interests in Asia-Pacific and in South-East Asia are mostly converging27. Moscow and Jakarta have almost the same mechanisms of cooperation as Moscow and Hanoi – in structure (intergovernmental committees, dialogues between ministries, etc.) and in practice (government-owned corporations are “anchors”, military-technical cooperation plays an

Хохлова Н.И. Отношения России и Индонезии на современном этапе // Юго-Восточная Азия: актуальные проблемы развития, 2018, № 2 (39). С. 99-105. 27

102

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

important role)28. At the same time problems are also quite similar, as ties between small and medium-sized enterprises are a weak point. It can be said that in some cases Russian relations with Vietnam are a model of cooperation with other South East Asian countries. Even prospects of cooperation between Moscow and Jakarta somehow follow the path of ties between Moscow and Hanoi – plans for integration with Eurasian Economic Union and peaceful use of nuclear energy are good examples29. But in the most of the spheres the level of RussianVietnamese relations is at least a small step ahead. At the same time this comparison is not really correct, because we need to compare relations with Vietnam not as of today, but of 20 years ago, before the establishment of strategic partnership. If we do so, we will realize that Russian-Indonesian ties have already achieved the level of cooperation between Russia and Vietnam on the eve of strategic partnership. Does it mean that strategic partnership is just a big talk? Different countries have different names for privileged partnerships, we can combine them in this way: comprehensive partnership, sectoral strategic partnership, strategic partnership, and strategic partnership plus. Sometimes this systematization can be confusing. For example, Russia has relations of “strategic partnership plus” in Asia with China, India Статья Министра иностранных дел России С.В. Лаврова «Россия и Индонезия: 70 лет плодотворного сотрудничества», опубликованная в индонезийской национальной газете «Компас» // Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации, официальный сайт, 02.02.2020. URL: https://www.mid.ru/ foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/ content/id/4016185 29 Kanaev E., Simbolon L., Shaternikov P. Russia-Indonesia relationship: assessing shortcomings and framing a response // Юго-Восточная Азия: актуальные проблемы развития, 2019, № 4(45). С. 95-106. 28

103

Chapter 4. Russia-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership: Lessons for Russia-Indonesia Relations

and Vietnam. Vietnam also has “strategic partnership plus” with India and China, while relations between Beijing and Hanoi sometimes are on the edge of conflict because of the South China Sea issue. At the same time, relations between Vietnam and the US are officially named just “Comprehensive partnership”, but in practice the countries are at least strategic partners. In fact, the status of strategic partnerships depends on many factors – history, real state of relations, political motivation, even personal relations between leaders. There are not any strict criteria of strategic partnership, even a clear definition – it makes the status more flexible and gives governments more freedom for maneuver. At the same time, it is possible to list the main characteristics of strategic partnership taking into account the example of Russian-Vietnamese relations and some other bilateral relations in the region. First, countries should share long-term mutual interests and joint projects. Without them relations are not sustainable and will depend on political environment. Second, countries should have a regular high-level political dialogue. Otherwise it is even difficult to sign a document establishing strategic partnership. Third, decision makers should be confident that right after the establishment of strategic partnership there will be no setbacks in the relations. That is because any setbacks can cast a shadow on decision makers’ strategic planning. Conclusion Thus, in relation to Russian-Vietnamese ties, it would be fair to assert that the status of a comprehensive strategic partnership does indeed have a solid substantive foundation. Moscow and Hanoi have developed a unique format of relations, based not only on a rich history, but also on a future orientation on long-term projects. At the same time, the promotion of bilateral ties to the level of strategic partnership in 2001 104

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

was clearly made "in advance" – with the expectation of the subsequent intensification of contacts. And this plan proved to be successful. In this context, it seems quite logical to raise relations with Indonesia to the level of strategic partnership, because today, in terms of the depth of interaction with Moscow, Jakarta is only slightly inferior to Hanoi. But at the same time, it is important to keep in mind that strategic partnership is not an “achievement” in itself, it is more like a declaration – it shows that countries have a mutual desire and real prospects to deepen relations. It also shows that they are confident in a long-term character of their cooperation. Based on this, it seems that this step should be expected in the foreseeable future during one of the bilateral high-level visits.

105

Nikolay P. Maletin Doctor of Historical Science, Professor, MGIMO (U) Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Senior Researcher, Department of Oriental Studies, Russia, Moscow, [email protected]

Chapter 5. Russian-Indonesian cooperation during

the presidency of Joko Widodo. 2014–2020

During the years of the “double presidency” of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–2014), the predecessor of the current president Joko Widodo, Indonesia has become one of the key countries of Southeast Asia. Indonesia became more and more actively involved to solving global problems and to the G20?), APEC, OIC. The international positions of the Republic of Indonesia have strengthened, the horizons of active national diplomacy have expanded, which allowed Joko Widodo to raise the prestige and international significance of the country even higher, to expand contacts with leading world powers, including Russia. In the fall of year 2014, the Russian government sent a representative to the inauguration ceremony of the new President of Indonesia, Joko Widodo, which once again emphasized that Moscow values relations with Indonesia and seeks to maintain relations of friendship and partnership with the country1.

Хохлова Н.И. Отношения России и Индонезии на современном этапе // Юго-Восточная Азия: актуальные проблемы развития, Том I. №2(39), 2018. С. 100. 1

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

The both states are united by a common interest in lasting peace and sustainable development in the APR. Our countries share the view that there is a need for a collective, unifying approach to maintaining regional security and responding to new threats and challenges in the Asia-Pacific region and in the world as a whole Russia has economic and political interests in the Southeast Asian region, in which Indonesia undoubtedly has a special place. In November 2014, Vladimir Putin met with the President of Indonesia in Beijing at the APEC summit. He noted that economic relations between our countries are not developing sufficiently, which is largely due to the general state of the world economy2. Indonesia seeks to expand political contacts and economic cooperation. Joko Widodo urged Russia to invest in the energy sector, railroads, businesses, irrigation, and food production3. Military-technical cooperation occupies a special place in bilateral relations. Widodo, like his predecessor General S.D. Yudhoyono, pays serious attention to building up the country's military potential. At the end of December 2014, Widodo set the task of turning the Indonesian army into a force that everyone in the region will count on. The President of Indonesia, after several disasters with the American S-130 transport aircraft and the F-16 fighter, gave an order to replace the exhausted American F-5 Tiger fighters, and negotiations began with Russia on the sale of SU-354. The Russian Federation expressed its readiness to provide Jakarta with weapons at affordable prices, loans for its purchase, and offered cooper-

Suara Pembaruan.com., 10.11.2014. Sinar Harapan.co., 29.12.2014; 16.01.2015. 4 Indonesia dan Rusia Barter Ekspor Sukhoidengan Ekspor Komoditas. URL: https://tirto.id/indonesia-dan-rusia-barter-sukhoidengan-ekspor-komoditas-cu7x 2 3

107

Chapter 5. Russian-Indonesian cooperation during the presidency of Joko Widodo. 2014–2020

ation in the joint development of their new types, as well as to provide equipment and engineering products. More than half of Russian exports to Indonesia are aviation products. This is due to the insular position of the state and the need to quickly respond to external and internal challenges. The plans to transform the country into a powerful maritime state will undoubtedly intensify the purchases of sea vessels and submarines. Under Widodo, traditional cooperation in the humanitarian sphere also continued. Russia provided assistance in eliminating the consequences of natural disasters and forest fires in 2015. In the same year, the construction of a 190 km railway began on Kalimantan, where it was decided to move the capital of the country, which is intended to accelerate the industrial and technological development of the region. Indonesia welcomes the participation of Russian capital in the construction of energy, transport, and industrial infrastructure enterprises5. After a series of attacks allegedly organized by ISIS supporters in Indonesia in January 2016, the Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation N.P. Patrushev visited the country in February 2016. He met with President Joko Widodo, Minister Coordinator L. Panjaitan, Minister of Foreign Affairs R. Marsudi, Minister of Justice and Human Rights, Chief of Police. L. Panjayitan. He reported on the agreement reached to exchange intelligence information and to build up contacts between law enforcement agencies, including on the problem of terrorism, noting at the same time that Indonesia is still too oriented towards the West in this6. Латухина К. Лидеры РФ и Индонезии обсудили экономику и борьбу с терроризмом /Российская газета. URL: https://rg.ru/ 2016/05/18/reg-ufo/lidery-rossii-i-indonezii-obsudili-ekonomiku-iborbu-s-terrorizmom.html 6 Antara News.com. 10.02.2016. 5

108

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

On the eve of the third Russia-ASEAN summit in Sochi on May 19–20, 2016, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi said that the visit of Indonesian President Widodo to the Russian Federation would open the doors for strengthening relations. She stressed that Russia is a very important partner for ASEAN. And since the goal of the Association is to work together to develop partnership and mutual benefit, Indonesia came up with an initiative to create effective mechanisms for cooperation between regional and extra-regional states, noting that Russia, India and China largely share these views7. “We would also like to enlist the support of Russia in promoting a number of initiatives, including strengthening interstate cooperation at sea and strengthening Russian-Indonesian cooperation and interaction in the economy, energy, in the field of small and medium-sized enterprises,” – she noted. According to the minister, Russia remains one of the important partners of Indonesia. She noted with regret that the trade turnover has not yet reached a sufficiently high level, amounting to 2 billion USD, and this does not correspond to the capabilities of our countries. Concerning the problems of the Middle East, Rento Marsudi emphasized that Jakarta and Moscow have common position on maintaining peace and stability in the region and, although Indonesia is not directly involved in the peace process in Syria, it invariably stands for the development of political dialogue and for a ceasefire, and Russia plays an important role in finding a political solution to the Syrian crisis8. At a meeting in Sochi in May 2016, President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin and President of the Republic of Indonesia Joko Widodo discussed the state and prospects of Глава МИД Индонезии: визит президента Видодо в РФ откроет двери для укрепления отношений /ТАСС, 12 мая 2016. URL: https://tass.ru/interviews/3276511 8 Глава МИД Индонезии: визит президента Видодо в РФ… 7

109

Chapter 5. Russian-Indonesian cooperation during the presidency of Joko Widodo. 2014–2020

trade and economic cooperation. In his statement to the press, Vladimir Putin said that the intention was confirmed to build up bilateral cooperation in all areas of cooperation. At the same time, special attention was paid to the prospects for development of trade. He noted that there had been positive trends after a slight decline in previous years and expressed hope that the countries will not only be able to maintain the momentum, but also give impetus to the further development of business connections. The head of the Russian Federation said that Russia is ready to help Indonesia in the implementation of a large-scale regional structural program, which is being carried out under the patronage of the President of Indonesia, and in particular the construction of a new capital of the country9. At the same time, he especially noted the project of the Russian Railways with Indonesian partners in Kalimantan, launched back in 2015 in a part of the island rich in natural resources. (By 2024, the capital is planned to be moved to Kalimantan, which will contribute to the development of other regions, and Jakarta will remain the business capital, the business center of the country.) Java is overpopulated, in addition, there, unlike Kalimantan, natural disasters often occur. Vladimir Putin stressed that Russian industries are ready to supply Indonesia with high-speed hydrofoils, catamarans, floating docks, and to offer the most modern equipment for satellite ship monitoring. An agreement was reached to continue cooperation in the field of civil aviation10. In terms of energy cooperation, the Russian companies “Zarubezhneft” and “Rosneft” have large-scale projects, includ-

Президенты России и Индонезии обсудили перспективы развития торговли, 18 мая 2016 г. / Внешняя торговля РФ. URL: https://russian-trade.com/news/2016-05/prezidenty-rossii-iindonezii-obsudili-perspektivy-razvitiya-torgovli/ 10 Президенты России и Индонезии обсудили перспективы… 9

110

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

ing in the construction of a modern oil refinery in Java with a potential investment of 13 billion USD. As the director of the oil and gas department of the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources of Indonesia, Viratmaya Puya, said in Sochi in 2016, “Russia is the most preferred partner for Indonesia in matters of fuel and energy. She has excellent technology”11. With the help of “Inter Rao”, it was planned to build a thermal power plant with an investment of 2.8 billion USD. The President of Indonesia confirmed that during the negotiations, issues related to strengthening cooperation between the two countries in such strategic spheres as economic, investment relations and military cooperation were thoroughly discussed. He expressed confidence that Indonesia and Russia can significantly strengthen and increase economic cooperation, drawing attention to the need to search for an increase in the export of palm oil to Russia, which has declined recently12. Widodo announced an agreement on expanding investment cooperation and expressed interest in Russian investment in large projects in Indonesia in the field of marine economy and infrastructure development, railway construction, as well as projects in the field of oil refining, etc. The parties agreed to develop relations in the field of tourism13. In the presence of the presidents, the following documents were signed between the respective ministries: On defence cooperation; a Memorandum of understanding between the ministries of foreign affairs and between the Federal Archival Agency of the Russian Federation and the National ArПолина Девятова. Курс на Южную Азию. «Роснефть» планирует строить НПЗ в Индонезии /АИФ, 22.05.2016. URL: http://www.aif.ru/money/company/kurs_na_yuzhnuyu_aziyu_ro sneft_planiruet_stroit_npz_v_indonezii 12 Президенты России и Индонезии обсудили перспективы… 13 Там же. 11

111

Chapter 5. Russian-Indonesian cooperation during the presidency of Joko Widodo. 2014–2020

chives of the Republic of Indonesia on cooperation in the field of archives; The program of cooperation in the field of culture for 2016–2018; Statement of Understanding and Cooperation in Preventing Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing of Living Marine Resources and Ensuring Sustainable Fisheries Regulation. The Russian side confirmed its readiness to make its worthy contribution to the development of mutually beneficial Russian-Indonesian cooperation in the field of education14. At the end of the negotiation with V. Putin, Joko Widodo noted that Russia and Jakarta had agreed to exchange intelligence and build up contacts between the security agencies, primarily in the field of overcoming challenges and threats, and countering terrorism15. As noted by A. Drugov, Indonesia is the first state in the Southeast Asia region that agreed to sign such an agreement with the Russian Federation. In Sochi, Indonesian leaders expressed a desire for the country's entry into the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Sergei Lavrov said that the Russian Federation supports the Indonesian initiative to create a free trade zone with this organization. Following the talks between the presidents of Russia and Indonesia, the 11th meeting of the Russian-Indonesian joint Commission on trade, economic and technical cooperation was held in October 2016, headed by the Minister of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation, Dmitry Manturov, and the Minister-Cordinator for Economic Affairs of Indonesia, Darmin Nasution. Russia and Indonesia are implementing more than 30 large-scale projects in various areas of cooperation. The parties planned to bring the mutual trade turnover Президенты России и Индонезии обсудили перспективы… Путин и президент Индонезии обсудили вопросы борьбы с терроризмом /РИА Новости, 18.05.2016. URL: https://ria.ru/20160518/1435938247.html 14 15

112

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

by the end of 2018 to 5 billion USD16. Russian and Indonesian companies that signed contracts in 2016 have started to work to quickly translate the agreements reached into practice. At the meeting in Sochi, the Indonesian side presented a list of military equipment which can be interesting to it. In addition to Su-35, it included 2 “Varshavyanka” submarines, since the issue of the safety of sea transportation is very acute in the Pacific and Indian oceans. In addition, the concept of Widodo “global sea axis” requires a powerful navy and Indonesia is showing increasing interest in the development of surface and submarine fleets. (However, the agreement on purchase of submarines is not reached). Jakarta expressed a desire to build a maintenance center for military equipment in Russia and to establish joint production of ammunition and some types of weapons. The President set the task to modernize aviation, navy and ground weapons. In January 2017, Jakarta and Moscow began lengthy negotiations on the purchase of 11 new-generation Su-35 fighters. Indonesia also expressed its intention to buy Be-200 amphibious aircraft and armored personnel carriers for about 100 million USD17. Russia is providing assistance to Indonesia in the fight against terrorism by expanding defenсe and security cooperation, since ISIS supporters in Indonesia become more active from time to time. In December 2017, over 100 Russian military personnel arrived in the country to practice joint combat missions. Negotiations continued on the opening of direct

Хохлова Н.И. Указ. соч. C. 101. Россия и Индонезия: большой потенциал для углубления связей /Eurasia daily, 26.12.2017. URL: https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2017/12/26/rossiya-i-indoneziyabolshoy-potencial-dlya-uglubleniya-svyazey 16 17

113

Chapter 5. Russian-Indonesian cooperation during the presidency of Joko Widodo. 2014–2020

Moscow-Jakarta flight. The main candidate for the role of the carrier is the Indonesian airline “Garuda Indonesia”. The new president of Indonesia has significantly expanded relations with the Russian Federation in traditional areas, and opened new areas of cooperation. The joint Russian-Indonesian business forum has become more active. In 2017 it was timed to coincide with the 11th Festival of Indonesia in Russia. The forum noted that the trade turnover between the countries amounted to 2.616 billion USD (Russian export – 402 million USD, аnd imports – 2.2 billion USD), that is an increase in comparison with 2016 by one third or 33.34%18. Russian Ambassador to Indonesia Mikhail Yu. Galuzin noted in September that trade relations between Russia and Indonesia are developing progressively19. Minister-Coordinator for Economic Affairs of Indonesia Darmin Nasution noted that Russia continues to be the key strategic partner of Indonesia in the economic sphere. Other areas of commercial and industrial cooperation included the automotive industry, agriculture and fishing, pharmaceuticals, interbank and financial cooperation. Shipbuilding industry was considered a driver, taking into account Indonesia's transformation into axial maritime power. Russian companies can participate in projects to create port infrastructure, which will facilitate the integration of the Indonesian islands into the international transport system, which will give the state logistical advantages. The task of reorienting bilateral economic relations to new forms, primarily those associated with innovation and investment cooperation, remained relevant. Президенты России и Индонезии обсудили перспективы… Михаил Галузин. Торговые отношения между Россией и Индонезией поступательно развиваются / Окно в АТР, 06.09.2017. URL: http://oknovatr.ru/articles/international-life/torgovyieotnosheniya-mezhdu-rossiej-i-indoneziej-postupatelnorazvivayutsya/ 18 19

114

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

Ambassador M. Galuzin emphasized that the traditional interest of Indonesian business in the Far Eastern Federal District (FEFD), which overlooks the Asia-Pacific region with its colossal resources, is growing more and more. At meetings with the Chairman of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, profile ministers and prominent representatives of Indonesian business, opportunities for promoting joint projects in the regions of the Russian Far East are discussed. Indonesia is provided with information on the progress in the implementation of the Russian Maritime Doctrine 2020 and on the process of modernizing the transport and port structure of the Far East region. Indonesia, within the framework of the president's project to transform the country into an "axial sea power", is showing interest in the Russian project of the Northern Sea Route20. The tourist flow has significantly expanded. 10 thousand Indonesian citizens visited Russia in 2017, which brought about 6 million USD to the Russian economy, and 110 thousand Russian citizens who visited Indonesia contributed 66 million USD to the Indonesian economy21. For the further growth of tourist traffic, it is necessary to establish direct flights between the countries. Since the end of October, “Rossiya” Airlines has been ready to operate non-stop flights from Moscow to Bali. In early August 2017, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov paid a working visit to Indonesia. During the negotiations with Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi, issues of further building up Indonesian-Russian cooperation in the Михаил Галузин. Торговые отношения между Россией… Комментарий Департамента информации и печати МИД России в связи с визитом Министра иностранных дел России С.В. Лаврова в Индонезию / МИД РФ, 07.08.2017. URL: https://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news//asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2833085 20 21

115

Chapter 5. Russian-Indonesian cooperation during the presidency of Joko Widodo. 2014–2020

political, trade, economic and humanitarian fields, as well as the regional and international agenda were substantively considered. Following the talks, it was noted that they were held in a friendly atmosphere and were very productive. The main attention was paid to the implementation of the agreements reached at the meeting of the presidents of the two countries in May 2016 in Sochi. The ministers noted progress in intensifying political dialogue and building up contacts between various departments in the interests of developing trade, economic and investment cooperation. The parties confirmed that the goal set by the leaders of the two countries – to bring the volume of trade to 5 billion USD remains very relevant. Trade turnover in 2017 amounted to 3.27 billion USD (For comparison, Indonesia had 58.8 billion with China, and 25.9 billion with the United States)22. The ministers noted that the Russian Federation provides substantial favorable conditions for traditional Indonesian exports. A plan of consultations between the ministries of foreign affairs of the two countries for 2017–2019 was signed. The parties agreed to speed up the process of preparing a number of treaties and agreements that are under development. The closeness or coincidence of positions on a number of pressing international and regional problems was confirmed. The ministers spoke in favor of resolving crises and conflicts on the basis of international law, the UN Charter, through political dialogue, search for compromises and consensus. They expressed concern about the state of affairs in the Middle East and North Africa. It was emphasized that the threat from ISIS persists in areas close to the Russian FederaВыступление Министра иностранных дел России С.В. Лаврова по итогам переговоров с Министром иностранных дел Индонезии Р. Марсуди, Джакарта, 9 августа 2017 года / МИД РФ. URL: https://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news//asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2834143 22

116

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

tion and Indonesia. They declared their readiness to develop cooperation in the fight against this evil, both through bilateral channels and within the framework of cooperation between the Russian Federation and ASEAN. The foreign ministers of the two countries together stressed the need not to weaken efforts to resolve the problem of creating a Palestinian state, to ensure Palestinian unity, reaffirmed the similarity of their positions on the Syrian and Iraqi settlement, on the situation in the Persian Gulf region and on many other issues on the international agenda23. Sergei Lavrov expressed gratitude to Indonesia for its consistent support in cooperation between the Russian Federation and ASEAN and other structures based on the initiatives of the Association of Southeast Asian countries, such as the EAC, the Regional Forum on Security Issues, the Meeting of ASEAN Defence Ministers and Partners, etc.24. It was stressed that Indonesia is showing interest in starting negotiations with the Eurasian Economic Union-EAEU on the creation of a free trade zone. Russia expressed support for this position. In Jakarta, Sergei Lavrov met with ASEAN Secretary General Le Luong Minh and took part in the opening ceremony of the Russian mission to ASEAN in Jakarta, which was headed by the Russian Ambassador to the Association Aleksandr Ivanov (former Russian Ambassador in Indonesia). In the presence of Sergei Lavrov, a presentation of the Russian ultra-modern aircraft MC-21 (produced by the “Irkut Corporation”) took place in Jakarta. Russia is an important supplier of military aircraft and other weapons to Indonesia. These are mainly Su-27 multipurpose fighters, Mi-35 and Mi-17 helicopters, Pantsir-S12 self-propelled anti-aircraft missile and cannon Лавров: отношения Москвы и Джакарты вышли на уровень стратегического партнерства /ТАСС, 13.03.2018. URL: https://tass.ru/politika/5025311 24 Лавров: отношения Москвы и Джакарты вышли на уровень… 23

117

Chapter 5. Russian-Indonesian cooperation during the presidency of Joko Widodo. 2014–2020

systems, infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-3) and other equipment. Next ministerial talks took place in Moscow in March 2018. The ministers expressed mutual opinion of the parties about their readiness to bring bilateral relations between Russia and Indonesia to the level of strategic partnerships, for which, according to Sergei Lavrov, the necessary conditions have already matured. The foreign ministers of Russia and Indonesia agreed to accelerate the development of the declaration25. The level of strategic partnership presupposes the stability of political dialogue, close trade and economic relations, intensive scientific and cultural contacts, closeness of approaches to solving international problems. At the meeting, it was noted that Russia and its Indonesian partners have many joint projects in various fields – from energy and agriculture to fishing and tourism. The Indonesian side expressed its interest in increasing high-tech exports from Russia, including products of the military-industrial complex, mechanical engineering, and software26. The country with a population of 260 million, whose number is growing, considers it a priority for the national economy to increase the share of energy resources, especially oil and gas, the production of which in Indonesia has declined. There is a way out in the construction of infrastructural facilities in this area, in which Jakarta counts on experience and cooperation with Russia. Noting the relatively low trade turnover between our countries, which in 2017 amounted to 3.3 billion USD, Retno Marsudi stressed that this does not correspond to the existing potential. In this regard, she supported Sergei

25 26

Berita Indonesia. 13.03.2018. Berita Indonesia. 13.03.2018.

118

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

Lavrov's proposal to accelerate the process of concluding an agreement on a free trade zone between Indonesia and the EAEU27. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia noted the interest of Indonesia in the joint development of animal husbandry at enterprises in the regions of the Russian Federation, taking into account the most favorable ones for this in terms of climate and terrain. Sergei Lavrov stressed that the Russian government encourages the development of direct contacts between entrepreneurs of the two countries. The Indonesian business delegation annually takes part in the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, as well as the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok. Referring to international issues, Sergei Lavrov pointed out that “our countries will continue to closely interact in all areas of activity in the APR on the basis of the principle of the leading role of ASEAN”. Retno Marsudi informed the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation that Indonesia will nominate itself for the post of a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for the period 2019–2020. Particularly noteworthy is the statement that Indonesia supports the initiatives of Russian President Vladimir Putin on the formation of the Greater Eurasian Partnership with the participation of the SCO member states, the EAEU, ASEAN. Since during the Russia-ASEAN summit in Sochi in May 2016, the leaders of Russia and the Association decided to bring relations to the level of strategic partnership, Sergei Lavrov expressed confidence that “Indonesia, which at the end of 2018 assumed the post of the coordinator of the dialogue partnership between Russia and ASEAN, will contribute to progress towards this goal”. At the end of 2018, Indonesia became the coordinator of the ASEAN-Russia partnership for 27

Berita Indonesia. 13.03.2018.

119

Chapter 5. Russian-Indonesian cooperation during the presidency of Joko Widodo. 2014–2020

2018–2021, and R. Marsudi called on everyone for inclusive cooperation to implement the ASEAN-Russia Action Plan 2016–2020, noting that it was 42% complete at the end of 201828. She proposed three priority areas for cooperation: combating terrorism, natural disasters and cyber security. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov welcomed the proposed priority of cooperation. He stressed that Russia and Indonesia will act as co-chairs of the ASEAN Regional Forum on Combating Terrorism and Transnational Crime for the period 2019–2020. The foreign ministers of the two countries spoke in favor of expanding economic and trade cooperation between the Russian Federation and ASEAN. In October 2018 Indonesia and the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) signed a memorandum of cooperation in Indonesia. The Indonesian Trade Minister stressed that the formalization of cooperation with the EEC is “a historic step for economic relations with the entire EAEU region”29. In the format of memoranda, the EEC interacts with a number of countries, including the ASEAN members. Indonesian President Joko Widodo at a meeting with Vladimir Putin at the ASEAN summit in November 2018 in Singapore, said that he was counting on the early establishment of an FTA with the EAEU and expressed hope that Russia would assist in accelerating negotiations on this issue. He especially noted that Jakarta expects to expand “economic partnership with Moscow, primarily in the field of palm oil supplies, one of the main items of the country's foreign trade30. 28 Индонезия станет координатором партнерства АСЕАН — Россия на 2018–2021 гг. /ИА REGNUM. URL: https:// regnum.ru/news/polit/2458788.html 29 Индонезия станет координатором партнерства АСЕАН… 30 Президент Индонезии рассчитывает на скорейшее создание зоны свободной торговли с ЕАЭС / Масложировой союз России. URL: https://www.mzhsr.ru/news/novosti-otrasli/prezident-

120

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

As the coordinator of the Russia-ASEAN dialogue, Joko Widodo made a statement on behalf of the member countries of the Association and stressed that “our meeting marks the expansion of relations between ASEAN and Russia as strategic partners”, noted the importance of completing all work programs contained in the ASEAN-Russia Action Plan for 2016– 2020, recalling that trade between Russia and ASEAN increased by almost 40% and the trade turnover reached 16.7 billion USD, and Russian investments – 40 million USD. He called for an immediate agreement with Russia on the negotiations regarding disaster management. According to UN data, economic losses from them in Southeast Asia reach 120 billion dollars a year. Indonesian Trade Minister Enggartiasto Lukita said Jakarta and Moscow agreed to expand bilateral trade and investment relations. Both countries also agreed to determine what hinders cooperation between them. At the meeting of the ministers of economics from the countries of the Association in Bangkok, he emphasized that the trade potential with Russia is great and the parties encourage overcoming trade barriers and advocate deepening economic relations. Russia is an important factor in terms of ensuring international energy and food security. Although not a member of OPEC, Russia significantly affects the formation of world prices for oil. On the other hand, Russia takes the third place in the world exports of wheat and other cereals. (Indonesia is the largest importer of Russian wheat).

indonezii-rasschityivaet-na-skorejshee-sozdanie-zonyi-svobodnojtorgovli-s-eaes

121

Chapter 5. Russian-Indonesian cooperation during the presidency of Joko Widodo. 2014–2020

Russia's contribution to ensuring stable food supplies to the world market was significant. In essence, Russia was a leader in solving these problems31. In May 2019 Vladimir Putin congratulated Joko Widodo on his victory in the presidential election and expressed confidence that he would continue to develop bilateral cooperation and confirmed his readiness to continue constructive dialogue and joint work for the benefit of the peoples of the two countries. The Russian president noted that he expects to meet with the Indonesian leader in Moscow and St. Petersburg32. During the second presidential term, Widodo left unchanged the vectors of the country's foreign policy in accordance with its Constitution. Foreign policy will continue to develop within the established course. At the same time, special emphasis will be placed on economic diplomacy, protection of the country's citizens and the social sphere, the sovereignty of the state, as well as the role of Indonesia in the global process. On August 29, 2019 President Putin approved the signing of an agreement with Indonesia on the extradition of criminals. In November 2019 a business mission from Indonesia arrived in Moscow, consisting of three Indonesian companies from Bogor, which signed cooperation agreements with Russian partners in the amount of 768 thousand dollars. Supplies from Bogor include foodstuffs, lotions, and household appliПосол РФ в Индонезии о покойном Хабиби: «Известная фигура в России» /ИА REGNUM. 12.09.2019. URL: https://regnum.ru/ news/polit/2717284.html 32 Поздравление Джоко Видодо по случаю переизбрания на пост Президента Индонезии / Президент России, 22.05.2019. URL: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60560; Путин отметил взаимовыгодное сотрудничество и координацию РФ и Индонезии в ООН /ТАСС, 03.02.2020. URL: https://tass.ru/politika/ 7669399 31

122

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

ances. The Ambassador of Indonesia to the Russian Federation Wahid Supriyadi highly appreciated the visit of the mission and expressed hope that such missions will be conducted regularly to achieve optimal results. He noted Russia's interest in potential investments in infrastructure development to move the capital of Indonesia to Kalimantan33. At the end of January 2020 Sergei Shoigu, at negotiations in Moscow with the Minister of Defence of Indonesia, Prabovo Subianto, said that he was counting on closer relations with the Russian military department, since Indonesia regards Russia as one of the largest powers in the world. He emphasized that Russia, and earlier the Soviet Union, always helped Indonesia in difficult times, always stood on the side of Indonesia. Indonesians have always wanted and still want to be close to Russia and develop friendly relations with it. He noted that bilateral relations between Russia and Indonesia, including through the military departments, have all the prerequisites for reaching the strategic level. Shoigu expressed hope that in 2020 a corresponding declaration on strategic partnership will be signed, which will become an important milestone in bilateral relations34. Strategic partnership provides for building relationships based on mutually beneficial rapprochement and support in certain areas of cooperation. For Russia, this is political interaction, the development of mutual cooperation in various spheres, refusal to join military-political blocs directed against 33 Близость зимы не помешала России тепло принять 14 студентов с Папуа /ИА REGNUM. URL: https://regnum.ru/news/ society/2761041.html 34 Военно-техническое сотрудничество России и Индонезии может выйти на стратегический уровень /ЦАМТО, 30.01.2020. URL: https://armstrade.org/includes/periodics/news/2020/ 0130/060056442/print.shtml; Красная звезда, 28.10.2020.

123

Chapter 5. Russian-Indonesian cooperation during the presidency of Joko Widodo. 2014–2020

a third country, non-interference in internal affairs and a policy of mutual trust. Humanitarian relations are developing successfully. Russian media establish themselves on the territory of Indonesia. In December 2017 an agreement was signed on the entry into the media market of the Russian channel “Russia Today”, which in the West is accused of political engagement. The programs are conducted in English, which allows Indonesians to receive objective information about the life of Russia and its foreign policy. This counters the anti-Russian propaganda of the American media, which suggests that Russia is “an unfriendly and dangerous country”. In 2016 about 300 Indonesian students were trained in the Russian Federation, including 150 people on railway specialties. For the 2017–2018 academic year 161 budget places were allocated35. In 2020 over 600 Indonesians are studying in the Russian Federation. 14 students from Papua came to study in Russia for the first time in 2019. Indonesia is also expanding its cultural presence in the Russian Federation. Cultural events are held in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Festivals, the exchange of teams, delegations, including those from the regions of Russia and the provinces of Indonesia, are held regularly. Our countries oppose the negative consequences of globalization and its impact on their culture. Indonesian films are shown in Russia. The Moscow Zoo is replenished with exotic animals from Indonesia. Indonesia remains a popular tourist destination among Russians, and it is stable, not confirmed by the political situation. In 2016, 65 thousand Russians visited Indonesia. They, like the citizens of other 30 countries are allowed to freely enИндонезия выбирает Дальний Восток /Информационноаналитическое агентство «Восток-Россия», 05.04.2018. URL: https://www.eastrussia.ru/material/indoneziya-vybiraet-dalniyvostok/ 35

124

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

ter the country for 30 days. In 2019, 160 thousand tourists from Russia arrived to Indonesia, this is the 5th place after Great Britain, France, Germany, and the Netherlands (the main visit place is Bali). Indonesian tourist flow to Russia is also growing rapidly. In 2016, it amounted to 5,000 people, and in 2018 it was already 30,000. People see that Russia is a safe country, and the Russian people are very good-natured. Russia is a multicultural country, it is completely different from how it is portrayed in Western films36. The Russian Federation continues to provide Indonesia with humanitarian assistance in connection with frequent natural disasters in the country. On October 8, 2018 a special plane of the Russian Emergencies Ministry delivered generators, tents, water purification systems, blankets, and other essential items to the victims of the earthquake and tsunami in Central Sulawesi. In Jakarta, the exhibition of the Russian photographer Sergei Kovalchuk, held in September 2019 under the title “Indonesia - a region with long traditions,” which, as Kovalchuk noted, was very important to preserve, was very popular. This exhibition, as stated by the Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Indonesia Lyudmila Vorobyova, became part of the events dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Indonesia and Russia, which the countries celebrated on February 3, 2020. In connection with this date, Vladimir Putin sent his congratulations to the President of Indonesia, Joko Widodo, in which the President of Russia noted that this anniversary date was marked by significant success in the development of Russian-Indonesian relations. Bilateral political dialogue, mutualРоссийский самолет с гуманитарной помощью прибыл в Индонезию / ИА REGNUM. 09.10.2019. URL: https://regnum.ru/ news/polit/2497283.html 36

125

Chapter 5. Russian-Indonesian cooperation during the presidency of Joko Widodo. 2014–2020

ly beneficial cooperation in trade and economic, scientific and technical, humanitarian, and other fields are expanding. Cooperation of efforts within the UN and other multilateral structures gives a good return. V. Putin expressed confidence that “we will be able to ensure the further build-up of the entire range of relations between Russia and Indonesia, their bringing to the level of strategic partnership. This, undoubtedly, meets the fundamental interests of our peoples, goes in line with the strengthening of peace, security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region”. In conclusion, Vladimir Putin wished Joko Widodo good health, and the citizens of Indonesia wellbeing and prosperity37. In his reply telegram, the President of Indonesia noted that our relations began to develop since the time of the first Indonesian President Sukarno and we should continue to promote them. In the statement of the Indonesian Embassy on the occasion of the anniversary, it is said that relations between Indonesia and Russia have moved into a new dimension in the 21st century. The 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries is an impetus for reaching a new level of strategic partnership. Indonesia and Russia have a solid foundation for the development of relations and cooperation in various fields. In an article published in the Indonesian newspaper “Kompas” on February 2, 2020, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov noted that strengthening relations with ASEAN is an unconditional priority of Russian foreign policy38. Russia as a whole proceeds from the fact that it is in our common interests not only to maintain the momentum of Путин отметил взаимовыгодное сотрудничество и координацию РФ и Индонезии в ООН /ТАСС, 03.02.2020. URL https:// tass.ru/politika/7669399 38 “Kompas” 02.02.2020. 37

126

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

practical cooperation, but also to do everything necessary for further development of business relations. The high level of mutual trust creates a favorable atmosphere for forecasting military and military-technical cooperation. Meetings of senior command personnel are held on a regular basis, Russian military personnel participate in joint exercises in Indonesia. The most important component of defence cooperation remains the supply of Russian weapons and military equipment. Sergei Lavrov emphasized that Indonesia is carrying out effective work as the acting coordinator of the Russia-ASEAN Dialogue Partnership39. Larissa Vorobyova, on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between our countries, stated that she looks with optimism at the development of not only diplomatic, but also economic relations. On February 4, 2020 a photo exhibition of archival documents and photographs was opened in Moscow to mark the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Russia and Indonesia. The ceremony was attended by representatives of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, Russian ministries and departments, business and academia, ambassadors of the ASEAN countries in Moscow, employees and veterans of the Russian diplomatic service. On February 19, 2020 MGIMO of the Russian Foreign Ministry hosted a seminar entitled “Towards a Strategic Partnership between Indonesia and Russia: Challenges and Opportunities”, which was opened by the former Prime Minister of the Russian Federation and the current head of the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies Mikhail Fradkov. In his speech, he noted that relations between Indonesia and Russia are at the stage of formation against the background of difficult dynamics in the region and the world. Traditional cooperation between the 39

“Kompas” 02.02.2020.

127

Chapter 5. Russian-Indonesian cooperation during the presidency of Joko Widodo. 2014–2020

two countries is based on such areas as mechanical engineering, military equipment, tourism, and agriculture. However, there is great scope for developing cooperation in other areas such as healthcare and pharmaceuticals, civil aviation, energy, cybersecurity and education40. Speaking at the seminar, the Ambassador of Indonesia to the Russian Federation Wahid Supriyadi noted that on the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations, cooperation between the two countries can be considered at a higher level. The ambassador called the current stage, which coincided with the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations, a new era in cooperation between the two countries. Close personal communications and mutual understanding between the leaders of the two countries are of key importance for the successful development of friendly relations and cooperation. There is a dialogue between the countries on all the main areas of cooperation41. Despite optimistic statements, the volume of mutual trade after 2017 began to decline and by the end of 2019 it was about 2 billion USD. At the same time, Russian exports were almost two times lower than Indonesian ones42. Unfortunately, the Russian-Indonesian contract for the purchase of 11 Su-35 fighters, agreed in principle, was stuck. Сергей Лавров. Россия и Индонезия: 70 лет плодотворного сотрудничества / РСМД, 03.02.2020. URL: https://russiancouncil.ru/ analytics-and-comments/comments/rossiya-i-indoneziya-70-letplodotvornogo-sotrudnichestva/ 41 Посол РФ в Индонезии о Су-35: «Есть технические проблемы» /ИА REGNUM, 13.02.2020. URL: https://regnum.ru/news/ polit/2857703.html 42 Внешняя торговля России с Индонезией за 9 месяцев 2019 г. / Внешняя торговля РФ. 14.11.2019. URL: https://russiantrade.com/reports-and-reviews/2019-11/vneshnyaya-torgovlyarossii-s-indoneziey-za-9-mesyatsev-2019-g/ 40

128

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

In August 2017 the Indonesian state trading company “Perusahaan Perdagangan” and the Russian state corporation “Rostec” signed a supply memorandum in Moscow, providing for a barter deal: Russia supplies multifunctional fighters in exchange for natural products partially, due to the possible inability of Jakarta to pay the necessary amount of cash. The estimated cost was 1.14 billion USD. It was previously reported that the Indonesian side will pay for a little more than half of this amount with the supply of food, raw materials and goods: palm oil, coffee, tea, rubber, spices, etc. It was envisaged that Russian aircraft would be delivered within 2 years43. However, the implementation of the agreement was postponed, reportedly for financial reasons. Russia's main competitor in the Indonesian arms market, the Pentagon, tried to pull the deal over to itself. The United States is concerned about cooperation between Moscow and Jakarta in the military field, and they are trying in every possible way to disrupt the agreement. In January 2018, a month before the signing of the contract, during a visit to Jakarta, US Secretary of Defence J. Mattis tried to persuade the Indonesian leadership to withdraw from the contract with Russia, threatening with sanctions. He reminded about the law “On Countering opponents of sanctions by America” and threatened to stop the supply of spare parts for the US aircraft of Indonesia armament in the event of signing the contract with the “Rosoboronexport”44. In exchange for abandoning the deal, the United States promised to supply used American F-16 fighters to In43 Михаил Ходаренок. После Су-35: Индонезия покупает истребители США /Газета.ru, 05.11.2019. URL: https://www.gazeta.ru/ army/2019/11/05/12796952.shtml 44 13 марта, источник: Ведомости, (новости источника) Bloomberg: Трамп вынудил Индонезию отказаться от покупки Су-35 /Ведомости, 13.03.2020. URL: https://news.mail.ru/ politics/40925368/?frommail=1

129

Chapter 5. Russian-Indonesian cooperation during the presidency of Joko Widodo. 2014–2020

donesia. But the contract with the Russian Federation was signed in February and provided for, among other things, 50% payment (570 million dollars) as counter deliveries of Indonesian goods. After that, the United States stepped up pressure on Jakarta, threatening not only economic but also political punishment, almost to the point of interference in internal affairs and the electoral process. With palm oil accounting for a significant portion of the contract payment with Russia, some observers call it a “palm deal”. However, palm oil – the most important part of Indonesian exports – is definitely a currency product and is in deserved demand. Moreover, it is actively used in cosmetics. The Ambassador of Indonesia Wahid Supriyadi stressed that in Indonesia almost the entire population has been using palm oil for a long time and this does not affect human health. However, negative image of palm oil has recently begun to develop in Russia. In a negative light, this product was first presented in the European Union. According to the Indonesian Ambassador, the issue of palm oil is a throw-in on the network from the West, which, as a supplier of sunflower oil, would like to protect its producers. As for Russia, one must not lose sight of the dishonesty of some Russian businessmen who import goods under the well-known slogan “more quantity, cheaper price!”, which means lower quality. Not without reason, the Minister of Trade of Indonesia, Enggartiasto Lukita, in order to remove all the rumors, proposed the creation of a Russian-Indonesian association for vegetable oils. The contract was to enter into force in August 2018, and the first two aircraft were scheduled to be delivered in August 2019 to participate in the military parade in honor of the 74th anniversary of the Indonesian armed forces on October 5, 2019, the next 6 to arrive in February 2020 and the last 3 in July

130

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

202045. But in January 2019, Defenсe Minister R. Ryakudu announced in the Indonesian parliament that the contract could not be implemented in 2019, because Indonesia had not made the necessary payments until January 2019. At the Shangrila Dialogue conference in Singapore in June 2019 on security issues in the Asia-Pacific region, Ryakudu nevertheless expressed hope that the delivery of Su-35 fighters would be carried out by the end of 2019. (In February, the Indonesian Minister of Politics and Security Viranto, after a working visit to Moscow, announced that the Russian and Indonesian sides had agreed to postpone the delivery of Su-35.) Before that, R. Ryakudu stressed that Jakarta “will not cancel the contract for the supply of Russian aircraft”. Earlier, he indicated that the country buys aircraft from the United States, Russia and China. One squadron will be equipped with Russian aircraft46. The contract for the Su-35 was postponed, but retained its legal force. Indonesia was not going to abandon it, since the price-quality ratio of Russian products is more attractive, as is the practice of a special system of lending to buyers. In addition, over the years of cooperation, Russia has proved that it is a reliable partner that does not impose any conditions, works on the principle of "business and nothing superfluous." Meanwhile, Washington's pressure on Jakarta grew. Expert Alexei Khazbiev noted back in November 2019 that Indonesia may have to pay a "fighter tax", meaning that as a compensation for the purchase of Russian aircraft, Jakarta will

45 Контракт на поставку Индонезии истребителей Су-35 пока не разорван, но подвис /ИА «Оружие России», 17.03.2020. URL: https://www.arms-expo.ru/news/cooperation/kontrakt-napostavku-indonezii-istrebiteley-su-35-poka-ne-razorvan-no-podvis/ 46 Индонезия рассчитывает на начало поставок Су-35 до конца года /ТАСС, 02.06.2019. URL: https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnayapanorama/6498862

131

Chapter 5. Russian-Indonesian cooperation during the presidency of Joko Widodo. 2014–2020

have to buy American ones in the amount of 1.5 billion USD to avoid sanctions47. Air Force Commander-in-Chief Marshal Yuyu Sutisno noted that in early 2020 Indonesia plans to apply for the purchase of two squadrons (24 aircraft) of F-16 Block72 light American consumers. This deal should be part of a plan to modernize the country's air force. He also said: “We still intend to receive Russian fighters. What has been started must be completed”. And Indonesian Defence Minister Ryamizard Ryakudu stressed that “the issue will be resolved during 2019”48. While on a visit to Moscow in early February 2019, the Minister of Defence of Indonesia Prabovo Subianto met with the Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation Sergei Shoigu and confirmed Indonesia's intention to acquire Russian Su-35 aircraft and, in addition, Russian tanks and helicopters, both military and civil. The minister said he was counting on closer relations with the Russian military department. “We in Indonesia view Russia as one of the largest powers in the world. Russia, and earlier the Soviet Union, has always helped Indonesia in difficult times, has always been on the side of Indonesia. We have always wished and still wish to be close with Russia, to develop friendly relations with it,” he said49. Russian Ambassador to Indonesia Lyudmila Vorobyova noted on February 13, 2020 that financial problems are one of the obstacles to the completion of the contract for the purchase of Russian Su-35 fighters and expressed hope that technical problems can be resolved, since the Su-35 is one of the best fighters in the world, which are bought by many countries. 47 Эксперт онлайн Москва, 07.11.2019, Алексей Хазбиев. Индонезия заплатит «истребительный налог». 48 Эксперт онлайн Москва, 07.11.2019, Алексей Хазбиев… 49 Посол РФ в Индонезии о Су-35: «Есть технические проблемы» /ИА REGNUM, 13.02.2020. URL: https://regnum.ru/news/ polit/2857703.html.

132

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

The Su-35 is a long-range heavy fighter. A machine with such characteristics is needed, according to experts, for an island country. Lyudmila Vorobyova stressed that Russia produces all types of military equipment that Indonesia may need. At the same time, Russia respects Indonesia's right to choose from whom and what to buy50. Despite certain technical difficulties associated with payment, the Indonesian side, as stated by Ambassador Supriyadi, does not abandon its plans to purchase Russian aircraft. In March 2020 there were reports in the press that the White House was literally "twisting the arms" of Jakarta, demanding to abandon the purchase of Russian Su-35 aircraft, turning on its “persuasion resources” to full power, which allegedly led to Indonesia's rejection of a deal agreed with Moscow. In connection with it, Russian Ambassador to Indonesia Vorobyova said the following: “It's no secret that the United States is exerting open pressure on countries that want to buy Russian defence equipment. The goal is clear: to force these countries to abandon the acquisition of Russian weapons and turn to American instead. Of course, this is unfair competition that violates the rules and norms of transparent and legitimate business”51. Realizing that their equipment is much more expensive, although it does not have any special advantages over the Russian one, Washington, unable to withstand healthy competition, resorts to blackmail and threats. In March 2020, the Bloomberg Agency reported that Trump allegedly Новая правда об отношении Индонезии к России. Эксклюзивное интервью с Чрезвычайным и Полномочным Послом Республики Индонезии в Российской Федерации и Республике Белоруссия Мохамадом Вахидом Суприяди /ИА REGNUM, 12.02.2020. URL: https://regnum.ru/news/polit/2856143.html 51 Светлана Гомзикова. Америка закрыла небо Азии для Су-35 // Свободная пресса, 14.03.2020. URL: https://svpressa.ru/ war21/article/259709 50

133

Chapter 5. Russian-Indonesian cooperation during the presidency of Joko Widodo. 2014–2020

forced Indonesia to abandon the purchase of Russian Su-35s and, threatening with sanctions, “closed the skies for the Su35”" As the newspaper ”Vedomosti” reported, the contract was not terminated. The Russian authorities have not received an official notice from Indonesia that it has been canceled. “Rosoboronexport” and the Federal Service for MilitaryTechnical Cooperation declined to comment. "The Jakarta Post” newspaper stated that the agreement on the acquisition of Russian aircrafts is “suspended” and the final decision will be made later52. Analysts, explaining the situation with the financial problems of Jakarta, believe that it is too early to write off the deal. The coronavirus has added additional obscurity to this issue. But already at the end of June 2020, the Minister of Defense of Indonesia Prabovo Subianto made a working visit to Moscow as an honored guest on the occasion of the celebrations dedicated to the 75th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War. He met with Deputy Defense Minister A. Fomin. At the meeting, the parties discussed issues of bilateral relations and cooperation in various fields, including education, joint training and cooperation in the defence industry53. On July 2, 2020 TASS with reference to the newspaper “The Jakarta Post” reported that Indonesia does not refuse to buy Russian fighter Su-35, however, redistribution of budget funds due to the pandemic coronavirus, as well as the US sanctions fail to complete the transaction. It is possible to achieve some kind of shift in this issue after Prabovo Subianto's third visit to the Russian Federation this year, the preparation of which was announced by the Russian Ambassador to Контракт на поставку Индонезии истребителей Су-35 пока … Джакарта не отказывается от покупки 11 истребителей Су-35 – посол РФ в Индонезии / ЦАМТО, 09.07.2020. URL: https://armstrade.org/includes/periodics/news/2020/0709/11405 8644/detail.shtml 52 53

134

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

Indonesia Lyudmila Vorobyova at a briefing for the Indonesian media on July 8. The purpose of the visit is to discuss the purchase of 11 Su-35 fighters. The Russian ambassador stated that the contract has not been canceled and will be implemented54. Trade and economic contacts also began to revive. On July 9 the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation together with the Business Council for Cooperation with Indonesia held a webinar “Russia-Indonesia: Prospects for Trade and Economic Cooperation in New Conditions”. Earlier in mid-February, as reported by “Ria Novosti”, the Indonesian authorities offered “Rosatom” a site for the construction of the first nuclear power plant in Kalimantan. According to the Investment Coordinating Board of Indonesia, the value of Russian investments in the country amounted in September 2019 more than 17 million USD55. Completed work on an intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in the field of international information security. A confidential dialogue in the field of strategic security is developing between the justice and law enforcement agencies of the two countries56. Indonesia has to pursue its balanced multi-vector foreign policy surrounded by major powers; in this regard, Russia is undoubtedly an attractive partner for it. Both sides are convinced that the preconditions have already been created for bringing bilateral relations to the level of strategic partnership. Индонезия не отказывалась от покупок российских истребителей Су-35 /AEX.RU, 02.07.2020. URL: https://aex.ru/news/ 2020/7/2/214184/ 55 Индонезия и Россия отмечают 70-летие установления дипотношений /ИА REGNUM, 03.02.2020. URL: https://regnum.ru/ news/polit/2847655.html. 56 Россия и Индонезия готовят встречу на высшем уровне /ТАСС, 04.02.2020. URL: https://tass.ru/politika/7680123 54

135

Chapter 5. Russian-Indonesian cooperation during the presidency of Joko Widodo. 2014–2020

At the beginning of February 2020, Sergei Lavrov said that almost everything is ready to announce that relations between our countries have been taken to a new level – the level of strategic partnership. He expressed hope that this can be done in the near future, and noted that Russia and Indonesia are discussing preparations for a new meeting of the leaders of the two countries57. According to the Ambassador of Indonesia to Russia Wahid Supriyadi signing a strategic partnership agreement at the level of heads of state is expected during the visit of President Vladimir Putin to Jakarta. Ambassador of Russia to Indonesia Ludmila Vorobyova in an interview with the International News Agency “Russia Today” noted that the pandemic somewhat delayed the plans for the signing of the corresponding declaration by the presidents of Russia and Indonesia, she expressed confidence that this event would happen as soon as the opportunity arises for this58. In my opinion, unfortunately, Russia are too late. While the United States, China and Australia are already connected with Indonesia not just by a strategic partnership, but by a Comprehensive Partnership, although, unlike them, our joint history with Indonesia is practically not overshadowed by anything, but on the contrary, as it has always been with the Soviet Union before and now on the Russian side it is extremely friendly and mutually beneficial.

Россия и Индонезия готовят встречу на высшем уровне… Интервью Посла России в Индонезии Л.Г. Воробьевой МИА «Россия Сегодня», 17 июля 2020 года / МИД РФ, 17.07.2020. URL: https://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/id/-/asset_publisher/ zaMdV5V4XUmC/content/id/4239024 57 58

136

Aleksey Yu. Drugov Doctor of Political Science, Chief Researcher, Center for Southeast Asia, Australia and Oceania Studies, IOS RAS, Russia, Moscow, [email protected]

Chapter 6. From the History of Soviet-Indonesian

Military-Technical Cooperation

In late 1950th and early 1960th Republic of Indonesia underwent the process that has not yet been fully estimated both in the country and abroad, both its meaning at that time and its long-term consequences. It was technical re-equipment of Indonesian Army, Navy and Air Force. By its depth and scope this process can be estimated as a revolution. The reequipment has been almost completely accomplished with the supplies from the Soviet Union and with technical and methodical assistance of Soviet military specialists. The author of this article directly participated in this process in 1961–1964 as an interpreter, and many of the matters suggested below are based upon my personal impressions and experience. In some way this re-equipment Indonesia was forced to undertake. Being one of the architects of the Bandung Conference 1955 and “Bandung Spirit”, Indonesian government under President Sukarno was firmly adhering the principle of peaceful coexistence, and the Indonesian Armed Forces were content with the arms it inherited from the time of the Second World War, that is several small navy ships at most of frigate class, several piston fighters and tactical bombers, transport

Chapter 6. From the History of Soviet-Indonesian Military-Technical Cooperation

air-crafts C-47, and rifles and sub-machine guns. Probably the only exception was really modern US-made transport aircrafts C-130 “Hercules”. Due to merely internal factors, in the middle of the 1950th mutinies/revolts against the central government flared in the provinces of Sumatra and Sulawesi islands. But the separatists began to receive assistance from the USA and Great Britain CSA including rather modern arms. It was believed that this assistance was not accidental, but reflected a kind of hostility of the West towards Indonesia pursuing “free and active” foreign policy. Although at that time Indonesia was adhering to the system of liberal parliament democracy system and did not give any pretext for criticism from this point of view. The West began reviling President Sukarno as dictator only later after transition of Indonesia to Guided Democracy in 1959. To secure the defense capacity of the country the Indonesian government as early as 1957 purchased some kinds of arms and other military equipment from Yugoslavia (motor torpedo boats, MTB), Czechoslovakia (jet-fighters MiG-17) and others. In 1959 from the Soviet Union were obtained two ocean-going submarines of 613 project, two destroyers and eight MTB. This purchase at least at that time was not yet connected to the problem of West Irian being determined by the idea of Indonesian political and military leaders about the long-time strategic needs of the country. In late 1950th Indonesian government under President Sukarno took firmer position on the issue concerning the status of West Irian, former part of the Netherlands Indies which was not transferred to Indonesia in 1949, when the Netherlands recognized independence of the Republic but refused to recognize the western part of New Guinea island to be a part of the Republic. Indonesia considered the situation as violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

138

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

Addressing the Fifteenth United Nations General Assembly on September 30, 1960, President Sukarno said: “I tell you in all seriousness, the situation in West Irian is a dangerous situation, an explosive situation: it is a cause of tension and it is a threat to peace… Our soldiers are not responsible for that. Sukarno is not responsible for that. Indonesia is not responsible for that. No! The threat to peace springs directly from the very existence of colonialism and imperialism”1. The Indonesian government decided to bring about large-scale modernization of Indonesian Armed Forces. Initially it made attempt to seek cooperation with the United States of America. Minister of National Security, Head of Staff of the Army General A.H. Nasution visited Washington, but his request about purchases of offensive kinds of weapons was rejected. This outcome of the visit was predictable. Washington could not supply to Indonesia armaments which could be used against the Netherlands, United States NATO ally. On January 2, 1961 the delegation of the Indonesian Government headed by General A.H. Nasution arrived in Moscow. He was accompanied by Foreign Minister Subandrio, Minister/Commander-in-Chief of Air Forces Marshal Surjadarma and other high-ranking officials. The Soviet delegation was headed by Prime Minister First Deputy Anastas I. Mikoyan. The level of reception of Indonesian delegation in Moscow was very high. Soviet Prime Minister Nikita S. Khrushchev twice met with General A.H. Nasution and attended the reception in Indonesian Embassy in Moscow – practically unprecedented case according to the Soviet diplomatic protocol of that time. But it became a kind of tradition, 1

To Build the World Anew. President Sukarno’s Speech before the Fifteenth General Assembly of the United Nations on Friday 30 September 1960. Department of Information Republic of Indonesia, Djakarta, 1960. P. 19.

139

Chapter 6. From the History of Soviet-Indonesian Military-Technical Cooperation

and N. Khrushchev was present at the celebration of President Sikarno’s birthday in Indonesian Embassy in Moscow in 1961. Speaking at the ceremony of sighing of the SovietIndonesian agreement A.I. Mikoyan paid special attention to the problem of West Irian, saying that this territory “was included in the Netherlands Kingdom treacherously despite the will of the West Irian people”. Here he was interrupted by N. Khrushchev who said: “Soon they will have to exclude it”2. According to General A.H. Nasution the agreement between Indonesia and the Soviet Union was to become a tool for defending peace and friendship in the Southeast region and preventing the colonizers’ actions against the cause of peace3. The Joint Communique on the result of bilateral negotiations particularly mentioned that “the Soviet Government met the request of General Nasution’s mission for the purchases of new equipment which is urgently needed by the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia. The Soviet Government supports the just demand of the Indonesian people on the reintegration with the Republic of Indonesia of West Irian which is its primordial territory”4. Later General A.H. Nasution wrote that the conditions of the long-term credit granted by the Soviet Union for these purchases were “not too burdensome for Indonesian economy”5. Indonesian Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral R. Martadinata pointed out that the USSR was the only country that was willing to help Indonesia on the conditions that were convenient for it”6.

2

«Правда» (М.), 07.01.1961. «Правда» (М.), 07.01.1961. 4 «Правда», 08.01.1061. 5 Nasution A.H. Sedjarah Perdjuangan Nasional dibidang Bersendjata. Djakarta, 1966. Hal.162. 6 “Harian Rakjat”, Jakarta, 01.12.1962 3

140

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

A month later another Indonesian delegation arrived in Moscow headed by General R. Hidajat, Deputy of General A.H. Nasution with the rank of Minister, to make more precise the detail of the agreement. General Hidajat also brought a message to the Soviet leaders requesting the provision of nuclear weapons to Indonesia. No answer was given. Later the same request for missiles with 5000 km capacity and nucleararmed missiles was passed to the Soviet Defense Minister by General Ahmad Yani who visited Moscow in his capacity as Minister/Commander-in-Chief of the Army. The Minister answered that the USSR is consistent in following the policy of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons 7. During President Sukarno’s visit to the USSR in June 1961, General A.H. Nasution who accompanied him and Soviet Defense Minister Marshal R. Malinovsky signed additional protocol to the previous agreements. The Joint SovietIndonesian Communique confirmed that the Soviet Union was supporting lawful demand of Indonesia for its territory West Irian which was still occupied by foreigners8. On December 19, 1961 President Sukarno issued the order which contained three points – to prevent creating of Papua State by the Netherlands in West Irian, to raise the Indonesian National Red-and-White banner in West Irian before the end of 1962, and to be prepared for general mobilization. It naturally meant interaction and cooperation between Indonesia and the Soviet Union under the agreements achieved before. On February 9, 1962 the Soviet government issued a statement that “its position is based upon the undisputable principle that West Irian is an inseparable part of the Republic of Indonesia”9. 7

Шолмов Ю.А. Россия – Индонезия. Годы сближения и тесного сотрудничества (1945–1965). М., 2009. С. 209–210. 8 «Правда», 13.06.1961. 9 «Правда», 09.02.1962.

141

Chapter 6. From the History of Soviet-Indonesian Military-Technical Cooperation

In May 1962 Indonesian delegation headed by Deputy Prime Minister/Foreign Minister Subandrio came to Moscow. General R. Hidajat was the member of the delegation. Minister Subandrio said about the agreement which was signed: “We shall not use the material assistance which we are receiving under this agreement for aggression. We shall use it only for liberation of our entire territory and for strengthening peace there”10. Under several Soviet-Indonesia agreements the Armed Forces of Indonesia received arms as follows: Air Force – strategic jet bombers Tu-16, guided-missiles equipped strategic aircrafts Tu-16KS, jet fighters MiG-17, jet fighters MiG-19, 10 supersonic jet fighters MiG-21, and 12 transport aircrafts An-12. Air Defence Force received several battalions of antiaircraft missiles and radars. Navy obtained a cruiser, six destroyers, six frigates, 12 torpedo motor boats, 12 missile bearing motor boats, 12 submarines, several minesweepers, minelayers, and other ships. The Navy got also torpedo bearing aircrafts Il-28. Indonesian marines received 100 amphibian tanks PT-76, armoured troopcarriers, field and howitzer artillery, considerable number of small arms including AK-47 sub-machine guns. The share of Land Force (Army) was smaller due to the geopolitical position of Indonesia as an archipelago country and therefore to the functions of land forces. The Army obtained considerable amount of engineering equipment (which was also quite successfully used for civil functions), antiaircraft weapons and small arms, parachutes for paratroops, and some other kinds of equipment and weapons. To serve

10

«Правда», 09.05.1962.

142

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

this equipment Indonesia purchased necessary auxiliary equipment, workshops, and shops11. The USSR First Deputy Prime Minister Anastas Mikoyan arrived to Jakarta in July 1962. Speaking at the opening of the sport complex in Jakarta built with the Soviet aid, he particularly said that the Netherlands colonizers had two choices. First, shameful crushing defeat of their forces in West Irian, because “the Indonesian people and Indonesian government have not only a strong will to liberate West Irian, but also strongly armed forces that have modern arms which are much stronger than those of the Netherlands…. The second choice is to listen to the reason if they do have the one, and to return West Irian to the Indonesian people this year and thus to avoid disgrace”12. In early 1962 the Indonesian Armed Forces started landing troops in West Irian. On January 15, the Netherlands ships and aircrafts sank an Indonesian motor torpedo boat which was transporting a detachment of marines to West Irian. These operations were not very significant from the military point of view, but they were meant to demonstrate seriousness of Sukarno and his government’s intentions. Commander-in-Chief of Indonesian Land Force General Ahmad Yani, instructing L.B. Moerdani, commander of one of the landing detachments, before his departing for West Irian, said that the main task of these operations was to facilitate diplomatic efforts in Indone11

These figures were taken from the article by E.K.Chubshev, who in 1962-1966 was the assistant to Navy Attache in the USSR Embassy in Jakarta “Our People in West Irian” which appeared in the journal «Воин России», No.4, 1998, and also from personal recollections of the author. 12 «Правда», 23.07.1962.

143

Chapter 6. From the History of Soviet-Indonesian Military-Technical Cooperation

sia – the Netherlands negotiations. “We must demonstrate that we are strong enough to control the territory of the island”13. The whole number of personnel landed in the territory was 1419, including 216 killed or missing, and 296 detained14. In 1961 the team of the Soviet military specialists in Jakarta was formed, headed by Rear-Admiral (later ViceAdmiral) Grigory Chernobay. In 1941–1945 he was fighting as an officer of the Soviet Northern Fleet, and before appointment to Indonesia he was commanding the squadron of the USSR Pacific Fleet. The task of the team was to lead the work of the Soviet military specialists in Indonesia and to coordinate it with higher echelons of Indonesian Armed Forces command. Most of large-scale deliveries of Soviet heavy armaments to Indonesia began in 1962. The considerable part of it was arriving with the Soviet crews and personnel, who were ordered to participate in military actions against the Netherlands if needed15. I myself, being at that time an officer-interpreter in Indonesia attended the meeting of the Soviet specialists with Air Marshal K. Vershinin, Deputy Defense Minister of the USSR, who on behalf of the Minister ordered that in case of military actions we were to act as if we were defending our national frontiers. Speaking at the reception in Jakarta, Marshal Vershinin said that the Soviet people and the USSR government were prepared to offer necessary aid for liberation of West Irian16. There was quite a large number of Soviet servicemen arriving in Indonesia. Fully staffed were the submarine subdivi13

Pour J. Benny Moerdani. Profile of a Soldier Statesman. Djakarta, 1993. P. 190. 14 Pour J. Benny Moerdani. Profile of a Soldier… Pp. 172, 174. 15 «Воин России», М., 1998, № 4. С.111. 16 «Красная звезда», М., 29.06.1962.

144

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

sion (six submarines), Commander Rear-Admiral A. Rulyuk, the Tu-16 strategic bombers regiment (Colonel V. Potkin), the regiment of missile-bearing Tu-16KS (Colonel G. Korobchak) and some other units. It is interesting that on the initiative of Indonesian side it was decided that the Soviet servicemen were given identity cards of volunteers and were clothed as Indonesian Navy servicemen without insignia. The idea was to prevent possibility of the USSR being blamed for military interference in the Netherlands-Indonesia conflict17. The Indonesian leaders (as well as the Soviet officials quoted above) demonstrated the seriousness of their intentions. President Sukarno personally inspected the Tu-16KS regiment in “Iswahyudi” Air Force base near Madiun. He said to Admiral G. Chernobay who was giving explanations: “Keep these aircrafts ready. I will soon need them”. (I was present there as an interpreter). It is highly probable that both the Indonesian and Soviet leaders were expecting that at the last moment the Netherlands would step back. The American “Newsweek” weekly wrote at that time that not only the Netherlands were not willing to enter war, but the United States wanted to stop conflict between its ally and the main neutral power, especially after that conflict gave Moscow the pretext to interfere with supplying arms to Indonesia18. But the probability of military operation still existed, despite Indonesia-Netherlands negotiations which started in New York with the USA mediation. Dozens of Indonesia and USSR crewed naval ships including submarines and aircrafts moved to the initial positions to start operations on August 15. 17

Чернобай Г.К. Главный советник. «Совершенно секретно», 1995, № 11. 18 “Newsweek”, (NY), 27.08.1962. P. 32.

145

Chapter 6. From the History of Soviet-Indonesian Military-Technical Cooperation

Their task was extremely heavy, especially for crews of submarines which were not sufficiently accommodated for operations in tropical areas. Very dramatic description of the situation was given by Yuri Sholmov, who at that time was the USSR general consul in Surabaya, the main Indonesian Navy base at that time19. (The USSR General Consulate was officially established in September 1962). Order “Retreat” came to the ships and aircrafts several hours before “H” hour. On August 15 in Washington Indonesian and the Netherlands representatives signed an agreement based on the plan prepared by American diplomat Bunker. Under the agreement the Netherlands had to submit the power over West Irian to the United Nations Executive Administration in October 1962, and on May 1, 1963, the territory was to become part of the Republic of Indonesia. The Netherlands Prime Minister Jan de Quay said that his government had to give up due to war menace from Indonesia and lack of support from the allies20. The Soviet-Indonesian cooperation and interaction provided the conditions necessary for successful solution of the West Irian problem, and probably it was one of the most efficient points in the bilateral relations of the two countries. Anastas Mikoyan who in 1964 was the head of the Soviet Parliament delegation to Indonesia said in his speech at mass rally in Jakarta on June 25: “We are proud… that we supplied the perfect modern arms for Indonesian Armed Forces, and now your Army has better weapons than any other army in Asia. The quality of your arms is better than that of British colonial forces in Asia. And today not only the Soviet-madе weapons are in the service of your revolutionary armed forces, but also the Soviet officers who in fraternal manner are train19 20

Шолмов Ю.А. Россия – Индонезия … С. 212. «Newsweek”, 27.08.1962. P.33.

146

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

ing your officers and soldiers to master these modern weapons”21. At the final press conference in Jakarta A. Mikoyan said that deliveries of Soviet-made weapons to Indonesia would be continued22. The Joint Communique on the results of President Sukarno’s visit to the Soviet Union in September-October 1964 contained the agreement to raise defence ability of Indonesia by additional purchases of the equipment for Indonesian Armed Forces 23 . The cooperation was really developing. In April 1964 Indonesia received seven more military ships, including two destroyers, two mine-sweepers and a transport ship24. But some new trends were appearing. In April 1964 Foreign Minister Subandrio in his interview to the French “Le Monde” newspaper said: “We have normal relations with the Soviet Union. Probably we are too dependent on Moscow in equipping our Armed Forces. That is why we are willing to purchase arms from different countries, probably from France, too”25. The radicalization of Indonesian foreign policy also played its role, including first of all confrontation campaign against Malaysia, newly created federation born in 1963. At the first stage the stand of the Soviet government was rather close to very negative President Sukarno’s position. Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev speaking to the participants of the Third World Journalist Meeting said: “Malaysia created by the British imperialists is merely a new form of old colonial policy. British imperialists are willing to preserve their colonial domination in South-East Asia, and therefore by creating this state they just want to change the signboard, so that under this new 21

«Известия», М. 27.06.1964. «Новое время», М., № 29, 17.08.1964. С. 6. 23 «Правда», 02.10.1964. 24 “Harian Rakjat”, 18.04.1964. 25 «За рубежом», № 16, 1964. С. 26. 22

147

Chapter 6. From the History of Soviet-Indonesian Military-Technical Cooperation

signboard they could proceed with their old policy in the region. And the peoples are right in resisting it”26. But the real position of the Soviet leadership was far more restrained than it had been during West Irian crisis, considering that from the point of view of international law Indonesia’s anti-Malaysia campaign did not have real prospects. The Soviet-Indonesian military-technical cooperation was proceeding but some kind of coolness was felt (see, for example, the above quoted statement by Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio). Probably Indonesian military elite had their own interests and consideration, and in fact they were not going to carry out large-scale operation against Malaysia. The Army abandoned the confrontation as soon as the political regime in Indonesia had changed in 1966, when the Armed Forces became the main political force and did not need the confrontation anymore. Above we were considering mainly military, technical and political aspects of the Soviet-Indonesian cooperation. But the re-equipment of the Indonesian Army, Air Forces and Navy in fact was a real revolution from cultural, scientific and technical points of view. The armaments that came to Indonesia, were one or two generations more modern than those which were used by the Indonesian servicemen before. And although the Soviet side tried its best to carry out all the requests of Indonesian partners as far as the training of the personnel was concerned, the Indonesian part was bearing heavy burden. For example, only for 12 submarines at least 800 officers, non-commissioned officers and privates with sufficient background were to be selected for training. New aircrafts, ships and missiles were equipped with instruments and devices quite unknown before in Indonesia. Most of the armaments and equipment purchased by Indonesia were used in 26

«Правда», 30.10.1963.

148

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

the Soviet Armed Forces, while the supersonic MiG-21 fighters were the most modern in the USSR, and probably Indonesia was the first of foreign states that obtained it. Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel L.I. Minenko, one of the most prominent test-pilots of the USSR, was sent to Indonesia in 1962 to test these fighters after assembling. As far as I can judge being a witness and a participant of the process, the large scale training of Indonesian navy personnel and pilots both in the USSR and in Indonesia was extremely successful, considering its scale and complexity. I believe that this success is to be shared equally by trainers and trainees. For example, Indonesian submarine crews in Vladivostok training centre were given one-month lessons of the Russian language, and after that during eight months they were trained in Russian. Until now I am feeling touched remembering a middle-aged Indonesian petty-officer in Vladivostok who was examined on a radar station. He behaved as if he was working with it for several years and was giving explanations in quite sufficient Russian. Several times I have heard from the Soviet pilots and Navy officers that in all questions connected with operating ships and aircrafts Indonesian trainees showed inborn talents that enabled them to master modern devices much sooner than it was expected before. But it must be quite frankly acknowledged that the problem of technical maintenance of arms and other equipment was much more complicated. Personal abilities of trainees and trainers’ diligence were enough for using arms, but day-to-day maintenance, its organization and use, regular repairing of all kinds of devices met with many difficulties. It needed years or even centuries of traditions which could not be inherited by Indonesian Armed Forces from the colonial past. It is to be remembered also that the new equipment was used in tropical environment which is very aggressive. Just one example. In 1963 Indonesian Air Force lost one strategic missile-bearing 149

Chapter 6. From the History of Soviet-Indonesian Military-Technical Cooperation

aircraft Tu-16KS because fuel for it was kept in tanks which were not closed tightly enough. It resulted in developing of bacterium in the fuel, and during the flight this bacterium sealed the filters of the engines. Soviet pilot-instructor and one of Indonesian crew members died. The most complicated problem that the Armed Forces of Indonesia faced was to develop modern technical culture and grafting it upon the servicemen. It was a truly revolutionary task. The re-equipment and rearmament of the Indonesian Armed Forces was conducted under extremely difficult situation in the country. Although the equipment and armament were purchased from the USSR under rather soft credit conditions, home financing remained quite insignificant. Later, some discussions took place in Indonesia questioning if all these expenses could be justified. Naturally, some details might be disputed, for example if all the expenses were really needed. But now, after almost 60 years, more important is the fact that just at that time fundamental modernization of the Armed Forces of Indonesia was implemented, and the basis was laid for its further development. The exact number of the Soviet military specialists who came to Indonesia in 1958–1971 reached 2997, including 15 generals and admirals, 1224 officers, 1484 privates and noncommissioned officers and 274 civil personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces 27 . Many hundreds of Soviet servicemen also took part in training Indonesian military personnel in the USSR including in highest military academies. The author of this article in 1962–1964 as an interpreter took part in the discussions between the head of the Soviet military specialist team Vice-Admiral G. Chernobay with the highest military persons of Indonesia. With all responsibility I 27

Россия (СССР) в локальных войнах и военных конфликтах второй половины ХХ века. М., 2000. С. 521.

150

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

should say that I do not remember a single case of serious misunderstanding or difference in opinions and approaches. The Indonesian commanding officers trusted advice of the Soviet specialists. Our experts always tried to take into consideration the real resources of the Indonesian Armed Forces and Indonesian economy. They submitted their opinions and recommendations fully taking into consideration of the cultural and national character of our Indonesian partners. In this connection I remember discussions with MinisterCoordinator of Defence and Security General A.H. Nasution and his deputy Lieutenant-General R. Hidajat, MinisterCommander-in-Chief of the Navy Admiral R.E. Martadinata and his deputies Rear-Admiral Muljadi and Brigadier-General Ali Sadikin (the latter was directly managing cooperation with the Soviet Union in purchases and training of the servicemen), Minister-Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force Marshal Omar Dhani and his deputies marshals Sri Muljono and Budiardjo, Minister-Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces General Ahmad Yani and his deputies generals Mursjid and Suprapto. Later it became known that these commanding officers sometimes had different opinions on the internal problems of the Armed Forces and political developments in Indonesia. But in discussions with the Soviet representatives, the national interests, defence ability problems were the absolute priority for all of them, and we never felt any noticeable differences in their approaches to these problems. Rear-Admiral (ret.) G.B. Haritonov recalling early 1960s when, at that time a navy major, he was engaged in SovietIndonesia military-technical cooperation in Jakarta entitled his article: “The Indonesians believed us unreservedly and considered our equipment reliable”28.

28

«Военно-исторический журнал», М., № 2, 2004. С. 49–53.

151

Chapter 6. From the History of Soviet-Indonesian Military-Technical Cooperation

The mutual trust in Soviet-Indonesia relations could be seen even in the very fact that in the USSR training centers for Indonesian navy personnel were placed in Vladivostok and Sevastopol, which at that time were navy bases and even for the Soviet citizens entrance there was limited. The crews for frigates and missile and torpedo motor boats were trained on Russky island near Vladivostok, to enter which even Vladivostok residents needed special permit, because at that time it was a separate military base. In 1961–1962 I was an interpreter in Vladivostok training center for submarine crews, and from personal impressions I should note that the local residents were very friendly to Indonesian servicemen as well as to the crews of two Indonesian (Soviet made) destroyers “R.I. Siliwangi” and “R.I. Singamangaradja” that visited the city in 1961. The food in the training centers was prepared according to Indonesian traditions and religious demands. The Indonesian part was also quite hospitable to our specialists. Very interesting are the recollections of the Soviet diplomat and specialist in Indonesian studies Yuri A. Sholmov who from 1962 was the Soviet General Consul in Surabaya, and his consular district covered the regions, where most of our servicemen were staying. These were Indonesian Navy base “Ujung” in Surabaya, and Air Force “Iswahyudi” base near Madiun (East Jawa). Soviet pilot trainers were quartered in villas and cottages located in mountainous areas where the climate was much more comfortable and suitable for real rest. “As far as the Soviet servicemen in Ujung base were concerned, on their days off from work those who wanted could go to mountain health resorts. The same services were given to Soviet officers who worked in Land Force Infantry School and Marines PT-76 tank regiment. According to Yu. Sholmov, all

152

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

kinds of services including material and technical services, food, health, and recreation services were quite sufficient29. At the same time the re-equipment, especially in Air Force and Navy created several problems for the Indonesian Armed Forces commanders. Modern arms equipped with very complicated devices needed simultaneous training of thousands of officers, non-commissioned officers and privates. As was said before, it was a kind of technical revolution. It could not be painless, because the modernization was brought from abroad and was a kind of a leap. It created a huge surmountable gap between the higher commanders (from colonel and above) and middle and junior officers who were mastering modern devices and ideas. Majority of generals being relatively young, the officers under their command had almost no prospects of promotion and no hope that this problem would be settled in natural way. The generation conflict in the Air Force and Navy in the late 1950th and early 1960th led to replacement of Commanders-in-Chief. In the Navy it was the result of a demand from young officers who insisted on changing of the commanding corpse staff of the Navy30. The distance between the present time and that historic years is growing, but it just enables us to get rid of the heritage of political conjuncture. It permits us to see the real meaning of the developments or, as Indonesians call it, to give them due proportions. The developments mentioned above are interesting not only from the point of view of History. Thousands of people in our country and in Indonesia took part in military and technical cooperation between our countries at different political levels during several years. It facilitated creation of long-term mutual political trust, including trust of In-

29 30

Шолмов Ю.А. Россия – Индонезия. С. 217. Nasution A.H. Kekaryaan ABRI. Jakarta, 1971. P. 384.

153

Chapter 6. From the History of Soviet-Indonesian Military-Technical Cooperation

donesia for our country as reliable partner that did not tie up far-reaching cooperation with any political concession. This trust survived serious testing in later decades after 1965 when members of left-oriented organizations were persecuted in Indonesia. The Soviet Union and its Communist Party, ruling party at that time, could not but express solidarity with its ideological fellows. The polemics around this situation took sometimes rather sharp forms. Still the Indonesian leaders and particularly the military, who played the leading role in the “New Order”, felt that the Soviet Union was not pursuing any self-profit aims in this situation. Indonesia with its great power of self-estimate never was interested in creation of a unipolar world. The advisor of the USSR President Professor K. Brutents in summer 1991 was a member of the Soviet delegation to the ASEAN conference in Jakarta. Later he wrote that Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad and Indonesian Coordinating Minister Radius Prawiro complained to him about the USA dictate, and expressed their hope that “nothing would happen to the Soviet Union”31. Naturally, the situation in the world and in Southeast Asia in particular, changed significantly. But basic values of foreign policy both of Russia and Indonesia did not undergo significant changes, and closeness of these basic values create quite workable basis for cooperation in various spheres. Already in the late 1990s the Russian Federation government and Indonesian government under President Suharto took steps for resuming military technical cooperation. However, this positive trend was hindered by economic and financial crisis in 1997–1998. The cooperation was renewed during President Megawati Sukarnoputri presidency in 2003. 31

Брутенц К.Н. Несбывшееся. Неравнодушные заметки о перестройке. М., 2005. С. 221.

154

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

The Russian-Indonesian partnership is being put to the test under the sanctions imposed by the United States government upon Russia, including the 2018 deal on purchasing 11 Sukhoi Su-35 jet fighters. In this context quite significant were two visits to Moscow by Defence Minister of Indonesia Prabowo Subianto. At their first meeting in January 2020 Prabowo Subianto and his Russian counterpart Sergey Shoigu stated their commitment to finalizing strategic partnership agreement between the two countries in 2020. If a final deal is reached, Russia will join other major countries that have inked trade treaties with Indonesia. Minister Sergei Shoigu said: “We consider Indonesia as one of the most important partners of Russia in the Asia-Pacific region. Cooperation with Indonesia is traditionally based upon friendship and mutual trust. We note that there are prerequisites for bringing bilateral ties to the level of strategic partnership”. The second visit by Minister Prabowo Subianto to Moscow took place in June 2020 to participate in the celebration of the 75th anniversary of the victory over Nazi in 1945. Commenting upon this visit “The Jakarta Post” on July 6, 2020, pointed out that Indonesia has been trying to reduce its dependence on American arms in the quest for military modernization. Washington once instated a military embargo on Indonesia on accusation of gross human rights violations in East Timor in 1999. The newspaper went on stressing that in addition to the favorable terms and conditions Russia offered, such as flexible payment, transfers of technology and absence of political considerations, Jakarta’s choice of Moscow is a manifestation of the free and active foreign policy Indonesia has exercised throughout its 75 years of existence. These expectations coincide with ours. And the experience of seven decades of diplomatic relations between our two countries since 1950 makes good ground for these expectations.

155

Aleksandr V. Popov PhD in Economics, Senior Researcher of the Center for Southeast Asia, Australia and Oceania Studies, IOS RAS, Russia, Moscow, [email protected] Chapter 7. The Development of Russia–Indonesia Military-Technical Cooperation since the Period of the “New Order” Currently, Russian – Indonesian military-technical cooperation is quite common, but this was not the case after General Suharto came to power in 1965–1967. In the mid-sixties, almost all cooperation between the two countries in this area was curtailed. Moreover, a significant portion of Soviet weapons that were sold or donated to the Indonesian armed forces during the Sukarno era was written off due to unsatisfactory service and lack of spare parts. Since that time, the Indonesian Armed forces have used only Western-made weapons with certain exceptions, but by the early nineties Indonesia was facing difficulties in obtaining new weapons from the Western bloc that accused Indonesia of violating human rights in East Timor which was occupied by Indonesia with the approval of the United States and some other Western countries in 1975 after the Portuguese revolution. Indonesia could not even get spare parts for some Western weapons that were purchased earlier. Under these circumstances, Indonesia was forced to ask other countries to purchase new weapons. It was not so easy to resume military cooperation between our countries, because for the past 20 years the entire military structure of Indonesia had been focused on relations with Western countries. Almost all relations between our two countries in the military field

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

were interrupted. In addition, at that time the Russian Federation was generally considered a Communist country in Indonesia, and communism was banned in Indonesia. The crucial moment in resuming this cooperation was the participation of Russian companies in Indonesian Airshow 1996. It was the time when Russian companies just began to enter the international market, and it was not easy for them to take decision to participate in the Airshow, because not many people in Russia believed that Indonesia could become a buyer of Russian equipment. Nevertheless, “Rosvooruzhenie” (the previous name of “Rosoboronexport”) together with “Sukhoi company”, Gromov Flight Research Institute, Arzamas machine-building plant and some other companies took part in IAS’96 and showed the capabilities of Russian equipment and first of all of the best Russian fighter Su-27. Both the Indonesian public, military circles and President Suharto himself could see brilliant technical capabilities of the Russian aircrafts in the sky of Indonesia. But it was still not enough to resume our military cooperation, because one of the parties had to take the first step. And such a step was made by Russia when on the 26th of February 1997 the Head of “Rosvooruzhenie” Alexander Kotelkin and the Assistant of the Russian President for the militarytechnical cooperation Boris Kuzyk conveyed to President Suharto Russia's proposal to resume this cooperation. Since that moment the relations between our countries began to develop very rapidly, many Indonesian delegations visited Russia for negotiations on armament purchases. The father of modern Indonesian aviation, Minister of Research and Technology, Professor Habibie played a fairly large role in this process. And within several months our countries made a progress worth of many years, and already in early August 1997 the Indonesian government took a decision to purchase Russian fighters Su-27 and helicopters Mi-17. That decision was an157

Chapter 7. The Development of Russia–Indonesia Military-Technical Cooperation since the Period of the “New Order”

nounced on the 5th of August 1997 in Jakarta by the Minister of National Planning Ginanjar Kartasasmita, and already by the end of August both parties signed the contract on this purchase. Unfortunately, by then a terrible economic and financial crisis had begun to develop in Southeast Asia in general and in Indonesia in particular. Most probably the intensity of that crisis in Indonesia was also connected with that contract. Anyway, due to that crisis Indonesia had to postpone the purchase of Russian armaments and at the same time to give up the production of its own aircraft N-250 which was established in 1995 by the team of Professor Habibie.

Russian proposal for military-technical cooperation was handed over to President Suharto, February 26, 1997. (Source: author's archive)

After the collapse of the “New Order” regime the Indonesian economy quite rapidly recovered from the economic crisis, and both parties continued contacts on that delayed issue. In 2001 a small quantity, that is 1300 pcs of Russian legendary Kalashnikov machine-gun, were purchased for the Indonesian Police and almost simultaneously both sides reached an agreement on 12 armored personnel carriers BTR-80A which were also presented by Russia at the IAS-96. That equipment was sent to Indonesia at the end of 2002 and according to the 158

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

Head of Indonesian Navy of that time, Admiral Bernard Kent Sondakh, the price of each BTR-80A was 550 thousand USD only1. It was at the time when Megawati Sukarnoputri came to power, and she wished to raise the military-technical cooperation of the two countries to the level which had existed, when her Father was the president of Indonesia. And when in April 2003 she came to Moscow with a state visit, she arrived with a decision to buy the best Russian fighters “Sukhoi”. This mission was entrusted to her best friend of that time Rini Suwandi who was the Minister of Industry and Trade. On the Indonesian side, the government agency “Bulog” which was supposed to provide reserves of basic food products, was chosen as an operator of the contract. That choice was based on the fact that the Indonesian side would like to arrange this deal partly on a barter basis, as it was also planned in 1997. Such a combination of main players in that game caused some kind of jealousy of the Indonesian Armed Forces, though their Chief Commander General Sutarto Endriartono who accompanied Megawati during her visit to Moscow participated in some negotiations which were very difficult and continued for some days and nights. And only when Megawati left Moscow for Poland, the agreement was signed by “Bulog” and “Rosoboronexport”. According to Rini Suwandi, Indonesia had to pay only 12.5% of the whole amount of the Contract as a down payment, and the rest 87.5% should be paid gradually during 18 months by traditional Indonesian commodities mainly by palm oil2. It was quite a favorable deal for Indonesia especially under the conditions of the USA embargo for armaments sales. Nevertheless, both Megawati and Reni Suwandi were strongly criticized in Indonesia first of all for violating of the Defence 1 2

”Tempo”, Jakarta. 15.11.2002. Liputan6.com/23.04.2003

159

Chapter 7. The Development of Russia–Indonesia Military-Technical Cooperation since the Period of the “New Order”

Law which demands that such agreements are to be signed with the approval of the Parliament and the user that is the Indonesian Air Forces. And their Chief, Cheppy Hakim was quoted to declare the refusal of buying “Sukhoi” fighters which, according to him, were of bad quality. Besides, in Indonesian national budget there were not special allocations for the payment in the form of the palm oil being used in that barter scheme. The total amount of the contract was estimated as much as 193 million US dollars3, the special price for Indonesia for buying two Su-27, two Su-30 and two helicopters Mi-35. Definitely, that deal was done by guerrilla means, was not properly agreed with the Indonesian Ministry of Defense, Indonesian Air Forces, Indonesian Ministry of Finance and the Parliament, and quite often was called in Indonesia as “Sukhoigate”. In any case, already in October 2003 when Indonesia paid only around 20% of the above mentioned amount, the Russian aircrafts began to be delivered to Madiun. Indonesia got its first “Sukhoi” jets, and it was a real breakthrough in our military cooperation. Since that time, “Sukhoi” jets are regarded by Indonesian Air Forces as the core of their armaments. It was a real achievement of Megawati and Rini Suwandi, though the deal was not done in accordance with certain rules. In 2004 Megawati lost the Presidential elections. Her successor and her former minister Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono continued her policy of military-technical cooperation with Russia that did everything to help Indonesia to increase its purchases of Russian armaments by providing Indonesia with a state credit worth of 1 billion USD for these purposes. It is interesting that the negotiations on this matter from Indonesian side were started by General Secretary of MOD Sjafrie

3

Liputan6.com/23.04.2003.

160

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

Syamsudin who at the end of last year became a special assistant of the new Minister of Defence Prabowo Subianto. In practice, that credit was agreed on the 1st of December 2006 during the state visit of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to Moscow. Both parties agreed that the state credit will be used for financing of Indonesian purchases of “Sukhoi” aircrafts, military helicopters Mi-17 and Mi-35, small tanks BMP-3F, avionics and simulator for Sukhoi and diesel submarine “Kilo” class4. The conditions of Russian state credit were more favorable for Indonesia than those of export credits usually used for military purchases, but this money should not come to Indonesia and should be used inside Russia for the payment of armaments production. Unfortunately, the whole amount of the state credit was not used by Indonesian side. 219 million USD were used for purchasing of the helicopters Mi17V5, 60 million USD – for BMP-3F and 80 million USD – for avionics, simulator and spare parts5. Actually, 700 million USD were supposed for “Kilo” class submarine, but Indonesia bought submarines in South Korea and two pcs of those “Chan Bogo” class were delivered to Indonesia last year. However, the performance of these submarines made by “Dawoo” did not satisfy the Indonesian side that was quite openly declared by the MOD Prabowo Subianto6. Kerjasama Senjata Indonesia-Russia. 02.12.2006. URL: https:// www.dw.com/id/kerjasama-senjata-indonesia-rusia/a-2956696 5 Ketidakwajaran dan Kemahalan Harga serta Kejanggalan Mekanisme Pembelian Sukhoi. URL: https://antikorupsi.org/sites/ default/files/Kajian%20Kasus%20Pengadaan%20Sukhoi%20%20Imparsial%20%26%20ICW_2.pdf 6 Prabowo Disebut Kecewa Soal Kapal Selam Buatan RI, Kok Bisa? / By Anisatul Umah. CNBC Indonesia. 09 September 2020. URL: https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20200909145829-44

161

Chapter 7. The Development of Russia–Indonesia Military-Technical Cooperation since the Period of the “New Order”

During the visit of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to Moscow, an agreement was reached to provide Indonesia with a 1 billion USD loan for the purchase of Russian weapons, December 1, 2006. (Source: author's archive)

Nevertheless, in August 2007 a new contract for “Sukhoi” was signed, and during 2009 and 2010 3 Su-27SKM and 3 Su-30MK2 were received by Indonesia7. Under the state credit Indonesia bought 6 Mi-17V5 and 3 more Mi-35 P. So, by the end of 2011 Indonesia already had 10 “Sukhoi”: 2 Su-27 SK, 3 Su-27 SKM, 2 Su-30 MK, and 3 Su-30 MK2. Our cooperation in military field was not limited to the purchase of armaments only. There were also visits by Russian warships to Indonesia, and during one of them, at the end of May 2011, two ships of the Russian Pacific Fleet entered Makassar. Russian marines and their Indonesian counterparts hold joint anti-pirate exercises. Russian pilots and technicians helped their Indonesian 185565/prabowo-disebut-kecewa-soal-kapal-selam-buatan-ri-kokbisa 7 Nasional.tempo.co, 08.12.2011

162

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

colleagues to master Russian aircrafts and helicopters both in Indonesia and in Russia. Many Indonesian military specialists visited Russian plants to examine the production of military equipment for their country. In short, during the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono our military cooperation was developing quite successfully, and on the 29th of December 2011 another contract for 6 Su-30MK2 worth 470 million USD was signed, and these aircrafts were delivered to Indonesia in 2013–20148. Besides, in January 2014 37 pcs of BMP-3F were handed over to Indonesian Marines in Situbondo, East Java. Thus, by the first presidency of Joko Widodo Indonesia has already had one squadron of “Sukhoi” fighters, though not all of them were in a satisfactory technical conditions. And what happened in our cooperation since the end of 2014? During the first presidency of Joko Widodo Moscow was many times visited by MOD Ryamisard Ryacudu, the Chief of Indonesian Armed Forces Gatot Nurmantyo and many other delegations which conducted negotiations on new purchases of Russian armaments, specifically amphibian aircraft Be-200, the world’s largest helicopter Mi-26T2, some antiaircrafts systems and certainly the most modern Su-35, “Sukhoi” fighter of the new generation. On the 14th of February, 2018 the parties signed an agreement on purchases by Indonesia of 11 Sukhoi-35 for 1.15 billion USD. For half of this amount Russia must buy different commodities of traditional Indonesian export. Besides, this agreement includes so called off-set program which supposes some Russian investments in creating a service center for “Sukhoi” in Indonesia9. Two more years have already passed since the time this agreement was signed, still, we do not see any implementation of it. The real reason is Ketidakwajaran dan Kemahalan Harga serta Kejanggalan… Kemenhan RI Berkomitmen Beli 11 Unit Sukhoi Su-35 / Republika.co.id?. 27 Jul 2020. URL: https://republika.co.id/berita/ qe3jei484/kemenhan-ri-berkomitmen-beli-11-unit-sukhoi-su35 8 9

163

Chapter 6. The Development of Russia–Indonesia Military-Technical Cooperation since the Period of the “New Order”

so called American CATSA or “America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act” that was signed by President Trump in August 2017 – around half a year before our new big Contract was signed in Jakarta. Since August 2017 it was obvious that the countries buying Russian armaments would face American economic sanctions. It was understood very well by Indonesian financial authorities that cut all possible transactions from Indonesian banks to Russian companies which were already under American sanctions like “Rosoboronexport”, “Russian Helicopters” and some others what made it very difficult to carry out even small contracts signed before CATSA. So, right now the Indonesian government must make a very difficult decision on the Contract with Russia concerning possible American sanctions. First of all, the Indonesian export can be jeopardized if the USA start using import taxes for Indonesian goods, because export to the USA is much, much more important for Indonesia than that to Russia. There go just a few figures on export of main Indonesian commodities in 2019: palm oil – 658.6 million USD to the USA and 358.5 million USD to Russia, coffee – 254 million USD to the USA and 17.3 million USD to Russia, frozen shrimps – 854.4 million USD to the USA and 2.2 million USD to Russia, clothes – 4.3 billion USD to the USA and 33 million USD to Russia, footwear – 1.4 billion USD to the USA and 38 million USD to Russia, rubber crumb – 76.4 million USD to the USA and 19.1 million USD to Russia, wooden furniture – 672.4 million USD to the USA and 1.8 million USD to Russia10. If there are import taxes or additional barriers for these commodities, this export to the USA will for sure be reduced. In threatening other countries which would like to buy Russian armaments the USA demonstrate a policy of internaBuletin Statistik Perdagangan LuarNegeri. Ekspor menurut kelompok komodity dan negara. Desember 2019. Jakarta, 2020. 10

164

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

tional dictatorship trying to impose their own arms. In case of our current big contract of “Sukhoi”, the USA would like to suggest to Indonesia not the most modern fighter F-35 but an old model F-16 Viper. I should also mention that since CATSA was announced, there were some countries which continued military cooperation with Russia and ignored CATSA. First of all, Turkey, the member of NATO that bought 4 battalions of S-400 11, though there were certainly threats from America. One more regiment of S-400 was received in December 2019 by China12. India also continues to buy the same armaments. In early 2019 Vietnam received 64 T-90S tanks13 and since the middle of 2018 Iraq has been receiving BMP-3 with total number of it by 2022 being 500 pcs14. Another point which in my opinion should be taken into consideration by the Indonesian government is the American embargo on selling armaments which was already applied to Indonesia in the 1990th. If and only if the president of Indonesia makes a decision on “Sukhoi” purchase, the crucial point for both parties will be how to arrange payments in order to avoid obstacles of western banks. In this case, first of all we can return to barter scheme which was used in the first contract. Certain trade companies would get the payment to the Russian seller in the В НАТО завелся предатель – Турция / Любовь Степушова. Pravda.ru. 09.11.2019. URL: https://www.pravda.ru/world/ 1348461-turkey/ 12 Источник: Россия завершила поставку второго полкового комплекта С-400 в Китай /ТАСС. 27.01.2020. URL: https://tass.ru/ mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/7611269 13 СМИ: Вьетнам получил вторую партию российских танков Т90 /ТАСС. 22.02.2019. URL: https://tass.ru/ekonomika/6149005 14 БМП-3 для Ирака получили дополнительную защиту /Военное обозрение. 21.11.2018. URL: https://topwar.ru/150110bmp-3-dlja-iraka-poluchili-dopolnitelnuju-zaschitu.html; Ирак и Саудовская Аравия хотят купить почти 1,5 тысячи БМП-3 /ТАСС. 30.09.2015. URL: https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/2302766 11

165

Chapter 7. The Development of Russia–Indonesia Military-Technical Cooperation since the Period of the “New Order”

form of Indonesian commodities for selling them both in Russian and international market. But we can also return to universal means of payment, that is Gold. And in this case, we will need no banks, no hard currency. The Buyer, let us say a MOD, would buy Gold from “Antam” by Rupiah, the Gold would be taken to Russia by Russian military aircraft and placed in the Central Bank that would pay in rubles to the Seller for the production of “Sukhoi” or some other military equipment. So, if America does not want its dollars to be used as means of payment, we can avoid them. *** We believe that our governments will find a solution suitable for both sides, and in this case, we very much look forward to the role of the new Indonesian Defence Minister Prabovo Subianto who recently visited Russia and held relevant negotiations with the Russian authorities. But looking into the future, we must consider a more stable cooperation based on a joint production of military equipment and transfer of technology. In this case, Russian armaments produced in a joint plant on the territory of Indonesia will be regarded as a national product of Indonesia and automatically will have a priority if there are purchases for the National Army and Police.

Defense Minister of Indonesia Prabowo Subianto visited Moscow and held talks with his Russian counterpart Sergei Shoigu. January 28, 2020. (Source: author's archive)

Alina V. Vladimirova Researcher, Center for Southeast Asia, Australia, and Oceania Studies, IOS RAS, Russia, Moscow, [email protected]

Chapter 8. Stable and Sustainable: Patterns of Foreign Trade Between Russia and Indonesia Introduction In 2020, we celebrate the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Russia and the Republic of Indonesia, and it is a right moment to look back at a long way behind us. As discussed in this book, there were multiple challenges to overcome, and assessing both accomplishments and failures, especially considering the turbulent times experienced by both countries, is a complicated task. Nevertheless, a proper analysis of foreign policy is the key to the successful development of bilateral relations. Thus, in this chapter we discuss the progress of international trade between Russia and Indonesia, which is an extremely important topic in our modern highly interconnected world. We believe that an exploration of international trade between these two states is extremely interesting due to the

Chapter 8. Stable and Sustainable: Patterns of Foreign Trade Between Russia and Indonesia

many contradictions that exist. Leading Russian scholars1 insist that policy makers overestimate the success of Russia in building relations with all countries of Southeast Asia; diplomats2 mostly express the opinion that bilateral trade is satisfactory but needs improvement; and some specialists3 argue that economic cooperation deepens steadily and has positive dynamics, although they suggest that a 10-times increase in trade volume in less than 10 years still does not match the true capacity . Note that these publications have similarities: the whole expert community agrees that “Indonesia is a special partner of Russia in the Pacific Asia” 4 and it is crucial to maintain a “close friendship” 5 between two countries and pass acceptable practices of foreign policy to future generations6. Thus, it is crucial for us to introduce new approaches to foreign trade Рогожин А.А., Рогожина Н.Г. Юго-Восточная Азия в приоритетах российской политики «поворота к Азии» // Контуры глобальных трансформаций: политика, экономика, право. 2019. Т. 12. № 1. С. 186. 2 Посол РФ в Джакарте: «Моя задача – укреплять связи России и Индонезии» // ИА REGNUM. URL: https://regnum.ru/news/ polit/2722318.html. 3 Сабон В.Л. Торгово-экономическое сотрудничество между Россией и Индонезией // Горный информационно-аналитический бюллетень (научно-технический журнал). 2013. № 1. С. 406. 4 M. Fradkov: «Indonesia is a Special Partner of Russia in the Pacific Asia» // MGIMO University. 2020. URL: https://english.mgimo. ru/news/M-Fradkov 5 Pinandita A. Snapshots: Indonesia, Russia Exhibit 70 Years of Friendship // The Jakarta Post. 2020. URL: https://www.thejakarta post.com/news/2020/02/05/snapshots-indonesia-russia-exhibit-70years-of-friendship.html 6 Milenial Jembatani Hubungan Indonesia – Rusia// Republika Online. 2020. URL: https://republika.co.id/share/qfnuqm479 1

168

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

analysis to enrich our knowledge about relations between Russia and Indonesia within complex global systems and strengthen our ability to effectively monitor trends of cooperation. We propose that exploration of trade patterns is a valuable addition to the traditional toolbox employed by experts in their case studies and we show how this type of analysis allows us to argue that relations between Russia and Indonesia are not only stable but also sustainable. Traditional Approaches to Studies of Trade Relations Between Russia and Indonesia Asian studies in Russia have a long history and strong traditions supported by leading universities, such as the Moscow State University (MSU) and famous think tanks, such as the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IOS RAS). A range of prominent scholars in this developed expert community have devoted their research on Southeast Asian countries, among which Indonesia has significance. According to numerous publications on different aspects related to historical, political, economic and cultural development of Indonesia, we can conclude that the uniqueness of this country has importance for these scholars. This scientific tradition to pay high attention to the specifics and contexts allows Russian experts to conduct amazing case studies with qualitative methods, which demonstrate deep knowledge of the issue in question. However, similar to any methodology, this approach has limitations. It seems reasonable to introduce new tools of data analysis that could enrich our understanding of trade relations between Russia and Indonesia.

169

Chapter 8. Stable and Sustainable: Patterns of Foreign Trade Between Russia and Indonesia

A foreign trade analysis common to publications by Russian scholars is usually based on export and import statistics, which include the total volume of trade and indicators for approximately 90 categories of goods. The evidence to support argumentation in these case studies is often presented as tables and separate records on bilateral flows. In the first steps of our research, we will follow this tradition and then we are going to depart to patterns of trade.

Fig. 1. Flows of Foreign Trade: Russia and Southeast Asian countries.

First, we can use a chord diagram (also known as a radial network diagram) to display all flows of commodities between Russia and Southeast Asian states as it could be more effective in our analysis than tables with data on bilateral relationships (Fig. 1). Here, each country is represented by a fragment along the circumference of the circle, and its size depends on a share of the total volume of trade among all these nodes. The Bézier curves show the bilateral relationships, and the thickness of a particular arc is proportional to the value of the flow measured in USD. Russia and Indonesia, which are the focus of this paper, are highlighted in black. These plots indicate that even though countries of Southeast Asia have 170

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

taken a more active role in the international trade system, shares of Russia and Indonesia have not decreased but have increased in the past 15 years. We cannot observe the same trend for Malaysia and the Philippines, whose shares diminished as shares of Thailand and Vietnam increased.

Fig. 2. Structure of Export: Russia to Southeast Asian countries.

These trends are interesting and give a better understanding of economic relationships dynamics. However, the direct comparison of export and import flows should be performed with caution while considering the specifics of international trade data. We note the asymmetry of mirror statistics, which comprised an infamous data quality problem in recent decades and could introduce serious constrains for an expert who is studying international trade networks7. Scholars in Russia8 Владимирова А.В. Влияние асимметрии зеркальной статистики на результаты сетевого анализа внешней торговли стран Юго-

7

171

Chapter 8. Stable and Sustainable: Patterns of Foreign Trade Between Russia and Indonesia

express concerns that imports from Indonesia are increasing at a faster rate than exports and provide statistics by the Federal Customs Service of Russia, which show a significant divide. For example, Russia’s exports to Indonesia in 2015 consisted of 439.1 million USD, and Russia’s imports from Indonesia in 2015 were 1522.5 million USD 9. According to reports provided to the United Nations (UN) by Indonesia, in 2015, its exports to Russia was just 1 million USD larger than its imports, which valued 992.6 million USD. There are multiple sources of asymmetry that cause a vast difference in numbers, which represents the same flows of goods10. Thus, it is reasonable to conduct a more complex analysis to assess the success of trade relationship developments. Modern datasets provide an opportunity to explore more specific patterns of international trade on a few levels.

Восточной Азии // Юго-Восточная Азия: Актуальные проблемы развития. 2019. Т. II. № 3 (44). С. 57–70. 8 Научная конференция “Юго-Восточная Азия и Южнотихоокеанский регион: актуальные проблемы развития” // YouTube. Ekaterina Astafyeva. 2020. URL: https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=_LHjinfDP4U 9 Russian Trade with Indonesia in 2015 // Russian Foreign Trade. 2016. URL: https://en.russian-trade.com/reports-and-reviews/201605/russian-trade-with-indonesia-in-2015/ 10 Владимирова А.В. Аналитический обзор основных факторов, влияющих на рост асимметрии показателей экспорта и импорта стран Юго-Восточной Азии // Юго-Восточная Азия: Актуальные проблемы развития. 2020. Т. 1. № 1 (46). С. 45–68.

172

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

Fig. 3. Structure of Export: Russia to Southeast Asian countries.

Russian experts traditionally use two or three of these levels; the total volume of exports and imports and the values for 21 sections, which can be split into 99 subgroups of goods that correspond to the two-digit level of the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS). This practice is reasonable as this system is maintained by the World Customs Organization (WCO) and utilised by more than 200 countries for the collection of international trade statistics11. The UN also uses it in a famous “Comtrade UN” dataset12, which is one of the most popular sources in the field of foreign trade analysis. As the UN puts a substantial amount of effort What is the Harmonized System (HS)? // World Customs Organization. 2020. URL: http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/nomencla ture/overview/what-is-the-harmonized-system.aspx 12 Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE) // United Nations Statistics Division. URL: https://comtrade.un.org/ 11

173

Chapter 8. Stable and Sustainable: Patterns of Foreign Trade Between Russia and Indonesia

in developing these data, including the official API13, we can easily access statistics for 99 HS chapters (HS 2-digit), which are further subdivided into 1 244 headings (HS 4-digit) and 5 224 subheadings (HS 6-digit). Thus, using modern approaches to data analysis and visualisation, we are able to explore complex systems of international trade with a high level of detailing.

Fig. 4. Structure of Import: Russia from Southeast Asian countries.

Patterns of International Trade Between Russia and Indonesia To describe patterns of trade between Russia and Indonesia, it is reasonable to start by exploring the changes in the structures of exports and imports. Figure 2 shows three levels of data aggregation according to the HS displayed side by side. The black cells represent categories of goods that Russia API Portal [Electronic resource] // UN Comtrade: International Trade Statistics. URL: https://comtrade.un.org/data/dev/portal/

13

174

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

exported to Indonesia, while the yellow cells represent trade with other Southeast Asian countries. Flows of commodities that were not presented in 1995 are marked in white. We used the same type of visualisation for 2015 foreign trade data; it is obvious that exports have become more diversified during these 20 years. This type of plot allows us to demonstrate that Russian experts appropriately claimed that import flows from Indonesia were developed in a more efficient way during this period. We note the evidence that confirms this conclusion on all three levels (Fig. 4 and Fig. 5). While the number of export categories with HS 6-digit codes has risen by 1.6 (from 164 to 258), imports increased 3.8 times (from 231 to 873). However, note that the average volume of export flows in 2015 is 2 times larger than that of import flows and data on commodities from Indonesia are characterised by a high positive skewness (26.1).

Fig. 5. Structure of Import: Russia from Southeast Asian countries.

175

Chapter 8. Stable and Sustainable: Patterns of Foreign Trade Between Russia and Indonesia

It could be useful to illustrate this trend of flows diversification just for Russia and Indonesia (Fig. 6). As a large number of codes are presented, the hierarchical structure of the HS categories resemble circles, and only at the HS 2-digit level can we easily distinguish flows of different goods. Nevertheless, these plots give a clear depiction of the changes happened in 20 years.

Fig. 6. Structure of Foreign Trade: Russia and Indonesia.

To display the hierarchical structure of trade data, we can also construct a treemap, which is a common visualisation for this type of analysis. A treemap is considered an effective tool for communicating information on shares, as each group of goods is represented by a rectangular area of different sizes 176

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

that is divided into smaller rectangles to show the subcategories. We have included data on HS 2-digit and HS 4-digit levels to illustrate the changes in the structure of exports (Fig. 7) and imports (Fig. 8). For instance, the most popular categories of exports in 1995 were iron and steel (72), aluminium (76), and cotton (52), while those in 2015 were fertilisers (31), aircraft (88), and mineral fuels (27).

Fig. 7. Structure of Export: Russia to Indonesia

By using these plots, we can obtain a better understanding of the high positive skewness of the data on imports. It is also evident that there was no principal change in the approaches to trade of Russia, while the patterns for Indonesia have transformed significantly. In 2015, we observe one large category, which includes animal or vegetable fats and oils (15) and numerous flows with much smaller shares.

177

Chapter 8. Stable and Sustainable: Patterns of Foreign Trade Between Russia and Indonesia

Fig. 8. Structure of Import: Russia from Indonesia

Fig. 9. Export of Russia to Indonesia: Commodities with Largest Shares in 1995 and 2015.

178

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

While the treemaps reveal that the goods with the largest shares were not the same during these 20 years, it has not demonstrated the dynamics. Thus, we suggest constructing a parallel coordinates plot to trace the changes in the ranks for the five top categories in 1995 and 2015 (Fig. 9). Obviously, export flows of cotton (52) have completely disappeared, but interestingly, new categories, such as aircraft (88) and cereals (10), held the leading positions in the bilateral trade structure immediately after their appearance in 2003.

Fig. 10. Export Flows of Russia to Indonesia: Changes in Size

To complete the description of trade patterns between Russia and Indonesia, we would like to present changes in the volumes of specific export categories (Fig. 10). Note that flows 179

Chapter 8. Stable and Sustainable: Patterns of Foreign Trade Between Russia and Indonesia

can decrease to a large extent at some moment, but they are persistent and can be expanded when appropriate. For instance, this situation has happened with mineral fuels (27). Discussion Our analysis of Russian and Indonesian trade relations confirms that the expert community has captured the general trends related to export and import flow dynamics. It is notable that the patterns shown on our plots do not contradict support the evidence from previous case studies and different approaches to analysis can be considered as first steps to triangulation of the results. However, the inclusion of lower levels of data aggregation allows us to conduct more positive assessments of the cooperation between Russia and Indonesia. Our first argument is that the volume of bilateral trade is increasing despite the negative influence of numerous factors, as discussed by scholars14; for instance, a physical distance, different consumption cultures, a lack of supplyproduction chains and underdeveloped logistics. Even more crucial, relations between Russia and Indonesia remain stable when external shocks of a diverse nature worsen these conditions. Although we have yet to assess the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, however, we have already seen how Indonesia continuously demonstrates a firm commitment to cooperate with Russia despite the high pressure of the United States15. Thus, experts in Russia have their reasons to give Indonesia a special place among our partners. Kanaev E., Simbolon L., Shaternikov P. Russia-Indonesia Relationship: Assessing Shortcomings and Framing a Response // ЮгоВосточная Азия: актуальные проблемы развития. 2019. Т. 2. № 4 (45). С. 99. 15 Indonesian Officials Report U.S. Pressure to Cancel Acquisition of Russian Su-35 Air Superiority Fighters; Attempts to Derail Jakarta’s Growing Cooperation with Moscow // Military Watch Magazine. 14

180

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

Based on these facts, we cannot agree with the conclusion that a more effective diversification of imports is a disappointing trend as it influences the stability of trade relations in a positive way. This trend can also offer other benefits for both states. For Indonesia, it is obviously an opportunity to support a further rise of the national economy. For Russia, a successful development of Indonesia means an increase in possible spheres of cooperation. Moreover, becoming an important market for Indonesia can be a source of power sought by Russian political leaders16. In the modern interconnected world, we can easily observe how countries can accumulate a ‘’power of importer’ and take advantage of a better position in the international trade network. The question on approaches to the efficient development of strategic ties is becoming even more crucial in the sustainable development age. The ideas of unconstrained globalisation and strong connections between all states of the world’s economic system appear unsuitable to the current agenda set by the global community. To make international trade sustainable, we have to avoid unnecessary relations and forcing flows of goods, which can be purchased with lower costs from other countries. We believe that modern tools of analysis can provide policy makers with sufficient information on how to maintain a balance between the sustainability of international trade networks and their resilience, which is an inevitable part of national security. 2018. URL: https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/indonesianofficials-report-u-s-pressure-to-cancel-acquisition-of-russian-su-35air-superiority-fighters-attempts-to-derail-jakarta-s-growingcooperation-with-moscow 16 Gurganus J., Rumer E. Russia’s Global Ambitions in Perspective // Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2019. URL: https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/02/20/russia-s-globalambitions-in-perspective-pub-78067

181

Chapter 8. Stable and Sustainable: Patterns of Foreign Trade Between Russia and Indonesia

Thus, considering the transformations of global systems and new strategies to build a better future for next generations, we can give additional positive feedback on the development of trade relations between Russia and Indonesia; they are sustainable. On the presented plots, we observe that unnecessary export flows easily decrease and vanish, while among categories with the largest shares appear unique products worth to be delivered on long distances. Note that both the ambassador of Russia to Indonesia Lyudmila G. Vorobyova and the ambassador of Indonesia to Russia Mohamad Wahid Supriyadi, who completed his mission in 2020, have demonstrated an understanding of their partners’ demands; they could even change the priority order of flows to increase when they were promoting bilateral cooperation on domestic mass media17 and foreign mass media18. Thus, it is pivotal to maintain the current approaches to building relations and avoid forcing flows that are motivated by numbers without a context. It is a correct observation19 that volumes of trade and investment flows between Southeast Asian countries and China are substantially larger; but this case is not suitable for a comparison with Russia due to multiple reasons, such as the size of economy and a geographic lo-

Supriyadi M.W. Merayakan 70 tahun Hubungan Diplomatik Indonesia-Rusia // detikNews. 2020. URL: https://news.detik.com/ kolom/d-4884052/merayakan-70-tahun-hubungan-diplomatikindonesia-rusia 18 Антонова Д. Новая правда об отношении Индонезии к России // ИА REGNUM. 2020. URL: https://regnum.ru/news/polit/ 2856143.html 19 Кобелев Е.В. Диалоговое партнерство «Россия-АСЕАН»: состояние, проблемы, перспективы развития // Пути укрепления безопасности и сотрудничества в Восточной Азии / под ред. В.М. Мазырина. М.: ИДВ РАН, 2014. С. 93. 17

182

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

cation. Thus, we completely agree with statements20 that we need to deepen the cooperation between Russia and Indonesia whenever the sphere is in focus; socio-cultural, politics, security, economy, investments, or trade. We are sure that the expert community can support it by providing comprehensive foreign trade analysis; this type of study is required among policy makers21. Conclusion Thus, by exploring patterns of foreign trade between Russia and Indonesia, we can conclude that the expert community has reasons to make positive assessments on bilateral trade as these relations appear stable and sustainable. In reaction to the challenges that arise due to external shocks, such as sanctions or pandemia, export and import flows tend to decrease significantly, but they are still persistent. It means it is relatively easy to enlarge volumes of trade when the influence of negative factors reduces. The flows of goods are becoming diversified at all levels, which is crucial for the stability of trade relations. Another characteristic that is important to highlight is that Russia and Indonesia do not force trade in goods that can be delivered with less cost from other countries. Russian and Indonesian diplomats understand the demands of their partner, which gives us hope for the further sustainable development of these trade relations.

20 Praditya I.I. Indonesia-Rusia Perkuat Kerja Sama Bilateral Ekonomi // Liputan6. 2019. URL: https://www.liputan6.com/bisnis/ read/4000914/indonesia-rusia-perkuat-kerja-sama-bilateralekonomi 21 Индонезия намерена расширить экспорт индонезийской продукции в РФ // ИА REGNUM. 2020. URL: https://regnum.ru/ news/polit/2830819.html

183

Nikita S. Kuklin assistant at the Department of Theory and History of International Relations, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, RUDN University, Russia, Moscow Alfachreza Azure 2nd year master's student at the Department of Theory and History of International Relations, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, RUDN University, Russia, Moscow

Chapter 9. Enhancing Indonesia-Russia Social

and Humanitarian Cooperation: New Opportunities for Strategic Partnership Introduction

Indonesia and Russia are united by the long experience of cooperation in the field of humanitarian diplomacy, one of the most successful periods in bilateral relations falls on the Sukarno era when the Soviet Union provided direct humanitarian and military support to the young Indonesian state, as well as provided loans and specialists to implement Sukarno's ambitious plans to create a new nation, as evidenced by the Gelora Bung Karno Stadium, an exact copy of the Luzhniki stadium and numerous statues of Soviet monumentalism style in the streets of Jakarta. Soviet experts have also designed factories and power plants. Soviet architects and engineers have built hospitals and other important constructions. According to the interview by the Russian Foreign Minister S. Lavrov in observance of the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two countries: after

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

Indonesia declared its independence in 1945, the former Soviet Union offered all-round support and assistance to the young state. “Thanks to our country’s efforts, the United Nations recognized Indonesia’s sovereignty over most of the territories of the Dutch East Indies on December 27, 1949. On January 25 and February 3, 1950, the Foreign Ministers exchanged telegrams on the establishment of diplomatic relations,” – Lavrov recalled1. All this shows the high role of social and humanitarian support in the framework of relations between the Soviet Union and Indonesia. According to the modern theories on humanitarian cooperation, such important criteria as direct humanitarian aid, display of power in support of an ally through actions of the Soviet Navy, specialists training and exchange of experience, as well as contacts in the field of education and political support within the framework of international organizations played a great role at that time. To list all this, such cooperation can be called a full-fledged social and humanitarian interaction. It is at Gadjah Mada University, where the creation of Peoples’ Friendship University, the main Soviet educational center for foreign countries was first announced in 1960 during Nikita Khrushchev’s visit to Indonesia. President Sukarno visited the USSR four times under the Khrushchev era, and delivered a speech at the Luzhniki Stadium, he also held a meeting that time with Moscow State University students and, according to eyewitnesses, called all those present “brothers”. In those years, the Soviet Union provided Indonesia not only with dry cargo ships and tankers, but also with military equipment.

Russia, Indonesia to raise relations to level of strategic partnership – Lavrov. URL: https://tass.com/politics/1115513 1

185

Chapter 9. Enhancing Indonesia-Russia Social and Humanitarian Cooperation: New Opportunities for Strategic Partnership

Thus, one can observe special attention to Indonesia on the USSR part and the willingness of the Soviet leadership to support the young country as part of the commitment to protect governments that had freed themselves from colonial dependence and the intervention by the Western bloc during the Cold War. On the other hand, Sukarno's rapprochement with the communists within the framework of the NASAKOM doctrine and the subsequent communist coup in 1965 reflected poorly on the image of the USSR because of the direct connection of the Soviet Union to the crisis and the later Sukarno initiatives and acronyms that took deep roots in people's minds. It is reasonable to assume that during the Suharto period, the turn to the Western countries and the United States, with the purpose to bolster the economy, strongly affected bilateral relations, and humanitarian cooperation no longer developed2. The Soviet Union also consistently condemned the anticommunist repression of the “New Order period”. Internal anticommunist sentiments in Indonesia and the influence of Western countries, including Western mass culture, filled many social spheres of Soviet-Indonesian relations, such as culture, education and scientific cooperation, with stereotypes, many of which are still alive in the minds of the elites and ordinary people. Sometimes the old stereotypes are identified with contemporary Russia. A breakthrough in relations between the two countries was marked by the visit of Indonesian President Suharto to Moscow on September 7–12, 1989, and a statement on the foundations of friendship and cooperation between Indonesia and the Soviet Union. Čufrin, G.I. ASEAN-Russia relations. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 2006. P. 31.

2

186

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

In 2003, several years after Indonesia overcame the consequences of the “Reformasi period”, the President of Indonesia, Megawati Sukarnoputri, paid an official visit to Russia intending to sign the Declaration on the Foundations of Friendly and Partnership Relations in the 21st Century. This important document also included a serious emphasis on humanitarian cooperation, in particular, paragraph 5 of this Declaration states: The parties agreed “to promote the exchange of delegations between public organizations, various contacts at the regional level, between twin cities and capitals, as well as between citizens of both states”. Paragraph 7 of the document is equally important, because it referred to the desire “to take further steps in the development of cultural, educational, youth and sports exchange, to strive to expand and enrich cultural and scientific cooperation between the two states.”3. This key event contributed to further advancement of relations towards precisely active social and humanitarian interaction during the presidential terms of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and the current President Joko Widodo. A challenging problem that arises in this domain is an information vacuum as a consequence of a thirty-year break in active contacts. A solution to this problem is proposed in the development of humanitarian and social cooperation as a focal area, which should become the basis to connect other areas into a single communication mechanism in order to avoid deepening communication problems and, most importantly, the formation of misperception and misunderstanding. To form social and humanitarian interaction that meets the challenges of the time, it is necessary to think not only Declaration on the Foundations of Friendly and Partner Relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Indonesia in the 21st Century. URL: http://kremlin.ru/supplement/3789

3

187

Chapter 9. Enhancing Indonesia-Russia Social and Humanitarian Cooperation: New Opportunities for Strategic Partnership

about the political direction of such cooperation, but also to act within a common field of values and points of contact of a deep structural nature, based on a joint response to a common worldview, perception of the system of international relations and understanding of the international relations system and understanding of major events surrounding it. Methodology First, even though we are considering the state policy of both countries in the humanitarian cooperation area, we should put aside the usual understanding of this phenomenon within the framework of a realistic or liberal paradigm. Humanitarian policy and academic debates have tended to treat such Non-Western states as Indonesia as “new” or “developing” in this field, and have made unfavorable comparisons with the “Major power states” that engage in humanitarian policy, considering the partner as a catch-up country needing help from a developed one. For contemporary Indonesia, self-identification with a global power, which is gaining more and more influence in the world, is an important issue of the internal self-awareness of the nation, thus the realistic paradigm, whether it is presented in practical action or theory, will not be useful as a scientific justification and consolidation for some inequality. Realist approaches also focus on the concept of competition between states, and the rational pursuit of national interests to ensure their survival and power4. In analyzing the role of these “rising global actors”, it is important to argue different frames of reference. Liberalists use the framing of international cooperation and ethics to

Korab-Karpowicz, W. J. On the history of political philosophy: Great political thinkers from Thucydides to Locke. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. 2017. P. 85. 4

188

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

argue that conflict is not inevitable, but something that can be mitigated through social relationships. This is built on the idea of an international community that pursues democracy, human rights, and free trade, whether through informal or formal collective and multilateral structures such as the UN. Despite this, the liberal approach does not suit us either, since Indonesia has its understanding of democracy based rather on the principles of social justice and community, which is enshrined in its Pancasila ideology than on the free market or liberal approach. The Russian understanding of democracy also differs in scope, and Russia also does not accept the idea of Western liberal democracy as a concept for the world order. Thus, the value component of social and humanitarian relations between Russia and Indonesia will be directly dependent on what values the political elites and societies share and how they look at the world and the system of international relations. In this regard, the constructivist theory will help us to build a panoramic view of such cooperation and determine ideational and value points. This assumption is supported by the fact that Indonesia and Russia are unique cultures and moreover – civilizations formed in special historical circumstances. Another important area of the methodological search is the very definition of humanitarian cooperation, since this term is mainly used in the Russian and post-Soviet paradigm as a universal definition for a wide range of cooperation in areas that do not directly relate to classical areas such as economics, military cooperation, and political relations. Thus, humanitarian cooperation is close to the term public diplomacy or, in the Western sense, to the notion of soft power. According to Russian expert Anna Velikaya “Both Russia and Post-Soviet countries have a unique approach 189

Chapter 9. Enhancing Indonesia-Russia Social and Humanitarian Cooperation: New Opportunities for Strategic Partnership

towards humanitarian cooperation: it is seen as being broader than international development cooperation and international aid or even broader than public diplomacy. Meanwhile it is necessary to empathize that humanitarian cooperation has nothing in common with the Western doctrines of humanitarian interventionism and the responsibility-to-protect (R2P)....”5. With regard to Indonesia, the experience of developing humanitarian practice cooperation and its understanding in relations with Russia is close to the Russian understanding, as evidenced not only by the above-mentioned Declaration of 2003, but also by the general today practice. Indonesians are also involved in humanitarian cooperation and development assistance projects with Western countries and therefore the Western style of humanitarian relations, which is more considered under the definition of direct aid and development promotion. The closest and most successful example of humanitarian ties system creation is a cooperation with China. In case of China humanitarian contacts were intended to establish strong friendly ties between the peoples of Russia and China, which find expression in the most significant spheres of public life both for ordinary people and the elite including popular culture, sports, education, science, health care, tourism, youth policy, in the field of mass communications6. For Indonesia, such a format is equally suitable. We also need to take into account that Russia could Velikaya A.A. The Russian Approach to Public Diplomacy and Humanitarian Cooperation //Public Diplomacy of Rising and Regional Powers. No 3(3), 2018. Pp. 39–61. 6 Положевич Р.С. Гуманитарное сотрудничество Российской Федерации с Китайской Народной Республикой на современном этапе // Государственное управление. Электронный вестник. № (63), 2017. С. 147–170. 5

190

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

act as an important partner for Indonesia precisely in terms of solving security and infrastructure problems, developing defense potential and even such common topics for the two countries as establishing interfaith dialogue. Thus, the main point for our analysis is the understanding of social and humanitarian cooperation not as political aid or soft power, but as an interaction, existing primarily at the interstate level, with the involvement of a wide range of social groups, representatives of civil society at the socio-economic, socio-political sphere and socio-cultural levels. The issue is analyzed from different points of view such as contemporary cultural and identity measurement theories by Hofstede7 or Hopf, as well as political analysis based on general constructivist assumptions concerning the identity and the problem of its display in empirical research and actionoriented recommendations. Current state of affairs: what has already been achieved The three levels of interaction Considering the question of what has already been done, we can turn to the direct practice of implementing such cooperation. According to the former Ambassador of Indonesia to Russia Mr. Mohammad Wahid Supriyadi: “The positions of Indonesia and Russia coincide on many issues of the international and regional agenda, including global challenges. Our countries have a rich potential for cooperation in various fields, such as: economy, trade, investment, energy, tourism, science and technology, education, social sphere and

Erdman, K.M. An analysis of Geert Hofstede's Culture's consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutes, and organizations across nations. London: Macat International. 2017.

7

191

Chapter 9. Enhancing Indonesia-Russia Social and Humanitarian Cooperation: New Opportunities for Strategic Partnership

culture, security and military-technical industry”8. Most of the areas listed here are directly or indirectly related to humanitarian cooperation. Starting with the detailed overview of such cooperation areas, we should identify five key spheres, namely development promotion, scientific cooperation, educational ties, cultural events, and religious issues. This suggests that we divide the humanitarian cooperation into three levels (see table 1). The first one is the level of diplomacy and official contacts, which encompasses the intergovernmental level and the semi-public sector represented by corporations and enterprises with public participation. In the practice of domestic and foreign policy of Indonesia and Russia, it is these corporations that are involved in the implementation of infrastructure projects and industrial development initiatives. The second is an expert level that concerns both training and the useful experience and information exchange in the framework of scientific and technical cooperation or culturaleducational ties in the scholar and teacher’s framework (e.g. Indonesianist scholars). The third level is social interaction, understood not only as networking between non-governmental public organizations, friendship associations, but also as the general state of knowledge about the country, about life, culture, customs, or traditions. This level is extremely important because, firstly, it is often overlooked by researchers or decision makers, and secondly, it is the most difficult to work with, since it is the Индонезия и Россия отмечают 70-летие установления дипотношений (Indonesia and Russia celebrate the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations) / REGNUM. URL: https:// regnum.ru/news/polit/2847655.html 8

192

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

activity of the third level that is achieved by involving a large number of people in relations between two countries. In this case we are talking about warm relations and a positive perception of each other between two social structures. Diplomatic level

Expert level

Diplomacy, business, development promotion, official intergovernmental interaction, the aim is to launch and control major projects

Education, science, technology, training opportunities. The aim is to create the network and exchange between professionals, including country studies experts

Ordinary people level People at this level initially perceive the other nations via stereotypes and empirical unprofessional experience. The aim – is to form a good image through culture and media

Table 1. Three levels of Indonesia-Russia humanitarian cooperation

Starting from the first level, we need to address the understanding and the motivations of governments and the goals they set. One of the key tasks of the first and current presidency of Joko Widodo has always been to solve infrastructure problems and encourage foreign investment to support economy and modernization, which is impossible without a strong technological base that ensures development of the country9. An important role in promoting development and scientific and technical cooperation is played by the RussianIndonesian Joint Commission on Trade, Economic and Jokowi and Prabowo clash over infrastructure in final debate. URL: https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Indonesia-election/Jokowi-andPrabowo-clash-over-infrastructure-in-final-debate

9

193

Chapter 9. Enhancing Indonesia-Russia Social and Humanitarian Cooperation: New Opportunities for Strategic Partnership

Technical Cooperation, created in 2002, the Joint Commission, which includes eight working groups, coordinates joint collaborative efforts. Russian companies such as Russian Railways and Rosneft are involved in major infrastructure projects in Indonesia. There are excellent opportunities for expanding cooperation in high-tech areas10. The intensification of contacts has reached an especially high level in February 2020, the anniversary month for bilateral relations. For example, on February 5, the third meeting of the Working Group on cooperation in the field of energy was organized within the framework of the Russian-Indonesian joint commission on trade, economic and technical cooperation. During the event, the parties discussed the current state of Russian-Indonesian cooperation in the field of energy, prospects for further expanding cooperation in the oil and gas and electric power fields and exchanged views on promising cooperation projects11. Nuclear cooperation plays an equally important role in the development of the energy potential of Indonesia both at the level of corporations and government institutions. In early February, experts from the Rosatom Technical Academy conducted a training course on the application of Russian computation codes for safety analysis of low-power nuclear power plants at the Nuclear Technology Polytechnic Russia and Indonesia: 70 Years of Valuable Cooperation / Kompas. URL: https://kompas.id/baca/english/2020/02/03/russia-andindonesia-70-years-of-valuable-cooperation/ 11 В Джакарте состоялось заседание Рабочей группы по сотрудничеству в области энергетики в рамках РоссийскоИндонезийской МПК (Jakarta hosted a meeting of the Working Group on energy within the framework of the Russian-Indonesian IGC). URL: https://minenergo.gov.ru/node/16955 10

194

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

Institute (STTN) under the National Atomic Energy Agency of the Republic of Indonesia (BATAN)12. Two years earlier, on May 17, 2018, a delegation of the Committee on National Economy and Industry of the Republic of Indonesia visited the Novovoronezh nuclear power plant as part of an official trip to the Russian Federation13. In this case, we observe that the key model in RussianIndonesian relations in the field of development assistance or economic aspects of humanitarian cooperation is the model of covering large flagship corporations with national diplomacy support. The great contribution is also made by business-oriented public organizations interested in boosting bilateral ties, such as Business Russia which is an All-Russian Public Organization that unites more than 5,000 entrepreneurs mainly from medium non-resource business. Founded in 2001, the organization today has 85 regional offices across the country14. A special place in this process is occupied by the

12 Эксперты Технической академии Росатома прочитали учебный курс в Институте ядерных технологий (Индонезия) (Rosatom Technical Academy Experts delivered a training course at the Institute of Nuclear Technologies (Indonesia)). URL: https://www.rosatom.ru/journalist/news/eksperty-tekhnicheskoyakademii-rosatoma-prochitali-uchebnyy-kurs-v-institute-yadernykhtekhnologiy-/ 13 Нововоронежскую АЭС посетила делегация Комитета по национальной экономике и промышленности Индонезии (Indonesian National Economy and Industry Committee delegation visited Novovoronezh NPP). URL: https://rosatom.ru/journalist/ news/novovoronezhskuyu-aes-posetila-delegatsiya-komiteta-ponatsionalnoy-ekonomike-i-promyshlennosti-indo/ 14 В «Деловой России» прошел бизнес-завтрак с послом Индонезии Вахидом Суприяди 16 июля 2019. URL: https://deloros.ru/vdelovoj-rossii-proshel-biznes-zavtrak-s-poslom-indonezi14. The no

195

Chapter 9. Enhancing Indonesia-Russia Social and Humanitarian Cooperation: New Opportunities for Strategic Partnership

equally well-known Indonesian-Russian Business Council15. The Business Council for Cooperation with Indonesia was established under the auspices of the Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce & Industry on the 10th of November 2009. The Council is incorporated and operated as a standalone non-commercial and non-governmental organization (non-commercial partnership) based on asset/capital contributions by the members for the primary purpose of developing B2B ties and boosting trade and economic relationships between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Indonesia16. The Council is chaired by Vladimir Strzhalkovsky, CEO and Chairman of the Management Board MMC Norilsk Nickel, formerly a head of the Russian Federal Agency for Tourism, yet co-chairman of the Russian-Indonesian Joint Commission for Trade-Economic and Technical Cooperation and Mikhail Kouritsyn – famous Russian Indonesianist, diplomat, chairman and CEO of Geo Spectrum Ltd. as the Executive Director of the Council. Incidentally Mr. Kouritsyn also fills the position of ExecDir in the Russia-Indonesia Cooperation and Friendship Society. This direction can be assessed as quite developed and a priority based on the tasks that the Indonesian and Russian governments set before the diplomatic action. It should also be borne in mind that the economic model of Indonesia puts the social dimension at the forefront, as it is prescribed by Pancasila. Indonesian Islamic banking is also known for its social orientation, which is a unique model for Asia, and therefore the involvement of companies and the

less famous Indonesia-Russia Business Council occupies a special place in the process i-vahidom-supriyadi.html 15 В «Деловой России» прошел бизнес-завтрак… 16 Indonesia-Russia Business Council. URL: http://bcri.ru/en/ indonesian_russian_cooperation

196

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

banking sector in social development projects can have a good effect on the viability of such projects. The next level is an expert level, which includes the activity of specialists in the field of education and culture. Russian-Indonesian cooperation in the field of education is developing actively and dynamically at the present stage. It covers not only scientific and educational spheres, but even extends to professional training programs. Student exchange programs, government scholarships, cooperation between educational institutions, as well as advanced training of employees in the teaching field have been implemented during the last decade of bilateral cooperation. Turning back to the article by Larisa Efimova we may have called attention to the fact that in 2005 Universitas Indonesia signed a cooperation agreement with Moscow and St. Petersburg State Universities, as well as with the Institute of Asian and African Studies at Moscow State University. The ties between Indonesian universities and St. Petersburg State University, one of the leading Russian centers for Indonesian Studies, have contributed to the training of many specialists in the field of the Indonesian language, culture, and politics. RUDN University has remained an important center of attraction for Indonesian students since its opening, and the university itself traditionally hosts the biggest Indonesian students fellowship in Russia, famous for taking an active part in all university events. In 2019 RUDN University signed a Memorandum of Cooperation in the field of science and education with 23 private universities in Indonesia, marking the new era of educational cooperation17.

http://eng.rudn.ru/media/news/international-cooperation/ rudn-university-signs-a-memorandum-of-cooperation-in-the-fieldof-science-and-education-with-23-private-universities-in-indonesia/ 17

197

Chapter 9. Enhancing Indonesia-Russia Social and Humanitarian Cooperation: New Opportunities for Strategic Partnership

It is also worth paying attention to the exchange of knowledge in the religious theological field and religionoriented education. As an example, we would like to refer to the series of agreements between Islamic State University (UIN) Yogyakarta and Islamic University of Moscow and Russian Islamic University of Kazan in 2009 and the Center for the Study of Islam of the North Caucasus (Makhachkala). Scholarships of the Russian government remain the leading issue of educational cooperation. In the 2010–2011 academic year, the Russian government allocated 35 scholarships for the study of Indonesian citizens in Russian universities, then in the next academic year their number increased to 45. In 2012–2013, 50 government scholarships were awarded. For comparison, in 2018 this figure was 161 quotas18. For its part, the Indonesian government and the Ministry of Education and Culture have been regularly providing scholarships to Russian students since 2004 as part of the Darmasiswa program to study Indonesian language and culture. In the framework of the program students get the opportunity to study at prestigious universities in Indonesia on a budgetary basis. Every year about 15-20 Russian students take part in this program with a study period of 6 to 12 months19. It is also worth noting that a large number of Russians annually take part in the Bali Democracy Forum – a meeting held in Bali, and attended by representatives from nations in the Asia Pacific region. The forum was initiated by Indonesia 18 Треть индонезийцев, желающих учиться в России, хотят поступать в ТГУ (A third of Indonesians wishing to study in Russia have chosen the TSU). URL: http://viu.tsu.ru/news/4702/ 19 Darmasiswa Indonesian Scholarship Program 2020/2021. URL: https://kemlu.go.id/washington/en/news/4032/darmasiswaindonesian-scholarship-program-20202021

198

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

in 2008 with the stated aim of fostering democracy, human rights, equality, and mutual respect20. As a result, the visits of delegations and the agreements of cooperation between higher educational institutions have increased significantly in recent years. The positive tendency is that the number of scholarships is expanding more and more. According to the World Grad School Tour Applicant Survey – 2016, the main factors in deciding to study in a particular country for Indonesians are scholarship and financial support (62%), international recognition of qualifications (61%), cultural diversity (56%), improvement language competences (51%). The choice in favor of this or that university is significantly influenced by the reputation of the educational organization (42%), the cost of education (42%), the prospects of employment and career growth (22%)21. Taking into account these indicators, we conclude that a large number of factors depend directly on official diplomatic efforts and decisions, which nevertheless require the involvement of civil society. On the Russian side, the Embassy and the Russian Center for Science and Culture in Jakarta are actively operating in Indonesia. The cooperation in the field of expert interaction is built classically relying on education, culture or civil society interaction. For example, exhibitions of Russian education or participation of Russian universities in a nationwide educational exhibition are organized annually. One of the authors took part in one of these in 201822. The The Bali Democracy Forum (BDF). URL: https://bdf.kemlu.go.id/ Экспорт образования: индонезийские перспективы (Indonesia perspectives for Russian education export) URL: https://akvobr.ru/ eksport_obrazovaniya_indoneziiskie_perspektivy.html 22 Семинар и выставка о российском образовании в Российском центре науки и культуры в Джакарте (Russian Center for Science and Culture in Jakarta hosted a seminar and exhibition on Russian 20 21

199

Chapter 9. Enhancing Indonesia-Russia Social and Humanitarian Cooperation: New Opportunities for Strategic Partnership

center also holds meetings with schoolchildren and participates in expert university meetings23. Thus, while this variety of activities look standard, it seems to be sufficient for a good foundation. The youth potential According to the authors, the main driving force to attract Indonesians to Russian education are the Indonesians themselves. This statement does not diminish the merits of official representations such as the Embassy or the Center of science and culture, since the activity in this direction is professionally organized, however, experts rarely pay attention to factors such as the role of civil society and the youth in education policies24. A great role is played by the youth community as a civil society engine for bilateral contacts. Young Indonesians actively conduct webinars and online meetings devoted to various issues of importance to young people, from “how to enter the prestigious university” and “learn a foreign language” to discussing scientific theories or just everyday topics. The pandemic and the need to apply the distant means of communication has led to the emergence of Indonesian online networking (or rather to its evolution), since Indonesians have been conducting webinars and livestreams for a long time before the pandemic. Such events are usually held in three main formats: Education at the). URL: https://idn.rs.gov.ru/ru/news/35960? category_id=4 23 Russian Day at the University of Bakrie. URL: https://idn.rs.gov. ru/ru/news/13158?category_id=9 24 Allen, M., & Ainley, P. Lost Generation? New strategies for youth and education. London: Continuum International Publishing Group. 2010. P. 55.

200

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

1) Senior speaker (official, businessman or expert) shares his experience with the younger generation. 2) Successful compatriot tells others about useful life hacks, the difficulties of studying or working abroad, ways of learning languages and other useful things, acting as an expert on the topic. 3) A youth organization gathers to discuss issues, where everyone shares their experience and opinions (sometimes with the participation of well-known speakers in a conference format). The phenomenon affects all layers of Indonesian society from secular youth organizations and associations to the youth branches of religious organizations, especially the Muhammadiya and Nahdlatul Ulama. Such meetings are not limited by Indonesian diaspora in Russia or European countries, but are spreading worldwide throughout the Indonesian global youth community since the young people are the engine for Indonesia development. Thus, at the output we have a whole network of information and experience exchange, which is built mostly through the efforts of civil society and the personal initiative of talented citizens who gain access to a network of connections for the fastest and most effective solution of life's problems, including education or career choice. Official actors are also involved in building such connections: government agencies and educational institutions also conduct “livestreaming events”, conferences, forums, or expert seminars. All this is not new for the Indonesian sociocultural field, as much as collectivism is one of the social foundations of Nusantara societies, and the tradition of uniting in organizations and building ramified social ties can be traced in Indonesia since ancient times.

201

Chapter 9. Enhancing Indonesia-Russia Social and Humanitarian Cooperation: New Opportunities for Strategic Partnership

To illustrate this, we turn to the Indonesian Student Association or PERMIRA, which was created to facilitate and bring all students in the Russian Federation closer together. This student Association was created in October 1998 in Moscow and this Association domiciled in Moscow. PERMIRA works as an Association that has experienced countless obstacles to lead the idea of implementing PERMIRA and create a representative office for every city in Russia where there are two or more Indonesian students. It took 6 years for PERMIRA to spread it wings to several cities in the Russian Federation. According to the 6th Congress of PERMIRA on May 16, 2004, the following structures were created for 2 cities: Central PERMIRA, PERMIRA Moscow branch and PERMIRA Saint Petersburg branch. The PERMIRA primary goal as an association is to facilitate a platform for Indonesian students to work together and brainstorming the idea for the development of home country, and PERMIRA as an association is affiliated with the PPI Dunia which is a more global initiative with similar goals. The affiliation of PERMIRA with other Associations throughout the world is to find the common interest to fulfill the national interests of Indonesia from youth perspective and individual approaches. The PERMIRA Moscow branch initially had 24 student members spread across multiple universities in Moscow including RUDN, MADI, MGIMO, FARGUFK, SCOLIPE University, Sechenov University, FA, MUT and Bauman University. This branch can provide high number of human resources due to the accessibility of Indonesian students to study here in the Russian Federation mostly focused on Moscow and Saint Petersburg. It finally reached a point where PERMIRA can work together indirectly with the government of Indonesia’s representative “Kedutaan Besar Republik

202

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

Indonesia” by holding PERMIRA Congress on August 14, 2008. The PERMIRA Congressional Meeting in 2008 involved the Deputy Ambassador of the Republic Indonesia to Russia as an advisor, the Officer for the Indonesian Socio-Cultural Education function as the education coach, and Indonesia Defense Attaché as a security coach, and the number of branchers were formed and endorsed by the commissariat. The PERMIRA Congressional Meeting discussed various aspects and was attended by 34 students studying in the Russian Federation. This Congressional Meeting has a purpose to spread the wings of PERMIRA in the Russian Federation by creating another PERMIRA branches in the big cities throughout the Russian Federation. PERMIRA was very successful in several events, such as “Wonderful Indonesia” or “Taste of Indonesia” – a Journey to the Archipelago’s Beauty through Cuisine, Culture and Art Performances. This event supported by the Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia to the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Tourism of the Republic of Indonesia was a great success. This event conducted in Kazan Federal University at Philology Campus was attended by the members of the Tatarstan House of Representatives and Deputy Minister of Culture of Tatarstan, and more than 400 students and local communities actively participated in that event. This is one of the PERMIRA work programs to contribute to the Indonesia and Russia relations through the perspective of youth and students with the cultural diplomacy activation. This is initiated because the majority of Indonesian students in the Russian Federation come from numerous provinces and ethnic groups in Indonesia and they can bring and spread their own culture to the Russian Federation at all levels, university level or regional level (festival of Indonesia in Moscow).

203

Chapter 9. Enhancing Indonesia-Russia Social and Humanitarian Cooperation: New Opportunities for Strategic Partnership

So, these events were organized after learning about Russian people's enthusiasm for Indonesian culture, cuisine, and performing arts. They worked together with the spirit of PERMIRA to spread Indonesian influence in culture in the wider community to compete with other countries and their soft power initiatives such as China, Vietnam, India, and others. PERMIRA created think tank under the education division in the period of 2008–2019. This think tank aimed at bridging all branches of PERMIRA through their own Strategic Analysis and Central PERMIRA in order to collect data on certain topics where it can be discussed with several invited think tanks, academicians and the Embassy representatives. The initiative to create a think tank to promote all branches is to focus on the development of Indonesia 4.0, which can also be implemented in the coming years. In this way, this Association can collect all data from all sectors of PERMIRA in the direction of urban development, whether the development of the Russian Federation focuses only on megacities or covers all cities, and how Russia can achieve this. Hence, several circumstances postponed the agenda of PERMIRA to instigate the internal think tank of PERMIRA. This initiative was initiated by one of the authors as Indonesian student of RUDN, when he reflects the idea of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia taking as an example the Analyses and Policy Development Agency as an internal think tank under the administration of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as a formal institution of foreign affairs. Ministry of Foreign Affairs is divided into 2 main divisions where one relates to support units involved in every day foreign policy issues, and the other is the Analysis and Policy Development Agency as an internal think tank of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia (personal 204

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

communication with the head P3K2 Aspasaf (head of the Center for policy analysis and development in the Asia-Pacific and African region). The initiative then continued, and in the next period in 2019–2020, PERMIRA created a think tank in its Education Department to facilitate PERMIRA's intention to spread its influence widely. PERMIRA invited several prospective experts from different background. Fortunately, the event was called by PERMIRA to solve the problem of "increasing the potential of soft power in cultural diplomacy between Indonesia and Russia”. The event was attended by a representative of the analytical group established by PERMIRA, as well as the Deputy Head of the Mission, Head of the Office – Charge d'Affaires of the Republic of Indonesia in the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus, Mr. Azis Nurvahyudi. The initiative proposed by the think tank team can come to a final conclusion when a representatives of the think tank and PERMIRA are invited to the Embassy and the Embassy has proposed the idea of creating a new Association to build bridges between the two peoples of Indonesia and Russia. Indonesia-Russia Youth Association hereinafter referred as IRYA had a unique background in forming and transforming it into Association. The initiative to create this Association came from the idea of Indonesian expert who had been studying in Master ’s and PhD degrees here in Russia by the invitation from PERMIRA (Indonesian Student Association in the Russia Federation). PERMIRA chose the eligible experts and invited them to a group to discuss necessary actions that Indonesian students can take to bring the two nations – Indonesian and Russian – together. Hence, after many arguments the relevant experts in PERMIRA think tank decided to propose the agreement between Indonesia and Russia to create the new institution which will unite Russian 205

Chapter 9. Enhancing Indonesia-Russia Social and Humanitarian Cooperation: New Opportunities for Strategic Partnership

students who have interest in Indonesia and studying Indonesia at the university. The idea is obviously complicated to implement due to the fact that the students here do not have any power to do so. That is why PERMIRA instigated a conference where the speakers invited were the Deputy Chief of the Mission Mr. Azis Nurwahyudi and Indonesian students who have just graduated from Moscow universities and are really interested in Russian culture and linguistic studies. Afterwards, the invited group discussed the possibility to create the new association to bridge the two nations, especially to develop youth leaders and activate youth relations between Indonesia and Russia in order to increase mutual understanding and human potential in the new era. Where it is not only about assessing what we can have in the near future concerning these relations between the two countries, but also about highlighting the necessary recommendations, such as agreements between universities in Indonesia and Russia, the creation of an exchange program, or the creation of double degree agreements between Indonesian and Russian universities. This is a common goal of youth leaders to increase the number of visits to both countries not only through the tourism sector, but also through educational and professional visits. The mission of this Association is actually to make solid action in the networking process here in Russia with Russian experts and there in Indonesia with Indonesian experts, building true communication between young professionals in addressing the relationship between Indonesia and Russia. To create a new engagement process where it can create a new platform for both young professionals from Indonesia and Russia, and vice-versa, to expand knowledge about the good relations between the two countries.

206

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

The idea of creating this Association was supported by the Deputy Ambassador Mr. Azis Nurwahyudi in relation to the commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the diplomatic relations between the Republic of Indonesia and the Russian Federation in the hope to unite Indonesian and Russian youth to share cultural and professional experiences, ideas, and establishing lasting friendly relations through the expansion of new types of sills and exchange of professional ethics between the two countries. The Association also has core values, where the key concern is to respect the culture and historical background of relations between the two countries, discuss diplomacy, meet with experts, and act as an expert itself. This Association also aims at finding potential through innovation and sustainability, respect and collaboration among young people, as well as creating passion and creativity and providing a platform for their professional implementation. This, in turn, marks an extremely important area of cooperation, the basis of which can be the involvement of Russia in such youth initiatives. The authors of this paper have repeatedly taken part in similar events, when Indonesian youth from schoolchildren to applicants were interested in education and living in Russia. Many of these events were carried out with the support of the Indonesian Embassy in Moscow, and Indonesian youth organizations were also involved in this process. Thus, the task that comes both from the structure of achievements in the field of education and the unique environment of the youth, is first of all, to boost horizontal communication within the expert level and the establishment of as many connections between the young people as possible through formal educational mechanisms and informal networks of interaction and experience exchange.

207

Chapter 9. Enhancing Indonesia-Russia Social and Humanitarian Cooperation: New Opportunities for Strategic Partnership

As for the third level of interaction, which includes a network of contacts at the level of ordinary people, we are talking about such widely accessible areas as tourism and cultural events where an average citizen takes part. In our opinion, the success of work in this area can be considered the case when even the simplest layman, who does not have expert knowledge, begins to understand life in another country without the influence of stereotypes25. Tourism is one of the most attractive areas for foreign states in the development of bilateral relations. Currently, tourism plays an important role not only for the domestic economy of the country, but also for strengthening the bond between the two actors in international relations. With the help of tourism, Indonesia is aiming at the creation of its image and gradually entering the global level 26. Given the great competition in tourism in the world, the Indonesian government put a big effort into promoting this direction27. Indonesia's Ministry of Tourism is actively engaged in tourism activities domestically as well as abroad. Under the slogan “Wonderful Indonesia” the country is planning to attract more and more tourists through international exhibitions and worldwide promotion28. Fields, C. Stereotypes and stereotyping: Misperceptions, perspectives and role of social media. Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science. 2016. P. 99. 26 Nafisah Ratanti Wulandari. Projected and Perceived Images of Indonesia’s Tourism Campaign ‘Wonderful Indonesia’. URL: https:// www.academia.edu/9402874/Projected_and_Perceived_Images_of_ Indonesias_Tourism_Campaign_Wonderful_Indonesia 27 Santoso, Y., Shaumi, F., Ninta Toreh, E. (2019). Indonesia’s path toward middlepowership. Surabaya: Pusat Penerbitan dan Percetakan Universitas Airlangga. 28 Wonderful Indonesia. URL: https://www.indonesia.travel/gb/ en/home 25

208

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

The Embassy of Indonesia in Moscow is actively involved in creating a positive image of Indonesian tourism in Russia as well as on a global scale. The development of bilateral relations in the field of tourism shows a positive trend, as a result of which a Memorandum of Understanding between the Federal Agency for Tourism (the Russian Federation) and the Ministry of Culture and Tourism of the Republic of Indonesia on Cooperation in the Field of Tourism from June 10, 2015 was concluded. A visa-free regime introduced in Indonesia with respect to citizens of the Russian Federation – holders of civil passports who enter this country for up to 30 days for tourist purposes represented another important step forward in the area. Every year more and more Russians are interested in opening Indonesia and watching the diverse world of Indonesian nature and culture. In 2019 tourist flow from Russia to Indonesia reached a historical maximum - over 12 months the country was visited by 158.94 thousand Russians, which is 26.4% more than a year earlier. Thus, in terms of the growth rate of tourist flow to Indonesia, Russia again took first place among European states and third place among all world countries. As noted by VITO Russia, Indonesia planned to receive 160 thousand Russian tourists last year and almost achieved this rate, thanks to direct flights from Moscow to Denpasar, which were launched in October 201829. The bilateral ties in the field of culture are also actively developing in the format of exhibitions and festivals. The main event in the Russian-Indonesian cultural cooperation was the

Турпоток из России в Индонезию вырос более чем на четверть в 2019 году. URL: https://tourism.interfax.ru/ru/ news/articles/67166/ 29

209

Chapter 9. Enhancing Indonesia-Russia Social and Humanitarian Cooperation: New Opportunities for Strategic Partnership

opening in 2016 of the Indonesian festival in Moscow, which has been taking place for more than 4 years. From 1 till 4 August 2019, Moscow hosted two key events in the sphere of Russian-Indonesian relations: The Business Forum and the Festival of Indonesia, initiated by the Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia in the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Tourism of the Republic of Indonesia and the Moscow Government30. More than 100 thousand citizens have had the opportunity to learn more about Indonesia. From the Russian side a Russian cartoon “Masha and the Bear” has successfully entered the Indonesian cartoonindustry. It gradually attracts many people and encourages them to learn Russian, since this cartoon has now captured a large part of the entertainment market. Produced by Moscowbased Animaccord Animation Studio, “Masha and The Bear” follows the lives of energetic, little girl Masha and her friend Bear. The popularity of the cartoon is proved by the fact that Masha and The Bear Ice live performance based on Russian animation series “Masha and The Bear”, was a major success during Indonesia Convention Exhibition (ICE) BSD in Tangerang31. Thus, we see active interaction at the third level with the involvement of the first two levels, as cultural events so often accompany business and diplomatic projects. On the one hand, this allows to successfully combine levels of implementation of humanitarian cooperation, on the other, it significantly diminishes the importance of the third level, which often seems to be a fun for ordinary people while Фестиваль Индонезии в Москве принял более 100 тыс. гостей. URL: https://www.trn-news.ru/news/93817 31 ‘Masha and The Bear on Ice’ to be held in August. URL: https://www.thejakartapost.com/life/2018/07/23/masha-and-thebear-on-ice-to-be-held-in-august.html 30

210

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

“serious bosses” are solving issues, which possibly leads to the formalization of the cultural diplomacy perception as a set of optional practices. The sphere of mass media remains a significant issue in this area, since one of the main obstacles to understanding between peoples is a set of stereotypes that are hard to break without the active work of the media and civil society. Indonesian researchers Chandra Purnama, Sasti Khoirunnisa, Anggia Utami Dewi and Dina Yulianti from Padjadjaran University in their article pay attention to the problem that Indonesia is referred to as a country with the highest negative perception of Russia in the Southeast Asia region. According to them, an important message that Russia wants to convey through its public diplomacy goes as following: Russia is not an aggressive country, as it is often portrayed by Western media, on the contrary – Russia wants to achieve mutually beneficial cooperation of all countries and supports a strive for a more just world order32. Their article focuses on the most famous Russian media in Indonesia – “Russia Beyond Indonesia”, the media that works professionally in the Indonesian language and reaches an Indonesian audience. It should be noted that the headings of information on the website of this media resource coincide with the directions and levels that we noted above, which are Techno Science, Discover Russia, Travel, Russian cuisine, History, Study in Russia, and Economy33. At the same time, Russia has only one project of this level, and despite its “exoticism” in the information field, it acts rather as a kind of “a door to Russia” and not as a fullfledged media that is constantly watched and listened to by Purnama, C., Khoirunnisa, S., Utami Dewi, A., & Yulianti, D. Russia Beyond Indonesia: Image Transforming Effort Through Public Diplomacy // Global Strategis, 14(1), 2016. Pp. 109–124. 33 Russia Beyond Indonesia. URL: https://id.rbth.com/ 32

211

Chapter 9. Enhancing Indonesia-Russia Social and Humanitarian Cooperation: New Opportunities for Strategic Partnership

Indonesians, such as the BBC or the CNN or other western media. The Indonesian media is not even represented in Russia, which leads us to a situation where the main information about bilateral relations comes precisely from the statements by the authorities and have a formal basis within the first and second levels, which we have identified. Moreover, these official levels are far from common people and not perceived properly, which maintains the status quo in the perception gap and subsequent stereotype problems. Among the stereotypes popular in Indonesia, we can single out typical Suharto Era stereotypes about communism, the Russian mafia, dictatorship, and the idea of Russians as an atheist’s nation among Indonesian religious communities. Indonesia is often perceived by Russians as a distant exotic country, living off tourism and not having a strong economy (which contradicts reality). Many Russian tourists, visiting Bali and other places in Indonesia, often do not seek contact with the local population and knowledge of culture, which allows them to have only a superficial perception of the country34. Such stereotypes can be overcome only through the active connection of the third level to the expert and diplomatic-business levels within a single space of information, which will allow nations to get to know each other better35. Thus, we see that in terms of the efforts of the two governments, relations are developing steadily and from the moment of the resumption of contacts under Megawati Dahles, H. Tourism, heritage and national culture in Java: Dilemmas of a local community. London: Routledge. 2015. 35 Fullerton, J. A., & Kendrick, A. Shaping international public opinion: A model for nation branding and public diplomacy. New York: Peter Lang. 2017. 34

212

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

Sukarnoputri and until the present presidency of Joko Widodo, more and more events, agreements and projects appear, all of which cannot be described even in a whole book. However, the formal diplomatic level does not have a stable connection with the expert level, including with young experts and especially with the level of ordinary people who are still poorly informed. With this in mind, we can look at what can be done to enhance the interaction between all three levels. What can be done to further improve social and humanitarian cooperation? First of all, defining the directions of development of humanitarian and social interaction, we presume that the existing communication between the three levels, which we consider here, is represented by the fact that the first level in the framework of large projects defines the strategy of cooperation, the second level facilitates and mediates the whole process through expert assessment, analysis, training of specialists, whose experience and involvement in projects will accelerate their implementation and expansion. The third level in this situation, which directly represents the society, will allow attracting a wide range of its active members to the popularization of relations, including bloggers, not only of a tourist orientation, but also expert popular science bloggers whose ideas are designed specifically for the common level individuals interested in getting additional knowledge36. The main point here is the circulation of information, respectively, the expansion of the common information environment. Sevin, E. Public Diplomacy and the Implementation of Foreign Policy in the US, Sweden and Turkey. Cham: Springer International Publishing. 2018.

36

213

Chapter 9. Enhancing Indonesia-Russia Social and Humanitarian Cooperation: New Opportunities for Strategic Partnership

The example of China and Russia is indicative here, since the countries organized not only the presence of the media, but contributed to the emergence of the whole information space independent from the official line, in which hundreds of blogs, channels or popular networks tell Russians about China and vice versa. Social networks are extremely popular in Indonesian society and as it was mentioned earlier, Indonesians tend to organize broadcasts and webinars. Indonesia was ranked 8th in the world in terms of the number of hours its citizens spend on the Internet, according to the Digital 2020 report from WeAreSocial, which conducts detailed analyzes of Internet use around the world every year. The World Wide Web has become an integral part of Indonesian life, and the digital economy has long been one of the goals of government and civil society37. Thus, Indonesia is actively developing the Internet, its accessibility and reliability, following the example of its neighbors Malaysia and Singapore. The digital environment has already covered more than 67% of the population, who cannot imagine their life without useful applications and communication in social networks. The Internet is becoming available to everyone, both in cities and in rural areas. The number of users is growing among both women and men. The government sees the Internet to overcome infrastructure and education problems. Regarding this, it is proposed, first of all, to increase the number of official mass media working in the country, which in their activity will be primarily represented on the Internet and social networks through notable projects38. Popular WeAreSocial. Digital 2020 reports. URL: https://wearesocial.com/ blog/2020/01/digital-2020-3-8-billion-people-use-social-media 38 Gao, J., Ingram, C., Kee, P. Global media and public diplomacy in Sino-Western relations. London; New York: Routledge. 2017. P. 43. 37

214

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

bloggers, especially from the expert community, should also back this activity from the part of civil society to cover many aspects in social network areas from culture to politics, science, art, and education. An important role is played by entertainment networks such as Tik-tok and Instagram, through which Russians and Indonesians can show their talents and become popular. Thus, many Indonesians love it when foreigners speak Indonesian, recite poetry, or sing songs, which often gets a lot of views. For example, the videos by Gamelan Dadali Moscow – the first Russian Javanese embassy-based gamelan group collect millions of views and hundreds of comments on YouTube39. Perhaps such simple activities may seem insignificant, but in the era of the Internet, the popularity and success of any people can easily increase due to trending. The main reason for improving such a system of information exchange is that governments and official media delegate most of the information field to independent nongovernment actors, setting trends for them at the same time. After the establishment of such a system of information interaction, it is possible to transfer humanitarian cooperation into the plane of social and humanitarian cooperation at all levels. For example, large projects at the level of governments and public corporations may be aimed primarily at solving social gaps and improving the quality of life. The sphere of space seems to be especially relevant. Indonesian telecommunication companies, the army and meteorological services are interested in the active development of the national satellite network40. Gamelan Dadali Moscow. URL: http://gamelandadali.tilda.ws/ Nair, K.K. Space: The frontiers of modern defence. New Delhi: Knowledge World in association with Centre for Air Power Studies. 2006. 39 40

215

Chapter 9. Enhancing Indonesia-Russia Social and Humanitarian Cooperation: New Opportunities for Strategic Partnership

In 2013 Indonesia passed a Law on Space Activities (Undang-undang No. 21/2013 Tentang Keantariksaan), under which, according to the regulations and Pancasila ideology, satellites are used in the country to solve its main social tasks: to support the national telecommunications system, the Internet and mobile communications, as well as to monitor emergencies, seismic activity and natural disasters41. Russia, as one of the leaders, is certainly capable of expanding space cooperation with Indonesia, which will have to be done in conditions of intense competition with such giants as Space X or NASA. In the context of a global pandemic, health cooperation is becoming another equally important area of humanitarian cooperation42. Earlier, Russia has officially made an offer to the Indonesian government on the use and further development of the “Sputnik V” coronavirus vaccine, which is currently in phase III of clinical trials43. At the beginning of the pandemic, Indonesia and Russia agreed on cooperation in this area and exchange of experience44. Accordingly, such projects using high technologies to improve social welfare and development will certainly find a

Current Progress on Space Science and Technology Development in Indonesia. URL: http://www.unesco.or.id/publication/ SC_Retreat/04_LAPAN-UNESCO-CurrentProgress_SpaceScience_ Technology.pdf 42 Zakaria, F. Ten lessons for a post-pandemic world. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company. 2020. 43 Russia offers Indonesia access to Sputnik V vaccine for COVID-19. URL: https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/10/16/russiaoffers-indonesia-access-to-sputnik-v-vaccine-for-covid-19.html 44 Индонезия и Россия намерены налаживать сотрудничество в борьбе с пандемией. URL: https://regnum.ru/news/polit/ 2975430.html 41

216

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

response and attract other levels to be included in solving problems their societies are facing. Regarding the second level, which is associated with the training of experts and their interaction, it is necessary to expand educational interaction to the school level, within the framework of the concept of lifelong learning, since there is an opportunity to create specialized classes for future specialists in Southeast Asia and Indonesia. Children of Indonesian citizens staying in Russia, could study together with Russian schoolchildren in such classes. Regarding the university level, it is considered necessary to move from a model, when the state is looking for partners for universities in its country to a model of independent search and independent initiative from universities45, which will significantly speed up the processes and remove the mediation factor in such interaction. Indonesianist can significantly facilitate the process of negotiation due to the high context of the Indonesian business culture and few experiences of interaction among Russian education professionals. As for the third level, the increase in activity among ordinary citizens directly depends on the creation of more independent actors on each side. Anything from popular science bloggers, artists, and writers to travel agents and nonprofit organizations or charity funds should be included to forge a broad network of interaction. We emphasize the independence of actors, referring to the fact that, despite the broad opportunities, government organizations can conduct a limited number of actions and events. Considering the American model as a unique example in this area, we can observe that the US State Department and Embassies carry out only formal work, and American values Jean-François, E., Avoseh, M. B., & Griswold, W. Perspectives in transnational higher education. Rotterdam: Sense. 2016. P. 26. 45

217

Chapter 9. Enhancing Indonesia-Russia Social and Humanitarian Cooperation: New Opportunities for Strategic Partnership

and the image of the United States are formed by thousands of companies, businessmen, universities, colleges, foundations, organizations, social movements acting on their initiative, which greatly enhances the potential for the development of positive relations between the United States and various countries46. As an example, here we can cite the work of the Russian initiative group Dari Jiwa, which helps poor Balinese families with food, medicine, and other assistance. The project involves both Russian expats and the Balinese themselves47. Conclusion The authors would like to conclude that social and humanitarian cooperation is considered as the critical foreign policy area. After analyzing the numerous achievements of Russian-Indonesian humanitarian cooperation, we subdivided it into three levels, in the aspect that we designated the first level as the official one, including the government, diplomats and big business, the second level we identified as an expert one, which includes experts with specialized knowledge and the education system that shapes these professionals and enables them to interact. We have also identified the third level as a common-man level, who lacks knowledge about a foreign country and receives it from cultural and media agenda. We have also set out that the media cannot be fully determined within the third level, as they touch on the second and are supported by the first level48. 46 Rugh, W.A. Front line public diplomacy: How US embassies communicate with foreign publics. Baskingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 2016. P. 25. 47 Dari Jiwa. URL: https://darijiwa.org/ru 48 Pamment, J. New public diplomacy in the 21st century: A comparative study of policy and practice. London: Routledge Taylor & Francis. 2014.

218

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

As a result, we can add that cooperation at the first level is highly developed and will continue to develop, however the second and third levels require an increase in number of actors and activity, despite the results of ongoing efforts. We also observe here a gap in the basic communications between state institutions and non-state actors. Thus, an increase in the number of independent actors that could help governments at the second and third levels will make it possible to establish a so-called symphony of interaction between all designated levels and automatically involve the new participants. In addition, we also believe that the information field and the media should be differentiated further, as a separate transmitter of basic information and a tool for overcoming stereotypes, that will ensure Indonesian-Russian relations to acquire a social dimension and the identity framework as a solid base for mutual cooperation.

219

Conclusion This book is timed to coincide with a significant date the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union / Russia and the Republic of Indonesia which were officially established on February 3, 1950. The Soviet Union began to support the young Republic of Indonesia from the very first day, when Sukarno, on August 17, 1945 declared the country's independence. The USSR demanded the suppression of the aggression against Indonesia by Holland in 1946 in the UN Security Council. The active action in the UN of the Soviet Union and a number of other countries in defense of Indonesia contribute that on December 27, 1949 its sovereignty was recognized throughout the territory of the former Dutch East Indies (with the exception of West Irian). A special role in strengthening friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and Indonesia was played by the full support of the USSR in the liberation of West Irian. Today, most Indonesians have a rather vague idea of Russia, as in Indonesia there is slightly reliable information about our country offered by the official media. In political field, most Indonesians are clearly positive about Russia, mainly because Russia is the only country that can rival US military power. In general, according to polls by the Pew Research Center, there is practically no dynamics in attitude of Indonesians to Russia. In 2007 and in 2017 – 36% of respondents had a positive attitude towards Russia. A negative attitude was also almost the same in years 2007 and 2017 is about 40%. The trust to Russian President V. Putin (in international affairs) was in years 2006–2017 was on average at a level of 21–28%. At the same time, distrust to President V. Putin was higher: somewhat about 33-44% on average in 2006–2017. According to the

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

report of the same Center, in 2019 36% of respondents expressed confidence in Putin, 27% did not trust, 38% answered “I don’t know”1. And yet, it seems to us, the help that our country rendered the Indonesians in overcoming the destruction of natural disasters – the consequences of the tsunami and earthquakes in 2004 and 2005, earthquakes on the island of Sumatra in 2009, extinguishing forest fires on the islands of Kalimantan and Sumatra in 2006 and 2015 – had a positive impact on the attitude of Indonesians to Russia. In 2015, the combined detachment of the Russian Emergencies Ministry took part in a search and rescue operation in the Java Sea in connection with the crash there in December 2014 of an AirAsia airliner. In 2018, Russia sent over 23 tons of humanitarian aid to the earthquake and tsunami-hit province of Central Sulawesi2. During these 70 years of bilateral relations, there were both periods of close cooperation and a noticeable cooling of relations between our countries. In this collective work of Russian and Indonesian authors, various materials are presented, dedicated, in particular, to the history of relations and cooperation between our states, as well as to the consideration of the problems and obstacles that are in the way of mutual cooperation at the present time, and, of course, to the prospects of bilateral relations of Russia and Indonesia. Christine Huang, Jeremiah Cha. Russia and Putin receive low ratings globally / Pew Research Center, February 7, 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/02/07/russia-andputin-receive-low-ratings-globally/ 2 Межгосударственные отношения России и Индонезии // РИА Новости, 14.11.2018, URL: https://ria.ru/20181114/ 1532601642.html 1

221

Con cl us i on

Foreword named “The 70th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations: Achievements and Tasks for the Future” provided by M. Wahid Supriyadi, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Indonesia to the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus. Mr. Ambassador turned to early relations between our countries, in particular, starting with the visit of Nikolay Mikhlukho-Maclay to Batavia and Ternate in 1873. He pointed out that in 1945, Indonesian study was formally established at the Institute of Asian and African Studies (ISAA) at Lomonosov Moscow State University. Further, Mr. Ambassador dwelled on the development of bilateral relations between our countries in different historical periods, specifically during the Old Order Period, noted that the close relations between the two countries and the success of Soekarno to establish a personal relation with Nikita Khrushchev at that time marked the period as the Golden Era of the bilateral relations between our two countries. Mr. Supriyadi also dwelled on the problem of the deterioration of relations during of New Order Era, when Indonesia becomes more dependent on the West. Meanwhile, Indonesia's relations with Eastern Bloc countries, especially with the Soviet Union, were stagnant, if not casual. At the same time relations with the Soviet Union were carefully maintained, and both agreed not to interfere in their domestic affairs. President Soeharto made his first state visit to the Soviet Union in 1989, where he met the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev. At the Post New Order Era started the new period of bilateral relations. One of the new milestones in our relations was the Declaration on the Framework of Friendship and Partnership Relations between the Republic of Indonesia and the Russian Federation in the 21st Century signed by President Megawati 222

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

Soekarnoputri and President Vladimir Putin in April 2003. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono visited Russia in September 2012. President Joko Widodo visited Sochi in May 2016 to attend the 20th ASEAN-Russia Summit. During his meeting with President Putin, both leaders discussed efforts to develop bilateral cooperation. In conclusion Mr. Supriyadi noted that the 70th anniversary of the bilateral relations between the two countries is the right moment to strengthen a closer cooperation and step forward to the next level of our strategic partnership. The First Chapter “Indonesian Vision of the Future in the Asia Pacific and Indo-Pacific Regions and Russia and Its Presence and Interests in the Southeast Asia” was provided by Dr. Dmitry Mosyakov. The chapter analyzes the position of Indonesia regarding the project of creating the Indo-Pacific region. This position is very close to the Russian view of current events. It shows the place and role of Russia in Southeast Asia and its high involvement in the processes taking place there. The chapter also discusses the key elements that make up the core of the Russian presence in the countries of Southeast Asia. It is shown how after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the almost complete disappearance of Russia from the map of Southeast Asia, the country began to return to this region. Special attention is paid to the formation of an atmosphere of mutual trust, overcoming prejudices and artificially created obstacles on this path. The Second Chapter “T The Greater Eurasian Partnership: a Re-Energizer of Russia-Indonesia Cooperation?” was prepared by Dr. Evgeny Kanaev and Evgeny Galchenko. The authors emphasise that to reach a profound and conceptual understanding of the potential of, as well as likely prospects for the Rus223

Con cl us i on

sia-Indonesia Strategic Partnership, it is imperative to clarify its principal instruments. In line with this analytical focus, the chapter discusses the Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) from the viewpoint of the extent to which it may form the foundation for the forthcoming Russia-Indonesia Strategic Partnership. Although the existing studies have sufficiently covered the GEP and explored the specificity of cooperation between the Soviet Union/Russia and Indonesia (these tasks have been performed mostly by HSE University and IOS RAS, respectively), possibilities to synergize the GEP with RussiaIndonesia relations have not been analyzed so far. The chapter aims to remedy this shortcoming in which its academic originality lies. The chapter focuses upon three different although interrelated issues. Part One undertakes a critical assessment of the GEP as a multilateral initiative. Part Two captures a range of issues relevant to the retrospect and the current priorities of the Soviet Union/Russia-Indonesia cooperation. Part Three reveals the present dynamics and the obtained results of trade exchanges between the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Indonesia, as well as between the EAEU and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The chapter concludes by drawing final assessments on the extent to which the GEP may provide a sound basis for, as well as be synergized with the forthcoming Russia-Indonesia Strategic Partnership proceeding from the present-day practical realities of cooperation between the parties. The Third Chapter “Russia-Indonesia Strategic Partnership: The Interplay of Institutional Foundations, Ulterior Motives and Emerging Tasks” by Pavel Shaternikov and Sofya Paderina dwells on the forthcoming Russia-Indonesia Strategic Partner224

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

ship to live up to its name, it should be premised upon the previously developed background. The research question is which elements (if any) of the Russia-ASEAN Strategic Partnership and the Russia-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership can be adopted to the Russia-Indonesia Strategic Partnership to make it respond to the priorities of both partners. In line with this analytical setting, the chapter focuses upon the foundations of the forthcoming Russia-Indonesia strategic partnership from three perspectives. Starting from an outline of the specificity of Russia-ASEAN Strategic Partnership, the chapter gives insights into the Russia-Vietnam Strategic Partnership and the Russia-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership from the viewpoint of their projects as pathfinders to finally turn to a review of what has been done between Russia and Indonesia as pillars of their nascent Strategic Partnership. The authors argue that the establishment of Strategic Partnership between Russia and Indonesia is a timely step as it allows both parties to substantiate the achievements in bilateral cooperation and provide it with favorable international milieu as an important prerequisite for success in the strategic perspective. The Fourth Chapter titled “Russia-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership: Lessons for Russia-Indonesia Relations” by PhD Mikhail Terskikh examines the specifics of RussianVietnamese relations which allow countries to call them a comprehensive strategic partnership. The main trends in the development of bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Hanoi are traced with an eye to the further development of Russian-Indonesian relations. 225

Con cl us i on

According to the author, Russia and Vietnam has developed a special type of partnership, covering almost all spheres. The experience gained in bilateral relations seems to be a good start for the development of relations with other Southeast Asia countries. The novelty of the study lies in an attempt to answer the question of what is hidden under the status of "strategic partnership", what criteria determine it. Findings on this set of issues add to the practical relevance of the study and make it academically unique. The Fifth Chapter “Russian-Indonesian cooperation during the presidency of Joko Widodo. 2014–2020” by Dr. Nikolay Maletin examines, how during the years of the “double presidency” of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–2014), the predecessor of the current president Joko Widodo, Indonesia has become one of the key countries of Southeast Asia. Indonesia became more and more actively involved in solving global problems and in the work of international organizations such as the UN, Group of 20, APEC, OIC. The international positions of the Republic of Indonesia have strengthened, the horizons of active national diplomacy have expanded which allowed Joko Widodo to raise the prestige and international significance of the country even higher, to expand contacts with leading world powers, including Russia. Traditional cooperation between the two countries is based on such areas as mechanical engineering, military equipment, tourism, and agriculture. However, there is great scope for developing cooperation in other areas such as healthcare and pharmaceuticals, civil aviation, energy, cybersecurity, and education. But, as the author notes, we are too late. While the United States, China and Australia are already connected with Indonesia not just by a strategic partnership, 226

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

but by a Comprehensive Partnership, although, unlike them, our joint history with Indonesia is practically not overshadowed by anything, but on the contrary, as it has always been with the Soviet Union before, and as it is now on the Russian side it is extremely friendly and mutually beneficial. The Sixth Chapter by Dr. Aleksey Drugov named “From the History of Soviet-Indonesian Military-Technical Cooperation” deals with large scale re-equipment and re-armament of the Indonesian Armed Forces realized with massive purchases of arms and related devices from the Soviet Union and with training of the Indonesian servicemen by Soviet officers. The author also touches upon the role the USSR was prepared to play in the re-unification of West Irian (former Dutch colony) with the Republic of Indonesia. The re-equipment and rearmament are considered as a kind of technical and scientific revolution in the Armed Forces of Indonesia. The USSR – Indonesia cooperation in this sphere was marked with mutual trust and was a beneficial contribution into further bilateral relations. Now these traditions and experience make sufficient ground for developing such cooperation under present day situation in the world. The Seventh Chapter by PhD Aleksandr Popov is dedicated to the Development of Russia - Indonesia Military-Technical Cooperation since the Period of the “New Order”. The author describes the development of military-technical cooperation of Russia and Indonesia since the late 90th, when Indonesia faced an embargo on purchases of armaments from the USA and other Western countries. This cooperation was in fact resumed since the participation of some Russian companies in Indonesian Airshow 1996 and began getting concrete forms, after the proposal of coop227

Con cl us i on

eration from the Russian Government was conveyed to President Soeharto on February 26, 1997. Due to the economic and financial crisis of 1997–1998 the Indonesian government had to postpone the purchase of Russian fighters Su-27 and military helicopters Mi-35, but a similar contract was fulfilled by the two countries in 2003 as a result of President Megawati Soekarnoputri's visit to Moscow. The contract for the purchase of “Sukhoi” fighters carried out by Megawati’s government was a real breakthrough in militarytechnical cooperation between Russia and Indonesia though earlier hadn’t been properly approved by the Indonesian parliament and National Army of Indonesia. Since that time, different types of “Sukhoi” fighters have become a core of Indonesian Air Forces' armaments. The cooperation of the two countries in military field was not limited to the purchase of armaments only. There were also visits by Russian warships to Indonesia. Russian marines and their Indonesian counterparts hold joint antipirate exercises. Russian pilots and technicians helped their Indonesians colleagues to master Russian aircrafts and helicopters both in Indonesia and in Russia. Since Joko Widodo came to power in Indonesia in October 2014, the two parties held many negotiations on new purchases of Russian armaments. But in August 2017 President Trump signed American CATSA or “America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act” according to which the countries buying Russian armaments would face American economic sanctions. Finally, the author concludes that in the conditions of American sanctions both sides could regard a possibility of arranging a joint production of some Russian armaments on 228

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

the territory of Indonesia and of using not traditional means of payments to avoid transactions in American dollars. The Eighth Chapter “Stable and Sustainable: Patterns of Foreign Trade Between Russia and Indonesia” by Alina Vladimirova. Assessing the development of economic relations between Russia and Indonesia is an important but complicated task. To navigate controversial statements made by the expert community, it is useful to introduce new approaches to analysis. One such approach could be an exploration of foreign trade patterns, which allows us to enrich our global knowledge and conclude that these bilateral flows of goods are not only stable but also sustainable. The Ninth Chapter “Enhancing Indonesia-Russia Social and Humanitarian Cooperation: New Opportunities for Strategic Partnership” by Nikita Kuklin and Alfachreza Azure is devoted to the issue of humanitarian cooperation in the contemporary era. The authors pointed that it is too complicated to consider it only as a part of official diplomacy and the accompanying soft power strategies. These days one can speak of social and humanitarian cooperation, since the emphases on social issues, common values and the semantic content of cooperation are increasingly gaining the upper hand over the formal style of conducting humanitarian diplomacy and the establishment of cooperation for the sake of cooperation only. Indonesia and Russia are connected not only by 70 years of diplomatic relations and even greater historical experience of interaction but also by the strive to get to know each other again and achieve a new level of cooperation. In this regard, both countries are reaching out to identify new interaction areas in pursuit of expanding the currently developed spheres of bilateral relations. The process of Russia reopening as a com229

Con cl us i on

ponent of Indonesian foreign policy was formed under PostSuhartian reformation era and has not completed so far. It indicates the need for greater involvement of the nations in each other’s destinies and development, and therefore, for greater knowledge of each other. The humanitarian cooperation understood as relations in the fields of culture, science, education, human rights, and the development of social institutions will play a primary role in the formation of a comprehensive view and the creation of social, cultural, and information interaction mechanisms. The ability to understand each other, jointly respond to challenges and threats and contribution to mutual prosperity through the exchange of experience and best practices - all these constitutes a promising social and humanitarian direction in the development of the relations between Indonesia and Russia at the present stage. We hope that this collective monograph will arouse the interest among a wide range of readers. The authors tried to reveal many aspects of Russian-Indonesian cooperation, where insights into the history of relations between our countries, a comparative analysis carried out on the example of other countries of the Southeast Asia region, an attempt to consider bilateral relations from the point of view of global and regional processes are very interesting. In our opinion, it is very important to learn lessons from the experience of past successful relations in order to further develop and deepen bilateral relations between our countries in line with mutually beneficial cooperation. It is necessary to work together to overcome the resistance of the third parties that hinder the establishment of strong ties between Russia and Indonesia. PhD Ekaterina M. Astafieva

BIBLIOGRAPHY Aisyah R. Indonesia to Cooperate with Five Eurasian Countries in Trade. The Jakarta Post. 15 Feb. 2019. URL: https://www.theja kartapost.com/news/2019/02/15/indonesia-to-cooperatewith-five-eurasian-countries-in-trade.html Allan, B., Vucetic, S., & Hopf, T. The Distribution of Identity and the Future of International Order: China's Hegemonic Prospects. International Organization, 72(4), 2018. 839-869. Allen, M., & Ainley, P. Lost Generation?: New strategies for youth and education. London: Continuum International Publishing Group. 2010. API Portal [Electronic resource] // UN Comtrade: International Trade Statistics. URL: https://comtrade.un.org/data/dev/ portal/ Around 21 per cent of Vietnamese gas produced within Bien Dong joint project of Russia and Vietnam // Information Directorate, Gazprom, September 07, 2018. URL: https://www.gaz prom.com/press/news/2018/september/article459410/ ASEANStats Data Portal. URL: https://data.aseanstats.org ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. URL: https://asean.org/ storage/2019/06/ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-Indo-Pacific_ FINAL_22062019.pdf Buletin Statistik Perdagangan LuarNegeri. Ekspor menurut kelompok komodity dan negara. Desember 2019. Jakarta, 2020. Christine Huang, Jeremiah Cha. Russia and Putin receive low ratings globally / Pew Research Center, February 7, 2020, URL: https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/02/07/ russia-and-putin-receive-low-ratings-globally/ Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE) [Electronic resource] // United Nations Statistics Division. URL: https:// comtrade.un.org/ Čufrin, G.I. ASEAN-Russia relations. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 2006. Dahles, H. Tourism, heritage and national culture in Java: Dilemmas of a local community. London: Routledge. 2015.

Bi b l i o g ra p h y EEC and Indonesia Signed a Memorandum of Cooperation. RussiaASEAN Business Council. 18 October 2019. URL: https:// www.russia-asean.com/en/news/113 EEC Statistics of Foreign and Mutual Trade in Goods. URL: http:// www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/act/integr_i_makroec/dep _stat/tradestat/Pages/default.aspx Efimova L.M. Russian-Indonesian Relations in the 21 Century. MGIMO Review of International Relations. 2014; 4(37): 73-81. Erdman, K.M. (2017). An analysis of Geert Hofstede's Culture's consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutes, and organizations across nations. London: Macat International. Ferracane M.F., Lee-Makiyama H., Marel E. Digital Trade Restrictiveness Index. European Center for International Political Economy. Brussels, 2018. P. 8. URL: https://ecipe.org/ wp-content/uploads/2018/05/DTRI_FINAL.pdf Fields, C. Stereotypes and stereotyping: Misperceptions, perspectives, and role of social media. Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science. 2016. Fullerton, J.A., & Kendrick, A. Shaping international public opinion: A model for nation branding and public diplomacy. New York: Peter Lang. 2017. Gao, J., Ingram, C., Kee, P. Global media and public diplomacy in Sino-Western relations. London; New York: Routledge. 2017. Global Publics Back U.S. on Fighting ISIS, but Are Critical of Post9/11 Torture // Pew Research Center, June 23, 2015, URL: http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/06/23/global-publicsback-u-s-on-fighting-isis-but-are-critical-of-post-911-torture/ Global Terrorism Index 2018. Measuring the impact of terrorism. Sydney November 2018. URL: http://visionofhumanity. org/reports. History of cooperation. Asia // Rosatom. URL: https://rosatomasia.com/rosatom-in-country/history-of-cooperation/ Indonesia Considers to Sign an FTA Agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union. Analytical Media Eurasian Studies. 12 August 2017. // URL: http://greater-europe.org/archives/ 3168 Indonesia dan Rusia Barter Ekspor Sukhoidengan Ekspor Komoditas.URL: https://tirto.id/indonesia-dan-rusia-barter-sukhoidengan-ekspor-komoditas-cu7x

232

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

International Seminar “Eurasian Economic Union: Challenges and Opportunities for Indonesia”. University of Udayana, Bali, 19 May 2017. URL: https://www.unud.ac.id/en/headline1902Finding-Out-the-Potential-Cooperation-of-IndonesiaEurasian-Economic-Union-the-Policy-Analysis-andDevelopment-Agency-Ministry-of-Foreign-Affairs-Republicof-Indonesia-in-Cooperation-with-Udayana-University-HeldInternational-Seminar.html Jean-François, E., Avoseh, M.B., & Griswold, W. Perspectives in transnational higher education. Rotterdam: Sense. 2016. Joint Statement of the 3rd ASEAN-Russian Federation Summit on Strategic Partnership. President of Russia. 14 November 2018. URL: http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5360 Kanaev E., Simbolon L., Shaternikov P. Russia-Indonesia relationship: assessing shortcomings and framing a response // ЮгоВосточная Азия: актуальные проблемы развития, 2019, № 4(45), С. 95-106. Kemenhan RI Berkomitmen Beli 11 Unit Sukhoi Su-35 // Republika. co.id, 27 Jul 2020, URL: https://republika.co.id/berita/ qe3jei484/kemenhan-ri-berkomitmen-beli-11-unit-sukhoi-su35 Kerjasama Senjata Indonesia-Rusia, URL: https://www.dw.com/ id/kerjasama-senjata-indonesia-rusia/a-2956696 Ketidakwajaran dan Kemahalan Harga serta Kejanggalan Mekanisme Pembelian Sukhoi, URL: https://antikorupsi.org/ sites/default/files/Kajian%20Kasus%20Pengadaan%20Sukhoi %20-%20Imparsial%20%26%20ICW_2.pdf Korab-Karpowicz, W.J. On the history of political philosophy: Great political thinkers from Thucydides to Locke. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. 2017. Margaret Vice. Publics Worldwide Unfavorable Toward Putin, Russia But few see Russian power and influence as a major threat / Pew Research Center, August 16, 2017, URL: https:// www.pewresearch.org/global/2017/08/16/publicsworldwide-unfavorable-toward-putin-russia/ Meeting with Representatives of the Russia-ASEAN Business Forum. President of Russia Official Web Site. May 20, 2016. URL: http://en.special.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51951

233

Bi b l i o g ra p h y Memorandum of Understanding between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Eurasian Economic Commission on Economic Cooperation. 14 November 2018. URL: https://asean.org/storage/2018/11/MOU-between-ASEANand-the-EEC_Signed-English.pdf Milenial Jembatani Hubungan Indonesia – Rusia // Republika Online. 2020. URL: https://republika.co.id/share/qfnuqm479 Nair, K.K. Space: The frontiers of modern defence. New Delhi: Knowledge World in association with Centre for Air Power Studies. 2006. Nasution A.H. Kekaryaan ABRI. Jakarta, 1971. Nasution A.H. Sedjarah Perdjuangan Nasional dibidang Bersendjata. Djakarta, 1966. NEWS - Anisatul Umah, CNBC Indonesia, 09 September 2020, URL: https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20200909145829-4185565/prabowo-disebut-kecewa-soal-kapal-selam-buatan-rikok-bisa Nile Bowie, As US-China tussle and joust, Russia moves on SEAsia // Strategic Culture, 27.11.2018. URL: https://www.strategicculture.org/news/2018/11/27/as-us-china-tussle-and-joustrussia-moves-on-seasia/ Pamment, J. New public diplomacy in the 21st century: A comparative study of policy and practice. London: Routledge Taylor & Francis. 2014. Post-2017 ASEAN-Russia Trade and Investment Work Programme. URL: https://www.economy.gov.ru/material/file/5ec0601 d3017b51582015c20869e0fea/programma_russia_ASEAN_201 9.docx Pour J. Benny Moerdani. Profile of a Soldier Statesman. Djakarta, 1993. P.190. Prakoso J.P. East Kalimantan Infrastructure: Relentlessly Pursuing Trains. PwC Indonesia. 6 July 2020. URL: // https://www. pwc.com/id/en/media-centre/infrastructure-news/july2020/east-kalimantan-infrastructure-relentlessly-pursuingtrains.html Programme of Cooperation between the Eurasian Economic Commission and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations for 2019-2020. URL: https://www.economy.gov.ru/material/

234

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

file/169a9800fa6f9234650b52919dfdf1ce/programma_20192020.docx Protecting Peace, Earth, and Freedom of Choice for All Countries. New Ideas for Russia’s Foreign Policy / S.A. Karaganov, D.V. Suslov et al. — Moscow: Higher School of Economics Publishing House, 2020. URL: // https://publications. hse.ru/mirror/pubs/share/direct/399727482.pdf Purnama, C., Khoirunnisa, S., Utami Dewi, A., & Yulianti, D. Russia Beyond Indonesia: Image Transforming Effort Through Public Diplomacy. Global Strategis, 14(1), 2020. 109-124. Rosatom Tech experts conducted the training course for continuing cooperation with Indonesia // Rosatom Technical Academy, February 10, 2020. URL: http://rosatomtech.com/rosatomtech-experts-conducted-the-training-course-for-continuingcooperation-with-indonesia/ Rosneft and Pertamina JV Sign Tuban Refinery Design Contract // Rosneft Information Division, October 29, 2019. URL: https://www.rosneft.com/press/releases/item/197739/ Rugh, W.A. Front line public diplomacy: How US embassies communicate with foreign publics. Baskingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 2016. Russia is a rising military power in the Asia-Pacific, and Australia needs to take it seriously, October 30, 2018 URL: http:// theconversation.com/russia-is-a-rising-military-power-in-theasia-pacific-and-australia-needs-to-take-it-seriously-105390 Russia, Indonesia to Raise Relations to Level of Strategic Partnership – Lavrov. TASS. 2 February 2020. URL: https://tass.com/politics/1115513 Russian Trade with Indonesia in 2015 // Russian Foreign Trade. 2016. URL: https://en.russian-trade.com/reports-andreviews/2016-05/russian-trade-with-indonesia-in-2015/ Sách xanh Ngoại giao Việt Nam 2018 (Vietnam Diplomatic Bluebook 2018 – in Viet.) // ISSUU, July 31, 2019, URL: https://issuu. com/mofavietnam/docs/s_ch_ngo_i_giao_vi_t_nam_2018 Santoso, Y., Shaumi, F., Ninta Toreh, E. Indonesia’s path toward middlepowership. Surabaya: Pusat Penerbitan dan Percetakan Universitas Airlangga. 2019.

235

Bi b l i o g ra p h y Sevin, E. Public Diplomacy and the Implementation of Foreign Policy in the US, Sweden and Turkey. Cham: Springer International Publishing. 2018. Siemon T. Wezeman. Arms Flows to Southeast Asia. SIPRI. 2019, December. URL: //https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/ 2019-12/1912_arms_flows_to_south_east_asia_wezeman.pdf The EAEU Digital Agenda 2025: Prospects and Recommendations. Overview report. World Bank Group. URL: http://docu ments.worldbank.org/curated/en/850581522435806724/pdf/ EAEU-Overview-Full-ENG-Final.pdf The Eighth AEM-Russia Consultations. Joint Media Statement. 10 September 2019. URL: https://asean.org/storage/2019/ 09/AEM-Russia-8-JMS-FINAL.pdf The fifth AEM-Russia Consultations. Joint Media Statement. 5 August 2016. URL: https://asean.org/storage/2016/08/07AEM-Russia-5-JMS-final.pdf The growing promise of ASEAN // Bangkok Post. 09.06.2014 To Build the World Anew. President Sukarno’s Speech before the Fifteenth General Assembly of the United Nations on Friday 30 September 1960. Department of Information Republic of Indonesia, Djakarta, 1960. P.19. Toward the Great Ocean – 5: from the Turn to the East to Greater Eurasia. Valdai Discussion Club Report. Moscow, September 2017. URL: // https://valdaiclub.com/files/15300 Velikaya, A.A. The Russian Approach to Public Diplomacy and Humanitarian Cooperation. Public Diplomacy of Rising and Regional Powers, 3(3), 2018, 39-61. Vietnam // Zarubezhneft, Official website. URL: https:// www.zarubezhneft.ru/en/operations/upstream/vietnam/ Weatherbee D.E. Indonesia, ASEAN and the Indo-Pacific Cooperation Concept. ISEAS Perspective. 7 June 2019. URL: https://www. iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2019_47.pdf What is the Harmonized System (HS)? // World Customs Organization. 2020. URL: http://www.wcoomd.org/en/ topics/nomenclature/overview/what-is-the-harmonizedsystem.aspx Working Visit of the ASEAN Secretary-General Dato Lim Jock Hoi to the Russian Federation. 4 February 2020. URL: https://

236

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

asean.org/working-visit-asean-secretary-general-dato-limjock-hoi-russian-federation Zakaria, F. Ten lessons for a post-pandemic world. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company. 2020. «НОВАТЭК» подписал меморандум о взаимопонимании по развитию во Вьетнаме проекта электрогенерации с использованием СПГ («NOVATEK» podpisal memorandum o vzaimoponimanii po raz-vitiyu vo V'yetname proyekta elektrogeneratsii s ispol'zo-vaniyem SPG) // Потал «Portnews», 23.05.2019, URL: https://portnews.ru/news/277351/ Алексей Заквасин, Святослав Петров. Предоставили альтернативу: как Россия завоёвывает тайский рынок оружия (Aleksey Zakvasin, Svyatoslav Petrov. Predostavili al'ternativu: kak Rossiya zavoyovyvayet tayskiy rynok oruzhiya)// RT, 15.09.2017. URL: https://russian.rt.com/world/article/4302 89-rossiya-tailand-postavki-oruzhiya Александр Королёв. Россия – АСЕАН поиск новых точек роста (Aleksandr Korolov. Rossiya – ASEAN poisk novykh tochek rosta) // РСМД, 09.01.2019. URL: https://russiancouncil.ru/ analytics-and-comments/analytics/rossiya-asean-poisknovykh-tochek-rosta/ Александр Новак: «Взаимодействие России и Вьетнама в сфере энергетики вышло на беспрецедентно новый уровень» (Aleksandr Novak: «Vzaimodejstvie Rossii i V'etnama v sfere energetiki vyshlo na besprecedentno vysokij uroven'») // Министерство энергетики Российской Федерации, URL: https://minenergo.gov.ru/node/14843 Близость зимы не помешала России тепло принять 14 студентов с Папуа (Blizost' zimy ne pomeshala Rossii teplo prinyat' 14 studentov s Papua ) // ИА REGNUM. URL: https://regnum. ru/news/society/2761041.html БМП-3 для Ирака получили дополнительную защиту (BMP-3 dlya Iraka poluchili dopolnitel'nuyu zashchitu )// Военное обозрение, 21.11.2018, URL: https://topwar.ru/150110-bmp3-dlja-iraka-poluchili-dopolnitelnuju-zaschitu.html; Брутенц К.Н. Несбывшееся. Неравнодушные заметки о перестройке. (Brutents K.N. Nesbyvsheyesya. Neravnodushnyye zametki o perestroyke) М. 2005.

237

Bi b l i o g ra p h y Владимирова А.В. Аналитический обзор основных факторов, влияющих на рост асимметрии показателей экспорта и импорта стран Юго-Восточной Азии (Vladimirova A.V. Analiticheskiy obzor osnovnykh faktorov, vliyayushchikh na rost asimmetrii pokazateley eksporta i importa stran YugoVostochnoy Azii) // Юго-Восточная Азия: Актуальные проблемы развития. 2020. Т. 1. № 1 (46). С. 45–68. Владимирова А.В. Влияние асимметрии зеркальной статистики на результаты сетевого анализа внешней торговли стран Юго-Восточной Азии (Vladimirova A.V. Vliyaniye asimmetrii zerkal'noy statistiki na rezul'taty setevogo analiza vneshney torgovli stran Yugo-Vostochnoy Azii) // ЮгоВосточная Азия: Актуальные проблемы развития. 2019. Т. II. № 3 (44). С. 57–70. Внешняя торговля России с Индонезией за 9 месяцев 2019 г. (Vneshnyaya torgovlya Rossii s Indoneziyey za 9 mesyatsev 2019 g.)/ Внешняя торговля РФ. 14.11.2019. URL: https://russian-trade.com/reports-and-reviews/201911/vneshnyaya-torgovlya-rossii-s-indoneziey-za-9-mesyatsev2019-g/ Военно-техническое сотрудничество России и Индонезии может выйти на стратегический уровень (Voyenno-tekhnicheskoye sotrudnichestvo Rossii i Indonezii mozhet vyyti na strategicheskiy uroven') // ЦАМТО, 30.01.2020, URL: https://armstrade.org/includes/periodics/news/2020/0130/ 060056442/print.shtml Воронин А.С., Кобелев Е.В. Яркая история дружбы и партнерства к 60-летию установления отношений между СССР/Россией и Вьетнамом (Voronin A.S., Kobelev E.V. Yarkaya istoriya druzhby i partnerstva k 60-letiyu ustanovleniya otnosheniy mezhdu SSSR/Rossiyey i V'yetnamom)// Проблемы Дальнего Востока, 2010, № 1, С. 17-35. Выступление Министра иностранных дел России С.В.Лаврова по итогам переговоров с Министром иностранных дел Индонезии Р.Марсуди, Джакарта, 9 августа 2017 года (Vystupleniye Ministra inostrannykh del Rossii S.V.Lavrova po itogam peregovorov s Ministrom inostrannykh del Indonezii R.Marsudi, Dzhakarta)/ МИД РФ. URL: https://

238

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/ cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2834143 Глава МИД Индонезии: визит президента Видодо в РФ откроет двери для укрепления отношений (Glava MID Indonezii: vizit prezidenta Vidodo v RF otkroyet dveri dlya ukrepleniya otnosheniy )// ТАСС, 12 мая 2016, URL: https://tass.ru/ interviews/3276511 Денис Мантуров: РФ предлагает Индонезии кооперацию в строительстве плавучих АЭС (Denis Manturov: RF predlagaet Indonesii cooperatsiu v stroitel’stve plavuchikh AES ) // Морская коллегия, 29 октября 2018. URL: http://marine. gov.ru/events/morskaya-kollegiya/3465/ Джакарта не отказывается от покупки 11 истребителей Су-35 – посол РФ в Индонезии (Dzhakarta ne otkazyvayetsya ot pokupki 11 istrebiteley Su-35 – posol RF v Indonezii) / ЦАМТО, 09.07.2020. URL: https://armstrade.org/includes/ periodics/news/2020/0709/114058644/detail.shtml Долгая дорога в Ханой (Dolgaya doroga v Khanoy) // Портал «LogiRus», 21.07.2020, URL: https://logirus.ru/articles/ ved/dolgaya_doroga_v_khanoy.html Индонезия выбирает Дальний Восток (Indoneziya vybirayet Dal'niy Vostok) // Информационно-аналитическое агентство «Восток-Россия», 05.04.2018. URL: https:// www.eastrussia.ru/material/indoneziya-vybiraet-dalniyvostok/ Индонезия и Россия отмечают 70-летие установления дипотношений (Indoneziya i Rossiya otmechayut 70-letiye ustanovleniya dipotnosheniy) // ИА REGNUM, 03.02.2020. URL: https://regnum.ru/news/polit/2847655.html. Индонезия не отказывалась от покупок российских истребителей Су-35 (Indoneziya ne otkazyvalas' ot pokupok rossiyskikh istrebiteley Su-35) // AEX.RU, 02.07.2020. URL: https://aex.ru/news/2020/7/2/214184/ Индонезия предлагает концепцию сотрудничества в ИндоТихоокеанском регионе (Indoneziya predlagayet kontseptsiyu sotrudnichestva v Indo-Tikhookeanskom regione) // ИА REGNUM, 24.10.2018. URL: https://regnum.ru/news/polit/ 2506524.html

239

Bi b l i o g ra p h y Индонезия предложила «Росатому» площадку под строительство АЭС (Indonesia predlozhila «Rosatomu» ploshchadku pod stroitel’stvo AES) // Вести.ру, 18 февраля 2020. URL: https://www.vesti.ru/finance/article/1266697 Индонезия рассчитывает на начало поставок Су-35 до конца года (Indoneziya rasschityvayet na nachalo postavok Su-35 do kontsa goda) // ТАСС, 02.06.2019. URL: https://tass.ru/ mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/6498862 Индонезия станет координатором партнерства АСЕАН — Россия на 2018–2021 гг. (Indoneziya stanet koordinatorom partnerstva ASEAN — Rossiya na 2018–2021 gg.) // ИА REGNUM, URL: https://regnum.ru/news/polit/ 2458788.html Интервью Посла России в Индонезии Л.Г. Воробьевой МИА «Россия Сегодня», 17 июля 2020 года (Interv'yu Posla Rossii v Indonezii L.G. Vorob'yevoy MIA «Rossiya Segodnya») / МИД РФ, URL: https://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/id//asset_publisher/zaMdV5V4XUmC/content/id/4239024 Ирак и Саудовская Аравия хотят купить почти 1,5 тысячи БМП3 (Irak i Saudovskaya Araviya khotyat kupit' pochti 1,5 tysyachi BMP-3) // ТАСС, 30.09.2015, URL: https://tass.ru/ armiya-i-opk/2302766 Источник: Россия завершила поставку второго полкового комплекта С-400 в Китай (Istochnik: Rossiya zavershila postavku vtorogo polkovogo komplekta S-400 v Kitay) // ТАСС, 27.01.2020. URL: https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-pano rama/7611269 Канаев Е.А., Шумкова В.А. Евразийские приоритеты асеаноцентричных диалоговых форматов по вопросам безопасности (Kanayev E.A., Shumkova V.A. Yevraziyskiye prioritety aseanotsentrichnykh dialogovykh formatov po voprosam bezopasnosti) // Вестник Российского университета дружбы народов. Серия: Международные отношения. 2017. Т. 17. № 3. С. 458-468. Канаев Е.А. Всеобъемлющее стратегическое партнерство РФ и Социалистической Республики Вьетнам: взгляд из России (Kanayev E.A. Vseob"yemlyushcheye strategicheskoye partnerstvo RF i Sotsialisticheskoy Respubliki V'yetnam:

240

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

vzglyad iz Rossii )// Россия и АТР, 2019, № 1 (103). С. 154-164. Канаев Е.А. Экономическое Сообщество АСЕАН – Новое Пространство Деловой Активности (Kanaev E.А. Ekonomicheskoe Soobshchestvo ASEAN – Novoe Prostranstvo Delovoy Aktivnosti)// Юго-Восточная Азия: актуальные проблемы развития, 2017, № 37. С. 14-27 Кань Тоан Нгуен. После соглашения с ЕАЭС в торговле Вьетнама и Беларуси произошел скачок – эксперт (Kan' Toan Nguyen. Posle soglasheniya s YEAES v torgovle V'yetnama i Belarusi proizoshel skachok – ekspert) //Евразия Эксперт. 22.01.2019. URL: http://eurasia.expert/v-torgovle-vetnama-ibelarusi-proizoshel-skachok/ Кашин В. Много ли Китай инвестирует в Россию (Kashin V. Mnogo li Kitay investiruyet v Rossiyu), URL: http://ru.valdai club.com/a/highlights/mnogo-li-kitay-investiruet-v-rossiyu/ Кобелев Е.В. Диалоговое партнерство «Россия-АСЕАН»: состояние, проблемы, перспективы развития // Пути укрепления безопасности и сотрудничества в Восточной Азии / под ред. В.М. Мазырина. (Kobelev E.V. Dialogovoye partnerstvo «Rossiya-ASEAN»: sostoyaniye, problemy, perspektivy razvitiya // Puti ukrepleniya bezopasnosti i sotrudnichestva v Vostochnoy Azii / pod red. V.M.Mazyrina.) М.: ИДВ РАН, 2014. Кобелев Е.В. Российско-вьетнамские отношения: реальность и перспективы (Kobelev E.V. Rossiysko-v'yetnamskiye otnosheniya: real'nost' i perspektivy) // Вьетнамские исследования, 2015, № 5. С. 21-43. Кобелев Е.В. СССР/Россия – Вьетнам: фрагменты истории (Kobelev E.V. SSSR/Rossiya – V'yetnam: fragmenty istorii) // Юго-Восточная Азия: актуальные проблемы развития, 2014, № 25. С. 45-54. Комментарий Департамента информации и печати МИД России в связи с визитом Министра иностранных дел России С.В. Лаврова в Индонезию (Kommentariy Departamenta informatsii i pechati MID Rossii v svyazi s vizitom Ministra inostrannykh del Rossii S.V. Lavrova v Indoneziyu) // МИД РФ, 07.08.2017. URL: https://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/

241

Bi b l i o g ra p h y news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/ 2833085 Контракт на поставку Индонезии истребителей Су-35 пока не разорван, но подвис (Kontrakt na postavku Indonezii istrebiteley Su-35 poka ne razorvan, no podvis) // ИА «Оружие России», 17.03.2020, URL: https://www.arms-expo.ru/ news/cooperation/kontrakt-na-postavku-indoneziiistrebiteley-su-35-poka-ne-razorvan-no-podvis/ Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации (утверждена Президентом Российской Федерации В.В.Путиным 30 ноября 2016 года) (Kontseptsiya vneshney politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii (utverzhdena Prezidentom Rossiyskoy Federatsii V.V.Putinym 30 noyabrya 2016 goda) // Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации, 01.12.2016. URL: https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/ official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/ content/id/2542248?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_CptICkB6B Z29&_101_INSTANCE_CptICkB6BZ29_languageId=ru_RU Лавров: отношения Москвы и Джакарты вышли на уровень стратегического партнерства (Lavrov: otnosheniya Moskvy i Dzhakarty vyshli na uroven' strategicheskogo partnerstva) // ТАСС, 13.03.2018, URL: https://tass.ru/politika/5025311 Латухина К. Лидеры РФ и Индонезии обсудили экономику и борьбу с терроризмом (Latukhina K. Lidery RF i Indonezii obsudili ekonomiku i bor'bu s terrorizmom) // Российская газета. URL: https://rg.ru/2016/05/18/reg-ufo/lidery-rossiii-indonezii-obsudili-ekonomiku-i-borbu-s-terrorizmom.html Локшин Г.М. Политическое сотрудничество России и Вьетнама (Lokshin G.M. Politicheskoye sotrudnichestvo Rossii i V'yetnama) // Юго-Восточная Азия: актуальные проблемы развития, 2014, № 25, С. 55-63. Лукин А.В., Новиков Д.П. От Большой Европы к Большой Евразии: что несет миру коренной геополитический сдвиг (Lukin A.V., Novikov D.P. Ot Bol'shoy Yevropy k Bol'shoy Yevrazii: chto neset miru korennoy geopoliticheskiy sdvig) // Восток (Oriens). 2019. № 5. С. 60-76. Матюхин М.В. Прямые инвестиции стран АСЕАН в Россию (Matyukhin M.V. Pryamyye investitsii stran ASEAN v Rossi-

242

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

yu), URL: http://www.webeconomy.ru/index.php?page= cat&newsid=3787&type=news Международная федерация танкового биатлона, официальный сайт (Mezhdunarodnaya federatsiya tankovogo biatlona, ofitsial'nyy sayt), URL: https://tank-biathlon.com/ Минэнерго сообщило об интересе нефтегазовых компаний к проектам в Индонезии (Minenergo soobshchilo ob interese neftegazovikh companiy k proiektam v Indonesii) // Ведомости, 25 октября 2018. URL: https://www.vedomosti.ru/ business/news/2018/10/25/784726-proektam-indonezii Михаил Галузин. Торговые отношения между Россией и Индонезией поступательно развиваются (Mikhail Galuzin. Torgovyye otnosheniya mezhdu Rossiyey i Indoneziyey postupatel'no razvivayutsya) Окно в АТР, 06.09.2017. URL: http://oknovatr.ru/articles/international-life/torgovyieotnosheniya-mezhdu-rossiej-i-indoneziej-postupatelnorazvivayutsya/ Михаил Ходаренок. После Су-35: Индонезия покупает истребители США (Mikhail Khodarenok. Posle Su-35: Indoneziya pokupayet istrebiteli SSHA) // Газета.ru, 05.11.2019. URL: https://www.gazeta.ru/army/2019/11/05/12796952.shtml Мосяков Д.В. Перспективы российско-вьетнамского экономического сотрудничества (Mosyakov D.V. Perspektivy rossiysko-v'yetnamskogo ekonomicheskogo sotrudnichestva) // Юго-Восточная Азия: актуальные проблемы развития, 2014, № 25, С. 41-44. Научная конференция “Юго-Восточная Азия и Южнотихоокеанский регион: актуальные проблемы развития” (Nauchnaya konferentsiya “Yugo-Vostochnaya Aziya i Yuzhnotikhookeanskiy region: aktual'nyye problemy razvitiya”) // YouTube. Ekaterina Astafyeva. 2020. URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_LHjinfDP4U Нго Дык Мань. Перекрестный год – новый толчок вьетнамороссийскому всеобъемлющему стратегическому партнерству (Ngo Dyk Man'. Perekrestnyy god – novyy tolchok v'yetnamo-rossiyskomu vseob"yemlyushchemu strategicheskomu partnerstvu) // Международная жизнь, 2019, № 9, URL: https://interaffairs.ru/news/show/23866

243

Bi b l i o g ra p h y Новая правда об отношении Индонезии к России. Эксклюзивное интервью с Чрезвычайным и Полномочным Послом Республики Индонезии в Российской Федерации и Республике Белоруссия Мохамадом Вахидом Суприяди (Novaya pravda ob otnoshenii Indonezii k Rossii. Eksklyuzivnoye interv'yu s Chrezvychaynym i Polnomochnym Poslom Respubliki Indonezii v Rossiyskoy Federatsii i Respublike Belorussiya Mokhamadom Vakhidom Supriyadi) // ИА REGNUM, 12.02.2020, URL: https://regnum.ru/news/ polit/2856143.html Основные направления военно-технического сотрудничества России и Индонезии (Osnovnyye napravleniya voyennotekhnicheskogo sotrudnichestva Rossii i Indonezii) // Новости ВПК, 12.11.2012. URL: https://vpk.name/news/ 78524_osnovnyie_napravleniya_voennotehnicheskogo_sotrud nichestva_rossii_i_indonezii.html Поздравление Джоко Видодо по случаю переизбрания на пост Президента Индонезии (Pozdravleniye Dzhoko Vidodo po sluchayu pereizbraniya na post Prezidenta Indonezii) / Президент России, 22.05.2019. URL: http://kremlin.ru/events/ president/news/60560 Полина Девятова, Курс на Южную Азию. «Роснефть» планирует строить НПЗ в Индонезии (Polina Devyatova, Kurs na Yuzhnuyu Aziyu. «Rosneft'» planiruyet stroit' NPZ v Indonezii) // АИФ, 22.05.2016, URL: http://www.aif.ru/ money/company/kurs_na_yuzhnuyu_aziyu_rosneft_plani ruet_stroit_npz_v_indonezii Положевич Р.С. Гуманитарное сотрудничество Российской Федерации с Китайской Народной Республикой на современном этапе. (Polozhevich R.S. Humanitarian cooperation of the Russian Federation with the People's Republic of China at the present stage) // Государственное управление. Электронный вестник, (63), 2017. C. 147-170. Посол РФ в Индонезии о покойном Хабиби: «Известная фигура в России» (Posol RF v Indonezii o pokoynom Khabibi: «Izvestnaya figura v Rossii») // ИА REGNUM. 12.09.2019. URL: https://regnum.ru/news/polit/2717284.html

244

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

Посол РФ в Индонезии о Су-35: «Есть технические проблемы» (Posol RF v Indonezii o Su-35: «Yest' tekhnicheskiye problemy») // ИА REGNUM, 13.02.2020. URL: https:// regnum.ru/news/polit/2857703.html Президент Индонезии рассчитывает на скорейшее создание зоны свободной торговли с ЕАЭС (Prezident Indonezii rasschityvayet na skoreysheye sozdaniye zony svobodnoy torgovli s YEAES) // Масложировой союз России. URL: https://www.mzhsr.ru/news/novosti-otrasli/prezidentindonezii-rasschityivaet-na-skorejshee-sozdanie-zonyisvobodnoj-torgovli-s-eaes Президенты России и Индонезии обсудили перспективы развития торговли, 18 мая 2016 г. (Prezidenty Rossii i Indonezii obsudili perspektivy razvitiya torgovli, 18 maya 2016 g.) // Внешняя торговля РФ, URL: https://russian-trade. com/news/2016-05/prezidenty-rossii-i-indonezii-obsudiliperspektivy-razvitiya-torgovli/ Путин и президент Индонезии обсудили вопросы борьбы с терроризмом (Putin i prezident Indonezii obsudili voprosy bor'by s terrorizmom) // РИА Новости, 18.05.2016. URL: https://ria.ru/20160518/1435938247.html Путин отметил взаимовыгодное сотрудничество и координацию РФ и Индонезии в ООН (Putin otmetil vzaimovygodnoye sotrudnichestvo i koordinatsiyu RF i Indonezii v OON) // ТАСС, 03.02.2020. URL https:// tass.ru/politika/7669399 Ребрей С. Прямые инвестиции Японии в российскую экономику: масштабы, проблемы, перспективы (Rebrey S. Pryamyye investitsii Yaponii v rossiyskuyu ekonomiku: masshtaby, problemy, perspektivy) // Мировое и национальное хозяйство, МГИМО МИД России, 2015, № 1, URL: http:// www.mirec.ru/2015-01/pramye-investicii-aponii-vrossijskuu-ekonomiku-masstaby-problemy-perspektivy Рогожин А.А., Рогожина Н.Г. Юго-Восточная Азия в приоритетах российской политики «поворота к Азии» (Rogozhin A.A., Rogozhina N.G. Yugo-Vostochnaya Aziya v prioritetakh rossiyskoy politiki «povorota k Azii») // Контуры глобаль-

245

Bi b l i o g ra p h y ных трансформаций: политика, экономика, право. 2019. Т. 12. № 1. Рособоронэкспорт: военно-техническому сотрудничеству России и Индонезии исполняется 60 лет (Rosoboroneksport: voenno-tekhnicheskomu sotrudnichestvu Rossii i Indonezii ispolnyaetsya 60 let) // Рособоронэкспорт // URL: http:// roe.ru/press-centr/press-relizi/rosoboroneksport-voennotekhnicheskomu-sotrudnichestvu-rossii-i-indoneziiispolnyaetsya-60-let/ Российский самолет с гуманитарной помощью прибыл в Индонезию (Rossiyskiy samolet s gumanitarnoy pomoshch'yu pribyl v Indoneziyu) // ИА REGNUM. 09.10.2019. URL: https://regnum.ru/news/polit/2497283.html Российско-вьетнамское военно-техническое сотрудничество: традиции и новые вызовы (Rossijsko-v'etnamskoe voennotekhnicheskoe sotrudnichestvo: tradicii i novye vyzovy) // Валдай: международный дискуссионный клуб. URL: https://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/rossiya-vetnamvoenno-tekhnicheskoe/ Россия (СССР) в локальных войнах и военных конфликтах второй половины ХХ века. (Rossiya (SSSR) v lokal'nykh voynakh i voyennykh konfliktakh vtoroy poloviny XX veka.) М., 2000. Россия и Вьетнам подписали меморандум о графике реализации проекта сооружения Центра ядерной науки и технологий (Rossiya i V'yetnam podpisali memorandum o grafike realizatsii proyekta sooruzheniya Tsentra yadernoy nauki i tekhnologiy) // Росатом, официальный сайт, 22.05.2019. URL: https://www.rosatom.ru/journalist/news/rossiya-ivetnam-podpisali-memorandum-o-grafike-realizatsii-proektasooruzheniya-tsentra-yadernoy-na/ Россия и Индонезия готовят встречу на высшем уровне (Rossiya i Indoneziya gotovyat vstrechu na vysshem urovne) // ТАСС, 04.02.2020. URL: https://tass.ru/politika/7680123 Россия и Индонезия: большой потенциал для углубления связей (Rossiya i Indoneziya: bol'shoy potentsial dlya uglubleniya svyazey) // Eurasia daily, 26.12.2017, URL: https://

246

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

eadaily.com/ru/news/2017/12/26/rossiya-i-indoneziyabolshoy-potencial-dlya-uglubleniya-svyazey Светлана Гомзикова. Америка закрыла небо Азии для Су-35 (Svetlana Gomzikova. Amerika zakryla nebo Azii dlya Su-35) // Свободная пресса, 14.03.2020. URL: https://svpressa.ru/ war21/article/259709 Сергей Лавров. Россия и Индонезия: 70 лет плодотворного сотрудничества (Sergey Lavrov. Rossiya i Indoneziya: 70 let plodotvornogo sotrudnichestva) // РСМД, 03.02.2020. URL: https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/ comments/rossiya-i-indoneziya-70-let-plodotvornogosotrudnichestva/ СМИ: Вьетнам получил вторую партию российских танков Т-90 (SMI: V'yetnam poluchil vtoruyu partiyu rossiyskikh tankov T-90) // ТАСС, 22.02.2019, URL: https://tass.ru/ekono mika/6149005 Совместное заявление по итогам официального визита Генерального секретаря Центрального комитета Коммунистической партии Вьетнам Нгуен Фу Чонга в Российскую Федерацию (Sovmestnoye zayavleniye po itogam ofitsial'nogo vizita General'nogo sekretarya Tsentral'nogo komiteta Kommunisticheskoy partii V'yetnam Nguyen Fu Chonga v Rossiyskuyu Federatsiyu) // Президент России, официальный сайт, 08.09.2018, URL: http://kremlin.ru/ supplement/5338 Соколов А.А. Российско-вьетнамское сотрудничество в сфере образования (Sokolov A.A. Rossiysko-v'yetnamskoye sotrudnichestvo v sfere obrazovaniya) // Российско-вьетнамские отношения сегодня: сферы совпадающих интересов, М.: 2020, С. 223-235. Справочные и аналитические материалы (Spravochnyye i analiticheskiye materialy) // Федеральная таможенная служба Российской Федерации, официальный сайт, URL: http://customs.gov.ru/statistic Статья Министра иностранных дел России С.В. Лаврова «Россия и Индонезия: 70 лет плодотворного сотрудничества», опубликованная в индонезийской национальной газете «Компас» (Stat'ya Ministra inostrannykh del Rossii

247

Bi b l i o g ra p h y S.V. Lavrova «Rossiya i Indoneziya: 70 let plodotvornogo sotrudnichestva», opublikovannaya v indoneziyskoy natsional'noy gazete «Kompas») // Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации, официальный сайт, 02.02.2020, URL: https://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/ -/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4016185 Статья Министра иностранных дел Российской Федерации С.В. Лаврова «Россия и Вьетнам: дружба, прошедшая сквозь десятилетия» для печатного издания МИД Вьетнама «Мир и Вьетнам», опубликованная 29 января 2020 года (Stat'ya Ministra inostrannykh del Rossiyskoy Federatsii S.V.Lavrova «Rossiya i V'yetnam: druzhba, proshedshaya skvoz' desyatiletiya» dlya pechatnogo izdaniya MID V'yetnama «Mir i V'yetnam», opublikovannaya 29 yanvarya 2020 goda) // Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации, 29.01.2020, URL: https://www.mid.ru/foreign_ policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/ 4013494?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw&_101_INS TANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw_languageId=ru_RU Статья Посла России во Вьетнаме К.В. Внукова о российсковьетнамских отношениях к 70-й годовщине установления дипломатических отношений между нашими странами (Stat'ya Posla Rossii vo V'yetname K.V. Vnukova o rossiyskov'yetnamskikh otnosheniyakh k 70-y godovshchine ustanoleniya diplomaticheskikh otnosheniy mezhdu nashimi stranami) // Посольство России во Вьетнаме, официальный сайт, URL: https://vietnam.mid.ru/rossijsko-v-etnamskieotnosenia Товарооборот России с Индонезией (Tovarooborot Rossii s Indoneziej // Внешняя торговля России URL: https:// russian-trade.com/reports-and-reviews/2020-02/torgovlyamezhdu-rossiey-i-indoneziey-v-2019-g/ Торговля между Россией и Вьетнамом в 2018 г. (Torgovlya mezhdu Rossiyey i V'yetnamom v 2018 g.) // Внешняя торговля России. 09.02.2019. URL: http://russian-trade. com/reports-and-reviews/2019-02/torgovlya-mezhdurossiey-i-vetnamom-v-2018-g/

248

RUSSIAN-INDONESIAN COOPERATION: Past, Present and Development Prospects

Федоров Н.В. Участие России в нефтегазовых проектах на континентальном шельфе Вьетнама - проблемы и перспективы (Fedorov N.V. Uchastiye Rossii v neftegazovykh proyektakh na konti-nental'nom shel'fe V'yetnama - problemy i perspektivy) // Юго-Восточная Азия: актуальные проблемы развития, Том II, № 4 (41), 2018. С. 129-143. Хохлова Н.И. Отношения России и Индонезии на современном этапе (Khokhlova N.I. Otnosheniya Rossii i Indonezii na sovremennom etape) // Юго-Восточная Азия: актуальные проблемы развития, 2018, № 2 (39). С. 99-105. Цветов А. Почему во Вьетнаме не будет российской АЭС (Tsvetov A. Pochemu vo V'yetname ne budet rossiyskoy AES) // Московский центр Карнеги, 11.04.2017, URL: https:// carnegie.ru/commentary/68575 Чернобай Г.К. Главный советник (Chernobay G.K. Glavnyy sovetnik)// «Совершенно секретно», 1995, №11. Шолмов Ю.А. Россия – Индонезия. Годы сближения и тесного сотрудничества (1945 – 1965). (Sholmov Yu.A. Rossiya – Indoneziya. Gody sblizheniya i tesnogo sotrudnichestva (1945 – 1965)). М., 2009. Periodicals Antara News.com.

Tempo, Jakarta

Berita Indonesia

Военно-исторический журнал

Harian Rakjat

Воин России

Kompas

За рубежом

Liputan6.com

Известия

Nasional.tempo.co

Красная звезда

Newsweek

Новое время

Sinar Harapan.co.

Правда

Suara Pembaruan.com.

249

Научное издание

РОССИЙСКО-ИНДОНЕЗИЙСКОЕ СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВО: прошлое, настоящее и перспективы развития коллективная монография

Редакторы: Е.А. Фомичева, Д.С. Панарина Корректор: Е.М. Астафьева Верстка, обложка О.В. Щербакова http://oksanascherbakova.tilda.ws/ Подписано 14.12.2020 Формат 60х90/16 Бумага офсетная Усл. печ. л. 15,63 Уч.-изд. 10,9 Тираж 500 экз. Заказ № 449

Федеральное государственное бюджетное учреждение науки Институт востоковедения Российской академии наук 107031 Москва, ул. Рождественка, 12 Научно-издательский отдел Зав. отделом И.В. Федулов E-mail: [email protected] Отпечатано в ПАО «Т8 Издательские технологии» г. Москва, Волгоградский проспект, дом 42, корп. 5