Rural Property and Economy in Post-Communist Albania [1 ed.] 9781789205862, 9781571811509

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Rural Property and Economy in Post-Communist Albania

Rural Property and Economy in Post-Communist Albania, edited by Harold Lemel, Berghahn Books, Incorporated,

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RURAL PROPERTY AND ECONOMY IN POST-COMMUNIST ALBANIA

i Edited by

Copyright © 2000. Berghahn Books, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Harold Lemel

Berghahn Books NEW YORK

•

OXFORD

Rural Property and Economy in Post-Communist Albania, edited by Harold Lemel, Berghahn Books, Incorporated,

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Published in 2000 by

Berghahn Books © 2000 Harold Lemel

Copyright © 2000. Berghahn Books, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form or by any means without the written permission of Berghahn Books.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Rural property and economy in post-communist Albania / edited by Harold W. Lemel. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-57181-150-8 (alk. paper) 1. Land tenure--Albania. 2. Albania--Rural conditions. 3. Albania-Economic policy. I. Lemel, Harold Walter. HD810.5.Z63 R87 1999 333.33'5'094965--dc21

99-045856

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed in the United States on acid-free paper.

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CONTENTS

List of Tables List of Figures Preface Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations Glossary

x xv xviii xix xxi xxii – Chapter 1 –

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Overview and Methodology Introduction Background Logic of the study and topics covered Highlights of study design and methodology General design considerations and challenges Controlling for non-project/non-tenure factors Generalizability Appendix 1.1: Highlights of sampling design

1

5

7 8

– Chapter 2 –

Involvement in Farming and Interest in Land Factors affecting concern about land Reliance on agriculture Agricultural potential and constraints Constraints in agriculture Conclusion

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vi

Contents – Chapter 3 –

Tenure Security Factors bearing on tenure security Tenure security and the mode of land distribution Survey data on tenure security Formal security Subjective security Connections between formal security and subjective security Conflicts and insecurity Boundaries and boundary demarcation Discretion Conclusion

27 31

45 48

– Chapter 4 –

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Tenure Security, Land Use, and Investment Introduction Overview of land use patterns General trends and patterns Spatial dimensions of land use Contrasting orientations Security and levels of use Unused parcels Extent of parcel non-use Multi-cropping Investments Scope and types of medium- to long-term investments Links between on-parcel investments and tenure status and security Concluding remarks Appendix 4.1: Percentage of total arable land used by major crop categories and by district (1995) Appendix 4.2: Connections between tenure security and area planted in alfalfa

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Contents

Appendix 4.3:

vii

(a) Estimate of vineyard establishment costs and production/profit, farkemadhe village, sauk komuna, tiranë (b) Cost quotes from kolonje komuna, lushnjë, on establishment of fruit tree orchard/grove – Chapter 5 –

Potential for Rural Property Markets

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Introduction Scope and nature of property transactions Aspects of property market potential Valuation Interest in sale and rental and constraints and restrictions affecting land market transactions Housing purchases, values, and documentation Conclusion Appendix 5.1: Description of variables used and detailed results of statistical analyses

75 75 76

81 85

– Chapter 6 –

Credit Access and Collateral Introduction Overview of current patterns Interest in credit and investment priorities Sources of finance Factors limiting access to formal credit The farmer’s perspective Review of institutional factors Use of immovable property as collateral Barriers and outlook for using immovable property as collateral Conclusions Appendix 6.1: Credit institutions and programs available in Albania

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Contents

– Chapter 7 –

Land Fragmentation Introduction Aspects and dimensions of the problem Holdings with “many” parcels Distance to parcels Small parcel size Roots and patterns of land fragmentation Historical dimensions Patterns among study districts Evidence of impacts Non-use or minimal use Reliance on farming Solutions The farmer organization solution Land market solutions Concluding remarks

109 109

111

118

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– Chapter 8 –

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Family and Property Rights: Implications for Gender and Farming Introduction Legal and social background for issues defining family and intra-family property rights Legal ambiguity and social conflict regarding family property Changing family structures and impact on property rights Family structure Gender of head of household and documentation of property rights Employment of household members and sources of income Land subdivision resulting from marriage Inheritance Decision-making authority over property rights

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Contents

ix

150

References Contributors Index

155 157 158

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Management of family farm enterprise Profile of female-managed farm households Differences between female- and male-managed farms Farm enterprise type Source of household income Investments and constraints in agricultural production Conclusions and Outlook

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1 Table 2.1

Table 2.2 Table 2.3

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Table 2.4 Table 2.5

Table 2.6

Table 2.7

Table 2.8 Table 3.1

Table 3.2 Table 3.3

Exogenous factors at the household, parcel, and village levels Main source of income for sample households in the IPRS Baseline Survey (by district) Mention of work abroad as an income source (by district) Expectations that children would carry on farming (by district) Holding size by main source of income Constraints mentioned by IPRS Survey respondents engaged in farming (percent distribution by district) Holding size, number of parcels per holding, and per capita land allotments for IPRS Baseline Survey sample families (by district) Remoteness or access difficulties reported by village leaders in the IPRS Baseline Survey sample broken down by prevailing topography of the villages Remoteness of sample villages by study district Mode of land distribution in IPRS Survey sample villages by (a) district and (b) topography Distribution of IPRS sample families possessing and not possessing tapis Percentage of families in sample villages with signed tapis (by district)

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16 17 19 20

21

22

23 23

30 33 33

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List of Tables

Table 3.4 Table 3.5 Table 3.6 Table 3.7 Table 3.8

Table 3.9 Table 3.10 Table 3.11 Table 3.12 Table 3.13

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Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 4.3

Table 4.4

Table 4.5 Table 4.6 Table 4.7

Table 4.8

Table 4.9

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Reasons given for not having tapis by family representatives and village leaders Mode of land distribution and presence of conflicts in IPRS Survey sample villages Boundary demarcation and (a) boundary conflicts; (b) competing claims; (c) non-use Extent to which holding consists of “father’s land” (by district) Extent to which holding is “father’s land” and (a) insecurity about some parcels; (b) conflicts about land or houses Insecurity about parcels and land conflicts Comparison of boundary demarcation for house and non-house parcels Forms of boundary demarcation and tenure security (on non-house parcels) Boundary demarcation on non-house parcels (by district) Boundary demarcation on Tiranë sample parcels (by tenure security) Major industrial crops: 1991 and 1994 Distance to markets and the incidence of dairy and vegetable sales Cash income earned by sample households from sale of crops and livestock/dairy products (by district) Cash income earned by sample households from sale of crops and livestock/dairy products (by topography) Tenure status of agricultural parcels (by district) Tenure status of agricultural parcels (by topography) Tenure status of agricultural parcels and whether landholders’ main source of income is crop farming Tenure status of agricultural parcels and whether landholders feel insecure about any of the parcels Analysis of variance: percent of parcel left uncultivated (by tenure category)

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39 42 43 45 46 47 51 54

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55 58 59

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60 61

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xii

Table 4.10 Table 4.11

Table 4.12 Table 4.13 Table 5.1 Table 5.2

Table 5.3 Table 5.4 Table 5.5 Table 5.6

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Table 5.7 Table 6.1 Table 6.2

Table 6.3 Table 6.4

Table 6.5

Table 6.6 Table 6.7

List of Tables

Amounts spent (New Leke) for various types of on-parcel investments On-parcel investments by extent to which holding consists of land formerly owned by the family (i.e., “father’s land”) Incidence of on-parcel investment and possession of tapis Whether any investments or improvements were made on parcels (by tenure category) Determinants of estimated sale and rental values of land Respondents’ estimates of rental and sale values of their lands by district (median values in New Leke) Who must be involved in decisions about selling or renting parcels? Determinants of willingness to sell or rent out land Document proving ownership of home Value of houses built by IPRS survey respondents or their families (in thousands of New Leke) Real value (in New Leke) of new construction, 1990-95 Priorities for formal credit if available Investment priorities if credit available by district and type (agricultural and non-agricultural) Source of finance for investments reported by IPRS Survey respondents (by district) Sources of finance for agricultural and non-agricultural investments/purchases reported by IPRS Survey respondents Use of collateral to finance agricultural and non-agricultural investments/ purchases reported by IPRS Survey respondents Value of investments/purchases by source of finance Value of investments/purchases by collateral used in financing

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68 69 69 77

78 80 82 83

84 84 94

94 97

98

98 99 99

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List of Tables

Table 6.8

Table 6.9

Table 7.1

Table 7.2 Table 7.3

Table 7.4

Table 8.1

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Table 8.2 Table 8.3 Table 8.4 Table 8.5 Table 8.6

Table 8.7 Table 8.8 Table 8.9 Table 8.10 Table 8.11

Table 8.12

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Main reasons given by IPRS Survey respondents for not having applied for credit Main reasons given by IPRS Survey respondents for not having applied for credit (by district) Connections between modes of land distribution and current land fragmentation problems among IPRS Survey sample households Mention of land fragmentation as an agricultural constraint (by district) Analysis of variance: parcel distance from homes and percentage of parcel area left uncultivated Factors preventing sale of parcel by whether parcel is the most distant one in the holding Descriptive statistics on household size (by district) Number of generations living in the same house (by district) Civil status of household heads by gender Position in family and gender of person on property title Extent of involvement in farming by all household members Involvement in farming of sons, daughters, and daughters-in-law (aged between 15 and 60) Marriages and land subdivisions since 1991 (by district) Respondents’ attitude regarding ownership rights of married sons and daughters Views on heir preferences Heir preference of families with only daughters compared to all other families Percentage distribution of rights to sell land and to determine use among family member across districts Distribution of farm managers by gender across districts

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113 114

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136 137 137 138 140

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Table 8.13

Table 8.14 Table 8.15 Table 8.16 Table 8.17 Table 8.18

Selected characteristics of female-managed farm households as compared to all IPRS Survey sample households Family position of title (tapi) holder in female-managed farms (by gender) Household characteristics of femalemanaged and male-managed farms Characteristics of female-managed and male-managed farm enterprises Destination of products of female-managed and male-managed farms Main source of income for female-managed and male-managed farm households Agricultural investments and constraints in female-managed and male-managed family farms

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Table 8.19

List of Tables

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1

Figure 1.2 Figure 2.1 Figure 2.2

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Figure 3.1 Figure 3.2

Figure 3.3

Figure 3.4 Figure 3.5 Figure 4.1 Figure 4.2 Figure 4.3 Figure 4.4

Districts Covered in the Immovable Property Registration System Project Survey Schema of Major Relationships to be Investigated Main Factors Constraining Agriculture Mentioned by Village Leaders Number of constraints mentioned by heads of households by (a) district and (b) topography Type of document IPRS Survey respondents have for their parcels Reasons reported for being secure or insecure about one or more of parcels: (a) reasons for insecurity; (b) reasons for security Insecurity about parcels and possession of tapis: Comparison of those with no “father’s land” and those with such land How respondents marked their boundaries since receiving their land Discretion over Land Use and Disposition of the Land Crops by Parcel Location Crops by district for all parcels in IPRS baseline survey sample Reasons for not using parcels Percent of parcel area left unused by main source of income and tenure categories

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25 32

37

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Figure 4.5

Figure 5.1 Figure 6.1

Figure 6.2 Figure 6.3 Figure 7.1 Figure 7.2 Figure 7.3 Figure 7.4 Figure 7.5 Figure 7.6

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Figure 7.7 Figure 8.1

List of Figures

Mean percentage of parcel area unused by tenure category, reliance on crop farming, and parcel location Ownership Documents for Houses by IPRS District Percentage of investments that were agricultural versus non-agricultural by district Type of Investment by District Source of Financing for Purchases/ Investments Number of Agricultural Parcels per Holding Fragmentation Features among IPRS Survey Sample Landholdings Fragmentation Characteristics of Holdings (by district) Number of Agricultural Parcels by District among Baseline Survey Sample Families Distribution of Agricultural Land by Distance in Minutes from Villagers’ Homes Size Distribution of Agricultural Parcels among Baseline Survey Sample Families Fragmentation Features by Dominant Topography Heir Preference (by district)

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95 95 96 111 112 114 115 116 117 117 139

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In loving memory of Adam Lemel and Jadzia Glasin

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Page xviii

PREFACE

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This volume is based on approximately three years of research on land issues in Albania between 1993 and 1996. That research culminated with a large-scale questionnaire-based survey carried out toward the end of 1995. I was planner and coordinator of that survey and of the report issued on the basis of it. As soon as the report was finished, many encouraged me to recast it for wider circulation. This book is the result of those efforts. It is hoped that the book will help fill what is a veritable information void on Albania, that it will be of interest and use as a case study of transition in Central and Eastern Europe and that it will be of value as a document for the historical record at a critical point in Albania’s history. Indeed, history continues to unfold at dizzying speed, raising the question as to whether what is explored here based on the situation in 1995/6 remains relevant to current Albanian reality. The well-publicized anarchy that engulfed Albania in early 1997, and its aftermath, add to the pertinence of this question. I believe that in its essentials, in terms of the structure of property dynamics and as a basis for assessing likely development prospects, the situation as described here remains largely accurate and relevant. Nevertheless, the impact of recent turmoil clouds some aspects of the situation. Two elements stand out in this respect. First, although the exact extent remains unknown, a massive transfer of properties purportedly occurred in the run-up to the crisis and collapse of 1997, as people sought to cash in their assets to invest in pyramid schemes. Second, the crisis also shook financial institutions to the core, although the major institutional players described here, remain. Harold Lemel, Madison, WI December 1998 Rural Property and Economy in Post-Communist Albania, edited by Harold Lemel, Berghahn Books, Incorporated,

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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Many people assisted in the preparation of this volume, and adequate thanks cannot be given to all of them. First, sincere appreciation goes to all of those who contributed chapters to this volume. Grateful thanks are also due to those who provided financial and institutional support for the various studies which, together, provided the material for this book. Major funding sources included the Land Tenure Center of the University of Wisconsin, the World Bank, and USAID. Diane (“Dee Dee”) Blaine of USAID in Tiranë was particularly supportive from the very earliest stages. Staff of TERRA Institute, Sandra Stanfield and Lynn Burnes, deserve recognition and thanks for so competently handling logistics for the authors when they were in the field. This was also true of Land Tenure Center staff, particularly Beki Roos, Teresa Berry, and Don Esser. In Albania, it is difficult to separate the professional from the personal contributions of what seem like countless numbers of people. This applies both to officials and colleagues who assisted in translating, in driving us around, and in giving us moral support. At the Immovable Property Registration System (IPRS) Project Management Unit, the support, humor, and suggestions of Ahmet Jazo, Albert Dubali, and Skelqim Agolli were integral and appreciated aspects of the process. Llukan Puka, Dean of Social Sciences at the University of Tiranë, was involved from the study’s inception, helping to shape the questionnaire and sampling approach and being involved all the way through to training and fieldwork for the IPRS baseline study. Late afternoon “seminars” with Romeo Sherko, Naim Sula, and Maksi Raço of ICC/GCC kept us going spiritually, intellectually, and gastronomically. Our close friend and driver Stefan Gjini evolved into an integral member of the research team, acting as a very competent interviewer when the need arose. All those who contributed to this volume enjoyed his company, his humor, and his friendship from our

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Acknowledgements

very earliest visits to Tiranë. Fatjon Ujkani, formerly of ICC/GCC and now with the IPRS project, also deserves special mention for his contributions in preparing a database and data entry framework for information gathered through the IPRS Baseline Survey. At the Ministry of Agriculture, Idriz Xhamara was remarkably helpful and a pleasure and joy to work with. We will always cherish memories of time spent together and gratitude for the insights and information he so readily shared. Other colleagues at the Ministry who were particularly helpful and others for whom the lines between work and friendship blurred included Llazar Kora and Agim Kukeli. In the various districts, there were the many cadastral officers and registration coordinators who gave so freely of their time, information, and once again their warmth. Last, but by far not least, we benefited greatly from the assistance and warm friendship of translators who worked most closely with us, particularly Andi Lushaj, Perlat Sula, Paqesor Shehu, and Enkeleida Haxhihyseni. David Stanfield of the University of Wisconsin Land Tenure Center, the resident project manager for the IPRS project, deserves particular credit for his insistence and encouragement in pushing to have this work see the light of day. His belief in its value was critical to its ultimate publication. His feedback and ideas are sprinkled throughout the manuscript. Malcolm Childress of the Land Tenure Center provided an important assistance in the early stages, both reviewing the manuscript and suggesting possible publishers. Finally, there is a very personal debt of gratitude that the editor wishes to extend to the two women in his life, Seema and Mom. Time spent on this project was time away from home and unavailable to provide support both emotional and otherwise. I cannot express how much I appreciate the grace and love with which I was supported by them in my efforts. Of course, despite the care of all involved in this enterprise, there are undoubtedly errors of fact and interpretation in the study. These are the sole responsibility of the authors. Dr. Harold Lemel

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ABBREVIATIONS

ADF EEC EU ICC IFAD IFAW IPRS MOAF PHARE PICU RCB SARA UNDP USAID VCC VCF VLDC

Albanian Development Fund European Economic Community European Union International Computer Company International Fund for Agricultural Development Independent Forum of Albanian Women Immovable Property Registration System Ministry of Agriculture and Food Poland-Hungary Assistance for Reforming the Economy Project Implementation Coordination Unit Rural Commercial Bank Support for Agriculture Restructuring Project United Nations Development Program United States Agency for International Development Village Credit Committee Village Credit Fund Village Land Distribution Committee

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GLOSSARY

aga

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bandje bey

çiftlik

dynam fis Hipoteka kanun kartela

This term assumed various meanings during various times and in various places across the Ottoman Empire. The common element is that aga refers to individuals holding positions of rank, authority and/or control over land or territory. As used popularly in Albania today, the term refers to large land owners who trace their origins to Ottoman land grantees. Concrete posts used in vineyards In common usage, this term is used interchangeably with aga. The main point is that these were large landowners, mostly concentrated in Albania’s south. In other parts of the Ottoman Empire, the term was variously used to refer to tribal leaders, ruling families or important officials. Pronounced, “chiftlik”, these were large estates often encompassing several villages which were assigned to individuals during the Ottoman era. Grantees were veritable proprietors able to transfer their rights to heirs. Measure of area equivalent to one-tenth of a hectare or a quarter of an acre. Refers to people belonging to the same patrilineal group or clan. The Deeds Registry where transactions concerning immovable property are recorded. A word of Turkish origin referring to Albanian customary laws or rules. Property title document being issued through the land registration process.

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Glossary

komuna

lagje Leke tapi

truall

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The unit of administration intermediate between village and district. The closest administrative parallel in the U.S. would be the county. Quarter of village or town. Unit of Albanian currency a term referring to land titles or certificates. Tapis issued after 1990 are commonly referred to as “new tapis, to distinguish them from those issued before World War II. All pieces of land assigned to families after 1990 are described on these new titles which were the precursors to the kartelas. house parcel

Average Exchange Rate in 1995

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93 New Leke = US$ 1

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– Chapter 1 –

OVERVIEW AND METHODOLOGY Harold Lemel

i Introduction

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One of the most far-reaching sociopolitical upheavals of the postWorld War II era has been the transition of formerly communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to private, market-oriented systems. For Albania, these changes have been particularly radical, far-reaching, and as events in early 1997 demonstrated, occasionally chaotic and wrenching. For about forty-five years Albania, under its Stalinist dictator Enver Hoxha, had been one of the most reclusive, controlled societies in the world. Nationalization of private property was more thoroughly accomplished there than perhaps anywhere else in Europe. Against this historical backdrop, changes after the collapse of the communist regime were all the more stunning and dramatic. This was particularly true of the abrupt and sweeping turnaround beginning in 1991, when the bulk of the country’s land and assets were distributed to its citizens. This book explores issues and challenges raised by this new situation for rural Albanians, in particular the matter of how secure people are about properties they recently acquired and the consequences such security or insecurity may be having on investment and land market activity. Three major development challenges emerging from the new property reality are also explored: excessive Notes for this section begin on page 13. Rural Property and Economy in Post-Communist Albania, edited by Harold Lemel, Berghahn Books, Incorporated,

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Harold Lemel

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Figure 1.1 Districts Covered in Immovable Property Registration System Project Survey

land fragmentation, credit access, and legal ambiguities concerning intra-family rights over property. Data for the book derive primarily from a questionnaire-based survey conducted in 1995. This survey, the Immovable Property Registration System (IPRS) project baseline survey, covered 792 rural residents holding over 3,000 parcels in the five districts identified in Figure 1.1. In addition to the formal survey, case studies, secondary data and other sources are also drawn upon.

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Overview and Methodology

3

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Background The IPRS survey was conducted some four years after the mass transfer of rural properties to Albania’s citizens. Properties were carved out of an almost entirely collectivized rural sector in which agricultural cooperatives accounted for about three-quarters of the nation’s arable land and state farms for the rest. These organizations had become the hubs of rural life and their sudden dissolution marked perhaps the most profound change in Albania’s troubled transition to a market economy.1 Within little over a year, virtually all land earmarked for distribution had been distributed, along with a smaller but still substantial number of land title certificates or tapis. A hallmark of Albania’s approach to land distribution was that, unlike most of its formerly communist Eastern and Central European neighbors, scant regard was accorded to ex-owner rights and claims.2 With about 60 percent of the nation’s citizens living in rural areas at the start of this process, much of the population was directly involved in and affected by this process. These developments engendered a stark new reality: the fate of Albania’s agriculture and the disposition of its land were now in the hands of approximately 400,000 village families, rather than being centrally managed or determined, as before. In this new context, establishing a system of up-to-date, accessible, and authoritative property information became a critical priority. Such a system would be needed to facilitate property transactions and enhance people’s ability to use their properties as collateral for bank loans. It would also provide public institutions with an up-to-date, accurate, and easily accessible information base for tax assessment and planning purposes. With these sorts of considerations in mind and with funding from USAID, the World Bank, and the EEC, the Immovable Property Registration System (IPRS) project was launched. This project has involved efforts to amend and record post-1991 distribution property information on maps and individual property documents (kartela). Fundamental property legislation was also elaborated and the opening up of property registry offices in most districts planned.3 Despite serious setbacks due to the anarchy which overwhelmed Albania in early 1997 and the persistent instability since then, the IPRS has continued to push forward, slowly but surely. Logic of the Study and Topics Covered The IPRS survey was meant to provide a basis for gauging the ultimate impacts of land registration and associated measures and whether Rural Property and Economy in Post-Communist Albania, edited by Harold Lemel, Berghahn Books, Incorporated,

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Harold Lemel

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their hoped-for benefits were being realized. Key among these were enhanced tenure security among property holders and certainty in property transactions, things which, in turn, were expected to enhance investment prospects and the pace and smoothness of property market activity. These two linkages, between land registration and tenure security on the one hand and investment and land market activity on the other, are depicted in Figure 1.2 and encapsulate the guiding logic and hypotheses of the study and the main topics covered in this book. Most fundamental is the point that the contribution of land registration in enhancing investment and orderly land market activity is considered to be contingent on success in enhancing tenure security, both formal and subjective. Formal security emanates from accurate, up-to-date documents and property maps. These facilitate land market activity by enhancing certainty in transactions. Titles also provide a basis for formal credit access, something which, in turn, may increase funds available for investment. Subjective tenure security or how secure people feel about their hold on the land is expected to raise owners’ willingness to risk making long-term investments on the land and to raise owners’ interest in sustaining the quality of their land through conservation or other measures. Treatment of these topics in the book is divided up as follows: • The linkage between the land registration and tenure security, on the one hand, and investment and land use on the other is explored most directly in Chapter 4, “Tenure Security, Land Use and Investment.” Chapters 2 and 3 lay the groundwork for this analysis, with the former providing an overview of agricultural and land use patterns and the latter a picture of how levels of land tenure security vary across the sample. • The issue of credit access, which bears on resources available for investments on the land is dealt with separately in Chapter 6. • The land market/transfer theme is covered in three chapters: Chapter 5, “Potential for Rural Property Markets” covers the topic most generally and comprehensively. Two additional chapters focus on particular aspects or consequences of land market operation: Chapter 7 on land fragmentation explores the potential and actual role of land market mechanisms in promoting land consolidation and thereby overcoming disadvantages posed by land fragmentation.

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Chapter 8, “Family and Property Rights: Implications for Gender and Farming,” deals with how rights over transfers ranging from inheritance to sale are processed and perceived at family level. Figure 1.2 Schema of Major Relationships to be Investigated

Highlights of Study Design and Methodology

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General Design Considerations and Challenges Land registration was still incomplete at the time of the IPRS survey. Thus, it was impossible to proceed by simply linking observed levels of tenure security to land registration by comparing registered and unregistered properties.4 Since one of the chief tenure securityenhancing benefits of registration would presumably be the title certificates (kartelas) issued through it, a substitute or proxy for kartelas was needed. This role was assigned to tapis (land title certificates) which recorded family rights to all parcels received through the 1991 distribution5. Indeed, they were the immediate precursors of the kartelas which were actually prepared and issued based largely on information recorded on tapis. Thus, in terms of formal security, households and properties could be distinguished as either being with or without tapis (signed or unsigned), as possessing other types of documents6 or as possessing no documents at all. Other factors were also considered in gauging actual and potential levels of tenure security. Since serious land conflicts during and following the 1991 distribution were considered liable to have undermined security, it figured centrally in village sampling (as detailed in Appendix 1.1). Other data about conflicts pertaining to entire hold-

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ings or specific parcels came from the respondents themselves who were asked directly about disputes and their overall sense of security about land they held. Combined, these elements make it possible to explore the importance of documents per se versus other factors in enhancing people’s sense of security and to assess the influence of tenure security differences on land use patterns and on-parcel investments.

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Controlling for Non-project/Non-tenure Factors To avoid spurious results, exogenous factors which might also explain observed land use, investment, and other outcomes had to be identified and incorporated into the study so that they could be controlled for during data analysis. Some of these factors are broadly contextual, having to do with national and local conditions shaping the general viability and lucrativeness of agriculture as a pursuit. These may affect how highly people value their land, how concerned they might be about their rights to it, and how intensively they might use it. Interest in and use of the land may also be influenced by the capacity of families to use it or by the availability of alternative sources of income which may siphon off family labor into more lucrative activities. Features of the parcels themselves may also be critical in determining how particular plots of land are used or regarded. For example, parcel location may be more important in determining land use than tenure security or other impacts of land registration. Location also affects land value. The study sought to control for as many of these competing and non-project explanatory factors as possible. Such factors were identified at the household, parcel, and village/community levels, as detailed in Table 1.1. Questionnaires and data structures were designed to permit analysis on a parcel-by-parcel basis while at the same time making it possible to control for or link specific parcels to household, holding, and village-level factors which could also affect land market activity, land use, and investment. Household/holding-level and parcel-level data were gathered through a two-part questionnaire. A separate village questionnaire was developed to provide contextual data on items such as those cited in the third column of Table 1.1.

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Table 1.1 Exogenous Factors at the Household, Parcel, and Village Levels Household level factors

Parcel characteristics

Community/villagelevel factors

Non-farm income sources, Family size and structure (eg.,stage of domestic cycle, gender of household head). Nature of holding— number of parcels, total extent

Main use—agriculture, housing, etc., Parcel size, Quality, i.e., irrigated/ non-irrigated, slope, etc., Location—distance from holders’ home, main roads, etc., Precision of boundary demarcation, Existence of competing ownership claims Estimates of market value, How property is documented

Proximity to urban centers, Accessibility to markets, Degree to which conflict attended the distribution of tapis, which preceded registration, Village population, Key agro-ecological features Position within administrative hierarchy (komuna center, etc.)

Generalizability Being analytically-focused, the study’s basic aim was to explore the linkages represented in Figure 1.2. This sets it apart from descriptive studies meant to be generalizable to a defined population which the sample is supposed to represent. While this is a limitation, three basic sets of measures were taken to enhance generalizability and interpretability of results. They included: • Reference to district-wide secondary data for all villages in the respective study districts on variables thought likely to impinge on land registration impacts, on tenure security, investment, and on land market activity. This makes it possible to surmise how common certain relationships or phenomena discovered to exist in the sample might be within a given sample district.

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• Purposeful selection of sets of villages in each sample district to mirror the district’s overall topographical and agro-ecological profile (see Appendix 1.1). Thus, if twothirds of a given district’s villages were situated in hilly areas, a roughly similar proportion of hill villages was included in the village sample for that district. Topography was assigned so much weight because of its close association with sociocultural, agricultural, and settlement structure differences in Albania. By linking major relationships to dominant topographic/agro-ecological features of sample areas, a reasonable basis is also provided for projecting results beyond the sample to other areas, based on their dominant topographical features. • Controlling for major factors other than land registration that might bear on land market and investment consequences of the project and/or differing levels of tenure security. While this volume relies primarily on formal survey data, other sources were also extensively drawn upon. Case studies were conducted to assist in interpreting the survey data and to guide survey data analysis to more specific questions arising from current realities. Published and unpublished statistical data were also drawn upon to make it possible to characterize and compare district-, komuna-, and village-level conditions as an aid in fixing the generalizability of survey findings. Finally, background material covering the institutional, legal, and policy context was widely consulted.

Appendix 1.1 Highlights of Sampling Design The survey employed cluster sampling performed in four successive stages: district, komuna, village, and household. Selection in the first three stages was purposive, being based mainly on topography and the reported presence or absence of problems or conflicts during the 1991 land distribution.

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Topography was singled out because of its role in structuring possible land uses and possible or likely investments. Topography is also related to current land tenure structure and its historical development (see Chapter 2, “Involvement in Farming and Interest in Land”). Conflict attending the land distribution process also figured centrally, being a factor likely to have engendered persistent tenure security problems. In addition to these criteria, reference was made to the degree of village remoteness, village size, and whether villages had formerly been part of state farms or cooperatives. Data needed to apply these criteria in selecting komunas and villages were provided by district registration coordinators. The Directorate of Lands in the Ministry of Agriculture supplied the research team with data on komuna-level progress in the distribution of property title documents. Since conflicts generally slowed down progress in the issuance of property documents, it was thought that perhaps localities with a low percentage of tapis distributed might have experienced more turmoil during the distribution than others.

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Stage 1: District Selection Selection of the five study districts—Lushnjë, Tiranë, Korçë, Kukës, Gjirokastër—was based on the belief that they encompassed the major agro-ecological and sociocultural variations operative in Albania. Agro-ecological differences structure land use possibilities; sociocultural differences may bear on family structure, inheritance customs, and attitudes about land. As elaborated below, although topographic differences figured centrally, other factors also contributed to the choice of the five sample districts. Kukës and Gjirokastër—Mountainous Districts While Kukës and Gjirokastër are predominantly mountainous, they differ sharply in several other key respects. First, unlike Gjirokastër, where land distribution was largely conducted on a per capita basis, the distribution in Kukës conformed with that typical of many northern districts: land was allocated among patrilineal kin (fis) on a per family basis. Another major difference concerns settlement patterns: while villages in Kukës tend to be small, fragmented, and widely scattered, Gjirokastër villages, even the mountainous ones, tend to be compact in structure, with a single core settlement surrounded

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by farmland. Land tenure history also distinguishes the two districts: while in Kukës most land had been owned by smallholders, ownership by a few large landholders (agas and beys), was much more common in Gjirokastër. Villagers in Gjirokastër also are much more reliant on work and income from abroad (mainly in Greece) than their counterparts in Kukës. Finally, the ethnic factor is a very salient one in Gjirokastër, with ethnic Greeks (largely concentrated in the Dropulli plain) and Muslim Albanians and Vlahs in the hills and mountains overlooking the plain.

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Korçë—High Plains/Mountainous District Korçë was selected for its sociocultural uniqueness and the agroecological distinction of occupying an extensive plain located at high altitude. High altitude imposes a relatively short growing season compared to the coastal plains and makes the district suitable for colder climate crops, particularly tree crops such as cherries and apples. Unlike plains in Gjirokastër (for example, Dropulli i Poshtem) which had been owned by large landowners (agas) and the largest expanse of plains in Kukës (the Shtiqen plain) which had been owned by smallholders prior to World War II, most of Korçë’s main highland plain derives from reclaimed marsh/swamp land.7 Land distribution in Korçë was, with only two exceptions8, carried out according to the Law.9 While labor migration to Greece is less widespread than in Gjirokastër, it is still a significant factor in Korçë. This is especially true for Vlahs and villages in which Vlahs are numerous. Lushnjë—A Coastal Plains District Lushnjë represents a coastal plains district in which pre-World War II large landowners were not particularly prominent. Land and title distribution had proceeded fairly smoothly there. Problems tended to be confined to villages located in hilly areas with less good quality land per capita to go around. Other contentious issues that were rather unique involved disposition (whether in-use or leasehold) of saline land in the Divjake komuna area. Overall, compared to other districts, land registration was proceeding smoothly and quickly in Lushnjë. Tiranë—Variable Topography/Location of the Capital City Tiranë represents one of the most heterogenous districts in the sample. Topographically, the district encompasses plains, hills, and Rural Property and Economy in Post-Communist Albania, edited by Harold Lemel, Berghahn Books, Incorporated,

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mountains. It holds particular interest because lands close to the capital city have attracted so many migrants from other parts of the country. One manifestation of this influx (especially from northern mountain districts such as Kukës, Tropoje, and Has) is the proliferation of illegal housing on state lands. Tiranë had been plagued by particularly serious and widespread land distribution conflicts and problems, something reflected in the slow progress in distributing property titles.

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Stage 2: Komuna Selection Within the administrative hierarchy, komunas represent the midpoint between districts and villages. Usually between five to perhaps fifteen villages might be linked to the same komuna. During the collectivist period, constituent villages were likely to have been administratively merged into what were termed “unified villages.” Each of these typically constituted a distinct cooperative or state farm. Villages designated as “central villages” during the communist era commonly serve as today’s komuna centers, where komuna administrative offices are located. Utilizing tabulated data and district maps, district cadastral officers were asked to suggest three or four komunas representing key differences within each of the districts. As a first step, a larger set of komunas was selected, stratified into groups based on dominant topographic features. This was done so that proportionately, the topographic features of the komuna sample would ultimately match—even roughly—the actual proportions of either flat, hilly, or mountainous komunas within the district as a whole. Thus, in Lushnjë, which is dominated by flat terrain, three out of four komunas selected shared this characteristic10. Other considerations applied in narrowing down the komuna sample included how uniform they were topographically and whether they contained at least one village with a record of tenure problems that might be contrasted with one or two other villages in the same komuna without such problems.11

Stage 3: Village Selection Sampling at this level was particularly perplexing. First, there was the challenge of devising a basis for sampling for a study meant to explore IPRS project impacts before most elements of the IPRS were

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actually in place. Timing the baseline study later—after the IPRS was essentially in place, but just starting—might have made it possible to sample “registered” and “unregistered” villages and see what difference if any inclusion in the IPRS was making for security, investment/land use and land market activities.12 As a way around this problem, a quasi-control group approach was adopted. Three to five villages were selected within each komuna with one or two of these—the “control-group villages”— being known to have experienced land conflicts during the 1991 land distribution. Presumably levels of security would be lower in “conflict-villages” than “non-conflict-villages.” Serious conflicts might also be reflected in the percentage of families without title documents or tapis. This cluster sampling approach (i.e., selection of several villages from only a few komunas within each district) was motivated by the desire to control for key factors besides tenure security likely to affect land use, investment patterns, and land market activity. Thus, within each cluster of villages in a given komuna, communities were selected that were as similar as possible in terms of population, distance to major markets, road access. Initially, it was conjectured that a low percentage of tapis distributed might be indicative of more serious tenure problems. Year of expected registration was also thought possibly to be such an indicator; presumably, areas designated as ripe for registration earlier rather than later would be those with fewer tenure problems and conflicts to overcome. However, it turned out that other factors were frequently more important in accounting for progress in tapi distribution, the precursor of registration.13 It was therefore decided to rely more on the first-hand knowledge of district cadastral officers and on fieldwork conducted by the study planning team.

Stage 4: Household Selection Using lists supplied by the Ministry of Agriculture and confirmed by village elders, about 10 percent or between twelve and twenty-five families in each village were randomly selected. The final total number of families selected for inclusion in the survey was 792.

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Notes 1. On the pretransition situation, see, Örjan Sjöberg, Rural Change and Development in Albania, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991). For descriptions of how the early years of the transition transpired, see Kristaq Pata and Myslym Osmani, “Albanian Agriculture: A Painful Transition from Communism to Free Market Challenges,” Sociolgia Ruralis 34, 1, 1994, pp. 84-101. 2. Czechoslovakia, East Germany, the Baltic nations, and Bulgaria opted for property restitution. Transition experiences in East and Central Europe are covered in Laszlo Somogyi (ed.), The Political Economy of the Transition Process in Eastern Europe (Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar Pub. Co., 1993). See also Ray Abrahams (ed.), After Socialism: Land Reform and Social Change in Eastern Europe (Berghahn Books: Providence, RI, 1996). 3. For an overview of the project, see David Stanfield and Agim Kukeli, Consolidation of the Albanian Agricultural Land Reform Through a Program for Creating an Immovable Property Registration System, Paper presented to the GIS/LIS Central Europe Conference, Budapest, Hungary, 12-16 June 1995. 4. Because final mapping and the issuance of parcel titles was still incomplete and the registries themselves were not yet open. 5. The main distinctions between kartelas and tapis are that kartelas are being issued for each and every parcel—they are parcel-specific, and the product of a land registration process which also involved checking and correcting maps and ownership/possession information. The process of their issuance and the rules under which they will be used are specified in land registration legislation. Tapis were issued to families since 1991 essentially in accordance with rules and procedures set out in the 1991 Law on Land (number 7501). They record information about all pieces of land assigned to each family through the work of Village Land Distribution Committees. In the process of issuing kartelas, the original land and tapi distribution and information generated by it, serve as a starting point or basis. 6. Among these were Form-6 documents, the final documents issued prior to the tapis and so-called “old tapis,” namely titles from the pre-World War II era. 7. As “new lands,” most reclaimed areas ended up being organized as state farms during the Hoxha period, something which accounts for the relative prominence of ex-state farm in the lowlands. The main area of such ex-state farm villages lies north of Korçë town within a triangle formed by the villages of Sheqeras, Vreshtas, and Bregas. 8. In only two villages (Voskop and Dolens) was a per capita/old boundaries solution accepted. 9. The law in question was the Law on Land (number 7501). As is explained more fully in Chapter 3, distribution according to the Law entailed distribution without reference to pre-collectivization ownership and on a per capita (rather than per family) basis. 10. Six out of twelve villages in the sample were predominantly flat land and two additional ones combinations of flat and hilly land; four of the villages were located in largely hilly areas. 11. The approach in Kukës differed from that in the other four districts. With little variation either topographically or in terms of how land distribution had proceeded, it was decided to incorporate another key dimension of difference among villages in that district: settlement structure. One of the two komunas

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selected, Malziu in the district’s northwest, is typical of most of the district in its dispersed multi-clustered villages; the other komuna, Topojane, contains some villages that are concentrated and others that are less extremely fragmented than those in Malziu. The reason for selecting only two komunas in Kukës versus three to four in the others, is the relative homogeneity of the district in virtually all respects considered in sampling. 12. Even this would have been problematic to the extent that registered and unregistered villages would likely have differed systematically in other ways likely to affect relationships being studied. 13. Progress in tapi distribution often was a reflection of technical or bureaucratic difficulties in getting the tapis out to the villages for signature, something with little or no conceivable connection to insecurity due to conflicts or some other reason. Expected year of registration also seemed like a somewhat ambiguous indicator because of different registration strategies adopted by the different districts. For example, in Lushnjë, the approach was to move the process systematically through the district north to south on a block-by-block basis. In Korçë efforts were concentrated in areas considered to have the greatest potential for land market activity. This meant concentrating efforts in the plains and largely leaving out the mountainous areas. In Tiranë, registration was being attempted in blanket fashion, even in areas where tapis had not yet been issued.

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– Chapter 2 –

INVOLVEMENT IN FARMING AND INTEREST IN LAND Harold Lemel

i

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Factors Affecting Concern about Land

In exploring how tenure security structures land use, investment, and land market activity, there is an implicit presumption: that those holding the land have an interest in it as a source of income or livelihood. However, fieldwork and case study research carried out in connection with the IPRS survey suggested that such interest in or commitment to land was far from universal and that this was for reasons having little or nothing to do with tenure security or insecurity. Instead, land may be too limited in quantity or quality to produce an adequate income; land may be highly fragmented or remote; other sources of income may be so much more lucrative that farming no longer seems worthwhile. In addition to influencing people’s desire to invest in their land, such interest or disinterest also would seem likely to influence people’s eagerness or willingness to sell it or rent it out. Reliance on Agriculture As seen in Table 2.1, it was only among sample families in Korçë and Lushnjë that farming assumed prime significance for the great Notes for this section begin on page 25.

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majority. About two-thirds of household heads in both of those districts were engaged in farming throughout the year. This was true of only 1 percent among Kukës households and 34 percent among Tiranë sample households.1 In Kukës and Gjirokastër, pensions and social assistance income emerged as most important. Income sources were most diverse among Tiranë families: employment for public or private enterprises ranked about the same as public assistance, with all three of these sources combining to surpass farming as the main sources of income. Table 2.1 Main Source of Income for Sample Households in the IPRS Baseline Survey (by district)

Lushnjë

Korçë

TOTAL REPSONDENTS

792 R 100% C 100%

243 31% 100%

133 17% 100%

113 14% 100%

213 27% 100%

90 11% 100%

383 R 100% C 48%

152 40% 63%

114 30% 86%

9 2% 8%

73 19% 34%

35 9% 39%

Livestock

80 R 100% C 0%

37 46% 15%

5 6% 4%

22 28% 20%

12 15% 6%

4 5% 4%

Non-farm work for state

87 R 100% C 11%

18 21% 7%

19 22% 17%

42 48% 20%

8 9% 9%

Non-farm employee/ private

54 R 100% C 7%

6 11% 2%

1 2% 1%

11 20% 10%

36 67% 17%

Work abroad

42 R 100% C 5%

15 36% 6%

10 24% 8%

13 31% 12%

4 10% 2%

Pension and social assistance

139 R 100% C 18%

10 7% 4%

2 1% 2%

38 28% 34%

45 33% 21%

Other

7 R 100% C 1%

5 71% 2%

1 14% 1%

1 14% 1%

Main source of income Crop farming

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District Gjirokastër Tiranë

(shows adjusted percents)

Chi Square Chi Deg of freedom Chi Probability

Kukës

350.72 24 0.00000

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High reliance on pensions and social assistance in both Kukës (48 percent) and Gjirokastër (34 percent), suggest conditions of either overall poverty or perhaps the predominance of an elderly population left behind by emigrating young individuals and families. In Kukës, small per capita land allotments (average = 0.3 ha) and a severe shortage of off-farm jobs appear to have prompted many to leave their villages and migrate to other parts of Albania, especially to major cities like Tiranë. The primary destination for most of those leaving Gjirokastër was abroad, mainly Greece. Table 2.2 Mention of Work Abroad as an Income Source (by district)

(shows adjusted percents)

Lushnjë

Korçë

District Gjirokastër Tiranë

Kukës

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Income from work abroad NO

668 R 100% C 84%

193 29% 79%

114 17% 86%

71 11% 63%

200 30% 94%

YES

123 R 100% C 16%

50 41% 21%

19 15% 14%

41 33% 37%

13 11% 6%

Chi Square Chi Deg of freedom Chi Probability

90 13% 100%

73.7004 4 0.00000

While substantially less widespread than in Gjirokastër, where 37 percent reported drawing income from it, international migration has also been conspicuous in Korçë (14 percent) and Lushnjë (21 percent)2 (see Table 2.2). The Greek visa-issuing policy of favoring Christians or ethnic non-Albanians has contributed to particularly high rates of out-migration in villages or komunas with large concentrations of such people. In Gjirokastër, such villages are concentrated in the komuna of Dropulli i Poshtem, the extensive plain cutting a north-south swathe through the district’s mid-section. In Korçë, authorities cited at least four villages inhabited mostly by Vlahs3, where agricultural land had not been cultivated for the past two or three years because so many were working and living abroad.4 Minimal importance was attached to farming in such villages, something contrasting sharply with the typical attitude of ethnic Albanians in the same general area.

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Contrasts were particularly stark in Gjirokastër where substantial correspondence was discovered between topography and the ethnic makeup of villages. In the Dropulli plain were “Greek villagers” who expressed little interest in their land. In the adjacent hills overlooking the plains, ethnic Albanians were much more concerned. Those in Suhë village complained that unlike their “Greek” neighbors, the door to emigration was largely closed. Yet even when it came to agriculture, their only real alternative for making a living, prospects appeared dim since they were living on lands claimed by a large exowner, a former aga. In their responses to a survey question asking whether parents expected children to continue farming (see Table 2.3), villagers from Gjirokastër exhibit further evidence of low commitment or interest in farming. Almost half (44 percent) said that they did not expect their children to carry on farming, giving two main reasons for this: “none of my children want to farm” (43 percent) and “I don’t want my children to farm (34 percent).” An additional 13 percent explained that their children were unlikely to become farmers because they were all gone, living and working elsewhere. This overall pattern is replicated among Korçë respondents. Among Tiranë and Kukës respondents, shortage of land was the dominant explanation for not expecting children to carry on farming. This factor was negligible in Lushnjë (mentioned only by 2 percent), where respondents appeared most hopeful that children would remain as farmers; only a third had doubts and less than 20 percent expressed lack of interest in having their children become farmers. Instead, low expectations were mostly based either on the absence of children or on children being too young to know what they might end up doing (63 percent). Most likely, these views reflect the relatively large landholdings of Lushnjë villagers, which render agriculture more viable and promising as a future source of livelihood. Forecasts of children’s future involvement in agriculture carry over to respondents’ views about the marketability of their land. Those in districts with higher expectations that children would continue farming were most likely also to say: “I cannot sell this parcel because I need it for agriculture.” This response accounted for 73 percent of parcels in Lushnjë, 50 percent of those in Korçë, and 57 percent of those in Tiranë. In contrast, in Gjirokastër and Kukës, percentages of parcels declared to be “not for sale” were much lower—only 17 percent and 25 percent, respectively.

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Table 2.3 Expectations that Children Would Carry on Farming (by district) District Gjirokastër Tiranë

(shows adjusted percents)

Lushnjë

Korçë

TOTAL REPSONDENTS

243 31% 100%

133 17% 100%

112 14% 100%

213 27% 100%

90 11% 100%

792 R 100% C 100%

Kukës

Expect children to carry on farming NO

257 R 100% C 32%

53 21% 22%

39 15% 41%

49 19% 44%

86 33% 41%

30 12% 33%

YES

491 R 100% C 62%

188 38% 78%

55 11% 59%

63 13% 56%

125 25% 59%

60 12% 67%

Chi Square Chi Deg of freedom Chi Probability

205.09 CELL .000

No

31

56

64

66

70

Shortage of land (%)

Yes

2

17

7

24

68

Chi Square 179.34 Prob. > .000

No

98

83

93

76

32

Yes

12

41

52

12

7

No

88

59

48

88

93

Yes

33

34

42

28

49

No

67

66

58

72

51

Fragmentation (%) Chi Square 113.59 Prob. > .000 Remoteness/access problems (%) Chi Square 11.53 Prob. = .02

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Total6

DISTRICTS Lushnjë

(n)

(724)

(725)

(724)

(724)

72 percent of their parcels as having been irrigable; when they received their land during and after 1991, this percentage had dropped to 52 percent. Some four to five years later, by the time the IPRS baseline survey was being conducted (fall 1995), a mere 30 percent of sample parcels benefited from at least one irrigation during the preceding year. Thus it comes as no surprise that shortage of irrigation water was the problem most commonly mentioned by village leaders. It was cited as the major problem in over a third of sample villages, was cited as a constraint by almost half of all respondents and was blamed for restricting use of 72 percent of the agricultural (i.e., nonhouse) parcels in the sample. It figured most prominently as a factor among both Lushnjë village leaders and household heads (69 percent). In the other four sample districts, between 30 percent (Kukës) to 44 percent (Korçë) of respondents mentioned this as a constraint. Land shortage/quality and land fragmentation Shortage of land was mentioned as the major constraint by 25.5 percent of sample village leaders and by about 15 percent of sample households. About three-fourths of these villages (13/17) and village families (90/126) were located in Kukës or Tiranë. The land situation was particularly acute in Kukës where average holding sizes were around 0.3 ha. per family. As seen in Table 2.5, over

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two-thirds of families sampled from Kukës complained that they had insufficient land. Lushnjë and Gjirokastër stood at the other end of the spectrum with median holdings of 1.7 ha and 1.2 ha., respectively, and with only 2 percent and 7 percent, respectively, calling attention to land shortage as a handicap. There is a strong association between per capita allotments and holding size on the one hand and district and dominant topographical conditions, on the other. Holding sizes for mountainous villages (5 dynam) averaged only a third the size of those in plains areas (15 dynam) and half of those in hilly areas (10.7 dynam). Mountainous villages accounted for all sample villages in Kukës, a relatively high percentage of villages in Gjirokastër, one of the sample komunas in Tiranë (i.e., Zallbastar) and none of the villages in Lushnjë. These differences are reflected in Table 2.6. Table 2.6 Holding Size, Number of Parcels per Holding, and per Capita Land Allotments for Sample Families (by district)

District

Holding size in hectares

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Mean Gjirokastër Korçë Tiranë Kukës Lushnjë

1.3 1.0 0.6 0.3 1.7

Number of parcels

Per capita land allotments (dynam)

Median

Range

Mean

Median

Max

Mean7

Median

Range

1.2 1.0 0.5 0.25 1.7

0.01-3.4 0.06-2.4 0.01-0.8 0.03-1.4 0.10-4.8

6 6 3 3 4.7

6 6 3 3 4

10 10 7 8 10

3.2 2.6 1.6 0.4 4.1

3.0 2.3 1.6 0.35 4.1

1.5-4.9 2.0-3.5 1.0-2.4 0.2-0.6 3.5-5.2

Fragmentation and distance to parcel Almost a quarter of respondents described their holdings as overly fragmented. This problem, which is explored further in Chapter 7, emerged as most acute for sample households in Korçë and Gjirokastër. In both districts the average number of parcels per holding reached six, substantially more than elsewhere (see Table 2.6). This would appear to be one of the reasons why about half of respondents in Gjirokastër and Korçë complained about fragmentation versus only between 7 and 12 percent in the other study districts. As is clarified in Chapter 7, high numbers of parcels combine with other problematic features of holdings, particularly in Gjirokastër.

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Parcel distance was also troublesome with about a fifth of parcels being more than thirty minutes away and about half, sixteen minutes or more away from villagers’ homes. Salinity, drainage, and steep slope problems Soil salinity was a problem largely confined to sample parcels in Divjakë village in Lushnjë; steepness mainly affected hilly villages in Lushnjë and the great majority of villages in Kukës, which are located in mountainous terrain. Drainage difficulties were reported for 42 percent of non-house parcels, particularly those in the plains of Korçë and Lushnjë.8 Isolation, remoteness, distance to markets, et cetera About 15 percent of village leaders and slightly over a third of village household respondents considered remoteness or access difficulties as major agricultural constraints for themselves and their commuTable 2.7 Remoteness or Access Difficulties Reported by Village Leaders in the IPRS Baseline Survey Sample Broken Down by Prevailing Topography of the Villages

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Dominant topography in village TOTAL RESPONDENTS C Village remote, isolated YES C NO C

flat

hilly

mountainous

46 100%

18 100%

14 100%

14 100%

28 58% 18 40%

8 44% 10 56%

9 64% 5 36%

11 79% 3 21%

Table 2.8 Remoteness of Sample Villages by Study District Distance to Asphalt Road (km) Median Mean

Lushnjë

Korçë

Gjirokastër

Tiranë

Kukës

6.5 7

3 4

3 14

4 9

10.5 16

Distance to Nearest Market (km) Lushnjë Median Mean

14 18

Korçë

Gjirokastër

Tiranë

23 22

32 33

14 16

Kukës

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nities. As seen in Table 2.7, such problems tend to be most serious in mountainous or hilly areas, which in the sample are mainly concentrated in Kukës, in much of Gjirokastër and portions of Tiranë. About 80 percent of village leaders from mountainous areas described their communities as remote and isolated. Table 2.8 shows how villages in the sample districts differ in terms of distances to all-weather roads and markets.

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General economic environment Almost two-thirds of respondents expressed frustration at trying to farm under conditions of escalating input costs and low product prices, especially for grains. Most concerned were those relying primarily on farming, particularly those in Lushnjë and Korçë; 84 percent and 77 percent, respectively of respondents from those two districts, lamented the untenable pricing structure they were being confronted with. Corresponding percentages for the other sample districts ranged between 43 percent (in Kukës) and 54 percent (in Tiranë). High costs of mechanized land preparation and the arduousness of substituting hand labor for it were also issues raised by about a quarter of all respondents. This was not much of an issue in Kukës where the tininess of the plots and the hilliness of the terrain rendered mechanized farming largely impractical. Overall picture It is important to realize that places disadvantaged by one or two constraints also tend to suffer from several others. This is particularly true of mountainous areas which tend to face the largest assortments of problems, as evidenced in Figure 2.2. Thus we see Kukës farmers, with the least land to begin with, being most likely also to be disadvantaged by stony, steeply sloping land, greater road and access difficulties, and lack of irrigation.

Conclusion Clearly, respondents in the various study districts differ greatly in terms of their level of interest in land they now possess and the potential such land holds for agriculture. These differences should be kept in mind as land use, investment, and land market patterns, are now explored.

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Figure 2.2 Number of Constraints Mentioned by Heads of Households by (a) district and (b) topography % 50 40 30 20 10 0

% 40 30 20 10 0

Constraints: Stony, salty, steep slope, water shortage, drainage, distance of parcel to home Old age/labor, Main road > 10km, market > 10km

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Note: Parcel-level data

Notes 1. These results for sample households are consistent with what was learned from village leaders about the sample villages: in Lushnjë and Korçë villages, an average of only 3 percent—5 percent of families were said to be relying primarily on non-agricultural incomes. In the remaining sample districts, the percentages rise to between 27 percent and 34 percent, with the highest percentage being in Kukës villages. 2. The relative preponderance of Korçë over Lushnjë in such migration is not as strongly reflected in the survey sample as it is reported by informants familiar with the situation in Korçë. 3. Vlahs originated in Rumania and mainly came to Albania to work as livestock herders. They are popularly referred to as Çoban, a Turkish word meaning shepherd. Based on discussions with a leading Vlah personality in Korçë, those in Gjirokastër and Korçë came to Albania in several waves. Part of the impetus for their migration was persecution in Rumania. Those in Korçë evidently came via Greece. In the early part of this century and up to World War II a school teaching in Romani, the Vlah language, was functioning in the city. Vlahs currently constitute an estimated 8 percent of households in the city of Korçë.

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4. Two of the villages specified in this regard were Belovoda and Denova. 5. Average arable dynams per person in Kukës (0.2 dynams) was one of the lowest in the country, only a third the average for Lushnjë. 6. Less than 792, because only households engaged in farming are included. 7. F=53.58, Prob. > .000 for difference among district means. 8. It was also frequently complained about in connection with parcels in the komunas of Topojane in Kukës and Zallbastar in Tiranë.

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– Chapter 3 –

TENURE SECURITY Harold Lemel

i Factors Bearing on Tenure Security

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How secure do people seem to be about land they received since 1991 and why are some people more secure than others about it? Historically, such differences can be traced back to two sources: (1) the pre-World War II/precollectivization agrarian structure and, (2) the way ex-cooperative and ex-state farm lands were distributed after 1990, especially the degree of accompanying conflict either among the villagers themselves, between neighboring villages over boundaries, or between villagers and the state over how the distribution was carried out. Insecurity has also been fueled by widespread apprehension that a change in government could abruptly nullify rights; people could not help but wonder if history might simply repeat itself. In terms of how pre-World War II agrarian structures bear on the current situation, three major profiles may be identified. One pertains to areas of former çiftliks or large estates, which typically encompassed several villages. Contemporary claimants of such land would be the descendants of Ottoman land grantees (beys or agas) who were typically Muslim, while their landless tenants tended to be Greek- or Albanian-speaking Orthodox Christians. The latter or their immediate ascendants were likely to have received land through the 1945 Agrarian Reform, land redistributed away from çiftlik-holders and others Notes for this section begin on page 48. Rural Property and Economy in Post-Communist Albania, edited by Harold Lemel, Berghahn Books, Incorporated,

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exceeding the maximum land holding ceiling set at that time. While Gjirokastër is the study district where this heritage predominates, other districts such as Vlorë and Fier share a similar history. Another pre-World War II land tenure configuration consisted of villages with between one and three relatively large landowning families coexisting with a mass of small landowners. This situation typified Lushnjë and parts of Korçë and Tiranë. Conflicts appear to have been most severe where at least one or two of the former landowners’ descendants were still residing in the village in 1991 and were insisting on retrieving ancestral lands. Finally, a third major pre-World War II tenure heritage encountered is one consisting exclusively of smallholders. While most characteristic of mountainous districts in the northeast such as Kukës, this same profile is also encountered in scattered mountainous komunas of other districts such as Korçë and Tiranë. Land distribution in such areas frequently deviated from the per capita stipulations of Law 7501 (see below), at least in part because of the small amount of land available to be distributed. Such distributions were initially declared illegal by District Land Distribution Committees, which temporarily left villagers bereft of ownership certificates or tapis documenting their rights. To some extent, each of these three tenure heritages correlates with topography—large holdings including ex-çiftliks concentrated in the plains and smallholdings being predominant in mountainous areas. However, the correlation is far from perfect. To cite but one major exception, the extensive central plain of Korçë did not share Gjirokastër’s history of çiftliks. Instead, before 1945, it used to be a swampy, marshy area which came into cultivation only after the War, when it was drained and reclaimed. That district and Lushnjë constitute the two study districts with the highest percentage of such reclaimed land. Compared to district-wide averages per village of between 61 percent and 63 percent of land reclaimed in those districts, the corresponding percentages for other study districts averaged only around 20 percent. This has profound implications for tenure security, since the higher the percentage of reclaimed arable land, the less of an issue ex-owner claims is likely to be and, therefore, the less grounds there may be for land ownership conflicts. Another dimension of the past that influences relative tenure security has to do with whether villages had been incorporated either into state farms or cooperatives during the communist era. There are several notable distinctions between these two pasts. First, ex-state farm lands tend to be less subject to ex-owner claims

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either because, ex-owners with extremely large holdings had been killed or had fled the country during the Hoxha regime or because the lands in question were reclaimed and lacked any identifiable owners. Far fewer conflicts about land were reported among families for this category of land than ex-cooperative land, 2 percent versus 11 percent respectively. Also, since little or none of ex-state farm land was formerly owned by current village residents or their ascendants prior to collectivization, the potential for claims by ex-owners against their neighbors and the state was much weaker. Mainly, insecurity voiced for this class of land took the form of trepidation about what a change in government might mean. Another particularity of ex-state farm land is that virtually all of it was allotted to villagers “in-use” (i.e., in usufruct) rather than “in-ownership,” something that also has undermined people’s sense of security about how enduring their rights might be.

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Tenure Security and the Mode of Land Distribution Law 7501, which governed land distribution efforts nationwide, called for strict adherence to the principle of distribution on a per capita basis to families in their village of residence as of 31 July 1989. According to this formula, larger families could generally expect to receive more land than smaller families. Village Land Distribution Commissions (VLDCs) were instructed to apply this per capita principle separately to categories of land distinguished by quality or dominant use. Thus, in each village, a per capita allotment size was to be derived for irrigated land, vineyards, orchards, etc.1 Both native families and “newcomers” who had moved into villages after World War II, were eligible for land on this same basis; old claims or, in the words of the Law, “old boundaries,” were not to be referred to. It was envisioned that precollectivization claims would ultimately be handled through compensation legislation, if and when it passed. Thus, to be considered strictly legal, land distribution had to have been carried out on a per capita basis and without reference to “old boundaries”; both elements were considered essential. In reality, a variety of approaches emerged which occasionally violated Law 7501, in letter, in spirit, or both. Distribution “according to the Law” Table 3.1 shows how closely sample villages adhered to these precepts.2 Distribution according to the Law prevailed in Korçë, Gjirokastër and most of Lushnjë. Only in a few villages in those disRural Property and Economy in Post-Communist Albania, edited by Harold Lemel, Berghahn Books, Incorporated,

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tricts, but much more widely in Tiranë and Kukës, did ex-owner families persist in retrieving their ancestral lands. In Lushnjë villages where this occurred, reference to old boundaries generally did not violate the per capita principle. This, however, was not true of mountainous northern districts like Kukës, where virtually all land distribution deviated from both tenets of legality, having been distributed according to old boundaries and on a family, not on a per capita basis.3 Several Tiranë villages also followed this path, with exowners often pressuring recipients of land which the ex-owners claimed, not to use it. Such conflicts were especially common in hilly areas where the quantity of good land for per capita distribution was limited to begin with and possibly reduced even further where a substantial contingent of “newcomers” had moved into the village over the preceding thirty or forty years. Unlike Tiranë, the return to Table 3.1 Mode of Land Distribution in IPRS Survey Sample Villages by (a) District and (b) Topography

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(a) (shows adjusted percents)

TOTAL RESPONDENTS

District Lushnjë

Korçë

Gjirokastër

Tiranë

Kukës

Chi Square Chi Deg of freedom Chi Probability

Mode of land distribution followed Old Per capita/ Per capita boundaries, Variety of no old + old not per principles boundaries boundaries capita /unorganized

43 R 100% C 100%

22 51% 100%

14 33% 100%

14 R 100% C 29% 6 R 100% C 15% 7 R 100% C 19% 12 R 100% C 25% 4 R 100% C 13%

11 79% 50% 6 100% 27% 5 71% 23%

3 21% 21%

1 14% 7% 10 83% 71%

5 12% 100%

1 8% 20% 4 100% 80%

2 5% 100%

1 14% 50% 1 8% 50%

60.5889 12 0.00000 [Missing cases = 6]

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Table 3.1 Continued (b) shows adjusted percents)

TOTAL RESPONDENTS

42 R 100% C 100% Dominant topography in village Mostly flat 18 R 100% C 39% Mostly hilly 14 R 100% C 30% Mostly mountainous 10 R 100% C 30% Chi Square Chi Deg of freedom Chi Probability

Mode of land distribution followed Old Per capita/ Per capita boundaries, Variety of no old + old not per principles boundaries boundaries capita /unorganized 21 51% 100% 13 72% 62% 5 36% 24% 3 30% 14% 24.9302 6 0.00035

14 33% 100% 5 28% 36% 8 57% 57% 1 10% 7%

5 12% 100%

2 5% 100%

5 50% 100%

1 7% 50% 1 10% 50%

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[Missing cases = 6]

old boundaries in Kukës, engendered little or no conflict among the villagers themselves; it was a matter of broad consensus.4 It did, however, produce a standoff between the villages and higher level authorities, who initially refused to legitimize the distribution by awarding villagers tapis; the authorities relented after 1993. In terms of their tenure security implications, the crucial point about these distribution modalities is that they differed in the extent to which people obtained “father’s land,” the vernacular term for ancestral land owned prior to 1945. As will be seen below, people’s sense of security about such land tends to be far stronger than for land for which others might entertain competing claims.

Survey Data on Tenure Security Formal Security Documents As can be seen in Figure 3.1, less than half of parcels in the sample were documented by signed, “new tapis” issued in 1991 or thereafter; almost a third of parcels lacked any documents at all.

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Figure 3.1 Type of Document IPRS Survey Respondents Have for Their Parcels

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No document New tapi/ ownership New tapi/own/ not signed Old tapi Form 6 Kartela Purchase agreement Rental doc. with state Private rental document Payment receipt Other TOTAL

Count 1,042

Adj% 29.4

1,699

48.0

316 21 337 2

8.9 0.6 9.5 0.1

8

0.2

2

0.1

1 3 108 3,539

0.0 0.1 3.1 100.0

To what extent does this slow progress in tapi distribution accord with broader reality at about the same time as the IPRS survey was conducted? Unfortunately, official aggregate statistics can provide only a partial and tentative answer, mainly due to their incompleteness and occasionally, questionable reliability.5 Taking this into account, here is what emerges. Official statistics for mid-1995 do appear to mirror slow progress in tapi distribution suggested by the IPRS survey. Only about 36 percent of 84,000 land recipients in the five sample districts were reported to have had tapis issued in their names; those actually taking possession of their tapis were even fewer, ranging between 14 percent in the case of Gjirokastër to 62 percent in Kukës.6 Consistently, both according to official and IPRS sample data (see Tables 3.2 and 3.3), Kukës’ progress in tapi distribution was outstripping that in the other sample districts.7 Data for Tiranë are least consistent accross the various sources consulted and it is difficult to be certain if Tiranë had indeed been lagging as markedly, as suggested by sample data displayed in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. One indication that this may have been the case, is that, as late as one year after the IPRS survey, district land registration officials reported that only 62 percent of villages in Tiranë had distributed any tapis.8 By that same time, according to MOAF data, tapis had been distributed to 99 percent in Korçë and 85 percent in Gjirokastër. As important as tapis may be, they do not always accurately document who is actually using or determining use of a given piece of land. This may sometimes be an ex-owner rather than a person

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Table 3.2 Distribution of IPRS Sample Families Possessing and Not Possessing Tapis Have tapi? (shows adjusted percents)

NO

YES

790 100%

373 47%

417 53%

244 100%

80 33%

164 67%

Korçë

133 100%

60 45%

73 55%

Gjirokastër

111 100%

80 72%

31 28%

Tiranë

213 100%

136 64%

77 36%

Kukës

89 100%

17 19%

72 81%

TOTAL RESPONDENTS District Lushnjë

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Chi Square Chi Deg of freedom Chi Probability

100.01 4 0.00000

Table 3.3 Percentage of Families in Sample Villages with Signed Tapis (by district) Percent of families in village with signed tapis Median Mean

Lushnjë

Korçë

Gjirokastër

Tiranë

Kukës

75 64

99 91

75 65

42 45

96 97

F = 3.2, Prob = 0.02 for means

legally assigned the land. Such discrepancies between documents and reality appeared to be most widespread in Tiranë villages, to which large numbers of “newcomer” families had moved over the past three or four decades and where land had been distributed according to old boundaries. In circumstances such as these, tapis cannot be equated with secure ownership rights, either in a formal or subjective sense. In Kukës, tapis documented only a fraction of land actually being used.9 However, since such undocumented use tended to be a matter of community consensus, it did not usually undermine security. There, contentiousness was more prone to arise

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between villages vying over pasture and water rights rather than among members of the same village over distributed agricultural land and house plots. According to family representatives and village leaders, the major reason for a lack of tapis was the failure by district authorities to distribute them (see Table 3.4). The other major set of reasons involved villagers’ refusal to accept or sign tapis as a form of protest. Sometimes this was due to the alleged inferiority of the land; at other times, it was insistence on wanting to “get back father’s land.” Table 3.4 Reasons Given for Not Having Tapis by Family Representatives and Village Leaders10

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REASON District did not distribute tapis Conflicts Dissatisfied over quality/quantity of land Wanted father’s land No one accepted tapis in village Worry about taxes VLDC corrupt/ mismeasurement Other TOTAL

Family representatives (%) (n)

Village leaders (%) (n)

54 9

863 143

50 21

14 6

17

274

13

212

9 3

137 43 18 11 100

5 3 28

7 20 //////// 11

119 316 1,594

Some also refused to sign because they were being intimidated by ex-owners not to accept or use the land they were assigned and entitled to through the 1991 distribution. Such conflicts and insistence on “father’s land” loomed largest in the Tiranë sample. In Gjirokastër, Korçë, and Kukës, district authorities’ failure to distribute tapis emerged as the most important factor; in Lushnjë, it was complaints over land quality and claims of mismeasurement. Data supplied by village leaders (Table 3.5) and district registration coordinators imply that conflicts were least frequent where land was distributed strictly according to the law or, in other words, where it was done on a per capita basis without reference to old boundaries. In contrast, disputes appear to have been most serious where the approach was mixed or “semi-legal” with ex-owners

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Table 3.5 Mode of Land Distribution and Presence of Conflicts in IPRS Survey Sample Villages Mode of land distribution followed (shows adjusted percents)

TOTAL RESPONDENTS R C

48 100% 100%

Per capita/ no old boundaries

Per capita + old boundaries

Old boundaries, not per capita

Variety of principles/ unorganized

22 51% 100%

14 33% 100%

5 12% 100%

2 5% 100%

To what extent do conflicts over land ownership exist in this village? No land conflicts 12 9 2 R 100% 75% 17% C 26% 41% 14% Only little conflict

R C

31 100% 66%

12 43% 55%

10 36% 71%

R C

4 100% 9%

1 33% 5%

2 67% 14%

Much conflict

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Chi Square Chi Deg of freedom Chi Probability

1 8% 20% 4 14% 80%

2 7% 100%

5.6875 6 0.45910

recovering some of their ancestral land while the rest was assigned to others. Fieldwork conducted in 1993 on this topic largely confirmed these findings. It further suggested that villages were particularly prone to disputes involving ex-owners if the amount of good quality land available for distribution was limited either because village land had to be shared with many “newcomer” families or because much of the terrain was hilly.12 This confluence of unfavorable factors most commonly typified Tiranë sample villages. Boundary demarcation Another element of formal security concerns accuracy of boundary demarcation. The vast majority (97 percent) of parcels were said to be clearly demarcated. Those that were not, were much more liable to have been involved in boundary conflicts (Table 3.6a), to have been claimed by someone else (Table 3.6b), and not to have been used (Table 3.6c). It now remains to be seen to what extent possession of documents and precision of boundary demarcation coincides with people’s sense of security.

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Table 3.6 Boundary Demarcation and (a) Boundary Conflicts; (b) Competing Claims; (c) Non-use (shows adjusted percents) (a)

Defined boundaries? NO

TOTAL RESPONDENTS R C

117 3% 100%

3361 97% 100%

R C

3385 100% 98%

89 3% 77%

3288 97% 98%

R C

80 100% 2%

27 34% 23%

52 66% 2%

Boundary conflicts? NO

YES

Chi Square Chi Deg of freedom Chi Probability

227.13 1 0.00000

(b)

Anyone claiming this parcel?

NO R C

3373 100% 96%

92 3% 79%

3244 97% 97%

R C

131 100% 4%

25 19% 21%

105 81% 3%

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YES

Chi Square Chi Deg of freedom Chi Probability

99.1085 1 0.00000

(c)

Any parcels that are no longer used?

NO R C

3240 100% 92%

94 3% 80%

3110 97% 93%

R C

288 100% 8%

23 8% 20%

248 92% 7%

YES

Chi Square Chi Deg of freedom Chi Probability

YES

3541 100% 100%

22.0074 1 0.00000

Subjective Security For the sample as a whole, about 17 percent of respondents expressed some insecurity or concern about their rights to at least one of their

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parcels. According to the data, such insecurity was most pronounced in Korçë (38 percent of families), Gjirokastër (21 percent of families), and Tiranë (15 percent of families) and least pronounced in the Kukës sample (6 percent).13 What might be accounting for such differences? Figure 3.2 Reasons Reported for Being Secure or Insecure about One or More of Parcels: (a) Reasons for Insecurity; (b) Reasons for Security

Copyright © 2000. Berghahn Books, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

(a) Insecure because: Land I have is not mine No document Government could change Pressure from ex-owners Land law could change OTHER TOTAL

Count 291 43 28 28 142 7 539

Adj% 54.0 8.0 5.2 5.2 26.3 1.3 100.0

(b) Secure because: Count I have “father’s land” 1,079 I have a tapi 1,100 My land is bad; no one wants it 55 No ex-owners in this village 111 No others claim this land 410 I am not interested in the land 37 Other 121 TOTAL 2,913

Adj% 37.0 37.8 1.9 3.8 14.1 1.3 4.2 100.0

As can be seen in Figure 3.2, the most significant factor in undermining security was the belief that the land received through the distribution “is not mine.”14 Indeed, this is mirrored in people’s most common explanations of why they did not feel insecure about certain parcels: “I have ‘father’s land.’” Next in importance as a factor undermining security was the sense that things could change—land distributed by a government could just as easily be lost through new legislation or by yet another abrupt change of regime. One villager’s explanations for refusing to sign a tapi for land that was not his family’s prior to collectivization cover most of the reasons given for insisting on ancestral land by ex-owners, even those with relatively small holdings. He explained that such land … is my father’s land The land was “bought with gold.” One doesn’t feel secure as an owner if one takes someone else’s land.

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If one can get even a portion of the patrimony, it may ultimately be possible to get all of it back through purchase or exchange. It is a matter of honor. “Father’s land” is better land than much of that being proffered through the distribution, formerly marginal land newly brought under cultivation, (i.e., “improved” land). Just as the Government changed its policy in the past about how the land was to be distributed, this could happen again; at least others in the village would honor claims to ancestral lands.

The extent to which people in 1991 obtained land previously owned by their families differs widely by district and even within the same districts, by komuna and village. These differences reflect contrasts in local land distribution approaches. As seen in Table 3.7, the extent to which most or all of respondents’ current land holdings encompass “father’s land” is highest in Kukës and Tiranë and lowest in Korçë, Gjirokastër, and Lushnjë (in that order). Table 3.7 Extent to which Holding Consists of “Father’s Land” (by district)

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How much of land is father’s land? No father’s land

(shows adjusted percents) TOTAL RESPONDENTS

Only small piece

Most

All of land father’s land

792 100%

253 38%

144 22%

123 19%

139 21%

244 100%

69 45%

54 35%

25 16%

6 4%

Korçë

133 100%

91 73%

20 16%

13 10%

Gjirokastër

112 100%

51 60%

21 25%

9 11%

4 5%

Tiranë

213 100%

40 19%

46 22%

76 37%

46 22%

Kukës

89 100%

2 2%

3 3%

District Lushnjë

83 94%

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Table 3.8 Extent to which Holding is “Father’s Land” and (a) Insecurity about Some Parcels; (b) Conflicts about Land or Houses (a)

How much of land is father’s land? No father’s land

(shows adjusted percents) TOTAL RESPONDENTS

Most

All of land father’s land

792 100%

253 100%

144 100%

123 100%

139 100%

Any parcels that feel insecure? NO 657 83%

188 75%

113 78%

104 85%

132 95%

62 25%

31 22%

19 15%

7 5%

124 86% 20 14%

100 81% 23 19%

133 96% 6 4%

YES

130 17%

Chi Square Chi Deg of freedom Chi Probability

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Only small piece

(b) Any conflicts about land/houses? NO 715 90% YES 76 10% Chi Square Chi Deg of freedom Chi Probability

25.2546 3 0.00000

229 91% 24 9% 15.5099 3 0.00143

Table 3.8 indicates the least insecurity and conflict among those whose entire landholding portfolio consisted of ancestral land. Receipt of a mix of ancestral and other land appeared to be a virtually certain recipe for conflict (Table 3.8b). Fieldwork conducted in conjunction with the baseline survey uncovered exceptional concern about land upon which there were houses. Ex-owners appeared to be particularly tenacious about such land, which was mostly concentrated within areas of the village zoned exclusively for housing, denoted as being within the “Yellow Line.” However, survey data did not reveal greater levels of ownership or boundary conflicts for parcels within the Yellow Line as compared with those outside the Yellow Line. Insecurity appeared to be especially acute for land held in-ownership that derived from ex-state farms; insecurity was expressed for 52 percent of such parcels15 compared to only 9 percent for owned

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parcels formerly held as cooperative land. The main reasons given for being insecure about such land were that “the land law could change” or that “the land is not mine.” Connections between Formal Security and Subjective Security

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“Someone with a tapi is more privileged than someone without one, but even those without tapis have claims which are honored.”

To what extent do documents per se appear to be enhancing subjective security, which after all is likely to be the main determinant of behavior? Earlier it was seen that relatively few respondents cited lack of a document as their reason for being insecure. Indeed, on the face of it, property documents were contributing only marginally to security; respondents felt themselves to be secure about 77 percent of parcels for which they possessed no documents, not much less than the corresponding figure of 84 percent for parcels that were documented by tapis. Yet in apparent contradiction to this, possession of a tapi rivals possession of “father’s land” as a reason given for not being insecure. Figure 3.3 helps to resolve this apparent anomaly. It shows that for people with land owned by their families prior to collectivization, possession of a tapi contributed little in reducing what was already a generally low level of insecurity about land; insecurity was expressed for less than 10 percent of their parcels. This picture changes radically among those without ancestral land. First, the overall level of insecurity is two to four times higher. Furthermore, unlike the other group having a tapi appears to make a very large difference indeed. It lowers levels of insecurity from almost 40 percent among parcels undocumented by tapis to about 15 percent. The implication: possession either of a tapi or ancestral land can substitute for each other in enhancing people’s sense of tenure security. Parcels documented by unsigned tapis appeared to be subject to extraordinary levels of insecurity; 56 percent of people with such parcels expressed insecurity about them. Ex-owner claims or claims by others fail to explain such insecurity16 and it is not entirely clear what percentage of those with unsigned tapis were people who refused to sign or had not had the chance to sign for bureaucratic reasons. What is known is the following: Firstly, almost 90 percent of unsigned tapi parcels in the sample were from only two komunas in Korçë (Pojan and Gore), and, second, about two-thirds of these parcels (61 percent) were formerly state farm lands. Indeed, over the entire sample, insecurity was expressed about 88 percent of ex-state

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Figure 3.3 Insecurity about Parcels and Possession of tapis: Comparison of Those with No “Father’s Land” and Those with Such Land % parcels about which insecure 50 40 30 20 10 0

No “father’s land”

All/most “father’s”

Have tapi Tapi

No tapi

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farm parcels documented by unsigned tapis, compared to only 12 percent for ex-cooperative parcels, similarly documented.17 In explaining their insecurity, about half of those with unsigned tapis indicated that lack of a documents was the issue; the other half feared that “the Law could change.” Conflicts and Insecurity Obviously, conflicts can erode people’s security about their property. Table 3.9b and Table 3.9c substantiate this for people whose parcels were being claimed by others or who were involved in boundary disputes. However, it needs to be stressed that such conflicts appeared to be extremely rare: only 2 percent of parcels were reported to have been subject to ownership conflicts and only 4 percent to boundary conflicts.18 Notably, half or more of the parcels involved in conflicts were undocumented: 55 percent (44/88) in the case of boundary conflicts and 58 percent (76/131) in the case of ownership conflicts in which parcels were said to be “claimed by someone else.” This reflects the strong relationship at the village level between the percentage of families with tapis and levels of land conflict. Whereas an average of over 80 percent of villagers had tapis in villages where no land conflicts were reported by village leaders, the percentage falls to 64 percent in villages with reports of “only minor conflicts” and 24 percent in villages where “severe conflict” was reported.

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Table 3.9 Insecurity about Parcels and Land Conflicts Any parcels that feel insecure? NO YES

(shows adjusted percents) TOTAL RESPONDENTS

792 100%

657 83%

130 17%

(a) Any conflicts about land or houses? NO 715 100%

615 86%

98 14%

42 57%

32 43%

YES

76 100%

Chi Square Chi Deg of freedom Chi Probability

40.1925 1 0.00000 Any parcels that feel insecure?

(shows adjusted percents) TOTAL RESPONDENTS

YES

3541 100%

2814 80%

702 20%

(b) Anyone claiming this parcel? NO 3373 100%

2760 82%

589 18%

26 20%

104 80%

YES

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NO

131 100%

Chi Square Chi Deg of freedom Chi Probability

301.69 1 0.00000 Any parcels that feel insecure? NO YES

(shows adjusted percents) TOTAL RESPONDENTS (c) Boundary conflicts? NO YES Chi Square Chi Deg of freedom Chi Probability

3541 100%

2814 80%

702 20%

3385 100%

2748 82%

622 18%

80 100%

34 43%

46 58%

73.8142 1 0.00000

Boundaries and Boundary Demarcation Precise or mutually agreed boundaries between neighbors contribute to security by reducing grounds for conflict. Explored here are peo-

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ple’s choices of boundary markers and whether these seem to reflect levels of tenure security. Figure 3.4 displays how current landholders marked their boundaries. As seen in Table 3.10, the more elaborate, permanent demarcations—trees, walls, and fences—were mostly encountered on house parcels. On land devoted strictly to agriculture, demarcation was generally limited to the digging of canals or the placing of stones. Figure 3.4 How Respondents Marked Their Boundaries since Receiving Their Land Did nothing Opened canal Planted trees/bushes Built wall Built fence Placed stones Other TOTAL

Count 848 955 19

Adj 24.3 27.4 0.5

111 440 1,006 104 3,483

3.2 12.6 28.9 3.0 100.0

Table 3.10 Comparison of Boundary Demarcation for House and Non-house Parcels Copyright © 2000. Berghahn Books, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

How boundary was marked

(shows adjusted percents)

TOTAL RESPONDENTS

House on Parcel? No

Yes

Chi Square Chi Deg of freedom Chi Probability

Did Opened nothing canal

Planted trees/ bushes

3541 848 955 19 R 100% 24% 27% 1% C 100% 100% 100% 100%

Built wall

Built fence

Placed stones

Other

111 440 1006 104 3% 13% 29% 3% 100% 100% 100% 100%

2742 636 835 R 100% 23% 31% C 77% 75% 87%

11 0% 58%

28 237 881 103 1% 9% 32% 4% 25% 54% 88% 99%

799 212 120 R 100% 28% 16% C 23% 25% 13%

8 1% 42%

83 203 125 11% 27% 17% 75% 46% 12%

1 0% 1%

474.61 6 0.00000

Where and under what circumstances do people seem to be adding the more elaborate forms of boundary demarcation? At least two possibilities come to mind: Rural Property and Economy in Post-Communist Albania, edited by Harold Lemel, Berghahn Books, Incorporated,

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• People who are insecure might try to strengthen their hold on the land by erecting visible structures. • Only those who are secure and have no fear of antagonizing ex-owners would dare to mark boundaries in highly visible or permanent ways. Data in Table 3.11, which is restricted only to non-house parcels, suggest the second proposition to be closer to the mark: parcels people feel greater security about are the ones where the more elaborate boundary markers are concentrated. While virtually half of Table 3.11 Forms of Boundary Demarcation and Tenure Security (on non-house parcels) (a) Boundary demarcation according to subjective tenure security of IPRS Survey respondents How boundary was marked Did Opened nothing canal

(shows adjusted percents)

Planted trees/ bushes

2742 636 835 11 R 100% 23% 31% 0% SUBJECTIVE SECURITY C 100% 100% 100% 100%

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TOTAL RESPONDENTS

Any parcels that feel insecure No 2151 489 593 R 100% 23% 28% C 79% 77% 72% Yes

570 147 230 R 100% 26% 40% C 21% 23% 28%

Chi Square Chi Deg of freedom Chi Probability

Built wall

Built fence

Placed stones

Other

28 237 881 103 1% 9% 32% 4% 100% 100% 100% 100%

9 0% 82%

25 1% 89%

2 0% 18%

3 1% 11%

218 712 103 10% 33% 5% 92% 81% 100% 19 169 3% 30% 8% 19%

80.8028 6 0.00000

(b) Boundary demarcation according to whether IPRS Survey respondents reported that the land was being claimed by someone else Anyone claiming this parcel? No 2,618 602 778 11 25 231 858 103 R 100% 23% 30% 0% 1% 9% 33% 4% C 96% 95% 94% 100% 93% 98% 98% 100% Yes

Chi Square Chi Deg of freedom Chi Probability

114 R 100% C 4%

34 30% 5%

52 46% 6%

2 2% 7%

5 4% 2%

20 18% 2%

27.4429 6 0.00012

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parcels for which no insecurity was expressed were demarcated by more than canals, the same was true of only a third of parcels for which some insecurity was expressed. Elaborate boundaries were particularly common on parcels for which security was explained as deriving from its having been “father’s land”; three-quarters (193/256) of all parcels on which respondents built walls, fences, or planted trees or bushes, consisted of such land. Another fragment of evidence linking security and the elaborateness of boundary demarcation is the following comparison: whereas 47 percent of parcels for which security was said to be due to “no claims by others” were demarcated by more than drainage ditches, the same was true of only 24 percent of parcels for which claims by others was reported. In addition to parcels people feel either secure or insecure about, there is a third category to consider: parcels for which people have little or no interest. The great majority (88 percent) of parcels for which respondents themselves expressed no interest, in which they thought that others would be uninterested because of inferior quality, or for which they were unconcerned about competing claims, were either left unmarked or marked only minimally, by canals or ditches. Patterns in Tiranë diverge somewhat from the rest of the sample (see Table 3.13). Even though fitting the general pattern of less frequent or noticeable marking of boundaries for parcels over which some insecurity was felt (see Table 3.12)19, the relationship between security and more elaborate boundary demarcation is less pronounced than elsewhere. Perhaps because of higher current or anticipated land values there or the desire to physically assert competing claims, the practice of constructing more elaborate boundary markers was very widespread, accounting for between two-thirds and three-quarters of parcels20 regardless of characteristics that would indicate either more or less security. Finally, there were no remarkable differences in the way parcel boundaries were demarcated based on forms of property documentation.

Discretion Tenure security is of such pertinence because of its likely influence on how people end up using or disposing of their land. An integral aspect or dimension of this is people’s perceived competence or discretion to build, plant what they want, sell, or rent out their land.

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Table 3.12 Boundary Demarcation on Non-house Parcels (by district) How boundary was marked Did Opened nothing canal

(shows adjusted percents)

TOTAL RESPONDENTS

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District Lushnjë

Planted trees/ bushes

2,743 636 835 11 R 100% 23% 31% 0% C 100% 100% 100% 100%

Built wall

Built fence

Placed stones

906 264 389 R 100% 29% 43% C 33% 42% 47%

8 1% 73%

14 229 2% 25% 6% 26%

Korçë

682 295 145 R 100% 43% 21% C 25% 46% 17%

1 0% 9%

4 237 1% 35% 2% 27%

Gjirokastër

572 R 100% C 21%

46 255 8% 45% 7% 31%

Tiranë

399 R 100% C 15%

28 7% 4%

Kukës

183 R 100% C 7%

3 2% 0%

Chi Square Chi Deg of freedom Chi Probability

46 12% 6%

Other

28 237 881 103 1% 9% 32% 4% 100% 100% 100% 100%

1 0% 4%

6 152 103 1% 27% 18% 3% 17% 100%

1 0% 9%

19 174 131 5% 44% 33% 68% 73% 15%

1 1% 9%

8 4% 29%

39 132 21% 72% 16% 15%

1822.73 24 0.00000

Survey questions about discretion referred to all the land a person was holding, not specific parcels which might each be distinct in terms of how they are documented or in terms of their ownership history. This makes drawing direct and unambiguous links between parcel status and perceived discretion, difficult. Instead, judgements about these issues must rely on case studies conducted in conjunction with the formal survey. These suggest that the matter of whether the parcel in question is “father’s land” or not, is decisive in determining how free people feel to use or dispose of land as they wish. Discretion over land allotted since 1991 which was not originally the family’s may be restricted because of ex-owner pressure or by fears of upsetting neighbors with competing claims. Respondents claimed greater discretion to act alone over land use and rental decisions than for sale and construction decisions. Of

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Table 3.13 Boundary Demarcation on Tiranë Sample Parcels (by tenure security) How boundary was marked Did Opened nothing canal

(shows adjusted percents)

TOTAL RESPONDENTS

399 28 46 1 R 100% 7% 12% 0% C 100% 100% 100% 100%

Any parcels that feel insecure? No 331 R 100% C 83% Yes

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Chi Square Chi Deg of freedom Chi probability

Planted trees/ bushes

68 R 100% C 17%

6 2% 21% 22 32% 79%

43 1 13% 0% 93% 100% 3 4% 7%

Built wall

Built fence

Placed stones

Other

19 174 131 5% 44% 33% 100% 100% 100% 16 156 109 5% 47% 33% 84% 90% 83% 3 4% 16%

18 26% 10%

22 32% 17%

84.3310 5 0.0000

course, hesitation at making expensive, long-term investments may also derive from a fear of losing the land. These basic findings are replicated in Figure 3.5. Slightly more than half of respondents indicated that they had sole discretion over sale and construction decisions, whereas over two-thirds claimed full discretion over decisions Figure 3.5 Discretion Over Land Use and Disposition of the Land

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concerning use or rental of the land. The survey yielded no evidence that possession of signed, new tapis or title certificates reinforced discretion in any way.

Conclusion

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As of 1995, a surprisingly high percentage of villagers lacked documents for the land they were using. Such documents appeared to have been a major contributor to tenure security in areas where land had no previous or identifiable owners (for example, newly reclaimed land) and where it had been distributed in conformity with the law. This was, however, not true for those whose precollectivization rights had largely been restored; ownership documents appeared to contribute very little to people’s sense of security in such cases. Implications of these tenure security differences for use, investment, and land transactions are explored in the next couple of chapters.

Notes 1. Usually tree-crops and vineyards were distributed according to numbers of trees or “vines” rather than by land area. 2. These generalizations are not only based on the sample survey. A rural appraisal was conducted by the author in 1993 focussing on this topic a large number of villages in Lushnjë and Tiranë. These patterns were also confirmed by key informants, including, the Director of Lands in Tiranë and district officials in all of the districts encompassed in the survey. 3. Having undergone cooperativization later than other districts (typically in the mid-1960s), memories in Kukës about past claims probably remain fresher and more accurate than elsewhere. 4. In Kukës, land was allocated by fis (or patrilineal kinship group) based on land such fis had before collectivization. Except for a couple of areas of nucleated settlement, the houses and lands of the fis form small clusters of up to fifteen houses each. Several such clusters separated by more than an hour’s walk are the way the majority of villages are structured. Administratively, the fis clusters coincide with lagjes or quarters; this tends to be true of both dispersed and nucleated villages. 5. In many cases, official statistics on several villages conflict with direct knowledge of the situation by the author. This was true of data for Tiranë in the only set of data, provided by district land registration offices, covering all five sample dis-

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6. 7.

8. 9.

10. 11. 12.

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13.

14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

19.

20.

49

tricts. Data obtained from the Ministry of Agriculture for 1995 was useful because it indicated how many tapis had been issued in respective villages and how many were actually distributed to what percentage of families in each village. Based on data provided by the district government to the Ministry of Agriculture in February of 1995. Kukës was also ahead in terms of the percentage of villages in which tapi distribution had at least been initiated, about 70 percent for Kukës and between 20— 63 percent for the other districts. The low 20 percent figure which is for Tiranë, was reported by district land registration officials. However, there are other MOAF statistics which show much higher percentages of tapi distribution for that district. What appears to be true is that progress in Tiranë lagged seriously behind that of other districts due to frequent, sometimes violent challenges to land distribution outcomes. Factors responsible for these conflicts are detailed later in this chapter. This datum came from Tiranë’s land registration coordinator. In 1996, the Immovable Property Registration Coordinator for Kukës estimated that only a third of land was actually documented by tapis. The procedure adopted for such undocumented land had been to register it as state land. They were asked to give reasons for failure to distribute tapis in cases where the percentage distributed was less than 75 percent. Does not equal 100 percent because based on multiple response variable. Within the Tiranë sample, 52 percent of parcels assigned to newcomers were involved in some sort of conflict or were parcels that respondents expressed some insecurity about. Such insecurity among newcomers was particularly notable in the sample komunas of Sauk, Vaqarr, and Berzhitë. It should be emphasized that these relative percentages of insecurity should be seen only as characterizing the respective samples in each of the districts, not the overall district-wide situations (see discussion of sampling logic and approach in Chapter 1). Slightly over a quarter of these parcels were being claimed by others. This figure comes from analysis of a more limited sample of parcels only in komunas where an ex-state farm village existed. Such claims are no more frequent on parcels documented by unsigned tapis than by other documents. The 2 x 2 cross-tabulation yielding these figures is highly statistically significant: Chi square = 168.47, P =.000 (with 1 degree of freedom). Rates are much higher in particular districts and komunas in the sample than others: komunas in which more than 10 percent of parcels were involved in either one of these types of conflict are Berzhitë and Zallbastar in Tiranë, and Cepo and Libhovë in Gjirokastër. Also, among the thirteen non-house parcels for which people said that they were insecure because of ex-owner claims or pressure, nothing was done to mark boundaries on nine (69 percent) of them; concern that a change in government could eliminate rights (seven parcels) was not as powerful a disincentive against boundary marking: Only one of these was left unmarked; four were fenced. Eighty-one percent of house parcels had boundaries demarcated by trees, walls, or fences; the same was true of about half of the non-house parcels.

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– Chapter 4 –

TENURE SECURITY, LAND USE, AND INVESTMENT Harold Lemel1

i

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Introduction

This chapter explores connections between people’s sense of security about their land and their propensity or inclination to invest in it or use it fully. Investments, which are most pertinent and conceptually linkable to tenure security, are permanent, fixed, or long-term ones, justifiable only if a reasonable expectation of prolonged, unchallenged use exists. Examples include tree crops, structures (for example, houses, sheds, and greenhouses), and other fixed improvements on the land such as terraces or wells. Levels of use or non-use are also germane. At the time of the study, many were reporting that extensive areas were either being left unutilized or under-utilized due to conflicts and insecurity. What does the IPRS survey have to say about the magnitude of this problem and where it seems to be concentrated? Before considering connections between land use, investment, and tenure security, an overall picture of land use patterns since 1991 would be useful.

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Overview of Land Use Patterns General Trends and Patterns In a remarkably rapid and sweeping transformation, an entire agricultural system of large, centrally coordinated state farms and cooperatives has given way to thousands of farmers with small, often fragmented holdings. Achieved in little over two years, this transformation has dramatically altered the very logic of how land is used. One of the more notable shifts has been a sharp decline in industrial crops, depicted nationwide in Table 4.1. Among IPRS survey sample districts, it was only in Korçë and Lushnjë that such crops (mostly tobacco) were still being cultivated to any measurable degree. Details about this are provided in Appendix 4.1.2 Table 4.1 Major Industrial Crops: 1991 and 1994 Year Industrial crops (ha)

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1991 1994

Tobacco

Sunflower

Cotton

Sugar beet

7,000 4,000

5,000 1,000

1,000 0

58,000 53,000

Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Food, Agriculture and Food Statistics of Albania—1994, Tiranë, 1995.

Expanding most remarkably has been the acreage of consumption and fodder crops, particularly alfalfa. In the plains and foothills3, alfalfa had come to occupy as much as 35-40 percent4 of the planted area. In the northeastern mountains, maize was the preferred crop, one with the distinct advantage of simultaneously being able to meet both human and livestock nutritional needs on the minuscule holdings typical of such areas.5 These trends reflect an increased reliance on animal husbandry and dairying, mainly large stock in the lowlands and small stock (sheep and goats) in the hills and mountains. With landholdings so small and off-farm employment opportunities so few, animal husbandry has emerged as one of the only viable options for making a living. Indeed about twice as many farms were deriving cash proceeds from sales of livestock and livestock products as they were from crops.6 All of this was reflected nationally in the sharp rise in livestock numbers between 1994 and 1995: cattle by 8.2 percent, goats by 14.4 percent, sheep by 29.5 percent and pigs by 29.3 percent.7

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Aside from the sporadic growing of a few trees or vines around people’s houses, new fruit tree or vineyard planting appeared to be very limited. This may be changing, however. For example, some return-migrant farmers from Gjirokastër were so impressed by the income Greek farmers were able to earn from fruit tree growing, that they themselves were now intent on following suit on their own lands. In Lushnjë, much interest was voiced about viticulture as a potentially lucrative pursuit, even on the small plots available. It was, however, realized that not everyone could afford the high initial investment costs and the substantial labor demands involved (see Appendix 4.3). Statistically, this increased interest appears to be reflected in the 8-12 percent jump between 1994 and 1995 in the number of farms with fruit trees or vineyards. While non-cultivation or non-use of land was encountered in all sample districts, it was most conspicuous in Gjirokastër and Korçë. This appears mainly to have been due to high out-migration and reliance on income from work abroad or remittances. Long distances to parcels, especially in Gjirokastër, may also have been a factor (see Chapter 7 for more details on this).

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Spatial Dimensions of Land Use Cropping intensity and variety appeared to be greatest on parcels closest to people’s homes. While partially a matter of convenience, other factors such as concern about crop theft on more remote parcels and easier access to water on parcels close to people’s homes, also promoted this pattern. Tree crops, vines, and vegetables, appeared to be most densely concentrated on or near to house parcels; grains occupied parcels up to thirty minutes away (average distance, twenty-one minutes); non-cultivation was most marked on the very distant parcels. Overall patterns are depicted in Figure 4.1. Distances between people and their fields reflect both settlement structure differences and the way land was distributed since 1991. Generally, settlements consist of discrete, clustered housing areas physically separated from surrounding agricultural land. The main exception to this pattern in the IPRS survey is Kukës. It resembles other northeastern mountain districts where settlements tend to be dispersed and tiny, consisting of clusters of only six to twelve houses occupied by families belonging to the same patrilineal kinship group (fis).8 With homes located in the midst of ancestral lands, people tend to be close to their plots.

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Figure 4.1 Crops by Parcel Location

At the time of the survey, there were signs of a return to the more scattered settlement patterns which prevailed before World War II. Houses were being built closer to or in the midst of farm fields or along the main roads. This unplanned proliferation of housing violates village land use planning and zoning according to which the “Yellow Line” designated in each community, is supposed to mark the boundary between areas relegated to housing and those to be preserved exclusively for agricultural use. The prevailing sentiment among villagers about this whole issue was that democracy and private ownership entitled people to do whatever they saw fit with their land: As one woman blurted out contemptuously: “The Yellow Line is a Communist line!” Indeed, while there is virtue in attempting to preserve as much of Albania’s limited supply of good quality agricultural land as possible, doing so through use of the “Yellow Line” on a village-wide basis makes little sense in the tiny, scattered villages of Albania’s mountainous north. Contrasting Orientations One may distinguish the orientation and land use profiles of farms in reference to holding size, dominant topography, and proximity to large

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urban markets. For holdings below one hectare, and beyond easy commuting range to major urban centers, production seems to be oriented and largely restricted, to consumption crops. Above 1.2 hectares, production of surplus vegetables and grain for market sale appears more likely, particularly for those living close to urban markets. Water availability has been a major constraint for vegetable production, particularly in areas otherwise suitable but now suffering serious water shortages due to the collapse after 1990/91 of what had been an elaborate set of irrigation networks. Some have sought to surmount this difficulty and provide themselves with an independent source of water by digging wells in the midst of their own fields. Table 4.2 suggests the role of proximity to major urban markets in stimulating such activity and even more so when it comes to dairy product sales. In addition to location, scope for dairy farming is subject to land availability and quality constraints. Between 4 and 5 dynam of alfalfa per cow was said to be the minimum amount of land required;9 some, who were short of land, were renting in additional areas explicitly to grow more alfalfa and thereby permit expansion of their operations. In mountainous areas, where virtually no alfalfa is grown, access to nearby pastures or to winter grazing in the plains appears to be the critical factor. Table 4.2 Distance to Markets and the Incidence of Dairy and Vegetable Sales (shows adjusted percents) TOTAL RESPONDENTS

1-15 minutes

Distance to Market in Minutes 16-30 31-45 45+ minutes minutes minutes

792 100%

358 100%

226 100%

150 100%

38 100%

Whether sells dairy products YES 185 23%

113 32%

40 18%

11 7%

5 13%

607 77%

245 68%

186 82%

139 93%

33 87%

115 15%

69 19%

24 11%

13 9%

677 85%

289 81%

202 89%

137 91%

NO Whether sells vegetables YES NO

38 100%

Missing = 20

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Tables 4.3 and 4.4 suggest that villagers in districts with extensive plains areas, such as Lushnjë, Korçë, and portions of Tiranë and those with relatively large holdings, were most likely to be involved in commodity crop sales. In Kukës, holdings were too tiny to support anything more than consumption-oriented agriculture. Maize and vegetables were the mainstay crops, with livestock sales representing the main source of cash income. In Gjirokastër, income from work abroad (mainly in Greece) and cash proceeds from livestock and dairy sales were overshadowing crop farming; uncultivated land accounted for an average of 40 percent of holdings there. Variations in the nature of crops planted on parcels in each of the study districts are displayed in Figure 4.2.10 Table 4.3 Cash Income Earned by Sample Households from Sale of Crops and Livestock/Dairy Products (by district) Income from:

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Crop sales Livestock/dairy sales

Gjirokastër (%)

Korçë (%)

Districts Kukës (%)

Lushnjë (%)

Tiranë (%)

2 55

48 67

23 32

40 56

25 45

Table 4.4 Cash Income Earned by Sample Households from Sale of Crops and Livestock/Dairy Products (by topography) Income from:

Crop sales Livestock/dairy sales

Flat/plains (%)

Topography Hilly (%)

Mountainous (%)

46 56

14 40

19 59

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Figure 4.2 Crops by District for All Parcels in IPRS Baseline Survey Sample

Security and Levels of Use During the conduct of case study research, it was common to hear about land not being used because of tenure insecurity or conflict. The reported extent of this problem ranged from just a few percent of cultivable area to as much as 40 percent. The IPRS survey helps establish the scope of this problem and factors apparently associated with it. Unused Parcels One bit of information comes from responses (displayed in Figure 4.3) about why certain parcels were not being used. Competing claims by ex-owners or others accounted for over a quarter of nolonger-used parcels. Other factors cited included lack of productivity, distance from the house, and lack of money or labor to farm the land. Unused parcels accounted for about 2 percent of all parcels (93/2742) in the sample and 3 percent of the agricultural area (229 dynam of a total 7938 dynam). No-longer-used parcels claimed by others exhibited several other symptoms of tenure insecurity. They tended to be subject to:

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• higher than usual levels of boundary conflict (10 percent versus 2 percent among other parcels) • virtually all (21/23) were in holdings consisting of only a little ancestral land, something true of only about a third (39 percent) of the entire sample • virtually all were in villages (23/25) or komunas—Zallbastar (Tiranë), Gradishte (Lushnjë), and Cepo (Gjirokastër)— where conflicts over land were reported to have been widespread and chronic.11 Figure 4.3 Reasons for Not Using Parcels

Land being claimed by ex-owner Land claimed by other in village Land is unproductive Land is very far from the house In no position to farm parcel Too much crop theft Other TOTAL

Count 24

Adj% 24.0

4

4.0

27

27.0

14

14.0

16

16.0

3 12 100

3.0 12.0 100.0

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Extent of Parcel Non-use In addition to parcels that are entirely unused, there are gradations of land use intensity that may reflect differences in tenure security: leaving land uncultivated as pasture marks one extreme of the spectrum; multiple cropping within the same year marks the other. Approximately 17 percent of non-house parcels were partially or entirely left uncultivated; about 2.5 percent of non-house parcels were subject to multiple cropping. Is there a connection between levels of use and people’s sense of security? If so, which of the factors already shown to buttress security is most influential? Is it possession of tapis, possession of “father’s land,” or a combination of both? Jointly taking these two dimensions of security into account, yields the following four holding groups or types: I II III IV

all parcels “father’s land” and documented by tapis all parcels “father’s land”; no tapi little or no land “father’s land”; possession of a tapi little or no land “father’s land” and no tapi

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These groups encompass 70 percent of agricultural parcels. The remainder of parcels fall into intermediate and therefore analytically ambiguous categories (for example, tapi/no tapi with most land being ancestral land) which are left out of the analysis. It is important to realize that the four tenure groupings are distinct in several ways besides tenure status and that these differences also may have a bearing on land use patterns. Distinctions include being concentrated in certain districts (Table 4.5), topographical differences (Table 4.6), and varying degrees of reliance on farming as a source of income (Table 4.7). The main points are as follows: Table 4.5 Tenure Status of Agricultural Parcels (by district)

(shows adjusted percents)

TOTAL RESPONDENTS

2,742 100%

District Lushnjë R C Copyright © 2000. Berghahn Books, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Korçë R C Gjirokastër R C Tiranë R C Kukës R C Chi Square Chi Deg of freedom Chi Probability

Have tapi and all land father’s

903 100% 33% 682 100% 25% 572 100% 21% 399 100% 15% 186 100% 7%

Tapi/father’s land Have tapi; No tapi; little/ all none land father’s father’s

No tapi, little or none father’s

168 9%

817 43%

122 6%

795 42%

20 4% 16%

38 19% 23% 130 70% 77%

305 58% 37% 345 58% 42% 107 27% 13% 55 27% 7% 5 3% 1%

200 38% 25% 246 42% 31% 277 70% 35% 72 35% 9%

1498.76 12 0.00000

11 3% 9% 40 20% 33% 51 27% 42%

CELL 0.000). Even controlling for these two factors, tenure security remains statistically significant factor in parcel non-use. Depicted as a dotted line in Figure 4.4, levels of non-use are higher and differences in levels of non-use among the tenure categories much greater among parcels held by the substantial percentage of villagers whose main source of income was not crop farming (see Chapter 3). Among them, Figure 4.4 Percent of Parcel Area Left Unused by Main Souce of Income and Tenure Categories

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percentages of non-use rise from a low of only a couple of percent among those with a tapi and with all or most of land being ancestral land (Group I) to a high of 35 percent among parcels in holdings not documented by tapis and in which none of the land is ancestral land (Group-IV). Levels of non-use were much lower among those relying primarily on crop income (the solid line in Figure 4.4). However, even for this segment of the sample, the overall pattern of higher levels of non-use among less secure parcels, persists. In Figure 4.5, which controls for both main source of income and parcel location, differences between tenure groups appear particularly pronounced on the most remote parcels located farther than thirty minutes away from people’s homes.

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Figure 4.5 Mean Percentage of Parcel Area Unused by Tenure Category, Reliance on Crop Farming, and Parcel Location

Tapi + all land father’s Tapi; little/no land father’s

Tapi + all land father’s Tapi; little/no land father’s

No Tapi; all land father’s No Tapi; little/no land father’s

No Tapi; all land father’s No Tapi; little/no land father’s

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Multi-cropping

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As the other extreme of the land use intensity spectrum, multi-cropping and the circumstances under which it occurs, are clearly of interest.13 However, drawing any definitive connections with tenure security is problematic. For one thing, multi-cropping was extremely rare, having been reported for only 2.5 percent of all agricultural parcels. Furthermore, multi-cropping was largely restricted to parcels located in flat or only slightly hilly areas benefiting from irrigation (54 percent of parcels with multi-cropping were irrigated). Finally, over two-thirds of multi-cropped parcels were confined to only one district, Tiranë, with most of these being in the same komuna (Berzhitë). Nevertheless, it is notable that patterns for multi-cropping conform logically with what was observed for percentage of parcel area left uncultivated: namely, a higher percentage of multi-cropped area in the presumably more secure parcels. The average percentage area multi-cropped is 6 percent for parcels in holdings composed mostly or entirely of “father’s land” versus less than 1 percent (0.7 percent) for parcels in other types of holdings (F = 75, Prob. > 0.000). These differences persist even after crop farming as the main source of income is controlled for.14

Investments Scope and Types of Medium- to Long-term Investments Respondents were asked if they had added any structures, made any land improvements (such as leveling or terracing), added fixed irrigation infrastructure, or had planted tree-crops on any of their parcels. As substantial, medium- to long-term improvements, these would presumably be unlikely unless people felt reasonably secure about retaining rights to their parcels for the foreseeable future. Indeed, case study interviews suggested that insecurity in the form of ex-owner claims was almost certain to preclude such improvements. Ex-owners with long-standing, precollectivization claims would generally prohibit others newly assigned and in de jure control of the same land from planting tree crops or doing anything else that might be construed as compromising ex-owner rights. About 8 percent of all parcels in the sample (281/3541) had benefited from one or more major investments. Over three-quarters of investments reported were confined to house parcels or were made on land within fifteen minutes from such parcels. Some details of these investments are highlighted below:

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• Structures: Houses (n=50), stalls (n=23), and storage sheds (n=3) accounted for over a third of reported improvements/ investments. One type of structure, not specifically identified in the formal survey, but discovered from other fieldwork to have become increasingly ubiquitous, is greenhouses.15 Construction of a couple of buffets and of six unidentified structures was also reported. • On-land developments: Land leveling, terracing (n=106), and the digging of drainage canals (n=67) were the most commonly reported types of investments, accounting for about two-thirds of the total. • Irrigation infrastructure: Wells represented only 4 percent (n=8) of on-parcel improvements. Indeed, on-parcel irrigation investments were very rare despite the great apparent need. Only twenty-seven parcels benefited from the installation of pumps (n=14) or from the construction of permanent canals (n=13). • Tree-crops: Only six cases of post-land distribution planting of fruit trees and vineyards were reported. Besides possible land tenure concerns, high costs and financing difficulties were also evidently inhibiting such investments.16 In the great majority of cases, only a single improvement was reported for any given parcel. Combinations of two or more investments occurred on only about a fifth of parcels. Monetary values of various types of investments (except for irrigation infrastructure), as reported by IPRS survey respondents, are displayed in Table 4.10.17

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Table 4.10 Amounts Spent (New Leke) for Various Types of On-parcel Investments Type of investment Structures Houses House expansion repair Stalls Storage sheds Buffet/ restaurant Other

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ALL types Land Improvments Well Drainage canal Leveling terraces ALL types Trees/vineyards Vines Olive trees Fruit trees Total

Mean

Median

Range

(n)

252,280

200,000

10,000-700,000

(50)

90,300

65,000

3,000-400,000

(10)

45,535 21,666

20,000 20,000

2,000-400,000 15,000-30,000

(23) (3)

550,000

550,000

300,000-800,000

(2)

246,667

150,000

80,000-700,000

(6)

183,078

100,000

2,000-800,000

(94)

35,000 3,186

20,000 2,000

3,000-100,000 100-30,000

(8) (67)

6,015

5,500

300-24,000

(106)

6,249 70,000 1,625 13,433

3,000 37,500 1,500 100,000

100-100,000 5,000-200,000 1,500-2,000 3,000-300,000 1,500-300,000

(181) (4) (4) (3) (11)

62,681

5,000

Note: Missing data for costs of two structures. Data for trees/vineyards included both house and non-house parcels.

Links between On-parcel Investments and Tenure Status and Security One of the most striking findings of case study research, conducted in parallel with the IPRS survey, was the degree to which actual investment and perceived freedom to invest was confined to “father’s land” parcels. The tendency to restrict investment to “father’s land” parcels has not just been fear-driven: it also derives from the deep-seated mutual recognition and respect by fellow-villagers of old claims and the suspicion that the 1991 distribution could be annulled or reversed. One remarkable example involved a farmer in Vishaj village, near Tiranë. Of the nine parcels at his disposal, all purchased fertilizer applied, and all trees and vines planted, were restricted to only those four parcels that his grandfather had owned prior to collectivization.

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Similar behavior extends to the boring of wells meant to substitute for a largely collapsed irrigation network. In one Tiranë village (Gropaj) all wells were discovered to be strictly confined to “father’s land” parcels. Villagers contemplating such an investment in the future talked of doing so jointly with four or five members of the same fis who would all then be connected to the common well by channels. This option was feasible in Gropaj since land had been distributed by fis, resulting in close relatives’ parcels being contiguous to one another. Significant exceptions to the rule of investment being confined to father’s land were encountered however. This was most notable in certain Lushnjë villages (in the komunas of Kolonjë and Babunjë) where land had been distributed purely on a per capita basis, without reference to old boundaries and with little or no conflict. Some very substantial investments were documented in these villages, such as the ones detailed below. INVESTMENT IN VINEYARD – NOT ON ANCESTRAL LAND: Lumth village, Lushnjë

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Land distribution in Lumth proceeded with few if any major problems and strictly according to the per capita formula stipulated by law. One person in that village had invested 200,000 Leke on approximately 2,500 plants. Many vines had been destroyed by vandalism, however. In addition to that investment, he also had a stall built behind his house with a metal roof, which accommodated two cows and three calves. The cost was said to have been 50,000 Leke. Asked to comment on why he felt secure enough to make such investments, interviewers were told: “There is no [land tenure] insecurity problem in Lumth”. A BUFFET ON THE MAIN ROAD BETWEEN TIRANE AND FIER, not constructed on ancestral land The building of two buffets are recorded in the IPRS survey. Costs were high in both cases, being between 300,000 and 800,000 New Leke. Here are details of the land situation of one of these. The buffet is on a 6 dynam parcel abutting the main road. Alfalfa is planted in back. It took about a year to get all necessary permits to build the buffet. This was considered to be a shorter-than-usual processing period, something attributable to the family’s influence in the village: a close relative was a member of the village land distribution committee and because he was “persecuted” under the Hoxha regime, he did not have to pay any of the usual bribes. The land upon which the buffet is built did not belong to the family before collectivization. In fact it did not belong to anyone before; it had served as a field road. There was consequently no risk that an ex-owner at some future point might claim it. Of the family’s entire land holdings, only one piece of land is “father’s land”. This 950 square meter piece of land is just across the street from the buffet and – notably – it is where the family decided to build a new house in 1992. In addition, the family has another 4 dynam parcel about 300 meters from the buffet parcel which is planted in wheat.

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IPRS survey data largely substantiate case study research findings: about two-thirds of parcels with investments were part of holdings which consisted mostly or entirely of “father’s land” (see Table 4.11). This characteristic was most notable for structures and land improvements such as drainage and leveling. Being documented by a tapi also seemed to be associated with higher rates of investment, but only slightly higher: 10 percent with tapis versus 5 percent without tapis (see Table 4.12). Table 4.13 shows patterns when this factor plus possession of tapis are both controlled for: 31 percent of parcels having some sort of investment are in holdings consisting mostly or entirely of “father’s land,” documented by a tapi. The corresponding percentage for parcels in non-ancestral, undocumented holdings is only 3 percent. Table 4.11 On-parcel Investments by Extent to Which Holding Consists of Land Formerly Owned by the Family (i.e., “father’s land”) Some investment

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NO

YES

TOTAL RESPONDENTS

3,541 100%

3,260 92%

281 8%

No “father’s land”

1,351 100%

1,301 96%

50 4%

Only a small piece

666 100%

623 94%

43 6%

Most of land

475 100%

441 93%

34 7%

All of land received

433 100%

313 72%

120 28%

Chi Square Chi Deg of freedom Chi Probability

251.69 3 0.00000

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Table 4.12 Incidence of On-parcel Investment and Possession of tapis Some investment (shows adjusted percents) TOTAL RESPONDENTS Have tapi? No Yes

NO

YES

3,541 100%

3,260 92%

281 8%

1,689 100%

1,601 95%

88 5%

1,847 100%

1,654 90%

193 10%

Chi Square Chi Deg of freedom Chi Probability

32.3917 1 0.00000

Table 4.13 Whether Any Investments or Improvements Were Made on Parcels (by tenure category) Some investment NO

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TOTAL RESPONDENTS

3,260 92%

281 8%

Tapi/no tapi and extent to which holding is “father’s land” Have tapi and all 257 178 land “father’s” 100% 69%

79 31%

Have tapi; little/none “father’s” No tapi ; all land “father’s” No tapi, little or none “father’s” Chi Square Chi Deg of freedom Chi Probability

3,541 100%

YES

1,010 100%

949 94%

61 6%

176 100%

135 77%

41 23%

1,002 100%

970 97%

32 3%

251.30 3 0.00000

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Concluding Remarks Virtually all major investments were confined to land owned by families prior to collectivization. When holdings consisted of a mix of some ancestral and some new parcels, investment tended to be confined exclusively to ancestral land. Exceptions occurred on reclaimed land without prior claims and/or land that had been distributed without reference to old boundaries and without much conflict. Correspondingly, levels of non-use appeared to be higher on parcels susceptible to greater levels of insecurity. Possession of tapi documents seemed to have little or no security-enhancing impact in cases of holdings composed mostly or entirely of “father’s land.” However, in areas lacking a strong history of claims, tapi possession did appear to significantly enhance security, something which, in turn, seemed to enhance levels of use and investment. These findings imply that prospects for investment and increased land use are liable to be circumscribed unless people’s sense of tenure security can be enhanced. While the passage of time without any major legal or policy reversals affecting land rights would certainly help, more active measures may also be called for. Fortunately, in some of Albania’s most promising agricultural areas in Korçë, Gjirokastër, Lushnjë, and Tiranë, insecurity may be diminished by simply giving a renewed and final push to tapi distribution and/or land registration. At the time of this writing, that effort had been in a state of paralysis, halted for budgetary and other reasons. Where bureaucratic delays were at issue, the task would probably be relatively straightforward. However, in conflict-ridden areas, tapi distribution would probably have to be accompanied by land adjudication efforts.

Appendix 4.1 Percentage of total arable land used by major crop categories and by district (1995) MAJOR CROP CATEGORIES/USES District Gjirokastër Korçë Kukës Lushnjë Tiranë

Total arable land (ha)

Grains %

Vegetables18 %

Industrial %

Forage19 %

Est. Unused20 %

(14,968) (42,045) (9,963) (46,390) (23,314)

9 35 30 43 35

4 9 24 20 16

4 2 -

26 21 20 42 32

60 30 26 0 17

Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 1995. Rural Property and Economy in Post-Communist Albania, edited by Harold Lemel, Berghahn Books, Incorporated,

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Appendix 4.2

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Connections between Tenure Security and Area Planted in Alfalfa As a multi-year crop, requiring some initial investment, alfalfa cultivation would seem to indicate levels of relative tenure security. Furthermore, fieldwork uncovered some hesitation by landowners to allow renters to plant alfalfa due to concerns that it would then become difficult to eject the renter from the land. However, alfalfa’s value as an indicator of security is compromised by the fact that its benefits begin from the same year it is planted (that is, there is really no gestation period) and that these first-year benefits themselves more than compensate for initial investment costs. Nevertheless, since the crop has become so important, it is of interest to see if there is any evidence that tenure insecurity correlates with lower propensity to grow this crop. Relations with variables indicative of security/insecurity levels, are not entirely consistent. Basing analysis on the combination tapi/ father’s land variable characterizing holdings, no statistically significantly differences emerge. Indeed, alfalfa is a bit more widespread on parcels that would be considered to be relatively insecure.21 This is largely because the district where virtually all land held is ancestral land, Kukës, is also the district where virtually no alfalfa is grown. Excluding Kukës from the analysis, the following results emerge: • No significant relationship between average area planted in alfalfa and the variable used to indicate subjective security. • Statistically significant, but very small difference in average areas of alfalfa planted when comparing parcels either documented or not documented by tapis (average percentage for parcels with and without tapis, 31 percent and 23 percent, respectively) and parcels in holdings in which father’s land comprises either all or none of the holding (22 percent versus 30 percent, respectively). The one variable which most strongly suggests a link between alfalfa growing and security, is that indicating village-level land conflicts (as reported by village leaders). Average percent of parcel area planted in alfalfa was 16 percent in villages with “serious conflicts” versus 32 percent in villages with no reported conflicts (F = 4.9 p = .01).

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Appendix 4.3 (a) Estimate of Vineyard Establishment Costs and Production/Profit, Farke-Madhe Village, Sauk komuna, Tiranë Information came from person whose family had 12 ha of vineyard; 10 were old, pre-dating the coop days and 2 were newly established. Estimates are based on the 2 new hectares. A rough overall estimate is $25,000-$28,000 per ha.

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I. Detailed COST breakdown: Roots: $1 per root; about 4,200 roots per ha (about 2% die and need to be replaced) Approx. total—$4,300/ha Poles: Concrete poles (bandje)—about 800-1000 per ha Begin with wooden ones first, with replacement by concrete bandje in year 3 or 4. Approx. total: $1,000 ($1.50 per pole) Labor: 1 ha requires one worker at $4 per day for 12 months:22 Approx. total- $1,400 x 3 years = $5,200 Tractor: (have own) $1,500 for 3 days = $4,500 x 4.5 times per year = $18,000 Irrigation: $20/ha once per year (July) Fertilizer: $400-$500 per ha Herbicide: $500/8 dn x 6 times per year: Since also use ploughing to control weeds, cost is about $1,000 per year for herbicide. Transport: Need transport—bought car Spends about $5 per day to go to Tiranë to distribute wine and raki to restaurants, embassies, etc. II. PRODUCT/PROFITS It takes 4 years for first product: Productivity is about 20 tons per ha Best profit from wine. 2 kilos of grapes for 1 kilo (liter) of wine sold for $1.50. Raki: 5 kilos of grapes for 1 kilo raki, sold for $2.50/liter.

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(b) Cost Quotes from Kolonje komuna, Lushnjë, on Establishment of Fruit Tree Orchard/Grove a. Per dynam cost of trees Density for fruit trees usually around 60 per dynam (assuming a 4-meter spacing between trees) Costs per sapling: $2.50/ apples, plums . . . . . . . . . . . $150/dynam $10/ orange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $600/dynam b. Holes: 1 meter deep and 1 meter wide: Cost about $2 per hole: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $120/dynam c. 10 kg. organic fertilizer per hole (no cost). ****** Total: $270-$720/dynam ******

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Notes 1. Skelqim Agolli, of the IPRS Project Management Unit, provided agricultural statistics and advice crucial to the preparation of this chapter. 2. In Korçë about a quarter of those reporting crop sales were selling tobacco; in Lushnjë the corresponding figure was 6 percent. The percentage of households reporting industrial crop cultivation was 40 percent in Korçë and 11 percent in Lushnjë. 3. Typically alfalfa acreage has been expanding at the expense of wheat. Declining wheat acreage also reflects broader macroeconomic trade and price policies designed to keep the price of cereals low for urban consumers. 4. The 1995 Annual Agricultural Survey (See, Republic of Albania. Ministry of Agriculture and Food. Results of the 1995 Annual Agricultural Survey, 1995, Tiranë, 1996) estimates the percentage of cropped area in the lowlands planted in alfalfa to have been 30 percent. 5. These patterns are confirmed by several sources, including fieldwork carried out in association with the IPRS baseline survey, Ministry of Agriculture statistics, and data gathered by the Support for Agricultural Restructuring Project (SARA) and reported in David Kunkel Albanian Agriculture Today, June 10, 1996 (SARA: Tiranë, 1996). 6. Kunkel, (p.10) indicates that while only 30 percent of farms cultivating crops drew income from their sale (including tree crops) 76 percent of farms with livestock had income from sales of livestock products. Corresponding figures from the survey data are 30 percent and 57 percent, respectively. 7. Kunkel, p.7. 8. Villages are usually composed of between five and eight such housing clusters, each administratively assigned the status of quarter or ‘lagje’. Clusters tend to be widely separated, being from fifteen minutes to an hour’s walk apart from each other.

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9.

If IPRS survey data from Vaqarr are accurate, this estimate is high. Average alfalfa area is only 1.9 dynam and the median 1.2 dynam, per cow. For a possibly more statistically representative view of cropping patterns among sample districts in 1995, see the table in Appendix 4.1. Its basis is unpublished 1995 data provided by district MOAF offices. However, even these data, especially percentages for the different usage categories, are not entirely comparable with the survey data. Firstly, district base figures for total arable land are questionable. Second, there are difficulties in estimating areas occupied by fruit trees and vineyards; data on the latter are given in terms of numbers of “roots” in the official data and in terms of area in the IPRS survey. Finally, forage crops are grouped as green and dry; no separate, specific data are available on alfalfa. There is an apparent connection between involvement in boundary conflicts and non-use of parcels. Thirty-one percent of parcels involved in such conflicts were left entirely unused, as compared to only 7 percent among parcels not involved in such conflicts. This connection is strongest and is in fact, largely confined to Tiranë, where the corresponding percentages are 44 percent and 10 percent. Berzhitë and Zallbastar are the two Tiranë komunas where this relationship is most pronounced. The same basic pattern persists when looking at the percentage of parcels respondents no longer use. While no such parcels are encountered in Group I, the percentage is 8 percent and 12 percent among parcels in holdings largely composed of non-ancestral land. The connection between tenure security and alfalfa growing is explored in Appendix 4.2. Differences are about the same, but average rates of multi-cropping are higher (10-11 percent) when analysis is restricted to the three districts (Lushnjë, Tiranë, and Korçë) where multi-cropping is most feasible and likely. By the end of 1995, there were reported to be about five or six greenhouses in Vaqarr komuna, Tiranë district. Two existed and a third was being built in Gropaj, a village close to Tiranë and renowned for its long tradition of vegetable growing. Costs of establishing greenhouses were said to vary widely depending on the materials used, ranging from 60-70,000 Leke per dynam to as much as 300,000 Leke. The least expensive greenhouses were made of light plastic and wood; the most expensive ones were made with concrete supports and plexiglass. See Appendix 4.3 for sample cost estimates. It is unclear whether the amounts quoted for on-parcel improvements covered only cash expenses or also imputed labor costs. Includes beans and potatoes. All types of forage; no separate figures for alfalfa. Including only those categories in the table; excludes area occupied by fruit trees and vineyards. Average percentage of holding area in alfalfa is only 6 percent on “tapi + father’s land” parcels versus between 20-28 percent for the other categories. Total work force is six (i.e., two family workers plus four hired).

10.

11.

12.

13. 14.

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15.

16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

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– Chapter 5 –

POTENTIAL FOR RURAL PROPERTY MARKETS Peter C. Bloch

i Introduction

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In post-communist Albania, agricultural land has come to be fragmented into nearly one and a half million parcels held by almost 400,000 families.1 While this has placed the destiny of agriculture into the hands of Albania’s farm families, this new situation also has raised many new challenges such as those of input supply, marketing, and production in what are often tiny and widely scattered plots. Many hope that land markets will contribute to agricultural rationalization via sales and rentals by those unable or uninterested in pursuing agriculture to those who are interested or able to do so. Rationalization and consolidation may also be promoted through parcel exchanges. Land market activity had been legally limited to rentals until mid-1995, after which sale of agricultural land was also sanctioned with enactment of the Law on Buying and Selling of Agricultural Land. Legal restrictions notwithstanding, anecdotal evidence suggests a substantial volume of informal land transactions especially in peri-urban areas.

Scope and Nature of Property Transactions IPRS survey results indicated only very limited rural immovable property market activity, certainly less than levels revealed in the course Notes for this section begin on page 91.

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of less standardized research. Only thirty-five parcels were reported to have been bought by their owners, with only six of these purchased in 1995 when such transactions were legalized; no parcel sales were reported. Only seven parcels had been rented in and only fifteen parcel exchanges were recorded in the survey. Certainly, a higher number of exchanges might have been expected, given the fragmented state of initial land allocations and the fact that all recorded exchanges were explained as having been motivated by either the desire to unify or consolidate parcels (n = 11) or to expand parcel size (n = 4). The great majority of purchased parcels (twentynine of the thirty-five) had houses on them, implying that the very limited amount of market activity that had taken place primarily concerned housing rather than farmland. This is something confirmed more widely through less formal study in areas where the IPRS study was carried out. Quality of property documentation for purchased parcels resembled that for other parcels: 20 percent of purchased parcels had no documentation, as compared with nearly 30 percent of all parcels; 35 percent of purchased parcels were supported by a new, signed tapi as compared with nearly half of all parcels. In terms of finance sources, bank credit was resorted to only once in all reported cases of home and land purchases (n = 70). Overwhelmingly, immovable property purchases were being financed through self-financing or informal loans.

Aspects of Property Market Potential With so few cases of reported property transactions to analyze, market patterns and trends must be assessed more in potential and hypothetical than in actual terms. Questions of interest include: • How do people appear to be assigning value to their lands? • What are holders’ motivations and attitudes concerning sale or rental of their properties? • Which factors either inhibit or stimulate their interest in renting out or selling land? • What are holders’ perceptions as to their discretion over disposition of their properties?

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Valuation After over thirty years without a land market in Albania, how are people now assigning value to their immovable properties? While the survey did not ask about this directly, people’s reasoning can be deduced to some extent through regression analysis, that is, by relating the declared value of a parcel to other factors such as location, productive potential, infrastructure, and so on.2 Highlights of the analysis results are shown in Table 5.1, with details displayed in Appendix 5.1, Table A.3 Table 5.1 Determinants of Estimated Sale and Rental Values of Land

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Variable Any “father’s land”? Existence of tenure conflict Flat land House on parcel Lack of ownership document Private ownership Time from house to parcel Time from parcel to all-weather road Size of parcel Village part of combination state farm/cooperative Village formerly part of state farm Parcel in Gjirokastër Parcel in Korçë Parcel in Kukës Parcel in Lushnjë

Sale value

Rental value

ns --++ + ++ ++

--++ ++ ++ ++ -

--

ns ns

++

ns

ns --ns

+ ---++

Note: The relationship between sale and rental values is shown by positive or negative signs; two pluses or minuses mean that the relationship is statistically significant, i.e. that there is less than a 5 percent chance that the perceived relationship is due to chance alone. Single signs indicate significance above 0.05 but below or equal to 0.15. Double signs indicate strong relationships; “ns” indicates, “not statistically significant.”

Not surprisingly, assigned parcel values related particularly strongly and positively to parcel size and existence of a house on the parcel. Also, strong regional differentiation in sale and rental values emerged, with Gjirokastër, Korçë, and Kukës all having lower values than Lushnjë and Tiranë; median values are presented in Table 5.2.

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Table 5.2 Respondents’ Estimates of Rental and Sale Values of Their Lands by District (median values in New Leke) District

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Gjirokastër Korçë Kukës Lushnjë Tiranë

Rental value

Sale value

10,000 3,300 10,000 20,000 20,000

100,000 150,000 50,000 1,300,000 52,0000

In terms of possible tenure-related factors, both rental and sale values were reduced by the existence of conflict in the village, and by the owner’s possession of “father’s land” (for rental, insignificantly). In the case of some of the other variables, occasional differences emerged between respective explanations of rental and sale values. For example, rental value appeared to be lower for flat land,4 whereas sales value was higher. Distance of the parcel from the house contributed positively to rental value, but not to sales value; conversely, distance from a road was negatively related to rental value, but not to sales value. The absence of documents raised value (sales significantly, and rental, not). Ownership status (that is, private or other) had no effect on value. Concerning the preprivatization status of the village as either a state farm, cooperative, or combination of these two forms, only the latter significantly and positively affected values, but only rental values. To summarize the interpretation of the regression equations: parcel owners appear to have been applying some clear criteria in assigning value to their parcels. They have been considering size, fixed assets, location, and other obvious determinants of value, but also appear to have been influenced by the existence of conflict and family land issues. Interest in Sale and Rental and Constraints and Restrictions Affecting Land Market Transactions Willingness or interest in selling or renting land The supply side of the immovable property market is determined by owners’ willingness to put their property up for sale. Reasons most frequently cited for being unable to sell parcels were that the land was needed for agricultural use (nearly half the parcels) followed by the belief that the land was not desirable (17.5 percent). Also prominently mentioned as reasons were that land was not ancestral land

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(8 percent) and that other family members would object (6 percent). Respondents designated only 110 parcels as being off the market because their house was on it, a number that represents only 13 percent of all parcels with houses on them. This implies that the most active portion of the rural immovable property market is likely to continue to be for housing. Tenure-related constraints on sale account for about 17 percent of the parcels. They include disagreement of other family members, the fact that the land was not owned by the family prior to collectivization, and location of the parcel on state land. Clearly, though, the most important factors restricting the supply of land for the market were not tenure-related. Many of those who asserted that they “needed” the land would still be willing to sell under certain conditions. For most parcels (54 percent), sale might be acceptable for a “good price.” Otherwise, it would be deemed appropriate if holders were no longer able to continue farming, or if they left the village (27 percent), or if better land were available (8 percent). In short, people were exhibiting great flexibility about sale; no major supply-side problem in the rural immovable property market would therefore seem to exist.

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Discretion over property market decisions Potential market property activity can be hindered by traditional or legal requirements to involve many people in transfer decisions. This can be particularly problematic where property is regarded as being held jointly by the family in undivided shares.5 Once again, the situation as reflected in the survey suggested little to be concerned about. Holders of about half the parcels said they could make sales decisions without having to consult anyone else, and for even more parcels (62 percent) it was said that they could be rented out by individual decision. In other words, it seems that disposition of a substantial number of parcels were not facing the constraints commonly associated with joint decision-making. However, in view of the complexity of real-world intrahousehold interactions, this conclusion needs to be taken with a grain of salt. Indeed, a more restrictive picture emerges upon reference to some additional data presented in Table 5.3 on who would have to be consulted in sale or rental decisions. The number of parcels characterized as being subject to individual decision decreases. The household head—the only individual given the opportunity by the questionnaire to make a sale or rental decision alone—could do so for only 38 percent for parcel sales or 44 percent for parcel rentals.

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For most other parcels, decisions were said to be made by all family members (about a third) or in consultation with the spouse (about a fifth). Even in view of the above limitations, sale or rental of the vast majority of parcels emerges as a relatively uncomplicated matter of individual decision making by the head of household or of joint decision-making of husband and wife. Seen in this light, Albania seems to be no more constrained in terms of property market supply than are most other countries with comparable joint property rules or traditions. Table 5.3 Who Must Be Involved in Decisions about Selling or Renting Parcels?

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Who involved?

SALE Frequency Percent

RENTAL Frequency Percent

Head alone Head and spouse Sons Daughters All family members Family and kin Family and neighbors Tradition Missing

1,354 811 69 -1,284 5 -7 11 ______

38.2 22.9 1.9 -36.3 0.1 -0.2 0.3 ______

1,549 689 82 -1,203 --7 11 ______

43.7 19.5 2.3 -34.0 --0.2 0.3 ______

Total

3,541

100.0

3,541

100.0

Willingness to sell or rent if given more security of tenure Another survey question which indicates levels of interest in selling or renting out parcels is one asking how respondents would react if they were more secure about their land/property. Again, indications are of openness to land market activity: about a fifth (22 percent) said that greater security would lead them to sell or rent out their parcels, while about half (48 percent) indicated that they would invest more.6 To explain differences between those who said they would sell their parcel and those who hinted at other responses to greater security, a regression equation was estimated, with most of the same explanatory variables used to estimate sale and rental values.7 The regression yielded some very strong results which are highlighted in Table 5.4 and presented fully in Appendix 5.1, Table B. Locational differentiation was particularly powerful. Owners in Gjirokastër and Korçë were significantly more willing to sell their parcels than those in Tiranë, and even more so than those in Lushnjë. Owners in villages formerly part of state farms were more will-

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.

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ing to sell than those in villages that used to be cooperatives, something that may reflect the more tenuous ties to the land of former state farm residents than residents of former cooperatives. Parcels distant from the residence were more likely to be offered for sale, as were those close to roads. Readiness to sell was less for parcels in flat zones. Among the tenure variables, two yielded highly significant results: first, possessors of at least some “father’s land” were more prone to sell land than those who did not own such land. Also, those holding their land in ownership were more likely to do so than renters or “in-use” holders. Lack of a document appeared to have no significant bearing on willingness to sell. Results for willingness to rent out parcels, also shown in Table 5.4, are as striking as those for willingness to sell. However, the direction of relationships does not always correspond with those between the same variables and willingness to sell. As with sale, willingness to rent out was greater in Gjirokastër and Korçë districts. However, residents of Korçë were less willing to rent than those in Tiranë, whereas they were more willing to sell. Plots with houses were significantly less likely to be rented out. Having a portion of the precollectivization family-owned land related negatively to readiness to rent out, as did absence of an ownership document; private ownership of parcels related positively. Since both people willing to sell and people willing to rent are potential land market participants, it is interesting to pool the two groups in order to determine whether the picture remains consistent. This is done in the third column in Table 5.4. The principal change is that the existence of conflict in the village and the absence of documents now become significantly negative. In other words, willingness to alienate land temporarily or permanently appeared to be lower in situations of both generalized insecurity and insecurity of tenure on the parcel itself.

Housing Purchases, Values, and Documentation Of the 792 families in the sample, only eleven had more than one dwelling, and all but thirty-one had single-family houses. Ownership predominated, with only eight families renting their home at the time of the survey. The truall, or house parcel, was acquired in mainly two ways. The truall of more than half the families was their property before 1946; that of nearly one-third was owned by the

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Table 5.4 Determinants of Willingness to Sell or Rent Out Land Variable Any “father’s land”? Existence of tenure conflict Flat land House on parcel Lack ownership document Private ownership Time from house to parcel Time from parcel to all-weather road Size of parcel Village part of combination state farm/cooperative Village formerly part of state farm Parcel in Gjirokastër Parcel in Korçë Parcel in Kukës Parcel in Lushnjë

Willingness to sell

Willingness to rent out

Willing to sell or rent

++ ns -ns ns ++ ++ --

-ns --++ ++ ns ns

ns --ns -++ ++ -ns

ns ++ ++ ++ ns --

ns ns -+ ns -

ns ns ++ ++ ns --

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Note: The relationship between willingness to sell/rent and the explanatory variables is shown by positive or negative signs; two pluses or minuses mean that the relationship is statistically significant, i.e. that there is less than a 5 percent chance that the perceived relationship is due to chance alone. Double signs indicate strong relationships; “ns” indicates, “not statistically significant.”

cooperative. The land distribution following the dissolution of the state farms and cooperatives did practically nothing to alter people’s residences. Only 6 percent8 had bought or rented the land on which their home is situated. There is only minor variation in this pattern among districts. Nearly all housing was built by the family now occupying it (77 percent) or inherited (13 percent). Six percent were purchased privately and 4 percent purchased from the National Housing Authority. No significant variation among districts exists in this respect. Documentation of home ownership tended to be very weak. As can be seen in Table 5.5, over half of the families lacked any written proof of ownership, with an additional one-fifth having only minimal forms of documentation such as receipts and construction permits. Only one-sixth of the families possessed a tapi for their home. There was some regional variation in the quality of documentation. As Figure 5.1 shows, Kukës had by far the highest share of families with tapis for their house, while Lushnjë and Korçë were at the other extreme, with under 10 percent of families possessing tapis.

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Table 5.5 Document Proving Ownership of Home

tapi Notarized contract Non-notarized contract No document Don’t know Other document (e.g. receipt, permit Missing Total

Frequency

Percent

133 10 9 409 58 167 6 792

16.8 1.3 1.1 51.6 7.3 21.1 0.8 100.0

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Figure 5.1 Ownership Documents for Houses by IPRS District

Some of the survey data on housing values is questionable.9 However, there are enough observations to generate time series of values for one category of houses: those built by the families themselves. For those inherited, observations are either too few or data too inconsistent for meaningful analysis. The time series are given in Table 5.6. Means and medians in that table follow a fairly regular upward trend, especially since the late-1980s. It is also interesting to note that the trend in the number of houses built has decreased noticeably since the mid-1980s, reflecting the deterioration of economic conditions in the last decade.

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Table 5.6 Value of Houses Built by IPRS Survey Respondents or Their Families (in thousands of New Leke) Year

Mean

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

35,132 31,821 20,200 41,105 24,143 46,566 28,292 21,955 62,235 69,467 122,432 184,545 276,800 230,000 353,000 411,111

Median 20,000 17,500 20,000 25,000 19,000 20,000 15,000 20,000 30,000 30,000 45,000 100,000 250,000 200,000 400,000 300,000

Maximum

Std. Dev.

Minimum

Count

400,000 200,000 35,000 350,000 65,000 300,000 250,000 100,000 460,000 350,000 700,000 600,000 600,000 500,000 700,000 1,000,000

2,500 5,000 10,000 6,000 10,000 1,000 2,500 8,000 5,000 9,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 20,000 60,000 100,000

66,063 50,567 7,921 75,302 16,733 73,763 47,956 18,710 108,316 109,020 189,050 184,844 174,866 177,764 186,908 293,447

34 14 15 19 14 41 25 22 17 15 22 11 10 10 10 9

Another aspect of the economic deterioration can be seen by accounting for inflation: prices rose by a factor of ten from 1990 to 1995 (no price information is available before that). Table 5.7 shows that—if both price and value information are reliable—there has been a significant drop in both the mean and median value of new housing construction in real terms. Table 5.7 Real Value (in New Leke) of New Construction, 1990-95

Year

Housing Value Price Current Prices Index* Mean Median

Housing Value Real (1995) prices Mean Median

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

100 120 150 200 500 1,000

1,224 1,540 1,847 1,150 715 411

122 185 277 230 353 411

45 100 250 200 400 300

450 830 1,667 1,000 800 300

*Source: IPRS project staff estimate.

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Conclusion These preliminary results suggest that in spite of the absence of many acknowledged land market transactions to date, conditions are right for considerable market activity in the future. Rural parcel holders express a willingness to sell, a sense of property values that is not irrational, and take account of some of the potential constraints and difficulties. This is far from a definitive analysis of the embryonic Albanian land markets, although little more can be done with the data currently available. There is a need for additional research focused on market behavior as well as on the economic context for that behavior, to take the analysis and understanding of rural property dynamics further.

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Description of Variables Used and Detailed Results of Statistical Analyses Variable Definitions ANYFAMLA: Did you receive any of the land that used to belong to your family? (yes=1, no=0) CONFLYES: Are there land conflicts in this village? (yes=1, no=0) FLAT: Village topography (flat=1, hilly or mountainous=0) HOUSE: Any house on the parcel? (yes=1, no=0) NODOC: Any documents verify ownership (no=1, yes=0) OWN: Type of ownership of parcel (private=1, other=0) P33A2: Time from house to parcel P33B2: Time from parcel to nearest improved road P30: Size of parcel in dynams SELLWILL: Would you sell the land if you had more security of tenure? (yes=1, no=0) STATCOOP: Was the village part of both state farm and cooperative? (yes=1, no=0) STATFARM: Was the village part of a state farm? (yes=1, no=0) P42: Rental value of parcel in new Leke(respondent’s estimate) P46: Sales value of parcel in new Leke(respondent’s estimate)

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Table A Regressions for Estimated Rental and Sale Values (a) Estimated rental value Dependent Variable: Estimated rental value Multiple R R Square Adjusted R Square Standard Error

.38913 .15142 .14550 72946.97499

Analysis of Variance DF Regression 16 Residual 2292 F = 25.56200

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Variable ANYFAMLA CONFLYES FLAT HOUSE NODOC OWN P33A2 P33B2 P30 SELLWILL STATFARM STATCOOP GJ KO KU LU (Constant)

Sum of Squares 2176353587272.40800 12196330578451.3600

Mean Square 136022099204.526 5321261159.88279

Signif F = .0000 Variables in the Equation B

SE B

Beta

T

Sig T

-1900.916108 -11096.15598 -10878.83283 43898.987537 5477.361156 -14909.10316 285.904347 -172.487880 4802.688128 -6631.771041 7674.407112 41605.504607 -9908.815871 -38508.09687 -21336.064136 4804.680339 41075.322312

3903.525343 3362.559012 4431.131446 4168.244925 3811.288775 10246.30637 72.840030 71.352356 606.891837 4483.762445 9355.025630 9828.625459 6070.904094 5636.483582 6285.755642 5225.895658 11605.22999

-.011970 -.070256 -.068124 .233212 .031752 -.030306 .089957 -.053254 .170033 -.032335 .034552 .204736 -.045354 -.210702 -.083435 .026196

-.487 -3.300 -2.455 10.532 1.437 -1.455 3.925 -2.417 7.914 -1.479 .820 4.233 -1.632 -6.832 -3.394 .919 3.539

.6263 .0010 .0142 .0000 .1508 .1458 .0001 .0157 .0000 .1393 .4121 .0000 .1028 .0000 .0007 .3580 .0004

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(b) Estimated sale value Dependent Variable: Estimated Sale Value Multiple R .56061 R Square .31429 Adjusted R Square .30958 Standard Error 1901955.3924 Analysis of Variance DF Regression 16 Residual 2331 F = 66.77375

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Mean Square 241549672015882 3617434314717.83

Signif F = .0000 Variables in the Equation

Variable ANYFAMLA CONFLYES FLAT HOUSE NODOC OWN P33A2 P33B2 P30 SELLWILL STATFARM STATCOOP GJ KO KU LU (Constant)

Sum of Squares 3864794752254114.00 8432239387607260.00

B

SE B

Beta

T

Sig T

-392453.7868 -382460.1860 228343.14289 517256.44098 296998.22411 155950.09023 -2942.371152 -117.585290 310595.13035 20035.559334 402533.88267 305277.30766 -772595.9750 -932083.3927 -391562.8967 871457.38111 409900.42042

100780.6710 86827.67330 115896.7380 108135.0968 99075.81219 216134.8959 1869.906713 1781.707876 15690.27740 115972.1427 243376.9418 255356.1017 154609.2426 145120.6637 162356.1346 136324.5469 262975.7755

-.085176 -.083417 .049138 .094301 .059910 .013494 -.032120 -.001283 .379314 .003352 .063157 .052146 -.124074 -.174834 -.052401 .162975

-3.894 -4.405 1.970 4.783 2.998 .722 -1.574 -.066 19.795 .173 1.654 1.195 -4.997 -6.423 -2.412 6.393 1.559

.0001 .0000 .0489 .0000 .0027 .4706 .1157 .9474 .0000 .8629 .0983 .2320 .0000 .0000 .0160 .0000 .1192

Adjusted R Square Standard Error Analysis of Variance DF Regression 16 Residual 2331

.30958 901955.3924 Sum of Squares 3864794752254114.00 8432239387607260.00

Mean Square 241549672015882 3617434314717.83

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Table B LOGIT for willingness to sell or rent with greater security (a) Willingness to sell Dependent Variable: Willingness to sell with greater tenure security Number of selected cases: Number rejected because of missing data: Number of cases included in the analysis: -2 Log Likelihood Goodness of Fit

3541 1117 2424

1706.104 2859.465 Chi-Square

df

Significance

541.422 541.422

14 14

.0000 .0000

Model Chi-Square Improvement

Classification Table for SELLWILL Predicted .00 1.00 0 1 Observed .00 0 1920 80 1.00 1 324 100 Overall

Percent Correct

96.00% 23.58% 83.33%

Variables in the Equation

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Variable ANYFAMLA CONFLYES FLAT HOUSE NODOC OWN P33A2 P33B2 P30 STATFARM GJ KO KU LU Constant

B

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig

R

Exp(B)

.7387 -.0764 -1.5948 .0516 -.0715 2.5333 .0117 -.0069 -.0533 1.2204 1.9050 1.9075 -.1604 -1.2456 -5.0825

.1550 .1346 .2268 .1768 .1526 .5359 .0024 .0036 .0404 .2420 .2168 .2039 .2810 .4036 .6086

22.7047 .3220 49.4388 .0852 .2195 22.3462 23.3878 3.7079 1.7395 25.4294 77.1884 87.5298 .3258 9.5257 69.7392

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

.0000 .5704 .0000 .7703 .6394 .0000 .0000 .0542 .1872 .0000 .0000 .0000 .5681 .0020 .0000

.0960 .0000 -.1453 .0000 .0000 .0951 .0976 -.0276 .0000 .1021 .1829 .1951 .0000 -.0579

2.0931 .9265 .2029 1.0530 .9310 12.5951 1.0118 .9931 .9481 3.3887 6.7195 6.7365 .8518 .2878

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(b) Willingness to rent Dependent Variable: Willingness to rent out Log Likelihood decreased by less than .01 percent. -2 Log Likelihood Goodness of Fit

818.297 2691.741 Chi-Square

df

Significance

381.753 381.753

15 15

.0000 .0000

Model Chi-Square Improvement

Classification Table for RENTWILL Predicted .00 1.00 0 1 Observed .00 0 2260 0 1.00 1 164 0 Overall

Percent Correct

100.00% .00% 93.23%

Variables in the Equation

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Variable ANYFAMLA CONFLYES FLAT HOUSE NODOC OWN P30 P33A2 P33B2 STATFARM STATCOOP GJ KO KU LU Constant

B

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig

-1.5077 -.0305 -.6996 -1.4476 -.7002 1.0993 .0272 -.0034 -.0038 6.7433 -2.9835 2.6873 -2.6244 .3775 -1.0413 -3.7047

.2674 .2135 .2772 .3531 .2373 .4027 .0379 .0031 .0061 10.6675 10.6802 .5023 .4413 .7594 .7026 .6756

31.7977 .0204 6.3674 16.8050 8.7050 7.4526 .5128 1.1744 .3830 .3996 .0780 28.6199 35.3652 .2471 2.1961 30.0696

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

.0000 .8864 .0116 .0000 .0032 .0063 .4739 .2785 .5360 .5273 .7800 .0000 .0000 .6191 .1384 .0000

R

Exp(B)

-.1576 .2214 .0000 .9700 -.0603 .4968 -.1111 .2351 -.0747 .4965 .0674 3.0022 .0000 1.0275 .0000 .9966 .0000 .9962 .0000 848.3316 .0000 .0506 .1489 14.6915 -.1667 .0725 .0000 1.4587 -.0128 .3530

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(c) Sell or rent Dependent Variable: Willingness to sell or rent Estimation terminated at iteration number 7 because Log Likelihood decreased by less than .01 percent. -2 Log Likelihood Goodness of Fit

1891.852 2701.202 Chi-Square

df

Significance

794.081 794.081

15 15

.0000 .0000

Model Chi-Square Improvement

Classification Table for SELLRENT Predicted .00 1.00 0 1 Observed .00 0 1730 106 1.00 1 327 261 Overall

Percent Correct

94.23% 44.39% 82.14%

Variables in the Equation

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Variable ANYFAMLA CONFLYES FLAT HOUSE NODOC OWN P30 P33A2 P33B2 STATFARM STATCOOP GJ KO KU LU Constant

B .0887 -.2392 -1.2791 -.1243 -.4208 1.8394 -.0169 .0152 -.0082 7.6254 -6.4094 2.2800 1.1250 -.3957 -1.6550 -3.2241

Wald

df

Sig

.1479 .3593 .1231 3.7757 .1973 42.0330 .1686 .5431 .1476 8.1274 .3311 30.8656 .0294 .3321 .0030 26.2226 .0037 4.9087 6.5131 1.3707 6.5149 .9679 .2000 129.9601 .1841 37.3579 .2627 2.2691 .3368 24.1430 .4143 60.5501

S.E.

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

.5489 .0520 .0000 .4612 .0044 .0000 .5644 .0000 .0267 .2417 .3252 .0000 .0000 .1320 .0000 .0000

R

Exp(B)

.0000 1.0927 -.0257 .7873 -.1221 .2783 .0000 .8831 -.0478 .6565 .1037 6.2927 .0000 .9832 .0950 1.0153 -.0329 .9918 .0000 2049.652 .0000 .0016 .2183 9.7768 .1147 3.0802 -.0100 .6732 -.0908 .1911

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Notes

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1. David Stanfield, and Maksi Raco, “Creation of Albanian Land Markets,” Land Tenure Center Newsletter 71 (Spring 1994). 2. Linear regression analysis is used to measure the partial contributions of several explanatory variables simultaneously, “controlling” for the effects of all the others. 3. For large-sample cross-section regressions, these equations perform fairly well, explaining 15 percent of the variation in rental value and 31 percent of the variation in sales value. 4. This particular result remains puzzling. 5. This issue is dealt with in depth in Chapter 8. 6. About 4 percent said that they would plant trees or vines and 3 percent said that they would build structures such as a shop or a storage facility. 7. Since the variable to be explained is dichotomous (having only two possible values, “0” and “1”), logistic regression is used. The interpretation of the signs and significance levels is the same, however, as for linear regression. There is no summary statistic similar to the R-square for logistic regression. 8. 5.9 percent purchased; 0.3 percent rented. 9. One is the issue of inflation. Although interviewers were instructed to solicit values for the year respondents acquired their house, it may be that some of the numbers are actually estimates of current value. Also, while this was a point emphasized repeatedly during training, it is unclear whether all values are reported in New Leke, as the questionnaire also specifies.

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– Chapter 6 –

CREDIT ACCESS AND COLLATERAL Rachel Wheeler and Harold Lemel

i Introduction

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The radical restructuring of Albania’s agricultural sector after 1990/91 introduced the need for credit delivery systems suitable for thousands of new small-scale family farmers. In addition to modest resource requirements for seasonal inputs, more substantial sums were now required to rehabilitate and readapt moribund irrigation systems, for livestock-related purchases (for example, animals, stalls, sheds), for transport vehicles, agricultural machinery, and to establish new vineyards and orchards. National financial institutions and special credit programs introduced by foreign donors have only gradually been emerging to meet these needs. Many consider lack of satisfactory collateral as a primary constraint in formal credit access. Developing some perspective on just how critical such improved collateral may be, is a major preoccupation of this chapter, as are the following other related issues: • How interested do villagers seem to be in formal credit and for which purposes? • How are investment needs currently being met and what forms of collateral are being utilized? • What are the major constraints to credit access and how do difficulties in terms of immovable collateral fit into the picture? Notes for this section begin on page 107. Rural Property and Economy in Post-Communist Albania, edited by Harold Lemel, Berghahn Books, Incorporated,

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These issues, as well as patterns of credit use and the extent and types of unmet demand/need for formal credit, will all be reviewed here.

Overview of Current Patterns According to IPRS baseline survey data, only 11 percent (n = 84) of respondents had applied for formal credit since 1991. Of these, only about a third were successful. Notably, while about the same percentage of male and female respondents in the sample applied for formal loans, none of the women’s but one-third of the men’s applications bore fruit. In addition to indicating that women apparently encounter greater credit access problems than men, these figures suggest that (1) few people seem to be interested in obtaining formal credit and, (2) that of those who actually apply, few ultimately succeed. As will now be seen, the first of these conclusions greatly understates actual interest in formal credit. Reasons for the low success rate in obtaining loans are explored afterwards.

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Interest in Credit and Investment Priorities Although official interest in promoting formal credit in rural areas has mainly been in connection with agricultural development, people’s priorities have focussed primarily on housing and household items. Priorities may be ascertained from responses to two survey questions, one, hypothetical, asking what investment priorities would be if formal credit were available and the second, actual, asking about types and financing of investments made since 1991. Table 6.1 details investment preferences mentioned, while Table 6.2 groups these into agricultural and non-agricultural categories1 and indicates how priorities differed according to district. Home construction, repair, or expansion accounted for almost half of responses. Only in Lushnjë and Korçë, the two study districts where people were most likely to have obtained ample land for farming, were agricultural investments cited as major investment priorities. In other study districts, interest in credit for farming-related items was very low as a first priority but a bit higher as a second priority. This suggests that interest in agricultural investment exists, but only after other needs, especially those related to housing, have been met. Over two-thirds of respondents (480/792) reported having actually made some sort of holding-level investment since 1991. In line with the hypothetically stated priorities, it is non-agricultural

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Table 6.1 Priorities for Formal Credit if Available Type of investment

(n)

Percentage

Build a house House repairs Build stall or warehouse Tractor Combine harvester Car or truck Install water pump Cows Sheep/goats Work animals Land Trees/vines Household appliances/items Travel abroad Other animals Other investment

300 81 14 126 4 26 50 19 34 4 10 21 39 5 1 39

38.8 10.5 1.8 16.3 0.5 3.4 6.5 2.5 4.4 0.5 1.3 2.7 5.0 0.6 0.1 5.0

Total

792

100.0

Table 6.2 Investment Priorities if Credit Available by District and Type (agricultural and non-agricultural)

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First loan priority2 DISTRICT

Agricultural

Second loan priority3

Nonagricultural Total

Gjirokastër (%)

34

66

Korçë (%)

55

45

Kukës (%)

27

73

Lushnjë (%)

49

51

Tiranë (%)

28

72

All Districts

40 (309)

60 (464)

100 (106) 100 (132) 100 (90) 100 (243) 100 (202) 100 (773)

Agricultural

Nonagricultural Total

54

46

66

34

64

36

77

23

50

50

65 (247)

35 (450)

100 (100) 100 (132) 100 (85) 100 (243) 100 (137) 100 (697)

investments that predominate. However, the relative preponderance of agricultural versus non-agricultural investments among districts differs from hypothetical investment priority patterns. As seen in Figure 6.1, instead of Lushnjë and Korçë being the districts where actual agricultural investment was most prominent, this distinction

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is held by Kukës, where 70 percent of investments were agricultural; Lushnjë ranks a distant second (33 percent), and Korçë last with only 17 percent. As Figure 6.2 indicates, most of the investments cited in Kukës pertained to animal husbandry, being for livestock purchases or for livestock-related structures such as stalls or wareFigure 6.1 Percent of Investments That Were Agricultural versus Non-agricultural by District

Districts Percent agricultural Copyright © 2000. Berghahn Books, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Chi Square = 89.4, DF = 4 P > .000

Figure 6.2 Type of Investment by District4

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houses for winter feed. Given the tiny land holdings available, the mountainous terrain, the harsh winters, and the highly limited opportunities for international migration or off-farm work, animal husbandry represents one of the few possibilities for economic survival for villagers in Kukës. Housing-related investments and purchases predominate in the other sample districts. Sources of Finance The overall picture in terms of financing sources is visible in Figure 6.3. It shows that only for very few purchases or investments were formal or collateralized loans the main source. Bank loans were cited only twelve times (2 percent of the total) and collateralized loans/credit, thirty times (that is, in about 5 percent of cases). Instead, self-financing predominated. Proceeds from agriculture, other work in Albania or abroad were cited as the main financing sources for almost three-quarters of purchases or investments. Informal loans from friends and relatives were another significant source, accounting for almost a fifth (16 percent) of purchases or investments.

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Figure 6.3 Source of Financing for Purchases/Investments

Gift from friend/relative Loan from friends/relatives Self-financed – agricultural income Self-financing – non-agricultural income Self-financed from private work Self-financed from work abroad Bank loan Other

As seen in Table 6.3, informal loans appeared to be most prominent in Kukës (mentioned as the main source for 58 percent of investments). Remittances or income from work abroad carried the most weight—about 40 percent—in both Gjirokastër and Korçë, not surprisingly, since these are the two study districts with the highest rates of international migration.

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Table 6.3 Sources of Finance for Investments Reported by IPRS Survey Respondents (by district) District Count Col Pct Gjirok. SOURCE Gift from friend or relative

Kukës

Lushnjë

Tiranë

Row Total

3 4.4%

4 2.9%

2 2.0%

10 6.1%

2 1.1%

21

2 2.9%

7 5.1%

57 57.6%

22 13.5%

19 10.1%

107

Income from agriculture

20 29.4%

59 42.8%

31 31.3%

67 41.1%

77 40.7%

254

Income from work for state

11 16.2%

5 3.6%

5 5.1%

6 3.7%

36 19.0%

63

3 4.4%

2 1.4%

7 4.3%

32 16.9%

44

28 41.2%

60 43.5%

2 2.0%

43 26.4%

17 9.0%

150

2 2.0%

3 1.8%

6 3.2%

12

Informal loan— friend/relative

Income from private sector work Income from work abroad Bank credit

1 1.5%

No reply

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Korçë

1 .7% Column Total

Chi-Square = 303.91

68 10.4%

138 21.0% DF = 28

5 3.1% 99 15.1%

163 24.8%

6 189 28.8%

657 100.0%

Prob = .0000

Income from agriculture figured most prominently as a source in three districts: Lushnjë, Korçë, and Tiranë. While the number of formal collateralized loans was small, loans from such sources are distinct in two critical ways. One is that the great majority—71-83 percent—were for agricultural purposes (See Tables 6.4 and 6.5). Only one other credit source category came close to these two sources in terms of the percentage (59 percent) being directed to agriculture: informal loans from friends or relatives. Formal collateralized loans also appear to have been the channel to the largest sums of money. As can be seen in Tables 6.6 and 6.7, the median value of items purchased through bank loans or loans backed by immovable collateral were between three and eight times higher than any other sources; the median for bank loans was 245,000 New Leke and that for loans backed by immovable collateral was 250,000 New Leke.5 The only other source significantly above the usual 30,000-50,000 Leke level was income from work abroad

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(median value of purchases—70,000 New Leke). A high percentage of expensive agricultural items such as tractors, water pumps, and cattle were financed by bank loans or loans secured by collateral.

Table 6.4 Sources of Finance for Agricultural and Nonagricultural Investments/Purchases Reported by IPRS Survey Respondents AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT Count Row Pct No Financing source Loan from friend or relative(s)

Row Total

43 40.2%

64 59.8%

107 16.4%

2 16.7%

10 83.3%

12 1.8%

Self-finance (excluding work abroad)

262 72.6%

99 27.4%

361 55.5%

Income from work abroad

123 82.0%

27 18.0%

150 23.0%

17 81.0%

4 19.0%

21 3.2%

447 68.7%

204 31.3%

651 100.0%

Loan from bank

Gift from friends or relatives Column Total Copyright © 2000. Berghahn Books, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Yes

Chi-Square = 71.85

Prob. > .0000

Table 6.5 Use of Collateral to Finance Agricultural and Nonagricultural Investments/Purchases Reported by IPRS Survey Respondents AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT Count Row Pct

No

Yes

Row Total

Collateral No collateral

431 70.5%

180 29.5%

611 100%

Immovable collateral

3 23.1%

10 76.9%

13 100%

Movable collateral

2 28.6%

5 71.4%

7 100%

Other

2 20.0%

8 80.0%

10 100%

438 68.3%

203 31.7%

Column Total Chi-Square = 29.59

Prob. > .0000

641 100.0%

(Missing Observations: 16)

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Table 6.6 Value of Investments/Purchases by Source of Finance

(n) SELF-FINANCE Agriculture, other work Income from work abroad FORMAL LOANS (from banks) INFORMAL LOANS from friends and relatives GIFTS

Value of investments/purchases in New Leke Mean Median Range

(361)

69,858

32,000

750-800,000

(150)

196,237

70,000

10,000-5 million

(12)

277,333

245,000

(107)

75,431

30,000

0-700,000

(21)

55,921

26,000

40-300,000

26,000-1.3 million

Table 6.7 Value of Investments/Purchases by Collateral Used in Financing

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(n) No collateral Immovable collateral Movable collateral Other

Value of investments/purchases in New Leke Mean Median Range

(611) (13)

86,841 955,846

37,000 250,000

–1 million 6,000-5 million

(7)

65,429

30,000

10,000-300,000

(10)

54,100

45,000

8,000-200,000

Factors Limiting Access to Formal Credit Clearly, there seems to have been great interest in investing and in acquiring finance. It is also clear that formal, collateralized loans represented the only channel available for major investments. Yet so few had applied and even fewer had obtained such credit. This section explores why this should have been the case from two perspectives: the farmer’s perspective and the institutional perspective. Prime interest is focussed on the role of collateral deficiencies in limiting availability and access to formal credit. The Farmer’s Perspective As Table 6.8 indicates, and as already suggested, it is neither absence of need nor absence of interest that accounts for the low number of

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credit applications. Less than 10 percent cited “no need” as their reason for not applying. Instead, fear of debt or inability to repay loans (almost 50 percent of responses) and complexity of the process were what appeared to be deterring people. Table 6.8 Main Reasons Given by IPRS Survey Respondents for Not Having Applied for Credit

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Reason Too complicated Sufficient funds from private income source Fear of debt Expect to be turned down Fear of inability to repay Unavailability of items No need for credit Other reasons No reply Total

Count

Percentage

177 6

25.0 0.8

138 56 200 1 66 3 61

19.5 7.9 28.2 0.1 9.3 0.4 8.6

708

100.0

Some inhibiting factors figured more prominently in certain study districts than others, as can be seen in Table 6.9. In Kukës, people explained that they were not applying mainly because they regarded application procedures as too complicated (56 percent); fear of debt was more of a factor in Tiranë and Gjirokastër (cited by 38 percent in both districts), and fear of ultimately being unable to repay loans, the primary reason given by respondents in Lushnjë and Korçë (52 percent and 39 percent, respectively). Review of Institutional Factors The credit environment for small-scale farming in Albania remains weak. The banking system had evolved little since the transition had begun in 1990/1 and in 1996/7 was still dominated by the state.6 Until very recently, only short-term agricultural credit had been available.7 The only exceptions were long-term loans for agricultural machinery. Low interest rates charged for such loans made them particularly attractive. However, creditors have realized that their emphasis on mechanization has been misplaced given the typically small plots farmers acquired through land privatization. Furthermore, lack of spare parts has meant that even simple breakdowns were liable to render machinery inoperable. These factors, combined with low farm incomes, have resulted in many loan defaults.

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Table 6.9 Main Reasons Given by IPRS Survey Respondents for Not Having Applied for Credit (by district) District Count Col Pct Gjirok.

Korçë

Kukës

Lushnjë

Tiranë

Row Total

Reason Bank problem

34 30.4%

36 28.6%

51 70.8%

60 27.5%

52 28.9%

233 32.9%

No need

10 8.9%

14 11.1%

2 2.8%

20 9.2%

26 14.4%

72 10.2%

Insufficient income

40 35.7%

65 51.6%

18 25.0%

129 59.2%

86 47.8%

338 47.7%

Other

28 25.0%

11 8.7%

1 1.4%

9 4.1%

16 8.9%

65 9.2%

112 100.0%

126 100.0%

72 100.0%

218 100.0%

180 100.0%

708 100.0%

Column Total

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Chi-Square = 101.75

DF = 12

Prob = 0.000000

From late 1993, the number and types of credit donor institutions and the sorts of activities targeted for loans began to proliferate. A wider variety of loan repayment terms also began to emerge. However, as can be seen in the Appendix 6.1, credit has retained its focus on large-scale agricultural investments, such as agro-processing, agro-industry, and farm mechanization. Major credit sources for small farmers Very few sources have explicitly devoted themselves to meeting small farmer credit needs. Of these the main ones have been the Rural Commercial Bank (RCB) and programs associated with it, most notably the European Union (EU)-sponsored PHARE (Poland-Hungary Assistance for Reforming the Economy) program.8 Another has been the Albanian Development Fund (ADF), financed by the World Bank and other contributors.9 The World Bank has been acting as ADF’s executing agency. Both for RCB and ADF loans, credit ceilings are relatively low—about $200 for RCB and $2,000 for ADF loans. Credit is also restricted to short terms. For the PHARE program, the RCB has acted as a sort of loan clearing house through its six regional offices. These appraise business plans and perform pre-loan qualification technical evaluations. The regional offices then forward credit recommendations to the central offices in Tiranë. Loans are disbursed through the Project

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Implementation Coordination Unit (PICU). Disbursable funds consist of a revolving credit account targeting small-scale farmers and rural traders. Financed activities include crop agriculture, livestock production and credits for fertilizer traders. Typical credit requests are for seeds, livestock, dairy, rice, and poultry. In 1995/6, credits were available throughout Albania at an average interest rate of 10 percent per year. Loans were also restricted to short terms up to a maximum of twelve months. The ADF is a rural development project that incorporates a credit component for small-scale farmers. The main instruments for allocating and administering ADF loans are Village Credit Funds (VCFs). They are mandated to identify potential borrowers and arrange small loans to poorer farmers and other rural residents who generally lack access to commercial bank credit. VCFs are managed by village credit committees (VCCs), which consist of three elected village members and representatives of the ADF. VCCs decide on credit allocations, define collateral, and set loan repayment terms. Many types of income-generating activities have been considered legitimate candidates for financing. As of June 1996, VCFs had been set up in 125 villages, with about 6,000 loans having been disbursed. VCF size depends on village population. On average, VCFs were controlling US$20,000 with funds delivered in two or three tranches. Maximum loan duration has been three years, with interest payments being due at least once per year. The bulk of loans (about 60 percent) have been livestock-related; about a quarter have been channeled to mechanization and the remaining 10-15 percent to handicrafts or other income-generating activities. Funds, which are held in the form of revolving accounts, are deposited in local ADF branches. The success of this decentralized approach has been attributed to its reliance on village solidarity. The low size limit on individual sub-loans from village credit funds effectively targets them to the poorest farmers. Use of Immovable Property as Collateral Both credit programs just described, as well as others targeting poorer segments of the rural population,10 have devised ways to circumvent problems associated with deficient collateral. In the case of ADF, village or group guarantees have been substituted for individual guarantees or collateral. The ADF considers loan security to be maximized by decentralizing decision-making to the village level. Defaulters are generally deterred by the threat of suspension of all

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credit to the defaulter’s entire village and by the stipulation that a person’s eligibility for future loans is contingent upon full repayment of previous loans. These policies have been credited with a claimed 100 percent loan repayment rate for ADF loans. Livestock and other movable property have occasionally served as collateral, as for example, in the PHARE program. Although relatively rare, the IPRS survey and officials of various financial institutions and credit programs indicate that houses, house plots, and stores have all been occasionally used as collateral, based on a property’s registration in the Deeds Registry (i.e., Hipoteka offices). Through the survey itself and other farmer interviews, it was discovered that farmers’ entire property holding (consisting of several discrete parcels and also perhaps the house) was sometimes used as collateral.11 There are two sets of figures on the number of formal bank loans backed by collateral in the IPRS survey. One derives from responses to the question of whether respondents had applied for bank loans and whether they had succeeded. Answers to this question provide details on the institution from which credit was obtained. This question generated reports of twenty-five bank loans. The other data on bank loans consists of responses to questions on investments or purchases and what the main source of financing was. Based on those questions, twelve bank loans were reported. Presumably, the discrepancy between the two numbers arises from the fact that some of those saying that they had received bank loans had other sources of finance which defrayed larger shares of the investment costs than the bank loans. All formal loans reported in the IPRS survey were extended through the RCB and/or the PHARE and ADF programs. Looking at these loans and the forms of collateral involved, we see the following: seventeen respondents had received credit from the RCB and eight respondents from ADF. All ADF loans were said to have required livestock as collateral. Collateral accepted by the RCB included a range of immovable and movable properties, with houses and livestock being the most common (seven and five respectively). Three people used land as collateral. Of the twelve investments said to have been financed mainly through formal credit channels, eleven required some kind of collateral: five required a house, three required animals, one, a vehicle, and two, land. Livestock served as collateral mostly in cases of livestock purchases. Houses or land were used as collateral for the most costly investments such as tractors; there were seven such loans.

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Barriers and Outlook for Using Immovable Property as Collateral Among the various obstacles to utilizing immovable collateral, a crucial one is legal. According to the Albanian Civil Code, immovable property cannot be used as collateral unless it is first registered: ‘The mortgage is registered in the office of the Registration of Immovable Property in the area that the property is located’ (Civil Code 1994, article 570). As of 1995, none of the district property registration offices had yet opened. This situation denied most farmers the legal basis for seeking loans collateralized by immovable property. As already indicated, either people’s homes or all the land they own has been used occasionally as collateral. This is highly problematic for other than strictly legal reasons. Firstly, properties used tend to be so critical to family survival that it becomes socially difficult to evict loan defaulters. There are also issues of justice which derive from the family ownership status of property acquired since 1991. Is it proper to impose collective punishment on an entire family for the irresponsible actions of one or two of its members? Until now, banking institutions, (such as the RCB), have only required the head of household’s signature as collateral authorization. Since, legally, the collateral belongs to an entire family, not just the household head, other non-consenting members have a strong defense against foreclosures.12 Where houses are used as collateral, family ownership can mean that even if a creditor is successful in removing debtors from real property used as their home, the debtors’ family members could retain the right to use one room as their place of residence. Finally, possible foreclosure is also encumbered by the fact that title to real property has often been and remains unclear. This can lead to lengthy litigation. Based on such problems and experiences, the RCB appeared (in 1996) to be moving away from reliance on people’s main dwellings as collateral and toward the use of other real property for which default proceedings might have a more realistic chance of succeeding.13 Believing that the land registration process is unlikely to be finished until the year 2000, officials of the RCB were proposing to use truall (land under the house) as the main form of immovable collateral, since such land is usually documented in the Hipoteka or Deeds Registry.14 Another policy change under serious consideration was to have loan applications accompanied by a notarized declaration of agreement signed by all family members over eighteen years living in the house at the time of application.

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Conclusions The IPRS survey reveals substantial pent-up demand for formal credit. Interest in agricultural investment was seen to be particularly high among Lushnjë and Korçë respondents. However, even if immovable collateral were to become more widely available following property registration through the IPRS project, there is little guarantee that credit usage would necessarily increase dramatically. Existence of legal, secure collateral does not eliminate the social difficulties of evicting families from their primary dwellings or properties. Nor does it eliminate issues associated with joint family ownership of property. This implies that, besides property registration, other supporting legislation and procedures that deal with collateral and obligations of creditors and debtors will still be needed. Other impediments to credit access will also have to be addressed. One of these is the demand of major Albanian credit institutions that loan applicants submit agricultural business plans. This is something most farmers lack the ability to do and for which assistance will be needed through extension services. A review of lending institutions and their policies revealed that one of the main hurdles faced in expanding loan access is the absence of adequate collateral in the form of immovable property. However, this problem and the potential benefits of land registration to credit access and investment need to be seen in proper perspective. Even without immovable property as collateral, several credit programs have still managed to extend modest credits for seasonal inputs and livestock. Where immovable property may be a greater factor is in opening up costly, medium-to-long- term investments such as the establishment of vineyards or orchards, building animal stalls, land leveling and refurbishing irrigation infrastructure. These are all critical to Albania’s agricultural development prospects. Currently, all institutions or programs providing larger, medium- to long-term loans require immovable property of some kind as collateral. These include building sites, structures, and stores. One sign that, once it is more available, a substantial amount of formal credit will be devoted to agriculture is the fact that virtually all bank loans among IPRS survey respondents were for such purposes.

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Appendix 6.1 Credit Institutions and Programs Available in Albania The table below provides an overview of major formal credit sources and programs currently existing in Albania. The table also indicates major activities targeted, loan terms, loan ceilings and types of collateral required for disbursement of funds.

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Credit Lines Available in Albania for Agroprocessing and Agrobusiness Activities Credit Institution

Donor/ Project

Targeted Activities

Loan Ceiling

Duration

Collateral

Rural Commercial Bank

EU-PHARE

Small Farmers and rural traders

20,000 Leke

Short-term

Previously dwelling houses, now building sites and stores

Rural Commercial Bank

EU-PHARE AL 9202 AL 9308 AL 9403

Agri inputs Agro-industry Mechanization

Not defined

Short-term Med.-term Long-term

Building sites and stores

Rural Commercial Bank

World Bank ASAC APDP (96)

Large-scale agricultural activities

$US 150,000

Med.-term Long-term

Building sites and stores

Rural Commercial Bank

Government of Germany (1996)

To develop business for refugees

150,000 DM

Med.-term Long-term

Dwellings

Agricultural Development Fund

Six donors with World Bank is executing agency

Farmers with poor access to formal credit

100,000 Leke

Short-term

Movable property (livestock and vehicles)

Savings Bank

EC PHARE

Small and medium enterprises and tourism

50,000 ECU

Med.-term

Buildings for larger credits; equipment for smaller loans

Savings Bank

Gov. of Albania

House construction and repair

Undefined: usually around 500,000 Leke

Long-term

House that credit is used for

AlbanianAmerican enterprise

USAID and Gov. of Albania

Agro-processing, small to medium enterprises

$US750,000

Med.-term

Inputs required to finance the investment

National Commercial Bank

Agriculture and Trading/KFW

Agriculture machinery

Not defined

National Commercial Bank

Commodity aid IV/KFW

Agro-industry

500,000 DM

Med.-term

National Commercial Bank

Commodity II/KFW

Agricultural machinery

Not defined

Med.-term

(PICU)

Long-term

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Notes 1. Investments and purchases categorized as agricultural included livestock, land, and agricultural machinery. 2. Chi Square = 89.42, DF = 4, Prob. > .000 3. Chi Square = 32.33, DF = 4, Prob. > .000 4. The “other” category includes water pumps, work animals, land, trees/vines, travel abroad, and other unspecified investments. 5. Analysis of variance comparison of mean differences in the values of purchases financed by banks (273,333 New Leke) versus those financed by other sources (100,000 New Leke) is statistically significant (F = 4.58, Prob. = 0.03) despite the small numbers of bank loans involved. 6. However, the National Commercial Bank is in the process of gradual privatization and there are rumors that the Rural Commercial Bank is looking for a buyer. 7. Definitions of long- or short-term varied among bank officials. For some, as for example someone interviewed at RCB (Rural Commercial Bank), short-term credit referred to loans of twelve months’ duration or less; medium-term, between one and seven years, and long-term over seven years. Most agree on one year as the cut-off point for “short-term.” Some use loan purposes as definitional criteria, with inputs like seeds, fertilizer, and pesticides being considered “short-term” and more expensive, fixed investments (eg., tractors and buildings), “long-term.” 8. In addition to credit aimed at small farmers known as the “PICU program,” the EU has another set of credit lines (AL-9202, AL-9308, and AL-9403) directed at large farm enterprises, for the financing of agricultural inputs, machinery, and agroprocessing. 9. Funders include the World Bank, the EU, Italy, the UNDP, and IFAD. 10. The Institute for Total Encouragement, a Catholic organization, relied mainly on peer pressure to ensure loan repayment. It was set up to finance small-scale agricultural activities and to help rural inhabitants unable to access formal credit. The loan ceiling was US$500, with zero percent interest charged and no collateral requirements. It was found that very few loans had been repaid. In another effort, a U.S. company, Land ‘O’ Lakes, has been encouraging the formation of informal credit/savings groups among female dairy farmers in connection with their extension program. This project began with only five or six women in each group. 11. The total number of parcels involved was twenty. Notably, only seven of these parcels were in holdings documented by tapis. 12. The National Commercial Bank has been taken to court twice because it failed to obtain authorization from family members other than the household head for mortgaging the family land. 13. RCB has a special unit that evaluates collateral. Evaluation includes verification of ownership documents (titles must be signed and stamped by the hipoteka and only titles “in ownership” are used); valuation of land or properties being used as collateral; advice on business plans, etc. The RCB’s district offices evaluate applications and make the requests for credit to the center. The district offices have the autonomy to decide who will get credit. According to the head of the RCB Credit Department in June 1996, only truall and non-residential buildings such as stores, warehouses, and kiosks are accepted as collateral.

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14. The requirements for using property registered in the Deeds Registry (Hipoteka) office include: an official confirmation from the Hipoteka that the property is registered; a notarized document validating the use of the property as collateral; and the official stamps of the district branch of the RCB where the credit application was made as well as the central RCB unit in Tiranë.

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– Chapter

7–

LAND FRAGMENTATION Harold Lemel and Albert Dubali

i Introduction

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Emergence of an agrarian structure dominated by thousands of independent family farmers in place of a relatively few, centrally managed state farms and cooperatives is generally regarded as a positive development. Yet this new structure also poses serious new challenges. One of the most critical of these is land fragmentation involving villagers’ possession of several, widely scattered, possibly tiny parcels. There are hopes that farmers may be able to consolidate or rationalize their holdings through land transactions among themselves—buying, selling, renting, or exchanging parcels to their mutual advantage. However, it is premature to assess the degree to which a functioning land market may actually realize such hopes; there are simply too few cases of actual transactions upon which to base conclusive judgement. For now, it remains valuable to characterize the nature and dimensions of the current land fragmentation problem and to suggest circumstances under which land market or other solutions might be most appropriate.

Aspects and Dimensions of the Problem About one fifth of IPRS survey respondents cited some aspect of land fragmentation as being a major agricultural production constraint.1 Notes for this section begin on page 125.

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Reference to “fragmentation” may imply any one or a combination of the following: • Having many parcels, • Having parcels distant from people’s homes or from each other • Having very small parcels. How are sample holdings characterized in these respects and what sorts of problems do each raise? These holding features are now operationally defined and their implications discussed.

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Holdings with “Many” Parcels Having many parcels may pose logistical and management challenges if the parcels are widely scattered and distant.2 However, multi-parcel holdings are not in themselves disadvantageous. Possession of dissimilar land in diverse locations can reduce risk and provide special ecological conditions or soil characteristics appropriate for specific crops. Villagers themselves appreciate such advantages. Some older villagers recalled having possessed plots in different parts of the village—a couple of fields for crop farming, a piece of forest land, a piece of pasture land, and so on.3 However, any potential advantages come to be overshadowed as the number of plots increases inordinately or as distances to parcels encumber access. Here, holdings characterized as having “many” parcels are defined as consisting of four or more agricultural parcels. As is indicated in Figure 7.1, such holdings represent about half (43 percent) of all holdings in the sample.4 Distance to Parcels Long distances between parcels and homes or between parcels in the same holding can impede movement of people, machines, inputs, and harvested products to and from fields. Problems may also arise in moving through other villagers’ fields.5 Inability to keep a constant and vigilant eye on crops may invite theft. For analytical purposes, holdings considered to be suffering the disadvantages of parcel distance are defined as those consisting of two or more agricultural parcels farther than thirty minutes from respondents’ homes or in which such distant parcels constitute a third or more of all agricultural parcels. About a fifth of holdings in the sample were characterized in either of these ways.

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Figure 7.1 Number of Agricultural Parcels per Holding

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Small Parcel Size Small parcel size can be particularly troublesome for mechanized land preparation and planting. Extremely small size or a layout in which parcels are arrayed in long and very narrow strips may ultimately render maneuver by tractors or harvesting equipment, impossible. Small size is not necessarily a problem for irrigation, for which the more pertinent constraint is coordination among those with parcels sharing a common water source. Holdings suffering from small parcel-size problems were defined as those with average parcel size of one dynam or less or in which a third or more of all agricultural parcels in the holding were that size. Almost a third (31 percent) of holdings fit this categorization. As can be seen in Figure 7.2, some two-thirds of holdings in the study sample exhibit one or more of these three land “fragmentation” features. Not surprisingly, perception of fragmentation as a constraint was most widespread among those with a combination of many, distant, small parcels; almost half (46 percent) of those with such holdings complained that “fragmentation” was problematic.

Roots and Patterns of Land Fragmentation Historical Dimensions Current landholding features reflect differences in the way land had been distributed since 1991, a subject treated in more detail in

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Figure 7.2 Fragmentation Features among IPRS Survey Sample Landholdings

Chapter 3. Table 7.1 shows that holdings with many, distant parcels are most common where land was distributed “according to the law,” that is, according to the per capita formula and without reference to old boundaries. This was the dominant distribution modality in Lushnjë, Korçë, and Gjirokastër. Small parcels were the main distinguishing feature of holdings in districts where “old boundaries” figured more prominently in the distribution, namely in Tiranë and Kukës. In Kukës virtually all land allottees re-claimed and reoccupied ancestral or “father’s land.” Terrain also appears to have much to do with relative prevalence of small parcels, which are most common in hilly and mountainous areas (See Figure 7.7 for more details on this). Patterns among Study Districts Fragmentation appears to have been regarded as most problematic in Gjirokastër and Korçë, where between 40 and 51 percent of families cited aspects of fragmentation as constraints (see Table 7.2). As indicated in Figure 7.3, the main problems faced in those districts tended to be the high number of parcels per holding plus great distances to parcels from people’s homes, particularly in the case of Gjirokastër.

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Table 7.1 Connections between Modes of Land Distribution and Current Land Fragmentation Problems among IPRS Survey Sample Households Mode of land distribution (Shows adjusted percents)

TOTAL RESPONDENTS

Old boundaries, not per capita

Variety of principles/ unorganized

792 100% 100%

368 51% 100%

237 33% 100%

92 13% 100%

28 4% 100%

R C

245 100% 31%

87 44% 24%

57 29% 24%

48 24% 53%

8 4% 29%

R C

537 100% 69%

277 54% 76%

176 34% 76%

42 8% 47%

20 4% 71%

No

Chi Square Chi Deg. of freedom Chi Probability

33.1543 3 0.00000

Distant parcels in holding Yes

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Per capita + old boundaries

R C Small parcels in holding Yes

R C

166 100% 21%

96 67% 26%

29 20% 12%

14 10% 16%

5 3% 18%

R C

616 100% 79%

268 47% 74%

204 36% 88%

76 13% 84%

23 4% 82%

No

Chi Square Chi Deg. of freedom Chi Probability

18.6360 3 0.00033

Many ag. parcels in holding Yes R C

339 100% 43%

225 76% 61%

49 16% 21%

17 6% 19%

6 2% 21%

R C

445 100% 57%

141 34% 39%

184 44% 79%

73 17% 81%

22 5% 79%

No

Chi Square Chi Deg. of freedom Chi Probability

Per capita/ no old boundaries

124.03 3 0.00000

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Table 7.2 Mention of Land Fragmentation as an Agricultural Constraint (by district)

No TOTAL RESPONDENTS District Lushnjë Korçë Gjirokastër Tiranë Kukës

Fragmentation as a constraint Yes No Response

792 100%

558 70%

166 21%

68 9%

243 100% 133 100% 112 100% 213 100% 90 100%

212 87% 75 56% 53 47% 149 70% 69 77%

30 12% 53 40% 57 51% 21 10% 5 6%

1 1% 5 4% 2 2% 43 20% 16 17%

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Figure 7.3 Fragmentation Characteristics of Holdings (by district)

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Figure 7.4 shows the high percentage of holdings in both of these districts—about one-third—with seven or more agricultural parcels; the median number of parcels in both districts was five. At the other end of the spectrum are Kukës and Tiranë where the median number of agricultural parcels per holding was two and where none of the holdings consisted of seven or more agricultural parcels. Lushnjë lies between these extremes with a median of three agricultural parcels and 9 percent of holdings with seven or more parcels.

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Figure 7.4 Number of Agricultural Parcels by District among Baseline Survey Sample Families

For the sample as a whole, almost half of all holdings consisted of four or more agricultural parcels. Distance to parcels seems most extreme in Gjirokastër, where average time for people to get to their agricultural parcels was reported to have been thirty-three minutes. At twenty and twentytwo minutes, respectively, distance to parcels was also but much less of a problem for those in Korçë and Lushnjë. About half of holdings in Lushnjë and Korçë included at least one parcel more than thirty minutes from people’s homes. Villagers in the Kukës and Tiranë samples were closest to their agricultural parcels, being an average of only sixteen to seventeen minutes away. Among those who cited fragmentation as a problem, average time to get to agricultural parcels in the holding was twenty-nine minutes, compared with twenty minutes for those who did not cite fragmentation as a problem (F = 28, p > .000 for difference between these means). As

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seen in Figure 7.5, between 9 and 20 percent of agricultural land in sample districts was reported to have been very distant. Evidence presented later suggests that such land is liable to be used less intensively than more accessible land. Figure 7.5 Distribution of Agricultural Land by Distance in Minutes from Villagers’ Homes 59%

50%

18%

19%

32%

22% Gjirokastër

Korçë

75%

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45% 70.5%

16% Tiranë

13.5% 20%

35% 16% Kukës Up to 15 minutes

Lushnjë 16-30 minutes

30 + minutes

Source: IPRS Baseline Evaluation Survey

Small parcel size most characterized holdings in Kukës and Korçë (See Figure 7.6). Compared to a median parcel size of 1 dynam in Kukës and 1.7 dynam in Korçë, corresponding figures for other districts were two to four times larger, with the largest parcel average (5 dynam), being reported for Lushnjë.

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Figure 7.6 Size Distribution of Agricultural Parcels among Baseline Survey Sample Families

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Generally, holdings composed of small parcels were most characteristic of mountainous areas, while possession of many or distant parcels appeared more characteristic of plains and hills areas. These topography-related differences are visible in Figure 7.7. Figure 7.7 Fragmentation Features by Dominant Topography

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Evidence of Impacts IPRS survey data indicate that fragmentation is not only perceived as a problem but that it may actually be discouraging land use and even the extent to which farming is relied upon as a source of income.

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Non-use or Minimal Use With increased distance of parcels from people’s homes, levels of use appeared to decline: average distance of agricultural parcels from home correlated positively with the percentage of holding area left unplanted (r = .14, P > .000). As a percentage of parcel area, the average percent of area unused went from a low of 10 percent on the closest parcels to a high of 47 percent on parcels more than sixty minutes from people’s homes (See Table 7.3). This relationship appeared to be strongest among families who reported their main source of income as being something other than agriculture. For them, percentages of non-use began at an average low of 19 percent for the closest parcels (that is, parcels up to fifteen minutes from people’s homes) and went up to a maximum average high of 60 percent for parcels farther than sixty minutes away.6 Among those who reported that their main source of income was crop farming, levels of non-use were lower overall and differences between levels of non-use for distant parcels much less dramatic. Still, non-use remained consistently higher for the most distant (14 percent) than the closest parcels (4 percent). Table 7.3 Analysis of Variance: Parcel Distance from Homes and Percentage of Parcel Area Left Uncultivated Dependent Variable: Percentage of Parcel Area Uncultivated Factor A Source A Residual Total

# Levels 4 DF 3 2659 2662

Variable Distance Categories Sum of Mean of Squares Squares 170078 56692.7 3187321 1198.69 3357399

F 47.2955

Prob 0.0000

Cell Means / Standard Deviations for maximum Prob of 1.0000 Distance (Factor A) Up to 15 minutes 16-30 minutes 31-60 minutes 60+ minutes

Mean 10.4 17.9 18.7 46.5

Std Dev 30.00 37.87 38.78 50.07

n 1485 636 413 129

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Reliance on Farming Once the various elements of fragmentation become overwhelmingly problematic, does this actually discourage involvement in agriculture? Some evidence to this effect emerges from the data, particularly when two problems are confronted simultaneously: small parcel size and distance. Among people with such holdings, only slightly over a quarter (27 percent), cited farming as their main source of income, compared with 48 percent for the entire sample. Where small parcel size coincides with small overall size of holdings, as it generally does in Kukës, reliance on crop farming could be expected to be less than otherwise. At issue here would seem to be small holding size, not small parcel size, per se. However, even focussing only on holdings larger than 15 dynam, the impact of parcel size on levels of non-use persists: in such holdings, the correlation between percent of parcel area left uncultivated with percent of parcels smaller than one dynam in the holding, was +.15 (Prob. >.000).

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Solutions Possibilities for attenuating the ill-effects of fragmentation, include the following: 1. The organizational option: promoting the coordination of cropping choices, crop operations, and irrigation activities among farmers with adjoining parcels. 2. Credit programs to reduce inheritance subdivision by extending loans to one or two heirs to purchase shares of fellow heirs or more generally extending credit to help people finance land purchases. 3. Legislation intended to prevent excessive subdivision (for example, laws issued to set minimum parcel size limits). 4. Reliance on land transactions through which more favorably located parcels may be rented, bought, or exchanged to consolidate adjoining small parcels. Of these, the two discussed in detail below are the organizational and land transaction approaches. As for the other two: credit programs have been proposed particularly in the Middle East and North Africa, places where the application of Muslim inheritance rules has

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led to extreme subdivision and fragmentation. Offering credit to finance heir buy-outs may be worth trying in Albania, although financial institutions which could do so are still too immature to fulfill this role adequately. Legal minima for subdivision are common features of land-use planning laws. However, their enforcement record is discouraging. People circumvent the law by simply resorting to informal subdivisions, something that ultimately degrades the accuracy of land records.

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The Farmer Organization Solution In some areas of Albania, farmers with adjoining parcels already appear to be informally coordinating planting and cropping choices so as to facilitate mechanization and irrigation.7 Lushaj and Papa8 report relatively large-scale coordination of this kind in Lushnjë, covering up to 163 hectares and eighty seven farmers. Other instances cited in Lushnjë and Durres involved farmers’ associations which, except for small individual plots, were farming all of their land (rented from the state or owned) essentially as a production cooperatives. Thus, even where land ownership may continue to be highly fragmented, farming operations may be organized sufficiently to enlarge the size of areas under unified management. Irrigation remains the more difficult challenge because of the interdependencies between those sharing a common water source or channel. Shorter distances of parcels to the common water source can reduce irrigation management and coordination difficulties, as can substitution of tube-well irrigation for canal-based irrigation. Efforts are currently underway with World Bank assistance to organize water users associations to coordinate use and maintenance of shared water sources and canal networks. Prospects for applying such farmer organization solutions appear most promising where land was distributed “according to old boundaries” by fis (patrilineal group), since adjoining parcels tend to be held by close relatives. Lushaj and Papa (1995) report several cases of cooperation in all aspects of farming among fathers and sons and married brothers sharing contiguous parcels. In other areas where land distribution proceeded differently, it may be more realistic to seek effective consolidation through the exchange, renting out, or sale of parcels. The prospects of these sorts of solutions are explored in the next section.

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Land Market Solutions While Chapter 5 explores land transactions in detail, this section focuses more narrowly on the extent to which past or prospective land transactions may attenuate the ill-effects of land fragmentation. In particular, does concern about land fragmentation explicitly figure in people’s expressions of interest or readiness to sell or rent out their land?

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Parcel exchange Only fifteen parcel exchanges were recorded in the IPRS survey. All were meant to either consolidate (n = 11) or to expand parcel size (n = 4). Most of these exchanges occurred in Lushnjë (Kolonjë, Gradishte, and Hysgjokaj komunas) and in Korçë (mostly in Pojan komuna); only one exchange was reported from Kukës (Topojane). Almost three-quarters (11/15) involved people whose main source of income was crop farming. Most also had relatively large holdings averaging 18.3 dynam. Parcels involved were also relatively large, averaging 3.6 dynam. With only one exception, all of the exchanges were fixed by oral and not written agreement. Three of the people involved reported two exchanges each. Parcels acquired through exchange were not particularly close either to people’s homes or to asphalted roads.9 With regard to the more remote parcels, it can be surmised that the primary motive for the exchange was consolidation with bounding parcel(s). One can only surmise this because the picture of exchanges is only fragmentary: we do not know which parcels were exchanged for the acquired parcels. Based on Lushaj and Papa’s land fragmentation study and unstructured discussions with farmers, the small number of exchanges recorded in the IPRS survey would appear to understate actual levels of interest. Lushaj and Papa note that despite widespread interest in plot exchanges, people frequently were discouraged by the belief that exchanges were unlawful. This also emerged from fieldwork associated with the IPRS study. Many of those interviewed expressed their desire for clear procedures to conduct and document such exchanges, by for example, being able to amend tapis; otherwise no clear, authoritative record of the exchange would exist. Rental All eight cases of rented parcels occurred either in Lushnjë or Tiranë. Parcels rented in were relatively large (average = 3.6 Rural Property and Economy in Post-Communist Albania, edited by Harold Lemel, Berghahn Books, Incorporated,

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dynam) and well-situated, being either close to people’s homes or close to main roads. One difference between the holdings into which parcels were absorbed in Lushnjë and those in Tiranë was that the ones in Lushnjë were added to what were already relatively large holdings in which the renters were relying primarily on crop farming. In Tiranë, all the rented parcels were acquired by families whose main source of income was not farming and for whom the rented parcels comprised the bulk of all the land available. In the case of rentals in Lushnjë, it is unknown whether choice of the parcels also involved consolidation-related motives.

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Land purchases As in the case of rentals, virtually all fourteen parcel purchases after 199110 occurred in Lushnjë and Tiranë. Purchased parcels were either very close to people’s homes or very close to asphalted roads, being better situated than rented parcels. Half of the parcels had houses on them. Fieldwork associated with the IPRS survey suggests that many home parcel purchases were probably forced expost facto on people already occupying the land by others claiming precollectivization rights to those same parcels. There is little to suggest that fragmentation-related motives were behind such purchases. About two-thirds involved parcels in holdings without any symptoms of fragmentation. Of the third that did, the problem was confined to small size of parcels. Interest/willingness to sell or rent Since the number of land transactions in the survey is really too small to draw any definitive conclusions, it is more revealing to look at people’s expressed interest or willingness to sell or rent out land for evidence of land fragmentation-related motives or implications. The evidence here appears to be quite strong. Firstly, there are indications that substantial amounts of land may be made available to farmers by people leaving their villages or no longer able to farm themselves. Almost a third of parcels would be made available under such circumstances. Over three-quarters of such parcels were held by people mentioning fragmentation as a constraint. This was true of over two-thirds of parcels for which respondents said they would sell “if I can find better land.” Parcels for which respondents indicated that they would sell if they were more secure also generally (87 percent) belonged to holdings considered to be suffering from fragmentation. Most of these were in Gjirokastër and Korçë. Finally, fluidity of the land market is sug-

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gested by the fact that respondents characterized half of sample parcels as eligible for sale “for a good price.” What seem to be the dominant fragmentation-type problems of those who both regarded fragmentation as a serious difficulty and also expressed willingness or interest in selling? The great majority belonged to holdings characterized by many parcels (half of these consisted of holdings with many, small parcels and the other half, many, distant parcels). Parcels designated as likely to be put up for sale or rented out tended to be substantially farther (average = 33 minutes) from people’s homes than other parcels.11 Data in Table 7.4 suggest that correcting the distant parcel problem by sale may not always be easy. Forty-three percent of parcels for which it was said, “no one would be interested to buy,” were the most distant parcels in people’s holdings. The percentage rises to 52 percent of such parcels in Kukës and Lushnjë and 63 percent of such parcels in Tiranë. Table 7.4 Factors Preventing Sale of Parcel by Whether Parcel Is the Most Distant One in the Holding Factors preventing sale of parcel?

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(shows adjusted percents)

I need this land

TOTAL RESPONDENTS 2708 1415 100% 100% Parcel is the most distant in holding? No 1794 929 66% 66% Yes

914 34%

486 34%

Others in family would oppose

Nobody would want this land

It’s not my old land

It’s state land

128 100%

481 100%

276 100%

82 326 100% 100%

83 65%

274 57%

208 75%

56 244 68% 75%

45 35%

207 43%

68 25%

26 32%

Other

82 25%

Chi Square = 40.6 DF = 5 Prob = 0.0000 Note: Table includes only non-house parcels in holdings of 2 or more parcels.

Concluding Remarks Land fragmentation has several dimensions, each of which—or combinations of which—characterize different study districts and areas marked by distinct topography. Two study districts stand out as the ones where perception of fragmentation was most acute:

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Gjirokastër and Korçë. Dominant problems in those districts were possession of many parcels and distance of parcels from people’s homes. Small size of parcels was the major fragmentation issue for respondents in Tiranë and Kukës. Parcel distance appeared to be associated with decreased levels of use. In circumstances where parcel distance combined with other fragmentation problems or where predominantly small parcel size coincided with small holding size, interest and involvement in farming appeared to suffer. Prospects are great that parcel proliferation and subdivision will be aggravated by inheritance. These effects are as yet drawing little attention because of the short time since people received their current holdings. However, even within this relatively short time span, numerous subdivisions were recorded in this study’s relatively small sample. Against this pessimistic scenario are hopes that a vigorous land market may be able to counter the ill-effects of fragmentation, allowing people to buy, rent, or exchange parcels to consolidate and enlarge parcels and holdings. Land available for purchase should increase as more and more people emigrate from their villages. In areas such as Gjirokastër, where some of the parcels people find difficult to farm are very remote, scope for land market solutions may fall short. Perhaps nothing short of extending permission to build houses on such distant parcels will overcome lack of interest in such land. In addition to entirely privately initiated and funded land transactions, consolidation may be promoted with the aid of special credit-for-land programs, in particular those making it affordable for heirs leaving the village to sell their shares to those staying behind and wishing to pursue farming. Parcel exchanges may be stimulated if a proper legal framework is put in place defining procedures for carrying out and documenting them. Farmer initiatives to overcome the disadvantages of fragmentation by cooperation among themselves hold great promise, especially in areas where land was distributed by fis (for example, Kukës, portions of Tiranë and small areas in Lushnjë). In other areas, even people who are not related may be nudged into cooperation by the simple logic of its benefits. Otherwise, it will largely be land market solutions that will be relevant in such areas.

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Notes 1. One element of fragmentation, great distance to parcels, was cited by about 7 percent (n = 51) of survey respondents as their reason for being dissatisfied with the 1990/91 land distribution program. About 2 percent (n = 20) said that they had refused to sign tapis because land was either too distant or because it was divided up into too many small pieces. 2. Vangjo Kovaci and Justina Borici (Study on Agricultural Land Fragmentation and Consolidation, IPRS—Project Management Unit, Policy Research Dept., Tiranë, 1995, p.25) point out that the proliferation of parcels tends to increase the number and complexity of relationships with neighbors. Areas affected include, movement of people and livestock and machines, through others’ fields. Interdependencies become more complex in irrigation and drainage and in sloping areas, regarding land leveling and erosion. They found animal movements to have been considered a problem by 40 percent of respondents and movement of mechanical means a problem by 60 percent. All of these challenges and disadvantages were estimated to translate into 11—40 percent declines in potential productivity for major crops. 3. Sherif Lushaj and D. Papa (Land Fragmentation and Consolidation, IPRS—Project Management Unit, Policy Research Dept., Tiranë, 1995, p.16) report that preference for more than one plot is a minority view: only 15 percent of respondents preferred two or three plots, with each plot respectively consisting of arable land, olive tree land, and vineyard land. 4. Numbers of parcels per holding understate the actual number of pieces of land cropped or managed, since parcels themselves—even small parcels—tend to be subdivided into fields devoted to different crops. Data on this phenomenon are not available from the IPRS survey instrument. However, fieldwork conducted by IPRS baseline study team members and studies by Vangjo Kovaci and Justina Borici (p.24) suggest this to be common. 5. Movement of machinery through others’ fields was cited as a problem for 60 percent of Kovaci and Borici’s survey respondents. 6. F = 29, P > 0.000 7. Ninety percent of farmers in Kovaci and Boraci’s survey supported the idea of coordinating crop choices, irrigation timing and planting and harvest times. Such cooperation may be more complicated where the total amount of land available is very limited and people feel constrained to diversify cropping patterns on their small parcels to meet their nutritional and livestock needs. 8. Lushaj and Papa, Land Fragmentation. 9. Average distance to homes was twenty five-minutes and to a road, seventeen minutes. Median distances were fifteen and ten minutes, respectively. 10. Thirty five parcels were reported as having been purchased at one time or another. Eight-four percent of these were house parcels. 11. Analysis of variance: F = 10.01, P > 0.000.

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– Chapter 8 –

FAMILY AND PROPERTY RIGHTS Implications for Gender and Farming Susana Lastarria-Cornhiel and Rachel Wheeler

i

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Introduction

During the nearly fifty years of communist rule between 1944 and 1990, Albanian families and individuals lost their ownership rights to land and buildings, which passed to the state. The great majority of rural inhabitants became state-farm or cooperative workers. Although the regime promoted gender equality in work and education, impacts on social norms concerning gender equality within the family, including attitudes regarding property rights, remain unclear. By mid-1991 Albania had begun the transition to the marketoriented economy, one aspect being the re-creation of private ownership. Two types of private ownership were applied in the privatization programs: (1) individualized ownership, either individual or groups of identified individuals; and (2) family ownership, where members of the family are not identified, except for the family head named on the title documents. Both of these ownership forms existed in practice if not by statute prior to World War II. With the re-creation of historical forms of private ownership, traditional gender relations have reemerged in which the status of women is unequal to men in various situations, including the effective ownership of land and other property. Notes for this section begin on page 153.

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In this historical context, the issue of how men’s and women’s property1 rights are being defined in Albania takes on unusual dimensions. People face the legacy of gender egalitarian policies of the communist system and at the same time the reemergence of customary laws and practices that predate the communist system. The question posed in this chapter is whether the family form of ownership of agricultural land, as established by the Law on Land of 1991 (Law No. 7501), is protective of or prejudicial to the rights to land of both women and men? Some of the basic tensions and contradictions affecting rights to property among family members are explored here, including that between individual and family-based rights concepts of property. Market forces, in particular the opening up of a property market, are likely to strengthen movement towards individualization of rights in practice. Relying on IPRS survey data and other studies, this chapter evaluates how rights to own, inherit, use, sell, or bequeath property are allocated to families and among members of farm families, thereby revealing social, economic, and legal-institutional constraints on both the individual’s and the family unit’s participation in the property market. The chapter details inheritance preferences, views on family authority over land use and other rights, and how the institution of marriage relates to property rights. It also explores the impact of gender on the management of family farms, an important issue given the high number of female-managed farms and the tenuous property rights women within the family enjoy. Some policy recommendations and ideas for future research are presented in the conclusion.

Legal and Social Background for Issues Defining Family and Intra-Family Property Rights It is commonly argued that the rationale underlying the agricultural land distribution program of 19912 was one of equality. According to the Law on Land of July 1991, land allotment certificates (tapi) were given to families who were members of the dissolved cooperatives according to the number of individuals comprising the family at the time of the distribution. Since the amount of land a family received was calculated according to the number of family members, it could be argued that these members became entitled to individual rights to the land.

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Moreover, certain Albanian legislation stipulates that all Albanians have the right to own property (Private Property Law, No. 7512, 1991) and that all family members, including spouse, sons, and daughters, have the right to inherit property (1994 Civil Code, Article 373). These provisions can be interpreted as assigning individuals distinct property rights. By contrast, legislation (Law 7501) and the process of agricultural land privatization and distribution between 1991 and 1993, defined rights to agricultural land on a family basis and not to identified individuals as provided for in other legislation. During the land distribution, the tapi for agricultural land given to each household were issued only in the name of household heads. The household head, usually the eldest male in the family, was seen as holding the property as representative of the family. In other words, ownership was given to families not individuals.3 The 1994 Civil Code also designates agricultural land as family farmland, stipulating that family farm land is not to be subdivided among family members except under specified conditions (for example, Articles 207 and 226 of the 1994 Civil Code). Family-based property legislation emerged out of customary family ownership values in Albania. Albanian customary law, which was traditionally governed by oral customary codes called kanun, identifies the family as representing the basic and most important unit in social and public institutions since the beginnings of Albania’s recorded history.4 Legal Ambiguity and Social Conflict Regarding Family Property As indicated earlier, current legislation relating to agricultural land5 assigns rights on a family, not on an individual basis; all family members share rights to land owned by the family. There are, however, two other bases for assigning intra-family rights that come into play with each having implications for how rights may be applied in practice. One derives from the reassertion of customary concepts of family and property; the other derives from certain provisions of the Civil Code. There are strong indications that at least in some communities patriarchal norms pre-dating the communist system are being asserted that govern the newly redefined property relations as well as other aspects of family life.6 Anthropological studies of rural Albanian social norms prior to World War II identified some aspects of patriarchal society in Albania. Patrilineal descent groups (clans), consisting of extended families, tended to live in close proximity,

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occupying clearly defined territories. The heads of clans and of the household itself were all men,7 and were referred to as “the brotherhood”. These male family members were conceptualized as belonging to the “branch of blood.” Only sons, not daughters, were believed to pass the family blood on to the next generation. Only the male bloodline was of significance in defining transfer of ownership of family land and property which was to be handed down exclusively through male relatives. Family land and property were usually apportioned when sons married and set up their own households. A family with no sons to inherit would generally allocate its land to the husband’s brothers and their male children. While wives and daughters had use rights to family property, they did not exercise other property rights such as rights to sell and inherit. In some communities such social structures continue to exist.8 In others the reestablishment of private ownership of the land can stimulate the reformation of patriarchal notions. Re-emergence of such norms in which rights of wives and daughters are clearly subordinate to rights of the eldest male in the family can create problems, particularly for divorced or widowed women. The family as a whole may also suffer loss of rights if the male head should deal with the land irresponsibly or without consulting family members. Scope for such irresponsible behavior by family heads was enlarged in the wake of the 1991 land distribution program through which only the names of heads of households’ were noted on title documents or tapis. This also meant that if the head of household named on a tapi were to migrate, family members left behind would find it difficult to prove their ownership of property. The other set of developments shaping how family and intrafamily rights may be exercised in practice lie in the legal arena, especially certain vague or contradictory provisions of the 1994 Civil Code. The Code specifies that only the head of the farm family should represent it and that the family head is elected or named by the family through some (unspecified) process. Law 7983 (7 July, 1995) which authorizes the buying and selling of agricultural land, specifies that any sale of family farmland requires the authorization of all family members before the family head carries out a transaction.9 As yet, the implementing regulations for this law have not been approved, so that the definition of who is a family member and who must approve the naming of the family head as representative of the family for the sale of land remains unclear. Furthermore, while the Civil Code makes provisions (vague as they may be) for family property, it at the same time permits prepa-

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ration of individual wills, something that would appear to undermine this family property concept. If agricultural land is family owned, how can a member of the family bequeath the land to another person? Customarily, heads of families bequeath land to their sons when they marry. But it would seem that such an action would not be possible under the existing provisions of the Civil Code that define agricultural land as family farm property. Thus, clear definition and applicability of property rights, particularly within the family, is hindered by problems of vagueness, contradictions, and inconsistency. Legal definition of the family and of procedures to obtain approval by family members of property transactions remain vague. Contradictions exist (a) between what Law 7501 suggests in terms of family rights and what custom dictates, and (b) between Civil Code provisions that designate family farm property as a type of property and other provisions on individual rights to draw up wills bequeathing immovable property. In summary, a tension exists between individual and familybased concepts of property, both legally and socioculturally. Certain legislation tends to support notions of individual rights, while other legislation supports notions of family ownership. Market forces, in particular the opening up of the property market, can have an important influence on this tension as buyers demand clear identification of who are the owners of properties they wish to buy. Family tradition may counteract these pressures and may pressure legal experts to find creative ways of providing security to the buyers of family land. Changes in cultural norms about family ownership and management of land as well as the structure and functioning of the family, may also affect how this tension evolves in the future.

Changing Family Structures and Impact on Property Rights Family Structure Traditional property rights within the family strongly relate to family structure and marriage practices. In the past, family structure in Albania was both vertically and horizontally extended,10 that is, not only were there several generations in the household (grandparents, parents, children, and grandchildren), but also married sons and their families. Fieldwork observations and previous analysis by the authors11 on the structure of the household in Albania, indicate that the pro-

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totype of the household cycle in contemporary Albania seems to follow this pattern: a son and his wife following marriage will live with his parents, participating in the farm operations and domestic chores. While they live with his parents they are part of the same farm family economy. They may share living space with other brothers and their wives, but contemporary evidence indicates that this will only be temporary as the young couple accumulates resources to establish their own household. It is also common that when the son is ready to start a family of his own, the father will give the son’s family a section of the family property on which they can build a house. Typically, a couple’s decision to move out of the parents’ house may depend on a variety of factors—migration to town, the marriage of a younger brother, economic circumstances, the decision to begin a family, and the father’s gift of some land. The changing structure of the Albanian family—from the extended family, often comprising several brothers and their descendants, to the more nuclear one, with very little horizontal extension—is also a result of the benefits that separate households can receive from social assistance programs. Informal discussions with rural families indicate that this was a common reason for married sons separating from their birth family. An examination of IPRS survey data confirms that while it is common for two married couples of different generations to be living in the same house, it is not common for two married couples of the same generation. That is, the data indicate a very low incidence of married brothers living together. When gathering information on the sampled families, an explicit definition of the family was used: “all those people living in the household at the time of interview and people who usually live with the family.” Table 8.1 shows that there is a significant difference in household size between districts, although most of them have an average of five persons.12 Table 8.1 Descriptive Statistics on Household Size (by district) District Gjirokastër Korçë Kukës Lushnjë Tiranë TOTAL F = 6.8

Mean

Mode

Min

Max

4.6 4.8 5.9 5.0 5.2 5.1

6 4 5 4 4 4

1 2 1 1 1 1

10 9 13 11 13 13

P < 0.00001

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Historically, the northern areas of Albania (where Kukës is located) have retained stronger patriarchal family traditions and customs than the rest of Albania. In the ethnographic literature this is attributed to two factors: the mountainous topography which kept the people in this region isolated from outside influences, and the need to retain strong family ties as a means of protection against any invasions. With this in mind, one would expect to observe the highest incidence of three- and four-generation households in Kukës, the most northern and mountainous district in the survey sample. Surprisingly though, Table 8.2 shows that Kukës had the least. The high outflow of young migrants and their families from Kukës may account for this finding. Table 8.2 Number of Generations Living in the Same House (by district)13

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Districts Number of generations

Gjirokastër (%)

Korçë (%)

Kukës (%)

Lushnjë (%)

Tiranë (%)

1 Gen 2 Gen 3 Gen 4 Gen TOTAL % (n)

15 52 32 1

3 70 26 1

11 69 20 0

7 67 25 1

6 66 28 0

100 (114)

100 (132)

100 (89)

100 (243)

100 (209)

Of a total of 294 marriages reported in the IPRS survey, 41 established themselves as separate families and of these, 38 officially registered themselves as distinct families in the Civil Registry. Of 152 sons who married, 116 stayed in their family home with their new wife; 25 moved away to separate homes; only 9 left to live with their spouse’s family. In contrast, of the 128 daughters who married, the majority (99) moved to their husband’s family home; 16 moved into a home of their own, and 11 stayed in their own family homes with their husbands. Gender of Head of Household and Documentation of Property Rights Female heads of household account for only 7 percent (53) of the 787 household heads,14 thus leaving 93 percent with a male head. There is no significant difference in the gender of household heads across the study districts. As Table 8.3 shows, the overwhelming majority (95 percent) of male household heads were married, whereas the

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majority (81 percent) of female household heads were widowed. The median age of the female household heads was 63, the majority of them being classified as retired or pensioners. In contrast, male heads were considerably younger, with a median age of 47. Table 8.3 Civil Status of Household Heads by Gender Gender of Household Heads Male Female Total

Civil status % Single

Married

Divorced

2.6 1.9 2.5

94.8 11.3 89.2

0.1 5.7 0.5

(%) (%) (%)

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Chi-square = 479.56

DF = 4

Total (n)

Widow/er 2.2 81.1 7.5

100 100 100

(734) (53) (787)

Probability < .0001

Although the small number of female-headed households in the survey renders statistical inference from any analysis about them somewhat questionable, the characteristics of such households may provide illuminating insights into different Albanian household structures. IPRS survey interviewers did not explicitly identify and interview de facto female heads of households. Other studies and field observations indicate that many Albanian families incorporate a strong matriarch who in fact manages and runs both the household and farming activities, although she is not given the formal title of the head of household. As Albania makes its transition to a market economy and families participate in this process by sending their men to work off the farm, de facto female-headed households are likely to become more prevalent. Higher levels of divorce, which seem to be accompanying the transition, may also result in more female-headed households in the near future.15 It will be interesting to observe how female heads of households’ rights to ownership and use of land change when the male head leaves the home. As previously pointed out, land titles (tapi) given out to rural families recorded only the household head’s name. In the IPRS survey, 52 percent (409) of households reported having received a title for their land. Of these, 95 percent (387) of the titles had a male name specified and only 5 percent (22) a female name. Table 8.4 identifies the family positions of those holding the title document by gender. As expected, the overwhelming majority of names on the tapi are men (husbands, fathers, and sons), while only two wives, two mothers, and no daughters are named on the tapis.

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Table 8.4 Position in Family and Gender of Person on Property Title Gender Position in household

Male

Female

Head of household Spouse Father Mother Son/s TOTAL (n)

95.9

81.8 9.1

2.8 9.1 1.3 100 (387)

100 (22)

Given this situation, the rights to property of family members, other than the one named on the tapi, may be disputed in cases of divorce or emigration of the household head. This can also create problems when transactions based on documented property rights, such as credit applications, are conducted by family members other than the household head.

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Employment of Household Members and Sources of Income Division of work by gender in rural Albania is by task and product rather than by sector. While most family members, regardless of gender, engage in agricultural work, women are the ones more likely to be responsible for farm processing, subsistence crops, and dairy production; men work mainly with cash crops, land clearing, and irrigation. Although the survey did not distinguish between different types of activities within each employment type, some broad patterns emerge. The relevance of intra-family division of labor to intra-family property rights is apparent from the current legal debate among officials of the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Justice, and the IPRS project on formulating a legal, workable definition of the farm family for purposes of land transaction procedures, for credit collateral policy, and for the creation of a new family code. Some of the debate has stressed that a definition of a farm family must incorporate “those individuals who are dependent on the land for a means of economic survival.” In other words, some level of involvement in farm activities may provide some family members with greater rights to land and property. If this kind of definition is to be adopted it will be interesting to observe whether those family members who tend to depend on agricultural activities are able to protect their legal rights on this basis.

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IPRS survey data provide us with information regarding the extent of involvement in farming of each family member, as shown in Table 8.5. Table 8.5 Extent of Involvement in Farming by All Household Members

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Involvement in farming/type of employment

Count

Percent

On farm all year On-farm 3 months a year On-farm 6 months a year Off-farm private sector all year Off-farm state sector all year Student Emigrant Retired/pensioner Housewife Minor (under 6 years of age) Soldier [Missing Data]

1,273 145 132 100 156 759 96 495 250 538 38 [40]

32.0 3.6 3.3 2.5 3.9 19.1 2.4 12.4 6.3 13.5 1.0

Total

4,022

100.0

Disaggregating data in Table 8.5 by gender and family position, we can make some generalizations regarding who is most involved in farm activities. Of those still working, agriculture represents the main activity of 42 percent (332/787) of household heads. Among them, • Thirty-two percent were classified as retired and 10 percent as permanently employed off the farm. • Forty-four percent of husbands were working on the farm all year, and another 8 percent only part-time. • Seventeen percent of the husbands were working off the farm all year and 2 percent had emigrated, • Over three-quarters (78 percent) of the fifty-three female heads were older or retired with only 17 percent claiming to have been involved in farming activities all year round. Comparing male heads of household with their wives, the data show that more wives (51 percent) were working as full-time farmers than husbands (45 percent), and that over four times more husbands (17 percent) were working off the farm than wives (4 percent). Nearly one-third of husbands and a fifth of wives were retired.

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Table 8.6 further demonstrates that even among children, proportionately more females than males in sample households were working on their family farms. While 49 percent of daughters and 58 percent of daughters-in-law were working on the farm, only 45 percent of sons were doing so. Conversely, a larger proportion of sons were working off the farm, had emigrated, or were soldiers.16 Table 8.6 Involvement in Farming of Sons, Daughters, and Daughters-in-law (aged between 15 and 60)

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Position in family Involvement in farming/employment type

Sons (%)

Daughters (%)

Daughtersin-law (%)

On farm all year On farm part of year Off farm all year Student Emigrant Retired Housewife Minor Soldier TOTAL % (n)

45 12 13 13 11 1 0 0 6 100 (587)

49 21 3 16 1 0 10 0 0 100 (275)

58 9 6 0 7 1 19 0 0 100 (192)

Missing cases = 36

Land Subdivision Resulting from Marriage Subdivisions of land often occur as a result of marriage or death.17 Documentation of these subdivisions can provide clues about the future development of land use and ownership structures. Table 8.7 indicates that of a total of 294 marriages since 1991, about 10 percent (32) had resulted in land subdivisions;18 78 percent (25/32) of these were associated with marriage of a son. Only two land subdivisions occurred when daughters married. These findings support the thesis that the traditional practice of daughters moving away from their birth home not being entitled to their birth family’s land still prevails. The married daughter is considered a member of her husband’s family and accordingly her property rights are defined within his family, not her family of origin. The access of children to their birth family’s land is dependent on marriage practices which in turn are determined by the person’s gender. Subdivisions in the sample were too few to permit conclusive findings. Keeping this in mind, data in Table 8.7 suggest less fre-

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quent subdivision upon children’s marriage in Gjirokastër and Kukës than in the other study districts, where between 10 and 15 percent of marriages were associated with subdivisions. The small landholding sizes in Kukës and Gjirokastër and low levels of farm activity, together with high out-migration, may partially explain why subdivision might be less common in those two districts. Table 8.7 Marriages and Land Subdivisions since 1991 (by district) District Number of marriages

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Gjirokastër Korçë Kukës Lushnjë Tiranë TOTAL

Land subdivisions resulting from: Son’s Daughter’s Other family marriage marriage member’s marriage

30 48 24 91 101 294

0 4 0 10 11 25

0 1 0 1 0 2

0 0 1 0 4 5

Table 8.8 provides information on respondents’ attitudes19 with respect to ownership rights to a share of family land by married sons and daughters. It is difficult to know how the concept of ownership was interpreted by respondents. A series of focus group meetings of rural village women carried out by one of the authors20 revealed immense difficulty in understanding the concept of individualized rights to land and houses as distinct from family rights. While this raises the need for caution in interpreting responses, one could tentatively conclude that sons are considered to have more rights to their birth families’ land than daughters. Table 8.8 Respondents’ Attitude Regarding Ownership Rights of Married Sons and Daughters21 Ownership rights Position in

Total

family

No

Yes

%

(n)

Son of head Daughter of head Other

18 87 50

82 13 50

100 100 100

(142) (109) (8)

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Inheritance The method by which the land was distributed in 1991 has given family members of many rural families the basis to believe they have ownership rights to a particular amount of land, whether they can physically identify it or not, and whether they actually claim it or not. In practice, however, land appears to be handed down to the next generation by parental decision to distribute the land only among their sons.22 Daughters sometimes inherit but usually only if there are no sons. Field observations indicate that daughters assume a passive stance in property acquisition by leaving their legal share of property to brothers. Their opportunity to acquire some rights to land, such as use rights, comes with marriage when they move to their husband’s family home. IPRS respondents reported only thirty-four cases of land inheritance since 1991. This represents about 5 percent of families in the sample. Of these thirty-four cases only four of the deceased left a will (two were notarized). In eleven cases, shares of land going to each heir were not clearly defined. However, only two respondents stated that this led to disagreements among heirs; one case had been settled within the family, the other with the presence of the village elder. In more than half of the cases for which land inheritance was reported, it was sons who inherited the land and who then presumably became de facto heads of household. Additional data from the IPRS survey confirm the strong preference for bequeathing land to sons and their families. As shown in Table 8.9, over two-thirds of respondents maintained that only males should inherit; only 13 percent favored inheritance by all family members. Table 8.9 Views on Heir Preferences Heir preference Youngest in family Eldest in family Only males of family All members of family According to the Law According to regional traditions TOTAL

(%) (n)

Percent 4 1 65 13 5 12 100 (792)

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Comparing the study districts (See Figure 8.1), we see Kukës having the highest percentage (91 percent) of male-only heir preference and Gjirokastër and Lushnjë, the lowest. Perhaps this is due to the extensive exposure to the outside world—in the case of Gjirokastër through migration—and the agricultural prosperity and accessibility of Lushnjë.

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Figure 8.1 Heir Preference (by district)

Given the history of patrilineal inheritance systems, one would expect that in families with only daughters and no sons, inheritance preferences would be for male relatives.23 In the entire sample, there were fifty-four families with only daughters. Table 8.10 shows the significantly different inheritance preferences of families with only daughters as compared to all other families. Focussing on the rows marked “Males Only” and “All Members,” we can see that families with only daughters show a preference for all family members inheriting family property and have a much lower preference for maleonly inheritance, while all other families are much more prone to prefer only males inheriting.24 Decision-Making Authority over Property Rights Property rights include the rights to sell, rent out, bequeath, use as collateral, determine use, or construct buildings on the land, among

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Table 8.10 Heir Preference of Families with Only Daughters Compared to All Other Families Families with only daughters (%)

Heir Preference Youngest Eldest Males only All members of family By Law By tradition TOTAL

(%) (n)

Other families (%)

Total (n)

5.6 0 22.2 48.1 5.6 18.5

3.7 1.1 68.5 9.9 5.2 11.7

(30) (8) (517) (99) (41) (96)

100% (737)

100% (54)

(791)

Missing observations = 1 Chi-square = 78.31

DF = 5

Probability = .0000

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others. Respondents were asked who in the family had decisionmaking authority over these rights. As the previous section about inheritance and land subdivision suggested, heads of household generally hold primary decision-making authority. Table 8.11 shows substantial variation across districts with regard to which household members have effective rights over two key ownership rights: the right to sell and the right to determine use. Table 8.11 Percentage Distribution of Rights to Sell Land and to Determine Use among Family Member across Districts District Family Member Head Head & spouse Sons Daughter Whole Family Family & Kin Regional tradition

Gjirokastër Sell Use (%) (%)

Korçë Sell Use (%) (%)

Kukës Sell Use (%) (%)

Lushnjë Sell Use (%) (%)

Tiranë Sell Use (%) (%)

Total Sell Use (%) (%)

39

44

41

43

48

19 11 0.5 0.5 0 0

11 6 0

13 7 0

21 2 0

15 3 0

34

33

43

66

31

46

66

70

40

50 1 0

25 5 0

38 2 0

21 3 0

10 2 0

9 2 0

5

4

29

30

19

17

51

49

39

39

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.1

0

0

0

0

0

2

2

0.5

0

0

0

0.5

0.3

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The right to sell is a very different ownership right from the one determining use: the right to sell is a one-time and permanent decision while the other is a periodic one that does not imply loss of the land. The head of household was reported to have the exclusive right to sell family land by just 43 percent of the respondents, with that sentiment being the very strongest in Kukës (66 percent) followed by Gjirokastër (43 percent) and Tiranë (44 percent). Shared authority of husband and wife were more frequently mentioned in Korçë and Gjirokastër. The view that all family members shared authority was prevalent in Lushnjë and Tiranë. Within some districts, differences emerged between who in the family was cited as enjoying the rights to sell versus the rights to determine use. In Gjirokastër, for example, the household head was most often said to decide land use, but both husband and wife were said to exercise the right to sell. Overall, we see that the role of the male head of family continues to be central in many Albanian families.

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Management of Family Farm Enterprise This section explores one aspect of the potential conflict between customary land ownership and individual property rights within the context of agricultural production in a market economy. The general question is: given that agricultural production within a market economy involves credit and investment, and that both men and women participate in farm work as well as in off-farm and family maintenance work, do family farms managed by women operate under different conditions than those managed by men? More specifically, we will address the following questions: • Do women managers have the same access to production factors (land, credit, labor) as men managers? • Are female-managed farms as market-oriented as malemanaged farms? • Do women farmers have the same level of tenure security as men farmers? • Do family farm enterprises managed by women face constraints different from those managed by men? The survey data do not permit a complete exploration of all these questions since women farm managers were not explicitly identified nor interviewed. The questions are valid, however, since Rural Property and Economy in Post-Communist Albania, edited by Harold Lemel, Berghahn Books, Incorporated,

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women manage a significant number of these family farms. As family members migrate or search for off-farm work and leave the farm operation to women, the problems that women face as owners and farm managers become of greater concern. Below, a profile of female-managed farms—as compared to the general sample—is presented, followed by an exploration of how family farm operations managed by women differ from those managed by men with regard to household and farm characteristics, family labor allocation, type of farm production, investment, sources of income, and farming constraints.

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Profile of Female-Managed Farm Households Albanian women have always been involved in farm work, including much of the hard, manual field work. Women’s participation rate in the collective agricultural labor force increased during the 1960s and 1970s, eventually surpassing men’s participation rate by 1981.25 Currently, wives, daughters, mothers, and daughters-in-law work on the family farm. In the IPRS survey sample, women made up 49 percent of household members and similarly accounted for about half of the labor force on the family farms: of the 1,273 persons who were working all year on the farm, 51 percent were women, and 52 percent of the 277 persons who were working only part of the year on the farm were women. While the great majority (93 percent) of the households in the sample were headed by men,26 only 45 percent of these male household heads were full-time farmers. The other farms were either managed by another male family member such as the eldest son, or by the head’s wife, daughter, daughter-in-law, or mother. Thus, most of the female-managed farm households had men as the culturally recognized household heads. For the purposes of this analysis, we classified the 792 families according to the gender of the farm enterprise manager. This breakdown27 resulted in 165 (21 percent) female-managed and 629 (79 percent) male-managed farms. The distribution of these households across districts is significantly uneven: as the column percentages in Table 8.12 show, the highest incidence of female-managed farms is in Tiranë (28.5 percent) and Kukës (24.7 percent) districts and the lowest incidence is in Lushnjë (14.3 percent). Possible explanations for these differences between districts is suggested by their different economic situations. Agriculture is strong in Lushnjë: most of the land is on a plain with extensive irrigation

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infrastructure; per capita allotment of land per household during the distribution program was considerably higher (4.1 dynam) than in the other districts (which ranged from 0.4 in Kukës to 2.6 in Korçë; see Chapter 2). There would be a tendency, therefore, in Lushnjë for the family to exploit the holding intensively, investing much family labor in the farm enterprise. Tiranë district contains the capital of Albania which offers off-farm work (temporary and permanent) to people from the surrounding villages. Since it is generally men who migrate in search of work, this would result in women being left in charge of the farm. In Kukës, farm holdings are tiny and the land is mountainous. Families in Kukës have experienced a permanent loss of their members, particularly adult children, to migration (mostly to cities within Albania) as they look for work opportunities. Table 8.12 Distribution of Farm Managers by Gender across Districts District Gjirok

Korçë

Kukës

Lushnjë

Tiranë

89 79.5 23 20.5

109 82.0 24 18.0

67 75.3 22 24.7

209 85.7 35 14.3

153 71.5 61 28.5

627 79.2 165 20.8

112 14.1

133 16.8

89 11.2

244 30.7

214 27.0

792 100.0

Manager Male

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(n) (%) Female (n) (%)

Column Total

(n) (%)

Chi-Square: 15.87,

DF: 5,

Total

Probability = 0.007

In these female-managed farm households, the male head (154 out of 165 households) was either retired (38 percent), had a government job (29 percent), or was working off the farm for a private enterprise (16 percent). A small percentage (4 percent) had emigrated. It appears that in several respects, subsample households differed little from the general sample. As Table 8.13 shows, in terms of household size (5), number of children and average age of the household head (around 49.5 years), the subsample closely resembled the overall sample. With regard to agricultural production, however, there do appear to be some notable differences. For example, in the total sample, well over half of the households responded that farming and livestock production were their main sources of income. In contrast, in female-managed farm households only 36 percent reported the same. Other main sources of income were off-farm work (42 per-

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cent) and social welfare or pension payments (16 percent). Not surprisingly, most of these farm-women cultivated crops, raised animals, and grew tree products mainly for family consumption. Only 24 percent of these households produced farm products for sale. Table 8.13 Selected Characteristics of Female-Managed Farm Households as Compared to All IPRS Survey Sample Households Household & farm characteristics

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Mean age of household head (yrs) Mean household size Mean number of children Percent with agriculture as main income source Mean family members working on farm Mean size of holding in dynam Mean number of parcels

Female-managed farm households

All sample households

49.6 5.0 2.5

49.7 5.1 2.3

36%

59%

1.8

2.3

9.2 4.1

10.9 4.5

Female-managed farms had fewer persons working on the farm than the total sample, 1.8 persons compared to 2.3 persons. In 45 percent of the subsample households, however, the women managers worked the farm without the help of other household members. Very few female-managed farms (7 percent) had persons outside the household, including hired help, working on the farm. There was no difference between the subsample and the total sample with regard to non-household persons, including hired help, working on the farm. In terms of farm holding characteristics, female-managed holdings were slightly more fragmented than what was the average for the entire sample: 4 and 4.5 parcels respectively. The average amount of land for all the sample households was also slightly higher (by 1.7 dynam) than for the subsample households. With regard to land title documentation, about half (88/165) of subsample households had received a tapi for their land. As Table 8.14 shows, six of these households, or less than 10 percent (6/88), were headed by women, in which case the farm manager and the tapi-holder would be one and the same person. In all the other households, the tapis were in the name of the male household head or another male relative.

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Table 8.14 Family Position of Title (tapi) Holder in FemaleManaged Farms (by gender) Title holder Gender

Head

Male Female Col. Total Percent

Spouse

Father

Son

74

1

2

1

6

-

-

-

1 1.2%

2 2.4%

1 1.2%

80 95.2%

Row Total 78 92.9% 6 7.1% 84 100%

As this brief description of certain characteristics of femalemanaged farms has shown, they are similar to the rest of the sample in household size and number of children. They differ in that the great majority of these farm enterprises are worked by persons who are not named on the tapi. In the majority of cases, the head of household named on the tapi works off the farm or is retired. * * *

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The next section will compare female-managed and male-managed farm enterprises to determine and explore other differences. Differences between Female- and Male-Managed Farms Three questions are addressed here: • How are farm operations managed by women in Albania different from those managed by men? • Do women as farm managers face constraints that men generally do not? • Do family farms managed by women have the same tenure security as those managed by men? As already noted, the survey data do not provide direct information on farm managers. Therefore the answers to these questions can only be inferred. The overwhelming majority (94 percent) of IPRS survey respondents were men; only 6 percent (48) were women. Consequently, very few women managers were respondents and able to provide their answers to questions regarding attitudes on different issues such as tenure security and inheritance.

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This analysis will begin with differences in household composition between female-managed and male-managed farms, and continue by looking at different aspects of agricultural production, investment, household labor allocation, and decision-making power. As the previous section already hinted, there are no significant differences in the mean household size and in the mean number of children (between 0 and 20 years of age) between female-managed and male-managed farm households (see Table 8.15). Neither is the dependency ratio (number of persons younger than 15 or older than 60 relative to the number of working-age persons aged 15 to 60) significantly different. These numbers would suggest that the structure of both types of households is similar with regard to overall size and age structure. The gender structure of the households would also appear to be the same for both types of households: the numbers of adult men and of adult women are not significantly different. The gender ratio (adult women to adult men within a household), however, is significantly higher for female-managed farm households, suggesting that the farm operation may depend more on women on female-managed farms than on male-managed ones.

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Table 8.15 Household Characteristics of Female-Managed and Male-Managed Farms

Household characteristics Household size No. of children Dependency ratio No. of adult women No. of adult men Gender ratio

Female-managed farms Standard Mean Deviation 5.0 2.2 1.02 1.8 1.7 1.25**

1.81 1.55 0.93 1.01 0.95 0.95

Male-managed farms Standard Mean Deviation 5.1 2.1 1.08 1.7 1.8 1.07**

2.11 1.59 0.99 0.91 1.08 0.59

* Analysis of variance shows significant difference at 0.05 level. ** Analysis of variance shows significant difference at 0.01 level.

As seen in Table 8.16, comparison of the farm operations of female-managed and male-managed farms also reveals significant differences with regard to farm size and level of fragmentation. The average size of holding for male-managed farms is two dynam larger than female-managed farms, a highly significant difference. Male-managed farms are also more fragmented.

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Allocation of family labor to the farm operation also differs significantly between the two groups. While both types of households have almost the same number of persons between the ages of 15 and 60 (defined as the available family labor force), the number of persons allocated to work on the farm differ significantly. Not only are there fewer full-time farm laborers on female-managed farms, the ratio of total family labor that works on the farm to that of available family labor is also significantly smaller. This confirms the assertion in the previous section that men are more prone to work off the farm, leaving the farm enterprise in women’s hands. Table 8.16 Characteristics of Female-Managed and MaleManaged Farm Enterprises Farm

Female-managed farms

Male-managed farms

characteristics

Mean

Mean

Size of holding (dynam) Number of parcels Available family labor No. of full-time farmers Total family farm labor Farm labor ratio

9.2** 4.1** 3.2 1.2** 1.3** 0.45**

11.3** 4.6** 3.3 1.7** 1.8** 0.57**

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*

Analysis of variance shows significant difference at 0.05 level. Analysis of variance shows significant difference at 0.01 level.

**

Farm Enterprise Type What type of farm enterprise are women managing? As with malemanaged farms, agricultural production is mostly for home consumption; relatively few households sold any of their production. However, as Table 8.17 shows, the proportion of male-managed farms selling some of their crop production is significantly higher than among female-managed ones. For livestock and tree products, little or no difference existed. Sale was very rare in both types of farms. Source of Household Income Differences among male- and female-managed households in terms of main source of income, reinforce the hypothesis that femalemanaged farms are less market-oriented. Table 8.18 shows that crop production is the main source of income for a higher percentage (53 percent versus 32 percent) of male-managed farm house-

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Table 8.17 Destination of Products of Female-Managed and Male-Managed Farms Femalemanaged Branch of production

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Crop production Livestock products Livestock Tree products

Malemanaged

Home

Market

Home

Market

Chisquare

Significance level

76% 81% 57% 97%

24% 19% 43% 3%

68% 76% 57% 97%

32% 24% 43% 3%

3.93 1.83 0.00 0.01

0.05 0.18 0.99 0.92

holds. This, however, does not mean that land is under-utilized in female-managed farms: in both types of households, only 8 percent were leaving any of their parcels uncultivated. Thus, while it appears that gender of farm manager does not affect whether land is being worked, agricultural produce from farms managed by men is more likely to find its way to the market than produce from female-managed farms. An interesting question is why women farmers market less of their produce. Do women encounter more problems doing so than men? Do they not need to sell their production because enough cash income is forthcoming from other sources? Off-farm income (government and private sector employment) is the main income for 44 percent of female-managed farm households but for only 11 percent of male-managed farm households. These figures support the idea that female-managed farms are more likely to be subsistence-type farms and that cash income for these households comes from offfarm sources. Table 8.18 Main Source of Income for Female-Managed and Male-Managed Farm Households Type of farm

Crop prod.

Femalemanaged Malemanaged Total

52 31.5% 331 52.8% 383 48.4%

Animal prod.

Gov’t job

8 4.8% 72 11.5% 80 10.1%

39 23.6% 48 7.7% 87 11.0%

Private job Remittances

31 18.8% 23 3.7% 54 6.8%

5 3.0% 37 5.9% 42 5.3%

Social benefits

Other sources

Total

26 15.8% 113 18.0% 139 17.6%

4 2.4% 3 0.5% 7 0.9%

165 20.8% 627 79.2% 792 100%

Chi-Square 100.09, Prob.< .0001 Missing Observations: 2

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Investments and Constraints in Agricultural Production Are levels of farm investment different in female-managed and malemanaged farms? Do female-managed farms face constraints different from those managed by men? On the issue of investment, the survey inquired about different types of investment in the farm operation such as purchasing a tractor or other farm machinery, buying farm animals, planting fruit trees, and constructing farm buildings. Positive answers to these questions were simply coded 1 and then added to come up with a number for each household that reflects the number of farm investment types they had made since 1991, with possible values ranging from 0 to 3. Only 17 percent of all sample households had made any farm investments, with no significant difference between female- and male-managed farms in this respect. Responses on credit availability may give us one reason for these low investment levels: only 11 percent of the households had applied to a bank for credit after 1991, and only about a third of these actually obtained a loan. Once again, there was little difference between female-managed and male-managed farm households.28

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Table 8.19 Agricultural Investments and Constraints in FemaleManaged and Male-Managed Family Farms Investments/ Constraints Average number of investments (Range 0-3) Percentage who mention fragmentation as constraint Percentage who mention high input prices as a constraint

Femalemanaged

Malemanaged

0.20

0.19

0.19

15%**

7%**

9%

15%**

26%**

23%

ALL

* Analysis of variance shows significant different at 0.05 level. **Analysis of variance shows significant different at 0.01 level.

In addition to credit constraints, farmers in Albania face many others: over 90 percent of all the farms encountered difficulties in farming. The most often cited constraints are: too little land, fragmentation, water shortage, high input prices, and lack of tractors. While there is little difference in response to most constraints between female-managed and male-managed farms, two are significantly different, namely fragmentation and high input prices. As Table 8.19 reveals, female-managed farms were about twice as likely

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to cite fragmentation as a constraint than male-managed farms, while male-managed farms were more likely to cite high input prices as a constraint. The latter is consistent with the previous finding that male-managed farms produce for the market, while female-managed farms produce for the family. Differences over the issue of fragmentation are more difficult to explain, particularly since male-managed farm holdings are significantly more fragmented than female-managed farm holdings (see Table 8.16). Perhaps women find managing fragmented holdings more problematic; if these women are also responsible for household maintenance and reproduction responsibilities, farming on multiple parcels, particularly if they are located far from the house, may account for this attitude.

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Conclusions and Outlook Most property systems in Albania until the 1950s were based on patrilineal, family property tenure. Privatization of socialist and state property since 1991 has instituted a property system, at least at the legal and formal levels, based on market principles and private property. This chapter has attempted to show that there are two types of problems with regard to applying and protecting property rights under post-socialist legislation: the conflict between legislation and customary practice, and contradictions between certain legal provisions. The traditional concept of family ownership where the family is the owner and a person’s right to property is determined by his or her position in the family, appears to have survived forty years of socialism. Analysis of IPRS survey data in this chapter has revealed that while there are some regional variations, in practice and in attitude, Albanian families retain a traditional, customary property system. For example, property titles were issued to rural families in the name of men in 95 percent of the households. In addition, practices in distributing land to a married child show that sons receive land while daughters generally do not. Questions regarding choice of heir also show an overwhelming preference for sons and other male relatives. Inquiries about who has the authority to exercise particular ownership rights (sell, bequeath, mortgage, and so on) elicited a majority of responses that the head of household (male in 97 percent of the households) alone holds these rights. However, the data do show that about half of respondents feel they share decisionmaking power over disposition and use of property with the spouse

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or the entire family. This more inclusive attitude emerged most strongly among Lushnjë respondents. In addition, Law 7501 which guided the distribution of agricultural land during 1991-93 and certain provisions of the 1994 Civil Code, have reintroduced the concept of family ownership of agricultural land in a new legal form. The difference in the concept of family ownership between Albanian custom and the new legislation is that while the family is the owner both according to custom and law, the new legislation recognizes that all family members, not just certain male family members, have the same and equal property rights. Besides the tension between customary and legal concepts of family property, there are contradictions among pieces of legislation with regard to immovable property, with some laws or decisions promoting individual property rights (for example, the Civil Code provisions on wills), while others promote the rights of the family as owner (for example, Civil Code provisions on farm family ownership). Such contradictions between certain legal provisions, combined with definitional vagueness and lack of clear and consistent procedures, put at risk some family members’ property rights. As a result, the family as a legal entity may be unable to adequately protect rights of all family members, including women. The property ownership rights of some family members remain tenuous, especially those who are not recognized as the family head but who have assumed farm management duties. Their rights need to be explicitly recognized and protected if they are to efficiently manage the family enterprise and not be subject to possibly irresponsible behavior of family heads who hold customary and documentary control over the land. Doing so would be consistent with the family property character of properties distributed according to Law 7501. The changing family structure suggests some pertinent considerations for the Immovable Property Registration System (IPRS) in Albania. Agricultural land transaction law29 requires that all family members agree and sign approval for any transfer of family property. Who these family members are is defined by civil registry records.30 As married couples move away from the extended family home to set up home on their own, it will be important to document the new household, or family, as a separate entity in the Civil Registry. Immovable property registry offices must have clear information as to which individuals comprise a property-owning family so that transactions are accompanied by the signatures of all the relevant family members.

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Looking at family farm enterprises, the data revealed that 20 percent of them are managed by women. Yet only 7 percent of these farms have tapis issued in the name of the woman. Some of the constraints which women farm managers face when compared with men farm managers are: less family labor, smaller holdings, and higher fragmentation. In addition, female-managed farms are more subsistence-crop oriented and are more dependent on off-farm income. The opening up of land markets will almost certainly expose the tensions between customary rules and formal law, and the contradictions contained within formal law. This growing tension does not imply the superiority of the individual model of ownership over the traditional family model. On the contrary, the family has provided the most important social unit of Albanian society for centuries, even through the previous regime. Even today there exists a strong commitment to family values. Moreover, while individualization of property rights at this point in time would be an ideological goal compatible with neoclassical economic theories of market development, such a concept may be inconceivable to the majority of Albanians. Despite this, market pressures may well cause the existing traditional family model of ownership to evolve into a more individualized one. We conclude that if legal ambiguities are not corrected, this is likely to lead some individuals to be alienated from land and property that the law and custom intends to be theirs. Therefore, laws and customs must evolve so as to protect individual interests of family members in immovable property alongside collective family ones.

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Notes 1. In this chapter the term “property” refers to land, buildings, and other improvements permanently attached to the land, which in Albanian law are called “immovable property”. 2. See Law on Land, No. 7501. 3. This intention is clear in the 1991 Law on Land (Law 7501), which allowed the distribution of agricultural cooperative land, and in its attendant regulations. 4. See Qemal Vokopola, “The Albanian Customary Law” ( The Quarterly Journal of the Library of Congress, 25:4, 1968, pp. 306-16). 5. See 1994 Civil Code of Albania, sections on ‘Joint Farm Family Property’ and on ‘Inheritance’. Also see the 1991 Law on Land No. 7501. 6. See, Rachel Wheeler, “Past and Present Land Tenure Systems in Albania: Patrilineal, Patriarchal, Family-Centered?” (Draft Paper), (Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1998). 7. See Ian Whitaker, “Familial Roles in the Extended Patrilineal Kingroup of Northern Albania” in J. G. Peristiany (ed.), Mediterranean Family Structures (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976, pp.195-203); also (Valbona Begolli, Women’s Position in Kosovo and Albania with Special Regard to the Customary Law, Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1994) 8. See E. Del Re and F. Gustincich, Bread, Salt and Heart: the Kanun of Lek Dukagjini Among the People of the Albanian Mountains (Argo, Bari, 1993), and Susana Lastarria-Cornhiel, “Customary Law, Family, and Property Rights in Albania” (Draft) (Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1995). 9. Article 84 of the Civil Code of 1994 states: “The farm family is represented in the property relationships with a third party, by the president, who is elected by the family members.” The Buying and Selling of Agricultural Land Law , No. 7983 of 27 July 1995, stipulates that the members of the family owning the land must sign a notarized statement which certifies that the family head is the legal representative for the transfer of agricultural land through sale. 10. While vertical extension within a household refers to the number of generations living in the same residential unit, horizontal extension indicates the number of married couples of the same generation living in the same residential unit. 11. See Rachel Wheeler, “Property Rights, Gender Bias, and the Family in Contemporary Albania”, (Draft) (Land Tenure Center, Madison, 1995) and LastarriaCornhiel, “Customary Law, Family, and Property Rights in Albania”. 12. Modified LSD (Bonferroni) test shows that the mean for Kukës is significantly higher than those of all the other districts, whereas the means of the other districts were not significantly different from each other. 13. One generation = Head and/or spouse; two generations = Head and/or Spouse + Children OR (Head and/or Spouse) + (Father and/or mother); three generations = (Head and/or Spouse) + Children + Grandchildren OR (Head and/or Spouse) + (Father and/or Mother) + Children; four generations = (Husband and/or Spouse) + (Father and/or Mother) + Children + Grandchildren. 14. In the entire sample, 787 respondents specified that their household had a family head. In the remaining five families, the head had recently died and no one had as yet been assigned that status. 15. Rachel Wheeler, “Notes from Weekly Meetings with Women from Tiranë”, unpublished manuscript, IPRS Project Management Unit (Tiranë, 1995).

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16. The survey data did not specifically code sons-in-law living with the parents of the daughter, although the number is probably small. 17. Subdivisions present an important procedural concern for the emerging immovable property registration system, as those taking place now will need to be recorded as the registration system begins functioning in the districts. 18. None of these subdivisions were documented in any way. 19. The great majority of respondents were male household heads. 20. See Rachel Wheeler, “Notes “. 21. This table includes only the first and second marriages occurring in each household since 1991; only seven families had three marriages since 1991. 22. Data from the Independent Forum of Albanian Women (IFAW) survey (see Wheeler, “Property Rights...”, 1995) indicated that 79 percent of respondents thought they had the right to leave the farmland to only their sons, not their daughters. 23. See Margaret Hasluck, “Bride-Price in Albania: A Homeric Parallel,” (in Man, 33, no. 203 (1933), pp. 191-5, and The Unwritten Law in Albania, Westport, Hyperion Press, Inc., 1954); Del Re and Gustincich, Bread, Salt and Heart; M.E. Durham, Some Tribal Origins, Laws and Customs of the Balkans, (London, 1928). 24. Case studies have indicated that when families have only daughters, they are sometimes inclined to leave the property to the daughter who stays in the house to care for the parents (Wheeler, “Notes …”, 1995). 25. Örjan Sjöberg, Rural Change and Development in Albania, (Boulder, Colo., 1991), p.117. 26. There were only fifty-three (6.6 percent) female-headed households in the entire sample, which is consistent with the Albanian practice of a son assuming family authority when the father dies. The majority (60 percent) of these female-heads were over sixty years of age and 81 percent were widows. Only eleven of them (17 percent) were working on the farm and the majority (72 percent) were retired. 27. Since the survey did not explicitly identify who in the household was managing the farm, the breakdown was done by assuming that persons working full-time on the farm were the managers. If both a man and woman in a family were working full-time on the farm, it was assumed that the man was the manager. If no one worked full-time, then the person working most time on the farm was deemed the manager, always assuming that if both a man and a woman in a household were working the same amount of time, the man was to be considered the manager. 28. If one relates gender of respondent (not farm manager) to credit, none of the female respondents who applied for loans were successful, while a third of male respondents who applied received formal credit. 29. Law 7983 on the Buying and Selling of Agricultural Land, Meadows and Pastures (July, 1995). 30. In Albania, the Civil Registry is maintained at the district level. All births, deaths, marriages, and other family changes are supposed to be registered in the Civil Registry. The Civil Registry is used to establish official recognition of a household. This record is used by families for certain procedures such as social welfare benefits.

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REFERENCES

Abrahams, Ray (ed.), After Socialism: Land Reform and Social Change in Eastern Europe. Berghahn Books, Providence, RI, 1996. Aslund, Anders and Orjan Sjolberg, “Privatization and Transition to a Market Economy in Albania,” Communist Economies in Transformation, 4, 1 (1992) 135-50. Begolli, Valbona. “Women’s Position in Kosova and Albania with a Special Regard to the Customary Law” (Manuscript). Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1994. Canco, Galantina, et al. Land Fragmentation and Some Alternatives for Land Consolidation in the Future, Soil Research Institute, Tiranë, 1995. Del Re, E. and F. Gustincich. Bread, Salt and Heart: the Kanun of Lek Dukagjini Among the People of the Albanian Mountains. Bari, Argo, 1993. de Waal, Clarissa. “Decollectivization and Total Scarcity” in Ray Abrahams, After Socialism, pp. 169-192. Durham, M.E. Some Tribal Origins, Laws and Customs of the Balkans. George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1928. Giorgi, Sergio. Farm Survey, Republic of Albania. Min. of Agriculture and Food/UN-FAO, Tiranë, 1994. Gjecov, Shtjefen, Kanuni i Leke Dukagjinit (Leonard Fox, translator). Gjonlekaj Publishing Company, New York, 1989. Hasluck, Margaret. “Bride-Price in Albania: A Homeric Parallel,” in Man, 33:203, 1933, 191-95. ______ The Unwritten Law in Albania. Hyperion Press, Inc., Westport, 1954. Kovaci, Vangjo and Justina Borici. Study on Agricultural Land Fragmentation and Consolidation, IPRS—Project Management Unit, Policy Research Dept., Tiranë, 1995. Kunkel, David. Albanian Agriculture Today, June 10, 1996, SARA, Tiranë, Albania, 1996. Laha, Mirvjena. Immovable Property First Registration; Gurantee for Protection of Owners’ Rights over Property—Problems, Paper presented to Project Management Unit, Immovable Property Registration System (IPRS), Evaluation Seminar, Tiranë, Dec. 12, 1995.

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References

Lastarria-Cornhiel, Susana. “Customary Law, Family, and Property Rights in Albania” (Draft Paper), Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1995. Lushaj, Sherif and D. Papa. Land Fragmentation and Consolidation, IPRS— Project Management Unit, Policy Research Dept., Tiranë, 1995. Pata, Kristaq and Myslym Osmani. “Albanian Agriculture: A Painful Transition from Communism to Free Market Challenges.” Sociolgia Ruralis, 34, 1, (1994), 84-101. Republic of Albania. Ministry of Agriculture and Food. Results of the 1995 Annual Agricultural Survey, 1995, Tiranë, May, 1996. ______. Agriculture and Food Statistics of Albania, 1994, Tiranë, 1995. ______. Immovable Property (vols 1-2): Collection of Legal Acts passed between 1991-1996 (In Albanian), Albal, Tiranë, 1996. Sjöberg, Örjan. Rural Change and Development in Albania, Westview Press, Boulder, Colo., 1991. Somogyi, Laszlo (ed.), The Political Economy of the Transition Process in Eastern Europe (Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar Pub. Co., 1993) Stanfield, David, Susana Lastarria-Cornhiel, John Bruce, and Edward Friedman. Consolidating Property Rights in Albania’s New Private Farm Sector. LTC Paper no. 146. Land Tenure Center, Madison, 1992. ______ and Maksi Raco. “Creation of Albanian Land Markets.” Land Tenure Center Newsletter no. 71, (Spring 1994), University of Wisconsin, Land Tenure Center, Madison, Wi., 1994. ______ and Agim Kukeli. Consolidation of the Albanian Agricultural Land Reform Through a Program for Creating an Immovable Property Registration System, Paper presented to the GIS/LIS Central Europe Conference, Budapest, Hungary, 12-16 June, 1995. The Civil Code of the Republic of Albania (in Albanian), Albal Press, Tiranë, 1996. Vokopola, Qemal. “The Albanian Customary Law,” The Quarterly Journal of the Library of Congress, 25:4, (1968) 306-16. Wheeler, Rachel. “Property Rights, Gender Bias, and the Family in Contemporary Albania” (Draft Paper), Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1995. ______. “Notes from Weekly Meetings with Women from Tirana,” Unpublished Manuscript, IPRS Project Management Unit, Tiranë, 1995. ______. “Past and Present Land Tenure Systems in Albania: Patrilineal, Patriarchal, Family-Centered?” (Draft Paper), Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1998. Whitaker, Ian. “Familial Roles in the Extended Patrilineal Kingroup of Northern Albania” in J.G. Peristiany (ed.), Mediterranean Family Structures. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976, pp. 195-203. World Bank, An Agricultural Strategy for Albania, Washington, DC, 1992.

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CONTRIBUTORS

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Besides Albania, Harold Lemel’s work on land tenure, land registration and rural development issues encompasses countries in the Middle East, Africa, East Asia and the Caribbean. In Albania he was concerned with various aspects of the Immovable Property Registration System project, including the planning and coordination of the baseline survey which provides most of the material for this book. Most recently, the editor was engaged in exploring issues of land tenure insecurity in Guyana, South America. Rachel Wheeler is currently completing her doctorate at the UW-Madison. She spent two years working in Albania for the Land Tenure Center as a research economist studying land policy issues, particularly women’s property rights. Since then, she has been engaged in the comparative study of post-communist land policies of Albania and Romania. Susana Lastarria-Cornhiel is Senior Researcher at the Land Tenure Center (University of Wisconsin at Madison) where she has been working on land privatization issues in Latin America, Africa, and Eastern Europe, including gendered aspects of land tenure changes. Most recently, she has been focussing on land tenancy issues in Latin America and Africa. Peter Bloch is currently a Senior Scientist at the University of Wisconsin Land Tenure Center. He is a land market specialist with extensive experience in Europe, Central Asia, the Caribbean and East Africa. Albert Dubali has served for many years in various senior capacities in Albania’s Land Institute. He is currently Albania’s Registrar of Lands. Before being appointed to that position he was the head of policy research at the Land Institute in association with the Immovable Property Registration System project.

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INDEX

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A ADF (Albanian Development Fund), 101-103 aga, 10 agrarian reform (1945-6), 27 agricultural production patterns, 51-56, 60, 109, 148, 149 constraints, 19-24, 54, 60, 92, 114, 141, 142, 145, 149, 150, 152 extent of product sales, 19, 51, 53-55, 144, 147 gender aspects, 135, 136, 141, 143, 146 involvement in, reliance on agriculture, 15-19, 60, 119, 134-136 alfalfa, 51, 53, 64n. 13, 67, 70, 71 ancestral land, 57, 60, 62, 68, 69 See also “father’s land”

in the property market, 18, 46, 47, 7881, 85, 127, 129, 130, 140, 141, 151 cooperation, 119, 120, 124 cooperatives (also ex-cooperatives), 3, 28, 29, 81, 82, 120, 127 cows, cattle, 51, 54n. 10, 55, 67, 94, 98, 101 See also livestock, dairy, pasture and alfalfa credit, 2-4, 76, 92-108, 149 gender aspects, 134, 141, 149 institutional aspects, 100-104 land fragmentation and, 119, 120, 124 sources, 96-99, 106 See also loans, banks customary (laws and practices concerning property), 127, 128, 130, 141, 150-152 See also kanun

B

D

banks, 3, 92, 96-106, 149 See also National Commercial Bank, Rural Commercial Bank, bey, 10, 27 boundaries boundary conflicts, 35, 36, 39, 41, 42, 57 boundary demarcation, 7, 35-36, 39, 42-47 land distribution according to “old boundaries,” 10n. 8, 29-31, 3335, 67, 112, 113, 120 village boundaries, 27

dairy, 51, 54, 55, 102, 102n, 134 See also cows, cattle, and alfalfa deeds, 103, 104 See also hipoteka discretion over use and disposition of land, 4548, 79, 80, 139-141 distance to parcels, 7, 23, 56, 62, 109, 110, 118, 121, 124 documents – ownership, title, etc., 3, 4, 5, 5n. 5, 5n. 6, 6, 47, 68-70, 78, 81, 85, 104, 126, 129 as incorporated into study design, 36, 12 credit access and, 104 gender aspects, 126, 129, 133, 134 land markets and, 78, 81, 85-90 possession of, 31-34 tenure security and, 40, 41, 70 See also tapi, kartela

C çiftlik, 27, 28 Civil Code, 104, 128-130, 151 collateral, collateralized loans, 3, 92, 96-99, 102-106 conflicts, disputes (over land), 27, 28, 31, 39, 67 boundary disputes, 35, 36, 42, 56 conflicts within families, 128, 134 land distribution and, 11, 12, 31, 34, 35, 70 land market activity and, 77, 78, 81, 82, 85-90 land use, investment and, 55, 56, 57, 67 study design and, 6, 7, 9, 12 tenure security and, 39, 41-43, 70 constraints agricultural, 19-24, 54, 60, 92, 114, 141, 142, 145, 149, 150, 152

E EEC, 3 emigration, 17-18, 133 ethnic aspects, 10, 17, 18 EU (European Union), 101, 106 exchange (of parcels), 38, 110, 121, 122 ex-owners, 3, 18, 24, 28-30, 31, 32, 34, 37, 39, 40, 44, 45, 56, 57, 64 conflicts involving, 28, 29, 34, 37, 39, 40 influence on land use and investment, 46, 56, 57, 64, 65, 67

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Index F

K

family structure, 9, 130-132, 151 See also fis farm management gender aspects of, 142-147 “father’s land,” 31, 34, 37-39, 40, 45, 57, 6062, 65-70 See also ancestral land financing of investments, 65, 96-99, 101-103, 106 See also credit and loans fis, 9, 31n, 52, 67, 120, 124 flat areas. See topography fragmentation. See land fragmentation

kanun, 128, 129n. 8 kartela, 3, 5, 5n. 5, 32 Korçë general features, 10, 15-19, 21-24, 28-30 agricultural patterns, 21-24, 51, 52, 55, 65n., 70, 94-97, 112, 114-117, 124, 137, 143 land tenure aspects, 28-30, 37, 38, 40, 46, 131, 132, 137 land market in, 77, 78, 80-82, 121, 122, 141 Kukës general features, 9-11, 16-19, 21-24, 28, 30, 119, 131, 132, 142, 143 agricultural patterns, 21-23, 25, 52, 55, 56, 70, 94-96, 112, 114-117, 124, 137, 142, 143 land tenure aspects, 28-34, 37, 38, 46, 78, 58, 82, 83, 112, 115-117, 130-132, 137, 139 land market in, 77, 78, 82, 85-90, 121, 123, 140, 141

G Gjirokastër general features, 9, 10, 15-19, 60, 70, 100, 101 agricultural patterns, 21-23, 52, 55, 56, 57, 70, 94, 95, 113, 115, 122 land tenure aspects, 28-30, 32-34, 37, 38, 46, 56-58, 96, 97, 131, 132 land market in, 77, 78, 80, 86-90, 141 goats, 51, 94 See also livestock grazing. See pastures Greece, Greek, 10, 17, 18, 27, 52

H

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159

heirs, 119, 124, 138, 139 See also inheritance hilly areas. See topography Hipoteka (Deeds Registry), 103, 104 historical aspects of land tenure, 10, 27-29, 70, 111, 112, 127, 132 house, house parcel, 7, 19, 122, 123, 130-132, 139 boundary demarcation on, 43 as collateral, 103-106 as an investment, 94, 95 See also truall

I Immovable Property Registration System (IPRS), 2, 3, 11, 151 See also land registration in-ownership, 29, 39 in-use, 10, 29, 81 income sources, 7, 16-18, 134, 142, 143 and land use intensity, 62, 63 inheritance customs and practices, 5, 9, 127130, 136-140, 145, 150-152 See also heirs insecurity (of tenure). See tenure security/insecurity international migration, 17, 18, 96, 97 intra-family property rights, 2, 127, 128, 129, 134 investment, 1-5, 6-8, 12, 15, 50, 52, 64-70, 92 patterns by gender, 142, 149 sources of finance, 96-99, 103-105 tenure security and, 67-70 types, value, costs of, 66-68, 71, 72, 73, 93-96, 99 irrigation, water shortage, etc., 20, 21, 24, 34, 52, 54, 65-67, 72, 92, 98, 105, 111, 119, 121, 134, 142, 149 See also agricultural production patterns, constraints

L labor availability and use patterns, 6, 52, 62, 72, 135, 136 division of, 134, 142, 143 gender aspects, 134, 141-143, 146, 147, 152 land distribution, 3, 5, 8-12, 27-32, 35, 37, 66, 67 as related to sampling logic and study design, 8-12 and housing, 82 as related to land fragmentation, 111-113, 120 and cooperation prospects, 120 implications for intra-family property rights, 127-129 land fragmentation, 2, 4, 9, 11n. 11, 15, 21, 22, 51, 76, 109-125, 144, 146, 149, 150, 152 Land ‘O’ Lakes, 102n. land sales. See sale of land land registration, 2-10, 12, 12n. 13, 32n. 5, 32n. 7 and credit access, 104, 105 and intra-family property rights, 136n. 17, 151 land subdivision, 110n. 4, 119, 120, 124, 128, 136, 137 land use, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 45-47, 51-53, 56, 57, 61-64, 70, 118, 140, 141 law and legal aspects, 2, 3, 5n. 5, 10n. 9, 11, 28-31, 33, 34, 37, 40, 41, 75, 76, 79, 104, 105, 119, 120, 124, 127-130, 134, 138, 150-152 and intra-family rights, 127-130, 134, 138, 139n. 23, 150-152 and land fragmentation, 119, 120, 124 and land market, 75, 76, 79, 124, 129, 130, 134, 151, 151n. 29 distribution of land “according to the law,” 28-31, 34 See also Civil Code Law 7501, 5n. 5, 10n. 9, 29, 127, 128, 130, 151 Law 7983 (The Law on the Buying and Selling of Agricultural Land, Meadows and Pastures), 75, 129, 129n. 9, 151, 151n. 29

Rural Property and Economy in Post-Communist Albania, edited by Harold Lemel, Berghahn Books, Incorporated,

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160 livestock, 16, 17, 17n. 3, 19, 20, 51, 51n. 6, 54, 55, 92, 93, 95, 102, 103, 105, 106, 110n. 2, 143, 147, 148 investment in, 92, 93, 95, 102-106 See also cows, sheep, goats, dairy loans, 3, 76 sources of, 96-99 institutional aspects, 100-104 See also credit Lushnjë general features, 9, 10, 15-19, 28-30, 119 agricultural patterns, 21-23, 25, 51, 52, 55, 56-58, 67, 70, 94-96, 112, 114-117, 124, 137, 142, 143 land tenure aspects, 33, 34, 38, 58, 82, 83, 130-132, 137, 139, 151 land market in, 77, 78, 80, 82, 94, 95, 121-123, 141

M marketing (of agricultural products), 7, 23, 51, 54, 55, 147, 148 See also sale of agricultural products migration, migrants, 10, 17, 17n. 2, 17n. 3, 18, 52, 96-99, 124, 129, 131, 132, 134-137, 139, 142, 143 See also remittances mountainous. See topography multi-cropping, 64

N National Commercial Bank (NCB), 100, 104, 106 National Housing Authority, 82

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O old boundaries, 10n. 8, 29-31, 33, 34, 67, 70, 112, 113, 120 orchards, 29, 72, 73, 92, 105 See also tree crops Ottoman heritage, 10, 27, 28

Index sources of income. See income sources state-farms, ex-state farms, 10n. 7, 11, 27-29, 39, 40 and land market, 77, 78, 80, 82, 85-90 subdivision of land. See land subdivision

T tapi, 3, 5, 5n. 5, 5n. 6, 9, 12, 12n. 13, 31-34, 37, 40, 41, 57-64, 68-71, 82, 83, 128, 129, 133, 134, 144, 145 tenure security/insecurity, 4-8, 12, 14, 15, 2731, 32, 35n, 37, 39-45, 47, 50, 57, 61, 62, 64, 70, 71, 88 Tiranë general features, 9, 10, 11, 16-19, 28, 30 agricultural patterns, 21-25, 55-57, 64, 67, 70, 93, 94, 95, 112, 114117, 137, 142, 143 land tenure aspects, 12n. 13, 32-35, 37, 38, 45-47, 58, 131, 132, land market in, 77, 78, 80, 81, 121, 122, 137, 139, 140, 141 topography and agricultural production, 18, 19, 22-25, 31, 52-55, 64, 96, 117, 143 and intra-family property rights, 132, 143 and land tenure issues, 19, 22, 28, 30, 31, 35, 59, 112, 117 and land market issues, 77, 78, 82, 85-90 as incorporated into the study design, 8-11 trees and tree crops, 10, 29n. 1, 43-47, 44n. 20, 50, 51n. 6, 52, 54n. 9, 64-67, 73, 80n. 6, 94, 95n, 110n. 3, 144, 147-149 See also orchards truall, 81, 104 See also house parcel

U

P

USAID, 3, 106

pasture, 19, 34, 54, 57, 110, 151n. 29 per capita (distribution of land), 9, 10, 17, 19, 22, 28-31, 34, 35, 67 PHARE, 101, 103, 106 Private Property Law No. 7512, 128 property documents. See documents

V

R reclamation, reclaimed land, 10, 28, 29, 47, 69 remittances, 52, 96 See also migration, migrants rent, rental, 15, 32, 45-48, 76-82, 86, 89, 90, 121-124, 139 Rural Commercial Bank (RCB), 100, 101, 103, 104, 106

S sale of agricultural products, 51n. 2, 54, 55, 147, 148 sampling design in IPRS baseline study, 8-12 sale of land, 15, 18, 45-47, 75-82, 85, 87, 88, 90, 121-124, 127, 129, 130, 140, 141, 150 See also Law 7983 settlement patterns, 9, 11n. 11, 53 sheep, 51, 94 See also livestock sources of finance. See credit and loans

value of land, 45, 77, 78, 81, 86, 87 village structure, 9, 11, 11n. 11, 31n, 53 selection in IPRS survey, 11, 12 vineyards, viticulture, 29, 29n., 52, 55, 65-67, 72, 92, 94, 105 Vlahs, 10, 17 VLDC, 34

W women involvement agricultural production, 93, 102n. 10, 134-136, 141-150 property rights, 126-129, 132-134, 136-139, 139-141 World Bank, 3, 101, 106, 120 See also ADF

Y “Yellow line,” 39, 53

Rural Property and Economy in Post-Communist Albania, edited by Harold Lemel, Berghahn Books, Incorporated,