Routledge Handbook of Japanese Foreign Policy 9781138182103, 9781315643076, 1138182109

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Routledge Handbook of Japanese Foreign Policy

From a nuclear North Korea and territorial disputes in the East China Sea, to global climate change and Asia-Pacific free-trade agreements, Japan is at the center of some of the most challenging issues that the world faces today. Taking an interdisciplinary approach, comprising contributions from the fields of politics, sociology, history, and gender studies, this handbook creates a comprehensive and innovative overview of the field, investigating the widening variety of interests, sometimes competing, that constitute Japanese foreign policy. Organized topically, it is divided into sections, including:     

Japan’s evolving foreign policy landscape Global environmental and sustainable development International and national security International political economy International norms and civil society.

Providing an evaluation of the key actors, institutions, and networks influencing Japanese foreign policy, the Routledge Handbook of Japanese Foreign Policy is an essential resource for students and scholars of Japanese and Asian Politics, International Relations, and Foreign Policy. Mary M. McCarthy is an Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations at Drake University in Des Moines, Iowa, USA. She specializes in exploring the impact of domestic politics on foreign policymaking.

Routledge Handbook of Japanese Foreign Policy

Edited by Mary M. McCarthy

First published 2018 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business Ó 2018 selection and editorial matter, Mary M. McCarthy; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Mary M. McCarthy to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN: 978-1-138-18210-3 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-64307-6 (ebk) Typeset in Bembo by Sunrise Setting Ltd., Brixham, UK

Contents

List of illustrations List of contributors Acknowledgments Acronyms Japanese terms Introduction Mary M. McCarthy

viii x xv xvi xxi 1

PART I

The evolving landscape of Japanese foreign policy

1 Japanese international relations and national identity gaps Gilbert Rozman 2 Japan’s 2015 security legislation: change rooted firmly in continuity Jeffrey W. Hornung

7

9

22

3 Departing from the postwar regime: the revision of the ‘peace constitution’ and Japan’s national identity Yongwook Ryu

41

4 The chrysanthemum and the cool: cultural diplomacy and soft power in Japan’s foreign policy Nissim Kadosh Otmazgin

55

PART II

The global environment and sustainable development

5 Global environmental problems and Japanese foreign environmental policy Miranda Schreurs

71

73

v

Contents

6 Japanese foreign policies on global climate change: from Kyoto to Paris Takashi Hattori

88

7 Push and pull by Japan for regional environmental cooperation: transboundary air pollution in East Asia Inkyoung Kim

102

8 Toward a sound material-cycle society: history of Japanese policy and its interaction with international norms Wakana Takahashi

119

9 Sustainable ocean management and the role of the Japan Coast Guard Miko Maekawa, Hiroshi Terashima, and Eka Higuchi

136

PART III

International and national security

153

10 Japan as a maritime power: deterrence, diplomacy, and maritime security Alessio Patalano

155

11 Disarmament and the non-proliferation policy of Japan Nobumasa Akiyama

173

12 Japan’s territorial-disputes policy: success or failure? Alexander Bukh

188

13 Smart power and Japan’s trouble-shooting approach to Southeast Asia Yee-Kuang Heng

202

14 Peacebuilding in Japan’s foreign policy Tadashi Iwami

216

15 National security at the crossroads: security interdependence and Japan’s arms trade ban policy Kyoko Hatakeyama

232

PART IV

International political economy

249

16 Economic diplomacy Maaike Okano-Heijmans and Takaaki Asano

251

vi

Contents

17 The evolution, politics, and prospect of Japanese trade policy Hidetaka Yoshimatsu 18 Japanese foreign direct investment in Thailand: promoting an ‘interactive’ institutional approach Sierk A. Horn, Bernhard H. Wittek, and Chie Iguchi 19 Japanese development assistance as a multipurpose political tool Marie So¨derberg

267

281

306

PART V

International norms and global civil society

319

20 Japan as a norm entrepreneur for human security Kaoru Kurusu

321

21 Gender equality in Japan: internal policy processes and impact, and foreign implications under Prime Minister Abe’s Womenomics Joyce Gelb and Naoko Kumagai 22 Precarious balances: history and memory in Japan’s foreign relations Thomas U. Berger

337

353

23 The power and limits of the transnational “comfort women” movement Mary M. McCarthy

366

24 Japan’s whaling diplomacy: science, morality, and international norms Michael Strausz

381

Index

391

vii

Illustrations

Figures 3.1 Constitutional revision attempts along the two dimensions of nationalism and military role 3.2 Public approval rating of the Abe Cabinet in 2016 3.3 Chinese vessels identified within contiguous zones and territorial sea (total/month) 4.1 Doraemon and Mao in a local media shop, Shanghai, August 2004 4.2 Doraemon (center) at his inauguration ceremony as cultural ambassador with Masahiko K omura (left), Minister for Foreign Affairs, March 2008 4.3 “Cool Japan” events are organized worldwide in publicized campaigns sponsored by METI – Singapore, October 2011 6.1 Japan’s energy efficiency efforts after the oil crisis 6.2 Breakdown of Japan’s GHG emissions 6.3 Japan’s GHG emissions by sector and CO2 emissions from power generation 6.4 GHG emission share and coverage of Kyoto Protocol, Paris Agreement 8.1 Conceptual diagram of EPR formation and development (Europe and Asia) 8.2 Cumulative EPR adoption 8.3 Municipal household waste and treatment methods in Japan 8.4 Municipal waste treatment costs 9.1 Organization of the JCG as of April 1, 2016 9.2 Japan Coast Guard: number of referrals of marine environmental crime 16.1 The trinity economic diplomacy in Japanese context 18.1 Top ten net FDI flows to Thailand by country 18.2 Bilateral institutional matrix 18.3 Annual average foreign exchange rate JPY to THB, 1948–2015 18.4 New FDI cases from Japan to Thailand between 1945 and 2015

46 48 51 57 62 63 90 95 97 99 122 122 126 127 139 142 255 282 284 294 298

Tables 2.1 Bill for Development of Legislation for Peace and Security (平和安全法制整備法): package of ten laws 6.1 Japan’s intended nationally determined contribution 6.2 The Plan for Global Warming Countermeasures 7.1 Number of pages of national assessments for the periodic report of EANET

viii

25 98 99 109

Illustrations

7.2 Relative contributions in percentage for total nitrate dry and wet deposition from China to Korea and Japan 7.3 Contributions of each country to monitoring data 8.1 Major international events related to building a sound material-cycle society 8.2 Countries adopting EPR systems 8.3 Timeline of Japan’s waste management policies 9.1 Establishment of coast guard agencies in ASEAN countries 14.1 Japan’s three-tier approach to peacebuilding 14.2 Japan’s ODA disbursement in the field of peacebuilding 18.1 Overview of relevant institutional perspectives 18.2 Average new FDI cases per year by phases

112 113 121 123 125 144 222 223 287 299

ix

Contributors

Nobumasa AKIYAMA is Professor of International Politics at Graduate School of Law and School of International and Public Policy of Hitotsubashi University, Japan. He was Minister Counsellor at the Permanent Mission of Japan to the International Organizations in Vienna from 2016 to 2018, Senior Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs, and Lecturer at Hiroshima Peace Institute, Hiroshima City University. Takaaki ASANO is Research Fellow at Tokyo Foundation, Japan. His research interests include economic diplomacy, Japan–US relations, US foreign policy, and Japanese foreign and security policy. His publications include ‘Japan–India Relations: Toward a Special Strategic Partnership’, in Yuki Tatsumi (ed.), Japan’s Global Diplomacy (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, March 2015) and Turning TPP to Japan’s Advantage (Tokyo: PHP Institute, March 2013, co-authored with Yutaka Harada, in Japanese). Thomas U. BERGER is Professor of International Relations at Boston University Pardee School of Global Studies. Previously, he taught for seven years at the Johns Hopkins Department of Political Science in Baltimore. He is the author of War, Guilt and World Politics after World War II and Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan and is co-editor of Japan in International Politics: Beyond the Reactive State. His articles and essays have appeared in numerous edited volumes and journals, including International Security, Review of International Studies, German Politics and World Affairs Quarterly. Alexander BUKH is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand. Bukh has published extensively on Japan’s national identity, foreign policy, and territorial disputes. He is the author of Japan’s National Identity and Foreign Policy: Russia as Japan’s ‘Other’ (Routledge, 2008). He is also a producer and a co-director of a documentary on territorial-disputes-related activism in Japan and Korea titled This Island is Ours (Contented Production, 2016). Joyce GELB is Professor Emerita of Political Science at City University and the Graduate Center, City University of New York. She published Gender Policies in Japan and the United States: Comparing Women’s Movements, Rights and Politics (Palgrave, 2003), and Women and Politics around the World, co-edited with Marian Palley (ABC-CLIO, 2009). Her edited volume chapters include ‘Women’s Leadership in Japan and Taiwan’ in O’Connor (ed.), Gender and Women’s Leadership (2010), ‘Gender Equity in Japan’ in James D Babb (ed.), Sage Handbook of Modern Japanese Studies (2015), and ‘Gender Policy and Leadership’ in Mino Vianello and Mary Hawkesworth (eds.), Gender and Power: Toward Equality and Democratic Governance (2015). x

Contributors

Kyoko HATAKEYAMA is Associate Professor at Kansai Gaidai University, Japan. Her current interests are on Japan’s maritime security policy, peacekeeping policy, and energy issues. Her major works include ‘Rare Earth and Japan: Traditional Vulnerability Reconsidered’ in D. Kiggins (ed.), The Political Economy of Rare Earth Elements (2015), ‘Japan’s Peacekeeping Policy: Strategic Calculations or Internalization of Norms?’, The Pacific Review (2014), and Snow on the Pine, with Craig Freedman (2010). Takashi HATTORI is Visiting Research Fellow at the United Nations University Institute for the Advanced Study of Sustainability, Japan. Previously, as Head of Environment & Climate Change Unit at the International Energy Agency, he directed the publication Energy, Climate Change and Environment. He has a doctoral degree from the Tokyo Institute of Technology. Yee-Kuang HENG is Professor at the Graduate School of Public Policy, University of Tokyo, Japan. Heng graduated from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) with a BSc (First Class Honors) and a PhD in International Relations. He previously held faculty positions at Trinity College Dublin, Ireland; the University of St Andrews, UK; and National University of Singapore. His work on Japan’s soft-power strategies includes ‘Smart Power and Japan’s Self-Defence Forces’, Journal of Strategic Studies (2015) and ‘Beyond Kawaii Pop Culture: Japan’s Normative Soft Power as a Global Trouble-shooter’, The Pacific Review (2014). Eka HIGUCHI is Research Fellow of the Ocean Policy Research Institute, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Japan. She is also a postdoctoral researcher at Tohoku University, Japan, and she was granted the degree of Doctor of Laws from Tohoku University, Japan, in 2016 for her research of the concept of due diligence in international law. Her dissertation is entitled ‘Kokusaihoujouno Soutounochuuigimu Gainen – Sono Keisei, Hatten to Sono Mondaisei’ (The concept of due diligence in international law – its formation, development and problems). Sierk A. HORN is Professor of international management at FH Vorarlberg, Austria. Previously, he was professor of the economy of Japan at the Munich School of Management, LudwigMaximilians-Universita¨t, Germany. He holds a PhD in Modern Languages and a Habilitation on Cross-Cultural Management from Freie Universita¨t, Berlin, Germany. Much of his work takes the perspective of resilience of individuals and organizations and sits at the juncture of language and international management. He is a regular commentator on how organizations tackle fragile environments. Jeffrey W. HORNUNG currently works at the RAND Corporation. Previously, he served as Fellow for the Security and Foreign Affairs Program at Sasakawa USA and Associate Professor for the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, a Department of Defense executive education facility in Honolulu, Hawaii. Hornung has written about Japanese security and foreign policy issues for numerous outlets including Asian Security, The Washington Quarterly, the Washington Post, Foreign Affairs, The Wall Street Journal, CNN, and The Diplomat. He received his PhD in political science from the George Washington University. He also holds an MA in international relations with a concentration in Japan Studies from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a BA in political science and international affairs from Marquette University, where he graduated magna cum laude. Chie IGUCHI is Associate Professor of International Business at the Faculty of Business and Commerce at Keio University, Japan. She received her PhD in International Business from the xi

Contributors

University of Reading School of Business, UK. Her research focuses on International Business, Global Innovation Management, and Global Strategic Management. Tadashi IWAMI is Lecturer of the Faculty of International Studies at the Institute of the Pacific United (IPU) New Zealand. His research interests include Japan’s security policy, peacebuilding, East Asian security affairs, and identity in international relations. He has recently published articles on peacebuilding in East Asia: An International Quarterly, Asian Journal of Peacebuilding, and The Pacific Review. Inkyoung KIM is Assistant Professor at the Political Science Department of Bridgewater State University in Massachusetts. She is a contributor to journals such as International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics and International Relations of the Asia-Pacific. She is currently working on a book manuscript titled Air Flows Gray: Regional Environmental Cooperation in East Asia on Transboundary Air Pollution. Naoko KUMAGAI is Associate Professor at the International University of Japan, working on the issue of comfort women. Her recent publications include ‘The Background to the Japan– Republic of Korea Agreement: Compromises Concerning the Understanding of the Comfort Women Issue’ in Asia-Pacific Review (2016). Kaoru KURUSU is Professor in International Relations at Kobe University, Japan. Her current research interests are human security and Japan’s multilateral diplomacy. Her publications include ‘Why Do Companies Join the United Nations Global Compact?’ (with S. Miura) in K. Tsutsui and A. Lim (eds.), Corporate Social Responsibility in a Globalizing World (Cambridge University Press, 2015). Mary M. McCARTHY is Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations at Drake University in Des Moines, Iowa. She specializes in Japan’s domestic and foreign policies and has published on topics including the Japanese media, and cooperation and conflict between Japan and China in the East China Sea. Her current research examines the historical legacies of the AsiaPacific War on Japan’s foreign relations. Dr. McCarthy is also a Mansfield Foundation US–Japan Network for the Future Scholar and was a 2014 Japan Studies Resident Fellow at the East–West Center in Washington, DC. She received her BA in East Asian studies and her PhD in political science from Columbia University. Miko MAEKAWA is Senior Research Fellow of the Ocean Policy Research Institute, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Japan. Her research interests include environmental policy and management and biodiversity conservation. Recent publications include a chapter in Resettlement Policy in Large Development Projects (Routledge, 2015). Maaike OKANO-HEIJMANS is Senior Research Fellow at the Netherlands Institute for International Relations ‘Clingendael’ in The Hague, the Netherlands, and Visiting Lecturer at the University of Leiden, the Netherlands. Her research interests are in economic diplomacy and international relations in East Asia and in consular affairs and diplomacy. Maaike co-authored Europe’s Response to China’s Activism: Balancing Hope and Fear in the New Age of Global Economic Governance (Clingendael Institute, 2015), with Daniel Lanting, and Economic Diplomacy: Japan and the Balance of National Interests (Clingendael Institute, 2013). Her work has been published/translated in English, Dutch, Japanese, Spanish, Chinese, and Arabic. xii

Contributors

Nissim Kadosh OTMAZGIN is Chair of the Department of Asian Studies, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel, and Associate Director of the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, Israel. He is the author of Regionalizing Culture: The Political Economy of Japanese Popular Culture in Asia (University of Hawai’i Press, 2013) and (together with Michal Daliot-Bul), The Anime Boom in the US: Lessons for Global Creative Industries (Harvard University Asia Center Press, 2017). He also co-edited (with Eyal Ben-Ari) Popular Culture and the State in East and Southeast Asia (Routledge, 2012), (with Sigal Galanti and Alon Levkowitc) Japan’s Multilayered Democracy (Palgrave, 2014), and (with Rebecca Suter) Manga and History: Stories for the Nation (Palgrave-Macmillilan 2016). Alessio PATALANO is Senior Lecturer at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, UK, and Visiting Fellow at the Japan Maritime Staff and Command College, Japan. He specializes in Japanese naval history and strategy. His latest monograph, titled Post-war Japan as a Seapower: Imperial Legacy, Wartime Experience, and the Making of a Navy, was published in 2015. Gilbert ROZMAN is Emeritus Musgrave Professor of Sociology at Princeton University and the editor-in-chief of The Asan Forum, a journal on international relations in the Asia-Pacific region. He specializes on national identities and their impact on bilateral and regional relations in Northeast Asia, including China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea. Yongwook RYU is Assistant Professor in the Department of International Relations, College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University, Australia. He specializes in East Asian international relations, the foreign policies of China, Japan, and Korea, ASEAN, and identity politics. His research has been published in The Pacific Review, Asian Survey, and Harvard Asia Quarterly, among others. He is fluent in Chinese (Mandarin), Japanese, and Korean and has held visiting positions at various places including Tokyo University, Japan; Beijing University, China; Uppsala University, Sweden; and NTU, Singapore. He holds a BA with first class honors from the University of Auckland, New Zealand, and a PhD in Government from Harvard University. Miranda SCHREURS is Professor of Environment and Climate Policy at the Bavarian School of Public Policy, Technical University of Munich, Germany. Her research focuses on climate change, low carbon energy transitions, and environmental movements in Europe, the United States, and Asia. She is currently Vice Chair of the European Environment and Sustainable Development Advisory Councils. She co-chairs the National Committee to Monitor the Nuclear Waste Management Site Location Search, Germany, and was a member of the Ethics Committee for a Secure Energy Future set up by Chancellor Angela Merkel in reaction to the Fukushima nuclear accident. She received her PhD from the University of Michigan. ¨ DERBERG is Professor and Director of the European Institute of Japanese Studies at Marie SO the Stockholm School of Economics, Sweden. A central focus of her research is Japanese foreign aid policy. She is the editor of the European Institute of Japanese Studies and East Asian Economics and Business Studies, a book series published by Routledge. She is also the chairperson of the European Japan Advanced Research Network (EJARN) executive committee. Michael STRAUSZ is Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas Christian University. His research has been published in journals including Foreign Policy Analysis, the Asian Journal of Political Science, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, and the Japanese Journal of Political Science. He is currently working on a book about Japanese immigration policy. xiii

Contributors

Wakana TAKAHASHI is Associate Professor of the Faculty of International Studies, Utsunomiya University, Japan. Her research interests are global environmental politics and comparative environmental politics. Her publications include The Comparative Politics of Transboundary Air Pollution (2017, in Japanese) and ‘Problems of Environmental Cooperation in Northeast Asia’ in International Environmental Cooperation in Pacific Asia (2002). Hiroshi TERASHIMA is President of the Ocean Policy Research Institute, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Japan. He is Vice-Chairman of the Japan Society of Ocean Policy and his research interests include ocean governance, coastal management, and ocean education. Recent publications include An Introduction to Ocean Issues and An Introduction to Integrated Coastal Management (in Japanese). Bernhard H. WITTEK is a PhD candidate at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universita¨t in Munich, Germany. He has gathered extensive professional experience as project manager for a global management-consulting firm based in the United States as well as Singapore, and has worked in both Thailand and Japan. Hidetaka YOSHIMATSU is Professor of Politics and International Relations at Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University, Japan, and a visiting research fellow at the University of Adelaide, Australia. His recent publications include Comparing Institution-Building in East Asia: Power Politics, Governance, and Critical Junctures (Palgrave, 2014). His research interests are Japan’s diplomatic policy and regionalism in East Asia.

xiv

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank all the authors for the commitment of their time and expertise to this volume. I would also like to thank our editorial board members, Shiro Armstrong, Keiko Hirata, Christopher W. Hughes, Margaret A. McKean, and Yoichi Sato. Each provided comments and suggested revisions for the chapters in a single section of the volume, making the individual chapters as well as the volume as a whole stronger. Finally, my appreciation goes out to Mollie Clark for her general editorial assistance and Kerstin Donat for editing the bibliographies. Both of their contributions were made possible through the generous funding of Drake University. Indexing was funded through the Center for the Humanities, Drake University.

xv

Acronyms

3R ACNT ADB ADIZ ADORC ADP AGICP AIIB AIM AIP ALGS APEC APP APP ASEAN ASW AU AWF BMD C4ISR CAI CDM CEFP CEPEA CHS CLB COP21 CPDA CTBT CTF DAC DDR DOD DPJ xvi

Reduce, Reuse, and Recycle Association for Countermeasures related to the Northern Territories Asian Development Bank Air Defense Identification Zone Acid Deposition and Oxidant Research Center Ad-hoc Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action Advisory Group on International Cooperation for Peace Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Asian-Pacific Integrated Model Air Independent Propulsion Automatic Logistics Global Sustainment Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Advisory Panel on Peacebuilding (Chapter 14) Asia Policy Point (Chapter 23) Association of Southeast Asian Nations Anti-Submarine Warfare African Union Asian Women’s Fund Ballistic Missile Defense Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Clean Asia Initiative Clean Development Mechanism Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement in East Asia Commission on Human Security Cabinet Legislative Bureau The 21st Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change China Public Diplomacy Association Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Combined Task Force Development Assistance Committee Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of ex-combatants US Department of Defense Democratic Party of Japan

Acronyms

DSPE EAEC EAFTA EANET EEZ EPA EPR ESCAP FDI FHS FTA FTAAP GAD GAM GATT GC/MS GDI GHG GMP GPP GRIPS HACGAM HADR HPC HSN IAEA ICJ ICPC ICRW IEEJ ILO IMO INDC IPR IRP IRTC ISR IWC JARPA JASDF(or ASDF) JA-Zenchu JBIC JCG JCGA JCM JESC JETRO JGSDF (or GSDF)

Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement European Atomic Energy Community East Asia Free Trade Area Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia Exclusive Economic Zone Economic Planning Agency Extended Producer Responsibility UN Economic and Social Committee for the Asia and the Pacific Foreign Direct Investment Friends of Human Security Free-trade Agreement Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific Gender and Development Gerakan Aceh Mederka (Free Aceh Movement) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Gas Chromatography Mass Spectrometry Gender Discrimination Index Greenhouse Gas Global Monitoring Plan Global Peacebuilders Program Graduate Institute for Policy Studies Heads of Asian Coast Guards Agencies Meeting Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Hiroshima Peacebuilders Center Human Security Network International Atomic Energy Agency International Court of Justice Individual Partnership and Cooperation Program International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling Institute of Energy Economics, Japan International Labor Organization International Maritime Organization Intended Nationally Determined Contribution Intellectual Property Rights International Resource Panel Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance International Whaling Commission Japanese Whale Research Program under Special Permit in the Antarctic Japan Air Self-Defense Force Japan Agricultural Cooperatives-Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives Japan Bank of International Cooperation Japan Coast Guard Japan Coast Guard Academy Joint Crediting Mechanism Japan Environmental Sanitation Center Japan External Trade Organization Japan Ground Self-Defense Force xvii

Acronyms

JICA JMNE(or MNE) JMSDF (or MSDF) JSDF (or SDF) JSO JSP KOCCA KOFICE LCA LCAC LDP LTP LULUCF MAFF MARPOL MAV MDGs METI MEXT MFG MHI MHW MIC MICS MITI MIW MMEA MOEJ MOEK MOF MOFA MSP NAMAs NDCs NDPG NEAC NEEs NF NIEs NIES NNPA NOWPAP NPT NSC NSG NSS xviii

Japan International Cooperation Agency Japanese Multinational Enterprises Japan Marine Self-Defense Forces Japan Self-Defense Forces Joint Staff Office Japan Socialist Party Korea Creative Content Agency Korea Foundation for International Cultural Exchange Ad-hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action Landing Craft Air Cushion Liberal Democratic Party Long-Range Trans-Boundary Air Pollutants Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships minimum access volume Millennium Development Goals Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry Ministry of Education, Culture, Sport, Science and Technology Mexico Friends Group (The Group of Friends for the United Nations Reform) Mitsubishi Heavy Industry Ministry of Health and Welfare Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Maritime Information and Communication System Ministry of International Trade and Industry (become METI in 2001) mine warfare Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency Ministry of Environment of Japan Ministry of Environment of Korea Ministry of Finance (Japan) Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan) Maritime Safety and Security Policy Program Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions Nationally Determined Contributions National Defense Program Guidelines Northeast Asian Conference on Environmental Cooperation Newly Emerging Economies Nippon Foundation Newly Industrialized Economies National Institute for Environmental Studies Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act Northwest Pacific Action Plan Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty National Security Council Nuclear Suppliers Group National Security Strategy

Acronyms

OAS OBOR ODA OECD PAFTAD PALM PCG PDA PEMSEA PICs PLAN PMC POPs PP QA/QC R2P RCEP RDF ReCAAP RHIB RIETI RTA SCAP SDGs SEALD SLOC SMEs SPF SUA TAN TGT TICAD TOSSD TPP TTIP UNCED UNCHE UNCHR UNCLOS UNDP UNEP UNESCO UNFCCC UNGA UNICEF UNMISS

Organization of American States One Belt One Road initiative Official Development Assistance Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Pacific Trade and Development Conference Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting Philippine Coast Guard Private Development Assistance Partnerships in Environmental Management for the Seas of East Asia Pacific islands countries People’s Liberation Army Navy Prime Minister’s Cabinet Persistent Organic Pollutants Pacific Partnership Quality Assurance/Quality Control Responsibility to Protect Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Refuse-derived Fuel Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia rigid-hulled inflatable boat Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry Regional Trade Agreements Supreme Commander for Allied Powers Sustainable Development Goals Students Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy sea-lanes of communication Small and Medium Sized Enterprises Sasakawa Peace Foundation Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation Transnational Advocacy Network Tokyo–Guam–Taiwan Tokyo International Conferences on African Development Total Official Support for Sustainable Development Trans-Pacific Partnership Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership United Nations Conference on Environment and Development United Nations Conference on the Human Environment United Nations Commission on Human Rights United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea United Nations Development Program United Nations Environmental Program United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change United Nations General Assembly United Nations Children’s Fund United Nations Mission in South Sudan xix

Acronyms

UNOCHA UNPBC UNSC USCG USMC USN USTR UNTFHS WAIR WAM WAW WFP WID

xx

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs United Nations Peace Building Commission United Nations Security Council United States Coast Guard United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Trade Representative United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security Western Army Infantry Regiment Women’s Active Museum of War and Peace World Assembly for Women World Food Program Women in Development

Japanese terms

anpo h osei bunkacho bunka gaik o bunkajin bunka koryu buryoku k oshi to no ittaika daitoa sens o danjo by od o danjo ky od o sankaku futsuka (or seij oka) gaiatsu Gaik o Seisho hanbei heiwa kokka heiwa no teichaku heiwashugi hibakusha hikaku san-gensoku jisonjiei no seisen jyagyakuteki kaken kaiken kaketsuke keigo

security legislation Agency for Cultural Affairs cultural diplomacy men of culture cultural exchange prohibition on integration with the use of force Greater East Asia War gender equality co-participation of men and women

normalize foreign pressure Diplomatic Bluebook anti-American peace nation consolidation of peace pacifism victims of the atomic bombings three non-nuclear principles war of survival and self-defense masochistic adding new provisions to the constitution revising the constitution come-to-aid (rushing to a distant location to protect people with armed assistance) kaku nuki henkan return of a no-nuke Okinawa kawaii cute kenpo kaisei shian “Revised Draft Constitution” (2005) kinrin shokoku jyok o neighboring countries clause kokkashugi statism kokub ogun National Defence Force kokusaika internationalization kokusai k ory u kikin The Japan Foundation kokusaishugi internationalism kokutai state-centered national polity xxi

Japanese terms

k odo minshushugi mintei kenpo s oan mangaka medeia gijutsu minzokushugi Nihonjinron norin zoku omiage gaiko paburikku dipuromashi seikatsu bunka sekkyokuteki heiwashugi senden gaik o sengo regimu sengo regimu kara dakkyaku sengo seiji no sokessan senshu b oei sens o dekiru kuni sens o h oan sens o sekinin shikata ga nai shingikai wa wabi-sabi yakuwari buntan y uji h osei

“Democratic Constitution for an Advanced Democracy” (1961) manga artists media technology ethnic nationalism theory of Japaneseness a policy tribe politician who has strong interests in agricultural affairs and seeks to maintain the interests of the agricultural group gift-giving diplomacy public diplomacy (or k oh o bunka gaiko) lifestyle proactive pacifism propaganda diplomacy postwar regime departure from the postwar regime final resolution of Japanese postwar history exclusively defense-oriented country that can wage war war bills war responsibility resigned attitude advisory councils group harmony transience and imperfection burden sharing National Emergency Laws

Conventions Japanese personal names are listed as given name followed by family name (surname). Korean and Chinese personal names are listed as family name (surname) followed by given name.

xxii

Introduction Mary M. McCarthy

Japanese foreign policy is undergoing profound developments in response to changes in the country’s strategic environment as well as transformations in the way in which Japanese foreign policy is conducted. As a reflection of this, as well as in consideration of an evolution in the way in which international relations is taught and studied, cutting-edge research in this field is also shifting. This corresponds to the actors and institutions that scholars deem to be most relevant, as well as the theoretical tools that can best explain Japanese foreign policy in the twenty-first century. Each author in this volume was tasked with writing a chapter in his or her area of expertise that reflects what international relations scholars who specialize on Japan are actually researching and writing – what they believe to be the most fascinating puzzles that are shaping the field and will shape the field for years to come. They were not required to follow any particular theoretical or methodological approach but were asked to write on a specific topic under one of five broad headings: Evolving Landscape of Japanese Foreign Policy, The Global Environment and Sustainable Development, International and National Security, International Political Economy, and International Norms and Global Civil Society. Thus, this volume conceives of foreign policy in a broad sense, by looking at the great variety of interests, sometimes competing, that constitute a foreign policy, as well as the diversity of actors involved with formulating and influencing that policy, from both inside and outside government. It further considers foreign policy as involving all the interactions that a state may have in the international realm, from those with other states to multilateral or international organizations to global civil society and transnational actors. As this volume seeks to be future-oriented, each author also explicitly or implicitly presents a plan for where we go from here. Some of the authors accomplish this through policy recommendations – introducing issues or processes that the Japanese government needs to consider further in order to best accomplish its goals. Others make recommendations for future scholarly research on the topic – raising questions that still need answers or suggesting approaches that may help to expand our understanding of some lesser-known aspect of Japanese foreign policy. Still, taken as a whole, several broad themes emerge from these chapters and constitute common threads throughout the volume. Three of these themes are domestic actors, history and historical memory, and development assistance. First, it is notable how many chapters explore the 1

Mary M. McCarthy

roles that domestic actors, both governmental and non-governmental, play in foreign policy, sometimes in unexpected ways. We certainly have the bureaucratic-politics model demonstrated in the interplay among the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, the Ministry of the Environment, and others on a variety of issues. However, bureaucrats are not the only domestic actors of influence. For example, Otmazgin (Chapter 4) looks at how actors in the creative arts, such as anime and manga, have opened up new avenues for Japanese diplomacy around the world, while Maekawa et al. (Chapter 9) examine the contribution of philanthropic organizations, such as the Nippon Foundation, in helping the government to achieve its foreign policy goals, in this case with regard to regional coast guard training and ocean management. And McCarthy (Chapter 23) explores the process by which domestic actors become transnational actors in this era of globalization. Berger’s chapter in this volume (Chapter 22) begins by stating, “There are few countries in the world whose foreign relations are as much burdened by the past as Japan’s.” In keeping with this sentiment, history and historical memory is a second thread found throughout the volume. Several chapters explore the constraining factor of history on Japanese foreign policy, as well as the way in which history has molded Japan’s strategic environment. This ranges from the large role that Japan’s “peace constitution” plays in terms of what tools of foreign policy Japan has available to it, as explored in the chapters by Hornung (Chapter 2), Ryu (Chapter 3), and others, to the way in which the San Francisco Peace Treaty and Cold War politics lay the foundations for current territorial disputes, as Bukh relates (Chapter 12). Finally, no volume on Japanese foreign policy would be complete without an exploration of development assistance, as one of the preeminent tools for a state limited in its use of military power. Thus, it is not surprising that Official Development Assistance (ODA) is mentioned by authors in every section of the volume. This ranges from the role it has played in environmental protection in Asia, as Schreurs investigates (Chapter 5), to its use to incentivize non-proliferation and punish nuclear testing, as Akiyama examines (Chapter 11), to its increasing securitization, as So¨derberg explores (Chapter 19). Our volume opens with The Evolving Landscape of Japanese Foreign Policy, with a focus on the major internal and external factors that influence Japan’s foreign policy and foreign relationships today, and on how best to understand Japanese international relations in terms of the tools of the field. The four chapters in this section particularly emphasize the normative parameters within which Japanese foreign policy has been debated and formulated since the end of World War II and even today, in the context of acknowledgement of evolving material and strategic interests and concerns. Thus, Rozman (Chapter 1) explores Japan’s most important foreign relations, with the US, China, South Korea, and Russia, as part of its search for national identity, as it struggles among the competing influences of statist revisionism, ethnic national revisionism, realist internationalism, and pacifism. While Hornung explores the intricate details of the “watershed” legislative security package of 2015, which, he argues, although significant, “stays clearly within the confines of the Three Pillars that have guided security debates for decades” – Article Nine, the non-use of force, and a defense-oriented strategy. Ryu goes on to discuss the prospects for revising the 1946 “peace constitution” in which such normative constraints are enshrined, connecting movements for revision back to both national identity and practical security and defense concerns. Finally, Otmazgin looks at how Japan can advance its strategic interests, given the normative and practical constraints discussed in the previous three chapters, through cultural diplomacy and soft power. The next section takes on the specific issue area of The Global Environment and Sustainable Development, revealing that there is no unified policy direction in Japan towards environmental issues in general. Japan has been a global or regional leader in some areas, a passive 2

Introduction

participant in others, and an outlier in still other areas. Japan’s response depends on competing interests within its own domestic scene, as well as external developments such as the actions (or inaction) of foreign governments. Further, while some of the authors in the five chapters in this section argue that the Japanese experience is beneficial as a learned experience to be shared with their Asian neighbors in developing countries, such as the coast guard capacity building discussed by Maekawa et al., others contend that the Japanese experience is not transferable, such as Takahashi’s exploration of the sound material-cycle society and waste management (Chapter 8). Here we start with an overview of Japan’s large global ecological footprint by Schreurs, who captures both the negative contributions that the country has made in terms of environmental degradation and the positive in terms of environmental assistance to developing economies and support for global environmental agreements. The next four authors each focus on a specific environmental issue. Hattori tackles global climate change (Chapter 6), exploring how Japan’s policies reflect the state’s simultaneous priorities of economic growth, energy security, environmental protection, and international contribution, but also its experience in dealing with less committed states that have fallen short of meeting expectations and its own domestic situation (such as the 2009 win by the Democratic Party of Japan and the 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear crisis). On transboundary air pollution, Kim (Chapter 7) finds that Japan is a leader in terms of cooperative mechanisms that have a wide regional scope encompassing both Northeast and Southeast Asia but is more likely to be a laggard in cooperative mechanisms that focus on the narrower confines of Northeast Asia, where South Korea has taken more of a leadership role. And Takahashi determines that, although Japan has engaged in some regional cooperation on waste management, it has only embraced international norms in this area in limited ways. She further questions the utility of sharing Japan’s experiences with potential regional partners when the administrative rationalism behind Japan’s waste management system is likely to be of less use than economic rationalism, which is prevalent in Europe and has more potential in achieving success in developing countries. Finally, Maekawa et al. positively evaluate the role that Japan has played in promoting regional cooperation and human resource development towards the goal of a sustainable maritime environment, with a particular focus on the leading role of the Japan Coast Guard. As the core of traditional foreign policy, this leads us to International and National Security, where our six authors explore the most profound issues for Japan in this realm. They respond to the normative constraints established in the first section of the volume, often presenting arguments and evidence that counter the conventional wisdom that such constraints have been the most important explanatory factors in Japanese foreign policy decision making. Thus, Patalano (Chapter 10) begins by questioning the common ‘normality–abnormality’ debate that dominates the literature on Japanese military power, arguing that when one focuses on Japan’s actual security goals and needs, it is revealed that its capabilities have been strategically developed such that it is able to meet those needs. And, while Article Nine has set broad boundaries for the use of force, the US–Japan Alliance has a greater impact on Japan’s strategic choices with regard to capability development. Akiyama’s chapter supports much of this underlying understanding of what drives Japanese foreign policy by focusing on the state’s rational strategic calculations in its decision to remain non-nuclear. Once again, it is the US–Japan Alliance and, in this case, US extended nuclear deterrence in particular that is a more important explanatory factor for the author than normative arguments. Addressing another of Japan’s most significant foreign policy challenges, ongoing territorial disputes, Bukh considers how to evaluate policy success and the necessity of looking at what the actual objectives were at specific points in time. He finds that policy goals have been complex when it comes to territorial disputes and have evolved over time due to changes in the international and domestic environments. And, in fact, perceived success at the achievement of one 3

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policy goal sometimes undermined the ability to achieve another goal at a later stage. Heng (Chapter 13) moves us from goals to means as he explores the meaning of “smart power” and how Japan can enhance its national security by utilization of a combination of hard and soft assets with the purpose of promoting itself as a “trouble-shooter” who is a reliable and beneficial partner to countries in Southeast Asia. This idea is reinforced by the significant role that peacebuilding has begun to play as a tool in Japanese foreign policy, including beyond Asia, as related by Iwami (Chapter 14). Iwami recognizes peacebuilding as means for Japan to play a proactive role in international security outside of military power. Finally, Hatakeyama (Chapter 15) investigates the abolishment of Japan’s arms trade ban as another means to enhance interdependence with allies and promote national security. Despite this focus on security studies in traditional studies of foreign policy, Japan’s postwar identity has emphasized its economic prowess. It has the third largest economy in the world and its economic might has been the most often used tool in its foreign policy toolbox. Yet as Japan continues to deal with its own domestic economic troubles and reforms, and the world economy shifts, in terms of actors and institutions, the scholars in the International Political Economy section enhance our understanding by analyzing what these changes mean for Japan’s political economy, its role in the world economy, and its foreign policy. The meaning of economic power in foreign affairs is introduced by Okano-Heijmans and Asano (Chapter 16) in an exploration of how economic diplomacy is playing an increasingly explicit role in Japanese foreign policy, even as we witness some expansion of military power, as examined in other chapters. Through the trinity of commercial diplomacy, trade diplomacy, and development assistance, they interpret economic diplomacy as becoming an integral part of geostrategic power plays by Japan. Yoshimatsu (Chapter 17) considers Japanese trade policy from an IPE perspective and how it has evolved in response to domestic and international factors. He views current and future challenges as further market liberalization and import pressures, the formation of regional trade architecture, and free-trade agreements. Horn et al. (Chapter 18) probe a different way in which the Japanese private sector interacts with the international community, namely foreign direct investment (FDI). Through a case study of Japanese FDI to Thailand, they determine how both home and recipient government policies shape investment decisions. Finally, So¨derberg looks at development assistance as a multipurpose political tool for Japan since the end of World War II, exploring how the 2015 Development Cooperation Charter is expanding the meaning of foreign aid and perhaps the role that ODA will play in the future. Over the past seven decades international norms have been transformed in a variety of areas, and civil society has become more active in both developing and responding to these new norms. Thus, global and domestic civil societies are increasingly making demands on domestic and foreign policy actors. At the same time, state actors are developing and promoting norms in pursuit of their own interests. Japan is no exception. In International Norms and Global Civil Society, our five authors examine the complexity of this area and the many ways in which nonmaterial factors influence foreign policy making. Some of our authors also dispute the conventional wisdom, where Japan is perceived to be unresponsive to specific global norms, including those related to gender and historical justice. First, Kurusu (Chapter 20) establishes Japan as a “norm entrepreneur” in the area of human security, arguing that the concept would not have become part of United Nations doctrine were it not for the leadership of Japan. Gelb and Kumagai (Chapter 21) go on to place Japan’s gendersensitive approach to development assistance and peacebuilding within a human security framework. They argue that such policies, as well as domestic policies for gender equality and women’s empowerment, are based on a recognition of where the state (and nation) has fallen short both in the past and today and that, therefore, Japan has a unique approach to the promotion 4

Introduction

of gender norms, emphasizing cooperation with developing countries on these goals and learning together rather than guiding. Berger examines another global norm in which conventional wisdom says Japan lags behind: coming to terms with its history and making appropriate restitution. He argues that history is a political construct and reconciliation requires finding an equilibrium among all the parties, based on each one’s interests. And whereas Japan and its neighbors have been able to find such an equilibrium at times in the past, this is becoming increasingly difficult to accomplish. McCarthy delves into one particular historical issue, that of the “comfort women.” She contends that this is a case where civil-society actors took advantage of changing global norms to gain traction on this issue by using international organizations and foreign governments to pressure the Japanese government to enact certain policies. However, they experienced limited success as evidenced by the December 28, 2015 agreement between Japan and South Korea that did not indicate a break with past policy. Finally, Strausz (Chapter 24) explores Japan’s continued practice of whaling amidst international outcry of “save the whales”. As he explains, Japan argues that there is no scientific basis for ending the practice of whaling (species that are not endangered) and, given this, Japanese cultural norms take precedence over global norms.

5

Part I

The evolving landscape of Japanese foreign policy

1 Japanese international relations and national identity gaps Gilbert Rozman

With the goal of expanding our understanding of the thinking behind Japan’s foreign policy, this chapter concentrates on four bilateral relationships and distinguishes four different outlooks on Japan’s national identity that can be seen reflected within each relationship. Since the mid 2010s the leaders of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s administration have been responding to abrupt changes in the regional environment and in the all-important Sino-US bilateral relationship. At the same time, they have been searching for clarity about what makes Japan distinctive, looking to various dimensions of national identity, especially historical memory. Recent media coverage has highlighted the symbols of identity that are invoked in bilateral relationships, such as “comfort women,” the Senkaku Islands, the Northern Territories, “return to Asia,” and realization of a “normal Japan.” Here, I place such symbols within broad dimensions of identity, which I have introduced previously (Rozman 2012), recognizing shared concepts across Japan and contested frameworks as seen in the four outlooks. The aim is to better understand Japan’s foreign policy choices. Four countries have long been in the forefront of Japan’s foreign policy, and they are also at the center of the way Japanese link bilateral relations to their national identity. Recent developments with each of the four highlight their salience, as Prime Minister Abe, the champion of the revisionist, conservative reconstruction of identity, has strived to use foreign policy as a means to realize a “normal Japan.” Most important is the United States, under the deep shadow of which Japan has regained only part of its great-power standing during the past seventy years. In 2015 Abe had satisfied most US concerns in how he handled historical memory, and President Barack Obama’s visit to Hiroshima in May 2016 alongside Abe culminated a process of alliance strengthening; but there is an undercurrent of Japanese dissatisfaction rooted in a search for “normality.” China stands in second place in Japanese thinking about the outside world, complicating hopes to complete Japan’s “return to Asia.” Despite the revival since late 2014 of summit meetings between Abe and President Xi Jinping, China, in the course of events marking the seventieth anniversary of World War II in 2015 and in its ongoing aggressive stance toward the East China Sea and South China Sea, has widened the identity gap between these two countries. In the shadow of these two dominant relationships, Abe’s agreement with South Korean president Park Geun-hye on the “comfort women” issue and pursuit of Russian president Vladimir

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Putin on the Northern Territories issue focus on two other targets for forging a “normal Japan,” as bilateral ties are continuously reoriented. A national identity gap—a concept I proposed (Rozman 2013)—exists when one or both countries in a relationship perceive the other as of great importance for how its people view the past, present, and future of their country, particularly in terms of notions of superiority or inferiority. Japanese have a long record of viewing China and South Korea as playing the “history card” to make the Japanese feel inferior, of anticipating a breakthrough with Russia to confirm their sense of recovery of national pride, and of feeling dissatisfied with the United States’ perceived “bashing” or “passing” Japan without treating it as an equal, and “stifling” Japan’s voice in regard to clashing historical memories. In striving to transform domestic and global thinking about Japan’s wartime record as critical for “normalcy,” Abe—more than any other postwar leader of Japan—keeps in mind how these four countries view that record. Also, in seeking pride in Japan’s postwar and post-Cold War achievements, the judgments of these same countries matter most. Finally, looking to Japan’s place in the region and world in coming decades, Abe cannot but question the degree to which each of these countries may be inclined to forge future-oriented relations or, instead, dredge up reasons for constraining Japan’s prospects. To grasp Japan’s international relations requires including in our analysis its identity gaps with these four most salient counterparts (Rozman 2013, 2014). National identity can be differentiated into multiple dimensions. For Abe (and others in the revisionist movement that has been gaining ground in public opinion and the National Diet), the temporal dimension is most pronounced, closely tied to the ideological dimension centered on kokutai, or statism. Reinterpreting Japan’s history is deemed vital for renewing aspects of a state-centered or emperor-centered community to which the Japanese must devote themselves. This is an obsession, dating at least from the 1950s, linked to the drive for constitutional revision; and, in its consistency and existence as the starting point for addressing all sorts of issues, it deserves to be viewed as an ideology. A conflicting ideology with comparable staying power, despite diminishing support, is the pacifist outlook, at the opposite end of the political spectrum. This outlook also places emphasis on historical identity, insisting on war guilt and apology as the sine qua non of national identity. Other dimensions of national identity—including the vertical dimension centered on state–society relations—are sharply disputed by these two approaches. One side favors a weak state—for example, opposing a state secrets law—while the other is doing what it can to concentrate power and rally the public around symbols of patriotism. In the overall analysis, I also invoke the sectoral dimension (political, economic, and cultural identity), the horizontal dimension, covering attitudes to internationalism and regionalism as well as other external identities, and the intensity dimension, measuring the strength of national identity sentiments. The six dimensions were initially applied to Japan in a chapter that was published in 2012 (Rozman 2012: ch. 1). For thinking about international relations—including internationalism and regionalism—it is helpful to introduce a typology of orientations found in Japan: 1) revisionism in its fullest form tied to statism—kokkashugi; 2) revisionism focused on ethnic nationalism—minzokushugi; 3) internationalism based on realism—kokusaishugi; and 4) pacifism in full denial of realism and of taking international responsibility—heiwashugi (Rozman 2015a). Below, these four approaches are applied to foreign relations, with stress on the national identity gaps that were discerned in the mid 2010s with the United States, China, South Korea, and Russia.1 Pursuit of any of these isms can serve the goal of showcasing Japan’s superiority, but internationalism separate from pacifism leaves Japan in the shadow of the United States. 10

International relations and identity gaps

Tightening the Japan–US alliance in the shadow of lingering anti-Americanism The Japan–US relationship appears to be a bulwark of internationalism (kokusaishugi). Summits produce joint statements replete with praise for universal values and insistence on abiding by the rule of law. Both states are democracies, which for seventy years have expressed shared outlooks on threats to the international order. In 2013–16 they found common cause on such issues as condemnation of human rights abuses in North Korea and affirmation of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. Even on sensitive matters such as the way imperial Japan treated US prisoners of war and the fact of US atomic bombs dropped on both Hiroshima and Nagasaki, unprecedented moves toward reconciliation were highlighted. Yet Abe’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in December 2013 and repeated criticism of Barack Obama in the Japanese media, as well as criticisms of then Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump (Country Report: Japan 2016) that gave Japanese license to intensify warnings about US relations (unreliable ally, unequal partner, narrow-minded state, selfish state without the will to stand firm on East Asian challenges), signal doubt about how much internationalism really is the driving force on the Japanese side. A leading Japanese academic has warned that in the war era and today as well the lack of internationalism has posed a serious problem in foreign relations (Hosoya 2012b). He has argued that Japan misunderstood pre-war internationalism, as if only imperialism ruled the world, and it has been very slow to assume responsibility for global challenges, such as the recent rise of ISIS, letting public opinion steer it to a very limited geopolitical role. This is in line with warnings in the 1980s of insufficient kokusaika, or internationalization, at a time when Japan confidently sought a new role (Rozman 1992). Assertions that US support for internationalism is deficient open space for alternative approaches to national identity, especially for heiwashugi. They cast doubt on the United States in various ways. Objections to Trump failing to uphold American standards of internationalism echoed comments around the world, including in the United States, even as they served to divert attention from Japan’s own failure to uphold them. Many in Japan had insisted that Obama’s weak leadership (no longer the world’s policeman, slowness in countering China’s aggressiveness, etc.) also meant that the United States could no longer be the leader it had been. Fear of outright isolationism under a Trump presidency carried this concern much further. Yet the passing of new laws in 2014–15, including those that gave Japan the right to collective self-defense, boosted the sense that heiwashugi was no longer dominant and kokusaishugi was gaining ground. In the first four decades of the postwar era heiwashugi prevailed, but it was losing ground, especially from the 1990s (Togo 2010). However, there was still fear of being entrapped into a US confrontation or war, and it remained a formidable force in opposition to the growing prospects after the July 2016 Upper House elections that Abe would seek to amend Japan’s constitution, especially Article Nine renouncing war and broadly prohibiting preparations for it. Given US efforts since the Korean War to turn Japan into a full ally with an unambiguous sense of responsibility for the international system (Green 2001), the struggle against pacifism has been closely linked to US pressure (gaiatsu). Despite reservations, kokusaishugi is seen as supportive of a closer Japan–US alliance; its spread greatly boosts the alliance. At times when the alliance is troubled, it is most desired (Inoguchi, Ikenberry and Sato 2011). Official policy and public opinion in Japan strongly support the Japan–US alliance, but this does not mean that anti-Americanism is absent from national identity. Rather, it takes more indirect forms than in most countries, having a long pedigree from the postwar era. The prevailing global image of Japan since the 1950s has been of a pro-American ally with a progressive movement critical of the Japan–US alliance but losing clout, and a right wing opposed to 11

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US thinking on the history of World War II but remaining a small fringe. In those two camps, especially the cultural intellectuals on the left and the supporters of rebuilding Japan’s military on the right, there was relatively little animus toward Americans and increasing recognition of the salience of special Japan–US relations. Few observers in recent times have given much credence to sentiments that could be called “anti-Americanism” in a Japanese populace accustomed to calling itself part of the “free world” with “universal values” and heavily dependent on an alliance with the United States for its security and its diplomacy around the world or in Asia. Yet it would be a mistake, as Japanese scholarship argues, to overlook the identity clash from the left and the right (Reizei 2016). Anti-Americanism on the left was seen in the sympathy for the Soviet Union in the 1950s before the revelations of de-Stalinization, for China during the Cultural Revolution and after normalization of relations, and for regionalism in the 1990s–2000s as an alternative to exclusive dependency on the United States. On the right, there were other sources of antiAmericanism—some of which resonated with the political left as well. The quest for a strong state not limited by some elements of civil society was meant to undo effects of the US occupation after World War II. Contrasts with the US model of capitalism and litigation pointed to community, harmony, and an inherent homogeneity and hierarchy. When the Obama administration pressed Japan to reduce agricultural protectionism in order to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), this revived suspicions of a US threat to Japan’s internal order and to rebuilding the kokutai (statecentered national polity). From the perspective of minzokushugi, there is also a sense that the United States is posing a civilizational threat. Thus, when the Japanese regained confidence in the 1980s following decades of grappling with the aftermath of defeat, the most popular expression of pride took the form of Nihonjinron (theory of Japaneseness), with its insistence on the superiority of Japanese culture from time immemorial (Befu 2001), in sharp contrast to the widely seen deficiencies in the supposedly declining US civilization. Although Japanese confidence slipped after the “bubble economy” burst, contrasts with US national identity persisted. Awareness among international observers of Japanese discontent with the United States and its policies has focused on specific moments in time, not on persistent themes. Anti-war, antialliance demonstrations leading to the 1960 showdown, followed by the student movement of the late 1960s were on the radar even as confidence was growing that Japanese conservative governments could keep them on the sidelines. Nihonjinron arrogance about Japanese cultural and management superiority in the 1970s and 1980s stirred doubts about shared values, although confidence in Yasuhiro Nakasone drawing his nation closer to the United States was reassuring. Japan’s push for Asian regionalism without the United States or for a role bridging its ally and China in the early 1990s was disconcerting to some before the reality of economic stagnation and of China’s patriotic education campaign clarified that Japan’s aspirations to be the leader of Asia were unrealistic. The brief Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) embrace, under Yukio Hatoyama, of a “spirit of fraternity” with China and the ideal of an “East Asian community” in 2009–10 (Funabashi and Nakano 2017) is remembered as little more than a short blip between the Koizumi and Abe eras of tightening bilateral bonds. No pattern is usually detected in this shifting record. A more discerning examination of the negative side of Japanese thinking regarding the United States requires at least three elements: 1) a long-term perspective on how this thinking has been manifest, linking leftist and rightist variations; 2) a new approach to national identity that can differentiate intertwined attitudes that leave a positive impression even when there is a negative foundation; and 3) an in-depth analysis of the underlying causes of thinking that some Japanese have labeled anti-American (hanbei). As for the underlying assumptions contrasted with US thinking, the desire to salvage a positive outlook on history in the half century to 1945 is top of the list. Another unmistakable theme is the quest for an autonomous Asian policy or at least a bridge role. Japan-led regionalism has been embraced at times both by heiwashugi, as a third way between 12

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the US and Soviet blocs or as a pathway to Asian values in a community distinct from any blocs, and the two revisionist approaches, as a means for Japanese to express their state and ethnic traditions independent of the deep US shadow. Finally, an enduring element of Japanese thinking about the contrast with the United States is preserving a “community” (under the emperor) at the expense of openness sought by Americans. These three dimensions of national identity are seen as driving negativity toward US identity pressure (Reizei 2016). After all, kokusaishugi suffers from the image of being repeatedly pressed on Japan at the expense of some traditional sense of identity unable to gain firm standing. In turn, that negativity is manifest in such disparate areas as the way evaluations of US leaders (lately Obama and Trump) have been expressed; the response to US pressure on Japanese foreign policy (lately on policy toward Russia); views of US motivations in seeking domestic reform in Japan (recently on the TPP); and concerns about the motivations behind recent US criticisms of Japan’s historical revisionism. In the background are clashing memories of World War II (Chirot, Shin and Sneider 2014). Critics in Japan—on the right and on the left—of US views of history focus not on one policy or another (the Vietnam War, the Iraq War, the Hiroshima and Nagasaki A-bombs, etc.) but on a more fundamental critique of US “imperialism.” The right wing pictures the struggle with the United States in the 1930s and first half of the 1940s as competition between two imperialist states with lingering concern about efforts since 1945 to keep Japan dependent and deny Japan foreign policy autonomy as the legacy of such hierarchical thinking. The left wing has concentrated on US efforts to entrap Japan in endeavors to boost US hegemony as modern-day imperialism. This is the basis for successive, progressive sympathy with the Soviet Union, China, and even, at times, North Korea. Perceiving US Republicans as the party of realist policies, conservatives have overwhelmingly preferred them to Democrats, who are viewed as most intent on approaching US foreign policy through the pursuit of ideals and to judge history in terms of such idealism. Neither camp in Japan has been keen on embracing a wide-ranging view of history, accepting the quest for idealism, anti-imperialism, and internationalism as an enduring US pursuit. Lack of respect for US idealism is at the root of skepticism. A sense of inequality in relations with the United States unbefitting a great power is hard to remove from such thinking. It fosters feelings of inferiority inconsistent with self-proclaimed great power status.

Standing strong against China despite aspirations for an East Asian community For about a quarter century from the time of the normalization of relations with China in 1972, many Japanese pinned their hopes on that great power for finding a way to lessen dependence on the United States. China would complete the “flying geese” model of Japan steering Asia through production networks reinforced by cultural affinity and eventually political leadership onto a separate path from that of the West. It would make Japan’s postwar “re-entry into Asia” complete, too, superseding the demeaning notion that Japan is just part of the “West.” To sustain such hopes, Japanese had to treat communism as a fleeting phenomenon, to be replaced with a revival of traditional Chinese culture and modernity filtered through Japan’s modernization, as was begun a century earlier. It was assumed also that China would long be a developing country in need of Japan’s capital, know-how, and goodwill. Finally, Japanese anticipated that Sino-US relations would not be as good as Sino-Japanese relations, leaving Japan the pivot in the triangle (Rozman 2001). In these ways, China served the identity needs of all four Japanese approaches. China’s salience for Japanese national identity began to change in the second half of the 1990s (Wan 2006), a process that accelerated in the 2010s. For a transitional decade or so, there was 13

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ambivalence about whether China would be a partner in win–win regionalism in which ASEAN and South Korea could serve in some sort of balancing roles, while Japan would stick close to the United States with internationalism and regionalism in a balance yet to be determined (Lam 2006). Hopes for minzokushugi were diminished by loss of self-confidence in the economic and political malaise of the 1990s–2000s, but they found new backing in a backlash against intensified Chinese critiques of Japan’s history. If for a time plans turned to decentralization to overcome bureaucratic suppression of local autonomy, by the end of the 1990s, the pendulum had swung back to boosting state authority and patriotism, as kokkashugi gained ground. Despite new Japan–US defense guidelines, kokusaishugi was not strongly endorsed. Japanese were growing more nervous about China, especially in 2005, when large Chinese demonstrations against Prime Minister Koizumi’s repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and Japan’s appeal to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council were perceived as China actively playing the “history card” (Kokubun 2007; He 2009, 2015). In the mid 2010s, there was no longer doubt in Japan of a “China threat” against both the security and the identity of Japan. Although the pacifist school protested against the new laws on collective self-defense and protection of state secrets—fearing that a much more powerful state would turn to kokkashugi and obliterate the postwar system while starting on a course that could lead to militarism—even they turned hostile to China’s policies and rhetoric toward Japan. The “China threat” eclipsed “anti-Americanism.” The pacifist school stigmatized not only Japan’s actions from the time of the “twenty-one demands” in 1915 or even from the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–5 but the entire sweep of Japanese history as a drastic perversion of Confucianism, an extreme form of imperialism, and a quest for a return to militarism. Belief in peaceful postwar development as a model China could follow, as well as sincere interest in a new “friendship” with China, has been lost. Few in Japan have any hope left for ties to China of the type envisioned by some after normalization (Smith 2015). This has dealt a heavy blow to heiwashugi but not solidified kokusaishugi, as the legacy of historical revisionism has gained new support under Abe (Nakano 2015). Even as Japanese leaders had eyed Southeast Asian states and ASEAN as partners that could affirm Japan’s rightful place in Asia, while aspiring to a special relationship with China to jumpstart this process, China’s rise and rivalry have left Japan on the periphery of the continent. Moreover, China’s strident efforts to forge institutions supportive of its notion of “Asia for the Asians” consciously serve to pressure Japan to accept a central place for China or become marginalized. Japanese perceive the struggle over defining Asia as exclusive—and Sinocentric—or inclusive (with an active US role) as critical for the identity of their country. China has greatly altered the terms of thinking about Asianism. It has now become a matter of competing with China, with the insistence that Japan is the real supporter of the international community and rule of law, even if this leaves Japan having little option but to appear to be seconding the US posture in Asia, i.e. forgoing Asianism. Heiwashugi has been put on the defensive by China’s aggressiveness. There are still calls for more dialogue from the progressive media, but few have any optimism that China will be a promising partner. Kokusaishugi has been boosted by the China challenge and by the daunting realization that Japan cannot face the difficult environment of East Asia without strengthening ties with the United States. As China insists that it is the true champion of Asianism, Japanese conservatives, who might these days be emboldened to claim that mantle, are obliged to echo themes of internationalism. The Chinese assault on Japanese cultural identity has led to a backlash in favor of renewed pride in Japanese ethnic identity, or minzokushugi, although the foundation for it is much thinner than in the peak days of Nihonjinron, when Japan’s bubble economy provoked arrogance. It is China’s arrogance recently that provokes a defensive response 14

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conducive to some ethnic pride. Yet there is a widespread impression that Japanese youth are apathetic to such messages. China’s salience for Japan’s national identity has risen—first as a “friend” for Asianism and then as a “foe” driving Japan back to the West and boosting internationalism, but it remains below that of the United States. The struggle over pacifism has revolved around being entrapped by the United States and keeping a distance from an ally capable of swamping Japan’s autonomous identity. The struggle over statism pays attention to the US social order, insisting that community and harmony are better served in Japan. Japanese civilization a millennium or half a millennium ago may have laid down markers to keep Chinese civilization from being overwhelming, but the target since 1945 has been the pull of US-led Western civilization as the threat to ethnic exclusivity. In thinking about both South Korea and Russia, the struggle with US identity is clearest.

Seeking triangularity with South Korea while demonizing its national identity The United States has since the 1950s been caught between South Korea’s insistence on Japan accepting a more negative recognition of its history during the first half of the twentieth century and Japan’s appeal for a future-oriented relationship setting the past behind them. At times, clear US sympathy for South Korea, as the victim of Japanese imperialism, has added to the pressure on Japanese leaders to apologize and forge trilateralism on terms acceptable to Seoul. At other times, however, US priority for a robust regional deterrent against military threats (from the Soviet Union, North Korea, or China) has freed Japan from such pressure and put the burden on South Korea to focus on the future. A confident Japan in the 1980s expected that its strong economic advantage would oblige the South Koreans to yield, and a beleaguered Japan in the 2010s anticipated that security conditions would have a similar impact. Despite the overwhelming support for South Korean views of historical reality in the international community, Japan refuses to acknowledge them. The troubled state of Japan–ROK relations is reflected in the fact their normalization took until 1965 and then only under intense US pressure and urgent South Korean economic exigencies. It is also seen in the rarity of summits between leaders of the two countries—there were none in 1965 and only a handful over the next quarter century. Since the end of the Cold War, each South Korean president has promised for a time to pursue closer ties to Japan, but relations sank over one grievance or another—usually anger over official policies or textbooks in Japan or statements by Japanese officials. The unwillingness of Tokyo to satisfy Seoul’s concerns speaks to their importance for the national identity approaches of kokkashugi, minzokushugi, and even heiwashugi. The weakness of kokusaishugi has frustrated US leaders intent on Tokyo cooperating with Seoul for regional security. In 2013–15, intense US diplomacy struggled to boost triangularity (Rozman 2015b). Japanese find the national identity gap with South Korea particularly challenging, since it is at odds with shared national interests in the face of security threats and overlapping commitments to the US-led international community and universal values. Yet, holding to narrow thinking about the past, they refuse to concede that the annexation of Korea in 1910 was coercive rather than by joint agreement and to acknowledge the evil of their cultural genocide in the late 1930s to 1945 through language policies and name-changing demands. Conservative leaders led by Abe insist, as conditions allow, on reversing earlier acknowledgment of government responsibility for the “comfort women” and previous restraint over claims to the territory of Takeshima (Dokdo). The agreement on December 28, 2015 on the “comfort women” quieted some concern, but there is 15

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no sign that the mainstream in the Liberal Democratic Party under Abe has lessened its advocacy of themes in direct contradiction to South Korean identity beliefs and at the expense of their bilateral relationship. Compelling US arguments for trilateralism have had an impact as a result of persistent diplomacy and deepening external dangers, especially in 2016 after South Korea took a hardline stance toward North Korea, but Japanese restraint is limited. The tendency for South Koreans—both the people and the government (much less the security community)—to confuse Japanese pursuit of internationalism through realist policies in security with historical revisionism complicates Japanese rethinking. In this respect, they echo what adherents of heiwashugi argue. Yet momentum in Japan is on the side of collective defense against the aggression of China and North Korea. This gives an opening to those who see an opportunity for rebuilding a powerful state under the legacy of kokkashugi and who favor a revival of ethnic nationalism under the sway of minzokushugi. For them, South Korea poses a threat with its constant reminders of what those approaches in the prewar era led Japan to do. Reassuring South Koreans—for example, by downplaying the symbols of these approaches, such as the Yasukuni Shrine visits of top leaders and revisionist textbook changes—would be a sign that kokusaishugi is triumphing over the other approaches, as some observers found on the basis of Abe’s record of 2015, culminating in the December 28 agreement with Seoul. Yet there is little trust in Abe and deep concern that realism conceals a long-term priority for these approaches. In 2013–15, President Park Geun-hye refused to hold a bilateral summit with Abe, saying that his treatment of the “comfort women” and other historical views were at odds with the promises made by Japan and its responsibilities to apology for the colonization of Korea. Japanese insisted that she was being unreasonable, putting too much stress on history when both countries faced urgent dangers. As Abe stepped back from some of his threats to retreat from past Japanese acknowledgments of wartime transgressions, the United States pressed Park to meet him and to refocus on the future, but it also pressed Abe to reach an agreement conducive to putting the “comfort women” issue behind Japan–ROK relations (Glosserman and Snyder 2015). After Abe had reached a deal with Obama on the multilateral trade agreement known as TPP and offered more support to US forces in defending freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, the December 28 agreement appeared to give a strong boost to internationalism. It was seen as reluctant recognition by Japan that it subscribes to the agenda set by the United States and is capable of compromising in light of its difficult situation. A focus on South Korea for other identity objectives, however, would not be abandoned, both Japanese and South Koreans found, doubting any easy path to mutual trust. For most Japanese, the fault is heavily on the South Korean side for never accepting a joint agreement without insisting on “moving the goal posts” to put pressure on Japan—an enduring message (Park 2007, 2016). The December 28 agreement included a clause that Park would strive to have the statue of a “comfort woman” removed from in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul. Given the widespread opposition to the agreement in South Korea, Park has not found a way to proceed. One response by those in Japan reluctant to back Abe’s agreement but inclined to give him space since he is a strong advocate of their identity causes was to demand that South Korea first remove the statue before the Japanese government made its payment of 1 billion yen to the South Koreanestablished Foundation for Reconciliation and Healing for the surviving women. No such condition was included in the agreement, and, finally, in July 2016, Japan reaffirmed that it would make the payment without this precondition. Another response to the agreement was to interpret it as Seoul abandoning the “history card” for good, freeing Tokyo to say whatever it liked with no fear of repercussions in the future. Thus, there was little discussion in Japan of what further steps would be advisable to build on a still fragile foundation in bilateral relations, as internationalists would contemplate, working with US 16

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diplomats and experts to solidify this weak leg of the alliance triangle. South Koreans found it dubious that Abe had not issued a letter of apology and that Japanese felt liberated to continue on a revisionist course of historical memory without any need to address the concerns that allowed the controversy to arise in the first place. They remained skeptical that conditions would suffice for substantial trust. The national identity gap with South Korea has surprising importance because it is proof of weakness in Japan–US relations, based on internationalism. Even in 2016, when Japanese were, at last, persuaded that South Korea was not tilting to China, they continued to issue textbooks and a defense white paper with new emphasis on Takeshima (Dokdo in Korean) to the great annoyance of South Koreans, who administer and lay territorial claim to the island. Strategic threats are still not changing this identity focus.

Wooing Russia against the odds even as Russia attacks internationalism For nearly six decades Japanese insisted that the return of the Northern Territories—four islands on the edge of Hokkaido taken from it in the final days of Russia’s belated entry into World War II—was a requirement for normalization of relations with Moscow. The basis for a compromise with the return of the two small islands closest to Japan existed in the late 1950s, after diplomatic ties with Moscow were restored; in the early 1990s, when Russia was at its weakest, just after the collapse of the Soviet Union; and in the early 2000s, when Putin was most eager for a multi-vector foreign policy. Japanese leaders rejected these opportunities not because they clashed with perceived national interests, but because, in each instance, an argument about national identity obscured the need for any discussion of national interests. For the decade after the breakdown of talks in 2002, scant sign was shown that Japan was reconsidering “four islands in a batch” as its negotiating stance. Was Japan’s rigid posture an indicator of kokusaishugi prevailing over heiwashugi during the Cold War and afterwards? Some observers thought so. Given the Japan–US alliance and the Soviet threat, rallying the Japanese people behind a symbol of illegal occupation of Japan’s inherent territory gave them a reason to assume international responsibility in defiance of the pacifist, anti-war arguments for Tokyo improving ties to Moscow and becoming a bridge between the two camps. This symbol tilted the balance, especially in the final stage of the Cold War, after “Northern Territories day” had been proclaimed, in support of an internationalist cause. Yet when other leaders were cutting deals with both Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin, explaining that they were required by international responsibility in a new era, Tokyo stuck to its territorial obsession. This was a matter of “justice” premised on assumptions about World War II, not a strategy for satisfying today’s geopolitical interests, and Russia acquired a narrow place in Japanese identity thinking. Despite media hyperbole in 1997 to 2001, no deal was reached (Rozman 2000, 2002). The pursuit of Russia by Abe from 2013 reflected transformed national identity thinking. While the pretense was kept of insisting on the return of all four islands and of engaging Putin for the sake of the islands, Japanese reasoning was shifting abruptly. The driving forces for Abe’s tenacious wooing of Putin—even as Russian responses crossed what in previous periods had been Japanese red lines—were fourfold (Russian leaders visiting the islands, increasingly hardline Russian statements, and increasingly provocative Russian military movements did not dissuade Abe from continuing in his quest). One was the desire to put one abnormal situation in Northeast Asia behind Japan in order to concentrate on others. Thus, pragmatism was taking precedence over identity to the extent this logic prevailed—a balance-of-power rationale to focus on a more 17

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serious threat by finding a way to resolve a less serious one. A second driving force was the presumption that Russia could be dissuaded from joining in vilification of Japan’s history with overtones for the present rather than joining with China in a united front to demonize Japan. Signs that China and Russia were finding common cause in celebrations of the seventieth anniversary of the war gave added incentive to reach a deal with Russia. Third among the driving forces was the hope that a deal with Russia would breathe new life into the quest for Asianism, dispelling recent anxieties that Japan was becoming isolated in its neighborhood. Finally, defying the United States in its pursuit of Russia, at a time when Putin was using military force and the threat of it in an aggressive manner, would allow Japan to step out of the US shadow more than at any previous time in the post-Cold War era (Rozman 2016). Why does Russia matter greatly for Japanese national identity? It is a neighbor, a great power, and the object of several wars or near wars in the period 1900–45. It remained high on Japan’s radar in the Cold War era as the foremost threat, the target of heiwashugi aspirations for a time, and the number one symbol in the 1980s of the quest to arouse the public, first, behind the need to rally behind the state and boost defense and alliance capabilities and, second, behind aspirations to end the Cold War as a victor, with Moscow yielding to Japan’s interpretation of 1945 and returning all four islands. For a period in the 2000s, Russia’s salience for Japanese foreign policy and national identity was much reduced—it would not be part of a regional community, did not have economic appeal even if trade was increasing, and could be treated with patience until its need for Japan gave new life to moribund negotiations. Yet Abe, briefly as prime minister in 2006–7 and again when he returned to the post, had a different take on Russia’s utility. Abe may appear to be an unlikely advocate for a breakthrough with Russia on terms that will not confirm revisionist reasoning about 1945 and will likely lead to two islands, not four, being returned. The case may be made that he is a superior strategic thinker, seeing Russia as a balance to China or, at least, calculating that Japan must strive to split Russia from China. Yet, given the limited degree to which Japan appears capable of impacting Russian foreign policy and the SinoRussian relationship, another case should be taken seriously, i.e. that Abe views his wooing of Putin as a means to realize national identity goals that he is pursuing in various ways. Given Putin’s ambitious program to develop the Russian Far East amid current economic difficulties, Abe expects offers of substantial economic cooperation to elicit Russian flexibility on the islands. Also, given Putin’s search for a way to split the G7 and remove sanctions on his country, Abe views his chances to gain leverage as rather high, even if Abe may decide that he needs to avoid timing that would anger Washington. The other aspect of his reasoning centers on what Japanese publications depict as Putin’s determination to avoid dependence on China and pursue multipolarity in the Asia-Pacific region with Japan as one of the main poles. Occasionally, one reads in Japanese sources of even deeper ambitions for a civilizational understanding between two great powers caught between East and West and intent on establishing space for their own civilizations to be recognized as autonomous, even as polarization proceeds between China and the United States. Russia’s ambitions for a Eurasian sphere and Japan’s for Asianism can find common ground. In the late nineteenth and for much of the twentieth century, Moscow and Tokyo had attempted to forge such a sphere and to make it a major part of an expansive identity. Each failed, but each is trying to salvage aspects of that once disparaged identity. Making common cause as civilizations whose leaders respect each other’s path and pledge cooperation to realize future aspirations could be the centerpiece in a breakthrough announcement. Suspicions that this would come at the expense of Japanese internationalism, providing a foundation for statism, would be warranted, as the outside world took notice of an unexpected result. 18

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The conventional narratives that Japan has only cared about the return of territory as the reason to pursue Russia or, lately, that Japan is only concerned about the impact of a deal on China are misleading. Neither of them would have serious ramifications for the US–Japan relationship. Both could be compatible with rising internationalism. They either assume a narrow, single-minded notion of national identity (as existed toward Russia for a long time) or a disinterest in identity for the sake of realist objectives. As before, Russia serves as a major test case for how Japanese national identity defies outside expectations.

Comparisons of responses to four countries Different approaches to national identity are emphasized in Japan’s relationships with the four countries of greatest significance for identity. Kokusaika is at the forefront of ties to the United States, masking the presence of the other approaches, as if the only restraining force is lingering heiwashugi. In the case of China, kokusaishugi often seems prominent; yet the threat is viewed as a challenge not only to the international and regional order but also as an attack on minzokushugi and the very essence of Japanese civilization. The gap with South Korea also centers on minzokushugi and the national character of Japanese, as internationalism struggles to overcome the main identity drivers. Finally, Russia serves as a possible means to rebuild kokkashugi, even if that comes at some cost to kokusaishugi. No one approach to the identity of Japan as a nation can explain the diversity of its ties. Symbols of historical memory remain at the center of Japanese national identity in regard to the four countries of primary concern. In three cases, territorial disputes represent these divides, only the United States being spared that focus. The Yasukuni Shrine is a symbol of defiance toward China and South Korea, with US involvement deemed a means to keep Japan–South Korea ties on track. Yet other symbols have been kept in the shadows. For Japan–US relations, the historical symbols have remained in the background. Until they are addressed openly, it is unlikely that internationalism will have smooth sailing. Once they are addressed, there may be another jolt to its prospects. To the extent that Japan’s ties with South Korea overcome the national identity barrier, this will benefit its ties to the United States and internationalism. Improved Japan–Russia ties, however, may have the opposite effect, driving a wedge between Japan and the United States, while raising questions about which approaches to national identity are receiving precedence. Abe is the leader who has done the most to show how national identity influences foreign policy. The most intense national identity discussions have centered on South Korea. Perhaps, this is because the zainichi community (ethnic Koreans residing in Japan) is perceived as an immigrant presence linked to one or the other Korea, unlike the images of the other countries divorced from issues of “outsiders” inside Japan. This brings minzokushugi into the picture. Discussions of the United States and Russia usually keep national identity more in the background, with the symbolic repetition of shared belief in the rule of law in the US case and of the need to resolve the “Northern Territories” in the Russian case. These symbols are meaningful, but they also obscure today’s deeper quest for answers about identity in these relationships.

Conclusion Contention over Japanese national identity is longstanding. Heiwashugi has lost its prime position. Kokkashugi has become the driving force, eclipsing minzokushugi, which was the main challenger to heiwashugi when the peak of the bubble economy had caused a spike in national identity. Yet 19

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kokusaishugi has gained ground also, reflecting urgency in appeals for Japanese foreign policy to turn in a realist direction in accord with US policy. Japanese thinking toward South Korea reflects minzokushugi and kokkashugi, even as US pressure is striving to achieve trilateralism based on kokusaishugi. If the December 28 Abe–Park agreement breathed new life into kokusaishugi, the forces in Seoul and Tokyo complicating this shift are formidable. The Japanese outlook on China is more in keeping with kokusaishugi, although as recently as 2010, the Hatoyama leadership’s heiwashugi led to optimism about regionalism through an East Asian community; and in 2013–14, alarm that Abe was failing to strike the right balance of cooperation and competition without unduly provoking China led to charges that he prioritizes his kokkashugi agenda. Abe’s wooing of Putin has been depicted as kokusaishugi to balance China, but there is suspicion that it is more a sign of kokkashugi to distance Japan from the United States. Of all Japan’s relationships, that with its ally is most readily perceived as kokusaishugi in action. Given Japan’s troubles with China, however, this may be a necessary transition to goals not in keeping with internationalism, which at present are not within Japan’s reach. If one relationship were singled out as the most powerful force influencing Japan’s search for identity, it would be the relationship with China. Optimism about becoming a bridge to China in the search for a “return to Asia” and for regionalism lingered for four decades from the time of normalization of relations in 1972. As that was fading, the need for close ties to the United States became more apparent, boosting kokusaishugi. The decisions in favor of compromise with South Korea in 1998 and 2015 not only reflected US pressure but also periods of increased concern over China. Abe’s overtures to Russia likewise are premised on deepening Japanese alarm about China. Yet such alarm provides not only a rationale for internationalism but also fertile soil for seeking relief in claims for superior Japanese identity through kokkashugi and minzokushugi. These are often subsumed in the label “revisionism,” in contrast to the realism linked to kokusaishugi (Rozman 2015a).

Note 1

On South Korea–Japan ties, see Park (2013); on China–Japan ties, see Wan (2013). On the evolution of Japan’s national identity with emphasis on international relations, see Togo (2012) and Hosoya (2012b).

Bibliography Befu, H. (2001) Hegemony of Homogeneity: An Anthropological Analysis of Nihonjinron, Melbourne: TransPacific Press. Chirot, D., Shin, G. and Sneider, D. (2014) Confronting Memories of World War II: European and Asian Legacies, Seattle: University of Washington Press. ‘Country Report: Japan’ (2016) (summaries and interpretations of articles in Japanese), The Asan Forum, bi-monthly. Funabashi, Y. and Nakano, K. (eds) (2017) The Democratic Party of Japan in Power: Challenges and Failures, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. Glosserman, B. and Snyder, S. (eds) (2015) The Japan–South Korea Identity Clash: East Asian Security and the United States, New York: Columbia University Press. Green, M. (2001) Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power, New York: Palgrave. He, Y. (2009) The Search for Reconciliation: Sino-Japanese and German-Polish Relations since World War II, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. He, Y. (2015) ‘IR Theory and Bilateral Relations among China, Japan, and South Korea in the 2000s’, in G. Rozman (ed), Misunderstanding Asia: International Relations Theory and Asian Studies over Half a Century, New York: Palgrave, pp. 163–87.

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Hosoya, Y. (2012a) ‘Japanese National Identity in Postwar Diplomacy: The Three Basic Principles’, in G. Rozman (ed), East Asian National Identities. Washington, DC and Stanford, CA: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press, pp. 169–95. Hosoya, Y. (2012b) Kokusai chitsujo: 18 Seiki Europe kara 21 Seiki Asia e [International Order: From 18th Century Europe to 21st Century Asia], Tokyo: Chuokoron Shinsha. Inoguchi, T., Ikenberry, G. and Sato, Y. (2011) The U.S.–Japan Security Alliance: Regional Multilateralism, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Kokubun, R. (2007) ‘Changing Japanese Strategic Thinking toward China’, in G. Rozman (ed), Japanese Strategic Thought toward Asia, New York: Palgrave, pp. 137–58. Lam, P. (ed) (2006) Japan’s Relations with China: Facing a Rising Power, London: Routledge. Nakano, K. (2015) ‘The Legacy of Historical Revisionism in Japan in the 2010s’, in G. Rozman (ed), Misunderstanding Asia. New York: Palgrave, pp. 213–25. Park, C. (2007) ‘Japanese Strategic Thinking toward Korea’, in G. Rozman (ed), Japanese Strategic Thought toward Asia. New York: Palgrave, pp. 183–200. Park, C. (2013) ‘National Identities and South Korea–Japan Relations’, in G. Rozman (ed), National Identities and Bilateral Relations. Washington, DC and Stanford, CA: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press, pp. 45–63. Park, C. (2016) ‘Reviving the US–South Korea–Japan Triangle in US Diplomacy’, The Asan Forum, 4(2). Reizei, A. (2016) ‘Hanbei’: Nihon no shotai [The Real Face of Anti-Americanism in Japan], Tokyo: Bungei Shinsho. Rozman, G. (1992) Japan’s Response to the Gorbachev Era, 1985–1991: A Rising Superpower Views a Declining One, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Rozman, G. (ed) (2000) Japan and Russia: The Tortuous Path to Normalization, New York: St. Martin’s Press. Rozman, G. (2001) ‘Japan’s Images of China in the 1990s: Are They Ready for China’s “Smile Diplomacy” or Bush’s “Strong Diplomacy”?’, Japanese Journal of Political Science, 2(1): 97–125. Rozman, G. (2002) ‘A Chance for a Breakthrough in Russo-Japanese Relations: Will the Logic of Great Power Relations Prevail?’, Pacific Review, 15(3): 325–57. Rozman, G. (ed) (2012) East Asian National Identities: Common Roots and Chinese Exceptionalism, Washington, DC and Stanford, CA: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press. Rozman, G. (ed) (2013) National Identities and Bilateral Relations: Widening Gaps in East Asia and Chinese Demonization of the United States, Washington, DC and Stanford, CA: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press. Rozman, G. (2014) ‘Japan’s National Identity Gaps: A Framework for Analysis of Relations in Asia’, in G. Rozman (ed), Joint U.S.–Korea Academic Studies: Asia’s Slippery Slope: Triangular Tensions, Identity Gaps, Conflicting Regionalism, and Diplomatic Impasse toward North Korea, Washington, DC: Korea Economic Institute. Rozman, G. (2015a) ‘Realism vs. Revisionism in Abe’s Foreign Policy in 2014’, The Asan Forum, 3(1). Rozman, G. (ed) (2015b) Asia’s Alliance Triangle: U.S.–Japan–South Korea Relations at a Tumultuous Time, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Rozman, G. (ed) (2016) Japan–Russia Relations: Implications for the U.S.–Japan Alliance, Washington, DC: Sasakawa USA. Smith, S. (2015) Intimate Rivals: Japanese Domestic Politics and a Rising China, New York: Columbia University Press. Togo, K. (2010) Japan’s Foreign Policy, 1945–2009: The Quest for a Proactive Foreign Policy, 3rd edn, Leiden: Brill. Togo, K. (2012) ‘Japanese National Identity: Evolution and Prospects’, in G. Rozman (ed), East Asian National Identities. Washington, DC and Stanford, CA: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press, pp. 147–68. Wan, M. (2006) Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic, and Transformation, Washington, DC and Stanford, CA: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press. Wan, M. (2013) ‘National Identities and Sino-Japanese Relations’, in G. Rozman (ed), National Identities and Bilateral Relations. Washington, DC and Stanford, CA: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press, pp. 65–93.

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2 Japan’s 2015 security legislation Change rooted firmly in continuity Jeffrey W. Hornung

Since Shinz o Abe returned as Japan’s premier in December 2012, he has actively advocated that Japan become a “proactive contributor to peace” (Government of Japan 2013b). One of the main pillars of this has been a package of security legislation meant to both enhance Japan’s security as well as enable Japan to make more proactive contributions to peace in the region and international community. On September 18, 2015, the Diet approved this package. Despite over 200 hours of deliberation, the full scope of the legislation, both its substance and impact, is not well understood. This is particularly true regarding what Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) are now legally able to do in regards to exercising collective self-defense. Public opinion was equally split. Those critical of the legislation saw it as proof that Japan abandoned pacifism by adopting “war bills” (sens o h oan) that will drag Japan into foreign wars, particularly those started by the US (Obe 2015; Soble 2015a, 2015b; McCurry 2015). A slightly different version of this stance saw the bills as further evidence that Japan is throwing off its postWorld War II shackles and remilitarizing (Anon 2015a, 2015b, 2015c; McDermott 2015). A supportive interpretation of the legislation, on the other hand, viewed it as an important step to strengthen Japan’s domestic legal framework to improve security cooperation with the US and help Japan more effectively respond to regional security challenges (Lind 2016; Mori 2015; Watanabe 2015). This chapter attempts to provide better clarity by exploring the drivers, substance, and implications of this watershed legislative package. It argues that while the legislation is significant, it does not amount to radical change in Japanese security policies. Instead, it amounts to incremental change because the legislation remains firmly rooted in continuity. After presenting three normative concepts that act as parameters within which debates over Japanese security policies take place, I introduce the contents of the security legislation and a summary of its background. Then, I outline aspects of the legislation that are different from and continuous with precedent. I close by addressing the broader question of why change in Japanese security policies occurs within unchanging parameters.

Security framework It is critical to begin a discussion on the legislation by contextualizing the parameters within which Japanese security policies take place. This security framework consists of three main 22

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normative pillars with legal importance: Article Nine of Japan’s constitution, the prohibition on integration with the use of force (buryoku k oshi to no ittaika), and a principle called senshu b oei (exclusive defense-orientation). The First Pillar is Article Nine of Japan’s constitution, considered the “peace article” given that it renounces both war as a sovereign right and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes and declares “war potential” will never be maintained. Opponents of the establishment of the SDF in 1954 argued that its existence violated the prohibition against “war potential.” The government, however, argued that Japan, as an independent state, had the constitutional right to possess the SDF as long as it remained self-defensive in nature (House of Councillors 1954a). Article Nine, the government argued, recognizes this right (House of Representatives 1954). The government therefore interpreted the intent of Article Nine as renouncing aggressive war, not defensive war. This meant Japan could possess a force to engage in defensive warfare, reflecting its right of individual self-defense enshrined in the UN Charter. This defensive focus was reinforced by not naming the SDF a military. Instead, it was (and still is) called the Self-Defense Forces. This led to the avoidance of military terminology, such as using Ground, Air, and Maritime SDF instead of army, air force, and navy. The Second Pillar, though derivative of the First Pillar, is the prohibition on being directly integrated with the use of force (buryoku k oshi to no ittaika). According to the government, the SDF cannot engage in actions that could directly integrate it with the use of force, except in the case of individual self-defense. The objective is for Japan to avoid being seen as carrying out the “use of force” which is not permitted under Article Nine, except under three strict conditions (discussed below). Under the government’s interpretation, even logistical support, which by itself does not constitute the use of force, including supply, transportation, and medical services, could be deemed to violate the prohibition if that support forms an integral part of the use of force by other countries to which the support is provided (Advisory Panel 2014: 35). This concept is “based on a strict view that errs on the side of caution with regard to new activities” (Advisory Panel 2014: 35). The Third Pillar, also derivative of the First Pillar, a principle called senshu b oei, or exclusive defense-orientation, was first introduced in parliamentary debate in July 1955 by Japan Defense Agency (predecessor to today’s Ministry of Defense) Director General Arata Sugihara in questions about Japan’s defense plans and purpose of the SDF when he answered that the SDF is “exclusively for defense, until the very end, defense” (House of Representatives 1955). In the following years, despite the lack of an official definition or further elaboration, it became visible in policies that eschewed major rearmament. The May 1957 Basic Policy for National Defense, for example, stated the government would establish defense capabilities “within the limits required for self-defense” (Government of Japan 2013a: 313). Senshu b oei was officially defined as a principle underlying Japan’s defense policies in the October 1970 inaugural publication of the JDA’s Defense of Japan White Paper (B oei Ch o 1970). The principle is reflected in decisions about the size and quality of defense power, weapons, force posture, and type of reaction by the SDF if Japan were attacked. Everything is limited to the minimum necessary for self-defense. Based on the assumption that Japan would rely on the US to repel full-scale attacks, it was considered sufficient for the SDF to build up capabilities exclusively focused on defending Japan (i.e. a shield) (Tatsumi 2007: 25). Governments have made clear delineations between the SDF and “war potential,” arguing that Japan has a right to maintain and use the “minimum necessary level” for self-defense but not capabilities that exceed a “minimum necessary level” (which would be considered “war potential”) (Asagumo Shimbunsha 2014: 613). This foundational normative argument was laid down by the Shigeru Yoshida government and subsequently became a mainstay in Japanese security debates. First used by the Cabinet 23

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Legislation Bureau (CLB) Director General Tatsuo Sat o during debates on the establishment of the SDF (House of Councillors 1954b), it has subsequently been used whenever questions are raised on SDF capabilities, use, or constitutionality. These three pillars—Article Nine, buryoku k oshi to no ittaika, and senshu b oei—form the framework within which all security debates occur. They are all related to one another, as the Second and Third Pillars are derivatives of the First. Within these parameters, Japanese governments establish laws/policies that constrain what Japan can do in the security realm. As shown below, deliberations on the security legislation stay within these parameters. Over time, particularly after the Cold War, these parameters have come under stress. Still, Tokyo consistently pursues revisions or reinterpretations of laws within the parameters set by these three pillars. The consequence is incremental, sometimes very minor, change in security policies.

Security legislation Following roughly a year of deliberations on an Advisory Panel’s report between the ruling coalition members, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Komeit o, Abe issued a Cabinet Decision on May 14, 2015 to pass security legislation and submitted it to the Diet for consideration the next day (Abe 2015). The objective of the bills was to secure Japan’s peace and integrity and enable Japan to make greater contributions to international peace and stability (Akiyama 2015). The bills were greeted with controversy given that they touched on issues pertaining to the SDF’s exercise of collective self-defense. Although seen as a constitutional right granted by Article Fifty-One of the UN Charter, all previous Japanese governments had interpreted that Japan was prohibited from exercising this right due to Article Nine. Understanding that enabling collective self-defense set him on a collision course with standing constitutional interpretation, Abe reinterpreted the government’s position—rather than revise the constitution—in order to allow Japan to exercise its right to collective self-defense. Following this reinterpretation, and 216 hours and 38 minutes of deliberation in both houses of the Diet, the bills passed on September 18, 2015 to become law (Nakauchi, Yokoyama and Kohiyama 2015: 1).1 On March 29, 2016, the law went into effect. The security legislation is often construed as simply being about collective self-defense. In actuality, it consists of two laws which, in turn, are made up of eleven separate laws. The “Bill for Development of Legislation for Peace and Security” revises ten existing laws. The other is called the “International Peace Support Law,” a new law—rather than a revision—that allows the SDF to provide logistical support to other forces engaged in missions working to eliminate threats to peace and security of the international community. A summary of these laws is provided in Table 2.1.

Background The security legislation was the culmination of multiple years of work by two Abe administrations. During Abe’s first time as premier, he established an Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security in May 2007. Abe gave the thirteen-member panel, chaired by former Ambassador to the US Shunji Yanai, the task of researching how to better align Japan’s constitutional constraints on the ability to exercise the right to collective self-defense with the growing range of new security challenges. Their objective was to examine what measures needed to be taken for Japan to respond effectively to a situation in which a response required recourse to collective self-defense. They did this through the examination of four cases.2 The Panel discussed what Japan should do in order to respond to these situations effectively; whether such policies can 24

 Enables the rescue of Japanese nationals overseas  Enables the protection of weapons/other equipment of US, armed forces of other countries and similar organizations that are engaged in activities that contribute to Japan’s defense  Expands situations where supplies/services can be provided to the US military, including peacetime activities  Establishes provisions for punishment of those who commit crimes overseas  Expands feasible operations for the SDF on operations like UN PKOs (i.e. “rush and protect” of local population or military personnel of another country involved in the PKO operation) even if the SDF itself is not under attack or located in close proximity  Revises weapon-use standards necessary for operations to align closer to UN standards  Enables the SDF’s participation in internationally coordinated peace and security operations (multinational cooperation outside of the UN PKO framework)  Replaces the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan (SIAS-J)  Reviews the regulation’s objective in order to clarify the purpose of the reform, such as providing necessary logistical support to the US and other countries’ militaries in situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security  Adds the provision of logistical support activities for foreign countries’ militaries (i.e. not the US) conducting operations contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the US–Japan Security Treaty  Expands the scope of logistics support  Eliminates distinction between combat and non-combat zones, which enables the SDF to provide close-range-logistics support to nations not engaged in combat (but retains restriction on the SDF being allowed to conduct activities in areas where combat is occurring)

自衛隊法

国際連合平和維持活動等 に対する協力に関する 法律

重要影響事態に際して我が 国の平和及び安全を確 保するための措置に関 する法律

Self-Defense Forces Law

Act on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations

Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security

(Continued )

Important revisions

Japanese name

English name

Table 2.1 Bill for Development of Legislation for Peace and Security (平和安全法制整備法): package of ten laws

 Applies POW Law to survival crisis situations

 Enforces maritime transport regulations during survival crisis situations

 Extends the coordination of use of designated public facilities to foreign militaries (i.e. not the US) engaged in activities during an armed attack situation

 Sets up the procedures, definition, and naming of armed attack situations against a foreign country that results in threatening Japan’s survival  Stipulates the SDF’s mission and mandate for the “use of force” permitted under the “Thee New Conditions”  Stipulates procedures for the “use of force” permitted under the “Three New Conditions”  In addition to the US military responding to armed attack situations and others, adds support activities for foreign militaries (i.e. not the US) responding to armed attack situations and for the US and foreign militaries in survival crisis situations

武力攻撃事態等における我 が国の平和と独立並び に国及び国民の安全の 確保に関する法律

Law for Ensuring Peace and Independence of Japan and Security of the State and the People in Situations including Where an Armed Attack against Japan Occurs

Law Concerning the Measures 武力攻撃事態等におけるア Conducted by the Government メリカ合衆国の米軍の in Line with US Military Actions 行動に伴い我が国実施 in Situations Including Where an する措置に関する法律 Armed Attack Situations Against Japan Occurs Law Concerning the Use of Specific 武力攻撃事態等における特 Public Facilities and Others in 定公共施設の利用に関 Situations including Where an する法律 Armed Attack Against Japan Occurs Law Concerning the Restriction of 武力攻撃事態における外国 Maritime Transportation of 軍用品等の海上輸送の Foreign Military Supplies and 規制に関する法律 Others in Armed Attack Situations Law Concerning the Treatment of 武力攻撃事態における捕虜 Prisoners of War and Other 等の取扱いに関する法律 Detainees in Armed Attack Situations

 Enables consent-based ship-inspection operations in foreign territories for the purpose of ensuring international peace and security in response to the International Peace Support Law

周辺事態に際して実施する 船舶検査活動に関する 法律

Law Concerning Ship Inspection Operations in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan

Laws related to the Armed Attack Law

Important revisions

Japanese name

English name

Table 2.1 (continued )

 Arranges for deliberation on new matters, such as responses to survival crisis situations, important influence situations, and international peace cooperative response situations  Defines matters that must be deliberated

国家安全保障会議設置法

New Law 国際平和共同対処事態に際 して我が国が実施する 諸外国の軍隊等に対す る協力支援活動に関す る法律

Act for Establishment of the National Security Council

Law Concerning Cooperation and Support Activities and Other Activities to Armed Forces, of Foreign Countries and Others, in Situations Where the International Community is Collectively Addressing for Peace and Security

 Source: Government of Japan (2015b); Ministry of Defense Official A and Hornung (2016); Government of Japan (2015a: 139–52); Government of Japan (2016: 208–27); Naikaku Kanbo et al. (N.D.)

 Enables the provision of support activities to armed forces of foreign countries collectively responding to a situation that threatens international peace and security

Important revisions

Japanese name

English name

Table 2.1 (continued )

Jeffrey W. Hornung

be implemented based on standing government legal interpretations, including its constitutional interpretation; what restrictions exist that hinder policy implementation; and what measures can be taken to resolve such legal issues with a view to ensuring Japan’s security (Advisory Panel 2014: 1). The Panel submitted its report in June 2008, concluding that it had become difficult to respond appropriately to important issues that arise in the contemporary security environment given the current government interpretation. As such, because of these situations in which it would not be possible to respond by the exercise of individual self-defense and the lawenforcement powers permitted under existing legislation, changes to the government’s constitutional interpretation were required to permit the exercise of the right to collective self-defense and participation in collective security measures (Advisory Panel 2008).3 The Panel’s findings did not result in change. Abe’s faced resistance from within his own coalition. Not only was the LDP’s coalition partner Komeit o broadly opposed to the exercise of collective self-defense, members of his LDP were split on how best to achieve it. Abe also faced the reality of a populace not ready for change. Having campaigned on a platform that included an appeal for constitutional revision in the July 2007 House of Councillors election, Abe was seen as responsible for leading his LDP to losing control in that House for the first time in fifty-two years. This resulted in Abe abruptly leaving office on September 26, 2007. Although the report was submitted to his successor, Yasuo Fukuda, in June 2008, little came of this for reasons that include Fukuda’s preoccupation with domestic political and economic problems, scandals at the Ministry of Defense, and using political capital to maintain the Maritime SDF mission in the Indian Ocean as well as the fact that he did not share Abe’s interest in security issues nor have the political base in the LDP to push such issues (Hughes 2009: 127; Ministry of Defense Official C 2016a). In subsequent years, Japan saw an annual turnover of premiers until 2012, when Abe returned. During this time, no premier took it upon himself to act on the Panel’s findings. Nor did the LDP attempt to revive the issue, as evident in it receiving scant attention in campaign manifestos ( Jimint o 2010: 33, 2012a: 21).4 Within a few short months of Abe’s return, however, he reconvened the Panel. All thirteen previous Panel members returned—plus Keio University Professor Yuichi Hosoya—and then International University of Japan President, Shinichi Kitaoka, replaced Yanai as Acting Chair (Hosoya 2016).5 Abe once again instructed the Panel to reexamine the legal basis for security and what Japan should do to maintain its own peace and security, but this time he asked them to take into consideration the range of new security scenarios facing Japan since the Panel last convened in 2008 (Government of Japan 2015a: 139). The Panel submitted its report in May 2014. It argued that due to the speed and scale of changes to Japan’s security environment, the country now faced a situation where adequate responses to maintain Japan’s peace and security can no longer be taken under the current interpretation of the constitution (Advisory Panel 2014: 8). As such, similar to the 2008 report, the Panel concluded that the constitution needed reinterpretation to enable Japan to exercise both full collective self-defense and engage in collective security, in addition to its current right to exercise individual self-defense. Specifically, the Panel argued that Japan should be able to participate in collective self-defense operations to repel an attack against a state, using force to the minimum extent necessary, if three requirements are fulfilled: 1) If a state with which Japan has close ties comes under attack; 2) if that attack has the potential to significantly impact Japan’s security; and 3) if Japan obtains an explicit request or consent from that state (Advisory Panel 2014: 29–30). With the Panel’s recommendations in hand, Abe faced Japan’s legislative process. This meant submitting his intentions to his coalition, the government, and the Diet. In this effort, Abe faced three critical actors in the deliberation process: the LDP, Komeit o, and the bureaucratic 28

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organization called the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB). Importantly, while the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and other smaller parties opposed Abe’s efforts, they proved incapable of mounting any serious challenge or impact the legislative process in any consequential way.

Liberal Democratic Party Although some LDP members disagreed with the Panel’s proposals on the grounds that they advocated constitutional revision of Article Nine as a necessary prior step to support full-fledged collective self-defense, there was little opposition within the LDP to Abe. Instead, the Panel’s recommendations split the LDP into two camps based on procedure and scope. One camp was Abe’s, which was spearheaded by Abe and LDP Vice President Masahiko K omura. The second was led by former Defense Minister, and Secretary General for the LDP, Shigeru Ishiba. Although both Abe and Ishiba initially agreed with the Panel’s recommendations, they found themselves at odds over two critical points. Both men agreed the government has the ability to enable the exercise of collective selfdefense via reinterpretation of Article Nine rather than revision. After Abe became premier, Ishiba continued to advocate for the full exercise of collective self-defense because he did not want to limit its usage by mandate; rather, he wanted the Diet to determine its parameters (Liberal Democratic Party Members’ Staff and Hornung 2016). Abe disagreed because he felt that politically he could not push ahead with the Panel’s full recommendations. He was concerned that overwhelming public opposition, whipped up by a media that was predisposed to challenge the legislation, would make his efforts difficult if he promoted the full exercise of collective self-defense. This was particularly concerning when Abe considered the difficulty in obtaining Komeit o’s support. Considering this, Abe decided to advocate a more legally limiting set of bills and took a position more moderate than that which the Panel recommended to avoid the impression that his government was bent on pursuing hawkish policies (Ministry of Defense Official C 2016a). A second point of contention had to do with procedure. Ishiba led a group of LDP members that wanted to establish a National Security Basic law. The Basic Law was intended to be a law to stipulate the basic principles of Japan’s defense policy to allow the government to avoid relying on special legislation every time it wanted to dispatch the SDF (Liberal Democratic Party Members’ Staff and Hornung 2016). This meant first stipulating basic policies of security, responsibilities of the central and local governments, responsibilities of Japanese nationals and the Diet, and SDF roles ( Jimint o 2012b). Only after this Basic Law was developed, would individual laws (like the security legislation) be drafted: in other words, a two-step process. It was not a new idea. While still in opposition, in July 2012 the LDP prepared such a bill, spearheaded by Ishiba, and included it in its 2012 campaign manifesto. It was never submitted to the Diet, however. The idea was still popular in the LDP after Abe became premier (Liberal Democratic Party Members’ Staff and Hornung 2016). Regardless of what Abe felt about the Basic Law when in opposition, he disagreed with the Basic Law in 2013. His disagreement, however, was once again based on politics. Abe saw the two-step legislative process as too time-consuming; it would deprive him of too much political capital and therefore be difficult to pass (Liberal Democratic Party Members’ Staff and Hornung 2016; Ministry of Defense Official C 2016a). Because he expected public opposition, the more he could shorten the process, the less damage it would do politically. This led him to rely on a Cabinet Decision to announce his basic position and reinterpretation of Article Nine instead of the lengthy process of Diet deliberation over a Basic Law, to be followed by developing individual laws for deliberation in the Diet. 29

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Komeito Abe faced a more serious challenge from Komeit o, a party that characterizes itself as a peace party. Worrying that the public had no interest in loosening Japan’s security laws, Komeit o feared it would be impossible to persuade its constituents to agree to any drastic security policy changes (Ministry of Defense Official C and Hornung 2016b). Abe shared their concern that a full exercise of collective self-defense would not be tolerated by the public, but he disagreed on how far to narrow its scope. Abe’s interest was to reinterpret the constitution to allow collective selfdefense but do so in a way that would gain Komeit o’s support. Komeit o sought to keep hard brakes on Abe’s efforts to avoid moving too fast, too far. Abe’s coalition examined fifteen specific scenarios divided into three fields that would need reinterpretation of the government’s stance on collective self-defense (Komeit o N.D.). Given the wide spectrum of possible missions examined, it was not unexpected that intra-coalition deliberations became challenging, particularly with Komeit o making efforts to drag out negotiations and use the LDP’s past logic against it in an attempt to kill the efforts (Hughes 2015: 50–2).

Cabinet Legislation Bureau A third critical actor in the deliberation process was the CLB, an advisory organ that provides legal opinions for the premier and his Cabinet and helps defend Cabinet legislation through Diet deliberations. Its officials have a “disproportionate, if not always decisive, voice in interpreting Article Nine” (Samuels 2004: 1). As such, it is the primary bureaucratic organization responsible for maintaining consistency in Japan’s legal interpretations, including defense issues. According to Richard Samuels, CLB officials “place a premium on consistency with past interpretations” (Samuels 2004: 3). It was therefore the actor whose support was most critical for Abe’s efforts. Initially, its main mission to maintain legal stability led the CLB to oppose these efforts. It had become ideologically inflexible. For the entire postwar period it has explained to the public that the exercise of the right of collective self-defense is unconstitutional. Abe’s efforts challenged this legal argument. Abe was able to blunt some of the CLB’s resistance by appointing Ichir o Komatsu, who was known to be an advocate of collective self-defense, as CLB Director General, pushing the CLB toward compromise from within.6 Still, Abe knew that this was not enough—because the CLB bureaucracy led by Deputy Director General Yusuke Yokobatake was not as supportive—and that he would have to limit his ambitions to get the CLB’s support and help to guide the bills through Diet deliberations (Ministry of Defense Official C and Hornung 2016b). This became particularly pertinent after Komatsu died in June 2014 and Yokobatake became the Director General. Abe could not ignore the opposition from Komeit o and the CLB. While neither the CLB nor Komeit o were successful in killing the bills, they proved to be the most consequential actors to influence the pre-Diet outcome that was issued as a Cabinet Decision on July 1, 2014 (Government of Japan 2014). In practice, Komeit o and the CLB were closely aligned in opposing full exercise of collective self-defense. They agreed on the need to limit the conditions for its exercise and held heated debates with K omura on what a compromise would look like. While Komeit o and the CLB advocated very specific or technical wording to strictly limit the conditions under which the SDF could exercise collective self-defense, K omura pushed to make the wording vague (Ministry of Defense Official C and Hornung 2016b). As Christopher Hughes details, Komeit o proved pivotal in changing important wording to rein in the application of collective self-defense. This included stating that the exercise of collective self-defense would be 30

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for states in a close relationship with Japan and the justification of utilizing collective self-defense when there is a “clear danger” to Japan (Hughes 2015: 53). Importantly, it also led to shelving the option of collective security in the final Cabinet decision. Significantly, Komeit o and the CLB had a direct hand in revising conditions on the use of force that date back to 1972 (discussed below). With New Conditions agreed upon, Abe issued the July Cabinet Decision and the LDP and Komeit o began the arduous task of revising the necessary domestic legislation required to make the proposed changes legally possible.

Opposition parties During the pre-Diet stage, Japan’s opposition parties had no effect on coalition deliberations. Significantly, however, they were equally unable to impact the legislation once it was submitted to the Diet. In previous cases of deliberating policies that promised to result in some degree of change in Japan’s security activities, opposition parties were able to affect the outcome despite lacking the legislative seats to block the government’s efforts. In 2015, however, the opposition parties, spearheaded by the DPJ, never posed a serious challenge. This is because instead of pushing the government toward limiting conditions or searching for workable compromises to address the security challenges facing Japan, the DPJ fell into a pattern of former Japan Socialist Party tactics of opposition-for-the-sake-of opposition. Although initially members like Akihisa Nagashima attempted to criticize Abe’s efforts by presenting alternatives, the DPJ’s more liberal wing successfully changed the party’s strategy toward outright opposition and allied with the Students Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy (SEALDs). Instead of relying on ideological debates, however, the party relied on legal arguments and distortions of fact about threats to Japan’s constitution. DPJ members rarely debated whether the proposed legislation was actually in Japan’s national interest or whether it would strengthen Japan’s security (Tatsumi 2015). Instead, the party “zeroed in relentlessly on abstruse technicalities without proposing viable alternatives and avoided any discussion of the larger strategic issues at stake” (Mori 2015). Taking advantage of opposition by constitutional scholars who testified before the Diet and fanning the public’s anxiety about war (Kotani 2015), its approach settled on framing the entire suite of bills as “war bills” (sens o h oan) and narrowly focused on the issue of collective self-defense. This approach proved ineffective. It is ironic that the principal political actors moderating Abe’s security legislation were the LDP’s own coalition partner and a government agency. The failure of the opposition parties to have any consequence on deliberations is still surprising given that there was much public opposition from which to draw. Polls showed the public both opposed the bills and did not understand their contents. There were also rallies outside the Diet building, led by SEALDs. A group of constitutional lawyers and political scientists even wanted to take Abe to court (Anon 2015d). This public opposition was essentially co-opted by the government, however, through its concern about public opinion. Abe was careful not to openly transgress the public’s anti-militaristic views by never pushing for full exercise of collective self-defense and showing his willingness to accept conditions to restrict the legislation’s scope.

Comparable legislative deliberations This was not the first time Japan had deliberated potentially explosive security policies. Ever since governments began tinkering with security policies after the end of the Cold War, debates over new SDF missions have elicited contentious political discussions, particularly within the ruling coalition. Importantly, like the 2014–15 deliberations, compromise legislation often 31

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emerged after the government agreed to impose upon itself limiting conditions to keep the policies firmly within the parameters of the Three Pillars. A few notable examples include the following. 







After Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, Toshiki Kaifu pursued a number of options to contribute to the multinational force (Hornung 2009: 131–200). Indicative of the strength of the Second and Third Pillars, Kaifu articulated the doctrine of prohibiting logistics support activities that would involve direct integration with the use of force and imposed restrictions on weaponry and their use for the SDF participating in UN-sanctioned peacekeeping missions (Hornung and Mochizuki 2016: 97). These attempts, however, were thwarted because of strong opposition within the LDP, Japan Socialist Party, and public opinion to SDF dispatch to assist in a war, regardless of whether it was UN-mandated or not, as it exceeded the scope of strict self-defense (Third Pillar) and therefore violated Article Nine (First Pillar). Kaifu eventually dispatched minesweepers after hostilities ended, thereby avoiding conflict with constitutional issues. Although Kiichi Miyazawa successfully passed the Peacekeeping Operations Cooperation Law in 1992, lingering hesitancy among the LDP, opposition parties, and public to dispatching the SDF overseas and possible involvement in foreign wars and becoming one with the use of force (Second Pillar) led him to attach five principles to all peacekeeping operations (PKOs) and freeze SDF participation in “core” PKO missions, such as ceasefire monitoring or patrolling (Government of Japan 1997).7 These five principles tightly restrict any SDF dispatch to a peacetime operation and ones focused on logistics or reconstruction. As indicative of the strength of the Third Pillar, while force is allowed, it is only permitted for one’s self-defense and for protection of those under SDF control. The Anti-Terror Special Measures Law, passed in 2001, established a legal framework for the SDF to provide logistical refueling to the US and other coalition forces fighting in Afghanistan. Both coalition and DPJ opposition to the legislation focused on the connectivity between providing fuel to forces engaged in combat with that of collective selfdefense, arguing that such provision was unconstitutional because it made the SDF one with the use of force (Second Pillar). To avoid these criticisms, and avoid possible conflict with Article Nine (First Pillar), then premier Junichiro Koizumi was forced to draw on the preamble of the constitution and tie the legislation to UN resolutions. The Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance, passed in 2003, established a legal framework for the SDF to provide reconstruction and logistical support for US and coalition forces fighting Saddam Hussein-regime forces. Opposition to the legislation within the LDP and other parties, including Komeit o, forced Koizumi to continuously struggle to distinguish between combat and non-combat zones and restrict the SDF to non-combat zones (Second Pillar) (Hornung 2009: 237–57). He also chose to have the SDF protected by other coalition forces so as to not violate Article Nine (First Pillar).

All of these missions were deliberated within the same Three Pillars that set the parameters for debate. As evident above, opposition to the legislation resulted in restrictions and/or conditions in order to gain its passage. Yet all were driven by external events, be they threats or gaiatsu (external pressure), to which Japanese governments felt compelled to respond. The 2015 security legislation differs in that the government was not responding to a specific event. Instead, it was a

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proactive attempt to review Japan’s security architecture to overcome known deficiencies in Japan’s legal ability to respond to future events. In this sense, it is similar to the June 2003 National Emergency Laws (yuji h osei) passed by the Koizumi Administration as a proactive effort to review Japan’s emergency response system. The laws provided Japan with its first legal framework within which the SDF could respond to an attack on Japan. Research into emergency legislation began in the late 1970s but never advanced due to disputes between government agencies, concern about public reaction, and the decline in threats to Japan with the end of the Cold War (Hughes 2004: 73). The Aum Shinriky o sarin gas attacks in Tokyo and the Kobe earthquake, both in 1995, highlighted weaknesses in the government’s legal authority to respond to crises and unnecessary restrictions/obstacles on the SDF’s ability to respond to emergencies (Samuels 2007: 100). Concerned that the government was not legally equipped to handle the new range of security threats, policymakers felt compelled to reboot the 1970s efforts. The September 2001 terrorist attacks in the US and the December 2001 incursion of North Korean spy ships into Japanese waters helped the public understand the need for a better emergency response system. Submitted to the Diet in April 2002, the set of three bills faced numerous challenges from within the LDP and Komeit o as well as opposition parties. Accused of touching on issues of collective self-defense and becoming one with the use of force, violating Article Nine, and being vague enough for any prime minister to mobilize the SDF in any scenario—even domestically—the LDP-led government attached numerous conditions as compromises to clarify SDF dispatch rules and ensure civilian rights in times of emergencies, particularly if special powers are conferred upon the prime minister. They passed in June 2003 with the support of the coalition, the DPJ, and the smaller Liberal Party.

What changes? The 2015 legislation is important in the fact that it eases restrictions on some SDF operations and therefore provides greater flexibility and responsiveness for different situations. This includes, but is not limited to, the exercise of collective self-defense. To understand the legislation’s full scope, it is important to highlight the significant aspects that are considered new.

Removes geographical boundaries to bilateral defense cooperation The 1999 SIAS-J Law effectively limited cooperation to an undefined “areas surrounding Japan.” Because the 2015 legislation redefines this to situations (i.e. situations that affect Japan’s peace and stability), the SDF can legally support close allies and partners anywhere in the world, if a situation gravely affects Japan’s security. In so doing, it means that the SDF can assist in overseas situations where there are emerging threats to peace that may have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security.

Enables the exercise of collective self-defense The changes in collective-self-defense interpretation means the SDF can come to the aid of the US and other friendly nations if an attack is initiated against them but not against Japan. Yet, as noted above, Komeit o and the CLB successfully attached conditions on the exercise of this right as it relates to the use of force. These New Conditions are: 1) Japan comes under armed attack or another nation with which Japan has a close relationship comes under attack and a clear danger exists that the survival of Japan is threatened and the right of the Japanese people to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness could be fundamentally overthrown; 2) there are no other

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appropriate means to protect the people and ensure Japan’s survival and eliminate the threat; and 3) no more than the necessary minimum level of force is used (Naikaku 2014: 7).

Authorizes SDF support to non-US military personnel The legislation opens up SDF support in a host of new areas, including being able to “rush and protect” other forces engaged in UN PKOs or provide greater logistical support to countries addressing a situation threatening international peace and security. This includes provision of SDF ammunition or fuel to non-US forces. Previously, only transportation of ammunition was authorized. It is important to note, however, that the SDF is allowed to use “weapons” but not “force” in a PKO. If a combat situation happens in a PKO, it triggers the withdrawal of the SDF because it collapses the five principles for SDF participation. It means if a ceasefire agreement between combating parties is broken, Japanese support must be temporarily suspended or terminated. The legislation allows the SDF to protect military equipment of other countries in peacetime as well as situations threatening Japan’s survival. In the latter, it would fall under the notion of collective selfdefense. It is important to note, however, that peacetime protection applies to foreign militaries engaged in an operation with the SDF which contributes to the defense of Japan, but it cannot exceed the use of “weapons” to become the “use of force.” The other protection under the situation of threatening Japan’s survival must meet the New Conditions.

Expands responsibility within alliance framework According to the new legislation, the SDF can protect weapons and equipment of the US military similar to that stated above; and because of the elimination of the rigid distinction between combat and non-combat zones, the SDF can provide closer-range support, including the provision of SDF ammunition or fuel to US forces. As stated above, previously only transportation was authorized in terms of ammunition. With each of these, however, conditions apply. In sum, the legislation widens and deepens the scope of its operations with the US.

What doesn’t change? The narrative surrounding the legislation has focused largely on these changes. Without contextualization of the legislation, Abe’s changes are seen in a vacuum, which leads to an exaggerated interpretation of the scale of change. While the changes brought on by the security legislation are important, the “new” in the legislation is extremely limiting. The SDF can conduct new missions, engage in broader sets of operations, and assist troops from other countries, but still under limiting conditions. Two critical things the security legislation did not change are worth noting.

Conditions on using force Consistent with previous policy, Japan can use force if it is under armed attack. Despite Japan’s new ability to use force even if it is not directly attacked, it still cannot use force unless its survival is threatened, and even then, it is only able to use the minimum amount necessary. As mentioned above, until 2015, Japanese governments maintained three specific conditions that must apply before the SDF can use force for self-defense. These “Old Conditions,” which originate from a 1972 government opinion that referenced both the Constitution’s Preamble and Article Thirteen (Advisory Panel 2014: 6) and did not recognize the right to collective self-defense, are: 1) there has been an imminent and illegitimate act of aggression against Japan which threatens the Japanese 34

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people’s right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; 2) no other appropriate means exist to deal with this aggression; and 3) the use of force is limited to the necessary minimum (Asagumo Shimbunsha 2016: 642). Because the Advisory Panel advocated full-fledged collective self-defense, it did not promote revisions to these conditions. Yet, as stated above, because of the influence of Komeit o and the CLB, Abe could not fully embrace collective self-defense, leading him to adopt three New Conditions. Whereas the Old Conditions allowed the use of armed force only “when there is an imminent and illegitimate act of aggression against Japan,” the New Conditions enable Japan to use force when another country is attacked, although Japan must have a close relationship with that country. In other words, the New Conditions merely replace one of the Old Conditions. But even here, an attack must still threaten Japan’s survival—consistent with previous government policy—by making it a matter of self-defense. And even when this condition is met, the other two conditions—consistent with previous policy—must be met. All this is to say that although the ability to come to the aid of a third country is new, Abe’s changes do not fundamentally change the conditions for using force, since force will only be initiated if Japan is threatened, thereby preserving Japan’s exclusive self-defense orientation. And even when it is initiated, the response will remain constrained (Government of Japan 2014). During Abe’s efforts leading up to his July 1, 2014 statement on enabling the exercise of the right to collective self-defense, CLB Director General Komatsu emphasized the same arguments of the “minimum necessary level” that were repeated ad nauseam by all his predecessors since Sat o first introduced the argument (House of Councillors 2013, 2014; House of Representatives 2014). In other words, conditions limiting the use of force for self-defense activities remain intact. Additional to this, Abe and Cabinet members referred to specific operations that will further impose restrictions on what should otherwise be a political choice. For example, Abe stated that the SDF will not be utilized even under UN Security Council-mandated operations like the 1991 Gulf War (Abe 2014). Any future premier will thus be faced with specific conditions and interpretations that will limit freedom of choice. Getting around these will be difficult, as they will demand constitutional reinterpretation, revision, or “legal acrobatics” (Ministry of Defense Official B and Hornung 2016).

Role of the SDF beyond its own security Even though Japan is legally able to do more, there are important consistencies with precedent. The laws enable new roles for the SDF, but these are still limited to support activities, search and rescue operations, and other non-combat activities. The legislation does not enable the SDF to deploy to active combat operations or missions that have no bearing on Japan’s security. Related, the SDF’s use of weapons is still permitted, in principle, only for purposes of self-defense and not beyond the minimum necessary level. Importantly, while Japan can provide its own ammunition and fuel, it is still prohibited from providing weapons and cannot assist troops engaged in actual combat. In fact, despite the fact that the distinction between combat and non-combat zones is eliminated, SDF activities overseas are still confined to areas where combat is not taking place and will immediately pause or cease if that area becomes the scene of actual combat (or is anticipated to become the scene of combat) so as to avoid becoming integrated with the use of force (Government of Japan 2014). Importantly, unlike provisions under NATO, for example, the new legislation does not require Japan to act. Rather, it allows for new, albeit limited, options to use the SDF in situations where Japan’s national security is at stake. In other words, Japan retains its choice to act, which is a political choice, as the legislation does not make the alliance a mutual defense pact. 35

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Explaining change within continuity The argument provided in this chapter is that while the security legislation is significant, it amounts to less change than meets the eye due to significant continuities with precedent. Nevertheless, it represents an important evolution in Japan’s security posture within the parameters of Three Pillars of Japan’s security framework. But how do we explain this change while at the same time explaining underlying continuity? Other scholars have pointed out the trend of Japanese administrations pushing change amidst stability as an incrementalist approach. In this view, governments make a small change, establish a new precedent in this one specific area, and then apply this to other issue areas. In so doing, the public builds up a tolerance for the change as the government slowly slices away at the norms of anti-militarism that were constructed after World War II (Hughes 2004; Samuels 2007). This explanation, however, is incomplete. Why are the foundational pillars of security debates never breached? And why do some policy proposals elicit greater public opposition than others? Although it is not my purpose to explain the reasons for both change and continuity in Japan’s security policies, it is helpful to consider one possible driver behind the contradictory dynamic of change amidst continuity. Polls indicate lingering pacifist sentiment among the Japanese public that opposes war, but it is a nuanced pacifism that accepts the SDF in limited roles, thereby enabling change in some areas as long as it does not breach the Three Pillars. The public strongly opposes moves to make the SDF a normal military or take on roles that may touch on combat. For example, a May 2016 poll found that 71% of Japanese opposed revision of Article Nine to make the SDF an official military (Asahi Shimbun 2016a). This was mirrored in a March 2016 poll that found 82% opposed to revising the first paragraph of Article Nine (stating that the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right) (Yomiuri Shimbun 2016). Likewise, a June 2014 TV Asahi poll found that 54% of Japanese did not think it is necessary to deploy the SDF overseas to use force in collective self-defense (TV Asahi 2014). In fact, the public maintains a lingering concern about being involved in foreign wars. Despite all the conditions Abe attached to the legislation and efforts to convince the public that the bills would not send the SDF into combat, the public is not convinced. A May 2015 poll found that 71% of Japanese were not convinced that the legislation would prevent Japan becoming wrapped up in America’s wars (TV Asahi 2015)—similar to a June 2015 poll that found 70% felt the same way (TBS 2015). It is widely agreed that public opposition to the legislation was rooted in the fear that the legislation will lead Japan into war ( Jiji, Kyodo Staff Report 2016). At the same time, the public maintains positive views of the SDF. Not only do 69% not see the SDF as violating the constitution (Asahi Shimbun 2016b), 92.2% hold a favorable impression of the SDF (Naikaku-fu 2015a). Yet, mirroring the anti-militaristic tendencies above, the public’s acceptance of the SDF, including its responsibilities and roles, is limited to non-combat missions. For example, Cabinet Office polls indicate that the dominant public belief of the purpose of the SDF is for disaster relief (81.9% in 2015) (Naikaku-fu 2015b). This does not mean the public is ignorant of the SDF’s role in defending Japan. The same poll shows that 74.3% believe the purpose of the SDF is to maintain the country’s security. While 89.8% of the public positively value the SDF’s activities overseas (Naikaku-fu 2015c), which are non-combat in nature, only a minority (25.9%) believe that the government should actively make an effort to do more in international peace cooperation activities (Naikaku-fu 2015d). Instead, a majority (65.4%) feel the government should simply maintain what it is currently doing. When asked about what should be the focus of SDF efforts looking ahead, the public chose disaster-relief activities first

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(72.3%), maintenance of Japan’s security second (69.9%), and at a far fourth was international peace cooperation activities (35.7%) (Naikaku-fu 2015e). Taken together, the public clearly has a positive view of the SDF and all that it does internationally, as long as this does not touch on combat. It is indicative of acceptance of the SDF protecting Japan and performing non-combat missions abroad but not of broadening the SDF’s activities or having it project power. The public is fearful of actions that may heighten the danger of Japan waging another war; of becoming embroiled or entangled in others’ conflicts; and taking action that may exacerbate regional tensions and thereby heighten the risk of war (Mori 2015). This results in continued opposition to policies that may breach the Three Pillars but not necessarily those which do not. Practically speaking, it translates into the continuity of the Three Pillars but allows policymakers to make gradual change in areas that do not transgress these foundational pillars. This support for the non-combat roles of the SDF is indicative of continuing pacifism.

Conclusion Since the late 1970s, the US and Japan have made efforts to restructure alliance roles and missions. This resulted in Defense Guidelines in 1978 that were subsequently revised in 1997. Abe continued this initiative in 2015 with a new set of guidelines to update the roles and missions of the alliance as well as the security legislation in an attempt to revise what Japan can do to address an increasingly threatening regional and global security environment. While the legislation is significant in aiding the evolution of Japan’s security policies, it is far from being as radical as Abe’s critics have portrayed. Conversely, it is far more limiting than its supporters initially hoped. Instead, as outlined above, it represents a compromise. Still, with the new security legislation, Abe laid a foundation for greater use of manpower than his predecessors and expanded the scope by which Japan can “sweat” for the international community (Hornung 2009). Japan’s SDF today can legally assume a slightly larger security role in the context of the alliance and regional security, albeit under strict limitations. Make no mistake, the changes are significant, but they are not dramatic. Instead, they are minimalist and stay clearly within the confines of the Three Pillars that have guided security debates for decades.

Notes 1 2

3

4

5

Debate in the House of Representatives was held for 116 hours and 30 minutes. Debate in the House of Councillors was held for 100 hours and 8 minutes. The four cases were: (1) defense of US naval vessels on the high seas; (2) interception of a ballistic missile that might be on its way to the US; (3) use of weapons in international peace operations; and (4) logistics support for operations of other countries participating in the same UN peacekeeping operations and other activities. The report found for cases (1) and (2), the exercise of the right to collective self-defense needs to be permitted, and for cases (3) and (4), that Japan should participate in international peace missions categorized as collective security measures under UN auspices. It also argued that the constitution permits SDF personnel’s use of weapons to protect themselves, to come to the aid of geographically distant units or personnel participating in the same operations who are under attack, and to remove obstructive attempts against its missions. Collective self-defense was mentioned in both the 2010 and 2012 campaign manifestos, but the former only says that the LDP will grapple with the issue “head-on,” whereas the latter, under Abe’s leadership, explicitly states it will make possible the use of collective self-defense. Hosoya was added and Kitaoka appointed Acting Chair because the Panel was expecting one less member due to Yanai being appointed judge to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea

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6 7

(ITLOS); but because Yanai managed to handle both ITLOS and Panel duties, he never quit the Panel, resulting in fourteen members. This appointment, from MOFA, was unprecedented. It was CLB custom that the Director General be promoted from the Deputy position. The SDF may only be dispatched if the following conditions are satisfied: (1) a ceasefire must be in place; (2) the parties to the conflict must have given their consent to the operation; (3) the activities must be conducted in a strictly impartial manner; (4) participation may be suspended or terminated if any of the above conditions ceases to be satisfied; and (5) use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect life or person of the personnel.

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Hornung, J. (2009) Learning How to Sweat: Explaining the Dispatch of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces in the Gulf War and Iraq War, Washington: George Washington University. Hornung, J. and Mochizuki, M. (2016) ‘Japan: Still an Exceptional U.S. Ally’, The Washington Quarterly, 39(1) https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Spring2016_ Hornung-Mochizuki.pdf accessed 10 April 2016. Hosoya, Y. (2016) Question [email]. House of Councillors. (1954a) ‘Hearing (20 May)’, Cabinet Committee http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp ( Japanese only) accessed 3 April 2016. House of Councillors. (1954b) ‘Hearing (16 April)’, Foreign Affairs Committee http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp ( Japanese only) accessed 3 April 2016. House of Councillors. (2013) ‘Hearing (25 November)’, Finance Committee http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp ( Japanese only) accessed 5 April 2016. House of Councillors. (2014) ‘Hearing (11 March)’, Budget Committee http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp ( Japanese only) accessed 5 April 2016. House of Representatives. (1954) ‘Hearing (22 December)’, Budget Committee http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp ( Japanese only) accessed 4 April 2016. House of Representatives. (1955) ‘Hearing (9 July)’, Cabinet Committee http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp ( Japanese only) accessed 4 April 2016. House of Representatives. (2014) ‘Hearing (16 April)’, Foreign Affairs Committee http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp ( Japanese only) accessed 4 April 2016. Hughes, C. (2004) Japan’s Re-Emergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power (Adelphi Paper 368–9), Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hughes, C. (2009) Japan’s Remilitarisation, London: Routledge. Hughes, C. (2015) Japan’s Foreign and Security Policy Under the ‘Abe Doctrine’, London: Palgrave Macmillan. Jiji, Kyodo Staff Report. (2016) ‘SEALDs-Led Protests Return to Diet as Security Legislation Takes Effect’, Japan Times www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/03/29/national/politics-diplomacy/sealds-led-protestsreturn-diet-security-legislation-takes-effect/#.Vxfr7PkrK4Q accessed 18 April 2016. Jimint o. (2010) Jimin T o Seisaku Shu J-Fairu 2010 (Manifesuto) www.jimin.jp/election/results/sen_san22/ kouyaku/22_sensan/pdf/j_file2010.pdf accessed 7 November 2016. Jimint o. (2012a) Juten Seisaku 2012 http://jimin.ncss.nifty.com/pdf/seisaku_ichiban24.pdf accessed 7 November 2016. Jimint o. (2012b) Kokka Anzen Hosh o Kihon H oan (Gaiyou) www.jimin.jp/policy/policy_topics/pdf/seisaku137.pdf accessed 8 November 2016. Komeit o. (N.D.) Gure- Zo-n Jitai wo Giron www.komei.or.jp/news/detail/20140528_14078 accessed 2 January 2017. Kotani, T. (2015) ‘“SEALDs” no Genkai ha Ima no Nihon no Riberaru no Genkai’, WEDGE Infinity http://wedge.ismedia.jp/articles/-/5808?layout=b accessed 29 December 2016. Liberal Democratic Party Members’ Staff ( Japan) and Hornung, J. (2016) Interview on Security Legislation. Lind, J. (2016) ‘Japan’s Security Evolution’, Policy Analysis, 788 https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/ pubs/pdf/pa-788.pdf accessed 3 August 2016. Liu, T. (2015) ‘Shinzo Abe Slashes 7 Decades of Pacifism, Switches Japan to War Mode’, Xinhuanet http:// news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-07/16/c_134418523.htm accessed 8 May 2016. McCurry, J. (2015) ‘Japanese Soldiers Could Fight Abroad Again after Security Bill Passed’, The Guardian www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/18/japanese-soldiers-could-fight-abroad-again-after-securitybill-passed accessed 8 May 2016. McDermott, D. (2015) ‘Japanese People: Abe’s Security Legislation is “War Bills”’, CCTV http://english. cntv.cn/2015/09/17/VIDE1442502958755346.shtml accessed 8 May 2016. Ministry of Defense Official A ( Japan) and Hornung, J. (2016). Interview on Security Legislation. Ministry of Defense Official B ( Japan) and Hornung, J. (2016). Interview on Security Legislation. Ministry of Defense Official C ( Japan). (2016a) Re: Question [email]. Ministry of Defense Official C ( Japan) and Hornung, J. (2016b). Interview on Security Legislation. Mori, S. (2015) The New Security Legislation and Japanese Public Reaction, Tokyo Foundation www. tokyofoundation.org/en/articles/2015/security-legislation-and-public-reaction accessed 23 October 2016. Naikaku. (2014) Kuni no Sonritsu wo Matto Shi, Kokumin wo Mamoru tame no Kireme no nai Anzen Hosh o H osei no Seibi ni Tsuite, Naikaku-fu www.cas.go.jp/jp/gaiyou/jimu/pdf/anpohosei.pdf accessed 20 April 2016.

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Naikaku-fu. (2015a) ‘Jieitai ni Tai Suru Insh o’. Jieitai-B oei Mondai ni Kan Suru Seiron Ch osa http://survey. gov-online.go.jp/h26/h26-bouei/2-2.html accessed 28 December 2016. Naikaku-fu. (2015b) ‘Jieitai no Yakuwari to Katsud o ni Tai Suru Ishiki’. Jieitai-B oei Mondai ni Kan Suru Seiron Ch osa http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/h26/h26-bouei/2-4.html accessed 28 December 2016. Naikaku-fu. (2015c) ‘Jieitai no Kaigai de no Katsud o ni Tai Suru Hy oka’. Jieitai-B oei Mondai ni Kan Suru Seiron Ch osa http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/h26/h26-bouei/2-4.html accessed 28 December 2016. Naikaku-fu. (2015d) ‘Kokusai Heiwa Ky oryoku Katsud o he no Torikumi’. Jieitai-B oei Mondai ni Kan Suru Seiron Ch osa http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/h26/h26-bouei/2-4.html accessed 28 December 2016. Naikaku-fu. (2015e) ‘Jieitai ga Kong o Chikara wo Ireteiku Men’. Jieitai-B oei Mondai ni Kan Suru Seiron Ch osa http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/h26/h26-bouei/2-4.html accessed 28 December 2016. Naikaku Kanb o, Naikaku-fu, Gaimush o, and B oeish o. (N.D.) ‘Heiwa Anzen Housei no Gaiyou’, Cabinet Office www.cas.go.jp/jp/gaiyou/jimu/pdf/gaiyou-heiwaanzenhousei.pdf accessed 12 April 2016. Nakauchi, Y., Yokoyama, N. and Kohiyama T. (2015) ‘Heiwa Anzen H osei Kanren H oan no Kokkai Shingi’, Ripp o to Ch osa, 372 www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/annai/chousa/rippou_chousa/backnumber/ 2015pdf/20151214003.pdf accessed 16 May 2016. Obe, M. (2015) ‘Japan Parliament Approves Overseas Military Expansion’, Wall Street Journal www.wsj. com/articles/japan-parliament-approves-abe-security-bills-1442596867 accessed 6 May 2016. Samuels, R. (2004) Politics, Security Policy, and Japan’s Cabinet Legislation Bureau: Who Elected These Guys, Anyway? JPRI Working Paper, 99 www.jpri.org/publications/workingpapers/wp99.html accessed 17 December 2016. Samuels, R. (2007) Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Soble, J. (2015a) ‘Japan’s Parliament Approves Overseas Combat Role for Military’, New York Times www. nytimes.com/2015/09/19/world/asia/japan-parliament-passes-legislation-combat-role-for-military. html?_r=0 accessed 5 May 2016. Soble, J. (2015b) ‘Shinzo Abe’s Bid to Redefine Japan and Its Military Has Echoes of Family History’, New York Times www.nytimes.com/2015/08/14/world/asia/japan-military-shinzo-abe-family-history. html accessed 6 May 2016. Tatsumi, Y. (2007) ‘Self-Defense Forces Today—Beyond an Exclusively Defense-Oriented Posture?’, in Y. Tatsumi and A. Oros (eds), Japan’s New Defense Establishment: Institutions, Capabilities, and Implications, Washington, DC: Stimson Center https://stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/Japan%27s% 20New%20Defense%20Establishment.pdf accessed 3 June 2016. Tatsumi, Y. (2015) ‘Japan’s New Security Legislation: A Missed Opportunity’, The Diplomat http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/japans-new-security-legislation-a-missed-opportunity accessed 18 September 2016. TBS. (2015) ‘Sens o ni Makikomare Ron ni Tsuite’ http://news.tbs.co.jp/newsi_sp/yoron/backnumber/ 20150919/q2-4.html accessed 28 December 2016. TV Asahi. (2014) ‘Sh udan Teki Jieiken’ www.tv-asahi.co.jp/hst/poll/201406/ index.html accessed 28 December 2016. TV Asahi. (2015) ‘Anp o Seisaku’ www.tv-asahi.co.jp/hst/poll/201505/ index.html accessed 28 December 2016. Watanabe, T. (2015) The Abe Government’s Security Bills: Time for a Responsible Debate, Tokyo Foundation www.tokyofoundation.org/en/articles/2015/abe-security-bills accessed 15 October 2016. Yomiuri Shimbun. (2016) ‘2016 Nen 1-2 Gatsu Yuus o Zenkoku Seiron Ch osa’ www.yomiuri.co.jp/feature/ opinion/koumoku/20160317-OYT8T50042.html accessed 28 December 2016.

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3 Departing from the postwar regime The revision of the ‘peace constitution’ and Japan’s national identity Yongwook Ryu

Introduction Revising the so-called ‘peace constitution’ has been one of the thorniest and most controversial issues in Japanese politics. On one hand, the proponents of constitutional revision aim to ‘normalize’ (futsuka or seij  oka) Japan through amending the constitution, where ‘normalization’ entails an increased sense of national pride and an enhanced military role in international affairs. On the other hand, the opponents seek to preserve the current constitution, believing that it has been a critical factor in Japan’s postwar peace and prosperity. Few issues are more critical than constitutional revision for Japan’s national identity and its foreign and national defense policies. This chapter examines the past, the present, and the future of the issue of constitutional revision in Japan. It first reviews the major challenges to the ‘peace constitution’ in the postwar period and then analyzes the current revision initiative under Shinzo Abe. The main argument is that various revision attempts can be understood along two dimensions: nationalism and Japan’s military role in international affairs. While most revision attempts have sought to promote nationalism and greater use of force, what distinguishes the current attempt by Shinzo Abe is a strong element of historical revisionism. This chapter also assesses the possible impact of successful constitutional revision on Japan’s national identity and argues that while it may be inevitable that Japan increases its military role in international affairs given the security challenges it faces, it is dangerous and counterproductive to mix the policy rationale for enhanced national security with the ideological desire to alter the mainstream postwar historical interpretation of Japan’s past aggression. Any attempt at historical revisionism would not only accentuate war memories and the salience of unresolved historical issues, thereby increasing tensions between Japan and its neighbors, but it would also hinder Japan’s return to the international military scene as a ‘normal country,’ a key aim of revising the constitution, for the international community would have less tolerance for an unrepentant Japan carrying out military activities.

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Many lives of the ‘peace constitution’ The making of the ‘peace constitution’ was an ideologically motivated, emotionally charged, and politically delicate process. While the then prime minister of Japan, Shigeru Yoshida, deftly navigated both domestic politics and relations with the US to give life to it, conservative nationalists in Japan have long been discontented with the US-imposed constitution (Dower 1999; Welfield 1988).1 They believe that the constitution had the aim of weakening the Japanese national entity and that the pacifist clause of Article Nine is of an “anti-independent” nature (Sankei 2013: 10–12). Only by changing it, along with other aspects of the postwar regime (sengo rejiimu), they believe, can a “beautiful” Japan be constructed (Abe 2013). Consequently, they have sought to revise the constitution since its enactment in 1947 only to fail, mainly due to the stringent legal threshold: a two-thirds majority in both the lower and upper houses followed by a simple majority in a national referendum (Article 96 of the constitution) is required. While there have been various proposals and initiatives for revising the constitution in the postwar period (Winkler 2011), the following four waves of constitutional revision movement were the major ones.

The 1950s Only a few years into its existence, the 1947 ‘peace constitution’ had not yet taken firm root in Japanese society. From its establishment in 1955, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) aimed to indigenize the ‘peace constitution.’ A revision movement soon emerged with a reactionary attitude toward what was perceived as the US-imposed social structure, including the constitution. The key actors of the movement were those who had been purged from political power during the US occupation, including figures like Nobusuke Kishi. Kishi confessed his hostility toward the US and said, “I cannot deny that my fellows in the prison disputed MacArthur’s policy,” whose real aim was “to weaken the Japanese entity” (Jomaru 2011: 313). Kishi’s conception of constitutional revision is best described as the restoration of the Meiji constitution and a fundamental reform of post-occupation Japanese society to reconstruct conservative rule similar to that of the prewar era. The focus of revision was on the emperor and the pacifist clause, i.e. Article Nine. About the former, Kishi argued that the symbolic status given to the emperor was neither sufficient nor appropriate to become the backbone of the national body (kokutai). Instead, he sought to restore the emperor’s status as the head of the state. About the latter, he considered that an independent security force was necessary to end the US occupation and remove its military bases from Japan (Watanabe 2002: 215–20). However, the LDP failed to gain a two-thirds majority in both houses in the 1958 general election, when it campaigned on the issue of constitutional revision, in order to push for a revision proposal. This was so even after the amendment of the Public Office Election Law in 1956, which aimed to increase LDP seats. The failure to overcome the legal threshold for revision also reoriented the LDP’s strategy from amending to interpreting the constitution. This has remained the most prevalent means by which to accommodate an expanding national force and the security role of Japan’s de facto army, the Self-Defense Force (SDF), resulting in the uncomfortable reality of the co-existence of the pacifist clause and the SDF. In hindsight this was the period when the likelihood of constitutional revision was relatively high, as the constitution had not yet been firmly established in Japanese society, but the high legal threshold ensured the survival of the constitution. Somewhat ironically, the conservative effort to revise the constitution in this period engendered various societal movements that eventually forged a social coalition aimed at protecting the constitution, with particular focus on preserving Article Nine. The Japan Socialist Party (JSP) is an 42

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example. The JSP, which acquired and widened its political base due to its stance as constitutional protector, increased its number of seats in the Diet during this period, enabling it to become a key political actor in blocking future legislative efforts at constitutional revision. In addition, from the 1960s to the 1970s the LDP found that Japan’s pacifist foreign-policy stance could serve its national economic interests, and hence it was quite content to rely on the US–Japan alliance, while focusing national resources on socio-economic development. One can interpret this Yoshida Doctrine – relying on the US for national security, while devoting national attention and resources to socio-economic development – as the LDP’s strategy to gain stable political power in an era of rapid economic growth (Watanabe 1994: 50–1).

The 1980s It took more than twenty years from Kishi’s resignation in 1960 for the LDP to see another prime minister who would take up the conservative cause with regard to constitutional revision. It was Yasuhiro Nakasone who broke the LDP’s long silence on this issue. Based on his political slogan of “the final settlement of the postwar politics” (sengo seiji no sokessan), and serving as prime minister from 1982 to 1987, Nakasone resuscitated the debate about Japan’s ‘normalization,’ including but not limited to constitutional revision. His interest in constitutional revision dates back as early as 1961, when he wrote his own draft constitution titled “Democratic Constitution for an Advanced Democracy” (k odo minshushugi mintei kenpo soan). Nakasone was also the lead author for another draft constitution, “Revised Draft Constitution” (kenpo kaisei soan), published by the Institute for International Policy Studies in 2005. The 1961 draft located the new constitution in the historical continuity of the Meiji and current constitutions, and defined the emperor as “head of the state,” expanding the emperor’s power to the point of his being the one to announce the dispatch of the SDF. The draft also placed strong emphasis on national defense, with recognition of the right of collective self-defense and approval of participation in international peacekeeping operations (PKOs). However, the draft maintained the pacifist clause on the renunciation of war as well as the requirement of keeping the military force to the bare minimum necessary for self-defense purposes. It also distanced itself from historical revisionism by explicitly stating a strong regret for past aggression and a warning against the rise of intolerant nationalism. Despite high expectations, Nakasone’s constitutional revision could not proceed far, as the LDP once again could not get over the two-thirds-majority threshold in the Diet. In the December 1983 election for the House of Representatives, the LDP under Nakasone managed to secure only 250 seats out of 511 (approximately 49%), far below the required two-thirds majority. In the earlier, June election for the House of Councillors, while the LDP increased its seats to 137 from 135, it still failed to get over the two-thirds-majority threshold. Nakasone did not abandon his interest in constitutional revision, however, and produced the 2005 draft, which once again displayed a sense of continuity from the Meiji Constitution. Although the status of the emperor shifted from “head of the state” to “the symbol of national unity,” Nakasone never rejected the idea that the emperor was the head of the Japanese nation. And similarly, although the number of provisions on national defense decreased in the 2005 draft, defense remained a key focus (Sakurai and Abe 2006: 80).

The 1990s The catalyst for the revision movement in the 1990s came from international changes. The previous source of threat, the USSR, had significantly weakened, as the Cold War melted, and 43

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the US–Japan alliance was struggling to reinvent its existential rationale (Hughes 2009: 41). At the same time, Japan’s significant financial contribution to the coalition forces during the Gulf War of 1990–1 attracted harsh international criticism for being ‘checkbook diplomacy’ and put Japan’s national security policy based on the Yoshida Doctrine into serious doubt by revealing Japan’s inability to act as a ‘global player’ (Ryu 2007). It was in this context that the third wave of constitutional revision emerged, this time led by Ichiro Ozawa, the then LDP Secretary-General. While the likelihood of actual revision was pretty low during this period, once again due to the lack of numbers in the Diet, Ozawa’s effort to pass the United Nations Cooperation Corps Bill (unsuccessfully) and the Peacekeeping Operations Bill (successfully) engendered a serious policy debate about the need to revise the constitution and make Japan a ‘normal country,’ largely understood in its security context. Ozawa and other proponents argued that Article Nine was an obstacle to Japan’s international cooperation.2 It was in this period that the Japanese government approved the dispatch of six marine SDF soldiers to the Gulf for mine-sweeping activities (Boyd and Samuels 2005: 28), the first time in the postwar era that Japan approved an overseas dispatch of its force. The most significant characteristic of Ozawa’s revision attempt was its overwhelming emphasis on UN-centered internationalism combined with a vision of Japan as a global player. In Ozawa’s own words, as a “normal” country, Japan should contribute its personnel to the “UN Standard Army” (Ozawa 1999). His idea of Japan’s ‘normalization’ differs from others in that he paid scant attention to collective defense, which is the main focus of other revision attempts; rather, Ozawa wanted to create a ‘peacekeeping reserve force’ separate from the SDF and contribute to the collective security of the UN through greater participation in international PKOs (Sato 1998). Ozawa’s revision initiative also preserved Article Nine as a whole and seldom discussed the status of the emperor, a good indication that this was not so much about the promotion of nationalism. Instead his proposal added a new provision: “The Japanese people shall positively contribute to international peace through means such as supply of military personnel and participation in peacekeeping operations of the international community.” Ozawa explained that this clause reflects the “spirit of the UN charter.” While Ozawa’s draft was perhaps too idealistic to materialize, it introduced a new dimension to the constitutional revision debate, namely Japan’s internationalism under UN guidance, and moved the issue of collective defense out of the bilateral context of the US–Japan security alliance.

The 2000s Another revision movement came during Junichiro Koizumi’s term as prime minister. Koizumi was vocal in his criticism of Article Nine, believing that the path to Japan’s ‘normalization’ was in the strengthening of the US–Japan alliance (Hughes 2009: 50). He forced constitutional pragmatists who did not support constitutional revision, such as Koichi Kato, Kiichi Miyazawa, and Hiromu Nonaka, to resign in order to generate pro-revision solidarity within the party (Boyd and Samuels 2005: 40–1). Like some of the previous attempts, his revision attempt focused on the preamble, with the aim of elevating the status of the emperor to the head of the state, and on Article Nine, with the aim of either relaxing or removing the prohibition on the exercise of the collective-self-defense right. The 9/11 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in 2001 and the ensuing US invasion of Iraq compelled the Koizumi administration to expand the overseas dispatch of the SDF under the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and to contribute to the rehabilitation operations in Iraq, citing UN Security Council resolutions (Sato 1998: 94–5). While significantly expanding Japan’s international security activities, these operations revealed major weaknesses about how effectively 44

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the SDF can operate overseas. Not only were they ad hoc policies with limited time periods and scopes, but they also clashed head on with the Article Nine limitation on collective defense. The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, for instance, clearly stipulates that the SDF “shall not undertake the supply of weapons and ammunitions, supply fuel or conduct maintenance on aircraft preparing to take off on military sorties, or undertake the land transportation of weapons and ammunitions in foreign territories.”3 This creates problems for joint operations between the SDF and troops from other UN member states, for the former cannot assist the latter in a military situation due to Article Nine. This period was unique in that both the LDP and the DPJ agreed on the need for constitutional revision for the first time, even though they differed on specifics. Both parties shared the common interest of revising Japan’s security policy, and each established an internal study group in its own party for constitutional revision. In this context, the LDP’s Commission on the Constitution announced that a new constitution should not be “reactionary (returning to the prewar period) but thoroughly future-oriented,” and to be thus “we have to face history, reflect on its bad, and pass the good to the next generation” (Higuchi 2013: 61). In this sense, the revision movement in the 2000s shared important aspects of the revision movement in the 1990s in that both explicitly dissociated themselves from historical revisionism. But Koizumi’s primary political interest was not so much in advancing the conservative political agenda of constitutional revision as in economic reform, particularly postal reform (Winkler 2011). Moreover, once again, the LDP’s lack of a two-thirds majority in both the upper and lower houses meant that the revision effort would not bear fruit, especially when partisan disagreements on the specifics meant that the DPJ would not support the LDP’s revision proposal in the Diet.

Nationalism, external security threats, and ‘Toward a Beautiful Country’ The earlier revision attempts revealed that two main factors propel constitutional revision. One is the emotion-driven desire to increase national pride, and the other is the policy-driven desire to enhance Japan’s military role in international affairs. The ultimate goal is the ‘normalization’ of Japan. Hence the term ‘normalization’ should be understood in its security context (Johnson 1992; Hughes 2004; Soeya, Tadokoro and Welch 2011) as well as in terms of its socio-psychological aspects (Ryu 2007; Burke 2007). The same two factors also undergird the current revision attempt, led by Shinzo Abe. Abe made no secret about his desire to revise the constitution when he took office as prime minister in 2006. His election defeat in 2007, however, meant that it was not until his return to office in December 2012 that he could mount a serious challenge to the ‘peace constitution.’ By then, the LDP’s political fortune had improved, as the perceived inability of the DPJ to govern Japan consolidated the LDP’s hold on power. In addition, external security threats in the form of North Korean missiles and territorial tensions with China had also increased substantially since the 2000s, thereby accentuating Japan’s need for greater military activities and security cooperation with the US. While focusing on economic revitalization through Abenomics, Abe pushed his conservative political agenda cautiously but in earnest, based on the slogan of “departure from the postwar regime” (sengo rejiimu kara dakkyaku). Abe believes that the constitution contributes to Japan’s lack of independent spirit and weakness in the face of foreign pressure (gaiatsu) (Sakurai and Abe 2006: 84–5).4 His idea of constitutional revision is to infuse a sense of national pride and patriotism with an emphasis on Japan’s “splendid history, culture and traditions.” Thus he supported elevating the status of the emperor to the head of the state and called the SDF the “National Defense Force” (kokubogun) 45

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during his participation in the 2012 LDP draft-constitution process. He later commented in an interview that the reason he wanted the name “National Defense Force” was to put an end to “the useless argument over interpretation of Article Nine and to move Japanese history into the future” (Abe 2013: 253). As for national security, Abe desired to expand Japan’s military role in international affairs by moving away from the Article Nine ban on collective defense. Unlike Ozawa’s approach, which focused on UN-centered multilateralism, Abe’s initiative emphasized the expansion of security cooperation in the bilateral context (i.e. with the US), envisioning Japan’s “proactive pacifism” (sekkyokuteki heiwashugi) and a more global role for the US–Japan alliance. Hence the revised 2015 Guidelines for US–Japan Defense Cooperation renews the alliance’s commitment to regional and global security cooperation, enables Japan’s greater participation in PKOs and humanitarian missions outside its immediate region, and broadens bilateral cooperation to new areas such as cyberspace. Figure 3.1 places the various revision attempts alongside the two dimensions of nationalism and military role. Most of the revision attempts (those by Abe, Koizumi, Ozawa, and Nakasone) clearly advocated a greater military role for Japan. The only exception was Kishi’s attempt. Even though he wanted to remove US military bases from Japan, his desire was more about achieving independence than advocating a greater military role for Japan. This is not surprising given that it was only a few years after Japan’s surrender and military defeat in World War II. As for nationalism, most of the attempts (those by Abe, Koizumi, Nakasone, and Kishi) explicitly sought to promote nationalism. Ozawa’s is the only exception here, with its emphasis on internationalism focused on the UN. Among all these attempts Abe’s is most explicit in its advocacy of both Japan’s greater military role in international affairs and nationalism. As far as national security is concerned, the logic of defensive realism has dominated the prorevision camp from Nakasone to Abe. Defensive realism assumes that states do not seek to dominate others through military aggrandizement but strive to protect their own national security, and one way to do this is deterrence through either internal or external balancing (Waltz 1979). Japan has not contemplated a military attack against any other state in any serious way since the end of World War II but has sought to deter potential attacks against itself mainly by improving military cooperation with the US, i.e. through external balancing. Abe has taken this defensive realist logic one step further and advocated a “proactive contribution to peace” by

Nationalism Abe

Kishi Nakasone Koizumi

Ozawa Military role

Figure 3.1

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Constitutional revision attempts along the two dimensions of nationalism and military role

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broadening Japan’s participation in international security activities: it promotes active participation in international security matters even if this may mean involvement in international conflict. While it is different from the power-maximizing behavior of offensive realism (Mearsheimer 2001), according to this logic, as Hagstrom (2015) notes, war is peace. What distinguishes Abe’s approach to constitutional revision from the rest, however, is its emphasis on and an acute sense of historical revisionism. A sizable portion of conservative nationalists in Japan have long believed that postwar history education has been ‘masochistic’ (jigyakuteki) and should change to infuse a sense of national pride and patriotism in the Japanese, especially the youth. A counter-historical narrative has thus been put forward by conservative groups to alter the mainstream postwar historical interpretation of Japan’s past war in Asia (dait oa sens o). That narrative advances the view that Japan’s past aggression was a holy war of self-defense and survival (jisonjiei no seisen) that was forced upon Japan by prevailing circumstances, such as expanding Western imperialism and lack of natural resources (Ishihara interview in Asahi Shimbun 2013). The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, it continues, operated for the betterment of East Asian nations rather than for Japan’s own interests, and it was a noble goal rather than imperial propaganda to justify Japan’s military expansion.5 This sort of revisionist historical perspective extends to the interpretations of other historical events. For example, in 2012, the Mayor of Nagoya, Takashi Kawamura, said of the Nanjing Massacre that only “conventional acts of combat” took place in Nanjing, not the mass murders and rapes that are widely discussed, and said “such a thing as Nanjing Massacre is unlikely to have taken place” (Japan Times 2012). In 2014, the Mayor of Osaka, Toro Hashimoto, as well as the NHK president, Katsuto Momii, opined that the ‘comfort women’ were a necessary part of war or could be found in any nation at war, including France and Germany (Fackler 2014). Such remarks have soured Japan’s bilateral relations with China and Korea and resulted in widespread anti-Japanese protests in both countries. Abe also supports various efforts to portray Japan’s modern history in a more positive light, such as the production of a more nationalistic history textbook by Tsukurukai (the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform) that de-emphasizes Japan’s wartime atrocities and increases the coverage of Japanese culture and traditions (Burke 2007). His controversial remark in the Diet that “The definition of aggression is not settled academically or internationally . . . It depends on one’s perspective in international relations” (Sekiguchi 2013) should be understood in this light. It is also no coincidence that it was during Abe’s term that the Fundamental Law of Education, which is touted as the “constitution of education,” was revised for the first time, in 2006, bringing in elements of nationalism and national character. Abe also scrapped the “neighboring countries clause” (kinrin shokoku j  oko ) in April 2013, which was a form of selfrestraint in the official textbook-writing guidelines out of concern for the feelings of neighboring countries, especially China and South Korea. Both changes have permitted greater room for conservative views to appear in Japanese history textbooks. The LDP’s 2012 draft constitution, which was drawn up when the LDP was out of power from 2009 to 2012, embodies these conservative values and changes. Ironically, being out of power accelerated the drafting process and made it easier for the LDP to express its conservative values in the draft, especially regarding the preamble and national defense, as the LDP neither needed to make any compromise with its coalition partner, Komeito, nor to consider diplomatic relations with neighboring countries. According to the deputy head of the LDP’s Constitutional Reform Commission, Yosuke Isozaki, the LDP wrote the draft constitution to reflect “Japan’s national character” (Asahi Shimbun 2016). Thus the preamble of the 2012 draft talks of the Japanese as a peace-loving people and their culture and values as peaceful, and it emphasizes Japan’s “long history,” “unique culture,” “beautiful landscape,” “natural environment,” and “splendid 47

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traditions.” It takes the cultural notion of wa as the basis of Japan’s pacifism and thereby departs from the US-imposed postwar pacifism in that it is not based on a negative view of the Japanese nation as a potential threat to international peace.6 The draft also proposes a major overhaul of Article Nine. Not only does the title of that article change from “Renunciation of War” to “National Defense,” but it inserts a new section titled “National Defense Force,” thereby giving a constitutional basis for the existence of the SDF. It also states that while “force shall not be used as a means of settling international disputes,” this “does not entail the prevention of the exercise of the self-defense right,” which presumably includes both individual and collective self-defense. The suggested revision would therefore eliminate the uncomfortable existence of the SDF under the ‘peace constitution’ and the potential unconstitutionality of the security legislation (anpo hosei), discussed by Hornung in Chapter 2 of this volume, by explicitly sanctioning the exercise of the collective-self-defense right. The likelihood of successfully revising the constitution is higher than ever due to several factors. First, the LDP, has the legislative power to put forward and pass an amendment bill in the Diet for the first time in the postwar era. The LDP’s victories in the July 2016 upper-house and October 2017 lower-house elections resulted in its controlling more than a two-thirds majority in the Diet with the support of its coalition partner Komeito and like-minded independents. Furthermore, Abe can claim somewhat legitimately that the October 2017 election victory has given his administration a public mandate for constitutional revision, as the issue was part of his election campaign. Although the LDP still needs to iron out differences with Komeito, which generally prefers the policy of kaken (adding new provisions to the constitution) rather than kaiken (revising the constitution), the LDP can now get over the legal hurdle in the Diet that has been the main reason for the defeat of past attempts at constitutional revision. Second, the continuation of external security threats – mainly North Korean missile threats and territorial dispute with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands – will sustain the policy need for expanding Japan’s military activities for national defense and security purposes. This policy rationale is important in convincing pragmatists, both Diet members and citizens, to support constitutional revision. And, lastly, the Abe administration maintains a generally favorable approval rating among the public. According to NHK opinion polls (see Figure 3.2), public approval for the Abe Cabinet was around 50% throughout 2016, with a low of 42% in April and a high of 57% in September. This is important because successful revision requires public approval in a national referendum after the Diet passes an amendment bill, and the popularity of the Abe Cabinet will likely influence the national referendum outcome.

60 50 40 30 20 Support Do not support

10 0 Jan

Figure 3.2

Feb

Mar

Apr

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Public approval rating of the Abe Cabinet in 2016

Source: NHK Monthly Polls, www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/research/yoron/political/2016.html.

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The biggest obstacle in the way of successful revision is public opinion. Opinion polls suggest that public support for constitutional revision varies. For example, according to an August 2016 Asahi Shimbun poll, there was 63% support for the Diet to begin the discussion about constitutional revision, while only 23% opposed it. Interestingly, there was significantly less support for revising Article Nine, with only 27% in favor and 56% in opposition. Leaving Article Nine aside, 48% of those polled supported revising other parts of the constitution, while 20% opposed it.7 An April 2016 NHK poll suggested that only 27.3% of those surveyed agreed that revising the constitution was necessary, while 30.5% disagreed. Of those who agreed, more than half (54.6%) identified external security threats as the reason for their support, with 20.4% saying that clarifying the self-defense right and the existence of the SDF was the main reason. Of those who disagreed, a vast majority (69.6%) identified protecting Article Nine as the main reason for their opposition.8 According to a March 2016 Yomiuri Shimbun poll, those who supported constitutional revision and those who opposed it were neck and neck, with 49% favoring and 50% opposing.9 A December 2016 Mainichi Shimbun poll revealed 50% agreeing with the need to start the discussion about constitutional revision in the Diet, while 21% were in disagreement.10 These various opinion polls suggest three things. First, it is not clear if the Japanese public is unequivocally in favor of constitutional revision. The polling results are mixed. But should the Abe administration choose the right time to push for constitutional revision it could certainly mobilize sufficient public support. Second, the polls clearly suggest that the public does not support revising Article Nine. And as can be seen from widespread protests against the 2015 Security Bills (anpo hosei), the Japanese public generally shuns Japan’s involvement in international military conflict. This is troubling for Abe and other proponents of constitutional revision, because Article Nine is one of the key provisions that they aim to change. And, lastly, leaving Article Nine aside, there is significantly more public support (generally above 50%) for altering other parts of the constitution, such as environmental rights and local governance. Once again, if Abe carefully selects the timing of an amendment bill, he could garner sufficient public support. There is still much ambiguity as to how Abe will pursue the goal of constitutional revision. Given the current public opposition to revising Article Nine, Abe can consider leaving Article Nine intact and revising other parts of the constitution. This would make discussions within the Diet smoother and increase the likelihood of getting a simple majority in an ensuing national referendum. But Abe is unlikely to pursue this path, for Article Nine is arguably the most critical provision of the ‘peace constitution’ that he seeks to change. However, including Article Nine as part of his revision proposal could jeopardize the entirety of constitutional revision and run the risk that no provision will be revised. At present, then, there are two choices, and they are not mutually exclusive. One is that Abe can try to amend Article Nine in such a way that the change is acceptable to both its proponents and opponents. Currently, with regards to Article Nine, the 2012 LDP draft constitution maintains the first part of the Article – renouncing the use of force as a means of settling international disputes – while sanctioning the exercise of the collective defense right. Abe himself does not think that the 2012 draft would be endorsed as it is, especially when many members of Soka Gakkai, a lay Buddhist organization and supporter of Komeito, are unhappy with revising or reinterpreting Article Nine to permit collective self-defense ( Japan Times, 24 August 2016). Hence he might be willing to accept some modifications to the 2012 LDP draft constitution. However, it is questionable if he would compromise on Article Nine, with his supporters ardently demanding that he include it in the overall revision of the constitution. It is equally questionable if the opponents of constitutional revision would accept an alteration of Article Nine that weakens the current legal and psychological limits on the use or threat of force. 49

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The other option is to shift the target from Article Nine to Article Ninety-six, and focus on revising the latter while leaving the former intact for the time being. If Article Ninety-six, which states the rules of revision, can be revised to lower the legal threshold for revision, then it would be easier to amend Article Nine in the future. This strategy may receive more support in the Diet as well as from the public, thereby increasing the likelihood of constitutional revision. However, if revising Article Ninety-six is perceived as being tantamount to revising Article Nine, then we are back to the above situation, where it would be difficult to garner Komeito support in the Diet and generate 50% of public support for constitutional revision, even if Article Nine remains untouched. Moreover, Abe and other proponents may not want to squander the current precious opportunity for revising the constitution, as there is no guarantee that the LDP will secure a sufficient number of seats in the Diet in the future and get over the two-thirds legal threshold. Given these difficulties, Abe might be waiting for the right moment to push for constitutional revision, and such a window of opportunity may arise in the form of external security threats, such as a North Korean missile flying over Japan, as happened in 1998 when a Taepodong ballistic missile was fired over Japanese territory and landed in the Pacific Ocean. The occurrence of external security threats would remind the Japanese public of the necessity of improving Japan’s national security and could prove to be sufficient to generate enough legislative and public support for constitutional revision.

Constitutional revision, use of force, and Japan’s national identity The issue of constitutional revision is essentially about (re)defining Japan’s national identity, of which the use of force is the most critical aspect, with Article Nine at the center of the debate. The opponents of constitutional revision desire to protect the postwar pacifist identity as enshrined in the current ‘peace constitution,’ while the proponents seek to replace it with a ‘normal country’ identity. Conservative nationalists such as Abe believe that the ‘peace constitution’ is the cause for Japan’s passive defense policy and regard Article Nine as a declaration of Japan’s abandonment of national security. As is well known, Article Nine has two paragraphs. The first paragraph states that Japan “forever renounces war as a sovereign right . . . and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.” The second paragraph continues, “land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.” The official legal interpretation of Article Nine has been that while the use of force is ruled out as a means of settling international disputes, it is permitted for the purpose of selfdefense, as the constitution does not renounce the right of self-defense. But the Cabinet Legislative Bureau that has the power to interpret the constitution stated in 1982 that while Japan has the self-defense right – both individual and collective – under the UN Charter, the exercise of the collective-self-defense right is prohibited by Article Nine. In other words, the use of force for the Japanese government is limited only to individual self-defense and does not extend to collective self-defense (Law Library of Congress of the United States 2015). This long-standing interpretation of Article Nine has come under severe strain since the outbreak of the 1990–1 Iraq War. Japan’s substantial financial contribution was heavily criticized by the international community for being ‘checkbook diplomacy.’ Further pressure arose due to the increased salience of external security threats throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s. In 1998, North Korea fired its ballistic missile across Japan, and continued its nuclear weapons development throughout the 2000s. Territorial tensions with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands have also increased substantially since the late 1990s, particularly so after the public 50

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160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0

2009 Jan Apr Jul Oct 2010 Jan Apr Jul Oct 2011 Jan Apr Jul Oct 2012 Jan Apr Jul Oct 2013 Jan Apr Jul Oct 2014 Jan Apr Jul Oct 2015 Jan Apr Jul Oct 2016 Jan Apr Jul Oct 2017 Jan Apr

Territorial Sea Contiguous Zone

Figure 3.3

Chinese vessels identified within contiguous zones and territorial sea (total/month)

Source: www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/mission/senkaku/senkaku.html.

acquisition of the islands by the Japanese government in September 2012. As Figure 3.3 shows, the frequency of Chinese vessels and aircrafts, both governmental and non-governmental, entering into the disputed area has dramatically increased from very few incidents before the acquisition to several hundred per annum after the purchase (Ministry of Defense of Japan 2015). In both cases, the Japanese government could do very little to prevent or deter either North Korea or China because, as conservative nationalists argue, of Article Nine. Faced with these external security challenges, the Japanese government has sought to improve military and security cooperation with the US to enhance Japan’s national security. The US’s own security calculus also favored such an approach by Japan. Being under tight budget constraints, the US increasingly sought greater burden-sharing from its regional allies in its rebalancing strategy in East Asia, for which the US–Japan Alliance had a pivotal role to play. However, Article Nine imposed significant limitations on improving bilateral security and military cooperation, despite the gradual expansion of Japan’s security role in the alliance in the post-Cold War era. Of particular concern was the fact that, due to the Article Nine prohibition of the exercise of collective self-defense, the SDF cannot assist US troops that are trying to assist their Japanese counterparts if a military confrontation takes place outside of Japanese territory. It was the Abe administration that broke away from the long-standing legal interpretation of Article Nine and enabled the exercise of the collective-self-defense right. It did so first by passing a Cabinet resolution in 2014 to allow the SDF to take action in support of the US when the ally comes under attack, and then by legislating the controversial security legislation (anpo hosei) in 2015, permitting the mobilization of the SDF when a “country that has a close connection to Japan” is attacked. However, this is unlikely to be the end of the story, as many constitutional lawyers in Japan believe that the security legislation breaches Article Nine and hence is unconstitutional. Consequently, the most unequivocal method for improving security cooperation with the US is to amend Article Nine altogether, for doing so would resolve the potential unconstitutionality of the security legislation as well as the existence of the SDF. Constitutional revision is not just about the desire to expand Japan’s security and military activities, however. The current revision initiative by Abe also directly impacts on and challenges Japan’s postwar pacifist identity in two ways. First, it challenges the postwar norm of pacifism by allowing greater use of force by the SDF. And, second, it challenges the official postwar historical interpretation of Japan’s past aggression and colonialism upon which Japan’s postwar pacifist identity was built. Let us examine these two points in more detail. 51

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First, if the LDP manages to get its constitutional draft passed in both the Diet and a national referendum, this would likely mean the end of the institutionalized form of pacifism that has been a unique feature of postwar Japanese foreign and security policy, as Article Nine would either disappear or be significantly overhauled. As discussed earlier, such change would pave the way for enhanced military cooperation with the US by enabling the exercise of the collective-self-defense right. While the accusation by opponents that Japan will become a “country that can wage war” (sens o dekiru kuni) is unlikely to materialize in actuality, Japan would be more likely to participate in US-involved military conflict, especially in Asia. Taken to the extreme, it means that the SDF will end up going everywhere US forces go. The mainstream thinking within the LDP, however, seems to favor a limited scope for Japan’s participation in international conflict with the newly enabled ability to exercise the collectiveself-defense right. The current and tentative test is the presence of an ‘existential threat to Japan.’ If a military situation is construed to be an existential threat to Japan, then Japan will exercise its right of collective self-defense and get militarily involved even if the conflict takes place outside Japanese territory. If it is deemed that no such threat exists, then even if US forces are attacked, so the argument goes, Japan should stay out of conflict and remain uninvolved. However, there is a great deal of ambiguity about this formula. Not only is there no clear definition of ‘existential threat’, and hence much depends on the construer, but it is also questionable if Japan can actually say no to the US if it requests military assistance, even when the situation does not constitute an existential threat to Japan. As a result, Japan might end up having to participate in US-involved international conflicts whenever the US requests, even if it doesn’t wish to. Second, the current revision attempt challenges the mainstream historical interpretation of Japan’s past aggression and imperialism. For conservative nationalists, historical revisionism is not only a means to an end, namely the promotion of nationalism. Given that Japan’s postwar pacifism is based on a deep sense of regret and self-reflection about its past wrongdoings, any challenge to this historical understanding of Japan’s past imperialism and colonialism would automatically undermine its pacifist identity. Historical revisionism would also significantly worsen bilateral relations with neighboring countries, particularly China and Korea, by increasing the salience of negative war memories. The controversy surrounding historical issues, such as visits to Yasukuni Shrine (Ryu 2007), Japanese history textbooks (Burke 2007), and the Nanjing massacre (Chang 1997) have resulted in widespread anti-Japanese protests and the deterioration of the bilateral relationships in the past. Both China and Korea, which bore the brunt of Japan’s aggression and colonialism, treat the shared historical understanding of Japan’s past imperialism as the foundation upon which their bilateral relationship with Japan could develop. Continuation of historical revisionism in Japan would thus entail greater political and diplomatic conflict between Japan and its neighbors. In the end, it is up to the Japanese people to decide what their national identity will be, what international role they would like to perform, and how they would like to define their relations visa`-vis the US as well as neighboring countries in Asia. In the process, difficult questions must be thought through. Is Japan an Asian country or a Western country? Is Japan ready for all out military cooperation with the US, which the full-fledged collective self-defense would demand? What kind of nationalism/patriotism should Japan strive for and on what values should it be based? Should Japan emphasize its military cooperation with the US for its national security, or should it seek to expand its security cooperation with neighboring countries? Very few proposed constitutional drafts discuss these issues or clarify Japan’s identity. Certainly, there are no easy answers to these questions, nor do answers have to be binary choices. But they must be discussed, examined, and scrutinized to the fullest extent possible, with as much public participation as possible, for few issues are as important and critical as the nation’s constitution and its national identity. 52

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Notes 1 It should be noted that the political left was also unhappy with the constitution at the time of its creation. They thought the constitution did not go far enough in eliminating the Japanese military institution and dismantling the imperial system. 2 It appears that Ozawa did not clearly see the difference between collective security and collective selfdefense. There are important distinctions in international law and international relations between the two. The former requires a prior UN Security Council authorization and becomes a duty on all member states. The latter does not require any UN authorization and can arise when the state determines that an armed attack has taken place. It is a right, not a duty, although it can be tantamount to a duty, depending upon the specific terms of a formal alliance. As it pertains to Japan, the latter would significantly broaden Japan’s international military activities, as it could justify any involvement where the US gets involved and even when no actual armed attack has taken place, as the training, supplying, arming, and directing of irregular troops that attack the armed forces of another state may amount to an “armed attack” for the purposes of triggering the right to self-defense (see ICJ judgment in Nicaragua vs. United States). 3 For details see the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, available at http://japan.kantei.go.jp/policy/ 2001/anti-terrorism/1029terohougaiyou_e.html as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affair’s explanation of Japan’s PKOs contribution under the UN flag, available at www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/pdfs/ contribution.pdf. 4 The particular sentence that they are not happy with is “We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world.” 5 For details see the website of Nippon Kaigi, one of the most influential and active right-wing groups in Japan, at www.nipponkaigi.org/. Influential politicians, including prime minister Shinzo Abe, are members of the group. The website contains their views on the constitution, education, and history as well as relations with neighboring countries. 6 The author’s own interview with the Chairman of the Constitutional Revision Committee Yasuoka Okiharu on 24 February 2016. 7 www.tv-asahi.co.jp/hst/poll/201608/index.html. Accessed 5 January 2017. 8 www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/research/yoron/pdf/20160506_1.pdf. Accessed 5 January 2017. 9 www.yomiuri.co.jp/feature/TO000302/20160316-OYT1T50132.html. Accessed 5 January 2017. 10 http://mainichi.jp/articles/20161222/ddm/010/040/003000c. Accessed 5 January 2017.

Bibliography Abe, S. (2013) Atarashii Kuni e [Toward a New Country], Tokyo: Bunshun Shisho. Asahi Shimbun. (2016) ‘Editorial: Values Embodied in Constitution Made Japan What It Is Today’, 3 May – www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201605030055.html accessed 10 May 2016. Asahi Shimbun. (2013) ‘Views of Ishihara Shintaro’, 18 May – http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/ politics/AJ201305180041 accessed 13 July 2015. BBC News. (2014) ‘Japan NHK Boss Momii Sparks WWII “Comfort Women” Row’, 26 January – www. bbc.com/news/world-asia-25901572 accessed 20 October 2015. Boyd, P. and Samuels, R. (2005) Nine Lives?: The Politics of Constitutional Reform in Japan, Washington: East–West Center. Burke, A. (2007) ‘Japan’s History Textbook Debate’, Asian Survey, 47(5): 705–26. Chang, I. (1997), The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II, New York: Basic Books. Dower, J. (1999) Embracing the Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, New York: W. W. Norton & Company. Fackler, M. (2014) ‘Japan to Revisit Apology to Wartime Sex Slaves’, New York Times, 28 February – www. nytimes.com/2014/03/01/world/asia/japan-to-review-apology-made-to-wwii-comfort-women.html accessed 20 October 2015. Hagstrom, L. (2010) ‘The Democratic Party of Japan’s Security Policy and Japanese Politics of Constitutional Revision: A Cloud over Article 9’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 64(5): 510–25. Hagstrom, L. (2015) ‘War is Peace: The Rearticulation of “Peace” in Japan’s China Discourse’, Review of International Studies, 42(2): 266–86.

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Higuchi, Y. (2013) Yima Kenpo Kaisei o Dou Kangaeruka: Sengo Nihon o Hoshu Suru Koto no Imi [Now, How to Think about Constitutional Revision: The Meaning of Turning Postwar Japan Conservative], Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Hughes, C. (2004) ‘Japan’s Security Policy, the US–Japan Alliance, and the “War on Terror”’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 58(4): 427–45. Hughes, C. (2009) Japan’s Remilitarisation, London: Routledge. Japan Times. (2012) ‘Mayor’s Massacre Denial Irks Beijing’, 21 February – www.japantimes.co.jp/news/ 2012/02/21/national/mayors-massacre-denial-irks-beijing/ accessed 1 September 2015. Johnson, C. (1992), ‘Japan in Search of a “Normal” Role’, Daedalus, 121(4): 1–33. Jomaru, Y. (2011) Shokun Seiron no Kenkyu: Hoshu Genron wa Dou Henyou Sitekitaka [Research on Shokun and Seiron: How Has the Conservative Media Changed Over the Years], Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Law Library of Congress of the United States. (2015) ‘Japan: Article 9 of the Constitution’ www.loc.gov/ law/help/japan-constitution/article9.php accessed on 28 May 2016. Liberal Democratic Party (2012) ‘Nihon Kenpo Kaisei Souan’ [Draft Constitution of Japan] http:// constitution.jimin.jp/draft/ accessed 20 June 2016. Mainichi Shimbun. (2016) ‘Public Opinion Poll of Japan’, 22 December http://mainichi.jp/articles/ 20161222/ddm/010/040/003000c accessed 5 January 2017. Mearsheimer, J. (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: W.W. Norton. Ministry of Defense of Japan. (2015), ‘Emergency Scrambling in 2014’, Joint Staff Press Release, 15 April – www.mod.go.jp/js/Press/press2015/press_pdf/p20150415_01.pdf accessed 30 October 2015. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2014) ‘Japan’s Contribution to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’, www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/pdfs/contribution.pdf accessed 10 September 2016. NHK Bunken. (2016) ‘Public Opinion Polls’ – www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/research/yoron/pdf/20160506_1. pdf accessed 5 January 2017. Ozawa, I. (1999) ‘Draft Plan for a Revised Constitution of Japan’, http://nipponissin1.blog136.fc2.com/ blog-entry-24.html accessed 2 May 2015. Ryu, Y. (2007) ‘The Yasukuni Controversy’, Asian Survey, 47(5): 705–26. Sakurai, Y. and Abe, S. (2006) ‘Jiminto no Gojunen’ [50 Years of LDP], in Abe Shinzo Taidanshu: Nihon o Kataru [Collection of Conversations with Abe Shinzo: On Japan], Tokyo: PHP Institute. Sankei, S. (2013) Kokukim no Kenpo [The People’s Constitution], Tokyo: Sankei Shimbun Press. Sato, Y. (1998) ‘Three Norms of Collective Defense and Japan’s Overseas Troop Dispatches’, in Y. Sato and K. Hirata (eds), Norms, Interests, and Power in Japanese Foreign Policy, New York: Palgrave MacMillan. Sekiguchi, T. (2013) ‘Prime Minister Abe Doubts “Aggression”’, Wall Street Journal, 26 April – http:// jp.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324289404578445770654912536.html accessed 20 October 2015. Sentaku, M. (2016) ‘The LDP’s Draft Constitution’, Japan Times, 24 August – www.japantimes.co.jp/ opinion/2016/08/24/commentary/japan-commentary/ldps-draft-constitution/#.WI8vSpLr-Vg accessed 5 January 2017. Soeya, Y., Welch, D. and Tadokoro, M. (2011) Japan as a ‘Normal Country’? A Nation in Search of Its Place in the World, Toronto: University of Toronto Press. TV Asahi. (2016) ‘Asahi Shimbun Poll’, www.tv-asahi.co.jp/hst/poll/201608/index.html accessed 5 January 2017. Waltz, K. (1979) Theory of International Politics, New York: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. Watanabe, O. (1994) Seiji Gaikaku to Kenpo Kaisei – Nakasone Yasuhiro kara Ozawa Ichiro e [Political Reform and Constitutional Revision: From Nakasone Yasuhiro to Ozawa Ichiro], Tokyo: Aoki Shoten. Watanabe, O. (2002) Kenpo Kaisei no Soten: Siryode Yomu Kaiseiron no Rekishi [Issues of Constitutional Revision: The History of Pro-Revision Argument Based on Primary Documents], Tokyo: Junposha. Welfield, J. (1988) An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System, London: The Athlone Press. Winkler, C. (2011) The Quest for Japan’s New Constitution: An Analysis of Visions and Constitutional Reform Proposals, 1980–2009, London: Routledge. Yomiuri Shimbun. (2016) ‘67% Decided Based on Stance on the Constitution’, 16 March – www.yomiuri. co.jp/feature/TO000302/20160316-OYT1T50132.html accessed 5 January 2017.

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4 The chrysanthemum and the cool Cultural diplomacy and soft power in Japan’s foreign policy Nissim Kadosh Otmazgin

In recent decades, cultural diplomacy and soft power1 have emerged as part of a conscious decision by the Japanese government to strategically advance its international position without threatening other countries with the use of force, which is prohibited by the Japanese constitution, and without utilizing its economic might in a way that will make Japan look threatening. This is especially useful in the context of Japan’s relations with its Asian neighbors, particularly China and South Korea, where “soft” diplomacy serves as a way to influence mass opinion in these countries without stressing the already troubled relations, and avoids skirmishes over historical or territorial disputes. An integral part of Japan’s move to increase its international influence is to better exploit its contemporary cultural resources. In recent years, the Japanese government has become increasingly aware of Japan’s contemporary cultural appeal and has been attempting to utilize its charm as part of its offensive abroad. In the past, the Japanese government was reluctant to introduce Japan’s contemporary culture and lifestyle overseas, considering it economically marginal and diplomatically unimportant. However, following the enthusiastic acceptance of products such as animation and manga in different countries, the policy has changed, directing it toward proactively displaying Japan’s cultural resources abroad as part of its exertion of “soft power”. At present, no fewer than thirteen government ministries and agencies are involved in promoting the country’s “content industries,” as they are called in Japan, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) taking the leading roles. What is interesting about Japan’s cultural diplomacy is that it has changed dramatically over the past 100 years. Japan’s cultural policy during its empire-building in Asia was different from its early postwar cultural diplomacy, which was implemented at a time when Japan was attempting to reposition itself as a non-military power primarily concerned with its economy. The cultural diplomacy changed again in the 1990s, following the emergence of Japan as a cultural power known not only for its industrial and consumer products but also for its innovative contemporary culture and lifestyle. In this later period, cultural diplomacy became directed toward economic and diplomatic purposes, designed to produce more export-oriented cultural commodities and present a friendlier image of Japan abroad. This chapter examines the changing attitude of the Japanese government toward the role of “culture” in the political life of the state and especially in its international conduct. How has Japan 55

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used cultural diplomacy to further its geopolitical goals? How has it shaped Japan’s relations with its neighbors? What is the mechanism for utilizing culture to achieve goals in international politics? How important is cultural diplomacy and soft power in an age of “hard” military buildup in the Asia-Pacific? This chapter addresses these questions by looking at the initiatives and discourses that have placed cultural diplomacy back on Japan’s foreign-policy agenda over the past two decades and evaluates the potential of cultural diplomacy and soft power to complement Japan’s “hard” global presence. This chapter suggests that Japan’s cultural diplomacy should be seen as part of its attempts to increase its visibility and involvement in world affairs and within a wider fabric of socio-cultural initiatives and discourses that construct Japan’s diplomatic identity. The first part of this chapter examines the rise of soft power and cultural diplomacy within Japan’s foreign policy over the past two decades. In Japan, these terms have been used both to explore new diplomatic directions and justify investments in the country’s culture and media industries, which are deemed the forerunners and promoters of Japan’s image as a global player. The second part of the chapter reviews some of the initiatives taken by the various Japanese ministries to enhance Japan’s position as a cultural power. This part emphasizes MOFA’s recent proactive approach to utilizing contemporary culture as part of its work, and discusses the “Cool Japan” project, which was designed by METI to assist Japanese culture-related firms to establish a better footing abroad. The third part examines the way the repositioning of Japan as a contemporary cultural power has been debated in both institutional and popular discourse in Japan. It looks at the reciprocity between domestic discourse and foreign policy and suggests that these two processes are linked in the sense that the overall positive appreciation given to the globalization of Japanese culture has a substantive influence on state policy. In other words, discourse constitutes an integral part of the “ecosystem,” where policy is debated and formulated. The conclusion discusses the potential of soft power and cultural diplomacy to further Japan’s position in the world and offers a few policy recommendations.

Contemporary culture, soft power and cultural diplomacy In a 2007 radio interview, then foreign minister Tar o As o argued that the promotion of Japan’s cultural assets abroad is crucially important for the nation’s future. Comparing the international arena to an elementary school, he likened a nation’s military power to a physically strong pupil who heads a group of students, its cultural power to a smart pupil who gets high grades and its economic power to a pupil who comes from a rich family. The first student is respected for his physical strength and the second for his achievements in class, but the rich pupil does not get much respect from his classmates. In that interview, As o said he believes that a country that has only economic power does not gain much international recognition; it must also possess military and cultural power. Although Japan’s military power has been constitutionally limited, its cultural power has been on the rise, especially thanks to manga and anime. Hence, As o recommends that Japan use its overseas cultural presence to upgrade its position in the world.2 As o’s entertaining description typifies the way in which leaders and bureaucrats in Japan have become interested in the possible marriage between popular culture and international relations and their wish to utilize Japan’s booming contemporary culture and lifestyle to improve the country’s image abroad and exert soft power. As this chapter discusses, this new attitude is overtly supported by a domestic discourse that calls on the government to make better use of its cultural resources. For many people in Japan – politicians, bureaucrats, journalists, academics and even mangaka (manga artists) – cultural diplomacy and soft power have been viewed as a golden opportunity to enhance Japan’s international position and to take a bigger part in the international community, as a major nation-state of its scale should. 56

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Figure 4.1

Doraemon and Mao in a local media shop, Shanghai, August 2004

Source: author.

The campaign to brand Japan as a cultural power and not only as an economic power stems from the successful transnational dissemination and consumption of its contemporary culture in recent decades. This process has been widely documented and analyzed in academic literature, especially in anthropology and cultural studies, showing that market forces and socio-economic changes and not governmental policies are responsible for the phenomenal success of Japan’s contemporary culture overseas (recent examples include Brienza 2016; Otmazgin 2013; Pellitteri 2011; Shiraishi 2013; Tsutsui 2010; Yano 2013). In other words, it is the private sector and social forces not state policy that have brought Japan’s contemporary culture to the world’s attention. These studies also show that the successful acceptance of contemporary Japanese culture abroad has created a huge interest in Japan. Japanese contemporary culture has reached consumers in other countries in a variety of ways and with an intensity that was previously unseen, with anime and manga at the forefront. One prominent example, seen in Figure 4.1. is the manga and anime series Doraemon, which gained immense popularity in Asia. The globalization of Japanese contemporary culture has not only introduced a variety of new consumer products to audiences of other countries but has also constructed new images of Japan as being home to an exciting cultural vibrancy and a bustling youth culture. While the “old” Japan may be represented by wabisabi aesthetics (of transience and imperfection), tea ceremony, kimono fabrics and other traditional items, the new and exciting Japan is being manifested in the massive circulation of video games, anime, manga, television programs, movies, fashion magazines and contemporary design, not to mention their derivative products in the form of games, food, toys and other accessories. As part of the excitement over the diplomatic possibilities brought about by contemporary Japanese culture, the term “soft power” has gained strong ground in Japan. Over the past two decades, the concept has been increasingly used by politicians and bureaucrats who see it as a legitimate way to increase Japan’s involvement in world affairs without the risk of challenging the constitution. In a nutshell, the soft-power argument, first developed in 1990 by political scientist Joseph Nye, claims that the dissemination of one country’s culture, ideals and values into other countries provides the potential for political power. 57

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According to Nye, soft power lies in the ability of a nation to entice, attract and fascinate other countries and societies so that a country “may obtain the outcome it wants in world politics because other countries – admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness – want to follow it” (Nye 2004a: 15). Nye first used this term to call on the United States to make better use of its cultural resources as part of its international conduct, and not rely only on “hard” economic and military powers. He later also cited Europe, Japan, India and China as having vast resources of soft power that they should use to better enhance their global position (Nye 2004a: 73–98, 2004b). In Japan, governmental and journalistic reports that emphasize the economic benefits of cultural exports and stress their possible contribution to the nation’s diplomacy repeatedly reference Nye’s discussion of soft power (Choo 2012). Although there has not been much debate about the actual meaning of soft power (Otmazgin 2008), and Nye himself admits that he introduced the term as a descriptive rather than an analytical concept (Nye 2008), there is extensive usage of the term when encouraging the state to intervene in Japan’s booming cultural sector. In this context, it is important to distinguish between the use of soft power as an analytical tool and its employment in political, popular and intellectual discourses. As pointed out by PressBarnathan (2012), the very term “soft power” can become a political resource, since attributing power to someone or something is itself a political act. The term “cultural diplomacy” has a longer history than “soft power.” Cultural diplomacy is understood to be the advancement of a country’s position abroad through the exchange of ideas, information, culture and the arts (Milton 2001: 1). Its primary purpose is to appeal to the widest range of audiences, especially important figures and opinions leaders, and convince them to improve their view of a certain country. Throughout history, empires and civilizations have always appealed to people of other ethnic groups through their culture and ideas and often used these intangibles as a resource of control. Such was the appeal of the Egyptian or Roman empires in ancient times or that of Chinese regional influence up to the nineteenth century. But in the aftermath of World War I, the major powers of the time (the US, Britain, France, Germany and Italy) started to initiate some sort of public-relations campaign using modern means of communication as part of new diplomatic behavior aimed at mitigating unfavorable images of their state. One of the most active figures to enhance the notion of cultural diplomacy was the twenty-eighth US president, Woodrow Wilson, who advocated active American diplomacy designed not only to represent the country’s position vis-a`-vis foreign governments but also to actively spread American ideas about freedom and democracy throughout the world. The Japanese government, as a diligent student of the West, developed its own cultural diplomacy (bunka gaiko), which was seen as a sophisticated strategy to advance Japan’s national interests. As far back as the 1930s, the government initiated cultural and educational activities in Western countries, including opening cultural-relations centers in Paris, Berlin, New York and Rome; dispatching Japanese lecturers and artists abroad; inviting foreign figures to Japan; sponsoring courses in Asian Studies (Oriental Studies) in foreign countries; supporting film production; coordinating student exchanges; and financing translations and the publication of material on Japan (Matsumura 2002: 275; Park 2008–9: 2–7). These diplomatic initiatives, however, were mostly silenced by the Japanese government with the worsening of relations during the war in Asia and the Pacific or, in the case of Asia, turned into propaganda (Kushner 2006). In the territories that Japan occupied during the 1930s and 1940s, and especially in its colonies, Japan used culture as a way to keep its empire together and cultivate local supporters under what was openly called “propaganda diplomacy” (senden gaiko). In Korea, Taiwan and Manchukuo the official language gradually became Japanese, scholarships to study in Japan 58

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were given to the local elite, radio broadcasts praised the Japanese Empire, and Japanese “men of culture” (bunkajin) were dispatched to introduce Japanese culture to native Southeast Asians. In the postwar period, however, the issue of cultural diplomacy received a rather marginalized role in Japan’s foreign policy, especially in Asia, and cultural initiatives in the first three decades after the war were highly inward looking (Hirano 2005; Neki 2001: 10–20; Sato 2012a: 144). For one, the defeat in the war and the legacy of American occupation broke the course of relations between Japan and its neighboring countries and effectively neutralized the Japanese government’s will to actively promote its culture in Asia. The underlining understanding was that cultural diplomacy directed outward would not be as productive and might even prove harmful. In Asia, the official fear was that any attempt to once again introduce Japanese culture would resurrect old wartime grievances and feed new resentment, which would only hamper Japan’s more important economic and political interests in the region. Coupled with the assessment that cultural export was not economically profitable, for most of the postwar period Japan exercised extreme caution when integrating cultural components into its Asia policy. Instead, the promotion of Japanese culture took place within the seemingly less assertive and intrusive framework of “cultural exchange” (bunka koryu). Other similar terms frequently used in official vocabulary included “intellectual and cultural exchange,” “cultural cooperation,” “cultural interaction,” “cultural understanding” and “cultural dialogue.” All of these concepts suggest a multi-directional flow whereby Japan was a recipient as well as a distributor of culture (Otmazgin 2012).3 During most of the postwar period, this sort of non-aggressive promotion of Japanese culture was undertaken by the Agency for Cultural Affairs (bunkacho) and the Japan Foundation (kokusai koryu kikin). Established in June 1968, the Agency for Cultural Affairs was given a mandate to promote international cultural exchange. Its main tasks were to preserve Japan’s cultural heritage and promote the understanding of Japanese tradition within Japan, while its outward initiatives mainly featured dispatching Japanese artists to foreign countries and introducing traditional culture to foreigners (Bunkach o 2003). In a similar vein, Japan has been a member of UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) since 1951. With the aim of “contributing to international society,” Japan has taken an active part in implementing UNESCO educational and cultural programs. Japan regularly hosts UNESCO-related conventions, appoints representatives to its governing bodies and provides nearly 10% of the organization’s budget, second only to the US.4 The Japan Foundation, established in June 1972, was directed to implement Japan’s cultural policies in concert with such governmental and quasi-governmental agencies as MOFA’s Information and Cultural Affairs Bureau, the Cultural Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Education, and the Cultural Exchange Section of the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) (Kahn 1999: 72). The establishment of the Japan Foundation, as historian Kusunoki (2015: 91–104) explains, should be viewed as part of the growing rhetoric in Japan starting in the mid 1950s over the need to better explain its position in the world, following its postwar reemergence as an economic power and its intensifying trade and manufacturing links to other countries. Since its establishment, the Japan Foundation has been engaged in supporting academic and cultural events, Japanese-language instruction, Japanese studies and various performances and exhibitions dealing with Japanese art, film and television. Today, the Japan Foundation operates on a global scale, yet the United States remains its major area of focus. Another initiative worth mentioning in this context is Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone’s kokusaika (internationalization) in the 1980s, designed to make Japan a more internationalized country, one that contributes to the global community. The kokusaika initiative emerged amid concerns in Japan that it was lagging behind other developed countries in the field of cultural 59

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exchange, especially at a time when its economy was expanding. Progress in Japan’s kokusaika was painstakingly slow, but some of the eventual outcomes were an increase in support for Japaneselanguage learning abroad along with a significant increase to the budget dedicated to cultural diplomacy (Itoh 2000: 5–6; Zykas 2011b: 111). In the past few years, cultural diplomacy has been organized by MOFA under a wider framework of “public diplomacy” (in Japanese scholarship, “cultural diplomacy” and “public diplomacy” are mixed and often used interchangeably to describe the same phenomenon). In present-day scholarship, this term is used to describe the integration of a wide array of activities and policies taken on by the state to increase its international visibility. These activities may include cultural diplomacy, intellectual dialogue, usage of social media, encouraging tourism, international TV and radio broadcasting, sporting events, student exchanges, etc. (Gregory 2008). In Japan, the term “public diplomacy” (paburikku dipuromashi or koho bunka gaiko) was first used in May 2004, during Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s tenure, in a report emphasizing the need to foster Japan’s international branding through cultural diplomacy. This was followed, during As o’s term, with concrete initiatives such as launching campaigns to boost the number of tourists, assisting the country’s cultural industries and appointing famous anime characters as cultural ambassadors of Japan to the world (Sato 2012b: 11–12). At present, Japan’s public diplomacy is designed to complement other means to achieve the country’s national interests; in the words of MOFA’s Public Diplomacy Strategy Division Director, its goal is “to connect diplomatic strategy with cultural appeal.”5 Therefore, in general, Japan’s public diplomacy efforts involve three groups of activities: “cultural image,” devised to improve the image of Japan abroad through the utilization of various cultural products and artifacts, ranging from anime through Murakami’s novels to karate; “brand image,” featuring efforts to increase the international visibility of Japanese brands, such as Toyota, Shiseido, Panasonic, etc., through their association with Japan’s cultural appeal; and “cultural exchange,” advancing initiatives such as organizing international exhibitions and investing in long-term relations with opinion leaders in other countries. A few important aspects of Japan’s contemporary cultural diplomacy differ from previous policies. First, its target is audiences abroad rather than within the nation. Second, its intention is to increase the country’s visibility and position abroad by connecting to different people rather than enforcing the regime’s ideology within the country and increasing the state’s control over its citizens. Third, its focus is much more on popular culture, while in the past it tended to devote attention to traditional and “high” culture. Fourth, the means of dissemination are now much more powerful and diverse, using not only the printing press but new communication and information technologies and powerful media such as transnational satellite television broadcasts, the global circulation of movies and the internet (Sato 2012b: 15–16; Shibanai 2012; Shirato 2012). In short, Japan’s cultural diplomacy has evolved in recent decades to become more proactive and better engaged with contemporary developments in Japanese society. As we shall see in the next sections, it has also gained a central position both in the Japanese bureaucracy and in domestic discourse. This is part of a wider global tendency nowadays where nation-states at all levels of influence view cultural/public diplomacy as an important tool to bridge international disagreements and have their voice heard (Kitano 2007: 17–18; Melissen 2007: 8).

Administrating the cool: (too) many captains in Japan’s cultural diplomacy The swift globalization of Japanese contemporary culture in many parts of the world – with both media-related products, such as anime, manga, games and J-pop, as well as “lifestyle” (seikatsu 60

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bunka), such as fashion, design and food – has firmly placed the issue of cultural diplomacy on Japan’s foreign-policy agenda. It has encouraged other ministries and agencies, in addition to MOFA, the Japan Foundation and the Agency for Cultural Affairs, to become more involved in this newly promising sector of cultural production and export. At present, no fewer than thirteen government ministries and agencies are involved in one way or another in promoting Japan’s cultural diplomacy (Zykas 2011a: 155–7). The most prominent are MOFA, the Japan Foundation, the Agency for Culture Affairs (under the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sport, Science and Technology, MEXT), the Prime Minister’s Cabinet (PMC) and METI. These governmental efforts, however, are uncoordinated, over-bureaucratized and often involve competition over resources and prestige. The different terminology used by the various ministries to support cultural production and export is one indication of the lack of coordination. MOFA advocates supporting “pop culture diplomacy” – for example, the promotion of manga, anime, street fashion, otaku subcultures, etc., The Japan Foundation promotes “cultural and intellectual exchange,” while the Agency for Cultural Affairs supports cultural diplomacy by encouraging the dissemination of more “traditional” Japanese culture abroad (although there is sometimes an overlap in the areas of promotion and even rivalry between the three). The PMC, on the other hand, seeks to popularize Japanese “life culture” abroad by introducing Japanese cuisine, fashion and brand names to foreigners, while MEXT endorses “media technology” (medeia gijutsu), referring to the industries producing visuals and sound, such as the music and movies (Zykas 2011a: 163–6). MOFA and the Japan Foundation are in charge of the diplomatic aspects of Japan’s cultural diplomacy and head the attempt to boost the country’s image in other countries as well as cultivate understanding of the country’s position through the usage of culture. In its publications and reports, the Japan Foundation has routinely highlighted Japan’s cultural capabilities and given testimony to the popularity of Japanese culture overseas. MOFA has teamed up with various organizations to promote popular-culture-related events. For example, since 2003, the ministry has collaborated with Nagoya-based tourism-related organizations to organize “World Cosplay Championships,” where participants are judged according to their anime costumes. In 2009, contenders came from fifteen countries: Australia, Brazil, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Thailand and the United States.6 In 2006, the ministry instituted an International Manga Prize, with the hope that it would become the “Nobel Prize” of manga. Competitors from around the world entered the first competition, and the prize was awarded to forty-three-year-old Hong Kong manga artist Lee Chi Ching, for his Sun Zi Tactics manga series. Encouraged by its own assessments, in 2005, MOFA allocated 1.16 billion yen (approximately US$94 million) to the promotion of Japanese anime and pop music in China. In 2006, the amount was almost tripled to 3.11 billion yen, a move meant to preclude any further deterioration in China’s image of Japan following an upsurge in anti-Japanese sentiment sparked by Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine. In the same year, MOFA decided to allocate additional funds to finance the export of Japanese animation to developing countries as part of the ODA program. (An annual budget of 10 million yen had already been designated in previous years.) The justification for these additional funds was that the animation programs would improve the perception of Japan in developing countries.7 Excited about the idea of linking the marketing of cultural products with consumer products, MOFA has, over the past decade, launched a series of creative campaigns aimed at improving the international image of Japan and increasing the visibility of Japanese products in foreign markets. One interesting initiative, which indicates the movement of popular culture to the mainstream, is the appointment of famous anime characters as special ambassadors. Doraemon, a blue robotic cat, 61

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Figure 4.2

Doraemon (center) at his inauguration ceremony as cultural ambassador with  mura (left), Minister for Foreign Affairs, March 2008 Masahiko Ko

Source: Japan Foreign Ministry website.

a character from one of Japan’s most famous manga and anime series, was appointed by the then Japanese foreign minister, Masahiko Komura, as special cultural ambassador to the world at an official inauguration ceremony in Tokyo in 2008 (Figure 4.2). Later that year, Hello Kitty, Japan’s ubiquitous ambassador of cuteness, was appointed as the country’s tourism ambassador to Hong Kong and China. In a similar vein, in 2009, MOFA announced the appointment of three “kawaii ambassadors” to spread the message of Japanese contemporary style and fashion around the world. By participating in publicized PR campaigns, these ambassadors were to meet fans, take part in events and generally bring Japanese contemporary culture closer to young people from other countries.8 More recently, Prime Minister Shinz o Abe appeared dressed as Super Mario, one of Nintendo’s famous animated characters, in the closing ceremony of the Rio Olympics in August 2016. METI and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) are both responsible for overseeing the economic portfolio of the cultural industries. They emphasize the contribution of culture to the national economy and the need to develop related infrastructure. METI’s research institute (RIETI) and its think tanks have been examining ways to encourage the development and export of cultural industries, mainly by studying related literature and data (Otmazgin 2013: 82). The positive projection of Japan’s popular culture exports led METI to establish, in July 2011, the Creative Industries Division, better known as the “Cool Japan” Division. The purpose of this division is to supervise the international promotion of “Cool Japan” and to assist Japanese small and mid-size culture-related firms to pursue a global strategy. METI allocated approximately 650 billion yen in 2013 (approximately US$650 million at that time) to the division’s activities.9 With this budget, the division financed promotional programs and publicity campaigns abroad. As part of this move, in October 2011, METI launched the “Cool Japan” campaign in order to increase the visibility of Japanese products in foreign markets. The overseas campaign, which was engineered by Dentsu Inc., Japan’s largest advertising company, was launched in Singapore and was 62

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Figure 4.3

“Cool Japan” events are organized worldwide in publicized campaigns sponsored by METI – Singapore, October 2011

Source: author.

scheduled to last several months (Figure 4.3: picture from this event). It introduced Japanese fashion, food and anime, and encouraged tourism to Japan. “Cool Japan” events were also scheduled for India, China, South Korea, France, Italy, the United States and Brazil. In July 2012, METI announced it would work together with private firms such as Shibuya’s Parco to launch full-scale exports of Japanese fashion and other cultural trends, featuring mini versions of the trendy Tokyo districts Shibuya and Harajuku in Asian countries overseas.10 More recently, METI announced that in 2016 it would allocate a record high of 70 billion yen (approximately US$500 million) to a global public relations campaign – more than triple the previous year’s budget of 20 billion yen. Essentially, the campaign aims to reach global audiences and to project a more positive image abroad through the support of local Japan-related associations and consultations with local opinion leaders. Part of this sum is allocated to improving the government’s ability to analyze and respond to developments in global opinion and ensure that Japan’s messages get across.11 According to Ibuki Hideki,12 director of the Creative Industries Division, the aim of these initiatives is to promote the export of Japan’s creative industries, such as anime, fashion, and food – entirely new fields for a ministry. In an attempt to facilitate better coordination between the various ministries and agencies involved in cultural promotion abroad as well as productive communication with the private sector, in 2002, the Japanese government established the Strategic Council on Intellectual Property within the prime minister’s office. The aim of the council is to promote growth in Japanese intellectual property, including patented technologies, home design, movies and video game software, as a means of revitalizing the economy and increasing its international appeal. The council is chaired by the prime minister and includes representatives from Japan’s Strategic Council on Intellectual Property, the National Police Agency, Interior Ministry, Foreign Ministry, Finance Ministry, Agency for Cultural Affairs, METI, Japan Patent Office and Keidanren (Japan Business Federation), as well as Diet members, academics and journalists (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet 2008). 63

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In 2014, then Minister Tomomi Inada was made responsible for the coordinated strategy to promote Japan’s culture abroad. According to Minister Inada, “Cool Japan” will serve as a “control tower” for the various ministries and agencies involved in Japan’s cultural exports and coordinate the country’s various “cool” initiatives. Infused with nearly US$500 billion in government funds, the Cool Japan Promotion Council, created by Inada, is to coordinate various promotion campaigns designed to increase the export Japanese cultural-related items and boost incoming tourism.13

Domestic discourse and foreign policy Mainstream discourse in Japan largely has been supportive of the globalization of Japan’s contemporary culture and, aside from a few vocal critics, of contemporary cultural production. Academics, journalists, politicians, bureaucrats and other spectators have all emphasized the growing importance of commodified culture for the country’s future, encouraged the government to intervene to help promote it abroad and at times referred to the export of their country’s culture as a manifestation of soft power. These voices bolster governmental initiatives aimed at promoting Japan’s cultural appeal oversees and constitute a supportive environment for proactive cultural diplomacy. This is because cultural policy is not simply a top-down process but a set of initiatives and actions shaped by the performance of the private sector and the way the public views the production and export of culture (Otmazgin 2011). In other words, to understand cultural policy in Japan, especially when an international aspect is involved, it is necessary to look not only at actions taken by the government but also at the way popular-culture production and export is being discussed and debated in official, intellectual and popular circles. Unlike during most of the postwar period, currently the production and export of popular culture is viewed as economically profitable and diplomatically useful and is therefore a legitimate object of state intervention. The influx of government reports on the topic illustrates this point. According to Choo’s (2012: 86–9) study, government reports dealing with content industries increased from ninety-seven in the 1990s to 516 in the 2000s, with analyses of anime and manga increasing almost fifteen-fold and thirty-seven-fold respectively, while those on video games merely tripled. These reports typically express optimistic prospects for the industry and encourage state intervention. In fact, promoting cultural production and export has become part of the bureaucratic vocabulary in a variety of governmental offices. MOFA, together with the Japan Foundation, routinely publishes reports highlighting Japan’s cultural presence overseas. Already in April 2003, the annual report of the Japan Foundation’s International Exchange Research Committee underscored the potential for Japanese culture to draw a sympathetic “national image” of Japan and to assist its overseas diplomatic aims, emphasizing the rising importance of new powers in today’s diplomacy and characterizing them as “soft power” (Japan Foundation 2003). In November 2010, the MOFA-supported journal Gaiko (Diplomacy) featured a special issue dedicated to Japan’s cultural diplomacy and soft power, with many of the articles referring to the worldwide popularity of anime and calling on the government to utilize it in Japan’s growing international role. While institutional discourse over the benefits of exporting popular culture has been intertwined with action to promote this sector, popular and intellectual discourse in Japan provides it with a strong tailwind. In recent years, newspapers, magazines and academic publications have been wielding support for exporting Japan’s popular culture, since it is seen as both an opportunity to upgrade Japan’s ailing economy and as a means of establishing better relations with people of other countries. 64

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Evidence of Japanese culture’s impact abroad is available from a wide range of communication media: television shows, popular books and magazine articles have dealt extensively with Japan’s “cool exports.”14 One of the most publicized examples in Japan, which is an example of the fascination with Japan’s popular-culture powerhouse, was journalist Douglas McGray’s 2002 article, which introduced the term “Gross National Cool” (GNC) in his depiction of Japan’s booming cultural innovation and lifestyle businesses. McGray (2002) recommended that Japan put more emphasis on developing its cultural production power to boost its economy and thereby increase its ability to influence world affairs. Japanese mass media were soon to endorse the potential of Japan’s contemporary cultural capabilities. One of the earliest examples is a series of twenty-three articles published in 2004 in the Nikkei Shinbun, Japan’s leading economic newspaper, which outlined the need to stimulate growth in Japan’s popular-culture sector. The articles also recommended that the government provide backing by delivering economic incentives and supporting the legal and educational infrastructure needed for the growth of this sector. A few of the articles indicated the potential of Japan’s popular culture to swiftly change Japan’s image overseas, citing Nye’s “soft power” theory as well as the term “Cool Japan” (Nikkei Shinbun, January 5– February 4, 2004). Two years later, the Asahi Shinbun, one of Japan’s leading daily newspapers, was similarly supportive. On the first day of 2006, the newspaper dedicated a front-page article to testimonies to the worldwide fascination with Japanese culture. The coverage included evidence for the success of Japanese culture in places such as Russia, China, Thailand, Europe and North America. The article emphasized the economic benefits of cultural production and export, suggesting that progress in these fields is the key to Japan maintaining its economic superiority over China and India. The second part of the article indicated that cultural exports also support diplomatic efforts by depicting Japan as a peaceful nation (Asahi Shinbun, January 1, 2006: 1–3). In this context, one tension that emerged strongly in the 1990s and remained through the first decade of the twenty-first century was the debate between traditional versus popular, or high versus contemporary culture. In the past, Japanese officials overly favored displaying Japan’s traditional culture – kabuki, kimono, tea ceremony, flower arrangement, Noh theater, etc. – which was thought to better represent Japanese values. In 2004, Kazuo Ogura, then president of the Japan Foundation, argued that Japanese high culture, such as Noh theater, bunraku (puppet theater), ikebana (flower arranging) and chanoyu (tea ceremony), was better for “transmitting the Japanese spirit” and offering the world “international assets.” In the past few years, however, popular culture has clearly won the battle over tradition in appealing to foreign audiences and gaining their interest in Japan. This is due to the simple fact that these days, manga and anime, and not the Japanese economy or Japanese traditional culture, bring students worldwide to study Japanese. In an interview, Nao Endo, Director of the Japan Foundation in Sydney, explained the shift toward displaying contemporary culture.15 While, in his opinion, traditional culture embodies “true” Japanese ideas more genuinely, the audience demands anime. The events they organize involving contemporary Japanese culture draw many young visitors while many of the traditional art exhibitions remain empty. As he sadly concluded, in order for the Japan Foundation to remain relevant, it must focus on exhibiting contemporary forms of Japanese culture.

Conclusion “So people across the world consume Japanese popular culture and have a positive image of Japan. So what?! What kind of profit [for Japan] does it actually generate?”16 65

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According to international relations scholar Peter Katzenstein (2005: 150–7), cultural diplomacy is the tool by which governments project their desired image of the state in other countries – for example, West Germany’s cultural diplomacy after 1949 projected of an image of “normality” following its defeat in World War II and repositioned the country within the American-led world order. In times of international conflict, states are likely to mobilize cultural resources to reaffirm state identity in the face of challenges stemming from the conflict (Press-Barnathan 2016: 5–6). A good example is the cooperation between the US government and Hollywood industry during the Cold War to maintain American self-image and propagate anti-Communist messages. In the case of Japan, as we have seen, its cultural diplomacy has evolved historically. Its cultural diplomacy fluctuated during the postwar era, moving from a neutral framework of “cultural exchange” (bunka koryu) to “internationalization” (kokusaika) and more recently to “soft power.” Its methods were also transformed from mainly dispatching artists and preserving traditional versions of Japanese culture to displaying more openly Japan’s contemporary media and urban lifestyle and linking it more directly to policy goals. The success of the private sector in globalizing Japanese popular culture, coupled with a supportive domestic discourse, has compelled the state to intervene even more and actively incorporate Japan’s cultural resources as part of its diplomacy. The big question is: does cultural diplomacy really make a difference in international affairs or is it merely an activity that creates a good atmosphere? Is hard power all that really matters? The available literature, including Nye’s description of soft power (2004), stresses that soft power works better when complementing hard power and may emerge as useful at certain periods of time in correlation with other political, economic and social factors. It is also obvious that cultural diplomacy works in the long term, whereas its ability to solve immediate tensions is more limited. According to international-relations scholar Fukushima (2012: 58–60), culture plays a constructive role in conflict resolution through long-term empowerment. She argues that crossconflict cultural activities in sporting events (Olympics, soccer tournaments), music concerts and art-related workshops provide people not only with new cultural capital and with an understanding of the value of their own traditions but also the feeling that they are part of a wider global community. One of the major advantages of utilizing culture as part of diplomacy is its ability to transcend national boundaries even in places where it is officially banned. In the case of Japanese contemporary culture, despite the attempts of governments in Asia to discourage the youth from consuming it because of political or moral concerns, fans were not persuaded. In South Korea, China and Taiwan, devoted fans continued to consume anime, manga and Japanese television programs and music even when it was illegal. Japanese popular culture in Asia, according to a questionnaire survey with students (Otmazgin 2012), has worked to placate Japan’s image as a wartime aggressor and engender within consumers positive images of Japan, such as being home to a dynamic culture and vibrant society. No doubt, there is an inherent vagueness in the term “soft power.” There is a need to create a more rigorous definition and to evaluate its capacity and impact – not to mention the need to investigate how it is utilized by the state. But the more important point, in this author’s view, is that soft power has become a powerful discursive force, which eventually influences policy. As we saw in Japan, the issue of soft power is no longer only in the hands of researchers from academia; it has assumed a life of its own, been bureaucratized in the official discourse and become an integral part of contemporary culture vocabulary. It has become part of the popular political and economic discourses that fuel interest in culture production and consumption and has thus become a legitimate object of, rather than concept for, analysis (Otmazgin and Ben-Ari 2012). For this reason, as Hsiao and Yang (2009) point out, soft power should be seen against a wider backdrop of relatively new policy initiatives that include “public diplomacy,” “smile diplomacy” 66

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and “good neighbor policy.” These initiatives all have one thing in common: the persuasive use of soft-power resources to ease cross-national tensions and resolve international disputes using peaceful means. While Japan’s cultural diplomacy has become more proactive in the past few years, it is now facing competition from neighboring countries. The popularity of South Korean contemporary culture, better known as Hallyu, in many parts of the world, together with the global success of Samsung, Hyundai, LG and other Korean manufacturers, provides Korea with significant new resources of soft power. The Korean government has been strategically exploring the benefits of utilizing Hallyu in the service of the state and organizing the bureaucracy accordingly. One example is the establishment of two special semi-government agencies – Korea Creative Content Agency (KOCCA) and the Korea Foundation for International Cultural Exchange (KOFICE) – to mediate between state policy and the private sector. The Chinese government, meanwhile, has been investing heavily in promoting the teaching of Chinese culture and language through its Confucius Institutes. Started in 2004, the number of these institutes had mushroomed to nearly 500 in 134 countries by 2016. On New Year’s Day 2012, the Chinese government inaugurated its first non-profit organization dedicated to the promotion of soft power – China Public Diplomacy Association (CPDA) – with the goal of “promoting China’s soft power.”17 According to some observers, the use of cultural diplomacy in China is now viewed as a way to counter Japan’s appeal as a democratic country and a long-time ally of the United States (Okawa 2007; Yoo 2007). Amid the growth of Korea’s and China’s cultural industries, and the competition it is facing from other Asian nations, Japan may be losing its position as a front-runner in Asia in the field of cultural diplomacy. This may force Japan to become more creative in its cultural-diplomacy initiatives, elevate cultural diplomacy’s position both within and outside state bureaucracy and provide it with bigger resources. More specifically, the author’s recommendation is that Japan’s cultural diplomacy refocus to display the diversity of Japanese society and not attempt to deliver a unified sense of Japanese culture. It should celebrate the heterogeneity of thoughts and behaviors, the dynamism of civil society and the creativity of its contemporary culture. Japanese society is not as homogenous as it is often portrayed. Showing the multifaceted diversity of Japanese localities and of opinions may serve Japan better than directing its cultural diplomacy toward a unified position towards international issues. Second, Japan’s cultural diplomacy should make better use of the dense traffic of communication with the advent of social media (Twitter, Facebook, etc.) as well as the continuing importance of mainstream media (television, radio) and the progress of what some believe may be a model of multidirectional global culture. Japan has a vibrant and a technology-avid youth culture (the success of Pokemon Go in summer 2016 is a recent example) that could be incorporated into Japan’s campaign to increase its presence in the world. For this purpose, there is a need for a better mediating mechanism between the policy and the market. A possible solution might be to establish mediating bodies that are staffed with people coming from the private sector and not officials descending from state bureaucracy. Those from Japan’s media and cultural industries are in a better position to decide what is “cool” and what is not. Third, Japan’s cultural diplomacy should invest in people. People-to-people relations are the best way to connect people to Japan and their impact remains for a longer period of time. Making a Japanese friend, experiencing a language course in Japan or having a joint seminar of state officials has an enduring impact on the participants. It is also a matter of priorities: the price of one F-16 should be enough to sponsor a whole decade of cultural initiatives and scholarships that would bring Japan more directly to the world’s attention. Lastly, Japan should not fear displaying its achievements more actively and expanding its cultural diplomacy even more, especially outside the Western European/North American world. Seven 67

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decades have passed since Japan’s defeat in the war and some of the traumatic clouds that shadowed Japanese postwar politics have faded. It is time for Japan, a stable constitutional democracy, an economic power and home to some of the world’s most vibrant cultural industries, to become more influential in international affairs, and cultural diplomacy is a good way to do it.

Acknowledgment The author acknowledges the following sources, where earlier versions of some parts of the chapter appear: ‘Geopolitics and Soft Power: Japan’s Cultural Policy and Cultural Diplomacy in Asia’ (2012), Asia-Pacific Review, 19(1): 37–61 and ‘A Tail that Wags the Dog? Cultural Industry and Cultural Policy in Japan and South Korea’ (2011), Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, 13(3): 307–25.

Notes 1

2 3

4

5 6 7 8 9 10 11

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The term “cultural diplomacy” refers to a policy that exploits cultural resources in order to improve a country’s image abroad and further its goals in the international system (Milton 2001). “Soft power” is a term coined by Joseph Nye to describe the growing importance of non-traditional means, such as the culture and ideals a country can wield to influence another country’s wants (Nye 2004a). Tar o As o, interview in Nikkei Business Online, December 6, 2007. This does not mean that Japan’s cultural diplomacy was completely paralyzed. During the postwar decades, it had its ups and downs until becoming more active in the 1990s and 2000s, as discussed later in this chapter. For an elaborated discussion see Kaneko and Kitano (2007), who divide Japan’s cultural diplomacy into six main periods, and Zykas (2011b), who divides the same period into four main stages. For a review of Japan’s involvement in UNESCO, see MOFA’s official website and its reports: www. unesco.emb-japan.go.jp/htm/japan_contribution_to_unesco.htm; www.mext.go.jp/en/unesco/ title02/detail02/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2014/10/10/1352429_01.pdf. Since the United States has suspended its funding to UNESCO in 2011 in protest of what it views as the organization’s one-sided views against Israel, Japan has become the organization’s largest contributor. Interview with Director of Public Diplomacy Strategy Division, Minister’s Secretariat, MOFA, Tokyo, July 10, 2014. “Japanese Win Cosplay World Title,” Japan Times, August 3, 2009, available at: http://search.japantimes. co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20090803a5.htm. Asahi Shinbun, December 22, 2005, p. 26. MOFA Announcement, “Introduction of the Kawaii Ambassadors,” March 12, 2009, available at: www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/2009/3/0312.html. Interview with Ibuki Hideki, director of METI’s Creative Industries Division, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, August 22, 2013. Yomiuri Online, July 15, 2012, available at: www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/business/T120724003516.htm. Jeff Kingston, “Japan’s Public Diplomacy is Expensive and Errant,” Japan Times, February 14, 2015, available at: www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/02/14/commentary/japans-public-diplomacyexpensive-errant/#.VPKP_PmUdR2. Interview conducted in Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, August 22, 2013. Minister Inada’s “Cool Japan” initiatives have gained wide coverage in domestic and foreign news. See, for example, www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2014/06/japans-soft-power and www.japanculturenyc.com/2014/02/03/whats-so-cool-about-japan. See “Kuru Japan Kasoku” [Speeding Cool Japan], Sankei Shinbun, September 26, 2015, p. 2; and also Mainichi Shinbun, February 25, 2015. Interview with Endo Nao, Sydney, August 24, 2012. Interview with Yusuke Arai, Director of Public Diplomacy Strategy Division, Minister’s Secretariat, MOFA, Tokyo, July 10, 2014. “China to Boost Public Diplomacy, Exchanges,” China Daily, January 1, 2013, available at: www. chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2013-01/01/content_16073723.htm; and “Destined to Fail: China’s Soft Power Push,” The Diplomat, January 7, 2013, available at: http://thediplomat.com/2013/01/07/destinedto-fail-chinas-soft-power-offensive.

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Bibliography Brienza, C. (2016) Manga in America: Transnational Book Publishing and the Domestication of Japanese Comics, New York: Bloomsbury. Bunkach o [Agency for Cultural Affairs] (2003) Kongo no Kokusaibunkakotyu no Suishin ni tsuite [About the Future of International Cultural Exchange], Kokusai Bunka K ory u Kondannkai [International Cultural Exchange Committee], 24 March. Choo, K. (2012) ‘Nationalizing “Cool”: Japan’s Global Promotion of the Content Industry’, in N. Otmazgin and E. Ben-Ari (eds), Popular Culture and the State in East and Southeast Asia, London: Routledge. Gaiko (2010) Bunkagaiko to Sofutopawa [Cultural Diplomacy and Soft Power], 3 November. Gregory, B. (2008) ‘Public Diplomacy: Sunrise of an Academic Field’, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 616: 274–90. Fukushima, A. (2012) Funso to Bunkagaiko—Heiwa Kochiku wo Sasaeru Bunka no Chikara [Conflict and Cultural Diplomacy: The Power of Culture to Support Peace Building], Tokyo: Keio University Press. Hirano, K. (2005) Sengo Nihon no Kokusai Bunka Koryu [Japan’s Postwar International Cultural Exchange], Tokyo: Keis o Shob o. Hsiao, H.M. and Yang, A. (2009) ‘Soft Power Politics in the Asia Pacific: Chinese and Japanese Quests for Regional Leadership’, The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, February. Itoh, M. (2000) Globalization of Japan: Japanese Sakoku Mentality and U.S. Efforts to Open Japan, New York: St. Martin Press. Japan Foundation (2003) Aratana Jidai no Gaiko to Kokusaikoryu no Aratana Yakuwari [Diplomacy in a New Era and a New Role for International Exchange], Tokyo: International Exchange Research Group. Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2006) ‘A New Look at Cultural Diplomacy: A Call to Japan’s Cultural Practitioners’ www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speech0604-2.html accessed 5 September 2010. Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2010) Gaiko, Bunkagaiko to Sofutopawa [Cultural Diplomacy and Soft Power], Tokyo, 3 November. Kahn, W. (1999) ‘Changing Attitudes toward Cultural Interchange in Postwar Japan’, Asia-Pacific Review, 6(2): 65–77. Kaneko, M. and Kitano, M. (eds) (2007) Paburikku Dipuromashi [Public Diplomacy], Tokyo: PHP Interface. Katzenstein, J.P. (2005) A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Kitano, M. (2007) ‘Paburikku Depuromashi to ha Nanika’ [What is Public Diplomacy?], in K. Masafumi and K. Mitsuro (eds), Paburriko Depuromashi – Yoron no Jidai no Gaikosenryaku [Public Diplomacy: Diplomatic Strategy in the Age of Public Opinion], Tokyo: PHP Interface. Kushner, B. (2006) The Thought War: Japanese Imperial Propaganda, Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press. Kusunoki, A. (2015) ‘Kokusai K ory u Kikin no Setsuritsu – Nichibeikankei to Nihongaik o no Ishikiheny o’ [The Establishment of the Japan Foundation: Japan-US relations and Japan’s Changing Diplomatic Awareness], in F. Fukunaga (ed), Daini no Sengo no Keiseikatei – 1970nendai Nihon no Seijitekigaikosaihen [Japan’s Postwar History Revisited: Politics and Diplomacy in the 1970s], Tokyo: Yuhikaku. Matsumura, M. (2002) Kokusai Koryushi. Kingendai Nihon no Koho Bunka Gaiko to Minkan Koryu [History of International Exchange: Contemporary Japan Information Diplomacy and Exchange], Tokyo: Chijinkan. McGray, D. (2002) ‘Japan’s Gross National Cool’, Foreign Policy, 130: 44–54. Melissen, J. (2007) ‘The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice’, in J. Melissen (ed), The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations, New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 3–27. Milton, C.C. (2001) Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government: A Survey, Center for Arts and Culture. www.americansforthearts.org/by-program/reports-and-data/legislation-policy/naappd/culturaldiplomacy-and-the-united-states-government-a-survey accessed 15 August 2016. Neki, A. (2001) Nihon no Bunkaseisaku – Bunkaseisakugaku no Kochiku ni Mukete [Japan’s Cultural Policy: Towards Constructing Cultural Policy Studies], Tokyo: Keisoshobo. Nye, S.J. Jr. (2004a) Soft Power. ‘The Means to Success in World Politics’, New York: Public Affairs. Nye, S.J. Jr. (2004b) ‘Nihon no Sofuto Pawa – Sono Genkai to Kanousei’ [Japan’s Soft Power: Its Limits and Possibilities], Gaiko, June. Nye S.J. Jr. (2008) ‘Forward’, in, Y. Watanabe and D.L. McConnell (eds), Soft Power Superpowers: Cultural and National Assets of Japan and the United States, New York: M.E. Sharp. Ogura, K. (2004) ‘“Kokusai zai” no shin ni Kachi koso Sekai ni Hasshin Shiyo’ [Sharing Japan’s Cultural Products as ‘International Assents’], Chuo Koron, October: 210–17.

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Okawa, T. (2007) ‘Shuyoukoku no Paburriku Diplomashi’ [Public Diplomacy in Major Countries], in K. Masafumi and K. Mitsuro (eds), Puburriko Depuromashi – Yoron no Jidai no Gaikosenryaku [Public Diplomacy: Diplomatic Strategy in the Age of Public Opinion], Tokyo: PHP Interface, 45–101. Otmazgin, N. (2005) ‘Cultural Commodities and Regionalization in East Asia’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 27(3): 499–523. Otmazgin, N. (2008) ‘Contesting Soft Power: Japanese Popular Culture in East and Southeast Asia’, International Relations of the Asia Pacific, 8(1): 73–101. Otmazgin, N. (2011) ‘A Tail that Wags the Dog? Cultural Industry and Cultural Policy in Japan and South Korea’, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 13(3): 307–25. Otmazgin, N. (2012) ‘Japan Imagined: Popular Culture, Soft Power, and Japan’s Changing Image in Northeast and Southeast Asia’, Contemporary Japan, 24(1): 1–19. Otmazgin, N. (2013) Regionalizing Culture: The Political Economy of Japanese Popular Culture in Asia, Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press. Otmazgin, N. and Ben-Ari, E. (2012) ‘Cultural Industries and the State in East and Southeast Asia’, in N. Otmazgin and E. Ben-Ari (eds), Popular Culture and the State in East and Southeast Asia, London: Routledge, 3–6. Park, S.M. (2008–9) ‘Wartime Japan’s Cultural Diplomacy and the Establishment of Culture Bureaus’, WIAS Discussion Paper. Pellitteri, M. (2011), The Dragon and the Dazzle: Models, Strategies, and Identities of Japanese Imagination–A European Perspective, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Press-Barnathan, G. (2012) ‘Does Popular Culture Matter to International Relations Scholars?’, in N. Otmazgin and E. Ben-Ari (eds), Popular Culture and the State in East and Southeast Asia, London: Routledge, 29–45. Press-Barnathan, G. (2016) ‘Thinking about the Role of Popular Culture in International Conflicts’, International Studies Review, 19(2): 1–19. Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet (2008) Official Website www.kantei.go.jp accessed 14 August 2009. Sato, T. (2012a) ‘Bunkarikkoku Nihon ni okeru Medeiaron no Hinkon’ [Cultural Leading Country: The Poor State of Media Discourse in Japan], in T. Sato et al. (eds), Sofuto Pawa no Mediabunkaseisaku – Kokusaihasshinryoku wo Motomete [Media Policy of Soft Power: Seeking International Power], Tokyo: Shinyosha, 143–76. Sato, T. (2012b) ‘Mediabunkaseisaku ha Nanika’ [What is Media Culture Policy?], in T. Sato et al. (eds), Sofuto Pawa no Mediabunkaseisaku – Kokusaihasshinryoku wo Motomete [Media Policy of Soft Power: Seeking International Power], Tokyo: Shinyosha, 9–23. Shibanai, Y. (2012) ‘Kontentsu A-kitekucha Sosharu’ [Content, Architectural, Social], in T. Sato et al. (eds), Sofuto Pawa no Mediabunkaseisaku – Kokusaihasshinryoku wo Motomete [Media Policy of Soft Power: Seeking International Power], Tokyo: Shinyosha, 315–36. Shiraishi, S. (2013) Grobarukashita Nihon no Manga to Anime [Globalized Japanese Manga and Anime], Tokyo: Gakujutsu Shuppankai. Shirato, K. (2012) ‘Denshin, Denpa, Denshi no Mediabunkaseisaku’ [Media Cultural Policy of Wave, Broadcast, and Media Technologies], in T. Sato et al. (eds), Sofuto Pawa no Mediabunkaseisaku – Kokusaihasshinryoku wo Motomete [Media Policy of Soft Power: Seeking International Power], Tokyo: Shinyosha, 270–91. Tsutsui, W.M. (2010) Japanese Popular Culture and Globalization, Michigan: Association for Asian Studies, Inc. Yano, C. (2013) Pink Globalization: Hello Kitty’s Trek across the Pacific, Durham: Duke University Press. Yoo, M. (2007) ‘Chugoku no taibei Paburiku Dipromashi’ [China’s Public Diplomacy in the US], in K. Masafumi and K. Mitsuro (eds), Puburiko Depuromashi – Yoron no Jidai no Gaikosenryaku [Public Diplomacy: Diplomatic Strategy in the Age of Public Opinion], Tokyo: PHP Interface, 151–82. Zykas, A. (2011a) ‘The Discourses of Popular Culture in 21st Century Japan’s Cultural Diplomacy Agenda’, in T. Kitamura, K. Koma and S. Li (eds), The Reception of Japanese and Korean Popular Culture in Europe, Kaunas: Vytautauto Magnus University. Zykas, A. (2011b) ‘Traditional and Popular Cultural Discourses within the Postwar Development of Japan’s Cultural Diplomacy’, Acta Orientlia Vilnensia, 12(1): 105–19.

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Part II

The global environment and sustainable development

5 Global environmental problems and Japanese foreign environmental policy Miranda Schreurs

As a group of volcanic islands, the Japanese archipelago lacks fossil fuels and many other natural resources. As the fourth largest economy in the world after the United States, China, and the European Union, Japan’s appetite for natural resources is large. Japan is heavily dependent on coal, oil, natural gas, and mineral imports both for domestic consumption and to support its export-oriented economy. Japan has played no small role in the biodiversity loss experienced in many parts of East and Southeast Asia through its appetite for lumber, mineral resources, and marine products. Japanese consumption patterns have contributed to the plastic and electronic waste problems facing many parts of Asia. And although a far smaller greenhouse-gas emitter than either China or the United States, Japan is nevertheless still the fifth largest greenhouse-gas emitter, at somewhat less than 4% of total world emissions. While the Japanese ecological footprint is substantial, Japan is also an active participant in global environmental agreements and a leader in the provision of global environmental assistance, both technological and financial. Domestically in the 1970s, serious industrial pollution (kogai) led to bottom-up pressures for change to Japan’s growth-oriented industrial policy and the introduction of pollution-control policies and technologies. These policies were late in coming but once implemented were quite successful. Japan has made use of the lessons it has learned from its own historical experiences with extreme pollution levels and their human and environmental consequences in advising others on how to control pollution. Japan has also made large financial commitments to environmental protection in developing and transitioning economies and shared with them considerable scientific and technological know-how (Armitage 2009; Kamidohzono, Gœmez and Mine 2016). This chapter considers the factors which drove Japan to become more active in global environmental protection and what that has meant for Japanese foreign environmental policies, focusing in large part on Japanese involvement in global environmental agreements. Japan is signatory to most of the major international environmental agreements, including the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Dumping, the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Cartegna Protocol on Biosafety, the Paris Climate Agreement, and the Minamata Convention on Mercury. The chapter also considers some continued areas of critique of Japan’s foreign environmental policies. 73

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The pressures of Japanese consumption on the planet Global warming has the potential to tip the natural climate systems out of balance, resulting in more severe weather extremes and storms. Warmer temperatures could lead to sea levels rising and threaten the survival of sensitive species. The sustained and rapid loss of global forests already has altered landscapes and ecological systems, changed ways of life, and reduced natural carbon sinks and biodiversity. Not only deforestation but also conversion of land for development and agriculture are contributing to widespread loss of plant and animal species. The oceans are becoming increasingly acidic, warm, and polluted with plastics. Large swaths of coral reefs have already been lost and many fish species are threatened with collapse. More generally, natural resources are being depleted at increasingly rapid rates as economic development leads to greater consumption and the global population continues to grow. In short, the planet being left to future generations is one that will be far less biologically diverse, with fewer available resources, and conceivably with far more extreme climatic conditions. These problems are closely tied to the capitalist economic structures that became rooted in the advanced industrialized countries and the energy and consumption patterns that have underpinned them (Yamamura 2017). Historically, consumption of natural resources has been very uneven between the developed and developing countries, with the richest parts of the planet responsible for by far the largest share of global resource consumption. Europe, North America, and Japan have been responsible for the largest share of industrial pollution and resource depletion. There are many examples of where Japanese consumption patterns have a large global impact. One is lumber, for which Japan’s appetite has been voracious. As Japan’s demand for timber in the construction industry grew, companies increasingly looked overseas for new supplies. Over time, Japan’s domestic forestry industry became less competitive and Japan became an increasingly large importer of timber from neighboring countries. Large Japanese trading firms (sogo shosha) dominate the Japanese timber trade, a position they solidify through their keiretsu chains. The Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry (METI) pushed to improve access for Japanese timbertrading companies overseas. Japan played a major role in the deforestation of the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia. While Japan’s investment in international public works projects, the building of roads, dams, highways, and airports, has certainly done much good, the negative environmental and social impacts of some of these projects has often received scant attention domestically. Considering how the Shinto and Buddhist roots of Japan have led to beliefs in the intertwined nature of all things in the universe, a sense of harmony with nature, and a respectful and compassionate relationship with animals, it is interesting to consider why the environmental pollution and natural degradation that were caused by Japan’s economic and trade activities internationally did not cause more discussion and debate in Japan. Vested interests have managed to link their commercial causes to international environmental-aid programs. Japan’s global environmental policies are linked to environmental-technology exports as well as to obtaining access to the energy and resources needed to fuel the economy (Kagawa-Fox 2012). The main actors involved in Japan’s foreign environmental policy are the METI and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). The Ministry of Environment’s interests lie primarily with environmental conservation and resource conservation. METI links environmental protection and energy savings to its primary role of promoting the economy and trade. MOFA uses environment as a form of soft power. Each places a different weight on the elements they deem most important in Japan’s foreign relations. 74

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Forces driving Japan’s foreign environmental policy There are several forces that have driven Japan to become more active in its foreign environmental policy. One important force is pressure from abroad. Japan has been the target of substantial international criticism for the role it played in depleting global fish stocks, in deforestation in many parts of Southeast Asia (Dauvergne 1997; Nectoux and Kuroda 1989), its continuation of “scientific” whaling, and its contributions to international waste export, among other issues. There is also the interest in being “part of the club.” When other states join in an international agreement, there can be an interest in joining in order not to be viewed negatively as a free rider or spoiler. Alternatively, one can improve information flows and strengthen international ties through global cooperation. Of course, growing domestic awareness of the importance of international environmental protection is also a factor. Japan has also pursued environmental protection as a form of soft power – that is, as a means to exert influence on the policies and programs of other countries while at the same time gaining good will for those efforts. This may be done in the hope of strengthening ties and possibly as an unspoken means of redress for previous damaging actions (Matsuoka 2014). An additional factor driving Japan’s foreign environmental policy may be the normative power of example. Japan has been very active in the provision of bilateral environmental assistance in China and throughout Southeast Asia. Much of this aid focuses on introducing Japanese technological know-how for environmental-pollution control as well as legal advice and awareness raising (Wu 2008).

The threat of the seal’s extinction leads to Japan’s first international environmental agreement It is interesting to see that Japan has been involved in international environmental protection for over a hundred years. During the Edo Period, from 1600 to 1868, Japan largely followed a politics of isolation, with some exceptions for Dutch, Portuguese, and Chinese traders. Japanese vessels remained largely within territorial waters. With the opening of Japan to the West, however, Japanese fishing fleets, schooners, and military ships began to be active in increasingly distant waters. In the Meiji Era, Japan joined Canadian, American, and Russian schooners in the hunt for seals in international waters to profit from the trade in fur pelts. Within a few short decades, various seal populations in the waters of the northern Pacific were endangered with extinction. Efforts to establish a cooperative solution were initiated and dragged on for several decades (Mirovitskaya, Clark and Purver 1993: 22). The United States initiated negotiations and in 1897 obtained Japanese and Russian agreement to a one-year ban on the killing of the fur seal and sea otter in all the open waters of the North Pacific Ocean, including the Seas of Bering, Okhotsk, and Kamtchatka, to prevent the seal’s extinction and thereby to protect the fur industry. The agreement, however, required Great Britain’s consent and this was not forthcoming. Great Britain disapproved of the agreement which it saw as an infringement on the freedom of the seas; as a result, the agreement came to naught (Wiktor 1976: 271). It took another fourteen years and much more negotiation before an agreement was finally reached. The 1911 agreement for the Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals was signed by the United States, Japan, Great Britain, and Russia. The agreement restricted pelagic sealing in the waters of the North Pacific Ocean, north of the thirtieth parallel of north latitude and including the Seas of Bering, Kamchatka, Okhotsk and Japan, and that 75

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every person and vessel offending against such prohibition may be seized, except within the territorial jurisdiction of one of the other Powers, and detained by the naval or other duly commissioned officers of any of the Parties to this Convention. (www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1913/6.html, cited in https://iea.uoregon.edu/treaty/259) The United States and Russia were given responsibility for enforcing the convention and compensated Canada and Japan with an annual portion of the pelts the United States harvested on its land for the restrictions they were subjected to. The convention remained in place until Japan’s entry into World War II led to a termination of the agreement (Corbett and Swibold 2005: 1463). Japan also became party to the 1920 Treaty concerning the Archipelago of Spitsbergen, which regulated fishing and hunting in the territory and gave Norway the power to determine “suitable measures to ensure the preservation and, if necessary, the re-constitution of the fauna and flora of the said regions, and their territorial waters” (www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1925/ 10.html). At the time, only a handful of agreements addressing wildlife conservation existed worldwide, making all the more interesting Japan’s early involvement in these agreements. There were clearly economic and political reasons for doing so. Two months before bombing Pearl Harbor, however, Japan abrogated the treaty, contending the seals were invading Japanese waters and eating too many squid and food fish. Japan laid plans for the resumption of extensive pelagic sealing (Loughrey 1943). Perhaps it is interesting to note that close to a century after Japan entered an international agreement to protect seals from the hunt for pelts, various animal-rights campaigns promoting ethical clothing effectively cut into the fur market in Japan, so that in 2016 the last mink fur farm was shut down (The Association for the Protection of Fur-Bearing Animals 2016). The immediate trigger for the shutdown of the mink fur farms in Japan was the passage of the Alien Species Act in 2006, which made it illegal to build new mink fur farms in Japan because of the damage caused to biodiversity by escaped American mink.

Japan and global environmental agreements After the end of World War II, initiatives to protect the marine environment took on new significance. In 1951, Japan joined the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling and in 1954 it signed the International Convention for Prevention of Pollution at Sea by Oil, prohibiting the dumping of oil at sea by ships (https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/ Volume%20327/volume-327-I-4714-English.pdf). As an island nation, Japanese culture is intertwined with the sea. Across the country, Shinto shrines were built to the gods of seas and storms. Japanese cuisine is dependent on fish proteins and many traditional crafts are made from whale bones, turtle shells, and seashells. Japan is one of the world’s largest producers and importers of fish although its fishery production has been decreasing since its peak in the early 1980s. Production levels were 5.32 million tons and 1.47 trillion yen in 2010, half of the peak values. The decline of Japanese fish production can be linked to the establishment of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) regime by the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Part V, Article 55), which gives a state special rights regarding the exploration and use of marine resources within 200 nautical miles of its coast. As a result of the EEZ regime, Japanese distant-water fisheries declined, so that as of 2010 less than 10% of Japan’s marine production (excluding aquaculture and inland waters) came from waters other than the NorthWestern Pacific covering Japan’s EEZ. Japanese production of fish has declined and imports have 76

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increased. The Japanese fishing industry was also badly damaged by the March 11, 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster, with fisheries in Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima being particularly heavily hit. Per capita consumption of fish has nevertheless increased with time. Compared with a per capita intake of 50.4 kg of fish per annum in 1961, in 2007 consumption had increased to 56.9 kg. This compares with China, which over the same time period went from 4.9 kg to 26.5 kg, the United States, which went from 13kg to 24.1 kg, and the EU, which went from 14.5kg to 22kg. Japan’s ecological footprint is particularly large in relation to some species. Japanese consume 80–90% of total world production of Atlantic and Pacific bluefin tuna. Japan also consumes about 70% of the world’s eel catch. International pressures for Japan to act have had some impacts, with enhanced monitoring and efforts to control illegal imports (Popescu and Ogushi 2013). A further significant step expanding Japan’s involvement in global environmental protection came with its ratification in 1960 of the Antarctic Treaty, which aims to protect and maintain peace on the only essentially uninhabited continent. The treaty explicitly bans nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive wastes in Antarctica and has been complemented by numerous agreements regarding the protection of the continent’s environment. In 1965, Japan joined the Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora, part of the Antarctic Treaty System. The objective of these measures was to protect the fauna and flora of the region while establishing rules and norms regarding their scientific study and use. The measures entered into force in 1982, but as of 2011 these measures were no longer considered current under the Antarctic Treaty, having been replaced by other conventions. Japan also is party to the conventions for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (1972), the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (1982), the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (signed in 1988 but not in force), and the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (entered into force in 1998). The protocol prevents development and activities related to mineral resources (except scientific) and includes five annexes on marine pollution, fauna and flora, environmental impact assessments, waste management, and protected areas. Japan’s reasons for becoming involved in the Antarctic Treaty include an interest in preventing rivalries and maintaining peace in the region but also economic interests. Being involved in the Antarctic Treaty arrangement allows Japan to be engaged in scientific research as well as to continue to engage in some fishing and whaling ( Joyner 1989). Japan has in the meantime joined a significant number of additional international environmental agreements. In 1970, for instance, Japan joined the Inter American Tropical Tuna Commission, which was first negotiated between the United States and Costa Rica and came into force in 1950. The agreement covers countries whose nationals fish for tropical tuna in the eastern Pacific Ocean (Bayliff 2001). Despite these positive steps, Japan’s marine-conservation initiatives remain under strong international scrutiny. Japanese whaling policy has been the subject of strong international criticism. Japan’s continued insistence on whaling puts it in a cultural and ethical conflict with the norms found in many other states that have agreed to a moratorium. Historically, Japan had a small whaling industry, but in the postwar period, Japan became the world’s largest consumer of whale meat. When an international moratorium on whaling was introduced in 1988 due to scientific evidence of declining whale populations and concerns about whale species’ long-term survivability, the Japanese government agreed to the moratorium but continued to engage in so-called “scientific whaling,” catching about 400 whales per year in the Antarctic and about 150 whales in the Pacific. There are various actors pushing for the right to continued whaling: the Fisheries Agency, the Institute of Cetacean Research, and the Japan Fisheries Association have actively argued for why Japan should be allowed to resume whaling. 77

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The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) is one of the earliest environmental agreements dealing with wildlife preservation. The CITES Convention originated at a meeting of the World Conservation Union (IUCN) in 1963. The text of the convention was originally agreed to at a meeting in Washington, DC in 1973. Japan was the 57th government to accept the agreement, doing so in 1980, several years later than the United States, Canada, and most western European states (https://cites.org/eng/disc/parties/chronolo.php). The list of species brought under the CITES trade controls is periodically reviewed. In 2017, new trade rules came into effect and hundreds of new species were brought under the agreement for protection (https://cites.org/eng/new_CITES_trade_rules_come_into_effect_as_2017_starts_ 02012017). There are approximately 5,600 species of animals and 30,000 species of plants protected by CITES (https://cites.org/eng/disc/species.php). Under the rules of CITES, countries are able to formally list reservations to the listing of species under the various categories found within CITES. Japan has entered twenty-one reservations to the listing of specific species (primarily shark and whale species) for protection. This compares with zero for Canada and the United States and seven for the European Union member states. The only other countries with similarly high numbers of reservations are Liechtenstein, Switzerland, and Saudi Arabia with seventeen, Iceland with twenty-two, and Palau with thirtytwo. Seven of the reservations Japan made to the listing of species were made in 2013 or 2017 and these were in relation to shark species. Reservations which were entered in earlier years are for specific whale, shark, and dolphin species as well as to one species of sea horse (https://cites.org/ eng/app/reserve.php). Japan’s continuation of whale, shark, and dolphin catching for “scientific” purposes has been sharply criticized by environmental groups and most other countries and overshadows the positive conservation initiatives Japan has made.

Protecting bird life A major area of interest in Japan has been the protection of bird life. Japan has a large population of bird watchers and the Wild Bird Society of Japan, established in 1934, is one of its largest nongovernmental organizations, with a membership of over 40,000 as of 2011. It has ninety chapters throughout the country (www.wbsj.org/about-us/summary/about/). The interests of these nature enthusiasts in promoting international nature-conservation activities in Japan has been substantial. Bird populations in Japan suffered major declines, and culturally significant species, such as the Japanese crane, are threatened with extinction. The loss of habitat due to construction projects, the filling in of wetlands, and agricultural expansion, as well as pollution and the use of agricultural pesticides, put heavy pressures on bird populations. Both in response to growing international concern and domestic pressures, Japan has entered into various agreements intended to protect migratory bird species. In 1972, the US and Japan signed the Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Birds in Danger of Extinction, and their Environment. The agreement was particularly important for birds migrating between Japan and the Pacific and Alaska Regions of the United States (www.fws.gov/ international/pdf/treaties-and-conventions-us-japan-migratory-bird-convention.pdf). The Japan– Australia Migratory Bird Agreement was negotiated in 1974 and entered into force in 1981. It commits both countries to take actions to protect migratory birds, some of which are threatened with extinction, by prohibiting the taking of migratory birds or their eggs, with some exceptions (e.g. for scientific, educational, or propagative purposes or by inhabitants who have traditionally been involved in such activities), controlling their export, and establishing sanctuaries 78

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(www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1981/6.html). Similar agreements have been reached between Japan and China (1981), Korea, and the USSR (now the Russian Federation) (1988). With the shift towards public–private partnerships, which emerged in an effort to improve public awareness and to aid enforcement and in recognition of the importance of multilateral frameworks, Australia spearheaded a drive towards a new initiative. Building on the earlier AsiaPacific Migratory Waterbird Conservation Strategy (2001–5), the East Asian-Australasian Flyway Partnership was adopted as a Type II voluntary and informal initiative of the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2006. The partnership which includes governments, intergovernmental agencies, international non-governmental organizations, and the international business sector aims to protect migratory waterbirds and their habitat throughout East Asia. Participating countries include Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, South Korea, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, Timor Leste, the United States, and Vietnam (www. eaaflyway.net/about/countries-in-the-flyway/). Efforts to enhance habitat protection have gained traction over time. The Ramsar Convention on Wetlands was negotiated in Ramsar, Iran in 1971 – an early initiative in this regard. The agreement establishes a set of norms and rules regarding national action and international cooperation for the conservation of wetlands and their resources. Japan became a signatory to the convention in 1980 and hosted the Fifth Meeting of the Conference of the Contracting Parties (COP5) in 1993, strengthening awareness of the importance of wetlands in the country after years of land-reclamation projects which destroyed wetland areas. The first site to be designated by the convention was Kushiro-shitsugen, a wetlands home to twenty-six species of mammal and 170 species of bird, including the endangered Japanese crane (www.env.go.jp/en/nature/ npr/ramsar_wetland/pamph/ramsarpamphen/RamsarSites_en_web17.pdf). As much of the original wetlands of this area was damaged from land reclamation for agriculture, various restoration projects were initiated. In 2015, three sites were designated for protection, bringing the total number of protected wetlands to fifty. The Japanese archipelago stretches over 3000 kilometers (1900 miles) from north to south and includes a wide variety of wetlands. The areas protected under the Ramsar Convention include marshlands, lakes, rice paddies, seagrass and seaweed beds, tidal flats, mangrove forests, coral reefs, and groundwater systems (Ministry of Environment: www.env.go.jp/ en/nature/npr/ramsar_wetland/pamph/). A number of the sites include dammed lakes and other wetlands which have been artificially constructed. Reclamation projects and conservation initiatives are a major goal of the agreement. The Ramsar Convention has been well supported in Japan in recent years. The Ramsar Center Japan was established as an NGO with the goal of increasing the number of Ramsar sites and promoting participatory activities for wetlands conservation, and it has also been active in promoting wetland conservation throughout Asia (http://rcj.o.oo7.jp/english/annual.htm). It is also interesting to note that joining the Ramsar Convention empowered Japanese NGOs in their quest to heighten public awareness of the importance of wetlands and to pressure the Japanese government and construction industries on their plans (Reimann 2008). In the case of Isahaya Bay, which was shut off from the ocean with a dike and floodgates despite wide-scale protests, the government has been ordered by the courts to open the floodgates in response to fishermen’s claims that their catches have been hurt by them. However, the government has not opened the gates, arguing that doing so would go against another court order which prevents the government from opening the gates in order to protect the farmers who settled on the reclaimed land. The quagmire continues as of 2017 ( Japan Times 2017). 79

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The UNCED and Japanese foreign environmental policy The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992 was used to spotlight attention on a series of major threats to the future of the planet, long-term economic stability and human survival, including climate change, desertification, deforestation, and biodiversity loss. By this time, the concept of sustainable development was beginning to take root, and this too was to have major impacts on Japan’s foreign environmental policies. At the UNCED, several international environmental agreements were to be negotiated. This put pressure on Japan to become more involved internationally in addressing global environmental problems for which it also has a share of the responsibility.

Biological diversity and the Biodiversity Convention Biological diversity is under extreme pressures due to population growth, agricultural expansion, urbanization and infrastructure development, fragmentation of land, and pollution. Habitat loss due to deforestation, wetlands development, coral bleaching, desertification, and land degradation are taking a severe toll on animal, fish, and plant species. In the mid 1980s, the US sponsored a resolution requesting that the United Nations organize an ad hoc group of experts to consider a comprehensive global treaty to conserve biological diversity. There were already many treaties dealing with protection of individual species, including the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species and numerous bilateral and multilateral agreements, yet there was no agreement dealing with the more complicated question of protecting ecological systems as a whole and biological diversity more generally. International scientists and environmental non-governmental organizations urged the international community to establish an agreement that would go beyond protection of individual species to a more comprehensive system for ecological and biosystem preservation. The UNEP governing council consented in 1987, initiated international negotiations in 1991, and proposed an international agreement on biodiversity preservation at the UNCED in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992. The agreement received wide-scale support and 150 countries, including Japan and all of the member states of the European Community, signed at the meeting. The Convention on Biological Diversity entered into force in December 1993 after obtaining the requisite number of signatories (www.cbd.int/convention/text/default.shtml). The Convention on Biological Diversity is intended to slow species extinction through conservation practices and the promotion of economic development based on sustainable use. The Biodiversity Convention requires nations to develop national biodiversity strategies and action plans and indicators for measuring trends in biodiversity. Japan has ratified the agreement and developed a National Strategy on Biological Diversity, released in 1995. The strategy promotes monitoring, research, and surveys, the strengthening of protective measures, and the addition of new protected and conservation areas (Council of Ministers for Global Environmental Conservation, Government of Japan 1995). In 2010, Japan hosted the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity in Nagoya City in Aichi Prefecture. Here the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–20, or what has come to be known as the Aichi targets, were agreed upon. Five strategic goals were set and twenty specific targets. The strategic goals were to address the underlying causes of biodiversity loss by mainstreaming biodiversity protection across government and society, reducing pressures on biodiversity and promoting sustainable use, safeguarding ecosystems, species and genetic diversity, enhancing benefits to all from biodiversity and ecosystem services, and enhancing implementation 80

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through participatory planning, knowledge management, and capacity building (www.cbd. int/sp/targets/). The Aichi targets established an expectation that states would develop national strategies for how they would meet the strategic goals and targets. Japan agreed to the goal of stopping the loss of biodiversity by 2020. Japan’s National Biodiversity Strategy is remarkably candid about the impact of Japanese consumption practices on global biodiversity: The ecological footprint per Japanese person in 2008 is about 1.5 times the global average and 2.3 planets would be needed if the entire world’s population is to live in the same way as Japanese people : : : Analysis results from another study : : : reports that Japanese consumption activities have the second largest impact after the United States on many threatened species through international trade. These studies show that Japanese people rely on imports from overseas for much of our domestic consumption of resources, which is affecting biodiversity overseas. (Government of Japan 2012: 28) Examples given of where the Japanese footprint is large are wood imports and marine products. In addition to the target for 2020 the Strategy set a long-term target for 2050 to maintain and recover biodiversity and use it sustainably to achieve a society in harmony with nature. The 2020 target focuses on achieving the Aichi targets so that biodiversity loss can be halted. The Japanese government also established the Japan Biodiversity Fund to support developing countries in developing national priorities to meet the objectives of the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–20.

The Cartegna Protocol on Biosafety A provision of the Biodiversity Convention called for an assessment of the need for a protocol on biosafety. Through the 1990s, as new technologies developed, scientists, NGOs, and developing countries began to express their worries about potential human and environmental harm from genetically modified (GM) organisms. These groups began to call for an international agreement that would lay out safety rules governing bio- and genetic engineering. In 1995, an ad hoc Working Group on Biosafety was set up by the conference of the parties to the Biodiversity Convention. After four years of negotiations, the Cartegna Protocol on Biosafety, a supplement to the Biodiversity Convention, was agreed upon (Gupta 2000). It went into effect in 2000. The Cartegna Protocol gives member states the right to signal if they accept or oppose the import of GM products. They must communicate their concerns, and the basis for those concerns, through the BioSafety Clearing House. In Europe, where there is strong public distrust of genetically modified organisms, there was significant public demand for the Cartegna Protocol and acquiescence on the part of the agricultural industry, which has not been widely involved in testing or manufacturing genetically modified products. In contrast, the United States, Canada, Australia, Argentina, and Uruguay did not sign the agreement due to vociferous opposition coming from their agricultural lobbies and a lesser level of concern shown by their publics. Japan was considered to be a member of what was dubbed the “compromise group” ( Japan, Norway, Switzerland, Mexico, and South Korea) in the negotiations. The Japanese government supported GMO trade (as the United States wanted) but recognized the need for safety restrictions (as the European Union and developing countries demanded). 81

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Climate change and international programs to assist developing countries to mitigate and adapt Japan was host to the 1997 international climate negotiations, and the agreement which resulted bore the name of Japan’s ancient capital, Kyoto. The Kyoto Protocol was the first major international environmental agreement to be formulated in Japan. In the run-up to the G8 Summit in June 2007, in Heiligendamm, Germany, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced a new program, Cool Earth 50, that set out Japan’s viewpoints on a postKyoto framework. Japan accepted that global emissions should be halved by 2050 but stipulated that the approach to doing this should, unlike the Kyoto Protocol, involve all major emitters, including China, India, and the United States. A global framework had to be based on flexibility, consider the national circumstances of each country, and, thus, work under the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.” And the framework had to achieve compatibility between environmental protection and economic growth through energy conservation and other technologies. In response to the Cool Earth concept, METI launched the Cool Earth-Innovative Energy Technology Program. Climate-change mitigation was linked to technology development with a goal of developing new products and markets for domestic use as well as export. The program focused on technologies that are expected to deliver large reductions in carbon dioxide emissions by 2050, innovative technologies that will deliver substantial performance improvements, and technologies where Japan can be a frontrunner (Government of Japan 2008). Japan also linked its climate-mitigation strategies to its foreign policy, especially its development-assistance programs. At the World Economic Forum in January 2008, Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda announced that Japan would “transfer high quality environmental technology to a greater number of countries” and introduced several new climate programs. One was a Cool Earth Partnership Fund that would provide US$10 billion in grants, aid, and technical assistance to developing countries to help them with mitigation efforts, such as energy-efficiency improvements, as well as to adapt to the impacts of climate change. He also called for major emitting countries (developed and developing) to come up with quantifiable reduction targets for a medium-term goal and suggested that this be done through a bottom-up sector-by-sector strategy where emission potentials for individual sectors were determined (e.g. housing, transport, industries) and then tallied to determine a national reduction target (Fukuda 2008). The Japanese Ministry of Environment has also emphasized the importance of the development of innovative, low-carbon technologies, international cooperation through existing international frameworks (such as the International Energy Agency, the International Partnership for Energy Efficiency Cooperation, and the International Renewable Energy Agency), and support for a global observation and monitoring system. Consistent with a focus on overseas action, it expressed Japan’s plans to work on further developing the Clean Development Mechanism (a mechanism that allows a country to gain credit toward its own emission reductions for certified emission reductions it invests in in developing countries) and the Joint Crediting Mechanism ( JCM) (Government of Japan 2013). The JCM, an initiative of the Japanese Government and partner countries, aims to facilitate the spread of advanced low-carbon technologies, products, and services and to conduct capacity building that can help developing countries reduce their carbon emissions. Japan initiated the program in 2013 with bilateral agreements with Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mongolia, Maldives, Viet Nam, and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (World Bank 2013). New and ongoing initiatives to promote climate change activities, especially in Asia, include the Japan– China–Republic of Korea Trilateral Summit, the “Decade Toward the Green Mekong” Initiative, bilateral cooperation with Indonesia on climate change, the Global Growth Green Institute, and the 82

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East Asia Low-Carbon Growth Partnership under the framework of the East Asia Summit (Government of Japan 2013).

Human health and global environmental agreements The cases of Minamata mercury poisoning and the Minamata Convention on Mercury Japan’s domestic experiences with Minamata mercury poisoning, Itai-itai disease, and pollutionrelated asthma (Yokkaichi asthma) have made the populace particularly sensitive to pollution-related diseases. There were two regions in Japan where mercury releases into the environment over long periods of time led to severe human health problems, including retardation and death. The cases occurred in Niigata Prefecture and in Minamata, Kumamoto Prefecture. These cases attracted global attention and can largely be seen as the triggers that finally led to large-scale reforms in Japan’s domestic pollution-control policies (Gresser, Fujikura and Morishima 1981; Imura and Schreurs 2005; George 2001; Avenell 2017). Japan was a strong supporter of international initiatives to form an international agreement on the management and use of mercury. The Minamata Convention on Mercury has special meaning in Japan, given the tragic history of Minamata mercury poisoning in Minamata and in Niigata Prefecture, which left thousands of victims suffering muscular loss and in more extreme cases paralysis, insanity, coma, and death. The Minamata Convention on Mercury is an international treaty that restricts the release of mercury and mercury compounds into the environment. The treaty was signed in 2013 in Geneva and symbolically adopted later that year in Kumamoto (Selin 2014). The Japanese government has pledged support to developing countries to assist in mercury monitoring and management (Government of Japan, undated-a).

Stratospheric ozone depletion and the Montreal Protocol Stratospheric ozone depletion is a case where Japan was slow in agreeing to the need for major action, despite health concerns, but since becoming a member of the agreement Japan has actively taken part and has aided transitioning countries in phasing out their use of ozone-depleting chemicals. The stratospheric ozone layer protects earth from excessive ultra-violet radiation. In the early 1970s, scientists warned that chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), widely used as refrigerants and as propellants in aerosol sprays, as well as in many other products, were most likely causing damage to the ozone layer. Japan made use of CFCs in its world-leading semi-conductor industry. In 1978, a unilateral ban on the uses of CFCs in aerosol spray cans was introduced in the United States. Efforts to regulate CFCs internationally intensified. After several years of preparations and negotiations, in 1985 the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer was formulated. Signatories agreed to take “appropriate measures : : : to protect human health and the environment against adverse effects resulting or likely to result from human activities which modify or are likely to modify the Ozone Layer” (http://ozone.unep.org/en/treaties-and-decisions/vienna-convention-protection-ozonelayer). Initial signatories included the European Community (later the EU), all of its member states, the United States, and several developing countries. Japan was noticeably absent. Japan also took on the role of a veto player in initial efforts to develop a protocol delineating the policies and measures states would be expected to take to phase out harmful ozone-depleting substances. The Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry was concerned about restricting the use of CFCs, arguing they were essential for the semi-conductor industry. 83

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This initial resistance to the agreement can be explained by a general lack of understanding about the consequences of ozone depletion for public health, the relative lack of familiarity with the issue in the Environment Agency and among environmental groups, and considerable industrial opposition to any kind of regulation. Japan’s negotiation position, however, changed relatively rapidly. The Japanese government’s decision, in 1988, to ratify the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol was certainly due in part to international pressure but can also be at least partly explained by the development of a greater appreciation of the harms associated with stratospheric ozone depletion. Alternative chemicals began to be explored. The Montreal Protocol is widely considered to be among the most successful global environmental agreements ever negotiated. After signing the Montreal Protocol, Japan phased out its use of CFCs by 1996 and worked with developing countries to assist them in phasing out ozone-depleting chemicals. After the successful conclusion of the Montreal Protocol, international concerns grew with the growing use of various fluorinated compounds, such as hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) as substitutes for CFCs. While not harmful to the ozone layer, the fluorinated compounds are extremely powerful greenhouse gases having hundreds, and even many thousands, of times stronger heat-trapping effect than carbon dioxide, the most abundant greenhouse gas (ScienceDaily 2012). In 2013, the Japanese Cabinet took a major step when it proposed measures to strengthen controls regarding the production and recycling of fluorocarbons and planned a sharp reduction in the use of HFCs in air-conditioning and refrigerating units. In 2015, the Act on the Rational Use and Proper Management of Fluorocarbons went into effect. It strengthens the expectations placed on manufacturers and importers regarding the replacement of HFCs with chemicals with low global-warming potential, as well as the recovery, recycling, and destruction of fluorinated gases in their products. Targets were set for reducing the use of various fluorinated compounds in different products by specific years. In this case, Japanese domestic action preceded international action. The following year a major amendment was made to the Montreal Protocol to sharply reduce and eventually eliminate the use of HFCs and other super greenhouse gases as coolants.

Asbestos Imports of asbestos increased in Japan in the mid 1960s because of Japan’s demand for building materials. The spraying of asbestos was prohibited in 1975 but little further action was taken for almost two decades despite growing warnings about the dangers of asbestos. Japan was far slower than European countries to stop using asbestos (Furuya 2015). The Socialist Party of Japan introduced a bill into the Diet calling for asbestos regulation in 1992, but it did not receive the support of the majority Liberal Democratic Party. The Japanese government’s slow reaction certainly contributed to more health suffering and death (McCurry 2005). In 1995, following a growing international trend, Japan finally banned crocidolite, a form of asbestos with very thin fibers linked to life-threatening lung and abdominal conditions, and amosite, which is also linked to a high risk of cancer. But it was only in 2004 that it banned the new use of chyrsotile in building and friction materials, and it was only in 2006 that it announced that a total ban on asbestos would begin. In 2005, Japan finally ratified the 1986 International Labor Organization’s Convention concerning Safety in the Use of Asbestos, but it took till March 2012 to achieve a total ban with no exemptions. From this date on, the manufacture, import, transfer, provision, or use of material containing asbestos became illegal under the Occupational Safety and Health Law (Kazan-Allen 2017). 84

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Sadly, in 2005, an asbestos shock hit Japan. A June 29, 2005 newspaper article reported that the Kanzaki Plant of the Kubota Corporation, a major industrial equipment manufacturer in Amagasaki City, near Osaka, had identified seventy-eight deaths among its workers and nearby residents, with the presumed cause of death asbestos-related lung cancer and mesothelioma (Government of Japan 2011). Subsequent research suggested even more deaths could be linked to the use of asbestos in and around the plant (Furuya 2015).

The Convention on International Trade in Hazardous Waste (Basel Convention) In the late 1980s, the strengthening of environmental controls in industrialized countries led to a sharp increase in the costs associated with hazardous-waste disposal. Some industries responded by starting to ship their hazardous wastes to developing countries for cheaper disposal. These were often countries that did not have the means or capacity to manage this waste properly. Developing countries and environmental groups began to lobby for an international solution to address this problem. This resulted in the Basel Convention on International Trade in Hazardous Waste. The initial aim of the Convention was to regulate the international trade in hazardous waste, and it required a notice of informed consent from the importing state for a hazardous-waste transfer. However, environmental NGOs and developing countries argued that the legalization of international hazardous-waste trade was an international environmental-justice matter. Japan ratified the agreement in 1990, Canada in 1992, and the European Union in 1994. The United States has not ratified the convention. In cooperation with the Secretariat of the Basel Convention, Japan launched the Basel Convention Partnership on the Environmentally Sound Management of E-waste for the Asia-Pacific Region. The partnership was launched in order to deal with the growing electronic-waste problems facing the region and to build up national capacity to monitor and manage the waste. Domestically, Japan has introduced the concept of a “sound materialcycle society,” which has been integrated into this program as well (www.env.go.jp/en/ recycle/asian_net/Project_N_Research/Asia_E-waste_Project.html). Japan has also promoted activities to address the illegal e-waste trade in the region (www.env.go.jp/en/recycle/asian_ net/index.html).

Conclusion Over time, Japan has become an increasingly active supporter of global environmental agreements and a major funder of bilateral environmental initiatives. It is interesting to note that despite Japan’s traditional close relationship to the United States and its propensity to follow the US in many foreign policy matters, it has acceded to several international environmental agreements that the United States has failed to ratify, including the Basel Convention, the Biodiversity Convention, and the Cartegna Protocol on Biosafety. While there are certainly government and corporate interests that see economic and diplomatic benefits which can be derived from the government’s international environmental-aid programs, this does not diminish the important role that Japan has played as one of the world’s largest environmental-aid donors. The reasons for Japan’s more proactive position on global environmental matters include both an interest in enhancing Japan’s foreign policy role and growing environmental awareness (both from the environmental community and a business community that began to see possibilities in environmental-pollution control and alternative-energy technologies). Still, Japan’s many positive foreign environmental-policy initiatives are at times overshadowed by its 85

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large global environmental footprint, which is linked to consumption patterns. Also problematic for Japan’s environmental image, at least in many parts of the world, is its continued support of whale, shark, and dolphin catches.

Bibliography Armitage, N. (2009) ‘From crisis to Kyoto and beyond: The evolution of environmental concerns in Japanese official development assistance’, Graduate School of International Development, Nagoya University, November – www.gsid.nagoya-u.ac.jp/bpub/research/public/paper/article/176.pdf The Association for the Protection of Fur-Bearing Animals (2016) ‘Japan’s last mink fur farm closes forever’, 30 November 2016 – http://thefurbearers.com/blog/japan’s-last-mink-fur-farm-closes-forever Avenell, S. (2017) Transnational Japan in the Global Environmental Movement, Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press. Bayliff, W.H. (2001) ‘Organization, Functions, and Achievements of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission’, Special Report 13, La Jolla, CA – www.iattc.org/PDFFiles2/SpecialReports/IATTCSpecial-Report13-ENG.pdf accessed 10 May 2017. Bernauer, T. (2003) Genes, Trade and Regulation: The Seeds of Conflict in Food Biotechnology, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Corbett, H.D. and Swibold, S.M. (2005) ‘North Pacific Fur Seal Convention’, in N. Mark (ed), Encyclopedia of the Arctic, Volumes 1, 2, and 3 A to Z, New York: Routledge, 1463–4. Dauvergne, P. (1997) Shadows in the Forest: Japan and the Politics of Timber in Southeast Asia, Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Fukuda, Y. (2008) ‘Special Address at the Annual Meeting of the World Economic Forum, Congress Center’, Davos, 26 January – www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/wef/2008/address-s.html Furuya, S. (2015) ‘Introduction to Asbestos Situation in Japan and Amagasaki’, Ban Asbestos Network Japan, January – http://anroev.org/aban/wp-content/uploads/ABAN2015/BANJAN_Report_large.pdf George, T.S. (2001) Minamata: Pollution and the Struggle for Democracy in Postwar Japan, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center. Government of Japan (1995) ‘National Strategy of Japan on Biological Diversity’, 31 October 1995, Council of Ministers for Global Environmental Conservation. Government of Japan (2008) ‘Cool Earth-Innovative Energy Technology Program’, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, March – www.meti.go.jp/english/newtopics/data/pdf/031320CoolEarth.pdf Government of Japan (2011) ‘Summary of Countermeasures against Asbestos in Japan’, Ministry of the Environment, March – www.env.go.jp/en/air/asbestos/summary_caa.pdf Government of Japan (2012) ‘The National Biodiversity Strategy of Japan 2012–2020: Roadmap towards the Establishment of an Enriching Society in Harmony with Nature’, 28 September – www.env.go.jp/ press/files/en/528.pdf Government of Japan (2013) ‘Japan’s Climate Change Policies’, Ministry of the Environment, 12 April – www.env.go.jp/en/focus/docs/files/20130412-68.pdf Government of Japan (undated-a) ‘Japan’s Commitment on the Minamata Convention on Mercury: Voices from Minamata to the World’, Ministry of the Environment – www.env.go.jp/chemi/tmms/suigin_ pamphlet_EN.pdf Government of Japan (undated-b) ‘The National Biodiversity Strategy of Japan 2012–2020. Roadmap towards the Establishment of an Enriching Society in Harmony with Nature’ – www.cbd.int/doc/ world/jp/jp-nbsap-v5-en.pdf Gresser, J., Fujikura, K. and Morishima A. (1981) Environmental Law in Japan, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Gupta, A. (2000) ‘Governing Trade in Genetically Modified Organisms: The Cartegna Protocol on Biosafety’, Environment, May, 22–33. Imura, H. and Schreurs, M.A. (2005) Environmental Policy in Japan, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Japan Times (2017) ‘The Gridlock in Isahaya Bay’, 22 April. Joyner, C.C. (1989) ‘Japan and the Antarctic Treaty System’, Ecology Law Quarterly, 16(1): 155–69. Kagawa-Fox, M. (2012) The Ethics of Japan’s Global Environmental Policy: The Conflict between Principles and Practice, New York: Routledge. Kamidohzono, S.G., Gœmez, O.A. and Mine, Y. (2016) ‘Embracing Human Security: New Directions of Japan’s ODA for the 21st Century’, in H. Kato, J. Page and Y. Shimomura (eds), Japan’s Development Assistance: Foreign Aid and the Post-2015 Agenda, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 205–21.

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Kazan-Allen, L. (2017) ‘Chronology of National Asbestos Bans’, International Ban Asbestos Secretariat, 18 February – www.ibasecretariat.org/chron_ban_list.php Loughrey, A. (1943) ‘Refugees on a Rock’, The Rotarian, March, 23–5. Matsuoka, S. (2014) ‘Japan’s Asian Strategy: Japan’s Asian Environmental Strategy and a Soft Power of the 21st Century’, Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance, Japan, Public Policy Review, 10(1): 189–226. McCurry, J. (2005) ‘Japan’s Asbestos Time Bomb’, The Guardian, 27 July – www.theguardian.com/world/ 2005/jul/27/worlddispatch.japan Mirovitskaya, N.S., Clark, M. and Purver, R.G. (1993) ‘North Pacific Fur Seals: Regime Formation as a Means of Resolving Conflict’, in O.R. Young and G. Osherenko (eds), Polar Politics: Creating International Environmental Agreements, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 22–55. Nectoux, F. and Kuroda, Y. (1989) Timber from the South Seas: An Analysis of Japan’s Tropical Timber Trade and Its Environmental Impact. Gland, Switzerland: World Wide Fund for Nature. Popescu, I. and Ogushi, T. (2013) Fisheries in Japan, Policy Department B: Structural and Cohesion Policy, European Parliament, December, European Union, IP/B/PECH/NT/2013-04. PE529.044 – www. europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2014/529044/IPOL-PECH_NT(2014)529044_EN.pdf Reimann, K. (2008) ‘Going Global: The Use of International Politics and Norms in Local Environmental Protest Movements in Japan’, in Dradyumna P. Karan and S. Unryu (eds), Local Environmental Movements: A Comparative Study of the United States and Japan, Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 45–64. ScienceDaily (2012) ‘CFC Substitutes: Good for the Ozone Layer, Bad for Climate?’ – www.sciencedaily. com/releases/2012/02/120224110737.htm accessed 24 February 2012 Selin, H. (2014) ‘Global Environmental Law and Treaty-Making on Hazardous Substances: The Minamata Convention and Mercury Abatement’, Global Environmental Politics, 14(1): 1–19. Wiktor, C.L. (1976) Unperfected Treaties of the United States, Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications – https://iea.uoregon.edu/treaty-text/1897-fursealseaotternorthpacificoceanberingseaentxt World Bank (2013) ‘Japan Announces Development of the New Joint Crediting Mechanism’, Climate Finance Options, 28 August. Wu, Z. 2008 ‘Research on Japan’s ODA to China and Its Contribution to China’s Development’, paper presented at the 9th workshop held by the Project on the Chinese Economy, ORC, Kyoto Sangyo University, 21 March – www.cc.kyoto-su.ac.jp/project/orc/econ-public/china/documents/WUDP28.pdf Yamamura, K. (2017) Too Much Stuff: Capitalism in Crisis, Bristol: Polity Press.

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6 Japanese foreign policies on global climate change From Kyoto to Paris Takashi Hattori

Introduction The climate change issue gained increased international political attention in the late 1980s, resulting in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Adopted in 1992, the UNFCCC came into force in 1994. The objective of the UNFCCC is to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. However, it did not specify binding limits on greenhouse gas emissions or specific concrete actions to realize this ultimate objective. The UNFCCC negotiation process over the past three decades has been directed at determining concrete targets and actions through negotiating its protocol and other instruments. First, the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated and agreed upon in 1997, setting the reduction targets for 2008–12 (first commitment period). Then, the Copenhagen Accord in 2009, enforced by the Cancun Agreements in 2010, included voluntary reduction targets for 2020. Finally, the Paris Agreement in 2015 incorporated post-2020 commitments through 2025 or 2030. The process has evolved from a top-down to bottom-up approach over the past three decades. The climate change issue has been a particularly challenging foreign policy issue for Japan. Given its national circumstances – including having already achieved high-efficiency and with limited natural resources – Japan has faced difficult questions about how it should lead the negotiations toward global actions to tackle climate change (Figure 6.1). As a developed and industrialized nation, Japan has sought to maintain its economic growth and energy security, while promoting environmental protection and contributing to international efforts on climate change. The complexity of the climate change issue has influenced Japanese foreign policy formulation to reflect the different priorities which Japan has pursued simultaneously, notably economic growth, energy security, environmental protection, and international contribution. This chapter describes Japan’s efforts to reconcile its pursuit of these four priorities among key governmental actors (Cabinet, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of the Environment, and Ministry of 88

On global climate change: Kyoto to Paris

Economy, Trade and Industry), as well as other stakeholders, through three stages in international climate negotiation:

Stage 1: Kyoto Protocol (COP3, 1997) to Marrakesh Accord (COP7, 2001) Stage 2: Bali Action Plan (COP13, 2007) to Copenhagen Accord (COP15, 2009) / Cancun Agreements (COP16, 2010) Stage 3: Durban Platform (COP17, 2011) to Paris Agreement (COP21, 2015) The literature on climate change negotiations has been growing (Sjoestedt and Penetrate 2015; Downie 2014), yet scholarship specifically focused on Japanese climate policy is limited (Kameyama 2017; Watanabe 2011). Therefore, this chapter provides needed insight into the role that Japan has been playing as a leader in climate change negotiations and the factors that have influenced its climate change foreign policies.

Stage 1: Kyoto Protocol (COP3, 1997) to Marrakesh Accord (COP7, 2001) Japan hosted the third Conference of the Parties (COP3) of the UNFCCC in Kyoto, the old capital of Japan, in 1997. The negotiation resulted in the Kyoto Protocol – considered a success for Japanese foreign policy – as consensus was reached among the Parties on this complex and challenging global issue. However, the outcome was far from optimal for Japan, and perhaps for other Parties. First, greenhouse gas emissions caps were set only for developed countries. This was an inevitable result of the Berlin Mandate set at COP1 in 1995 when negotiators agreed that only developed countries should face caps for their emissions. Under the Berlin Mandate, developing countries were allowed to continue pursuing their own policies without numerical commitments against climate change. The UNFCCC included a principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” between developed and developing countries, which remained one of the key issues in the following negotiation. Second, Japan was considered to have been forced to accept the most stringent emissions cap among developed countries. The negotiation resulted in emission-reduction targets for Japan, the United States, and the EU of 6%, 7%, and 8% below their respective 1990 levels during the first commitment period (2008–12). Given their earlier efforts to reduce energy use after the oil crisis in 1970s, Japan had already achieved relatively large energy-related greenhouse gas emissions reductions. Therefore, further reductions were expected to be more costly in Japan than in other developed countries. Japan’s attempts to negotiate an agreement on differentiated targets among the Parties started in the early stage of the negotiations. Later, Japan came up with its proposal for reduction between 2.5% to 5% based on its national circumstances. Japan was able to convince other Parties in setting differentiated targets, but the differences among the three were very limited. The reduction target for Japan itself ended at 6%, which was more ambitious than expected. The EU had asserted a 15% reduction for the EU and other Parties in the earlier negotiation process, so its 8% reduction target was considered to be easy to achieve (Ringius 1999). The United States had negotiated for a “no reduction” target for the United States during the earlier negotiation process but finally agreed to a 7% reduction target. However, the United States Congress ultimately did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol and thus the United States was not obligated to achieve this. 89

Figure 6.1

1.0

1.1

1.2

Japan’s energy efficiency efforts after the oil crisis

0

1

2

3 1.1 1.1 1.2 0.8 1.0

U.K.

1.3

Japan

4

Germany

1.4

EU28

5

France

1.5

1.4 1.4

OECD

6

1.6

U.S.A

7

Australia

1.6

Approx. 40% improvement

2.0

2.3

Korea

1.7

4.8 4.9

Middle East

1.8

Indonesia

8

5.3

6.1

Thai

9

Non–OECD

1.9

5.5

India

2.0

1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

6.2

Primary energy supply per GDP unit of each country (2013)

Canada

(Index : Japan=1.0)

China

Primary energy use per real GDP of Japan

(Oil converted Mt /1 trillion yen)

7.8

Russia

of energy consumption per GDP in the world.

Japan intensively introduced "Energy Management System based on the Act on the Rational Use of Energy”, then achieved the lowest level

private industrial sectors.

Japan has improved energy efficiency by approx. 40% after the oil crises in the 1970s as a result of positive actions by both public and

2.5

World

On global climate change: Kyoto to Paris

From the earlier negotiation process toward the Kyoto Protocol, Japan had insisted that reduction targets for developed-country Parties should be based on their national circumstances. Japan asserted that “all sides should exercise flexibility so that mutually acceptable agreement can be reached at Kyoto, which provides for meaningful, realistic, and equitable targets.”1 Since the same unit of reduction was considered to be more costly in Japan than in Europe or the United States, Japan wanted to achieve fair sharing of reduction efforts among the Parties. At the same time, Japan wanted to achieve meaningful reduction around the globe. Therefore, realistic and equitable reduction was considered important in addition to meaningful reduction. Here, “equitable” means that Japan would make reduction efforts but would encourage other countries, especially major developed countries, to make similar, if not greater, efforts at reduction. Japan considered domestic interests in formulating its position in advance of the international negotiations. The inter-ministerial coordination process toward developing the Japanese proposal for the international Ad-Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM) illustrates the consideration of the four priorities in Japan’s approach to climate negotiations: economic growth, energy security, environmental protection, and international contribution. In mid 1997, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto asked the Cabinet Secretariat to actively facilitate inter-ministerial coordination regarding establishing Japan’s position toward international negotiations on the climate change issues as it looked toward the Kyoto conference in December of that year (Hattori 1999). During the consultation process among the relevant ministries, the Environment Agency proposed a 7% emissions reduction based on the modeling analysis by the Asian-Pacific Integrated Model (AIM).2 They asserted that a substantial reduction would be feasible for Japan if policies suggested in the AIM analysis were introduced and that the reduction was necessary for global environmental protection. However, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) proposed a reduction to the emissions at the 1990 level. MITI insisted that further reductions could not be committed to, based on the ministry’s assessment, taking into account the priorities of ensuring energy security and sustaining economic growth. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) insisted that at least 5% reduction was necessary to meet international expectations of an acceptable reduction target for Japan. MOFA emphasized the international importance of Japan’s contribution to the negotiation process, as this target could help to bridge the gap between the EU and the United States. The Cabinet Secretariat facilitated inter-ministerial consultations to negotiate a 5% reduction proposal, attempting to bridge the gap between the “no reduction” target proposed by MITI and the 7% reduction set forward by the Environment Agency, taking into account the 5% reduction proposed by MOFA. First, the Cabinet Secretariat encouraged shifting the coverage from a single gas of carbon dioxide reduction to multiple greenhouse gases, allowing Japan to increase its stated reduction by 0.5%. Second, the Cabinet Secretariat and other ministries agreed to include a differentiation clause in the proposal, allowing countries to set a reduction target 2.5% different from the common target that considered national circumstances, such as a high rate of energy efficiency as a result of its previous efforts. Third, the Cabinet Secretariat took into account the facilitative aspect of the compliance clause: if a country used its best efforts to reduce emissions and was within a buffer of 2%, that country would be able to avoid non-compliance. Japan could make further efforts to reduce emissions by that extra 2% while the certainty of achieving it was less certain. Considering these three ideas, Japan developed a 5% reduction proposal, while at the same time setting a 2.5% reduction goal for Japan. Reconciling the pursuit of different priorities represented by different ministries, Japan’s proposal was set in order to facilitate the climate negotiation toward COP3. During the negotiation at COP3, Japan was requested to enhance its reduction target to 6%, and it accepted, although this was considered a difficult target to achieve. After the Kyoto 91

Takashi Hattori

conference, Japan began to develop and implement its policies and measures (such as promoting energy efficiency in industries, transportation, and households, and setting voluntary action plans for industries) to achieve the 6% reduction target in the first commitment period, while waiting for the Kyoto Protocol to take effect. Japan also pursued the operationalization of the mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol by actively participating in the international negotiations that resulted in the Marrakesh Accord in 2001. The Marrakesh Accord set the rules for implementing the Kyoto Protocol and operationalized the Clean Development Mechanism, Joint-Implementation, and other tools which were agreed upon and introduced in the Kyoto Protocol. However, during this process, the United States withdrew from its ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, and Japan became the only major developed country outside of the EU facing an emissions-reductions cap under the Kyoto Protocol. While implementing the Kyoto Protocol, Japan started to make further efforts in its foreign policies to create a future framework on climate change which would cover a wider range of countries. Japan had been working toward its commitment in good faith, assuming that the EU and the United States were also doing so. As such, the failure of the United States Congress to ratify the Kyoto Protocol was a surprise to Japan. Japan tried to recover from this surprise by working toward making sure future negotiations would bind more developed countries as well as developing countries. Given this experience, the reactions among the different ministries during the preparation for the Kyoto Protocol were not the same as their reactions in later periods, as we shall see.

Stage 2: Bali Action Plan (COP13, 2007) to Copenhagen Accord (COP15, 2009)/Cancun Agreements (COP16, 2010) In May 2007, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made a speech on the climate change issue, entitled “Invitation to ‘Cool Earth 50’” at an international conference held in Tokyo. This speech contained what Japan thought most important in addressing the issue: the development of a longterm strategy toward 2050, and the establishment of an international framework after 2013 to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions. The speech stressed three “principles” in establishing the international framework:

– – –

First, all major emitters should participate in the framework; the emissions reduction should be achieved globally beyond the coverage of the Kyoto Protocol. Second, the framework should be flexible, taking diverse national circumstances and capacities into account. Third, the framework should meet the objectives of both environmental protection and economic growth, while promoting technological development such as energyefficiency technology.

The Prime Minister’s speech reflected the priorities Japan had followed in its foreign policy formulation regarding the climate change issue: economic growth, energy security, environmental protection, and international contribution. Given the limitations in coverage and stringency of the Kyoto Protocol, Japan tried to promote a flexible, global framework on climate change which would be consistent with energy security and economic growth. Japan’s position was reflected, although only partially, in the Heiligendamm G8 Summit in June 2007. The Chair’s summary stated that: In setting a global goal for emissions reductions in the process we have agreed today involving all major emitters, we will consider seriously the decisions made by the European 92

On global climate change: Kyoto to Paris

Union, Canada and Japan which include at least a halving of global emissions by 2050 : : : We are committed to moving forward in that forum and call on all parties to actively and constructively participate in the UN Climate Change Conference in Indonesia in December 2007 with a view to achieving a comprehensive post 2012-agreement (post Kyotoagreement) that should include all major emitters. At COP13, in Bali in December 2007, the Bali Action Plan was adopted. It established the Adhoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (LCA) to complete its work in COP15 in 2009. The negotiation covered reduction targets and actions by developed-country Parties, and “nationally appropriate mitigation actions” (NAMAs) by developing-country Parties. This was an attempted compromise toward a global framework on climate change that could be applicable to all. The policy-formulation process to determine Japan’s reduction target toward 2020 again involved competing priorities related to climate change. In February 2008, the Cabinet established the Council on the Global Warming Issue. The Ministry of the Environment (MOE) and Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) jointly helped the Cabinet Secretariat to operate the Council. Representatives from academia, industry, and other stakeholders comprised the twelve members of the Council. In June 2008, the Council released its report, entitled “In Pursuit of Japan as a Low-carbon Society.” The Council discussed, from various perspectives, “the ideal low-carbon society and the path to achieving it.” The report further stated that: Halving global emissions by 2050 is a reduction target that constitutes the core of the ‘Cool Earth’ initiatives advocated by Japan. Japan, as a developed country, bears greater responsibility in achieving global climate objectives. Japan has achieved economic growth with a world-class energy efficiency rate by using various ecology-conscious products (ecoproducts), and superior industrial technologies to navigate the country through the two oil crises. The Mid-Term Target Examination Committee was established under the Council in November 2008. Policy formulation was conducted by the Committee, which consisted of eight members from the academic and research communities. During the first half of 2009, the Japanese government worked to formulate its greenhouse gas emission-reduction target toward 2020. The Ministry of Environment pursued to reduce greenhouse gas emissions stringently based on their analysis using inputs from the National Institute for Environmental Studies (NIES). On the other hand, METI pursued to make the reduction path which was consistent with energy supply and consumption prediction using inputs from the Institute of Energy Economics, Japan (IEEJ). The Mid-Term Target Examination Committee took into account the following points when they examined the emission-reduction target: reduction potentials, reduction costs, economic growth, energy security, fairness with other countries’ pledges, and consistency with a long-term reduction path. In April 2009, the Committee presented several options based on different scenarios: reductions of 4%, 14%, 21%, or 30% from 2005 levels. Industries and labor unions supported the 4% reduction option, while environmental groups supported the 21% or 30% reduction options. In June 2009, Prime Minister Taro Aso released Japan’s new target of a 15% reduction from 2005 levels. The government chose the 14% reduction option from the four presented by the Committee and then added one percentage point to the target by considering the addition of 93

Takashi Hattori

further diffusion of solar energy. This target represented reconciliation of the four priorities, with particular consideration given to environmental protection and international contribution. The 15% reduction target from 2005 levels represented an 8% reduction target from 1990 levels, since greenhouse gas emissions in Japan had increased during the 1990s and early 2000s. The 15% reduction target did not include emissions from Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) activities, given the higher level of uncertainty. It also did not include reduction credits from other countries, such as the credits from the Clean Development Mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol. Japan tried to emphasize in this proposal the importance of domestic emissions reductions for all countries. Including LULUCF and the Kyoto credit, the reduction target was equivalent to a 0.6% reduction from 1990 levels (Arima 2015). This proposal was submitted to the international climate-negotiation process at Bonn in June 2009. Japan tried to lead the international negotiation by presenting its proposal based on its domestic consultations through the Council on the Global Warming Issue and its Mid-Term Target Examination Committee, utilizing academia, industries, and other stakeholders. However, this proposal was short-lived. The outcome of the 2009 election resulted in a dramatic shift of foreign policy formulation on climate change. In July, the Democratic Party of Japan won the general election of the House of Representatives, its manifesto having pledged to reduce emissions by 25% from 1990 levels by 2020 through the introduction of an emissionstrading system and an environmental tax. These policy instruments had been previously rejected by the Liberal Democratic Party, having been discussed at the Mid-Term Target Examination Committee without participants reaching consensus on them. In September 2009, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama made a speech at the United Nations in New York and presented Japan’s willingness to pursue a 25% emissions reduction by 2020 from 1990 levels. This speech signaled a shift toward greater emphasis on environmental protection in Japan’s approach to climate change. The increase from a 15% reduction from 2005 levels to 25% reduction from 1990 levels was the direct result of the government change. While this was consistent with Prime Minister Hatoyama’s campaign commitments, such targets had not been fully discussed with the relevant stakeholders before the UN announcement. Still, at COP15 in 2009, where the Copenhagen Accord was drafted and was “taken note of” by the COP, Parties submitted nonbinding emissions-reduction targets or mitigation actions, including Japan’s pledge of its 25% reduction target. The following year, at COP16, the Cancun Agreements were accepted by the COP. Japan formulated its foreign policies on climate change by shifting away from the Kyoto Protocol and focusing on the development of a new global framework. On the first day at COP16, June Arima, Chief Negotiator for the Kyoto Protocol, METI, announced, “Japan is not in a position to inscribe our target in the Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol under any condition or circumstances” (Arima 2015). This statement was considered a clear departure from the Kyoto Protocol by Japan, and after this announcement, other countries had to take this into consideration in the international climate negotiation. By shifting away from the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, which covered only developed countries’ reduction targets, Japan tried to show their commitment to establishing a flexible, fair, and equitable global framework.

Stage 3: Durban Platform (COP17, 2011) to Paris Agreement (COP21, 2015) On March 11, 2011, the magnitude 9.0 Great East Japan Earthquake and resulting tsunami devastated the Tohoku district and other regions. The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 94

Figure 6.2

Energy-originated CO2 1235(87.7%)

4 gasses, such as alternative CFC: 38.6(2.7%)

NF3: 1.4(0.1%)

SF6: 2.2(0.2%)

Breakdown of Japan’s GHG emissions

Non-energy-originated CO2: 75.9(5.4%)

Methane: 36.0(2.6%)

Dinitrogen monoxide: 22.5(1.6%)

PFCs: 3.3(0.2%)

HFCs: 31.8(2.3%)

Value: 1 mil tons CO2

GHG Emissions in FY 2013

1067

Total of Energyoriginated CO2

131

Residential

92.4

134

Commercial & Other

Energy conversion

206

503

Transport

Industry

FY 1990

1219

104

180

239

240

457

FY 2005

1235 (100%)

927 (100%)

73 (7.9%)

122 (13.2%)

201 (16.3%) 101 (8.2%)

168 (18.1%)

163 (17.6%)

225 (18.2%) 279 (22.6%)

401 (43.3%)

(Reference) FY 2030 Target

429 (34.7%)

FY 2013

Compared with 1990 +15.7%

Compared with 1990 +9.3%

Compared with 1990 +53.4%

Compared with 1990 +108.2%

Compared with 1990 +9.2%

Compared with 1990 14.7%

Emission in FY 2013

Value: 1 mil tons CO2

Change in Energy-originated CO2 Emissions by Sector

Takashi Hattori

plant led to a shutdown and comprehensive review of all fifty-four nuclear plants operating in Japan. This event has dramatically shifted energy and climate policies in Japan. At COP17 in 2011, the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action was drafted and accepted by the COP. The Ad-hoc Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) was established with a mandate to produce a new legally binding greenhouse gas reduction protocol or instrument by 2015 for the period beyond 2020. Japan insisted on the establishment of a common global framework applicable to all countries. The mandate of the ADP was to develop a framework which could be “applicable to all Parties.” Therefore, from the point view of Japanese foreign policy, the ADP became a more suitable forum than previous negotiation settings such as the Berlin Mandate and the LCA. On December 16, 2011, the Liberal Democratic Party won the general election for the House of Representatives. In light of the shutdown of nuclear power, the new Cabinet was tasked with reevaluating the 25% reduction target. At COP19 in 2013, Japan announced that it would revise its 2020 target to a 3.8% reduction from 2005 levels. This was a big change from a 25% reduction from 1990 levels. But it was certainly a more realistic target given the situation after the earthquake. The 3.8% reduction was considered to be achievable domestically, without using credits from the emission-trading system. Although Japan had pursued the Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM), which was introduced as a replacement of CDM under the Kyoto Protocol, Japan did not intend to include reduction using the JCM when the proposal was announced. In the lead-up to COP21 in Paris, international climate negotiations followed a more bottomup approach, with the UNFCCC requesting all Parties, both developed and developing countries, to submit their Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) in advance of COP21 (by the first quarter of 2015). Under this process, Japan formulated its reduction target toward 2030. The Japanese government attempted to examine and draft its INDC in order to make an early submission. Two major ministries led the process: MOE and METI co-organized the joint expert committee which consisted of members of the MOE’s Central Environmental Council and METI’s Industrial Structure Council. The joint expert committee met seven times from October 2014 to April 2015 in order to examine the targets and related policies for Japan’s INDC (Figures 6.2 and 6.3). Based on previous COP decisions, other countries’ situations, discussion of the future framework, and domestic considerations (e.g. domestic energy policies and energy mix), the expert committee prepared the content for the draft INDC. MOE and METI worked together to reconcile the different views of various experts, taking into account disparate priorities during the process. In June 2015, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced the new target: a 26% reduction from 2013 levels (a 25.4% reduction from 2005 levels) by 2030. The 2030 target was a big advance compared to the revised 2020 target of 3.8% from 2005 levels. Once again, considering priorities such as economic growth, energy security, environmental protection, and international cooperation, the Japanese government looked to set an ambitious yet realistic target. Japan submitted its INDC to the UNFCCC Secretariat on July 17, 2015. On that day, the Japanese government held a meeting of the Global Warming Prevention Measures Headquarters, which is comprised of relevant ministers, and adopted the INDC (Table 6.1). The Paris Agreement was adopted at COP21 on December 12, 2015. The agreement included a mechanism for Parties to submit Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) every five years. Japan’s INDC stated the following explanations for Japan’s key consideration on the climate change framework: “Climate change is a global challenge. To solve the problem, it is essential to establish a fair and effective new international framework which is applicable to all major Parties.” In its INDC submission to the UNFCCC, Japan stated that fairness and ambition, 96

Transport

Figure 6.3

Energy conversion

0.0%

0.8%

FY 2014 FY 2015

249

182

216

413

88

Reference: FEPC Power Generation by Source

Commercial & other

1.0%

98 75.0

264

191

220

421

93

76.1

95

278

201

225

432

99

76.6

93

Japan’s GHG emissions by sector and CO2 emissions from power generation

Residential

1.7%

Non-energy-originated CO2

26.0% 29.2% 28.6% 10.7%

*Total of 10 electric power companies

Industry

Fiscal Year

FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013

Other gasses (alternative CFC, etc.)

Nuclear Power Ratio

Reference: Japan Greenhouse Gas Inventory Report

0

254

236

219

220

231

237

236

239

239

226

221

210

210

203

193

181

175

170

167

151

145

148

204

226

432

105

140

148

192

220

429

111

75.5

137

133

151

174

222

414

110

74.5

1990

163

221

382

103

72.7

88 74.3

1991

174

225

417

106

85

1992

184

234

472

88 82.3

1993

168

236

472

88

108

85.2

1994

180

240

457

104

85.3

1995

170

245

468

89

86.9

1996

171

251

471

93

86.8

1997

168

255

468

93

87.8

1998

158

259

453

87

87.9

91

1999

161

255

466

90

90.4

89

2000

156

256

455

92

90.2

89

2001

152

252

443

92

90.2

89

2002

148

254

473

102

124

90.1

87

2003

141

253

482

97

95.9

87

2004

140

225

247

478

100

69.9

90

2005

131

219

238

484

98

95.8

92

2006

200

206

228

467

90

124

94.7

98

2007

400

491

481

92

89.9

115

108

2008

600

502

91

92.2

115

111

2009

800

91

90.4

112

133

2010

1,000

89.2

110

134

2011

1,200

133

2012

1,400

2013

Change in GHG Emissions (FY 1990 – FY 2015)

Emissions from the industry has decreased, while emissions from the residential, commercial and other, and transport sectors have increased.

2014

(Unit: mil tons CO2)

The total amount of GHG emissions in FY2015 was 1.321 billion t (provisional figure)

2015

Commercial & other

17.7%)

0.182 bil t (+38.9%)

0.249 bil t (+81.7%)

0.216 bil t (+4.8%)

27% Indirect emissions 18% Direct emissions Transport (cars, ships, etc.)

20%

CO2 Emissions 39% 34% 17% Total FY 2013 1.311 bil tons

Industry (manufacturing plants, etc.)

Others (fuel leakage, etc.) Energy conversion 2% 7% 4% 4% 15% 4% 2% 6%

Industrial processes (limestone consumption, etc.) Residential

2015 0.413 bil t (

Breakdown of CO2 Emissions by Sector (FY 2015) Waste (plastic and waste oil combustion)

Residential

Commercial & others

0.206 bil t

Transport

→ → 0.137 bil t → 0.131 bil t → 0.502 bil t

Industry

1990

Change in CO2 Emissions by Sector

Takashi Hattori

Table 6.1 Japan’s intended nationally determined contribution (approved by Global Warming Prevention HQ on July 17, 2015 and submitted to the UN)

Energy-originated CO2 Other GHG Carbon dioxide sink Reduction of GHG

Energy-originated CO2 Industry Commercial and other Residential Transport Energy conversion

Non-energy-originated CO2 Methane (CH4) Dinitrogen monoxide (N2O) 4 Gasses, such as HFC HFCs PFCs SF6 NF3

Compared to FY 2013 level (compared to FY 2005 level) :21.9% (:20.9%) :1.5% (:1.8%) :2.6% (:2.6%) :26.0% (:25.4%) Estimated Emissions of each sector in FY 2030 927 401 168 122 163 73

FY 2013 (FY 2005) 1,235 (1,219) 429 (457) 279 (239) 201 (180) 225 (240) 101 (104)

Estimated Emissions of each gas in FY 2030 70.8 31.6 21.1

FY 2013 (FY 2005) 75.9 (85.4) 36.0 (39.0) 22.5 (25.5)

Estimated Emissions in 2030 28.9 21.6 4.2 2.7 0.5

2013 (2005) 38.6 (27.7) 31.8 (12.7) 3.3 (8.6) 2.2 (5.1) 1.4 (1.2)

Value: 1 million $CO2.

as well as contributions toward achieving the objectives of UNFCCC, were important, and that Japan’s emissions reduction goal was an ambitious goal. The Paris Agreement was qualitatively different from what came before: it covered all Parties, while the Kyoto Protocol covered only developed-country Parties; the Paris agreement was a legally binding instrument, while the Copenhagen Accord (and the Cancun Agreements) was not; and the Paris Agreement supported where Japan sought to go in this issue area (Figure 6.4). Although Japan might not have been seen as a leader in the process toward the Paris Agreement, compared to the previous stages, Japan secured its long-term goal in international climate negotiations. The Paris Agreement aims to limit the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2℃ above pre-industrial levels and pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5℃. It also seeks to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible, and achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century. Following the adoption of the Paris Agreement in COP21, the Plan for Global Warming Countermeasures was formulated and approved by the Cabinet on May 13, 2016 (Table 6.2). Japan also formulated the Energy and Environment Innovation Strategy, specifying innovative technologies that enable significant emission reductions, as well as the Innovative Energy Strategy to achieve the Energy Mix. These domestic efforts will be the basis for Japan to conduct future negotiations on climate change. 98

(Kyoto Protocol) 22.0% (First Commitment Period)

13.4% (Second Commitment Period)

EU 10.2%

Australia 1.2% Kazakhstan 0.7% Other 1.4% Japan 2.8% Russia 5.1% NZ 0.2%

Other 35.3%

Canada 1.5% US 13.8%

(COP21) Post-2020 framework applicable to all Parties including major emitters

8%

ia

5.

d

In

China 22.2%

163 countries & 1 region submitted INDCs (Covering over 98.9% of global GHG emissions)

Figure 6.4

GHG emission share (2010)

GHG emission share and coverage of Kyoto Protocol, Paris Agreement

Source: IEA, CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion (2014).

Table 6.2 The Plan for Global Warming Countermeasures Mid-term target (FY2030) Mid-term target of 26.0% reduction by FY2030 compared to FY2013(25.4% reduction compared to FY2013). Long-term target (FY2050) Condition ① Under the fair and effective framework of Paris Agreement in which all major countries participate, ② our country is going to lead the international society where major emitter countries should tackle with emission reductions based on their own capacity. ③ And, while enhancing both counter global warming measures and economic growth at the same time, we are aiming at reducing GHG emissions by 80% by 2050 as a long term target. Such a large scale reduction is difficult to be realized if we continue the conventional way of our efforts. Principles ④ Therefore, we will exert our utmost efforts to solve the global warming problems through innovations reinforcing Research & Development and Disseminations on innovative technologies. ⑤ At the same time, we will encourage domestic investments and enhance international competitiveness, and ⑥ ask opinions and wisdoms broadly from the public, aiming at the large scale of emission reductions through long-term, strategic efforts. Through those efforts, we will contribute to the emission reductions for the entire world. Effort to reduction GHG emission for the entire world.  The key to achieving both economic growth and emission reductions is the development of innovative technologies  Based on Energy & Environment Innovation Strategy, enhance R&D of such innovative technologies  Contribute to reducing global GHG emissions through Japan’s leading technologies.

Takashi Hattori

Conclusion This chapter illustrated Japan’s efforts to reconcile the various priorities that it has pursued in the foreign policy formulation process on climate change during the last three decades. Each priority was represented by policy input from key government actors, with a focus on the MOE, METI, and MOFA. The process for the Kyoto Protocol (Stage 1) resulted in an agreement that Japan did not consider to be fair and effective, since it did not set targets for developing countries and resulted in the heaviest cost burdens for Japan among developed countries. Japanese foreign policies on climate change since then have been devoted to changing these conditions in addition to realizing long-term goals to avoid global climate change. The process for the Copenhagen Accord and Cancun Agreements (Stage 2) was in the middle of the shift, and the process for the Paris Agreement (Stage 3) was the achievement in terms of the realization of priorities set by Japan. Japan has not just reacted to the international process in formulating its own policy: it has taken a leadership role in negotiating and has influenced both the process and the outcomes. Japan might have been seen as passive at COP21, but the outcome of the negotiation was fully within Japan’s desired outcomes following its efforts since the Kyoto Protocol. Although it has maintained a clear objective in this regard, Japan’s international role as a promoter of actions on climate change has altered with domestic conditions. A major shift occurred in 2009 following the general election, when the government leadership transitioned from the Liberal Democratic Party to the Democratic Party of Japan in the middle of Stage 2. Another major change occurred when the Great East Japan Earthquake caused a policy shift in Japan’s energy mix, especially the treatment of nuclear plants and the introduction of renewables, at the beginning of Stage 3. Tension among different ministries and among various stakeholders has existed throughout the three decades, but the mechanism to reconcile these differences was established and Japanese foreign policies on climate change were rather stable in pursuing an effective framework on climate change which was fair for all. Overcoming the difficulty of global climate negotiations in which many different Parties were involved, Japan secured the vision it had first considered in the Kyoto Protocol. Climate change is a global issue, and many matters are still to be tackled. Japan is likely to continue to take a leadership role in addressing climate change, while considering different priorities such as economic growth, energy security, environmental protection, and international contribution.

Acknowledgment I would like to thank George Kamiya for his assistance in research. Tables and figures were borrowed from Takashina (2017). This chapter, however, does not represent any official views of government or organizations in which the author has been involved.

Notes 1 2

Quote from the statement by Toshiaki Tanabe, the Ambassador for Global Environmental Affairs, at AGBM8 on 22 October 1997. The Asia-Pacific Integrated Model (AIM) is a simulation model developed by the National Institute for Environmental Studies in collaboration with Kyoto University and several research institutes in the Asia-Pacific region.

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Bibliography Arima, J. (2015) Tikyuondankakosyo no Shinjitsu (in Japanese), Tokyo: Chuokoronshinsya. Council on the Global Warming Issue (2008) ‘In Pursuit of Japan as a Low-carbon Society’. Downie, C. (2014) The Politics of Climate Change Negotiations: Strategies and Variables in Prolonged International Negotiations, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. Government of Japan (2015) Intended Nationally Determined Contributions. Hattori, T. (1999) ‘The Road to the Kyoto Conference: An Assessment of the Japanese Two-Dimensional Negotiation’, International Negotiation, 4(2): 167–95. Kameyama, Y. (2017) Climate Change Policy in Japan: From the 1980s to 2015, Abingdon: Routledge. Ringius, l. (1999) ‘Differentiation, Leaders, and Fairness: Negotiating Climate Change Commitments in the European Community’, International Negotiation, 4(2): 133–65. Sjoestedt, G. and A. M. Penetrate (eds) (2015) Climate Change Negotiations: A Guide to Resolving Disputes and Facilitating Multilateral Cooperation, Abingdon: Routledge. Takashina, J. (2017) ‘Japan’s Global Warming Countermeasures’, 7 March, Presentation Material, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. Watanabe, R. (2011) Climate Policy Changes in Germany and Japan, Abingdon: Routledge.

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7 Push and pull by Japan for regional environmental cooperation Transboundary air pollution in East Asia1 Inkyoung Kim

Introduction In Japan, air pollution has become a primary issue that the government is attempting to address. Japan’s dense air pollution was caused by high dependence on coal and then petroleum in the face of increasing energy demands for rapid economic growth after World War II. Japan has worked hard to solve the pollution problems it caused for itself, but air pollution is a transnational problem that requires cooperative solutions among all the nations that contribute to it. In fact, in addition to domestic sources of air pollution, Japan is now a victim of transboundary air pollution as a net importer from China. Atmospheric pollution is transboundary in nature as pollution migration does not care about national borders. This study examines three cooperative mechanisms in which Japan has been involved regarding transboundary air pollution issues. These three cooperative mechanisms, dealing with acid deposition, persistent organic particles (POPs), and several other transboundary air pollutants, illustrate different directions of Japanese foreign policy on regional environmental cooperation. These three cases are complementary in showing various stances taken by the Japanese government to allow analytical comparisons and contrasts. The variations in the ways the Japanese government responds to different transboundary issues will show that “the potentials and limitations for the exercise of power depend not only on the size and capabilities of an actor, but also on the peculiarities of an issue and the policy framework” (Wong 2001: 18). Along with the end of the Cold War, which had impeded any regional cooperation that needed to include China, Japan’s advanced economic performance and technological development has led the Japanese government to exercise active leadership for some regional environmental cooperative mechanisms, while lagging on others. Japan is a leader on the cooperative mechanisms that have a wider regional scope encompassing both Northeast and Southeast Asia, but is more likely to be a laggard in cooperative mechanisms that focus on a narrower regional scope, encompassing Northeast Asia.

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Pollution in Japan Even though it is difficult to indicate exactly when the Japanese started to problematize environmental pollution, Japan observed several environmental dispute cases between the 1868 Meiji Restoration and World War II. Due to “an all-out drive for industrialization” and the “increasing rise of nationalism and militarism” (Kawashima 1995: 233, 236), water and soil pollution became prevalent in the 1880s, particularly associated with mining activities in Japan. In this pre-World War II period, several statutes incorporated environmental pollution provisions that enabled the government to order a factory to stop its operations to prevent injury of neighbors and infringement upon the public interest. However, these statutes “were mainly aimed at the regulation of factory operations from the standpoint of industrial police power, not direct environmental protection” (Kawashima 1995: 236). In addition to the lack of development of environmental regulations, people also viewed the smoke from the factories as the symbol of the nation’s economic recovery after the World War II. However, after the notorious “big four” environmental tragedies, or “four major pollution issues,” between the 1940s and the late 1960s, Japan established comprehensive measures for environmental protection. The issues include: 1) Itai-Itai malady caused by cadmium contamination of the Jintsu River in Toyama Prefecture; 2) Minamata disease caused by mercury contamination in Minamata Bay in Kumamoto Prefecture; 3) Niigata Minamata disease caused by mercury contamination in Agano River in Niigata Prefecture; 4) Yokkaichi asthma caused by sulfur dioxide in Mie Prefecture (Miyazaki 2015: 118).2 The legacy of these big four environmental tragedies created “judicial, administrative, social, and political changes in attitude toward environmental protection” (Kawashima 1995: 242). The media’s comprehensive coverage of the trials surrounding these environmental incidents awakened the entire nation in the early 1970s and empowered the judiciary to play a crucial role for the victims. In addition to increasing domestic awareness of environmental pollution, rising international concerns regarding severe air pollution in Japan urged the Japanese government to take more active positions on environmental regulations. For example, in 1970, the Times published an article, entitled “Tokyo Threatened by Killing Pollution,” that described Tokyo’s smog pollution thus: “a group of children playing in a schoolyard had trouble breathing and began falling down. In the days and weeks that followed thousands of people had to be treated in Tokyo hospitals for painfully smarting eyes and sore throats” (Sauchuk 2015). Along with the international media coverage, the Nixon administration influenced the Japanese government to adopt more rigorous environmental laws. Russell Train, the appointed chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality of the United States, advised President Nixon to contact the Japanese Prime Minister, Eisaku Sato, with the goal of dealing with environmental pollution together. For President Nixon, environmental pollution was “both an international issue that required diplomacy and an opportunity to cooperate with another country on a common problem” (Sauchuk 2015), particularly when trade issues, including textile exports to the United States, troubled relations between Washington and Tokyo in the 1960s (Cohen 2000). Prime Minister Sato responded to President Nixon’s letter: I agree with your statement that the impact of a deteriorating environment extends beyond national borders. In view of its international character and the enormous scientific techniques needed to be developed, the problem could be effectively dealt with only through international cooperation. (Sauchuk 2015) 103

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After visiting Japan in October 1970 to meet with Prime Minister Sato, Mr. Train reported to the Assistant to the President that Japan had since set up an Environment Agency with Cabinet rank, passed environmental legislations and statutes, raised public and private investment on environmental protection, and supported the United States in urging the polluter-pays principle (Sauchuk 2015). In fact, Japan, “as the first industrializer in East Asia”, was “the first country in the region to build up government environmental organizations and set up environmental legislation” (Shin 2015: 75). As the four environmental tragedies of the 1940s–60s were associated with either water pollution or air pollution, Japan’s response started with the 1958 Water Quality Preservation Act, the 1958 Factory Effluent Regulation Act, and the 1962 Smoke and Soot Regulation Act (Kawashima 1995: 236). The Basic Law for Environmental Pollution Control (superseded by the Basic Environmental Law in 1993), promulgated in 1967, provided more fundamental principles and a framework that stipulated environmental pollution issue areas (air pollution, water pollution, noise, vibration, ground subsidence, offensive odor, and soil contamination). The Smoke and Soot Regulation was the first legal measurement to combat air pollution. This was followed by the “Air Pollution Law” in 1968 (amended in 1970) under a special legislative session, the so-called “Pollution Diet” in 1970 (McKean 1981; Upham 1987). In addition to the Japan–US bilateral discussion on environmental degradation, the international efforts to solve environmental problems at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) in 1972 also inspired Japan to take some initiatives for regional environmental cooperation. Principle 21 of the UNCHE pointed out transboundary pollution, noting: States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. (UNEP 1972) Even though Japan started to discuss the necessity of international environmental cooperation in the 1970s, it was not until the early 1990s that regional environmental cooperation became a priority. Particularly, Paragraph 9.26 of Agenda 21, adopted at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 1992, explicitly emphasized that successful European initiatives in tackling transboundary atmospheric pollution should be shared with other regions: The 1979 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, and its protocols, have established a regional regime in Europe and North America, based on a review process and cooperative programs for systematic observation of air pollution, assessment and information exchange. These programs need to be continued and enhanced, and their experience needs to be shared with other regions of the world. (UN 1992) Responding to all of these domestic and international pressures, Japan started to pay considerable attention to the environmental aspects of its international engagement. For example, Japan endeavored to green its environmental official development assistance (ODA) in the 104

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1990s (Miyazaki 2015). Until 1989, most of the Japanese environmental ODA had been administered by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI, later the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, METI) and approved by the Ministry of Finance (MOF). Therefore, Japan’s environmental ODA had focused on imports of natural resources and technical assistance for mega-dam construction in developing countries. This began to change after that date. Due to various types of international criticism of Japan’s negligence of the environment ( JICA Research Institute 2001; Dauvergne 1997; Miyazaki 2015) and ODA’s “self-serving” features, such as overemphasis on bilateral assistance, and tied aid and loans (Otopalik 2010), the Japanese government endeavored to green its ODA from the early 1990s. The greening of aid means that donor countries reform their existing practices and institutions to incorporate “the concept of sustainable development into aid policy and delivery” (Kim 2009: 24). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), which is responsible for the formulation of general ODA guidelines, implementation of loans, and promotion of technical cooperation, created a high governmental position, Ambassador, for global environmental issues in the early 1990s. In 1992, MITI also initiated its own environmental assistance for developing countries through the Green Aid Plan in order to transfer Japanese environmental technologies (Imura 2005). The Ministry of the Environment (MOEJ) had participated in sharing expertise and technical know-how with developing countries through international environmental cooperation since the early 1990s, particularly elevating its division for international cooperation to a Global Environmental Department (Imura 2005). MOEJ also established the International Cooperation Office, in 2001, to green its environmental ODA and to focus on international environmental aid, and became willing to fund regional environmental cooperation. The Sino-Japan Friendship Center for Environmental Protection (Center) is another good example of Japan’s active engagement in international environmental cooperation. The Center was established in 1992 at the request of the Chinese government. Supported by MOEJ, MITI, National Institute for Environmental Studies, and Overseas Environmental Cooperation Center, Japan, etc., Japan provided about 10 billion yen (about US$113 million in 1995 value) in grant aid between 1990 and 1995 to construct the building of the Center and to provide equipment in the building ( JICA undated). The Center focused on environmental technical guidance, research, training, and monitoring functions during its early phases, between 1990 and 2001. In addition to greening its ODA through various channels, the Cabinet approved the Third Basic Environment Plan in 2006, emphasizing its international efforts as one of six major strategic aims (OECD 2010). It is notable that Japanese economic and environmental cooperation has made a major shift toward Asia due to rapid economic growth in the region, which has been accompanied by increasing pressure on the environment. Japan has been interested in expanding its environmental cooperation, “exports of environmental technology (e.g. air pollution control, energy-efficient technologies, monitoring instruments), and environmentally related development co-operation, both bilaterally and regionally” (OECD 2010: 99–100). In fact, Japan recorded the highest environmental ODA in the world in terms of the cumulative total of the absolute value from 1990 to 2006, “nearly double that of the secondplace country, the US” (Matsuoka 2014: 208). It is worth noting that these environmental activities should not be overemphasized as altruistic or purely environmental aid and support. Japan has employed its international aid policy to protect its economic interests abroad, based on its mercantilist approach (Hook and Zhang 1998; 105

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Tuman and Strand 2006). The global trend is also notable in that “the growing emphasis on the environment, in parallel with lax ODA norms, is increasingly facilitating donor-oriented greenlabeled projects and is creating a strong selective affinity with an undesirable aid modality” (Park 2016: 2). However, Japan’s environmental ODA has endeavored to develop “a type of regional public good” through the “environmental center approach” that combines grant aid with environmental-technology sharing through helping developing countries enhance environmentalmonitoring abilities, develop environmental information, and train government employees (Matsuoka 2014: 213).

Environmental cooperation in East Asia The Japanese government has not only participated in numerous regional cooperative mechanisms in diverse issue areas but has often initiated various programs or been a founding member. For example, in the area of air pollution, Japan is a founding member of the following: Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia (EANET) since 1998; Tripartite Director General Meetings for yellow sand/dust sand storm among China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (hereafter Korea) since 2007; Joint Research Project on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollutants in Northeast Asia (LTP) since 1995; Workshop on Environmental Monitoring of Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) in East Asian Countries since 2002; and Clean Asia Initiative (CAI) since 2008. In addressing water pollution, Japan has been involved in the Northwest Pacific Action Plan (NOWPAP) since 1994. In the area of biodiversity, Japan has participated in the East Asian Biosphere Reserve Network since 1995; Northeast Asian Site Network Center since 1997; and Asia-Pacific Migratory Waterbird Conservation Strategy since 2002. In addition to these issue-specific cooperative mechanisms, Japan has actively participated in several comprehensive cooperative mechanisms: the Asian Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Network since 2005; Project Atmospheric Brown Cloud since 2002; Environmental Congress for Asia and Pacific since 1991; Northeast Asian Sub-regional Program of Environmental Cooperation since 1993; Tripartite Environment Ministers Meeting since 1999; and Asia-Pacific Network for Global Change Research since 1995 (Kim 2014a; OECD 2010). The first regional environmental cooperative mechanism, the Northeast Asian Conference on Environmental Cooperation (NEAC), was created in October 1992 by China, Japan, Korea, Mongolia, and Russia to serve as a venue for informational exchanges and policy dialogues for advanced environmental-conservation efforts. Experts from national governmental organizations, local authorities, and research institutes from those five countries, observed by experts from the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the UN Economic and Social Committee for the Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), have held annual meetings. This NEAC was a form of expansion from bilateral environmental symposia between Japan and Korea, initiated in 1988 by a proposal from the Korean government. Assisted by UNEP, this bilateral symposium was opened to China and later Mongolia and the USSR as observers, and studied as a model toward the possibility of organizing meetings for regional cooperation. In 1992, the meeting was reorganized as NEAC. As such, the first regional environmental cooperative mechanism was bred by bilateral environmental cooperation between Japan and Korea, sharing inspiration for the necessity of regional environmental regimes (Ministry of Environment of Japan, hereafter MOEJ, 2006a).

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Japan and Korea, as recipients of transboundary air pollution from China due to its geographical and meteorological conditions, have been proactive in taking firm leadership on the establishment and development of these various cooperative mechanisms or initiatives. Japan has been active in trying to incorporate a geographically wide area, which includes most countries in East Asia (North and South), into these mechanisms (for instance, EANET and CAI), whereas Korea has been more interested in a narrow regional scope, focusing on Northeast Asia (for instance, LTP and NOWPAP). The Korean government organized the Seoul Symposium on “UNCED and Prospect on the Environmental Regime in the 21st Century” in 1992, and the participants established an informal Environmental Network (MOEJ 2006a) and also adopted a declaration calling for general environmental cooperation in the region of Northeast Asia (Yoon 2006; Yoshimatsu 2014). Unlike Korea, which has shown a strong commitment to regional environmental cooperation in Northeast Asia specifically, Japan has pursued developing broader regional cooperation throughout East Asia (North and South) and even the Asia-Pacific more broadly (Kim 2014b). For example, the Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia (EANET) includes Southeast as well as Northeast Asian countries, even though acid deposition was a particular concern for Northeast Asian countries, based on China’s rapid economic development and their geographical locations. The participation of Southeast Asian countries was intended to reduce the potential tensions and mistrust among Japan, China, and Korea. If the focus of cooperation was only Northeast Asia, disputes between emitting countries and recipients would have been inevitable, especially given the region’s history, in which there was an element of mistrust between some countries and therefore a certain reluctance to cooperate. (Miyazaki 2015: 127) For Japan, which was affected by upstream air pollution emitters and was searching for an international topic to show its presence beyond ODA activities in the international community, regional environmental cooperation in the wider scope of East Asia seemed like a reasonable choice. The following sections will discuss Japan’s strong leadership in regional environmental cooperative mechanisms, EANET and Workshop on Environmental Monitoring of Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) in East Asian Countries, which encompass the geographically and meteorologically broader region of East Asia. In contrast, Japan has been less active and sometimes passive in regional cooperative mechanisms for the narrower scope of Northeast Asia, in which the Korean government has exerted active leadership as the initiator.

Japan’s push for regional environmental cooperation Japan started its international efforts for regional environmental issues with EANET to tackle acid deposition in East Asia. Acid rain was first reported in Japan in 1973 in the Kanto Plain near Tokyo through tree decline (Wilkening 2004). The Environment Agency (currently Ministry of the Environment) of Japan organized a special committee to conduct a domestic survey on wet air pollution in that area in 1975. It found that Japan needed to understand the transboundary risk of acidification that resulted from high levels of air pollutants from neighboring countries. However,

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during the Cold War, “there was no diplomatic channel for negotiating on air pollution” with China (Miyazaki 2015: 126). The World Bank also warned in 1995 that if East Asia continued its energy and environmental policies, its levels of sulfur dioxide emissions in 1990 would nearly triple by 2020 (EANET 2011a). Responding to these environmental concerns and the international pressures from the UNCED and Agenda 21, the Environment Agency of Japan organized a series of expert meetings on acid deposition in East Asia between 1993 and 1997. The Japanese Prime Minister, Ryutaro Hashimoto, officially proposed establishing EANET at the UN General Assembly Special Session for the overall review and appraisal of national implementations of Agenda 21 in June 1997 in order to “assist the enhancement of monitoring capacity of relevant countries, the establishment of an information network on air pollution and the transfer of environmental technologies” (Yoshimatsu 2014: 149). EANET has established concrete procedures for collective monitoring by providing clear guidelines (EANET 2000a) and technical manuals (EANET 2000b), and by establishing Quality Assurance/Quality Control programs (EANET 2000c). Particularly, the annual “Inter-laboratory Comparison Project” examines the monitoring results of member countries to improve “reliability of analytical data through assessment of suitable analytical methods and techniques” (EANET 2013: 1). Through these efforts, EANET has achieved standardized monitoring capability among the 13 member countries. Since EANET began its full operation in 2001, MOEJ has exerted active leadership within EANET and provided various resources. In fact, the Japanese government has dominated financial contributions both for the Secretariat and the Network Center of EANET, at approximately 90% and 99% respectively (Kim 2014b). The Environment Agency of Japan worked as the interim Secretariat until 2001, when the United Nations Environment Program’s Regional Resource Center for Asia and the Pacific in Bangkok, Thailand, was designated as the Secretariat. In addition to the interim Secretariat, the Japanese government has hosted the Network Center that compiles and evaluates the monitoring data of member countries. The Network Center is located at the Asia Center for Air Pollution Research, previously the Acid Deposition and Oxidant Research Center (ADORC) in Niigata, Japan, since member countries agreed to designate ADORC as the Network Center in 2000 at the second Intergovernmental Meeting, a decision-making body (EANET 2000d). The Network Center also hosts group and individual training courses for trainees from member countries. For example, the Network Center invited five trainees each from Cambodia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Russia, and Thailand for the individual training course in February 2016 in Niigata, Japan (EANET 2016). Based on these various monitoring activities and training, EANET successfully published its first and second periodic reports of its monitoring results (Table 7.1) (EANET 2006; EANET 2011b). These reports not only show different degrees of commitment by participating countries but also demonstrate an impressive accomplishment for getting countries to do work beyond sending people on a junket to a meeting and training session each year. Table 7.1 shows Japan’s significant contribution to these reports and knowledge accumulation regarding acid deposition in East Asia. As such, Japan has exerted firm leadership for EANET. It has provided diverse resources for regional atmospheric-monitoring activities for more than two decades. Another example of strong leadership by Japan in the area of regional cooperation on air pollution is its sub-regional initiative under the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (hereafter referred to as “Stockholm Convention”). Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) “possess toxic properties, resist degradation, bioaccumulate and are transported, 108

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Table 7.1 Number of pages of national assessments for the periodic report of EANET

China Japan Korea Cambodia Indonesia Lao PDR Malaysia Mongolia Myanmar Philippines Russia Thailand Vietnam

1st Report in 2006

2nd Report in 2011

total

14 28 18 4 26 8 20 14 No submission 24 28 20 27

20 58 15 8 14 6 32 8 8 34 44 34 22

34 86 33 12 40 14 52 22 8 58 72 54 49

Source: EANET 2006, 2011b.

through air, water and migratory species, across international boundaries and deposited far from their place of release, where they accumulate in terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems” (UNEP 2009) causing “serious health effects including certain cancers, birth defects, dysfunctional immune and reproductive systems, greater susceptibility to disease and damages to the central and peripheral nervous systems” (UNEP undated). POPs are generated from pesticides for agricultural purposes and industrial chemicals for various applications, and are also the unintended result of incomplete combustion and chemical reactions. Due to their long-range transport, no one government or limited number of governments can protect their own citizens or environment from POPs. Thus, the Stockholm Convention was adopted in May 2001 and entered into force in May 2004 to take measures to eliminate or reduce POPs to protect health concerns. As of January 2017, 181 parties have ratified the agreement (Secretariat of the Stockholm Convention Clearing House 2016).3 Under the convention, parties are required to restrict POPs production, conduct environmental monitoring both at national and international levels to reveal current POP levels in humans and the environment (Article 11), and assess the effectiveness of this international agreement based on monitoring data (Article 16) (UNEP GMP 2017a). For this, a Global Monitoring Plan (GMP) was established to collect “comparable, harmonized and reliable information on POP levels in the four core environmental matrices” including ambient air, human milk, human blood, and surface water for water-soluble POPs. The first set of regional reports from the five UN regions (Africa, Asia & Pacific, Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, Western Europe, and Other States) was published in 2008–9 (Secretariat of the Stockholm Convention Clearing House 2016).4 The reports “revealed serious challenges related to data identification and standardization” due to “the lack of standardized taxonomy for POPs” (Stockholm Convention Regional Centre in the Czech Republic and Research Centre for Toxic Compounds in the Environment 2015: 9). To improve this situation, a new electronic data capture system, Data Warehouse, was developed to standardize existing data, obtain and process newly available data, and create an online data visualization system. As part of these international monitoring efforts to conduct the effective monitoring of POPs, eleven East Asian countries have operated the POPs Monitoring Project for the sub-regional 109

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initiative since 2003. The operation of the POPs Monitoring Project in East Asian Countries has two parts: (1) organizing workshops to which the participating countries are invited to discuss and guide the Project; and (2) providing technical assistance for background field monitoring of POPs in air in terms of: (a) sampling; (b) high resolution GC/MS analysis including relevant capacity building elements; and (c) data validation, QA/QC and treatment and reporting of the obtained data. (MOEJ 2006b: 7) The Ministry of the Environment of Japan serves as the Secretariat and has organized meetings and workshops for the sub-regional monitoring activities approximately every twelve months since December 2002 (with the exception of 2014). The most recent workshop was held in January 2016 in Hanoi, Vietnam (MOEJ 2016). Several Japanese organizations have taken a firm initiative in promoting regional monitoring activities. MOEJ, the National Institute for Environmental Studies (NIES), and the Japan Environmental Sanitation Center ( JESC) have worked together to organize the workshops and meetings (MOEJ 2007). For the monitoring activities, the Japanese government provides and transports the sampling materials, analyzes POPs chemicals in the collected samples, and then finally reviews the obtained monitoring data and reports back to the participating countries – with the exception of samples from Korea, which is the only participant country, other than Japan, that has full in-country capacity for these analytical processes (MOEJ 2007). NIES and JESC have also served as “reference laboratories for the POPs monitoring” (MOEJ 2007: 6). All the data is sent to China, which is the representative for the Asia-Pacific region in the GMP, and is then used in the review report by the Global Monitoring Program (Chung 2016). Even though this monitoring effort seems like an initial stage, it is still essential to know about causes and behavior of POPs to achieve the targets under the Stockholm Convention. The participation of most East Asian countries, including Japan, China, and Korea, in POPs monitoring through this mechanism illustrates a different route to cooperation than that of EANET, in which member countries have not yet produced any legally binding agreement. Korea has also put forward an interesting initiative. Korea established an Information Warehouse of POPs in 2005 (Ministry of Environment of Korea, hereafter, MOEK 2015) to respond to the request of the participating countries in the POPs Monitoring Project in East Asian Countries for more information sharing and data-analysis training (Chung 2016). As part of this program, Korea has hosted workshops annually for training and information sharing among member countries since 2005. In fact, the National Institute of Environmental Research in Korea has funded travel for one expert and one policymaker from each member country to the annual workshops. Japan, the main resource provider for the regional monitoring activities, has welcomed this proactive initiative by the Korean government as a great burden sharing with Japan (Chung 2016). At the most recent workshop, the tenth, held in November 2015 in Korea, member countries presented their information-management strategies and discussed their plans to use monitoring data and enhance Information Warehouse activities (MOEK 2015). For more systematic data sharing at the global level, the Global Monitoring Plan Data Warehouse (hereafter, Data Warehouse) has been developed since 2012 by the Czech Republic under the guidance of the GMP Global Coordination Group to store and visualize data on levels of POPs (UNEP GMP 2017b). More specifically, the Data Warehouse aims to build a

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harmonized and standardized data and information structure to enhance compatibility as well as public access to the data. It contains data on POPs concentrations in ambient air, human breast milk, human blood, and surface water (the “four core environmental matrices” mentioned earlier). However, China and Japan are the only countries that have monitored human milk in the Asia Pacific region, through Osaka Prefecture in Japan and the China National Center for Food Safety Risk. Other programs to survey human milk in the region have been conducted for other countries only through a collaboration of the Secretariat of the Stockholm Convention, UNEP Division of Technology, Industry of Economics Chemicals Branch, and the World Health Organization. China and Japan are again the only countries that have monitored POPs levels in surface water. Data from Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand have been collected by the United Nations University through a capacity building program, “Environmental Monitoring and Governance in the Asian Coastal Hydrosphere” in East/South Asian countries (Secretariat of the Stockholm Convention Clearing House 2015: 58). Moreover, Japan is the only country that has operated a national monitoring program on human blood to examine the health impact of POPs. As such, Japan has shown itself to be a clear leader for POP monitoring in the Asia Pacific in various manners.

Japan’s pull for regional environmental cooperation Unlike Japan’s firm leadership on the issues of acid deposition and POPs, Japan has shown limited willingness to engage in other regional environmental cooperation efforts. Korea’s closer geographic proximity to China has led the Korean government to be more urgent and responsive to several transboundary air pollutants, including smog and yellow dust. However, it is notable that these transboundary environmental issues have always affected Japan to a lesser extent and have been part of concerns that Japan-led cooperative mechanisms have addressed for decades. Thus, it is worth examining how Japan has participated in the Korea-led and narrower-region-based environmental cooperative mechanisms. This section examines the Joint Research on Longrange Transboundary Air Pollutants in Northeast Asia (LTP), a cooperative mechanism initiated not by Japan but by Korea. The Korean government, as the initiator for LTP, hosted the first Northeast Asian Workshop on Long-range Transboundary Pollutants among China, Japan, and Korea in 1995. The Korean government invited China and Japan for expert meetings in 1996 and 1997. The three countries launched LTP at the First Sub-Working Group Meeting in 1999 and adopted the Terms of Reference for joint research (Chang 2012). The National Institute of Environmental Research, under the auspices of the Ministry of Environment of Korea, has served as the Secretariat. LTP has undergone several stages. For the first stage, 2000–4, LTP aimed to build “an international cooperation platform for monitoring, modeling, and emission inventory.” For the second stage, 2005–7, it focused on “analysis of LTP monitoring data, and development of LTP emission inventories and model evaluation on transboundary transport of sulfur.” For the third stage, 2008–12, LTP conducted model inter-comparison to improve modeling of each member country (Chang 2012). Since the participating countries of LTP agreed to monitor and review the gridded emission data for SO2 (sulfur dioxide), NOx (nitrogen oxides), and Volatile Organic Compounds at their First Sub-Working Group Meeting in 1999, LTP has expanded its scope of monitoring. For example, the participants of the annual meeting in 2007 agreed to monitor not only SO2

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Table 7.2 Relative contributions in percentage for total nitrate dry and wet deposition from China to Korea and Japan

Modeling by Korea Modeling by Japan Modeling by China

From China to Korea (%)*

From China to Japan (%)*

46 44.5 57.3

35 39.8 33.25

Note: Adapted from Nam and Lee 2013, p. 7. *

Nam and Lee (2013) provides percentages of the four months, February, May, June, and November. I have averaged them.

and NO2 (nitrogen dioxide) but also PM10 (particulate matter less than ten microns in diameter) and ionic components. Moreover, they included O3 (ozone) and PM2.5 for optional monitoring (Kim 2014a). The current, fourth, stage of LTP activities focuses on PM2.5 and O3. PM is the sum of solid and liquid hazardous particles suspended in air. PM can be classified as PM10 (particles with ten microns or smaller aerodynamic diameter) and PM2.5 (finer particles with 2.5 microns and smaller aerodynamic diameter). PM as a major component of outdoor air pollution has been classified as “carcinogenic to humans” or “leading environmental cause of cancer deaths” by the International Agency for Research on Cancer, the specialized cancer agency of the World Health Organization (International Agency for Research on Cancer 2013). In addition to monitoring more air pollutants, LTP has emphasized modeling activities to vindicate the source and receptor relationships in the region. Furthermore, LTP has implemented model inter-comparison to understand the different modeling results that each of the three participating countries has presented in its annual national report to the LTP Secretariat. Table 7.2 illustrates how each country’s modeling of China’s contributions to total nitrate deposition in Japan and Korea has shown different degrees of source and receptor relationships. We can take at least two important points from the LTP study on source and receptor relationships. First, transboundary air pollution is evident in East Asia, and Korea and Japan receive lots of air pollutants from China. Second, even though Japan is affected by the transport of air pollutant emissions from China to a lesser extent than Korea, Japan receives significant amount of pollutants from China.5 While the Korean government has provided the most financial resources for the LTP project, between US$600,000 and US$1,450,000 a year (Kim 2014a), Japan has been a subdued participant in LTP. Japan has not contributed to LTP’s annual budget, instead allocating US $10,000 a year for its activities related to LTP monitoring, which is used to cover travel costs for its own scientists to attend LTP meetings, beyond expenses already supported by the LTP’s Secretariat. According to a senior researcher at the Network Center of EANET, who was in charge of the Japanese activities for LTP in 2011, “even this amount of budget is included in the budget for domestic monitoring, rather than being recognized as separate for LTP” (Kim 2014a: 227). In addition to its limited financial contribution, Japan has shown only moderate interest in providing monitoring results for the annual reports of LTP. As LTP has not structured its monitoring activities through the creation of common modeling tools and monitoring requirements, the monitoring data submitted by participating countries are significantly different in types and amounts of information. Thus, the length and detail of monitoring 112

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Table 7.3 Contributions of each country to monitoring data (Unit: Number of pages) Item of measurement Annual reports Long-term monitoring

Gaseous measurements Particulate matter Surface meteorology Precipitation Intensive Gaseous monitoring measurements Particulate matter Surface meteorology Precipitation Satellite data and remote sensing Aircraft measurement Total pages contributed

China

Japan

Korea

2010 2

2005 1

2010 2005 2010 2005 3 3 7 3

1 Not submitted

1 Not submitted

2 4

3 3

2 3

1 2

2 Not submitted

2 N/A

7 2

6 2

2 8

2 3

7 Not submitted

6 Not submitted

9 5

8 4

42 5

5 2

Not submitted N/A

N/A N/A

2 N/A

1 N/A

1 2

N/A N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

17

N/A

9

10

29

30

80

18

Source: Kim 2014a: 229–30.

information that appears in annual reports varies by country (Table 7.3). For most items of air pollutants measurement, Japan has provided less specific information than Korea, unlike the detailed national assessment it submitted for the first and second periodic reports of EANET (Table 7.1). The Korean government has expanded its efforts in preparing its national annual reports for the LTP project by including the intensive monitoring of particulate matter and expensive aircraft measurement that can help track the air stream and trajectory analysis for more successful modeling. The participating countries agreed in 2009 to conduct aircraft measurement as an option due to their different monitoring capabilities and resource availability. Japan has not conducted aircraft measurement yet despite its advanced economic and technological development. Japan’s lack of support for the LTP activities that the Korean government initiated can also be shown through its objection to the Korean proposal to combine EANET and LTP. EANET focuses on measuring acidification to eventually establish a regional framework, like the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, adopted in 1979 by thirty-two European countries to reduce air pollution.6 LTP performs joint research on modeling as well as monitoring. Thus, the duplication of activities between EANET and LTP is “unavoidable” due to “some overlapping activities on monitoring” (Kim 2014b: 158). In 2009, the Korean government proposed to merge EANET and LTP to divide the labor more effectively, but the Japanese government rejected the proposal because it preferred to keep the existing organizational format of EANET. As such, Japan does not seem to have contributed to fostering and expanding Korea’s research efforts through LTP activities, which should be one of the key benefits of a joint research program (Levy 1994). 113

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Conclusions As the first industrialized country and the first establisher of an environmental agency and legislation in the region, Japan has been active in regional environmental cooperation in East Asia since the 1990s. Its own domestic measures have met the challenges of transboundary air pollution issues, particularly from China. It is known that more than 30% of Japan’s air pollution originates from China. This source-and-receptor relationship may be intensified by China’s fast growing economy. To respond to transboundary air pollution concerns, Japan has exercised active and positive leadership for regional environmental cooperation on monitoring activities for acid deposition and POPs. Based on its advanced technology, Japan has led regional monitoring activities. In addition, its status as the only developed country in the region has led the Japanese government to provide financial and material assistance for other member countries through EANET and the POPs Monitoring Project in East Asian Countries. In fact, Japan’s efforts toward joint monitoring have succeeded in collecting monitoring data and standardizing or equalizing monitoring techniques (Ishii et al. 2016). EANET published two periodic reports of regional monitoring, in 2006 and 2011. It is preparing for its third periodic report, which will describe the state of air pollution in East Asia. Japan’s prevalent leadership for the POPs Monitoring Project in East Asian Countries has also contributed to establishing regional monitoring results on POPs. In fact, two monitoring reports were published in 2008 and 2015 for the periodic evaluations of the effectiveness of the Stockholm Convention (Secretariat of the Stockholm Convention Clearing House 2016). Japan’s firm leadership has reaped the practical results that these two cooperative mechanisms aimed for as the first step in tackling transboundary air pollution issues. These proactive Japanese efforts in regional environmental cooperation in the wider area of East Asia have not been repeated in other regional cooperative mechanisms in the narrow region of Northeast Asia. Japan’s participation in several cooperative programs for Northeast Asia such as LTP, which the Korean government initiated, has been subdued. Japan’s greater willingness to participate in the wider geographical scope of East Asia or the Asia Pacific for regional environmental cooperation is due to mistrust and political tensions among Japan, China, and Korea based on the history of the first half of the twentieth century. However, some criticize this as Japan’s Asian environmental strategy being “scattered,” without specific regional focus, and propose a “selection and concentration” strategy (Matsuoka 2014: 217). This is contrasted with the Korean focus on the more narrow regional scope of Northeast Asia. Not surprisingly, Japan has not invested extra effort or resources for LTP monitoring activities as it considers that LTP and EANET monitoring activities are duplicated to some extent (Kim 2014a). It is notable that all of the cooperative mechanisms in the region, whether they are wide or narrow in geographic scope, are not legally binding. In fact, environmental cooperation in East Asia is characterized by “soft institutions” (Yoshimatsu 2014: 147). A soft institution relies on voluntary contributions and participation. Action through international institutions can take several different forms, such as normative pronouncements, monitoring programs, scientific research, or regulatory standards (Keohane et al. 1993). None of the environmental cooperative efforts in East Asia have established specific regulatory standards, as we have observed regarding marine pollution in the Baltic and North Seas as well as acid rain in Europe and North America. East Asia’s soft institutions emphasize information exchange, the consultation process, and consensus-based decision-making without binding obligations. Informal institutions have some benefits, such as a flexible decision-making environment, 114

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mutual accommodation, and a higher comfort level when using informal communication (Yoshimatsu 2005). However, this East Asian regional environmental cooperation model has not been effective enough to tackle transboundary air pollution problems because there is a difference between researching a problem and considering costly remedial measures through regulatory institutions. Based on the European experiences with transboundary environmental problems, future research should focus on whether East Asia needs to pursue hard institutions, or keep its current soft institutions for more efficient regional environmental cooperation. It will be very interesting to see to what extent Japan or any other member country needs to revise its leadership and participation for these two options of regional environmental cooperation.

Notes 1

2 3

4 5

6

I would like to thank Dr. Jung In Young for sharing her thoughts and experiences on POPs at the interview as well as the two reviewers, Dr. Margaret A. McKean and Dr. Mary M. McCarthy for providing perceptive and constructive feedback on this chapter. See McKean 1981 for the Japanese participation in environmental movements through environmental litigation. One-hundred-and-eighty-seven countries signed the Convention, but six countries, including Brunei, Haiti, Israel, Italy, Malaysia, and the United States, have not ratified it yet (Secretariat of the Stockholm Convention Clearing House 2017). The most recent regional monitoring reports from the five regions were published in 2014–15. A Japanese study shows that the contribution rates of the transboundary air pollution from other Asian countries in the Kinki Region of Japan account for 69–79% for aerosols, 47–87% for ionic concentrations in rain, and 55–79% for ionic concentrations in fog ionic, depending on the specific air pollutants (Shimadera et al. 2009). For more information on the Convention on the Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, see www.unece.org/environmental-policy/conventions/envlrtapwelcome/the-air-convention-and-itsprotocols/the-convention-and-its-achievements.html.

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EANET (2011a) ‘Brief history’, www.eanet.cc/eanet/brief.html accessed on 16 December 2016. EANET (2011b) The Second Periodic Report on the State of Acid Deposition in East Asia. Part II: National Assessments, www.eanet.asia/product/PRSAD/2_PRSAD/2_PRSAD2.pdf accessed on 14 December 2016. EANET (2013) ‘Report of the inter-laboratory comparison project 2011’, www.eanet.asia/product/ interlab/interlab2011.pdf accessed on 14 December 2016. EANET (2016) ‘Events and activities’, www.eanet.asia/schedule/2016.html accessed on 26 November 2017. Hook, S.W. and Zhang, G. (1998) ‘Japan’s aid policy since the Cold War: rhetoric and reality’, Asian Survey, 38(11): 1051–66. Imura H. (2005) ‘Japan’s environmental policy: international cooperation’, in H. Imura and M. A. Schreurs (eds), Environmental Policy in Japan, Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. International Agency for Research on Cancer (2013) ‘IARC: outdoor air pollution a leading environmental cause of cancer deaths’, online at www.iarc.fr/en/media-centre/iarcnews/pdf/pr221_E.pdf accessed on 14 December 2016. Ishii, A. et al. (2016) ‘東アジアにおける越境大気汚染と外交の考え方——PM2.5問題を軸に’ [Thinking about transboundary air pollution in East Asia and Foreign Policy: Focusing on PM2.5], www.researchgate.net/publication/283057158_dongajianiokeruyuejingdaqiwurantowaijiaonokaoefang–PM25wentiwozhouni accessed on 14 December 2016. Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) (undated) ‘Evaluation summary’, www.jica.go.jp/english/ our_work/evaluation/tech_and_grant/project/term/asia/c8h0vm000001rr8t-att/chi_02_1.pdf accessed on 30 December 2016. JICA Research Institute (2001) The Second Study on Development Assistance for the Environment, http://jica-ri. jica.go.jp/IFIC_and_JBICI-Studies/english/publications/reports/study/topical/environment/pdf/ environment.pdf accessed on 14 December 2016. Kawashima, S. (1995) ‘A survey of environmental law and policy in Japan’, N.C.J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg., 20: 231–72. Keohane, R. O, Haas, P. M., and Levy, M. A. (1993) ‘The effectiveness of international environmental institutions’, in P. M. Haas, R. O. Keohane, and M. A. Levy (eds), Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Kim, I. (2014a) Still Dirty after All These Years: Political Leadership, Knowledge, and Socialization and Regional Environmental Cooperation in Northeast Asia, http://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? article=1156&context=dissertations_2 accessed on 14 December 2016. Kim, I. (2014b) ‘Messages from a middle power: participation by the Republic of Korea in regional environmental cooperation on transboundary air pollution issues’, International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 14(2): 147–62. Kim, S. (2009) ‘Translating sustainable development: the greening of Japan’s bilateral international cooperation’, Global Environmental Politics, 9(2): 24–51. Levy, J. (1994) ‘Learning and foreign policy: sweeping a conceptual minefield’, International Organization, 48(2): 279–312. Matsuoka, S. (2014) ‘Japan’s Asian strategy: Japan’s Asian environmental strategy and a soft power of the 21st century’, Public Policy Review, 10(1): 189–226. McKean, M. A. (1981) Environmental Protest and Citizen Politics in Japan, Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press. Ministry of Environment of Japan (2006a) ‘Northeast Asian Conference on Environmental Cooperation’, www.env.go.jp/earth/coop/coop/neac_e.html accessed on 14 December 2016. Ministry of Environment of Japan (2006b) ‘Background air monitoring of persistent organic pollutants in East Asian countries 2004–2006’, www.env.go.jp/en/chemi/pops/eaws/background04-06.pdf accessed on 14 December 2016. Ministry of Environment of Japan (2007) ‘Fifth workshop on environmental monitoring of persistent organic pollutants (POPs) in East Asian countries: chairperson’s summary’, www.env.go.jp/en/ chemi/pops/eaws/07_summary.pdf accessed on 14 December 2016. Ministry of Environment of Japan (2016) ‘Eleventh workshop on environmental monitoring of persistent organic pollutants (POPs) in East Asian countries’, www.env.go.jp/chemi/pops/11th/mat02.pdf accessed on 14 December 2016.

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Ministry of Environment of Korea (2015) ‘Cooperation on POPs data analysis and information sharing among 11 East Asian countries’ (in Korean), www.me.go.kr/home/web/board/read.do?boardMasterId=1&boardId=580980&menuId=286 accessed on 14 December 2016. Miyazaki, A. (2015) ‘Japan’s foreign policy and transnational environmental risks’, in S. Maslow, R. Mason, and P. O’Shea (eds), Risk State: Japan’s Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty, Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. Nam, S. and Lee, H. (2013) ‘Reverberating beyond the region in addressing air pollution in North-East Asia’, www.reg-observatory.org/docs/EEREG_NamLee.doc accessed on 26 January 2017. OECD (2010) OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: Japan 2010, www.oecd.org/japan/japan2010. htm accessed on 27 January 2017. Otopalik, C. M. (2010) ‘Japan’s overseas development assistance: assessing conformance with shifting priorities’, International Journal of Politics and Good Governance, 1(1.1): 1–33. Park, J. B. (2016) ‘Toward the green comfort zone: synergy in environmental official development assistance’, Global Environmental Politics, 16(4): 1–11. Sauchuk, K. (2015) ‘Diplomacy under smoggy skies’, www.nixonfoundation.org/2015/06/diplomacyunder-smoggy-skies/ accessed on 13 December, 2016. Secretariat of the Stockholm Convention Clearing House (2015) ‘The 2nd POPs monitoring report AsiaPacific region’, http://chm.pops.int/Implementation/GlobalMonitoringPlan/MonitoringReports/ tabid/525/Default.aspx accessed on 28 January 2017. Secretariat of the Stockholm Convention Clearing House (2016) ‘Monitoring reports’, http://chm.pops. int/Implementation/GlobalMonitoringPlan/MonitoringReports/tabid/525/Default.aspx accessed on 14 December 2016. Secretariat of the Stockholm Convention Clearing House (2017) ‘Status of ratification’, http://chm.pops. int/Countries/StatusofRatifications/PartiesandSignatoires/tabid/4500/Default.aspx accessed on 28 January 2017. Shimadera, H., Kondo, A., Kaga, Al, Shrestha, K. L. and Inoue, Y. (2009) ‘Contribution of transboundary air pollution to ionic concentrations in fog in the Kinki Region of Japan’, Atmospheric Environment, 43: 5894–907. Shin, S. (2015) ‘Environmental policy in East Asia: institutions in comparative perspective’, in P. G Harris and G. Lang (eds), Routledge Handbook of Environment and Society in Asia, New York: Routledge. Tuman, J. P. and Strand, J. R. (2006) ‘The role of mercantilism, humanitarianism, and gaiatsu in Japan’s ODA programme in Asia’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 6(1): 61–80. United Nations (1992) ‘Agenda 21’, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/ Agenda21.pdf accessed on 16 December 2016. United Nations Environment Programme (1972) ‘Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment’, www.unep.org/documents.multilingual/default.asp?documentid= 97&articleid=1503 accessed on 16 December 2016. United Nations Environment Programme (2009) ‘Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) as amended in 2009: Text and Annexes’, http://chm.pops.int/TheConvention/Overview/ TextoftheConvention/tabid/2232/Default.aspx accessed on 14 December 2016. United Nations Environment Programme (undated) ‘Overview’, http://chm.pops.int/TheConvention/ Overview/tabid/3351/Default.aspx accessed on 14 December 2016. United Nations Environment Programme GMP (2017a) ‘Global Monitoring Plan on Persistent Organic Pollutants’, www.pops-gmp.org/ accessed on 28 January 2017. United Nations Environment Programme GMP (2017b) ‘Global Monitoring Plan Data Warehouse overview: online too to store and visualize data on levels of POPs in core matrices’, www.pops-gmp.org/ index.php?pg=gmp-data-warehouse accessed on 28 January 2017. Upham, F. K. (1987) Law and Social Change in Postwar Japan, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Wilkening, K. E. (2004) Acid Rain Science and Politics in Japan: A History of Knowledge and Action toward Sustainability, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Wong, A. (2001) The Roots of Japan’s International Environmental Politics, New York & London: Garland Publishing.

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Yoon, E. (2006) ‘South Korean environmental foreign policy’, Asia-Pacific Review, 13: 74–96. Yoshimatsu, H. (2005) ‘Political leadership, informality, and regional integration in East Asia: the evolution of ASEAN Plus Three’, European Journal of East Asian Studies, 4(2): 205–32. Yoshimatsu, H. (2014) Comparing Institution-Building in East Asia: Power Politics, Governance, and Critical Junctures, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

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8 Toward a sound material-cycle society History of Japanese policy and its interaction with international norms Wakana Takahashi

Introduction In the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the author carried out a comparative study of waste and resource management capacities at the municipal level between Japan and Korea, as part of a joint Japanese-Chinese-Korean research project. That research project, titled “Policy research on improving waste and resource management capacities in China,” was led by Masaharu Yagishita, formerly of Japan’s Ministry of the Environment (MOE), and received a grant for scientific research on waste from the MOE. The project compared the cities of Nagoya in Japan and Busan in Korea, both of which had been relatively successful in promoting reduction, reuse, and recycling of waste (3R), aiming to identify suggestions for improving waste and resource management capacities in China. However, the findings of that research were surprising. While Japan had established a series of policies toward building a sound material-cycle society,1 it had not sufficiently deployed measures extending to the production and distribution stages in order to reduce municipal household waste. Nagoya had decided not to begin charging for waste and had not adopted deposit systems or similar programs. Nagoya’s advancement of 3R was weighted heavily toward cooperation among citizens, administrators, and citizens’ groups to ensure thorough separation and disposal of waste, in response to an emergency declaration from the mayor on shortage of landfill capacity. On the other hand, while South Korea had been behind Japan through the 1980s, in the 1990s it adopted policies intended to promote waste reduction at the production and distribution stages, such as charges, deposit systems, and restrictions on single-use products, as well as an ordinance prohibiting disposal of food waste in landfills. Most of these were similar to policies adopted in Europe during the 1990s. It was not Japan, which had been a leader in levels of waste management technologies and management capacities, that had fulfilled international ideals, but South Korea. China too has adopted the term “circular economy”2 in the general concepts of its state plan and has met some international norms. As a matter of fact, the beginning of the twenty-first century witnessed rapid proliferation of international norms aimed at establishing a sound material-cycle 119

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society/circular economy not only in OECD states but non-OECD states, as is reflected in the experiences of South Korea and China. So why hasn’t Japan adopted similar international norms, or adopted them only in limited and modified forms? What is the significance of this fact as Japan promotes international cooperation in East Asia? This chapter, first, will provide an overview of the formation and spread over time of international norms supporting a sound material-cycle society; then it will sketch out the historical development of Japan’s policies on waste management and policy change toward establishing a sound material-cycle society, taking into consideration its interaction with emerging international norms.

The formation and spread of international norms on establishing a sound material-cycle society/circular economy The terms “sound material-cycle society” and “circular economy” began to spread in international society after the start of the twenty-first century. However, a sense of crisis regarding resource destruction and depletion and the necessity of international waste and resource management was shared widely from the latter half of the twentieth century. Table 8.1 shows important events around the world related to establishing a sound material-cycle society. As illustrated, with the exception of the Basel Convention,3 adopted in 1989, no global environmental regime with legally binding force has been developed. Traditionally, waste has been considered a domestic, or even local, issue. However, the latter half of the twentieth century experienced mass consumption, mass production, and mass waste production all over the world. Resource depletion became a global concern. Progress was made in technologies and policies on waste treatment in developed countries. On the other hand, in developing countries, where waste has increased exponentially, even today most waste is not treated in environmentally appropriate ways. The increase in waste in developing countries is strongly related to the fact that, with advancing globalization, developing countries have turned into important production bases for industry. Environmental destruction due to transboundary movements of waste also has increased in developing countries. Recyclable resources transported internationally are processed in environmentally inappropriate ways in developing countries, causing severe local environmental damage and negative human health effects. In light of this complex state of affairs, proper waste treatment and the establishment of a sound material-cycle society came to be recognized as global topics as well as local issues, and they were mentioned in so-called “soft laws” or as international norms.4 The oldest example is the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, which states, “natural resources . . . must be safeguarded for the benefit of present and future generations through careful planning or management” and “The capacity of the earth to produce vital renewable resources must be maintained and . . . restored or improved.” Agenda 21, adopted at the 1992 Rio de Janeiro Summit, calls for “optimization of resource use and minimization of waste.”5 It advocates use of environmentally appropriate methods or the transfer of such efforts to developing countries.6 Since the 1990s, international standards have been created through practical policy methods designed to realize such ideals. Traditionally, environmental policies in developed countries have been based mainly on administrative rationalism through end-of-pipe controls. These refer to the method of establishing legal rules or standards for economic actors and enforcing compliance by penalizing violations. These policies are often implemented through a command-and-control method. However, in the 1980s, such direct controls were considered inefficient (Bruijn and Hufen 1998). It came to be recognized widely that there was a need for some kind of more thoroughgoing preventive measures (Lindhqvist 2000). Methods based on economic rationalism 120

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Table 8.1 Major international events related to building a sound material-cycle society 1960s

1972 1973

1980s 1987 1988 1989

1992 1994 1994 1995

2001 2007 2011 2015 2016

Rising consumption of resources and increasing pressure on the environment: rapid economic growth and frequent environmental disasters in developed countries  Pessimistic essays: “The tragedy of the commons,” “Astronaut economics”  Developed countries: Development of environmental laws and administrative organs, progress on waste-related laws Club of Rome: “Limits of Growth” Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm Declaration) United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) established Developed countries: Promoting investment in pollution, development of waste treatment technologies, gradual spread of recycling concept Developing countries: Accumulation of untreated waste, overall environmental worsening, increasing transfer of hazardous waste Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, “Our Common Future,” proposes the concept of sustainability Coco Incident (Nigeria, environmental damage due to abandonment of hazardous waste) Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste and their Disposal United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro Summit, Agenda 21 OECD recommends use of economic methods in environmental policy EPR principle adopted in Sweden and Germany / Spreads to OECD member states United Nations University proposes concept of zero emissions Weizsa¨cker et al. (1998): Factor Four (doubling wealth, halving resource use), Factor 10 (increasing resource productivity by ten times) OECD EPR Guidance Manual published / EPR spreads to non-OECD states as well UNEP International Resource Panel (IRP) established EU prepares roadmap to resource-efficient Europe G7 Elmau Summit focuses on resource efficiency UN Sustainable Development Summit: Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) formulated European Commission adopts new sustainability strategy for the EU: “Circular Economy Package” OECD policy guidance on resource efficiency UNEP-IRP resource-efficiency-report summary released Toyama Environment Ministers’ Meeting: Toyama Framework on Material Cycles

came to be focused on as a way of realizing this goal. Policy measures such as emissions trading and environmental taxes spread, mainly in OECD states, based on the belief that the market is a powerful tool for changing the behaviors of individuals and systems. That is, if set up correctly, they can achieve or surpass environmental objectives at less cost with less opposition than traditional regulatory approaches (Dryzek 2005). During the first half of the 1990s, the OECD recommended that countries use various economic measures in environmental policies.7 In addition to household waste fee and deposit systems, extended producer responsibility (EPR) is one such measure related to waste disposal. EPR requires producers to cover not only production costs but collecting and recycling costs; it encourages producers to design products that internalize the environmental costs of final disposal. By doing so, EPR was expected to promote waste generation reduction, an increase in recyclable use at the production stage, and an increase in resource efficiency (OECD 2001: Section 1.4). 121

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OECD International level

Regional level

National Level

Figure 8.1

EU(Legislation through Directives) Sweden, Germany (Origin state)

EU countries

Japan

Korea, Non-OECD states

Conceptual diagram of EPR formation and development (Europe and Asia)

Cumulative EPR Adoption 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50

Figure 8.2

2012

2009

2006

2003

2000

1997

1994

1991

1988

1985

1982

1979

1976

1973

1970

0

Cumulative EPR adoption

Source: Kaffine and O’Reilly (2013): 24.

Today, use of EPR and other economic measures has spread widely, not only to OECD states but non-OECD states as well. Although dominant realist views of politics have neglected the influence of international norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), since the latter half of the 1990s international norms on waste disposal, namely EPR, have had a major impact on individual states as well as at the regional level. Figure 8.2 depicts the path by which EPR formed and developed. EPR first developed in Sweden and was then adopted by the EU and codified through the 1994 EU container directive and the 2003 directive on waste electronics. These directives even had an effect on prospective EU member states such as the Baltic states. At the same time, the idea of EPR was addressed by the OECD and UNEP and developed into international norms through the processes of deliberation. Japan also participated in the process of creating the EPR Guidance Manual. The OECD published the EPR Guidance Manual for governments in 2001.8 In parallel with the process, as shown in Figure 8.2, the number of EPR systems adopted worldwide increased steadily from the 1990s through the 2000s (Kaffine and O’Reilly 2013). Table 8.2 shows the trend in the number of countries adopting EPR: twenty-three OECD member states and seventeen non-OECD member states have adopted recycling systems based on EPR. Adoption of such systems spread among OECD member states mainly during the 1990s and among non-OECD member states from the 2000s. 122

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Table 8.2 Countries adopting EPR systems

–1994 1995–99 2000–4 2005– Total

OECD-EU

OECD-nonEU

7 4 4 1 16

4 3 1 8

EIC

non-OECD

Total

1 8 1 10

3 4 1 8

11 11 16 4 42

Source: Based on Kaffine and O’Reilly (2013).

However, acceptance of EPR differs widely from country to country. As noted above, Korea has adopted the related international norms broadly, while Japan has interpreted EPR in its own, limited way, narrowing the scope of producer’s responsibility. Tasaki et al. have pointed out that such differences in the understanding of producer responsibility (PR) between different countries’ EPR systems are due to variances in perception among countries and regions of the importance of the goals to be achieved through the application of EPR (Tasaki, Tojo and Lindhqvist 2015). For example, in Japan the perspectives of business promotion and technological advancement through the adoption of EPR are said to be weak, as promotion of new business models and innovations in waste treatment is not stressed. On the other hand, the objective in the EU is based on the concept of circular economy. This is said to include a stronger recognition of the perspectives of business and employment than in previous recycling and waste policies. These variations in the framework of recognition have resulted in major differences in the adoption of international norms. Entering the 2010s, the formation of international norms grounded in a more comprehensive approach has embraced market-based approaches. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are one example of such norms. They were formally adopted at the UN Sustainable Development Summit 2015 as successors to the Millennium Development Goals. The SDGs consist of 169 targets on seventeen subjects valid over the coming fifteen-year period, based on the philosophy of putting an end to chronic poverty in various places and ensuring that nobody is left behind. One of the goals is “sustainable production and consumption.” However, one characteristic of the SDGs is that they establish a series of universally applicable goals through a combination of the three dimensions of sustainable development—the environment, society, and the economy—rather than calling for the achievement of individual goals separately. The International Resource Panel (IRP), established by the UNEP, is an attempt to examine resource-recycling issues scientifically in parallel with SDGs. This panel aims to contribute to the understanding of how to decouple economic growth from environmental degradation, through providing “independent, coherent and authoritative scientific assessment on the sustainable use of natural resources and the environmental impacts of resource use over the full life cycle.” The IRP is an international system strongly influenced by European initiatives. In 2016, the IRP released a report on resource efficiency. The report clearly advocates the ideas that resource efficiency is essential to achievement of the SDGs and climate change mitigation goals and that cost savings from improved resource efficiency would promote economic growth and employment. If set up appropriately, the world can achieve greater resource efficiency, which will benefit all humanity. For example, the majority of food waste around the world is still going to landfills, which require large amounts of space and are often associated with environmental degradation. Incineration of food waste, as in Japan, can save space and solve the odor issue but requires a lot of energy and carbon dioxide emissions. Besides, there have been many NIMBY (Not in My Backyard) movements opposing the construction of incineration plants. On the other hand, 123

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if food waste was transferred to compost, it could free up carbon dioxide emissions and chemical fertilizer. Even if the quality of food waste is not good enough for compost, it can be turned into biogas, which can power vehicles and heat urban homes, thus significantly reducing fossil fuel use as well as carbon dioxide emissions. This food-to-energy system is just one example of resource efficiency. In order to make this system work, there is considerable room and pressing need for harmonized action by the various related actors. Thus, the IRP report emphasizes system thinking and puts an emphasis on life-cycle and value-chain perspectives for the purpose of achieving such resource efficiency. That is, it clearly identifies the need to elucidate the interrelations among issues across multiple resources and adopt a perspective extending above and beyond bureaucratic sectionalism, stressing supply chains and footprints (International Resource Panel 2016). It can be said that “resource efficiency” embodies “ecological modernization.” “Ecological modernization” can be defined as “essentially an efficiency-oriented approach to the environment,” which is based on a “positive-sum game format”.9 It advocates that it would be possible to reconstruct the capitalist political economy in a more eco-friendly direction through conscious and strategic mediation (Dryzek 2005). “Resource efficiency” satisfies this definition. Furthermore, resource efficiency is not the first norm based on ecological modernization in the context of waste disposal. The EU’s “circular economy” concept is in line with ecological modernization. The EU, through “Towards a Circular Economy,” issued in 2015, promotes a fundamental transition: away from a linear economy where resources are not simply extracted, used and thrown away, but are put back in the loop so they can stay in use for longer. It sets out measures driving a more efficient use of resources and waste minimization. Prior to “resource efficiency” and “circular economy,” similar concepts were suggested and advocated by some scientists, such as “Factor 4” and “Factor 5” announced by the German economist Weizsa¨cker in the mid 1990s (Weizsa¨cker, Lovins and Lovins 1998), or Hawken’s “natural capitalism” (Hawken, Lovins and Lovins 2000). The point is that these ideas, all embodying the concept of ecological modernization in the context of waste disposal, have been sublimated into shared international norms in international knowledge-building, or what Haas called “epistemic communities.”10

Development of waste and resource management policies in Japan11 As seen above, international norms toward establishing a sound material-cycle society, or circular economy, have been gradually formed and developed. EPR was among the first in the 1990s, based on economic rationalist thinking. Entering the 2010s, more comprehensive and strategic norms, such as resource efficiency and circular economy, have been advocated, based on a paradigm of ecological modernization. How have these international norms been linked with Japanese policies on waste and resource management? This section will sketch out the historical development of waste and resource management policies in Japan over four periods, taking their interactions with international norms into consideration (Table 8.3).

First period: the age of public health (through 1970)—from a classical, sound material-cycle society to the establishment of the principle of incineration It is said that in Japan during the Edo Period, from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, Tokyo was cleaner than major European cities (Ishi 2016). In Japan, there was a deep-rooted 124

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Table 8.3 Timeline of Japan’s waste management policies Japan 1950s 1960s

1970s

1954 1958 1962 1964 1968 1970 1971 1972

1973 1976 1980s 1990s

1991 1992

1993 1995 1997

2000~

1998 2000

2001 2002 2003 2003 2004 2013

Public Cleansing Law (public health) Law Concerning Water Quality Control, Factory Effluent Control Law Soot and Smoke Regulation Law Basic Law for Environmental Pollution Law to finance urgently public cleansing facilities Air Pollution Control Act Waste Management and Public Cleansing Law Environment Agency established Law for Special Measures for the Improvement and Construction of Waste Treatment Facilities Nature Conservation Act Law Concerning Pollution-Related Health Damage Compensation and other Measures Waste Management and Public Cleansing Law (amended: regulations strengthened) Act on the Promotion of Effective Utilization of Resources Waste Management and Public Cleaning Act (amended: recycling) Act on Promotion of Development of Specified Facilities for the Disposal of Industrial Waste Basic Environment Act Act on the Promotion of Sorted Collection and Recycling of. Containers and Packaging. Waste Management and Public Cleaning Act (amended: waste reduction, reuse, introduction of manifest system) Act on Recycling of Specified Kinds of Home Appliances Basic Act for Establishing a Sound Material-Cycle Society Act Concerning Recycling of Materials from Construction Work Act Concerning the Promotion of Recycling Food Cyclical Resources Act on Promotion of Procurement of Eco-Friendly Goods and Services by the State and Other Entities (Green Purchasing Law) Law for the Promotion of Utilization of Recyclable Resources Act on Special Measures concerning Promotion of Proper Treatment of PCB Waste Act on Recycling, etc. of End-of-Life Vehicles. (End-of-Life Vehicles Recycling Law) Basic Plan for Establishing a Sound Material-Cycle Society Waste Management and Public Cleansing Act (amended: prevention of illegal dumping) Waste Management and Public Cleansing Act (amended: enhanced disciplinary provisions, etc.) Act on Promotion of Recycling of Small Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment

Source: Excerpted from Takahashi et al. (2010), partially revised.

cultural practice of using raw sewage as fertilizer. It is said that by the late eighteenth century agricultural production could be conducted in sustainable ways, even without leaving fields fallow once every three years as in Europe, because a system of recycling raw sewage had been established (Ishikawa 1997). This is why Japan could maintain a population of some thirty million from the late eighteenth century to the early nineteenth century. At the time, in Japan, a “sound material-cycle society had formed through the existence of specialists in repair, recycling, and 125

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recovery, including those who repaired buckets, sellers of used clothing, buyers of old iron, and buyers of scrap paper” (Inoue 2006). However, with the arrival in the nineteenth century of the chemical fertilizers used in the West, “Raw sewage, which no longer had any use in society after being abandoned as a fertilizer, became a major public health issue, and there was a pressing need for facilities to purify it” (Inoue 2006). The result of rapid expansion of urban cities and increase of population was a surge in un-recycled waste and its open dump. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, incinerators, originally developed in England, were introduced in Japan to counter infectious diseases and the urban waste that had arisen following the industrial revolution. Japan’s first incinerator was built in 1897. The Waste Sanitation Law, the starting point of waste laws in Japan, was enacted in 1900. It called for incineration of waste as much as possible, in order to counter infectious diseases. After that, incineration would be the main method of treating waste in Japan. At that time, incineration still was an immature, polluting technology. It was very difficult to build a costly incinerator due to strong opposition from local residents. According to Mizoiri, there was a debate at the time between incineration based on sanitary principles and putting waste to effective uses without incinerating it (Mizoiri 1988). During World War II, when Japan faced severe shortages of resources, the principle of incineration was abandoned and recovery of waste was enforced, while individuals were encouraged to conserve in their private lives as well. The policy principle of incineration was restored after World War II. Open dumps, in which waste was simply dumped on low land or on the coast, persisted in Japan into the 1950s. Dumps were sites of frequent fires, and nearby residents had to endure flies, rodents, and foul odors. It is said that as a chaotic period of unsanitary treatment of waste and raw sewage continued, many children died each year due to epidemics such as typhoid fever and dysentery. For this reason, during the postwar recovery period sanitary treatment of waste and raw sewage was considered a pressing issue, and localities built incinerators rapidly. In 1954, the Public Cleansing Law was introduced with the goal of “improving the public health through sanitary treatment of waste and cleaning up environment.” The law specified that “municipalities are responsible for public cleansing service and solid waste management,” and municipalities across Japan advanced district-based waste treatment.12 60000 Others including direct/indirect recycling

50000 Landfill

40000 30000

Incineration

20000 10000

Figure 8.3

2013

2010

2007

2004

2001

1998

1995

1992

1989

1986

1983

1980

1977

1974

1971

1968

1965

0

Municipal household waste and treatment methods in Japan

Source: Based on Ministry of the Environment, White Papers: Annual Report on the Environment in Japan, 2001–2006; Annual Report on the Environment, the Sound Material-Cycle Society and Biodiversity in Japan, 2007–2015; Environment Agency, Environmental White Paper, 1972–2000.

126

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30000 25000 20000 15000 10000 5000

Figure 8.4

2014

2012

2010

2008

2006

2004

2002

2000

1998

1996

1994

1992

1990

1988

1986

1984

1982

1980

1978

1976

1974

1972

0

Municipal waste treatment costs (unit: 100 million yen)

Source: Based on each year’s Health and Welfare White Paper published by MHW and Environment White Paper published by Environmental Agency/Ministry of the Environment. Note: No data provided in Health and Welfare White Paper or other sources for 1979–1988.

In addition, in 1963, the law to finance such facilities was enacted, and under a five-year plan, implemented from 1964, treatment facilities for waste, raw sewage, and drain water were developed urgently. The Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) distributed subsidies to municipalities across Japan for the purpose of improving their waste treatment facilities. After this there was a steady increase in incineration, as shown in Figure 8.4. This was the starting point of Japan having the world’s highest rate of waste disposal through incineration, based on administrative rationalism. Japan’s rapid economic growth from the 1960s through the 1970s increased waste rapidly, and the nature of waste changed too. The rapid increase in plastic waste caused problems, and the spread of durable goods led to “oversized trash.” There was a dramatic increase in industrial waste incompatible with traditional treatment by municipalities. This forced new types of response.

Second period: the era of waste treatment through regulatory environmental laws (1971–90) To respond to environmental damage accompanying the changing nature of waste, in 1970 the Diet completely revised the Public Cleansing Law. Eventually, the Waste Management and Public Cleansing Law was enacted in 1971. This was the birth of the current waste treatment system in Japan. Jurisdiction under this act, written before the establishment of the MOE, remained with the MHW, responsible for public health. The key points of the new policy are outlined as follows. First, the primary objective of the act was environmental protection. The act established a foundation for ensuring appropriate treatment of waste from the perspective of environmental protection by covering all stages of the waste treatment process, from the generation of waste through final treatment. Second, it split waste into the categories of municipal household waste and industrial waste, clearly defining who is responsible for which waste treatment. That is, responsibility for municipal household waste lies with municipalities; responsibility for treatment of 127

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industrial waste was based on polluter responsibility. Finally, the Waste Management and Public Cleansing Act incorporates a legal structure based on regulatory law, planning law, and business law (Takahashi et al. 2010). It incorporates within a single legal structure the contradictory aspects of autonomous treatment of waste as a business and autonomous controls from the perspective of environmental protection. With regard to municipal household waste, it called for reducing and stabilizing volume, chiefly through incineration and then disposal in landfills. Thus, the mainstream approach became an end-of-pipe one, from generation of waste through final treatment. As shown in Figure 8.4, the rate of incineration increased from 49% in 1971 to 74% in 1990. This was associated with massive advances in technological development, centered on incineration and landfill. This was handled by the Institute of Public Health (under the jurisdiction of the MHW), the Japan Waste Management Association (whose main members are municipalities from across the country), organizations authorized by the Ministry of Health and Welfare such as the Japan Environmental Sanitation Center, and researchers from individual plant manufacturers and universities. In conjunction with the enhancement of environmental laws and regulations, environmental measures required in waste treatment needed to be implemented thoroughly, and the cost of their adoption increased steadily. Figure 8.4 shows the trend in costs faced by municipal household waste treatment operations. While the annual cost was 36.5 billion yen in 1972, by 1977 it had risen to more than 1 trillion yen, costs covered entirely by taxes. At the base of this approach was the concept of a national minimum under Article 25 of the Constitution. As a result, waste policies were established using general tax funds instead of charging for waste. In short, a municipal household waste management system was fully established under the dominant paradigm of administrative rationalism. The influence of international norms on waste disposal based on economic rationalism was limited during this period.

Third period: the era of recycling (1991–9) During the second period, Japan’s economy continued growing, which is associated with increased amounts of waste and its diversification. Difficulties in securing treatment facilities, illegal dumping, and improper treatment became issues. Against this background, in 1991, the Waste Management and Public Cleansing Act was drastically amended. The objectives of the amended law were stated clearly as not just “waste treatment” but “controlling generation of waste” and “recycling waste.” At municipalities, councils were established to promote waste reduction, and volunteer-based 3R (reduce, reuse and recycle) promoters were widely recruited and appointed at the local community level. Municipalities were obliged to formulate plans for controlling the generation of municipal household waste and could collect fees for oversized and business waste for the first time. This represented the limited adoption of charging for waste. In addition, the law also permitted mayors of municipalities to call on industry to cooperate on waste treatment when they determined it would be difficult to treat waste appropriately with the municipalities’ own treatment facilities and technologies. That same year, the Act on the Promotion of Effective Utilization of Resources was enacted to control the generation of waste from an upstream perspective. Intended to “protect the environment through the effective use of resources and controlling generation of waste,” it adopted a basic approach under which the minister responsible for each business sector would establish judgment criteria regarding the promotion of reuse and recycling. In response to the enactment of the Act on the Promotion of Effective Utilization of Resources, industry-led recycling projects began, with one notable example being the efforts by the PET bottle industry. Recycling plazas and centers were developed across the country, beginning in 1992. Subsidy 128

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programs were promoted for separate household waste collection by municipalities, development of systems such as group household waste collection by residents’ groups, and programs and awareness-raising activities by prefectures to promote recycling over wider areas. However, an examination of waste overall shows that while the recycling rate of industrial materials was 39% in 1993, for household waste it was only 8%. In order to encourage recycling of household waste, the Containers and Packaging Recycling Act was passed in 1995 and took effect in 1997. It was the first recycling law in Japan to apply an international norm based on economic rationalism, i.e. EPR. That is, the law required producers to cover recycling costs for the first time. This was applied first to PET bottles and glass bottles, followed by paper and plastic containers. Given that European EPR requires producers to take responsibility for both collecting and recycling, Japanese EPR is limited to recycling only. Thus, it can be safely said that this is the limitation and modification of EPR, as discussed earlier in this chapter. It was municipalities that were designated to take responsibility for collecting. The law required municipalities to collect recyclables separately from household burnable waste and required residents to separate them. In short, the law requires not only producers but every related actor to take responsibility evenly. To secure residents’ cooperation with separating waste into different categories, the law placed importance on activities to raise awareness. Behind the design of the system, which limited EPR, were conflicts and compromises among related actors. Being aware of the development of international norms, the Environment Agency first took into comprehensive consideration economic methods of encouraging recycling, including a deposit system. However, in the process of policy decision making, the Environment Agency’s own proposal was rejected and the Containers and Packaging Recycling Act was formulated through an alliance between the Ministry of Health and Welfare and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (Yorimoto 1998). There was almost no substantial participation by civil society in the actual policy that emerged. Incidentally, at that time, public interest in the issue of toxic dioxins’ impact on human health was increasing, and in 1996 the MHW announced strengthened guidelines on emissions of dioxins by incinerators. Eventually, this led to further technological development and an increase in incineration capacity, which also brought integration and zone widening of incinerators. Development of advanced incineration technologies and diversification of incineration technologies such as RDF (refuse-derived fuel) and the gasification and melting furnace led to a further increase in the costs of waste management, to be met by public funds. Figure 8.3 shows that the cost of municipal household waste treatment operations in 2001 had reached 2.6 trillion yen. In short, during the third period, Japan, for the first time, codified international norms based on economic rationalism, by applying EPR in a limited way. Administrative rationalism remained dominant.

Fourth period: the era of policies for a sound material-cycle society (2000 and later) As described above, various measures were adopted during the 1990s with regard to control of waste generation and recycling. But despite such efforts, the volume of waste generated remained largely unchanged. In addition, recycling rates did not increase very much, especially for municipal household waste. The issues of diversification of the natures of waste and pressure on final treatment facilities continued to be problematic. Accordingly, in 2000, the Diet passed the Basic Act on Establishing a Sound Material-Cycle Society and amended the Act on the Promotion of Effective Utilization of Resources. This legislation sought to resolve these problems by breaking free from an economy and society based on mass production, mass 129

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consumption, and mass waste and pressing forward with the formation of a sound material-cycle society. This would be the first law aimed at reducing the production of waste rather than simply at incinerating or recycling whatever amount of waste might be produced. The Basic Act aimed to control consumption and reduce environmental impact through (1) controlling the generation of waste; (2) cyclical use of resources; and (3) proper treatment.13 In 2001, the Environment Agency was upgraded to the Ministry of the Environment (MOE), and administration of waste was transferred from the MHW to the MOE. Simultaneously, some of the waste research sections of MHW-affiliated institutes were also transferred to MOE-affiliated institutes. Furthermore, the Diet passed additional laws on waste and the recycling of individual products, grounded in the principle of EPR. These included acts concerning construction-work material recycling, food recycling,14 and automobile recycling, among others. The Containers and Packaging Recycling Act, the earliest of the individual recycling acts to be enacted, is the law fully implemented by Nagoya in its centerpiece 3R policy, as described at the start of this chapter. However, many citizens’ groups argued that there were numerous problems in the form of limited EPR described above, and the subject was debated by the Japan Association of City Mayors. Identified as a central issue was the difficulty and ambiguity of segregating waste in addition to the substantial financial burden on local governments and the fact that it had almost no effect on controlling waste generation. Similar criticisms were also made by experts. Yorimoto offered the following: It does not put a stop to the disappearance of returnable containers; the cost to local governments of segregated collection of wastes is immense, while the cost to businesses is relatively light; and progress on controlling use of containers and packaging and switching to recycled containers and packaging cannot be said to have begun as expected. (Yorimoto 1998: 267–8) And Otsuka pointed out: The perspective of controlling the generation of container and packaging wastes is not incorporated sufficiently, and it fails to break free from the idea of how best to treat wastes. Furthermore, this law is not sufficient with regard to recycling either. (Otsuka 2002: 398) According to Tasaki, even if this division of responsibilities resulted in partial optimization, it could hinder overall system functions (Tasaki 2015). For these reasons, the Japan Association of City Mayors, to cite one example, has called for legal amendments such as “appropriate review of the division of costs and responsibility between municipalities and businesses, for example by requiring producers or others to collect wastes from the perspective of EPR” and “promoting the expanded use of returnable containers and introducing a deposit system as part of efforts to control the generation of container and packaging wastes and prevent illegal disposal of wastes.”15 In light of such problems, the Act on the Promotion of Sorted Collection and Recycling of Containers and Packaging was amended in 2007, with regard to measures to promote control of waste generation, and in 2008, with regard to the system of contributions to funding. However, PR for segregated waste collection remains extremely limited, not just in terms of physical responsibility but in terms of financial responsibility as well. The introduction of a deposit system has not been put on the policy agenda.16 A similar story can be seen with regard to a waste fee. As discussed earlier, since 1970, municipalities in Japan have taken physical and financial responsibility for waste collection, 130

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treatment, and recycling. Utilizing general taxes for this public service was seen as justified. However, the more the number of recyclable items has increased, the more municipalities have had to bear the financial burden for the collection service. Thus, the introduction of unitcharging programs, known as pay-as-you-throw (PAYT), has been repeatedly discussed (Sakai et al. 2008) but has faced strong criticism as dual taxation. Since the MOE released guidelines for waste charging systems for municipal waste in 2007, a number of municipalities have introduced the PAYT system—about 60% by 2017.17 However, revenue from PAYT seldom enriches municipal finances. The revenue is, in many cases, used only for PR or other environmental activities. In short, the Japanese PAYT system is totally different from the systems in Western countries. These two examples indicate the strong tradition of administrative rationalism. International norms on waste disposal based on economic rationalism, such as EPR and waste charges, are adopted in limited and modified form. In parallel to these domestic developments, Japan also has stressed deployment of international cooperation in East Asia. While no legally binding regional environmental regime like that of the EU has been developed in East Asia, Japan has deployed measures such as loose policy dialogue and the formation of non-binding regional action plans (Takahashi 2000, 2002). Since 2000, there have been pronounced moves toward using such policy dialogue as an opportunity for attempts at harmonizing policy in the areas of establishing a sound material-cycle society. In the background of these efforts have been experts’ forecasts that population increases and economic growth in Asia mean that “the nations seeing the world’s greatest increases in volumes of waste generated will be the developing countries, centered on Asia.” Relatedly, there are concerns that “residents and society could suffer serious harm due to severe waste-related problems that may arise in the regions of Asia,” and that Official Development Assistance (ODA) that has supported the adoption of environmental equipment and technologies in developing countries has “not necessarily led to sufficient results” (Tanaka 2004). Masaru Tanaka, Professor and Director of the Sustainability Research Institute of Tottori University of Environmental Studies, who has been involved for many years in technical cooperation on waste disposal in both Japan and developing countries, says, “plans to build treatment facilities using advanced Japanese technologies rarely make it to the implementation stage, due to insufficient funding.” For this reason, Tanaka points out that “it is important to improve the current situation through raising awareness among residents, education, and the resulting cooperation in reducing volumes of waste or in recycling and cleanup.” Tanaka’s words reflect a strong belief in administrative rationalism, not economic rationalism. With this understanding among experts and policymakers in the background, in 2004 the Japanese government proposed to a G8 Summit a “3R Initiative” aiming to realize 3R from a global perspective. It also dispatched an expert from Japan to the aforementioned UNEP International Resource Panel.18 At the same time, Japan began focusing on efforts to communicate information about its own experiences, believing that it would be beneficial to share throughout Asia its difficult struggle against waste. Previously, Japanese foreign aid had been centered on bilateral aid to countries such as China, Thailand, the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, Singapore, and Indonesia in the forms of loan aid, grant aid, and technical cooperation through the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). Now Japanese foreign aid began to shift to put more importance on multilateral policy dialogue. One example is the 2006 tripartite ministerial conference among Japan, China, and Korea, where promotion of policy dialogue was prominent (Yoshida 2006, 2008). Then, in 2009, an Asia promotional forum for 3R was established. Promotion of 3R also was advocated at high-level policy meetings including the ECO ASIA Ministers’ Meeting. In these and other ways, Japan has been trying to share Japanese experiences and their implications with Asian countries in multilateral venues (Yoshida 2007). 131

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Furthermore, during the 2010s, a wide range of researchers, including ones affiliated with the MOE, related auxiliary research institutions, university institutions, and other organizations, began translating and introducing to Japan new international norms such as the SDGs and those of the IRP on resource efficiency. Some of these experts have been joining international normmaking processes, conducted at the UNEP, IRP, and OECD. Lively dialogue is underway on how these new international norms should apply to Japan (Hotta and Kojima 2012). The basic ideas and principles of newly emerging international norms is quite similar to the sound material-cycle society advocated in Japan. However, in Japan system thinking, as emphasized in the IRP, is seldom discussed in practice. Japan might face difficulties in breaking out of bureaucratic sectionalism, given that its basic paradigm has been administrative rationalism (International Resource Panel 2016).

Conclusion This chapter first questioned why Japan did not adopt international norms or simply internalized them in a limited form. The author believes that this is due to a gap between the paradigm of influential actors in Japan and the paradigm assumed by international norms. That is, in international society, since the 1990s, with Europe leading the way, international norms have been developed based on economic rationality, such as EPR, charging for waste, and deposit systems, and, during the 2010s, a paradigm shift has occurred toward ecological modernization. On the other hand, in Japan, the basic paradigm of waste treatment still remains based mainly on administrative rationalism. It is true that Japan was able to achieve its long-held desire for public health during the chaotic postwar years and to implement environmental restrictions related to waste treatment thanks to a strong corporatism led by technocrats. However, it seems that the series of successes led by administrative rationalism ironically impeded a paradigm shift toward economic rationalism for recycling and establishing a sound material-cycle society in Japan. Under the Waste Management and Public Cleansing Act, the routes for treatment of municipal household waste and industrial waste were strictly separated. While efforts toward recycling and zero emissions advanced in the industrial waste treatment flow, for municipal household waste large amounts of taxpayer funds were invested to develop waste technologies with no concept of economic efficiency. Massive governance systems were also established. Those developments are all products of administrative rationalism. This author believes that this strong tradition of administrative rationalism limits Japanese ability to respond to international norms and adopt principles of economic rationality and ecological modernization. This is the reason why charging for waste has remained small-scale, deposits have not been adopted, and EPR has been adopted only in a limited manner. Division of responsibilities has been advocated as a counter to limited producer responsibility, but separate collection by municipalities has led to dissatisfaction. Citizen actors were subject to awareness-raising on waste separation and disposal. But the limited political participation of civil society is a structural issue in Japan (LeBlanc 1999; Pekkanen 2006; Schreurs 2002). Almost no participation by citizen actors was involved in the policymaking process behind the Containers and Packaging Recycling Act. Waste separation and disposal stresses individual effort, with women supplying most of the effort and with little attention paid to user-friendly systems for complying (Takahashi 2015). Behind this is Japan’s strongly gender-biased society. This technocratic, administrative-rationalism paradigm remains the basic structure for waste management even after the transfer in 2001 from the MHW to the MOE. Waste administration is centered on the MOE, but jurisdiction under various recycling laws is split among numerous agencies. It is doubtful that system thinking and a perspective extending above and beyond bureaucratic sectionalism, stressing supply chains and footprints, as advocated by the IRP, could 132

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be adopted in Japan. To realize such international norms it will be essential to have strong political leadership and opportunities for participation by a wider range of citizen actors under an ecological-modernization paradigm. As earlier discussed, civic participation of environmental policy making has been quite limited in practice. A Japanese shift from administrative rationalism to ecological modernization in the area of establishing a sound material-cycle society could have a major impact on policy dialogue and aid in East Asia. As noted at the start, while Korea followed Japanese policy in the early years of its attention to environmental policy, it began following the European 3R policy in the 1990s. It was able to adopt widespread international norms and practice probably because its governance structure was based less on administrative rationalism than Japan’s (Takahashi et al. 2010). The same is likely to occur elsewhere in East Asia. It will not be economically sensible for developing countries to invest taxes in high-tech facilities for treatment and incineration as Japan did. In addition, the role that citizens must play in such a system, as explored above, is not feasible in many places. Of course, citizens need to be well informed about waste separation and disposal, and there have been tremendous numbers of local citizens’ initiatives for promoting source separation and disposal in Japan. This is truly a part of civil-society participation. Most of these initiatives, however, seem to rely on citizen efforts or volunteer organizations only. A problem with this approach is that, while it may succeed where citizen awareness is high, it lacks general applicability. A student from Sri Lanka at my university reports that waste separation and disposal was adopted there with Japanese support but abandoned within two weeks because it was too complicated and troublesome. The student showed interest when the author explained economic incentives and user-friendly systems for waste sorting. This example suggests the limitations of administrative rationalism, as well as the programs that it has resulted in, and the possibility that international norms based on economic rationalism and ecological modernization are better suited to developing countries in East Asia. That is, although administrative rationalism did work in the Japanese case, it is unlikely it will work in other countries in Asia. As a matter of fact, it is proving difficult to advance waste separation even in Japanese cities, where increasing numbers live alone. Given this demographic change, it is not just developing countries in Asia that can learn from the international policy dialogue such as the 3R Initiative: Japan itself may need the flexibility to adapt to new international norms as a result of this learning process.

Notes 1

“Sound Material-Cycle Society” means a society in which the consumption of natural resources will be conserved and the environmental load will be reduced to the greatest extent possible, by preventing or reducing the generation of waste, etc. from products, etc. by promoting proper cyclical use of products, etc. when these products, etc. have become circulative resources, and by ensuring proper disposal of circulative resources not put into cyclical use (Basic Act on Establishing a Sound Material-Cycle Society, Article 2 (1), 2000). 2 According to the EU, “Circular Economy” means an economic system which “close[s] : : : the loop of product lifecycles through greater recycling and re-use, and bring benefits for both the environment and the economy” (EU Action Plan for the Circular Economy). The term is also used in China. 3 The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste and their Disposal was adopted in 1989. It was an international response to a public outcry following the discovery, in the 1980s, in Africa and other parts of the developing world of deposits of toxic waste imported from abroad. 4 “Soft laws” here refers to international resolutions and declarations adopted by international authorities, i.e. United Nations General Assembly. 133

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5 6 7

8 9 10

11

12 13 14 15 16 17

18

Agenda 21 Plan of Action, 4.15. Agenda 21 Plan of Action, 4.18–19. The OECD has been encouraging the economic-incentives approach to internalize social costs since 1972 with the polluter-pays principle. In the 1990s, it renewed the campaign by suggesting various approaches, including environmental taxes and emissions trading, among others. (OECD 1994). The EPR guidance manual for governments states the potential benefits and costs associated with EPR. It is not a legally binding agreement but can be considered an international norm. See Hajer (1995) for the roots of ecological modernization. Haas concluded that the reason international cooperation on preventing pollution in the Mediterranean Sea succeeded was due to transnational cooperation among ecologists and marine scientists, the establishment of an international agenda, and guidance of individual countries toward support for international activities and adoption of strong domestic anti-pollution measures. Haas called such a community of experts sharing values and approaches on a policy issue an “epistemic community” (Haas 1990). The structure of this section relies mainly on the following works: Environment Agency/Ministry of the Environment, White Papers: Annual Report on the Environment in Japan, 2001–6; Annual Report on the Environment, the Sound Material-Cycle Society and Biodiversity in Japan, published annually (Takahashi et al. 2010; Kobayashi 2006; Otsuka 1998, 2002; Tanaka 2004; Toshi to Haikibutsu Editorial Team 2006; Yagi 2006). See Article 1 of the Act. Excerpted from the Ministry of the Environment publication “Overview of the Basic Act for Establishing a Sound Material-Cycle Society.” The Act on promotion of recycling food cyclical resources mainly targets the food industry. Japan Association of City Mayors, “Requests Concerning Addressing Waste,” June 2004 [www. mayors.or.jp/opinion/youbou/h1606/26.htm]. For an international comparison of deposit systems, see Numata (2014). Yamaya, a professor at Toyo University in Japan, has conducted numerous studies on the PAYT system in Japan. Apart from articles and books, he also published some survey results [www2.toyo.ac.jp/ ~yamaya/profile.html]. Yuichi Moriguchi, now a professor at the University of Tokyo, who previously directed research on waste at the National Institute for Environmental Studies, an auxiliary organ of the Ministry of the Environment, is the only Japanese name on the membership roster, as a co-author of the above International Resource Panel report.

Bibliography Bruijn, H. A. De and Hufen, H. A. (1998) ‘The Traditional Approach to Policy Instruments’, in B.G. Peters and F.K.M. van Nispen (eds), Public Policy Instruments: Evaluating the Tools of Public Administration, Northampton: Edward Elgar, 11–32. Dryzek, J.S. (2005) The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Finnemore, M. and Sikking, K. (1998) ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, International Organization, 52(4): 887–917. Haas, P.M. (1990) Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics of International Environmental Cooperation, New York: Columbia University Press. Hajer, M. (1995) The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hawken, P., Lovins, A. and Lovins, L.H. (2000) Natural Capitalism: Creating the Next Industrial Revolutions, London: Earthscan. Hotta, Y. and Kojima, S. (2012) ‘Policy Framework for International Collaboration Towards Sustainable Resource Circulation and Management in Asia’, IGES White Paper, IV: 159–86. Inoue, Y. (2006) ‘History of Waste Research: Part 1’, Kankyo: The Online Magazine of the Center for Material Cycles and Waste Management Research of the National Institute for Environmental Studies, 2006(11_5) (in Japanese). Ishi, H. (2016) Global Environment and Human History based on State-of-the-Art Researches, Tokyo: Yosensha (in Japanese). Ishikawa, H. (1997) Oedo Recycling Affairs, Tokyo: Kodansha (in Japanese).

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Kaffine, D. and O’Reilly, P. (2013) What Have We Learned about Extended Producer Responsibility in the Past Decade? A Survey of the Recent EPR Economic Literature, ENV/EPOC/WPRPW(2013)7/FINAL, 2–45, Paris: OECD. Kobayashi, Y. (2006) ‘From the Waste Disposal Law to the Basic Law for Establishing a Sound MaterialCycle Society’, Journal of Japan Waste Management Association, 59(272): 315–22 (in Japanese). LeBlanc, R.M. (1999) Bicycle Citizens: The Political World of the Japanese Housewife, Berkeley: University of California Press. Lindhqvist, T. (2000) Extended Producer Responsibility in Cleaner Production: Policy Principle to Promote Environmental Improvements of Product Systems, Lund: IIIEE, Lund University. Mizoiri, S. (1988) 100 Years of Waste, Tokyo: Gakugeishorin (in Japanese). Numata, D. (2014) Environmental Economics of Deposit System—Toward Realization of Recycling-Oriented Society, Tokyo: Keisoshobo (in Japanese). OECD (1994) Managing the Environment: The Role of Economic Instruments, Washington, DC: OECD Publications and Information Center. OECD (2001) Extended Producer Responsibility: A Guidance Manual for Governments, Paris: OECD Otsuka, T. (1998) ‘Directions in General Laws and Regulations on Recycling’, Journal of the Japan Society of Material Cycles and Waste Management, 9(6): 413–23 (in Japanese). Otsuka, T. (2002) Environmental Law, Tokyo: Yuhikaku (in Japanese). Pekkanen, R. (2006) Japan’s Dual Civil Society: Members without Advocates, Stanford: Stanford University Press. Sakai, S., Ikematsu, T., Hirai, Y. and Yoshida, H. (2008) ‘Unit-Charging Programs for Municipal Solid Waste in Japan’, Waste Management, 28(12): 2815–25. Schreurs, M.A. (2002) Environmental Politics in Japan, Germany, and the United States, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Takahashi, W. (2000) ‘Environmental Cooperation in Northeast Asia’, in IGES Environmental Governance Project: Regional/Subregional Environmental Cooperation in Asia, Shonan, Japan: IGES. Takahashi, W. (2002) ‘Problems of Environmental Cooperation in Northeast Asia: The Case of Acid Rain’, in P. Harris (ed), International Environmental Cooperation: Politics and Diplomacy in Pacific Asia, Boulder: University of Colorado Press, 221–47. Takahashi, W. (2015) ‘Household Recyclable Waste Separation and Collection System—A Case of Policy Development and Implementation in Sweden’, Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 8(1): 99–103 (in Japanese). Takahashi, W., Yanagishita, M., Suzuki, K. and Yokota, I. (2010) ‘Development Trajectories of Waste and Resource Management Policies: A Comparative Analysis of Japan and Korea’, Research Papers, Utsunomiya University Faculty of International Studies, 29: 49–60 (in Japanese). Tanaka, M. (2004) ‘Waste Treatment Technologies in Japan and Overseas’, Monthly the Waste, 10: 50–6 (in Japanese). Tasaki, T. (2015) ‘Harmful Effects of Division of Responsibilities Under Recycling Systems and the Meaning of Goal Setting’, Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 8(1): 78–81 (in Japanese). Tasaki, T., Tojo, N. and Lindhqvist, T. (2015) International Survey on Stakeholders’ Perception of the Concept of Extended Producer Responsibility and Product Stewardship, Tsukuba, NIES and IIIEE. Toshi to Haikibutsu Editorial Team (2006) ‘Interview with Hideto Yoshida (Director, Waste and Recycling, Ministry of the Environment)’, Toshi to Haikibutsu, 36(2): 19–23 (in Japanese). UNEP (2016) Resource Efficiency: Potential and Economic Implications. A report of the International Resource Panel. Ekins, P. Hughes, N., et al. Nairobi. www.env.go.jp/press/files/jp/102839.pdf. Weizsa¨cker, E.U. von, Lovins, A.B. and Lovins, L.H. (1998) Factor Four: Doubling Wealth, Halving Resource Use—A Report to the Club of Rome, London: Routledge. Yagi, Y. (2006) ‘Postwar Changes in Waste Policies’, Journal of Japan Waste Management Association, 17(6): 349–59 (in Japanese). Yorimoto, K. (1998) ‘Policy Formation and Citizens’, Tokyo: Yuhikaku (in Japanese). Yoshida, H. (2006) ‘Interview with Hideto Yoshida (Director, Waste and Recycling, Ministry of the Environment)’, Toshi to Haikibutsu, 36(8): 17–19 (in Japanese). Yoshida, H. (2007) ‘Keynote Lecture on Japan’s Cooperation in the 3R Field in Asia’, Seikatsu to Kankyo, 52(12): 6–9 (in Japanese). Yoshida, H. (2008) ‘Japanese-Chinese Cooperation in Waste and Recycling’, Indust, 23(7): 34–7 (in Japanese).

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9 Sustainable ocean management and the role of the Japan Coast Guard Miko Maekawa, Hiroshi Terashima, and Eka Higuchi

Sustainable ocean management and Japanese actions The ocean plays a central role in regulating the global climate, absorbing heat, generating oxygen, and providing humans with important natural resources such as food, energy, and different types of material. Maritime transportation has been a significant part of human history and international trade. Increasing levels of global population, human activities, economic growth, and free access have placed pressure on the global marine environment. Major challenges for sustainable ocean management are various forms of pollution, increasing natural resource use and extraction, including overfishing, and climate change, ocean acidification, and hypoxia (reduced oxygen content of a body of water). The term “sustainable development” was first introduced in a world conservation strategy published by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature in 1980. In 1987, the United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development issued the report Our Common Future, commonly referred to as the Brundtland Report. It suggested what is now one of the most widely accepted definitions of sustainable development: “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987: 30). In 1992, the UN Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, declared an Earth Charter to build a just, sustainable, and peaceful global society in the twenty-first century, along with an action plan for sustainable development, Agenda 21. Chapter 17 of Agenda 21, one of the longest chapters in this document, is devoted to the protection of the oceans and seas and the protection, rational use, and development of their living resources. The same chapter points out that the marine environment forms an integrated whole that is an essential component of the global life-support system and a positive asset that presents opportunities for sustainable development. International law, as reflected in the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which came into effect in 1994, also sets forth rights and obligations of states and provides the international basis upon which to pursue the protection and sustainable development of the marine and coastal environment and its resources. The ocean covers more than 70% of the planet’s surface, and islands and continents

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worldwide are connected by the oceans. Intrinsically, sustainable ocean development and management requires a global perspective and international cooperation. Japan is a country surrounded by oceans: the importance of oceans to Japan is self-evident from its geographical location, and oceans have played a significant role in Japanese culture and in Japan’s economy. Since the 1960s, in order to cope with the environmental problems caused by high economic growth and weak regulations, as well as to exercise the responsibilities of coastal states stipulated in UNCLOS, Japan has put in place a series of laws and regulations to curb marine pollution and to promote better conservation. In order to ensure enforcement of this national legislation, the Japan Coast Guard ( JCG) played an essential role in terms of marine scientific research and data collection, patrolling and policing of violations of marine pollution acts, and expanding regional cooperation and international assistance. This chapter examines the evolution of the JCG and its safeguarding of Japan’s marine environment; it also discusses the JCG’s role in helping establish coast guard agencies in Asia and the Pacific region and enhancing their capacities, thus ultimately contributing to enhanced law enforcement for sustainable ocean management in the region.

Japan as a maritime nation and its ocean-related administration Surrounded on all sides by wide expanses of ocean, Japan is a maritime nation that enjoys the benefits of the sea in the forms of maritime trade and fishing. Historically, the Japanese have benefited from a rich marine ecosystem, with 3,100 species of fish and 5,500 species of algae. Oceans have been highly important for food security, diplomacy, trade, industry, and so on. After the Japanese government shifted from a policy of seclusion to a policy of opening the country, in 1858, Japanese ocean policy as part of a diplomatic strategy developed rapidly, as the country sought to absorb the relevant knowledge and practices of Western states. Just as today, at that time the greater part of Japanese ocean policy was based on the international law of the sea. Today, the Japanese maritime zone is constituted by its territorial sea, internal waters, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and continental shelf. The Japanese territorial sea and its EEZ cover some 4,470,000 sq km (Terashima and Hayashi 2015). When we compare the scale of the Japanese land area with its maritime area, the maritime zone is about twelve times larger. The main existing Japanese domestic laws relating to the oceans and coastal zone could be categorized according to the themes outlined below (based on Terashima and Hayashi 2015: 285–6).  

   

Coordination and harmonization – Basic Act on Ocean Policy Legislation on planning – national land sustainability and development; national land-use planning; natural parks; development of the national capital region; development of remote islands; development of Hokkaido; development of the Ogasawara Islands; city planning; factory locations Law of the sea – Territorial Sea; the EEZ; the continental shelf Land preservation and management of public goods – government property; coastal areas; rivers; improvement of fishing harbors and grounds; improvement of infrastructures with overriding priority Fisheries – Basic Law on Fisheries Policy; conduct of fishing; preservation and management of marine living resources; promotion of development of marine fishery resources; fishing boats; exercise of sovereign rights with regard to fisheries and other activities Mineral resource development – mining; mining safety; development of petroleum resources and inflammable natural gas; stockpiles of petroleum; petroleum pipeline industry; extraction of gravel 137

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Shipping – marine transport; domestic shipping industry; maritime traffic safety; personnel for ships; aids to navigation; port regulations; prevention of collision at sea; maritime accident inquiry; life-saving in coastal accidents; pilotage; hydrographic activities; security of ships; port facilities Space utilization – reclamation of publicly owned water surface; city planning; urban parks; factory locations Energy – stockpiles of petroleum; electricity industry; promotion of energy-resources development; restriction of nuclear source material and nuclear reactors; prevention of radioactive damage caused by radioactive isotopes Waste disposal – waste disposal and cleaning; regional offshore environmental improvement Environmental protection – Basic Environment Plan; environmental impact assessment (EIA); natural parks; prevention of water pollution; prevention of marine pollution and maritime disasters; special measures for the conservation of the Seto Inland Sea environment

Currently, the principal ministries and agencies relevant to ocean and coastal areas are:         

Headquarters for Ocean Policy, within the Cabinet, and National Ocean Policy Secretariat, Cabinet Office Ministry of Defence Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Post and Telecommunications Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, including the Fisheries Agency Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, including the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, including the Japan Coast Guard, the Meteorological Agency, and the Geographical Survey Institute Ministry of the Environment

Japan Coast Guard: evolution of marine environmental watchdog The JCG was established based on the Japan Coast Guard Act, enacted in 1948, three years after the end of World War II, with the urgent tasks of repairing destroyed sea marks, restoring weakened hydrographic survey capacities, surveilling illegal entries into the country, removing underwater mines blocking sea routes, and so forth (JCGF 2016). The JCG was developed by learning from the United States Coast Guard (USCG) as an organizational model. However, the JCG was administered under the Ministry of Transport, whereas the USCG is a military branch within the Department of Homeland Security. The USCG is one of the five armed services of the United States. In addition, the USCG is a law-enforcement and regulatory agency with broad legal authorities associated with maritime activities. It provides humanitarian service to people in distress or affected by disasters at sea or ashore. The USCG’s homeland security and defense operations are carried out either under its own control or that of the Department of Defense Combatant Commander (USCG 2017). In Japan, the function of the Hydrographic Watercourse Department and the data and information of the Imperial Japanese Navy from the pre-World War II period was absorbed into the newly established JCG. However, it was made clear that the JCG is a law-enforcement institution strictly separated from military functions. Later, in 1954, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force was organized with the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force and the Japan Air Self-Defense Force as the National Security Force, under the Defense Agency, 138

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based on the Self-Defense Forces Act. Over sixty years, the JCG has expanded its mandate and responsibilities to conduct search and rescue, guard territorial waters and the EEZ, take measures for the safety of navigation, combat pollution, and enhance disaster preparedness and response, etc. (JCGF 2016) in order to cope with emerging challenges and respond to the new global maritime order introduced by UNCLOS. At present, the JCG is administered under the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism and has these main areas of responsibility: maintaining maritime order, guarding territorial waters and the EEZ, saving lives, protecting the marine environment, preparing for disasters, exploring the ocean in terms of conducting marine scientific research and observation, ensuring the safety of maritime traffic, and promoting international cooperation (JCG 2016). With its headquarters in Tokyo, the JCG has divided the nation into 11 regions to facilitate its coast guard operations. Each region has a Regional Coast Guard Headquarters under which there are various Coast Guard Offices, Coast Guard Air Stations, Coast Guard Stations, Traffic Advisory Service Centres, Air Stations, and Hydrographic Observatories, as illustrated in Figure 9.1. At the HQs in Tokyo, the Internal Departments, the Hydrographic and Oceanographic Department, and the Maritime Traffic Department are primarily in charge of marine scientific research, observation and data compilation, and protection of the marine environment and disaster response. The respective eleven Regional Coast Guards HQs, also have their own Hydrographic and Oceanographic Departments and Maritime Traffic Departments (except for the eleventh HQ not having a Hydrographic and Oceanographic Department of its own.) In the 1960s, the Japanese economy entered a period of high growth, and industrial waste was discharged without being properly controlled or treated. For example, industrial effluent became a public hazard, causing various diseases, e.g. Minamata disease, Niigata Minamata disease, and the “ouch-ouch” disease of Toyama (UNEP 2007: 11). In the late 1950s and early 1960s, several

Vice Commandant Vice Commandant for Operations Internal Departments

Administration Department

Coast Guard Research Center

Equipment and Technology Department Administrative Inspector General

Guard and Rescue Department Hydrographic and Oceanographic Department

Commandant Maritime Traffic Department Attached Institutes

Coast Guard Academy Coast Guard School

Moji Branch Miyagi Branch

Regional Organizations Regional Coast Guard HQs (1st–11th)

Figure 9.1

Organization of the JCG as of April 1, 2016

Source: JCGF 2016: 3 (translated by the authors).

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environmental laws were passed dealing with the issues of industrial waste. In 1967, the Basic Law for Environmental Pollution Control was enacted as a comprehensive legal framework for environmental regulation, followed by the historic “Pollution Parliament” in the 1970s. The Diet session of 1970 passed fourteen more detailed pollution-control laws, including the Act on Prevention of the Marine Pollution and Maritime Disaster. In 1971, the Environment Agency was established. In 1971, the Marine Pollution Department was established within the JCG. In order to meet its expanded mandate of enforcing legislation related to marine pollution, the Department’s institutional arrangement, staff allocation, equipment, and facilities were enhanced. Later, in 1980, the Department was merged into the Maritime Traffic Department. In 1972, the Natural Environment Preservation Law was enacted with a stronger focus on conservation than on cleaning up pollutants. In 1992, the Basic Law for Environment Pollution Control was replaced by the Basic Environment Law, which incorporated the conservation of the global environment and the need for international cooperation. Around the same period, on the international front, the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) was adopted in 1973 at the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, the so-called London Convention, of 1972, has been in force since 1975. Towards the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century, there was a pressing need for a new paradigm for human and ocean interactions. This was enshrined in the Earth Charter and international laws such as UNCLOS, a comprehensive global legal framework encompassing almost all aspects of the law of the sea, that came into effect in 1994. It prompted the shift of the principle of maritime and ocean order from “freedom of the seas” to “management of the seas.” UNCLOS also requires each state party to put in place respective national legislation and relevant law-enforcement mechanisms to ensure the implementation of UNCLOS. Part VII of UNCLOS deals with Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment, and indicates that “States have the sovereign right to exploit their natural resources pursuant to their environmental policies and in accordance with their duty to protect and preserve the marine environment” (Article 193). In the 2000s, a series of new conventions relating to the marine environment were adopted, including one on anti-fouling systems (in 2001), another on ballast-water management to prevent the invasion of alien species (in 2004), and another on ship recycling (Hong Kong International Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships 2009) (IMO 2017). In Japan, the JCG serves as the primary law-enforcement agency to monitor, patrol, and protect the marine environment of Japanese territorial waters and its EEZ on the frontline.

JCG in action for marine environmental protection and sustainable ocean management Both the geographic and sectoral responsibilities of the JCG increased over time. In the 1960s, the JCG was given the mandate to monitor, patrol, and police vessels and actors violating national legislation to curb marine pollution, primarily in coastal areas. With the ratification of UNCLOS, Japan as a coastal state became responsible for the protection of its own vast EEZ. Law enforcement on the sea is fundamentally different from that of the land-based one, in terms of its very large coverage, the target area being three dimensional and covered with sea water, having areas with no human inhabitants, having to cope with activities of vessels from foreign countries, and so forth. All these conditions require special equipment, expertise, and trained personnel to effectively enforce laws. Practically, the JCG is the sole agency meeting these tasks with its legal mandate, necessary equipment, vessels, aircraft, navigation aids, trained personnel, and marine and hydrographic data 140

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and information. For example, the Ministry of the Environment does not possess a single vessel for monitoring, research, or patrol. The JCG has four main functions in marine environmental management, namely: 1) marine and hydrographic survey and data management; 2) dealing with marine environmental crimes (oil spills, illegal fishing, illegal disposal of waste water, etc.) and accidents; 3) disaster response; and 4) awareness-raising and civil engagement. First, regarding marine and hydrographic survey and data management, the JCG carries out marine-pollution surveys studying the various components of seawater and sediment for the sake of marine-environment conservation and assessment of radiation levels. The results of these surveys are made public via the internet and other means ( JCGF 2016). According to the JCG, it measures the precise depth of the seafloor and utilizes it to update nautical charts and to ensure safe navigation of vessels of different sizes. This topographical data is also used as the basic information to make claims for extended continental shelf, to make investigations concerning earthquakes, to conduct simulations of tsunami propagation, and to develop marine resources. Detailed investigations are made to determine and record the locations of low-water lines (the borders between land and sea at nearly lowest low-water) on nautical charts, which are used as baselines to determine territorial waters. The JCG also explores ocean currents, such as the Kuroshio, as these can affect the safety and efficiency of navigation. In searching for missing persons and predicting the spread of spilled oil, it is crucial to monitor and forecast the ocean currents and tidal currents. Seawater and marine surface sediment contain substances generated as a result of human activities. In order to design countermeasures against marine pollution, it is thus important to continuously measure the amounts of such substances and their trend of increase (JCGF 2016). The JCG manages or contributes to the following database and websites: Mobile website for oceanic conditions/rapid currents, Visual Data website, MSI (Maritime Safety Information), Marine Cadastre, Marine Information Clearing House, and the Maritime Information and Communication System (MICS). For instance, MICS provides maritime safety information, including local meteorological and oceanographic data such as wind direction/velocity and wave height collected from lighthouses across the country, maritime construction-work notices, and live camera views of sea conditions. Second, the JCG plays a significant role in dealing with marine environmental crimes (oil spills, illegal fishing, illegal disposal of waste water, etc.) and accidents. Over the last decade, the JCG has referred around 600 cases of marine environmental crimes to prosecutors (Figure 9.2). The cases were in violation of the following Acts: Act on Port Regulations (1948, amended in 2009), Water Pollution Control Act (1970, amended in 2016), Waste Management and Public Cleansing Act (1970, amended in 2015), Act on Prevention of Marine Pollution and Maritime Disaster (MPMD Act) (1970, amended in 2014). There are reported cases of illegal discharge of wastewater from businesses and oil and other substances from ships, illegal dumping of waste and scrapped vessels, and crimes committed with an aim to avoid paying costs for waste disposal or equipment maintenance (JCGF 2016). In comparison to the number of referrals from the 1970s to the early 1990s, averaging over 1,500 each year, there has been a significant decrease in referrals, as a result of improved marine practices and law enforcement (Figure 9.2). Of the categories of crime referred to the appropriate authorities by the JCG in 2015, the second largest was fisheries-law violations, such as poaching, which accounted for roughly 30 (the largest, at approximately 40%, was navigation by non-inspected vessels and transportation of passengers in excess of capacity) (JCGF 2016). Recently, poaching has become increasingly tricky and sophisticated. Some poachers work together with purchasers in a highly organized manner, and other poachers work to fund criminal syndicates by selectively catching fish and shellfish that have premium value in the market (JCGF 2016). The JCG explains that in order to eradicate such criminal activities it works closely with individuals involved in fisheries and relevant organizations in each region to conduct thorough monitoring and surveillance activities. 141

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Figure 9.2

Japan Coast Guard: number of referrals of marine environmental crime

Source: Developed by the authors based on the data from JCG Annual Reports 1995– 2016.

Illegal operations and other unlawful acts by foreign fishing vessels are increasingly being carried out in malicious and ingenious ways. To combat this trend, the JCG works to coordinate and cooperate with the relevant organizations and regions in Japan and abroad, collects and analyzes information, and conducts rigorous monitoring and surveillance activities. Environmental crimes too in the last decade are becoming increasingly concealed and subtle, with waste, oil, and other substances being dumped under the cover of night, while ships are abandoned after their names and numbers have been removed (interview with JCG officials 2015). To tackle these crimes, the JCG wisely chooses the best combination of its vessels, aircrafts, and trained personnel, with overall coordination by the control centers. The JCG actively works with relevant organizations, such as local municipalities, fishery cooperatives, civil reporting, etc., to build a system for sharing information on crimes affecting the marine environment, and it is enhancing its surveillance activities. It is also crucial to continue to improve the safety of navigation in order to reduce the number of accidents, as fires, collisions, sinking, and incidents with other vessels not only threaten lives and properties but also have a serious impact on the natural environment (JCGF 2016). Third, the JCG has positioned firefighting ships and disaster-mitigation equipment around the country to enable prompt and accurate responses in the wake of accidents and man-made disasters. This provides the JCG with a system for such tasks as predicting how oil spills will spread 142

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and drift in order to facilitate effective clean-up work. The JCG carries out emergency relief operations, including the rescue of disaster victims, provision of emergency transportation of personnel and relief supplies, and survey of disaster-stricken areas, whenever natural disasters such as earthquakes, tsunamis, typhoons, and volcanic eruptions occur (JCGF 2016). It also compiles disaster-prevention maps for public use and is currently compiling a database of information acquired from its regular observations and emergency surveys of submarine volcanoes and volcanic islands. The JCG also has the capacity and responsibility to carry out seafloor geodetic observation, topographical surveys, and geological investigations in order to obtain the basic information necessary for predicting major earthquakes (JCGF 2016). Fourth, the JCG collaborates with local governments and volunteer organizations for awareness-raising and environmental education for preserving the marine environment. The JCG boasts the slogan “Preserving Blue Seas for the Future” and conducts activities such as boarding ships for instructional visits and marine-environment-preservation seminars, beginning in 1998 (interview with JCG officials 2015). There are various awareness-raising events organized around Marine Environment Preservation Month in June each year. This is in response to the need to reduce effluents from land-based sources, including households, and stimulate public action to combat marine litter. Also, in a highly closed-off area of sea surrounded by a metropolitan area, such as Tokyo Bay, Ise Bay, Osaka Bay, and Hiroshima Bay, the inflow of domestic wastewater and other effluents, and difficulties in exchanging water between the bay and the surrounding ocean, results in many problems, such as red tide and diminished sea life (JCGF 2016). Collaboration networks are being developed among local government, academia, the private sector, and civil-society organizations for better environmental monitoring and the discussion of possible future joint actions, with the JCG playing a facilitating role (Furukawa 2016).

Regional cooperation in Asia and the Pacific for sustainable ocean management Asian countries, especially in Southeast Asia, have benefitted from the support and leadership demonstrated by Japan to strengthen the relevant law-enforcement mechanisms of their coast guards. This governance and administrative set-up has led Japan and most of its neighboring Asian countries to forge partnerships and collaborative relationships to guard and protect their ocean areas and regional seas. Respective efforts will be explained in detail.

International capacity-building assistance efforts by the JCG The JCG’s capacity-building assistance began in 1969, providing technical support to secure safety of navigation in the coastal nations of the Strait of Malacca, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. The Strait of Malacca is an important sea lane for Japan as well as for world trade, as it is one of the most heavily used routes globally. These initial efforts included basic technical support for creating nautical charts, and conducting hydrographic surveys and studies on tides and currents. The JCG’s support in the form of Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA), for securing safety of navigation in the area, continues to this day. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) training program on the conducting of hydrographic surveys continues to play an important role in Japan’s capacity-building assistance to other Asian nations, and this contribution is well acknowledged by the leaders of coast guard agencies in the region (interview with JCG officials 2017). Since the program’s inception in 1971, more than 400 participants from forty-two countries have been trained in the basic methods of conducting 143

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hydrographic surveys and creating nautical surveys (Noguchi 2016), and the program has continued in recent years as the JICA training program “Hydrography for Charting and Disaster Management (Internationally Accredited Category B)” (Hisaki 2012). Through a training program on hydrographic data processing and marine cartography, conducted with the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) and United Kingdom Hydrographic Office, with support from the Nippon Foundation, the JCG has conducted training courses meeting the requirements of the IHO’s international standards. In recent years, the JCG has also been actively implementing training programs in creating electronic navigational charts (PCG & JICA 2002). Especially with regard to developing nations, these efforts have contributed to the decrease in blank spaces in the electronic navigational charts of nations around the world (Hisaki 2012). The JCG’s fields of support gradually widened to include efforts concerning search and rescue and maritime disaster prevention. Following the Showa Maru incident in January 1975, in which the grounding of the Japanese tanker led to a large crude-oil spill in waters between the Malacca and the Singapore Straits, technical cooperation regarding safety of navigation shifted into high gear (interview with JCG officials 2017). Such incidents led to developments in the late 1980s, when many JCG officers were dispatched to provide expert advice in response to the increased need for technical cooperation in the fields of maritime search and rescue and maritime disaster prevention. These included many of the JCG’s Special Rescue Team and divers being dispatched on short-term missions to Indonesia and the Philippines to provide guidance on diving techniques, contributing to the improved search-and-rescue abilities of the nations’ relevant agencies (Hisaki 2012). With respect to the JCG’s contributions to training in this field, the JICA developed the “Maritime Search and Rescue, Maritime Disaster Prevention” course, which evolved into the Maritime Safety and Security Policy Program (MSP), a master’s program run by the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), which is explained in greater detail later in the chapter. As previously mentioned, in 1994 UNCLOS came into effect as a comprehensive global legal framework encompassing almost all aspects of laws of the sea. In this context, countries around the world came to share the maritime and ocean order as common goods. In the late 1990s, increasing numbers of piracies took place in the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca. In the late 1990s, with increased numbers of incidents of illegal migration and smuggling, as well as piracy and even terror attacks, the JCG gradually supported efforts to establish coast guard agencies in neighboring Asian nations that could deal with such incidents. In addition, there was an increased need for more multilateral and bilateral coordination and cooperation between the respective coast guard agencies in these nations (Hisaki 2012). Under such circumstances, centralized coast guard agencies and relevant liaison and operation agencies were established in many ASEAN nations (Table 9.1), and in several cases became independent of the conventional navy and land police forces in response to

Table 9.1 Establishment of coast guard agencies in ASEAN countries 1998 2005 2006 2008 2009 2010 2011

Philippine Coast Guard was established by separation from the Armed Forces of the Philippines Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) was established Indonesian Maritime Security Coordinating board (Bakorkamla) was established Vietnam Coast Guard was established by separation from the Vietnam People’s Navy The National Committee for Maritime Security (NCMS) of Cambodia was established Department of Coast Guard (Sri Lanka) was established All Malaysian law enforcement agency were integrated into MMEA

Source: Hisaki 2012: 27. Translated by authors.

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changes in maritime law enforcement. In the early 2000s, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) Treaties was revised to combat terrorist acts on the seas. Countries around the world came to have a strong stake and interest in maintaining the global maritime and ocean order and ensuring law enforcement in their respective geographical areas. In response to these emerging needs and interests, political attention was paid to coast guards as an institution that could play a role in such law enforcement. They were expected to perform functions in the marine environment corresponding to those of the police on land. Against this background, a number of countries started to establish their national coast guards. The JCG was one of the coast guard entities to spearhead this trend. In line with these developments, the JCG provided active support for the establishment of coast guard agencies in the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia (interview with JCG officials 2017). The JCG’s international capacity-building assistance takes on many forms and is not limited to implementing training programs in neighboring Asian countries. Since 2000, the JCG has regularly dispatched its patrol vessels and aircraft to ASEAN countries and has provided vesselnavigation training and piracy-countermeasure drills to personnel of relevant agencies. The JCG Academy’s training ship “Kojima” has also been used in long-term ocean voyages undertaken by trainees from various countries. In addition, through utilizing the frameworks of the Nippon Foundation and JICA, personnel of coast guard agencies in Asia and Africa have been invited to Japan to receive training in various fields (Hisaki 2012). This has evolved into the current Maritime Safety and Security Policy Program (MSP), a collaborative program designed and administered jointly by the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) and the Japan Coast Guard Academy (JCGA) (interviews with JCG officials 2016). The MSP provides a master’s program for students covering public policy, security studies, maritime safety, and maritime security, as well as marine environmental science as an optional subject (GRIPS 2017). Building the capacity of coast guard agencies’ personnel should contribute to enhancing the overall function of law enforcement of these institutions, including, where relevant, enforcing marine environmental regulations.

Bilateral assistance to the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) was established in 1998 following its independence from the Philippine navy. In order to support capacity building for the PCG, the JCG began the five-year “Philippine Coast Guard Human Resource Development Project” in July 2002, with the support of the JICA, to provide full-scale technical support regarding search and rescue, aids to navigation, protection of the environment, and maritime law enforcement. Following the five-year project, the JICA “Philippine Coast Guard Education and Human Resource Management System Development Project” began in 2008, with the aims of developing and improving the PCG’s educational system and nurturing instructors. Since 2000, the JCG has dispatched more than 250 experts to the Philippines, including long-term experts such as administrative advisers dispatched through the JICA, resulting in the improved capacities of the PCG. The JCG dispatched its own experts from the establishment stages of the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) to advise on effective operation methods, as well as to provide technical support in the fields of maritime law enforcement and search-and-rescue operations. Following the MMEA’s establishment in 2005, these efforts have continued through several JICA projects, including the “Project on Enhancing Practical Capacity for Maritime Safety and Security and Improving Education and Training Program,” which implements specific training efforts in maritime law enforcement and search and rescue, as well as improvements in existing training initiatives. The MMEA has shown great improvement in its abilities as a maritime 145

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law-enforcement agency, such as increasing its number of arrests from 170 in 2006 to 1332 in 2010 (Hisaki 2012). In 2011, several vessels of the Royal Malaysian Marine Police and Customs were transferred to the MMEA, establishing the MMEA as Malaysia’s sole maritime law-enforcement agency. This development, just six years since its establishment, shows the increased capacity of the agency, supplemented by the support provided by JCG through its training programs. In Indonesia, the JCG provided support to the Indonesian Maritime Security Coordination Body, which liaises with the nation’s several coast guard agencies. Among recent efforts, JCG experts of the JICA “Technical Cooperation Project on Enhancing of Vessel Traffic Service System Management Capacity” were dispatched to the Indonesian Directorate General of Sea Transportation to follow up on Japan’s assistance in the construction of a vessel transport system on the coast of the Malacca and Singapore Straits and provide technical support for the effective operation of the system, as well as strengthen coordination between relevant nations and agencies (JICA 2017).

High-level exchanges to enhance partnership In the 1990s, there were increased numbers of piracy incidents in Asia, including the hijacking of the Panamanian-registered Japanese cargo ship MV Alondra Rainbow in October 1999. In response to these developments, Japan led efforts to hold the “Conference on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships” in Tokyo in April 2000. After undergoing several transitions, this conference, with the support of the Nippon Foundation and the Japan Association of Maritime Safety, gradually developed into the Heads of Asian Coast Guards Agencies Meeting (HACGAM), which facilitates congregation of the major coast guard agencies of eighteen countries in the Asian region. Through the establishment of this framework, the Japan Coast Guard has led increased efforts to strengthen regional coordination among the Asian coast guard agencies (interviews with JCG officials 2016). HACGAM now focuses on four major pillars: search and rescue, marine environmental protection, preventing and controlling unlawful acts at sea, and capacity building. HACGAM’s main topics for discussion were limited to piracy, armed robbery, and capacity development from the first meeting to fifth meeting (2004–9), although topics concerning the marine environment had already been included under capacity building (The Report of the Results of the WorkingLevel Meeting of the Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies Meeting, 2008). HACGAM started to deal with the marine environment as a main discussion point from its sixth meeting (Joint Statement, sixth Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies Meeting, 2010). At the eighth meeting (2012), HACGAM designated the secretariat for each of the major five fields: search and rescue, large-scale disaster response, environmental protection, law enforcement, and human-resource development. Since then, the Philippines has served as the secretariat for marine environment efforts. The main five pillars of the discussion of HACGAM were reformed at the eleventh meeting (in 2015) into four pillars, as described above, with the marine environment keeping its status as a main pillar ( Joint Statement, eleventh Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies Meeting, 2015). With regard to capacity building, and keeping in mind the discussions of this meeting, the JCG began the “Asia Coast Guard Junior Officer Course of Japan.” Since the eighth session of HACGAM, held in India in 2012, which added human resource development (and capacitybuilding support) as a cross-sectional tool for supporting the other four fields, the JCG has served as secretariat to promote efforts in the fields of law enforcement and human-resource development. In addition to bilateral cooperation efforts, the JCG looks to provide a leading role in providing capacity-building support through this framework. The significance of HACGAM has 146

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grown with the region’s rapid economic and population growth, and has since expanded the scope of its discussions to include the following topics: search and rescue, environmental protection, preparedness to address natural disasters, preventing and controlling unlawful acts at sea, and capacity building. Recent HACGAM discussions have included such topics as the need for partnerships among coast guard agencies to deal with illegal poachers, who have exploited the region’s limited resources because of rising demand for fisheries resources in the EEZs of the countries in Asia, where illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing is prevalent and necessary patrols and control are not fully in place. There is a need for a regional response mechanism to deal with contamination of the maritime environment caused by increased maritime traffic and the transportation of hazardous materials, as well as further collaboration among coast guard agency members to strengthen the region’s disaster preparedness and response capacities to deal with large-scale tsunamis and other marine hazards.

Public and private partnership for sustainable ocean management There are different types of partnership framework in Asia and the Pacific region to pursue sustainable ocean management. To name a few, Partnerships in Environmental Management for the Seas of East Asia (PEMSEA) is an intergovernmental organization operating in East Asia to foster and sustain healthy and resilient oceans, coasts, communities, and economies across the region. The Action Plan for the Protection, Management and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the Northwest Pacific Region (NOWPAP) is another intergovernmental initiative, which was adopted in September 1994 as a part of the Regional Seas Program of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP). Maritime and ocean issues are also discussed at high-level political forums such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Focusing on the support to coast guard agencies as law-enforcement institutions, the Government of Japan and the Nippon Foundation (NF) and its group organizations played an essential role in institutional building, providing equipment and other necessary operational support and human-resources development in the region. The support offered to the coast guard agencies in the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia was explained in the previous section. This section will focus on how a public and private partnership between the Government of Japan and the Nippon Foundation group developed and contributed to sustainable ocean management in the region. In 1962, the Nippon Foundation was established as a non-profit philanthropic grant-making organization, under the Japanese Motorboat Racing Law. Its initial focus was largely on maritime and shipping activities, which gradually expanded to cover a whole range of issues including education, social welfare, and public health, carried out in both Japan and abroad—in more than 100 countries to date (Nippon Foundation 2017). The current chairman, Yohei Sasakawa, is World Health Organization Goodwill Ambassador for Leprosy Elimination, Special Envoy of the Government of Japan for National Reconciliation in Myanmar, and the son of the Foundation’s founder, Ryoichi Sasakawa. The early efforts of the Foundation were direct support for the shipbuilding industry, and guaranteeing safety in the Straits of Malacca—vital to Japan’s national security, due to the fact that more than 80% of her oil passes this sea lane. Support for the maritime activities remained an important focus in the 1980s, which was later expanded to support broader “ocean” issues. In 1988, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation (SPF), a Nippon Foundation group organization, hosted the Pacific Island States Conference, inviting eleven heads of state from Pacific island countries (PICs) in order to encourage a high-level dialogue and to advance Japanese engagement 147

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in the region. The Conference was chaired by former Minister for Foreign Affairs Tadashi Kurashige, who issued the Kurashige Doctrine in 1987 during his service as the Minister for the third Nakasone Cabinet, outlining Japanese foreign policy towards Pacific island countries. The Kurashige Doctrine indicated the following: 1) to respect the independence and ownership of PICs; 2) to support regional cooperation; 3) to make an effort to ensure that the Pacific region continues to be a “peaceful and stable region”; 4) to provide support for economic prosperity; and 5) to promote person-to-person interactions (SPF 2017). Nine years later, this forum was taken over by the Government of Japan as a summit-level meeting known as the Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM), and it is now the primary platform for partnership between Japan and Pacific island leaders. Another example is the support provided by the Nippon Foundation group in strengthening the coast guard agencies of PICs. It granted two patrol vessels to the Republic of Palau as well as committing to support the cost of necessary fuels, parts, and equipment for the vessel for eight years. In Palau, SPF provides financial support for training the coast guard personnel. Another sister organization of the Foundation, the Japan Association of Marine Safety, dispatches trainers to Palau for continued training of Palau Coast Guard staff members. This is also carried out in coordination with Australia and the United States, who also are active in enhancing coast guard capacities in the region. With this support, Palau is able to patrol and strives to protect its vast EEZ from IUU fishing and other threats to the nation. Similar assistance is provided by the Nippon Foundation group to the Federated States of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands (Toriumi 2015). As mentioned, the Foundation has been supporting HACGAM since 1999. It has also worked to foster the world’s maritime human capacities through such leading institutions as the World Maritime University, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, and the International Maritime Law Institute. To date, the Foundation’s efforts have resulted in the training of 1,190 people from 139 countries, including coast guard personnel. Already, there are cases where those who were trained are now playing active roles in building important maritime frameworks in the Asian region and around the world. The work by the government of Japan on diplomacy in the Pacific island region and its support to enhance law enforcement through assistance to coast guard agencies has been initiated and implemented hand in hand with active support from private foundations such as the Nippon Foundation group. Some of the important initiatives were in fact first launched and tested by the Nippon Foundation and taken over by the government. The core mission of the Nippon Foundation, of maintaining global ocean order, has been pursued through various means, including projecting a vision, advising the government, offering speedy and flexible assistance in terms of financial, technical, and morale help, and building on long-term commitment, network, and relevant achievements by the group as a whole. This work has enhanced and supplemented government-based undertakings.

Discussions The JCG since its inception has evolved to take on new missions, ranging from protecting its coastal territorial waters to responding to environmental crimes and providing regional and international support to enhance law-enforcement agencies in Asia and the Pacific. Building on these basic functions and solid national capacity to execute the core mission of the JCG, it has expanded its activities to forge regional and international exchange and cooperation (interview with JCG official 2016). The establishment of a national law-enforcement institution on coastal waters, separate from the military, to protect the lives and assets of people, prevent violation of 148

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laws, and investigate crimes and suppress them—whose function is similar to that of the police on the land—intensified in significance when UNCLOS was put in place. UNCLOS provided a basis for a paradigm shift in the principle of maritime and ocean order from “freedom of the seas” to “management of the seas.” Within this framework, UNCLOS requires each country to establish law-enforcement mechanisms to ensure the implementation of UNCLOS. At the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century, the legal regime under UNCLOS began to take shape, and in this process Asian countries, especially in Southeast Asia, have benefitted from the support and leadership demonstrated by Japan to strengthen their relevant law-enforcement mechanisms. Public and private partnership between the government of Japan and the Nippon Foundation group has proved to be one of the effective ways of contributing to sustainable ocean management in the region. The JCG is also a one-stop shop for data management, patrolling and policing, search and rescue, and the equipment and personnel necessary for enforcing laws in the Japanese EEZ for sustainable ocean management. This type of arrangement is not always in place in other Asian countries where the marine police are separated from the entity capable of search and rescue. The partnership among coast guard agencies in Asia was made possible as the JCG was non-military in nature. This governance and administrative set-up has led Japan and its Asian neighboring countries to forge partnerships and collaborative relationships to guard and protect their ocean areas and regional seas. One of the recent global trends is to ensure civilian control and demarcation between law enforcement and the military forces. Japan has contributed to this trend in the Asian region, as regional cooperation through non-military institutions was conducive to promoting regional cooperation for sustainable ocean management. In ASEAN countries where coast guard agencies and law enforcement capacities are being established and developed, Japan has demonstrated its leadership in enhancing their individual and institutional capacities, contributing to sustainable ocean management in the region. This is in line with Japanese policy to enhance the rule of law in ocean governance expressed in the National Security Strategy of Japan, which was adopted by cabinet decision in 2013 (MOFA 2017). At the Ministerial Council on the Strengthening of the Maritime Security System, held at the Prime Minister’s Office in December 2016, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe presented the Policy on Strengthening the Maritime Security System through broadly strengthening the capability of the JCG. Regarding the JCG, significant increases of the initial budget to more than 210 billion yen for 2017 and the addition of more than 200 staff members were announced. It highlights that the JCG is an integral part of Japanese security policy (Cabinet Secretariat 2016). The JCG has continued to accommodate new tasks and responsibilities over the course of its development. Now, with the increasing demand for protecting Japanese waters and ensuring both security and safety around the country, the expectations put on it are growing ever larger. In addition, in the context of recent international developments in terms of ongoing diplomatic negotiations on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ), increasing economic and industrial activities in the sea, and the global pledge to achieve the sustainable development goals (SDGs), including Goal 14 to conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources, the need to construct better law-enforcement mechanisms for the world’s oceans is pressing. Based on global arrangements and upstream policy-level decisions by governments and ministries, as a coastal state it is perhaps unavoidable for the JCG to play a key function in order to exercise Japan’s rights and duties to meet emerging global responsibilities on sustainable ocean management. The experiences, lessons, and human networks developed so far by the JCG should serve as significant assets in meeting these future responsibilities. 149

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Conclusion Japan’s contributions to establishing regional mechanisms and cooperation and human-resources development for enhancing safety of navigation, security, and the fight against criminal acts at sea, including piracy, and protection of the marine environment, have resulted in progress in the region towards improving sustainable management of the oceans and the global commons. The JCG in particular has taken a leading role in helping to secure ocean management not only in the waters surrounding Japan but across Asia. Japan has played an active role in developing and enhancing coast guard agencies in Asia and the Pacific region and building interactive networks among them, with the aim of maintaining the newly defined global maritime order under UNCLOS and institutionalizing law-enforcement mechanisms.

Acknowledgments We would like to express our profound and heartfelt appreciation to the members of the Japan Coast Guard (JCG), especially Rear Admiral Atsushi Tohyama, Commander, Ishigaki Coast Guard Office and his colleagues, as well as Captain Keizo Eguchi, Director, Education and Training Division, Administration Department of JCG who have provided valuable information and insights on the roles and actual functions of the JCG. Our appreciation also goes to the officials of the Ministry of the Environment who have kindly accepted our interviews. We are also thankful to our colleagues from the Ocean Policy Research Institute, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Satoko Takahara for providing assistance in conducting a field survey in Ishigaki City in Okinawa Prefecture, Japan and translating relevant Japanese material into English, and John Dolan for reviewing and proofreading the English text and providing useful comments.

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Part III

International and national security

10 Japan as a maritime power Deterrence, diplomacy, and maritime security Alessio Patalano

Introduction Since the end of the Cold War and the appearance of Ichiro Ozawa’s Blueprint for a New Japan, scholars have been debating when Japan would regain a ‘normal’ military profile. Rooted in the content of Article Nine of the constitution, this military anomaly derives from the rejection of the use of war as a tool of statecraft and the maintenance of armed forces with ‘war potential’. Scholars agree that such a constitutional arrangement has significantly affected the postwar military posture (Hagstro¨m 2015: 127; Fatton 2013). They disagree, however, as to why in the face of an evolving security landscape and changing domestic politics Japan has continued to punch below its weight – failing to significantly rearm and engage in overseas missions. Realists assert that Japan has opted for a strategy of limited ‘militarization’ or ‘military normalization’ that relied on the security guarantee offered by the alliance with the United States (Inoguchi and Bacon 2006; Arase 2007; Hughes 2007; Pyle 2007; Samuels 2007; Hughes 2009; Tadokoro 2011; Midford 2013). Constructivists, by contrast, have suggested that the reluctance to build up military capabilities is symptomatic of a ‘pacifist’ or ‘antimilitarist’ culture in security affairs (Berger 1993; Hook 1996; Berger 1998; Hagstro¨m 2010; Oros 2007). From a military perspective, both sides of the argument share three assumptions. First, with a different constitutional arrangement Japanese military power would feature a different make-up. Second, the standard to achieve ‘military normality’ is assumed but never explained. Third, Japan would be more operationally active if it possessed such a degree of supposed ‘normal’ capabilities. These assumptions, and the unfolding ‘normality–abnormality’ debate, in turn, do not contribute to understanding the composition and balance of Japanese capabilities and military operations. This chapter, therefore, builds upon existing work addressing the significance of aspects of Japanese military power to shift the analytical focus away from the normality–abnormality debate (Patalano 2008, 2015: chapter 6). It explores the link between military power and national security to show the strategic logic underpinning Japanese military power and capabilities. By bringing the question of strategy back into the assessment of Japanese military power, this chapter tests the Japanese pursuit of military ‘means’ against specific security ‘ends’, not against supposed standards of normality. Within this context, it argues that the specific composition of Japanese military power is the product of a maritime strategy intended to address the impact of the archipelago’s geography and dependence on international sea-lanes identified by analysts and 155

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historians (Auer 1973; Woolley 2000; Graham 2006; Patalano 2011). The shape, size, and operational requirements of Japanese military power are informed by a maritime-centric military balance, one that puts a premium on maritime capabilities (including all naval and air capabilities able to operate at sea, underneath its surface, and in the skies above it) to pursue regional sea control as the cornerstone of the national defense posture – a choice that the normality–abnormality framework cannot adequately explain. This military posture, whilst aligned with the spirit of the constitution, is informed by strategic imperatives. Thus, since the late 1970s, Japanese military posture has combined a force structure to perform anti-submarine and (ASW) mine warfare (MIW) within Japan’s immediate Northeast Asian periphery with a naval alliance with the United States complementing gaps in nuclear and maritime strike capabilities. Upon this basis, the chapter further contends that in the post-Cold War era such a posture possessed a degree of operational flexibility and core capabilities that required only specific enhancements to meet new mission requirements. These encompassed conventional deterrence against missile and offshore-islands attacks, diplomatic actions by means of humanitarian interventions, and maritime security. Crucially, regional sea control was complemented by the pursuit of a degree of expeditionary capabilities. Assessed against the country’s specific security circumstances, the strategy that underscored the Cold War military posture did not lose its relevance in the aftermath of this period. Japan enhanced its sea-control core of capabilities to allow for expeditionary missions, currently focusing on disaster relief and maritime security, beyond the boundaries of its primary operational theaters in the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea. Within the context of regional sea control, Japan has modernized its force structure and capabilities to retain the ability to operate autonomously; beyond these boundaries, the country can project military power for presence and relationship-building missions as much as for good order at sea (Speller 2014: 81–2, 152). An examination of the strategy informing the nature and scope of Japanese military power does not support the notion that a different constitutional arrangement would entail a fundamentally different defense posture or a more proactive military behavior. This chapter is divided into three sections to articulate its argument. The first focuses on the framework of analysis; the second explores the link between maritime strategy and national security in Japan; the final section presents three examples pertaining to the areas of deterrence, diplomacy, and maritime security to show how Japanese military power is evolving to remain relevant.

Maritime strategy and naval power: the framework Why do navies matter? In what ways do maritime strategy and capabilities inform defense and security policy? Since men live on land, and maritime capabilities are expensive commodities, these questions are far from trivial. The first consideration pertains to the nature of the sea as an operational environment. The sea allows maritime forces to extend their reach far from national shores – the ocean makes up more than 70% of the world’s surface. It is the world’s ‘super highway’ offering worldwide arteries to trade and communication (Parry 2014: 1–3). It is a major resource, for it contains fish stocks and natural resources invaluable to food and energy requirements. And it is also a staging platform for territorial defense as well as for the projection of power (soft and hard) and influence (Till 2009: 23–33). Within this context, maritime forces can, and often are, designed also to protect wider economic interests in addition to performing military missions (Lambert 2016: 5–19). Design features concerning a warship’s poise, versatility, and self-sustainment determine the extent to which it can perform a variety of duties in peacetime as well as in crises and war (Speller 2014: 28–32). Drawing upon the notion of the sea as a vast access and maneuver space, as a resource, and a space for the projection of power, Ken Booth conceived maritime forces as capable of performing 156

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three different categories of task. This ‘trinity’ comprised military, diplomatic, and policing – or constabulary – functions (Booth 1977: 15–16). The ‘unity’ of the maritime domain and the related versatility of naval platforms meant that such functions could be performed at any given time and simultaneously (Booth 1977: 15; Speller 2014: 16–18, 23–4). In Booth’s framework, the trinity was represented as a triangle. ‘Military roles’ composed the triangle’s base, for the ultimate raison d’etre of any military organization is the use of force (Booth 1977: 16; Grove 1990: 233). Military roles were divided in missions seeking to achieve peacetime ‘balance of power’ functions or wartime sea control and power projection. The former included strategic and conventional deterrence with the aim to ensure sea control (Booth 1977: 20–3). Once acquired, sea control constituted the highest expression of freedom of action in a given maritime theater. The protection of shipping was part of the wartime sea-control missions. Power projection included operations designed to retain sea control in war or to achieve impact ashore (Booth 1977: 23–4). For Booth, the diplomatic and policing roles of navies pertained to the ensemble of activities conducted in support of foreign and security policy, and of law-enforcement and maritime governance respectively. Diplomacy has always been a significant component of naval activities (Cable 1998, 1999; Luttwak 1974). Naval deployments are conducted in international waters and, as such, they naturally offer themselves for visits to foreign countries that, depending on the context, promote relationships and institutional links or signal intentions, benign or otherwise. Indeed, naval diplomatic engagements can be tailored to convey a degree of implicit or explicit coercion with the aim of ‘negotiating from strength’, to ‘manipulate’ other actors’ behavior, as well as missions to promote ‘national prestige’ (Booth 1977: 18–19). Policing activities were pre-eminently confined to territorial waters and aimed at coastguard duties (which, depending on national arrangements, could be performed by separate coast guards or by navies), which included the protection of national sovereignty at sea and the management of the exploitation of resources (Booth 1977: 17–18). Recent scholarship on this subject has articulated the difference between cooperative constabulary behaviors, aimed at good order at sea and governance, and competitive constabulary behaviors, focusing instead on the enforcement of sovereign rights in contested maritime spaces. The latter form has gained prominence notably the in the East and South China Seas (Haines 2017: 81–91; Patalano 2017). How does the enabling character of navies translate into a strategic asset to national security? The English philosopher Sir Francis Bacon captured the relevance of maritime strategy when he noted that ‘he that commands the sea is at great liberty, and may take as much or as little of the war as he will’ (Bacon 1765: 490). As this observation suggests, the aim of maritime strategy – in war as much as during peacetime – is not the control of the sea for its own sake. As Corbett put it, the object of naval warfare ‘must always be directly or indirectly either to secure command of the sea or to prevent the enemy from securing it’ (Corbett 1911: 91). Command of the sea, in turn, means control of maritime communications ‘for commercial or military purposes’. This matters to states insofar as access to the sea is ‘essential to national life’ – in war as well as in peacetime (Corbett 1911: 94). For Corbett, therefore, the size and shape of a navy was a function of a maritime strategy harmonizing geography, military power, and available economic and political capital to build and sustain maritime capabilities. In this view, one scholar remarked that the British choice of maintaining a superior naval force to maintain sea control in the early twentieth century gauged a strategy that minimized attacks from the sea and maximized deterrence and power projection to prevent disruptions to trade and commerce (Speller 2014: 45). This did not mean, however, that a superior naval force capable of performing all forms of naval missions is a ‘mandatory’ strategy. However, governments of industrialized, export-oriented nation states, depending on unfettered access to maritime communications for their economic survival, will be amongst those needing to 157

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prioritize questions about maritime capabilities. This will allow them to meet the requirements of national security ensuring they can have a say on the ability of trade and communication to take place without disruptions.

Securing Japan as a ‘sea-faring democracy’ In the case of postwar Japan, since the second half of the 1960s, possessing and maintaining a degree of naval power has not been, and is not, a question of ‘if’. It is a strategic imperative informed by a political choice. In the mid 2000s, the Japanese Ministry of Defense ( JMOD) concisely described the navy as Japan’s ‘first line of defense’, for the archipelago’s core strategic security concerns have to take into consideration its maritime geography and a quasi-complete dependence on overseas supply of raw materials ( Japan Defense Agency 2005: 186). For the country’s export-oriented economy, maritime capabilities contribute critically to national security. They are poised to avoid disruptions to the country’s sea-lanes of communication (SLOCs), by working alone within 1,000 nautical miles from Japanese shores, or together with the United States Navy (USN) and its allies both within and beyond these boundaries. Today, these maritime arteries – stretching from the Middle East, through the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, to the Sea of Japan – transport almost the country’s entire trade by value and volume and more than 80% of its energy (Graham 2006: chapters 5, 8; Government of Japan 2013a: 5). The significant vulnerability of the Japanese economy to disruptions to the international maritime trade system, both in terms of transport and energy access, was proved in full in the aftermath of the triple disaster of March 2011. On that occasion, the root causes of the problems of disruption were related to a reduced national port and logistical capacity and the consequent shutdown of nuclear power plants rather than direct sea-lanes disruption. Nevertheless, the net result was remarkably similar to what such a maritime disruption would entail. Exports fell by 2.2%, compared to the previous March, with car shipments alone down 28%.1 This meant that in a very short period of time shortfalls in spare components – a shortage that would be similar to a disruption of maritime traffic – heavily affected Japanese car manufacturers’ overseas production. In the UK, Toyota had a delay of around 12,600 units in just two months, whilst Honda had to enact a 50% cut in output during the same period.2 Similarly, Japanese energy imports increased significantly after the shutdown of the country’s nuclear power plants, with notable effects on trade deficits especially with the Middle East, from where Japan imports its largest share of oil and gas.3 An inability to maintain a regular flow of energy imports would have further added to disruptions to the Japanese economy. Within this context, it should come as no surprise that one core assumption underpinning Japan’s first National Security Strategy, published in 2013, was that Japan is ‘a maritime state,’ one where ‘maritime trade and development of marine resources’ and ‘Open and Stable Seas’ had been critical factors in the country’s economic rise (Government of Japan 2013a: 2). In fact, the relevance of maritime forces to protect the nation’s maritime economic arteries and interests has the highest political recognition (Patalano 2014a). In contemporary Japan, these include the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force ( JMSDF) and its constabulary counterpart, the Japan Coast Guard (or JCG, the law-enforcement agency tasked to protect life at sea in Japanese waters and to protect the country’s maritime rights as recognized by UNCLOS). Political rhetoric has supported this emphasis on the importance of maritime power to national identity and security. In December 2012, only days after he had come to power, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe pointed out that Japan is ‘one of the oldest sea-faring democracies in Asia’ as a way stress the link between the country’s economic dependence on the sea and its national 158

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identity (Abe 2012). In 2016, he consistently stressed how Japan’s relationship with the sea was not one merely based upon its use as a ‘highway’ but also as a significant resource of food and energy in itself. From his perspective, ‘the sea shaped Japan as a nation,’ and his government was looking forward to ‘developing ocean energy and mineral resources and ( : : : ) marine resources’ (Abe 2016). Abe expected Japan to ‘play a greater role in preserving the common good’ in the Indo-Pacific area (Abe 2012), with the aim of doing what is ‘necessary to protect the sea under international law as a public good shared by all of humanity’ (Abe 2016). Whilst his political rhetoric fell short of what a ‘greater role’ would actually entail, his views on the significance of maritime affairs to national security were further emphasized by the escalating tensions with China over the outstanding boundary and sovereignty disputes in the East China Sea (Patalano 2014b: 39, 47–4). Already in July 2013, the Prime Minister had been clear that: The peace and prosperity of Japan as a maritime nation have their origins in free, open, and peaceful seas. Based on a shift in thinking from “a country protected by the sea” to “a country that protects the sea”, Japan is determined to maintain stable sea lanes and defend our maritime interests within our territorial waters and EEZ while also upholding the order of free and open seas on the basis of the rule of law, opposing changes to the status quo predicated by force. (Abe 2013) Prime Minister Abe’s more recent efforts to emphasize the importance of the ‘rule of law’ at sea are in part connected to the increasing tensions over maritime and territorial disputes in East Asia, not least to China’s activities in the pursuit of its claims. Nonetheless, by connecting the requirements of national security to the country’s maritime geography, Prime Minister Abe re-emphasized a postwar understanding of Japan’s dependence on the sea for its economic survival that has its origins in the policies first set by Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida (Kitaoka 2010: 46–9). The main difference today is that the importance of the sea is no longer limited to economic survival but includes two additional factors. The first concerns an enhanced perception of the Chinese challenge to the Japanese archipelago’s territorial integrity and its related maritime rights and entitlements in the East China Sea. The second is related to the broader potential impact of maritime and territorial disputes in sea-lanes relevant to Japanese security, most notably in the South China Sea – a theater central to the waterways connecting Japan to Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean region, and the Middle East. Maritime governance within Japanese territorial waters is a task pre-eminently performed by the JCG (together with the search for and rescue of civilians and seafarers). On the other hand, the broader significance of the Japanese navy to national security pertains to its contribution to these functions on the high seas as well as to other core functions of national defense, from sea-lanes defense to deterrence. The centrality of the fleet to the prevention of military incursions and missile threats in Japanese air and maritime spaces underscore this latter point (Kaneda 2006: 119–22). In particular, though missile defense is a multilayered integrated system, incorporating sea-based and land-based components, its maritime-based element is crucial for the timely intercept of missiles, a fact recently re-emphasized in discussions over increasing North Korean missile brinkmanship.4 Japanese joint efforts with the United States in implementing the seabased component of the system are confirmed by the success of recent intercept tests of ballistic missile targets.5 The navy has set also the tone for national contributions to alliance requirements with the United States as well as in the broader international security arena. For decades, during the Cold War, the JMSDF worked in tandem with the US Navy to monitor Soviet naval activities in the 159

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Sea of Japan and the East China Sea. In 1991, JMSDF minesweepers were deployed in the Persian Gulf for Japan’s first postwar overseas operation; ten years later, Japanese refueling activities in the Indian Ocean defined the country’s support for the ‘war on terror’; since 2008, the anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden have shaped the boundaries of Japan’s contribution to the stability of the international maritime system. In this regard, it is important these activities set legal precedents for Japanese military interventions in maritime missions. In a similar fashion, the JMSDF has been at the forefront of the promotion of bilateral relations and confidence-building measures such as visit exchanges, joint exercises, and maritime cooperation with other regional actors, from China to the Republic of South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines. The use of the navy as a tool of statecraft has empowered recent Japanese governments with an important means to enhance the country’s diplomatic profile.

Articulating Japanese maritime strategy: ‘commitment’ and ‘contingency’ The latest National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), adopted in 2013, were based on the premise that Japan had to assume a ‘dynamic deterrence’ to deny any potential competitor the opportunity to pursue ‘fait accompli situations’ and ‘probing activities’ by avoiding a ‘geographical opening’ or a ‘gap in time’ in the operational posture (National Institute for Defense Studies 2011: 243, 256). The Japanese defense posture had to focus on such ‘grey zone’ contingencies, or situations where coercive forms of actions were conducted in peacetime ( Japan Ministry of Defense 2013: 7). Thus, the regular exercise of intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance (ISR) activities, enhanced readiness of personnel and assets – including improved coordination with the JCG, and an increasingly ‘joint’ approach to the conduct of operations – with the reorganization of the Joint Staff Office ( JSO) to enhance its operational command role were the main military manifestations of the new policy guidance (Pajon 2017). The main aim was to make a potential adversary ‘realize that there would be little probability of success for a strategy of attempting to change the status quo’ ( Japan Ministry of Defense 2013: 7–8). The controversial security legislation passed in 2015 further sought to streamline the Japanese ability to respond to crises under ‘grey zone’ contingencies, both alone and in coordination with the United States (National Institute for Defense Studies 2016: 301–9). This policy framework rewarded the maritime strategy the Japanese navy had adopted in the mid 2000s, integrating missions in waters as far away as the Indian Ocean, meeting the challenge of increasing Chinese naval activities in the East China Sea and, to a lesser extent, North Korean adventurism in the same area and in the Sea of Japan. In November 2008, Rear Admiral Tomohisa Takei authored what became known as the JMSDF ‘new’ maritime strategy. In the introduction to the document, Admiral Takei reaffirmed that the country’s ‘national survival relies on unimpeded economic activities via sea-lanes of communication’ (Takei 2008: 6). He added that in the post-9/11 era, the main difference was that ‘the freedom of the seas was a priority to pursue during peacetime’, and ‘it was time for the JMSDF to expand its participation to peacetime activities’ to that end (Takei 2008: 8, 11–12). In his view, the navy had to change its approach to sea-lanes defense. It had to become more versatile to ‘provide a wide range of options to achieve national objectives’, in peace and war, alone, together with the United States, and with other like-minded partners (Takei 2008: 15–16). The new strategy proposed a conceptual shift in the understanding of sea-lanes defense. These were no longer to be regarded as ‘routes’ to be protected by escort flotillas in case of emergency. They were to be reconstructed as four wider ‘areas’ of passage for shipping bound to and from Japan. The specific nature of the potential threats in each one of them (Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Middle East) and the available resources to tackle them had to define the 160

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JMSDF activities.6 Northeast Asia was the nerve center of Japanese maritime operations for three reasons. Within the triangle Tokyo–Guam–Taiwan (TGT), the defense of sea-lanes overlapped with that of the Japanese home waters that included a set of disputed maritime, territorial, and potentially resource-rich spaces. The defense of the TGT area was similarly crucial to the ability of the United States to project military power in East Asia, especially in relation to the strategic value of Okinawa and Guam as staging platforms for US interventions in the event of a crisis. For Admiral Takei, ‘the TGT area was a major bridgehead for US military deployments in East Asia’ (Takei 2008: 19). The strategy rewarded an active naval presence as a way to define the JMSDF contribution to national security and alliance requirements in supporting US operations in the Western Pacific. It defined naval peacetime activities as part of a ‘commitment strategy’ designed to achieve two objectives, maintaining stability and deterring attacks – seeking to ‘win without fighting’ (Takei 2008: 17). In the TGT area, ISR capabilities and coordination with civilian agencies like the JCG were targeted to help the navy deliver the timely ‘detection of missile attacks, incidents of terrorism, and suspicious maritime activities’ (Takei 2008: 18). To maximize this ‘outwardly visible presence’, the ISR effort was to be coordinated with the US Navy. Defense exchanges, capacity building, multilateral exercises, port calls, and international relief missions all contributed to complete the JMSDF’s toolkit (Takei 2008: 20–1). Especially in the more distant areas, cooperation with NATO countries in operations like Active Endeavour, or to fight Somali piracy, as much as regular visits to and exercises with countries like India, was to be at the forefront of the JMSDF commitment (Takei 2008: 22). In Northeast Asia, this multilayered set of peacetime activities was central to managing the crucial relationships with potential competitors like China. The commitment strategy combined a ‘power cancellation’ of Chinese naval ambitions in the East China Sea with genuine efforts to enhance mutual understanding and interactions by means of exchanges and visits.7 Within this construct, a commitment to regional conventional deterrence was coupled with a proactive diplomatic and security endeavor beyond its confines. In situations of crisis or conflict, notably in the context of aggression against Japanese territorial waters and/or maritime traffic, the JMSDF would rely on a ‘contingency strategy’. In spaces closer to the archipelago, the document regarded conflict over maritime interests or territorial sovereignty as possible scenarios, suggesting the JMSDF take advantage of the peacetime earlywarning and detection systems for swift responses, concentrating its capabilities on anticipating and intercepting enemy actions. ‘The JMSDF must maintain its own strategic defense through its own initiative,’ and sea control and straits defense in the TGT implemented by means of strong Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), and at-sea logistical support were the ways to achieve it.8 In emergency situations, the JMSDF expected its responses to be coordinated with the US Navy, but it assumed that it had to be self-sufficient in those scenarios (like small-scale incursions against remote islands) that would not necessarily prompt a US intervention (Takei 2008: 24). In geographical terms, naval strategy as much as the broader emphasis on a dynamic posture gauged a shift in the operational focus from the northeast to the southwest part of the archipelago (Kendall 2010). In fact, strengthening mobility and readiness of Japanese forces reflected the genuine logistical requirements to defend the remote parts of the archipelago, including the offshore islands in the East China Sea (National Institute for Defense Studies 2012: 253–6). In all, a more dynamic military posture was required by the emerging understanding in Japan of the deterrent effect and diplomatic importance of military power in tense situations that fell beneath the level of open conflict. Hence, Admiral Takei’s maritime strategy played to the strengths of a 161

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defense policy that paid attention to the peacetime uses of military power and offered a vision that did not discard the centrality of sea-lanes defense. On the contrary, the security of shipping lanes enabled the JMSDF to prioritize geographic areas of interest and, within them, the allocation of its resources.

Maritime capabilities for a regional naval power? The key, therefore, is whether current capabilities are sufficient to match the stated security requirements and strategic objectives. Whilst the JMOD maintains that some capabilities remain beyond the grasp of what would be allowed by the Japanese constitution, such as ‘strike’ carriers and nuclear attack submarines, the quality of Japanese capabilities as well as the overall structure would suggest that this is the case ( Japan Defense Agency 2006: 93). In the 1980s, the JMSDF was the first navy in the world to be able to adopt the USN AEGIS integrated combat system – one of the most advanced in terms of combat capabilities – and has since continued to develop capabilities, doctrines, and training procedures that today make it one of the world’s most advanced navies. Already by the end of the Cold War, its surface combatants, submarines, and aircraft were optimized for the conduct of MIW and ASW. In its aftermath, the contraction in numbers was counterbalanced by an increase in the fleet’s tonnage, including the introduction of new enhanced destroyers, mine hunters, maritime patrol aircraft, refueling ships, and the upscaling of the submarine force from 18 to 22 boats (Patalano 2014a: 428–34). Further, new capabilities were introduced to meet new challenges – notably to support international missions, whilst the core of the fleet was being restructured to increase its tactical flexibility and its command and control and ISR functions. In particular, from the Cold War structure based around four ASW flotillas, each comprising eight ships, the Japanese introduced smaller ‘task groups’ to allow for more tailored deployments and an increased operational tempo without affecting the fleet readiness (Patalano 2014a: 433–4). On the basis of the maritime strategy developed by Admiral Takei in the mid 2000s, the Japanese navy’s core aim was to maintain a force capable of performing MIW and ASW functions on its own in the Sea of Japan and in the East China Sea, and together with its partners – crucially the US Navy – beyond those confines. The results were missile destroyers like the Atago class, an AEGIS destroyer featuring advanced missile-defense capabilities and a helicopter hangar, maximized for both air defense and ASW. In terms of submarines, the JMSDF introduced the largest and most advanced conventionally powered submarine platform, the Soryu class, a boat capable of conducting extended patrols whilst maintaining a very limited noise signature thanks in part to its Air Independent Propulsion (AIP). In the area of ‘expeditionary’ capabilities, already in 2004, Japan’s first major landing ships, the Osumi class, were showcased for the deployment of some 600 troops, 200 vehicles and the necessary logistics to southern Iraq. In January 2005, in the aftermath of the Indonesian earthquake and tsunami, JDS Kunisaki (LST-4003) made this point again, operating as command platform for the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force ( JGSDF) relief teams and their CH-47JA helicopters (Patalano 2014a: 432–3). Within this context, the latest DDH of the Hyuga and Izumo classes enhanced the fleet’s core ASW and air-defense capabilities but also its command and control functions, since they could be deployed as flagships for an expeditionary task force and for amphibious missions to defend Japanese offshore islands (Patalano 2015: 162). Thus, the nature of Japanese military power was not defined in terms of possessing a ‘twoocean’ navy, or a navy with strike capabilities. Rather, the Japanese opted for a navy with a strong regional profile that could pursue sea control within the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea in defense of the archipelago and its main sea-lanes. This basic layer has been coupled in recent years 162

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with the development of specific capabilities to renew the ability to defend Japanese territory – notably its southwestern offshore islands, projecting forces for short-distance amphibious raids. Further away, the lifting and command and control capacities associated with such capabilities constituted invaluable assets to complete an expeditionary core for disaster-relief and maritime security missions. Within this context, the navy specifically enhanced its ability to operate with the US navy and its allies in theaters within the confines of Southeast Asia or the Indian Ocean region for the conduct of both ASW and maritime security missions. In particular, the alliance with the United States continued to complement functional areas that Japanese military power did not cover, notably nuclear deterrence and strike, and power projection ashore. Nonetheless, Japanese capabilities remain in keeping with the security circumstances it faces and its strategic goals.

Deterrence, diplomacy, and maritime security: the faces of Japanese maritime power This final section explores three specific examples of the areas where Japan has been strengthening its capabilities to retain a credible – and more dynamic – defense posture, deploying assets as part of a wider diplomatic agenda and engaging them in broader missions to contribute to the stability and governance of the high seas. These examples are particularly apt to test the relevance of capabilities to meet operational requirements. The development of the amphibious brigade is the prime example of how the Japanese have sought to develop a new tailor-made capability to defend offshore islands. The size of this component disqualifies it to be regarded as a tool of power projection, but its composition suggests a clear strategy defining its role as a deterrent for the conduct of amphibious operations within the range of the archipelago. The JMSDF’s humanitarian interventions in Southeast Asia, especially in the Philippines, are, on the other hand, a relevant case of a renewed approach to naval diplomacy, albeit pre-eminently to strengthen relationships, working in support of a broader agenda of renewed engagement in the region. Rather than an example of Japan’s normative constraints, these maritime activities are the result of a specific strategy of engagement in the region. Lastly, the contributions to the counter-piracy operations are another demonstration of how Japanese maritime capabilities have been deployed for constabulary missions in line with the government’s ambition to be a ‘proactive contributor’ to international stability.

Deterring ‘small’ invasions: the establishment of an amphibious core The NDPG approved in December 2004 was the first defense-policy document introducing ‘responses to the invasion of Japan’s offshore islands’ as one of the core roles for the Japanese armed forces. Territorial defense had always included the ability to repel an invasion, but the 2004 NDPG was proposing a significant shift since, with the disappearance of the Soviet Union, ‘the likelihood of a full-scale invasion’ of northern Japan was expected to remain ‘modest in the foreseeable future’ ( Japan Defense Agency 2005: 42). The seeds were planted for the creation of an amphibious capability. This was to be designed to repel an attack against the main islands; it had to deter the takeover of small offshore ones – or, failing that, allow for their recovery. For almost a decade, the understanding of how to develop such a capability remained a question confined to the individual services. The JMSDF focused on strategic lift, with the Osumi class gaining experience in logistical transportation and practicing ship-to-shore operations with Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCACs) (Goldman 2013: 121, 130).9 The Western Army Infantry Regiment (WAIR) of the JGSDF started to gain basic knowledge of expeditionary operations, joining the Iron Fist exercise in 2006, and to train personnel on helicopter assaults (Newsham 2014: 73). 163

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From 2010, however, the defense of offshore islands became a higher political and security priority, especially in light of increasing Chinese military and paramilitary activities around the Senkaku Islands, claimed by Beijing and known in Chinese as Diaoyu. The Japanese army and navy had to step up their efforts and team up to produce a coherent and relevant capability. In 2011, the experience of the Great East Japan Earthquake in Tohoku further created momentum to work jointly towards this goal (Newsham 2014: 73). In 2012, the JGSDF formed its first amphibious study group to systematically develop a doctrine for amphibious operations. In December, it decided to embed one infantry platoon with a US Marine Expeditionary Unit for joint training in Guam.10 Similarly, the JMSDF included in the operational requirements for the DDH of the Izumo class specifications for both ASW and amphibious missions, and army and naval planners sought to increase interactions to ensure a degree of coordination across the services.11 In 2013, the first results of the momentum towards the establishment of a more coherent amphibious capability were put to test in a major exercise, Dawn Blitz 13. The force that crossed the Pacific Ocean to reach the shores of southern California proved that in less than eighteen months the Japanese could put together the nucleus of an operationally viable amphibious task group. Two amphibious ships, including the new DDH Hyuga and the Osumi class ship Shimokita, accompanied by an Aegis destroyer, conducted two successful assault landing operations during the exercise. They delivered ashore a company from the WAIR by a combination of LCACs and CH-47JA helicopters protected by AH-64 Apache helicopters and naval gunfire support.12 Two F-2 fighter jets from the Japan Air Self-Defense Force ( JASDF) added to the operation’s air cover (Newsham 2014: 74). According to informed analysts, US military observers were impressed by the Japanese performance.13 The pace of the progress was due to two main factors. First, a number of off-the-shelf forces and hardware components were already being developed, whilst missing capabilities – notably air-to-ground support (the Japanese lacking jets like the AV-8 Harrier) – were supplemented by Apache and Cobra helicopters (Newsham 2014: 72–3). The navy transport capacity still lacked vehicles suited for ship-to-objective maneuver in contested landings and forcible entry, but this gap was regarded as a top issue to address (Goldman 2013: 121). Second, the JMSDF and JGSDF leaderships, in particular Vice Admiral Katsutoshi Kawano and General Eiji Kimizuka, were fully supportive of the need for Japan to be equipped with an amphibious corps (Newsham 2014: 73). This enabled the two services to work closely and to take maximum advantage of the technical assistance offered by the US Marine Corps (USMC) (Newsham 2014: 73). The amphibious capability was effectively taking shape. Japan’s experience matured during Dawn Blitz, and the subsequent deployment in the aftermath of the tsunami in the Philippines (see the next section) contributed to ensure that gaps in capabilities were addressed. The NDPG approved in December 2013 set the pace (and the financial requirements) for procuring missing capability. In the new policy document, completing the development of the amphibious component remained a primary stated goal.14 The JGSDF was to halve its main battle-tank fleet to introduce some 300 light maneuver combat vehicles (MCVs) and, critically, to purchase 52 AAV-7 amphibious landing vehicles, seven Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft and additional CH-47JA helicopters.15 The objective was to establish by the following year a Rapid Deployment Brigade (RDB) that would be similar in size and capabilities to a USMC Marine Expeditionary Group/Amphibious Ready Group (MEU/ARG) (Newsham 2014: 73–4). This would enable Japan to possess at least one standing MEU/ARG-like capability on high readiness. The JMSDF too continued to take steps in that direction. In 2014, media sources reported that the DDH Izumo was to undergo a refit to enhance its command functions to operate as a command ship in amphibious operations as well as to gather and redistribute information across the battle spectrum 164

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from and to surface, air, and other assets from different branches of the Japanese military.16 As of 2017, progress continues, albeit at a more regular pace, with joint training with the USMC continuing on the established patters.17 In line with the stated objective to possess a relevant deterrent capability the Japanese are steadily progressing towards a short-range punch to ‘cancel the noise’ over a possible hostile overtaking of its offshore islands.

Enhancing diplomacy: the JMSDF interaction with the Philippines The area of disaster relief is often regarded as a clear example of how constitutional constrains have contributed to define the limits of Japanese action. Yet in Southeast Asia, Japanese actions in this area are better defined within the context of Admiral Takei’s strategy of engagement. This has in fact offered a framework for Japanese maritime power to play a non-negligible diplomatic role over the past decade (Hribernik 2015). In particular, given the country’s complex military legacy, the Japanese navy’s involvement in capacity building and, significantly, Japan’s expeditionary role in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief contributed to promote a benign and professional image of Japanese military power ( Japan Ministry of Defense 2016: 19–20). Since 2007, for example, Japan has joined he US Navy-led initiative Pacific Partnership, aimed at offering regular medical assistance to local communities in Southeast Asia. The Japanese described it as a way to promote the ‘smooth implementation of international disaster relief activities’ ( Japan Ministry of Defense 2013: 5). The Japanese interest in developing such a military profile is included in plans to enhance bilateral relations with other regional powers like Australia (Keir 2015: 2–3).18 Within this context, one of the most successful examples of how a disaster-relief activity furthered bilateral relations is the Japanese naval deployment in the Philippines in November 2013 in the aftermath of the typhoon Haiyan. A week after the disaster had struck the country, the BBC was reporting that more than 11 million people, some 10% of the population, had been affected. In some areas, approximately 90% of the housing had been destroyed – a total of 130,074 houses ruined, 544,606 people displaced, and 2.5 million people in need of food aid.19 In the first few hours following the disaster, Japanese authorities organized two medical teams including some fifty personnel and arranged for their immediate dispatch to the country. On 14 November, as the conditions in the country deteriorated, the JSDF were mobilized further and a joint task force was established to deploy some 1,100 personnel. This was the first time the Japanese had organized a joint task force to conduct a Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operation, and the ability to set it up quickly was a combination of prior experience and the lessons learned during the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake. The task force included the DDH Ise, and the landing ship Osumi, the former operating as a flagship. A replenishment-at-sea vessel supported the group. Throughout the deployment, it worked in close co-operation with other international militaries, notably with UK, US, and Australian units. The task-force contribution amounted to medical support to some 2,624 people, 11,924 vaccinations, an epidemic control, and the transport of 630 tons of food, medical, and other supplies ( Japan Ministry of Defense 2014). Support to a population in distress in areas with few basic facilities was a key contribution to avoid further loss of life and the spread of disease. Logistical transport by air and at sea, combined with the efforts of engineer and medical teams, allowed the Japanese response to be swift. The HADR was concluded a little less than a month later. Speed, co-ordination, and, above all, the availability of large expeditionary vessels capable of command and control functions, and of carrying a variety of amphibious and air assets, defined the meaningful nature of the contribution. The deployment was an important opportunity for relationship building, in stark contrast to the slow response offered by the main regional power, China.20 In addition to interactions with 165

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key partner navies, the size of the Japanese deployment – the largest deployment of this kind in postwar history, coupled with a series of aid initiatives – showcased a political willingness to enhance relations with the Philippines – 21 a willingness that required follow-up. In November 2014, President Benigno Aquino supported Prime Minister Abe’s policy for a Japan that is a ‘proactive contributor to peace’; he similarly commended Abe’s commitment to the respect of ‘rule of law’ in the China Seas. Prime Minister Abe, on his part, responded in kind announcing investment loans worth 20 million yen for a transportation development and flood-management projects.22 In 2016, the Japanese Prime Minister and the new Philippine President, Rodrigo Duterte, were still on track to enhance diplomatic relations. In April, when the DDH Ise returned to the Philippines in Subic Bay during a training mission, Japanese warships had already visited the Philippines two times since the beginning of the year as a way ‘to deepen the relationship with the Philippines’.23 In September, the two governments confirmed a deal to provide Manila with patrol vessels and to loan its armed forces up to five TC-90 aircraft, whilst just a month later President Duterte said he was open to military exercises between the two countries.24 This positive diplomatic trend was further confirmed in January 2017, when Prime Minister Abe became the first foreign leader to visit the Philippines under President Duterte, stressing the Japanese intention to counter China’s influence and maritime expansion in the region with an effective diplomacy that included maritime power as a prime delivery tool.25 These examples strongly suggest that strategy is more helpful than constitutional constraints in explaining the way Japanese naval power has been deployed in the region. The navy strategy of diplomatic engagement to assist regional state actors informed the way it built its reputation as a professional and benign force. This presence aimed at building relationships and was strengthened by Prime Minister Abe’s active political agenda, one that signaled Japan’s intention to play an active security role in regional affairs – from disaster relief to capacity building, from port calls to enhanced defense engagement. If regional security needed it, Japanese naval diplomacy proved the point that the country could be counted on to take part.

Enforcing good order at sea: the JMSDF counter-piracy activity Beyond the boundaries of Japan’s main theaters of the commitment strategy, the JMSDF has been engaged to preserve good order at sea for almost a decade. In 2008, the escalation in pirate activities off the coast of Somalia presented a dilemma that struck at the heart of the Japanese maritime strategy, given its emphasis on the importance of protecting sea-lanes from serious disruptions. As pirate attacks involved Japanese shipping, pressure from the business sector led to the government decision to dispatch two P-3C maritime patrol aircraft and two destroyers to join the international effort to counter piracy.26 In July 2009, the ‘Act of Punishment and Countermeasures against Piracy’ was further enacted to permit Japanese destroyers to escort ships of any nationality – not just Japanese ones – and the government leased base facilities in Djibouti to operate its aircraft on a regular and continuous basis. A year later, the Japanese navy was coordinating its escort activities with other actors, notably NATO and the EU. Indeed, in 2010, a NATO surface asset, working in conjunction with a Japanese helicopter, stopped an attack on the Greek-flagged ship Mv Anangal Innovation.27 Since 2009, the Japanese surface task force, officially called the ‘Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement’ (DSPE), has encompassed two destroyers, three helicopters, and an average of three rigid-hulled inflatable boats (RHIBs), for a total of approximately 400 crew members – including a small detachment of JCG officials.28 This represents one of the most substantial international contributions, one coupled by a similarly significant air-patrol effort. In an attempt to combine close escort with better maritime situational awareness, the JMSDF maintained 166

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a regular air-patrol schedule. Indeed, by 2014, Japanese air patrols had come to cover 60% of all surveillance flights in the Gulf of Aden, with operational tempos higher than any other navy there.29 Information gathered by the Japanese was accessible to naval forces operating in the area. Within flight zones determined in coordination with the Combined Task Force (CTF) 151, also known as the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC), Japanese aircraft had flown some 1,248 missions by the end of 2014, identifying approximately 102,200 vessels and providing information to patrolling vessels on some 10,300 occasions (Government of Japan 2015). In addition to proving the Japanese ability to operate a substantial surface and air task force away from regional shores for a sustained period of time, the other significant contribution of the experience in combating piracy was to interoperability and integration. In December 2013, Prime Minister Abe first raised with Vice Admiral John W. Miller, then Commander US Naval Forces Central Command, US Fifth Fleet and Combined Maritime Forces, the possibility of Japan taking command of CTF 151 as part of the country’s policy of ‘proactive contribution to peace’.30 In 2014, the JMSDF guidelines for the operations were modified to accommodate such an eventuality, and a first officer was sent to join CTF 151 staff. In 2015, Rear Admiral Hiroshi Ito was the first Japanese flag officer to take up responsibility for an international command, leading twenty-one officers from nine nations in the HQ in Bahrein.31 By then, Japanese interactions with other navies in the area had grown well beyond the realm of simple coordination or sharing of information. Japanese maritime power was at the heart of an international effort to guarantee good order at sea. This point was not lost on PM Abe. In 2014, whilst addressing the North Atlantic Council, he stressed how the counter-piracy mission represented a ‘touchstone’ in his country’s commitment to ‘defend the maritime order, including freedom of navigation’ and a symbol of a shared responsibility to promote ‘the rule of law on the world’s seas’ (Abe 2014a). Within NATO, the need to join forces to meet challenges to maritime governance underwrote the emphasis on maritime cooperation in the Individual Partnership and Cooperation Program (ICPC) with Japan. Shortly thereafter, under the aegis of the new framework, Japan and NATO forces conducted their first counter-piracy exercise, with the drills testing communication and tactical skills. Further, in 2015, the JMSDF Chief of Staff, Admiral Tomohisa Takei, became the first serving head of the Japanese navy to visit the NATO Maritime Command in Northwood to review the state of the cooperation.32 As one study recently remarked, the Japanese counter-piracy mission and the related quest for maintaining maritime governance offered an opportunity to the country to propel its security relations with actors other than the United States, notably NATO, into a new phase of enhanced cooperation (Patalano 2016: 45–6). Maintaining maritime security embodied the spirit of a more ‘proactive’ Japan, ‘protecting the seas’ rather than being merely protected by them. In so doing, Japanese maritime power was reaching beyond regional shores and testing its procedures and capabilities, whilst at the same time safeguarding international trade routes and consolidating Japanese role as a stakeholder contributing to international stability.

Conclusions: the boundaries of a maritime power? Japan is a maritime power with the capabilities today to meet its security requirements in a fastevolving and well-armed neighborhood. From within the confines of the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea, the Japanese defense posture is designed to deter invasions of offshore islands and possible missile attacks, whilst maintaining limited sea control in times of crisis to allow for counter interventions, alone or together with the United States. Beyond these regional boundaries, Japanese military power is deployed as a tool of relationship-building diplomacy – combining regular 167

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military exchanges and exercises with expeditionary missions for humanitarian and disaster-relief assistance. Similarly, it is poised to support maritime governance and stability to meet the goals of a Japan that ‘proactively contributes to peace’, as the government’s narrative has it. Such a military posture has been built over decades. The constitutional framework has set the broader boundaries for the use of force; strategy has guided the development of its capabilities and how they are used. Being a maritime power has not meant, for now, the possession of strike or projection capabilities. This has required a military posture that could fill in such a gap in an alternative fashion. At the national security level, the alliance with the United States represented a choice to supplement missing capabilities. This is clearly gauged in the current maritime posture, where a core component of Admiral Takei’s TGT strategy is designed to maintain sea control to protect Japanese sea-lanes as much as to allow for US military power in the western Pacific to be deployed if needed. This does not mean, however, that Japanese military power has forfeited the possibility to integrate greater strike power. An examination of Japanese force structure and capabilities – the development of the amphibious capability being the most recent example – shows that Japan possesses many of the building blocks to enhance its ‘punch’. Given current regional trends in the development of missile-strike capabilities, it is no coincidence that Japan is fully committed to jointly develop a sea-based missile defense system with the United States (Heginbotham 2015).33 The fleet is being modernized to be capable of intercepting missile attacks, whilst its submarine force could, in principle, be enhanced with missile-strike capabilities. The inherent flexibility and adaptability of maritime capabilities has allowed, and continues to allow, Japan to retain a posture that can be upgraded and enhanced in terms of strike and projection power if required. Does this mean that with a different constitution the country’s posture would have a significantly different military outlook? The maritime-centric nature of Japanese military power does not support such a conclusion. The alliance with the United States and the military support it provides is a factor of greater significance on the shape of the current posture. In the absence of a close military alliance, Japanese maritime posture would need to address the question of missing capabilities, either through alternative political arrangements or by changing the country’s military posture to introduce a greater degree of punch – from maritime conventional strike capabilities to a much more substantial amphibious and expeditionary components. Similarly, longrange air cover for fleet operations would raise the question of introducing aircraft carriers, or larger amphibious ships with the ability to project air power. As the alliance arrangements are being discussed with the new US administration, one option for Japan would be to invest more in defense precisely to enhance some of these components of its arsenal.34 Last but by no means least, the above considerations require us to address whether this reliance on the United States has limited the potential of Japanese military power in meeting the ambitions of Japanese foreign and security policies. Is Japan less militarily active than it could be because of the make-up of its defense posture? The examples offered in this chapter strongly suggest that this is not the case. Japan has maintained one of the most substantial and regular national contributions to the counter-piracy mission for the past eight years; it has enhanced its profile as a disaster-relief and military actor in Southeast Asia. Japan has been deploying its maritime assets from the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea to maintain maritime governance, support local populations, promote stability, and, in the process, enhance relations with key actors, from the Philippines to Australia to NATO. As a country with a great dependency on the international shipping routes connecting the Middle East to Northeast Asia, Japan has been present to meet challenges affecting them. Japanese naval diplomacy has focused less on coercive types of action – a fact especially worth pointing out in light of the continuing tensions in the key theater of the South China Sea. Nonetheless, it is again no coincidence that Japanese concerns over maritime tensions in the South China Sea have been politically vocal, and the government has not ruled out patrol 168

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activities to restate the importance of freedom of navigation on the high seas as a way to signal its interests and intentions to Beijing.35 In all, understanding Japanese military power requires an engagement with the strategy that underpins its development. This chapter has argued that such a strategy is maritime in nature and that it explains the nature of Japanese military capabilities and operations and their potential for policy action better than the existing normality–abnormality framework defined by the constitutional constraints. This is particularly true in light of the proactive nature of Prime Minister Abe’s government, one that has benefited from the flexibility of the country’s maritime-centric posture. Regional sea control and conventional deterrence in the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea and a more proactive military diplomacy and maritime security profile in the areas from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean have defined the ambition of a ‘proactive contributor’ to international peace and stability. In line with this argument, the future of Japanese military power is likely to remain a question to be examined within the context of its maritime strategy and maritime-centric military balance. In this respect, whether, and to what extent, missing capability gaps – currently provided for by the alliance with the United States – will be addressed is likely to remain a matter of strategy rather than normative constraints.

Notes 1 ‘Toyota Cuts UK Car Production Due to Parts Shortage’, BBC News, 20 April 2011. 2 Ibid. 3 Danielle Demetriou, ‘Energy Imports Push Japan Trade Deficit to Record High’, Telegraph, 27 January 2014. 4 ‘US Fills Gap in SDF to Watch N. Korea’, Japan Times, 30 December 2016; ‘Defense Budget Must Be Scrutinized for Cost Effectiveness’, Asahi Shimbun, 24 December 2016. 5 Brad Lendon, ‘US, Japan Conduct Successful Missile Intercept Test’, CNN News, 6 February 2017. 6 JMSDF Staff College, seminar discussion with the author, 20 September 2011. 7 Vice Admiral Tomohisa Takei, JMSDF, interview with the author, Tokyo, 12 September 2012. 8 Ibid. 9 Vice Admiral Izuru Fukumoto, JMSDF (Ret.), interview with the author, Tokyo, 30 September 2015. 10 Euan Graham, ‘Japan: The Salamander Stirs’, The Strategist – ASPI, 8 July 2013. 11 Vice Admiral Yoji Koda, JMSDF (Ret.), interview with the author, Tokyo, 25 September 2015. 12 Col Grant F. Newsham, USMCR, email exchange with the author, 6 October 2013. 13 Euan Graham, ‘Japan: The Salamander Stirs’, The Strategist – ASPI, 8 July 2013. Kirk Spitzer, ‘Japan Learns Anew How to Fight from the Sea’, Battleland – Time U.S., 27 June 2013, http://nation.time. com/2013/06/27/japan-learns-anew-how-to-fight-from-the-sea/. Kirk Spitzer, ‘A Nice Fit for Japan?’ Battleland – Time U.S., 17 June 2013, http://nation.time.com/2013/06/17/a-nice-fit-for-japan/ 14 Paul Kallender-Umezu, ‘Amphibious Focus, Joint Strategy Drive Japan’, Defence News, 11 May 2015. 15 Ibid. 16 Jiji, ‘Izumo to Serve as Command Ship’, Japan Times, 13 January 2014. 17 Carl Prine, ‘Camp Pendelton Marines Training with Japanese Forces’, The San Diego Union-Tribune, 7 February 2017. 18 Tomohiko Satake, ‘Japan and Australia Ramp Up Defence Engagement in the South China Sea’, East Asian Forum, 26 April 2016. 19 BBC News, ‘Typhoon Haiyan: Aid in Numbers’, 14 November 2013. 20 Greg Torode, ‘No Sign of Help for Philippines from China’s Hospital Ship’, Reuters, 15 November 2013. 21 Jeffrey Ordaniel, ‘Japanese Troops Return to the Philippines’, East Asian Forum, 27 November 2013. 22 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), ‘Japan–Philippines Summit Meeting’, 12 November 2014. 23 AFP-Jiji, ‘Japan Warship MSDF Vessel Visits Philippines as China Sea Row Festers’, Japan Times, 26 April 2016. 24 Robin Harding and Michael Peel, ‘Japan Provides Ships for Philippines to Help Counter China at Sea’, Financial Times, 6 September 2016; Kyodo, ‘Duterte Says Open to Idea of Military Exercises with Japan’, Japan Times, 27 October 2016. 169

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25 Robin Harding and Michael Peel, ‘Abe’s Visit to Philippines Highlights Contest for Influence with China’, Financial Times, 13 January 2017. 26 Rear Admiral Hiroshi Ito, JMSDF, interview with the author, Tokyo, 27 September 2016. 27 ‘NATO/Japan Cooperation in Gulf of Aden Disrupts Pirate Attack’, Atlantic Organization for Security (AOS), 16 August 2010, www.aofs.org/2010/08/16/nato-japan-cooperation-in-gulf-of-aden-disruptspirate-attack/ 28 Rear Admiral Hiroshi Ito, JMSDF, interview with the author, Tokyo, 27 September 2016. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. ‘Japan Makes History as It Takes the Lead to Combined Task Force 151’, Combined Maritime Forces, 2 June 2015, https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/2015/06/02/japan-makes-history-as-it-takes-thelead-of-combined-task-force-151/ 31 Rear Admiral Hiroshi Ito, JMSDF, interview with the author, Tokyo, 27 September 2016. 32 ‘NATO’s Allied Maritime Command Hosts Japan Maritime Self Defence Chief of Staff’, NATO Press Release, 30 September 2015, www.mc.nato.int/PressReleases/Pages/NATO%E2%80%99sAllied-Maritime-Command-Hosts-Japan-Maritime-Self-Defence-Force-Chief-of-Staff.aspx 33 Thomas Shugart, ‘Has China Been Practicing Pre-emptive Missile Strikes against U.S. Bases?’, War on the Rocks, 6 February 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/02/has-china-been-practicingpreemptive-missile-strikes-against-u-s-bases/?utm_content=buffer44f6d&utm_medium=social&utm_ source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer 34 US Department of Defense, ‘Joint Press Briefing by Secretary Mattis and Minister Inada in Tokyo, Japan’, Tokyo, 4 February 2017, www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/ 1071436/joint-press-briefing-by-secretary-mattis-and-minister-inada-in-tokyo-japan 35 Ankit Panda, ‘Japanese Defense Minister: Military “Will Not Be Sent” to the South China Sea Alongside US’, The Diplomat, 6 February 2017. Yuka Hayashi and Chieko Tsuneoka, ‘Japan Open to Joining US in South China Sea Patrols’, Wall Street Journal, 25 June 2015.

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Newsham, G. F. (2014) ‘Japanese Amphibious Development: The Bulldog and the Salamander’, Marine Corps Gazette: 72–5. Oros, A. L. (2007) Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice, Stanford: Stanford University Press. Ozawa I. (1994) Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation, Tokyo: Kodansha International. Pajon, C. (2017) ‘Japan’s Coast Guard and Maritime Self-Defense Force in the East China Sea: Can a Blackand-White System Adapt to a Grey-Zone Reality?’ Asia Policy, 23: 111–30. Parry, C. (2014) Super Highway: Sea Power in the 21st Century, London: Elliott & Thompson Limited. Patalano, A. (2008) ‘Shielding the “Hot Gates”: Submarine Warfare and Japanese Naval Strategy in the Cold War and Beyond (1976–2006)’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 31(6): 859–95. Patalano, A. (2011) ‘Japan’s Maritime Strategy’, RUSI Journal, 156(2): 82–9. Patalano, A. (2014a) ‘Japan as a Seapower: Strategy, Doctrine, and Capabilities under Three Defence Reviews’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 37(3): 403–41. Patalano, A. (2014b) ‘Seapower and Sino-Japanese Relations in the East China Sea’, Asian Affairs, 45(1): 34–54. Patalano, A. (2015) Post-war Japan as a Sea Power: Imperial Legacy, Wartime Experience, and the Making of a Navy, London, New York: Bloomsbury. Patalano, A. (2016) ‘Natural Partners in Challenging Waters?’ RUSI Journal, 161(3): 42–51. Patalano, A. (2017) ‘Naval Warfare’, in D. J. Galbreath and J. R. Deni (eds), Routledge Handbook of Defence Studies, Abingdon: Routledge. Pyle, K. B. (2007) Japan Rising. The Resurgence of Japan’s Power and Purpose, New York: Century Foundation Book, Public Affairs. Ru¨ger, J. (2007) The Great Naval Game: Britain and Germany in the Age of Empire, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Samuels, R. J. (2007) Securing Japan. Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Speller, I. (2014) Understanding Naval Warfare, Abingdon: Routledge. Tadokoro, M. (2011) ‘Change and Continuity in Japan’s “Abnormalcy”: An Emerging External Attitude of the Japanese Public’, in Y. Soeya, M. Tadokoro and D. A. Welch (eds), Japan as a ‘Normal Country’? A Nation in Search of Its Place in the World, Toronto: Toronto University Press, 38–71. Takei, T. (2008) ‘Kaiyou Shinkindai ni okeru Kaijoujieitai’ (The JMSDF in the New Maritime Era), Hatou, 11: 2–29. Till, G. (2009) Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, Abingdon: Routledge. Woolley, P. J. (2000) Japan’s Navy: Politics and Paradox, 1971–2000, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

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11 Disarmament and the non-proliferation policy of Japan Nobumasa Akiyama

Introduction: framing Japan’s disarmament and non-proliferation policy – four pillars and two dilemmas Since the advent of the nuclear age, Japan has existed in a dangerous geopolitical environment surrounded by nuclear armed states. A puzzle in understanding Japan’s disarmament and nonproliferation policy is why Japan did not go nuclear given this severe security situation. Another puzzle is how Japan reconciles its tragic experiences of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with its security realities. This chapter argues that the decision to remain non-nuclear was based on rational strategic calculations that included not only historical experiences and public sentiment but an agenda to proactively contribute to international peace and security and maintain a strong alliance with the United States. And it also argues that Japan’s disarmament and non-proliferation diplomacy has evolved, and continues to evolve, around the dilemma between the disarmament ideal and the security reality. Japan’s nuclear policy can best be explained by four pillars and two dilemmas. The four pillars are: 1) denuclearization under the three non-nuclear principles (hikaku san-gensoku), 2) advocating disarmament diplomacy, 3) reliance on US extended nuclear deterrence, and 4) promoting peaceful use of nuclear energy. The two dilemmas are the apparent contradiction between denuclearization and disarmament on the one hand and reliance on US extended nuclear deterrence as well as promotion of nuclear energy on the other. The “four pillars of nuclear policy” were first expressed in a policy speech by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato on January 30, 1968. The first pillar underlines Japan’s determination to forego the nuclear option as a means to defend itself. The three non-nuclear principles are “not to produce, not to possess and not to introduce nuclear weapons.” After Sato’s 1968 presentation of these principles, they were consolidated as a National Diet resolution in 1976, symbolizing the national commitment to a denuclearized security policy. The promotion of nuclear disarmament (the second pillar) is a projection of this commitment internationally, as Japan considers this its natural manifesto, given the tragic experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Japan has actively participated in multilateral-disarmament diplomacy, including the review processes of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), UN First Committee meetings, negotiations for and campaign for entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and others. 173

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At the same time, facing a serious security environment in East Asia, where four nuclear armed countries, Russia, China, North Korea, and the United States, are involved, Japan considers the US–Japan alliance as a cornerstone of its security policy. It is expected that the United States will provide Japan with extended deterrence including nuclear deterrent (third pillar) in order to deter attacks or aggression involving use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The last pillar is the active utilization of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Driven by energy needs, the Japanese nuclear energy sector has experienced consistent growth. Before the Fukushima nuclear accident following the Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11, 2011, fiftyfour commercial nuclear reactors were operating throughout Japan, and nuclear power covered 29% of electricity supply in Japan in 2010 (Shigen Enerugi Cho 2011). With its scarcity of natural resources, Japan has sought to increase its semi-autonomous energy supply through nuclear fuel cycle programs. A full-scale reprocessing plant was about to open when the Fukushima incident occurred but was stalled. The pursuit of these “four pillars” poses two dilemmas. The first is the two contradictory attitudes toward nuclear weapons: advocating nuclear disarmament and relying on US extended nuclear deterrence. The second is the relationship between Japan’s full-scale promotion of nuclear energy and its advocacy for nuclear non-proliferation. Japan is the only nation that has experienced the use of nuclear weapons in wartime. Hiroshima and Nagasaki suffered the loss of thousands of lives and unimaginable trauma. Survivors still endure sequelae, post-traumatic stress, and social discrimination. Compounded by the Daigo Fukuryu-maru (or Lucky Dragon No. 5) incident in 1955, where a Japanese fishing boat named Daigo Fukuryu-maru was exposed to radiation from the fallout from hydrogen bomb testing in the Bikini Atoll, anti-nuclear sentiments have become widespread across Japanese society. At the same time, since 1951, when Japan signed the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan (the US–Japan Security Treaty), the US’s extended deterrence has constituted an indispensable element of Japan’s security. In the early days of the Cold War, Japan was on the front line of defense in Asia against the expansionism of the Communist camp, and faced Soviet threats such as frequent patrols of Soviet strategic bombers and passage of Soviet strategic submarines through straits between the major Japanese islands of Hokkaido and Honshu. In addition, China conducted its first nuclear test in 1964, which was the beginning of the continued transformation of the strategic nuclear landscape in East Asia; and North Korea has played up nuclear crises since the early 1990s, with a series of nuclear and missile tests. Still, holding a significantly large constituency with a strong nuclear taboo at home and advocating nuclear disarmament abroad may seem to contradict a security policy that relies on a nuclear umbrella. The second dilemma was an apparent contradiction between the pursuit of nuclear fuel cycle policy and advocacy of nuclear non-proliferation. Under the current non-proliferation regime, peaceful use of nuclear technology must be pursued in tandem with non-proliferation. Japan is in full compliance with the comprehensive safeguards agreement and its additional protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and thus considered a ‘good student’ of the international non-proliferation regime. However, some view the stockpile of separated plutonium1 and enrichment and reprocessing capabilities as a potential threat to proliferation (Ota 2014). This stockpile is at least partly due to the pursuit of energy self-sufficiency, given scarce energy resources at home, which has led Japan to implement a nuclear fuel cycle policy.2 Dual-use technology such as enrichment of uranium and reprocessing of spent fuel is proliferation sensitive, and preventing the spread of such technologies through international export-controls regimes such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is an important part of the current nuclear non-proliferation regime. 174

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It is in this dangerous strategic environment, and with these historical, social, and material realities, that Japan promotes disarmament and non-proliferation in the international community, with full knowledge of these dilemmas.

Historical and societal roots of policies Political and economic foundation As Japan recovered from the devastation of World War Two, it made critical choices with regard to the political and economic principles that would shape its postwar state model. The first was the pacifist constitution. Article Nine of the constitution prohibits the use of force to resolve international conflict, and the second section of the Article can be read as prohibiting Japan’s possession of military forces. The second is the security alliance with the United States. When Japan signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty with the allied forces in 1951, through which Japan regained independence, it also signed the US–Japan Mutual Security Treaty. This made it clear that Japan had aligned itself with the United States, or the Western bloc, in the midst of an intensifying Cold War. The combination of the peace constitution and the US–Japan alliance led the way for Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida to choose a particular principle for postwar reconstruction. It was a policy orientation where Japan would refrain from investing in its own military forces, instead relying on the United States for its security, and focus its financial resources on economic growth. Yoshida chose an economy-first, internationalist, lightly armed state model as a principle of national strategy for postwar Japan. Since then, successive prime ministers have followed Yoshida’s choice, and this principle has come to be called the “Yoshida Doctrine” (Nagai 1985). In the midst of war weariness in the postwar period, the peace constitution was so well accepted by the public that the government faced strong social antipathy when it decided to upgrade the National Police Reserve (established in 1950 by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, or SCAP) into the National Safety Forces (later, Ground Self Defense Force) in 1952 in the wake of the Korean War. In fact, the constitution has become a critical impediment even to the build-up of Japan’s autonomous defense capability. (It should be noted that social opinion against the alliance with the United States was also strong, although nowadays the majority of the Japanese public views the alliance favorably.) The Yoshida Doctrine framed Japan’s nuclear policy as well as its foreign and defense policy in three ways. First, the Japanese government had to pursue a minimum, necessity-only defense capability to overcome a debate on the constitutionality of the Self Defense Forces. This would not necessarily mean a prohibition against nuclear weapons if, generally speaking, nuclear weapons could be considered a minimum defense capability. But combined with a nuclear taboo among the public, the non-nuclear option in defense policy was a natural choice. (It should be noted that in the early postwar period Japan was banned from conducting nuclear research by the Allied forces.) Second, as long as Japan tries to achieve its security through the Alliance, reliance on extended nuclear deterrence is inevitable. Third, after the ban on civilian nuclear activities was lifted in 1955, the strong orientation toward economic growth contributed to Japan eyeing nuclear energy as a means to combat the scarcity of energy resources and, thus, to develop cutting-edge nuclear technology. After experiencing energy crises in the 1970s, Japan was further inclined toward nuclear energy.

Societal foundation of Japan’s anti-nuclear attitudes A crucial factor that shapes Japan’s disarmament posture is the lived experience of nuclear bombings. Japan is the only nation that has suffered the use of nuclear weapons in wartime. 175

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Fatman, a gun-barrel-type atomic bomb which used highly enriched uranium as fission material, was dropped on the city of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, and had killed 140,000 people by the end of the month. Three days later, Little Boy, an implosion-type bomb with plutonium, was dropped on the city of Nagasaki, killing 100,000 people. This is in addition to those who died from radiation sickness and related diseases after this initial period. It can be said that the Japanese public antipathy to nuclear weapons originated from the harsh experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but the majority of Japanese society remained relatively unaware of the issue until the mid 1950s. In order for such tragic but limited experiences to become a strong nationally shared anti-nuclear sentiment, there needed to be a catalytic event. It was the Daigo Fukuryu-maru incident in March 1954 that upscaled this anti-nuclear sentiment into a national movement against nuclear weapons. A grassroots signature movement by a housewives’ reading society started as a consumers’ movement, triggered by concerns over radiation contamination of tuna fish from the South Pacific. It rapidly developed into a nationwide movement against atomic and hydrogen bombs, and by the end of 1954, more than 20 million signatures had been collected against nuclear weapons. The movement played a catalytic role in transforming tragic experiences and memories known only among a limited portion of the community into a national experience and memory (Fujiwara 1991). A nationwide anti-nuclear organization, the Gensuikyo (the Japan Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs), was formed in 1955 to support victims of atomic bombs. The establishment of the Gensuikyo helped the experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to become perceived by many Japanese as a national tragedy caused by nuclear weapons. This big social movement against nuclear weapons naturally turned into a political issue. In April 1955, both the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors passed a resolution urging the international management of atomic energy and the prohibition of nuclear weapons. The proposal of the resolution states: We are the only nation in the world that knows the fear of nuclear weapons. Hence our nation has a reason to possess the sublime obligation to save the human race from the destruction by nuclear weapons, and have the largest voice on it.3 This resolution marked the beginning of a process of consolidating and institutionalizing a ‘nuclear taboo’ in Japanese politics. Ironically, it was when politics became involved in the anti-nuclear movement that it started to decline. In the beginning, the anti-nuclear movement involved a wide spectrum of political forces ranging from communists to conservatives. But ‘politicization’ caused its eventual split. The movement accepted support from socialist and communist parties, which led conservative politicians to leave the movement, and it was further split over recognition of Soviet nuclear weapons.4 The public did not want to involve themselves in ideological confrontations among political parties. The movement was successful in its initial stages because it eschewed any political elements, which made it possible to rally the masses to support the anti-nuclear posture. In other words, by possessing particular political and ideological propensities, these organizations lost their function as a mechanism to empower widespread public sentiment as a political force. In 1958, Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi stated that Japan would follow a policy of not possessing nuclear weapons, while simultaneously promoting an interpretation of the Constitution that did not prohibit the possession of nuclear weapons if they were defensive in nature.5 He reaffirmed the no-nuclear policy in 1960, saying that Japan would not have nuclear weapons and not let nuclear weapons be introduced into Japanese territory by the United States.6 176

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Development of Japan’s commitment to a multilateral non-proliferation regime During World War Two, Japan conducted research to acquire nuclear weapons. But the research remained at a preliminary level and never succeeded (Yamazaki 2001). After the defeat, the SCAP prohibited Japan from conducting any nuclear-related research and activities. However, a policy shift occurred in response to a new US policy toward international nuclear cooperation. In 1953, President Dwight Eisenhower delivered a speech, titled “Atoms for Peace” at the UN General Assembly.7 The concept of “Atoms for Peace” consisted of two pillars, namely seeking multilateral control of nuclear technology to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and sharing the benefit of nuclear technology for peace and prosperity of humankind.8 After the speech, the United States changed its policy for the management of nuclear technology. Formerly, nuclear technology was exclusively held by national nuclear laboratories, but from 1954 the US government made nuclear technology available for private corporations to utilize it for commercial purposes. The prohibition of international technology transfer was also lifted, and the United States provided technical cooperation in the civilian nuclear field with various countries. As the United States became engaged with international nuclear cooperation, Japan’s nuclear activity was restarted. The Japanese government allocated a budget for research activities in nuclear science and technology in 1954, for the first time in the postwar period, and nuclear research activities restarted with the enactment of the Nuclear Basic Law in 1955, which stipulated principles for Japanese nuclear activities9. As part of an extensive US campaign for peaceful nuclear cooperation, Japan and the United States concluded the US–Japan Agreement for Cooperation Concerning the Civil Use of Atomic Energy in November 1955. Based on this, the United States provided a research reactor to Japan, and it went critical in August 1957. Japan also introduced its first power reactor from General Electric in 1958, the operation of which started in 1963. After that, Japanese nuclear energy programs rapidly expanded, by introducing light-water reactors, whose technology was mostly American in origin. Another important product of “Atoms for Peace” was the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957. Embodying two fundamental ideas of “Atoms for Peace,” namely the promotion of international exchange and cooperation for peaceful use of nuclear energy and the prevention of diversion of such nuclear activities (materials) into military purposes, or prevention of nuclear proliferation, it has functioned as a nuclear “watchdog” to guardian nuclear non-proliferation. Japan is a founding member of the IAEA and naturally subscribes to these principal ideas. A further key institution that has shaped the global non-proliferation and disarmament order is the NPT. The NPT constitutes the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime. It was open to signature in 1968 and entered into force in March 1970. Japan signed it in February 1970 and ratified it in 1976. During the period when the NPT was negotiated, the government of Japan had two major concerns, which caused the delay in Japan’s signing the treaty. The first was that the accession to the NPT might bind Japan’s choices in security policy, namely closing a window for a nuclear option. Such a commitment gave Japan pause due to China’s successful nuclear test in 1964. The second concern was the arrangement on safeguards, which required reporting and verification to avoid misuse of civilian nuclear materials. Japan considered the safeguards obligation under Article 3 of the NPT to be a consolidation of inequality in obligations and a potential obstacle to peaceful use of nuclear technology. Japanese industry also considered that intrusive safeguards could be used for industrial espionage. Watching closely how safeguards were treated in the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), as well as West Germany’s decision to accept the safeguards obligation, Japan 177

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decided to sign the treaty in February 1970, just before the entry-into-force of the NPT. It took almost another seven years before Japan ratified the NPT, due to some reluctance among the domestic audience to accept the legal inequality in the treaty with regard to the nuclear option and potential restrictions over peaceful use of nuclear energy, which could bind Japan’s future nuclear policy.

Responses to changes in the strategic environment in Asia From the 1960s to the 1970s, the strategic environment in Asia was drastically changed by three critical events, namely China’s acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1964, the so-called “Nixon shock” (the US indication of retreat from Asia and surprise visits by US National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and President Richard Nixon to China in 1971–2), and India’s “peaceful nuclear explosion” or de facto nuclear test in 1974.10 The major changes in US foreign policy toward Asia caused a concern on the Japanese side of the US commitment to extended deterrence. Another concern for Japan was the reversal of the US attitude toward nuclear fuel cycle, prompted by India’s nuclear test in 1974. With a view to strengthening nuclear non-proliferation, the United States tightened the control over proliferation-sensitive fuel cycle technology, which affected Japan’s nuclear energy policy.

Policy reactions to the changing strategic landscape in Asia In October 1964, China conducted a successful atomic bomb test in Xinjiang Province. China also succeeded in developing delivery systems, demonstrating, in 1966, that a Dongfu 2 missile, loaded with a nuclear warhead with U235, could be delivered to a testing site. The following year, China conducted its first hydrogen bomb test, which also turned out to be successful. This made China the fifth nuclear power in the world. China’s acquisition of a nuclear capability triggered Japan’s security concerns. It also promoted voices arguing for Japan to develop a nuclear option to counter China’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. But this did not become a mainstream argument. Rather, the resilience of the antinuclear policy was demonstrated in Japan’s reaction to the first Chinese nuclear test. Despite the rise of security concerns, Japan did not publicly call for the pursuit of the nuclear option. Privately, this possibility was discussed. In December 1964, according to US Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer, Prime Minister Sato expressed that “his views coincided with those expressed to him by British PM Wilson that if the other fellow had nuclears it was only common sense to have them oneself.”11 The United States responded to this with the reassurance of its provision of extended nuclear deterrence. Two weeks after the conversation, President Lyndon B. Johnson told Prime Minister Sato that “if Japan needs our nuclear deterrent for its defense the United States would stand by its commitment and provide that defense.”12 But at the same time, Sato was aware of a strong sentiment among the Japanese public against nuclear weapons. Asked by Secretary of State Dean Rusk about the magnitude of change in Japanese public opinion due to China’s nuclear test, he replied that, because of this strong antinuclear sentiment and a sense of security provided by the United States, the majority of Japanese felt that Japan should never possess nuclear weapons.13 This led Sato to state to the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives in 1967, “we have clearly said that we do not produce, possess nor allow the introduction of nuclear weapons,” during deliberations on a bill on the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese administrative control, where the issue of American possession of nuclear weapons in Okinawa was critical.14 178

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Despite this, in the late 1960s, after China’s nuclear acquisition, the Japanese government secretly examined the possibility of a nuclear option. The Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office (Naikaku Chosa Shitsu) commissioned a research group, named Minshushugi Kenkyukai (Study Group on Democracy), to examine the feasibility of the nuclear option. The group completed the first part of its secret report in 1968 and the second part in 1970. The first part reviewed technical and economic issues, and the second part reviewed strategic, diplomatic, and political issues. The report concluded that if Japan armed itself with nuclear weapons, it would cause a tremendous negative impact in international politics, and the effectiveness of national security would significantly diminish (Minshushugi Kenkyukai 1968, 1970). It was not publicized because of three reasons, namely a strong anti-nuclear sentiment among the Japanese public, the prospect of the renewal of the US–Japan security treaty, and concerns about hysterical responses from the Japanese media (Kase 2001). Although it is not clear to what extent this internal report affected the actual decision on Japan’s nuclear option, it is important to note that its analysis was shared by senior staff members in the Prime Minister’s office and relevant ministries. Several other views against the nuclear option were expressed. Atsuhiko Yatabe, a diplomat who was involved in negotiation for the NPT, indicated the irrationality of Japan competing with China in nuclear armament (Yatabe 1971). Yasuhiro Nakasone, then Minister of State for Defense, who was known to be a nationalist politician and later became prime minister, launched a study in 1970 to examine Japan’s nuclear option based on Japan’s technical capabilities and financial situation as well as other conditions. According to his memoir, his study, emphasizing that it was experimental in nature, concluded that, while it would be possible for Japan to have nuclear arms within five years at a cost at the time of 200 billion yen, since the country could not secure a test site due to the scarcity of land, it would have been impossible (Nakasone 2004). While there was certainly public discourse on the nuclear option, studies within the government in that period concluded that a non-nuclear security policy would be preferred.

The reassurance of the US extended nuclear deterrence in a changing strategic landscape Japan made its international legal commitment to forego the nuclear option by signing the NPT in February 1970 in the midst of the transition of US policy. It took almost seven years before it ratified the treaty in 1976. This seven-year gap between signature and ratification of the NPT can be explained by changes in US policy toward Asia, and the subsequent process of mutually reassuring US security commitments. In Guam in July 1969, President Richard Nixon stated, “we must avoid the kind of policy that will make countries in Asia so dependent upon us that we are dragged into conflicts such as the one we have in Vietnam.”15 Nixon’s remarks clearly outlined a US retreat from Asia and encouraged self-supporting efforts by Asian countries in their own defense. Furthermore, Nixon’s visit to China in February 1972 surprised US Asian allies, including Japan. Later that year, the United States and China stated in the Shanghai Communique that they would pursue the normalization of relations.16 This Guam Doctrine and the change in America’s policy toward China aroused fear of abandonment among US allies in Asia. Due to doubts as to the reliability of the US security assurance, South Korea and Taiwan began to consider the nuclear option. Although the Japanese government signed the NPT in 1970, there were cautious views in Japan on the ratification of the NPT, due to the discriminatory nature of the treaty (in particular on the nuclear option) as well as potential restrictions on the peaceful use of nuclear technology. In the Diet, a group of nationalist politicians in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party expressed 179

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their reluctance to ratify this unequal treaty, which might close a window for a future nuclear option for Japan. The voice against ratification was not the majority, but it was still large enough to be a veto power (Solingen 2010). Reportedly, Nixon suggested to Sato that the United States would not exert pressure on Japan to ratify the NPT and that “Japan might take its time, and thus keep any potential enemy concerned.”17 Behind this attitude of the United States was a balance-of-power-type strategic calculation. Nixon and Kissinger predicted that a potential nuclear Japan could scare China and force it toward the United States. On Japan’s side, the reversion of Okinawa was Sato’s most important agenda in his foreign policy. A major issue in the bilateral negotiation was whether the US nuclear forces would be removed at the time of return. In Okinawa, the United States had deployed both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, and these nuclear forces played an important role in the US nuclear deterrent. Backed by strong public opinion, Sato sought kaku nuki henkan (or return of a no-nuke Okinawa). The Nixon administration, meanwhile, had hoped for the maintenance of “essential elements governing US military use,” including “emergency storage and transit rights” of nuclear weapons. The Japanese and US governments disagreed on the “introduction” of nuclear weapons, which was stipulated in the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. After a series of tough negotiations, the two governments secretly agreed that while officially maintaining a no-introduction policy, US nuclear weapons could be “introduced” in case of emergencies.18 (Wakaizumi 1994). The issue of nuclear introduction at the reversion of Okinawa was the result of strengthened public antipathy to nuclear weapons, which can be characterized as a ‘nuclear allergy.’ This implies that people do not take a stance on nuclear policy based on thorough debate on and consideration of the pros and cons of nuclear options. Those who argue in favor of the nuclear option often contend that the ‘nuclear taboo’ even inhibits debate on the nuclear option; some ridicule the Three Non-Nuclear Principles as actually Four non-nuclear principles, including prohibition on debate over nuclear weapons. However, if the ‘nuclear taboo’ in Japan is solely the result of such an ‘allergy,’ Japan’s nonnuclear choice has a rather fragile foundation. In reality, as seen above, Japan’s non-nuclear choice in the 1960s and 1970s was the conclusion of rational strategic considerations, which provide it with a resilient foundation. Even in the midst of the deterioration of the political relationship with China, Japan did not react to such a dramatic change of the strategic landscape with the pursuit of nuclear weapons. Instead it chose to reaffirm and strengthen the alliance with the United States, rather than seeking a national nuclear capability.

The shift in US non-proliferation policy and Japan’s nuclear fuel cycle program In the midst of changes in US policy toward Asia, combined with the trend of nuclear proliferation in the wake of China’s nuclear test in 1964 and India’s test in 1974, Japan acted to reaffirm the US commitment to providing extended nuclear deterrence through strengthening the alliance rather than pursuing independent defense capabilities, i.e. the nuclear option. But the same changes in the strategic environment brought a divergence between Japan and the United States in non-proliferation approaches, especially over the management of fuel cycle technology. While Japan sought a self-sustained nuclear fuel cycle program, the United States changed its policy to forego a civilian nuclear fuel cycle program and to dissuade other countries from pursuing them. Japan’s nuclear fuel cycle program became a major contentious issue between the two governments. 180

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In the 1970s, Japan experienced two energy crises. Geopolitical crises in the Middle East, combined with rising nationalism over natural resources in the region and beyond, caused prices of fossil-fuel resources to increase sharply. This was followed by drastic inflation in the Japanese economy. At that time, more than 90% of oil consumed in Japan came from the Middle East. The two energy crises, or ‘oil shocks,’ made Japan aware of the vulnerability of dependence on external sources for energy. The nuclear fuel cycle, if completed, would reduce Japan’s reliance on foreign sources of energy, because plutonium separated from spent fuel could be reused for mixed oxide (MOX) fuel. In September 1977, a reprocessing plant in Tokai-mura, Ibaraki, the construction of which had started before these crises, began a hot-testing process using spent fuel from a reactor of the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (later the Japan Atomic Energy Agency). In the meantime, the United States was in the process of transforming its non-proliferation policy. Shocked by India’s nuclear test, or “peaceful explosion,” in 1974, which used plutonium separated from the spent fuel of a CANDU reactor supplied by Canada, and heavy water supplied by the United States, the US government was moving toward tightening restrictions on the transfer and utilization of nuclear technology, in particular fuel cycle technology. In response, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was established, with seven initial members including Japan. The NSG established guidelines for peaceful nuclear transfer “not to be diverted to a nuclear fuel cycle without safeguards or to nuclear explosions.” Also, the Nuclear NonProliferation Act (NNPA) was enacted in 1978. Regarding the nuclear cooperation described in Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the new act stipulated that the nine requirements pertaining to nuclear non-proliferation must be satisfied for cooperation with non-nuclearweapons states (NNWSs). This included the requirement of advance consent by the United States for enriching or reprocessing nuclear materials transferred from the United States, the application of IAEA comprehensive safeguards, the right of the United States to demand the return of any nuclear materials or those portions of subsequent generation that were used in a nuclear explosion or that had been in breach of IAEA safeguards, and the right of the United States to advance consent regarding retransfer to a third country. The US government also tried to dissuade the international community from using reprocessing technology. It tried to stop the operation of the reprocessing plant at Tokai-mura, Japan, based on the right of advance consent stipulated by the Japan–US nuclear cooperation agreement – that is to say, on US consent for the reprocessing of nuclear fuel originating in the United States. After negotiations with Japan, Washington finally allowed Japan to operate the reprocessing plant in exchange for certain concessions, including the limitation of plutonium separation (Tomotsugu 2009). This process meant Japan was well aware of the criticality of full compliance and cooperation with the IAEA as well as with the United States in demonstrating that Japan’s nuclear programs were exclusively for peaceful purposes and operated without any breach of safeguards agreements. Japan tried promoting its own image as an “honors student” within the nuclear non-proliferation regime, by strictly complying with the NPT, the IAEA Statute, and the safeguards agreement. In the 1980s, while the United States did not publicly comment on potential proliferation threats arising from friendly countries’ nuclear activities, recognizing the importance of alliances and respecting independence and flexibility of their nuclear programs, there were strong voices advocating the strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation globally. At that time, Japan and the United States were negotiating a renewal of the Japan–US Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (revised in 1988). The main issue was whether or not the United States would recognize Japan with an “advance consent arrangement” (Endo 2014).19 The negotiation was difficult. Within the US government, there was a divide between a group that placed importance on the Japan–US 181

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alliance and a group that placed importance on the principle of nuclear non-proliferation. The latter was reluctant to grant advanced consent to Japan. Eventually, with President Ronald Reagan’s preference for the alliance over non-proliferation, it was decided to recognize an “advanced consent arrangement” with Japan. The negotiation over the renewal of the bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement became an occasion to reaffirm both the alliance commitments and non-proliferation commitments of the two countries. The combination of the alliance and non-proliferation became even more critical as the United States increasingly paid attention to non-proliferation in the later period.

Shifting international priorities: from disarmament to non-proliferation The end of the Cold War raised worldwide expectations of a ‘dividend of peace.’ As the bipolar confrontation with huge nuclear arsenals came to be dramatically relaxed, the United States and the Soviet Union (later Russia) agreed on the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), which was to sharply reduce the number of nuclear warheads and delivery systems. It raised the expectation, particularly within civil society, for further advancement of global nuclear disarmament. However, other critical threats arose. Cases of Iraqi clandestine nuclear development (which was revealed after the Gulf War), the North Korean nuclear program, and loose nukes from former Soviet states made nuclear proliferation a higher international security priority. After the disappointment of failing to meet international expectations (especially that of the United States) in its contribution to the Gulf War, Japan, which had achieved economic development, sought a more proactive commitment to international society, including in the area of security. Japan dispatched its Self Defense Forces to UN peacekeeping operations in Cambodia in 1992, sending its forces abroad for the first time since World War Two. Japan also began to seek a permanent seat at the UN Security Council from the mid 1990s. Promoting nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation also constituted an important part of Japan’s cooperation and contribution to international peace and prosperity (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 1991). In multilateral arenas such as the United Nations and NPT, Japan has been actively engaged in dialogues and negotiations on nuclear disarmament. Japan has been hosting UN conferences on disarmament affairs since 1988, as first announced by Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita at a special session on disarmament of the UN General Assembly. Japan has also sponsored UN resolutions on the total elimination of nuclear weapons since 1994 – every year, the Japanese resolution has gained overwhelming majority support – and been an enthusiastic advocate of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) since its negotiation. With regard to the extension of the NPT in 1995, Japan made an early commitment to supporting its indefinite extension. Although Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa had expressed reservations about unconditional indefinite extension in light of concerns over the consolidation of inequality, Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa, who succeeded Miyazawa, expressed support for the indefinite extension soon after his inauguration. During the negotiation for the extension, Japan supported strengthening the review process for the accountability of nuclear-weapons states (NWSs) in their commitment to nuclear disarmament. The Japanese government also linked its official development assistance (ODA) with its disarmament and non-proliferation policy objectives. The ODA Charter of 1992 stated the principle of paying close attention to the trend of development and production of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles as well as the arms trade. In 1995, Japan suspended its ODA to China after it conducted a nuclear test. The following year, with China’s declaration of a moratorium on nuclear testing and signing of the CTBT, Japan resumed its assistance to China (DiFilippo 2006). 182

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However, from the late 1990s to early 2000s, the international security environment became more challenging for Japan’s promotion of disarmament, as the proliferation of WMD and terrorism were perceived to pose graver threats to the international community. This perception has become much clearer in the wake of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (hereafter 9/11 terrorist attacks). In 1998, India conducted a nuclear test, and Pakistan followed. Japan suspended its economic cooperation, applying its ODA Charter principle, as mentioned above. The crisis in South Asia also triggered the launch by the Japanese government of the Tokyo Forum, a ‘wise men’ committee to discuss how to advance nuclear disarmament and strengthen non-proliferation. But these efforts were overshadowed by the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Prioritizing the prevention of proliferation to non-state actors and the campaign against terrorists (or ‘war on terrorism’), the United States decided to engage Pakistan (for fighting against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan) as well as India. Japan under Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi chose to stand by the United States, and Japan resumed its economic cooperation with the South Asian countries. In addition, Prime Minister Koizumi, who made it clear that partnering with the United States was a priority in his foreign policy, expressed support for the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) announced by President George W. Bush in 2003 and proactively participated in its activities. Meeting US expectations and joining the campaign to strengthen non-/counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism, which was reflected in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review of the United States, Japan gained stronger reassurance of the US commitment to extended deterrence (even if it was not a primary reason for the policy choice).

The rise of humanitarian discourse and deepening disarmament dilemma In April 2009, President Barack Obama made a speech in Prague on a world free of nuclear weapons, raising the expectation of further acceleration in nuclear disarmament. Japan perceived it as an opportune moment to resolve its dilemma of nuclear disarmament and security. On April 27, 2009, three weeks after Obama’s Prague Speech, then Foreign Minister, Yasufumi Nakasone, made a speech on Japan’s nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation policy, in which he identified “eleven benchmarks” in three areas, namely nuclear disarmament measures by nucleararmed states, multilateral disarmament diplomacy, and measures to support countries in the peaceful use of nuclear technology. The items listed in this policy speech were mostly practical measures to enhance the process of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, such as the leadership role of the United States and Russia, the transparency and irreversibility of nuclear disarmament, verification, a nuclear test ban, a weapon-usable-fissile-material-production ban, countering nuclear terrorism, and so on. However, the international discourse on nuclear disarmament moved in a rather challenging direction for Japan. Japan’s disarmament diplomacy remains facing an old dilemma between the continued reliance on US extended nuclear deterrence and the ethical argument on nuclear weapons. This is even more so as the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons have become sharply highlighted in the international debate over nuclear disarmament. The process of drafting the Nuclear Posture Review of 2010 in the United States again raised concerns in the Japanese government over the credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence. In particular, given North Korea’s nuclear, chemical, and biological weapon capabilities, Japan had concerns over whether the “sole purpose” of nuclear weapons, limiting its role in deterring nuclear attacks, would be employed, and asked for the reaffirmation of a US commitment to extended nuclear deterrence (Akiyama 2015). 183

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This took place while international forums on nuclear disarmament were becoming more inclined toward the abolition of nuclear weapons. The 2010 NPT Review Conference, for the first time, referred to humanitarian concerns in its final document. A series of conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons began with a meeting in Oslo in March 2013, followed by one in Nayarit, Mexico, in February 2014, and a third one in Vienna in December 2014. This movement raised expectations of a legal ban on nuclear weapons. A large number of NNSWs and civil society moved toward the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-ban treaty, which would prohibit the use and threat of use, possession, and production of nuclear weapons. Japan, which dispatched a delegation of government and civil-society representatives to these conferences, did not join the negotiation after making remarks at the beginning of the negotiation in March 2017. The international community became divided over the issue. Nuclear-armed states and so-called umbrella states, including Japan, which were under US extended nuclear deterrence, were rather cautious about an immediate legal ban on nuclear weapons as they faced what they considered existential nuclear threats. Japan’s dilemma is seen symbolically in the government’s 2013 decision to join two similar, but different, joint statements on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. One statement sponsored by New Zealand, with more than a hundred cosponsors, stated that it is “in the interest of the very survival of humanity that nuclear weapons are never used again, under any circumstances (emphasis added).”20 Another resolution sponsored by Australia, and joined by seventeen states, mostly allies of the United States, noted the importance of recognizing the security dimension as well as the humanitarian one in the nuclear weapons debate.21 The difference between the two statements is whether to consider the security dimension of nuclear weapons, implying that the use of nuclear weapons should not be excluded when the very survival of the state is at stake. Japan was the only state that signed both statements. Japan has led the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), a group of NNWSs from diverse geographical backgrounds and diverse disarmament priorities, to steadily promote the agenda of the final document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, with a view to working with both NWSs and NNWSs and bridging a divided nuclear-disarmament trend. A speech by Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida in January 2014 describes the Japanese government’s approach to nuclear disarmament.22 Based on two premises, namely a clear understanding of the humanitarian aspects of the use of nuclear weapons and the need to balance this with measures to address the severe security environment, Japan recognizes that nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament are “inseparable like ‘two wheels of a cart’” and that they must be tackled in tandem. Non-proliferation policy prioritizes “Three Preventions”: (1) prevention of the emergence of new NWSs, (2) prevention of the proliferation of nuclearweapons-related materials and technologies, and (3) prevention of nuclear terrorism. With regard to nuclear disarmament, as realistic and concrete steps toward “a world free of nuclear weapons,” Japan advocates “Three Reductions”: (1) reduction of the number of nuclear weapons, (2) reduction of the role of nuclear weapons, and (3) reduction of the incentive for possession of nuclear weapons. Japan – reaffirming the NPT, pursuing three pillars of the NPT (non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful use of nuclear technology) in a balanced manner, and identifying its role as bridging the gap between NWSs and NNWSs – advocates a step-by-step approach that it believes to be more realistic than seeking the legal ban of nuclear weapons, which Japan views as too drastic for NWSs to accept. In the meantime, to cope with the tougher security environment in East Asia, Japan continues to place importance on the US–Japan alliance. The role of extended nuclear deterrence remains a vital part of its security strategy while Japan upgrades its capability against nuclear attacks, such as 184

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missile defense systems, and its capability to respond to conventional contingencies such as conflicts over disputed islands. One may argue that Japan’s continued reliance on US extended nuclear deterrence in its security policy contradicts Japan’s posture to advocate the increased awareness of the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, deriving from the experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and to urge the world to make more efforts for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In other words, one may say that to pursue both constitutes a “double standard.” However, the reliance on US extended nuclear deterrence is a strategically rational measure to respond to present security needs, while advocating for the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons is a measure to establish a common basis for various approaches to nuclear disarmament and sustain such efforts for the long term. Japan’s choice of a non-nuclear option is strategic rather than emotional, and the basic assumption that US extended nuclear deterrence is more effective than national nuclear deterrence has not significantly changed. As long as the commitments by both Japan and the United States are reaffirmed by each other, Japan’s rational choice of a non-nuclear option will be maintained. In addition, Japan’s nuclear choice has not only been rational but adaptive. Japan has not been particularly proactive in setting conditions for nuclear disarmament but has adapted its security policy to the changing environment. Thus, it can be assumed that the essential conditions for Japan choosing a nuclear option would be when Japan believes, first, that the US–Japan alliance can no longer match the expansion of Chinese military capabilities and, second, that the United States no longer intends to maintain the credibility of extended deterrence, in particular with regard to its nuclear element. In order to avoid such a situation, confidence-building actions should be pursued which would lead to nuclear-threat reduction with China and reassurance that the United States will continue its deterrence strategy. Non-military measures such as diplomacy and dialogue should be used to seek a common understanding on the modality of a stable strategic relationship among major players in East Asia, in particular the United States, China, and Japan. For the time being, Japan must pursue the improvement of its security environment and promote conditions less reliant on nuclear weapons, while ensuring US involvement in the security of Asia, including alliance commitment and the reassurance of US extended deterrence. Japan’s disarmament dilemma can be solved through seeking the best mix of reinforcing norms of non-use of nuclear weapons at the global level and nuclear-threat reduction with confidencebuilding measures at the regional level.

Notes 1 As of 2016, Japan keeps 10 tons of separated plutonium at home, and 37 tons abroad. The overwhelming majority of these stockpiles is not weapon-usable, and all stockpiles are fully declared and put under IAEA safeguards. 2 Another view is that even though Japan does not have the intention to build a nuclear arsenal, its spentfuel-management policy failed. cf. Lewis (2014). 3 The Diet Record, House of Representatives, Plenary Session, April 2, 1954. 4 The Gensuikin (Japan Congress Against A- and H-Bombs) was formed in 1965, to argue that “human beings and ‘nukes’ can never be compatible” (www.gensuikin.org/english/). They were supported by a labor movement that backed the Socialist Party of Japan. On the other hand, Gensuikyo (Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs) received support from the Communist Party of Japan and recognized Soviet nuclear weapons as good because they countered US imperialism. 5 The Diet Record, the Diet Committee, House of Councillors, April 18, 1958. 6 The Diet Record, the Special Committee on Japan–US Security Treaty, House of Representatives, April 19, 1960. 185

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7 Address by Mr. Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States of America, to the 470th Plenary Meeting of the UN General Assembly, December 8, 1953, www.iaea.org/about/history/atoms-forpeace-speech, accessed May 10, 2017. 8 “Atoms for Peace” provided a conceptual framework for the international nuclear order, both to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation and to promote peaceful use of nuclear technology through international cooperation. It led to the establishment of the IAEA in 1957. 9 Gensuiryoku Kihon Ho (the Nuclear Basic Law) is considered a legal basis for the prohibition of a Japanese nuclear option, by limiting the use of nuclear energy to peaceful purposes. 10 It used to be considered that a nuclear explosion could be utilized for civilian purposes such as large-scale civil-engineering projects. India claimed its nuclear explosion was for such a peaceful purpose. 11 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 2, Japan, Document 37 Telegram from the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State, December 29, 1964, National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 JAPAN. Secret; Limdis., https:// history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p2/d37#fn1, accessed May 10, 2017. 12 Memcon, Sato, Johnson, et al., January 12, 1965, NSF, Country File, Japan, 1/11-14/65 Sato’s Visit Memo & Cables, Box 253, CBJL, in Kurosaki (2006), 57, 191. 13 Some argue that Sato’s comments were intended to strengthen the US commitment to its extended nuclear deterrence rather than expressing an interest in a national nuclear option. Cf. Haruna, 2008. 14 The Diet Record, the Budget Committee, House of Representatives, December 11, 1967. This policy was further consolidated by the Diet resolution on the Three Non-Nuclear Principles in 1976. 15 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969– 1972, Office of the Historian, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d29, accessed May 10, 2017. 16 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Office of the Historian, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d203, accessed May 10, 2017. 17 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972, Office of the Historian, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/ frus1969-76ve02/d58, accessed May 10, 2017. 18 US nuclear weapons had actually been ‘introduced’ prior to the secret agreement on the introduction of nuclear weapons after the reversion of Okinawa. Based on the US ‘not-to-confirm, nor not-to-deny’ (NCND) policy, the two governments did not clarify whether US vessels and aircrafts entered Japanese territories with nuclear weapons. The official position of the Japanese government was that prior consultations between the two governments were required for the introduction of nuclear weapons, but the Japanese government had never been consulted by the US government. Therefore, there had been no case of introduction. But former senior US officials revealed that there had been cases. 19 With “advance consent arrangement,” the United States allows states that receive US-origin materials and technology to use them without obtaining permission from the United States for every program that uses such materials and technology. It allows those recipient states to have more flexibility in their nuclear programs. 20 ‘UNGA 68: First Committee Joint Statement on the Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons’, delivered by Ambassador Dell Higgle of New Zealand, October 21, 2013, www.mofa.go.jp/ mofaj/files/000017499.pdf, accessed May 10, 2017. 21 ‘Joint Statement on the Humanitarian Consequence of Nuclear Weapons’, delivered by Ambassador Peter Woolcott of Australia, at UNGA68 First Committee, October 21, 2013, http://unrcpd.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/10/ND21_Oct_joint-statement.pdf, accessed May 10, 2017. 22 Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation Policy Speech by H.E. Mr. Fumio Kishida, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, at ‘Dialogue with Foreign Minister Kishida’ at Nagasaki University, January 20, 2014, www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000028597.pdf, accessed May 10, 2017.

Bibliography Akiyama, N. (2007) ‘Kaku Fukakusan Kihan no Junshu Kyoka to Amerika Gaiko’ [Strengthening Compliance with Nuclear Nonproliferation Norms and American Diplomacy], Kokusai Seiji [International Politics], 150: 83–98. Akiyama, N. (2012) Kaku Fukakusan o Meguru Kokusai Seiji [International Politics Surrounding Nuclear Nonproliferation], Tokyo: Yushindo. 186

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Akiyama, N. (2015) ‘Japan’s Nuclear Disarmament Dilemma’, in G.P. Schultz and J. Goodby (eds), The War That Must Never Be Fought, Stanford: Hoover Institution, 436–69. Akiyama, N. (2017) ‘America’s Nuclear Nonproliferation Order and Japan–US Relations’, Japan and the World, Japan Digital Library (March 2017) – www2.jiia.or.jpc/en/digital_library/world.php. Originally published as ‘Amerika no Kakufukakusan Chichujo to Nichibei Kankei’, in Endo, S. (ed.), Nihon no Anzenhosho: Nichibei Ampo to Jieitai [Japan’s Security: US–Japan Security Relations and the Self-Defense Force], Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2015, 169–202. DiFilippo, A. (2006) Japan’s Nuclear Disarmament Policy and the U.S. Security Umbrella, New York: Palgrave. Endo, T. (2014) Nichibei Genshiryoku Kyotei (1988 Nen) no Seiritsu Keii to Kongo no Mondaiten [The Details of the Realization of the US–Japan Atomic Energy Agreement (1988) and Future Problems (revised edition)], Tokyo: The Japan Institute of International Affairs. Fujiwara, O. (1991) Gensuibaku Kinshi Undo no Seiritsu: Sengo Nihon Heiwa Undo no Genzo 1954–1955 [The Establishment of Nuclear Abolition Movement: The Origin of Peace Movement in the Post War Japan, 1954–1955], Tokyo: PRIME, Meiji Gakuin University. Haruna, M. (2008) ‘Itsuwari no heiwashugi-sha “Sato Eisaku”’ [Sato Eisaku as a False Pacifist], Gekkan Gendai, September. Kase, Y, (2001) ‘The Costs and Benefits of Japan’s Nuclearization: An Insight into the 1968/70 Internal Report’, The Non-proliferation Review, Summer, 8(2): 55–68. Kurosaki, A. (2006) Kaku Heiki to Nichibei Kankei [Nuclear Weapons and US–Japan Relations], Tokyo: Yushisha. Lewis, J. (2014) ‘Japan Has Enough Plutonium to Make Thousands of Nukes’, Foreign Policy, 1 December – http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/12/01/japan-has-enough-plutonium-to-make-thousands-of-nukes/ accessed 10 May 2017. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (1991) Diplomatic Bluebook, Vol. 35. Minshushugi Kenkyukai. (1968) Nihon no kaku seisaku ni kansuru kenkyu [Research on Japan’s Nuclear Policy], Vol. 1, Tokyo: Naikaku Chosa Shitsu. Minshushugi Kenkyukai. (1970) Nihon no kaku seisaku ni kansuru kenkyu [Research on Japan’s Nuclear Policy], Vol. 2, Tokyo: Naikaku Chosa Shitsu. Nagai, Y. (1985) Gendai to Senryaku [Contemporary Era and Strategy], Tokyo: Bungeishunju. Nakasone, Y. (2004) Jisei roku: Rekishi hotei no hikoku toshite [On Self Reflection: As a Defendant of a Court of History], Tokyo: Shinchosha. Ota, M. (2014) Nichibei (Kaku) Kaku Domei Genbaku, Kaku no Kasa, Fukushima [The US–Japan ‘Nuclear’ Alliance, Atomic Bomb, Nuclear Umbrella, Fukushima], Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Shigen Enerugi Cho [Agency for Natural Resources and Energy]. (2011) Enerugi hakusho [Energy White Paper]. Solingen, E. (2010) ‘The Perils of Prediction: Japan’s Once and Future Nuclear Status’, in W.C. Potter and G. Mukhatzhanove (eds), Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: A Comparative Perspective, Vol. 2, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 131–57. Tomotsugu, S. (2009) ‘1970 nendai no Beikoku Kaku Fukakusan Seisaku to Kaku Nenryo Saikuru Seisaku – Higashi Ajia Takokukan Saishori Koso to Tokaimura Shisetsu o Meguru Gaiko Kosho Kara no Kosatsu’ [Nuclear Non-proliferation Policy and Nuclear Fuel Cycle Policy of the United States in the 1970s – Plan for Multinational Reprocessing in East Asia and Observations from the Diplomatic Talks Around the Tokaimura Plant], Ningen Kankyo Gaku Kenkyu [Human Environmental Studies Research], 7: 2. Wakaizumi, K. (1994) Tasaku nakarishi to shinzemu wo hossu [I Wish You to Believe That There is No Alternative Option], Tokyo: Bungei-Shunju. Yamazaki, M. (2001) ‘Dainiji sekai taisen ji no nihon no genbaku kaihatsu’ [ Japan’s Nuclear Weapon Development at the Time of the Second World War], Nihon butsuri gakkai shi [ Journal of Japan Physics Association], 56(8): 584–90. Yatabe, A. (1971) Kakuheiki Fukakusan Joyaku Ron [On the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty], Tokyo: Yushindo.

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12 Japan’s territorial-disputes policy Success or failure? Alexander Bukh

Introduction This chapter examines Japan’s state-level policies related to its territorial disputes and analyzes whether the goals of these policies were achieved or not. Today, Japan has territorial disputes over groups of islands with all of its neighbors. The origins of these disputes can be traced to the politics of the Cold War. The territorial provisions in the main legal document that stipulates postwar Japan’s borders—that is, the Treaty of Peace with Japan—are rather vague and leave room for conflicting interpretations regarding the ownership of the islands in question. As Hara (2006) has persuasively argued, this ambiguity can be connected with the Cold War policy of the United States, which was the main occupying power of Japan and the most significant power behind the structure of the postwar settlement. As a result, Japan has a dispute with Russia over the ‘Northern Territories’ (known as South Kuriles in Russia), with South Korea over the Takeshima (Dokdo in Korean) islets and over the Senkaku (Diaoyu or Diaoyutai in Chinese) islands with China.1 In the case of the disputes with Russia and South Korea, Japan is the one that demands the return of a territory it argues to be illegally occupied by the two countries. In the case of the dispute with China, Japan administers the islands claimed by both the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and officially denies the existence of a dispute. There are different ways of evaluating the success or failure of a certain policy pursued by the government. The approach taken in this chapter construes policy success as simply an achievement of the goals set by the policy makers. Territory and exclusive control over it are among the main attributes of a modern state. Thus, it may seem that in the case of territorial disputes policy goals are rather obvious—retrieving the lost territory and maintaining control over territory claimed by others. If this was the case, the answer to the question regarding success or failure is simple: as of 2016, Japan failed to regain control over the Northern Territories and Takeshima but succeeded in fending off Chinese claims to the Senkaku islands. As this chapter will show, however, retrieving or retaining the territory in question has not been the only, and at times not the main, goal of policies developed and pursued by the Japanese government. The specific goals and related policies emerged in the context of a broader conception of Japan’s national interests as construed by the policy-making elites. During the Cold War years, the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party)-led Japan was an integral part of the Western camp. The LDP and conservative pundits viewed the Japan–US Alliance as the 188

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main pillar of Japan’s foreign policy. It was seen as vital for maintaining Japan’s independence, peace and economic prosperity as well as a major factor in sustaining stability in the region (e.g. Kosaka 1963). Needless to say, maintaining good relations with other non-Communist countries and especially US allies in the region and beyond was also an important part of Japan’s Cold War foreign policy. Today, relations with the US and the bilateral security alliance are still the primary focus of Japan’s international relations. However, the rise of China, the relative decline of US power and the changes in the LDP leadership brought about significant changes in the way Japan’s policy-making elites see their country’s position within this alliance. While during the Cold War, pursuit of economic prosperity under the so-called ‘Yoshida doctrine’ was the key priority of Japan’s foreign policy, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s government seeks to turn Japan into a more equal partner of the US, an active player in security arrangements in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. It is within this broader context that the specific policy goals related to the territorial disputes were set and pursued. Furthermore, as a result of various domestic and international developments, these goals and the ways to achieve them varied from one dispute to another and changed over time as well.

Northern Territories/South Kuriles The Northern Territories are comprised of three islands: Etorofu (Itrup), Kunashiri (Kunashir) and Shikotan, as well as the Habomai islets. The overall territory of the disputed islands is about 5000 square kilometers. Today, there are over 16,000 Russian residents on these islands, who engage mainly in fishing, fish processing, forestry and farming. In 1945 there was a roughly similar number of Japanese who resided on these islands. Between 1855 and 1905, Japan and Russia concluded a number of treaties that involved changes in the border between the two countries, but the four disputed islands were never administered by Russia prior to 1945 and therefore the roots of the dispute are political rather than historical. During the February 1945 Yalta summit it was agreed that the Soviet Union would get the rights to Southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles (without specifying the exact scope of the Kuriles) in exchange for the Red Army’s participation in the war against Japan. The Soviet Union joined the war against Japan on the August 9, 1945 and completed the occupation of the Kurile chain in September 1945. In 1947–8, the Soviet authorities expelled most of the remaining Japanese residents and unilaterally incorporated the islands into Sakhalin Oblast. Japan renounced its right to the Kurile Islands and to Sakhalin in article 2 (c) of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, signed on September 8, 1951. Importantly, the treaty did not stipulate the scope of the ‘Kuriles’. This omission has been traced to the Cold War policy of the US, which prioritized close relations with Japan over those with the Soviet Union and construed a territorial dispute between the two countries as beneficial to its interests (for details, see Hara 2006). In his speech at the conference, Japan’s Prime Minister, Shigeru Yoshida, referred to Kunashiri and Etorofu as never being part of Russia and to Shikotan and the Habomais as being part of Hokkaido. However, prior to and after the conclusion of the treaty, the Japanese government’s goal remained the same and concerned mainly the return of Shikotan and Habomais (Berton 1992; Hara 1998: 24–33). The Soviet Union did not sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty and, instead, bilateral peacetreaty negotiations took place in 1955 and 1956. In terms of the scope of the territory Japan sought from the Soviet Union, the initial threshold for concluding the treaty was still limited to the two islands. This condition was generally acceptable to the Soviet side and the two parties were close to the conclusion of a peace treaty. However, due to domestic intra-conservative 189

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rivalry in Japan and subsequent pressure from the United States not to compromise and accept only the two islands—aimed at preventing bilateral rapprochement—Japan’s territorial demand evolved into four islands. Hellmann (1969) and Hasegawa (1998) trace the demand for the four islands to the anti-Communist and anti-Soviet sentiments of the right-leaning faction of the recently formed Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which was against reestablishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union—that is, the demand for the four islands was utilized by the conservatives and their supporters in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) to undermine the negotiations. Japan’s legal justification for the four-islands claim, which emerged during this period and remains intact today, states that the two islands of Kunashiri and Etorofu belong to the South Kurile (Minami Chishima in Japanese) islands that are not included in the ‘Kurile islands’ renounced in the Peace Treaty, and that the Habomais and Shikotan are part of Hokkaido (e.g. Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015). The demand for four islands was rejected by the Soviet Union and thus the goal of the conservatives inside the LDP was at least partially achieved. The negotiations did result in a restoration of diplomatic relations stipulated in the Joint Declaration but did not bring a resolution to the territorial dispute (for a detailed discussion see Matsumoto 1956; Hellmann 1969; Berton 1992; Hasegawa 1998; Hara 1998; Wada 1999). According to the Declaration, the Soviet Union would transfer the two small islands, Shikotan and Habomais, to Japan after the conclusion of a peace treaty. In 1960, however, after revision and renewal of the US–Japan Security Treaty, the Soviet Union refused to carry out transfer of the islands, citing a change in circumstances. Nevertheless, after 1956, the dispute did not feature high on the agenda of the ruling LDP or any of the other parties, and while Japan’s official position maintained the four-islands demand vis-a`vis the Soviet Union, there was little interest in the dispute. Overall, from 1960 until the late 1980s there were hardly any developments in the territorial-dispute-related bilateral relations between Japan and the Soviet Union (Tsukamoto 2011a: 7). The general public also lost interest in the dispute. Results of a public opinion poll conducted on Hokkaido in 1966 show that despite the proximity of the islands and the relatively high number of former residents of the islands living on Hokkaido, the interest in the issue was very low. Fifty-five percent of those polled said they did not have any knowledge regarding the history of Japan’s negotiations with Russia that justified Japan’s possession of the ‘Northern Territories’. Asked about contemporary international issues, only 9% of those polled stated that they were interested in the ‘Northern Territories’ (and only 6.3% in fisheries-related negotiations with the Soviet Union), as opposed to, for example, 44% that expressed interest in the Vietnam War (Hopp ory odo fukki kisei d omei 1966: 2–12). Japan’s governmental policy on the territorial dispute with the Soviet Union started to evolve in the mid 1960s, but it was directed internally rather than toward the Soviet Union. In 1963, the term ‘Northern Territories’ was officially adopted by MOFA and from that point onwards became the official term of reference to the disputed territories (Iwashita 2005). The references to the islands as ‘northern’ implies the importance of their location vis-a` -vis Tokyo, as opposed to their eastward location from Hokkaido, the official administrative center. In 1969, a new quasi-governmental agency in charge of domestic policy related to the Northern Territories, the Association for Countermeasures related to the Northern Territories (ACNT), was established. In 1973, for the first time, the Diet adopted a resolution demanding the return of all four islands. In 1978, again for the first time, MOFA published a booklet titled ‘Our Northern Territories’, which provided detailed explanations regarding the illegality of the Soviet occupation and Japan’s inherent rights to the four islands. In the late 1970s, the government also built a number of Northern Territories-related educational facilities, including the hundred 190

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million yen observatory cum museum on Hokkaido’s Nosappu Cape. In 1981, the Diet designated February 2 as a national Northern Territories Day. As such, while there were hardly any significant Northern Territories-related developments in Japan–USSR relations, Japan’s domestic policy evolved significantly. The official documents examined by the author do not carry any direct references to the goals of this domestic campaign besides the need to spread the knowledge and educate the public about the territorial dispute. However, David L. Osborn, at that time a Minister at the US Embassy in Tokyo, reported that the establishment of the ACNT in 1969 had little to do with facilitating the return of the islands. The actual reason, Osborn argued, was related to domestic politics and to the Japan–US negotiations regarding the reversion of Okinawa. Namely, through the ACNT, the LDP-dominated government was hoping to sway public support away from the Socialist Party, which opposed the reversion of Okinawa with American bases (cited in Ikeda 2003: 42–3). The parliamentary interpolations related to the rationale behind the establishment of the Association and of Northern Territories Day suggest that the need to ‘enlighten’ the public regarding the Northern Territories prevailed over the need to assist the affected residents or to reach an actual solution to the dispute (e.g. Special Committee for Okinawa and Northern Territories 1969). In other words, the emphasis was put on the creation of a national symbol rather than on a solution to the dispute and related issues. Overall, it can be argued that the main goal of this prolonged campaign was to consolidate the people around the LDP and to direct their nationalist sentiments in opposition to the Soviet Union rather than the United States and the bases. If this indeed has been the main purpose of the campaign, it can be seen as generally successful. The demise of the once powerful Japan Socialist Party started in the late 1960s, behind which there were numerous factors, but the Socialists’ relatively warm relations with the Soviet Union were one of them. The comprehensive educational campaign about the dispute also bore fruit. In a public opinion poll conducted by the government in 1969, only 4.7% of those polled mentioned the Northern Territories problem among the issues in which they were interested (Cabinet Office 1969). Contrastingly, in a similar poll conducted in 1973–4, the Northern Territories and Soviet Union-related policy in general received the highest number of voices for issues that should be prioritized by the government (Cabinet Office 1974). The government also managed to create a single coherent ‘return of the Northern Territories’ movement by utilizing its broader practice of subordinating associations and turning them into vehicles of its own policy through subsidies (Pekkanen 2006). Most of the numerous grassroots groups engaged in activism related to the Northern Territories dispute, which were active mostly on Hokkaido in the 1940s and 1950s, ceased to exist. The exact process that led to their disappearance is not fully clear but probably lack of funding, fatigue and lack of attention from policy makers were the most important factors. The three organizations that survived and exist today are the above-mentioned ACNT, the Alliance for Achieving the Return of the Northern Territories and the League of the Residents of Chishima Archipelago, and they have overlapping membership. ACNT was established by central government and despite its nominal independence is fully financed and controlled by it. The other two are also financially and structurally dependent on central government, as well as the Hokkaido prefectural governments (Williams 2010). As such, during the Cold War years the policy of turning the territorial dispute into a symbol of Japan’s suffering at the hands of the Soviet Union shared by the relevant non-state organizations and the majority of the public was rather successful. Importantly, though, in the process of creating a national symbol out of the disputed territories, the idea of the ‘Northern Territories’ took on a life of its own and became closely associated with Japan’s basic principles and norms (for a detailed discussion see Bukh 2012). As such, when 191

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the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union ceased to exist, Japan’s policy toward Russia became a mirror of the domestic campaign. Subsequently, despite the fundamental change in regional and global politics, the return of all four islands continued to be the main goal of Japan’s Russia policy. In the 1990s and early 2000s, there were numerous bilateral negotiations aimed at resolving the dispute. On the eve of the March 2001 Irkutsk summit with Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin came out with an unprecedented statement that was in effect the first explicit acknowledgment in 40 years by a Soviet/Russian leader of the validity of the 1956 bilateral declaration stipulating the transfer of Shikotan and the Habomais. Russia was now openly showing its readiness to honor the agreement and to transfer the two islands to Japan, along with conclusion of the peace treaty. On the Japanese side, the dominance of the pragmatic approach in shaping Japan’s Russia policy led to a proposal for ‘simultaneous parallel negotiations’ that envisaged a separation in negotiating the status of the two smaller islands, the return of which was agreed in the 1956 Declaration, and the two larger ones. This approach, however, did not survive for long due to the eruption of a series of scandals in MOFA in December 2001. The scandals resulted in a purge of many of the Russia specialists in MOFA and brought an end to the behind-the-scenes negotiations, virtually paralyzing Japan’s Russia policy. Negotiations on the status of the islands and toward the conclusion of a peace treaty entered a ‘dormant season’; Japan’s position relapsed into that of the Cold War era—the simple demand for the return of the four islands (Sato 2003: 263; Iwashita 2005: 10–14). Since then, the leaders of the two countries have met a number of times and pledged to resolve the territorial dispute, though no actual progress was achieved. The most recent development has been Prime Minister Abe’s announcement of a ‘future oriented, new approach’ in the territorial negotiations, after his meeting with Putin on May 6, 2016 (Nikkei Shimbun 2016a). There is no doubt that the most important factor in Abe’s attempt to solve the territorial dispute and improve relations with Russia is the China factor. Today, the territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands with China and the broader rivalry between the two countries for leadership in Asia is the most important concern of Japan’s defense and foreign policies. Thus, most of the pundits agree that fostering better relations with Russia should be seen as an attempt to weaken Russia’s partnership with China and prevent the emergence of a China–Russia military alliance in East Asia (Yamakawa 2016). Recently, the Japanese media reported that Abe’s ‘new approach’ involves a plan for extensive economic cooperation and assistance with the development of the Russian Far East. In terms of the actual territorial dispute, the media reported that the government has considered a plan for a return of the two small islands and joint administration of the other two (Nikkei Shimbun 2016b). Officially, however, Japan’s government has stated that there has been no change in its demand for the return of all four islands, and President Putin has stated that he has no plans to ‘sell’ the Kurile islands to Japan (Mano 2016). As such, the exact details of the ‘new approach’ are not completely clear but, nevertheless, the possibility of the two leaders reaching some kind of a compromise in the near future cannot be ignored. However, the resolution of the territorial dispute will hardly lead to close defense-related cooperation between the two countries. China’s power is indeed a matter of long-term concern for Russia’s policy makers, but as long as the security treaty with the US remains the main pillar of Japan’s foreign policy and Russia and China remain in a ‘soft’ alliance directed at the US, close security ties between Japan and Russia are rather improbable.

Takeshima/Dokdo Takeshima (Korean name: Dokdo, also known as Liancourt Rocks) is a group of two main islets and a number of small rocks in the Sea of Japan. Its territory is less than 200,000 square meters and 192

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it is located 150 kilometers from Japan’s Oki Island and 90 kilometers from Korea’s Ulleung Island. The islets are volcanic rocks with a very thin layer of soil. They have fresh spring water which is not drinkable due to guano contamination. There are only two permanent Korean residents on the islets and about 35 Korean coastguardsmen who rotate every few months. The islets do not have significant economic value, though the surrounding seabed may contain natural gas and mineral deposits. The islets were incorporated into Japan’s Shimane Prefecture by a Cabinet Decree in January 1905. They were administered by Shimane Prefecture until the end of the Asia-Pacific War. In September 1945, as a result of Japan’s surrender, hostilities were brought to an end, and the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP) became the highest authority in occupied Japan. In June 1946, SCAP issued a decree (SCAPIN 1033) that restricted the areas of fishing, whaling and other similar activities by the Japanese. This decree placed Takeshima outside the restricting line that came to be known in Japan as the ‘MacArthur Line’, named after General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the occupation authorities. The purpose of these boundaries was of a purely administrative nature and did not purport to demarcate Japan’s borders. In January 1952, in the midst of the Korean War and three months before the peace treaty with Japan came into force, South Korea’s Rhee Syngman government issued a ‘Presidential Proclamation of Sovereignty over the Adjacent Seas’. In this proclamation, South Korea declared national sovereignty over the seas within the designated line, known as the Peace Line or Rhee Line. The purpose of the line was to replace the MacArthur Line that limited the fishing activities of the Japanese vessels during the occupation period. Since then, Korea has exercised effective administration over the islets and Japan has persistently demanded their return. Similarly to the Northern Territories, the origins of the dispute over Takeshima are more political than historical. Namely, despite the fact that both sides made claims to the islets during the negotiations of the San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan, article 2a of the treaty, which depicts the territory of the newly independent Korea, does not mention the islets. While preparing the final peace treaty with Japan, various drafts were produced by the US authorities. In the early drafts, compiled in 1947–9, ownership of the islets was allocated to Korea. Later drafts, however, either allocated them to Japan or did not mention them at all. There were probably numerous reasons for this change but, arguably, the politics of the Cold War played the decisive role in this transformation. In June 1950, North Korea invaded the South, starting the Korean War that lasted until July 1953. In the early 1950s, then, the US officials involved in drafting the peace treaty could not be sure that the whole Korean Peninsula and adjacent islands would not fall into the hands of the Communist forces. Furthermore, the Korean War increased the strategic importance of Japan in the ongoing struggle with Communism in Asia. Thus, US policy makers believed that it was in the interests of US Cold War policy in Asia to retain potential sources of discord between Japan and its neighbors (for a detailed discussion see Hara 2006). The differences regarding the ownership of the islets in the various drafts that preceded the treaty and the omission of the islets from the final text enabled the two sides to come up with contradictory interpretations of the peace treaty. Japan’s official position cites the lack of reference to Takeshima in the peace treaty as justifying its claims. Furthermore, it argues that the 1905 incorporation was simply an act of confirmation of historical possession. Korea became Japan’s protectorate in November 1905 and a formal colony in 1910. The fact that the incorporation of the islets happened prior to Japan’s official colonization of the Korean Peninsula as well as the history of the islets’ administration by Shimane Prefecture and not the colonial GovernmentGeneral of Korea are used by Japan’s government today to support its claims to the islets (Tsukamoto 2011b). The Korean government refers to the Cairo Declaration and earlier drafts of 193

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the peace treaty and documents of the occupation authorities that support its claim to ownership. It sees the 1905 incorporation as an illegal occupation of an integral part of Korea and construes it as the first step in Japan’s colonization of the peninsula (Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016). Since the early days of the dispute, the Japanese government’s goal has been to recover the islets it believes belong rightfully to Japan. Thus, the government protested immediately after the announcement of the Rhee Line, arguing territorial rights to the islets (Kim 2004: 202–4). A few months later, Shimane Prefecture issued a Prefectural Fisheries Regulation which indirectly suggested that Takeshima is part of its prefectural territory. In the early 1950s, there were a number of clashes on the islets and in the adjacent waters that involved Japanese and Korean fishermen and coastguardsmen (Kataoka 2006: 17–18). In the process, the two governments exchanged numerous protests in which they argued their respective rights to the islets and condemned the actions of the other side as illegal. In 1954, Japan suggested they refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), but the Rhee Syngman government refused (Kim 2004: 209–14). Japan did not make any attempts to recapture the islets by force and the Dokdo islets have remained under South Korean control. Similarly to the Soviet Union, South Korea was not a party to the San Francisco Peace Treaty and thus there was a need for a separate treaty to determine the basic principles of postwar Japan’s relations with its former colony. The negotiations started in 1952, but the parties could not reach an agreement on many issues, most of which had to do with the legacy of Japan’s four-decade colonial rule. The negotiations gained momentum after the May 16, 1961 military coup in Korea, carried out by Park Chung Hee. An agreement was eventually reached in 1965, when the Basic Treaty between Japan and the Republic of Korea was signed. The territorial issue was one of the main stumbling blocks in the normalization negotiations. During the negotiations that led to the eventual conclusion of the treaty, both sides realized that the economic importance of the islets was negligible and secondary to their common Cold War struggle against Communism and the economic benefits to be reaped from closer cooperation (Roh 2008). This view was voiced by Banboku Ono, at that time Vice-Chairman of the LDP, who in December 1962 publicly suggested that Japan and Korea exercise joint ownership of the islets (Asahi Shimbun 1963). Neither the Japanese nor the Koreans, however, could yield to the other side’s demands, for domestic political reasons. Park Chung Hee’s dictatorial rule was perceived as illegitimate by many of his countrymen. Furthermore, his policy of rapprochement with Japan was not popular domestically, and there were numerous demonstrations by the opposition against Park’s Japan policy (Hyon 2006: 118–19). Arguably, Park did not want to further provoke his fellow countrymen by conceding to Japan’s demands to return the islets. In Japan, the ruling conservative LDP faced strong criticism from the Socialist Party, which was opposed to closer relations with South Korea’s military dictatorship. Ono’s statement was met with strong criticism (e.g. Nakamura 1965) and it became obvious that giving up the claims to islets would enhance the opposition. Thus, the final text of the treaty did not touch on the territorial dispute and both governments have continuously made opposing interpretations of its clauses. Based on interviews with and memoirs of the politicians and bureaucrats involved in the bilateral negotiations that led to the conclusion of the 1965 Treaty, Roh (2008) argued that the sides had actually reached a tacit agreement: both governments would continue to hold their respective interpretations regarding the ownership of the islets but avoid escalation of the dispute and challenges to the status quo. Despite official refutations of the agreement from both governments, Roh’s argument seems reasonable if one considers the Cold War foreign policy priorities of both Japan and Korea. Moreover, the existence of this tacit understanding between the two countries was recently 194

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confirmed by an LDP heavyweight, Yasuhiro Nakasone, who participated in the normalization talks (Nakasone 2012: 160–2). The territorial issue could not be successfully shelved, however, without resolving the question of fishing rights in the waters surrounding the islets. This question was addressed in the Agreement on Fisheries that accompanied the Treaty. Under this agreement, a Joint Regulation Zone that included waters surrounding the islets was established. The Agreement enabled fishermen from both countries to fish in the zone, where rules are enforced by the party whose flag the vessel flies. As such, from 1965 onwards, the Japanese government’s goal regarding Takeshima underwent a drastic change. If, until the conclusion of the normalization treaty the goal was to retrieve the islets, from 1965 onwards Japan’s broader interests suggested that maintaining the status quo and excluding the Takeshima issue from domestic debates should be the main goal of the government. Overall, it can be argued that the government’s policy of minimizing the domestic debate regarding Takeshima and the importance of the issue in Japan’s relations with Korea was successful. This is despite the fact that, between 1965 and the early 2000s, the dispute did resurface a couple of times in Japan’s relations with Korea. In 1977, following the US and Soviet declarations of 200-mile exclusive fishery zones, Japan and Korea declared 12-mile territorial waters and 200-mile exclusive fishery zones. In this context, the question of territorial rights to Takeshima surfaced again in the domestic debates in both countries and resulted in exchanges of rival claims and denouncements (Kajimura 1997). Tokyo, however, was eager to subdue the tensions and promptly announced the exclusion of Korea and China from the application of the 200-mile rule. The issue of ownership over Takeshima rose to the fore of the bilateral agenda again in 1996 when both Japan and Korea ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and declared their respective Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). In accordance with their claims, both countries included the islets as their sovereign territory. This led again to Japanese and Korean politicians arguing their respective country’s historical rights to the islets and denouncing the other side’s claims. After two years of exchanges, the parties reached a solution not dissimilar to the 1965 one. They agreed to separate claims of sovereignty from fisheriesrelated issues and demarcated their respective EEZs in a new Fisheries Agreement, which came into force in 1999 (for details, see Bukh 2015). Otherwise, the Takeshima dispute played a minimal role in Japan’s relations with Korea, and the domestic political discourse has all but ignored the issue. This silence can be witnessed in multiple fora. For example, in the early 1950s, conservative MPs from Shimane often raised questions related to Takeshima in parliamentary interpolations devoted to negotiations with South Korea. A decade later, no LDP MPs, including those from Shimane constituency, raised the issue of Takeshima during numerous debates in the Diet on the forthcoming treaty with South Korea. Also, in the midst of Japan–Korea negotiations, the Society for Support of Compatriots in the South, which until the 1970s was the sole semi-governmental agency devoted to Japan’s territorial issues, published a booklet on Japan’s territories under foreign administration (Nanp o d oh o engokai 1965), which, while it discussed Japan’s rights to Okinawa, the Bonin (Ogasawara) islands and the Northern Territories in detail, simply omitted Takeshima. Similarly, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not publish anything related to the Takeshima issue until 2008; and the first official public opinion poll on the Takeshima issue was conducted only in 2013. Incidentally, in 2005, only 13% of respondents in a Yomiuri Shimbun poll believed that Takeshima was an important issue in Japan’s relations with South Korea (cited in Nakajima 2007). The Takeshima issue was absent not only from the official discourse but also from the public discourse in general. For example, one of Japan’s major magazine-article search engines, Oya Bunko, gives only 82 hits for a keyword search of “Takeshima” and “problem” for the period between 1951 and 2004. 195

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As such, the post-1965 LDP/governmental policy of keeping the territorial dispute on the back-burner of Japan’s relations with Korea was quite successful. The turning point came in 2005, when Shimane Prefecture passed an ordinance that designated February 22 as prefectural Takeshima Day. The immediate trigger for this ordinance was the Korean announcement in 2004 regarding issuance of a Dokdo memorial stamp. The ordinance however was a culmination of five decades of Takeshima-related activism by the prefectural authorities and had more to do with domestic center–periphery relations than with relations with Korea (for a detailed analysis see Bukh 2015). Importantly, LDP heavyweights including Shinzo Abe, who was later to become prime minister, were against this Takeshima Day initiative and turned down a request for a national Takeshima Day that preceded the prefectural ordinance (Yokota 2005). At that time, the LDP likely did not see any reason to breach the above-mentioned tacit agreement, as it did not want to further aggravate Japan’s relations with Korea, which were already tense because of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni Shrine. South Korea’s fierce reaction to the Takeshima Day ordinance and its wide coverage in the media brought Takeshima to the center of public attention. Over the following years, the Takeshima issue became firmly embedded in Japan’s political debates regarding relations with Korea. According to a 2013 public opinion poll conducted by the government, 94.5% of respondents knew about the Takeshima issue and 71.1% stated that they were interested in the issue (Cabinet Office 2014). As the Takeshima issue gained importance, it came to be exploited by politicians from across the political spectrum. It was quite visible during the 2012 election campaign and possibly contributed to the return of the LDP to power after three years of absence. The re-emergence of Takeshima as one of the main issues in Japan’s Korea-related policy debates undermined the initial goal established in the 1960s of preventing the territorial dispute from hampering bilateral ties with Korea. In fact, after the conclusion of the December 2015 agreement on the so-called ‘comfort women’ controversy, the territorial dispute became the main stumbling block in bilateral relations. Its impact on Japan’s economic relations with Korea has been rather limited but, together with other history-related issues, the territorial dispute does indeed hinder security cooperation between the two countries (Yamamoto 2012). Bearing in mind the recent inclusion of Takeshima in the middle- and high-school curriculum guidelines for Japanese schools by the Ministry of Education, it seems that the current government cannot or does not want to decrease the visibility of the dispute in the public discourse. As the Korean government, media and civil-society groups closely monitor Japans domestic policies related to Takeshima and respond accordingly (e.g. Donga Ilbo 2014), the dispute will probably continue to hamper bilateral relations in the foreseeable future.

Senkaku/Diaoyu The Senkaku (PRC name: Diaoyu; Republic of China (ROC) name: Diaoyutai) dispute between Japan on the one side and the PRC and ROC on the other is about eight islands located in the southern part of the East China Sea. The total territory of the islands is about 6.3 square kilometers, and they are located in a very important strategic position approximately 170 kilometers from Japan’s Ishigaki Island and from Taiwan. The islands were incorporated by Japan into its Okinawa Prefecture in January 1895 during the Sino-Japanese War. In the first few decades of the twentieth century, there was some economic activity on the islands but they have been uninhabited since the 1940s. Along with the rest of Okinawa Prefecture, the islands were administered by the United States between 1945 and 1972. Today they are administered as part of the Japanese Okinawa prefecture and claimed by both Beijing and Taipei as being historically part of China. 196

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In the period preceding the conclusion of the peace treaty, the dispute between Japan and China (mostly the ROC) was about Okinawa (Hara 2006). In the early 1970s however, after a publication of a study that found gas and oil deposits in the vicinity of the Senkakus, both Chinas made claims to the islands, arguing that they were historically part of Taiwan, illegally annexed by Japan in 1895. In 1972, Japan’s MOFA published a document that explained Japan’s position regarding its entitlement to the islands. It argued that the 1895 incorporation of the islands was that of terra nullius conducted after a careful examination that produced no evidence of ownership by China (Toyoshita 2012: 47–8). In the same year, the US government returned the islands together with the rest of Okinawa Prefecture to Japan’s control. While there was an understanding among US policy makers that the Senkakus are part of Okinawa, the Nixon administration decided not to take a position on issues of sovereignty as a reflection of the various developments in US Cold War interests vis-a`-vis Japan and both Chinas (Hara 2006). Since then, Japan has administered the islands while both the PRC and ROC claim them as being part of Taiwan. From the early days of the postwar era, trade with mainland China was perceived as crucially important for Japan’s economy (see Soeya 1999 for a detailed analysis). Japan’s normalization negotiations with the PRC, however, started only in late 1971 after the so-called ‘Nixon shocks’ and culminated in the Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed in August 1978. Similarly to Japan–Korea negotiations in the early 1960s, the territorial dispute was one of the stumbling stones in the negotiations, raised mainly by Japan, but economic interests prevailed, and it seems that the sides reached a tacit agreement to shelve the dispute to prevent it from destabilizing bilateral relations (e.g. Higuchi 2013; Toyoshita 2012; Drifte 2013; Tomabechi 2015). While Japan’s MOFA continues to deny the shelving agreement, recently its existence was confirmed by Takakazu Kuriyama, who served as Director of MOFA’s Treatise Division during the negotiations (cited in Drifte 2013: 20–1). At that time, the shelving agreement was obviously in favor of Japan as the country de facto in control of the islands. Thus, it may be argued that since the conclusion of the 1978 Treaty, Japan’s goal was to prevent the dispute from damaging bilateral relations while maintaining control over the islands. The dispute went through a number of ups and downs in the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s (Wiegand 2009). In the 1990s, the ratification of UNCLOS by both Japan and China, and China’s oil and gas developments, contributed to the erosion of the shelving agreement (Drifte 2013: 23–6), but both governments cooperated to avoid escalation of the dispute (O’Shea 2015: 565). It was after the 2010 and 2012 incidents, however, that the dispute rose to the forefront of Japan–China relations and came to be seen as potentially leading to an armed conflict between the two countries (Smith 2013). The September 7, 2010 confrontation between a Chinese trawler that was fishing in the waters near the islands and the Japanese Coast Guard shocked the Japanese public and policy makers alike (Smith 2015: 189). The captain of the trawler was detained after refusing inspection and ramming two Coast Guard ships. The incident escalated into a major diplomatic crisis after the Japanese authorities decided to prosecute the captain. China demanded immediate release of the captain and applied pressure on Japan through economic sanctions and detention of Japanese citizens. The Japanese government released the captain in late September and the tensions receded (Smith 2015: 190–4). The second crisis started in September 2012 when the government of Japan decided to nationalize three of the Senkaku islands, which were privately owned and leased by the government. The decision came as a response to Tokyo’s right-leaning Governor Shintaro Ishihara’s initiative to purchase the islands and put them under the jurisdiction of Tokyo and was intended to prevent further escalation of the dispute rather than induce it. In the aftermath, government officials claimed that the rationale behind the decision to nationalize the islands was conveyed to 197

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the Chinese side and was met with understanding (Yoshino 2016). However, the Japanese government obviously either misunderstood the Chinese response or miscalculated the possible reaction. In China, nationalization was construed as Japan’s attempt to strengthen its position in the dispute. Many cities in China saw large-scale anti-Japanese demonstrations, attacks against Japanese businesses and individuals and looting and burning of Japanese property. Numerous official events between the two countries were suspended on China’s initiative, and incursions by Chinese official and private vessels into waters surrounding the islands became frequent (Nakauchi 2012: 77–78). In November 2013, China announced its Air Identification Zone, which included airspace over the Senkaku islands and was met with strong protest from the Japanese government. Since then, Japan’s Prime Minister Abe and China’s President Xi Jinping have met a few times on the sidelines of various multilateral groupings, but a purely bilateral meeting is yet to happen. As such, while it seems that the impact of the Senkaku problem on bilateral economic ties has been quite limited (Seguchi 2014), the territorial dispute did become a major issue in Japan’s relations with China. Thus, it can be argued that Japan’s policy of preventing the Senkaku issue from affecting bilateral relations has failed to achieve its goal. However, in order to fully understand the effects of the recent escalation on Japan’s policy, it is important to look at Japan’s domestic politics and the important changes in Japan’s foreign policy doctrine. The 2010 and 2012 Senkaku crises occurred during the short-lived rule of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which interrupted the almost continuous rule of the LDP since its inception in 1955. One of the main policy goals voiced by the DPJ was to enhance Japan’s relations with Asian countries and even to create an ‘East Asian Community’. Needless to say, the emergence of the Senkakus-related problems and the poor management of the two crises by the DPJ government further underscored its inability to deliver what it promised. Relations with China were not the only issue that worked against the DPJ in the December 2012 elections, which resulted in a landslide victory for the Abe-led LDP, but, without doubt, it was one of them (e.g. Hrebenar and Haraguchi 2015). As such, the escalation in the territorial dispute with China contributed to the LDP’s main goal in 2012—that is, the return to power. Furthermore, the LDP under Abe differs significantly from the LDP of the previous century. Abe’s main foreign policy goals have been to do away with the restrictions of the ‘peace constitution’, to develop a more assertive security posture for Japan and to deepen Japan’s security ties with the United States (Hughes 2015: 2). There is little doubt that the escalation in the Senkaku dispute contributed to furthering this agenda. The Abe cabinet used the ‘China threat’ extensively as one of its arguments to increase Japan’s defense budget and to revise the interpretation of Article Nine of the Constitution to allow collective self-defense (Mainichi Shimbun 2015). Japan’s security alliance with the United States also received a boost. Various US officials referred to the Senkaku islands as falling within the scope of the US–Japan Security Treaty, but Barack Obama was the first US President to state this clearly, during his April 2014 visit to Tokyo. The US government also condemned the Chinese unilateral declaration of ADIZ (air defense identification zone), and the US Marines conducted exercises with Japan’s Self Defense Forces in retaking remote islands (Hughes 2015: 69–70). The confrontation over the Senkaku islands also enabled Japan to strengthen its cooperation with those Southeast Asian countries that also have territorial disputes with China, such as Vietnam and the Philippines. While Abe probably did not manage to achieve the encirclement of China (Hughes 2015: 86–8), Japan’s role in the region has definitely changed from being purely that of an economic powerhouse to that of one of the leading players in the realm of security. As such, the escalation in the Senkaku dispute has contributed to the Abe-led LDP furthering its main foreign and defense policy-related goals.

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Conclusion This chapter introduced Japan’s territorial disputes and examined both the domestic and the international policies related to them. These policies emerged against the background of Japan’s broader interests and international relations. The chapter showed that the territorial-disputesrelated goals and related policies were not static and evolved over time, reflecting changes in ruling elites’ priorities, domestic politics and structural changes on both regional and global levels. It also showed that successful achievement of a certain policy goal can lead to failure at a later stage and vice versa. For example, the domestic Northern Territories campaign helped in consolidating the rule of the LDP and diverting public anger away from the US bases on Okinawa. However, this successful promotion of the idea of the Northern Territories became the main obstacle in attempts to solve the dispute in the post-Cold War era, when Japan could benefit from improved relations with Russia. Contrastingly, the escalation in the Senkaku dispute, which followed the failure to keep it on the back-burner of Japan’s relations with China, helped the LDP to return to power in 2012 and facilitated the implementation of its security agenda. As these cases illustrate, it is impossible to make univocal assessments of Japan’s territorialdisputes-related policies as either successes or failures. Policy goals varied depending on the period in question, and the results of these policies had unexpected effects on the subsequent agenda. It remains to be seen whether Prime Minister Abe and President Putin will manage to find a solution to the Northern Territories dispute. As argued above, however, resolution of the dispute will probably not lead to significant changes in Japan–Russia relations, especially in terms of security cooperation. In the case of the dispute over Takeshima, domestic politics in both countries do not allow much room for a compromise and the dispute will probably continue to play a certain role in Japan–Korea relations in the foreseeable future. Today, the territorial dispute over the Senkakus is the most important among the three as it has the potential to cause an armed conflict between the two major actors in the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, the tensions carry certain benefits for leaders in both Japan and China. In the case of the former, they are utilized to create a more assertive security policy, while for the Chinese leadership they are utilized to boost their legitimacy. Whether the policy makers on both sides will manage to prevent the tensions from ‘boiling to the point of overflowing’, to borrow from a song by Papercut Massacre, is a question of major concern for pundits and people in the two countries and beyond.

Note 1

As this chapter focuses on Japan’s polices, Japanese names of the disputed islands are used. This is done purely for the sake of convenience and should not be interpreted as a support for Japan’s position in the dispute in question.

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13 Smart power and Japan’s trouble-shooting approach to Southeast Asia1 Yee-Kuang Heng

Introduction Smart power usually refers to using a combination of economic, diplomatic, developmental, legal, cultural, and military tools to achieve certain foreign policy goals. As Hillary Clinton suggested in her nomination hearing to become Secretary of State, it is ‘picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation’ (Clinton 2009). According to Nye, ‘smart power is neither hard nor soft. It is both’ (Nye 2004: 32). This chapter adopts an analytical framework based on smart power to analyze the ways Tokyo is expanding its toolkit of influence in Southeast Asia, in particular. Although policy-makers do not explicitly use the term to justify their activities, much of what Japan is doing to assert an image of trouble-shooting to counter Chinese accusations of trouble-making can be interpreted through the smart power framework. Responses of target countries to Japanese initiatives are also evaluated. This framework allows scholars to systematically evaluate in a more holistic manner the combination of tools at Japan’s disposal, which include a traditional reliance on regional multilateral structures, Official Development Assistance (ODA) and economic development, but increasingly encompass the Japanese SelfDefense Forces ( JSDF) as well. Japan has long utilized tools such as ODA and military diplomacy, but the smart power framework prompts researchers to focus on the broader comprehensive combination of a range of tools simultaneously applied to a specific problem, country or region. For instance, the Shinzo Abe administration enacted many regional diplomatic initiatives, changes to the ODA Charter, capacity-building and donating patrol vessels and the use of the Japan Coast Guard and JSDF to provide training. Besides focusing more on the whole package of instruments used, smart power above all emphasizes the issue of establishing legitimacy. Evaluating how smart power tools are being utilized in the dueling trouble-maker/trouble-shooter dichotomy enables researchers to address this issue of legitimacy in Japanese security policies vis-a`-vis Southeast Asia. The Center for Strategic and International Studies defined smart power as ‘an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships and institutions of all levels to expand American influence and establish legitimacy of American action’ (Center for Strategic and International Studies 2007: 7, italics added). Smart power ‘involves the strategic use of diplomacy, persuasion, capacity building and the projection of power and influence in ways that are costeffective and have political and social legitimacy’ (Crocker, Hampson and Aal 2007: 13, italics 202

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added). These definitions suggest that smart power can, above all, help establish the legitimacy of foreign policy actions. The notion of legitimacy is particularly relevant in light of China’s attempts to depict Tokyo and the JSDF as unrepentant and illegitimate ‘trouble-makers’. In July 2016, the US–Australia–Japan Trilateral Strategic Dialogue issued a joint statement calling on China and the Philippines to abide by the Arbitration Tribunal ruling on the South China Sea. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi swiftly accused the trio of ‘fanning the flames’ and pointedly said, ‘Now it is the time to test whether you are peacekeepers or trouble-makers’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2016). Wang’s labelling of countries as trouble-makers was not a one-off affair, particularly in relation to Japan. In February 2014, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying, citing moves by the Abe administration to re-interpret its pacifist constitution and expand its JSDF, warned in no uncertain terms that ‘Japan has already become a de facto trouble-maker harming regional peace and stability’ ( Japan Times 2014). In January 2014, a day after Prime Minister Abe completed a tour of Africa to bolster Japanese presence, China’s ambassador to the African Union, Xie Xiaoyan, said, ‘Abe has become the biggest trouble-maker in Asia,’ accusing the Japanese premier of exaggerating the threat posed by China as an ‘excuse for the resurrection of Japanese militarism’ (South China Morning Post 2014). In March 2016, on the occasion of new Japanese security legislation taking effect to allow the JSDF to engage in collective defense for the first time since World War Two, state media Xinhua News carried a commentary criticizing the legislation that ‘once again unmasked Japan as a trouble maker’ (Liu 2016). By no means is such labelling limited to the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) PM Abe. At the height of the 2012 Senkaku island crisis, during the previous Democratic Party of Japan’s (DPJ) Yoshihiko Noda Administration, China’s People’s Daily published an English commentary titled ‘Is Japan a peacemaker or a trouble-maker?’(People’s Daily Online 2012), lambasting the sending of JSDF personnel to drills with US forces and Noda’s ‘strategy of military power.’ This recurrent pattern of painting Japan as up to no good and a mischief-maker is of course designed to serve broader diplomatic and strategic goals, beyond simple dramatic propaganda. Beijing’s ultimate aim is to frustrate Tokyo’s attempts to enhance its security role in the region by driving a wedge between Japan and target ASEAN states, such as the Philippines or Vietnam, that have appeared receptive to Japanese overtures. Central to this attempt is often a blunt reminder of past war-time atrocities committed in these countries by Imperial Japanese military forces and an assertion that the JSDF unleashed by Abe from its constitutional shackles is a potentially dangerous “trouble-maker.” Such discussions about whether a country’s war-time past would lead to future ‘rogue’ military behavior are not new. Within post-unification Germany too, supporters of ‘normalization’ insisted that a ‘normalized’ Deutschland would not once again ‘become an international troublemaker’ (Forsberg 2005: 215). In trying to analyze the use of such unsavory labels, there has been work examining ‘derogative actor categories’ such as ‘evil’ and ‘rogue’ in international politics (Geis and Wunderlich 2014: 458). Incidentally, when, in April 2014, the Philippines submitted its case against China at the UNCLOS tribunal, its lead counsel branded China in similar derogatory terms: ‘There’s a price to be paid for branding yourself as an international outlaw, as a state that doesn’t respect, that doesn’t comply with international law’ (Dancel 2014; italics added). Like ‘evil,’ ‘rogue,’ and ‘international outlaw,’ variety of such ‘more or less obnoxious others have been identified over the years’ (Geis and Wunderlich 2014: 459; italics added). This chapter suggests that ‘trouble-maker’ should be added to the growing lexicon of ‘deviant actor categories.’ The use of derogatory lexicon by China serves to resurrect regional fears over Japanese militarism and undermine the legitimacy of Tokyo’s moves towards ‘normalization’ and a more proactive security policy. Naming, defining and labelling Japan in this derogative sense allows the 203

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framers (China) to seek hegemony in a discourse and shape threat perceptions of target countries (Geis and Wunderlich 2014). This may undermine the perceived legitimacy of, and, in turn, target country receptivity to, Tokyo’s overtures. In the process, Beijing not only seeks to bottle up and stifle Japan’s strategic options, it also reinforces in the minds of target audiences China’s own growing influence as the ‘legitimate’ key power in Asia. The contest for legitimacy between the two Asian giants may well be symbolic, but there are important and real national interests at stake for Japan. Seeking a more active role for the JSDF in shaping the regional security order and facing down the rise of China, Tokyo has to present itself in ways that are attractive, or at least acceptable, to regional states, some of which retain memories of Japanese war-time invasions. Rather than stirring-up trouble as Beijing would suggest, using the JSDF in combination with diplomatic and developmental tools can help legitimize Tokyo’s regional policies and the expanded role for the JSDF as part of Abe’s signature ‘proactive contribution to peace and stability.’ Indeed, Tokyo has made great play of the understanding that countries such as Indonesia have shown towards its new security legislation ( Joint Statement First Japan–Indonesia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting 2015). Overcoming the tag of a “trouble-maker” can soften the ground in terms of foreign public opinion accepting Tokyo’s enhanced security profile, and building diplomatic support vis-a`-vis Chinese assertiveness. Regional governments can also more comfortably expand military and security cooperation with Tokyo if domestic public opinion is not particularly negative. There is an opportunity for Tokyo to generate new positive perspectives, regarding JSDF roles as legitimately helpful and beneficial rather than detrimental to regional security. This is aimed at forging new relationships whereby Japan is seen as a trustworthy and indispensable security partner for ASEAN states, in addition to existing relationships built on trade, aid, economic and financial linkages. This might well develop beyond what some scholars have termed the aid-based ‘dependency politics’ of the Japan–ASEAN relations which underpinned the previous Japanese quest for regional leadership roles (Hsiao & Yang 2009: 8). This chapter, however, does not purport to establish that achieving smart power is the goal of Japanese activities. Rather, it argues that smart power provides a useful analytical frame to evaluate Japanese initiatives in Southeast Asia, bearing in mind the Chinese rhetoric on Tokyo’s trouble-making. In other fields, smart power has been utilized to examine global health programs as a valuable tool for diplomacy (Kevany 2014). While the term ‘smart power’ has not been officially laid out in Japanese government documents, Prime Minister Abe has used the concept to describe Japan’s determination to lead in global health diplomacy (Abe 2013) through various tools such as use of ODA, diplomacy at the UN and G7 and engagement with ASEAN. The think-tank, Japan Foundation for International Relations, also released a report in 2015 considering the US–Japan alliance in ‘the era of smart power.’ Japan’s legitimacy as a trouble-shooter can be illustrated through two developments. First, providing assistance and capacity-building for ASEAN states in upholding norms of maritime freedom of navigation. Some scholars argue that the US–Japan alliance could generate smart power by combining overwhelming hard power assets with soft power and attracting other countries by providing international collective goods (Matake 2012). Maritime freedom of navigation in the Asia–Pacific has emerged as one such key public good in recent years due to tensions over the South China Sea. Second, JSDF capabilities could be strengthened, especially in humanitarian relief and peacekeeping, so that ‘hard power can be used to support soft power objectives’ (Wakabayashi 2008: 5). JSDF disaster relief missions after the 2008 Sichuan earthquake and Typhoon Haiyan in 2013 and PKO missions in South Sudan are pertinent examples. The way in which military assets are deployed crucially shapes how they are received because ‘fighting and threatening are hard power behaviors; protecting and assisting are soft power behaviors’ (Nye 2011: 227). For instance, American aircraft carriers are stereotypical examples of 204

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coercive ‘hard’ power, yet they were deployed on relief operations off Indonesia after the 2004 tsunami. For Singaporean PM Lee Hsien Loong, this was an example of US military power deployed in ‘soft’ assistance mode. In a speech, he argued that ‘the US should make the most of this soft power to win over hearts and minds and inspire and shape developments in Asia and beyond’ (Lee 2007). Therefore, depending on how military assets are used and deployed, ‘what the army calls the kinetic use of force is not the only currency of military power’ (Nye 2010: 40). A related idea is defense diplomacy; in essence it involves the use of military forces “to dispel hostility, build and maintain trust and assist in the development of democratically accountable armed forces, thereby making a significant contribution to conflict prevention and resolution” (Dodd and Oakes 1998: 22). This may include the sharing of knowledge and trust between armed forces, education programs, bilateral assistance and cooperation programs, advisory services and visits and interactions between ministers and other military and civilian personnel (Capie 2013). However, defense diplomacy should not be evaluated on a stand-alone basis, particularly for a country like Japan, which has long relied on non-military means to achieve its foreign goals. Instead, defense diplomacy can be situated within a larger framework of smart power to better understand the broader repertoire of hard and soft tools that states such as Japan can utilize. Indeed, Abe stressed at the Shangri-La Dialogue 2014 that ‘Japan will combine various options within its assistance menu, including ODA, capacity-building by the Self-Defense Forces and defense-equipment cooperation, to support seamlessly the capacity of ASEAN countries in safeguarding the seas’ (Abe 2014b). This notion of using the JSDF in different ways apart from conventional ‘hard’ war-fighting and battle hints at Nye’s emphasis on the importance of context and mode of deployment: ‘the resources often associated with hard power behavior can also produce soft power behavior depending on the context and how they are used : : : A tangible hard power resource such as a military unit can produce both command behavior (by winning a battle) and co-optive behavior (by attracting), depending on how it is used’ (Nye 2011: 21). When it comes to evaluating Japan’s policies and goals as a legitimate trouble-shooter, there has to be some element of reciprocity present: on one hand, how far Japan views itself as the trouble-shooting donor nation when engaging with these target countries; the second core dimension comprises the desire of the receiver/target nation to view the giver/donor nation somewhat positively as being in a position to provide assistance to solve problems.

Presenting Japan as a global trouble-shooter in the maritime commons The idea of states claiming to protect access to global commons is not unique to Japan. Indeed, the US National Security Strategy 2015 devoted significant space to what it terms the need to ‘assure access to shared spaces’ (cyber, space, air and oceans) that ‘enable the free flow of people, goods and ideas : : : [where] access is at risk due to ‘provocative behavior and increased competition’’ (White House 2015: 12). For Japan helping to maintain access to the Asia-Pacific maritime commons, a combination of reinvigorated diplomacy, development aid through more ‘strategic’ use of ODA for capacity-building, Japan Coast Guard ( JCG) activities and finally JSDF deployments is clearly emerging. These are attempts to enhance the legitimacy and image of Japan as a helpful trouble-shooter for weaker countries in the region that lack capabilities in maritime surveillance and security. Evidence of this intention to trouble-shoot can be traced in Japanese government speeches and documents. Beginning with the diplomatic front, in his 2014 speech at the North Atlantic Council, Abe stressed that ‘Japan should play a more proactive role in order fully to defend freedom of overflight, freedom of navigation, and other global commons’ (Abe 2014a). The 2013 National Security Strategy (NSS) identified, amongst others, ‘risks to global commons’ where 205

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conflicts of interest over the sea are increasing (Government of Japan 2013: 8). The Strategy goes on to note that it considers Japan’s need to ‘maintain and develop : : : open and stable seas’ as well as ‘maintenance and protection of the international order based on shared values and rules’ important (Government of Japan 2013: 2,4). The NSS envisions Japan as ‘a guardian of the rule of law’ and proactive participant in rule-making and strengthening capacity building efforts for developing countries in these fields (Government of Japan 2013: 28). This idea of Japan as a guardian-protector of the global commons contrasts with Chinese depictions of Tokyo as a ‘trouble-maker in Asia.’ In a speech delivered to the Australian Parliament in July 2014, PM Abe declared, ‘So far as national security goes, Japan has been self-absorbed for a long time : : : We want to make Japan a country that will work to build an international order that upholds the rule of law, in order to make vast seas from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian, and those skies, open and free : : : ’ Maintaining and upholding the freedom of navigation in maritime sea lines of communication has emerged as a key indicator of Japan’s trouble-shooting stance vis-a`-vis other countries that share the same concerns. Take for instance Abe’s ‘Bounty of the Open Seas’ speech that was to be delivered in Jakarta in 2013, until a hostage crisis involving Japanese in Algeria drew him back to Tokyo: Japan’s national interest lies eternally in keeping Asia’s seas unequivocally open, free and peaceful—in maintaining them as the commons for all the people of the world : : : [S]eas, which are the most vital commons to us all, are governed by laws and rules, not by might. (Abe 2013) Tokyo also managed to insert the importance of ‘freedom of navigation’ into the Chairman’s statement, despite some ASEAN concerns, at the 16th ASEAN–Japan summit in October 2013 hosted by Brunei. In his 2014 speech in Singapore, outlining what was dubbed the Abe Doctrine, PM Abe continued to stress Japan’s ability to provide solutions to ASEAN in upholding access to the global commons: ‘Japan will offer its utmost support for the efforts of the countries of ASEAN as they work to ensure the security of the seas and the skies, and thoroughly maintain freedom of navigation and freedom of overflight’ (Abe 2014b). Securing diplomatic support from neighboring ASEAN countries such as the Philippines has been a key goal. As a result of this rhetoric and concomitant actions, Japan is beginning to be seen by ASEAN states as a potential source of assistance. Then-Philippines President Benigno Aquino remarked that ASEAN together with Japan could work in a ‘chorus’ against Chinese actions that create ‘instability’ or ‘tensions’ (Philippine Star 2013). Manila, it should be noted, was already tilting towards Tokyo in view of shared maritime disputes with China in the South China Sea and East China Sea, respectively. Then-Foreign Minister Albert del Rosario stated that ‘We would welcome that [Japan play a more active military and security role] very much. We are looking for balancing factors in the region and Japan could be a significant balancing factor’ (Pilling, Landingin and Soble 2012). Backing up these diplomatic moves and rhetoric has been a package of JSDF deployments and developmental activities involving the Japan Coast Guard ( JCG), together with the ‘strategic’ use of ODA to support Japan’s national security interests. Financed through an ODA loan, two used Japanese Fishery Agency patrol vessels and four former commercial fishing boats were transferred to Vietnam in 2015 for marine police and fisheries enforcement missions. Ten patrol vessels are also being built under the new ‘strategic’ use of ODA to bolster the capabilities of the Philippine Coast Guard. All such equipment under ODA have to go to noncombat military aid such as capacity building for coast guard and maritime law enforcement. 206

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Unlike the US Coast Guard, the Japan Coast Guard ( JCG) is a civilian agency under the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism. The Japanese government does not consider its coast guard activities as military activities, and Vietnam’s Marine Police was eligible to receive ODA aid only after Hanoi removed it from Navy control. Japan’s latest 2015 ODA charter upholds the long-standing principle forbidding ODA for military purposes, although, for the first time, it mentions the potential for non-combat military aid on a case-by-case basis if foreign military forces are involved in disaster relief or public welfare. This might make it easier for Tokyo to transfer patrol boats directly to a foreign military; train foreign personnel or provide mine-clearing equipment (Hughes 2015). Radar systems and maritime surveillance aircraft are other possibilities. Under a new ‘more strategic approach’, ODA is now based on Japanese national security interests and the ‘strategic importance of the recipient countries’ (Cabinet Office 2015: 9). In terms of the JCG, Japanese and Philippine coast guard boats held anti-piracy drills in the Philippines in 2015: the first joint exercise of such since World War Two. The JCG has also conducted training for, and joint exercises with, ASEAN countries in addition to the Philippines, such as Indonesia and Thailand. The JCG training vessel Kogima has engaged in three-month long patrols and cooperation programs in the region. Training includes maritime search and rescue and disaster prevention as well as marine pollution surveillance and control. These ODA and JCG initiatives should not be understood as stand-alone efforts. In May 2012, days after Tokyo first announced plans to supply coast guard patrol vessels to Manila, three Maritime Self-Defense Forces training vessels arrived for a routine port call in Manila, which the Yomiuri Shimbun linked to Japan’s interest in the Philippines and the South China Sea disputes. Talks are also underway to grant the JSDF access to Philippine naval bases and facilities for refueling. Several recent developments involving the JSDF and military material are firsts for the JSDF and Japan for that matter. In February 2016, Japan and the Philippines signed a new defense agreement to allow the transfer of defense equipment and technology from Japan to the Philippines: the first such deal between Japan and an ASEAN country. In May 2015, the first Japan–Philippines joint naval exercises were held in the South China Sea, although Manila stressed that the location was unrelated to disputed waters. Two JMSDF destroyers—the JS Harusame and Amigri—trained with the Philippine Navy frigate BRP Ramon Alcaraz on communication strategies to respond to ‘unplanned encounters at sea’ (de Castro 2015). In 2016, Japan announced the lease (under a separate agreement on transfer of defense equipment) of up to five retired MSDF Beechcraft TC-90 King Air advanced trainer aircrafts to the Philippines Navy, fitted with basic surface and air surveillance radars which can be used for maritime patrols. In April 2016, a training submarine and two destroyers made a port call at strategic Subic Bay, the first visit by a JMSDF submarine in fifteen years. Later that same month, the JMSDF flat-top helicopter destroyer (or helicopter carrier) Ise docked at Subic Bay for a port call before joining the Komodo regional military exercises led by Indonesia. This reflects an accelerating trend of visits by JSDF vessels to the Philippines for training exercises focused on interoperability, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations and maritime surveillance and safety techniques. In April 2016, two JMSDF destroyers. Ariake and Setogiri, sailed into strategic Camh Ranh Bay in Vietnam for the first time since World War Two. It is rare for foreign vessels to be granted permission to the Bay, and the port call was seen as a reflection of growing defense cooperation between Hanoi and Tokyo. Japan’s Ministry of Defence (MOD) defines capacity-building assistance as ‘assisting other nations to build their defense capacities through using the resources of our country : : : [and having] the JSDF use their capabilities and resources to assist other nations’ militaries or militaryrelated organisations.’ One key objective is ‘gaining trust from the international community’ 207

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(Ministry of Defense 2016: 1). Here, the importance of legitimacy is apparent in helping to achieve wider strategic interests, especially support for Japan’s security interests in maintaining freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.

Target country response to Japan’s trouble-shooting efforts In helping plug these capability gaps on issues of shared strategic importance to both sides, Japan is being viewed not as a trouble-maker, but as a useful trouble-shooting solutions provider, firstly in the eyes of Manila. The first provision of retired MSDF aircrafts to a foreign nation, thenPhilippines Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin described as ‘a big help because we don’t have such a capability’. Gazmin confirmed that ‘we already submitted a wish list to Japan, what equipment the Philippines needs urgently to boost our maritime security’ (Associated Press 2016). During the naming ceremony for the first completed patrol vessel built by Japan in May 2016, Transportation Secretary Joseph Abaya thanked Japan for its invaluable assistance in enhancing the Philippines patrol capability and promoting the freedom of maritime navigation. These donations of used or cheap equipment squarely fit the needs and constraints of Manila. As Rear Admiral Alexander Lopez, commander of the Western Command, noted ‘in the midterm we don’t have the funds to buy new equipment for things like maritime domain awareness’ (Sekiguchi 2015). These Filipino responses suggest that Japanese actions were seen as useful in helping to plug critical capability caps and trouble-shooting Filipino problems in maritime surveillance. The dynamics of reciprocity and gratitude for assistance provided by Japan are apparent. President Duterte also stated during his visit to Tokyo in October 2016 that ‘Japan will continue to play an important role modernizing the capabilities of the Philippines’ in maritime security. In a October 2016 speech marking the anniversary of the Philippine Coast Guard, Duterte remarked that the Philippines needed the donated patrol boats from Japan as it did not have enough, and conveyed his ‘sense of gratitude : : : heartfelt thanks for giving us ships, some are here, others are coming and your desire to help the Philippines’ (Adel 2016). Finance Secretary Carlos Dominguez also described the vessels from Japan as ‘a big boost to our Coast Guard’s capabilities in securing our waters’ (Venado 2016). As for the other key recipient of Japanese assistance in ASEAN, it was later announced in May 2016 that Vietnam had made additional requests for brand new vessels. As Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs deputy spokesman Masato Otaka said in Hanoi, where Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida was meeting his Vietnamese counterpart, ‘Japan is a maritime country with a lot of know-how, so it’s perfectly understandable that countries like Vietnam come to Japan for help. We’re doing our best’ (Tan 2016). Here, one can identify the crucial dynamic of a recipient country (Vietnam) perceiving a donor country ( Japan) as being able and willing to provide help. Just as Manila looked towards Japan for used or retired equipment to solve their maritime surveillance problems, Vietnam has done the same. Vietnamese Navy officials reportedly informally enquired into the possibility of purchasing cheaper second-hand aircrafts from the JMSDF, namely the P-3C Orion maritime surveillance and anti-submarine aircraft, as well as training from JMSDF operators. In addition, the JMSDF has been providing training on underwater medicine for Vietnam since 2012, at the request of Hanoi. This needs to be considered in terms of how Vietnam has boosted its submarine force in recent years with purchases of Russian diesel electric Kilo submarines, a move viewed as a response to Chinese naval power. Meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Kishida in May 2016, Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh cited Japan as his country’s most important and long-term partner, expressed gratitude for Tokyo’s donation of used patrol vessels and requested 208

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‘prompt provision’ of more newly constructed vessels. Luu Van Huy, head of the Vietnam Fisheries Resources Surveillance, declared that Hayato, the first Japanese ship donated to Vietnam in August 2015, was the most advanced vessel it ever had. These statements suggest that Japanese initiatives to trouble-shoot maritime security capabilities gaps are seen positively for Vietnam. Commentators such as Jeffrey Hornung have written that Beijing is waging a ‘war on international norms’ and that ‘in essence, China is bucking international norms that guarantee freedom of movement in both the maritime and aerial realms’ (Hornung 2013). This, however, also appears to present a diplomatic opportunity for Japan. Lauding the ASEAN–Japan joint statement unveiled in December 2013 in Tokyo, where all parties agreed to cooperate on ‘freedom of navigation’, PM Abe took a dig at Chinese policies, saying ‘in contrast [to the cooperation we have achieved here], at present we see attempts to alter the status quo in the East China Sea and the South China Sea through unilateral actions [by China].’ The 2014 Diplomatic Blue Book of Japan depicts Tokyo ‘promoting the establishment of the rule of law at sea’ in the face of ‘increasing unilateral actions (by other states) in an attempt to change the status quo by coercion’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014: 3). PM Abe’s speech at the 2014 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore similarly proposed ‘three principles on the rule of law at sea’ to maintain confidence and security—another veiled reference to China’s maritime activities, which are contrasted to Japan’s behavior as unpredictable and destabilizing. This so-called Abe Doctrine has ‘shone a negative light on China by raising the importance of international law and stressing the consensus between Tokyo and its allies on the matter’ (Singh 2014). The focus on capacitybuilding helps confer legitimacy on the JSDF and Japan as responsible helpful powers; whilst China is presented as behaving irresponsibly outside the realms of expected behavior. Abe himself summed up this approach with the slogan: ‘Japan for the rule of law. Asia for the rule of law. And the rule of law for all of us : : : all of us should find one common benefit in keeping our oceans and skies as global commons, where the rule of law is respected throughout’. (Abe 2014b) Tokyo accentuates its more ‘helpful’ and ‘legitimate’ policies while highlighting the flaws and allegedly ‘abnormal,’ ‘unhelpful’, ‘provocative,’ ‘reckless,’ ‘illegitimate’ behavior of China. Interestingly, while Japan portrays itself as a trouble-shooter in response to China calling it a trouble-maker, it is for all intents and purposes counter-labelling China as the real trouble-maker. Perceptions clearly do matter here, for one man’s trouble-shooter is another’s trouble-maker, and we shall return to this point in the conclusion. What is most important, perhaps, is how the target audience such as ASEAN states perceive the issue. Initial evidence is promising for Tokyo and the concluding section will return to this issue of perceptions.

Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) Another way in which a trouble-shooting Japan can function within a smart power approach is in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), especially in the Asia-Pacific, the world’s most natural-disaster-prone region. Disasters and their aftermath provide an opportunity to legitimize JSDF presence in the area and at the same time present Japan as being there to help. In attempting to deflect Chinese claims of Japanese trouble-making, one of the most prominent successes is perhaps a goal that China kicked in its own net when it offered a paltry initial offer of $100,000 to aid relief efforts for the Philippines after Super Typhoon Haiyan in 2013. This stood in comparison to the more generous ten million dollars promised by Japan. As a result, Beijing 209

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received global media criticism (BBC News 2013). To back up monetary donations, Tokyo also seized the opportunity to send its largest ever contingent of JSDF personnel overseas, dispatching major surface combatants such as the flat-top helicopter-destroyer Ise. Filipino and global media outlets reported on the favorable reception JSDF troops received, not least because of the historical symbolism: this was the first-time Japanese naval vessels had returned to the area since the Battle of Leyte Gulf with the US Navy during World War Two. Tente Quintero, 72, a former vice mayor of Tacloban, remarked that at a time of dispute with China over the South China Sea islands, he was ‘happy’ there were Japanese boots back on Filipino soil to help with disaster relief. Other elderly survivors with memories of Japanese war-time occupation quipped that ‘I don’t hold any grudges anymore. There’s no more bad blood between us’ (Abbugao 2013). The difference this time is that JSDF was on a trouble-shooting mission to provide assistance rather than to coerce or threaten. As Filipino analyst Jeffrey Ordaniel pointed out, the disaster provided a platform for the JSDF to play a greater role in peace and security, which ‘can reduce concerns about the country’s alleged return to militarism that have resurfaced in South Korea and China since Abe came to power’ (Ordaniel 2013). This was reinforced by the welcoming response from Filipinos. Besides HADR missions, JSDF naval vessels are also employed on more routine operations that showcase the ability to serve in a trouble-shooting capacity (Heng 2015). The US Navy’s annual Pacific Partnership (PP) program is purposely designed to win hearts and minds through the delivery of medical and dental services to various South Pacific remote islands and ASEAN countries. Personnel also engage in community support activities such as painting kindergartens and rebuilding schools. Since 2007, JMSDF has sent medical personnel to PP, but, in 2010, for the first time, the flat-top amphibious ship Kunisaki sailed with forty medical/dental personnel, plus twenty-two NGO personnel, off Vietnam and Cambodia. After scaled-down involvement in 2011 because of the Great East Japan earthquake, the JMSDF in 2012 contributed another amphibious ship, the Oosumi, with JSDF personnel (air force and navy mostly) and NGOs. In 2013, medical personnel from the Ground (GSDF), Maritime (MSDF) and Air Self-Defense Forces (ASDF) (approximately forty personnel), a destroyer, Yamagiri, and an ASDF transport aircraft were deployed. NGOs working together with JMSDF vessels for the duration of the PP missions have included: Operations Unites (four members), Humanitarian Medical Assistance (HuMA) (fourteen members), Civic Force (two members) and Peace Winds Japan (two members). In 2012, NGOs included International Emergency Medicine and Health Support, Japan (fourteen members) and Association of Medical Doctors of Asia (two members). These NGOs delivering humanitarian dental and medical services and health education activities comprise the crucial non-military developmental aspects of any smart power mission. Tokyo has several aims in PP: enhancing its maritime presence in the region and improving Japan’s image while strengthening inter-operability with the US and other partner navies. The JMSDF role in PP is interestingly described by government documents as ‘an international civilian assistance activity’, despite the use of naval vessels and military personnel (Government of Japan 2010: 1). These ‘international peace cooperation activities’ are listed as particularly important missions in the National Defense Guidelines (Ministry of Defense 2013:7). The use of the JSDF in such missions present Japan as keen to provide assistance and trouble-shoot developmental challenges in the region, seeking to legitimize a more visible Japanese naval presence as a positive trend in the process. The deployment of military vessels under PP has also been used to bolster wider diplomatic initiatives in the region. For instance, Vietnam was one of the host nations for the 2015 iteration in conjunction with the twentieth anniversary of normalization of diplomatic relations between the US and Vietnam. In 2015, Vietnam and the Philippines, two key targets of JSDF and JCG 210

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capacity-building initiatives outlined in the earlier section, were also visited by JMSDF; this time under the ambit of the PP exercise. The Chief of Staff of the JSDF, Admiral Katsutoshi Kawano, observed the August 2015 PP mission, including the participation of JSDF personnel, as it was underway in the Philippines. PP exercises by the JSDF, seen in this light, can help to complement the other JSDF capacity-building missions, by deepening the legitimacy of the Japanese presence in the region as trouble-shooter not just in maritime security, but also in tackling health and developmental issues too. Detailed studies remain to be done as to the all-important aspect of ‘local’ receptivity in the target countries to such PP activities. How far do PP exercises and JSDF participation help legitimize the Japanese presence in the region and present Japan as a trouble-shooter, there to provide assistance? US Navy and JMSDF reports are generally positive and full of impressive statistics of patients treated and schools rebuilt with plenty of smiling faces to go around (American Forces Press Service 2011). There have, however, been scarce evaluations of the key second element of the trouble-shooting strategy: the reciprocity and views of the target audience regarding the JSDF presence. Indeed, the South Pacific Press, such as the Tonga Daily News, has raised some important and critical eyebrows: ‘While there is inherent immediate value to these visits, and participating Naval staff work diligently to provide services, there is minimal sustainability to its efforts or meaningful measurable aid that comes from these exercises. The visibility, however, is great, as the Navy utilizes its PR machine to get word and photos of their visits out to the public’. (Natuzzi 2014) The JSDF can also better tailor its long experiences with disaster relief in Japan through the PP exercises to address local needs of South Pacific islands, including climate-change challenges (Heng 2015). More in-depth field research is required into whether visiting once a year for a few days to provide medical services really enhances legitimacy of the JSDF and Japan as a troubleshooter.

Conclusion Japan’s trouble-shooting stance in Southeast Asia is geared towards achieving its national interests in the security realm. The ‘defense of the maritime global commons’ approach can ostensibly serve two purposes. First, it could prove to be a wide enough net to draw in other states (such as Singapore) who share similar concerns over maritime navigation but do not want to be identified as part of a counter-balancing ‘anti-China posse’ led by Japan. Second, it allows Tokyo to increase its security profile in a more reassuring fashion, bearing in mind sensitivities to its war-time atrocities within the Asia-Pacific. Being a ‘trouble-shooter’ makes Japan attractive and attentive to ASEAN security needs, whilst also supplying Tokyo with tools to signal its strategic responses to Beijing’s maritime initiatives. Of course, China is not blind to what Japan is attempting to do. As a Chinese state-run station observed on the day of the December 2013 joint ASEAN–Japan statement, ‘Japan is loudly publicizing [the importance of[ the safety of the sea and the sky to Asian countries to counter China’s ADIZ and is forcing them to join the network that encircles China’ (Asahi Shimbun 2013). Ultimately, it can prove to be counter-productive if Tokyo’s policy fuels a sense of resentment, suspicion and encirclement within Chinese policy circles, leading to a hardening and militarization of Chinese policy in the region. Beijing has repeatedly accused Japan of ‘interfering’ and ‘meddling’ in the South China Sea through the provision of assistance to Vietnam and the Philippines; what 211

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Tokyo presents as trouble-shooting is unsurprisingly seen as trouble-making by Beijing. Thus far, however, ASEAN governments’ perceptions on the whole differ from Chinese portrayals of Japan as a trouble-maker. On a wide spectrum, they are either likely to view and accept Japanese assistance enthusiastically, express understanding or at least refrain from explicit criticism. The arrival of new Filipino President, Rodrigo Duterte, has not yet derailed the Japanese attempt to trouble-shoot in the region. At the time of writing, Duterte’s statements have signaled a willingness to consider joint patrols with JMSDF vessels in Filipino ‘territorial waters’ in the South China Sea. He also went to some length to address concerns over his perceived tilt towards China, reassuring Tokyo that he wanted to ‘reconnect’ with Japan and that his Beijing visit was all about ‘economics’, and nothing to do with alliances or military and security matters. Indeed, he even referred to Japan as ‘a special friend who is closer than a brother.’ As for the South China Sea, Duterte floated the idea that future discussions on the issue could be ‘multilateral, and that would include Japan.’ This would be contrary to Beijing’s preference for bilateral agreements that exclude Tokyo. Through a series of accelerating joint exercises, historically significant port calls, more routine training and capacity-building for weaker Southeast Asian navies and coast guards, Japan’s presence, in combination with diplomatic initiatives and development aid, has expanded in quite significant ways within a relatively short space of time without stirring much concern or significant backlash in the ASEAN region. Indeed, countries such as the Philippines openly welcome and even encourage JSDF engagement with the region. This is no doubt mainly because these ASEAN states are driven by larger overriding worries about China’s growing maritime ambitions. An opportunity exists for Japan pitching itself as willing and able to help weaker ASEAN states tackle their maritime and related security troubles. A two-way reciprocal dynamic of the ‘troubled–trouble-shooter’ relationship has been observed. States such as Vietnam and the Philippines view increasing JSDF presence (and other non-military assistance) not so much as problematic, but rather as a useful practical and diplomatically symbolic tool vis-a´-viz maritime disputes with China. Japanese aid of a few boats and surveillance planes here and there may not make a significant difference to the military balance of power for Vietnam or the Philippines in the field (given the huge capabilities gap with China), but the growing Japanese presence (and its receptivity) is noteworthy in light of the historical baggage Japan has had with its war-time occupation of the two countries. However, the idea of Japan as a notional trouble-shooter also means that, taking the argument to its logical conclusion, Tokyo will eventually have to consider what position it will actually adopt in the so-far hypothetical event of inter-state military conflict between China and other claimant states (such as Vietnam, which has been a grateful recipient of Japanese assistance). Such a conflict would constitute a worst-case scenario for all parties concerned. Indeed, as Hughes (2015) has argued, the recent moves to expand the JSDF under Abe are potentially dangerous and provocative, and may aggravate regional tensions and ironically worsen Japan’s strategic position. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has increasingly sailed ‘grey-hull’ warships, including intelligence gathering ships and frigates, rather than ‘white-hull’ coast guard vessels, closer into Japan’s contiguous waters near the Senkaku Islands. While the merits of such Chinese escalation might remain debatable (Stashwick 2016), this serves as a stark reminder that defense of the Japanese home islands and territorial integrity will remain the JSDF core mission. Providing capacity-building programs and humanitarian cruises in the South Pacific might well be a luxury secondary priority, especially in light of concerns about over-stretching the JSDF operational tempo through frequent overseas deployments and gains in Chinese maritime capability; the recent commissioning of monster 12,000-ton Chinese coast guard vessels and alleged repainting of armed PLAN vessels in white coast guard colors comes to mind. 212

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Rather than tit-for-tat military moves, Tokyo should continue to develop other means to deal with admittedly serious security challenges from China, beyond simply military responses. Hughes’ recommendation to use regional multilateral institutions to restrain Chinese behavior and for Japan to ’regain its confidence in non-military means’ raises important and significant implications for thinking about the broader spectrum of power capabilities states should, and can, bring to bear in a concerted fashion (Hughes 2015). Indeed, emerging pieces of the so-called Japanese pivot southwards can be seen to reflect some of these smart power principles, even though such a framework was never explicitly stated by the government. As mentioned earlier, using a combination of tools in other cases, such as Japan’s global health diplomacy, has already been outlined explicitly by PM Abe. While such an explicit declaration has not been seen in the case of Japan’s policy towards ASEAN, Abe’s declaration that Japan will combine different tools to provide aid to help ASEAN uphold the freedom of maritime navigation is an important starting point. In practical terms, this has meant a plethora of measures ranging from the use of JSDF in a trouble-shooting mode, providing ‘assistance’ rather than ‘coercion’, to leasing out used equipment such as maritime surveillance aircrafts, education, training and joint exercises to plug capability gaps. It bears reminding that smart power also means that non-military approaches should continue to be emphasized simultaneously. Indeed, Funabashi has argued that ‘Japan is pioneering a civilian power approach that may offer an alternative to military solutions’ (Funabashi 2016). JICA development aid, donations of used patrol boats and civilian agencies such as JCG working towards capacity-building of weaker regional coast guards have to be reinforced through adept diplomacy at multilateral regional bodies like ASEAN to build support for Japan’s key foreign policy and security interests in the region.

Note 1

Some ideas and arguments in this chapter were made in an earlier form in the author’s article, (2015) ‘Smart Power and Japan’s Self Defense Force’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 38(3): 282–308.

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Center for Strategic and International Studies (2007) Commission on Smart Power, www.csis.org/programs/ former-programs/smart-power-initiative accessed 20 May 2014. Clinton, H. (2009) ‘Nomination hearing to be Secretary of State’, 13 January, Washington, D.C.: Department of State, www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2009a/01/115196.htm accessed 30 May 2015. Crocker, C. and Hampson, F. and Aal, P. (eds) (2007) Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, United States Institute of Peace Press: Washington D.C. Dancel, R. (2014) ‘Manila already a winner in UN suit against China sea claims’, 12 April, The Straits Times/ Asia News Network, www.chinapost.com.tw/commentary/the-china-post/special-to-the-china-post/ 2014/04/02/404211/Manila-already.htm accessed 19 April 2015. de Castro, R. (2015) ‘Philippines and Japan strengthen a twenty-first century security partnership’, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 17 December – http://amti.csis.org/philippines-and-japan-strengthena-twenty-first-century-security-partnership/ accessed 10 May 2016. Dodd, T. and Oakes, M. (1998) ‘The Strategic Defence Review White Paper’, House of Commons Library Research Paper, House of Commons Library, 15 October, 91. Forsberg, T. (2005) ‘German Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq’, Security Dialogue, 36(2): 213–231. Funabashi, Y. (2016) ‘Japan enters South China Sea dispute’, Asia Sentinel, 24 May, www.asiasentinel.com/ politics/japan-south-china-sea-dispute/ accessed 28 July 2017. Geis, A. and Wunderlich, C. (2014) ‘The good, the bad and the ugly: comparing notions of “evil” and “rogue” in international politics’, International Politics, 51(4): 454–74. Government of Japan (2010) ‘Pacific Partnership 2010’, Highlighting Japan, July, www.gov-online.go.jp/ pdf/hlj/20100701/18-19.pdf accessed 7 April 2014. Government of Japan (2013) National Security of Japan, Tokyo. Heng, Y. K. (2015) ‘Smart Power and Japan’s Self-Defense Forces’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 38(3): 282–308. Hornung, J. (2013) ‘China’s war on international norms’, The National Interest, 12 December, http:// nationalinterest.org/commentary/chinas-war-international-norms-9547?page=2 accessed 9 January 2014. Hsiao, M. & Yang, A. (2009) ‘Soft Power Politics in the Asia Pacific: Chinese and Japanese Quests for Regional Leadership’, The Asia-Pacific Journal, 7(8): 1–16. Hughes, C. (2015) Japan’s Foreign and Security Policy under the Abe Doctrine: New dynamism or dead end?, Houndsmills: Palgrave. Japan Times (2014) ‘China accuses Japan of being regional “troublemaker”’, 26 February – www. japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/02/26/national/politics-diplomacy/china-accuses-japan-of-being-regionaltroublemaker/#.Vz1aO89JlwE accessed 1 April 2016. Kevany, S. (2014) ‘Global health diplomacy, smart power and the new world order’, Global Public Health, 9(7): 787–807. Lee, H. L. (2007) ‘America and Asia: our shared future’, Speech at the Asia Society/US–ASEAN Business Council Gala Dinner, 3 May – http://asiasociety.org/america-and-asia-our-shared-future accessed 1 February 2014. Liu, T. (2016) ‘Japan’s security laws push Asia-Pacific into abyss of instability’, Xinhua News, 29 March – http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-03/29/c_135232813.htm accessed 1 April 2016. Matake, K. (2012) ‘US–Japan alliance in the era of smart power’, in Report of Prospects and Challenges for the formation of international public goods in the era of smart power: Enlarging the concept of alliance, Japan Forum of International Relations, October – www.jfir.or.jp/e/special_study/201210.pdf accessed 18 August 2014. Ministry of Defense (2013) National Defence Programme guidelines for FY 2014 and beyond, 17 December. Ministry of Defense (2016) Japan’s Defense Capacity Building Assistance, 1 February. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2014) Diplomatic Blue Book 2014 www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/ 2014/html/chapter1/stateofaffairs.html accessed 19 December 2014. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (2016) ‘Wang Yi refuting the Joint Statement by US, Japan and Australia: Peacekeeper or Troublemaker’, 27 July, www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ zxxx_662805/t1384823.shtml accessed 30 May 2017. Natuzzi, E. (2014) ‘Pacific Partnership: can an expensive exercise deliver more value?’, Tonga Daily News, 26 April – www.tongadailynews.to/?p=5703 accessed 28 June 2015. Nye, J. (2004) Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, New York: Public Affairs. Nye, J. (2010) The Power to Lead, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nye, J. (2011) The Future of Power, New York: Public Affairs. Ordaniel, J. (2013) ‘Japanese troops return to the Philippines’, East Asia Forum, 27 November, www. eastasiaforum.org/2013/11/27/japanese-troops-return-to-the-philippines/ accessed 4 May 2016.

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14 Peacebuilding in Japan’s foreign policy Tadashi Iwami

Introduction In the midst of the evolving state of international politics over the last two decades, Japan has sought to find its own way to fulfill its responsibilities as a member of international society. In so doing, Japan has incrementally widened its role in political and security-related affairs around the world. However, Japan’s path to enlarging this role has not been linear and its particular route is founded on its own past experiences. Prior to the 1990s, there were a few international security challenges in which Japan was expected to respond in a certain manner, but instead it averted its own eyes. For instance, as early as June 1958, then United Nations (UN) Secretary General Dag Hammarskjo¨ld asked Japan to deploy ten Japanese Self-Defense Force (SDF) officers to the UN Observation Group in Lebanon. Japan refused his request on the grounds of constitutional, political and normative considerations (Ishizuka 2006: 4–5; Murakami 2003: 154–5; T og o 2005: 377). In the international crisis of the Gulf War in 1990 and 1991, Japan once again failed to fulfill an international expectation, except for providing a large amount of financial assistance. The international response to this failure was clear: Japan was turning its back on the world by not playing a security role commensurate with its economic might (T og o 2005: 386–9). Japan learned it could not continue to avert its eyes if it sought to be considered a fully contributing member of international society. The harsh international criticism against Japan’s lack of commitment to international security in the early 1990s served as a critical juncture in its foreign policy. Since 1992, Japan has become a regular contributor to UN-authorized peacekeeping operations (Dobson 2003). Although controversies over constitutional restrictions remain, Japan has also played partial security roles in global anti-terrorism campaigns, post-Iraq War reconstruction and, more recently, anti-piracy activities (Hughes 2009, 2015). It is in this context that Japan has proactively sought to meet its international responsibilities. In particular, soon after his successful return to the Prime Minister’s Office in December 2012, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made an explicit reference to Japan’s international responsibility to contribute to international security. Referencing Japan’s promise in 1952, upon its restoration

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of sovereignty and return to international society, to consistently contribute to world peace, Abe proclaimed, We have a duty to do good and strive after virtue for the future of the world. This is because sixty-one years ago, our forerunners made a profound pledge, wishing to make Japan exactly that kind of nation. And for that very reason, I believe we have an obligation to make Japan strong and robust and make it a country that the people of the world are able to depend on (Abe 2013b). In order to accomplish this objective, Abe reiterated that Japan would serve as a peacebuilding nation not only in the Asian region (Abe 2013a), but also internationally (Abe 2014). Abe’s principle of “proactive contribution to world peace” was born, in part, out of this declaration. Since then, it has become the central driving force of Japan’s contemporary foreign policy. In the high-level seminar on peacebuilding in Asia proposed by Abe at the East Asia Summit in November 2014, and subsequently held in Tokyo on June 20, 2015, Abe reaffirmed that peacebuilding is a part of his principle, thereby an important means to fulfilling such a duty in international society (Abe 2015). Against this background, this chapter focuses on Japanese peacebuilding in its foreign policy. By recognizing some historical relevance to building peace in Japan’s past, it focuses on making peacebuilding part of Japan’s foreign policy, particularly in reference to the post-9/11 era. Also, this chapter examines how Japan has institutionalized peacebuilding. Importantly, the concept and practice of Japanese peacebuilding is broader and more elastic than often considered in the sense that it is regarded as a set of comprehensive measures to ensure human security. To this end, Japan takes a three-tier approach to peacebuilding: an international approach in promoting dialogue among key stakeholders in international forums; a national approach in providing conflict-affected regions with security and financial assistance through foreign aid and participation in multilateral peacekeeping; and a local approach in the development of human resources for fostering civilian peacebuilders at home. This chapter turns its focus to making some critical observations with regard to Japan’s peacebuilding in the context of the recent evolution of its security strategy. Some conclusions will be drawn concerning the prospect of Japan’s peacebuilding in its foreign policy.

Origins of peacebuilding in Japan’s foreign policy The word “peacebuilding” has become commonly used in international political discourse since its appearance in the UN document, Agenda for Peace, in 1992 (United Nations General Assembly 1992). In parallel with this, many countries, agencies and organizations have defined peacebuilding on the basis of their own policy priorities, agenda items and mandates (Barnett et al. 2007). The likely outcome is that “while everyone might support the idea of building peace, they will operate with considerable differences of interpretation regarding the meaning and practice of peacebuilding” (Barnett et al. 2007: 53). This often leads to a relative lack of definitional clarity in peacebuilding. Japan also defines the term in accordance with its own foreign policy options within the frameworks of its domestic norm of pacifism and external expectations for contributing to peace and security in international society. As explored below, Japan’s peacebuilding strategy shows some degree of similarity with those that are generally agreed upon internationally, such as long-term efforts to implement post-conflict political, economic and social reconstruction in conflict-affected regions. Critical differences are that Japan takes a broader and more elastic approach to peacebuilding by encompassing multidimensional tasks that go beyond the on-the-ground works in conflict-affected regions. The term peacebuilding appeared in a handful of official Japanese

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documents in the late 1990s and early 2000s, such as in international speeches of foreign ministers (K omura 1999; K ono 2000). In particular, following then Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s announcement of the concept of the “consolidation of peace [heiwa no teichaku]” in 2002 (Koizumi 2002), which is now referred to as “peacebuilding”, Japan has incorporated it into official discourses of key ministries and agencies, particularly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). In doing so, Tokyo has gradually developed the idea and praxis of peacebuilding.

Historical insights If we understand peacebuilding as building a peaceful society in a given place, then we see an essence of its origin in Japan’s modern history. According to Hideaki Shinoda, Japan’s first experience of this kind of peacebuilding took place during the late nineteenth century. During this period, while Japan encountered the surge of European imperialism, a number of internal conflicts between the pro-Tokugawa Shogunate forces and the pro-imperial/modernist groups erupted. As a result of this series of conflicts, known as the Boshin War (1868–9), the pro-Tokugawa Shogunate forces were overthrown by the pro-imperial/modernist groups, and the Meiji government was established through the restoration of the imperial rule. The Meiji government then accelerated Japan’s political, economic, social and legal modernization and, in doing so, it successfully restored a more peaceful domestic society in Japan. Obviously, the time period and the context of this kind of peacebuilding are different from those of today given the current systems of peacebuilding that entail UN/multilateral peacekeeping and the provision of foreign aid. Yet, the aims of building a peaceful society in Japan – in this case, stabilizing political, economic, social and legal systems – may not be very different from those of peacebuilding today (Shinoda 2009: 494–502). Furthermore, the origin of Japanese peacebuilding is related to the development of Japan’s foreign policy in the post-Second World War period. In a broader sense, the making of a new Japan that would never threaten international peace and stability was deemed as durablepeacebuilding both in domestic and international societies. The US, in close collaboration with the Japanese side, drew up a blueprint for accomplishing this objective by rewriting the constitution. By liberalizing, demilitarizing and democratizing domestic society, leaders from both countries laid the foundation and began to build a peaceful Japan that prioritized economic recovery and growth while ruling out its international military security roles. By the 1970s, most Japanese leaders sought to play a greater role commensurate with the country’s emerging economic power within the confines of constitutional restrictions. The clearest example was from then Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda, who promised the Southeast Asian countries and international society that Japan would be committed to regional and world peace. By establishing the “heart-to-heart relationship” with Southeast Asian friends for nurturing mutual understanding, trust and confidence between the region and Japan, it would seek a political role in ensuring regional stability (Lam 2013a: 181, 2013b: 13). This soon became the so-called Fukuda Doctrine. The doctrine was translated into Japan’s foreign policy practice in Asia that prioritized distributions of Official Development Assistance (ODA) while not playing a military role in the region. The generally agreed-upon view among Japanese leaders until the end of the 1980s was clear: Japan would become and continue to be a country that would opt out of any military role in resolving international conflicts. An approach of “not doing something militarily” rather than “doing something militarily,” in other words one-country pacifism, was considered a significant baseline for Japan’s foreign policy in contributing to building a peaceful society inside and outside of Japan. Japan’s idea of peacebuilding in the current context may not directly originate from the aforementioned historical insights. Yet, it should not be discounted, because they are relevant to the 218

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choices Japan makes in the context of the incremental changes in Japan’s foreign policy over the last seven decades. As constructivists have revealed (Berger 1996; Katzenstein 1996; Oros 2008; Singh 2008), domestic norms of pacifism engrained in post-Second World War politics and society have served as normative parameters of Japan’s foreign policy. In recent years, some changes are taking place mainly due to Abe’s enthusiasm to enhance Japan’s security strategy. Nevertheless, the domestic norms of pacifism work like a “compass” that indicates where Japan is heading.

The making of Japanese peacebuilding With the end of the Cold War and the rise of the new world order in the early 1990s, Japan reached a critical point in its foreign policy development. While Japan began redefining and refining the rationale of the Japan–US security relationship, its leaders also sought a way to play a sufficient role in international peace and security, balancing domestic normative constraints and increasing international expectations. One profound example is Japan’s peacekeeping role in UN-authorized operations. In 1992, Japan passed a bill that enabled Japanese SDF to participate in UN-authorized peacekeeping operations, such as those in Cambodia and East Timor. The passing of the bill brought about a series of intensive discussions in the parliament and domestic society due mainly to issues of constitutionality and a sense of public fear that Japan would get involved in military activities again. In response to such concerns, Japan made a set of five strict criteria for the participation. Although they limited the role of SDF in peacekeeping operations, Japan’s involvement in UN peacekeeping missions has become one of the most important foreign policy options for Japanese leaders in the post-Cold War era. Other important events in the first decade of the post-Cold War period included then Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi’s promotion of human security. He was particularly keen on spreading a new idea of security from a human-centered perspective. After witnessing a series of devastating consequences of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and 1998, he believed that human security – freedom from want and, to a certain extent, freedom from fear among individuals – was as valuable as national security. As Kaoru Kurusu points out in her chapter in this volume, the concept of human security has added a new flavor to Japan’s foreign policy. It is important to note that Obuchi’s conceptualization of human security had a profound impact not only on the direction of Japan’s foreign policy in the twenty-first century, but also on the idea of peace in Japan. Along with the absence of war and conflict as a form of direct and physical violence, a condition under which human security is satisfied has been perceived as equivalent to the meaning of peace among Japanese leaders, policy-makers and the general public. In this light, peacebuilding has gradually been seen to be an appropriate means to achieve this form of peace. If the end of the Cold War was the first critical point, then 9/11 in 2001 served as another turning point in the history of Japan’s foreign policy. This was not only due to the fact that Japan became actively involved in anti-terrorism campaigns in the Indian Ocean under the antiterrorism special measures law passed that same year (although its activities were limited to logistical support to supply fuel, water and medical supplies), but Also because this event provided Japan with a window of opportunity to reconsider its foreign policy implemented in the last decade. While supporting the US-led global war on terrorism, Japan has begun promoting a form of non-coercive, human-centered activities to help (re)build durable peace. As presented below, from the immediate aftermath of 9/11 in 2001 onwards, Japan began to acquire a clear vision in terms of encouraging approaches contributing to international peace and stability from multidimensional perspectives through long-term processes. Against this background, peacebuilding became a crucial agenda item for Japan’s foreign policy. In particular, this took place following then Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s speech in 219

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May 2002 in Australia. In his speech, Koizumi stressed that Japan would “consider how to increase our international role by providing an added pillar for the consolidation of peace” (Koizumi 2002). There was an ambiguity about what the consolidation of peace meant in his speech, but it was important particularly because the consolidation of peace soon became a synonym for peacebuilding in domestic political discourses. Also, the development of the idea and praxis of Japan’s peacebuilding gained traction immediately after his announcement. In the same month as his speech, Koizumi established a working group called the Advisory Group on International Cooperation for Peace (AGICP) in order to concretize the concept of the consolidation of peace, acknowledge challenges in current conflict situations, and provide practical means of addressing those challenges as a form of Japan’s peacebuilding. In its final report, AGICP wrote that peacebuilding should be understood not only as a direct contribution to restoring stability in conflict-affected regions, but also as a more comprehensive contribution to nurturing the soil in which the seeds of peace can spring. In this respect, the report pointed out that Japan must engage in activities ranging from humanitarian emergency assistance to institution building in the political, economic and social sectors. In order for Japan to effectively implement these initiatives, it concluded by suggesting that Japan must enhance legal and institutional frameworks that enable it to make a more flexible contribution to peacekeeping operations, utilize ODA more effectively and build a system to foster civilian peacebuilding experts at home and abroad (Advisory Group on International Cooperation for Peace 2002). In concert with Koizumi’s initiative in developing the concept of the consolidation of peace into peacebuilding, key ministries and agencies began taking action in this direction. For instance, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) took Obuchi’s concept of human security into account and acknowledged that it would be important for JICA, and Japan as a whole, to utilize ODA for peacebuilding activities in a comprehensive manner. For JICA, peacebuilding should include prevention of conflicts, the provision of humanitarian emergency assistance and more long-term recovery and reconstruction of conflict-affected regions, without causing more harm than good (Japan International Cooperation Agency 2001: ii). This view was reflected in a number of JICA’s policy papers, most notably its ODA Charter in 2003 and the 2015 Development Cooperation Charter. Both recognized peacebuilding as one of the priority agenda items that would need to be addressed through the provision of ODA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2003, 2015a). Similarly, from 2002 onwards, MOFA considered peacebuilding to be one of its most significant roles in stabilizing conflict-affected regions. MOFA’s policy document, Gaiko Seisho, or Diplomatic Bluebook, in 2003 urged that Japan would need to commit itself to the consolidation of peace by promoting peace processes, participating in international peacekeeping efforts and providing humanitarian reconstruction efforts to the people in conflict-affected regions. In 2007, Gaiko Seisho went on to enlarge the scope of peacebuilding to entail state-building through constructing and reconstructing political, economic and social foundations for the long-term consolidation of peace. In November 2013, the most recent Advisory Panel on Peacebuilding (APP) was established to make recommendations to the foreign minister. The final report of APP was submitted to the current Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida in April 2014. It reiterated that Japan must “implement seamless assistance from conflict prevention to reconstruction and development while taking into account the conditions of given countries” (Advisory Panel on Peacebuilding 2014: 4). It also wrote that Japan’s proactive contribution to international efforts on peacebuilding was not only “Japan’s responsibility in international society, but also the source of its national security in a long-term, comprehensive sense” (Advisory Panel on Peacebuilding 2014: 3). In addition, there was growing recognition in Japan that peacebuilding would be more comprehensive than focusing on conventional tasks, namely the provision of ODA. For instance, 220

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then Foreign Minister Taro As o stressed in December 2005 that Japan’s contribution to peacebuilding would ultimately encompass activities that facilitated human resource development for peacebuilding through civilian training (As o 2005). In the following year, Prime Minister Abe reiterated this point when he visited President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of the Philippines. This political enthusiasm led to the launching of the global human resource development program for fostering civilian peacebuilders at the Hiroshima Peacebuilders Center (HPC), Japan, in 2007. As of the 2014 fiscal year, more than 480 civilians from Japan and other Asian and African countries have participated in the program, some of whom have worked in the field of peacebuilding (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2015b: 152). Under the Abe administration since 2012, peacebuilding may have been overshadowed by his more assertive approach to international peace and security. Abe continues to stir political and public debates regarding Japan’s military role, underpinned by the reinterpretation of Article Nine, the limited exercise of the right to collective self-defense under the US security alliance relationship and the passing of new security laws in 2015 (Hughes 2015; Liff 2015; Maslow 2015; Nakanishi 2015). However, it is also important to note that Foreign Minister Kishida reconfirmed the importance of training civilian peacebuilders (Kishida 2015), coupled with other activities such as the participation of peacekeeping operations and the provision of ODA.

Japan’s three-tier approach to peacebuilding Following the development of political discourses on peacebuilding from 2001 onwards, Japan presented a three-tier approach to peacebuilding that consisted of international, national and local efforts in order to consolidate peace in conflict-affected regions (Table 14.1). This approach appeared for the first time in the Gaik o Seisho of the same year. Since then, it has employed broader and more elastic ways to help achieve a high level of human security and thereby build durable peace in conflict-affected regions. As will be assessed below, participation in multilateral peacekeeping missions and the provision of ODA as an incentive for peace are not the only means for Japan to undertake peacebuilding. Along with these key on-the-ground efforts, multiple engagements through a variety of channels, such as diplomatic dialogues in international forums as well as human resource development at home, are regarded as suitable policy options for peacebuilding among Japanese leaders and practitioners. Indeed, “while the broader definition of the concept [of peacebuilding] may not pass muster with academics keen on intellectual rigor and conceptual clarity, Tokyo is more concerned about the practicalities of conflict prevention, peace negotiations and post-conflict reconstruction” (Lam 2009: 16). In short, the hallmark of Japan’s peacebuilding is the elasticity of peacebuilding in concept and in practice.

International level As noted above, Japanese peacebuilding consists of three tiers: international, national and local. Although these are all interlinked, it is nevertheless useful for us to understand the distinctive purposes of each approach, how each is institutionalized and on what areas of Japanese peacebuilding each is focused. First, the international approach puts emphasis on taking a diplomatic lead in international forums. The main purpose of this approach is that Japan not only participates in international discussions and conferences on peacebuilding, but also actively organizes those forums in order to promote the concept of human security and its achievement as a central objective of peacebuilding. For instance, Masahiko Kiya, the former Director of the International Cooperation Division and Director of the UN Planning and Administration Division of MOFA and currently the Japanese Ambassador to South Sudan, notes that international forums like the 221

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Table 14.1 Japan’s three-tier approach to peacebuilding Tier

Purpose

Institutionalization

International

Promotion of better ideas of, and approaches to, peacebuilding through international forms International: UNPBC Implementation of the ground work in conflict-affected regions Various Fostering the future generation for peacebuilding

UN policy

Regional policy National ODA Local

Areas of focus

UN/Multilateral PKO Human resource development

At home: Hiroshima Peacebuilders Center

UN and the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (UNPBC) are a set of “venues” for Japan and other concerned organizations and countries to get involved in rule-making processes on internationally significant agenda items such as peacebuilding. It is therefore important for Japan not only to marshal knowledge and resources, but also to set its own priorities for peacebuilding by taking international leadership (Kiya 2010: 153). An active diplomatic involvement in international forums as a part of Japan’s peacebuilding approach has been institutionalized in its own foreign policy. For instance, at the time of gaining UN membership in 1956, Japan explicitly proclaimed that the UN would be the cornerstone of Japan’s foreign policy. In the first Diplomatic Bluebook of MOFA published in the following year, Japan’s so-called UN-centralism was reiterated. Although there were twists and turns in Japan’s UN-centralism during the Cold War, Japan has continued to place a strong emphasis upon it. To a greater extent, this is what has led Japan to be elected as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council eleven times as of 2016. There are at least two obvious areas of focus in this first-tier approach that puts an emphasis on taking a lead in international forums. First, Japan has enhanced the architecture of peacebuilding under the UN framework. Particularly, Japan considers the UNPBC, of which it is a founding member, a leading organization for seeking effective means to provide peacebuilding in individual cases such as conflicts in Sierra Leone and Burundi. Also, serving as a chair of the UNPBC from June 2007 to December 2008, Japan coordinated key stakeholders in the organization for effective strategies of peacebuilding in order to seek ways to promote the engagement of domestic and international private sectors (United Nations General Assembly and United Nations Security Council 2008). In addition, Japan produced a report for the UNPBC in June 2008. In this report, the importance of seamless and long-term commitments, the significance of institutional capacitybuilding in the political, economic and social sectors and the centrality of human security in peacebuilding were stressed (Takasu 2008). In so doing, Japan took a leadership role in developing the principles of, and approaches to, effective strategies of peacebuilding through UN institutions. Second, Japan has regularly held a series of international conferences that have focused on regional peacebuilding and development. Particularly, it has hosted seven Tokyo International Conferences on African Development (TICAD) since 1993, which have been underpinned by the three fundamental principles: consolidation of peace, human-centered development in the region and poverty reduction. Today, TICAD is perceived as a key global framework for Africa’s peacebuilding and development processes. It has helped to put Africa’s challenges and potential onto the international stage while highlighting the main agendas from both the donor’s and recipient’s perspectives (Osei-Hwedie and Osei-Hwedie 2010: 38–9). TICAD has allowed 222

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Table 14.2 Japan’s ODA disbursement in the field of peacebuilding (US million) Year

Peace processes

Administrative capability

Security assurance

Demining

DDR of ex-combatants

Total

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

2.86 – 5.00 50.31 67.87 3.62 0.72 17.65 24.63

8.28 11.72 29.70 12.30 240.62 5.19 14.39 2.52 16.87

35.87 12.25 23.24 10.69 32.26 34.32 38.41 22.96 19.24

3.99 – 10.22 20.96 37.78 45.31 32.74 45.12 24.40

19.91 16.25 – 1.68 – 20.72 13.70 – –

70.91 40.22 68.16 95.94 380.53 109.17 99.96 88.25 85.14

Source: Modified from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2010 “Sanko Shiryo Shu [Appendix]” in Seifu Kaihatsu Enjo (ODA) Hakusho [Official Development Assistance (ODA)White Paper], 14; and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2015 “Sanko Shiryo Shu [Appendix]” in Seifu Kaihatsu Enjo (ODA) Hakusho [Official Development Assistance (ODA)White Paper], 14.

Japan to directly engage in conversations and dialogues with regional and international stakeholders and enabled them to articulate their shared views on agenda items and come up with their best possible solutions for regional challenges. For Japan, this well-institutionalized global framework within their foreign policy serves as one important and distinctive way of contributing to peacebuilding.

National level The second-tier approach to Japanese peacebuilding is national-level support to conflict-affected regions through the provision of ODA and participation in multilateral peacekeeping operations. Although this approach is often concerned with international mandates and frameworks of peacebuilding, it can be characterized as “national” in the sense that ODA and peacekeeping are Japan’s bilateral means of directly engaging in the process of peacebuilding on the ground in conflict-affected regions. The second-tier approach encompasses a great degree of similarity with those activities we usually conceive of as peacebuilding. The provision of ODA to conflict-affected regions for the purpose of peacebuilding has been institutionalized in Japan’s foreign policy since 2001 (So¨derberg 2010). As noted above, Japan’s 2003 ODA Charter acknowledged peacebuilding as one of the priority issues. In particular, Japan’s ODA is used for five areas of peacebuilding: 1) financial and technical support for security and stability assurance that aims at security sector reforms; 2) the enhancement of the administrative capability of local governance including processes of political, economic, judicial and social systems and infrastructures; 3) support for peace processes by encouraging dialogues with the parties in conflict; 4) disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR) and the collection and disposal of weapons through the provision of financial aid; and 5) demining. Table 14.2 shows the financial disbursement of Japan’s ODA within the category of peacebuilding since 2006. This illustrates Japan’s areas of focus through ODA disbursements. These areas generally reflect Japan’s continued commitment to supporting peace processes and the post-conflict capacity-building of societies in Southeast Asia, namely Cambodia, East Timor, Aceh in Indonesia, Mindanao in the Philippines and Sri Lanka. Indeed, Japan utilized ODA as a key incentive to prevent the reoccurrence of conflicts in those regions (Lam 2009, 2013a: 183). Also, Japan has disbursed ODA for support of security assurance, demining and DDR as part of its 223

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engagement in the post-9/11 reconstruction of Afghanistan and post-war humanitarian reconstruction of Iraq (Ashizawa 2014). In addition to the provision of ODA, Japan’s participation in multilateral peacekeeping missions is another means of implementing peacebuilding on a national level. Japan’s peacekeeping on the ground is strictly limited to a non-military role in the sense that neither does it go to the forefront of combat areas nor does it use coercive means to create peace. This means that even if Japanese SDF personnel participate in those peacekeeping activities, their activities are confined within engineering, logistical and reconstruction assistance such as building basic infrastructure, transporting food, water and fuel and delivering medical/health care. Combatstyle operations to restore order and security by force are not considered a part of Japan’s peacebuilding practice. This is due mainly to the self-restrictive principles and roles of peacekeeping engagement underpinned by the domestic norm of pacifism. The so-called five principles of Japan’s participation in peacekeeping – the existence of a peace agreement between parties in conflict, the attainment of consent from them, the maintenance of impartiality, the withdrawal of Japanese troops from the operations if one of the three aforementioned principles are not satisfied and the strict use of weapons for self-defense purposes – serve as a set of normative frames of reference to the extent of their own activities. Although the recent change in security legislation under the Abe administration has had an impact on the fifth principle on the use of weapons, the administration has sustained a non-coercive approach to peacebuilding. In 2002, East Timor became the first test case of Japan’s commitment to on-the-ground efforts in peacebuilding after Koizumi’s articulation of consolidation of peace. Japan initially sent 680 engineering unit personnel, along with twenty-two staff officers and liaison personnel, to the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET; later became the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) in May 2002). By the end of its participation in UN-led missions in East Timor in June 2004, Japan had contributed more than 2300 personnel in total for repairing and maintaining key infrastructures for building a newly established state. Although the scale was small when compared to this initial involvement in East Timor, Japan continued to send a handful of SDF and civilian personnel, including twenty-two election monitoring observers between March and July 2007, for the April presidential and legislative elections. From September 2010 to September 2012, seven liaison and coordination officers were deployed to the UN Integrated Mission in East Timor. Another example is Japan’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations in South Sudan since 2011. More than 1400 Japanese engineering personnel and coordination officers have been stationed in South Sudan as part of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) (Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters 2013). Their duties include the reconstruction of roads and planning and coordinating engineering work with other foreign forces in UNMISS. In October 2016, the Abe administration extended Japan’s participation in UNMISS by five months until March 2017. Furthermore, Abe decided to approve a new mandate for Japanese SDF personnel in UNMISS: a role to come to the aid of foreign peacekeepers and civilian officials based on the recent change in security laws (Kubo and Sieg 2016). In the eyes of the Japanese leaders and practitioners, peacekeeping operations are, to a great extent, another integral part of Japan’s peacebuilding in practice.

Local level The third-tier approach to Japanese peacebuilding is the human resource development of civilian peacebuilders. This approach is “local”-level support in the sense that Japan focuses on training civilians from Japan. Although human resource development may be regarded as an indirect (and sometimes irrelevant) way for building peace when compared to actual on-site participation in 224

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peacekeeping missions and the provision of financial and material foreign aid, human resources are considered one of the useful “assets” for a long-term commitment to peacebuilding. Human resource development for fostering civilian peacebuilders in Japan has been institutionalized since 2007 following then Foreign Minister Aso’s enthusiasm in establishing what he called “a school to build peacebuilders” (As o 2006). Commissioned by MOFA from 2007 onwards, Hiroshima Peacebuilders Center (HPC) has been the primary implementer of the human resource development training program. The main program, called the Global Peacebuilders Program (GPP), is intended for young professionals and other individuals from Japan and the Asian region who seek to develop their own careers in peacebuilding (Uesugi 2012). Participants are trained to be experts in analyzing the root sources of conflict and implementing effective mediation processes. Also, GPP aims at providing intensive training in coordinating and managing DDR, security sector reforms, humanitarian emergency support and long-term development in the political, economic and social sectors. As of January 2015, a total of eighty-nine Japanese civilians have participated in GPP. Of those, twenty-four work in international organizations, including UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, and WFP; twenty-two have joined the Junior Professional Officer Program – a program for young professionals to pursue their careers in participating international organizations; another twenty-one serve as officials or staff in government ministries, agencies or non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as MOFA, the Cabinet Office, JICA and the Japan Center for Conflict Prevention (Hiroshima Peacebuilders Center 2014: 15). This three-tier approach indicates the comprehensive and elastic nature of Japan’s peacebuilding, and to this extent the country’s comparative advantage in the field of peacebuilding (Uesugi 2014). Simultaneously, it has enabled Japan to put the concept of human security into practice in various ways without relying on coercive means to contribute to peace and security.

Critical observations of peacebuilding in Japan’s foreign policy The preceding section has presented that Japan considers peacebuilding as a comprehensive and inclusive process of addressing the root causes of conflicts in a wider context. Contributing to a condition where there is a diminished occurrence of conflict and direct violence among conflicting parties is certainly one of the main goals of Japanese peacebuilding. Moreover, with the development of the concept of human security in Japan’s foreign policy since the late 1990s, peacebuilding has become a useful tool for Japan to help achieve human security of individuals in conflict-affected regions. In particular, Japan takes a three-tier approach to peacebuilding in order not only to make a direct contribution to keeping peace through peacekeeping and the provision of material assistance and financial foreign aid at the national level, but also to create venues for international dialogues on promoting effective peacebuilding in concept and practice on the international stage while developing human resources at home. In this light, one of the key benefits of this three-tiered approach is that it gives Japan a wide range of opportunities for the purpose of promoting human security to engage in through the long-term process of peacebuilding, while continuing to work within domestic normative constraints. However, we can make four critical observations regarding Japan’s peacebuilding in the context of the development of its own security strategy in recent years.

Changing characteristics of ODA Characteristics of ODA, which is an important component of Japan’s peacebuilding, are changing in two ways. To begin with, as Table 14.2 indicates, the disbursement of ODA in the field of 225

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peacebuilding has shrunk significantly. In 2014, it fell to US$85 million from US$380 million in 2010. In fact, Japan’s net ODA has decreased by 14.6% in the last year alone, becoming fifth behind the US, the UK, Germany and France (approximately US$9.26 billion). It also had the lowest level of net disbursements of ODA over in the last five years (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2016: 35). This steady decrease in the budget raises concerns over the consistency between policy discourses that emphasize ODA as one of the core means for Japan to undertake peacebuilding and the actual peacebuilding praxis. Another changing characteristic is that the use of ODA for assisting foreign military forces is being incrementally justified. As part of Prime Minister Abe’s refinement of Japan’s security strategy, the ODA Charter was revised in February 2015 (and renamed the Development Cooperation Charter). Under the new charter, Japan may provide foreign military forces with material and financial assistance if they are involved in humanitarian aid or disaster relief, and Japan’s ODA is used for these purposes. Whether such provision of ODA to foreign armed forces is appropriate or not is considered by the Japanese government “on a case-by-case basis in light of their substantive relevance” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2015a). Given the possibility that Japan’s ODA can be transferable to military usage by recipient countries, one scholar notes that this can be perceived as “remilitarization of ODA” (Hughes 2015: 36). The statement “caseby-case basis in light of their substantive relevance” is highly contestable because it is often difficult for, and ultimately up to, the Japanese government to draw boundaries between military and non-military purposes. In fact, it has been reported that Japan will provide up to ten patrol boats to the Filipino government by 2018 as part of its ODA which can be used for strategic purposes by the Filipino government in relation to the ongoing South China Sea dispute (Nikkei Shimbun 2015). Some argue that this change in the Charter could potentially pave a path to “militarize” Japan’s ODA under the name of “peacebuilding” (see Chapter 19 of this volume). However, a statement on the avoidance of the use of ODA for military purposes also appears in the revised charter, with almost identical expressions to that which appeared in both previous charters (1992 and 2003). It stresses that Japan will “comply with the principle of avoiding any use of development cooperation for military purposes or for aggravation of international conflicts” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2015a). From this perspective, the revision explored in the previous paragraph merely suggests that Japan can make substantial material and financial contributions to foreign military forces as long as they are utilized for non-military purposes. The provision of ODA for repair and maintenance of a military hospital in Senegal in 2001 was an instance of the use of ODA for this purpose. Also, as is often the case in the immediate aftermath of natural disasters, domestic and foreign armed forces are deployed to affected regions for the purpose of disaster relief. In this light, it is also possible that Japan’s ODA can be used for providing them with medical supplies, tents, machinery and technical assistance as part of disaster relief support (Miyasaka 2014). The question of the extent to which ODA will be used for assisting foreign military forces in non-military terms still remains unclear. Abe and his successors need to be accountable for making sure Japan’s ODA is used for humanitarian and disaster relief purposes only.

Expanding the role of Japanese SDF As part of peacebuilding activities, Japanese SDF personnel could potentially play an extended military role. The recent security legislation reforms that took place under the Abe administration have widened the legal framework for their future roles (see Chapter 2 of this volume for Hornung’s detailed analysis). For instance, following the reforms, Japanese SDF personnel are now allowed to use weapons not only for the purpose of self-preservation, but also for coming to the aid of foreign armed forces and civilian staff who are geographically distant from the SDF 226

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personnel. As one report suggests, the Japanese government announced on November 15, 2016 that a new SDF unit would participate in the come-to-aid (also known as kaketsuke keigo) mission when deployed to South Sudan in November 2016 (Japan Times 2016). In this case, the Japanese government stated that come-to-aid operations would be undertaken exclusively for rescuing NGO staff if any other foreign armed peacekeepers cannot execute similar missions. An aid mission for other foreign troops under attack has been opted out of in this government decision. Nevertheless, the inclusion of the come-to-aid activities indicates an important change in the rule of engagement of Japanese personnel in peacekeeping operations. This change eases some restrictions on the use of weapons and gives them greater responsiveness for difficult situations such as when rescuing foreign armed forces and civilian staff under attack. Another example is that, under the revised security legislation, Japanese SDF personnel are permitted to play wider peace monitoring roles. They may establish missions to monitor and patrol regions where they have been deployed in order to protect civilians, their livelihood and their property, which they could not do in previous cases such as in Aceh (Lam 2009: 64), Mindanao in the Philippines (Lam 2009: 86), and Sri Lanka (Lam 2009: 103). Optimists may argue that Abe’s security legislation reforms have enabled Japan to play a better and more internationally-demanded role in peacebuilding so that it will make practical contributions to on-the-ground work. Critics may suggest that Japan will get involved in operations in which SDF personnel are exposed to high risks of killing or being killed by combatants. The widening of the legal framework does not suggest that they will undertake fully-fledged combat-style missions in order to make and keep the peace. Nevertheless, it is important to be cognizant of the potential consequences of these legal and policy changes.

Lacking inter-agency coordination Another critical observation is that inter-agency coordination among Japanese ministries and agencies in peacebuilding is often lacking. MOFA is working on establishing bilateral and multilateral diplomatic dialogues; MOFA and JICA are more focused on the provision of ODA; and the Ministry of Defense (MOD) is the central ministry for the deployment of SDF to peacekeeping operations. While the Secretariat of the International Cooperation Headquarters in the Japanese Cabinet Office plays some degree of an inter-coordinative role, scholars and practitioners have pointed out the potential for better and more robust coordination (Ashizawa 2014: 10–11; Hasegawa 2007: 61–5). The importance of inter-agency coordination of, or as it is often called the “whole-of-government” approach to, peacebuilding, was reiterated in the final report of the Advisory Panel on Peacebuilding in April 2014. The newly established National Security Council (NSC) may be the best possible solution to help the Japanese government achieve better coordination among key agencies in this area because dealing with peacekeeping operations is considered one of the primary objectives of the NSC. To be sure, closer collaboration among the relevant ministries and agencies in the NSC does not mean the automatic success of peacebuilding in conflict-affected regions. Neither does it guarantee that peacebuilding will not be overshadowed by other priorities in the NSC. Still, better inter-agency coordination is particularly imperative for Japan because the three-tier approach to peacebuilding may become ineffective without it when considering the comprehensiveness of peacebuilding operations.

Lacking political will among Japanese leaders Last, but not least, of the challenges that Japan’s peacebuilding policy faces is that a high level of political will among Japanese leaders to commit themselves to long-term peacebuilding is often 227

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lacking. With the exception of the case of Cambodia where Japan has been completely committed to resolving the conflict since the 1980s, Japan has not played substantial political roles in practical conflict resolutions. For example, Japan failed to play a key role in securing a political settlement between the Sinhalese-led Sri Lankan Government and Tamil minorities. In the case of Aceh in Indonesia, Japan was initially motivated to broker a peace agreement between the Indonesian Government and the separatist Gerakan Aceh Mederka (GAM). However, it was overshadowed by other domestic priorities, in particular the postal reform in 2005 under the Koizumi administration. Instead, it was Finland that successfully brokered the peace agreement between the Indonesian government and GAM in August that same year. In short, Japan “displayed none of the tenacity and eagerness shown by Finns in hosting peace talks for Aceh” (Lam 2009: 71). The challenge ahead is whether and to what extent Japan demonstrates a continued political commitment to peacebuilding (Lam 2013a: 187). In South Sudan, the political cleavage between President Salva Kiir from Dinka, the largest ethnic group, and the first Vice-President Riek Machar from Nuer, the second largest ethnic group, has deepened since the political and military confrontation in 2013. This has recently reignited a series of conflicts in which the new country is facing a serious humanitarian crisis (BBC 2016). While a handful of Japanese leaders, such as the Japanese Ambassador to South Sudan, Masahiko Kiya, may have a good background in peacebuilding, whether they will be able to play a sufficient political role in mediating the confrontation of the two parties remains to be seen. Japan has a proven track record of showing its political interests in taking a leadership role in international forums for peacebuilding and development in Africa such as TICAD. It has also shown its serious commitment to peacekeeping operations in South Sudan by extending its involvement in UNMISS. These efforts must come with a high level of political will by Japan to helping broker peace agreements in South Sudan as well, if it wishes to maintain peacebuilding as one of the pillars of Japanese foreign policy.

Conclusion Abe’s return to power in 2012 has attracted scholarly and public interest in, and concerns about, where Japan will go from here. Under the Abe administration, we have seen the widening of the security role of the SDF in peacekeeping operations and a more flexible use of Japan’s ODA for security purposes, along with a reinterpretation of Article Nine of the constitution, and the possibility of the limited exercise of the right to collective self-defense under the US security alliance relationship. These policies and debates have made some perceive Abe as having a more assertive approach to international security than we have seen since the end of the Second World War. While the change in foreign policy to be more assertive under Abe worries some, it is equally important to bear in mind that the majority of the members of international society have high expectations of Japan’s international security role. Although Japan was able to maintain one-country pacifism up until the end of the Cold War, and generally stay in tune with domestic expectations and international responsibilities, the dynamics of the international system today require a different response. Today, as its long-term foreign policy strategy, Japan is seeking a greater security role in international society in order to assume such responsibilities. Peacebuilding fits into this strategy well because, albeit it has some limitations, peacebuilding has allowed Japan to achieve such goals by striking a balance between the domestic norm of pacifism and increasing international expectations to do more than checkbook diplomacy. Thus, when done well, peacebuilding is certainly a well-balanced, well-accepted means of protecting human security among people in conflict-affected regions and making an international contribution. 228

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Serious commitment to peacebuilding can therefore be a useful strategic tool for Japan to raise its international status, thereby ensuring its position as a valuable member of international society. To be respected and recognized by other nations in international society, Japan needs to walk the walk. This international recognition is, to a great extent, dependent upon Abe’s, and more generally the Japanese government’s, genuine political commitment to continuously matching the peacebuilding praxis with the concept of human security and the elastic approach to peacebuilding. For the time being, it is unlikely that under Abe Japan would choose to participate in fully-fledged military roles in peacebuilding, despite the development of Japan’s recent security strategy (see Chapter 2 of this volume). Nevertheless, how long this highly non-military-oriented form of peacebuilding will serve as one of the cornerstones of Japan’s foreign policy under Abe and his successors remains to be seen. We need to be cognizant of their political intentions under the banner of “peacebuilding”.

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15 National security at the crossroads Security interdependence and Japan’s arms trade ban policy Kyoko Hatakeyama

Introduction In the era of globalization, complex linkages among security, economics and technology have been deepening. In response, Japan’s arms trade policy has evolved. While existing scholarship focuses on changes in the strategic environment, domestic economic goals or non-material explanatory factors, it underestimates the ramifications that deepening interdependence has had in the security field. Today, having interdependent relationships with friendly states is becoming more important than ever for Japan to protect its national security, and Japan has responded in kind with fundamental changes to its arms trade policy. The Three Principles on Arms Export (hereafter called the Three Principles), in place since 1967 and reaffirmed in 1976, did not permit the export of arms to communist bloc countries, countries under a UN arms embargo or countries engaged, or likely to be engaged, in international conflict. This policy was initially relaxed under the rule of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in 2011. This revision enabled participation in international collaboration and the transfer of defense equipment when doing so would contribute to international peace. Subsequently, the Shinzo Abe administration, which has vigorously championed a policy labeled ‘proactive pacifism,’ enacted new regulations (hereafter, New Three Principles) in 2014 to further allow the transfer of defense equipment and components. Although the New Three Principles require a prior government screening for any firm wishing to export weapons, it greatly broadened the scope of arms exports. The government also established the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency in 2015 to ensure smooth technological cooperation and strengthen the technological base and production of defense-related equipment. The motivation behind these policy alterations was primarily three-pronged. First and foremost, the aim was to allow Japan to engage in joint weapon development programs with allied countries. The belief was that involvement of this sort would contribute to national security. Accordingly, Japan made defense equipment cooperation agreements with the UK, France and Australia in 2013 to kick-start joint research. It also decided to participate under US initiatives in the ongoing development of the F-35 fighter, which is predicted to become the Air SelfDefense Force’s next main combat aircraft. The second objective was to allow peacekeepers, as 232

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represented by the Self Defense Forces (SDF), to donate equipment, such as heavy machinery and bulletproof vests, to their host country upon withdrawal. For example, in December 2012, the government decided to donate the SDF’s armor-plated heavy machinery to Haiti upon the SDF’s withdrawal from peacekeeping operations there. The third purpose was to enable the government to either provide or export defense equipment to other, mainly Asian, countries. For instance, the government decided to provide patrol vessels to the Philippines in 2013 and Vietnam in 2015, both of which are eager to strengthen their military capabilities to patrol the South China Sea. It also attempted, although unsuccessfully, to export submarines to Australia in 2016 and hopes to export US-2 amphibious aircraft to India to deepen its security ties. Undeniably, such exports benefit the defense industry. More importantly, however, the provision or export of defense equipment serves to develop Japan’s security relationships. Japan’s decision to abolish the ban is noteworthy because the policy had been regarded as a hallmark of the country’s anti-militarism by constructivists, who claim that Japan’s foreign policy has been guided by anti-militarist norms/identity (Katzenstein and Okawara 1993; Berger 1998; Oros 2008). However, their claims cannot explain why Japan abolished the ban after long-term compliance.1 Noting Japan’s active involvement in the security field in the post-Cold War era, some modified the former claim by arguing that Japan’s anti-militarist norm or identity has shifted from a ‘peace state’ norm to an ‘international state’ norm, which believes that Japan should contribute militarily to peace and stability of the world as a member of the international community (Singh 2008). However, unlike participation in UN peacekeeping operations, the aim of the decision was not to contribute to peace and stability of the world. Thus, normative factors cannot effectively explain Japan’s decision to end the ban on arms exports. Mercantilists explain Japan’s behavior by arguing that Japan’s foreign policy is organized around the goal of enhancing its techno-economic interests (Heginbotham and Samuels 1998).2 From a mercantilist perspective, Japan relaxed the ban to revive its defense industry by promoting the export of weapons. However, given its small domestic market and tough international competition, it is not a conceivable option for Japan to considerably increase its arms exports (Jo 2016: 142–4). Therefore, it is not a persuasive argument to say the objective was a revival of the defense industry. Closely investigating Japan’s defense industry, Samuels and Green both emphasize Japan’s pursuit of technological preponderance through domestic production (Samuels 1994; Green 1995). They note that the benefits of the technology obtained through licensed production extended to civilian sectors, promoting Japan’s overall economic growth. Similarly, by recognizing the changed circumstances in the defense field, Hughes (2011) argues that Japan’s techno-nationalist model, which aimed to integrate civilian and military technologies, is losing its previous effectiveness due to structural limits such as constrained defense budgets and limited international collaboration. As a result, Japan’s defense industry faces a ‘slow death’. This has the potential to result in declining technological strength, and thus to increase Japan’s dependence on other countries (mainly the US) for its national security (Hughes 2011). Both of these arguments note that Japan has responded to changed circumstances, and implicitly reference the importance of interdependence in the economic and security fields. However, neither answers the question of how increasing interdependence affects the preferences of actors and then national security policy. By explicitly incorporating the interdependence approach, this chapter aims to complement the existing literature, which has not paid sufficient attention to the impact of interdependence on national security. As I will argue, autarkic defense production has been undermined by ‘production interdependence’ (Brooks 2005: 126). That is to say, the growing interdependence of the security field completely changed the situation surrounding Japan, posing a challenge to the country’s established course, namely semi-autarkic 233

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policy. Therefore, this assessment of the arms trade ban policy, where national, economic and technological security converge, will provide us with a new perspective on the factors driving Japan’s policy changes. It also gives us insights into Japan’s overall international strategy and its future course: a negative impact caused by deteriorating technological competitiveness is not limited to the arena of technological competitiveness – it will inescapably extend to various fields, including national security. Given that Japan’s power structure is quite limited, with its military power heavily constrained due to Article Nine and its economic power vulnerable due to the lack of national resources, maintaining technological superiority must be indispensable for Japan to pursue its national interests. This chapter’s first section lays out a conceptual framework that will be used to elucidate this complex problem. The concept of interdependence was first debated in the 1970s, but it is still a useful concept for analyzing foreign policy given the growing and expansive interdependence of the modern world. This interdependence has not only removed the hierarchical barrier between military and economic issues but has also affected actors’ preferences. The second section explains the preferences of both the government and the business community regarding defense production during the Cold War period. The third section analyzes the changing preferences of the business community and the government in the post-Cold War period. By investigating how the actors perceived the arms trade ban policy over time, the chapter argues that interdependence changed actors’ preferences, leading to a policy modification. Although Japan still believed, to a large degree, that semi-autarkic policy was preferable, it could not single-mindedly pursue the policy due to deepening interdependence. One might assume that Abe’s decision to install the New Three Principles in 2014 is a more crucial case study than that of 2011. However, the 2011 change by the DPJ government formed the basis for Abe’s subsequent total abandonment of the long-standing policy. Therefore, an analysis of 2011 is even more essential to understanding policy change in this case and will be the focus of this chapter.

Explanatory link: interdependence and preference change Interdependence in a security setting It is a widely-accepted view that interdependence creates asymmetrical relationships among states by producing sensitivity and vulnerability. Keohane and Nye define these terms as follows: ‘sensitivity means liability to costly effects imposed from outside before policies are altered to try to change the situation. Vulnerability can be defined as an actor’s liability to suffer costs imposed by external events even after policies have been altered’ (Keohane and Nye 2012: 11). In an interdependent world, states depend on each other, but the degree of that dependence naturally varies. Asymmetrical levels of dependence may at times provide a less dependent state with a greater degree of influence and more bargaining power (Keohane and Nye 2012: 10). Conversely, the heavy dependence of some states on others inevitably results in the dependent states’ vulnerability, exposing the more dependent states to the risk of supply disruption. This is not a preferable path for most states. In the security field, the risks created by this vulnerability may be insurmountable. Therefore, most countries indisputably prefer autarky, or at least autonomy, for their national defense procurement because heavy dependence on foreign supply poses a possible supply disruption—a risk to national security. Importing advanced weapon systems requires technical support from the manufacturing country, which may also be the source of a security risk. To avoid such a risk, states protect their defense industries in order to secure indigenous equipment and stable supplies. They also produce weapons domestically to promote industrial and 234

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technological development. For instance, European countries have a history of purchasing weapons solely from domestic contractors, whereas in the US, no serious competition existed due to concerns about national security and stable supply, despite its posture to prefer international competition (Bialos, Fisher and Koehl 2009: 13–17). Since the 1970s, interdependence among states has been deepening because rapid technological advances have facilitated dramatic increases in economic transactions. Interdependence among states is not confined to the economic arena: it has also extended to the military and technological arenas, a phenomenon which has been accelerating in the post-Cold War era. For instance, states cooperate to counter terrorism, collaborate on military research and co-produce defense equipment.3 The major reason for the growth of security interdependence was the swelling cost of development and production of weapons. With the disappearance of a well-defined security threat, namely the Soviet Union, and a growing number of sluggish economies, many countries that once participated in the arms race during the Cold War era began to cut their defense expenditures after the end of the Cold War. Meanwhile, owing to innovations in military technology, the cost of military research and development (R&D) increased considerably, making it difficult for a country to conduct military R&D on its own. The rising cost of defense production due to the incorporation of cutting-edge technology exacerbated the situation, pushing states to pursue affordability. Therefore, there emerged incentives for governments to build more ‘open and competitive markets’ in pursuit of efficiency (Bialos, Fisher and Koehl 2009: 10). In fact, it became a matter of survival for states to conduct joint research, development and co-production of military equipment. The joint development of the F-35 fighters ultimately involved nine countries, including the US, the UK and Australia. Similarly, France, Italy, Spain and Germany co-produced the Euro Fighter. Western developed countries became closely connected in defense production. Due to these changes, overemphasis on autarky became outdated. Such a policy isolates a country’s defense industrial base from the international market, depriving it of the chance to access advanced foreign technologies, capital and global markets (Bitzinger 2003: 76). This is not beneficial in the long run because technological transfer as well as interaction among rich countries have been shown to be significant factors in technological development (Edgerton 2007: 9). No state can effectively maintain cutting-edge technology these days unless it pursues internationalization in defense production (Brooks 2005: 6). Consequently, even for a large power such as the US, it is becoming difficult to pursue autarky (Brooks 2005: 78). In addition, the overprotection of the defense sector by the government entails economic costs because it ends up creating or bailing out an inefficient industry (Ripsman 2005: 18). A state that pursues autarkic defense production ends up paying a higher premium. That is to say, avoiding international collaboration because of adherence to an autarkic policy may result in a huge loss of economic and technological benefits. This growing interdependence has potential challenges for some states, such as Japan, if those states have long pursued domestic production without interacting with foreign markets. In Japan, production options were constrained by the Three Principles. Given a widely-accepted assumption that a state cannot remain competitive if it is left behind in the context of international changes, Japan’s domestic production policy would lead to erosion of its technological preponderance. Facing the completely changed circumstances caused by interdependence, Japan’s options were quite limited.

The ramification of interdependence for domestic politics Generally, interdependence increases the sensitivity of states to the external environment: states need to adjust their policies to take advantage of a newly emerged situation or to mitigate 235

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exogenous shocks. For instance, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) pushed Japanese companies to go offshore in the 1980s when the Japanese yen skyrocketed after the Plaza Accord of 1985. This new foreign economic policy resulted in the establishment of many subcontractors in Asia, with the subcontractors producing low-value-added products and Japan manufacturing high-value-added products. The division of labor then created a ‘production alliance,’ with Japan playing the role of lead goose (Hatch and Yamamura 1996). The drastic appreciation of the yen changed the preference of MITI, resulting in the alteration of its foreign economic policy. The ongoing negotiation of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) is another example. It shows that changes in the international environment have affected domestic coalitions and the interests of various actors. Japan’s agricultural sector had long been protected by successive LDP governments. However, as the TPP neared ratification, the government went in a new direction, making an effort to restructure the inefficient and overprotected agricultural sector with the hope of advancing its competitiveness. In doing so, the government aims to encourage farmers to export their products. This was not a conceivable option in the past. The only policy the government had previously implemented was to protect the farmers from foreign competition. The reason for such policy shifts is that the changed environment alters the preferences of the actors. As interdependence deepens, a discord between international and domestic politics inevitably occurs. Political actors are forced to address the political or economic challenges produced by the transformed external circumstances. Some may seek to defend existing policies or institutions even under conditions of environmental change to protect their vested interests; others may aim to modify or drastically change existing policies by taking advantage of external changes. In this way, globalization offers an opportunity for various actors to reshape institutions or policies (Farrel and Newman 2014; Keohane and Miller 1996: 244; Moravcsik 1997). One may wonder here whose preferences would be reflected in a policy formulation. Gilpin noted that the ‘objectives and foreign policies of states are determined primarily by the interests of their dominant members or ruling coalitions’ (Gilpin 1981: 19).4 The process of a policy alteration necessarily reflects the struggles among individuals or groups who hope to advance their interests. Therefore, the end of Japan’s arms trade ban policy—a turning point of national security and economic security policy—should be largely influenced by two actors: the government and the business community. In a security setting, government plays a central role in developing military technologies and producing weapons. The preference of the government, especially the Ministry of Defense (MOD), which is in charge of national security, should affect Japan’s behavior. However, the MOD was excluded from the decision-making process during the Cold War period because of concerns over the revival of militarism. The MOD’s secondary role in domestic politics was well illustrated by its institutional status. The MOD had operated as an agency until it was upgraded to a ministry in 2007. It was the unstable security environment exemplified by North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and the Taiwan Strait missile crisis that allowed the MOD to enter onto the political stage in the latter half of the 1990s. In the economic arena, we cannot dismiss the influence of firms on the formation of economic policy. It is because close communication between the government and the defense industry is required in the area of defense production. Since its establishment in 1946, the Keidanren (the Japan Business Federation) has acted as an interest group and lobbied the government on the behalf of big business. The Keidanren’s influence on policy formation is observed not only in the economic, but also in the security arena. Japan has depended on private companies, whose 236

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major outputs are civilian products, for the procurement of defense equipment and technological development. Therefore, although the preferences of the business community are not a decisive factor, the government cannot dismiss its preferences.

Actors’ preferences during the Cold War period The preferences of the government With the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the US began to support Japan’s arms production. This was a complete departure from the former occupation policy. The aim of the shift was to secure a supply of weapons to carry out the Korean War (Kato 1992: 161–2). The US special procurement of weapons greatly helped Japan’s economic recovery and the revival of its defense industry. However, due to the armistice of the Korean War and the end of the first Indochina War, US procurement considerably decreased by 1955. The procurement of ammunition also totally ceased in that year (Keidanren Boei Seisan Iinkai 1964: 128–9). Without US procurement, Japan’s defense industry had to find a new way to survive. However, the then government was hesitant to expand its weaponry exports in order to ‘avoid being entrapped by international conflicts’ and thought that ‘arms export would have a negative impact on the export of civilian products’ (House of Councillors 1956: 602). In response to the request made by the business community to support the defense industry, the government merely provided a nominal subsidy to alleviate the damage caused by the rapid decline in US procurement. Such minor assistance hardly contributed to the survival of the defense industry (Goto 1967: 50). In contrast, the MITI hoped to nurture the defense industry by securing procurement from the SDF. However, because the US had provided most of the weapons the SDF needed under the framework of the Japan–US Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, the SDF’s procurement from Japanese companies remained trivial (Otake 1984: 6). In 1967, responding to a question from the opposing party, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato expressed the so-called Three Principles. He clearly stated that the government would not permit arms exports to the following three types of countries: 1) communist bloc countries; 2) countries subject to an ‘arms’ exports embargo under the United Nations Security Council’s resolutions; 3) countries involved in or likely to be involved in international conflicts.5 This announcement was hardly a new policy, however. Sato merely articulated the existing regulations of the export control policy enacted in 1949, which aimed to block arms exports to communist countries.6 Because Sato strongly hoped to realize the reversion of Okinawa while he was in power, he supported the US war in Vietnam despite public opposition. The aim of this support was to obtain US agreement regarding the return of Okinawa. The announcement of the Three Principles came at this time to assure the public, who were afraid of being drawn into the war, by underlining Japan’s pacifist posture. Despite the announcement, Sato believed that peace could be achieved only after ensuring Japan’s national security; to achieve this end, Japan needed to strengthen the capacity of its domestic arms production and export defense equipment. Sato thought that it was not desirable to restrict all arms exports for the financial health of the defense industry and that Japan needed a robust defense industry for its own security.7 From Sato’s point of view, it was in Japan’s national interest to make sure the defense industry remained viable. It was a strategic decision for Japan to domestically produce Nike and Hawke Missile Systems with the help of US technological support instead of importing the finished products from the US (US Department of State 1967). By having a licensing agreement with the US, Japan expected to learn advanced technology and anticipated spin-off effects for civilian products (US Department of State 1969). 237

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Reflecting Sato’s view, Director General of the Defense Agency Yasuhiro Nakasone took initiatives to propel domestic production. In 1970, he announced a policy (Basic Policy on Equipment Production and Development) that aimed to promote the development of the defense industry. The goal of the policy was to encourage the domestic production (indigenization) of defense equipment tailored to the Japanese. Although importing weapons would cost less, producing weapons under US license was a quicker way to learn advanced technology and catch up with the West. It also contributed to the development of the civilian sector by converting defense technology for civilian uses. With a policy that encouraged domestic production, in the 1970s and 1980s Japan produced a significant amount of defense equipment under US licenses. For instance, Japanese firms licensed and co-produced twenty-nine US weapons systems in the 1970s and 1980s (Samuels 1994: 45–6). While the Three Principles prohibited the defense industry from exporting weapons, successive Japanese governments strongly encouraged domestic production either under US license or via autonomous development. Therefore, whereas Prime Minister Takeo Miki strengthened the Three Principles in 1976 by stating that Japan would refrain from exporting weapons regardless of destination,8 Japan had been able to maintain a reasonable amount of domestic output to ensure the defense industry’s viability. In the 1980s, Japan’s domestic procurement cost, including licensed production, reached approximately 90% of total procurement cost with foreign imports accounting for only 10%. Japan’s adherence to domestic production and the development of its military system are well illustrated by its attempt to develop its own fighters—through the FSX program—although this attempt was frustrated because of the politicization of the program between the US and Japan (Green 1995). Thus, the government encouraged domestic production while showing no interest in exports. This strategy functioned effectively for decades.

The business community’s preference With the outbreak of the Korean War, Japan’s defense industry began producing weapons to meet US demands (Keidanren Bouei Seisan Iinkai 1964: 76). However, because of the armistice in 1953, US procurement almost ceased. As a result, by the middle of the 1950s, most defense firms were on the verge of bankruptcy. Unable to obtain procurement from either the US or the SDF, the defense firms hoped to export weapons to survive instead. However, the government was unwilling to support their exports (Keidanren Bouei Seisan Iinkai 1964: 200–2). Not only the government but also the banks were reluctant to provide financial assistance to the defense industry (Otake 1984: 23). Due to the absence of sufficient government support and procurement, many firms had to shift to civilian products to survive. Although some firms somehow continued to export arms such as bullets and helicopters to Asian countries, the amount of the exports was negligible.9 Hoping to revive the defense industry, the Japan Association of Defense Industry and the Keidanren requested that the government support arms exports to maintain the operational status of its manufacturing line in the 1960s. However, they could not obtain the government’s support. Although US procurement resumed because of the Vietnam War, such temporal procurement was not sufficient to revive and sustain the defense industry. The government’s decision in 1970 to support the domestic production of defense equipment changed the situation surrounding the defense industry. The procurement budgets began to increase noticeably. Although the companies were not able to export weapons due to the Three Principles, they could access foreign technologies, and secure orders from the Japan Defense Agency because of the domestic production policy. There were no foreign 238

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competitors. In addition, technological development largely acquired through licensed production allowed them to expand their civilian outputs and thus increase their civilian exports significantly during this period. As a result, there was no pressing need for them to seek profits by exporting defense equipment. However, the adoption of the domestic production policy did not completely eliminate the industry’s desire to export. When the 1973 oil shock hit the Japanese economy, including the defense industry, hard, debates resurfaced within business circles about whether Japan should export weapons to get out of the depression. Because of rising unit cost as a result of inflation, the production of defense equipment in 1974–6 plunged to almost half of the 1972 levels.10 The SDF’s procurement budget, which accounted for 25.4% of the total defense budget in 1973, plunged to 16.4% in 1976. To supplement the decline, in 1976, the industry attempted to export a C1 multi-purpose transport aircraft that removed combat equipment, and they obtained export permission from MITI. However, the plan was frustrated because the government withdrew the export permission due to the fierce censure of the opposition parties such as the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and the Communist Party. Although the procurement budget temporarily declined, the total defense budget was increasing proportionately to the bourgeoning GDP during the period of economic growth. The growing procurement budget, except for in some years due to the oil shock, was sufficient to keep the defense firms in good shape. Moreover, due to a cost-plus fixed fee contract with the government, there was no possibility for the firms to incur losses, although profits were limited to only 5% of the total cost. Thus, both the government and the business community accepted the Three Principles, even if they did not totally support them. The government pursued a semi-autarkic policy through domestic production to promote technological development and support the firms. The firms greatly benefited from the domestic production, contributing to Japan’s overall technological development. Consequently, the defense sector’s technology and know-how accumulated enough to launch an autonomous development plan of fighters in 1982, namely, the FSX program. However, deepening interdependence completely changed the circumstances surrounding them.

Actors’ preference changes: towards relaxation The changing preferences of the business community Due to the international changes occurring after the end of the Cold War, developed countries began to launch joint collaboration.11 Quickly sensing the international trend of collaboration, in 1995 the Keidanren resumed its request for government’s support and the modification of the export policy (Employee, Keidanren 2012, personal communication). The Keidanren’s report demanded that the government engage in international collaboration, especially with the US. The Japan Defense Agency had a similar view. In 1997, at the invitation of the US Department of Defense (DOD) and the Japan Defense Agency, the US–Japan Industry Forum for Security Cooperation (ISFEC) was established by the Keidanren and the US National Defense Industrial Association. The aim was to provide a channel for dialogue on issues affecting US–Japan defense programs and serve as an industry advisory group to DOD and the Japan Defense Agency (National Defense Industrial Association 2016). In 2004, the Japanese government decided to participate in the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) joint development program and review the 1996 National Defense Program Outline. In the same year, the Keidanren for the first time explicitly referred to the review of the Three Principles in its 239

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policy proposal. Although the government avoided the revision of the Three Principles when they decided to introduce the BMD system, the Keidanren concluded that Japan needed to fully revise the Three Principles. The Keidanren’s argument was as follows: lacking any sizeable natural resources, Japan depends on its skill base to survive as an ‘innovation oriented country.’ Given the disappearing distinction between military and civilian technology, maintaining cutting-edge technology is indispensable to preserving competitiveness and reviving Japan’s economy. Allowing participation in the international development and production of weaponry could help advance Japan’s technological progress (Keidanren 2004). The Keidanren also asserted that Japan’s defense industry was isolated, due to the Three Principles, from international trends encouraging joint development and research collaboration. The president of the Keidanren was more explicit. He expressed concerns that Japan was being left behind and losing competitiveness because of the Three Principles.12 In the past, Japan had been able to obtain technology through licensed production. However, because cutting-edge technology became increasingly black-boxed,13 the new technology that Japan could learn from licensed production was increasingly limited. In addition to the fear of technological isolation, Japan’s defense industry faced limited procurement. Since the end of the Cold War, increasing maintenance costs cut the budget available to purchase new equipment and more technically complex equipment pushed up the prices.14 For example, F-15J/DJ fighters cost three times as much as the former F-4EJ fighters—the standard aircraft of the 1970s. Rescue aircrafts such as the U-125A, imported by Japan in 2007, cost fourteen times as much as the domestic MU-2 plane (MOD 2009: 5). Reflecting the tight procurement budget, the SDF did not have a single contract for fighters from 2008 to 2011. Such extended intervals between purchases made it difficult for the relevant defense contractors to sustain their necessary production bases (Nishiyama 2011: 6). As a result, small subcontractors15 were forced to withdraw from this area of production (MOD 2009: 15–16). From 2003 to 2010, twenty-one firms ceased their involvement in this field (MOD 2010: 5).16 Even the factory of Mitsubishi Heavy Industry (MHI), which assembled F-2 fighters, was not operating at full capacity due to a failure to secure the required level of necessary procurement (Senior employee A, manufacturing firm 2014, personal communication). Japan has, over the decades, exploited civilian industrial strengths to sustain its defense production base (Hughes 2011). Contracts with the MOD have limited profits in this segment to 5% (RIPS 2007: 16). Therefore, other divisions of these companies have subsidized the much less lucrative defense divisions. However, in recent years, this cross-subsidization has lost its viability. Japanese companies have witnessed a decline in profits from traditionally more lucrative civilian products. Although Japan still maintains technical superiority in some areas, such as power semiconductor devices, it has lost competitiveness in other areas, such as liquid crystal technologies, where South Korea now excels (Director General, MOD 2014, personal communication). Faced with rising competition from newly emerging economies, defense divisions are now required to hold their own (Boueiseisan gijutsukiban kenkyukai 2012: 2). Under these circumstances, the Keidanren attempted to influence government policy. Such an attempt to persuade the government became more intense after the DPJ government was inaugurated (Employee, Keidanren 2012, personal communication). They argued that Japan should revise the outdated Three Principles given the difficulties Japan’s defense industry was facing, and began to appeal to ministers and key politicians directly and privately, including Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa (Employee, Keidanren 2012, personal communication). Their extensive persuasion was effective, leading to the amendment of the ban (Employee, Keidanren 2012; Senior employee A, manufacturing firm 2013, personal communication,). Defense industry executives felt that Japan needed to start joint collaboration to avoid isolation, but there were also other factors operating behind the epoch-making decision. 240

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The changing preferences of the government During the Cold War period, Japan’s security debates revolved around ideological confrontations between the conservatives and the left wing (Otake 2005: 266–7). Due to this political division, the Defense Agency, which was supposed to play a central role in planning security policy, had long been excluded from the decision-making process. Successive governments had been wary of even making contact with the Defense Agency; any engagement with its officials could attract criticism from the left wing and the public, who were sensitive to the revival of militarism during the Cold War era. The media were also vigilant about such a move (Hughes 2004). However, due to the unstable regional situation, the expertise of the Defense Agency became essential to making security-related decisions. Japan’s enlarged role in the framework of the US alliance, exemplified by the adoption of the New Guidelines in 1997, combined with its humanitarian contribution to the ‘war on terrorism’, provided a chance for the Defense Agency to expand its influence. In addition, the JSP that criticized the SDF and the alliance with the US lost public support, resulting in its 1996 dissolution. Consequently, there emerged a rough agreement over Japan’s security policy among the major political parties. The two major parties, the LDP and the DPJ, supported Japan’s larger security role, although with minor differences. This changed domestic political landscape enabled the Defense Agency to expand its role in the decision-making process. As Japan’s military role steadily grew, its security relationship with the US also deepened. Although the Three Principle restricted military cooperation with any states, the Yasuhiro Nakasone government allowed the export or exchange of military technology to the US (excluding exports of components) in 1983 by making an exemption from the Three Principles.17 Making exemptions, without changing or introducing a new scheme, was an expedient strategy for the LDP government because they were able to exempt a case without having deliberate political debates. However, when a plan of BMD joint development and production with the US came up, voices emerged whether the government would exempt a case again. The Defense Agency initiated the argument of policy modification rather than exempting the case (Director, MOD 2014, personal communication). The Defense Agency was fully aware of the need to exchange military technology not only with the US but also with other developed countries to maintain technological competitiveness. The LDP’s subcommittee on defense policy also recommended the reappraisal of the Three Principles. Similarly, in October 2004, the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities recommended the reevaluation of the Three Principles and the modification of the domestic production policy and encouraged interdependence with other countries given the changed environment the defense industry faced (The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities 2004: 21). The alteration of the policy would deepen cooperation with the US and enable the export of Japanese-made components to the US, thus further cementing Japan’s security relationship with the US. However, the idea was dismissed shortly thereafter, before any policies were changed (Iwaya 2014, personal communication). As long as they could employ the strategy of making an exemption, there was no urgent need to modify the policy. Moreover, the LDP politicians repeatedly confirmed the compliance of the policy in the Diet whenever questioned by the opposition parties. Given repeated articulation of their determination to comply with the policy, it was difficult for the LDP government to alter the policy (Iwaya 2014, personal communication). Instead, the LDP government again exempted the plan in December 2004. However, the government faced another challenge. The Japanese government was considering purchasing F-22s as the next main aircraft of the SDF. However, due to the 2007 US decision to ban the export of the F-22, the purchase of the F-35 came into sight instead. This meant that Japan would either participate in the joint 241

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development program of the F-35 started in 2000 or purchase finished products. Considering that procurement of finished products would increase Japan’s dependency on foreign countries for the maintenance and repair of aircraft, that would not be a preferable option. Japan would end up heavily dependent on foreign firms for its military readiness. However, the ban blocked Japan from participating in the F-35 program, in which many friendly countries were to participate. Elimination from the F-35 joint development program, despite the F-35’s adoption as its next major aircraft,18 would have resulted in Japan’s technological isolation and subsequently the corrosion of its technological base. Generally, states exchange military technology with other developed states through participation in joint research and production. By doing so, states are able to access foreign technologies. Japan had, so far, depended on US license to obtain advanced technology. However, US cutting-edge technology became increasingly black-boxed. For instance, the Aegis system that Japan purchased was a black-boxed technology. The software of the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC) system was also black-boxed (MOD 2009: 10). Without access to US advanced technology, it became less beneficial to produce licensed weapons. As the former Minister of Defense mentioned, the production model on which Japan had depended became less effective (Morimoto 2015: 239). Therefore, it became critical for the MOD to either revise or abolish the ban to enable Japan’s participation in the Automatic Logistics Global Sustainment (ALGS) program of the F-35, where participating countries produce and export components and create an inventory. It is argued that a state prefers autarky in defense production. The decision to participate in ALGS would run counter to this traditional wisdom. However, playing a role as an important component supplier in a global supply chain would enhance Japan’s influence in the security field (former SDF General 2014, personal communication). The initial stages of joint development were already underway by the time the Japanese government began to actively debate their participation. Entry into the final stage of the global supply chain would not ensure Japan’s access to advanced technology. Nevertheless, it would still be more beneficial to participate in the program than just purchasing aircrafts within the framework of Foreign Military Sales. Participation in the supply chain would enable Japan to repair and upgrade aircrafts for the next thirty years. Failure to participate in the program would have had a negative impact on Japan’s defense technological base and national security in the long run (Morimoto 2015: 88). Moreover, the Three Principles had become outdated and obsolete, failing to achieve their purported goals in an interdependent world (Former Admiral, JMSDF 2013, personal communication). As interdependence increased, the government had less control over the flow of goods and technology. The boundary separating defense from civilian industries has been becoming less clearly defined since the 1980s.19 Previously, defense technology, when suitable and profitable, eventually flowed into an appropriate array of civilian adaptations. The internet, radio, and airplane are good examples. Therefore, it was effective for governments to place arms export controls to prevent advanced military technology from diffusing freely. However, in more recent years, this flow has traveled in both directions. Cutting-edge civilian technology is now commonly employed when developing and producing new weaponry (Ikegami 2004: 119). The blurring distinction meant that the Three Principle’s narrow system of classification yielded contradictory results. Despite the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)’s strict control, considerable quantities of cutting-edge civilian products were exported to other countries because they failed to fit the category of ‘weapons’. These items included such materials as carbon fiber and Tyranno fiber (Silicon Carbide Fiber) (Former Lt. General, JASDF 2014, personal communication). These products could then be utilized partly to advance the development of defense equipment overseas (Senior employee B, manufacturing firm 2013, personal communication). Ironically, items that were clearly obsolete as military equipment and 242

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strategically worthless, such as flashlights and chemicals, were not allowed to be exported because they were categorized as ‘weapons’. Therefore, the MOD and the SDF shared the view that the inconsistencies inherent in this policy urgently needed to be addressed (Deputy Director, METI 2014; Commander, Maritime SDF 2014, personal communication). The Defense Agency/MOD also shared the business community’s sense of crisis. They thought that Japan’s defense sector had lost its competitiveness quite considerably. With rising concerns that Japan’s technological base was declining, the MOD set up a committee to fully review the defense technological base, and issued a report in 2009 that implied a link between Japan’s declining technological base and the Three Principles. The MOD began to lobby the DPJ government, inaugurated in 2009. Although the LDP had previously considered modifying the arms export ban, it was constrained by its own previous statements in support of the Three Principles and by its oft-coalition partner, pacifist Komeito, who believed that exporting weapons was equivalent to becoming a ‘merchant of death’. However, the DPJ government found it relatively easy to alter existing policy. There were two reasons: first, there was no substantial opposition within the party—although the party embraced many former JSP members, most of them were moderate-left, in contrast to the former JSP members who started the Social Democratic Party and were more extremist in their views. Therefore, despite past left positions, once in government, most members of the DPJ, including the former JSP members, supported an enlarged role for the SDF, as long as it was under a UN framework. Moreover, a landslide victory in the 2009 election enabled many of the DPJ’s new candidates to obtain seats. The DPJ gained 308 seats in the House of Representatives, 143 of which were taken by new candidates. These pragmatic newcomers overwhelmed the extant leftist voices, tipping the balance in favor of the proponents of alteration. Debates that required expertise in military technology and arms trade also made it difficult for some of the former JSP members to oppose the relaxation (Nagashima, 2014; Ohno, 2014, personal communication). With the LDP supporting the modification, there were no substantial obstacles. With a strong push from the MOD, Defense Minister Yoshimi Kitazawa took the initiatives to accomplish this (Director, MOD 2014; Employee, Keidanren, 2012, personal communication). Secondly, the DPJ governments were not restrained by past statements or predispositions like the LDP had been (Employee, Keidanren 2012; Director, MOD 2014, personal communication). Because the DPJ had neither previous position nor bias on this issue, it was flexible enough to listen to persuasive arguments made by the MOD and the business community. The nature of the government influenced the timing of the policy change. During the Cold War period, Japan’s strategy to obtain advanced technology from the US through licensed production contributed to the development of technology in both the defense and civilian arenas. However, in an increasingly interdependent world, where joint development and production were the most effective ways to achieve technological development and bargaining power in the security field, the ban’s restrictions had become largely meaningless due to dual-use technologies. Under the growing inclination towards joint collaboration, a reasonable solution to preserve technological competitiveness and avoidance of foreign dependence seemed to be participation in a joint program and supply chain. Furthermore, the continuation of the defense industry in Japan required the modification of the existing autarkic policy. The changed preferences of the MOD, supported by the changed preferences of the defense industry, resulted in the modification of the arms trade ban policy.

Diverging interests between business community and government The Keidanren welcomed the modification of the ban. However, in contrast to the government, which was keen to participate in a global supply chain and conduct international 243

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collaboration in any way, firms were not necessarily excited about joining a joint program. For instance, MHI was not enthusiastic about participating in the ALGS for the F-35 because it would provide neither large economic benefits nor technological advantages. The Japanese would play subcontractor roles in the ALGS. In addition, it was not possible to access the advanced technology because Japan joined the program at the final stage (Senior employees A and B, manufacturing firm 2013, personal communication). MHI’s role was to assemble forty-two F-35 for the SDF at a factory used to build F-2 fighter aircraft in the 1990s, and produce F-35 rear fuselage. The Japanese government has subsidized over $620 million for MHI’s F-35 final assembly and check-out (FACO) facility, where MHI is to assemble and provide maintenance, repair, overhaul, and upgrade services to F-35 fighters based in the North Asia-Pacific region (Kelly and Kubo 2014). However, MHI was not able to reach an agreement with the government over the amount of subsidy for initial investment to set up a production line for rear fuselage (Kelly 2014). After completing its calculations, MHI decided not to produce the rear fuselage. One employee stated, ‘given a subcontractor status and marginal profits, no companies are enthusiastic about participation although I admit that it will definitely contribute to maintaining the factory in an operational status’ (Senior employee A, manufacturing firm 2013, personal communication). This implies that manufacturing firms are not necessarily keen to engage in joint collaboration or join a global supply chain unless doing so brings either profit or access to cutting-edge technology. Although the preferences of the defense industry and the government coincided with regard to a desire to modify policy, they did not have the same reasons for wanting to modify it. Therefore, some of the outcomes did not serve the perceived advantages of the defense industry itself.

Conclusion In the post-Cold War era, interdependence in economic and trade relationships has reached the security domain as well. It is becoming more important for states to exchange technology and conduct joint military research and production. The growing interdependence among likeminded countries in the security field generates benefits, enabling states that cannot afford to pursue national programs to obtain defense equipment more efficiently. However, this interdependence creates asymmetrical relationships among states. Despite this possible risk, it seems that the preferences of states to pursue efficient production of technologically advanced weaponry and obtain cutting-edge technology converge, thus accelerating this interdependence in the security field. Japan was not an exception. It chose to become interdependent, rather than continuing to single-mindedly pursue its semi-autarkic policy. While Japan had long followed a ban on arms exports, it had vigorously pursued domestic production for SDF use. Japan’s strategy to obtain advanced technology from the US through licensed production functioned effectively, contributing to the development of technology in both the defense and civilian arenas. As long as Japan was able to access foreign advanced technology through licensed production, the government thought, given the burgeoning economy, the export ban policy did not pose any serious problems. Moreover, the defense sector was somewhat protected by the policy because the ban prevented foreign competitors from entering into Japan’s domestic defense market. Therefore, both the Japanese government and the business community acquiesced to, if not totally supported, the arms trade ban policy during the period of economic growth. However, with the international changes introduced above, the preferences of both sets of actors changed, resulting in a policy alteration. To bolster the country’s defense technological base through participation in joint development and production and enable the transfer of defense 244

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equipment, the Japanese government relaxed the ban in 2011. It then introduced the New Three Principles for smooth export of Japanese-made components and participation in a joint program. The modification of the ban and the New Three Principles met the interests of the government, which was eager to maintain technological superiority and an autonomous national security policy. These changes also served the interests of the business community that hoped to expand their business. However, the chapter also revealed that the preference of the government was not necessarily identical to the companies’ interests. While both were concerned with a possible erosion of Japan’s technological base, the business community was not necessarily ready to go international. It pursued narrower interests, namely profit. In contrast, the government believes that obtaining cutting-edge technology is crucial to ensure Japan’s national security and strategic autonomy. This is well illustrated by the statement by a General Director of the MOD: ‘the strength of Japan’s defense companies is equivalent to the strength of Japan’s defense power’ (public statement by Tokuchi 2014). Therefore, it chose to slightly shift its rigorous semi-autarkic policy to secure technological superiority by creating, paradoxically, interdependent relationships with other countries.

Acknowledgements This study was financially supported by Japan Society for Promotion of Science (grant number: 24653044, 2012–14). I am grateful for their generous support. I also deeply appreciate people who spared their time and agreed to be interviewed for my research. Lastly, I greatly thank Dr. Hughes and Dr. McCarthy who provided me with insightful and concrete comments for the improvement of this chapter.

Notes 1 They also claim that the announcement of the Non-Nuclear Principles (no possession, no production and no permission of nuclear weapons) supports the antimilitarism argument. However, studies have revealed that the Japanese government acquiesced, albeit secretly, to US demands that allowed American vessels to carry nuclear weapons within Japanese territory and maintain them on US bases in Japan without any prior declaration (Wakaizumi 1994). 2 For more, see Pyle 2007; Hollerman 1988; Rosecrance 1986. 3 Fully acknowledging the increase in joint production and research in the defense area, the discourse on the globalization of defense industries is ubiquitous (Sato 2015). However, I employ ‘interdependence’ rather than ‘globalization’ because in this chapter I examine how interdependence among like-minded countries affect a state’s policy. 4 Also, see Welch 2011: 27; Cortell and Davis 2005: 9; Wiener 2009. 5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Japan’s policies on the control of arms policies’, www.mofa.go.jp/policy/ un/disarmament/policy/, accessed on July 2013. 6 During the Cold War period, countries in the Western Bloc banned arms exports to communist countries under Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM). On COCOM and Japan’s defense industry, see Kato (1992). 7 Sato’s statement. (House of Representatives 1967). 8 The amount of export in the 1970s was negligible. Moreover, the announcement was a convenient strategy to assure the Asian countries that were fearful of Japan’s remilitarization (Hatakeyama 2015: 120). 9 Asahi Shimbun, 1964, 26 August. 10 Asahi Journal, 1980, 1 August. 11 For example, joint development of the Euro fighter started in 1988. 12 A statement made by the president of the Keidanren (ELNEOS 2004: 50). 13 For instance, the US categorized some of the advanced technologies as classified and made it ‘blackboxed.’ 245

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14 The amount of procurement contract declined by 33% from 1,207 trillion yen in 1989 to 683,7 billion yen in 2010. In contrast, the maintenance cost increased by 80% from 440 billion yen to 792 billion yen in those same years (MOD 2010: 3). 15 Except for the MHI Corporation (which accounted for 11% of MHI revenue as of 2012), companies involved in military production devoted, on average, only 3% of their output to this sector (MOD 2009: 10). 16 For example, 2,500 companies are involved in the production of an escort ship while 1200 firms make up the Patriot Missile systems contingent. In a similar manner, some 1100 firms have been drawn to the production of the F-15 (Nishiyama 2011: 8). 17 After 1983, successive governments continually made exemptions whenever necessary. Such exemptions were granted more than twenty times (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 2014). 18 Japan officially announced its decision to adopt F-35 in December 2011. 19 America’s strategy of ‘civilian-military integration’ contributed to the increasing importance of ‘dual-use technology’ in a security field (Perani 1997: 1–7).

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Personal communications Commander, Maritime SDF (2014). Employee, Keidanren (2012). Former Lt. General, JASDF (2014). Deputy Director, METI (2014). Director, defense division, manufacturing firm (2013). Director General, MOD (2014). Director, MOD (2014). Director, METI (2014). Iwaya, T., LDP politician (2014). Ohno, M., DPJ politician (2014). Nagashima, A., Former Special Advisor to Prime Minister (2014). Senior employee A, manufacturing firm (2013). Senior employee B, manufacturing firm (2013).

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Part IV

International political economy

16 Economic diplomacy Maaike Okano-Heijmans and Takaaki Asano

Introduction Globalization and shifting power balances between the West and other countries, particularly those in the Asia-Pacific region, are creating new incentives for governments everywhere to rethink the balance between their different national interests. In this process, the economic dimension of states’ foreign policies and therefore the role of economic diplomacy is receiving much attention. Japan is no exception in this regard, even if it is coming from a very different direction than developed countries in Europe and the United States. Since the end of the Second World War, Japan’s so-called ‘peace constitution’ and the security guarantee by the United States provided Japanese policy-makers with a unique chance to focus on economic development and to openly emphasize economic, rather than military, means to project and exert power in its relations with other countries. In a system that was largely dominated by the United States and European countries, Japan has chiefly employed economic diplomacy as a means to secure broader national interests—including economic prosperity, political stability and national security. Strategically, this is to affirm that economic/commercial and political/strategic interests reinforce one another and should thus be seen in tandem. Economic diplomacy is a contested concept and a diverse practice. Although it is certainly not a new phenomenon, and even less so for Japan than for other countries, the end of the Westerndominated era of free-market capitalism marks a new episode in its conceptual and practical evolution. To the Japanese government, which takes a comprehensive approach to the subject, economic diplomacy has long been a tool to assist businesses abroad and to steer the regional and global rebalancing that is currently underway. Newer, perhaps, is its use also as a means of addressing pressing global issues, such as climate change and scarcity of natural resources (for example, water, energy and minerals), as well as standard-setting in international economic and financial governance. This chapter assesses continuity and change in various sub-fields of Japan’s economic diplomacy in recent years. While numerous studies of expressions of Japan’s economic diplomacy exist—most without reference to the term, by the way—these commonly address one or a few particular element(s) of the whole.1 The distinctiveness and overlap between various strands—that is, the policies, tools and purposes—thereby remain largely ambiguous. In an attempt to overcome 251

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this flaw, the present chapter takes a comprehensive approach.2 It analyzes developments in the three strands of economic diplomacy that comprise the so-called newly emerging ‘economic diplomacy trinity’, which will be used as a conceptual framework.3 A comprehensive picture thereby emerges of activity and inactivity on the bilateral and multilateral fronts. The analysis presented here considers how and why Japanese economic diplomacy practice evolved in the 2010s. The main reason for policy adjustments in recent years is the greater need for Japan to act in light of China’s growing activism in the field. This triggered a domestic process of professionalization of economic diplomacy in Japan, wherein the concept came to be explicitly pronounced from 2010—for the first time in the postwar period. Three case studies collectively suggest that the emphasis on commercial goals of economic diplomacy is broadened to include also a more outspoken and visible element of strategic power play and limited securitization. That is, Japan’s evolving economic diplomacy aims to spur change in domestic and multilateral environs, including domestic economic reform (especially in the agricultural sector), financial and economic governance in the East Asian region and beyond and new rules and standards governing international economic interaction. Security-related technology plays an increasingly large role herein, including by way of sales promotion of military and aerospace technology, and the inclusion of military elements (patrol vessels) in development assistance to Southeast Asian nations. Continuity and change in Japanese policies is spurred in particular by the re-emergence of China and the evolving role of the United States in the East Asian region, as well as by Japan’s decline as an economic power in both absolute and relative terms. Aiming to contribute also to a better understanding of Japan’s foreign policy at large, and the role of economic diplomacy within it, this chapter also addresses two larger, underlying questions. First, is the trend in Japan towards more or less economic diplomacy? This question speaks to arguments that Japan is losing faith in its comprehensive security approach, and foreign policies are moving towards a greater emphasis on the military security dimension. Such voices were heard already at the beginning of the millennium,4 and the new security legislation pushed by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2014–16 certainly reinforced this view. Second, to what extent may Japan be seen as a norm-setter for other East Asian governments’ economic diplomacy policies? Even if Japan’s policies have evolved in new directions, there are clear signs that its traditional emphasis on economic diplomacy in foreign policy has inspired governments in the region. Many in Tokyo are aware of the role that Japan played by providing a model for economic development for Asian neighbors. More questionable, however, is whether Japanese bureaucrats, politicians and foreign observers are now cognizant of the potential impacts of Japanese economic diplomacy on other Asian countries’ policies in this field. Recent trends suggest that Japan’s influence on both developed countries and latecomer countries—especially in Asia—has been substantial, even if sometimes indirect. This chapter continues with a brief discussion of economic diplomacy in Japan’s post-war foreign policy, as well as of the conceptual framework of economic diplomacy that is applied here to the case of Japan. Next follows an assessment of recent developments in the three strands that form the ‘trinity’ in economic diplomacy, comprising commercial diplomacy (that is, the promotion of international trade, investment and tourism); trade diplomacy (bilateral, regional and multilateral negotiations on trade and investment agreements); and development cooperation. General trends in Japan’s economic diplomacy can then be discerned, and the relevance of Japan’s diplomatic style and practice beyond its own borders can be more broadly considered. The case is made that the shift in Japanese tactics that is brought to light in this chapter constitutes a pragmatic reorientation to the rapidly changing global environ rather than a move away from economic diplomacy as the key foreign policy instrument. Economic instruments have been, and are most likely to continue to be, at the core of Japanese policy to influence other states, even if we may be 252

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experiencing a limited securitization of economic diplomacy. A better understanding of how Japanese policies in this field have (not) evolved over the past decades will prove beneficial in a world where differences between ‘the West and the rest’ will only rise.

The economics–politics–security nexus in post-war policies The Japanese government has adhered to a policy that integrates economics, politics and security for a long time. Explicit reference to the concept of economic diplomacy is of more recent origin, however. The advent of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government in September 2009 marked a clear turning point in this regard. The staunchest promoter of economic diplomacy as part of foreign policy was the DPJ’s head, Seiji Maehara—first in his position as Minister for Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism and later as Minister for Foreign Affairs in the reshuffled Kan Cabinet. Under the strong leadership of Maehara, economic diplomacy was placed at the center of foreign policy. In June 2010, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) published the Industrial Structure Vision 2010, which included the export of infrastructure as a key strategic policy.5 For its part, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MOFA) annual Diplomatic Bluebook has since 2011 consistently dedicated a full section—one of roughly fourteen sections—to the topic.6 Indeed, after the DPJ administration ended in 2012, the trend to strengthen Japanese economic diplomacy continued under the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) government. In 2017, the Abe administration put out a publication on economic diplomacy stressing the importance of Japan being proactive on economic statecraft in the face of a sea change in global politico-economic surroundings.7 So what are the key features of Japan’s economic diplomacy today? The Bluebook of 2011 broke new ground in explicating five pillars of Japan’s economic diplomacy: (1) promoting the free-trade system; (2) securing the long-term and stable supply of resources, energy and food; (3) the international promotion of infrastructure systems; (4) the promotion of Japan as a tourism-oriented nation; and (5) publicizing the ‘brand’ of Japan. These priorities largely remain in 2016, albeit in slightly revised form. Trade diplomacy still features prominently, at both the bilateral level—the promotion of economic partnerships—and at the multilateral level, aiming for international rulemaking for example the EU–Japan agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership and plurilateral initiatives. Commercial diplomacy continues to revolve around support for Japanese companies’ overseas business expansion, while support for the promotion of investment in Japan—that gained prominence for a few years—is less continuous.8 For its part, the stable supply of energy, mineral resources and food continues to be one of five Japanese economic diplomacy priorities. Finally, the ‘branding Japan effort’ as a fifth pillar evolved over the years to be relabeled in the 2016 Bluebook as ‘international discussions led by Japan’, under the category of international rule-making. Remarkably, the promotion of tourism moved to a different section in the Diplomatic Bluebook, even if burgeoning numbers of tourists visiting Japan in recent years contributed significantly to the revitalization of the economy as well as to the country’s internationalization and the ‘Japan brand’. As the vast attention to economic diplomacy in Japan’s Diplomatic Bluebooks suggests, MOFA has always had an important role to play in the various strands of economic diplomacy. Many other actors are involved, however. Lacking an office that undertakes international trade talks—similar to that of the Office of the US Trade Representative—the Japanese government has been handling trade negotiations through a consensual decision-making structure involving four different ministries: MOFA, delivering the chief negotiator; METI, home to all other trade negotiators; the Ministry of Finance (MOF), supervising policies related to customs procedure and tariff revenues; and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF), overseeing exports and imports of agricultural products. Uniquely, Prime Minister Abe created a TPP 253

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Headquarters at the Cabinet Secretariat not long after his announcement of Japan’s intention to join the TPP negotiation in 2013. Headed by Economic Revitalization Minister Akira Amari, this office aimed to develop unified negotiating positions and to streamline inter-ministry coordination processes. Separately, the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC) in December 2013 effectively provides MOFA with a branch office inside the PM’s office to steer the general direction of foreign policy decision-making at the top level. The Council has its own national security advisor to the PM, and a staff of roughly seventy officials—mainly from the Foreign and Defense ministries—providing MOFA with an opportunity to exert stronger influence on a wide range of matters of foreign relations. At this point in time, however, the NSC does not have an international economy division. This may be explained by bureaucratic infighting—which is beyond our analysis here—but it needs to be rectified if the Japanese government wants to further strengthen its economic diplomacy with a whole-government approach. Japan has traditionally held a strong preference for positive inducements—especially development cooperation—and has shied away from using sanctions and other, more blunt instruments at the ‘power-play end’ of economic diplomacy. That being said, its policies have shown remarkable shifts in recent years. Hesitance about engaging in arms trade is weakening—signified at the government level by the lifting of the arms ban in 2014, as discussed by Hatakeyama in Chapter 15 of this volume—and economic diplomacy is coming to encompass more military-technical elements. This can be seen in the recent Japanese bid to export amphibious aircraft and submarines to India and Australia respectively. The key drivers of these policy shifts should be sought in Japan’s declining ODA capabilities and the United States’ demands for a greater military role for Japan, with the alliance partner propelling Tokyo to make greater use of its military power.9 Although Donald Trump during his 2016 presidential election campaign called for more burden-sharing to make the US—Japan partnership ‘a fair deal’, tensions on the Korean Peninsula and other politico-economic considerations in the region prevented a real push in this direction during Trump’s first year in office. There also has been a strong desire on the part of Japan, especially since the early 1990s—after the First Gulf War—to proactively engage in regional and global affairs on par with its national capabilities and to avoid being criticized for so-called checkbook diplomacy. Responding to such calls, the revision of defense laws and the reinterpretation of the constitution in 2014–16 have expanded the scope of operation for the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in theory. However, while this suggests that we may be witnessing a peak in Japanese military policy, even now the Japanese government has not moved away from the understanding that its strength is in economic tools. That is not to say that Japan’s economic diplomacy is not evolving—in fact, quite the contrary is true. Developments in Japan’s economic diplomacy are spurred by the ongoing change in the geostrategic and economic power balances among countries in East Asia. Regional and global rebalancing appears to be the primary driver behind Japan’s strategic reorientation. The evolving role of the United States and the US–Japan alliance plays a fundamental part herein. Indeed, the Japanese government is adjusting to the new reality where the hegemonic presence of the United States will be a more negotiated system that will entail a more pluralistic organization of power and influence.10 Japanese politicians and policy-makers are hence having another look at the economic and military benefits of the alliance with the United States and are reconsidering their policies.

The ‘economic diplomacy trinity’ in Japan’s economic diplomacy As governments throughout the world are actively re-emphasizing economic diplomacy in their foreign policy, there is a common trend towards developing stronger linkages between three 254

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strands of economic diplomacy: trade diplomacy, commercial diplomacy and development cooperation. These economic diplomacy tools are employed most regularly in times of relative peace—that is, when there is no need to resort to more extreme instruments such as sanctions or, worse still, declarations of war. Different from most developed countries in the West, Japan has long conflated trade promotion, trade diplomacy and development cooperation. This is even if it was partly ‘socialized’ into the rhetoric and ways of the G7 and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC)—for example, in the debate on tied aid (stipulating that goods and services bought with development funds can only be purchased from the donor country or from a limited selection of countries) and the emphasis on poverty reduction (rather than infrastructure development). The recent trend also seen in Europe and the United States, however, has led (back) to greater linkages between the three (see Figure 16.1)—as was more common in those countries in the 1960s and 70s. This change is spurred by the growing presence and influence of a group of countries—led by

Changing Regional Power Balance

Historical Stigma

Fiscal Constraint

Commercial Diplomacy • Trade & Investment Promotion • Infrastructure Systems Export • Attracting FDI • Tourism Attraction

Economic Diplomacy

Figure 16.1

Trade Diplomacy

Development Cooperation

• Multilateral Liberalization (WTO) • Bilateral & Regional Liberalization (EPA) • Sectoral Plurilateral Initiatives

• Industrial Capacity Building • Environmental & Energy Assistance • Support for Social Infrastructure

The trinity economic diplomacy in Japanese context

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China—that is increasingly inclined to challenge the rules and conventions of the game of international politics and economics that developed in the aftermath of the Second World War. While not attempting to overthrow the existing system, these players try to reshape and circumvent the existing system of global economic governance, while also establishing new institutions and carving out a greater role for themselves through the promotion of international networks of choice. As strategies and practice evolve in all three strands of economic diplomacy, linkages between the various fields are multiplying. Although the conflation of trade and investment promotion (commercial diplomacy) and development cooperation is widely known, development issues also increasingly feature in trade agreements. Japan has been at the forefront of conceiving of trade diplomacy as a way to move beyond issues of trade alone; its economic partnership agreements may also involve cooperation in the fields of energy and environment, science and technology, trade and investment promotion and tourism. The following paragraphs discuss such developments in the three strands of Japan’s economic diplomacy in greater detail.

Commercial diplomacy The support for Japanese companies abroad was featured consistently as an economic diplomacy pillar in Japan’s Diplomatic Bluebook between 2011–17. In fact, such assistance has been common practice in post-war Japanese foreign policy, as the establishment of the Japan External Trade Organization ( JETRO, with seventy-three overseas offices in fifty-four countries worldwide) back in 1958 attests to. A notable difference now is the fact that government—including MOFA—no longer shies away from supporting specific groups of private companies more openly. To varying degrees, commercial diplomacy has come to involve the promotion of infrastructure systems abroad; the promotion of Japan as a tourism-oriented nation; helping small to medium-size Japanese firms (rather than multinationals); and the promotion of incoming investment into Japan. Trade and investment promotion have thus long been two defining elements of Japan’s economic diplomacy, even before the concept came in fashion in recent years. Primary responsibility for policy-making in this field lies with METI, while implementation is undertaken by JETRO. At both the policy and the practical level, policies have evolved significantly in recent decades. The initial focus on export promotion and facilitation of trade complaints from large Japanese companies abroad (business advocacy) has been broadened to also include outgoing investment promotion. Furthermore, a serious effort to promote foreign direct investment into Japan materialized in the new millennium. More recently, however, JETRO’s focus returned to its outgoing function. Active support for Japanese enterprises has become particularly important in recent years, with the advance of economic partnerships worldwide and the rising demand for infrastructure. While the focus is still on countries in Asia,11 the Memorandum of Understanding between JETRO and the African Development Bank to cooperate on infrastructure development—signed during the Tokyo International Conference of African Development (TICAD) VI in August 2016—illustrates that Japan’s business support is also strengthening in other regions. Proactive efforts by the Japanese government to support the overseas business expansion of Japanese companies nowadays primarily target industries that concern themselves with infrastructure and environmental and energy technology. Exemplary in this regard is the Infrastructure and Plant-Exporting Assistance Committee that was established at JETRO’s Tokyo headquarters in April 2010. This committee works with METI’s promotion and strategy offices that are active in various sectors, including the railway, nuclear power generation, water and next-generation automobile industries. In parallel, MOFA established a Division for International Promotion of 256

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Infrastructure Systems in 201012 to consolidate information and knowledge related to infrastructure export to the more than 100 designated Japanese diplomats serving in overseas missions as specialists in Infrastructure Projects. Efforts of the Japanese government in this field aim primarily to help its industries find new markets abroad, while at the same time addressing issues of resource security, and securing cooperative relations with other countries. On this front, it is directly challenged in recent years by the catch-all term for China’s economic diplomacy today: the New Silk Road or Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), proposed by President Xi Jinping in 2013.13 Notwithstanding Japan’s new activism, the promotion of infrastructure systems abroad faces various difficulties. For example, the lack of a structure to provide the lump package of equipment supply, maintenance and management, together with low price competitiveness, are seen as major reasons for the problems facing both the nuclear and water industries. Unsuccessful bids for nuclear power projects in the United Arab Emirates and Vietnam in 2009–10—which were lost to South Korea and Russia, respectively—served as a wake-up call and spurred reorganization efforts and government involvement. This included the creation in September 2010 of a ‘Ministerial Meeting for the Development of Package Infrastructure Overseas’ and of a support office at MOFA in October 2010. Five years later, the sensitive loss of a contract to build Indonesia’s first high-speed railway by a Japanese consortium against China spurred further reform. Particular attention now went out to the financing of projects, as China’s proposal appeared to have won because of it not requiring Indonesian fiscal spending or government debt guarantees. A new initiative on ‘Partnerships for Quality Infrastructure’—including more encompassing financial facilities—announced by Prime Minister Abe in May 2015, helped Japan win a bid to build a high-speed line in India later that same year. By then, the competition to sell infrastructure projects had clearly become a feature in the Sino-Japanese competition for political influence in Asia and the pursuit of (domestic) economic growth through infrastructure projects overseas. Compared to the longstanding efforts in trade and investment promotion, the Japanese government was late to recognize the added value of incoming foreign investment and of tourism for Japan’s domestic economy and economic diplomacy. The Japanese government first established a Visit Japan Campaign Headquarters in 2003 to publicize Japanese tourist attractions and attract overseas visitors. Japan’s big business federation Keidanren followed-up by establishing a Committee on Tourism in 2004. In these years, policies focused more on providing financial support to local governments to develop tourism-related infrastructures, however. Even when the Japan Tourism Agency was established in 2008, little was made of tourism (promotion) as part of economic diplomacy practice. A clear indication of the shift in this direction, however, was the June 2011 officers’ meeting on the economic diplomacy for reconstruction following the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami. This meeting, held at MOFA, aimed to revitalize exports from Japan and to increase the number of foreign visitors to Japan. Other practical steps towards these ends in recent years include attempts to enhance easier entry for visitors by improving airport access and introducing more flexible visa regimes for visitors from countries with growing rich and middle class populations—including China, India and Indonesia—as well as for medical purposes. These initiatives aim primarily to tap into tourists’ purchasing power and thereby to revitalize Japan’s domestic economy. Complementing local and national-level initiatives, tourism is increasingly discussed at the international level, both in multilateral (economic) forums and regionally. For example, when tourism ministers from the APEC countries gathered for the first time in 2000, they committed to improving the economic, cultural, social and environmental well-being of APEC member economies through tourism. Ten years later they emphasized the development of sustainable 257

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tourism industries and called for investment in newly emerging trends—including medical/ wellness tourism and sports tourism. Moreover, ministers from Japan, China and South Korea have also gathered in recent years to discuss tourism trilaterally, thereby also facilitating cooperation between officials from local government tourism bureaus, travel agencies and airlines. As investments paid off—evidenced by record high numbers of foreign tourists’ visits and spending in 201414—government efforts in 2016 shifted to the supply-side issues, such as improvement of productivity in the tourism sector. Separately, new commercial diplomacy activism in Japan is evident in the field of defense equipment and technology trade. In April 2014, the Abe administration lifted Japan’s blanket ban on arms trade and adopted the ‘Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology,’ allowing Japan to export defense equipment and engage in cross-border research and development cooperation in defense technology after a rigorous screening process. The lifting of the defense embargo did not result in an immediate and drastic market gain for the Japanese defense industry, however, as can be observed in the failed 2016-bid to build the Australian submarine fleet by selling the Japanese Soryu-class submarine. Japan and India have also been talking for years about a possible deal on Japanese amphibious search-and-rescue aircraft US-2, but an agreement has not been reached so far. Lack of experience on the part of both the government and the private sectors involved is one major reason for this, combined with low demand and international visibility of Japanese defense equipment. These factors pose challenges to the new Japanese economic diplomacy initiative. To summarize, it is clear that a range of new policy initiatives is being undertaken in the field of commercial diplomacy. These are occurring domestically at the local and national levels, as well as in bilateral and multilateral meetings with other countries. Politicians and representatives from a diverse private sector are increasingly active, searching for new ways to further cooperation between them. In the fields of trade and investment promotion—infrastructure systems in particular—and tourism this also involves high-level political initiatives and the establishment of new agencies. Key drivers of this change are domestic (the shrinking population and sluggish economic growth) as well as international competitive pressures.

Trade diplomacy Bilateral and multilateral trade liberalization has featured prominently in Japan’s economic diplomacy since the late 1990s. This is reflected in MOFA’s Diplomatic Bluebooks, as the promotion of the free-trade system is emphasized as one of the key pillars of economic diplomacy. Reflecting the trend of deepening competitive multilateralism as well as the new emphasis on sector-based plurilateral initiatives, by 2015 the promotion of economic partnerships and multilateral trade liberalization were included as two separate priorities. Attempts of the Japanese government to move forward in trade diplomacy are challenged mainly on two fronts. For one, domestic political forces—first and foremost, the agricultural lobby—have been slowing actual progress in bilateral and multilateral free-trade negotiations and have proven largely successful in keeping many of Japan’s protectionist policies in place. This is despite the fact that politicians, the private sector (especially Keidanren), academia and even the general public are increasingly questioning these protectionist policies supported by the agricultural lobby. Secondly, there can be little doubt that the economic decline of Japan has (had) a negative influence on Japan’s ability to wield power through trade diplomacy, not only multilaterally and through free-trade agreements, but also with regard to engagement with other countries in the region. As a result, initiatives are realized only very slowly, if at all, and Japan has often lagged behind other countries in the region—especially key competitor, South Korea. 258

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The surge in negotiations towards bilateral and multilateral trade agreements in Asia that started in the late 1990s has received extensive attention. Tokyo’s decision to embark on this path came in response to the proliferation of trade agreements in the global economy (with negative consequences for Japanese companies that did not enjoy such preferential treatment) and the stagnation of multilateral negotiations in the WTO Doha Development Round.15 The Japanese government’s ambitions are laid out in the Basic Policy on Comprehensive Economic Partnerships, which was published in November 2010. Since the first bilateral FTA with Singapore was signed in 2002, Japan has signed and ratified free trade agreements with 15 countries, including India, Peru, Australia and Mongolia, as well as ASEAN. Within the region, the Japanese government in 2016 signed the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP)—a regional free-trade initiative that involved the United States, Australia and other Asia-Pacific nations, but excluded China. The deal unraveled, at least in its initial form, however, when President Trump withdrew the United States from the TPP in January 2017, on his first working day in office. The remaining 11 countries, including Japan, sought to maintain the regional trade framework and agreed in November 2017 on the core elements of the TPP, now renamed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The protectionist backlash in the United States did prove a boon to EU–Japan talks, while talks on a trilateral with China and South Korea, among others, continue. Japan’s FTA policy has aimed to score points on three goals: (1) conferring important economic advantages—such as restoring the level playing field for companies that have been excluded from existing trade areas and to expand market share; (2) furthering new rules given the WTO deadlock; and (3) achieving political and diplomatic goals—that is, consolidating relations with other countries and Japan’s influence in the region.16 Indeed, the rivalry that exists between Japan and China has led both governments to engage countries in the Asia-Pacific region through bilateral and regional trade agreements (so-called mega-FTAs).17 When announcing Japan’s intent to join the TPP negotiation in March 2013, Prime Minister Abe stressed that ‘the significance of the TPP is not limited to the economic impact’; Japan’s efforts to create a ‘new economic zone’ with the United States and other neighboring countries who share universal values will contribute not only to the national security of Japan, but will also underpin the stability of the Asia-Pacific region. Similar discourse on the strategic benefits of TPP was repeated during Abe’s address to a joint session of U.S. Congress in April 2015.18 The Japanese government thereby prioritized the inter-regional TPP, while attempting to also use the EU–Japan EPA and sectoral plurilaterals as a way to set the next-generation standards in international trade and investment. China has not been part of the TPP’s negotiations, and instead emphasizes the intra-regional Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP, involving ASEAN plus six—with China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand). Against fierce domestic opposition, especially from the agricultural lobby, the Japanese government signed the TPP in early 2016, signaling that diplomatic concerns relating to alliance politics and regional rivalry had the upper hand. This is also evident from Japan’s first-ever National Security Strategy, published in 2013, which also makes explicit reference to the expansion of the open and rules-based economic system as a way of ‘strengthening cooperation based on universal values to resolve global issues.’19 Summing up, Japanese activism in the field of trade diplomacy is uneven. Clearly, domestic politics and geopolitical considerations are shaping government approaches in the field of trade diplomacy, interfering with economic logic and pointing to the importance of the IPE-security nexus. But while the Japanese government is slowly overcoming domestic resistance to deeper trade agreements, real successes remain few. Also, the Japanese government has so far avoided significant liberalization in agriculture and needed structural reform of this sector, 259

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notwithstanding the successful signing of the Japan–Australia EPA, which partially opened up the Japanese agricultural market. Much now depends on the future of the TPP, with Tokyo continuing to urge Washington to rethink its opposition and some other member nations pressing to move ahead without the United States. Japan and Australia took the lead to push for the 11-member CPTPP, i.e. without the United States but leaving the door open for future US engagement. Given the demise of the Trans-Pacific deal in its original form, it is unsurprising that the Japanese government from midNovember 2016 redoubled its efforts to conclude the EU–Japan EPA swiftly. The two partners signed an agreement in principle on the EPA on the eve of the G20 meeting in Hamburg in July 2017, sending a powerful signal that two of the world’s biggest economies reject protectionism. Both the TPP and the EU–Japan agreements hold profound politico-strategic importance, aiming to set standards in several new sectors (such as digital commerce, the environment and labor policy) and on sensitive issues such as state-owned enterprises. In doing so, they could also reduce the economic risk of ever-growing differences in rules of origin. As for the China–Japan– (South) Korea (CJK) trilateral FTA, though negotiations never ceased, even during the time of political tension between Beijing and Tokyo, there is no indication that the deal would reach an agreement soon. The Japanese government believes that the trilateral agreement will bring insufficient economic benefit as long as both China and South Korea see it as a mere extension of the China–South Korea FTA, which came into effect in December 2015. The success of the Chinese Communist Party Congress in October 2017 gave Beijing the political flexibility to consider participating in a CJK summit to be held in Tokyo, which could create a positive atmosphere for the trilateral FTA.

Development cooperation Securing the long-term and stable supply of resources, energy and food has also been consistently featured as a pillar of Japan’s economic diplomacy in the Diplomatic Bluebooks of 2011–17. Policies in this field cannot be seen as separate from its efforts in the field of development cooperation—the third leg in the trinity of economic diplomacy. The Japanese government seeks to strengthen relations with countries in the Asian region as well as resource-rich countries—especially emerging economies—further away through economic cooperation that also aims to improve the security of supply of natural resources. Depending on the target country and industry, these policies often have an element of commercial and trade diplomacy, especially apparent in the provision of infrastructure systems. On development assistance more generally, it has been said that the reason Japanese policies are so impregnated with foreign policy objectives has to do with the few tools that are available to Japanese diplomacy. From the 1970s the Japanese government deliberately increased its spending in the field of development assistance as the country grew into an economic superpower. Having become the world’s largest bilateral donor by 1989, Japan remained the single biggest provider of ODA from 1991 through 2001. The need for change began to be addressed in Japan in response to fiscal problems, as well as to internal and external pressures for policy shifts—such as the need to address lack of transparency and the sensitivity of recipient needs, as well as an insufficiently coherent and coordinated policy.20 Clearly, as the only ‘non-Western’ member of the G7/G8 throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, Japan was at least partially ‘socialized’ into the ways of the OECD DAC, which was dominated by Western countries. At the same time, however, the Japanese government attempted to garner support for its ‘economic cooperation’ approach. At roughly one-third of the total, loans—compared to grants—remain a much larger percentage of Japanese programs in comparison with European donors, while grants are largely technical. 260

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Furthermore, the tendency to employ the know-how of modern industrial productionrelated sectors to build friendly relations with target countries and simultaneously to contribute to the stable supply of natural resources is still apparent. The Japanese government was even successful in having its principles of ownership and results-oriented assistance included in the 2005 Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness. Furthermore, as illustrated by the adoption of the Seoul Development Consensus on Shared Growth at the G20 summit in 2010, convergence towards the economic, cooperative style of development cooperation accelerated as a larger group of nontraditional players emerged. The importance of natural resources in Japan’s economic diplomacy is of a dual nature and involves importing energy resources, as well as securing the supply of rare earth-metals and minerals that are needed for electric cars and nuclear plants. To address the challenge of importing energy resources, the Japanese government mainly targets oil-rich countries in the Middle East, while securing the supply of rare earth metals involves a number of countries in South-East and Central Asia, Latin America and Africa that harbor other natural resources. In both cases the Japanese government aims for a dual win, whereby deals to import raw materials go hand-in-hand with development/economic cooperation projects that benefit Japan’s exporting industries. For example, improvement of the security of supply of crude oil is sought through provision of water and nuclear infrastructure to Middle Eastern countries.21 In a similar vein, efforts are made in the next-generation automobile sector to secure the stable supply of rare metals by forming ‘mutually beneficial relationships’ with resource-producing countries.22 This is reminiscent of Japan’s Eurasian diplomacy and Silk Road diplomacy, initiated in the late 1990s with the aim to reshape Japan’s approach to Russia and to strengthen political and economic relations with the new republics in Central Asia and the South Caucasus against a background of the growing weight of China.23 Environmental and energy assistance have become an important feature of economic cooperation (ODA) programs since the 1980s. Other than the direct commercial benefits that emerge from this approach, improving energy efficiency in other countries also helps to ease pressure in the competition for natural resources. The strategic importance of forging mutually beneficial relationships and the diversification of natural resource imports for the Japanese business sector were underscored in a territorial and political dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in autumn 2010. While the Chinese government denied that any formal ban had been imposed, exports of rare earth minerals to Japan—and, later, to the United States and European countries—suddenly stopped. This constituted a severe blow to the Japanese manufacturing sector, which at the time largely depended on China for its imports of rare earth-minerals. Indeed, there can be little doubt that this occurrence provided further impetus for the Japanese government to strengthen its ties with other countries that hold these resources. At the same time, Japanese car manufacturers and other industries have sought to lessen their reliance on such minerals by way of developing alternative materials and technologies. Rather than escalating the conflict, Tokyo thus opted for a quiet strategy of economic diplomacy that aimed for long-term, comprehensive goals. The adoption of the first Official Development Assistance Charter in 1992 had already recognized Japan’s foreign assistance activities as an indispensable tool of Japanese diplomacy—including for stability and peace-making. If the inclusion of assistance as ‘a contribution to peace and development’ was regarded with anxiety by some already back then;24 concerns only grew with the adoption of a new Development Cooperation Charter in 2015. The new Charter was intended to redesign Japan’s assistance scheme to strengthen the country’s role in global affairs in line with its 2013 National Security Strategy, which stated that Japanese development assistance should be utilized from the strategic perspective as well. Some ODA experts have expressed concern that the new charter opens a path for Japan to provide assistance to foreign troops, though for non-military purposes. For its part, the Japanese government assured that development cooperation will not be 261

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provided for military purposes and careful case-by-case consideration will be conducted when assistance is provided to foreign armed forces, for instance, on disaster relief activities. In the meantime, competition for influence in East Asia has spurred development assistance and trade promotion policies in new directions also at the regional level. Until the beginning of this millennium, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) facilitated the development and maintenance of shared expectations between Japan and China over the future direction of development assistance, despite the worsening Sino–Japanese relationship.25 China’s influence in the ADB expanded since it became a member in 1986, but arguably not (yet) at Japan’s expense. Displeasure with Japan’s substantial influence in the ADB and with the Bank’s turn towards ‘social infrastructure’ in certain regions at the expense of ‘hard’ infrastructural projects, fueled Chinese initiatives towards the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). In 2015, Beijing succeeded in securing almost sixty members from around the world for this new international institution—conspicuously not labelled ‘a development bank’, but aiming to spur economic growth and development in the countries where it operates. Within months, Tokyo unveiled a plan to provide $110 billion in assistance for Asian infrastructure projects over a period of five years, topping the expected $100 billion capitalization of the China-led AIIB.

Trends in Japan—an example to follow? For post-Second World War Japan, economic diplomacy has long been about expanding economic opportunities overseas and strengthening relations with its Asian neighbors through economic interdependence. Globalization and the shift in the regional power balances have forced Japanese foreign policy to attain politico-strategic goals as well as economic ones. A series of Chinese-led economic diplomacy initiatives such as the AIIB and BRI—but also the BRICS countries’ New Development Bank—are prompting Japan with a shrinking population and over two decades of economic stagnation to counter the regional trend. Two of the clearest examples of the evolution in Japanese economic diplomacy have been its push for the TPP and the EU–Japan agreement, and the partnerships for quality infrastructure. Both fall within the remit of the economic diplomacy trinity, involving commercial diplomacy, trade diplomacy and development cooperation. While public debate remains scant, Japanese policies in the field of development assistance are simultaneously moving in opposite directions. Assistance efforts today indisputably involve the greater investments in social goals that traditional donors in Europe have long emphasized, but at the same time new players—notably China—are pushing the Japanese government towards renewed linkages with commercial diplomacy—i.e. trade and investment promotion. Similar differences and policy shifts are discernible in the field of trade diplomacy, where the Japanese government is displaying relatively more concern with political-strategic rather than commercial considerations. In other words, the Japanese government sees trade agreements as an important tool in the struggle for influence in the East Asian region and to spur domestic restructuring of the economy, while businesses that favor such agreements seek enhanced commercial opportunities abroad. At the same time, the lifting of the arms trade bans, the creation of the NSC and the changes in the ODA Charter suggest that we are witnessing a limited securitization of Japan’s economic diplomacy. Japanese firms have been very cautious to be seen as ‘merchants of death’ by fully engaging in defense trade. They are reportedly less allergic, however, to being part of ‘strategic industries’—such as the aerospace technologies sector—compared to, say, ten years ago. While such activities remain the exception rather than the rule in Japanese policies, it is fair to say that the Japanese government’s new security posture is also having a direct impact on its economic diplomacy. To a growing extent, economic diplomacy is being interpreted as a zero-sum game, 262

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especially vis-a`-vis China. When Prime Minister Abe formally announced in March 2013 that Japan would join the TPP negotiation process, he stated the significance of establishing a new economic sphere in East Asia with Japan’s only ally, the United States, and other nations with whom Japan share universal values, and thus emphasized the strategic aspect of the free trade agreement. As noted earlier, Prime Minister Abe announced in May 2015, that Japan will provide economic assistance for ‘high-quality’ infrastructure development in Asia, in an apparent action to counterbalance the Beijing-led AIIB. Public debates are very much guided by domestic political purposes—namely, vote-winning—and at the same time aim to garner public support for strengthening military capabilities and thus more forceful economic diplomacy to frustrate the perceived Chinese ambition of becoming an economic hegemon in East Asia. Summing up, while there is no denying that the Japanese government has also been strengthening and restructuring its military capabilities since the 1990s, its diplomatic practice still emphasizes economic means. During the Russo–Japanese summit in May 2016, for example, Prime Minister Abe proposed his eight-point economic cooperation plan on energy projects, the development in the Russian Far East and other economic matters including urban development. Japanese economic diplomacy vis-a`-vis Russia is widely understood as offering political and economic incentives to President Putin to build mutual trust toward the signing of a peace treaty and resolving the decades-long territorial dispute. At the same time, Japanese economic diplomacy includes more forceful means, such as economic sanctions imposed against North Korea and Russia, which can still largely be seen within a comprehensive framework of economic diplomacy. This is not so much an erosion of the comprehensive notion of security and the practice of economic diplomacy, as a pragmatic reorientation in response to the changing regional economic and security environment. Finally, how does continuity and change in Japan’s economic diplomacy in the post-war period relate to policies of other countries—especially in the Asian region? There can be little doubt that economic considerations have featured greatly in Japan’s development assistance/ economic cooperation, and those of other Asian countries in its wake, including South Korea, China and India. While aspiring to build friendly ties, emphasis has been given to promoting the economic growth of both the sending and the recipient states. To emphasize the mutual gains, this is commonly labelled economic cooperation rather than development assistance (let alone ‘aid’, which is, even to many in Europe today, an outdated term). This approach clearly diverges from that of European countries, whose activities have often been commissioned to nongovernmental agencies and comprised of rather direct efforts to improve political and social rights, such as good governance and human rights. While Japan in the 1970s was an early example of the economic approach, the Japanese government have partly adjusted its policies since then in order to appease Western concerns of ‘tied aid’—that is, of using development policies to promote its own corporate interests. Pressured by financial constraints at home and competitive pressures from emerging and other (Asian) players with approaches reminiscent to the Japan of old, the Japanese government in recent years has been readjusting its policies again.26 This now puts Japan in a middle position as a country that aims towards both economic and political objectives. It is challenged by Chinese activism in Africa, whose practice of conflating trade, investment and assistance on the African continent are reminiscent of Japanese policies of old. This may come as no surprise, as Chinese delegates do indeed visit Japan to learn from its practices.27 But the traditional ways of Tokyo’s economic diplomacy appear to have inspired its key rivals in Beijing not just in the field of development/economic cooperation. As explicated earlier, China has chosen to compete with Japan also on infrastructure investment—in particular, the highspeed rail and nuclear power generation industries. More fundamentally, the flagship initiative of 263

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Chinese economic diplomacy today, BRI, shows remarkable similarities to Japan’s Fukuda Doctrine, launched by Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda in the late 1970s—even if the two vastly differ in regional scope, with the former being much more comprehensive, targeting no less than the Eurasian landmass (but conspicuously leaving out Japan). The Fukuda Doctrine aimed to facilitate the ‘going out’ of Japanese companies into the Southeast Asian region, while promising to build friendly ties and contribute to the improvement of regional cooperation and even integration. This Japanese strategy was a product of reflection on the negative political impacts created by the fast-growing Japanese economic presence in Southeast Asia. It was carefully drafted to placate the public sentiment in Southeast Asia illustrated by anti-Japan protests in Jakarta and Bangkok in 1974, and marked a turning point in Japanese economic diplomacy toward Southeast Asian countries. If BRI is understood as a manifestation of Chinese geo-economic ambitions, it remains to be seen if China could also learn from the Fukuda Doctrine on the importance of proper consideration for local economic nationalism and avoid being accused of engaging in neo-colonialism.

Conclusion This chapter has presented a rough sketch of the trajectory of Japan’s economic diplomacy, with a particular focus on the 2010s. A conceptual framework that emphasizes three economic diplomacy strands was employed to capture diverging developments in various fields and to make sense of the sometimes-contradictory policies that are part of the Japanese approach. The framework proved helpful in drawing links between developments in three key strands of economic Japan’s diplomacy at both the bilateral and multilateral levels—namely, commercial diplomacy, trade diplomacy and development cooperation. This allowed for a comprehensive analysis of multiple policy considerations on the part of the Japanese government, that are all too often addressed separately in the fields of security studies and international political economy. The analysis showed how, in the 2010s, economic diplomacy gained sway as a concept in Japanese government circles, not least MOFA. Economic diplomacy is evolving in new directions, coming to involve a greater element of geo-strategic power play and a limited degree of securitization. It is increasingly perceived in zero-sum terms—a trend that is unlikely to subside as long as Prime Minister Abe is in power. Japanese policymakers should therefore recognize with pride, and a bit of concern, the fact that neighboring countries regularly turn to Japan’s economic diplomacy practice—today and of old—to inform their own policies.

Notes 1 See, for example, on Japan’s commercial diplomacy, Christopher B. Johnstone (1998) ‘How Much Bang for the Buck? Japan’s Commercial Diplomacy in Asia’, in Jeffrey Garten, Robert Zoellick and James Shinn (eds), Riding the Tigers: American Commercial Diplomacy in Asia, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 63–71; on official development aid, see David Arase (ed.) (2005) Japan’s Foreign Aid: Old Continuities and New Directions, London: Routledge. 2 This draws on Maaike Okano-Heijmans (2013) Economic Diplomacy: Japan and the Balance of National Interests, Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 3 This framework is explicated in greater detail in Maaike Okano-Heijmans (2016) ‘Economic Diplomacy’, in: Costas Constantinou, Paul Sharp and Pauline Kerr (eds), The SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy, London: SAGE. 4 Christopher W. Hughes (2004) Japan’s Security Agenda: Military, Economic, and Environmental Dimensions, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 208. 5 Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan (2010) Industrial Structure Vision: The way forward for Japanese Industry, Tokyo, 3 June. 6 MOFA, Diplomatic Bluebooks 2011 to 2017. Throughout these years, Economic Diplomacy was included as Section 3 in Chapter 3. 264

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7 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2017) ‘Waga kuni no keizai gaikou’ [Our Nation’s Economic Diplomacy], Tokyo. 8 Remarkably, the promotion of investment into Japan features less prominently in the 2016 Bluebook in comparison with its 2015 version. 9 Hughes, Japan’s Security Agenda. 10 For an analysis of the changing US hegemony and role in East Asia, and the interaction between subsystems of economics and security therein, see, for example, G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi (2010) ‘Introduction’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 10(3): 383–8. 11 MOFA (2011) Diplomatic Bluebook, 29. 12 The Office was reorganized in 2015, as Division for Promotion of Public-Private Partnership. 13 By improving infrastructural connectivity across the Eurasian and African continents, BRI is heralded by the Chinese government as a ‘harmonious and inclusive’ initiative that seeks to ‘promote the economic prosperity of the countries along the Belt and Road and regional economic cooperation, strengthen exchanges and mutual learning between different civilizations, and promote world peace and development’. More on BRI in the final paragraph of this chapter. 14 Keidanren Report (2015) Tokyo: Japan Business Federation, 13. 15 Saadia M. Pekkanen, Mireya Solı´s and Saori N. Katada (2007) ‘Trading Gains for Control: International Trade Forums and Japanese Economic Diplomacy’, International Studies Quarterly, 51, December, 945–70. See also numerous articles by established scholars such as Masahiro Kawai and Shujir o Urata. 16 Mireya Solı´s (2011) ‘Globalism Ascendant, Regionalism Stagnant: Japan’s Response to the Global Financial Crisis,’ The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 6(1–2): 51–2. See also Naoko Munakata, ‘Regionalization and Regionalism: The Process of Mutual Interaction’ (2004) in RIETI Discussion Paper Series, 04-E-006, Tokyo: Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry. 17 For more on this, see, for example, Lam Peng Er (2006) ‘Japan’s FTA with Singapore: The China Factor and Regionalism’, Japanese Studies, 26(2): 211–20; and Aurelia George Mulgan (2008) ‘Where Japan’s Foreign Policy Meets Agricultural Trade Policy: The Australia–Japan Free-Trade Agreement’, Japanese Studies, 28(1), May: 31–44. 18 Prime Minister of Japan, Press Conference by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, 15 March 2013; and Prime Minister of Japan, Toward an Alliance of Hope—Address to a Joint Meeting of the U.S. Congress by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, 29 April 2015. See also, Keiichi Umada (2015) ‘Henyou suru ajia taiheiyou nochitsujo tonitibeichuu kankei no yukue’ [Changing Order in the Asia Pacific and the Prospect of Japan-U.S.-China Relations], Kokusai Boueki to Toshi, 100, Summer: 4–19. 19 Cabinet Office of Japan, National Security Strategy, Tokyo, 17 December 2013, esp. 31–4. 20 Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid. 21 MOFA (2010) Japan’s ODA White Paper 2009: Japan’s International Cooperation. 22 METI (2010) Jisedai jidousha senryaku 2010 [Next-generation Vehicle Strategy 2010], 12 April. 23 Reinhard Drifte (2004) Japan’s Eurasian Diplomacy: Power Politics, Resource Diplomacy or Romanticism London: Routledge. 24 Marie So¨derberg (ed.) (1996) The Business of Japanese Foreign Aid: Five Case Studies from Asia, London and New York: Routledge. 25 Joel Rathus (2008) ‘China, Japan and Regional Organizations: The Case of the Asian Development Bank’, Japanese Studies, 28(1): 87–99. 26 European countries are evolving in a direction that resembles Japan’s more economic approach of old, albeit coming from the opposite end; ODA efforts of European countries have primarily tended to emphasize political goals, such as furthering good governance, human rights and the rule of law in recipient countries. 27 Authors’ informal discussions with Japanese (including JICA), Chinese representative and other experts in the field (2010–16).

Bibliography Arase, D. (ed.) (2005) Japan’s Foreign Aid: Old Continuities and New Directions, London: Routledge. Cabinet Office of Japan (2013) National Security Strategy, Tokyo, 17 December. Drifte, R. (2004) Japan’s Eurasian Diplomacy: Power Politics, Resource Diplomacy or Romanticism, London: Routledge. 265

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George Mulgan, A. (2008) ‘Where Japan’s Foreign Policy Meets Agricultural Trade Policy: The Australia– Japan Free-Trade Agreement’, Japanese Studies, 28(1): 31–44. Hughes, C.W. (2004) Japan’s Security Agenda: Military, Economic, and Environmental Dimensions, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Ikenberry, G.J. and Inoguchi, T. (2010) ‘Introduction’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 10(3): 383–8. Johnstone, C.B. (1998) ‘How Much Bang for the Buck? Japan’s Commercial Diplomacy in Asia’, in J. Garten, R. Zoellick and J. Shinn (eds), Riding the Tigers: American Commercial Diplomacy in Asia, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 63–71. Keidanren–Japan’s Business Federation (2015) Keidanren Report, Tokyo: Keidanren, September www. keidanren.or.jp/en/profile/keidanren_report.pdf Lam, P.E., (2006) ‘Japan’s FTA with Singapore: The China Factor and Regionalism’, Japanese Studies, 26(2): 211–20. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan (2010) Industrial Structure Vision: The Way Forward for Japanese Industry, Tokyo, 3 June. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan (2010) Jisedai-jid osha-senryaku 2010 [Next-generation Vehicle Strategy 2010], Tokyo, 12 April. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (various years) Diplomatic Bluebook, Tokyo (available online). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2010) Japan’s ODA White Paper 2009: Japan’s International Cooperation, Tokyo. Munakata, N. (2004) ‘Regionalization and Regionalism: The Process of Mutual Interaction’, in RIETI Discussion Paper Series, 04-E-006, Tokyo: Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry. Okano-Heijmans, M. (2013) Economic Diplomacy: Japan and the Balance of National Interests, Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Okano-Heijmans, M. (2016) ‘Economic Diplomacy’, in C. Constantinou, P. Sharp and P. Kerr (eds), The SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy, London: SAGE, 552–63. Pekkanen, S.M., Solı´s, M. and Katada, S.N. (2007) ‘Trading Gains for Control: International Trade Forums and Japanese Economic Diplomacy’, International Studies Quarterly, 51: 945–70. Prime Minister of Japan (2015) Press Conference by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, 15 March 2013; and Prime Minister of Japan, Toward an Alliance of Hope—Address to a Joint Meeting of the U.S. Congress by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, 29 April. Rathus, J. (2008) ‘China, Japan and Regional Organizations: The Case of the Asian Development Bank’, Japanese Studies, 28(1): 87–99. So¨derberg M. (ed) (1996) The Business of Japanese Foreign Aid: Five Case Studies from Asia, London and New York: Routledge. Solı´s, M. (2011) ‘Globalism Ascendant, Regionalism Stagnant: Japan’s Response to the Global Financial Crisis’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 6(1–2): 37–61. Umada, K. (2015) ‘Henyou suru ajia taiheiyou nochitsujo tonitibeichuu kankei no yukue’ [Changing Order in the Asia Pacific and the Prospect of Japan–U.S.–China Relations], Kokusai Boueki to Toshi, 100, Summer: 4–19.

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17 The evolution, politics, and prospect of Japanese trade policy Hidetaka Yoshimatsu

Introduction Since Japan is poorly endowed with natural and energy resources, trade constitutes a crucial condition for economic growth of the country. While Japan has imported natural and energy resources necessary for industrial upgrading, it has exported manufactured products to overseas markets and acquired foreign currency. While trade, like investment, is basically undertaken by corporate groups as economic activities, it has permeating impacts on the overall economy and society. Consequently, trade policy has been a major source of political debate in which major societal groups seek to protect their vested interests in the domestic market or search for the possibility of profit expansion. Trade policy is also crucial for a country’s external relations as it contributes to closer political linkages with partner countries through expanded economic transactions and support for economic prosperity. The main objective of this chapter is to provide the overall picture of the evolution and prospect of Japanese trade policy from the international-political-economy perspective. It seeks to address three questions. The first is how Japanese trade policy has changed in response to evolving trends in the international trading system. The second is what factors have influenced the formation of Japanese trade policy; here it pays particular attention to domestic factors in trade policy-making, including bureaucratic rivalry and societal interest representation, as well as international factors that have urged Japan to adopt specific trade policies. The third question is what the major challenges are based on evolving conditions and pressures on Japanese trade policy. The chapter begins with an overview of Japanese trade policy in the post-war period.

The evolution of Japanese trade policy Japan and the GATT In post-war trade policy, Japan sought to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as a fundamental condition to return to international society. It offered its first proposal to join the GATT in 1952, but European states, the United Kingdom in particular, strongly objected to Japan’s joining due to their bitter experiences of Japan’s unfair trading behavior during the pre-war period (Nakakita 1993: 287–8). When Japan achieved an accession to the 267

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GATT in 1955, fourteen out of the then thirty-four members, including the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, and Australia, invoked GATT Article 35 (which allows member-states to refuse to have GATT relations with another member state), with a fear that cheap Japanese products would flood their domestic markets and those of their ex-colonies (Komiya and Itoh 1988: 178; Cortell and Davis 2005: 11). Given increases in the export of manufactured products, Japan was confronted with growing international pressure on market liberalization. In June 1960, the Japanese government adopted the Outline of the Plan for Trade and Foreign Exchange Liberalization, and promoted import liberalization by enhancing the customs system and converting import quotas to tariffs. As a consequence, the import liberalization rate, which indicates the percentage of liberalized goods as a proportion of all imported goods, rose from 41% in 1960 to 93% in 1964 (Urata 2015: 46–7; Komiya and Itoh 1988: 181–2). At the same time, the government kept mercantilist-inspired ‘state developmentalism’ to nurture specific industrial sectors with various industrial policy measures including protective import quotas and tariffs for these sectors. The fostering of the machinery industry with international competitiveness and export power was particularly important to gain foreign currency to compensate for the payments for growing imports due to industrialization. After the conclusion of the Kennedy Round (1964–7), the Japanese government implemented further trade liberalization policies. It removed a large number of import quotas: the number of items under ‘residual’ (illegal under the GATT) import restrictions decreased from 122 in April 1968 to 33 in April 1972. As for tariffs, the government reduced tariff rates on all (with a few exceptions) processed agricultural products, manufactured goods, and mining products by 20% in December 1972 (Komiya and Itoh 1988: 190–1). Furthermore, Japan promoted trade liberalization during the Tokyo Round (1973–9), which began with Japan’s initiative. Japan offered tariff reductions on the largest number of items among the participating members and carried out the first round of tariff reduction in advance of the agreed time schedule in order to express its enthusiasm for the successful conclusion of the negotiations (Komiya and Itoh 1988: 204). With Japan’s growing commitments to multilateralism, the so-called ‘GATT fundamentalists’, who held a solid belief in trade liberalization principles, were fostered among the economic policy authorities (Cortell and Davis 2005; Hatakeyama 2015: 248). Agricultural protection was positioned as one of the major agenda items during the Uruguay Round (1986–94), which was more comprehensive and ambitious than any other GATT multilateral negotiations, engaging in liberalization in difficult agricultural and textile sectors and targeting new areas such as trade in services and intellectual property rights (IPRs). In the round, Japan contributed to making rules in trade in services, IPRs and investment policy (Urata 2015: 50). However, Japan opposed the blanket conversion of import quantity restrictions to tariffs on all products. In particular, Japan was desperate to protect the domestic market of rice, which had large and nation-wide producers with strong political clout. Finally, the government accepted the minimum access volume (MAV) to defer the tariffication of rice in the face of strong domestic opposition. The MAV was formulated in the form of ‘national trade’, in which the government purchased the whole volume of imported rice in order that the price of domestically-produced rice would not be adversely affected by an increase of imported rice. The government used imported rice for processing, feeding stuff, and foreign aid. The quantity of imported rice under the MAV increased from 426,000 tons in 1995 to 767,000 tons in 2000, and maintained this level afterwards (MAFF 2009: 7). As a consequence of a fundamental shift from quotas to tariff protection and a subsequent reduction in tariff rates, the average level of Japanese tariff rate on agricultural products was not high compared with other advanced nations with imports of agricultural goods. However, Japan 268

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maintained extremely high protection on a small number of products such as rice, wheat and barley, dairy products, meat, and sugar and starch crops. On the one hand, many of these items have been the key farm products in Hokkaido, Kyushu, and Okinawa, sustaining the socioeconomic life of the local people (Shimizu et al. 2012). On the other hand, commodities such as rice, wheat and barley, which are produced across wide regions, were deemed to be important for maintaining the multifunctionality of agriculture, such as the preservation of the land and the natural environment, watershed protection, and the prevention of floods (Urata 2015: 63). Thus, the protection of domestic agriculture has been a highly political matter, being a major concern for politicians at elections. The removal of protection became a major agenda item for subsequent trade policies including free-trade agreements (FTAs).

Growing commitments to FTAs The GATT fundamentalists in Japan considered that the formation of regional trade agreements (RTAs) such as customs unions and free-trade areas, which was exceptionally admitted in the GATT 24 and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 5, ran counter to the GATT principles (Hatakeyama 2015: 249). Consequently, Japan adhered to GATT/WTO-centered multilateralism even when other major countries strengthened moves towards regionalism through the formation of RTAs. In the late 1990s, some bureaucrats raised a concern about steady progress in regionalism in Europe and North America, and considered the positive use of affluence labor and growing markets in Asia for the vitalization of the Japanese economy. Under such trends, in summer 1998 the International Trade Policy Bureau of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) commenced to investigate worldwide trends of regional economic integrations, its merits and demerits, and possible policy options for Japan (Munakata 2001: 99–100). The new policy stance became apparent in METI’s 1999 White Paper on International Trade, which appreciated positive aspects of RTAs such as the provision of models of rule-making for multilateral forums and the advancement of multilateral trade negotiations in deadlock by enabling plural countries to form one voice (METI 1999: 293–4). In line with changes in its basic stance, Japan pursued the conclusion of an FTA with Singapore, signing the Japan–Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement (JSEPA) in January 2002. The JSEPA had significant implications for reducing the feeling of veto against FTAs among officials within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and METI, and establishing the precedent for exceptional treatment for agriculture as it excluded agricultural products effectively from liberalization (Kim 2016: 104–6; George Mulgan 2015a: 6). Japan then concluded FTAs with Mexico in September 2004, with Malaysia in December 2005, and with Thailand in April 2007. In these FTAs, Japan offered concession of aid and technical cooperation in exchange for the preservation of its agricultural market. In the case of the Japan–Malaysia FTA, for instance, Japan agreed to offer food processing, preservation technologies, and assistance to establish a certification system in the wood-based industry. Consequently, the liberalization rate in terms of trade value basis in Japan’s FTAs with Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines were 91.6–94.1% while the partners’ offer was 96.6–99.3% (Urata 2015: 60). Japan has used the term ‘economic partnership agreement’, rather than ‘free-trade agreement’, which is used broadly by other countries. This is because it hoped to make tariff reduction one component of broad economic agreements and the name ‘economic partnership agreement (EPA)’ was a euphemism for a weak and partial FTA (Sally 2006: 315). After the mid-2000s, Japan extended its FTA initiative in two directions. First, it began to engage in negotiations on FTAs with developed countries. Japan began negotiations with Australia in April 2007 and with Switzerland the following month. The negotiations with developed 269

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countries were difficult for Japan because it was unable to use aid and technical cooperation as an exchange for other countries to accept Japan’s requirements to maintain tariffs on agricultural products. The negotiations with Switzerland ended smoothly, largely because the country did not have many agricultural items for exports to Japan. However, negotiations with Australia, a major exporter of agricultural products, were tough, lasting for more than seven years. Second, Japan proposed an idea for a regional FTA: the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement in East Asia (CEPEA). This concept, which was proposed formally in METI’s report called Global Economic Strategy in April 2006, intended to create an EPA among ASEAN+3+3 including India, Australia and New Zealand. At the second EAS meeting in January 2007, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe formally proposed the idea of seeking a 16-nation EPA, and leaders endorsed an agreement to begin a private-level study to explore the idea. Later, the concept of CEPEA was integrated into the ASEAN Framework on Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). In the 2010s, the mega-FTA move began, and Japan was deeply involved. In March 2010, the US and seven other countries began negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP). In accordance with the launching of TPP negotiations, Japan began to deliberate on the participation, but it took a long time to make a final decision. In March 2013, Prime Minister Abe expressed his decision to join TPP talks, and Japan joined the 18th round of negotiations as the 12th member four months later. The 12 TPP members reached a broad agreement in early October 2015. While Japan was forced to accept the removal of tariffs on some 30% of five ‘sanctuary’ categories of agricultural products – rice, wheat, sugar and starch, dairy products, and meat (beef and pork) – its opening ratio (95%) was lower than other members (99–100%). Japan’s participation in the TPP drove another crucial FTA with the European Union (EU): the Japan–EU FTA. While Japan had originally hoped to begin negotiations earlier, the EU was reluctant largely because it had huge trade deficits with Japan and some 70% of its exports to Japan incurred no tariffs. However, Japan’s participation in the TPP negotiations raised the EU’s concern that it might be disadvantaged relative to the US and Australia if and when the TPP came into effect. One week after Abe’s announcement of TPP participation in March 2013, the EU and Japan agreed to launch FTA talks as soon as possible, and the first round of negotiations took place the following month. In brief, Japan gradually strengthened its commitments to FTAs, expanding the scope of partners from developing countries to developed countries, engaging in negotiations on megaFTAs that involve the US and the EU. A peculiarity in this trend is the slow progress of FTAs with China and South Korea, Japan’s neighbors and major trade partners. In Japan’s FTAs, the protection of the agricultural market has been the major concern of negotiations.

Domestic trade politics Societal interest representation The first important domestic factor that influences trade policy in Japan is the representation of societal interests in trade policy. Trade liberalization through multilateral negotiations under the GATT imposed on Japan the reduction of tariffs in specific industrial sectors, and some societal groups belonging to the sectors undertook opposition activities. A shift from the multilateraloriented to bilateral-centered trade policy has significant distributive effects on various segments of domestic society. Consequently, political struggles for and against FTAs became complicated among the major interest groups that have specific trade policy preferences and strove to have them reflected in policy outcomes. Furthermore, as FTA negotiations have covered wider 270

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domestic regulatory rules and institutions, a diverse array of interest groups have expressed their preferences. In the case of the TPP that identified the twenty-one areas of negotiation, 124 organized groups submitted a report on opinions regarding this trade agreement to the government (George Mulgan 2015b). The big business represented by Nippon Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) is the most influential interest group in Japan, and has strong influence on the formation of Japanese trade policy. Keidanren, the largest peak business association in Japan, with 150 major industrial associations and more than 1,300 individual firms, seeks to expand opportunities for business operations, including increasing market liberalization. The securing of greater business opportunities through better access to foreign markets is crucial for export-oriented manufacturing companies and multinationals, and thereby big business groups have been major supporters of trade liberalization measures including FTAs. The federation has submitted formal recommendations to relevant ministries and agencies to promote FTA formation. Moreover, the business federations and major industrial sectors have sent their executives to members of advisory councils (shingikai). In addition to formal routes of interest delivery, business groups have established informal routes to deliver their interests and demands to the policy-making process through informal meetings with senior government officials and ruling politicians. In some FTA cases, big business played a key role in initiating negotiations on an FTA. For instance, Keidanren became the main player who raised the position of Mexico in Japan’s FTA policy. The federation, whose member firms had sustained enormous harm from the absence of an FTA with Mexico, showed how the lack of an agreement had negative influences on businesses in the country, and demanded a prompt conclusion of a Japan–Mexico FTA by lobbying the government and ruling politicians (Yoshimatsu 2005). The Japanese business groups also encouraged an early start of negotiations on an FTA with the EU. Japanese business groups represented by Keidanren issued a series of position papers from 2009, which called on the early start of negotiations on Japan–EU economic integration, and organized business-level meetings with their European counterparts to get information about the exact demands for a possible agreement on economic integration. Another crucial interest group that influences trade policy in Japan is the Japan Agricultural Cooperatives (JA) with JA-Zenchu (Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives) as the peak farm body. The JA group’s political influence derives from internal cohesion and external linkages. The JA group has 4.41 million full members and 5.86 million associate members (as of March 2016), covering the entire nation. The group has been highly-unified and well-organized, with a three-tiered system of national, prefectural and local-level groupings, covering various aspects of farmers’ business, from the supply of farming machines and fertilizers, to wholesaling and retailing, as well as banking and insurance. The JA group has maintained political linkages with the executive and legislative branches of government. The group has played a semiadministrative role for the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), being the principle marketing agent for rice and the monopolist of supplying fertilizer and agricultural machinery to farmers (George Mulgan 2011: 111). Furthermore, the JA group with its huge membership in rural areas has functioned as a vote-mobilizing machine for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) candidates. The LDP politicians whose constituencies are located in rural areas became the so-called agricultural tribe (norin zoku), which has strong interests in agricultural affairs and seeks to maintain the interests of the agricultural group. Moreover, the JA group mobilizes members and supporters in public gatherings and protest, and issues public statements on the Internet and in press releases. Since the JA group has its own mass media outlets – JAcom and the Japan Agriculture Newspapers (Nihon Nogyo Shimbun), it holds the advantage in molding public opinion and eliciting wider support for its policy stance (George Mulgan 2015b: 144). 271

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The JA group has arduously undertaken lobbying activities and public campaigns against the opening of the agricultural market. The chairman of JA-Zenchu organizes direct meetings with the Prime Minister, the MAFF Minister, and the LDP’s Secretary-General to ensure exemption of sensitive agricultural products from the target of market liberalization. The JA group has also organized emergency national gatherings against the opening of the farm market through FTAs. In some cases, the JA-Zenchu sent a mission to the government of an FTA partner in order to explain the special position of the agricultural sector in Japan. These political activities are major reasons why Japan has successfully gained the exclusion of agricultural products in negotiations on FTAs including the TPP.

Trade policy-making structures The societal interest groups have specific preferences for trade policy and deliver them to the policy-making process through various routes. This does not imply that government officials are just coordinators of demands from various societal groups, or that they do not have their own specific interests and objectives to be realized through trade policy. For instance, they recognize the need for domestic structural reforms to promote improvement in productivity and efficiency in internationally uncompetitive sectors. FTAs are crucial means to advance such reforms because they are international agreements and external commitments with reciprocal effects. The officials also seek trade expansion and trade facilitation because international trade underpins corporate growth and leads to national economic prosperity. The extent to which state interests are realized is dependent largely on the policy-making structure. In Japan, economic diplomacy including trade policy has long been under the jurisdiction of MOFA. However, the presence of METI in economic diplomacy has gradually risen as Japanese firms have intensified their offshore operations and growing needs to integrate commercial interests into economic diplomacy. As for trade negotiations, Japan has adopted a system involving four ministries: MOFA, METI, MAFF, and the Ministry of Finance. The fourministry decision-making system had value in terms of ‘policy credibility’. Since a policy is produced as a consequence of intensive and prudent debates involving a wide range of agencies concerned, it will be implemented as originally intended once it is determined. However, this system was accompanied by a serious shortcoming: sectionalism. Such sectionalism produced different ideas and approaches to FTAs especially at the initial stage. MOFA and METI considered that close trade linkages through FTAs was an inevitable trend, while MAFF was cautious about including agricultural products under the purview of FTAs. Although MOFA and METI adopted a common stance on the necessity of market opening even in internationally weak sectors, they had different views on concrete approaches to FTAs. METI pursued a more regionbased FTA approach, represented by its advocacy of the CEPEA, in order to assist the business groups’ overseas operations and the formation of regional production networks in East Asia. In contrast, MOFA was skeptical about an East Asia-based FTA from the viewpoint of the relationship with the US, which was excluded from the FTA (Yoshimatsu 2008: 156). In the US, there is an independent administrative body to deal with trade policy: the US Trade Representative (USTR), whereas in Japan, there is no central administrative body to deal with trade policy. The lack of a central administrative body to formulate trade policy was recognized as a problem among various actors. For instance, Nippon Keidanren recommended the creation of an economic partnership strategy headquarters and a minister of state for economic partnerships in its policy paper issued in March 2004. However, the bureaucrats were passive about the creation of an administrative body that had independent authority to give commands and guidance on their policy management. Moreover, the bureaucrats found great 272

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interest in retaining jurisdiction over the FTA policy as a crucial source to increase the budget and personnel of their ministries. Successive cabinets sought to overcome this shortcoming with various measures. During the Koizumi era, the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP) played a crucial role in advancing trade policy.1 Indeed, the council did not exhibit a substantial presence in policymaking before the Koizumi cabinet. But, Koizumi took advantage of the council as a tool to proceed with domestic structural reforms by blocking resistance from bureaucrats and conservative LDP members. The council decided on the overall direction of Japan’s public policy by annually issuing the Basic Policies for Economic and Fiscal Management and Structural Reform, and this gradually played an important role in leading FTA promotion and agricultural reforms. In particular, the council’s four expert members – two business representatives and two economists – promoted FTAs by submitting reports that showed the numerical target and timetable of FTA formation. In joining TPP negotiations, Prime Minister Abe ordered the establishment of a solid administrative organ to engage in negotiations. In April 2013, the Governmental Headquarters for the TPP was set up with sixty-five staff. In addition to the Chief Negotiator, who headed the negotiation team, the Chief Domestic Coordinator was appointed to lead the domestic measures team. The domestic measures team implemented the mandates to undertake coordination with ruling politicians and major societal groups and provide the people with information about the merits of TPP membership. The formation of a coherent negotiations line from the State Minister in charge of TPP issues to the Chief Negotiator, as well as the creation of the Chief Domestic Coordinator in charge of restraining domestic opposition, were crucial factors in advancing TPP negotiations relatively smoothly.

International trade politics Defensive and offensive mercantilism It is broadly recognized that there are political domino-effects in FTA formation (Ravenhill 2010). This has surely influenced Japan’s trade policy. As already explained, Japan was cautious about promoting regional and bilateral trade arrangements until the late 1990s. However, it was forced to engage in FTA formation partly as ‘defensive mercantilism’. This is particularly salient in relation to industrial rivalry with South Korea. After South Korea began to engage in simultaneous FTA promotion in 2003, its FTA partners reached forty-five and the ratio of trade with FTA partners to its total trade amounted to 35.8% by December 2010. Its main FTA partners – the EU and the US – represented crucial markets for Japan’s manufacturing sectors, and thereby differences in tariff imposition were considered serious handicaps for Japanese firms. For instance, the South Korea–EU FTA, which came into effect in July 2011, had a significant impact on Japanese car sales in the EU market. Hyundai Motor and Kia Motors increased the number of new car registrations by 9.4% and 14.1% in 2012 compared with the previous year. In contrast, Toyota Motor saw a 3.1% decrease while Nissan Motor faced a 6.3% drop compared with the previous year.2 Moreover, South Korea’s FTA led to declining sales of Japanese products relative to European ones in the Korean market. Japanese exports of products covered by the Korea–EU FTA declined by 1.8% in the year after the FTA came into effect, while the EU’s exports increased by 15.4% over the same period (Okuda 2013: 108–9). The gap in FTA commitments between Japan and South Korea caused rising concern among Japanese government officials, politicians, and business executives. METI admitted that Japan’s FTA commitments were slow compared with South Korea’s, and that several Japanese products 273

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would incur more than a 10% tariff gap in large markets in the EU and the US because of the Korea–EU FTA and the Korea–US FTA (METI 2011: 247). Keidanren warned, in its position papers, that South Korea’s pro-active FTA policy would lead to a widening gap in competitive conditions and would place Japanese firms at a disadvantage in third-country markets. Thus, South Korea’s bold FTA policy directed towards Japan’s major trading partners presented significant challenges for the Japanese government and business community. As offensive mercantilism, the Japanese government and multinationals sought to advance the network of FTAs in East Asia in order to gain greater commercial benefits in production networks and supply chains. One of the major characteristics of Japanese business operations is the diffusion of production sites in plural countries. This is typically the case in the manufacturing of electronics and automobiles in Southeast Asia, where Japanese multinationals have sliced up the value chain, separating and relocating parts of the production process to wherever opportunities for increased profitability are greatest (Beeson 2014: 171). In order to reduce transaction costs in production networks and supply chains, it was necessary to remove tariffs and non-tariff barriers among countries in different production sites, and FTAs play a crucial role for meeting this necessity. The Japanese government emphasized that a major benefit of the ASEAN–Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (AJCEP) lay in the use of cumulative rules of origin, which admitted the combined share of value-added in all member countries (METI 2007). In the RCEP formation, Japan intended to secure commercial benefits from regional supply chains involving India and China. In addition to China and ASEAN, India has been gradually integrated into Japanese production networks. India and China had import-restriction measures such as complicated customs procedures. Even if Japanese multinationals were involved in troubles in relation to products exported from ASEAN to China or India through ASEAN+1 FTAs, Japan was unable to engage in resolving such troubles. The formation of the RCEP was expected to overcome these constraints (Yoshimatsu 2014: 57).

Trade policy as political leverage Japan also took advantage of FTAs as a means to maintain its political presence, and this element became crucial in response to China’s growing economic and political importance in East Asia. This was highlighted in its FTA strategy towards Southeast Asia. Japan aimed to formulate not just an FTA, but also an EPA, which covers investment rules, trade facilitation measures, and competition policy, as well as cooperation in technology transfer and intellectual property, in addition to conventional-tariff elimination. The Japanese government stressed differentiation in its EPA approach from China’s tariff-cut-oriented FTA approach (MOFA 2007: 16). Moreover, unlike China and South Korea, in addition to an FTA with ASEAN (AJCEP), Japan sought to conclude a bilateral FTA with each ASEAN member. Even before beginning negotiations with ASEAN as a whole, Japan made strong commitments to a bilateral FTA with Southeast Asian countries, signing the first EPA with Singapore in January 2002. By December 2008, Japan concluded FTAs with seven ASEAN members. While Japan has not concluded an FTA with Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar yet, it developed an investment agreement with these countries. Thus, Japan established a network of formal commercial agreements with all ASEAN members as a means to maintain its economic and political presence as well as to decrease these countries’ economic dependence on China. As for a regional approach, as previously explained, Japanese Prime Minister Abe proposed the idea of the CEPEA in January 2007. The CEPEA was Japan’s counter-proposal to China’s initiative in forming an East Asia Free-Trade Area (EAFTA) among the ASEAN+3 members. Japan was worried that China’s political influence in East Asia would become strong through the 274

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formation of the EAFTA, and felt a need to balance its influence by inviting three additional democratic states (India, Australia, and New Zealand) to the formation of a regional FTA. A senior METI official explained the objective of the CEPEA concept, stating that ‘China will take the lead in +3 negotiations. We should promote +6 negotiations ahead of the curve’.3 Consideration to balance China’s political leverage influenced Japan’s decision to join TPP negotiations as well. Prime Minister Abe hoped to strengthen links with countries that shared universal values through the TPP under threat of China’s growing economic weight being translated into political influence. Abe’s hope was clearly shown during a press conference in March 2013, held to announce his decision to join TPP negotiations. Abe explained that Japan, in collaboration with the US, would establish new rules in the Asia-Pacific region with the countries that share the universal values of freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.4 Abe regards the TPP as a crucial linchpin in developing a collective political front for rule-making against countries that did not share these universal values, especially China.

Trade policy as economic statecraft After the 2010s, a new element – economic security – was added to Japanese trade policy. Economic security, entering only in widespread usage since the 1990s, is an elusive concept with multi-dimensional implications. The term is used here as a state’s purposeful diplomatic policy orientation, in that it employs economic means as toolkits of ‘statecraft’ to enhance overall strategic and security advantages vis-a`-vis other specific states or in the international system (Hirschman 1980; Baldwin 1985). The economic security element was clearly shown in Japan’s approach to the TPP. As already explained, Prime Minister Abe decided to join the TPP talks in March 2013, despite robust opposition in domestic political circles. At that time, Abe felt a strong need to forge closer political linkages with the US in light of the growing Chinese threat in Japan’s maritime security. The diplomatic relationship with China had deteriorated after the nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in September 2012, and tension in the waters around the islands escalated, with a Chinese navy ship locking its fire-control radar on a Maritime SelfDefense Force destroyer in January 2013. Under such conditions, Tokyo needed to strengthen political and military linkages with Washington in order to urge Beijing to exercise self-restraint in its approach to disputes over maritime territory. Abe sought to participate in the US-led TPP talks as a cornerstone of its alliance policy with the US. Abe’s willingness to join TPP negotiations influenced the content of preliminary talks with the US. Through bilateral consultations, Japan agreed to phase out US tariffs on motor vehicles with the longest staging period, while it accepted a very generable reference to the sensitivities of the domestic agricultural market. The acceptance of this disadvantage with regard to sensitivities resulted from Japan’s desire to achieve a formal entry into TPP negotiations as soon as possible, even paying a high ‘admission fee’ for joining (Honma 2015: 96–9). In 2014, it was revealed that Beijing engaged in building artificial islands at an unprecedented pace to bolster its territorial claims in the Spratly Islands. China’s actions included the building of harbors, radar towers and other facilities on these artificial islands, and were coupled with intensified maritime patrols and energy exploration in disputed waters. China’s unilateral behavior increased US concern about instability in the South China Sea, leading to a statement by Ashton Carter, Secretary of Defense, that ‘I never forget that military strength ultimately rests on the foundation of the economy’, and ‘that’s one reason why the Trans-Pacific Partnership or TPP is so important for both our countries and probably one of the most important parts of America’s rebalance’.5 Prime Minister Abe echoed Carter’s statement in a speech at a joint session of the US Congress in April 2015, stating that ‘the TPP goes far beyond just economic benefits. 275

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It is also about our security. Long-term, its strategic value is awesome. We should never forget that’.6 The two main outcomes of the US–Japan summit that month were the strengthening of the alliance’s deterrence and response capability under the New Guidelines for US–Japan Defense Cooperation, and a joint will to lead other TPP members to a prompt and successful conclusion of the talks. Abe and Obama regarded the TPP and strength in their military alliance as a pair strategy that Washington and Tokyo can push forward against China’s increasingly assertive security postures.

Challenges in trade issues Enhancing internal resiliency Japan’s challenges are relevant to internal resiliency, which entails strength and endurance in response to likely hardships in the trade field. Trade resiliency consists of two dimensions: internal and external. As for the internal dimension of trade resiliency, Japan needs to promote structural reforms in preparation for trade liberalization. In this regard, the most crucial sector is agricultural as Japan has protected the domestic farm market with border measures such as tariffs and quantitative quotas. Japan cannot continue these measures with growing trends in FTA formation. Under the TPP agreement, Japan promised to liberalize the agricultural market by removing tariffs on 1,885 out of 2,328 agricultural items and to reduce the level of protection on five ‘sanctuary’ categories – rice, wheat and barley, sugar and starch, dairy products, and meat (beef and pork). Accordingly, the Japanese government needs to implement policies and measures to promote structural reforms in order to improve the resiliency of Japanese agriculture. In so doing, Japan cannot repeat the failures of the Uruguay Round. While ¥6 trillion was allocated to projects for agricultural and rural developments, this massive amount in subsidies did not contribute to improving the competitiveness of the agricultural sector. This was largely because the subsidies were provided as a part of election measures, being used for the construction of useless roads, hot spring facilities, and other things. In preparation for the TPP participation, the government formulated a new agricultural reform plan in 2013, with the objective of developing farming as a ‘sixth’ industry, thus boosting its market size to ¥10 trillion in 2020 from the existing ¥1 trillion, doubling the incomes of farms and farming villages in ten years, reducing rice production costs by 40% and increasing the number of agricultural production corporations to 50,000. These objectives need to be pursued through the demand-driven, not supply-driven, perspective, in close harmonization with the real needs of full-time farm households that are serious about increasing their income level through the improved competitiveness of their products. As for the external dimension of trade resiliency, Japan is required to expand exports. Japan’s export power has been sustained by their industrial and technological strengths, and such strengths have been heavily dependent on three manufacturing sectors – general machinery, motor vehicles, and electrical machinery. Not only have Japanese firms in these sectors been confronted with rising competition in the global market but they have also accelerated the transfer of production bases overseas. The transfer of production bases overseas provoked the hollowing-out of domestic production and resultantly led to a decline in export performance. For instance, Japan’s share in world exports declined from 5.7% in 2005 to 5.0% in 2010 to 3.8% in 2013 (METI 2015: 69). Given the declining export power, Japan is required to broaden the scope of industrial sectors that are capable of undertaking global operations beyond the narrow manufacturing sectors, and integrate these sectors into growth potential in newly emerging markets. The deployment of infrastructure systems could be a new area for regaining export 276

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competitiveness. While Japan has strength in the high quality of its hard machines and facilities, it can take advantage of its know-how in planning a business model and operating complicated facilities in a safe manner. The Japanese government explicitly located the deployment of infrastructure systems as a key to revitalizing the Japanese economy. In May 2013, the government published an integrated grand strategy for infrastructure deployment: the Infrastructure Export Strategy. The strategy explicitly presented a numerical target of tripling infrastructure sales from ¥10 trillion in 2010 to ¥30 trillion by 2020. Two years later, Prime Minister Abe announced the ‘Partnership for Quality Infrastructure: Investment for Asia’s Future’. Abe pledged to provide US$110 billion to finance quality infrastructure needs in Asia over a period of five years. Under these explicit policy goals, the Japanese government combined policies from foreign aid, public finance, information sharing, and so on, in order to provide favorable environments for Japanese companies’ advancement in the infrastructure business. Another area of potential export expansion is related to agriculture. With steady economic growth, a growing portion of society in neighboring countries can afford to purchase Japanese agricultural and food products at a high price but with excellent quality and reliable safety. Moreover, the TPP agreements broadened the potential of agricultural exports by extending the protection of geometrical labelling and the adoption of a consultation system regarding Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS). The challenge is how to foster entrepreneurship for exports and exploit feasible routes for them. The government can provide financial support for branding and marketing of Japanese products and encourage agricultural groups to explore linkages with trading companies and other enterprises in order to gain the know-how to export to overseas markets and develop global food value-chains.

Strengthening external commitments In the Asia-Pacific region, there is a common vision to create a Free-Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) in the long run. In the mid-2010s, there were three major FTAs in the region – the TPP, RCEP, and the China–Japan–Korea FTA –, and these FTAs are expected to merge into the FTAAP. Given the emergence of the Trump administration in the US that declared an exit from the TPP, the RCEP and the trilateral FTA increased their presence as key FTAs in the Asia-Pacific region. Some RCEP members, China in particular, seek to locate it as the main driver to create a free trade area with relatively low-level liberalization that is acceptable for developing countries. The trilateral FTA, whose members account for some 70% of the total gross domestic product (GDP) of the RCEP members, can serve as a building block for promoting RCEP negotiations. Japan, the only country that committed to all three FTAs, can understand economic motivations, geostrategic intentions, and domestic sensitivities of the FTA partners involved, and consider possible coordination of diverse interests among the partners. Accordingly, Japan’s position is extremely important in advancing the formation of the FTAAP. Japan is required to incorporate high-standard elements achieved in the TPP into the RCEP and the trilateral FTA with due attention to economic conditions of the less-developed members. China and ASEAN members prefer pragmatic and flexible formats of FTAs, which take into account the different degree of economic development of member countries. Japan needs to encourage these countries to accelerate structural reforms to harmonize domestic regulatory systems with international rules and governance. India is another key player in regional FTA formation because the country has shown passive postures towards trade liberalization in previous FTAs.7 Japan could encourage India to accept high-level agreements by providing support through measures such as capacitybuilding and aid-for-trade. 277

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More broadly, Japan’s role is important for advancing a broad FTA in terms of supply chains and production networks. The governments in East Asia are eager to be involved in supply chains and production networks because they make significant contributions to their economic development. In order to develop sophisticated supply chains, regional states need to promote a wider range of policies, from removal of non-tariff barriers through trade facilitation and market access to government procurement, and the harmonization of legal and economic systems (Nakagawa 2016: 9). The formation of a broad FTA becomes a catalyst in encouraging the promotion of these policies. Japan can take a lead in consolidating the contents of the broad FTA by gaining information from business groups, international financial agencies, and other governments about necessary and appropriate policies for advancing sophisticated production networks and supply chains. In the international scene, there is potential competition in developing international economic architecture between the advanced nations and the newly emerging economies (NEEs). The NEEs have raised their presence in the world economy. The share of Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRICs) in the world GDP increased from 13.1% in 2007 to 20.8% in 2013, while that of advanced nations declined by 10% from 71.7% to 61.3% in the same period (METI 2014: 5). Moreover, the NEEs centered on China have advanced the formation of new international economic institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank. They also raised their presence in international economic institutions. The dysfunction of the WTO had much to do with the NEEs’ growing presence and difficulties in harmonizing contrasting views between the advanced nations and the NEEs. The advanced nations are reluctant to accept state capitalism in which state-owned enterprises play a key role in economic development, finding common interests in consolidating advanced nation-initiated international standards with the prospect that China would raise its voice in the international economic scene. The EU, Japan, and the US have advanced their initiatives in creating an open and transparent economic system through the formation of the FTA architecture: the TPP, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), and the EU–Japan FTA. There are common characteristics of the FTAs among advanced nations: high-standard market access and so-called ‘WTO-x areas’ such as competition policy, environmental laws, investment, labor market regulation, and movement of capital. The ideational power exerted through common rules and standards is expected to counter material power of the NEEs in the international political and economic system. Importantly, Japan’s willingness to join TPP negotiations stimulated two other FTAs. While the US and the EU announced the start of negotiations on the TTIP in February 2013, Japan and the EU agreed on the start of negotiations on an FTA the following month. The TPP, the first FTA that reached a broad agreement among major mega-FTAs, will be a template to diffuse global standards to other FTAs. Japan is required to promote harmonization of regulatory rules such as IPRs and standards and certification among the FTAs. Japan can also urge debates on the WTO-x areas at the WTO by encouraging the adoption of the critical mass method.

Conclusions Japanese trade policy has changed relative stress from the GATT/WTO system to gradual engagement in bilateral/regional FTAs that led to commitments to the TPP and the Japan–EU FTA. The factors that conditioned the development of Japanese trade policy are pertinent to both the domestic and the international. While major societal groups have sought to have their interests reflected in trade policy outcomes, the government has searched for more solid trade policy-making structures. Japan has committed to FTA formation defensively to protect its 278

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overseas markets from rival states and to offensively secure commercial benefits produced by production networks and supply chains. China’s growing political economic presence in East Asia encouraged Japan to retain political leverage and maintain security interests through trade policy in cooperation with its East Asian partners and Japan’s sole ally, the US. Its ongoing challenges are related to internal resiliency and external commitments. While Japan needs to prepare for growing import pressure through market liberalization and pursue export expansion in new fields such as infrastructure systems and agriculture, it is required to play a leadership role in creating regional and global trade architectures that have become extremely complicated in the mega-FTA formation era.

Notes 1

2 3 4 5 6

7

The council comprises the Chief Cabinet Secretary, the Minister of State for Economic and Fiscal Policy, other relevant ministers (Ministers for Internal Affairs and Communications, Finance, and Economy, Trade and Industry), Governor of the Bank of Japan, and four private-sector experts. The CEFP was established in January 2001 within the Cabinet Office as a consultative body to facilitate Prime Minister’s leadership in economic and fiscal policy formation. The Japan News, March 27, 2013. Asahi Shimbun, August 27, 2006. “Press Conference by Prime Minister Abe, March 15, 2013,” . “Defense Secretary Touts TPP Completion as US National Security Goal,” Inside US Trade, April 9, 2015. “‘Toward an Alliance of Hope’ – Address to a Joint Meeting of the US Congress by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe,” April 29, 2015, . Among five ASEAN+1 FTAs, the liberalization ratio of some 80% in the ASEAN-India FTA was extremely low compared with other four FTAs.

Bibliography Baldwin, D.A. (1985) Economic Statecraft, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Beeson, M. (2014) Regionalism and Globalization in East Asia: Politics, Security and Economic Development, 2nd edn. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Cortell, A.P. and Davis, J.W. (2005) ‘When Norms Clash: International Norms, Domestic Practices, and Japan’s Internalisation of the GATT/WTO’, Review of International Studies, 31(1): 3–25. George Mulgan, A. (2011) ‘The Farm Lobby’, in T. Inoguchi and P. Jain (eds), Japanese Politics Today: From Karaoke to Kabuki Democracy, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. George Mulgan, A. (2015a) ‘Understanding Japanese Trade Policy: A Political Economy Perspective’, in A. George Mulgan and M. Honma (eds), The Political Economy of Japanese Trade Policy, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. George Mulgan, A. (2015b) ‘To TPP or Not TPP: Interest Groups and Trade Policy’, in A. George Mulgan and M. Honma (eds), The Political Economy of Japanese Trade Policy, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Hatakeyama, N. (2015) Keizai Togo no Shin Seiki [Economic Integration in the New Century], Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha. Hirschman, A.O. (1980) National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, Berkeley: University of California Press. Honma, M. (2015) ‘The TPP and Agricultural Reform in Japan’, in A. George Mulgan and M. Honma (eds), The Political Economy of Japanese Trade Policy, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Kim, J. (2016) Nihon no Tsusho Seisaku Tankan no Seiji Keizaigaku: FTA/TPP to Kokunai Seiji [The Political Economy of Japanese Trade Policy Shift: FTA, TPP and Domestic Politics], Tokyo: Yushindo. Komiya, R. and Itoh, M. (1988) ‘Japan’s International Trade and Trade Policy, 1955–1984’, in T. Inoguchi and D.I. Okimoto (eds), The Political Economy of Japan, Volume 2: The Changing International Context, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 279

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Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) (2009) Minimamu Akusesu Mai ni Kansuru Hokokusho [Report on Minimum Access Rice], Tokyo: MAFF. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) (1999) Tsusho Hakusho 1999 [White Paper on International Trade 1999], Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) (2007) Nichi/ASEAN hokatsuteki keizai renkei kyotei (AJCEP) kosho no daketsu ni tsuite [The Conclusion of Japan–ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJCEP)], Tokyo: METI. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) (2011) Tsusho Hakusho 2011 [White Paper on International Trade 2011], Tokyo: Yamaura Insatsu. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) (2014) Tsusho Hakusho 2014 [White Paper on International Economy and Trade 2014], Tokyo: Katsumi Insatsu. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) (2015) Tsusho Hakusho 2015 [White Paper on International Economy and Trade 2015], Tokyo: Katsumi Insatsu. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) (2007) Nihon no keizai renkei kyotei (EPA) kosho: Genjo to kadai [Japan’s EPA Negotiations: Current States and Problems], March, Tokyo: MOFA. Munakata, N. (2001) ‘Nihon no chiiki keizai togo seisaku no keisei’ [The Formation of Japan’s Regional Economic Integration Policy], in N. Munakata (ed), Nicchu Kankei no Tenki [A Turning Point of JapanChina Relations], Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha. Nakagawa, J. (2016) ‘TPP to nihon: TPP no nihon heno inpakuto wo saguru’ [TPP and Japan: Examining TPP’s Impact on Japan], Boeki to Kanzei, 759: 4–16. Nakakita, T. (1993) ‘Boeki to shihon no jiyuka seisaku’ [Trade and Investment Liberalization Policy], in Y. Kosai and J. Teranishi (eds), Sengo Nihon no Keizai Kaikaku: Seifu to Shijo [Economic Reform in Post-war Japan: Government and Market], Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press. Okuda, S. (2013) ‘Kankoku no FTA senryaku to nihon e no eikyo’ [South Korea’s FTA Strategy and its Impact on Japan], in I. Yamazawa, K. Baba and B.T. Kenkyukai (eds), Ajia Taiheiyo no Shin Tsusho Chitsujo: TPP to Higashi Ajia no Keizai Renkei [New Trade Order in the Asia-Pacific: TPP and Economic Partnership in East Asia], Tokyo: Keiso Shobo. Ravenhill, J. (2010) ‘The “New East Asian Regionalism”: A Political Domino Effect’, Review of International Political Economy, 17(2): 178–208. Sally, R. (2006) ‘Free Trade Agreements and the Prospects for Regional Integration in East Asia’, Asian Economic Policy Review, 1(2): 306–21. Shimizu, T. et al. (2012) ‘Boeki jiyuka to nihon nogyo no juyo hinmoku’ [Trade Liberalization and Major Items of Japanese Agriculture], Norin Kinyu, 12: 20–43. Urata, S. (2015) ‘To TPP or Not TPP: Interest Groups and Trade Policy’, in A. George Mulgan and M. Honma (eds), The Political Economy of Japanese Trade Policy, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Yoshimatsu, H. (2005) ‘Japan’s Keidanren and Free Trade Agreements: Societal Interest and Trade Policy’, Asian Survey, 45(2): 258–78. Yoshimatsu, H. (2008) The Political Economy of Regionalism in East Asia: Integrative Explanation for Dynamics and Challenges, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Yoshimatsu, H. (2014) Comparing Institution-Building in East Asia: Power Politics, Governance, and Critical Junctures, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

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18 Japanese foreign direct investment in Thailand Promoting an ‘interactive’ institutional approach Sierk A. Horn, Bernhard H. Wittek, and Chie Iguchi

Introduction Japan is a significant source country for foreign direct investment (FDI). In 2015, the outward FDI stock exceeded 1,226 billion US dollars (UNCTAD 2016), ranking Japan as one of the top five economies for foreign direct investments globally. Although Japanese firm activities in Asia have fluctuated over the last two decades, FDI stock there is now substantial (JETRO 2015). In 2010, Asia surpassed Europe as the second largest destination of Japanese FDI after North America. Within Asia, investments from Japanese firms are evenly distributed among China, NIEs (Newly Industrialized Economies: Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, Singapore), and the ASEAN-4 (Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines). These trends have largely been attributed to both efficiency-seeking investment, spurred by yen appreciation (Bayoumi and Lipworth 1998), and, more recently, to market-seeking investment, spurred by the increasing spending power of Asia’s middle class (Kharas 2010). Both quantity ( Japan is by far the largest investor in ASEAN member states, for instance; ASEAN Secretariat 2015) and quality of Japanese subsidiary involvement in Asia (i.e. spill-over effects in form of employment, diffusion of technology and managerial know-how resulting in productivity growth; Iguchi 2008) stress the policy relevance of Japanese investment in Asian economies. For Thailand especially, Japan has been the single largest source of net inward FDI over the past decade. Figure 18.1 illustrates this striking dominance. In the period between 2005 and 2015, Japanese companies contributed more than one third of total net investment inflows into the country (BOT 2016). FDI is a phenomenon that is commonly defined within the context of interactions between host countries and firms (e.g. Rugman 1981). In line with this research stream, one commonality associated with the burgeoning literature on the investment behavior of Japanese firms is that they usually focus on how country factors interact with Japanese Multinational Enterprise ( JMNE) activities, either at a national level (e.g. Nicolas, Purcel and Gray 2001; Cieslik and Ryan 2002) or, more recently, at a sub-national level (e.g. Cassidy and Andreosso-O’Callaghan 2006; Horn and Cross 2016). A second commonality associated with these studies is that they position

281

Net FDI flows to Thailand [USD billion]

Horn, Wittek, and Iguchi

$16 $14 $12 $10 $8 $6 $4 $2 $0 2005 –$2

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

–$4 Japan

United States

Cayman Islands

Figure 18.1

Singapore

United Kingdom

Hong Kong China

Mauritius

British Virgin Islands

Switzerland

Top ten net FDI flows to Thailand by country

socio-economic contextual factors of Japanese firm internationalization, such as network effects (e.g. Head, Ries and Swenson 1995; Hoshi, Kashyap and Schwarfstein 1991; Belderbos and Sleuwagen 1996), at the core of their analytical approach. Much of this research, however, covers only interactions between Japanese firms and the institutional environment of host countries. Yet, Japanese firms also operate within institutional developments in Japan itself that might explain why and how a firm engages internationally. The exploration of processes of institutionalization and their interaction seem particularly relevant for Japan inasmuch as the role of the government in shaping organizational decision-making has long attracted considerable attention ( Johnson 1982; Leftwich 1995). In this chapter, we seek to promote consideration of the responsiveness of Japanese firms to regulatory and policy regimes for FDI within the context of institutions at home and abroad. We have chosen Thailand as a suitable comparator economy to study the institutional fabric in which Japanese FDI takes place. Inward FDI plays a major role in the country’s economic development (Brimble and Urata 2006) and the Thai government’s unequivocal commitment towards attracting investments from abroad, as a necessary part of industrial restructuring, has led to a strong economic presence of Japanese firms. Fuelled by a self-reinforcing and perpetuating investment trajectory, Thailand is poised to gain further importance as a growth engine for corporate Japan. As evidence: (i) it surpassed Singapore and advanced to become the second biggest Asian investment destination for Japanese firms after China; (ii) Thailand is consistently in the top four of Japanese firms’ medium-term appreciation ranking; and (iii) many firms seek to expand their production and R&D facilities in Thailand, highlighting the emerging dual function of efficiency and market-seeking activities. Even in the light of substantial political hazards in the wake of the military coup d’etat in May 2014, the assessment of Thailand as an attractive hub for overseas operations among Japanese firms remains favorable ( JBIC 2015). An analysis of Japanese firm engagement in Thailand over time is, therefore, likely to foster a better understanding of the interactive effects of institutional regimes on the investment behavior of Japanese firms. This study is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a brief overview of the literature on institutionalization. We then apply this thinking to Japanese investment behavior in 282

Foreign direct investment in Thailand

Thailand by developing a conceptual framework that combines home and host country policy measures as driving factors for investment activities by Japanese firms. Thereafter, we identify phases in the evolution of Thai-Japanese political and economic relations. Using firm-level data, we then consider the responsiveness of Japanese firms within these evolving investment environments. Through a longitudinal lens, we set out to illustrate how investment decisions are influenced by policy factors at home and abroad. The study concludes with a discussion of its findings and limitations, and suggestions for future research initiatives.

The Bilateral Institutional Regime and its Importance for Foreign Investment Decisions Japanese firms that engage in FDI activities generally pursue some advantage when investing in foreign countries (Buckley and Casson 1976; Dunning 1981). However, the political complexion of the Japanese economy is such that Japanese firms do operate in an environment traditionally characterized by close government-business relationships (e.g. Dore 1986; Magaziner and Hout 1980). Behrman (1970) suggests that national interests can and do have effects over and above business management decisions. By adopting a ‘new institutional theory’ (North 1990; Scott 1987) perspective, we focus attention on the extent to which regulatory and policy regimes affect organizations themselves and actors within them, and how Japanese firms adjust to changes in the institutional environment. This theory emphasizes that policy-making institutions articulate widely observed norms and shared understanding. These ‘rules of the game,’ in turn, influence the behavior of agents, including that of investing firms (Buckley, Cross and Horn 2012). Looking at how institutions “shape the incentives of key economic actors in society” (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2005: 389), Scott (2014) argues that institutional mechanisms work through three institutional pillars: (i) the cultural-cognitive pillar, i.e. wider belief systems and cultural influences that provide a platform for institutional structures; (ii) the normative pillar, i.e. institutions providing direction for organizations by defining what is appropriate even in the absence of formal sanctions; and (iii) the regulative pillar, e.g. direct governmental legislation. While we anticipate all three pillars to affect the behavior of Japanese firms (joining Trevino, Douglas and Cullen 2008), we presume the more embedded cultural-cognitive factors to have an influence on government policies or administrative action, but to be too long-term in nature than to serve as a direct lever in the influence of contemporary institutional actions. Thus, our argumentation mainly relies on the regulative and normative pillars to draw support for the influence of institutional incentives and direction. Previous work has made great strides in explaining JMNE behavior abroad (e.g. Delios and Beamish 2005; Delios and Henisz 2003; Farrell 2008; Kiyota and Urata 2007; Tomiura 2005; Yoshida and Ito 2006); they have especially clarified motivations of internationalization and processes that underlie Japanese firms’ activities across national borders. Although Japanese firms are entirely capable of adjusting their business repertoire to host market environments (Buckley and Horn 2009), established social routines – the home institutional environment – remain influential in terms of the direction, extent and nature of adaptation (e.g. Johnson 1999; Horn 2015). Under these circumstances, both host and home market considerations should pervade organizational behavior. The implication is that it is impossible to understand activities of Japanese firms without also considering ‘mixed’ interactions of socio-economic contextual factors at home and abroad. Accordingly, studies should explore institutional perspectives in home economies, in host economies, and the interactive and reactive elements between these two environments. Although we do not argue that JMNE research should exclusively focus on interactive aspects, we propose that preferences for either host countries or firms as units of analysis may lead to an all 283

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too narrow understanding of the effects institutions may have on FDI activities. In our argument, thus, lies an important differentiation of institutional actors. While we focus our attention on Japanese firms as the recipients of the described influence, we look at both home and host country institutions as its source, an approach for which precedent can be found in recent institutional research (e.g. Moore, Bell and Filatotchev 2010). When firms consider a geographic expansion, they must deal with the issue of how to respond to government regulations. If our reasoning is correct, adjustment processes are variable and depend on policy regimes that reside in the home country and the host country. At home, primarily two motivations regulate outward FDI: (i) governments are concerned with stimulating the international competitiveness of home country firms; and (ii) governments may want to promote overseas investment to coordinate national economic development (e.g. securing raw materials or access to superior technology). Host country governments, by contrast, need to weigh up the benefits of inward FDI (e.g. job creation, transfer of technology and management skills, regional development, linkages with local suppliers) with its costs (e.g. technological dependence, dampened competitiveness of domestic firms, lower wages; see Behrman 1970). These tensions at home and abroad exist before, and happen during, the course of the investment decision processes. Firms have to work out how to adjust to policy regimes by considering the underlying institutional issues simultaneously. The combination of push (coming from home country institutions) and pull factors (coming from host country institutions) provides us with a practical framework for our analysis (Figure 18.2). Governments can provide or remove incentives as well as impose or remove restrictions. For purposes of presentation, these institutional regimes can generally be transferred into negative or positive (‘low’ or ‘high’) commitments to FDI. From the point of view of firms, these institutional regimes at home and abroad define four institutional orientations that together either discourage or encourage foreign market

Institutional pull [from host country, in this case Thailand]

high

Tournament

Integration

[expected FDI impact]

[expected FDI impact]

Segregation

Dissent

[expected FDI impact]

[expected FDI impact]

low low

high Institutional push [from home country, in this case Japan]

Figure 18.2

284

Bilateral institutional matrix

Foreign direct investment in Thailand

expansion. The environments we describe carry different names, depending on whether or not the promotion of investment in two countries is vague or strong. When both governments consider FDI between the two countries of value (i.e. both institutional push from the home country and institutional pull from the host country are high), an integration scenario is defined. Under these circumstances, it seems reasonable to expect substantial firm activities. In contrast, when both governments place little value on FDI (i.e. both institutional push from the home country and institutional pull from the host country are low), a segregation scenario is defined. It is possible to conjecture that firms may not seek engagement. When the active promotion of inward investment meets an unfavorable or more ambivalent institutional environment from a possible source country (i.e. low institutional push from the home country and high institutional pull from the host country) tournament scenarios, where host countries ‘compete’ for available investments from firms, are likely to occur. Finally, when there is little possibility for or interest in inward investment (often for reasons of protectionism), but home government institutions actively promote relationships (i.e. high institutional push from the home country and low institutional pull from the host country), a dissent scenario is defined. Here, threats associated with investment disputes (e.g. boycotts of goods, accusations of protectionism) may deflect investment initiatives. Of course, these dynamics take place in a system of bilateral and multilateral relationships between myriad countries. Therefore, the absolute level of investment activities of Japanese firms in Thailand is also influenced by institutional activities between Japan and, for example, Malaysia, Indonesia or Vietnam. However, the perspective offered by our study focuses on the relative differences between distinct phases, caused by specifically bilateral developments. In spite of overlapping spheres of influence, this focus draws additional justification from the observed economic bilateralism in Southeast Asia (Dent 2006). According to our proposition, FDI inflow to the host country is expected to be highest when both institutional push from the home country and institutional pull from the host country are high. FDI inflow to the host country is expected to be lowest when both institutional push from the home country and institutional pull from the host country are low. We further propose that in this bilateral perspective, an environment with high institutional pull and low institutional push should have a stronger effect on FDI volume than vice versa, as pull measures should be more targeted to the individual host country, and other considerations (e.g. macroeconomic or strategic) may still prompt firms to invest overseas. Incentives and norms established by institutional push in the home country typically encourage foreign investments in general or with a regional focus, but seldom target a specific country (i.e. ASEAN vs. Thailand in particular). Institutional pull from the host country, on the other hand, is by its very nature focused on a single country. We expect this to be true in particular during phases where there already is a basic level of foreign investment activity present, as a positive attitude towards investing overseas is already established. Consequently, we anticipate home country institutional push to be important most of all during early phases of overall foreign investment activities, as it provides the necessary support for a positive approach towards FDI in general. One aspect, where the direct influence of institutional measures should be particularly visible, is geographic location choices of investing firms in the host country (Meyer and Nguyen 2005). Here, Thailand has for years been trying to attract FDI to specific industrial focus areas and estates (Tsuneishi 2005) in attempts to avoid the establishment of too much of a gap in regional development (Lecler 2002). Thus, we expect to observe institutional effects via sub-national location choice of JMNEs. Before proceeding with our discussion, two issues require discussion. First, Japanese firm responses to administrative guidance are known to vary, depending on context and time period (e.g. Weinstein 1995). This may also affect outward investment decisions, as some firms may be 285

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less sensitive to home institutional regimes than others. In fact, some Japanese firms expanded abroad precisely because of institutional constraints at home (Turner 2010). Second, Japanese firms may not only passively accept institutional demands, but may seek actively to exert control over outward FDI policy formulation, for instance through lobbying for bilateral agreements to bolster competitiveness (e.g. Manger 2005).

Evolving institutional environments in Thailand and Japan and their interaction In reviewing the external institutional environment, we explore the impact of institutionalization on FDI activity through a longitudinal lens. We do this because institutional change happens incrementally and is path dependent, limited by inherent constraints that are imposed by existing institutions (North 1990). Thus, we do not expect sudden or large changes in direction, but rather incremental transitions as reflected in evolving institutional regimes at home and abroad. This perspective enables us to observe how economic policy formulations – and constraints on (or opportunities for) investment that flow from them – influence the engagement of Japanese firms with the Thai economy. Japanese firms are usually quick to respond to changes in the macro-environment (Buckley and Horn 2009; Buckley et al. 2013; Horn 2015), and institutional considerations should, therefore, provide useful insights into how policy adjustments designed to promote investment by Japanese firms affect organizational decision-making. This study is concerned with foreign investment activities by Japanese firms being embedded in a set of institutional environments. We explicitly account for both host and home country institutional environments, integrating four relevant perspectives: (i) intranational developments in Japan; (ii) intranational developments in Thailand; (iii) bilateral developments between Thailand and Japan; and (iv) multilateral developments involving either or both countries. An overview of the developments that were considered for our identification of institutional phases is provided in Table 18.1. We do not argue that the only pressures on JMNEs are institutional regimes. Macroeconomic considerations are part of foreign investment decision processes. The influential role of, for example, the bilateral exchange rate in FDIs has been documented, albeit with nuances, in general (e.g. Blonigen 1997) and in the case of Japanese investments in Asia in particular (Baek and Okawa 2001; Xing and Wang 2006). We expect this indicator to offer useful additional explanations for variable FDI activity levels (Figure 18.3). With these determinants in mind and combining insights from Brimble (2002) and Sivalingam (2014), we identify five bilateral phases in the political and economic evolution of the Thai-Japanese relationship since World War II. For subsequent discussions, we summarize the expected impact of each phase on Japanese FDI in Thailand according to the observed institutional push from Japan and the institutional pull from Thailand. Before we do this, however, it is important to note that the economic ties between Japan and Thailand have been traditionally strong. They date back to the fourteenth century when ceramics from Thailand were used for tea ceremonies in Japan, and Japanese swords and textiles found their way to Thailand. Even during Japan’s seclusion period (beginning in the seventeenth century), trade between the two countries continued, with Chinese merchants as middlemen. Official diplomatic and commercial relations resumed in 1887 (Iida 1991). Arguably, trade and investment between the two countries are, thus, not a new phenomenon and perhaps need to be placed in the wider context of traditionally close relationships between Japan and Thailand, and possibly the SEA region as a whole. 286

1956 1957 1960

1955

1954

1952

1948 1951

1947

1946

1945

More Japanese firms receive approval for overseas manufacturing activities

LDP formed through ‘Coalition of Conservatives’

Japan regains national sovereignty PM Yoshida mentions Southeast Asia in connection with economic diplomacy

(i) Intranational developments in Japan (selected)

Industrial Promotion Act replaced with the Act for the Promotion of Industrial Investment Board of Industrial Investment is established to promote investment

Industrial Promotion Act to promote investment

‘Silent Coup’ brings militarydominated government

Military coup brings royalist Democrat Party to power

(ii) Intranational developments in Thailand (selected)

Table 18.1 Overview of relevant institutional perspectives

PM Kishi visits Thailand

(iii) Bilateral developments between Thailand and Japan (selected)

Japan joins UN

(Continued )

Japan joins the IBRD Japan joins the Colombo Plan Japan joins GATT

San Francisco Peace Treaty takes effect Japan accepted as member of the IMF

GATT goes into effect San Francisco Peace Treaty signed

Japan surrenders, ending World War II and beginning Allied occupation International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) begins operations IMF launched

(iv) Multinational developments involving either or both countries (selected)

1973

1972

1970

1967 1968

1966

1965

1964

1962

Japan moves to a floating exchange rate system Following the first oil shock, Japan pursues the procurement of energy resources through ‘resource diplomacy’

Relaxation of restrictions on outward FDI Okinawa returns to Japanese administration

(i) Intranational developments in Japan (selected)

Table 18.1 (continued )

Students protest Japanese economic influence Mass boycott of Japanese products Discovery of natural gas in the Gulf of Siam

Office of the Board of Industrial Investment is inaugurated and assigned permanent staff (later renamed Board of Investment, or BOI)

(ii) Intranational developments in Thailand (selected)

‘Special Yen Agreement’ concluded, settling World War II compensation claims

(iii) Bilateral developments between Thailand and Japan (selected)

Paris Peace Accord ends outside military intervention in Vietnam Japan establishes diplomatic relations with North Vietnam The seventh round of GATT negotiations (called the ‘Tokyo Round’) begins

Japan joins OECD Olympic Games held in Tokyo US military involvement in Vietnam begins, directly supported by Thailand Establishment of the Asian Development Bank Ministerial Conference for the Economic Development of Southeast Asia held in Tokyo ASEAN founded Pacific Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD)

(iv) Multinational developments involving either or both countries (selected)

1980

1979

1978

1977

1976

1974

Formulation of Fukuda Doctrine

(i) Intranational developments in Japan (selected)

Table 18.1 (continued )

Military coup brings about change of government ministers

Student protests are suppressed by force at Thammasat University, cumulating in a military coup Government enacts the Investment Promotion Act One unsuccessful and one successful military coup

(ii) Intranational developments in Thailand (selected)

Japan begins major cooperation with Thailand on the development of the Thai Eastern Seaboard industrial zone

Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda visits Thailand and other Southeast Asian (SEA) nations

Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka visits Thailand Riots erupted during the Prime Minister’s visit, caused by discontent about the strong Japanese economic presence

(iii) Bilateral developments between Thailand and Japan (selected)

(Continued )

Japan accepted as an ASEAN dialogue partner First ASEAN-Japan Economic Council held Seventh round of GATT negotiations ends with substantial lowering of tariffs in Japan First Japan-ASEAN Economic Ministers’ Meeting held First Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference is held

Japan-ASEAN Forum initiated

First Japan-ASEAN Rubber Forum (Kuala Lumpur)

(iv) Multinational developments involving either or both countries (selected)

1987

1985

1984

1983

1982

1981

Following the stock market crash known as ‘Black Monday,’ Japan begins adopting a long-term lowinterest rate policy

(i) Intranational developments in Japan (selected)

Table 18.1 (continued )

Economic downturn forces policy changes towards exportoriented manufacturing (away from agriculture) Thai baht is devalued, tariffs and tax incentives are revised Government pushes investment promotion Failed military coup attempt First Industrial Estate is completed in Northern Thailand (Lamphun) Revision of the Investment Promotion Act divides Thailand into three incentive zones

Second ‘oil crisis’ causes significant economic unrest in Thailand’s economy Failed military coup attempt Eastern Seaboard Development Plan establishes a special economic zone and becomes key component of national economic planning

(ii) Intranational developments in Thailand (selected)

(iii) Bilateral developments between Thailand and Japan (selected)

Japanese PM Takeshita visits ASEAN countries

Plaza Accord leads to appreciation of Japanese yen

Japanese PM Nakasone visits ASEAN countries

Japanese PM Suzuki visits ASEAN countries

(iv) Multinational developments involving either or both countries (selected)

1994

1993

1992

1991

1989

1988

PM Miyazawa announces the ‘Miyazawa Doctrine’

PM Takeshita formulates the ‘Takeshita Doctrine’

(i) Intranational developments in Japan (selected)

Table 18.1 (continued )

Deregulation of automotive industry to encourage investments Military coup overthrows the elected government leading to protests Protests continue, violent clashes with military forces lead to resignation of military-led government

(ii) Intranational developments in Thailand (selected)

In their first overseas trip, the Emperor and Empress of Japan visit Thailand

(iii) Bilateral developments between Thailand and Japan (selected)

(Continued )

PM Miyazawa visits SEA Joint regional security efforts agreed upon between ASEAN and PostMinisterial Conference members PM Murayama visits SEA First meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum in Bangkok Eighth round of GATT negotiations concluded with the signing of the Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)

Japan-ASEAN Investment Fund is established Launch of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Japanese PM Takeshita visits ASEAN countries PM Kaifu visits SEA

(iv) Multinational developments involving either or both countries (selected)

2006

2003

2002

2000

1998

1997

1995

PM Hashimoto Ryutaro seeks closer ties with ASEAN (‘Hashimoto Doctrine’)

(i) Intranational developments in Japan (selected)

Table 18.1 (continued )

BOI puts forward initiatives to improve competitiveness of Thai industries Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra removed from power by military coup

BOI adopts additional incentives to support industrial decentralization

Currency crisis erupts, causing devaluation of the Thai baht and significant economic downturn IMF provides loan and insists on further economic liberalization BOI launches short-term measures to promote investment

(ii) Intranational developments in Thailand (selected)

Emperor and Empress of Japan visit Thailand Thai PM Thaksin Shinawatra visits Japan

PM Obuchi visits Thailand

Japan announces assistance of $4 billion to Thailand Thai Queen visits Japan

(iii) Bilateral developments between Thailand and Japan (selected)

Japan’s first bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA) is signed with Singapore

First APEC Leaders Meeting held in Japan (Osaka) PM Hashimoto visits SEA ASEAN plus Three initiated International conference in Tokyo agrees on $17.2 billion in economic assistance to Thailand IMF assistance in response to the Asian financial crisis comes with the condition to further liberalize FDI and trade Japan grants a total of $79 billion in major assistance initiatives to crisis countries in Asia (1997–98)

(iv) Multinational developments involving either or both countries (selected)

Military coup in Thailand ousts Yingluck Shinawatra

(ii) Intranational developments in Thailand (selected)

Thai PM General Chan-o-Cha visits Japan

Japanese PM Aso visits Thailand Thai PM Vejjajiva visits Japan Crown Prince Naruhito of Japan visits Thailand Thai PM Yingluck Shinawatra visits Japan PM Abe visits Thailand, along with other ASEAN states, underscoring the importance of the region Thai PM Yingluck Shinawatra visits Japan

Japan and Thailand conclude FTA (Economic Partnership Agreement) Thai PM General Chulanont visits Japan

(iii) Bilateral developments between Thailand and Japan (selected)

Japan and ASEAN develop joint roadmap for strategic economic and industrial cooperation

Comprehensive Economic Partnership (CEP) between Japan and ASEAN takes effect

(iv) Multinational developments involving either or both countries (selected)

Sources: Baker and Phongpaichit 2009; BOI 2016; Brimble 2002; Brimble and Urata 2006; Hook et al. 2012; JICA 2001; MOFA 2016; Sivalingam 2014; Sudo 2002; Togo 2005; Tsuneishi 2005; Versetti and Heal 2015.

2015

2014

2013

2012

2009

2008

2007

(i) Intranational developments in Japan (selected)

Table 18.1 (continued )

Horn, Wittek, and Iguchi

Foreign exchange rate [1 JPY to THB]

0.45 0.4 0.35 0.3 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.1 0.05 1945 1947 1949 1951 1953 1955 1957 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015

0

Figure 18.3

Annual average foreign exchange rate JPY to THB, 1948–2015

Sources: Investing.com, Pacific Exchange Rate Service, Leenabanchong 2001: 267. Note: Excludes data points with missing year entry.

Phase 1 (1952–65): institutional foundation setting In the immediate post-war period, Japanese firms operated under extremely restricted FDI regimes at home. Foreign currency considerations and worries about ‘reverse imports’ (i.e. import of goods manufactured by Japanese firms abroad) undermining the competitiveness of Japan’s economy informed the industrial policy formulation. The Japanese government, above all the Ministries of Industry and Trade (MITI) and Finance (MOF), strictly controlled foreign investment initiatives. Restrictions imposed by the Japanese government followed either market-seeking (facilitating export of Japanese goods) or resource-seeking (securing the import of critical resources) investment motives (see Mason 1999). Rigorous screening processes ensured corporate compliance. Preferential financing and tax concessions further regulated overseas activities of Japanese firms (Dickens 1988). Against this backdrop, Japanese FDI began playing a role in Southeast Asia in the 1950s and 1960s. However, efforts focused mainly on securing resources in the region (Hook et al. 2012) and developing export markets, most notably for electrical products and cars (Sivalingam 2014). The latter took place often through the catalyst of repatriation agreements or loans (Sudo 2002). We choose 1952 as the starting year for our discussions as it marks the resumption of trade between the two countries. The year before, Japan regained its sovereignty with the signing of the San Francisco peace treaty and was thus able to begin to craft its own foreign diplomatic and economic policy more actively. In Thailand, the ‘Silent Coup’ pushed aside a proposed royalist-democratic constitution and laid the foundation for a military-dominated government for the next two decades (Baker and Phongpaichit 2009). Phase 1 sees several first steps taken in Thailand to lay the institutional foundations necessary to encourage industrial development through inward FDI. Policies were enacted in Thailand to promote investments in selected industries, starting with the Industrial Promotion Act in 1954. This was followed by the Act for the Promotion of Industrial Investment in 1960 (Board of Investment 2016). With the policy measures taken in 1960, the Thai government also laid the groundwork for a dedicated agency to promote foreign investment, the ‘Board of Industrial Investment,’ later renamed ‘Board of Investment’ (BOI) (Board of Investment 2016). Brimble and Urata (2006) characterize this phase in Thai economic policy as classical import substitution. 294

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Relative to later phases, we consider institutional push and pull during phase 1 to be low and classify it as a ‘segregation’ scenario according to our framework. A low impact on FDI activity is expected.

Phase 2 (1966–85): gradual rise in activity In the late 1960s, a policy shift towards export promotion took place in Thailand, driven largely by balance of payment problems (Brimble 2002). A key role in the pursuit of this policy fell on the BOI, which was inaugurated as a government agency with dedicated staff in 1966 (BOI 2016). From then on, this body played an important part in the formulation and execution of Thai FDI policy. It was also tasked with direct FDI promotion through image building, direct investor targeting and providing selected services to investors (Brimble 2002). The Thai people, however, did not greet the subsequent expansion of Japanese firms and goods in the country with enthusiasm. Their, at times, fierce resistance was visible, for example, in the boycott of Japanese goods in 1972 and the riots during the state visit of Prime Minister Tanaka in 1974. These sentiments changed slowly and as proponents of closer economic cooperation with Japan gathered momentum in Thailand, the Investment Promotion Act of 1977 was a first expression of a more positive attitude towards Japan (Board of Investment 2016). From the Japanese perspective, national interests played again an important role in reframing the investment regime under which Japanese firms operated. In response to mounting corporate pressure, and with the objective of internationalizing Japan’s economy, the government successively lifted outward FDI restrictions by the late 1960s (Cowling and Tomlinson 2007). This phase saw an initially selective but, from the 1970s onward, a sustained expansion of Japanese FDI to Southeast Asia. In the wake of shocks caused by the demise of the Bretton-Woods system and the first oil crisis, Japanese companies began to geographically diversify and transfer part of their operations abroad (Hook et al. 2012). Politically, the first Ministerial Meeting on Southeast Asian Development, held in Tokyo in 1966, is seen as a strategic move to facilitate Japan’s re-entry into the markets of Asia. By offering war reparations, assistance in economic development, and economic cooperation, the Japanese government arguably took the initiative to prepare JMNE re-engagement in the region (Suehiro 1999). During the late 1970s and early 1980s, private businesses began to identify investments in Southeast Asia as an opportunity as well. Japanese companies looked to the region to lower their cost base and diversify their supply chains (Hook et al. 2012). The so-called Fukuda Doctrine (1977), widely regarded as the inauguration of a new era in relations between Japan and the core economies of Southeast Asia (Sivalingam 2014), pledged to deepen diplomatic and economic ties between Japan and countries in the region, including Thailand. This spurred further JMNE activities, and high-level diplomatic visits to the region increased (Sudo 2002). A prominent example of the burgeoning economic ties between Thailand and Japan during this phase is the ‘Eastern Seaboard Development Plan’ (ESDP). After the discovery of natural gas in the Gulf of Siam, the industrial development of the region became a key component of Thai economic planning. The ESDP, which was a priority area of the ‘Fifth Economic and Social Development Plan,’ supported the development of industrial complexes and related infrastructure. Japan expressed support early on and began assisting the development of the region ( JICA 2001). Consequently, we observe a stronger institutional push and yet still low institutional pull (albeit gradually increasing), especially with outright popular opposition to Japanese investments during parts of this period. The appreciating Japanese yen further points to growing support. We expect a moderate effect on Japanese FDI in Thailand and classify this phase as a ‘dissent’ scenario. 295

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Phase 3 (1986–97): complementing emphasis on economic ties Key institutional actions that shape firm behavior during phase 3 were taken in the aftermath of the second oil crisis in 1980–1. This external shock created significant economic turmoil and contributed to an increasing trade imbalance in Thailand, with oil as the country’s largest import good increasing dramatically in price. The results were adjustments to the Thai economic policy regime, most notably liberalization in FDI policies. In the wake of a policy switch towards export-oriented manufacturing, tariffs were revised, tax systems overhauled and efforts launched to promote investments directly. A substantial devaluation of the Thai baht (Baker and Phongpaichit 2009) was seen in 1984, and in 1987, the revision of the Industrial Promotion Act established three industrial zones with targeted incentives for foreign investments (Tsuneishi 2005). The second half of the 1980s also saw an increasing decentralization of investment promotion efforts on the Thai side. The 5th (1982–6) and the 6th National Economic and Social Development Plan (1987–91) point to “the concentration of industrial activities : : : in Bangkok and the surrounding areas” (NESDB 1982: 60) and attribute it largely to the availability of infrastructure. Having identified this imbalance, policymakers promote the establishment of “new economic areas” to counteract it (NESDB 1982, 1987). The 7th development plan (1992–6) further specifies nine provinces as centers for industrial development (Chiang Mai, Phitsanulok, Nakhin Sawan, Khon Kaen, Nakhon Ratchasima, Saraburi, Ratchaburi, Surat Thani and Songkhla; NESDB 1992). 1985 also saw the completion of Thailand’s first industrial estate in the North of the country (Tsuneishi 2005). During the early 1990s, further reforms were undertaken to provide additional stimulus. The baht was made fully convertible, access to the stock market was eased, interest controls were removed and the Thai automotive industry was deregulated to encourage investments by Japanese and US firms (Baker and Phongpaichit 2009). From the perspective of home country institutional development, the Plaza Accord of 1985 must be regarded as a seminal development leading up to this phase. The resulting rapid appreciation of the Japanese yen augmented overseas investments in Thailand (Suehiro 1991), with two notable effects. First, it increased production costs in Japan, thus encouraging overseas production. Second, it shifted the focus of FDI from developed countries to the developing economies in Asia, as lowering the cost base was now critical. As a consequence, Thailand rapidly became a preferred target of Japanese transplants (Sivalingam 2014). We, therefore, view the years following these pivotal events as the beginning of a new phase that should see substantial bilateral economic activity. The importance of the bilateral relationship in this phase can also be seen by the visit of Japan’s Emperor and Empress to Thailand in 1991, their first overseas trip ever (MOFA 2016). In light of the observed strong institutional push and pull, as well as substantial supporting macroeconomic effects, we expect a strong effect on Japanese FDI in Thailand. We classify this phase as an ‘integration’ scenario.

Phase 4 (1998–2003): the aftermath of the financial crisis In 1997, Thailand was hit by a severe economic crisis, initially driven by speculation and a massive devaluation of the country’s currency. The government was forced to seek help from the IMF, which in return insisted on further liberalization of the economy and facilitated access for foreign capital (Baker and Phongpaichit 2009). Following the financial crisis in 1997, the BOI put forward short-term oriented measures to support the struggling economy. These initiatives facilitated production capacity increases by Japanese firms already based in Thailand and allowed capital increases to the point where existing joint ventures could become 100% foreign-owned. Additional steps announced in 2000 then permitted the possibility of majority 296

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foreign ownership for manufacturing projects, lifted further restrictions and provided incentives to promote efficiency and competitiveness (Brimble and Urata 2006). In these efforts, the BOI placed repeated emphasis on decentralization of investments to broaden the geographic footprint throughout Thailand (Brimble 2002). In 2003, the focus began to shift towards more tailored incentive offerings for specific industries. This has been accompanied by direct targeting of individual sectors with investment promotion activities. In the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis, Japan provided significant financial assistance to Thailand and the other affected Asian economies, however, without focusing on FDI policy changes (Hook et al. 2012). This strong institutional pull, but low institutional push characterizes a ‘tournament’ scenario according to our proposed framework. We expected it to lead to an overall moderate to strong effect on FDI volume.

Phase 5 (2004 to date): increased regional strategic cooperation Beginning in 2004, we observe a refocusing of the Japanese overseas investment strategy: away from China and towards Southeast Asia. This was driven, among other things, by the rise in production cost in China as well as territorial disputes between the two countries (Sivalingam 2014). We notice stronger strategic cooperation among Japan, Thailand and the ASEAN region as a whole. Important recent milestones have been the bilateral FTA concluded between Thailand and Japan in 2007, along with the Japan-ASEAN CEP one year later. Japan and ASEAN have further developed a roadmap for increased industrial cooperation, set to push a variety of initiatives through 2020 (Versetti and Heal 2015). While aimed at stepping up trade and FDI liberalization, these activities also have strong collaborative components, namely provisions of economic cooperation and capability-building support (Dent 2013). The emphasis on fostering bilateral Japanese-Thai relationships is flanked by numerous highest-level state visits over the past years. In six out of the last ten years since 2007, the prime minister, head of state or crown prince have undertaken trips to the respective other country (MOFA 2016). All these activities point towards the ongoing and growing importance of economic collaboration for both the Thai and the Japanese governments. In summary, we observe strong institutional push and pull in these bilateral and multilateral efforts, with some adverse macroeconomic effects due to the depreciating Japanese yen vs. the Thai baht. We therefore classify this most recent phase as another ‘integration’ scenario, with our conceptual framework suggesting strong effects on Japanese investments in Thailand.

Data analysis To generate insights into the evolution and location of Japanese direct investments in Thailand, we combined the Japanese Overseas Investment Directory or Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigy^o S^oran, published by T^ oy^ o Keizai, for the years 2008 and 2015. The resulting database contains 2,446 entries of affiliate Thai companies in which Japanese parent firms hold at least a 10% equity share. Address information (e.g. postcodes, street addresses, city and province) was entered into online geodata services (Latlong.net 2016; Zwiefelhofer 2016) to generate geographic location data. A historical overview of the currency exchange rate between the Japanese yen ( JPY) and the Thai baht (THB) was consolidated from multiple sources. For the years 1948–80, the exchange rate was inferred via the JPY to United States dollar (USD) rate taken from Investing.com, as well as the USD to THB rate taken from Leenabanchong (2001: 267). For the years 1981–92, the exchange rate was inferred via the JPY to USD rate as well as the USD to THB rate, both taken from 297

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Investing.com. Finally, for the period between 1993 and 2015, monthly average exchange rates between JPY and THB were available from the Pacific Exchange Rate Service. Available monthly average rates were converted to annual averages.

Findings Figure 18.4 provides an overview of new investment cases by Japanese firms in Thailand between 1945 and 2015. We focus our analysis on a count of new investment projects for the respective years, rather than overall investment volumes expressed in Thai, Japanese or another currency. This is mainly due to the nature of the investment stock data provided by the publications used. Other data sources that comprehensively cover the discussed timeframe were not readily available. This approach finds precedents in recent research (Buckley, Cross and Horn 2012). A gradual increase in investment activity is observable beginning in the 1960s, with a notable outlier in 1974 (thirty-two new investment cases), the year of Prime Minister Tanaka’s visit to Thailand. Subsequently, a significant and sustained surge can be seen from the late 1980s onwards, with its peak reached in 1996 (140 new cases). Notable breaks in the overall trend are apparent in the years 1992 and 1993, interestingly following a sustained political crisis in Thailand, after the Asian financial crisis in 1997, as well as in the aftermath of the global financial crisis in 2008. For a more comprehensive review of the respective level of FDI activity, we aggregate average new investment cases per year for each of the phases we have identified (of course, this measure is volatile to shifts by single years, especially for phases that cover smaller timeframes). A summary view is provided in Table 18.2. Overall, we observe the highest level of FDI activity during phase 3. On average, seventy-three Japanese firms established a presence in Thailand each year during this period. This increase in the number of investments represents a significant leap compared to phase 2, with only about ten new cases per year. The phenomenon of Japanese firms turning their attention to Thailand in larger numbers begins in 1987, with more new investment projects during that year (thirty-four) than during any previous one. Reviewing the

New inward FDI cases [number of]

160 PHASE 1

PHASE 2

PHASE 3

PHASE 4

PHASE 5

140 120 100 80 60 40 20 1945 1947 1949 1951 1953 1955 1957 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015

0

Figure 18.4

New FDI cases from Japan to Thailand between 1945 and 2015

^ yo ^ Keizai 2008 and 2015. Source: To Note: Excludes data points with missing year of entry.

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Table 18.2 Average new FDI cases per year by phases Phase

Average new FDI cases p.a.

Phase 1: Institutional foundation setting (1952–65) Phase 2: Gradual rise in activity (1966–85) Phase 3: Complementing emphasis on economic ties (1986–97) Phase 4: The wake of the financial crisis (1998–2003) Phase 5: Increased regional strategic cooperation (2004–14)

2.1 10.2 73.0 56.8 64.8

^ yo ^ Keizai 2008 and 2015. Sources: To Note: We exclude 2015 from the average for phase 5, as the available data source published during that same year cannot be considered to be comprehensive at the time of writing.

institutional developments during phase 3 in more detail, it is notable that this increase happens after the conclusion of the Plaza Accord in 1985 and following the ‘Black Monday’ market crash in 1987. In terms of overall FDI activity, phase 3 is followed by phases 4 and 5 with roughly fifty-seven and sixty-five new cases per year on average respectively. We note the lowest overall investment level during phase 1, with about two new projects per year. Beyond the number of new cases, we also reviewed the geographic locations where these direct investments occurred. We initially observe a heavy concentration of Japanese FDI in Bangkok and its immediate vicinity. Only with the beginning of the 1980s do project locations slowly start to extend beyond these initial beachheads. During phase 3 then, we see a wider geographic diversity, with additional centers of activity in Chiang Mai/Chiang Rai/Lampang region in the North, Khon Kaen and Kalasin in the East, as well as Trang and Songkhla in the South of the country. This geographic focus is sustained during the later phases 4 and 5, with occasional individual outliers in other parts of the country. In terms of the macroeconomic factors reviewed, a gradual and significant appreciation of the JPY against the THB can be observed beginning in 1985. This trend continued with only small interruptions until 2005. We then see a more pronounced depreciation of the JPY from 2006–8, followed by a short recovery and then another phase of depreciation, beginning in 2013, that was still ongoing at the time of writing. Based on our findings, institutional reforms and changes in Thailand and Japan matter for explaining the trajectory of Japanese investment in Thailand. Push and pull factors of FDI from recipient and host country interact in specific ways and, together, are a useful framework to organize bilateral FDI relationships. Our analysis suggests that, depending on normative and regulatory mechanisms that reside in the firm environment at home and abroad, investment preferences vary. The four institutional orientations (segregation, integration, tournament, dissent) represent different phases of Japanese investment initiatives.

Discussion Our study seeks explanations for the interaction between policy regimes and Japanese FDI. Institutional theory emphasizes the role of institutions in shaping and constraining the behavior of organizations, in our case the influence of policy regimes on investment decisions. We have argued that institutionalization is predicated by cognitive, normative and regulative considerations and that these processes work simultaneously in home and host markets. Therefore, our argument continues, an interactive perspective should be applied to MNE activity as a conduit of investment decisions. We complement international business research by considering the 299

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moderating effects of institutions on firm behavior from a different angle – the interplay between home and host country environment – and, thus, go one step further. Although complex in detail, the effects of institutional processes on organizational decisionmaking are very simple: state structures may allow organizations to operate freely, whereas more interventionist structures might constrain or incentivize certain international firm activities. This distinction between levels of institutional openness to FDI activities is important for two reasons: (i) to examine combinations of relationships between home and host country environment, and (ii) although firms are likely to vary in the extent to which they oblige (see cautionary note earlier), to illustrate the impact of administrative guidance on organizational decision-making between institutional push at home and pull abroad. It is important to note that our conceptual framework does not end with the display towards institutional push and pull factors; rather the outcomes of these considerations may serve to influence future parallel investment behavior (i.e. follow-the-leader phenomena, Knickerbocker 1973). By applying our conceptual considerations to Thailand’s evolving position in the global network activities of Japanese firms, we provide insights into investment patterns that occur between Thai-Japanese regulatory and policy environments. First, Japanese firms have faced discontinuous institutional regimes over time. The promotion of investment in both countries was sometimes vague, sometimes strong. Of course, JMNEs must deal with this issue and factor in expectations about long- and short-term volatility within the political environment. The discrepant environments at home and abroad intersect to create the fundamental institutional conditions for organizational investments. Second, this perspective has enabled us to observe how economic policy formulations – and constraints on (or opportunities for) investment that flow from them – influence the engagement of Japanese firms with the Thai economy. Our institutional considerations, therefore, provide useful insights into how policy adjustments both in Thailand and Japan can play a role in attracting investments by Japanese firms. Third, we have developed a framework that brings together considerations of institutional regimes that reside in the home and host countries. The relationship between institutional environments and how firms navigate the resultant dynamics between these two decision sets (flowing from the institutional environments firms are in) has, to our knowledge, so far been explored primarily in isolation. In the case of Japanese firms operating in Thailand, we have demonstrated important links between the dynamic interaction of investment contexts (both foreign and domestic) and their impact on corporate decision-making. Although in need of further refinement through additional empirical studies (especially qualitative fieldwork), we observe a pattern in foreign investment decisions by Japanese firms that is consistent with four proposed institutional scenarios. The two phases with both strong institutional push and pull (phases 3 and 5), are those with the highest number of new investments, even though the most recent phase 5 has thus far fallen short of overall investment activities observed during phase 3. Shifts in the currency exchange rates (supportive for Japanese firms during phase 3, not supportive during phase 5), indicate a moderating role of macroeconomic factors, which might explain these different levels. We draw additional support from the observed geographic dispersion of investment locations corresponding to institutional directives on the Thai side. Fourth, market imperfections stimulate firms to expand across borders. Still, we find that Japanese investment behavior in Thailand cannot be explained solely by such efficiency considerations. Though we concede that institutional change is not the entire explanation, commercial activities between these two countries are embedded in a broader economic and political context (exemplified, for instance, by frequent high-level state visits, including members of the imperial households). Institutional change brings opportunities, but it also brings pressures to 300

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comply, which, according to Dent (2013), might follow East Asia’s state-led tradition, whereby policy measures accompany (and perhaps even influence) economic development objectives.

Limitations and conclusion While our knowledge about the FDI behavior of JMNEs is relatively advanced, research has, to date, focused mainly on interactions between host countries and Japanese firms and, by extension, the transfer of firm-specific advantages across borders. By considering institutional perspectives in the host and home markets and, thus, specifying a dual perspective of institutional environments and their impact on investment decisions, we contribute to the literature on how JMNE activities are embedded within regulatory structures more broadly. Policy regimes at home appear to be an influential sub-facet of their investment considerations and, together with host country activities that seek to attract investment, have effects on the weight Japanese firms give to business opportunities or imperatives abroad. In the case of JMNEs operating in Thailand, the development of effective political relationships serves as an additional backdrop to real and ongoing economic interaction, such that JMNE activity takes place between host and home country policy regimes. We, thus, demonstrate that an integrative tool that advocates a combination of institutional regimes is a potentially useful alternative to exploring the impact of policy regimes on Japanese firm behavior across national borders. Clearly, this work has several limitations. It does provide, however, a rich context for future research initiatives. First, we have argued that failure to consider home country factors may lead to an incomplete understanding of the institutional impact on organizational decision-making. Yet, interactive explorations of FDI add a layer of complexity such that variables are more difficult to control. We have addressed this issue by focusing on the evolution of Japanese corporate engagement with Thailand. Hence, we cannot rule out that Japanese policy regimes may be less (or even more) relevant for investment in other country contexts. Additional research could test our conceptual framework in non-Asian contexts, where the emphasis on regulatory cooperation is perhaps less pronounced. A second limitation of this study pertains to the lack of qualitative data. Of course, as Chang (2010) has previously pointed out, the interaction between institutions and economic development is not fully explained through generalized observations like ours. It remains an open question whether the dynamics of continuity and change run from institutions to economic behavior, or if said behavior could also cause corresponding changes in the institutional regime. Furthermore, we also did not consider the potential influence that corporations and their strategies exert on the formulation of institutional policies (see, for example, Child and Tsai 2005, for a discussion of these aspects). Therefore, our argument is not that foresighted politicians independently initiated institutional actions with clear strategies in mind. Rather, it is conceivable that institutional incentives (or constraints) emerge from the interplay of business and government interests. Further research could explore these interest group effects, for example, by studying how Japan’s corporate and political sectors interact in the run up to FTAs. Nonetheless, we argue that, in the end, the behavior of corporate actors (i.e. foreign investment decisions) is heavily influenced by institutional incentives, constraints and direction, irrespective of their original cause. From a theoretical perspective, we have employed Scott’s three pillars to guide us in our thinking about the mechanisms through which institutions exert influences. This basis also provides a theoretical challenge that should be pointed out. While the impact of regulatory action by Japanese and Thai authorities is immediately evident and the normative effects of Japanese institutions on Japanese firms appear plausible, the normative influence of Thai institutions on 301

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firms that are not already operating in the country is less obvious. If we consider that organizations seek legitimacy in their own social context (DiMaggio and Powel 1983), the normative effect of host country institutional action could seem questionable, given its influence is exerted outside the organizations’ immediate social environment. While we do not explore this theoretical challenge in further detail, we believe it to be a fruitful avenue for future research. Although our analysis revealed some possible outcomes from the interaction of policy regimes at home and abroad, we hasten to warn that our investigation did not extend beyond national level variables. A further limitation, thus, is related to the diplomatic and community activities that underpin economic policy formulation in host countries. ‘FDI lobbying’ can be a powerful tool for economic engagement (or disengagement, as most recently demonstrated by the so-called ‘Brexit Document,’ published by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which Japanese firms formulated demands vis-a`-vis the British government). Additional research could examine the commercial interest formulation of Japanese firms through the lens of diplomatic effort, including the liaison of government officials, or through the lens of other interest groups such as the Japan Business Federation (Keidanren) or foreign chambers of commerce. In conclusion, this study set out to portray the responsiveness of Japanese firms to regulatory and policy regimes for FDI. For this purpose, we developed a conceptual framework that allows for a sophisticated, integrative analysis of institutions within which investment behavior can be investigated. Although not intended to guide a specific set of predictions for JMNE modus operandi, we are confident that our framework can be used to articulate testable hypotheses for future theory development and their practical application.

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Kharas, H. (2010) ‘The Emerging Middle Class in Developing Countries’, Working Paper No. 285, OECD Development Centre, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/12/52/44457738.pdf accessed 2 August 2016. Kiyota, K. and Urata, S. (2007) ‘The Role of Multinational Firms in International Trade: The Case of Japan’, Working Paper No. 560, Research Seminar in International Economics, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan. Knickerbocker, F. (1973) Oligopolistic Reaction and Multinational Enterprise, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Latlong.net (2016) ‘Get Latitude and Longitude’, www.latlong.net/ accessed 26 July 2016. Lecler, Y. (2002) ‘The Cluster Role in the Development of the Thai Car Industry’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 26(4): 799–814. Leenabanchong, C. (2001) ‘Thailand: 1997 Thai Financial Crisis’, in T. S. Yu and D. Xu (eds), From Crisis to Recovery: East Asia Rising Again? Singapore: World Scientific. Leftwich, A. (1995) ‘Bringing Politics Back in: Towards a Model of the Developmental State’, Journal of Developmental Studies, 31(3): 400–27. Magaziner, I. C. and Hout, T. M. (1980) Japanese Industrial Policy, London: Policy Studies Institute. Manger, M. S. (2005) ‘Competition and Bilateralism in Trade Policy: The Case of Japan’s Free Trade Agreements’, Review of International Political Economy, 12(5): 804–28. Mason, M. (1999) ‘The Origins and Evolution of Japanese Direct Investment in East Asia’, in D. J. Encarnation (ed.), Japanese Multinationals in Asia: Regional Operations in Comparative Perspective, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Meyer, K. E. and Nguyen, H. V. (2005) ‘Foreign Investment Strategies and Sub-National Institutions in Emerging Markets: Evidence from Vietnam’, Journal of Management Studies, 42(1): 63–93. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA) (2016) ‘Japan-Thailand relations’, www.mofa.go.jp/region/ asia-paci/thailand/data.html accessed 17 August 2016. Moore, C. B., Bell, R. G. and Filatotchev, I. (2010) ‘Institutions and Foreign IPO Firms: The Effects of “Home” and “Host” Country Institutions on Performance’, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 34(3): 469–90. National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) (1982) ‘The Fifth National Economic and Social Development Plan (1982–1986)’, www.nesdb.go.th/nesdb_en/ewt_dl_link.php?nid=3780 accessed 24 September 2016. National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) (1987) ‘The Sixth National Economic and Social Development Plan (1987–1991)’, www.nesdb.go.th/nesdb_en/ewt_dl_link.php?nid=3781 accessed 24 September 2016. National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) (1992) ‘The Seventh National Economic and Social Development Plan (1992–1996)’, www.nesdb.go.th/nesdb_en/ewt_dl_link.php?nid=3782 accessed 24 September 2016. Nicolas, S., Purcell, W. and Gray, S. (2001) ‘Regional Clusters, Location Tournaments and Incentives: An Empirical Analysis of Factors Attracting Japanese Investment to Singapore’, Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 18(3): 395–405. North, D. C. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Rugman, A. (1981) Inside the Multinationals, New York: Columbia University Press. Scott, W. R. (1987) ‘The Adolescence of Institutional Theory’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 32: 493–511. Scott, W. R. (2014) Institutions and Organizations: Ideas, Interests, and Identities, 4th ed., Los Angeles: Sage Publications. Sivalingam, G. (2014) ‘Japanese Foreign Direct Investment in the ASEAN-4 Countries’, in T. Shiraishi and T. Kojima (eds), ASEAN-Japan Relations, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Sudo, S. (2002) The International Relations of Japan and South East Asia, London: Routledge. Suehiro, A. (1999) ‘The Road to Economic Re-Entry: Japan’s Policy Toward Southeast Asian Development in the 1950s and 1960s’, Social Science Japan Journal, 2(1): 85–105. Togo, K. (2005) Japan’s Foreign Policy, 1945–2003: The Quest for a Proactive Policy, Boston, MA: Brill. Tomiura, E. (2005) ‘Technological capability and FDI in Asia: Firm-Level Relationships Among Japanese Manufacturers’, Asian Economic Journal, 19(3): 273–89. T^ oy^ o Keizai (2008) Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigy^o S^oran [ Japanese Overseas Investment Database], Tokyo: T^ oy^ o Keizai Shinp^ osha.

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T^ oy^ o Keizai (2015) Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigy^o S^oran (Kunibetsu-Hen) [ Japanese Overseas Investment Database (by country)], Tokyo: T^ oy^ o Keizai Shinp^ osha. Trevino, L. J., Douglas, T. E. and Cullen, J. (2008) ‘The Three Pillars of Institutional Theory and FDI in Latin America: An Institutionalization Process’, International Business Review, 17(1): 118–33. Tsuneishi, T. (2005) ‘The Regional Development Policy of Thailand and its Economic Cooperation with Neighboring Countries’, Discussion Paper No. 32, Chiba, JP: Institute of Developing Economics. Turner, L. (2010) Industrial Collaboration with Japan, London: Routledge. United Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 2016. World Investment Report: Investor Nationality: Policy Challenges. New York and Geneva: United Nations. Versetti, A. and Heal, A. (2015) ‘Japan-ASEAN Economic Partnership: Prospects for 2015 and beyond’, United Nations ESCAP Trade Insights, 3: 1–14. Weinstein, D. E. (1995) ‘Evaluating Administrative Guidance and Cartels in Japan (1957–1988)’, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 9: 200–23. Xing, Y. and Wan, G. (2006) ‘Exchange Rates and Competition for FDI in Asia’, The World Economy, 29(4): 419–34. Yoshida, Y. and Ito, H. (2006) ‘How Do the Asian Economies Compete with Japan in the US Market? Is China Exceptional? A Triangular Trade Approach’, Asia Pacific Business Review, 12(3): 285–307. Zwiefelhofer, D. B. (2016) ‘Batch Geocoding’, www.findlatitudeandlongitude.com/batch-geocode/#. V5dCtzYkrZR accessed 26 July 2016.

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19 Japanese development assistance as a multipurpose political tool Marie So¨derberg

Economic might has been an important tool in Japanese foreign policy and is very much tied to Japan’s postwar identity. Although the economy has been rather stagnant since the late 1990s, Japan is still the third largest economy in the world. For many of the surrounding Asian countries it has been a kind of role model and, thus, in the 1990s, Japan sponsored a study by the World Bank (WB) called the East Asian Miracle1 to try to confirm the Japanese model for Asian development. Although the economy is no longer booming, economic power is still the main tool in Japan’s international relations. The shifts in the world economy as well as the global power structure, and the fact that Japan today also needs to deal with its own domestic economic problems, have implications for its political economy and the ways in which that tool is utilized. Development assistance is and has always been a powerful implement in relations with many of Japan’s Asian neighbors as well as the developing world in general. It is useful as it can be employed for various purposes amidst changing conditions. Stimulating economic growth, both for Japan and recipient governments, is one important area. Establishing good diplomatic relations and managing Japan-US relations are others. In a more insecure world where foreign aid in general is becoming more security oriented, this is the way Japanese assistance is also going, as part of a long tradition that supports such a direction. Lacking the capability to send troops in fighting positions abroad, due to constitutional restraints,2 Official Development Assistance (ODA) has since the end of the 1970s been one way for Japan to contribute to international society and peace and stability on a global basis. ODA is the term used to define aid by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Developments (OECD)’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC), of which Japan has been a member since its inauguration in 1961. DAC is the organization that has set the standard for what funds are calculated as development assistance. It should be government-to-government assistance, it should be used for development purposes and have a grant element of at least 25%. In 2015 the Japanese government adopted a new Development Cooperation Charter. Dropping the label ODA in the title of this new Charter indicates some of the changes that are ongoing in this field within Japan and globally, and where we are likely to see substantial changes also in the way other DAC countries define development cooperation. In 2015 the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), during which poverty had been cut by half, were finished. At the same time 193 member nations of the UN agreed that there were many 306

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development issues left that needed to be tackled. A new framework for this, the so-called Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),3 was adopted. The SDGs should be achieved by 2030. They are much broader in scope than the MDGs, encompassing 17 different goals and 169 different targets, and calling on all countries – be they upper, middle or low income – to make tangible improvements to the lives of their citizens. The goals encompass social, environmental and economic aspects. This is an ambitious agenda and the resources needed every year to achieve the SDGs are, according to the OECD, about ten times larger than current levels of ODA. An astonishing development is that on a global level Private Development Assistance, which is assistance undertaken by private actors (foundations, corporations, voluntary and non-profit organizations), provided at concessional financial terms where commodities and loans are concerned, now has reached a level roughly equivalent to net ODA (Desai 2015). Private commercial flows in the form of trade and investment as well as remittances have grown tremendously and have overtaken ODA in amount as well as importance for development in many countries. The private sector can be a powerful promoter of sustainable development. Companies provide jobs, infrastructure, innovation and social services. The public sector can leverage the private sector contribution, helping to manage risk and providing insights into effective policy and practice.4 In the future ODA is expected to be used strategically and “smartly” to make investment attractive in high-risk situations by spreading and sharing risk with private companies and by creating incentives. The measure of total official support for sustainable development (TOSSD) has been proposed to complement ODA as a measurement for wider support. According to the current working definition “TOSSD includes all officially-supported resource flows to promote sustainable development in developing countries and to support development enablers or address global challenges at regional or global levels.”5 The TOSSD concept first emerged in 2014 in the course of work undertaken by the OECD DAC to align its statistical system with today’s development finance landscape. Work to develop TOSSD has been carried out in close consultation with a wide variety of development stakeholders and actors, including civil society, government officials, the private sector, international experts and private citizens. An important new phase in developing TOSSD is beginning: while initial efforts have been led by the OECD DAC in order to maintain momentum, TOSSD work will now be taking place under the aegis of the UN and a proposal for a comprehensive TOSSD measurement and monitoring mechanism for endorsement is at present being developed.6 Another force to count on is that of the emerging donors, such as China (although not actually a new donor), that play an increasingly important role. According to the Japan International Cooperation Agency ( JICA), the Chinese foreign assistance budget is now the sixth largest in the world (Kitano and Harada 2014). Its growing foreign aid has been having a significant impact on the landscape of the global development community. Chinese foreign aid, with conditions and characteristics different than that of DAC donors, has become an alternative to existing aid. China is also taking initiatives on a multilateral level and has established, among other things, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which more than fifty other countries have joined. How this will affect existing institutions, including the WB, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), remains to be seen. China is not the only emerging (or rather non-DAC) donor. There are a number of others as well such as India, Brazil and South Africa, to mention a few. They all have their own conditions and characteristics for how aid is distributed. So what does all this imply for Japanese development cooperation? What we can understand from the formulations in the new Japanese Charter is that development cooperation to an even larger degree than before is likely to become a political tool serving Japan’s external as well as 307

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domestic political interests. In the Charter it is clearly stated that development cooperation should be dealt with in an all-of-government approach, not separated from other Japanese policies towards the developing countries. To a large extent the document reads like an extension of Abe politics both in the field of security and economics. This chapter will start with a short historical background of Japanese ODA before we move into the analyses of the 2015 Charter and the external as well as internal forces that were behind this Japanese reformulation of its policy. In conclusion, some of the implications of the new development policy for Japanese foreign policy will be presented.

Historical background In 2014, Japan celebrated the sixtieth anniversary of its ODA program (Kato, Page and Shimomura 2016). As the term ODA did not exist in 1954, one must assume that what was being referred to rather is the foreign aid or economic cooperation program. Up until 1958 the distinction was never made between “aid” and “economic cooperation,” a concept which includes official flows in general as well as private direct investment. In 1954 Japan became a donor by contributing US$50,000 to the Colombo Plan. Besides this, it is war reparations that are presented as the origin of “aid.” Burma received such reparations in 1954, the Philippines in 1956 and Indonesia in 1958. The reparations were mainly given to build up infrastructure damaged by the war. Money was tied and has been regarded as part of the promotion of exports from Japanese industry, as well as war reparations. Major government economic cooperation started with the yen loans of 1957, which came from the Export-Import Bank of Japan and were based on conditions that were too severe to qualify them as ODA within the present definition (So¨derberg 1996a: 31–50). Japan joined the OECD and provided its first grant aid in 1969, the same year as the DAC introduced the concept of ODA. During the 1960s, almost all Japanese aid was confined to Asia and overwhelmingly served commercial purposes. This changed with the oil crises of 1973. When the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) placed an oil embargo on the US and its allies that had supported Israel during the Yom Kippur War, a Japanese mission, endowed with a huge aid package, was sent out to placate Arab anger. Aid became politicized and a stable supply of natural resources became another motivation for Japanese aid policy. By the end of the 1970s Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) had two motives as justification for aid. One was that Japan should contribute to peace and stability in the world. As a country without military power, the only means to do this was through economic aid. The second motive was related to the first and had to do with Japan’s image as a country poor in natural resources. Trade was the means to obtain these resources and the building of infrastructure was a prerequisite for that trade. Thus, MOFA asserted that Japanese aid money should be spent on the building of infrastructure. Humanitarianism was not mentioned as a reason for aid until 1978 when MOFA announced it as one of five main considerations; the others being international economic security, Japan’s duty as an economic power, economic self-interest and what was called “normal diplomatic necessity” (So¨derberg 1996a: 31–50). In 1989, Japan became the world’s largest donor of ODA and, with the exception of one year, continued to be so during the coming decade. This made Japan appear to be a responsible country with a strong social conscience. A statistical analysis reveals another picture. Despite being the largest donor in absolute terms, Japanese ODA as a percentage of GNI was always well below the average of DAC countries. The large size of the aid budget was thus more a reflection of the size of the Japanese economy. Quality of aid, as measured by DAC solely in economic terms, which is by proportion of grant, had Japan at the bottom of the list, as most of the Japanese aid was loans. 308

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(So¨derberg 1996a: 31–50). Most of it went to Asia for the building of infrastructure in the form of roads, railways, ports and power plants. In addition, domestically, Japanese aid was not very popular with public opinion and often was criticized for not having a face, meaning that Japanese aid was invisible to the populations that were benefitting from it, as societies did not know that the infrastructure was being built with Japanese funding. Aid at the end of the 1980s was further justified through the concept of “burden sharing” (yakuwari buntan) with the US, according to which Japan should take greater responsibility in aid to compensate the US for its global security role (Islam 1991: 191–230). Aid was in this way used to fend off US demands for increased Japanese military spending. With the end of the Cold War this situation changed again. The need to contain the communist threat decreased and there was a whole range of new countries applying for Japanese aid. It was in this climate that Japan announced its first ODA Charter in 1992.

The First ODA Charter With this Charter, Japanese ODA became more politicized and more environmentally friendly. This followed the trend at the time. The Gulf crises had called attention to the question of armaments in developing countries, and in 1991 Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu announced four antimilitaristic principles for ODA which were further strengthened in the ODA Charter of 1992 (So¨derberg 1996b: 133–45):    

Environmental conservation and development should be pursued in tandem. Any use of ODA for military purposes or for aggravation of international conflicts should be avoided. Full attention should be given to recipient countries’ military expenditures, their development and production of mass destruction weapons and missiles, their export and import of arms. Full attention should be given to efforts for promoting democratization and the introduction of a market oriented economy, and the situation regarding the securing of basic human rights and freedoms in the recipient countries.

The First Charter was well received internationally but the characteristic of Japanese aid as well as the varied interests of the different bureaucratic actors involved made it difficult to implement. Policy in general was formulated as a result of pluralistic conflict and consensus building among four main bureaucratic actors that looked at ODA from different aspects. Ministry of Finance (MOF) (public finance and international monetary policy), MOFA (diplomacy and foreign policy), Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) (trade and the national economy) as well as the Economic Planning Agency (EPA) that was to coordinate and formulate the policies (Orr 1990). The building of a coal power plant in the Philippines in the 1990s (as well as many other infrastructure projects) was promoted by the MITI, but was hardly what the MOFA wanted as they tried to profile Japan as an environmentally friendly country (So¨derberg 1996a: 45–8). Japanese authorities claimed that it was trends in the fields of the principles that should be watched (So¨derberg 2001: 116–17) and care should be taken to ensure fair and non-arbitrary application, but there were basically only two ways to implement the Charter. If we take the situation regarding the securing of basic human rights as an example, development in line with that principle could either be promoted by aid or an increase of aid. In case of severe violation, aid could be cut or reduced. Examples of positive promotion included donor meetings, like the one arranged for Mongolia that at the time was moving in the direction of a more democratic society and market oriented 309

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economy; an international donor meeting for the rehabilitation of Cambodia; and reinitiated aid to both Vietnam and South Africa, which at the time were seen as moving in a more democratic direction. There were also efforts to assist five Central Asian Republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tadzhikistan) that seemed to be moving in the right direction. Seminars on democratization were held in Japan for people from Africa and Latin America but was not offered for Asia, as this was considered too sensitive. War memories were still lingering in Asia, and Japan did not want to intervene in domestic affairs which made implementation of the principles of democracy and human rights difficult. Examples of negative actions were Japan’s suspension of ODA to Sudan due to human rights violations in 1992, to Sierra Leone after the coup in 1992, and to Niger and Guatemala when their constitutions were partly suspended in 1993. China was a tricky case. Japan stopped aid in 1989 after the incident at Tiananmen Square (before the Charter was adopted), but Japan was also the first country to resume aid again. Aid picked up quickly and in 1993 China was the top recipient. The country was moving in the direction of a market economy, but military spending was increasing, human rights abuses occurred and China had continued its underground testing of nuclear weapons. In 1995, Japan decided to cut aid to China due to their nuclear policy, given strong public opinion within Japan against nuclear weapons. The cut was, however, only in grant assistance, which amounted to a mere 4% of total bilateral assistance. It did not have any effect on Chinese nuclear testing, which continued according to schedule. The loan aid for building infrastructure and promoting trade under the auspices of the MITI, MOF and EPA continued as usual. Both the positive and negative actions raised questions about Japanese aid under the 1992 Charter. The case of China raised the question of if Japan really was ready to use aid cuts as a foreign policy tool against its main Asian neighbors, as this might create repercussions in other fields such as trade and foreign direct investment (So¨derberg 2001: 114–29; Takamine 2006). Furthermore, certain characteristics of Japanese aid in the beginning of the 1990s (that it was request based, emphasized self-help and was mainly loan aid for economic infrastructure) acted as a hindrance for positive promotion of principles enshrined in the Charter. For example, could one expect authoritarian governments to request aid for promoting democracy (So¨derberg 1996b: 133–45)?

The Second ODA Charter Globalization, spurred by advances in information technology during the 1990s, accelerated economic integration and the rapid growth of some developing countries. As the flow of private capital increased, the gap between those that reaped its benefits and those that could not also increased. Recognizing this fact, the US increased its foreign aid after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001. Quickly following suit were the EU and several other donors. The MDGs and their promise to reduce poverty by half by 2015 was adopted by the UN and signed by more than 190 nations at the turn of the century. With this the international donor community seemed to be moving more towards a coordinated approach (Sunaga 2005). While the Japanese government was complacent about its role as the world’s biggest donor, the popularity of ODA was decreasing among the Japanese domestic population that were suffering protracted recession. The Japanese citizens had also become increasingly sensitive concerning their own security. This can partly be attributed to the threat from North Korea as well as the terrorist attack in the US and the battle against terrorism in the Iraq war. Nationalism had surfaced in particular in relation to China where the economy was rapidly growing. As Japan went into a prolonged recession in the 1990s, at the end of the decade the Liberal Democratic Party made administrative reforms a core part of its political reform. This opened up 310

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room for aid policy reforms as well. In 1999 the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund that dealt with the ODA loans was merged into JBIC ( Japan Bank of International Cooperation) that besides aid also provided other kinds of financing. In 2001 the MITI was merged with the EPA to form the Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry. In 2003 the legal status of the JICA changed so that it became semi-independent. The new chairperson, Sadako Ogata, started a thorough revision of the organization and in August 2003 the Japanese government revised the ODA Charter. The Second ODA Charter states that the objectives of Japanese ODA “are to contribute to peace and development of the international community and thereby to help ensure Japan’s own security and prosperity.” The first part of this sentence is in line with DACs overarching principle that ODA’s primary objective is promoting development and welfare. Reducing poverty and achieving the MDGs are the objective of all countries. At the same time peacebuilding is now seen as a prerequisite to reach those goals. The importance of security became evident in the 1990s when the DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development was formed producing guidelines for donors on these issues. In 2004 the Security System Reform was endorsed specifying a number of recommendations for actions in order to promote peace and security as fundamental pillars of development on both a personal and state level (So¨derberg 2010: 99–116). The second part of the sentence “to help ensure Japan’s own security and prosperity” clearly reflects Japan’s own national interest. This can be seen as a way to popularize ODA on the domestic scene, but also indicated the basic fact that Japan has always seen ODA as a two-way flow that should assist both donors and recipients. The Second ODA Charter also spells out a number of concepts and ideas that should be upheld, such as (1) supporting self-help efforts,7 (2) enhancing human security, (3) assuring fairness, (4) utilizing Japan’s experience and expertise, and (5) partnership and collaboration with the international community. In the 2003 Charter four priority issues were set out: poverty reduction, sustainable growth, addressing global issues, and peace building. In the new expanded priority for international cooperation adopted in 2007, there were some changes in the sense that poverty reduction was no longer mentioned as a priority issue, the fight against terrorism had been added to the part on peacebuilding and human security had become a priority issue of its own (So¨derberg 2010: 99–116). Japan followed the general worldwide trend with securitization of aid. In 2008 the New JICA was launched. JICA, which had been Japan’s main instrument for technical cooperation, took over the ODA loans (yen loans) traditionally provided by the JBIC and most of the grant aid provided by the MOFA. At the time it became the world’s largest aid agency for bilateral cooperation. This is the same set-up that exists today. While JICA is the executing agency that is responsible for ODA implementation, it is the MOFA that holds responsibility for policy formation. There are also some grants that the Ministry implement by themselves. Country Assistance Programs that explicitly set out priorities are drawn up for major recipient countries, and country-based ODA Task Forces that are made up of overseas diplomatic missions participate in the formulation of assistance policies like Country Assistance Programs and Rolling Plans. ODA Task Forces also including local officers of JICA, and other related agencies also hold policy consultations with the governments of developing countries and offer suggestions on possible collaborations. They review aid schemes and engage in the formation and selection of candidate assistance projects.

The 2015 Japanese Development Cooperation Charter In December 2014, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe won a two-third majority in the lower house election. This gave him carte blanche to continue his reform policy both in the field of security 311

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and economics. Especially in the field of security he had already undertaken sweeping reforms motivated by increased tension in Northeast Asia due to the rise of Chinese military power as well as North Korea’s continued development of nuclear arms. These changes would also spill over into the field of development cooperation.

The link between development and security In December 2013 Japan for the first time announced a National Security Strategy.8 This document also included some changes to the development cooperation policy. According to the Security Strategy, Japan should step up its activities and in the future make a “proactive contribution to peace,” which includes “strategic utilization of ODA.” The government led by Prime Minister Abe also inaugurated a National Security Council, which has a new secretariat in charge of planning and coordinating security issues including utilization of some of the ODA funds. Japan’s Security Strategy puts an emphasis on strengthening the US-Japan alliance. Here ODA has for a long time played a role as stated earlier. Already in the 1980s there was talk of burden sharing where the US was to take the military responsibility in wars and Japan would thereafter assist in peacebuilding by providing ODA (Yasutomo 1986). In the twenty-first century there have so far been two major interventions, both with strong US leadership, one in Iraq and one in Afghanistan. In 2005–6 Iraq became the top recipient of Japanese ODA, indicating that peacebuilding and the fight against terrorism were given considerable space within the budget. Japan was however not alone; nine other DAC countries also had Iraq as a top recipient. Japanese contribution was second only to the US. Concerning Afghanistan, Japan’s Self Defense Forces in 2001 conducted a refueling mission for US vessels (and later also allied naval vessels) conducting anti-terrorism activities outside Afghanistan in the Indian Ocean (Midford 2010: 46–67). Japan hosted the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan in 2002 and yet another donor conference in 2012. At first, Japanese ODA to Afghanistan was quite small in amount, but when the Self Defense Forces were withdrawn from refueling missions in 2009, Japan pledged US$5 billion in ODA to Afghanistan and became a major donor. Thus, using ODA for national defense purposes and as a tool for burden sharing with the US is actually not new although it has not been explicitly spelled out before. Another objective stated in Japan’s new National Security Strategy is to improve the security environment of the Asia Pacific region. North Korea with enhanced capability of Weapons of Mass Destruction, including nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, is seen as a threat. So is China’s rapid advance in military capability and intensified activities in various areas in the East China Sea, including the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands,9 as well as the Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone announced in November 2013. The South China Sea is deemed important, especially the sea-lanes that are vital for transportation of goods as well as bringing oil from the Middle East to Japan. As China is advancing its presence in the South China Sea, Japan has felt that it should cooperate with the ASEAN countries that also have territorial disputes with China to find legal solutions to those. Japan has been promoting multilateral regional security cooperation when it comes to maritime safety and anti-piracy activities. It has played a vital role in the formation of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery (RECAAP) through which information exchange is conducted regarding crimes at sea. Besides multilateral arrangements, Japan is also working bilaterally concerning maritime security with many of the ASEAN countries. Here ODA packages are part of the deal. In 2006 Japan announced that it would provide Indonesia with three patrol boats financed through ODA. Although officials in charge of ODA were averse, aid has gradually been used more often for ‘non-traditional’ security issues such as anti-terrorism and 312

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piracy. Labeled law enforcement issues, these ‘grey zones’ became eligible for Japanese ODA (Pajon 2013: 5). The Japanese Coast Guard has, through aid money, provided education and training on anti-piracy for Southeast Asian countries and, in 2013, the Philippine Coast Guard was promised ten patrol boats financed by Japanese ODA. This kind of assistance has become an important tool in the Japanese balancing strategy towards China. It assists the countries to build capacity to defend themselves but also to create a network of security partners among maritime countries facing China and is partly made to make up for relative US decline. It is no coincidence that three of Japan’s top four recipients of ODA (Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines) have territorial conflicts with China (Asplund 2017). Although the patrol boats are meant for anti-piracy and safety of navigation and not for challenging other states on territorial issues, it still sends a political signal. The impetus given to ‘strategic use’ of ODA in Japan’s new National Security Strategy makes it likely that we will see more of this kind of aid in the future. Since the 2015 reinterpretation of paragraph 9 in the constitution which now allows Japan to participate in collective defense if vital Japanese interests are threatened, this is no longer a grey zone either. Strategic use of ODA has an old history and can be seen in Japanese relations with Myanmar (which today is one of the top ten recipients of Japanese ODA). Except for some humanitarian assistance, Japanese ODA, as well as that from many other DAC donors, was suspended when a new junta grasped power in 1988, but after a few months the Japanese one started again. From 1997 the Japanese government started to behave somewhat more proactively towards what was labeled the “Myanmar problem.” The US and many western countries have imposed sanctions to protest against severe human rights abuses. This increased the space of influence for China that provided a huge amount of foreign aid. After the Depayin incident in 2003 when Aung San Suu Kyi and her followers were attacked by a gang armed with bamboo staves and swords and as many as seventy or eighty persons were killed, Japan froze ODA again. The Myanmar regime held general elections in November 2010 with 25% of the seats reserved for the armed forces (Gaens 2013). Shortly afterwards a number of military officers took off their uniforms and formed a nominally civilian government. Since 2011 Japan has been acting proactively and in fact has taken a leadership role in preparing for other donors to enter Myanmar again. It has been helping the country to clear old payment arrears necessary to be able to be eligible for foreign aid again. This was done in a series of operations in which the Japanese government played a major role. At the time of President Thein Sein’s visit to Tokyo in April 2012, debt cancellation and a rescheduling of Japanese loans of a total amount of 50 billion yen ($600 million) were announced. In November 2012 then Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda pledged a new loan package of roughly $600 million. It is not only Japan that is going back to Myanmar. In April 2012 the EU opened a representative office, and a year later it lifted all its punitive restrictions except for an arms embargo, citing Myanmar’s “remarkable process of reform.”10 In November 2012 US President Barack Obama paid a visit as well. In January 2013 Myanmar’s arrears to the WB and the ADB were also cleared through bridging loans of $900 million from the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (Rieffel and Fox 2013: 46–7). The Development Cooperation Charter states that Japan will uphold its policy of avoiding any use of development cooperation for military purposes or for aggravation of international conflicts.11 But to maximize effective implementation, Japan will continue to promote coordination with UN peacekeeping operations. One of the most recent examples of that is South Sudan to where Japan has sent engineering troops to assist under a UN peacekeeping mission. The engineering contingent launched the ODA financed Sakura project to help students’ development training in automotive repair and maintenance. 313

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The link between development cooperation and Abenomics In Japan there is a strong belief in development through industrialization. This is the path Japan itself has taken since its opening up during the Meiji period at the end of the nineteenth century and when it made an economic resurgence after WWII. When foreign aid was initiated as war reparations, it was, besides serving the recipient countries, also to assist the comeback of Japanese companies. The concept of foreign aid was often used interchangeably with the concept of economic cooperation, which also implied that this was a two-way trade where both the developing countries and the Japanese economy (as well as Japanese companies) should profit. This belief in development through industrialization can be seen in the characteristics of Japanese foreign aid to Southeast Asia during the 1970s–1990s. More than any other donor, Japanese ODA had (and still has) a strong emphasis on so-called economic infrastructure, which is the building of roads, bridges, railways, power plants, ports, etc., all necessary prerequisites for industrialization. Most of these were financed by loan aid rather than grants and are now being paid back by the countries in Southeast Asia as well as by China. Japanese industry, that during this period went through several stages of increased foreign direct investment, also profited by the improved infrastructure that made it possible for them to establish production in Southeast Asia. The appreciation of the yen after the 1985 Plaza Accord meant increased wages and production costs in Japan. This, as well as the opening up of the Chinese market, led Japanese industry to establish even more production sites abroad. The large manufacturing companies played a central role throughout this period. Following the 2008 financial crisis, there is also an increasing number of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that have established overseas production bases independent of large parent companies. Another reason for recent increase in outward Japanese FDI into Southeast Asia is that some companies want to avoid the risk of being too dependent on production in China and therefore pursue a strategy of “China plus one.”12 Japan has provided East Asia with cooperation that combines trade, investment and ODA. This mix has been seen as the Japanese ODA Model (Ohno 2017). When the Liberal Democratic Party came to power at the end of 2012, Prime Minister Abe launched a new economic strategy, the so-called “Abenomics.” This economic strategy ( Japan Revitalization Strategy: Japan is Back)13 is aiming at increasing economic growth in a stagnant Japanese economy. Besides the three arrows of Abenomics (expansive monetary policy, increased fiscal spending and structural reforms), the strategy also included a global outreach action plan and set specific numerical targets for infrastructure exports and the overseas expansion of SMEs and leading medium-sized enterprises. It also envisages “the strategic use of economic cooperation.” The new Development Cooperation Charter of 2015 makes it clear that Japanese ODA should not only be beneficial for developing countries but also for Japanese companies. There are a number of new schemes for public/private cooperation that are financed by ODA funds (Ohno 2017). Many Japanese SMEs are now trying to establish themselves in developing countries, with the assistance of these schemes. However, having healthy economic growth, in particular in Southeast Asia, is deemed important not only to create markets and production sites for Japanese companies, but also to create strong and resilient countries that can act independently and not be intimidated by other big powers in the area.

The diplomatic link ODA has always been a good tool to create friends among developing countries. It is government-to-government assistance and as such has given Japan access to both high level bureaucrats 314

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and politicians and opened up for influencing decisionmakers both in the immediate neighborhood as well as in international organizations. At the beginning of the 1970s, when Japanese companies started their first investment boom in Southeast Asia, they were not sensitive enough to workers’ conditions and environmental issues. The memories from WWII were also very much alive among part of the recipient population. When the Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka made a tour in Southeast Asia in 1974, he was met by a protest storm in several countries and demonstrators throwing eggs at him. Something had to be done about the situation and that was why Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda in 1977 in a speech in Manila in the Philippines announced a new Japanese policy towards Southeast Asia that was later labeled “the Fukuda doctrine.” Fukuda said that Japan had no intention of becoming a military threat to anyone in the area and was aiming for an equal partnership with the Southeast Asian countries. Japan wanted to establish a “heart to heart” relationship with them. The end of the 1970s was also the time when the first of a number of aid doubling plans were presented by Japan. Most of the ODA went to Southeast Asia during the 1980s and 1990s, and Japanese prime ministers often used so-called “gift-giving diplomacy” (omiyage gaiko) during their visits bringing with them all kinds of aid packages. Africa also received its share of Japanese foreign aid. In 1993 the first Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), to promote high level dialogue between African leaders and development partners, was held. Since then a number of TICAD conferences have been held and nowadays various UN organizations are also co-hosting. In 2016 the conference itself was, for the first time, held in Africa. Since 2000 there is also the Forum on China Africa Cooperation which has stepped up development activities between China and Africa. With increased economic growth in Africa, Japanese as well as other countries’ interests in the continent have also grown. Besides this, the continent is important for Japan in another way as well; there are many African states, which means they have a large number of votes when it comes to electing non-permanent members of the UN Security Council. Japan is the country that has held a non-permanent seat more often than anyone else. It is the second largest contributor to the UN budget and has for years been pushing for a change in the structure of the Security Council so that the number of permanent members could be increased. Japan itself is aiming for such a seat and wants more influence in the organization.

Conclusion Since its initiation, ODA has been an important multipurpose political tool for Japan. How it has been used has varied over time and has been dependent on changes in the external environment as well as domestic politics. Still it has always been different from that of any other donor and has had some definite ‘Japanese’ characteristics such as a heavy emphasis on loan aid, a focus on economic infrastructure and a geographical emphasis on Asia. The 2015 Development Cooperation Charter outlines the road ahead for Japanese foreign aid. Avoiding ODA in the title means that Japan now feels free to go outside the limited definition of foreign aid that was set by DAC. As a matter of fact, DAC itself has started a process to redefine the concept. With the UN SDGs, development cooperation is changing and new ways of measuring it are needed. One new initiative that was started by DAC but has now been overtaken by the UN is the so-called TOSSD, which will measure total support for sustainable development. This is in line with the new broader goals now set by the UN. These call on all countries to contribute and will lead to a greater variety of development cooperation efforts, which gives more freedom for Japan to cooperate with other emerging donors and not only DAC. 315

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The Charter states that a more strategic approach shall be taken. Quality growth is the first priority and poverty should be reduced through such growth. Japanese national interests should also be considered, and there should be further cooperation between the public and private sectors in development. Development cooperation can be used to create economic growth in developing countries and at the same time also support Japanese companies. Asia is a region that has a close relationship with Japan and high relevance to its security and prosperity, the Development Cooperation Charter states. This indicates that there will be a continued emphasis on this area in development policy, although parts of the region have become quite wealthy and are actually not eligible for ODA any longer. Japan will focus on ASEAN and continue its assistance to countries that have already achieved a certain level of economic growth to keep them from being caught in the “middle income trap.” In the Charter it states that development cooperation should be used to make a “proactive contribution to peace.” Such cooperation will also lead to ensuring Japan’s national interests such as maintaining its own peace and security. Development cooperation shall be pursued bearing Japan’s National Security Strategy in mind. For Japanese foreign policy this means that Japanese development cooperation now has become an even stronger tool that can be used with great variety depending on both internal and external factors as well as the interplay between the two. The new whole of government approach envisioned in the Charter is in the long run likely to make development cooperation an integrated part of a more coherent Japanese foreign policy.

Notes 1 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/975081468244550798/Main-report (accessed 11 February 2017). 2 Paragraph nine of the constitution reads: “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounces war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.” 3 https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/?page=view&nr=1021&type=230&menu=2059 (accessed 11 August 2016). 4 www.oecd.org/dac/development-co-operation-report-20747721.htm (accessed 31 January 2017). 5 www.oecd.org/dac/development-co-operation-report-20747721.htm (accessed 31 January 2017). 6 www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/TOSSD% 20Flyer%20crops.pdf (accessed 31 January 2017). 7 Meaning that the recipient countries should be in the driver’s seat of their own development and that Japan only should have a supporting role. 8 www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/131217anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf (accessed 11 August 2016). 9 Japan controls these islands today but China also has territorial claims here. 10 www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-24/u-s-moves-to-boost-myanmar-trade-ties-after-eu-liftssanctions.html (accessed 28 April 2013). 11 The patrol boats in Southeast Asia were given to the coast guards not the military. 12 Manufacturing capacity is diversified beyond China usually to countries in Southeast Asia. 13 www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/keizaisaisei/pdf/en_saikou_jpn_hon.pdf (accessed 3 December 2017).

References Asplund, A. (2017) ‘Aligning Policy with Practice: Japanese ODA and Normative Values’, in A. Asplund and M. So¨derberg (eds), Japanese Development Cooperation, The Making of an Aid Architecture Pivoting to Asia, London and New York: Routledge, 41–56. Desai, R. (2015) Private Aid and the Financing of Development, a talk given at Stockholm School of Economics Development Day, 11 May, www.hhs.se/en/about-us/news/site-publications/2015/finance-for-sustainable-development–conference-highlights-and-speakers-presentations/ accessed 18 May 2015.

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Gaens, B. (2013) ‘Political change in Myanmar: Filtering the Murky Waters of “Disciplined Democracy”’, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, FIIA Working Paper. Islam, S. (1991) ‘Beyond Burden Sharing: Economics and Politics of Japanese Foreign Aid’, in S. Islam (ed.), Yen for Development: Japanese Foreign Aid and the Politics of Burden-sharing, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 191–230. Kato, H., Page, J. and Shimomura, Y. (2016) Japan’s Development Assistance, Foreign Aid and the Post-2015 Agenda, Basingstoke, UK and New York: Palgrave. Kitano, N. and Harada, Y. (2014) ‘Estimating China’s Foreign Aid 2001–2013’, Tokyo: JICA-RI Working paper http://jica-ri.jica.go.jp/publication/assets/JICA-RI_WP_No.78_2014.pdf accessed 10 August 2016. Midford, P. (2010) ‘Japan: Balancing between a Hegemon and a Would Be Hegemon’, in M. So¨derberg and P. A. Nelson (eds), Japan’s Politics and Economy; Perspectives on Change, London and New York: Routledge. Ohno, I. (2017) ‘Network-based Development Cooperation as a Way Forward for Japan’, in A. Asplund and M. So¨derberg (eds), Japanese Development Cooperation, the Making of an Aid Architecture Pivoting to Asia, London and New York: Routledge, 159–76. Orr, R. M. (1990) The Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid Power, New York: Columbia University Press. Pajon, C. (2013) ‘Japan’s “Smart” Strategic Engagement in Southeast Asia’, Conference paper presented at The Asean Forum, 6 December www.theasanforum.org/japans-smart-strategic-engagement-insoutheast-asia/ accessed 11 August 2016. Rieffel, L. and Fox, J. (2013) ‘Too Much Too Soon: The Dilemma of Foreign Aid to Myanmar/Burma’, Report, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. So¨derberg, M. (1996a) The Business of Japanese Foreign Aid: Five Case Studies from Asia, London: Routledge. So¨derberg, M. (1996b) ‘Japanese Aid as a Foreign Policy Tool’, in B. Edstro¨m (ed.), Japan’s Foreign and Security Policies in Transition, Stockholm: Swedish Institute of International Affairs (Utrikespolitiska institutet), 133–45. So¨derberg, M. (2001) ‘The Role of ODA in the Relationship’, in M. So¨derberg (ed.), Chinese-Japanese Relations in the Twenty-first Century, London: Routledge, 114–29. So¨derberg, M. (2010) ‘Foreign Aid as Tool for Peace Building’, in M. So¨derberg and P. A. Nelson (eds), Japan’s Politics and Economy: Perspectives on Change, Routledge: London, 99–116. Sunaga, K. (2005) ‘The Reshaping of Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) Charter’, Discussion Paper No. 36, Discussion Paper Series, APEC Study Center, Columbia University. Takamine, T. (2006) Japan’s Development Aid to China: The Long-running Foreign Policy of Engagement, London: Routledge. Yasutomo, D. T. (1986) The Manner of Giving: Strategic Aid and Japanese Foreign Policy, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.

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Part V

International norms and global civil society

20 Japan as a norm entrepreneur for human security Kaoru Kurusu

Introduction Since the late 1990s, Japan has incorporated the concept of human security into its international cooperation policy. The subjects of the human security approach are individuals, and its end goal is to protect people from traditional military threats as well as nontraditional threats such as poverty and disease (Gregoratti 2013). The idea of human security is supported by all the main political parties in Japan, enabling it to survive frequent changes in administration.1 It is now one of the established guiding principles of Japan’s foreign policy. This is sustained through the institutionalization of human security: for instance, in the revision of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) Charter in 2003, human security formally became a key principle for guiding Japan’s ODA policy. As a recent example, several months after the Great East Japan Earthquake of March 11, 2011, Japan presented the first guideline for its humanitarian activities, the “Humanitarian Aid Policy,” which was filled with human security ideals. Japan’s consistency in maintaining human security as a foreign policy concept is key, especially when compared with the case of Canada, which abandoned this policy once conservatives assumed power in 2006. After establishing the concept of human security as one of its international policy pillars, Japan began to take the lead in refining the concept of human security globally. Perhaps most notably, it initiated norm diffusion in the UN General Assembly, whose member states adopted a resolution on human security by consensus in 2012. This chapter will deal with Japan’s proactive role in human security, focusing especially on the norm-diffusion process. Why and how has Japan been involved in creating and disseminating a global normative idea of human security? What are the constraints on Japanese policy elites in promoting the idea of human security? To answer these questions, we will examine Japan’s role on the path leading to the adoption of the UNGA’s two human security resolutions, from the creation of the Commission on Human Security (CHS), to the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, to the creation of the “Friends of Human Security.” We will explore Japan’s successes and failures as a new norm entrepreneur in the international realm on the concept of human security. There have been several previous studies on Japan’s incorporation of human security into its foreign policy (Gilson and Purvis 2003; Soeya 2005; Edstrom 2008; Tan 2010; Kurusu 2011). Some studies have conducted comparative analyses of the cases of Canada and Japan (Bosold and Werthes 2005; Fukushima 2010). However, besides those by the Japan Center for International 321

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Exchange, there have been only a limited number of studies on the actual implementation of human security that deserve attention (JCIE 2004; Hubbard and Suzuki 2008). Such studies have analyzed the effectiveness of projects implemented, for example, by the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS). This chapter will instead demonstrate Japan’s involvement in the norm-diffusion process, to which few researchers have paid serious attention to date.2 Japan, as a “norm entrepreneur” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), strategically promoted the idea of human security among the United Nations member states by creating a network among likeminded states as well as persuading skeptical developing countries. I argue in the following sections that the concept of human security probably would not have been accepted in the United Nations if not for the leadership of Japan in promoting the concept. Thus this is a rare example of successful norm diffusion led by Japan. Japan was able to pursue this because of the support of domestic foreign policy elites for the concept and its related initiatives. It sought to utilize this concept partly because it wished to “frame” an expanded area of international cooperation in the post-Cold War era as its economic power became reduced. Japan was also working in this area because it was pursuing an intellectual leadership role. The dissemination of the concept of human security was influenced by Japan’s other goals in the international realm, such as securing a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC). However, in the end, the challenges of negotiating with actors with different views and without Japan having a preexisting institutional framework or network for multilateral negotiation meant that the concept of human security as originally envisioned by Japan was somewhat lost.

Change and expansion in Japan’s international cooperation policy tools in the post-Cold War era Japan’s emphasis on human security since the late 1990s was never isolated from the broader setting of its policy on international cooperation. With its economic success in the post-war era on the one hand, and its unique institutional constraints on military capability under Article Nine of the constitution on the other, Japan has been characterized as an “economic power” with limited military capability. Manifesting such characteristics of power resources, in comparison to the fully fledged Western great powers, its international cooperation policy relied heavily on ODA yen loans to developing countries, at least until the end of the Cold War. In international cooperation, however, Japan has gradually expanded its scope of policy tools since the 1990s. As an example of these changes, Japan enacted the International Peace Cooperation Law in 1992, which enabled the Self Defense Forces to participate in UN-led peacekeeping activities. Japanese policy elites began to demand a greater contribution to peacebuilding3 in post-conflict societies (Advisory Group on International Cooperation for Peace 2002). By the beginning of the 2000s, peacebuilding had become an important international cooperation policy concept, and Japanese experts were sent to Cambodia, East Timor, Afghanistan, and many other countries. In addition, the experience of the Hanshin Awaji Great Earthquake in 1995 led Japan to play a more active role in humanitarian activities, especially in prevention of and response to natural disasters. Still, Japan most clearly expressed its position as the second largest economic power in the world through its ODA, with a peak in 1997. However, as Japan’s economic power declined, the government began to face increasing criticism, both domestically and internationally, on the meaning and disbursement of its ODA, and had to think more deeply about how it was engaging in and articulating that engagement in international cooperation. The concept of human security was introduced into Japan’s foreign policy lexicon around this period, with the aim of giving Japan’s international cooperation a coherent direction and meaning. Japan rebranded its ODA policy under the rubric of human security, providing concrete guidelines 322

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for project implementation (such as targeting the most vulnerable, protection, and empowerment) and providing a fund for implementing human security. Additionally, having developed a wider range of tools, including economic and technical assistance, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and (later) disaster prevention and relief at hand, Japanese foreign policy elites considered that a “human-centered approach” or “human security” could be utilized to show a more active posture of international involvement. Japan has also begun to recognize that it must play a more proactive role in global norm creation and dissemination, which is a relatively new policy agenda for Japan. Japan has tried to take the initiative in refining and disseminating this concept globally, exerting its intellectual and entrepreneurial leadership; this will be the main focus of this chapter.

Japan’s initial decision to incorporate human security into its foreign policy Although Japanese policymakers sporadically referred to the concept of human security after its mention in the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)’s Human Development Report of 1994, it was Foreign Minister (1997–8) and later Prime Minister (1998–2000) Keizo Obuchi (Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)) who decided to formally incorporate human security into Japan’s foreign policy. In 1997 and 1998, Japan formulated a policy toward Asian societies gravely affected by the financial crisis based on this concept. Concrete policies taken by the Japanese government included empowering the most vulnerable and establishing safety nets for those affected by the IMF’s structural adjustment program (Takemi 2008; Kurusu 2011). Obuchi, the then Foreign Minister, advised by his personal and informal brain trust4 on the idea of human security through a series of intensive meetings, officially used human security as a foreign policy concept for the first time in 1998. This was intended to frame these responses by the Japanese government. His brain trust persuaded him that Japan should assume the role of global intellectual leadership by advocating the concept of human security (Yamamoto 2008; Kurusu 2011). Furthermore, Obuchi, with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, established the UNTFHS to support damaged societies in Asia. UNTFHS is a trust fund established by the United Nations in 1999 through a Japanese government initiative; it is to be used for human security projects. It was soon to expand its scope globally.

Refining the human security concept by establishing the commission After the introduction of human security as a foreign policy idea in the late 1990s, based mainly on the advice of Obuchi’s brain trust and its expanded network of transnational experts,5 the Japanese government took the initiative to refine the idea, with the goal of universal acceptance. The first step was to establish an independent international commission to discuss and define the concept of human security. Here Japan’s role was not to create a new norm, but rather to referee existing different and contested perspectives and thus to refine the term. There were different and contested perspectives on what human security actually meant. For example, the Canadian government’s human security policy prioritized issues of freedom from fear, especially the responsibility to protect. At Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy’s initiative, the Canadian government held that international society should take decisive action, including military intervention, in the case of serious human rights violations such as genocide and ethnic cleansing. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty was established by the Canadian government, and it issued a final report in 2001 on this theme (ICISS 2001). However, some developing countries preferred to focus on the freedom from want. A CHS would be able to consider these various elements of human security more holistically and possibly integrate them.

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From Japan’s perspective, the creation of an international commission was crucial for two reasons (Kurusu 2011). First, the concept of human security was still too vague to create the common ground that would be necessary to use it as a policy guideline for international cooperation. Second, the Japanese government was concerned about the sensitivity of developing countries to sovereignty and the view that developed countries would be imposing ideas of human security on developing countries. Furthermore, some members of the brain trust felt that Japan would be able to impact global agenda setting through this commission. Therefore, at the Millennium Summit meeting of the UN General Assembly in 2000, the Japanese government submitted a proposal to create an international commission. The CHS was first convened in 2001 and was chaired by Sadako Ogata, who had field experience through her UNHCR role, and Amartya Sen, a recipient of the Nobel Prize for Economics. The commission was comprised of such prominent experts as former Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan and Lakhdar Brahimi, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Afghanistan. In May 2003, the commission submitted its report, Human Security Now, to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. This thick report clarified the fundamental approaches to be taken by donors as well as developing countries for the improvement of human security. Such approaches included the necessity of placing people at the center of security; targeting the most vulnerable as a focal point of policy; and using both protection and empowerment as complementary methods. The report encompassed a wide range of issues, covering freedom from fear and freedom from want; however, it remained ambiguous on the utility of military intervention for humanitarian purposes (Kurusu 2011).

Japan as a “norm entrepreneur”: promoting human security in the UNGA6 During the initial phase, as Japan was introducing the idea of human security and later establishing the CHS, the brain trust of Prime Minister Obuchi served as the key promoter of human security. However, after the death of Obuchi, who himself strongly believed in the idea and was a steady promoter, the involvement of high-ranking Japanese politicians quickly decreased. The main advocates of the idea of human security became the officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After CHS’s publication of its human security report, Japan’s foreign ministry began to promote the concept through regional fora such as APEC and in the UNGA. Japan publicized the idea of human security as a core and official idea for guiding UN practice. The negotiation leading up to the adoption of the World Summit Outcome Document in September 2005 was crucial in this regard. Experiences through dissemination activities there and discussion in informal fora later served as gradual education for foreign ministry officials, which influenced subsequent dissemination in Japan.

Negotiating the 2005 World Summit Outcome In September 2005 the World Summit was convened as a follow-up to the 2000 United Nations Millennium Summit; 2005 also marked sixty years since the UN’s establishment. It was expected that the head of member states would meet to discuss progress on the Millennium Development Goals and issues such as possible UN reform. Member states were expected to endorse a document called “World Summit Outcome,” which would cover a range of intergovernmental agreements on development, security, human rights, and reform of the United Nations (General Assembly of the United Nations 2005). 324

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Incorporating human security into the Outcome Document was considered by the foreign ministry to be an essential step for disseminating the idea of human security in the UN. Japan’s stance was clarified in a speech in 2005 by the Japanese Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador Kenzo Oshima. He strongly supported the idea presented by the Report of the Secretary-General (SG), In Larger Freedom, saying that its core message was to demonstrate the interlinking of the core elements of human security, which are “development, security, and human rights” (Oshima 2005). With regard to the issue of responsibility to protect (R2P), he said that although the more than ten years of experience after the end of the Cold War had shown that the international community must cope with R2P, Japan intended to stress the importance of the efforts of the international community to introduce preventive measures short of the use of force.

Japan’s diplomatic maneuver in the Mexico Friends Group: delinking R2P from the concept of human security Attempting to introduce a paragraph on human security into the Outcome Document, Japan’s foreign ministry sought to collaborate with a group of small and medium-sized countries of diverse regional and developmental backgrounds, the Group of Friends for the United Nations Reform (Mexico Friends Group (MFG)).7 This ad hoc group held informal ambassadorial meetings for the purpose of discussing matters of UN reform and submitting proposals. Cooperating with the governments of Mexico and Chile, Japan as a norm entrepreneur succeeded in gaining the rough support of the members of MFG in drafting a paragraph on human security. Since there were still UN member states that feared that the notion of human security would allow more intervention into state sovereignty, the foreign ministry intended to form a core group in MFG to expand support for human security. Japan’s foreign ministry devised an informal document that would explain the difference between the two interrelated concepts of human security and responsibility to protect. The paper stated that genocides or massive violations of human rights in a sovereign state are extreme cases, and the international community must use all means to prevent and stop them, including, where necessary, as a measure of last resort, the use of military force. Meanwhile, the paper went on to assert that the concept of human security attaches more importance to the prevention of the occurrence of such crises through the protection and empowerment of people. More attention should be paid to planning and strengthening national and international capacity for prevention of outbreaks of genocide and mass killings. Thus human security was conceptualized to clarify the roles of national authorities and the international community in enhancing the protection of individuals. While the foreign ministry of Japan did not oppose the idea of R2P, they cautiously crafted draft paragraphs in which the expressions human security and R2P were written separately. With the support of Chile and Mexico, Japan prepared a joint paper, and these three countries persuaded other members to support the notion of human security. The Ambassador in Charge of Human Security, Kinichi Komano, then attended the Human Security Network (HSN) ministerial meeting in Ottawa to promote Japan’s conception of human security directly to the foreign ministers of the members of HSN and to promote understanding and cooperation between Japan and the members of HSN (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2016; Shinyo 2008). The HSN is a multilateral group of states that seek to promote human security as part of foreign policy. At this meeting, Komano stated that the use of force in reaction to the most serious humanitarian crises should not be understood as a measure for human security, but rather conceptualized as the realization of R2P (Komano 2005). 325

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Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC and its effect on the promotion of human security It was also in 2005 that Japan made its biggest push for securing a permanent seat on the UNSC. Although Japan championed human security due to its own belief in its utility and importance, the way in which it strategically sought to promote this norm related to its other goal (and real priority in 2005) of becoming a permanent member of the UNSC. In the early phase of Japan’s dissemination effort in the GA, in 2005, Japanese politicians made statements implicitly linking human security with the issue of a permanent seat at the UNSC. For example, speeches in Diet sessions in January 2005 show an interesting association between human security and Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (LDP) asserted, “While striving for a permanent seat at the UNSC, Japan will continue to bring the importance of the idea [of human security] to the attention of the international community” (Koizumi 2005). Takenori Kanzaki, the head of LDP’s coalition partner New Komeito Party, stated: Japan’s quest for a permanent seat on the UNSC should not be conducted out of expectation of an international position and honor. But Japan should become a permanent member of the SC in order to contribute more in the field of human security. (Kanzaki 2005) Perhaps at this moment these were simply two goals that Japan had at the same time and their link was not intentional. We should not conclude from this language that the promotion of human security by the Japanese government arose from bare national interest. Rather, Japanese policy elites recognized human security as an important concept in international cooperation, and, in this context, the utility of human security is referred to in connection with Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC. However, as the actual negotiation processes progressed, and the seriousness of Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC increased, becoming its first priority, the promotion of human security and the bid for a permanent seat were intentionally and tactically separated from each other, at least at the level of the negotiators in the foreign ministry. Since there were unresolved disagreements over the concept of human security, including the use of force in the case of humanitarian crises, and some developing countries continued to skeptically associate human security with R2P, the foreign ministry later came to consider that it was better not to link the two agendas (Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC and the promotion of human security), so as to secure the ultimate goal of acquiring a permanent seat (Tsuruoka 2008). In the end, in the summer of 2005, the so-called Group of Four (G4) was formed by India, Brazil, Germany, and Japan, all of whom were demanding permanent seats at the UNSC. On July 6, the G4 proposal was submitted to the UN Secretariat, and GA meetings were held over this issue. In early August, however, it was reported that the governments of China and the US would not support the G4 proposal. During the rest of August, the Japanese government made lastminute attempts to formulate several compromise proposals, though they were in vain. Even after the G4 plan finally failed, before the GA Summit meeting in September, Japan continued its effort to promote human security in the GA.

General Assembly meetings The joint paper on human security, authored by Japan, Mexico, and Chile, with the support of the MFG, was submitted to the SG in the preparatory phase and distributed to member states. 326

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Although the Canadian government also participated in this coordination, it did not co-sponsor the proposal. The main reason for this is that the joint paper defined human security and R2P as different concepts, but the Canadian perspective did not share this point of view. The draft proposal of the World Summit Outcome document was prepared by the staff of the UN Secretariat under the instruction of SG Annan. The Japanese permanent mission succeeded in including the human security paragraph in the first draft as an independent paragraph (General Assembly President of the United Nations 2005). Despite the fact that human security was introduced in the first draft proposal, it was unclear whether the language would survive the multilateral negotiation processes inherent in drafting. The draft proposals underwent frequent revisions, in which language was corrected, replaced, and even erased. Some member states remained suspicious of the concept of human security, owing mainly to their concerns over humanitarian intervention. The Cuban representative frequently asserted that human security was not suitable for the Outcome Document, since it lacked a concrete definition. In fact, Cuba demanded the deletion of all paragraphs on human security and R2P. The representative of Brazil also disapproved of the inclusion of a paragraph on human security in the Outcome Document, claiming that the introduction of the concept of human security would confuse issues of human rights and security. Malaysia, speaking for neutral and non-aligned members, said that the GA should further discuss the concepts of R2P and human security, which had not gained adequate consensus. Several member states, including the representatives of Brazil and Pakistan, stressed that, while not denying the need for the protection of civilians, the concept of R2P should pay due consideration to state sovereignty, which should be limited to “threats to international peace and security,” situations that fall under the UNSC’s auspices. On the other hand, the representatives of Switzerland and Argentina expressed clear support for the paragraph on human security. Western governments and some Latin American governments, such as Argentina and Peru, indicated strong support for R2P. In this way, the diversity of opinion led to significant discussion and debate over what could and should be included in the final document. In the end, the World Summit Outcome, adopted by heads of states on September 15, included R2P in paragraphs 138 through 140. After two paragraphs on children’s rights, human security was introduced as an independent item in paragraph 143: We stress the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. We recognize that all individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential. To this end, we commit ourselves to discussing and defining the notion of human security in the General Assembly. (General Assembly of the United Nations 2005) In recapitulation of the negotiations in the GA over the Outcome Document in 2005, the concept of R2P drew the attention of member states. In addition to Canada and Australia, European states and some Latin American states supported the idea, whereas it met with obstinate opposition or lack of sympathy among other member states, including the US (Bolton 2007: 202). The reasons for opposition were diverse, but essentially R2P was seen to challenge the fundamental principle of sovereignty and potentially affect UN practices of the use of enforcement in cases of humanitarian crisis. In comparison to R2P, the debate over human security focused on its definitional vagueness, and it should be noted that, despite efforts by Japan, Mexico, and Chile to clarify the difference between the two concepts in the paper, persistent criticisms equated human security with R2P. 327

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In sum, through the establishment of the CHS, the Japanese government tried to create a comprehensive norm by integrating freedom from fear and freedom from want. This created a situation in which Japan was confronted more directly with the issue of freedom from fear. Japan was forced to clarify its stance toward R2P continuously in the preparatory phase of negotiation over the Outcome Document. Japan supported the idea of R2P in the most serious cases of massive violations of human rights substantiated by UNSC resolutions, as is consistent with existing international law. However, Japan’s foreign ministry held that R2P should not be included in the concept of human security. Japan carefully intended to avoid being seen as seeking to intervene in other states. Japan did this with the intention of gaining further support from developing countries in its propagation of human security and because nonintervention has been a long-standing principle of international cooperation for Japan in the post-WWII era.

Further dissemination through networking: the “Friends of Human Security” The Outcome Document was adopted as a package of various issues, and so the inclusion of human security does not mean that it was firmly established. A significant number of countries remained skeptical of the concept. Consensus was far from being reached. This is supported by the inclusion of a sentence in paragraph 143 indicating that human security was a matter that needed further discussion. From the perspective of the Japanese foreign ministry, the paragraph lacked much of the substance it sought to include on the actual implementation of human security. Three important changes after 2005 deserve attention. First, even if it was not legally binding, the inclusion of paragraph 143 on human security in the Outcome Document was relatively important. This document was adopted by heads of state and would serve as a reference point for the normative development of human security. Second, in disseminating the concept of human security in the UN, the Japanese government strategically took advantage of ties established with other states during the 2005 negotiations, especially those with Mexico and Chile. Japan’s foreign ministry officials began to recognize the utility of networking in a multilateral forum. Third, in February 2006, the Conservative Party assumed power in Canada and emphasized its ties of alliance with the US. Subsequently, Canada rapidly lost interest in human security issues, losing hold of the HSN. The Japanese foreign ministry and its Permanent Mission to the UN took advantage of this to exert its influence over the HSN. An October 2006 statement by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (LDP) in a Diet session articulated Japanese government’s policy objective of mainstreaming human security in the UN (Abe 2006). Under the UN framework, Japan’s foreign ministry launched an ad hoc coalition of states called the “Friends of Human Security” (FHS). The origin of the network can be traced back to when the Ambassador in Charge of Human Security, Yukio Takasu, participated in an HSN meeting in June 2006 as a guest and proposed to establish a scheme whereby members and non-members of the HSN would establish a common foundation to cooperate with each other on human security issues (Takasu 2008). Japan’s Permanent Mission to the UN had for some time been nursing the idea of developing human security as a universal principle by creating a more inclusive coalition. In this way, Japan, as norm entrepreneur, with other collaborative governments, would allow representatives of skeptical governments to participate in a forum where Japan and its collaborators attempted to persuade them. The idea of creating a network initially attracted the attention of several governments. Among these, the role played by the Mexican government was significant. For the MOFA, to enhance the legitimacy of human security as a normative concept, it was more desirable to 328

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propagate it through collaboration with developing countries (Shinyo 2008). This idea came to be realized soon after, through co-hosting the Human Security Workshop in Mexico in February 2006. A total of twenty-nine countries attended this workshop, notably including states such as the US, India, and Brazil, all of which had been unenthusiastic about the issue. The participants discussed their understanding of the concept and learned about concrete actions related to human security taken in regional frameworks, such as the Organization of American States and the African Union (Workshop on Human Security 2006). At the meeting, Japan introduced FHS as an open forum, not only for countries supporting human security, but also for those suspicious of it, with the purpose of promoting understanding and encouraging discussion of human security. The first meeting of the FHS was held in October 2006, with the participation of twenty-four states and seven international organizations. At the first meeting, many participants estimated that the prospects that member states would agree on a (political) definition in the GA were not promising; notwithstanding, formulating a legal definition of human security would be too unrealistic. A few participants were even opposed to referring to human security within the framework of the UN. The second meeting was held in April 2007, and its participants expanded to thirty-five states and thirteen international organizations. The meeting focused on two agenda items (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2007a). The first item was how to promote a common conception of human security, reflecting actual activities in international organizations. The second was to find common areas of interest. The third meeting took place in July 2007, with attendance by forty-eight governments and eleven international organizations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2007b). As agreed upon in the previous meeting, regional organizations and the HSN reported on their past activities, and then an exchange of views and experiences was completed. Different emphases and priorities were placed by each actor within the pursuit of human security. In this meeting, the governments of Japan and Mexico, with the support of the Chilean government, announced that they should explore the possibility of having a discussion on human security in the GA. The fourth FHS meeting was held in May 2008, with eighty-six states and sixteen international organizations, and the fifth meeting was held in November 2008, with fifty-two states and regions and thirteen international organizations. From April 2007 through November 2008, an additional four meetings of FHS were held, with expanded participation by states and international organizations. By 2008, it had tripled or quadrupled its size.8 The swift expansion in the number of participating states can be explained by the following factors. First, the 2005 Outcome Document had successfully introduced human security as an important topic in international discourse. Second, not only Mexico and Chile but also countries such as Thailand and Slovenia (members of the HSN) acted jointly to build an expanded network for human security. Japan extended its ties with Slovenia, which as the EU president contributed to the expansion of European participants. During these meetings, major governments previously unenthusiastic about or suspicious of human security gradually changed their attitudes. India, Egypt, Indonesia, and Pakistan had attended since the second FHS meeting, though it is important to note that this does not necessarily mean all of these countries had changed their policies. India, however, was a notable example of a country that changed its attitude from skepticism to cooperation. This expansion of participation in the FHS enabled Japan to convene an informal thematic debate on human security in the GA. An informal thematic debate on human security was held for the first time in the GA in May 2008 (General Assembly of the United Nations 2008). The 329

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thematic debate on human security was held under an official initiative by the governments of Japan, Greece, Kenya, Mexico, and Mongolia. The Japanese representative stated that human security would take a human-centered approach to tackling global issues in accordance with the UN Charter and that human security would pay due respect to state sovereignty and complement national security. Approximately forty participants spoke in the debate. Representatives from Slovenia, Thailand, Mexico, Greece, Ireland, Lichtenstein, and Jordan expressed their keen support for the concept of human security. Again, persistent opposition was given by the Cuban representative. The sixth FHS meeting in 2009 was marked by ninety-eight participants, the largest number. However, some governments continued to criticize the concept, saying that it lacked a clear definition. To minimize this resistance, Japan and Mexico proposed that the SG should prepare a report on human security.

The first human security resolution in the GA The above developments in the GA led to two reports on human security by Secretary-General (SG) Ban Ki-moon in 2010. Furthermore, the first resolution on human security was adopted in the GA session of July 2010, and the second, with more substantial content, was adopted in 2012. The following section analyzes this series of developments in norm diffusion. The permanent representatives to the UN of the six FHS member countries, Costa Rica (then Chair of the HSN), Tanzania, Kazakhstan, Nauru, Mexico, and Japan (Japan and Mexico were co-chairs of the FHS), met with the SG to request a report on human security. The SG accepted this idea. The basic line of the report was drafted by the Human Security Unit (HSU) of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and numerous consultations were conducted with the SG Office. It should be noted that there was a person-to-person network between the staff of the HSU, the SG Office, and the Japanese foreign ministry, which made it possible to feed the Japanese government’s view into the SG report. The Japanese government intended to articulate the following elements in the SG report: the comprehensive nature of the concept of human security, the promotion of partnerships with civil society actors, and approaches of “protection and empowerment.” These points were introduced in the report (Official of UNOCHA 2010). The Japanese foreign ministry was determined to distinguish human security from R2P as well (Official of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2010). The foreign ministry, however, feared the possibility that measures for human security would be written so as to include military intervention, which meant the concept of human security would not survive in the context of the GA. Hence, the Japanese government tried to gain an understanding with the SG Office on the point, namely that human security does not entail the use of force. In the fall of 2009, they came to an understanding that, as a policy concept in the UN, it would be better to distinguish between the two concepts, namely R2P and human security, avoiding overlap, and that this would add value to each concept. Thus, it was agreed that measures of human security would not include military measures, which was a tactical and tentative policy demarcation. This policy line necessitated close consultation with the staff of the SG Office, which oversaw the 2009 SG report on R2P, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (Secretary-General of the United Nations 2009). They saw to it that there was no contradiction between the language of R2P and that of human security. In this connection, it was also repeatedly emphasized in their consultations that human security complements state sovereignty and that the former does not replace the latter. The first SG report on human security summarized developments since the 2005 GA Summit meeting, such as the FHS and the informal thematic debate on human security in the GA, and 330

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gathered information about regional human security practices in groups such as ASEAN, OAS, AU, and the EU (Secretary-General of the United Nations 2010). The report raised three elements, stating that they are commonly witnessed cross-regionally:   

threats in today’s world are diverse, complex, interlinked, and transnational in nature; the concept of security needs to be expanded, in which protection and empowerment of people are the foundation; and human security does not entail the use of force against state sovereignty.

This report also emphasized that human security integrates the goals of freedom from fear, freedom from want, and freedom to live in dignity. It is a people-centered concept, which stresses comprehensive, context-based, and preventive measures. The report also analyzes the relationship between human security, state sovereignty, and R2P. Human security is described as a notion that is based on the understanding that governments play an important role in the survival and dignity of people. In the application of the concept of human security, emphasis should be placed on the capacity building of governments and local communities. At the time of the 2005 World Summit Outcome, the Japanese foreign ministry was not entirely devoted to the phrase “[to] commit ourselves to discussing and defining the notion of human security in the General Assembly.” The foreign ministry emphasized the importance of putting human security into actual projects on the ground, rather than “discussing and defining the notion.” In realizing the ideal of human security, they believed it was more pressing to focus on its implementation, since the discussion of the definition would be more likely to end in a quagmire. However, through informal consultation in the GA and FHS, Japan’s foreign ministry came to learn that vagueness of definition would hinder them from putting human security on the formal agenda of the UN. Such criticisms came not only from opposition states but also, on rare occasions, from those that advocated for human security. Upon the publication of the SG report, the Japanese and Mexican Ambassadors, as co-chairs of FHS, visited the office of the presidency of the GA session to convince him to hold an official debate on human security based on the SG report. In April and May, Japan’s foreign ministry frequently approached the embassies of member states in Tokyo for prior behind-the-scenes consensus building. In May 2010, an official debate on human security was convened in the UNGA, which was the first occasion on which human security was treated as a formal single agenda item in a GA session. This was designed to integrate the various views of member states on the basis of the SG report and possibly to link to a GA resolution on human security. The draft proposal for the resolution on human security was in preparation by this time and was distributed to certain member states. The foreign ministry took advantage of the occasion of the official debate to evaluate its strategy toward the adoption of a resolution on human security. Among the forty-nine member states that spoke in the formal debate, various positions were presented. Approximately 60% (thirty participants) strongly supported and 80% (forty participants) at least supported the notion of human security.9 It may be assumed that the governments that expressed a position were either in relatively strong support or totally unenthusiastic. Thus, the list is biased, since it does not represent data on those not interested or on those that wished not to clarify their positions. Calculating the positive and negative points above, here it would be reasonable to assume a minimum of 60% acceptance of human security in the GA (Kurusu 2013). Countries that were clearly opposed included, for example, Iran and Bolivia, whereas China did not give clear approval, saying that more debate on the issue was needed. Regardless of the SG report, some representatives still associated human security with R2P and the use of military 331

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force. Meanwhile, there were interesting changes in the discourse of some representatives, from skepticism to self-diagnosis. The latter means that such participants explained what human security meant in their own context and how it differed from its meaning in the UN. For example, the Cuban representative mentioned that human security for the country means overcoming famine through development assistance; human security should be implemented based on principles such as respect for state sovereignty, non-interference, and national ownership, and it should exclude military intervention. As we have seen, despite the existence of some skeptical governments, there was an increasing level of acceptance of human security in the UNGA (or perhaps we could say, “in New York,” not in the capitals of all the countries concerned). It may be that not all governments agreed, but many member states reached a level of comfort with it. This evaluation was shared by speakers at the informal panel discussion convened just before the official debate, who assessed that some countries were still worried about the application of human security as a domestic policy concept; however, at least the idea of human security as a principle for international cooperation approached a higher comfort level. By contrast, only approximately 30% supported the idea of submitting the matter to the GA to be adopted as a resolution. The others either remained silent or stated that the time was not ripe for a resolution, since the concept had not yet been firmly established. That is, to support a policy concept and to adopt it as a GA resolution were different matters. Moreover, even among supporters of human security, there were different approaches on how to translate it into official language. The road to a UNGA resolution was not yet easy (Kurusu 2013). Soon after the official debate, informal meetings to draft the details of the GA resolution took place. There were two broad approaches in the drafting group: whether to focus only on procedural matters or to delve into the conceptual analysis of human security. The preference for restricting the resolution to procedural matters emanated from diverse views: some said the timing was not yet ripe and current focus should be placed on the further elaboration of the concept of human security, rather than rushing to a single definition; others took the tactic of seeking to postpone the adoption of a resolution by saying the timing was not yet ripe. A resolution by consensus was sought by Japan and its co-sponsors, so that the foreign ministry not only had to convince the skeptical, but to move onto deals with them when persuasion failed. The most difficult consultations remained to be those on the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. Japan’s foreign ministry had believed that a resolution on human security would not be adopted without adequate consideration of these principles. However, some European and Latin American states criticized Japan’s attitude as conceding too much to the nonintervention principle and thus making the concept of human security too vague. In their view, the resolution should mention respect for human rights as enshrined in the UN Charter. There was an imbalance in stressing only state sovereignty. Until the last moment of the negotiations, this discrepancy remained unresolved. Finally, the draft resolution was submitted, with thirty-five co-sponsors. It should be noted that some EU member states and HSN members did not participate in the group of co-sponsors. On July 16, the UNGA resolution on human security was adopted by consensus. The content of the resolution is characterized by procedural matters, far from the in-depth content Japan’s foreign ministry initially expected.10 The resolution merely “requests the Secretary-General to seek the views of the Member States on the notion of human security, including on a possible definition thereof, and to submit a report to the General Assembly” and “decides to continue its consideration of the notion of human security” (General Assembly of the United Nations 2010). 332

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Toward the second resolution The foreign ministry of Japan, with a view to obtaining an expanded consensus on the substantial content of human security, continued in its efforts to persuade skeptics and those who were cautious about adopting a resolution in the GA. An informal thematic meeting was held again in April 14, 2012 to collect various views from member states. Incorporating the analysis from this meeting, a second SG report on human security was submitted (Official of UNOCHA 2010). The representatives of Japan and Jordan took the initiative as facilitators of a second resolution, using the SG report as a reference point. They held informal meetings with member states and ten formal meetings. Thanks to previous negotiation, facilitators knew that they had to persuade not only skeptics, but also some Western states. This included Western states that supported human security in general but not the content of the initial draft of the first resolution due to its lack of balance between principles of human rights and non-interference. A policy innovation was created to overcome the hurdle. This innovation was linking three issue areas; namely, the idea that the three pillars of security, human rights, and development should work as a balance. The word “development” was introduced for developing countries and “human rights” for Western states, and the notion of human security was formulated on the balance of these three elements. The linking of these three areas facilitated the adoption of the second resolution on human security (General Assembly of the United Nations 2012). The contents of the resolution, for the most part, endorsed the second SG report. The resolution was adopted by consensus in the GA, stipulating: “Human security recognizes interlinkages between peace, development, and human rights, and equally considers civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights.” The resolution finally included the definitional substance of human security, with eight elements. Human security is about the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. “Human security calls for people-centered, comprehensive, context-specific, and prevention-oriented responses that strengthen the protection and empowerment of all people and all communities.” The remaining paragraphs mainly targeted skeptical member states among the developing countries. According to the resolution, human security is based on national ownership, and governments retain the primary responsibility for ensuring the survival and dignity of their citizens. The role of the international community is to complement and provide necessary support to governments. It also reemphasized that the notion of human security is distinct from the R2P and does not entail the threat or the use of force or coercive measures. The resolution emphasized that human security in its implementation should pay full respect to the purposes and principles enshrined in the UN Charter, including full respect for the sovereignty of states, territorial integrity, and non-interference.

Conclusion The Japanese government introduced the concept of human security in the initial phase. Japan’s pursuit of global “intellectual leadership” led to the establishment of the CHS. Thereafter, Japan acted proactively to promote human security globally. Propagating global values and norms and taking “entrepreneurial leadership” (Young 1991) in multilateral fora are relatively new challenges for Japanese diplomacy. This served as a learning process for Japan’s foreign ministry. Japan’s foreign ministry considered the occasion of the 2005 UN World Summit a further opportunity to promote human security. With the application of this experience, the foreign ministry extended its network with small and medium-sized powers to disseminate 333

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human security in the UN. Networking was the key word in exerting entrepreneurial leadership. Japan’s new approach to network building in the GA can be evaluated as a relative success to the extent that, despite the existence of some skeptical governments, an increasing level of acceptance of human security was achieved in the GA. However, the foreign ministry’s short-run logic on R2P and sovereignty to persuade hard-liners contained a contradiction, which was also challenged by Western norm supporters. In the second resolution, Japan as norm entrepreneur learned from its failure and used the notion of “three pillars” as a focal point to persuade different strands. Japan, having recognized the necessity of playing a role in global agenda setting, embarked on norm dissemination in the GA by utilizing a networking strategy. Indeed, Japan is in a relatively disadvantaged position in terms of creating and maneuvering networks, compared with countries that have existing institutionalized networks, such as EU member states and members of the G77. In the case of human security, Japan’s style was circumspect, conciliatory, and reserved, rather than unilateral, argumentative, and confrontational. Owing partly to this, the definitional content of human security lost clarity. Japan’s achievement as a norm entrepreneur was thus limited, in spite of the success it achieved in adopting a UNGA resolution. Networking policy will continue to be a challenge that Japan must face in exerting leadership in a multilateral environment. Japan needs to do more to overcome its shortcomings.

Notes 1 This idea, introduced during an LDP-led administration, has gained continuous support in the LDP. There are strong supporters of this idea in the New Komeito, which has been a coalition partner of the LDP since the turn of the century. The Democratic Party of Japan also has been a supporter of the idea. 2 Takasu (2014) reviews this process from a perspective of the diplomat in charge. 3 The Japanese government preferred the terms, “peace consolidation” and “state building,” instead of peacebuilding. 4 The members were Japan Center for International Exchange director Tadashi Yamamoto, scholars such as Makoto Iokibe, parliamentarians such as Keizo Takemi, and Asahi Shimbun’s foreign policy correspondent Yoichi Funabashi (Kurusu 2011). 5 Transnational experts network members were for example Lincoln Chen of Harvard University and Surin Pitsuwan, former Foreign Minister of Thailand. 6 The process in the GA from 2005 to 2010 is analyzed in Kurusu (2013) from a theoretical perspective on multilateral negotiation. 7 The members were Mexico, Germany, Algeria, Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Spain, Japan, Kenya, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Singapore, and Sweden. 8 Details of each FHS meeting can be obtained from the webpage of Friends of Human Security www. mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/friends/. 9 Data transcription was done by the author from the video archive of the UNGA, GA 87th and 88th Plenary Meeting, integrated and coordinated implementation of and follow-up to the outcomes of the major United Nations conferences and summits in the economic, social, and related fields; Follow-up to the Outcome of the Millennium Summit: Report of the Secretary-General (A/64/701), 20 May 2010; GA 89th Plenary Meeting, 21 May 2010. UN Webcast Archives, accessed May 26, 2010. 10 For Japan’s preferences, please see the resolution, discussed in the next section.

References Abe, S. (2006) ‘Statement by Shinzo Abe’, 165th Upper House Diet Session, 23 October. Advisory Group on International Cooperation for Peace (2002) Kokusai Heiwa Kyoryoku Kondankai Hokokusho (the Report of the Advisory Group on International Cooperation for Peace) www.kantei. go.jp/jp/singi/kokusai/kettei/021218houkoku.html accessed 20 November 2017.

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Bolton, J. (2007) Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations and Abroad, New York: Threshold Editions. Bosold, D. and Werthes, S. (2005) ‘Human Security in Practice: Canadian and Japanese Experiences’, Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, I: 84–101. Edstro¨m, B. (2008) Japan and the Challenge of Human Security: The Founding of a New Policy 1995–2003, Stockholm-Nacka: Institute for Security and Development Policy. Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998) ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, International Organization, 52(4): 887–917. Fukushima, A. (2010) Ningen no Anzenhosho [Human Security], Tokyo: Chikura Shobo. General Assembly of the United Nations (2005) World Summit Outcome 16 September 2005 [A/RES/60/1] https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/PDF/N0548760.pdf?OpenElement accessed 30 July 2008. General Assembly of the United Nations (2008) 66th General Assembly Plenary, Thematic Debate on Human Security: General Assembly President Calls for New Culture of International Relations, with Principle of Human Security at its Core, During Day-long Debate, 22 May, New York: United Nations Department of Public Information. General Assembly of the United Nations (2010) Follow-up to Paragraph 143 on Human Security of the 2005 World Summit Outcome, 16 July [A/RES/64/291] www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol= A/RES/64/291 accessed October 2011. General Assembly of the United Nations (2012) Follow-up to Paragraph 143 on Human Security of the 2005 World Summit Outcome, 10 September [A/RES/66/290] www.un.org/humansecurity/sites/ www.un.org.humansecurity/files/hsu%20documents/GA%20Resolutions.pdf accessed October 2013. General Assembly President of the United Nations (2005) Draft Outcome Document 3 June www. responsibilitytoprotect.org accessed 10 April 2010. Gilson, J. and Purvis, P. (2003) ‘Japan’s Pursuit of Human Security: Humanitarian Agenda or Political Pragmatism?’ Japan Forum, 15(2): 193–207. Gregoratti, C. (2013) ‘Human Security’, Encyclopedia Britannica, last updated 6 June 2013 https://global. britannica.com/topic/human-security accessed 30 October 2016. Hubbard, S. and Suzuki, T. (2008) Building Resilience: Human Security Approaches to AIDS in Africa and Asia, Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (2001) The Responsibility to Protect www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf accessed 17 June 2012. Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE) (2004) Human Security in the United Nations, Tokyo: JCIE. Kanzaki, T. (2005) Statement by Takenori Kanzaki, the 162nd Lower House Diet Session, 24 January. Koizumi, J. (2005) Statement by Junichiro Koizumi, the 162nd Lower House Diet Session, 24 January and 25 January. Komano, K. (2005) Statement by Kinichi Komano, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan in Charge of Human Security, on the occasion of the Seventh Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network, held in Ottawa 18–20 May www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/state0505.html accessed 10 February 2010. Kurusu, K. (translated by Kersten, R.) (2011) ‘Japan as an Active Agent for Global Norms’, Asia-Pacific Review, 18(2): 115–37. Kurusu, K. (2013) ‘Anzenhosho [Security]’, in S. Oyane (ed.), Konsutorakutivisumu no Kokusaikankeiriron [Constructivist International Relations Theory], Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 29–51. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2007a) Chair’s Summary, Second Meeting of the Friends of Human Security, 20 April www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/friends/summary0704.html accessed 9 December 2016. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2007b) Co-chair’s Summary, Third Meeting of the Friends of Human Security, 7 November www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/friends/summary0711.html accessed 9 December 2016. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2016) Friends of Human Security www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/ friends/ accessed 10 October 2016. Official of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2010) interviewed by Kurusu, K., Tokyo, 16 July. Official of United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) (2010), interview by Kurusu, K., New York, 25 August 2010. Oshima, K. (2005) Statement by Ambassador Oshima on Report of the Secretary-General 7 April www.mofa.go.jp/announce/speech/un2005/un0504.html accessed 10 February 2010.

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Secretary-General of the United Nations (2009) Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, Report of the Secretary-General, 12 January, A/63/677. Secretary-General of the United Nations (2010) Human Security, Report of the Secretary-General, 8 March, A/64/701. Shinyo, T. (2008) Interview by Kurusu, K., New York, 24 March. Soeya, Y. (2005) ‘Japanese Security Policy in Transition: The Rise of International and Human Security’, Asia-Pacific Review, 12(1): 103–16. Takasu, Y. (2008) Interview by Kurusu, K., New York, 25 March. Takasu, Y. (2014) ‘Japan and Networked Human Security’, in M. Martin and T. Owens (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Human Security, London: Routledge, 239–50. Takemi, K. (2008) Interview by Kurusu, K., Tokyo, 16 January. Tan, H. (2010) ‘Not Just Global Rhetoric: Japan’s Substantive Actualization of Its Human Security Foreign Policy’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 10(1): 159–87. Tsuruoka, K. (2008) Interview by Kurusu, K., Tokyo, 7 March. Workshop on Human Security (2006) Report of the Workshop on Human Security, Organized by the Government of Mexico, in Cooperation with the Government of Japan, Mexico City, 9th and 10th February 2006 http://ochaonline.un.org accessed 10 February 2010. Yamamoto, T. (2008) Interview by Kurusu, K., Tokyo, 30 January. Young, O. (1991) ‘Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society’, International Organization, 45(3): 281–308.

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21 Gender equality in Japan Internal policy processes and impact, and foreign implications under Prime Minister Abe’s Womenomics Joyce Gelb and Naoko Kumagai

This chapter examines Japan’s efforts for gender equality and women’s empowerment, both at home and abroad, focusing on the implications of recently accelerated efforts since December 2012 under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Abe has fostered gender equality and empowerment through policy changes, including enhanced labor participation by women in Japan and womenfocused development through Official Development Assistance (ODA). These initiatives are based on a foundation of almost thirty years of experiences and efforts toward gender equality in both domestic and foreign policies. What is the motivation for Abe to further strengthen Japan’s effort toward gender equality and empowerment both at home and abroad? What are the implications of the simultaneous reinforcement of the domestic and international efforts? This chapter proposes and argues that both domestic and international efforts are fundamentally anchored by Prime Minister Abe’s overall design of Japan as a strong nation both domestically and internationally through strengthening Japan’s national power, and enhancing its internationally influential position. Such an idea was expressed in Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party campaign that “We will restore Japan” in the lead up to the 2012 December Lower House election and the 2013 Upper House election. Thus, the domestic effort is strongly motivated by the practical reason of revitalizing the Japanese economy by incorporating women into the labor force and by addressing the declining birth rates. Japan’s domestic effort is also designed to match international standards and to acquire international recognition. The international effort is part of the Prime Minister’s goals to enhance Japan’s role in the world, particularly with the notion of proactively contributing to a global peace that encompasses wider elements of health, economic and social welfare, as well as security. Such international efforts of Japan, albeit with pragmatic calculations, have been supported by the long accumulated intellectual and practical achievements of Japan’s foreign aid with a focus on human security, gender equality, and women’s empowerment. While it is pointed out that the issue of comfort women and Japan’s low international ranking in gender equality pushed Japan’s domestic and international effort in order to deflect Japan’s shame, the reality is rather that Japan has utilized lessons from both challenges proactively as normative foundations of Japan’s domestic and international efforts. The former has provided the 337

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foundation for Japan’s awareness of the need for women’s protection from violence under armed conflicts and the latter has created a momentum to invigorate Japan’s domestic and international efforts through recognizing the universal importance of gender equality with progressive implications for men.

Abe’s initiative both at home and abroad Prime Minister Abe has taken the initiative to promote the status of women at home and abroad (Kameda 2015). In 2013, the government of Japan decided to cultivate the power of women as the greatest potential for the growth of the Japanese economy and to strengthen assistance to developing countries based on the principle that “a society in which women shine” will invigorate the world (Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) 2013). The Abe Cabinet in 2014 initiated a program calling for 30% of all leading positions in society to go to women and to rapidly expand the number of daycare centers by 400,000 by 2017 (Cabinet Office Gender Equality Bureau 2014a). In 2015, there was a commitment by Abe to raise the number of men who take childcare leave to 13% since it was only 2.30% in 2014 and 2.65% in 2015 (Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare 2016) and to reduce the lengthy work hours required of the predominantly male work force, presumably to further increase men’s role in the family (Cabinet Office Gender Equality Bureau 2016a). Also in 2014, Prime Minister Abe initiated the World Assembly for Women to promote both domestic and international social awareness of gender equality and women’s empowerment. It was organized by the Gender Mainstreaming Division in the MOFA newly established in 2014. At the first Assembly held in 2014, attended by high profile women from Japan and abroad, Abe had a universal message that creating a society in which women shine “is one of my highest priority issues” (Mizuno 2016). One hundred male leaders of corporate Japan signed on to the “Women Shine” concept in a highly publicized media event. At these events, Abe stressed his concerns about Japan’s record low birthrate in 2014 (Herd 2015), as well as a culture that encourages long working hours for men, and the aging society (Mizuno 2016). Prime Minister Abe also addressed late developing states’ agendas of women’s basic rights in health and education and protection from violence under armed conflicts (Abe 2014b). To reinforce efforts for women, the government decided to open a liaison office for UN Women in Tokyo in April 2015 dedicated to women’s empowerment in Japan and globally. It is the first such liaison office in Asia.1 The collaboration between UN Women and Tokyo, enhanced particularly since Abe’s September 2013 General Assembly Speech that Japan respects UN Women’s activities, is an illustration of Japan seeking to position itself as one of the leading contributors to these activities and a close partner with relevant international organizations (Abe 2013a). UN Women Executive Director Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka’s communications with Japanese leaders during her visit to Tokyo to attend WAW! Tokyo 2014 strengthened the relationship between Japan and UN Women, thus leading to the establishment of the Asia liaison office in Bunkyo Ward, Tokyo (Kameda 2015). In 2013, shortly after his assumption of power, Prime Minister Abe pledged to provide more than USD3 billion in development assistance over three years between 2013 and 2015 for women’s empowerment and health care (Abe 2013a). Accordingly, Japan’s contribution to UN Women in 2015, almost USD19 million, was twice the amount of 2014 with a focus on health, peace, and security concerns related to gender (UN Women 2015). In 2013, Prime Minister Abe set an agenda to address the medical and health needs of vulnerable people, particularly women, through the promotion of universal health coverage as part of the post-2015 Millennium Development Goals (Abe 2013b). The 2015 revised ODA Charter strengthened and widened the 338

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commitment for women’s rights and empowerment in the issues of poverty reduction, human security, peacebuilding, and development (MOFA 2015a).

Why gender empowerment in Japan? Womenomics: pragmatic motivation Abe’s policy to revitalize women’s contribution to the workforce is underpinned by the pragmatic motivation that Japan needs to boost its economy by increasing labor force participation and tax revenue. Such policy has come to be widely known as Womenomics, mainly as a result of a series of policy analyses and reports by Kathy Matsui at the Goldman Sachs Group, suggesting Japan’s strategy for economic growth (Matsui et al. 2005, 2010, 2014). Japan faces a declining birthrate, a labor shortage in the workforce, and an aging society. The conservatives in the Diet were convinced that the demographic combination of the declining birth rate and the rapid growth of the aged population would result in a serious labor shortage and a chronic deficit in the social security fund, which was already suffering. However, unlike in many other advanced nations such as the United Kingdom and France, the Japanese government was still quite strict in maintaining a low number of foreign workers. Foreign workers have never been considered as an ideal solution to the labor shortage in Japan due to Japanese people’s preference for de facto homogeneity.2 One feasible solution, therefore, would be to further the incorporation of women into the labor market. Abe introduced a set of economic reforms, later dubbed Abenomics by the media, when he was elected as prime minister in December 2012. Abenomics represents a set of fiscal, monetary, and structural reform policies to revitalize the Japanese economy. In realizing Abenomics, the increase in the birthrate and the increase of women as workforce are of vital importance. In the opening remarks of the UN Women’s Liaison Office in Bunkyo Ward in August 2015, Abe stated that Abenomics is “Womenomics” (Mizuno 2016). Abe’s “Womenomics” saw three merits in the promotion of the female workforce: the expansion of the labor force in a society facing an aging society and declining birth rates; a well-educated and competitive work force in the global market; and the creation of a consumer-centered market through women’s roles at the supply side as well as at the demand side of everyday life commodities (Cabinet Office Gender Equality Bureau 2014b). A focus on both an increase in the birthrate and an increase in the percentage of women in the workforce poses a huge demand on women. The contradiction was partially addressed through gender equality policy efforts to improve working conditions and increase the number of childcare centers.

Gender Equality Law and other previous policies Since the 1990s, Japan has sought to address concerns about declining birth rates, shortages in the workforce, and social insurance revenue, with limited results. Under these circumstances, the Gender Equality Law was legislated in 1999. Conservatives’ concerns about the declining birth rate, which reached 1.57 in 1989, 1.42 in 1995, 1.29 in the year 2004, and the record low of 1.26 in 2005, functioned as a major political factor to promote gender equality policies. For conservatives, the declining birth rate means declining national power and international competitiveness and particularly the necessity for foreign migration. At the time of the Gender Equality Law’s passage in 1999 the birth rate was 1.34 births per woman. The rate increased from 1.26 in 2005 to 1.32 in 2006 and 1.32~1.33 in 2007. But these increases were due to births of thirdgeneration baby boomers in Japan, thus the trend of decline was expected to continue in the long run. The decline is due to the growing number of unmarried women, women who marry at an 339

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older age, and women who choose not to bear children. Of those who choose to have children, many have only one child although studies show that the perceived ideal number of children to have is two or more.3 The gap between the ideal and the reality is due to factors such as the high financial costs (childcare, schooling, etc.), as well as the perceived physical and mental burden of raising children (Cabinet Office 2016). For those seeking gender equality in the workplace, having children was seen as an obstacle to full labor force participation. Basic Laws, such as the Gender Equality Law in Japan, are intended to address fundamental issues of the state system and are presumed to take priority in relation to other laws in the same area. They are intended also to affect lawmaking at the national and local levels (Gelb 2015). Therefore, the principle of the Gender Equality Law mattered. While some viewed the law as vague and primarily rhetorical, others saw it as leverage for changing future progressive policy. An initial “Vision” statement proposed by women’s groups and their allies during the drafting process was very progressive in that it sought to correct gender bias embedded in social systems in Japanese society rather than to improve the status of women case by case (Osawa 2000: 7). This stance led to the idea of joint participation which could go beyond gender equality to a gender-free society in which policies and systems would eventually be designed to minimize gender relevance (Council on Gender Equality 1996).4 Ironically, the progressive expression of joint participation was favored by the Japanese government which shied away from language of male/female equality. The new law, which went into effect in June 1999, was titled Danjo Kyodo Sankaku Shakai Kihon-ho, which in English is translated as the Basic Act for Gender-Equal Society. Kyodo Sankaku, whose literal meaning in English is ‘joint participation or co-participation of men and women in society,’ not ‘gender equality,’ does not question the actual state and quality of ‘co-participation’ related to gender justice and fairness (Takeda 2015). As far as the Japanese title goes, danjo Kyodo Sankaku (co-participation of men and women) rather than danjo byodo (gender equality) could emphasize the equality of opportunity rather than that of outcome, thus pacifying the concerns of conservative politicians (Osawa 2000: 6). Still, the “Vision” statement included danjo byodo in the content by defining ‘joint participation’ as part of a process toward attainment of ‘genuine equality of men and women’ (Osawa 2000: 7). The conservative concern over the framing, however, anticipated a later backlash regarding the law and its implementation, as discussed later in this chapter. The law did have at least two major results. The first was administrative reorganization in 2001, establishing a Cabinet level office related to gender and the Cabinet Office Gender Equality Bureau headed by the Chief Cabinet Secretary, and in 2003 a Minister for Gender Equality under the Koizumi administration. The Cabinet Office Gender Equality Bureau equality has the goal of mainstreaming gender policy by monitoring, coordinating, and providing opinions, among other functions (Osawa 2000; Gelb 2015: 213). A second was an effort to have government ministries set and meet goals for increased participation by women. One example was the proportion of women in governmental positions equivalent to or higher than the director level at Headquarters; it should have been approximately 5% by the end of fiscal year 2015 (Cabinet Office Gender Equality Bureau 2015a). Another was to increase women’s roles in advisory committees and councils in ministries; as an example of success, as of 2015 the number had risen to 36% from 20% in 1999 (Cabinet Office Gender Equality Bureau 2016b). However, since its creation, the Bureau has been by most accounts a relatively weak policy advocate on behalf of women. The law was designed to be implemented by prefectural (provincial) and local governments who were to develop their own basic plans for gender equality. Administrative changes at the local level, and lack of follow up leadership at the national level, have caused these efforts to stall. Initially, the Basic Law was off to a good start in terms of local level efforts to take positive measures to bring the gender-equal society to fruition. As of April 2008, all prefectures and close 340

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to 1,000 municipalities considered gender policy – building on an infrastructure of local women’s centers (which exist in most Japanese local and neighborhood governments), female Assembly members, and women’s and feminist groups. Some local governments requested record keeping and proof by private companies that they were complying with the new regulations (Hashimoto 2002). Others established new compliance systems to evaluate and mediate complaints. A number of targets were created for women on local advisory committees and in local office (Hashimoto 2002). The result of the administrative reform of local governments in Japan since 1999, however, had a negative impact on the promotion of policies of gender equality under the Basic Law. As the number of local authorities in Japan has significantly decreased, from 3,232 in April 1999 to 1,719 in April 2011, with a corresponding fall in the number of Assembly members, from more than 60,000 to just under 30,000, opportunities for women’s advocacy and gender equality policy innovations have similarly decreased. The administrative reform accompanied cuts in budget and personnel, thus resulting in inadequate gender equality policies particularly at the levels of towns and villages. As of 2015, while most cities have gender equality policies, only 52.6% of towns and villages do (Cabinet Office Gender Equality Bureau 2015b). The average rate of completion of policy making at the combined city, town, and village level is 70.3%, while that solely at the town and village level is 48.7% (Cabinet Office Gender Equality Bureau 2014c: 55). Efforts at the town and village levels, which have closer access to residents, are required for job opportunities and security for those who raise children and seek greater access to daycare services. A backlash, which set in about two years after the Gender Equality Law was enacted, is also thought to have caused policy implementation to grind to a halt. The backlash was spurred on by hardliner conservatives and nationalistic forces who feared the destruction of the family and Japanese culture due to the implementation of gender equality policies. This is a legacy of the “good wife and mother” ideology which has permeated, albeit in a weakened form, the culture for almost 150 years since the Meiji period. It appeared as a distinctive movement in the activities of the group Nippon Kaigi (Japan Conference), established in 1997, insisting that fundamental differences between men and women be acknowledged. Advocates of gender equality were vilified as “Communists” and worse in the press (Gelb 2015: 217). Some local assemblies established statutes against the Basic Law (Nihon Josei Gakkai Jenda Kenky u 2006). A puzzle is that Prime Minister Abe himself is a member of Nippon Kaigi. About one-third of the Diet belongs to this group and over 75% of Abe’s Cabinet ministers 2012–16 were members, indicating Nippon Kaigi’s huge influence on Japanese politics (Kingston 2016). In fact, Nippon Kaigi’s backlash against danjyo kyodo was not directly against the promotion of women in the workforce. It was rather cultural and educational, such as resistance against the idea for separate family names for married couples and sex education at school. Womenomics is in keeping with these policy initiatives of work and employment, and countermeasures to the declining birth rate based on the Basic Law since 1999. The announced numerical targets for gender equality in 2014–15 under Womenomics, such as women occupying 30% of leadership positions, were actually the continuation of a similar policy proposed and initiated by former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in 2003 (Economist 2014). However, the Japanese government has failed to make a significant difference. As one simple example, even as of 2015 it was reported that there were over 23,000 children on waiting lists for daycare (Cabinet Office Gender Equality Bureau 2016a). Though in prior publications it has been argued that gaiatsu, or pressure to conform to standards articulated by the international community, including the UN and ILO, has been crucial in policy change, at least producing symbolic change (Gelb 2003), gaiatsu has not had any significant impact on working and child-bearing conditions in Japan at the policy implementation level. 341

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In fact, it is fair to say that Womenomics has not been working well. One year after the announcement of Womenomics, the targets for increasing women in managerial and leading positions were lowered. As for “the initial proposal of 30% of societal positions going to women, these goals were lowered to 7% in the government and 15% in the private sector” (Aoki 2015; Cabinet Office Gender Equality Bureau 2015b). The percentage of female leaders in various fields – defined as lawmakers, highly skilled professionals, or corporate department heads and higher – remains much lower than the 30% target (Cabinet Office Gender Equality Bureau 2015b), although there were a few limited gains in corporations in recent years, e.g., in 2011, 4.5% of company division heads were female, up from 1% in 2011 (Economist 2014). In this environment, Womenomics as Abenomics seems to have difficult cultural and practical obstacles to achieving substantial effects. It is fair to say that the poor outcomes are attributable to the general patriarchal notions widespread in Japanese society and institutional defects than to Abe’s rather hardline conservatism as shown through Nippon Kaigi. A distinctive factor contributing to the poor performance of women’s empowerment in the work force is a widespread patriarchal notion in Japanese society of a certain work style in the office that is related to the attitudes of men toward the responsibility of household chores and child upbringing, and cannot just be attributed to Nippon Kaigi’s hardline conservative thought. In 2015, the Cabinet Bureau set a target of having less than 5% of the workforce working more than sixty hours a week by 2020; this was the result of concerns over a negative trend. Whereas in 2010, 10% of employees exceeded the sixty hours mark (Cabinet Office Gender Equality Bureau 2010), in 2014, 12.9% of male and 2.8% of female hires exceeded the sixty hours mark (Cabinet Office Gender Equality Bureau 2015b). Furthermore, the aim to encourage male employees to take childcare leave and participate more in homemaking has been far from successful in reaching the goal of raising the ratio of men who take the leave to 13%, though it was up to 2.3% in the private sector in 2014 and 3.1% among civil servants in fiscal 2014 from the 1.72% in 2011 in general (Aoki 2015; Cabinet Office Gender Equality Bureau 2015b). The permeating patriarchal work culture (MacNaughton 2015) is supported by the lack of confidence among women who are not sure of their abilities and thus may hinder efforts at change. This creates a lack of female role models in the workplace, creating a vicious circle. The effect of the lack of role models in what has been a high gender stratified work system, with women largely consigned to the clerical track, appears in statistics. Only 16.1% of female executives at larger companies said that they wanted promotion, in contrast to 65.7% of men (Lewis and Ishikawa 2016). Long working hours and continued forced transfers supported by patriarchal systems that emphasize women’s primary role as caregivers in the home based on the notion of motherhood (bosei) lead to this hesitation. Today the ratios of female workers in highly skilled positions are as follows: prosecutors, judges and lawyers stand at 21.4%, 18.7%, and 18.1%, respectively (Cabinet Office Gender Equality Bureau 2015c). In contrast, as of 2014–15, female directors comprised 3.5% in the national civil service, 9.2% of directors, and 16.2% of section chiefs in private corporations (Cabinet Office Gender Equality Bureau 2016b). Women in Japan hold just 3.1% of board seats at major companies, in contrast to 19.2% in the United States and 20.8% in Canada (Holodny 2016). It should also be noted that the number of women increases at the lower levels of the corporate chain – at the assistant manager level they comprise 17% of the positions, while those of department manager rank remained at just 6.2% as of 2015 (Cabinet Office Gender Equality Bureau 2016c). Hiring and, particularly, promotion in areas not involving gender-neutral examinations are based on seniority and overtime work, so those who are not full participants in that system are held back. Although Japan has passed parental leave policies and arguably has more available public childcare than the United States (though far from the number that are sought after, given 342

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the extensive waiting lists for access), these policies have not altered the larger dire economic picture for female labor force participation as long as women are subject to major workplace discrimination. An additional one million women have entered the labor force since Abenomics was announced in 2014. However, they tend to be placed in part-time, low-paying jobs with few benefits such as pensions and job guarantees. The percentage of female workers relegated to parttime jobs continues to rise (for men as well, but in lower proportions). It was 22.2% in 2012 and 19.8% in 2007 for men in the labor force, while it was 54.4% in 2012 and 51.1% in 2007 for women (Assmann 2014). Many women continue to hold low-level jobs with the attendant problems noted; the labor market continues to be highly stratified by gender. The so-called “M” shaped curve, partially influenced by cultural norms, continues to exist, though the “M” has moderated a bit in recent years. The “M” shaped curve refers to the entrance of often well-educated women into the labor force after graduation from school, followed by a steep drop after marriage and/or children when cultural norms reinforcing the “good wife and mother” tradition are invoked. Women stopping work for a decade or more amount to 70%, in contrast to just 30% in the United States (Economist 2014). If women wish to return to the labor force when their children are older, they have already surrendered their places in the hierarchical, seniority based economy, and little is left for them other than the parttime positions which lack benefits, decent salaries, and security. Women comprised 77% of Japan’s part-time and temporary work force as of 2012 (Economist 2014). Although the “M” shaped curve has been modified somewhat, in the main women’s labor force opportunities remain highly constrained. Institutional drawbacks under Womenomics, on top of patriarchal notions, can be addressed. In fact, many women do aspire to pursue careers and get promoted. Of particular note is that the occupations based on gender-neutral examinations show higher positions held by female workers than in government and in the private sector. This testifies to two things: (1) women’s willingness to seek highly skilled jobs, and (2) social and institutional obstructions to women’s career pursuits and promotion. As one example of such obstructions, in urban areas in particular, waiting lists for daycare access may be long, and it may be difficult to gain entry to these public sector institutions. One goal of the new 2015 Fourth Basic Plan for Gender Equality is to decrease the number of children waiting on daycare lists (as of 2015 averaging 23,000) to zero by 2017. Abe has promised subsidies and tax incentives for complying institutions. In addition to the factors of patriarchal notions and institutional defects discussed earlier, experts attribute the trends related to an ineffective gender equality policy to spousal tax deductions that discourage many married women from earning more. The tax rules keep women’s earnings low by treating men as the “head of the household” and permitting women to earn 1.3 million yen without paying premiums and still being eligible for the national pension. As of March 2017, efforts for tax policy change at the Diet have stumbled. The situation remains similar in political representation. At the time of this writing in 2017, women comprised only 9.5% of Lower House representation (the more powerful house) in 2014 – though it is up from 8% a couple of years ago – and 20.7% of the Upper House, the latter arguably perhaps the highest such total in Japanese history (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2016). Five women served in the second reshuffled Abe Cabinet from September to December of 2014 – two resigned almost immediately due to conflicts of interest. In the third Abe Cabinet from October 2015 to January 2016, there were three female Cabinet members – at least one of whom was a hardliner nationalist with a reluctance toward gender equality issues. The success of gender equality and women’s empowerment policies depends on whether such layers of patriarchal cultural, institutional, and taxation issues can be addressed. Effective 343

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institutional and taxation reforms require a change to the patriarchal culture and to the disinterest in gender equality issues.

Japanese foreign policy: why does Japan strengthen international cooperation for gender equality and empowerment? As mentioned earlier, Prime Minister Abe had both domestic and international initiatives for gender equality and women’s empowerment. Along with Abe’s pledge with the USD3 million in ODA between 2013 and 2015, it doubled its financial contribution to UN Women in 2015, and the Foreign Ministry of Japan announced its assistance for developing countries in the field of women’s health care as part of its strategy for global health diplomacy (MOFA 2016). The new Development Cooperation Charter of 2015 is also more in keeping with gender equality and empowerment in wider issue areas of poverty reduction, human security, peacebuilding, and development. Such an active stance is backed by Abe’s diplomatic agenda of a “Proactive Contribution to Peace,” which represents Japan’s stronger determination to work more proactively for the peace, security, and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region and the world with a greater sense of responsibility. In practice, for the purpose of organically linking the Development Cooperation Charter with this new Abe diplomacy principle, the Japanese government set up the “Development Strategy for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment” in March 2016, which seeks the promotion of women’s rights, the building of women’s and girls’ capacity to reach their full potential, and the advancement of women’s leadership (MOFA 2016). The principle of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” has the norms of the rule of law, freedom, and democracy (Abe 2014c). Thus, the peace for which Japan works more proactively encompasses diverse meanings, including protection from global threats of climate change, terrorism, poverty, and natural disasters as well as from instability as a result of a changing power balance and missile and nuclear threats in Asia and the world (Cabinet Office 2013). Japan’s participation in diverse aspects of peacemaking and peacebuilding, particularly women’s roles in peacebuilding, is one of the important pillars (Cabinet Office 2013). In his speech at an intergovernmental security dialogue arena, the Shangri-La dialogue, Abe mentioned the contribution of three Japanese female lawyers and prosecutors in assisting Cambodia in establishing a civil code and civil procedural code. He also emphasized the effort of Japan to have sustainable peace in civil-war stricken Mindanao in the Philippines, by establishing a job occupational training school/center for women in Mindanao so that women can be economically independent (Abe 2014c). Though the “Proactive Contribution to Peace” might be misunderstood as Japan’s revived prewar unilateral assertiveness, it is rather Japan’s active contribution to diverse contemporary meanings of peace through varied paths of international cooperation. Most importantly, it is based on Japan’s reflection on the past. Abe’s speeches on the “Proactive Contribution to Peace” in the Australian parliament in July 2014 (Abe 2014d) and the US Congress in April 2015 (Abe 2015b) acknowledge that prewar Japan made the wrong choice and emphasizes Japan’s pledge that Japan today contributes to the maintenance of international order based on peace, human rights, and democracy in the principle of international cooperation. It is argued that Prime Minister Abe’s leadership in women’s empowerment is to deflect attention away from the stigma regarding Japan’s handling of the comfort women issue (Coleman 2017; Hasunuma 2017). The issue refers to the Japanese government’s responsibility to, and reconciliation with, former comfort women who were recruited mainly from Japan and Japan-colonized Choson (the Korean peninsula) to provide sexual services to Japanese soldiers and officers. 344

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Japan certainly pays attention to its reputation. As is expressed in the preamble of the Japanese Constitution: “We desire to occupy an honored place in international society.” The 1997 ODA report affirms that Japan assumes the costs for peace and prosperity in the international community for the purpose of taking personal responsibility and ensuring its status (MOFA 1997). Prime Minister Abe’s idea of a “Proactive Contribution to Peace” is in response to the world’s expectation that Japan play a larger role in international peace and security, and it is natural to interpret that as the government’s intention to enhance Japan’s reputation. However, it is more accurate to assert that Abe’s motivation is to enhance the overall leadership role of Japan in the world within the context of the historical lessons from the past, rather than to deflect attention away from the comfort women issue or Japan’s low world ranking on women’s status. First of all, the Japanese government itself faced, instead of avoided, the issue of the comfort women starting in the early 1990s when the subject appeared following the first public testimony of former Korean comfort women in August 1991. The Japanese government acknowledged the wartime Japanese authority’s involvement in the establishment and management of comfort stations and the sufferings of many comfort women, thus making apologies to former comfort women in the Kono statement in 1993 and the Japan-Korea agreement in December 2015. In the meantime, the Japanese government consistently performed its moral responsibility through the atonement projects of the Asian Women’s Fund for former comfort women in South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, and the Netherlands from 1995 to 2007 (Kumagai 2014). In fact, Japan’s efforts went through often heated debate involving fierce hardline conservative resistance against any recognition of former comfort women as victims, particularly in the 1990s. Still, through its reflection on the plight of former comfort women, Japan has come to see the importance of women’s rights in its foreign policy. The Asian Women’s Fund developed the historical lesson of the issue of comfort women into a progressive Women’s Dignity Project for women’s human rights, based on Japan’s past reflections, to address the contemporary issues of domestic violence, sexual violence, and women’s and children’s rights in Japanese society, and to address the sexual violence in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. Thus, Japan has faced the issue and made efforts toward the healing and dignity of former comfort women and utilized the lesson for the improvement of contemporary women’s rights in Japanese society as well as in the rest of the world (Asian Women’s Fund 2007). Abe carries the spirit and achievements of the Asian Women’s Fund. Abe’s statement on the seventieth anniversary of the end of the war clearly renewed Japan’s acknowledgement of the importance not to forget the plight of women behind the battlefields whose honor and dignity were severely injured and the respect that must be given to women’s human rights (Abe 2015a). Abe’s “Women Shine” notion clearly intends to promote Japan’s international leadership in gender equality and women’s empowerment efforts across countries. The “World Assembly for Women (WAW) in Tokyo” in 2014 was the launch pad. It was the first Japanese prime ministerled world conference for gender equality and women’s empowerment with the participation of leaders in politics, academia, business, and non-profit sectors from all over Japan and around the world and with numerous related events both in Japan and abroad. WAW under “Women Shine” demonstrates Japan’s unique leadership under a platform that Japan and other states cooperate together and mutually assist each other’s own challenges in gender equality and empowerment. First, WAW renewed the awareness of the universal importance of “Women Shine,” across states with different cultural and development situations, and sought to share wisdom and discover solutions from this cooperation (Abe 2014a, 2014b). Second, Abe acknowledges Japan’s own domestic challenges and required efforts; Japan itself is still at the beginning stages of a society where women shine (Abe 2014a). WAW 2014 had two main agendas, one for the role for women in economic activities, of course Japan’s agenda, and 345

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the other for the global agendas of many developing states such as peace, education, and health. This initiative is not intended to transform the discourse from one over Japan’s poor record in women’s empowerment, where it is ranked 111th out of 144 countries in the World Economic Forum’s gender gap index in 2016 (World Economic Forum 2016), to one over Japan’s leadership role in a global movement to empower women (Coleman 2017). Instead it is to acknowledge each nation’s shortcomings in achieving goals of gender equality and women’s empowerment, and to work together toward improvement. The universal idea of “Women Shine” contains a distinctive and wide benefit of gender equality and women’s empowerment not only to women but also to peace and overall wellbeing around the world (Abe 2013a). It is a reaffirmation and revitalization of the long-held idea of the mutually reinforcing linkage of development, peace, and equality, as has been already acknowledged by Japanese women’s suffrage leader Fusae Ichikawa in the early twentieth century, by the UN in the 1975 International Women’s Year, and by the “Vision” statement as the foundation of the 1999 Gender Equality Law. “Women Shine” should bring social harmony and economic development. Furthermore, the idea of “Women Shine” progressively means changes and benefits for men. The WAW meeting in 2015 took the catchphrase of “WAW! for All” to acknowledge that both men and women must cooperate to create a society in which it is easy for both to have more fulfilled lives as individuals and in their families and communities (Abe 2015c). The main themes were to change corporate working culture of male-centered long working hours and to facilitate men’s participation in child rearing and household chores. “Women Shine” enriches men’s lives as well. Abe’s wish to enhance Japan’s position in the world should also be recognized from the setting of Japan’s pursuit for international recognition for its gender equality as part of its domestic gender equality policy (Cabinet Office Gender Equality Bureau 2016a). First, Japan’s domestic efforts should seek to achieve the international standards of norms on gender equality, as those set out in the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. Second, Japan’s international cooperation for gender equality and women’s empowerment should have international recognition (Cabinet Office Gender Equality Bureau 2016a). The Japanese government set the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security in September 2015 (MOFA 2015b) to implement the 2000 United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR 1325) in response to the United Nations Secretary-General’s strong advocacy (United Nations Secretary-General 2010) and to criticisms from former Deputy Secretary-General, Anwarul Karim Chowdhury (Fukuse 2010). The resolution is to promote the protection of women under armed conflict and the participation of women in the peace process. The National Action Plan established the mainstreaming of women in the monitoring and reviewing processes of Japan’s efforts for conflict prevention, humanitarian assistance, and peacebuilding. Such initiatives concerned with international recognition might seem rather hasty and have nothing to show, but they are also supported by the intellectual and normative anchor based on the experiences and achievements of Japan’s women-focused international development assistance. Japan’s ODA, which is over sixty years old, has paid attention to the importance of women in development particularly since the 1990s. The 1992 ODA Charter reflected the Women in Development (WID) initiative, though it was under peer pressure from more progressive members of the Development Assistance Committee under the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (It o 1998). WID, having emerged in the 1970s from Washington-based groups of female experts on development (Tinker 1990: 30), sought to integrate women into national economies to assist development efforts based on the notions of social justice and equity for women, and efficiency for economic development.5 The 1992 ODA Charter had three primary efforts in education, health, and social and economic participation 346

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(MOFA n.d.). The ODA has sought to provide literacy training, training of teachers, and textbook and educational materials which meet the needs of girls’ education, to reduce maternal and infant mortality, to emphasize family planning, and to provide basic information on sanitation and nutrition. The ODA in the case of women’s economic and social participation assisted job skills training and development of micro-enterprises to gain access to financial facilities. The UNDP/ Japan Women in Development Fund was established in 1995 in the UNDP for sustainable development and poverty reduction for women. ODA later strengthened gender-oriented development assistance by incorporating the new approach, the Gender and Development (GAD) approach, as suggested in the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995 in Beijing to include gender mainstreaming in all areas of policy making, including both government and business (United Nations 1995). GAD addresses gender inequality within social contexts and structures and seeks to change stereotyped rules, institutions, and systems that bring gender disparity and inequality (Razavi and Miller 1995). Reflecting GAD, Japan’s revised ODA Charter in 2003 gives full consideration to the active participation of women in development as well as to the securing of benefits for women from development (MOFA 2003). Japanese aid’s attention to women was reinforced by the people-centered approach, as represented in the notion of human security, which pays attention to people particularly in vulnerable conditions. “Human Security Now,” a report from the Commission on Human Security, co-chaired by Sadako Ogata, who later served as the President of the Japan International Cooperation Agency ( JICA), Japan’s main agency of bilateral ODA, sets the importance of protection and empowerment of people under insecurity (Commission on Human Security 2003). The 2003 ODA Charter set human security as one of the main principles and situated assistance in peace building and humanitarian reconstruction as one of its development assistance priorities. In the face of widening disparities in the course of economic growth in developing countries, JICA sought inclusive and dynamic development, emphasizing the importance of dynamic development that benefits all people ( JICA 2011: 10). The 2015 Development Cooperation Charter, seeking development that leaves no one behind, sees women as the vulnerable to be protected and empowered under human security for poverty eradication, peace, and security (Cabinet Office 2015). Second, behind Japanese aid’s growing devotion to human security and women lie also the experiences of Japan’s engagement in the reconstruction of post-Taliban Afghanistan. After the fall of the radical Taliban regime in November 2001 and under the continued war on terror since September 2001, Afghanistan was the first country in which the Japanese government paid special attention to gender equality issues in peace building and humanitarian/reconstruction assistance under JICA’s ODA (Tanaka 2012: 188). The MOFA had six priority areas of reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan. One of these was women’s empowerment in the areas of education and health care (Tanaka 2012: 193). There was an institutional mechanism to have comprehensive intellectual inputs into JICA from the Advisory Council on the Assistance to Women in Afghanistan, which was established in February 2002 by Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary and Minister for Gender Equality, Yasuo Fukuda, as his private advisory body in response to the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan held in Tokyo in January 2002 (Tanaka 2012: 192). The Council recommended concrete measures to direct ODA policymakers to be more responsive to gender issues in peace building and then to assist Afghan women in six specific issue areas: political and institutional capacity building; education, reproductive health and medical care; economic empowerment and employment; social and economic infrastructure; peace and security; and measures for monitoring and evaluating Japanese assistance efforts from a gender 347

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perspective (Cabinet Office Gender Equality Bureau 2003). JICA utilized the Council’s recommendations to launch a project to enhance the capacity of Afghanistan’s Ministry of Women’s Affairs. The Cabinet Office itself also proactively engaged by organizing a “Meeting on Assistance to Women in Afghanistan” in July 2002 (Cabinet Office Gender Equality Bureau 2003). The lessons learned from the gender mainstreaming efforts in Afghanistan had important implications for the wider field of Japan’s ODA and transnational foreign aid, emphasizing and raising awareness about the relation between gender and peace building across the gamut of agencies in particular (Tanaka 2012: 199). This was reinforced by the increasing and consolidating voices of gender and human rights-related NGOs, both domestic and transnational, with their growing capacities in domestic politics since the 1990s, along with legal and government institutional reforms (Lancaster 2012: 50–1). The 1998 NPO Law in particular, was a legal system set up to incorporate support and promotion of volunteer and civil society activities, partly pushed by the rapid rise of volunteer activities in Japanese society as a result of the Great Hanshin Earthquake in 1995 ( Japan NPO Center n.d.). Third, Japan’s initiative for international cooperation with an aim toward international recognition incorporates Japan’s accumulated gender equality experiences in its own peacekeeping cooperation. The National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security for UNSCR 1325 includes Japan’s efforts for enhanced female participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations in the phase of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Such promotion is anchored by Japan’s experiences in making contributions to women’s participation and empowerment in peacebuilding activities. Japan started dispatching female Self-Defense Forces to UN peacekeeping operations in 2002 (UN Information Center 2013). Since then up to the end of 2011, fifty female personnel have been dispatched to the missions in East Timor and South Sudan (Cabinet Office 2011). Japan also promotes awareness to gender sensitivity in human resource development and capacity building by providing pre-deployment education and training on gender issues, including sexual violence and women’s care, for Japanese and foreign PKO personnel (MOFA 2015b). Prime Minister Abe’s international initiative for gender equality and empowerment surely represents his wish to restore Japan’s international position. First, it is by means of an active ODA contribution that is more inclusive and gender sensitive under the principle of “Proactive Contribution to Peace.” Such a stance is not to deflect Japan’s concern about its reputation over the unresolved issue of the comfort women (Coleman 2017; Hasunuma 2017). Rather it is supported by Japan’s reflection upon the wartime past that includes comfort women. Second, effort has been made through the “Women Shine” initiative by launching the WAW in 2014, which has seen Japan’s wide-reaching cooperation with diverse states and businesses and non-profit sectors to tackle both Japan’s and the world’s challenges. Japan’s leadership was based not on guidance but on collaboration. The message of the universal importance of “Women Shine” has renewed and reinforced the awareness of both developed and developing states and contains the progressive aspect that “Women Shine” contributes to peace and wellbeing in society and thus benefits both women and men. Fourth, Japan’s pursuit of international recognition of its own international cooperation has been responsive to international voices of encouragement and criticisms, as in Japan’s prompt setting up of the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security in response to external pressures. The Action Plan is thus far anchored in Japan’s accumulated efforts on female participation in peacekeeping operations. Overall, Japan’s pursuit of international recognition of its own international cooperation mainly goes beyond nominal promotion toward genuine reputation. Japan’s reinforced ODA and international gender initiatives, particularly in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, have 348

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been anchored by Japan’s long-held people-centered and gender-centered ODA practices, particularly humanitarian operations in Afghanistan, and Japan’s practices of gender-focused participation in peacekeeping operations.

Conclusion This chapter has analyzed the background of Japan’s recently enhanced domestic and international efforts for gender equality and empowerment, particularly under Prime Minister Abe’s administration since December 2012. It argues that this policy can be attributed to Japan’s pursuit of national strength and enhanced international position. Domestic efforts represent pragmatic motivations to strengthen the Japanese economy, and the continued and renewed efforts to address long failed gender equality and empowerment policies, many of which failed to come to fruition due to the mainly traditional patriarchal culture as well as drawbacks in social institutions and the taxation system. Japan’s strengthened international efforts for gender equality and women’s empowerment, particularly through ODA, have effectively been linked to Japan’s diverse measures to enhance its international position via new diplomacy based on the “Proactive Contribution to Peace,” accompanied by the universal notion of “Women Shine” with the new launch of the WAW annual meeting, and reinforced by Japan’s pursuits of international recognition through international norm implementation in peacebuilding. These processes have normative, institutional, and practical foundations that transcend mere face-saving pragmatic gestures. Rich experiences of gender-oriented and human security-focused ODA and peacebuilding, and Japan’s practices of past reflection, have kept the foundation for strengthened ODA for gender equality and women’s empowerment. Japan’s even-footed intellectual cooperation among states for gender equality and empowerment has faced challenges and has demonstrated insights into the organic linkage of gender equality with peace and wellbeing in society and with the enrichment of women and men’s lives. The Action Plans for women’s protection and empowerment in security was based on the experiences of female participation in peacekeeping operations. All these international efforts, albeit with the pragmatic purpose of enhancing Japan’s international status, have held a firm grip on Japan’s wartime past, current challenges, and Japan’s accumulated intellectual and practical experiences in gender-oriented foreign assistance in peace and development.

Notes 1 2

3 4

5

UN Women has liaison offices in Addis Abba for the African Union, Brussels for the European Union, in Copenhagen for the Nordic Countries as well as in Geneva and Tokyo. Japan’s system of Technical Intern Training Program was officially designed as Japan’s assistance to late developing states, but it has actually become a source of foreign labor in the name of training in labor shortage areas such as agriculture, fishery, and dairy farming (Uebayashi 2015). It was 2.42 in the survey by the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research in 2010 (Cabinet Office 2016). Several contents of the “Vision” identify the problems to be addressed of gender bias in social institutions and customs (as opposed to legal and political institutions), and seek the policy goal of individual-based thinking, instead of household-based thinking in designing social systems, thus making concrete policy proposals such as an amendment to the Civil Code to give a married couple the option to use the same family name or not and correcting gender inequalities in spouse-related taxation. For example, WID was strategically linked to mainstream development concerns during the United Nations Decade for Women from 1976–85. The 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women includes equal access to credit and marketing facilities as well as women’s rights to education. 349

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Matsui, Kathy, Hiromi Suzuki, Christopher Eoyang, Tsumugi Akiba, and Kazunori Tatebe. (2010) ‘Womenomics 3.0: the Time is Now’. Goldman Sachs Japan Portfolio Strategy. October 1. Retrieved from www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/investing-in-women/bios-pdfs/womenomics3_the_time_ is_now_pdf.pdf#search=%27WOmenomics%3A+Japan%E2%80%99s+Hidden+Asset+in+2005%27 [December 23, 2016]. Matsui, Kathy, Hiromi Suzuki, Kazunori Tatebe, and Tsumugi Akiba. (2014). ‘Womenomics 4.0. Time to Walk the Talk. Goldman Sachs Japan Portfolio Strategy’. May 30. Retrieved from www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/outlook/womenomics4-folder/womenomics4-time-to-walk-the-talk.pdf [December 23, 2016]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). (1997) ‘Japan’s ODA Report (summary)’. Retrieved from www. mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/summary/1997/ [March 8, 2017]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). (2003) Japan’s Official Development Assistance Charter. August 29. Retrieved from www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/oda/3.html. [December 10, 2016]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). (2013) Japan’s Initiative regarding Women’s Empowerment and Gender Equality (Toward a society in which all women shine)’. September. ‘Retrieved from www. mofa.go.jp/files/000016518.pdf [March 10, 2017]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). (2015a) Cabinet Decision on the Development of Cooperation Charter. Retrieved from www.mofa.go.jp/files/000067701.pdf [March 14, 2017]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). (2015b) ‘National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security’. Retrieved from www.mofa.go.jp/files/000101798.pdf [December 15, 2016]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). (2016) ‘Development Strategies for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment’. Retrieved from www.mofa.go.jp/files/000158137.pdf [March 10, 2017]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). (n.d.) ‘JAPAN’s Initiative on WID’. Retrieved from www.mofa.go. jp/policy/oda/category/wid/japan.html. [December 10, 2016]. Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, Equal Employment and Child Welfare. (2016) ‘Heisei Nij unana nendo Koy o Kint o Kihon Ch osa no Kekka Gaiy o’. Retrieved from www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/list/dl/ 71-27-07.pdf [April 20, 2017]. Mizuno, Tetsu. (2016) ‘Abenomics is Womenomics’, Economy, Discuss Japan, Japan Foreign Policy Forum, 31, June 6. Retrieved from www.japanpolicyforum.jp/archives/economy/pt20160605163823.html [March 8, 2017]. Nihon Josei Gakkai Jenda Kenky u. (2006) Q&A Danjo Ky odo Sankaku/Jenda Furı Bsshingu Bakkurasshu heno Tetteihannron, Tokyo: Akasho Shoten. Osawa, Mari. (2000) ‘Government Approaches to Gender Equality in the mid-1990s’, Social Science Japan Journal, vol. 3, 1: 3–19. Razavi, Shahrashoub and Miller, Carol. (1995) ‘From WID to GAD: Conceptual Shifts in the Women and Development Discourse,’ Occasional Paper. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, United Nations Development Programme. February 1. Takeda, Hiroko. (2015) ‘All the Japan State Wants is Shining Women (and Their Families): Tatemae and Honne of Abe-Womenomics’. Retrieved from www.psa.ac.uk/sites/default/files/conference/papers/ 2015/Abe-Womenomics_R_0.pdf#search=%27hiroko+takeda+gender+equality%27 [April 15, 2017]. Tanaka, Yumiko. (2012) ‘Promoting gender equality in Japanese ODA: the challenge of assistance to women in Afghanistan’, in David Leheny and Kay Warren (eds.) Japanese Aid and the Construction of Global Development: Inescapable Solutions, London, Routledge. Tinker, Irene. (ed.) (1990) Persistent Inequalities, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Uebayashi, Chieko. (2015) Gaikokujin Rodosha Ukeire to Nihon Shakai. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press. United Nations. (1995) Platform for Action. The United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing China. September. Retrieved from www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/platform/plat1. htm#objectives [December 1, 2016]. United Nations Information Center. (2013) ‘Women in Peace Keeping Operations’. Retrieved from www. unic.or.jp/activities/peace_security/peace_keeping/document/peacekeepers_day/women/ [April 20, 2017]. United Nations Secretary General. (2010) ‘Women and Peace and Security–Report of the Secretary General’, (28 September, 2010 UN Document S/2010/498). Retrieved from https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/540/24/PDF/N1054024.pdf?OpenElement [April 10, 2017]. UN Women. (2015) ‘Partner Profile with Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida.’ June 3. Retrieved from www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2015/6/interview-with-the-foreign-minister-of-japan. [December 1, 2016]. World Economic Forum. (2016) The Global Gender Gap Report 2016. Retrieved from www3.weforum. org/docs/GGGR16/WEF_Global_Gender_Gap_Report_2016.pdf [December 1, 2016]. 352

22 Precarious balances History and memory in Japan’s foreign relations Thomas U. Berger

There are few countries in the world whose foreign relations are as much burdened by the past as Japan’s. Every effort to expand Japan’s armed forces or loosen the tight legal constraints on their actions provokes charges from around the region that Japanese militarism is once again on the rise. Every statement by Japanese leaders is carefully scrutinized for signs of revived nationalism and lack of penitence for Imperial Japan’s legacy of aggression and colonial oppression. And there are few countries in the world whose relationship to the past is as enshrouded in myth or as poorly understood as Japan’s. According to conventional wisdom, the continued salience of history in Asia is the result of Japan’s peculiar form of selective amnesia, one that allows it to remember only its own victimization without recalling the suffering it inflicted on others (Chang 1997; Hicks 1997) As a result, Japan has almost never apologized for its historical misdeeds, and when it has been compelled to do so, it has triggered a nationalist backlash that undermined any positive progress it may have made towards achieving reconciliation with its neighbors (Lind 2008). While this story contained elements of truth, it is grossly misleading on many levels. Far from suffering from amnesia, Japan has been obsessed with the past – including its role as a perpetrator of atrocity – and debated it for decades (Seraphim 2006). Japanese politicians have offered increasingly clear and unambiguous apologies beginning already in the 1960s (Yamazaki 2005), and Japanese Prime Ministers have at times been willing and able to stifle nationalist dissent (particularly under Nakasone). Why then is Japan’s recent past such a source of tension in the region? To answer that question, one must first take a more realistic look at how history and memory affect politics. At the root of many of these misconceptions is a fundamentally misguided and naı¨ve understanding of the way in which the politics of history works. It takes as its starting point the idea that there are historical truths, including unpleasant ones, that cannot be denied. When countries try to deny those truths, they inevitably offend those who have been the victims of past atrocities and create dangerous domestic and international tensions. When, however, governments forthrightly face up to the past, sincerely apologize and seek to make amends, the path to reconciliation is opened up (Long and Brecke 2003: 148–9). This view can be pithily summed up as “no justice, no peace.” In reality, however, the truth is far more difficult to pin down than this perspective allows. There may indeed be hard historical facts – realities that are hard to deny in the light of the 353

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preponderance of the evidence – but those facts are open to multiple interpretations (White 1987). How people choose to interpret facts and put them together to create historical narratives reflects not only their own subjective experiences, but also their economic, political and security interests. To put it simply, everyone is in search of a usable past (Moeller 1996). This is especially true of governments which, in creating an official historical narrative, seek to craft one that is at least acceptable to all parties – both domestic and international – that are politically significant. When there are disagreements between them, a form of political and cognitive bargaining may take place – historical reality is renegotiated in order to strike a balance that meets the interests and expectations of the different sides. Such official historical narratives have multiple components, including how leaders talk about the past, the way history is portrayed in government museums, official ceremonies and public monuments, as well as the treatment of history in government sponsored or approved textbooks. Also of critical importance is who is defined as a victim – and thus deserving of compensation – and who is defined as a victimizer – and as such is required to offer apologies, reparations and suffer possible punishment. When political leaders can agree on an official historical narrative, or at least agree not to make a political or diplomatic issue out of it, we can say that an equilibrium has been found. If it is impossible to find such an equilibrium, then tensions over history issues are likely to result. Domestically, political infighting – both within and between political parties – and domestic unrest in the form of protests and even riots are likely to result. Internationally, disequilibrium is marked by the breakdowns in diplomatic relations, ranging from official protests, through the withdrawal of ambassadors to the breaking off of all communications and the suspension of existing treaties and other forms of cooperation. Even though instrumental factors play a critical role in establishing an equilibrium on historical issues, all sides tend to act as if the new version of historical reality is in fact true. Often, they manage to convince themselves of the facticity of the narratives that they have devised. Indeed, it is crucial that they do so if those narratives are to enjoy legitimacy and have long-term staying power. It might even be said that there can be no higher achievement in diplomacy than the arriving at a sincere form of hypocrisy (Berger 2012). To better understand Japan’s relationship to the past and the politics that surround it, this chapter will trace the development of Japan’s official historical narrative since 1945 as a series of negotiations between a variety of actors, both domestic and foreign. As will be argued later, Japan has at numerous times been able to find an equilibrium over historical issues that has allowed a degree of fitful cooperation between Japan and its neighbors. These efforts can be divided into three periods – the early Cold War from 1945 to 1982, the late Cold War and early post-Cold War era lasting from 1982 to 2002, and the current period from 2003 on. In each of these periods Japan and its diplomatic partners were able to establish an equilibrium on historical issues. In each case, new trends forced significant adjustments to the official narrative. Over time, however, it has been increasingly difficult to maintain a stable balance, and disputes over history have come to bleed over into issues – most notably territorial disputes. While the region’s leaders continue to try to contain the resulting tensions, the balances that they find are becoming increasingly precarious.

A pretense of penance: the formation of Japan’s official narrative, 1945–82 Between the Japanese invasion of China in 1937 and Japan’s surrender in 1945 an estimated twenty to thirty million people are believed to have died in Asia as a result of war and the chaos 354

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associated with the collapse of social and economic order (Rummel 1991: table 5a). In the wake of this enormous catastrophe, there was a natural desire to explain this disaster and to hold those responsible for it to account. Almost immediately, however, very different narratives emerged. Within Japan the dominant battle was between the political Left and the Right. Many Japanese conservative leaders had been deeply implicated in the Imperial policies that had led to the war. Perhaps the most egregious example was Nobosuke Kishi, who as the former head of the Manchurian Railway and later Minister of Munitions in the Tojo Cabinet had both been a signatory of the declaration of war and at least partially responsible for the vast Japanese system of slave labor. Despite this checkered past, however, Kishi would become Prime Minister from 1957 to 1960, and remained one of the most powerful leaders in the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) thereafter. Given their history, the conservatives had no interest in pursuing the issue of who had been responsible for the war. As a result they favored a historical narrative that blamed external factors for the war – Western racism and Imperialism, the rise of anti-Japanese Chinese nationalism and the threat of Communism. They also tended to restrict responsibility for the war to a relatively small group – the far Right and extremist elements in the Japanese military. In propagating this narrative, the conservatives enjoyed the support of large segments of Japanese society, including former soldiers and their families – many of them organized in the gigantic Japan War Bereaved Families association (Izokukai) – as well as groups that had been associated with the old Imperial regime, such as the Association of Shinto Shrines (Jinja Honcho) (Seraphim 2006). On the other side of the political spectrum was the political Left, led by the Japanese Communist and Socialist parties backed by the Japanese trade unions and left-wing intellectuals. The Left wanted to pursue the question of “war responsibility” (senso sekinin) in order to undermine their conservative opponents. The historical narrative that the Left propagated was one that emphasized the enormous suffering that the Imperial elites had brought upon the Japanese people. The suffering that Japan had inflicted on the rest of Asia tended to be downplayed by the Left, in part because they were more focused on mobilizing the people against the US-Japanese alliance on the basis of having been victimized by the United States (Orr 2001: 66–7). The Japanese controversy over history soon got caught up in other political debates, most importantly over defense and national security. The Japanese conservatives were intent on rearming Japan and allying with the United States, both in order to defend against the threat of Communist attack and because they viewed a strong national defense as an indispensable attribute of sovereignty. These two goals, in their eyes, went together. Pride in the nation and a spirit of self-sacrifice were indispensable prerequisites for national defense. In turn, the promotion of  national defense was a vital instrument for encouraging a nationalist revival (Otake 1983). The Left, in contrast, opposed both rearmament and the alliance with the United States, which they feared would lock Japan into the capitalist camp in the context of the Cold War. By focusing the victimization of the Japanese people at the hands of the United States, and especially on the US atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, they hoped to be able to mobilize public anger against the conservatives. At the same time, by encouraging a new national identity of Japan as a “peace nation” (heiwa kokka) they hoped to resist the conservatives’ campaign to revive a more traditional form of nationalism (Berger 1998). In the heated political atmosphere of the 1940s and 1950s, the mutually antagonistic views of the ideological Left and the Right fed off each other. For the Left, the conservatives were unreconstructed militarists intent on restoring the Imperial system and dragging Japan into a new series of military adventures. For the conservatives, the Left were pawns of Beijing and Moscow whose pacifist views both undermined Japanese national defense and prevented the development 355

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of a healthy sense of patriotism. The resulting polarization became one of the central features of post-1945 Japanese politics reaching into the twenty-first century. Between the Left and the Right was the large number of more moderate Japanese who were suspicious of both the conservative’s extreme nationalism and the Left’s Marxist ideology. Elements of the two sides’ stance on history had widespread resonance with centrists. There was a widespread desire to mourn family members who had died fighting as soldiers and sailors in the war (Shibuichi 2005: 214–15). While ordinary Japanese at times expressed revulsion at reports of atrocities committed by Japan’s forces overseas (Dower 1999: 504–8), they preferred to think of the sons, husbands and fathers who had died in uniform as heroes who had fallen fighting a tragic war. At the same time, there was also widespread anger at the old Imperial elites who had launched the nation on a catastrophic war that they should have known they could not win and which they had waged with utter disregard for the value of human life, all in the name of a misguided, fanatical belief in the nation and loyalty to the Emperor. In this sense, the Japanese public harbored a deep sense of double-victimization – victimization at the hands of the Allied powers who had ruthlessly slaughtered over two million Japanese, and victimization at the hands of the militarist government. This sense of what one American scholar described as “heroic victimization” became the perhaps one unifying feature of Japanese thinking about the past (Orr 2001). The Japanese domestic political debate did not occur in a vacuum. In particular, the United States, as the chief occupying power in Japan, had considerable leverage over Japan, and initially it was intent on using that leverage to promote a very different historical narrative than that of either the Japanese Right or the Left. Not satisfied with having won a military victory against Japan, the United States also sought to win a moral one as well. Repugnance over Japanese atrocities ran deep. Moreover, the US government had arrived at the conclusion that the successful inculcation of democracy in Japan required rooting out and delegitimating anti-democratic elements in Japanese society. Through the instruments of war crime trials, purges and control over the media and the educational establishments, the United States promoted a vision of a Japan that had been guilty of crimes against peace and crimes against humanity. The Tokyo War Crimes Trials of the senior Japanese political and military leadership were of particular importance in this context (Harries and Harries 1987). Yet, despite its immense power, the United States quickly ran into serious limits to its ability to shape Japanese views. On the most immediate level, many of those the United States wanted to put on trial were precisely the people that were needed to rebuild a ruined and potentially volatile country – beginning with the Japanese Emperor. Already in 1946, the commander of the occupation forces, General Douglas MacArthur, wrote back to Washington warning – perhaps somewhat hyperbolically – that if the United States placed the Emperor on trial he would need perhaps a million more troops to deal with the uprising that he expected might result. Making matters worse, many of those who were placed on trial as war criminals – such as former Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo – had been well known as fierce opponents of the war. Others who were not placed on trial undoubtedly should have been. The arbitrary and politicized nature of the US efforts to pursue Japanese guilt soon undermined the legitimacy of the entire project in the eyes of the Japanese people (Totani 2009). According to a 1955 government survey, 65% of the Japanese public had an essentially resigned attitude towards the trials (shikata ga nai), and 63% of those surveyed felt that they had been too harsh in their judgment (Yoshida 1995: 41). Many inside of the occupation also became convinced that the entire enterprise had been misguided. With the intensification of the Cold War and increased US concerns over the growing influence of pro-Moscow and proBeijing forces in Japan, the United States quietly decided to reverse its efforts, releasing many former conservatives – such as Kishi – who had been held for war crimes. 356

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With US support, the conservatives eventually won the upper hand in the domestic political battle, but they could only do so by going into coalition with the centrists and compromising on a broad range of issues, including history. While the United States gave up trying to convince the Japanese people of their moral culpability for the war, it insisted on the Japanese government at least formally paying lip service to the principle that it had been at fault in the war. Under Article Eleven of the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco, which formally ended the war between Japan and the Western allies, Japan agreed to accept the verdict of the Tokyo War Crimes Trials. The Japanese government also agreed to pay reparations to Allied countries that had suffered during the war and to Allied prisoners of war. The sums paid, however, were relatively modest, with the exception of the large amounts of Japanese property in its former colonies to which Japan abandoned all claim. In return, the United States and the Western allies agreed that neither they nor their citizens would pursue any further claims against Japan (Finn 1995: 197–9). The San Francisco formula, while much criticized by advocates of a more vigorous pursuit of Japanese guilt, nonetheless set the broad parameters for acceptable discourse on history which all subsequent Japanese governments took care to observe. Future Japanese governments would take care to avoid adopting an outright revisionist stance of the sort favored by many conservatives for fear of the potential diplomatic repercussions. The conservatives also had to compromise with both the centrists and the Left. This was most clearly evident in the area of defense and national security policy, which was closely intertwined with historical issues. While Japan did align itself with the United States and create a small but highly professional military establishment, it avoided creating the kind of large military establishment that the conservatives and many in the United States hoped for. Moreover, its strategic relationship with Washington was highly asymmetrical – the United States committed itself to come to Japan’s aid if Japan were attacked, but Japan refused to become involved in military operations beyond its own territory and its armed forces were only loosely linked with those of the United States. Underlying this eschewal of creating a stronger military and entering into a more vigorous alliance was the historically grounded fear that to do so would not only drag Japan into wars overseas, but in the event of an emergency the conservatives would stir up nationalist passions and recreate a more authoritarian system of government. Periodically, the conservatives would try to overcome these self-imposed limitations on Japanese defense policy and the historical narrative that undergirded it, but whenever they did so they triggered fierce opposition not only from the Left, but also from the center. When the divisions became deep enough, the coalition between the  centrists and the ideological conservatives would begin to disintegrate (Berger 1998; Otake 1980). While many LDP politicians and their conservative constituents harbored deeply revisionist views regarding Japanese history, their ability to propagate such views through government policy was limited. Following a bitter campaign in the late 1950s, the conservatives were able to force Japanese textbook authors to omit references to Japanese wartime atrocities. However, in the face of bitter opposition from the left-wing Japanese teachers union (Nikkyoso), a considerable degree of freedom was given to schools with regard to the kinds of supplemental materials teachers could use, and outright revisionist views regarding Japanese history were rejected (Duke 1972). The use of traditional national symbols – such as the flying of the Japanese flag or singing the national anthem (kimigayo) – were sharply restricted. The Yasukuni shrine in Tokyo – dedicated to the spirits of the Japanese soldiers and sailors who died in the war – continued to be used as a site where the spirits of fallen Japanese soldiers were commemorated, but official state sponsorship of the shrine was terminated (Takenaka 2015). The LDP controlled Diet voted to release the remaining Japanese war criminals from Japanese prisons by 1958, but the government was unable to foster a particularly positive view of the Japanese military. Indeed, 357

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members of the SDF who lived through that period report that they preferred not to wear their uniforms off base because of the hostile public attitude that they encountered (author’s personal conversation with former SDF officers). The official historical narrative was reduced to the lowest common denominator acceptable to all sides – one that denounced war and militarism while expressing sorrow for the suffering of the Japanese people. Beyond the United States, other countries had little interest or little ability to influence the Japanese debate. The other Western powers whose citizens had been victimized by Japan – Australia, Holland and the United Kingdom – decided to follow the US lead on the issue. China was preoccupied with its own internal struggle between the nationalist Guomindang under Chiang Kai Shek and the Communists led by Mao. While Chiang in particular was interested in extracting reparations from Japan, he was constrained by both the United States and by his need to court the Japanese support for his life and death struggle with the Communists. In the 1952 treaty normalizing relations between the Republic of China (by then reduced to Taiwan) and Japan, Chiang followed the San Francisco Treaty formula and gave up the right to make any claims for reparations against Japan (Rose 2005: 41–3). For their part the Chinese Communists similarly chose to adopt a lenient stance, releasing Japanese prisoners of war at a relatively early date and promoting a version of history assigning responsibility for the war to a small “militarist clique” and portraying the Japanese people, like the rest of the peoples of Asia, as victims of capitalist, Imperial oppression (He 2009: 107–12). When China began to normalize relations with Japan, it too renounced any right to demand reparations, settling instead for large sums of foreign aid and creating a business-friendly climate in which Japanese investment began to flood in. Other Asian countries similarly settled for aid and trade rather than pursuing apologies and reparations, beginning with Burma, which normalized relations with Toyo in 1954. The only country that tried to seriously challenge Japan’s minimally penitent stance was South Korea. The new government of Rhee Synghman had made a hard anti-Japanese stance one of its two ideological pillars along with anti-Communism, a stance that was reinforced by North Korean accusations that the ruling business and political classes in the South had been collaborators during the Japanese colonial period. The fact that Pyongyang’s charges in many cases had a solid basis in reality made it vital for Rhee to demonstrate his government’s nationalist credentials. Consequently, normalization talks between Tokyo and Seoul were time and again disrupted by historical issues, beginning in 1953 when the head of the Japanese negotiating team suggested that Japanese colonization had brought great economic benefit and that if Japan had not taken over Korea in 1910 other countries would have (Yoon 2011: 18). Not until 1965 were the two countries finally able to normalize relations, and even then Korean President Park Chung Hee had to deploy thousands of troops to suppress the large-scale protests that broke out across his country. Even Korea, however, in the end was forced to accept what Japan had to offer – a normalization of relations without a formal apology and an abandonment of the right to press reparation claims in return for aid and an improved business climate, coupled with vague expressions of regret on the part of senior Japanese leaders over past “difficulties” (Wakamiya 1998: 235–40). Korea’s security fears against the backdrop of an intensifying Vietnam war, and the urgent need for Japanese assistance to support the ROK’s industrialization drive, convinced the Korean government that it had no other choice (Cha 1996). Japan’s historical memories during the 1950s through the early 1970s therefore existed in a strange twilight world where the conservative dominated LDP government adapted a very limited stance of formal penance towards the outside world, while domestically expressing little or no remorse for Japan’s role as an aggressor. It was a world in which history remained a fiercely contested space, where revisionist writers like Hayashi Fusao wrote bestselling books glorifying 358

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Japan’s struggle against the West as holy war against white racist Imperialism (Fusao 1968), while mainstream left-wing intelligentsia was sharply critical of the Japanese Empire and virtually every aspect of pre-war Japan. It was a world where the public was simultaneously deeply sympathetic towards the Japanese victims of the war and relatively uninterested in Japan’s role as a perpetrator of atrocities. Inevitably, many were deeply dissatisfied with this contradictory state of affairs. For the Left, Japan’s unwillingness to face the dark side of the past perpetuated the risk of a return to authoritarian nationalism. For the Right, the failure to promote a more positive view of modern Japanese history prevented the emergence of a “healthy patriotism” and robbed Japan of the will to defend itself from its enemies, both internal and external. Most importantly, it meant that many victims were neglected, both within Japan and abroad. Inside of Japan, certain groups – especially veterans – received generous compensation, while others, such as the victims of the atomic bombings (hibakusha), were largely ignored (Tanaka 1999). Outside of Japan the situation was much worse, with millions of victims receiving little or no acknowledgement or assistance, even from their own governments. Regardless of these shortcomings, Japan had managed to find with its neighbors an equilibrium on historical issues that met certain basic needs. Domestically, it allowed for the contentious coexistence of sharply polarized ideological groups within a democratic framework. Internationally, the pretense of penance permitted Japan to find a modus vivendi with virtually all of its neighbors (North Korea being the sole exception) and to establish economic relations that would prove immensely beneficial to both Japan and the region. While fierce debates continued, historical issues did not disrupt Japanese politics in the 1970s into the early 1980s, neither did they have much impact on Japan’s diplomatic relations after 1972. This would change dramatically in 1982.

Getting to sorry: the era of apology diplomacy 1982–2002 Starting in the 1970s, the domestic Japanese discourse on history began to move in an increasingly liberal direction. After Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka’s historic visit to Beijing, there was a sharp increase in popular interest in Japan’s relations with China and other Asian countries, and a growing readiness to confront the darker sides of Japanese history. Beginning with the enormously successful Ch ugoku no Tabi (Journey to China) by Asahi newspaper reporter Tatsukichi Honda (Honda 1972), a wave of bestselling books came out describing in detail the Chinese experience of the war and the horrors of the Japanese occupation. Japanese textbooks began to carry again descriptions of Japanese wartime atrocities, and legal battles over the Ministry of Education’s system of screening the contents of textbooks intensified (Nozaki and Inokuchi 2000). Public opinion data seemed to shift in the direction of increased acknowledgement of Japan’s role as a victimizer as well as a victim, even though a certain degree of ambiguity remained over whether Japan had been forced into war or not. By 1982, 51% of those surveyed agreed with the statement that the fifty-year period between the first Sino-Japanese War and the end of the Second World War had been one of aggression against Japan’s Asian neighbors (Yoshida 1995: 216). A number of factors played a role in changing Japanese attitudes. First and foremost, the passage of time and a generational shift had created a window of opportunity in which old views and attitudes regarding a traumatic past could be reexamined. In this Japan was no different than many other Western societies – such as Germany, Austria or France – which required at least twenty years before such a reexamination at least became possible (Berger 2012). Increased political stabilization and vastly improved economic conditions undoubtedly gave Japan the confidence that it could afford such a reexamination, while the increased internationalization of Japanese society gave millions of Japanese greater exposure to outside views. In addition, the shift 359

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in Japanese attitudes reflected broader international shifts among advanced industrial democracies in the direction of increased concern about human rights issues, including the pursuit of historical justice (Barkan 2000). This apparent leftward shift in public opinion provoked a backlash from more conservative quarters. A fierce, polemical battle over historical issues ensued. In the late 1970s, the reintensification of the Cold War and the buildup of Soviet forces in the Far East prodded the usually fractious LDP to consolidate support around conservative, pro-defense leaders like Takeo Fukuda and Yasuhiro Nakasone. Following the pattern that had been set in the 1950s, these conservative leaders saw the promotion of nationalism as the indispensable, spiritual component of any program to strengthen Japanese national security, leading among other things to a new  emphasis on promoting a more positive view of Japanese history in school textbooks (Otake 1983; Berger 1998). The conservative campaign to promote a positive view of the past, however, provoked fierce criticism not only domestically, but internationally as well. In 1982, large-scale protests broke out in China and South Korea in response to reports that the Nakasone government was preparing to tighten the textbook screening process and pressure textbook authors to use language that would downplay Japanese responsibility for the war. Likewise, in 1985, major demonstrations broke out throughout Asia after Prime Minister Nakasone made an official visit to the Yasukuni shrine. Furthering heightening the provocative character of the visit, Nakasone linked it to increased defense spending as well as achieving a “final resolution of Japanese postwar history” (sengoseiji no s okessan) (Kamanishi 1986: 21–2). In both instances, the Japanese government was surprised by the intensity of the Chinese and Korean reactions. While Nakasone and his conservative supporters were strongly committed to fostering a new official historical narrative, South Korea and China were vital allies in the battle to contain the Soviet Union, and measures were taken to placate them. Nakasone visited Seoul and apologized for Japan’s history of waging aggressive war against its neighbors and colonial domination – becoming the first head of government to use that language. His Chief Cabinet Secretary Kiichi Miyazawa made it a principle that henceforth the feelings of neighboring countries would be a criterion in evaluating textbooks (Jeans 2005: 185). Similarly, following his trip to Yasukuni, Nakasone ceased any further visits, telling his conservative supporters that “spirits of the war dead would not be happy about worshippers undermining the national interest” (Wakamiya 1998: 177) – an ingenious combination of Shinto theology and hard-nosed realpolitik. A variety of structural factors were behind this increased sensitivity to Japan’s official narrative. First, in contrast to the 1950s and 1960s, China and South Korea had far greater leverage over Japan given their growing economic strength and strategic importance in dealing with the Soviet military threat. Japan could simply not afford to neglect Chinese and South Korean popular sentiment as it had during the early Cold War period. Second, in both countries, there had been a loosening of controls on public debate. In Korea a more prosperous and educated middle class began to vigorously challenge the authoritarian government’s authority, a process that would lead to a full-scale transition to democracy in 1987. Left-wing critics of the authoritarian military government used the history issue, and in particular the regime’s failure to stand up for the rights of Korean victims of Japanese colonial oppression, as a potent symbol of the regime’s moral bankruptcy. In China the space for public discourse was more constrained than in Korea. Nonetheless, in the reform era ushered in after 1978, it became possible to voice opinions on a far wider range of topics than in the past. In this context, there was a renewed awareness of Japanese wartime atrocities, and a new sensitivity to responding to any perceived insult to Chinese national honor. In many instances, protestors were not only criticizing Japan, but also the Chinese government’s 360

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failure to respond to Japanese actions. While Chinese leaders could ignore or suppress such popular pressures, at times they used them to attack their opponents in the leadership. Chinese leaders who were seen as close to Japan – such as Hu Yaobang in 1985 – were particularly vulnerable to such attacks (He 2009: 273–4). Finally, the spread of human rights norms gave greater legitimacy to victims’ groups across Asia, allowing them to reopen the question of Japanese responsibility for pre-1945 injustices and encouraging them to press for apologies and reparations even though their governments had formally given up the right to do so (Berger 2012: chapter 5). Clearly the old equilibrium on historical issues was falling apart. While the Cold War continued, the Japanese government’s response to these changed conditions tended to be reactive and piecemeal. With the end of the East-West conflict in 1991, however, a consensus emerged that a concerted effort needed to be made to pursue genuine reconciliation with Japan’s neighbors. Beginning in 1991, Japanese Prime Ministers began to offer increasingly clear and unambiguous statements of contrition, culminating on the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the War in the Pacific in 1995 when Socialist Prime Minister Tomoiichi Murayama issued a remarkably strong apology for the suffering that Japan had inflicted on the people of Asia through colonial rule and wars of aggression (Togo 2013a). Japan also began to offer limited, but symbolically important amounts of compensation and aid to victims’ groups, most importantly to the former comfort women who had been pressed into sexual slavery during the war. In 1993 Chief Cabinet Secretary Y ohei K ono issued an official apology recognizing Japanese government complicity in setting up the comfort system, followed by the establishment of the Asian Women’s Fund in 1995 offering financial aid and support to any former  comfort women who could be identified (Onuma 2007). Japan’s efforts at pursuing reconciliation with its neighbors enjoyed some success in creating a new equilibrium, in particular in the context of its relations with South Korea. In a historic meeting in the summer of 1998, President Kim Dae Jung met with Prime Minister Keiz o Obuchi. Obuchi not only offered an apology, but just as importantly Kim Dae Jung accepted the apology and spoke of the need to forge future oriented relations (Moon and Suh 2005). Following the summit, the atmosphere between the two countries improved markedly. Public opinion polls showed that the percentage of Koreans expressing dislike for Japan declined from 65% in 1996 to 42.6% in 1999, while the percentage of Japanese expressing a lack of friendliness towards Korea decreased from 60.6% to 46.9% over the same period (Ku 2008: 25). Japanese relations with China remained rockier than with South Korea. When Chinese leader Jiang Zemin visited Japan a few weeks after Kim Dae Jung, Obuchi was unwilling to offer the kind of apology that he had given to Korea, in part because he believed that even if an apology were offered, it would ultimately not be accepted (Wakamiya 1998: 256–61). Nonetheless, while relations between the two countries remained chilly over historical issues, there were no largescale protests against Japan as there had been in 1982 and 1985, even after Prime Minister Ry utar o Hashimoto visited the Yasukuni Shrine in 1996. In sum, by the 1990s, Japan had once again found a new balance over the historical issues, this time one based on a more penitent stance. Resistance from conservative quarters within Japan continued to be fierce. Conservative members of the LDP often made statements designed to undercut their government’s efforts to reconcile with Japan’s neighbors, and civil society groups such as the revisionist Committee for the Creation of New Textbooks (Tsukurukai) kept up a steady, anti-apology campaign in the Japanese press and media. Nonetheless, the economic motives for keeping relations on an even keel seemed overwhelming, and the Japanese public as a whole appeared broadly supportive of the policy of apology (Saaler 2006: 138–43). Thus, at the start of the twenty-first century, Japan seemed to be moving in the same direction as many 361

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European countries like Austria, France and Switzerland, which only beginning in the 1990s had started to come to terms with their respective roles in the Holocaust (Lebow, Kansteiner and Fugu 2006).

Apologies through gritted teeth: 2002 to present In the early 2000s, the new equilibrium on history came under increasing pressure as a result of the unfortunate interaction between a worsening international security climate, territorial disputes and the politics of nationalism in Asian countries. With the reemergence of a North Korean nuclear and missile threat after 1998, and with increased US pressure on Japan to contribute more to the international security order after 9/11, the Japanese political establishment recognized the need to make significant new adjustments to Japan’s national security policies. As in the past, this shift in priorities brought the ideological conservatives to the forefront, and once again they sought to promote a more nationalist official historical narrative. In 2002, the newly elected Prime Minister Junichir o Koizumi ignored the warnings from many inside the Japanese government and made good on a campaign promise to visit the Yasukuni Shrine. While many thought that he did so to garner conservative electoral support, Koizumi was also at least in part motivated by the belief that at a time when Japan was once again preparing to dispatch forces abroad into dangerous situations, it was necessary to pay respects to those who had given their lives for their country (Tanaka 2008: 134). Thereafter he would visit the shrine every year – a total of six times – until he left office in 2007. At first, China and Korea were relatively restrained in responding to Koizumi’s repeated provocations. After Koizumi’s second visit in 2003, however, tensions began to spike rapidly. In South Korea, the left-wing Roh Moo Hyun had entered office intending to continue the reconciliation process that his predecessor Kim Dae Jung had started. Koizumi’s repeated visits to the shrine made this untenable. To make matters worse, in 2004 Japan’s Shimane prefecture – with the support of the nationalist Nihon Kaigi, which included many parliamentarians in its ranks – had reignited the long-standing territorial dispute over the Dokdo/Takeshima1 islands which both countries claimed but which had been under Korean control since 1952 (Bukh 2015). Faced with a decline in his support ratings, and under growing pressure from Korean civil society actors, Roh sharply denounced Japan’s actions and linked Japan’s stance on Dokdo/ Takeshima to its annexation of Korea in 1910. In a televised address to the nation, Roh declared what he called “the diplomatic equivalent of war,” suspending all diplomatic cooperation in Japan and threatening to defend Dokdo by force if necessary (Asahi March 24, 2005: 1, 2, 7). At the same time, Sino-Japanese relations entered into a downward spiral. The new Chinese leader, Hu Jintao, had come into power in 2003, and like Roh initially intended to maintain positive ties with Japan (Tanaka 2008). Koizumi’s repeated visits to Yasukuni, however, made it difficult for him to do so, and as with the case with South Korea, territorial disputes further complicated the picture. Tensions over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands were on the rise, spurred by growing competition over fish and other natural resources as well as by the pressures created by the UNCLOS regime to stake out maritime claims. From 2003 to 2005 a series of often ugly anti-Japanese incidents broke out all across China, culminating in massive anti-Japanese demonstrations in 2005 (Chen Weiss 2014: chapter 6). Faced with a potential complete breakdown, the three countries began to restabilize their relations. In 2005 Koizumi reaffirmed the Maruyama apology in a major speech given in Bandung, followed soon thereafter by a visit to Japan by Hu Jintao’s second in command, Premier Wen Jiaobao. Roh Moo Hyun was forced to tone down his anti-Japanese rhetoric or face the risk of diplomatic isolation, and his more conservative successor, Lee Myun Bak, came into office 362

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seeking to put relations between Tokyo and Seoul on a more practical, business-like footing. After Koizumi stepped down, his successor, Shinz o Abe helped further relax tensions by ceasing official visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. In 2009 the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) came into office with an Asia first strategy that sought to further reduce tensions over history and promote the creation of a strong network of East Asian regional institutions. The respite would prove short lived, however, as new rioting broke out in China following the arrest of the captain of a Chinese fishing trawler in the waters around the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. In 2012, however, the situation took a further sharp downturn. This time the spark came from the ultra-conservative Governor of Tokyo, Shintar o Ishihara, who managed to force the DPJ government of Yoshihiko Noda to officially nationalize the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. More or less at the same time, President Lee Myun Bak came under increased domestic political pressure to negotiate a new package of measures to provide assistance to the surviving comfort women. Talks between Lee and Noda broke down, however, over apparently trivial issues concerning the framing of the agreement, as well as an ill-considered demand by Noda that the Korean government withdraw the statue of a comfort woman that had been erected across from the Japanese embassy in Seoul.2 A veritable explosion in Japan’s relations with its neighbors ensued late in 2012. Mass demonstrations – both bigger and more violent than those of 2005 and 2010 – broke out across China to protest Japan’s position on the Senkaku/Diaoyus. Chinese fishing boats, backed by maritime police vessels, began to intrude into the disputed waters around the islands. Well-armed ships from the Chinese navy lurked in the background, facing off with their counterparts from the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Forces. For the first time, the Chinese government explicitly linked the islands to historical issues, saying that Japan had “stolen” the islands from China with the help of outside powers (i.e. the United States) and that their restitution to China was a matter of historical justice, restoring what had been taken from China by force during its “century of humiliation” following the Opium Wars (Togo 2013b; Drifte 2014). In Korea as well there were fierce anti-Japanese demonstrations, and President Lee Myun Bak made a quick helicopter trip to the Dokdo/Takeshima islands, the first ever undertaken by a Korean head of state. There Lee angrily reiterated Roh Moo Hyun’s declaration that Korea would defend Dokdo by force if need be, and demanded that if the Japanese Emperor should visit Japan, he should sincerely apologize to the victims of Japanese colonial domination. South Korea and China than began to work together to diplomatically isolate Japan in East Asia, breaking off high level diplomatic communications. Seoul also cancelled long planned agreements on cooperation on intelligence and logistics, agreements that were considered by both Korean and Japanese security experts as vital to managing the rising threat from North Korea (Togo 2013b). After December 2014, tensions subsided once again when Abe met with the new Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, on the sidelines of the annual APEC meeting in Vancouver. In Korea, Lee’s successor, President Park Gyeun He, managed with great difficulty to revive the failed agreement on new compensation for the comfort women. In both cases, the United States – which in the past had viewed the history issue as a basically second order issue – played a key role, actively backing Japan on the territorial issue and pressuring both Seoul and Tokyo to stabilize relations and work together to meet the steadily worsening security challenges on the Korean peninsula. Once again, an equilibrium on historical issues, and patterns of cooperation in trade and other areas were restored. This time, few of the participants believed in the possibility of any genuine reconciliation. The leaders were merely going through the motions, offering – and accepting – apologies through gritted teeth. 363

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Conclusion It is difficult to look back upon the history problem in East Asia with much of a sense of optimism. While a complete breakdown of relations has been avoided, the passage of time paradoxically has made the issue more, not less toxic. The period of time between crises over history appears to be growing shorter, while the amplitude of popular protests has increased. Moreover, the growing entanglement of the history issue with territorial disputes has inserted a dangerous new element – inflaming nationalist passions on all sides and making it more difficult for the region’s leaders to find practical solutions. The high degree of economic interdependence in the region continues to limit how far governments in the region are willing to allow tensions to go. The US intervention on the issue also has played a welcome, stabilizing role. Over time, however, there are questions about Washington’s ability and willingness to continue to play the kind of central role that it has. Moreover, slowing economic growth creates the temptation for leaders to appeal to nationalist sentiments to divert public attention from domestic problems. Now, more than ever, leaders in Beijing, Seoul and Tokyo need to devote time and energy to create a new and more stable equilibrium on the history issue. Unfortunately, now, more than ever, the general perception is that no progress can be made. As a result, future crises appear all but inevitable, further eroding the already precarious political willingness to cooperate and further increasing the risk of more violent and dangerous confrontations.

Notes 1

2

Here all disputed territories will be referred to with both names, with the name used by the country that actually controls the islands coming first. In this case, Dokdo is the name used by Koreans, Takeshima by the Japanese. On this point, the author is indebted to conversations he had with ambassador Kazuhiko Togo and Dan Sneider of Stanford University, as well as interviews in Tokyo, November 2012 and Boston, April 2014 with Japanese diplomats who were directly involved in these discussions.

Bibliography Barkan, E. (2000) The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices, New York: W.W. Norton. Berger, T. (1998) Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Berger, T. (2012) War, Guilt and World Politics After World War II, New York and Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Bukh, A. (2015) ‘Shimane Prefecture, Tokyo and the Territorial Dispute Over Dokdo/Takeshima: Regional and National Identities in Japan’, The Pacific Review, 28(1): 47–70. Cha, V. (1996) ‘Bridging the Gap: The Strategic Context of the 1965 Korea–Japan Normalization Treaty’, Korean Studies, 20: 123–60. Chang, I. (1997) The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II, New York: Basic Books. Chen Weiss, J. (2014) Powerful Patriots: Nationalist Protest in China’s Foreign Relations, New York and London: Oxford University Press. Dower, J. (1999) Embracing Defeat; Japan in the Wake of WW II, New York: W.W. Norton. Drifte, R. (2014) ‘Moving Forward on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Issue: Political Context and Policy Options’, Journal of International Law and Diplomacy, 113(2): 49–68. Duke, B. (1972) ‘The Textbook Controversy’, Japan Quarterly, 19: 337–52. Finn, R. (1995) Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida and Postwar Japan, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Harries, M. and Harries, S. (1987) Sheathing the Sword: The Demilitarization of Japan, New York: Macmillan. Hayashi, F. (1968) Daitoa Senso Koteiron, Tokyo: Tsubasa Shoin. 364

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He, Y. (2007) ‘History, Chinese Nationalism and the Emerging Sino-Japanese, Conflict’, Journal of Contemporary China, 15(50): 1–24. He, Y. (2009) The Search for Reconciliation: Sino-Japanese and German-Polish Relations Since World War II, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Hicks, G. (1997) Japan’s War Memories: Amnesia or Concealment, London: Routledge. Honda, T. (1972) Ch ugoku no Tabi, Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha. Jeans, R. (2005) ‘Victims or Victimizers? Museums, Textbooks and the War Debate in Contemporary Japan’, The Journal of Military History, 69(1): 149–95. Kamanishi, A. (1986) GNP 1% Waku: Boeiseisaku no Kensho, Tokyo: Kakugawa. Ku, Y. (2008) ‘International Reconciliation in the Postwar Era, 1945–2005: A Comparison of Japan-ROK and Franco-German Relations’, Asian Perspective, 32(3): 5–37. Lebow, R., Kansteiner, W. and Fugu, C. (eds) (2006) Politics and Memory in Postwar Europe, Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press. Lind, J. (2008) Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Long, W. and Brecke, P. (2003) War Reconciliation: Reason and Emotion in Conflict Resolution, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Moeller, R. (1996) ‘War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany’, American Historical Review, 101(4): 1008–48. Moon, C. and Suh, S. (2005) ‘Security, Economy and Identity Politics: Japan-South Korean Relations Under the Kim-Dae Jung Government’, Korea Observer, 36(4): 564–73. Nozaki, Y. and Inokuchi, H. (2000) ‘Japanese Education, Nationalism, and Ienaga Saburo’s Textbook Lawsuits’, in L. E. Hein and M. Selden (eds), Censoring History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany, and the United States, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharp, 96–126.  Onuma, Y. (2007) Ianfu Mondai to wa nan datta no ka? Media, NGO Seifu no Kozai, Tokyo: Ch uo K oron Shinsha. Orr, J. (2001) The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Japan, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press.  Otake, H. (1983) Boei to Kokunai Seiji: detaanto kara Gunkaku e, Tokyo: San Ichi Shobo. Rose, C. (2005) Sino-Japanese Relations: Looking to the Past, Facing the Future?, London: Routledge. Rummel, R. (1991) China’s Bloody Century: Genocide and Mass Murder since 1900, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Saaler, S. (2006) Politics, Memory and Public Opinion: The History Textbook Controversy and Japanese Society, Munich, Germany: Ludicum Verlag. Seraphim, F. (2006) War Memory and Social Politics in Japan, 1945–2005, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Shibuichi, D. (2005) ‘The Yasukuni Shrine and the Politics of Identity in Japan’, Asian Survey, 45(2): 197–215. Takenaka, A. (2015) Yasukuni Shrine: History, Memory and Japan’s Unending Postwar, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press. Tanaka, H. (1999) ‘Nihon no Sengo Hosho to Rekishi Ninshiki’, in K. Awaya, Senso Sekinin Sengo Sekinin, Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha. Tanaka, A. (2008) ‘Enshrinement Politics: War Dead and War Criminals at Yasukuni Shrine’, Japan Focus www.japanfocus.org/products/topdf/1747 accessed 3 March 2008. Togo, K. (ed.) (2013a) Japan and Reconciliation: The Murayama Statement and its Implications, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Togo, K. (2013b) Rekishininshiki o toinaosu: Yasukuni, Ianfu, Ryodo Mondai, Tokyo: Kadokawa Shoten. Totani, Y. (2009) The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Pursuit of Justice in the Wake of World War II, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University East Asia Center. Wakamiya, Y. (1998) The Postwar Conservative View of Asia: How the Political Right has Delayed Japan’s Coming to Terms with its History of Aggression in Asia, Tokyo: LTCB International Library Foundation. White, H. (1987) The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Yamazaki, J. (2005) Japanese Apologies for World War Two: A Rhetorical Study, London and New York: Routledge. Yoon, T. (2011) ‘Historical Animosity Is What States Make of It: The Role of Morality and Realism in Korea-Japan Relations’, Korean Journal of International Relations, 9(1): 1–37. Yoshida, Y. (1995) Nihonjin no Sensokan: Sengoshi no Naka no Henyo, Tokyo: Iwanami.

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23 The power and limits of the transnational “comfort women” movement Mary M. McCarthy

Introduction Global norms have the power to impact foreign policy by shaping how states conceive of their interests. They may do this by shifting the rational cost-benefit calculations of different policy choices or even by transforming the whole debate so that new choices appear and others disappear. Norms are created through the initial work of “norm entrepreneurs,” individuals who seek to infuse into the national, regional, or global consciousness the idea that certain behavior is right and morally correct. Therefore, non-state actors play an integral role in norm emergence. Still, entrepreneurs must elicit the assistance of “norm leaders,” states that are critical to the issue area and can formulate their foreign policy such that they actively support the emerging norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). States also have agency in terms of how they interact with global norms, behavior that is often highly conditioned by their own domestic political scene. The issue of the “comfort women” is a case in point. During the 1990s transnational advocacy groups seeking historical justice for sexual slaves of the Japanese imperial armed forces not only drew attention to the matter but transformed the international discourse surrounding the plight of these women by reframing the issue as a women’s rights and human rights issue, areas that were already being seen as global norms. However, this case also reveals the limitations of normative change in bringing about actual foreign policy change. Although advocates modified the normative foundations of the discourse about “comfort women,” their partnership with states to achieve their goals meant that power remained with those states, whose interests ultimately differed from those of the transnational actors. Thus, in 2015, we saw an agreement between Japan and South Korea on the “comfort women” issue that did not advance the goals of the original transnational advocates but did help the governments of Japan and South Korea (as well as the US) put themselves on a path to be able to put this issue behind them, at least for the time being, in order to move onto cooperation on issues deemed of high priority for all, such as North Korea.

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Transnational advocacy networks: their power and limits Keck and Sikkink (1998) introduced the concept of transnational advocacy networks (TANs) as a form of organization among committed and knowledgeable individuals across borders, who seek “to promote causes, principled ideas, and norms,” often along with policy change (pp. 8–9). They argue that TANs are most likely to appear when channels between domestic groups and their governments are blocked or ineffective as a means to resolve the issue, when activists believe that transnational networking will aid their cause, and when “conferences and other forms of international contact create arenas for forming and strengthening networks” (p. 12). Keck and Sikkink discuss the different types, or stages, of influence that TANs can have as: (1) issue creation and agenda setting; (2) influence on discursive positions of states and international organizations; (3) influence on institutional procedures; (4) influence on policy change in “target actors” which may be states, international organizations like the World Bank, or private actors like the Nestle Corporation; and (5) influence on state behavior. (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 25) I argue that a TAN emerged around the “comfort women” in the 1990s, due to the inability of concerned civil society groups to get a response from their governments in Japan and South Korea (as well as Taiwan and the Philippines). Transnational activists viewed the fora associated with the United Nations as appropriate ones to air their grievances and achieve historical justice for the “comfort women,” given the transnational nature of the issue itself and the human rights and women’s rights issues already under discussion at those venues at that time. These activists successfully introduced the issue into global public consciousness and established the tone and rhetoric of the discussion both at the international organization level and at the domestic state level around the world. However, as they sought to achieve policy change, their efforts were thwarted by the Japanese government’s ability to appeal to the material interests of the US and South Korea.

Who are the “comfort women”? “Comfort women” is a euphemism for women and girls from across Asia who were used as sexual slaves by the Japanese imperial armed forces during the 1930s and 1940s. Their experiences of recruitment varied. For example, some women on the Korean peninsula were deceived by solicitation for factory workers; whereas some women in Southeast Asia were forcibly removed from a civilian detention facility by Japanese soldiers (Ruff-O’Herne 1994; Soh 2008: 79–106; Yoshiaki 1995: 98–128). During the 1980s, activists, scholars, and journalists in Japan, South Korea, and elsewhere, who were interested in the story of the “comfort women,” began to actively research the topic and seek out these women. Tsutsui dates the beginning of the “political mobilization for comfort women” to the late 1980s when Professor Yun Chung-Ok of Ehwa University made a presentation on the “comfort women” at an international conference on “Women and Tourism” and a protest arose in South Korea against representatives of the government attending the funeral of Emperor Hirohito (Tsutsui 2006: 336). Barkan notes the importance of the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul as a venue to inspire women’s activism, particularly among those Japanese and South Korean women’s organizations campaigning against the sex industry in South Korea. He sees the raising of the “comfort women” issue as a means to attract supporters for their goals with regard to the contemporary sex industry and argues that “rallying against the Japanese occupation during the war became an effective tool that held appeal beyond the gender gap in Korea. It could enlist Japanese women activists as well as Korean men; it could combine gender and nationalism” (Barkan 2000: 54). In this way, 367

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by linking “comfort women” with the current sex industry, activists were able to attract more supporters for their issues of contemporary concern (i.e., sex tourism). At this time, the Japanese government officially denied that any system of sexual slavery had existed during World War II. Other governments in Asia were not primed to pursue this issue either. As Hein related in the 1990s: Asian governments [have not] been particularly interested in championing the military comfort women : : : The comfort women have received much more support in their bid for restitution from feminist organizations than from government officials in the Republic of Korea and other Asian countries, most of whom seemed to just want the old ladies to go away quietly. (Hein 1999: 349) In fact, Reilly argues that “At the 1995 Beijing Conference on Women, the official Chinese Women’s Federation resisted NGO pressure to address the comfort women issues, instead holding a ‘Friendship Meeting’ with their Japanese counterparts” (Reilly 2008: 97). And Barkan cites that even “in 1991 the Korean government was still uninterested in the issue. In contrast, there was more interest and cooperation from Japanese women, including a Diet representative, Shimizu Sumiko, who lent the campaign legitimacy” (Barkan 2000: 54). When activists are unable to resolve an issue in the context of their own governments, Keck and Sikkink predict that “domestic NGOs bypass their state and directly search out international allies to try to bring pressure on their states from outside” (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 12). This was particularly natural in the case of the “comfort women” because, first, the system itself had been transnational, with victims across Asia and beyond, and, second, transnational links already existed among some of these groups working on what they perceived to be a related issue, sex tourism in Asia. This meant that the second and third factors that Keck and Sikkink assert make the emergence of a TAN likely (perceived utility and existing arenas for exchange) were present in this case as well. As the example of the “Women and Tourism” conference illustrates, women’s organizations across Asia were already meeting to discuss and advocate for issues of common concern. Therefore, a “comfort women” movement could take advantage of existing networks. Another reason why activists thought it would be useful to take this issue to the international realm was because of emerging global norms, with regard to both women’s rights and the accountability of current governments for historical human rights abuses. As for the former, international norms, as they concerned women, changed in two important and related ways between the 1940s and the 1990s. First, sexual violence against women during armed conflict was no longer considered a natural course of how things were, but a crime against humanity that had to be punished. Second, women were encouraged to speak up with regard to their rights as human rights. Globally women were being considered less like property in the legal scheme of things, and sex crimes were seen as “crimes of violence and destruction” (Askin 2001: 7). As Askin relates, “History is replete with reports of women being raped, sexually enslaved, impregnated, sexually mutilated, and subjected to myriad other forms of sexual violence during periods of armed conflict, mass violence, occupation, resistance, and transition” (Askin 2003: 296). However: [w]hile the post-World War II trials held in Nuremberg and Tokyo largely neglected sexual violence, the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals have successfully prosecuted various forms of sexual violence as instruments of genocide, crimes against humanity, means of torture, forms of persecution and enslavement, and crimes of war. (Askin 2003: 288) 368

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As this both reflected and promoted emerging international norms, it also set a precedent for the punishment of behavior deemed unacceptable in these terms. The fact that a historical issue potentially could enter into these contemporary discourses was beginning to have a foundation for support as well with “the emergence of a nascent global historical justice regime” (Berger 2012: 166). “By the 1980s, the international parameters within which the history issue had been handled in the past had been transformed” to “a worldwide movement of activists, internationally active NGOs, and last, but not least, lawyers promoting the cause of historical justice” (p. 166). These transnational networks had an impact on discursive positions and policies of states. As Gluck describes, “What we now routinely call the ‘politics of apology’ is itself almost completely new. Heads of states in the 1950s were not expected as a routine matter to say ‘I’m sorry’ to other countries, even when reparations were involved” (Manabe 2013). Furthermore, with the third wave of democratization, domestic actors across Latin America, Asia, and Eastern Europe began to raise their voices to call for justice on a plethora of issues. This included unresolved issues that had occurred under a previous authoritarian regime as well as issues from World War II. For example: The pluralization of politics in China and South Korea allowed the long stifled voices of former victims to be heard. Increased regional economic and political interdependence gave those voices greater international political weight, while the spread of human rights norms gave them enhanced legitimacy. (Berger 2012: 166–7) As Tsutsui has argued, “When movement goals click with global norms of the time, the movement is more likely to succeed in the global arena” (Tsutsui 2006: 335). Therefore, the time was ripe for a “comfort women” transnational advocacy network to emerge.

TAN The transnational advocacy network for “comfort women” developed in stages as women’s organizations began to come together in support. First domestically and then transnationally. The most relevant domestic group in this regard is the Korean Council for Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan (commonly known as the Korean Council). It was founded in 1990 through the merging of a variety of Korean women’s organizations, with the goal of achieving Japanese government recognition, apology, and compensation for the “comfort women.” Toward that end it arranged for the first public testimony of a former “comfort woman,” that of Kim Hak-sun in 1991, and the launching of a suit brought by three former “comfort women” in Tokyo district court later that same year. As Ku describes: Kim’s testimony, reported by news media, attracted much attention from the Japanese public, notably promoting the cooperation of many Japanese groups with the Korean Council. Among these groups were the Association of Japanese Women, the Young Women’s Christian Association, the National Council of Churches in Japan, and the Asian Women Association. (Ku 2015: 256) Networking was also done across Asia to include all those nations that had victims of the “comfort women” system. Groups that joined in solidarity with the Korean Council across Asia included 369

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the Asian Center for Women’s Human Rights in the Philippines and the Taipei Women’s Rescue Foundation. According to Ku, however, it was the first Asian Women’s Solidarity Forum held in Seoul in 1992 that “formalized a transnational network dedicated to the comfort women issue” (Ku 2015: 256–7). As Keck and Sikkink state, “such face-to-face encounters generate the trust, information sharing, and discovery of common concerns that give impetus to network formation” (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 169). Cooperation, including data collection and information sharing, proliferated. The network continued to expand as: [f]eminists in Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Europe, North America, and Australia have provided most of the labour required to publicise the stories of both the military comfort women and women forced into the sex industry today. They have collected testimony, organised protests, spoken to the press, written legal briefs, designed lawsuits, and successfully petitioned the United Nations to investigate. (Hein 1999: 348) Now that they had successfully created a transnational network, the next stage was transnational advocacy for their cause. They had already tried direct appeals to national governments with no success. But with new attention being given to women and human rights at the United Nations, especially with the end of the Cold War, it was the ideal venue to further promote their cause. Japanese activists already had some experience with bringing issues of concern that were being ignored by the Japanese government to the United Nations. For example, Japanese activists had brought the issue of the mentally disabled to the UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities1 and, thereby, were able to achieve Japanese domestic policy change (Totsuka 1989). Therefore, this seemed a fitting venue to bring the issue of the “comfort women,” especially with the international normative changes described earlier. The TAN, with Korean and Japanese activists at its core, lobbied behind the scenes to gain allies and get the “comfort women” issue on the agenda at the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR)’s Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in the early 1990s. Most of those whom they contacted had not even been aware of the “comfort women” issue previously. When informed, many were more concerned with ongoing human rights abuses around the world, as opposed to historical ones. Some were even reluctant to accept that their Sub-Commission was an appropriate place for the investigation of historical injustices.2 Still, the “comfort women” TAN did not have a single-pronged attack. Not only did they lobby behind the scenes and try to get on the Sub-Commission agenda, “these newly networked groups actively sought to raise the comfort women issue in international conferences sponsored by the UN” (Ku 2015: 257). They formed the Asian Women’s Forum at the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna and adopted a resolution calling on the UN to investigate the “comfort women” system. They also actively participated in the lead up to the 1995 World Conference on Women in Beijing. By using existing fora, they assured themselves publicity and they were able to get their preliminary goals achieved step by step. Thus Ku claims that “this mobilized transnational activism significantly increased issue resonance in the international community” (Ku 2015: 257). Arguably their greatest success in this arena was the inclusion of the “comfort women” case in the 1996 report of the UNCHR’s Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, commonly referred to as the Coomaraswamy Report, after the report author and human rights advocate Radhika Coomaraswamy. (The existence of this report was itself the direct result of another TAN, women’s networks seeking global attention to women’s rights (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 187).) 370

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It was the first of three issue reports and the inclusion of the “comfort women” reportedly “provoked a hostile reaction from the Japanese government” (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 188). The investigation of the “comfort women” in this report legitimized the activist claim that this issue of historical justice was an appropriate issue of which to demand contemporary restitution and to be discussed at venues that included discussion of current human rights issues.

How transnational actors transformed the dialogue One of the most significant achievements of the “comfort women” TAN was its ability to change international and national rhetoric. This was not only with regard to the fact that the “comfort women” issue was now considered an appropriate case to be discussed alongside contemporary human rights, but in the terminology used to describe it. Terminology can transform an issue, fundamentally changing our attitudes toward it and our ability to discuss it. Prior to the mid-1990s, most former “comfort women” remained silent about their experience. Even when these women began to come forward, it tended to be those without families. There was a great deal of shame connected with the experience of sexual violence. This was the result of social patriarchies but also (relatedly) of the practice of defining these women as prostitutes or camp followers, as they had been described in the 1944 Japanese Prisoner of War Interrogation Report No. 49 of the United States Office of War Information.3 These women were also regarded by some to have been complicit with the Japanese imperial armed forces. In fact, one of Professor Yun’s initial goals in the 1980s, “was to organize a public rejection of the notion of the victims’ complicity” (Barkan 2000: 54). However, as the language related to sexual violence, forced military prostitution, and genderspecific exploitation changed, as well as our understanding of what constitutes coercion, the “comfort women” TAN was able to take advantage of these normative shifts. The final document of the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993 “explicitly recognized genderbased violence, including rape and sexual slavery, and all forms of sexual harassment and exploitation as human rights issues” (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 187). This was the direct result of the lobbying and advocacy efforts of transnational women’s organizations (p. 187). The term “sexual slavery” was first used in international criminal law in the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. However, it was first used to describe “comfort women” prior to this date. Most notably in the 1996 Coomaraswamy Report, which states that “the practice of ‘comfort women’ should be considered a clear case of sexual slavery and a slaverylike practice.” As evidence of shifting global norms supporting a change in terminology, in 2001, Askin argued that: The so-called “comfort women” of World War II, while clearly victims of sexual violence, have in the past been most commonly referred to as victims of enforced prostitution, although emerging norms deem the crime more appropriately termed sexual slavery. The term “slavery” is appropriately invoked when victims effectively lose all or partial ownership over their own bodies, being treated as the personal property of the perpetrators or other culpable parties. (Askin 2001: 14) Since 1996, the term “sexual slaves” has been used to describe the “comfort women” in legal or official documents at both the international and national levels throughout the world. Variations on the term are also common. For example, 2007 US House of Representatives Resolution 121 states that the women were used “for the sole purpose of sexual servitude.” 371

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As women’s organizations successfully transformed sexual slavery into a human rights issue, the “comfort women” TAN successfully transformed the “comfort women” into “sexual slaves,” in a rhetorical sense, and, thus, victims of human rights abuses, by utilizing the new vocabulary and linkages afforded to them by these international normative changes. This had profound effects on the movement. As Hein relates: That reconceptualisation of rape as a violation of fundamental human rights and as something that should be judged by a single global standard was a crucial step in shifting popular opinion in Japan and elsewhere toward sympathy for the former comfort women. (Hein 1999: 347) Hein argues that this further gave the former “comfort women” the power of speech as: [f]eminists reconceptualised their experience as a violation of their human rights rather than the vehicle of their moral disgrace. Moreover, because feminists had drawn the parallel between the military comfort women and contemporary prostitution, the old ladies felt they were speaking out for younger women as well as for themselves, further rehabilitating them as socially responsible in their own eyes and those of others. (Hein 1999: 348) This change in terminology, therefore, made it easier for former “comfort women” and their supporters to come forward before a more sympathetic global and domestic audience that deemed their cause legitimate. In fact, revealing the power of terminology, Japanese nationalist conservatives have argued strongly against the use of the term “sex slave” and prefer “prostitute,” pointing to the 1944 US report mentioned above. In 2014, in the face of rising nationalist conservatism in Japanese politics, the Yomiuri Shimbun, Japan’s largest circulation newspaper, had to issue an apology for using the term “sex slave” in articles about the “comfort women” in its English-language paper.

Domestic debate within Japan As the example above implies, Japanese constructs of the “comfort women” have been influenced by global norms but have also fought against them. Pesek has described “the world changing around Japan, but Japan remaining on Galapagos,” meaning that Japan often does not succumb to shifting global norms, trends, or forces (Pesek 2014). The case of the “comfort women” both supports this and refutes it. In the early 1990s, in the face of international and domestic pressure, the Japanese government conducted a year-and-a-half long study of the “comfort women” and, in 1993, produced the so-called Kono Statement. This was the official announcement of the findings of the government inquiry and acknowledged military (thus, government) culpability. The Kono Statement recognized that the establishment and management of “comfort stations,” as well as the coercive recruitment of “comfort women,” was done by, or on behalf of, the Japanese military. It also stated that Japan intended to remember and learn from history. This was followed in 1995 by the Asian Women’s Fund (AWF), a public-private initiative to provide atonement money to the surviving former “comfort women” as a display of moral responsibility. (The AWF was criticized, and, therefore, rejected, by some within and outside Japan as merely a means to evade legal responsibility.) Money was accompanied by a letter of apology from the sitting prime minister. And the AWF maintains a digital museum that includes documentation of the “comfort women” system and the history of the movement for historical justice. 372

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Furthermore, in response to a 1996 Ministry of Education directive, by 1997, all textbooks approved for use in junior high schools in Japan included some type of description of the “comfort women” or “comfort stations.” Hein argues that: Those steps represent an important change of state policy toward acknowledgement and apology for wartime Japanese depredations in Asia. That policy shift was the result of a sea change in public opinion about the military comfort women in Japan and abroad. (Hein 1999: 350)

TAN responses to these initiatives within Japan Still, the TAN reception of these initiatives was lukewarm at best. They sought an official government apology, which they defined as a Cabinet decision, and official compensation from the Japanese government. The Kono Statement was not a Cabinet decision. And, although the government maintained the AWF, the atonement money was provided mainly through private donations. In fact, the “comfort women” support organizations in both South Korea and Taiwan rejected the money from AWF and made it difficult for any women to accept it. The Taiwanese group that represented thirty-three surviving former sex slaves, for example, not only formally decided to reject the payments but also “would not allow individuals to break away from that policy.” The organizers criticized one woman who indicated she wished to take her payment. (Barkan 2000: 59) The situation was similar in South Korea. Still, between 1995 and 2007, when AWF closed, 364 former “comfort women” received an apology and compensation (Government of Japan). The form of compensation differed depending on the home government’s preference for identifying or not identifying victims. In the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan, “atonement money” of two million yen was sent to each of 285 former “comfort women.” In the Netherlands, 245 million yen was provided over three years to the “Project Implementation Committee in the Netherlands,” to a total of seventy-nine unidentified recipients. In Indonesia, 380 million yen over ten years was provided to the Government of Indonesia for social welfare services for the elderly. In addition, general medical and welfare support projects were implemented for “comfort women” in each of these countries, amounting to a total of 500 million yen (Government of Japan).

Contradictions between the Japanese domestic debate and evolving global norms However, even if one agrees that there was an initial “sea change,” it was partial or temporary, at best, as it ushered in a countermovement of nationalist conservatism in Japan that viewed these measures as going too far. Over the next two decades, political and social forces within Japan worked to undermine the Kono Statement and reverse the government position on inclusion of the “comfort women” in textbooks. Although every administration since 1993 has stated that it would uphold the Kono Statement, two actions, in particular, have hurt its validity. First, in 2007, the Cabinet under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (during his first stint as prime minister) reviewed the documents leading to the Kono Statement and declared that “Among the materials which 373

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were studied in that research and investigation [that preceded the Kono Statement], the government did not find a description which directly proves that there was so-called coercive recruitment by the military or government authority.” Although it was asserted, as mentioned earlier, that the government would continue to uphold the Kono Statement, this was seen as a reinterpretation. Again, in 2014, there was a review of the Kono Statement (under the second Abe administration) and, this time, it was revealed that the Statement had been composed in consultation with the government of South Korea (a fact which the two governments had agreed previously would be kept secret). This revelation suggested that the Statement was more of a political document for the purpose of bilateral relations than a factual document revealing historical truths. Even when the Chief Cabinet Secretary asserted that the Statement would be upheld, despite this political construction, it was done so explicitly in the context of currently troubled Japan-South Korea relations. This, again, promoted the idea that the Kono Statement and the government’s upholding of it was more about diplomacy than about facts and historical justice. Therefore, although Japanese government movement on the issue of the “comfort women” was due to international and domestic pressure, both of which had been influenced by changing global norms, the norms themselves did not significantly impact the government directly. Neither was the government fundamentally transformed by the changing global normative structure. Global norms, and the success of the “comfort women” TAN in connecting them to the “comfort women,” caused the Japanese government to have to address the “comfort women” issue, but it did so in a manner that allowed it to largely evade responsibility over time, within the demand structure of the changing landscape of Japanese domestic politics. In addition, whereas some domestic actors within Japan, particularly certain women’s organizations, have been not only influenced by these norms but are actual norm entrepreneurs, other domestic actors have actively rejected these norms. For example, Nadeshiko Action is a Japanese woman’s organization that opposes these norms and espouses anti-feminist and historical revisionist views.4

Targets The primary target of this transnational movement has been the Japanese government, as it is the only actor that can issue an official government apology and compensation. However, in order to pressure the Japanese government, the secondary targets have been other national governments, the United Nations, and global civil society. This is the “boomerang pattern” that Keck and Sikkink (1998) present. When NGOs cannot achieve resolution domestically, they seek out their transnational network to pressure third parties, including other states and international organizations, to themselves pressure the initial target. Part of the transnational movement has been to enlist national legislatures around the world to enact resolutions recognizing Japanese sexual slavery during the 1930s and 1940s. Resolutions have been passed in the US, the Netherlands, the European Parliament, and Canada. In the US case, there had been lobbying for a joint resolution of the House of Representatives and Senate for years. This was led politically by Lane Evans, Democratic Representative from Illinois. The movement, however, first began to make progress in 2006 when Evans called his friend, Henry Hyde, the Republican Representative from Illinois, and chair of the House International Relations Committee (2001–7), to ask him the personal favor of putting this resolution on the Committee agenda prior to Evans’ retirement in 2007. 374

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Hyde did so and 2006 saw the first US congressional discussion of the resolution at the Committee level. It was not, however, put to the House floor for a vote.5 Prior to 2006, “comfort women” TAN influence in the US was small. This changed due to the decision of Evans to ask this personal favor of Hyde, and the decision of Hyde’s staff to gather more information by contacting Asia Policy Point (APP), a DC-based non-governmental organization that conducts research and supports programs about US-policy-relevant issues in Asia. The importance of the “comfort women” TAN cannot be overstated in this case. US domestic actors allied with other actors, particularly in Japan, to gather information and create a resolution that spoke to the goals of the TAN. Japanese civil society actors were fundamental here in terms of the core action of providing data and historical details. One particularly important group was the Women’s Active Museum of War and Peace (WAM) in Tokyo. Founded in 2005, in the aftermath of the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery (2000), it houses all the Tribunal records and materials, as well as other ongoing research on the “comfort women.” It also has a permanent exhibit and temporary exhibits on the “comfort women” and sends traveling exhibits to places, such as Indonesia, which lack such a museum.6 APP was the focal point of the TAN in Washington, DC. Hyde’s staff asked for assistance from its director, Mindy Kotler. APP teamed up with WAM, as well as individual activists and scholars, in the US, Japan, and elsewhere, who compose part of the “comfort women” TAN, creating what Kotler called her “comfort women ninjas.” They created a strategy for passage of the resolution, firmly rooted in the evolving global norms discussed earlier.7 Previous resolutions in the US had failed to gain traction because they were rooted in historical conflicts between Japan and Korea. Therefore, US politicians could easily dismiss these resolutions as referencing JapanKorea bilateral issues that did not concern the US. APP and its allies transformed the US policy dialogue, in keeping with the “comfort women” TAN global strategy, to one of women’s rights and human rights. It was no longer a historical issue or a Japan-Korea issue, but a universal issue. The revamped resolution was presented as US House of Representatives Resolution 121 (H.Res.121) in 2007 through the sponsorship of Representative Mike Honda, Democrat from California. Upon his plans for retirement, Evans had asked Honda to take up the mantle of the “comfort women.” Honda had some experience on this issue, having been party to the passage of a Japanese war crimes resolution, which included mention of Japanese sexual slavery, in California in 1999, when Honda was a member of the California State Assembly.8 Although Ku argues that “Japanese conservative groups produced a strong backlash and dampened the transnational comfort women movement significantly” in the late 1990s and 2000s (Ku 2015: 259), the truth is that the nationalist conservative backlash that I also discussed earlier, actually bolstered this movement globally. For example, the civil society actors lobbying for the adoption of H.Res.121 could not have asked for better timing of a now infamous Washington Post ad, signed by a number of nationalist conservative Japanese politicians, denying the “comfort women.” They argue that Japanese conservative actions such as this convinced US politicians who were on the fence about support for the resolution. US House of Representatives’ support for the resolution clearly increased after the ad was published.9 Of course, not only individual politicians, but the Japanese government in general lobbied against this resolution.10 They garnered some strong US political support, including from Senator Daniel Inouye, Democrat from Hawaii.11 Other politicians also expressed concern about a resolution targeting an important ally. But the reframing of the issue as a women’s rights and human rights issue, and the vocal denialism of nationalist conservative Japanese politicians, combined to ensure the passage of H.Res.121. It must also be noted that part of the strategy of the resolution supporters was to advance a House resolution rather than a joint House and Senate resolution, as had been proposed prior to 2006. This structural change also made it easier to pass. 375

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Allying with state actors Keck and Sikkink argue that “In order to bring about policy change, networks need to pressure and persuade more powerful actors” (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 23). They further discuss how “NGO influence often depends on securing powerful allies” (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 23). By gaining international recognition of the issue and transforming the debate from a historical one centered on bilateral relations to a universal one of women’s rights and human rights, the “comfort women” TAN was able to secure powerful state and international organization allies, as well as positive coverage for their viewpoint in the global media. Their goal in so doing was to use “moral leverage or the ‘mobilization of shame,’ where the behavior of target actors is held up to the light of international scrutiny” (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 23), to effect change in Japanese government policy and behavior. The assumption here is that the Japanese government cares about its international reputation and seeks the good opinion of others. One significant card in the network’s pocket with regard to moral leverage was Pope Francis’ meeting with seven former “comfort women” when he visited South Korea in 2014. As the Diplomat reported, “One of the women gave the pope [sic] a butterfly pin, which is used to symbolize the comfort women’s plight. Pope Francis wore the pin throughout the ensuing mass.” Kotler (2014) argues that “Pope Francis has helped internationalize and humanize the issue.” He has also helped to reinforce moral leverage in favor of those who seek historical justice for the “comfort women.” The Japanese government has been painted as immoral if it does not accede to the expressed needs of these elderly women who suffered tragic life stories at the hands of the Japanese military. Emphasizing morality, immediately prior to the Pope’s visit in 2014, this author was asked in an interview on tbs eFM’s “This Morning” in Seoul if the reason that the Japanese government had failed to make amends to the “comfort women” was because it was not a Christian nation. Still, for the advocacy network, probably the most important allies were the South Korean and US governments, which could create not only moral leverage but material leverage as well. As mentioned earlier, the South Korean government was not particularly interested in pursuing this issue with Japan until a combination of domestic and international opinion not only pressured it to take some action but made it in its own best interests to do so. The South Korean government adopted the transformed terminology of universal women’s rights and human rights, and the connection with the contemporary plight of women and girls in conflict-ridden areas. This gave it a moral upper hand globally. President Park Geun-hye refused to meet with Prime Minister Abe until he offered a “sincere” apology and compensation to the women. After the passage of H.Res.121 and the continued controversial statements by Japanese nationalist conservative politicians about the “comfort women,” even representatives of the US State Department began to illustrate public support for historical justice for the women, when questions were raised by journalists at daily press briefings. And in 2014, President Barack Obama called it a “terrible and egregious violation of human rights” during a press conference in Seoul with President Park.12

State actors resume control and put the “comfort women” issue back in the box Activists may have felt that their best strategy was to bring in government allies who could pressure Japan in ways that they were unable to do. They could bring both moral and material leverage to bear in ways that non-state actors could not. However, the problem in bringing in these state actors as allies was that the advocacy network lost control of the issue, as well as the meaning of resolution. 376

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On December 28, 2015, the foreign ministers of Japan and South Korea jointly announced the resolution of the “comfort women” issue. The agreement included the promise of a letter of apology from the Japanese prime minister and government compensation, on the one hand, with the acknowledgement on the part of the South Korean government that it would never raise the issue in international fora again, on the other. With this, it was declared that “this issue is resolved finally and irreversibly.” The agreement was applauded across the world, by political pundits, foreign policy experts, the US government, and Ban Ki-moon, Secretary General of the United Nations, among others. The legitimacy of this resolution was to be found in the fact that the US government, the South Korean government, and the UN had all been part of, or allies with, the “comfort women” TAN, and they all praised the agreement. Yet it was also a resolution that was negotiated and concluded without input from the “comfort women” themselves or their support organizations. They were the ones who brought this issue to the international stage and created, or promoted, the frame under which it was discussed. They made it an issue in Japanese, Korean, and US domestic politics, and in JapanKorea bilateral, Japan-US bilateral, and Japan-Korea-US trilateral relations. Still, when the US decided that its material interests were being hurt in the Asia Pacific by the inability of two of its major allies in the region to cooperate, it increased pressure on the two states to resolve the issue. Thus, some have called the US the big winner of this agreement. I would argue that Prime Minister Abe was the big winner, as he was internationally praised for an agreement that was similar to what had been implemented two decades earlier, during the 1990s, but was actually less expansive than the promises of those statements that had been criticized by the early “comfort women” TAN movement. But, certainly, the “comfort women” themselves and the network more generally were not the winners.

What the transnational movement accomplished and what it failed to accomplish As laid out earlier, Keck and Sikkink identify five measures of effectiveness of TANs: (1) agenda setting, (2) discursive change, (3) procedural change, (4) policy change, and (5) change in state behavior. The “comfort women” TAN clearly introduced the issue on the global stage and set the agenda. It also brought about discursive change at the national and international levels, by transforming the normative framework, as illustrated by state governments and the UN beginning to discuss the “comfort women” in terms of human rights and as an example of sexual slavery. Where this influence fell short was in discursive change by the Japanese government. However, the very fact that the Japanese government felt a need to reject vociferously the “sexual slavery” label for “comfort women,” reveals the global normative change that had occurred. Some may argue that procedural change has also occurred, with the December 28 agreement in 2015. This is due to the fact that it responded to calls for an official apology and government compensation. As argued earlier, I disagree that this constitutes procedural change as the official letter from Abe is the same as the letter composed as part of the AWF, 1995–2007, and is not an apology by Cabinet decision. In addition, the statement that this issue cannot be raised again at international fora, and is “finally and irreversibly” resolved, seems to contradict the 1993 Kono Statement, which declared the government’s “firm determination never to repeat the same mistake by forever engraving such issues in our memories through the study and teaching of history.” Neither did Japanese government policy change, as it continues to adhere to the viewpoint that the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea ended any legal responsibility that Japan has toward activities it undertook during World War II or its colonization of Korea. This has not changed and, 377

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therefore, any apology or compensation is done in terms of moral responsibility, which the TAN previously rejected as insufficient. Keck and Sikkink (1998) admit that there may be other measures of success for TANs as well, such as generating data and other information through research on a previously understudied topic. In some ways the “comfort women” TAN has accomplished this. Historians, sociologists, and political scientists around the world are doing research on this topic because of the awareness of it that the TAN spread. In addition, as mentioned earlier, the research that organizations like WAM conduct, increase the body of knowledge available. On the other hand, the TAN has been less open to accepting information, and has even worked to suppress information, that undermines the narrative that is at the core of the movement (that the Japanese were the sole perpetrators). For example, Park Yuha, who wrote a book implicating Korean middlemen and society in the “comfort women” system (Park, 2014), was sued for defamation by a group of former “comfort women” in South Korea in 2014. She was forced to change some of the content of her book by the Seoul District Court in 2015, and was indicted by the state prosecutor of that same court later in the year (Togo 2016). Ku argues that one weakness with the global “comfort women” movement was a schism among its membership. And it is true that activists, particularly in Japan, were split about Japanese government responses during the 1990s, including the AWF. However, the movement actually gained global influence after this supposed schism, as one part of supporters became the core of the network. We see schisms in all TANs, as actors differ in terms of what they see as appropriate strategies or prioritization of goals. Instead, for the “comfort women” TAN, the biggest weakness was their alliance with state actors who coopted the movement. This goes to the fundamental danger of such alliances as transnational and state actor interests inherently differ.

Conclusion The importance of the contribution of this chapter is that it reveals the interaction effect between transnational activist networks and states. It is not merely that TANs influence state policy and behavior, but states influence TAN policy and behavior. One way in which this is accomplished is with regard to domestic laws and regulations. Horvat has argued that “the overwhelming strength of the state in comparison to civil society has inhibited the development of Japanese NGOs and therefore has made it extremely difficult for all but a handful of civil society organizations to function as TNAs [transnational non-state actors]” (Horvat 2007: 219). However, another way in which this is accomplished, and what this chapter has focused upon, is the way in which states that are TAN allies at one point can coopt the movement to pursue their own interests that may not be in keeping with TAN interests. Transnational actors can transform a dialogue, but ultimate power continues to reside with states. In today’s globalized world, with increased ease and decreased cost of communications and travel, it has never been easier to create transnational movements. This is furthered by the large number of democracies or liberalizing regimes around the world. TANs further have the ability to raise awareness, set the agenda, create norms, change discourse, and promote policy shifts. However, whether they are a target or an ally of the network, states retain the ultimate power to make policy. And, as their interests are much broader than that of a TAN, states are likely to shift alliances as it is in their perceived benefit to do so. Although states may at times base policies on principles, ideas, or norms, material interests will always be part of their calculations and will tend to carry more weight than the intangibles. The transnational “comfort women” movement is a case in point as, although it was able to fundamentally change global dialogue around the issue, when material interests were at stake, Japan (the TAN target) and the US and South Korea (the TAN allies) together put the issue back in its box. 378

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During the 1990s transnational advocacy groups seeking historical justice for sexual slaves of the Japanese imperial armed forces transformed the international discourse surrounding the plight of these women by reframing the issue as a women’s rights and human rights issue. However, although they changed the normative foundations of the discourse, their choice to partner with states to achieve their goals meant that power remained with those states, whose interests ultimately differed from those of the transnational actors. And, although it was NGOs who got the “comfort women” onto the international agenda, state actors and their allies have retaken control of the issue. This suggests that, even in an age when non-state actors can wield significant influence, the state still holds the power. In this case, civil society actors expanded their network to include the seemingly strong partner of the South Korean government to pressure the Japanese government to take concrete action of apology and compensation for the “comfort women.” The South Korean government had leverage that civil society actors lacked, such as President Park Geun-hye refusing to a bilateral meeting with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe until the issue was resolved. They also had the apparent support of elements of the US government, with the 2007 adoption of House Resolution 121, which called on the Japanese government to apologize for the use of “comfort women” and then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reportedly using the term “sex slaves” to refer to the women in 2012. However, by 2015, with US interests in jeopardy given the ongoing dispute between its two closest allies in the region, Japan and South Korea announced an agreement that would settle the “comfort women” issue “finally and irrevocably.” Yet, this took place without consultation with or the support of the transnational activists who had started the campaign in the first place, and arguably undermined the real attitudinal and policy changes they sought to achieve. Material interests took precedence over ideational ones, and the Japanese government, under Abe, was able to walk away from the issue reflected in the light of praise for a policy that did not indicate any radical change.

Notes 1 After 1999, it was called the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. 2 Author’s interviews, 2014. 3 This terminology of “prostitute” and “camp follower” is used despite the fact that the report goes on to explain that recruitment occurred in Korea through “false representation” of what work the “girls” would be doing. 4 https://proxy.qualtrics.com/proxy/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fnadesiko-action.org%2F&token=m675ldQydPDEef67x%2F75JGqpPRYn3YF6kSG0vxHzCcU%3D. 5 Author’s interview with House Foreign Affairs Committee Aide, 2011. 6 Author’s interview with Mina Watanabe, WAM, 2014. 7 Author’s interviews with Mindy Kotler, 2011, 2012 and with Annabel Park (activist), 2011. 8 Author’s interview with Congressman Mike Honda and his staff, 2011. 9 Author’s interviews, 2011. 10 Author’s interviews, 2011. The DC-based law and lobbying firm Hogan Lovells worked for the Japanese government on the “comfort women” issue during that earlier period and still today. See, for example, Bogardus, K. (2014) “Japan Turns to K Street Amid Calls for Apology for WWII-era ‘Comfort Women’” The Hill http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/business-a-lobbying/197599-japan-turnsto-k-street-amid-calls-for-apology-on. 11 Senator Inouye wrote a letter to Congressman Tom Lantos, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, dated March 5, 2007, asking the committee not to support H.Res.121. He writes in the letter that this is the first time in his 48 years of government service that he has written a letter to a committee. 12 www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/25/press-conference-president-obama-and-presidentpark-republic-korea. 379

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References Askin, K. (2001) ‘Comfort Women: Shifting Shame and Stigma from Victims to Victimizers’, International Criminal Law Review, 1: 5–32. Askin, K. (2003) ‘Prosecuting Wartime Rape and Other Gender-Related Crimes under International Law: Extraordinary Advances, Enduring Obstacles’, Berkeley Journal of International Law, 21(2): 288–349. Barkan, E. (2000) The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices, New York: W. W. Norton & Company. Berger, T. U. (2012) War, Guilt, and World Politics After World War II, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Coomaraswamy, R. (1996) Report on the Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea and Japan on the Issue of Military Sexual Slavery in Wartime, New York: UN Commission on Human Rights, Economic and Social Council. Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998) ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, International Organization, 52(4): 887–917. Government of Japan. ‘Recent Policy of the Government of Japan on the Issue Known as Comfort Women’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs www.mofa.go.jp/policy/q_a/faq3.html accessed 16 November 2017. Hein, L. (1999) ‘Savage Irony: The Imaginative Power of the “Military Comfort Women” in the 1990s’, Gender & History, 11(2): 336–72. Horvat, A. (2007) ‘A Strong State, Weak Civil Society, and Cold War Geopolitics: Why Japan Lags Behind Europe in Confronting a Negative Past’, in G. Shin, S. Park and D. Yang (eds), Rethinking Historical Injustice and Reconciliation in Northeast Asia, London: Routledge, 216–34. Keck, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998) Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Kotler, M. (2014) ‘The Pope’s Verdict on Japan’s Comfort Women’, The National Interest. August 31 http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-popes-verdict-japans-comfort-women-11168 accessed 18 December 2016. Ku, Y. (2015) ‘National Interest or Transnational Alliances? Japanese Policy on the Comfort Women Issue’, Journal of East Asian Studies, 15: 243–69. Manabe, H. (2013) ‘Interview Carol Gluck: Change in Japan is a Long-Distance Run’, Asahi Shimbun www.asiapacificinitiative.org/interview-carol-gluck-change-in-japan-is-a-long-distance-run/ accessed 18 December 2016. Park, Y. (2014) Teikoku no Ianfu, Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun Shuppan. Pesek, W. (2014) Japanization: What the World Can Learn from Japan’s Lost Decade, Bloomberg News. Reilly, J. (2008) ‘The Role of Public Opinion in China’s Japan Policy 1997–2007’, dissertation, The George Washington University, August 31. Ruff-O’Herne, J. (1994) Fifty Years of Silence, Sydney: Editions Tom Thompson. Soh, S. (2008) The Comfort Women: Sexual Violence and Postcolonial Memory in Korea and Japan, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Togo, K. (2016) ‘Park Yuha Indictment Risks Hindering ROK-Japan Reconciliation’, East Asia Forum, January 14 www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/01/14/park-yuha-indictment-risks-hindering-rok-japanreconciliation/ accessed 13 July 2016. Totsuka, E. (1989) ‘The Changing Face of Mental Health Legislation in Japan’, The International Commission of Jurists Review 42: 67–81. Tsutsui, K. (2006) ‘Redressing Past Human Rights Violations: Global Dimensions of Contemporary Social Movements’, Social Forces, 85(1): 331–54. Yoshiaki, Y. (1995) Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery in the Japanese Military During World War II, New York: Columbia University Press.

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24 Japan’s whaling diplomacy Science, morality, and international norms1 Michael Strausz

Whaling draws the attention of scholars of Japan and international relations for a number of reasons. First, “save the whales” was one of the first slogans of the global movement that emerged in the 1970s around environmental issues. Even today, the issue (if not the direct slogan) of “saving the whales” figures prominently on the agendas of influential environmental groups.2 Second, whaling is often discussed as an issue area in which norms have been particularly effective in changing the behavior of states. As Nadelman argues: [t]he killing of whales, elephants, and other endangered animal species, are becoming the subject of increasingly powerful norms. These norms strictly circumscribe the conditions under which states can participate in and authorize these activities and proscribe all involvement by nonstate actors. Those who refuse or fail to conform are labeled as deviants and condemned not just by states but by most communities and individuals as well. (Nadelman 1990: 479) Third, whaling is an area where Japan openly and clearly confronts the norms of the advanced industrialized states of the West. This is not typically the way that Japan deals with advanced industrialized states or international norms. As David Leheny notes, “whaling is one of the few areas in which Japanese practices seem at odds with international norms” (Leheny 2011: 364). I will begin by briefly outlining the history of international regulation of whaling. Next, I will focus on Japan’s whaling diplomacy, with reference in particular to the period of the 1980s, when Japan ended its commercial whaling and began scientific whaling, as well as Japan’s reaction to the 2014 International Court of Justice ruling that ruled that Japan’s Antarctic whaling program was a violation of its obligations under the treaty that established the International Whaling Commission. Finally, I will look at both public and elite opinion regarding whaling in Japan. How does the Japanese government justify Japan’s position on whaling, and what do ordinary Japanese people think about whaling?

International regulation of whaling A Norwegian named Sven Foyn helped create the era of modern whaling with a series of technological innovations in the 1860s including steam-driven whaling boats, cannon-fired 381

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harpoons with grenade tips, and the attaching of ropes to harpoons so that sinking whales could be pulled to the surface. The whaling industry was in need of innovation at that particular historical moment because stocks of relatively slow right whales dwindled, and existing technologies were not effective in catching rorquals such as blue whales and fin whales, as those whales were too fast and sank after being killed (Tønnessen and Johnson 1982: 6). Unlike traditional practices of whaling in which small scale communities used the entirety of the animal that they caught, including the meat, the bones, the skin, and the blubber, modern whaling was concerned primarily with oils and baleen, which were used in all kinds of mass produced goods, as well as lighting and lubrication. As Epstein argues, “the whaling industry [in the first half of the twentieth century] was the equivalent of today’s petroleum industry” in that, like petroleum today, whale oil was used in a wide variety of everyday products (Epstein 2008: 28). Since Japan used modern techniques and, unlike most other modern whaling states, consumed whale meat, Epstein also argues that Japan “blurs the distinction between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ whaling” (Epstein 2008: 31). As the world transitioned from traditional to modern whaling, Japan’s unusual position as a modern whaling nation that consumed whale meat made the Japanese whaling industry less vulnerable to global swings in the price of whale oil. Eventually, in the postwar period, whale scarcity and increasingly convenient and affordable substitutes for whale oil would eventually drive other states’ whaling industries out of business (Peterson 1992: 162; Stoett 1999: 59; Tønnessen and Johnson 1982: 229). However, Japan’s domestic market for whale meat meant that Japan was able to expand its whaling efforts and Japanese firms purchased the floating factories of Norway, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands (Epstein 2008: 42). As more states suspended or ended their large-scale whaling efforts, the approach of international institutions to the regulation of whaling changed as well. The International Whaling Commission (IWC) was established by the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) in 1946, and the IWC met for the first time in 1949. The ICRW was “the first global agreement in which member countries have entrusted a commission with the task of establishing how much may be caught in the free and open oceans” (Tønnessen and Johnson 1982: 9). While the IWC was established with a view toward avoiding overexploitation of whale populations, states initially were wary of granting the IWC tools that would have limited those states’ ability to continue to whale at a high rate (Mitchell 1998: 145). The IWC has the power to establish a schedule of quotas, but the schedule is not permitted to be amended in a way that would “involve restrictions on the number or nationality of factory ships or land stations, nor allocate specific quotas to any factory or ship or land station or to any group of factory ships or land stations” (ICRW 1946: V.2). Moreover, states can opt out of quotas within 90 days with no consequence (ICRW 1946: V.3), and the IWC does not have the power to impose sanctions on states that exceed quotas (Flory 1986: 633). Also, states can leave the organization with no penalty (ICRW 1946: XI). Finally, member states are permitted to issue permits in order to take whales “for purposes of scientific research,” and while states must report their research programs to the IWC’s Scientific Committee, the commission only has the ability to respond with nonbinding recommendations (Wilkinson 1989: 277). Because of the weak enforcement provisions of the IWC along with a lack of member state will, the early years of the IWC is sometimes called the era of “Olympic whaling” (Wong 2001: 94). During those years quotas for annual whale kills were established at extremely high levels and even those high quotas were often exceeded. This period of “Olympic whaling” took a serious toll on global whale populations, and by the 1961–2 season, “the paradoxical situation had emerged with whaling growing in inverse 382

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proportion to the whale stocks” (Tønnessen and Johnson 1982: 573). Peterson argues that these two trends—expanded whaling efforts as whale stocks rapidly decreased—“lent urgency to the problem of stock survival,” so that “even the industry managers recognized the problem and could no longer discredit the cetologists’ case for quota reductions on scientific grounds” (Peterson 1992: 164). Concerns about rapidly decreasing whale stocks helped to usher in an era of whaling quotas that Mitchell (1998) calls “scientific management,” where quotas were set with a view toward the long-term survival of whale stocks. In 1959, a British initiative established a committee of fisheries experts from nonwhaling countries that would be consulted in establishing annual quotas (Peterson 1992: 163). By 1967 the IWC “finally : : : agreed on a quota that was below scientific estimates of the sustainable yields of the stock” (Scarff 1977: 366). Quotas continued to dip after 1967, and by 1974 the IWC voted to allow a New Management Procedure which used “scientific estimate of sustainable yields to set quotas” (Mitchell 1998: 148). By the early 1970s a number of international environmental groups had taken up the issue of whale conservation and began to push for a temporary moratorium on commercial whaling. This was a strong issue for environmental NGOs because it appealed to both radical and moderate environmentalists: [a temporary moratorium on whaling] has appealed simultaneously to conservationists concerned with wiser resource use, to radical decentralizers believing that industrial society must be replaced by simpler lifestyles : : : to preservationists and animal rights activists objecting to treating whales as a resource under any circumstance, and to protectors of biological diversity worried that continued whaling will lead to the extinction of some or all whale species. (Peterson 1992: 155) These environmental groups received substantial support from scientists. While in 1963 there was a consensus among cetologists that “immediately limiting catches to 4,000 sei and 12,000 fin whales a year while continuing the ban on taking blue and humpback whales would permit Southern Ocean stocks to recover in thirteen years,” by 1974 the cetologist community was divided, and there were substantial numbers of scientists who thought that existing data was uncertain enough to warrant a temporary moratorium on the taking of whales (Peterson 199 169–70). The newly developing anti-whaling movement scored its first major victory at the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment—the “Stockholm Conference”—when the conference report recommended a ten-year moratorium on the taking of commercial whales. The anti-whaling movement won other victories at that conference as well, as the conference was instrumental in spreading the ideas of Western environmental groups to non-Western audiences. Moreover, the conference led to the establishment of the United Nations Environmental Programme, which joined the Food and Agriculture Organization as “a source of well-informed and significant criticism of IWC policies and procedures” (Peterson 1992: 166–7). After its success at the Stockholm Conference in 1974, the anti-whaling movement turned toward the IWC; environmental groups worked to convince nonwhaling states to join the group in order to attain the necessary three-quarters majority to amend the schedule of quotas in order to establish a moratorium. These efforts were a success, as they “transformed IWC membership from eight nonwhaling and eleven whaling members in 1978 to twenty-seven nonwhaling and twelve whaling members by 1982” (Mitchell 1998: 152). Consequently, in 1982 the IWC amended the schedule so that commercial whaling was outlawed; this policy is often called the “moratorium.”3 383

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The moratorium was initially “linked to a requirement that the IWC Scientific Committee undertake a comprehensive assessment of whale stocks ‘by 1990 at the latest’ (according to the resolution), at which time the IWC was to reconsider the fate of the moratorium” (Aron, Burke, and Freeman 2000: 180). However, many environmentalists are unequivocally opposed to the killing of whales for any purposes, and supporting an indefinite moratorium is a low cost way for nonwhaling states to appease environmental groups (Kalland 1993). Thus, the United States, Britain, Australia, and New Zealand have all announced that they “will not support any reopening of commercial whaling under any conditions” (Aron, Burke, and Freeman 2000: 181). The IWC’s Scientific Committee finished its review of whale stocks, and in 1993 they proposed a new Revised Management Procedure (RMP) which would allow for limited commercial whaling of non-endangered species. This was initially rejected by the IWC, and in 1994 the IWC “adopted” the RMP without “implementing” it – a gesture with no policy relevance. After the 1993 rejection of the RMP, the chair of the Scientific Committee resigned in frustration (Aron, Burke, and Freeman 2000: 180). In the years since 1994, despite regular requests from Japan, the IWC has made no moves to reintroduce commercial whaling, and in fact has established an 11.8 mile sanctuary in the Southern Ocean where whales cannot be taken, even with scientific permits (Caron 1995: 168). In sum, the anti-whaling stance of the IWC had two related causes: the collapse of the whaling industries in most of the advanced industrialized world and the particular direction that the global environmental movement took beginning in the 1970s.

Japanese whaling diplomacy As most of the West moved out of the whaling business while the global environmental movement increasingly focused on “saving the whales,” whaling became an issue of contention in US-Japan relations. The United States’ hand in this contention was strengthened by two laws: the 1971 Pelly Amendment to the Fisheries Protection Act (herein called the Pelly Amendment)4 and the 1979 Packwood-Magnuson Amendment to the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act (herein called the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment). The Pelly Amendment allows the United States to unilaterally sanction another country when “the Secretary of Commerce finds that nationals of a foreign country, directly or indirectly, are conducting fishing operations in a manner or under circumstances which decrease the effectiveness of an international fishery conservation program” (cited in DeSombre 2000: 113). When the Secretary of Commerce makes such a determination, the President has the option to “prohibit the bringing or importation into the United States of fish products” from that country (cited in DeSombre 2000: 113). Unlike the Pelly Amendment, which was written to address Danish, Norwegian, and West German salmon overfishing (DeSombre 2000: 112–13), the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment was specifically targeted at whaling. The Packwood-Magnuson Amendment requires that countries certified under Pelly as violating the ICRW must lose 50% of their fishing quotas in the US Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (Peterson 1992: 172–3).5 Both the Pelly and PackwoodMagnuson Amendments have been used against Japanese whaling, with some degree of success. At the 1973 IWC meeting, Japan objected to the IWC quota on minke whales. In November 1974 President Ford certified Japan under the Pelly Amendment, and shortly after that Japan withdrew its objection (DeSombre 2000: 209). Japan also objected to the 1982 moratorium on commercial whaling. While America didn’t certify Japan under the Pelly Amendment, America did apply a 9% cut to Japan’s 1983 allocation in the US EEZ—which represented around 102,000 metric tons of fish—in order to signal its displeasure to Japan (Caron 1989: 320). This certification led to a series of negotiations between Japan and the United States in which the United States wanted Japan to remove its objection to the moratorium on commercial 384

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whaling, while Japan wanted continued access to the US EEZ. Neither of the heads of state at the time of these negotiations—President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone—seems to have been particularly concerned with the issue of whaling. However, they were both operating in domestic political contexts in which the issue of whaling mattered a great deal to a number of important actors. The US Congress was essentially unanimously antiwhaling, while the Japanese Diet was divided, as some Diet Members were concerned with Japanese fishing in the US EEZ while others were concerned with the Japanese whaling industry.6 These negotiations occurred in conditions of gradually decreasing US leverage over foreign whaling. This is because a 1982 amendment to the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act eliminated all fishing rights for foreigners in the US EEZ after six years except for those directly involved in joint ventures with US firms (Peterson 1992: 180). Thus, regardless of what else happened, 1988 was scheduled to be the last year of Japanese allocations in the US EEZ. Also during these negotiations, US environmental groups began a lawsuit that would have compelled the Reagan administration to sanction Japan under the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment (Shabecoff 1984).7 If the environmental groups won that lawsuit, then the Reagan administration would have lost its leverage to negotiate when, how, and whether those sanctions might be applied to Japan. As a result of these talks, in 1984 Japan agreed to stop taking sperm whales by 1988 and to remove its objection to the IWC moratorium on commercial whaling by April 1, 1985 (New York Times 1984). Immediately after these talks, Japan’s Fisheries Agency (a division of MAFF—the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries) denied that Japan had promised to withdraw its objection to the moratorium arguing that Japan had only agreed to give up coastal sperm whaling, not all forms of commercial whaling (Yomiuri Shimbun 1984). Indeed, the issue of the future of Japanese commercial whaling was still on the agenda of US-Japan trade negotiations in January 1985 ( Japan Economic Journal 1985). On March 28, 1985, the Diet voted to indicate its approval for the beginning of scientific whaling (Wong 2001: 117); in short, Nakasone was now clearly faced with a pro-whaling Diet in a way that he had not been in the past. On April 5, four days after the deadline that the United States had established, Japan agreed to remove its objection to the moratorium on commercial whaling after a formal request from the United States that came with a threat to invoke the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments. Japan’s Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries said of the decision to remove Japan’s objection to the moratorium on commercial whaling: “it is an extremely regrettable choice, but it is unavoidable” (Yomiuri Shimbun 1985). Two years later, as the June 1987 IWC meeting approached, the Fisheries Agency prepared a proposal to begin its first lethal scientific whaling project, which would be called the Japanese Whale Research Program under Special Permit in the Antarctic ( JARPA). Before Nakasone’s 1987 visit to the United States to discuss a variety of issues of importance to the United States and Japan, Nakasone expressed his concern to the Director General of the Fisheries Agency that the United States would interpret scientific whaling as “continuing commercial whaling in the guise of research whaling” (Wong 2001: 117). The Fisheries Agency proceeded anyway and organized a proposal at the IWC for a program that involved scientific permits for the taking of 825 minke whales and 50 sperm whales annually. This plan worried Japanese fisheries, who asked the Fisheries Agency to reduce the number of scientific permits to 525. Nakasone also thought that the 525 figure was too high, and without consulting Fisheries Agency bureaucrats, Nakasone publicly stated that the figures under consideration were too high and “requested” that the number of permits be reduced to 300 (Wong 2001: 118). The IWC passed a nonbinding objection to Japan’s plan, and Japan resubmitted a plan on the last day of the meeting that involved the taking of 300 minke whales annually. The United States 385

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was critical of this proposal for scientific whaling, arguing that it was a violation of the moratorium on commercial whaling, and suggesting that, should Japan carry out this proposal, it would be sanctioned under the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments (New York Times 1988; Shabecoff, 1988). This threat was not successful in convincing Japan to give up its scientific whaling program. In late January 1988, Japan took its first whales with scientific permits, and, as soon as the United States received confirmation of Japanese whaling, they certified Japan under the Pelly Amendment and consequently ended all Japanese fishing in the US EEZ (Martin and Brennan 1989: 304–6). In the years since Japan began its scientific whaling program, Japan has continued to try to end the moratorium on commercial whaling. In 1995, 1996, 2002, and 2003, Japan sponsored proposals at IWC meetings that would have permitted a resumption of commercial whaling (Strand and Tuman 2012: 412). Japan has also regularly attempted to get the IWC to permit “Small-Type Costal Whaling,” as a kind of middle way between large-scale commercial whaling (which is forbidden by the IWC’s moratorium) and aboriginal subsistence whaling (which is permitted under the ICRW). Small-Type Coastal Whaling is not discussed in the ICRW; rather, since 1986, Japan has attempted to introduce this category as a new kind of whaling that the IWC might regulate (Epstein 2008: 227). To supplement efforts to end the moratorium and permit Small-Type Coastal Whaling, Japan has tried to shape IWC policies through its foreign aid distributions; Strand and Tuman’s (2012) analysis suggests that Japan gives significantly more foreign aid to microstates that voted with it at the IWC between 1994 and 2005, and Miller and Dolsak (2007) report a similar finding for the period of 1999–2004.8 As Japan’s frustration builds with its difficulty in getting the IWC moratorium lifted, it has resorted to more aggressive tactics at the IWC meetings. On the last day of the 2002 meeting in Shimonoseki, Japan, two contentious issues were on the agenda: St. Vincent and the Grenadines was asking to increase its annual quota of whale kills from two to four, and the United States and Russia were asking to renew the annual quota for Alaskan Eskimos and Russian Chukchi. The night before those issues came to a vote, Japan and its Caribbean allies cut a deal with Russia, the United States, and their allies whereby each side would vote to allow the other’s permits to be issued. However, Japan and the Caribbean states did not fulfill their end of the bargain, and the meeting ended in uproar, with the United States, Russia, and even environmental groups, who rarely come down on the side of any kind of whaling, offering harsh criticisms of Japan (Brooke 2002). In recent years, Australia and New Zealand have become the most vocal state critics of Japanese whaling. (Sea Shepherd is the most active non-governmental critic, as it pilots boats that attempt to disrupt the Japanese whale hunt.) In 2010, Australia brought Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), charging that Japan’s JARPA II Antarctic whaling program (which Japan had begun in 2005) was not truly scientific, and is thus commercial whaling, which is a violation of Japan’s obligations under the ICRW. (New Zealand intervened on Australia’s side in 2012.) On March 31, 2014, the ICJ ruled against the Japanese program. Although the court ruled that Japan’s whaling program could “broadly be characterized as ‘scientific research’” (paragraph 127, cited in Peel 2015) the court also ruled that: [t]he target sample sizes selected under JARPA II—including an annual target take of 825 minke whales—were not reasonable in relation to achieving the objectives of the program. This, the Court noted, lent credence to Australia’s argument that the target sample size for minke was set for non-scientific reasons. The Court ordered that Japan revoke any extant authorization, permit, or license for whaling under JARPA II and refrain from granting any further permits under Article VIII in pursuance of that program. (Peel 2015) 386

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After the ICJ ruling, Japan cancelled the JARPA II permits that it had issued for Antarctic whaling in the 2014/15 season, although Japan did not cancel scientific permits issued for its much smaller whaling program in the northwestern Pacific Ocean, as the ICJ did not rule on that program. Subsequently, Japan began a new Antarctic scientific whaling program called NEWREP-A, for which Japan issued scientific permits for the killing of 333 whales. This program was designed to address the concerns raised by the ICJ ruling (BBC 2016), but critics of Japanese whaling were not satisfied (Normile 2015).

Public opinion and elite justifications of whaling In a survey of the Japanese public carried out in April of 2014, 60% of respondents answered that they support the continuation of Japan’s scientific whaling program, and only 24% of the public indicated that they are against the continuation of scientific whaling (Asahi Shimbun 2014). Despite the high favorability rating of Japan’s whaling program, however, the Japanese people do not actually consume much whale meat. Stocks of whale meat often go unsold (The Telegraph 2014), and the same survey reveals that 37% of respondents “do not eat whale.” Some 48% of respondents “ate some very long ago.” Some 10% said that they eat whale “very rarely” and 4% said that they eat whale “every so often.” Perhaps because of both international restrictions on whaling and the lack of popularity of whale meat in Japan, the whaling industry in Japan is tiny; according to one estimate, whaling in Japan only employs about 500 people (in a country of more than 120 million; Green 2002). One might speculate that Japanese public opinion on whaling might be related to the Japanese public’s view of international institutions. Maybe the Japanese public does not appreciate the IWC and the ICJ telling Japan how to conduct their business? This explanation seems plausible because the survey was taken just weeks after the ICJ ruled that Japan’s Antarctic scientific whaling program is a violation of Japan’s obligations under international law. However, according to the same survey where 60% of Japanese indicated their support for Japan’s scientific whaling, respondents were much more divided on the appropriateness of that ICJ ruling. Some 40% said they thought the ruling was appropriate, while 39% said they thought the ruling was inappropriate (Asahi Shimbun 2014). Perhaps the Japanese public is just not very concerned with environmental issues, and thus they do not support international efforts to ban whaling? This does not seem to be the case either. In a 2010 survey, Japanese respondents from across the ideological spectrum suggested that they are quite concerned with environmental issues (Tanioka, Maeda and Iwai 2010).9 Some 59.7% of respondents answered that the Japanese government spends either an appropriate amount or an insufficient amount on environmental problems, while only 6.1% said the Japanese government spends too much. Even among those who identified themselves as quite conservative, only 10.1% said the Japanese government spends too much on environmental issues, while 41.1% said the Japanese government spends the right amount or an insufficient amount on environmental issues. Similarly, 69.3% of respondents either agreed or somewhat agreed with a policy of reducing carbon emissions to 25% of 1990 levels by 2020, while only 12.9% disagreed or disagreed with this goal. In Japan, these goals are shared across the ideological spectrum. Even among the most conservative group of respondents, 58.9% agreed or somewhat agreed with the goal of reducing carbon emissions, while only 16.3% disagreed or somewhat disagreed. In short, whaling employs only a tiny fraction of the Japanese public. Moreover, the Japanese public does not care much for whale meat, seems to respect international institutions, and seems very concerned about environmental issues. Why, then, does the Japanese public support Japan’s scientific whaling program? 387

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While the Asahi Survey that I discussed earlier did not give respondents a chance to explain their decisions, I have spoken with many Japanese about whaling in the years since I have been researching this topic. And among those that are in favor of continued whaling, there are a few arguments that I hear most frequently. I heard all of these arguments in a recent interview with a former Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries who remains an LDP politician. The interview was about another topic, but at the end, I asked him about why Japan continues whaling, and he said: One reason is culture. If it is scientifically ok, then why must we stop eating something which is not bothering anybody? Some people are eating beef, pork, kangaroo, cat, we don’t care what they are eating but, if it is sustainable, then there is no reason for us to accept that. That is a cultural issue. And another issue is food security. And, relating to that, fisheries. Because Japan is surrounded by the sea, so we heavily rely on the protein from the sea.10 In short, the former Minister made three arguments about why Japan keeps whaling. First, he said that Japan whales because it is part of Japan’s cultural tradition (see Hirata 2004 for more discussion of this argument). Second, he expressed concern about Japan’s future food security. Many people that I have spoken with have expressed concern that if Japan gives into international pressure on whaling, it will then be pressured to reduce consumption of other ocean creatures, and this could one day threaten Japan’s ability to feed itself. Third, the former Minister argued that there is no scientific reason to ban the killing of whale species that are not endangered. While many whale species remain endangered because of historic overexploitation by commercial whalers, according to the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the minke whale populations is “considered stable throughout most of its range” (NOAA Fisheries 2014). This last argument is the most interesting one for the purposes of this chapter. Much discussion of whaling outside of Japan presumes that Japan is issuing scientific permits to whale because that is the only avenue available to Japan, because of the moratorium on commercial whaling. In short, science is a pretext, and the word “scientific” in the phrase “scientific whaling” is often placed in quotation marks to illustrate skepticism that the whaling is truly scientific. In the recent ICJ dispute, both Australia and New Zealand claimed that Japanese whaling was not truly scientific (Peel 2015). In their decision, the court recognized that Japan’s whaling program could “broadly be characterized as ‘scientific research’” (quoted in Peel 2015), but went on to find “the target sample sizes selected under JARPA II—including an annual target take of 825 minke whales—were not reasonable in relation to achieving the objectives of the program” (Peel 2015). From the perspective of Japanese whaling advocates, this is an important victory. The dispute, from their perspective, is about how much whaling is permitted by science, not whether or not science permits whaling in the first place. Thus, for proponents of Japanese whaling, “scientific whaling” is not just a way to get around the IWC’s moratorium, but is also an attempt to claim back the title of “the true believers in science” from the opponents of whaling.

Conclusion In the wake of the 2014 ICJ decision about Japan’s Antarctic whaling program, whaling continues to be an issue of contention between Japan and many of its friends and allies. I am going to end this chapter with three suggestions for areas of future research regarding whaling that seem potentially fruitful. First, whaling might be considered in comparison with other issue areas. Why does Japan continue to whale while changing its behavior in response to other international pressures? Why did whaling become a mainstream environmental issue in most of the advanced industrialized world, but not in Japan? Second, whaling might be considered in light of the recent ICJ decision. 388

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Has that decision caused Japanese whaling to change in any meaningful ways? What does the answer to that question tell us about Japan’s approach to international law more broadly? Third, whaling might be considered in the context of Japan’s increasingly dangerous neighborhood and other major international agenda items. As China continues to strengthen its claims in the South and East China Seas, and as North Korea continues to develop their nuclear weapons and missile programs, and as Japan continues to seek a seat on the United Nations Security Council, Japan seeks to strengthen its relationships with its friends and allies internationally. Under what circumstances might the desire to strengthen relationships with anti-whaling states cause Japan to weaken or eliminate its whaling program? Are there powerful voices in Japan calling for the elimination of whaling, and if so, what is holding them back?

Notes 1 Part of this manuscript has been reproduced and adapted from Strausz (2014a), published by Oxford University Press in association with the Japan Association of International Relations, and Strausz (2014b), which was published as commentary for the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation. 2 Whales feature prominently on the webpages of Greenpeace (2016) and Sea Shepherd (2016). 3 The moratorium does not affect aboriginal subsistence whaling or whaling authorized by scientific permits. 4 The Fisheries Protection Act was originally passed in 1967 (DeSombre 2000: 113). 5 A state’s Exclusive Economic Zone includes waters up to 200 miles off that state’s coastline, where that state has sovereign authority to manage the use of ocean resources. This was a new doctrine in international law in the postwar period, and it is usually traced to the negotiations for the third UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Peterson 1992: 167). 6 See (Strausz 2014a: 462–472) for a discussion of these negotiations. 7 In 1986, the US Supreme Court ruled in Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society that the Packwood–Magnuson Amendment gave the president the option to sanction Japan but did not compel the president to do so. 8 Strand and Tuman’s (2012) analysis did not find a relationship between foreign aid and voting with Japan for non-microstates, but Miller and Dolsak’s (2007) analysis did not treat microstates separately. 9 The Japanese General Social Surveys ( JGSS) are designed and carried out by the JGSS Research Center at Osaka University of Commerce (Joint Usage/Research Center for Japanese General Social Surveys accredited by Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology), in collaboration with the Institute of Social Science at the University of Tokyo. 10 Interview with LDP Diet Member conducted on March 9, 2016 in Tokyo.

References Aron, W., Burke, W. and Freeman, M. M. R. (2000) ‘The Whaling Issue’, Marine Policy, 24: 179–91. Asahi Shimbun. (2014) ‘Asahi Shimbun April 21 2014 Regular Public Opinion Poll’, Mansfield Foundation Asian Opinion Poll Database http://mansfieldfdn.org/program/research-education-and-communication/ asian-opinion-poll-database/listofpolls/2014-polls/asahi-shimbun-regular-public-opinion-poll-042114/ 2014 accessed 15 June 2016. BBC News. (2016) ‘Japanese Whaling: Why the Hunts Go On’, May 25 www.bbc.com/news/world-asia35003272 accessed 31 May 2016. Brooke, J. (2002) ‘Japan Cuts Whaling Rights for Native Peoples of Arctic’, New York Times, May 25, A4. Caron, D. (1989) ‘International Sanctions, Ocean Management, and the Law of the Sea: A Study of Denial of Access to Fisheries’, Ecology Law Quarterly, 16: 311–54. Caron, D. (1995) ‘The International Whaling Commission and the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission: The Institutional Risks of Coercion in Consensual Structures’, American Journal of International Law, 89: 154–74. DeSombre, E. R. (2000) Domestic Sources of International Environmental Policy: Industry, Environmentalists, and U.S. Power, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Epstein, C. (2008) The Power of Words in International Relations: Birth of an Anti-Whaling Discourse, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 389

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Flory, E. (1986) ‘Construing the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments: The D.C. Circuit Court Harpoons Executing Discretion’, Washington Law Review, 61: 631–62. Green, S. (2002) ‘For Japan, Continued Pursuit of Whales Is a Matter of Principle’, Sydney Morning Herald, May 25. Greenpeace. (2016) www.greenpeace.org/international/en accessed 30 March 2016. Hirata, K. (2004) ‘Beached Whales: Examining Japan’s Rejection of an International Norm’, Social Science Japan Journal, 7: 177–97. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) (1946), Washington https://archive. iwc.int/pages/view.php?ref=3607&k accessed 11 December 2017. Japan Economic Journal. (1985) ‘In Bilateral Trade, U.S. and Japan List Demands of Each Other’, January 15, p. 1. Kalland, A. (1993) ‘Management by Totemization: Whale Symbolism and the Anti-Whaling Campaign’, Arctic, 46: 124–33. Leheny, D. (2011) ‘The Other Rashomon Story: International Norms and the Constructions of Japaneseness’, in A. Gaunder (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Japanese Politics, London: Routledge, 361–71. Martin, G. S., Jr. and Brennan, J. W. (1989) ‘Enforcing the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling: The Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments’, Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, 17: 293–315. Miller, A. R. and Dolsak, N. (2007) ‘Issue Linkages in International Environmental Policy: The International Whaling Commission and Japanese Development Aid’, Global Environmental Politics, 7: 69–96. Mitchell, R. (1998) ‘Forms of Discourse, Norms of Sovereignty: Interests, Science, and Morality in the Regulation of Whaling’, in K. Litfin (ed.), The Greening of Sovereignty in World Politics, Cambridge, MA: MIT, 141–71. Nadelman, E. A. (1990) ‘Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society’, International Organization, 44: 479–526. New York Times (1984) ‘US–Japan Accord on Whaling’, November 14. New York Times (1988) ‘Japan and Iceland Will Defy Ban on the Killing of Whales’, January 24, p. 18. NOAA Fisheries (2014) ‘Minke Whale (Balaenoptera acutorostrata)’, Office of Protected Resources www. nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/species/mammals/cetaceans/minkewhale.htm accessed 14 June 2016. Normile, D. (2015) ‘Scientists Renew Objections to Japan’s Whaling Program’, Science, June 19, www. sciencemag.org/news/2015/06/scientists-renew-objections-japan-s-whaling-program accessed 31 May 2016. Peel, J. (2015) ‘Introductory Note to Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand Intervening)’, I.C.J., International Legal Materials, 54. Peterson, M. J. (1992) ‘Whalers, Cetologists, Environmentalists, and the International Management of Whaling’, International Organization, 46: 147–86. Scarff, J. E. (1977) ‘The International Management of Whales, Dolphins, and Porpoises: An Interdisciplinary Assessment’, Ecology Law Quarterly, 6: 323–427. Sea Shepherd (2016) www.seashepherd.org accessed 30 March 2016. Shabecoff, P. (1984) ‘Sanctions Sought Against Japanese Whalers’, New York Times, November 3. Shabecoff, P. (1988) ‘US Warns Japan Not to Kill Whales in Antarctic’, New York Times, January 22. Stoett, P. J. (1999) The International Politics of Whaling, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press. Strand, J. R. and Tuman, J. P. (2012) ‘Foreign Aid and Voting Behavior in an International Organization: The Case of Japan and the International Whaling Commission’, Foreign Policy Analysis, 8: 409–30. Strausz, M. (2014a) ‘Executives, Legislatures, and Whales: The Birth of Japan’s Scientific Whaling Regime’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 14: 455–78. Strausz, M. (2014b) ‘Whaling in Context: Why does the Japanese Public Support Scientific Whaling?’ Mansfield Foundation Asian Opinion Poll Database (APOD), http://mansfieldfdn.org/blog/japanese-publicopinion-on-whaling/December accessed 22 June 2016. Tanioka, I., Maeda, Y. and Iwai, N. (2010) ‘Japanese General Social Survey’, http://jgss.daishodai.ac.jp/ english/data/dat_top.html accessed 14 June 2016. The Telegraph. (2014) ‘Seventy-Five Percent of Japanese Whale Meat “Unsold”’, June 14. Tønnessen, J. N. and Johnson, A. O. (1982) History of Modern Whaling, London: C. Hurst and Company. Wilkinson, D. M. (1989) ‘The Use of Domestic Measures to Enforce International Whaling Agreements: A Critical Perspective’, Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, 17: 271–91. Wong, A. (2001) The Roots of Japan’s International Environmental Policies, New York: Garland. Yomiuri Shimbun (1984) ‘Mada Kosh o no Yochi ha Aru; Suisanch o Ch okan’ [Direction of Fisheries Agency: There is Still Room for Negotiation], November 14. Yomiuri Shimbun (1985) ‘88 Nen 2 Gatsu Kagiri de Maku; Bei ni Seishiki Ts ukoku he’ [By the end of March, 1988, It’s Over; Formal Communication Sent to America], April 5.

390

Index

Locators in bold refer to tables. Abe, Shinzo 62, 82, 92, 149, 328; comfort women 371, 375; development assistance 311–312; economic diplomacy 253, 258–259, 262–263; gender equality 338–344; maritime power 158–159; national identity 15–16, 18–19, 45, 48, 51; peacebuilding 219, 221, 224, 226; security legislation 24, 28; Southeast Asia 205–206, 209; territorial disputes 192, 198; trade policy 270, 273–277 Abe Doctrine 206, 209 Abenomics 314, 339 accidents 141–142, 174 accountability 182, 368–369 Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia (EANET) 106–108, 110, 113 acid rain 107 Act on the Promotion of Effective Utilization of Resources 128 Ad-hoc Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) 96 administration, cultural diplomacy 60–64 advance consent 181–182 Advisory Group on International Cooperation for Peace (AGICP) 220 Advisory Panel on Peacekeeping (APP) 220 Afghanistan 32, 224, 312, 322, 347–348 Afghanistan Ministry of Women’s Affairs 348 Africa 222, 263, 315 African Development Bank 256 Agency for Cultural Affairs 59, 61 Agreement on Fisheries 195 agriculture 109, 125, 236, 258–259; environmental policy 78–79, 81; trade policy 268–270, 275–277 Aichi targets 80–81 aid (programs) 74, 269, 308, 358, 361, 386; economic diplomacy 255, 260, 263 aid-for-trade 277 aircraft 241–242 air defense identification zone (ADIZ) 198

air pollution 102, 114–115; background 102–106; cooperation with East Asia 106–107; regional cooperation 107–113 Alien Species Act 76 Alliance for Achieving the Return of the Northern Territories 191 Amagasaki 85 Amari, Akira 254 amphibious core 163–165 animal-rights campaigns 76 anime 56, 60, 61, 64 Antarctic Treaty 77 anti-nuclear movement 176 Anti-Terrorism (Anti-Terror) Special Measures Law 32, 44–45 Aquino, Benigno 116, 206 Argentina 327 arms trade 236, 237, 254, 258, 262 see also weapons (weapon systems) Article Nine 11, 322; disarmament 175; national identity 42, 44–52; national security 234; norm entrepreneur 322; peacebuilding 221; security legislation 23–24, 29–30, 32–33, 36; territorial disputes 198 Article Ninety-six 49–50 artists 59 As o, Tar o 56, 93, 221, 225 Asahi Shimbun 65 asbestos 84–85 ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (AJCEP) 274 Ashizawa, K. 224, 227 Asian Development Bank (ADB) 261 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) 262, 278 Asianism 14–15, 18 Asian-Pacific Integrated model (AIM) 91 Asian Women’s Forum 370 Asian Women’s Fund (AWF) 345, 372 Asian Women’s Solidarity Forum 370

391

Index

Asia-Pacific Migratory Waterbird Conservation Strategy 106 Asia Policy Point (APP) 375 Askin, K. 368, 371 Association for Countermeasures related to the Northern Territories (ACNT) 190–191 Association of Shinto Shrines 355 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 14, 203–210, 285, 297, 312, 330; ocean management 144, 147, 149; trade policy 259, 270, 274, 277 audiences 178, 372, 383; diplomacy and power 57–58, 60, 63, 65; Southeast Asia 204, 209, 211 Australia 79, 259, 269–270, 275, 327, 358; whaling 384, 386, 388 autarky 234, 235 authors (writers) 358–360 Automatic Logistic Global Sustainment (ALGS) 242 automobiles (cars) 256, 273–274, 276, 294 Baker, C. 294, 296 Bali Action Plan 92–94 Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) 239–240 Barkan, E. 360, 367–368, 371, 373 Basic Act on Establishing a Sound Material-Cycle Society 129–130 Basic Act on Ocean Policy 137 Basic Law (National Security Basic law) 29 Basic Law for Environmental Pollution Control (Basic Environmental Law) 104 Basic Policy on Comprehensive Economic Partnerships 259 Basic Policy on Equipment Production and Development 238 Behrman, J. N. 283–284 Berger, Thomas U. 219, 233, 252–253, 255, 257–259, 369 Berlin Mandate 89 Bill for the Development of Legislation for Peace and Security 24, 25–27 biodiversity 74, 80–81, 106, 149 Biodiversity Convention 80–81 biogas 124 biological diversity see biodiversity biosafety 81 birthrates 338, 339 ‘Black Monday’ 299 blood, human 111 Board of Investment (BOI) 294, 297 Bolivia 331 boomerang pattern 374 Booth, Ken 156–157 Boshin War 218 branding 60, 253, 277 Brazil 326–327, 328

392

Bretton-Woods system 295 Brimble, P. 282, 286, 294–295, 297 Brundtland Report 136 bubble economy 12, 14 Buckley, P. J. 283, 286, 298 Bukh, Alexander 191, 195–196, 362 Burma 308, 358 business communities 236–237, 239–240, 243–244 Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB) 23–24, 29, 30–31, 50 Cabinet Office Gender Equality Bureau 340 cadmium 103 Cairo Declaration 193 Cambodia 182, 219, 274, 322, 344 Canada 323, 326–327, 328 Cancun Agreement 94 capacity building 204–209, 211–212, 223, 277, 297, 331; air pollution 108, 110–111; environmental policy 81–82; gender equality 347–348; maritime 161, 165–166; ocean management 143–147 capitalism 74, 124, 251, 355–356 carbon dioxide 82, 91, 123–124 carbon emissions 387 carbon sinks 74 Cartegna Protocol 81 Carter, Ashton 275 cereal crops 268–270, 276 see also agriculture Center for Strategic and International Studies 202 charts, nautical 144 childcare (child rearing) 338–339, 341–343, 346 children 340, 345 Chile 325, 326, 328, 329, 331 China 192, 297, 326, 389; air pollution 106–107, 112; development assistance 310, 312–314; diplomacy and power 58, 61, 66–67; disarmament 174, 177, 179–180, 182, 186; economic diplomacy 255, 257, 259–263; environmental policy 75, 79; history and memory 355, 358–360, 362–363; maritime power 159, 164–165; national identity 12, 13–15, 19, 45, 47, 50, 52; Southeast Asia 203, 209; territorial disputes 196–197; trade policy 270, 274–277 China Public Diplomacy Association (CPDA) 67 chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) 83–84 Choo, K. 58, 64 Chung, I. Y. 110 circular economy 120, 123–124, 133n2 see also resources management policies; waste recycling civil engagement 143 civilians 224 Clean Development Mechanism 82, 92 climate change 80, 82–83, 88–89, 100, 211, 344; Bali Action Plan 92–94; Durban Platform 94–99; Kyoto Protocol 89–92

Index

clothing, ethical 76 Cold War 15, 17–18, 66, 182, 370; air pollution 107; defense industry 237–239; development assistance 309; disarmament 174, 182; history and memory 354–355, 360–361; maritime 155–156, 159, 162; national identity 43, 51; national security 235–241, 243; norm entrepreneur 322–323, 325; peacebuilding 219, 222; security legislation 24, 31, 33; territorial disputes 189, 191–194, 197 colonialism (colonization) 51, 52, 193–194 Combined Task Force (CTF) 167 come-to-aid 226–227 comfort women 15–16, 47, 196, 344–345, 361, 363 comfort women movement 366, 378–379; domestic debate 372–373; global norms 373–374; state actors 376–377; TAN 367, 369–371, 373, 377–378; targets 374–375; transformed dialogue 371–372; who they are 367–369 commercial whaling 383–386, 388 Commission on Human Security (CHS) 323–324, 327 Committee for the Creation of New Textbooks 361 Committee on Tourism 257 communications 58, 64–65, 157 communism 13, 174, 193, 309, 341, 355–356 Communist Party 239 compensation 361, 373 see also reparations composting (of waste) 124 Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia (CEPEA) 270 conflicts 66, 161, 194, 197, 218, 309; armed 346; international 52; prevention 348 conservation 74, 78, 141, 309; marine 77; whales 383 construction 78, 79 consumers 61 Containers and Packaging Recycling Act 129 containers (packaging) 129–131 contamination, marine 146 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) 78 Convention on International Trade in Hazardous Waste (Basel Convention) 85, 120 Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 346 Cool Earth 50 82, 92 Cool Earth Partnership Fund 82 Cool Japan 62–64 Coomaraswamy Report 370, 371 cooperation 46, 269, 297, 308; economic 295; international 82, 104–105, 326; regional 143–147 Copenhagen Accord 92–94 coral reefs 74, 80 corporate compliance 294

Costa Rica 330 costs 128, 235, 240, 297, 340 Council on the Global Warming Issue 93 crime, maritime 141–142, 144–145, 160, 166–167, 207, 312–313 criminals, war 357 crises 33, 141, 161, 239, 314, 325; energy 175, 181; financial 323; humanitarian 228, 327; oil 89, 295–298, 308–309 Cross, A. R. 283, 298 Cuba 327, 329, 331 culpability, moral 357 culture 47, 341–342, 388; popular 56, 60 see also cultural diplomacy currency, values 314 currency exchange rates 297, 298, 300 curve, M shaped 343 cyberspace 46 Czech Republic 109, 110 Daigo Fukuryu-maru 174, 176 dairy products 269–270, 276 see also agriculture Data Warehouse 109 Dauvergne, P. 75, 105 Dawn Blitz 13 164 daycare see childcare (child rearing) DDH Izumo 164 debt cancellation 313 defense: collective 44–45, 46, 313; cooperation 33; diplomacy 205; equipment 207, 235, 258; exchanges 161; industry 237–238; state 18 see also national defense deforestation 74–75, 80 demining see minesweeping democracy (democratization) 309–310, 344 Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) 29, 94, 198, 241, 243, 253, 363 demonstrations 12, 198, 362–363 see also opposition groups (societal interests); riots Dent, C. M. 285, 297, 301 Dentsu Inc. 62 desertification 80 deterrence 157, 161, 183 developing countries 120, 314, 322, 323, 328, 338 development assistance 80, 82, 205, 263, 306–308, 315–316; Abenomics 314; background 308–309; Development Cooperation Charter 311–312; domestic link 314–315; first ODA Charter 309–310; second ODA Charter 310–311; security 312–313 development cooperation 254–255, 260–262 Development Cooperation Charter 220, 226, 261, 344, 347; development assistance 311–312, 314 Development Strategy for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment 344

393

Index

Diet 127, 129–130; comfort women 368; diplomacy and power 63; disarmament 179; environmental policy 84; gender equality 339, 341, 343; history and memory 357; national identity 43–45, 47–51; national security 241; norm entrepreneur 326, 328; ocean management 140; security legislation 24, 28–31, 33; territorial disputes 190–191, 195; whaling 385 diplomacy 157, 160–161, 185, 206, 384–387; commercial 254, 256–258, 262 diplomacy, cultural 55–56, 65–68; administration 60–64; domestic discourse 64–65; soft power 56–60 diplomacy, economic 251, 272; post-war policies 253–254; trends 262–264; trinity 254–262 Diplomatic Bluebook (Gaiko Seisho) 182, 220–222, 253, 256, 258, 260 disarmament 223 disaster prevention 144, 207, 323 disaster relief 204, 207, 210–211, 226, 261, 322 disasters 139, 142–143, 158, 165–166, 209–210; natural 77, 94, 141, 344; nuclear 77; preparedness 146 discourse (dialogues) 64–65, 223 disputes, international 49 see also territorial disputes; territorial waters dissemination 60, 64–65, 323, 328 dissent scenario 285, 295 Dokdo see Takeshima (Dokdo/Takeshima Islands) Doraemon 61–62 Dower, J. 42, 354 Drifte, Reinhard 197, 361 Dryzek, J. S. 121, 124 dumping (dumps) 126, 141–142 durable goods 127 Durban Platform 94–99 Duterte, Rodrigo 166, 208, 212 Earth Charter 140 earth-metals 260–261 see also mineral resources (minerals) East Asia 106, 131, 159 East Asian-Australian Flyway Partnership 79 East China Sea 159, 161, 209, 312 Eastern Seaboard Development Plan (ESDP) 295 East Timor 219, 224, 322, 348 economic development 295, 344, 345, 346 Economic Planning Agency (EPA) 309 economic security 275 economies, emerging 240, 260 Economist 343 education 196, 205, 210, 346–347 see also training (training programs) Egypt 329 electrical machinery 276 electrical products 294 electronics (industry) 274

394

emissions 82, 89, 91, 92, 93, 98; trading 121 emperors 13, 42–45, 356 endangered species 388 energy: climate change 93, 98; conservation 74, 82; consumption 89; economic diplomacy 260–261; efficiency 92; maritime power 158–159; material-cycle society 123; ocean management 138; solar 94; territorial disputes 181 see also nuclear energy (programs); oil engineering, genetic 81 environmental conservation 309 environmental groups 84, 85, 93, 383, 385, 386 environmental issues 315, 387 environmental policy 73–75, 86–87; biodiversity 80–81; birdlife 78–79; Cartegna Protocol 81; climate change 82–83; global agreements 76–77; public health 83–85; seals 75–76; species trade 78; UNCED 80 environmental problems 73–75, 86–87; biodiversity 80–81; birdlife 78–79; Cartegna Protocol 81; climate change 82–83; global agreements 76–77; public health 83–85; seals 75–76; species trade 78; UNCED 80; waste 85 environmental protection 127, 128, 138, 140–143 environments 77, 120, 123, 261 espionage 177 ethnic communities (groups) 19, 58 European Union 89, 122–124, 310 Evans, Lane 374 exchange, cultural 59, 60 Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 76, 195, 384, 386 exercises, military 161, 212 exports 62, 103, 158, 256, 261, 268, 276 extended nuclear deterrence 184 extended producer responsibility (EPR) 121–123, 129 Factory Effluent Regulation Act 104 families 338, 356 family planning 347 feminism 372, 374 fertilizers 126 financial assistance (support) 238, 257, 260, 297 Finland 228 Finnemore, M. 122, 322 fish (stocks) 74–77, 80 fisheries 137, 388 Fisheries Agreement 195 fishing (rights) 79, 195, 362, 385 fishing vessels 142, 194, 363 flooding 269 food 123, 260, 277, 388 force, use of 23, 34–35, 48–52, 157, 326, 330 foreign aid (assistance) 131, 144–145, 218, 277 foreign currency 268, 294

Index

foreign direct investment (FDI) 281–283; 1952-65 294–295; 1966-85 295; 1986-97 296; 1998-2003 296–297; 2004 to date 297; data analysis 297–298; discussion 299–301; findings 298–299; institutional regimes 283–286; limitations and conclusions 301–302; Thailand 286–297 foreign investment, incoming 257 Forum on China Africa Cooperation 315 fossil fuels 124 Foundation for Reconciliation and Healing 16 Francis, Pope 376 freedom 58, 157, 275, 333–334; from fear 219, 323–324, 327, 331; live in dignity 331, 333; of navigation 16, 167, 204–206, 208–209; of the seas 75, 140, 149, 160; from want 219, 323–324, 327, 331 free-trade 253 Free-Trade Agreement (FTA) 259, 262, 269–270 Free-Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) 277 Friends of Human Security 328 fuel cycle technology 178, 180–181 Fukuda, Takeo 218, 263, 315, 360 Fukuda, Yasuo 28, 82, 347 Fukuda Doctrine 218, 263–264, 295, 315 Fukushima Daiichi 94, 96, 174 Funabashi, Yoichi 12, 213 Fundamental Law of Education 47 fur (pelts) 75–76 gas, natural 295 Gelb, Joyce 340–341 Gender and Discrimination (GAD) 347 gender equality 337–338, 367; Abe, Shinzo 338–339; gender empowerment 339–344; international cooperation 344–349 Gender Equality Law 339 Gender Mainstreaming Division (in MOFA) 338 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 267–269 genetically modified (GM) organisms 81 Gensuikyo 176 George Mulgan, A. 269, 271 Germany 326 Global Economic Strategy 270 globalization 60–61, 120, 236, 251, 262 Global Monitoring Plan (GMP) 109 Global Peacebuilding Program (GPP) 225 global warming 74 Greece 329 Green, M. J. 11, 233, 238 Green Aid Plan 105 greenhouse gases 89, 91, 92, 93 grey zone 160, 313 Gross National Cool 65 Group of Four (G4) 326 growth, economic 82, 123, 239, 311 G7 18

G20 summit 260 Guam 161, 164, 179 Guatemala 310 Gulf of Aden 167 Gulf War 44, 182 Haas, P. M. 124, 134n10 habitats 78, 79 Habomais 189–190, 192 Hanoi 110 Hashimoto, Ryutaro 91, 108 Hatakeyama, N. 268–269 Hatoyama, Yukio 12 Heads of Asian Coast Guards Agencies Meeting (HACGAM) 146, 148 health (healthcare) 109, 112, 120, 129, 338, 346–347; asthma 103; public 126; services 210 Heiligendamm 82 Heiligendamm G8 Summit 92 Hein, L. 368, 370, 372–373 heiwashugi 10, 14 Hello Kitty 62 Hideki, Ibuki 63 Hirohito, Emperor 296, 356, 363, 367 Hiroshima 11, 13, 143, 353; disarmament 173–174, 176, 185 Hiroshima Peacebuilding Center (HPC) 221, 225 history, national 353–354, 364; 1945-82 354–359; 1982-2002 359–362; 2002 to present 362–363 Hokkaido 190, 269 Holland see Netherlands Honda, Mike 375 Honda, Tatsukichi 359 Hoo, G. D. 294–295, 297 Horn, Sierk A. 283, 286, 298 Hornung, Jeffrey W. 29–30, 32, 35, 209, 226 Hosoya, Yuichi 11, 14, 28 House of Councillors 23–24, 28, 35, 43, 48, 176 House of Representatives: climate change 94, 96; comfort women 371, 374–375; disarmament 176, 178; national identity 43, 48; security legislation 23, 35 Hsiao, H. M. 66, 204 Hu, Jintao 362 Hughes, Christopher W. 44–45, 198, 207, 212–213, 221, 226; national security 233, 240, 241; security legislation 28, 30–31, 33, 36 humanitarian aid (activities) 210, 241, 308, 322, 324, 347; peacebuilding 220, 226 Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) 165, 209 humanitarian crises (concerns) 184, 228, 327 Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons 184 humanitarian relief 204 see also humanitarian aid (activities) human resources 224–225, 348

395

Index

human rights 309–310, 313, 344, 360–361; comfort women 368, 371, 376; norm entrepreneur 323, 325, 328 human security 321–325, 333–334, 339, 344, 347; dissemination through networking 328–330; first resolution in GA 330–332; GA meetings 326–328; MFG 325; peacebuilding 219, 221, 225; second resolution 332–333; UNSC 325–326 Human Security Network (HSN) 325 Human Security Now 324, 347 Hussein, Saddam 32 hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) 84 Ichikawa, Fusae 346 images, cultural 60 immigrants 19 imperialism 52, 218, 355 Implementing the Responsibility to Protect 330 imports 77, 268, 294 Inada, Tomomi 64 incineration 126–127, 129 India 183, 259, 263, 326, 328–329; trade policy 274–275, 277 Indonesia 145, 204, 257, 312–313, 329, 345, 373 industrialization 314 Industrial Promotion Act 296 Industrial Structure Vision 2010 253 industrial waste 139 industry 84, 92, 103, 109, 120, 256; automobile 273–274, 294; defense 237–238; whaling 387 information 141, 142, 167, 277, 370 Information Warehouse 110 informed consent 85 infrastructure 74, 80, 276–277, 296, 347; development assistance 308–309, 314; economic diplomacy 253, 256–257, 260, 262–263 Infrastructure and Plant-Exporting Assistance Committee 256 Infrastructure Export Strategy 277 In Larger Freedom 324–325 Innovative Energy Strategy 98 Inoguchi, Takashi 11, 155 institutional environments 300–301 institutionalization 286, 299–300 institutional mechanisms 283 integration scenario 285, 296, 297 intellectual property 63, 274 intellectual property rights (IPRs) 268, 278 intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) 160 interdependency 234–237 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 174, 177 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 323 International Convention for the Protection of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) 140

396

International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) 382 International Court of Justice (ICJ) 194, 386–388 international forums 221–222 internationalism (internationalization) 10–11, 13–19, 44, 46, 59–60, 283 Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) 167 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 296, 323 international peacebuilding 221–223 International Peace Support Law 24, 25–27 international relations 9–10, 19–20; China 13–15; Russia 17–19; South Korea 15–17; trade 273–276, 277–278; United States (US) 11–13 International Resource Panel (IRP) 123 International Whaling Commission (IWC) 382–388 internet 60 interoperability 167, 207, 210 intranational developments 286 investment 166, 256, 274, 299–300, 358 Investment Promotion Act 295 Iran 331 Iraq 224, 312 Ireland 329 Isahaya Bay 79 Ishiba, Shigeru 29 Itai-Itai 83, 103 Itoh, M. 60, 268 Iwashita, I. 190, 192 Japan Agricultural Cooperatives ( JA) 271–272 Japan Bank of International Cooperation ( JBIC) 311 Japan Biodiversity Fund 81 Japan Coast Guard ( JCG) 137–138, 158, 197, 206–207, 313; in action 140–143; discussions 148–150; partnerships 147–148; regional cooperation 143–147; as watchdog 138–140 Japan Environmental Sanitation Center 128 Japanese Development Cooperation Charter 311–312 Japanese Whale Research Program ( JARPA) 385, 386–387 Japan External Trade Organization ( JETRO) 256 Japan Foundation 59, 61, 64 Japan International Cooperation Agency ( JICA) 220, 311 Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force ( JMSDF) 158, 166–167 Japan Multinational Enterprises ( JMNE) 283 Japan Revitalization Strategy: Japan is Back 314 Japan Self-Defense Forces ( JSDF) see Self-Defense Forces (SDF) Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement ( JSEPA) 269 Japan Socialist Party ( JSP) 42–43, 239 Japan Tourism Agency 257

Index

Japan-US Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement 237 Japan War Bereaved Families 355 Jimint o 28–29 Johnson, A. O. 382–383 Johnson, C. 45, 282–283 Joint Crediting Mechanism ( JCM) 82, 96 Joint Declaration 190 Jordan 329 justice, historical 360, 369, 370–371 Kaffine, D. 122–123 Kaifu, Toshiki 32 Kanzaki, Takenori 326 Kanzaki Plant 85 Katzenstein, Peter J. 66, 219, 233 Kawashima, S. 89, 103–104 Kazakhstan 330 Keck, M. 367–368, 370–371, 374, 376–378 Keidanren 236–240, 243, 257, 271–272, 274 Kenya 329 Keohane, R. O. 114, 234, 236 Kim, Inkyoung 105–108, 112–114 Kishi, Fumio 208, 220–221 Kishi, Nobusuke 42–43, 46, 176, 184, 355 Komatsu Ichir o 30 K omura, Masahiko 29–30 knowledge sharing 205 Koizumi, Junichiro 14, 32–33, 44–46, 60–61, 326; comfort women 362–363; gender equality 340–341; peacebuilding 218–220, 224, 228; territorial disputes 183, 196; trade policy 273 kokkashugi 10, 14–16, 19–20 kokubougun 45 kokusaika 59–60 kokusaishugi 10–11, 13–17, 19–20 Komano, Kinichi 325 Komeito (Komeit o) 24, 28, 30–31, 47–50, 243 see also New Komeito Party Komiya, R. 268 Kono Statement 372–374, 377 Korea Creative Content Agency (KOCCA) 67 Korea Foundation for International Cultural Exchange (KOFICE) 67 Korean Council for Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan (Korean Council) 369 Korean War 175, 193, 237, 238 Kotler, Mindy 375, 376 Ku, Y. 369–370, 375, 378 Kubota Corporation 85 Kurashige Doctrine 148 Kurashige, Tadashi 148 Kuriyama, Takakazu 197 Kurusu, Kaoru 323 Kuwait 32 Kyoto Protocol 82, 89–92 Kyushu 269

labor, slave 355 labor force see workforce labor unions 93 see also trade unions Lam, P. E. 218, 221, 223, 227–228 land 74, 79–80, 137, 269 Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) 94 language (wording) 58, 60, 327, 340 see also terminology Laos 274 Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance 32 law enforcement 149, 206 see also policing leadership 323, 344, 345 League of the Residents of Chishima Archipelago 191 legislation 129–130 legitimacy 205, 208–209, 211 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 44, 84–85, 96, 271, 310; history and memory 355, 357, 360; national security 241, 243; security legislation 24, 29–30; territorial disputes 190–191, 194, 198 licenses (production) 239, 242–243 Lichtenstein 329 Lind, J. 22, 353 Lindhqvist, T. 120, 123 loans 166, 260, 294, 322; development assistance 308, 310–311, 313–314 London Convention 140 Long-range Transboundary Air Pollutants (LTP) 111–113 lumber (wood) 74, 81 MacArthur, Douglas 193, 356 MacArthur Line 193 machinery 271, 276 Maehara, Seiji 253 Malaysia 145, 269, 327 Manchukuo 58 manga 56, 61, 64 manufacturing (manufactured products) 268, 297 see also industry marine life 75–76, 78, 382–385, 388 see also whales (whale meat); whaling marine products 76–77, 81 maritime commons 205–208 maritime power 155–156, 163, 167–169; amphibious core 163–165; capabilities 162–163; commitment and contingency 160–162; diplomacy 165–166; framework 156–158; piracy 166–167; sea-faring democracy 158–160 maritime safety 312 Maritime Safety and Security Policy Program (MSP) 144 market economy 309–310 market forces 57 marketing 61, 277 markets 82, 284–285

397

Index

Marrakesh Accord 92 material-cycle society 85, 120–125, 129–132, 133n1 see also resources management policies; waste recycling maternity conditions see childcare (child rearing) Matsui, Kathy 339 McCurry, J. 22, 84 media 192, 210, 241, 271, 341, 361; air pollution 103; diplomacy and power 60, 64–65, 67 Memorandum of Understanding 256 memories, war (grievances) 52, 59 memory, national 176, 204, 353–354, 364; 1945-82 354–359; 1982-2002 359–362; 2002 to present 362–363 mercury 83, 103 Mexico 269, 271, 325, 326, 328, 329–330 Mexico Friends Group (MFG) 325 Middle East 181 military 45–47, 149, 218, 241–242; force 325, 331; intervention 324; research 235; spending 310 milk, human 111 Miller, H. V. 236, 347 Milton, C. C. 58, 68n1 Minamata 83, 103 Minamata Convention on Mercury 83 mineral resources (minerals) 137, 159, 260 minesweeping (mine clearing) 160, 207, 223 minimum access volume (MAV) 268 mining 103 Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF) 253, 271, 272, 385 Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) 105, 242–243, 253, 256, 272; climate change 93–94, 96; diplomacy and power 55–56, 61–63; economic diplomacy 253, 256; environmental policy 74, 82; trade policy 269–270, 272–276, 278 Ministry of Education, Culture, Sport, Science and Technology (MEXT) 61 Ministry of Finance (MOF) 253, 272, 294, 309 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) 253–254, 272, 296–297, 309, 328; air pollution 105; climate change 91; development assistance 308–309, 311; diplomacy and power 59–62, 64; economic diplomacy 253–254, 256–258; environmental policy 74; gender equality 338–339, 344–348; ocean management 149; peacebuilding 218, 220–222, 225, 227; territorial disputes 190, 192, 197; trade policy 269, 272, 274 Ministry of Industry and Trade (MITI) 294, 309 Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) 62 Minshushugi Kenkyukai 179 minzokushugi 10, 12, 14–16, 19–20 missiles (missile defense systems) 159, 184–185, 236–237, 309, 344

398

Mitchell, R. 382–383 mixed oxide fuel (MOX) 181 Mlambo-Ngcuka, Phumzile 338 Mongolia 106, 259, 329 monitoring systems 82, 347–348 Montreal Protocol 83–84 moratorium 383 mortality rates 347 motor vehicles see automobiles (cars) M shaped curve 343 municipalities 126–131, 142, 341 MV Alondra Rainbow 146 Myanmar 274, 313 Nagasaki 11, 13, 173–174, 176, 185, 355 Nagoya City 80 Naikaku-fu 36–37 Nakasone, Yasuhiro 12, 43, 59, 195, 385; national security 238, 241 Nakauchi, Y. 24, 198 Nanjing Massacre 47, 52 National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security for UNSCR 1325 348 National Biodiversity Strategy 81 national constitution 41; peace constitution, revisions of 42–45; revision and national identity 50–52; towards a beautiful country 45–50 national defense 138, 159, 175, 355, 357 see also national security National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) 160 national economy 128, 129–130, 139, 158, 181, 240 National Emergency Laws 33 national identity 12–13, 41, 50, 355–356; revision 50–52 national identity gaps 9–10, 19–20; China 13–15; Russia 17–19; South Korea 15–17; United States (US) 11–13 National Institute for Environmental Studies (NIES) 93 nationalism (nationalization): history and memory 356, 360, 362; national identity 45–50, 52; territorial disputes 191, 197 nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) 93 national peacebuilding 223–224 national reputation 345, 348 national security 179, 184, 220, 232–234, 244–245, 312; changes in preferences 239–244; Cold War actors 237–239; history and memory 355, 357, 362; interdependence 234–237; maritime power 158–159; national identity 46, 50–51; ocean management 147, 149 see also national defense National Security Council (NSC) 254, 262 National Security Strategy (NSS) 205–206, 259, 312

Index

Nauru 330 naval power 156–158, 162–163 see also maritime power navigation 139, 141–143, 204, 206, 208, 313 Netherlands 345, 358, 373, 382 Network Center 108 networking 328–330, 369 see also Transnational Agency Network (TAN) Network on Conflict, Peace and Development 311 New Guidelines 241 New Komeito Party 326 newly emerging economies (NEEs) 278 see also economies, emerging New Zealand 275, 384, 386, 388 Niger 310 Nihonjinron 12, 14 Niigata 103, 108 Nikkei Shimbun 65 9/11 219 Nippon Foundation 146–149 Nippon Kaigi 341–342 nitrogen oxides 111 Nixon, Richard 103, 178–180, 197 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 374, 376 norms, international: material-cycle society 120–124, 128–129, 131–132; Southeast Asia 209; whaling 368–369 norms creation (normalization) 44, 323 North, D. C. 283, 286 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 161, 167 Northeast Asian Conference on Environmental Cooperation (NEAC) 106 Northern Territories 17–19, 189–192 North Korea 159, 193, 236, 263, 389; development assistance 310, 312; disarmament 174, 183; history and memory 358–359, 363; national identity 45, 48, 50 North Pacific Ocean 75 Norway 382 Not in My Backyard (NIMBY) 123 Nuclear Basic Law 177 nuclear deterrence 178, 180, 184 nuclear disarmament 173–175, 182; Asia 178–182; development 177–178; humanitarian discourse 183–185; international priorities 182–183; roots 175–176 nuclear energy (programs) 158, 174–175, 177–178, 256–257, 263; climate change 94, 96 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 173, 177–182, 184 Nuclear Posture Review 183 nuclear proliferation 182 Nuclear Supplier group (NSG) 174, 181 Nye, S. J. ( Joseph) 57–58, 65–66, 204–205, 234

Obama, Barack 183, 198, 276, 313, 376; national identity 11–13, 16 observations, critical, peacebuilding 225–228 Obuchi, Keizo 219, 323 ocean management 74, 136–137; administration 137–138; discussions 148–150; environmental protection 140–143; Japan Coast Guard ( JCG) 138–140; partnerships 147–148; regional cooperation 143–147 Official Development Assistance (ODA) 131, 143; air pollution 104–106, 107; development assistance 306–315; diplomacy and power 61; disarmament 182–183; economic diplomacy 254, 260–262; First Charter 309–310; gender equality 338, 344–349; norm entrepreneur 322; peacebuilding 218, 220–221, 223–227, 225–226; Second Charter 310–311; Southeast Asia 204–207 oil 89, 141, 181, 239 Okinawa 191, 197, 237, 269 One Belt One Road (OBOR) 257, 262–264 opinion polls 36–37, 48–49, 190, 195–196 see also public opinion Opium Wars 363 opposition groups (societal interests) 76, 123, 270–272, 295, 383 see also demonstrations; riots O’Reilly, P. 122–123 organizational behavior 283, 285 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 308 Orr, J 355–356 Osborn, David L. 191 Oshima, Kenzo 324–325 Oslo 184 Otake, H. 237–238, 241, 355, 357, 360 Otmazgin, Nissim Kadosh 57–59, 62, 64, 66 Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund 311 Ozawa, Ichiro 44, 155 ozone 83–84, 112 Pacific Island States Conference 148 Pacific Partnership (PP) 165, 210 pacifism 36, 175, 224, 237, 355; national identity 10–11, 14, 43, 46, 51–52 Packwood-Magnuson Amendment 384–386 Pakistan 183, 327, 329 Palau 148 Paris Agreement 96–99 Paris Declaration 260 Park, Chung Hee 194, 358 Park, Geun-hye 16, 376 Park, Yuha 378 particulate matter (PM) 112 Patalano, Alessio 157–159, 162, 167 patriarchy, system (patriarchal notions) 341–342 patriotism 45 pay-as-you-throw (PAYT) 131

399

Index

peacebuilding (peace) 46, 77, 216–217, 228–229, 311, 323; critical observations 225–228; gender equality 338–339, 344, 346–348; origins 217–221; three-tier approach 221–225 peace constitution 42–45, 48–50, 175, 198, 251 peacekeeping 44, 182, 322–323 Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) 32, 34, 43–44, 46, 204, 348 Peacekeeping Operations Bill 44 Peacekeeping Operations Cooperation Law 32 Peel, J. 386, 388 Pelly Amendment 384, 386 People’s Republic of China see China permits, scientific 382, 384, 385, 387, 388 Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) 108–109; impact 111 Peru 259, 327 Peterson, M. J. 382–385 Philippines 145, 164–166, 198, 221, 344–345, 373; development assistance 308, 313, 315; smart power 206, 208–210, 212 Phongpaichit, P. 294, 296 piracy 144, 146–147, 207, 312–313; maritime power 160, 163, 166–167 plant manufacturers 128 plastics 127, 128–129 Plaza Accord 236, 296, 299, 314 poaching 141, 146 policing 149, 157 political leverage, trade 274–275 political will, peacebuilding 227–228 politics, international 179 polluter-pays (principle) 104 pollution 74, 75, 78, 80, 102–106, 139; marine 77, 141, 207 Pollution Parliament 140 polyethylene terephthalate (PET) 128–129 POPs Monitoring Project 109–110 population 80, 126; global warming 74 port calls 161, 207, 212 poverty reduction 255, 310–311, 333, 339, 344, 347 power 156–157, 161, 205, 258 see also Japan Coast Guard ( JCG); nuclear energy (programs) power, soft 56–60, 64–65, 66, 74–75 preferences: business communities 238–240; government 237–238, 241–243 Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals 75–76 press see media Press-Barnathan, G. 58, 66 Prime Minister’s Cabinet (PMC) 61 Proactive Contribution to Peace (speech) 344–345 processing plants 181 production (networks) 235, 238, 274, 278, 296 propaganda 58 property, intellectual 63 protestors 360–361 see also demonstrations; opposition groups (societal interests); riots

400

public awareness 79, 83 Public Cleansing Law 126–127 public health 83–85, 139 see also health (healthcare) public opinion 176, 191, 204, 241, 271, 309–310; history and memory 355–356, 358–360; security legislation 31–32, 36–37; whaling 387–388 see also opinion polls public support 49, 262 Putin, Vladimir 17–18, 192, 263 racism 355 radiation 141, 174, 176 railways 256, 263 Ramsar Convention on Wetlands 79 Rapid Deployment Brigade (RDB) 164 reactors, nuclear 177 Reagan, Ronald 385 recycling 128–129 see also material-cycle society; waste recycling refueling activities (missions) 160, 312 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) 274, 277 Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery (RECAAP) 312 regional trade agreements (RTAs) 269 Reizei, A. 12–13 relief missions 161, 165–166 see also disaster relief relief supplies 143 reparations 357, 361 see also compensation Republic of China (ROC) 196–197, 358 see also Taiwan Republic of Korea see South Korea (ROK) research: military 235; scientific 77, 382 research and development (R&D) 235 Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry 62 residents 129 resiliency, internal 276–277 resource efficiency 121, 124 resources 120, 128, 157, 260–261; human 224–225; management 120; marine 76, 141; natural 74, 77, 193, 197, 308, 362; security of 257; supply 253 resources management policies: first period 124–127; fourth period 129–132; second period 127–128; third period 128–129 see also waste recycling responsibility 355, 378 responsibility to protect (R2P) 325–328, 330–331, 333 reverse imports 294 Revised Management Procedure (RMP) 384 revisionism 10, 13–14, 16, 47; national identity 43, 45, 52 Rhee, Syngman 193–194, 358 Rhee Line 193–194 Rio de Janeiro (Summit) 80, 120

Index

riots 295, 363 see also demonstrations; opposition groups (societal interests); protestors Roh, Moo Hyun 362–363 Rozman, Gilbert 10–11, 13, 15, 17–18, 20 Russian Federation (Russia) 106, 174, 263; environmental policy 75, 79; maritime power 159, 163; national identity 17–19, 43; territorial disputes 189–190, 192 Ryu, Yongwook 44–45, 52 safety 81, 141, 312 see also maritime safety; national defense; national security St Vincent and the Grenadines 386 Samuels, R. J. 30, 33, 36, 44, 233, 238 sanctions 18, 254, 313, 382 San Francisco Peace Treaty 189, 194, 294, 358, 377 Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) 277 Sasakawa Peace Foundation 148 Sato, Eisaku 103–104, 173, 178, 180, 237 Sato (Sat o), T. 24, 59–60 Sato, Y. 11, 44 Sauchuk, K. 103–104 scandals 192 sea-lanes 158–162, 166, 168, 312 sea level rise 74 Sea of Japan 160 search and rescue 139, 144, 149, 207 security 338; economic 275; external threats 45–50; human 219, 221, 225; maritime 275 security legislation 22–24, 34–35; background 24, 28–33; changes 33–34; change within continuity 36–37 segregation scenario 285, 295 Sekiguchi, T. 47, 208 self-defense, collective 24, 28, 30–31, 33–35, 48–52, 198 Self-Defense Forces (SDF) 358; economic diplomacy 254, 256; national identity 42–45, 48–52; national security 233, 237–244; peacebuilding 224, 226–227; security legislation 23–24, 28–37; Southeast Asia 203–211, 212–213, 219 senden gaiko 58 Senegal 226 Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 164, 196–199, 362–363; development assistance 312; economic diplomacy 261; history and memory 362–363; national identity 48, 50; territorial disputes 192, 196–199; trade policy 275 Seoul Symposium 107 sewage 125–126 sexual slavery 371–372 sexual violence 368, 371 Shangri-La Dialogue 205, 209, 344 Shikotan 190, 192 Shimbunsha, Asagumo 23, 35 Shinoda, Hideaki 218

Shinyo, T. 325, 328 shipping 138, 157, 160, 162 Showa Manu 144 Sierra Leone 310 Sikkink, K. 122, 322, 367–368, 370–371, 374, 376–378 Silent Coup 294 Singapore 274 Singh, B. 209, 219 Sino-Japan Friendship Center for Environmental Protection (Center) 105 Sivalingam, G. 286, 294–297 Slovenia 329 Small-type Coastal Whaling 386 smart power 202–205, 211–213; HADR 209–211; maritime commons 205–208; responses 208–209 Smith, S. 14, 197 Smoke and Soot Regulation Act 104 Soble, J. 22, 206 social media 67 social security fund 339 So¨derberg, Marie 223, 308–311 Soeya, Y. 45, 197 soft power 64–65, 66, 74–75 Soka Gakkai 49 Somalia 166 South China Sea 16, 226, 275, 312; maritime power 157, 159; Southeast Asia 209, 211 Southeast Asia 75, 198, 202–205, 211–213, 297, 367; HADR 209–211; maritime commons 205–208; ocean management 143–147, 149; peacebuilding 218, 223; responses 208–209; whaling 377 Southern Ocean 383 Southern Sakhalin 189 South Korea (ROK) 14, 15–17, 66–67, 79, 179, 345; air pollution 106–107, 111–113; comfort women 367, 373–374, 377; economic diplomacy 258, 260; history and memory 360, 362; national identity 19, 47, 52; territorial disputes 193, 195–196; trade policy 270, 273–274 South Kuriles see Northern Territories South Sudan 224, 227–228, 313, 348 sovereignty 157, 324, 327, 329–332 Special Rescue Team 144 species, endangered 388; protection 78 Speller, I. 156–157 Spitsbergen 76 Spratly Islands 275 starch crops 269–270, 276 see also cereal crops state visits 297–298 statism 15, 18 Stockholm Convention 109, 111 Stockholm Declaration 120 stock markets 296, 299 stockpiles 174 Strait of Malacca 143

401

Index

Strand, J. R. 106, 386 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START 1) 182 Strategic Council on Intellectual Property 63 Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 80–81 students 12, 66 Students Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy (SEALDs) 31 submarines 162 subsidies 240, 244, 343 Sudan 310 Sudo, S. 294–295 Suehiro, A. 295–296 sugar 269–270, 276 Sugihara, Arata 23 sulfur dioxide 103, 108, 111 supply chains 124, 242–244, 278 Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP) 193 surveillance 141–142, 160–161, 167, 205, 207–209 surveying 141, 143–144 surveys 66 see also opinion polls sustainability 80, 123, 140–143, 383 sustainable development 136, 347 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 123, 132, 149, 307 Sweden 122 Switzerland 269–270, 327 Taiwan 179, 197, 236, 345, 373; diplomacy and power 58, 66; see also Republic of China (ROC) Takei, Tomohisa 160 Takeshima (Dokdo/Takeshima Islands) 15, 17, 192–196, 362–363 Tanaka, Kakuei 295, 298, 347–348, 359 Tanaka, Masaru 131 Tanzania 330 tariffs 268, 274, 275, 296 Tasaki, T. 123, 130 Tatsumi, Y. 23, 31 taxation (tax systems) 121, 296, 343 tax incentives 343 technologies 60, 63, 67, 258; environmental policy 75, 81–82; information 310; material-cycle society 120, 128; national security 235, 238, 240, 242; nuclear 177 tensions: air pollution 107; climate change 100; development assistance 312; diplomacy and power 65–67; economic diplomacy 260; history and memory 362–363; maritime 159, 168; national identity 45, 49–50; security legislation 37; Southeast Asia 204, 206, 212; territorial disputes 195, 197; Thailand 284; trade policy 275 terminology 371, 372, 376 see also language (wording)

402

territorial disputes 159, 185, 297, 312, 362; national identity 15, 17, 19, 45, 48; Northern Territories 189–192; Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 196–199; Takeshima/Dokdo 192–196 territorial waters 76, 139, 141, 157, 161 terrorism 183, 219, 235, 241, 311, 344 terrorist attacks 33, 44, 144, 310 see also piracy textbooks 47, 52, 357, 359–360, 373 Thailand 269, 329; Japan’s FDI 286–297 Three Pillars 32, 36–37 Three Principles 209, 235, 237–243, 258 3R (policy) 128, 130–131 timber (wood) 74, 81 Tokai-mura 181 Tokyo-Guam-Taiwan (TGT) 161 Tokyo International Conference of African Development (TICAD) 222, 228, 256, 315 Tønnessen, J. N. 382–383 tourism 60, 62, 63, 253, 256, 257–258 tournament scenario 285, 297 Toyama 139 Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) 222–223 Tokyo War Crimes Trials 357 trade 158, 253; agreements 256, 258–259, 262; diplomacy 254–255, 258–260, 262 trade policy 267, 278–279; challenges 276–278; domestic politics 270–273; evolution 267–270; international politics 273–276; making structures 272–273 trade resiliency 276 trade unions 355, 357 training (training programs) 313; ocean management 144, 147–148; peacebuilding 221, 224–225; Southeast Asia 207, 212 Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 278 Transnational Agency Network (TAN) 366–367, 369–371, 377–379; comfort women 367–369; global norms 373–375; state actors 376–377; transformed dialogue 371–372 Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 12–13, 16, 236; economic diplomacy 253–254, 259, 262; trade policy 270, 273, 277 transportation 92, 141, 143, 312 Treaty of Peace and Friendship 197 trouble-shooters 202, 204–209, 211–212 Trump, Donald (Trump administration) 12–13, 254, 259, 277 Tsukurukai 47 Tsuneishi, T. 285, 296 Tsutsui, Kaoru 367, 369 Tuman, J. P. 106, 386 Uesugi, Y. 225 UN Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm Conference) 383

Index

United Kingdom (Great Britain) 75, 358, 382, 384 United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) 370 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) 80 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) 104 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Law of the Sea) 76, 152, 195, 197, 203, 362; ocean management 137, 139–140, 145, 149 United Nations Cooperation Corps Bill 44 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 59 United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) 122–123, 131–132; air pollution 106, 109, 111; environmental policy 80; ocean management 139, 147 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA): 2005 World Summit Outcomes 324–325; FHS 328–330; first resolution in GA 330–332; GA meetings 326–328; MFG 325; second resolution 332–333; UNSC 325–326 United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (UNPBC) 222 United Nations Security Council 44–45, 182, 325–326, 389 United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR 1325) 346 United Nations Trust for Human Security (UNTFHS) 323 United Nations Women (UN Women) 338 United States Coast Guard (USCG) 138 United States Navy (USN) 158 UN Sustainable Development Summit 123 USA (US) 92, 259, 384–385; Asia 178–182; comfort women 374–375, 377; development assistance 309, 312; diplomacy and power 58–59, 66; environmental policy 75, 78, 80; history and memory 355–357, 363; humanitarian discourse 183–185; Japan’s non-proliferation regime 177–178; maritime power 159–160, 174; national identity 11–13, 18–19, 42–43, 51–52; national security 237–238, 241; norm entrepreneur 326, 328; security alliance 175–176; territorial disputes 196, 198; trade policy 272, 275 US House of Representatives Resolution 121 (H.Res.121) 375–376 US-Japan Industry Forum for Security Cooperation (ISFEC) 239 USSR see Russian Federation (Russia) victimization 356 victims (victims’ groups) 359, 361 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer 83

Vietnam 198, 313, 358; smart power 206, 208–209, 210, 212 Vietnam War 190, 238 vocabulary see terminology Volatile Organic Compounds 111 volunteer organizations 143, 348 vulnerability 234; women 347 Wakamiya, Y. 358, 360–361 war criminals 357 warfare 23, 37 war memories 310 war reparations 295 waste 77, 121; disposal 85, 138; export 75; industrial 127–128; municipal household 127–128; radioactive 77; recovery 126 Waste Management and Public Cleansing Law 127–128 waste recycling 119, 132–133; international norms 120–124; policy development 124–132 Waste Sanitation Law 126 Watanabe, O. 42, 43 water 111; industry 256–257; pollution 106; wastewater 141 see also sewage Water Quality Preservation Act 104 waters, territorial 76, 139, 141, 157, 161 watershed protection 269 weapons (weapon systems) 223, 226, 234, 237, 240; definition 242–243; exports 238; missiles 45, 48; nuclear 50, 175–177, 180, 310, 389 weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 174, 182, 309, 312 weather extremes 74 wetlands 78, 79, 80 whales (whale meat) 382–385, 388 whaling 75, 77, 381, 388–389; international regulations 381–384; Japan’s diplomacy (scientific programs) 385–387; public opinion 387–388; quotas 382–383 White Paper on Defense 17, 23 White Paper on International Trade 269 Wild Bird Society of Japan 78 wildlife 76, 78 see also marine life Winkler, C. 42, 45 women 338–340, 346; rights of 344–345, 368, 376; roles 345–346 Women in Development (WID) 346 womenomics 339 Women’s Active Museum of War and Peace (WAM) 375, 378 Women’s Dignity Project 345 Women Shine 345–346, 348 Wong, A. 382, 385 workforce 339, 342–343 work practices 315, 342–343, 346 World Assembly for Women 338

403

Index

World Assembly for Women (WAW) 345–346 World Conference on Women 370 World Conservation Union (IUCN) 78 World Summit 2005 324 World Summit on Sustainable Development 79 World Trade Organization 259, 269, 278 World War II (World War Two) 66, 76, 103, 126, 314; comfort women 368–369, 371, 377; disarmament 175, 177, 182; national identity 12–13, 17, 46; ocean management 138; security legislation 36; Southeast Asia 203, 207, 210; trade policy 262

Yalta (summit) 189 Yamamura, K. 74, 236 Yang, A. 66, 204 Yasukuni Shrine 61, 196, 357, 361–363; national identity 11, 14, 16, 19, 52 Yokkaichi 83, 103 Yorimoto, K. 129–130 Yoshida, Shigeru 23, 42, 159, 175, 189, 283 Yoshida, Y, 356, 359 Yoshida Doctrine 43–44, 175, 189 Yoshimatsu, Hidetaka 107–108, 271–272, 274 youths 15, 47; culture 67

Xi, Jinping 198, 257, 363

zainichi 19

404