Routledge Handbook of Asian Cities [1 ed.] 9781003256533, 9781032188409, 9781032188416

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ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF ASIAN CITIES

This handbook provides the most comprehensive examination of Asian cities—developed and developing, large and small—and their urban development. Investigating the urban challenges and opportunities of cities from every nation in Asia, the handbook engages not only the global cities like Shanghai, Tokyo, Singapore, Seoul, and Mumbai but also less studied cities like Dili, Malé, Bandar Seri Begawan, Kabul, and Pyongyang. The handbook discusses Asian cities in alignment to the United Nations’ New Urban Agenda and Sustainable Development Goals in order to contribute to global policy debates. In doing so, it critically reflects on the development trajectories of Asian cities and imagines an urban future, in Asia and the world, in the post-sustainable, post-global, and post-pandemic era. Presenting 43 chapters of original, insightful research, this book will be of interest to scholars, practitioners, students, and general readers in the fields of urban development, urban policy and planning, urban studies, and Asian studies. Richard Hu is an urban planner, designer, and critic. His work and interests—both intellectual and professional—integrate built environment, economy, and technology to tackle contemporary urban transformations and challenges, with a focus on the Asia-Pacific region. He is the author of Smart Design: Disruption, Crisis, and the Reshaping of Urban Spaces (2021).





ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF ASIAN CITIES

Edited by Richard Hu



Designed cover image: Getty Images First published 2023 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2023 selection and editorial matter, Richard Hu; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Richard Hu to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Every effort has been made to contact copyright-holders. Please advise the publisher of any errors or omissions, and these will be corrected in subsequent editions. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Hu, Richard, editor Environmental aspects. Title: Routledge handbook of Asian cities / edited by Richard Hu. Description: First Edition. | New York, NY : Routledge, 2023. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2022056175 (print) | LCCN 2022056176 (ebook) | ISBN 9781032188409 (hardback) | ISBN 9781032188416 (paperback) | ISBN 9781003256533 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Cities and towns–Asia. | City planning–Environmental aspects–Asia. | Cities and towns–Growth. Classification: LCC HT147.A2 R68 2023 (print) | LCC HT147.A2 (ebook) | DDC 307.76095–dc23/eng/20221121 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022056175 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022056176 ISBN: 978-1-032-18840-9 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-18841-6 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-25653-3 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003256533 Typeset in Times New Roman by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India

CONTENTS

 List of Tables ix List of Figures x Notes on Contributors xii Acknowledgementsxviii

PART I Introduction1 1 Urban Asia in perspective Richard Hu

3

2 Smart cities in Asia: Ambiguity, innovation, and evolution Hoon Han

26

3 Asian cities in and beyond COVID-19 Kh Md Nahiduzzaman and Md Moynul Ahsan

38

4 Vulnerable resilience in COVID-19: Invisibility and adaptability of the ‘informal’ cities of Southeast Asia Amanda Achmadi and Sidh Sintusingha 5 Making liveable cities: Experiences from Asia and the Pacific Bambang Susantono, Ramola Naik Singru, and Lara Arjan PART II East Asian cities

49 60

71

6 East Asian cities: Deindustrialisation, greening, and the new geography of urbanisation Shahid Yusuf v

73

Contents

7 Hong Kong: One city, three spatial forms, and two possible fates? Mee Kam Ng, Tsz Chun Yeung, Chun Hei Cheng, and Nok Yin Ma

87

8 Pyongyang: An urban metamorphosis under the power of marketisation Pavel P. Em

104

9 Seoul: Pursuing and sharing a global city Yu-Min Joo

115

10 Shanghai: New directions in Chinese metropolitan planning Richard Hu

126

11 Taipei: Towards a liveable and sustainable city Chia-Huang Wang

140

12 Tokyo: Reinventing the modern Asian metropolis through adaptive strategies154 Carola Hein 13 Ulaanbaatar: When international plans and local preferences over urban densification collide Aldarsaikhan Tuvshinbat, Raven Anderson, and Michael Hooper

163

14 Xi’an: From an ancient world city to a 21st-century global logistics centre 172 Xiangming Chen and Ziming Li PART III South Asian cities

187

15 South Asian cities: Informalisation of ecological and social change Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt

189

16 Colombo: From colonial outpost to indigenous kleptocratic city Nihal Perera

201

17 Delhi: Rethinking Indian urbanism through the capital’s multi-nuclei development213 Pilar Maria Guerrieri 18 Dhaka: Growth management challenges for a rapidly urbanising megacity 225 Shilpi Roy 19 Kabul: The 21st-century urbanism we did not expect Pietro Calogero vi

238

Contents

20 Karachi: Changing institutional landscapes, challenges, and reforms Noman Ahmed

249

21 Kathmandu Valley: Unrealised proposals, decades of urban chaos, and planning for a better future Rajjan Chitrakar

257

22 Malé: Decentralising the world’s densest island capital—plans, determination, and challenges Mariyam Zulfa

270

23 Mumbai: ‘Mess is more’—value and shortcomings of the city’s ad hoc development process Matias Echanove and Rahul Srivastava

280

24 Thimphu: Tranquil, peace, and happy city of the Himalayas Leishipem Khamrang PART IV Southeast Asian cities

291

301

25 Southeast Asian cities: The imbalances of urban development Rita Padawangi

303

26 Bandar Seri Begawan: Why is Brunei’s capital chasing foreign dollars? Victor K. S. Ong

318

27 Bangkok: Creative disorder and the military imagination Ross King

329

28 Dili: Hurdles in constructing the urban from the ground Joana de Mesquita Lima and João Pedro Costa

343

29 Ho Chi Minh City: Can it avoid the path dependence with Thu Duc City? Du Huynh

353

30 Jakarta: Seeking the sustainable megacity region Christopher Silver

365

31 Kuala Lumpur: Post-Vision 2020 and post-pandemic futures Keng-Khoon Ng and Tim Bunnell

380

32 Manila: Aspiring to be an inclusive, resilient, and sustainable city amidst climate and disaster risks Emma Porio and Justin See vii

392

Contents

33 Phnom Penh: Towards a post-dependency metropolisation? Gabriel Fauveaud and Dolorès Bertrais

405

34 Singapore: Planning for healthy ageing Belinda Yuen

415

35 Vientiane: Challenges in the policies and practices for sustainable urban development in a ‘least developed’ city Thanousorn Vongpraseuth

426

36 Yangon: Displacement urbanism, housing provisionality, and feminist spatial practices—an infrastructure of care at the urban margin Giovanna Astolfo

437

PART V Central Asian cities

449

37 Central Asian cities: Challenges in balancing global, national, and local development needs Madina Junussova, Saniya Soltybayeva, and Rameesha Khan

451

38 Almaty: Modernisation through spatial reordering—stratification, transport sector reforms, and Eurasianism Henryk Alff and Wladimir Sgibnev

463

39 Ashgabat: The architecture as a showcase of a personal regime Slavomír Horák

472

40 Bishkek: Searching for Asianness in a post-Soviet city Emil Nasritdinov

483

41 Dushanbe: Urban transformation, changing spaces, and identities in Tajikistan Tahmina Inoyatova 42 Tashkent: Aspiring for entrepreneurship and innovation hub Farrukh Irnazarov and Madina Junussova

492 503

PART VI Conclusion513 43 The Asian city in a new urban age Richard Hu

515

Index523 viii

TABLES

  1.1 1.2 1.3 2.1 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 10.1 11.1 11.2 11.3 18.1 18.2 20.1 20.2 26.1 26.2 31.1 35.1 35.2 35.3 38.1

An overview of Asian development 5 Linkages between SDG 11 targets and other SDGs 11 Dimensions and implementation of the New Urban Agenda 12 Smart city related concepts 27 The three spatial forms in Hong Kong 91 Social indicators in urban, new towns, and ‘rural’ NT 92 Economic indicators in urban, new towns, and ‘rural’ NT 94 Environmental indicators in urban, new towns, and ‘rural’ NT 95 Master plans for Shanghai, 1986–2017 128 Statistics of business and companies registered in Taipei City (by industry type) 143 Indicators of housing affordability (Q2, 2021) 147 Structure of electricity installed capacity in Taiwan by fuel type (in %), 2000–2020 149 Quantification of urban growth (built-up area) in Dhaka 228 Changes in the intensity of urban growth in the neighbourhoods over time 231 Evolution and development of local institutions in Karachi since 1947 252 Important planning exercises in Karachi since 1947 253 Brunei attracts the lowest number of tourists among countries in Southeast Asia, 2019 319 Polarising towards a unified goal of economic diversification in Bandar Seri Begawan 325 Land area and ownership of the six urban (re)development projects 386 Agencies responsible for urban planning and development in Vientiane 430 Major legislation in urban planning and land management in Lao PDR 432 Three versions of Vientiane Master Plan 434 Electric public transport systems in Kazakhstan 467

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FIGURES

  1.1 1.2 1.3 2.1 3.1 4.1 4.2 6.1 7.1 7.2 8.1 8.2 10.1 11.1 14.1 14.2 14.3 16.1 16.2 16.3 17.1 17.2 17.3 18.1

Urban Asia, 2020 Urban Asia in the world, 2020 Conceptual framework The ambiguity of the Asian smart city concept Path towards a resilient city From farmers to market to your doorstep: The rise of the roaming greengrocer Buddhist merit-making in the public open space of a roadside fresh market Urbanisation in East Asia, 1960–2020 Territories of Hong Kong Reclamation around Victoria Harbour in Hong Kong New residential buildings in Pyongyang Grand People’s Study House in Pyongyang Planning Shanghai in the Yangtze River delta region An indicative map of Taipei City with its administrative districts and Northern Taiwan Metropolitan Area Xi’an’s long way from an ancient world city to a state-driven new logisticsled global city The sites of palaces of imperial dynasties and the boundaries of current urban areas, Xi’an Economic growth and traffic volume in Xi’an, 1978–2019 Colombo as part of the Portuguese Indian Ocean space Map of Colombo showing colonial and migrant areas The Fort area of the 1980s and the new parliament building Hauz Khas urban village, Delhi Shahjahanabad, Delhi Gurgaon development, Delhi Urban growth within Dhaka between 1991 and 2019 x

7 8 15 28 46 53 55 75 88 90 108 112 136 141 173 175 178 203 204 208 218 219 221 227

Figures

18.2 Neighbourhood transformation pattern in Dhaka between 1991 and 2019 18.3 Urban densification in Dhaka between 1991 and 2019 19.1 Urban neighbourhoods developed by Kabul Municipality, 1921–1992 19.2 Central Kabul, 2003 21.1 Map of the Kathmandu Valley showing three principal towns and other smaller towns 21.2 Housing process in the unplanned and planned new growth areas of the Kathmandu Valley 21.3 Urban environment of New Baneshwor, Kathmandu Valley 22.1 Urban features of Malé 23.1 Streetscapes of Dharavi, Mumbai 25.1 Urbanisation rates in Southeast Asia, 1950–2050 25.2 Participatory design efforts in Bukit Duri, Jakarta, 2016 26.1 Collaborative forces of economic diversification in Bandar Seri Begawan 27.1 Bangkok and ‘soi urbanism’ 27.2 Bangkok space of the royal-Buddhist military imagination 28.1 Public space in Dili, 2022 28.2 Child playing and collecting refuse in drainage channel in Dili, 2022 30.1 Commercial high-rise corridor along Jalan Sudirman on the horizon 30.2 Jabodetabek cities and districts 30.3 Proposed expansion of DKI Jakarta in 1965–1985 Master Plan 30.4 Informal settlement along the shores of Situ (lake) Rawa Besar in Depok 31.1 Kuala Lumpur and its surrounding urban region 31.2 Warisan Merdeka 118 dethrones PETRONAS Twin Towers as Malaysia’s tallest building 31.3 The six high-profile projects located within the federal territories of Kuala Lumpur 32.1 Map of Metro Manila 32.2 Informal settlements along the coast in Navotas City, Metro Manila 32.3 An intersectional approach to vulnerability, adaptation, and resilience in Metro Manila 35.1 Urban development levels in Vientiane capital 37.1 Populations of the largest cities in Central Asia, 2000–2020 39.1 The monument to the constitution, Ashgabat 39.2 Gökdepe museum, Ashgabat 40.1 Plan and houses of the Russian colonial city of Pishpek at the turn of the 19–20th centuries 40.2 Expansion of Bishkek since 1862 41.1 Statue of Lenin in Dushanbe 41.2 New developments in Dushanbe 42.1 Innovation and entrepreneurship model of Tashkent 42.2 Innovation hub model of Tashkent

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229 232 240 244 259 263 265 272 281 305 314 325 333 336 345 348 366 368 369 374 382 385 386 394 395 399 431 452 477 478 484 489 495 497 505 509

CONTRIBUTORS

Amanda Achmadi is Senior Lecturer in Architectural Design, Asian Architecture and Urbanism at the Melbourne School of Design of the University of Melbourne, Australia. Her research works consider the interactions between architectural discourses, socio-spatial practices, and identity politics in colonial and postcolonial Indonesia. She is a founding member of the Society of Architectural and Urban Historians of Asia (SAUH-Asia) and a member of the InfUR research hub. Noman Ahmed is an architect and planner, working as Dean of the Faculty of Architecture and Management Sciences at NED University, Karachi, Pakistan. His recent books include Water Supply in Karachi: Issues and Prospects (2008), Karachi: The Land Issue (2015), and Karachi, from the Prism of Urban Design (2016). Md Moynul Ahsan is Assistant Professor at Ankara University, Turkey, and has over eight years of professional experience in teaching and research in the fields of urban planning and development, sustainable real estate, housing, climate change, disaster, and migration at a number of universities and research centres in Bangladesh, Brunei, and Turkey. Henryk Alff was trained as a human geographer and ‘areanist’ (Slavic and Central Asian Studies) and currently is a senior researcher in the TRANSECT project (Agrarian Transformations and Social-Ecological Complexities, Local Bioeconomy Scenarios in Central and South Asia) at Eberswalde University for Sustainable Development (HNEE), Germany. Raven Anderson is an urban planner and writer who has worked on urban development projects in Mongolia, Brazil, Indonesia, and the United States. He works for the New York City Economic Development Corporation (NYCEDC) and previously worked for the City and County of San Francisco and the World Bank. Lara Arjan is an Urban Development Specialist at the Asian Development Bank and concurrently serves as a Project Officer for the Cities Development Initiative in Asia. With over 20 years of experience as an urban planner, she has a wide-ranging experience in urban development, programme management, monitoring, and evaluation with familiarity in both international and municipal contexts.

xii

Contributors

Giovanna Astolfo is an urban researcher with an architectural theory and practice background. As a Lecturer and MSc Director at the Development Planning Unit, University College London (UCL), London, UK, she combines research-based teaching and action learning from contested and ungovernable urban geographies in Southeast Asia and Southern Europe with a focus on non-conventional urbanisms, continuous displacement and migration, spatial violence, and housing justice. Dolorès Bertrais is a PhD candidate and teaching assistant at the Institute of Environmental Governance and Territorial Development of the University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland, since September 2019. Her research focuses on new mechanisms of city production in Southeast Asia and East Africa, particularly in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, and Kigali, Rwanda. Tim Bunnell is Professor of human geography and Director of the Asia Research Institute (ARI) at the National University of Singapore, Singapore. His academic interest in Kuala Lumpur began with doctoral fieldwork in the 1990s. Pietro Calogero studied urban design and housing and practised in the San Francisco Bay Area for ten years. Through Afghan–American contacts he began periodic work for the Afghan government in 2003. He worked as a senior policy advisor on housing formalisation in Kabul in 2017–2018. Xiangming Chen is Director of the Urban Studies Program and Paul E. Raether Distinguished Professor of Global Urban Studies and Sociology at Trinity College, Connecticut, USA, and a guest professor at the School of Social Development and Public Policy, Fudan University, Shanghai, China. Chun Hei Cheng was a research assistant at the Institute of Future Cities at Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK), Hong Kong, China. His research interests focus on community planning and heritage conservation. He is currently studying a master’s degree of urban planning at Hong Kong University. Rajjan Chitrakar is a researcher and educator with a background in architecture, urban design, and planning. He is currently a Lecturer in Architecture and Urbanism at Melbourne Polytechnic. Rajjan holds a PhD in Urban Design and Planning from the Queensland University of Technology and has widely published in highly ranked international journals. João Pedro Costa is Professor of Urbanism at the CIAUD, Research Centre of Architecture, Urbanism and Design, Lisbon School of Architecture, Universidade de Lisboa, Portugal. His research interests include urban waterfronts, climate change adaptation, and urban policy. Recently he published Overlooked Cities and [Re]Urban Practice, Towards a European Research Agenda for Urbanism. Matias Echanove, co-founder of urbz​.ne​t, has studied Economics and Political Science at London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), Urban Planning at Columbia University in New York, and Urban Information Systems at the University of Tokyo, Japan. He has initiated urban participatory workshops with civic groups and municipal bodies in cities around the world. Pavel P. Em is Visiting Research Fellow at the Seoul National University Asia Center, South Korea. He obtained a Candidate of Science degree in geography from Moscow State University in 2013. His main area of interest is the comparison of urbanisation in the two Koreas with a recent focus on the urban development of Pyongyang. xiii

Contributors

Gabriel Fauveaud is Assistant Professor at the Department of Geography and the Centre for Asian Studies at the University of Montreal in Quebec, Canada. His work explores various aspects of the production of urban spaces in Southeast Asia and North America. Pilar Maria Guerrieri is an architectural historian, now teaching History of Architecture at Politecnico di Milano. She is the author of books Maps of Delhi (2017), Negotiating Cultures: Delhi’s Architecture and Planning from 1912 to 1962 (2018), and Architettura di Egizio Nichelli 1937–1991 (2022). Hoon Han is Professor of City Planning and Associate Director of City Futures of Research Centre (CFRC) at the University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia. He has published over 100 publications in spatially integrated social science. He currently sits on the editorial boards of Housing Studies and Spatial Information Research. Carola Hein is Professor and Chair of History of Architecture and Urban Planning at the Delft University of Technology and UNESCO Chair Water, Ports and Historic Cities. Her recent (co-)edited books and monographs include Oil Spaces (2021), Urbanisation of the Sea (2020), and The Routledge Handbook of Planning History (2018). Michael Hooper is Associate Professor of Community and Regional Planning at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada. He previously taught at Harvard University and worked with UNDP in New York and Kenya. Slavomír Horák is Associate Professor in Political and Cultural Geography, based at the Department of Russian and East European Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague, Czechia. His research covers Central Asian political, social, and economic issues. He conducts systematic research on Turkmenistan’s domestic politics, especially informalities and state- and nation-building processes. Richard Hu is an urban planner, designer, and critic. His work and interests—both intellectual and professional—integrate built environment, economy, and technology to tackle contemporary urban transformations and challenges, with a focus on the Asia-Pacific region. He is the author of Smart Design: Disruption, Crisis, and the Reshaping of Urban Spaces (2021). Du Huynh is Senior Lecturer at the School of Public Policy and Management, Fulbright University, Vietnam. His teaching and research interests are urban economics, local and regional development, infrastructure development, and finance and banking. His recent book is Making Megacities in Asia: Comparing National Economic Development Trajectories. Tahmina Inoyatova is a PhD candidate at Simon Fraser University, BC, Canada, researching media, urban space, culture, identity, and power in Eurasia. Tahmina has authored a chapter in the forthcoming edited volume Mapping the Media and Communication Landscape of Central Asia. Farrukh Irnazarov is Co-Founder at the Central Asian Development Institute. He has been working on economic transition and urban development, trade, and migration, and he managed projects for ADB, World Bank, IOM, UNDP, UNICEF, GIZ, USAID, DFID, GDN, and Volkswagen and Gerda Henkel Foundations. Yu-Min Joo is Associate Professor at the KDI School of Public Policy and Management in Korea. Her latest books include Megacity Seoul: Urbanization and the Development of Modern South Korea (2019) and a co-edited volume titled Smart Cities in Asia (2020). xiv

Contributors

Madina Junussova is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Public Policy and Admini­ stration of the University of Central Asia, Kazakhstan/Kyrgyzstan/Tajikistan, and a CERGE-EI Foundation Teaching Fellow. Her research interests include public policy, urban and regional development, and sustainable use of local resources. Leishipem Khamrang is Professor of Human Geography at the Royal Thimphu College, under the Royal University of Bhutan. His research interests centre on development studies, human well-being, urban studies, population and environment, and environmental humanities. Rameesha Khan is Editor at the University of Central Asia. She holds a master’s degree in public policy and management from the University of Glasgow, Scotland, UK. Ross King is Emeritus Professor and Former Dean in the Faculty of Architecture, Building and Planning at the University of Melbourne, Australia. Research in recent decades has focused on the urban condition of Asian cities. Recent books include Reading Bangkok and Heritage and Identity in Contemporary Thailand (2011 and 2017) and Seoul: Memory, Reinvention, and the Korean Wave (2018). Ziming Li is Assistant Professor at the Institute of Central China Development & Institute of Regional and Urban-Rural Development, Economics and Management School, Wuhan University, Wuhan, China. Joana de Mesquita Lima is a PhD candidate at the CIAUD, Research Centre of Architecture, Urbanism and Design, Lisbon School of Architecture, Universidade de Lisboa, Portugal, focusing on urban Dili. Research interests include the urban global south and housing. Recent chapters are included in the books Overlooked Cities and Rural-Urban Dichotomies and Spatial Development in Asia. Nok Yin Ma was a teaching assistant at the Urban Studies Programme of Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK), Hong Kong, China. He obtained an MSc in Global Sustainability Solutions from the University of Exeter with research interests in the areas of sustainability and society. He is currently a PhD student at CUHK. Kh Md Nahiduzzaman held faculty positions at the Department of City and Regional Planning in KFUPM (Saudi Arabia) and at the Department of Urban Planning and the Environment in the Royal Institute of Technology (Sweden), prior to joining the University of British Columbia (UBC) Okanagan. His research interests are transformational planning, urban resilience, and environmental studies. Emil Nasritdinov teaches urbanism and anthropology at the American University of Central Asia, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. He holds a PhD in Urban Planning from the University of Melbourne, Australia. His main research interests include urbanism, migration, and Islam. He leads the Social Innovations Lab Kyrgyzstan (SILK) research centre, which focuses on urban issues in Bishkek. Keng-Khoon Ng is Lecturer at NUS College, the undergraduate honours college of the National University of Singapore, Singapore. His urban transformation research focuses on Penang, Kuala Lumpur, Johor Bahru, and several cities in Malaysian Borneo. Mee Kam Ng is Vice-chairman of the Department of Geography and Resource Management, Director of the Urban Studies Programme, and Associate Director of the Institute of Future Cities at Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK), Hong Kong, China. She is a fellow of RTPI, the Academy of Social Sciences in the UK, and the HKIP. xv

Contributors

Victor K. S. Ong is an educator and a practitioner who is pursuing his doctorate at the University of Canberra. He travelled regularly to offshore sites in oil-rich cities for work. His current research encompasses digital disruption. Professionally, he is leading an Industry 4.0 transformation project for a logistics firm. Rita Padawangi is Associate Professor of Sociology at the Centre for University Core, Singapore University of Social Sciences, Singapore. She coordinates the Southeast Asia Neighbourhoods Network (SEANNET), which connects academic institutions, scholars, and communities for collaborative research and education on urban life. Nihal Perera is Professor of Urban Planning at Ball State University, Muncie, IN, and the founder-director of CapAsia immersive-learning program. The two-time Fulbright scholar was also Senior Research Fellow at the National University of Singapore, Singapore. His research focuses on how ordinary people produce (lived) spaces for daily activities and cultural practices. Emma Porio is Professor at the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, School of Social Sciences, Ateneo de Manila University in Quezon City, Philippines, and Science Research Fellow at Manila Observatory. She is currently the President of the International Sociological Association (ISA), Clinical/Sociology Division (2019–2023), and of the Asia Pacific Sociological Association (2020–2023). Shilpi Roy is Associate Professor of Urban and Rural Planning at Khulna University, Bangladesh. She is currently the Country Lead of the Centre for Sustainable, Healthy and Learning Cities and Neighbourhoods (SHLC) project and the focal point in Bangladesh for the UNESCO-IIEP ‘Local challenges, global imperatives: cities at the forefront to achieve Education 2030’ programme. Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt is Senior Expert at the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, Copen­ hagen University; Senior Researcher, Global Policy Institute, London; and Adjunct Associate Professor in Development and International Relations at Aalborg University, Denmark. He has published about 250 publications with a primary focus on Asian issues. Justin See is a postdoctoral research fellow at the Sydney Environment Institute at the University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia. His research centres around issues of justice, vulnerability, and adaptation. He has published his research in Global Environmental Change, Climatic Change and Climate and Development. Wladimir Sgibnev received his PhD from Humboldt University of Berlin, Germany. Currently he works as senior researcher at the Leibniz Institute of Regional Geography (IfL), where he is coordinating the research group on Mobilities and Migration, and leading the Leibniz Junior Research Group ‘Contentious Mobilities through a decolonial lens’. Christopher Silver is Emeritus Professor of Urban and Regional Planning and past Dean of the College of Design, Construction and Planning, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL. His recent publications include Urban Flood Risk Management: Looking at Jakarta (2022). He is a four-time Fulbright Senior Scholar in Indonesia and holds honorary faculty appointments at the University of Indonesia and the Institute of Technology Bandung, Indonesia. Ramola Naik Singru is Principal Urban Development Specialist with the Asian Development Bank with over 23 years of experience. Her research interests are urban liveability, equitable futures, and climate-resilient growth. She holds a master’s degree in City Design and Social Science from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), London, England. xvi

Contributors

Sidh Sintusingha is Senior Lecturer in Landscape Architecture at the University of Melbourne, Australia. He researches on socio-cultural, environmental, and scalar issues relating to urbanisation in Southeast Asian cities. He co-edited International Perspectives on the Belt and Road Initiative: A Bottom-Up Approach (2021). Saniya Soltybayeva is a research fellow at the Economic Research Institute, Ministry of National Economy of Kazakhstan. Her research interests include regional and local economic development, decentralisation, human capital development, and regional innovation systems. Rahul Srivastava, co-founder of urbz​.ne​t, has studied Social Anthropology at St. Xavier’s College (Mumbai, India), JNU (Delhi, India), and Cambridge University (UK). He works closely with urban practitioners to use his learnings and skills in anthropology as an applied tool for civic action and research. Bambang Susantono is former Vice-President for Knowledge Management and Sustainable Development of the Asian Development Bank. In March 2022, he was appointed the Chairman of the Nusantara Capital City (Ibu Kota Nusantara—IKN) Authority, the future capital city of Indonesia. He holds a PhD in Infrastructure Planning from the University of California Berkeley. Aldarsaikhan Tuvshinbat works as the Head of Exploration (Accelerator Lab) at UNDP Mongolia. Prior to joining UNDP, she worked on urban development projects in Ulaanbaatar and at the New York City Economic Development Corporation (NYCEDC). Thanousorn Vongpraseuth is a faculty member at the National University of Laos, Vientiane, Laos. He is a founder of the Urban Development and Built Environment Lab of the Faculty of Architecture. His research interests are in urban planning, transportation planning, urban and health development issues, smart and liveable cities, and related fields. Chia-Huang Wang is Full Professor in the Department of Social and Policy Sciences at Yuan Ze University, Taoyuan City, Taiwan. His current interests include Taipei’s urban culture and the sociological analysis of contemporary information technology applications, such as algorithms, social media, and smartphones. Tsz Chun Yeung was a research assistant at the Institute of Future Cities at Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK), Hong Kong, China. His research interests focus on geographical information systems and sustainable communities. He is currently a PhD student at CUHK. Belinda Yuen is Professorial Fellow and Research Director at the Lee Kuan Yew Centre for Innovative Cities, Singapore University of Technology and Design, Singapore, where she directs the Ageing Urbanism Programme. Belinda is interested in the planning of inclusive, sustainable cities, particularly, environmental, health, and sociocultural dynamics. Shahid Yusuf is Chief Economist at the Growth Dialogue in George Washington University, and Non-Resident Fellow at the Center for Global Development, Washington DC. Mariyam Zulfa is currently a founder-member of Maldives Policy Advocacy Caucus (https:// mpac​.ac). A former Minister of Tourism and an urban planner, she has worked in the Office for Planning & Design and later as Director of Selected Islands Development Unit, the Maldives. Her research interests are in constitutional law and the Maldives.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am deeply grateful to all the contributors of this handbook. This handbook would not have been possible if it had not been for the collective efforts of the international community of common interest in Asian cities. They generously and kindly contributed their time, knowledge, and collegiality to undertake research and enable a productive, smooth, and timely fruition of the handbook. The outcome of this collaborative endeavour is more than a handbook; it has forged an intellectual community committed to advancing the excellence of studying urban Asia. I also wish to thank Routledge editor Stephanie Rogers, who initiated the brilliant idea of this handbook and provided invaluable advice on its design and contents.

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PART I

Introduction



1 URBAN ASIA IN PERSPECTIVE Richard Hu

Introduction A handbook of Asian cities is an ambitious and bold endeavour. Asian cities are numerous, diverse, dynamic, and complex; they are rapidly expanding, evolving, and changing. The vastness and diversity of Asia and Asian cities, the elusiveness and ambiguity of delineating and defining them, the complication and entangling of perspectives and contexts involved in approaching them—any one of these issues could have impacted people’s interest and will of making such an endeavour. These could be reasons for not doing it. These could also be reasons for doing it. This handbook pioneers the endeavour, exploring a vast area—in both geographical and intellectual senses. It has no intention or capacity of including every Asian city and every aspect of Asian cities into one collection: it is neither possible nor desirable. Rather, it endeavours to offer a comprehensive, up-to-date, and inclusive examination of Asian cities at a critical time to advance knowledge of and inform policymaking and planning for them. The timing of this endeavour in the early 2020s is critical. The macro processes and trends that have contextualised and structured our approaches to and aspirations for Asian cities are shifting, rapidly and paradigmatically. We are at the mid-point of the timeline—not necessarily the midpoint of the progress albeit—towards the United Nations’ (UN) 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the associated New Urban Agenda (NUA) since these international agreements were negotiated and reached in the mid-2010s. Urban sustainability is the dominant imperative for contemporary cities including Asian cities. It is not a new discourse. However, the SDGs and the NUA, for the first time in the history of urbanisation, have forged a cohesive framework for engaging debates, establishing consensus, and undertaking concerted actions for a common urban future. They provide visions and roadmaps; they also encounter challenges and roadblocks for achieving them, calling for further shared understanding and efforts. Translating such grand visions into actions and outcomes on a global scale is not an easy task. Localising the SDGs and the NUA—the process of adapting, implementing, and monitoring the goals at the local city level, taking into account subnational contexts—is crucial (UCLG ASPAC Cities Alliance, 2018). United Nations’ review of the implementation of the NUA in Asia and the Pacific in 2018–2021 identifies unclear, uneven, and uncoordinated transformative commitments in the region to the implementation (United Nations, 2022a). Urban sustainabil-

DOI: 10.4324/9781003256533-2

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ity, as underlined in both the SDGs and the NUA, is confronting new challenges, uncertainties, and changes. Disruption is the keyword of the global transformations at the turn of the second decade of the 21st century. Globalisation is being reinvented. COVID-19 is dismantling an old normal, and a new normal is yet to be established. Uncertainty is the only certainty; change is the only constant. What are the latest development patterns of Asian cities? How do they fare in pursuing urban sustainability? What are the implications of the global disruptions for Asian cities? What is the ‘Asianness’ that defines Asian cities and differentiates them from other cities? These are legitimate questions for inquiry and debates at this critical moment for urban Asia. Addressing these questions in the broad global and Asian contexts, this handbook has four broad aims: • • • •

To provide the most comprehensive and the latest survey of the development of Asian cities. To understand the state of Asian cities in the context of the SDGs and the NUA. To reflect on and imagine Asian cities in the post-sustainable, post-global, and post-pandemic settings. To capture the ‘Asianness’ in urban development and experience.

Urban Asia in the world Geographically, this handbook delineates Asia that includes East Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Central Asia (further read Chapter 43 about the geographical scope of the study). This geographical scope of Asia includes 32 countries and regions including Chinese special administrative regions (SARs) of Hong Kong and Macau, in addition to Taiwan. An overview of Asian development measured by economic development levels and urbanisation rates is presented in Table 1.1. Selected measures of both urbanisation rate and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in 2020 are further plotted in Figures 1.1 and 1.2, comparing urban Asia by countries and regions within Asia and comparing urban Asia in the world, respectively. Here is a snapshot of the latest state of urban Asia in the world: • • • •

55 per cent of the world’s population live in Asia. 48 per cent of the world’s urban population live in Asia. Asia’s urbanisation rate is 49 per cent, while the world’s is 56 per cent. Asia’s average GDP per capita is US$ 6,889.1, accounting for 63 per cent of the world’s average of US$ 10,918.7.

If Asia were a country, it would be one of upper middle income, close to the levels of  Thailand and Maldives. Measured by urbanisation rate, the ‘country’ of Asia would be like the Philippines, Uzbekistan, and Thailand. Indeed, Asia is a developing continent. In terms of either economic development or urban development, it is below the world’s average and is lagging way behind the developed world of the European Union, North America, or the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Diversity is probably the most salient attribute of Asia in a general perception. This diversity is multi-dimensional: geographical, environmental, cultural, religious, historical, political, and economical. In terms of economic development, Asia has high-income countries like Japan and South Korea, and it also has low-income countries like Afghanistan and North 4

Urban Asia in perspective Table 1.1 An overview of Asian development Asian countries/ regions

East Asia China (Mainland) Hong Kong SAR Macau SAR Taiwan Japan Korea (North) Korea (South) Mongolia South Asia Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Southeast Asia Brunei Darussalam Cambodia Indonesia Lao PDR Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore

Country classification, 2021

GDP per capita (current US$), 2020

Population (in thousands), 2020

Urban population (in thousands), 2020

Urbanisation rate (%), 2020

Upper middle income High income High income High income High income Low income High income Lower middle income

10,434.8

1,410,929.36

866,705.69

61

46,323.9 39,403.1 32,787 40,193.3 618 31,631.5 4,061

7,481.8 649.34 23,451 125,836.02 25,778.81 51,780.58 3,278.29

7,481.8 649.34 18,502 115,494.82 16,081.08 42,156.64 2,250.78

100 100 79 92 62 81 69

Low income (LDC) Lower middle income (LDC) Lower middle income (LDC) Lower middle income Upper middle income Lower middle income (LDC) Lower middle income Lower middle income

516.7

38,928.34

10,131.49

26

1,961.6

164,689.38

62,873.47

38

3,000.8

771.61

326.51

42

1,927.7

1,380,004.39

481,980.33

35

6,924.1

540.54

219.83

41

1,155.1

29,136.81

5,995.19

21

1,188.9

220,892.33

82,094.63

37

3,680.7

21,919

4,101.7

19

High income

27,443

437.48

342.33

78

Lower middle income (LDC) Lower middle income Lower middle income (LDC) Upper middle income Lower middle income (LDC) Lower middle income High income

1,543.7

16,718.97

4,051.34

24

3,869.6

273,523.62

154,926.51

57

2,629.7

7,275.56

2,640.3

36

10,412.3

32,366

24,973.6

77

1,467.6

54,409.79

16,943.75

31

3,298.8

109,581.09

51,950.2

47

59,797.8

5,685.81

5,685.81

100 (Continued)

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Richard Hu Table 1.1 Continued Asian countries/ regions

Country classification, 2021

GDP per capita (current US$), 2020

Population (in thousands), 2020

Urban population (in thousands), 2020

Thailand

Upper middle income

7,186.9

69,799.98

35,898.13

51

Timor-Leste

Lower middle income (LDC) Lower middle income

1,442.7

1,318.44

412.94

31

2,785.7

97,338.58

36,346.23

37

Upper middle income Lower middle income Lower middle income Upper middle income Lower middle income

9,122.2

18,754.44

10,815.87

58

1,173.6

6,591.6

2,429.4

37

859.1

9,537.64

2,623.42

28

7,612

6,031.19

3,167.34

53

1,750.7

34,232.05

17,258.43

50

6,889.1

4,249,669.84

2,087,510.9

49

LDC (UN) Low income Lower middle income Low & middle income Middle income Upper middle income High income

1,053.8 691.2 2,217.2

1,057,438.16 665,149.04 3,330,652.55

366,304.35 222,498.08 1,413,633.26

35 33 43

4,754.8

6,518,253.97

3,339,281.47

51

5,216.9 9,177.8

5,853,104.94 2,522,452.39

3,116,783.4 1,703,150.14

53 68

44,003.4

1,214,930.23

993,239.32

82

World European Union North America OECD

10,918.7 34,148.9 61,502.1 38,218.9

7,761,620.15 447,801.42 367,553.26 1,370,858.75

4,357,623.76 335,656.32 303,426.49 1,110,609.31

56 75 83 81

Vietnam Central Asia Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Asia

Urbanisation rate (%), 2020

Data source: GDP per capita, population, urban population, and urbanisation rate—The World Bank (2022a, 2022b, 2022c); Taiwan—various online sources; GDP per capita for Korea (North)—United Nations (2022c); country classification—The World Bank (2022d); United Nations (2022b).

Korea. A country’s economic development and urban development are generally correlated. In Asia, the range of urbanisation rates is as vast as economic incomes. The urbanisation rate ranges from 19 per cent (Sri Lanka) to 100 per cent (city-state of Singapore, and Chinese SARs of Hong Kong and Macau). The high-income countries are also highly urbanised societies: Japan’s urbanisation rate is 92 per cent and South Korea’s is 81 per cent. In 2021, of the 6

Figure 1.1  Urban Asia, 2020. Notes: The dotted lines indicate Asia’s averages of urbanisation rate and GDP per capita, respectively. The bubble sizes are proportional to the urban populations they represent. Source:  Created by the author.

Urban Asia in perspective

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Figure 1.2  Urban Asia in the world, 2020. Notes: The dotted lines indicate the world’s averages of urbanisation rate and GDP per capita, respectively. The bubble sizes are proportional to the urban populations they represent. Source:  Created by the author.

Richard Hu

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Urban Asia in perspective

46 least developed countries (LDCs) defined as ‘low-income countries suffering from structural impediments to sustainable development’, eight of them are in Asia (United Nations, 2022b) (see Table 1.1). There are different approaches to understanding the diversity of Asia. The measures here indicate the very insufficient and unbalanced development within Asia, as a representation of its diversity. Urban Asia has been a focus of research and policy debates for its vast size, massive processes, complicated outcomes, and challenging futures. Asia has two of the most populous countries in the world—China and India. Observers and commentators tend to compare the development trajectories of these two countries. The urbanisation of both or either of them would significantly impact not only urban Asia but also urban world. Both countries have been the centres of the world’s urbanisation in recent decades. In around 1990, both countries had a similar urbanisation rate of around 25 per cent (The World Bank, 2022c). Ever since both countries have experienced significant urbanisation with differing scales. Three decades later, China recorded an urbanisation rate of 61 per cent and India 35 per cent (The World Bank, 2022c). China is now at the threshold of a high-income country and a highly urbanised society. It is restructuring the urban landscapes of Asia and the world, for both progress and challenges it is bringing about. Many Asian cities are rapidly growing, as well as transforming—shifting from quantity to quality in urbanisation (UN Habitat, 2015). However, this shift is not a smooth process that will be naturally happening in due course. Instead, a quantity–quality contradiction is confronting urban Asia, which is materialised in the tension and interaction between quantitative growth and qualitative transformation and underpins many representations of urban Asia’s progress, opportunities, and challenges (further read Chapter 43 about the quantity–quality contradiction in urban Asia). Growth and growth-driven transformation do not fully represent urban Asia. There are five countries whose urbanisation rates are below the world’s average of 33 per cent for low-income countries: Timor-Leste (31 per cent), Afghanistan (26 per cent), Cambodia (24 per cent), Nepal (21 per cent), and Sri Lanka (19 per cent) (see Table 1.1). The different stages of urbanisation would create another layer of complexity for appreciating and tackling urban sustainability in Asia.

In and beyond urban sustainability The United Nations’ 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2015) and New Urban Agenda (2016) were adopted by 193 nations and 167 nations, respectively. They combine to provide the benchmark visions, targets, principles, and roadmaps for sustainable urban development across the world. They probably represent the broadest international consensus on confronting common challenges and shaping a common future in cities. These two agreements are closely connected. They work in tandem in developing knowledge and informing policy and planning ‘for a better urban future’ (United Nations, 2017). Below is a recapping of the 17 SDGs, which will be referred to in some subsequent chapters: • • •

SDG 1 No Poverty: end poverty in all its forms everywhere. SDG 2 Zero Hunger: end hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture. SDG 3 Good Health and Well-being: ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages. 9

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• • • • • • • • • • • • • •

SDG 4 Quality Education: ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all. SDG 5 Gender Equality: achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls. SDG 6 Clean Water and Sanitation: ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all. SDG 7 Affordable and Clean Energy: ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, modern energy for all. SDG 8 Decent Work and Economic Growth: promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment, and decent work for all. SDG 9 Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure: build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialisation, and foster innovation. SDG 10 Reduced Inequalities: reduce income inequality within and among countries. SDG 11 Sustainable Cities and Communities: make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient, and sustainable. SDG 12 Responsible Consumption and Production: ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns. SDG 13 Climate Action: take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts by regulating emissions and promoting developments in renewable energy. SDG 14 Life below Water: conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas, and marine resources for sustainable development. SDG 15 Life on Land: protect, restore, and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss. SDG 16 Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions: promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels. SDG 17 Partnerships for the Goals: strengthen the means of implementation and revitalise the global partnership for sustainable development. (United Nations, 2015)

The SDGs are interrelated. In an increasingly urbanised world, many of the development goals are quintessentially urban development goals. The NUA accelerates the SDGs, particularly SDG 11 Sustainable Cities and Communities, which is intrinsically linked to the other SDGs. The synergies between the two agreements and among the SDGs underscore that the efforts to achieve the SDGs and the NUA must work together. The majority of the 17 SDGs feature explicit urban targets. The targets of SDG 11 also have clear linkages to other SDGs (Table 1.2). The NUA focuses on the SDGs within an urban context and outlines core dimensions of sustainability and means of implementation to achieve them (Table 1.3). Securing agreement on SDG 11 with an urban focus and the resultant NUA was not an easy task. It has involved significant political battles across differing interests and parts of the world; the fruition of them represented a major triumph, fundamentally reshaping the urban development discourse into the future (Watson, 2016). They continue to be hot topics of discussions and debates, as well as battlegrounds of competing interests and stances. Readings, responses, progress, and prospects of them differ by contexts and localities. The goals and targets conveyed in them are ‘far-reaching, ambitious and socially progressive’ (Watson, 2016, p. 447). One could also easily read them as utopian. They are hard to achieve—if not impossible 10

Urban Asia in perspective Table 1.2 Linkages between SDG 11 targets and other SDGs SDG 11 targets

Linkages to other SDGs

11.1 By 2030, ensure access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic services and upgrade slums.

SDG 1, SDG 3, SDG 4, SDG 5, SDG 6, SDG 7, SDG 10 SDG 1, SDG 2, SDG 8, SDG 9, SDG 13

11.2 By 2030, provide access to safe, affordable, accessible and sustainable transport systems for all, improving road safety, notably by expanding public transport, with special attention to the needs of those in vulnerable situations, women, children, persons with disabilities and older persons. 11.3 By 2030, enhance inclusive and sustainable urbanization and capacity for participatory, integrated and sustainable human settlement planning and management in all countries. 11.4 Strengthen efforts to protect and safeguard the world’s cultural and natural heritage. 11.5 By 2030, significantly reduce the number of deaths and the number of people affected and substantially decrease the direct economic losses relative to global gross domestic product caused by disasters, including water-related disasters, with a focus on protecting the poor and people in vulnerable situations. 11.6 By 2030, reduce the adverse per capita environmental impact of cities, including by paying special attention to air quality and municipal and other waste management. 11.7 By 2030, provide universal access to safe, inclusive and accessible, green and public spaces, in particular for women and children, older persons and persons with disabilities. 11.a Support positive economic, social and environmental links between urban, peri-urban and rural areas by strengthening national and regional development planning. 11.b By 2020, substantially increase the number of cities and human settlements adopting and implementing integrated policies and plans towards inclusion, resource efficiency, mitigation and adaptation to climate change, resilience to disasters, and develop and implement, in line with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015– 2030, holistic disaster risk management at all levels. 11.c Support least developed countries, including through financial and technical assistance, in building sustainable and resilient buildings utilising local materials.

SDG 16 SDG 4, SDG 5, SDG 10, SDG 12, SDG 13 SDG 6, SDG 7, SDG 13, SDG 14, SDG 15 SDG 6, SDG 7, SDG 13, SDG 14, SDG 15 SDG 1, SDG 5, SDG 8, SDG 9 SDG 10, SDG 16 SDG 10, SDG 12, SDG 13, SDG 16, SDG 17

SDG 10, SDG 17

Source: Adapted from UN Habitat (2020a).

at all—given the explicit mismatch between aspirations and implementations, the tight timeframe of achieving them in only one and half decades when they were agreed, and dependence on major shifts in global governance and urban development paradigms. But the greatest triumph of having them agreed by the international community was to establish a new urban development discourse for debates, actions, policymaking, and planning. 11

Richard Hu Table 1.3 Dimensions and implementation of the New Urban Agenda Core dimensions

Social sustainability

Economic sustainability Environmental sustainability

Means of implementation

Spatial sustainability Intervention mechanisms

Hard measures for infrastructure and services Soft measures

Technology and innovation

• Empowerment of marginalised groups • Gender equality • Planning for migrants, ethnic minorities, and persons with disabilities • Age-responsive planning • Job creation and livelihoods • Productivity and competitiveness • Biodiversity and ecosystem conservation • Resilience and adaptation to climate change • Climate change mitigation • Spatial sustainability and equity • Spatial sustainability and urban density • National urban policies • Land policies • Housing and slum upgrading policies • Urban legislation and regulations • Urban design • Municipal finance • Urban governance • Transport and mobility • Energy • Solid waste • Water and sanitation • Culture • Education • Health • Urban safety • Technology • Transportation • Construction and building technology • Mapping and spatial data

Source: Adapted from UN Habitat (2020a).

The New Urban Agenda provides a holistic framework for urban development that encourages the integration of all facets of sustainable development to promote equality, welfare and shared prosperity. Our cities and towns must mainstream these commitments in their local development plans with a deliberate focus on tackling inequality, poverty and climate change, among other challenges. Sustainable urban futures remain a cornerstone of the fight to ensure that cities are better prepared for the next crisis. (UN Habitat, 2022, p. v) The SDGs and the NUA provide a ready discourse for approaching urban Asia. While this discourse is as encompassing as possible and is open to extension and interpretation, it could fall into a pitfall of ‘reductionism’ given its emergence as a ‘temporally bounded moment of opportunity’ (Caprotti et al., 2017, p. 375). There are always emerging and evolving forces 12

Urban Asia in perspective

and factors, which were not able to be fully anticipated or prepared previously. But they are forging new contexts and dynamics that are reshaping the way we approach cities in Asia and the world. A study of Asian cities in the early 2020s would have to face several interrelated contexts, which might not be possibly or sufficiently comprehended in the mid-2010s when the SDGs and NUA came into fruition. These contexts are not all new; they are either emerging abruptly or evolving into a significant stage at the turn of the second decade of the 21st century. Among many, three of them stand out, directly impacting how we should approach urban Asia at present and in the future. First, the timeline towards the 2030 SDGs is within one decade, and the future pathway is uncertain and challenging. ‘With [less than] ten years left to achieve the SDGs, the importance of sustainable urbanization as an entry point for ensuring progress across multiple SDGs needs to be reemphasized’ (UN Habitat, 2020b, p. 10). This pressing timeline raises due questions: Are the SDGs achievable in the Asian context? Is the NUA achievable for urban Asia? How do individual Asian cities fare in the new urban development discourse? The NUA and the urban realities in the region raise justified concerns in areas like urban governance, urban planning and policy, and service delivery and access for social inclusion (Dahiya & Das, 2020). The Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) of the United Nations identified four broad areas—planning, urban resilience, smart cities, and urban finance—as the thematic pillars for pursuing sustainable urban development in the region and for assessing progress in implementing the SDGs and the NUA: Planning lays a foundation, resilience guards against future risk, smart cities deploy the best technology for the job and financing tools help pay for cities to achieve the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. (United Nations, 2019, p. 40) COVID-19 has hindered the progress of achieving the SDGs. In Asia, the pandemic accelerated the urgent need for sustainable urban development, challenging the resources available for urban management and investment, shrinking local taxes and revenues, and exacerbating poverty (United Nations, 2022d). The implementation and monitoring of the agenda rely on the voluntary action and partnership of member countries and localities. The disruptions of global crises and the voluntary nature of participating actors cast great uncertainties on the effectiveness of delivering these advocacy initiatives and aspired goals. However, the SDGs and the NUA, in a very broad sense, incorporate numerous Asian cities into one discourse of urban sustainability. This discourse serves both a context and a prism for examining Asian cities. Rather than benchmarking the targets and indicators of sustainable development in Asian cities, these international agreements bring them onto one dialogue debating on the state of Asian cities in and beyond urban sustainability. Second, the globalisation process that has been intertwined with much of Asia’s urbanisation seems to be at a crossroads. As far as East Asia is concerned, it has experienced at least two major waves of urbanisation—as well as rapid economic growth—since World War II. Both urbanisation and economic growth, which are mutually enabling, are integral to the globalisation process which had been developing in the post-war decades and has been accelerating since the late 20th century. The first wave of urbanisation mainly occurred in Japan and the newly industrialised economies like the Four Asian Tigers of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. By 1990, the urbanisation rates of Japan and South Korea had reached 77 per cent and 74 per cent, respectively (The World Bank, 2022c). The second wave has been 13

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led by China, which has increased its urbanisation rate from 20 per cent in 1980 to 61 per cent in 2020 (The World Bank, 2022c). Chapter 6 by Shahid Yusuf provides an overview of urbanisation in East Asia. Many factors could explain the rapidity of urbanisation in East Asia and elsewhere in Asia. Globalisation is a major one: integration with the world economy and participation in the new international division of labour have concurrently industrialised and urbanised these Asian localities. Export and globalisation have been the main drivers for Asia’s urban economies and thus urbanisation (UN Habitat, 2010). Asia is the world’s largest regional economy: its shares in the world in several key socio-economic indicators—GDP, consumption, and middle classes—have been growing in the early 21st century; the strategic urban centres in Asia are global urban hubs, underpinning the growth of Asia (Tonby et al., 2019). The success of leading Asian countries has set models for other countries to imitate and adapt. China’s early development of export-oriented economy in the coastal cities benefited from the successful experiences of Japan and the Four Asian Tigers. Now it seems these practices are diffusing to Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries. In the first two decades of the 21st century, Vietnam’s urbanisation rate has increased from 24 per cent to 38 per cent (The World Bank, 2022c). However, the globalisation as we have known it for half a century is changing itself. Globalism is being challenged by rising nationalism and populism, arousing observed trends and due concerns of deglobalisation involving geopolitics, trade war, decoupling of leading economies, and inward turn to economic isolationism and protectionism. There are arguments in stark contrast. One strand of arguments holds that globalisation is in retreat, in crisis, or is simply dead (Flew, 2020; The Economist, 2019). There is also a counterargument that these changes will be marginal rather than fundamental in nature, and the future world economy will need even more globalisation (Contractor, 2022). It is too early or hard to judge that deglobalisation will become the new paradigm. ‘Asian cities can be considered crucial places for … the evolution of the role of cities in globalisation’ (Bekkering et al., 2019, p. 16), as well as for the impacts of globalisation on cities. But the globalisation that has contextualised our understanding of Asia’s urbanisation is shifting, presenting a new setting for comprehending and imagining Asian cities in a post-global era. Third, the COVID-19 pandemic is setting a ‘new normal’ for understanding many aspects of Asian and global cities. The pandemic is still ongoing. It is integral to globalisation; it is also disrupting globalisation and reinventing globalisation. The pandemic has placed unprecedented burdens on the world economy, healthcare, and globalisation, exposing and exacerbating the vulnerability and disparities between countries (Shrestha et al., 2020). For cities, the pandemic is far more than a public health challenge. In many developing countries of Asia, the immediately observed challenging issues include inadequate urban and social infrastructure; intensified impacts on vulnerable population; ineffective information and communication technology system; urban economic crisis at the macro- and micro-levels; and strained local government planning and management (Asian Development Bank, 2020). The profound impacts of this pandemic are yet to be explored in the coming years or even decades and longer. Undoubtedly, it is the most overwhelming global crisis since World War II. It has impacted nearly every aspect of urban life: environmental quality, socio-economic impacts, urban management and governance, and transport and urban design (Sharifi & Khavarian-Garmsir, 2020). It has also tested practices and refreshed our thinking about innovation, smart cities, and sustainability. While it has disrupted the way we live and work, it seems to have also presented new opportunities for new ways of living and working. It has accelerated the practice of smart work—working anywhere, anytime—and is profoundly impacting the future of work and urban spaces 14

Urban Asia in perspective

(Hu, 2021). It has also aroused new opportunities of leveraging towards strategies for a circular economy (Ibn-Mohammed et al., 2021). It presents an unusual circumstance under which to observe, reflect, and imagine the post-pandemic cities in Asia. Most of all, the pandemic has enhanced a realisation of the imperative for a more just, green, and healthy urban future (UN Habitat, 2021). There are many important contextual factors that should not be overlooked in understanding Asian cities. They include new technology and smart cites, innovation, exacerbating climate change, enlarging social inequality, and escalating challenges to liveability. These factors are incorporated into the urban sustainability discourse, and their recent trends require focused attention to reveal the latest development in Asian cities. The smart city imaginary has triggered some optimistic aspirations for creating liveable Asian cities (Susantono & Guild, 2021). However, there remains a grey area of defining liveability: sometimes the buzziness of terms blurs a clear differentiation between aspirations for liveability or sustainability. An ostensible gap exists between aspiration and outcome; the urban reality would rebut a sweeping wish list. All these contexts—established or emerging— deserve a critical inquiry that integrates the reality and imagining of Asian cities under a structured framework to seek the essence.

Framework and approach A conceptual framework is created to underpin the operationalisation and summarisation of the study, involving both deductive and inductive processes. This framework incorporates the aims and contexts for the study into a relational structure for observing the present and imagining the future of Asian cities (Figure 1.3). The framework integrates the current forces—sustainability, globalisation, and COVID-19—into an interconnected ambience for examining the state of Asian cities and imagining their future in post-sustainable, post-global, and post-

Figure 1.3  Conceptual framework. Source:  Created by the author.

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pandemic settings. All these settings—both present and future—are further abstracted and externalised into one of change, uncertainty, and disruption that characterise a new urban age for approaching Asian cities. Both of the layers of settings are centred on the core of searching for ‘Asianness’. The framework and the relationality between the constructs within it are designed in a way to ensure the structure is dynamic, interactive, and flowing, maximising its capacity of incorporating the complexity and elusiveness of the phenomenon it is applied to. This framework is enclosed enough to provide a distinct and cohesive framing for the study. It is also open enough to encourage and include the unexpected and the unconventional into the framing. This framework is utilised to introduce and guide through the study; it is also used to summarise it and draw conclusions (see Chapter 43). There has not been a title on Asian cities like this handbook yet. A small number of collections have been produced, bearing the title of ‘Asian cities’ or equivalents. The emergence of a small number of them in the recent decade reflects the growing scholarly interest in the subject on the one hand; on the other hand, they also reflect the challenge of undertaking the task. These titles have collectively enriched the wealth of knowledge about urban Asia. They also point out the void and direction of advancing the subject area. The existing titles can be classified into two broad types in terms of approach and organisation: • •

First, they address one umbrella and/or a set of urban themes in one Asian region. This type includes titles like Routledge Handbook of Urbanization in Southeast Asia (2019) and Cities in South Asia (2015). Second, they address either one umbrella theme or a set of broad themes of urban Asia, based upon a group—large or small—of selected cities/countries/regions in Asia. This type includes titles like The Emerging Asian City (2013), Planning Asian Cities: Risks and Resilience (2011), Post-Politics and Civil Society in Asian Cities: Spaces of Depoliticisation (2020), Transforming Asian Cities: Intellectual Impasse, Asianizing Space, and Emerging Translocalities (2013), and Asian Cities: Colonial to Global (2015).

Each of these titles, listed or unlisted here, has its focus and merits, contributing to the scholarship of urban Asia in its own way. This handbook builds upon and extends them, in approach and organisation, to offer a ‘comprehensive, up-to-date, and inclusive examination’ of Asian cities—one prime drive for the endeavour of this handbook as stated in the beginning of the chapter. To do so, it includes every country in every region scoped for Asia in this study. From each country, it selects at least one representative city. By doing so, this handbook does not necessarily include every Asian city, nor is it possible at all. Instead, it includes the most representative Asian cities to draw eclectic insights. It is also most inclusive of Asian cities—developed and developing, large and small, and prominent and obscure. It includes cities like Shanghai, Tokyo, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Mumbai—the sort of star cities that have attracted the most attention and have been selected by default to (mis)represent Asian cities. It also includes cities like Dili, Malé, Bandar Seri Begawan, Kabul, and Pyongyang—the overlooked or isolated cities that have attracted much less attention. These cities are of no less importance than their counterparts of global glamour. They are integral to urban Asia and are indispensable to our understanding of it. However, the claimed ‘comprehensive, up-to-date, and inclusive examination’ needs to be understood in a relative sense, and as a goal aspired and approached as close as possible. The handbook represents the latest effort of studying

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urban Asia, addressing the exclusivity of Asian cities within one geographical region or the selectivity of them in certain parts of Asia in the extant literature. This handbook is not organised by themes; this is different from the common way of most collections of its type. It is mainly organised into parts by Asian regions, with each part comprising those representative cities—mostly capital cities—in countries within the region. This seems to sit squarely within an inductive approach to case studies. However, the commissioning and preparation of constituent chapters were guided by a general alignment to the pre-set aims and contexts. It is also open for the authors of individual chapters to develop themes and focus that are important and unique in local contexts. This openness welcomes and enables the generation of outcomes that are beyond the initial project design. Each city chapter bears the city’s name as the title and uses a subtitle to illustrate the thematic focus of the chapter. Altogether, they are not a mosaic of city profiles. As outlined in Figure 1.3, they are structured under a cohesive framework of aims and contexts for studying urban Asia while maintaining a focus on local urban issues and settings. Similar representative cityfocused approaches are employed in titles like Planning Asian Cities: Risks and Resilience (2011), Asian and Pacific Cities: Development Patterns (2013), and Directors of Urban Change in Asia (2005). As commented earlier, these titles would have to tackle a common issue of balancing ‘selectivity’ and ‘completeness’ in representing urban Asia. We have a group of 59 authors—most are academics, and some are practitioners with research interest—from across the world contributing the chapters of original research. They have local experience, knowledge, and expertise, as well as global engagement. The combination of both inside-out and outside-in approaches enables a complementary and balanced reading of urban Asia in the global context. As we are going to read in the subsequent chapters, the diversity of the authorship and the diversity of perspectives—conventional and unconventional—well serve the diversity and complexity of urban Asia.

Organisation and overview The handbook is divided into six parts. Part I introduces and Part VI concludes the handbook. Four parts on each of the four Asian regions constitute the main body. Each of these main body parts contains an introductory overview chapter, followed by individual city chapters which are alphabetically sequenced.

Part I: Introduction Part I introduces the handbook and provides overviews of several dominant issues and challenges in urban Asia. Chapter 1 sets the contextual and conceptual scenes and introduces the aims, approach, and organisation of the handbook. It stresses the timing and the importance of undertaking the study to contribute to the debates on urban Asia in both established and emerging contexts including sustainable development, globalisation at a crossroads, COVID-19, and new technology and innovation. The remaining chapters in this part address smart cities, COVID-19, and liveability, respectively, laying broad thematic structures for subsequent chapters, many of which address how these issues impact the case cities to various degrees. Smart cities are the new urban imaginary in Asia and the world. In Chapter 2, Hoon Han examines the booming smart cities across Asia and compares the innovation and evolution of smart city programmes in several Asian countries. Han argues that technology-based smart city practices do not always translate into aspired outcomes in terms of urban equality, 17

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liveability, and sustainability. In part, this is a result of the conflict between the rich cultural diversity and rapidly urbanising economies in the Asian megacities. Smart city imaginary does not provide a panacea for contemporary urban challenges. It must be situated within local settings to seek smart urban solutions that can be technology-enabled, but cannot be technology-centric. COVID-19 is the new dividing line of comprehending the world. Both Chapters 3 and 4 concern the impacts of COVID-19 on Asian cities, with different focuses and from complementary perspectives, however. In Chapter 3, Kh Md Nahiduzzaman and Md Moynul Ahsan critically review the planning, development, and management responses to the pandemic in several major Asian cities—the formal top-down interventionist approach. In Chapter 4, Amanda Achmadi and Sidh Sintusingha reflect on the informal bottom-up adaptative approach to the pandemic, drawing upon observations and experiences in Indonesia and Thailand. The complementarity of the approaches in the two chapters sheds light on the diverse efforts of achieving resilience in response to the pandemic in Asian cities with mixed results. The impacts of and responses to COVID-19 are a major theme in the subsequent chapters. Liveability is a common aspiration for Asian cities, but its conceptualisation and approaches differ by contexts. In Chapter 5, Bambang Susantono, Ramola Naik Singru, and Lara Arjan draw observations on making liveable cities in Asia and the Pacific largely from the urban development projects of the Asian Development Bank. Despite some grey areas in conceptualisation, liveable cities are essentially sustainable cities. In a dialogue with the previous Chapters 2–4, Chapter 5 develops several initial recommendations on policy and research for liveable cities in the region in the new contexts of both COVID-19 and rising smart cities.

Part II: East Asian cities East Asian cities have attracted probably the most interest and attention among Asian regions, for the rapid urbanisation and economic growth there. However, urban East Asia is more than a story of ‘growth’, as commonly perceived. Within East Asia, both urban scholarship and urban development are unbalanced: the ‘success’ stories of cities in Japan, South Korea, and China often overshadow the urban transformations in North Korea and Mongolia and efforts of understanding them. Further, the ‘success’ stories are often read as ones of ‘growth’ at the expense of the complexity and multi-dimensionality of them. Behind the ‘success’ stories are shared challenges of achieving sustainable development; ‘growth’, while significantly enhancing socio-economic standards, is also extravagating the sustainability challenge. This part retells a story of the East Asian cities that is beyond ‘growth’. In Chapter 6, Shahid Yusuf provides an overview of East Asia’s rapid urbanisation and challenges of deindustrialisation, digital disruption, and climate change. Yusuf sharply observes that East Asian cities have been slow to rise to these challenges, despite rapid growth of them. Addressing none of these challenges will be easy, however. They call for hard choices and actions. China is a focal centre of contemporary urbanisation as well as urban challenges, in Asia and the world. Four Chinese cities—Hong Kong, Taipei, Shanghai, and Xi’an—are included here; they have different historical and political settings and face different urban development issues. In Chapter 7 on Hong Kong, Mee Kam Ng, Tsz Chun Yeung, Chun Hei Cheng, and Nok Yin Ma apply the NUA principles to critically analyse the city’s spatial forms and recent development strategies. They are doubtful that the development approach will transform the city’s current ‘fate’. Rather, they advocate a strategy that is more aligned with the NUA to change the city’s spatial forms into settlements that can optimise their cultural and natural heritages and lead to more sustainable communities for human well-being and 18

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flourishing. In Chapter 11 on Taipei, Chia-Huang Wang employs a similar critical approach to the city’s grand vision of building a liveable and sustainable city. Wang raises several cardinal challenges such as energy policies by the ruling party that increase greenhouse gases, high housing price and lack of social housing, and partisan politics, which together might undermine the city’s substantiality vision. On the contrary, the two chapters on the mainland cities—Shanghai and Xi’an—tend to be more sympathetic towards their growth agendas. In Chapter 10 on Shanghai, Richard Hu presents the city’s ambitious aspiration for global leadership through transformative metropolitan planning, in which sustainability is both a vision and an instrument for its globality. Chapter 14 on Xi’an presents another Chinese case of aspirating for global city in the country’s less developed western region. In this chapter, Xiangming Chen and Ziming Li examine the roles of the local state, market, and favourable location in launching the oldest Chinese capital city onto a new path and pattern of development. Xi’an’s resurgence into a global city has been powered by freight train logistics, manufacturing revival, and consumption boom. Both Tokyo and Seoul are East Asia’s leading global cities, and they are the most frequently cited cases in the ‘success’ stories about the region. In Chapter 9, Yu-Min Joo traces Seoul’s trajectory from an aspiring to a leading global city in vision, planning, and action. Seoul is now sharing and diffusing its global city experiences elsewhere along with its selfdevelopmental motivations and global outreach. In Chapter 12 on Tokyo, Carola Hein takes a historical lens to the city’s resilience, exploring its transformative experiences of surviving disasters through adaptative strategies. Tokyo, in its role as Asia’s prime global city, has set models for other cities including its East Asian neighbours like Seoul and Shanghai. This chapter draws out its lessons for cities in Asia and worldwide in terms of employing adaptive strategies to nurture resilience and sustainable development. Global forces and global–local interactions do not just influence urban planning and development of global cities like Seoul, Shanghai, and Tokyo. They also occur in less prominent cities, in different senses, however. In Chapter 8 on Pyongyang, Pavel P. Em makes an alternative urban narrative about East Asian cities. Em employs an unusual angle to investigate how marketisation—an alien perception of the most enclosed capital—has instigated a metamorphosis transforming it into a post-socialist city. In Chapter 13 on Ulaanbaatar, Aldarsaikhan Tuvshinbat, Raven Anderson, and Michael Hooper present the collision between international plans and local preferences over densification. This is a vivid case of the disjoining between international expertise and local realities in planning approaches and tools in much of the developing Asia. This case bolsters the importance of consensus building and local engagement in adapting international practices to local settings.

Part III: South Asian cities Urban South Asia is less prominent—in terms of urbanisation rate—but is more diverse or complicated than its eastern neighbour region. Globalisation, colonial and post-colonial transition, wealth, power, poverty, and environmental vulnerability are all working to position the uniqueness of urbanisation in the region—both its growth and challenges. Several megacities are globally leading in terms of sizes, urban characteristics, and challenges. Informalisation is an entrenched perception of many cities in South Asia. However, informalisation itself is a contested reading of urban South Asia: it is criticised as the source of urban problems, calling for formal urban interventions; it is also celebrated as the solution to urban problems, contributing to urban dynamism. In Chapter 15, Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt provides an over19

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view of the urban challenges in South Asia. Schmidt explores the trends of informatisation in light of the SDGs and the disruptions of COVID-19 to underline the problems pertinent to urban South Asia: infrastructure, services, economy, housing, and ecology. India dominates urban South Asia for the sizes, growth, and challenges of its cities. For this reason, two Indian cities—Delhi and Mumbai—are included, illustrating Indian urbanism from related and somewhat complementary perspectives. In Chapter 17 on Delhi—one of the world’s biggest and most chaotic megacities, Pilar Maria Guerrieri explores the independent nuclei structure that characterises the megacity and its functioning at the neighbourhood level, on a much more minute scale—an often neglected, decisive aspect in understanding the capital’s identity and the unique soul of Indian urbanism. Mumbai offers another strong manifestation of Indian urbanism. In Chapter 23, Matias Echanove and Rahul Srivastava challenge the conventional ‘slum’ notion of Mumbai—a notion of probably much urban South Asia as well. Instead, they posit ‘mess is more’ and argue that: Mumbai’s urbanism is misunderstood by failing to acknowledge its complex history; Mumbai has grown in an incremental and homegrown way like many urban settlements. Both chapters reveal certain aspects of authentic Indian urbanism and challenge some conventional ‘outside’ reading of Indian cities. Growing megacities in South Asia are confronting similar sustainability changes to cities elsewhere. They suffer from governance and policy failures, and they indicate urgent imperatives for planning and development transformation. Chapter 18 concerns the fast-growing megacity, Dhaka. In this chapter, Shilpi Roy finds that urban policies and interventions have been ineffective at stemming and managing the city’s rapid, haphazard, unstable, and unregulated urban growth. Roy calls for a shift in philosophical preferences that would demonstrate the state’s willingness to ensure distributive justice of economic growth, commitment to sustainable urban growth, and a people-centred development approach that would make Dhaka a liveable and inclusive city. Chapter 20 on Karachi documents and analyses the city’s transformations during the post-independence period from an institutional perspective. In the chapter, Noman Ahmed includes a diversity of cases and examples illustrating weak urban governance, fragile political process, the rise of various interest groups, and informal processes that inflict the city’s management. Chapter 21 on Kathmandu Valley presents another case of problematic urban planning and chaotic urban development. In the chapter, Rajjan Chitrakar offers insights into the drawbacks of the current process of urbanisation and the barriers to a healthy and sustainable city, and points out a need for renewed urban planning and policy measures. South Asian urbanism takes different forms; urban failures occur in different contexts. In Chapter 16 on Colombo, Nihal Perera traces the city’s colonial and post-colonial transition— a salient theme of many transformative Asian cities—towards an indigenous kleptocratic city. Perera observes that the post-colonial authorities have made little progress; instead, the city’s subjects have incrementally transformed it by living in it and have shown a high level of connectivity. In Chapter 19 on Kabul, Pietro Calogero goes beyond the global urban imaginary of the city as a site of ongoing and recurring catastrophes. Rather, Calogero integrates onsite experience and distant observation to argue that Kabul is an ‘ordinary city’ that is representative of an urbanism that we did not expect in the early 21st century. Less prominent cities may convey a fresher image of urban South Asia. In Chapter 22 on Malé, Mariyam Zulfa examines the decentralisation strategy of the densest island capital of the archipelagic country of the Maldives. This unique city has not received due attention in urban studies in both Asian and global contexts. Chapter 24 on Thimphu presents an urban image opposite to the other (South) Asian cities: a sustainable, convivial, peaceful, happy, and ecofriendly city. In the chapter, Leishipem Khamrang discusses the Bhutanese notion of happi-

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ness—Gross National Happiness—and unfolds the transformative process of Thimphu city which is deemed essential for implementing the SDGs at the local level.

Part IV: Southeast Asian cities Southeast Asia has the largest number of member countries among Asian regions. Thus, this part contains more case cities than other parts. Diversity characterises Asian cities, Southeast Asian cities especially. Its vast geographical area, numerous countries and cities, unbalanced socio-economic structures, complex political systems, and diverse cultural and historical settings challenge any effort of organising them into one urban narrative. Southeast Asian cities share the salient attributes with cities in other Asian regions, like the ‘growth’ in East Asia and the ‘informalisation’ in South Asia. They also have their own contesting urban issues that define and constantly redefine Southeast Asian urbanism. In Chapter 25 on an overview of Southeast Asian cities, Rita Padawangi skilfully canvasses Southeast Asian cities under one umbrella theme—the imbalances of urban development. Padawangi discusses a suite of issues—inequalities, migration, diversity, mega-urban regions, peri-urbanisation, the problematic formal–informal dichotomy, technologisation, and participatory planning—in Southeast Asia’s cities. Through the lens of those socially and economically marginal, Padawangi argues that each of these issues is remindful of contentious urban spaces in Southeast Asia. The remaining chapters in this part can be broadly classified into three themes about Southeast Asian cities: transformative growth, contested placemaking, and planning for sustainability and inclusion. In the following, the chapters are grouped and discussed by these themes. First, transformative growth has been driven by both endogenous development imperatives and exogenous factors—foreign investment, geostrategic influence, and urbanism diffusion—in Southeast Asian cities. In Chapter 26 on Bandar Seri Begawan, Victor K. S. Ong explains how the capital of Brunei spearheads the oil-rich nation’s economic diversification through administering economic development strategies and pursuing foreign investments for priority business sectors. The chapter critically examines the oil-rich Sultanate’s unfolding contrasts, conflicts, and contradictions in its economic strategy, tourism industry, and governance, respectively. In Chapter 29 on Ho Chi Minh City, Du Huynh outlines a binary of urban futures for the city—the successful Seoul and Shanghai or the problematic Jakarta and Manila—all drawing upon examples of other Asian cities. Huynh casts doubts on the successful scenario and predicts the city’s likely path dependence in urban planning and development towards an old undesired outcome. In Chapter 31 on Kuala Lumpur, KengKhoon Ng and Tim Bunnell provide a critical analysis of urban (re)development in the politically tumultuous years leading up to 2020 in Malaysia and the pandemic-dominated period since. They contend that the intersection of political and pandemic-related developments has inspired more people-centric actions and ideas for rethinking urban futures. The development of Phnom Penh, the capital city of Cambodia, has depended strongly on Western development and technical aid from the beginning of the 1990s. In Chapter 33 on Phnom Penh, Gabriel Fauveaud and Dolorès Bertrais observe what they call ‘post-dependency metropolisation’, a new phase and paradigm shift of urban development since the 2010s that is evolving into a more complex system of resources exploitation, capital formation and circulation, and multilateral politico-economic cooperation at both regional and international levels. Much of the growth aspiration in Southeast Asia has been inspired by the ‘success’ stories of their East Asian counterparts or regional leading city-state Singapore. However, it

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is the local settings and endogenous factors that would determine if the aspiration would be achieved in the end. Second, contested placemaking has taken a diversity of manifestations in urban Southeast Asia. This theme often requires non-conventional approaches to delve into nuanced insights that would not be otherwise sufficiently uncovered in paradigms for conventional urbanism. In Chapter 27 on Bangkok, Ross King reads the disconnect between urban life and the real urban situation in the city from a juxtaposition of creative disorder and military imagination. Further, the city is dependent on imported fossil fuels and is flood-prone, raising justified questions and concerns of its sustainability. In Chapter 28 on Dili, a fast-evolving post-conflict city, Joana de Mesquita Lima and João Pedro Costa address public space as a missing element in the development of the city, presenting its absence as a hurdle towards development and supporting planning and creating space for community-led processes. In Chapter 36 on Yangon, Giovanna Astolfo focuses on displacement urbanism, engaging with the housing provisions in the marginal new towns, looking at multiple acts of reterritorialisation as feminist spatial practices at the urban margin, and showing how women collectives have created a housing infrastructure based on provisionality and care. Contested placemaking is intrinsic to the urban world. It is not exclusively manifest in urban Southeast Asia. One focal illustration of these cases is the relationality in the contestations—top-down and bottom-up, formal and informal, central and marginal, and conventional and non-conventional—that interact, conflict, and transform. Third, the diversity of Southeast Asian cities is enriching approaches to sustainable planning and development to achieve resilience and inclusion, with mixed outcomes although. Jakarta and its surrounding districts and cities, commonly referred to as Jabodetabek, is the second most populous megacity region in the world. In Chapter 30 on Jakarta, Christopher Silver offers both a historical and a contemporary panorama of its urbanisation, aspiration, challenges, and governance system, and outlines a future of towers in suburbs in seeking a sustainable megacity region. Manila is another Southeast Asian city prone to climate and disaster risks. In Chapter 32 on Manila, Emma Porio and Justin See illustrate an initiative of adopting resilience-informed frameworks and tools, integrating the social development goals into the resilience agenda, and addressing the dual crises of climate change and social inequality. In Chapter 34 on Singapore, Belinda Yuen interrogates the city’s planning and remaking of local neighbourhoods for healthy ageing in place, and discusses how senior-friendly housing, spatial accessibility, and social connectivity are being pivoted towards age-inclusive infrastructure and city. Vientiane presents a case of the ‘least developed’ city. In Chapter 35 on Vientiane, Thanousorn Vongpraseuth introduces the government’s response to the dilemma of achieving both development and sustainability through an emerging vision of sustainable urban development and modernisation. Vongpraseuth traces an evolving regime of master planning and consequent policies and practices and points out their limitations.

Part V: Central Asian cities Central Asian cities are starting to receive due attention in the studies of urban Asia. Compared with the diversity of cities in other Asian regions, Central Asian cities share more in common among themselves for their Soviet history and intersecting Eurasian geography, history, and culture. But each Central Asian country has its own cultural and national identity, and their post-Soviet experiences converge and diverge. This part collects chapters on major Central Asian cities, revealing their commonalities and differences in urbanities, identities, and planning and development approaches. In Chapter 37, Madina Junussova, Saniya Soltybayeva, and 22

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Rameesha Khan provide an overview—probably the first effort of its type—of urban Central Asia, including urban development and governance challenges, applied reforms and their impacts on urban planning, and residents’ perception of contemporary urban living. They suggest that Central Asian national governments could improve urban development by implementing adequate administrative and fiscal decentralisation reforms, and by supplying city governments with resources and capacities to address development challenges. They advocate bottom-up and integrated planning for sustainable urban development through empowering city governments. The seek for ‘Asianness’ is probably one of the most outstanding marks on urban transformations in Central Asia. The seek has to deal with the decolonisation of the Soviet legacies and the drive for modernisation in the new global and regional geopolitical and economic contexts. In Chapter 38 on Almaty, Henryk Alff and Wladimir Sgibnev trace the transformation of the city since independence—the top-down spatial reorderings and the underlying modernisation agendas that involve urban-level innovations in re-negotiations and clashes with Soviet legacies. They offer a critical analysis of unequal spatial development and sustainability, public transport system reforms, and Eurasian connections in the city. In Chapter 39 on Ashgabat, Slavomír Horák employs an architectural lens to view the city’s post-Soviet transformation: the architecture of Ashgabat is an amalgam of presidential visions of the city—inspired by other Asian metropolises—and the architects’ attempts to encapsulate these visions and present them to the president for the purpose of promoting business or simply obtaining the approval of the president. In Chapter 40 on Bishkek, Emil Nasritdinov chronicles the evolution of and searches for ‘Asianness’ in the city. Despite being marginalised in the pre-independence eras, the city’s ‘Asianness’ has been slowly coming back, reclaiming its urban presence and increasing its right to and centrality in the city in the last two decades. In Chapter 41 on Dushanbe, Tahmina Inoyatova investigates the city’s recent transformation and explores the relationship between urban space, nationalism, neoliberalism, decolonisation, and identity in Central Asia. Dushanbe is increasingly losing its Soviet identity in a strive for a new national identity and a more contemporary globalised urban image. This chapter addresses several significant aspects of Dushanbe’s urban transformation. Situated in the context of global, regional, and local processes, the urban transformation serves as a crucial lens to study emerging transformations and changing identities and complex power relations in the nation and in the region. Different from the preceding chapters that have a common thematic focus on post-Soviet urban transformation in Central Asian cities, in Chapter 42 on Tashkent, Farrukh Irnazarov and Madina Junussova concern the city’s economic growth and transformation by aspiring for an entrepreneurship and innovation hub. The chapter directly addresses the transformation and imperative for Central Asian cities in the global and regional contexts of increasing competition between countries through their urban centres. Colonial and post-colonial transition could bring Central Asian cities into a dialogue with cities in other Asian regions in a very broad sense. But the historical contexts and post-colonial experiences in Central Asia are fundamentally different from those post-colonial cities in other Asian regions. The Eurasian connections—in both cultural and geographical senses— differentiate and define much of the uniqueness of urban transformation in Central Asia. There are significant external factors at play that are influencing the modernisation drive and self-identity in the region. These include the rise of China and the spillover of its economic prowess and political influence, traditional links and present proximity with Russia, and the escalating geopolitical confrontation and conflict (e.g., Russia’s invasion into Ukraine and 23

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the West’s eastward outreach). Central Asian cities have been Eurasian connectors in history; this geostrategic position will continue to play a significant role in shaping the future urban transformations there.

Part VI: Conclusion The concluding Chapter 43 recapitulates the endeavour of providing a ‘comprehensive, upto-date, and inclusive examination’ of Asian cities in the contexts of sustainability, globalisation, and COVID-19. It posits a quantity–quality contradiction—materialised through the relationality between quantitative growth and qualitative transformation—that confronts urban Asia and underpins many representations of Asian urban landscapes and changes. It delves into the conception of  ‘Asianness’ and establishes an intellectual thread of Asian urbanism through the past, present, and future to capture the ‘Asianness’ in both the reality and imaginary of Asian cities. It revisits the extant scholarship on ‘Asianising’ the standpoints of and approaches to the Asian city, and extends the search for ‘Asianness’ in new contexts and along new directions into the second decade of the 21st century and beyond. In doing so, it refreshes the reading and imagining of post-sustainable, post-global, and post-pandemic Asian city in a new urban age marked by increasing change, uncertainty, and disruption.

References Asian Development Bank. (2020). COVID-19 and livable cities in Asia and the Pacific: Guidance note. http://doi.org/10.22617/TIM200416-2 Bekkering, H., Esposito, A., & Goldblum, C. (Eds.). (2019). Ideas of the city in Asian settings. Amsterdam University Press. Caprotti, F., Cowley, R., Datta, A., Broto, V. C., Gao, E., Georgeson, L., Herrick, C., Odendaal, N., & Joss, S. (2017). The New Urban Agenda: Key opportunities and challenges for policy and practice. Urban Research and Practice, 10(3), 367–378. https://doi.org/10.1080/17535069.2016.1275618 Contractor, F. J. (2022). The world economy will need even more globalization in the post-pandemic 2021 decade. Journal of International Business Studies, 53(1), 156–171. Dahiya, B., & Das, A. (Eds.). (2020). New Urban Agenda in Asia-Pacific: Governance for sustainable and inclusive cities. Springer. Flew, T. (2020). Globalization, neoglobalization and postglobalization: The challenge of populism and the return of the national. Global Media and Communication, 16(1), 19–39. Hu, R. (2021). Smart design: Disruption, crisis, and the reshaping of urban spaces. Routledge. Ibn-Mohammed, T., Mustapha, K. B., Godsell, J., Adamu, Z., Babatunde, K. A., Akintade, D. D., Acquaye, A., Fujii, H., Ndiaye, M. M., Yamoah, F. A., & Koh, S. C. L. (2021). A critical analysis of the impacts of COVID-19 on the global economy and ecosystems and opportunities for circular economy strategies. Resources, Conservation and Recycling, 164, Article 105169. https://doi. org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2020.105169 Sharifi, A., & Khavarian-Garmsir, A. R. (2020). The COVID-19 pandemic: Impacts on cities and major lessons for urban planning, design, and management. Science of the Total Environment, 749, Article 142391. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.142391 Shrestha, N., Shad, M. Y., Ulvi, O., Khan, M. H., Karamehic-Muratovic, A., Nguyen, U.-S. D. T., Baghbanzadeh, M., Wardrup, R., Aghamohammadi, N., Cervantes, D., Nahiduzzaman, K. M., Zaki, R. A., & Haque, U. (2020). The impact of COVID-19 on globalization. One Health, 11, Article 100180. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.onehlt.2020.100180 Susantono, B., & Guild, R. (Eds.). (2021). Creating livable Asian cities. Asian Development Bank. http://doi. org/10.22617/SGP210110 The Economist. (2019, June 28). Globalisation is dead and we need to invent a new world order. The Economist. https://www.economist.com/open-future/2019/06/28/globalisation-is-dead-and-we-needto-invent-a-new-world-order

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Urban Asia in perspective The World Bank. (2022a). GDP per capita (current US$). https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP. PCAP.CD The World Bank. (2022b). Urban development. https://data.worldbank.org/topic/16 The World Bank. (2022c). Urban population (% of total population). https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS The World Bank. (2022d). The world by income and region. https://datatopics.worldbank.org/worlddevelopment-indicators/the-world-by-income-and-region.html Tonby, O., Woetzel, J., Choi, W., Eloot, K., Dhawan, R., Seong, J., & Wang, P. (2019). The future of Asia: Asian flows and networks are defining the next phase of globalization. McKinsey Global Institute.  https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/asia-pacific/the-future-of-asia-asian-flowsand-networks-are-defining-the-next-phase-of-globalization UCLG ASPAC Cities Alliance. (2018). City enabling environment rating: Assessment of the countries in Asia and the Pacific. United Cities and Local Governments Asia-Pacific. https://www.citiesalliance. org/resources/publications/cities-alliance-knowledge/city-enabling-environment-rating-assessment UN Habitat. (2010). The state of Asian cities 2010/11. United Nations. https://unhabitat.org/the-stateof-asian-cities-201011#:~:text=The%20report%20throws%20new%20light,organised%20civil%20 society%20are%20facing UN Habitat. (2015). The state of Asian and Pacific cities 2015: Urban transformations shifting from quantity to quality. United Nations. https://www.unescap.org/resources/state-asian-and-pacific-cities2015-urban-transformations-shifting-quantity-quality UN Habitat. (2020a). The New Urban Agenda illustrated. United Nations. https://unhabitat.org/the-newurban-agenda-illustrated UN Habitat. (2020b). World Cities Report 2020: The value of sustainable urbanization. United Nations. https://unhabitat.org/World%20Cities%20Report%202020 UN Habitat. (2021). Cities and pandemics: Towards a more just, green and healthy future. United Nations. https://unhabitat.org/cities-and-pandemics-towards-a-more-just-green-and-healthy-future-0 UN Habitat. (2022). World Cities Report 2022: Envisaging the future of cities. United Nations. https:// unhabitat.org/world-cities-report-2022-envisaging-the-future-of-cities United Nations. (2015). Transforming our world: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. United Nations.  https://sdgs.un.org/sites/default/files/publications/21252030%20Agenda%20for%20 Sustainable%20Development%20web.pdf United Nations. (2017). New Urban Agenda. https://www.habitat3.org/the-new-urban-agenda United Nations. (2019). The future of Asian & Pacific cities: Transformative pathways towards sustainable urban development. https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/d8files/knowledge-products/ Future%20of%20AP%20Cities%20Report%202019.pdf United Nations. (2022a) Implementation of the New Urban Agenda in the Asia and the Pacific: A review in preparation for the second quadrennial report. https://www.urbanagendaplatform.org/sites/default/ files/2022-02/NUA%20implementation_Asia-Pacific.pdf United Nations. (2022b). Least developed countries (LDCs). https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/ least-developed-country-category.html United Nations. (2022c). Per capita GDP at current prices—US dollars. http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q= korea+gdp&d=SNAAMA&f=grID:101;currID:USD;pcFlag:1;crID:408,410 United Nations. (2022d). The transition of Asian and Pacific cities to a sustainable future: Accelerating action for sustainable urbanization. https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/d8files/knowledge-products/Regional-Partners-Forum-Outcome-Report-20220318.pdf Watson, V. (2016). Locating planning in the New Urban Agenda of the urban sustainable development goal. Planning Theory, 15(4), 435–448. https://doi.org/10.1177/1473095216660786

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2 SMART CITIES IN ASIA Ambiguity, innovation, and evolution Hoon Han

Introduction According to the United Nations (2018), the world’s urban population was only 746 million in 1950. In 2020, it was 4.4 billion; and 48 per cent of them lived in cities and towns in Asia delineated in this handbook (see Chapter 1). Despite its progress, fast urbanisation has also come with negative externalities, such as social polarisation (e.g., digital inequality), spatial disparity (e.g., digital ghettos), a shortage of urban services, and mismatches between housing and labour markets. Urban agglomeration in Asia requires higher efficiency and technological innovation, and the concept of smart city has been championed for urban development and management in recent decades. Although the origin of the smart city concept was initiated by the ‘smart growth movement’ of the late 1980s (Harrison & Donnelly, 2011), smart city development was primarily driven by digital technologies as the main solution to urban issues during and since the global financial crisis (2007–2008) (Söderström et al., 2014). Asian countries such as China, India, and South Korea have adopted the techno-centric smart city concept promoted by global technology giants, such as IBM, Cisco, Samsung, and Baidu, which encouraged a profoundly technocratic vision of the future city, also known as the ubiquitous city. At the early stage of the Asian smart cities, development models focused on boosting technology innovation, entrepreneurialism, and resource efficiency in times of economic uncertainty, vulnerability, and hardship (Leem et al., 2019). The Asian smart city domains were most recently extended to sustainability and cultural and societal identity (Han & Hawken, 2017). Ironically, the recent smart city paradigm shift in Asia has returned to the original smart concept based on the ‘smart growth’ and ‘new urbanism’ movements in the 1980s (Grant, 2009). This chapter reviews the evolution of Asian smart cities in terms of smart city concepts and planning methods, and discusses their innovation and evolution.

Ambiguity of the Asian smart city concept Many Asian cities have adopted a techno-centric smart city concept as an urban planning and management framework. Table 2.1 shows the various spin-off smart city concepts used in the early stage of smart cities across the globe. 26

DOI: 10.4324/9781003256533-3

Smart cities in Asia Table 2.1  Smart city related concepts Concepts

Definitions

References

Digital city

A connected community that combines broadband communications infrastructure; a flexible, serviceoriented computing infrastructure based on open industry standards; and innovative services to meet the needs of governments and businesses and offer seamless experiences for all inhabitants across the city. The ‘techno-creative habitus’ is shaped by the urban agglomeration of tech start-ups and creative clusters fuelled by an entrepreneurship mindset and the supply of a highly-skilled workforce to push economic vitality through invention and innovation. A city using network technologies, high-speed broadband and wireless infrastructure for instrumenting the city for rapid management and delivery of services. A city or region with ubiquitous accessibility to infrastructure and computing technology to provide a built environment where every citizen can access services anywhere, anytime through smart devices. Territories with a high capacity for learning and innovation, which is built into the creativity of their population, their institutions of knowledge creation, and their digital infrastructure for communication and knowledge management. A city that promotes a culture of partnership and knowledge transfer through higher education institutions embarking on a strategic mission to encourage and nurture locally focused innovation, science, and creativity within the context of an expanding knowledge economy and society. A digital environment collecting information from local communities and delivering it to the public via web portals.

Anthopoulos and Fitsilis (2010), Yovanof and Hazapis (2009)

Tech city

Wired city

Ubiquitous city (or U-city) Intelligent city

Knowledge city

Information city

Smart community

A community broadly ranging from a neighbourhood to a nation-wide scale whose residents, organisations, and governing institutions use IT to transform life and work in their region in significant and positive ways.

Downey and McGuigan (1999), Foord (2013) Batty (2012)

Han and Lee (2013)

Komninos (2002)

Ergazakis et al. (2004), Yigitcanlar et al. (2008)

Anthopoulos and Fitsilis (2010), Sairamesh et al. (2004) California Institute for Smart Communities (2001)

Source: Adapted from Praharaj (2018).

Despite the conceptual diversities in the early smart cities (1990–2010), information and communications technology (ICT) has remained the core element of smart city planning strategies. However, the early smart city concept was not sufficiently integrated into social and sustainability practice. In particular, societal and cultural identity has been used as a supplementary goal of the smart city (Han & Hawken, 2018; Martin et al., 2018). Hollands (2008, p. 304) observes that ‘the problematic mapping of the “smart city” label onto a series of other 27

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Figure 2.1  The ambiguity of the Asian smart city concept. Source:  Created by the author.

seemingly progressive urban planning concepts creates definitional problems, but it also hints at a lack of sound ideological basis of the concept’. More recently, scholars have argued that a smart city should generate high-quality, sustainable, and liveable places for all rather than offer state-of-the-art digital technology services only for the urban elite (Arfiansyah & Han, 2020; Yigitcanlar et al., 2019). The development of city models is considerably impacted by sustainable development, particularly in terms of economic and environmental dimensions of sustainability (Joss, 2011). Figure 2.1 shows the ambiguity of the Asian smart city concept in the early stage, which has a narrow focus on economic growth and technological implications. This focus has recently shifted towards environmental sustainability, societal inclusion, and cultural identity. Considering global climate change, an eco-city or green city needs to focus on ecological sustainability and diversity through technological innovation with passive solar design, renewable energy, urban greening, environmental management, and environmentally friendly policies (Joss, 2011). Eco-cities aim to promote economic development while reducing greenhouse gas emissions and urban pollution and maintaining biodiversity (OECD, 2010). Resilient cities aim to prepare for increasingly frequent natural disasters such as bushfires, flooding, drought, earthquake, and landslide (Desouza & Flanery, 2013). Creative cities emphasise the role of social infrastructure, such as education, health, and community services. They regard culture and knowledge as an economic engine and emphasise the provision of sustainable transport, mixed land use, cultural diversity, and flexible design coding (Kong & O’Connor, 2010). Consequently, the tech-led smart cities in Asia have moved towards the eco, resilient, and creative city concepts (see Figure 2.1). The recent Asian smart city concept combines the three city concepts. Cugurullo (2018) considers that smart cities and eco-cities are experimental 28

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models promoted by their advocates, and there is not much difference between the two types of cities. The increasing ambiguity of Asian smart cities also reflects the emerging technologies to address the current global challenge of climate change and carbon neutralisation under the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The latest Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) smart cities framework was designed to address the required sustainability goals by enabling smart city services (civic and social, health and well-being, safety and security, quality environment, built infrastructure, industry and innovation and ecosystem services) by integrating master planning and a dynamic and adaptive urban governance system (ASEAN, 2018). As a result, the ASEAN smart city framework shifted from a focus on tech-centred solutions to people-centred ones, aiming to improve liveability and enhance mutual understanding across cultures towards the building of resilient and creative cities (ASEAN, 2018). While the degree of ambiguity has increased, different countries in Asia have developed their smart city strategies to explicitly address urban challenges and improve the quality of life. For instance, countries like China, India, and Indonesia have proposed a large number of smart city development projects, while Japan and South Korea (hereafter Korea) focused on developing several testbed cities as new towns (greenfield development). The latest developments in Australia and Singapore actively adopt a retrofitting strategy at the precinct level to create urban renewal (Australia) and regeneration (Singapore).

Innovation and evolution in Asian smart cities This section provides a chronological review of Asian smart city strategies and discusses their innovation, characteristics, and uniqueness in smart city development in several representative countries. The order of the countries is based on the time when they each first introduced the smart city concept.

Korea The smart city was first introduced in Korea in 2003, as a revolutionary concept of ubiquitous computing. Numerous computers are embedded in physical objects, so that users cannot recognise the invisible computers, sensors, and sensor networks. Later, this ubiquitous computing concept became integral to the Internet of Things (IoT). In the early 2000s, Korea adopted the ubiquitous computing concept in city planning and development. The Ubiquitous City (U-City) Act (2003) mandates an integrated urban data system, and a threshold of broadband speed and standards was established in 2003. Boosted by the U-City Act, the 2000s saw the arrival of the first-generation Korean smart city, the so-called ‘U-City’, focusing on the ubiquity of urban services and infrastructure, which citizens can access anytime and anywhere (Lee et al., 2008). The early stage of the U-City mainly focused on crime prevention, safety, and public transport services. The second-generation smart city (2007–2018) in Korea focuses on urban ecology and environmental conservation. The U-Eco City aims to overcome the climate change and energy crisis by adopting eco-technologies (EcoTs) that reduce daily energy use through a real-time energy consumption monitoring and warning system. The first stage of the Korean landmark smart city, Songdo, was completed in 2009 and 7 out of the 11 stages had been developed by 2020. Songdo is quoted as the most progressive large-scale greenfield-based smart city project and is, arguably, an exemplary best practice of the smart city in the world (Yigitcanlar et al., 2019). It is widely recognised that Songdo 29

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has created a new development path and set a high benchmark for cutting-edge urban technologies linked with a prosperous global hub for innovation and technological development (Kolotouchkina & Seisdedos, 2018; Townsend, 2013; Yigitcanlar et al., 2019). In 2019 Korea established the Korea Smart City Open Network (K-SCON) as an enabler of the ASEAN smart city network (ASCN). K-SCON is a smart city project to establish an international cooperation system for regions interested in Korean smart city models, such as ASEAN, Latin America, and the Middle East. K-SCON selects pilot projects through cost matching between Korean and overseas governments. The Korean government plans to set targets for participation through international competitions and promote preliminary feasibility studies and master plans to link involvement in the smart city project in the future. In addition, it plans to establish a smart city database through the Integrated Information System for Ordering from All Ministries to provide one-stop information on the business environment, project order information and procedures, and government and international organisation support (Lee et al., 2018).

China China has the world’s largest number of smart cities. According to China’s Chien Zhan Industrial Research Institute (2020), the number of smart city pilot programmes in China has expanded from about 694 in 2015 to 789 in 2019, and as of 2020, there were about 900 smart city pilot programmes being developed across China. This massive quantity of smart city development has been accelerated by a national strategy of  ‘new-type urbanisation’ in 2014 and an Industrial Revolution 4.0 initiative. The smart city approach is integral to a domestic demand-oriented urban development model. With hundreds of smart cities being built across China, the market is expected to be worth about 25 trillion yuan in 2022 (Lee et al., 2021). One of the unique characteristics of China’s smart city approach is forming an ecosystem with local industries, which play a pivotal role in the development of smart cities. Hangzhou, the home of high-tech giant Alibaba, promotes smart city projects by forming an industrial ecosystem with local companies, while it is not easy for foreign companies to enter the market (Lee et al., 2021). Alibaba established an integrated data infrastructure—called City Brain—through forming a consortium of 13 local companies and utilising its artificial intelligence (AI) solution and platform (Hangzhou Government, 2017). This is Hangzhou’s champion smart city project. Smart cities in China are led by local city governments that often form cooperative consortiums with large IT companies such as Baidu, Alibaba, and Taiji. The industrial ecosystem strategy focuses on applying new technologies such as 5G, big data, and AI to urban infrastructure. Following the United Nations 2020 carbon neutralisation declaration that aims for carbon neutrality by 2050 after carbon emissions peak in 2030, China’s smart cities are likely to expand investment in renewable energy and eco-friendly infrastructure, and environmental sustainability will be a key focus in smart cities (Wang & Mell, 2019). The Hebei Xiong’an New Area, a large-scale greenfield development project, is right under construction, aiming at a green and smart city by 2035.

India India is the world’s largest democracy and the second-most populous country, after China only. India has rapid urbanisation, with the urban population increasing from 17.9 per cent in 1961 to 34.9 per cent by 2020 (The World Bank, 2022). By 2030, 590 million people will live in cities in India, with a net increase of 270 million working-age population from 2011 (NIUA, 2017). 30

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In 2015, the government of India announced its ambitious 100 Smart Cities Mission (SCM) to develop 100 smart cities in the context of national urbanisation (GoI, 2015). The new policy encourages cities to embrace urban transformation by developing innovative citywide solutions and area-based development. The Smart Cities Mission Statement and Guidelines communicates a strategic intent to promote the application of ICT in infrastructure management (GoI, 2015). The policy has also set an ambitious target to transform urban governance models and broaden citizen participation in policymaking (NITI Ayog & CSTEP, 2015). The smart city development is divided into stages, including basic infrastructure construction, essential urban service provision, and complex service development. Among the types of smart city development, area-based urban regeneration and redevelopment and pan-city projects applied to existing cities, following these stages of development (Jo et al., 2019). Praharaj (2018) classified 100 Indian cities into four clusters based on the three stages of development progress and the degree of smart city readiness: leading cities, moving cities, reluctant cities, and edge cities. One of the unique characteristics of Indian smart city development is its area-based redevelopment of existing city spaces—known as brownfield development. Even though the selection of 100 Indian smart cities is based on the proposals prepared for a city’s new areas (greenfield), the primary objectives are to improve sporadic and unreliable services, including transport, water and wastewater, and solid waste in the built-up areas (brownfield) (Praharaj, 2018). While China focuses on building new smart cities, India largely undertook brownfield development of existing cities or disadvantaged communities in cities, especially those with slums and small- and medium-sized towns. Rather than a massive scale greenfield development with state-of-the-art technologies, the 100 SCM encourages area-based initiatives or urban regeneration, where a minimum standard service is not met. The area-based approach is suitable for modernising and digitising existing physical infrastructure (GoI, 2015). Unlike China, another characteristic of India is that global IT companies from Germany, Japan, Korea, UK, and USA have actively participated in the special purpose vehicle (SPV) for India’s smart city development. Japan has had a longstanding partnership with India for the Delhi–Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC) development since 2009, and many Japanese companies, including Toshiba, NEC, Mitsubishi, Sumimoto, and Hitachi, participated in the 100 SCM. In particular, Hitachi managed the smart transport infrastructure project for the Chennai smart city in 2017. In addition, Microsoft and India’s leading IT services company, Tata Consulting, were selected to provide ICT infrastructure in Surat (Jo et al., 2019).

Singapore Singapore is consistently regarded as one of the smartest cities in the world. The government of Singapore has been implementing its Smart Nation programme since 2014. The initiative seeks to provide a nation-wide virtual platform that will give the government an unprecedented capacity to monitor how the country is functioning in real time. It will allow government departments to predict, plan, and deliver services, such as transport, environment, water, and public security, with robust and high efficiency. A range of smart services have been developed under Smart Nation, including LifeSG to access government services, National Digital Identity to provide an efficient and secure platform for both citizens and businesses, Punggol smart town as a tech-enabled sustainable town, a smart national sensor platform to provide an integrated nation-wide data platform, and smart urban mobility to enhance the public transport system using a better smart solution (Smart Nation Singapore, 2022). 31

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One of the distinctive features of Singapore’s Smart Nation is to provide an integrated, onestop, nation-wide urban service. For instance, the Singpass, a Digital Identity Card, is accepted at all government counters, facilitating access to over 2,000 services for more than 4.5 million users (Smart Nation Singapore, 2022). Smart Nation Singapore provides an integrated nationwide communication platform, Smart Nation Core Operations Development Environment and eXchange (CODEX), which allows the public and private sectors to easily share reusable digital components, including machine-readable data, middleware, and microservices (Smart Nation Singapore, 2022). Singapore is the first country that formed a partnership with China to develop a smart city, the Sino-Singapore Tianjin Eco-City, which commenced its development in 2008. Singapore and China are expanding efforts in the areas of smart and low-carbon development of the ecocity. The first eco-smart city development is called ‘smart Tianjin’ and is planned to be built by 2025 (SMND, 2021).

Australia Australia is a highly urbanised society and over 90 per cent of its population lives in urban areas, including large regional cities, towns, and suburbs with wide socio-economic and geographic variations (Baum et al., 2007). In 2017, the Australian Government invested about $50 million in the Smart Cities and Suburbs program to enhance community well-being, productivity, and sustainability in large- and medium-sized urban centres. This smart city programme will provide up to $250,000 per project that combines smart technology, data-driven decisionmaking, and people-focused design to create economic, social, and environmental value (DITRDC, 2021). Unlike many Asian countries, Australia has fostered a bottom-up approach to smart cities and suburbs development. Local governments, universities, and agencies propose a project idea, establish partnership with different disciplines, and forge collaboration to share knowledge, advance innovation, and solve broader urban problems (DITRDC, 2021). The programme provides funds to increase local government’s capabilities and innovation through developing collaboration and smart city ecosystem, and to improve performance and sustainability in cities and suburbs in the areas of smart infrastructure, smart complex, smart services and community, and smart planning and design. At the state government level, the Smart Places Acceleration Program in New South Wales (NSW) is a major smart city support programme. The state partners with local governments and real estate owners. The primary aims of the programme are to: • • • •

Support economic and community recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. Encourage partnerships with and co-investment from local councils and industry to deliver smart place initiatives. Support progress and implementation of the NSW Smart Places Strategy. Ensure NSW remains the leading state in implementing smart places initiatives (DPIE, 2021, p. 5).

The main characteristic of this programme is that individuals and local governments follow the bottom-up approach and receive state funding through proposing various ideas for ‘smartising’ spaces. One essential criterion for project selection is that the proposed project should form partnerships with private companies, local communities, and local governments. Business support can take two forms: support through partnerships with state agencies (local government, public corporations, and investment institutions); and support for partnerships 32

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with private companies or organisations. Both the Australian federal government’s Smart Cities and Suburbs program and the NSW government’s Smart Space Acceleration program require partnerships between government agencies and private organisations as an essential criterion for support. The smart city strategy in Australia has also focused on addressing the recent digital divide or digital inequality between urban and regional Australia. There is a wide spatial disparity in terms of smartness between cities and regions because most regional areas are located far from employment centres and have a small population. Thus, local governments in regional Australia have a limited capacity to introduce smart city programmes. For example, a study of smart areas shows that, in Queensland, its largest city of Brisbane performed well in all the areas of smart assessment, due to its large population and the presence of a large number of innovation precincts and infrastructure in the city; in contrast, only two regional areas in Queensland were selected as the smartest areas (Dezuanni et al., 2017). Socio-economic disadvantage in regional Australia can produce locational inequality as obstacles to equitable access to smart technologies and services (Han et al., 2010).

Indonesia Indonesia is one of the world’s largest ecological resource-rich countries. It is developing sustainable smart cities, taking advantage of being a latecomer. Despite the technocratic concept of smart cities in Asia, Indonesia’s notion of the smart city focuses on building the capacity of local communities for the diversity of Indonesian culture and knowledge development, and holds that technology is part of the enabler (Sutriadi, 2018). With Indonesia’s high vulnerability to natural disasters such as volcanic activity, flooding, and bush fires, sustainable and resilient cities have been a national priority. Indonesia has received worldwide attention for its environmental endeavours such as rainforest conservation. With solid commitment and encouragement from the Indonesian Government, an administrator in Indonesia introduced the country’s smart city programme, ‘Gerakan Menuju 100 Smart City’ (Movement Towards 100 Smart Cities), in 2017. Like India’s programme, Indonesia’s programme targets 100 cities and regencies, aiming to accelerate city-making using the concept of the smart city. Using latecomer advantage, the smart city implementation adapted best practices from Asian counterparts, including China, India, and Korea. The programme covers the preparation of a smart city masterplan; planning and implementing a smart city ‘Quick Win’ program; and implementing a smart city development roadmap in 5 to 10 years (Arfiansyah & Han, 2020). As a result, 24 cities and regencies were selected in 2017, and 50 cities and regencies in 2018 (Rizkinaswara, 2018). For instance, Bandung, the capital of Indonesia’s West Java province, was chosen among the first batch of cities and regencies to receive smart city technical guidance from Gerakan Menuju 100 Smart City (Arfiansyah & Han, 2020). A unique smart service is the Bandung Panic Button application, which was offered by the Bandung City Government and monitored by the Bandung Command Centre. This application can immediately respond to emergencies like natural disasters (Bandung Command Center, 2020).

Development approaches in Asian smart cities Asian cities are getting smart using cutting-edge digital technologies. While numerous digital sensors, sensor networks, and management platforms with AI have been adopted in Asian smart cities, the technological implications are not a major determinant of the success of the 33

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smart city. A more important determining factor is a city’s planning and development approach to the smart city. For this reason, Hu (2022) argues for a smart design approach that stresses a holistic place-based smart thinking in addressing contemporary urban challenges. In terms of development approaches, smart cities in Asia can be broadly categorised into three groups: greenfield development, brownfield development, and retrofitting development. Massive smart city plans have been introduced in both China and India. While India took a brownfield approach in selected cities by upgrading and installing smart urban infrastructure, China mainly used the greenfield development approach. Representative greenfield development projects among Asian smart cities include Nusantara, Indonesia’s new capital, and Sejong, Korea’s new administrative city. Sejong is a master-planned city through a top-down approach under the Ubiquitous City Act (2003). It has an area of 73 km², and is within a two-hour drive from Seoul. Sejong has an estimated population of 300,000 residents, mainly comprising government officials, researchers, academics, and employees of public companies and institutes that have moved from Seoul and adjacent cities (Leem et al., 2019). Brownfield development in urban renewal is widely adopted in many Asian smart city projects, including those in cities like Sydney (Barangaroo smart precinct) in Australia, Busan (Eco-delta) in Korea, Tianjin (Eco-city) in China, Yokohama (Kitakyushu) in Japan, and Mumbai (BKC Bandra East) in India. The retrofitting approach focuses on improving existing urban built-up areas and precincts through injecting smart elements into them. Visakhapatnam (Smart campus) in India and Darwin (Switching on Darwin) in Australia have retrofitted smart technologies to improve quality of life and productivity through smart solution applications. The Switching on Darwin project was funded by the Australian Government’s Smart Cities and Suburbs program. It aimed to address urban problems such as environment (air quality monitoring), urban crime (smart LED light and CCTV), and economic productivity, drawing upon data obtained through smart urban technology (DITRDC, 2021).

Conclusion In the context of continuing urbanisation and accelerating digital innovation such as AI, 5G, IoT, and digital twin, smart city best practices are increasingly evident in many Asian countries, including Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Korea, and Singapore. However, driven by intense urban competitiveness and agglomeration amongst Asian cities, the early stages of Asian smart city development focused on economic growth and technological innovations (e.g., digital or ubiquitous cities). However, the focus has recently shifted to enhancing liveability (e.g., resilient cities) and sustainability (e.g., eco-cities). Four main characteristics of Asian smart cities are identified, drawing on the above ­analysis: First, the future city vision in Asian smart cities was primarily influenced by global tech giants such as IBM, Cisco, Samsung, and Baidu, fostering digital technology as the first solution to many urban problems. In particular, IBM ‘smarter cities’ concept in 2008 ushered in a smart city boom in Asia. In China, smart city construction was used as a lever for economic recovery during and after the global financial crisis of 2008. Second, urban competitiveness and agglomeration led to massive smart city developments in Asia which often follow a top-down approach, except in Australia. During the development phase, governments directly intervened in city planning and construction to achieve sustainable economic growth and to recover from the global economic recession.

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Third, Asian smart cities involved massive greenfield development. While European smart cities have taken a retrofitting approach to existing cities and towns, many Asian smart cities were developed from scratch as greenfield development, such as Songdo in Korea. This is attributed to the rapid urban population growth, housing shortage, and relatively stable digital infrastructure provision (e.g., internet speed and network service). Finally, environmental sustainability and eco-service sectors have become a primary consideration for future smart cities in Asia. Asian smart cities with rapid urbanisation need to focus on minimising the urban footprint, limiting emissions, encouraging active and green transport use, establishing urban farms, and addressing urban waste problems (Yigitcanlar et al., 2019). Eco-technology and resilient city concepts were recently spotlighted and will be in high demand with the emerging global challenges for carbon neutralisation set in the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Smart cities in Asia are relative latecomers in the global smart city boom and have faced numerous challenges in the limited technological solutions to chronic urban problems such as urban health and poverty. Socio-economic disadvantages are obstacles to equitable access to smart services, especially in non-smart rural areas. This may exacerbate digital disparity and inequality in Asia. However, the fast urbanisation and population growth in Asia has led to the world’s most significant smart city boom, with over 1,000 testbed cities built over the past decade. The large number and rapid growth of smart cities with various development approaches, such as greenfield, brownfield, and retrofitting, has provided a unique opportunity to design, test, and implement numerous digital technologies, such as sensor networks, integrated systems, big data storage and analysis, and intelligent responses. The urban competition and agglomeration in Asia’s booming smart cities should not be read as a disadvantage but as an opportunity to find suitable planning strategy and development approach for the next generation of smart cities. Nevertheless, the domain of the next generation of Asian smart cities should move from smart city development to smart city management, focusing on how to meet the UN Sustainable Development Goals and to achieve a balance between carbon neutralisation, social equality, and economic growth.

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3 ASIAN CITIES IN AND BEYOND COVID-19 Kh Md Nahiduzzaman and Md Moynul Ahsan

Introduction Cities are densely populated places with opportunities and challenges. Urbanisation has taken place by either planning intervention or organically: either way has its pros and cons. While contemporary and emerging problems like uncontrolled urbanisation (migration), social inequality, and climate change have been existential threats to the sustainability and liveability of cities, pandemics such as COVID-19 add another layer of unpredicted challenges to achieving these urban development goals (Nahiduzzaman & Lai, 2020; Shrestha et al., 2020). Since the pandemic started, available approaches and tools of planning, development, and management have been severely challenged in terms of what would be the right options to make cities healthier and safer. Immediate actions have been called for to restrict mobility to stop the spread of COVID19. Historically, global cities are exposed to many pandemics, e.g., Spanish flu, Swine flu, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) (Nahiduzzaman, 2021). However, the lessons learnt from those events have less reflections on the planning, policies, and development approaches than COVID-19. Path dependency in ‘optimistic’ bias of planning under the most favourable conditions has been a critical barrier to making cities prepared and resilient against the probable worst-case scenarios. Therefore, when the pandemic hit, cities did not have any effective tool ready for planning interventions. Instead, they chose actions (e.g., mask mandate, crowd restrictions, limited mobility with the partial operation of public transit, closure of schools, and offices) that were perceived to be somewhat effective to battle against the impacts of the pandemic (Ahsan, 2020; Mahmoudi & Xiong, 2022; Spennemann, 2021). These are attempts to achieve immediate resilience. Such a quick fix approach might reduce the intensity of the effects of the pandemic temporarily, but it needs to be connected to the pathway for long-term sustainable solutions. Such missing link between ‘quick fix’ and ‘resilient solution’ has been observed across the world, including Asian cities. Strategic investment in physical and social (cultural and wellbeing) infrastructure helps get cities prepared to battle any foreseeable odds while offering an ability to fight against the ‘knowingly-unknown’ challenges such as COVID-19, which had similar appearances contemporarily and in history (Nahiduzzaman & Lai, 2020; Sadiq et al., 2020). However, the inertia of not being able to foresee such periodicity and making cities resilient has been a key failure of con38

DOI: 10.4324/9781003256533-4

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temporary planning practices. This has been reflected in the disjointed approaches to planning, development, and management where health infrastructure and wellbeing are put in silos while investments in the remaining infrastructure, e.g., transportation, housing, land subdivision, and educational institutions, are made under a different sense of priority. As a result, global and Asian cities, representatively Ankara, Tokyo, Shanghai, and Singapore, faced an unprecedented and almost irreversible challenge to deal with the health impacts on citizens, which has had an overwhelming pressure on the existing medical facilities and other health-related infrastructure. There is no doubt that a robust planning approach and feasible policy measures are vital to overcoming uncertainty and risk, including the pandemic (Ahsan, 2020). While people’s physical health and mental wellbeing were at the lowest point during the waves of COVID-19, the existing planning policies and approaches could not offer much to stop the infections and the climbing rate of death until the vaccines were made available (Greene et al., 2022). Set against this backdrop, this study critically reviews the key policies and approaches of planning, development, and management in four chosen Asian cities: Ankara, Tokyo, Shanghai, and Singapore. It analyses and compares their planning endeavours and transformational planning strategies to control the worsening health situation for the citizenry, and reveals the limitations and challenges of these interventions. It further ponders upon the adequacy of such immediate and long-term (resilient) actions and summarises the best practices (composed of adaptation, inclusion, greenness, and equity) that could help make future cities safer and more resilient.

Living through the pandemic and beyond Ankara After the 1923 Atatürk’s Revolutions in modern Turkey, the capital city of Ankara has served as the political, administrative, and economic centre of the country. Ankara is a rapidly growing city with a population of around 20,000 in 1923 and it reached more than 5.6 million people with a density of 222 persons per km2 in 2022 (Aliefendioğlu et al., 2022). It has experienced regular waves of coronavirus cases since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Learning from the past experiences of the Ottoman State, the Turkey government adopted a state-led approach to dealing with the outbreak of COVID-19 and formed the Coronavirus Scientific Advisory Board (Ahsan, 2020). This board was established to monitor the measures and take additional nationwide resilience approach to continue the services (Ahsan, 2020; OECD, 2020). As an immediate resilience measure, a balance was attempted to strike between the need to continue the public services and to control the infections to the lowest possible number. Following the international examples, the central and local governments took a myriad of measures to control the spread of the disease (Ahsan, 2020; Shahin & Yetişkul, 2021). In the first wave of coronavirus in 2020, the government reduced 50 per cent passengers in the EGO (Electricity, Gas and Bus Operations Organization) bus and other transportation modes, and bus passengers reduced by 84 per cent in Ankara (Ahsan, 2020). However, the number of private cars increased by 8.54 per cent compared to 2020, and cycling activities significantly expanded (Shahin & Yetişkul, 2021). It is found that the citizen’s active participation in concomitant with the implementation of the government’s directives was instrumental to combat the pandemic during its first wave (Ahsan, 2020). However, after the first wave, the residents failed to strictly follow the time-sensitive directives of the local and central governments. Some places strictly followed the prescribed measures (e.g., sanitising, mask use, social distancing) for community protection while others were reluctant to comply with those regulations. 39

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The existing urban, strategic, and transport plans completely miss out on approaches to make the city resilient against the pandemic. Contemporary growth and development are taking place in all directions in Ankara with a decreasing trend of blue-green infrastructure, loss of nature, and shrinking of water resources (Aliefendioğlu, Sevgen & Tanrıvermiş, 2022). It has proven that urban green space, nature-based solutions, etc., are critical infrastructure that enables residents to cope with COVID-19. Although the Ankara Master Plan 1990 could have protected the city’s green belt area to a large extent, the sheer decreasing trend in the green area has been observed in the city between 2008 and 2018. The 1990 plan—a 15-year, longterm plan—was considered as a vital plan for Ankara’s planning and design, but there was no specific focus on uncertainty or pandemic-related resilient element in it. This document aimed to create a holistic plan and an integrated urban macroform and stated that every kind of strategy for keeping forests, afforestation areas, and agricultural areas out of settlement shall be meticulously implemented. However, the focus on urban resilience seemed inadequate and was poorly implemented. The 2015 Ankara Structural Plan, the 2023 Capital Ankara Master Plan, and the 2038 Ankara Environmental Plan were all prepared as safeguards of green space, but they could not achieve the targets set for the green city concept (Aliefendioğlu et al., 2022). These plans have no specific focus on a resilient strategy to combat uncertainty and pandemics. Further, the trend of decreasing green space raises a concern that the planning endeavour is lagging behind its course and is failing to accommodate the immediate needs of both rapid urbanisation and the pandemic. COVID-19 has already slowed down all other social, economic, and physical planning and development actions in this capital. As discussed earlier, Ankara has not moved ahead with integrated planning to pursue resilient urban planning and design. Ankara’s example of urban policy and planning to combat COVID-19 is way from efficient implementation. At present, the city is implementing Green City Action Plan, aiming to become a more sustainable, resilient, and inclusive city through climate change adaptation strategies and developing a circular economy; but it has no specific focus/integration about ongoing or post-COVID-19 urban planning, design, and management (Ankara Metropolitan Municipality, 2021). Therefore, it is imperative for Ankara to develop a roadmap, including guidelines for post-COVID-19-integrated and people-centred city planning and design.

Tokyo With a population of nearly 38 million, the Greater Tokyo Area is one of the most populous metropolitan regions in the world. This capital city is serving as the political, administrative, and economic centre of Japan. After the outbreak of COVID-19, the Japanese government created a one-stop database on the real-time COVID-19 situation and has declared a series of State of Emergencies (SOEs) to curb the spread of the pandemic, especially in Tokyo due to its large population and high rate of infections (Gyamfi & Shaw, 2022). Despite its high population density, the rate of COVID-19 infections and number of deaths in Tokyo have been staggeringly low compared to many North American and other global cities that have lower population densities. Now the pandemic has been largely contained across Japanese cities, including Tokyo. Evidently, efficacy in maximising space use, functional public policy, and quality of life for residents were key factors to fight against COVID-19 as well as to keep the momentum of the city to support its residents. The floor area ratio (FAR) of Tokyo is 20, much higher than any North American cities. Despite the high density of buildings, the city has a great amount of space available for public amenities, including parks, playgrounds, gardens, and active transportation for biking and 40

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walking. Many pavements turn out to be wider than the road. Even the pavement outside the public transit nodes is much wider than that in many other cities. It is deliberately planned to encourage walking and to create a vibrant space and culture for health and safety. Tokyo has been able to offer 87 square metres of public space per person (Cao et al., 2020). High FAR means high density of buildings and residents, which understandably has been a catalyst for spreading COVID-19. The question is: How Tokyo did manage to maintain a relatively low rate of infections and deaths while other cities with lower FAR have been at a constant struggle to deal with the surging number of COVID-19 cases? Tokyo was never fully immunised from COVID-19. Children living in the central area of Tokyo experienced the challenge of accessing open spaces. Parents had difficulties in looking after children during the pandemic, posing psychological stress on both of them. However, smart management of the density by avoiding the ‘Three Cs’—closed spaces, crowded places, and close contact—to adapt to the ‘new normal’ pays off. It is an incredible dividend that enables Tokyo to deal with the global pandemic, keeping its residents as much safe as possible (Tomikawa et al., 2021). How Tokyo has prudently handled the challenge of the pandemic suggests that effective planning and management of dense areas is far more critical than allocating hefty resources and putting forth strategic and detailed action plan to contain urban growth. As it turns out, Tokyo showed how to maximise public space, integrate active transport systems, and place relentless emphasis on quality of life. One way to overcome the challenges of high-density living and mass mobility, understood as the positive coefficients for the spread of coronavirus, is through efficient mass transit of commuting (Ando et al., 2021). Lacking adequate mass transit typically characterises many contemporary cities with high population density. This overriding challenge of mobility essentially impacts the overall productivity and liveability of these cities. However, Tokyo has a different stand on that. More than 50 per cent of the commuting trips are made through public transit—an easily navigable network connecting almost all the parts of the city—by people from all socio-economic tiers. During the pandemic, the Japanese opted for remote working arrangements through home-based virtual offices. Concomitantly, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government reinstated regular commuting schedules for those who are unable to avail of the work-from-home option. Even under the staggering stress of the global pandemic, Tokyo continues to uphold the key spirit of the city: Tokyo is meant for people by placing a fundamental focus on creating enabling conditions for them to live and thrive. While some other global cities like Shanghai opted for stringent measures, such as prolonged lockdown, Tokyo did not face such a stalemate. The city residents followed time-sensitive government directives. Shopping malls, groceries, and restaurants, among others, remained open. Time-responsive and thoughtful policies appeared to keep the residents away from possible risks, but without much compromising of their quality of life. Constant sanitisation, temperature checks, and other protective measures were always in place. A few small yet notable measures were adopted by the Tokyo city authority, which have proven to be effective. For example, playing loud music was restricted in restaurants so that diners did not have to raise their voices in conversations. This measure was meant to avoid loud conversations that could produce droplets to easily transmit the virus. In 2016, Tokyo prepared a four-year action plan called New Tokyo: New Tomorrow, focusing on notions like ‘safe city’, ‘diverse city’, and ‘smart city’ that are inclusive of potential risks and uncertainties. During COVID-19, Tokyo developed a recovery roadmap, including guidelines for businesses to prevent the spread of viruses (Tokyo Metropolitan Government, 2020). In this roadmap as a resilient strategy, the government is encouraging people to relocate to the less-populated regions while continuing to work (virtually and in-person) for companies 41

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based in the Tokyo metropolitan area. ‘Migration without changing jobs’ allows people to continue the work they have in Tokyo while living in regional areas (The Japan Times, 2021). The recent Future Tokyo strategy envisions an inclusive society where ‘people shine’ and ‘no one is left behind’ to achieve ‘sustainable recovery’ (Tokyo Metropolitan Government, 2021). This strategy aims to strike a balance between recovery from the pandemic and a sustainable way of life for people. It employs a planning approach that is human-centred and eco-friendly. In its visions for Tokyo until the 2040s, it is adaptive to disruptive risks to realise a comfortable city where people can live with peace of mind.

Singapore Singapore has the highest population density of 7,804 persons per km2 in Asian cities. More than 20 per cent of its population are foreign workers. Reportedly, the initial spread of COVID19 in the city emerged from high-density dormitories that housed several thousands of longterm foreign workers. However, the numbers have been very low compared to other Asian and global cities. Learning from its SARS experiences, the Singaporean government reacted rapidly by setting up a Multi-Ministry Taskforce, which brought together public officials, medical professionals, and scientists to facilitate inter-departmental coordination (Yuen et al., 2021). Evidently, Singapore is lauded for its efficacy in managing the pandemic and stood first in Bloomberg’s COVID-19 resilience ranking. In Singapore, three principles of ‘immediate-yet-long-term’ resilience that involves tradeoffs of managing the pandemic-induced crisis are summarised (Thong et al., 2021): •

•

•

Lives vs livelihoods: thoughtful and gradual reopening of intensified alert was found to be a more viable solution than a nationwide lockdown following major outbreaks. Community hygiene measures, safe distancing, and effective contact tracing system helped achieve economic resiliency in Singapore. Immediacy vs incrementalism: through the pandemic, access to the resources was ensured on a priority basis to decide on who needs them first. The decisive and incremental resource deployment strategy has been a mainstay to smartly manage the COVID-19 situation. Effective communication vs being diplomatic: the Singaporean government communicated the messages of the seriousness of the crisis effectively to avoid any possible confusion or conflicts in order to create trust among the citizens. Such transparent governance helped people cooperate and share scarce resources that allowed the government to efficiently manage the pandemic. A gradual realisation that much confidence had been placed in the ability of vaccines to bring down infection numbers was one factor in Singapore. Thus, a paradigm shift from ‘zero-COVID’ to ‘living with the pandemic’ worked as a catalyst to keep the momentum of economic and social livelihoods as normal as possible within the state-announced safety restrictions.

Essentially, the government’s top-down collaborative approach played a crucial role. Economic stimulus packages and operational and political capacities also contribute to the low fatality rate and economic stability in Singapore during the pandemic. Now, Singapore is pushing ahead with polycentric and integrated transport planning to further decentralise its residential and commercial districts. Singapore is expanding its cycling networks and urban mobility innovations (National Parks Board, 2022). It is intensifying planning for green and blue spaces so that residents can enjoy park and recreational spaces within 42

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a 10-minute walking distance from their homes. A vision to become a ‘City in Nature’ is going to be achieved through softening urban infrastructure and re-establishing ecological connections within the city (National Parks Board, 2022). The current intellectual standing of public health and wellbeing (HeWe) in physical, social, and economic planning provides a guide for future city planning. The post-COVID-19 master planning will become more important in helping cities adapt to future health crises. New principles will be considered to integrate townships with the natural environment to achieve both healthy living and better sustainability as well as employing smart technologies to manage estate, to plan and design it to cope with future crises (CLCS, 2022). The city is planning for every household to be within a 10-minute walk from a park by 2030, adding 500 km of park connectors. HeWe infrastructure would be a core objective of designing this city, which is a brilliant integration that many cities across the globe have failed to incorporate into their planning strategies and outlook (National Parks Board, 2022).

Shanghai Shanghai, China’s largest city, financial capital, and innovative hub, is home to 28.5 million people with an average population density of 3,854 person per km2 (World Population Review, 2022). Before the COVID-19 pandemic, Shanghai had reinforced its city resiliency in space defence, engineering technology, and social governance (Song et al., 2021), indicating its early preparedness for future uncertainties and challenges. Learning from experiences in Mao’s era, after the outbreak of COVID-19, urban governance has played a significant role in combating the pandemic. The central government is encouraging mutual surveillance among city-dwellers, which is implemented by the local Communist Party of China (CPC) committees and at the lowest-level residential communities (Ekman & Picardo, 2020). This movement through national- and local-level collaboration between different departments and information sharing has unified and standardised processes, which allowed the city to have a decisive and quick response to the pandemic. For instance, Xiaoqu (the residential conglomerates) neighbourhood committees were in charge of taking the temperature of the people at the entrance of each residential compartment as well as paying more attention to the most vulnerable inhabitants (Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies, 2020). Shanghai had managed its smaller previous outbreaks with limited lockdowns of housing compounds and workplaces where the coronavirus was spreading. The nation’s ‘zero-tolerance’ COVID-19 strategy seems challenging though China’s vaccination rate stands at about 87 per cent and it is considerably lower among older people. The strategy focuses on eradicating community transmission even sometimes by locking down entire cities (Associated Press, 2022). This megacity has formulated relevant planning and construction guidelines, advocating the creation of community life units categorised as innovation, coordination, green, open, and sharing units (Song et al., 2021). Its technical guidelines for operation and management have been issued by the Municipal Housing and Urban Rural Department, giving importance to land use, spatial planning, or building design vis-à-vis health crisis and planning (Wu & Wang, 2021). After initially devising short-term emergency responses related to land use, environmental management, and city management, Shanghai started shaping long-term policy initiatives for a more resilient city that is greener and healthier (Wu & Wang, 2021). It has also given emphasis on walking and cycling as a means of transport, significantly increasing the relevance of the ‘15-minute community’ life circle prescribed for reducing the spread of COVID-19 (Song et al., 2021). 43

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Shanghai’s drive together with technological surveillance through the ‘smart city’ perspective as well as human surveillance through a ‘top-down urban governance’ perspective, seems an endeavour of combating existing pandemic-related challenges (Ekman & Picardo, 2020). Whereas the world cities are now moving to ease COVID-19 restriction measures, the most extensive lockdown restrictions in Shanghai in two years were imposed from 27 March 2022 due to the growing outbreak of more than 400,000 cases so far, and the city was escalating its lockdown restrictions from then (Brant, 2022). Therefore, the flagship of planning endeavour is still lagging behind its course towards adaptive and inclusive planning and environmental resilient strategies. However, the government’s policy initiatives with a long-term policy prescription suggest a vital effort towards a more resilient and healthier Shanghai.

Responding to the pandemic: Commonalities vs differences It is reasonable to claim that Ankara, Tokyo, Shanghai, and Singapore adopted almost similar state-led and top-down approaches in responding to COVID-19. All of them went through somewhat similar transformative approaches to plan, design, and govern the cities during the pandemic. While ‘quick fix’ characterises the initial planning endeavours and outlook at the primary shock of the pandemic, it could also be understood as an ‘immediate’ resilient approach to deal with the mounting and unprecedented challenges. However, the inherent sense of understanding and applications of the ‘quick fix’ and ‘immediate’ are different among these cities. From the very outset, although these four cities adopted a top-down or centralised planning and decision-making approach, local governments played a crucial role in implementing the directives and measures in combating the COVID-19 outbreak through a two-way communication (Ahsan, 2020). However, the approach has not always been effective in dealing with the unknown impacts and what would be the ‘right’ directives for interventions still remains to be known (Nahiduzzaman & Lai, 2020). These four cities have relative successes in curbing the spread of infections. Especially, Tokyo’s local government played a crucial role in mobilising self-help containment efforts in the early stage of the outbreak. The city continues its high-density living, the realisation of the need for public recreation, and active transportation spaces. These practices, understandably, are going to change the current planning approach during the post-pandemic era. Singapore’s preparedness and rapid state-led responses helped stall the spread of infections. This was praised by the World Health Organization, which found the city-state as the gold standard of crisis management (Cher, 2020). Shifted paradigm towards ‘live through the pandemic’ somewhat led Singapore to adopt a ‘decentralised’ planning approach from its decade-long densification strategy. Effective and inclusive governance of communication and incremental decisions based on the evolving pandemic situation has been a great strength for Singapore. This approach helped the city transit through the pandemic and adapt to a decentralised planning approach that otherwise perhaps was not realisable in a normal situation. Apparently, Tokyo, Singapore, and Shanghai learned lessons from past pandemics, such as SARS. However, the initial responses were widely perceived to be inadequate and tougher measures were only introduced because of peer pressure mounted by civil societies (Rondinone et al., 2022). The history of human settlements suggests that diseases have shaped our cities and will continue to do so. Many remarkable approaches to urban planning, development, and management have been changed in response to public health crises, such as cholera outbreaks (in London), the Spanish flu of 1918 (in New York and Mexico City), and the Ebola virus disease (in West Africa in 2014), among others (Klaus, 2020). They all have left lasting marks on urban spaces. COVID-19 seems to have an ultra-dimen44

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sion—it was spread all over the globe and caused an unprecedented disruption in economic, social, and health infrastructure. Arguably, such an enormous scale of impacts is unprecedented and has forced every nation to continue to respond to the evolving situations, more than dealing with a complete planning response (Nahiduzzaman, 2021). COVID-19 has also hoisted to the weakening health infrastructure across the globe that has been somewhat delinked and neglected in public investments on infrastructure. Therefore, the COVID-19 pandemic appears to remind and reinstate the significance of health infrastructure and its connectedness to entire planning, development, and management endeavours to build safer and healthier cities in the future. From a planning perspective during and after the pandemic, Singapore has a focus on 10-minute forest city, and Shanghai aims for 15-minute city (Pehlivan, 2021). However, Ankara does not seem to have such a vision. It has various perceptions of the pandemicrelated risks, which are reflected on highly differentiated responses by the people living across different parts of the city. Ankara has been losing its green space in the last few decades. This stems from the need to regain the urban green and open space if the city aims to fight against pandemics such as COVID-19. As mentioned earlier, the recent Green City Plan for Ankara aims to promote an integrated green economic growth. Thus, Pehlivan (2021) contends that 20-minute neighbourhoods could be possible in Turkish cities, including Ankara, and planning should be directed towards an inclusive approach to create and protect green and open spaces for active transportation and recreation. The situation is a bit different in Tokyo as its neighbourhoods are designed with community parks and open spaces. However, residents seeking a rich green environment largely felt its inadequacy during the pandemic. These public amenities also suffered a lack of fair share of distribution and access, which otherwise would have been planned and designed as per the population density and size of each neighbourhood (Omatsu, 2022). The 15-minute community life circle (15 min-CLC) strategy in Shanghai could be considered in other cities for the future urban planning and development endeavours to overcome the shortcomings in supplying optimised service delivery and infrastructure, among others (Wu et al, 2021). This strategy is included in the Shanghai Master Plan (2017–2035) that paid attention to the ‘green and open eco-network’ and provides a powerful tool to integrate people and built environment with the ecology (Hartog, 2021). Thus, ‘15-minute city’ appears to be a right and fitting planning approach for the post-pandemic cities that advocate and enable wider social equality while providing access to the main urban services to every citizen and city user (Balletto et al., 2021). The following is a summary of the fundamentals of the ‘15-minute city’ concept that would be critical not only for promoting inclusive, adaptive, and green development but also for creating a natural shield to fight against and live through the pandemics, such as COVID-19 (Campisi & Nahiduzzaman, forthcoming): • • • •

Ecology: creating a green and sustainable city. Proximity: living at a reduced distance from one’s work activities. Solidarity: creating links between people. Participation: involving citizens in the transformation of living spaces.

Conclusion Understandably, all investments in financial, economic, health, and social infrastructure and contemporary buzzing approach to planning are fundamentally pro-densification and 45

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Figure 3.1  Path towards a resilient city. Source:  Created by the authors.

pro-urbanisation. However, pandemics such as COVID-19 called for a reversal approach to planning, development, and management (Nahiduzzaman, 2021). As cities are in an almost impossible state to become less dense and de-urbanised, innovative approaches like 10- or 15-minute city would be a bridging ground to achieve a reality where intertwined HeWe and other infrastructure articulates with the upheld goals of equity, inclusion, adaptation, and resilience (Figure 3.1). Digital infrastructure for e-commerce, socialisation, virtual work, conferencing, education, etc., would truly contribute to the making of future cities that are more resilient and safer for all (Nahiduzzaman & Aldosary, 2012; Nahiduzzaman et al., 2021). Pandemics have been repetitive disruptive forces in the history of human civilisation. Approaches to planning, development, and management have to a certain extent evolved in responding to complex external disruptions, including pandemics (Mouratidis, 2022). Starting from Spanish flu (H1N1) to the resurgence of Swine flu, SARS, MERS, and Ebola virus, they did have a trajectory of impacting the cities and forcing the planning professionals and pertaining government agencies to act—first through ‘immediate’ resilience or ‘quick fix’ approach followed by an adaptation of ‘long-term’ planning prudence. Arguably, the four cities in this study are following the same pathway to survive through the pandemic. Apparently, lessons learnt from the history did not seem to have discernible impacts, yet in taking innovative, adaptive, or inclusive approaches to planning. Singapore, Tokyo, and Shanghai took quite distinctive approaches, notably through building green infrastructure, controlled densification (e.g., 10- or 15-minute city) with equitable access to public amenities, and prioritised investment in health infrastructure. Ankara is still lagging behind the pace to catch up with them and endorse the needed approach that would make the city safer and more resilient against the pandemic. However, all these cities are in need to integrate the infrastructure into the core planning and investment decisions about other physical and social infrastructure and balance them accordingly. Such integration is going to further influence urban policy, development strategies, smart management, and innovative planning, paying attention to the detailed and efficient implementation of them. Moreover, green development and HeWe infrastructure must be adaptive and inclusive for all citizens from across the city, and from all social, cultural, and income groups. Essentially, this study underpins that planning gatekeepers in these cities, and in Asian cities broadly, must prioritise and integrate public HeWe into future planning and development endeavours through adaptive, resilient, and inclusive planning and governance strategies. 46

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4 VULNERABLE RESILIENCE IN COVID-19 Invisibility and adaptability of the ‘informal’ cities of Southeast Asia Amanda Achmadi and Sidh Sintusingha

Introduction The global pandemic of COVID-19 exposed the landscape of inequality in cities throughout the world, particularly in terms of access to urban amenities, public open spaces, healthy housing, and social infrastructure. At the same time, many informal urban neighbourhoods in Southeast Asia have demonstrated resilience and an ability to adapt to challenging situations allowing the formal cities to continue to ‘function’ through the flexibility and reliability of the region’s vast informal economy. This chapter explores the interplay between the vulnerability and resilience of informal urbanism in Southeast Asian cities with a focus on Indonesian and Thai cities, where the COVID-19 pandemic brutally exposed societies’ weaknesses, yet also revealed strengths. Indonesia, a country known for its relaxed attitude towards regulations, reality, and risk, has retained its true colours through the ongoing pandemic. The general looseness of governance could be observed across the nation. Public reactions originally seemed to be divided along class lines, with anxiety and frustration among the urban middle classes to the general obliviousness among the urban poor. For the latter group, social distancing is simply an impossibility due to their dependence on informal street trading and the conditions of their urban neighbourhood, the kampung, where dwellings, communal facilities, and the streetscape spatially overlap. The looseness of governance and the generally inadequate social safety net mean that most Indonesians rely on their social network both virtually and in real space, in some instances blurring the previously hardening class lines and crossing the physical barrier between the formal and informal cities. In their attempts to ‘protect’ their own community from the dire situation, driven by a mixture of pragmatism and solidarity, the urban middle classes rediscovered their kampung spirit by creating new collective urban practices. Meanwhile, the urban poor showcased their resilience by inventing community-based social safety net and creating a myriad of ad hoc supply chain and neighbourhood upgrading initiatives to fill in the vacuum left behind by the shutdown of the formal sector. The theme of evolving conflicts, contradictions, and synergies across socio-economic classes during the pandemic is further explored in the case of Thai cities. At the outset of DOI: 10.4324/9781003256533-5

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the pandemic in early 2020, public spaces that are dominated by informal practices, such as markets and street commerce, were perceived as ‘diseased’ and feared conduits of COVID-19. The Thai ‘pantry to share happiness’ phenomenon provides an example of synergy between the global virtual and real public spaces. The initiative started as a (middle class) proposal on Facebook for a social experiment to anonymously install a food pantry in public space to ascertain the (urban poor) public's selfishness versus collective mindedness. The phenomenon went ‘viral’ to all the country’s provinces—spreading through social media as in the real public spaces of cities and towns around the country. It is observed that the phenomenon’s ‘success’ is due to limits of governmentality and rooted in two types of ‘social capital’, namely in the practices of (middle class) merit-making and the practices of (lower middle class and poor) informal urbanity. For the latter, the food pantry sustains the social–commercial roles that the streets played, once spaces of opportunities, now of social support, while concurrently exposing socio-economic inequities and prejudices. The following sections trace and reflect on the changing role and visibility of informal urbanism as these take shape through the unique interplay between the virtual and the real urban spaces of Jakarta and Bangkok as necessitated by the pandemic. The pandemic exposes and at once destabilises the landscape of social division that has been inscribed by the shaping of built environments in these Southeast Asian cities. The urban population of the two cities turns to the virtual space of online communities, social media, and e-commerce to compensate for the temporary closure of the actual cities and the formal sectors, as well as the lack of a functioning social welfare system. More connections, encounters, and transactions were made possible and necessitated through the pandemic despite and because of the limitations of the real, material cities. The virtual space enables and mediates fluid exchange between socioeconomic classes, an alternative ‘cityness’ that is nimble, adaptive, and infused with a spirit of solidarity, public disobedience, and pragmatic survivalism.

Informalising as a pandemic survival strategy in Indonesia: From invisibility to adaptability For most parts of the colonial and postcolonial history of urban formation in Indonesia, a fluid negotiation of improvised modes of governance, production, and appropriation of urban neighbourhoods has shaped the formation of the nation’s large cities. Despite the dichotomy implied in the terminologies such as formal urbanism and informal urbanism, city and kampung, and ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ development, the functioning of Indonesian cities depends heavily on the inseparability and coexistence between contrasting conditions of the formally planned city and the agile resilience of what has been classified as the informal sector. Ananya Roy (2005) reminds us that urban informality is in fact part of the repertoires of both the urban rich and the poor in operating and claiming their rights to the city. In the case of Indonesia, Abidin Kusno has further observed that urban informality is in fact practised by all the stakeholders in the capital Jakarta, Southeast Asia’s megacity with a population nearing 30 million, from the city authority, private developers, and the kampung communities, but at ‘different degrees of legitimacy’ (Kusno, 2013, p. xvii). He further explains that ‘[o]ne would imagine that a city run by informality would be chaotic, but such a practice is neither primitive nor crude. Rather it rests on a regime of power that makes use of informality to govern society’. Elsewhere, AbdouMaliq Simone describes the highly complex outcomes of urban informality in Northern Jakarta as ‘a very messy city, but one that contains within it the vast spectrum of challenges and possibilities inherent in urban life’ (Simone, 2010, p. 59). 50

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The messiness of Indonesian cities and other Southeast Asian cities where urban informality is practised often means that their urbanities are not always readily legible in the eyes of scholars and built environment professionals, such as planners, urban designers, and architects, those tasked to evaluate and reimagine the urban form of these cities. Their illegibility is both their strength and their weakness (Achmadi et al., 2019; Reerink, 2015; Simone, 2021 ). They are hard to identify, describe, represent, and measure, thus making them elusively hard to be controlled, contained, and managed. Although such a quality gives them the capacity to adapt themselves, it is also a critical weakness. The ruling authorities could easily dismiss urban informality’s messiness as a form of disorder, illegal practice, and slum to justify their marginalisation, or even forcibly displace them through the imposition of ‘visual order’. This manifests in the forms of the production of city as an urban spectacle driven by the quests for symbolical capitals as part of nation-building projects; uncritical adoption of West-centric perception of world cities; commodification of urban space and urban living; and the illegibility of the informal facets of the city. These practices and perceptions lead to the treatment of the sites of informal economy and housing in Indonesian cities, locally known as the kampung, as if they are invisible and expendable. What is the viability of the informal city in Indonesia when faced by the onslaught of what has been described as the once-in-a-century pandemic? From the start of the pandemic in 2020, it was clear that the Indonesian government from the national to local Rukun Tetangga (RT) and Rukun Warga (RW) administrative levels do not have the ability to impose a strict lockdown or offer equal access to COVID-19 risk mitigation, health service, and welfare to compensate the potential loss of income (The Jakarta Post, 2020a, 2020b; Lindsey & Walden, 2021). For the majority of the urban poor and the working classes, social distancing, restricted mobility, and working from home are neither realistic nor affordable options (Klugman & Moore, 2021). The largest segments of the nation’s population live from and on the street and the economic impact would be significant and immediately felt. The majority of its population, including the middle and upper classes, rely on the operation and mobility of the informal sector in all facets of the country’s economy, from production to distribution (The Jakarta Post, 2020a). Middle-class and upper-class households, including those who live in a gated housing estate and towering apartment buildings, depend on the availability and mobility of the informal sectors: their drivers, security guards, housemaids, and the green armies of GoJek or Grab delivery services and rideshares (the highly popular Indonesian versions of Uber on motorbike) in obtaining everyday goods and services. The majority of these informal workers live in dense kampung neighbourhoods. Unsurprisingly, through the pandemic, the street life and the informal economy lining major transport routes along the sprawling desakota region in Indonesia continue to operate and sustain the economic life of the nation. Only the towering office buildings, the formal commercial sectors such as the shopping malls and hospitality along the main roads of Central Jakarta, have the capacity to comply with the directive to reduce mobility, keep social distance, and work from home (The Jakarta Post, 2020b). Other Asian countries with a very large population such as China and India implemented strict lockdowns and other COVID-19 mitigation strategies compared to the experience in Indonesia. Such strict measures and strategies triggered the widely reported large-scale enforcement of imposed quarantine or mass exodus of the urban poor and rural migrants forced to return to their hometowns or villages. In contrast, Indonesians relied on the resilience of the informal sectors to sustain their livelihood and their pragmatic resignation to face the risk of catching the virus in order to sustain the economic beats of the country. What has emerged out of Indonesia through the pandemic is an affirmation of the fluid practice of urban 51

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informality as a kind of collective social security. The crucial nature of informal urbanism and the pervasive sense of community have been further highlighted through the pandemic. Multiple kampung communities across Java, including in Jakarta, demonstrate their readiness and strong social capital to self-organise, mobilise, and equip their neighbourhoods with affordable health and hygiene protocols within the limit of their capacities in monitoring movements and mobility of its community members (Wilson, 2020). And despite the early prediction of the vulnerability of dense kampung neighbourhoods in facing the spread of the airborne virus, and the identification of dense kampung of Northern Jakarta as a major COVID-19 hotspot, the mapping of data collected by the capital city authority’s COVID-19 response has instead indicated that the major hotspots were middle classes and affluent suburbs (Fortuna, 2020; Klugman & Moore, 2020). A number of key kampungs elsewhere in the city, such as Kampung Luar Batang and Kampung Kunir, continue to work on their planning for in-situ upgrading of their settlements via Zoom technology, to sustain current Jakarta Governor Anies Baswedan’s political momentum and will to support the renewal of Jakarta’s historical Kampung neighbourhoods. After all, Baswedan’s successful campaign for Jakarta Governorship in 2017 rested on the support of the urban poor and informal trading sectors, who signed an agreement to vote against the then incumbent Basuki ‘Ahok’ Tjahaja Purnama, a controversial figure popular among the urban middle class and whose reign was marked by a high number of evictions and demolitions of riverside kampung settlements as part of the implementation of the national project of ‘Normalisation of the Ciliwung River’ in Jakarta (Sofian, 2018; see also Dovey et al., 2019). Crucial elements of the rebuilding of Jakarta kampungs, developed through partnership with the city’s young and socially minded architects and urban designers as well as urban thinktank and NGOs such as RUJAK and Urban Poor Consortium, are the spatialisation of the economic operation of the kampung, provision of communal facilities, and articulation of neighbourhood’s interface with surrounding open green space (typically the urban riverscape). While the private developers’ formal development of urban housing continues with its business-as-usual typology of highly secured high-rise apartment buildings or gated housing estates with typical single-household villa-type dwelling on the urban fringe, the kampung upgrading project showcases a genuine rethinking of urban consolidation by focusing on the new spatial configuration of affordable housing, mixed-use development, and communal urban living. Coinciding with the pandemic, the upgrading of the kampung is also informed by the first-hand experiences of kampung residents of their vulnerability in facing the spread of airborne disease. A strong design focus on aspects such as cross ventilation, circulation space that allows for social distancing, experimentation with density, and allocation of equal access to open green space makes these kampung upgrading projects a pioneering laboratory of postpandemic urban design and urban housing architecture. The informal sector and kampung residents were quick to respond to the gap left behind with the closure of the formal sectors, such as supermarkets and shopping malls and hospitality industry during the first wave of the pandemic (Wahba et al., 2020). Home-based textile industry and tailors swiftly supplied and distributed cloth facemasks in the midst of shortage of surgical masks. Numerous home-based culinary industry and food deliveries were initiated and promoted via WhatsApp, Instagram, and Facebook, capitalising on Indonesian’s prolific use of social media. Kampung neighbourhood also sustained its operation in producing crucial affordable food staple, such as tofu and tempe, and street food ensuring food provision and security in the city. Gojek motorbike drivers quickly installed perplex shields to continue their services to transport people and goods across Indonesia’s major cities. Their services became even more crucial as the majority of middle-class residents sought to reduce their mobility. 52

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Figure 4.1  From farmers to market to your doorstep: The rise of the roaming greengrocer. Source:  Amanda Achmadi.

Previously struggling to retain customers, the local practice of roaming greengrocer on pushcart (tukang sayur) emerged as the saviours for the gated middle- and upper-class housing estates. They now operate as the crucial connecting link between wholesale traditional fresh produce markets and the residents of middle- and upper-class neighbourhoods, bringing fresh food to their doorsteps every morning and afternoon (Figure 4.1). The middle- and upperclass neighbourhoods embraced their community spirit by organising informal collective shopping through WhatsApp group, where each household has a unique responsibility of obtaining certain daily goods from local suppliers and distributing these across the community. E-commerce soon adopted the language of informal trading such as pasar (traditional food market) and tukang sayur with the launch of multiple collective shopping apps, such as Tukang Sayur Online and Kedaisayur.com. Beyond such virtual practices, COVID-19 mitigation in smaller Indonesian cities has demonstrated further the interconnected nature of formal and informal urbanism. This challenges the hardening of physical borders that often separate the affluent from the poor suburbs, between what is considered as the proper formal city and the informal urban kampung in many urban centres in the country. The East Java city of Salatiga showcases a unique approach in enabling the operation of traditional food market on the major street of the city centre during early hours and during limited lockdown. The vast space of the city’s main streets was largely underutilised during periods of restricted mobility, and the city government productively appropriated and utilised this urban space to facilitate fresh food trading, enabling the traders (most of them are employed casually and informally) to social distance while sustaining their livelihood. Prior to the pandemic and for the most part of modern history of Indonesia, life in the kampungs existed and operated precariously while relying on below standard if not non-existent physical infrastructure and amenities to ensure a dignified, healthy, and safe living environment (Jellinek, 1991). Kampung residents also face a constant risk of displacement either triggered by new urban development or major disaster such as flooding, fire, and spread of disease (Dovey et al., 2019). Their resilience and adaptability in facing such challenges were largely invisible and illegible for most of the middle and upper classes public and the city-making professionals and urban authorities, hidden behind the solid wall that isolate their physical existences from the rest of the ‘formal’ city. Through the pandemic, the kampung and its informal economy gain a new kind of visibility through social media and their crucial sustained 53

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presence in the real physical space of the city in the midst of the temporary closure of the formal sector.  The appropriation of the language and the mode of operation of the informal sector by the urban middle and upper classes have further cemented the contribution of the informal city in the functioning of urban environments in Indonesia.

Expending social capital in the Thai ‘pantry to share happiness’ The COVID-19 pandemic brutally exposed many societies’ weaknesses but has also revealed strengths, as stated and evidenced earlier. At the pandemic’s outset in early 2020 in Thailand, public spaces and ‘others’ have been perceived as ‘diseased’ and feared conduits of COVID-19. In this context, the Thai ‘pantry to share happiness’ (ตูป ้ น ั สุข) phenomenon emerged to mitigate the pandemic’s effects on the urban poor and provides a case of an almost simultaneous synergy between the global virtual and real public spaces. Inspired by Jessica McClard’s ‘Little Free Pantry’ (Chatinakrob, 2020), the ‘pantry to share happiness’ is simply a cupboard placed in public where anyone can put in food for those in need. While the objective is theoretically altruistic as the giver and taker can both do so anonymously, the initiative started as a (albeit middle class) proposal in a Facebook post on 9 May 2020 (Supakit Bank Kulchartvijit, 2020) that became a social experiment to ascertain the (albeit urban poor) public's ‘selfishness’ versus ‘collective mindedness’. Pantry setup and location were shared, via Facebook—a social medium that, as of 2019, has over 46 million users (out of a population of ~69 million) in Thailand (World Population Review, 2002), for givers and takers. As reported in a news article the following day, 150/200 commentators were sceptical, some saying that ‘both the goods and the pantry could disappear’ (Matichon, 2020a). Independent of actual results, like an online phenomenon, it went ‘viral’ in all 76 provinces of the country—spreading through social media as in the real public spaces of cities and towns (Matichon, 2020b). In the following days, videos captured by smartphones and security cameras alike, flood virtual spaces, capturing the good, the bad and the ugly, both confirming and dispelling class stereotypes. Newspapers reflect the phenomenon with headlines (author translated) such as ‘Goods finish people ring bell for more’ (Matichon, 2020c), ‘Gangs raid pantries in the area’ (Manager, 2020b) and worse, ‘People at Nakornsawan fighting over pantry goods’ (Matichon, 2020d). Others expressed the positive aspects such as ‘Auntie expresses appreciation to benefactors’ (Manager, 2020a) with online polls suggesting the majority prefers to keep going with the practice and that ‘we should not lose hope because of the actions of a few’ (Bangkok Business News, 2020). It is observed that the phenomenon’s ‘success’ can be attributed to technological factors such as the proliferation of social media, but also to the limits of governmentality—consistent with the Indonesian case. It is further surmised that the pantry’s wide adoption is rooted in two types of ‘social capital’ expenditures. One is the practices of (middle-class) Buddhist meritmaking (Figure 4.2). This has a basis in the millennia-old tradition of almsgiving to monks, performed daily in public spaces (either in front of homes, at markets, or at the temple). In fact, in contemporary intensified urbanised areas, temples have an excess of food to the point that they quickly performed the role of ‘community pantry’ at the outset of the pandemic. Hence with the ‘pantry to share happiness’, to counter evidences of selfish exploitation, Buddhist responses are usually cited along the line of ‘it’s not about the results, but the intention’ and people carry on installing and/or adding goods to pantries. Others take a vigilant approach and put up pantries where there are ‘eyes on the streets’ whether of real people or security cameras. The second practice is of social capital that manifests in (lower middle class and poor) informal urbanity that sustains the social-commercial role of the streets as spaces of opportunities 54

Vulnerable resilience in COVID-19

Figure 4.2  Buddhist merit-making in the public open space of a roadside fresh market. Source:  Sidh Sintusingha.

in good times, and of social support during the pandemic. Yet this concurrently exposed socioeconomic prejudices. For the urban poor, the public spaces of the street are spaces of livelihoods (Sintusingha, 2021). In bad times, even before the pandemic, the streets can be relied upon for help and assistance. In contrast, with economic development and growth, the middle classes have been self-segregating in the air-conditioned private spaces and many view the streets, real and virtual, with distrust—as illegal, unsafe, messy, dirty, and in need of reorganisation (Radović et al., 2020). Augmenting these socio-cultural practices, the ‘pantry to share happiness’ success is further reinforced when the ‘formal’ sectors quickly catches on, with private corporations and government agencies erecting their own pantries, with all the formal pomp and public promotions (sometimes involving celebrities) to boost (Manager, 2020c; Matichon, 2020e). This perhaps reflects the Asian/Thai practice of elaborate, ritualised formal veneer, but important decisions on street use are often negotiated and made informally via the local social networks (Sintusingha et al., 2010). The phenomenon also reveals conceptual, cultural, and spatial slippages embedded in language and notions of ‘patronage’ or ‘social capital’ manifest specifically both in meaning and socio-spatially. Like an accordion, formal–informal ebbs and flows expand and contract in time and circumstances. Social capital is analogous to the pantry—it is about ‘trust’, give and take at scale and beyond. Drawing upon the above experiences, the following questions are posed: Are there lessons in how to build and ‘mine’ social capital? Can this be done via synergising the virtual and real public spaces (that seem to have a mutually exclusive relationship when it comes to street commerce)? It is manifested that informal urbanism brings diverse stakeholders in direct interaction with each other, enriching social capital. As demonstrated by the ‘pantry to share happiness’ phenomenon, through the pandemic’s disruption, social media casts the network 55

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that captures and relinks middle-class netizens to the streets. This could be an opportunity to encourage and embed further co-presence and interaction across social classes.

Discussion: Informal urbanism lost and rediscovered The broad trend, as each country ‘develops’, is the erosion—and, at times, eviction—of informal practices, whether of kampung urbanism in Indonesia or street commerce in Thailand. In gentrified locations within the city where the contrasts are pronounced, such as at the old urban core or high-end areas, YouTube vloggers and their subscribers can be condescending and even disparaging of informal urbanism (Bangkok Sightseeing, 2021). They view the phenomenon compromises the new symbolic capital and has no place in ‘developed’ parts of the city. This is inevitable as society ascends the economic ladder and economic disparities widen, differences will be more pronounced. In this context, the chapter reveals and confirms the crucial function of informal urbanism in both countries as a social safety net—a role it is called to play time and again. Many Thais and Indonesians will have memories of the 1997 ‘tom yum kung’ economic meltdown and the historic political repercussions, and how the workers in the formal sectors who lost their jobs were able to survive by joining the informal economy through street vending and flea markets. With the return of good times, the lessons are ignored—if not forgotten, and a reversion to the class-biased perception/judgment of the urban poor and their practices. The Indonesians rediscovered the invisible kampung and its informal urbanism practices during the pandemic—but how long will this last? In Thailand, the impacts of the pandemic were initially mitigated by ‘social capital’ facilitated by social media. This includes the now-famous role of the one-million strong Village Health Volunteers (VHVs) in the tracing and quarantining of high-risk groups fleeing COVID19 epicentres (Jiaviriyaboonya, 2022). However, social media has been inevitably utilised to ruthlessly exploit societies’ political divisions that undermined efforts against the spread of COVID-19—particularly through sowing distrust of the government, health officials, and vaccines. These reinforce the importance of real civic spaces and of resisting their erosion by the polarising social media and the stratification of public spaces through gentrification by government agencies and developers. As a result of the continued waves of COVID-19 variants, the practices of ‘pantry to share happiness’ have been continued, retained its roles, and—consistent with Kusno (2013)—even become part of the official repertoire to mitigate the socioeconomic impacts of ensuing COVID-19 waves. In August–September 2021, the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration set up pantries in all its 50 districts (Thairath, 2021a) and four major parks (Thairath, 2021b), facilitating collaborations and contributions from the community and also the business sector. These practices demonstrate and are speculative of ‘best practices’ of formal and informal sectors establishing and recognising complementarity— and perhaps even promoting the value of inclusiveness and ‘a sense of shared ownership’ (Chatinakrob, 2020). Chatinakrob (2020) further attests that the sense of shared ownership is ‘embedded in the existing tradition of community activities that people have engagement in filling food, taking care of it, and taking it out in an appropriate proportion’. The practice of leveraging of social capital across the formal and informal networks also manifests in the aforementioned Village Health Volunteers and the nationwide Baan Mankong social housing projects (Sintusingha et al., 2011). While the cases highlight that ‘social capital’ is a positive asset—like economic capital, there are inequities in its distribution in the kampungs and street commerce of Indonesian and Thai cities. What is evident in the cases is that, in extremely disruptive events such as the pandemic, social capital is the currency of society’s safety net. It is the trust established 56

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through predominantly face-to-face reciprocal relationships and patronage—Kusno’s ‘regime of power’ (2013)—that links people together whether for administrative and/or philanthropic ends. The role of social media has been prominent and pervasive in both cases in ‘daylighting’ the invisible informal urbanism and the interdependence between the formal and informal city—albeit in facilitating an effective transactional and patronising relationship. It concurrently equalises but also reinforces the contrasting and hierarchical conditions in the most vivid way. It has been effectively utilised to mobilise and expend social and economic capital—but also to further sow and entrench socio-economic and political divisions. The cases discussed in this chapter represent contrasting ‘bottom-up’ experiences from the kampung’s scaffolding of the middle and upper classes in Jakarta to middle-class charity in Thailand via the ‘pantry to share happiness’ phenomenon. Consistent with Simone’s (2010) argument, considered together, they demonstrate the complex outcomes and potentials of informal urbanism practices.

Conclusion The chapter provides critical reflections on the landscape of inequality embodied within the contrasting urban conditions of Southeast Asian cities. It is observed that the pandemic offers opportunities to envision future urban possibilities and alternatives in the rapidly urbanising Southeast Asian region, including a rethinking of the relationships between density and access to public open space, virtual and real public spaces, and informal and formal urbanism. It is argued that the resilience and social capital showcased by case studies in Jakarta and Bangkok contribute to broadening up public discourses about social capital and diversity as a component of sustainable and resilient urban future. In a region where the interplay between informal and formal practices, now amplified by social media, has always shaped the governance and the production of its vast urban landscape, the pandemic has unleashed a renewed realisation of the region’s true strength, its social capital.

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Amanda Achmadi and Sidh Sintusingha Jiaviriyaboonya, P. (2022). Anthropological study of village health volunteers’ (VHVs’) socio-political network in minimizing risk and managing the crisis during COVID-19. Heliyon, 8(1), e08654. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2021.e08654 Klugman, J., & Moore, M. (2021). COVID-19 has a postcode: How urban housing and spatial inequality are shaping the COVID-19 crisis. Pathfinders. https://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/cic_pathfinders_covid-19_has_a_postcode.pdf Kusno, A. (2013). After the new order: Space, politics and Jakarta. University of Hawaii Press. Lindsey, T., & Walden, M. (2021, June 3). Indonesia may be on the cusp of a major COVID spike. Unlike its neighbours, though, there is no lockdown yet. The Conversation. https://theconversation. com/indonesia-may-be-on-the-cusp-of-a-major-covid-spike-unlike-its-neighbours-though-there-isno-lockdown-yet-158955 Manager. (2020a, May 12). Good manners! Elderly woman raise hands to say thank you after picking up items from the “pantry to share happiness” (watch the clip) [มารยาทงาม! หญิงสูงวัยยกมือไหว้ขอบคุณ หลังห ยิบของจาก “ตู้ปันสุข” (ชมคลิป)]. Manager. https://mgronline.com/onlinesection/detail/9630000049294 Manager. (2020b, May 11). Controversy with “pantry to share happiness”: A gang empties pantry in 2 minutes at Ninja-Chonburi intersection [ทัวร์ลง “ตู้ปันสุข” มากันเป็นแก๊ง 2 นาทีหมดเกลี้ยง พิกัดแยกนินจาชลบุร]ี . Manager. https://mgronline.com/onlinesection/detail/9630000049226 Manager. (2020c, May 11). “Pantry to share happiness”: From insults to become a new trend of sharing kindness to help the poor during Covid-19 [“ตู้ปันสุข” จากคำ�ปรามาส สู่เทรนด์ใหม่การปันน้ำ�ใจช่วยผู้ยาก ไร้ช่วงโควิด19]. Manager. https://mgronline.com/travel/detail/9630000048681 Matichon. (2020a, May 11). Happiness in adversity “pantry to share happiness”, people gradually share, the recipients’ appreciation (watch clip)? [ความสุขในยามทุกข์ยาก “ตู้ปันสุข” คนทยอยแบ่งปัน ผู้รับซาบซึ้ง (ชมคลิป)?]. Matichon. https://www.matichon.co.th/covid19/news_2180334 Matichon. (2020b, May 10). The “pantry to share happiness” phenomenon appears all over Thailand, reflecting sympathy exists even in times of crisis [ปรากฎการณ์ “ตู้ปันสุข” โผล่ทั่วไทย สะท้อนความเห็นอก เห็นใจ ยังมี แม้ยามวิกฤต]. Matichon. https://www.matichon.co.th/region/news_2179175 Matichon. (2020c, May 12). So painful! Owner brings emptied pantry to share happiness into house and encounters someone ringing the bell, shouting insults [สุดช้ำ�ใจ! ตู้ปันสุขของหมด เจ้าของยกเก็บในบ้าน เจอคนกดกริ่งเรียก-ตะโกนด่า]. Matichon. https://www.matichon.co.th/social/news_2181544 Matichon. (2020d, May 11). Chaos at Nakhon Sawan! People fight for goods from the pantry to share happiness. Netizens asked, should we go on or this is enough before moving the pantry to the municipal rescue building for the officers to manage [นครสวรรค์วุ่น! แย่งของตู้กับข้าวปันสุข ชาวเน็ตถ าม”ไปต่อหรือพอแค่นี้”ก่อนย้ายตั้งหน้ากู้ภัยเทศบาลให้จนท.ดูแล]. Matichon. https://www.matichon.co.th/ news-monitor/news_2180862 Matichon. (2020e, June 9). The Tobacco Authority of Thailand opens the “Punsuk Cabinet, Thai Tobacco sharing kindness to fight COVID-19” program [การยาสูบแห่งประเทศไทย เปิด “ตู้ปันสุข ยาสูบไทยปันน้ำ�ใ จสู้ภัยโควิด-19”]. Matichon. https://www.matichon.co.th/publicize/news_2221500 Radović, D., Boontharm, D., Bruzzese, A., Cairns, S., Fikfak, A., Klomp, P., Kuma, K., Cossio, B. M., Medina, A., Oguma, E., Sim, D., Sintusingha, S., & Verhoeven, S. (2020). Urban questions in the times of coronavirus: Responding to the crisis of public space. The Journal of Public Space, 5(2), 233–248. https://doi.org/10.32891/jps.v5i3.1362 Reerink, G. (2015). From autonomous village to ‘informal slum’: Kampong development and state control in Bandung (1930–1960). In F. Colombijn & J. Coté (Eds.), Cars, conduits, and kampongs: The modernization of the Indonesian City, 1920–1960 (pp. 193–212). Brill. https://brill. com/view/title/26707 Roy, A. (2005). Urban informality: Towards an epistemology of planning. Journal of the American Planning Association, 71(2), 147–158. Simone, A. (2010). City life from Jakarta to Dakar: Movements at the crossroads. Routledge. Simone, A. (2014). Jakarta: Drawing the city near. University of Minnesota Press. Simone, A. (2021). Differences without separability. INFUR, Informal Urbanism Research Hub of the University of Melbourne. https://www.infur.org/paradox Sintusingha, S. (2021). Designing indigenous modernity in Southeast Asia. In H. Rahmann & J. Walliss (Eds.), The big Asian book of landscape architecture (pp. 128–134). JOVIS. Sintusingha, S., Dhabhalabutr, K., & Natakul, B. (2011). Thai democratization and housing the poor: The case of Baanmankong and Baanurarthon. RIMA: Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs, 44(2), 69–87.

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Vulnerable resilience in COVID-19 Sintusingha, S., Polakit, K., & Bruch, R. (2010). Urban dynamism, a contrasting experience: Street life in unplanned Bangkok and planned Melbourne. Nakhara: Journal of Environmental Design and Planning, 6, 93–106. Sofian, E. (2018, April 4). Jakarta’s urban poor have found a new way to fight city hall—and win. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/apr/04/jakartas-urban-poor-have-found-a-newway-to-fight-city-hall-and-win Supakit Bank Kulchartvijit. (2020, May 9). Please update the pantry locations. You can add photos and locations to collect [มีที่ไหนกันบ้าง ช่วยอัพเดทกันหน่อยครับ ใส่รูปและสถานที่ได้เลยครับ เพื่อรวบรวม]. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/bank.kulchartvijit/posts/3183464905010493 Thairath. (2021a, September 7). Bangkok installs pantry to share happiness in all 50 districts to help with COVID efforts [กรุงเทพติดตั้งตู้ปันสุข ช่วยโควิดทั้ง 50 เขต]. Thairath. https://www.thairath.co.th/news/ local/bangkok/2187018 Thairath. (2021b, September 21). Bangkok metropolitan authority opens four parks to share happiness, setting up food cabinets ready to accept donations to help those who are suffering from COVID-19 [กทม.เปิดสวนปันสุข 4 สวน ตั้งตู้อาหารช่วยผู้เดือดร้อนโควิด-19-พร้อมรับบริจาค]. Thairath. https://www. thairath.co.th/news/local/bangkok/2198863 The Jakarta Post. (2020a, April 12). COVID-19: More regions request PSBB status as Indonesia sees big jump in infections, deaths. The Jakarta Post. https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/04/12/covid19-more-regions-request-psbb-status-as-indonesia-sees-big-jump-in-infections-deaths.html The Jakarta Post. (2020b, May 19). Local authorities scramble to curb Covid 19 in crowded Pademangan red zone. The Jakarta Post. https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/05/19/local-authorities-scramble-to-curb-covid-19-in-crowded-pademangan-red-zone.html Wahba, S., Sharif, M. M., Mizutori, M., & Sorkin, L. (2020, May 12). Cities are on the front lines of COVID19. World Bank Blogs. https://blogs.worldbank.org/sustainablecities/cities- are-front-lines-covid-19 Wilson, I. (2020). Covid-19, inequality and Jakarta’s urban poor: Resilient, but at great risk. Indonesia at Melbourne Blog. https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/covid-19-inequality-and-jakartasurban-poor-resilient-but-at-great-risk/ World Population Review. (2002). Facebook users by country 2021. https://worldpopulationreview.com/ country-rankings/facebook-users-by-country

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5 MAKING LIVEABLE CITIES Experiences from Asia and the Pacific Bambang Susantono, Ramola Naik Singru, and Lara Arjan

Introduction: Urbanisation and challenges in Asia and the Pacific The region of Asia and the Pacific is experiencing rapid urbanisation. The region currently has more than 56 per cent of the world’s total population and 54 per cent of its urban population. Its average annual urban population growth rate was 1.26 per cent during 2015–2020 (UN-DESA, 2018). More than half of the four billion population in the region lived in urban areas in 2019. About one billion may join them in the next 30 years, pushing the regional urbanisation rate above 64 per cent by 2050 (Susantono & Guild, 2021). Rapid urbanisation is often equated with improved economic opportunities, better access to health and education services, and better living conditions. Yet, it has also created problems. The rapidity of urbanisation and uncontrolled growth are compounding the existing challenges of environmental degradation, social inequality, reduced social cohesion, disaster risks, and shortfalls in urban infrastructures (ADB, 2018). Well before COVID-19, many urban areas were already overcrowded, unsafe, and unhealthy. The poor and informal workers were particularly vulnerable in the pandemic, without financial or medical means or access to formal social protection systems (Susantono, 2021a). Key defining characteristics of Asian cities are density, informal settlements, and inequality (UN-Habitat, 2010). Spatial, social, and economic inequality is exemplified in the unequal access to services in the city. Inefficient land use and transport planning and natural resource management, deteriorating infrastructure and inadequate urban services, limited community engagement and decision-making processes, and insufficient financing remain major challenges. Climate change and natural hazard-induced disasters exacerbate these risks, as most urban agglomerations in the Asia-Pacific region are located on or near vulnerable coastal zones, with over half of urban residents living in flood plains and low-lying coastal zones (Dwyer, 2017). With economic and demographic growth, the urban agglomerations expand spatially— vertically through urban densification and horizontally through metropolitanisation, periurbanisation, and urban sprawl. In Asia, the population growth of metropolitan areas was 174 per cent during 1985–2020 (Metropolis, 2021). These spatial expansions have been linked with the expanding urban populations. New forms of urbanisation are emerging like mega regions, peri-urban areas, urban corridors, satellite cities, and clustered city regions (Naik Singru, 2015). 60

DOI: 10.4324/9781003256533-6

Making liveable cities

High levels of rural–urban migration in the Asia-Pacific region have resulted not only in demographic growth but also in the rise of informal settlements in many cities (UN-Habitat, 2010). Migrants are attracted to cities for economic activities or job prospects with an expectation of improved conditions of living. However, the quality of life experienced by the urban poor can be far below that in rural areas (Naik Singru, 2015). This poses the challenge of improving the informal settlements to both national and local city governments. Along with rapid urbanisation, cities in Asia and the Pacific are confronting increasing challenges, especially with regard to liveability. This chapter discusses the making of liveable cities, largely drawing upon the Asian Development Bank’s (ADB) experiences in the region. It introduces the ADB’s framework for approaching liveable cities and discusses the challenges and examples of ADB’s work in the planning and development of liveable cities in its developing member countries (DMCs). Further, it offers a ‘4D’ approach that could be considered for designing post-COVID-19 urban environments. Finally, the chapter presents areas of future research to achieve urban liveability in the region.

Towards liveable cities To address the rising urban challenges and expansion in the past two decades, a series of new urban development concepts have been proposed, under various labels like sustainable cities, liveable cities, green cities, competitive cities, and inclusive cities. The Sustainable Development Goal 11 and the New Urban Agenda have emphasised inclusive, safe, resilient, and sustainable cities and communities (United Nations, 2017). These discourses converge on envisioning an urban future, to which liveability is integral. At ADB, the idea of liveable cities provides the overarching framework for providing technical and financial assistance to DMCs. This idea puts ‘people and community wellbeing at the centre of urban development and decision-making’ (AfDB et al., 2019, p. 49). ADB’s Strategy 2030 identified ‘making cities more livable’ as one of its seven operational priorities (ADB, 2018). This operational plan sets out the direction and approach for ADB to help its DMCs build liveable cities that are green, competitive, inclusive, and resilient. It also details ADB’s strategic operational priorities to provide support to cities in DMCs to help them develop the right institutions, policies, and enabling environments to become more liveable. With lessons learnt from the implementation of several projects, ADB expanded the broad 3E—economy, environment, and equity—dimension of sustainable development to the 5E Livable Cities Framework comprising: economic competitiveness, equity and inclusiveness, environmental sustainability and resilience, enablers, and engagement (AfDB et al., 2019). ADB has applied the 5E Livable Cities Framework in its urban development investments to make cities in the region of Asia and the Pacific liveable. The key to transforming into liveable cities is an integrated planning approach to the provision of urban infrastructure and services and other public goods. Many cities in Asia and the Pacific, with support from national governments and ADB and other donor partners, have adopted integrated planning approaches to addressing the emerging urban challenges and achieving liveable cities. Analytical toolkits for national urban assessments, green cities, and inclusive cities have been further developed to materialise integrated planning. They provided practical guidance for the shift from siloed investments in subsectors, such as water supply and sanitation, to integrated planning and investments. The projects included the preparation of integrated urban action plans in central and west Asia, green city action plans in Southeast Asia, and sponge city in East Asia (ADB, 2020a). 61

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Below are ADB’s experiences of addressing urban challenges and achieving liveable cities in Asia and the Pacific, organised by themes that are related to the 5E Livable Cities Framework. Much of the discussion articulates the current challenges presented by COVID‑19.

Economic competitiveness The potential contribution of urbanisation to economic growth is often constrained by inadequate infrastructure and services. Many countries are driving economic growth through planned urban development. In India, this notion was first articulated in the country’s Tenth Five-Year Plan (2002–2007). The Indian Government put monetary support for several programmes under the strategy, such as the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission and its subcomponent, the Urban Infrastructure Development Scheme for Small and Medium Towns (Sharma & Alipalo, 2021). Supported by ADB, the Rajasthan Urban Infrastructure Development Project was a long-term alliance to address state-wide infrastructure deficit. Besides investment in infrastructure projects, national governments in the Asia-Pacific region started planning and investing in economic growth clusters, urban cluster development, and economic corridor development. Economic corridor development is an integrative strategy that enables industrial proliferation, creates jobs, upgrades infrastructure, aligns infrastructure development with urban and social agglomerations, unifies domestic markets, and links production centres with global value chains. One example is the Government of India’s National Industrial Corridor Development Program to develop 11 industrial corridors spanning 17 states into world-class industrial nodes. These industrial corridors are supported by efficient urban agglomerations and multimodal connectivity––including international gateways like ports and airports and inclusive, climate-resilient, and sustainable infrastructure, and strong institutional and regulatory frameworks. Similarly, under ADB’s Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program, the development of a pilot cross-border AlmatyBishkek Economic Corridor aims to ‘integrate the relatively dense economic area in Central Asia and create one economic space without barriers, following a multisector approach’ (ADB, 2017, p. 1). Connectivity and mobility within cities are an important asset for economic growth. To provide mass transit to growing cities in the Asia-Pacific region, investments are being made for the replacement of private vehicles and the expansion of urban public transport infrastructure. In this regard, India is implementing the Mumbai Metro Rail Systems Project. Worth $1.67 billion, this project aims to improve transport safety through high-level technology and move passengers of all social groups in a modern, energy-efficient, comfortable, and safe transit system; establish an efficient and sustainable metro rail organisation; and establish lastmile connectivity solutions including non-motorised transport and electric vehicles (ADB, 2019). Pakistan’s Peshawar Bus Rapid Transit project is a gold-rated system recognised for excellence in delivering a sustainable transport transformation and improving urban liveability (ADB, 2021a). The project has delivered 30 km of dedicated busway infrastructure and 80 km of direct service routes, providing mobility for over 285,000 passengers per day. In Georgia, ADB’s Livable Cities Investment Project for Balanced Development aims to improve the quality of life for 1.5 million people (ADB, 2020a). For city visioning and investment prioritisation, the project conducted upstream urban planning and stakeholder engagement workshops with citizens and decision-makers. The participants included women who accounted for 52 per cent of the total participants. This process resulted in the preparation of a 10-year integrated urban action plan for four urban growth and tourism clusters. The project includes the upgrading of city centres and tourist sites, provision of community facilities and 62

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services, transport and connectivity, and mobility investments as well as a business development facility for local economic development. The COVID-19 pandemic has affected economies and posed new challenges to sustaining economic growth in the region. First, the region’s economy shrank by 0.2 per cent in 2020 (ADB, 2020b). Before the pandemic, ADB estimated that the region would need to invest US$26.2 trillion during 2016–2030 (or US$1.7 trillion per year) in infrastructure to maintain growth and eradicate poverty. After the pandemic broke out, however, this estimate was expected to increase substantially. Second, the pandemic has slowed down the movement of goods, affecting supply chains and production processes (ADB, 2021b). The third condition that has emerged during COVID-19 was the ‘work from home’ phenomenon (CNBC, 2021). Some other challenges include building high-density areas, managing crowdedness, providing health services, creating healthy cities, supporting vulnerable groups—such as women, aged, people with disabilities, and providing social protection. The lack of concerted and collaborative policies and actions may result in a ‘K-shaped’ recovery (Susantono, 2021b): for example, inequities in digitalisation may give rise to a situation where those who are better-off will take off economically, and those who do not have access to digital technology and/or financial services will lag behind. This creates challenges for urban management and local economic development and further urban liveability.

Equity and inclusiveness COVID-19 has raised two important challenges related to urban form, densities, and social protection. First, COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted perceptions of urban form and density. It is generally believed that density leads to the spread of the pandemic in cities. This seemed to threaten the two decades of advocacy for building high-density urban forms. However, studies have shown that it is not density but crowdedness that contributes to the spread of the pandemic. Evidence from New York showed that high-density areas did not experience high infection rates of COVID-19 (Lall & Wahba, 2020). Further, evidence from Mumbai showed that the spread of the pandemic in informal settlements was contained by engaging relevant stakeholders, supporting the most vulnerable groups (i.e., aged), and timely provision of health services of vaccination and treatment (Kumar et al., 2020). It is argued that ‘crowding is in many ways linked to socio-economic status and should be defined in terms of floor space/person rather than population density’ (von Seidlein et al., 2021). Second, the economic growth of cities has not equally benefitted the various social groups. The lack of redistributive mechanisms has left behind vulnerable groups such as women, aged and youth, and persons with disabilities (UN-Habitat, 2010). Some of these problems have been entrenched by the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly regarding health, education, and social protection. By an estimate, COVID-19 could have pushed back 89 million people in the Asia-Pacific region into extreme poverty (UN-ESCAP, 2021). During the pandemic, poverty-targeted schemes were ‘failing to reach the poorest families’ (ILO, 2020). Inequality in digitalisation has affected the poor urban and rural areas alike. Lack of access to information and communication technologies (ICTs) has hindered education, health services, and flexible working arrangements for the poor. To support the vulnerable population, some countries have come up with social protection programmes that are implemented at national and local levels. In India, the ‘Jan Dhan-AadhaarMobile’ or ‘JAM Trinity’ has provided a comprehensive social protection cover to vulnerable groups in both urban and rural areas. Jan Dhan is a national financial inclusion scheme of the Government of India, and Aadhaar is the unique identification provided to every citizen. With the combination of Jan Dhan and Aadhaar, mobile services were used to make direct transfers 63

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to support the poor and vulnerable groups during the COVID-19 pandemic (The Economic Times, 2021). In Pakistan, a $603 million results-based financing Integrated Social Protection Development Program has been supporting the implementation of ‘Ehsaas’—a national social protection and poverty reduction strategy (ADB, 2021c). There is wide consensus that cities in their current form are not designed to be responsive to women’s needs. The issues range from the unsuitability of transit frequency to serve women who have family tasks in addition to their jobs and to safety issues women experience in cities. Some grassroots organisations are using applications to crowdsource safety data, to help women navigate the public space. India’s Safetipin app is one example. It collects and analyses data on several parameters that impact safety and plays a role in creating inclusive spaces for a diversity of people, with a focus on vulnerable groups, especially women. In doing so, it conducts safety audits and promotes the improvement of public spaces. Inclusive Cities: Urban Area Guidelines is designed for adapting the built environment for differently abled persons, elderly, women, youth, and children, and is being applied in the design of the Livable Cities Investment Project for Balanced Development in Georgia to ensure an accessible urban environment (ADB, 2022a). This includes the provision of kindergartens at a suitable distance from housing developments, e-learning facilities, and sports complexes that boost a sports culture and promote healthy lifestyles. Health and education facilities and services play a central role in making healthy and liveable cities. In this regard, the 5E Livable Cities Framework supports the development of inclusive cities. Apart from large investments, it promotes urban strategies and integrated urban development approaches to address the multiple challenges related to urban form and population densities. These efforts need to be combined with actions to improve social protection and provision of urban services for informal settlement dwellers, women, aged, youth, and differently abled people in the Asia-Pacific region.

Environmental sustainability and resilience Asia and the Pacific is the most disaster-prone region in the world. Cities, particularly those in low-lying areas along the coastlines, are increasingly vulnerable to climate change risks, such as sea level rise, increased and erratic rainfall, and other extreme weather events. In the Pacific, the sea level rise is likely to be four times faster than the global average. About 300 million people are at the risk of coastal flooding, by 2050, and six out of ten of the world’s most vulnerable countries to climate change impacts are in the region (i.e., Cambodia, India, Lao PDR, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Vietnam) (Kulp & Strauss, 2019). To address these challenges, DMCs have taken various initiatives that are supported by multilateral development banks, including ADB. Countries in the region have brought in policy changes to tackle environmental challenges, disaster risks, and climate change impacts. In 2012, the Indonesia–Malaysia–Thailand Subregional Growth Triangle Green Cities Initiative propelled the development of the ‘GrEEEn cities operational framework’, which had pilot green city action plans in Malaysia for Melaka; in Thailand for Songhkla, and Hat Yai; in Indonesia, for Medan, Kendari, Malang, and Batam; in Vietnam for Hue, Vinh Yen, and Ha Giang; and in Myanmar for Mandalay (Sandhu et al., 2016). The People’s Republic of China piloted the concept of ‘sponge city’ with green infrastructure in 16 locations. The Jiangxi Pingxiang Integrated Rural-Urban Infrastructure Development Project was endorsed in 2014, providing financial support to protect floodplains, restore wetlands, and create wider green spaces along rivers in Pingxiang city (ADB, 2022b). The Cities and Climate Change Initiative of UN-Habitat supported several cities in the Asia-Pacific region, 64

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assessing their vulnerabilities to climate change or compiling inventories of their greenhouse gas emissions (UN-Habitat, 2021). For example, the climate change vulnerability assessment conducted for Port Vila, Vanuatu, helped government officials to develop early recovery actions after typhoon Pam in March 2015. In Fiji, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, this initiative has advised the national governments on ‘addressing urban issues and empowering local authorities in their National Climate Change Policies’ (UN-Habitat, 2021). Nature-based solutions are those ‘approaches that are designed to formally include ecological processes as services within infrastructure management systems’ (ADB, 2020c, p. 6). These solutions provide sustainable and cost-effective options with multiple benefits, such as restoring ecosystems, promoting health and wellbeing, risk management, and climate change mitigation and adaptation. They complement and provide alternatives to conventional grey infrastructure, or ideally function together with these through systemic integration in planning and design (Arjan et al., 2021). In the Greater Mekong Subregion in Southeast Asia, multiple strategies for green infrastructure and nature-based solutions for urban development have been put in place (ADB, 2016).

Enablers and engagement The governance of cities and metropolitan regions presents institutional challenges at the national level and the inter-jurisdictional level. In the DMCs of Asia and the Pacific, at the national level, urban development ministries are responsible for preparing and implementing national urban policies and programs. One aspect of preparing effective policies is to mainstream thematic issues, such as climate change, in them. In this regard, ‘entry points’ are considered important for mainstreaming thematic issues (Gogoi et al., 2017). The ‘entry points’ include projects, regulations and protocols, annual plans and budgets, cross-sectoral policy, and sectoral policy. Another aspect is the implementation of national programmes that becomes complex in multilevel governance systems which involve national, subnational, and local governments, such as in China, India, and Indonesia. One way to address this challenge is to put in place ‘special purpose vehicles’ for delivering urban infrastructure and services. For example, in India, the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs proposed the incorporation of ‘special purpose vehicles’ in public transport projects under the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (Government of India, 2011). The lack of a metropolitan regional governance structure in large cities impacts the delivery of integrated solutions to urban challenges. Environmental problems often cross urban and regional boundaries, increasing the complexity and transaction cost for investments and governance across multi-jurisdictional institutions (Bigio & Dahiya, 2004). To improve the governance of metropolitan and peri-urban areas, integrated approaches are needed in areas such as regional infrastructure planning for metro transit systems. Moreover, ‘enablers’ such as ‘incentivising regulations and policies’, ‘improved fiscal management and decentralisation’, ‘engagement’ through ‘inter- and intra-governmental coordination’, and ‘incremental capacity development’ as recommended under the ADB’s 5E Livable Cities Framework (AfDB et al., 2019) could be instrumental in tackling inter-jurisdictional coordination problems.

Imagining post-pandemic urban environments The COVID-19 experience has shown there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution or approach to a national pandemic response. So, in this new situation, how can cities not only ‘build back better’ but ‘build forward better’ and adapt to a new normal based on their specific circumstances? The World Health Organization (WHO) has implemented the Healthy Cities Program since the 65

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1980s and has underlined the importance of urban planning for building healthy cities (Barton et al., 2009). Moreover, its Urban Health Equity Assessment and Response Tool is a ‘decisionsupport tool’ that can help identify and reduce health inequities in cities (WHO, 2010). In view of the COVID-19 pandemic, health and wellbeing in cities is considered central for urban communities as well as the competitiveness of cities. An important aspect of building healthy cities is the prevention and control of pandemic and other diseases in the city, especially in informal urban settlements. To assure that basic needs, such as food, water, sanitation, health care, and public transport, are met, this process involves organising community infrastructure for diagnosis and treatment (von Seidlein et al., 2021). In doing so, governments and relevant stakeholders need to take decisive steps to rehabilitate and improve informal settlements. This calls for an inclusive approach to building healthy cities. Therefore, there is an urgent need for health impact assessments and healthy and age-friendly city action and management plans (Habib et al., 2020). If both assessments and plans are aligned with urban infrastructure project objectives, they can ‘focus on strengthening the positive outcomes of the planned investments, providing systematic sector assessment, and on planning for the addition of further health and age-friendly benefits’ (Habib et al., 2020, p. 3). These offer helpful tools in building ‘healthy cities’, ‘age-friendly cities’, and ‘child-friendly cities’. To inform an understanding and provoke further debates, the authors offer a ‘4D’ approach that could be considered for imagining post-COVID-19 urban environments: •

• •

•

Density: Density of the population has ensured sustaining businesses and e-commerce and delivering the daily needs to people during the lockdown. In this regard, the ‘contacless’ commerce systems, including logistics, delivery network, e-tailers, and mobilebased apps, were empowered by density in establishing their business and mobilising an efficient network. Diversity: To tackle the pandemic, it is essential to address and manage the problems related to diversity, such as the inclusion of slum dwellers, women, aged, youth, and people with disabilities, and to provide social protection. Design: Spatial (re)design could be considered to better fit the pandemic: the areas for spatial redesign may include self-sustaining neighbourhoods, street design, public transport, public spaces, parks and green areas, housing and building, and smart cities technologies. Digitalisation: Digi-life is a new normal of digital integration. This includes addressing concerns related to health in terms of crowdedness control, contact tracing, and pandemic preparedness and response; to economy with regard to opportunities for small- and medium-sized enterprises, automation, and alternative consumption methods; and to education that could be online or in hybrid mode.

Future research for liveable cities in Asia and the Pacific The ADB’s experiences suggest at least two important areas that require future research and practice to inform the making of liveable cities in the Asia-Pacific region. The first is the holistic development of urban liveability. Cities in the Asia-Pacific region require an urban liveability index that will support cities to benchmark and improve their own performances. Benchmarking is the first step for making liveable cities. The ADB’s 5E Livable Cities Framework presents a sort of holistic measurement for urban liveability as it covers more dimensions than a binary framework between liveability and sustainability which was applied elsewhere (Newton, 2012). Some Asian cities are developing an 66

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integrated, coordinated approach to enhancing liveability, among government agencies and with participation of stakeholders in planning and implementation. The efforts include finding the optimum urban density for various land uses in a city-specific context to balance development. Urban planning systems can be improved by establishing the baselines and benchmarks for measuring key performance indicators of infrastructure, service delivery, institutional response, operation and maintenance, asset management, and sustainability of investments. Cities in Asia and the Pacific will benefit from an urban liveability index, showing how infrastructure and other investments contribute to improving urban liveability and supporting investment decision-making. The second is smart development in the context of pandemic and smart cities. The COVID-19 pandemic has embedded digitalisation into daily lives and has emphasised the importance of building smart cities which ‘can improve the access and quality of urban services for citizens, businesses, and governments through digital technologies’ (Yoon et al., 2020, p. xi). It has also been shaping the way people work around the world. In the Asia-Pacific region and across the world, ‘work from home’ or flexible working arrangement is increasingly seen as a new normal. Smart city development in the context of pandemic and remote work forms an important area of future exploration which will have implications not only for cities in the Asia-Pacific region but also those around the world. There is no one-size-fits-all approach to smart cities, and operational models need to be tailored to individual country and city contexts. Within Asia and the Pacific, the settings in terms of development status, digital development maturity, and government capacity vary greatly. Smart city programmes can vary from building basic ICT infrastructure to sophisticated big data and artificial intelligence-enabled applications and platforms (Yoon et al., 2020). Some pioneer practices of applying smart cities technologies are being tested in Asia and the Pacific. In Fiji, a blockchain-enabled digital platform is making customary land management more efficient, potentially boosting land-related tax collection, value capture, and planning. Earth observation and space-based technologies help cities in Bangladesh and Indonesia to strengthen environmental sustainability and resilience by identifying the best location and design for new infrastructure. This practice also fosters better urban planning and can remotely monitor historical and future climate impacts (Susantono, 2021a). Water utilities and other urban service providers across the region are taking steps to modernise their services. The Dhaka Water Supply and Sewerage Authority in Bangladesh now applies digital solutions and remote monitoring tools to improve the accessibility, quality, and reliability of urban services. Using the best available technology and applying digital solutions, cities can offer better urban services and infrastructure to make smarter and more liveable cities.

Conclusion Cities in Asia and the Pacific are on their unique pathways towards liveability. To enable sustainable, inclusive, and resilient growth, cities require planning approaches that take into consideration the practical conditions on the ground. Baseline data, benchmarking, and establishing an urban liveability index could provide the basis for seeking integrated solutions and supporting informed decision-making. Integrated solutions adapted to the unique settings of the AsiaPacific cities and built on their unique competitive advantages could unlock their potential to become more liveable. Equal access to digitalisation and ICTs is critical for citizens to explore the potential of smart cities and to access smart opportunities. This has become increasingly clear in the context of work from home or smart work imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Cities of the future have to establish systems and networks and make technology available to their citizens to ensure smart, sustainable, and inclusive growth. 67

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For long, the focus of debates on liveable cities has been on the know-what. It is time to redefine the focus on the know-how of implementing projects that deliver liveability on the ground. This requires capturing the know-how from the projects under implementation not only in the physical operations but also in the soft aspects of institutional structures, strategies, policies, and reforms that have worked or failed. Governments and most organisations function through their vertical silos defined by sectors or services. However, integrated planning and solutions require a matrix system for implementing cross-sector, cross-thematic projects that can capture co-benefits from improving liveability. Building cities of the future in the Asia and Pacific region, whether development on greenfield sites or regeneration on brownfield sites, requires a systematic approach of benchmarking, data collection, analysis, and transformative ideas that set a sustainable, resilient path for making cities liveable.

Acknowledgement The authors would like to thank Dr Bharat Dahiya for his contribution to the chapter.

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PART II

East Asian cities



6 EAST ASIAN CITIES Deindustrialisation, greening, and the new geography of urbanisation Shahid Yusuf

Introduction High-income countries in East Asia have urbanisation rates comparable to members of the European Union. The urbanisation rates ranged in 2020 from 79 per cent for Taiwan to 81 per cent for the Republic of Korea and 91 per cent for Japan (The World Bank, 2021; Wikipedia, 2021a). Virtually the entire populations of Hong Kong and Macau Special Administrative Regions (SARs) are classified as urban. China is rapidly catching up with over 61 per cent of its population residing in cities in 2020 as against 26 per cent in 1990 (The World Bank, 2021). Two-thirds of Mongolia’s population is concentrated in cities and the share has remained stable for close to a decade. The urban population of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea also appears to have stabilised at a little over 62 per cent (The World Bank, 2021). Looking towards 2050, the UN projects that the biggest change will be in China where the urbanisation rate could reach 78 per cent with the number of urban residents approaching 1.1 billion, an increase of 255 million over the level in 2018 (United Nations, 2018). Although this will be distributed across cities of varying sizes, the employment opportunities, services, and amenities available in large and mega cities could enable them to raise their share of the total urban population and of gross domestic product (GDP) relative to medium- and small-sized cities. Of the world’s 35 megacities—with populations exceeding 10 million—ten are in East Asia. Moreover, 103 of the world’s top 300 metropolitan regions were in China (Brookings, 2015). China’s Pearl River Delta (or Greater Bay Area) is now the world’s most populous urban region. It encompasses nine cities in the Mainland including Dongguan, Guangzhou, Foshan, Huizhou, Jiangmen, Shenzhen, Zhaoqing, Zhongshan, and Zhuhai with a combined population of more than 60 million in 2016 (O’Meara, 2020), in addition to Hong Kong and Macau SARs. Just three decades ago, the combined population of the cities in this region was barely 12 million and no one imagined that such a massive, networked agglomeration could emerge and morph into a leading economic and innovation hotspot. The Yangtze River Delta region and the Jing Jin Ji (Beijing–Tianjin–Hebei) region are two of the other agglomerations that dominate China’s urban landscape. The Tokyo and the Osaka–Kobe metropolitan regions in Japan and the Seoul metropolitan region in Korea are of comparable demographic and economic salience.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003256533-8

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Although cross-country data shows that per capita incomes are correlated with the level of urbanisation, there does not appear to be a causal relationship between these variables (Henderson, 2010). Urbanisation does not influence the level or the rate of growth of gross national income (GNI) and vice versa. Nevertheless, a wealth of qualitative and quantitative evidence indicates that economies arising from agglomeration and urbanisation can promote productivity and the growth of urban GDP (Glaeser, 2011; Glaeser & Gottleib, 2009; Combes & Gobillon, 2015; Glaeser & Cutler, 2021). This body of research indicates that urban factor productivity increases as cities become more populous because of scale economies, deepening pools of labour skills, greater innovativeness, and scope for spillovers among firms. The explosion of the digital economy notwithstanding, there appear to be no substitutes for the ‘sharing, matching, and learning mechanisms’ that take root in cities (Duranton & Puga, 2003). ‘Proximity or nearness is becoming more important as the cost and time of connecting across distance is becoming less’ (Batty, 2021, p.15). In the East Asian context, the benefits conferred by urbanisation have paralleled the emergence and flourishing of manufacturing activities. Post-war Japan provided the template for South Korea, Taiwan, and China, showing how an economy could enter a virtuous growth spiral by way of a structural transformation that channelled labour and capital into urban industries. By incentivising these industries to focus on global markets, first Japan and subsequently the other East Asian economies made key urban agglomerations into engines of growth. The utility of this model peaked for Japan in the 1980s. For South Korea and Taiwan, the growth impetus derived from urban manufacturing began weakening after the turn of the century. And with its growth trending downwards in the 2020s, China also is being compelled to rely on other urban drivers to achieve its targeted growth rates. East Asia’s industrial cities have delivered economic benefits matched by few cities in developing regions. Now governments are being challenged by trends in globalisation and trade, by servitisation, which is displacing manufacturing as the primary source of employment and growth, by demographic factors, by digital technologies, by the COVID-19 pandemic, by income inequality, and by environmental pressures, among others, to adopt strategies that will sustain and improve the economic performance, liveability, and resilience of cities. The future of East Asian cities promises to be even more eventful, and how effectively urban centres respond will determine whether they remain triumphant or they struggle to survive. The rest of this chapter is divided into five sections. The next section examines the role of cities in East Asia and how this has evolved particularly during the first two decades of the 21st century. The third section identifies the challenges impinging upon the urban economy and reshaping its composition, design, and geography. The fourth section discusses the preparedness of East Asian cities to the emerging challenges and opportunities. The fifth section explores the hard decisions confronting cities and the necessity for early action. The last section concludes the chapter with several observations.

Rapid urbanisation East Asian economies can be divided into three groups: the early mover Japan, which had joined the ranks of the high-income and highly urbanised countries by the mid-1960s; the fast followers South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and later China; and those bringing up the rear, North Korea, and Mongolia. Their urbanisation trends have shown diverging and converging patterns ever since the 1960s until today (Figure 6.1). By the mid-1960s, Japan’s industrialisation was on the roll. Its per capita income was approaching that of western European economies. More than two-thirds of its population was 74

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Figure 6.1  Urbanisation in East Asia, 1960–2020. Source:  The World Bank (2021).

classified as urban and in virtually every respect it was far more advanced than the other East Asian countries. China, the two Koreas, Taiwan, and Hong Kong were all in the industrial catching-up phase. Their per capita incomes lagged far behind Japan, with Hong Kong excepted. The rate of urbanisation was relatively low, especially in China. Mongolia was the least developed economy with the bulk of its population engaged in nomadic pastoral activities. Japan’s urban infrastructure and industry suffered severe damage during World War II (WWII). However, because enough of the human capital survived, recovery as in Germany, quickly gathered momentum. Not only light manufacturing but also a host of more complex capital-intensive industries were revived or developed. The government’s industrial policy guided and coordinated industrialisation with public and private banking institutions supplying finance. Major corporations resurrected from the remnants of the pre-war family-owned conglomerates (zaibatsu)—and suitably relabelled as keiretsu—marshalled the technical skills and provided the managerial and organisational expertise. Japan demonstrated the efficacy of industrial policy coupled with urbanisation as trade globalisation was taking off from the mid-1960s onwards (Okazaki, 2017). Urban agglomeration resulting from the concentration of population and industry in a few parts of the country appeared to have buoyed productivity and growth led by manufacturing (Otsuka et al., 2010). The high-speed rail network (Shinkansen) served to tighten the linkages among cities in key regions, reinforcing the benefits accruing from the concentration of activities and urban population density, particularly in the Pacific coastal region. The railway lines radiating out from the main cities also spurred suburban and edge city development away from the core areas while allowing residents convenient access to the central city. The compressed industrialisation and the accelerated pace of urbanisation delivered economic gains, but urban crowding coupled with inattention to city planning gave rise to severe congestion, spiking land prices, and extreme pollution. From the 1990s onwards, Japan’s economic growth slowed to a crawl; its population began stabilising and urbanisation entered a mature stage with the share of industry entering a slow downward spiral. Cities began adjusting to changes in the structure of economic activity, by 75

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making more efficient use of urban land and giving greater attention to the quality of the urban environment. Both South Korea and Taiwan had begun urbanising during the colonial period spurred by the influx of Japanese migrants who gravitated towards urban centres—large and small—and initiated business activities. After a hiatus during the 1940s and early 1950s caused by the war and its aftermath, urbanisation picked up speed and surged from the 1960s. Both economies took their cues from Japan, quickly perceived the opportunities presented by the decline in barriers to world trade and introduced policies to promote industrialisation (Irwin, 2020). The remarkable success of these policies pulled labour from rural areas into cities as jobs in industry multiplied. The almost three decades of rapid export-led growth were paralleled by steadily rising urbanisation (Irwin, 2021a, 2021b). However, the pattern of urbanisation diverged. The division of the Korean peninsula into two parts assured the primacy of Seoul because it was the only major urban centre in what became the Republic of Korea. This initial advantage was reinforced by the scale of industrial investment in the Seoul metropolitan area which gradually sprawled across Gyeonggi-do province. Other industrial cities such as Daegu, Daejeon, Ulsan, Busan, Gwangju, and Suwon also achieved industrial prominence with populations ranging from a million to over three million in 2000, but Seoul-Incheon and its several satellite cities pulled far ahead of other urban agglomerations. By the turn of the century, Seoul and its suburbs alone accounted for a quarter of the nation’s population and the extended metropolitan region for one-half. Such primacy is unusual, but it has persisted despite efforts by successive governments to disperse the population to other parts of the country to lessen congestion, and in the interests of security as Seoul lies a short distance from the demilitarised zone separating South Korea from its heavily armed and volatile neighbour to the north. The urbanisation of Taiwan as it embarked on the road to industrialisation differed from Korea’s in two respects. First, the rate of urbanisation, which as in Korea moved into higher gear in the 1960s, was more dispersed (Liao, 1988). Taipei, the capital, is not a primate city like Seoul, but one among four major cities distributed across the island—the other three being Taichung, Tainan, and Kaohsiung, although it is more populous than the others. Moreover, many urbanites reside in smaller peripheral cities and towns. A second difference that may explain the pattern of urbanisation is that industrial investment was not focused on one or two large cities; instead, smaller towns attracted their shares (Hashiya, 1996). This investment nourished a large and thriving small and medium enterprise (SME) sector, which Korea has struggled to match (Lee & Jioe, 2017). Taiwan’s industrial policy also placed less emphasis on the heavy and chemical industries (HCI) and did not rely on large privately owned industrial conglomerates as Korea did to spearhead diversification into complex, capital-intensive products. From the late 1960s, industrial policies guided fast-paced, export-led industrialisation, which further supported urbanisation in both Korea and Taiwan. Each economy adopted its own variant of industrial and urbanisation policies. But as they approached industrial maturity early in the 21st century, the level of urbanisation had converged, although the distribution of the population among cities of different sizes varied considerably. Urbanisation in both North Korea and Mongolia has proceeded apace since the 1990s and more than two-thirds of the population are housed in cities with North Korea a bit more than 62 per cent (data tends to be sparse and laced with conjecture). Pyongyang is by far the largest city in North Korea with about 3.5 million people trailed by two medium-sized cities, Hamhung and Chongjin, with populations in the 620,000–780,000 range, and a few smaller cities such as Nampo, Wonsan, and Tanchon, each with a population of less than 400,000 (World Atlas, 2022). 76

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Ulaanbaatar is the primate city in Mongolia with 40 per cent of the country’s total urban population. Having grown steeply since the late 1990s once the grip of central planning was relaxed, growth that has resulted in the appearance of urban sprawl comprised largely of informal settlements and extraordinary levels of air pollution (Park et al., 2019). Other cities while adding to their numbers are all much smaller with fewer than 100,000 people. Neither North Korea nor Mongolia adopted the manufacturing and export-led growth model, which contributed to the economic performance and urbanisation of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Mongolia’s GDP growth has been sourced mainly from the production and export of natural resource-based products. It has been choppy and has generated relatively few, wellpaid urban jobs in the formal sector. Most urban employment is provided by micro-enterprises. After an initial attempt at opening and at gaining international recognition in the 1960s, North Korea retreated into isolation and is arguably the last remaining hermit kingdom pursuing a self-imposed, autonomous developmental path. Because of its size and its shifting urban industrial strategy over the past seven decades, China is in a class of its own. Prior to the start of the ‘reform and opening’ in 1979, the rate of urbanisation was the lowest in East Asia—in the 17 per cent range and relatively dispersed (Delisle & Goldstein, 2019; Kojima, 1995). Most Chinese cities were centres of industry with highly attenuated service sectors deemed unproductive by the prevailing Maoist/Marxist frame of reference. The function of cities was to ‘produce’ rather than ‘consume’. Urban workers enjoyed higher living standards relative to rural inhabitants because the state or state-owned enterprises (danwei) provided housing and most services free of charge and food products as well as other consumer goods were subsidised. To minimise the fiscal burden resulting from these entitlements, strict residency requirements (hukou) and restrictions on labour hiring by urban entities controlled rural–urban migration. Chinese urban development since the middle of the 20th century was integrated with a strategy to make China industrially self-reliant and to curtail if not eliminate its reliance on external sources of raw materials and manufactured products. This approach plus the parallel efforts to develop, industrialise, and urbanise the interior provinces and to check the growth of the major cities on the Eastern periphery meant that China today does not have a primate city comparable to Seoul or Tokyo in their countries. For a country as large and as populous as China, it is also unlikely that a single urban hegemon could emerge and tower over the rest. Provincial-level municipalities and provincial capitals of inland provinces have emerged as major centres and are growing strongly. For example, the population of the Chongqing metropolitan region rivals that of Shanghai and cities such as Chengdu, Wuhan, and Xi’an are at or approaching the 10 million population mark. Others such as Zhengzhou, Changsha, and Kunming are close to 5 million with many others now in the 2–3 million range (Wikipedia, 2021b). Industry was the economic motor of virtually all Chinese cities through at least the 1990s. However, since then the share of services has burgeoned in the major coastal cities. It is the principal source of employment and growth, accounting for 60 per cent of employment in 2020 (Wong, 2020), and the trend closely tracks that of cities in European countries. However, industry remains the core activity of many secondary and smaller cities and they mirror the sectoral composition of medium-sized urban centres in Korea and Taiwan. Hong Kong, an SAR of China since its return to the motherland in 1997, was a charter member of the Four Asian Tigers economies. During the ‘miracle’ years of 1965–1995, it enjoyed high average rates of growth comparable to those of the other three (Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea). Its growth was initially sourced from light manufacturing and logistics and after the 1980s, increasingly from financial, producer and transport services once much of the 77

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manufacturing capacity was transferred first to special economic zones (SEZs) like Shenzhen and subsequently to emerging urban centres such as Dongguan and Foshan in the Greater Bay Area. Hong Kong’s population was already more than 80 per cent urban in 1960 and was ever since rising. In the 1980s, the development of new towns and a mass transit system pushed the rate of urbanisation close to 100 per cent. As only a fifth of the region’s land area (1,100 km²) is available for urban use by a population of over 7 million, crowding and congestion are inevitable as is air pollution, some of which is spreading from the Mainland. The above encapsulates East Asia’s urban development from the latter part of the 20th century to the present. In Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and China, rapid industrialisation orchestrated by industrial policies pulled people from rural areas into cities and their numbers were augmented by the natural increase of urban populations. North Korea with its inward-looking and import-substituting industrialisation (ISI) also urbanised albeit more slowly with the government, as in China, exercising tight control on the distribution of the population between the countryside and cities. Given its history and topography, Hong Kong was already largely urban in the 1960s and within a couple of decades, the rural areas were emptied of people and absorbed into urban centres—old and new—with services generating much of the employment. The urbanisation of Mongolia, which had exceeded one-half by 1978, was unrelated to industrialisation and strongly favoured Ulaanbaatar. Rural dwellers were attracted to cities by land allotments of 0.7 hectares within city limits free of charge for between 15 and 60 years, and by the lure of urban amenities and services. And many were forced to abandon farming because their livestock was decimated by a succession of summer droughts and severe winters (dzuds). After a decade-long hiatus during the 1990s, urbanisation resumed in 2000 as rising exports of commodities and government spending raised GDP growth. Since 2011, urbanisation has stabilised at 68 per cent. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are at or approaching peak urbanisation. China, Mongolia, and North Korea have ground to cover.

Looming challenges In the next three decades, urbanisation may be in for a makeover, resulting from a geographical redistribution of urban populations, especially in China, and from a change in the economic structure of cities and investment in both digital and physical infrastructures to make cities both ‘smarter’ and more resilient. Four developing challenges will transform the urban landscape with some of what is in store already having surfaced. First, the transition from manufacturing to services as the core economic activity, which in conjunction with technology absorption, will impact employment and inequality as well. For East Asia, export-led growth is a feature of the past and the dominance of manufacturing in cities is fast eroding. The emergence of Southeast Asian and other competitors and the dispersal of industries caused by foreign direct investment (FDI) transferred labour-intensive processing and assembly industries to countries where wages and other costs are lower, at first from the high-income East Asian economies and more recently from China (Lee, 2021a; Hanson, 2020). The shock administered by the COVID-19 pandemic to supply chains could result in some reshoring of industries as countries attempt to reduce their dependence on critical imports as well as imports from a single country and lessen the vulnerability of supply chains. But it is unlikely that this will stem or reverse the decline of industry in major urban centres. The future of East Asian cities, which have been long reliant on manufacturing for their economic dynamism, is now hitched to services, with larger cities such as Seoul, Tokyo, Osaka, Beijing, and Shanghai resembling service-dependent European and North American cities. One implication is that the servitised city might not generate the growth that industrial 78

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cities delivered in their heyday. If many routine, repetitive, and customer-facing tasks are automated and artificial intelligence (AI) displaces more cognitively demanding white-collar jobs as well, the service sector might also create far fewer employment opportunities than it did in the recent past (McKinsey Global Institute, 2017; Susskind, 2020). New occupations, if they emerge, could require college-level education and different skill sets from those of displaced workers. A widening of income inequality, which is already a worrisome trend in advanced economies, could become a more acute social issue. Second, the assimilation of digital technologies, the electrification of transport, and the shift to renewables as the primary sources of energy could generate revolutionary transformations. Leading cities including some of the medium-sized ones are pinning their hopes on digitisation. Several are at the forefront of the digital technology wave and working to create the digitally integrated, sensor-studded ‘smart city’—a city where networked products gather, transmit via high-speed broadband, and store data thereby facilitating analysis, planning, decision-making using AI, and the efficient functioning of urban systems (Joo & Tan, 2020; Ratti & Claudel, 2016). Songdo on the outskirts of Seoul is a test case. As with industrial policy, governments—central and sub-national—are in the driver’s seat and using a variety of levers to achieve results. In making the leap to this brave new urban world, the major cities are advantaged by the concentration of talent and research and development (R&D) in local institutions that are a fruitful source of technologies that can be tested and mainstreamed in the urban environment. Cities are investing in state-of-the-art public transport systems, with cameras, sensors, and intelligent traffic control systems, which use algorithms to analyse urban data to improve the flow of traffic. Digital technology and robotics are being harnessed to manage energy usage and to monitor the operation and upkeep of water, sewerage, and sanitation facilities (Townsend, 2013). The impending revolution in automobility once AI comes into widespread use could begin transforming urban transportation. It could also transform the physical layout of cities by freeing the space allocated to roadways and parking for recreational purposes—to enlarge green spaces and to combat the heat island effect and conserve water—and for housing or commercial use. Third, there is a growing focus on the resilience of key services and physical infrastructure to enable cities to weather shocks. The frequency of severe weather events since the turn of the century, as global average temperatures have inched upwards, has exacerbated an already burdensome problem. Their resilience is being tested by unusually heavy rainfall and flooding, by destructive hurricanes, by heatwaves, by drought, and by rising sea levels, which magnify the threat from storm surges and are salinising the groundwater. Much of the urban infrastructure of cities becoming exposed to a new climate regime which is not designed to withstand the recent battering and worse to come. Many cities have ageing drainage systems and water and power infrastructures that are more vulnerable than newly built ones. Hence, urban resilience is the new watchword. In coming to grips with this imperative, cities need to make water, power, and road systems climate resilient, for example, by raising roadways, building seawalls, and installing pumping stations to ensure that the flooding of streets can be minimised and that storms do not disable power supplies and telecommunications. A smart city is a complex and fragile creation, which could be brought to its knees if electricity and the Internet of Things (IoT) ceased to function. Japan was hit by two powerful typhoons in 2020, causing extensive damage. Tokyo suffered a heatwave in the summer of 2021. Prolonged heavy rain across central and northern China in 2020 and 2021 was responsible for flooding forcing the evacuation of thousands. Rainstorms in July 2021 dropped a year’s worth of rain on Zhengzhou over the course of three days, submerging large areas, and 10 inches fell on Xinxiang within a matter of hours. Climate change and environmental 79

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degradation are also subjecting Mongolian and Chinese cities bordering the Gobi Desert to intensifying sandstorms that coat roads, airports, and power facilities, damage health, and disrupt transport. The complexity of the modern city and its dependence on key energy and telecommunications infrastructures has been highlighted by the disruption that can be caused by a power outage or a flood. The disabling of cell phone service by flooding in Zhengzhou deprived people who do not carry cash as means of payment. The COVID-19 pandemic revealed the importance of a variety of services particularly healthcare and of the quality of governance. Cities that have proven resilient in the face of shocks are ones that have built robust systems of governance complemented by well-equipped services run by trusted professionals. In normal times such capabilities enable a city to function efficiently; in an emergency, they contain damage and disruption and help to restore normality. In short, the likelihood that the frequency of shocks could be on the rise means that cities that neglect their physical and social infrastructures do so at their own peril. Fourth, there is a need for the managed relocation of populations from certain areas that are likely to be exposed to severe weather and a progressive decline in liveability. Even if greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions can be reduced by enough to prevent global temperatures from rising by more than 1.5°C, the CO2, which has been pumped into the atmosphere, will persist for thousands of years and its warming effect will not abate (Archer, 2009). Therefore, rising sea levels are a given. The likely change and how it will affect coastal areas in different parts of the world is uncertain, but coastal cities are on notice that they are in harm’s way. Proximity to waterways was long viewed as an advantage because it facilitated transport, met cities essential needs, and helped to flush waste. However, in earlier times, major port cities were rarely built on the ocean’s edge. Amitav Ghosh (2016, p. 37) writes the great port cities of Europe like London, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Stockholm, Lisbon, and Hamburg are all protected from the open ocean by bays, estuaries, or deltaic river systems…so also are old Asian ports [such as] Cochin, Surat, Guangzhou, Hangzhou, and Malacca … as if … a provision had to be made for the unpredictable furies of the ocean. Prior to the Opium War, China’s major urban centres were inland, such as Hangzhou and Nanjing. China’s major coastal cities emerged after the Treaty of Nanking was signed in 1842 permitting foreign powers to trade at initially five (the ceding of Hong Kong added a sixth) and later many more treaty ports and cities. This initial wave of colonial-era port city building, which was based on the belief that natural forces could be checked and mastered, triggered the creation of many more ocean-facing cities in East Asia. China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan have together engaged in coastal urbanisation because hitherto the climate in coastal locations is more benign. They are ideally suited to support the boom in marine trade and transport. People are attracted by the scope for recreational and cultural activities, and because the interface between land and sea has a special fascination. Flourishing coastal cities have served as a magnet for migrants and consequently, millions now reside in low-elevation coastal zones (LECZs) highly susceptible to the vagaries of climate. China is now one of the five countries with the largest number of people living in LECZs. A failure to flatten and bend the warming trend will have profound implications for the geography of urbanisation and economic activity. Rising sea levels, drought, and drying of soil and water bodies in inland regions, shrinking river flows and their increasing seasonality, 80

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intensifying heat during the summer months, and severe weather impacting coastal and inland regions alike, will undermine the viability of many urban centres going forward.

But East Asian cities have been slow to rise to these challenges The COVID-19 pandemic and earlier economic shocks (e.g., the financial crisis of 2007–2009), the diffusion of digital technologies and climatic pressures to come, demand a rethinking of urbanisation. Are East Asian cities ready for the challenges posed by the ‘known knowns’ and others that will come as a surprise? In the past, when the pace of change was gradual, innovation could be absorbed, and cities grew organically with tinkering and refinement of design on the margins. The pell-mell growth of cities in East Asia since the last quarter of the 20th century, some in areas ill-suited for habitation over the longer term (seismically active areas, floodplains and LECZs), the hurried construction of’ ‘tofu buildings’, the emerging polycentric urban sprawl, the rush to make cities smarter using digital technologies, are storing problems that will need to be tackled in the next two to three decades. Urban development has been pursued with little attention to its energy intensity. Cities now account for 75 per cent of carbon emissions as much of their energy consumption is derived from fossil fuels (UNEP, n.d.). Many of the largest emitters of GHGs are in Chinese cities with concentrations of industry such as Shanghai, Tianjin, Suzhou, Handan, Urumqi, Yinchuan, and Dalian (Wei et al., 2021). A number of developments have made cities more vulnerable to severe weather, to warming as well as to risks arising from the failure of key systems, e.g., electricity and telecoms. These include the emphasis on automobility using private vehicles, the embrace of digital technologies, the design of buildings requiring virtually year-round active climate control, and the focus on heavy industry. Cities have also been rendered more vulnerable by the paucity of green spaces and tree cover to provide shade, which could moderate the heat island effect, and the inattention to stormwater drainage as more and more of the urban space is paved over. The many high rises that have mushroomed in East Asian cities, most notably in China, although they do promote arguably desirable densification, may be illsuited for an ageing population with restricted mobility. The rush to digitise and thereby make cities ‘smarter’ while enlarging access to information in real time, reducing some transaction costs, and improving governance and possibly services delivery, also has its downsides. The loss of privacy, from machine learning-enabled tracking devices, which provide seamless surveillance, is one concern. The risk of data theft and from cyber-attacks that could disable critical infrastructures is a second. A third is the spiralling energy consumption by digital devices and server farms and other electrified systems. East Asian cities in the forefront of digitisation have been slow to factor in the implications of technological change for jobs and for income inequality in urban centres. Although new occupations could emerge to replace jobs lost because of the spread of ‘intelligent’ machines, there are many who doubt that jobs will be as plentiful and observe that new occupations may require specialised skills and computer literacy, which the layoffs and new entrants could lack (Yusuf, 2021a; Qureshi, 2020). The evidence is growing that the middle class in industrialised countries is being squeezed (OECD, 2019). In Japan and Korea, middle-income groups are experiencing a secular decline in income/wealth shares (Lee, 2021b; Nagai, 2021). Furthermore, research conducted in the United States shows that inequality is higher in large metropolitan areas and major cities relative to the national average (Glaeser et al., 2009; Holmes & Berube, 2016). For the East Asian economies, those where urbanisation has peaked and others where it is ongoing, the need for cities to not just survive in the face of challenges to come 81

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but to also thrive, calls for long-range planning. National and sub-national policy-makers confront hard choices regarding the geography of urbanisation over the coming decades. There is an urgent need to invest strategically, leveraging technology to render cities more productive and resilient while drastically reducing their carbon footprints. Compressing the changes needed within a few decades will require the mobilising of political support for far-reaching and costly measures plus a large outlay of resources in support of urban and industrial greening.

Time for hard choices and action For most East Asian cities, tipping points lie in the future and there is time for adaptation, strengthening defences, and building resilience. There are many hurdles to surmount. But if they act with all due speed, many cities can shield themselves from the black swans to come. Undoubtedly, the cost of adequate precautionary measures may be too high for the most exposed ones, depending on the severity of problems that lie in the future. Vulnerability to climatic and other factors may be compounded by the erosion of the economic and fiscal bases. In fact, industrial hollowing and the closure of mines is a more immediate threat to some cities in East Asia than climate change. For example, declining heavy industries in China’s Northeast are creating a rust belt of fading cities. Single-industry cities in inland areas are facing similar hardship. These industries are losing out to competitors, to a shift in the composition of demand, and the need to reduce carbon emissions as well as other pollutants. Other cities in China and Japan are imploding or on the verge because the mineral resources, which underpinned their prosperity, are exhausted or mines face closure because coal and other hydrocarbons have an uncertain future. Having reached or passed peak industrialisation, the economic prospects of cities depend upon or will come to depend upon tradable and non-tradable services. If digital technology delivers on its promise, the productivity of services will soar, and the economic future looks relatively secure. But governments and firms need to further incentivise innovation and the innovations must prove their worth. Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and China are among the leading investors in R&D and generating a wealth of (services/software) patents. This is encouraging because it could be good for growth. Advances for example in healthcare and green technologies will be needed to cope with future outbreaks of disease, with an ageing urban population, with the imperatives of making cities more liveable and curbing GHG emissions. The development of vaccines against the COVID-19 virus in record time, the amazing leap of Fintech since 2010, and the progress in areas such as machine (deep) learning and storage batteries all underscore the desirability of supporting research and incentivising the uptake of commercially viable technologies, initially in some instances, with the help of subsidies and pilot projects (e.g., renewable energy, electric vehicles). Services have already taken the lead in Japan and Hong Kong. They are vying with industry for the pole position in Korea and Taiwan and are moving to the forefront in the major Chinese cities as well. But the productivity of services in Japan and Korea remains low despite progress in assimilating digital technology. Productivity in China and Taiwan is no better. As Japan, Korea, and Taiwan are mature, high-income economies, the slowing of factor productivity is less of an issue. For China—and for North Korea and Mongolia—factor productivity is far more critical. With population growth slowing and the workforce declining, absent substantial gains in productivity, China and these other countries could ‘grow old before they become rich’—especially so in a global environment beset with stronger headwinds. The decline in the productivity of manufacturing in Japan and other advanced economies, as well as Korea’s 82

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flagging productivity growth, is a warning for China. Chinese cities, especially older industrial ones, and cities where services have become dominant, may struggle to revive productivity, which in China has tracked the low rates in advanced countries since 2009 (Baily et al., 2020; Swiston, 2021; Brandt et al., 2020). Thus, raising the productivity of services by investing in digital technologies and complementary skills has taken on greater urgency. East Asian countries must also make tough choices regarding the geography, energy intensity, and spatial layout of urban development. The concentration of population and of industrial and economic assets in the coastal areas is a major issue. For example, China’s Eastern provinces are the most developed and a magnet for migrants. Several coastal cities are in LECZs, including Shanghai and Tianjin as well as others along the Bohai Economic Rim. Two decades of construction activity have crowded the region with port infrastructures and linked industries. The Eastern region is China’s economic heartland. An attempt to shift the centre of gravity closer to the South-central region sheltered from coastal furies and better supplied with water will face fierce opposition from a variety of entrenched interests. This is no different from the resistance that would be encountered to attempts at relocating activities and infrastructures away from Osaka/Kobe, Nagoya, and Tokyo/Yokohama in Japan. Likewise, with more than a quarter of its population and two-thirds of industry located in coastal zones, Korea would face equally hard choices. According to Park and Lee (2020), it is the cities on the Southern coastline that would be more endangered by climate change compared to cities along the western and eastern coastline in Korea. But the central region and Seoul are not necessarily immune to severe weather events. This was brought home by the flooding of Daejeon and Seoul in 2020. North Korea was equally hard hit by rainstorms. Sustaining and/or growing all existing urban agglomerations may prove to be both undesirable and too costly. Hence, a managed retreat and a concentration of urban populations in urban regions, which are likely to be viable over the longer term, could become a necessity. An initial step might be to scale back the expansion of the most exposed coastal cities followed by a gradual abandonment of certain locations, which cannot be adequately protected by active and passive barriers of various sorts. Some cities in the hot and dry inland areas of China may also be difficult to maintain at current levels even with water transfer schemes and investment in cooling technologies. The groundwater which supplies 40 per cent of agricultural requirements and close to 70 per cent of the drinking water in northern and north-western regions of China is running out and dust storms are becoming fiercer (Qiu, 2010). Deindustrialisation could compel de-urbanisation not only in China but also in Korea. It is ongoing in Japan. The cost of climate-proofing certain locations repeatedly exposed to severe weather events could compel a concentration of the population in the remaining climatic and geographical sweet spots. This is not necessarily disadvantageous given that large metropolitan areas could enjoy scale economies. Climate-induced migration is a given (Podesta, 2019; The World Bank, 2018). Advanced planning and pre-emptive action where feasible could minimise future hardship. Cities throughout East Asia are collectively responsible for as much as 28 per cent of GHG emissions, with Chinese cities contributing between a fifth and a quarter of global emissions (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2020). While all East Asian cities must scale back the release of CO2, China must take the lead and make the largest reductions. It is better positioned than the other countries to curtail emissions for at least four reasons: First, China’s rate of urbanisation is well below that of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan and hence there is greater scope for tailoring future urbanisation to reduce energy intensity and carbon release. Second, China’s extraordinarily high level of domestic savings can finance the investments that will narrow 83

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the carbon footprint of its cities. With resource mobilisation on this scale, China has degrees of freedom no other country can claim. Third, China’s national and sub-national governments have demonstrated the capacity to implement massive projects in record time with the help of a construction industry that is easily the world’s most capable one and could relocate millions of people. Fourth, China is targeting net-zero emissions by 2060 and is already the largest producer of renewable energy equipment. It is prioritising the use of renewable energy and taking steps to green urban industry and transport. However, in attempting to green urbanisation and urban industry, China and some of the other East Asian countries will be hamstrung by several factors. First is the reliance on coal as a source of primary energy. Weaning industry, the power sector, and urban users away from coal could be a slow process. To this must be added the opposition from coal producers and users, the cost of replacing or retrofitting equipment to use clean energy, and the vast outlay needed to increase the supply of energy from renewable sources, from fusion, and from green hydrogen. Furthermore, concerns regarding energy security could slow the transition away from coal, particularly in China. The speed with which many East Asian cities have been constructed has meant that insufficient attention was given to the impact of forests of high-rise buildings on congestion, to heat island effects, to the elder friendliness and walkability of urban spaces, and to the allocation of valuable urban land for green areas. With temperatures on the rise, the demand for energyintensive cooling equipment has skyrocketed and this also injects more heat into the urban environment (Yusuf, 2021b). Many Chinese cities are locked into high-energy consuming mode with limited scope for change over the medium term as most buildings have a 30–50year lifespan. So also are the cities in Korea and Taiwan. However, as noted earlier, China, Mongolia, and possibly North Korea have some room to change tracks and ‘build better’ in safer locations because its urbanisation rate is the lowest in East Asia. Others may have to engage in the retrofitting and renewal of urban housing and infrastructure, which is bound to be more costly.

Conclusion The coming decades will be testing times for East Asia and its cities will be the most affected. Compared with cities in other developing regions, those in Japan turned in a superior economic performance since the late 1950s; in South Korea and Taiwan from the late 1960s; Hong Kong had a good run from the 1950s; and Chinese cities began to bloom from the mid-1980s. Both North Korea and Mongolia were late starters, however. Urban and economic transformations have been interlinked. All are now poised to enter a new era. The COVID-19 pandemic has given a warning that navigating the decades ahead would require skilful, farsighted leadership and policymaking, disaster preparedness, and collective effort of all nations. Countries will need to marshal innovation and mobilise resources on a larger scale than in the recent past. Moreover, the sacrifices that these actions will entail must be equitably shared by all, especially when climate change accelerates and is compounded by other grey and black swan events. With the bulk of the population concentrating in polycentric urban regions, future urban prosperity and quality of life will hinge on developments on several fronts: the adaptation in the urban regions; the priority assigned to greening; the creation of resilient systems implemented through concrete monitorable actions; and the achievement of a better social and economic equilibrium to mitigate the impacts of emerging or abrupt challenges. 84

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7 HONG KONG One city, three spatial forms, and two possible fates? Mee Kam Ng, Tsz Chun Yeung, Chun Hei Cheng, and Nok Yin Ma

Introduction The 2016 New Urban Agenda (NUA) relates directly to the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (United Nations, 2017), with the transformative commitments of ‘leaving no one, no place and no ecology behind’. While the NUA advocates sustainable territorial planning to integrate urban and rural functions, the generic and normative document is rather silent on tackling production of space issues which are rooted in the historical, socioeconomic, and political contexts of a place. Implementing the NUA to achieve socio-spatial justice in places with socio-spatial disparities would be much more challenging as power relationships may need to be revisited and transformed. Hong Kong is one of such places. A Google Maps search of Hong Kong shows primarily urban scenes of a compact highdensity city. However, only about 25 per cent of the city’s land is built-up urban areas. Such a high concentration of urban development is less an effort to economise on land resources to ensure sustainability than a legacy of the city’s former colonial history. This historical background has contributed to Hong Kong’s unique patterns of spatial development, leading to various challenges for the city in pursuing the NUA and achieving the 17 SDGs. This chapter aims to ascertain whether the city’s spatial development is moving towards achieving the NUA that leaves no one behind through sustainable and inclusive economic developments and environmental sustainability (United Nations, 2017). The following section briefly outlines the genesis of the city’s variegated landscape: a compact urban core on two sides of Victoria Harbour, new towns, and a rapidly changing rural countryside in the New Territories (Figure 7.1). The chapter then presents an audit of these three spatial forms with reference to the NUA and indicators of the SDGs, highlighting their respective key development issues. Two recent territorial spatial development plans—Hong Kong 2030+ and the Northern Metropolis Development Strategy—are examined to evaluate whether the identified development issues in the three spatial forms are addressed, and what needs to be done to achieve an ecological and humane urbanism. The chapter concludes with some remarks advocating for a more NUA-informed strategy in the city.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003256533-9

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Figure 7.1  Territories of Hong Kong. Source:  The authors.

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One city, two historical trajectories, and three spatial forms Britain colonised Hong Kong in three stages: first the cession of Hong Kong Island (7 per cent of land area) in 1842, then the cession of Kowloon peninsula (4 per cent of land area) in 1861, and finally the leasing of the New Territories (over 80 per cent of land area) in 1898 for 99 years. The leasing of the ‘New Territories’ gave rise to the 1997 question and the consequent return of the former colony to Chinese rule (Figure 7.1). However, the ‘New Territories’ leased by the British colonial government was a complete misnomer (Ng, 2022). The territory might be ‘new’ to the colonisers, but it has a long and rich history. As early as 973 in the Song dynasty, ancestors of one of the five powerful clans in the New Territories were given patents by the emperor to cultivate the low-rise plains of the northwestern parts of the city (Palmer, 1987). In fact, immigration had continued throughout the Song (960–1279), Yuan (1271– 1368), Ming (1368–1644), and Qing (1644–1911) dynasties. This historical background is especially important for us to understand the spatial forms in Hong Kong. The extension of the British colonial administration to the New Territories was met with fierce resistance. People in the New Territories fought bravely to defend their land until their defeat by the British military in April 1899. Eager to collect tax from the much-extended territories, the colonial government carried out a land survey from 1899 to 1904, and 165 km2 of land (about 15 per cent of total land area in Hong Kong) was surveyed and was given Block Crown Leases (Sit & Kwong, 2011). Since the 1950s, 27 Rural Committees were established with over 900 members representing 651 villages and these members in turn elected the Rural Council (Watson, 1983). The Rural Council became a particularly important political force in the New Territories. Due to the organisation of the inhabitants and the leased status of the New Territories, its rural character was retained and urban development in Hong Kong was then concentrated on the two sides of Victoria Harbour (Figure 7.1). Reclamation has played a key role in the expansion of the city, with the first reclamation projects concentrated around Victoria Harbour (Figure 7.2). As reclaimed land would automatically become ‘crown land’ that could be sold to boost the public coffer, it has been a desirable development strategy of the colonial administration (Ng, 2020; Ng & Cook, 1997). After the setting up of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Hong Kong experienced an influx of capitalists and refugees from the mainland. The population grew from 1.86 million in 1949 to 3.7 million in 1966 (Fan, 1974, p. 2). A ‘transferred industrialisation’ took place and the government further reclaimed land along the Kowloon peninsula to extend the urban areas and to sell land to incoming industrialists and other developers. Massive immigration had led to the mushrooming of squatters throughout the city, and coupled with corrupt government practices and the spillover effects of the Cultural Revolution from mainland China, urban riots broke out in 1966 and 1967. To address the discontent of the people, the colonial government launched a Ten-year Housing Programme. To find enough construction sites to achieve the housing targets, the colonial government had to go beyond its rugged ceded territories and resume coastal land from the villagers in the New Territories to undertake massive reclamation for new town developments from the 1970s onwards (see Figure 7.1). Unlike the urban areas, most of these new towns have a Corbusian cityscape with tall towers and inward shopping facilities, rather than adopting the vibrant and human-scale streetscapes of urban areas that provide more spaces for small businesses and opportunities for social interactions. And to protect water catchment areas and provide recreational facilities for the people, the colonial government enacted the Country Parks Ordinance in 1976, leading to the conservation of about 40 per cent of the city’s land as country parks and other conservation zones (Figure 7.1). 89

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Figure 7.2  Reclamation around Victoria Harbour in Hong Kong. Source:  The authors, modified from Lee and Ng (2007, p. 310).

New towns development in the New Territories and the opening-up of China in the late 1970s have led to a dramatic conversion of the rural character of the New Territories. To ease land resumption for new town development and to pacify the indigenous population, who were defined as those who arrived in the New Territories before the British leased it in 1898, the colonial government allowed male descendants to build, once in their lifetime, ‘a small house’ of no more than 25 feet tall covering 700 square feet (Chan, 1998). Economic integration between Hong Kong and an opening China turned many agricultural fields into storage grounds, first for containers, then construction materials, waste car dumps, and facilities for recycling materials, transforming the once tranquil rural landscape into the sporadic brownfield sites of today. The colonial administration did extend the Town Planning Ordinance to the New Territories in 1991, but there was no strategic rethinking or planning of the landscape. In fact, the brownfield sites proliferated and according to recent studies spread over 1,400 hectares of land (ARUP & Planning Department, 2019). As a result, Hong Kong has three spatial urban forms: the urban areas, the new towns, and the ‘rural’ New Territories (hereafter ‘rural’ NT). Table 7.1 shows that about 95 per cent of the city’s population lives in the urban areas (48 per cent) and the new towns (47 per cent), with respective densities of about 36,000 per km2 and 20,000 per km2. Population density in the ‘rural’ NT (1.5 times the areas of the urban areas and the new towns combined) is only around 1,100 per km2. The following section takes stock of the socio-economic and environmental status of these three spatial forms in the city.

Socio-spatial and environmental conditions of the three spatial forms The socio-economic and environmental conditions of the three spatial forms are compared and contrasted with reference to the NUA and the SDGs, followed by a synthesis of their key 90

Hong Kong Table 7.1 The three spatial forms in Hong Kong

Land population (2016 census data) Land area (km2) (2021) (% of total land) Land population density (persons/ km2)

Urban area

New towns

‘Rural’ NT

Protected areas

Others

3,494,764 (48%)

3,438,182 (47%)

402,438 (5%)

—

—

96.65 (8.7)

174.99 (15.7)

366.02 (32.9)

455.39 (41)

18.21 (1.6)

36,159

19,648

1,099

n.a.

n.a.

Source: Census and Statistics Department (CSD) (2017a, 2017b); Lands Department (2022).

development issues. The NUA aims to achieve sustainable urban development through ‘leaving no one, no place and no ecology behind’ (United Nations, 2017). Leaving no one behind involves, among others, ending poverty (SDG1), reducing inequity (SDG10), and building sustainable cities and communities (SDG11) that provide affordable housing options, basic physical and social infrastructure, heritage conservation, etc., to promote people’s health and well-being (SDG3). Leaving no place behind argues for sustained, inclusive, and sustainable economic growth that provides decent work for all (SDG8) through promoting inclusive, sustainable, and innovative economic activities (SDG9) and building sustainable communities and cities with appropriate levels of mobility and accessibility (SDG11). Leaving no ecology behind aims to maintain ecosystem services on land (SDG14) and under water (SDG15), as well as combating climate crisis (SDG13). To achieve these, it is important to foster institutional coordination (SDG16) among different stakeholders (SDG17) through integrated territorial planning and development.

Socio-economic disparities: Which community is left behind? Table 7.2 reveals that the urban areas, new towns, and the ‘rural’ NT exhibit different socioeconomic characteristics. The range of median monthly household income is the smallest in the ‘rural’ NT (about ten times, from HK$10,000-97,940), followed by new towns (about 13 times, from HK$9,000 to 115,000) and the largest is in the urban areas (about 57 times, from 5,900 to 335,650); and the median monthly household income is the lowest in urban areas, highlighting the severity of intra-urban disparities. The urban areas also have the majority of homeless people (87 per cent) and households living in sub-divided units (76 per cent), which may be related to job distributions (see the following section) (CSD, 2017d; Society for Community Organisation, 2021). These figures show that the poorest people are living in socio-economically polarised urban areas. Disparities in terms of the ranges of median housing rent and median floor area follow similar spatial patterns. As the overwhelming majority of the population lives in the urban areas and the new towns, there are more housing options. About 58 per cent of the urban population live in private permanent housing and about 40 per cent live in public rental or subsidised sale flats. In new towns, more than half of the residents live in public rental or subsidised sale flats and over 40 per cent live in private permanent housing. Yet in the ‘rural’ NT, over 87 per cent 91

Mee Kam Ng et al. Table 7.2 Social indicators in urban, new towns, and ‘rural’ NT Indicators

Urban

New town

‘Rural’

SDG1 & SDG10: ending poverty and reducing inequality Range of median monthly 5,900–335,650 9,000–115,000 10,000–97,940 domestic household income (HK$ (HK$7.8 = US$1.0)) Median monthly domestic 24,960 25,000 26,000 household income (HK$) SDG11: housing policies, varieties, and options Population in public rental 29.2 32.7 4.8 housing (%) Population in private 58.3 44.3 87.1 permanent housing (%) Population in subsidised home 11.6 22.4 0.6 ownership schemes (%) Range of median monthly 990–93,000 590–50,000 800–41,000 domestic household rent of street blocks (HK$) Median monthly domestic 2,490 1,750 6,000 household rent (HK$) Range and median Range 6–66.3 4.3–40 9–46.3 Median 15.5 16.3 21.7 of median per capita floor area of accommodation of street blocks (m2) SDG10 & SDG11: social and basic services for all to address urban inequality Health and Medical Services (Food and Health Bureau, 2021; GeoInfo Map, 2022b) No. of hospital beds under 57.29 25.92 21.30 hospital authority per 10,000 persons No. of clinics/health centres 0.34 0.23 0.20 under the Department of Health per 10,000 persons Rehabilitation services for person with disabilities (GeoInfo Map, 2022a) No. of community support 45 53 0 services and facilities No. of residential care services 114 136 4 and facilities Children and youth services (GeoInfo Map, 2022a) Capacity of aided child care 14,683 13,907 501 centres No. of integrated children and 0.81 1.04 0.46 youth services centres per 10,000 persons aged 24 or below Elderly services (GeoInfo Map, 2022a) Capacity of day care centres 39.70 32.55 3.07 and units per 10,000 persons aged 65 or above (Continued)

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Table 7.2 Continued Indicators

Urban

New town

No. of subsidised places in 101.27 72.56 private residential care homes per 10,000 persons aged 65 or above Services to ethnic communities (Geoinfo Map, 2022a) No. of ethnic minority support 0.12 0.23 service centres per 10,000 ethnic minorities

‘Rural’ 129.15

0.00

Source: Unless specified otherwise, all data are from CSD (2017a, 2017b, 2017c).

live in private permanent housing. The lack of public housing might explain why ‘rural’ NT has a much higher median monthly domestic household rent (HK$6,000) when compared to urban areas (HK$2,490) and new towns (HK$1,750). These figures show that urban areas and ‘rural’ NT need to provide more permanent affordable housing. Table 7.2 shows that the ‘rural’ NT has a disproportionately high provision of private residential care homes for the elderly. Yet, for other basic social amenities, living in the ‘rural’ NT would be rather inconvenient. This is not desirable as the ‘rural’ NT has relatively higher proportions of persons aged 15 or below, new migrants, and ethnic minorities, together with a high proportion of the elderly (CSD, 2017b, 2017e). The upside is that people in the ‘rural’ NT live in larger accommodations with more generous per capita living space. Furthermore, given its rich history, there are more cultural elements. Approximately, around 650 historic buildings are found in the ‘rural’ NT, while around 570 and 210 buildings are found in the urban areas and new towns, respectively (Antiquities and Monuments Office (AMO), 2021b, 2021c). There are also 38 declared monuments in the ‘rural’ NT (AMO, 2021a). These figures suggest that for people living in urban areas, there is a need to improve per capita living space, but for communities in ‘rural’ NT, there is a need to provide more basic social amenities.

Home–job imbalance: Which place is left behind? The former colony has left a legacy of concentrated urban developments around Victoria Harbour. According to the 2016 Census data shown in Table 7.3, new towns and the ‘rural’ NT, both located in the New Territories, have been left behind in terms of job opportunities. Compared with the urban areas, fewer of their residents work in the same districts, and more of them have to work outside their residential districts (64.2 per cent in the new towns and 60.2 per cent in the ‘rural’ NT). While the population size in new towns is similar to that of urban areas, the number of job establishments in urban areas is 2.3 times of that in new towns and 30 times of the ‘rural’ NT. The differences between the number of persons engaged in economic activities and the working population in urban areas (+~530,000), new towns (-~599,000), and the ‘rural’ NT (-~84,000) are revealing, meaning that many of those who live in the New Territories (including new towns and the ‘rural’ NT) have to travel a longer distance for employment opportunities in the urban areas. Indeed, the average commute duration and 93

Mee Kam Ng et al. Table 7.3 Economic indicators in urban, new towns, and ‘rural’ NT Indicators

Urban

New town

SDG8: labour productivity and decent work for all Population working outside their district (%) 57 64.2 Job establishment 249,360 108,200 No. of persons engaged 1,909,660 746,320 Working population (with fixed workplaces) 1,377,904 1,345,355 SDG11: sustainable transport and mobility (He et al., 2020) Average commute duration (minutes) 84.2 105.4 Independence index 0.45 0.12 SDG11: prioritising urban renewal (Urban Renewal Authority, 2021) Redevelopment projects 80 2 Rehabilitation projects 945 120 Heritage preservation and revitalisation 18 0 projects

‘Rural’ 60.2 8,400 50,980 135,086 95.8 0.06 0 0 0

Source: Unless specified otherwise, all data are from CSD (2017a, 2017b, 2017c, 2021a).

independence index (a measure created by Thomas (1969) to divide internal work trips by the sum of external work trips) are, respectively, longer and smaller in new towns (105.4 minutes and 0.12) and the ‘rural’ NT (95.8 minutes and 0.06), when compared to the urban areas (84.2 minutes and 0.45). The urban bias is also reflected in the city’s urban renewal programme; the overwhelming majority of the projects are in urban areas and there are none in the ‘rural’ NT (see Table 7.3). These figures show that the New Territories have been left behind in terms of employment opportunities and regeneration efforts.

Sustainable environment: Which ecology is left behind? As development has been concentrated in urban areas and new towns, most of the country parks, conservation areas, sites of special scientific interest and ecologically important streams are located in the ‘rural’ NT (Table 7.4). Similarly, most of the agricultural land, fishponds, and Gei Wais (for prawns) are found in the ‘rural’ NT. Unfortunately, there are also many brownfield sites in the ‘rural’ NT, intermixing with rural settlements, conservation areas, etc. Because of Hong Kong’s concentrated urban developments, per capita land used as open space or recreational purposes is extremely tight in urban areas and new towns, 2.3 m2 and 2.4 m2, respectively, not even one-tenth of the figure in the ‘rural’ NT. Zoned per capital open space in the ‘rural’ NT is two to three times that of urban areas and new towns. As the northwestern part of the New Territories is low lying, a sizable area is subject to flooding hazards. These statistics show that even though the ‘rural’ NT has rich ecological resources, there are threats such as polluting operations in brownfield sites and flooding hazards. And much more needs to be done to restore the ecosystem and environmental sustainability in urban areas.

Key development issues identified in the three spatial forms The three spatial forms in Hong Kong have their respective development issues. The ultra-dense urban areas (1.8 times and 33 times the density of new towns and the ‘rural’ NT, respectively) 94

Hong Kong Table 7.4 Environmental indicators in urban, new towns, and ‘rural’ NT Indicators

Urban

New Town

SDG15: life on land Country parks1 Count 24 (39% of territorial land) Site of special scientific % of land 0.3% 0.7% interest2 Conservation area2 % of land — 1.9% Normalised difference Range (−1 to 1) 0.17 0.21 vegetation index (NDVI)3 SDG14: life below water Marine parks and Count 7 (2.5% of territorial water) reserves4 Ecologically important Length 0.9 km 8.0 km streams5 SDG12: sustainable production patterns Agricultural land6 % of land 0.3% 3.3% Land used as fishponds % of land — 0.1% & Gei Wais6 SGD11: (un)sustainable land uses Brownfield sites7 % of land — 0.9% SGD11: public open spaces and sustainable transport Land used as open space % of land m2/ 8.4% 2.3 4.7% 2.4 and recreation6 person Land zoned as open % of land m2/ 8.1% 2.2 6.9% 3.5 2 space person Cycle tracks8 Length 0.6 km 203.2 km SDG11 & 13: resilient city and climate action Land at risk of flooding % of land 1.3% 1.3% in 20509

‘Rural’

Within country parks

1.4%

0.6%

14.9% 0.26

— 0.31

26.2 km

2.5 km

10.3% 3.8%

1.1% 0.5%

3.9%

0.1%

3.0% 26.9 0.2% 0.7% 6.7

—

35.2 km

—

5.3%

1.0%

Source: (1) Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation Department (AFCD) (2017); (2) Planning Department (2022); (3) Morgan & Guénard (2019); (4) AFCD (2020); (5) AFCD (2021); (6) Planning Department (2021); (7) Planning Department (2020); (8) Transport Department (2021); (9) Climate Central (2022).

have more housing options, enjoy the best provision of social and basic services, and have numerous employment opportunities. However, there are serious intra-urban disparities, in terms of income and housing conditions. The city had a 24 per cent poverty rate (CSD, 2021b). Although after policy interventions (such as recurrent cash and in-kind subsidies such as housing and medical services), the percentage dropped to 13 (CSD, 2021b), Hong Kong still has some way to go to end poverty (SDG1). The majority of the 13 per cent households below poverty line, comprising the homeless, those living in sub-divided units and families with monthly household income less than HK$10,000, are probably residing in the job-packed urban areas. As redevelopment projects concentrate in urban areas, people dwelling in old buildings may be displaced to make way for up-market accommodations, enlarging the socio-economic gaps (SDG10). The ultra-dense urban environment also means that people have minimal access to a green environment or quality public open space, let alone the enjoyment of natural streams, cycling tracks, etc., 95

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presenting challenges to achieving SDG11 (sustainable cities and communities). There is a dire need for urban areas to restore a better and more ecological environment above land or under water (SDG14 and SDG15). Compared with urban areas, new towns perform better in SDG11 (sustainable communities), having a less dense urban environment and different housing options, with social and basic services compatible with the urban areas. As over 50 per cent of residents are living in public housing, median monthly domestic household rent is much lower in new towns (70 per cent of urban areas). In general, they live in larger accommodations, enjoying better and more open space, and are closer to ecological resources. However, people living in new towns have less access to local employment opportunities, failing to achieve SDG8 (economic growth and decent work for all) or SDG9 (opportunities to develop innovative economic activities). While the numbers of workers in new towns and urban areas are similar, the number of economic establishments in new towns is only 43 per cent of that in urban areas. One reason is related to the deindustrialisation of Hong Kong as factories preferred to relocate to tap into cheap labour and land resources in an opening-up China in the 1980s. China’s economic reforms have led to the growth of the tertiary sectors in Hong Kong, with jobs concentrating in the urban areas. Another reason has to do with urban forms in new towns. The modern Corbusian landscape in new towns is completely different from the human-scale vibrant street life in urban Hong Kong where economic spaces abound, facilitating all sorts of economic transactions and social capital accumulation. As a result, many have to travel long distance and spend much time commuting to work (Table 7.3). Hence, there is room for improvements in building sustainable communities in new towns (SDG11). ‘Transformation’ of the ‘rural’ NT in the past few decades has more to do with the decline of agricultural activities, out-migration of villagers, the government’s small house policy, and the city’s economic integration with an opening-up China from the late 1970s. Only the older generations still have memories of idyllic yet lively New Territories with active rural economies and energetic communities. Today, the ‘rural’ NT has many challenges in building sustainable communities (SDG11). Population density in ‘rural’ NT is much lower and there are fewer housing options—87 per cent live in private permanent housing. Median monthly household income and rent are the highest in the ‘rural’ NT though in terms of social and basic services it is inferior to urban areas and new towns, presenting socio-spatial inequity (SDG10). This implies that there are households in the ‘rural’ NT who have the financial means to take care of their multifaceted needs through the market and choose to live in a lower-density environment, closer to natural and cultural heritage. There may also be households who stay in the ‘rural’ NT because they lack the means to live in urban areas or new towns. Similar to new towns, job opportunities are scarce and people have to commute longer to work, failing to achieve SDG8 (decent works for all). Though the ‘rural’ NT in general has a rich cultural heritage and is closer to ecological resources and conservation areas, it also contains many brownfield sites, causing certain environmental problems for local communities. To sum up, the auditing of the three spatial forms with reference to the three transformative commitments of the NUA reveals first, stark socio-economic disparities with many left behind in urban areas where the ecological environments need to be better restored. Urgent actions are required to improve the living conditions of poor households, including access to affordable housing and decent jobs with liveable wages (the current minimum wage in Hong Kong is HK$37.5 or US$4.8 per hour). In other words, more needs to be done in SDG1 (ending poverty), SDG10 (reducing inequity), and SDG11 (building sustainable communities), as well as SDG14 and SDG15 (restoring the land and water ecosystems). Decanting people from urban areas into new towns has improved their physical living environment, but the urban 96

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form of new towns and the lack of local job opportunities have led to serious job–residence imbalance, leaving new towns and ‘rural’ NT behind in terms of SDG8 (decent work for all) and SDG9 (innovative industries). The neglect of the ‘rural’ NT has allowed the conservation of some of its natural and cultural resources, but the landscape is now littered with brownfield sites and incompatible and fragmented ‘developments’. The rural communities have been the most neglected compared with urban and new town settlements, suggesting more work needs to be done in terms of SDG11 (building sustainable communities), SDG14 (life under water), and SDG15 (life on land). To tackle these development issues in the three spatial forms, the city, including the government, the market, and the civil society, needs to work harder with reference to SDG16 (justice and strong institutions) and SDG17 (partnership).

Two possible fates? The following sections review two recent territorial spatial planning documents and examine whether they have addressed the key development issues identified in the previous section. Both plans have not referred to the NUA nor the SDGs. While job–residence imbalance (SDG8) is highlighted and some issues related to building sustainable cities and communities (SDG11), fostering blue green infrastructure (SDG14 and SDG15) are mentioned, the plans have not acknowledged the differences of the three spatial forms and their respective development issues. In order to steer the fates of the three spatial forms towards sustainable urban development, a more NUA and SDG-informed strategy is recommended.

Existing territorial spatial planning and the continuing fate of the three spatial forms In 2021, the government of Hong Kong published two inter-related strategic territorial planning documents, Hong Kong 2030+ (Development Bureau and Planning Department (DBPD), 2021) and the Northern Metropolis Development Strategy Report (Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government (HKSARG), 2021). The vision of the Hong Kong 2030+ for the city is ‘to become a liveable, competitive, and sustainable “Asia’s World City” and the overarching planning goal is ‘to champion sustainable development with a view to meeting our present and future social, environmental and economic needs and aspirations’ (DBPD, 2021, p. 4). The strategy aims at ‘enhancing liveability in a compact high-density city; embracing new economic opportunities and challenges; and creating capacity for sustainable growth’ through the development of two metropolises, Harbour Metropolis (including reclaiming a 1,000-hectare artificial island east of Lantau) and the Northern Metropolis (see below), and two development axes (western economic corridor and eastern knowledge and technology corridor) (DBPD, 2021, p. 4). Hong Kong 2030+ has no population projection but it has provided a land budget, estimating that the city is short of 2,600–3,000 hectares of land. The land budget has no spatial differentiation and the scientific foundation of the land requirements is not clearly explained in the document. While more housing land is required (about 2,000 hectares) (an amount greater than the existing 1,700 hectares of land for public rental and subsidised housing that accommodates 3.2 million population) (DBPD, 2021, p. 29; Planning Department, 2022), it is not specified how this would eventually tackle socio-economic and spatial disparities and poverty issues (SDG1, SDG10, and SDG11 on ending poverty, reducing inequality, and building sustainable communities) in urban areas. The land budget for economic land uses (1,100–1,200 97

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hectares) may help relieve job–residence imbalance in new towns and the ‘rural’ NT (SDG8 decent work for all) or even provide spaces for innovative and inclusive industries and economic activities (SDG9) (DBPD, 2021, p. 29). However, the document has not elaborated on how existing brownfield sites, warehouses, and open storage land, amounting to 1,700 hectares, will be tackled (Planning Department, 2020). Spatial development problems in building sustainable communities (SDG11) in the ‘rural’ NT, including sporadic existence of brownfield sites, fragmented and mixed land uses, inadequate basic social services and the roles of agricultural land and fish ponds (occupying about 6,500 hectares of land) for sustainable production and consumption (SDG12), and combating climate crisis (SDG13), are not explicitly or specifically addressed in HK2030+. The Northern Metropolis Development Strategy Report plans to transform two key rural districts (Yuen Long District with 144 km2 and North District with 168 km2) in the northern part of the New Territories into a metropolis housing altogether 2.5 million people and providing 650,000 jobs (HKSARG, 2021, pp. 12, 78). Currently, the Northern Metropolis has three developed new towns (housing 960,000 people with 116,000 jobs), four under construction new development areas next to existing new towns (that will house 1,030,000 people and 450,000 jobs), and three proposed new development areas close to the administrative boundary with Shenzhen (that will house about half a million people and provide 66,000–68,000 jobs). According to the Northern Metropolis Report (2021), the development strategy has strategic directions at the national Greater Bay Area (Li et al., 2021) and Hong Kong levels, with four strategic objectives (HKSARG, 2021, pp.19–20): 1. 2. 3. 4.

Integrating into China’s overall development Enriching the practice of ‘One Country, Two Systems’ Improving the mode of Hong Kong–Shenzhen integration Creating the second economic engine for Hong Kong

Specific planning principles are laid out (HKSARG, 2021, pp. 21–22), including urban–rural integration, proactive conservation, high-quality outdoor eco-recreation or tourism outlets, optimised spatial planning for economic land, expansion of development capacity, and enhancing the efficiency, capacity, and comfort level of cross-boundary travel. Based on these principles, the strategy lists ten action areas (HKSARG, 2021, pp. 33–82), five are primarily related to the integration with mainland China, particularly the Greater Bay Area, including: 1. Constructing Hong Kong–Shenzhen (China’s Silicon Valley) Western Rail Link to connect and expanding new development area. 2. Developing Hong Kong’s Silicon Valley—San Tin Technopole (right next to Shenzhen, China’s Silicon Valley). 3. Developing Lo Wu/Man Kam (existing cross-boundary checkpoints) to comprehensive development node. 4. Strengthening radiation of Hong Kong with comprehensive footholds in the Greater Bay Area, proactively supporting Hong Kong universities to expand to the Greater Bay Area, to facilitate researchers, students, and start-ups from Hong Kong to work and engage with local residents and their peers in the Greater Bay Area. 5. Re-engineering administrative mechanism and operation process to facilitate cooperation with relevant authorities of Shenzhen and other Greater Bay Area cities and to formulate a rolling ten-year construction programme for the Northern Metropolis. 98

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The other five are supposed to tackle the city’s existing development issues such as: 6. Infrastructure: exploring the northern link (railway) eastward and expanding new development areas to better connect to a proposed new town in northern New Territories. 7. Conservation: implementing proactive conservation policy to create environmental capacity, including two proposed wetland parts surrounding the San Tin Technopole. 8. Recreation: creating outdoor eco-recreational/tourism space with high landscape value. 9. Communities: making sustainable communities suitable for living and working. 10. Job–residence imbalance: taking proactive steps to redress home–job imbalance through relocation of government facilities, encouragement of public and private developments, rezoning, land grants, construction of talent apartments by private enterprises, and developing a diversified economy including revitalising local market towns. Seven out of the ten action areas are related to economic integration with China and developing technological partnerships to address job–residence imbalance. Even conservation is for enhancing the qualities of the San Tin Technopole, and outdoor ecological recreation is for tourism development. These may help achieve SDG8 and SDG9 related to provision of jobs and development of industry, innovation, and infrastructure. Only one action area is related to the building of sustainable communities (SDG11) and provision of region-based and territorywide facilities such as international schools and private hospitals. It is, however, not clear how these will redress the poverty of social and basic facilities in ‘rural’ NT. In a nutshell, the two strategic plans seem to replicate the strategy of past urban developments that fall short of an integrated and balanced territorial planning advocated in the NUA. The two plans focus on reclaiming a 1,000-hectare artificial island on the east of Lantau and developments on the fringe of the New Territories at key boundary crossing points, on top of previously planned sporadic new development areas in different parts of the northern New Territories. It is not clear how this approach can address key development issues identified in the audits of the three spatial forms. The development of high-tech clusters with synergies with Shenzhen, China’s Silicon Valley, and the building of comprehensive development nodes at major cross-boundary facilities may help redress home–job imbalance, allowing residents in new towns and the ‘rural’ NT to work in the Northern Metropolis. Maybe if more jobs would be available after the implementation of the two strategic plans, and more urbanites would move to the New Territories, then issues of poverty (SDG1) or inequalities especially those in urban areas (SDG10) can be eventually addressed. Yet, reclaiming a 1,000-hectare artificial island is worsening the climate crisis (SDG13) and damaging multiple ecologies under water (SDG14) and on land (SDG15). Although the Northern Metropolis is going to be built in two key rural districts and there is tokenistic discussion of urban–rural integration, the plan has mentioned cultural heritage only once in the context of tourism development, rather than recognising the ‘rural’ NT as a cultural hearth for sustainable community building and rural revitalisation. Further, the lack of social and basic facilities in the existing ‘rural’ NT is not identified as an issue. There is certainly scope to enhance these two strategic spatial plans to reverse the fates of the three spatial forms in the city.

A more NUA and SDG-informed vision to redress key issues in the three spatial forms? The NUA calls for a transformative commitment towards sustainable urban development for social inclusion and ending poverty (SDG1); inclusive urban prosperity and opportunities 99

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for all (SDG8) to tackle urban inequity (SDG10); and environmentally sustainable and resilient urban development through planning (SDG11), governance (SDG16), and cross-sector implementation (SDG17) (United Nations, 2017; United Nations, 2022). To achieve a vision that ‘leaves no one, on place and no ecology behind’, the two strategies should be complemented with inclusive and participatory processes (United Nations, 2017, p. 12) to acquire in-depth and solid place-based knowledge to develop an integrated and comprehensive territorial plan, addressing simultaneously intra-urban disparities, home–job imbalance in new towns, and neglected as well as chaotic rural developments, and the restoration of ecosystem services values throughout the territory. In other words, new towns and the ‘rural’ NT should be planned together after a thorough audit of their natural and cultural resources, identifying no-go areas and zones of differential developments (United Nations, 2017, p. 3). One of the action areas in the Northern Metropolis should include a renaissance of the city’s rural culture that integrates rural functions, and the 21st-century lifestyle and economic developments that focus on meeting mutual needs, building human relationships, and enriching the natural environment The principle of subsidiarity should be applied (United Nations, 2017, p.12), so that the lowest affected level in the ‘rural’ NT can adopt a bottom-up planning approach to transform the current scarcely populated rural landscapes into opportunities for building vibrant and sustainable communities (SDG11) with affordable housing options in resilient ecological and cultural environments, with social and basic amenities, local economic opportunities, decent spaces for start-ups, and dignified jobs (SDG8 and SDG9) so that better integration can be made to the new development areas and the government’s planned development nodes at the three cross-boundary points. These will provide more jobs in the New Territories while resolving its lack of social infrastructure. If sustainable communities are planned and developed in the ‘rural’ NT, the Urban Renewal Authority responsible for renewing the urban fabric can be encouraged to transfer their development rights to these communities when they undertake redevelopment projects in the old urban areas. If the ‘rural’ NT is revitalised and harmonised with existing and future new development areas or new town developments, conserving their cultural heritage in diversified cityscapes and creating lots of business opportunities for the small- and medium-sized enterprises (currently over 340,000 in Hong Kong), many businesses may consider leaving the urban areas to re-establish in new towns or even the ‘rural’ NT. They in turn will attract urbanites to these new job opportunities and living styles, gradually resolving intra-urban disparity and poverty issues (SDG1). De-densification of the urban area can then allow spaces for restoring its ecological resources (SDG14 and SDG15) and improving per capita living space (SDG11). Even displaced urbanites in the course of gentrification may then have options to live in more sustainable communities for more hopeful starts. The vision of a rural renaissance cannot be achieved without tackling the brownfield sites that scatter across the future Northern Metropolis, causing hazards to local communities and the environment. As advocated by the NUA, ‘integrated, polycentric and balanced territorial development policies and plans’ (United Nations, 2017, p.13) should be in place to restore the environments in brownfield sites, relocating economic activities vital to the operation of the city, reinstating the ecology (SDG14 and SDG15), and identifying the most suitable uses for building sustainable cities and communities (SDG11) and providing decent jobs for all (SDG8) and spaces for infrastructure and innovative industries and economic activities (SDG9). This vision would require a much stronger leadership by the government, determined and orchestrated inter-departmental cooperation (SDG16), and a will by the administration to 100

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work with different stakeholders (SDG17). To implement this vision, the government would need to rally the business sectors and local communities to roll out many community planning and development projects and develop plans based on the principles of the NUA, utilising the city’s diversified cultural and natural resources to create ecologically resilient communities for human flourishing.

Conclusion The city’s history has given rise to three spatial forms with different development issues. We argue that if the city follows the current strategic spatial development plans, the fate of the three spatial forms and their respective development issues may perpetuate. We, therefore, advocate for a more NUA and SDG-informed strategy that aims to transform the three spatial forms into settlements with unique yet interesting ecological landscapes, spaces for economic dynamics that at the same time promote community building, social equity, and social capital accumulation. We suggest that this alternative can start with a bottom-up rural renaissance that aims at restoring the once ecological and humane landscapes through rationalising brownfield developments, and practising integrated and comprehensive planning based on the rich history and ecological and cultural resources of the New Territories. This network of developments may provide more affordable housing options and spaces for local and creative economic activities, serving as desirable lived space choices for urbanites to help lower urban densities and enhance opportunities to restore urban ecologies. Rural renaissance, when properly planned and designed will redress job–residence imbalance in new towns and the ‘rural’ NT, simultaneously providing necessary and basic social amenities to new and old residents in the ‘rural’ NT. Instead of focusing only on cross-boundary sites, reclaiming a 1,000-hectare artificial island in the middle of the sea, on top of a few already planned new development areas, we consider the restoration, revitalisation, planned and integrated development, and growth of rural settlements according to the NUA and SDGs will complement the two strategic plans, reversing the fates of the three spatial forms, helping the city to move towards the vision of ‘leaving no one, no place and no ecology behind’.

Acknowledgements This research is supported by the Research Grants Council, University Grants Committee of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (CUHK14604218 & CUHK14613320).

References AFCD. (2017). Designated country park in Hong Kong, designated special area in Hong Kong (outside country park). https://www.afcd.gov.hk/english/country/cou_vis/cou_vis_cou/files/KeyPlan_1_CP_ SA_v1.jpg AFCD. (2020). Designated marine parks and marine reserve. https://www.afcd.gov.hk/english/country/ cou_vis/cou_vis_mar/cou_vis_mar_des/cou_vis_mar_des.html AFCD. (2021). Ecologically important stream. Hong Kong GeoData store. https://geodata.gov.hk/gs/ view-dataset?uuid=08d614c6-61f9-480b-b9c9-2e5ad97d3282&sidx=0 AMO. (2021a). Declared monuments in Hong Kong. https://www.amo.gov.hk/en/historic-buildings/ monuments/index.html AMO. (2021b). Assessment of 1444 historic buildings and new items. https://www.amo.gov.hk/en/historic-buildings/historic-buildings-hk/assessment/index.html

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Mee Kam Ng et al. AMO. (2021c). Replies to the Sha Tin District Council on heritage in the district. [in Chinese]. https://www. districtcouncils.gov.hk/st/doc/2020_2023/tc/committee_meetings_doc/DHC/19581/DH4_Appendix.pdf ARUP & Planning Department. (2019). Operation of brownfield sites in the new territories—feasibility study. Final report. https://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_en/p_study/comp_s/Brownfield/Report/Brown field%20Study_FR_ENG.pdf CSD. (2017a). 2016 population by-census: Statistics by large street block group. https://www.bycensus2016.gov.hk/en/bc-dp-tpu.html CSD. (2017b). Main tables: H. new towns. https://www.bycensus2016.gov.hk/en/bc-mt.html CSD. (2017c). 2016 population by-census: Statistics by small tertiary planning unit group. https://www. bycensus2016.gov.hk/en/bc-dp-tpu.html CSD. (2017d). Thematic report: Persons living in subdivided units. https://www.bycensus2016.gov.hk/ data/16BC_SDU_report.pdf CSD. (2017e). District profile. https://www.bycensus2016.gov.hk/en/bc-dp.html CSD. (2021a). Table E009: Number of establishments and persons engaged (other than those in the civil service) analysed by industry section and tertiary planning unit (TPU) in 2016. https://www.censtatd. gov.hk/en/EIndexbySubject.html?pcode=D5250006&scode=452 CSD. (2021b). Table E402: Poverty indicators. https://www.censtatd.gov.hk/en/EIndexbySubject.html? scode=461&pcode=D5250402 Chan, S. C. (1998). Politicizing tradition: The identity of indigenous inhabitants in Hong Kong. Ethnology, 37(1), 39–54. Climate Central. (2022). Coastal risk screening tool: Land projected to be below annual flood level in 2050. https://coastal.climatecentral.org/map/11/114.0665/22.3541/?theme=sea_level_rise&map_type= year&basemap=roadmap&contiguous=true&elevation_model=best_available&forecast_year= 2050&pathway=ssp3rcp70&percentile=p50&refresh=true&return_level=return_level_1&rl_ model=gtsr&slr_model=ipcc_2021_med DBPD. (2021). Hong Kong 2030+: Towards planning vision and strategy transcending 2030. https:// www.pland.gov.hk/pland_en/p_study/comp_s/hk2030plus/document/2030+_booklet.pdf Fan, S. C. (1974). The population of Hong Kong. The Committee for International Coordination of National Research in Demography. http://www.cicred.org/Eng/Publications/pdf/c-c21.pdf Food and Health Bureau. (2021). Replies to initial written questions raised by finance committee members in examining the estimates of expenditure 2021–22. https://www.fhb.gov.hk/download/legco/ replies/210413_sfc/fhb-h-e.pdf GeoInfo Map. (2022a). Health . https://www.map.gov.hk/gm/map/ GeoInfo Map. (2022b). Community & social welfare services. https://www.map.gov.hk/gm/map/ He, S. Y., Tao, S., Ng, M. K., & Tieben, H. (2020). Evaluating Hong Kong’s spatial planning in new towns from the perspectives of job accessibility, travel mobility, and work-life balance. Journal of the American Planning Association, 86(3), 324–338. https://doi.org/10.1080/01944363.2020. 1725602 HKSARG. (2021). Northern metropolis development strategy. Report. https://www.policyaddress.gov. hk/2021/eng/pdf/publications/Northern/Northern-Metropolis-Development-Strategy-Report.pdf Lands Department. (2022). Digital topographic map iB5000. https://data.gov.hk/en-data/dataset/hk-landsdopenmap-development-hkms-digital-b5k Lee, J. W. Y., & Ng, M. K. (2007). Planning for the world city. In Y. M. Yeung (Ed.), The first decade: Hong Kong SAR in introspective and retrospective perspectives (pp. 297–319). The Chinese University Press. Li, C., Ng, M. K., Tang, Y., & Fung, T. (2021). From a ‘world factory’ to China’s Bay Area: A review of the outline of the development plan for Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. Planning Theory & Practice, 23(2), 310–314. https://doi.org/10.1080/14649357.2021.1958539 Morgan, B., & Guénard, B. (2019). New 30 m resolution Hong Kong climate, vegetation, and topography rasters indicate greater spatial variation than global grids within an urban mosaic. Earth System Science Data, 11(3), 1083–1098. Ng, M. K. (2020). Transformative urbanism and reproblematising land scarcity in Hong Kong. Urban Studies, 57(7), 1452–1468. Ng, M. K. (2022). Editorial: Planning standards and spatial (in)justice. Planning Theory & Practice, 23(2), 167–172. https://doi.org/10.1080/14649357.2022.2061773

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Hong Kong Ng, M. K., & Cook, A. (1997). Reclamation: An urban development strategy under fire. Land Use Policy, 14(1), 5–23. Palmer, M. J. E. (1987). The surface—subsoil form of divided ownership in late imperial China: Some examples from the New Territories of Hong Kong. Modern Asian Studies, 21(1), 1–119. Planning Department. (2020). Profile and operations of brownfield sites in the New Territories. https:// geodata.gov.hk/gs/view-dataset?uuid=389ce689-8e89-48c5-ade8-5f58a4d1c1df&sidx=0 Planning Department. (2021). 2020 raster grids on land utilization. https://data.gov.hk/en-data/dataset/ hk-pland-pland1-land-utilization-in-hong-kong-raster-grid Planning Department. (2022). Digital planning data. https://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_en/info_serv/digital_planning_data/download.htm# Sit, F. S., & Kwong, C. M. (2011). History of the rural council. [in Chinese]. Joint Publishing. Society for Community Organisation. (2021). Hong Kong homeless census 2021. [in Chinese]. https:// soco.org.hk/rp20211026/ Thomas, R. (1969). London’s new towns: A study of self-contained and balanced communities. PEP. Transport Department. (2021). Cycling information. https://data.gov.hk/en-data/dataset/hk-td-tis_20cycling-information United Nations. (2022). Global indicator framework for the sustainable development goals and targets of the 2030 agenda for sustainable development. https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/indicators/Global%20 Indicator%20Framework%20after%202022%20refinement_Eng.pdf United Nations. (2017). New urban agenda. UN-Habitat. https://habitat3.org/wp-content/uploads/NUAEnglish.pdf Urban Renewal Authority. (2021). Redevelopment and rehabilitation projects. https://www.ura.org. hk/en Watson, J. L. (1983). Rural society: Hong Kong’s New Territories. The China Quarterly, 95, 480–490.

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8 PYONGYANG An urban metamorphosis under the power of marketisation Pavel P. Em

Introduction The secretive nature of North Korea predestined Pyongyang to be one of the most mysterious cities in the world. Although many scholars have shown interest in examining the ‘capital of Juche’, with Juche being the state ideology of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) preaching on national self-reliance, the existing publications on the city are limited. Most of them discuss Pyongyang in the 2000s (see Ahn, 2012; Dormels, 2014; Meuser, 2012). However, since marketisation, which started in the 1990s and intensified in the 2010s, has rapidly transformed North Korean cities, the extant publications turn outdated. Em et al. (2021) have made an effort to tackle this problem, but this work reads like encyclopaedic an entry. Although it provides some important information, a more critical approach is indeed required to provide a holistic investigation into the city’s transformation. This chapter aims not only to detect and discuss the features of urban development of the North Korean capital in each significant historical period, but also to identify the influence of those periods on the urban planning and architectural style of contemporary Pyongyang.

City of myths and royal glory Although Pyongyang is believed to be one of the oldest cities on the Korean Peninsula, its early history is shrouded in myth. The Koreans believe that the state of Gojoseon (Old Joseon) was founded near modern Pyongyang at least 3,000 years ago. However, this claim is dubious as there is no relevant evidence that can confirm this narrative. Throughout its history, Pyongyang largely played the role of a multifunctional regional centre, the importance of which was determined by its strategic location on the road between contemporary Seoul and Beijing. In history, the current capital of the DPRK occupied a secondary position in the urban hierarchy of Korea, with the only exception being a short period between the 5th and 7th centuries, during which Pyongyang served as the capital of the Kingdom of Goguryo spanning the whole of northern Korea along with parts of current north-eastern China. The location of the city on a plain nestled between a river and a mountain, which were employed as natural defences, was based on the phungsu system. This Korean modification of feng shui considered location to be a crucially important factor in energy circulation (Choi, 104

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1993). The city boasted of four fortresses: the northern one together with a system of defensive walls was designed to prevent an attack on the Anhak Palace built in 427 AD within the inner fortress, while the other fortresses contained a variety of administrative buildings. The area between them was the city proper, and along with the middle fortress, it was generally laid out on a grid pattern (Lee, 1994). Broad thoroughfares connected the city centre with the main gates, while the river was integrated into the urban structure through the construction of bridges. Furthermore, artificial lakes with beautiful pavilions on islands were created not only for fighting fires but also for recreational purposes (Rhee, 1993). The population of Pyongyang had reached approximately 150,000 people by the end of Joseon (1392–1910), the last Korean royal dynasty. It was the second largest city after the capital Seoul (Hanseong) (Kang et al., 1986). The Taedong River, which divides contemporary Pyongyang, was subject to a ‘closed door’ policy in the aftermath of the Japanese invasion of 1592–1597 (Schinz & Dege, 1990). Once foreigners had obtained the right to ply the river in 1897 (Yim, 2016), Pyongyang, which had managed to preserve the main features of its ancient urban structure, began to transform rapidly. Christianity was the first injection of Western culture into Korea, and Pyongyang was proudly dubbed as the ‘Jerusalem of the East’ at the beginning of the 20th century. However, it was not so much these religious influences that were significant for the city itself, but rather the advent of schools and hospitals and the opening of other social services for all its residents.

Light and shadow: The legacy of Heijō The Japanese considered Pyongyang, called Heijō, a strategic military bulwark to counterbalance the influence of China, as well as an important economic centre. The colonial administration cultivated in Korea the typical Japanese style of that time, namely a melding of traditional motifs and neoclassicism (Ahn, 2012). The urban structure of Pyongyang dramatically transformed over the colonial period (1910– 1945). Due to its proximity to natural resources, rapid industrialisation occurred through the establishment of two industrial zones. The first included a munitions factory and military base near the area of the railway station. It was situated about 2 km from the southern gate, thus outside the old town. The second zone was developed to expand the city on the right side of the Taedong River by constructing not only industrial facilities and developing agricultural land, but also the requisite residential areas to house the needed workforce. These industrial centres were connected by a railway which began operation in 1906. All of these changes, along with the renovation of outdated infrastructure, were projected in the Master Plan of 1930 (Lee, 2000). Estimations show that the population of Pyongyang had grown from 44,000 in 1914 to 340,000 in 1944 (Lee, 2000), approximately 15 per cent of whom were Japanese citizens (Schinz & Dege, 1990). The city was ethnically segregated in that Koreans lived in the old city, while the Japanese generally occupied the newly developed areas.

The ‘ideal’ socialist city The conclusion of the Second World War granted the Korean Peninsula liberation from Japan, but shortly after it was divided into northern and southern parts, supported by the USSR and the USA, respectively. During the Korean War (1950–1953), Pyongyang was almost completely destroyed. While Seoul was officially the occupied capital of the DPRK, Pyongyang 105

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held the status of temporary seat of government up until 1972. Therefore, although post-war North Korean officials proclaimed the reconstruction of a better Pyongyang as a symbol of socialist dominance over capitalism as one of its top priorities, the resources devoted to this project were abridged to some extent in anticipation of achieving the goal of reunification in the early years of the republic. Nevertheless, the city of Pyongyang obtained the status of chikhalsi, a directly administered city comparable to a province in 1946. It soon became the most privileged city, providing the best services, and the vast majority of DPRK’s citizens could only dream of residing there. The East Europeans, who were led by the Soviets and involved in the reconstruction of Pyongyang, employed styles of urban planning and architecture akin to that of their own countries. This predestined Pyongyang to be a typical socialist city. However, local architects inspired by the great leader had already declared the necessity of diminishing European influences by the 1960s. This can be partially explained by the decision to minimise expenditure on construction by reducing overall material and labour costs (Shin & Jung, 2016). The first post-war socialist Master Plan of 1953 was contradictory from an urban planning standpoint. On the one hand, it envisioned Pyongyang with elongated residential buildings running parallel to the main streets and a clear delineation of industrial areas. This was inspired by the linear city model which had been implemented by Miliutin for the postwar reconstruction of Soviet Stalingrad. After Kim Il-sung criticised it, however, residential tower blocks began to spring up not only along the main streets but also inside residential neighbourhoods. On the other hand, the Master Plan also introduced the microdistrict as the basic unit of the city, i.e., a block of houses enclosing a common space, with each complex having the necessary infrastructure for its residents, as well as factories within walking distance. The microdistrict was designed not only to equalise the distribution of the population but also to disperse the industrial and service facilities around the city, thus contradicting the model of the linear city with its zones. A possible explanation for this is the constant shortage of housing, which seemed to push for the transformation of low-rise microdistricts into streets lined by high-rise housing complexes (Kim & Jung, 2019). Meanwhile, Yim (2016) argues that the linear model-based Master Plan in socialist cities was a crucial element in creating the conditions for a lack of housing. In the case of Pyongyang, the microdistrict-based residential complexes on Gwangbok and Tongil Streets are early eclectic examples of conflict with the Master Plan of 1953, demonstrating the plan’s failure. Therefore, the basic Master Plan of socialist Pyongyang promoted a mixture of conflicting ideas: the linear city and grid-structured microdistricts on the eastern bank of the Taedong River, the specific concentration of industrial and business facilities in southern Pyongyang, and a quite homogeneous distribution of other social infrastructure throughout the city (Rhee, 1993). French and Hamilton (1979) made a significant contribution to the development of the term ‘socialist city’. As the political regime prioritised ideological and military concerns over the economy, the absence of markets and nationalisation of all private property, the predominance of public interests over the personal, and the centralisation of administration were all features of socialist cities. These countries declared an ideological advantage in preventing uncontrolled growth, inhumane working and living conditions, and the exploitation of labour. These factors, and especially the full state ownership of land and real estate, had a critical impact on socialist cities. For instance, administrative buildings, along with a significant quantity of symbolic places and green spaces, replaced the central business district (CBD). Therefore, the focus on production over consumption was achieved by minimising the number of commercial and service points while also increasing the number of manufacturing plants (Szelenyi, 106

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1996). The dominance of massive residential buildings and equal access to social and transport infrastructure provided high standardisation across the city and a lower level of social segregation (Hirt, 2013), while the ban on internal migration and the limitation of commuter traffic to the city controlled the size of the urban area and its population. The Kim Il-sung Square was designed and constructed to become the heart of Pyongyang, inspired by the ‘extraordinary character of socialism and spirit of the national hero’ (Ahn, 2012, p. 105). Pyongyang was proclaimed to be the face of North Korea and its central square the face of the capital (Yim, 2016). All sorts of administrative buildings, each a colossus surrounded by broad open space, were constructed around the main square. The development of social infrastructure, with the widespread injection of symbolic places, was one of the main urban planning strategies for Pyongyang in the 1960s (Kim 1998).  Although improving the living conditions of workers by providing them with a better and more comfortable place to live in high-rise residential buildings was among the top priorities, these housing projects only started to be realised in the late 1970s. Then this truly picked up steam in the 1980s, when the state was able to construct 150,000–200,000 houses per year, with the advent of the famous ‘Pyongyang Speed’ programme of finishing one flat every 14 minutes (Shin & Jung, 2016). During this period, residential blocks with up to 40 floors of spacious apartments were constructed mostly in non-central and peripheral areas of the city, including in eastern Pyongyang. Pyongyang had been one of the main industrial centres in the northern part of the peninsula for a long time, and the reality in the DPRK was no different from its capital. It is fair to say that Pyongyang generally relied on industrial development as its main economic driver. Although factories were located in different parts of the city, the most important ones were concentrated in its southern and south-eastern districts. Nowadays, Pyongyang is full of all kinds of industrial facilities from mining to heavy industry and electronics (Dormels, 2014), producing an assortment of goods, which at least partially satisfy domestic demand. The abundance of greenery in Pyongyang also deserves attention. The North Korean capital was envisioned as a city within a park rather than a city with parks sprinkled throughout (Yim, 2016). This approach correlates with Ebenezer Howard’s Garden City concept. Green zones not only perform a recreational function that maximises the effectiveness of labour, but they also act as a buffer zone separating the developed areas from the agricultural zones within the city. Nowadays, while the structure of Pyongyang still mostly consists of farmland (38.7 per cent) and mountain zones (50.5 per cent), the developed parts occupy only 10.8 per cent of the total area (Yim & Luna, 2014). Moreover, about 13.3 per cent of Pyongyang residents lived in rural areas in 2008 (CBS, 2009). This fact demonstrates that the city was designed as a union between the urban and rural areas. Based on the above attributes, it is argued that Pyongyang, at least until the 1990s, perfectly typified a socialist city.

Post-socialist transformation of Pyongyang The rapid urban development of Pyongyang was interrupted by the collapse of the socialist bloc. As financial support from the USSR was disrupted, the North Korean economy experienced its harshest economic crisis in modern history and a severe famine in the mid-1990s. While these conditions led to the suspension of all construction projects, they also led to the emergence of markets (Kim, 2018). The authorities turned a blind eye to the growing number of street vendors and black markets as they were heavily engaged in dealing with more serious issues. The speed of marketisation accelerated even further as a 107

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result of a significant relaxation in restrictions on private trade once Kim Jong-un came to power in 2011, giving impetus to the rapid development of the service sector. There is an analogous transformation which followed the fall of the Berlin Wall in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. But how did it affect the cities in that region? Overall, real estate markets were re-established (Nedović-Budić et al., 2006) and consumer markets started to develop (Kostinsky, 2001), leading to significant commercialisation of the urban fabric (Sailer-Fliege, 2000). Moreover, the diversification of land use and architectural styles led to a reduction of green zones and a complete cessation of the construction of new symbolic places (Hirt, 2013). However, has marketisation been powerful enough to initiate a post-socialist transformation of Pyongyang? The North Korean capital triumphantly entered the 21st century with the completion of several ambitious development projects on Mansudae Street in 2009, Changjon Street in 2012, Miraegwahakja Street in 2015, and Ryomyong Street in 2017, which provided better apartments for the elites and the rich strata of society (Figure 8.1). Special attention should be paid to the fact that even the COVID-19 pandemic did not derail the construction of the new Sadong, Pothong, and Taephyong residential complexes, which will be completed in the near

Figure 8.1  New residential buildings in Pyongyang. Source:  Pavel Em.

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future (Williams, 2022). Even though those new districts might seem similar to districts in many other major Asian cities, the in-built symbolic elements, including some sort of obelisk and the socialist slogans, cement their connection with state ideology. The above-mentioned projects are well known, but they are not alone as there are many others of the in-fill variety. Private investors support construction projects under the aegis of profit-seeking state organisations (Lankov et al., 2017), as these organisations constitute an alternative way to secure one’s capital given the vulnerable banking system. As only the best projects with scenic views of symbolic places or the river can attract investment, the urban fabric in central Pyongyang has become denser (Yim, 2016). A real estate market has emerged in Pyongyang and developed rapidly with some apartments now costing up to $150,000 per unit (Joung, 2016, p. 87). The state has even started to legalise real estate transactions to some extent (Lee, 2017), though it recognises residents merely as the holders of tenancy rights, not owners (Kong, 2015). Since the majority of development projects are generally located on former green zones, the share of green space in Pyongyang’s land area was expected to fall from 25.3 per cent in 2000 to 20.6 per cent in 2020 (Zhang et al., 2019). Although many significant development projects have been realised, more than one-third of Pyongyangites resided in one-story buildings in 2014 (CBS, 2015, p. 12), and more than one-fifth of them were engaged in backyard gardening, farming, and raising livestock (CBS, 2009). Therefore, Pyongyang is a city of contradictions where shining residential complexes, majestic squares, and massive symbolic monuments neighbour rural areas. The North Korean capital used to be famous for its colourful pastel façades, where propaganda posters could be found in place of street advertisements (Meuser, 2012). However, the ‘retail revolution’ (Em & Ward, 2021), spurred by rapidly spreading commercial and service points, now endeavours to attract customer attention through the employment of colourful signboards. On this account, Em and Ward (2021) argue that the authorities have lost control over the urban aesthetic. The North Korean version of the ‘corner shop’ is a kiosk installed in a busy part of the city providing commercial services literally at the street level, a common phenomenon since the mid-2000s (Em et al., 2021). Although ceremonial places are still used only for their primary purpose, a variety of commercial points have emerged inside them. Therefore, although commercialisation in Pyongyang has increased and a commercial culture is developing, a CBD has not yet formed. Pyongyang has also focused on satisfying the demands of more sophisticated consumers. The increasing number of commercial and service points not only compete for customers but also provide hitherto exotic services such as laundromats, bakeries, and barber shops, among others (Em et al., 2021). The majority of these high-standard service and commercial enterprises constituting the new consumer paradise of Pyongyang are located in the new districts as the most affluent social strata reside there. The North Korean capital has always been well supplied with goods, including imported ones, since the very end of the Korean War, and nowadays nothing has changed in this regard as Pyongyangites may enjoy a variety of goods and services that other citizens in the country can only dream of. The large-scale development of places whose main purpose is to provide more options for leisure should also be mentioned. The most significant examples are the Rungra Amusement Park (2012), equipped with rollercoasters, a mini-golf course, arcade games, a 4D cinema, and a dolphinarium, among others, as well as the Munsu Water Park (2013). Both parks are open to anyone who can afford the ticket prices.  These facilities aim to pamper the city dwellers and to demonstrate the economic progress of North Korea even in the midst of economic sanctions.

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Pyongyang is experiencing not only commercialisation and a customer-first orientation, but also beautification. Thus, the aptly named ‘Beautification Law’ requires the improvement of the cleanliness and aesthetics of buildings and other facilities. Lastly, it mandates the making of the city to be more convenient for its residents. The construction of bicycle lanes and the installation of greenery are efforts to make the city more eco-friendly and more beautiful, especially in the new districts; and solar panels along the roads are also evidence of work in this direction (Em et al., 2021). Pyongyang has many newly built and refurbished factories, but there is no evidence that they have been purposed for any sort of high-tech production. Nevertheless, it has to be considered that the DPRK has developed successful missile and nuclear programmes, showing its technological capacity. In 2008, almost half of Pyongyang’s population over 16 years old was already employed in the service sector of the economy, while the secondary and primary sectors accounted for only 37 per cent and 16 per cent, respectively (CBS, 2009, p. 199). Because the share of people involved in the service industry appears to have increased since that year, it is argued that a clear majority of the population in Pyongyang is now engaged in such work. This differs markedly from the statistics in the country as a whole where the shares of the primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors were 30 per cent, 28.5 per cent, and 41.5 per cent, respectively (CBS, 2009, p. 195). Although Pyongyang still generally looks like a typical socialist city, the recently emerging and rapidly developing market has initiated its rapid transition into a post-socialist city. Pyongyang is currently transforming from a city of workers and manufacturing into a city of consumers and services, and further marketisation is radically reorganising the spatial structure of the city.

The unsung colonial and feudal heritage in the Juche city of Pyongyang Pyongyang still retains many features of the typical socialist city, but the urban planning and architecture of the Juche capital seem to be influenced to some extent by previous historical periods as well. This passage is crucial for an understanding of the urban planning of Pyongyang and should be discussed. Although North Korean officials will never recognise the Japanese influence on the urban planning of contemporary Pyongyang, this fact is obvious to an informed observer. The Master Plan of 1953, with its roots in the early socialist period, in fact reflected an earlier document, which was originally penned under the Japanese colonial administration. Thus, the real picture of Pyongyang today largely iterates that earlier plan, and as such, it is necessary to highlight those features of the Juche capital. First, both the Japanese-made plan and the actual layout of Pyongyang have similar spatial patterns in the development of road and railroad networks. Moreover, the Taedong Bridge, which spans across the river for which it was named, was reconstructed exactly in the same location where it had stood during the colonial period, albeit under a different name. Second, even though some new industrial facilities have been constructed by the DPRK, the manufacturing cluster that first emerged in the southern part of the city around the railway station under Japanese administration still remains one of the most important manufacturing clusters in the city. Third, even today the main axis of the North Korean capital, running between the Juche Tower and Kim Il-sung Square and passing through the Grand People’s Study House (Meuser, 2012), and connecting the old town with the railway station, was originally established by the Japanese administration (Yim, 2016), and it still has not lost its importance. Therefore, the 110

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second and third features strongly depend on the first. Fourth, the revolutionary plan for city expansion through the development of the eastern bank of the Taedong River was originally made under the rule of the Japanese governor-general. However, neither the colonial administration nor the current regime has succeeded in balancing the development between the two sides of Pyongyang across the Taedong River. The western bank is still much more developed than the eastern one. Consequently, it is fair to declare that despite having had a real chance to reconstruct the North Korean capital as an exemplary socialist city after its almost complete destruction during the War, even with the support and guidance of Eastern European architects, Pyongyang still inherited the basis of its urban planning from the Japanese colonial administration. Moreover, during the early years of the young republic, many important buildings, including the main railway station, the headquarters of the Rodong Sinmun newspaper, and the International Post Office, were reconstructed in the same location where they had been situated during the Japanese administration. It is a fallacy, though, to assume that the North Koreans were only following the canvas of urban planning for Pyongyang as laid out by the Japanese administration. Being officially against anything related to capitalism, imperialism, and monarchy, the DPRK declared a strong willingness to break with the colonial and pre-colonial past in every possible measure, including urban planning and architecture. It is extremely important to analyse which post-war reconstruction projects in Pyongyang were aimed to symbolise the dominance of the Juche regime over previous historical epochs. First, the Grand People’s Study House was constructed in the area between the fortresses of the old town, which had been occupied by the aristocracy and bureaucracy during the precolonial feudal period. Second, the Moranbong Theatre was built on the hill for which it was named in 1946, replacing the main Shinto shrine in the city, a legacy of the colonial period (Lee, 2000). Third, the North Korean regime replaced the commercial district, which had been developed during the Japanese period, with numerous symbolic and administrative buildings. Therefore, the first example illustrates the dominance of universal socialist education over the pre-colonial heritage, the second one emphasises liberation and the supremacy of socialist culture over religion, and the third one symbolises the advantages of the Juche ideology over commerce. These features may well be just a coincidence. If they are not—this notion seems more plausible—then those replacements have elegantly hidden in plain sight the passive promotion of socialism over capitalism and monarchism. Even though the DPRK has criticised the colonial period and made some ideological replacements in the urban structure of Pyongyang, as discussed earlier, its planning still largely relies on the Japanese-designed Master Plan. If the North Korean regime indeed inherited, to such a large extent, the heritage of the colonial administration, is there anything in the contemporary urban planning or architecture of Pyongyang which has its roots in the feudal period? In fact, North Korea heavily criticises monarchy as a form of rule, but it has adopted some features of the cultural heritage that emerged during that period. Without mentioning the connection between traditional culture and monarchy, Pyongyang began to develop its own peculiar style of architecture through the adaptation of cultural elements in the 1960s. First, many public buildings, such as the impressive Grand People’s Study House (built in 1982, Figure 8.2), have a traditional giwa curved roof made from green ceramic tiles. Second, even in an ideal socialist city, some reproductions of historical Korean architectural objects, such as the Taedong Gate and the Ryongwang Pavilion, were constructed in post-war Pyongyang. Third, those architectural objects not only have wooden supporting structures, dancheong, but they were also decorated using traditional techniques of wood painting. Although some of these 111

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Figure 8.2  Grand People’s Study House in Pyongyang. Source:  Pavel Em.

features might ultimately have Chinese origins, they are included in the lexicon of traditional Korean culture. Therefore, Meuser (2012, p. 47) claims that although the North Korean architectural style does not correspond to Korean traditions, their employment and presence in Pyongyang are indisputable. Not only are the more obvious exteriors of some architectural elements in Pyongyang linked with traditional culture, but some interior features are as well. The most significant of these is the floor heating system called ondol, which Koreans are proud of. Its widespread installation began after it was praised by the great leader in 1967, and nowadays most residential units boast of it (Shin & Jung, 2016). Thus, one can argue that both the exterior and interior features of traditional architecture are employed in the North Korean capital, creating its unique aesthetic. But what about urban planning? Japanese rule significantly influenced the urban planning of Pyongyang, but there are two patterns which locals were familiar with well before the 20th century. First, the current city centre is approximately located on the site of the old city. Therefore, neither the Japanese colonial administration nor the Korean War and the following reconstruction actually moved the location of the city centre. Second, although some may consider the grid structure of the district to have been first employed when planning eastern Pyongyang, the middle fortress of the old city was based on the Li-Bang grid-structures, where Bang was the unit size and Li was the number of aggregated units (Lee, 1994). Consequently, this spatial pattern had come to Pyongyang not from Japan, but rather from China many centuries before the Japanese invasion.

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Conclusion This chapter has proven that the North Korean capital is no longer an ideal socialist city, as the advent of marketisation since the early 1990s has led to the emergence of all the features of a post-socialist city. The Juche capital is currently undergoing revolutionary change from a city of industrial workers into one of service consumers. Through a brief discussion of the urban development of Pyongyang from the distant past to the present, this chapter has shown that the canvas of urban planning of contemporary Pyongyang was made by the Japanese colonial administration. Moreover, not only elements of traditional Korean architecture but also some patterns of urban planning, which were implemented during the feudal period, are still employed. Therefore, the urban planning and architecture of the North Korean capital have strong connections with both feudal and colonial periods as well.

Acknowledgements This chapter was prepared with the support of the Seoul National University Asia Center through its Visiting Scholar Fellowship.

References Ahn, C. (2012). Korean architecture: Urban and architectural history in Pyongyang. In P. Meuser (Ed.), Architectural and cultural guide Pyongyang (Vol. 2, pp. 85–161). DOM Publishers. CBS (Central Bureau of Statistics). (2009). DPR Korea 2008 population census. Pyongyang. CBS (Central Bureau of Statistics). (2015). Socio-economic, demographic and health survey 2014. Pyongyang. Choi, C. J. (1993). Phunsu geography of Korea. [in Korean]. Minumsa. Dormels, R. (2014). North Korea’s cities: Industrial facilities, internal structures and typification. Jimoondang. Em, P. P., & Ward, P. (2021). City profile: Is Pyongyang a post-socialist city? Cities, 108, Article 102950. Em, P. P., Ward, P., Prokopljevic, J., Zakharova, L., & Sigley, A. (2021). Pyongyang 3.0: Inside out. North Korean Review, 17(1), 30–56. French, R. A., & Hamilton, I. (Eds.). (1979). The socialist city: Spatial structure and urban policy. Wiley. Hirt, S. (2013). Whatever happened to (post)socialist city? Cities, 32, S29–S38. Joung, E. (2016). An analysis of the North Korean real estate developer's appearance and attitude: Focused on comparative study with China. KDI Review of the North Korean Economy, 9, 51–89. Kang, K., Lee, K., & Lee, C. (1986). Yesterday’s and today’s of Pyongyang. [in Korean]. Sahwe Kwahak Chulpansa. Kim, M., & Jung, I. (2019). The site planning of Gwangbok new town in Pyongyang. From microdistrict to street formation. Journal of the Architectural Institute of Korea Planning & Design, 35(10), 91–102. Kim, P. (2018). The segmented marketization of North Korea and its sociopolitical implications. Asian Perspective, 42(1), 1–31. Kim, W. (1998). Socialist urban planning. [in Korean]. Posonggak. Kong, M. (2015). A study on the North Korea’s real estate system. [Doctoral dissertation in Korean]. Dongguk University. Kostinsky, G. (2001). Post-socialist cities in flux. In R. Paddison (Ed.), Handbook of urban studies (pp. 451–465). Sage. Lankov, A., Ward, P., Yoo, H., & Kim, J. (2017). Making money in the State: North Korea’s pseudo-state enterprises in the early 2000s. Journal of East Asian Studies, 17(1), 51–67. Lee, C. (2017). A study of housing market in North Korea: Focusing on Pyongyang since the Arduous March. [Master dissertation in Korean]. University of North Korean Studies. Lee, W.-G. (1994). Research on architectural history in North Korea. [in Korean]. Paron. Lee, W.-G. (2000). North Korean architecture as another aspect of us. [in Korean]. Seoul Forum.

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9 SEOUL Pursuing and sharing a global city Yu-Min Joo

Introduction What does it mean to be a global city? Cities have been perceived as the economic engines for organising globalised economic activities since the world city hypothesis (Friedmann, 1986) and Saskia Sassen’s seminal book The Global City (1991). Connected more to other international cities than their own national peers, global cities have been depicted as the command and control centres of the globally dispersed economy, disproportionately concentrating financial sectors, advanced producer services, and multinational company headquarters (Sassen, 1991). Despite the ramifications of increasing social polarisation (Sassen, 1996), cities have been competing to attract global capital and talents by highlighting their urban competitiveness with entrepreneurial strategies (Harvey, 1989). Cities have recently been receiving another kind of attention amid global crises such as climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic, heightened inequality, etc. With over half of the global population now living in urban areas, many global challenges are caused by or exist in cities. However, cities are also potential loci of policy intervention and problem-solving. In If Mayors Ruled the World, Benjamin Barber (2013) argued that the worldwide platform of cities and mayors, with their pragmatism and innovation, might make better advances in tackling our society’s challenges than nation-states entrenched in ideologies and nationalism. Indeed, there are already several global urban networks and platforms for collaborating and sharing the best urban practices: C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI), the Partnership for Democratic Local Governance in Southeast Asia (DELGOSEA), Mayors for Peace, Cities for Mobility, and United Cities and Local Governments for Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). A new global urban dynamic is emerging, expecting cities to generate positive changes. Instead of competing to attract global capital and talents, cities are collaborating to share knowledge and address climate change, transportation problems, and other development challenges. This new expectation of global responsibility has implications for global cities. Rather than being defined by their economic roles and impact, global cities are expected to add greater value to global society (Joo & Heng, 2017). Being a global city now involves pursuing urban leadership from a globalised perspective. To contribute values other than ‘growth’—such as liveability, resilience, and sustainability—global cities need to adopt collaborative behavDOI: 10.4324/9781003256533-11

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iours—such as intercity cooperation (Douglass, 2002)—that depart from competitive urban strategies upheld by neoliberal ideologies (Brenner & Theodore, 2002). Seoul—the capital city of South Korea (hereafter ‘Korea’)—has recently sought to increase its presence on the global stage by building international relations (Joo, 2019, p. 116). It has been packaging its development experience as policy solutions to be shared internationally. Surpassing the collaboration efforts of other global cities, Seoul has also been proactively ‘exporting’ its urban solutions to developing countries with massive urban growth that need good urban management and infrastructure development. Seoul has been capitalising on its reputation as the capital of a country that developed rapidly over a few decades, overcoming similar challenges, and becoming one of the global cities in Asia today. In the AT Kearney’s first Global Cities index published in 2008, Seoul ranked ninth, with only three other cities in Asia ranking in the top ten (i.e., Tokyo fourth, Hong Kong fifth, and Singapore seventh). This ranking is a remarkable departure from previous assessments. Seoul was categorised as a ‘secondary city’ in the ‘semi-periphery’, alongside Manila, Bangkok, Taipei, and Hong Kong, in the world city hypothesis published only 20 years earlier (Friedmann, 1986). This chapter examines Seoul’s transformation from a small, underdeveloped capital city of Korea into one of Asia’s global cities in three sections. The first section explores Seoul’s development during Korea’s state-led industrialisation that began in the 1960s, and its emergence as the command and control centre of the domestic economy, setting the foundation for its future growth as a global city. The second section explores Seoul’s policy efforts to enhance its competitiveness in an increasingly neoliberal and globalised environment after the Asian Financial Crisis in the late 1990s. The third section explores Seoul’s latest global urban leadership aspirations reflected in its international development endeavours. By viewing Seoul’s overall development experience through the lens of global city formation, this chapter highlights an East Asian global city, born and grown under the developmental state, and explores what it means to be a global city in Asia today.

Seoul in Korea’s industrialisation The modern development of Seoul was closely tied to Korea’s economic development and established its rise as a competitive global city in Asia. Despite its history as the capital city since 1392, Seoul was a small, underdeveloped city with a population of 2.4 million people in 1960. Following the success of Korea’s export-oriented industrialisation led by the military state that came into power in 1961—widely known as the developmental state (Amsden, 1989)—Seoul grew its population to 10 million in less than 30 years. Given its strong role in industrialising Korea and developing Seoul, the role of the state has been highlighted in the literature that examines Seoul through the lens of a global city framework (e.g., Hill & Kim, 2000; Shin & Timberlake, 2006; 2020). In fact, the rapid expansion and modernisation of Seoul during this period can be credited to state-led urbanisation (Joo, 2019); the local government, under its state-appointed mayor, acted as an implementer of state policies. At the beginning of Korea’s industrialisation, Seoul hosted labour-intensive light industries. The Korean government built the Guro export industrial estate in Seoul to benefit from its local labour pool. As light industries succeeded, Seoul faced explosive growth; its population more than doubled to 5.4 million by 1970. Unable to keep pace with its population growth, Seoul faced problems such as severe congestion, pollution, an increasing number of squatter settlements, and concentrated urban poverty (Lim, 2005). Concerned about the social unrest that could arise from challenging urban conditions, the state sought to actively control and manage Seoul’s development. 116

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Although Seoul’s official boundary increased in 1963, doubling its land size, the developed part of Seoul in the 1960s consisted only north of the Han River (Lim & Kim, 2015). The plan for the Gangnam area (translated as ‘the south of the river’) began in the 1970s and sought to strategically transform this mostly farmland area into one of the large-scale urban developments. To disperse and house the increasing population within Seoul and develop Gangnam, the state employed the private sector to mass-produce apartment high-rises, which began to replace single-landed houses, which had been the city’s major housing. By 1985, 99,830 apartment units (equivalent to about 70 per cent of total apartment units in Seoul) were built in Gangnam (Seoul Museum of History, 2011). Many apartment complexes were built with basic urban amenities, such as commercial centres, playgrounds, small parks, elderly centres, etc. These complexes thus helped to develop Gangnam rapidly and compactly. Simultaneous with its expansion plans, the state controlled Seoul’s growth. The national government introduced the greenbelt policy, adopted from the UK, and designated more than half of its developable land between 1971 and 1977, prohibiting uncontrolled sprawl surrounding Seoul. The organisation and modernisation of urban space throughout the 1970s and 1980s in Seoul were facilitated by the city being devoid of major heavy-chemical industries, which were in Korea’s southeast coastal regions. Korea’s next stage of industrialisation—capital-intensive heavy-chemical industrialisation—had a significant role in Seoul’s emergence as the command and control centre of the country’s economy. Beginning in 1973, the Korean state promoted heavy-chemical industries (e.g., iron and steel, nonferrous metals, petrochemicals, machinery, shipbuilding, and electrical appliances and electronics). Korea successfully pivoted from labour-intensive low-cost manufacturing because of the state’s active intervention in the market, i.e., ‘getting the prices wrong’ (Amsden, 1989). Large domestic conglomerates (called chaebols) were given favourable low-interest loans and credits in return for meeting criteria set by the national government. The close intervention of the state in the industrialisation process led to the headquarters of major Korean companies relocating to Seoul, where the ministries and important state agencies were housed. In 1960, only half of Korea’s top ten company headquarters were in Seoul, but after the promotion of heavy-chemical industrialisation, all ten were in the capital city by 1979 (Joo, 2019, p. 36). While the chaebols concentrated their headquarters in Seoul, actual manufacturing activities were located in the southeast region. The state designated several new industrial sites in areas with port access to host capital-intensive industrial plants that produced exports. The success of this latter part of Korea’s heavy-chemical industrialisation produced two significant spatial outcomes. First, the selected industrial sites grew to become Korea’s major industrial cities (e.g., Pohang, Ulsan, Changwon, Goeje, Onsan, Gwangyang, and Yeosu). Second, Seoul became the centre of decision-making, where the state agencies and chaebol headquarters commanded and controlled the physically separated production activities taking place in these industrial cities (Joo, 2019). A parallel can be drawn here to a global city. Seoul’s early ability to command and control manufacturing within the domestic economy established its ability to later control manufacturing activities dispersed internationally as a global city. When the Korean chaebols became global competitors and began to locate their factories overseas, Seoul automatically became a basing point of multinational headquarters and established its economic role as a global city. Seoul’s global economic power depended largely on these manufacturing-based chaebols that were closely communicating with the national government, rather than the finance and producer service sectors usually associated with global city development (Sassen, 1991). Hill and Kim (2000) have noted this distinct economic behaviour and thus distinguished Seoul 117

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from the Western-based global cities in the market-based economy. Seoul can be explained to have risen in global city rankings because of state-led industrialisation, the growth of local manufacturing conglomerates, and geographically separated industries. In fact, housing the state, chaebol headquarters, finance, and other service sectors, Seoul was locally deindustrialising as Korea’s national industrialisation intensified throughout the 1970s and 1980s. With key industrial manufacturing outside the city, Seoul could focus on its urban modernisation and redevelopment efforts. Preparing for the 1988 Summer Olympics, Seoul underwent a massive transformation, including the redevelopment of old residential and city centres, eradication of slums, and development of several new bridges and boulevards, cultural facilities, and public parks (Son, 2003). The Korean government considered the international megaevent an occasion to showcase its economic achievements to the global audience. In the process, Seoul accelerated its urban redevelopment, shedding what had then remained as the images of poverty and underdevelopment (Joo et al., 2017). By 1988, Seoul became a megacity of 10 million people, which continues to date.

Towards Seoul as a competitive global city Seoul’s early development focused on ‘catching-up’ amid Korea’s industrialisation to accommodate its growing population. After having ‘caught up’, its development in the 2000s focused on placing Seoul higher within the global city hierarchy. Seoul was not alone in this effort. The intentional world city formation, often around the capital city, was prevalent in Asia, as cities were considered critical gateways to the global economy (Douglass, 2000). In Korea, major political and economic changes provided further conditions for Seoul to distinguish itself from the national urban network and seek its own global competitiveness, mostly through focusing on urban refurbishment efforts. First, Korea democratised in 1987 and underwent decentralisation reforms throughout the 1990s. Beginning in 1995, mayors and governors who had previously been centrally appointed were popularly elected. This political context allowed Seoul to pursue its global city ambitions. While the national government had been concerned about unbalanced regional development caused by Seoul’s predominance, the newly elected mayors had a political interest to promote Seoul’s development and prosperity and respond to its residents. Empowered by decentralisation reforms, the elected mayors had more control over Seoul than before. Furthermore, the elected mayors of Seoul—the most important city with one-fifth of the national population—began to develop ambitions for the Presidency. There was thus an impetus for the elected mayors of Seoul to effect change during their tenure, rather than maintain a bureaucratic managerial role. Second, Korea faced the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and, under the International Monetary Fund (IMF) mandate, was required to carry out several deregulation reforms, including downsizing the government and conducting market-oriented reforms in finance and labour. In the increasingly neoliberal environment, Seoul was pressured to strengthen its international competitiveness and attract globally mobile capital (Park, 2019). Hence, throughout the 2000s—especially under the two conservative party mayors (Mayor Lee, Myung-bak, 2002–2006 and Mayor Oh, Se-hoon, 2006–2011)—Seoul prioritised refurbishing its urban landscape to position itself as a competitive global city in Asia (Joo, 2019; Park, 2019). While Seoul’s first two elected mayors, Mayor Cho, Sun and Mayor Goh, Gun, were longtime bureaucrats, Mayor Lee, Myung-bak had a background in the private sector as the CEO of Hyundai Engineering and Construction. He was an ‘entrepreneurial’ mayor, seeking to bring new changes to the local government administration and Seoul’s urban landscape. In an 118

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interview published by Sijung Ilbo (‘municipal administration newspaper’) in 2006, Mayor Lee explained that the main reason why he wanted to become the mayor of Seoul was to bring his experiences as a CEO of a private company into public administration. When asked how he would summarise the changes and development of Seoul in the last four years of his tenure, he highlighted his attempt to innovate the public sector by introducing the business mindset and commented on how he considered it to be the most important foundation for developing the ‘world first-class city Seoul’ (Sijung Ilbo, 2006). In fact, making the ‘world first-class city’ was the vision for Seoul under Mayor Lee’s tenure (Goh & Ahn, 2017). With this vision, major development and infrastructure projects were carried out. One of the most symbolic projects was the Cheonggyecheon restoration, which signified a turning point in Seoul’s development narrative. The Cheonggyecheon restoration involved taking down an elevated freeway 5.6 km long that was built in the central downtown of Seoul amid Korea’s rapid industrialisation. When it was built in the 1970s, it symbolised Seoul’s achievement in economic growth and modern development. In the 2000s, it became an unattractive and derelict structure. Tearing it down and restoring the small stream it covered, to make a public green space, symbolised Seoul’s transition to an environmentally conscious city and signalled Seoul’s departure from rapid growth-oriented development. An article in Time heralded the project as the ‘greening of Seoul’ and instructive to other ‘environmentally challenged Asian cities’ (Walsh, 2006). The project was a milestone; it represented Seoul moving beyond catch-up urbanisation and becoming a model that could diffuse to other Asian cities for imitation. The Cheonggyecheon restoration also intended to market Seoul’s competitiveness in the global economy, as a pet project of the mayor keen to make Seoul into a world-class city. It was an urban regeneration project designed to reinvigorate a dilapidated part of downtown Seoul and attract global capital (Lim and Kim, 2015), while increasing Seoul’s international profile as an ‘environmentally friendly financial hub of Asia’ (Erpenstein, 2010, p. 96). Although the project drew criticism for being artificial, lacking authenticity, costing too much, and developing hastily (Cho, 2010; Lee & Anderson, 2014), it was an entrepreneurial success. It produced a green urban spectacle in downtown Seoul previously blemished by traffic congestion, street vendors, and small industrial shops. It successfully blended the environmental and post-industrial development agendas; riding partially on its success, Mayor Lee became the President of Korea in 2008 (Lee & Anderson, 2014). The subsequent mayor, Oh, Se-hoon (2006–2011), continued a similar agenda to enhance the global competitiveness of Seoul, particularly through culture, design, and city marketing (Goh & Ahn, 2017). Two visions were promoted: ‘Creative City’ and ‘Design Seoul’. Seoul’s Creative City policy ambitiously stated its goal to make Seoul a ‘global top-ten competitive city’ within four years (Seoul Metropolitan Government, 2007). The Design Seoul campaign leveraged design to attract global capital and tourism. Gaining international recognition was required to create global city ‘imagery’ through design (Yun, 2017). During Mayor Oh’s tenure, Seoul was awarded the title of World Design Capital 2010 and joined the UNESCO Creative Cities Network as a Creative City of Design. Seoul’s use of culture and design as the key to gaining global competence, including its Creative City policy, mostly took the form of urban refurbishment efforts (Lee & Hwang, 2012; Lim & Kim, 2015; Yun, 2017). Emphasising design, Seoul’s initiatives pursued urban development projects and provided urban amenities that could attract global clientele. Given its limited power in industrial and economic policies, the local government was pursuing construction projects (Lee & Hwang, 2012). Mayor Oh’s design-centred policies led to notable urban megaprojects under his tenure. The Dongdaemun Design Plaza (DDP), costing 375.5 119

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billion Korean Won and designed by the world-renowned architect Zaha Hadid, was envisioned to landmark the city as a global hub of design and fashion. This iconic landmark for design and fashion replaced an old sports stadium and flea market, again reflecting Seoul’s efforts to upgrade its urban landscape to what seemed to be more fitting with a global city. The Han River Renaissance Project, another successful megaproject, redesigned many of Seoul’s riversides and bridges. It included the Floating Island project, which contained an international convention centre and spaces for cultural events and water sports. Seoul’s symbolic open space, Gwanghwamun Square, was constructed during Mayor Oh’s tenure as well. Continuing Mayor Lee’s drive towards efficient administration, Mayor Oh also attempted to downsize the government, increase cost efficiency, and improve public services for citizens, perceiving them as customers of the city, under the Creative City Administration (Lee & Hwang, 2012). However, grandiose megaprojects that visibly impacted the city’s landscape gained more public attention. This time, however, they were not being received positively within Seoul (Lee, 2015; Yun, 2017). While the city transformed its urban landscape to gain more global attention, there has been a growing citizen demand for Seoul to pursue other values than growth. The hardware-driven approach to developing Seoul into a competitive global city, which prevailed throughout the 2000s, dissipated with the arrival of a new policy agenda led by Mayor Park, Won-soon (2011–2021).

Interpreting a new meaning of being a global city in Asia Seoul in the 2010s pursued the status of a global city differently from the past decade’s focus on appearance. While the previous decade had been about refurbishing ‘hardware’ to attract global capital, Seoul’s global strategy began promoting software (i.e., urban development solutions) to be shared or ‘exported’ to other cities. Seoul’s reformed global ambitions became more collaborative than the traditionally competitive approach to establishing a global city (Joo, 2019). This new strategy required a stronger international standing, and during Mayor Park’s tenure, Seoul became a friendship city with 32 international cities, joined ten global urban networks, and located to Seoul 19 out of 22 international organisations currently in the city (Cho & Kim, 2021). Mayor Park’s global city vision was ‘Seoul, Global Sharing City’. He promoted global city agendas, albeit in a different way than the two previous mayors who had explicitly stated their ambitions to make Seoul into a competitive global city. Instead of striving for competitiveness or becoming the financial hub in Asia, Mayor Park endeavoured to create an image of Seoul as a ‘good global citizen’ by focusing on environmental problems and urban problem solutions (Cho & Kim, 2021, p.16). There were local, global, and national explanations for this changed strategy, which will be explained in that order in the rest of this section. First, the global city strategy could be interpreted as a reflection of the new local policy paradigm that was taking place. Its cooperative element and emphasis on values other than growth and competition—such as enhancing environmental sustainability and contributing to the global society—aligned with Seoul’s changed policy goals and narratives. Entering the 2010s, there has been a rising local citizens’ demand for Seoul to make a departure from its competitive growth-first ideology. In response, Mayor Park distinguished his policy agenda from his predecessors’ focus on construction and urban megaprojects. Under the slogan, ‘Citizens are the Mayor’, his administration emphasised participatory governance, social welfare, and community-oriented policies that sought to address everyday life issues of average citizens (Goh & Ahn, 2017; Park, 2019). This new policy shift towards emphasising citizen-centred values in the policy narrative began to receive international acclaim. The case of Seoul under Mayor Park Won-soon com120

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prised one of the chapters in Benjamin Barber’s If Mayors Ruled the World (2013). In an edited book, The Rise of Progressive Cities East and West, by Douglass et al. (2019), Seoul’s experience has been highlighted as the first empirical chapter, introducing Mayor Park’s ‘innovative policies’ in the four areas of public inclusion, environmental sustainability, distributive justice, and conviviality, while also discussing some of its limits (Cho, 2019). In fact, while Mayor Park’s new policy narrative aspired to fundamentally transform Seoul’s development governance, the reality was more complex. Park (2021b) has commented that ‘the city will become an arena for competing policy ideologies of “competitive city” versus “liveable city” for years to come’ (p.3). Nevertheless, Park’s policy agenda has, at the least, introduced an alternative policy narrative to growth-first ideology and brought urban experimentation that began to capture global attention and renewed the image of Seoul. In 2018, Seoul received the Lee Kuan Yew World City Prize; the jury commented, ‘the city has successfully turned itself around from a highly bureaucratic top-down city … into the inclusive, socially stable, and highly innovative city of today’ (Urban Redevelopment Authority, n.d.). In 2016, Seoul also received the Gothenburg Award for Sustainable Development for its Sharing City initiatives, and the C40 Cities Award for Social Equity and Climate Change for its energy policy addressing the issue of social equity. This renewed image of Seoul, stemming from its new local policy narratives, effectively marketed the city internationally and contributed to its new global city strategy. Second, Seoul’s new global city strategy can be interpreted to have catered to the rising demand in the global society for more collaboration between cities to find solutions to shared problems. With over half of the global population living in cities, the issue of how to develop cities more sustainably has become an important challenge. Cities and local governments have become crucial not only to local development but also to global problem-solving. There have been several congresses of mayors assembled to solve global problems, and many cities have become international friendship cities. In 2015, the United Nations launched the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which called for every country regardless of economic status to contribute to achieving sustainable development. The SDGs gave explicit attention to cities; SDG 11 has directly addressed sustainable cities and communities, acknowledging the important role of cities in sustainable development. Global cities were thus no longer being recognised as competitive engines of economic growth alone. The role of the global city began to embody a focus on international cooperation, seeking to contribute to the global society. Cities have also become major consumers of policies, amid the unprecedented urbanisation process in many developing countries. The provision of urban services, infrastructure, and urban management skills are needed to meet the demands of rapid population growth and economic expansion. These rapidly developing cities are thus emerging as potential consumers of urban management solutions. In particular, they are keen to learn from cities like Seoul, which has overcome similar urban challenges in a number of areas, such as public services, land development, infrastructure, and housing, during its own rapid urbanisation (Kang, 2015; Shin, 2015). Unlike developed cities in the West, where development took place gradually and slowly, Seoul’s relatively recent and condensed development experience appears to be a more realistic model for developing countries’ cities to replicate (Joo, 2019; Shin, 2015). Seoul has capitalised on this potential demand and, by 2021, it signed agreements to share 89 of its policies with 60 cities in 34 countries (Smart City Korea, 2021). Last but not least, Seoul’s evolving approach to its role in global society needs to be understood within a national context. After successfully growing into the tenth largest economy in the world, Korea has become a unique example of an aid recipient country that became a notable emerging donor. In 2010, Korea joined the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Since then, the Korean government has pursued refurbishing its Official Development 121

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Assistance (ODA) strategy by promoting its development experience as a model (Park et al., 2021b). In other words, Korea—which has been historically preoccupied with ‘catch-up’ development—has now begun to shift its position to become a leader capable of sharing its own development experience. Seoul’s global strategy to share its development experience with other developing countries’ cities has coincided with this national-level change and can be interpreted as part of a national trend. Korea’s ODA is also noted for being in an ambivalent position that showcases both sides of an emerging donor and a traditional donor. Unlike traditional donors in Western societies that have followed humanitarian or geopolitical motivations, emerging donors, such as China, have often pursued ODA for economic interests (Park et al., 2021b). Korea has aspired to follow the international standard of the DAC and enhance the country’s global diplomatic presence by providing ODA to give back to the global society. However, it has also sought to use ODA as an opportunity to expand export markets for Korean private companies (Park et al., 2021b). Competing motivations have also been found in Seoul. Closely resembling the national government’s ODA, Seoul has pursued both diplomatic interests to elevate its global standing and local economic interests. According to policy exchange team manager at the Global Urban Partnership Division at the Seoul Metropolitan Government: Seoul is the capital city of a unique country, whose status changed from an international aid recipient country to a donor country. Seoul thus feels the responsibility and the necessity to contribute to the global urban community by sharing Seoul’s development experience with developing countries’ cities, striving for win-win development. Therefore, by globally transferring its policy know-how and development experience that have been accumulated during its process of rapid urban development, Seoul seeks to strengthen its city diplomacy and increase business opportunities for the private sector. (Shin, 2015, p. 80) In 2015 the local government established Seoul Urban Solutions Agency (SUSA) as the primary implementing agency for urban solution exports. Its goal has been to share Seoul’s urban solutions with cities abroad and, in the process, to help expand business opportunities for local companies in international markets (Seoul Solution, n.d.). The Korean name of SUSA translates to ‘Seoul Policy Export Project Group’, which indicates how its self-development goals have been more directly communicated to domestic audiences. Furthermore, Seoul Solution (seoulsolution.kr/en)—a platform to share Seoul’s policies and development experiences— was launched in 2014. By providing information on Seoul’s specific urban systems (e.g., water management, transport, e-government, and urban railways), the expectation is to help connect local companies’ products and technologies to recipient cities (Joo, 2019; Shin, 2015). The Seoul Metropolitan Government has also liaised with the Korean government’s ODA projects and has collaborated with international organisations (e.g., the World Bank) on funded projects to reduce financial risk (Shin, 2015). Understanding the underlying self-developmental motivation to provide local companies with international markets in Seoul’s global strategy, it becomes clear why the term policy or urban solution ‘export’ is often used, especially locally. The expectation is to stimulate the local economy via helping companies find export markets for their products and services in conjunction with the Seoul Metropolitan Government sharing its policies. Although the policy itself is not being ‘exported’, the local use of the term indicates the self-developmental intention behind the ‘Seoul, Global Sharing City’ vision. 122

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This self-development aspect, which mimics the behaviour of the Korean government, distinguishes Seoul from Western donor cities. It appears to reflect the continued national influence and legacy of the developmental state. Similarly, Singapore—another global city with a strong state-guided development history—has been ‘exporting’ its development model to developing countries (Chua, 2011). To be sure, critics have questioned the integrity of what is being ‘exported’ and whether one city’s policies can be replicated in different local contexts (Park et al., 2021a; Chua, 2011). However, the globally changing narrative and, in particular, rapid development and escalating environmental and urban challenges in Asia seem to demand an Asian global leader to take a leading role in addressing regional challenges. Cities like Seoul, with its unique and rapid development and urbanisation experience, have combined self-developmental motives with the newly rising demand for cooperation and co-prosperity in the global urban society.

Conclusion Seoul’s growth from a minor regional city to a notable global city in Asia was dependent on the rise of Korea’s economic status in the global economy. In fact, the capital city’s success is still tied to its position as the national economy’s headquarters. The city has acted as the command and control centre of the domestic economy dominated by the Korean chaebols since its industrialisation. When the chaebols became international competitors, Seoul naturally emerged as a global city in Asia. Further, during this stage, Seoul rapidly expanded and modernised under the strong hand of the developmental state. In addition to the nation-state, local administrations have contributed to Seoul’s rise as a global city, especially under politically powerful mayors following Korea’s decentralisation reforms in the 1990s. The two conservative party mayors who governed in the 2000s had a distinct approach to Seoul’s global city formation compared with that of the left-leaning mayor who governed throughout the 2010s. The former two were impacted by neoliberalism after the Asian Financial Crisis and strove to refurbish Seoul’s image through mostly ‘hardware’ makeovers under the drive of enhancing Seoul’s global competitiveness. The latter mayor—under the influence of rising local demand for citizen engagement and the changing global narrative towards sustainability and intercity cooperation—began to forge a new development path and definition of being a global city in Asia. Seoul’s development reveals the influence of global narratives and trends on local policies in global city-making. The confluence of international values (whether competitive or sustainable/cooperating) and the ideologies of local political leaders shaped the two distinct stages of global city formation in the past two decades. What was also noteworthy was how, despite aligning Seoul’s policy agenda with changing global trends, the legacy of the developmental state persisted. Seoul continues to hold self-developmental aspirations while nesting in national and global value trends. Seoul has thus become a unique global city: simultaneously self-developmental and collaborative, contributing to the global society by leveraging its own development experience. In Asia, which is undergoing massive urbanisation, this new model of a global city seems to fit well. In the 2010s, Seoul had a unique opportunity to forge a new path in developing itself as a global city; the changing local, national, and global trends aligned to buttress its strategy. However, in 2021, Mayor Park’s administration abruptly came to an end, when the mayor committed suicide over a sexual harassment scandal. In a by-election, former Mayor Oh Se-hoon was elected once more. He has reintroduced global competitiveness to the local agenda; in a press meeting with foreign media, Mayor Oh stated his goal to establish Seoul as a ‘top-five 123

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global city’ in the world, emphasising its need to build competitiveness as a financial hub (Goh, 2022). Mayor Oh’s administration is aware of the global trends and local policies of the last decade. How Seoul will progress as a global city in the coming years remains to be seen.

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10 SHANGHAI New directions in Chinese metropolitan planning Richard Hu

Introduction China is rapidly marching into a highly urbanised society. According to the 2020 Census, China reached an urbanisation rate of 64 per cent (National Bureau of Statistics, 2021). In 1978 when China launched its ‘reform and opening-up’ agenda, its urbanisation rate was just 18 per cent (The World Bank, 2022). The scale and complication of this urbanisation are unusual. It has created progress and challenges, both of which are unprecedented in history and are unparalleled by any other country. It has come with mixed outcomes for sustainable development. It has achieved remarkable economic growth, massive infrastructure construction, and an overall lift in the standard of living; it has also caused environmental degradation, pollution, and social polarisation. China’s urbanisation has reached a critical stage or a crossroads of its strategic future: should it continue the old path of rapid growth with grave challenges or should it pursue a new post-growth trajectory of sustainable and high-quality development. This bifurcation has influenced the recent discourse—debates, policymaking, and planning—of Chinese cities. Building upon this emerging discourse, this chapter explores the new directions in Chinese metropolitan planning by drawing upon the latest planning efforts for Shanghai. Shanghai is an international metropolis by size and importance. It has a land area of 6,341 km², and it had a permanent population of nearly 24.88 million and a gross domestic product (GDP) output of RMB 3.87 trillion (USD 607 billion) in 2020 (Shanghai Bureau of Statistics, 2021). Within the Chinese urban system, Shanghai is the prime and gateway city: it leads other domestic cities in terms of economic power and is a strategic urban node linking the national economy with the global economy. In the Chinese administrative structure, Shanghai is a provincial-level municipality directly under the authorities of the central government. Its administrative scope contains central urban areas, suburban areas, and rural areas. So, metropolitan planning for Shanghai involves planning within its administrative area as well as planning in the region—the Yangtze River delta region, in which Shanghai is the ‘dragon’s head’ for its strategic geographic and economic positions (Hu & Chen, 2019). This chapter is organised as follows. It compares Shanghai 2035, the city’s latest master plan with two historical master plans since the early 1980s to identify new planning thinking and approaches. It further compares the latest master plans of Shanghai, Beijing, and 126

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Shenzhen to unpack how the new national development vision in a ‘new era’ and the recent national planning system reform have influenced the strategic visions and metropolitan planning practices. The chapter then examines the regional planning efforts in the Yangtze River delta region that aim to break through administrative borders to achieve regional integration and coordination. These historical, comparative, and multi-scalar analyses altogether reveal several explicit new directions in Chinese metropolitan planning in terms of vision, strategy, approach, and governance. These new directions inform an understanding of Chinese urban imaginary and development in the coming decades and further towards the mid-21st century.

Planning for global Shanghai Three master plans have been released for Shanghai since the early 1980s: in 1986, 2001, and 2017, respectively (Table 10.1). Both the 1986 plan and the 2001 plan played significant roles in guiding the city’s rapid growth and transformation, although planning often lagged the city’s development—a common phenomenon in many Chinese cities due to the rapidity of urbanisation (Hu, 2020; Hu & Chen, 2019). Preparation for a new master plan for Shanghai commenced in April 2014 to replace the incumbent 2011 plan then. The end product Shanghai Municipal Master Plan (2017–2035)—or Shanghai 2035 in abbreviation—was approved by the State Council in principle on 15 December 2017, and it was released to the public in January 2018. Centred around the vision of ‘striving for the excellent global city’, the Shanghai 2035 plan presents a structure that is akin to the strategic plans of major global cities while maintaining strong Chinese and local planning considerations. The document lists seven major features of itself, which are revealing as well as self-promoting (Shanghai Government, 2018): 1. Integrate global trends and local reality; unify national strategy and public will. 2. Highlight people-centric principles. 3. Employ a more open and coordinated development approach to achieve ‘global connectivity and regional coordination’. 4. Adhere to ‘bottom-line constraint, qualitative development, and resilient adaptation’, and explore a new development model for a megacity with high density. 5. Take advantage of unified administration of urban planning and land management, and implement ‘integration of urban planning and land use planning, and fusion of multiple plans’. 6. Transform planning thinking, system, and approach in a post-industrial age. 7. Emphasise the public policy nature of planning, and reflect its policy features in terms of strategic guidance, structural control, and implementation governance. Shanghai 2035 is fresh, open, and confident, compared with its predecessor plans (Table 10.1). It demonstrates a significant departure from the city’s previous master plans in terms of planning thinking, approach, and presentation. Among other things, there are three attributes of the plan that are particularly worth noting: First, Shanghai 2035 is global-oriented and is most reflective of the influence of international planning diffusion. The vision of ‘the excellent global city’ explicitly articulates Shanghai’s aspiration for ‘the global city’ status and for joining the global cities club. The plan acknowledges its borrowing of ‘the global city’ concept from theorists like Peter Hall, Stephen Hymer, John Friedmann, and Saskia Sassen, and draws upon the Globalization and World Cities (GaWC) Research Network’s rankings of global cities that show Shanghai’s steady rise 127

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• China and Shanghai’s integration with globalisation, and Shanghai’s rise as a global city • Xi Jinping’s ‘new era’ • Challenges and constraints of megacity growth • Integration of multiple plans into one blueprint: municipal master plan, land use plan, and special plans

Shanghai 2035 (2017)

Source: Created by the author.

• Strengthened national agenda of ‘reform and opening-up’, and a new round of China’s urbanisation and economic growth in the 1990s • ‘Socialist market economy’ enshrined in the national orthodoxy and Shanghai identified as the ‘dragon’s head’ in Chinese economy in 1992 • Pudong’s development and opening in 1990 • Shanghai’s economic restructuring and foreign direct investment growth

Shanghai Municipal Master Plan (2001)

• • • •

•

•

• Shanghai’s development situated in the international context • Shanghai as China’s economic, high-tech, and cultural centre; and as an international port city • Four layers of spatial structure: central city, suburban industrial towns, exurban towns, and rural towns • Ecological balance • Positioning of Shanghai as ‘serving the nation and facing the world’ • Shanghai as a modern socialist international metropolis and ‘four centres’ of international economy, finance, trade, and shipping • Spatial structure: multi-axis, multi-layer, and multi-nuclei • Megaregional development of the Yangtze River delta region

• National agenda of ‘reform and opening-up’ • Shanghai’s reversal from an inward-focused production centre and industrial base to a multi-functional foreign-oriented economic centre

Shanghai Municipal Master Plan (1986)

Influences

• Shanghai’s first statutory master plan approved by the State Council • Systematic implementation through district plans, detailed plans, and special plans • Guided Shanghai’s social, economic, and urban transformation at the end of the 20th century • A plan targeting 2020 and approved by the State Council • Implemented through a five-level planning system: master plan, divisional plan, unit plan, development control plan, and detailed plan • Expansion of Shanghai’s urban development from Huangpu River to Yangtze River • Guided Shanghai’s development in the beginning of the 21st century with a strong focus on internationalisation Vision: the excellent global city of innovation, • A plan targeting 2035 and approved by humanity, and green; an international centre of the State Council economy, finance, trade, shipping, and sci-tech • Representative of new planning thinking innovation and new approaches to plan-making, Alignment with the national agenda of socialist presentation, and communication in modernisation by 2035 and the ‘Chinese Shanghai and China dream’ of ‘great rejuvenation’ by 2050 ‘People-centric’ development Public consultation and communication Planning as public policy International planning diffusion of ‘the global city’ concept

Attributes

Contexts

Plans

Table 10.1 Master plans for Shanghai, 1986–2017

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in the 21st century. Almost two decades of urban knowledge circulation on ‘the global city’ concept informed, directly and indirectly, the central vision of the plan. Shanghai 2035 contains references to the latest strategic plans of London, New York, and Tokyo to benchmark its vision statement and strategic directions against theirs. Concepts in international planning literature and practice, such as smart growth, underpin the key development approaches. The central activity zone (CAZ), a concept first used in The London Plan (Mayor of London, 2004), was borrowed and applied to Shanghai. The plan is presented in a single plan report with three appendix documents on district plan guidelines, special plan guidelines, and action plan guidelines, respectively. This package seems to follow a common international style of plan documentation. The plan report is professionally designed with engaging graphics and illustrations, a contrast to the previous plans which mostly reflected the flair of government documents—bureaucratic and lacklustre. Second, Shanghai 2035 marks a shift from technical prescription to public policy in defining the nature of master plans in Shanghai and the Chinese planning system. This attribute reflects the most profound transformation in planning thinking and practice, one which has been nurtured over the past two decades along with China’s increasing integration with the world, including international planning diffusion. Since 1949, Chinese planning had, under the influence of the Soviet model, a strong emphasis on physical planning, spatial layout, and urban forms. This ‘technical nature’ (Wu, 2015, p. 46) also influenced planning education. In China, planning educational programmes are generally affiliated with architecture and civil engineering departments, prioritising spatial technical skills over broader economic, social, and environmental analyses. These planning professional and educational traditions have shaped the way master plans were made in Shanghai and other major cities in China previously. The earlier plan documents were more spatial plans with many technical specifications than strategic guidelines on comprehensive economic, social, and environmental development. Shanghai 2035 is a pioneer in clearly asserting its nature of public policy, differentiating it from the previous master plans for Shanghai and from this Chinese planning tradition. This pioneering approach is manifest in the document itself, transforming the plan from a prescriptive technical document to a set of strategic spatial policies, and emphasising plan implementation and governance mechanisms to achieve an operable and executable spatial management policy. This shift reflects the increasing maturity of planning theory and practice in the 21st century in China and embeds the growing incorporation into plan-making of social sciences and related disciplines such as geography, sociology, economics, and public policy. Third, the process of making Shanghai 2035 has been open, collaborative, and participatory, a telling contrast to the way the previous master plans were made. For a long time, urban plans were confidential in China. Plan-making was confined to a team of official planners, under the direct instruction of officials and political leaders, and involved limited advisory roles of government-recognised experts. The approach to making the Shanghai 2035 plan was reasonably receptive to stakeholder engagement. ‘Making plan with open doors’ was the principle set by government leaders in April 2014 when the project commenced. According to the plan document, its making involved the collaboration of 40 research teams, 22 municipal departments, and 16 district departments, working on 18 strategic research issues and 28 special plans (Shanghai Government, 2018). The documentation was prepared by four professional and academic institutions in different but complementary disciplines. The planning process was advised on by four lead experts representing the government and 30 advisory experts for independent third-party advice. A ‘public consultative league’ comprising delegates of the People’s Congress (a legislative body in the Chinese political system), members of the Political Consultative Conference (an advisory and deliberative body in the Chinese political 129

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system), and the public participated in the whole process of making the plan. Progress on the plan’s making was disseminated through the new media channels of WeChat and Weibo—both very popular social media outlets in China—and a dedicated project website. Community outreach included symposiums, conceptual urban design competitions, public surveys, civic forums, and a variety of other engagement activities. The draft plan was on public exhibition for one month as required by law. The final endorsed plan document is publicly available online; it even includes an abridged version in English. The above three features are tactical and technical in terms of setting the vision and making the plan. The shift from growth to post-growth that confronts China’s transformative urbanisation is most reflected by the three approaches proposed by the plan for Shanghai’s future development: • • •

Bottom-line constraints—population scale; land resources; ecological environment; and safety and security. Qualitative development—innovation-led; urban regeneration; quality upgrade; and urban-rural and regional integration. Resilient adaptation—multi-scenario planning; spatial reservation; resilient functional layout; and dynamic adjustment.

The plan uses all the buzzwords like ‘innovation, quality, regeneration, integration, resilience, and adaptation’ to pursue ‘smart growth under resources and environment constraining’ (Shanghai Government, 2018, p. 33). Put under the triple bottom-line framework of sustainable development in terms of economic growth, environmental protection, and social equity, the paradox confronting Shanghai’s development is essentially one of grow-green. On the one hand, the plan has set an ambitious ‘grow’ goal of ‘striving for the excellent global city’. On the other hand, the plan has also set stringent ‘green’ controls: by 2035, Shanghai’s population will not be more than its current level of around 25 million; the urban construction land will only decease; and the ecological space will only increase (Shanghai Government, 2018, p. 36). How to tackle and balance the intrinsic grow-green paradox is a wicked problem. This wicked problem is propelling the transformative urban discourse in China, as articulated in Shanghai 2035. However, Shanghai 2035 does not delve much into the reconciliation of this paradox, nor does it explicate a clear and reliable roadmap for realising the post-growth urban imaginary about sustainable and high-quality development.

Metropolitan planning in a ‘new era’ Planning is politics; this is especially so for Chinese planning. Political will and political discourse exert great influences on the way cities are envisioned, planned, and developed. Here are two political contexts for transformative metropolitan planning in China. One is the ‘new era’ discourse; the other is the planning system reform. The 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC)—such national congress is the most important event for deciding on the power structure and national strategies in the Chinese political system—was held in October 2017.  At the congress, Xi Jinping claimed a ‘new era’ for Chinese socialist modernisation and national ‘great rejuvenation’. Xi mapped a ‘three-phase’ strategy, building upon and advancing the ‘three-step’ strategy outlined by Deng Xiaoping in 1987, with a set of targeted timelines in 2020, 2035, and 2050, respectively: first, to ‘finish building a moderately prosperous society in all respects’ by 2020; second, to see that ‘socialist modernisation is basically realised’ by 2035; third, to develop China into 130

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a ‘great modern socialist country’ by 2050 (Xi, 2017). For the first stage’s goal, the Chinese government just claimed and celebrated the successful achievement of it in 2020 amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. The strategic focus is now on achieving the second stage of goal—a ‘basic’ modernisation by 2035. Thus, the year 2035 becomes a critical timeline for setting urban visions and making urban plans, as to be further illustrated below. Reforming the Chinese planning system has been an enduring issue for policy debates and proposals since the early 1980s, when urban planning was resurrected as a discipline and as a profession to meet the demand of the nation’s emerging urbanisation. In the official discourse, planning system reform is a part of the modernisation of the Chinese governance system and governance capacity, an integral component of the modernisation agenda for the ‘new era’. The most comprehensive and the latest planning system reform came in early 2018. The Chinese government established a new Ministry of Natural Resources to take charge of the repackaged ‘territorial spatial planning’—an ‘all-in-one’ spatial planning system integrating multiple planning types, like main function zone planning (the planning of development or protection of zones which have a main function of industrial products or services, agriculture, or ecology), land use planning, urban–rural planning, and other types of spatial planning, which formerly belonged to separate planning systems and were responsibilities of different government agencies. The new ‘territorial spatial planning’ is essentially ‘spatial planning’; but the former is—conceptually, administratively, and geospatially—broader than the latter after integrating and repackaging the multiple spatial planning responsibilities under one umbrella planning term and agency. Debates on the new ‘territorial spatial planning’ and its advances from the traditional ‘spatial planning’ are still on; there are some perceptive grey areas and confusions that are yet to be clarified between the two very similar terms. The new term’s conceptualisation and implications for planning practices are evolving and are open to interpretation and experimentation. This territorial spatial planning system was formally in place for implementation from May 2019, replacing the old planning system and its plan types—including main function zone plan, land use plan, urban system plan, municipal master plan, etc.—to achieve ‘integration of multiple plans into one’, or ‘one plan’ system. It was expected that by 2020 the new planning system would be ‘basically’ established nationwide, encompassing four subsystems of planmaking and approval system, implementation and supervision system, law and policy system, and technical standard system; further, the new territorial spatial master plans would be ‘basically’ completed at city/county and above administrative levels (Chinese Government, 2019a). This planning reform explained the discrepancies of major master plans released among major cities in the years before and after 2019–2020, as illustrated below. Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen are the top three cities in mainland China, measured by economic power, political significance, and prestige. They each head one of the three backbone city regions in China: the Beijing–Tianjin–Hebei region, the Yangtze River delta region, and the Greater Bay Area. These cities and regions are also gaining increasing leadership in the global urban system, thanks to the growth of the Chinese economy and the roles played by them in the Chinese and global economies. These cities are ready prisms through which to view the current metropolitan planning transformations in China. Their futures are being reimagined under the new national development strategy in a ‘new era’ and the new planning system, as stated above. They each had a new master plan in recent years, setting development visions, goals, and strategies till 2035 and long-term visions till 2050, aligned to the timeline of the national development strategy of modernisation. These plans are thereafter called Beijing 2035, Shanghai 2035, and Shenzhen 2035, respectively. The national development strategy and planning system reform have influenced the making of these plans 131

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to various degrees. The differences in the contexts of making them vividly reflect the recent changes in the planning discourse and practice in China. Beijing 2035 covers a planning timeframe of 2016–2035. This plan was formalised before the national 2035 vision came out in late 2017; as a result, the latter was not explicitly incorporated into the plan’s development vision and goals for Beijing. The ending year 2035 in the plan’s timeframe could be simply a coincidence with that of the national development strategy due to a master plan’s lifespan of 20 years from 2016 to 2035; and/or planners in Beijing could be presumably advised of the benchmark lines of 2035 and further 2050 given their proximity and connections with planners of the central government—just a guess! Beijing 2035 was the latest and probably the last master plan of a major city that was produced before the national 2035 vision and the planning system reform. Shanghai 2035 covers a planning timeframe of 2017–2035. Its title and timeframe were adapted during its making process from the original Shanghai 2040, responding to the new-born national 2035 vision. This plan was endorsed by the State Council in December 2017 and was officially released in January 2018, ahead of the planning system reform that started in March 2018. Consequently, Shanghai 2035 was probably the first master plan of a major city that was closely and explicitly aligned to the new national 2035 vision. But it was made and released as a ‘municipal master plan’ under the old planning system, rather than a ‘territorial spatial master plan’ in the new planning system. Technically, Shanghai had experimented with an integrative planning approach of combining the management and implementation of multiple plans, especially of master plans and land use plans, for years. The long-existing fragmentation of various plans in the Chinese planning system affected the consistency, coordination, implementation, and outcomes of urban planning—the central problem to be addressed in the planning system reform. The central government has called to ‘integrate multiple plans’ to ‘adhere to one blueprint’ in planning and constructing cities in its endorsement of Shanghai 2035 (Chinese Government, 2017). Shanghai was among the earliest cities to experiment with this transformative planning system. Shanghai 2035 was the first plan produced through integrating a master plan and a land use plan in a major Chinese city. Discussion and preparation of a new master plan in Shenzhen started in the same period as other major cities. But the progress was put on hold during those years of changes in the planning system and governance until 2021 when a draft ‘territorial spatial mater plan’—Shenzhen 2035—was released for public consultation. This draft plan covers a timeframe of 2020–2035. The public consultation process had already concluded by early 2022. Presumably the final version is going to be released soon, after being revised drawing upon the public feedbacks, and after being formally endorsed, normally, by the State Council. It is also presumed that the vision and major development goals in the final version will not be significantly different from those in the version for public consultation. Shenzhen 2035 is probably the first master plan of a major city that fully captures the national 2035 vision out in 2017 and the new planning system in place in 2019. These are well reflected in the plan’s full title Shenzhen 2035: Territorial Spatial Master Plan of Shenzhen. The master plan is the most important strategic and spatial planning document of a city, in the old and the new planning systems. The recent master plans of Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen had different contexts for their making within a short period of several years when both the national development strategy and the national planning system were updated or changed. They are the newest manifestos of metropolitan planning and development in China. Strategic positionings, visions, and development goals of them provide a new set of urban imaginaries: futuristic, optimistic, aspirational, and propagandic. There are differentiated strategic positionings and visions of these top Chinese cities: 132

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Beijing 2035: Strategic positioning—national political centre, cultural centre, international communication centre, and sci-tech innovation centre. Vision—an international first-class harmonious, liveable city. Goals by 2020—making significant progress in building an international first-class harmonious, liveable city. Goals by 2035—preliminary construction of an international first-class harmonious, liveable city. Goals by 2050—complete construction of an international first-class harmonious, liveable capital at a higher level. (BMCPNR, 2018) Shanghai 2035: Strategic positioning—an international centre of economy, finance, trade, shipping, and sci-tech innovation. Vision—an excellent global city. Goals by 2020—construction of a basic structure for a sci-tech innovation centre with global influence; basic construction of an international centre of economy, finance, trade, and shipping. Goals by 2035—basic construction of an excellent global city. Goals by 2050—complete construction of an excellent global city. (Shanghai Government, 2018) Shenzhen 2035: Strategic positioning—a national special economic zone and gateway of opening-up; an international sci-tech innovation centre; and a pilot demonstration zone of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Vision—a global benchmark city. Goals by 2025—becoming a modern, international, and innovative city; basic realisation of socialist modernisation. Goals by 2035—becoming an innovative, entrepreneurial, and creative city with global influence; becoming a model city of great socialist modern China. Goals by 2050—becoming a global benchmark city with excellent competitiveness, innovation, and influence. (SPNRB, 2021)

Beijing’s ‘four-centre’ (political centre, cultural centre, international communication centre, and sci-tech innovation centre) positioning is a reimagining of the capital’s role. This positioning, legitimised in a master plan, signifies a firm departure from the city’s previous aspiration of becoming a ‘world city’ of economic prowess (Hu, 2021). This positioning is a reaffirmation of the city’s primary role as the national capital, which for long has been mingled with an impetus of building the city into an economic centre rivalling Shanghai and Shenzhen under an overwhelming pro-growth ethos and urban regime. Decades of rapid growth—illplanned and wanton—has generated grave challenges to sustainability and liveability. The new master plan set the vision of a ‘harmonious, liveable city’ in the coming decades to counter its current ‘big city syndrome’ (BMCPNR, 2018). This vision responds to a repercussion of the undesired past and expresses a wish for the desired future. From a regional planning perspective, a salient feature of Beijing 2035 is the decentralisation of non-capital functions out of central Beijing to ‘Beijing subcentre’—a new civic centre to the east of the city to accommodate the Beijing government and some public services and resources. Xiong’an, a new city being built 105 km to the south of Beijing in Hebei province, was announced in April 2017 after Beijing 2035 was released. The imagination of Xiong’an has a dedicated purpose of accommodating those non-capital functions relocated from Beijing and of rebalancing and coordinating the development of Beijing–Tianjin–Hebei region which is overconcentrated in Beijing (Hu, 2020). In contrast to Beijing, the master plan of Shanghai reaffirms the city’s role as China’s leading economic centre and its gateway city status, through its ‘five-centre’ (economy, finance, trade, shipping, and sci-tech innovation) positioning and its vision of ‘striving for the excellent global city’ (Shanghai Government, 2018). In any sense, Shanghai is already a leading ‘global city’ (Sassen, 2001), a buzzword in the global urban discourse that appeals to city leaders and marketers in recent decades. Shanghai has ascended in the global city system from obscurity to leadership in just two decades (Hu & Chen, 2019). The particular ‘excellent global city’—a 133

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considered term by Shanghai’s planners and advisors—tells the city’s vision or ambition for the future: Shanghai, a latecomer and a follower of its counterpart global cities like New York, London, Tokyo, Singapore, and Hong Kong, now wants to become a leader. This is a recent mindset shift not only of the city, but of the nation probably. The planning of Shanghai in the regional context of the Yangtze River delta region will be discussed in next section. Shenzhen, the youngest and the most pioneering major Chinese city, is often dubbed an ‘urban miracle’. Planners tend to quote the city as a case of the triumph of planning—an over-simplistic generalisation about the city. The city’s genesis and rapid growth into an international metropolis nearly from scratch is not just a result of top-down decision and planning, notwithstanding crucial roles of them. Shenzhen is also an unplanned city, growing out of grassroots ingenuity and entrepreneurship—a more important factor in shaping the city’s risk-taking culture and its innovation capacity (Hu, 2020). Shenzhen, essentially a capitalist experiment, is being re-ideologised and celebrated as a socialist advancement in the official discourse. It was crowned a ‘pilot demonstration zone of socialism with Chinese characteristics’ by the central government in 2019. In its master plan, the city is attached with both an urban vision and a political mission: advancing Chinese urban development approach and showcasing Chinese socialism. This dual role differentiates Shenzhen’s vision from that of either Beijing or Shanghai: it is going to be a Chinese model city and a global benchmark city in the coming decades (SPNRB, 2021). Different from Beijing and Shanghai, the regional planning context of Shenzhen in the Greater Bay Area involves ‘one country, two systems’, a unique bespoke governance structure for Hong Kong and Macau. In 1980, Shenzhen was designated as a special economic zone (SEZ) simply for its proximity to Hong Kong. Today, Shenzhen’s GDP is more than Hong Kong’s. The rapid rise of Shenzhen presents a contrast to Hong Kong’s relative decline in the national urban system and the city’s bumpy integration with the motherland and increasing political unrest and socioeconomic divisions since its return in 1997 (Hu, 2020). Hong Kong is being reoriented towards closer integration with regional and national development by the central government’s resolute and forceful intervention, especially after the 2019 antiextradition street movement. Shenzhen seems to be commissioned with another political task of fulfilling ‘one country, two systems’ through ‘supporting the integration of Hong Kong and Macau into national development’ and ‘supporting Hong Kong’s economic and social development’, as explicitly expressed in Shenzhen 2035 (SPNRB, 2021, p. 6). At the Hong Kong side, a Northern Metropolis is being imagined along the border with Shenzhen, aiming to capitalise on the spillover of technology and innovation (HKSARG, 2021). ‘One country, two systems’ presents a unique and interesting context of intercity collaboration and regional planning for Shenzhen and its neighbouring city Hong Kong in the Greater Bay Area. Despite the intercity nuances and regional contexts in setting visions and development goals, the latest master plans of these leading Chinese cities are broadly aligned with the national development vision towards 2035 and beyond. Altogether, the national plan and the urban plans collectively forge a set of imaginaries that are illustrative of the new discourse that is attempting to reinvent metropolitan planning and development in the coming decades.

Planning Shanghai in the Yangtze River delta region Regionalisation is the new spatial representation of Chinese urbanisation and national development. The 14th Five-Year Plan set the national development strategy for the period of 2021–2025 and outlined a long-term vision until 2035 in alignment with the national development strategy for the ‘new era’. This strategic plan mapped a spatial structure underpinned by 134

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‘city clusters’ and ‘metropolitan circles’ for China’s ‘new-type’ urbanisation. The central tenet of promoting this strategic spatial structure is to establish integrated, coordinated regional development governance and mechanism across the country (Chinese Government, 2021). The 14th Five-Year Plan identified 19 city clusters—essentially mega urban agglomerations of city regions (Scott, 2001)—which are of different scales and at different development stages: the eastern coastal ones are larger and stronger; the inland and western ones are smaller and weaker. Many city clusters contain metropolitan circles, which refer to the congregated and closely connected urban area within the commuting range of a central city—mostly a powerful provincial capital city. This central city has a strong regional outreach that is often beyond the administrative boundary of itself. Thus, a metropolitan circle generally comprises one strong central city and several smaller cities (in terms of population size, economic power, and administrative level) in its surroundings. Definitions and criteria of metropolitan circles differ. One recent study identified 34 metropolitan circles in mainland China (ICSU, 2019). Shanghai plays a ‘dragon’s head’ role in the planning for both regional scales of ‘city cluster’ and ‘metropolitan circle’ in the Yangtze River delta region. Shanghai 2035 presents a spatial structure for Shanghai in the region (Figure 10.1). This spatial structure has been identified in previous national strategies. Shanghai 2035 reaffirms Shanghai’s importance and role in regional planning that is beyond the administrative border of the city itself. The Yangtze River delta city cluster headed by Shanghai is one of the three backbone city regions that all are of international leadership and competitiveness, as stated above. Planning for all these leading city clusters is now a national strategy. In 2016, the central government, via the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the Ministry for Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MHURD) then, released the Development Plan for the Yangtze River Delta City Cluster. The development plan scoped 26 cities across one provincial-level municipality (Shanghai) and three provinces (Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Anhui), which altogether accounted for 2.2 per cent of national land, 18.5 per cent of national GDP, and 11 per cent of national population as of 2014 (NDRC & MHURD, 2016). The development plan further scoped five metropolitan circles centred around Hangzhou, Ningbo, Nanjing, Hefei, and Suzhou–Wuxi–Changzhou, respectively, while Shanghai is the core of the whole city cluster (NDRC & MHURD, 2016). Built upon this city cluster structure, Shanghai 2035 delineates a 90-minute commuting circle as the base for ‘one city development’—a central planning and development notion for metropolitan circles to achieve intercity connectivity and consistent delivery of and access to public services. On the basis of this commuting circle, a spatial and planning concept of the Great Shanghai Metropolitan Circle is being forged, containing major cities within the commuting circle: Shanghai; Suzhou, Wuxi, Changzhou, and Nantong in the Jiangsu province; and Jiaxing, Ningbo, Zhoushan, and Huzhou in the Zhejiang province. With a total land area of 56,000 km², this metropolitan circle had a population of 71 million and GDP of RMB 10 trillion (USD 1.57 trillion) (SPNRB, 2020). If this metropolitan circle were a nation, it would rank 20th by population between Germany and France (Wikipedia, 2022a), and would rank 14th by GDP between Australia and Spain (Wikipedia, 2022b). Shanghai government took the lead in formulating a spatial coordinative plan for this Great Shanghai Metropolitan Circle, which was released to the public in September 2022. Spatially, this metropolitan circle incorporates the whole Suzhou–Wuxi– Changzhou metropolitan circle, and parts of Hangzhou and Ningbo metropolitan circles. The Great Shanghai Metropolitan Circle seems to impose an upper layer and super metropolitan circle on the existing ones, with Shanghai as the central city. The Yangtze River delta has

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Figure 10.1  Planning Shanghai in the Yangtze River delta region. Source:  Shanghai Government (2018), recreated by the author.

developed into an interconnected urban region and urban system, challenging the conceptualisation and spatial delineation of metropolitan circles that are distinct from each other. In November 2018, Xi Jinping announced that the integrated development of the Yangtze River delta region was elevated onto a national strategy. In December 2019, the Chinese gov136

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ernment released the Outline Plan for Integrated Development of the Yangtze River Delta Region, covering the whole area of the above one municipality and three provinces—a total area of 358,000 km², among which the major cities that constitute the Yangtze River delta city cluster occupy 225,000 km² (Chinese Government, 2019b). As of 2020, the Yangtze River delta region had a total population of 235 million (Shanghai Bureau of Statistics, 2021). This is a grand plan for the integrated development of a mega region that produces a quarter of the national GDP. The Yangtze River delta region is the most urbanised, developed region in China; it is also one of the leading global city regions. There is no shortage of regional planning strategies and visions for it. Of the plans at various regional scales—metropolitan circle, city cluster, or the whole delta region, Shanghai is the ‘dragon’s head’ for its geographical location at the estuary of the Yangtze River as well as for its strategic importance as China’s gateway city. All the above regional plans converge on one central objective of achieving integrated, coordinated regional development that would break through the administrative borders between cities and between provinces. This is a challenge confronting regional planning in China and elsewhere, and there is no easy approach or a panacea that would work for all regions. As we have observed in the Yangtze River delta region, the regionwide planning is elevated onto a national strategy and the central government is taking the lead and employing a top-down approach to steer planning and actions at provincial and local levels. Uncertainty and questions remain in implementation, which rests at provincial and local levels, however. When cities are chained in city regions, regional coordination becomes a paramount planning and governance issue. There are two overarching goals in all the efforts to achieve regional coordination. One is to break through the administrative borders and the associated governance, planning, services, and infrastructure that are fragmented or ‘bordered’. The other is to rebalance the centrality of urban functions, capacities, and resources that are ‘overconcentrated’ in those central cities. Both inter-regional and intra-regional imbalances exist in China. While certain coastal regions are already at the levels of developed economies, the vast inland and western regions still define China as a developing country. Within a metropolitan circle, the central city has achieved an agglomeration economy often at the cost of its surrounding cities in terms of attracting talent, resources, and political favouritism. Administratively delineated cities are competitors rather than collaborators. Shifting intercity competition to collaboration is a focal issue confronting Chinese metropolitan planning in the context of increasing regionalisation.

Conclusion The recent planning for Shanghai has demonstrated three explicit directions at three scales, respectively: global aspiration, national mission, and regional coordination. Shanghai is a strategic urban node in the global city system. The vision of ‘striving for the excellent global city’ in Shanghai 2035 is a statement about the city’s re-emergence as a global city and about the nation’s economic rise in the 21st century. Nationally, the city’s development goals, together with those of other major cities like Beijing and Shenzhen, are closely aligned to the national development strategy and timeline towards modernisation in a ‘new era’. Politic will is injecting new discourse and missions into the urban imaginary for a strategic city like Shanghai. Both globalism and nationalism have mingled into the imagining of future Shanghai. Regionalism is expanding the spatial scope for Shanghai’s metropolitan planning that is not just within its administrative area but in the Yangtze River delta region, which as a global city region is of 137

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national dominance and international importance. Shanghai, without any doubt, is expected to play a ‘dragon’s head’ role in achieving integrated, coordinated regional development. China’s urbanisation is transitioning towards a post-growth paradigm from what it has been known for several decades—growth. The shift from growth to post-growth confronts Chinese urban development and broader national development. As illustrated in the metropolitan planning of Shanghai in historical, comparative, and multi-scalar contexts, both transformative planning discourse and practice are emerging, in response to and in anticipation of the urban paradigm shift. Challenges and complications have characterised China’s urbanisation marked by rapid growth. The post-growth stage of China’s urbanisation is no less challenging and complicating in pursuit of sustainable and high-quality development. Both promise and uncertainty exist in implementing the new plans to achieve the imaginaries aspired and advocated, especially in reconciling the grow-green paradox.

References BMCPNR (Beijing Municipal Commission of Planning and Natural Resources). (2018). Beijing municipal master plan (2016–2035) [Beijing cheng shi zong ti gui hua (2016–2035)]. http://ghzrzyw.beijing.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/zxzt/bjcsztgh20162035/202001/t20200102_1554613.html Chinese Government. (2017). State council’s approval on Shanghai municipal master plan [guo wu yuan guan yu shang hai cheng shi zong ti gui hua de pi fu]. State Council. http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/ content/2017-12/25/content_5250134.htm Chinese Government. (2019a). CPC Central Committee and State Council’s opinions on establishing territorial spatial planning system and its supervision and implementation [zhong gong zhong yang guo wu yuan guan yu jian li guo tu kong jian gui hua ti xi bing jian du shi shi de ruo guan yi jian]. Xinhua News Agency. www.gov.cn/zhengce/2019-05/23/content_5394187.htm Chinese Government. (2019b). Outline plan for integrated development of the Yangtze River delta region [chang jiang san jiao zhou qu yu yi ti hua fa zhan gui hua gang yao]. Xinhua News Agency. www. gov.cn/zhengce/2019-12/01/content_5457442.htm Chinese Government. (2021). The People’s Republic of China’s 14th five-year plan for national economic and social development & outline objectives of the 2035 vision [zhong hua ren ming gong he guo guo ming jing ji he she hui fa zhan di shi si ge wu nian gui hua he 2035 nian yuan jing mu biao gang yao]. Xinhua News Agency. http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021-03/13/content_5592681.htm HKSARG (Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government). (2021). Northern metropolis development strategy. Government Logistics Department. https://www.policyaddress.gov.hk/2021/ eng/pdf/publications/Northern/Northern-Metropolis-Development-Strategy-Report.pdf Hu, R. (2020). The Shenzhen phenomenon: From fishing village to global knowledge city. Routledge. Hu, R. (2021). Smart design: Disruption, crisis, and the reshaping of urban spaces. Routledge. Hu, R., & Chen, W. (2019). Global Shanghai remade: The rise of Pudong new area. Routledge. ICSU (Institute for China Sustainable Urbanization). (2019). China metropolitan circles development report 2018 [zhong guo du shi quan fa zhan bao gao 2018]. Tsinghua University. http://tucsu.tsinghua.edu.cn/upload_files/atta/1551401345990_2C.pdf Mayor of London. (2004). The London plan: Spatial development strategy for Greater London. Greater London Authority. https://www.london.gov.uk/what-we-do/planning/london-plan/ past-versions-and-alterations-london-plan/london-plan-2004 National Bureau of Statistics. (2021, May 11). Key data from the 7th national census on population [di qi ci quan guo ren kou pu cha zhu yao shu ju qing kuang]. http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/202105/ t20210510_1817176.html NDRC & MHURD. (2016). Yangtze River delta city cluster development plan [chang jiang san jiao zhou cheng shi qun fa zhan gui hua]. NDRC. https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xxgk/zcfb/ghwb/201606/ t20160603_962187.html?code=&state=123 Sassen, S. (2001). The global city: New York, London, Tokyo (2nd ed.). Princeton University Press. Scott, A. J. (Ed.). (2001). Global city-regions: Trends, theory, policy. Oxford University Press. Shanghai Bureau of Statistics. (2021). Shanghai statistical yearbook. http://tjj.sh.gov.cn/tjnj/20220309/0 e01088a76754b448de6d608c42dad0f.html

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Shanghai Shanghai Government. (2018). Shanghai master plan 2017–2035 [Shanghai shi cheng shi zong ti gui hua 2017–2035]. Shanghai Urban Planning and Land Resource Administration Bureau. https://www.supdri. com/2035/index.php?c=message&a=type&tid=33 SPNRB (Shanghai Planning and Natural Resources Bureau). (2020, October 9). Coordinated plan for great Shanghai metropolitan circle [shang hai da du shi quan xie tong gui hua]. https://ghzyj.sh.gov. cn/gzdt/20201009/3e74e232eb4f4436a3972b63e1f8adf1.html SPNRB (Shenzhen Planning and Natural Resources Bureau). (2021). Shenzhen 2035: Territorial spatial master plan of Shenzhen (2020–2035) [version for public consultation]. http://pnr.sz.gov.cn/attachment/0/794/794784/8858879.pdf The World Bank. (2022). Urban population (% of total population). https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS Wikipedia. (2022a). List of countries and dependencies by population. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ List_of_countries_and_dependencies_by_population Wikipedia. (2022b). List of countries by GDP (nominal). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_ by_GDP_(nominal) Wu, F. (2015). Planning for growth: Urban and regional planning in China. Routledge. Xi, J. (2017). Secure a decisive victory in building a moderately prosperous society in all respects and strive for the great success of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era. XinhuaNet. http:// www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping's_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf

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11 TAIPEI Towards a liveable and sustainable city Chia-Huang Wang

Introduction This chapter investigates the Taipei City government’s attempts to realise the grand vision of building a ‘liveable and sustainable Taipei’ through the use of strategic spatial planning and the implementation of policies that promote urban environmental, economic, and social sustainability. It begins by providing a profile of Taipei City, including its history, geography, urban spatial development, and economic and industrial structures. Thereafter, Taipei City government’s (TCG) strategic vision and planning policies are introduced, followed by descriptions and analyses of the strategies, policies, and measures aimed at achieving environmental, economic, and social sustainability. The chapter also highlights the challenges the city faces in achieving these three dimensions of urban sustainability, revealing the local political and social contexts and how they interact with the United Nations’ global agenda of sustainable development, especially in relation to urban development.

Transformation of Taipei City Taipei City is located in the Taipei Basin in Northern Taiwan and is surrounded by New Taipei City (formerly Taipei County). The basin is characterised by ridges resulting from overthrust faults and is bordered by the Datun volcano group. With a subtropical monsoon climate, Taipei City has a hot and humid summer with afternoon thunderstorms and typhoons being common. The winter is relatively mild, influenced by the Northeast monsoon. Taipei City stretches across an area of 271.7997 km2 and has more than 2.6 million residents (2,602,418 residents in 2020) in 12 administrative districts, with a population density of 9,575/km2 (TYEG, 2020, pp. 48–52). A map of Taipei City and its administrative districts is presented in Figure 11.1. Although separated by administrative boundaries, Taipei City and New Taipei City form the core of the Northern Taiwan Metropolitan Area. These two cities and the neighbouring cities (Keelung City, Taoyuan City, and Yilan County) constitute a commuter belt, with residents living and working across the region. The metropolitan area has a population of approximately 9.28 million, placing considerable demands on Taipei City’s carrying capacity in environmental, economic, infrastructure, psychological, and spatial dimensions. 140

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Figure 11.1  An indicative map of Taipei City with its administrative districts and Northern Taiwan Metropolitan Area. Notes: The above map is Taipei City; the below map is Northern Taiwan Metropolitan Area that contains Taipei City. Source:  The author.

The development of Taipei City began in the Qing dynasty when Han settlers from China requested permission to establish a development corporation in 1709. Settlers gradually moved to the area to engage in agricultural and commercial activities. The western area of Taipei, today’s Wanhua and Datong, was the focus of this area of development. The Taipei Prefecture was established in 1875, and the city’s walls were constructed at that time. The Japanese empire defeated the Qing dynasty in the First Sino–Japanese War in 1895 and colonised Taiwan. The Japanese colonial government initiated a programme of urban regeneration 141

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in 1905, demolishing the walls and developing the city infrastructure, including thoroughfares, parks, and sanitation facilities (TYEG, 2020, pp. 48–50). Owing to the progress of the colonial government’s urban plans and construction, Ximending, the new central business district (CBD) around the old West Gate, emerged and became the centre of political, socioeconomic, and cultural development, whereas the eastern area of Taipei specialised in agricultural production. The end of World War II brought Taiwan back under China’s rule. However, in 1949, when the Kuomintang (KMT) government was defeated by the Chinese Communist Party, it was forced to flee to Taiwan. Taipei was designated as the provisional capital of the Republic of China and was promoted to a centrally administered municipality in 1967. Taipei City continued to grow through the merging of several townships of Taipei County and by attracting skilled workers, domestic migrants, and resources. Ximending, Taipei Main (train) Station, and the surrounding areas became a focus for popular culture, shopping, and commerce. With Taiwan’s rapid industrialisation in the 1960s and 1970s, migrants from the rural areas of Central and Southern Taiwan moved to Taipei in search of jobs and opportunities, rapidly populating the eastern area of Taipei City and establishing the need for housing and commercial activities. A polycentric structure developed during the 1980s because of the establishment of local business and transnational corporation headquarters in Taipei City. This led to an influx of foreign direct investment (FDI), the growth of local markets and consumption, the promotion of high-tech industries and producer services, and the formulation and implementation of an eastward urban plan and industrial policies (Chou, 2005, pp. 56–58). In the polycentric urban structure, the eastern and western areas of the city are the core CBDs. An eastward urban plan was conceived in the mid-1970s to remove the military sites in the eastern area of the city, build residential houses to accommodate the rapidly increasing population, and ease the spatial pressures on the western area. In the planning process, the creation of a multifunctional commercial centre was envisioned. At the end of the 1970s, a more ambitious plan was formulated to relocate the City Hall to this area, build the Taipei World Trade Centre, and promote large-scale property development. In the 1990s, Xinyi Planning District was reimagined to create a ‘Manhattan of Taipei’, with marketing and reimagining strategies intended to promote finance, MICE (meeting, incentive, exhibition/event, and convention/conference), and producer service industries. A new CBD has emerged in Xinyi District with the construction of Taipei 101, the landmark skyscraper, creating a cityscape reminiscent of a first-tier global city, with transnational corporation headquarters, five-star hotels, luxurious mansions, grand convention centres, and shopping and entertainment complexes. Together, the old and new CBDs have been the driving force behind Taipei’s urban development (Jou, 2005). Ximending, the old urban core and CBD, experienced a long-term decline in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Nevertheless, Ximending and the surrounding areas have begun to redevelop following the demolition of the Zhonghua Shopping Mall, rerouting of the railway underground, and the construction of the mass rapid transit (MRT) system. The Zhonghua Shopping Mall was popular with both the city’s residents and tourists because of its food stalls and nightlife, but with the ageing of the buildings and development of the city’s polycentric urban structure, this mall began to constrain the redevelopment of the western area. The dismantling of its buildings, together with the rerouting of the railway, helped to create an open space to accommodate the flow of people, vehicles, and commercial activities. Moreover, the MRT stations have contributed to Ximending’s revitalisation by providing efficient transportation for commuters and tourists.

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Taipei Table 11.1 Statistics of business and companies registered in Taipei City (by industry type) Industry

No. of local businesses

%

No. of companies

%

Agriculture, forestry, fishing & animal husbandry  Mining and quarrying  Manufacturing  Electricity & gas supply  Water supply & remediation  Engineering  Wholesale & retail  Transportation & storage  Accommodation & food service  Information & communication  Finance & insurance  Real estate  Professional, scientific, & technical services  Support service  Public administration & defence; compulsory social security  Education  Medical services & social work activities  Arts, entertainment, & recreation  Other services  Other services  Total

187

 0.31

2,796 

1.55

6  701  4  117  2,220  29,240  5,207  9,505  929  423  226  2,005 

0.01  1.18  0.01  0.20  3.74  49.22  8.17  16.00  1.56  0.71  0.38  3.38 

440  29,130  1,112  437  20,715  31,692  5,175  1,969  11,146  21,441  8,952  29,909 

0.24  16.18  0.62  0.24  11.51  17.60  2.87  1.09  6.19  11.91  4.97  16.61 

1,324  0 

2.23  0

5,095  24 

2.83  0.01 

128  0 

0.22  0

158  4 

0.09  0

2,060 

3.47 

828 

0.46 

5,119  0  59,401

8.62  0 100

3,884  5,126  180,033

2.16  2.85  100

Source: TYEG (2020, p. 76). Notes: According to the Business Registration Act, the term ‘business’ means ‘an enterprise managed in the manner of sole proprietorship or partnership for sale’. The term ‘company’ means ‘a corporate juristic person organised and incorporated for the purpose of profit making’, in accordance with the Company Act. For the details of the Acts, please browse the website of the Ministry of Justice (2022).

With the transformation of the urban spatial structure, Taipei has become a post-industrial city characterised by the activities of the tertiary sector and high-tech industries, such as information and communication-related manufacturing. Table 11.1 compares local businesses and companies by industries. Wholesale and retail businesses constitute 49.22 per cent of all local businesses, whereas accommodation and food services account for just 16 per cent of local businesses. In terms of companies, the wholesale and retail sector constitutes 17.6 per cent of the total number of companies in the city, followed by professional, science, and technical services (16.61 per cent) and electricity and gas supply companies (16.18 per cent). In addition, 11.91 per cent of companies are in the finance and insurance sector, and 11.51 per cent of companies are engineering related. In the manufacturing sector, the leading subsectors are computer, electronics, and optical products (13.95 per cent), metal products (12.11 per cent), food manufacturing (11.63 per cent), the printing and reproduction of recorded media (9.59 per cent), and machinery and equipment manufacturing (8.53 per cent) (TYEG, 2020, p. 76). 143

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Grand vision and strategic urban planning The TCG has been promoting sustainable development since the mid-1990s. The mayors and their administrations over the past two decades have set objectives and formulated policies to pursue the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In response to the Agenda for Sustainable Development launched by the United Nations Sustainable Development Summit on 25 September 2015, the TCG devised a grand vision for Taipei’s sustainable development, designating seven priority SDGs in 2019 and increasing them to 11 in 2020. The TCG formulated a four-tier strategic planning structure. The first tier is the grand vision of a liveable and sustainable city, based on three principles: (1) environmental resources based on symbiosis and recycling, (2) social security and sharing progress, and (3) an intelligent economy and technological development. The second tier consists of 17 SDGs corresponding to the grand vision, with six subgoals aimed at building city brands: Sustainable Taipei, Safe Taipei, Ecological Taipei, Cultural Taipei, Clean Taipei, and Industrial Taipei; each of these subgoals corresponds to a relevant SDG. The third tier comprises 11 priority SDGs with specific indicators and outcomes. The bottom tier consists of strategic maps, national environmental plans, and indicators relating to a healthy city and city competitiveness (DEP, 2020, p. 32). The TCG’s plans, policies, and actions not only follow the agenda set by the UN SDGs but are also consistent with the core dimensions of the New Urban Agenda (NUA) articulated by the United Nations Human Settlements Programme: social sustainability, economic sustainability, environmental sustainability, and spatial sustainability (UN Habitat, 2020, p. xviii). The TCG has adopted many of the NUA instruments, including intervention mechanisms, physical measures for infrastructure and services, soft measures, and technology and innovation, which will be discussed further in the following sections.

Environmental sustainability To address the challenges of extreme climate change, the TCG has developed a three-stage roadmap to review the actions of previous administrations and guide the city’s climate response. The first stage focuses on developing strategies (2008–2015), the second stage on capacity building (2015–2030), and the third on achieving net-zero emissions by 2050 (2030– 2050). During the first stage, the plans and regulations promoting energy saving and carbon reduction have focused on mitigating and adapting to an increasingly extreme climate by promoting industrial and commercial energy saving as well as green buildings. The second stage concentrates on the control of carbon emission and self-examination based on Taipei City’s voluntary local review and supervisory reports. The goal of the final stage is to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050 (DEP, 2021, pp. 20–21). The TCG plans to implement six strategies: smart zero-carbon buildings, green transportation, e-mobility, renewable energy, green innovation investment, and low-carbon procurement. The smart zero-carbon strategy has begun with energy management systems and the intensive recycling of materials and waste in the Nangang Depot Social Housing project and is combined with low-carbon designs for public construction projects and the launch of the Solar Taipei Program, which encourages the use of solar energy. Green transportation is based on a network of transit-oriented development (TOD), which establishes the MRT as the backbone of the public transport system, connecting to the bus network, bike sharing system (YouBike), and pavements with bike lanes. The green transportation network is complemented by e-mobility, characterised by electric public buses, incentive programmes encouraging motorbike riders to buy electric motorbikes, and supportive infrastructure. 144

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The pilot project involves the provision of subsidies to bus companies to replace diesel buses with electric ones, building of electric bus terminals, and promotion of electric buses for new routes. The number of electric buses is expected to increase from 48 in 2020 to 400 by the end of 2022. The TCG has tripled subsidies for motorbike riders to buy electric motorbikes and offered ‘four exemptions’: no vehicle licence tax, no fuel tax, no parking fees, and no charging fees. The TCG has been installing charging bays at the carparks of government offices, schools, and parks, and providing subsidies to encourage private apartments to install chargers for electric vehicles. The promotion of renewable energy focuses on solar energy by establishing photovoltaic power stations at government offices and schools, subsidising the private installation of solar energy facilities, encouraging civil power plants, and promoting a smart grid. With the goal of constructing an urban circular economy, green innovation investment programmes have been established to provide incentives and subsidies to small and medium enterprises to help them reduce manufacturing-related pollution. Finally, low-carbon procurement regulations encourage manufacturers to apply for ecolabels so that the government and citizens can identify their products and engage in green consumption (DEP, 2021).

Economic and spatial sustainability To promote Taipei’s economic sustainability, the TCG has formulated a strategic spatial plan in which the West Gate and East Gate become the hubs of Taipei’s industrial, social, and transportation development, helping to balance urban spatial development. The East Gate is located in Nangang District, where the high-tech and service industries, such as software, MICE, popular music, cultural and creative, and biotechnology industries, are located. Industrial parks, buildings, and infrastructure have been constructed to support these industries; examples include the Nangang Software Park, Nangang Exhibition Center, and Taipei Music Center. The Taiwan Railway, Taiwan High Speed Rail (THSR), and MRT stations serve as the transit points in this sector. In addition, a three-dimensional connected pedestrian system, ecological and green corridor, and social housing are under construction (DUD, 2020). The West Gate sector focuses on smart transportation, the reconstruction of public infrastructure, revitalisation of cultural heritage, and urban redevelopment. Taipei Main Station and bus, MRT, and THSR stations constitute the transit gateways of the West Gate. An urban redevelopment project with new buildings, including a city museum, at the old Taipei City Council site, and the urban renewal of the old North Gate Post Office with specialised zones will provide an open and green space for pedestrians (DUD, 2020). The West Gate development will connect Ximending with two old sub-CBDs in western Taipei, Wanhua District and the Dadaocheng area in Datong District (especially Dihua Street), a popular traditional trading and shopping area, thus synergising urban consumption and cultural and creative heritagebased activities. The East and West Gate projects are based on the developmental strategies and plans of former administrations. The East Gate project integrates the central government’s and previous city administrations’ plans and policies for eastward urban development. For example, Nangang Software Park was established by the Industrial Development Bureau, Ministry of Economic Affairs. Another example is Neihu Technology Park, which was initially designated as a light industrial park; however, in view of the emerging clusters of high-tech firms and the problems of spatial coordination and infrastructure demands, the TCG stepped in to help organise a local industrial association, enact regulations, and allocate resources. The park was renamed Neihu High Technology Park in 2001. Two MRT lines, the Taiwan Railway (Nangang 145

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Station), and expressways and highways constitute complex transportation networks that connect the parks to other areas of Taipei and cities in Northern Taiwan. The Taipei Music Center was conceived as one of the New Ten Grand National Constructions in 2003, and the official project was approved by the Executive Yuan (the executive branch of Taiwan’s government) in 2008. The Council of Cultural Affairs (now the Ministry of Culture), under the Executive Yuan, delegated its construction to the TCG, overseen by a board of trustees. In terms of the West Gate, the Dadaocheng area, especially Dihua Street, was a key trading centre (wholesale and retail of tea, rice, and Chinese food ingredients) under the Qing dynasty and Japanese rule. The urban planning of the Japanese colonial government resulted in the city walls being demolished and modern thoroughfares built, which helped connect the Dadaocheng area and Manka (today’s Wanhua District) with the inner city, triggering economic and population growth in these two areas (Lee, 2020). Between 1949 and the 1980s, after the relocation of the KMT government to Taiwan, Dihua Street and the Dadaocheng area became commercial subcentres, although their prosperity began to decline as Ximending began to prosper and a new CBD emerged in the eastern area of Taipei City. The city government had been planning to demolish the old buildings and widen Dihua Street between the late 1970s and late 1980s to address traffic problems and encourage urban renewal. However, the plan encountered opposition from civil society groups and professionals ( journalists, historians, and architects). Local residents, property owners, professionals, and the city government engaged in debate for several years until the TCG finally proposed the Dadaocheng Historical Landscape Special Zone plan, offering incentives through transferrable development rights (TDRs) to settle the matter; however, not everyone in the local community is satisfied with this compromise (Tan & Waley, 2006). Nevertheless, the Dadaocheng area, especially Dihua Street, has become a leading cultural tourism attraction, with stores selling traditional Chinese medicines (e.g. ginseng), fabric, and Chinese food ingredients (e.g., dried sea cucumber and black fungus) since the mid-2000s. A number of microenterprises, such as cafes, pubs, and stores, selling tea sets and accessories have moved into this niche market (cultural and creative industries). Festivities and events promoted by local associations and the city government, such as a Chinese New Year Market and Valentine’s Day Fireworks Show at Dadaocheng Wharf, have been extensively used for place marketing. This approach is based on the desire to balance cultural tourism attractiveness and landscape conservation (Luo & Chiou, 2021). Between the East Gate and West Gate are the Songshan Cultural and Creative Park (SCCP) in Xinyi District and Huashan 1914 Creative Park in Zhongzheng District near Taipei Main Station. The SCCP was a tobacco factory under Japanese rule and was designated by the TCG as an example of a city historical heritage in 2001, turning it into a cultural and creative park. The TCG entrusted the Taipei Culture Foundation with the management of the park to build a ‘Creative Hub in Taipei’. The Huashan 1914 Park was a winery and camphor factory from the time of Japanese rule to the late 1980s. Over the past two decades, the site has evolved from a special zone for cultural and art activities into a creative park under national economic planning. Moreover, the Beitou–Shilin Technology Park, located in the north of Taipei (Beitou and Shilin Districts), was constructed to develop biomedical technologies and serve as a model smart city. Thus, Nangang Software Park in the East Gate sector, Neihu Technology Park, and Beitou–Shilin Technology Park are set to generate clusters of high-tech industries, such as those related to information and communication technology and biomedicine. The relatively new CBD in Xinyi and the business-consumption belt along Section 4, Zhonghsiao East Road, are key spaces for MICE, finance, shopping, and entertainment. The West Gate 146

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sector, linking the old CBD in Ximending, Wanhua District, and Dadaocheng, serves as a business and transit centre in the west of the city. The SCCP and Huashan 1914 Creative Park between the two gates constitute Taipei’s cultural and creative industrial corridor. The MRT, bus transportation, and roadway systems interconnecting the gates, industrial parks, and commercial and residential areas form the arteries of Taipei’s economic and spatial development.

Social sustainability House prices in Taipei City are extremely high and continue to rise. Upper-middle-class or double-income households might be able to buy a house in the city, but housing is unaffordable for the lower middle classes and socioeconomically disadvantaged. As indicated in Table 11.2, the mortgage-to-income ratio in Taiwan is 36.27 per cent, and the house-price-to-income ratio was 9.07 in quarter 2 of 2021. The mortgage-to-income ratio and price-to-income ratio in Taipei City are 63.11 per cent and 15.79, both of which are far higher than those of other cities and counties in Taiwan. New Taipei City and Taichung City are in second and third places, respectively. Soaring house prices in Taipei City have resulted in gentrification clusters in certain areas of the city (Jou et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2016), highlighting the need for social housing, which is lacking in Taiwan in general and in Taipei in particular (Chen, 2020). The ratio of social housing to total housing supply is 0.12 per cent in Taiwan and 0.9 per cent in Taipei, which is Table 11.2 Indicators of housing affordability (Q2, 2021) City/county

mortgage-to-income ratio (%)

Price-to-income ratio

National  New Taipei City  Taipei City  Taoyuan City  Taichung City  Tainan City  Kaohsiung City  Yilan County  Hsinhu County  Miaoli County  Changhua County  Nanto County  Yunlin County  Chiayi County  Pingtung County  Taitung County  Hualien County  Penghu County  Keelung County  Hsinchu City  Chiayi City 

36.27  48.48 63.11 30.29 39.46 31.64 30.36  34.83 33 31.73 34.2 34.57 27.76 22.3 23.07 31.76  33.96 33.3 22.8 29.66 22.71 

9.07  12.13  15.79  7.58  9.87  7.92  7.6 8.71  8.26  7.94  8.56  8.65  6.95  5.58  5.77  7.95  8.50  8.33  5.7 7.42  5.68 

Notes: The mortgage-to-income ratio is the percentage of the annual household income used for annual mortgage repayment. The price-to-income ratio is the average house price divided by the average annual household income. Source: Real Estate Information Platform (2021a).

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much lower than in Hong Kong (30 per cent), Australia (23 per cent), the United Kingdom (18 per cent), or Japan (6.1 per cent) (Cai, 2018). To address this housing affordability crisis and respond to social movements advocating housing justice, the central government and TCG have endeavoured to curb skyrocketing house prices and increase the supply of social housing. The central government has reimposed a vacancy tax to encourage full land use—which could lead to an increase in housing supply— integrated land and building taxes into the Integrated Housing and Land Tax, raised the level of land value tax and land value-added tax, and implemented selected credit controls focusing on the Northern Taiwan Metropolitan Area of Taipei City, New Taipei City, and Taoyuan City. Nevertheless, house prices have not been effectively suppressed (Chen, 2018), supporting the notion that house prices in Taiwan never fall (Chen, 2020) and that Taiwan is a ‘speculation island’ (Liu et al., 2021). The Department of Urban Development of the TCG (DUD, 2020, pp. 65–67) indicates that the TCG uses three approaches to help those in need. The first is to build new social housing, with 130 sites and 19,659 housing units, including those newly built (4,313), under construction (9,832), under offer (388), and at the planning stage (2,246), at the end of 2020. The second is to compile an inventory of and integrate public housing units (public national apartments for rent, affordable apartments, apartments for senior citizens, and provisional housing for residents waiting for urban renewal), a total of 4,472 housing units. The third includes rent subsidies to households in need (20,923) and the ‘Incentives for Privately-Owned Subsidised Housing’ project (1,666). Together, the three approaches will supply 46,720 housing units.

Challenges to progress Environmental challenge Despite the TCG’s strategies and policies, structural and institutional constraints may undermine the outcomes. The first challenge is the geographical environment and climate conditions. The Taipei Basin and the city’s subtropical climate create a perfect environment for the urban heat-island (UHI) effect. The widespread use of air conditioners, densely distributed high-rise buildings, and high number of vehicles shuttling between Taipei City and other cities in the Northern Taiwan Metropolitan Area weaken strategies aimed at cooling the city. The central government’s energy policies, especially those of the controlling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), hamper the reduction of the UHI effect in Taipei because the DPP is strongly opposed to nuclear power and advocates the use of coal, liquefied natural gas (LNG), and renewable energy. After winning the presidential election in 2016 with the slogan ‘Nuclearfree Homeland by 2025’, President Tsai Ing-wen swiftly pushed through an amendment to the Electricity Act, which includes a clause abolishing nuclear power plants by 2025, and to the Renewable Energy Development Act. Under the newly amended clauses and policies, the shares of natural gas, coal, and renewable energy (solar, wind, and hydropower and biomass) in the energy sector will be 50 per cent, 30 per cent, and 20 per cent by 2025, respectively (Chung, 2021; Huang & Chen, 2021, p. 4). The DPP government also promptly halted construction of the fourth nuclear power plant, which was supposed to replace the three older nuclear power plants, and shipped nuclear fuels to the United States, claiming that renewable energy, natural gas, and coal would fill the energy gap. Government data reveal that the use of fossil fuel in Taiwan’s electricity generation increased between 2000 and 2020. However, the percentage of renewable energy has risen slowly from 3.4 per cent to 5.5 per cent. The share of pumped-storage hydroelectricity decreased from 2.3 148

Taipei Table 11.3 Structure of electricity installed capacity in Taiwan by fuel type (in %), 2000–2020 Fuel type

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

Coal-fired  LNG-fired  Renewable energy  Nuclear power  Pumped-hydro  Oil-fired 

39 14.4  6.5  14.8  7.5  17.8 

39.5  25.8  6  11.9  6 10.7 

36.8  32.2  6.5  10.5  5.3  8.6 

34.5  32.8  8.9  10.6  5.3  7.9 

36.4  32.4  16.4  6.7  4.5  3.6 

Source: Bureau of Energy (2020, p. 89).

per cent to 1.1 per cent (Bureau of Energy, 2020, p. 89). The data in Table 11.3 indicate the dominance of fossil fuels in installed electricity capacity. The share of coal decreased slightly from 39 per cent in 2000 to 36.4 per cent in 2020 but that of LNG increased dramatically from 14.4 per cent to 32.4 per cent. The shares of nuclear and oil-fired power declined substantially from 14.8 per cent and 17.8 per cent to 6.7 per cent and 3.6 per cent, respectively. The share of renewable energy rose from 6.5 per cent to 16.4 per cent, but this is negligible when compared with the share of fossil fuel used for meeting Taiwan’s energy needs. The industrial sector’s share of electricity consumption increased from 49.8 per cent in 2000 to 55.6 per cent in 2020, whereas those of the residential, services, and energy sectors decreased slightly. Electricity consumption per capita rose gradually from 10,438 kWh in 2011 to 11,502 kWh in 2020 and energy consumption per capita from 3,520 to 3,621 litre-oil-equivalent (LOE) (Bureau of Energy, 2020). The data in Table 11.3 reveal that renewable energy has not compensated for the reduction in electricity from nuclear power. This is because the central government prioritises fossil fuels for electricity generation, which has increased carbon emissions, decreased air quality island-wide, and produced an increasing amount of fine particulate matter. These factors undermine the effectiveness of Taipei City’s strategies and policies for environmental sustainability.

Challenges to housing justice The causes of house price rises are primarily structural and beyond the TCG’s control. The first is the central government’s long-term neoliberal housing policies of the late 1980s and 1990s (Chen, 2019; Jou et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2016) and the commodification of Taiwan’s housing market (Chen, 2011; Chen, 2019; Chen, 2020; Chen & Bih, 2014; Chen & Li, 2012). As long as these policies remain in place, achieving housing justice in Taiwan will be difficult. The second structural cause is the unfair property tax regime that benefits property owners and speculators (Chen, 2011; Chen, 2019; Chen, 2020; Liu et al., 2021). The relatively low effective rates of the land value and land value-added taxes (0.155 per cent and 1.01 per cent, respectively) have prevented the full utilisation of auctioned parcels of public and private land and have reduced the tax burden on property developers and speculators, which helps to escalate house prices, undermining housing affordability and consolidating unfair wealth distribution. To address these problems, newer taxes and policy measures have been implemented to curb the rapid rise in house prices, suppress property speculation, increase the housing supply, 149

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and raise tax revenues (Lin & Cheng, 2016). A quantitative analysis of house prices in Taipei by Yu and Chen (2018) revealed that a 1 per cent increase in mortgage rates results in a 5 per cent to 17 per cent decrease in house prices, and the Actual Price Registration System that improves housing market transparency helps to decrease house prices by 4–29 per cent. They indicate, however, that both the mortgage rate and Actual Housing Price Registration System are based on national policies, and mortgage rate adjustments must consider financial and social impacts Studies have demonstrated that property-led urban regeneration supported by pro-private capital policy incentives (floor area ratio bonus and floor area ratio transfer), as well as the building of ultraluxury apartments, have contributed to the dramatic rise in house prices in Taipei City. A quantitative study revealed that the positive effects of urban renewal tend to outweigh the negative effects, thus increasing house prices in these neighbourhoods; psychological expectations also positively affect local house prices (Liang, Lee, & Yong, 2020). Urban renewal projects implemented through TDRs in Taipei City have created a model for the social dispossession of the ground rent gap, leading to soaring house prices, gentrification, and social opposition (Yang & Chang, 2018). Another quantitative study revealed the positive spillover effect of luxury house prices; house prices increase by 13 per cent during the construction of luxury housing and by 5.8 per cent after construction (Liang et al., 2020). Although the central government has implemented selected credit controls, Luxury Housing Tax, Actual Housing Price Registration System, and Integrated Housing and Land Tax, house prices in Taipei City and Taiwan continue to rise. These structural causes of house price increases are difficult to overcome. The central government and TCG have pledged to increase the supply of social housing. The DPP government, under the leadership of President Tsai, has promised to build 200,000 social housing units in 8 years (2016–2024). Government data indicate that, by the end of November 2021, 125,996 units were available, and landlord rental incentives would provide 27,966 units. However, the data are inflated. Of the 125,996 units, only 6,436 units are readily available and 13,098 are newly constructed. A total of 20,360 are under construction, and 11,172 have yet to be constructed. Moreover, 74,390 units are still at the planning stage (Real Estate Information Platform, 2021b). The TCG claims that it has provided 22,589 social housing units, but currently only 4,213 newly built apartments are available. More units (12,466) are still under construction, in the planning stage, or being bid for. The 2016 estimate of the Ministry of Health and Welfare indicates that 40,164 households require social housing, which far exceeds the maximum supply capacities of the TCG (The Executive Yuan, 2017, p. 12). Thus, socioeconomically disadvantaged households must apply through a lottery system and endure long waiting times (Cai, 2018). Moreover, negative attitudes towards social housing have caused a not-in-my-backyard response in the neighbourhood of the designated sites, obstructing the selection of construction sites (Chen, 2019, p. 39).

Challenges of partisan politics Although Taipei is the capital of Taiwan, the city’s urban governance is deeply influenced by the vertical intergovernmental relations between TCG and the central government in terms of resource allocation and policy coordination. The conflicts of partisan politics based on nationalistic identities and political calculations complicate intergovernmental interactions. In general, intergovernmental relations between the central government and TCG were relatively smooth during the 1994–2000 and 2008–2016 periods. From 1994 to 2000, the 150

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relationship between the central government controlled by the KMT and Chen Shui-bian, the DPP mayor of Taipei City (1994–1998), witnessed few conflicts regarding resource allocation. When Mayor Chen was seeking re-election in 1998, Ma Ying-jeou, the KMT mayoral candidate, defeated Chen. Chen soon became the DPP candidate for the presidential election, defeating his KMT opponent in 2000 and winning re-election in 2004. The DPP were the ruling party from 2000 to 2008, and intergovernmental relations were turbulent during the remaining 6 years of Mayor Ma’s two terms (2000–2006) (Wang, 2006; Liu et al., 2016). Conflicts arose between the DPP government and TCG with regard to the construction of a trade exhibition hall in Nangang Software Park and turning Songshan Domestic Airport in Taipei into an international airport, promoting a direct air link between Taiwan and Mainland China (Chen, 2006). In 2008, Ma Ying-jeou became the KMT’s president after defeating his DPP opponent. The relationship between the central government and TCG under the KMT was smooth from 2008 to 2014. However, Ko Wen-je, a candidate supported by the DPP, beat the KMT candidate in the mayoral election in 2014, and Tsai Ing-wen, the DPP candidate, won the presidential election in 2016. The central government and TCG had a short honeymoon period during Mayor Ko’s first term, but intergovernmental relations turned sour when the DPP designated its own candidate to compete against Mayor Ko in his attempt at re-election. Mayor Ko managed to win by a narrow margin, establishing the Taiwan People’s Party before the 2020 presidential election, and was elected as the party’s president. The expectation that Mayor Ko would stand in the 2024 presidential election produced conflict between the DPP government and Mayor Ko (Aspinwall, 2020). In 2022, Wayne Chiang, the KMT candidate, won the mayor election. Whether the intergovernmental relations between the TCG and the central government controlled by the DPP will be smooth remains to be seen. Nevertheless, the experience of the past two decades demonstrates that the relationship between the central government and TCG is uncertain when the two governments are controlled by different political parties with conflicting nationalistic ideologies and political calculations.

Conclusion This chapter introduced the transformation of Taipei City, including its history, geography, and economic, industrial, and spatial structures. It described and analysed the TCG’s grand vision for urban planning and policies with the aim of building a liveable and sustainable city. The institutional and structural factors that undermine these efforts include the central government’s energy policies against renewable energy use, constantly increasing house prices, lack of social housing, and intergovernmental relations based on Taiwanese nationalistic politics and political calculations. The extent to which Taipei City can become a liveable and sustainable city in accordance with the UN’s SDGs and NUA depends on the coordinated interaction between local political, economic, and social contexts and global trends.

References Aspinwall, N. (2020, January 16). The Taiwan election’s other big winner: Ko Wen-je’s Taiwan People’s Party. Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/the-taiwan-elections-other-big-winner-ko-wenjes-taiwan-peoples-party/ Bureau of Energy, MOEA. (2020). Energy statistics handbook 2020. Bureau of Energy. https://www. moeaboe.gov.tw/ECW/english/content/ContentLink.aspx?menu_id=1540 Cai, S. (2018). Taipei’s affordable housing challenge. Taiwan Business Topics. https://topics.amcham. com.tw/2018/10/taipeis-affordable-housing-challenge/

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12 TOKYO Reinventing the modern Asian metropolis through adaptive strategies Carola Hein

Introduction Since the mid-19th century, Japan has displayed a unique capacity to navigate changing global conditions and to adapt flexibly to diverse challenges. In contrast to many other Asian countries that were colonised by European nations, Japan managed to overcome foreign pressure and chart its own path, determined to catch up and overtake the West—including by becoming a coloniser itself. Japanese planning history demonstrates how public and private actors have consciously and unconsciously developed strategies to rebuild urban settlements to respond to internal and external challenges in part by adopting Western practices, in part by maintaining and making use of unique historic spaces and practices. This process was not straightforward, but characterised by long periods of trial and error. Traditions of adaptation to the local geography and climate may have played a role in how Japan has adapted to industrialisation and modernisation in the 19th century, and to shifting international political and economic frameworks in the 20th and 21st centuries. At times of major transitions beginning during the Meiji restoration in 1868, Japanese elites transformed their cities rapidly, often developing unique new forms, connecting local particularities of geography, history, landownership, and funding to inspiration drawn from foreign practices and planning tools. The history of Tokyo, the country’s capital (known as Edo until 1868), provides ready references for other Asian cities as they search for ways of responding to natural disasters; political, economic, social transformations; and seek paths to sustainable development. In the history of Tokyo, Japanese ways of doing things have often been strategically combined with foreign innovations, resulting in techniques that attract global attention. Over time, Japanese practices became part of a global network of transnational urbanism. In particular, throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, Japanese politicians and planners developed new spatial practices within and outside cities, as well as new planning tools and urban forms. As a densely built city with an extensive public transportation network, Tokyo today serves as a model for cities around the world. The planning history of Tokyo, as a key example among Japanese cities, shows the capacity of an Asian city to develop into a major global player and to develop spaces that become models worldwide. It also shows how local particularities and historic path dependencies can be used to support adaptive strategies. A close study of the city’s planning, particularly since 154

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the Meiji restoration in 1868, offers lessons for other Asian mega cities. Such an investigation also raises questions about what adaptability means in light of contemporary discussions of sustainability. Because conflicting interests are part of any transition, scholars must explore the sustainability of cities in a nuanced way. By exploring transitions that have occurred in the past, we can gain insight into what new developments in post-global, post-pandemic times mean for different population groups, and what they imply for governance and spatial transformation at local, city-wide, metropolitan, and regional levels. Finally, we explore what time frames are particularly relevant in relation to adaptability and possible (planned) interventions.

Japan’s long history of adaptive strategies: Lifestyles Urban life in Japan has long depended on careful adaptation to geographic and climatic conditions. The country is located on the boundary of four tectonic plates, in an area prone not just to earthquakes but also to tsunami and typhoons. There are high mountains with rapid rivers and a constant risk of flooding. Japan’s methods of coping with these threats include some that are unique to the country. Historically, adaptation involved lifestyles rather than built structures. The focus was on building structures that could be rapidly rebuilt, rather than ones that would resist destruction. The selection of wood as a key building material, for example, provided flexibility in the event of tremors. This lightweight construction, however, was prone to fail in the case of heavy winds, although heavy roofing helped stabilise houses. Wooden construction was also vulnerable to fire; conflagrations regularly destroyed Japanese cities. Rather than opting for a different material, the Japanese lived with fire. Japanese citizens developed a practice of rapid rebuilding, often within days after the destruction (Seidensticker, 1990, 1991). Some even prepared for disaster by keeping new building materials at hand in a different location and they even had another place to live when disaster struck. As wooden buildings typically burnt to ashes, clearing the site and rebuilding could occur rapidly. Rather than upgrading building standards to prevent fires, the authorities instead directed their energy to improving fire-fighting capabilities through the creation of fire brigades. Existing land use and land practices and the reuse of traditional building materials and techniques allowed people to adapt to repeated disasters. At times of political, economic, or social change, however, local elites opted to implement large-scale change, transforming urban spaces, land structures, or planning tools (Hein, 2010).

The Meiji restoration: First attempts at spatial adaptation Tokyo’s response to industrialisation, modern cities, and planning, started from a different foundation from that of European and American cities—in terms of population, land use, streetscapes, and legal structures of land ownership. In the early 1600s, Japan had cut itself from outside contact, remaining isolated for more than 200 years under the shogunal system. This led to unique patterns of urban uses and land ownership. The military class—made up of the shogun, daimyo, and samurai (retainers of the daimyo)—occupied more than two-thirds of Tokyo’s urban area. Industrialisation and Westernisation following the Meiji restoration of 1868 brought major political, economic, and social changes: the end of the shogunate and the restoration of imperial power to the Meiji Emperor, or the so-called Meiji restoration. The Meiji restoration introduced national and prefectural government as well as a system of municipal administration—all of which were invested in the development of the capital city, now named Tokyo. The new leaders introduced a democratic government with a parliament and modern ministries. New economic opportunities and social hierarchies led to the emergence of busi155

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ness leaders, whose interests helped shape urban spaces. Cities throughout Japan—and particularly the capital Tokyo—grew rapidly as they came to host new industrial, infrastructural, and administrative structures. As Japan changed, it also maintained some of its historic practices. Elements of Edo-time Tokyo remain relevant to contemporary development (Ishizuka & Ishida, 1988; Jinnai, 1995). An examination of  Tokyo's history since the Meiji restoration allows us to explore the unique adaptability of the Japanese capital, including the limitations of transformation. The brick district in the Ginza area at the heart of Tokyo is a good example of early attempts to make adjustments to the traditional city. After a major fire in 1872, which destroyed nearly 3,000 houses, the governor decided that reconstruction in the Ginza area should set an example for fireproof residential construction. He retained the English engineer Thomas J. Waters to rebuild the entire district with brick buildings and in a fashion that could rival Western capitals (Okamoto, 2000). The Ginza then became the first example of urban planning in Japan based on the creation of a unified streetscape and the separation of traffic, common in many European cities at the time. The new scheme laid out streets fitted with footpaths, and brick buildings adorned with arcades governed by a strict design code. The new plan largely preserved the traditional layout of the area after attempts to unify the land rights of the district failed. The new buildings, made from bricks, were not suited to Japanese climate, earthquakes and lifestyles and some buildings remained empty. While public authorities promoted street widening and the use of fire-resistant building materials as in the best interest of all, the push for a uniform architectural streetscape had no historical basis in Japan and was subsequently scrapped. In fact, some of the later rebuildings even returned to the Edo-time street layout. Because the district was destroyed by an earthquake in 1923 and by air raids in 1945, the traces of these historic planning efforts have largely vanished, leaving room for rebuilding in line with Japanese practices of land readjustment. Western borrowings were limited by their appropriateness to the Japanese context. The Meiji restoration spurred numerous structural and functional urban transformations, which went hand in hand with spatial interventions. With the end of the shogunal system, regional aristocrats no longer needed to be present in Tokyo. The domain lands—the lands distributed by the shogun to members of the military caste—returned to the central government. As the provincial lords and their families returned to the provinces, Tokyo’s population fell significantly. The departure of the former leadership left vast abandoned spaces in the centre of the capital. The new Japanese elite saw an opportunity to reuse this land to create a new political and economic centre. They laid out new planned infrastructure (roads, railways, etc.) without making changes to bordering lots or imposing regulations on the buildings alongside them. They allowed politicians, businessmen, and planners to carry out a surprisingly speedy transformation of selected areas while leaving other urban units largely unchanged. Urban planning, from the beginning of the Meiji period to the 21st century, reinforced an existing patchwork character of Japanese cities. The Japanese elite experimented with foreign planning concepts and adapted Japanese cities and notably Tokyo to the new conditions of the Meiji period. Japan did not opt for wholesale transformation or comprehensive urban design paired with building regulations but rather opted to rearrange existing urban patterns to satisfy new needs. Japanese leaders established novel planning practices, building on their knowledge of established European techniques and developing other strategies that were in line with the country’s needs. The Hibiya and Marunouchi districts became a central element in the transformation of Tokyo, providing space for all the elements of a modern metropolis, including a political centre, major park, business district, and central train station (Hein, 2010). The conditions for 156

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large-scale adaptation of the historic city appeared ideal. The land left untenanted after the departure of the provincial lords was ideally suited to house the central institutions of a capital as well as new economic headquarters. Clearing the land of existing buildings and sub-divisions, the government used these sites for ministries, foreign embassies, new political authorities, and military facilities such as exercise grounds, ammunition factories, and military schools. Effectively, the new Meiji government found ways to adapt to the needs of the new time by taking advantage of political and economic changes. Even the development of a new business centre conformed to the particularities of Japanese urban form and planning. The government laid out its overall ideas for Tokyo in the 1889 First Plan for Urban Area Improvement of Tokyo. For the Marunouchi area, the Plan preserved the existing layout but suggested the addition of urban improvement projects. In particular, it prescribed the layout of the new railway line connecting the two existing railway terminals, Shinbashi in the South and Ueno in the North, on opposite sides of the outskirts of the Marunouchi area. In 1890, after it had sited ministries and railways, the government offered 27.9 hectares of the former daimyo area for sale. Inspired by the central business district (CBD) in London, the leadership of the Mitsubishi company was keen on buying the area. Originally a shipping company, Mitsubishi had a history of acquiring land for warehouses and residences and, starting in the early Meiji period, it had taken part in the redevelopment of several sites. Mitsubishi’s rebuilding of the Marunouchi area in the immediate vicinity of the castle was a special case because of the functions and scale of the buildings introduced, the financing available, and the people involved. The area’s transformation from daimyo use to a government and private office district is also a singular and special event in Japanese urban history due to its unique location outside the palace gates. The developer of the business district, Mitsubishi, chose to site new central functions near the palace, based on the old layout of the land. Today, none of the original red-brick buildings survive, but the land in the Marunouchi– Hibiya district, still owned by Mitsubishi, remains a landmark in Japanese urban development. Once home to the most powerful daimyos, the district has retained its role as the political and economic heart of Tokyo—and of Japan—through successive changes of leadership. The availability of extensive areas of land at Marunouchi, the modernisation of Tokyo, and its transformation into a modern capital proceeded smoothly, continuing some historic patterns while allowing for adaptation to modern needs.

Infrastructure and planning tools: Land readjustment and the transformation of the suburbs By the 1920s, modern planning had taken root in Japan and the country had started to implement its own spatial strategies, notably focused on land readjustment as a tool for spatial transformation. In 1919, the Home Ministry passed the Town Planning and Urban Building Act, developed with help of its City Planning Section under Ikeda Hiroshi. This legislation introduced a system of zoning, land readjustment, and building lines, which applied to the entire built-up area, including the urban extension. Japanese politicians and planners used the country’s colonial expansion as another opportunity to test their newly gained knowledge of urban planning. The vast destruction unleashed by the 1923 Great Kantô Earthquake and its consequent fires, which killed some 140,000 people, affected large parts of two major cities, Tokyo and Yokohama. Plans that were developed by the former Tokyo mayor Goto Shinpei, then Home Minister and president of the Imperial City Restoration Department, for an overall rebuilding and replotting of the city with the goal of adapting to modern needs failed. 157

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As a tool to adapt, readjustment became the principal means for the reconstruction of the area. It was a tool to strategically adapt urban areas while facilitating transformations. When instruments and comprehensive plans for consolidating large areas failed, it was because they needed longer periods of intervention at a moment when people wanted and needed to rapidly rebuild their homes and businesses. Land readjustment let people stay on the sites they had formerly occupied and introduced only minor changes to the site layout for the construction of streets without reorganising the bordering zone. Leaders deployed land readjustment to create infrastructure, not building space—a major difference with European models. While creating new thoroughfares, land readjustment left the city largely with the old land division (Ishida, 1987). The 1923 Imperial Reconstruction Plan by the City of Tokyo proposed widening existing streets and creating better connections to environing areas. East of Tokyo station and the Maru­nouchi area, the Plan projected a new avenue that would run alongside the moat and cross through the densely built Nihonbashi area diagonally; several other streets would be widened. The Plan resulted in approximately 8,895 acres of land readjustment projects, the construction of 157 miles of roads, and the building of some 55 parks. The Plan remained in effect until 1930 and helped to establish land readjustment as the main Japanese planning tool (Hein, 2018). Land readjustment has a particular character in Japan. It does not consist of the overall expropriation of a site followed by a completely new urban plan, but rather street widening and straightening, which strives to keep the new lots as close as possible to the old ones and thus maintain elements of the traditional urban form. In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, the citizens wanted stability and relief and strongly opposed major changes. The longing on the part of citizens to quickly rebuild their lives, and the Edo ‘habit’ of fires, further promoted rapid rebuilding according to traditional protocols and partly prevented large-scale rebuilding. To aid the citizenry, the construction of temporary barracks in pre-assigned firebreak zones was permitted. But the removal of these dwellings was never strictly reinforced, and so large areas of Tokyo turned once again into densely settled districts of inflammable wooden buildings. The earthquake of 1923 spurred a variety of changes already underway. It accelerated the move of the wealthy to the outskirts of the city, a trend that began around 1900 and was further impelled by the great flood of 1910. At the same time, people began moving from the countryside to these suburban districts, furthering their growth. New road and rail infrastructure was built to connect the emerging suburbs with the central city and to accommodate the burgeoning traffic needs. Specifically, this involved the construction of terminal stations and of interchanges such as Shinjuku and Shibuya. While the development of Shinjuku as a major sub-centre of Tokyo was prompted by disaster, it was reinforced by earlier planning decisions. In 1919, Fukuda Shigeyoshi, a technical officer of the City of  Tokyo, proposed the development of sub-centres like Shinjuku to promote de-concentration of the growing metropolis. The concept was taken up in later plans, and Shinjuku's west side has since evolved into Tokyo's high-rise CBD and the home of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, an area where the 84-acre Yodobashi water purification plant once existed. The reconstruction after the 1923 Great Kantô earthquake illustrates how urban development and radical change depend both upon private and public intervention and their interaction, as well as on the larger political, economic, social, and cultural conditions prevailing at the time. The earthquake accelerated the growth of the suburbs and of the infrastructure of roads and rail to accommodate growing traffic needs. Following the transformation of the inner city, the suburbs also began to transform.

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Adaptive strategies after the Second World War A new form of adaptation was needed following the Second World War, when the Occupation Army transformed Japanese politics and economics. After the air raids of 1945, Japan’s production capacity was crippled and the economy could not support a massive reconstruction effort. In contrast to the 1923 earthquake—which left the rest of the country capable of sustaining the revitalisation of the capital region—the Second World War touched nearly every major Japanese city. More than one hundred urban areas were severely damaged by air raids and were designated for restoration according to the War Damage Restoration Plan. Only a handful of cities survived the war intact, including Sapporo and the historic cities of Kyoto and Nara. In response to the national scope of the destruction, the government created a central planning office for reconstruction on 5 November 1945. In December, the cabinet decided on the policy for the reconstruction of war-damaged areas, and in September 1946 the Special City Planning Act was passed. Despite the national planning, the outcome of post-war reconstruction efforts varied in each city, as did pre-war experiences with urban planning (Hein, 2003). Moreover, Japan in the post-war years was an occupied country and did not enjoy complete freedom in the reconstruction of its cities. This was particularly the case in Tokyo. Based on its strong tradition of pre-war planning, Tokyo was well-equipped for comprehensive redevelopment, but progress was, nevertheless, slow. The manager of the Tokyo metropolitan government’s planning section, Ishikawa Hideaki, had led Tokyo's planning since 1933 and was also in charge of  Tokyo's War Damage Rehabilitation Plan. Ishikawa had very specific ideas about the future of the city, suggesting decentralisation and de-concentration of the urban population. Based on his ideas for ‘living spheres’ proposed during the war, Ishikawa sought a ward-area population of around three and a half million and the development of satellite and outer towns all over the Kantô plains to accommodate the growth of both the population and industry. Ishikawa developed a plan for mono-functional towns containing 200,000–300,000 people, set apart by greenbelts—an inheritance from air defence planning during the war—and structured by a ring- and radial-shaped road network. Ishikawa's original plan projected land readjustment on about 50,000 acres, exceeding the burned-out area. But the nation’s financial difficulties and the Fundamental Policy for the Reconsideration of Reconstruction Planning of 1949—based on the American-imposed so-called Dodge line—forced reconstruction projects to be scaled down or abandoned, and curtailed Ishikawa's idealistic concepts. Private landownership, as Ishikawa had anticipated, was the major obstacle to rebuilding, and only a small part of the proposed land readjustment was realised. As a result, the major part of  Tokyo was not rebuilt according to any carefully thought-out overall master plan (Ichikawa, 2003). Faced with the need for housing and the enormity of the destruction, citizens longed for quick rebuilding and not a city built from scratch. Existing property rights and limited finances prevailed and prevented large-scale transformations in line with global models; land, for the places where urban transformation happened, readjustment served as a tool for the basic adaptation of Japanese cities, giving them their own unique character.

From planning to community building as strategies for post-war growth The infrastructural improvements of the boom period provided the foundation for the post-war adaptation of Tokyo. The 1964 Olympics involved large-scale transformation of the urban structure, including multi-layered highways built over historic moats and canals. Beyond infrastructural improvement, Tokyo’s reconstruction was largely left to the private sector, which 159

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quickly re-established the metropolis as the economic heart of Japan. By the 1970s, Tokyo had fully recovered its pre-war functions and gone beyond reconstruction to become a global city (Sassen, 1991). A general discussion of political, economic, social, and cultural aspects of comprehensive planning in Tokyo was largely absent in the years after the Second World War as land readjustment provided the framework for rebuilding. The 1968 New City Planning Act channelled the rapid growth of the Japanese city, creating urban control areas and urban promotion areas. The modern Japanese mega cities arose under a comparatively weak planning system. Urban renewal (saikaihatsu) projects and new town developments characterised the 1960s and 1970s as well as comprehensive national development plans (Hatsuda, 2011). Attempts to comprehensively organise the city on a large scale through planning coincided with a new movement by architects and urbanists who focused on the central districts of Tokyo and other large Japanese cities as lively urban cores. This reading of the city— known as Tôkyôron (Tokyo theory) and related to Edogaku (the study of Edo), as specifically in Japanese urban space—built upon literature from the 1930s, arguing for a specific Japanese identity established on a special link between nature, space, and Japanese society. By the 1980s, a number of publications celebrated a unique Japanese urban form—particularly visible in the capital, Tokyo—based on continuities between the traditional and the modern city: multi-functional neighbourhoods, skyscrapers and low-rise neighbourhoods, multi-storey highways and tiny lanes, and intersections between public and private spaces. Instead of thinking of these dynamics as chaotic, many professionals now perceived them as inspirations for dense liveable developments in the West, similar to the ideals advocated by movements such as New Urbanism. In fact, while Japanese planners had employed Western-inspired planning practices, tools, and policies for almost a century, creating new urban forms, large-scale connections and implanting new functions (including government centres, industrial districts, schools, shopping malls), they had left other areas of the city untouched. Between the transforming spaces, limited places remained for corporate or private forces to intervene, promoting self-governing neighbourhoods, small-scale land use, and new land ownership patterns. At the same time, planners developed new planning tools and practices for small areas, to address local opposition or to deal with the lack of funding. Both Japanese and foreign scholars have engaged with these themes, starting to build bridges between different groups of observers. Several scholars have paid close attention to the histories of bottom-up planning in its various forms (community-based planning, the democratisation of planning, community activism, and civic/civil society in the planning context), exploring community building and its limits while acknowledging the complementary and competing influences of planning and community development (Brumann, 2012; Jinnai, 1995; Sorensen, 2001, 2007; Sorensen & Funck, 2007; Watanabe, 2007). Machizukuri and community building emerged as new themes of adaptive strategies, especially in regard to citizens’ acceptance or rejection of city planning and the importance of urban issues. This was all happening in the same 20 years when urban history emerged as an academic field under the leadership of historians, social historians, and architectural historians (Hatsuda, 2011). The role of community-based planning activities in the long-term rebuilding of communities after disaster remains to be fully explored, as several scholars have pointed out in regard to the reconstruction of Kobe in the wake of the 1995 earthquake and the assessment of the triple disaster in Fukushima in March 2011 (Hatsuda, 2011; Hein, 2001; Samuels, 2013; The City Planning Institute of Japan, 1988). Part of engaging with local communities is engaging with questions of heritage. Going beyond issues of historic preservation and restoration, various planning historians have addressed controversies over the Kyoto townscape and questions of townscape preservation 160

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(Brumann & Cox, 2009; Kenzo & Kultermann, 1970; Riani, 1970). Planners’ use of urban heritage for tourism and cruise-shipping, tangible in Kyoto for several years now, and the views of local residents about this use, merits investigation from the perspective of planning history. A number of other themes have emerged in Japanese planning history over the last few decades. They are also core themes for policy-makers and planners in cities across the world. These are intimately connected to specific idioms and debates underway around the world, such as decentralisation, sustainability, slow cities, urban branding, heritage; and they are being debated by scholars both in and outside Japan. Many of these concepts captured the need to counterbalance the country’s economic downturn, to take attention away from natural and man-made disasters, urban over-development, dramatic rural decline, and emerging social differences. Government policies officially promoted decentralisation across the nation, as Japan’s post-war period economic growth led to urbanisation, migration, and lifestyle changes. Yet centralisation seems to have often been the result (Hein & Pelletier, 2006/2009; Tange, 1968). By the 1990s, urban branding ideas drove Tokyo’s desire to be part of a network of global cities and found its expression in new projects such as a city hall, an international forum, and corporate towers. Mori Minoru’s Roppongi Hills development is an archetypal global/creative city project: a gleaming tower with an elite contemporary art museum on top. Sustainable urban development is another of these idioms. Capturing the need to counterbalance the country’s economic downturn, it stands at the forefront of the long-term vision of 2014 for Tokyo in 2020 and beyond, which includes the 2020 Olympics that were designated as Eco-Friendly Games.

Conclusion The history of Tokyo’s transformation has shown that the city, and the country, has a specific Japanese style of adaptation. The existing urban structure has proven both very resistant to change and very adaptable when a complex set of political, economic, and social forces promotes change and there are large tracts of land available for comprehensive transformation. From traditional practices of living in line with local challenges to contemporary ways of adapting planning practices to institutional and cultural particularities, the country has found a unique way of managing space, of planning, and of living. Understanding this particular way of shaping space may help open new perspectives on the energy transition and to sustainable development. Connecting to traditional ways of thinking and working can facilitate the transition. Cities are more than built form; they are a complex phenomenon of spatial forms, political decisions, economic powers, social structures, cultural experience, and legal systems. These multiple facets create path dependencies that can help or hinder transformation. Adaptive strategies are anchored in intangible urban culture as well as in the physical remnants of the urban past. New practices need to recognise and be anchored in this unique local past. Japan’s cities are changing faster than most European or American ones. Its quickly shifting social patterns—including an ageing population and more single-person households—are changing spatial forms much more quickly than before. The ongoing socio-economic crisis, shrinkage of cities, demographic transitions, and population shrinkage are reflected in housing transformation (Ronald & Hirayama, 2006; Sorensen, 2007). New studies are particularly important, as trends observed in Tokyo are often analogous to those of other East Asian urban centres with similar demographic trends, such as Taipei and Seoul. A future decline in urban population and the end of urban growth, however, may limit new development to existing lands. Knowing that the urban structure changes very slowly, planners should develop princi161

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ples rather than fixed plans for the future. If planners are to intervene in the future transformation of a city, they must lay out a long-term plan based on strategies that can be implemented and checked in line with progress made. Creating transitional spaces and opportunities may be one way to assure that innovation is also applicable to that city’s culture and traditions.

References Brumann, C. (2012). Tradition, democracy, and the townscape of Kyoto: Claiming a right to the past. Routledge. Brumann, C., & Cox, R. A. (Eds.). (2009). Making Japanese heritage. Routledge. Hatsuda, K. (2011). Toshi no Sengo (Post-war city). Tokyo University Publisher. Hein, C. (2001). Toshikeikaku and Machizukuri in Japanese urban planning—the reconstruction of inner city neighborhoods in Kobe. Japanstudien, 13, 221–252. Hein, C. (2003). Rebuilding Japanese cities after 1945. In C. Hein, J. Diefendorf, & Y. Ishida (Eds.), Rebuilding Urban Japan after 1945 (pp. 1–16). Palgrave Macmillan. Hein, C. (2010). Shaping Tokyo: Land development and planning practice in the early modern Japanese metropolis. Journal of Urban History, 36(4), 447–484. Hein, C. (2018). Idioms of Japanese planning historiography. In C. Hein (Ed.), The Routledge handbook of planning history (pp. 244–259). Routledge. Hein, C., & Pelletier, P. (2006/2009). Cities, autonomy and decentralization in Japan. Routledge. Ichikawa, H. (2003). Reconstructing Tokyo: The attempt to transform a metropolis. In C. Hein, J. Diefendorf, & Y. Ishida (Eds.), Rebuilding Urban Japan after 1945 (pp. 50–67). Palgrave Macmillan. Ishida, Y. (1987). Nihon kindai toshi keikaku no hyakunen (A hundred years of Japanese urban planning). Jichitai-kenkyûsha. Ishizuka, H., & Ishida, Y. (1988). Tokyo: Urban growth and planning. Center for Urban Studies, Tokyo Metropolitan University. Jinnai, H. (1995). Tokyo: A spatial anthropology. University of California Press. Kenzo, T., & Kultermann, U. (1970). Kenzo Tange, 1946–1969: Architecture and urban design. Praeger Publishers. Okamoto, S. (2000). Destruction and reconstruction of Ginza town. In N. Fukui & H. Jinnai (Eds.), Destruction and rebirth of urban environment (pp. 51–83). Sagami Shobo. Riani, P. (1970). Kenzo Tange. Hamlyn. Ronald, R., & Hirayama, Y. (2006). Housing commodities, context and meaning: Transformations in Japan's urban condominium sector. Urban Studies, 43(13), 2467–2483. Samuels, R. J. (2013). 3.11: Disaster and change in Japan. Cornell University. Sassen, S. (1991). The global city: New York, London, Tokyo. Princeton University Press. Seidensticker, E. (1990). Tokyo rising. Charles E. Tuttle Company. Seidensticker, E. (1991). Low city, high city: Tokyo from Edo to the Earthquake: How the Shogun’s ancient capital became a great modern city, 1867–1923. Harvard University Press. Sorensen, A. (2001). Urban planning and civil society in Japan: Japanese urban planning development during the ‘Taisho period’ (1905–31). Planning Perspectives, 16(4), 383–406. Sorensen, A. (2007). Liveable cities in Japan: Population ageing and decline as vectors of change. International Planning Studies, 11(3/4), 225–242. Sorensen, A., & Funck, C. (2007). Living cities in Japan: Citizens’ movements, Machizukuri and local environments. Nissan Institute Routledge Japanese Studies Series. Tange, K. (1968). Nihon no toshikukan. Shokokusha. The City Planning Institute of Japan. (1988). Centenary of modern city planning and its perspective. The City Planning Institute of Japan. Watanabe, S. (2007). Toshi Keikaku vs Machizukuri: Emerging paradigm of civil society in Japan, 1950– 1980. In A. Sorensen & C. Funck (Eds.), Living cities in Japan (pp. 39–55). Routledge.

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13 ULAANBAATAR When international plans and local preferences over urban densification collide Aldarsaikhan Tuvshinbat, Raven Anderson, and Michael Hooper

Introduction Many plans for Asian cities, including Mongolia’s capital, Ulaanbaatar, argue for densification as a means for coping with diverse environmental, social, and economic challenges (Dave, 2010). These plans typically recommend transitioning from lower-density, often informal, settlements on the outskirts to more concentrated, multi-storey development. In Ulaanbaatar, rapid urban growth has led to multiple plans calling for denser urban development (Anderson & Hooper, 2017). This chapter examines perceptions towards densification held by key planning actors, including international and Mongolian planners and residents of ger districts, the rapidly growing areas that house many rural migrants. Building on tensions between international development agencies, which advocate for densification, and some local leaders, who have called for more locally appropriate plans, the chapter explores the extent and nature of disagreements over densification. It identifies points of overlap but also sharp differences between international planners’ and both local residents’ and local planners’ urban density preferences. Notably, local planners and ger district residents hold more negative views towards densification, while the more positive attitudes of international planners are those reflected in large-scale plans for the city. We argue this divergence has important lessons for Ulaanbaatar’s ability to address the environmental, social, and economic externalities of rapid growth and for the success of densification plans elsewhere in Asia and the Global South.

The growth of Ulaanbaatar and its ger districts The physical size and population of Ulaanbaatar have grown rapidly in recent decades, expanding from 829,000 to 1.6 million residents between 2001 and 2020 (National Statistics Office of Mongolia [NSOM], n.d.). Between 1990 and 2020 the city expanded its spatial footprint 117 per cent and now covers 470,000 hectares, including 50,000 hectares occupied by buildings (The World Bank, 2015). Despite this growth, urbanisation in Mongolia is a relatively recent phenomenon (Bruun & Odgaard, 1996). Urban migration was strictly controlled during communist rule, beginning in 1921, but increased in the 1990s with the transition from Soviet-style central planning to a market economy (Chinbat et al., 2006). The recent experience of rapid urbanisation has led to Ulaanbaatar being the subject of several large-scale plans, including the DOI: 10.4324/9781003256533-15

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Ulaanbaatar Master Plan 2020, this study’s main focus, and the Master Plan 2040, currently in development. Ulaanbaatar, like many Asian metropolises, presents compelling reasons for rural-tourban migration. Ulaanbaatar’s growth has been driven by periods of high economic growth, peaking between 2010 and 2012, due to expansion of the country’s mining industry (Asian Development Bank [ADB], 2020). In 2011, over 65 per cent of Mongolia’s gross domestic product (GDP) was produced in Ulaanbaatar and remained at these levels as of 2015 (The World Bank, 2015; NSOM, n.d.). Since the end of state socialism in the 1990s, rural areas have experienced economic decline. Rural residents have lower access to education, healthcare, safe drinking water, and other services (United States Agency for International Development [USAID], 2010). Droughts and harsh winters, called dzuds, between 1999 and 2002 and again in 2010, impacted rural herders, causing many to migrate to cities (Sternberg, 2010). The availability of relatively inexpensive land in Ulaanbaatar and Mongolia’s land administration system also contribute to ger district growth (Kamata et al., 2010). According to the 2002 Law on Allocation of Land to Mongolian Citizens for Ownership, each citizen is entitled to a land allocation, the size of which varies by region. In Ulaanbaatar, citizens are entitled to between 300 and 700 m2 of land, which is made especially attractive since approximately 90 per cent of this entitlement is exempt from land fees (Kamata et al., 2010). Due to a combination of push and pull factors, by 2011 approximately 61 per cent of Ulaanbaatar’s population lived in ger districts (Byambadorj et al., 2011). Ger districts are often located on the urban periphery where infrastructure is limited. These typically sprawling districts take their name from the traditional felt tents, or gers, that are their typical housing mode. Gers are viewed as important to Mongolia’s heritage and are therefore different from the shacks and shanties sometimes occupied by the poor in the Global South (Byambadorj et al., 2011). Many ger district residents also have some degree of legal tenure, again differentiating gers from many other types of  ‘slums’ or informal neighbourhoods. Nevertheless, these areas are associated with limited services, poor infrastructure, and adverse health and environmental conditions (Brown, 2003). The proportion of households using water from insecure sources is 30 times higher in ger districts than for apartment dwellers and 97 per cent of residents use pit latrines (UN-Habitat, 2010). One of Ulaanbaatar’s biggest challenges is poor air quality, in part arising from the burning of coal and wood in ger areas. An estimated 29 per cent of cardiopulmonary deaths and 40 per cent of lung cancer deaths in Ulaanbaatar are attributed to air pollution (Allen et al., 2013). Ulaanbaatar is one of the world’s coldest capitals and heating fuel consists mainly of local coal and wood, which heightens air pollution, forest overexploitation, run-off, erosion, and flooding (Kamata et al., 2010). These challenges are, in part, what has drawn international attention to Ulaanbaatar and what has led diverse organisations to engage in planning the city’s future.

Densification plans and debates about density Densification has been suggested as a solution to Ulaanbaatar’s challenges. A common theme in plans for the city, most of which have been developed with the support of international organisations, is a call for higher densities and multi-storey living. Reflecting this, the Ulaanbaatar Master Plan 2020 includes, as a priority, ‘increas[ing] the density of the urbanised area’ (Gotov, 2010, p. 7). Development of the master plan was supported by UN-Habitat, the World Bank, and the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), among other organisations (ADB, 2013). The Master Plan 2020 is the main plan for the city, although an updated plan, the Master Plan 2040, is being developed. Looking across Ulaanbaatar’s plans 164

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at all scales reveals at least 29 currently in operation (Anderson & Hooper, 2017). Virtually all are implemented by local organisations but are at least partially funded by international donors. The Master Plan 2020 calls for the highest densities, in the form of high-rise buildings, in central districts, with middle districts focusing on mid-rise apartments and outer districts maintaining single-storey development (City of Ulaanbaatar, 2014). The master plan calls for an additional 28 per cent of the population living in apartments by 2030, to be enabled by the construction of 78,000 new apartments. The plan also calls for an urban growth boundary of green space to limit expansion and meet residents’ open space needs. To accommodate these changes in density and housing types, the World Bank (2010) has proposed relocating some residents from low-density areas to high-density ones. Many international organisations have strongly promoted densification of Ulaanbaatar. As the World Bank (2010, p. xi) argues, it is hoped that a more compact form will ‘control spatial expansion and promote high-density development for the ger areas’. Reflecting the importance of densification, the city’s Ger Area Upgrading Strategy and Investment Plan (GUSIP), developed by UN-Habitat and 20 organisational collaborators, lists ‘increas[ing] population density in ger areas’ first among city-level priorities (Cities Alliance, 2010, p, 13). The upgrading strategy argues that densification will reduce infrastructure costs (Cities Alliance, 2010). Such calls for densification in Asian and other cities are increasingly common, with UN-Habitat having strongly promoted the inclusion of densification in the United Nations’ global Sustainable Development Goals (UN-Habitat, 2013). While international organisations have called for densification, some prominent local officials have been adamant that this is not an appropriate policy. The next chapter undertakes a detailed examination of actors’ different density preferences.

Listening to actors in the field This chapter is based on detailed interviews with key planning actors, including ger district residents and international and Mongolian planners (Anderson et al., 2017, Anderson & Hooper, 2017). The first set of interviewees consisted of 120 ger district residents. These interviews were conducted in July and August of 2014 in three ger districts selected according to the Cities Alliance’s (2010) categorisation of these areas into three types: central, middle, and outer ger districts. The three sites in which interviews were conducted were randomly selected from lists of the city’s administrative subdivisions. The randomly selected central site was Bayanzurkh District Khoroo 2, the middle was Chingeltei District Khoroo 10, and the outer was Chingeltei District Khoroo 17. Forty interviews were conducted in the central site, 41 in the middle site, and 39 in the outer site. On each day of the interviews, a different street within each site was selected as a starting point and a route followed through neighbouring streets, stopping at each occupied house to conduct interviews. Multiple times throughout the day, a new starting point was selected to ensure wider coverage of diverse physical and socioeconomic conditions within the site. The second set of interviews, conducted in January 2014, included people working in 18 organisations involved in urban planning and policy in Ulaanbaatar. Organisations were selected across four categories. The categories, with the number of interviewees given in parentheses, were: International development organisations, defined as intergovernmental, multilateral, or bilateral agencies, such as the UN and World Bank (5); Mongolian urban planning agencies, defined as government organisations working on land allocation, development control, and provision of infrastructure and services (7); private sector firms, defined as organi165

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sations engaged in urban planning that are run for profit and not government controlled (2); and civil society organisations, including non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and community groups (4). To identify organisational interviewees, the authors contacted the Zorig Foundation, an Ulaanbaatar-based NGO with extensive local connections focused on democracy and social equity.  The foundation maintains an Urban Actors Database, which identifies key urban planning actors. Drawing on the 58 organisations in this database, a snowball sampling methodology was adopted. First, the five organisations most publicly involved in urban planning from across the categories were contacted for interviews. Interviews with this first cohort led to additional relevant organisations across the categories. Interviewees were asked about urban planning challenges, organisational goals, decision-making, coordination with partners, and approaches to densification and land use. Interviewees’ identities are kept anonymous to protect them from any adverse consequences arising from the information they shared. The interviews reveal striking differences in the densification preferences of international planners and both local planners and ger district residents. They show that seemingly cohesive concepts like density can have different meanings to different stakeholders. While international planners mean one thing by ‘density’, Mongolian interviewees interpret the concept very differently. International planners unanimously viewed densification as positive, compared with only 39 per cent of local planners. Of ger district residents, 90 per cent favoured low-density land use. Many local interviewees argued that their dislike for high densities stemmed from its incompatibility with Mongolian ways of life which, they claimed, are rooted in nomadism and rural livelihoods. These results are further presented and discussed below.

Ger district residents’ density preferences Ger district residents widely support Ulaanbaatar having more apartments, as envisioned in the Master Plan 2020. A majority in each of the three study areas felt more apartments were desirable. In the central and middle districts, 90 per cent and 93 per cent of interviewees, respectively, answered affirmatively, as compared with 77 per cent in the outer district. The most mentioned reason for wanting more apartments was that they are less polluting than individual houses or gers. Ger district residents listed the specific characteristics they want to be included in any new apartment developments. Notably, many of these were associated with low land use density. The characteristics included: ‘having less [land use] density’ and ‘building outside of the city’. There was a tension between residents’ desire for more apartments and for adjacent open space. Typifying interviewees’ perspectives, one central ger district interviewee said, ‘apartments should be built because ger districts are creating lots of pollution’. However, as with many others, he added that ‘apartments should be built less densely’. Many interviewees said they would personally like to live in an apartment, with those in the middle district expressing the greatest interest. In the central district, 59 per cent of interviewees expressed an interest in personally living in an apartment, in contrast with 81 per cent and 49 per cent of interviewees in the middle and outer districts, respectively. Reasons given for wanting to live in an apartment included improved cleanliness, greater comfort, and more accessible infrastructure such as water, heating, and sewerage. The results reveal a tension between preferences concerning the density of units within buildings and of buildings themselves. Interviewees expressed a strong preference for lowdensity land use, a sentiment shared by 93 per cent of interviewees in the central district, 83 per cent in the middle district, and 95 per cent in the outer district. This preference was cap166

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tured by a central district resident, who said: ‘Less is better. Who likes dense neighbourhoods? My son cannot even play ball. I like the suburbs of the US’. Similarly, an outer district resident remarked: ‘There’s lots of land in the countryside so it would be better to use that space. Otherwise, when you open your door right next to another person’s door your stress increases’. While stereotypes might lead to an expectation that herders and rural residents would have a particularly strong appreciation for open spaces, the interviews show that even urban interviewees in Ulaanbaatar’s ger districts—of whom only 8 per cent were herders before moving to their current home—have a strong preference for open space. This was further shown by the fact that both Ulaanbaatar natives and residents who had migrated to the city held strong preferences for low-density land use. Of people born in the city, 91 per cent preferred low-density land use, compared with 89 per cent of non-natives.

Planners’ density preferences The results show that interviewed planners share a common understanding of Ulaanbaatar’s challenges. Overall, 78 per cent considered air pollution the most urgent issue. International and Mongolian planners had relatively similar perspectives, with 75 per cent and 83 per cent, respectively, citing air pollution as the city’s top concern. All other challenges listed were mentioned by considerably smaller percentages of organisational interviewees. Despite strong agreement on Ulaanbaatar’s challenges (or challenge), the results reveal strong disagreement concerning how urban planners should respond. The point of greatest disagreement relates to the city’s ideal density. Increasing densification was the most popular approach to planning, with ten strong advocates among the interviewees. Two interviewees argued for limited densification, focusing only on specific neighbourhoods. Two interviewees argued for diffuse development and held that the small population, relative to Ulaanbaatar’s physical size, justified a more sprawling development pattern. Finally, four interviewees reported no density preference. Densification preferences differed across planners from Mongolian and international organisations. Representatives of international organisations unanimously favoured urban densification. Of interviewees from Mongolian organisations, 67 per cent did not advocate densification. This difference, like the findings from interviewees with ger district residents, suggests culture influences density preferences. Mongolian planners’ attitudes towards density took the form of ‘Mongolia is different’ and argued that Ulaanbaatar should not copy other cities’ form. Similar perspectives are expressed in public fora where Mongolians discuss the future of the city (Anderson et al., 2017). Among interviewees for this study, a Mongolian planner captured this perspective, saying: ‘Why do I have to be squeezed in a small place? Why? For instance, there are metropolitan areas like Seoul or Tokyo … I don’t want a similar type of life here in Mongolia’. Similar sentiments were heard from other Mongolian planners, with many saying they wanted a Mongolian alternative to dense urban life. An interviewee from a Mongolian NGO was adamant that Mongolia’s history should influence Ulaanbaatar’s urban form: ‘It should be a unique form. Mongolia has more land than any other place; it should use this to its advantage by allowing ger districts. Instead of trying to densify, Ulaanbaatar should embrace the ger district’.

Tensions around densification: International plans vs local preferences That cultural values inform the divergent perspectives of Mongolian and non-Mongolian interviewees regarding density would not be surprising as researchers have long held that per167

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ceptions of density, and crowding, vary across cultures (Evans et al., 2000). What is surprising is that Mongolian attitudes towards density and densification have been given relatively little attention in plans for Ulaanbaatar. Despite Mongolian interviewees’ voicing a desire for different urban models that reflect Mongolia’s distinct conditions and history, such ideas make a limited appearance in most official plans, most of which embrace densification. For example, the Master Plan 2020 lists as one of its priorities ‘to increase the density of the urbanised area’ (Gotov, 2010, p. 7). Likewise, the UN-Habitat GUSIP states ‘densification is an appropriate option’ and ‘urban sprawl is to be prevented’ (UN-Habitat, 2010, p. 2). The results reveal a challenging tension between normatively accepted ideas around what constitutes ‘good’ planning, with international planners favouring densification and Mongolian interviewees preferring more sprawling development. The tension between Mongolian attitudes around density and actual plans for the city begs the question—if Mongolian viewpoints aren’t given attention in plans, whose are? Each of the plans for Ulaanbaatar includes input from Mongolian actors (in fact, they claim to be developed by them, with technical assistance from international organisations). However, the interviewees suggest local voices are filtered through international agencies’ normative lenses, resulting in plans that reflect international rather than Mongolian preferences concerning urban development. While international actors appear to override local preferences in their plan-making, local actors similarly override these international plans through their actions on the ground. As an example, the former mayor of Ulaanbaatar, Bat-Uul Erdene, conveyed his strong preference for lower-density development and promised to provide ger district residents with detached homes (Erdene, 2013). This promise conflicts with the Master Plan 2020’s densification approach, with UN-Habitat’s Ger Upgrading Strategy, and with numerous plans and policies from the World Bank, ADB, and JICA. Importantly, the mayor also endorsed each of those plans. His promise to residents, contrary to his commitments to international agencies, reflects the local attitudes concerning densification mentioned so frequently by Mongolian interviewees. The disconnect between local preferences and international plans, and the problems it poses, has also been observed in other contexts. Watson (2009, p. 2260) argues that planning systems in the Global South ‘have either been inherited from previous colonial governments or have been adopted from Northern contexts’. She states that ‘approaches to planning which have originated in the global North are frequently based on assumptions regarding urban contexts which do not hold elsewhere’ (p. 2272). Scott (1998) provides detailed examples, including the design of Brazil’s capital Brasilia, of how the lack of fit between plans and local preferences leads to suboptimal outcomes. The lack of local viewpoints in plans has critical implications for urban planning in Ulaanbaatar, as in other rapidly growing Asian cities. As Satterthwaite (2008, p. 261) contends, development agencies are ‘only as effective as the organisations they fund; none of the staff of these [development] agencies actually build or run schools or health centres or install water pipes and manage water distribution; they fund others to do so’. Therefore, if local actors responsible for implementation disagree with or are ambivalent about international plans, implementation will be compromised. There is evidence from Ulaanbaatar to support this assertion. According to Byambadorj et al. (2011, p. 173), ‘while a number of plans and policies have been produced, there is widespread apathy towards these tools, and few government officials and residents respect or comply with their content’. Disagreements between Mongolian and international organisations, in Ulaanbaatar as elsewhere, are complicated by differences in political power. Martens (2005) describes this power differential as a root cause of the ownership problems 168

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so frequently observed in international development and argues that concerns arise wherever donors can impose decisions on beneficiaries without involving them in decision-making. Several researchers have studied how the divide between international organisations and local actors can be resolved. Pritchett and Woolcock (2004, p. 207) argue that planners need to create ‘conditions under which genuine experiments to discern the most appropriate local solutions to local problems can be nurtured and sustained’. They argue that local solutions are needed since top-down efforts typically fail to deliver effective solutions. The disconnect between local preferences and the ambitions of Ulaanbaatar’s Master Plan 2020 suggests that urban planning practice has yet to absorb this insight. It will be a considerable challenge to change international organisations’ practices so they better listen to and act on local perspectives, including around densification. Pointing one way forward, Campbell (2002) suggests that such a change could occur through the introduction of new programmatic ideas. Programmatic ideas are those that facilitate policy-making by specifying how to approach and solve particular problems (Campbell, 2002). These ideas often emerge through advocacy by epistemic leaders whose claims are broadly respected and viewed as legitimate (Brooks, 2005). For instance, intellectuals were critical early advocates for European and North American welfare policies (Rueschenmeyer & Skocpol, 1996) and the Red Cross played an early role in increasing accountability in humanitarian intervention (Barnett, 2005). In the international urban planning field, an epistemic leader of this kind would likely be an intergovernmental or multilateral organisation that plays a key role in funding and coordinating global urban policy. If one such organisation were to advocate persuasively for a shift in how urban planning is approached, it could have a transformative effect on the wider network of organisations in this field. In short, one way to develop more locally responsive plans with respect to densification would be to have a prominent organisation act as a first mover towards adopting more locally-driven and community-oriented plans that bring different actors into a more shared conception of how to tackle urban challenges. Regarding densification, one particular challenge for international organisations is that the approach favoured by Mongolian interviewees—reminiscent of the ‘towers in the park’ model—is precisely that least favoured by many international planners. One way to creatively bridge this divide could be to draw on Snow et al.’s (1986) idea of ‘frame extensions’ and focus on expanding the widely understood frame of ‘compact cities’ to include locally relevant ideas regarding density. This could involve identifying what levels of density overlap with the preferences of both international and Mongolian actors through listening and visioning exercises, in which stakeholders share information and experiences openly and work towards mutually compatible outcomes (Shmueli, Elliott, & Kaufman, 2006). While the precise nature of densification with Mongolian characteristics remains to be seen, such a transformative paradigm has much greater potential to win residents over to plans for the city. Without such a transformation, the plans that international organisations develop and support financially will continue to struggle with immense implementation hurdles and be viewed as illegitimate by many local residents and officials. Additionally, without efforts to find common ground between international and local planning actors, the seemingly progressive idea of densification will continue to be deployed in a top-down way that, in Ulaanbaatar as in other Asian cities, runs the risk of running roughshod over local preferences.

Conclusion Ulaanbaatar, like many Asian cities, has been the subject of numerous plans that promote densification—an increasingly widespread planning paradigm—as a way to address environmental, 169

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social, and economic challenges. This chapter examines Mongolia’s capital to understand how densification plans relate to local perceptions of housing and land use. The focus is on Ulaanbaatar’s ger districts, the neighbourhoods where the majority of residents live. The chapter reports on interviews with planners working with 18 international and Mongolian organisations engaged in urban planning and with 120 ger district residents. The interviews reveal that international and local interviewees hold strongly divergent attitudes towards density and densification. Mongolian planners and ger district residents are far less supportive of land use densification than international planners. Local planners and residents favour lower densities, with ger district residents in particular highlighting a preference for relatively high unit densities, in the form of apartments, and low-density land use. This model diverges from the visions advanced in major plans for the city, which are heavily influenced by international donors and professionals. This raises important questions about the extent to which local norms should influence internationally supported plans and suggests that international planning norms must be modified to be more responsive to the preferences of local people. Without concerted efforts to reconcile international and local preferences around density, internationally supported plans will continue to face immense implementation hurdles and the urgent urban challenges they seek to address will go unresolved.

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14 XI’AN From an ancient world city to a 21stcentury global logistics centre Xiangming Chen and Ziming Li

Introduction • • •

How many great cities have risen, fallen, and risen again? How do we account for them? What insights can we draw about long-run urban renaissance and the transformations of world/global cities?

Xi’an stands out as a prominent case for exploring these questions, across the annals of great cities in Asia and the world. A world city of the first order in the premodern era, Xi’an anchored the starting point of the ancient Silk Road, a set of long-distance trading routes from China to ancient Rome going back to the onset of AD. Through the 21st century of reform and opening, Xi’an has re-emerged as a new global logistics centre, anchoring many China–Europe and China–Central Asia freight train routes across the vast Eurasian continent. We tell this roller-coaster tale of a great city in this chapter and add it to the roster of other Asian cities in this handbook. By framing a study of Xi’an as an early-world city in trade and culture and its resurgence as a new global city specialised in cross-border freight logistics, we have a timely opportunity to drill into the deep economic history of Xi’an by addressing how a city is capable of switching from a local agri-industrial past to a global logistics hub by re-assembling its cultural endowment, location advantages, granted favourable policies, and concentrated investment in transport logistics. Given a long temporal lag between Xi’an’s old and new global status, this change is akin to a combined result of an initial starting position and subsequent domestic and international conditions at critical temporal junctures. This process stretches beyond any singular logic in urban change such as global capitalism or postcolonialism (Ong, 2011). In the context of China, Xi’an allows us to examine the crucial role of a powerful state regime in shaping a premier political centre as an imperial capital vs reshaping an inland provincial political and economic centre into a global logistics hub over the last decade. These historical and contemporary features guide us to chart the long pathway, along which Xi’an has resurged from an early world city into a new global city driven by logistics-led development, with a distinctive focus on its recent local and global connections through the Chinese state’s regionally targeted policies (Figure 14.1). 172

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Figure 14.1  Xi’an’s long way from an ancient world city to a state-driven new logistics-led global city. Source:  Created by the authors.

Figure 14.1 identifies Xi’an’s distinctive positions as functionally different but temporally sequenced cities at four critical temporal junctures of uneven duration on a long trajectory of urban change from the ancient Silk Road to the present. They mark the signposts of an analytical roadmap guiding our focused analyses of four Xi’ans through time in consecutive sections. The second section discusses Xi’an in its earliest decades/centuries as a cosmopolitan world city (Box 1 in Figure 14.1) anchoring trade and cultural flows along the Silk Road from the Chinese end, with a very long arch heralding the city’s most recent four decades of change and continuity. Skipping a long interregnum largely irrelevant to recent times, the third section draws out sharp differences between Xi’an as a centrally planned production city (relative to consumption) during Maoist China (Box 2 in Figure 14.1) and its lagged development during the first phase of the Reform and Opening-up era in the 1980– 1990s which had favoured China’s coastal cities (Box 3 in Figure 14.1). The fourth section examines how new state policies prioritising China’s interior and border regions since around 2000 have fostered Xi’an’s strategic catch-up development as a globally oriented inland port with an intensive logistics complex (Box 4), which reveals inter-referencing and backward–forward linkages between Xi’an’s Silk Road roots and recent global logistical reach and influence across Eurasia. Finally, we summarise several aspects of central-state influence on Xi’an shifted positions and roles as four different types of cities over time (from the central box to the four corner boxes, Figure 14.1) as a focal analysis. The last section discusses broader implications from tracing the early origins and recent resurgence of Xi’an’s prominence. Designed to not only chronicle the epochal times of Xi’an’s long history and shifted roles, Figure 14.1 also offers a 173

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temporal lens to illuminate one transformative pathway of a historic world city towards a new global city that may resonate elsewhere.

The legacy of Xi’an’s starting position As a song called Big Xi’an goes, ‘welcome to Shenzhen and you can understand China of the recent 20 years and welcome to Xi’an and you can understand China of 5,000 years’. With a recorded history of over 3,000 years, Xi’an, named Fenghao, Xianyang, or Chang’an through 1369, was the capital city of 13 dynasties and a renowned historic city for trade, culture, and administration. Xi’an reached and sustained its position as one of the world’s few premier cities during the Han Dynasty (206 BC–220 AD) and Tang Dynasty (618–907 AD), which also marked the peak periods of the Silk Road, respectively (Box 1 in Figure 14.1). While many of the world’s great cities in history have favourable locations, primarily on and near the sea that offers natural access to and convenient advantage for international trade, Xi’an is an inland city and has a long way from China’s coast. Located in the Kuan-chung Plain of Shaanxi province and surrounded by the Weihe River and the Qinling Mountains, Xi’an enjoys an agreeable monsoon climate of medium latitudes for agriculture production. Nourished by at least eight rivers, Xi’an gained its first name, Fenghao, meaning ‘the state of harvest and richness’. As the capital city of the Western Zhou Dynasty (1046–771 BC), Chang’an witnessed the rise of the Qin Dynasty (221–207 BC) that united all kingdoms of ancient China. Later on, the Han Dynasty extended China’s geographic reach and connectivity to the Middle East and Europe along the Silk Road while expanding and reconfiguring the spatial boundaries of the imperial administrative base in Chang’an that was enlarged into the rectangular walled city during the Tang Dynasty (Figure 14.2). Chang-an (meaning ‘Eternal Peace’) refers to the goal of peaceful and powerful development under the rising and prosperous times of the Han and Tang Dynasties which were open to external trade and cultural exchange. To rule over the newly unified state, the first Emperor of the Qin Dynasty centralised the development of transportation and communication across national jurisdictions including completing the national project of Qin Highways (Qin chi dao) in 212 BC. This nine-line ancient highway system, creating a scenario of ‘all roads leading to Xianyang’, covered all the territories of the Qin Empire including present-day Shaanxi, Shanxi, Shandong, Henan, Hebei, Beijing, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, Liaoning, Hunan, Hubei, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Zhejiang, and Anhui provinces. Even though built and paved with salted or baked earth, these highways remained in use until the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911). Zhang Qian, the renowned imperial envoy of the Han Dynasty, walked along one line, Qin zhi dao, and then travelled further west along the Silk Road to establish trade and cultural ties with today’s Central Asia. The Silk Road highlights the role of Chang’an as the then political and economic centre of an early cross-regional economy. Zhang Qian’s journey stimulated trade between East and West in silk, tea, porcelain, gold, jewellery, spice, arts, and animals, which fostered regional prosperity across Eurasia from the Han to the Tang Dynasties. This also enhanced the international reputation and connections for Chang’an whose city fabric, architectural design, and street names were appropriated by such historic Japanese cities as Kyoto. While Chang’an’s urban core was moved across dynasties (Figure 14.2), its gridpatterned and walled urban structure remained largely unchanged from the Tang Dynasty to the present. The recent designs and constructions in Xi’an’s urban core have sustained such ancient features as crown cornice, arched doors, rectangular blocks, and straight streets, which match the city walls, imperial gardens, bell and drum towers, temples, and pagodas. 174

Figure 14.2  The sites of palaces of imperial dynasties and the boundaries of current urban areas, Xi’an. Source:  Created by the authors.

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In a restored Muslim quarter dating back centuries near the bell tower in central Xi’an, the original great Muslim temple built in the Tang Dynasty has been preserved. The temple murals and calligraphies register extensive commercial and cultural interactions between ancient China and Arabic visitors. These past and recent features of Xi’an reinforce its status as the premier world city along the Silk Road prospering through the Tang Dynasty (Box 1 in Figure 14.1). In the mid-8th century, the insecurity along the Silk Road associated with the eroded Tang Dynasty disrupted Xi’an’s dominant position and influence within and beyond the Chinese empire. During the vicissitudes of dynasties, the urban areas of Chang’an were burned and rebuilt repeatedly, but its earlier regional, national, and international impact failed to recover. Over the millennium after the Tang Dynasty, the political centre of China moved from Chang’an to other cities such as Luoyang (capital for the Northern Song Dynasty, 960–1127), Nanjing (capital for the Southern Song Dynasty, 1127–1279), and Beijing for the Yuan Dynasty (1271– 1368). In addition, the centre of economic gravity moved incrementally from the north to the south of the Qinling Mountains and the Huaihe river surrounding Xi’an after the Southern Song Dynasty. Furthermore, China became more open to international trade along and via its eastern seaboard during the Song Dynasty and the first half of the Ming Dynasty. This led to a more global network of trade ties from a China-enabled Maritime Silk Road to Southeast Asia and Africa as exemplified by Zheng He’s oceanic voyages from Chinese coastal cities to the east African coast between 1405 and 1433. Over this long time, the city of Chang’an shifted its names and finally settled with Xi’an (Western Peace) in 1369. Chang’an became a name of a nearby county for centuries and then suburban district at present. This sequence of renaming signified a wish for this once glorious city to remain a historical and cultural centre to the west of the subsequent national capitals in stable existence. The decline and relative stagnation of Xi’an from ancient times stemmed from combined demographic, geographic, climatic, and political factors. The weaker monsoon during some years of the Sui, Tang, and Yuan Dynasties affected rainfalls in northwest China (Zhang & Lu, 2007; Zhang, 2006). The growing population and demand for food posed an urgent and severe challenge of food shortage for Xi’an and its broader region (Huang et al., 2016). To the north and northwest of Xi’an were sandy and dry. To the northwest was Shu (Sichuan), the land of abundant granary, and to the southeast was Chu (Hunan and Hubei provinces today), the home of rice and fish. Xi’an’s access to these rich and productive agricultural regions was constrained by the combination of the Qinling Mountains and the Yangtze River due to the high cost of inter-jurisdictional transportation. The only way out was to connect Xi’an with Luoyang in the east, an important port on the Grand Canal in the Sui and Tang Dynasties. The unfinished water transport project at the Yellow River Gorge between Xi’an and Luoyang, however, kept Xi’an’s transport connectivity weaker than Luoyang. As a result, Luoyang and another historic city Kaifeng gradually replaced Xi’an as more important economic and political centres. In addition, long-standing wars against invading groups from the west and north, coupled with the high cost to renew decayed urban form and functionality of Xi’an leading up to the Song Dynasty, discouraged the Song and later emperors to relocate the capitals back to Xi’an. Different national administrative decisions, more than geographic conditions, have left their strong and lasting imprints on Xi’an since its early days and shaped its relations with the wider world. In reverse, Xi’an’s change and continuity relative to its peer cities within and beyond China reflect the short- and longer-term influence of national authorities that guides our focal analysis to the next critical position of Xi’an’s journey through time (Box 2 in Figure 14.1). 176

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Xi’an under central planning and reform/opening While Xi’an’s post-Tang decline itself does not fully justify jumping to Xi’an in post-1949 China, this time point marks a historically critical second baseline for the continued tracing of Xi’an’s change and then resurgence towards a new global city with material and spiritual throwbacks to its initial emergence as a premier world city (Figure 14.1). By establishing a centrally planned economy by the mid-1950s, the Chinese national government reshaped Xi’an from its past existence. With only around 590,000 people in a built-up urban area of 14 square kilometres in the early 1950s, Xi’an was a small and pre-industrial city with severely undeveloped infrastructure supported by limited local finance. Its roads were unpaved, lights poorly lit, and telephones hardly working (Shaanxi Provincial Government, 2008). For the first five-year plan covering 1953–1957, the national government allocated 17 of 156 major construction projects to Xi’an. In 1954, the Xi’an government unveiled its first master plan for new urban development, which designated five functional areas devoted to military industries, textiles, electric and electronic production, culture and education, and heritage preservation and commercial administration. This plan sparked rapid population growth, industrialisation, and urbanisation through the 1950s. The city added 1.39 million new residents through 1960, 15.1 per cent of whom were migrants, especially skilled workers and their families from the more developed coastal provinces (Liang, 2020). The early 1960s brought another turn of fortune to Xi’an, albeit for a geostrategic manoeuvring for protecting China’s industrial assets in its coastal region against a potential military threat from both the United States and the former Soviet Union. This led the national government to use its central planning and administrative mechanisms to relocate various industries from the coastal cities to the interior through a programme known as the Third Front initiative (Figure 14.1). From 1964 to 1980, China devoted almost 40 per cent of its capital construction budget to moving strategy- and heavy-industry factories to inland areas and building new ones that were protected by mountains (Lin et al., 2019). The Third Front initiative also financed and facilitated the construction and extension of some roads and railways to better connect key interior cities and their surrounding regions in the northwest (Shaanxi and Gansu) and southwestern provinces (Sichuan and Yunnan). These government efforts nurtured the emergence of a large military–industrial complex of aerospace, war equipment, heavy machinery, and electronics production, as well as other modern manufacturing facilities. This was accompanied by the concentrated formation of major universities and engineering institutes that contribute research applications and human capital to the local economy (Shaanxi Provincial Government, 2008). While a few of these new industrial enterprises involved non-state capital, the overwhelming majority of them had strong investment and ownership ties to the national government. They shared the prominent features of (1) exclusive decision by controlling government bureaucracies; (2) a rigid local labour market; and (3) government dominance in setting growth targets and infrastructure provision (Walcott, 2003). They collectively shaped Xi’an’s economy as a largely closed local system vertically organised and controlled by higher authorities. Despite fast economic growth from 1949 to 1979, except during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), Xi’an became and remained a major production city under China’s planned economy characterised by prioritised heavy industries, international isolation, high inefficiency in capital and labour allocation, and suppressed consumption (Box 2 in Figure 14.1). If the Third Front initiative benefited Xi’an by solidifying its state-dominated industrial structure and strength, the onset of the Reform and Opening-up in 1978, which was supposed to weaken the planning shackle around Xi’an, turned out to disadvantage it as the coastal cities were 177

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prioritised by favourable policies to grow first and faster. The new policy eroding the inefficient centrally planned and state-dominated economy was to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) into the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) of Shenzhen and others and 14 coastal cities with Economic and Technological Development Zones (ETDZs). From 1978 to 1998, cumulatively 85 per cent of FDI in China flowed into its coastal areas, while only 3 per cent went into its inland region. While the central region increased its FDI share from 1.1 per cent in 1983 to 8.8 per cent in 1993 due to policy extension, the share of the western region including Xi’an dropped from 5.9 per cent to 3.7 per cent and further to 0.5 per cent by 1997, despite having over 50 per cent of China’s land and 20 per cent of its population (Chen, 2020). This uneven spatial distribution of FDI and its associated international connectivity would be a major obstacle for Xi’an in the first two decades of the Reform/Opening era. As the coastal cities raced far ahead of inland cities like Xi’an, the latter caught some spillover benefit of FDI. Not getting to host its first foreign company until 1983, Xi’an attracted around 1,800 foreign-invested enterprises by the late 1990s with a contracted investment of $3.8 billion (Shaanxi Provincial Government, 2008). While this lagged considerably behind such coastal cities like Shenzhen and Shanghai and even their smaller neighbours, it contributed to the rapid expansion of foreign trade that cumulated into $3.1 billion over that period at an average annual rate of 25 per cent. This in turn helped boost the city’s overall economic growth. In 1999, Xi’an’s GDP reached 61.4 billion RMB (~$9.5 billion), nine times over 1978 at an average annual rate of 11.6 per cent, although its GDP per capita grew slowly in the same period of 1978–1999 (Figure 14.3). Yet this aggregate GDP growth was obtained primarily by the dominance of 46 thousand state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as recorded in 1999, which was 20.5 times the figure for 1978 (Shaanxi Provincial Government, 2008). Besides this largely state-driven economic growth, Xi’an benefited from upgrading its infrastructure, building new

Figure 14.3  Economic growth and traffic volume in Xi’an, 1978–2019. Source:  Created by the authors, using data from Xi’an Statistical Yearbook 2020.

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transport and telecommunication connections with other cities, and establishing the Xi’an High- and New-Tech Industrial Zone that featured the clustering of electronics and information, computing, and bio-pharmacological industries. Nevertheless, in the larger national context and with its GDP ranking outside of China’s top 40 cities in 1999, Xi’an continued to lag in economic development and global connectivity due to its western location and China’s coast-oriented policies (Box 3 in Figure 14.1).

National steering, catch-up development, and resurgence to a new global city In Xi’an’s change and development over the past four decades since around 1980, the year 2000 marked a momentous turn of fortune for this city, which has been driven largely by China’s Grand Development of the Western Region campaign. This campaign mainly consisted of (1) increasing the magnitude of investment (e.g., priority allocation in national construction projects); (2) improving the investment environment (e.g., tax incentives in selected sectors); (3) expanding the region’s economic sectors for investment (e.g., foreign investment in infrastructure development); and (4) attracting skilled labour and strengthen the science, technology, and education sectors (Han & Qin, 2005, p. 387). This ‘Go West’ initiative started from 1997 and marked the ‘second turn’ of China’s Reform/Opening era to the interior, while the ‘first turn’ was focused on the coast. The ’second turn’ was inaugurated with the central government’s granting of the provincial-level municipality status to Chongqing in 1997 and the designation of this megacity as a major hub in the western region. In its wake, the national government approved the establishment of 17 new ETDZs, most of which are located in the western region, during 2000–2002 (Chen, 2020). During 2000–2016, the central government invested 6.4 trillion RMB (~$1 trillion) in the western region to build up infrastructure of different types in both urban and rural areas. In 2004, the central government unveiled the first official directive for ‘Western Development’. This directive included Shaanxi province as the first tier of provinces incorporated into it and labelled Xi’an as the so-called ‘bridge-head’ for spearheading economic and infrastructure developments in the western region. But an updated version of the ‘West Development’ directive in 2010 gave somewhat more attention to Xi’an’s rival cities like Chongqing and Chengdu (Ma, 2020). A series of regional development policies, especially the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, have channelled massive investment to the west and thus fuelled broader regional economic growth including Xi’an. Shaanxi’s GDP rose from 159 billion RMB (~$25 billion) in 1999 to 2,579 billion RMB (~$397 billion) in 2019 at an average annual rate of 11.4%. For Xi’an, the corresponding figures were 62 billion RMB (~$9.5 billion) in 1999 (Shaanxi Provincial Government, 2008) and 932 billion RMB (~$143 billion) in 2019 (Ma, 2020), with a 15-fold increase over 1999, compared to the ninefold rise from 1978 to 1999. Xi’an’s GDP per capita also rose 9.7 times from 2000 to 2019, much faster than the previous two decades (Figure 14.3). In aggregate economic terms, Xi’an improved more over the second half of the Reform/Opening era (from Box 3 to Box 4) than during the first half (from Box 1 to Box 2), to a great extent due to the central government’s targeted policies for developing the western region (Figure 14.1). This catch-up development created opportunities for Xi’an to leverage its location advantages and locally strengthened economic position to generate new global city functions, particularly in transport logistics. As Xi’an began to catch up in economic development after 2000, it has continued to be shaped or steered by targeted planning and policy of the central government, even more so in different ways than at the previous three junctures (Figure 14.1). In 2010, in the National 179

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Urban System Planning Principles document, the central government designated five cities— Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chongqing, Tianjin—as National Central Cities, which would play dual roles in shaping both the national economy in their central positions and the global economy with their various international outreaches. This short list would expand to include Chengdu, Wuhan, Zhengzhou, and Xi’an in the following years, even though Xi’an ranked last behind the other eight cities (Tencent.net, 2022). To follow and implement this top-down vision, the Xi’an municipal government has committed to developing the city into five centres: economy and communication, technology and innovation for the modern Silk Road, the inland commanding height of openness, national comprehensive transportation, and featured history and culture by 2030. In reaching the ambitious municipal goals in alignment with the national vision, Xi’an faces strong competition with its two regional peers of Chengdu and Chongqing. Xi’an not only has a smaller economy—40 per cent of Chongqing’s and 54 per cent of Chengdu’s in 2019—but also is smaller territorially, covering about 10,000 square kilometres (12 per cent of Chongqing’s 82,400 and 71 per cent of Chengdu’s 14,300 square kilometres) (Ma, 2020). This latter disadvantage has been associated with Xi’an’s slower incorporation of neighbouring areas and designation of its previous rural counties as urban districts, in spite of an administrative decision to place Xi’an–Xianyang New District under Xi’an’s governance in 2021 (Figure 14.2). This enlarged geography of Xi’an municipality has become better connected through the construction of ring expressways, an international airport, and inter-regional highways around Xi’an, which have fostered its metropolitan and regional development and integrated Xi’an with Xianyang and its suburban districts or former counties more strongly. Moreover, three important national highways have linked Xi’an into an extensive network of inter-city highways connecting China’s seaport and land port cities in different directions, including G312 from Shanghai to Khorgos and G108 from Beijing to Kunming including the segment between Xi’an and Chengdu. These recently completed transport lines have raised the volume of both passenger and freight flows in Xi’an (Figure 14.3). Xi’an has also benefited from national and provincial investment in railway construction for widening Xi’an’s access and connectivity to both passenger and freight movements nationally and globally. During China’s 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015) period, Shaanxi completed new rail lines and upgraded existing ones to connect Xi’an and other major cities of the province with two vertical and five horizontal trunk routes which are integral to the national rail system. Over the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016–2020) period, 222 billion RMB (~$34 billion) were invested in Xi’an’s transport infrastructure, mostly into railways, and yielded 601 km of new lines, over one-third of which was high-speed rail. During the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021– 2025) period, the completed rail in and around Xi’an is expected to reach 900 km (Xi’an Municipal Government, 2021). In the direction towards Xi’an, completed rail projects originating from elsewhere in China have pushed more passenger and freight traffic along multiple major railways to converge on Xi’an. While high-speed trains shorten the time of travel from Xi’an to Chengdu to three hours and to Shanghai to five hours, the Lianyungang–Khorgos Expressway or the China-based segment of the New Eurasian Land Bridge, constructed and upgraded between 1998 and 2014, stretched a long way in extending and enhancing Xi’an’s intra- and inter-regional freight transport capacities. As a new global logistics hub, the regional impact of Xi’an is reinforced along with transportation network expansion. Of all transport connections linked to Xi’an, rail freight has stood out as the most effective and powerful factor that has driven the city into a new global logistics hub. This progress has not only benefited from Xi’an’s unique location in the geometric centre of China but also resonates with its status as a trading centre anchoring the eastern 180

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end of the ancient Silk Road (Figure 14.1). In addition, the rise of Xi’an as a new global logistics hub has much more to do with the BRI-enabled policy and economic dynamics. In 2013, Xi’an sent its first freight train to Kazakhstan as part of the growing China–Europe Freight Train (CEFT), which started in Chongqing in 2011. This initiative has been a strong booster for Xi’an to become a transport/logistics centre for Eurasian trade (Zhang, 2018), fitting into the municipal government’s five-centre development vision mentioned earlier. While the BRI, with the CEFT as its flagship project, originated as a top-down policy, Xi’an was a willing and proactive local participant in the CEFT. This followed a similar effort in 2008 when the Xi’an International Trade and Logistics Park (ITLP), proposed by the municipal government and sponsored by the Shaanxi provincial government, was approved by the national government. Planned for 120 square kilometres with a built-up area of 90 square kilometres and located about 15 kilometres the northeast from Xi’an’s old walled city (Figure 14.2), the ITLP aimed to create three integrated zonal functions: (1) the Xi’an Comprehensive Bonded Zone; (2) the Xi’an rail container centre; and (3) the Xi’an inland road port. In 2009, the ITLP established and financed the Xi’an International Inland Port Investment & Development Group (ITL Group) as a large state-owned enterprise (SOE) and the ITLP’s operating arm. The ITL Group owns more than 45 controlled and joint-stock subsidiary companies under five functional groups with around 1,500 employees and total assets reaching 35 billion RMB (~$5.4 billion) (Chen, 2021a). The municipal government is the de facto operator of the ITLP and thus ensures the central position of the CEFT for Xi’an’s development. As an example, a former Vice Mayor of Xi’an also served as the Party Secretary in charge of the ITLP during 2917–2019. Other Chinese cities have done similar things as Xi’an. These local governments are the ultimate driver of the CEFT as a global logistics network, supporting the argument that global logistics would not function without the state developing local logistics (Rimmer, 2014). Through the International Logistics subgroup company, the ITL Group launched the first train to Almaty, Kazakhstan, in 2013. From the outset, Xi’an idealised this initiative with a re-imagination of its ancient Silk Road position for implementing the CEFT by invoking the metaphor of the ‘Iron Silk Road’. The Xi’an government named its CEFT after the old city name of Chang’an. In making another backward reference, the Xi’an government used a throw-back image of three Bactrian camels walking alongside a locomotive as the fitting logo for the ‘Chang’an Express’, which is a historically reimagined urban branding strategy used by gateway cities to sustain or reassert themselves (Scholvin, 2021). Xi’an is not only the capital of Shaanxi but also one of the cities specially designated in the state plan and sub-provincial cities. Xi’an government is subordinate to the national government in the vertical administrative hierarchy while acting with considerable autonomy in building up its logistics capacity. This differs considerably from the market-dominated logistics sector in Western advanced economies where local governments are both more independent of higher-level authorities and largely dependent on cooperation with large logistics firms. The Xi’an municipal government has played a triggering and primary role vis-à-vis the national state and the market agents of large and small logistics firms in shaping the CEFT’s multiple impacts (Chen, 2021a). Xi’an’s leading role in creating a robust CEFT hub has received national coordination and support for pushing the BRI and CEFT forward as linked projects. In October 2019, the Ministry of   Transportation incorporated Xi’an into its plan for a competitive nation-wide logistics system as a special top-tier inland port for driving and channelling cargo flows across China’s northwestern region and beyond. In July 2020, the national government invested 200 million RMB (~$28.5 million) in consolidating the CEFT hub functions in five cities—Chengdu, 181

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Chongqing, Urumqi, Xi’an, and Zhengzhou (Henan province)—in order to make these favourably located, successful logistics hubs and their routes and the overall network more efficient (Chen, 2020). While relatively small, this investment signalled the national government’s vision for and interest in improving the CEFT’s overall performance largely powered by local governments’ logistical initiatives and activities (Figure 14.1). More symbolically for Xi’an, Xi Jinping encouraged Xi’an to become the top CEFT hub in northwestern China to serve the BRI during his inspection tour of Shaanxi province in 2020. By launching the CEFT, Xi’an has joined a growing number of Chinese cities that have fuelled the rapid growth of the CEFT trips since only 17 trips including the inaugural train from Chongqing to Duisburg in 2011. The BRI’s official inauguration in 2013 saw 80 trips, which rose to 308 in 2014. The number of trains jumped to 6,363 in 2018, almost equalling the total number of trips in the previous seven years. While the Covid-19 outbreak in China at the beginning of 2020 slowed the CEFT’s strong growth through 2019, the quick suppression of the virus halted the temporary slowdown before growth resumed and accelerated through 2021. By the year-end, the total of 15,136 CEFT trips were 8.9 times over 2016 and exceeded the record year of 2020 by 22 per cent. In the first quarter of 2022, 3,630 CEFTs carried over 350,000 containers, which represented increases of 7 per cent and 9 per cent over the corresponding period, respectively. For 23 months in a row, the monthly number of CEFT trips has averaged over 1,000 (The Chang’an Express WeChat platform, 2022). Amidst this ever-expanding number of CEFT trips, 30 of the 50-plus Chinese cities sent more than 100 trains to Europe and Central Asia in 2021. Five officially designated CEFT hub cities including Xi’an sent over 1,000 trains. Xi’an has ranked first among these five cities as China’s largest (in)land port. Riding on the ‘Chang’an Express’, Xi’an has since 2013 sent over 10,000 freight trains, ahead of the almost 8,000 trains for second-place Chongqing. Xi’an has accounted for more than one-fifth of more than 50,000 train trips between China and Europe including Central Asia since 2011. In 2020 alone, 3,670 trains left and returned to Xi’an, ahead of Chengdu (2,800) and Chongqing (2,177), respectively, accounting for almost one-third of China’s total number of CEFTs (Belt and Road Portal, 2021). In the first quarter of 2022, Xi’an sent and received 790 train trips along 16 routes reaching scores of cities within and through 45 countries and regions, maintaining its top rank among all top CEFT hubs in China (Cui, 2022). These cities include Duisburg, Hamburg, Neuss, Rostock (all in Germany), Tilburg (the Netherlands), Kouvola (Finland), Riga (Latvia), Milan, Budapest, Minsk, Moscow, Warsaw, and Istanbul, among others. In November 2019, a freight train went from Xi’an to Prague across the Caspian Sea, by Ankara, and through the Marmaray tunnel below the Bosporus Strait in Istanbul, marking a rare land–sea–land intermodal run along the CEFT’s central or southern corridor. This new line gained more use in early 2021 when the inaugural return train from Istanbul arrived in Xi’an after 15 days and thus launched the bidirectional Xi’an–Istanbul service (Chen, 2021a). As the spatial scope of Xi’an’s logistical reach widens, it has exerted a growing impact on redirecting and reconfiguring some transnational flows of trade and production through its newly established logistics role. In September 2019, the ITL Group dispatched the first ‘LG block train’, which carried exclusive liquid-crystal display (LCD) panels and electrodes to the factory owned by the large Korean manufacturer located in the Polish city of Sławków. Instead of around 40 days by sea, these containerised parts on a dedicated freight train arrived at the destination in 10–12 days. Since 2019, LG has already sent over 1,000 TEUs of parts to its factory in Sławków on the ‘Chang’an Express’ after shipping them from Korea to the Chinese port city of Qingdao and then to Xi’an for Europe, which saves time and cost for LG (Belt and 182

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Road Portal, 2020). Xi’an has effectively redirected a global supply chain from East Asia via western China to central Europe. Xi’an has also gained another and more direct logistical effect on production as its transnational freight connectivity has lured more manufacturing companies to (re)locate locally in order to ship products and parts to European markets more quickly and cheaply. In 2018, the founder of Siying, an electronics manufacturing company in Shenzhen, originally from Xi’an, moved his entire factory back to his hometown after realising that he could ship products to Central Asia faster (from over 40 to around 15 days) at lower costs and thus expand production. Since relocation, this company has reduced the cycle of its order placement and supply chain coordination from around 90 to 30–40 days, almost tripled its output, hired more local workers, and expanded its markets from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to France and Germany (Chen, 2021b). Going along with its impact on production, the ‘Chang’an Express’ has strengthened Xi’an role in connecting and redistributing consumption across European and Chinese cities. For example, Volvo has benefited greatly from running a new regular train between Xi’an and Ghent, Belgium. In June 2018, a CEFT train departed from Ghent and arrived at Xi'an Vehicle Port with 160 European-made Volvo XC90 SUVs and V40 hatchbacks, after 16 days. These more expensive models sell very well in China, the world’s largest market for Volvo cars. In 2019, a ‘Chang’an Express’ train loaded with 160 XC60 SUVs arrived in Ghent, Belgium, after an 18-day journey. Made at Volvo’s plant in Chengdu, China, the XC60 were sold in 25 European countries including France and Germany (Hao, 2018; Li, 2019). During the first three months of 2020 when China was dealing with the pandemic, 27 trains from Xi’an carried 3,377 XC60s (averaging 125 cars per block train) to the European markets through a fast and secure system from truck to train without exposing the new cars to potential virus contamination (Chen, 2021b).

Conclusion We conclude on a key argument that Xi’an’s logistics-led development, formally sparked by the BRI in 2013, has since stimulated and strengthened other facets of strength to and from its geoeconomic position. By attracting more manufacturing investment to take advantage of shipping on the ‘Chang’an Express’, the municipal government can avoid the city’s ‘premature deindustrialisation’ as reflected in the declined share of manufacturing in GDP to 22.3 per cent in 2016, ranking second from the bottom on the list of 15 major cities (Ma, 2020). Besides its enhanced manufacturing capacity, Xi’an has gained strength in channelling and redistributing consumption from hosting east-bound freight trains carrying European imports and transhipping them to other parts of China from the latter’s geometrical centre with the shortest average distance to much of the national territory. In 2020, more than 20 provinces, with uneven access to overland exports, used the ‘Chang’an Express’ to export and import their goods via consolidation and redistribution via Xi’an. More than half of the imported goods for Shaanxi province passed through Xi’an, which also moved over 70 per cent of these goods to the rest of China (Zhang & Wang, 2021). The ‘Chang’an Express’ has brought such popular European imports as Dutch dairy products, French cosmetics, and Italian clothing to Chinese consumers. As China has become an even bigger consumer, whose share of global consumption rose from 9 per cent during 2000–2005 to 23 per cent during 2013–2018 (McKinsey & Company, 2021), Chinese consumers have been buying more imported goods, especially luxury European brands, with over half of this spending from second- or lower-tier interior cities led by cities like Xi’an. 183

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To the extent that Xi’an embodies an emerging global logistics city that has also benefited more broadly from accelerated local development and extended national and global influence, it is both largely expected and somewhat unexpected. We expect this for Xi’an from an effective coupling of targeted state policies and the city’s historic status and geographic location. We do not fully expect this in light of how the Chinese state had shaped the city’s past positions before 1979 and 2000 (Figure 14.1) and of whether freight logistics would be able to generate this much economic activity and momentum. Has this logistics-driven development helped Xi’an rise from its ranking as a world city at the Gamma-level in 2016 to Gamma+ in 2018 and then to Beta− in 2020, according to the Globalisation and World Cities Research Network’s biennial ranking? Although we cannot answer this question, Xi’an appears on its way to returning to a dominant Eurasian city as a CEFT logistics hub as the BRI has ‘returned’ China’s growing economic prowess to Eurasia along the Silk Road Economic Belt. Xi’an resurgence through the BRI has brought about both realised opportunities and emerging challenges for its new powerful function in transport logistics from far beyond China’s borders. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Xi’an has had to reroute the ‘Chang’an Express’ to bypass Russia by running more trains along its relatively new route to the Kazakh port of Aqtau on the Caspian Sea where containers would be shipped by boat to the Azeri port of Baku and then moved on trains again to pass Tbilisi and the Turkish city of Kars before going further west to Europe via Istanbul. Finally, having traced Xi’an’s long and checkered pathway from an ancient world city to a new global logistics city as guided by Figure 14.1, we alert research on great cities of the past to refocus on critical temporal junctures and their underlying forces capable of reshaping these cities to new status and roles that reflect an oft-shifting balance of change and continuity.

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PART III

South Asian cities



15 SOUTH ASIAN CITIES Informalisation of ecological and social change Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt

Introduction Urbanisation in South Asia has increased since the turn of the century in terms of both population and build environment. This growth, though modest compared with other regions in Asia, also reflects increased diversity in the region economically, socially, and environmentally. Present and future problems related to urbanisation will be more severe in Asia than elsewhere because of continuing rapid growth of its cities and associated increases and challenges of environmental degradation, pollution, poverty, inequalities, poor water and sanitation system, deforestation, inappropriate land use, natural disasters, and urban heat island effects. South Asian urban development is in many ways informal and not visible which is symptomatic of the failure to adequately address congestion constraints that arise from the pressure of urban populations on infrastructure, basic services, land, housing, employment, and the environment. These characteristics are further exacerbated by informalisation of jobs, housing, and ecological footprint. This chapter explores the informalisation of urban South Asia. The next section gives an overview of recent urban development trends in the region. Then the chapter relates urban South Asia to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the United Nations (UN) and gives some basic empirical data on how sustainability has evolved in the region. It further discusses the impacts of COVID-19 on the underlying pressures of rapid social change. The final section analyses current trends of informalisation of the economic, social, and environmental spheres in urban settings in South Asia.

Recent urban development trends South Asia as a region or sub-region is one of the most densely populated areas of the world and has approximately 3 per cent of the world’s land mass and 22 per cent of the world’s population. There are numerous challenges facing the processes of urban development in South Asia, home to some of the biggest cities in the world. The South Asia region comprises Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. One-sixth of the world’s population lives in this region, which is both culturally and socio-politically extremely diverse. What meets the eye is urbanisation driven by human resource allocation and mobility and agglomeration economies or neo-liberalisation playing a primary role. It is also the result of DOI: 10.4324/9781003256533-18

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capital accumulation through the possession of land for industrialisation and speculation. It unveils various injustices such as dispossession, ecological degradation, and informalisation of the urban poor who in many cases are migrant farmers coming to the city for a better life. Urbanisation in South Asia ‘is characterised by the nearby low economic importance of agriculture’ (Pathak et al., 2020, p. 5), which is diminishing in importance all over the region although most of the region is still rural in employment terms. According to the World Bank figures, the urban population growth rate in South Asia peaked in the mid-1970s when it was 4.5 per cent per year. It then decreased, and today it is below 2.5 per cent per year, less than that in the 1960s. Comparatively speaking, South Asia has a low urbanisation rate, but the urban population has more than doubled in the period from 1960 to 2020 (The World Bank, 2022). Some projections by the UN suggest a much faster increase in urbanisation in the coming years. However, it is important to note that the term urban is highly disputed, especially in Asia. The distinction between rural and urban is increasingly blurred, and migration and commuting patterns further complicate the question of what is urban and what is rural (Hugo, 2020, p. 9). There is also a dispute about the reasons for urban growth itself. Wilson et al. (2020) refer to urban growth as a product of poverty-induced rural–urban migration, and it is due to urban pull and rural push. Migration for employment from rural to urban areas emerges as a major approach for poverty alleviation. Urbanisation has a systematic and strong association with poverty reduction in neighbouring rural areas. For example, urban-torural remittances appear to be particularly important in the well-being of the poorest states in India (Wilson et al., 2020). Huge unplanned population growth and unregulated slum areas produce hitherto new challenges to resilience against environmental damage and climate change. Megacities such as Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Dhaka, Bangalore, and Karachi, which are among the most densely populated cities in the world, have more than 30 per cent of the urban population across the region living in informal settlements. The growth of formal and informal slums in peri-urban areas, destruction of ecosystems, tensions and conflicts based on uneven spatial patterns, and in some cases wars are characteristics of the region’s megacities. Forty per cent of the world’s poor (399 million people) in the region are still living under $1.25 per day in hardcore poverty (Arfanuzzaman, 2021). There are other important and more positive signs and trends related to urban development such as shopping malls, call centres and new middle classes showcasing new identities, consumerism, and status. There is a transnational imagination of the megacities as dystopic (Anjaria & McFarlane, 2011). With mobile telecommunications and gentrification, newly affluent middle strata occupy jobs with global connections and global capital. They have relocated to the renovated suburbs in a sort of reverse type of decentralisation. In this sense, urbanisation in the region is driven by the neoliberal reordering of space and co-option of social, political, and environmental agendas set by the new middle classes and urban elites. Based on the European and North American experience, the World Bank is enthusiastically speculating with almost certainty that urban growth ultimately will lead to prosperity, economic growth, and increased liveability. If there are deficits in urban management and finance, it may lead to even more pressures on infrastructure, housing, environment, and other public goods. This view is encapsulated in the mainstream or neo-classical view of urban planning as if it is just a matter of getting infrastructure and a few other public necessities right in urban planning and management. Then economic growth will increase, and poverty will disappear within a short span of years. This is neatly illustrated by the message that ‘messy and hidden patterns of urbanisation are symptoms of market and policy failure’ (Ellis & Roberts, 2016, p. 24). 190

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New evidence, though, does show some resemblance with these arguments. The new emerging megacities across the region have flourished and become more affluent in tandem with economic liberalisation. These cities, especially in southern India, like elsewhere, rely on a capital-intensive, export-driven, and information-technology-driven economy. These new entities are ‘connected externally to global networks and segments of their own countries, while internally disconnecting local populations that are either functionally unnecessary or socially disruptive’ (Schmidt, 2021, p. 376). This is what makes the new megacities a ‘new urban form’ (Castells, 1996, p. 404). In other words, ‘the city in South Asia is not disordered, but highly competitive, and in being so reveals a dynamism and creativity that is startlingly different from European examples’ (Bates & Mio, 2015, p. 12). At the same time, urbanisation continues to create new opportunities for some, but in its current form and content, it creates enormous challenges for the health and livelihoods of the disenfranchised, poor, and marginalised citizens both within the cities and in transitional peri-urban areas. However, the role of urban governments is unclear with limited functional and revenue assignments. It creates uncertainties about local government authority and restricts decisionmaking for service delivery. On paper, local governments have the authority to create budgets but have limited capacity and sufficient resources for planning and implementation. This picture may differ across the region but is a general situation because ‘they depend greatly on transfers from upper tiers of government, and the reporting requirements for budget approvals are heavy’ (Ellis & Roberts, 2016, p. 5). Related to the inefficiencies of governments are problems related to resources, accountability, connectivity and planning, land and housing, resilience to disasters, and the effects of environmental degradation. Anthropogenic global warming leads to contestation and inequalities inside cities. Uneven development inevitably leads to situations, where subaltern communities face clashes both legally and in real time. ‘Environmental transformations in cities cannot be “socially or ecologically neutral”. The outcomes of these changes impact one group adversely and the other favourably which cause rifts and displacements—both literally and figuratively’ (Mehmood et al., 2021, p. 538). These contradictions, struggles, and resistance from below may indicate that a new ‘subaltern citizenship’ is emerging in cities. Middle and working classes are seeking to empower themselves aided by legal non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and charities. As Bates and Mio (2015, p. 2) mention, ‘battles are being fought over planning, the environment, and the utilisation of urban space’. This evolution may have new political, economic, and even cultural implications for the global cities in the region, ‘which are of crucial concern to national and international development agencies, as well as business enterprises seeking to invest in the burgeoning South Asian urban environment’ (Bates & Mio, 2015, p. 2). What these processes and various strata have in common is the challenge of climate change. Climate change–induced disasters such as flooding, drought, and coastal erosion had severe consequences for almost 1.7 billion people. The costs involved more than $127 billion in damage from 1990 to 2017, and about 800 million people are ‘at risk of deteriorating incomes due to climate stress. In addition, due to change in weather, living standards of more than 80 per cent of the overall population could be adversely affected by 2050’ (Arfanuzzaman, 2021). Study shows that the urban poor comprise migrants coming from regions and localities where the impacts of climate change have been severe. Many migrants, though, also come to the cities in search of better livelihoods. With no supply of space in extant cities and towns for such people, they find it convenient to settle in the vulnerable left-out space in ‘marginal areas such as riverbanks, railway tracks, hill and other slopes and low-lying areas prone to inundation during rains and floods’ (Srivastava, 2020, p. 5). Many migrants end up in the urban 191

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informal sector, where they work in 3D jobs (dirty, dangerous, and demeaning), but it is still worth it and provides a way to achieve a better life. Extreme climate risks and vulnerabilities pose new challenges to poor people and migrants in informal settlements since they are at risk because slums are in environmentally fragile locations. In most cases there are high levels of poverty, illiteracy, unhygienic shelter, poor quality drinking water, inadequate sanitation facilities, poor drainage and solid waste disposal, and low levels of capacity to deal with climate impacts. Urban authorities seldom recognise the inherent problems in slums since the inhabitants do not have ‘rights to the city’ (Lefebvre, 1996). The only exceptions to these general characteristics are Bhutan and Sri Lanka where a more planned approach has proved relatively successful. In both cases there is an active government and political will to deal with informal settlements. In the case of Sri Lanka there is a value placed on tenure security and the importance of functional land markets (Redwood & Wakely, 2012). A contrasting view to this scenario is encapsulated in a study of the peri-urban spaces in Hulna in Bangladesh, Gurugram and Hyderabad in India, and Kathmandu in Nepal. These case studies are illuminating by showing how burdens and benefits of water governance are allocated under conditions of socio-environmental change. They also illustrate how those in control of political power influence these issues in ways that characterise peri-urban spaces, populations, and livelihoods under pressure. These circumstances are examples of the effects of a changing climate ‘in the tidal floodplains of Bangladesh—the conflicts are primarily socio-political, about exertion of power and control over people, resources, and water infrastructure by networks of political and entrepreneurial elites’ (Roth et al., 2019, p. 590). Interestingly, it may be argued that ‘anyone who believes that global warming is a real danger should see dense urban living as part of the solution’ (Glaeser, 2012). High population density may reduce carbon footprints, and in a temporal and spatial perspective, scarce resources and services are distributed to people in a shorter span of time and reduce time and geographical limits involved.

The SDGs in urban South Asia The UN’s SDGs rely on the comprehensive principles of inclusiveness, equity, and sustainability. The objectives of SDGs are stated in 17 interconnected program areas. They cover poverty, hunger, health, education, gender equality, water and sanitation, energy, employment and economic growth, infrastructure, inequality, responsible consumption and production, climate change, natural systems and biodiversity, peace and justice, and partnerships to achieve the goals. The aim is to invent a new holistic development path to societal sustainability, and it is being suggested that the challenges and commitments are interrelated and call for integrated solutions. The SDGs also emphasise the urban setting, where ‘cities are hubs for ideas, commerce, culture, science, productivity, social, human, and economic development. Urban planning, transport systems, water, sanitation, waste management, disaster risk reduction, access to information, education and capacity-building are all relevant issues to sustainable urban development’ (UN, 2022). Achieving these goals presents a significant challenge to South Asia, which is among the fastest-growing regions in the world, with an aggregate GDP of more than three trillion US dollars and a population of more than 1.8 billion. The region has significant human development problems, with 37 per cent of the world’s poor and nearly half of the world’s malnourished children. South Asia accounts for nearly 30 per cent of the world’s population, a third of the 192

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world’s poor, and a projected move from rural towards urban in the form of internal mobility and migration (Kumar, 2020). Migration is encompassed in the 2030 agenda in several goals and targets and notable among these are SDGs 4, 5, 8, 10, 16, and 17. The central focus of migration is covered in SDG 10.7, facilitating orderly, safe, regular, and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies (Sivakumar & Rajan, 2022, p. 8). Data on internal migration in India shows stunning mobility. Estimations from the Census of India 2011 indicate that there were ‘a total of 449 million internal migrants in India, out of which only 54 million were interstate migrants. The Government’s Economic Survey of 2017 estimated that 9 million people migrated within the country annually between 2011 and 2016’ (Mitra & Singh, 2022, p. 68). Global Education Monitoring Report of 2019 from UNESCO reveals that approximately 80 per cent of seasonal migrant children in seven Indian cities lack access to education near worksites, and 40 per cent of children from these households are likely to end up in work rather than school, facing exploitation and abuse. (Cf Mitra & Singh, 2022, p. 76) Another pertinent but linked problem is the spatial distribution of cities with more than two million inhabitants. The pattern shows a coastal orientation in some of the megacities. This is connected to the colonial heritage of these large coastal port cities like Chennai and Mumbai. In India, though, ‘the distribution of cities is more even’ (Hugo, 2020, p. 30). Nevertheless, the coastal cities in South Asia, particularly cities located in ‘Bangladesh, India, and the Maldives face tremendous risks of climatic hazards including sea-level rise, tropical cyclones, erosion, and flooding’ (Qayyum et al., 2021, p. 2560). This situation presents a major problem with regard to SDG 11. Another objective of SDG 11 is to ensure ‘access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic services and upgrade slums’. Redevelopment normally means a focus on upgrading physical housing stock, which potentially risks the creation of new forms of social and spatial marginalisation. Kerala has won international recognition for its participatory approach to governance. Williams et al. (2018, p. 19) find that there are ‘mixed results’, and this instance should not hide the fact that policy space does exist for cities to debate national housing programmes, and to insert and enact more progressive values within them. If participatory slum redevelopment is to go beyond providing a place at the table for representatives of marginalised communities, especially when they are facing the trauma of being re-housed. This in turn requires explicit articulation of an agenda that challenges their bases of exclusion and coordinated action to support this at a city-level. At the UN’s Urban Sustainable Development Goals platform (http://www.urbansdgplatform. org/index.msc), there are eight interesting projects taking place in South Asia. Among those eight, the following stand out: Metro Colombo Urban Development project; Islamabad Urban Bus Rapid Transit; Nagpur Water Supply; and Dhaka Waste concern. These examples may appear to be trivial, but there are also serious attempts to achieve the SDGs, and many paradoxes are involved in urban development. One such paradox is quite illuminating as argued by Sethi and de Oliveira (2018, p. 17): 193

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a critical aspect of cities is that they are meant to absorb additional, often unskilled labour that is expected to migrate from rural areas. The irony is that cities are expected by the SDG goal to become engines of growth, while at the same time reduce emissions by pursuing sustainable strategies. Another much-debated issue is how much greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are coming from the urban sector. Various sources demonstrate that despite relatively low levels of national urbanization, Indian cities can be associated with 85 per cent of energy generation from thermal plants … and are responsible for 66.5–70.3 per cent of the national GHG emissions … giving irrefutable evidence about urban causations of global warming. (Sethi & de Oliveira, 2018, p. 18) India may take a lead in the region in terms of orchestrating the implementation of SDG 11, since it is the largest economy in the South Asia region. Furthermore, it has scientific expertise and can become a role model and initiator for regional cooperation. India’s Smart Cities Mission 2015 had the ambition to create 100 smart cities and support new types of governance aimed at improving the quality of life in Indian cities (Goel, 2021). The smart cities are supposed to develop smart solutions to improve basic services like water, energy, and transport—SDG 6 Clean Water and Sanitation, SDG 7 Affordable and Clean Energy, and SDG 12 Sustainable Consumption and Production—for a decent quality of life. The expectation is to create 24 × 7 power and electricity to rural households for agriculture. Accordingly, ‘smart and clean cities can become model cities for other South Asian countries’ (Goel, 2021, p. 173).

The pandemic and its aftermath COVID-19 affected all societies including those in South Asia; there is grave uncertainty about the virus’ nature and when it is likely to end. Comparatively, the virus hit the rural sector hard and encapsulated a contested view of an urban–rural divide over the outbreak. In the beginning of the pandemic, the UN referred to the urban areas as the ‘epicentre’ hosting about 90 per cent of total cases (UN, 2020). This notwithstanding, ‘viruses and other microbes that play an active role in our contested urban lived realities go unattended except when they reclaim their due space through pandemics’ (Mehmood et al., 2021, p. 535). The disease and related calamities led to the belief that this was an almost exclusively urban incident with grave consequences for policies and human mobility. The South Asia region was in a challenging situation due to its large populations, congested cities, poor health facilities, high inequality and poverty rates, weak social protection systems, and ‘limited access to water and sanitation, and inadequate living space, necessary to maintain physical distancing and take other required measures to contain this pandemic’ (Rasul et al., 2021, p. 2). Population density and the high number of informal settlements overcrowded with limited space led to rapid and wide spreading of the disease. Nevertheless, surveys found that in the urban setting people did wash their hands more frequently, maintained social distance, and were wearing face masks in public ‘and avoiding touching eyes, nose and mouth’ (Maredia, 2020). Initially ‘the predominance of COVID-19 has been in dense urban centres’ (Desai, 2020, p. 4), but it quickly spread to the rural population. Although this is contradictory, the circumstances created a situation since ‘infectious 194

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diseases are a biophysical phenomenon which are linked to the presence of certain social practices, conditions, and circumstances’ (Mehmood et al., 2021, p. 540), all present in both rural and urban settings. South Asian countries imposed total or partial lockdowns, curfews, and quarantines. Economic activities were shut down, travels banned, movement of goods and services restricted, and cross-border movements closed. Labour, the main factor of production, was quarantined, borders were ‘closed and national, regional, and global supply chains have been disrupted’ (Rasul et al., 2021, p. 2). The spread of the pandemic created hostilities at ‘a scale on which their communal and sectarian hostilities operated and also the historicised metamorphosis of the pandemic as an instrument of exclusion cutting across various spaces’ (Mehmood et al., 2021, p. 549). COVID-19 and its tensions constituted one exclusive zone of urban emergency and reinforced already existing problems and contradictions among various communities. In March 2020, India went into a national lockdown, leaving millions of migrants in cities without jobs or livelihoods. This reverse migration created a humanitarian catastrophe since there was no social safety net or support from the government. According to media reports, migrants were forced to walk on foot to desperately reach their home states. Due to lack of reliable data on the number of internal migrants within their respective states, many of the sending and receiving states were not able to better coordinate the migrants’ travel or protect their basic rights during this ordeal. (Rajan & Manasi, 2022, p. 36) India was forced to exit the lockdown after seven weeks due to economic reasons, and the peak in infections came in September and the number decreased subsequently. The second wave started in March 2021, and daily cases crossed the 100,000 mark on 4 April. The second wave was deadlier than the first one, with India accounting for as many as one-third of deaths worldwide during this period (Pellissery et al., 2021). There was a sobering effect of the pandemic. South Asia struggled with the pandemic alone whether in urban or rural settings and did not receive any support from external sources. India realised that it has no real partnership with the United States or European Union and that it was what Bhadrakumar (2022) has referred to as a mere transactional relationship based on ‘a global Apartheid regime’ with grave consequences for both urban and rural populations in the region’. Further, he concludes that South Asia ‘handled the pandemic far better than most countries. International experts acknowledge it today, and those who threw stones at that time grudgingly accept it, too’ (Bhadrakumar, 2022). Some scholars using an Urban Political Ecology framework show that pandemic politics were shaped by religious actors in the Indian subcontinent. There was contested self-governance of coronavirus by religious actors; embodied defiance to the institutional biosecurity; religious spaces generating the crisis of technologies of governing the disease; the intercommunal shades of disparities and showcasing of communalism in international relations. It has been argued that religious communities in India and Pakistan approached the UPE of COVID-19 with their disruptive potential which altered biosecurity regimes and enhanced health hazards for their respective societies. (Mehmood, Hasnain & Azam, 2021, p. 548) 195

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Conclusion: Informalisation in urban settings South Asia, comparatively speaking, has moderate urban growth rates, and this has not translated into higher economic growth and human development. Informal employment and informal settlements go together to define urbanisation in the region. However, this is not an exclusive South Asian phenomenon since informal settlements are the most common form of urbanisation on the planet, accounting for one-third of the total urban form. It is expected that by the mid-twenty-first century, up to three billion people will live in informal urban environments. (Sampler et al., 2020) The World Bank’s attempts to diplomatically designate urbanisation as “messy” with reference to the widespread existence of slums and sprawls, while ‘hidden’ urbanisation refers to people living in settlements that possess urban characteristics, but do not satisfy the criteria required to be officially classified as urban (Ellis & Roberts, 2016). Estimates of informal employment vary from country to country. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) explains that ‘the informal economy in India still accounts for more than 80 per cent of non-agricultural employment’ (ILO, 2021) while other estimates note that 40–50 per cent of the unemployed labour force in South Asia are based in informal work conditions. Definitions of the informal sector vary ‘as hidden from taxation these activities account for one-third to half of the whole economy’, while the multidimensional impact of the informal economy on environmental degradation and the ecological footprint differ from country to country (Qayyum et al., 2021, p. 67011). In Pakistan and other parts of South Asia, agricultural land is converted into urban use, and this process in many cases ends in social conflicts, losses of income, devaluation of properties, and general misuse of resources. ‘The landowners involved tend to consider only the quantitative, monetary difference between land prices for urban versus agricultural use—while utterly disregarding the negative consequences related to the loss of agricultural land and ill-conceived construction in peripheral areas’ (Pathak et al., 2020, p. 5). These rural-turned urban processes also lead to ‘high population pressure and built up, most of the South Asian cities are debasing their tree covers, open spaces, water sources, and clean air which significantly demean the quality of life of the dwellers’ (Arfanuzzaman, 2021), in general, but in a harsh fashion for poor people in informal settlements. Furthermore, urbanisation creates environmental pressures related to the destruction of soil, water salinisation and the use of inefficient building materials. In the absence of an adequate institutional framework, local populations face the lack of safe drinking water; the breakdown of transports, education, and healthcare infrastructures; as well as social exclusion and spatial injustice. (Pathak et al., 2020, pp. 7–8) The destruction of natural resources leads to pollution and a whole series of difficulties related to health and survival. For instance, Delhi is among the most polluted city in the world. All in all, navigating the city whether you are poor, rich, or middle class creates enormous possibilities but also moral crisis and death (Hansen & Verkaaik, 2009, p. 9). It is not all despair. The region is extremely diverse and heterogeneous in terms of how urban dwellers cope with life. There are plenty of resources, and the term informal is being 196

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questioned as to static and inflexible for being able to identify the agency, even among poor people. We may shift our attention to the everyday life, practices, and contestation of both rich and poor that, ‘while being “informal” or even illegal, nevertheless comprise the bulk of the everyday life of a city’ (Anjaria & McFarlane, 2011, p. 10). Let us briefly turn our attention to some of the less-known cities in the South Asian region. Habitants in slums have dreams, hopes, and indeed agency as illuminated in the blockbuster movie ‘Slumdog Millionaire’, shot in the Juhu slums in Mumbai. The story is about a young teenager, whose name represents the three religions Hinduism, Islam, and Christianity. The story is about bravery and compassion, perseverance, and courage against impossible odds. He is using all his skills and smartness to earn love and friendship with his girlfriend Latika. What is interesting is the empowerment and cleverness of the young man. He is a contestant on the Indian version of Who Wants to Be a Millionaire? He answers each question correctly, winning ₹20 million. When he is accused of cheating, he recounts his life story to the police, illustrating how he can answer each question correctly. A more mundane cleavage set in Mumbai is middle-class civil society and civic activism against subaltern ‘non-modern’ urban poor. As Japanese scholar Taguchi (2015) notes that the filthy public spaces with dirt, garbage, and substances in streets and alleys are the responsibility of the vendors, hawkers, slum dwellers, and the poor. The ‘bourgeois environmentalists’ want to educate the illiterate urban ‘peasants’ to work for a clean and tidy city and help make Mumbai a ‘world-class city’ (Taguchi, 2015, p. 207). Progressive middle-class paternalism towards the poor is a potent problem, which is also present in other segregated cities all over the world, where the state and public sphere are unable to execute, what otherwise would be deemed as their natural responsibility and jurisdiction. Caste- and religion-based divides in the urban slums and the wider cities create situations of social apartheid, where communities clash over not only material and pecuniary issues but also problems related to culture, norms, and values. Thimphu, the capital of Bhutan, has no traffic lights and no real congestion, and life is characterised by Gross National Happiness (GNH). The almost silent flow of cars and bicycles is taken from a slow movie, and during the night you hear stray dogs barking and howling asking the King not to kidnap them and take them to the forests in the suburbs. No hassle and no hurry seem to be the lifestyle of this capital city with a population of about 115,000 only. In 2008, the city government in a survey of informal settlements concluded that they have problems identifying who this segment is, because some residents choose to live in poor dwellings despite having reasonable incomes. As they illegally occupy land, they are reluctant to improve the buildings and they have no legal right to demand provision of municipal services. Also, people move into and out poverty in response to shocks such as loss of a job. However, it is estimated of that somewhere between 800 to 2,900 households in Thimphu are on the poverty line. (Ministry of Works and Human Settlement, 2008, p. 17) The contrast to clean and tidy Thimphu, set in picturesque surroundings in a valley with a golden Buddha watching the scenery, is another mountain capital, Nepal’s Kathmandu, with all its charm and wilderness, chronic traffic jams, noise from constant horns, and foul exhaust fumes. Sitaram Hachhethu, a retired traffic police officer, said riders only follow the traffic rules if they see traffic police around; otherwise, they breach the lane. ‘The same is at traffic lights. People do not stop at lights unless there is a traffic police officer. If one thus breaches 197

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the rule, another person breaks the rule too, causing traffic jams’ (Ojha, 2022). In Nepal, more than 70 per cent of the economically active population is involved in the informal economy, but acquiring and using knowledge is political practice for slum dwellers. Organisations for slum residents’ rights are attempting to ‘document settlements through digital mapping and household surveys, which they use to successfully negotiate with local ward offices’ (Anjaria & McFarlane, 2011, p. 9). Enter Herat, the Pearl of Khorasan. It is an oasis city located in a fertile valley and has historically been a trading crossroad centre at the Silk Road. With a population of almost 500,000, it is the third biggest city in Afghanistan. It has also been a traditional meeting place for the manifold peoples of Central Asia Tadjik, Turkomans, Uzbeks, and Hazara. A study by the World Bank and United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) found that in Herat conflict and insecurity are the main push factors leading to displacement and migration to the city. Many fled villages of origin as a response to conflict. Over a third of internally displaced persons (IDPs) reported food insecurity, while unemployment and underemployment was the third most important reason. Economic incentives act as important pull factors towards urban centres. ‘This reflects the intersection of forced migration paths with urbanization in Afghanistan’ (The World Bank & UNHCR, 2011, p. 6). IDPs belong to the most vulnerable part of the population even worse than the urban poor who live in informal settlements. South Asia is pursuing new pathways to deal with the emerging challenges of ecological and social justice in both urban and rural sectors. This is not an exclusive task for the region since ‘ecologically, urban consumption pre-empts the bulk of the net primary production of the biosphere, putting most countries in ecological deficit since the 1980s’ (Revi, 2017, p. x). New avenues to sustainable urbanisation within the region will determine the outcomes of social progress in the countries and on a regional and global level in the 21st century. There are no apparent shortcuts to sustainable development in the near future. As the proceedings from a conference at Jawaharlal Nehru University argued: Build upon the skills, ideas and experiences of diverse stakeholders who are generally absent from formal decision-making processes and may bring together often divergent initiatives concerned with the environment and with social justice in urban areas. Local innovations, new engagements across the formal and informal sector, and social and political mobilisations, often in informal settings, have resulted in the emergence of multiple alternative urban practices. These have potential for enhanced social justice, environmental integrity, and synergies across the urban-rural interface. (TRCSS, 2016, p. 3)

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Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt cooperation in peri-urban South-Asia. Climate Policy, 19(sup1), S78–S93. https://doi.org/10.1080/1 4693062.2018.1530967 Samper, J., Shelby, J. A., & Behary, D. (2020). The paradox of informal settlements revealed in an ATLAS of informality: Findings from mapping growth in the most common yet unmapped forms of urbanization. Sustainability, 12(22), Article 9510. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12229510 Schmidt, J. D. (2021). Roots and routes and the origins of urban theory: A journey to ‘Stadtluft Macht Frei’. In A. K. Giri (Ed.), Roots, routes and a new awakening: Beyond one and many and alternative planetary futures (pp. 235–254). Palgrave Macmillan. Sethi, M., & de Oliveira, J. A. P. (2018). Cities and climate co-benefits. In M. Sethi & J. A. P. de Oliveira (Eds.), Mainstreaming climate co-benefits in Indian cities (pp. 3–45). Springer. Sivakumar, P., & Rajan, S. I. (2022). Contours of migration and development in the SDG agenda. In P. Sivakumar & S. I. Rajan (Eds.), Sustainable development goals and migration (pp. 1–19). Routledge. Srivastava, R. K. (2020). Managing urbanization, climate change, and disasters in South Asia. Springer. Taguchi, Y. (2015). ‘Fight the Filth’: Civic sense and middle-class activism in Mumbai. In C. Bates & M. Mio (Eds.), Cities in South Asia (pp. 197–209). Routledge. TRCSS. (2016). Pathways to sustainable urbanization. Transdisciplinary Research Cluster on Sustainability Studies (TRCSS), Jawaharlal Nehru University. https://www.jnu.ac.in/sites/default/ files/Report_SustainableUrbanisation2016.pdf UN. (2020). Policy brief: COVID-19 in an urban world. https://www.ipsnews.net/Library/2020/07/ SG-Policy-brief-COVID-Urban-World-July-2020.pdf UN. (2022). Sustainable cities and human settlements. UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs Sustainable Development. https://sdgs.un.org/topics/sustainable-cities-and-human-settlements Williams, G., Omankuttan, U., Devika, J., & Aasen, B. (2018). Enacting participatory, gender-sensitive slum redevelopment? Urban governance, power and participation in Trivandrum, Kerala. Geoforum, 96, 150–159. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2018.07.021 Wilson, E., Jayanthakumaran, K., & Verma, R. (2020). Interdependencies of internal migration, urbanization, poverty, and inequality: The case of urban India. In K. Jayanthakumaran, R. Verma, G. Wan, & E. Wilson (Eds.), Internal migration, urbanization, and poverty in Asia: Dynamics and interrelationships (pp. 109–131). Springer and Asian Development Bank. The World Bank. (2022). Urban population growth (annual %) South Asia. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.GROW?locations=8S The World Bank & UNHCR. (2011). Research study on IDPs in urban settings—Afghanistan. https:// documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/458151468153539693/pdf/685390WP00PUBL0Ps0in0urban 0settings.pdf

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16 COLOMBO From colonial outpost to indigenous kleptocratic city Nihal Perera

Introduction Colombo, the de facto capital of Sri Lanka, is essentially a European colonial product forced upon the inhabitants of the island and not a creation of their own choice or making (Brohier, 1984; Perera, 1998). Colombo did not historically evolve from Lankan communities. It was this European outpost that created Ceylon (Sri Lanka since 1972) as its hinterland, a socio-spatial system that both depends on and ‘sustains’ the city, displacing Lankan societies. Also, from its inception, Colombo was a global city and had been highly diverse. Hence, its historical production is central to understanding Colombo. Despite useful contributions, mainstream urban studies offer little help to understand Colombo. Although a European product, it is not a European city which is believed to have evolved through agriculture, industrialisation, and modernisation. Models that privilege the European historical trajectory have othered non-Western cities as ‘primate cities’ that have ‘urbanised without industrialising’. Such an approach cannot explain urbanisation generated via prominent European colonial port cities (Karasch, 1985; Perera, 1998). Highlighting the significance of individual contexts, Cartier (2017) and Tang (2017) question the applicability of ‘gentrification’ to explain the urban transformation in Hong Kong. More specific to Colombo, ‘Importing Problems’ (Perera, 2016) demonstrate how importing a foreign perception, via the housing ordinance of 1915, transformed local realities to fit the framework, turning low-income living environments into ‘slums’. The lack of understanding of Colombo and its position in the world and Sri Lanka, i.e., its illegibility, is precisely why the politicians and experts have failed to engage the city impactfully. Understanding Colombo needs its own approach. Despite the richness and insights it offers, Colombo is not well-studied. There are only two research-based books, each addressing aspects of its history: Dharmasena’s (1980) study of the regional significance of the Colombo harbour in the early 20th century and Hulugalle’s (1965) history of the Colombo Municipal Council. While Brohier (1984) and Kumarasingha (2023) provide autobiographical accounts of their lived experiences in colonial Pettah and Dematagoda, Kaluarachchi (2013) introduces historical Colombo to the Sinhala reader. These volumes are complemented by, among others, a chapter that describes colonial Colombo in Cave’s (1908) The Book of Ceylon and a few studies by Michael Roberts (1984). My own Society and Space (Perera, 1998) investigates the social production of Colombo in the context of European DOI: 10.4324/9781003256533-19

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expansion, the production of Ceylon, and the Sri Lankan responses. Drawing on it, this short chapter maps out Colombo’s roots as found in its colonial production but focuses on the contemporary city as negotiated by neoliberal and kleptocratic interventions.

Colonial production, reproduction, and restructuring Modern Colombo was first established by the Portuguese as an outpost in 1517. In the following centuries, it was employed by the Dutch (1656–1796) and the British (1796–1948) to penetrate inland. The British colonised the entire island in 1815. Over time, the outpost was transformed into the administrative centre, the economic centre, and the cultural centre of Ceylon. Portuguese Colombo belonged to the ‘Portuguese Indian Ocean space’ (Perera, 1998), defined by a series of hierarchically organised ports along the route of Carreira da India, the ship that linked the capital of the ‘Indian’ Empire, Goa, with the metropole, Lisbon and Oporto (Figure 16.1). The city was defined by four main institutions that were alien to the Lanka society: the port, the fort, the feitoria, and the church with a large church square at the centre. Used as the locus for looting, gathering, and storing the riches from the surrounding, the feitoria served as the warehouse, library, office, and residence of the feitor, the powerful royal trading representative and the intelligence officer directly appointed by the king. Offering Portuguese military help to each crowned head, Franciscan missionaries used political conflicts to convert them. The main one was the king of Kotte. The Dutch and the British outposts too were parts of their empires, the British calling it one of the keys that lock the globe. The British extended roads equipped with military posts and maps to the interiors and, using a rift in the court, conquered the last kingdom of Kande Uda Rata (Up-Country) in 1815. The territory was created by separating the island from being a part of other colonies such as future India and Indonesia, at the Treaty of Amiens (1802). This territoriality they produced was qualitatively different from former indigenous kingdoms of which the power diminished with the distance from the capital to its frontier. In contrast, Colombo established uniform power across the territory, demarcated by a boundary, as in European nation-states. Obliterating the identity of Kande, the colony was organised in terms of administrative provinces and revenue districts, subjugated by connecting their capitals physically and administratively to Colombo. Ceylon was incorporated into the European (capitalist) world economy by the 1840s, by the establishment of a coffee plantation complex (Perera, 1998). Located between the European market and the plantations that produced coffee, tea after the 1860s, Colombo established itself as both the control and command centre of the economy in Ceylon and its centre of capitalist accumulation and diffusion. It saw the growth of new institutions such as banks, agency houses, trading companies, and shipping companies. Since its inception, Colombo has been greater than the capital of Ceylon. All 19th- and early20th-century maps confirm the pre-eminent position of Colombo as a critical fuelling station and port of call linking colonial economies and societies in four continents. Cave (2002, p. 1) described the ‘Clapham Junction of the East’ as ‘a spot on which converge the steamships of all nations for coal and the exchange of freight and passengers’. Its architectural and spatial provisions were built in relation to London, Perth, Calcutta, and Cape Town but not to Kandy or Anuradhapura. What Cave (2002, p. 1) calls ‘colossal houses of business befitting the dignity of the port’ is evident in the 400-foot-long Cave Building which housed a large bookstore. Like European colonial cities in general, Colombo was racially segregated into white and black (indigenous) cities. The Fort served as the locus of political power with no comparable social and cultural institutions outside it (King, 1976). The 1860–1880s saw the full expres202

Figure 16.1  Colombo as part of the Portuguese Indian Ocean space. Source:  Perera (1998), drawn by Ashra Wickramathilaka.

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sion of colonial culture, represented in the separation of work (Fort) and residence (Cinnamon Gardens); work (Fort) and vacation (Nuwara Eliya); and capitalist production (plantations) and control and command (Colombo) (Figure 16.2). The disappearance of the need for high security, once the 1848 rebellion was quenched, is evident in the dismantling of the Fort in 1859, turning the open field of fire (Galle Face) into a public square, and the emergence of public recreational spaces. Man-pulled rickshaws provided the imagery of social power the colonials enjoyed. The highlight of the transformation was the creation of a residential suburb cum cultural district, Cinnamon Gardens, in Garden City form long before either of these was recorded by urban scholars. It was a repository of colonial culture which included an Anglican church, a civil hospital, and a racecourse (Havelock). Organised around the spacious Circular (later, Victoria) Park, the circular streets were named after the members of the royal family:

Figure 16.2  Map of Colombo showing colonial and migrant areas. Source:  Perera (1998), drawn by Ashra Wickramathilaka.

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Edinburgh, Albert, and Guildford crescents while the radials bore names of British Governors of Ceylon: Horton and Torrington. The nomenclature was obscure, strange, and ahistorical for the Ceylonese; it was never meant for them. The colonials not only produced Colombo and Ceylon but also re-worlded the displaced subjects within these. The main repository of ordering the history of the Ceylonese through archaeology and historical artefacts is the Colombo Museum, built in 1877. The symbolical framing of the Ceylonese culture within the most prominent building located in Cinnamon Gardens, with a bronze statue of Governor William Gregory in front, highlights the appropriation of one history and culture by a dominant other (Perera, 1998). To this date, busloads of people, especially school children, visit the museum to learn about their own heritage.

Indigenous adoption, reproduction, and transformation The indigenes’ responses to colonial Colombo and Ceylon were integral to their colonial production, ranging from adoption to rejection. The bridging of the gap between the subjects and colonial socio-spatial structures occurred through both the westernisation of subjects and the familiarisation of available space (Perera, 1998; 2016). The responses became more pronounced in the late-19th century. The long-lasting impact of European colonialism was the hegemony of the colonial worldviews and culture achieved among the Ceylonese which naturalised and universalised what the colonial community perceived, produced, and professed. In Franz Fanon’s (1968) words, where confrontation with the colonial order of things had at first disoriented the native, subsequently, the colonial system became a world of which the native was envious. The envious subjects, especially the elite, who grew up in the Low Country under European powers for four and a half centuries, looked for peaceful ways to improve their own positions within colonial economic, political, and administrative structures. Hence, the colonial environment and Colombo did not change while they held power until the mid-1950s. The elite followed the late-colonial model of living in residential suburbs and ruled the nation that emerged from the colony from the colonial parliament, re-interpreting these institutions and reinventing their own identities. These choices were part of a broader emulation of late-colonial culture which included eating habits, dress, consumerism, naming practices, and dog breeding (Roberts, 1984). Adjusting to the post-colonial state, the newly elected governments got the blessing of the Buddhist Temple of the Tooth Relic in Kandy. At the same time, the public works department removed the ‘non-essentials’ such as ‘[long] eaves, high valleys, embellishments, broken outlines, and mouldings’ from the houses of low-ranking government servants. Racial inequality built into the colonial urban form was thus reproduced within the post-colonial spheres of status and class. The ordinary people, most visibly the emergent elite, the Buddhist leaders, migrants, the naturalised, and women, rapidly Ceylonised Colombo, amending it to their own needs and values. Most migrants were attracted to the harbour, the main employer in town; so, workingclass tenements and small businesses clustered in Kochchikade and Gintupitiya (Perera, 2016) (Figure 16.2). These neighbourhoods followed the ‘industries’, particularly the railway workshops, warehouses, and printing presses, spreading across Maradana, New Bazaar, Kotahena, and Slave Island. Women feminised the white-male Christian city, making it less unfriendly to them (Perera, 2016). Challenges to the colonial rule from outside—especially Up-Country—were replaced, after the 1848 rebellion, by challenges from religious, nationalist, and socialist movements. Their focus on Colombo reinforced its centrality in Ceylon but as a city contested from within. The location 205

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of new key institutions such as printing presses and schools in Colombo and the adaption of old ones in the vicinity made Colombo the locus of the Buddhist establishment in Ceylon. With it, the leaders of Buddhist revival, well addressed by scholars such as Gombrich and Obeyesekere (1988) and Malalgoda (1976), contested the colonial public sphere. The location of Lankan institutions capable of challenging the colonial authority brought a power institution to the indigenous side of the city, breaching the basic tenet of the divided city. Despite the friendly transfer of power to the local elite at independence, it was the active politics of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party, created in 1935, that produced the (post-colonial) nation by recruiting the inhabitants on the island into it (Perera, 1998). Beginning with helping those in rural areas affected by the malaria epidemic in 1933, the SamaSamajists welcomed the labour in Colombo and the plantations through workers’ unions and the Tamils in the north and the east through politics, thus transforming them into subjects of Ceylon, a classic transformation of subalterns into citizens. The SamaSamajists got national politics to revolve around social justice and equity (Perera, 1998). The process reached its peak under the United Front government (1970–1976) led by the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, a Sinhala nationalist (centrist) party founded in 1951. With its victory—with the support of socialists—in 1956, Ceylon entered two decades (1956–1977) of centre-left dominance. Leaders focused on rural development, particularly through providing collective consumption goods such as transportation, education, and medical facilities. If colonialism had not penetrated into villages, the Freedom Party brought the villages into the orbit of Colombo. The rural-focused development supported the distribution of population across the nation, saving Colombo from becoming a primate city like Bangkok (six million people) which is disproportionally larger than the next which has three million. The renaming of Victoria Park as Viharamahadevi Park, after a highly regarded queen in Sinhala history, is indicative of the many name changes since the 1950s. More substantively, severing all vestiges of colonialism, the United Front installed a new constitution and changed the name of the country to Sri Lanka in 1972. The Supreme Court in Colombo, created in 1801, was made the highest court of appeal after sending appeals to the Privy Council in London was stopped. Thus, Colombo came under Sri Lankan control. Housing which makes the largest component of the city also changed from within. The United Front created a separate cabinet ministry for housing and appointed a member of the parliament from Colombo. It also introduced a rent control act, a minimum lot size for building, a maximum floor area for houses at 2,000 sq ft, and a ceiling on the ownership of housing property to two per family, transforming many tenants of low-income housing into homeowners. Evidently, the government did not perceive ‘planning’ as simply a technical exercise but as a value-laden political activity. Building a new airport, uplifting the airline (Air Ceylon), and buying ships, the government renewed the foreign links, guided by its non-aligned orientation. Despite the calmness it showed to the outside observer, Colombo gradually changed in regard to its contents and connections, especially in the early 1970s. The substantive changes caused pressure on the form and physicality of the city. The government embarked on the Colombo Master Plan Project in 1974 to reorganise Colombo.

The neoliberal city The 1977 government’s responses to the United Front took a neoliberal path. Along with adopting austerity measures, as part of structural adjustments, the government privatised many state institutions, deregulated the economy, made it export-oriented, and broke the 206

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backbone of the labour movement by defeating the general strike of 1980. It attempted to change the international orientation from Britain to the USA but failed. It then promised to transform Sri Lanka into a Singapore, looked for foreign models, technology, and money, and embarked on spectacular, large-scale infrastructure projects. It accelerated the main 30-year component of the Mahaweli Project which included building six dams and hydropower projects to six years (1978–1984), creating the largest development project ever in Sri Lanka. The 1970s also saw militancy which escalated into a civil war in the early 1980s, contesting Colombo’s centrality. Colombo was restructured by separating political and economic spaces, spreading out its functions, and re-incorporating those back into the fold. The government relocated administrative operations to Kotte (southeast of the city limits) and transformed Fort into an economic command centre. These were complemented by locating economic production near the airport and warehousing in Peliyagoda (north of the city limits) but expanded the working definition of Colombo to incorporate the expanded areas. The government radically transformed urban (re)development. The insecurity, anxiety, desire, and haste were evident in the creation of the Urban Development Authority (UDA) to overcome the legal and bureaucratic obstacles to finding land for investment. Unlike in the West where capital gentrified urban areas, in Sri Lanka, the state initiated and directed such changes. Uncharacteristic of neoliberalism, as evident in the food stamps (1979) and the Mahapola (scholarship) program, the government opted to protect poorer citizens. The Colombo Master Plan of 1978 acknowledged ‘underserved’ settlements. In the Fort, the state initiated a business district with the construction of the 32-storey Bank of Ceylon headquarters. Excluding Sri Lankan architects, the state awarded the contract to a Singaporean turnkey firm. Following the Singaporean style, the government built overhead pedestrian crossings and created a night bazaar in Pettah. In contrast to Delhi’s attempt to showcase the city (and India) on the world stage, argues Nipesh Narayanan (2020), the Sri Lankan leaders tried to make Colombo visible to the world. The object was to attract foreign investments. The UDA adopted a pro-growth approach. Declaring ‘special project areas’, suspending the operation of other building regulations. In place of development controls, it adopted mechanisms such as floor area ratios and maximum plot coverage to promote building over two million sq ft of 15- to 25-storey towers in the business district. Some multi-storeyed buildings sprouted in the 1980s, but there was no race to go tall. The bank stood for the state’s intended image until the 43-storeyed World Trade Center appeared in 1997. Until then, international banks including the Bank of America opened branches, but the visible additions were a few hotels. The modernisation of the Fort area dwarfed the colonialbuilt environment including the parliament building (Figure 16.3). The new seat of government was built in Sri Jayawardenapura Kotte, away from the business district. Naming after himself, President Jayawardena opted to defeat the Tamil separatists and re-unify the country from Kotte as King Parakramabahu IV (1411–1466) once did. Commissioning the leading Sri Lankan architect Geoffrey Bawa to design the parliament house, the government selected a national representation (Figure 16.3). Creating a conducive environment for export-oriented production, the government established Export Processing Zones (EPZs). The EPZ near the airport was not only a legal safe haven for foreign investments but also physically separated, protecting it from the unionists. Instead of the expected electronic (blue-chip) industry, it attracted garment factories. They provided over 17,000 jobs in 1981, with young women claiming the most. The garment industry became the main export earner of Sri Lanka in 1988, replacing the plantations. 207

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Figure 16.3  The Fort area of the 1980s and the new parliament building. Source:  Nihal Perera.

Prime Minister Premadasa (1977–1988), who later became the president (1988–1993), attempted to organise a central Buddhist role for Colombo. In 1979, Gangaramaya temple began to hold a colourful annual procession (Nawam Maha Perahera) on the full moon day in February, resembling the one held in Kandy by the Temple of the Tooth Relic. As Colombo was restructured and repositioned, the nation it presided was politically destabilised, first by the armed uprise staged by Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) in 1971. Then, the sovereignty of Sri Lanka was challenged by Tamil-based separatist groups led by the Tamil Tigers of Tamil Eelam which grew into a full-fledged civil war in 1983. The disruptions were reinforced by the JVP-Government killing spree in 1987–1989. Instead of negotiating in Colombo through discussions and voting, the militants invited the authorities to rural areas to negotiate their grievances with arms. Leading to these, almost all post-colonial political leaders opted to divide the nation— brought together by the SamaSamajists (Perera, 1998). The first independent government 208

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denied citizenship to plantation workers who immigrated from India. The Freedom Party using a ‘Sinhala only’ policy came to power in 1956. While the civil war did not end the Sinhala–Tamil conflict, it was followed by Sinhala-Muslim antagonism and the bombing of Catholic Churches on the Easter of 2019. Housing in Colombo changed with the Massive Hundred-Thousand Houses Programme (1977–1983), under which several high-rise apartment complexes including the Liberty Plaza with a mall were built. Instead of the state providing houses, the Million Houses Programme (1983–1989) supported those who built their own housing. It unofficially ended involuntary displacements. The centrality of Colombo was destabilised by the government itself which destroyed its old opposition: the working-class movement. Until then, all elected governments fell towards the end of their terms due to worker- and student-led strikes in the capital, followed by the rural electorate electing the next government. With the end of working-class movements, Colombo lost its clout from social justice and political power standpoints, transforming it into a ‘neoliberal’ city in Sri Lanka, dominated by ethnic identities and the civil war.

The kleptocratic city At the end of the civil war in 2009, Colombo was subjected to direct transformation. The government shifted its focus to ‘development’ and assigned its command to the (victorious) Secretary to the Ministry of Defense, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, the brother of President Mahinda Rajapaksa (2005–2015). Gotabaya embarked on an aggressive construction program, building highways, an airport, a harbour, and cricket stadia in Hambantota, near Rajapaksa’s hometown in southwestern Sri Lanka (Mariyathas et al., 2016). Colombo’s lead project is the massive Port City. Besides sidelining Rajapaksa-era symbols and providing an environment for more free speech, the in-between government led by President Maithripala Sirisena (2015–2019) added the Megapolis project but did not make much progress. The election of Gotabaya as president in 2019 reinvigorated the change. According to news reportage, his government-initiated projects in Sinharaja (the primary rainforest), brought Muthurajawela (the central wetland) under the UDA, constructed a beach in Mount Lavinia, and planned to restructure the Fort area. Progress was stalled by the COVID-19 pandemic and the 2022 protests against the government. The Port City is a new luxury-living cum working district built on land reclaimed from the sea. The Chinese-planned project is represented as the premiere residential, retail, and business destination in South Asia that offers unmatched planned-city living by the Indian Ocean (CHEC Port City Colombo, 2019). It comprises over 5.6 million sq m of built space that provides ‘world-class’ facilities along with a 100-ha marina bay which is larger than New York’s Central Park. The project is expected to be completed in 2042. Despite environmentalists’ warnings, the government has not shown sensitivity to the environmental impacts of its projects; the Port City plan is not concerned with the sea-level rise. One victim group of the project is the fishing community and fishing-related industry between Kalutara and Negombo, 30 km south and north of Colombo (Chamikara, 2015). Despite drawing on local resources, Port City is planned as an independent district connected to the world via hi-tech. With the new highway connection to the airport, people could come from abroad and leave without ever visiting Colombo or the country. The Megapolis plan, unveiled in 2015, opts to transform the Western Province into a ‘world-class metropolis’ (Ministry of Megapolis, 2019). It aims to lay a massive infrastructure across the province relying on external resources such as loans and grants. It is rooted in the 209

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1977 idea of greater Colombo, further developed into the CESMA Plan of 2004, named after the subsidiary of Singapore’s Housing and Development Board which prepared the plan. The Rajapaksa intervention in 2009 provided a feeling of freedom and openness after the civil war (1983–2009). Gotabhaya opened up select public areas around Independence Square and Viharamahadevi Park. Yet most new spaces such as jogging tracks, the Arcade Independence Square, and racecourse created through the refurbishment of old colonial buildings were geared towards the upper-income groups. Some spaces such as Diyatha Uyana were militarised. These projects display an ambitious city-beautification effort, in middle-class aesthetics, combined with privatisation and militarisation. What is being created is complemented by the displacement of low-income and minority groups. The Megapolis plan proposes the elimination or transformation of 1,499 neighbourhoods occupied by 68,812 families, calling them unfit for human habitation. The object is ‘to release the economic corridors occupied by them’, i.e., releasing the meagre 9 percent of city’s land occupied by low-income settlements for capital investment, ‘urgently’, through ‘lowincome community regeneration programs’, i.e., relocating the inhabitants in ‘new’ housing blocks (Ministry of Megapolis, 2019). Although the Megapolis project has hardly progressed, Colombo is growing fast and many projects use it as a guide. The underlying shift from investments directing development to generating growth that intensifies the cash flow is driven by a kleptocracy. Since the late 1970s, some politicians had begun to acquire wealth through the state. By the Rajapaksa era this trend has grown to the level of intercepting the circuits of property and money such as loans and purchases at the point of the state. In front of this new opportunity, the most skilled politicians and high-level officials gradually coagulated into a single class of powerful elite who employed the government to take control of the state, thus establishing authority over its cash flows and accounting systems; stymying the judiciary, the state, and the capitalists; and transforming the difference between main political parties into a complementary enmity. The interest in projects of high return is evident in the cancelling in 2020 of the light rail transit (LRT) project funded by the Japanese at a low interest rate, even after completing the studies. How each kleptocrat becomes rich is not transparent for transparency is not a virtue of this system; I will not speculate either but employ this larger understanding to explain the change. Enabled by the changes such as the introduction of the district-based electoral system, politicians became less accountable. This was evident when the flabbergasted Minister Ranawaka first refused to accept responsibility for the Meethotamulla garbage-mountain collapse of 2017, killing 32 and victimising thousands. The lack of care for public good is evident when a new restaurant and its parking lot were allowed to encroach on the main public space, Galle Face, in 2013. Subjecting the state to the government and its militarisation weakened the expert. Increasingly, the politicians decide which projects to implement. They may be lost as Bent Flyvbjerg (1999, p. 234) elegantly demonstrates: while ‘power has a rationality that rationality does not know. Rationality … does not have a power that power does not know’. The kleptocrats attempt to enhance their economic and political gains via making Colombo visible to the world and providing a nationalist image for local consumption. The ‘experts’ are expected to operationalise and rationalise projects. The external face is economic and profit driven. The state displaced ‘sub-prime’ uses and low-income settlements from central areas, refurbished colonial structures, and brought claimed land into recirculation. These are organised around lucrative projects, creating an environment of consumption for people with higher spending powers, especially tourists and local upper classes, ignoring the sublime purpose of planning. The recently opened One Galle Face (2021) 210

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claims to be the first prestigious shopping mall and ‘Colombo’s first internationally developed and managed integrated lifestyle destination and mixed-use development’. Recent structures, including expensive condominiums, have hardly provided any recognisable form to Colombo except as a concrete jungle; the form following uncoordinated investments. The local face combines nationalism and the ruling family. Mahinda elevated himself as the greatest ruler in the 2,600-year Sinhala-Buddhist history, thus joining Jayawardena who proudly claimed to be the 205th head of state of Sri Lanka. The Rajapaksa regime used the lotus, representing Sinhala-Buddhism, to dress up various structures across the city, including the Nelum Pokuna auditorium and planted na plants around the Independent Square. The lotus bud was used as the election symbol of Gotabaya in 2020. The process culminated in the Lotus Tower where this Sinhalised-Buddhist-Rajapaksa symbol met Chinese technology, loans, and, perhaps, domination.

Conclusion In sum, the conservatives adapted themselves to colonial Colombo, the centre-left governments radically changed its contents, and the neoliberals transformed its form to attract foreign investment. The kleptocratic regimes intensified the movement of money and intercepted it at the state level, through the government. They replaced investing for development with growth for investment and cash flow, allowing individual projects to shape the city. Despite major efforts to change the city and its hinterland, the post-colonial authorities have made little progress. As its own resistance to change demonstrates, Colombo has an identity that depends on national and global systems of cities and is not a free-floating signifier that can be changed by any random actor.  As it is the producer of Ceylon, and intimately connected to it, changing Colombo needs a broader and deeper understanding, vision, and strategy. Yet the colonial production is incomplete, nor is the city dualistic, or totally structured. Despite the inefficiencies of the state and the experts, its subjects, who incrementally transform it by living in it (Perera, 2016), have shown a high level of connectivity. The emerging elite, the Buddhist revival, and the migrants, among others, familiarised the city. These and other layers of people’s society and space contest, cooperate, and entangle with the formal city of the authorities, causing cascades of change that modify and generate new elements.

References Brohier, R. (1984). Changing face of Colombo (1501–1972). Lake House. Cartier, C. (2017). Contextual urban theory and the ‘appeal’ of gentrification: Lost in transposition? International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 41(3), 466–477. Cave, H. (2002 [1908]). The book of Ceylon. Cassell. Chamikara, S. (2015, April 17). Colombo Port City causing ‘unimaginable’ environmental. Asia News.  http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Colombo-Port-City-causing-unimaginable-environmentalharm-34010.html CHEC Port City Colombo. (2019). Building a world class city for South Asia. http://www.portcitycolombo.lk/about/#vision-mission Dharmasena, K. (1980). The port of Colombo 1860–1939. Lake House Publishers. Fanon, F. (1968). The Wretched of the Earth: The handbook for the black revolution that is changing the shape of the world. Grove Press. Flyvbjerg, B. (1999). Rationality and power. Knopf. Gombrich, R., & Gananath, O. (1988). Buddhism transformed: Religious change in Sri Lanka. Princeton University Press.

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Nihal Perera Hulugalle, A. J. (1965). Centenary volume of the Colombo Municipal Council 1865–1965. Colombo Municipal Council. Kaluarachchi, S. (2013). Colamba Puranaya. [in Sinhala: Ancient Colombo]. Suriya Publishers. Karasch, M. (1985). Rio de Janeiro: From colonial port town to imperial capital. In R. Ross & G. Telkamp (Eds.), Colonial cities: Essays on urbanism in a colonial context (pp. 123–154). Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. King, A. (1976). Colonial urban development: Culture, social power and environment. Routledge. Kumarasingha, K. (2023). My memories of Colombo life in the 1970s–1980s [කොළඹ මතක: 1970 සහ 1980 දශකවල කොළඹ ජීවිතය පිළිබද මගේ කැබලි මතක].  Vidarsdhana. Malalgoda, K. (1976). Buddhism in Singhalese society 1750–1900: A study of religious revival and change. University of California Press. Ministry of Megapolis. (2019). The megapolis: From island to continent. Ministry of Megapolis. Mariyathas, S., Perera, N., & Yehiya, M. (2016). What development has done to a town: Lessons from Hambantota, Sri Lanka. Bhumi, the Planning Research Journal, 5(1), 57–72. Narayanan, N. (2020). World-class as a provincial construct: Historicizing planning in Colombo and Delhi. Planning Theory, 13(2), 210–233. Perera, N. (1998). Society and space: Colonialism, nationalism, and postcolonial identity in Sri Lanka. Westview Press. Perera, N. (2016). People’s spaces: Coping, familiarizing, creating. Routledge. Roberts, M. (1984, December 5–12). Colombo in the round: Outlines of its growth in modern times [Conference paper]. The Second International Conference on Indian Ocean Studies, Perth, Australia. Tang, W. S. (2017). Beyond gentrification: Hegemonic redevelopment in Hong Kong. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 41(3), 487–499.

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17 DELHI Rethinking Indian urbanism through the capital’s multi-nuclei development Pilar Maria Guerrieri

Introduction Delhi has been experiencing one of the fastest urban expansions globally, reaching a population that is swelling each year so much that the United Nations projects it will overtake Tokyo by 2028 (Smith, 2018). Delhi, one of the world’s largest megacities, has become emblematic of the challenges the urbanising Global South faces, including housing insecurity, mounting inequality, pollution, and congestion. Over the years, many have written about the cities of Delhi and their urban development, but often the periods analysed and the themes are the same. There are very few studies published on the first six cities of Delhi—Qila Rai Pithora, Siri, Tughlaqabad, Jahanpanah, Firozabad, and City of Sher Shah—and in most cases, they are only reconstructions by archaeologists or fantastic stories by travellers (Fanshawe, 1902; Frykenberg, 1986). The texts become numerous when it comes to Delhi’s seventh Mughal city: Shahjahanabad, which still retains its urban character in its entirety. Certainly, the period about which most has been written was the colonial one, and mainly, looking at architecture, the texts focus on the intervention of the British architects Edwin Lutyens and Herbert Baker responsible for the construction of New Delhi expansion. After independence, there was again a loss of interest in writers in the city, and this gap was only partially filled in around the 1970s. The authors who have addressed the city’s theme over the years are both Indian and foreign (Patil & Purnima, 1997). The latter, probably for reasons of language, has concentrated in particular on the colonial period. The study of the city’s historiography clearly highlights colonialism’s impact on urban memory. Undoubtedly its multi-nuclei development is one of Delhi’s most fascinating aspects. Directly from the Delhi Planning Department website, it is possible to read that rapid urbanisation has led to one distinctive feature in Delhi: different types of settlements. The type of settlements in Delhi are categorised in terms of civic infrastructure, types of houses, such as resettlement colonies, slum resettlement colonies, approved colonies, unauthorised-regularised colonies, unauthorised colonies, urbanised villages, JJ clusters, notified slum areas, and rural villages. (Planning Department, 2000)

DOI: 10.4324/9781003256533-20

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India’s capital has been built in distinct parts, each with its own strong autonomy and character. This chapter intends to focus on these parts—the fragments of the old cities, the villages, the Mughal capital, the British capital, the independent capital, the colonies, and the megacity’s latest satellite expansions—to better understand their unique nature. Many internal and external factors played a role in developing these characters, such as migrations after partition with Pakistan, migrants from rural areas, and foreign rulers’ impact or economic aspirations. Today certain parts are only archaeological remains, not alive at all, while other parts may be very much inhabited like pre-industrial settlements such as Shahajanabad or all the urban villages incorporated in the urban fabric. There are very green and open parts, such as the Lutyens zone (the area of Delhi designed by British architects during colonial rule) or the farmhouses green belt surrounding the megacity, and others incredibly dense, like the many unauthorised settlements areas. The city presents very different ways of inhabiting the urban area; some zones are to be considered entirely urban while others still present a rural way of living despite urbanisation. Interestingly, large sections of the population, nearly 30–50 per cent in the case of Delhi, live in some squatter settlements (Planning Department, 2000). The National Commission on Urbanisation has described urbanisation in India as a process whereby the surplus population of workers from rural areas resettles in urban centres. However, urbanisation becomes a process of transfer of rural poverty to an urban environment, and it results in a concentration of rural inhabitants in pockets of urban areas and dynamics of village life transferred into the city.

Early settlements in the area: The first six cities Little or nothing is known about the ancient origins of the city of Delhi. Historiography always tends to refer to those cities in Delhi that were founded from the year 1000 onwards (Gupta, 1981). However, archaeological excavations in the 20th century have confirmed the existence of an older urban agglomeration dating back to the first millennium BC, in the area between Feroz Shah Kotla and Humayun’s tomb. The only text in which the city seems to be described for the first time is the epic poem Mahabharata. The epic poem Mahabharata is entrusted with the mythical image of the city’s foundation (Kaul, 1985). This text refers to a distant time when two families, including the Pandavas, were at war. The latter had their base in a city called Indraprastha, the present Purana Qila in Delhi. It should be noted, however, that in this account, historical truth is confused with myth. There is a great deal of uncertainty in historiography about the actual number of cities in Delhi before the construction of the still well-recognisable Shahjahanabad. Sometimes one hears talk of six, sometimes of nine, sometimes of 13 or 14 settlements (Singh, 2006). Of these, not much remains today, except for a few ruins, fragments of walls of fortifications, or isolated religious buildings, and this lack does not help historical reconstruction. The towns have been consumed by time and encompassed by the contemporary city, becoming monuments. All, however, were founded in the triangle of land between the Ridge, Raisina Hill, and the Yamuna River. According to the most accredited hypothesis, it seems that the first city was officially founded in 1052 by the Rajputs (people coming from Rajasthan) and was named Qila Rai Pitora or Lal Kot. In 1203 a Mongol horde invaded the plains of Delhi, and Sultan Alaud-din to protect himself founded what is called the second city of Delhi: Siri. Tughlakabad, the third city, was born out of Tughlak Shah’s desire for grandeur and protection in 1300. The fourth, Jahanpanah, was founded by Muhammad Tughlaq with the intention of walling in the settlements of Lal Kot and Siri and dated 1327. The fifth date back to 1354 and is located much further north than the others, commissioned by Firoz Shah and was named Firozabad. Finally, 214

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the last of the six is the City of Sher Shah, which dates back to 1540. The megalopolis absorbs the latter pre-colonial cities, once fortified citadels and now gigantic ruins (Sharma, 1993). We find it reported in Gordon Risley Hearn’s The Seven Cities of Delhi: ‘Ang Pal Built Delhi in 1052’ (Hearn, 2010, p. 46), the only inscription on the famous iron pillar dating back to 550 AD preserved inside the Qutb Minar complex that comes back to Delhi. It was, in fact, the king of the Rajput dynasty Anangpal Tomar, driven out of Kannauj by Mahmud, who reconsidered the banks of the Yamuna River as the site for the capital of his kingdom. The book The Seven Cities of Delhi refers to this urban core, Old Delhi, as the first city. It fell into the hands of the Turkish invaders in 1193, and the first new king Muhammad undertook the construction of a series of monuments, first and foremost the marvellous Qutb Minar. Twenty-seven Hindu temples were also erected during this period, making Delhi a major centre of Hindu worship. As also happened in Europe, in this period, a process began that saw the superimposition of a centralising state apparatus on the feudal political system. This attempt at centralisation was put into practice by the ruler Iltutmish, who in 1206 founded the Sultanate of Delhi, destined to last until 1526. The Mongol threat and that of the invincible leader Genghis Khan are certainly key issues for the Sultanate. A century after its foundation, in 1303, a Mongol horde invaded the plains of Delhi, forcing Sultan Ala-ud-din Khilji to retreat with his army to Siri. Here, after the expulsion of the raiders, Ala-ud-din decided to found the second city of Delhi. Between 1307 and 1311, the Sultanate saw a remarkable expansion of its possessions, as Delhi’s armies penetrated deeper and deeper into southern India until they reached the southernmost tip of the peninsula. When Tughlak Shah ascended to the throne in 1320, being a stern old warrior, used to facing constant enemy attacks, he stated that he did not feel sufficiently protected by the walls of Old Delhi, and in order to find the desired isolation and shelter, he decided to build a third city, Tughlaqabad, perched on a promontory five miles east of Old Delhi. The large number of people who resided, encamped, between the cities of Old Delhi and Siri had increased progressively over the years and were in a very exposed position to possible enemy attacks. For this reason, Muhammad Tughlaq, the second ruler of the Tughlaq dynasty, built walls in 1327 to connect the two settlements, Old Delhi and Siri, effectively giving rise to the fourth city of Delhi: Jahanpanah. Firoz Shah, having just ascended the throne as Muhammad Tughlaq’s successor, also decided he wanted to build his own urban settlement, and in 1354, five miles northeast of Siri, he founded his fifth city, Firozabad. The exact extent of the latter is uncertain, but it is thought that it covered part of present-day New Delhi to the south, and to the north, it reached the Ridge. As we read in Michelguglielmo Torri’s Storia dell’India: ‘The battle of Panipat in 1526 is generally regarded as the founding date of the Mughal (or Mughal, or Mughal) Empire […]. In fact, even at Babur’s death (1530), Mughal rule in northern India was far from solid’ (Torri, 2007, p. 250). It was only with Humayun, Babur’s successor, that Mongol power began to consolidate, and, in 1534, he started the construction of the Purana Qila fort. In 1540, having ascended to the throne by force, Sher Shah decided to build the walls of the sixth city around Purana Qila, the City of Sher Shah, which occupied only part of Firozabad.

Urban villages In addition to the individual ancient cities that built Delhi, the villages are no less important. Indeed, in India, the city played a subordinate role to the village communities for a long time. 215

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Many of these small, concentrated urban agglomerations rise around Delhi and today, like the ruins of the six cities, form part of the urban fabric. The rapid urbanisation of Delhi has seen the enormous conversion of rural land into urban. Delhi’s rural population has decreased from 9.49 lakh in 1991 to 4.19 lakh in 2011. This pace of urbanisation has reduced the number of rural villages in Delhi from 300 in 1961 to 165 in 2001 and 112 in 2011. Urbanised villages have increased from 20 in 1961 to 135 in 2011. In 2017, 89 more villages were added to the existing urban village list (Census of India, 1971–2011). The term urban village first appeared in the Masterplan of Delhi in 1962 (Goodfriend, 1980), to be used for those villages in the urban fringe of Delhi, where the rural type of small-scale industries was to be located (Tyagi, 1982). Historically, an intricate system of water channels, which flowed into the Yamuna River, connected these settlements. The water system was accompanied by connecting roads (Sarin, 2000). The villages, with their characteristics, are still perfectly recognisable from the size of the streets (two and a half metres wide) or the concentration of buildings. Each village is often built around a religious monument, an empty loan, or a water pond (Lewis & Karoki, 1997). In the past, the buildings were two storeys high, but today they have been raised to three or four storeys, giving the feeling to those walking in the streets that they are walking inside a house corridor. Each village is an autonomous entity defined by the Lal Dora, an administrative boundary established originally during British colonial rule. The Lal Dora denotes that the jurisdiction of the municipal authorities or the Delhi urban development rules is not applicable in toto to the village area (Ajay, 2005). In the process of urbanisation, the shift from rural to urban results in various transformations such as loss of agricultural land and adoption of different urban occupations. The agricultural labour class is the most affected by the transformation. Population in the urban villages increases due to in-migration, resulting in the residential pockets of high density, poor infrastructure, and public amenities. The daily interaction between the city and the village is observed, generating a social and economic transformation of the village community. It is interesting to see how the proximity of the metropolis, the allpervasive effect of the television and other media has planted urban aspirations in the rural mindset leading to a partial departure from traditional values. An interesting example is Kotla Mubarakpur, a medieval settlement classified by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) as an urban village in 1971. In the land of Kotla Mubarakpur, there are presently five different villages Kotla, Pilanji, Khairpur, Aliganj, and Jor Bagh. The main village is Kotla, surrounded by the other four villages. The population of this settlement has been steadily increasing over five decades, but the land available for the development of the village has remained almost the same since the time it was declared urban, and most roads are still very narrow. With the rise in urbanisation around the settlement and the massive demand for rental accommodation within it, development has grown vertically (Chattopadhyay et al., 2014). Kotla is a service provider to the city, an important factor ushering in its development. The principal occupation of the people of this village is service sector-based or self-employed. A small population sector in the village depends on the primary sector of activities. The structural condition of the building in the village is primarily permanent in nature with the highest prevalence of pucca—permanent brick mortar or concrete—structures, but still, there is a small percentage of the houses which are semi-pucca—semi-permanent in nature. The village at present does not have any temporary kutcha structure of the housing. This area has much historical importance as far as valuable monuments are concerned. Some of the tombs which date back to the Lodhi and Sayyid dynasties are Bare Khan Ka Gumbad, Chote Khan Ka Gumbad, Bhure Khan Ka Gumbad, and Kale Khan Ka Gumbad. There are two wells in the village, which 216

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are not functional at present. There is a shortage of water availability in the area as the groundwater is depleting. The sewerage pipelines were laid in 1988 in the village by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi department. The settlement has open drains running along the roadsides. It has been electrified even before 1970, and all the houses have accessibility to electricity. The market initially at peripheral road has expanded and covered 40 per cent of the village. This kind of commercial development co-exists with adjacent residential areas. The factor that it is surrounded by two posh markets of South Ex and Defence colony has created a lot of pressure on Kotla to change from raw building materials to finished products (Expert Committee, 2007). Kotla Mubarakpur, in the south-central part of Delhi, one of the oldest developed areas, does not lack social infrastructure due to ample development in the surrounding areas. In the transformation phase of the rural village to urban village, these settlements have lost the fundamental essence of the village, but there are still some rural characteristics left in the village, such as dairy farming, keeping cows, and selling milk. Change in the elements of the morphology has resulted in an overall change in the urban fabric. The elements such as plot size have become way smaller and fragmented. Some of the houses have still retained the system of open veranda within the plot premise. The population has grown over the decades, but the open spaces have been reduced. Moreover, many pockets of open spaces have encroached for car parking or cattle rearing. The open/vacant pockets are often being used to throw garbage, resulting in environmental degradation. The demand for and supply of housing and other services has led to uncontrolled, unplanned haphazard growth of the urban village (Planning Department, 2018). The existing planning framework has often failed to integrate the urban villages into the planned development of the adjacent fabric. Kotla Mubarakpur, like many other urban villages, such as Khirki, Chirag Delhi, Shahpur Jat, Masjid Moth, Hauz Khas (Figure 17.1), Nizamuddin, and more, is still recognisable and an isolated nucleus.

The seventh city The seventh city is called Shahjahanabad and was built in 1648 by the penultimate great Mongol emperor Shah Jahan (Blake, 1991). The latter demolished part of the city of Firozabad and the City of Sher Shah to erect the walls of his new settlement. The area of Shahjahanabad was much larger than any of the earlier cities of the Sultans of  Delhi or of any other rulers on the subcontinent. Studies (Ehlers & Krafft, 1993) have shown that the city has Indo-Islamic characteristics. The plan of Shahjahanabad reflects both Hindu and Islamic influences. It is Islamic because of the presence of the straight road, Chandni Chowk, connecting the fort with the mosque, the presence of the walls, and the division into mohallas commerce communities. It is Hindu because of the unusual mixture and coexistence of different ethnic and religious groups— non-Muslims are not ghettoised in any way—and at the same time because of the crescent shape that turns towards the river (see the descriptions in the oldest architectural treatise Vastu Shastra) and the decorations with Hindu symbols. It seems to have followed a design from Manasara Shilpa Shastra, an ancient Sanskrit treatise on architecture (Fonseca, 1971). Shahjahanabad was a walled city, and only some of its gates still stand. The city, in many ways, has been modified by British intervention during the 19th and 20th centuries. The most notable changes in the urban pattern are the gutting near the Red Fort and those for constructing the railway station, which removed all the Mughal gardens to the north (Ehlers & Krafft,1993). Differently from the previous archaeological six historical cities of Delhi, Shahjahanabad today retains its size, walkable nature, and urban life. Shahjahanabad’s lively bazaars, irregular narrow streets, and alleyways are among the best examples of the traditional urban environment in India (Figure 17.2), characterised by a great variety of hard and soft heritage, all sorts of people 217

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Figure 17.1  Hauz Khas urban village, Delhi. Source:  Pilar M. Guerrieri.

and activities (Chenoy, 2004). It is a multicultural, crowded, congested, and competitive environment, where there is no formal separation of vehicles, animals and pedestrians. This historic city’s continued chaotic vitality challenges the rationale underpinning mainstream Indian urban planning. Lewis Mumford alluded to these forces when he said that dynamic, historic cities represent ‘energy converted into culture’ (Mumford, 1961, p. 570). The intrinsic nature of the ‘energy’ enables Shahjahanabad to continue functioning as a vibrant entity even today. This ‘energy’ has enabled it to face the challenges of Indian urbanisation and urbanism with dignity and grace that eludes the rigidity of modern cities. The concept of jugaad, the legendary Indian capacity to find solutions to problems through ingenuity, is crucial to understand how there is a form of order despite the city’s seeming chaos. Understanding this ‘energy’ holds the key to mediating the regeneration of degraded city centres in India and conserving particular historic cities. Unfortunately, negative perceptions of the historic city often underpin the vision of the Masterplan of Delhi, 1961, which states: ‘the Old City is … a chaotic mix of incompatible land uses’, and ‘there is an undesirable mixing of land uses almost everywhere in the city; residential with shopping and industry; wholesale with retail; business with service industry’ (Delhi Development Authority, 1961). The Delhi 218

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Figure 17.2  Shahjahanabad, Delhi. Source:  Pilar M. Guerrieri.

Development Authority and the Municipal Corporation Delhi have designated the old city a slum and thus become complicit in the wrong production of inefficiency and inequality in the city, instead of highlighting Shahjahanabad’s specific characters within the framework of its particular context and not with ‘universal’ templates provided by modernist western planning ideology.

New Delhi, the eighth city Although the British arrived in the city of Delhi as early as 1803, New Delhi was only founded in 1911 with the decision to move the capital from Calcutta to Delhi. The idea was to rule the country from the interior, no longer from the edge of the Bengal coast, and to build ‘Imperial Delhi’ (Byron, 1931; Chakravarty,1980; Irving, 1981). In 1911 there was uncertainty as to where the city should be located, whether north or west: in the end, the choice, for reasons of more stable terrain and the presence of Raisina Hill, was west. New Delhi has a completely different character from the congested Shahjahanabad, and the two cities are separated by a railway line. The new city is predominantly designed as a garden city, with wide avenues and green spaces, following the city’s beautiful movement’s principles (Chipkin, 1958; Davis, 1985). At the top of the hill is the heart of the ‘Indo-Saracenic’ public buildings designed by E. Lutyens and H. Baker, while at the foot of the hill is the residential area, designed by many other architects such as R. T. Russel or H. Medd or C. G. Bloomsfield (Hosagrahar, 1997). The latter was built to accommodate those who held the most prestigious government posts: an extensive area of bungalows and compounds called the Lutyens Bungalow Zone (LBZ) (Jain, 2010). The whole town is designed according to a strict social division: the more prestigious the office, the closer to the government buildings. There are also many other residential areas, often overlooked by scholars, which are planned together with the imperial city or, from 1931, 219

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the date of its inauguration. Among the most interesting interventions are the colonies of the plotted housing types such as Karol Bagh, those entirely developed by private contractors such as Sujan Singh Park, or those designed by the Central Public Works Department (PWD) such as the colonies of Darya Gunj or Lodi Colony: all recognisable and of ‘semi-modern design’. The panorama of public buildings outside Raisina Hill is equally varied and rich, ranging from St Martin’s Church to Willingdon Airport. Despite the preferences of historiography, as Guerrieri’s work Negotiating Cultures (Guerrieri, 2018) explains, it is clear that it is not possible to reduce the city of Delhi to the work of E. Lutyens and H. Baker. This British-designed city is very recognisable in its westernised characters even nowadays, providing another clear autonomous part of the megacity of Delhi.

Greater Delhi, the ninth city After independence and separation from Pakistan, the city of Delhi underwent a vast population increase. Practically all the British architects who had built the city up to that point returned to England; those who remained, to solve the problem of building houses for the new government employees, refugees from Pakistan, and a whole series of other newcomers to the city, was the Central PWD. Central PWD is an organisation founded by the British in the second half of the 19th century, where practically only Indian architects/engineers remained to work. There was an explosion of settlement projects for refugees from Pakistan after the country’s partition (Ewing, 1969). Some government interventions try to buffer the emergency, offering two-storey houses like those in Lajpat Nagar or RK Puram, while other solutions, like Patel Nagar, are less generous, and the lot is sold without any housing. Government employees are given colonies like Sarojini Nagar that have their own recognisable architectural identity, and the first big private builders, DLF, take advantage of the moment by producing colonies like Hauz Khas Enclave or Greater Kailash. As many public buildings flourished, sometimes in revivalist style like Krishi Bhawan, sometimes modern like Transport Bhawan. In light of this explosion of construction, both residential and public, Nehru called for a commission to set up a Masterplan for the capital of the independent nation. Thus, in 1955, work began on Ninth Delhi, the ninth city: a ‘Civic Citizen Habitation’ that would hold together all the previous eight cities (Cullen, 1960; Cullen, 1961; Singh, 1971). The intention of the preliminary plan, or Greater Delhi Interim General Plan (Delhi Development Authority, 1957), was to convert haphazard casual construction to planned and conceptualised building, to promote the health, safety, and social and moral well-being of the community, whilst also imposing limitations on the use of land. The zoning principles were intended to ‘rationalise’ the distribution of functions on the territory and ensure better hygienic conditions. The city was divided into functional zones, and each activity—residential, commercial, industrial, and entertainment—was governed by its own set of rules and spaces (Government of India, 1962). This master plan’s principles for the city, though revised multiple times, are partly still in force today. Moreover, the basic concept of the master plan had been the development of Delhi colonies, considered the best unit for planning residential settlements. The British Delhi Improvement Trust was substituted in 1955 by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) and became the biggest builder of houses for different income groups in the country’s capital (Rao & Desai, 1965). Indeed, those in charge of urban development went on to construct autonomous, self-contained neighbourhoods (Ali, 1995). The master plan just confirms one of Delhi’s most ancient traits— that of it being a polycentric urban formation. In Delhi, the neighbourhoods were no longer a British legacy, nor were they merely inspired by American culture; they had become the most crucial unit through which the megacity grew till today (Bopegamage,1957). 220

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Satellite towns Most of the recent expansions of Delhi occurred on the peripheries of New Delhi, as rural areas have become more urban (Bentinck, 2000). Already after 1947, The Delhi Masterplan envisaged the development of Ring Towns, viz. Ghaziabad, Faridabad, Ballabhgarh, Gurgaon, Bahadurgarh, Loni and Narela, and the Delhi Administration together with the Delhi Improvement Trust were considering building a series of Townships to house West Pakistani refugees (Singh & Dhamija, 1989). Since India’s economic liberalisation in the 1990s, real estate speculation and rising costs in urban centres have pushed growth centrifugally to the peripheries of Delhi and satellite cities outside Delhi have experienced fast urban growth (Nangia, 1976). Interestingly, each of the Delhi peripheral satellite towns developed in different regions and are ruled by independent urban laws (NIUA, 1988). For example, Gurgaon is a district in the state of Haryana, southwest of Delhi; it is split administratively from the area of Faridabad, which is also located in the same state. While Faridabad developed more industrially, Gurgaon became more of an information technology hub. Many leading firms worldwide have decided to locate in Gurgaon, and there are 43 shopping malls, many expensive apartments and skyscrapers, 7 golf courses and luxurious five-star hotels, all realised by private developers. Gurgaon is an example of a new kind of city-making in post-liberalisation India, in which the private sector performed the major responsibilities of city planning (Figure 17.3). In Gurgaon, it is possible to witness the incredible contradiction between the private sector development, with shiny modern buildings, and poor public sector development, with a lack of infrastructure, services, and sewage (Rajagopalan & Tabarrok, 2014). Gurgaon was, and remains, one of the largest single real estate ‘mega-projects’ in India. In the 1970s, the Delhi Land and Finance Corporation (DLF) assembled nearly 3,500 acres of former farmland, while the company’s chief executives battled with state governments to change the land ceiling laws that initially prevented large-scale real estate development (Goldstein, 2015, p. 3). Today Gurgaon is not

Figure 17.3  Gurgaon development, Delhi. Source:  Pilar M. Guerrieri.

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only a bedroom community but offers employment opportunities; here, many young professionals move for work and find reasons to stay. Despite the absence of a strong government planning presence, Gurgaon has become a city of nearly 4 million in a few short decades. Faridabad, like Noida, was conceived as two industrial satellite towns. Noida is a settlement in Uttar Pradesh initially imagined to relocate Delhi industries, and in the late 20th century, it was designated to be a new industrial town (Dupont, 2001a). It had constant tensions between local farmers, private builders, and government bodies, presenting a different set of issues and characters compared to other satellite towns. This is interestingly explored in the book of Vandana Vasudevan Urban Villager: Life in and Indian Satellite Town (Vasudevan, 2013). The different characters of each of these peripheral urban developments from the National Capital Region of Delhi clearly suggest the idea of a continuing multi-nuclei logic through which the megacity is still growing.

Conclusion Delhi conforms to the Multiple Nuclei Model conceived in 1945 by Chauncey D. Harris and Edward L. Ullman (Harris and Ullman, 1945, pp. 7–17): a model of urban land use in which a city grows from several independent points rather than a central one. These multi-centres developed independently and played a significant role in the city’s evolution. The multi-nuclei have been the way the capital of India developed over the centuries; till today, Delhi is characterised by a multimodal quasi-continuous urban area. The recent progressive process of peri-urbanisation and urbanisation around Delhi has been following the same logic. Interestingly, the spatial distribution in nuclei depicts social organisations and cultural relationships. The internal organisation of a city includes both physical and human aspects. Indeed, each Delhi urban area is strongly defined by its people. The development via nuclei has been defining and reflecting, simultaneously, segments of the population, and it also became a subtle system of segregation. According to how each area has been planned, it clearly resulted in more or less inclusive land. For example, the fenced bungalow areas of Lutyens Delhi are as much inhospitable as those of Gurgaon, where public services are reduced to the minimum. Otherwise, the well-defined smaller plots of neighbourhoods, such as Golf Links, Panchsheel Park, or Nizamuddin, facilitate the settlement of the middle class. The small size of houses and narrow multifunctional streets of urban villages welcomed the inhabitation by an even less wealthy segment of the population. The number of urban villages has increased from 20 in 1961 to 135 in 2011, while the number of rural villages reduced from 300 in 1961 to 112 in 2011 (Planning Department, 2019). The city development has not led to the total extinction of the city’s rural scape. Delhi’s rural–urban interactions are very interesting. Indeed, Delhi’s multiple cities in its neighbourhood reality developed a ‘village feeling’, where on one side the city is generating new aspirations, and, on the other side, festivities typical of the rural areas and neighbourhood relationships representative of smaller settings are still visible. Despite the large size of the urban development, each area developed a much smaller human scale, liveable environment. The urban pattern structure and its physical characteristics have defined social and cultural aspects, determining a natural segregation process. The economic parameter is just one that can be taken into consideration. Other relevant elements that define these areas are religion, type of employment, and similarities in terms of where people are coming from in India, such as Kerala or Punjab. Even though Delhi has urban and regional planning policies, it has often been criticised for being unplanned and for all the contradictions and discrepancies between the planner’s vision 222

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and the actual development of the metropolitan area. Its free and organic evolution clearly emphasised its cultural and social diversities, making Delhi, as much as other Indian urban environments, a fascinating example of Indian urbanisation.

References Ajay, M. K. (2005). Urbanization and governance in India: Urban villages of Delhi. Manohar. Ali, S. (1995). Environment and resettlement colonies of Delhi. Har Anand. Bentinck, J. (2000). Unruly urbanization of the Delhi’s fringe, changing patterns of land use and livelihood. Netherland Geographical Studies, 270, 1–190. Blake, S. P. (1991). Shahjahanabad:  The sovereign city in Mughal India 1639–1739. Cambridge University Press. Bopegamage, A. (1957). Housing in Delhi: A study in urban sociology. [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. University of Bombay. Byron, R. (1931). New Delhi. The Architectural Review, LXIX(410). Census of India 1971–2011. Delhi State Archives. Chakravarty, S. (1980). The making of the imperial city. In E. F. N. Ribeiro & A. K. Jain (Eds.), Proceedings of the Seminar on The Future of New Delhi. School of Planning and Architecture. Chattopadhyay, S., Dey, P., & Joel, M. (2014). Dynamics and growth dichotomy of urban villages: Case of Delhi. International Journal for Housing Science, 38(2), 81–94. Chenoy, S. M. (2004). Shahjahanabad: Seventeenth and eighteenth centuries symphony: Identities, plurality. Nehru Memorial Museum and Library. Chipkin, C. M. (1958). New Delhi. South African Architectural Record. Cullen, G. (1961). Ninth Delhi. Government of India Press. Cullen, G. (1960). IXth Delhi. The Architectural Review, 756, 111–117. Davis, P. (1985). Splendours of the Raj: British architecture in India 1660 to 1947. John Murray. Delhi Development Authority. (1957). Work studies relating to the preparation of the master-plan for Delhi, I–II. Delhi Development Authority. Delhi Development Authority. (1961). Master plan of Delhi. Delhi Development Authority. Dupont, V. (2001). Noida: Nouveu pole industriel ou ville satellite de Delhi? Le project des planificateurs, ses Faulles et son Devenir. Revue Tiers-Monde, 165, 189–211. Ehlers, E., & Krafft, T. (Eds.). (1993). Shahjahanabad/Old Delhi: Tradition and colonial change. Manohar. Ewing, J. E. (1969). Town planning in Delhi: A critique. Economic and Political Weekly, 4(40), 1591–1600. Expert Committee. (2007). Report of the expert committee on Lal Dora and extended Lal Dora in Delhi. https://mohua.gov.in/upload/uploadfiles/files/laldora.pdf Fanshawe, H. C. (1902). Delhi: Past and present. John Murray. Fonseca, R. (1971). The walled city of Old Delhi. Ekistics, 31(182), 72–80. Frykenberg, R. E. (1986). Delhi through the ages: Essays in urban history, culture and society. Oxford University Press. Goldstein, S. (2015). Planning the millennium city:  The policy of place-making in Gurgaon India. Cornell University. https://www.rc21.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/F1.1-shoshanagoldstein.pdf Goodfriend, D. E. (1980). The Delhi master plan (1962): A critical reappraisal. Spa, 2(3), 83–100. Government of India. (1962). Master plan for Delhi (I). Delhi Development Authority. Gupta, N. (1981). Historical growth of New Delhi up to 1911. The Indian Architect, (January), 18–24. Guerrieri, P. (2018). Negotiating cultures: Delhi’s architecture and planning from 1912 to 1962. Oxford University Press. Harris, C. D., & Ullman, E. L. (1945). The nature of cities. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 242(1), 7–17. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1026055 Hearn, G. R. (2010). The seven cities of Delhi. Aryan Books International. Hosagrahar, J. (1997). Design, domination and defiance: Negotiating urbanism in Delhi, 1857–1910. [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. University of California. Irving, R. G. (1981). Indian summer: Lutyens, Baker, and imperial Delhi. Yale University Press. Jain, A. K. (2010). Lutyens’ Delhi. Bookwell. Kaul, H. K. (1985). Historic Delhi: An anthology. Oxford University Press. Lewis, C., & Karoki, L. (1997). Delhi’s historic villages: A photographic evocation. Ravi Dayal Publisher.

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18 DHAKA Growth management challenges for a rapidly urbanising megacity Shilpi Roy

Introduction Dhaka is the capital city of Bangladesh. As the economic engine of the country, in 2020, this South Asian megacity contributed $162 billion in nominal gross state product (40 per cent of the national GDP) and $235 billion in national purchasing power parity (Assure Group, 2022). Following a very high annual population growth rate of above 8 per cent since 1991 (Roy et al., 2021), as of 2020, it is home to a population of 10.834 million (RAJUK, 2015). Despite severe issues with the quality of life and its failure to ensure balanced urbanisation, the city will likely continue to host an influx of population in the coming years (RAJUK, 2015). With a large population and growth in investment, Dhaka is expected to generate more than 150 per cent of GDP growth between 2017 and 2030; this growth will be the greatest out of all megacities in the world (Wood, 2018). Environmental sustainability, quality of life, and sustained and inclusive economic growth present grave risks in the context of Dhaka’s rapid urban growth. Dhaka is the world’s fifth-fastest expanding megacity (Myers, 2016). The haphazard and rapid spatial transformation, accommodating a large population, has exhausted the city’s services and facilities. Extreme inadequacies in basic urban amenities against the very high population density in urban neighbourhoods, severe road traffic congestion, and acute air pollution are the most pressing urban sustainability challenges this city encounters (Roy, 2021; Roy et al., 2019). Drainage and sewer systems, gas and water supply, and waste management are on the edge of failure. Many city residents live in slums and low-income settlements where they seldom access proper sanitation, water supply, education, healthcare, and housing (Roy & Sowgat, 2020). By 2035, this city will have a 20 per cent population rise from 2000 (RAJUK, 2015). Without any radical shift in policy interventions and governance, Dhaka is unlikely to be able to support such a population explosion successfully. To tackle and guide the urban change in Dhaka, knowledge of the pattern and process is as essential as the broader political and economic forces shaping relevant policies and their implementation. This chapter investigates the growth pattern and process in one of the world’s fastest-growing megacities and the transformation of its neighbourhoods. The findings ­highlight various challenges related to growth management from a political and economic perspective.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003256533-21

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Measuring growth and recognising the challenges of growth management To measure Dhaka’s growth, at first, pre-processed 30 × 30-metre spatial resolution Landsat level-2 imageries of the years 1991, 2001, 2011, and 2019 were gathered from the United States Geological Survey website. Around 25,000 training signatures were extracted for each of the four periods as the image classification sample (see Roy et al., 2021). Then multi-temporal (1991, 2001, 2011, 2019) K Nearest Neighbourhood supervised classification into five land cover classes (see Lillesand et al., 2015) followed an accuracy assessment of the four classified images. The accuracy of the classified images was evaluated using 200 random points for each study year. The accuracy test continued until the Kappa score for all the years became more than 87 per cent. Change detection helped to detect and measure land-use changes from 1991 to 2019 in the 307-square kilometre city. The classified four images were reclassified to binary images for observing the intensity of the built-up land compared to the non-built-up land covers. These binary images are analysed in FRAGSTATS using eight widely accepted spatial metrics (see Fenta et al., 2017; Aithal & Ramachandra, 2016; Reis et al., 2016; Liu & Yang, 2015). These metrics are class area (CA), number of patches (NP), largest patch index (LPI), percentage of land (PLAND), edge density (ED), area weighted mean patch fractal dimension (AWMPFD), contagion (CONTAGION), and Shannon diversity index (SHDI). The metrics values and their widely pronounced interpretations suggested the nature of the spatial structure, composition, configuration, and pattern of built-up land transformations in Dhaka and its neighbourhoods during the study years. The growth analysis shows that nine areas within the city have witnessed the most urban change during the study period. Direct visits to nearly 46 locations in these areas and 36 semi-structured interviews with the residents revealed the drivers determining and shaping the patterns and intensity of urban growth and associated impacts. Interviews with academics and policymakers and study of secondary literature delineated the broader challenges of managing urban growth in Dhaka.

Rapid and uneven urban growth in Dhaka Dhaka is one of the rapidly urbanising megacities in the world (Roy et al., 2021). The city has witnessed an astonishingly high growth rate in the built-up area since 1991, with an average annual growth rate of 7.79 per cent. The highest average yearly urban growth of 8.88 per cent between 1991 and 2001 decreased to 3.48 per cent in the following decade, followed by a slow growth rate of 2.49 per cent from 2011 to 2019. This decreasing average annual growth rate may falsely express a declining growth rate. An extension of the city boundary (from 128 square kilometres) added up about 179 square kilometres of new rural hinterlands towards the eastern side of the old city area in 2017 (Azad, 2017; Bhattacharjee & Khan, 2016), contributing to the declining annual growth rate of the built-up area. Following a high annual urban growth rate, between 1991 and 2019, metropolitan Dhaka gained around 116 square kilometres of new built-up area, equivalent to a 38 per cent increase. This remarkable urban growth continued, although urban managers and planners could not effectively respond to the growing pressures and demands for urban services (Roy et al., 2019, cited in Roy et al., 2021). From 1991 to 2019, Dhaka went through a dramatic urban expansion in its East and North part at an annual rate of 33.25 per cent and 27.55 per cent, respectively; this rate was 6.02 per 226

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cent for the West region and 4.55 per cent for the South part (see Figure 18.1). As was within the old city boundary, areas in the West and South already had a high concentration of built-up areas with urban infrastructure in 1991. These areas thus could offer little room for new spatial growth afterwards. In contrast, the places close to already developed settlements in the eastern periphery of the old city and an abundance of vegetation and low agricultural land in the northeastern and northwestern regions (Ahmed & Bramley, 2015) could provide more room for the new settlements. The uneven urban growth in the city continued to fill up all available areas with built-up areas. From 2011 to 2019, however, outside the old city boundary, the northern and southern parts of the city went through the most rapid urban transformation with an annual growth rate of

Figure 18.1  Urban growth within Dhaka between 1991 and 2019. Source:  The author.

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7.52 per cent and 6.47 per cent, respectively. Planned residential area in Uttara, industries in Mirpur, Ashulia, Tongi, Joydebpur, Gazipur, and Konabari areas in the North, Dhaka Export Processing Zone (EPZ) and settlements in Aminbazar, Savar and Manikganj in the northeastern outskirts contributed to this change. The rapid urban expansion in the southeastern part was triggered by the Dhaka Narayanganj Demra embankment and Narayanganj City. The new city area on the flood plain, low agricultural land and wetlands, and emerging new settlements suffer from the absence of essential services, demonstrating a lack of long-term vision, policy interventions, and weak growth management mechanism for Dhaka and its regions (Roy et al., 2021).

A dynamic process of urban change at the city scale The spatial metrics values suggest (see Table 18.1) that Dhaka tends to follow compact urban growth and vertical expansion over time, responding to the soaring demands for space. The increasing LPI values and the gradual decline of SHDI and ED values between 1991 and 2019 indicate a sharp aggregation of smaller built-up patches into relatively larger homogenous patches, resulting in simple regular geometric shapes of the built-up patches and a dramatic increase in spatial homogeneity of the built-up area. Besides, the steady increase of AWMPFD values between 1991 and 2019 suggests that the geometry of urban patches in Dhaka is taking a more complex shape with rough edges over time—a sign of unregulated growth. The increase of NP values from 2001 to 2011 and the slight decrease of CONTAGION values from 2011 to 2019 signify dispersed haphazard growth of the overall urban area during this time due to the emergence of new small heterogeneous urban patches. The concentration of urban infrastructure within the old city limit and surging demand for space enabled the city’s compact urban growth until 2001. Later, with weak regulations for managing sprawl, new residential and industrial land uses with discontinuous built-up patches have encroached into rural farming land, vegetation, marshlands, and low flood protection area outside the old city boundary. Fragmented growth resulted in leapfrog, sporadic and lowdensity built-up areas, mainly in the northern part of the city at the city edge, with abundant agricultural land (see Figures 18.1 and 18.2). With a weak regulatory framework for managing urban growth in the city region and the absence of a long-term vision and policy directions for guiding the development of the newly added city area, the remaining land here is awaiting conversion into built-up areas in the face of the growing need for space in the city and fragmented growth will continue to spill over to its peripheral locations. Early signs of losing invaluable farming land, vegetation, and low

Table 18.1  Quantification of urban growth (built-up area) in Dhaka Year

CA (km2)

NP

ED

CONTAGION

AWMPFD

SHDI

LPI

PLAND

1991 2001 2011 2019

53.25 100.53 135.56 169.26

5339 4122 4688 4484

117 53 43 40

28.3 30.7 31.3 31.1

1.060 1.090 1.095 1.100

0.42 0.26 0.21 0.19

46 73 82 86

51 75 83 87

Source: The author.

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Figure 18.2  Neighbourhood transformation pattern in Dhaka between 1991 and 2019. Source:  The author.

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water retention areas are alarming. Without guidance and exceptional care, it is not an unjustified fear that this growth will likely be unregulated and abrupt and may lead to further severe environmental loss.

The pattern of urban expansion in Dhaka’s neighbourhoods Dhaka has 945 planned and organically developed neighbourhoods (BBS, 2011), though the number of planned neighbourhoods is nominal. Over the last three decades, infill, fragmented, and stable growth of built-up areas has transformed these neighbourhoods. Infill is a pattern of urban growth that appears within already developed built-up patches, whereas fragmentation emerges outside the existing built-up patches and is sporadic. The transformation of urban Dhaka has followed a heterogeneous and multi-scale pattern of urban growth since 1991. As the neighbourhood transformation pattern implies, between 1991 and 2019, nearly 56 per cent of the city area had transformed through the fragmented growth pattern, and these neighbourhoods are scattered throughout the city. In contrast, about 44 per cent of city area went through infill growth and became increasingly congested and chaotic. Only 0.36 per cent of area had stable growth or no growth. In fact, above 55 per cent of the city area followed the scattered pattern throughout all phases of transformation (1991–2001, 2001–2011, and 2011–2019). During the first phase, about 50 per cent of the city’s neighbourhoods, which make up about 59 per cent of the city area, hosted dispersed fragmented growth that produced new small built-up patches (see Figure 18.2). During the second phase of urban change (2001–2011), fragmented growth of built-up patches emerged in 25 per cent of neighbourhoods, covering almost 64 per cent of the city area (see Figure 18.2). Fragmented growth of built-up patches at this stage was heavily concentrated in the eastern, southeastern, northeastern, and northwestern suburbs and contributed to sprawling (with reference to the old city boundary). As time passed, neighbourhoods exhibited more tendency of fragmented growth as, during the years from 2011 to 2019, 65 per cent of the city area or 30 per cent of neighbourhoods revealed scattered growth of built-up patches. During 1991 and 2001, the built-up area in 42 per cent of neighbourhoods constituting 38 per cent of the city area was consolidated (see Figure 18.2). These neighbourhoods are in the central and western parts within the limit of the old city boundary and the eastern periphery. Among the neighbourhoods that accommodated infill growth from 1991 to 2001, 122 have been adjusted through infill growth for the next 18 years and are left with little provision for new built-up patches. After 20 years of infill growth since 1991, 132 neighbourhoods have experienced fragmented growth after 2011, demonstrating intensive land restructuring practices in these localities.

Dhaka’s transformation into a high-density metropolis Infill urban growth has transformed Dhaka from a low-density city to a high-density metropolis within the last three decades. As a result of dramatic population growth and rising urban density, driven mainly by in-migration, Dhaka is one of the world’s most densely populated cities. According to the population census of 2011, about 64 per cent of residential communities had a very high population density of 100,000 people per square kilometre or above (BBS, 2015). The number of high-density neighbourhoods significantly increased to 763 by 2019 from 246 in 1991 (see Table 18.2). Following the infill urban growth and edge expansion, moderate230

Dhaka Table 18.2 Changes in the intensity of urban growth in the neighbourhoods over time

High-density neighbourhoods (Built-up PLAND > 80 per cent) Moderate-density neighbourhoods (Built-up PLAND ≥ 45 to