Rosenzweig Jahrbuch / Rosenzweig Yearbook: Gebet, Praxis, Erlösung / Prayer, Praxis, Redemption   9783495826041, 9783495464137

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ROSENZWEIG JAHRBUCH ROSENZWEIG YEARBOOK

12 Gebet, Praxis, Erlösung Prayer, Praxis, Redemption

VERLAG KARL ALBER

https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495826041

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Rosenzweig Jahrbuch / Rosenzweig Yearbook 12 Gebet, Praxis, Erlösung / Prayer, Praxis, Redemption

https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495826041 .

Rosenzweig Jahrbuch / Rosenzweig Yearbook Im Auftrag des Vorstands der Internationalen Rosenzweig-Gesellschaft Herausgegeben von / Edited by Luca Bertolino (University of Turin) Irene Kajon (Sapienza University of Rome) Redaktionsbeirat / Editorial Board Stefano Bancalari (Rome) Francesco Paolo Ciglia (Chieti-Pescara) Danielle Cohen-Levinas (Paris) Ángel Garrido-Maturano (Resistencia) Eveline Goodman-Thau (Jerusalem) Adriano Fabris (Pisa) Martin Kavka (Tallahassee) Gesine Palmer (Berlin) Silvia Richter (Berlin) Jules Simon (El Paso) Ynon Wygoda (Jerusalem)

https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495826041 .

Rosenzweig Jahrbuch / Rosenzweig Yearbook 12

Gebet, Praxis, Erlösung

Prayer, Praxis, Redemption

https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495826041 .

Gedruckt mit Unterstützung der Internationalen Rosenzweig-Gesellschaft und des Department of Philosophy, Sapienza University of Rome

Originalausgabe © VERLAG KARL ALBER in der Verlag Herder GmbH, Freiburg / München 2021 Alle Rechte vorbehalten www.verlag-alber.de Satz und PDF-E-Book: SatzWeise, Bad Wünnenberg Herstellung: CPI books GmbH, Leck Gedruckt auf alterungsbeständigem Papier (säurefrei) Printed on acid-free paper Printed in Germany ISBN (Print) 978-3-495-46413-7 ISBN E-Book (PDF) 978-3-495-82604-1 ISSN 1862-829X

https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495826041 .

Inhalt / Table of Contents

Luca Bertolino, Irene Kajon Vorwort / Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Inhaltsangaben / Abstracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Ephraim Meir Redeeming Religions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Martin Fricke »Da hört man nichts mehr von Sache noch von Tat« (Rosenzweig) – Liturgie und Erlösung . . . . . . . . . .

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Gesine Palmer Redeeming Liturgy: A Eulogist’s Perspective on Rosenzweig’s Concept of Liturgy . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Hanoch Ben Pazi Linking Redemption to Prayer. Rethinking Redemption from the Perspective of Jewish Prayers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Giacomo Petrarca Erbeten, Prayer and Action: Theological-Political Glimpses at Franz Rosenzweig . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

79

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Inhalt / Table of Contents

Gabriella Caponigro The Suffering of the Kingdom of Heaven. Violence and Tyranny in The Star of Redemption . . . . .

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Stephanie Brenzel The Gnostic Problem of Prayer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 Elias Sacks Liturgical Counter-Symbols: Jacob Taubes, Franz Rosenzweig, and the Politics of Redemption

. . . 127

Naomi Tanaka Die Bedeutung von »Erlösung« in sozialer Dimension. Zur Akzeptanz des Rosenzweig-Gedankens in nichtjüdischen Kulturbereichen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142 Eveline Goodman-Thau In Search of Life – Franz Rosenzweig and the Deconstruction of Historical Dialectics as the Birth of Self . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158 Sebastian Wogenstein Rosenzweig’s Silences: Tragedy and Life in The Star of Redemption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 Josiah Simon The New Pygmalion: On Aesthetics and Redemption in the Work of Franz Rosenzweig and Hans Ehrenberg . . 190 Ellen De Doncker Rosenzweig and Chalier on Teshuva: Repentance and Redemption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205

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Inhalt / Table of Contents

Francesco Valerio Tommasi Redemption and the Commandment to Love the Neighbour. Rosenzweig’s Critique to Kantian Ethics . . . . . . . . . 220 Lucas Scott Wright Das All ist nur virtuell: Paganism, Fiction, and the Concepts of Redemption, Truth, and God in Der Stern der Erlösung . 230 Jules Simon Truth and Bewährung – Imparted by Rosenzweig . . . . . 245 Autorenverzeichnis / Authors Index . . . . . . . . . . . 263

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Vorwort / Preface

On February 17–20, 2019, a Conference took place in Jerusalem, Israel, under the title »Back to Redemption: Rosenzweig’s Star 1919–2019«. On February 16, 1919, Franz Rosenzweig, after his return to his family in Kassel from the war front in the Balkans, completed his opus magnum, Der Stern der Erlösung. One hundred years later, there was an inspiring significance in celebrating this anniversary with a special event dedicated to the discussion of the main theme of his thinking, particularly in a city which is so suggestive for the history and memories enclosed in its buildings, walls, and landscapes, so evocative of the possibility of contact between the divine and the world that might liberate human beings from their finiteness, and a »holy city« for some religions. The Conference was carefully organized by Benjamin Pollock (Franz Rosenzweig Minerva Research Center, Hebrew University) and Ynon Wygoda (Martin Buber Society of Fellows, Hebrew University) and it was attended by many old and young scholars and researchers from all over the world. The principal institution which supported the Conference was the Internationale Franz Rosenzweig Gesellschaft. But many other academic, cultural, and religious institutions and foundations cooperated in order to ensure the realization of this meeting: among them the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, the Franz Rosenzweig Minerva Research Center for German-Jewish Literature and Cultural History, the German-Israeli Minerva School, the Hebrew University Jerusalem, the Martin-Buber-Professur at the Goethe Universität Frankfurt am Main, and the Evangelische Kirche in Hessen und Nassau. The Conference confirmed the undying attractive force of 9

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Vorwort / Preface

Rosenzweig’s philosophy. Certainly it remains true today, as it was in the past – Rosenzweig himself recognized it – that The Star of Redemption is a very difficult book; but it also remains true that for every generation of readers the Star is an extremely intriguing text: the expression of a soul at a crucial moment in its existence, and at the same time an epochal work which, like a two-faced Janus, on one side is closely connected to the history of philosophy and theology, and on the other side opens towards a new perspective which could universally orient the life of mankind beyond the singularization of every nation and every individual, and give order to the world notwithstanding the incapacity of the human intellect to embrace the All. The present volume 12 of the Rosenzweig Jahrbuch / Rosenzweig Yearbook collects some of the papers presented in the context of this Conference. Some authors are well-known scholars in the field of Rosenzweig studies, and some are young scholars following their own paths in interpreting the Star. They belong to different linguistic and cultural areas and were trained in philosophical work according to different traditions and styles, but all of them converge in finding the topic of redemption – redemption of the human being, of the world, of God – essential in any thinking which intends to abandon nihilism (i. e. the doctrine which divides life and meaning, being and sense, and therefore underlines the absurdity of existence), in the search for a well-grounded and convincingly argued humanism. We decided to present this collection under the title Gebet, Praxis, Erlösung / Prayer, Praxis, Redemption because it seems to us that every essay which is here included deals with all three of these concepts: in fact – as is demonstrated through the subtle phenomenological analyses carried out in most of the writings – prayer is itself a praxis, an action, and in a sense it has already in itself redemption, just as the praxis directed to redemption, the action moved by love, disinterestedness, generosity, in personal relationships or in history, always implies theoretical or contemplative grounds, the attitude of prayer. Each contributor emphasizes one of these concepts, shifting the other two a little bit into the background, though never can10

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Vorwort / Preface

celling them. According to this last criterion, the reader of this Rosenzweig Jahrbuch / Rosenzweig Yearbook will find a first group of writings (whose authors are Ephraim Meir, Martin Fricke, Gesine Palmer, Hanoch Ben Pazi) that mostly discuss the question of prayer, in a traditional or secular form, connected with the problem of an interreligious dialogue aimed at achieving concord and peace; a second group of texts (written by Giacomo Petrarca, Gabriella Caponigro, Stephanie Brenzel, Elias Sacks, Naomi Tanaka) that mostly consider the paradoxes, the risks, and the oppositions between particularity and universality aroused by the idea of a human redemption in history; a third group of contributions (whose authors are Eveline Goodman-Thau, Sebastian Wogenstein, Josiah Simon, Ellen De Doncker) that mostly concern individual prayer and praxis for redemption in time, partly with reference to the poet’s or artist’s activity; and, last but not least, three texts that mostly deal with Rosenzweig’s idea of redemption in relation to other philosophers: Francesco Valerio Tommasi compares the concept of the praying human being in the Star with Kant’s idea of homo noumenon; Lucas Scott Wright interprets the tragic and redeemed human being described by Rosenzweig from the point of view of an anti-metaphysical and postmodern thought; and Jules Simon points out the affinity between the idea of truth as conceived by Rosenzweig and the idea of truth as a guide for human life maintained by some proponents of pragmatism. To pray, to act, to redeem are, for all these interpreters of Rosenzweig’s thought, necessary forms of the human condition which are interrelated. The author of the Star, in the third part of the book, when reflecting upon the hard work of the interpreter of the Jewish sources, observes that the interpreter necessarily links his/her own teaching or narratives to the past, and thus makes the revelation living again. Due to the fact that the Star itself today is a classic work among the classics of Jewish tradition – it is no accident that Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed, Yehuda ha-Levi’s Kuzari, and Hermann Cohen’s Religion of Reason Out of the Sources of Judaism are the models which inspired Rosenzweig, as proven by many pages of his work – it is perhaps possible to say 11

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Vorwort / Preface

that every interpretation of the Star is a miraculous event: be it sympathetic or critical toward Rosenzweig, in any case the exegetical analysis and evaluation makes the spirit which animated the author present and actual again. Sharing this conviction about the connection between one generation of interpreters of Rosenzweig’s masterpiece and another generation, we offer these essays on the Star to the reader. But what is true for the sources of Judaism, is true for every work which arises from human freedom notwithstanding human limits. As a system of philosophy too, and not only as a Jewish book, the Star gives us much to think about. Turin and Rome, February 2021 Luca Bertolino (University of Turin) Irene Kajon (Sapienza University of Rome)

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Inhaltsangaben / Abstracts

Ephraim Meir (Bar-Ilan University) Redeeming Religions In my presidential address, I answer a number of questions connected to redemption. First: can we redeem the non-Jewish and non-Christian religions in The Star of Redemption and give them a place in the process of redemption? Second: are religions able to redeem the world? Third: can religions be redeemed from their own sins? My lecture is therefore about liberating religions from a negative treatment, about restoring their practical soteriological dimension, and about freeing them from exclusivist tendencies. Keywords: religions, exclusivism, practical soteriology Martin Fricke (Düsseldorf) »Da hört man nichts mehr von Sache noch von Tat« (Rosenzweig) – Liturgie und Erlösung In the third part of The Star of Redemption Franz Rosenzweig develops his notion of the liturgical practice of Jews and Christians as manifestations of the »eternal life« resp. the »eternal path«. In his view, liturgy represents redemption in a twofold way: in formulating the expectation of the Messiah still to come in Judaism, in remembering life, death and resurrection of Christ already realized in Christianity. Yet, by exploring concrete liturgical examples of both religious communities this essay tries to show that elements of redemption, either as forward-looking hope or as remembrance rooted in the past, are to be found in Judaism as well 13

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as in Christianity. The task of probing God’s »eternal truth« therefore reveals itself as common task, uniting Jews and Christians in lighting a beacon of hope in a disillusioned world. Keywords: liturgical practice, Judaism, Christianity, expectation, Bewährung Gesine Palmer (Berlin) Redeeming Liturgy: A Eulogist’s Perspective on Rosenzweig’s Concept of Liturgy Beginning with a sketch of liturgy’s decline in modern societies, the article discusses the function of liturgy as developed in The Star of Redemption. Other than common patterns of development and progress, which disregard liturgy, Rosenzweig’s philosophy highly appreciates it. Explained alongside Rosenzweig’s notions of »Nichts« and »Ichts«, liturgy turns out to have an important part in helping people to bare severe losses. Redeemed from prejudices that see liturgy only as a remnant of earlier stages in religious and spiritual development, liturgy can unfold its own redeeming qualities in Rosenzweig’s book. Keywords: liturgy, eulogy, death, Nichts, Ichts Hanoch Ben Pazi (Bar-Ilan University) Linking Redemption to Prayer. Rethinking Redemption from the Perspective of Jewish Prayers This essay suggests a close reading of the meaning of prayer in The Star of Redemption, that leads from revelation to redemption. The third part opens with an introduction with the heading »On the Possibility of Obtaining the Kingdom by Prayer«. Towards the end of the introduction, Rosenzweig adds two important directives: one relates to the structure of the book, and the second to the organizing principles of its various parts. My argument is that to understand the uniqueness of the idea of »prayer«, we have to give attention to the various prayers or religious practices dis14

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Inhaltsangaben / Abstracts

cussed throughout the entire book. And that a close reading of the introduction to the third part will contribute to our observation of Rosenzweig’s textual analyzing of the prayers. In a broad sense, I would like to identify a line of progression running though the Star, suggesting a transition from the mythological religions to religions of revelation, and toward the encounter between the father religion and the son religion, through studying the rituals of cultures and religions and through studying the prayers of the various religions. In keeping with this claim, it is possible to relocate the standard Jewish liturgy as an organizing element in the book as a whole. Therefore, this interpretation of the prayer should be regarded as one of the more important milestones in the Star. It provides a definition of the study of Judaism and of Christianity, of Jewish ritual and Christian ritual, as paths to truth and redemption. Keywords: prayer, religious practices, mythological religions, religions of revelation Giacomo Petrarca (Vita-Salute San Raffaele University of Milan) Erbeten, Prayer and Action: Theological-Political Glimpses at Franz Rosenzweig This paper aims to investigate some implications of the theological-political problem in the third part of The Star of Redemption. In particular, it will focus on the problem of tyranny on the Kingdom and the tension between waiting and anticipation that the prayer produces. Starting from an etymological and philosophical analysis of the word erbeten, this paper aims to show its centrality in Rosenzweig’s theological-political understanding; afterward, it will analyze the tyrannical risks of prayer and some implications of this temporal declination, in particular concerning Rosenzweig’s interpretation of the Sabbath day. Keywords: political theology, prayer, tyranny, temporality, Sabbath

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Gabriella Caponigro (University of Chieti-Pescara) The Suffering of the Kingdom of Heaven. Violence and Tyranny in The Star of Redemption The paper intends to explore Rosenzweig’s idea of tyranny and to delve into the complex connection between violence and redemptive horizon, which comes to the fore right from the beginning of the third part of The Star of Redemption. The violence that the Kingdom of Heaven suffers in consequence of the tyrant’s action is to be understood in the order of temporality: it takes the shape of a coercion that forces the redemption’s time to be predictable, transforming the punctuality of the instant (Augenblick) into an unnatural duration. This dramatic eschatology sheds light on Rosenzweig’s comprehension of evil as possibility arising in the disproportion between the temporality in which the Kingdom unfolds and the temporality in which man acts. Paradoxically, the fulfillment of redemption must emancipate itself from the tyrannical dimension of history and, at the same time, entertain a relation with it. Keywords: temporality, instant, evil, eschaton, tyranny Stephanie Brenzel (University of Toronto) The Gnostic Problem of Prayer This essay revaluates Rosenzweig’s philosophy of prayer. Drawing on Gershom Scholem’s review of the 1930 edition of The Star of Redemption, I examine the ways in which prayer is a problematic category in Rosenzweig’s thought. He uses it to drain mystical ideas of their gnostic impulses while at the same time describes it as a mechanism by which it is possible to radically subvert the created world order. Reflecting on the different ways Rosenzweig and Scholem conceive of the fruitfulness of gnostic ideas, this essay moves to diagnose the current fascination with the heretical ideal at this time of upheaval in American politics. Keywords: prayer, liturgy, Scholem, heretical ideal, revolution

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Elias Sacks (University of Colorado Boulder) Liturgical Counter-Symbols: Jacob Taubes, Franz Rosenzweig, and the Politics of Redemption This article explores Franz Rosenzweig’s political legacy by turning to the notorious rabbi and philosopher Jacob Taubes, who famously insists that the sovereignty of God and the Messiah undermines the legitimacy of all earthly states. I argue that Taubes’s political theology involves a covert appropriation and revision of Rosenzweig’s account of redemption. Taubes illustrates his notion of theological delegitimation with the example of Jewish communities challenging the state of Israel by performing a liturgical »counter-symbol« – by marking Israeli Independence Day as a public fast. I show that this idea of a politically charged liturgical counter-symbol draws on, but also reimagines, a central element of Rosenzweig’s account of redemption: the claim that the Jewish people, through its recurring liturgical cycle, experiences a form of eternity that challenges the aspirations of the nation state. My analysis has both historical and constructive implications, illuminating the possibilities – and the limits – of Rosenzweig’s political legacy. Keywords: Rosenzweig, Taubes, political theology, liturgy, Paul Naomi Tanaka (Minami Kyushu University) Die Bedeutung von »Erlösung« in sozialer Dimension. Zur Akzeptanz des Rosenzweig-Gedankens in nichtjüdischen Kulturbereichen In my paper, I will define the significance of the »anticipation of redemption« in the social dimension, especially in non-Jewish cultural spheres. First, I will confirm that not only Jewish people but also we non-Jewish people can anticipate the »redemption« potentially. Second, I will show that God can be recognized as a »truth« particularly in Jewish prayer; and in this prayer, because each individual calls to God by vocative, and a relation between oneself and »only one God« comes out, it is created a »We« 17

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among the individuals. Third, I will find that we must not only receive but also verify (bewähren) the truth, because the truth is given to us as a gift through the dialogue between God and human. The Jewish prayer would be a role model of the anticipation of redemption for us, non-Jewish people, comparing the dialogue between God and human to the dialogue between Human and human. Keywords: non-Jewish cultural sphere, anticipation, prayer, dialogue Eveline Goodman-Thau (Jerusalem) In Search of Life – Franz Rosenzweig and the Deconstruction of Historical Dialectics as the Birth of Self Franz Rosenzweig’s journey in search of self is an attempt to step out of the system of Western philosophy in order to emancipate the individual from the constraints of history towards a point of decision (Entscheidung). In this way, past and future, time and eternity are pressed into a present: in Rosenzweig’s words, a Mitte der Zeit, which breaks the axis of time and continuity, opening historical reality to the possibility of redemption as an existential category. This touches the core of the Jewish contribution to Western thought: the Messiah has not come, the world is yet to be redeemed. Time and reality of history are a constant reminder of the unredeemed state of the world and the self. The coming of the Kingdom of God on earth is therefore experienced as a mode of Erwartung, a critique of Hegelian dialectics in the age of secularization. Keywords: messianism, eschatology, system, self, history Sebastian Wogenstein (University of Connecticut) Rosenzweig’s Silences: Tragedy and Life in The Star of Redemption Taking Rosenzweig’s praise of the spoken word as a point of departure, this essay considers how defiant gestures and related re18

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flections on language in The Star of Redemption parallel the aesthetic evolution traced by the book overall. The essay focuses largely on Rosenzweig’s understanding of tragedy as a key element of his thinking. In this context, the essay explores the origins of Rosenzweig’s claims regarding the tragic hero’s silence and discusses parallels in Hans Ehrenberg’s Cross and Tragedy. The essay concludes with a midrashic reading of the Star’s last words, which follows Rosenzweig’s turn from the figure of the saint and the uninhabitable space of the physical sanctuary to the ways in which the sanctification and invocation of life are embedded in everyday Jewish practice, specifically in the context of kiddush. Keywords: language, tragedy, silence, life, kiddush Josiah Simon (Valparaiso University, IN) The New Pygmalion: On Aesthetics and Redemption in the Work of Franz Rosenzweig and Hans Ehrenberg This essay explores the performative function of Rosenzweig’s aesthetics through a critical reading of Hans Ehrenberg’s still unpublished manuscript Der Neue Pygmalion. Ehrenberg wrote and revised his »philosophical drama« between the years of 1921–1925 and dedicated the final scene to Rosenzweig. In the work, Ehrenberg presents a dialogical retelling of the Pygmalion myth, culminating in a meditation on philosophy, art and death. By aligning key concepts from Ehrenberg’s drama with Rosenzweig’s own aesthetics in The Star of Redemption, it is shown how for both thinkers the tragic tension between the artist and the work of art, as manifested in the image of Pygmalion, reveals the limitations and personal underpinnings of a redemptive aesthetics. Keywords: Rosenzweig, Hans Ehrenberg, aesthetics, Pygmalion

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Inhaltsangaben / Abstracts

Ellen De Doncker (Catholic University of Louvain) Rosenzweig and Chalier on Teshuva: Repentance and Redemption This article studies the concept of teshuva within the thinking of Franz Rosenzweig and Catherine Chalier, who both consider teshuva as a special kind of repentance. Re-reading Rosenzweig’s The Star of Redemption through the lens of teshuva shows the importance of anticipatory acts in the present as an impatient awaiting of the redemption that is always yet to come (à-venir). First, the concept of teshuva is explored. Next, Rosenzweig’s and Chalier’s interpretation of teshuva are analyzed. Finally, two challenges to teshuva (complacency and despair) are examined. Through this analysis, teshuva appears as a part of the messianic anticipation as a Liebestat which, by acts of redemption in the present in response to the omnipresent love of God, anticipates and prepares the future redemption, without determining it as would be the case with a Zwecktat. In doing so, teshuva radically breaks with the notion of evil as fatalistic, while acknowledging the irreversible character of evil. Keywords: redemption, teshuva, messianism, repentance Francesco Valerio Tommasi (Sapienza University of Rome) Redemption and the Commandment to Love the Neighbour. Rosenzweig’s Critique to Kantian Ethics Rosenzweig shares two Kantian theoretical moves: ethics should be detached from metaphysics. But ethics is also able, for its part, to ground a new metaphysics, rooted in the idea of man as a finite being. Despite this general affinity with Kant, in the pages of the third book of the second part of The Star of Redemption Rosenzweig introduces a critique to Kantian ethics and especially to its formalistic character. To avoid ambiguity, ethics must have a content. This content is love for the neighbour. Rosenzweig’s critique can be seen as one that focuses the decisive point in Kantian moral philosophy: its formalism. However, an interpretation of Kant is possible that permits him to be brought closer to Rosenzweig, 20

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even on this point of apparent distance and contrast. It is actually possible to read the Kantian categorical imperative as grounded on the principle of intersubjectivity. This intersubjectivity would consequently allow love of neighbour to be taken as an adequate formulation of the categorical imperative. Keywords: Kant, categorical imperative, ethics, love, intersubjectivity Lucas Scott Wright (University of California, Irvine) Das All ist nur virtuell: Paganism, Fiction, and the Concepts of Redemption, Truth, and God in Der Stern der Erlösung In this article, I attempt to make clear the pluralistic impulse of Rosenzweig’s thought by explicating how Rosenzweig distinguishes between redemption, truth, and God in The Star of Redemption. Following the approach of Elliot R. Wolfson, I argue that Rosenzweig’s description of all three rests upon an approach to narrating history that confounds fiction and non-fiction. As an example, I highlight Rosenzweig’s critique of paganism contra the monotheism of Judaism and Christianity. I argue that despite this critique, wherein Rosenzweig maintains the truth of paganism, the pluralistic impulse of his thinking lies in his claim that were somebody other than he to write in accord with his idea of a neues Denken, the elements and narrative would look rather different. Keywords: Elliot R. Wolfson, redemption, truth, fiction, paganism Jules Simon (University of Texas, El Paso) Truth and Bewährung – Imparted by Rosenzweig Franz Rosenzweig pairs truth with Bewährung as the penultimate moment of his midrashic response to the question that he sets for his readers in the opening act of The Star of Redemption, when he asks: what happens when we deconstruct the truth that the world – by which he means the world of philosophy – has given us? An 21

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essential starting point for that deconstruction is Rosenzweig’s challenge to Hegel’s conception of truth, the verification of which I interpret by initially evaluating Martin Kavka’s recent attempt to more closely align Rosenzweig’s concept of »verification«, and his ideas about martyrdom in the Star, with Hegel’s philosophy of recognition. I argue that Kavka’s work misdirects Rosenzweig’s readers from the more obvious interpretation of Rosenzweig’s attempt to establish an ethical orientation that is grounded in a kind of existential pragmatics when he weds his speech-act philosophy with a Jewish messianic aesthetic that he develops throughout the text. That crystalizes in how truth is actualized in the world not through acts of negation and death but through ampliative illuminating affirmative acts of life and love. Keywords: Bewährung, truth, speech-acts, messianic aesthetic, love

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Ephraim Meir (Bar-Ilan University)

Redeeming Religions 1

Welcome to the International Rosenzweig Conference here in Jerusalem, a centenary after the completion of The Star of Redemption (henceforth: Star). Redemption is the theme of this conference, carefully organized by Benjamin Pollock and his team. At the Rome Conference of 2017, Rosenzweig was hailed as a pioneer in dialogical thinking, a hero of the »and«. This is true, but uneasy questions remain. First: can we redeem the non-Jewish and non-Christian religions in the Star and give them a place in the process of redemption? Second: are religions able to redeem the world? Third: can religions be redeemed from their own sins? My lecture is therefore about liberating religions from negative treatment, about restoring their soteriological function, and about freeing them from exclusivist tendencies. 1. Rescuing Religions in The Star of Redemption Rosenzweig grew up in a dominantly Christian world. Over the course of time, he came to perceive Jewish existence as an unusual phenomenon, highly critical of the dominant society. He rescued Judaism from its marginality and placed it at the center, contending that Christian vitality depended upon its living Jewish source. In the world Rosenzweig inhabited before he shaped his own worldview, Judaism hardly had a place. On his spiritual journey, he gradually distanced himself from a culture that marginalized 1

The following text contains my presidential address in its original form of a spoken lecture.

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Judaism. With his new worldview, unusual in his time, he created a still problematic, but nevertheless new, dual »we«. 2 My first question concerns Rosenzweig’s limited Jewish-Christian horizon. Can we come to a new, alternative Gestalt, to a broader »we«? Rosenzweig was shaped by a Christian world and freed himself from its a prioris. However, while shaping his own worldview, he created new oppositional thinking. Judaism was no longer a regrettable phenomenon deviating from the dominant culture. It became the critical element in a world that refused otherness. It was redemptive, even for Christians. Yet, non-Jewish and non-Christian religions remained out of his spiritual horizon. With all his innovations, Rosenzweig nonetheless inherited the West European narrative on religions. As a new Yehuda Halevi, he saved Judaism, but he concomitantly neglected other religious ways of life. Other religions did not merit a place in the process of redemption. Fortunately, in his Lessing lectures of 1919 he corrected himself: he now agreed with Lessing that Jews and Christians were first of all human beings. In the post-Star period, he broadened his perspective, leaving more space for the religious other. The Star shows a progression from the religions of China, India, and Greece in Part I, to Islam in Part II, and to Christianity and Judaism in Part III. The religions in Part I understand the elements, but insufficiently. Islam in Part II grasps the course, but equally insufficiently. Finally, Christianity and Judaism in Part III grasp the configuration of the elements and the course, each seeing a part of the whole configuration. In the rigorously planned framework of his discussion on creation, which becomes manifest in revelation, Rosenzweig writes about the religions of China, India, and Greece. He hereby grants 2

The correspondence between Rosenzweig and Gritli Rosenstock-Huessy is an eminent example of intercultural thought. His dialogical approach returns in the third part of the Star, where Judaism and Christianity obey the commandment »You shall love«: the Christian and the Jewish communities offer a different, complementary answer to revelation, avoiding in this way religious fanaticism. See further Ephraim Meir, Letters of Love. Franz Rosenzweig’s Spiritual Biography and Oeuvre in Light of the Gritli Letters, New York: Peter Lang, 2006.

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a special place to paganism. 3 Yet, he was conscious that his most serious deficiencies in the Star concerned China, and all the more India. 4 A similar deficiency characterizes his description of Islam. To Gertrud Oppenheim he admitted that the treatment of Islam in the Star was its biggest flaw. 5 In the system of the Star, Islam functions in an antithetic position, as a legalistic formation. It serves as an example of a complete misunderstanding of what revelation, with its commandment of love, entails. It presents the pagan notions of God, man and the world in revelation without an inward turn, and promotes a mythic God to the role of Creator. 6 In the Star, Rosenzweig does not offer a matter-of-fact, objective description of the religions of India, China, and Greece. They rather provide him with an opportunity to approach God, world, and man as separate substances on the level of creation. Similarly, Islam plays a unique function in the Star. It is an example of how not to perceive revelation. It is, therefore, like the religions of the far East, a thought category, not a description of real, existing Islam. It is typologically contrasted to »the true faith« (der wahre Glaube). 7 Following Rosenzweig’s logic, one 3

»Heute hab ich endlich für das Heidentum Unterkunft besorgt«: sic in his letter of August 25, 1918, in: Franz Rosenzweig, Die »Gritli«-Briefe. Briefe an Margrit Rosenstock-Huessy, eds. Inken Rühle and Reinhold Mayer, Tübingen: Bilam, 2002 (hereafter: GB), 129. Cf. also Franz Rosenzweig, »Das neue Denken. Einige nachträgliche Bemerkungen zum ›Stern der Erlösung‹«, in: id., Zweistromland. Kleinere Schriften zu Glauben und Denken (Der Mensch und sein Werk. Gesammelte Schriften, III), eds. Reinhold and Annemarie Mayer, Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984 (hereafter: GS III), 147. 4 See his letter of November 28 or 29, 1918, GB, 202. See also Rosenzweig, »Das neue Denken«, 147. 5 Franz Rosenzweig, Briefe und Tagebücher, 2 vols. (Der Mensch und sein Werk. Gesammelte Schriften, I), eds. Rachel Rosenzweig and Edith Rosenzweig-Scheinmann, in collaboration with Bernhard Casper, Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979, vol. 1, 353: »Hast du den größten Mangel des ›Stern‹ eigentlich nicht bemerkt? Der Islam ist darin viel zu kurz gekommen«. 6 In a letter of October 10, 1918, GB, 167. 7 Franz Rosenzweig, Der Stern der Erlösung, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1988 (hereafter: Stern), 137; id., The Star of Redemption, transl. Barbara E. Galli, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005 (hereafter: Star), 134.

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may ask how much Islam is present in Judaism and Christianity or how much Judeo-Christian tradition is present in Islam or in the religions of antiquity. But the fact that Islam overall is characterized in a negative way, as not understanding what »true« revelation is about, removes us from what Islam is in the real world. In defense of Rosenzweig, one could argue that his description of the religions in the Star is a purely philosophical account of them. Yet, such a defense of the »system« – as justified as it may be in itself – at the same time inculpates the one who questions the »system« as not being systematic. With this indictment, one accuses the one who criticizes Rosenzweig’s view of the world religions of lacking philosophical rigor. This is another form of exclusion, in which the reading of the Star is reserved for philosophical »Feinschmecker«. Hence again my question: can the nonJewish and non-Christian religions be rescued from their inferior status in the Star? Can they »belong« to redemption and be »included« in it? »Belonging« to a well-defined group is consistent with »belonging« to the world as such, which has to be mended and in which a variety of religions serve as guides or roadmaps for various nations and cultures. By transposing the Hegelian thought on Judaism to Islam, Rosenzweig establishes a new power structure. 8 The question is: how not to talk about other religions? How to get rid of a predisposition that exalts the own by lowering the other? On this point, the apophatic tradition comes to our rescue. In a negative theology, the Infinite is unutterable. All religions have much to say about what remains finally ineffable. They are a mosaic of different experiences of the Transcendent. If one accepts that Transcendence is beyond all religions and experienced in a variety of ways, religions may be redeemed.

8

Hegel saw Judaism as a legalistic religion. His negative approach to Judaism travelled to the Star in the form of a similar criticism of Islam. See Shlomo Pines, »Der Islam im Stern der Erlösung. Eine Untersuchung zu Tendenzen und Quellen Franz Rosenzweigs«, Hebräische Beiträge zur Wissenschaft des Judentums deutsch angezeigt 3–5 (1987–1989), 138–148.

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Religions that are not Jewish or not Christian disappear in Rosenzweig’s process of redemption because they do not fit his concept of redemption. Yet, are the various world religions not all varying experiences of Transcendence, which as Ultimate Reality remains undescribable? Does redemption not surmise a »dialogue« between religions? Could redemption be conceived as an interreligious dialogue in which one learns from the other, translates in an act of peace and communicates in a »trans-different« attitude? In such a perspective, redemption is essentially the dialogue between different people who want to create an always expanding »new we«, as envisioned in Psalm 115. Religions differ greatly, but in order to create a society in which plurality is celebrated, there must be communication between them. Since we live in one world, such communication is not only desirable, it is necessary. In a »trans-different« perspective, talking about »true« faith, as does Rosenzweig, is replaced with a plurality of narratives that all concern the Ultimate Reality, approached from multiple perspectives. In his essay »Apologetisches Denken«, Rosenzweig warned his readership not to idealize the own and only superficially take notice of the other. 9 He was well aware of the problem of self-glorification to the detriment of the other. Yet, such a self-glorification on the negative background of the other is present in his own description of Islam. Collective identities are frequently shaped on the negative background of other identities. To my mind, a »new we« comes into being only with respect for the plurality of dissimilar religions, which are all valid human organizations reacting to a transcendent reality. I use the term »trans-difference« in order to mark the differences between religions and, at the same time, their essential relatedness. »Trans-difference« avoids the Scylla of particularities that are cut off from the larger world and the Charybdis of an illusionary unity that does away with distinctiveness. In »transdifferent« religiosity, one may discover what makes peoples spe9

See Franz Rosenzweig, »Apologetisches Denken. Bemerkungen zu Brod und Baeck«, GS III, 680.

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cific and what unites them. 10 In light of the creation of a »transdifferent« religiosity and society, one cannot take Rosenzweig’s descriptions of Islam and of the ancient religions of China, India, and Greece at face value. These religions function perfectly well in his philosophical system, but this system does not do justice to the religions as they are in reality. Rosenzweig’s inevitably deforming Eurocentrism could be corrected by bringing Rosenzweig against himself, just as he himself was anti-Hegelian with the help of Hegel. Reimagining the Star, we may pluralize the religious field, allowing the copula »and« to stand between more religions than merely Judaism and Christianity. In a highly structured system, Rosenzweig offers his readers a certain picture of revelation that is diametrically opposed to all that »Islam« stands for. The problem is that he works with a »concept of the way of Allah«. 11 As a consequence of using mere »concepts«, his talk about the »true faith« somehow joins exclusivist truth claims. Alternatively, one may point to the presence of relatedness in many other religions. Relatedness as a sign of love occurs in a variety of religious lifestyles, including Buddhism, Jainism, Baha´i, Confucianism, Hinduism, Taoism, and Islam. 12 Rosenzweig’s classification of religions neglects the relationality present in the vast majority of religions. The divine commandment of love is central in Rosenzweig’s Star, but it is unclear why he excludes religious others from hearing or understanding the high demand of love. Although his diatribe against Hegel »saves« Judaism, Rosenzweig perpetuates existing negative images of religious others, bringing caricatures that perpetuate deep-seated prejudices.

10

Ephraim Meir, Dialogical Thought and Identity. Trans-Different Religiosity in Present Day Societies, Berlin/Boston and Jerusalem: Walter de Gruyter and Hebrew University Magnes Press, 2013, 133–140. 11 Stern, 240 / Star, 231. 12 For a survey of sayings concerning relationality in different religions, see Marcia Pally, Commonwealth and Covenant. Economics, Politics, and Theologies of Relationality, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2016, 352 f.

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In the Star, the dual divine commandment of love receives a twofold answer in Jewish and Christian communities. But why should the answer to a call for love be restricted to only two groups? The dimension of love is present in the majority of religions. If God’s love is encompassing and universal, how is it possible not to include a variety of religious others? On the level of redemption, one may critically ask if mending the world (tiqqun ʿ olam) by loving the neighbor is the exclusive task of Jews and Christians. And yet, Rosenzweig is at the beginning of the redemption of religions themselves, since he advances more than one religion as providing legitimate answers to what remains transcendent. He also knows that the different houses of God are not God’s bride. 13 This is the start for a pluralization of theology, in which one’s own orientation to the Transcendent is only one vantage point in a wide range of orientations. A pluralist and »trans-different« perspective, developed in a dialogical theology that has dialogue as its aim and method, respects the uniqueness of each and every religion and is open to mutual exchange, fecundation and even transformation. Dialogical theology tries to understand the other as he or she wants to be understood. It seems to me that it is preferable to conceive of revelation as revelation of the Transcendent to which different religions offer diverse responses in which, nevertheless, collectively, love and empathy play a significant role. The Druze faith, the Alevite faith, Bahai, Islam, Hinduism, Taoism, Buddhism, Jainism and other religions are all reactions to what John Hick calls the Real or the Ultimate. 14 Can we »redeem« them from a second rank position 13

See Franz Rosenzweig, »Lessings Nathan«, GS III, 450. Referring to the Kantian distinction between what appears to us and what is in itself, independently of human observation, John Hick applies this distinction to the human awareness of the Ultimate. The Real is a term for the Transcendent, the Ultimate, the Divine. It can be formulated in personal terms – the eternal Thou, Allah, etc. – or impersonal terms, such as Brahman or the Tao. This Real is »beyond the range of our entire network of concepts«. John Hick, Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion, Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001, 190 f.

14

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in a religious pyramid, the top of which is occupied by Judaism and Christianity? Rosenzweig created a double covenant theology that courageously put Christianity alongside Judaism. The experiences of religious others are played down and not recognized as legitimate and valid encounters with the Transcendent. Are other religions mere precursors of the truth of Judaism and Christianity? Why should these two religions be spearheads, on the frontline of all others religions? Rosenzweig’s apologetic mood is understandable: he had to defend himself against a pervasive totalizing vision that negated Jewish particularity. During history, Christians held the view that redemption came into the world only and exclusively with Jesus, causing much suffering to the Jews. Rosenzweig showed the relevance, actuality, and necessity of a deviance from a dominantly Christian world. He shaped his own identity in permanent conversation with his Christian friends who denied his Jewish specificity. But his appreciation of a dual response to revelation prevented him from recognizing the broader spectrum of religions, that all constitute partial responses to the Transcendent. 15 Today, we recognize the rich and complex tapestry of religions. There is also more interchange between religious persons and a new understanding of interreligious communion. All religions have love potential and are attempts to welcome Transcendence. It is also increasingly recognized that for different situations, one needs different approaches and, correspondingly, different religious paths are necessary for different groups. In a pluralistic, interreligious theology, the interaction with other religions is necessary in order to appreciate the diverse experiences of Transcendence and to learn from them. We are not alone in our experiential access to Transcendence. Through intense listening to what others have to say about Transcendence, 15

John Pawlikowski remarks that the »double covenant theology« has to be turned into a »multi-covenants theology«. John T. Pawlikowski, »Judentum und Christentum«, in: Theologische Realenzyklopädie, vol. 17, Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988, 401 f.

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we may learn and enrich our spiritual lives. This presupposes epistemological humility. Our own interpretation of the Divine is not the only one. The plurality of interpretations offers a more complete view on the Ultimate. All religions have their own language game, but there is the possibility of communicating and understanding each other. In Rosenzweig’s phrasing: »There is only one language« (Es gibt nur eine Sprache). 16 In a »trans-different« society, differences are highlighted. Thanks to these differences, communication becomes possible. Religious others are partners in bringing redemption. 2. Practical Soteriology With the preceding, I hope to have made clear that religions have to be »redeemed« from their second-class status in the Star. My second point is that they also have to be redeemed from Weltfremdheit. A practical, world-oriented soteriology pays attention to human suffering and finds ways to alleviate it. It encourages religions to play an active role in the public sphere. A worldoriented soteriology emphasizes that – before praying for help from above, »yequm purqan min-shemaya« – one has to work bealma ha-den, to bring deliverance from beneath. Such a soteriology stimulates religions to contribute to the improvement of society in a this-worldly spirituality. After all, it is the world that has to be mended in the process of redemption. As Rosenzweig noted: »God did not create religion, He created the world« (Gott hat eben nicht die Religion, sondern die Welt geschaffen). 17 Rosenzweig was interested in truth. Paganism was the truth in embryonic form. In the third part of the Star, Judaism is the truth, above Maimonides’ and Mendelssohn’s equation of Judaism and philosophy. If this were not the case, Rosenzweig maintains, Jews 16

Franz Rosenzweig, Jehuda Halevi. Zweiundneunzig Hymnen und Gedichte. Deutsch, mit einem Nachwort und mit Anmerkungen, Berlin: Lambert Schneider, s. d. [1926], 155. 17 Rosenzweig, »Das neue Denken«, 153.

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would not have any interest in reading the Star. 18 Happily, we read at the very end of the Star that the task »to do justice, to love loving-kindness, and to walk humbly with your God« (Mic 6:8) is everyone’s task. Redemption is necessarily world-oriented. In this way, Rosenzweig resembles Nathan the Wise, who wanted those who feel near to God to work for a nobler humanity. Like Lessing, Rosenzweig conceived of the truth as to be realized. This insight is useful in the construction of a dialogical theology, in which truth is never abstract, eternal, and a-historical, but to be »done« in life. Religions may be »redeemed« by concrete action in the world, by verily mending the world. Their common action to heal a broken world is their redemption. 19 3. Redeeming Religions from Absolute Truth Claims I asked if religions are able to redeem the world. If one succeeds in redeeming religions from their hierarchical ranking in the Star, one has not yet redeemed the world. But it is a start. Religions cannot redeem the world if they continue to have absolute truth claims, from which they exclude others. The truth is necessarily subjectively experienced and lived; it is always truth for somebody. It follows that religions themselves have to be »redeemed« from their centuries-long sin of thinking that they possess the truth. This is my third and last point. In the name of religions many 18

Cf. GB, 494. Rosenzweig’s view of Judaism as outside the maelstrom of history was criticized by Irving Greenberg, who notes that »Judaism was always charged with the task of journeying through history, showing the way for humanity toward tikun olam […]. To me, Judaism was as much a pilgrim religion as Christianity; it could work alongside Christianity but it could not turn its mission over to that faith. In my judgment, Rosenzweig, writing before the rebirth of the State of Israel, was glorifying Jewish powerlessness and giving over much too much of the task of witnessing to the nations. Moreover, I wanted to focus on the triumph of life through covenantal action – the central teaching of Judaism – and of Christianity«. Irving Greenberg, For the Sake of Heaven and Earth. The New Encounter between Judaism and Christianity, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 2004, 39 f.

19

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injustices have been inflicted, delaying redemption. Absolute truth claims led in the past to persecution and annihilation. Religions are pharmakon, poison and, yet, also medicine. Again, Rosenzweig’s thoughts about God as the truth in which religions participate is most helpful in reimagining the redemption of the world by »redeeming« religions themselves. But why should only Judaism and Christianity participate in the truth, which finally transcends all religions? Rosenzweig himself knew that confusing religion with God himself is counter-redemptive. Reconceiving religions as testifying to the Transcendent is liberating. Religious texts that reflect human responses to the Divine easily become absolutized. For this reason, Moses had to smash the first tablets that contained the ten commandments. Texts are not God himself. The source of texts is not reducible to a text. If the text replaces the source, if it is cut off from the living source and absolutized, there is no longer any respect for the source, which is unutterable and infinite. To my mind, all religious texts are finite recipients of the Divine, which is not itself containable within the finite. What comes into expression cannot exhaust what is not graspable in words or formula. One has to remain conscious that the infinite cannot be confined into the finite, although the finite hints at the Infinite; in the words of Peter Berger: there is »a rumor of angels«. Once again the apophatic tradition comes to rescue religions from their sins. Negative theology prevents one from projecting one’s own attributes onto the Divine. God’s Name is not to be pronounced; He is transcendent, »beyond« and, therefore, all God-talk is problematic. In the Jewish tradition, which loves to discover the spiritual in the materiality of words and in corporeality, the world (ʿ olam) conveys the hidden (neʿ elam). This means that the Divine is not completely disclosed and entirely uncovered, but rather suggested. The Transcendent comes into expression in the world, but can never be fully present, open, and available. Only fanatics completely »know« God. The apophatic tradition thus teaches us that the »beyond« is not graspable. In many ways, Transcendence is manipulated and misused for social or political reasons. But the »be33

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yond« reveals itself only as »a still small voice« (qol demama daqa; 1 Kgs 19:12), almost unheard; the in-finite is only alluded to. Apophatic theology makes religions humble before God’s face and prevents religious totalitarianism. Conclusion Here in Israel, especially here in Jerusalem, religious sensibility lies in the positive interaction between people who belong to different cultures and religions. We all are partners in the improvement of political, social, and economic conditions. Truth comes into being in dialogue; it sprouts from the earth: emet mi-ʾ erets titsmach (Ps 85:12), from beneath, in dialogue. Phrased differently: a dialogical theology is linked to secularity and nurtures itself with social, economic, and political action on the ground. Rosenzweig’s idea of eternity realized within our worldly life may inspire us in the construction of an interreligious discourse on redemption. How do Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, or Taoism contribute to an interreligious theology that liberates human beings from suffering and strives for a more equal and peaceful society? Rosenzweig’s narrative on a double covenant breaches the monopoly of one religion, but does not stand up to scrutiny when one takes into account the plurality of religions, which are all organizations around a transcendent reality, to be approached in human solidarity. The inclusive alternative of interreligious cooperation replaces a narrative on the »axis of evil« and the »clash of civilizations«. Our times are in need of a non-exclusivist, humanist, and non-naive view of religions. Finally, Rosenzweig’s view on redemption cannot be properly understood without his view on Messianism. Rosenzweig fled apocalyptic Messianism that envisions a catastrophic end followed by a miraculous and utopian era. Neither was his Messianism political; it was rather anticipated in communities that lived eternity and hoped for it in their liturgies. In the Kingdom, eternity takes place as »a today that would be conscious of being more than to-

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day« (Ewigkeit ist ein Heute, das aber sich bewußt ist, mehr als Heute zu sein). 20 Kingdom and eternity belong together. This eternity is understood by Rosenzweig as the future which is already here, a tomorrow which may be today. Dissimilar to Hegel, he deems that eternity is never realized in states, which strive for a false eternity. He protests against a theodicy of history and pleads for a community that lives eternity in a meta-historical time, critical of history and free from its chains. In 1948, the Jewish people entered again into history after 2000 years. Again we have a state and this is a great event. However, Rosenzweig resists Jewish normalization in the land as in the diaspora. Can we still hear his words in Jerusalem today? If the Star would be translated into Hebrew, Rosenzweig wanted as its title not kokhav ha-geʾ ula (Star of Redemption), but kokhav mi-Yaʿ aqov (Star from Jacob), alluding to Bileam’s prophecy »A star shall shoot forth from Jacob« (darakh kokhav miYaʿ aqov; Num 24:17). In his discourse of redemption, eternity needs to be realized both in Sion and in the Diaspora. In all places, Jews must preserve their meta-historical destiny. On a wall at Ben Gurion Airport, one can read that Herzl called Zionism an »infinite ideal«. To Rosenzweig’s mind, the infinity of that ideal prevents the absolutization of any finite realization. The verse in the Amida-prayer »May our eyes behold Your return to Zion in mercy« (vatechezenu ʿ enenu be-shuvkha le-tsion berachamim) implies communities that hope for and anticipate redemption, in which »the whole earth is full of His glory« (Isa 6:3). I wonder what Rosenzweig would have thought about the expression hathalta de-geʾ ula, the dawn of redemption, or reshit tsmihat geʾ ulatenu, the first flowering of our redemption. Whatever his answer would have been, redemption had to be realized by human beings in tiqqun ʿ olam; this is the eminently Jewish element in the Star. Those who participate in the divine truth have to make the truth true in a plurality of communities. Conceiving of truth as truth »for us«, communities remain distinct. 20

Stern, 250 / Star, 241.

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Continuing and broadening Rosenzweig’s thoughts on Messianism, one may perceive the brilliance of Messianic light in each and every human being. Redemption is therefore not the more or less catastrophic end of history by the coming of a Messiah, it is rather the process of unifying the sparks in the souls of all with their divine source. By bringing the Kingdom, a plurality of communities testify to the fact that truth is always lived in a partial, fragmental way and that it has to be made true in the praxis of bringing worldly redemption. May this conference »Back to Redemption« contribute to a critical reevaluation of Rosenzweig’s thoughts for today. I wish all participants in this Rosenzweig Congress good encounters, fruitful discussions and a memorable stay in Jerusalem.

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»Da hört man nichts mehr von Sache noch von Tat« (Rosenzweig) – Liturgie und Erlösung

Einem Diktum Elie Wiesels zufolge fragt der Jude: »Die Welt ist so schrecklich, warum kommt der Messias nicht?«, der Christ hingegen: »Der Messias ist bereits gekommen, warum ist die Welt so schrecklich?« 1 Beide, Juden wie Christen, halten die Frage nach der Erlösung offen; angesichts des unheilen Zustands der Welt ist sie unabgeschlossen, noch nicht beantwortet. Aber beide, Juden und Christen, tun dies auf unterschiedliche Weise: Die Frage des Juden ist auf spirituelle Versenkung ausgerichtet, die des Christen drängt nach ethisch-politischer Praxis. Damit scheint Wiesels Diktum jene Charakterisierungen abzubilden, die Franz Rosenzweig Judentum und Christentum als den Bewährungsgestalten der Offenbarungswahrheit grundsätzlich zugeschrieben hat: in der Frage nach dem Kommen des Messias das introvertierte, in sich kreisende »ewige Leben« auf der einen, in der Frage nach dem Zustand der Welt der extrovertierte, sich in die Welt ersteckende »ewige Weg« auf der anderen Seite. Beide sind zueinander gegensätzlich, aber gerade darin ergänzen sie sich auf komplementäre Weise in der Antizipation der Erlösung, der »ewigen Wahrheit Gottes«. 2 Ob diese Gegenüberstellung, die Rosenzweig im dritten Teil des Stern der Erlösung entfaltet, allerdings die Wirklichkeiten der existierenden Religionsgemeinschaften Judentum und Christen1

Robert McAfee Brown, Elie Wiesel. Zeuge für die Menschheit, aus dem Amerik. von Reinhold Boschert, Freiburg/Basel/Wien: Herder, 1990, 199. 2 Siehe dazu Martin Fricke, Franz Rosenzweigs Philosophie der Offenbarung. Eine Interpretation des Sterns der Erlösung, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2003, 271–282.

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tum tatsächlich trifft, ist des öfteren bezweifelt worden. Insbesondere die von Rosenzweig so genannten »soziologischen« Darstellungen der liturgischen Praxis von Juden und Christen wirken demgemäß »zu statisch, zu geschichtslos, zu spekulativ konstruiert« 3. Sie schließen zwar Rosenzweigs philosophisches System ab, aber ob sie es zugleich, wie von ihm intendiert, »INS LEBEN« 4, in das wirkliche Leben von Juden und Christen öffnen, muss vor diesem Hintergrund kritisch hinterfragt werden. Ich möchte dies hier tun, indem ich zwei konkrete Beispiele jüdischer und christlicher Festtagsliturgien vorstelle und die in ihnen zum Ausdruck gebrachten Perspektiven auf Erlösung untersuche. Sollten sich in der Vielfalt der liturgischen Formen in beiden Religionsgemeinschaften Perspektiven finden, die Rosenzweig schematisch der jeweils anderen zuschreibt, würde dies – so meine These – sein System zwar nicht entkräften, dessen Abschluss allerdings in ein neues Licht rücken. Zuvor jedoch ein kurzer Blick auf Rosenzweigs grundlegende liturgietheoretische Überlegungen und deren Voraussetzungen im Rahmen seines Systems. Zunächst formal: Als philosophisches System weist Der Stern der Erlösung über sich selbst, seinen abstrakten theoretischen Zusammenhang hinaus in die konkrete Zeitlichkeit, das tatsächliche Sprechen und das Erleben des Menschen. 5 Judentum und Christentum sind für Rosenzweig die Repräsentationen des Inhalts des Systems – der »Bahn« des Sterns mit der Offenbarung als Mittelpunkt – in eben dieser Zeitlichkeit, Sprachlichkeit und Erlebniswirklichkeit; in seinen Worten: 3

Bernhard Grümme, »Gott ›kann keinen entbehren‹ (Rosenzweig). Zu Franz Rosenzweigs theoretischer Grundlegung des christlich-jüdischen Dialogs«, Kirche und Israel 13 (1998), Heft 2, 120–127, hier: 125. 4 Franz Rosenzweig, Der Stern der Erlösung, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1988 (im Folgenden: Stern), 472. 5 Siehe dazu Hans Martin Dober, »Franz Rosenzweigs Der Stern der Erlösung als liturgietheoretische Konzeption«, in: Yehoyada Amir, Yossi Turner, Martin Brasser (Hg.), Faith, Truth, and Reason. New Perspectives on Franz Rosenzweig’s »Star of Redemption«, Freiburg/München: Karl Alber, 2012, 185–201; Martin Fricke, »Die Kraft der Lehre: Rosenzweigs Beitrag zu einer performativen Religionspädagogik«, Proceedings of the Internationale Rosenzweig Gesellschaft 1 (2014), 46–58, hier: 57 f.

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»geformte[…] Abbild[er]« 6, reale Gestalten der dem Menschen durch die Offenbarung erschlossenen Wirklichkeit. Dies sichtbar und nachvollziehbar zu machen, ist das Ziel, das Rosenzweig mit der »soziologischen« Darstellung des religiösen Lebens von Juden und Christen im dritten Teil des Stern der Erlösung verfolgt. Inhaltlich vermag erst die Entfaltung der Liturgien und Festkreise von Judentum und Christentum die »Bahn« des Sterns zu vervollständigen. Hatte nämlich im Offenbarungsgeschehen Gottes Liebe die einzelne menschliche »Liebestat« evoziert, so ist es, so Rosenzweig in der dritten Einleitung des Stern der Erlösung, das Gebet, das die Tat der Nächstenliebe bewusst und frei in einen Bezug zum schöpferischen Wachstum der Welt setzt. Erst das Gebet »stiftet die menschliche Weltordnung« 7. Das Sich-unddie-Welt-in-Bezug-Setzen-zu-Gott erzeugt einen zwischenmenschlichen Zusammenhang, ein »Wir« in der Welt. Dieses »Wir« ist das »Wir« derjenigen, die darin zu einer Gemeinde werden, dass sie sich nicht nur als je in die Zeit Geworfene erleben, sondern sich die Zeit nehmen, »um auf den Ruf der Erlösung, der, nach Verwirklichung verlangend, in unserem Inneren erschallt, zu antworten.« 8 Mit dem Gebet zieht also die Perspektive der Erwartung der Erlösung in die Erfahrung und die Begegnung mit der Unfertigkeit der Welt und der Fremdheit des Anderen; in sie und für sie. Dies ist die unabdingbare Voraussetzung für den Einbruch der Ewigkeit, die Beschleunigung des Kommens des Reiches des Ewigen in unsere Wirklichkeit. Die liturgische Antizipation des ewigen »Wir« öffnet die Welt, in der wir leben, für die Erlösung. 6

Franz Rosenzweig, »Das neue Denken. Einige nachträgliche Bemerkungen zum ›Stern der Erlösung‹«, in: ders., Zweistromland. Kleinere Schriften zu Glauben und Denken (Der Mensch und sein Werk. Gesammelte Schriften, III), hg. von Reinhold und Annemarie Mayer, Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984, 125–138, hier: 155 f. 7 Stern, 298. 8 Ángel E. Garrido-Maturano, »Zeit als Gebet. Eine Einführung in die phänomenologische Bedeutung der Zeitigung des Selbst in Franz Rosenzweigs Stern der Erlösung«, in: Wolfdietrich Schmied-Kowarzik (Hg.), Franz Rosenzweigs »neues Denken«. Internationaler Kongreß Kassel 2004, 2 Bde., Freiburg/München: Karl Alber, 2006, Bd. 2, 923–937, hier: 936.

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»Liturgie ist Erinnerung und Vorwegnahme, ja sogar schon Vollzug und ›Gestalt‹ der Erlösung«. 9 Dies freilich nun in zweierlei Gestalt! Das Judentum, der profanen Welt enthoben und immer schon ganz bei Gott, lebt nach Rosenzweig liturgisch im Modus reiner Erwartung. Vom wöchentlich wiederkehrenden Sabbat, der im gemeinschaftlich hörenden Erinnern an die Schöpfung beginnt, aber als letzter Tag der Woche bereits auf die Erlösung verweist, über die in der Mahl- und Tischgemeinschaft die Offenbarung vergegenwärtigenden Wallfahrtsfeste bis zum Versöhnungs- und zum Neujahrsfest, an dem in der absolut entgrenzenden kultischen Gebärde des Segensgrußes die Erlösung vorweggenommen wird, spannt sich der Bogen des jüdischen Festkreises auf das Kommen des Messias hin. 10 Anders das Christentum: Es hat die Erlösung »gleichsam im Rücken« 11; als »ewiger Anfänger« in der Bewährung der schon geschehenen Erlösungstat Christi – mit dem Sonntag, dem »Tag des Herrn«, beginnt die christliche Woche – verströmt es sich in die Welt und verwandelt deren Feste. Im Gegensatz zum Judentum, das die Ambivalenzen des Lebens vor Gott und in der Welt in sich enthält und liturgisch austrägt, tritt das Christentum in ein Gegenüber zur Welt. Und während das Judentum schon immer als erwähltes Volk vor Gott steht, richten sich Wort und Sakrament im Christentum an den Einzelnen; erst die Kunst – der sakrale Raum, die Kirchenmusik – sowie die alle Christen verbindende und orientierende »Tat in der Welt«, nämlich »die Bahnung des 9

Elmar Salmann, »Andacht. Philosophen vor dem Phänomen der Liturgie«, in: ders., Joachim Hake (Hg.), Die Vernunft ins Gebet nehmen. Philosophisch-theologische Betrachtungen, Stuttgart/Berlin/Köln: Kohlhammer, 2000, 75–101, hier: 98. Siehe grundlegend, unter Verzicht auf einen Blick auf die jeweilige liturgische Praxis, auch Hans-Christoph Askani, »Die Gestaltung der Zeit durch die Liturgie im Judentum und Christentum«, in: Schmied-Kowarzik (Hg.), Franz Rosenzweigs »neues Denken«, Bd. 2, 956–981. 10 Siehe dazu Robert Gibbs, »Rolling a Scroll. Jewish History«, in: SchmiedKowarzik (Hg.), Franz Rosenzweigs »neues Denken«, Bd. 2, 982–987. 11 Elmar Salmann, »Andacht«, 99. Vgl. zum folgenden auch Joost H. Jansen, »Gebet und Liturgie im Stern der Erlösung«, in: Schmied-Kowarzik (Hg.), Franz Rosenzweigs »neues Denken«, Bd. 2, 946–955.

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Wegs« 12, lässt aus einer Gemeinschaft von Einzelnen die ἐκκλησία der von Christus Zusammengerufenen entstehen. Entsprechend beginnt der christliche Festkreis mit dem Fest der Ankunft und Geburt des Erlösers (Advent, Weihnachten), durchläuft das Fest der Offenbarung in dessen Kreuz und Auferstehung (Passion, Ostern) und endet im Fest der Kirche (Pfingsten). Das Judentum – Religion der Erwartung des kommenden Messias; das Christentum – Religion der tätigen Bewährung der Erlösung? In der Tat sind, über das von Rosenzweig selbst im Stern der Erlösung Angeführte hinaus, zahlreiche Beispiele liturgischer Praxis zu finden, anhand derer sich diese Charakterisierung verifizieren ließe. 13 Allerdings ist diese Praxis in der geschichtlichen Entwicklung beider Glaubensgemeinschaften – ganz abgesehen von wechselseitigen Einflüssen – derart vielfältig gewesen und hat eine so große Pluralität an liturgischen Formen hervorgebracht, 14 dass sich auf jeder Seite auch prominente Beispiele für jene Perspektive finden lassen, die Rosenzweig der jeweils anderen zuschreibt. Wenn das aber so ist, verläuft die Grenze des komplementären Ergänzungsverhältnisses in der Bewährung der »ewigen Wahrheit Gottes« nicht zwischen Judentum und Christentum, sondern quer durch die Praxis beider Religionen. Die Aufgabe eben jener Bewährung in der Anbetung und in der Tat wäre damit nicht obsolet; im Gegenteil! Allerdings wäre sie auf ganz neue Weise in Angriff zu nehmen: als gemeinsame Aufgabe von Juden und Christen nämlich. Auch Christen leben ja im Modus der Erwartung: der Erwartung der παρουσία, der Wiederkunft Christi nämlich, die das Reich vollenden wird. Und das Christentum hat diese Erwartung in vielfältige liturgische Formen gefasst. So etwa in der Messfeier 12

Stern, 380. Zu Rosenzweigs Verwendung jüdischer Liturgiestücke im Stern der Erlösung siehe Daniel Hoffmann, »Die Stimme der jüdischen Liturgie in Franz Rosenzweigs Stern der Erlösung«, in: Schmied-Kowarzik (Hg.), Franz Rosenzweigs »neues Denken«, Bd. 2, 938–945. 14 Siehe für das Judentum Ismar Elbogen, Der jüdische Gottesdienst in seiner geschichtlichen Entwicklung, Hildesheim/Zürich/New York: Georg Olms, 1995 (2. Nachdruck der 3., verbesserten Aufl., Frankfurt a. M.: J. Kauffmann, 1931). 13

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der römisch-katholischen Kirche in der Antwort der Gemeinde auf die Proklamation des so genannten mysterium fidei, die auch in einige lutherische Agenden Einzug gefunden hat: Deinen Tod, o Herr, verkünden wir, und deine Auferstehung preisen wir, bis du kommst in Herrlichkeit! Diese Akklamation aktualisiert das paulinische »Sooft ihr von diesem Brot esst und von dem Kelch trinkt, verkündigt ihr den Tod des Herrn, bis er kommt« (1. Kor 11,26). Obgleich eine der jüngsten Einfügungen in das eucharistische Hochgebet, nimmt sie damit eine der ältesten Bekenntnisformulierungen auf. Theologisch zeichnet sie das Erlösungshandeln Christi, an dem die Gemeinde verkündigend und lobpreisend Anteil hat, eschatologisch in den Horizont der Erwartung seiner Wiederkunft ein: bis du kommst in Herrlichkeit. 15 Erwartung ist dabei freilich kein passives Abwarten, sondern kreative Imagination und aktive Vorwegnahme des Kommenden. Die Antizipation der künftigen Erlösung wirft ein qualitativ neues Licht auf unsere Erfahrungen in der Gegenwart. In Wort und Sakrament kommt sie leibhaftig auf uns zu, so dass auf sie, auf ihre Zukunft ausgerichtetes ethisches und politisches Engagement möglich wird. Umgekehrt kennt das Judentum die Rückbesinnung auf schon geschehenes Erlösungshandeln Gottes. Als Beispiel sei hier Psalm 116 angeführt; ein biblisches Gebet also, das zum so genannten Hallel (Psalmen 113–118) gehört und »wohl schon im ersten Jahrhundert in liturgischer Verwendung war« 16. Sein engerer liturgischer Kontext ist auch hier eine ritualisierte Mahlfeier, die ursprünglich mit dem Jerusalemer Tempel verbunden war. Mit ihr wird ein Gelübde eingelöst, das der Beter in einer Zeit aller15

Siehe dazu Wolfgang Schrage, Der erste Brief an die Korinther. 3. Teilband: 1 Kor. 11,17–14,40 (Evangelisch-Katholischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament, VII/3), Zürich/Düsseldorf/Neukirchen-Vluyn: Benziger/Neukirchener, 1999, 44–47. 16 Peter Ebenbauer, »Eingekehrt in Gottes Zeit. Gebetstheologische Beobachtungen zu Lobpreis und Danksagung in biblischen und nachbiblischen Kontexten«, in: Albert Gerhards, Stephan Wahle (Hg.), Kontinuität und Unterbrechung. Gottesdienst und Gebet in Judentum und Christentum, Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2005, 63–106, hier: 75.

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größter existentieller Not für den Fall seiner Errettung durch Gott abgelegt hat. Anders als der von Rosenzweig am Ende des der Erlösung gewidmeten dritten Buches des zweiten Teils des Stern der Erlösung analysierte Psalm 115 »beginnt und schließt« Psalm 116 nicht »mit einem gewaltigen betonten Wir« 17 derer, die das Kommen des Reichs preisen, sondern mit der Erfahrung der Errettung des Einzelnen: Ich habe Gott liebgewonnen; denn Gott hat mein lautes Flehen gehört, denn Gott hat mir das Ohr zugeneigt an dem Tag, als ich zu Gott rief. Fesseln des Todes hatten mich umfangen, die Ängste der Unterwelt hatten mich befallen, ich habe Bedrängnis und Kummer erfahren. Da rief ich den Namen des Ewigen an: »Ach Ewiger, rette mein Leben!« Der Ewige ist gnädig und gerecht, unser Gott ist barmherzig. Der Ewige behütet die, die sich selbst nicht schützen können; ich war schwach, doch Gott brachte mir Hilfe. Komm wieder zur Ruhe, meine Seele! Denn der Ewige hat dir Gutes erwiesen. Ja, du hast mein Leben dem Tod entrissen, meine Tränen getrocknet, meinen Fuß vor dem Gleiten bewahrt. So gehe ich meinen Weg vor dem Ewigen im Lande der Lebenden. Voll Vertrauen war ich, auch wenn ich gesagt habe: »Ich bin so tief gebeugt.« In meiner Bestürzung dachte ich: »Die Menschen lügen alle.« Wie kann ich Gott all das vergelten, was Gott mir Gutes getan hat? Ich will den Kelch des Heils erheben und den Namen Gottes anrufen. Ich will Gott meine Gelübde erfüllen, öffentlich vor dem ganzen Gottesvolk. Kostbar ist in den Augen des Ewigen der Tod derer, die an ihn glauben. Ach Ewiger, ich bin doch dein Diener, dein Diener bin ich, der Sohn einer Frau, die dir diente. Du hast meine Fesseln gelöst. Ich will dir ein Opfer des Dankes bringen und den Namen des Ewigen rufen. Ich will dem Ewigen meine Gelübde erfüllen, öffentlich vor dem ganzen Gottesvolk, in den Vorhöfen am Hause Gottes, in deiner Mitte, Jerusalem. Halleluja! – Lobet Gott! 18 17 18

Stern, 280. ‫סדר התפלות‬. Das jüdische Gebetbuch, Gebete für Schabbat und Wochentage, hg.

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»Ps 116 inszeniert […], worin die Durchführung einer Todah besteht: Er aktualisiert die Erfahrung überwundener Not als heilvolles Aufeinandertreffen zunächst unvereinbar erscheinender Ereignisse oder Situationen und stellt die persönlich erfahrene Dynamik dieses Geschehens als dankbar artikuliertes GottesGedächtnis in den Raum der öffentlichen Religiosität.« 19 Das Schicksal des Beters – Krise, Rettung und Neubeginn – wird im Gebet als ein Leben erkannt, in dem Gott sich als der Erlösende erweist und den Betenden auf einen Weg unter den Lebenden stellt. Der Dank für erlebtes heilvolles Rettungshandeln Gottes begründet mithin eine Weg-Existenz. Sie ist erfüllt von der Gewissheit, dass sich der Ewige auch auf diesem Weg als der Erlösende erweisen wird, und sucht sie in der Welt, im Lande der Lebenden zu bewähren. Die beiden hier entfalteten Beispiele liturgischer Praxis von Juden und Christen widerlegen nicht Rosenzweigs grundsätzliche Charakterisierung von Judentum und Christentum als »ewiges Leben« resp. »ewiger Weg«. Sie zeigen jedoch, dass sich die Kraft des Judentums, die »ewige Wahrheit Gottes« zu bewähren, auch aus der dankbar erinnerten Erfahrung der Rettung des Einzelnen speist; und dass das Christentum eben jene Kraft auch aus der im gemeinsamen Lobbekenntnis erwarteten Zukunft des Wiederkommens des Messias gewinnt. Judentum wie Christentum enthalten in sich Perspektiven des je Anderen. Beide, Juden und Christen, sind sowohl in den Lebensraum der Erlösung als auch auf den Weg ihrer tätigen Bewährung gestellt. In der Anschauung ihrer jeweiligen liturgischen Praxis lösen sich die begrifflichen Unterscheidungen ihrer Theologien auf. So Rosenzweig selbst: »Da hört man nichts mehr von Sache noch von Tat.« 20 Von daher muss dann aber sein bekanntes Diktum neu gelesen werden: »Vor Gott sind so die beiden, Jude und Christ, Arbeiter von Jonathan Magonet in Zusammenarbeit mit Walter Homolka, aus dem Hebr. von Annette Böckler, Berlin: Jüdische Verlagsanstalt, 2001, 251 und 253. 19 Peter Ebenbauer, »Eingekehrt in Gottes Zeit«, 76. 20 Stern, 328.

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am gleichen Werk. Er kann keinen entbehren. Zwischen beiden hat er in aller Zeit Feindschaft gesetzt und doch hat er sie aufs engste wechselseitig aneinander gebunden.« 21 Ja, Juden und Christen sind »Arbeiter am gleichen Werk«. Aber »Feindschaft« ist nicht »gesetzt« zwischen ihnen. 22 Vielmehr bergen sie in sich Potentiale, das Werk der Bewährung der »ewigen Wahrheit Gottes« als gemeinsames Werk anzugehen – »Schulter an Schulter, um der einen Schöpfung und der einen Erlösung und der gemeinsamen fundamentalen Offenbarung willen.« 23 In einer Welt, die von Vorurteilen, Unversöhnlichkeiten und Konflikten zwischen Religionen dominiert zu sein scheint, wäre das nicht wenig. Ein Hoffnungszeichen allzumal.

21

Ebd., 462. Das Skandalon Jahrtausende langer christlicher Judenfeindschaft soll damit nicht klein geredet oder gar geleugnet werden. Die Konsequenz aus der Einsicht in die Tatsache dieses Skandalons kann für Christen jedoch nur darin bestehen, diese Feindschaft eben gerade nicht als »gesetzt« zu betrachten und zu legitimieren, sondern die eigene Schuldgeschichte zu bekennen und in aller Demut Wege zur Bewährung der göttlichen Wahrheit zu suchen. 23 Bernhard Casper, »Das Gebet stiftet die menschliche Weltordnung. Zum Verständnis der Erlösung im Werk Rosenzweigs«, in: ders., Religion der Erfahrung. Einführungen in das Denken Franz Rosenzweigs, Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2004, 177–191, hier: 189. 22

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Redeeming Liturgy: A Eulogist’s Perspective on Rosenzweig’s Concept of Liturgy »Gebräuche her! wir haben nicht genug Gebräuche. Alles geht und wird verredet« (Rainer Maria Rilke, Requiem für eine Freundin)

Introduction In Germany today, if someone has died after a long illness, people often say, »Es war eine Erlösung« (It has been a redemption). But, can death redeem? As far as Rosenzweig is concerned, certainly all his work on redemption 1 goes against such compliance with death. In this paper, I present some thoughts on liturgy that have developed based both on my professional work as a secular eulogist in Berlin, and on my ongoing reading of Rosenzweig. I will argue that the very work of liturgy is meant to lead away from helpless compliance with death, and, as in Rosenzweig, toward a more helpful notion of redemption. I have divided this paper into three sections: 1) love’s liturgy lost – on the present »Nichts« of liturgy; 2) back to liturgy – the danger of a fundamentalist turn in »total re-religion-ification«; 3) redeeming the redemptive powers of liturgy – on the »Ichts« of liturgy. 2

1

The translation of »Erlösung« as »redemption« is still common in the English reception of Rosenzweig’s work. 2 I wish to thank Michael Lederer for his careful editing and very useful advice in all questions of phrasing.

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1. Love’s Liturgy Lost – On the Present »Nichts« of Liturgy Rosenzweig’s magnum opus has been described as a philosophical outcry against death. Literally from the first to last word, The Star of Redemption (henceforth: Star) is intended to serve as an earnest guide from death to life: »Vom Tode… Stern… ins Leben«. To begin a book with death means to begin with one of those problems that cannot be solved. Both natality and mortality point to aspects of the condition humaine that have simply to be borne (»ertragen« in German). Traditionally, liturgy helps people through the often-painful passages between different stages of human life, especially through that passage from a life with somebody, to a life without somebody. Yet, how do people manage who are no longer imbedded in religious communities? The dead still have to be buried (a legal obligation in Germany), and most still wish that transition to be accompanied by something, and someone. In the anti-religious world of the former German Democratic Republic (the largest territory with least religious population worldwide), reduced funeral rites were performed by professional speakers. Today, a service by such eulogists can be booked throughout Germany. 3 All of us who do this work try to establish some sort of liturgy in the original meaning of the word. Composed from the Greek laos, »people«, and ergon, »work« or »service«, liturgy means »public service«. 4 The absence of any liturgy would leave an uncomfortable void. 3

This struggle might still resemble Rosenzweig’s observation about the life of the nations: »So sind auch die Völker lebendig, indem sie immerfort ihr Heute in neue Sitte, neues Ewig-Gestriges, verwandeln und gleichzeitig aus ihrem Heute heraus neues Gesetz für das Morgen setzen«. Franz Rosenzweig, Der Stern der Erlösung, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1988 (hereafter: Stern), 336. 4 For a more general, »untheological« definition of liturgy cf. Thomas Bagatzky, Mythos, Weg und Welthaus. Erfahrungsreligion als Kultus und Alltag, Berlin/Münster: Lit, 2007, 142 und 144: »Das Wort ›Liturgie‹ […] ist offenbar geeignet […], die in unserem nachaufklärungszeitlich geprägtem Verständnis eher getrennten Bereiche des politischen Handelns und des Gottesdienstes zusammenzufügen […]. Liturgisches Handeln soll […] als ein Handeln verstanden werden, das mythische Substanz in Kultus und Weltgeschehen gegenwärtig setzt. Liturgisches

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I often wonder if some family discomforts, even conflicts, that may erupt after certain funerals might be due to a lack of a common ritual and liturgical order that could have given comfort and orientation in the process of this passage. If mourning is confined to privacy, does that not risk an added stress in the very moments when acknowledgement of one’s mourning might provide such solace? Yet without doubt, liturgy as an integral part of religious culture has undergone a shrinking role. I see two principle narratives as explaining this decline. First, the sociological. Beginning with Judaism as the initial »rational« religion, and not ending with Protestantism, rationalization, secularization and individualism are viewed as continuous, and unstoppable. Hence, fewer ask, »What is the meaning of it all?« The urban Western individual of our time, well organized in what Max Weber called the »methodische Lebensführung«, is generally supposed to be engaged in a problem-solving »self-optimization« that follows a path of de-religion-ification. Beginning with the opaque problem of death, Rosenzweig of course dismisses this entire Weberian description of progress. 5 The second narrative explaining the general decline of liturgical competence, that is the practiced ability to speak words in a ritual and meaningful way, argues both on ethical and at times religious grounds. Critical toward an empty process of economic, physical and social rationalization, it is a widespread psycho-moralHandeln umschließt auch die liturgische Arbeit als eine ›Teilmenge‹, so dass jegliche liturgische Arbeit auch liturgisches Handeln ist, aber liturgisches Handeln nicht immer auch liturgische Arbeit«. 5 In a letter from Heidelberg, where he met Weber and Rickert in spring 1919, he wrote to Margrit Rosenstock-Huessy: »Gestern bei Rickert – ich merkte wieder wie grundunsittlich (Hans hatte wirklich einfach simpel recht, Max Weber abzuschreiben) auch schon ein blosses Gespräch mit so jemandem mit dem man nicht sprechen kann wirkt. Man müsste ganz frei sein, um wieder sprechen zu können auch mit solchen«. Letter of May 1, 1919, in: Franz Rosenzweig, Die »Gritli«-Briefe. Briefe an Margrit Rosenstock-Huessy, eds. Inken Rühle and Reinhold Mayer, Tübingen: Bilam, 2002, 288. This had to do with Rosenzweig’s general distancing from a mere sociological approach to matters of culture, religion, and philosophy.

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istic discourse regarding morals and values in the individual, as well as in the wider community. 6 When both psychological and pedagogical theories insist on a need to internalize values and virtues, it is an almost-natural consequence that outward signs of communion, social bonds, and virtue are less appreciated. The »liturgical« protocol is less honoured as an integral part of public service. It is perceived instead as an »outward« (»äußerlich« in German) remnant, contributing little to the substantial values of society. Emmanuel Levinas has gone so far as to write that it can even put at risk real, immediate and »ethical« encounters between human beings: »das Von-Angesicht-zu-Angesicht ist verschieden von jeder Beziehung […] in der die Rede Beschwörung wird wie das zu Ritus und Liturgie werdende Gebet«. 7 Even if contempt for liturgy and rite is balanced by other strains of thought in the great Rosenzweig-reader’s work, it is matched by a contemporary inclination to appraise a situation in which liturgy is »overcome«. Followers of the first narrative, i. e., progress of rationalization, believe people have learned to avoid problems that cannot be solved rationally. They focus instead on things that can be done rationally. Followers of the second narrative, namely that internalization renders external exercises and liturgy superfluous, focus more on the encounter between the »I« and the »thou«, believing external liturgy does not affect the inward journey of people engaged in such an encounter. The work of a eulogist, however, offers abundant evidence of original liturgical desire when it comes to existential problems that have to be suffered rather than solved. Where the liturgical impulse is suppressed, it may appear in disguise elsewhere. Even in mundane life. Could it be due to this liturgical impulse when, for instance, at some academic conference a scholar might read with 6

Cf. all sorts of theories in the wake of Lawrence Kohlberg’s model of moral development. 7 Emmanuel Lévinas, Totalität und Unendlichkeit. Versuch über die Exteriorität, aus dem Franz. von Wolfgang Nikolaus Krewani, Freiburg/München: Karl Alber, 1987, 291.

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great ceremonial voice a very well-known Walter Benjamin or other quotation, as if he or she had discovered it for the first time? 8 And exactly because it is so widely known, the audience can hardly fail but to repeat it? If this is more than a random observation, it points to a void left by the decline of liturgy in our Western lives. Even beyond such a soulful situation as a funeral ceremony. 2. Back to Liturgy – the Danger of a Fundamentalist Turn in »Total Re-Religion-ification« If loss of liturgy poses a problem, what then might be the alternative? A simple return to liturgy, to redeem people in mourning (and other critical situations) as they face the uncanny void? This is not Rosenzweig’s answer. Yet, it was the liturgical experience of the famous Yom Kippur service in 1913 that redeemed him from the promise to be baptized (given to Eugen Rosenstock in the famous Leipziger Nachtgespräch), and convinced him to remain Jewish. No wonder then that in the Star, Rosenzweig, like his teacher Hermann Cohen in his Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums, makes the liturgy of Yom Ha-Kippurim the central point of his interpretation of Judaism. But distinct from Cohen, who stresses the standing of the community before the Lord when confessing sin, 9 Rosenzweig underlines the kneeling of the com8

Cf. Rosenzweig’s diary fragment of November 20, 1906, in: Franz Rosenzweig, Briefe und Tagebücher, 2 vols. (Der Mensch und sein Werk. Gesammelte Schriften, I), eds. Rachel Rosenzweig and Edith Rosenzweig-Scheinmann, in collaboration with Bernhard Casper, Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979, vol. 1, 65: »Der Privatgelehrte – der Eremit der Wissenschaft – wird mitleidig belächelt, der Ordinarius – der Abt im Kloster – bestaunt und bewundert! […] Die […] Überschätzung des […] Werts der gelehrten Beschäftigung, der Gelehrtenstolz […]: nur durch diese gepanzerte Überzeugung vom Wert der Gelehrtenarbeit ist es zu erreichen, dass, wenn draußen vor dem Kloster einer fragt: ›Was tuen sie denn dadrin?‹ der andere mit tief respektvollem Ernst ihm erklärt: ›Sie beten!‹«. 9 »Die Auszeichnung des Menschen vor dem Tiere […] besteht in dem aufrechten Gang, und demgemäß bezeugt sich die Würdigkeit des Menschen für seine

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munity in the moment of commemorating redemption »im Schauen der unmittelbaren Gottesnähe«. »Die ›gewaltigen Tage‹ […] sind ausgezeichnet vor allen andern Festen dadurch, dass hier und nur hier der Jude kniet«. 10 Did Rosenzweig sink to his knees in order to fall back into an outdated religious and more liturgically-orientated way of life? I don’t believe so. If not, what then was his intent? The third part of the Star deals expressly with liturgy. 11 The relationship between Christianity and Judaism, the main religious traditions of his time and place, 12 is built around the concepts of a circular time in Judaism, a linear time for nations, and a kind of spiral time for Christianity. His use of liturgy helps Rosenzweig transcend mere apologetics. Claiming universal relevance for the particular service of »the eternal people«, he uses his well-known technique of turning prejudice against Judaism into an advantage. Where liturgy to the modern mind appears an element of older times, in danger of stupefying spiritual development with its endless repetitions and stiff rules, Rosenzweig applies what he deErlösung von der Sünde in dem zwar demütigen, aber auch ebenso aufrechten Stehen vor Gott«. Hermann Cohen, Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums, 2nd ed., ed. Bruno Strauß, Frankfurt a. M.: J. Kauffmann, 1929, 256. 10 Stern, 359. 11 This part of his work has recently gained attention, cf. e. g. Ephraim Meir, »Rosenzweig’s Contribution to a Dialogical Approach of Identity and to Interreligious Theology«, Rosenzweig Jahrbuch / Rosenzweig Yearbook 11 (2018), 38– 50, where he writes: »The first Part has a descriptive and epic language, the second Part contains a prescriptive and lyric language and the third Part has hymnal language. In the ›proto-cosmos‹ silence or monologue reign. The ›cosmos‹ has the living language of love. The language of the ›hyper-cosmos‹ is that of the liturgical community« (42). So, liturgy belongs to more than cosmos, belongs to »hyper-cosmos«? This is in fact an appraisal. 12 This restriction has always disturbed modern and postmodern minds; cf. e. g. Robert Gibbs’s remark: »The whole grand scheme of the work depends on this eternity of life, an eternal life that is emplanted within the Jewish community. No idea is more disturbing because it seems blatantly dogmatic, exclusionary, metaphysical, and ethically dangerous«. Robert Gibbs, »Rolling a Scroll. Jewish History«, in: Wolfdietrich Schmied-Kowarzik (ed.), Franz Rosenzweigs »neues Denken«. Internationaler Kongreß Kassel 2004, 2 vols., Freiburg/München: Karl Alber, 2006, vol. 2, 982–987, 982 f.

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scribes in his essay on apologetics. He starts with this weakest point, and declares it the central achievement of the matter to be defended. 13 This, however, comes with a price. The peoples of the world live in a process of permanent renewal, which leads to »the sea«. They thus leave a growing past behind them, continuously turning future into past. The Jewish people – the eternal people – freeze the moment and let it stand steadily between an »unvermehrbarer Vergangenheit« and an unmoveable future. This eternity of the »liturgical« moment creates an unbridgeable distance between participation in a people’s eternity, and the life of nations. Even life itself. »Und wieder erkauft sich das ewige Volk seine Ewigkeit um den Preis des zeitlichen Lebens […]; so hört der Augenblick auf zu verfliegen […]. Aber so wird der Augenblick freilich dem Strom der Zeit enthoben, und indem das Leben geheiligt wird, ist es nicht mehr lebendig«. 14 While nations live in revolution, their laws permanently changing their skin, Jewish law will never be abolished by revolution. One can run from it, but one cannot change it. 15 Pace modern Judaism, pace reform and liberal Judaism, Rosenzweig claims here an unchanging mode for Jewish law, and Jewish practice. Some offer Judaism as the boogeyman for everything stiffened, inflexible, unchangeable, authoritarian and »legalistic«. And yes, says Rosenzweig, those are elements of Judaism. But for a great reason. He makes the point that other peoples of the world have their death before them. Their love is even increased as they know they 13

»Aber trotzdem kann Verteidigen eine der edelsten menschlichen Beschäftigungen sein. Nämlich wenn es bis auf den Grund der Dinge und der Seelen geht und, auf die kleinen Mittel der Lüge verzichtend, mit der Wahrheit selbst, der ganzen Wahrheit nämlich, ent-schuldigt. In diesem großen Sinn kann auch literarische Apologetik verteidigen. Sie würde dann nichts beschönigen, noch weniger einen angreifbaren Punkt umgehen, sondern gerade die bedrohtesten Punkte zur Basis der Verteidigung machen«. Franz Rosenzweig, »Apologetisches Denken. Bemerkungen zu Brod und Baeck«, in: id., Zweistromland. Kleinere Schriften zur Religion und Philosophie, Berlin/Wien: Philo, 2001, 63–73, 72 f. 14 Stern, 337. 15 Cf. ibidem.

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are (still) mortal. 16 And there will be a day when their »language will be buried in books«, and their habits and laws will have lost living power. The Jewish people cannot conceive of such a thing for one reason: »Denn alles, worin die Völker der Welt ihr Leben verankerten, uns ist es schon vorlängst geraubt; Land Sprache Sitte und Gesetz ist uns schon lang aus dem Kreise des Lebendigen geschieden und ist uns aus Lebendigem zu Heiligem gehoben; wir aber leben immer und leben ewig«. 17 A modern thinker might be tempted to believe Rosenzweig regards Judaism as a sort of »zombie«, i. e., a faith that has survived its own death. Anti-Semites might respond, »that’s what we always knew. It has refused to grow with time, outdated by later developments«. Many modern Jews, refusing to adhere to stricter religious practice, may share the view that an inflexible liturgy could signify the dead-end of any religion whose practitioners refuse to consider insights of modern science. Is religious Judaism à la Rosenzweig, therefore, a fundamentalist version of it? Resisting assimilation to a hostile environment; driven back from modernity into a stubborn remoteness? Some so-called orthodoxy may appear so. But this, of course, is not Rosenzweig’s belief. Kal vachomer, he would as much have mocked more extreme Christian variants of fundamentalism, with their court-trials regarding Darwin’s theory, also resistant to the insights of modern science. What Rosenzweig does is to point to the contribution of liturgical order to those who have survived the death of anything, or anyone, dear to them.

16

»Ja ihre Liebe zum eigenen Volkstum ist süß und schwer von diesem Vorgefühl des Todes« (Stern, 338). 17 Ibid., 338 f.

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3. Redeeming the Redemptive Powers of Liturgy – on the »Icht« of Liturgy Throughout the history of both religion and culture, there has been tension between a ritualistic, circular attitude toward conditions of human life, and a development-orientated linear approach in which spiritual internalization plays a major part. Rosenzweig knows there has been no solution to this permanent tension. 18 In many Western views of culture, concepts like »legalism«, meaning ritual and law – often identified with Jewish tradition – are seen as outward actions. By the same token, belief, attitude and internalization – often identified with Christian tradition – are at times regarded as »superior« values. Rosenzweig rearranges this order in favour of liturgy and law. With him, liturgy becomes a force reminding those who have lost any immediate affiliation of their interior strength, and an abiding sense of belonging. 19 It is not that Jews, as is often suggested, do not internalize values. Neither is it true that liturgy is standing against internalization. It is only that through liturgy and a system of »legalist« ideas about rites and everyday life that the otherwise unlimited (and hence, »excessive«) consequence of internalization becomes ba-

18

Inasmuch as time is concerned, this problem has been dealt with a lot, cf. e. g. Hans-Christoph Askani, who exposes the dilemma of talking about Rosenzweig’s concept of liturgy in the following way: »Die liturgisch gestaltete Zeit […] ist eine unvergleichliche, unvordenkbare Erfahrung von Zeit, die das philosophische System in einen Horizont führt, den es einerseits nur empfängt und der andrerseits doch eben sein eigener ist. Ist es möglich, dies in der bekannten philosophischen Begrifflichkeit zu sagen? Evidenterweise nicht. Ist es möglich, dies zu sagen, indem man nur die Erfahrungen dieser gelebten Zeit nachformuliert? Wiederum eben nicht«. Hans-Christoph Askani, »Die Gestaltung der Zeit durch die Liturgie im Judentum und Christentum«, in: Schmied-Kowarzik (ed.), Franz Rosenzweigs »neues Denken«, vol. 2, 956–981, 956 f. 19 In fact, the piece quoted in note 17 (Stern, 338 f.), proceeds with an elevation of the Jew being after all rooted entirely in his inner life. This has become part of an Anti-Zionists reading of Rosenzweig, as in Judith Butler’s Parting Ways. Jewishness and the Critique of Zionism, New York: Columbia University Press, 2012.

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lanced and limited. This may become understandable in short examples. The community and its manifold endless dialogue within, and with the sacred texts, and with God, are silenced in liturgical reading of the Tora. 20 The eternal element of liturgy, the Holiest of Holy, the kneeling in the presence of God once a year, does not change. These and other elements may look authoritarian to the viewer from outside. Ismar Elbogen, however, is right to stress, »[d]er jüdische Gottesdienst […] war der erste, der, völlig losgelöst vom Opfer, als Gottesdienst mit dem Herzen Avodah shʾ balev bezeichnet werden durfte«. 21 Rosenzweig supports his view. Instead of hailing »the Christian way« as a step forward in internalization, Rosenzweig turns the limits of Jewish liturgy into a strength, arguing it limits the otherwise endless work of the heart, and puts a full stop to the unlimited demands evoked by Levinas (who later, in his Talmudic Readings, made greater sense of liturgy). Immediateness and total internalization of faith and values are in need of being limited in order not to become destructive. This is what liturgy does. It is once a year Jews kneel in the presence of God. No more. It is once a year they gather in a moment beyond any temporal and geographic reality. Having this moment of unquestionable stabil20

Almut Bruckstein points to the importance of that which is silenced in the liturgical moment: »Im lauten Verlesen des Textes, der Tora, der fünf Bücher, inmitten der hörenden Gemeinde schweigt die Rhetorik des Widerspruchs und der Wechselrede, die Rosenzweig sonst unter dem Stichwort des Sprachdenkens oder auch des ›neuen Denkens‹ ins Zentrum seiner philosophischen Aussage stellt. Kommentartradition, Dialogdenken, Widerrede, die für Rosenzweig sowohl neues Denken als auch lebendige mündliche Lehre und Lehrhaustradition charakterisiert, schweigen im Hören des verlesenen Wortes im liturgischen Kontext […]. Im Schweigen angesichts des laut verlesenen Textes knüpfen die Hörenden an einen Anfang an, dessen Anbeginn wir nicht erinnern können«. Almut Sh. Bruckstein, »Zur Phänomenologie der jüdischen Liturgie in Rosenzweigs Stern der Erlösung«, in: Martin Brasser (ed.), Rosenzweig als Leser. Kontextuelle Kommentare zum »Stern der Erlösung«, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 2004, 357– 368, 363 f. 21 Ismar Elbogen, Der jüdische Gottesdienst in seiner geschichtlichen Entwicklung, 3rd ed., Frankfurt a. M.: J. Kauffmann, 1931, 1.

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ity, the congregation and individuals within it are free to be creative in shaping all the other things surrounding it. It is the same with the Shabbat as weekly reminder. The Shabbat as the small holiday is fixed. But how exactly it is to be celebrated, with readings, music, commentaries and poems in Hebrew or other language – this is left to the congregation. Are Jews therefore in Rosenzweig’s scheme »better off« than Christians, whose task according to Rosenzweig is to spread across the world and believe in everything, endlessly, boundlessly, without rhythm, but with a coercion instead to prove their heartfelt authenticity in every single moment? 22 Had they only this aspect of permanent development and linear time, it would be hard for Christians. But Rosenzweig concedes that thanks to Jewish tradition still being accepted as their backbone, thanks to a rhythm secured by the Hebrew Bible, Christians have at least a little share in Jewish liturgy. Their time is, therefore, what I have called »spiral time«. Nevertheless, the general direction should be clear by now. Rosenzweig translates the idea of necessary development into unlimited belief. In fact, unlimited processes of examination, coupled with a demand to go on with the mission, characterize Christian history. This trend is unbroken in religious scholarship, à la Weber and Freud, still displaying the structure of unlimited progress. In describing religion and its liturgy as belonging to »an earlier stage« of development, assuming it to be replaced by a more appropriate world view and behaviour in the never-ending process of rationalization, they adhere to the path prescribed by »Christian« religious structure. The Star argues another point. In order to describe the inner circle of Jewish liturgy, Rosenzweig employs a metaphor taken from the land of Israel, that of Yam Hamelach, which presents 22

»Das Christentum als ewiger Weg muss sich immer weiter ausbreiten […]. Er darf nicht auf Worte verzichten: […] das Etwas, woran er glaubt, [muss] kein Etwas, sondern Alles sein. Und eben darum ist er der Glaube an den Weg. Indem er an den Weg glaubt, bahnt er ihn in die Welt. So ist der zeugnisablegende christliche Glaube erst der Erzeuger des ewigen Wegs in die Welt, während der jüdische Glaube dem ewigen Leben des Volks nachfolgt als Erzeugnis« (Stern, 379 und 380).

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another idea of the »eternal people«. 23 To understand this comparison which Rosenzweig draws between Judaism and Christianity in the third part, we have to go back to the beginning of the Star. Much has been written of the »something« out of »nothing« in Rosenzweig’s Meta-Metaphysik, and its relation to Cohen’s Logik des Ursprungs. With Rosenzweig, the »Etwas« of which the Jew, in contradistinction to the Christian, is so sure in himself, is an »Icht[s]«. A Nicht-nichts. He introduces this expression almost as a hapax legomenon: it appears three times in that paragraph that bares the side-title »Zur Methode«. It appears again in the same paragraph a fourth time as »Nicht-Icht[s]«. In each case, as a genitive of a negation, or accompanied by a negation. Its negation is used to mark a concrete nothing, even void, which presupposes anything can grow. Empty as it may be, it is not the general Nichts that must be accepted or desired. The Nichts Gottes grammatically follows the conditional »wenn Gott ist, so gilt von seinem Nichts das folgende. Indem wir also das Nichts nur als das Nichts Gottes voraussetzen, führen auch alle Folgen dieser Voraussetzung nicht über den Rahmen dieses Gegenstandes hinaus«. 24 The »Ichts« of negative theology is God. Negative theological sentences, therefore, are achieved through the process of »Entwesung« – of the positive notions that have been established as theology. The »Mystikerwort Entwesung« with Rosenzweig nearly equals the more »natural« word »Verwesung«. 25 23

»Nur ein einziges Gewässer auf Erden steht ewig kreisend in sich selbst, ohne Zufluß scheinbar und ohne Abfluß, nämlich ohne irdischen Zufluß und Abfluß – ein Wunder und ein Anstoß allen, die es sehen; denn es entzieht sich der Aufgabe aller Wässer, ins Meer zu laufen« (ibid., 421). 24 Ibid., 27 f. 25 »Beim Wesen fragt man nach dem Ursprung, bei der Tat nach dem Anfang […]. Das Gesagte wird sich […] schon etwas erhellen, wenn wir, nur zum Vergleich, den umgekehrten Vorgang, das Werden zum Nichts, betrachten. Hier sind ebenfalls zwei Möglichkeiten gegeben: die Verneinung des, um nun einmal den heute zu stark verengten Ausdruck ›Etwas‹ durch einen unbelasteten zu ersetzen, – also die Verneinung des Ichts und die Bejahung des Nicht-Ichts, des Nichts. Die Umkehrung ist so genau, dass dort, wo auf dem Hinweg das Ja erschien, jetzt das Nein erscheint und umgekehrt. Für die Entstehung des Nichts durch Verneinung des Ichts hat die deutsche Sprache einen Ausdruck, den wir

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Given that only this means of negation leads to the reality of realities, the consequence of the process of »innere Umkehrung« throughout the book, it appears necessary that Judaism can transcend natural time which rules life. Jewish liturgy achieves this by converting total loss in its beginning: »Land Sprache Sitte und Gesetz« (here written, against all rules of German grammar, without comma, and with »law« in special position). These are the Ichts of normal national and cultural lives of the peoples in the world. After having lost these, the Jewish people have preserved them as spiritual entities, and brought them back to life via liturgy. Thus, Jews did not achieve their »eternity« in spite of liturgy – but through it. And their liturgy does not separate them from life, but helps to preserve life. Therefore, liturgical Judaism as described by Rosenzweig does not live the non-life of a »zombie«. Hence, he is more courageous than, e. g., Gershom Scholem, when it comes to translating liturgical prayers into a ceremonial German. He is also more confident as far as establishment of the Holy language in everyday-life in Palestine is concerned. His point is the opposite of a fundamentalist one. That having already lost all, and having learned to live after all, it is fruitless to teach the Jewish people how to be »spiritual«. If any culture »has already been there« (beim Vater is another formula for this), it is the Jewish culture. To recall this through liturgy does not render one immortal. But it creates a concept of eternity, not affected by worldly fate. Nor does it claim to hold in its inner Holiest of Holies a concept of worldly affairs. It happens, however, that some of Rosenzweig’s students and followers have claimed they were able to survive spiritually the horrible on-

nur von seiner engeren Bedeutung befreien müssen, um ihn hier einsetzen zu können: Verwesung bezeichnet (genau wie das Mystikerwort Entwesung) die Verneinung des Ichts. Für die Bejahung des Nichts aber hat die Sprache das Wort Vernichtung. In der Verwesung, der Entwesung entsteht das Nichts in seiner unendlichen Unbestimmtheit; der verwesende Leib so wenig wie die entwesende Seele streben nach dem Nichts als einem Positiven, sondern einzig nach Auflösung ihres positiven Wesens; aber indem ihnen die geschieht, münden sie in die gestaltlose Nacht des Nichts« (ibid., 26 f.).

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slaught of the Holocaust thanks to the riches of their own culture – to which Rosenzweig had opened their eyes. Conclusion Modern cities are often a desert when it comes to ritual. The absence of liturgical practice seems to create all sorts of insecure judgement surrounding the facts of death, mourning, and the soulful labour of memory. All too quickly, people following the development pattern wish to »look ahead« and step forward. All too often, they wonder why this does not really work. Liturgy and memory, as explained in Rosenzweig’s philosophy, are means to resist the frightening fact of mortality, without flight into illusion, or resignation to an amor fati. Liturgy, as the craft of memory, does not solve the problem of mortality (as most »ideologies« pretend to do), but rather helps society and community bear it. To stand facing it. Instead of assuming that it redeems humanity from the problem of death, liturgy – and the memory it protects – offers hope for redemption. No false promise is given. No true hope is abandoned.

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Linking Redemption to Prayer. Rethinking Redemption from the Perspective of Jewish Prayers There are a number of important studies on the topic of prayer in Rosenzweig’s thought, some are broader and some are more specific studies on his approach to prayer. The studies on prayer to which I owe a great debt are those of Hugo Bergmann, Moshe Schwartz, and Yehoyada Amir. 1 This essay is part of a larger endeavor that seeks to read Der Stern der Erlösung – The Star of Redemption (henceforth: Star) – through the lens of the Siddur, the Jewish prayer book, in order to pinpoint Rosenzweig’s concept of prayer. It draws upon his analysis of prayer in the third part of the

1

On the study of prayer in The Star of Redemption, see Samuel Hugo Bergman, »Hitgalut, Tefila Vegeula BeMishnato shel Franz Rosenzweig«, in: id., Anashim Udrakhim, Jerusalem: The Bialik Institute, 1967, 308–317 [Heb.]; Moshe Schwartz, »The Idea of Prayer in Franz Rosenzweig’s ›Star of Redemption‹«, in: Gabriel H. Cohn, Harold Fisch (eds.), Prayer in Judaism. Continuity and Change, Northvale: Jason Aronson, 1996, 163–175; Yehoyada Amir, »Rosenzweig’s Concept of Prayer«, Criticism and Interpretation. Journal for Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and Culture 37 (2003), 29–64 [Heb.]; Yossi (Joseph) Turner, »Prayer and Love in Franz Rosenzweig’s Star of Redemption«, European Journal of Jewish Studies 8 (2014), no. 2, 173–193; Robert Gibbs, Correlations in Rosenzweig and Levinas, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992, 24 f., 70–104; Yudit Kornberg Greenberg, Better than Wine. Love, Poetry, and Prayer in the Thought of Franz Rosenzweig, Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1996, 14–16, 81–108; Hanoch Ben Pazi, »Prier«, in: Salomon Malka (ed.), Dictionnaire Franz Rosenzweig. Une étoile dans le siècle, Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 2016, 278–298; Gabriella Caponigro, »Prière«, in: Malka (ed.), Dictionnaire Franz Rosenzweig, 298–304; Yehoyada Amir, »Towards Mutual Listening. The Notion of Sermon in Franz Rosenzweig’s Philosophy«, in: Alexander Deeg, Walter Homolka, Heinz-Günther Schöttler (eds.), Preaching in Judaism and Christianity. Encounters and Developments from Biblical Times to Modernity, Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2008, 113–130.

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Star and contends that understanding his perspective on prayer is crucial to understanding the third part as a whole. The third part opens with an introduction with the heading On the Possibility of Obtaining the Kingdom by Prayer. 2 Towards the end of the introduction, Rosenzweig adds two important directives: one relates to the structure of the book, and the second to the organizing principles of its various parts. My argument is that to understand the uniqueness of the idea of »prayer«, we have to give attention to the various prayers or religious practices discussed throughout the entire book. And that a close reading of the introduction to the third part will contribute to our observation of Rosenzweig’s textual analyzing of the prayers. Our interpretation could illuminate in a new light the main place of prayer and prayer book in the entire book. Regarding the structure of the book, Rosenzweig asserts that just as the miracle was the intermediary between creation and revelation, prayer – in particular, prayer for the advent of the Kingdom of Heaven – is the intermediary between revelation and redemption. 3 He is actually more specific, saying that the intermediary between the first two books of Creation and Revelation, respectively, and the third, of Redemption, takes us from the created world to the revealed world and then on to the redeemed world. 4 He adds another point: the organizing principle of the first part was mathematics, the second grammar, and the third liturgy. Mathematical symbols are mute, and they logically precede reality. Grammatical forms express a direct relationship to revelation, which is conveyed through language. Therefore, lan2 Franz Rosenzweig, Der Stern der Erlösung, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1988 (hereafter: Stern), 295–330; id., The Star of Redemption, transl. Barbara E. Galli, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005 (hereafter: Star), 283–315. 3 On the significance of the Kingdom of Heaven in the Star, see Benjamin Pollock, Franz Rosenzweig’s Conversions. World Denial and World Redemption, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014, 56–59, 122–126; Alexandra Aidler, »Judaism, Ethics, and Time: On Levinas’s Re-Interpretation of Rosenzweig’s Concept of the Kingdom of God«, European Journal of Jewish Studies 14 (2020), no. 1, 73–96. 4 This is not the place to discuss Rosenzweig’s concept of redemption and tikkun.

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guage is within revealed reality. Liturgy, in contrast, prefigures the future and turns it into the present. These steps are crucial in mapping out the path to redemption. I would like to add another point regarding the methodology of the Star. The book’s structure shows preconceived order, organization, and structuring of thought, as Stéphane Mosès has shown in his study of the methodology of the Star. 5 Indeed, academic research continues to delineate different ways to read the Star in light of its structure and the interconnectedness of its different sections. Rosenzweig attempts – and perhaps even succeeds – in presenting Jewish prayer within the broader context of world religions, starting from the East and continuing to the religions of revelation that attempt to bring about the Kingdom of Heaven: Judaism and Christianity. He finds the basis of his approach in the works of Maimonides, much in the same way that rabbinic scholars do. 6 Rosenzweig quotes Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah, who writes about the Christian Messiah who came to »clear the way for King Messiah, to prepare the whole world to worship God with one accord«. 7 This is a particularly important moment in the Star, since Rosenzweig uses it to construct the particularistic stance of universal Judaism. I argue that he seeks to replace the symbol of the cross with the symbol of the star of redemption with its emanating rays. 8 5

Stéphane Mosès, System and Revelation. The Philosophy of Franz Rosenzweig, transl. Catherine Tihanyi, Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1992. See also Martin Brasser, »Dialogue and System in Rosenzweig’s Star of Redemption«, Rosenzweig Jahrbuch / Rosenzweig Yearbook 7 (2013), 27–41. 6 Cf. Norbert Samuelson, »Exploring Rosenzweig’s Sources – The God of Maimonides«, Rosenzweig Jahrbuch / Rosenzweig Yearbook 1 (2006), 155–165; Marga Andrei, »Conséquences européennes de la pensée de Maïmonide, Mendelssohn et Rosenzweig«, in: Carol Iancu, Alexandru-Florin Platon (eds.), Enseignants et étudiants juifs, Iaşi: Editura Universitii Alexandru Ioan Cuza, 2012, 27–58. 7 Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Laws of Kings 11:4, in: A Maimonides Reader, ed. Isadore Twersky, Springfield: Behrman House, 1972, 226. 8 On the possibility of the star as a symbolic representation of the cross, see for example the very interesting Wayne Cristaudo, Frances Huessy (eds.), The Cross

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1. The Development of Prayer in the Rosenzweig-Buber Correspondence The correspondence between Rosenzweig and Martin Buber contains a fascinating exchange between the two regarding his invitation to Buber to deliver a series of lectures about the study of religion in the Freies Jüdisches Lehrhaus. 9 The ultimate question dealt with the priority of prayer as a religious phenomenon. Is prayer one of the primal elements of religious life? How did it develop? How does one account for the brazenness of approaching the Almighty in a simple act of prayer with insignificant human requests? All these need to be clarified. Their correspondence took place against the backdrop of David Strauss’ book on the history of Christianity and its pagan origin, which stirred up a great controversy when it was published in 1835, which continued to reverberate in the academic world of the history and phenomenology of religion. The book revolved around the question of Jesus’ relationship towards the religions of his time, primarily towards paganism. It introduces not only an historical but also a philosophical approach, drawn from the phenomenology of religion. 10 Against this background, their correspondence contains concrete references to the question about the meaning of paganism and the Star. The Post-Nietzschean Christian and Jewish Thought of Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy and Franz Rosenzweig, Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2009. 9 On the lectures given in the Freies Jüdisches Lehrhaus see Ephraim Meir, The Rosenzweig Lehrhaus. Proposal for Jewish House of Study in Kassel Inspired by Franz Rosenzweig’s Frankfurt Lehrhaus, Ramat Gan: Rappaport Center for Assimilation Research and Strengthening Jewish Vitality, Bar Ilan University, 2005; Hanoch Ben Pazi, »The Freies Jüdisches Lehrhaus: On Study and Midrash according to Franz Rosenzweig«, Education and Context 27 (2005), 157–170 [Heb.]. 10 On Rosenzweig’s place in the study of phenomenology of religion see Yehoyada Amir, »Religion and Religions in The Star of Redemption«, in: Luc Anckaert, Martin Brasser, Norbert Samuelson (eds.), The Legacy of Franz Rosenzweig. Collected Essays, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2004, 199–210. This material enables us to further analyze Rosenzweig’s work in the context of the study of religious phenomenology in the beginning of the twentieth century.

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and Jesus’ attitude towards it, and in it we can discern a pattern of thinking about the development of the religious act, and prayer in particular. 11 In a letter written to Rosenzweig on August 21, 1922, about a name for a lecture at the Lehrhaus, Buber suggests calling it »Primal Forms of Religious Life«. Buber’s insists that there really are »pagan religions«, and suggests the following diagram: Magic (the paganism in all religions)

Sacrifice Mystery Prayer

Religious Life

In his reply on August 22, 1922, Rosenzweig writes the following: It seems to me that the difference between us is in our outlook on history – that is, the world – and not in the acceptance of life, and therefore it is not important. I know paganisms and pagan religions, but I too do not know any pagans […]. I worked for three years on the solution to the same problem, from the spring of 1914 to the autumn of 1917. When I found it – when I was stumbling at night on a disgusting thorny plant, on my way from the front to Prilep in Macedonia – I knew »everything«. That was the moment when the kernel of my book was deposited in me (not yet in the form of a book); I knew the relationship between creation and revelation, and then six weeks later, when I tried to translate that from non-verbal knowledge into the language of words, all the rest welled up in me as though it were self-evident. In the introduction to the third section, I again found, in an outburst of joy, my good conscience toward Goethe […]. That is what happened to me with pagans. 12

11

See David Friedrich Strauss, Das Leben Jesu, kritisch bearbeitet, 2 vols., Tübingen: C. F. Osiander, 1835–1836 (The Life of Jesus, Critically Examined, transl. Eliot George, New York: Calvin Blanchard, 1860). And see Henry Hart Milman, The History of Christianity, from the Birth of Christ to the Abolition of Paganism in the Roman Empire, 3 vols., London: John Murray, 1840. 12 Franz Rosenzweig, Briefe und Tagebücher, 2 vols. (Der Mensch und sein Werk. Gesammelte Schriften, I), eds. Rachel Rosenzweig and Edith Rosenzweig-Scheinmann, in collaboration with Bernhard Casper, Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979 (hereafter: GS I), vol. 2, 815 f. On the importance of this seminal event see Benjamin Pollock, Knowing the All: Franz Rosenzweig’s System of Philosophy, Dissertation, Jerusalem: Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2006; id., Franz Rosenzweig and the Systematic Task of Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

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This excerpt makes a number of significant points for understanding the structure of the Star. Rosenzweig is clearly describing his personal experience, where nonverbal understanding succeeds in becoming verbal and conceptual. It emphasizes the basic philosophical position that words acquire meaning and from then the door is opened to confronting the Faust’s Mephisto, the questioning the meaning of the words. Are words just air and spirit, or are they like fire that gives meaning? 13 Rosenzweig now turns to a more precise and direct analysis of his understanding of Buber’s attitude to the development of religion. He writes: By magic you mean the pagan side – that is, »the pagan in all peoples«. And by the term prayer you mean the religious side – that is, »the Judaism in every religion«. And so, in the middle we can find »sacrifice« and »mystery« – two embodiments of religious life. 14

However, Rosenzweig tries in this letter to depict the order of things that would be appropriate for Buber in a slightly different way: Magic and pagan man Sacrifice: the religious act Mystery: the religious vision Prayer and the Jew. 15

Rosenzweig is also describing the process that begins with the various religions and the religious act. He will show that the movement toward prayer is the organizing basis for religion or, more accurately, for the transition to redemption, to truth. The process 13

See Ephraim Meir, »Goethe’s Place in Rosenzweig’s Star of Redemption«, Daat. A Journal of Jewish Philosophy & Kabbalah 48 (2002), 97–107 [Heb.]; Hanoch Ben Pazi, »›The Path that Leads to the One God, Must be walked in Part Without God‹«, The Germanic Review: Literature, Culture, Theory 93 (2018), no. 3, 230– 249. 14 GS I/2, 816. 15 Ibidem.

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of spiritual development goes from paganism to revelation to prayer: the pagan religions – the mythological religions – and the ecstatic act; the religions of revelation – theological rationalism – and the credo; the liturgical religions – the importance of prayer, to lead to redemption. It should be emphasized that this entire discussion must be understood against the context of the broader picture of the academic study of religion in Germany in the early twentieth century. This is an interesting subject in and of itself, and one of its most prominent figures is Rudolph Otto. 16 While Buber searched for what was common to all religions, Rosenzweig emphasized that beyond all the common characteristics, prayer alone had a unique Jewish quality. Thus Jewish prayer is the pathway to sacrifice and to liturgy; it is a call to God of a different nature. 2. »Prayer« – or What Do We Mean When We Use the Term »Prayer«? When Rosenzweig uses the term »prayer«, he does not refer to just any worship ritual, but a certain type of address of man to God, which must be understood precisely, and in stages. The term prayer is used in many senses: it can be a magical act, a halakhic act, an act of love, and can request love, forgiveness, or action. 17 16

On the emerging research in the phenomenology of religions see first and for most the magnum opus of Rudolf Otto, Das Heilige. Über das Irrationale in der Idee des Göttlichen und sein Verhältnis zum Rationalen, Breslau: Trewendt & Granier, 1917 (The Idea of the Holy, transl. John W. Harvey, London: Oxford University Press, 1958). And see Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction, 2 vols., 3rd ed., The Hague: Kluwer, 1982; Richard Schmitt, »Phenomenology«, in: Encyclopedia of Philosophy, New York: Macmillan, 1967, vol. 5, 133–151. 17 On the different perspectives of prayer see for example Bernhard Casper, »Über das Gebet. Betrachtungen zu Franz Rosenzweig im Hinblick auf Levinas«, in: Julie Kirchberg, Johannes Müther (eds.), Philosophisch-theologische Grenzfragen. Festschrift für Richard Schaeffler zur Vollendung des 60. Lebensjahres, Essen: Ludgerus, 1986; Ángel E. Garrido-Maturano, »Zeit als Gebet. Eine Einführung in die phänomenologische Bedeutung der Zeitigung des Selbst in Franz Rosenzweigs

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Furthermore, this question is connected to another matter: to whom is prayer addressed? Is it addressed to God, to man, to the community, to the collective, or to time? A range of common expressions are used to describe the liturgical offerings of all religions, without making precise distinctions between the different prayers. It is important to distinguish between the parts of prayer that are »real prayer« and others that serve other purposes: declaration, remembrance, hope, glorification, praise, and making a request before God. As we follow this process, we perceive clearly the special place Rosenzweig ascribes to the uniqueness of Jewish prayer, that is, to the tefillah par excellence, the ʿ Amida or Shemoneh-Esrei. It is not a declaration of faith or revelation, but a special gesture of request, daring to address a request to God. Prayer, for Rosenzweig, is dependent upon the ability to call the Lord’s name – to address God by name. This, of course, is a direct translation of the traditional form of blessings (rabbinical version of blessing) and Rosenzweig understands that this formula, so common and quotidian in the Jewish world, is unusual among other religions. In the final analysis, Rosenzweig will reveal to us that the formula of prayer is structured like the star of redemption, called the Magen David. Margarete Susman determined that the key to understanding the Star is the way in which Rosenzweig confronts Goethe, or as she puts it, the meaning of faith after the death of faith, the death of God. She presents us with an important question on the struggle for meaning, or what I call the process that shapes meaning. Faust challenges us with the loss of meaning, with the abrogation of words for the sake of nature, the sake of power itself. However

Stern der Erlösung«, in: Wolfdietrich Schmied-Kowarzik (ed.), Franz Rosenzweigs »neues Denken«. Internationaler Kongreß Kassel 2004, 2 vols., Freiburg/München: Karl Alber, 2006, vol. 2, 923–937; id., »Gebet als ereignishafter Weg zur Wahrheit. Bemerkungen über die Rosenzweigische Auffassung des Gebetes«, in: Yehoyada Amir, Yossi Turner, Martin Brasser (eds.), Faith, Truth, and Reason. New Perspectives on Franz Rosenzweig’s »Star of Redemption«, Freiburg/München: Karl Alber, 2012, 277–302.

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Rosenzweig concludes it is preceded by the confrontation with the basic tension between being and nothingness. 18 Faust’s Mephisto declares that all is without meaning. One who says God has no name will still describe nature itself as the embodiment of the power within it. In contrast, others say that meaning is found in giving something (God, man, good or nature) a name, and calling it by name. Although this statement appears as early as in the first part of the Star, it receives its full treatment only at the end, standing at the gate, the gate of life. 19 In dealing with the fear of the loss of meaning, Rosenzweig suggests not only the idea of revelation, but the way in which the idea of revelation is structured. If the metaphysical starting point is the primal question of »being« and »nothingness«, then the first processes that these principles enable are »becoming« and »disappearing«, which can be translated into individual terms as »emptying out« and »filling up«. These complicated processes make possible the individual perspective, whose climax is in giving a name, which is the recognition of the uniqueness of the other, at first, and ultimately, of God. The greatest meaning of this effort will become evident when man grants a name to God, the moment at which truth is the Holy One’s seal. 20 The process which leads to God is ultimately revealed by means of the seal of God, which is »truth«. The midrash to which Rosenzweig refers in one of its medieval versions, speaks of Adam being created from the earth by means of God’s seal which is »truth«, as it is written, »Truth springs up from the Earth« (Ps 85:12). The act of forming meaning to repel the danger 18

Cf. Norbert M. Samuelson, »The concept of ›Nichts‹ in Rosenzweig’s Star of Redemption«, in: Wolfdietrich Schmied-Kowarzik (ed.), Der Philosoph Franz Rosenzweig (1886–1929). Internationaler Kongreß Kassel 1986, 2 vols., Freiburg/ München: Karl Alber, 1988, vol. 2, 643–656. 19 Margarete Susman’s reading of The Star of Redemption is crucial in this point. See Ben Pazi, »›The Path that Leads to the One God, Must be walked in Part Without God‹«, 230–249. 20 Cf. Kenneth Hart Green, »The Notion of Truth in Franz Rosenzweig’s The Star of Redemption: A Philosophical Enquiry«, Modern Judaism 7 (1987), no. 3, 297–323.

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of the loss of meaning will finally occur in God’s presence, in the presence of his seal of truth. 3. Schelling and the Problem of Development of Religions The idea, developed by Rosenzweig, that the evolution of Judaism is part of the greater story of the evolution of religions is borrowed from Schelling. 21 Schelling conjured up one great story of the evolution of religions that connects the revealed religions to mythology and paganism, and leads up to the development of civilization of his time. However, Rosenzweig used this model to develop another conception of the evolution of religions, and placed the idea of redemption at the pinnacle. Schelling’s objective in his book on the eras of the world and human history enable a structured and ordered look at the development of religion, and the place of the monotheistic religions in human evolution. 22 The Hegelian tendency that tries to tell the great story of that movement hovers over the entire book, and includes careful attention to and appreciation for the primal ele21

Cf. Else-Rahel Freund, Franz Rosenzweig’s Philosophy of Existence. An Analysis of The Star of Redemption, transl. Stephen L. Weinstein and Robert Israel, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979, 17–22, 111–115; Agata Bielik-Robson, »›The Story Continues …‹ Schelling and Rosenzweig on narrative philosophy«, International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 80 (2019), no. 1–2, 127–142; Eliot R. Wolfson, Giving Beyond the Gift. Apophasis and Overcoming Theomania, New York: Fordham University Press, 2014; Cass Fisher, »Speaking Metaphysically of a Metaphysical God: Rosenzweig, Schelling, and the Metaphysical Divide«, in: Christian Wiese, Martina Urban (eds.), German-Jewish Thought Between Religion and Politics. Festschrift in Honor of Paul Mendes-Flohr on the Occasion of His Seventieth Birthday, Berlin/Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2012, 151–166. 22 Schelling’s view of development of religions is found in The Ages of the World. On Rosenzweig’s identification of a manuscript by Schelling and his idealistic theory of history see Franz Rosenzweig, Das älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus. Ein handschriftlicher Fund, Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1917; Horst Fuhrmans, Schellings Philosophie der Weltalter. Schellings Philosophie in den Jahren 1806–1821, Düsseldorf: L. Schwann, 1954; Samuel Hugo Bergmann, Toldot hafilosofyah ha-hadashah. Ya’akobi. Fikhte. Sheling, Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 1977, 37–153 [Heb.].

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ments of the religious gesture, as it relates to nothingness and being: the most basic elements of ecstatic spiritual experience – the mystical experience – in which appreciation is given to the act that goes as far as self-annihilation, or self-fulfillment in a variation on the well-known statement of the Kabbalists. Perhaps, we may make a variation of the well-known phrase: the place where the mystics’ heads are is where the feet of philosophers tread. Rosenzweig, in his article on »The New Thinking«, says so explicitly. 23 Not only are these primal elements the beginning of the religious experience, the movement towards God, but they are part of the world’s religious culture, and still exist in the cultures of India and China. 24 In fact, we can identify around those religious cultures the basic religious gestures toward the elements: God, man, and world. That is to say, the primal gestures of religiosity are repetitive gestures, which turn into being which fills everything or into nothingness that precedes everything. 25 This is what Rosenzweig calls listening, the ritual practice of meditation – and so he sees the importance of the repetitive Indian mantra »Om«. 26 Rosenzweig’s discussion of mythology emphasizes that while we 23

On the term itself see Aviezer Ravitzky, »A Kabbalist Confutation of Philosophy – The Fifteenth-Century Debate in Candia«, Tarbiz 58 (1989), 453–482 [Heb.]. 24 Cf. Stern, 38 f. / Star, 43 f. 25 A fair amount of research has been done on the place of East Asian civilizations in The Star of Redemption, see Wolfgang Bock, »In China: über das Motiv der Gewalt bei Walter Benjamin und Franz Rosenzweig«, Rosenzweig Jahrbuch / Rosenzweig Yearbook 6 (2011), 33–66; Pollock, Franz Rosenzweig and the Systematic Task of Philosophy, 165–172; Norbert M. Samuelson, A User’s Guide to Franz Rosenzweig’s Star of Redemption, London/New York: Routledge, 2010, 38–40, 54, 73–78; Hanoch Ben Pazi, »Rosenzweig between East and West: Restoration of India and China in The Star of Redemption«, RUDN Journal of Philosophy 24 (2020), no. 3, 362–378. 26 Cf. Stern, 39 / Star, 44. On the meaning of the mantra »Om«, see the classical work of F. Max Müller (ed.), The Sacred Books of the East, vol. 1, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1879, xxiii–xxvi; Stephen Knapp, The Heart of Hinduism. The Eastern Path to Freedom, Empowerment and Illumination, New York/Lincoln/Shanghai: iUniverse, 2005, 408–417; Jan Gonda, »The Indian Mantra«, Oriens 16 (1963), 244–297.

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are speaking of ancient cultures, indeed there are cultures that maintain belief in myth and mythology in our day as well. 27 In the particular reckoning suggested by Rosenzweig, he includes Indian, Chinese, and Greek mythology. Their religious manifestation has mystical spiritual meaning, an ecstatic experience that is still relevant to them. These elements are among the first modalities through which man seeks to understand his world. Mythologies are exceedingly complex, but they can be understood logically as a development of being and nothingness. They are the basic mythological positions from which it is possible to understand the human motivation to ascribe meaning to life. The mythological elements represent, for our purposes, the prayers and rituals of the pagan religions. Rosenzweig sees them as a legitimate stage in the development of human spirituality. The transition to the second part of the Star is achieved through a discussion of miracles and revelation, and thus the second level is built upon the first. 28 Only by building on those elements can the next stage of religiosity be reached: the religions of revelation: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. For Rosenzweig, these religions do not report on a revelation in the past, but one that can still take place at present. The meaning of revelation depends upon the actual experience of the individual or of the community. 29 As Rosenzweig will argue, the experience of revelation at present can occur through love, sacred scriptures, or law, while listening to the ritual reading of the Koran with its proper melody, or listening to the public reading of the Torah. Revelation makes it possible to come together, even to sing in unison. What is significant here are the varied ritual forms that are not understood as prayer, but as declarations of faith, allegiance, or obedience to the voice of God. These actions are not prayers to God, but rituals of a different sort, rituals of revelation.

27

See Freund, Franz Rosenzweig’s Philosophy of Existence, 37–40. See Stern, 174 / Star, 169. 29 Cf. Myriam Bienenstock, »Recalling the Past in Rosenzweig’s Star of Redemption«, Modern Judaism 23 (2003), no. 3, 226–242. 28

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The second part of the Star presents the reader with a complex but focused analysis of the religions of revelation. The description is not as simplistic as three religions – Judaism, Christianity, and Islam – but one that takes into account the complexity and differences between them. What they all have in common is the granting of meaning by the bestowal of a name. Calling by name begins in Genesis with Adam being called by name. It should be noted that the name »Adam« is the common property of all the religions of revelation. Parallel to this idea from Genesis, the religions of revelation also speak of calling a name to God. Some of their religious ceremonies are directly connected to the act of giving or calling a name. Rosenzweig regarded Islam as a religion of revelation, and accordingly analyzed the phenomenon of Islamic prayer. According to Rosenzweig, what we call prayer in Islam is equivalent to Christianity’s Credo and Judaism’s Shemaʿ Yisrael, but for him it does not meet the criteria for prayer, since the latter is the request for redemption. 30 However, real prayer can only be achieved between two religions of revelation – Judaism and Christianity, or, more accurately, between two particular concepts of revelation in Judaism and Christianity. 31 The most important transition is from prayer to redemption, which is a feature of two religions alone – Judaism and Christianity. 32 30

Rosenzweig’s relationship to Islam have been viewed both negatively and at times apologetically terms, see Gesine Palmer, Yossef Schwartz (eds.), »Innerlich bleibt die Welt eine«. Ausgewählte Texte zum Islam, Berlin: Philo, 2003; Yossef Schwartz, »On Two Sides of the Judaeo-Christian Anti-Muslim Front – Franz Rosenzweig and Muhammad Asad«, Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte 37 (2009), 63–77; Wayne Cristaudo, »Rosenzweig’s Stance Toward Islam: The ›Troubling‹ Matter of the Theo-Politics in The Star of Redemption«, Rosenzweig Jahrbuch / Rosenzweig Yearbook 2 (2007), 43–86. 31 Thus should we understand the development of the Johannine Church: see Samuelson, A User’s Guide to Franz Rosenzweig’s Star of Redemption, 236–241; Gibbs, Correlations in Rosenzweig and Levinas, 125–129, 149–154. On Schelling’s sources for Johannine Church in Rosenzweig see Vincent A. McCarthy, Quest for a Philosophical Jesus. Christianity and Philosophy in Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, and Schelling, Macon: Mercer University Press, 1986, 208–215. 32 The relationship between Judaism and Christianity in the Star is perhaps one

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What follows is an exacting analysis of the prayers themselves – in Judaism and the Church – of the gesture of Jewish and Christian prayer; more specifically, between the gesture of Jewish prayer in a minyan on Shabbat and the Mass on Sunday; 33 and between marking of the end of days within the week on the Jewish side and the circular return of the beginning of days in the Church. The daring attempt – daring from the scholarly, philological point of view – to identify the connections between Jewish liturgy and the text of the Mass is the basis for the study of liturgy that will facilitate the structure of the entire Star. 4. Analysis of the Third Part of The Star of Redemption The opening section of the third part must include a careful reading of the comparison between the Sabbath prayer of Judaism and the Christian mass on Sunday. There is no need to draw a comparison here between the ecclesia – the gathering of the community, which is the redeeming force – and the synagogue, which of its best known features, so I will not deal extensively with it, only as it relates to the religious act. See Shemaryahu Talmon, »Judaism and Christianity in Franz Rosenzweig’s perspective«, in: Maurice Carrez, Joseph Doré, Pierre Grelot (eds.), De la Tôrah au Messie. Études d’exégèse et d’herméneutique bibliques offertes à Henri Cazelles, Paris: Desclée, 1981, 587–598; Maurice G. Bowler, »Rosenzweig on Judaism and Christianity – The Two Covenant Theory«, Judaism 22 (1973), no. 4, 475–481; Stanisław Krajewski, »Franz Rosenzweig, the Jewish people, ›and‹ Christianity in dialogue«, Rosenzweig Jahrbuch / Rosenzweig Yearbook 11 (2018), 68–84; Yehoyada Amir, »The Star of Redemption: Between Judaism and Christianity«, Daat. A Journal of Jewish Philosophy & Kabbalah 29 (1992), 107–130 [Heb.]; Ephraim Meir, Star from Jacob. Life and Work of Franz Rosenzweig, Jerusalem: Hebrew University Magnes Press, 1994 [Heb.]; Pierre Masset, »Judaïsme et christianisme: ›L’étoile de la rédemption‹ de Franz Rosenzweig«, Nouvelle Revue Théologique 120 (1998), no. 3, 384–403. 33 For a comparative analysis between the Sabbath prayer and the Mass see Albert Gerhards, »Crossing Borders. The Kedusha and the Sanctus: A Case Study of the Convergence of Jewish and Christian Liturgy«, in: id., Clemens Leonhard (eds.), Jewish and Christian Liturgy and Worship. New Insights into its History and Interaction, Leiden: Brill, 2007, 27–40; Bruno Italiener, »The Mussaf-Kedushah«, Hebrew Union College Annual 26 (1955), 413–424.

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gathers together the minyan of worshippers. Rosenzweig calls for a comparison between the symbols of the cross and the star of redemption; between the physical buildings of the synagogue and the church; between the sacred days, Shabbat and Sunday; between the Christian and Jewish reading of Scriptures; 34 between the full cycle of Scriptures, like a wreath of Sabbaths, and selected texts. 35 More importantly, he sees the aggregation of those Sabbaths as a circle and the aggregation of Mass days as a line. Following Hegel, Rosenzweig devotes attention to the Christian conception of time, which sees time as one straight line without end, like a ray in motion. The Jewish counting of time, in contrast, moves in a circle of Shabbatot, of eternity in time. It speaks of »today« in the sense of a day that it is more than just today. 36 It is precisely through this comparison that the difference between Jewish and Christian rituals is clarified, and at the same time, the need is created to build a link between the two worlds. Rosenzweig’s invocation of the passage from Maimonides on Jesus’ message to the nations now requires a symbolic reference. While one group seeks the Kingdom of Heaven on earth, the other seeks to bring it about in Heaven. One appeal is to the Father, the other to the Son. In this way we can compare the var34

On the Christian and Jewish calendars and their treatment in the Star, see Steven Kepnes, Jewish Liturgical Reasoning, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, 79–129. 35 Rosenzweig highly regarded the weekly Torah portion, and saw it as an eternal garland of flowers for the course of the entire year. See Orr Scharf, Thinking in Translation. Scripture and Redemption in the Thought of Franz Rosenzweig, Berlin/ Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2019, 95–106. 36 For the significance of the term hayom in Deuteronomy, for Rosenzweig proposed understanding of this term (following Hermann Cohen) see Asher D. Biemann, »The ›And‹ of History: Thinking Side by Side in Rosenzweig’s Imagination of Eternity«, Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy 27 (2019), no. 1, 60– 85; Benjamin Pollock, »To Infinity and Beyond: Cohen and Rosenzweig on Comportment Toward Redemption«, in: Michael L. Morgan, Steven Weitzman (eds.), Rethinking the Messianic Idea in Judaism, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015, 174–194; Jonathan Cohen, »The Halakah, Sacred Events, and Time Consciousness in Rosenzweig and Soloveitchik«, Shofar. An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies 35 (2016), no. 1, 69–94.

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ious sections of the Amida and the Mass, and easily see how close they are to each other, and especially in reference to faith and credo, sanctification and kedushah, and between the sections of praise in the two worlds. There is also similarity in the request for forgiveness and the plea »ḥonnénu«, »ḥonnénu« (»forgive us«, »grant us grace«). From this emerges clearly the gap between prayer addressed to Jesus as the Lamb of God and prayer addressed to God, who delights in our rest. The first prayer is the request for the ability to pray. The unusual structure of the Star indicates that human prayer is a response to the voice that calls out to him, »Ayekka?«, »Where are you?«, to the voice that calls him by name »Adam«, meaning »human«, the voice that addresses him with love. Mutuality, reciprocity, is the greatest secret of revelation, since the human being learns about revelation not from hearing the voice of God but from the human reaction to hearing the voice. The experience of God’s love for man is heard by man during the liturgical prayer in which a thousand mouths profess »Shemaʿ Yisrael«, and »ve-ahavta«, »you shall love«. Who commands that love? It is actually the lover, who informs man he really is one who loves. For Rosenzweig, the liturgical encounter with God is an encounter with revelation that not only offers the possibility of prayer, but requires it. 37 Rosenzweig then directs our attention to Isaiah 43, the chapter that boldly declares that humans are God’s witnesses. The testimony to God’s existence grants significance to it. »You are My witnesses, says the LORD, and I am God«. It’s hard to say whether Rosenzweig knew the midrash at that time, but the language of the midrash in the name of Rabbi Shimon is even more audacious: »If you are not My witnesses – it is as though I am not God«. Rosenzweig directly proclaims the necessity of prayer as expressed in Isaiah 43:1:

37 Cf. Hanoch Ben Pazi, »Naʿ aseh Ve-nishmaʿ : A Generative Foundation of Judaism in Franz Rosenzweig’s Thought«, in: Schmied-Kowarzik (ed.), Franz Rosenzweigs »neues Denken«, vol. 2, 1013–1029.

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But now thus said the LORD – Who created you, O Jacob, Who formed you, O Israel: »Fear not, for I will redeem you; I have singled you out by name, You are Mine«.

What does it mean to be singled out by name? How does it establish the necessity of prayer? Rosenzweig relies here on the verses 19–20 in Psalm 66: But God did listen; He paid heed to my prayer. Blessed is God who has not turned away my prayer, or His faithful care from me.

Rosenzweig listens to the sound of the prayer within the prayer and discovers there the holy petition, pleading with God to reveal Himself again in the sight of all that lives. For this reason, Rosenzweig argues that the most important part of revelation is the continual petition that is never fully answered. Three facets that are one: bakkasha, »request« – Shehela, »question« – zaʾ aka, »appeal«, and only prayer is for their fulfillment. Prayer seeks to bring the future into the present, and thus to complete the redemption that has begun. The soul dares to petition because it placed its trust in God. That is the fruit of revelation, but the soul receives no response to that request. The permission granted it is the permission to cry out, to appeal. There is a difference, says Rosenzweig, between the ability to pray, the necessity to pray, and real prayer. There is prayer that is like a calling out, an appeal for redemption, but there is also another prayer: There is still another prayer. So the ultimate reality that belongs entirely to the Kingdom of Revelation remains quiet faith, the soul calmed in God’s »You are mine«, the peace it found in his eyes. There, the dialogue of love comes to an end. 38

Rosenzweig boldly combines two prayers, Jewish and Christian, and the common response to both: »Amen«, »True«. However, in order to separate them from magical, pagan prayer, and transform 38

Stern, 206 / Star, 199 f.

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prayer into the instrument of bringing about the Kingdom, Rosenzweig seeks out two illustrious prayers, that of Moses and of Goethe, the prayer of the believer and of the heretic. 39 The person who prays for himself acknowledges being created. Such a person allows wisdom to dwell within him in the way that God made him. He has to unite with others who pray to all the sons of the divinity. Wisdom dwells within him, in his being a person with »the fear of heaven«. Rosenzweig touches upon the importance of a double dimension: the call directed inward and outward, the call of the believer and of the heretic, the call of Judaism and Christianity. In truth, these are all reflections of each other. The process leads to the truth, and from it … back into life. And this is how Rosenzweig describes the meaning of truth that grows from prayer: Divine truth hides from the one who reaches for it with one hand only, regardless whether this reaching hand is that of philosopher’s realism, which imagines itself as having no presuppositions, soaring above things, or the theologian’s blindness that, proud of its experience, shuts itself off from the world. It wants to be implored with both hands. To the one who calls to it with the double prayer of the believer and of the unbeliever, it will not be denied. God gives of his wisdom to the one as to the other, to belief as to unbelief, but to both only when their prayer comes jointly before him. 40

Conclusion At the beginning, I set out to reread and rediscover a new understanding of the introduction to the third part of the Star. I wanted to understand the meaning of the prayer that brings about or precedes redemption. In my humble opinion, at the end of the jour39

I return to the importance of Goethe’s Faust in the Star, for the ultimate question of prayer is resolved in the comparison between Moses and Goethe, between the prayer of the believer and the prayer of the unbeliever. 40 Stern, 329 f. / Star, 314 f.

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ney, I think that my inquiry reveals that prayer is without a doubt the central concern, the shaping force of the entire book. The correspondence between Rosenzweig and Buber about the development of religions and the religious act revealed the various aspects of the latter, starting from pagan religions to the three monotheistic religions, and finally to the two praying religions. The ontological tension between nothingness and being becomes an existential tension that finds expression in the mythological religions. Mythology, after all, is the possibility of thinking about being that is not being. The religions of India and China devoted their efforts to reach nothingness, or to reach being. Their call is meditation directed toward nothingness and being. The religions of revelation bring about a transition when they recognize speech, the tongue that speaks the language of God that is revealed, the Scriptures. The religious act of revelation is the religious act of calling God by name, and the profession of faith, which includes both the love of and subjugation to God. All of these reach their peak in the ability to pray, the ability to pray for the advent of the Kingdom of Heaven, and possibility of bringing about redemption. This is no small step, but rather a profound one that goes from eternity to the present and from the present to the eternal. It takes place through Jewish prayer, which is beyond time. It also happens through Christian prayer, which establishes time. It happens through the linking up of creation, revelation, and redemption, and through the creation of truth in the form of a star, a Magen David. If we place these two symbols one on top of the other, we can even see the Magen David whose rays radiate out to infinity. This is the ultimate image of the truth that Rosenzweig sought to posit in the Star. And if I were to return to the starting point of the Star, the star is the central image that makes it possible to grapple with truth and being in the face of meaninglessness, which is the great danger that Rosenzweig grappled with, embodied in the call of Mephisto in Goethe’s Faust. In that sense, the prayer that the Star composes is the ultimate answer to the danger of the loss of meaning of existence, and from it the gates open into life.

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Giacomo Petrarca (Vita-Salute San Raffaele University of Milan)

Erbeten, Prayer and Action: TheologicalPolitical Glimpses at Franz Rosenzweig

The theological-political configuration of the third part of Der Stern der Erlösung (The Star of Redemption; henceforth: Star) 1 is essentially built upon the concept of erbeten. This element is strictly linked to the concept of prayer (Gebet) and it essentially entails the risk of tyranny, from which no prayer is exempted. Because of its internal constitution, prayer has a very peculiar tension between waiting and anticipation. In this paper, I would like to show some implications of this tension in theological-political terms and its relationship with the problem of tyranny on the Kingdom. It is not by chance that this problem structurally involves the meaning of redemption that springs up from the conclusion of the Star, perhaps just in opposition to Rosenzweig’s explicit purposes. I have divided this research into three sections: a first section, in which I will propose an etymological and philosophical analysis of the word erbeten and of its centrality in Rosenzweig’s theological-political understanding; a second section about the risks of prayer contributing to tyranny in Rosenzweig’s reflection; a third section, in which I will submit some critical remarks on the last part of the Star, in particular concerning Rosenzweig’s interpretation of the Sabbath day.

1

Franz Rosenzweig, Der Stern der Erlösung (Der Mensch und sein Werk. Gesammelte Schriften, II), ed. Reinhold Mayer, Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976 (hereafter: GS II); id., The Star of Redemption, transl. Barbara E. Galli, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005 (hereafter: Star).

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1. The Concept of Erbeten: On the Introduction to the Third Part of The Star of Redemption As is well-known, Rosenzweig published the Star without a foreword because of his deep disregard of every form of philosophical introduction, which he considered as a sort of narcissistic »cackling after the egg had been laid« 2 by the philosopher. Evidently, Rosenzweig’s stance is not limited to this merely polemical choice; on the contrary, it seriously declares a methodological warning through which he proposes a different conception and use of a foreword. Locking at it more closely, one can easily notice that the Star has three specific introductions to each part of the book, although there is not a principal foreword. Each introduction represents a sort of ›programmatic manifesto‹ in which Rosenzweig discloses the philosophical task he is addressing in each part of his book. 3 In this sense, the introduction assumes a methodological and practical value, indicating what each part should achieve, in opposition to the classical philosophical foreword which showed its purpose as something that had already been achieved. This is a specific philosophical criterion which characterizes Rosenzweig’s entire reflection as a philosophy always in fieri, at every moment ›under construction‹. This programmatic manifesto is essentially expressed by, on one hand, a title of the introduction, and, on the other hand, by an exergue (in Latin) expressed through a short invective. We must pay close attention to these invectives, because they immediately make it possible to understand the main topic of each section of the book. In fact, as the critique of totality exposed in the first part is undertaken under the ›battle cry‹ »in phi-

2

Franz Rosenzweig, »The New Thinking. A Few Supplementary Remarks to the Star«, in: Alan Udoff, Barbara E. Galli (ed. and transl.), Franz Rosenzweig’s »The New Thinking«, New York: Siracuse University Press, 1999 (hereafter: NT ), 67. 3 Despite of Rosenzweig’s critique against the philosophical tradition, the meaning of this task does not lose its »systematic« attitude in favor of an irrationalist or anti-philosophical orientation. On this fundamental point in Rosenzweig’s philosophy, see Benjamin Pollock, Franz Rosenzweig and the Systematic Task of Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

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losophos!«, 4 the exergue of the second part »in theologos!« is an explicit critique against the forms through which theology has interpreted the ›categories‹ of creation, revelation and redemption – which, according to Rosenzweig, are not categories but relational events. In the wake of this same structure, the introduction of the third part is titled: Über die Möglichkeit das Reich zu erbeten. I would like to propose a purely lexical analysis of this title. The English translation by Barbara Galli proposes the following version: On the Possibility of Obtaining the Kingdom by Prayer. It is a good translation, although, as we shall shortly see, it gives us only a part of the meaning of the German expression used by Rosenzweig. For this reason, it will be necessary to stick fairly close to Rosenzweig’s text trying a literal translation of the syntagm which composes this title and offering a semantic and philosophical analysis of its meaning. In the first part of the syntagm, we can read: »über die Möglichkeit«, which literally means »on the possibility«. What is this possibility? Möglichkeit is a possibility which has not yet become real or actual. It is not something of simply ›potential‹. On the contrary, it specifies something which has to become real. It is very interesting to underline how Rosenzweig shows this kind of possibility precisely at this point of the Star, after the Schwelle (Threshold ) 5 beyond which we can find Die Gestalt oder die ewige Überwelt (The Configuration or the Eternal Supra-World ). The meaning of this supra-world is undoubtedly a very controversial matter; perhaps, one of the most controversial in Rosenzweig’s masterpiece. 6 Despite this consistent difficulty in respect to an 4

On this point see Myriam Bienenstock, »Franz Rosenzweig et sa critique des philosophies de l’esprit«, Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 104 (1999), no. 3, 291–312. 5 This Threshold is a paradigm of an existential, historical and philosophical condition for Rosenzweig. See Wolfdietrich Schmied-Kowarzik, »Der Ausbruch aus dem Idealismus und die Sinneserfahrung unseres geschichtlichen Daseins«, in: Luc Anckaert, Martin Brasser, Norbert Samuelson (eds.), The Legacy of Franz Rosenzweig. Collected Essays, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2004, 102. 6 Benjamin Pollock has explored the meaning of this ›controversial‹ notion of

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appropriate definition of this word (though I will shortly provide a summary of its meaning below), it coincides with the place and field of history. Only at this point of the Star, the elements of the »ever renewed world« finally find their Wirklichkeit, their own reality in the sense that they become real, operative, ›historical‹. 7 At the »supra-world« and its connections with world, history and their ›possible‹ overcoming. See Benjamin Pollock, Franz Rosenzweig’s Conversions. World Denial and World Redemption, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014, esp. chap. 4, 127–215. On the mystical influences on Rosenzweig’s thought, see Gershom Scholem, »On Franz Rosenzweig and His Familiarity with Kabbala Literature«, Naharaim 6 (2012), no. 1, 1–6; Enrico Lucca, »Gershom Scholem on Franz Rosenzweig and His Familiarity with Kabbala Literature«, Naharaim 6 (2012), no. 1, 7–19; Elliot R. Wolfson, »Facing the Effaced. Mystical Eschatology and the Idealistic Orientation in the Thought of Franz Rosenzweig«, Journal for the History of Modern Theology / Zeitschrift für Neuere Theologiegeschichte 4 (1997), no. 1, 39–81; Moshe Idel, »Franz Rosenzweig and Kabbalah«, in: Paul MendesFlohr (ed.), The Philosophy of Franz Rosenzweig, Hanover/London: Brandeis University Press, 1988, 162–171. 7 In the Interlude of his book, Repetition and Philosophical Crumbs, transl. Marylin G. Piety, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, Søren Kierkegaard asks: »Is the past more necessary than the future? or has the possible, by having become actual, become more necessary than it was?« (140). The negative answer is trenchant. According to Kierkegaard, irreversibility does not mean necessity, if »necessity stands completely alone; nothing at all comes to be with necessity, just as little as necessity comes to be, or that something by coming to be becomes necessary. Nothing is because it is necessary, but the necessary is because it is necessary, or because the necessary is. The actual is no more necessary than the possible is, because that which is necessary is absolutely different from both« (ibid., 142). Kierkegaard makes becoming free from the Hegelian ›prison‹ of necessity. This means that there is no mediation between becoming and history, it is a ›fact‹ : »Everything that has come to be eo ipso historical; because even if nothing else historical could be applied to it, the decisive predicate of the historical can be predicated of it: it has come to be« (ibid., 143). This radical conception of temporality undoubtedly influences Rosenzweig’s reflection, as he writes in »The New Thinking«: »It is not what happens in [time] that happens, but it, it itself happens«. I am aware of several difficulties that this comprehension of the notion of history in the Star implicates; in particular, I am aware of ambiguous and dangerous consequences which could derivate from an unhistorical conception of the revelation in the second part. Anyway, from the perspective of the second part of the Star we are able to conceive the conditions of possibility of history and its redemption, but not its real happening. For a different perspective on this pro-

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same time, this history obtains a meta-historical dimension that leads it beyond itself (to the Gestalt). It is only in the light of these provisional clarifications that we can understand the meaning of Möglichkeit as the possibility of history andof redemption, or better, possibility of the concrete reality of this history and its redemption. The Kingdom is properly the happening of this history as the history of redemption. The role of this theological-political connection between history and redemption is especially interesting and we shall pay much attention to its peculiarities. In Rosenzweig’s view, history and redemption are not the same event (Rosenzweig is not Hegel, of course), although both share the same perspective. 8 In this way, redemption is closely linked to the meaning that Rosenzweig confers on the concept of history, if history needs to be ›redeemed‹, in order to ›become‹ authentically itself. We should remember that only in this third part, Rosenzweig introduces the concept of community, the true ›keystone‹ of the connection between history and redemption. After all these considerations, we have acquired some important elements to enrich our etymological analysis. We have seen that there is a possibility of making something real. We should ask: who or what has this faculty to do that? How can the Kingdom be made as present? It is only at this point that we can find our keyword: erbeten. We have to recognize that the English translation of this syntagm reveals two precious clues: 1) this possible Kingdom must be obtained, earned (otherwise, it would not have been possible but real); 2) in order to obtain this achievement of the Kingdom, we cannot use any instrument than prayer (i. e. »to obtain blem, see Luca Bertolino, Il nulla e la filosofia. Idealismo critico e esperienza religiosa in Rosenzweig, Torino: Trauben, 2005, in which he shows that revelation is essentially a historical event that we can already find in the second part of the Star. 8 Gérard Bensussan has underlined the sense of this proximity and distance between Hegel and Rosenzweig, in »Hegel et Rosenzweig: le franchissement de l’horizon«, in: Franz Rosenzweig, Hegel et l’État, transl. Gérard Bensussan, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1991, 19–43. See also Gérard Bensussan, »État et éternité chez Franz Rosenzweig«, in: Arno Münster (ed.), La pensée de Franz Rosenzweig. Actes du colloque parisien organisé à l’occasion du centenaire de la naissance du philosophe, Paris: Presse Universitaires de France, 1994, 137–148.

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the Kingdom by prayer«). This means that the Kingdom must be requested through the prayer or, more precisely, through the »act of praying«. According to Rosenzweig, prayer is always an action, a performative act, a praxis. However, from the word erbeten we can infer much more elements. If we look up to its etymology, the stem of erbeten [erbitten] (such as the German word Arbeit) recalls a semantic plexus which directly refers to the Greek stem of ἔρδω, which means: to do, to work, to operate. The erbeten is not just any prayer or a simple request for something, but it is a peculiar prayer which claims and wants that what it asks for is obtained. For this reason, the other possible solution in the translation of erbeten – that is, »of entreating« – does not seem very convincing ever; in fact, erbeten is not simply a deep supplication (entreaty), but a prayer that is such that realizes its content. 9 9

We also borrow and shape the idea of the meaning of erbeten from the other available translations of Der Stern der Erlösung. The French translation proposes »De la possibilité d’obtenir le Royaume par la prière« (Alexandre Derczanski and Jean-Louis Schlegel, 2003), while the Spanish edition translates with »Sobre la posibilidad de alcanzar el Reino orando« (Miguel García-Baró, 1997). Both versions basically reflect the same solution chosen by the English translator: on the one hand, there is a necessity to obtain the Kingdom and, on the other hand, there is an instrument – a kind of very special and unprecedented tool – in order to do that: the prayer. However, in this kind of translation the connection between prayer and realization of the Kingdom completely remains unquestioned. In other words, there is no separation between the obtaining of the Kingdom and the act of praying for this accomplishment, if the syntagm erbeten holds them within itself. In this regard, the Italian translation follows a different path by keeping the track of the German version: »Sulla possibilità di impetrare il Regno« (Gianfranco Bonola, 1985). It is important to draw our attention to this verb by which Italian translator expresses the syntagm zu erbeten: impetrare (the modern Italian preserved the same form as the Latin). We can find an archaic analogous English form of the same verb »to impetrate«, evidently deriving from the same Latin verb, impetrare, of which we can indicate almost two different etymologies: the first one, deriving from the Latin word petra (Engl. »stone«) which indicates a certain form of realization: »to become a stone«, »to harden like a stone«; the second one, from the Latin in- and patrare (from pater, Engl., »father«) that means: »to perform an act in the quality of a father«, then from the beginning of the fourteenth century, »to execute, to conclude«, or again »to obtain with prayers, with supplications, or generally to achieve a thing strongly desired«, »get-

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To obtain the Kingdom by prayer is, first of all, a gesture, an action which already has its own strength, its ability to achieve the Kingdom (according to the first meaning: erbeten as to become a stone, build up). In this case the prayer is not simply an instrument, but it properly is the action (the praying) through which the fulfillment of the Kingdom is achieved. Therefore, such a kind of action-prayer not only asks for something, not only has the claim of obtaining what it asks for, but it properly achieves what it desires to, bringing to completion what it waits for. Therefore, the possibility of obtaining the Kingdom seems above all in the hands of those who ask for this Kingdom, of those who claim its coming. It is precisely at this point we can find a substantial difficulty, given that – as we have already mentioned – the introduction of this third part presents a particular exergue: »in tyrannos!«. What does it mean? Or better: who are the tyrants of the Kingdom? And above all: in what does their tyranny consist of? Rosenzweig says that tyrants are those who require to bring the Kingdom before its own time. What is the ›proper‹ time of the Kingdom? If the act of achievement is a prayer which not only asks for the coming of the Kingdom, but demands its advent because it causes this advent, why is not already this assertion a form of tyranny? This is the point, the neuralgic problem of the whole third part of the Star.

ting what you ask«. The verb impetrare appears (we are not able to say if for the first time) in a translation of the Bible in the Tuscan language – La Bibbia tradotta in lingua toscana, di lingua hebrea, per il reverendo maestro Santi Marmochini fiorentino, con molte cose utilissime & degne di memoria [The Bible translated into the Tuscan language, from the Hebrew language, by the Reverend Santi Marmochini from Florence, with several very useful things & worthy of memory] –, published in 1546 in order to translate Psalm 4:3: »Sapiate ch’esaltato ha il gran Signore / il Santo suo, onde spero impetrare / chiamando a quello con perfetto amore« [»Remember that the Great Lord exalted / his Saint, so I wish to impetrate (my prayer) / calling to him with perfect love«]. If we combine the several pieces of this manifold etymological puzzle, we can discover a deeply pertinent analogy to Rosenzweig’s notion: finally, erbeten shows us its most authentic meaning.

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2. Prayer as Temptation: The Theological-Political Background I have already reminded the reader that the third part of the Star is focused on the concept of prayer. Rosenzweig specifically mentions some different forms of prayer (the prayer of the sinner and the zealot one) underlining the centrality of the prayer »of the right time«. 10 After a complex and articulated exposition, he demonstrates that the practical essence of the prayer is constitutively characterized by its temporality. Prayer is definitely the way through which one experiences time and a specific form of temporality. In spite of the different types of prayer, a common element remains constant in each kind of prayer, namely its ›practical‹ nature, its power to accomplish what it asks for. Rosenzweig defines this ›power‹ of prayer in a very specific way, as the »possibility of tempting God«. Opening the third part of the Star, he writes: The assertion that one might be able to tempt God is perhaps the most absurd of the many absurd assertions that faith has brought into the world. 11

It is die absurdeste Behauptung, of course, but we shall pay closer attention to this rhetorical construction: it is the most absurd of the many absurd ideas, precisely because it is the ›realest‹ one, the most concrete and most tyrannical idea. Rosenzweig explains in which way this power of tempting God falls back against those who are tempting him. Man can tempt God because, in this temptation, God is already tempting him. It is important to note that, in this chain of reciprocal actions and conditionings, Rosenzweig points at the construction of a very peculiar nexus of his theological-political conception. And he writes: But precisely in prayer, Jews and Christians incessantly repeat the petition: »Lead us not into temptation!« So here it is the reverse: there is produced before God the twofold denial of his providence and of his fatherly love. It is he who would be thought capable of permitting him10 11

GS II, 304 / Star, 291. GS II, 295 / Star, 283.

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self the sacrilegious game of »tempting« his creature and his child. If prayer were then really the opportunity to tempt God, this opportunity would still be severely restricted due to the ever-present fear that possibly when the one who is praying thinks he is tempting, is already himself being tempted. 12

This passage draws attention to two essential elements: 1) this act of temptation is not singular, individual, but it is essentially plural (»Lead us not …«). As a consequence of this, this act of prayer finds its most appropriate expression in the space of community; 2) this constitutive link between activity (to tempt) and passivity (to be tempted ) produces, under the temporal nature of the prayer, a deep tension between anticipation and waiting. Just as the active peculiarity of prayer represents its power to anticipate the Kingdom so its passivity represents its capacity of waiting. For this reason, the meaning of erbeten completely depends on that (temporal) tension between anticipation and waiting; that is, if the erbeten represents the act to obtain the Kingdom, this fulfillment becomes an act which involves time and, for that, a tyranny on time (whatever its meaning is). Rosenzweig’s theological-political construction is not immune to the ›tyrannical‹ danger that every theological-political construction carries within itself. I would like to show how Rosenzweig tries to escape this risk and what internal consequences are produced by this problem in the structure of the Star. Despite the process of the Star being apparently triumphal, this element represents a great difficulty which requires reconsidering the whole path. Two explanations are needed: the first one is about the mere editorial circumstances of the book, the other one is related to the structure of Rosenzweig’s masterpiece. As is known, the Star was published in 1921. This date represents a pause, almost a parenthesis, a narrow and ephemeral standstill between the violence of the Great War and the horror and folly of another violence, which brings damnation on the future generations. Personally, I am always distressed by the complete absence of a feeling or a suspicion of that menace in Rosenzweig’s work. The great conclusion titled: 12

Ibidem.

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The Star or Eternal Truth is similar to a »happy ending«. The destinations of Judaism and Christianity are perfectly reconciled in the same divine project, »both, Jew and Christian, are workers on the same task«, 13 each one according to his nature and his place in the world. To use an Hegelian expression, we could say that theory and praxis are balanced, the task of the Jew or the Christian is known to themselves. There is no mystery in their operation, the own meaning of their doing is clarified in the openness of their common task. Confronted with this epilogue, a question springs up: where all is clear, where everything is illuminated, where God is seen »face to face« (panim el panim, Exod 33:11; videmus […] facie ad faciem, 1 Cor 13:12) is the vision again possible? When each prayer is immediately listened to and satisfied by God because there is no distance between the one who prays and God, is the action possible again? That means: is the distinction, the finitude conceivable again? The conclusion of the Star is at any rate ambiguous and it is open to some different possible interpretations. 14 Rosenzweig returns to this point in his essay »The New Thinking« – that strange postface to the Star that, in some way, is a deep and radical calling into question of Rosenzweig’s masterpiece. He writes: The temples of the gods have rightly fallen, their statues rightly stand in the museum, their worship, as far as it was set in order and codified, may have been a single enormous error – but the invocation that called out to them from a tormented breast, and the tears shed by the Carthaginian father, who offered up his son as a sacrifice to Moloch, cannot have remained unheard, or unseen. Or is God supposed to have waited for Sinai or even for Golgotha? No, as little as there are roads leading from Sinai or from Golgotha by which he may reached with certainty, so little could he have refused to meet even the one who sought him on the mountain trails surrounding Olympus. 15 13

GS II, 462 / Star, 438. See Elliot R. Wolfson, »Facing the Effaced. Mystical Eschatology and the Idealistic Orientation in the Thought of Franz Rosenzweig«, Journal for the History of Modern Theology / Zeitschrift für Neuere Theologiegeschichte 4 (1997), no. 1, 39– 81. 15 »The New Thinking«, NT, 91. 14

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The problem no longer applies to the pagan prayer and the meaning of its supposed veracity or fallacy before the revelation, as for Schelling’s conception. 16 Rosenzweig does not move back the meaning of the revelation to the pagan age, as if paganism was a sort of secret and hidden revelation. On the contrary, he states the uncertainty of the pagane prayer – so its absence of relatedness – to the heart of his own meaning of revelation. In other words, if on the one hand Rosenzweig tries to recover the value of the pagane religious experience providing a foundation to the paganism, on the other hand he produces an abyss in the same concept of revelation. He writes: There is no temple built which would be so near to him that would permit man to be confident of this nearness, and none which would be so far from him that his arm could not easily reach even to there, no direction out of which he could not come, none out of which he had to come, no block of wood in which perhaps he does not at some time take up a dwelling, and no Psalm of David which always reaches his ear. 17

Rosenzweig brings into discussion the meaning of revelation itself, namely the sense of the manifest and unclosed word of the prayer. But this operation is not without consequences: inside the space of revelation, the place apparently safest, a distance, or more, a ›fracture‹ springs up. The Psalm which represents the unclosed word, relational-word, could also not receive response: »no 16

It stands to reason that Schelling’s influence is enormous in this passage, despite the distance of Rosenzweig to Schelling is as much deep. In fact, Rosenzweig makes a radical transformation of his point of view regarding Schelling’s temporal conception, restoring the centrality of the future as actual and real event of redemption. On this point see Stéphane Mosès, Système et Révélation. La philosophie de Franz Rosenzweig, Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1982; Myriam Bienenstock, »Mythe et révélation dans l’›Étoile de la rédemption‹. Contemporanéité de Franz Rosenzweig«, Archives de Philosophie 55 (1992), no. 1, 17–34; Robert Gibbs, »The Limits of Thought. Rosenzweig, Schelling and Cohen«, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 43 (1989), no. 4, 618–640; Xavier Tilliette, »Philosophie et révélation. L’étoile de la rédemption de Franz Rosenzweig«, Axes. Recherches pour un dialogue entre christianisme et religions 14 (1982), no. 3, 21–28; id., »Rosenzweig et Schelling«, Archivio di Filosofia 53 (1985), 141–152; Claudio Belloni, Filosofia e rivelazione. Rosenzweig nella scia dell’ultimo Schelling, Venezia: Marsilio, 2002. 17 »The New Thinking«, NT, 91.

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Psalm of David which always reaches his ear«. The possibility of this non-relational outcome does not have to be regarded as a metaphor concerning simply the prayer and its fulfillment, but it shows a space, an essential nature of the word (and consequently of the prayer), where it is always – in some way – at risk. In the third part of the book, which is the one we are focusing on, we can exactly find the non-foundational character of the relationship in the tension between anticipation and waiting. The praxis of prayer is always in fieri, it is not a ›definitive‹ act nor certain, in as much as its claim to force (anticipate) the coming of the Kingdom collides with the recognition of the fact that Kingdom comes according to its own time. As Rosenzweig hardly writes: »Time and hour are all the more powerful the less man knows them«. 18 For this reason, every act of prayer is a tyranny on the Kingdom, when it does not recognize this radical and constitutive otherness between itself and its praxis. In a certain sense, we could affirm that an act of tyranny, according to Rosenzweig, is a form of idolatry: idolatry of fulfillment, idolatry of achieved end. 3. »Der Traum von Vollendung«: Rosenzweig on Sabbath Day This anti-idolatry tendency is radically embodied by the tension between anticipation and waiting; we can find the highest expression of that within Rosenzweig’s interpretation of the Sabbath day. 19 Rosenzweig offers an original and very suggesting reading of the Sabbath day. As is well-known, the prescription of sanctifying the Sabbath day appears in two different passages of the Torah: »Remember [zakhor] the Sabbath day, to sanctify it [leqadesho]« (Exod 20:8) and »Observe [shamor] the Sabbath day, to sanctify it [leqadesho]« (Deut 5:12). It is well-known as, according to the rabbinic tradition, this double formulation was pronounced in a 18

GS II, 302 / Star, 290. An analysis of these pages of the Star is present in Steven Kepnes, Jewish Liturgical Reasoning, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, 79–130.

19

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single utterance. 20 Beyond the divine extraordinariness that the commentary wants to emphasise, the fact that action is prescribed to be done twice shows a temporal and practical tension that Sabbath day brings in itself. A tension which involves the same act of sanctification of the day in the same way as the tension between anticipation and waiting involved the act of communitarian prayer. As the Midrash explains: »Remember« and »observe«. »Remember« before it and »observe« after it. Based on this, they declared: One adds on from the profane to the sacred. This may be illustrated by the parable of a wolf that is lurking in front of and behind a person (Mekhilta de Rabbi Ishmael Baḥodesh 6).

In a nutshell: the praxis of the prayer (sanctification) sanctifies the Sabbath day in accordance with what is prescribed by the Torah, but this same act of sanctification has to recognise its constitutive incompleteness. Prayer sanctifies the ›day of holiness‹ but, at the same time, the holiness of the Sabbath does not completely depend on the sanctification by prayer, because its holiness ›precedes‹ its sanctification as »a wolf that is lurking in front of and behind a person«. Therefore, sanctifying the Sabbath needs to add on something from the profane to the sacred: the sacred that we sanctify will be always our image of that sanctity, in the same way as the imagination of fulfillment of the Kingdom will be always our imagination, our representation of the Kingdom. Starting from this perspective, Rosenzweig reconsiders the entire liturgy of Sabbath day in the light of this anti-tyrannic (read: anti-idolatrous) awareness, highlighting his significant insistence on the rite of havdalah (separation). Once arrived at the end of the ›day of rest‹, Rosenzweig suggestively describes the experience of its eternity:

20 »‫ את כל הדברים האלה‬All these words – This statement (that God spoke all these words) tells us that the Holy One, blessed be He, said all these words in one utterance, something that is impossible to a human being to do – to speak in this manner« (Rashi on Exod 20:1). The same unity is reaffirmed in the famous liturgical song Lekhah Dodi (during the welcoming of Sabbath liturgy): »›Observe‹ and ›remember‹ in a single utterance« (‫)שמור וזכור בדבור אחד‬.

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All this rings, too, in the Sabbath afternoon prayer in the hymn on the one people of the One. And the songs of the »third meal«, for which in the twilight of the sinking day gray-haired ones and children are united around the table set long ago, are completely drunk by the transport of the future of the Messiah, which is surely drawing near. 21

The Sabbath is the day of this eternity celebrated within the time, day of cessation and achievement in which profane time is suspended and arrested, or more precisely, sanctified. The experience of Sabbath day becomes an experience of a time which not only prepares itself to welcome eternity, but which anticipates the eternity within itself, as a memorial to creation, reminder of the exodus from Egypt and anticipation of the day of redemption. Therefore, the day of fulfillment holds within itself the perfect scan of what has been, what is and what will be; it contracts these three moments (or temporal ecstasies) in the hayyom / Heute 22 in which the community invokes the Unique Name, in this »today« in which Israel’s eternity has been planted in time. For on the Sabbath the community feels, as far as it can in any such anticipation, as if redeemed – already today. The Sabbath is the holiday of the Creation, but of a Creation that took place for the sake of Redemption. The Sabbath is revealed at the end of Creation and as the meaning and goal of Creation. For that reason we celebrate the holiday of the very first work not on the first day of Creation, but on its last – on the seventh day. 23

The sanctity of the day of Sabbath is not an oblivion, it is not a cancellation of the tension between anticipation and its fulfill21

GS II, 347 / Star, 332. The same »Heute« of which Rosenzweig writes to Gertrud Oppenheim on February 5, 1917: »Da fragt er: wann kommst du, Herr? Messias antwortet: Heute. Da geht er fröhlich heraus und wartet bis zum Abend. Als aber Messias immer noch nicht kommt, sagt der Rabbi zu Elias: Messias hat gelogen; er sagte, er käme heute. Antwortet Elias: er meinte: (Zitat aus Psalm 91 oder 92 oder 93, 94) ›heute, wenn ihr auf meine Stimme hört‹« – so in Franz Rosenzweig, Briefe und Tagebücher, 2 vols. (Der Mensch und sein Werk. Gesammelte Schriften, I), eds. Rachel Rosenzweig and Edith Rosenzweig-Scheinmann, in collaboration with Bernhard Casper, Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979, vol. 1, 345. 23 GS II, 349 / Star, 334. 22

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ment, on the contrary, it is essentially an experience of this tension. It is only for this reason that the holiday of the beginning is celebrated on the last day. However, the community evokes this ›last‹ day »as far as it can in any such anticipation«. For this reason, fulfillment is certainly the beginning, it is finally the unveiling of the mystery of ›origin‹, precisely: seventh day, not the first; nevertheless it remains, at same time, uncompleted, it waits for – as fulfillment – its own completeness. If anticipating means to accomplish something, then anticipation shall not simply accelerate the fulfillment, but it consumes it, since it reveals its (of the fulfillment) incompleteness. It is precisely because anticipated fulfillment that, every time, it has to consume its anticipation. Therefore, this means that the anticipation is nothing so different than waiting if, as Rosenzweig openly explains, »prayer of course, when it illuminates, shows the eye the farthest goal«. 24 We can easily understand why, at this point, the rite of separation in the Sabbath evening (havdalah) becomes the keystone of all the path made so far. In fact, we have to go out from the holiness. It is necessary to separate ourselves from our own claim of plenitude, in order that it does not become the highest form of hybris, if the extreme form of tyranny properly consists of estimating ourselves as ›holies‹ in that holiness. According to Rosenzweig, the separation from the ›holy‹ day represents an essential moment to this act of ›sanctification‹ of Sabbath day. In a certain sense, it is a paradoxical sanctification which recognizes the fact that sanctifying something means to be able to recognise a distance between itself and its (achieved) accomplishment: The fulfillment does not yet take place in this Sabbath itself […]. A child holds the fire-brand that an old man kindles, awakening with the last goblet emptied with closed eyes, from the dream of perfection that the holiday of the seventh day had woven. Outside of the sanctuary it is a matter of again finding the road into the everyday. Upon the alternation of holy and ordinary, of seventh day and first, of fulfillment and begin-

24

GS II, 301 / Star, 288.

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ning, of old man and child, the year is built, life is built. The Sabbath is the dream of perfection, but only a dream. 25

»Der Sabbat ist der Traum von Vollendung, aber nur ein Traum«. The bliss of anticipation is still our image of bliss, our imagine of redemption. 26 For this reason, if we want to prevent that this image of bliss does not become the greatest of tyrannies – tyrannical, in this case, just because perfectly ›pious‹, idolatry of eternity –, we have to consume and dismiss this same image keeping ourself in Time and the world. As Martin Buber tells us about Rabbi Elimelekh of Lizhensk: When Rabbi Elimelekh said the Prayer of Sanctification on the sabbath, he occasionally took out his watch and looked at it. For in that hour, his soul threatened to dissolve in bliss, and so he looked at his watch in order to steady himself in Time and the world. 27

This idea of ›transcendence‹ beyond every representation of fulfillment compels us to reconsider the concrete meaning of the Gestalt of the Star and its truthful sense, in continuity with (but, may be, also beyond) Rosenzweig himself.

25

GS II, 348 / Star, 332 f. Commenting this experience of Sabbath day, Haim Baharier says that we rest and our rest is still an action: see Haim Baharier, La Genesi spiegata da mia figlia, Milano: Garzanti, 2006. 27 Martin Buber, Tales of Hasidim, transl. Olga Marx, New York: Schocken Books, 1975, 253. 26

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Gabriella Caponigro (University of Chieti-Pescara)

The Suffering of the Kingdom of Heaven. Violence and Tyranny in The Star of Redemption »The Kingdom of Heaven suffereth violence, and, by force, the violent bear it away« (Matt 11:12)

The horizon of redemption, which opens up the very instant man is called to responsible action for the consummation of eternity, is delineated, in The Star of Redemption (henceforth: Star), as an eschatological drama unfolding in the historical-world arena of actual reality (Wirklichkeit). To analyse the complexity of the relationship between the temporality wherein redemption plays itself out and the violence that impacts this same temporality on the world’s stage is to enter the heart of the problem of time that infused Rosenzweig’s philosophical quest after 1913 – the year he identified in the event of revelation that point of conjunction between the eternal and the transient that can furnish time with an orientation that is unique, absolute and irrevocable. In the real world, time is an inexhaustible source of unpredictability and continual differentiation. Any attempt to turn into a foreseeable what is essentially not so, to reduce the multiple and ever-different manifestations of life to a unity in order to affirm the identical, according to Rosenzweig, constitutes a kind of violence (Gewalt). It amounts to a trespassing on time – the »not to take time seriously«, »not to understand at the right time«. 1 On 1

Cf. Rosenzweig, Franz Rosenzweig, »Das neue Denken. Einige nachträgliche Bemerkungen zum ›Stern der Erlösung‹«, in: id., Zweistromland. Kleinere Schriften zu Glauben und Denken (Der Mensch und sein Werk. Gesammelte Schriften, III), eds. Reinhold and Annemarie Mayer, Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984 (hereafter: GS III), 149 ff.

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the eschatological horizon, this violence takes the shape of efforts to bring on the Kingdom before it is due, to accelerate the times of redemption, enforcing on time a goal to be reached at all costs. The special relationship that joins the act of violence to the advent of the Kingdom of Heaven comes across as a paradoxical nexus, because the final fulfilment of redemption comes to pass with an absolute emancipation from violent action and yet, at the same time, redemption must remain entwined to the historical plane that produces the violent endeavor meant to hasten its completion. Indeed, the messianic time, wherein the redemption of the world takes place, despite playing out as a counterpoint to historical time necessarily marked by violent action, sustains a formidable rapport with the latter: not ordained in terms of exclusion or simple opposition, it is one of ›limitation‹ and ›critical proximity‹. The present paper intends, therefore, to delve into the peculiar connection between violence and the end times, with the introduction and the first book 1 of the third part of the Star as the privileged loci for our investigation. 2 1. How the Kingdom Grows It is by way of the hermeneutic filter of temporality that the dramatic nature of redemption may be grasped and light thrown upon the crux of the question whereon Rosenzweig’s most original and surprising ›phenomenology of time‹ stands. We shall refer to the problem of evil. Although, in his writings, no ample or ex2

These are the text passages in which the problem of violence appears explicitly in relation to the end of time. Beyond The Star of Redemption, the notion of violence appears only in some short passages in notes and letters: cf. Franz Rosenzweig, »Paralipomena«, GS III, 90; id., »Anleitung zum jüdischen Denken«, GS III, 608; id., Briefe und Tagebücher, 2 vols. (Der Mensch und sein Werk. Gesammelte Schriften, I), eds. Rachel Rosenzweig and Edith Rosenzweig-Scheinmann, in collaboration with Bernhard Casper, Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979 (hereafter: GS I), vol. 1, 305. However, if we consider Rosenzweig’s conception of tyranny, as coercion practiced by any totalitarian attitude, then the notion of violence is to be considered pervasive in Rosenzweig’s thought, as well as the notion of tyranny.

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plicit position is taken in this regard, the concept of evil plays a fundamental role in the elaboration of the »New Thinking« 3 and underpins the third part of the Star, which is dedicated to the »eternal hyper-cosmos« that must be perfected in the man-world relational axis. Thus, does the possibility of evil arise and a vision of violence in view of the end times – to which Rosenzweig gives the pregnant title of tyranny – come to the fore in all its complexity. Tyranny is one of his constant themes, cutting across the thinker’s reflections, under various nuances. In the emblematic motto »in tyrannos!«, 4 put in exergue to the introduction to the 3

The notion of evil underlies the entire comprehension of the relation between »I« and »world«, which has been Rosenzweig’s great concern since the very beginning of his thought. In an attempt to find a link between subjectivity and objectivity, between freedom of human action and necessity of worldly becoming, Rosenzweig confronts the thought of Goethe, Kant, and Hegel. Disappointed by those theoretical solutions, the young thinker develops a conception of the world as an intrinsically negative horizon, and a dualistic position, similar to the one of Marcion (cf. »Paralipomena«, GS III, 99), who conceives revelation and world as absolutely irreconcilable. The 1913 teshuvah (cf. letter of October 31, 1913, to Rudolf Ehrenberg, GS I/1, 132 ff.) leads Rosenzweig to overcome such dualism and to identify the event of revelation as the true conjunction point between man and world: in this new perspective, the possibility of evil is no longer necessarily intrinsic to the world, and it becomes instead the space of a choice which occurs in the instant of acting. In turn, such evolution in Rosenzweig’s thought opens up a scenario in which redemption is the horizon of absolute freedom, and evil takes form of tyranny, in both the eschatological and the historical dimension. The entire research path of Rosenzweig is grounded in his profound meditation on evil, as testified by letters and notes, especially in the »Paralipomena«. For an in-depth study of the hereby sketched theme of evil and tyranny, we refer to our works: Gabriella Caponigro, Unde Malum? Libertà e tirannia in Franz Rosenzweig, Pisa: ETS, 2015; id., »Mal«, in: Salomon Malka (ed.), Dictionnaire Franz Rosenzweig. Une étoile dans le siècle, Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 2016, 223– 229. This paper proposes, in a revised and renewed form, parts of our previous studies. 4 The motto »in tyrannos!« is a quotation from Hegel. It appears in young Hegel’s notebooks close to »Vive Jean-Jacques!«, »Vive la liberté!«, in the years of the prestigious Stift in Tübingen, and expresses a praise for the French Revolution and the ideals of freedom. This motto acquires significance within Rosenzweig’s polemic against Hegel’s idealism and universal history, against the violent power of the state, as it will be further elaborated. It also expresses a polemic against the

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third part, not only do criticisms denoted in the mottos »in philosophos!« and »in theologos!« come together, like confluent rivers, so does the foundational controversy that drove Rosenzweig’s speculative search, the basis of the New Thinking: the critique of idealistic, a priori and all-encompassing reason that seeks to determine the direction of history, to resolve the complexities of life in a unifier conceptual system. The critical target is the Western philosophical tradition, of which Hegel is the greatest exponent, and its totalising tendency to understanding the absolute truth. The introduction, entitled On the possibility of Entreating the Kingdom, focuses on the violence that the Kingdom of God suffers in consequence of the tyrant’s action. It has to do, as stated before, with a suffering that is to be understood in the order of temporality. As the words of the Evangelist suggest, in the verses that make a similar reference to the suffering of the Kingdom of Heaven (Matt 11:12–15), the violent one may be interpreted as the false prophet in the broader sense, that is, the one who, preaching falsehoods about the end of days, aims to appropriate a truth that is to be evident solely in the messianic future, and attempts, thereby, to render predictable what must necessarily remain unpredictable. For Rosenzweig, the Kingdom is a reality to come that is, however, present in the history of the world only to the extent that it is prophesied in it. 5 This very presence, being prophesied, is given over to the fragility of man and to the possibility of evil. All the same, Rosenzweig is categorical, »the kingdom of heaven will not be coerced: it grows«. 6 While redemption is, insubjectivism that overcomes creatural limits attempting to absolutise freedom. Irene Kajon observes that Rosenzweig’s opposition to tyranny appears in different ways along the various stages of his thought. See Irene Kajon, »La critica della tirannia in Franz Rosenzweig«, Archivio di Filosofia 59 (1991), no. 1–3, 219–241. 5 Cf. Franz Rosenzweig, Der Stern der Erlösung (Der Mensch und sein Werk. Gesammelte Schriften, II), ed. Reinhold Mayer, Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976 (hereafter: GS II), 278; id., The Star of Redemption, transl. William W. Hallo, New York/Chicago/San Francisco: Holt Rinehart & Winston, 1971 (hereafter: Star), 250. 6 GS II, 302 / Star, 271.

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deed, already part of the manifest world as much as it is of creation and revelation, the Kingdom of God, which comprises the fulfilment of redemption, is a growing reality. This clarifies the fundamental difference between the temporality in which the Kingdom unfolds and the temporality in which man’s redemptive action does. Messianic time, the time for the advent of the Kingdom, cannot be calculated as a time panned out with intention: »the tempo of this growth is not fixed, nay, more exactly: the growth has no relationship at all to time«. 7 For this reason, the Kingdom, since it unfolds not within the horizon of intentionality, does not allow itself to be violated. This fundamental difference inherent in the Messianic time also explains the disproportion between man and the world. Defined by the limited horizon that surrounds him, man is unable to grasp any progress and any telos in the history of redemption and, as an immediate corollary, the worldly horizon. 8 In consequence, the intentionality that man projects upon the future does not correspond to the progression of the world’s life, and man’s action, marked by its non-coincidence with respect to the worldly order, cannot but proceed casually. This temporal asymmetry is caused by the necessarily indeterminate ›when‹ of redemption that delineates an ›eschatological drama‹. However, a coincidence is essential for the attainment of redemption. The guarantee of the world’s eternity lies in man’s action: the cosmos becomes hypercosmos, awaiting man’s action, to become one with God’s work. How then to reconcile the eternity of the Kingdom with the finite time of individual existence? Or how can finite man quench the desire and the need to claim eternity for himself?

7

GS II, 250 / Star, 224. As clarified by Alexander Altmann, »it would be wrong to assume that Rosenzweig wishes to deny altogether the relevance of time for the growth of the Kingdom. No one is more emphatic than he that time is needed for the growth of the world into the Kingdom«. See Alexander Altmann, »Franz Rosenzweig on history«, in: id. (ed.), Between East and West. Essays Dedicated to the Memory of Bela Horovitz, London: East and West Library, 1958, 208. 8 Cf. GS II, 243 ff., 287 ff. / Star, 217 ff., 258 ff.

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Despite this cognitive defect, man can take resort to the ›utopian modality‹ 9 of his action, that is the prayer, the one most suited to reconcile the temporality of man and of the world and to project his desires and plans far and wide. At the beginning of Part III, the word erbeten, inserted in the triadic structure beside the words erkennen (Part I) and erleben (Part II), denotes a new configuration of being and indicates an unprecedented temporality between the redeemer and the redeemed. Upon the threshold of the disproportion between man and the world prayer finds its Sitz im Leben, which is prayer for the fullness of one’s own time. 10 In the context of man’s temporalization i. e. his being finite with regard to the redemptive action towards the Kingdom of Heaven, evil turns into a material possibility. 2. Redemption and Utopian Prayer The non-teleological form of this ›eschatological drama‹ underpins the absolute freedom and the space of human action. It is in this space that man is tempted, faced with the instant of choosing between good and evil. The idea of temptation dominates right from the introduction and turns into the cornerstone of the entire third part of the Star. It explains the major peril inherent in human intentionality, that of the will to tempt God by tyrannically taking His place in the redemptive process. By directing man’s desires and intentions, not only is prayer where man’s redemptive action takes place, but also where his violence may explode, manifesting itself as the tyranny practiced 9

Cf. Stéphane Mosès, Système et Révélation. La philosophie de Franz Rosenzweig, Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1982, 158 ff. 10 For a comprehensive elaboration on the relationship between prayer and temporality, cf. Bernhard Casper, »Über das Gebet. Betrachtungen zu Franz Rosenzweig im Hinblick auf Emmanuel Levinas«, in: Julie Kirchberg, Johannes Müther (eds.), Philosophisch-theologische Grenzfragen. Festschrift für Richard Schaeffler zur Vollendung des 60. Lebensjahres, Essen: Ludgerus, 1986, 35–43; id., Das Ereignis des Betens. Grundlinien einer Hermeneutik des religiösen Geschehens, Freiburg/ München: Karl Alber, 1998.

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upon the Kingdom of Heaven. In instituting the human order of the world, prayer also runs the risk to intervene in the world’s divine order – the ever on-coming reality – wanting to refer exclusively to itself the future of history. Thus, it tyrannically moves towards the last things, in order to be able to avail itself according to its own intentionality. If man does not have the wisdom to understand that the man-God relationship is one between a time-bound and a time-transcendent being, his prayer can’t but be tyrannical, delaying the advent of the Kingdom it sought impatiently to quicken on. For prayer to be effective, so that the risk of violence against the Kingdom of Heaven be overcome, it must be raised at an »appropriate time«, which Rosenzweig calls, a »time of grace«. 11 A time that demands a further effort on the part of man, a realistic wisdom that drives actions and intentions towards achievable objectives. In this sense, the utopia that defines the intentionality must never be u-topos, devoid-of-place: the ›unreal‹ on which the experience of the future is based must always be able to find support in the ›real‹ of history, in the natural time of the world. Redemption is, indeed, the most attainable of desires. In the climactic moment of his analysis of prayer, Rosenzweig introduces the figure of Goethe as one who, in his very unbelief, has managed to fully make his intentionality coincide with the mutable life of the world. Effective prayer is the one addressing his personal destiny, as recited by Goethe: »Labor of my hands that I / finish, grant, oh Fortune high!«. 12 The verse expresses the concreteness of an individual existence and, at the same time, an invocation to a universal destiny: his prayer has created a time that is alive, a current wherein the vitality of the creaturely life of the man could grow. 13 But his prayer, an unavoidable precondition 11

GS II, 303 f. / Star, 273. GS II, 306 / Star, 275. 13 With his prayer, Goethe achieves the perfect conciliation with the world. This special bond with the world, which Rosenzweig calls destiny, is the same that characterizes the Christianity of the Johannine era. Both Goethe and the Johannine Church represent the true fulfillment of the temporality of life – the former at the individual level, while the latter at the historical one. For this reason, 12

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for the advent of the Kingdom, is not a sufficient condition, since such pure temporality needs to access eternity. An accelerative power must be added to life’s pure temporality. Such prayer as quickens the coming of the Kingdom is the one pronounced by the believer, completion and not abolition of the unbeliever’s prayer. It is indeed necessary for life to come alive with unbelieving prayer in order to be able to receive the gift of eternity. 3. Instant and Eternity In the introduction to the third part of the Star, Rosenzweig introduces a crucial concept for the understanding of the temporal braiding that enables the Kingdom of God to come. It is the idea of the instant, which, playing a capital role in his philosophy, occurs throughout his work. The instant represents the point of access to eternity, the irruption of transcendence. For Rosenzweig, according to Stéphane Mosès, »eternity is not a time indefinitely extended forward, but a total immobilisation of the present moment, a state of perfect balance, absolutely removed from the passage of time«. 14 Man’s task is to lift the world as well to the same state of temporal equilibrium, projecting eternity into historical time. Only thus may redemption come about: by keeping the instant detached from temporal succession. Rosenzweig sees in the »hour« the paradigm of the immutable projected in perceived time. It is an abiding moment, a nunc stans, which, in its immobility, reproduces a circular movement of inRosenzweig considers Goethe to be the first of the fathers of the Johannine Church (cf. GS II, 318 / Star, 285). This Church does not become visible as a built Church. Underlying here is a veiled critique of Rosenstock’s vision of Christianity as a Church triumphans. The Kingdom of Heaven cannot be identified with the reign of the Church, nor with any other visible institution. Instead, an invisible community, the community of a religion of humanity, will bring the time to his fulfilment: cf. GS II, 390–392, 446 f. / Star, 352 f., 401. Cf. also the correspondence between Rosenzweig and Rosenstock, in particular the letters of November 7 and 30, 1916, GS I/1, 280–289 and 302–306. 14 Mosès, Système et révélation, 175.

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stants that are ever beginning anew. It is not a divine creation, but an entirely human institution. Man transforms into the hour the natural periodic rhythm of the sun and the moon in order to be able to integrate them in his experience and redeem himself from the transient. Through such an utterly human institution, man gives time an immutability that becomes the projection of eternity. This passage takes place through the fundamental mediation of the liturgical rite. Here lies the heart of Rosenzweig’s vision of eternity as a stillness within the very dimension of time. Eternity is this paradoxical time, immobile and projected in time, based, as it is, on the extraordinary intertwining of profane and sacred time. This throws new light on the reality of paganism, one that opens up the possibility of man’s reconciliation with the world’s time, which is the very object of redemption. The fleeting and elusive present of pagan temporality now finds itself anchored in the flow of a temporality that is ever tending to its full eschatological fulfilment. 15 Rosenzweig’s great philosophical intuition lies in considering the eternity of redemption as one traversed by a temporal split and a disproportion that can guarantee a space for man’s freedom of action. As Emmanuel Levinas writes: »Rosenzweig gets us used to thinking of the non-synthesisable, the difference, contrary to a philosophical tradition where the Same absorbs the Other into its interiority«. 16 Against the risk of falling into totality, the messianic time of redemption is traversed by an absolute interval, by separation, by the dia of diachrony, between sacred and profane time. After all, the whole system of Rosenzweig’s thought is based on the duality of contrary and complementary terms, on the con-

15

For an in-depth analysis on this special temporal braiding in Rosenzweig’s thought, cf. Francesco Paolo Ciglia, »Nel labirinto del tempo. Storia ed escatologia nel confronto fra Rosenzweig e Agostino«, in: Riccardo Panattoni, Gianluca Sciolla (ed.), Teologia Politica 2. Anarchia, Genova: Marietti, 2006, 144–185. By highlighting the difference between »ideal time« and »real time«, Ciglia identifies the present as the very heart of the problem of time. 16 Emmanuel Levinas, »Préface«, in: Mosès, Système et révélation, 13.

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junction »and« (und ) as an element that binds together and keeps apart. 17 It may well be asked if redemption is the progressive dissolution of the temporal nexus or if it needs the constant maintenance of the temporal contradiction unto the end times. Does redemption proceed as God’s miraculous intervention in the world or is it the effect of the historical activity of man who, as »dust and ashes«, 18 as a being subject to temptation, is destined to temporal disproportion with the world? Is there a political aspect – taken, in the broader sense, as a space for action in the historical order – to redemption? 4. Violence and the State To get back to the question of violence, the real distinction between the tyrannical and the trusting attitude towards the coming of the Kingdom is not so much in the hands of the individual but in its relation with the other. Redemption is a theatre with many characters, with an outcome that remains, always, necessarily open. Only the point where the ethical-political horizon touches the eschatological one retains the fundamental character of unpredictability. The conjunction »and« that unites man and the world in the horizon of redemption is, to be precise, openness to others, the ability to relate to the other dramatis personae. In the first book of the third part, Rosenzweig further specifies the significance of this violence inflicted on the Kingdom. The possibility of evil, as a phenomenological dimension at work in history, is not seen as inherent to the single individual, although he is born in it, but as a form of totalitarianism that impacts the 17

A few recent publications have been devoted to the complexity of the conjunction und in Rosenzweig’s thought: Archivio di Filosofia 86 (2018), no. 1, »The ›and‹ in Franz Rosenzweig’s work: connection, disjunction, contrariety«; Rosenzweig Jahrbuch / Rosenzweig Yearbook 11 (2018), »Das ›Und‹ im Werk Franz Rosenzweigs / The ›And‹ in Franz Rosenzweig’s Work«; Filosofia 63 (2018), »Franz Rosenzweig: storia e redenzione«. 18 Cf. Rosenzweig, Paralipomena, GS III, 119.

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destiny of the entire community. It is because of this that Rosenzweig’s reflections focus on the coincidence of tyranny and politics, of demonic force and state power. The political state, whose field of action, defined by the relationship between man and the world, coincides exactly with that of redemption, intervenes on the destiny of the world by partaking in the desire for eternity that guides the action of peoples. This interference can be understood, once again, in the horizon of temporality. The action of the political state is, indeed, aimed entirely at the appropriation of the instant, that is, of the right time for man to decide and act. According to Rosenzweig, the instant is characterized by continual differentiation and punctuality that make it fleeting, with no connection to the preceding instant or the successive one. Due to the incessant differentiation of the present moment, time is a succession of ever-different and, therefore, unpredictable scenarios. However, precisely the unpredictability and indeterminateness (Unvordenklichkeit) of the instant do not constitute its negative limit but rather a pure force of actuation, the source of action. This means that the effects of an action cannot be predicted, nothing can be foreseen, one cannot want one or another thing. 19 What remain are trust and hope, the essential elements of redemptive action. The institution of the state intervenes by transforming the indeterminacy of the Augenblick into a ›bad eternity‹, into an unnatural duration. To counter the constant flow of time, the state sets itself up above the flow of time »by newly and masterfully grasping the moment, and every subsequent moment, and shaping it according to its desires and capacities. At every moment, the state is forcibly deciding the contradiction between conservation and renovation, between old law and new […]. Thus the state turns every moment into eternity«. 20 For Rosenzweig, »the state 19

Cf. Franz Rosenzweig, Glauben und Wissen, GS III, 591 ff. In these pages, Rosenzweig clearly focuses on the proper character of non-violent action, which emerges only by abandoning the spheres of »will« and »duty«, »calculation« and »intention«. Redemptive action is rather the fulfillment of a prayer: pure hope, abandonment in trust. 20 GS II, 370 f. / Star, 333 f.

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is itself nothing but the constantly undertaken resolution of this contradiction«, 21 a failed attempt to untie the Gordian knot of time, to resolve once and for all the limits of creatural life, which is life lived in contradiction. Law and violence, which the state resorts to in order to grapple with the contradiction of time, circumscribe the space of a temporal suspension doomed to death, a ›true now‹ that makes up the building block of universal history. Rosenzweig is categorical: »there is no universal history without the state«. 22 Here, in the historical horizon irremediably marked 21

GS II, 370 / Star, 333. For an accurate analysis of the Augenblick and the distinction between »instant étatico-politique« and »instant éthique« we refer to Gérard Bensussan, »Instant éthique et raison politique«, in: Wolfdietrich Schmied-Kowarzik (ed.), Franz Rosenzweigs »neues Denken«. Internationaler Kongreß Kassel 2004, 2 vols., Freiburg/München: Karl Alber, 2006, vol. 1, 459– 469. 22 GS II, 371 / Star, 334. Rosenzweig criticizes universal history built according to Hegelian principles, which inevitably lead to the bloody confrontation among European states in the name of an emerging national mystique. Such nationalism rests on the idea that history is an ineluctable march towards the accomplishment of an ultimate meaning. In the idea of messianic politics the hallmarks of tyranny are sketched: claim to ultimate truth and absolute meaning, projection towards future and eschaton. For an examination of Rosenzweig’s comprehension of universal history, we refer to Stéphane Mosès, »Hegel pris au mot: la critique de l’histoire chez Franz Rosenzweig«, Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 90 (1985), no. 3, 328–341; id., »Exposé«, in: Jean Halpérin, Georges Levitte (eds.), Politique et Religion. Données et débats. Actes du XXe Colloque des intellectuels juifs de langue française, Paris: Gallimard, 1981, 283–311. The juxtaposition between state and violence, between history and messianic politics, can be clearly understood in the light of the formidable Rosenzweig’s work Hegel und der Staat, 2 vols., München/Berlin: Oldenbourg, 1920: »the state has become an idol that demands that the individual and the nation sacrifice themselves« (vol. 2, 243). Rosenzweig sketches a critique of tyranny as unity of knowing-and-being, unable to maintain the differentiation of individual existences. »The great thought of immanence« (ibid., vol. 2, 198 ff.) leads to an exaltation of totalitarian reason realised in historical reality. Several scholars have argued that Hegel und der Staat is of fundamental importance in understanding Rosenzweig’s thought and, more in particular, his view on the state. Among those: Guy Petitdemange, »Hegel et Rosenzweig. La différence se faisant«, in: Olivier Mongin, Jacques Rolland, Alexandre Derczanski (eds.), Franz Rosenzweig, Paris: La nuit surveillée, 1982, 157–170; Heinz-Jürgen Görtz, Tod und Erfahrung. Rosenzweig »erfahrende Philosophie« und Hegels »Wissenschaft der Erfahrung des Bewußtseins«, Düsseldorf: Pat-

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by the tyrannical attitude of the politician, does the drama of redemption consume itself. 5. Differentiation and Contradiction Now, however, time has to be redeemed starting precisely from the present moment. It is necessary that the Augenblick keep its indeterminacy and punctuality, that it be removed from the current of time, reasserting its difference from history. We have seen how all endeavours of state are doomed to failure, because redemption cannot come to pass by paths purely historical. Historical time is, in fact, a quantitative and cumulative time, where the instants add up one to the other without anything really changing in the world; it is a time without end, for which no limit can be set, which keeps pushing redemption back to infinity. As Mosès writes:

mos, 1984; Mosès, »Hegel pris au mot«; Otto Pöggeler, »Between Enlightenment and Romanticism: Rosenzweig and Hegel«, in: Paul Mendes-Flohr (ed.), The Philosophy of Franz Rosenzweig, Hanover/London: Brandeis University Press, 1988, 107–123; id., »Rosenzweig und Hegel«, in: Wolfdietrich Schmied-Kowarzik (ed.), Der Philosoph Franz Rosenzweig (1886–1929). Internationaler Kongreß Kassel 1986, 2 vols., Freiburg/München: Karl Alber, 1988, vol. 2, 839–853; Shlomo Avineri, »Rosenzweig’s Hegel Interpretation: Its Relationship to the Development of His Jewish Reawakening«, in: Schmied-Kowarzik (ed.), Der Philosoph Franz Rosenzweig, 831–838; Myriam Bienenstock, »Rosenzweig’s Hegel«, The Owl of Minerva 23 (1992), no. 2, 177–182; Peter Eli Gordon, Rosenzweig and Heidegger: Between Judaism and German Philosophy, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 2003, 82–118; Jules Simon, Josiah Simon, »Hegel und der Staat«, in: Wolfdietrich Schmied-Kowarzik, Eva Schulz-Jander (eds.), Franz Rosenzweig. Religionsphilosoph aus Kassel, Kassel: euregioverlag, 2011, 31–37. Moreover, it should be noted the first publication of some Rosenzweig’s early work about Hegel, collected in: Wolfgang D. Herzfeld (ed.), Franz Rosenzweigs Jugendschriften (1907–1914), II: Hegel, Hamburg: Dr. Kovač, 2015. For a comprehension of Rosenzweig's political view on the historical background, see also: Wolfgang D. Herzfeld, Rosenzweig, »Mitteleuropa« und der Erste Weltkrieg. Rosenzweigs politische Ideen im zeitgeschichtlichen Kontext, Freiburg/München: Karl Alber, 2013.

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While the idea of Redemption is, precisely, that of a terminus to history, of a result, of a definitive consummation of all expectations […] the temporal revolution implied by redemption demands a change in the game plan, a leap out of history towards another order of reality, which Rosenzweig calls eternity and which may be interpreted as temporality lived in religious life, in liturgical time. 23

This recovery of time, this preparation for redemption, takes place by way of Christianity and Judaism. The third part of the Star is, therefore, presented as a description of the two modalities to access eternity, radically different and opposite but necessarily complementary, represented by the two monotheistic faiths: if it has been Judaism’s task to eternalise time by means of ritual, Christianity embodies eternity in its institutions, in the life of peoples, in human affairs. Both modalities have in common the same orientation towards the utopia of redemption and the purpose to disengage themselves from the sterility of historical time in order to make every moment fruitful. The fact is to be pondered upon that, if it be true that redemption implies a sacred time anticipated in ritual, it is equally true that liturgical time is interwoven only with the profane, that this sacredness must, somehow, partake of worldly-historical time. In other words, it stands to reason that redemption should require political time in order to realise itself, because it cannot remain a simple religious experience relegated to the supra-historical dimension of sacred time. 24 Even as sacred and profane are the two 23

Mosès, »Exposé«, 297. Judaism itself, which in the Star is presented in its eternal supra-temporal dimension, participates in historical reality and takes part in political reality. It is crossed internally by the duality of the sacred and profane order, because a political form is, »in spite of everything« (letter of June 6, 1924, to Gertrud Oppenheim, GS I/2, 969), absolutely necessary. In other words, it could be said that for Rosenzweig Judaism must intertwine with the political reality in order to unmask its myths. Zionism and assimilationism, though being the only viable, and therefore necessary ways for Jews to actually live in the historical reality, are just »illusions, attempts to force the Kingdom of Heavens ›quickly, in our days‹« (letter of November 30, 1916, to Eugen Rosenstock, GS I/1, 304). Both historical-political paths »are exposed to the danger of reaching an accessible goal« (letter of May 1,

24

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planes that must intersect for the process of redemption to initiate, so are polity and religiosity two ways for man to relate to the world. Given the connection between the political dimension of human existence and the violence that is exercised in it, it might be conjectured that the advent of the Kingdom, the consummation of eternity, must somehow entertain a relation with history’s tyrannical dimension. Although the terms »violence« and »redemption« are marked by irreducible differences and oppositions, they are united by the conjunction »and«. Some form of coercion is always necessary, and must be maintained – with due limitations – until the end of times. 6. Resistance and Maintenance At this point, it is admissible to superimpose Rosenzweig’s eschatological conception upon that of Paul of Tarsus, condensed in the image of the katechon (2 Thess 2:6–7), »he who withholds«. 25 The figure of the katechon, which Paul uses to warn against false prophecies on the coming of the Kingdom, can be taken as a key to reading the historical-eschatological paradigm outlined in redemption. Such a power, resisting evil and delaying the end of the world, inaugurates a time ›withheld‹, ›deferred‹, ›sustained‹, wherein both anomie and man’s decisive and redemptive action unfold. Likewise, in Rosenzweig’s thought, the political order, marked by tyrannical intentionality, must be maintained so that,

1917, to Gertrud Oppenheim, GS I/1, 398), and of falling into a tyrannical attitude. On Rosenzweig’s critic of Zionism, see Yaakov Fleischmann, »Franz Rosenzweig as a critic of Zionism«, Conservative Judaism 22 (1967), no. 1, 54–66. 25 In Paul’s enigmatic words, the katechon is the force that prevents anomia from overflowing and, at the same time, the force that delays the end of the world. The literature on this argument is very extended. We just refer to: Wilhelm Bornemann, Die Thessalonicherbriefe, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1894, 400–459; Oscar Cullmann, »Le caractère eschatologique du devoir missionnaire et de la conscience apostolique de S. Paul. Étude sur le κατέχον (-ων) de 2. Thess 2:6–7«, Revue d’Histoire e de Philosophie religieuse 36 (1936), no. 3–5, 210–245.

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in a paradoxical interplay with it, religious time may be enabled to anticipate the eternal in time. 26 What then really brings redemption to completion, what unmasks the all-embracing claims of tyranny and the coercive force of violence, is the maintenance of the indeterminateness inherent in the punctuality of the instant that confers unpredictability to time. Man’s redemptive action, far from attempting a »resolution of the contradiction«, must remain in it. For Rosenzweig, eternal truth may abide only in the tension that exists between world and Kingdom of God, between time and eternity. The prayer that tempts God to bring forth the Kingdom, if pronounced at the right moment, is the most radical challenge to Hegel’s ›totalitarian‹ thought, because, by becoming a pure liturgical gesture, it exposes itself to what can no longer be put in definite words. The prophet who speaks of the end times tells the truth if he entrusts himself to the uncertain word of contradiction: the Kingdom of Heaven comes only if it is invoked by the Psalmist’s »nonetheless« (dennoch), 27 the »lo-ken« of prophets Jeremiah (32:33–40), Isaiah (64:8) and Hosea (14:5–8). 28 The Kingdom 26

Rosenzweig never refers explicitly to katechon and yet, if we consider it as a paradigmatic figure, we can identify a katechontic idea in his theory of the irrevocability of the election of Israel. The role of the Jews vis-à-vis the political order is to restrain, with their very existence, political interference over eternity itself and the world’s destiny (cf. GS II, 372 / Star, 335). For the purpose of deliverance, the Jewish people would have the fundamental role of holding back the last days. This special ›retaining‹ eschatological role is to be played by Judaism also in its relationship with Christianity. Judaism has the kathecontic task of retaining the end of times, and of mitigating the Christian concern about anticipating the redemption times. Jews are the »living announcement« (letter of October 31, 1913, to Rudolf Ehrenberg, GS I/1, 135) that eschaton has not been reached yet: »the holy restlessness of your work« – Rosenzweig writes to Rosenstock – »is matched in us by the holy fear that redemption comes ›ahead of time‹« (letter of November 7, 1916, to Eugen Rosenstock, GS I/1, 284). 27 Cf. GS II, 278 / Star, 250. 28 As highlighted by exegetes such as André Neher (L’essence du prophétisme, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1955), lo-ken (»however«) is the word of the prophet that breaks the linearity of time, indicates hope and brings out the affirmation in the contradiction of life. Gérard Bensussan connects this word to Rosenzweig’s thought: see »État et éternité chez Franz Rosenzweig«, in: Arno

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draws near when it is the child’s »aber doch« 29 that speaks, the naivety of a faith that believes in the existence of God despite the contradiction of evil present in history. History must therefore remain ambiguous, as concluded by Levinas in his essay Transcendance et Mal. 30 The notion of »ambiguity« indicates »time in its enigmatic diachrony: tendency without outcome, aim without convergence; it would signify […] the ever-growing approximation of an infinite God, an approximation that is His proximity«. 31 It is but the maintenance of contradictions that makes it possible for the instant to open itself to the apocalyptic catastrophe, to the unpredictable arrival of the Messiah in history: »Eternity as the catastrophic end of days that irrupts in the bosom of time«. 32

Münster (ed.), La pensée de Franz Rosenzweig. Actes du colloque parisien organisé à l’occasion du centenaire de la naissance du philosophe, Paris: Presse Universitaires de France, 1994, 147; id., Franz Rosenzweig. Existence et philosophie, Paris: Presse Universitaires de France, 2000, 127. 29 We intend to refer to the protagonist of the short anecdote that Rosenzweig told in opening the cycle of lessons on the existence of God at Freies Jüdisches Lehrhaus in Frankfurt am Main. Rosenzweig focuses on this adversative conjunction that the girl uses in the exclamation »Es gibt Ihn aber doch!« to affirm the existence of God despite the evidence emerging from life itself which rather shows the opposite, as affirmed by the mother. See Franz Rosenzweig, Die Wissenschaft von Gott, GS III, 631 ff. 30 Emmanuel Levinas, »Transcendance et Mal«, Le Nouveau Commerce 41 (1978), 55–75. 31 Ibid., 75. 32 Rosenzweig, Paralipomena, GS III, 68.

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The Gnostic Problem of Prayer

Introduction As Rosenzweig feverishly finished The Star of Redemption (henceforth: Star) in the early months of 1919, the ramifications of the war were becoming all the more apparent. Germany was a wreck on every level. While Rosenzweig and friends like Eugen Rosenstock and Hans Ehrenberg were not immune to the political and economic fallout, they found themselves more concerned about the impending religious crisis. The same intellectuals who had likened the war to a holy cause now sought answers for Germany’s defeat in the heretical movements of the Judeo-Christian tradition. They rehabilitated figures like the Christian sectarian Marcion of Pontus and the false Lurianic messiah Sabbatai Zevi to promote their apocalyptic premonitions of the end of days; redemption would be a cataclysmic event where the strange and distant God would institute a Kingdom not of this world. 1 For those in Rosenzweig’s circle, this resurgent Gnosticism was nothing short of evil because it demanded the destruction of the created order, which, after all, had been divinely pronounced »good«. Against this backdrop, I will examine Rosenzweig’s understanding of redemption in the Star. Like his friends, Rosenzweig was quick to dismiss these popular visions of a catastrophe by describing how the seeds of the redeemed world were already planted in the created one. Yet, his defense of creation was not entirely satisfying since he also alluded to the coming Kingdom 1

Cf. Benjamin Lazier, God Interrupted. Heresy and the European Imagination between the World Wars, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008, 5–9.

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as a terrifying spectacle. It marked the arrival of a »supra« world whose rays would cause the »surrounding world« to lose its brilliance and would absorb »the dark shadows of secrets and the colorful lights of the sign into itself«. 2 Even more perplexing, he seemed to give credence to the actions performed by destructive figures like Sabbatai Zevi by affirming that prayer did have the potential to radically alter the world order. It was the means by which human beings could »interfere violently in the sovereignty of divine power and love«. 3 Rosenzweig’s enigmatic take on redemption has been the subject of much scholarly discussion. 4 Gershom Scholem, perhaps the first to spot the Lurianic overtones in the Star, criticized Rosenzweig for trying to incorporate these »dangerous« elements while simultaneously silencing them. He undercut »the theory of catastrophes contained in Messianic apocalypticism« by »making it the mission of the Jew to render harmless its [redemption’s] destructive power«. 5 In Scholem’s assessment, this was why the Star failed to reinvigorate Jewish theology after the war. It fell under the weight of its own inconsistency by hollowing out the revolutionary impulse of Judaism and settling for a liberal notion of internal regeneration. With Scholem’s comments in mind, I propose revaluating the role of liturgy in part three of the Star. I suggest Rosenzweig framed the liturgical rites to serve as restraints on the apocalyptic visions prompted by the wrong kind of prayer. Accordingly, this article has three parts. First, I will examine Scholem’s critique of the Star by evaluating Rosenzweig’s inclusion of gnostic or mystic 2

Franz Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, transl. Barbara E. Galli, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005 (hereafter: Star), 280. 3 Ibid., 285. 4 Cf. Rivka Horowitz, »From Hegelianism to a Revolutionary Understanding of Judaism: Franz Rosenzweig’s Attitude towards Kabbala and Myth«, Modern Judaism 26 (2006), no. 1, 31–54; Moshe Idel, Old Worlds, New Mirrors. On Jewish Mysticism and Twentieth-Century Thought, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010, 159–167. 5 Gershom Scholem, The Messianic Idea in Judaism and Other Essays on Jewish Spirituality, New York: Schocken Books, 1995, 323 f.

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principles in his discussion on redemption. Specifically, I will weigh whether his understanding of prayer does indeed subvert his defense of creation. Second, I will move to discuss how Rosenzweig, with additional insights from Eugen Rosenstock and Hans Ehrenberg, found inspiration in Schelling’s liturgical ruminations to »neutralize« the dangerous aspects of prayer without sacrificing its creative potential. Finally, I will evaluate Rosenzweig and Scholem’s different notions of renewal by reflecting on what Rosenzweig calls the »right prayer at the right time«. My ultimate goal in reading Rosenzweig in the context of Scholem’s review is not simply to defend the coherence of the Star. Rather, it is to use their different assessments of the »gnostic condition« to reflect on what is happening in our own time. We too are witnessing a resurgence of interest in what Benjamin Lazier calls the »heretical ideal« in American society due to the rise of populist parties that are demanding the razing of the old liberal order. On both sides of the intellectual and political spectrum, writers are describing with some urgency the dangers associated with the new secularized versions of gnostic thinking. Jeff Sharlet, writing in Vanity Fair about the U.S. elections, has voiced alarm about the growing fascination on the right with the messianic pretentions of Donald Trump. In turn, scholars like Helen Pluckrose and James Lindsay have strongly condemned the Manichaeism of »Wokeism« on the left. At this time of great divide, there is a sense that we are entering a point of no return. 6 As the year 2020 comes to a close then, Scholem and Rosenzweig cut interesting figures because they provide us with two fundamentally different interpretations of what this heightened awareness of the »heretical ideal« means. Scholem held that these sorts of gnostic movements could potentially lead to positive developments because they presage an intellectual revolution where 6

Jeff Sharlet, »›He’s the Chosen One to Run America‹ : Inside the Cult of Trump, His Rallies are Church and He is the Gospel«, Vanity Fair, June 18, 2020 (https:// www.vanityfair.com/news/2020/06/inside-the-cult-of-trump-his-rallies-arechurch-and-he-is-the-gospel, accessed November 15, 2020); Helen Pluckrose, James Lindsay, Cynical Theories. How Activist Scholarship Made Everything about Race, Gender, and Identity, Durham: Pitchstone Publishing, 2020, 209.

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all that is stale and worn-out will be swept away. Conversely, I suggest Rosenzweig and his friends believed this resurgence of gnostic ideas represented the final breath of a dying revolution. The exact opposite of a change agent, it indicated the desperation that comes when an ideal drifts into banality, triviality and absurdity. Hence, an »internal« spiritual regeneration is needed in order to recharge life and release it from this malaise. 1. The Dangers of Illumination Part of the reason why Scholem considered Rosenzweig’s vision for redemption problematic was because he incorporated the same gnostic or mystic ideas that had been previously denounced. In the chapter on creation, he rejected the notion of tzimtzum or the idea that God contracted Himself to make room for the finite world because it implied the world was formed out of »a primordial chaos […], of ›the darkness that in the beginning was everything‹«. 7 His objection to tzimtzum is understandable when taking Isaac Luria’s full revision of the biblical narrative into account. Creation did not mark the creative work of a perfect Creator but rather a universe born from a crisis within God Himself. Adam Kadmon – the primordial man that emerged from tzimtzum – sought to establish a link between God and this universe by directing the divine light into the empty space but ultimately failed. The vessels holding the divine light shattered, causing sparks to scatter throughout the void. It is remarkable then that Rosenzweig chose to connect redemption to the mystical ideas of the merkabah, shekhina, and tikkun since they directly relate to the catastrophe brought about by tzimtzum. In his lecture on mystical heresies, Scholem noted how quickly they developed Sabbatian overtones in the Jewish lexicon. Though the mystical traditions surrounding the merkabah had long been in existence, Nathan of Gaza coopted Ezekiel’s fantastical vision of God’s throne room to bolster Sabbatai Zevi’s 7

Star, 148.

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messianic claims. 8 Moreover, Zevi, through Gaza’s machinations, became identified as the central player in the cosmic process of tikkun or the liberation of the divine sparks trapped in the abyss of the fallen world. He was the one chosen to restore the shattered vessels that had contained God’s sparks, His shekhina. Admittedly, Rosenzweig did offer an explanation for why these gnostic concepts could elucidate the content of redemption but not creation. Upon hearing God’s revelation, we gain the ability to pray and prayer opens a direct window into eternity. Thus, the chariot vision of the merkabah, when understood correctly, did not illuminate the path out of the desolate void but instead revealed the created world’s relationship to the redeemed world via the Law. The shekhina in the Star did not represent the divine sparks forced into exile by a primordial catastrophe (like he formerly imagined in a poem he wrote in 1910) but God’s freely made decision to live among and suffer with His people as they wandered through foreign lands. 9 The process of tikkun did not lead to the supersession of the created world but to its completion. By performing the divine command to love God via loving the neighbor, human beings slowly turned the present world into God’s permanent dwelling place. 10 Like Scholem emphasized in his review however, Rosenzweig’s conception of redemption remained paradoxical because his notion of prayer was still apocalyptic to a certain degree. 11 Even while he used prayer to strip the merkabah, shekhina, and tikkun of their gnostic impulses so that they represented, in Benjamin Pollock’s words, the »fulfillment« rather than the negation of the created order, he acknowledged that prayer was a dangerous exercise because it was how humans forced God to take note of and

8

Cf. Gershom Scholem, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism, New York: Schocken Books, 1974, 295. 9 Cf. Benjamin Pollock, Franz Rosenzweig’s Conversions. World Denial and World Redemption, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014, 38 f. 10 Cf. Star, 431–433. 11 Scholem, The Messianic Idea in Judaism and Other Essays on Jewish Spirituality, 322.

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respond to their actions. 12 Prayer was not simply the manner by which one professed his deepest reverence for God after hearing the divine profession of love. It was also how one could commandeer the redemptive plan. In other words, revelatory prayer was what freed human beings from the dangers of gnostic ideas and at the same time kept us susceptible to this temptation because it produced a sense of arrogance that we alone were favored with this gift. To be clear, Rosenzweig’s understanding of prayer was not exactly apocalyptic in Scholem’s Lurianic sense. He did not consider prayer dangerous because it could tempt God to alter the content of His redemptive vision for the world. Rather, what made prayer dangerous was that it could lead human beings to privilege their own personal desires over God’s, which could affect the timing of redemption. As God’s servant, we are commanded to actively transform the created world into the Kingdom by loving our neighbors. 13 Thus, a person could potentially delay redemption by using prayer as an excuse to retreat from his toils in the imperfect world and »establish an eternal wall of separation« between himself and all others. Equipped with the special knowledge of salvation, he made the conscious decision to halt the outflow of love in the world because he did not wish to share God’s favor. On the opposite end, there was the danger of the zealot’s prayer. The zealot actively worked against God by forcibly trying to bring about redemption before its time. In Scholem’s schema, this fit the profile of the antinomian gnostic Sabbatai Zevi and his »Redemption through Sin« approach. This kind of gnostic worked under the impression that the immanent arrival of the messianic era had fundamentally changed the natural order of things. To push God to complete the process of tikkun, it was acceptable to violate the norms of behavior, going so far as to transgress the law by »eating the fat of animals« or »violating the

12 13

Pollock, Franz Rosenzweig’s Conversions, 149. Cf. Star, 285.

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Sabbath«. 14 In seeking this kind of control however, Rosenzweig believed the zealot ultimately prevented the redemptive roots from taking hold in the created world. The energy of love could only be effective when left unhindered. When forced, it invariably missed its target, thus delaying the Kingdom’s arrival. Rosenzweig associated what Scholem would call a nihilistic form of Gnosticism with Goethe who uttered the prayer, »Give, oh labor of my hands, the great happiness that I can finish it!« 15 For Scholem, the nihilistic mystic was someone entirely preoccupied with the affairs of the present life – with living a life utterly free and unfettered by any sort of law or authority. Where Zevi theologically justified his actions, the nihilistic mystic – who Scholem identified most closely with Jacob Frank – did no such thing. 16 (And arguably, one could say that this is where the modern American variations of Trumpism and Wokeism come into play; they both demand the complete unmooring from any sort of political canon or authoritative establishment.) Rosenzweig saw Goethe as opening the door to this same kind of trap. While Goethe was able to pass through these doors unscathed, those that attempted to follow him would potentially cause the most havoc. They were equally posed to be the »immoralist who breaks the tablets« and »the tyrant who does violence to his neighbor« because they chose to forgo the eternal. 17 2. The Need for Liturgical Restraints With prayer leaving us vulnerable to Gnosticism, Rosenzweig does seem left with a predicament: how do humans, as imperfect beings, avoid the hubris associated with prayer so that we do not stymie the redemption of the world but actually bring it about? 14

Scholem, The Messianic Idea in Judaism and Other Essay on Jewish Spirituality, 98 f. 15 Star, 293. 16 Cf. Gershom Scholem, »Religious Authority and Mysticism«, Commentary 38 (November 1964), 38. 17 Star, 304.

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Noting that it was the nation of philosophers and poets who had prostrated itself before Hitler and proclaimed him the »new Christ«, Eugen Rosenstock confirmed that what prevented human beings from succumbing to the false idols constructed by our egos were the »No’s« first coded into the Jewish and eventually the Christian religious calendars. A key characteristic of gnostic movements is their desire to destabilize the traditional narratives of a society in order to break open the shell that supposedly hides the higher realms of truth. The fixed rhythms of these calendars effectively stop this »spell-binding«, or in Scholem’s words, »the revolution of values« by making its observers continually aware of what distinguished the temporal from the eternal, the monstrous from the good, the heavens from the earth. 18 From Rosenzweig’s so-called Urzelle letter, we know that the »New Thinkers« found an important resource for their liturgical thinking in Schelling, who saw mysticism as both a helpful bridge between theology and philosophy and at the same time appreciated the dangers. Schelling had been impressed by the potential of Kabbalistic ideas to address pestering philosophical problems. He used the notion of tzimtzum in the never completed The Ages of the World to explain how God could differentiate Himself within Himself to create a finite world. Yet, he still approached mystical ideas with circumspection. Hans Ehrenberg noted how Schelling, in his theosophical novel Clara, emphasized the dangers associated with mystical forms of illumination. The quest for some higher knowledge or truth often led to madness. Only those who were simple and pious were deemed worthy of receiving openings from another world. 19 Schelling insisted that a religion based on revelation needed the bolstering of something more stable than personal experience if it was to escape devolving into »pietism«. The »cycle of festiv18

Cf. Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, »Hitler and Israel or On Prayer«, in: id. (ed.), Judaism Despite Christianity. The »Letters on Christianity and Judaism« between Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy and Franz Rosenzweig, transl. Dorothy M. Emmet, Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1969, 189 f. 19 Cf. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, Clara or, On Nature’s Connection with the Spirit World, transl. Fiona Steinkamp, Albany: SUNY Press, 2002, 75.

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ities« associated with Judaism and Christianity reigned in these mystical flights of fancy by revealing the infinite in a communal setting where »each member had a part«. 20 Furthermore, these rituals served as a better confirmation of God’s law or authority than the relatively weak support provided by the grammatical signs of language, which could easily be disassembled. 21 Pluckrose and Lindsay, in their discussion of the gnostic pretensions of Wokeism today, similarly comment that this »disassembling« of language is actually intentional. Those who subscribe to a gnostic perspective purposely describe language as an unreliable form of communication – that it cannot be used to represent reality or communicate it to others – in order to generate profound skepticism about the present world. 22 Relating this back to the Star, Rosenzweig affirmed that the different Jewish and Christian congregations provided the necessary oversight with their insistence on a communal space for worship. The nuclear family asserted this role in the Jewish tradition while the church accepted this task in Christianity. 23 The presence of the community served as a constant reminder to the »sinner« that he no longer had the option to »stay« in the closed circle of revelation and leave the task of transforming creation to others. Here, he found himself compelled to pray for the »nearest« for he was no longer just an »I« standing before God but part of a »We«. The individual had to let go of his solitary supplications and join others as they lifted their voices to praise the Lord. The Jewish and Christian liturgical calendars likewise helped reign in the zealous impulses associated with prayer by designating specific »illumination« times. This »fixing of the moment« effectively put a stop to the forceful attempts to provoke the coming of the Kingdom in the manner of Sabbatai Zevi. By celebrat20

Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, transl. Douglas W. Stott, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989, 43. See also his Philosophy of Revelation (1841–42) and Related Texts, transl. Klaus Ottmann, Thompson: Spring Publications, 2020, 387. 21 Cf. ibid., 317 f. 22 Pluckrose, Lindsay, Cynical Theories, 40. 23 Cf. Star, 364.

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ing the Israelites’ liberation from Egypt during Passover, the receiving of the Torah at Mount Sinai during Shavuot and their wandering in the desert during Sukkot, the Jewish communities were reminded that God brought about everything at its promised or appointed time. They did not have to take it upon themselves to prompt God to take action because the promised day would neither come too early nor too late. Similarly, the Christians learned how to practice the art of waiting for the right time by recalling how the events of Jesus’ birth and resurrection were grounded in the prophesies of the Hebrew Bible. 24 Rosenzweig concluded the cycle of festivities stabilized revelatory prayer because the silent gestures that accompanied them comprised a language that could not be detached from its eternal foundation; it represented an incorruptible form of communication. 25 Recall that Frank for Scholem was a perfect example of the nihilistic mystic because he rejected all values and norms as he plunged into »this continuum of destruction«. 26 Against this descent into anarchy, the silence of the liturgical forms stood guard as the »purified lip« where »a glance very likely suffices to make themselves understood«. 27 During the Jewish community’s solemn observance of Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur, Rosenzweig poignantly described how one falls prostrate before the King of Kings. Though the Christians did not have any corresponding holidays, they were equally compelled into silence during the sacrament of baptism. Those who bore witness renewed their own consecration to the Lord as the unconscious child ascended to the highest consciousness of silent prayer. 28

24 25 26 27 28

Cf. ibid., 335–340, 385–387. Cf. ibid., 312–314. Scholem, »Religious Authority and Mysticism«, 38. Star, 314 and 313. Cf. Star, 343, 396 f.

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3. Revolution and Rejuvenation Scholem, however, complained that Rosenzweig’s liturgical thinking was precisely what deprived the Star of its theological power. His »bitter polemic against apocalyptic prayer« in favor of an overly churchy view of Jewish practice deprived redemption of its liberating potential; a muted redemption took the place of a redemption that would clean away the cobwebs with its catastrophic razing of the historical order. 29 From Scholem’s perspective, it seemed like Rosenzweig was simply following the same tired formulas practiced by religious authorities for centuries. They watered-down the fervor of the gnostic mystics by reframing their visions to conform to accepted doctrines and dogmas. We can certainly see how this »appropriation« transpires today in a secular setting as the different political parties try to bring their extremists into the fold by »recoding« their beliefs into more mainstream views. Sharlet describes how the radicalness of Trump’s ideas are often clothed in jokes and innuendo as those in his party want Trump »to be taken seriously but not literally«. 30 Yet, Scholem believed it was only by releasing the gnostic spirit from the tyrannical hold of the community that real change could be affected. Looking back in history, Scholem did have a point: the rabbinical authorities, the Catholic Church, etc. all privileged the health of the community over individual expression when it came to religious experience. Before clasping hands to sing unending songs of praise at the advent of redemption, Rosenzweig admitted that the »We« of the community was terrifying because it could exclude and cast away from its »most luminous and audible sphere, into the cold dread of the nothing« all those that did not conform. 31 Moreover, his prescription of love seemed to align with the traditional methods for reigning in mystical excesses. As 29

Scholem, The Messianic Idea in Judaism and Other Essay on Jewish Spirituality, 322. 30 Sharlet, »›He’s the Chosen One to Run America‹ : Inside the Cult of Trump«. 31 Star, 255.

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Scholem explained, the religious leadership typically avoided conflict with mystics by charging them with social responsibilities; they should participate in communal activities because »love of God« could only be demonstrated by »love of neighbor«. 32 But was Rosenzweig really just rehashing the same tactics? This gets back to the question of the impact of the heretical imagination. I suggest the fundamental difference between Scholem and Rosenzweig boils down to whether the »heretical ideal« was fruitful in a historical sense. As Lazier recounts, Scholem believed it could provide a needed spark even if it was ignited from the ruins of catastrophe. The Zionist movement, with its determination to revive the Jewish nation and hasten the end of exile, could be traced back to Sabbatai Zevi’s efforts to coopt heresy as a mode of a Jewish self-assertion. 33 Conversely, I contend that Rosenzweig and his friends considered the reappearance of Gnosticism a sign of culture’s barrenness – the final scream of an exhausted population who had lost their ability to work meaningfully toward the »tomorrow«. While acknowledging that humanity’s collective passions give life to the world, Rosenstock maintained these passions only made »epochs in history« when there was a willingness to accept sacrifice – to suffer on account of love. 34 Arguably, Gnosticism did not have the power to make epochs because it was a libertine movement that rejected the constructive value of pain. Against Scholem then, Rosenzweig did not use the religious community to stifle the creative energies of the individual but to ensure they were not weighed down by the banality of gnostic ideas. In other words, the community was necessary to keep the revolutionary spark alive. This point is perhaps best illustrated by what Rosenzweig described as the right prayer at the right time: the one that the Jewish and Christian communities utter in unison. After all, Christianity is the greatest example of a heretical movement changing history. Rosenzweig wrote to Rosenstock 32

Scholem, »Religious Authority and Mysticism«, 38. Cf. Lazier, God Interrupted, 145. 34 Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, Out of Revolution. Autobiography of Western Man, New York: William Morrow & Co., 1938, 3 f. 33

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that the Jews would be obligated to crucify Jesus all over again if he made his appearance on the world stage today even as he acknowledged that the active work of redemption could not be performed without the Christian effort. 35 However, Christianity would fail in its »revolutionary mission« if it ever chose to sever its roots in Judaism like Marcion had desired when he proposed removing the Hebrew Scriptures from the canon. It would have deprived the movement of its dynamism since there would be nothing to distinguish it from the other pagan sects of the Roman Empire. 36 For Rosenzweig, the »No« of the Jewish community – its restraint on the Christians so they did not succumb to these gnostic temptations – was what led to the »Yes« of redemption. This redemption, as Wayne Cristaudo notes, signaled the redemption of life through »the activation of all possible potencies« and the »recharge« of »all regions and potencies of creation with love«. 37 No longer just grounding one’s foothold within space and time, Rosenstock described how the united prayers actually anticipated redemption – versus hindering its arrival – by bringing together the world’s inner and outer spaces, prejective and trajective times. The inner space of the world was the »restful« space left free from everyday work. The outer space was the space that was filled »with results, with fruits, with work«. Prejective time corresponded to linear time – the time moving forward from past to future. Trajective time reflected a-linear time – the time that moves backwards from future to past. 38 In contrast to the sinner, zealot and nihilistic gnostic who respectively looked to the »favorableness of his own destiny«, the Jewish and Christian communities prayed »to build a house where 35

Cf. Rosenstock-Huessy (ed.), Judaism Despite Christianity, 113. Cf. Star, 437. 37 Wayne Cristaudo, Religion, Redemption, Revolution. The New Speech Thinking of Franz Rosenzweig and Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012, 155. 38 Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, Cross of Reality (1965), one 1-hour lecture, Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy Fund (http://www.erhfund.org/lectures/volume-28-cross-ofreality-1965/lecture-01/, accessed November 15, 2020). 36

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God may accept a dwelling« in created space and time. 39 They divided the tasks with the Christians uttering prayers of intercession asking for strength to transform the everyday work of the outer space into redemptive work. The Jews prayed the prayers of thanksgiving, celebrating the joy of rest in those inner spaces. 40 In so doing, the Christians fulfilled the ends of trajective time by revitalizing the past for the future; the fleshly birth of God’s only begotten son. The Jews, dwelling in the burning fire of God’s presence, bore witness to future prejective time when »the earth will be filled with the knowledge of the Lord like the waters cover the sea«. 41 And while this image of redemption would certainly be too neat for Scholem, it made it possible to come full circle. As Rosenzweig concluded, the failure of the original Adam in capturing the divine sparks would be superseded by the successful efforts of the new Adam. His »redeemed-ness is one that belongs to him from the very beginning, from creation« for »creation is really already redemption«. 42 Conclusion In the beginning, I claimed that we are, in many ways, living at a time that mirrors Rosenzweig and Scholem’s own during the interwar years in Germany. Just as the war destroyed the liberal dream in the unlimited potential of human civilization, there is a growing sense of despair about the future while we witness the systemic failure of the world governments to address the current ails of society. The pandemic, of course, is merely exposing the increasing class, cultural, and moral divides that have been shrouded under the façade of economic stability. As extremists on both the right and the left are becoming more forceful in their attempts to impose radical solutions to the crisis, Rosenzweig and 39 40 41 42

Star, 310. Cf. ibid., 333 f., 380 f. Ibid., 338. Ibid., 442.

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Scholem provide us with two opposite perspectives for judging the ideas undergirding these responses. For Scholem, the gnostic energies that drive these movements offer the necessary intellectual critique to ignite real change. Rosenzweig, however, viewed them as the deathblow to any meaningful effort for revitalization. There is something to be said for both perspectives. How everything shakes out remains to be seen. But in thinking about the »heretical ideal« in our own time and the potential anarchy it will inspire, Eugen Rosenstock made the interesting observation about the future of revolutions in the twenty-first century. He believed the idea of revolution itself would ultimately become banal since we would live in a world »which makes a principle of changing every day«. 43 What will happen when we no longer pursue any kind of renewal with a sense of conviction or personal decision – when we no longer see change as leading towards a final goal or end? In the current climate, does liturgical prayer still have a place when the very notion of redemption seems to have lost its significance as a meaningful pursuit?

43

Rosenstock-Huessy, Out of Revolution, 22.

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Liturgical Counter-Symbols: Jacob Taubes, Franz Rosenzweig, and the Politics of Redemption What is the political legacy of Franz Rosenzweig’s theory of redemption? Does he allow politics little role in the pursuit of redemption or offer a theological defense of imperialism? 1 Does his oft-cited »non-Zionism« challenge the legitimacy of the state of Israel, or is his work compatible with – and even capable of contributing to – Zionist discourse? 2 Are there discernable but limited affinities between his thought and aspects of contemporary American politics, 3 or can we go further and treat him as a resource for democratic theory? 4 This article takes up Rosenzweig’s legacy by recovering a covert engagement with his politics by one of the twentieth century’s most provocative Jewish thinkers: the German-Jewish rabbi and philosopher Jacob Taubes (1923–1987). 5 Born in Vienna, Taubes 1

While arguing for the latter reading, Benjamin Pollock also surveys examples of the former in »From Nation State to World Empire. Franz Rosenzweig’s Redemptive Imperialism«, Jewish Studies Quarterly 11 (2004), no. 4, 332–353. 2 On Rosenzweig and Zionism, see, e. g., Leora Batnitzky, Idolatry and Representation. The Philosophy of Franz Rosenzweig Reconsidered, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000, 169–206. 3 Cf. Peter Eli Gordon, »Rosenzweig Redux. The Reception of German-Jewish Thought«, Jewish Social Studies 8 (2001), no. 1, 43 f. 4 Cf. Bonnie Honig, »The Miracle of Metaphor. Rethinking the State of Exception with Rosenzweig and Schmitt«, Diacritics 37 (2007), no. 2–3, 78–102; Miguel Vatter, »Cosmopolitan Political Theology in Cohen and Rosenzweig«, Philosophy Today 60 (2016), no. 2, 295–324. 5 On Taubes, see Eveline Goodman-Thau, Richard Faber, Thomas Macho (eds.), Abendländische Eschatologie. Ad Jacob Taubes, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2001; Martin Treml, »Reinventing the Canonical. The Radical Thinking of Jacob Taubes«, in: Eckart Goebel, Sigrid Weigel (eds.), Escape to Life. German

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would go on to a career that took him to institutions including the Jewish Theological Seminary, the Hebrew University, Harvard, Princeton, Columbia, and the Freie Universität Berlin. His work has exercised considerable influence across fields from biblical studies to continental philosophy, most notably by helping reclaim the apostle Paul as a Jewish figure and developing a »negative political theology«: an argument that the sovereignty of God and the Messiah undermines the legitimacy of all earthly states. 6 Yet Taubes was also deeply controversial, maintaining friendly relations with the notorious jurist Carl Schmitt while engaging in numerous feuds; writing to Gershom Scholem, Hannah Arendt once described Taubes as »always duplicitous and shameless and bluffing people«. 7 In what follows, I argue that Taubes’s political theology involves a covert appropriation and revision of Rosenzweig’s acIntellectuals in New York – A Compendium on Exile after 1933, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2012, 457–478. 6 On Taubes and »negative political theology«, see Aleida Assmann, Jan Assmann, Wolf-Daniel Hartwich, »Afterword«, in: Jacob Taubes, The Political Theology of Paul, transl. Dana Hollander, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004 (hereafter: PTP), 115–142; Marin Terpstra, Theo de Wit, »›No Spiritual Investment in the World As It Is‹. Jacob Taubes’s Negative Political Theology«, in: Ilse Bulhof, Laurens ten Kate (eds.), Flight of the Gods. Philosophical Perspectives on Negative Theology, New York: Fordham University Press, 2000, 320–353. 7 Arendt to Scholem, April 9, 1953, in Marie Luise Knott (ed.), The Correspondence of Hannah Arendt and Gershom Scholem, transl. Anthony David, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017, 176. Taubes’s and Scholem’s own personal and intellectual conflicts are well-known: see Ole Jakob Løland, Pauline Ugliness. Jacob Taubes and the Turn to Paul, New York: Fordham University Press, 2020, 36 f., 41 f., 104 f. Shortly before her tragic suicide in 1969, Taubes’s former wife, Susan Taubes (born Feldman), famously published a novel – Divorcing – in which the protagonist’s cruel husband, Ezra, is widely taken to be modeled on Jacob: on Jacob’s role in this novel and his misogynistic behavior more generally, see David Rieff, »Introduction«, in: Susan Taubes, Divorcing, New York: New York Review Books, 2020, x–xi. After long years of neglect, Susan Taubes has begun to receive the attention she deserves as an author and thinker: see, e. g., Sigrid Weigel, »Die Religionsphilosophin Susan Taubes. ›Negative Theologie‹ als Kulturtheorie der Moderne«, in: Bernhard Greiner, Christoph Schmidt (eds.), Arche Noah. Die Idee der »Kultur« im deutsch-jüdischen Diskurs, Freiburg: Rombach, 2002, 383–401. I thank Sarah Imhoff for discussing these issues with me.

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count of redemption, and I draw on this analysis to explore Rosenzweig’s legacy today. For Taubes, if individuals and communities are committed to the idea that the sovereignty of God and the Messiah deprives earthly states of authority, then these individuals and communities should enact this commitment liturgically, challenging these polities – deemed evil and illegitimate – not through revolutionary uprisings, but rather through practices of worship. He illustrates this idea with the example of Jewish communities challenging the state of Israel by performing what he calls a liturgical »counter-symbol« – by marking Israeli Independence Day as a public fast. My claim is that Taubes’s idea of a politically charged liturgical counter-symbol implicitly draws on, but also reimagines, a central element of Rosenzweig’s account of redemption: the claim that the Jewish people, through its recurring liturgical cycle, experiences a form of eternity that challenges the aspirations of the nation state. This recovery of Taubes’s engagement with Rosenzweig, I continue, has both historical and constructive implications. It reveals that a work of political theology which looms large in contemporary thought is profoundly shaped by Rosenzweig’s account of redemption, and it points to the possibilities – but also the limits – of Rosenzweig’s political legacy in today’s world. 1. Taubes The key source is a series of 1987 lectures, posthumously published as The Political Theology of Paul (henceforth: PTP), that Taubes delivered shortly before his death. Cited by figures from historians of antiquity such as John Gager to philosophers such as Giorgio Agamben, 8 these lectures advance three central claims focused on Paul’s Epistle to the Romans. 8

John Gager, Who Made Early Christianity? The Jewish Lives of the Apostle Paul, New York: Columbia University Press, 2015, 31–33; Giorgio Agamben, The Time That Remains. A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans, transl. Patricia Dailey, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005, 3.

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Taubes argues, first, that Paul develops a political theology involving a delegitimation of the Roman Empire. In part, this is a critique of imperial brutality: taking Paul to view Rome as »evil«, Taubes cites violence including the »mass killings« of Jews and Jesus being »nailed to the cross« by Roman law. 9 More fundamentally, though, Taubes takes Paul to issue »a political declaration of war on the Caesar« by performing an »enthronement« of Christ and describing him as »designated to rule«, thereby attacking the »emperor religion« that provided Rome with »legitimation«. 10 On this view, Paul holds that the sovereignty of God and the Messiah deprives Rome of any legitimate claim on subjects’ loyalty: if God has designated the Messiah to rule, then Roman emperors are not designated to do so, and Rome is not a polity that exercises any genuine authority. Moreover, Taubes continues, this Pauline theology remains relevant, undermining the legitimacy not only of Rome but also of modern states. Describing himself as a »Paulinist, not a Christian«, 11 Taubes stresses his agreement with the apostle’s politics: »[T]hat Jesus is the Christ« is not an empty phrase, but an ever-returning principle. This is why the machine of the state is not a perpetuum mobile, a thousand-year Reich, sine fine, but thus mortally a fragile balance between inside and outside, thus mortally also always defeated. […] [T]he Apostle Paul […] to whom I turn at the turn of the ages, distinguished inside and outside, also for »the political«. Without this distinction we are exposed to the thrones and powers that in a »monistic« cosmos no longer know any Beyond. 12

Taubes claims to follow Paul by holding both that states act with brutality (that it is perilous to be »exposed to the thrones«), and that the »Beyond« and Christ leave »the state […] always de-

9

PTP, 40, 23 f. et al.; the German is Die politische Theologie des Paulus, München: Wilhelm Fink, 1993, 58, 36–38 (hereafter PTP, English/German). 10 PTP, 14–16/24–27. 11 Ibid., 88/122. 12 Jacob Taubes to Schmitt, September 18, 1979, PTP, 112 (used by Taubes in his lectures).

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feated« – that the sovereignty of God and the Messiah deprives earthly polities of authority. 13 Finally, Taubes casts this position as part of the Jewish tradition. Describing the Epistle as »the most significant Jewish […] political theology«, 14 he claims that Paul’s views have sufficiently robust analogues in Jewish sources for him to count as a Jewish thinker. 15 My starting point is a question: what would Taubes’s Pauline politics look like in practice? The answer is not revolutionary uprising. »If tomorrow the whole palaver, the entire swindle were going to be over«, Taubes takes Paul to argue, »there’s no point in any revolution!« 16 On this view, Paul is an apocalyptic figure who expects an imminent eschaton and therefore refrains from revolution against entities already doomed to vanish. Indeed, more than a reading of Paul, wariness of revolution represents Taubes’s own view. Declaring that he »would give the same advice«, 17 Taubes casts this posture as relevant in modernity: In [Romans] 12 the Christian life is described; and 13 – well, we’re living in the evil Roman Empire, so how are we living there? What, should we still be rising up against something that’s going down anyway? There’s no point in raising a finger; it’s going to disappear anyhow […]. Sure it’s evil, but – what are you going to do. I know this sort of mentality. It’s not at all foreign to me. I have a passport. But what do I have to do with

13

This reading – the prevailing one (see note 6) – has been challenged by Martin Kavka, who casts Taubes as a democratic thinker: »The Politics of Negative Theology«, in: Michael Fagenblat (ed.), Negative Theology as Jewish Modernity, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2017, 335–355; Martin Kavka, »A Mystic Conception of History. Negative Political Theology in Jacob Taubes«, Modern Theology 36 (2020), no. 1, 13–28. I cannot fully assess Kavka’s insightful reading here. However, while he shows that two Taubes texts from the 1950s might advance democratic views, this is less clear for the PTP (composed decades later): the key section Kavka cites does not clearly invoke democracy, whereas many others stress the Pauline view outlined above. 14 Taubes to Schmitt, September 18, 1979, PTP, 112. 15 Cf. PTP, 7–11/17–22, 28–54/43–75 et al. 16 Ibid., 54/75. 17 Ibidem.

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my country beyond my passport? My president’s name is Reagan. Do I strike you as very American? 18

Paul’s response to »the evil Roman Empire« informs Taubes’s posture towards polities such as the United States, discouraging attempts to »rise up«. But if theological delegitimation does not involve revolution against states deemed evil and illegitimate, what does it involve? Recall Taubes’s claim that Paul challenges Rome by attacking emperor worship. Links between Pauline politics and worship recur throughout the PTP. Describing the Epistle as part of a »literature of protest against the flourishing cult of the emperor«, Taubes notes that Paul was active when »Nero took office with full liturgy […] that is, with full pomp and circumstance and the legitimation granted by the cult of the emperor«, and that the Epistle was sent to followers in close proximity to that cult: Jesus’s »attributes that are imperatorial, kingly, imperial […] are stressed before the congregation in Rome, where […] the center of the cult of the emperor, the emperor religion, is located […]. This is a political declaration of war, when a letter introduced using these words […] is sent to the congregation in Rome to be read aloud. One doesn’t know into whose hands it will fall, and the censors aren’t idiots«. 19 Taubes continues: For the Jews he [Paul] was a troublemaker. He disturbed the peace of the congregations and the peace in the city. He disturbed the precarious balance of Jews who were able to get around the emperor cult without being accused of revolution. They were a religio licita and didn’t want to allow another group that adopts a king by the name of Chrestus or Christus to be recognized as Jews. 20

While most of Paul’s fellow Jews sought to avoid calling undue attention to the fact that they refused to participate in the emperor cult, the apostle and his followers highlighted this refusal and its political stakes through a new form of worship: the acknowledge18 19 20

Ibid., 40 f./58. Ibid., 14–16/24–27. Ibid., 17 f./29.

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ment of a non-Roman, messianic »king by the name of Chrestus or Christus«. Far from going unnoticed, this adoration of a sovereign other than the emperor had the potential to be »recognized« as a form of Jewish religious life and thereby »disturbed […] the peace in the city«, calling attention to Jews’ rejection of the imperial cult central to the state’s legitimacy. Taubes thus casts Paul’s politics as a liturgical endeavor – as involving worship that publicly challenged Rome. Taubes also discusses liturgy later in the PTP: [T]he orthodox of Jerusalem fast on the State of Israel’s Independence Day; they take out the Torah scrolls and read the portion for fast days. So it’s the absolute inversion. […] [T]he orthodox (of whom I am not one, but to whom I am bound in deep friendship) have broken with the State of Israel. And I must say, I once took part in this; while the whole country rejoiced and praises were being given in the synagogues, as is the custom on national independence days, a good-sized group fasts and reads the portion for fast days. This is a counter-symbol [Anti-Symbol] that Jews are capable of even today. (Something you will certainly not hear about in the Jewish newspaper.) 21

Taubes describes Jewish communities challenging the state of Israel by enacting a liturgical »counter-symbol« – by marking Israeli Independence Day as a public fast, and thereby casting that day (and the polity it celebrates) as a cause for lament rather than praise. Moreover, by framing this practice as a »counter-symbol« in which he »once took part« and which »Jews are capable of even today«, Taubes indicates that these practices represent a modern mode of religio-political resistance that he, a Paulinist, can endorse – that these practices are what Pauline politics might involve »today«. Theological delegitimation is thus a liturgical, rather than revolutionary, project: a project in which practices of worship publicly challenge earthly states.

21

Ibid., 29 f./44 (slightly altering the translation).

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2. Taubes and Rosenzweig Taubes’s position, I argue, owes much to Rosenzweig. 22 Having discussed Paul’s politics, the PTP turns to Paul’s Jewishness, highlighting his affinities with diverse elements of the Jewish tradition. 23 One example is a selection from the Yom Kippur liturgy, which Taubes explicates by quoting four long passages from the account of that holiday in Rosenzweig’s The Star of Redemption (henceforth: Star). Taubes explains his turn to Rosenzweig with three comments: I want to introduce here a text by Rosenzweig, so that you at least get an impression of the aura of these texts that I’ve presented to you here. Rosenzweig’s work The Star of Redemption is an ingenious breakthrough; the task he took on in it is to interpret the religious community through its liturgy. 24 [W]e have learned from Rosenzweig to take liturgy seriously. 25 22

On other links (and differences), see, e. g., Gesine Palmer, »Thinking to Stay. Franz Rosenzweig’s Anti-Conversion and the New Pauliners«, Rosenzweig Jahrbuch / Rosenzweig Yearbook 3 (2008), 158 f.; id., »Rosenzweigs Antikonversion und die neuen Pauliner – revolutionäre Treue zum Gesetz«, in: id., Konversionen und andere Gesinnungsstörungen, vol. 5, Berlin: epubli, 2015, chap. 10, 52–54; Aleida Assmann, Jan Assmann, Wolf-Daniel Hartwich, »Introduction to the German Edition«, in: Jacob Taubes, From Cult to Culture. Fragments Toward a Critique of Historical Reason, transl. William Rauscher, in: eds. Charlotte Elisheva Fonrobert and Amir Engel, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010, xxiv, xxx; Nitzan Lebovic, »Review of Taubes, Jacob. From Cult to Culture: Fragments Toward a Critique of Historical Reason; Taubes, Jacob. Occidental Eschatology«, H-Judaic, H-Net Reviews March 2011, 2, 4–6 (https://www.h-net.org/reviews/ showrev.php?id=29694, accessed November 15, 2020); Massimo Giuliani, »Il confronto critico di Jacob Taubes con Franz Rosenzweig. Note sulla ›disputa irrisolvibile‹ tra ebraismo e cristianesimo«, in: id. (ed.), Franz Rosenzweig. Ritornare alle fonti, ripensare la vita, Trapani: Pozzo di Giacobbe, 2012, 261–269; Agata Bielik-Robson, »Modernity. The Jewish Perspective«, New Blackfriars 94 (2013), no. 1050, 190 n. 2, 191; Vatter, »Cosmopolitan Political Theology in Cohen and Rosenzweig«, 307, 313, 315, 318 n. 8; Løland, Pauline Ugliness, 19 f., 28, 37 f., 41, 57, 65, 108. 23 Cf. PTP, 28–38/43–55. 24 Ibid., 34/50. 25 Ibid., 36/52.

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Rosenzweig has an ingenious handle on one aspect of the phenomenology of the Jewish soul on the Day of Atonement […]. I know how denigrated the field of liturgics is in departments of theology. If people really knew what goes on in liturgics, then a very important man, highly distinguished, would have to be appointed to it. 26

For Taubes, Rosenzweig offers not merely a description of one holiday, but an »ingenious breakthrough« about liturgy more generally: the insight that we should »take liturgy seriously«, that worship illuminates theology and religious life. A 1953 Taubes essay makes a similar claim, stating that Rosenzweig »more than anyone before him appreciated the theological relevance of the realm of liturgy«. 27 Already, we might suspect a link between Rosenzweig and Taubes’s politics. If Rosenzweig teaches Taubes »to take liturgy seriously«, then perhaps the liturgical framing of Taubes’s political theology reflects Rosenzweigian influence. 28 But signs of a connection run deeper, for the section of the Star that Taubes cites addresses the very issue that he raises: not just the significance of liturgy in general, but the political significance of liturgy in particular. Taubes ends his discussion by quoting the final line of the Star’s account of Yom Kippur: »the cycle of the year can begin again in which alone we are permitted to implore eternity in time«. 29 Taubes is quoting a central element of Rosenzweig’s account of redemption: the idea that the Jewish people, through its recurring liturgical cycle, experiences »eternity in time«. As a »blood community«, a community that secures its enduring existence through the mere act of procreation, the Jewish people ex26

Ibid., 38/55. Jacob Taubes, »The Issue Between Judaism and Christianity. Facing Up to the Unresolvable Difference«, in: id., From Cult to Culture, 51. Taubes takes Rosenzweig to nevertheless miss aspects of Christian liturgy. 28 Taubes is also critical of Rosenzweig: see notes 27 and 36. 29 Franz Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, transl. Barbara E. Galli, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005 (hereafter: Star), 347; the German is Der Stern der Erlösung, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1988 (hereafter: Stern), 364. The Galli translation of this line includes a typo, substituting »win which« for »in which«. This line appears (translated differently) in PTP, 37/53. 27

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periences its annual cycle of sabbaths and festivals as persisting into the future. This recurring cycle, in turn, means that Jewish communal life is experienced not as a series of ephemeral moments destined never to return, but as a pattern that continues for all time. This life is experienced as a form of eternity: as permanent and enduring, as a »nunc stans« or »standing now« in which what occurs now recurs again and again. Moreover, this eternity-generating liturgical cycle brings together holidays that celebrate creation, revelation, and redemption and involve worshipers coming together before God; this eternity-generating cycle thus provides Jews with an experience of unity that anticipates the unity of a future redeemed world. 30 The key for us is that although Taubes does not mention this point, the Rosenzweigian argument that he cites contains an emphatically political dimension. After invoking »the cycle of the year«, Rosenzweig notes that the nation state, too, seeks to »give to the peoples eternity in time« – that such states also seek to provide access to redemptively significant experiences of permanence and persistence. 31 By fighting wars, such states aim to secure their lasting existence (and continue to contribute to history’s march toward redemption); by establishing laws in the wake of revolutions, such states seek to fix ever-changing customs into enduring forms. Such attempts at eternity, however, are doomed to fail. Wars aim at permanence, but they force states to grapple with the prospect of defeat and disappearance; revolutionary acts yielding legislation seek to fix custom in permanent form, but such laws will be cast aside as circumstances change, giving way to further revolution and lawgiving. 32 This is the backdrop for the Star’s claim about liturgy and politics: A cycle, the cycle of the year, guarantees its eternity to the eternal people. […] [W]ar and revolution are the only reality that the State knows […]. 30

Star, 306–355 / Stern, 321–372; the quote is Star, 307 / Stern, 322 (altering the translation). 31 Star, 352 / Stern, 369. 32 Cf. Star, 318–324, 348–355 / Stern, 332–339, 364–372.

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[…] [T]he true eternity of the eternal people must remain always foreign and annoying to the State and to world history. Against the hours of eternity, which the State in the times of world history carves with a sharp sword into the bark of the growing tree of time, the eternal people every year places untroubled and intact ring upon ring round the trunk of its eternal life. […] [T]his true eternity of life […] again and again through our existence is pushed in front of the eyes of the peoples of the world so that it might silently reprove the worldly, all too worldly illusory eternity of their lies of world historical moments drawn up into States. 33

Enabled by its liturgical cycle to embody a genuine experience of redemptive eternity in time, the Jewish people highlights just how far short nation states fall with respect to this aim. Taubes is aware of this aspect of the Star: beyond the PTP’s quotation from precisely this section of the text, Taubes’s 1953 essay cites Rosenzweig’s view that Jews’ eternity places them outside »the historical destiny of the Gentile nations«, echoing language the Star employs in the argument outlined above. 34 Moreover, the Taubes-Rosenzweig similarities are striking. Both take liturgy to challenge the aspirations of earthly states. Taubes describes practices that undermine (ancient) Rome’s claim to »legitimation« and (modern) Israel’s claim to celebration, just as Rosenzweig insists that Jewish worship reveals the »illusory« status of nation states’ hopes for eternity. Both link these liturgical challenges to redemption. Taubes stresses the political significance of worshipping a messianic sovereign, and Rosenzweig invokes a liturgically grounded anticipation of redemptive unity. Both contrast these liturgical practices with revolutionary acts. Taubes juxtaposes Paul’s turn to worship with the apostle’s eschewal of uprisings, just as Rosenzweig contrasts the eternity arising from violent revolutions with the eternity secured by Jewish liturgy. There are also other links. 35 The contours of the TaubesRosenzweig relationship, though, are already emerging. Endors33

Star, 352–355 / Stern, 369–372. Taubes, »The Issue Between Judaism and Christianity«, 49; for Star passages invoking non-Jewish nations and »world history«, see note 32. 35 Taubes’s 1947 dissertation not only cites another aspect of Rosenzweig’s account of redemption, but does so in a paragraph where Taubes invokes Paul and 34

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ing a Pauline theology that involves the delegitimation of earthly states, Taubes frames this posture in liturgical rather than revolutionary terms. He then credits Rosenzweig with teaching him to attend to worship, quoting a section of the Star – its account of redemption and Judaism – that infuses liturgy with a political force that anticipates the PTP’s claims in striking ways. Taken together, this evidence suggests that Taubes’s political theology involves an implicit appropriation of Rosenzweig’s account of redemption. Having »learned from Rosenzweig to take liturgy seriously«, Taubes discovers in the Star an insistence that worship is suffused with political potential, and he incorporates this argument into his account of Pauline politics. Rosenzweig helps Taubes move from the abstract to the concrete: taking the sovereignty of God and the Messiah to deprive earthly states of authority, Taubes describes how religious communities might enact this posture, and he offers his description by taking up Rosenzweig’s insight that it is through liturgy that such groups issue political challenges. Yet Taubes also breaks with Rosenzweig. The PTP’s embrace of Paul and his apocalypticism in finds little precedent in Rosenzweig, whom Taubes characterizes as un-Pauline. 36 Moreover, while Taubes takes aim at all earthly polities, Rosenzweig focuses on the failures of nation states. 37 On one reading, in fact, the Star ascribes considerable theological significance to an alternate political form – namely, empire – by arguing that imperialism’s drive to

the idea that God »abolishes all worldly domination, authority, and power«: Jacob Taubes, Occidental Eschatology, transl. David Ratmoko, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, 15, 195 n. 42; the German is Abendländische Eschatologie, Bern: A. Francke, 1947, 14, 40 n. 39. 36 The PTP casts Rosenzweig’s view of Judaism and Christianity as »an alternative vision to Paul’s« (PTP, 38/55). »The Issue Between Judaism and Christianity« criticizes Rosenzweig for (among other errors) minimizing the doctrinal significance of the Epistle to the Romans (cf. 51). On Rosenzweig and Paul more broadly, see vol. 4 (2009), »Paulus und die Politik / Paul and Politics«, of the Rosenzweig Jahrbuch / Rosenzweig Yearbook. 37 Cf. Vatter, »Cosmopolitan Political Theology in Cohen and Rosenzweig«, 307.

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unite the globe facilitates the emergence of a redemptively united humanity. 38 Most fundamentally, Taubes and Rosenzweig offer differing accounts of how worship challenges the state. Taubes stresses liturgical disruption, highlighting cases where communities break with existing practices to enact new performances. He suggests that Paul »disturbed« existing forms of liturgical life by »adopt[ing] a king by the name of […] Christus«, just as he portrays a public fast on Israeli Independence Day as »the absolute inversion« of prevailing celebrations. By contrast, Rosenzweig focuses not on disruption, but on continuity. For him, the Jewish liturgical cycle challenges the nation state precisely because it is a cycle: because it recurs year after year. The political force of this liturgy derives not from its capacity to undermine existing practices but rather from its capacity to ensure their continuity, allowing the Jewish people to achieve a form of eternity that »reproves« the nation state’s aspirations to do the same. Even as Taubes accepts Rosenzweig’s insight that liturgy possesses political significance, then, he broadens the mechanisms by which that significance is realized, going beyond the Star’s stress on liturgical repetition to emphasize liturgical innovation. Whereas Rosenzweig takes liturgy to preserve modes of worship that reveal the limitations of earthly states, Taubes takes liturgy to disrupt modes of worship that fail to issue such challenges. Taubes thus performs a covert appropriation and revision of Rosenzweig’s account of redemption, developing a vision of liturgical counter-symbols that draws on, but also reimagines, a central element of the Star. 3. Rosenzweig’s Legacy If my analysis is correct, then Rosenzweig’s account of redemption looms large in contemporary thought, shaping a political-theological voice that has exercised considerable influence. To the extent 38

Cf. Pollock, »From Nation State to World Empire«.

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that figures from biblical studies to continental philosophy grapple with Taubes’s appropriation of Paul, they are engaged with a project that reworks the Star. But there is also a constructive point here. On my reading, Taubes adopts the Rosenzweigian notion that worship is suffused with political potential, but he posits an alternate path to actualizing that capacity. Implicitly, then, Taubes advances a claim about the possibilities of Rosenzweig’s legacy, suggesting that Rosenzweig offers a politically inflected theory of liturgy that can be developed in un-Rosenzweigian ways. Rosenzweig may focus on Judaism’s seemingly timeless cycle of worship, but Taubes suggests that insofar as the Star teaches us that liturgical life is potentially political, the Star teaches us that liturgically grounded acts of political resistance can be found in a much wider range of contexts. For Taubes, Rosenzweig’s legacy lives on not only when synagogues remain rooted in inherited liturgical forms, but also when communities challenge the state of Israel by rejecting prevailing modes of worship. Looking further afield, we might suggest that this legacy would also be present in the case of an American congregation challenging the United States by breaking with the past to replace widely recited prayers for the state with new compositions exclusively praising the sovereignty of God. Yet Taubes also invites a note of caution. For both him and Rosenzweig, liturgy derives its political potency from its emphatically public nature. That is to say, liturgical performances matter politically because their attack on the state is recognized by others. For the Star, it is because the Jewish people’s liturgically grounded eternity »is pushed in front of the eyes« of others that it can »reprove« nation states; for Taubes, it is because Paul’s followers might be »recognized« as »adopt[ing] a king by the name of […] Christus«, and because his enthronement of Jesus might be »read aloud« near Roman officials, that he poses a political threat. Yet recall Taubes’s account of liturgical counter-symbols. After describing public fasts on Israeli Independence Day, he remarks that this is »something you will certainly not hear about in the Jewish newspaper«. I suspect that Taubes intends this less as a substantive philosophical claim and more as a snide comment about his con140

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temporaries. Nevertheless, I would suggest that he is raising, perhaps unintentionally, a genuine concern: how likely is it that liturgy will attain sufficient publicity to pose serious challenges to earthly states? Even if some Israeli communities were to enact modes of worship that call the state into question, will such performances be »pushed in front of the eyes« of others? Even if some American groups were to revise prayers in politically charged ways, will such revisions penetrate the public’s awareness? The answers are far from clear. Perhaps phenomena such as the rise of social media can help secure liturgical publicity, empowering communities to broadcast counter-symbols to a wide audience. 39 Alternately, perhaps the increasingly fragmented and polarized nature of contemporary religious (and political) life will diminish such symbols’ efficacy, allowing members of the public to retreat into closed circles of like-minded individuals and ignore the liturgical lives of other groups. If Taubes offers a way of conceptualizing the contemporary relevance of Rosenzweig’s account of redemption, then, his lectures also raise – perhaps inadvertently – a question about that relevance: is liturgy sufficiently public to function as a mode of theological delegitimation? Is worship capable of being »pushed in front« of others in a manner that allows it to »reprove« earthly polities? What Taubes provides, I would suggest, is insight into both the possibilities and the limits of Rosenzweig’s legacy in today’s world.

39

Separately from the rise of social media, the Israeli organization Women of the Wall might be seen as an example of a group whose politically charged liturgical enactments have attracted widespread attention. I thank an anonymous referee for raising this point.

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Die Bedeutung von »Erlösung« in sozialer Dimension. Zur Akzeptanz des Rosenzweig-Gedankens in nichtjüdischen Kulturbereichen

Einleitung Das Ziel dieses Beitrags ist es, die Bedeutung der Vorwegnahme der Erlösung in sozialer Dimension zu klären, insbesondere in nichtjüdischen Kulturbereichen. Dieser Artikel konzentriert sich auf Rosenzweigs Konzept der »Erlösung« und untersucht, wie Rosenzweigs Gedanken in Bereichen akzeptiert werden können, von denen bisher angenommen wurde, dass sie nicht in Zusammenhang mit jüdischen Gedanken stehen. Damit werden wir bestätigen, dass es in Rosenzweigs Gedanken wichtig ist, die Erlösung vorwegzunehmen, und zeigen, dass die Vorwegnahme von Erlösung, die auf das jüdische Volk beschränkt zu sein scheint, auch für Nichtjuden potenziell möglich ist. Außerdem stellen wir fest, dass Gott im jüdischen Gebet als Wahrheit und als Geschenk anerkannt wird. Des Weiteren zeigen wir, dass wir die Wahrheit nicht nur empfangen, sondern auch bewähren müssen, da Wahrheit als Geschenk in Form eines Dialogs zwischen Gott und Mensch gegeben wird. Ferner zeigen wir, warum das jüdische Gebet ein Vorbild für die Vorwegnahme der Erlösung ist, indem wir die Art des Dialogs zwischen Gott und dem Menschen mit dem Dialog zwischen Mensch und Mensch vergleichen. Zum Schluss finden wir die Bedeutung der Vorwegnahme von Erlösung in sozialer Dimension, insbesondere in nichtjüdischen Kulturbereichen.

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1. Die Vorwegnahme von Erlösung In diesem Abschnitt untersuchen wir das Konzept der Erlösung als Vollendung Gottes. Nach Rosenzweig ist die Erlösung das Ende, deren Vorwegnahme von ihm als wichtig erachtet wird. Wir stellen klar, dass die Erlösung nicht nur von Juden, sondern auch von Nichtjuden vorweggenommen werden kann. 1.1. Warten auf »das Zukünftige« Was ist Erlösung? Ist die Erlösung das Ende einer für uns ungünstigen Situation und die Ersetzung durch einen gewünschten Zustand? Können wir die verheerenden Zustände in der heutigen Welt durch die Hinwendung zur Religion lösen oder verbessern? Zwar können wir eine Erlösung in diesem Sinne in Betracht ziehen, Rosenzweig jedoch betrachtet die Erlösung als Erlösung für Gott und nicht für den Menschen. Gott erlöst in der Erlösung, der Welt durch den Menschen, des Menschen an der Welt, sich selber. Menschen und Welt verschwinden in der Erlösung, Gott aber vollendet sich. Gott wird erst in der Erlösung […] All und Eines. 1

Gott erlöst und vollendet sich. Wenn die Erlösung bedeutet, dass Gott All und Eines wird, scheint die Erlösung nichts mit den Menschen zu tun zu haben. Wir können nicht wissen, wann diese Erlösung eintreten wird, und es ist auch nicht das Ende unserer Lebenszeit. Je näher wir uns dem idealen Endpunkt nähern, der auf der sich immer weiter ausbreitenden Zeitachse vor uns zu liegen scheint, desto mehr wird dieser Endpunkt von Tag zu Tag verschoben, wie ein sich entfernender Horizont. In der gegenwärtigen Zeit, die der Mensch erlebt, besteht jeder Moment aus einem angespannten Verhältnis zwischen den widerstreitenden 1

Franz Rosenzweig, Der Stern der Erlösung (Der Mensch und sein Werk. Gesammelte Schriften, II), hg. Reinhold Mayer, Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976 (im Folgenden: GS II), 266.

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Tendenzen von Leben und Tod, so dass die gegenwärtige Zeit für Rosenzweig im Wesentlichen unvollendet ist. Daher bezeichnet Stéphane Mosès, im exakten Gegenteil der Erlösung, diese Vorstellung einer endlosen Bewegung nach einem solchen unerreichbaren Ziel als »Utopie« 2. Was Utopie als eine Kategorie der Zeit in unserer Vorstellung bedeutet, sind nur neue Verbindungen zwischen bereits bekannten Elementen. Im Gegenteil zur Utopie geschieht die Erlösung entgegen allem sehnsüchtigen Warten mit der Unvorhersehbarkeit der absolut neuen Dinge. Da die Erlösung noch nicht eingetreten ist, kann ihr Ursprung nicht als Ausgangspunkt betrachtet werden, so dass der Startpunkt nur in der Zukunft vorausgesetzt werden kann. 3 Trotzdem bedeutet Rosenzweigs Erlösungskonzept nicht, dass Menschen in die Welt des Jenseits eintreten. Was er präsentiert, ist »ein neues Erlösungskonzept, das dem post-metaphysischen menschlichen Verlangen entspricht, in der Welt zu bleiben.« 4 Mit anderen Worten, anstatt dass Menschen das Jenseits erreichen, wird etwas Jenseitiges zu uns kommen. Erlösung bedeutet »einen gewaltsamen Bruch des historischen Gewebes, den Einbruch einer absoluten Andersheit in den Mittelpunkt der Zeit und eine Form der Erfahrung, die sich radikal von allem unterscheidet, was wir wissen.« 5 Auf eine solche Zukunft in dieser Welt können wir als Menschen nur warten. Die Handlung des Wartens ist nur auf »zukünftige Dinge« ausgerichtet und »Dinge, die noch nicht angekommen sind«, so dass man scheinbar nichts tut und anderen alles überlässt. Aber da die Handlung des Wartens auf zukünftige Dinge jetzt geschieht, ist das Warten ein Akt des Brückenschlags zwischen Gegenwart und 2

Stéphane Mosès, The Angel of History. Rosenzweig, Benjamin, Scholem, aus dem Franz. von Barbara Harshav, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, 50. 3 Vgl. ebd., 57. 4 Peter Eli Gordon, Rosenzweig and Heidegger: Between Judaism and German Philosophy, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 2003, 149. Vgl. Takashi Sato, Franz Rosenzweig. »Atarashii Shikou« no Tanjyo [Franz Rosenzweig. Die Geburt des »neuen Denkens«], Tokyo: Chisen Shokan, 2010, 192 [Jap.]. 5 Mosès, The Angel of History, 51.

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Zukunft. Mit anderen Worten: Warten ist eine Tat der »Vorwegnahme« der Zukunft. 6 [D]as Zukünftige [ist] als das was es ist, nämlich als Zukünftiges, nur zu fassen durch das Mittel der Vorwegnahme. Wollte man auch das Zukünftige er-zählen, so würde man es unabwendbar zum starren Vergangenen machen. Das Zukünftige will vorausgesagt werden. Die Zukunft wird erlebt nur in der Erwartung. Das Letzte muß hier in Gedanken das Erste sein. 7

Rosenzweig sagt, dass das Zukünftige vorausgesagt werden will. Dies bedeutet, dass die Zukunft im noch nicht angekommenen Zustand vorweggenommen werden muss, als ob die Zukunft jetzt hier wäre. Daher wird Erlösung immer erfahren »als Warten auf einen Umbruch, der jederzeit auftreten kann.« 8 Solche Vorwegnahme erscheint nur möglich, wenn Juden eine »Sonderstellung« zugewiesen wird. 1.2. Das jüdische Volk als Blutgemeinschaft Wie Hilary Putnam sagt, »Juden nehmen eine besondere Stellung in Rosenzweigs Gedanken ein«, indem sie an einer »welt-unhistorischen Stelle« stehen. 9 Sie haben ihre eigene Sprache und ihr eigenes Land verlassen und garantieren ihre Ewigkeit, indem sie in sich selbst verwurzelt sind. Nach Rosenzweig ist das jüdische Volk, das sein Land verlassen hat, ein Fremdling und Beisaß überall, wo es in dieser Welt wohnt. Für ihn ist dieses Land zugehörig zu Gott, der Stammvater von Israel (Abraham) ist zugewandert. Wenn das jüdisches Volk auf Fahrten und Abenteuern draußen weilt und sich nach der ver6

Vgl. Shinichi Muraoka, »Atogaki« [»Nachwort«], in: Franz Rosenzweig, Kyuusai no Hoshi [Der Stern der Erlösung], aus dem Deutschen von Shinichi Muraoka, Kazuyuki Hosomi und Ken Kosuda, Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo, 2009, 689 [Jap.]. 7 GS II, 244. 8 Mosès, The Angel of History, 52. 9 Hilary Putnam, Jewish Philosophy as a Guide to Life. Rosenzweig, Buber, Levinas, Wittgenstein, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008, 52.

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lassenen Heimat zurücksehnt, ist das Land ihm im tiefsten Sinn eigen als das Land seiner Sehnsucht, nämlich heiliges Land. 10 Außerdem sprechen die Juden als Gäste die Sprachen der Nation. 11 Sie haben ihre eigene Sprache als Umgangssprache verloren. Aber »[d]ie Heiligkeit der heiligen Sprache, in der er [der Jude] nur beten kann, läßt sein Leben nicht im Boden einer eignen Sprache Wurzel schlagen«. 12 Die einzige Stelle, an der die Juden ihre Wurzeln niederlegen können, ist kein Land, keine Sprache, sondern die Verwurzelung in sich selbst. Rosenzweig bezeichnet »diese Verwurzelung in sich selbst« mit dem gefährlich rassischen Wort »Blut«. Aber wie Karl Löwith und Emmanuel Levinas verteidigt haben, hat dieser Begriff keinen rassistischen Sinn. 13 Vielmehr ist »Blut« eine Möglichkeit, die Erlösung vorwegzunehmen, weil die Zeit für Blutgemeinschaft allein Kind und Kindeskind ist. Mit anderen Worten, sie erleben die Zukunft in der Gegenwart, indem sie auf Kinder und Enkel warten. Die jüdische Gemeinschaft als Blutgemeinschaft ist eine sichtbare Gestalt von Zeitlichkeit, bei der die Zukunft schon gegenwärtig ist. 14 Die Blutgemeinschaft allein spürt die Gewähr ihrer Ewigkeit schon heute warm durch die Adern rollen. Ihr allein ist die Zeit […] Kind und Kindeskind. Was andern Gemeinschaften Zukunft und also ein der Gegenwart jedenfalls noch Jenseitiges ist, – ihr allein ist es schon Gegenwart. 15

Die Blutbeziehungen zwischen den Juden beziehen sich nicht auf ihre Rasse, sondern auf die Verbindungen zwischen den Generationen, so dass die zeitabhängige Eigenschaft der Verbindung der Generationen eine Analogie für die Vorwegnahme von Erlösung 10

Vgl. GS II, 333. Vgl. ebd., 334. 12 Ebd., 335. 13 Vgl. Emmanuel Levinas, »Between Two Worlds«, in: ders., Difficult Freedom. Essays on Judaism, aus dem Franz. von Seán Hand, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990, 193 f.; Karl Löwith, »M. Heidegger und F. Rosenzweig. Ein Nachtrag zu ›Sein und Zeit‹«, in: ders., Sämtliche Schriften, Bd. 8, Heidegger – Denker in dürftiger Zeit, Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1984, 92. 14 Vgl. Muraoka, »Atogaki«, 690. 15 GS II, 332. 11

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ist. Also ist diese zeitliche Gemeinschaft nicht auf die Juden beschränkt. Es ist möglich, dass auch wir alle, die zu Nationen gehören, die Zukunft in der Gegenwart erleben können, indem wir auf Kinder und Enkel warten. Trotzdem wäre der Grund, aus welchem besonders Juden, anders als national definierte Gemeinschaften, scheinbar die Erlösung vorwegnehmen können, dass sie nur eine Bindung von Blut haben können. Die Form der Vorwegnahme von Erlösung erscheint eindeutig bei Juden, die sich in Situationen befinden, in denen ihnen ihre eigene Sprache und ihr Land fehlen. Die Völker der Welt, denen die Gemeinschaft des Bluts nicht genügt, halten sich an Land und Sprache fest. 16 Diese Völker haben zu viele Bindungen, um die Bindung von Blut als wesentlich anzusehen. Es scheint daher, dass nur Juden die Erlösung vorwegnehmen können, aber auch wir alle haben die Möglichkeit, die Erlösung vorwegzunehmen. 2. Eine Form des Gebets, die im jüdischen Volk bemerkenswert ist Wie zuvor erwähnt, nimmt die jüdische Gemeinschaft als Blutgemeinschaft die Erlösung vorweg. Rosenzweig diskutiert ferner die Vorwegnahme der Erlösung im Gebet. In diesem Abschnitt zeigen wir, dass in diesem Gebet Gott als Wahrheit und als Geschenk anerkannt wird. 2.1. Gebet als Vorwegnahme von Erlösung Gebet bedeutet ursprünglich »eine Suche nach dem, was ich will«. Es ist also in erster Linie ein Ausdruck von Wunsch und Egoismus. 17 Zum Beispiel würden viele Menschen in Japan dem 16

Vgl. ebd. Vgl. Shinichi Muraoka, Namae no Tetsugaku [Philosophie des Namens], Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2020, 144 [Jap].

17

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Brauch nach zum »Gott des Kinderschatzes« beten, wenn sie sich Kinder wünschen, und zum »Gott der Studien«, wenn sie die Aufnahmeprüfung für die Universität bestehen möchten. Für uns Japaner hatten diese Gebete ursprünglich eine religiöse Bedeutung. Aber heute gehen wir zum Schrein um formell zu beten, ohne dass wir uns der besonderen göttlichen Bedeutung bewusst sind. Diese einzelnen Gebete scheinen sündhaft zu sein, wie Rosenzweig es »das Gebet des Ungläubigen« nennt, sind aber nicht inhaltlich unrichtig; »denn Gott will, daß der Mensch sein Eigenes habe, er gönnt ihm, was er zum Leben braucht, ja mehr: was er im Leben zu brauchen glaubt, ja was er nur immer wünschen kann.« 18 Außerdem wurden diese »einzelnen Dinge« dem Menschen bereits gegeben. Trotzdem sind diese Gebete auf einzelne Dinge beschränkt, und indem wir auf diese Weise beten, trennen wir uns voneinander und auch die Gottheit wird in einzelne Götter aufgespalten. Darauf weist Shinichi Muraoka, einer der führenden Experten in der Studie von Rosenzweig in Japan und einer der Übersetzer vom Stern der Erlösung, in seinem Buch hin. Der Grund dafür ist, dass die Anderen, die mehr Macht als die Betenden haben, unterschiedliche Namen haben, wie zum Beispiel ein »Gott der Studien« oder ein »Gott des Kindersegens«. Egal wie viele Menschen sich zu jedem Gott versammeln, unser Gott unterscheidet sich von Ihrem Gott. 19 In einem solchen Gebet ist es unmöglich, die Erlösung vorwegzunehmen, weil in Rosenzweigs Denken nur ein einziger Gott erlöst und dadurch der Mensch und die Welt verschwinden werden. Also muss die Erlösung auf der Grundlage der Struktur von einem einzigen Gott, der uns gegenübersteht, vorweggenommen werden. Es ist »das Gebet des Gläubigen«, das die Zukunft beschleunigt und die Ewigkeit zum Nächsten, zum Heute macht. 20 Dieses Gebet ergänzt das Gebet der Ungläubigen. Der Gläubigen betet nicht für das Eigene, sondern für »das Kommen des Reichs«. Rosenzweig sieht aus den Lehren von dem 18 19 20

GS II, 304. Vgl. Muraoka, Namae no Tetsugaku, 145. GS II, 321 f.

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Kommen des Reichs die Vorwegnahme der Zukunft ab. Dieses kultische Gebet wird in der Versammlung der Gläubigen abgehalten. 21 Aber können nur Juden an diesem Gebet teilnehmen? Denn, wie Rosenzweig sagt, »[d]er Sabbat ist Fest der Erlösung«, 22 anders als der Sonntag des Christen. Wie Mosès und Putnam angedeutet haben, in der »jüdischen religiösen Erfahrung wird das ideale Ende der Geschichte im gewissen Grad im Voraus durch die Symbolik der Rituale erlebt.« 23 Wenn wir den Inhalt dieses Gebets betrachten, können wir feststellen, dass dieses Gebet nicht nur für Juden, sondern für alle die Erlösung vorwegnehmen kann, weil Gott in diesem Gebet keinen einzigen Namen hat. Bei den Gebeten, die sich wie oben erwähnt einzelne Dinge wünschen, können wir – wenn wir wissen, wofür wir beten sollen – von einem Gott mit bestimmten Eigenschaften und mit bestimmtem Namen wie »Gott des Studiums« oder »Gott des Kindersegens« usw. etwas verlangen. Aber geraten wir im Leben in Situationen der Verzweiflung, aus denen wir nicht herauszufinden wissen und in denen wir nicht wissen, was wir tun sollen, ist das »Gebet um das Kommen des Reichs […] immer nur ein Schreien und Seufzen, nur ein Stoßgebet.« 24 Und wenn wir nicht wissen, was wir tun sollten, schreien wir – wie Muraoka beschreibt – aus dem Grund unseres Herzens: »Oh Gott, bitte rette mich«. In diesem Fall wissen wir nicht, zu welchem Gott wir beten. Dieser Gott hat keinen bestimmten Namen. Dieser Gott ist ein »verborgener« Gott. Da dieser Gott keinen bestimmten Namen und keine besonderen Eigenschaften hat, kann dieser Gott nicht unterschieden werden: Dieser Gott ist der einzige Gott. Der Name Gottes, den wir unter diesen Umständen nennen, ist kein Eigenname, sondern ein Name als reiner Vokativ, der es möglich macht, »Gott« 21

Vgl. ebd., 325. Ebd., 398. 23 Sato, Franz Rosenzweig, 211. Vgl. Mosès, The Angel of History, 56; Putnam, Jewish Philosophy as a Guide to Life, 52 f. 24 GS II, 206. 22

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zu rufen. Indem wir diesen reinen Vokativ nennen, können wir zu einem einzigen Gott beten. Da wir unter einem einzigen Gott sind, sind wir auch nicht getrennt in Juden, Christen oder diejenigen, die zu einem bestimmten Gott beten. In diesem Moment wird zum ersten Mal eine Gemeinschaft von »Wir« verwirklicht, die sich auf die Menschheit selbst verbreiten. Und so können die Wir, in deren Gemeinschaft der Einzelne also in seiner nackten und bloßen Menschlichkeit vor Gott an seine Brust schlägt und in deren bekennendem Wir er sein sündiges Ich fühlt wie nie im Leben, keine engere Gemeinde sein als die eine der Menschheit selbst. Wie das Jahr an diesen Tagen unmittelbar die Ewigkeit vertritt, so Israel an ihnen unmittelbar die Menschheit. »Mit den Sündern« ist sich Israel bewußt zu beten. Und das heißt ja, sei der Ursprung der dunkeln Formel welcher er wolle: [Israel] als Ganzes der Menschheit »mit« einem Jeden. Denn Jeder ist ein Sünder. 25

Indem wir »Gott« – den Namen Gottes als einen reinen Vokativ – nennen, werden »Wir« also im Gebet als Vorwegnahme von Erlösung einem einzigen Gott gegenüberstehen. Wer erscheint, wenn Juden »Gott« als Vokativ rufen, unterscheidet sich z. B. von dem Wesen im Christentum mit Eigennamen Jesus Christus. Ein einziger Gott, auch wenn der Jude seinen Namen kennt, wenn er es wagt, diesen Namen nicht zu nennen, 26 steht jedem offen, der keine andere Wahl hat als zu beten. 2.2. Die Wahrheit als Geschenk In diesem Gebet erscheint ein einziger Gott als ein einfaches Dasein. Zwar wird die Heiligkeit nur durch den Vergleich mit Unheiligen entdeckt, aber es gibt nur die Tatsache, dass ein einziger Gott existiert, weil es da nur ein Dasein gibt. Rosenzweig nennt dieses einfache Dasein »Wahrheit«.

25 26

Ebd., 361. Vgl. ebd., 427.

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Jenseits des Worts – und was ist der Name andres als das ganz gesammelte Wort – jenseits des Worts leuchtet das Schweigen. Wo dem einen Namen keine andern Namen mehr sich entgegenwerfen, wo der eine Name all-ein ist und alles Geschaffne ihn und nur ihn kennt und bekennt, das ist die Tat der Heiligung zur Ruhe gekommen. Denn Heiligkeit gilt nur, solange es noch Unheiliges gibt. Wo alles heilig ist, das ist Heiliges selbst nicht mehr heilig, da ist es einfach da. Solch einfaches Dasein des Höchsten, solch ungekränkte allherrschende und alleinherrschende Wirklichkeit jenseits aller Not und Wonne der Verwirklichung, das ist Wahrheit. 27

Diese Wahrheit ist Gottes Siegel, durch das wir Gott erkennen. 28 Zudem ist die Wahrheit, die hier erscheint, weder eine transzendentale, ewige, universelle Wahrheit, die durch Kontemplation von der Vernunft angeeignet wird, noch »meine« subjektive Wahrheit, die durch meine subjektive Entscheidung angeeignet wird. 29 Für Rosenzweig ist die Wahrheit ein Geschenk. »Denn nur was man als Gabe empfängt, nur das lehrt einen den Geber erkennen.« 30 Das heißt, obwohl Gott noch nicht in unsere erkennbare Welt gekommen ist und wir nicht in die transzendente Dimension Gottes, die Zukunft, gelangen können, kann Gott in dieser Welt hier und jetzt als die Wahrheit wahrgenommen werden. Wie können wir die Gabe der Wahrheit bekommen? So wie wir normalerweise Geschenke von anderen erhalten, wird uns dies durch Warten auf ein Geschenk ermöglicht. 31 Hier wird jedem die Wahrheit gegeben, aber das bedeutet nicht, dass die Wahrheit geteilt ist. Die Wahrheit wird uns nicht in Fragmenten, sondern als Anteil gegeben. Dabei kümmert uns nicht, ob der Anteil die »ganze« Wahrheit ist, denn ich kann nur das mein eigen machen, »[n]ur das, was mir an meinem inneren Hier und Jetzt zuteil wurde.« 32 Wie wir bereits im vorherigen Abschnitt über das Gebet 27 28 29 30 31 32

Ebd., 426 f. Vgl. ebd., 423. Vgl. Muraoka, Namae no Tetsugaku, 134 f. GS II, 437. Vgl. Muraoka, Namae no Tetsugaku, 135 f. GS II, 437.

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festgestellt haben, kann der eine und einzige Gott nicht weiter unterteilt werden. Das Gleiche gilt für die Wahrheit, die Gottes Siegel ist. Daher erscheint uns ein einziger Gott sowohl in Einzelgebeten als auch in Gebeten in der Kultgruppe jedes Mal. Die Wahrheit wird für ewig er- und bekannt […], indem sie als eigene, empfangene, zuteil gewordene bewährt wird, Teil also, der die ganze Wahrheit, statt sie zu verleugnen, bewährt; der bloße Teil ist »mein ewiger Anteil« worden. 33

Wir müssen jedoch nicht nur auf diese Wahrheit warten, sondern sie muss sich auch bewähren, weil die Wahrheit mir als Offenbarung gegeben wird und sie im »Dialog« zwischen mir und Gott erscheint. 3. Die Bewährung der Wahrheit In diesem Abschnitt zeigen wir, dass wir, die Wahrheit nicht nur empfangen, sondern sie auch bewähren müssen, weil die Wahrheit als Geschenk in Form eines Dialogs zwischen Gott und Mensch gegeben wird. Indem wir die Art des Dialogs zwischen Gott und dem Menschen mit dem Dialog zwischen Menschen und Menschen vergleichen, zeigen wir ferner, warum das jüdische Gebet ein Vorbild für die Vorwegnahme der Erlösung ist. 3.1. Die im Dialog erscheinende Wahrheit Bei dem Gebet als Vorwegnahme der Erlösung ist der gerufene Name Gottes rein Vokativ. Der Name als Vokativ hat nur einen Inhalt. Sobald Vokativ einmal gerufen wird, garantiert er dem Anrufer die unbedingte Antwort. 34 Denn mit dem Aufruf wird etwas da sein, und ich werde ihm zum ersten Mal begegnen. Das Gebet um das Kommen des Reichs, das immer nur ein Schreien und 33 34

Ebd., 438. Vgl. Muraoka, Namae no Tetsugaku, 147.

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Seufzen, nur ein Stoßgebet ist, wird also nicht erfüllt. Anders ausdrückt: Man wird aus der Not nicht gerettet. Man kann in diesem Gebet nur zur Überzeugung gelangen, dass Gott einem antwortet, d. h. Gott mit einem existiert, oder er einem begegnet ist. 35 Wenn der eigentliche Kasus, der das Ereignis dieser Begegnung ausdrückt, der Vokativ ist, 36 dann ist Gott verborgen und anwesend zur gleichen Zeit. Daher ist der Name als Vokativ von Gott auch eine Offenbarung Gottes. Und was Gott uns offenbart, ist der Befehl »Liebe mich«. Derjenige, der dieses Gebot Gottes hört, ist »ganz empfangend, noch nur aufgetan, noch leer, ohne Inhalt, ohne Wesen, reine Bereitschaft, reiner Gehorsam, ganz Ohr.« 37 Man kann aber nicht stumm bleiben. 38 Wir müssen darauf antworten. Denn im imperativen Satz wird der Satz nicht ohne Antwort vollendet 39. Dass ich auf Gottes Ruf, auf seinem Befehl höre, auch wenn Gott nicht vor mir erscheint, setzt Gottes Existenz voraus, und weiter, dass ich auf diesen Ruf antworte, bedeutet, dass ich Gottes Existenz bewähre. Also sagt Rosenzweig, die menschliche Antwort auf Gott ist »wahrlich« 40. Aber die Bewährung der Wahrheit endet nicht, auch wenn man einmal dem Anruf antwortet. Denn diese Antwort erkennt an, dass Gottes »Existenz« da ist, und sie rät nicht, was Gottes Wesen ist. Alles, was wir tun können, ist, ständig zu erproben, Gottes Existenz zu bewähren und es ist wahrscheinlich Gott, der bestimmt, ob wir sie »bewähren« können. »Wahrheit hört so auf, zu sein, was wahr ›ist‹, und wird das, was als wahr – bewährt werden will. Der Begriff der Bewährung 35

Muraoka stellt eine Szene des alltäglichen Gesprächs vor. »Damit ein Anruf möglich ist, muss der Anrufgegenstand jetzt vor mir anwesend sein. Dies bedeutet aber nicht, dass etwas sich vor meinen Augen in Form eines Objekts befindet, denn ich spreche jemanden nicht ›Hallo, Herr …‹ an, wenn er dort bereits vorhanden ist«. Shinichi Muraoka, Taiwa no Tetsugaku. Doitsu. Yudaya no Kakureta Keifu [Dialogphilosophie. Verborgene Genealogie deutsch-jüdischer Gedanken], Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2008, 163 [Jap.]. 36 Vgl. ebd., 165. 37 GS II, 196. 38 Vgl. ebd., 199. 39 Vgl. Muraoka »Atogaki», 686. 40 GS II, 431.

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der Wahrheit wird zum Grundbegriff dieser neuen Erkenntnistheorie«. 41 Während der Hörer, der den Befehl erhält, völlig passiv und gehorsam zu sein scheint, erscheint das Subjekt in der ersten Person Ich zum ersten Mal in dem Hörer und wird das Verb dieses Subjekts notwendigerweise grammatikalisch zum Aktiv. Wenn ich jedoch auf Gottes Gebot »Liebe mich« antworte, erscheint nicht nur das »Ich«. Dieses Ich muss weiter in die Welt vordringen. Er [der Mensch] muß dort leben, wohin er gestellt ist; denn er ist von der Hand des Schöpfers hingestellt […]. Er muß dahin gehen, wohin er gesandt ist; denn er hat vom Worte des Offenbarers Richtung empfangen […]. Stand und Sendung – zu beiden muß er, wie er sie in dem vorgefundenen Ort und in dem entscheidenden Augenblick seines Lebens als sein persönliches Hier und Jetzt empfing, sein Wahrlich sagen, auf daß sie ihm Wahrheit werden. 42

Diese Wahrheit zu bewähren bedeutet, dass ich sowohl akzeptieren muss, dass ich in die Welt gestellt werde, als auch, dass ich mit anderen in dieser Welt lebe. Daher zeigt der Begriff der Erlösung nicht das Verhältnis von Gott und Mensch, sondern das Verhältnis von Mensch und Welt, die menschliche Initiative, sich in die Realität zu richten, um in der Realität zu wirken. 43 Was bedeutet es konkret, in die Welt zu gehen, in die wir geschickt wurden, nämlich die Praxis der Nächstenliebe?

41

Franz Rosenzweig, »Das neue Denken. Einige nachträgliche Bemerkungen zum ›Stern der Erlösung‹«, in: id., Zweistromland. Kleinere Schriften zu Glauben und Denken (Der Mensch und sein Werk. Gesammelte Schriften, III), hg. Reinhold and Annemarie Mayer, Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984, 158. 42 GS II, 437. 43 Vgl. Mosès, The Angel of History, 49.

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3.2. Der Dialog zwischen Gott und Mensch und der Dialog zwischen Menschen Für Rosenzweig bedeutet die Nächstenliebe nicht, dass der Mensch seinem Nächsten tut, was er selbst empfangen möchte, sondern dass man einen Abgrund und gleichzeitig eine Verbindung zwischen sich und den Anderen schafft, weil die Beziehung zwischen einem und dem Anderen auf dem Dialog zwischen Gott und den Menschen basiert, der sich aus dem oben erwähnten Imperativsatz der Liebe entwickelt hat. 44 Auch im täglichen Dialog hängt es vom Anderen ab, was ich sagen soll; ich weiß nicht, was ich im Voraus sagen soll. Ich kann etwas sprechen, damit ich nicht still darauf warte, dass mein Gesprächspartner anfängt zu reden und seine Geschichte zu Ende führt. Daher kann die Tat des Wartens auch im Kontext des zwischenmenschlichen Dialogs in der sozialen Dimension dieselbe Funktion erfüllen wie das Gebet, das die Erlösung vorwegnimmt. Denn die Tat des Wartens ist eine zukunftsorientierte Haltung. Was noch nicht in Dialog angekommen ist, ist die Aussage des Anderen. Da die Tat des Wartens jetzt stattfindet, ist das Warten eine Brücke von der Gegenwart zur Zukunft, also eine Vorwegnahme der Zukunft. So wie die Wahrheit im Gebet erscheint, erscheint auch die Wahrheit im Dialog. Das Schweigen beim Warten auf die Aussage des Anderen ist ein Abgrund, der mich von dem Anderen unterscheidet. Das heißt, es entsteht der Unterschied, der mich von meinem Gesprächspartner unterscheidet. Gleichzeitig bin ich aber auch durch die Wahrheit, die sich aus dieser Stille ergibt, mit dem Anderen verbunden, denn meinem Gesprächspartner ist die Wahrheit auf dieselbe Weise zuteil wie mir. Wenn ich auf die Äußerung des Anderen antworte, geschieht diese Antwort jetzt. Aber da es eine Antwort ist, liegt ihr Ursprung in der vergangenen Aussage. Da meine jetzige Antwort kein Mo44

Rosenzweig sagt, dass die Rolle zwischen Gott und den Menschen immer dieselbe ist, während die Rolle zwischen Mensch und Mensch sich ändern kann. Vgl. GS II, 189.

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nolog, sondern eine an den Anderen gerichtete Äußerung ist, erwartet sie eine weitere Antwort des Anderen in der Zukunft. Egal wie lange der Dialog dauert, beginnt jede Aussage hier und jetzt, weil ich nach der Aussage des Anderen antworte. Mit anderen Worten, die Vorwegnahme der Erlösung wird jetzt zwischen Vergangenheit und Zukunft, in jedem Augenblick ausgeführt. Es gibt jedoch zwei wichtige Unterschiede zwischen diesem Dialog und dem Gebet als Vorwegnahme der Erlösung. Der erste Unterschied ist der Unterschied des Verhältnisses. Während ich im Dialog zwischen Gott und mir immer der Anrufer bin und Gott antwortet, sind in alltäglichem Gespräch zwischen Mensch und Mensch der Anrufer und der Antwortende in einer interaktiven Beziehung. Der zweite Unterschied ist die Weise des Schweigens. Im Gebet muss ich vollkommen schweigen. Dabei wird mir ein einziger Gott als die Wahrheit offenbart. Obwohl ich Gott selbst nicht sehen kann, kann ich hören, dass Gottes Stimme mir befiehlt, ihn zu lieben, deshalb muss ich mit meinen Ohren buchstäblich zuhören. Im Gegensatz zu diesem Gebet muss ich zwar auch im zwischenmenschlichen Dialog schweigen, um der Äußerung meines Gesprächspartners zuzuhören, aber da ich dem Anderen gegenüber anwesend bin, nehme ich die Äußerung auch mit meinen Augen wahr. Daher vermittelt mein Schweigen etwas, auch wenn ich still zuhöre. 45 Daher kann man im zwischenmenschlichen Dialog durch die Einzigartigkeit des Lebens, das ein Gesprächspartner bisher geführt hat, und durch den jeweiligen Ausdruck in seinen Augen und Haltung getäuscht werden, und es mag nicht leicht sein, die Wahrheit zu hören. Aber gerade aus diesem Grund ist es notwendig, das Schweigen zu lernen, indem man in absolutem Schweigen betet, um auf die Wahrheit zu hören, die auch Anderen zuteil ist. Dass Juden in ihren einzigartigen kultischen Gebeten die Erlösung vorwegnehmen, bedeutete also, dass sie das Stillschweigen haben lernen können, um den Andern anzuerkennen, der im Dialog nicht auf sich selbst reduziert werden kann, und dass sie eine Haltung des Zuhörens haben lernen können, um den Abgrund 45

Vgl. ebd., 343.

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zwischen Ich und Du zu überbrücken, da beiden die Wahrheit zuteil ist. Hier finden wir die Rolle des jüdischen Gebets, nämlich das Leitbild der Haltung, Andere als Andere zu respektieren. Wie bereits erwähnt, ist das Erlösungsgebet aber nicht nur auf das jüdische Volk beschränkt. Also könnte als »jüdischer Mensch« bezeichnet werden, wer sich bewusst ist, dass jedem Einzelnen von uns die Wahrheit zuteil ist. So könnten auch wir es sein, auch wenn wir nichtjüdischen Kulturbereichen angehören. Fazit Aus dem Vorherigem lässt sich ableiten, dass uns die Vorwegnahme von Erlösung die grundsätzliche Haltung lehrt. Rosenzweigs Begriff der »Erlösung« besteht nicht darin, menschliche Wünsche im Gebet zu erfüllen, sondern die Existenz von Gott in Gebeten zu überzeigen. Zur gleichen Zeit erscheinen ein einziger Gott und »Wir«. »Wir« könnte sich auf Menschen allgemein beziehen, ob wir Gläubige sind oder nicht, nicht bloß, weil das Judentum ein Monotheismus ist, sondern weil der Name Gottes Vokativ ist. Solche Vorwegnahme der Erlösung, ob im Gebet oder im Dialog, bedeutet jetzt auf das Zukünftige zu warten. Eine Gemeinschaft von »Wir«, die nicht auf Juden beschränkt ist, erscheint jedes Mal, wenn wir mit der Haltung des Wartens auf den Ruf des Anderen (und Gottes) hören. Deshalb verlasse ich mich dabei selbst und erkenne die Priorität eines Anderen an. Ich werde niemals in Totalitarismus verfallen. Ich bin nicht »Ich« ohne den jeweiligen Anruf des Anderen. Die Tatsache, dass ich dem Anderen geöffnet bin, wird eine Gelegenheit bringen, zu fragen, was »Wir« – etwa der Nationalstaat – bedeutet. Die Haltung des schweigenden Zuhörens und die Chance des Fragens nach »wer/was-istWir« wären sinnvoll besonders in Bereichen, die die Tendenz haben, nicht im Zusammenhang mit jüdischen Gedanken zu stehen, z. B. in Japan, in dem das »japanische Volk« und der Nationalstaat untrennbar miteinander verbunden sind.

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In Search of Life – Franz Rosenzweig and the Deconstruction of Historical Dialectics as the Birth of Self »For redemption merely brings into view of all the living, which had previously taken place in the actual revelation as invisible occurrence in the individual soul« (Franz Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption)

Introduction Reading Rosenzweig leaves one on the one hand inspired and even elated, but at the same time almost bewildered. This puzzlement is not only due to his attempt to step out of the system of philosophy, but also because he seems to draw many circles before reaching the center of his ›argument‹, as a self. This forces the reader to follow him through pathways, which have an irresistible spiral movement leaving no way out, no possibility of return, ending in an open space. In this way, past and future, time and eternity are pressed into a present in Rosenzweig’s words, a Mitte der Zeit, in which the notion of to-day 1 breaks the axis of time and continuity, opening historical reality to the possibility of redemption as an existential category. 2 This experience indeed touches the core of the Jewish contribution to Western thought: the Messiah has not come, the world is yet to be redeemed, time and the contingency of history are a constant reminder of the unredeemed state of the world and of the self. Belief in the coming of the Kingdom of God on earth is 1

Hebrew: ha-yom, literally: »the day«; cf. Eveline Goodman-Thau, Liebe und Erlösung. Das Buch Ruth, Wien: Lit, 2006, 9–11. 2 Cf. Eveline Goodman-Thau, Zeitbruch. Zur messianischen Grunderfahrung in der jüdischen Tradition, Berlin: Akademie, 1995.

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therefore experienced as a mode of waiting (Erwartung), a counter-movement against the Western notion of eschatology and of Hegelian dialectics, as a cure for Christian dualism of time and eternity in the age of secularization. In this way Franz Rosenzweig is a forerunner of the historical materialist Walter Benjamin: A historical materialist cannot do without the notion of a present which is not transition, but in which time stands still and has come to a stop. For this notion defines the present in which he himself is writing history. Historicism gives the »eternal« image of the past; historical materialism supplies a unique experience with the past. The historical materialist leave it to others to be drained by the whore called »Once upon a time« in historicism’s bordello. He remains in control of his powers, man enough, to blast open the continuum of history. 3

What Benjamin did for the notion of history, Rosenzweig did first and foremost to the question of redemption in Western tradition: after writing his dissertation on Hegel und der Staat (1920) 4 under the guidance of the historian Friedrich Meinecke in Berlin, he forfeits an academic career and starts out – deeply shocked by his war-time experience in the Balkans – on a journey of self-discovery, which ends with the famous words: to walk humbly with thy God – the words are written over the gate, the gate which leads out of the mysterious-miraculous light of the divine sanctuary in which no man can remain alive. Whither, then, do the wings of the gate open? Thou knowest it not? INTO LIFE. 5

3

Walter Benjamin, Illuminations. Essays and Reflections, transl. Harry Zohn, ed. Hannah Arendt, New York: Schocken Books, 1969, 262. 4 Franz Rosenzweig, Hegel und der Staat, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 2010. 5 The Star of Redemption, transl. William W. Hallo, New York/Chicago/San Francisco: Holt Rinehart & Winston, 1971 (hereafter: Star), 424.

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I Into life becomes the motto not only for Rosenzweig’s unfortunately too short lived life, but of his philosophical and theological critique of Western and Christian metaphysics. Through his personal crisis we perceive a glimpse of the sanctuary »in which no man can remain alive« leading to the open winged gate of life: the journey of man leads not into death 6 but into life. It means a refutation of the entire Western tradition from Ionia to Jena. Life thus becomes a category in which the individual is able to consider his own existence as a real presence in time, a category of historical contingency and an expression of his or her freedom to choose life over death. 7 Rosenzweig breaks with German idealism in order to save philosophy from its own ruin, caused by Hegelian dialectics, which had tried to solve Western dualism by way of logic, without taking into account the condition humaine: the fact of »the creature whose limbs are quivering with terror for its thiswordly existence to a Beyond of which it doesn’t care to know anything at all«. 8 Rosenzweig’s »New Thinking« aims at creating a new relation between thought and reality. According to Martin Buber, »Rosenzweig does not talk about perceptions about God, man and world, indeed, he would even like to get rid of this ›about‹ and say, that he speaks between them as a translator«. 9 He turns away from German idealism, which had reduced the world to the observing »I«. In the assumption that the world is something else than it seems to be, philosophy poses the question about the essence of things (Wesen der Dinge) in order to find out

6

Cf. Martin Heidegger, »Sein und Zeit«, Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung 8 (1927), 1–438 (als off-print Halle a. d. S.: Max Niemeyer, 1927). 7 See Dt 30:19: »I call heaven and earth to witness this day against you that I have set before thee life and death, blessing and cursing, therefore choose life that both you and your seed may live«. 8 Star, 3. 9 Martin Buber, »Franz Rosenzweig«, Kant-Studien 35 (1930), no. 4, 520.

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their real nature. 10 Rosenzweig on the contrary, delegates the experience of the world back to the world, the experience of God back to God, and recognizes, in contrast to idealism, the world, man and God, as three separated elements of reality, which shows itself in their relationship.11 The separation between God, man and world, allows us, thus Rosenzweig, to experience all three in their reality. This reality becomes however paradoxically, only visible in their relationship, not separately as a visible object. »What does becomes visible, is their reciprocal interaction. That which is here immediately experienced is not God, man and world, but rather creation, revelation, redemption«. 12 Here we encounter the core of Rosenzweig’s New Thinking in the form of a philosophy of revelation from the sources of Judaism, 13 which is at once a cultural critique, as Rosenzweig had already shown in the introduction to the second part of The Star of Redemption (henceforth: Star): »Revelation is after all at once revelation of creation and of redemption, for it is founded on creation of cognition but directed towards redemption in volition«. 14 In cognition and volition a time of reality is founded, which is not the time of past, present and future: its experience is founded in recognition and anticipation. In this way only, can the relation God-man-world be recognized. 15 In this context it should be 10

Cf. Franz Rosenzweig, Das Büchlein vom gesunden und kranken Menschenverstand, ed. Nahum N. Glatzer, Düsseldorf: Joseph Melzer, 1964. 11 Cf. Franz Rosenzweig, »Das neue Denken. Einige nachträgliche Bemerkungen zum ›Stern der Erlösung‹«, in: id., Zweistromland. Kleinere Schriften zu Glauben und Denken (Der Mensch und sein Werk. Gesammelte Schriften, III), eds. Reinhold and Annemarie Mayer, Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984 (hereafter: GS III), 145. 12 Star, 391. 13 Cf. Eveline Goodman-Thau, »Vom Wesen der Freiheit. Über das Neue in Franz Rosenzweigs ›Neuem Denken‹«, Rosenzweig Jahrbuch / Rosenzweig Yearbook 1 (2006), 166–190. 14 Star, 110 (emphasis added). 15 Cf. Eveline Goodman-Thau, »Gott auf der Spur. Biblischer Humanismus in der Philosophie des Anderen von Emmanuel Lévinas«, in: Wolfdietrich SchmiedKowarzik (ed.), Vergegenwärtigungen des zerstörten jüdischen Erbes. Franz-Rosen-

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borne in mind, that the significance of revelation on Mount Sinai is fundamentally different in Christianity than in Judaism and has therefore fundamental consequences for Christian theology and Western thought in modernity. 16 The New Thinking of Rosenzweig wants to show that the boundaries of thought are not identical with the laws of reality. Since the thinker is not an abstract being and has indeed a personal stake in the question as well as in the answer, his way of thinking is existentially determined and can neither use predetermined concepts, nor move towards predetermined aims, the way philosophy does. For experience knows after all nothing of objects: it remembers, it senses, it hopes and fears. One might perhaps understand the content of memory as an object; this would then be a matter of understanding, and not the content of memory itself. 17

II Instead of the abstract, pure and timeless way of thinking, which had been developed in former philosophy, the method of speech appears in the New Thinking. Speech is bound to time and nourished by time […]. It takes its cues from others. In fact it lives by the virtue of another’s life […]. In actual conversation something happens. I do not know in advance what the other person will say to me, because I do not even know what I am going to say […]. The thinker knows his thoughts in advance […]. The speechthinker on the other hand, cannot calculate anything in advance; he must be able to wait since he is dependent on the word of the other; he needs time […]. »Speaking« means speaking to someone and thinking for someone; and this particular someone is always a quite definitive

zweig-Gastvorlesungen Kassel 1987–1998, Kassel: Kassel University Press, 1997, 106–134; id., Aufstand der Wasser. Jüdische Hermeneutik zwischen Tradition und Moderne, Berlin/Wien: Philo, 2002. 16 Cf. Moritz Güdemann, Jüdische Apologetik, Glogau: Carl Flemming, 1906. 17 Rosenzweig, »Das neue Denken«, GS III, 147.

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one, who does not merely have ears, like »all the world«, but also a mouth. 18

Rosenzweig connects here time and speech. The Sprachdenker (»speechthinker«) must interrupt his speech, that is, his speaking time, and adapt himself to another measure of time, that of his listener, who instead becomes a speaker. This time-measure, the speaker cannot calculate in advance. On the level of time this means that he does not know for how long he will be interrupted. In this way a new dimension of time is opened, which becomes only visible in conversation. »In real conversation something happens« – Rosenzweig is interested in the occurrence of this expectation: the experience of the unpredictable and unprecedented nature of the occurrence in order to allow the actual historical experience to become the point of departure of historical thought, as a center which opens the »focal point of time« (Mitte der Zeit). It means an ultimate break with Hegelian dialectics, since the actual occurrence of this point of time can never be predicted and can therefore not be thought as a system. This is then the point of departure of Rosenzweig’s New Thinking: away from a mode of thought which had presupposed the identity of being and knowledge, and had therefore missed reality, the elementary reality of human existence. Thought is only capable of attaining an abstract idea of being, Rosenzweig on the other hand aims at allowing being, through the human experience of dialogue in revelation, an understanding beyond the postulate of the origin of thought, as this had been formally practiced in philosophy since Plato. Revelation »renews creation«, that is, it restores the natural norm. To give an example: Reason is originally passive, man recognizes what he must recognize, the moment dictates his recognition. But now, reason becomes »autonomous«, it recognizes, »in order to recognize«; it »experiments«, that is, it forces the question on objects instead of allowing objects to ask their own questions. Here revelation enters and teaches man again to truly recognize. […] [A]ta hereta ladaʾ at [»You were made to see, so that you could know« (Deut 4:25)]. And out of this »You were made 18

Ibid., 151 f.

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to see« which at first was directed to one person only, now flow powers, which in the end transform our experiences into a true seeing with eyes, so that one can no longer recognize in any other way. 19

Through this change from passive to active seeing, man has, thus Rosenzweig, the possibility not only to see the world with new eyes, but to construct the relationship God-man-world, philosophically in a new way, and to translate it into language: revelation as the relationship between God and man. The contingency of the world is determined by God’s act of creation. The relationship of God and man requires however revelation in order to break isolation 20 and to allow him through concrete individual encounter to describe the diversity of the world in a language, which does not only express the uniqueness of man, but in fact renews creation as a birth of self, and thus leads to a new way of cognition. The translatability of the world in human language constitutes thus the bridge between being and knowledge. 21 Rosenzweig’s search leads him to Judaism: »Jewish is my method, not my subject« (Das Jüdische ist meine Methode, nicht mein Gegenstand ). 22 It is a new method of thinking for which he recognizes the old words of Judaism as suitable, since he received the New Thinking in these old words. I know, that a Christian would have used words of the New Testament […]. Instead I received these. And this [The Star of Redemption] is a Jewish book: not one that deals with »Jewish subjects« […], but one that uses for what it has to say, and in particular for the new things it 19

Rosenzweig’s diary fragment of March 26, 1922, in: Franz Rosenzweig, Briefe und Tagebücher, 2 vols. (Der Mensch und sein Werk. Gesammelte Schriften, I), eds. Rachel Rosenzweig and Edith Rosenzweig-Scheinmann, in collaboration with Bernhard Casper, Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979 (hereafter: GS I), vol. 2, 760. 20 Cf. Eveline Goodman-Thau, »Vom Nichts zum Ich im Stern aus den Quellen des Judentums«, in: Wolfdietrich Schmied-Kowarzik (ed.), Franz Rosenzweigs »neues Denken«. Internationaler Kongreß Kassel 2004, 2 vols., Freiburg/München: Karl Alber, 2006, vol. 2, 988–1012. 21 In the words of the Rabbis: »The Torah speaks as if in human language«. Also see Franz Rosenzweig on creation and Adams naming of the world in the book of Genesis, in: Star, 186 ff. 22 Rosenzweig’s letter of September 1921 to Hans Ehrenberg, GS I/2, 720.

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has to say, the old Jewish words. Jewish things are, as things in general, always past things; Jewish words however, old or new, take part in the eternal youth of the word. 23

The language of experience 24 which Rosenzweig seeks to discover he finds in the revelatory language of the Bible, which uses a narrative method. »What does it mean to tell a story? Whoever tells a story, does not want to say what truly happened, but how it ›really‹ happened […]. Time becomes real for him. Things do not happen in time, but time itself happens«. 25 In the act of narration, time becomes reality. In the mouth of the narrator the event is torn out of the past and gains a meaning in the present. As a narrator man gains an identity and a name, and thus redeems himself and history from anonymity: history indeed becomes his-story. 26 Both are original, in the sense that they create origin. A point where creation and revelation meet, so that redemption can become a possibility in time. »This is the secret of the relation between creation and revelation that they both have to work together in every moment – so that redemption can come«. 27 This is in fact the basis of Rosenzweig’s New Thinking: each in every event has its presence, its past and its future […]. To understand God, World and Man means to understand what happens to them in the dimension of real time [Zeiten der Wirklichkeit] […]. A pre-condition for this is the separation between their ›being‹, since they could not do anything to each other if they were not separated […]. Because in the reality which we experience the separation is bridged and everything we 23

Rosenzweig, »Das neue Denken«, GS III, 155. Cf. Eveline Goodman-Thau, »Sehen, Sein, Sagen. Zur Lesbarkeit religiöser Erfahrung«, in: id., Aufstand der Wasser, 73–117. 25 Rosenzweig, »Das neue Denken«, GS III, 148. 26 In the introduction to his book Religion of Reason Out of the Sources of Judaism (1919) Hermann Cohen points out that in the Jewish reading of the Bible, the sources of Judaism have a Doppelbezug, a »two-fold characteristic« of history and of witness-bearing. 27 Rosenzweig’s letter of August 26, 1918, to Eugen Rosenstock, in: Franz Rosenzweig, Die »Gritli«-Briefe. Briefe an Margrit Rosenstock-Huessy, eds. Inken Rühle and Reinhold Mayer, Tübingen: Bilam, 2002, 131. 24

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experience are such bridgings [Brückenschläge]. God himself, if we would want to understand him, hides himself, man, as a self is closed off, the world becomes a visible riddle. Only in their relation only in creation, revelation, redemption, do they appear. 28

The separation between God, man and world allows us to experience all three in their stark reality. A reality which becomes however only visible in their relation, albeit not as an object: »What does become visible is their reciprocal interaction. […] [N]ot God, man and world are the immediate, which is experienced but creation, revelation and redemption«. 29 The immediate experience of God, man and world is their relation, not as a dialectic construct but as creation, revelation and redemption. Here we indeed encounter the very core of Rosenzweig’s philosophy of revelation expressed in the introduction to Part II of the Star: Revelation is after all at once revelation of creation and of redemption, for it is founded on creation in cognition, but directed toward redemption in volition. And language as the organon of a relation is at the same time the thread running through everything human that steps into its miraculous splendor and into that of its ever renewed presentness of experience. 30

Creation gains its meaning as cognition through revelation. Revelation is namely the act of volition, which opens redemption into an »ever renewed presentness«. 31 In cognition and volition a kind of »real time« is established which is not the time of past, presence or future, but a time of expectation based on cognition and volition. Through the unity

28

Rosenzweig, »Das neue Denken«, GS III, 150. Star, 391. 30 Ibid., 110. 31 See Benjamin, Illuminations, 264: »We know that the Jews were prohibited from investigating the future. The Torah and the prayers instruct them in remembrance […]. This does not imply, however, that for the Jews the future turned into homogeneous, empty time. For every second of time was the straight gate through which the Messiah might enter«. 29

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of these two elements of the human spirit God, man and world can be recognized. 32 Rosenzweig’s renewal of Western philosophy from the sources of Judaism is aimed at a new notion of time and individuality. 33 He recognizes this in the narrative of the Bible which by way of the orality of its language renews with every reading the original living dialogue between man and God. The written text covers it only like a light garment; the psalms are prayed, commandments are followed, the prophets are believed, they immediately lose their monological muteness, they beget a voice and call the eternal dialogue partners: the hearing man and answering God [erhörenden Gott]. 34

What Rosenzweig states here regarding the Bible he considers a general truth: »Every word is a spoken word«. In the Bible Rosenzweig finds a book, which serves this orality. It must be read aloud to be understood. 35 This is indeed the basis of Rosenzweig’s notion of Sprachdenken. 36 The Bible is »Holy Scripture« as it is a written expression of the spoken word of God. The encounter of man with this scripture is an encounter with life and the birth of the self. An encounter for 32 See Naʾ ase ve-nishma – »We will do and we will hear« (Exod 24:7) the pronouncement of the children of Israel at Mount Sinai: the voluntary act is here an expression of cognition. 33 Cf. Goodman-Thau, »Vom Nichts zum Ich im Stern aus den Quellen des Judentums«; id., »Truth, Time and the Other in Europe. Levinas’ Ethical Theory of Knowledge from the Sources of Judaism«, Rosenzweig Jahrbuch / Rosenzweig Yearbook 3 (2008), 51–70. 34 Franz Rosenzweig, »Das Formgeheimnis der biblischer Erzählungen«, GS III, 828. 35 The Hebrew name for the bible is Mikra, from the root k-r-a, »to call«. Note also that in the Hebrew language only the consonants are written: the reader and speaker must add the vowels as becomes evident in the liturgical reading out loud of the Torah. 36 Cf. Eveline Goodman-Thau, »›Zungen-, nicht federgeboren‹ – Martin Buber und Franz Rosenzweig über den ursprünglichen Sinn der Schrift«, in: Andreas Losch, Thomas Reichert und Johannes Waßmer (eds.), »Alles in der Schrift ist echte Gesprochenheit«. Martin Buber und die Verdeutschung der Schrift, Lich: Verlag Edition AV, 2016, 71–87.

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each individual, in his or her individuality of the »Let us make man in our image, after out likeness« (Gen 1:26), 37 imbued with the task of not only encountering, but caring for the world and its inhabitants. Human life and world are here almost synonyms for Rosenzweig who was skeptical towards old theories, programs, systems and speculations and who doubted the validity of his own views, as long as they were not confirmed by life itself. III Rosenzweig touches here on the problematic of his Jewish identity within European culture. The sources serve not only different ways of expression between Judaism and Christianity, in their relationship to biblical sources, but at the same time the philosophical position of Rosenzweig as a self. The reality, which Rosenzweig experienced in his historical existence, becomes a task as expressed in a letter to his successor as director of the Freies Jüdisches Lehrhaus in Frankfurt am Main, Rudolf Hallo: A decent person does not live out of the ninety-seven-and-a-half possibilities there are, but out of reality which he experienced […]. In the »great moment« lies a duty, not towards new moments – that would be frivolous – but that the small moments that follow, do not belie the large ones, but in their way – even in a »small« way – are true to them. 38

Rosenzweig’s intention is not to discover in every »small« moment the »great« meaning of history, but to remain, in every human act, true to the continuity of history: to hold together the human chain of history as a living member. 39 The fact that he philosophies as a Jew, does not only carry an existential importance for him as a 37

Cf. the famous Rabbinic saying: »Whoever saves one life is as if he has saved the whole world and whoever destroys one life is as if he had destroyed the whole world« (Mishnah Sanhedrin 7:5). 38 Rosenzweig’s letter of February 4, 1923, GS I/2, 890. 39 See Deut 29:13–14: »Neither with you alone do I make this covenant and this oath; but with him that stands here with us today before the Lord our God, and also with him that is not here with us this day«.

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self, but binds God, man and world together as the foundation of his New Thinking, so that creation, revelation and redemption gain a new meaning, which opens, beyond the inner-Jewish understanding, new ways of thought for Western tradition in the encounter between religion and modernity. »The Star will once and rightly so be considered a gift which the German spirit owes its Jewish enclave«. 40 The Jewish problem of education (Bildung) became for Rosenzweig a paradigm of the general crisis of culture after the enlightenment, which is still felt in the German humanities, as a deep ambivalence of traditional texts, 41 with political and social implications. The Star is a Jewish book in the sense that it shows the historical existence of Judaism as a category of being (Ereignis) by expressing Rosenzweig’s relationship to life as a self. Time and eternity, immanence and transcendence, meet here in a »time-break« (Zeitbruch), a historiography as messianic hermeneutics. 42 The Star is a Jewish book, since it provides a testimony from the sources of Judaism – without most of the time specifically quoting these sources – and bears witness to these sources. 43 It is not meant to be the product of an intellectual exercise ›about something‹ : it is a unique encounter of the individual as a autonomous, responsible self with life and his community, as a devastating critique to the notion of logic of German idealism. This then is a triumph along the whole front, but at what price! The great edifice of reality is destroyed. God and man are reduced to the marginal concept subject of cognition; world and man on the other hand to the marginal concept of a mere object of this subject. And the world, whose cognition was Idealism’s initial intent, has become a mere bridge between these marginal concepts. Idealism becomes part of the list against the idea of creation in order to substantiate the metalogical char-

40

Rosenzweig’s letter of end of January 1923 to Rudolf Hallo, GS I/2, 887. Cf. Jürgen Habermas, »Die verkleidete Tora. Rede zum 80. Geburtstag von Gershom Scholem«, Merkur 32 (1978), no. 356, 96–104. 42 Cf. Goodman-Thau, Zeitbruch. 43 Cf. Hermann Cohen, Religion of Reason Out of the Sources of Judaism, transl. Simon Kaplan, Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1995, 24–34. 41

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acter of the world, its factuality. This is now wholly destroyed along with the factuality of God, which is foreign to Idealism, and of the self, which is a matter of indifference to it, both being thrown into the general vortex of destruction. 44

Out of this destruction, which means in fact an act of self destruction, Rosenzweig tries to save the factuality of man as a personal task. Only an individual life, which lives its own life, can prove a theory – this is the truth of life. A theory can be accepted or criticized, it is not ›true‹ in itself. The proof of truth lies in the midst of life, in everyday life. The last word of the Star was »Into life«, what Rosenzweig calls a »book-no-longer« (Nichtmehrbuch): 45 the relationship between philosophy and life ends and opens an era. Conclusion The First World War had once and for all broken with the premise of idealist tradition: that the world is based on logic and that man has a place in the universal order of things in which the laws of reason lead to true harmony in life. A hundred years later we are still in the process of gathering its pieces in an attempt to mend the world. 46 Rosenzweig was aware of the fact that the anthropos philosophikos no longer rules the world, that Hegel admittedly had been right declaring to be the end of philosophy, but that in spite of it the cry of protest of the individual, »the-individual-in-spite-of-it-all« (Dennoch-Individuum) resonates from one end of the world to the other. Out of the agonizing cries of his dying comrades, Rosenzweig begins to write a new political philosophy of European history, which at the same time is a cultural critique, which gains a new significance in our present time. Rosenzweig searches for an Ar-

44

Star, 144 f. (transl. altered). Rosenzweig, »Das neue Denken«, GS III, 160. 46 Cf. Emil Fackenheim, To Mend the World. Foundations of Future Jewish Thought, New York: Schocken Books, 1982. 45

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chimedean point, an order of things in life, 47 which is to be found beyond the book and which hears out of the nothing the cry of the individual as I, beyond the self-aim of a philosophical system, since the boundaries of thought no longer match reality. The »middle of time« (Mitte der Zeit) thus gains eminent importance for Rosenzweig, who sees in revelation the experience of love of God in time, connecting time and eternity. Revelation is for Rosenzweig however not merely a point of orientation, no longer an »above and below in nature«, »heaven and earth« or a real »before and after« in time. 48 It means much more: »Revelation is also to become a center point, a fixed immovable center. And why? Because it occurs at that point, at the point of the stubborn, deaf, immovable point, the obstinate I, ›which I am‹«. 49 The conscious experience of the self as being spoken to, does not only break time but frees the »I« from his isolation, his sinful shame and alienation: the »I« gains a proper name. With the summons by the proper name, the word of revelation entered the real dialogue. With the proper name, the rigid wall of objectness has been breached […]. Nor does it still have its place in the world, its moment in occurrence. Rather it carries its here and now with it. Wherever it is, there is a midpoint and wherever it opens its mouth, there is a beginning. 50

The significance of the name calls the individual in his uniqueness into life, where each and every cognition is a recognition of origin, and thus originality in the encounter with the other. Here the connection with God and with his fellow-man is established and permanently guaranteed as the place where the world gains its meaning. In naming the world man gains his personality as an autonomously speaking individual, where the name becomes his own name (Eigenname). This kind of subjective objectivity is for 47

Cf. Michel Foucault, Les mots et les choses. Une archéologie des sciences humaines, Paris: Gallimard, 1966. 48 Franz Rosenzweig, »›Urzelle‹ des Stern der Erlösung. Brief an Rudolf Ehrenberg vom 18. 11. 1917«, GS III, 125 ff. 49 Ibid., 133. 50 Star, 186 f.

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Rosenzweig a key for the renewal of philosophy and subjectivity can regain their meaning and thus fulfill their true function of helping man as a self, to interpret the world, not as a »tragic hero« but as a human being, an individual who responds to the cry of his fellow man in this unredeemed world. It is this beginning which carries in it the hope for the birth of self as part of true humanity.

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Rosenzweig’s Silences: Tragedy and Life in The Star of Redemption

At the heart of The Star of Redemption (henceforth: Star), and of Rosenzweig’s concept of redemption writ large, is a speculative history of the arts. The performing arts, in particular, are central not only to Rosenzweig’s line of argument but also to the aesthetics and the architecture of the Star itself. 1 Redemption is framed in a narrative of this history – a narrative that begins with the first expression of the tragic heroes’ will in their defiant silences. The narrative culminates in the performative convergence of voices as the harmonious unison of the chorus in hymnic recital. 2 Taking Rosenzweig’s praise of the spoken word as a point of departure, I consider how the Star’s defiant gestures parallel the aesthetic evolution traced by the book overall, including a dramatic reiteration of the hero’s defiance – a hero who, in a world defined by inevitability, »does not accept death as a just judgement«. 3 Along the way, I explore the origins of Rosenzweig’s 1

Stéphane Mosès, for example, sees the tripartite teleological structure of the Star as corresponding to literary genres: epos to creation, poetry to revelation, and drama to redemption. Stéphane Mosès, »Die Ästhetik Franz Rosenzweigs«, in: Bernhard Greiner, Maria Moog-Grünewald (eds.), Etho-Poietik. Ethik und Ästhetik im Dialog, Bonn: Bouvier, 1998, 69–82. See also Mara H. Benjamin, Rosenzweig’s Bible. Reinventing Scripture for Jewish Modernity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, 37. 2 On the chorus in the Star and Rosenzweig’s »applied« aesthetics, see Luca Bertolino, »Die Rolle des Chores in Franz Rosenzweigs Stern der Erlösung«, Rosenzweig Jahrbuch / Rosenzweig Yearbook 5 (2010), 141–159. 3 Agata Bielik-Robson, »Franz Rosenzweig«, in: Philip Goodchild, Hollis ̌ ̌ Phelps (eds.), Religion and European Philosophy. Key Thinkers from Kant to Zizek, London: Routledge, 2017, 184–195, 188.

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claims regarding the tragic hero’s silence and discuss parallels in Hans Ehrenberg’s Cross and Tragedy. I conclude with a midrashic reading of the Star’s last words that follows Rosenzweig’s turn from the physical sanctuary, the kodesh hakodashim, to the ways in which the sanctification and invocation of life are embedded in everyday Jewish practice, specifically in the context of kiddush. In a 1926 essay titled »Scripture and Word«, Rosenzweig describes the cultural historical hegemony of the written over the spoken word. At first merely a medium for the spoken word, scripture eventually dominates the word in what Rosenzweig portrays as a struggle: »The book no longer serves the [spoken] word. It becomes the word’s ruler and hindrance; it becomes Holy Scripture«. 4 The history of language emerges in Rosenzweig’s narrative as a sidelining of the primary, spoken word by the originally secondary, written scripture (Schrift), which overcomes the spoken word because of its technological advantages. Unlike the spoken word, written language does not depend on the human body. Its lifeless »technical« existence (das Technische) is scripture’s advantage. It does not need periods of rest and regeneration as does the human body. Unlike a human mouth of flesh and blood, a book does not get weary. It is, Rosenzweig points out, »indefatigable, cares nothing for day and night, has no sense of the human need for relaxation and change«. 5 Since it does not depend on the human body, scripture – as Literatur or Schrifttum – is not limited by time and space. Yet scripture’s independence from the human body, and its transcendence of time and space, come at a high price: the written word’s »spatial and temporal homelessness«. 6 Rosenzweig warns 4

Franz Rosenzweig: »Scripture and Word«, in: Martin Buber, Franz Rosenzweig, Scripture and Translation, transl. Lawrence Rosenwald with Everett Fox, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994, 40–46 (hereafter: SW), 40. 5 Ibid., 41. 6 My translation, SW. The original reads: »räumlich[e] und zeitlich[e] Heimatlosigkeit«. Franz Rosenzweig, »Die Schrift und das Wort«, Die Kreatur 1 (1926/ 1927), no. 1, 124–130, 124. Rosenwald and Fox’s translation, »damned to exile in space and time« (SW, 40), does not fully capture the destitution in the German original.

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that literature’s »unlimited possibility« (unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten) 7 is also the source of its own impoverishment and that of the consumer of literature. The timelessness and social distance of literature produce a »lesenden, verlesenen, zerlesenen Menschen« – a reading, misread, read-to-tatters human being. 8 Rosenzweig's essay is a reflection on his and Martin Buber’s Bible translation project. As the essay explains, Buber and Rosenzweig attempted to reverse the historical »literarization« and let the spoken word, the rhythm of each breath in speaking, shape the written word. In their translation, it should not be scripture that dominates the word. Instead, building on the tradition of synagogal cantillation, the guiding principle was the envisioned public recitation of the sacred text, which Rosenzweig calls a »pre-literary mode of reading«. 9 For our purposes, it is noteworthy that Rosenzweig explicitly mentions in the essay another form of expression where the written text serves the spoken word: on the stage in theater and opera. In these cases as well, the written text »originally served the word, whether declaimed, sung, or spoken […]. Opera people talk of the score and theater people talk of the script as something technical, instrumental, provisional«. 10 In the Star, this appreciation of the spoken word over the written book is part of the story of language that forms the red thread of the Star. It culminates in a gesture that points beyond the written word and directs the reader of the Star to abandon this very book and turn toward life. The story of language that the Star portrays, and in which drama plays a central role, begins with the birth of the spoken word out of silence. Yet this silence is neither the »nocturnal silence that enveloped the human race in its origins« 11 nor the silence of contemplation. Rather, it is a »speaking silence« of pain, suffering, and rebellion, out of which 7

SW, 40. Rosenzweig, »Die Schrift und das Wort«, 126. The English translation, »in reading been read off, read wrong, and read under« (SW, 41), does not seem to adequately convey the bodily effects of reading that Rosenzweig’s original implies. 9 SW, 42. 10 Ibid., 40. 11 Ibid., 46. 8

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speech emerges as a form of subjective affect. Analyzing a comparable reflection on the origin of language in Gershom Scholem’s early writings, Agata Bielik-Robson calls this nascent silence, out of which lament emerges as the first manifestation of language, »the other origin of language«. 12 Rosenzweig’s narrative of the emergence of language in the Star is embedded in a systematic yet highly selective theory of art, which is largely a counter-aesthetics. It includes reflections on pagan art in Part I, lays out its central claims against an idealist aesthetics in Part II, and concludes with a discussion of Christian art in Part III. As Leora Batnitzky argues, the central point of Rosenzweig’s counter-idealist aesthetics, and indeed of his entire philosophical system, is his objection to idealism’s »denial of the human ability to be affected and changed«. 13 In clear opposition to idealism’s concentration on »absolute« or »pure art« and what Rosenzweig rejects as its lifeless and objectionable »idolization of art«, 14 the Star offers a different approach, namely a »vindication of art through applied art« (Rechtfertigung der Kunst durch das Kunstgewerbe), as Rosenzweig explains four years after the publication of his opus magnum. 15 In his studies of music and the chorus in Rosenzweig, Luca Bertolino shows that »applied art« has a central purpose within Rosenzweig’s systematic thinking: it leads »back to Gan Eden, the divine garden of life, through ›application‹ (in its double meaning of ›putting some-

12

Agata Bielik-Robson, »The Unfallen Silence: Kinah and the Other Origin of Language«, in: Ilit Ferber, Paula Schwebel (eds.), Lament in Jewish Thought. Philosophical, Theological, and Literary Perspectives, Berlin/Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2018, 133–152, 133. 13 Leora Batnitzky, Idolatry and Representation. The Philosophy of Franz Rosenzweig Reconsidered, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000, 97. See also Myriam Bienenstock, Cohen und Rosenzweig. Ihre Auseinandersetzung mit dem deutschen Idealismus, Freiburg/München: Karl Alber, 2018, 73. 14 Bienenstock, Cohen und Rosenzweig, 77. 15 Franz Rosenzweig, »The New Thinking. A Few Supplementary Remarks to the Star«, in: Alan Udoff, Barbara E. Galli (ed. and transl.), Franz Rosenzweig’s »The New Thinking«, New York: Siracuse University Press, 1999, 67–102, 95.

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thing into operation‹ and ›sustained effort‹)«. 16 This kind of art has a »deep, organic connection to the real everyday life« 17 and prepares the ground for art’s »redemption into life«, toward which Rosenzweig’s Star ultimately steers at the very end of the book. His famous last lines engage the reader directly, and typographically point the way out of the book itself: »Whither, / then, do the wings of / the gate open? Thou / knowest it not? / INTO LIFE«. 18 The dramaturgy of the book’s final sentences points back to Rosenzweig’s comment on the »shadow realm of art« that »longs for life itself«: »Pygmalion cannot by himself hammer life into his statue, try as he will«. 19 To come alive, art would need to transcend the work of art. Neither the idealist vision of pure art nor pure religion – the »mysterious-miraculous light of the divine sanctuary in which no man can remain alive« 20 – provide conditions for life. Rosenzweig later interprets »the opening gate« at the end of the Star as that which »is still coming, is already beyond the book: ›Gate‹, out of it, into the No-longer-book«. 21 In pointing beyond the book, he claims that the »book is not a goal that has been reached […]. It itself must be answered for [selber verantwortet werden], instead of carrying itself or being carried by others of its kind. This responsibility [Verantwortung] happens in everyday life [Alltag des Lebens]. Only in order to recognize and to live the

16

Luca Bertolino, »Religion und Musik bei Franz Rosenzweig«, in: Hans Martin Dober, Frank Thomas Brinkmann (eds.), Religion.Geist.Musik. Theologisch-kulturwissenschaftliche Grenzübergänge, Wiesbaden: Springer, 2019, 59–84, 69. For a rich discussion of Wagnerian resonances in Rosenzweig’s Star, especially the idea of the Gesamtkunstwerk and reflections on gesture, see Ido Ben Harush, »Franz Rosenzweig, Richard Wagner, and the Sacred Theater of the Day of Atonement«, New German Critique, forthcoming 2021. 17 Bertolino, »Religion und Musik bei Franz Rosenzweig«, 69. 18 Franz Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, transl. William W. Hallo, New York/Chicago/San Francisco: Holt Rinehart & Winston, 1971 (hereafter: Star), 424. 19 Ibid., 249. 20 Ibid., 424. 21 Rosenzweig, »The New Thinking«, 100.

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day as every-day [All-tag], the day of the life of the All [Lebenstag des All] had to be traversed«. 22 In traversing the All, and at several key points in his argumentation, Rosenzweig sketches out the founding story (Entstehungsgeschichte) of the self within the framework of tragedy. In the tripartite relational field of God-world-human, Greek tragedy serves as a thought device (Denkfigur) of the primal human emergence of becoming a self. For Rosenzweig, this is an isolated and initially silent process in the constitution of human reality, and the central component in forming the self is defiance as the affective reaction to suffering. The portrayal of the defiant tragic hero is more than merely a step in the emergence of the self-conscious subject. The narrative of the hero’s eventual coming to language can be read in allegorical fashion as the story of the Star itself, on the first pages of which Rosenzweig announces in Nietzschean style its own act of defiance: »He who denies the totality of being, as we do, thus denies the unity of reasoning. He throws down the gauntlet to the whole honorable company of philosophers from Ionia to Jena«. 23 It ends with the abandonment of the book as a book, and with the reader being swept through the gate into the »Nolonger-book«. Before we return to this final gesture, let us consider some of the Star’s dramatic invocations of tragedy and the tragic, and the reception it received. Rosenzweig offers neither analyses of individual tragedies nor a general theory of tragedy’s relationality and effects on the audience; rather, he postulates apodictically specific conceptions of the »tragic hero«, and of tragedy overall. One of the most enthusiastic early readers of Rosenzweig’s conception of the tragic hero was Walter Benjamin. In his Origin of the German Trauerspiel, he celebrates Rosenzweig with a now famous reference to the Star as the one who, in »his analysis of ›metaethical man‹, […] has made the speechlessness of the tragic hero, which distinguishes the main figure of Greek tragedy from all later types, into 22 23

Ibidem. Star, 12.

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a cornerstone of the theory of tragedy«. 24 Indeed, according to Rosenzweig, silence is the defining characteristic of the tragic hero and its representation the central element of tragedy: »The tragic hero has only one language which completely corresponds to him: precisely keeping silent. It is thus from the beginning. Tragedy casts itself in the artistic form of drama just in order to be able to represent speechlessness«. 25 Rosenzweig locates this powerful silence, the »icy solitude of the self« that expresses a »stubborn selfreliance«, in Aeschylus: »The heroic is speechless. In Aeschylus, the dramatis personae can keep silent through a whole act; if these great silences are not found in the later dramatists, then this gain in ›naturalness‹ is purchased at the cost of a greater loss in tragic force«. 26 What shall we make of Rosenzweig’s claim, given that Aeschylus’s best-known tragedies, the Oresteia, The Persians, or The Suppliants, have no significant silences? Before we try to answer this question, let us first take a closer look at what Rosenzweig says about the tragic hero’s silence. In Rosenzweig’s broad narrative, Attic tragedy is not the first instance in which we meet a tragic hero. Far older is The Epic of Gilgamesh, which produces according to Rosenzweig the »original type« (Urtyp) of the tragic hero. It is in Gilgamesh’s encounter with Eros that the human self awakens, and it is the encounter with Thanatos in his friend’s death that »his tongue fails him«. 27 In facing his friend’s death, Gilgamesh »beholds« his own death and enters »that sphere where the world becomes strange to man with its alternation of screaming and silence, the sphere of pure and lofty speechlessness, the self«. 28 24

Walter Benjamin, Origin of the German Trauerspiel, transl. Howard Eiland, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2019, 101. For a detailed analysis of Benjamin’s reading and misreading of Rosenzweig, see Caspar Battegay, »The Infinite Citation. Walter Benjamin and Franz Rosenzweig«, Bamidbar. Journal for Jewish Thought and Philosophy 2 (2012), no. 1, 52–74. 25 Star, 77. 26 Ibidem. 27 Ibid., 76. 28 Ibid., 77. For a discussion of the role of the silent tragic heroes within Rosenzweig’s ethics and aesthetics, see also Jules Simon, Art and Responsibility. A Phe-

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William W. Hallo’s translation of »die Sphäre der reinen erhabenen Stummheit« 29 as »pure and lofty speechlessness« misses an important point in disregarding the philosophical weight of the adjective »erhaben«, which might have been better rendered »sublime«. In the »sublime muteness«, Rosenzweig invokes resonances to the long debate about the sublime in the German philosophical tradition. Take, for example, Moses Mendelssohn’s definition of »sublime«. In his essay »On the Sublime and Naïve in the Fine Sciences«, Mendelssohn explains: »In general, one could […] say: each thing that is or appears immense as far as the degree of its perfection is concerned is called sublime«. 30 On one hand, it is the high degree of perfection that causes admiration; on the other hand, the sublime consists in the generation of admiration when the degree of perfection appears immense. Interestingly, the three spheres of experiencing the sublime in Mendelssohn correspond to the three elements of the All Rosenzweig identifies, world, man, and God: »A truth is said to be ›sublime‹ if it concerns a quite perfect or complete entity such as God, the universe, the human soul [ein sehr vollkommenes Wesen als Gott, die Welt und die menschliche Seele]«. 31 To understand how Rosenzweig deploys the notion of »sublime muteness«, we must also recall Immanuel Kant’s definition of the sublime. As a »judgment of reflection« (Reflexionsurteil), the sublime in Kant presupposes not only admiration but also amazement at the ability of reason: »The sublime is that, the mere capacity of thinking which evidences a faculty of mind transcending

nomenology of the Diverging Paths of Rosenzweig and Heidegger, New York/London: Continuum, 2011, 44–51. 29 Franz Rosenzweig, Der Stern der Erlösung, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1988, 83. 30 Moses Mendelssohn, »On the Sublime and Naïve in the Fine Sciences«, in: id., Philosophical Writings, transl. and ed. Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, 192–232, 195. 31 Ibidem. The phrase might have been better translated as »a very perfect being or entity such as God, the world, and the human soul«.

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every standard of sense«. 32 In this judgment of reflection, the sublime idea of the self emerges within the audience’s mind when they witness the silence of the tragic hero and consider their own capacity to comprehend the implications of this silent defiance. What, precisely, makes this silence so immense for the audience? Its immensity lies in the free will that appears in the act of defiance: »Defiance [Trotz], the proud withal, is to man what power, the lofty Thus [das erhabene Also], is to God. The claim of defiance is as sovereign as the privilege of power. The abstraction of free will takes shape as defiance«. 33 The God-likeness of the human lies in the human being’s sovereign freedom. Yet there is a notable difference: while God’s freedom is the unlimited freedom of action, the freedom of the human is the freedom of the will. Humans’ unlimited capacity for will, despite their limited capabilities, manifests itself in silent defiance as freedom of the will and human sovereignty. Because »God has no free will, man no free capability«, 34 the manifestation of free will in humans is qualitatively an absolute: »(human) free will is as free as divine free action«. 35 This manifestation in the defiant hero of a freedom that God does not possess is what generates awe or admiration. The conjunction of the two elements that constitute the sublime – the defiant tragic hero’s immense sovereignty on the stage and the audience’s awe as a reaction – forms what Hermann Cohen in Aesthetics of Pure Feeling calls the »dramatic unity« or the »dramatic subject«. 36 This dual constitutive structure of the theater involves the simulta-

32

Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, transl. James Creed Meredith, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, § 25, 81. 33 Star, 67 f. 34 Ibid., 67. 35 Ibidem. 36 Hermann Cohen, Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls, 2 vols. (Werke, 8–9), Hildesheim/Zürich/New York: Georg Olms, 1982 (reprint of the first ed. 1912), vol. 2, 65. For a more detailed analysis of Cohen’s aesthetics and theory of tragedy, see Sebastian Wogenstein, Horizonte der Moderne. Tragödie und Judentum von Cohen bis Lévinas, Heidelberg: Winter, 2011, 53–94.

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neous presence of the actors and the audience, as well as the interaction between them. Rosenzweig finds a »tragic defiance« comparable to that of Gilgamesh in the actions of the Biblical heroes Samson and Saul. They both die at their own hand, yet their deaths can be perceived as tragically heroic because they demonstrate strength and defiance in a hopeless situation. Upon facing an insurmountable enemy, they choose to end their lives rather than experience humiliation by their captors. 37 What these cases have in common is the hero’s defiant »break[ing] down the bridges that connect him with God and the world« as a sovereign decision to »elevate himself out of the fields of personality […] into the icy solitude of the self«. 38 For Rosenzweig, defiance is the defining element of tragedy, and distinct from pathos: »In pathos, the self suffocates in its misfortune; in tragedy, misfortune loses all independent power and significance. It belongs to the elements of distinctiveness on which the self stamps the seal of its defiance«. 39 As should by now be clear, the concept of the tragic does not, for Rosenzweig, emanate from tragedy. Instead, tragedy emerges as the adequate form for the tragic, and defiant silence is its seal: »The tragic«, Rosenzweig asserts, »created the artform of the drama in order to represent the silence«. Precisely because drama consists of the spoken word, silence becomes noticeable: »dramatic poetry […] knows only of speaking, and it is only thereby that silence here becomes eloquent [das Schweigen wird beredt]«. 40 As far as the genre is concerned, Rosenzweig, like Benjamin, works with the popular definition by Ulrich Wilamowitz-Moellendorff that tragedy is »heroic lore, poetically modified in a sublime style for representation through an Attic chorus of citizens and two to

37

Most contemporary theories of tragedy would probably take issue with classifying such willful death as tragic. For a concise discussion of tragic structures, see Hans-Dieter Gelfert, Die Tragödie. Theorie und Geschichte, Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1995, 12–15. 38 Star, 77. 39 Ibid., 76. 40 Ibid., 77.

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three actors«. 41 Rosenzweig takes this definition in a new direction through his emphasis on silence as well as his claim that the concept of the tragic precedes tragedy. Thanks to Benjamin’s extensive quotation in the Origin of the German Trauerspiel, Rosenzweig’s thesis of the intrinsic (wesensgemäßen) silence of the tragic hero has found its way into contemporary theoretical discourse. Given the lack of classical philological references in the Star, we can only speculate about the origins of Rosenzweig’s thesis regarding the tragic silence. We do, however, find discussions of this topic in his correspondence. In a letter to Margrit RosenstockHuessy (»Gritli«) from April 30, 1919, Rosenzweig mentions Hans Ehrenberg’s lectures on Tragödie und Kreuz (Tragedy and the Cross), published in 1920 in two volumes in a small imprint, which the friends had established and named Patmos. 42 In this letter, Rosenzweig writes: »Hans said he read you a piece from Tragödie und Kreuz? Have you noticed that it is very close to mine? Like him, I discovered these things at first in tragedy. He is so close to me that there is almost nothing new left for me. Except that in his writing, at least for now, everything remains stuck in the aesthetic«. 43 The parallels are indeed striking, as the following quotation from the second volume of Ehrenberg’s Tragödie und Kreuz illustrates: Rolling thunder resounds in the words of the tragedian, rolling thunder from the mouth of Prometheus unsettles us in our comfortable leisure: at first in the language of his silence while being shackled to the mountain 41

Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Einleitung in die attische Tragödie, Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1921 (reprint of the first ed. of Euripides Herakles I, chaps. 1–4, 1889), 107. 42 Hans Ehrenberg, Tragödie und Kreuz, 2 vols., Würzburg: Patmos, 1920. Rosenzweig, Eugen and Margrit Rosenstock, the brothers Hans and Rudolf Ehrenberg, Leo Weismantel, and others had plans to establish a publishing house with three imprints: a Christian one, the Patmos Verlag; a Jewish one, the Moriah Verlag, where Rosenzweig initially meant to publish his Star of Redemption, and a »pagan« (humanistic) imprint. Cf. Michael Zank: »The Rosenzweig-Rosenstock Triangle, or, What Can We Learn from Letters to Gritli?: A Review Essay«, Modern Judaism 23 (2003), no. 1, 74–98, 97. 43 Franz Rosenzweig, Die »Gritli«-Briefe. Briefe an Margrit Rosenstock-Huessy, eds. Inken Rühle and Reinhold Mayer, Tübingen: Bilam, 2002, 287.

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[…] the same silence that in Achilleis and in Niobe lasts for almost half the tragedies. It keeps us word-spoiled humans in unbearable suspense and lets us wait inhumanely long for the redeeming word! The famous silence of Aeschylus’s heroes that speaks with a thousand tongues and screams silently into our hearts! This is where the hero is nothing but hero, lonely Urzeitmensch without human community – I, I, and thrice I. And he is entirely within himself […]. No language can speak as tragically as this silent speech. 44

Both Ehrenberg and Rosenzweig see in Aeschylus’s tragic figures the emergence of the self, completely isolated and devoid of any human community. Yet a look at the extant plays and fragments by Aeschylus reveals that Prometheus does not appear as silent as Ehrenberg suggests. 45 Moreover, most fragments of the tragedy Niobe, which allow us to reconstruct the text and the drama’s silences, were not known in the early twentieth century but rather found and published later. 46 In light of these circumstances, we must assume that Ehrenberg and Rosenzweig were relying on sources other than the Aeschylean tragedies themselves. It may not be too far-fetched to consider Aristophanes’s comedy, The Frogs (Batrachoi), as a possible source. The comedy’s second part depicts a theatrical contest (agon) in the underworld between Aeschylus and Euripides as contestants and Dionysus as judge. In this contest, a very talkative Euripides mocks the brutish language and heroic demeanor of Aeschylus’s protagonists. Most of all, however, he ridicules their silence and suggests that they were not even human actors but puppets on the stage. Aeschylus responds to these accusations – with silence, of course. Only after Dionysus and the chorus repeatedly ask him to speak, does he finally defend himself by condemning the talkative characters in Euripides’ tragedies

44

Ehrenberg, Tragödie und Kreuz, vol. 1 (Die Tragödie unter dem Olymp), 105. See Mark Griffith, Aristophanes’ Frogs, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, 123. 46 Cf. Oliver Taplin, »Aeschylean Silences and Silences in Aeschylus«, Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 76 (1972), 57–97. See also Albin Lesky, Die tragische Dichtung der Hellenen, 3rd ed., Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1972, 114. 45

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as empty chatter and their decadent hedonism as destructive to society. 47 There is no explicit reference to Aristophanes in the Star, only an allusion that Aeschylus’s »contemporaries already noticed« his tragic silences. 48 Yet the references to Sophocles’s and Euripides’s »artful disputations« support my thesis that Rosenzweig and Ehrenberg built their claims regarding the tragic silences more on Aristophanes’s comedy than on direct analysis of the available Aeschylean tragedies. Of course, this does not diminish Ehrenberg’s and Rosenzweig’s insights into the power of defiant silences, nor does it lessen the impact of Rosenzweig’s lucid observation that, »if the great silences are not found in the later dramatists, then this gain in ›naturalness‹ is purchased at the cost of a greater loss in tragic force«. 49 In contrast to the silent and solitary hero of antiquity, who »was always the same self defiantly buried within himself«, Rosenzweig sees modern tragedy mainly as »character tragedy«. 50 Although modern tragedy shares some dramatic elements with classical Greek tragedy, the »modern heroes« are highly individualized, embedded in their social surroundings, and possessing a view of the world that is specific to their own personality. In modernity’s tragedies, »there are many of these I-viewpoints, as many as there are I’s«. 51 All modern characters are entangled in a world from which they cannot remove themselves. The heroes of modern tragedy are deeply rooted in history, in contrast to the classical tragic hero who never existed within history in the first place. In modern tragedy, the heroes strive for absolute consciousness and struggle with insurmountable limitations. In the

47

See Aristophanes, Frogs. Assemblywomen. Wealth (Loeb Classical Library), transl. and ed. Jeffrey Henderson, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002, 147–151 (vv. 907–927). 48 Star, 77. 49 Ibidem. 50 Ibid., 210. 51 Ibidem.

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examples Rosenzweig mentions, Hamlet, Wallenstein, and Faust, »the hero is to all intents and purposes a philosopher«. 52 Rosenzweig’s trajectory in the quest for the Absolute reaches from the philosopher hero of modern drama to the saint. According to Rosenzweig, the goal of modern tragedy, albeit a »hardly conscious« one, 53 is the saint as the absolute figure in whom all the different characters of modern tragedy converge. The saint not only knows the Absolute but »lives absolutely in the Absolute«. The idea of a »tragedy of the saint« is raised by Rosenzweig as »the secret longing of the tragedian«. Yet the realization of this yearning is immediately put into question: »Perhaps it is a longing that cannot be fulfilled«. 54 The reason is that the conditions for tragedy and saintliness contradict one another. The saint could only become the hero of a tragedy »by virtue of his earthly residue of profane ingredients [beigemischten Erdenrest der Unheiligkeit]«, but the saintliness excludes precisely these »profane ingredients«. The tragic hero, at the other end of the spectrum, »remains secluded in darkness, ever one and the same, of the self«. 55 After probing the extremes and the Absolute, Rosenzweig rejects them in the aesthetic, philosophical, and religious realms, and concludes the Star with a dramatic gesture that points beyond the uninhabitable Absolute, »out of the mysterious-miraculous light of the divine sanctuary in which no man can remain alive […] INTO LIFE«. 56 In Franz Rosenzweig’s Conversions, Benjamin Pollock argues that the Star reflects a conversion in Rosenzweig’s thinking from a »theology of radical world-denial that took dying for God seriously« 57 to redemption as a form of sanctification of and within

52

Ibidem. Ibid., 211. 54 Ibidem. 55 Ibidem. 56 Ibid., 424. 57 Benjamin Pollock, Franz Rosenzweig’s Conversions. World Denial and World Redemption, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014, 216. 53

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the world, a »path along which we affirm our creatureliness«. 58 Interpreting the final lines of the Star, Pollock points to the end of the »Night« scene in Goethe’s Faust. A Tragedy, in which Faust is on the verge of taking poison to escape the limitations of earthly existence but is »called back« at dawn of this Easter morning by bells and choral song »into life« (ins Leben). 59 Pollock shows how allusions and references to Faust in the Star provide a commentary on Rosenzweig’s crisis of 1913, when he contemplated taking his own life. Like Faust when called back into life, »Rosenzweig thus leads his readers from out of the realm of redemptive vision back ›INTO LIFE‹«. 60 I suggest a further reading of the last lines of the Star, with the help of a midrash. In contrast to the physical »divine sanctuary« (göttliche Heiligtum) 61 – the Holy of Holies (kodesh hakodashim) in the time of the Temple – later rabbinic Judaism, after the destruction of the Second Temple, emphasizes the sanctification of time in Jewish worldly life. One such practice sanctifying time is kiddush, the blessing over wine, which marks the distinction of Shabbat and holidays from weekdays, the holy from the profane. In some communities, it is a custom that after the person reciting kiddush introduces the blessing by saying, »savrei maranan«, those who are present respond, »lʾ chayim!« (»to life!«). 62 58

Ibid., 214. See also Peter Gordon’s suggestion that Rosenzweig »promises to develop an alternative model of redemption, based upon the fundamental premise that to be human is to remain in the world«. Peter Eli Gordon, Rosenzweig and Heidegger: Between Judaism and German Philosophy, Berkeley/Los Angeles/ London: University of California Press, 2003, 149. 59 Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Faust. Eine Tragödie, in: id., Werke. Hamburger Ausgabe, vol. 3, C. H. Beck, München 1996, 31 (v. 770). See also Inken Rühle, »Leben im Angesicht des Todes. Zum Verständnis des Todes im Stern der Erlösung«, in: Martin Brasser (ed.), Rosenzweig als Leser. Kontextuelle Kommentare zum »Stern der Erlösung«, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 2004, 369–394. 60 Pollock, Franz Rosenzweig’s Conversions, 213 f. 61 Star, 424. 62 It is not uncommon to shorten the phrase to »savrei« to be more inclusive and avoid the male gendered »maranan« (»gentlemen« or »masters«). Often translated as imperative, »Attention, gentlemen«, the phrase »savrei maranan« is likely a participle construction in the sense of »masters who are in agreement«. Its purpose is

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A late midrashic compilation, Tanḥuma Yelammedenu, connects this custom to an earlier rabbinic tradition according to which the purported Great Sanhedrin of the Second Temple period functioned as the Supreme Court and ruled on cases of capital punishment. Those charged with investigating offenses that could carry the death penalty would be asked, at the conclusion of their deliberations, »savrei maranan« (»What is your opinion, masters?«). 63 Two responses were possible: to life, »lʾ chayim«, or to death, »lʾ mita«. If a death sentence was carried out, the convicted would be given strong wine to reduce their suffering. To emphasize, in contrast, the life-affirming use of wine during kiddush or havdalah (the introductory and concluding blessings for Shabbat, the midrash explains, those participating would respond: »›lʾ chayim‹ that is to say, may this cup be for the living«. 64 Early in Part III, Rosenzweig mentions Shabbat as the day on which »the community »feels as if it were already redeemed«. 65 Here too, we find a reference to silence, yet not as defiance, but in the sense of resting from the language of the everyday. 66 Redemption is foreshadowed; and although it is »only a dream«, as Rosenzweig claims, Shabbat nevertheless becomes a »cornerstone of life« and the »sanctuary« from which a way must be found »back into the workaday world«, again with the blessing over wine to express that it is said on behalf of all those present. I thank my colleague Stuart Miller for helpful comments on this phrase. For a detailed account of the complex relationship between customs and halacha, see Stuart S. Miller, »›All Law Begins with Custom:‹ Rabbinic Awareness of Popular Practice and Its Implications for the Study of the Jews of Roman Palestine«, in: Stuart S. Miller, Michael D. Swartz, Steven Fine, Naomi Grundhaus, Alex P. Jassen (eds.), From Scrolls to Traditions. A Festschrift Honoring Lawrence H. Schiffman, Leiden: Brill, 2020, 350– 397. 63 Here, the word »savrei« is used in the sense of being of an opinion. 64 Midrash Tanhuma-Yelammedenu, transl. Samuel A. Berman, Hoboken: KTAV Publishing, 1996, 651 (Parshat Pekudei, 2:8). Seligmann Baer's annotated siddur, Avodat Yisrael, first published in 1868 and widely distributed in the 1901 Rödelheim edition, mentions this custom and midrash. Seligmann Baer, Avodat Yisrael. Rödelheim: Lehrberger, 1901, 197. 65 Star, 315. 66 Cf. ibid., 314.

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during havdalah. 67 The affirmative »(IN)TO LIFE«, both in the context of distinguishing Shabbat from the everyday life and in the transition from the Star to the »No-longer-book«, is an essentially performative gesture that marks off the holy from the profane. Yet »only in its being both does it become the cornerstone of life«. 68 As I have shown, this transitions that recure between silence and language, guage in dramatic performance, between the spoken word and written text, between non-Jewish and Jewish sources, between holy and profane, between Shabbat and the workdays, between the book and the »No-longer-book«, between The Star of Redemption and redemptive life, are as pivotal to the architecture of the Star as they were to Rosenzweig’s life.

67

Ibid., 313. Abraham Joshua Heschel calls Judaism »a religion of time aiming at the sanctification of time«. His seminal essay, The Sabbath, provides a fascinating account of this sanctified day within Jewish ritual's artful »architecture of time«. Abraham Joshua Heschel, The Sabbath. Its Meaning for Modern Man. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005, 17 f. 68 Ibid., 313 f. (my emphasis).

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The New Pygmalion: On Aesthetics and Redemption in the Work of Franz Rosenzweig and Hans Ehrenberg »Art teaches man to overcome without forgetting« (Franz Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption)

It is well-known that Rosenzweig took inspiration from both Schiller and Goethe, and the tradition of German aesthetics more broadly, when writing The Star of Redemption (henceforth: Star). Indeed, it is impossible to overlook the intricate philosophy of art that is interwoven into all three parts of the work. 1 Most striking perhaps, as I would like to explore in this essay, is that Rosenzweig’s aesthetics, his reflections on myth, form and content, on the work of art and genius – and his few, but important references to the Pygmalion myth – apply equally, if not »uncannily«, 2 to his own project in the Star. When read broadly along these lines, that 1

For a schematic account of the categories and function of Rosenzweig’s aesthetics, especially as they »pre-figure« his understanding of theology, see Francesco Paolo Ciglia, »Pygmalion auf den Knien. Die theologische Ästhetik Franz Rosenzweigs«, in: Markus Enders, Holger Zaborowski (eds.), Phänomenologie der Religion. Zugänge und Grundfragen, Freiburg/München: Karl Alber, 2004, 255–270. A revised version of this same essay, with a series of visual graphs, also appeared as: Francesco Paolo Ciglia, »Kunst als Propädeutik der Erlösung. Ästhetik und Theologie im Denken Franz Rosenzweigs«, Rosenzweig Jahrbuch / Rosenzweig Yearbook 1 (2006), 134–147. 2 See Leora Batnitzky, »Rosenzweig’s Aesthetic Theory and Jewish Unheimlichkeit«, New German Critique 77 (Spring/Summer 1999), 87–112. Batnitzky argues that »uncanniness« (Unheimlichkeit) is a central feature of Rosenzweig’s aesthetics and moreover, that Rosenzweig understands this term to represent »a particularly Jewish contribution to the understanding of human existence« (88). Especially important for the essay at hand is how Batnitzky differentiates Rosenzweig’s position within the German Jewish tradition with regard to a »revaluation of vision« (ibid., 89).

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is, if we turn a critical eye towards the aesthetic dimension of the Star as a »work« itself – and Rosenzweig as the sculptor of this work – then the performative function of Rosenzweig’s aesthetics also serves as a guide to show, in the words of Rosenzweig himself, how »the door of the personal realm of art opens and discloses the way into life« 3 – in aesthetic-theological terms, how Rosenzweig’s work »pre-figures« his idea of redemption. In order to explore the Star from this performative vantage point, I would like to interpret Rosenzweig’s aesthetics through a concept of »work« drawn from an unpublished manuscript by Hans Ehrenberg, Rosenzweig’s cousin, close friend and first teacher in philosophy. 4 The text in question is a »philosophical drama« titled Der Neue Pygmalion. 5 Ehrenberg wrote and revised this work between the years of 1921 and 1925, the same time span within which he published his philosophical dialogues on Fichte, Schelling and Hegel in the three-volume Disputation. Drei Bücher vom deutschen Idealismus. 6 In Der Neue Pygmalion, an art critic, a painter and a philosopher take up contrasting views on the subject of sculpture, discuss the plastic arts more broadly, 3

Franz Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, transl. William W. Hallo, New York/Chicago/San Francisco: Holt Rinehart & Winston, 1971 (hereafter: Star), 248. 4 Cf. Wolfdietrich Schmied-Kowarzik, Rosenzweig im Gespräch mit Ehrenberg, Cohen und Buber, Freiburg: Karl Alber, 2006, 61–112. 5 Hans Ehrenberg, Der Neue Pygmalion (unpublished), Hans Ehrenberg Nachlass, Landeskirchliches Archiv der Evangelischen Kirche von Westfalen, Bielefeld, Bestand 3.17, 399. The manuscript consists of 186 double-spaced pages; hereafter cited as: NP, Bild/Gespräch. All translations into English are my own. 6 Ehrenberg dedicated the first volume on »Fichte« to Rosenzweig, who had praised this volume extensively upon reading it (see Rosenzweig’s letter to Margrit Rosenstock-Huessy, October 1, 1921, in: Franz Rosenzweig, Die »Gritli«-Briefe. Briefe an Margrit Rosenstock-Huessy, eds. Inken Rühle and Reinhold Mayer, Tübingen: Bilam, 2002, 775 f.). Biographically, this same time span from 1921– 1925 was the period during which Ehrenberg carried out the life-transforming decision to leave his position as university professor and begin work as a Protestant pastor in Bochum. See here Wolfdietrich Schmied-Kowarzik, »Der Philosoph Hans Ehrenberg und sein Abschied von der Philosophie«, in: Traugott Jähnichen, Andreas Losch (ed.), Hans Ehrenberg als Grenzgänger zwischen Theologie und Philosophie, Kamen: Hartmut Spenner 2017, 1–42.

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and debate the implications of these art forms for philosophy, aesthetics – and life. These dialogues are offset by six mythological »pictures« (Bilder), recalling Rousseau’s Pygmalion (1762) in style and tone, 7 by way of which we play witness to the private exchanges between Pygmalion and his statue, Galatea. When translated into Rosenzweig’s language from Part I of the Star, 8 the aesthetic form of Der Neue Pygmalion contrasts the »metaethical« and silent space of the artist – Pygmalion and his statue – with the »metalogical« and structured world – the »world view« (Weltanschauung) of the art critic, painter and philosopher. In these terms, the dramatic tension between the »tragic self« and the »plastic world« forms an undercurrent to the entire work, throwing the question of redemption into broad relief. 9

Handwritten cover page to Hans Ehrenberg’s Der Neue Pygmalion

We learn from a letter Rosenzweig wrote to Martin Buber in 1925 that Ehrenberg’s drama was intended to be published in the first volume of the interreligious journal Die Kreatur. Although Ehren7

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, »Pygmalion. Scène lyrique«, in: id., Œuvres complètes (Bibliothèque de la Pléiade), vol. 2, Paris: Gallimard, 1961, 1224–1231. 8 Rosenzweig had dedicated the introduction to Part I of the Star to Ehrenberg. See here Schmied-Kowarzik, Rosenzweig im Gespräch, 61 and 75. 9 See Ciglia, »Pygmalion auf den Knien«, 262.

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berg had already edited the work extensively by 1925, the manuscript of Der Neue Pygmalion ultimately remained unpublished. 10 It may have remained entirely out of view, if not for Ehrenberg’s contribution to the commemorative volume presented to Rosenzweig upon the occasion of his fortieth birthday in 1926. 11 In this volume, a collection of hand-written notes from Rosenzweig’s friends and associates, Ehrenberg carefully wrote out the sixth and final »picture« of his drama, the culminating monologue in which Pygmalion laments his tragic plight as an artist. This small, but significant historical detail points to the great importance that Ehrenberg still placed on the work. Moreover, the manner in which the scene was presented so personally to Rosenzweig signals that Ehrenberg found the very content of the drama revealing and still relevant to their intellectual friendship. And indeed, this is certainly the case. Der Neue Pygmalion begins, without further description, in Pygmalion’s workshop. After triumphantly placing the final 10

Cf. Martin Buber, The Letters of Martin Buber. A Life a Dialogue, transl. Richard and Clara Winston, Harry Zohn, ed. Nahum N. Glatzer, Paul MendesFlohr, New York: Schocken Books, 1991, 328 f. (Rosenzweig to Buber, June 19, 1925). Ehrenberg was intimately involved in the conception and realization of Die Kreatur. It is evident, however, that he clashed with Buber (and Rosenzweig) over the purpose and theological underpinnings of the journal. Ehrenberg’s exchange with Buber in this context can be partially reconstructed from letters held at the Martin Buber Archive at the National Library of Israel (Arc. Ms. Var. 350). With regard to the publication of Der Neue Pygmalion, Ehrenberg edited the manuscript extensively over the years and notated the dates he made substantial changes. At certain junctures, Ehrenberg even marks how many pages he had omitted from the at times sprawling script, an indication that there had been at least some consideration as to the acceptable length of a published version of the manuscript, possibly with regard to Die Kreatur. In the context of Ehrenberg’s intellectual biography, remarkable is that he revisited this project over ten years later, in September of 1936 – in the midst of his struggles as a »Jewish-Christian« pastor within the Kirchenkampf in Germany – making substantial changes to the first dialogue. It appears, therefore, that he still intended to rework and edit the entire manuscript for publication, but there is no evidence that he made any new edits beyond the first dialogue. 11 This collection was later set and reprinted as: Martin Goldner (ed.), Franz Rosenzweig. Zum 25. Dezember 1926, New York: Leo Baeck Institute, 1987.

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touches on his statue, Pygmalion cries out in an eruption of pride and resignation: Der letzte Schlag! Du stehst! Mein Werk! Mein warst Du, wem gehörst du jetzt? Toter Stein! Zu Deinen Füssen liege ich! […] [E]ine Fremde mir geworden […]. Reich war ich – erbarmenswürdig ist jetzt mein Los. The final touch! You stand! My work! You were mine, to whom do you now belong? Dead stone! I lay at your feet! […] [Y]ou’ve become a stranger to me […]. I was rich – pitiful is now my lot. 12

Resigned in his loss, Pygmalion is taken aback when the statue speaks: Du Tor! Bin ich nicht Deine Tochter? Willst Vaterrecht Du von Dir tun, weil Schöpferrecht Dir nicht mehr zusteht? […] Höre doch, dass ich Dein Kind, Dein Werk, Dir Tochter bin. You fool! Am I not your daughter? Will you give up your father’s rights now that you no longer have the rights of the creator? […] But listen, that I am your child, your work, a daughter to you. 13

After a long and passionate exchange, lamenting the inner conflict that arose for him once his work had been completed, Pygmalion, convinced he must now share his artwork with humankind, finally decides to travel with his »child« out into the world. However, after a time displaying his work and turning fearful that his »daughter« would revert to stone, thereby losing the life with which she was imbued – »Du fühltest wohl, dass jeder Ort ganz langsam, Jahr um Jahr, zurück zur Statue herab mich sinken liess« (»You must have felt that every place, year after year, slowly allowed me to fall back into a statue«) 14 – Pygmalion returns from the public world, misunderstood in his genius, to a solitary landscape. Over the course of the six mythological »pictures« – serving as interludes to the five main dialogues of the play – Ehrenberg carries out the tragedy of the artist, showing Pygmalion’s yearning for 12 13 14

NP, Bild 1, 1. Ibidem. Ibid., Bild 3, 3.

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what Rosenzweig in the Star calls an »immortality« that results in the »the solitude of demise«. 15 Pygmalion struggles with his choice to remain in isolation and inner harmony with his work, still questioning if he should give up this artist’s ideal – and thereby his very reason to exist 16 – and return again to humankind. In the final »picture« of the drama, the same scene Ehrenberg had personally shared with Rosenzweig, Pygmalion is called by distant human voices back into the world. With his dying words, alone in his workshop in what could be described in allusion to Rosenzweig’s Goethe as a »prayer to the personal fate«, 17 Pygmalion laments the loss of the »work of his hands«. 18 The myth of Pygmalion has been passed down as the tale of an artist who, after casting off worldly love, falls in love with his own work, a sculpture of fine marble who Venus then miraculously brings to life. Recorded in Ovid’s Metamorphoses, 19 the myth gained renewed popularity with Rousseau in the eighteenth century and new significance into the nineteenth century with the resurgence of classical forms of sculpture, painting and poetry. 20 An allegory for the passionate love or Eros that an artist bears for their work, Pygmalion is a figure of defiant bliss and hopeful long15

Star, 78 f. In evoking this inner existential conflict of the artist, Ehrenberg seems to be borrowing and elaborating upon a theme from Rousseau. The last lines of Rousseau’s drama read: »worthy masterpiece of my hands, my heart and the Gods… It is you, you alone: I have given you my whole being; from now on I shall live only through you«. See here Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Pygmalion, transl. Patricia de Man, in: The Portable Rousseau [digital manuscript], Irvine: University of California Irvine Libraries, s. d. (http://hdl.handle.net/10575/1094, accessed November 15, 2020). 17 Star, 286. 18 NP, Bild 6, 1. See here also August Wilhelm Schlegel’s poem, »Der Neue Pygmalion«, published in Schiller’s Musen-Almanach für das Jahr 1799, 144: »Was zürnst du noch dem Werke deiner Hand / Dem Spiegel deiner schöpferischen Seele, / Als ob ihm Leben zur Vollendung fehle?« 19 See Ovid, Metamorphoses (Loeb Classical Library), Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984, Book X, 244–297. 20 For a discussion on Goethe’s adaptation of the Pygmalion myth and the corresponding historical context, see Liliane Weissberg, »Kästchenwahl«, Goethe Yearbook 14 (2007), 74–77. 16

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ing as such. Thus, in Schiller’s poem »Die Ideale«, paradigmatic of the age of idealism, Pygmalion is evoked in the image of a youthful poet, longing to give life and form to nature. 21 However, what begins as the poet’s desire to capture »the realm of the ideal« 22 is shown to ultimately come at the cost of solitude and despair. 23 Hans Ehrenberg’s »new Pygmalion« walks a kindred path and speaks in a familiar tone of pathos. While in Ovid’s Metamorphoses Pygmalion is married and even has a child with his work, thereby consummating the »self-love« (Selbstliebe) of the artist, 24 Schiller’s poet, at first fulfilled in the youthful act of creation, is left desolate on the path of life. And yet, despite the recognition that the artist’s own »ideals have faded away«, 25 the work remains. It is the work, in this instance the poetry that has outlived the poet, that stands apart from the experience of the artist and thus creates the conditions for despair. This tragic tension between artist and work – and the outlying position of the observer to that work – courses through the entirety of Ehrenberg’s philosophical drama and is at the very core of Rosenzweig’s reflections on redemption and aesthetics in the Star. Ehrenberg, who had written one of the first reviews of the Star for the Frankfurter Zeitung in 1921, 26 was certainly aware of the 21

Friedrich Schiller, »Die Ideale«, in: id., Werke. Nationalausgabe, vol. 2/I, ed. Norbert Oellers, Weimar: Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1983, 367–369. »Wie einst mit flehendem Verlangen / Pygmalion den Stein umschloß […] So schlang ich mich mit Liebesarmen / Um die Natur, mit Jugendlust« (367). 22 Cf. Friedrich Schiller, »Das Ideal und das Leben«, in: id., Werke. Nationalausgabe, vol. 2/I, 396–400. 23 Schiller, »Die Ideale«, 369: »Und immer stiller ward’s und immer / Verlaßner auf dem rauhen Steg, / Kaum warf noch einen bleichen Schimmer / Die Hoffnung auf den finstern Weg«. 24 Ehrenberg introduces his two-volume work on tragedy with a critical reflection on the term »Selbstliebe« as it applies to his own experience as an author. See Hans Ehrenberg, Tragödie und Kreuz, 2 vols., Würzburg: Patmos, 1920, vol. 1, vii. 25 Schiller, »Die Ideale«, 367: »Die Ideale sind zerronnen / Die einst das trunkene Herz geschwellt«. 26 Hans Ehrenberg, »New Philosophy«, in: Alan Udoff, Barbara E. Galli (ed. and transl.), Franz Rosenzweig’s »The New Thinking«, New York: Siracuse University Press, 1999, 112–120.

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passage from the Star where Rosenzweig draws upon the myth of Pygmalion in order to introduce the »spectator« and the redemptive potential of art: »Without the spectator the work would be mute, since it does not ›speak‹ to the author: Pygmalion seeks in vain to breathe life into the marble that he has shaped himself. It would be merely spoken, not speech. It only ›speaks‹ to the beholder«. 27 With Rosenzweig’s formulation in mind, the opening lines of Ehrenberg’s drama are all the more striking. In casting Pygmalion’s statue as his »daughter«, and in crafting their interaction as a dialogue, Ehrenberg is able to draw out the unresolved tension internal to artistic consciousness. While Pygmalion is the first »beholder« of his work of art, the statue’s response to the artist is not the revelatory »speech« of the other, but the occasion by which the artist first comes to self-awareness (and also to the recognition of the »family likeness« 28) of his work – it is the internal, the silent speech of art. Finding himself as the »creator«, as the father of the work, the artist soon realizes that in order for his work be »configured« 29 in the world, in order for the work to become a work at all – to be observed – he must give up his autonomy over that work: »Pygmalion cannot by himself hammer life into his statue, try as he will. Only after laying aside his sculptor’s chisel and falling to his knees, a poor mortal, only then does the goddess bend down toward him«. 30 Like Schiller’s poet, Ehrenberg’s »new Pygmalion« must be »sacrificed on behalf of the humanity of the rest of mankind«. 31 The tragedy of the artist, the tragedy of the poet is the awareness – again in the words of Rosenzweig – »that his works will not follow him, that he must leave them behind on that earth whence they sprang«. 32 It is telling to recall that Rosenzweig explored a strikingly similar relationship between author and work at the end of his essay »The New Thinking«. Reflecting on the difficulty of writing 27 28 29 30 31 32

Star, 243. Ibid., 149. Ibid., 55. Ibid., 249. Ibid., 191. Ibid., 190.

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about the Star, he claims that he is like any other reader of his book when it comes to determining »that which in his work is spirit [Geist] and thus transplantable into other spirits«. 33 With this thought, Rosenzweig evokes a central dynamic from the heart of his aesthetics: what it means to become observer to one’s own work. For Rosenzweig, the author who had since gone »into life« in finishing his work, the Star became of necessity Nichtmehrbuch – »no-longer-book« 34 – indeed, this is the redemptive message of its final pages. By way of association, these reflections resonate with a cursory remark by Paul Ricœur from his lectures on Interpretation Theory highlighting the hermeneutical aesthetics of Rosenzweig’s work. »Thanks to writing«, Ricœur claims, »the works of language become as self-contained as sculptures«. 35 Indeed, Rosenzweig would agree, it is preciously in this »self-contained« form that art can and does exist outside of the author. This idea is echoed in a short prose work on books and the bookstore by Jean-Luc Nancy: »the sacredness of the book consists in the fact that the book poses and imposes itself at one and the same time as a given, fully formed, integral and nonmodifiable entity, while also opening itself liberally to reading, which will never stop opening it wider and deeper, giving it a thousand senses or a thousand secrets, rewriting it, finally, in a thousand ways«. 36 A book, like a work of art, remains »inwardly full of form«, 37 thereby providing both testament to the creator of the work, while taking on new dimensions of interpretation – it »gives its secret ever anew«. 38 In becom33

Franz Rosenzweig, »The New Thinking«, in: id., Philosophical and Theological Writings, transl. and ed. Paul W. Franks and Michael L. Morgan, Indianapolis/ Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 2000, 137. Franz Rosenzweig originally published »Das neue Denken« in 1925. 34 Ibidem. 35 Paul Ricœur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning, Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1976, 33. 36 Jean-Luc Nancy, On the Commerce of Thinking, transl. David Wills, New York: Fordham University Press, 2009, 18. 37 Star, 150. 38 Ibid., 192.

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ing public and thus able to be viewed from all sides – like a sculpture – a work of art helps to create the prerequisite discourse or »speech« necessary for establishing the contours of actual community. But at what cost? Who will remember the sacrifice of the sculptor? Just as the work exceeds the intention of its author, so too must the artist be more than the work. Or to express the concern in allusion to Ehrenberg and Rosenzweig: »The philosopher must be more than the philosophy«. 39 In the present context, how do such existential concerns inform a redemptive aesthetics? How is the tragedy of the artist to be reconciled with the redemptive potential of art? Returning with these questions to Ehrenberg’s philosophical drama, we meet the »beholders« of the work of art in his art critic, painter and philosopher. A playful spin on the three figures from the preface to Lessing’s Laokoon, 40 Ehrenberg’s protagonists also correlate to the three categories of Rosenzweig’s aesthetics: the art critic speaks to »outer form«, and to the question as to what makes something a work of art at all; the painter speaks to »inner form« and to what lends a works its harmony and sense; and the philosopher speaks to »content«, that idiosyncratic and tragic aspect of all art. Although their roles do overlap significantly, taken together the three figures serve as an allegory for the phenomenon of art in general. Over the course of five dialogues, their discussions range from masks, painting and photography to the aesthetics of space, beauty and sight. 41 At the center of these discussions, mirroring Pygmalion’s »personal fate«, is the subject of 39

Ibid., 296. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Laokoon oder über die Grenzen der Malerei und Poesie, in: id., Gesammelte Werke, vol. 2, München: Carl Hanser, 1959, 781– 962. »Der erste war der Liebhaber, das zweite der Philosoph, das dritte der Kunstrichter« (783). 41 There are other significant characters who interact with the three protagonists throughout: a friend, two female companions, a mother, and most importantly »der Unbekannte« (»unknown stranger«), who appears in the fifth and final dialogue of the drama. I discuss the role and significance of this character for Ehrenberg’s understanding of aesthetics below. 40

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sculpture and how art – as work – outlasts and preserves individual life, preserves personality itself: Die Plastik lässt uns in das innere Einsamkeitsgeheimnis des Menschen hineinschauen und setzt damit dem Menschen Denkmäler. Das Denkmal verewigt einen Toten – das, was von ihm zurückbleibt, nachdem er gelebt ist; das innere Geheimnis des Daseins. Denn der Restbestand des Lebens kann nie ein anderes sein als sein Urbestand: die Person! Sculpture allows us to glance into the inner mystery of human loneliness and thereby erects monuments to humankind. The monument immortalizes a dead person – that which remains of him after he has lived; the inner mystery of being. For the remainder of life can never be something other than its original existence: the person! 42

The appreciation of a work in »silent accord« 43 with others, the possibility to configure this work into a shared and communal space allows for a work to be remembered, to be recognized as a »monument« to the life of an individual – to become Lebenswerk: »Life is the curriculum vitae«, writes Rosenzweig. »The real nature of man is not exhausted in his corporeal or in his spiritual being; it is complete only in the whole course of his life. Nor ›is‹ it, in fact, at all; it becomes«. 44 Just as Walter Benjamin writes of book collecting and the life of a collector, it is only in the »extinction« (Aussterben) of the collector, 45 in the death of the artist that the »inner mystery« of his Lebenswerk is understood. Ehrenberg’s Der Neue Pygmalion culminates in such existential concerns, his characters coming to self-awareness and a dramatic reckoning with their mortality and fate. 42

NP, Gespräch 4, 13. In the last sentence, Ehrenberg crosses out »Individuum« and inserts »Person«. 43 Star, 354. 44 Ibid., 282. 45 Walter Benjamin, »Unpacking My Library«, in: id., Illuminations. Essays and Reflections, transl. Harry Zohn, ed. Hannah Arendt, New York: Schocken Books, 1969, 59–67. »I do know that the time is running out for the type [of collector] that I am discussing here and have been representing before you a bit ex officio. But, as Hegel put it, only when it is dark does the owl of Minerva begin its flight. Only in extinction is the collector comprehended« (67).

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Mirroring the figure of Pygmalion, Ehrenberg’s philosopher struggles most visibly with the course his life has taken. Nearing the end of the drama, the philosopher and an »unknown stranger« (who is revealed to be none other than the figure of »Death«) converse on the themes of life and work. In defiant tone, not unlike Rosenzweig’s description of the tragic hero, the philosopher wishes to defend »das Werk seiner Hände« (»the work of his hands«) 46 against the call of death: »mein Werk überdauert Deine Tat« (»my work outlasts your deed«), 47 he exclaims. In response, the »unknown figure« mocks the philosopher: Der Tod hat seine Sprache in euern Werken. Gewiss, ihr seid die Schaffenden, aber Ihr schafft nur meine Werke, tut nur meine Taten. Nichts bleibt innen zurück, im Inneren, wohin Ihr es aus dem Aussenleben setzt, sondern kaum geschaffen wird jedes Werk Eures Geistes wieder in die Aussenwelt verpflanzt, wo ich herrsche. Da wird es aus dem Akustischen wieder ein Optisches, wird Gestalt. Im Inneren bleibt nur trüber Rest zurück und Ungegorenes oder solches, womit Ihr nicht fertig wurdet. Death has its language in your works. Certainly, you are the creators, but you create only my works, do only my deeds. Nothing remains internal, nothing inside of you where you place it from life outside; barely created every work of your spirit is transplanted back into the outside world where I rule. There it changes from something acoustic into something optical, it becomes configured. Only a murky residue remains inside, something unfermented or the like, which you cannot dispel of. 48

In evoking this movement from the »acoustic« to the »optical«, culminating in the Gestalt, the words of the »unknown stranger« clearly recall the same trajectory of form explicit in Rosenzweig’s own aesthetics. And yet, Ehrenberg’s drama also directly addresses »the problem of the philosopher« 49 implicitly raised by Rosenzweig throughout the Star. Like Pygmalion, the philosopher seeks to eternalize himself in his work. Echoing Rosenzweig’s language, Ehrenberg has his »unknown stranger« proclaim: »Getrieben vom 46 47 48 49

NP, Gespräch 4, 28. Ibid, Gespräch 5, 10. Ibid., 11. Rosenzweig, »The New Thinking«, 137.

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dem Stachel des Ungestalteten trachtet Ihr alle nach der Gestalt« (»Driven by the sting of what is unconfigured, you all seek configuration«). 50 As Gestalt, the work of the philosopher becomes a testament to his life – but at the cost of his very being. »Im Optischen«, observes the art critic, »in der Gestalt siegt der Tod über den Philosophen« (»In what is optical, in what is configured does Death conquer the philosopher«). 51 In becoming static and »selfcontained like a sculpture«, the work of the philosopher, like that of the artist, makes possible what Ehrenberg calls »die Sprache des Todes« (»the language of death«). 52 The philosopher thus seals his fate in assuring the immortality of his work. Ehrenberg’s art critic, who only moments ago had learned of the death of his other friend, the artist, now witnesses this heightened drama between the figure of Death and the philosopher. The art critic is thereby moved to exclaim: Sind wir eine Tragödie? Es scheint nur so. Eine Komödie ist das Ganze – irdische Komödie, irdisch-göttlich. Und fataler Ernst! Die Schaffenden sterben, die Geniesser bleiben am Leben. Die Mutigen kommen um, die Feigen dürfen weiter leben. Meine Freunde, soll ich für Euch leben? Einmal komme auch ich zu Euch […]. Gott, Du bist uns nahe, wirklich genau so nahe . . . wie der Tod! O Mensch! Are we a tragedy? It only appears so. The entire thing is a comedy – an earthly comedy, earthly-divine. And fatally serious! The creators die, those who enjoy remain alive. The courageous ones perish, the cowards are allowed to live on. My friends, should I live for you? I will also join you in time […]. God, you are close to us, really as close . . . as death! Oh human, alas!

These lines were written, significantly, in December and January of 1924–1925, the last months before Ehrenberg would begin his new life as a Protestant pastor in Bochum, leaving his post as an academic philosopher behind. In more than a figurative sense then does Ehrenberg attempt to kill off the philosopher in his work. Moreover, he becomes, like the art critic, an observer to 50 51 52

NP, Gespräch 5, 17. Ibid., 11. This is also the title of the fifth and final dialogue of Der Neue Pygmalion.

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what was created. And yet today – despite being still hidden away – Hans Ehrenberg’s Der Neue Pygmalion stands as a »Denkmal«, a self-contained testament not only to the limitations of a redemptive aesthetics, but also to the enduring force of Ehrenberg’s philosophical personality. In this same spirit – in this aesthetic sense – the Star is a testament to Rosenzweig’s own »personal fate« as philosopher and artist. In completing the Star, in crafting his internal passion into a work, Rosenzweig confronts the same dangers as the »new Pygmalion«. Would he remain trapped within the walls of the self, within the »metaethical« spirit of tragedy? Would he look for redemption only from »the work of his hands«? In finishing the Star, in becoming observer to his own work, Rosenzweig’s book became for him Nichtmehrbuch. As Buch, as a work of art, the Star is an externalization, a »self-contained« work that can be appreciated, read and interpreted. This is indeed the Christian and tragic character of the work. For according to Rosenzweig it is the Christian, like the pagan artist before him, who »depicts« his suffering. 53 But in the depiction of suffering the artist is also aware that he too will soon become a mere observer to his work. It is through this experience, that is, in recognizing »with a certain romantic-ironic levity« 54 that his own work is both Buch and Nichtmehrbuch that Rosenzweig could claim: »Art as depiction is tragic and comic in one«. 55 In anticipation of the Nichtmehrbuch Rosenzweig could already see that when the experience of the artist – the tragic content of art – is coupled with the critical glance of the beholder – its comedic form – it reveals the Janus-face of all art and gives way to its redemptive potential: »Art teaches man to overcome without forgetting«. 56 As a Jewish intellectual, in order that he »live his way even deeper into himself«, 57 Rosenzweig first had to overcome the 53 54 55 56 57

Star, 376. Ibidem. Ibidem. Ibid., 377. Ibid., 408.

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poetic temptation of Selbstliebe, that danger of falling in love, like the »new Pygmalion«, with »the work of his hands«. But in order that the difference between Christianity and Judaism become clear to him, he could not abandon art altogether, could not forget the lived-experience of the philosopher-poet. The Star is thus both a station-of-life in Rosenzweig’s becoming, in his remaining Jewish, and a testament to the Christian faith. As a testament, as a work of art, the Star »opens and discloses the way into life«. 58 For from »where is the solitary soul thus to prepare for community?«, asks Rosenzweig – and I would add whether Christian, Jewish or other –, from what source is he or she to learn to »harmonize with others in true symphony?« Together with Hans Ehrenberg he may answer: »from art«. 59 This is at least one configuration that can be gleamed from reading The Star of Redemption in light of Ehrenberg’s work.

58 59

Ibid., 248. Ibid., 354.

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Rosenzweig and Chalier on Teshuva: Repentance and Redemption

This article aims to study the concept of teshuva within the thinking of Franz Rosenzweig (1886–1929) and Catherine Chalier (born 1947). Both of these philosophers understand teshuva as a special kind of repentance. Re-reading Rosenzweig’s Der Stern der Erlösung (henceforth: Stern) through the lens of teshuva shows the importance of anticipatory acts in the present as an impatient awaiting of the redemption that is always yet to come (à-venir). First, the concept of teshuva will be explored. Next, Rosenzweig’s and Chalier’s interpretation of teshuva will be analyzed. Finally, two challenges to teshuva (complacency and despair) will be examined. Through a reading of Rosenzweig’s Stern, it will be shown how these challenges can be overcome. Doing so, this article hopes to read Rosenzweig’s Stern from a new angle, through the rather unknown concept of teshuva. 1. Teshuva Teshuva (‫ )תשובה‬is a crucial concept within Judaism. The word teshuva doesn’t occur as such anywhere in the Hebrew Bible and probably came into existence only later. The meaning of the term teshuva is a combination of its root shuv (‫ )שוב‬and the verb niham (‫)נחם‬. 1 Shuv means »to turn«, and could indicate that teshuva is a

1

See Kaufmann Kohler, Max Schlesinger, »Repentance«, in: Isidore Singer (ed.), The Jewish Encyclopedia, vol. 10, New York/London: Funk and Wagnalls, 1905, 376–379.

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dynamic principle. 2 Niham or nacham means »to regret«, »comfort« or »feel sorrow«. 3 Teshuva is thus, linguistically speaking, a dynamic form of »repentance«. The dynamic aspect lies in a double movement away from evil and towards the good. This way, there is a parallel between teshuva and the biblical metanoia (μετάνοια): both represent a radical revolution in mind and heart. Metanoia is essential within Christian and Western thought. Teshuva, on the other hand, is typically Jewish. Judaism emphasizes in its writings as well as in its liturgy (Yom Kippur) the liberating power of teshuva, which exists in a self-liberation from sin. Moreover, teshuva goes beyond metanoia because, in addition to an internal change, it calls for external changes in behavior and actions. 4 In addition to the rather narrow definition of teshuva as a dynamic form of repentance, there is a broader definition as »return«. This broader sense of teshuva is a product of modernity, a period characterized by a tearing away of the traditional Jewish faith or the abandonment of faith as such, sometimes followed by a return. 5 Rosenzweig uses teshuva especially in its broad sense of »return«, while Chalier, re-reading Rosenzweig, understands teshuva in its moral dimension of »repentance«. 2. Rosenzweig and Chalier: Teshuva Franz Rosenzweig questioned himself at a young age about the meaning of Judaism. He wanted to fully integrate into European culture, which implied a conversion to Christianity. Nevertheless, after the Leipziger Nachtgespräch, he opts for a return to Judaism and thus characterizes himself as baʾ al teshuva, a »master of re2

Cf. Wilhelm Gesenius, Hebrew and Chaldee Lexicon to the Old Testament Scriptures, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987, 808 f. 3 Cf. ibid., 483. 4 Cf. Alan Unterman, »Repentance«, in: Fred Skolnik, Michael Berenbaum (eds.), Encyclopedia Judaica, 2nd ed., vol. 17, Detroit: Thomson Gale, 2007, 221–224. 5 Cf. ibidem.

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turn«. 6 Rosenzweig’s description of teshuva as return goes back to Hebrew roots of the word: Uns gilt unsre »Verstocktheit« als Treue, und unsre »Abtrünnigkeit von Gott« wird, da es eben Abtrünnigkeit und nicht ursprüngliche Gottesferne (»Adams« Sündenfall!) ist, nur durch Rückkehr, nicht durch Umwandlung, geheilt. Daß der Begriff der Buße, der hebräisch durch »Rückkehr«, »Umkehr«, »Wiederkehr« wiedergegeben wird, daß also dies hebräische Wort »Teschubah« im Neuen Testament μετάνοια [Umdenken] heißt, das ist einer der Punkte, wo die Weltgeschichte im Wörterbuch steht. 7

Rosenzweig departs from the Jewish alienation of God (Abtrünnigkeit von Gott), which can only be restored by returning (Rückkehr), not by transformation (Verwandlung). Rosenzweig has Christianity in mind here. That Christianity sees teshuva as a transformation, even more so as μετά-νοια (meta-noia) or »rethinking« (Umdenken), accentuates the difference between the two religions. Christianity, situated within world history, can act within history in order to overcome alienation. Judaism, which, as will be explained later, is situated outside the world and its history, must necessarily return to what has already been given: Israel, as the holy people, must and can return to its roots, for it is chosen. Within this frame, Rosenzweig presents teshuva as a dynamic principle within Judaism: it is a return (Umkehr) and not a rethinking (Umdenken). This implies a critique of the rational, totalitarian historicism. Within Hegel’s conception of history, every historical revolution appears as a revolution in thinking, or, more precisely, as a step in the self-fulfilment of the Spirit. 8 Against the totalitarian »philosophy of the All« – the (Hegelian) idealism – Cf. Nahum N. Glatzer, Franz Rosenzweig. His Life and Thought, 2nd ed., New York: Schocken Books, 1953, 23–28. 7 Rosenzweig’s letter of November 4, 1913, to Rudolf Ehrenberg, in: Franz Rosenzweig, Briefe und Tagebücher, 2 vols. (Der Mensch und sein Werk. Gesammelte Schriften, I), eds. Rachel Rosenzweig and Edith Rosenzweig-Scheinmann, in collaboration with Bernhard Casper, Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979, vol. 1, 142. 8 Cf. Franz Rosenzweig, Der Stern der Erlösung, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1988 (hereafter: Stern), 7. 6

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Rosenzweig juxtaposes three irreducible »nothings«: man, world and God, not coincidentally the three postulates of Kant’s idealism. By placing the irreducible at the center, he envisions the nonidentical. This last point brings us to Catherine Chalier, a student of Emmanuel Levinas and specialized in the philosophy of Rosenzweig and Spinoza. In her own way she goes against a totalitarian assimilation of reality, of which her description of teshuva testifies: Ce qu’enseigne l’idée de techouva n’est en aucune façon l’effacement du mal: l’irréparable de la mort demeure. Mais […] techouva peut enrayer l’engrenage fatal du mal, […] elle met un terme à cette nécessite terrible d’un mal qui appelle un autre mal en un processus sans fin. Elle déjoue le piège d’une condamnation définitive au mal, elle récuse le verdict sans merci jeté sur le pécheur et donne à penser le temps comme soustrait à la rigueur impitoyable de la seule fatalité. 9

Teshuva, here understood in its moral sense as repentance, does not eliminate evil and the irreparable remains. Chalier connects teshuva with the stories of Cain and Abel and the fall of Adam. In both stories, the evil done is irreparable, parallel to Theodor Adorno’s statement: »Das Negierte ist negativ, bis es verging«. 10 At the same time, a positive movement occurs, away from evil: teshuva, as repentance, breaks with the fatal nature of evil. Chalier distinguishes the fatal from the irreparable side of evil. Irreparable evil, on the one hand, relates to what was done in the past, with consequences in the present. This cannot be reversed. The fatal character of evil, on the other hand, as a »nécessite terrible d’un mal qui appelle un autre mal en un processus sans fin«, 11 a necessary process of retribution, relates to the future that can be reversed. Here again the root of teshuva, shuv (»turning«) emerges. Teshuva can overthrow the logic of retribution: by repentance, the »merciless verdict« (verdict sans merci) of the sinner can be re9

Catherine Chalier, La persévérance du mal, Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1987, 195. 10 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialektik, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1966, 160. 11 Chalier, La persévérance du mal, 195.

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jected. The sinner is no longer doomed to evil and his evil should not be retributed. Chalier likewise criticizes the Hegelian view of history which integrates evil into a necessity: La dialectique, grâce à son pouvoir d’assumer les contradictions du réel, de les subordonner à la rationalité d’un projet qui les intègre et qui les dépasse, justifie la nécessité du mal en tant que moyen de réalisation de ce règne des fins où l’Esprit et le réel se réconcilieront enfin. 12

When evil is incorporated into a Hegelian project of spiritualization, evil loses its tragedy because it is only interpreted as a necessary moment of negativity. Chalier wants to overthrow this logic by means of teshuva. Whereas Walter Benjamin’s »angel of history« looks to the past to discover the particular sorrow and to be driven forth to paradise, 13 teshuva looks to the past to find the particular, irreparable evil and then, in a positive movement, to break with the fatality of evil. 3. Conditions for Teshuva In order to speak of genuine teshuva, says Chalier, two difficulties must be solved: »[l]es deux plus grands obstacles à la techouva [sont]: la satisfaction de soi-même d’une part et de l’autre le désespoir qui fait oublier qu’une conversion reste à chaque instant possible«. 14 First, the first difficulty (complacency, satisfaction de soimême, contentement de soi) will be discussed, and later the second difficulty (despair, désespoir). Chalier radically opposes the closedness of complacency to the humility needed for teshuva: »[la techouva] nécessite toujours de savoir arracher le ferment (haretz) du cœur, d’en déchirer la superbe pour l’ouvrir sur la voie de l’hu12

Catherine Chalier, »L’utopie messianique«, in: Jean-Christophe Aeschlimann (ed.), Répondre d’Autrui: Emmanuel Levinas, Neuchâtel: À la Baconnière, 1989, 53–71, 55. 13 See Walter Benjamin, »Über den Begriff der Geschichte«, in: id., Gesammelte Schriften, eds. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser, vol. I/2, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1974, 691–704, 697 f. 14 Chalier, La persévérance du mal, 196.

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milité«. 15 It is about overthrowing the complacent self and humbly opening up one’s heart to the other. In order to understand this, an important theme of Rosenzweig’s Stern should be addressed. 3.1. Three »Nothings« In his Stern, Rosenzweig departs from three »nothings« as opposed to the great »All« of idealism. The totalitarian »philosophy of the All« understands death as a »nothing« and thus pretends to have no presuppositions. Rosenzweig unmasks this façade as a presupposition – the presupposition not to have any presuppositions – and takes the »something« of death as its starting point. Here, Rosenzweig goes back to the positive philosophy of the later Schelling, who, upon re-asking the question on the origin of things, invokes the Grund, an irrational ground of being that cannot be fully contemplated or assimilated. 16 Similarly, Rosenzweig places the non-identical origin at the center of his characterization of death as a »dunkle Voraussetzung«. 17 In the fear of death, which is irrefutable according to Rosenzweig, the »All« bursts open in three parts that are absolutely separate. Man, as the first element, appears, facing (his) death, in his completely irreducible individuality. Philosophy tried to assimilate man to the »All«, via ethics. Man, who appears, facing death, in his absolute individuality, cannot be integrated in such a system; man is meta-ethical. In other words, man, in his pre-reflective experience of himself, 18 is a nothing: he captures himself intuitively, but cannot think himself completely. Now that man is un15

Ibidem. Cf. Myriam Bienenstock, »Auf Schellings Spuren im Stern«, in: Martin Brasser (ed.), Rosenzweig als Leser. Kontextuelle Kommentare zum »Stern der Erlösung«, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 2004, 273–291, 286. 17 Stern, 5. Rosenzweig refers through his lexicon to Luria, who is at the base of Schelling’s dark Grund. Cf. Bienenstock, »Auf Schellings Spuren im Stern«, 285. 18 Stéphane Mosès uses the word pré-réflexif to point to the intuitive experience of the elements of the »All«. See Stéphane Mosès, Système et Révélation. La philosophie de Franz Rosenzweig, Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1982. 16

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masked as a »nothing«, the »All« shatters further into the nothings »world« and »God«. The world appears as an element within the pre-reflective experience of man’s existence, as a meta-logical given. It is not so much the thinking that provides the world insight, as idealism assumes, rather, the insight is immanent to the world. Here, too, the prefix »meta« indicates that it concerns a »nothing«: the world does have reality, but is given as an element in the prereflective experience of existence. From the element of the world, the third »nothing« now appears: God. God is meta-physical: God has a nature of his own that cannot be identified with the world, in contrast to the Hegelian project of equating the Spirit and the world. Concluding, »das Nichts des Wissens [ist] nicht mehr einfach, sondern dreifach«. 19 Knowing is not without presuppositions; on the contrary, there are three »nothings« that precede knowing. For Rosenzweig, these three irreducible elements form the starting point of philosophy. The step that follows upon the shattering of the »All« into three »nothings« is not a discourse according to a rationalist logic, but an explication of nothingness through two paths, one of affirmation (Bejahung, an affirmative »yes«) and one of denial (Verneinung, a negative »no«). Rosenzweig is here inspired by Schelling’s Potenzenlehre. 20 Furthermore, the differential calculus of the neoKantian Herman Cohen provided Rosenzweig the way to come from »nothing« to »something«. 21

19

Stern, 24. Rosenzweig disagrees with Schelling’s cyclical thinking. He presents affirmation as the real beginning and emphasizes that the unity of affirmation and negation is the process in which affirmation and negation come together. On the relationship Rosenzweig-Schelling, see inter alia Mosès, Système et Révélation, 38–41. 21 Cf. Stern, 23. 20

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3.2. Complacency Now, in order to understand Chalier’s quote on the conditions for teshuva, Rosenzweig’s understanding of man must be taken into account. In contrast to the negative psychology that takes the »nothing« of man as its end point (Rosenzweig refers to Kant, who describes the »Ich« as fundamentally unknowable), Rosenzweig takes the »nothing« of man as his starting point. 22 The human »yes« (Bejahung) affirms man as a singularity within infinity. This singularity takes its place in the character of man. There is also the negation (Verneinung) of the nothingness of man. Denying that man is nothing entails an infinity of possibilities; in short, it means freedom: man is free to will. Rosenzweig then asks to think the two paths, affirmation and negation together. Rosenzweig indicates by the word und (»and«) that this is not about an aufhebende synthesis, but a genuine being together. 23 Bringing together affirmation (singularity) »and« negation (free will), the overconfident, challenging (trotz) will to preserve oneself in the singularity emerges. In the end, the will takes the character as an object and thus the »self« is formed: »Das ›Selbst‹ ist das, was in diesem Übergriff des freien Willens auf die Eigenheit, als Und von Trotz und Charakter, entsteht«. 24 Furthermore, inasmuch as the will focuses on the uniqueness of the character, it is closed and focused on itself. 25 According to Rosenzweig, the three elements found through the paths of affirmation and negation are the elements as they appear in antiquity as a mythical, metaphysical God, a plastic, metalogical world, and a tragic, metaethical man. The three elements are fundamentally separated from each other in their elementality and cannot, as Hegel wanted, be reduced to one another. Man, in his complacent solitude, falls outside the world and thus also outside the ethical sys22

Cf. Mosès, Système et Révélation, 53. Rosenzweig is inspired by the correlation-thought of Hermann Cohen. Cf. Pierfrancesco Fiorato, Hartwig Wiedebach, »Hermann Cohen im Stern der Erlösung«, in: Brasser (ed.), Rosenzweig als Leser, 305–355. 24 Stern, 73. 25 Accordingly, the solitary self forms the counterpart of the personality. 23

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tem, he is meta-ethical. This out-of-world standing also makes man tragic: the closed man cannot step out of himself and is doomed to an incessant, solitary and silent affirmation of himself. It is this form of complacency that Chalier sees as a challenge for teshuva. She stated that complacency must be overthrown for true teshuva or repentance to take place. 26 When the closed human being accords his freedom of will only to his self, he is complacent and does not allow to be made part of an ethical system. In his complacency, man is not open to the world, where he finds the concrete other he possibly harmed, and in this way no repentance – no teshuva – can take place. A Talmud commentary by Levinas, »Rav et l’égorgeur«, illustrates this point. 27 Levinas tells how Rav visits the butcher, who hurt Rav, on the evening of Yom Kippur where one has to repent and ask forgiveness from the victim in order to get forgiveness from God. Rav wants to forgive the butcher in order to get divine forgiveness and thus visits him. However, the butcher remains indifferent and sends Rav away with the words »I have nothing in common with you«. Then a bone jumps out of the boned head and hits the butcher deadly in the throat. For Levinas, this story illustrates how man has to step out of his own complacency in order to forgive the other and only then receive divine forgiveness. 3.3. Overthrowing Complacency In the second part of Stern, Rosenzweig describes how the three elements break through their elementary closedness by confirming or denying their original affirmations and negations. This breakthrough, in turn, establishes relations between the former elements. Through the word und, the elements are related to each other, through an authentical opening up to the other within the temporary succession of the series of creation-revelation-redemp26

See Chalier, La persévérance du mal, 196. Emmanuel Levinas, Quatre lectures talmudiques, Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1968, 30 and 50 f. 27

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tion. 28 During the first transition from elementariness to existence (Creation), God »and« world enter into relationship with one another. God affirms himself, through his elementary power, as creator. This implies that the world appears as a creature in its »already being-there« (Dasein). Accordingly, creation is connected with the past: the creation is always »already there«. Only after creation, a relationship can be established between God »and« man; this happens within Revelation. The first movement of revelation is God’s denial of his elementary infinity in order to reveal himself. After all, something is needed after the act of creation so that God does not retreat into his elementary closedness. 29 God, to be factual, must be present at all times. This instantaneous presence is found in the love of the loving one: »›Gott liebt‹ ist reinste Gegenwart«. 30 The eternity of God’s love is situated in the present; it is an eternity only to be grasped in the instantaneous present. God’s love flows over man, who is the other side of revelation. In revelation, man alters his closed, complacent hybris into the »humility« (Demut) of the beloved one who feels loved. A fundamental heteronomy precedes man’s turning outward. Through God’s love, the elementary human closedness is broken; this movement does not originate in man. This point is emphasized by God’s commandment to love Him. Through the commandment, God positions Himself as an »I« (Ich): »Love me«, is the commandment. Only when man acknowledges God as a »You« (Du) can God himself become an »I«. 31 In response to the absolute commandment of God, man confesses his sins; teshuva takes place: in the face of the Absolute God, man necessarily ap28

Cf. Mosès, Système et Révélation, 144. Also in this case Rosenzweig is inspired by Herman Cohen’s correlation-thought. 29 Like Schelling, Rosenzweig departs here from tzimtzum: God chooses a contraction for the benefit of the finite world and man. 30 Stern, 183. 31 Cf. Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy’s motto: »respondeo etsi mutabor«. Similarly, Hermann Cohen writes: »erst das Du, die Entdeckung des Du mich selbst auch zum Bewußtsein meines Ich, [vermöchte] zur sittlichen Erkenntnis meines Ich zu bringen«. See Hermann Cohen, Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums, 2nd ed., ed. Bruno Strauß, Frankfurt a. M.: J. Kauffmann, 1929, 17.

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pears as imperfect, conscient of his own lack of absolution. Accordingly, he confirms the existence of God as the absolution which he does not possess, but of which he bears a trace. The root shuv is present: it is a »turning« away from the complacent self towards God. In the last phase, Redemption, a relationship is drawn between man »and« the world. In order for man to open up to the world, he must break with what keeps him in his closedness: his »character« (Charakter, Daimon). Rosenzweig discovers in neighborly love the movement that opens up man to the world. Man responds to divine love with neighborly love. This love encompasses the whole world in the fact that one’s neighbor is only a »standin«: it focuses on the one who is neighbor at that moment. 32 Chalier writes the following in this context: »La repentance s’identifie à ce moment où […] le cœur se brise […] par là elle ouvre [l’homme] […] à l’amour de l’autre que soi […]. Avant même de prouver notre liberté la repentance témoigne de la responsabilité qui la précède et la sollicite«. 33 Chalier states that repentance or teshuva, as man’s movement to the world, is a moment of love for the other than oneself. Here, too, radical heteronomy is present. Before man decides to repent for what he has done, he is touched by the suffering of the other, a suffering that is a Levinasian call to responsibility that precedes every freedom. 3.4. Overthrowing Despair According to Chalier, the second element that stands in the way of teshuva is despair: »le désespoir qui fait oublier qu’une conversion reste à chaque instant possible«. 34 Despair flows from the fatality of evil. To accomplish teshuva as real repentance, evil, as explained above, must be thought to be irreparable, but reversible. Chalier 32

The difference with Levinas should be noted here: for Levinas, the neighbor can never be a mere »stand-in«. 33 Chalier, La persévérance du mal, 199. 34 Ibid., 196.

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sees »love for the stranger« (amour de l’étranger) as an example of breaking through the fatalistic logic of retribution. 35 The fact that Chalier draws a line from teshuva to love for the stranger implies that repentance is a matter of love. As we saw above, teshuva takes place in the moment when the heart opens in »love for the other than itself« (amour de l’autre de soi). 36 Here, Rosenzweig’s distinction between a »love-act« (Liebestat) and a »purpose-act« (Zwecktat) is clarifying. 37 Rosenzweig distinguishes the love-act from the purpose-act in the fact that the former is blind, as opposed to the purpose-act that goes straight for its goal. In this way, neighborly love emerges: the blind love gropes about and blindly finds the neighbor. Love of the neighbor is a fundamental part of the redemptive relationship between man »and« the world. Responding to the eternal love of God in the continuing present by neighborly love, man contributes to redemption, to the coming of the Kingdom. The act of love, however, is blind, and can thus impossibly record redemption in an object or at a fixed time. The fact that this act of love is not a calculating event shows that the other should not be seen as a »shortcut« to God’s redeeming action. In this way one could say that teshuva satisfies the second formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative: man is not seen as a mere means in function of the end, namely God’s redeeming act. Instead, man expresses repentance towards the other from the experience of love for the other than himself. Furthermore, that teshuva is situated in the middle of redemption, links teshuva to the »not yet« of the future. This future is experienced in the anticipation in the present. The best expression of this anticipation is the messianic impatience. 38 The Jewish people are aware of the radical alterity of the future Kingdom of God, but at the same time they experience this future as a longing for ultimate redemption during their redemptive acts and within the 35 36 37 38

Ibid., 201. Ibid., 199. Stern, 299. Cf. Mosès, Système et Révélation, 140.

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liturgy. The anticipation concerns the radically new of the future moment that might just as well take place tomorrow. 39 In order to experience this future moment, on the one hand man has to wait patiently by beholding it as a miracle yet to come. On the other hand, man can experience the Kingdom in messianic impatience, as an anticipation of what is yet to come. Accordingly, the future is characterized by the tension between waiting and looking forward, a tension that Rosenzweig expresses as »hope« (Hoffnung). For Rosenzweig, the anticipatory looking forward contains a specific relationship to time: in anticipation, the eternity of the Kingdom is present in its impatience. Anticipation thus involves impatiently waiting for an eruption of the radically new. This anticipation involves a rupture with the organic, homogeneous course of time and asks man to make way for eternity through his redemptive action. Teshuva is one of those forms of human redemptive intervention in the world. The line between the love for the stranger and teshuva emphasizes another important aspect of teshuva. This love, Chalier argues, springs from the memory within the Jewish people that they themselves were once strangers to others during slavery in Egypt. This very memory is a rediscovery of the call to holiness. Both Rosenzweig and Chalier characterize the Jewish people as a »holy people« (heiliges Volk, or peuple sainte). Jewish holiness can be traced back to two events: on the one hand the divine promise to Abraham of his people, and on the other hand the election of this people to receive God’s word, the Torah. The Jewish people thus have a unique mode of existence: their existence is an answer to the »Promise« (Promesse) and to the »Word« (Parole) of God. 40 On this point, the Talmud tells a remarkable story about Moses’ reception of the Torah. Rav Abdimi bar Chama bar Chassa is said to have told that when God gave the Law to Moses on Mount Sinai, He placed the mountain like a jar above the people. Then God 39

»Ewigkeit ist nicht eine sehr lange Zeit, sondern ein Morgen, das ebensogut Heute sein könnte« (Stern, 250). 40 Cf. Catherine Chalier, Pensées de l’éternité. Spinoza, Rosenzweig, Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1993, 124 f.

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said: »If you accept the Torah, all the better; if not, it will be your tomb«. 41 When the Jewish people do and listen to the Torah they will live. If not, the mountain will become a closed tomb. The carrying out of the Torah is an ethical task unable to avoid. The guidelines of the Torah (Rosenzweig translates the word as Weisung) are at the same time the only thing: the Jewish people have no land, no language and no law. Firstly, the Jewish people carry with them the exile as an event in history, but also as their mode of being. This means that Judaism is landless, their land is always a holy land, a land of desire and of promise. Secondly, the language has been taken away from the Jewish people. The Jewish people lost their own language and now speak the language of their »guest-land«: because of the diaspora, Hebrew is no longer a spoken, but a holy language. Finally, the Jewish law also differs from that of the nations. The Jewish people find their holy law in the Torah. Unlike the nations who make their laws by means of revolutions, the law of the Torah is already given and is experienced as an always near memory. In this threefold way the Jewish people are outside the history of the world, which constitutes their holiness. The Jewish people, as holy people, must be constantly aware that their mode of existence is the one of an answer to the word of God. For the Jewish people to be able to answer to God, the proper name is crucial. It is through the receptivity of the proper name that man can receive the commandment of divine love, to which man will respond by neighborly love. 42 To be able to respond to God’s word constitutes the Jewish election and is similar to the breakthrough of complacency, where man acknowledges God as »You«. In the receptivity of one’s own name, God arises as a »You«; only after this decisive moment of opening can a true dialogue take place. Teshuva, as an element of neighborly love, is exemplary for the responsivity of the Jewish people. Not only is it a response to God, in the recognition of one’s own sin in contrast 41

Mishnah Shabbat, 88a. See also Levinas, Quatre lectures talmudiques, 67 and 80–83. 42 Cf. Stern, 196.

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to the Perfect God, but it is also a response to the other who has been hurt and an attempt to restore the irreparable but non-fatal evil committed. Conclusion Through a re-reading of Rosenzweig’s Stern, through the lens of teshuva, the importance of anticipatory acts in the present as an impatient awaiting of the redemption is underlined. Teshuva, understood as »return«, indicates that the Jewish people can return to the Parole and the Promesse that have been given to them. Returning in this sense, the Jewish people opens up to God, recognizing God as »You«. In this first opening up to God, complacency, as the first challenge to teshuva, is overcome. When the Jewish people overcome the self-sufficient complacency, they can answer the godly command »Love me«. Doing this, teshuva appears on the one hand as a response to God’s love, and on the other hand as amour de l’étranger stemming from this responsive repentance. Accordingly, teshuva appears as a Liebestat, which means that teshuva is not focused on accomplishing a well-set goal. Rather, it focuses on the other as the neighbor and opposes despair: a totalitarian vision of history in which evil is fatalistic and (stemming from the fatalistic understanding of evil) the future is predetermined. Teshuva, on the contrary, participates in the messianic anticipation which, by acts of redemption in the present in response to the omnipresent love of God, anticipates and prepares the future redemption, without determining it as would be the case with a Zwecktat. In doing so, teshuva radically breaks with the notion of evil as fatalistic, while acknowledging the irreversible character of evil.

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Redemption and the Commandment to Love the Neighbour. Rosenzweig’s Critique to Kantian Ethics »Der philosophierende Jude fühlt sich wie heimatlich angehaucht auf dem Boden Kants« (Hermann Cohen, Innere Beziehungen der Kantischen Philosophie zum Judentum)

1. Rosenzweig and Kant »A Jew who works in philosophy feels at home in the world of Kant’s thought«: an essay, published in 1993, by Irene Kajon on Franz Rosenzweig’s interpretation of Kant begins with this famous quotation by Hermann Cohen. Kajon’s text, contained in an important volume of Archivio di Filosofia dedicated to the history of Jewish philosophy, describes Rosenzweig’s relation to Kant in terms of an »elective affinity«. 1 Kajon analyses the specific character of Rosenzweig’s interpretation of Kant in the light of the readings of Kant that were more common at that time. After that, she examines the way Kant contributed to define Rosenzweig’s idea of Jewish philosophy. In the third part, finally, Kajon evaluates the link between a philosophy, such as Kant’s, radically based on the autonomy of human capacities, and the structural openness to revelation which, on the other hand, distinguishes the thought of Rosenzweig, and Jewish thinking in general. The three elements are closely connected to each other: Rosenzweig’s reading of Kant is certainly original, both with regard to Kantian interpretation in

1

Cf. Irene Kajon, »Storia della filosofia e filosofia ebraica. L’interpretazione di Kant in Franz Rosenzweig«, Archivio di Filosofia 61 (1993), no. 1–3, 305–338.

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general and in regard to the question of the link – historical and theoretical – between Kant and Judaism. As is well-known, Kant’s judgement on Judaism is highly controversial, and has repeatedly been a subject of dispute. On the one hand, there are many passages in the published works where Kant expresses very negative opinions of Jews, their culture and their religion. Some of those passages are often surprising for their rudeness and banality. It is really incomprehensible how the standard bearer of the enlightenment was able to offer such prejudices. 2 On the other hand, Kant had very good personal relationships with prominent Jews of his time – as his correspondence testifies – with figures such as Moses Mendelssohn, who was highly esteemed by Kant; or like Marcus Herz, who was chosen as »respondent« of Kant’s dissertation. Moreover, Kant’s thinking has been considered by highly reputed Jewish thinkers to be very close to the Jewish spirit and to some extent even as a philosophical expression of Judaism: Saul Ascher, for example, a contemporary disciple of Kant, who found critical philosophy particularly convenient for Judaism. Very recently, Steven Schwarzschild called Kant even a »Jewish non-Jew«. 3 Julius Guttmann was one of the first who explicitly tried to analyse the contradictory, surprising and paradoxical relationship between Kant und das Judentum. 4 This somehow irresolvable matter has gained attention also in recent debate. In her recent book on Heidegger and the Jews, Donatella Di Cesare traces back in German classical philosophy and in Kant the roots of what she calls »metaphysical antisemitism«, a way of thinking proper to the western philosophical tradition – we may say »from Ionia to Jena« – that implicitly or explicitly has been totalitarian in its theoretical 2

Cf. e. g. Immanuel Kant, Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, AA VII, 205 f. Steven Schwarzschild, The Pursuit of the Ideal, ed. Menachem Kellner, Albany: SUNY Press, 1990, 4. Cf. also Silvia Marzano, L’eredità di Kant e la linea ebraica, Milano-Udine: Mimesis, 2014. 4 Cf. Julius Guttmann, »Kant und das Judentum«, in: Nathan Porges, Joseph Bechor Schor, ein nordfranzösischer Bibelerklärer des XII. Jahrhunderts, Leipzig: Fock, 1908, 41–61. 3

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presuppositions. 5 For what concerns transcendental philosophy, already Joshua Halberstam describes a path From Kant to Auschwitz, underlining the fact that the idea of duty for the sake of duty led to the possibility of blind obedience. 6 On the contrary, in 2001, Bettina Stangneth wrote a long and detailed essay on Antisemitische und antijudaistische Motive bei Immanuel Kant, considering in a very attentive and moderate way all possible aspects of the question. Stangneth contextualizes the notions of antisemitism and anti-Judaism in the period, and underlines especially the strictly religious critique made by Kant. 7 In 2008 Daniela Tafani also wrote in the Italian review Studi Kantiani a very well-informed essay, considering especially the context and the milieu of Prussia at the end of the eighteenth century, where Kant’s judgements on Judaism must unavoidably be included. 8 Rosenzweig can be placed in a line inaugurated by Hermann Cohen and followed – in many respects – by Emmanuel Levinas: according to this interpretation Kant, theoretician of the impossibility of a totalising manner of thinking, the defender of human finitude, the protagonist of the primacy of ethics over speculative reason, is a philosopher who has much in sympathy with fundamental traits of Jewish thinking. In this line of interpretation, it is significant that Rosenzweig is also felt to be very close to Martin Heidegger – as I have been able to show in a contribution I made at the recent Rome conference of the Internationale Rosenzweig-

5

Cf. Donatella Di Cesare, Heidegger e gli ebrei, Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 2014. 6 Cf. Joshua Halberstam, »From Kant to Auschwitz«, Social Theory and Practice 14 (1988), no. 1, 41–54. 7 Cf. Bettina Stangneth, »Antisemitische und antijudaistische Motive bei Immanuel Kant? Tatsachen, Meinungen, Ursachen«, in: Horst Gronke, Thomas Meyer, Barbara Neißer (eds.), Antisemitismus bei Kant und anderen Denkern der Aufklärung. Prämierte Schriften des wissenschaftlichen Preisausschreibens »Antisemitische und antijudaistische Motive bei Denkern der Aufklärung«, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2001, 11–124. Cf. also Susan Meld-Shell, »Kant and the Jewish Question«, Hebraic Political Studies 2 (2007), no. 1, 101–136. 8 Cf. Daniela Tafani, »Religione e diritti civili. La questione ebraica«, Studi Kantiani 21 (2008), 33–58.

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Gesellschaft. 9 On these aspects – and especially on the affinity between Rosenzweig and Kant as a theoretician of »finite freedom« – Irene Kajon herself also reflected in the text cited at the start of this contribution. In the first part of her study, Kajon draws attention to how Rosenzweig considered Kant, alongside Schelling, to be one of his two »guardian angels«. The defence of existence and its irreducibility to thought, and therefore the critique of the identity between thought and being, are a decisive element that permits Rosenzweig to value Kant as a thinker who refutes rationalism and the totalising and absolutizing pretences of philosophy. But Kant does not stop there. Thanks to the fact of reason’s being constituted by freedom, he also shows the specific nature of the »ego« and the immediacy of self-awareness that everyone has. Kant is the philosopher of freedom, but of a freedom that is tied to the concrete conditions of the world, and so of a finite freedom. Such finite freedom is contemporaneously open to the possibility of attaining metaphysical ideas and even to a theological plane, without its being the case that the idea of God found or be confounded with the ideas of the soul or the world. In this way, for the Rosenzweig of The Star of Redemption, Kant is a philosopher who, from his critique of rational metaphysics, by means of selfawareness as spontaneity of an individual’s existence, arrives at ethics as a body of teaching independent of any preceding consideration about being, and finally in its turn at metaphysics. 10

Kajon’s text carries on with an analysis of interpretations of Kant contemporary with The Star of Redemption which were analysed and discussed by Rosenzweig in his work; then she goes on to show how the critique of philosophy’s pretensions to embrace the absolute, and existence as a given datum are decisive characteristics for Rosenzweig’s concept of Jewish philosophy.

9

Cf. Francesco Valerio Tommasi, »Il corpo come ›Und‹. Cohen, Heidegger e lo ›scambio di fronti‹ rosenzweighiano«, Archivio di Filosofia 86 (2018), no. 1, 183– 189. 10 Cf. Kajon, »Storia della filosofia e filosofia ebraica«, 314.

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2. Rosenzweig and the Categorical Imperative Now, in my opinion, these aspects can be developed on the basis of a specific element in Rosenzweig’s reading of Kant, namely the question of the categorical imperative. Indeed, in the pages of the third book of the second part of The Star of Redemption, that are devoted to the idea of redemption, Rosenzweig introduces a critique to Kantian ethics and to his formalistic character. Rosenzweig writes: Moral laws do not seek only to be rooted in freedom – as love toward the neighbor also wants it – they actually do not want to recognize any presupposition other than freedom. This is the famous requirement of »autonomy«. The natural consequence of this requirement is that the laws destined to determine this act lose all content, for any content would exert a power which would ruin the autonomy; one cannot will »something« and yet will only »in general« […]. In the moral domain, everything is uncertain; all things considered, everything can be moral, but nothing is so with any certainty. 11

To avoid ambiguity and equivocity, ethics must have a content. This content is love for the neighbour. In contrast to moral law which is necessarily purely formal, and hence not only ambivalent, but infinitely ambiguous as regards content, the commandment of love is clear and unambiguous in its content, and for this love which springs from the oriented freedom of character, it needs a presupposition that is situated beyond freedom. 12

Love of neighbour is unequivocal, but at the same time it represents again a universal principle. The neighbour is someone, but he or she could be anyone. Love of neighbour is a commandment, but it commands love. All these paradoxes are grounded in the peculiar structure of the synthesis, that Rosenzweig describes a few pages after: the »and« (und ) is the form of mediation that 11

Franz Rosenzweig, Der Stern der Erlösung, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1988 (hereafter: Stern), 239 / The Star of Redemption, transl. Barbara E. Galli, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005 (hereafter: Star), 230. 12 Stern, 239 / Star, 230 f.

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can keep together universality and particularity, formality and materiality. The »and« takes the form of the matrix sentence »God is good«, which allows the imperative »Love thy neighbour« to be grounded. Freedom still has its full autonomy, but this autonomy is grounded elsewhere. »God is good« is the originative source of all other ethical judgements. This »and« of redemption must reunite the root words of Creation and Revelation, that-whichwas-only-predicate, the »good!« with that-which-was-only-subject, the divine I. 13

The originative matrix proposition of redemption is therefore the »I am good« of God, which repeated by the world and by human beings obviously becomes, »He, God, is good«. This is the only sentence that is true, always and in all circumstances, uttered by whoever. If, for example, a parrot were to utter a mathematical truth, it would have no sense on its mouth, in contrast to the foundational matrix sentence which is full of meaning even if it spoken by an animal. An analysis of this specific critique allows therefore a deeper understanding of Rosenzweig’s general reading of Kant: Rosenzweig shares what he sees as two Kantian theoretical moves: ethics should be detached from metaphysics. But ethics is also able, for its part, to ground a new metaphysics, rooted in the idea of man as a finite being. Rosenzweig’s critique can be seen, above all, as one that focuses on the decisive point in Kantian moral philosophy: its formalism. From Hegel to Husserl, the presumed emptiness of the categorical imperative has often been subject to objection. However, an interpretation of Kant is possible that permits him to be brought closer to Rosenzweig, even on this point of apparent distance and contrast. It is actually possible to read the Kantian categorical imperative as grounded on the principle of intersubjectivity. This intersubjectivity would consequently allow love of neighbour to be taken as an adequate formulation of the categorical imperative.

13

Stern, 257 / Star, 248.

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Let us consider the question in detail. Above all we should note that between the empty formalism of the law and the specific content of concrete actions there are, according to Kant, levels of mediation. It is possible in fact to distinguish between perfect and imperfect duties, or, following the terminology proposed by Onora O’Neill, between contradiction in conception and contradiction in the will. 14 Not every maxim – as Hans Kelsen had previously argued – can be raised to the level of law. It is for example clear that for Kant the prohibition of suicide and the prohibition of lying were perfect duties, even though they have an explicit material content and therefore by commanding something concrete reach the level of empty formality and purity required by the moral law. It actually seems that these commands cannot envisage any kind of exception. In fact, the Kantian foundation which seems to guarantee the move from empty formality of the law to concrete contents seems to be respect of human dignity, and so of a human being’s rational and moral nature. The denial of such nature implies a self-contradiction. There are consequently ends, or contents, that are perfect, or which are immediately coincident with a duty. Following what Kant says in the Metaphysics of Morals, the ends that are at the same time also duties are the perfection of oneself and the happiness of another person. On this basis the further subdivision between duties to oneself and duties towards others is grounded. But now it is necessary to observe that in the Metaphysics of Morals the technical way in which self-contradiction is defined as a criterion for deriving an end as a duty as well, is in fact based on what Kant considers a real and true duplicity in human nature: according to Kant, the human being divides into homo noumenon and homo phaenomenon. This division lies at the base of all duties to oneself, as is shown by the first paragraphs of the Tugendlehre (Doctrine of Virtues). But this idea of the distinction between 14

Cf. Onora O’Neill, »Consistency in Action«, in: Nelson T. Potter, Mark Timmons (eds.), Morality and Universality. Essays on Ethical Universalizability, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1985, 159–186 (esp. 174–180); id., »Universal Laws and Endsin-Themselves«, The Monist 72 (1989), no. 3, 341–361 (esp. 347 f.).

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homo noumenon and homo phaenomenon actually grounds the very idea of duty überhaupt already in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and then in the Critique of Practical Reason. In human beings the law takes the form of an imperative which should subdue human inclinations. Human beings are not animals, nor God; and in fact neither animals nor God have the possibility of lying, or of committing suicide; animals spontaneously follow their nature which is uniquely phenomenal and God spontaneously follows his or her nature which is uniquely rational. A contradiction can be verified only in the case of a separation. Reason commands with its »Thou shalt«, which paradoxically seems to root autonomy completely outside a person’s own power. The voice of conscience seems to be that of a »Thou«, of another. Human beings are possessed of a moral reason rather than possess one themselves. So, on the basis of the individual’s two-fold nature, indeed on the basis of the real and actual presence of two homines in the same individual, it seems possible to assert that all duties, including duties to oneself are always already intersubjective duties. Duties to oneself also seem to be duties to another. More than that: this alterity is not only figurative or metaphorical but must necessarily be understood as a concrete alterity as well. If I were alone in the world – if there were no one else in the world besides me, not even God – could I lie or commit suicide? If I did not have to answer to anyone else for my actions, could I do so? The only way of saying »no« is, precisely, to presuppose an »other« within me. But in regard to this other, how can the criterion of universalizability be thought? If moral reason implies immediately and even coincides with universal validity, it seems immediately to imply a real and concrete intersubjectivity. The categorical imperative is not thinkable without the presence of others. The moment of moral objectivity is in fact always and already a moment of inter-subjectivity. More than that: the noumenal part of human being is reason. But pure reason has a moral nature. It immediately coincides with the law, which is defined as Faktum der Vernunft. Morality, accordingly, is rationality itself, and the dignity of being consists in 227

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this noumenal nature on which moral ends can consequently be based. This is where the homo noumenon resides. But this reason is a reason that is characterised only by universality. The plurality of subjects internal to the individual – or the distinction between homo noumenon and homo phaenomenon – seems secondary and derived as a result in relation to the plurality of real subjects external to oneself. The deeper self-contradiction in moral reason is therefore constituted by the attempt to assert solipsism of human nature. Following Kant beyond Kant himself, one can therefore assert that, on a logical level and in principle, commandments towards others seem necessarily to precede commandments towards oneself. This assertion seems to me fully to reflect the spirit and premises of Kantian moral philosophy. This approach seems to me to be capable – at least in principle – of perhaps contributing to a resolution of certain difficulties that have characterised Kantian ethics, and over which interpreters have clashed – for example the possible conflict between the perfect duty always to speak the truth and the possible requirement of protecting and hiding an innocent who is being unjustly pursued. Rather than introduce a critique of formalism, and a reassertion of the material and substantive aspect of ethics, the Rosenzweig’s analysis seems to me to be open to an interpretation in this direction: it deepens a trait already present in Kantianism and which can be asserted on the basis of Kant’s own philosophy. It is not about reasserting the material aspect against the formal aspect of ethics. Rather it is to observe that the formal aspect is not grounded on an empty notion of freedom but on the plurality of subjects. Duties towards others precede duties towards oneself. In this way it is also possible to take the closeness of Kant to the principles of Jewish philosophy still further in the interpretative line of Cohen-Rosenzweig-Levinas, which I mentioned at the start, referring also to the article of Kajon. Kantian freedom is a finite freedom because it is a freedom for others. Kantian autonomy can then be understood – paradoxically – as a radical heteronomy, because the command of reason is an unconditional command. The »ego« that must decide with its freedom how to 228

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act does not find itself before an infinite range of equivalent possibilities. Nor does it find itself before an abstract and empty law. The »ego« finds itself before a concrete face – that of its neighbour. And perhaps this concrete face appeals immediately to goodness as an originary source, as a matrix.

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Das All ist nur virtuell: Paganism, Fiction, and the Concepts of Redemption, Truth, and God in Der Stern der Erlösung One of the more well-known arguments in Rosenzweig’s Der Stern der Erlösung (henceforth: Stern) is the insistence that redemption belongs exclusively to Judaism in full, and Christianity in part. In the following, I explicate Rosenzweig’s comments regarding the viability of other religions, specifically paganism, the importance of subjectivity in Part I of Stern and in Das neue Denken, 1 the appeal to the ever elusive full truth of God, and in Part III of Stern the distinction between the truth and God. My goal is twofold. First, I explicate the theological and philosophical stakes of his concept of Nichts in Part I in relation to the separation between the notions of redemption, truth, and God in Part III of Stern, illustrating how Rosenzweig’s critique of totalising philosophy informs his positive, normative, claims regarding liturgical communities. Following Elliot Wolfson’s reading of Rosenzweig, I highlight how the coincidence of truth and untruth – wholeness and partiality – are central to both his specific claims regarding the two main liturgical communities vis-à-vis redemption, and the method of writing and thinking which characterises this neues Denken. 2 1

Franz Rosenzweig, »Das neue Denken. Einige nachträgliche Bemerkungen zum ›Stern der Erlösung‹«, in: id., Zweistromland. Kleinere Schriften zu Glauben und Denken (Der Mensch und sein Werk. Gesammelte Schriften, III), eds. Reinhold and Annemarie Mayer, Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984 (hereafter: GS III), 153 f. 2 I owe the core of my argument to Elliot R. Wolfson who, in a conversation regarding the gestural and fictitious character of Part I of Stern, suggested that the entirety of the text be read in this way, and whose own work has focused upon the coincidence of identity and relation, and truth and untruth in Rosenzweig. I

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Finally, I gesture toward the pluralistic possibilities for comparative theology of Rosenzweig’s notion of redemption beyond the confines of Judaism and Christianity. The fact that the confinement of redemption to two ways of Judaism and Christianity appears alongside the chastening of any temptation to hypostatise either way into the only way, calls the focus of the reader back to the incomprehensibility of the ultimate perspective, to the impossibility of total objectivity, and the fictive character of every theological positing, liturgical act, and politics. In this sense, Rosenzweig’s concept of redemption is a manifestation of the subjectivity that is constitutive of every theo-poetics and, perhaps, every politic – a subjectivity that must be in order to say anything, but which can, according to Rosenzweig’s own terms, be, without being das All. Insofar as this is the case, I am affirming Rosenzweig’s project, despite his protestations to the contrary, as apophatic. I argue that if we make his historical claims concerning redemptive communities our point of departure, we may miss both the underlying pluralistic impulse of Rosenzweig’s thinking as a whole, as well as gloss over the important distinction between redemption and truth and the fundamental truthfulness of fiction, which seems to underpin Rosenzweig’s entire mode of thinking. 1. Das Nichts and das Virtuelle I draw attention now to Rosenzweig’s concept of Nichts within the context of his discussion of the affirmation and the negation, the triad which is constitutive of the three Ur-phenomena of Part I of Stern. Rosenzweig describes his use of das Nichts as, »a methodological Hilfsbegriff«, 3 a move meant to chasten the absolute language of traditional metaphysical renderings of das Nichts as an ontological Urpunkt, a chastening function which, as I dehope my comments regarding pluralism and paganism have shed light upon one particular possibility for this way of reading Rosenzweig’s texts. 3 Rosenzweig, »Das neue Denken«, GS III, 142.

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monstrate below, underpins too the more concrete claims made about the relation between liturgical communities, redemption, truth and God in Part III. Here I follow Luca Bertolino’s position that Rosenzweig’s initial thematization of das Nichts functions as the »common thread« running throughout the subsequent parts of the text. 4 Bertolino cites a passage from Das neue Denken, a passage which precedes Rosenzweig’s larger explication of the aim of Part I of Stern, in which Rosenzweig makes clear that the initial sense of the concept of Nichts appears first in the end of Part I, whereas its final sense appears in the end of the end of the whole work. 5 As Bernhard Casper has noted in his essay »Transzendentale Phänomenalität und ereignetes Ereignis«, one may characterise Part I of Stern as a »phenomenological approach« 6 with regard to the three elements and by extension, I argue, das Nichts. This is the case insofar as, with regard to Rosenzweig’s rendering of the elements of reality, »all context of being is turned off […] in such a manner [that] there persists nothing other than the pure consciousness of the Ur-phenomenon of God, the Ur-phenomenon of the world, and finally the pure consciousness of the Ur-phenomenon of humanity«. 7 Indeed, Rosenzweig says as much regarding Part I in Das neue Denken. Describing the approach of »all earlier philosophy«, in which all of reality is said to be primarily cosmological, theological, or anthropological at bottom, Rosenzweig writes, »[t]hat somebody generally did not want to say: everything ›is‹…, did not [even] occur to these philosophers«. 8 Rosenzweig elaborates on this critique, noting that it is the drive to essentially define 4

Luca Bertolino, »›Schöpfung aus Nichts‹ in Franz Rosenzweigs Stern der Erlösung«, Jewish Studies Quarterly 13 (2006), no. 3, 247–264. 5 Cf. Rosenzweig, »Das neue Denken«, GS III, 142; Bertolino, »›Schöpfung aus Nichts‹ in Franz Rosenzweigs Stern der Erlösung«, 247. 6 Bernhard Casper, »Transzendentale Phänomenalität und ereignetes Ereignis«, in: Franz Rosenzweig, Der Stern der Erlösung, Freiburg: Universitätsbibliothek, 2002, vii (https://freidok.uni-freiburg.de/data/310, accessed November 15, 2020). 7 Ibid., vii f. 8 Rosenzweig, »Das neue Denken«, GS III, 143.

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things, which obfuscates the primarily living and immediate character of encounter and knowledge. 9 By way of contrast, the approach of Part I of Stern can be summarized in the following statement from Das neue Denken. »Experience discovers in the human, as far as it goes, always again only what is human, in the world only what is worldly, in God only the divine«. 10 As Casper points out, and Rosenzweig reinforces in the transition to Part II, Part I functions as a suspension of the life-world, and yields only what is cognizable in abstraction from the context of lived reality – a point again that invites comparisons to phenomenology. 11 Rosenzweig, maintaining the narrative structure of his argument, appears to support just such a reading when, after describing the tautological endpoint of abstract speculation vis-à-vis the three elements in Das neue Denken, he only gestures toward the alternative figuring of each element in living relation, pulling back just short of any definitive claims beyond the scope of the limits he has already put in place in Part I. It is not yet time, Rosenzweig tells his reader, to divulge these newly construed definitions. One must first sit with the critique of cognition. 12 The point, then, is not to undercut the importance of the lifeworld, a point made clear with Rosenzweig’s assertion that one does not encounter abstract elements of reality in the first instance, but rather, »a living movement, an electric circuit, in which these elements swim«. 13 The abstract thinking in which Rosenzweig is engaged in Part I functions to overturn the overreaching of the aforementioned threefold reduction of what-is to 9

See ibid., 145. Ibid., 144. 11 Cf. Bertolino, »›Schöpfung aus Nichts‹ in Franz Rosenzweigs Stern der Erlösung«, 248. Regarding the resonance of Rosenzweig’s critique of die Philosophie des All to phenomenology, Bertolino cites from Bernhard Casper’s »Sein und Offenbarung, Zum achtzigsten Geburtstag Frans Rosenzweigs«, Philosophisches Jahrbuch 74 (1967), no. 2, 315–317. 12 See Rosenzweig, »Das neue Denken«, GS III, 145. 13 Franz Rosenzweig, Der Stern der Erlösung, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1988 (hereafter: Stern), 91. 10

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either God, world, or human by foreclosing any confounding of the elements into one another, 14 and by prohibiting any privileging of one over the other insofar these elements are only »concepts«. 15 In this way, Rosenzweig illustrates that this mode of philosophical inquiry can only ever end in »tautological answers«, 16 rather than absolute truths. By so chastening the philosophical discourse, Rosenzweig lays the foundation for the subsequent turn to the concrétude of human being in Part II, and the specific treatment of time, liturgical communities, and redemption in Part III. This is the case insofar as he delimits up front any venturing beyond the confines of what is knowable within the parameters of living itself. He writes: »We know of everything equally much and equally less. Namely, everything and nothing. We know most meaningfully […] with the vivid knowledge of experience, how God, human, and world are taken in themselves«. 17 The notion of »grounding« by which traditional thinking functions, no longer applies if by this notion one intends to rank points of access to the truth in a hierarchical fashion. There is only now for each concept a kind of equivocity of being-in-itself of each element vis-à-vis the others – vis-à-vis the difference of relation itself. This statement must be qualified of course, in that there is no fourth term called »being« which is a stake in this formulation, insofar as each concept is both immanent and transcendent to itself, 18 accessible only via relation, as Part II and Part III demonstrate. The aforementioned comments by Rosenzweig regarding philosophy’s obsession with what something »really is«, clearly par14

Cf. Rosenzweig, »Das neue Denken«, GS III, 144. Ibid., 145. 16 Ibidem. 17 Ibidem. 18 See ibid., 144: »Jede[s] [der Elemente] ist selbst ›Wesen‹, jede[s] selbst Substanz mit dem ganzen metaphysischen Schwergewicht dieses Ausdrucks«. I am reminded of the fact and grateful to an audience member at the 2019 Internationale Rosenzweig Gesellschaft conference after my presentation for making a conceptual connection between Rosenzweig’s refusal to hypostatize being and the fact that Hebrew does not have a verb for being, though to be is rendered ‫לִהְיוֹת‬. 15

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ticipate in what Emmanuel Levinas describes as a Kierkegaardian disavowal of totality via anguish, and in so doing anticipate similar critiques of the philosophical and theological obsessions with totality in the traditional way of thinking. 19 Turning away from this obsession must mean upholding distinction and relation in contradistinction to the false and totalising demarcation between being as a quantitative ground with regard to beings. As Wolfson points out in relation to these issues and the problems associated with apophatic thinking, what we are left with is a notion of identity as difference, of identity as the repetition of heterogeneity. 20 The triadic construction of each element – that is, the interplay between the Yes, the No, and the nothing of each element – leads to the neutralisation of the question concerning transcendence and immanence with regard to the sheerly conceptual status of the elements. The affirmative Yes indexes the essence of each element, the negation indexes each element’s dynamism. 21 In this sense, the Yes and the No name the constitutive interplay between the identity and non-identity of each element, this interplay being mediated, though crucially never synthesized and thereby arrested, by what Rosenzweig identifies as das Nichts – the nothing. The nothing is, as with the Yes and the No, plural, specific to each element, just as, Rosenzweig tells his reader in the opening pages of Stern, the nothing of death is particular to each and every human being – a seemingly infinite multiplicity of nothings then, rather than the singular grounding nothing of all totalising negative theological thinking. 22 19

Cf. Emmanuel Levinas, »Préface«, in: Stéphane Mosès, Système et Révélation. La philosophie de Franz Rosenzweig, Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1982, 8. In his preface to Mosès’ text, Levinas writes: »Bien avant Heidegger, Rosenzweig reprend les thèmes kierkegaardiens de l’angoisse«, and continues by noting how the resulting isolation of each element constitutes »la ›vérité‹ du paganisme«. 20 Cf. Eliot R. Wolfson, Giving Beyond the Gift. Apophasis and Overcoming Theomania, New York: Fordham University Press, 2014, 12. 21 Cf. Lucas S. Wright, »Difference Through the Prism of the Same: Apophasis and Negative Dialectic in Rosenzweig and Adorno«, in: Ingolf U. Dalferth, Marlene A. Block (eds.), The Meaning and Power of Negativity, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, forthcoming. 22 Cf. Stern, 5.

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For totalising philosophies, the singularity of the nothing, the very notion of nothingness reified into singularity itself, reduces the reality of the nothing to just that, nothing. There is no real meaning, no possible reckoning with nothingness at this level of thinking, insofar as this singular nothing allows one to seek refuge from the nothingness of oneself by way of an abstract, absolute, concept. To put the matter differently, to hold onto the singular nothing as the most indefinite ontologically grounding point is not to tarry with one’s contingency, but rather, to deny one’s contingency – that is, the fact of having and being determined by a presupposition. 23 For Rosenzweig, the relative plurality of the nothing – relative to everyone – forces each person to tarry with the most basic presupposition of all thought and life – namely, the fact of death, which belies all pretence to absolute self-assurance and knowledge. 24 The reader is confronted by the correlation between the subjective, or relational, mode of access to reality, and the objective presupposition of all subjects – death. The nothing is now cognizable within the parameters of one’s specific being-here, as only ever »virtual«, and only ever a marking with which one must reckon, but which, contrary – allegedly – to the »dark ground« of Eckhart, Böhme, and Schelling, one is never able to turn into a metaphysical absolute. 25 »It [the nothing] would be before every beginning – if it were to be – but it is not. It is only the virtual location for the beginning of our knowledge«.26 In this sense, the matter is not dissimilar to Theodor Adorno’s conception of the »preponderance of the object«, insofar as the dialectical interplay between one’s identity and one’s unconscious – objective – non23 See ibidem: »Indem aber die Philosophie die dunkle Voraussetzung alles Lebens leugnet, indem sie nämlich den Tod nicht für Etwas gelten läßt, sondern ihn zum Nichts macht, erregt sie für sich selbst den Schein der Voraussetzungslosigkeit«. 24 Cf. ibidem. 25 See ibid., 28: »Es ist nur die Markierung für das Gestelltsein des Problems […]. Es ist kein ›dunkler Grund‹ noch sonst ein irgend mit Eckharts, Böhmes, oder Schellings Worten Benennbares. Es ist nicht im Anfang«. 26 Ibidem.

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identity is never resolvable in any absolute sense, while in an existential sense one’s sense of identity is only ever made possible on the basis of, and indeed haunted by, the objective character of one’s being finite. 27 It is on the basis of Rosenzweig’s correlating the nothing-ofdeath to the nothing-of-conceptual thinking, that the general consistency between the abstract comments in Part I and his more precise comments regarding language and religious life in Part III is forged. Looking forward to the third book of Part III, in the section entitled »The Meaning of the Verification«, the reader sees Rosenzweig return to this interplay between the positive claims of identity and the deconstruction of these positive identities vis-àvis the question of claiming the whole truth. The positive claims now refer to the collective identities of the Jewish people, who live redemption via a messianic diremption of historical time, 28 and the Christian Church whose messianic identity is coeval with the time of the world. 29 After establishing the identity of these two communities as such, Rosenzweig describes a state of perpetual tension between the two communities. In the section entitled »The Eternal Protest of the Jews Against Christ«, Rosenzweig asserts that it is because the Jewish people live perpetually in the Kingdom of God, by virtue of their sanctified »flesh and blood under the yoke of the law«, that the Christian life is always made apparent as only in hope of sanctification and messianic fulfilment. 30 The Christian is only ever on the way to redemption, never able to resolve the tension between being on the way and arriving at the destination in question, an arrival which would, in the end, conclude and destroy Christianity. Returning to the comparison of Part III to Part I, what appears to be at stake here is only the status of each liturgical community vis-à-vis redemption, just as what is at stake in Part I is the status 27

See Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialektik, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1966, 182 f. 28 Cf. Stern, 364. 29 Cf. ibid., 375 f. 30 Ibid., 460.

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of the three elements in relation to the status of the previous ontological priority of the nothing. Yet, just as the neutralisation of the ontological hegemony of the nothing in Part I redistributes the meaning of the nothing in relation to each element, so too does Rosenzweig’s claim regarding the inability of either Judaism or Christianity to grasp the »whole truth« redistribute the importance of the question of the validity of each community, and, by extension, the status of the concept of redemption itself as separate from the truth an sich. Rosenzweig obviously orients the situation of each community around the living reality, or lack thereof, of redemption. Indeed, insofar as the Jewish people fully live into redemption by being rescued from the mythological fluctuations of time, they miss what is to be redeemed in the last instance – the world. And insofar as the Christian Church only ever is on the way in and for the world, in its evangelistic mission, it misses the living heart of redemption. Both communities, in the fulfilment of their respective roles, are unable to contain the whole of the truth in any theological sense, just as Rosenzweig refuses to accord total primacy to any element in Part I in any philosophical sense. In the end, then, the meaning of each community is determined not by an ontotheological notion of redemption-as-truth, as the comprehensive possession of God-Godself, but rather, but something immanent to the two communities either as presence or absence, but never the totality of the two-in-one. Reflecting upon this connection, one can say now that whereas »traditional thinking« attempts to settle these tensions either on the side of the transcendence-as-objective or immanence-as-subjective, Rosenzweig instead revises the tension, such that one may speak of the nothing, and of the »whole truth«, while foreclosing any point of total access beyond the confines of the particular, and by extension, following Wolfson’s work on the matter, the confines of truth and error thought as coincident. The issue, then, is not whether redemption can be extended beyond the demarcation between Judaism and Christianity for Rosenzweig, just as the issue in Part I is not whether one of the elements is really the beginning and end of the others. Indeed, the question concerning redemp238

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tion has been settled for the author – Judaism lives its redemption, Christianity may only ever desire its redemption. 31 Yet the whole truth requires both, and, as I argue in my conclusion, still more than both according to Rosenzweig’s own method of subjective narration – namely, the reality of the so-called pagan conceptions of each element, and the possibility overall to rewrite the story otherwise in perpetuum. It is with this claim that I move to conclude my argument, turning back now to Part I in light of the comparison to Part III just made. 2. Paganism, Pluralism, and the Disjuncture of Redemption and Truth The crucial question remains at this juncture, what is it, beyond the latter explications which lead to Judaism and Christianity, that Rosenzweig says we know with these general notions of God, world, and human in Part I, chastened as these concepts now are by his critical remarks? Too, what is the importance of the answer to this question with regard to the question concerning the status of redemption in Part III, and the place Rosenzweig accords to the two named communities against the backdrop of other excluded communities? The answer, if we persist with his later comments in Das neue Denken, is nothing less than what is already present in the antique – pagan – conceptions of these three elements, stripped of any progressivist rendering which would pit later monotheistic revelations against their pagan counterparts. 32 In fact, it is precisely insofar as these elements appear in their undeveloped, isolated, and concealed modes, that the value of these »pagan« elements is made apparent and aligned against any ontotheological 31

I again am grateful to Wolfson for my interpretation of Rosenzweig’s notion of what is possible for Christianity, which is Wolfson’s interpretation. His position is that Rosenzweig forecloses the fullness of redemption for Christianity. I agree. The pluralism of Rosenzweig’s thought is not to be found in his claims about religions, but rather again in his awareness of the positionality of any claim. 32 Cf. Rosenzweig, »Das neue Denken«, GS III, 147.

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notion of »substance«, and aligned with the »non-objective and unsubstantial« material of experiential thinking. 33 Contra the work of Oswald Spengler regarding simplified »apollonian culture«, 34 Rosenzweig maintains that the plastic, antique, depictions of God, world, and human, were and remain true. He writes, »God is as alive as the God of mythology, the created world is as real […] as plastic self-contained finitude […]; the human is truly as human, and so not as a house of mere ideas [und ganz und gar kein Gehäuse von Idealen], as the tragic hero in his rigid defiance«. 35 The point is clear – whatever the tone of Rosenzweig’s text implies with regard to the erasure of the pagan in the advance of the two privileged monotheistic religions, it cannot imply that the pagan has no truth. In another section from Das neue Denken, Rosenzweig reinforces this point, writing, »[p]aganism is thus no mere religious-philosophical irritation [Kinderschreck] for the mature […] but rather it is, no more and no less, the truth«. 36 This being the case, I do not wish to overextend the generosity of Rosenzweig’s reading – it is clear that for Rosenzweig, with the advance of monotheism, and more precisely of the revelation of the deity, paganism is shown to be false. 37 Moreover, as Sophie Nordmann in her article »Judaïsme et paganisme chez Cohen, Rosenzweig et Levinas« notes, there is a ethic of violence that becomes associated with paganism as a metaphysical reduction of all transcendence to the world, an association which, coincidental with the problematic Christian colonial history of the notion of paganism as primitive, perhaps suggests a more complicated relationship in this context between a rendering of this aforementioned colonial concept and the rejection of a politics of violence and a 33

Ibidem. Ibid., 146. 35 Ibidem. 36 Ibid., 147. 37 Cf. Wayne Cristaudo, »Redemption and Messianism in Franz Rosenzweig’s The Star of Redemption«, in: Wayne Cristaudo, Wendy Baker (eds.), Messianism, Apocalypse, and Redemption in 20th Century German Thought, Adelaide: ATF Press, 2006, 264. 34

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supersessionist notion of history. 38 In addition, yet, the fact that Rosenzweig is so intent on preserving the partial truth of pagan38

See Sophie Nordmann, »Judaïsme et paganisme chez Cohen, Rosenzweig et Levinas. Un ›geste spéculatif‹ commun«, Archives de Philosophie 70 (2007), no. 2, 227–247. Citing the 1935 article by Levinas entitled »L’actualité de Maimonide«, Nordmann writes: »La fin de l’article met en place et définit ces catégories dans le cadre d’une opposition: ›le paganisme n’est pas la négation de l’esprit, ni l’ignorance d’un Dieu unique […]. Le paganisme est une impuissance radicale de sortir du monde. […] [D]ans ce monde se suffisant à lui-même, le païen est enfermé. Il le trouve solide et bien assis […]. Le sentiment d’Israël à l’égard du monde est tout différent […]‹. Ainsi, l’opposition du paganisme et du judaïsme se pose en termes d’enfermement dans le monde – et l’on aperçoit ici, en creux, les thèmes liés à l’évasion, á l’au-delà de l’être, à la sortie hors de l’être: seul le judaïsme permet de ›sortir‹ du monde en posant une véritable transcendance de Dieu par rapport au monde – qui apparaît alors dans toute sa contingence«. Nordmann concludes this paragraph, writing: »Et de même que la morale païenne n’est, pour Levinas, que le prolongement éthique de cette métaphysique – soit ›la conséquence de cette incapacité foncière de transgresser les limites du monde‹, de même Levinas montera que l’éthique juive place cette ›sortie du monde‹, cette ›trace du provisoire et du créé‹ que le juif trouve dans le monde, en son cœur même« (230 f.). Nordmann continues, explicating how this idea appears in Cohen’s thinking, for whom the uniqueness of God leads to the notion of a common humanity and responsibility for each other (cf. ibid., 235 f.), and for Rosenzweig where paganism can only be the isolation of God, world, and human and religion entailing the relation of the three in creation, revelation, and redemption (cf. ibid., 244). For Cohen, Rosenzweig and Levinas, then, paganism represents isolated enclosure contra the revelation of and relation to the other. Following Nordmann’s explication of this idea with regard to Cohen, Rosenzweig and Levinas, the notion of the pagan and the primitive as enclosed in a static, non-textured, reality is also presented by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno in their description of myth and disenchantment in the first chapter of their 1947 Dialektik der Aufklärung, which follows similar descriptions of how religion and society develop from a point of close proximity to nature to a point of increasing reference to that which transcends nature in the work of Max Weber and Émile Durkheim. While the colonial implications of these concepts are by now wellknown in the field of religious studies, the ethical and metaphysical dimensions of these concepts in the context of the debates with which Cohen, Rosenzweig, Horkheimer, Adorno, and Levinas were engaged should not be dismissed for a number of reasons, including the long-lasting intelligibility of these concepts as such in the thought of other significant thinkers. One such thinker relevant to the context of the present article’s concern for pluralism and some possible limits of applying what I am saying here about the possibility of applying Rosenzweig’s

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ism as the Voraussetzung of all subsequent theological unfolding is of the utmost importance, especially in light of his own admission in Stern of the partiality of both Judaism and Christianity, for understanding the pluralistic impulse that he is, at the least, attempting to incorporate into his system. While Rosenzweig himself sees these pagan Gestalten as not totally true, he nonetheless confirms their partial truth, and this point, alongside his admission later that this entire project is only his project – rather than the project – allows one to perceive clearly the opening for another person to rewrite the story in accordance with the truths of these »pagan« religions. This brings me to my final point about Rosenzweig’s narrative method. That Rosenzweig so guards the truth of what seems a perspective one may disregard in light of the progression to Judaism and Christianity is crucial for understanding how to interpret the positive claims made with regard to Judaism and Christianity, in addition to understanding how the discussion of paganism, Judaism, and Christianity mirrors Rosenzweig’s own preservation of die alte Philosophie through his aforementioned critical remarks. More importantly, Rosenzweig’s chastened rendering of the relation between Judaism, Christianity, and paganism, centred as this rendering is around the question of ›truth‹, illustrates precisely the disjuncture between revelation and truth in his thinking. Rosenzweig immediately moves from this reading of paganism in Das neue Denken to his description of eine erzählende Philosophie – a position he aligns with the second part of Stern – method across traditions is the Argentine-Mexican Catholic thinker Enrique Dussel, who in a number of texts refers to this Levinasian theme of an ethic according to the revelation of the other contra totality, albeit through the lens of a fully supersessionist reading of the movement of history from an ethic aligned with a metaphysics of totality to an ethic concerned with the other. On the supersessionism, and thus the limits of Dussel’s Catholic appropriation of Rosenzweig’s and Buber’s respective thought, see Silvana Kandel Lamdan, »Longing for Authenticity in the Middle East and the Americas: Martin Buber and Enrique Dussel on Semitic Humanism«, in: Judith Gruber, Sebastian Pittl, Stefan Silber, Christian Tauchner (eds.), Identitary Temptations. Identity Negotiations between Emancipation and Hegemony, Aachen: Wissenschaftsverlag Mainz, 2019, 367– 378.

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and then to his discussion of why he chose the specific languages and elements which comprise his text. It is precisely because a narrative philosophy does not seek to define what things »really« (eigentlich) are, but rather how they are for oneself, he tells his reader, that he chooses Judaism and Christianity to express his thinking. 39 Yet, he notes, if he was of another faith, the text would look different in accordance with his same method – a point that, while not undercutting his positive claims regarding redemption in relation to Judaism and Christianity, should caution any elision of the distinction between the concept of redemption and truth, given that the positive redemptive claim of even the Jewish people is built upon only the »signalling« of a 39

Cf. Rosenzweig, »Das neue Denken«, GS III, 148. Here I follow the readings of Rosenzweig proposed by Elliot Wolfson and Leora Batnitzky. Wolfson’s work has, since the beginning of his career, focused upon the tension between the transcendent and irrepresentable aspect of God and the somewhat ironic fact that this prohibition leads to a proliferation of representation in the form of the apophatic engendering more and not less speech. See Elliot R. Wolfson, Through a Speculum that Shines. Vision and Imagination in Medieval Jewish Mysticism, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. Thus, Wolfson’s discussions in his book Alef, Mem, Tau. Kabbalistic Musings on Time, Truth, and Death, Berkeley/Los Angeles/ London: University of California Press, 2006, of the »parabolic nature of truth« is an apt description not only with regard to the Kabbalistic texts Wolfson is discussing but so too of Rosenzweig’s own method and consonant with Wolfson’s reading of Rosenzweig in Giving Beyond the Gift. Similarly, in her Idolatry and Representation. The Philosophy of Franz Rosenzweig Reconsidered, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000, Batnitzky notes that while »we have seen that for Maimonides, Cohen, Kant, and the German Romantics, the problem of representation is a problem of thinking about, in the case of God, what God is […] Rosenzweig understands representation differently […]. Rosenzweig does not use the word Vorstellung in The Star of Redemption to talk about representation. Instead, he uses the noun Vertreter, and the verb vertreten, which mean ›representative‹ and ›to represent‹ in a political and ethical sense. The problem of representation for Rosenzweig is not a problem about presenting ideas. Rather, it is always an ethical and political question as to how we represent ourselves in relation to others« (29). Following both Batnitzky and Wolfson, I would suggest that Rosenzweig’s sense of the subjective reality of truth is about narrating, of narration making possible the expression of, just this aspect of being related, as individuals to our finitude, to others, to God, and the impossibility of a truth that is without relation, a point again made by Wolfson in Giving Beyond the Gift.

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deconstruction of all positive identity in the silence of the truth that is one, the truth which lies at the heart of the referral to G-D as »Lord«, the anticipated silence of completion and comprehension signalled in the refusal to pronounce the Name. 40 The entire project relies, then, upon an apophatic rendering of God and truth. Das All is, as is the status of the nothing in the threefold cognition of each element, only ever virtual, that which calls one to think, pray, and speak in life. Redemption is, thus, chastened in its epistemic meaning by both Rosenzweig’s own admission of his subjective position in his writing, and his concept of redemption’s disjuncture from being the whole of truth, and thus, from being the whole of God. As such, Der Stern der Erlösung appears as a book which yields, beside its normative claims, a method for a ›new thinking‹ about the ways in which each person is capable of thinking about the other, the world, and God through the creation of true-fictions – that is, narratives which capture truly, but only in part and thus in coincidence with error, 41 the truth which God is, but never fully Godself which exceeds the truth, and so too, life. 42

40

Cf. Stern, 427. See ibid., 431: »Die Unleugbarkeit der Wahrheit und die Unleugbarkeit der Unwahrheit sind als Tatsachen untrennbar«. 42 Cf. ibid., 462. 41

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Truth and Bewährung – Imparted by Rosenzweig »In your majesty ride forth victoriously in the cause of truth, humility and justice; let your right hand achieve awesome deeds« (Franz Rosenzweig’s epigraph to Der Stern der Erlösung)

Franz Rosenzweig pairs truth with Bewährung as the penultimate moment of his midrashic response to the question that he sets for his readers in the opening act of The Star of Redemption (henceforth: Star), when he asks: what happens when we deconstruct the truth that the world – by which he means the world of philosophy – has given us? That is, what happens when we question our belief in ›the Truth‹ which Hegel and a long line of idealist philosophers before him have called the »All«? What happens when we dismember ›the All‹ and its dialectical counterpart, ›the Nothing‹, via the reductive abstractions of conceptual analyses with their mathematical, symbolic notations that provide us with adequate, that is, ›rational‹ and thus – by inferential implication – absolutely comprehensive and satisfactory answers to ›all‹ of our existential and metaphysical questions? Rosenzweig encourages us to question the assumptions underlying the words that we habitually and regularly use in such truth claims in order to re-examine the propositional parts that they play in the conceptual structures that humans have constructed in our efforts to depict the actual, historical effects of our ethical experience with others in the world. We find Rosenzweig’s midrashic response to those very questions in the Star, which provides the immediate context for us to better understand why he associates Bewährung with truth in the way that he does at the end of that book. The following thesis explores the role that Bewährung plays in Rosenzweig’s philosophy, a thesis that has already been taken up as a central concern for other interpretations of the normative signif245

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icance of Rosenzweig’s thought. One of the most significant of those interpretations is Martin Kavka’s »verification (Bewährung) in Franz Rosenzweig«. 1 In focusing attention on the concept of Bewährung, Kavka intends to align Rosenzweig more closely with Hegel by reconstructing a Rosenzweigian concept of Bewährung through Kavka’s rendering of the lens of Hegel’s master/slave dialectic and the phenomenon of recognition. His rendering and reconstruction is compelling but ultimately does not address what I consider to be Rosenzweig’s essential intent in employing Bewährung as he does as the culminating movement of faith, love, and hope at the end of the Star. Indeed, and in direct contrast to Kavka’s argument, Rosenzweig uses Bewährung as the underlying conceptual equivalent to the ›archstone‹ word und (»and«) in the logical structure of his book precisely in order to provide an ethically normative departure from Hegel’s systematic ethicality as that was developed in the Philosophy of Right. Specifically, Kavka interprets Rosenzweig’s assertion about martyrdom as the epitome of verification for Rosenzweig from the Star in order to correlate that with Hegel’s conceptual development of the dialectical struggle to the death of the master/slave relationship in his Phenomenology of Spirit. The normative point that he makes entails correlating Rosenzweig with Hegel’s concept of »recognition« as the motivating force for building community but points us in the opposite direction of Rosenzweig’s attempt to lay the foundations for building ›redemptive‹ communities that encourage fruitful and open-ended dialogical encounters. Kavka’s is a strong and tempting argument that reinforces understanding Rosenzweig in his neo-Hegelian context and in order to adequately address its salience, I take a rather lengthy detour – which constitutes the body of my thesis – through competing and complementary theories of truth vis-à-vis what I take to be a more faithful rendering of Rosenzweig’s version of Bewährung. 1

See Martin Kavka, »Verification (Bewährung) in Franz Rosenzweig«, in: Christian Wiese, Martina Urban (eds.), German-Jewish Thought Between Religion and Politics. Festschrift in Honor of Paul Mendes-Flohr on the Occasion of His Seventieth Birthday, Berlin/Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2012, 167–184.

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As the second step in my thesis, I look at some classical models of epistemology and philosophy of science that were in play in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when Rosenzweig was living and writing. Like Rosenzweig’s approach, those models presuppose the general condition that humans live in communities constituted by belief in this or that truth claim and do so with almost unquestioning confidence and blind certainty in their commitments to those communities, thereby expending effort and energy towards maintaining and growing those communities. Such commitments include the pedagogical practices of teaching and learning the kinds of knowledge needed for what it takes to carry on such maintenance and growth which quintessentially means, in German etwas zu bewähren, »to preserve, maintain, or save by validating or proving the worth of something«. Specifically, the concept entails a ›practical‹ demonstration of one’s beliefs or ideas. The ›truth‹ and excellence of the belief is ›seen‹ or demonstrated in the actual practice of showing it forth. For Rosenzweig, as a member of those German/European science communities, those sciences of his day laid the groundwork for the meta-sciences that structure Part I of the Star. Several examinations of those meta-sciences have already been done, for example by Norbert Samuelson and Benjamin Pollock as well as by myself, but those systematic treatments are not directly relevant for this thesis. 2 Instead I build on those more comprehensive studies and take for granted, here, that Rosenzweig was a competent enough philosopher that he was well aware of the problem of induction in the claims of inductivist methodologies that commonly characterize the general educational level of many of our human communities. That is, we should take for granted that he was aware of the simplistic assumption that moving from an empirical statement that 2

See Benjamin Pollock, Franz Rosenzweig and the Systematic Task of Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009; Norbert M. Samuelson, A User’s Guide to Franz Rosenzweig’s Star of Redemption, London/New York: Routledge, 2010; Jules Simon, Art and Responsibility. A Phenomenology of the Diverging Paths of Rosenzweig and Heidegger, New York/London: Continuum, 2011.

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»here is a white swan« to a universal statement that »all swans are white« is evidently bad logic. Like David Hume, Immanuel Kant, and Karl Popper, it is clear from his work that Rosenzweig would have known that this method is deductively invalid since it’s always possible that a »black swan« has eluded our observations. 3 Moreover, Rosenzweig’s position on the truth or verifiability or falsifiability of our speech-acts as a judgment on what we have experienced, are experiencing, and could possibly experience with each other in the world is far more complex than that simplistic logic. Rosenzweig raised questions, as we raise them now, about the language games that philosophers in his historical epoch were playing that led them to a kind of sickness that plagued their »common sense understanding« about the intent and purpose of speech-acts, as such. 4 But the culmination of his critique, appears in the practical, socio-historical ways that he applies the logic of Bewährung in the closing movements of the Star. To more clearly identify Rosenzweig’s originality, I stake out three philosophical positions, all of which help to move us beyond Kavka’s interpretation, as orientation points that were historically in play when Rosenzweig was conceiving and writing the Star, in 3

Inductive reasoning entails that some premises provide evidence for the ›truth‹ of a conclusion, the derivation of general principles from specific observations. Thus, such conclusions can only ever be probable. By contrast, the conclusion of a deductive argument is certain. See David Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, London: A. Millar, 1748. Induction makes logical assumptions. Hume argues that we cannot have real knowledge of the nature between events and thus cannot justify inductive assumptions. This means that we cannot predict the future based on what happened in the past. In response to Hume, see Immanuel Kant, Logik: Ein Handbuch zu Vorlesungen, ed. Gottlob Benjamin Jäsche, Königsberg: Friedrich Nicolovius, 1800. Here, in his lectures on logic, also known as Jäsche-Logik, Kant classifies induction as one of the two modes of inference of the power of judgment. The other mode is analogy. Where Hume claimed that induction is a subjectively contingent and unjustified habit of assumption, Kant attempted to show that induction is a subjectively necessary and rationally justified and generally useful principle of inference from particulars to ›probable‹ universals. 4 These sorts of questionings were articulated by Rosenzweig in Das Büchlein vom gesunden und kranken Menschenverstand, ed. Nahum N. Glatzer, Düsseldorf: Joseph Melzer, 1964.

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order to situate Rosenzweig in relation to those positions. Each position takes up the task to philosophically ascertain the phenomena of ›truth‹ and ›meaning‹, specifically challenging us to inquire about the relationship of human speech-acts to what are generally accepted to be truth-claims. These challenges entail coming to some agreement about what more precisely we refer to when we make this or that truth claim about the absoluteness of the truth claim. Secondly, and in relation to the issue of defining truth – ontologically, as it were – we are then compelled to ask: in what way do we come to certainty about such claims to truth and what does that certainty have to do with our beliefs, experiences and ways of acting in the world? In other words, what do our past and present experiences say about our expectations for the future? Are they absolute claims that constrain our choices? Or are they messianically, that is, aesthetically and ethically open? The first position is that of logical positivism and is represented by the Vienna Circle, consisting of Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, Hans Reichenbach, et al. A core tenet of the Vienna Circle was that the truth of a statement had to be established via logical reasoning or empirical testing, a tenet they named »the verification principle«. 5 In Language, Truth, and Logic Alfred Jules Ayer, a frequent visitor of the Vienna Circle, sets out the view about what statements, or speech-acts, can be deemed meaningful: only empirical, tautological, or mathematical statements are meaningful, that is, those that can be demonstrated to be true or false using either scientific method or logic. 6 Any discussions 5

As is well-known, the Vienna Circle came into formation in the same years that Rosenzweig was studying in German universities, from 1907–1912 led by Phillip Frank, Hans Hahn, and Otto Neurath at coffeehouses in Vienna where they worked to implement the positive science of Ernst Mach and his efforts to eliminate what he thought was the misuse of metaphysics in science. Eventually the Vienna Circle grew to include Ludwig Wittgenstein, Alfred North Whitehead, Bertrand Russell, Moritz Schlick, and Rudolf Carnap. The philosophers were as ambitious as any Hegelian or Marxist in their attempts to institutionalize and internationalize their ideas about logical empiricism, philosophy of science, and the unity of science. 6 See Alfred J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic, London: Penguin Books, 1936. Ayer presents the logical positivism of Carnap, Neurath, and others rate in his

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about art, beauty, history, religion, or ethics are meaningless since none of them can be tested or proven, or justified to be true, and thereby conform to the verification principle. It is clear, given the a priori limiting conditions for determining what speech-acts are even permitted to be evaluated for verification – excluding in principle any speech-act that has to do with art, beauty, history, religion, or ethics –, we are from the onset narrowly limiting our consideration of the full range of human experience. The goal for classical positivists was to promote the prejudice of speaking precisely in such a way that dictated new norms for deducing the meaningfulness of conversations about human experiences of the world based on freely or ›arbitrarily‹ assigning this or that truth value to this or that set of atomic sentences. But such norms eliminate language about value, ethics, and metaphysics in favor of a closed, consistent system of ideas chained to the formal rules of logic. This leaves us with an incredibly weak form of empiricism. Which leads me to the second position which is Karl Popper’s falsifiability principle. Popper critically rejected what he took to be the unverifiability of the verifiability principle, that is, the insistence of the logical positivists in linking meaning to only those propositions that could be logically or empirically justified. Popper proposed a set of demarcation criteria that consist of clarifying the practical function of observing all empirical instances that have to do with making a claim about the universal condition of this or that in the world. He convincingly argues that the Baconian/Newtonian position that all formation of theory has to begin with an act of ›pure‹ observation is completely mistaken. Instead, he maintained that all observation is selective and theory-laden and that there are no pure observations free from theory or ›bias‹. This brings his position roughly in line with what Rosenzweig has to say about the inductive relationship of historically or existentially embedded particulars to claims about universal concepts. In other words, for Popper, it is true that one cannot go from the particular existential statement that there is »one white swan in attempt to demonstrate how the imperfect understanding of the uses of language leads to fuzzy thought and muddled writing.

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Europe« to infer the universal statement that »all swans are white«, because doing so would entail an impractical ›proof‹. One can, however, infer from the empirical observation that »there is one black swan in Israel« the negation or ›falsification‹ of the claim that »all swans are white«. This is Popper’s falsifiability principle. 7 The third position moves us away from the technical, analytic forms of philosophy of science of Rosenzweig’s day to the proponents of pragmatism and their theory of truth. From Charles Sanders Peirce, we have the pragmatic maxim that he set out in 1878: It appears, then, that the rule for attaining the third grade of clearness of apprehension is as follows: Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object. 8

He then recasts that definition of the ›truth‹ of pragmatism in 1906: Pragmatism is the principle that every theoretical judgment expressible in a sentence in the indicative mood is a confused form of thought whose only meaning, if it has any, lies in its tendency to enforce a corresponding practical maxim expressible as a conditional sentence having its apodosis in the imperative mood. 9

As Pierce elaborates this position in later writings, this way of determining the ›truth‹ value of any indicative claim depends on translating (interpreting) that claim into conditions that should be ›verified‹ experimentally by way of testing or proving those claims through conditionals that result in imperatives to act in one way or another. 7

His philosophy was also used to help determine U.S. law cases. See Karl Popper, Logik der Forschung. Zur Erkenntnistheorie der modernen Naturwissenschaft, Berlin: Julius Springer, 1935. 8 Charles Sanders Peirce, »How to Make Our Ideas Clear«, Popular Science Monthly 12 (January 1878), 293. 9 Charles Sanders Peirce, »Lectures on Pragmatism«, in: id., Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking. The 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism, Albany: SUNY Press, 1997, 110.

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And here is the juncture in my thesis, and a moment in the history of philosophy, where roughly aligning Rosenzweig’s project with that of the pragmatists, we can begin to better understand the kind of speech-act philosophy that informs Rosenzweig’s ethical metaphysics, a philosophy which inspired Emmanuel Levinas and others to follow his lead in implicitly challenging the philosophical epistemologists of the early part of the twentieth century as ethically bankrupt. Rosenzweig was a significant proponent of speech-act philosophy but also was a philosopher who was deeply convinced that all of our speech-acts are in one way or another implicated in and determinative for normative human relations. Correlatively, Peirce’s attempt to conjoin an analysis of grammatical forms of speech with normative imperatives should recall the major chords of Part I and Part II of Rosenzweig’s Star. I will not go over the details of those parts of Rosenzweig’s speech-act philosophy (since I do so elsewhere) except to say that it forms the underlying logic for understanding the three metasciences – metaphysics, metalogic, metaethics – as well as the roles that the three elements – God, world, human – play in the ordering relations of the three courses of the cosmos with which the elements are related – creation, revelation, redemption. 10 But in Part III of the Star, Rosenzweig provides the ›completed structure‹ of his narrative, the vision of a dynamic star-like structure that is meant by its creator to ›seal the deal‹, so to speak, in bringing together the strands of his narrative in a messianic vision which depends upon joining the philosophical elements in Part I with the theological strands developed on the personal and social levels in Part II, and the first two books of Part III, respectively. In fact, this very structuring of the work that combines elements of ethical normativity, historical analysis, and messianic speculation is what Rosenzweig labels the work of Bewährung. For the rest of this thesis, I focus on verifying that claim. With the first phrase of the third book of Part III, »God is the truth« (Gott ist die Wahrheit), Rosenzweig provides the root sen10

See Jules Simon, Art and Responsibility.

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tence (not an atomistic sentence) out of which he develops and completes the midrashic task that he set for himself in the opening pages of the book: how do we respond to the challenge of our having been ›created‹ mortal and how do we know what to think and do in our humanly mortal life with other human mortals in the world, with other men, women, and children? As we know by now, the answer comes in the heartpiece of the book, in having experienced love, in experiencing love, and in sharing the expectation of the experience of love. As he notes at the conclusion of the opening section of that book: »Die Offenbarung der göttlichen Liebe ist das Herz des All«. 11 But he also clarifies that the conceptual relation is not a trivial tautology: Daß Gott liebt, erfahren wir, nicht daß Gott die Liebe ist […]. Nur daß er Gott ist, erfahren wir in seiner Liebe aber nicht, was er ist. Das Was, das Wesen bleibt verborgen. Es verbirgt sich grade indem es sich offenbart. Das Wesen eines Gottes, der sich nicht offenbart, könnte sich uns auf die Lange nicht verschließen; denn was verbirgt sich der umherfahrenden Erfahrung, dem zugreifenden Begriff, der vernehmenden Vernunft des Menschen. 12

In other words, with Peirce, we only ever ›experience‹ the act of love, not the ontological or epistemological ›truth‹ of God or any other being for that matter – das Was, das Wesen. We sensually experience empirical, embodied effects. It is only the reality of the existential and experiential factuality of the act of love which, as a revealing act, helps us to make sense that we in fact experience the phenomena of discovering something that was previously hidden in our wandering experience, the grasping concept, the interrogating reason of the human. Rosenzweig recalls the earlier part of his narrative on the phenomenology of revelation which happens, in his narrative, as a process of God pouring out his love over the ›object‹ of God’s loving, revelatory attention and in this ›pouring‹ the experience 11

Franz Rosenzweig, Der Stern der Erlösung (Der Mensch und sein Werk. Gesammelte Schriften, II), ed. Reinhold Mayer, Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976 (hereafter: GS II), 424. 12 Ibidem (my emphases).

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of love transforms the beloved from a condition of being stillstanding (indicative) to that of being active, namely, to someone who is also able to (imperatively) love in this overflowing, freeing way that she or he was loved. Indeed, not only is one ›freed‹ or aufgelöst from rigidity or thingliness but one’s very ability to spontaneously reason and to autonomously think for oneself, or better, to think only of and for oneself, is instead ›chained to love‹ and bound in a new form of union, a new covenant. One is bound because one is called in one’s concrete particularity by one’s name and thus set on a distinct direction, on a course that moves us »over and beyond« (darüber hinaus) that which was offered by ›powerless‹ and empty concepts to begin a life of loving. 13 Thus, those who heed the concretizing call of love are brought into the active circle of the lover and of loving because they are called by their particular, personal name and, because she or he is so univocally intended by being personally recognized and called, she or he is »freed and redeemed« (löst und erlöst) to ›extend‹ the life of loving – called to widen the circle, so to speak. Moreover, the only way that someone can gain temporal or spatial orientation comes through experiencing the light of divine love, which takes the embodied form of being loved by a human lover, as such: »Der Liebende also ist es, den wir allein unmittelbar erblicken«. 14 In loving, God (through the embodied acts of the human lover) is active and, moreover, only in loving can God (through the embodied acts of the human lover) be ›seen‹ because »He is just in that. He is one with her. He loves« (Er ist darin. Er ist eins mit ihr. Er liebt). 15 Rosenzweig notes that the »living knowledge« (lebendiges Wissen) of humans only knows and only is able to know ›immediately‹ the language of love and thus the knowledge of love. But also, for Rosenzweig, only God redeems God’s self – which is an act that is beyond human knowing. In redeeming itself, God is ›freed‹ from that which stands over against itself, from being objectified: »To 13 14 15

Cf. ibidem. Ibid., 425. Ibidem.

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him, it is the eternal deed in which he frees himself from being confronted with something that is not himself« (Ihm selbst ist sie die ewige Tat, in der er sich selber befreit davon, daß ihm etwas gegenübersteht, was nicht er selbst ist). 16 It is this conjectural part of Rosenzweig’s narrative that takes us back to the issues that I raised at the beginning of this paper, that is, to issues of how we know what is true and the language that we use to ›name‹ the truth. Here we learn that redemption is bound up with being freed from the work of creation in taking care of enlivening souls to engage in revelatory speech-acts and actions of love. Redemption is non-confrontational; it is, rather, a day of rest, the Sabbath. Rosenzweig ties the experiencing acts of imperative love to the historical evidence of love having-been-experienced and prepared for in the weekly practices of observing Sabbath for Jews and Judaism. Die Erlösung befreit ihn von der Arbeit an der Schöpfung wie von der lieben Not um die Seele. Die Erlösung ist sein Ruhetag, sein großer Sabbat, auf den der Sabbat der Schöpfung nur vordeutet, der Tag wo er, erlöst von allem außer ihm, das ihm dem Unvergleichbaren immer wieder verglichen wird, Einer sein wird und sein Name: Einer. Die Erlösung erlöst Gott, indem sie ihn von seinem offenbarten Namen löst. Im Namen und seiner Offenbarung vollendet sich die in der Schöpfung angehobene Niederkunft der Offenbarung. »Im Namen« geschieht fortan alle was geschieht. Heiligung wie Entweihung des Namens – es gibt keine Tat seit der Offenbarung, die nicht eins oder das andre wirkte; der Gang der Erlösung in der Welt geschieht im Namen und um des Namens willen. 17

Rosenzweig says that »the end is nameless« and that all sanctification of the name is done for the purpose that naming and the name will »for once« (einmal) be silenced, even the name of God. What this ethically means is that at the end, in the end times, all division, all tribalism and conflict, all forms of self-preservation of one’s group identity – through the practices of naming and conceptual ›branding‹ – will no longer hold true. On the 16 17

Ibidem. Ibidem.

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far side of the word will be the »light of silence«. My word will not confront your word, as all ›argument‹ and all ›proof‹, all ›verifiability‹ and all ›falsifiability‹ will no longer have any meaning. There is only a ›need‹ for making something holy, that is, for loving something when there is ›unholiness‹ or that which is not yet touched by the warmth and light and enlivening breath of the word of love. Truth stands in need of Bewährung, of verification, for Rosenzweig, but initiates a process that does not enunciate polarizing bi-valent logical oppositions of true/false, right/wrong or correct in opposition to error. Nor is Bewährung for Rosenzweig a matter of verifiability as in justifying this or that hypothesis of experimental falsification; but is, rather, what Rosenzweig calls the »bliss of actualization« (Wonne der Verwirklichung) 18. Significantly, truth is also not »the actualization of what is rational« or the »rationalization of what is actual«, as Hegel optimistically prophesizes about the nation-state in the preface to the Philosophy of Right. 19 Such a sense for truth further distances Rosenzweig from Kavka’s interpretation, namely, of reading Rosenzweig’s redemption through the lens of Hegel’s philosophy of recognition. Rather, Rosenzweig’s version of truth has much more to do with the phenomenon of love and with the messianic ›task‹ to actualizing love in the world to bring all peoples to recognize and confess their unity under ›one name‹ : that is, under the one God whose act is love and thus is ›redeemed‹ in truth when those who actually love one another create the kind of conditions that facilitate and expand, rather than limit and contract, further experiences of love. Such love acts could be ›giving the bread from one’s mouth to the hungry other‹ or opening the door to one’s home or ›tabernacle‹ with an open place at the table to welcome a stranger to share in one’s blessings, one’s harvest, one’s sabbath or Pesach meal.

18

Ibid., 427. See Jules Simon, »From Hegel to Rosenzweig: From what is Rational … and what is Actual, to what is Ethical«, Rosenzweig Jahrbuch / Rosenzweig Yearbook 8/9 (2014), 112–128.

19

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But again, for Rosenzweig, the issue of truth is nonetheless still an issue of language, of speech-acts and thus of words. Hence, he raises the question about language once more, but only after having ›vanquished‹ competing, abstract, analytic models of truth (at least implicitly), at the end of the subsection entitled »Der Herr« (»The Master«): Mit welchem Wort wäre aber das, was über den Worten läge, zu fassen? Es dürfte ebenso wenig unter den Worten selber Platz finden wie das Nichts. Das Etwas ist in der Welt der Worte zuhause. Aber über dieser Welt liegt, ebenso unheimisch in ihr wie das Nichts, das All. Und zwar das wahre All, das All, das nicht in Stücke springt wie in der Welt des Nichts, sondern das eine All, das All und Eine. 20

When God is the »master« over »All und Eine« then that will be the ›other side‹ of all words, of all language – »Jenseits der Worte« which is ›something‹ that is »uncreated« (Ungeschaffne), because it is a not-yet messianic ideal. This is, for Rosenzweig, what is meant with the phrase »God is the truth«. What then is to be done? More specifically, what for humans is the ›true work‹ of redemption? It is the work of Bewährung, but not in the sense of verifiability of the logical positivists or the falsifiability and ›demarcation‹ of Popper. Rather, it is closer to Peirce, James, or Husserl or more to the point: for a Rosenzweigian what is meant by truth entails that a sense for truth has a practical dimension and a personal dimension that is quite other than epistemic static relations that are generally taken to define truth impersonally and objectively in the analytic tradition of philosophy. To clarify this even more, it is helpful to refer to a few excerpts on ›truth and pragmatism‹ from William James’s Pragmatism. A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking (1907). [T]he great assumption of the intellectualists is that truth means essentially an inert static relation. When you’ve got your true idea of anything, there’s an end of the matter. You’re in possession; you know; you have fulfilled your thinking destiny. You are where you ought to be mentally; 20

GS II, 428.

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you have obeyed your categorical imperative; and nothing more need follow on that climax of your rational destiny. Epistemologically you are in stable equilibrium. Pragmatism, on the other hand, asks its usual question. »Grant an idea or belief to be true«, it says, »what concrete difference will its being true make in any one’s actual life? How will the truth be realized? What experiences will be different from those which would obtain if the belief were false? What, in short, is the truth’s cash-value in experiential terms?« The moment pragmatism asks this question, it sees the answer: True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. False ideas are those that we cannot. That is the practical difference it makes to us to have true ideas; that, therefore, is the meaning of truth, for it is all that truth is known-as. 21

Similarly, in Rosenzweig’s theologically inflected way of casting the issue, the work of redemption is the work of truth and that means that, since we are still in the world that stands in need of love – our world that is beset by wars, hatred, genocides, racism, sexism, and murder – we need a whole lot of loving in the form of a whole lot of truth-making. But how do we know that we are ›truly‹ loving in a way that transforms such patterns of hate, resentment, and self-serving rigidities? But James would still press Rosenzweig by asking: how do we know that we are acting ›in truth‹ by assimilating »true ideas« into our actual lives? Responding for Rosenzweig, I maintain that we can only be ›certain‹ that we are acting ›in truth‹ through a process Rosenzweig describes as Bewährung, which literally means »to make something true« but in practical usage involves ›showing‹ that something is true to others in the world in the form of embodying the action in my practice, in holding true a ›maintaining‹ and ›continuing‹ of my practice, my ritual, my ethically informed acts. By doing so, I thereby create the certainty of confidence in myself to not only to continue to act in such self-regulated way in the future but, by ›lived life‹ example, normatively recommend this way for others to similarly act, emboldened with corresponding confidence. 21

William James, Pragmatism. A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1907, 200 f.

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Rosenzweig begins the section »The Spirit (psychology)«, subtitled »In the Truth«, with the indicative assertion about self-identity, as an ›emboldening‹ and enactive spatio-temporal process: Wir finden uns wieder. Wir finden uns vor. Aber wir müssen den Mut haben, uns in der Wahrheit vorzufinden, den Mut, inmitten der Wahrheit unser Wahrlich zu sagen. Wir dürfen es. Denn die letzte Wahrheit – sie ist ja keine andre als unsre. Gottes Wahrheit ist nichts andres als die Liebe, mit der er uns liebt. Das Licht, aus dem die Wahrheit leuchtet, es ist nichts andres als das Wort, dem unser Wahrlich antwortet […]. So sprechen wir unser Wahrlich dort, wo wir uns finden. 22

What Rosenzweig articulates here is a nuanced distinction between finden and vorfinden. The former is used in simply finding something that one means when one uses finden – as in »Ich finde das gut« or »Ich fand mein Herz (oder meinen Mut), um in guten Glauben zu handeln« – while the use of the latter can often include a moment of surprise or the inclusion of empirically concrete conditions such as a particular time or place – such as: »Rate mal, wen ich dort vorgefunden habe«. The Duden dictionary provides these definitions for vorfinden: »an einem bestimmten Ort [in einem bestimmten Zustand] antreffen, finden […]; vorgefunden werden, sich finden«. For me, as an interested reader interpreting this passage, the implication is clear; namely, that what it means to be ›in the truth‹ is that one must say »truly« (wahrlich) to where one finds oneself in one’s »Standort und Sendung« 23 – in one’s concretely particular place and one’s moment, when the words of revelation, the actualizing words of love, transform the »person« (Persönlichkeit) with character into the daimonized self and into the beloved soul – and bind someone, as one is bound to an ethically imperative command, in relation to the lover who has attended to me in loving attention and in becoming messianically open to love an other. And now, firmly with Rosenzweig and looking forward to Levinas, how do I know the truth? »I know« with certainty, only when I find that I have received a gift of love that is given to me 22 23

GS II, 436. Ibid., 438.

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as »gift« (Gabe) from some other – as if the gift had no ›strings attached‹, and not as something with exchange value – do I learn to recognize the giver or learn what it means to be a giver. It is precisely at this point that we learn what Rosenzweig means by Bewährung that is other than the kind of impotent form of truth-as-verifiability we are ›given‹ in the tradition of analytic philosophy or in Hegel’s philosophy of recognition, which Kavka problematically aligns with a Masada-like adumbrated justification of martyrdom in the Jewish tradition. Rather, and boldly, Rosenzweig moves from death to life over the course of his work and with redemption we find, instead of the language of death and martyrdom, speech-acts of thanksgiving and gift-giving: Was ich bloß finde, gilt mir für herrenloses Gut, bestenfalls für eine verlorene Sache. Nur das Geschenk erfahre ich, grade weil und indem es mein wird, also das Eigentum des Gebers. So gilt mir die Wahrheit erst für Gottes Wahrheit, indem ich sie im Wahrlich zu meiner mache. Was aber kann ich also mein mache? Nur das, was mir an meinem inneren Hier und Jetzt zuteil wurde. 24

Only by ›acting‹ to make the gift of love mine in and through my historically particular place and time, my Jetzt-Zeit, that takes shape as my own most ›here‹ and ›now‹, is the process of Bewährung enacted. More specifically, Bewährung only happens as a complex conjoining of, on the one hand, freely turning towards another in loving speech-acts – in the ›here and now‹ – while, at the same time, rooting oneself more deeply in oneself as having already been loved, perhaps by a stranger or, organically and naturally, by a mother or father or sister or brother. Rosenzweig’s messianic structure of the Star entails a two-fold emphasis on rooting oneself in the ongoingly vital fire of keeping the home hearth burning while providing the rays of light that guide others – those who have not been loved or who are not loving – to be able to love in the future. This is content, the Gehalt, that Rosenzweig had in mind when he says that we only have that one part of the truth that has been ›imparted‹ to us in our partic24

Ibid., 437.

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ular place and time. In his case, and for the book project named The Star of Redemption – if we accept his position – ›the Truth‹ that is to be bewährt needs multiple partners engaging in multiple dialogues on many different levels and from many different perspectives in order to bring such a ›Truth‹ to ›true‹ actualization. This is an open-ended task that – for the sake of addressing actual oppressions, alienations, exploitations, and exiles in an actually ›existing‹ world – can only be envisioned as an ideal in some distant, empirically uncertain messianic future. Moreover, and minimally, this would include Jews, Christians, and pagans. And unlike the closed-systems of logical positivism or of Hegel’s philosophy of recognition, for Rosenzweig, the future remains unknown and unknowable but, nonetheless, the present that includes our dialogical partners includes the imperative demand that each of us learn to teach each other that the experience of loving entails many kinds of hands and open hearts in helping to co-create a more loving world.

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Autorenverzeichnis / Authors Index

Hanoch Ben Pazi is the Chair of Department of Jewish Philosophy at Bar-Ilan University. His research is dedicated to contemporary philosophy and modern Jewish thought, especially to the philosophical writings and Jewish thought of Martin Buber, Franz Rosenzweig, Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida. Among his many publications are the following books: Interpretation as Ethical Act. The Hermeneutics of Emmanuel Levinas (Tel Aviv: Resling, 2012) [Heb.]; Zionism: A Levinasian View – Identity, Ethics, and Responsibility (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 2018) [Heb.]. Luca Bertolino is Associate Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Turin. His research interests include Jewish philosophy in the twentieth century, neo-Kantianism, postmodernism, philosophical practice. Among his recent publications on Rosenzweig: »Rosenzweig in prospettiva. Il nuovo pensiero tra vecchia filosofia e filosofia della differenza«, Archivio di Filosofia 86 (2018), no. 1, 221–231; as co-editor, with Irene Kajon, Filosofia 63 (2018), monographic issue on »Franz Rosenzweig: storia e redenzione«; »Bach in die Synagogen!. Erlösende Noten in Franz Rosenzweig«, Naharaim. Zeitschrift für deutsch-jüdische Literatur und Kulturgeschichte / Journal of German-Jewish Literature and Culture History 14 (2020), no. 2, 209–223. Stephanie Brenzel is an independent scholar specializing in modern Jewish thought. She received her Ph.D. from Northwestern University in 2019 and served as the Igor Kaplan Postdoctoral Fellow in Jewish-Christian Relations at the University of Toronto and Toronto School of Theology in 2020. She is currently work263

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ing on two projects: a monograph on the »New Thinking« and translations of Rosenzweig’s essays on Hermann Cohen. Gabriella Caponigro holds a Ph.D. in Humanistic Studies from the »Gabriele d’Annunzio« University of Chieti-Pescara. Her scientific research focuses on contemporary Jewish philosophy, particularly on Rosenzweig, Levinas and Benjamin. She published several scientific papers and the monography Unde malum? Libertà e tirannia nel pensiero di Franz Rosenzweig (preface by Bernhard Casper, Pisa: ETS, 2015). The scope of her current work also includes interreligious dialogue. In this domain she has edited the collective volume Figli di Abramo. Il dialogo fra religioni cinquant’anni dopo Nostra Aetate (preface by Francesco Paolo Ciglia, Pisa: ETS, 2017). Ellen De Doncker is a Ph.D. student in Biblical Studies at the Catholic University of Louvain (UCLouvain). She received a Master in Philosophy at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (KU Leuven) in 2018 and a Master in Biblical Studies at UCLouvain in 2020. Her research interests include Jewish philosophy (modern and medieval) and textual criticism of the Old Testament. Martin Fricke, Ph.D., is Synodal Assessor of the Evangelischer Kirchenkreis Düsseldorf and Protestant Chairman of the Gesellschaft für Christlich-Jüdische Zusammenarbeit Düsseldorf. His research interests include philosophy of dialogue and themes of the Christian-Jewish dialogue. Selected publications: Franz Rosenzweigs Philosophie der Offenbarung. Eine Interpretation des Sterns der Erlösung (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2003); »Tillich und Rosenzweig: Korrelation als Grundfigur neuen Religionsdenkens«, in: Yehoyada Amir, Yossi Turner, Martin Brasser (ed.), Faith, Truth, and Reason. New Perspectives on Franz Rosenzweig’s ›Star of Redemption‹ (Freiburg/München: Karl Alber, 2012), 223–243; »›Lesen Sie den Stern der Erlösung‹ : Zur Aktualität von Kornelis Heiko Miskottes Rosenzweig-Interpretation«, Rosenzweig Jahrbuch / Rosenzweig Yearbook 11 (2018), 173– 185. 264

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Eveline Goodman-Thau, born in Vienna in 1934, is in Israel since 1956. Professor of Jewish and Western Philosophy and Rabbi, founder of the Hermann-Cohen-Akademie in Buchen (Odenwald), she has held numerous guest professorships in Kassel, Oldenburg, Halle, Bern, Heidelberg, Berlin, Harvard, Osnabrück, Lüneburg. Among her works: Zeitbruch. Zur messianischen Grunderfahrung in der jüdischen Tradition (Berlin: Akademie, 1995), Aufstand der Wasser. Jüdische Hermeneutik zwischen Tradition und Moderne (Berlin/Wien: Philo, 2002), Erbe und Erneuerung. Kulturphilosophie aus den Quellen des Judentums (Wien: Picus, 2004), Vom Archiv zur Arche. Geschichte als Zeugnis (Bodenburg: Verlag Edition AV, 2018). Irene Kajon, former Professor of Moral Philosophy at Sapienza University of Rome, is the Vice President of the Internationale Rosenzweig Gesellschaft. Her actual research in the field of philosophical anthropology, in dialogue with Jewish and Christian sources and with art and literature, concerns the problem of humanism today. Among her books: Ebraismo e sistema di filosofia in Hermann Cohen (Padova: Cedam, 1989); Contemporary Jewish Philosophy. An Introduction (2nd ed., London: Routledge, 2010); Ebraismo laico. La sua storia e il suo senso oggi (Assisi: Cittadella Editrice, 2012). She was professor in UNAM (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México) and Université d’Aix en ProvenceMarseille; visiting scholar at Columbia University (New York), McGill University (Montreal) and Université de Montréal. Ephraim Meir is Professor Emeritus of Modern Jewish Philosophy at Bar-Ilan University and President of the Internationale Rosenzweig-Gesellschaft. For several years he was the Levinas Guest Professor for Jewish Dialogue Studies and Interreligious Theology at the Academy of World Religions, University of Hamburg. Among his recent works: Dialogical Thought and Identity. Trans-Different Religiosity in Present Day Societies (Berlin/Boston and Jerusalem: Walter de Gruyter and Hebrew University Magnes Press, 2013), Interreligious Theology. Its Value and Mooring in Modern Jewish Philosophy (Berlin/Boston and Jerusalem: Walter 265

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de Gruyter and Hebrew University Magnes Press, 2015), OldNew Jewish Humanism (Tel Aviv: Idra Publishing, 2018), Faith in the Plural (Tel Aviv: Idra Publishing, 2019) and The Marvel of Relatedness (Tel Aviv: Idra Publishing, 2021). For more information see https://www.ephraimmeir.com Gesine Palmer, Ph.D., has been working in academic positions until 2006 at the Freie Universität Berlin and the Forschungsstätte der Evangelischen Studiengemeinschaft in Heidelberg. Her research interest is Jewish philosophy of the twentieth century (with a focus on Hermann Cohen and Franz Rosenzweig) and interreligious dialogue. Since 2007 she works as a free-lanced eulogist and author in Berlin. She is associated with the Zentrum für Jüdische Studien Berlin-Brandenburg. Selected publications: as editor, Fragen nach dem einen Gott. Die Monotheismusdebatte im Kontext (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007); »›In 100 Jahren hat die Welt wieder eine Form und wieder ein Gesetz‹. Rosenzweig’s Polemics on Law and Love«, Rosenzweig Jahrbuch / Rosenzweig Yearbook 8/9 (2014), 193–207; Tausend Tode. Über Trauer reden (Berlin: PalmArtPress, 2020). For more information see https://gesine-palmer.de Giacomo Petrarca is Assistant Professor in Theoretical Philosophy at Vita-Salute San Raffaele University of Milan. He obtained his Ph.D. discussing a research on the problem of law in Paul of Tarsus and Franz Rosenzweig. His research interests are political theology (in particular the problem of law), Jewish thought and philosophy of interpretation. Among his publications: Nel vuoto del tempo. Rosenzweig, Hegel e lo shabbàt (preface by Vincenzo Vitiello, Milano: Jaca Book, 2015); La legge per la legge. Paolo, Spinoza, Rosenzweig (preface by Gérard Bensussan, Livorno: Salomone Belforte, 2018).; »Totality and Community. Rosenzweig versus Hegel«, Philosophy & Society / Filosofija & Društvo 31 (2020), no. 4, 449–660. Elias Sacks is Associate Professor of Religious Studies and Director of the Program in Jewish Studies at the University of Colorado 266

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Boulder. His research interests include Jewish thought, JewishChristian relations, philosophy of religion, hermeneutics, religion and politics, and religious ethics. He is the author of Moses Mendelssohn’s Living Script. Philosophy, Practice, History, Judaism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2017) and published some of the first English translations of Mendelssohn’s Hebrew writings. Sacks is currently working on a study of Nachman Krochmal’s politics. Josiah Simon is a teacher, independent scholar and translator living in Austin, Texas. He holds a Ph.D. from the University of Oregon and has taught German and Humanities at the University of New Mexico, Schreiner University, California State University Long Beach, Carleton College and Valparaiso University. His recent publications include »Journey to the ›Realm of the Mothers‹ : Franz Rosenzweig’s Response to Goethe’s Faust«, in: Jacob-Ivan Eidt, Christoph Daniel Weber (eds.), Goethe’s »Bildung«. Dialog Between Tradition and Innovation (New York: Peter Lang, 2019), 33–50, and several contributions to the newly founded Hans Ehrenberg-Studien (Kamen: Hartmut Spenner). Jules Simon is Professor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Texas at El Paso. He teaches and writes in the areas of phenomenology, ethical theory, aesthetics, and philosophy of the city. He has authored Art and Responsibility. A Phenomenology of the Diverging Paths of Rosenzweig and Heidegger (New York/London: Continuum, 2011), co-edited The Double Binds of Ethics after the Holocaust. Salvaging the Fragments (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), and is currently co-translating Rosenzweig’s Hegel and the State with Josiah Simon (Routledge, forthcoming 2022). Naomi Tanaka, is Lecturer of Philosophy of Education at the Minami Kyusyu University (Japan). In 2016 she obtained her Ph.D. from the Ochanomizu University on a thesis titled »Research as a Formative Theory in the Dialogical Thinking. From H. Arendt to F. Rosenzweig«. Her research interests include edu267

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cation, dialogue, translation, ethics, and the thought of Hannah Arendt. She co-translated some of Rosenzweig’s texts about the Freies Jüdisches Lehrhaus and the theory of translation etc. with Shinichi Muraoka in the book: Franz Rosenzweig, Atarashii Shikou [The New Thinking], Tokyo: Hosei University Press, 2019). Francesco Valerio Tommasi is a tenure track Associate Professor at Sapienza University of Rome. He teaches History of Philosophy and History of Metaphysics and his main research interests are in classic German philosophy and in contemporary philosophy of religion. Among his publications: Philosophia transcendentalis. La questione antepredicativa e l’analogia tra la Scolastica e Kant (Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 2008), L’analogia della persona in Edith Stein (Pisa/Roma: Fabrizio Serra, 2012), Umanesimo profetico. La complicata relazione tra cattolicesimo e cultura (Cinisello Balsamo: Edizioni San Paolo, 2015). Sebastian Wogenstein is Associate Professor of German and Comparative Literature at the University of Connecticut. He is Faculty Associate of the Human Rights Institute and the Center for Judaic Studies and Contemporary Jewish Life. His research focuses primarily on German Jewish literature and intellectual history as well as the intersection of literature and human rights. He is the author of Horizonte der Moderne. Tragödie und Judentum von Cohen bis Lévinas (Heidelberg: Winter, 2011) and co-editor of Globale Kulturen – Kulturen der Globalisierung (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013) and An Grenzen: Literarische Erkundungen (Saarbrücken: Wehrhahn, 2007). Lucas Scott Wright is a Ph.D. student at the University of California at Irvine. His current research examines narrative and history in German idealism, modern Jewish thought in Europe, and Latin American philosophies and theologies.

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Internationale Rosenzweig Gesellschaft (IRG) / International Rosenzweig Society (IRS)

Membership fees: Students: 10 Euros. Lecturers: 20 Euros. Professors: 50 Euros. You can join the society online by using the form on the IRG website (http://www.rosenzweig-gesellschaft.org/mitglied-werden/) or by contacting our treasurer, Prof. Christian Wiese (c.wiese@em. uni-frankfurt.de). Vorstand / Board: President: Prof. em. Dr. Ephraim Meir (Ramat Gan) [email protected] Vice-president: Prof. Dr. Irene Kajon (Rome) [email protected] Vice-president and treasurer: Prof. Dr. Christian Wiese (Frankfurt) [email protected] Member: Prof. Dr. Agata Bielik-Robson (Nottingham) [email protected] Member: Prof. Dr. Yudit Greenberg (Winter Park) [email protected] Member: Prof. Dr. Hans-Christoph Askani (Geneva) [email protected] Wissenschaftlicher Beirat / Members of the Scientific Committee: Stefano Bancalari (Rome) Luca Bertolino (Turin) 269

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Francesco Paolo Ciglii (Chieta-Pescara) Danielle Cohen-Levinas (Paris) Ángel Garrido-Maturano (Resistencia) Eveline Goodman-Thau (Jerusalem) Adriano Fabris (Pisa) Martin Kavka (Tallahassee) Gesine Palmer (Berlin) Silvia Richter (Berlin) Jules Simon (El Paso) Ynon Wygoda (Jerusalem) Scientific Secretary: Silvia Richter (Berlin) Comptrollers: Gesine Palmer (Berlin) Hanoch Ben-Pazi (Ramat Gan) Bankverbindung / Bank Information: Kasseler Sparkasse BLZ: 520 503 53 Kontonummer: 000111 0711 IBAN: DE58 520 503 53 000111 0711 SWIFT-BIC: HELADEF1KAS Weitere Informationen / Further information: www.rosenzweig-gesellschaft.org

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