Rome and the Neapolitan Revolution of 1820–1821: A Study in Papal Neutrality 9780231889919

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Laibach

Trieste

LOMBARDY Verona

MILAN

!VENICE

Istria

Pavia Mantua Tiscenza Ferrara P A R M A

Comacchio Ravenna

FLORENCE

Urbino Ancona

Macerata • Fermo Ripatransone Ascoli Orvieto

Teramo

Viterbo K I N G D O M

Civitavecchia

OF N A P L E S

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Benevento Capua NAPLES

T H E

PAPAL

STATE

AND

ADJOINING

COUNTRIES,

1820

Avellino

ROME AND THE NEAPOLITAN REVOLUTION OF 1820-1821 A Study in Papal Neutrality

JOSEPH H BRADY, Ph.D.,S.T.D. P R O F E S S O R OF H I S T O R Y SF.TON H A L L C O L L E G E

NEW COLUMBIA

YORK

UNIVERSITY

PRESS

LONDON : P. S. KING & SON, LTD. 1937

Nihil obstat C . J.

KANE

Censor

Librotum

imprimatur *

THOMAS

J.

WALSH

Bishop of

Newark

Newark, A'. J., April 30, 1937

COPYRIGHT, 1937 BY COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

PREFACE THE scope of this study is a limited one. It is not intended as a history of the revolution that took place in Naples in 1820 and 1821, though the author hopes that he has provided an outline of that affair adequate for the general reader. Neither is it intended as a study of the international situation created by that revolution. The author's purpose has been simply to portray the reaction of the Papal government to the revolution in Naples, and the part it played in the subsequent international discussion and settlement of it. In presenting the study, the author wishes to express his appreciation to the Most Reverend Thomas J. Walsh, D.D., Bishop of the Catholic Diocese of Newark, N . J., through whose generous patronage he enjoyed the opportunity for study and research. Professor Carlton J. H . Hayes of Columbia University has been most helpful, both by his inspiration and by his practical suggestions. Mr. Thomas H . Thomas, Lecturer in History at Columbia University, has also made suggestions of great value which have been incorporated in the text. Monsignor Angelo Mercati, Prefect of the Vatican Archives, and his assistants were untiring in guiding the author in his research. N o less helpful has been the Library Staff of Columbia University, particularly Miss Bernero of the Paterno Library. Professors Gerald G. Walsh, S.J., of Fordham University, and Joseph Grisar, S.J., of the Gregorian University, and the Reverend Pietro Pirri, S.J., of the Civiltà Cattolica, in Rome, were most generous in placing at the author's disposal the benefits of their experience. T o these, and to others as well, the author takes this opportunity to express his deep gratitude. JOSEPH H . B R A D Y MAY

I,

1937. S

TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE INTRODUCTION

9 CHAPTER

NEAPOLITAN

I

R E V O L U T I O N AND P A P A L

QUANDARY

1. B e g i n n i n g of the Revolution 2. Overthrow of the Papal Government in Benevento and Corvo 3. Papal Attitude towards the Revolutionary Régime 4. Developing Strain between the Papacy and Naples 5. Apprehension within the Papal State . CHAPTER

20 26 34 42

II

I N T E R N A T I O N A L C O M P L I C A T I O N S AND P A P A L

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

17 Ponte

POLICY

Austrian H o s t i l i t y . . Papal Attitude towards Possible Austrian Intervention Preparations for the Congress of Laibach G r o w i n g Threat of W a r Papal Participation in the Congress of Laibach CHAPTER AUSTRO-NEAPOLITAN

52 57 64 70 77

III

W A R AND P A P A L

NEUTRALITY

1. T h e Question of Austrian Occupation of Ancona and the Legations 94 2. Papal Plans for Maintaining Neutrality 104 3. Difficulties A r i s i n g from the Presence of Austrian Troops on Papal Territory no 4. Fear for Rome, and Danger from Neapolitan Irregulars . . 123 5. Neapolitan Troops on Papal Territory and Anti-Clerical Legislation in Naples 131 CHAPTER

IV

A F T E R M A T H O F R E V O L U T I O N AND

WAR

1. Restoration of the Papal Government in Benevento and Ponte Corvo 2. T h e Questions of Exiles and of Indemnification 7

142 150

8

TABLE

OF

CONTENTS PAGE

3. T h e Question of Anti-Clerical Legislation in Naples 4. Collection of Debts from Austria and Naples 5. Getting the Austrians out of Bologna

159 164 171

CONCLUSION

177

APPENDIX: Austro-Papal Negotiations over Ancona in 1821

181

BIBLIOGRAPHY

189

INDEX OF NAMES AND P L A C E S

197

INTRODUCTION IN the early days of July, 1820, a revolution, bloodless, poorly organized, and successful largely because of the ineptitude of the government in meeting it, transformed the Kingdom of Naples from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy in less than a week's time. On the second of the month, two lieutenants of the Royal A r m y , Michele Morelli and Giuseppe Silvati, deserted from their post at Nola, near the capital, with one hundred and twenty-seven followers. W i t h cries of " God, Constitution and K i n g , " the group marched to Avellino, the location of an important military post; here they were joined by other comrades-in-arms. T h e movement gathered strength with each passing day; a march on the capital was probable at any time. When news of the rising reached the aged K i n g Ferdinand, he was aboard ship in the Bay of Naples, having just returned from Sicily. It was only with the greatest difficulty that he was persuaded to land and face the threatening revolt. His counsellors were divided, however, as to what should be done after he had come ashore; while they debated, the number of the rebels increased. A t length General Carascosa was commissioned to go to Avellino to disperse them, but, because the government did not trust him fully, he was given no men to support the demands he was to make on the rebels. Meanwhile General Guglielmo Pepe, whom the government had passed over for Carascosa because it distrusted him still more, had fled from Naples to Avellino, where he quickly assumed the leadership of the movement for a constitution. Pepe reached Avellino on July 5; on the following day an embassy was sent to Naples, where it presented to Ferdinand, in the name of the " nation in arms," a demand for the granting of a constitution. The K i n g , in fear and perhaps in the hope of gaining time, promised to comply within eight days. The embassy appeared satisfied and withdrew, but returned the next 9

IO

INTRODUCTION

day to demand the immediate promulgation of the Spanish Constitution of 1812; this was selected not so much f o r its suitability as for its availability. This demand the K i n g likewise accepted, and on July 7 the Spanish Constitution was made the law of the land in the Kingdom of Naples. T w o days later General Pepe made a triumphal entry into the capital at the head of the rebels from Avellino and of others w h o joined them to show their enthusiasm for the new era about to dawn. In promulgating the constitution Ferdinand announced that his poor health would render him incapable of carrying into effect the new order of things. H e therefore appointed his son and heir, the Duke of Calabria, as his Vicar or Regent, with full authority to act in his name. The K i n g was able, however, to appear publicly on the 13th to take an oath to support the newly granted constitution; his son took the same pledge. The Prince Regent inaugurated his rule by appointing a provisional Giunta of fifteen members to administer the affairs of state until the Parliament could be elected and convened. A new ministry was selected, headed by the Duke of Campochiaro as Minister of Foreign Affairs. In the course of the next few weeks, most of the foreign representatives of the old government were removed because they refused to accept the new, but there seems to have been little immediate change in the internal administration of the state. On July 22, the Regent ordered the election of a National Parliament. It was to be by indirect suffrage, and take place between August 20 and September 3. The assembly thus elected convened on October 1. On that day the K i n g appeared to open the session, and to renew his oath of fidelity to the constitution he had granted. A revolt within a revolt was created when the Sicilians seized the opportunity provided by the disturbed state of affairs in the capital to strike a blow for autonomy. In the middle of July a provisional Giunta at Palermo drove out General Naselli, the Royal Governor, and sent a delegation to Naples to present

INTRODUCTION

II

their demands for an administration distinct from that of the mainland. T h i s the provisional government in Naples refused, and at the end of August dispatched General Florestano Pepe with a force of 4,000 men to bring the Sicilians to obedience. Pepe, however, succeeded only in securing a truce at the beginning of October, under the terms of which the Sicilian provinces were to send representatives to Palermo to determine the real will of the people with regard to their future status. T h e Naples Parliament rejected this plan, and sent General Colletta to replace Pepe, with an increased force and with orders to reduce the Sicilians to subjection, and to force them to accept their place in the united nation under the constitution. The revolution which in three months had imposed a constitution on the K i n g and given to the nation a Parliament was the result of the united effort of the army and of a secret society known as the Carboneria. The latter organization (about which, from its very nature, little is known with certainty) was a product of the Napoleonic era in Italy. Its membership reached all parts of the peninsula, but was particularly numerous in Naples. Its political program was somewhat vague and uncertain but centered, in the years after the Congress of Vienna, on the gaining of a constitutional f o r m of government by which the rights of citizens would be guaranteed and the arbitrary power of the K i n g restrained. It had aspirations, too, for the independence of Italy through the destruction of the foreign (Austrian) influence with its governments. The Neapolitan Carbonari were to be found chiefly in the army; most of the officers at least are thought to have joined the society by 1820. This was only natural, as the Neapolitan army of that time was recruited largely from among those who had seen service in the Napoleonic wars, and who therefore were already familiar with the ideals for which the Carboneria strove. Besides this majority group, a minority was made up of business and professional men; not a few of the clergy were likewise affiliated with it.

12

INTRODUCTION

It was, then, the Carbonaro army which imposed its will on the King. The actual revolt was centered in the limited area bounded by the city of Naples, Nola (where the first open disaffection occurred) and Avellino (where the rebels concentrated under the leadership of General P e p e ) . The mass of the population in the provinces of the kingdom seem neither to have opposed the movement, nor to have furthered it; they merely acquiesced in its accomplishments. Revolutions usually have a cause. The revolt in Naples is to be attributed first to the example given by the apparently successful rising in Spain which at the beginning of 1820 had won for that country the same Constitution of 1812. A second cause is to be found in the theoretical political ambitions of the Carboneria. The revolution is not, however, to be charged to the bad government of Ferdinand, which, had it existed, would have been the greatest excuse for rebellion. The government of the restored Bourbon monarch was " old régime," of course, and no doubt left much to be desired, but it does not seem to have been singularly oppressive or detested by the mass of the population. This seems to be confirmed by the utter lack of popular participation in the revolt; the people as a whole did not seize the opportunity to throw off the yoke of an oppressor, but simply stood by, quiescent observers of a phenomenon they probably understood none too well. It was for this reason that the English cabinet was outspoken in its condemnation of the revolt, which it regarded (on the strength of the reports of its representative in Naples, William a'Court) as unprovoked and ungrateful treachery of the army to its benevolent K i n g . So Castlereagh from the beginning urged Metternich to intervene single-handed (he was, and remained, opposed to any united action of the five Powers) because the Naples revolution was a menace to the Austrian possessions in Italy and because it had been entirely unjustified. The condemnation which the English ministry levelled at the revolt in Naples was mild in comparison with the reaction it created elsewhere in Europe. The new government was recog-

INTRODUCTION

13

nized only by Spain, its brother-in-rebellion, and by Holland. Austria was most hostile. It continued to recognize Count R u f f o as the ambassador from Naples, though the provisional Giunta had removed him from office because of his refusal to take the oath to the new constitution ; it later refused to admit the Duke of Gallo whom Naples sent to replace Ruffo. The other states of Europe followed the lead of Vienna in declining to recognize the constitutional government or to open diplomatic relations with it. Neighbor to the K i n g d o m of Naples in 1820 was the Papal State. Due to this proximity we might suppose that the revolution exerted even more influence there than in more distant states. A s a matter of fact, its progressive internal developments and international complications involved the Papal government in a complex of conflicting interests that well tested the diplomatic talents of its leaders, and illustrated in a remarkable manner the political policy of the Papacy. Pope Pius V I I was both head of the universal Church and sovereign of a temporal kingdom. It was this double character which rendered his position so difficult in the situation created by the revolution which took place at his very door. A s the religious head of all Catholics, the Pope was by tradition and principle indifferent to the political changes in the nearby state. " The position of His Holiness as Head of the Church," wrote Cardinal Consalvi, Papal Secretary of State, at the time, " obliges him to have care for the interests of religion in the Kingdom [of Naples], whatever may be the form of government that may be adopted there." A s long as the interests of religion were safeguarded, absolute monarchy, constitutional monarchy, even republic, were acceptable forms of government to him. Only a few months before the revolt in Naples, the K i n g of Spain had granted the same constitution under very similar circumstances; Pius V I I had readily recognized the new order of things. In the case of Naples, at least he could show no animosity to the rebel regime, lest such an attitude be harmful to the religious welfare of the Neapolitan people.

14

INTRODUCTION

A more material consideration, too, moved the Pope to adopt the same policy. T h e Papal State, his state, was adjacent to the southern kingdom along an extended and irregular boundaryline. T h e Papal government had at its disposal only a small military force (between 7,000 and 8,000 men), most of which was scattered in permanent garrisons throughout the state. Even if it could have all been concentrated on the border, it would have been inadequate for defense if the Neapolitans, in a hostile frame of mind, should attempt an invasion. Again in the words of Consalvi, " for this reason alone, the Holy Father, considered merely as a temporal sovereign, must refrain from any and every act that could present the appearance of hostility towards that [Neapolitan] government." T h e Pope could not, therefore, risk incurring the enmity of his neighbor by manifesting any opposition to its new government. F r o m motives both religious and political, then, Pius V I I was inclined to accept the new order in Naples which grew out of the July revolution. Y e t political motives of equal, if not greater weight, counselled the opposite course. The same proximity which made acquiescence advisable, provided a circumstance which rendered that very acquiescence dangerous. The Neapolitans had forced their king to grant a constitution. Might not the Pope's own subjects, seeing his apparent acceptance of the revolutionary régime in Naples, be moved by this example so nearby to demand a constitution for themselves? A n d that was something Pius V I I felt he could not grant. Incompatible as it was with the dominant political thought of the day throughout central and eastern Europe, a constitutional form of government for the states of the Church was regarded with particular aversion by the Papacy. The Church as an ecclesiastical organization is essentially absolute. Quasi-democratic perhaps in the selection of its supreme head, it admits no " constitutionalism," no limitation of monarchy, once that head has been chosen. In the grant of a political constitution, in the recognition of limitations of power in the political order, there was danger that a similar spirit might creep into the purely

INTRODUCTION

15

ecclesiastical order. If men might claim the right to restrict, even to dictate, the political powers of the head of the ecclesiastical state, might they not attempt the same in the purely religious sphere? N o Pope before Pius I X could see his way out of this difficulty; to Pius V I I and his Secretary of State, it was insoluble. A s Consalvi wrote in September, 1820: " I f any government in its elements is in contrast with those of a constitutional government, it is the Papal government. . . . The fundamental principle of constitutional government, if applied to the government of the Church, becomes a principle of heresy. If it were introduced in the government of the States of the Church, men would soon desire that it be extended to the government of the Church itself." The Pope could not, therefore, openly approve the new régime at Naples lest his own people be moved thereby to imitation. He could not oppose it, lest religion in Naples, and possibly his own domain, suffer in consequence. H e was, in short, in the delicate position of having to be at the same time indifferent to, and vitally concerned in, the course of events south of his border. A s a temporal ruler, he must have desired the suppression of the revolution, the restoration of the status quo ante. Y e t because of the relatively defenseless condition of his state, he had to refrain from anything that might arouse the wrath of his neighbor. A s head of the Church, too, he had to maintain good relations with Naples, for the religious welfare of its people. Difficult enough in itself, the Pope's position was made more so when Austria, with the backing of Russia and Prussia, entered the scene as the restorer of that status quo. That great Catholic power, traditional friend of the Papacy, now charged herself with the overthrow of the revolutionary government in Naples. Pius V I I , influenced by that traditional friendship and by his own aversion to a constitutional régime so close at hand, would have been inclined to second the Austrian effort. Y e t to do so would be such manifest hostility to Naples that his position as head of the Church forbade it. O n the other hand, in a

i6

INTRODUCTION

refusal to cooperate with Austria, there was danger of incurring her displeasure to the possible detriment of religion in the imperial domains; Austria, the enemy of revolution, might see in that refusal, that denial of an open condemnation, a tacit approval of what she had dedicated herself to destroy. A s Consalvi put it, " the strong disapproval, justly shown by the Great Powers . . . and the anti-revolutionary attitude they are assuming, oblige the Holy Father not to separate himself from them in a cause of common interest to all governments." Such was the situation which in 1820 and 1821 confronted Pius V I I and Cardinal Consalvi, his Secretary of State, who was the guiding spirit of the internal administration of the Papal government, as well as of its foreign policy. It was a situation which could be met only by a strict impartiality, by a neutrality which, while it would satisfy neither side, would at least give no positive grounds for dissatisfaction. The attempted preservation of that neutrality is the subject of the following pages.

CHAPTER I NEAPOLITAN REVOLUTION AND PAPAL QUANDARY I . B E G I N N I N G OF T H E REVOLUTION

THE outbreak of the Neapolitan revolution 1 should not have been a complete surprise at Rome. Since the previous May, Monsignor Olivieri, the Delegate 2 of Benevento (a Papal territory situated within the Kingdom of Naples), had been reporting the threatening state of affairs in the neighborhood. On June 7, he had given an accurate prediction of what was to happen: a political revolution in Naples in the near future would result in the overthrow of the Papal government in the Duchy of Benevento, accompanied by his own arrest, the removal from office of all Papal employees, and the disarming of the Papal Carabinieri.' Rome, however, did nothing until news of the actual revolt had been received, when steps were taken to prevent its spread across the border or its spontaneous imitation. A hurried survey of conditions throughout the Papal State, made by Cardinal Bernetti, head of the Papal Police, at Consalvi's direction, was encouraging; except for a few groups of malcontents, notably in Bologna, Forli, the Maritime Provinces and the Campagna, the only actual danger spot was the Duchy of Benevento, where the Carbonari were admittedly numerous and in close relationship with their " cousins " of 1 No written. Odierno Politico

adequate history of the Naples revolution of 1820-1821 has been The most complete accounts are found in: Michele Rosi's L'Italia (Torino, 1922-26), 1,385-739; Italo Raulich's Storia del Risorgimtnto d'ltalia (Bologna, 1920), I, 149-243-

2 Cf. below, p. 90, note 107, for an explanation of this and other terms used in reference to the organization of the Papal government. 3 Dispatch D. Benevento to Consalvi, June 7, 1820, in A V , S S , R165-118. An explanation of these and other symbols used in references is found in the Bibliography, pp. 189-190. 17

l8

ROME AND T H E

NEAPOLITAN

REVOLUTION

Naples; the Papal Army, small and scattered throughout the State, was loyal and no cause for apprehension.4 Nevertheless, Consalvi directed all government officials to keep a close watch on those who might cause trouble, but to avoid anything that would exasperate the people and thus create new enemies, as well as anything that might indicate apprehension on the part of the government and encourage those who might be hostile.* Special caution was urged against the possibility of Neapolitan agents entering the State to spread the doctrine of revolt,6 while to minimize the effect of the events at Naples on the people, a press censorship was established, prohibiting the publication of any news items dealing with them.7 More probable than domestic disturbance was invasion from across the border, whence Neapolitan rebels might come to seek refuge or support. Against this possibility such measures were taken as were permitted by the limited military resources of the Papal government. A border patrol was formed by withdrawing troops from the interior of the provinces and placing them in small numbers in the towns along the boundary. In this way Ceprano, Falvaterra, Ripa, Posi, Sonnino and Terracina in the Delegation of Frosinone, and San Benedetto, Grottamare, Porto di Fermo and other towns in the Delegations of Fermo and Ascoli were occupied within a few days after the outbreak of the revolution; * these three provinces were the most accessible from Naples, and therefore the most endangered. Orders were given that these troops were to oppose any armed force attempting to enter the Papal State; in case of necessity they 4 Report Bernetti to Consalvi, July 7. 1820, in AV, SS, R165-307. 5 Circular Consalvi to all LL. and DD., July 8, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-307. 6 Dispatch Consalvi to D. Civitavecchia, July 8, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-308. 7 Circular Consalvi to all LL. and DD., July 12, 13, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-307. 8Dispatches: D. Frosinone to Consalvi, July 8, 1820, and Consalvi to D. Frosinone, July 12, 1820, both in AV, SS, R165-118; Consalvi to DD. Ascoli, Fermo, July 12, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-307.

PAPAL

QUANDARY

19

might call upon the male population of the towns in the vicinity for help in offering resistance.* The strain which was placed on the Papal military establishment by the creation of the border patrol showed only too clearly its inadequacy. To remedy this condition and to build up the armed forces of the state for present and possible future needs, a campaign was begun to enlist volunteers; an inducement was held out in the form of a bonus, and all military officers were directed to bestir themselves in the search for suitable recruits.10 Later a further step was taken to the same end. On July 3, Cardinal Consalvi had published an edict intended to rid the state of the evils of idleness and unemployment; all men who were classed as osiosi and vagabonds, i. e., those who were physically fit, but without work or visible means of support, were ordered to change their way of life within ten days, under penalty of the law. 11 Now, when the need of more soldiers arose, this edict was utilized for that purpose; those who had not fulfilled its injunction were taken up and enrolled in the military ranks. 12 9 Dispatch Consalvi to D. Frosinone, July n , 1820, in AV, SS, R165-118. 10 Dispatch Consalvi to Military Congregation, July 14, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-307; also Circular Military Congregation to Commanders of Troops, July 15, 1820, in AV, SS, R190. 11 Edict of Secretary of State, July 3, 1820, in AV, SS, R149. 12 There is no record in the Vatican Archives of any order given for this enrollment in the army of men classified as osiosi and vagabondi, but much of the correspondence in R149 indicates that there was one. In August the Delegate at Ancona felt it necessary to counteract the impression created by it that a forced military conscription was being levied; he sent a Circular throughout the Delegation explaining that only those who had not obeyed the Edict of July 3 were being given the opportunity to make an honest living by serving in the Papal Army. (Dispatch D. Ancona to Consalvi, August 9, 1820, enclosing copy of Circular, in AV, SS, R149.) Many other reports from other sections of the Papal State during the fall of 1820 imply the existehce of the order in question.

20

ROME

AND

THE

NEAPOLITAN

REVOLUTION

2. O V E R T H R O W OF T H E P A P A L GOVERNMENT IN B E N E V E N T O AND P O N T E CORVO

The revolutionary fever in Naples was not long in spreading to the nearest Papal possessions. These were the Duchy of Benevento and the city of Ponte Corvo, both situated within the Kingdom of Naples; Benevento lay deep in foreign territory, some seventy miles from the nearest point on the border, and only thirty-five from the Neapolitan capital; Ponte Corvo was much closer, being ten miles from Ceprano on the border. Benevento was a distinct Delegation or Province, governed by Monsignor Olivieri; Ponte Corvo for administrative purposes was part of the Delegation of Frosinone. The people of Benevento were the first to follow the example given by the Neapolitan army. The Delegate had been conscious for some time that all was not well; he had been especially anxious on July 2, when great crowds gathered in the city's churches and piazzas to celebrate the traditional feast of the Madonna delle Grasie, but nothing unusual had happened. The rumors on the morning of the 5th, however, were more definite, sufficiently so to cause him to consult with his military officers on the measures to be adopted in case of trouble. That afternoon the flag of revolt was raised. About eight hundred armed men took possession of the city and proclaimed the Neapolitan constitution in force. The forty Papal Carabinieri who constituted the entire military force of the government retired to the Castello or fortress, as had been prearranged, except for four, who were cut off in an outpost; of these, three were killed by the rebels, while the fourth was taken prisoner. Within the Castello, which enclosed also the government offices and the residence of the Delegate, the Carabinieri stood on the defensive, frustrating an attempt to capture the place by closing and barring the gates. The whole of that night and the following day were passed in this state of armed inaction. In the evening of the 6th, Colonel Andrea Valianti, a Neapolitan who described himself

PAPAL

QUANDARY

21

as Presidente del Tribu Carbonaro presented himself at the Castello to ask for an interview with the Delegate, which was granted for the following day. Valianti came at the appointed time; the object of his mission was, he said, to present, as the representative of the people of Benevento, their petition for the annexation of the Duchy to the Kingdom of Naples; they wished the approval of the Delegate before sending it to the capital. Monsignor Olivieri refused his approval of any such violation of the rights of the Holy See, and added that he could not accept Valianti's claim to represent the people of Benevento. The rebel leader promised to bring with him others who would constitute a cross-section of the population. This he did on the 8th, appearing at the Castello with a group of professional and business men who reiterated their desire for union with Naples. The interview closed with the suggestion that if the Delegate could not accept the petition, he might wisely seek safety in flight; two days were granted to him to ask for instructions from Rome. A t the end of this period of grace, on the ioth, a formal passport, bearing the seal of the Tribu della Stella del Sannio all'Oriente di Benevento, and signed by Valianti, was presented to Monsignor Olivieri; and a formal military surrender was arranged between the Papal Carabinieri and the " Constitutional and Carbonaro Army of Benevento," by which the former were allowed to retire with all the honors of war. The Delegate, after issuing a formal protest against the violence done to his office and to his sovereign, made his departure on July n , accompanied by his troop of Carabinieri, and Papal government in Benevento was no more.18 In Ponte Corvo, the revolt which took place on July 9 was not the work of its own citizens, but of Neapolitan soldiers. On that day, a troop of about one hundred uniformed men, coming from San Germano in Naples, under the leadership of 13 The foregoing account is based on one dispatch of the Delegate at Benevento, dated July 7, 1820, and on a report which he made to Consalvi on July 19, 1820, after his return to Rome. Both are in A V , SS, R165-118.

22

ROUE

AND

THE

NEAPOLITAN

REVOLUTION

two officers named Pelagalli and Massarotti, invaded the city. Massarotti went at once to the Governor of the place, Giuseppe Tani, to inform him that they had come to set up in Ponte Corvo the constitutional system recently adopted in Naples. In the meantime, the Carbonaro tricolor was raised in the Piazza, amid shouts of " Long live the Constitution " by the soldiers and the small number of citizens who joined them. The six Papal Carabinieri who formed the garrison of the city were disarmed, as were all the other government agents in the vicinity. On the ioth, the Neapolitan soldiers withdrew, leaving the revolutionary government under the leadership of Giovanni F. Sparagani, a native of the city, supported by a council and a hastily organized civic guard. Several days were passed in an effort by the rebels to get assurance of Neapolitan support for their constitutional régime. A t last, relying on the promises made to them by General Minuotolo, commander of the royal force stationed at San Germano, they took the definite step of offering, in the name of the Kingdom of Naples, to retain the Governor in office if he would recognize the new authority ; a refusal would mean expulsion. Tani chose the second alternative, as did the Carabinieri, to whom the same choice had been given. All left together on July 16, the Governor registering a formal protest in the name of the Pope (as he had been instructed to do) against his forced departure.14 On the arrival of reports of these events at Rome, the Papal government prepared to vindicate its rights. Though Cardinal Consalvi admitted privately 15 that he did not believe that the two uprisings had been instigated by the Naples government, there was, nevertheless, some ground for the opposite opinion.1" 14 Undated " Relazione sull' accaduto rovesciamento del Governo Pontificio in Ponte Corvo li 9 Luglio, 1820," in A V , S S , R165-244. 15 Dispatch Consalvi to D. Frosinone, July 12, 1820, in A V , S S , R165-118. 16 Negotiations for the transfer of Benevento and Ponte Corvo from the Papacy to the Kingdom of Naples had, in accordance with a secret provision of a convention signed at Vienna on June 12, 1815, been instituted by Naples in December, 1819. They had progressed unsatisfactorily, chiefly on account

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Especially in the case of Ponte Corvo the innocence of Naples was at best doubtful. Neapolitan soldiers had invaded the city and given at least a start to the movement; General Minuotolo had more than half-heartedly promised to second the petition of the rebels for annexation to the kingdom. 17 Consalvi was awaiting only more precise details to call upon Naples for an explanation; he was ready, if that explanation were not satisfactory, to appeal to the Great Powers which had signed the Treaty of Vienna, by which the territory of the Holy See was guaranteed, to protect its rights. 18 These moves, however, were forstalled by the spontaneous disavowal of any and all responsibility by the Neapolitan government in the case of Benevento. The Duke of Campochiaro, Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote to that effect on July 12, pointing as evidence of good faith to the edict issued that day by order of the Prince Regent announcing his firm determination that no Neapolitan intervene in the affairs of Benevento, and to the instructions which had been sent to military and civil officers to prevent any armed men from crossing into Papal territory. He concluded with a pledge, in the names of the King and of the Regent, that Naples would never violate the territorial sovereignty of His Holiness. 19 This declaration of the Neapolitan government, with its " non-intervention " edict of July 12, cleared the atmosphere considerably. There was, it is true, no express mention of the of the apparent unwillingness of Naples to make an adequate territorial compensation for the cession of the two places by the Holy See. In March, 1820, Naples had unexpectedly and without notice to Rome appealed to the Austrian Emperor to act as mediator to settle the difficulty. (Dispatch Consalvi to Metternich, April 29, 1820, in AV, ANV-244.) Since then the matter had rested; might not Naples be taking advantage of the disorders of the moment to accomplish by force what it had failed to achieve by negotiations ? 17 Letter General Minuotolo to D. Frosinone, July 12, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-244. 18 Dispatches Consalvi to N. Paris, July 11, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-307; to CP. Naples, July 13, 1820, in AV, A N N . 19 Dispatch Campochiaro to Consalvi, July 12, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-307.

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matter of Ponte Corvo, but when Consalvi called the attention of Campochiaro to this omission 20 he was told that at the time of the declaration (July 12) nothing was known of what had occurred there, but that it was obviously included in the general promise to respect the Papal sovereignty; on receipt of reports covering the case, the orders given in connection with the affair of Benevento were renewed.21 This eminently correct attitude the Neapolitan government carried out not only in words, but also in acts. Even before the expulsion of Monsignor Olivieri from Benevento, Valianti had gone to Naples, on July 9, to ask for ratification of the Beneventans' desire to become part of the Kingdom of Naples; this petition the government rejected. 42 A second request, presented shortly afterwards by a delegation of three, Giaccomo Gioia, Giovanni Toria and Carlo Cardone, met with the same refusal. 28 Because of the compromising part played in the rising at Ponte Corvo by General Minuotolo, disciplinary measures were taken against him; he was removed from his command, recalled to Naples and replaced by General Arcovito." When Servideo di Nota and Filippo Filippi went to Naples from Ponte Corvo to ask for annexation or assistance, they were turned away empty-handed." The court of Rome had good reason to be satisfied with the course followed by Naples in the matter. The outspoken disavowal of any interest in the affairs of Benevento and Ponte Corvo served to discourage the rebels, so much so that the Benevento delegation, on the refusal of Naples to intervene, asked the Prince Regent to act as mediator between them and 20 Dispatch Coasalvi to Campochiaro, July 14, 1820, in A V , SS, R165-307. 21 Dispatch Campochiaro to Consalvi, July 18, 1820, in A V , SS, R165-307. 22 Dispatch Consalvi to L. Forli, July 26, 1820, in A V , SS, R165-307. 23 Dispatch CP. Naples to Consalvi, July 14, 1820, in A V , SS, R165-118. 24 Dispatch Campochiaro to Consalvi, July 18, 1820, enclosing Report of Minister of War, in A V , SS, R165-307. 25 Dispatches D. Frosinone to Consalvi, July 26, August 2, 1820, in A V , SS, R165-244.

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the Pope for favorable conditions for a resubmission to the Papal government.28 For the same reason, the Delegate of Frosinone had for some time high hopes that Ponte Corvo would voluntarily return to obedience.27 The refusal of Naples to cooperate with the rebels also tended to depress the spirits of those within the Papal State who might hope to effect a constitutional rising with the help of their " cousins " from beyond the border; this was particularly true of the Delegation of Frosinone, where the danger had seemed the greatest,2* and was admitted by Consalvi himself. 29 So much did the Cardinal believe the situation relieved, that he removed the censorship against the publication of any news relative to affairs in Naples.80 Even the best will in the world, however, on the part of the Neapolitan government did not restore the lost territories; and in order to provide for the future, Consalvi thought it advisable to notify the Great Powers of what had occurred, so that there might be no misunderstanding of the attitude of the Papal government towards the recovery of Benevento and Ponte Corvo. Accordingly, the Secretary of State at the beginning of August addressed to the representatives of Austria, Prussia, Russia and France in Rome, and to Lord Castlereagh in London, a note giving a detailed account of the uprisings in both places, and crediting the Naples government with the 26 Dispatch Campochiaro to Consalvi, July 18, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-307. Consalvi in his reply assured the Naples minister that the rebels could count on a general pardon f r o m His Holiness, but that he would not consider anything in the nature of " bargaining." (Consalvi to Campochiaro, July 25, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-307.) This attitude may have served to discourage the rebels from any hope of an immediate peace with His Holiness; at any rate nothing more was heard of the idea. 27 Dispatches D. Frosinone to Consalvi, August 2, 1820, in AV, SS, R165244, and September 13, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-118. 28 Dispatch D. Frosinone to Consalvi, August 2, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-244. 29 Dispatch Consalvi to N. Paris, July 21, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-307. 30 Dispatch Consalvi to L. Forli, July 26, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-307.

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measures it had taken to prevent any help from being extended to the rebels.81 3 . P A P A L A T T I T U D E TOWARDS T H E R E V O L U T I O N A R Y

REGIME

Though hopeful that the revolution in Naples would prove to be but a passing spasm of disorder, 12 the Papal government nevertheless was ready to face the possibility that it might result in a permanent change. On July 10, a special congregation of cardinals was formed to advise the Secretary of State on the affairs of Naples and on the policy of the Pope with regard to them.33 We do not know how frequently this " Congregation for the Naples Revolution " met, nor are there available any records of its deliberations; it was apparently called as needed by Consalvi, and invitations to only four meetings, those of July 10, 1 1 , 14 and 23, are recorded in the Vatican Archives. 34 The only clue to any of its discussions is found in a memorandum prepared by Consalvi for the session of July 1 1 . Since it forms an interesting forecast of the future Papal policy, the reproduction of it in detail may be pardoned. It was compiled in the form of questions which presumably were submitted to the congregation for consideration; the answers to them we find in the subsequent actions of the Papal government. The events at Naples [the memorandum began] must be considered from a threefold point of view: in themselves, in relation to Benevento and Ponte Corvo, and in relation to the danger to which they expose the entire Papal State. I. In themselves, they offer matter for the most serious consideration. It is certain that the Neapolitan constitution, like that of 31 Notes Consalvi to Ministers of France, Austria, Russia and Prussia in Rome, and to Castlereagh in London, August 2, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-118. 32Dispatches Consalvi to CP. Naples, July 7, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-118; July 11, 1820, in A V , A N N . 33 Note Consalvi to Cardinals Decano, Pacca, Delia Genga, Gabrielli, Doria, DeGregori, July 10, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-307. 34 Notes Consalvi to same Cardinals, July 10, 11, 14 and 23, 1820, in A V , SS, R165-307.

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Spain, proclaims the absolute independence of the Nation, and that consequently it will attack the rights of the H o l y See in the K i n g dom of the T w o Sicilies; whence arise the questions: 1 ) W h a t should be done to uphold the rights of the H o l y See ? 2 ) C a n the constitutional government of Naples be recognized by H i s Holiness ? 3 ) In the event of non-recognition, can the observance of the Concordat be demanded? II. [ W i t h regard to] Benevento and Ponte Corvo, it is foreseen that these will either give themselves to the K i n g d o m of Naples, or demand a constitution f r o m the Pope. 4 ) In the first case, what should be done ? Appeal to the P o w e r s guaranteeing the Vienna settlement ? 5 ) In the second case, should a representative constitution be given them? I I I . T h i s last question involves the principal issue arising f r o m the events in Naples in relation to the danger they create f o r the whole Papal State, i. e., 6) W h e t h e r the Pope can give a constitutional representative f o r m to his temporal government; in the event that this is answered affirmatively, w e must consider: 7 ) whether the Pope should adopt this form for Benevento and Ponte Corvo, or 8) whether their request, when made, should be denied, with the risk of the loss of these territories to the Holy See. In the event that it is decided that the Pope cannot adopt a constitutional f o r m in his temporal government, w e must consider : 9) whether it is expedient to appeal to the Vienna P o w e r s ; 10) whether, if the E m p e r o r of Austria offers to send troops to prevent an insurrection, the offer should be accepted; 1 1 ) whether, if he de facto sends them to protect his o w n States in Italy f r o m danger, opposition should be m a d e ; 12) what measures should be taken to maintain the tranquility and security of the State. 85 35 Memorandum of Consalvi, July 11, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-307.

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The policy of the Papal government towards Naples, as developed f r o m the discussion of the foregoing questions, dictated the protective measures of self-defense already referred to. It included also an effort to avoid anything that might antagonize the people or government of Naples against the Church or the States of the Church, and the decision to accept the revolutionary government as the de facto government of the country, but to refrain from formally recognizing it, at least for the moment. Because of the unrest and excitement throughout the Kingdom of Naples during the first days of the revolution, there was danger that even the appearance of intervention on the part of the Papal government might have disastrous consequences. An occasion for just that was provided by an agreement made some years before between the two states whereby the police of either, in the pursuit of criminals, might cross the frontier freely and without formality. The Delegate of Frosinone, realizing that such an incident at the moment might be looked upon as a hostile invasion, gave orders early in July that no Papal force, military or police, should set foot on Neapolitan soil. For the same reason, though he knew of the dangerous conditions existing in Ponte Corvo, and the inadequacy of the Papal force stationed there, he refrained f r o m sending reinforcements." In spite of these precautions, Naples took umbrage at the movement of Papal troops towards the border; Campochiaro, in stating the position of Naples in regard to the Benevento revolt, seized the opportunity to complain of the unfortunate impression that had been created in the minds of his people, and to ask that care be taken, by the most stringent regulation, against any provocative " incident." iT Consalvi, in his reply, pointed out the purely defensive character of the troop movements that had been made. H e indicated, in the small number of troops at the disposal of the Papal government and in the 36 Dispatch D. Frosinone to Consalvi, July g, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-118. 37 Dispatch Campochiaro to Consalvi, July 12, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-307.

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essentially pacific character of its head, the surest guarantees that no hostile plans were being formulated, and reported the voluntary suspension just made of the exercise of the right of crossing the border in the pursuit of criminals. The recent invasion of Ponte Corvo by Neapolitan soldiers, he concluded, was ample justification for whatever measures of defense the Papal government had taken or might take." Even in dealing with Austria, Rome was careful to avoid anything that could give offense to the south. In the early days of July, a conversation of Consalvi with Gennotte, the Austrian Charge d'Affaires in Rome, brought to light the possibility that the Emperor might offer to send troops into the Papal State to preserve order. This, of course, would be an open reflection on Naples, and the Cardinal, also desirous of avoiding the expense and the popular discontent which the presence of such troops would involve, directed the Nuncio in Vienna to do what he could to prevent the offer being made; he was not, however, to let it be known that he had been instructed to do so." Later, in August, the Vienna cabinet communicated to the several Italian courts the points of its policy in the situation created by the Naples revolution; the assembly of a strong military force in the Lombardo-Venetian provinces was announced, and the Italian states were asked to join Austria in a " strong and pronounced moral attitude against" the lawless elements which had seized the Kingdom of Naples.40 Consalvi accompanied the official reply of Rome (which, while acknowledging the evils of secret societies and the " sectarian " character of the revolution in Naples, passed over in silence the matter of cooperation with Austria against the revolution) with a confidential letter to Metternich, in which he stressed the limits within which any such cooperation would have to be confined. These limits were 38 Dispatch Consalvi to Campochiaro, July 14, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-307. 39 Dispatch Consalvi to N. Vienna, July 13, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-307. 40 Note Gennotte (Austrian Charge d'Affaires) to Consalvi, August 10, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-307.

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necessarily imposed by the character of His Holiness as Head of the Church, and by the relatively defenseless condition of the Papal State ; because of the former, any hostile activity on the part of the Roman government would be detrimental to the interests of religion in Naples, a thoroughly Catholic state; because of the latter, even an appearance of hostility would bring invasion and revolution to the Papal State. Consequently, if the Emperor, in calling for the union of the Italian courts against the Naples revolution, implied measures of active hostility against it, the Pope would be unable to cooperate; short of that, however, Vienna would find Rome in perfect agreement. 41 A short time later rumors began to spread in Naples to the effect that the Pope had actually asked Austria to send troops to preserve order within the Papal State, and to undertake the recovery of Benevento. In order to prevent the creation of bad feeling by these rumors, Consalvi instructed the Papal representatives there to deny them at every opportunity. 42 " A s both of these rumors are entirely false," he wrote to Giustiniani, " you will deny them frankly as opportunities present themselves to do so." The court of Rome might privately condemn the revolution of Naples as the work of a secret society whose anti-religious tendencies made it utterly unacceptable to an ecclesiastical government," but publicly it was willing to accept as a de facto government the constitutional régime set up by that revolution. A s soon as the passage of time made it evident that the new order was more or less firmly established, Consalvi instructed Monsignor Giustiniani, representative of the Pope in Naples as Pontifical Commissioner for the execution of the Concordat of 1818, concerning the part he was to take. He was warned 41 Letter Consalvi to Metternich, August 23, 1820, in A V , SS, R165-307. 42 Dispatches Consalvi to C P . Naples, September 2 and 8, 1820, in A V , A N N ; t o Papal Consul, Naples, September 2, 1820, in A V , SS, R285. 43 T h e secret society of the Carboneria was formally condemned on September 15, 1821.

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of the delicacy of his position at the court of a government which his sovereign could not, for many reasons, recognize. H e was, nevertheless, to stay at his post and endeavor to safeguard the interests of religion and of the Concordat. 44 Yet even this acceptance of a de facto government was surrounded by certain restrictions which not only kept it from constituting formal recognition, but also made it something negative rather than positive. In the instructions of Consalvi just referred to, Giustiniani was told to select with care the matters on which he would continue negotiations with the Neapolitan Commissioner. A final settlement of any question would call for some formal acceptance on the part of the Pope ; in order to forestall the necessity of even this limited recognition of the constitutional regime, he was to choose, at least for the present, matters which he foresaw could not be brought to a conclusion except as the result of protracted discussion. It is in this same light that we must regard the delay of Pius V I I in answering the letter addressed to him by the King to announce the granting of the constitution. 48 This silence on the part of Rome was not unobserved in Naples, where an unfavorable comparison was made with the promptness and favor with which the Pope had replied to a similar letter from Ferdinand of Spain. 44 When this aspect of the matter was brought to Consalvi's attention, he explained frankly to Campochiaro, through Giustiniani, that a reply to such a letter would 44 Instructions Consalvi to CP. Naples, in code, August 27, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-118. 45 Letter Ferdinand I to Pius VII, July 18, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-118. 46 Dispatches : Papal Consul, Naples, to Consalvi, August 8, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-307 ; CP. Naples to Consalvi, August 24, 1820, in AV, SS, R252. Ferdinand of Spam wrote to the Pope on March 23, 1820, to inform him of the granting of the Constitution. (Letter Ferdinand to Pius VII, March 23, 1820, in AV, SS, R245.) The reply of His Holiness must have been prompt and agreeable, for in May the Nuncio in Madrid reported to Consalvi that it had been published in the press, and that he believed that it would be "pleasing and productive of the best results." (Dispatch N. Madrid to Consalvi, May 17, 1820, in AV, SS, R249-428.)

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imply a formal recognition of the new government, and that it would be quite contrary to the traditional policy of the Papacy in its dealings with political affairs to be the first to accord such recognition. 4 * T h e Minister of Foreign A f f a i r s saw the reasonableness of this attitude, but wished that the Pope would reply in spite of it.48 Giustiniani believed that the much solicited acknowledgment was wanted chiefly because of the disarming effect it would have on opposition at home and abroad, 4 * an opinion which no doubt fortified Rome's determination to withhold it. The same problem was presented in the matter of diplomatic relations between the two courts. Monsignor Giustiniani was not a nuncio, i. e., an officially accredited minister of the Holy See, but only a special representative, charged with the execution of the Concordat of 1 8 1 8 , an exclusively religious mission. H e felt that if his post were given an official, public character, he would be in a much better position to safeguard the rights of the Holy S e e ; he would be able to deal officially with the government, and participate in the conferences held by the ambassadors of the other powers regularly since the outbreak of the revolution. A s matters stood, he could make representations to the government only on sufferance, and had to rely on the offices of friendly ambassadors f o r much of his contact with the Neapolitan Ministry. Accordingly, he wrote in July to suggest to Consalvi that he or some one else be accredited to the Naples government with full diplomatic powers. 80 The Cardinal admitted the force of the arguments advanced by Giustiniani, and the advantages which would accrue to the Holy See f r o m the suggested change, but by the personal order of the Pope, declined to make it. The time, he wrote, in reply, 47 Dispatch 48 Dispatch 49 Dispatch 60 Dispatch

Consalvi to CP. Naples, August 18, 1920, in AV, ANN. CP. Naples to Consalvi, August 24, 1820, in AV, SS, R252. CP. Naples to Consalvi, August 21, 1820, in AV, SS, R352. CP. Naples to Consalvi, July 21, 1920, in AV, ANN.

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1

was not opportune" for such a step, and, while his position was without doubt difficult, he was sure that he would be able to carry on satisfactorily." In August the King notified the Pope that he had granted Count Fuscaldo, his Ambassador at Rome, permission to retire,53 but that he would replace him as soon as possible, in order that the friendly relations between the two courts might not be interrupted.51 He was as good as his word, and before the month of September was out, Consalvi was faced with the dilemma of receiving or refusing Count de Cesare, the new appointee. There was only one practical course to be followed, and accordingly he notified the Naples government that His Holiness could not accept a new ambassador at the moment. None of the other courts of Europe had received a representative of the constitutional regime as yet, while Austria had pointedly refused to admit the Duke of Gallo to the imperial court, and Rome could not be the first to take such a step. The relations between the two states were being satisfactorily maintained by Signor Cattaneo, the Naples Chargé d'Affaires, whose continued presence in Rome was not being misinterpreted by the other powers. Consalvi's action, however, was not a formal refusal, but rather a plea for the cooperation of Naples in avoiding embarrassment to both courts, especially to that of Rome, which, by the arrival of a new ambassador, would be caught in the dilemma of offending either Naples by refusing to accept him, or the rest of Europe, particularly Austria, by 51 In the final version of this dispatch, Consalvi simply said : " Non è questo il momentodi ripristinarla [Nunziatura]," but in the preliminary draft (found in AV, SS, R165-118) he wrote of the impolicy of making the suggested change at that time, when most of Europe had not recognized the new government. This was crossed out and rewritten as above. 52 Dispatch Consalvi to CP. Naples, August 1, 1820, in AV, A N N . 53 No reason was given for Fuscaldo's retirement, but his resumption of the office of ambassador after the restoration of the King indicates that he had been removed because of lack of sympathy with the constitutional régime. 54 Letter Ferdinand I to Pius VII, August iz, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-118.

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receiving him. This, he felt, could be accomplished very easily, even after the nomination of the new man, simply by deferring his departure; this would not be unusual, and could be done on any of several pretexts." Giustiniani, on Consalvi's order, interviewed Campochiaro on the matter, in order to give a fuller explanation if it seemed useful or necessary. He found the Minister surprisingly sympathetic and willing to refrain from forcing the issue.68 4. DEVELOPING STRAIN BETWEEN THE PAPACY AND NAPLES

There was, then, much in the policy of the new Neapolitan government that gratified the Holy See, notably its disavowal of support to the rebels of Benevento and Ponte Corvo. Constitutional though it might be, it seemed anxious to maintain good relations with Rome. Campochiaro, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, frequently gave expression to this desire, and to his personal devotion to His Holiness," and afforded no small proof of both by his friendly understanding of the Pope's position in the matter of receiving a new ambassador. Yet there were at the same time certain indications that in the course of time an anti-religious, or at least an anti-ecclesiastical, policy would be adopted. It was more or less to be expected, since the revolution was admittedly the work of a secret society which was widely believed to fall under the general prohibitions of the Church against such organizations."8 The first sign of approaching trouble came early in July, when the Minister of Finance called upon Monsignor Giustiniani for the documents justifying his enjoyment of the franking privilege for his correspondence with Rome.58 It might 55 Dispatch Consalvi to CP. Naples, September 19, 1820, in AV, ANN. 56 Dispatch CP. Naples to Consalvi, September 26, 1820, in AV, SS, R252. 57 Dispatches CP. Naples to Consalvi, July 19, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-118; July 25, 1820, in AV, SS, R252. 58 Because of its suspected affiliation with Freemasonry, Carbonarism was thought to fall under the condemnation of the former organization by Popes Clement XII in 1738 and Benedict XIV in 1751. 59 Note Minister of Finance to CP. Naples, July 19, 1820, in AV, ANN.

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have been, as the Minister presented it, merely a step in the reorganization of the government offices under the constitutional system, but subsequent developments were to give the matter a more sinister aspect. Giustiniani was unable to produce the requested documents, for the simple reason that there were none; the arrangement had been made verbally by his predecessor, Cardinal Caracciolo, and no formal authorization had ever been given. He so informed the Finance Minister, adding that he felt that the free service was amply justified by the fact that most of the correspondence so franked dealt with cases of secularization f o r religious, and other dispensations in favor of Neapolitan subjects, whose government might not unreasonably be expected to bear the expenses involved.40 Here the matter was apparently allowed to rest for some months, but in January, 1 8 2 1 , the franking privilege was formally revoked." 1 The unhappy suspicions created by this incident were increased when, a short time later, the question of the appointment of a new Royal Commissioner for the execution of the Concordat came up. This post was of the greatest importance from the ecclesiastical point of view, and the interest of the Church authorities in the character of the man who held it was not unwarranted. It was first proposed that, in accordance with precedent, Count Ricciardi, the Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs, should assume the additional office. The advantage that this would bring in affording direct negotiations with the minister by whom all decisions would ultimately have to be made (instead of through an intermediary who could but refer all matters to his chief), was sufficient, in Giustiniani's mind, to counterbalance the rather doubtful reputation of Ricciardi in religious matters.*2 His appointment was actually communicated to the Holy See for approval, but before this 60 Note CP. Naples to Minister of Finance, July 22, 1820, in AV, A N N . 61 Dispatch CP. Naples to Consalvi, January 19, 1821, in AV, SS, R252. 62 Dispatch CP. Naples to Consalvi, July 26, 1820, in AV, SS, R252.

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could be given (as it was " ) , it was decided that Ricciardi would be too occupied with the ordinary affairs of his office to take on the added burden; he was replaced in the office of Royal Commissioner by Baron David Winspeare." This appointment Giustiniani found not an unmixed blessing; it would complicate matters by the multiplication of negotiations between himself, Winspeare and the Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs. This disadvantage, however, he thought to be at least partially off-set by the high character and independence of Winspeare, who might thus nullify the possible hostility of Ricciardi. His selection was especially welcome after the rumor that the choice had fallen on one Adamo Sartelli, one of the most notorious enemies of Rome and the Concordat. 85 Consalvi, however, even before he received these observations of Giustiniani, decided to rely on the high recommendation given to Winspeare by Campochiaro, and approved his appointment." The first negotiations between the two commissioners were not encouraging. On receipt of news of his selection for the office, Winspeare notified Giustiniani of the fact, and proposed that they hold their meetings in the building of the abolished Royal Chancery, now occupied by the Provisional Giunta, which held the reins of government pending the convening of Parliament. W i t h that in mind, he had arranged with the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs for the transfer of all documents and personnel connected with the Concordat to that place.61 This pace was rather too fast for the Papal representative; he objected to carrying on the business of the Concordat in the place occupied by the government itself, lest public opinion see in the circumstance the reduction of his office to a state of subordination, 63 Dispatch Consalvi to Campochiaro, July 28, 1820, in A V , SS, R252. 64 Dispatch Campochiaro t o Consalvi, July 28, 1820, in A V , S S , R165-307. 65 Dispatch C P . Naples to Consalvi, August 2, 1820, in A V , A N N . 66 Dispatch Consalvi to Campochiaro, August 1,1820, in A V , S S , R165-307. 67 Note Winspeare to C P . Naples, August 10, 1820, enclosed in Dispatch C P . Naples to Consalvi, August 11, 1820, in A V , SS, R252.

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whereas it was, and should appear to be, absolutely independent. He objected, too, to the designation of officials of one of the government ministries as custodians of the documents involved; these were of interest and value to the Holy See as well as to the government, and should be in the custody of at least nominally disinterested persons. He therefore suggested other offices, located in the building occupied by an agency already involved in matters pertaining to the Concordat—the so-called Mixed Commission, set up according to the terms of the Concordat to administer certain kinds of ecclesiastical goods.** These reasons were valid enough, but to Consalvi he pointed out the underlying motive of what might seem to be " much ado about nothing "—the maintenance of the dignity of his position as the representative of the Pope. Winspeare had been inclined to the place he suggested, because, as a member of the Provisional Giunta, he was already occupied there. This circumstance, Giustiniani feared, would place him in the position of a suppliant; he would have to go to Winspeare, perhaps await his coming from Giunta conferences, all of which would be destructive of the independence of his position.** The Royal Commissioner proved to be most tractable; while disavowing any sinister motive behind the arrangements he had made and doubting that any derogatory interpretation would be placed on them by public opinion, he acceded to Giustiniani's wish and accepted the meeting-place chosen by him.70 Even before this minor difference was adjusted, there was reason for more serious concern. On August 9 the Provisional Giunta, with the approval of the Prince Regent, issued a decree which seemed to mark the first move of the government to interfere in ecclesiastical affairs. According to the provisions of the act, bishops conducting ecclesiastical trials were ordered to 68 Note CP. Naples to Winspeare, August 11, 1820, enclosed in Dispatch CP. Naples to Consalvi, August 11, 1820, in AV, SS, R252. 69 Dispatch CP. Naples to Consalvi, August l i , 1820, in AV, SS, R252. 70 Note Winspeare to CP. Naples, August 12, 1820, enclosed in Dispatch CP. Naples to Consalvi, August 12, 1820, in AV, SS, R252.

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call their witnesses through the offices of the civil police, who were empowered to suspend the summons under certain conditions ; they were also to commit the execution of the sentence to the civil authorities of the kingdom in cases in which a cleric was to be punished by being confined in a religious house for a protracted period.71 This decree, while in many cases it might serve the interests of religion, also provided an easy occasion for unwarranted pretensions on the part of the civil government. Giustiniani, however, was not sure that it would be within his function to protest against it, since it did not violate any explicit article of the Concordat. He therefore submitted it to Cardinal Consalvi for examination, asking instructions, and remarking that it might be wise to resist this first step in the wrong direction, lest a failure to do so encourage still further aggression.72 The Cardinal tabled the matter for future consideration,73 and, though Giustiniani recalled it to his attention in October,74 nothing more was heard of it until after the extinction of the government which had broached it. Almost as though in justification of Giustiniani's warning, principiis obstare, the month of September brought still more serious anti-religious enactments. Two decrees were published on the 13th, the first of which abrogated a long-standing practice by which the bishops of the kingdom were accustomed to demand assurances of the free state of those who wished to contract matrimony. The second suspended all religious investitures and professions until such time as the Parliament about to meet should have made new provisions.75 The first of these decrees was, like its predecessor dealing with procedure in the ecclesiastical forum, doubtfully within 71 Decree of August 9, 1820, published in L'Amico delta Constitusione, No.

XXIII, August 11, 1820, enclosed in Dispatch CP. Naples to Consalvi, August 12, 1820, in AV, SS, R252. 72 Dispatch CP. Naples to Consalvi, August 12, 1820, in AV, SS, R252. 73 Dispatch Consalvi to CP. Naples, August 15, 1820, in AV, SS, R252. 74 Dispatch CP. Naples to Consalvi, October 9, 1820, in AV, A N N . 75 Dispatch CP. Naples to Consalvi, September 15, 1820, m AV, SS, R252.

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Giustiniani's competence, and was, like the other, submitted by him to Rome for examination. The second threatened a more serious blow at the welfare of religion, and was a direct violation of the fourteenth article of the Concordat; as such it brought an immediate protest from the Papal Commissioner. He addressed himself to Count Ricciardi, the Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs, and asked him to consider the incongruity of such a measure being enforced in a thoroughly Catholic kingdom, a measure which was so directly detrimental to the interests of religion; let him recognize, too, the irregularity of an arbitrary change, made by one party without even notice to the other, in a matter provided by the Concordat, a reciprocal agreement. In view of these considerations, he called for the immediate revocation of the offensive decree.78 With his protest registered, Giustiniani gave thought to the possible consequences of what he had done. If the decree were not recalled, some one would have to decide whether more could be gained by insisting upon it firmly, even to the point of breaking off relations, or by adopting an attitude of sufferance, enduring under protest what could not be changed. The policy of firmness offered the hope that the threat of a rupture with Rome might be more efficacious than a mere protest; he believed that the Naples government would surrender almost anything, rather than give the world the sight of the representative of the Pope forced to abandon its capital. Yet there was the possibility that a threat might not accomplish any more than a protest; to be consistent, he would have to depart, and leave the interests of religion absolutely without protection. On the other hand, a policy of protesting patience would allow him to remain on the ground, ready to do whatever good might be possible; yet it might be taken as a tacit justification of this particular infringement of the Concordat, and encourage others. The final decision, of course, rested with Rome.77 76 Note CP. Naples to Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs, September 14, 1820, enclosed in Dispatch CP. Naples to Consalvi, September 15, 1820, in AV, SS, R252. 77 Dispatch CP. Naples to Consalvi, September 17, 1820, in AV, SS, R253.

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Pending further developments, Consalvi fully approved of what Giustiniani had done in the matter of the suspension of religious professions, and asked for further information regarding the practice abrogated by the other decree of September 13. 7 * When the ministerial reply was presented, it was far from satisfactory. Ricciardi denied any intention on the part of the government to infringe upon the stipulations of the Concordat, and alleged the necessity of providing for the defense of the state as the sole motive of the decree. Many of those called to serve in the army, he maintained, were seeking to exempt themselves from military service by donning the religious garb, for the moment only and until the danger had passed. " A Catholic kingdom," he said, " would find itself in a very hard way, if Catholicism consisted in an unlimited permission to its subjects to free themselves from the obligation of defending the throne and the state, under pretext of wishing to devote themselves exclusively to the service of religion." 79 Giustiniani forwarded this reply to Rome for instructions, pointing out the inconsistency of basing such a general decree, involving both men and women, on the grounds of the defense of the state. H e thought of using this argument in rebuttal, but hesitated to do so unless directed, since it might involve an acceptance of the decree as far as it concerned men.40 The Roman court took its stand squarely on the Concordat. Passing over the incompetence of the secular authority in such a purely religious matter, Consalvi pointed out to Giustiniani that Article X I V of that document expressly guaranteed the freedom of religious investiture and profession. A s the Concordat had been arrived at by mutual consent, it was clearly a breach of faith for the Neapolitan government to abrogate, or 78 Dispatch Consalvi to CP. Naples, September 18, 1820, in AV, SS, R252. 79 Note Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs to CP. Naples, September 20, 1820, enclosed in Dispatch CP. Naples to Consalvi, September 22, 1820, in A V , SS, R252.

80 Dispatch CP. Naples to Consalvi, September 22, 1820, in AV, SS, R252.

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41 even suspend, one of its provisions, without even consulting the Holy See, the party of the second part. He then ordered him to make another representation to the government, in the name of the Pope himself, and ask for the recall of the decree in question.11 This second protest was held up for a short time, owing to a misunderstanding on Giustiniani's part,*2 but was finally presented on October 13, just one month after the publication of the disputed decree. In the name of His Holiness (in his first protest, Giustiniani had acted simply in his capacity as Pontifical Commissioner), he denounced the decree as a direct violation of Article X I V of the Concordat, and as exceeding even the motive alleged in justification of it, in including prospective nuns, who could hardly be classed as potential defenders of the state." The force of this latter point was not lost upon Ricciardi, who, in his reply of November 1, announced that permissions were being readily granted for the profession of religious women. This was a further proof that the decree had been motivated, not by hostility to religion or by contempt for the Concordat, but solely by military necessity. He stressed again the impossibility of granting unlimited license to all citizens to evade their duty to the state by entering the religious life; such a condition was obviously not comprehended in the Concordat, and the government had taken the only feasible way of meeting it* 4 81 Dispatch Consalvi to CP. Naples, October 6, 1820, in AV, SS, R252. 82 H e was not sure whether the representation called for by Consalvi was already taken care of by his protest of September 14, or whether a second was desired; he wrote to ascertain. (Dispatch CP. Naples to Consalvi, October 9, 1820, m AV, SS, R252.) 83 Note C P . Naples to Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs, October 13, 1820, enclosed in Dispatch CP. Naples to Consalvi, October 13, 1820, in AV, A N N . 84 Note Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs to CP. Naples, November 1, 1820, enclosed in Dispatch CP. Naples to Consalvi, November 3, 1820, m

AV, SS, R252.

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Acting under previous instructions Giustiniani forwarded this reply to Rome before taking any action on it." There the Pope, warned perhaps by the persistence of Naples in holding its position in the face of the double protest, and desirous of avoiding an open break, ordered that for the moment no further representation should be made on the question; Rome could afford to await the restoration of calm in the kingdom, the coming of a time when there would be greater hope of effective action. In communicating this desire of His Holiness to Giustiniani, Consalvi took up in detail Ricciardi's message on the subject, stressing in particular the impossibility of the condition envisaged by the Minister in which all citizens might evade their duty to the state by hiding behind a religious garb. Article XIV of the Concordat provided that religious professions should be free, within the limits imposed by the financial resources of the several orders; as the latter were fixed by law and were meager enough, it would be obviously impossible for even a large number—not to speak of the totality—of citizens to seek the refuge of the cloister to evade military duty. This and other comments were passed on for the guidance of Giustiniani, in the event that an opportunity or the necessity for discussion with government officials should arise; until further orders, however, he was to take no new steps in the matter." There the question rested, buried, no doubt, in the deeper concern felt by both sides over the rising indignation of Europe at the state of affairs in Naples, which was to find expression within a few months in Austrian intervention. 5. APPREHENSION WITHIN THE P A P A L S T A T E

While Rome was thus trying to maintain friendly relations with Naples without recognizing its government, and to meet what were thought to be its first hostile moves without antagonizing it, its vigilance over its own house was not relaxed. As 85 Dispatch CP. Naples to Consalvi, November 3, 1820, in AV, SS, R252. 86 Dispatch Consalvi to CP. Naples, November 10, 1820, in AV, SS, R252.

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the revolutionary régime in Naples passed through its second, third and fourth months, and seemed to assume some of the aspects of stability, the danger to the quiet of the Papal State was really increased. Successful at home, the Neapolitan Carbonari might hope to arouse the neighboring state to join them in the enjoyment of the blessings of constitutional liberties; the Roman Carbonari could look with greater hope for the aid which had been denied them in the first days of the revolution. The caution of the Papal government was based, however, not upon theory but upon unwelcome evidence. From the first days of July, a troublesome unrest seemed to pervade many areas of the State. Rumors spread, with rapidity and frequency, of insurrections in various quarters, especially in Bologna and Ascoli." No one seemed to know their origin; they were without foundation, but tended to stimulate the so-called esaltati. Inflammatory posters and inscriptions made their appearance in many cities and towns, among which Ferrara, Ancona, Viterbo, and Terni may be mentioned.8* One such inscription, terse and of unmistakable meaning, was common; it called for Costitu2ione o Morte. A s might be expected, all efforts to apprehend the authors of these messages ended in failure ; the most the authorities could do was to remove them before they were generally seen. During the nights of July 30 and August 1, there were minor disorders in Forlimpopoli, in the Legation of Ferrara. About fifteen young men, led by Ludovico Golfarelli, went about the town, singing seditious songs, throwing their hats in the air, and generally showing their enthusiasm for Neapolitan constitutionalism. There seems to have been some doubt in the minds of the police whether this enthusiasm was the result of political 87 Dispatches D. Ascoli to Consalvi, July 23, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-308 ; October 5, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-311. 88 Ferrara, Rapporto Politico, July 22, and August 12, 1820, in AV, SS, Ri55-302; Dispatches: D. Ancona to Consalvi, July 28, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-310; D. Viterbo to Consalvi, July 16, and September 13, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-311; D. Spoleto to Consalvi, August 1, and September 2, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-311.

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leanings or of wine; the former interpretation was given the preference. Golfarelli and three companions were arrested on August 6; an investigation at the former's home brought to light several questionable writings, including a book entitled Le Vrai Maçon, and the minutes of a Carbonaro meeting, signed by Golfarelli himself." A f t e r the customary legal process, completed in January, 1821, he was condemned to ten years at hard labor, while his companions were given lesser sentences.90 Of more serious import was the evidence found that beneath such unrest were definite plans for insurrection. One such plot was uncovered in August and September, centering in Macerata, the scene of a disturbance in 1817* 1 It was revealed to the government by Lorenzo Basvecchi, who had been involved in the 1817 affair, and who now offered his services—and information—to Luigi Mattioli, Director of Police at Macerata."2 He still maintained his contacts with Livio Aurispa, Antonio Fioretti, and others whom he had known when he, too, was a " liberal " and kept Mattioli fully abreast of their present plans. Their revolt, depending somewhat upon a similar rising in France, and upon the supposition that Austria would not intervene in Naples, was to take place before the year was out; with Macerata, the Delegations of Ancona and Pesaro were to rise, and it was hoped that the rest of the Papal State would follow their good example. The leading government officials in the provinces were to be assassinated, and replaced by Carbonari.M 89 Dispatch L. Forli to Consalvi, August 9, 1820, in AV, S S , R165-370. 90 Decree, Congregation* Criminate, January 22,1821, in AV, S S , R165-370. 91 The story of this plot forms the first part of Domenico Spadoni's Una

Trama t Tentatwo Rivolusionario dello Staio Romano nell' 1820-1821.

(Roma-Milano, 1910.) Spadoni's work is based on records in the Provincial Archives at Macerata; what is narrated above was taken from the reports sent from the latter place to Rome in 1820. 92 Letter Basvecchi to Mattioli, August 9, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-370. 63 Reports Basvecchi to Mattioli, August 11 and 18, September 3, 1820, in AV, S S , R165-370.

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By September, the government believed it had enough information to justify the arrest at least of Aurispa, but decided to hold off temporarily, in the hope that Basvecchi, through him, might be able to uncover still more concerning the plan of revolt.84 Towards the end of the month, however, it appeared dangerous to wait, as Basvecchi reported that the Carbonaro organization had been completed and its plans approved by a visiting delegate from Naples; the execution of the plot awaited only some assurance that Austria would not march.95 Consalvi, who had been kept informed of the whole affair, then approved the immediate arrest of Aurispa,94 which took place on the night of October 7, in Macerata. With him, Alessandro Cellini, Benedetto Ilari, Giuseppe Capanna and Giuseppe Pasini were also taken into custody and sent to Rome, to be lodged in the Castel San Angelo, for safety's sake.97 In the investigation carried out to formulate the charges necessary for their condemnation, Giovanni Clavari of Macerata was implicated and arrested.88 Given an assurance of impunity and pardon, he agreed to talk; his evidence completed the case against Fioretti and involved Aurispa's son, Pirro. Both were arrested in November and sent to join their fellow-conspirators in Rome.99 The completion of the entire case was a lengthy matter; it was not until the following October that Livio Aurispa, Fioretti, Cellini and Pasini were sentenced to seven years at hard labor on the charge of " seditious machinations." The same penalty, but for only five years, was meted out to Ilari, while all the others connected with the affair were placed on probation.100 94 Dispatches: Consalvi to Mattioli, September 13, 1820; Mattioli Consalvi, September 22, 1820, in A V , SS, R165-370.

to

95 Dispatch Mattioli to Consalvi, September 29,1820, in A V , SS, R165-370. 96 Dispatch Consalvi to Mattioli, October 4, 1820, in A V , S S , R165-370. 97 Dispatch Mattioli to Consalvi, October 9, 1820, in A V , SS, R165-370. 98 Dispatch Mattioli to Consalvi, October 16, 1820, in A V , SS, R165-311. 99 Dispatch Consalvi to D. Macerata, November 15, 1820, in A V , S S , R165-311. 100 Report Bernetti to Consalvi, October 6, 1821, in AV, SS, R165-370.

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Thus the projected Macerata rising was forestalled by the opportune arrest of its leaders, without whom it could not be effected. T h e actual danger may well have been less than it seemed; in one instance in which claim could be balanced against fact, there appeared that exaggeration which seemed common to the efforts of the Italian Carbonari. In the development of the process against Aurispa and his accomplices, it was brought out that the plotters were relying on the support of some four thousand " provincials " from Bologna, who were being won over to the cause by one Giuseppe Gianelli. 101 Cardinal Spina, the Legate at Bologna, however, on investigation was unable to discover Gianelli or any trace of his having been in the Legation, while the total number of " provincials" in the whole region scarcely exceeded one hundred and fifty.103 If Macerata proved only a delusion of the " patriots," there was an outbreak in Civitavecchia which actually materialized, and for the moment caused serious concern. The political character of this affair is not too evident, but at the time and in the circumstances in which it occurred, it could not have been regarded otherwise than as a political plot or part of one; besides, indications were not lacking that there were political interests involved. Part of the fortress of Civitavecchia was then used as a prison, in which some sixteen hundred men were confined. O n the afternoon of September 4, information was conveyed to the authorities by four of the prisoners that a revolt had been planned among their fellow-inmates, to take place that night. Such rumors were apparently not uncommon, but this one seemed serious enough for Monsignor Cattani, the Delegate, to arrange with Colonel Dandini, commander of the fort, for additional guards. T h e gates were reinforced, and all available soldiers were ordered held in readiness for whatever might 101 Dispatch Consalvi to L. Bologna, November 15, 1820, in A V , SS, R165-307. 102 Dispatch L. Bologna to Consalvi, November 20, 1820, in A V , S S , R165-307.

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develop. It was hoped that these measures, openly taken, would discourage the would-be rebels, but in vain. That evening, towards seven o'clock, after all had been returned to their quarters for the night, rioting broke out in several parts of the prison ; it seemed to have no immediate object, and to consist chiefly in a refusal to settle down for the night. The exhortations of the Delegate, and the threatening presence of the soldiery were equally unavailing in restoring order. The authorities hesitated to send any of the armed guards among the rioters, lest they be overpowered and lose their muskets to the rebels. Finally the order to fire was reluctantly given. Shooting from points of vantage outside the compounds, the soldiers killed one prisoner and wounded several, and succeeded in creating enough fear in the rest so that by midnight order had been substantially restored. Individuals, however, kept up some disturbance here and there throughout the night, and it was not until the next morning that complete quiet reigned in the prison.103 In itself, this riot might have been nothing more than a reaction to a none too kindly régime (that the poor quality of the food was a factor was later admitted by Consalvi 104 ), but certain circumstances were viewed with special suspicion. The rioters had tried to win over the guard by promises of the high places they would occupy in the republic which was to be established; many of them had held out during the night, and gave in only in the morning, in the clear light of day—a fact which made Monsignor Cattani think that their surrender was motivated by the non-arrival of help they had expected from outside the walls. There was, too, the added circumstance that at the height of the revolt, a group of armed citizens had presented themselves, offering their services in restoring order. They were, however, such dubious-looking persons that the Delegate felt justified in suspecting that they were only awaiting the success of the prisoners in order to join them, over103 Report D. Civitavecchia to Consalvi, September 5, 1820, in AV, SS, R204. 104 Note Consalvi to Treasurer General, October 6, 1820, in AV, SS, R204.

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power the garrison and overthrow the government. 10 " His suspicions, however, could not be verified; he spent the months of September and October trying to discover the real motive of the riot, and its connection, if any, with the outside world, but without success.10* Whatever may have been the truth of the matter, the example of the Civitavecchia prisoners might well have incited others to attempt similar risings, with possibly more success. Accordingly warning was sent at once to the other four major prisons of the Papal State, at Forte San Leo, in the Delegation of Pesaro, and in the cities of Perugia, Ancona and Spoleto; all guards were to be doubled, and all officials were to be called upon to be most watchful and most exact in the fulfilment of their various duties. 107 B y way of discouraging any imitation of the Civitavecchia riot by other prisoners, summary justice was visited upon those who had participated in it. A special military tribunal was organized in Civitavecchia, which sat from September 20 to 23, and summed up its findings by condemning to death thirty-two of the prisoners as authors of the rising; twelve others, as accomplices, were sentenced to imprisonment for terms ranging from ten years to l i f e ; nine others were acquitted. O f the thirty-two death sentences, two were commuted to life imprisonment by the Pope because the verdict of the court had not been unanimous, as it had been in the other thirty. 108 T h e thirty were executed before the end of the month by a firing squad, as had been directed by the court; precautions taken against possible trouble from the other prisoners proved unnecessary. 109 105 Observations of D. Civitavecchia, September 6, 1820, in A V , SS, R204. 106 Dispatches D. Civitavecchia to Consalvi, October 25, 27, 30, 1820, in A V , SS, R204. 107 Dispatches Consalvi to D D . Pesaro, Perugia, Ancona and Spoleto, September 6, 1820, in A V , SS, R204. 108 Report and Judgments of Special Military Tribunal, September 23, 1820, in AV, SS, R204. 109 Dispatch D. Civitavecchia to Consalvi, September 30, 1820, in A V , S S , R204.

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If the justice of the government was summary and very harsh to those judged guilty of attempted revolt, it was equally summary—but kindly—to a number of prisoners who had distinguished themselves in opposing the rising. There were the four who had revealed to the authorities in the early afternoon of September 4 the plans for the proposed revolt; these were accorded a full pardon, with only minor restrictions on their future freedom. Twenty-three others who had done what they could to resist the rioters were given the remission of half of the time they still had to serve; if that half were less than three years they were freed at once. Sixty-dght others, who had signally refused to join in the rioting, had their sentences reduced by one third, with immediate release in cases where the balance to be served was three years or less.110 In the midst of this internal unrest, the government continued the development of its defensive measures to afford protection against either a domestic revolt or an invasion by irregular bands of Carbonari from Naples. In August and September, detailed plans of defense were drawn up by the Military Congregation. A s Rome, the capital, and the person of His Holiness were believed to be the natural object of attack by either internal or foreign enemies, the defense of the city was carefully provided for. An alarm system was arranged to give warning of trouble, and places of concentration were scheduled for the assembly of the various troops of the city's guard at strategic or dangerous spots. 111 Looking to the safety of the State as a whole, the same Congregation prepared plans for the allocation of troops, and their strategic retirement from the Maritime Provinces and the Campagna in case of an invasion from Naples. 1 " 110 Dispatch Consalvi to D. Civitavecchia, September 28, 1830, in AV, SS, R204. 111 Resolutions of Military Congregation, August 7, 24, September 1, 1820, in AV, SS, R190. 112 Report Military Congregation to Consalvi, September 7, 1820, in AV, SS, R242.

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The two seacoast fortresses of Ancona and Civitavecchia would also be particularly attractive to either rebels or invaders. In August, the Delegate at Ancona, Monsignor Giovanni Benvenuti, reported the necessity of making certain repairs in the fortress there, and the advisability of removing from the garrison a number of officers and men suspected of treasonable correspondence with Papal or Neapolitan Carbonari; included on his list was the acting commander of the place, Lieutenant-Colonel Dondini.118 Consalvi authorized the necessary repairs, but advised delay, pending the accumulation of further evidence, in making any removals or transfers. 1 " In the meantime, warning of a possible attack on Ancona was sent by Monsignor Giustiniani from Naples, where rumor credited General Pepe with plans to seize the place. Consalvi at once passed the warning on to the Delegate, with instructions to take whatever measures he could, and to capitulate only to an overwhelming force and after enough resistance to establish the violence to which he yielded.118 The rumor proved to be without foundation, as did a similar threat on the part of Carbonari within the Papal State, the traces of which were discovered both by the Papal Police at Macerata in connection with their investigation of the Aurispa plot, and by the Austrian Police.118 At the beginning of October, the Delegate reported that the place was in a fair state of defense; the walls had been repaired, cannon were being remounted, and the garrison had been raised to six hundred by drawing " provincial" reserves into active service.1" The work of renovation went on steadily; by December the fort was in a condition to withstand any coup de main from within 113 Report Bernetti to Consalvi, September 10, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-310. 114 Note Consalvi to Bernetti, September 20, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-310. 115 Dispatch Consalvi to D. Ancona, September 13, 1820, in AV, SS r R165-118. 116 Dispatches Consalvi to DD. Ancona and Macerata, November 15, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-118. 117 Dispatches D. Ancona to Consalvi, September 27, October I, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-118.

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the State, and to hold out well against a regular siege in case of an invasion f r o m Naples. S o at least thought the Delegate, provided the changes in personnel f o r which he had repeatedly asked were carried out. 1 1 8 Consalvi seemed very reluctant to agree to these latter; he hesitated, he said, to cast reflection on the character and loyalty of a superior officer ( D o n d i n i ) on the strength of mere suspicion. 11 * H o w e v e r , in January, 1821, on receipt of more positive proof that he was involved in questionable correspondence with officers of the Neapolitan A r m y , Dondini was transferred to R o m e and replaced by LieutenantColonel T i o r a v a n t i ; the other changes were made at the same time, and the last fear f o r the safety of A n c o n a was removed." 0 Since the rioting at Civitavecchia, work had been under w a y to secure that fortress-prison against a repetition of it, or against an outside assault. Located at some distance f r o m the Naples border, it offered little likelihood of being the object of an attack f r o m that quarter; nevertheless, as a measure f o r general security, the artillery w a s renovated and increased." 1 T o remedy internal defects in the prison, a new code of discipline w a s prepared, while its administration was transferred f r o m the distant office o f the Treasurer General in Rome, to a local committee composed of the Delegate, the Director of Police, the Commander of the Port, and the Commander of the f o r t r e s s . " 2 118 Dispatch D. Ancona to Consalvi, December 11, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-118. 119 Dispatch Consalvi to D. Ancona, December 20, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-118. 120 Dispatch Consalvi to D. Ancona, January 3, 1821, in AV, SS, R165-118. 121 Report Military Congregation to Consalvi, September 30, 1820, in AV, SS, R199. 122 Dispatch Consalvi to D. Civitavecchia, October 21, 1820, in AV, SS, R204.

CHAPTER II INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS AND PAPAL POLICY I. AUSTRIAN

HOSTILITY

DIFFICULT as Consalvi was finding his effort to maintain the balance between Neapolitan constitutionalism and Papal conservatism, without recognizing the one to the detriment of the other, he had the added burden of knowing that his policy was not meeting with the approval of the Vienna government. T h e Papal State lay geographically between Naples and the Austrian provinces of Lombardy and Venetia. T h e Papal government found itself similarly placed between the governments of Naples and Austria, with the opposing interests of the two meeting in conflict in the center. In August the Papal Nuncio at Vienna, Monsignor Leardi, experienced considerable difficulty in arranging an audience with the Emperor. This, he believed, was an indication of disapproval of the attitude which Rome had adopted towards events in Naples. In fact, it had been reported to him that Metternich had expressed disgust because the Roman government was preparing to grant a constitution to its people, and had spoken very critically of Consalvi's reply to Campochiaro's note relative to the Benevento and Ponte Corvo rebellions, as being too courteous and entirely lacking in any tone of condemnation. 1 These charges—if they were such—filled Consalvi with amazement. He could see in them only the work of someone endeavoring to destroy the harmony existing between Rome and Vienna. He instructed the Nuncio to point out to Metternich the absolute impracticability of any papal grant of a constitution. A s for his reply to Campochiaro, an acknowledgment of a friendly offer of mediation was hardly a suitable occasion for the expression of any condemnation of the gov1 Dispatch N. Vienna to Consalvi, August 16, 1820, in A V , S S , R165-307. 52

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ernment which had made it. Even at that, some disapprobation could easily be gathered from the fact that the people of Benevento and Ponte Corvo were referred to as rebels because they had adopted a constitution against the wishes of their sovereign, just as the Naples rebels had imposed their constitution on the K i n g . Besides, was not the delay of the Pope in answering the letter of the K i n g announcing the changed form of government a sufficient indication of his real attitude? 2 These reiterated assurances, coupled with the explanations embodied in the confidential letter of the Cardinal to Metternich at the end of August, 8 succeeded in allaying Metternich's suspicions of the Papal policy. 4 Consalvi seems rather to have suspected Gennotte, the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires, of being the one who had prejudiced the Vienna Minister against the Papal government ; at least, in receiving the official reply to the Austrian note of A u g u s t 10 (of which Consalvi's letter of August 23 was a confidential commentary), he had shown signs of dissatisfaction at its rather meager content. 5 Almost at once, as though designed to test the reality of the devotion of Rome to the " good cause," an incident involving conflicting Austrian and Neapolitan interests occurred. The end of September found the Duke of Gallo and Prince Cimitile stopping in Bologna, both returning from unsuccessful missions to Vienna; the former had been refused admittance as ambassador from Naples, while the latter had been unable to convince Metternich of the solidity and good intentions of the constitutional government. 8 The presence of these two leading figures of the hated regime so near the Austrian border could not be tolerated by Vienna, which presented Rome with 2 Dispatch Consalvi to N. Vienna, September 9, 1820, in A V , ANV-244. 3 Cf. above, pp. 29-30. 4 Dispatch N. Vienna to Consalvi, September 21, 1820, in AV, SS, R247. 5 Dispatch Consalvi to N. Vienna, September 23, 1820, in AV, ANV-244. 6 Cesare Spellanzon, Storia del Risorgimento e dell' Unita d'Italia (Milano,

1933-35), I, 825-826.

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a demand that neither they nor any other Neapolitans be allowed to remain in Bologna, where they could too easily spy upon Austrian manoeuvres north of the Po. Further, as long as Cimitile remained there, the Vienna government was most anxious to know what information he was forwarding to his government. These requests were laid before Consalvi, who pointed out to Count Apponyi, the Austrian Ambassador, that he could not be too drastic about excluding Neapolitans from Papal territory, without compromising himself and his government with that of Naples. Nevertheless, he directed Cardinal Spina, Legate at Bologna, to carry out the Austrian demands but only to the extent that was possible without compromising the Papal government with Naples. He suggested a frank and courteous interview with the unwanted guests, in which it should be indicated how too long a sojourn by them in a city so near the Austrian frontier might well embarrass the Papal government with Vienna, and that His Holiness would appreciate their cooperation in avoiding so unfortunate an outcome of their enjoyment of his hospitality.7 Spina at once arranged with the postal authorities for the interception of Cimitile's mail. He also interviewed the two Neapolitan representatives, and found them already appreciative of the difficult position of the Pope; in fact Gallo had wanted Cimitile to go on at once to Naples, to avoid the suspicion that would be created by their both remaining in Bologna. They were both awaiting orders from Naples before moving on. As instructed, Spina pointed out the compromising effects their stay might have, but without immediate result.8 Consalvi again warned the Legate against assuming too strong an attitude on the matter, lest Naples take offense.9 Several letters of Cimitile that were intercepted and forwarded in copy to Rome only confirmed Spina's belief in the 7 Dispatch Consalvi to L. Bologna, September 25, 1820, in AV, SS, R242. 8 Dispatch L. Bologna to Consalvi, September 30, 1820, in AV, SS, R242. 9 Dispatch Consalvi to L. Bologna, October 4, 1820, in AV, SS. R242.

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good faith of the writer and his companion; they were, from all evidence, really only awaiting instructions from their government. 10 So the issue proved in the case of Cimitile, who, on receiving orders and passport, left at once for London, where he had been designated ambassador. 11 Before the end of October, Gallo, too, left the city, having been recalled to Naples; in departing, however, he left behind him his secretary, Signor Micheroux, entrusted with the task of keeping Naples informed of all matters that came to his attention that might be of interest to it. 11 For several months the Neapolitan agent and the Cardinal Legate circled about the question of the former's departure, the Cardinal endeavoring to bring it about without appearing to order it, the Neapolitan declining to move without an order from his government (which never came) or an express declaration by Spina that his presence was unwelcome.18 Finally in January, Consalvi, in concert with the Austrian Ambassador, instructed Spina to order Micheroux to leave at once. His continued presence in Bologna, without any public mission there, was being regarded by Austria as definitely suspicious, and was, therefore, compromising Rome with Vienna—something that Naples had no right to cause. He was, however, at liberty to remain in the Papal State, in a place of his own choice, but where his presence would not give rise to suspicion or complaint on the part of Austria. 14 Micheroux asked for five days of grace, in which to await the outcome of the effort that Gallo was to make to secure a passport for him to go on to Laibach as a member of the party of the King of 10 Dispatch L. Bologna to Consalvi, October 7, 1820, in AV, S S , R242. 11 Dispatch L. Bologna to Consalvi, October 11, 1820, in AV, S S , R242. 12 Dispatch L. Bologna to Consalvi, October 25, 1820, in AV, S S , R242. 13 Dispatches: L. Bologna to Consalvi, November 22, 29, December 16, 1820, January 3, 1821; Consalvi to L. Bologna, December 23, 1820, all in AV, S S , R242. 14 Dispatch Consalvi to L. Bologna, January 10, 1821, in AV, S S , R242.

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Naples; when that time had passed without result, he left Bologna on January 20, for Naples, via R o m e . " In endeavoring, by intimation or by direct order, to remove Neapolitan agents whose presence might be prejudicial to Austrian interests, Consalvi was unquestionably favoring the latter. Y e t such action was within the limits of what later became one of the principles of neutrality adopted by the Papal government when actual hostilities began, viz., that neither side should do anything to the detriment of the other on Papal territory. 14 It was in accordance with the same principle that Consalvi acted in a similar case, in which the removal of the person in question just as definitely favored Neapolitan interests. On December 7, there arrived in the city of Spoleto one Giuseppe Nanni, a Tuscan military officer, with a commission from his government to gather accurate and detailed information concerning the movements of Neapolitan troops along the Papal border; he was the bearer of two letters, addressed by the Tuscan Foreign Ministry to the Delegates and to the Governors of the Papal State, asking them to render all possible assistance for the success of his mission. The presence of such an agent in the Papal State would compromise its government with Naples, no less than that of Neapolitan agents in Bologna, with Austria. Tuscany was closely allied with A u s t r i a ; the Grand Duke, Ferdinand III, was a brother of the Emperor Francis of Austria; their close connection was evidenced by the fact that the Austrian Ambassador in Rome also represented the Tuscan government. Consalvi took immediate action, more decisive than the somewhat dilatory policy adopted with regard 15 Dispatch L. Bologna to Consalvi, January 20, 1821, in AV, SS, R165-373. 16 Cf. below, pp. 132-133; Consalvi protested against the demands of a Neapolitan commander at Rieti for supplies to be carried across the border, so that the Austrians would be deprived of them; among other reasons he alleged that, while the neutrality of the Pope permitted the passage of troops through his territory, it did not allow either side to do anything to the detriment of the other within his borders. (Note Consalvi to Cattaneo, February 24, 1821, in AV, ANN.)

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to the unwanted Neapolitans. He wrote at once to Signor Valentini, Papal Minister at Florence, pointing out the irregularity of such a mission authorized by the Tuscan ministry without previous agreement with Rome, and the difficulties which it might involve for the Papal government, and then directing him to interview Fossombroni, the Tuscan Foreign Minister, and secure from him the recall of Nanni from the mission entrusted to him. 17 At the same time, Consalvi ordered the Delegates of Spoleto and Rieti, in whose provinces Nanni would most likely be found (he had informed the Delegate at Spoleto on his arrival that he thought of settling in Rieti), to locate him, point out to him the inconvenience of his presence, and ask him to return to Tuscany. 1 ' Nanni reached Rieti on December 10. Shortly after his arrival, the Delegate received Consalvi's instructions. He at once sought out the Tuscan officer, and communicated to him the orders he had received. Nanni took them in good part, and left the following day to return to Florence. 19 On his way he again passed through Spoleto, where he was again informed that he was not wanted. 20 Several days later, Valentini reported that Fossombroni had accepted the Papal point of view, and, not knowing that Nanni was already on his way back, had promised to recall him. 21 2. PAPAL ATTITUDE TOWARDS POSSIBLE AUSTRIAN INTERVENTION

The interest of the Austrian and Neapolitan governments in each other's military activities arose from the possibility that the former would carry its hostility to the latter to the extent of war. Nor was such a possibility remote. From the very 17 Dispatch Consalvi to Valentini, December 9, 1820, in AV, SS, R210-5. 18 Dispatches Consalvi to DD. Rieti and Spoleto, December 9, 1820, in AV, SS, R210-5. 19 Dispatch D. Rieti to Consalvi, December 12, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-308. 20 Dispatch D. Spoleto to Consalvi, December 12, 1820, in AV, SS, R165308. 21 Dispatch Valentini to Consalvi, December 16, 1820, in AV, SS, R210-5.

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beginning of the revolution at Naples, Austria had given no uncertain indications of her attitude towards it. T h e concentration of troops in the Lombardo-Venetian provinces, in the light of the declaration of the Vienna cabinet to its representatives abroad on July 2 6 , " was clearly a preparation for w a r . " The rejection of the Duke of Gallo, sent by the constitutional government to replace Count R u f f o as ambassador at Vienna, pointed in the same direction. 24 T h i s attitude was regarded as utterly unjustified in Naples, and on October 1, Campochiaro formally called upon Vienna for an explanation, " positive and categoric," of the military preparations being made north of the Po. 2 5 A n answer to this demand was given in the Troppau Protocol, adopted by the representatives of Austria, Russia and Prussia as the expression of their political belief and policy. According to the terms of this document, endorsed by the three Powers late in November, 1820, it was agreed that " States which have undergone a change of government due to revolution, the results of which threaten other states, ipso facto cease to be members of the European Alliance and remain excluded from it until their situation gives guarantees for legal order and stability ;" and in the event that such revolutionary changes threaten immediate danger to other states, the powers bound themselves " by peaceful means, or if need be by arms, to bring back the guilty State into the bosom of the Great Alliance." 24 22 " The political order of things established in 1815 . . . has made Austria the natural warder and protector of public peace in Italy. The Emperor is determined to fulfill [this obligation] . . . , and if legal and administrative precautions should not afford sufficient security, he will resort to the most vigorous measure." Cf. Memoirs of Prince Metternich (Napier translation, New York, 1880-82), III, 434-436. 23 Debidour, Antonin, Histoire Diplomatique de l'Europe depuis l'ouverture du Congrès de Vienne jusqu'à la clôture du Congrès de Berlin, 1814-1878 (Paris, 1891), I, 146. 24 Cesare Spellanzon, op. cit., I, 825. 25Georg F. von Martens, Nouveau Recueil (Gottingue, 1817-1841), V, 568-576.

de Traités d'alliance . . .

26 Le Baron Descamps et Louis Renault, Recueil International des Traités en XIX' Siècle (Paris, 1914), I, 803-805.

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W a r was clearly in the air. Rome was fully aware of it, and even before the verdict of Troppau, Consalvi outlined, in a letter to the Papal Nuncio at Paris, the position of the Pope in the event, which he termed " most probable," of a war between Austria and Naples. In the uncertainty in which we still are [he wrote] concerning the decisions which will be made at Troppau regarding the affairs of Naples, I cannot give you an exact idea of the position in which the Papal government will find itself, nor of the policy it will follow. But foreseeing the result Which up to now seems the most probable—that of a war between Austria and Naples—I am taking advantage of the opportunity offered by the departure of a French courier to let you know what are the intentions of the Papal government, and what policy it will adopt in this hypothesis. . . . There are four principal points to be considered . . . ; they are: first, the passage of Austrian troops through the Papal State ; second, the permanence of a part of these troops in the Papal State; third, the supplies to be provided for these troops; fourth, the restoration to His Hofcness of the Duchy of Benevento and of Ponte Corvo. To begin with this last, it is beyond question that both these territories must be restored at once to His Holiness, as is demanded by the guarantee given by all the Great Powers for the maintenance of the settlement made by the final act of the Congress of Vienna. The Papal government will ever insist on this, and, should the Austrians propose to leave garrisons in the two places for the preservation of order, the Papal government will provide for that itself. As for supplies for the army, the Papal government is absolutely not in a position to assume any obligation, because it is without the necessary resources. Besides this reason (which cannot be gainsaid) there are others, no less forceful. If the Holy See should . . . assume the burden of maintaining the troops . . . it would be taking an active part against the Kingdom of Naples, which would be directly contrary to the attitude which the Papal government by its very nature must take towards all states. . . . Finally

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there is die difficulty which has been, and is being, experienced in securing reimbursement from the Austrian government for the expenditures made for the maintenance of its troops in past years. . . . The Papal government is disposed to assist [the advance agents which Austria must send] wherever possible, but it will never itself assume the burden of supply. The permanence of Austrian troops in the Papal State could be asked by the Imperial Court only for the maintenance of its correspondence with the army in Naples, or for the preservation of order within the Papal State. No other reason could be admitted by a government which must preserve a perfect neutrality. But the first of the two reasons mentioned demands neither the presence of Austrian garrisons in the forts of the Papal State nor the stationing of Austrian forces at any points within the State. . . . The second motive does not exist, as is proved by the quiet maintained here during the past four months. . . . The Papal government, therefore, does not intend to consent to the admission of Austrian garrisons into its forts, nor to any occupation of its territory by Austrian forces. Finally, the Holy Father does not intend to refuse passage to the Austrian Army, but the Court of Vienna cannot fail to see that, in view of the peculiar situation of His Holiness, it is indispensable that his non-opposition be in some way veiled. I can assure you that the other governments of Europe hold the opinion that . . . the Holy Father, considering his necessary neutrality, should protest against the passage. But His Holiness, because of the particular friendship which binds him to His Majesty . . . would wish to spare him even the appearance of acting contrary to a protest on his part, and desires to find some way by which this can be avoided and by which, nevertheless, his consent to the passage of the troops will be concealed. When the Imperial Court makes its request for the passage, I will plan, with the Austrian Ambassador here, some way to allow it without compromising the neutrality of the Holy Father and without creating an impression that Austria is acting contrary to a protest of His Holiness. . . . 27 27 Dispatch Consalvi to N. Paris, in code, November i, 1820, in A V , ANP-viii.

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This communication, in code, w a s intended f o r the private information of the Nuncio, to enable him to present clearly the Papal stand in any discussion he might have with the diplomats in Paris relative to the affairs of Naples. T w o weeks later, Consalvi gave the same outline of policy to Monsignor Leardi, in Vienna, with instructions to do what he could to influence the adoption of measures by A u s t r i a in conformity with the principles and position of the Pope. 2 4 W h i l e R o m e was thus preparing f o r eventualities, Naples forcibly thrust its side of the question into view. O n November 3, Campochiaro called Consalvi's attention to the increasing solidity of the Naples constitutional government, the respect it had paid to the rights of others and its evident desire f o r peace, contrasting this with A u s t r i a ' s menacing military measures and its refusal of diplomatic communication. Denouncing A u s t r i a ' s claim to be the protector of Italy, he said that the K i n g , though desirous of peace, was yet prepared to wage war in defense of Neapolitan independence. Pointing out the military disadvantage in which Naples would be placed if, in the event of w a r materializing, it were to wait while Austria marched its troops peacefully through the Papal State, he gave warning that Naples might find itself, with regret, in the necessity of ordering a defensive advance of its forces into Papal territory. H e therefore advised the Pope, in the interests of his people, and in order to keep his State f r o m being made the scene of war, to use all means in his power, both of persuasion and, if need be, of force, to prevent the passage of any foreign troops bent on a hostile invasion of Naples. 1 * T h i s effort o f Naples to enlist the moral and material forces of the Papacy on its o w n side against Austria was, of course, doomed to failure. Setting aside the private knowledge of the trend of affairs he had shown in his letter to the Nuncio at 28 Dispatch Consalvi to N. Vienna, November 15, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-307.

29 Dispatch Campochiaro to Consalvi, November 3, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-307.

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Paris, and really evading the point at issue, Consalvi replied that, as the Papal government had received from Vienna no request for the passage of troops, nor in fact any communication whatever relative to a war against Naples, it was unaware of any intentions on the part of Vienna to send any force against Naples. The note of the Austrian cabinet to the governments of Italy had stated that the reason for the massing of troops in the north was only to preserve order there and to place Austria in a position to render assistance to any Italian state which might request it. Finally, since the inviolability of the Papal State was guaranteed by the Great Powers in the Treaty of Vienna, His Holiness was sure that his domains would be respected by all governments.34 Because of a false version of this reply which appeared in the Neapolitan press, Consalvi was subsequently forced to emphasize his non-committal attitude. On November 13 there appeared in the journal L'Amico della Costituzione, and in hand-bills scattered throughout the city of Naples, a note which was alleged to have been written by Consalvi to Campochiaro, and which bespoke far more the presumed wish of Naples than the mind of the Papal Minister. According to this version, the Pope would " use all means possible with the Emperor to prevent the entrance of Austrian troops into Papal territory, and resort to armed opposition in case the inviolability of his State, guaranteed by the Congress of Vienna, were not respected." This was quite different from the copy of the note to Campochiaro which Giustiniani had received from Consalvi, but the former hesitated to make a formal protest; he referred the matter to Rome, and made a point of showing the true version of the note to members of the diplomatic corps in order that, in circles where the false version might be detrimental to the Holy See, the truth might be known." 1 But Consalvi felt that 30 Dispatch Consalvi to Campochiaro, November 7, 1&20, in AV, SS, R165-307. 31 Dispatch CP. Naples to Consalvi, November 14, 1820, in AV, SS, R165-118.

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such private rectification, while helpful, would not suffice; a public misrepresentation of his sentiments demanded a public correction." T h o u g h he exculpated the Naples government f r o m any complicity in the error, he ordered Giustiniani to take steps for the publication of the exact words of his note, with the same publicity as had been accorded the false v e r s i o n . " T h e editor of L'Amico delta Costituzione, however, said that he could print nothing without the approval of one of the ministers, as the journal w a s intended only f o r the publication of official acts. ( T h i s would seem to invalidate Consalvi's exculpation of the government in the publication of the false version, w h i c h — a p p a r e n t l y — w o u l d not have been printed without the order of one of the ministry.) Giustiniani did not feel authorized to take the official step of appealing to any of the ministers f o r the necessary order, and so let the matter drop, turning to another journal, La Voce del Secolo. B y a strange coincidence, its editor w a s the same Count de Cesare w h o m Rome had refused to receive as ambassador. However, he seemed to bear no animosity, f o r he agreed at once to print the required correction. In the issue of November 21, he wrote as f o l l o w s : The account given by one of our journals of the reply of Cardinal Consalvi to the note directed to him by our Minister of Foreign Affairs is not correct. The reply, as we stated before, was conceived in friendly and reassuring terms, but there was no word about armed opposition to the violation of Papal territory which may be attempted in disregard of the guarantees of the Congress of Vienna.** W i t h this, Consalvi w a s satisfied,®5 though the correction given by La Voce did not contain, as his instructions had indicated, a verbatim copy of his original note. 32 Dispatch 33 Dispatch 34 Dispatch 35 Dispatch

Consalvi to Consalvi to CP. Naples Consalvi to

N. Vienna, November 18, 1820, in AV, ANV-244. CP. Naples, November 17, 1820, in AV, ANN. to Consalvi, November 21, 1820, in AV, SS, R252. CP. Naples, November 24, 1820, in AV, ANN.

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3. PREPARATIONS FOR T H E CONGRESS OF L A I B A C H

W a r was to come, but not before all diplomatic formalities had been observed. A t Troppau the Great Powers had met in October and November, 1820, for two objects: to establish the basic principle of intervention, and to apply that principle to the case of Naples. The former was achieved in the Troppau Protocol, affirming the right and duty of intervening in states which had suffered a change of government through revolution. The latter was provided for in the invitation extended to the K i n g of Naples to join the Congress at Laibach in January of the following year, to discuss the situation created by the revolution and to decide what should be done with regard to it. The courts of Austria, Russia and Prussia, therefore, addressed identical notes to Ferdinand, in which they requested him to join the Congress at Laibach for a discussion of the political affairs of his kingdom. F o r the moral effect that it would have, they requested the Pope to support their invitation in whatever way he saw f i t . " His Holiness, hoping for a peaceful settlement of the whole affair through the instrumentality of the Congress, which would thus spare Italy the scourge of war, acquiesced heartily in the request of the powers. On December 3, therefore, he dispatched a personal letter to the K i n g , in which he referred to the work to be done in Laibach in the interests of peace and order—both most dear to his h e a r t — and joined his voice to that of the Allies in urging him to attend the proposed conference. 37 The letter was to be delivered personally to the K i n g by Giustiniani, but only after the ministers of Austria, Russia, and Prussia had submitted the notes of their sovereigns. This was to make evident what was actually the case, that the Pope was not an active agent in extending the invitation, but only adding his support to their request." 36 Dispatch Consalvi to C P . Naples, December 3, 1820, in A N , A N N . 37 Letter Pius V I I to Ferdinand I, December 3, 1820, enclosed in Dispatch Consalvi to N. Vienna, December 5, 1820, in A V , ANV-244. 38 Dispatch Consalvi to C P . Naples, December 3, 1820, in A V , A N N .

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Giustiniani, having learned from Count Stakelberg, the Russian Ambassador, when the ambassadors of the Allies were to see the K i n g , arranged for an audience on December 7, when he presented to Ferdinand the Pope's letter. O n reading it, the K i n g declared his willingness and even eagerness to conform to the wishes of the Great Powers, but he doubted whether he would be permitted to leave the kingdom, inasmuch as the constitution forbade it without the consent of Parliament, and such consent was not likely to be given. 89 T h e Papal representative took no part in the manoeuvres of the diplomats by which that difficulty was overcome and permission secured from Parliament for the K i n g to go to the Congress. Indeed, he was severely critical of the part played by the foreign ambassadors there, feeling that in their zeal to gain the desired consent they had cared too little how they compromised the K i n g with his people, in counselling him to promise that he would uphold before the Congress the constitution he had granted—a promise that Giustiniani suspected he w o u l d — o r could—not keep. 40 In the plans of the Allies the Pope was to have a greater part in the conference than merely that of assisting in securing the presence of the K i n g of Naples. Since the object of the Congress was the adoption and execution of measures deemed best for the welfare of the people of Naples and for the interests of the reigning family, and through these, for the peace and stability of Italy, its proceedings and accomplishments were obviously of interest to the other governments of Italy. For that reason, the Allies wished that all the Italian courts be represented at Laibach. Accordingly the ambassadors of the three Powers in Rome were instructed to communicate to the Papal government the plans of their sovereigns, and their wish 39 Dispatch CP. Naples to Consalvi, December 8, 1820, in AV, ANN-407. 40 Dispatch CP. Naples to Consalvi, December 10, 1820, in A V , R165-118.

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that the Pope would send a representative to join in the work of the forthcoming Congress. 41 At a conference between Consalvi and the three ambassadors, Apponyi, Italinsky and Niebuhr, the Cardinal asked that they go beyond the " confidential communication " prescribed by their courts, and issue a formal note of invitation. The Congress, he said, was being regarded in Naples as a meeting of its enemies, and he wished to remove the danger that the sending of a representative after a merely confidential indication of the wishes of the Allies might be judged by Naples as a spontaneous participation by the Pope in a hostile conference. The presentation of a formal note of invitation by the Allies should remove this suspicion, as King Ferdinand himself had, with the consent of Parliament, heeded a similar summons.42 Accordingly, on January 6, the three ministers delivered to Consalvi the desired notes, in the names of their respective courts, asking the Pope to send a representative to the Congress about to meet at Laibach. 48 The invitation was promptly accepted. The following day Consalvi, expressing the appreciation of His Holiness to the Allies for their interest in the welfare of Italy, notified the ambassadors that he would send Cardinal Spina, the Legate at Bologna, to represent him at Laibach. 44 41 Dispatches : Metternich to Apponyi, Bernstorff to Niebuhr, December 24, 1820, in A V , S S , R242. 42 Dispatches Consalvi to Metternich, to Blacas, January 6, 1821, in A V , S S , R165-118. 43 Notes: Apponyi, Italinsky, Niebuhr to Consalvi, January 6, 1821, in A V , S S , R242. In view of subsequent discussions at Laibach, it may be noted that, according to the invitations of the Allies' ministers, " . . . l'objet principal [des conférances] est de se concerter sur les mesures et les principes à adopter pour assurer à ses [ceux de Férdinand] peuples un gouvernement stabile qui puisse offrir les garanties d'une tranquilité permanente et générale." 44 Notes Consalvi to Apponyi, Italinsky, Niebuhr, January 7, 1821, in A V , S S , R242.

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In still another way the Pope was expected to take part in the work of settling the disorders in Naples. At Troppau, Capo d'lstria, the Russian minister, had proposed that the Allies appeal to His Holiness to act as mediator in effecting peace with the rebel nation. 45 To arrange this, as well as other matters, Count Lebzeltern was sent to Rome, where he arrived at the end of December/ 6 However, by that time the situation envisaged by the Allies in proposing Papal mediation had changed, and he made no official communication on the matter, pending receipt of new instructions. For the Allies had assumed that King Ferdinand would not be allowed to leave Naples to go to Laibach; they would be unwilling to deal with either a King whom they regarded as under restraint, or a parliamentary government which they refused to recognize. They saw, however, in the Pope, the common Father of all, an acceptable means of presenting their aims and determinations to both prisoner-King and rebel parliament.1" Lebzeltern's instructions, therefore, provided for the case in which the Pope could act as mediator between the Allies on the one hand, and King and Parliament on the other. This, however, was changed by the departure of the King on December 12, with the permission of Parliament, at about the same time that Lebzeltern left Troppau for Rome.48 The Austrian heard of the new development on reaching Florence, and realized the possible effect that it might have on his mission ; he communicated at once with Metternich, asking for instructions in view of the changed circumstances.'" He then proceeded to Rome, where he made a confidential report of the plans of the Allies for mediation, but withheld the 46 Charles K. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822 (London, 1934). P- 308. 46 Dispatch Consalvi to N. Vienna, December 30, 1820, in AV, ANV-244. 47 Dispatches : Consalvi to N. Vienna, January 16, 1821, in AV, ANV-245; Spina (Laibach) to Consalvi, January 26, 1821, in AV, SS, R242. 48 Letter Metternich to Consalvi, December 13, 1820, in Mémoires du Cardinal Consalvi (Paris, 1864), I, 126-127. 49 Dispatch Consalvi to N. Vienna, December 27, 1820, in AV, ANV-244.

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official letters concerning it until he should have received further instructions. 50 The idea of Papal mediation in the Neapolitan affair was not new in Rome. W h e n it became evident that the Allies were regarding the constitutional system in Naples with hostile eye, Monsignor Giustiniani, in September, 1820, had proposed to Consalvi that it might be possible for the conflicting parties to be brought together in a compromise, provided a mediator acceptable to both sides could be found; for this office he suggested the Pope. 51 T h e idea, however, found no favor in Rome; against it Consalvi noted the inopportuneness of making any such gesture at the moment, before the intentions of the Allies were definitely known, as well as the impossibility of the Pope's undertaking any office in behalf of the change brought about by a secret society, without contradicting the principles which the Holy See had always held with regard to such an organization." Even if the Pope were now to act at the request of the Allies, his intervention would necessarily be governed by certain principles which Consalvi thought it wise to make known, so that, if the Powers saw fit to persist in their design, they might make their proposal in conformity with the position of the Pope. This he did in letters to Metternich himself, and to Count Blacas, the French Ambassador at Vienna and Laibach, who was throughout a sympathetic supporter of Cardinal Spina and the Papal policy. 58 The attitude of the Pope towards the matter of mediating in the affairs of Naples was outlined by Consalvi as follows. There were two reasons which prompted the acceptance of the profered post, first his appreciation of the honor paid him by his 60 Dispatch Consalvi to N . Vienna, J a n u a r y 16, 1821, in A V , A N V - 2 4 5 . 51 Dispatch C P . Naples to Consalvi, September 9, 1820, in A V , R165-118.

SS,

52 Dispatch Consalvi to C P . Naples, September 19, 1820, in A V , A N N . 53 Dispatches Consalvi to Metternich, to Blacas, J a n u a r y 6, 1821, in A V , SS, R165-118.

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selection, and secondly his office, as the Vicar of the God of Peace, which obliged him at all times to further the interests of peace and harmony. On the other hand, there were several practical objections and difficulties in the way of his acceptance. The first concerned the parties between whom he was to mediate. Had the Neapolitan Parliament refused to allow the King to go to Laibach, the issue would have been plainly between the Powers on the one side and the King and people of Naples on the other. But with Ferdinand in Laibach, such mediation would be between the Allies and the King on the one hand, and the rebellious people on the other; in this case, the Pope would be placed in the necessity of recognizing the Parliament as representing the people and as capable of being the other party in the proposed mediation. Further, it was hard to see just what mediation was possible between the extreme views of wanting and of not wanting the Spanish Constitution in Naples. Even the obvious compromise of inducing the Neapolitans to accept some other constitutional form less radical than that of Spain (and such a hypothesis involved the assumption, by no means sure, that the Allies were willing that Naples have a constitution at all), could not be proposed by the Pope without raising the question of a similar grant for the Papal State." These two considerations radically destroyed the possible usefulness of the Pope as a mediator, but Consalvi counted on the Allies to appreciate his position. Within the limits imposed by that, he was most willing to do anything he could to avoid the evil of war and to effect a peaceful settlement. He suggested that the Pope might write a letter to the people of Naples, warning them against the evils which threatened them unless they accepted the plans formulated for them by their King and 54 Consalvi, in writing to the Nuncio in Vienna, made this last point even more forceful. " I f [he wrote] through the intervention of the Pope, Naples should secure a constitution which could be said to be authorized by the Great Powers, how could he refuse to grant one to his own subjects, who would not fail to demand i t ? " (Dispatch Consalvi to N. Vienna, January 16, 1821, in AV, ANV-245 )

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his Allies. T h i s he might do a f t e r — a n d therefore in support o f — t h e letter it was planned that the K i n g would write to announce the results of the consultations at Laibach, or, if it seemed better, simultaneously with the K i n g ' s communication. T h i s latter proposal, Consalvi added, was his own thought, not yet submitted to H i s Holiness for approval. The question of mediation, in the development of events, was practically dropped; no more was heard of it until the Congress of Laibach. 4 . GROWING T H R E A T OF W A R

B y December, though all was still technically peaceful, both Austria and Naples were well along in their preparations for the war which both sides felt was inevitable. A s early as November 4, the Papal Police at Ferrara observed that, as far as the Austrian forces were concerned, all was in readiness for the campaign. 55 F r o m Naples came similar reports; at the end of October, Giustiniani wrote that in spite of grave financial difficulties the nation was preparing—with more or less enthusiasm — f o r w a r ; the dispatch of troops to the frontier could be expected during the first days of November. 58 Between these two hostile camps lay the Papal State, helpless even from a military point of view, and more so because of its character as an ecclesiastical state whose sovereign by virtue of his office, was obliged to preserve amicable relations with all states. In the coming conflict between its two neighbors, the Papal State would inevitably suffer; as Consalvi wrote to the Nuncio in Madrid in the last days of November, " the problem which we must solve is no longer that of avoiding all harm, but of finding the way to suffer as little as possible." 57 It was in that attempt—to find the way to suffer as little damage as possible—that Rome began in December to issue to its diminu65 F e r r a r a , Rapporto Politico, November 4, 1820, in AV, SS, RiS5-3