Rome and the Enemy: Imperial Strategy in the Principate [Reprint 2019 ed.] 9780520929708

Citation preview

Rome and the Enemy

The publisher gratefully acknowledges the generous contribution to this book provided by the General Endowment Fund of the Associates of the University of California Press.

Rome and the Enemy Imperial Strategy in the Principate

Susan P. Mattern

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS Berkeley / Los Angeles / London

University of California Press Berkeley and Los Angeles, California University of California Press, Ltd. London, England by The Regents of the University of California © 1999

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Mattern, Susan P. Rome and the enemy : imperial strategy in the principate / by Susan P. Mattern. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-520-21166-9 (alk. p a p e r )

1. Rome—History—Empire, 30 B.c-284 A.D.—Historiography. 2. Rome—History,Military—30 B.c-476 A.D. 3. Rome—Military policy. 4. Rome—Foreign relations—30 B.c-284 A.D. I. Title. DG271.M18

1999

937'.07—DC21

98-40630 CIP

Manufactured in the United States of America 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements o f ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992 (R 1997) ( P e r m a n e n c e of Paper).

®

To my parents, Nancy and Peter, and my sisters, Emily and Elizabeth

Contents

L I S T OF MAPS AND I L L U S T R A T I O N S

IX

PREFACE

XI

N O T E ON A B B R E V I A T I O N S

XV

R O M A N E M P E R O R S , 31 B . C . - A . D . 2 3 8

XVII

CHAPTER I

Introduction: The Decision-Making Elite

CHAPTER 2

The Image of the World

24

CHAPTER 3

Strategy

81

CHAPTER 4

Income and Expenditure

123

CHAPTER 5

Values

162

Carthage Must Be Destroyed

211

REFERENCES

223

INDEX

245

EPILOGUE

I

Maps and Illustrations

M A P OF T H E R O M A N E M P I R E IN THE SECOND CENTURY A.D.

FIGURE I

XX

The Peutinger Table; routes east of the Caspian

42

FIGURE

2

The world according to Strabo

45

FIGURE

3

Mappamundi from a manuscript of Lucan

48

FIGURE

4

The world according to Agrippa

50

FIGURE

5

The world according to Ptolemy

62

Preface

It is the understandable tendency of the modern student of Roman history to seek there some sort of lesson or practical example. After all, the Romans achieved immense success in certain areas—war, empire building. How did they accomplish these things, we ask? And it is perhaps our uniquely modern tendency to seek the answer to this question not in Roman valor or fortune, as the ancients did, but in the Roman mind; to attribute their success to some superior insight or expertise, some science of war or administration. We would like to see expert strategists tracing defensible borders and buffer zones on the wellplotted topography of Europe and Asia; evaluating the political and military strengths and weaknesses of their enemies; collecting, tracking, and allocating financial resources to meet their strategic goals. The Roman mind is, in fact, precisely what this study seeks to explore. It asks the question, What were the reasons behind the Roman leadership's most important decisions about foreign war and peace? It has been argued in recent years that the image of the Romans as expert military strategists in the modern sense is illusory, and in general that conclusion is supported in this work. But what, then, were the motivations governing Roman foreign relations? What were the rules of the game at which they were so successful, and what ultimately determined the limits of that success? The chronological boundaries of this study are roughly the battle of Actium, in 31 B.C., and the fall of Severus Alexander in 235. In choosing them, I do not mean to suggest that the conclusions of this study are xi

xii

PREFACE

not applicable to other time periods; in fact, some of the most characteristic aspects of Roman foreign relations were also the most traditional and enduring. Rather, these limits are convenient because the system set up by Augustus—a certain arrangement of provinces and armies, and the taxation system that paid for them—remained substantially unchanged throughout the centuries under discussion here, and the literary evidence required is especially abundant. After 235, however, the literary sources almost completely disappear and the Augustan system itself largely ceased to function. The loss of literary sources is important because it is on this evidence that my discussion mainly relies; the reasons behind this choice of source material are outlined in the first chapter, which seeks to define and to describe the people who made Rome's foreign-relations decisions. For the most part these were members of the Roman senatorial aristocracy; and, since their class produced much of what remains of Greek and Latin literature, that literature can be used as a source of information on how they thought about foreign-relations issues. The chapters that follow discuss four aspects of this question. Roman conceptions of geography, military strategy, and economics are examined in turn; but a great deal of Roman thinking on the subject of warfare and empire is expressed in value terminology, which is the subject of the final chapter. This study suggests that international relations, for the Romans, were not so much a complex geopolitical chess game as a competition for status, with much violent demonstration of superior prowess, aggressive posturing, and terrorization of the opponent. The Romans behaved on an international level like Homeric heroes, Mafia gangsters, or participants in any society where status and security depend on one's perceived ability to inflict violence. Image or national "honor" emerges as the most important policy goal. In this sense Roman strategy was coherent and consistent over a remarkable period of time; and in a world where the technology and information necessary for more modern and familiar types of military strategy were lacking, it was quite effective. The value attached to honor, which was maintained by conquest, terror, and retaliation, explains the repeated, often unsuccessful attempts at expanding the empire, and the seemingly disproportionate investment of force in retaining territories of questionable strategic or economic value such as Britain and Mesopotamia. On the other hand, Roman concerns about the strength and geographic distribution of the army, and the financial cost of war, conquest, and occupation, emerge as the main factors limiting the empire's growth. The tension between these differ-

PREFACE

xiii

ent concerns ultimately helped to determine the shape of the Roman empire. This book is intended not only for students of Roman history but for nonspecialists as well, to provide a survey of many key features of Roman decision making over a long period of time. Thus it necessarily includes some material that has been discussed already by others, in more technical works; and it is necessarily incomplete, too, as it would be impossible to incorporate all of the vast and sophisticated scholarship that has been produced on all of the subjects discussed here. In particular, I have not attempted to review or synthesize the insights offered by the very extensive body of work on Roman frontier archaeology. The premise of this book is rather to let the Romans speak for themselves through their literature. Also, works published after 1996 could not, for the most part, be included in the bibliography. It is a pleasure to acknowledge the many scholars and friends who have contributed their time and energy to this book, and who are mainly responsible for whatever merits it may have. My greatest debt of gratitude is to Professor Ramsay MacMullen, for his insight, advice, and encouragement on this project over several years, and for all, besides this, that he has taught me. The book's editors, Mary Lamprech and Kate Toll, provided invaluable advice and detailed commentary on several sections, as well as tireless attention to the endless complexities of production. Professor Arthur Eckstein and Professor Carlin Barton generously gave their time to read the manuscript, and improved it greatly with their suggestions. I would also like to thank Professors Thomas Arnold, William Harris, Donald Kagan, and Gordon Williams, who read and commented on the entire text at an earlier stage; and Professor Heinrich von Staden and Brian Fuchs for their limitless patience with my queries about Greek texts and for their help, friendship, and encouragement. My translations owe much to the Loeb versions in most cases. Finally, I could not have written this book without the faith and support, through some difficult times, of my family, to whom it is dedicated. Lewisburg, Pennsylvania August 1997

Note on Abbreviations

Abbreviations for ancient sources and reference works follow the third edition of the Oxford Classical Dictionary.

Roman Emperors, 31 B.c.-A.D. 238

EMPEROR

Augustus Tiberius Gaius (Caligula) Claudius Nero Galba Otho Vitellius Vespasian Titus Domitian Nerva Trajan Hadrian Antoninus Pius Marcus Aurelius Lucius Verus Commodus Pertinax Didius Julianus Septimius Severus Pescennius Niger Clodius Albinus

Y E A R S OF R E I G N 31 B.C.—A.D. 1 4 A.D. 1 4 - 3 7

37-41 41-54 54-68

68-69 (a) 69 69 69-79 79-81

81-96 96-98 98-117 117-138 138-161 161-180 161-169 (b) 176-192 (b) 193 (a) 193

193-211 193-194 193-197

xviii

R O M A N E M P E R O R S , 31 B . C . - A . D . 238 Caracalla

1 9 8 - 2 1 7 (b)

Geta

2 0 9 - 2 1 1 (b)

Macrinus

217-218

Elagabalus

218-222

Severus Alexander

222-235

Maximinus Thrax

235-238

Notes (a) The years 69 and 193-197 were years of civil conflict with two or more "rival" emperors. (b) Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus ruled simultaneously as co-emperors; so did Marcus Aurelius and Commodus, Septimius Severus and Caracalla, and Septimius Severus and Geta.

ARCOMANNI

T.IV.M.V^ia • fUPPPRl ' f** ' r'

'fJUMIDIA.

AFRICA

Map of the Roman empire in the second century A.D.

.......

QUADI - - "T- , Cimuiuumi. - ' MORIC.UM', • PANNONIA? (UPPER) ,-

ALANI £

I

DACIA , " m Sarmizegethusa

J

!

'BOSPOR IBERI

r

MOKSIAVÍ ,( U P P E R ) / M P E S I A 1 L O W E R ) THRACIA

ALBANI

INTUS

Artaxata

\

ARMENIA

MACEDONIA 1 GALATIA 'Actiumì

Ancyra'

CAPPADOCIA Samosata

Nisibis

Carrhae

.CHAEi 'Antioch

/

C

SYRIA

)

Ctesiphon

f

f —

JUDAEA.

/

Jerusalem

PARTH LA ARABIA

CYRENAICA AEGYPTUS

\

CHAPTER I

\

Introduction: The Decision-Making Elite

When Marcus Aurelius died in A.D. 180, his son, the new emperor Commodus, had to decide what to do about the war on the Danube frontier. The circumstances surrounding the decision are recorded in detail only by the unreliable Herodian; 1 however, the purpose here is not to evaluate the ultimate accuracy of Herodian's account, but to determine whether Commodus' decision seems plausible in light of other ancient sources—and, as we shall see, it does. Commodus talks over the options with the "friends" who had accompanied his father on the expedition. They urge him not to abandon the war: To leave the war unfinished, besides being dishonorable (anqeneq), is also dangerous (em.ocpa^e