Rohingya Refugee Crisis in Myanmar: Ethnic Conflict and Resolution 9811664633, 9789811664632

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Rohingya Refugee Crisis in Myanmar Ethnic Conflict and Resolution Edited by

k u dr e t bü l bü l m d. n a z m u l i sl a m m d. s a j i d k h a n

Rohingya Refugee Crisis in Myanmar

Kudret Bülbül  •  Md. Nazmul Islam Md. Sajid Khan Editors

Rohingya Refugee Crisis in Myanmar Ethnic Conflict and Resolution

Editors Kudret Bülbül The Presidency of Foreign Relations and Protocol, The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) Ankara, Turkey

Md. Nazmul Islam Department of Political Science and Public Administration Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University Ankara, Turkey

Department of Political Science and Public Administration Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University Ankara, Turkey Md. Sajid Khan Department of Social Work Hacettepe University Ankara, Turkey

ISBN 978-981-16-6463-2    ISBN 978-981-16-6464-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6464-9 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-­01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

To our parents and Rohingyas around the World

Preface

The recent coup in Myanmar and the detention of the democratic leaders is what makes our book more relevant and timelier. The things unfolding in Myanmar have surprised the whole world with its latest military coup and a subsequent emergency declaration in 2021. This edited book discusses the current crisis of ethnic Rohingyas in Myanmar from their history, policy and politics and, most importantly, focusing on Rohingya ethnic conflict and resolution, whereas China, India, other international actors and big power’s role has been described to understand the policy challenges and current situations in resolving the Rohingya crisis. The book covers global politics as well as regional responses to Myanmar’s Rohingya crisis, focusing more on the regional policies and politics of South and Southeast Asia, including China, India, Bangladesh and Myanmar. Also, it evaluates whether actual activities of repatriation agreement are holding official priorities of Bangladesh and Myanmar government. Moreover, this book discloses whether regional countries such as India and China are interested in the Rakhine State of Myanmar to resolve this humanitarian vulnerability beyond their foreign policy. Eventually, this book offers an account of a previously little known, yet much-­ discussed, role of media from Bangladesh and India and international actors, including Western and Turkish approach, INGOs and NGOs contributions, Myanmar government’s policy and politics and Bangladesh’s response towards Rohingya with the detailed discussion on Rohingya challenges in Bangladesh, whether and how Rohingya case could be verified under international law, human trafficking in particular reference to Rohingya, and finally identity and humanitarian-based resolution with vii

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special stories, experiences from the top activists and leaders from the Rohingya diaspora. Readers will discover an entirely new perspective on the integration and future of Rohingya refugees in the post-Rohingya influx era of Bangladesh. It also examines the neighbouring nations’ current policies and challenges in dealing with the region’s ongoing refugee movements. Considering the economic as well as the political significance of Myanmar, it will give a brief discussion from West to East overview of the Rohingya crisis beyond refugees. This edited book focuses on the Rohingya refugee crisis beyond history and politics within the 16 chapters’ framework. This book is based on primary and secondary research, largely drawn from literature, descriptive, fact-finding and fieldwork data. This book is contributed by prominent scholars and academicians who are very well known in the field of politics, refugees, migrations, media, international law and Rohingya crisis. Nevertheless, this book contains 16 chapters under two specific thematic areas such as policy and politics of Rohingya crisis beyond the refugees and Rohingya ethnic conflict and resolution, but in the analytical section, the book emerged as several thematic, theoretical and experimental discussions. The first chapter, “Pre-historical Identity of Rohingya: Exploring Islam and the Historical Identity of the Muslim Kingdom in Arakan” by Ali Dadan and Abdur Rahman Fuad, assesses how Islam came into the Arakan and its internal diffusion process. The authors explained some key assets of Muslim development and how it progresses in Arakan that predominantly reflected the glorious period of Arakanese Muslims. At the outset, Dadan and Fuad emphasise the pre-Islamic history of Arakan, generally, about the first Arakanese kingdom, founded in B.C. 2666. Nebile Pelin Mantı and Dilara Nur Cansu Islam identify the three legal themes, including genocide, forced migration and forced labour, whether the Myanmar government and its security forces act against Rohingya ethnic in Rakhine state qualifying any breach under international law, in Chap. 2, “Genocide, Forced Migration, and Forced Labour: A Case Study on Rohingya People Under International Law”. In this case, the authors analysed the “elements of genocide” in the theoretical frame with contextual evidence from international organisations’ reports, think tanks and newspapers. The theoretical frame consists of the previous decisions given by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, International Criminal Court and International Court of Justice.

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Md. Sajid Khan and Nurefşan Arslan, in Chap. 3, “Forced Migration and Human Trafficking: In the Context of Rohingya Refugees in South Asia”, focus on the refugees and human trafficking issue in South Asia with special reference to the Rohingya crisis of Myanmar. They use a descriptive approach to identify the Rohingya trafficking, which highlights the present laws, policies, government efforts and intra-government and non-government organisations working to combat refugee trafficking in South Asia. The fourth chapter, “Myanmar Government’s Rohingya Policy and Politics” by Asif Bin Ali, aims to investigate the Myanmar government’s major policies and politics towards the Rohingya ethnic minority group for the period 2008–2020. In that respect, the author examines the intention and limitations of the Myanmar government’s policymaking and the underlying factors driving Myanmar’s policy and politics, including institutional constraints. To achieve that understanding, the author takes a constructivist approach followed by qualitative methodology and connecting analysis of textual data. The fifth chapter is explored by Sariful Islam; in his study “Regime’s Interests in Hosting Refugees: Bangladesh’s Response to the Rohingya”, Islam analyses the political interests of the political parties, particularly parties in power of Bangladesh, in hosting or not hosting Rohingya. With such analysis, the author problematises the claim of the Bangladesh government’s response as pure “humanitarian”. Author’s argument holds over a period of time with all three regimes (Ziaur Rahman [1978], Khaleda Zia [1991–1992] and Sheikh Hasina [2017]) did not face much difficulty in responding positively to the Rohingya, as there was support— domestic and international—for such a policy. The author shows how the pursuit of power and political legitimacy appear to have played a part, in different ways, in their “humanitarian response”. The sixth chapter, “Questioning the Crisis of ‘Rohingya Muslim’ Ethnic Minority Beyond the Foreign Policy of Bangladesh and Myanmar” by Md. Nazmul Islam and Habibur Rahman focuses on the Rohingya Muslim refugee crisis from the perspective of Bangladesh and Myanmar foreign policy where instrumentalism and primordialism theories have been employed to identify the Rohingya ethnic minority crisis in Myanmar. This chapter explores whether and how Myanmar and foreign countries are trying to achieve their own interests in the Rakhine State. The authors outline the steps that Myanmar took to resolve the Rohingya catastrophe

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by analysing Bangladesh’s and Myanmar’s foreign policies to address the region’s current humanitarian emergency. The seventh chapter by Md. Ishtiaq Ahmed Talukder discusses “Are Refugees a Blessing or a Curse: An Analysis of Economic Impact of Rohingya Refugees on Bangladesh Since the Exodus”. In this chapter, Talukder identifies the understanding of the modern-day refugee crisis in Bangladesh, especially the economic impact of the Rohingya refugees on Bangladesh; therefore, the author tried to understand whether the refugees are blessing or curse to Bangladesh. In Chap. 8, Vedat Işıkhan and Md. Sajid Khan discuss the “Rohingya Beyond the Refugees: India’s Policy and Realpolitik for the World’s ‘Most Persecuted Refugees’”. In this chapter, the author explores how with each passing year, the Indian government and non-government organisations have changed plans to deal with the Rohingya refugee crisis. Authors employed descriptive study to understand the various aspects and factors behind the current policies and realpolitik of the Indian government towards Rohingya and Myanmar. In that case, they unfold the role of I/ NGOs in supporting Rohingya refugees in India. Additionally, the authors explore the recent coup and the succeeding challenges for both the Indian government and the Myanmar government in resolving the Rohingya refugee crisis. The authors also assess how the recent coup in 2021 will jeopardise India’s strategies and geopolitics for handling Rohingya issues. They also highlight the kind of challenges and problems faced by the government and the Rohingya refugees in India. In Chap. 9, entitled “Rohingya Refugee and Foreign Policy: China’s Policy and Interests in Rakhine State”, Faisal Mahmood, Md. Nazmul Islam and Md. Sajid Khan examine the deriving factors that pushed China to be a peace settler in the region and try to find out its key interests linked with the crisis. In this chapter, the authors argue that China’s prime motive is to achieve its strategic and economic goals, associated with both the countries, Myanmar and Bangladesh, rather than to resolve the Rohingya crisis. In Chap. 10, “Turkey as a ‘Humanitarian Actor’: Assistance to Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh and Myanmar”, Nurefşan Arslan, Md. Nazmul Islam, Lutfun Nahar and Esra Eymen Cansu address the contributions of the Turkish government and non-governmental organisations, including Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency, Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency, Turkish Health Ministry, Turkish president, Turkish foreign minister, Presidency for Turks Abroard and Related

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Communities, Turkish Media, Turk Kizilay (Turkish Red Crescent), Turkish Diyanet (Religious Affairs) and Humanitarian Relief Foundation, in helping the Rohingya people. In doing so, the authors of this chapter analyse and describe the aspects and arenas of projects and diplomatic roles led by the Turkish government and non-government organisations thoroughly and pay more attention to link up with the theoretical framework of the “constructivist approach” of Turkish humanitarian aid towards the Rohingya refugee crisis in Bangladesh and Myanmar, making Turkey a “humanitarian actor”. In Chap. 11, “Representation of Rohingya Refugees in the Bangladeshi Media: A Content Analysis”, Mobassera Jahan Fatima and Aytül Tamer Torun address how Rohingyas are represented to the people of Bangladesh by the Bangladeshi newspapers. For this purpose, the authors aim to find an in-depth analysis of the Rohingya refugees’ representation in the top five Bangladeshi media (both Bengali and English), which is conducted using the content analysis method in the context of the historical relationship between Myanmar and Bangladesh. Accordingly, through their content analysis, the authors identified the top five common themes of the newspapers: humanitarian crisis, the atrocity of the Myanmar army, labelling as Rohingyas instead of refugees, diplomatic negotiation for a reasonable solution, and repatriation of Rohingyas. Followingly, in Chap. 12, “Unfolding Rohingya Refugee Crisis Through Mass Media: A Thematic Analysis of Indian Print and Electronic Media”, Kanika Walia and Serdar Öztürk explore and focus on the media reporting of the Rohingya issue in Indian mass media. The study is based on the thematic analysis of two major Indian news media. The authors employed the descriptive study for analysing the various set of themes related to Rohingya refugees reported from August 2017 to December 2019. The chapter also explores the media discourses about India’s Rohingya situation and how it helps in developing public opinion. In Chap. 13, “Position of Responsibility: International Response to the Rohingya Refugee Crisis—the Case of Western Countries”, Gershon Dagba and Israel Nyaburi Nyadera examine how the international community and in particular Western countries are responding to the situation. Are the efforts and commitment to end the brutality against the Rohingyas enough? What actions are being taken so far and are there gaps that can be filled to achieve a quicker and more sustainable resolution to the problem? These are the questions that the authors seek to address. In this way, the authors structured this chapter by examining the genealogy

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of the Rohingya crisis and responses from Western countries where they illustrate how Western countries could channel their efforts through ASEAN to contain and moderate violence against the Rohingyas. In Chap. 14, “INGOs and NGOs Strategies for Social Cohesion: The Case of Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh”, Aghna Shujat, Md. Sajid Khan and Md. Nazmul Islam explain non-governmental organisations’ strategies for social cohesion of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. To achieve a better understanding of INGOs’ and NGOs’ strategic policies towards Rohingya refugees, the authors focus on systematic literature review on social cohesion. Considering social cohesion as a multidimensional concept, the authors analyse INGOs’ and NGOs’ work and activities towards Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. In Chap. 15, “Identity and Humanitarian Based Approach: Resolution and Resolving the Rohingya Refugee Crisis”, Sanjida Parveen and Mehebub Sahana examine the relationship between forced migration, resultant identity crises and humanitarian solution for Rohingya crisis. In this chapter, the authors argued why Rohingya had been deprived of their identities of being not just Muslims but human beings. Authors clarify a historical demographic assessment of Rohingya through the relation of the nation-state and its borders, their exclusions and the magnitude of ill-­ treatment due to migration to neighbouring countries. The final chapter, “Looking Past, Moving Future: Stories from the Spectacle of Rohingyas”, is an editorial desk-based analysis, which explores the problems and difficulties that Rohingya refugees are facing in their host country. Editors employed this chapter as thematic analysis, which aimed to find out the Rohingya’s current problems and regional and international responses with the short and long-term solutions of Rohingya ethnic conflict and resolution, where editors identified the future of Rohingya people and Rohingya refugees in around the world. Editors used semi-structured interviews to get reliable data, where Rohingya leaders and activists were taken as a purposive sample for proceeding with this study. This is a study of the Rohingya historical, political, ethnic and policy crises, from South Asia to Southeast Asia and from regional politics to

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international politics. Looking at the current situations of the Rohingya, this edited book is suited to historians, political scientists, sociologists and anthropologists, as well as more general readers, policymakers, academicians and journalists. Ankara, Turkey December  2021 

Kudret Bülbül Md. Nazmul Islam Md. Sajid Khan

Acknowledgements

Indeed, writing a book project such as this when the world is trying to recover from the deadly global pandemic is undoubtedly a challenging and difficult task. It took active engagements and persistent efforts from many institutes and individuals to make this book project possible. The unique idea for this project came from discussions between the editors, which started in the late 2017s. Islam’s work on “Questioning the Rohingya Ethnic Minority Beyond the Foreign Policy of Bangladesh and Myanmar” presented as a paper on Rohingya at Kartepe Summit in 2018, organised by Kocaeli Municipality in Turkey led him to realise the striking lack of fit between his subject areas and the possible conflict resolution for Rohingya refugee crisis in Myanmar. Bülbül’s regular engagements with academia and civil society organisations and voluntary activities for Rohingya left him with the impression that there was slight if any original development of academic works on Rohingya. Besides, his collaborative work with different bureaucratic and academic environments in Turkey underlined to him the dependence of much humanitarian and academic role for Rohingya people in Myanmar. Khan’s consistent academic role in refugee and migration studies left him with the idea that there was little academic discussion on the Rohingya refugee crisis from the regional perspective. We are indebted to all those individuals and institutions providing intellectual stimulation and practical support for completing this book project. First and foremost, we wish to show our sincere gratitude and respect to our parents and other family members who were our backbone during these challenging times. In this tiring journey, our family had always encouraged us and walked along with us to make our long-standing dream xv

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come true. Our deepest appreciation and gratitude to all talented and collaborative authors for their timely submission at this difficult time. Certainly, each contributor deserves our heartfelt gratitude and appreciation for their invaluable inputs and suggestions during the whole book publication process. We would like to thank the Library authority of T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Millet Kütüphanesi, Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Saarland University, Greifswald University, Trento University, European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), Hacettepe University, Ankara University, Istanbul University, Aligarh Muslim University, Jawaharlal Nehru University, University of Dhaka and University of Chittagong for allowing us to work on this book project during the last five years and want to thank several student research assistants at Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, who have participated in this project at various stages. We would also like to thank various authorities and institutions such as Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) and Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University Migration Application and Research Center (AYBUMPC) for giving us a platform for continuing our research. The editorial team at Palgrave Macmillan deserves special appreciation, especially; thanks are also due to Sandeep Kaur, Tikoji Rao Mega Rao and Susan Westendorf, our editor and project coordinator at Palgrave Macmillan, whose efforts have contributed to the timely publication of the book. We also extend our deep gratitude to all the people who readily agreed to become responsive to our study, especially to the current and former Myanmar and Rohingya leaders, activists, researchers and organisations for providing us with valuable information regarding the past, present and future of Rohingya. We are highly indebted for their cooperation and as participants in this book project. In addition, we would like to acknowledge and thank all our friends and well-wishers who have directly or indirectly helped us in the study as well as in other work. December 2021

Kudret Bülbül, Ankara Md. Nazmul Islam, Dhaka Md. Sajid Khan, New Delhi

Contents

1 Prehistorical Identity of Rohingya: Exploring Islam and the Glorious Past of the Muslim Kingdom in Arakan  1 Abdur Rahman Fuad and Ali Dadan 2 Genocide, Forced Migration, and Forced Labor: A Case Study on Rohingya People Under International Law 19 Nebile Pelin Mantı and Dilara Nur Cansu Islam 3 Forced Migration and Human Trafficking: In the Context of Rohingya Refugees in South Asia 47 Md. Sajid Khan and Nurefşan Arslan 4 Myanmar Government’s Rohingya Policies and Politics 71 Asif Bin Ali 5 Regime’s Interests in Hosting Refugees: Bangladesh’s Response to the Rohingya 97 Sariful Islam 6 Questioning the Crisis of “Rohingya Muslim” Ethnic Minority Beyond the Foreign Policy of Bangladesh and Myanmar135 Md. Nazmul Islam and Md. Habibur Rahman

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7 Are Refugees a Blessing or a Curse: An Analysis of Economic Impact of Rohingya Refugees on Bangladesh since the Exodus173 Md. Ishtiaq Ahmed Talukder 8 Rohingya Beyond the Refugees: India’s Policy and Realpolitik for the World’s ‘Most Persecuted Refugees’189 Vedat Işıkhan and Md. Sajid Khan 9 Rohingya Refugee and Foreign Policy: China’s Policy and Interests in Rakhine State211 Faisal Mahmood, Md. Nazmul Islam, and Md. Sajid Khan 10 Turkey as a “Humanitarian Actor”: Assistance to Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh and Myanmar233 Nurefşan Arslan, Md. Nazmul Islam, Lutfun Nahar, and Esra Eymen Cansu 11 Representation of Rohingya Refugees in the Bangladeshi Media: A Content Analysis261 Mobassera Jahan Fatima and Aytül Tamer Torun 12 Unfolding Rohingya Refugee Crisis Through Mass Media: A Thematic Analysis of Indian Print and Electronic Media291 Kanika Walia and Serdar Öztürk 13 Position of Responsibility: International Response to the Rohingya Refugee Crisis – The Case of Western Countries313 Gershon Dagba and Israel Nyaburi Nyadera 14 INGO and NGO Strategies for Social Cohesion: The Case of Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh337 Aghna Shujat, Md. Sajid Khan, and Md. Nazmul Islam 15 Identity and Humanitarian-Based Approach: Resolution and Resolving the Rohingya Refugee Crisis357 Sanjida Parveen and Mehebub Sahana

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16 Looking at the Past, Moving to the Future: Stories from the Spectacle of Rohingyas379 Kudret Bülbül, Md. Nazmul Islam, and Md. Sajid Khan Index413

Notes on Contributors

Editors Kudret  Bülbül  graduated from Faculty of Political Sciences, Istanbul University, in 1991. He holds a master’s degree from the same university for his study titled “Prince Said Halim Pasha as a Political Thinker”. He holds a PhD (2004) with the thesis titled “Globalization, Culture, and Politics: Globalisation Approaches in Turkish Intellectual and Political Life” from the Department of Political Science at Ankara University. He became associate professor in 2007. In 1995, Bülbül stayed in London for academic and research purposes and was a visiting scholar at The University of Kansas, USA, between 2000 and 2002. He worked at Kırıkkale University and Ankara University between 1993 and 2010. Bülbül held various positions in the bureaucracy between 2010 and 2017. He served as Deputy Undersecretary for the Undersecretariat of Public Order and Security for nearly four years and Acting Undersecretary for a period. He was a President of Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities under Prime Ministry (YTB) for nearly three years and Counsellor for Turkish Prime Ministry for a short period. He is a professor of Political Science at Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University. At the same time, He has been serving as a Head of Foreign Relations and Protocol Department of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM). Bülbül wrote weekly articles translated into 35 languages for Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) nearly for two years and made weekly programmes for TRT Radio Voice of Turkey in 2018 and 2019. Taking an active role in many non-governmental organisations and think tanks xxi

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throughout his student and professional life, Bülbül conducts academic studies on globalization, identity politics, human rights and security issues, conflict resolution and global peace. He wrote many books, book chapters and articles. In his bureaucratic positions, he focused on raising the level of democracy and freedom in Turkey, strengthening Turkey’s Diaspora, restoring lost relations with kin and related communities, protecting Muslim communities’ rights, and supporting international students in Turkey. Md. Nazmul Islam  is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Ankara, Turkey and PD Research Fellow at the Faculty of Communication, Ankara University, Ankara, Turkey. He is a former ERASMUS Research Fellow at Europa Institute, Saarland University, Germany, and a former Research Associate at the joint project between the University of Cambridge, UK, and BRAC, Bangladesh. Islam’s PhD dissertation focused on “Comparing China and India’s Foreign Policy Strategy in the Case of Pakistan and Iran”. He completed his master’s and bachelor degrees in the Department of Peace and Conflict Studies from the University of Dhaka, Bangladesh. Islam also completed his second master’s courses from the Department of European and International Law at the Faculty of Law and Economics European Institute, Saarland University, Germany. Nazmul Islam is the author of several books, many book chapters, and peer-reviewed articles. His book chapters are available as a book, Global Encyclopaedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance, edited by Ali Farazmand (Springer), one chapter of a forthcoming book, namely the Routledge Handbook of Poverty in Global South, and his publications (papers, articles, reports, and reviews) on various subjects have appeared, among others, in the journals of Contemporary Review of the Middle East, Journal of Contemporary China (forthcoming article), Insight Turkey, ADAM Journal of Social Science, Journal of Youth Research, Cappadocia Journal of Area Studies, and M5 Journal. He has more than 30 conference proceeding including in University of Toronto, Canada, Oxford University, UK, Virginia University, USA, and King College London, UK, to his credit. Islam worked in different positions and in projects conducted at the University of Cambridge, Saarland University, University of Trento, Greifswald University, Ankara University, OICSESRIC, BRAC University, BRAC, Grameen Bank-Yunus Center, UNDP, YTB, and ILO. Between 2015 and 2018 and 2019 and 2020,

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Islam worked in the Ministry of External Affairs, India; VšĮ Inceptus Organization, Lithuania; University of Trento, Italy; University of Griefswald, Germany; Natural TV, Turkey; Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), SESRIC, Turkey; Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry, Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB), Turkey; and International Labour Organization (ILO), Bangladesh, as a consultant, research fellow, and policy analyst. Islam’s academic work has been published in Op-eds published by the Ankarabased Anadolu Agency; Istanbul-based Daily Sabah & INSAMER; Hong Kong-based Asia Times; New Delhi-based South Asia Journal; Dhaka-based Perspective Magazine and has frequently appeared on TRT, Kanal 5, and Natural TV (Producer and Analyst). Islam’s major areas of interest include politics, foreign policy, and administration of the South, Southeast and West Asia especially the policy and politics of China and India towards South and West Asia. He has been recently appointed to the Foreign Relations and Protocol Department, Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM). Md. Sajid Khan  is a PhD candidate in the Department of Social Work, Hacettepe University, Ankara, Turkey. He was also a visiting research fellow at Migration Research and Application Center, Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Ankara. He has been an active researcher in the area of migration, refugees rights, social integrating, social justice, social policies, child rights, minority rights and Islamophobia. Presently, he is writing his PhD dissertation on “Role of Non-government Organisations in Refugee Integration in Turkey”. He is also the recipient of Gold Medal in his Master of Social Work programme from Central University of Himachal Pradesh. His undergraduate is from Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, India. He is also former participant of the International Summer programme at Frankfurt am Main University, Germany. He has also worked at different non-­governmental organisations on street children, drug abuse and child welfare. He is engaged with various national and international research organisation where he is studying migration and diaspora. He has participated in and attended different research activities such as research methodology workshops, capacity building programmes, national and international conferences, seminars and research events.

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Contributors Asif Bin Ali  is a former journalist turned academic. Apart from working with the Daily Observer, he has also worked as a faculty member of sociology at Eastern University, Dhaka. He, as an Erasmus Mundus fellow, is at the Aarhus University, Denmark. With over 60 opinion articles, 15 interviews, 3 peer-reviewed book chapters, he has studied at Swansea University, the UK, Aarhus University and Danish School of Media and Journalism, Denmark, South Asian University (SAARC Estd.), New Delhi, and the University of Dhaka, Bangladesh. He has received the prestigious Erasmus Mundus scholarship funded by the European Union and SAARC-India Silver Jubilee Scholarships by the Indian government. He has conducted ethnographic research on the Aam Aadmi Party of India and archival research on the Great Bhola Cyclone of 1970. He is the regional editor of Global Dialogue, a quarterly magazine of the International Sociological Association. His recent co-edited book is Buddhist Nationalism Rohingya Crisis and Contemporary Politics in 2019. His research interest includes media coverage of terrorism, Islam and Muslim thinkers, artificial intelligence and communication, nationalism and movement. Nurefşan Arslan  is working at the Turkish Red Crescent (Turk Kizilay), Ankara, Turkey. Before joining there, Ariçam worked at Temple University, USA, as a research assistant. She was a representor of Turkey in Model United Nations in Bosnia. She worked in France/Strasbourg DITIB as a teacher. She is a Doctoral Scholar in the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies at Ankara University, Ankara, Turkey. After graduation she worked for one year as a freelance researcher at Bosphorus Migration Studies Center (BOGAM), Ankara, Turkey. Esra Eymen Cansu  is a post-graduate researcher in the Department of International Relations at Social Sciences University, Ankara, Turkey, and holds a bachelor’s degree from the Department of International Relations at Istanbul University, Istanbul, Turkey. Cansu organised the youth ministerial meeting with the NATO public diplomacy division (PDD)— Antalya 2015. She also worked and was involved in different think tank organisations in Turkey, such as SAM, ORSAM, IRAM, SETA and TUIC. Additionally, she has a great interest in studying “Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)” issues especially China’s grand strategy in the Middle East and Turkey and the public diplomacy of Turkey around the world. She is currently working under the Republic of Turkey Directorate of Communications.

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Dilara  Nur  Cansu  Islam  is an advocate of the Union of Turkey Bar Associations. She has graduated from Istanbul University Faculty of Law (2011–2013), Akdeniz University Faculty of Law, holds an LLM (with a specialisation in Private Law) from Social Sciences University, Ankara, Turkey. Cansu Islam is working at the Turkish Competition Authority (TCA) as a Head of Strategy Development Department and is an editor of the Competition Journal at TCA. Ali Dadan  joined Necmettin Erbakan University in 2013 as an assistant lecturer. He is an assistant professor and assistant dean in the Faculty of Theology since February 2019. Besides, he is a programme coordinator at ILHAM Research Centre and editor in chief of ISTEM. Previously, he was a teaching staff of the Islamic History and Arts Department at the same University. Dadan completed his BA and post-graduate degree from the Selcuk University in 2003 and 2006 consecutively. Finally, in 2013, he finished his doctorate programme on “The Turks According to the Islamic History Sources”. Gershon  Dagba is an Indian Council for Cultural Relations Scholar Fellow, pursuing MA in Public Administration at Punjabi University, Punjab, India. He worked as a teaching and research assistant at the Department of Political Science of the University of Ghana. He has published in several peered-review journals and his research interest lies in migration, elections, public policy and e-governance. He is also a Global Shaper at the World Economic Forum and working on equipping slum women with self-employable skills in India. Additionally, he is involved in a campaign to promote road safety with Patiala Foundation, India. Mobassera  Jahan  Fatima  is a research assistant at Migration Research Foundation (Göç Araştırmaları Vakfı), Ankara, Turkey, and a PhD candidate at the Department of Communication and Journalism, Ankara University, Ankara, Turkey. Previously, Fatima worked in the SESRIC, Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and as freelance journalist at Daily Ittefaq and News24 at Dhaka, Bangladesh. She completed her postgraduate degree from the Department of Journalism at Gazi University, Ankara, Turkey, and focused on her thesis on “Examination of Turkish Image in Bangladeshi Media”. In addition, she worked as a sub-editor at Daily Asian Age, a daily English newspaper in Bangladesh. Her research interests included media and communication studies, image, digital communication, ethnicity, migration, culture and so on.

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Abdur  Rahman  Fuad is pursuing his PhD in Islamic History from Ataturk University in Turkey. Fuad completed his master’s and MPhil degrees from the Department of Islamic History and Arts at Necmettin Erbakan University, Turkey, with his master’s thesis partially related to Bengal Islam. He graduated in 2014 from the Department of Arabic (literature and History), University of Dhaka, Bangladesh. He is involved with a research project at ISTEM. Previously, he worked as a conference coordinator. Besides, he is a columnist of Perspective.bd magazine and the Daily Ittefaq. Fuad presented his research paper at conferences held in the UK, Spain, KSA, Turkey and India. Moreover, he has a speciality in Indian and Bengal history and has a great interest in the Ottoman Empire, ancient Turkish history and contemporary Islam. Vedat  Işıkhan completed his bachelor’s in 1990 and master’s in the Department of Social Work (1993) from Hacettepe University, Ankara, where he completed a master’s thesis on “Job Satisfaction of Social Workers”. He holds a PhD from the same University (1998) with a thesis titled “The Sources of Job Stressors of Managers Who Employed Under Social Work and Health Institutions”. He became associate professor in 1999 at Hacettepe University and professor in 2009. From 2011 to 2014, Işıkhan gave his services as the chairman of the Department of Social Work and Vice Dean of the Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences at Hacettepe University. He is serving as Professor of Social Work at the same university. Işıkhan is the author of ten books, namely, Homeless People Living in the Shadow of Cities; Management Stress; Stress in Working Life and Ways of Coping; Problems of Mothers of Mentally Handicapped Children in Turkey; General Features of Tuberculosis Patients; Depression in Mothers and Babies with a Disability Child; Oncology Burnout and Coping Strategies; Social Work and Coping with Burnout; Social Work and Burnout; and Stress Management: From Burnout to Happiness. He is also the author of many articles published in Social Science Citation Index (SSCI) and Expanded (SSCI-SSCE) in such journals as Cancer Nursing, Oncology Nursing Forum, The Turkish Journal of Paediatrics, Asian Pacific Journal of Cancer Prevention, HealthMed, European Journal of Oncology Nursing Society and Social Work in Public Health. Işıkhan lectured at Erasmus Programme Homelessness and Social Work at the Department of Special Education, Social Care Work, at Katholieke Hogeschool Limburg, Belgium. Since October 2018, Işıkhan is appointed as a member of the Presidency Social Policy Council.

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Sariful Islam  is a doctoral candidate at the Department of International Relations at South Asian University (SAU, a university established by SAARC nations), New Delhi, India. He has received a Master of Art and a Master of Philosophy degree from the same department in 2017 and 2019, respectively. Before joining SAU, he has received his first master’s and bachelor’s degrees from the Department of Mass Communication and Journalism at the University of Dhaka, Bangladesh. Islam’s research interests include the agency of post-­colonial subjects, refugees, human security, media and international politics, amongst others.He has experience working as sub/newsroom editor for more than five years with multiple media houses, namely, Bhorer Dak, Daily Sangbad, Banglanews24. com and Somoy News, in Bangladesh. Islam writes opinion articles in both Bangla and English in Bangladeshi national dailies on domestics and international politics. Faisal  Mahmood is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, India. He holds a BA(Hons) in Political Science and an MA in Human Rights from the same university. He is a UGC Junior Research Fellow and writing his PhD Thesis on “Development, Displacement and Human Rights in India: a Critical Study”. His area of research centres on the problem of displacement caused by development projects. He has also participated in various national and regional conferences. Nebile  Pelin  Manti  is a faculty member in the Department of Public International Law (PIL) at Istanbul University. Mantı has been giving lectures on public international law, air and space law, law of the sea and Law of the Armed Conflict (LOAC) in National Defence University since 2013. She has graduated from Galatasaray University’s Faculty of Law and holds an LLM (with a specialisation in Public Law and Criminal Law) and a PhD in Public Law from International Space Station (ISS) of Galatasaray University. Moreover, Mantı was accepted as a visiting researcher by the honourable International Air and Space Law Institute of Leiden University in 2013 and Harvard Law School in 2014 and, during her PhD studies, received TÜBITAK and Istanbul University Tinçel Foundation Research Scholarships. She is also the vice coordinator and participant of the EU Environmental Law Project, a joint research project executed by Silke R. Laskowski of Kassel University and Istanbul University PIL Department, between 2012 and 2018. She is a member of the editorial board of the Public and Private International Law Bulletin of Istanbul University.

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Additionally, she served as a legal advisor to the Turkish Air Force in Military Games within the Turkish Armed Forces in 2015–2016. She took place in the organisation committee of Philip Jessup Moot Court Competition, Turkish National Rounds in 2013 and 2015. She has been serving as an The International Board of Review (IBOR) member of the Leiden Sarin International Air and Space Law Moot Court Competition since 2013. Lutfun  Nahar is a Doctoral Scholar in the Department of Islami Economics and Finance at Istanbul University, İstanbul, Turkey and was a post-graduate researcher in the Department of Islami Economics and Finance at Sakarya University, Sakarya, Turkey. She holds a Bachelor in Business Administration from Manarat International University, Dhaka, Bangladesh. Before starting her MPhil, Nahar worked as a research assistant at the Islami Bank Training and Research Academy (IBTRA), Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited (IBBL), Dhaka, Bangladesh. She has research interest in refugee employment, migration studies and Islamic economics. Israel  Nyaburi  Nyadera is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at Egerton University & Riara University, Kenya. He also works as a research fellow in the Department of Governance and Public Administration, University of Macau, China. He completed his PhD in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University. He holds an MA in International Relations from the Middle East Technical University and a BA in Political Science and History from the University of Nairobi. He has been a visiting researcher to the University of Milan. He has published with journals such as International Journal of Public Administration, International Journal on World Peace, African Journal on Conflict Resolution and Asian Journal of Peacebuilding. Serdar  Öztürk  is working as a professor in the Department of Radio, Television and Cinema, Faculty of Communication in Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University, Ankara, Turkey. He is a graduate of Journalism and Public Relations from Ankara University. He completed his post-graduation in Journalism from the Institute of Social Sciences at Gazi University, Ankara. He holds a PhD (2005) from Ankara University. He was also able to publish his thesis as a book titled Coffeehouses and Power in the Turkish Republic (1930–1945). He is an active researcher who has studied from an interdisciplinary perspective. Öztürk has published extensive papers in both

  NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS 

xxix

national and international journals. He is also the author of seven books concerning the cultural history of Turkey as well as history, sociology and philosophy of cinema. His other books includes Cinema, Reception, and Politics During the Early Republican Period; Dialectics of Communication in the Ottoman Period; The Sources of Sociology of Communication in Turkey; and The Origins of Communication Thoughts in Turkey. The book Space and Power: The Sub Politics of Communication Spaces with Movies has mainly focused on cinema sociology. His latest book Cine-Philosophy: The Journey into Akira Kurosawa’s Dreams (Ankara: Heretik, 2016) and Introduction to Cinema-Philosophy (Ankara: Ütopya, 2018) are basically on the relationship between films and philosophy. He is a founder and publisher of the international open-access peer-reviewed film-philosophy journal, Cine-­Philosophy (www.sinefilozofi.org). Sanjida Parveen  Born and educated in a Muslim family of Kolkata, her fascination for stories about the genesis of Islam, how it influenced the society with a specific focus on the South Asian Muslims and their portrayal in the literature, eventually triggered her academic pursuits. Presently, she is enrolled as a PhD scholar in the Department of English Literature, Aligarh Muslim University, India. She has completed her graduation as well as post-graduation in English Literature from Calcutta University, India. Her research interests include post-colonial literature, diaspora literature, immigrant literature, minor literature, women’s literature, and British-Muslim and American-Muslim fiction post-9/11. She has also been engaged in interdisciplinary research that brings together literature and social-science methods and materials. She had the good fortune of teaching at the English, Aliah University, Calcutta departments between 2016 and 2017. She is writing her first book, Do See the Muslim in Me? A Tale of Tripartite Struggle, which shall bring to the fore various socio-cultural accounts of the ethnic-religious minorities of India post-independence. Md.  Habibur  Rahman  is an MPhil research fellow at the Dr. Wazed Research and Training Institute, Begum Rokeya University, Rangpur, Bangladesh. He is a circular manager and a former news editor of the daily Law News (Dainik Ain Barta). Rahman is also a researcher associated with 60 Decibels, Inc., USA. He holds graduate and post-graduate degrees from the University of Dhaka and has successfully completed a project as a senior programme manager that was jointly run by the Asia Foundation and JANIPOP (National Election Observation Council). He has worked

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

with the Bangladesh Election Commission; NGO Affairs Bureau (situated at the Prime Minister’s Office); Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council; and concerned ministries and departments to implement the project entitled “Strengthening and Promoting Active Citizenship in Bangladesh”, which was funded by JANIPOP and the Asia Foundation. In terms of research experience, he has published several articles in various peerreviewed journals covering disaster management; migration; women empowerment in Japan; water governance, gender and Islam; and water logging in Dhaka City. Additionally, he has published five columns in prominent newspapers. He has also written two book chapters that are going to be published soon. He has collaborated with various domestic and foreign universities on some national and international research projects (as an independent contractor). Mehebub Sahana  is a cultural and environmental geographer interested in analysing land-use changes with particular respect to spaces, politics and the governance of the living and materialistic world. Conceptually, his work focuses on landscape alterations in the post-colonial era and their consequences on developing countries’ sustainability issues. His work unfolds the post-modernistic idea of unpredicted urbanisation in postcolonial nations by examining the ambient and evolving human-­ environment relationships. His research interests include landscape ecology, biodiversity conservation, land-use change, rural-­urban conversion and land-use dynamics’ socio-political implications. He is working as a research associate in the School of Environment, Education and Development, The University of Manchester, UK. Previously, he worked as a lecturer (2018–2019) at Indira Gandhi Conservation Monitoring Centre (IGCMC), WWF-India. He was a GIS Research Assistant (2013–2016) in the GENDER ATLAS Project at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. He has contributed more than 35 scientific research papers in international journals on issues pertaining to land-use changes and environmental degradation. He is writing his first book, Partition and Post-colonial Geography of Bengal Delta, which shall bring to the fore various cultural-environmental accounts of the world largest delta after its political fragmentation. He is a regular contributor to various media outlets like Cafe Dissensus, India Climate Dialogue, Third Pole and Biodiversity. He holds BA in Geography from Burdwan University (2010), MA in Geography from Lucknow University (2012) and PhD in

  NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS 

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Environmental Geography (2018) from Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, India. Aghna Shujat  is a research associate at the Centre for Early Childhood Development and Research (CECDR) in Jamia Millia Islamia University, New Delhi, India. She has completed an MA in Social Work from Mahatma Jyotiba Phule Rohilkhand University, Bareilly, and she is specialised in medical and psychiatric social work. For the last five years, she has been working with various non-government organisations. She is involved in several research projects. During her work at Centre for Early Childhood Education and Development (CECED), Ambedkar University Delhi, she completed several projects based in Odissa, Bihar, and Delhi. She is also trained in developing data collection tools and designing training modules at various Levels. She has also provided training to school teachers on the new teaching methodologies and pedagogies to enhance and increase students’ learning level. Her research interest includes women and child welfare, minorities, vulnerable groups, migration, refugee and community development. Md. Ishtiaq Ahmed Talukder  is working as a full-time faculty member at the Department of Criminology and Police Science, Mawlana Bhashani Science & Technology University (MBSTU), Tangail, Bangladesh, since 2012 and is a PhD fellow at the Department of Security Studies and Management, Institute of Security Sciences, Turkish National Police Academy, Ankara, Turkey. Talukder holds Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees in Criminology and Police Science from MBSTU. He is also the Director of Associates for Innovative Research and Development, a developmental research institute. Talukder published articles on criminological issues like crimes, domestic violence and sexual assault. He is interested in working on migration and crime, victimisation and fear of crime. Aytül  Tamer  Torun is a member of Communication Faculty in the Department of Journalism at Ankara Haci Bayram Veli University. She holds a BA degree (1999) from the History Department of Middle East Technical University. She holds MA (2003) and PhD (2010) in Journalism from Ankara University, Institute of Social Science. With her master thesis, Torun gained the Young Turkish Social Scientist Award in 2004, given by Turkish Social Science Association. During her PhD thesis research, she gained a scholarship for Egypt Archives (2005) and NARA-USA Archives (2007). As a post-doctoral fellow, she found an opportunity to research at

xxxii 

Notes on Contributors

the British Archives in London in 2013. Besides her two books about Turkish media history, she has many articles about Turkey’s political and social history and the history of communication. Her major interests are media history, transformation of knowledge and propaganda. Kanika Walia  is a PhD candidate in the Department of Radio, Television and Cinema, Faculty of Communication in Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University, Ankara, Turkey. She finished her post-graduation in New Media Communication from the School of Journalism, Mass Communication and New Media at Central University of Himachal Pradesh, India. In addition, she worked as a copy writer and editor at ETV Network India, a reputed news channel in India. Her research interests included media and communication studies, cinema, new media communication, refugees, migration and cultural, among others.

Abbreviations

A.D.: Anno Domini ACRS: The Advisory Commission on the Rakhine State AFAD: Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency AJS: Acute Jaundice Syndrome ARI: Acute Respiratory Infections ARSA: Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations AWD: Acute Watery Diarrhea b.: Ibn (son) B.C.: Before Christ B: Baskanligi BAL: Bangladesh Awami League BBC: British Broadcasting Corporation BCM: Burma Centrun Nederland BGB: Border Guards Bangladesh BGP: Border Guard Police BIMSTEC: Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation BJI: Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami BJP: Bharatiya Janta Party BNP: Bangladesh Nationalist Party BRCA: Burma Rohingya Community Australia BRI: Belt and Road Initiative BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa BROUK: Burmese Rohingya Organization United Kingdom C.E.: Common Era CAA: Citizenship Amendment Act 2019 xxxiii

xxxiv 

ABBREVIATIONS

CADS: CEDAW:

Corpus-Assisted Discourse Analysis Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women CHT: Chittagong Hill Tracts CIA: Central Intelligence Agency CMLA: Chief Martial Law Administrator CNN: Cable News Network CPB: Communist Party of Bangladesh CPD: Centre for Policy Dialogue CRDI: Canadian Rohingya Development Initiative CSW: Christian Solidarity Worldwide DFP: Department of Film and Broadcasting EBO: European Business Organisations EC: European Commission ECHO: Europeans Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Department EEAS: European External Action Service ESCAP: Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific EU: European Union EWARS: Early Warning, Alert and Response System FPA: Foreign Policy Association FTA: Free-Trade Agreement G20: Group of Twenty GA: General Assembly GAATW: Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women GDP: Gross Domestic Product GNI: Gross National Income GOB: Government of Bangladesh GOI: Government of India HRC: Human Rights Commission HRP: Humanitarian Response Plan HRW: Human Rights Watch HSC: Higher Secondary Certificate Hz.: Hazarat ICC: International Criminal Court ICCPR: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ICG: International Crisis Group ICJ: International Court of Justice ICOE: Independent Commission of Enquiry ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross ICTR: International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ICTY: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia IDP: Internally Displaced Person

 ABBREVIATIONS 

IHH: IIFFMM: ILO: INGOs: IOM: ISCG: ITLOS: KIA: MDMR: MIKTA: MINLAW: MOFA: MoU: MSF: NAM: NDA: NDTV: NGOs: NLD: NOW: NRC: OCHA: OECD: OHCHR: OIC: PIL: POCSO: PRI: PTI: RCSI: RNDP: RRRC: SAARC: SAM: SANEM: SCF: SDGs: SEZ: SFCG: SLORC: SPDC:

Humanitarian Relief Foundation Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar International Labour Organization International Non-government Organisation International Organization for Migration Inter Sector Coordination Group The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea Kachin Independence Army The Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief Mexico, Indonesia, Republic of Korea Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs Memorandum of Understanding Médecins Sans Frontières Non-Aligned Movement National Democratic Alliance New Delhi Television Non-governmental Organisations National League for Democracy Newspapers on the Web National Register of Citizens Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Organisation of the Islamic Conference Public Interest Litigation The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Policy Research Institute Press Trust of India Red Crescent Society of India Rakhine Nationalities Development Party Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commission South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Severe Acute Malnutrition South Asian Network on Economic Modelling Save the Children Fund Sustainable Development Goals Special Economic Zone Search for Common Ground The State Law and Order Restoration Council State Peace and Development Council

xxxv

xxxvi 

ABBREVIATIONS

SVS: Savage-Victim-Savior TI: Transparency International TIKA: Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency TOI: The Times of India TRC: Temporary Registration Card TRT: Turkish Radio and Television Corporation UAE: United Arab Emirates UDHR: Universal Declaration of Human Rights UEC: Union Election Commission UN: United Nations UNDP: United Nations Development Programme UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee UNHRC: United Nations Human Rights Council UNICEF: United Nations Children’s fund UNODC: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime UNSC: United Nations Security Council UNTOC: United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime UP: Uttar Pradesh UPA: United Progressive Alliance USA: United State of America WB: World Bank WFP: World Food Programme WHO: World Health Organization YTB: Presidency for Turks Abroard and Related Communities

List of Figures

Fig. 3.1 Fig. 3.2 Fig. 11.1 Fig. 12.1 Fig. 15.1 Fig. 15.2 Fig. 15.3

Fig. 15.4

Fig. 16.1

Elements of human trafficking. (Source: Prepared by the author) 50 Human trafficking approaches in South Asia. (Source: Prepared by the author) 52 Top five themes regarding the Rohingya crisis in 2017 among the scanned newspapers. (Source: Created by the authors) 278 Representation of themes in both media 295 Location of Rakhine State in the apex of Bay of Bengal and its interlinking position between Myanmar and Bangladesh. (Map prepared by the authors) 363 Number of Rohingya refugees from Rakhine to neighboring countries for last two decades. (Adopted from Sahana et al., 2019)365 Number of UNCHR refugees during 1991 to 2017 from Myanmar to the different countries in the world. (Data Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNCHR] for 1991–2016 and Inter Sector Coordination Group [ISCG] for 2017) 365 Number of registered and other Rohingya Refugee camps in Bangladesh and total number of refugees as the UNHCR, ISCG report up to September 2018. (Map prepared by the authors)366 Top Rohingya host countries. (Figure prepared by the authors. Source: Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) and Anadolu Agency, September 9, 2019) 386

xxxvii

List of Tables

Table 1.1 Table 1.2 Table 5.1 Table 10.1 Table 10.2 Table 10.3 Table 10.4 Table 11.1 Table 11.2 Table 12.1 Table 12.2 Table 14.1 Table 16.1 Table 16.2

The kings and their Muslim titles Common loan words in the Burmese language Parliament elections results of four constituencies of Cox’s Bazar from 1991 to 2008 Export, import, and trade volume (million $) between Turkey and Bangladesh Turkey’s commerce with Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan from the year of 1980 ($ million) Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s instrumental role for the Rohingya people Turkey’s academic assistance for Rohingya students in Turkish universities Considered newspapers’ profile Most common themes regarding the Rohingya crisis in 2017 among the considered newspapers Identified themes Regrouping of the themes Historical Rohingya refugee influx and repatriation in Bangladesh (1977–2019) Rohingya diaspora organizations Interviewees’ list details

13 15 117 240 241 248 251 271 277 295 296 344 383 384

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CHAPTER 1

Prehistorical Identity of Rohingya: Exploring Islam and the Glorious Past of the Muslim Kingdom in Arakan Abdur Rahman Fuad and Ali Dadan

Introduction Myanmar is geographically located in between the Indian and Chinese civilization basins, and it has been a crossing point for many ethnic elements throughout history. The Arakanese is one of them. Furthermore, more than 50 different ethnic groups exist, each with its own local language and dialect. Husayin (2006) claims that the Burmese ethnicity comprises 68.96% of the population and lives in the flatlands. The other main ethnic groups in Myanmar are Kayin, Karen, Chinese, Mons, Rakhine, and

A. R. Fuad (*) Department of Islamic History and Arts, Ataturk University, Erzurum, Turkey A. Dadan Faculty of Theology, Necmettin Erbakan University, Konya, Turkey © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 K. Bülbül et al. (eds.), Rohingya Refugee Crisis in Myanmar, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6464-9_1

1

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A. R. FUAD AND A. DADAN

Bamars. The main religious minorities are Muslims 4%,1 Christians 4%, Hindus 2%, and Animists 1%. Muslims live predominantly in the isolated Arakan,2 which is separated from rest of Myanmar by high mountains. That is why Arakan is adjacent to Bangladesh’s southeast region, with its 1,960,000 people. To conduct a new study on the history of Arakan, we should consider its historical proceedings primarily from B.C. 3000. Although some of its sources claim that the Arakan’s history began in B.C. 2666, there is no clear evidence about its historical adventure (Hall, 1981). Generally, we know that the Buddhist kingdom of Dhannyawadi and the Vesali kingdom reigned in Arakan respectively in the first and the third millennium. After that, Islam reached Arakan in the early seventh century as Arab traders played a significant role in this perspective. Moreover, the Arabs developed their trade relations with South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Far East. They established commercial towns from the seaside of Arakan to Sumatra Island and from there to Java. At the dawn of the fifteenth century, when king Naramitlha converted to Islam, though this is a controversial issue, Islam began to spread rapidly in this territory (Bayram & Yaylar, 2019; Islam & Rahman, 2018). It was home to both Muslim and Buddhist inhabitants before the Mrauk-U dynasty, which Naramitlha founded. Regarding the early periods of Myanmar history, Chan (2005) professes that it is vital to detect the Rohingya ethnicity and drop a detailed account of Rohingyas that back to the earliest presence predecessor of Arakan. However, from another aspect, to consider the Rohingya term, we can put aside the earliest history of the Muslim presence in Arakan. So, in the early 1950s, some intellectuals of Arakan started to call Burmese Muslims the Rohingya. Chan (2005) added another comment on it. According to him “they were the direct descendants of immigrants from the Chittagong indeed. After the province ceded to British India under

1  According to a report of 2016, “the overall Muslim population declined to 2.3% from 3.9% in 1983. However, this figure does not count around 1.2 million Rohingya Muslims in western Rakhine State—who were not enumerated. It included country’s 51 million population where 1,147,495 are registered as Muslim.” See more- Anadolu Agency, “Census data shows Myanmar Muslim population has fallen”, http://aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/censusdata-shows-Myanmar-Muslim-population-has-fallen/612764, Date of Access: 03.03.2019. 2  “The junta Ne-Win changed the name of Arakan to Rakhine state in the 1990’s. This name demonstrates the supremacy of the Rakhine community. However, most of the Rohingyas were against the decision” (Akhanda, 2013).

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3

the Treaty of Yandabo, they moved into Arakan. Finally, it concluded the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824–1826).” The Arakanese Muslims as Rohingya—one of the most discriminated communities globally—are deprived of fundamental rights such as freedom to perform religious activities, right to property, work and job, education, marriage, health, and travel. Even they have not counted the population census of Myanmar. Some countries raised their voice against fascist activities, like the massacre against the Rohingya ethnic minority, of the Myanmar government. After the bird’s eye view, this chapter explores Islam’s historical background and the glorious tenancy of Arakan (current Rakhine State) over the decades. Toward this context, we sought out systematic literature reviews that made a research gap in this study. Some issues were written on Bengal Islam and scarcely described the Islamic rule in Arakan. Moreover, some genuine Bengali literature has been used in this chapter. Because the framework of this study is partly related to the land of Bengal, however, considering some English works, we have also concentrated on few selected Turkish works that helped us bear this qualitative research. In this perspective, with some hang-ups, Akhanda (2013) and Yegar (1972) had tried to furnish information on Muslim development in Arakan rather than others. However, Yunus (1994) is a rare piece of work in terms of published accounts on Arakan history. But, mostly, he figured out political development in Arakan. Habibullah (1995) kept a flawed character in his academic exertion, where he predominantly relied on the Bengal-­ Arakan relation in a subjective way. At the same time, Phayre (1833) and Harvey (2000) both hanged on Burmese history rather than turning it into an Arakanese account. They all touched upon the context from their perspective, but none depicted this study from its originality. However, the entire data was recycled to put out a new vibrant research question in this scope. Under the above circumstances, we have emphasized and drawn a new outline of how Islam developed in Arakan from the Prophet Muhammad era and how it played a decisive role in establishing a distinct identity like Bengal Islam despite living in a Buddhist territory. After all, in the initial stage, to the more accurate analysis of this study, firstly, this study delineates its pre-Islamic history.

4 

A. R. FUAD AND A. DADAN

A Glimpse of the Pre-Islamic History of Arakan As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the history of Arakan dates back to B.C. 2666. It can be said that the chronological history of Arakan began with the Marayu dynasty. From the earliest times, the Marayu dynasty existed in Banaras (Uttar Pradesh, India). Later on, they moved to Arakan and began to reign in the frontier land. They built the old Rama Valley as their capital, whereas it belongs to today’s Rambree Island (Akhanda, 2013). We have to say that this region was divided into four central geographical areas like Dhannyawadi, Ramawadi, Mekhawadi, and Darawadi. The Dhannyawadi was the capital of the historical Arakan (Khan, 1999). After Marayu’s death, his son Kumising succeeded to the throne, and for a long time, his descendants ruled it. However, after a period of internal contention within the dynasty, Arakan was divided into ten parts. For fear of internal turmoil, some of the dynasty members escaped from Arakan. Then the rest had established dominance over a far-sighted princess. After sitting on the throne, she married a Brahman prince to ensure her life security; she left Ramawadi and founded a new capital near Ramawadi. They had a daughter named Dhannyawadi, who also married a prince living on the Kaladan riverbank. The Marayu dynasty continued to rule Arakan for about 1830 years. The last king of this dynasty was killed during a coup attempt. Along with her two daughters, the queen took refuge in the mountain of Kyaukpandaung (Phayre, 1833, cited in Khan, 1999, p. 12). Another individual reference articulates the following information about the above-mentioned historical event. This particular source says that after an uprising in the country, king Aviraj left his throne and established a kingdom in Tagaun near the Irrawaddy River. To be the next king, Aviraj’s sons were ready to fight for their rights after his death. During this scuffle, the two brothers realized that they could not outpace each other. In the end, they reached a covenant that if one of them built a Buddhist pagoda in one night, the other would recognize him as king. The younger one managed to become king by making a pagoda overnight. According to the treaty, his brother shifted to another place with his soldiers. He established two new sovereignties at a near distance. At that time, his dame established a dynasty to rule the land after his death. Sixty-two kings from his lineage reigned in Arakan for almost 1782 years. After the obliteration of this dynasty, the Chandra-Surya dynasty’s dominance appeared in the region in 146 A.D. (Phayre, 1833).

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5

If we evaluate Arakan’s history from B.C. 2666, we cannot present plausible historical data because of recorded data and history practice deficiencies. Whatever we say in this context, Phayre (1833) had tried to keep its historical accuracy. However, it is far from the scientific method. Nevertheless, this is to be accepted at the outset that Phayre cited the kings’ names and their ruling period consecutively. In the middle of the second century, the Chandra-Surya dynasty had invaded Arakan and the Chittagong with large armed forces. Besides, they also seized the ancient capital Dhannyawadi and launched their sovereignty there. Moreover, under this sovereignty, Buddhism and Hinduism became more influential in Arakan and Chittagong region, respectively. Until the fifth century, as a whole, Arakan-Chittagong was ruled by the Chandra-Surya dynasty. For the most part, historical proceedings show us that the first 11 kings (total 25) from this dynasty reigned in the Arakan-­ Chittagong territory until the fifth century as a single authority (Harvey, 2000). After that, Chittagong had left Arakan and joined with the Samatata region under the Kadhag administration (Chowdhury, 1994). Furthermore, it is being said that someone from the Chandra-Surya dynasty had governed the Vesali constituency. Akhanda (2013) states that the Chandra dynasty, founded by Mahataing Tsnddra, established a new rule in 788. By separating from the Surya dynasty, they made Vesali their capital. Consisting of 12 kings, this dynasty continued its dominance until 1018. In the aftermath of Nga-Mining-Ngu-tum, the 12th king of the Chandra dynasty was killed during the Burmese’s rebellion, and his son Khettathing acceded to the throne. Soon after, he aimed to shift his capital from Vesali to Pyintsa for security concerns. Overall, 15 kings of this family ruled Arakan (Khan, 1999). Later on, the Pagan king Anwaratha seized Arakan in 1057. To strengthen his supremacy, the king got spliced with a princess from the Chandra dynasty. From 1057 to 1103, ten kings consistently ruled Arakan under the Pagan kingdom. However, Letiya Men-gan-­ ung, son of King Minbilu (the sixth king of the Pagan kingdom), ascended the throne in 1103. Again, the capital relocated from Pyintsa to Parin. The eight kings who ruled the dynasty lasted 64 years until 1167 in a comprehensive way (Harvey, 2000; Phayre, 1833). Subsequently, some kingdoms prevailed over in Arakan, as Phayre (1833) mentioned about these kingdoms in his prestigious book. For example, the Hkrit dynasty (1167–1237) and the H-Lan-ma-Phyu dynasty under the Pagan kingdom (1237–1406). Even though the Mughal

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A. R. FUAD AND A. DADAN

invasion of 1277 and 1283 had caused Pagan to disappear from its 226year dominance, the Mengdi dynasty (1279–1406) managed to preserve their sovereignty (Akhanda, 2013). However, in the period of MengTsau- mun, the history of Arakan was changing rapidly. After that, the history of Arakan formally went through the Islamic tradition, beliefs, and culture. Nevertheless, initially, Arakan started to embrace Islam from the eighth century.

The Spread and Development of Islam in Arakan Arakan has a less precise measurement of historical data on the first arrival of the Muslims. But, we can roughly say that it had met with earlier Islam through the Arab traders. The Muslim Arabs firstly made their commercial contacts with the Indian Ocean in the initial stage of Islam. The preachers of Islam were travelling with the Arab merchants by the following sea routes such as Malabar, Cheror, Chittagong, Akyab, North Sumatra, and Canton. So, it seems there was minimal contact between Islam and Buddhist Burma during the early days of Islam. According to venerable historian Habibullah (1995), the Arab traders came to the Bay of Bengal and established a secure commercial link with its seashore inhabitants. Furthermore, it is believed that the gradual increase of Arab impacts made them eager to find an independent region for them. Another study in this regard states that before the fifth century, the Arab merchants conducted their commercial activities and influences in Southeast Asia, including the Indian Territory (Cheror, Madras, Bombay), Burma (Arakan), and the Canton ports of China (Akhanda, 2013, p. 34). Historian G.E. Harvey (2000) depicted an Arab influence between the eighteenth and sixteenth century’s Eastern waters. The Arabs knew Arakan and Lower Burma as Rahma; mostly, it was claimed by the Arab geographers Ibn Khurdadbih (844–848 C.E.), Sulayman (851 C.E.), and Ibn Faqih (902 C.E.). A scholar of Islamic law and an academic author, Muhammad Hamidullah (1993) claimed that Basra and Bahrain had some lucrative trade fairs like Muakkhar and Deba, especially for the Arab merchants. Besides, traders from China, Iran, and India had joined in the trade fairs as mentioned above. Therefore, the Prophet Muhammad said in some of his hadiths (speeches) about the Indian, Chinese, and Central Asian people. Probably, he used to get information and impressions that were attained during these travels. Besides, it is narrated in the Musnad-e

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Ahmad (Musnad, IV/206) that Prophet Muhammad also took part in the fairs, as mentioned earlier with the Indian, Persian, and Chinese traders. Within these circumstances, Islam may have reached Arakan as early as possible via Indian waters. Specifically, in the fifth and sixth centuries, the Byzantine and the Persian’s prolonged war had been continued. But at the same time, the land routes of the Arabs were delimited. At the beginning of the sixth and seventh centuries, the Arabs preferred to use the maritime routes and develop their commercial relationships with Malabar, Calcutta, Cheror Bandar. They recognized much more permanent commercial zones in Arakan and Chittagong deltas (Khan, 1992). However, Yegar (1972) remarked in his famous book “The Muslims of Burma” that the first Muslim seafarers appeared around the ninth century in Burma region. Also, the Chinese travellers provided much more information about the presence of Persian colonies of the 860s in Burma territory. We pointed out before an idea of a separate Arab state in Arakan. Now, it can be examined from a historical observation. It was the first time for Haq (1948), who transferred his opinions about an Arab country in Arakan. He claimed that the Arakanese king ‘Tsu-la-taing Tsan-da-ya’ called on to Bengal (called Thu-ra-tan) for an expedition. Therefore, he set up a monument and named it Tset-ta-going, which means war is not appropriate for this land. However, some historians claim that ‘Thu-ra-­ tan’ is derived from the Arabic word ‘Sultan’.3 This might be the reason why the Arab rulers governed the place before now. Historian Ali (2003) also relies on this source. Chowdhury (1967) evaluates the information, as mentioned above, as follows. In the eighth century, the Arabs built up a far-flung commercial relationship with the East Indian part. Nevertheless, it was impossible to settle Muslims until the Turks came into this region in 1203 through the conquest of Bengal under the Ikhtiyar Uddin.4 On the other hand, if Arabs had a settlement in Arakan, the Arab geographers such as Ibn Kurdadbih and Masudi would write a note discretely on this event in their famous travelogues. Sharif (2010) points out that the existence of the coin

3  The term Sultan is different from the king though both refer to a sovereign ruler. It is to be noted that the sultan is used in Muslim countries as the title bears religious importance. 4  Ikhtiyar Uddin Muhammad bin Bakhtiyar Khalji was the military commander of the Delhi Sultanate, who first conquered Bengal in 1203/04.

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A. R. FUAD AND A. DADAN

found in Bengal in the ninth century was issued by the Abbasid Caliphate,5 trying to prove the Muslim existence in Bangladesh (Bengal) before Ikhtiyar’s conquest of Bengal. However, he also denied the presence of a Muslim settlement or a Muslim-majority province. Although this is an arguable discussion, this issue is being used as a reference to clarify the spreading of Islam in South Asia and the Far East territory. Moreover, there are no available pieces of evidence to prove them correct. However, researcher Cemil Lee, who has profound knowledge on this subject, has evaluated the issue visibly in his manuscript. According to Lee (1991), it is impossible to find reliable proof in this regard; even it will be rejected if the historical data and trade contacts have been going on for centuries. After that, Cemil Lee gives a review of Islam in China. Islam entered China in 628, but according to most historians, this time should be 651 because the first contact of Muslims with the Far East happened during Caliph Osman’s reign (644–656) by sending an envoy. Nevertheless, individually some Arab traders are likely to have gone to China before this date and have commercial contact with the regions. For this reason, Sad b. Abu Wakkas might not have gone to China in 632, or according to another source, Sad b. Labid al-Habshi and Yousuf were accepted as the predecessor of Islam in the Far East by local people at the same time (Lee, 1991). To connect more on the previous discussion, some individual dealings are required to be discussed briefly. Local historians are trying to find some new aspects of South Asian Islam, which help them recognize how Arakan maintained its bonding with the Arab and Persian kings. In this case, some researchers referred to a hadith, narrated by Abu Said al-­ Khudri, based on an unnamed Indian king. He informed us about some presentations sent by a king to the Prophet Muhammad; unfortunately, the narrator did not mention the king’s name. However, we can predict that the kings of Ruhmi or Rahmi6 were occasionally sending gifts to the  The Abbasid Caliphate ruled the Muslim world from 750–1258 CE.  Historians have understood the word Ruhmi for Arakan. Because the ancient name of Arakan was ‘Rukham’ which means a marble in Arabic literature. The former capital of Arakan was Mrohangs, and its previous name was Kyakpru. The word Kyakpru in the Burmese language indicates the white stone. So, both Rukham and Kyakpru are in the same region and point to Arakan. Besides, some historians changed the word Rukham slightly as Ruhmi and some refer to Ruhmi as Ramu. According to this explanation, nowadays, Ramu belongs to Bangladesh and the border of Myanmar. See more: Akhanda, Arakaner Musalmander Itihash, p. 77; Muhammad Nurul, Praçin Itihase Ruhmi Rajjo, Ed. Muhibullah 5 6

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9

Persian governors. The same things also happened with the Umayyad Caliphs Abdul Aziz and Abdullah Mamun. Sometimes, they got some letters from the Ruhmi kings and conveyed something in response (Zubeyir, 1959). We can infer from here that since the early times of Islam, the Muslim Arab traders had frequently visited Arakan like China and established a relationship between the kings and the Muslim caliphs of West Asia. Either Surya Khiti (714–723) or Surya-Engu-Chandra (810–830) sent these letters to the Caliphate center (Akhanda, 2013). These letters were proof of love for Islam and a positive outlook for a Muslim kingdom. The kings might have influenced the relation between the Caliphs and the Arakanese kings, and it might have created a soft corner for Islam because most of the kings had believed in Buddhism. On the other hand, the open policy and the benevolence of Mahat-­ Engu-­Chandra, the ruler of Arakan in 788, pleased the Muslims and acted as an excellent opportunity for Islam’s spread. The ruler was also motivated by observing their intelligence and proper etiquette. The motivation of the Islamic faith encouraged him to permit settlement for them in a suitable region. These Muslim merchants did not take their wives with them. Consequently, they got married to the local Hindu and Buddhist women. During the centuries, Muslims grew in significant measures as a result of local conversion and new migration. In this case, Muhammad Yunus cited a comment “After the 10th century the country was professedly Buddhist, notwithstanding the spread of Mohammedanism which by the thirteenth century had dotted the coast from Assam to Malaya with the curious mosques known as Badar Maqam. Doubtless, it is a Mohammedan influence which led to women being more secluded in Arakan than in Burma.” (Harvey, 1954, cited in Yunus, 1994, p. 44). The intermarriage among the distinct races of Arakan, mostly Arabs, vetoed their previous seafaring lives and preferred agricultural life. Besides, they did not forget their mosque building policy (Tha, 1966). But, a question may arise as why they chose Arakan firstly for their missionary activities. A logical reply to the question is that there were a few noteworthy religious

Siddiki, Arakan Historical Society, Chittagong, 2000, pp. 264–275. Another aspect explains the word as following: When the Arabs first came to this limit by sea, a vessel of theirs had an accident near Arakan, Then they shouted for help by addressing the seashore people as Rahm or Raham which means in Arabic as mercy. Some claim that the word Rohingya may come from these words.

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A. R. FUAD AND A. DADAN

infrastructures such as Pagodas and Badar Moqams,7 including some ramshackle Dargahs,8 which pulled the Islamic legends and Muslim traders there. Islam developed firmly in Arakan but in a natural way. However, from the thirteenth century, when the Bengal Sultans patronized Islam in Bengal, subsequently, the kingdom of Arakan had started to take indirect effects on the subject of religious, political, cultural, and commercial links. This influence because once Chittagong was a part of the Bengal Sultanate and Arakan was treated as extended Chittagong. In this way, the Muslim population of Arakan increased significantly. Their growth rate augmented abruptly during the Mrauk-U dynasty. It is known that during the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries, a large number of Buddhists accepted Islam in Arakan without any plea (Islam, 2011, p. 2). The Arakanese Muslims have a bona fide historical root in the region that evolved with the multiethnic society over the past several centuries. These characteristic ethnic waves came to Arakan in four different times. In the seventh century, the first Muslim sailors who came from Persia, Arabia, Turkistan, and Bengal settled with no difficulty. Later on, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, Arakan received a large number of immigrants. Then, the second wave started in the fifteenth century until Arakan was seized by the Burmese king Bodawpaya in 1784. The colonial policy under British rule led to the first Anglo-Burmese war in 1824. The third and massive wave of immigration lasted until the 1940s. Under the early British rule, the population of Arakan increased from less than 100,000 inhabitants to more than one million (FIDH Report, 2000). Qanungo (1988) commented that the Muslim community of Arakan was composed of both refugees and captive Muslims such as the Arabs, Egyptians, Syrians, Turks, Abyssinian, Byzantinian, Khorasani, Uzbek, northern Indian, Deccanian, Assamese, Bengali, Khotanese, Acehnese, Cochins, Central Asians, and a host of other nationalities. In conclusion, he did not forget to state that the “Muslim population of Arakan consisted roughly of four categories, namely, the Bengali, another Indian, Afro-­ Asian, and native.” 7  The Badar Moqam is connecting with Badar Uddin Aulia. These universal shrines are accepted by the Buddhists, Hindus, Muslims, natives of India, Burma, and the Chinese alike. The tradition of these houses seems to go back to a much earlier date. 8  A dargah is an establishment that is built over the grave of a Sufi, saint, or darbish. People gather to pay religious visits and hold ceremonies. This place is often linked with Sufi eating and meeting rooms. Sometimes, it is also called khanqah.

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After the settling stages of Muslims in Arakan, we can depict some census statistics here. It reveals a large scale of the Muslim population that is never seen before. On this occasion, Yegar (1972) figured out some statistical information. According to Yegar, in Akyab, their number grew from 58,263 in 1872 to 99,548 in 1881. The country’s total Muslim population (Arakan) increased from 99,846 in 1872 to 168,881 in 1881. In his remarks “the Sunnis accounted for 150,821; the Shi’as, 11,287; the Wahabis, 698; the Rafid (a Shi’a sect), 551; and others 5324. This minute subdivision of Muslims never repeated in future census taking. The 1891 census included the whole of Burma for the first time. The Muslims of Lower Burma then numbered 210,649, compared with the 168,881  in 1881; the Muslims of entire Burma numbered 253,640. Shaykhs were listed at 204,846; Sayyids, 3405; Mughals, 5053; and Pathans, 15,689. The rest of the list is Burmese, Arakanese, Panthay, and Shan Muslims. Some Turks, Arabs, Chulias, Mappallais, and Lebbais were also recorded.” It is necessary to bear in mind why Islam was confined in Arakan instead of spreading in the other parts of Myanmar. The following factors may elucidate the question. Firstly, the geographical factors such as the natural barriers and the Bay of Bengal detached Arakan from the other parts of Myanmar. Another Muslim contact with Arakan was carried out via the east part of India (Bengal). At that time, Arakan-Chittagong was governed under individual sovereignty. Secondly, since before, the Arakan-­ Chittagong region was an attractive and gainful commercial center rather than Burma’s other parts. Muslim merchants who came to this region were not very interested in trade outside of Arakan. Thirdly, the Buddhists have preferred to live in the inner parts of Myanmar and showed less interest in Islam for their conservative philosophy. Also, the preachers were not eager to preach Islam there. Additionally, on the eve of the nineteenth century, the Buddhist monks’ anti-Islamic propaganda created prejudice against Islam and Muslims.

The Islamic Kingdom and the Effects of Islamic Culture in Arakan The fifteenth century was a turning point in the history of Arakan. In 1430, after three decades of exiled life in Bengal, Naramitlha returned to Arakan with force and founded the Mrauk-U dynasty. He overcame all of his counterparts, such as Burmans and Mons. Sulayman Shah became the

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A. R. FUAD AND A. DADAN

king of the new golden age (1430–1645)—an era of power and prosperity. He started to adopt Muslim titles and minted coins like in the Sultanate period. He built the Sundi Khan Mosque, which still stands to this day. One of his admirable works was appointing Muslims in administrative posts (Akhanda, 2013). It is necessary to evaluate that in 1345, Ilyas Shah founded the Bengal Sultanate, but it did not have any direct outcome on Arakan until the beginning of the fifteenth century. In the same year, Bengal Sultan Jalal Uddin helped Naramitlha reinstate his previous throne with his armies. Due to the Bengal Sultan’s military assistance, Arakan surrendered under the Bengal suzerainty for a time. After that, Arakan started to accept some standard practices such as Muslim title, Bengali literature, religious thinking, and daily doings (Akhanda, 2013) directly. From the Naramitlha tenure, the Arakanese kings began to take Muslim titles and Kalima Shahadah9 in their coins using Arabic letters by the Muslim tradition of Bengal (Gaur) and Delhi (Göksoy, 2016). Moreover, some inscription declares the Islamic faith and a short prayer, which may be translated as “May Allah perpetuate his kingdom.” At the end of the Muslim ruling period, two ships that belonged to king Sane of Ava (1698–1714) were given Islamic names Elahee and Salamat. Perhaps, the Arab shipbuilders made these types of boats. These practices were probably the first to officially introduce Islam, which indicated the Bengal Sultans’ supremacy. During this period, the Arakanese kings invited Bengali Muslim scholars, artists, and poets. The kings and the local peoples learned the Muslim traditions, the culture at home, and even followed after when it was vassalage of Bengal Sultanate until 1531 (BA Shin, 1961). He also pointed out that Muslims virtually ruled Arakan from 1430 to 1531. Besides, BA Shin stated some kings’ names, though some disputes accepted Muslim titles from 1434 to 1531 successively (see Table 1.1). The following are vital assets of Muslim development and progress in Arakan for decades that mainly reflected Arakanese Muslims’ glorious period. • Intercommunity Muslim customs, manner, spiritual prosperity, and the tradition of administration doings mostly copied from the Delhi and Bengal Sultanate. 9

 The Islamic confession of faith.

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Table 1.1  The kings and their Muslim titles Name of kings and regnant years

Real names

Muslim titles

Arabic versions

1. Min Khari (1434–59) 2. Basawpyu (1459–82) 3. Dawlya (1582–92) 4. Baswnyo (1492–94) 5. Yanang (1494) 6. Salingathu (1494–1501) 7. Minyaza (1501–23) 8. Minsaw-o (1523–25) 9. Thatasa (1525–31)

Man: Khari Bhacophru Man: Dolyu Bhacoman: No Man: Ran’On Calankasu Man Raja Man: Co’Ui Sajata

Ali Khan Klamasya Mokhusya Mahamosya Narisya Sakkokdolasya Ilisya Jalasyd Ilisya

Ali Khan Kalimashah Ma’Kul Shah Muhammam Shah Nuri Shah Sheik Abdullah Shah Ilias Shah Jalal Shah Ali Shah

Prepared by the authors

• The court shaped similarly to Gaur and Delhi. • Initiation of taking Muslim titles voluntarily or involuntarily. Moreover, Buddhist names and titles. Besides, coins were issued by engraving Kalima in Arabic letters to consolidate the Muslim faith. • Persian and Bengali languages were declared official languages and patronized by the palace kings. • Top officials of the government were appointed by the Muslims, such as the prime ministers, defense ministers, ministers, Qadis, and the large scale of Muslim armies. • Muslim missionaries and apostles hit in the social animus and proselytized people into Islam through their willingness. Besides, these religious influences dotted the seacoasts from Assam to Malaya. Between these places, were the inquisitive mosques known to us as Badar Maqam. Simultaneously, some missionaries and Pashas (Delhi Empire) came into Arakan to propagate the Islam religion. They tried to build mosques in every nook of the country and preached Islam’s peaceful messages among the local people. Outside of these individuals, some legendary Sufis and Pir-dervishes10 also came to the Arakan. Hanifar Tonki and Hayafurir Tonki from Manyu district, Babaji Shah Munayim from Ambari, and Badar Shah Pir from Akyab are the most prominent figures in this point of view. The most well-known Pir of this region is Badar Shah. The 10  “Peer or Pir is a title for a Sufi master or spiritual guide. They are also referred to as Hazrat, Sheikh or Shaykh, which is the Arabic equivalent. The title is often translated into English as a saint.”

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A. R. FUAD AND A. DADAN

chronicles indicate that Muslim Sufis were traveling in the area during the Pagan period (Yunus, 2012). In the history of Arakan, Zabuk Shah (Min Bin) was one of the robust rulers who ascended the throne in 1531 and established the Arakanese Empire. Although he was a Muslim by faith, he successfully fused various components into a unique style. Afterward, Arakan was converted into a Sultanate where people had the liberty of fundamental rights such as religious thoughts and movements, social and cultural values, and independence. Zabuk Shah made Bengali Muslim architecture flourish through building mosques, pagodas, and monuments. It did not resemble Indo-­ Islamic or Indian style, rather it was a distinct one (Yunus, 1994). Yunus (1994) provides more data on their internal politics. In 1571, the deserving son of Zabuk Shah, Sultan Sikandar Shah (Min Phalaung), ascended the throne. This interruption of power took place for more than two decades due to the misrule by usurpers. He also had to deal with internal disturbances and external threats throughout his rule. After that, Arakan remained under the Min Raza Gyi (Salim Shah, 1593–1612), Min Khamaung (Hussein Shah, 1612–1622), and Thiri Thudamma (2nd Salim Shah, 1622–1638) governance. In the period of Thiri Thudamma (Salim Shah II), the last ruler of Arakan, the Portuguese’s activities in the Gulf increased rapidly. They were in the top position in the slave-hunting missions. At the same time, Maghs and Rohingyas participated in the raids though their trips were fewer than that of the Portuguese. Moreover, in the ruling period of Salim Shah II, from 1631 to 1635, a five-year famine devastated Arakan largely. As a result of crop failures in the past cumulative years, a famine occurred. It quadrupled the average price of the goods (Yunus, 2012). With Salim Shah II’s death, the superiority of Arakan had started to decline because of an intra-palace conspiracy in 1638. Yunus (1994) describes this plot in a better way. According to him “Salim Shah’s son Meng Sani succeeded him. However, he was murdered by an ordinary person, who was the lover of the dowager queen. Later on, he usurped the heir and got the title of Narapati. Afterwards, his nephew Thadomintra succeeded in Narapati in 1645. The son of Thadomintra Sanda Thudamma became the succeeding king of Arakan after 1652.” Over time, some Arakanese gradually adopted the Burman language and culture. They became the master of Burmese literature. After the seventeenth century, Burmese Muslim writers and poets appeared who wrote various books from Islam’s aspect. As a result of long-term contact with

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Table 1.2  Common loan words in the Burmese language

Burmese

Arabic (A)/Persian (P) English

Kalon Alarir Chapa Khallsi Mutsun Namuna Pyata Saraphu

Qalam (A) Alam (A) Safyah (A) Khalasi(A) Mawsim (A) Namunah (P) Piadah (P) Sarapaich (P)

15

Pen Flag Shawl Ship’s crew Monsoon Sample Peon Crown

Prepared by the authors

Arakan, and afterwards, Burma’s effect helped them accept some Arabic and Persian words in the sphere of nautical and commercial terms. In this case, Ba Shin (1961) narrated some common loan words that entered in the Burmese language (see Table 1.2). When Muslims first conquered it, 26 kings ruled Arakan after Sanda Thudamma until the Burmese king occupied and invaded it in 1784. Muslim influence and rule in Arakan have lasted 350  years. After this incursion, more than 200,000 Arakanese were killed. Most of the surviving people were forced to work in the temples built in the region. It is said that the roots of the current conflicts extend to those days. In 1796, Muslims revolted against the Burmese occupation, but this uprising failed. After this incident, approximately two-thirds of the Arakanese people escaped from Rakhine (Arakan) and fled to Bangladesh.

Concluding Remark In the pre-Islamic period, Arakan persisted in its diversifying life and religious thoughts within Hinduism and Buddhism. After that, Arakan had met with Islam through the Muslim traders. The contribution of Islam preachers and later on the Sufis cannot be ignored. Before Islam hailed from the Transoxiana to the Indian frontier, social injustice and the Hindu caste system had caused the people to tend to Buddhism. After that, Islam brought many peace offerings and a new code of life. Islam in Arakan led the social justice, Muslim trade center, and constructive relations with the local people, and married off the local woman.

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With the advent of the Bengal Sultanate in the thirteenth century, Arakan was influenced by the Bengali religious and social culture. Sufi-­ dervishes, who came to the Bengal tract, ministered to Islam. At the same time, Arakan was not backward in a number of the apostles. When the reverend Sufi activities enabled the spreading of Islam in this region, it also made contributions that were more serious to Bengal’s daily life. The social status of the Rohingya Muslims in their land is now under an unacceptable criterion. The Myanmar governments argue that the Rohingya Muslims migrated to Myanmar illegally even though it is a shared history order phenomenon. However, historical evidence admits that the Rohingya Muslims must be considered the ancient nation of this land. Only because of their Muslim identity the government cannot overlook their citizenship status. They are peace-loving and aspire to serve the country as responsible citizens. In these circumstances, to keep up Islam’s existence and its etiquette as a past, there should be a peaceful environment, by which, again, they can survive and will return to their heydays.

References Akhanda, M. R. (2013). Arakaner Musalmander Itihas (The history of Muslim Arakan). Dhaka: Bangladesh Co-operative Book Society. Ali, M. M. (2003). History of the Muslims of Bengal (Vol. 1A). Islamic Foundation. Bayram, M., Yaylar, Y. (2019, February 28). Myanmar’daki Din Çatışması’nın Swot Analizi (Swot analysis of religious conflict in Myanmar). https://docplayer.biz.tr/2526553-­Myanmar-­daki-­din-­catismasi-­nin-­swot-­analizi.html Chan, A. (2005). The development of a Muslim enclave in Arakan (Rakhine) state of Burma (Myanmar). SOAS Bulletin of Burma Research, 3(2), 396–420. Chowdhury, A. M. (1967). Dynastic history of Bengal. Asiatic press. Chowdhury, A. H. (1994). Prachin Arakan: Rohingya, Hindu O Badua Bauddya Odhibasi (Ancient Arakan: Rohingya, Hindu and the inhabitants of Badua Buddha). Dhaka: Bangla Academy. FIDH Report. (2000, April). Burma: Repression, discrimination, and ethnic cleansing in Arakan. FIDH. ̇ Göksoy, I.̇ H. (2016). Arakan. Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Islam Ansiklopedisi. TDV Yayınları. Habibullah, N. M. (1995). Rohingya Jatir Itihas (The history of Rohingya nation). Dhaka: Bangladesh Co-Operative Book Society. Hall, D. G. E. (1981). A history of South-East Asia. The Macmillan Press Ltd.. ̇ Hamidullah, M. (1993). Islam Peygamberi (The Prophet of Islam). Trans: Salih Tuğ. Istanbul: Irfan Yayınevi.

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Haq, M. E. (1948). Purva Pakistane Islam (Islam in East Pakistan). Dhaka. Harvey, G. E. (1954). Outline of Burmese history. Orient Longmans. Harvey, G. E. (2000). History of Burma. Asian Educational Services. Husayin, S. S. (2006). Myanmar, Fiziki ve Beşeri Cogr̆ afya (Myanmar: Physical and human geography). Ankara: DIA. Islam, N. (2011, November 15). Muslim influence in the kingdom of Arakan. Retrieved from http://www.kaladanpress.org/images/document/Muslim%20 influence%20in%20Arakan.pdf Islam, M. N, & Rahman, H. (2018). “The humanitarian question of Rohingya Muslim refugee crisis beyond the foreign policy of Bangladesh and Myanmar: Forced migration, identity linkage and demographic assessment of their histori̇ cal exclusion and statelessness”. In Haluk Selvi, Ibrahim Şirin, Yusuf Adigüzel, Murat Lehimler, Ali Yeşildal, Raşit Fidan, Hasan Yilmaz, Hayriye Sözer and ̇ Muzaffer Sabur (Eds.), Göç Mültecilik ve Insanlik (Migration, refugee and humanity). Kocaeli, Turkey: Kocaeli Municipality Press. ISBN: 978-605-5116-67-5. Khan, M. (1992, January). Bangladese Islam: Koekti Totthya Sutra (Islam in Bangladesh: Some evidences). Dhaka: Masik Madina. Khan, A.  M. (1999). The Maghs: A Buddhist community in Bangladesh. University Press. ̇ Lee, C. (1991). Islam ve Türk Kültürünün Uzak Doğuya Yayılması (The spread of Islam and the Turkish culture to the Far East). Ankara: TDV Yayınları. Phayre, A. P. (1833). History of Burma. Trübner & Co. Qanungo, S. B. (1988). A history of Chittagong. Chittagong University. Sharif, H. (2010). Bangladeshi Islam: Tatta O Bastobata (Islam in Bangladesh: Theory and practice). Dhaka: Adorn Publication. Shin, B. (1961). Coming of Islam to Burma 1700 A.D. Myanmar Muslim Library. Tha, B. (1966, April). Muslims in Arakan. The Islamic Review. 54th Year of Publication, England. Yegar, M. (1972). The Muslims of Burma. Wiesbaden. Yunus, M. (1994). A history of Arakan (past & present). Magenta Colour. Yunus, M. (2012). Dünden Bugüne Arakan .Trans: Hatice Ugur. Istanbul: Mavi Offset. Zubeyir, K. R. B. (1959). Kitab-uz Zahare wa-t Tuhuf. Kuwait.

CHAPTER 2

Genocide, Forced Migration, and Forced Labor: A Case Study on Rohingya People Under International Law Nebile Pelin Mantı and Dilara Nur Cansu Islam

Introduction The ongoing situation with Rohingya poses a significant security crisis in the region and has serious implications in the bilateral relations between Myanmar and Bangladesh. In a multiethnic country like Myanmar, besides state-sponsored violence, forced migration, forced labor, sexual assault and rape, genocide, and hate speech are the main crimes committed against Rohingya people. Although the problem is not new, taking its

N. P. Mantı Department of Public International Law, Istanbul University, Istanbul, Turkey D. N. Cansu Islam (*) Department of Law, Ankara Social Science University (ASBU), Ankara, Turkey © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 K. Bülbül et al. (eds.), Rohingya Refugee Crisis in Myanmar, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6464-9_2

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roots from 1970s, following Ne Win’s election1 (known as Tatmadaw) in 1963, it has developed into a more complex set of problems since 2017 that future generations will inherit. Rohingyas are victims of large-scale and extensive human rights violations, including extrajudicial torture, executions, and ill-treatment, often combined with forced labor, forced relocation, strict constraints on their freedom of movement (Petrasek, 1996), and so on. Therefore, the Human Rights Council (HRC) established the independent international fact-­ finding mission on Myanmar by its Resolution No. 34/22 in 2018, following the migration of thousands of refugees to Bangladesh as of August 2017 (HRC, 34th Session, April 3, 2017b).

Historical Grounds: Decline of Social Rights and Identity After British rule,2 Burma became independent in 1948. Although in Rakhine State the tension between Buddhists and Bengali-speaking Muslims have existed for decades, all communities had enjoyed equal rights until 1982 when a new law was passed by military junta3 in Burma, which recognized eight ethnicities entitled to citizenship, and excluded Rohingya (ICJ, January 23, 2020a). Almost overnight, thousands of Muslims living in Myanmar were collectively stripped of their citizenship rights and divested from their cultural, national, and ethnic identities by violence and state policy. Most of the Rohingya population, living in Burma’s western Rakhine State, belongs to the predominantly Muslim ethnic group. As a result of social and political turmoil, this population comprises stateless people 1  General Ne Win took over control of the government on March 2, 1962. He had his military training in Japan as a soldier of the Burmese National Army. He initiated the systematic expulsion of Muslims from government and the army. For a more detailed story please see: Mujtaba Razvi, The Problem of The Burmese Muslims, Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Fourth Quarter, 1978), pp. 82–93. 2  British rule in Burma lasted more than 100 years, from 1824 to 1948, following successive three Anglo-Burmese wars (between 1824–1826, 1852–1853, and 1885), through the creation of Burma as a Province of British India to the establishment of an independently administered colony, and finally independence. Michael W. Charney, A History of Modern Burma, January 2009, p. 5. 3  Military junta under the Burma Socialist Programme Party came into force following a coup d’état in 1962.

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denied of their citizenship rights in both Bangladesh and Burma. The United Nations describes them as one of the world’s most persecuted group (HRC, December 5, 2017a). The Rohingyas face persecution by both the Buddhist majority and the government militias. Historically and geographically, Arakanese kingdoms bridged between Islamic civilization and the Buddhist tradition (Myanmar, 2017). Muslims came to Rakhine State, also known as Arakan, and Myanmar today, from the 1430s. Rakhine was politically an independent coastal kingdom from 1429 to 1782, with its own rich history and culture, and in 1784, when the Burmese Empire conquered it, a small Muslim population was living in Arakan State. In 1824, Britain conquered Burma; during Britain’s rule Burma was a part of British India (Zarni and Brinham, 2017). The Muslim population in the region has long been ignored intentionally by the central government and excluded from national peace talks (International Crisis Group, October 1, 2013), since the British colonialists, who consider the ethnic Rakhine is like the majority in Bamar (ethnic Burmese group). The region is known for the political turmoil since the declaration of independence in 1948. The new government formed by the Buddhist majority denied citizenship to the Rohingyas. In the short term, the Muslim minority was subjected to extensive systematic discrimination in the country. From 1970s, Myanmar’s government applied discriminatory policies against Muslims, augmenting the degree of restrictions, such as restricting their movements and family size (Albert and Maizland, 2020). From 1993 to 2013, some government documents showed that the government policies targeting the Muslim minority imposed “extensive restrictions on the basic freedoms of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar’s Rakhine State” (Fortify Rights, February 2014). According to Fortify Rights’ Myanmar Report (February 2014), 8 out of 12 internal documents outline official discriminatory policies targeting Rohingya in Rakhine State. This includes three Rakhine State “regional orders”4 (RO of 2008 and RO of 1993), and four additional government documents. 4  Regional Order, 2008, circulating previous orders and addenda, p. 62, Regional Order, 1993 p.  64, Regional Order 1/2005, p.  66, Various Addenda to Regional Orders: Restrictions, Guidelines, and Enforcement Methods, Letter with Questions from Fortify Rights to President Thein Sein, p.  68, in Policies of Persecution Ending Abusive State

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The ethnoreligious encounter between the Muslim minority and the Buddhist majority has historical roots, and this conflict has escalated since 2016, following the escalation of the political conflicts in the region. The policies restricted Rohingya Muslims’ “movement, marriage, childbirth, home repairs and construction of houses of worship,” and have forced Rohingya people to flee to Bangladesh, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia (Tan, 2017; Islam & Rahman, 2018). According to media reports, after the killing of nine police officers in October 2016, the discriminatory behaviors, violence, and the numbers of casualties keep growing (Radio Free Asia, 2016). After the news about the rape and murder of a Buddhist woman, widespread rioting and clashes between Rakhine Buddhists and Muslims took place in June 2012 and left 200 dead and displaced thousands, largely assumed to be Rohingya Muslims. In the following chapters, some details about the acts committed will be mentioned.

Qualifying the Acts Under International Law On the Rohingya situation, to investigate alleged human rights abuses by Myanmar authorities, United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC) founded the independent international fact-finding mission5 on Myanmar, which focused on the situation in Shan States, Rakhine, and Kachin since 2011. In the report,6 it is claimed that, on August 25, 2017, after an armed group, namely “the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army,” started small-scale attacks against government military outposts, Myanmar government operation aimed at Rohingya communities caused minimum 10,000 deaths and caused 725,000 Rohingyas to escape. The fact-finding mission Policies Against Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar, Fortify Rights, February 2014, pp. 62–77. Union government orders of 1993 detail additional restrictions on marriage for Rohingyas, and on freedom of movement, and for noncompliance specify fines and imprisonment. Fortify Rights, Policies of Persecution: Ending Abusive State Policies Against Rohingya in Myanmar (February 2014), pp.  36–7, Available at: http:// www.fortifyrights.org/downloads/Policies_of_Persecution_Feb_25_Fortify_Rights.pdf 5  The Human Rights Council, Resolution A/HRC/RES/34/22, of 24 March 2017. Available at: https://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/RES/34/22 6  Report of the independent international fact-finding mission on Myanmar, Advanced Edited Version, A/HRC/39/64, 12 September 2018, p.4. Available at: https://www. ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/FFM-Myanmar/A_HRC_39_64.pdf

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concluded that the Myanmar forces committed war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. In that vein, the rest of this chapter will evaluate the actions of Myanmar authorities against Rohingya community under international law.

Genocide Under international law, protecting people from genocide is preliminary (jus cogens) where “fundamental principle of international law accepted by the international community of states as a norm from which no derogation is permitted” (Bassiouni, 1996). “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide” in 1948 is the first attempt to enact “Genocide” as a crime where member states are almost 150, and even Myanmar is one of the signatory states in this convention in 19567 (HRC, September 17, 2018). Nevertheless, in Rohingya people’s case, indiscriminate killings of general people, women, and children, rape, sexual harassment, which forced most of the Rohingya to flee from the Rakhine State of Myanmar within August 2017, might be considered under international law. However, following the international pressure, the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecution requested to investigate allegations of “genocide, crimes against humanity, and persecution” on Rohingya Muslim; therefore, on November 14, 2019, the ICC has officially initiated a full investigation on “Myanmar’s alleged crimes against Rohingya.” Additionally, Tun Khin, a president of Burmese Rohingya Organization UK (BROUK), with two other human rights organizations from Latin America—Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo (Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo) and the Foundation for Peace and Justice (Fundación Servicio Paz y Justicia)—filed a separate legal case in Argentina against Myanmar government, and its military and de facto civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi, regarding the crimes committed against Rohingya community (The Guardian, November 14, 2019). By following the case, International Criminal Court (ICC) “accepted that there exists a reasonable basis to believe widespread and/or systematic acts of violence may have been committed that could qualify as crimes against humanity of deportation across the Myanmar-Bangladesh border” (ICC-­ CPI, November 2019). Besides, the USA Congress also emphasized the Rohingya issue as a “persecution on grounds of ethnicity and/or religion 7

 Ibid., p.16.

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against the Rohingya population” (Congressional Bills 116th Congress, June 11, 2019). Additionally, Gambia made submissions before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) with the legal case where they accused the state of Myanmar of “mass murder, rape, and genocidal acts” which violate its obligations under the Genocide Convention, along with acts comprising the burning of the villages where Rohingyas live, arbitrary imprisonment, and torture on Rohingya people (International Court of Justice, November 11, 2019). ICJ ordered Myanmar to “take all measures within its power” to avoid any kind of violence that may harm the Rohingya community in Rakhine State. However, ICJ is not clear whether the Myanmar government had genocidal intent against the Rohingya community in 2016–17 (The Conversation, January 21, 2020). According to the “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide” (in short, Genocide Convention), the term genocide defines “acts that are committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” (UN, December 9, 1948), as International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) accepts “genocide can be committed against national, ethnical, racial or religious groups” (ICTY, March 22, 2006); however, it is essential to note perpetrator’s subjective perception in social or historical context (ICTR, June 7, 2001c; ICTY, December 1, 2004b). Regarding this, the Human Rights Council’s fact-finding report opined that Rohingya community mostly live in Rakhine State, constitute a protected group as an ethnic “members share a common language or culture”, racial “based on hereditary physical traits often identified with a geographical region, irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national or religious factors” or religious “members share the same religion, denomination or mode of worship” group (HRC, September 2018). The Rohingya community also distinguish themselves from the “Rwangya,” as do the Myanmar authorities (British Foreign Office, December 31, 1952). After the 1982 law, which redefined citizenship rights, the Rohingya community was accepted as Myanmar residents (Habib et  al., August 2018). According to Human Rights Council

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fact-­finding report if adopting some specific law or policies lies behind the differential treatment of the Rohingya, it concludes protection of the Rohingya community under the Genocide Convention. Physical Acts The convention of genocide classifies and prohibits the five physical acts which require to prove the primary elements of crimes that took place in the particular area, as ICC portrait “in the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct directed against that group or was conduct that could itself effect [the] destruction” (ICC, 2011; HRC, 2018). However, Nasour Koursami argued that these ‘elements of genocide’ prevents abstract crimes from listing as “crime of genocide”. However, the physical and executed acts committed on the Rohingya community by the Myanmar government are one of context, which is an evident background identified by the “Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide” in 1948. Human Council’s fact-finding report stated that generally, Tatmadaw and security forces killed Rohingya children, women, and people intentionally and unlawfully since 2011, especially since August 25, 2017. These systemic oppressive “clearance operations” culminated in 2016 and 2017 (ICTY, 2004a; ICTY, 1999d). Another report indicates that government measures against many Rohingya communities formed serious abuses, including “summary killings, rape and other sexual violence, torture and ill-treatment, arbitrary arrests, and arson” (Human Rights Watch, 2017, p. 150). Also, a similar report came from Amnesty International, which stated that Myanmar Army has committed “Arbitrary Arrest and Torture; Extrajudicial Executions and Enforced Disappearances; Forced Labour and Related Abuses; Indiscriminate Shelling of Civilian Areas; Denial of Free Movement, Clearance of Villages; and Restrictions of Humanitarian Access” (Amnesty International, 2017). The actions committed by Myanmar government clearly shows that they were carried out in a targeted way, since Rohingya people were sealed in burning houses or thrown into burning homes or murdered and executed there (Amnesty International, 2018 and Habib et al., 2018). In his study on “Forced Migration of Rohingya: The Untold Experience,” Habib et al. estimated that approximately 23,962 Rohingya people were murdered, while approximately 17,718 women were raped, 34,436 family members and Rohingya villagers were thrown into burning houses,

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114,872 were beaten by Myanmar security forces, and 41,192 Rohingya people were injured by gunshot (Habib et al., 2018, p. 85). For instance, Human Rights Council finds out that in Min Gyi and Maung Nu villages where Rohingya people reside, Myanmar security forces gathered the Rohingya men and women, then separated the men from women and killed them; even they took women and girls to the closest houses where they raped them then killed or injured them (Dussich, 2018). HRC’s interview verified this report was taken from survivors in 54 different locations with 22 further places of “clearance operations” by the Myanmar government (HRC Report, 2018, p. 352). Another dimension of ‘executed physical acts’ is called ‘serious bodily harm and ‘serious mental harm’. A bodily harm is defıned by ICTR as “serious injury to health, disfigurement, or serious injury to the external or internal organs, or senses” (ICTR, May 21, 1999c). There may be several ways of causing serious bodily harm, such as rape, torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, and sexual violence. However, the second way to determine the genocide through physical acts is ‘serious mental harm’ which must make more than a temporary damage of mental and psychological faculties (ICTR, February 25, 2004a) and is evaluated on a case-­ by-­case base where immediate situations surrounding the incident will form the evidence for further investigation of genocide (ICTR, February 2009). Through the measurement of physical act, Nowak and Janik (2015) identified that bodily and mental harm means a ‘temporary unhappiness’, which either can be embarrassment or humiliation and inflict “grave and long-term disadvantage to a person’s ability to lead a normal and constructive life” (p. 332); even this serious bodily and mental harm may destroy the group, community in whole or in part. As above mentioned, the physical acts through bodily and mental harm have happened on a large scale against the Rohingya community in Myanmar. By referring to the report of Human Rights Council (2018), it is obvious that weapons and knives were used, people were continuously burned, women and girls had their parts of limbs and breasts mutilated and suffered from serious bodily harm. The rape and sexual violence perpetrated on women and girls also included severely biting or scarring by the military forces on their breasts, faces, and even instances of cutting off their genitalia during the October 2016 and August 2017 “clearance operations” by Myanmar security forces.

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Genocidal Intent The crime of genocide is described with the precise requirement of intent. Besides demonstrating that the perpetrator intended to commit the underlying act, it must also be displayed that the act was committed with the specific intention (dolus specialis), the intention to destroy a protected group as such in whole or in part (Schabas, 2009). This intent allows the perpetrator to plan, as such, to “destroy” the targeted community in whole or in part. The victims are chosen because of their membership in the group for which destruction is sought (Noor, July 22, 2013). The Myanmar Independent Commission of Enquiry (ICOE) established by Myanmar provided the final report on the violence against the Rohingya community before the International Court of Justice’s decision on January 23, 2020. The report claimed that actions constitute crimes against humanity, sexual violence in Rakhine; however ICOE did not find evidence of genocidal intent. However, for genocidal intent, it is rare to find direct evidence (ICTR, June 1, 2001d). The intent can be deduced from the composition of “circumstantial evidence” and “all evidence taken together” while direct evidence’s absence under “beyond reasonable doubt” criminal norm (ICTY, March 24, 2016a; ICTY, January 30, 2015; ICTR, May 8, 2012; ICJ, February 27, 2007; ICTY, December 1, 2004b). As stated by ICC in Al Bashir case for genocidal intent, the act in question embraces these factors (ICC, March 4, 2009): In order to determine genocidal intent under the criminal norm “beyond reasonable doubt,” any conclusion arising from circumstantial proof must be the only conclusion that may possibly be obtained from the actions at issue. Contextual evidence related to the assessment of genocidal intent includes (ICC, March 4, 2009): –– “plans, policies and preparation”: the existence of a genocidal plan or policy considered important to the establishment of intent. For example, execution lists, broadcasting of terrorist ideology, and planning perpetrators’ transportation (ICTY, July 5, 2001b). –– “evidence of modus operandi”: systematical actions—committed with similar type of weapons, perpetration of killings, time and similarity in the operation of attack and so on—of a consistent character were directed toward a protected group (ICTR, September 2, 1998a; ICTR, May 21, 1999c; ICTR, April 28, 2005)

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–– “evidence of breadth and scale”: the scope and severity of the attacks (ICC, March 4, 2009) –– “other factors” physical harm, offensive language toward members of the target group, discrete words, various forms of communication between perpetrators (ICTR, June 1, 2001d). The constructive factor is the actions and conduct of the convicted people themselves; genocidal motive “should be determined, above all, from his words and deeds, and should be evident from purposeful action patterns” (ICTR, June 7, 2001c). Finding the Genocidal Intent: Relevant Factors This section identifies what factors are relevant for finding the genocidal intent of the Myanmar authorities against the Rohingya people in the Rakhine State. We identify five categories as the main factors influencing the genocidal intent of the Myanmar government. That first factor will appear into the greater perspective wherein the law took place, that is widespread propaganda started due to dislike of and contempt against Rohingya. Rohingya people have been fostered by the landscape of enduring, excessive, and structural discrimination based on their ethnical, racial, and/or religious identification. The Rohingya were denied their ethnic and citizenship identity, but they have also been systematically victimized by the degrading and stigmatizing terms by other ethnic communities and citizens of Myanmar with the open support of Myanmar authorities. The apparent aim and purpose of such propaganda was to expel Rohingya people from Myanmar, where they once belonged. The method of “othering” by the Myanmar government, which routinely referred to Rohingya people as “Bengali” or “illegal immigrants” who would overwhelm and Islamize that state, has succeeded. They are represented like an existential threat to the country as well as its Buddhist nature. Those kinds of propaganda, starting to come from authority figures, have long fueled the nation’s anti-Rohingya viewpoint (Genocide Watch, December 12, 2019). Regarding ferocity of 2012, the change within that language has seen a rise in comparisons toward Rohingya as “violent extremists” and “terrorists,” as well as their practice of “violent Islam,” thereby fostering distrust and deep resentment in the Myanmar society. Via social media sites, the effect of derogatory language has been magnified and on which hate speech, racist narratives, and incitement to hatred and violence towards

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Rohingya have flourished. The use of homophobic slurs directed toward selected team members is an accurate predictor of genocidal intent (Human Rights Council, 42nd Session, August 22, 2019). “The general political doctrine” that inevitably leads to forbidden acts of genocide was a significant factor in deciding the presence of genocidal intent in other contexts (ICTR, September 2, 1998a). The overall political ideology of Myanmar regarding the Rohingya is one of state-sanctioned injustice and repression across all aspects of their lives. This, when combined with the failure of past and present Myanmar governments to condemn the omnipresent rhetoric of hatred and contempt toward the Rohingya, as well as the involvement of high-level officials and authority figures in it, could constitute one set of indicators from which to reasonably infer that acts were committed with genocidal intent. The second set of criteria seems to be the specific statements given by government authorities, politicians, religious authorities, and military commanders, and significant perpetrators prior to, during, and after the brutality. Aims of a “clearance operations” by Myanmar government identified a dialect of derogation that frequently associated forms of cruelty, which was not only a language disrespectful, this also often uncovered a discriminatory perspective, with offenders using phrases like “go away,” “you don’t belong here,” “you are Bengali,” “we‘re going to kill all of you” (Human Rights Council, 39th Session, September 17, 2018). A fact-­ finding report by Human Rights Council (September 17, 2018) exposed how a victim woman and her sister were gang-raped by Tatmadaw security forces where the expression of the security forces is like this: “We are going to kill you this way, by raping. We are going to kill Rohingya. We will rape you. This is not your country” (Interview taken by HRC, September 17, 2018, p. 360). Tatmadaw soldiers and police officers who were deployed in the “clearance operations” at Rakhine State have so many available derogatory and hate comments in the social media such as introducing Rohingya as “Muslim dogs” and expressed their intention in this way: “Have been wanting to kill these ‘Kalar’ for so long. Only got to kill them just now” (War is Boring, November 2, 2018). However, it must be clarified that in the case of Rwanda, the soldiers who were found singing songs at the time of killing Tutsi was taken into account when genocidal intent was found (ICTR, December 13, 2004b). Additionally, ICTY identified that phrases such as “exterminate them, look for them everywhere, kill them, and get it over with” were depended on to attribute the clear purpose of killing the Tutsi population taken as a case example of

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‘genocidal intent’. Nevertheless, similar context has been the case of the Myanmar security forces in the case of “clearance operation” to destroy the Rohingya ethnic minority. Myanmar’s institutions, including government officials, politicians, religious figures, and commanders of the military and security forces, made public statements or comments that were deeply disturbing against Rohingya people, such as killing them and removing their existence from the Rakhine State by their direct or indirect role. Many speeches have been found to have utter hatred for the Rohingya community, including direct threats or incitement to violence. In 2015, at a rally at Bo Sein Menn football ground in Bahan Township, Yangon, Nay Myo Wai who is a chair of the Peace and Diversity Group, announced to a crowd, available in the video posted to YouTube: “I will not say much, I will make it short and direct. Number one, shoot and kill them! (the Rohingyas). Number two, kill and shoot them! (the Rohingyas). Number three, shoot and bury them! (the Rohingyas). Number four, bury and shoot them! (the Rohingyas). If we do not kill, shoot, and bury them, they will keep sneaking into our country!”, which is an additional example of Myanmar society’s structure and how it instigates the violence against the Rohingya minority. Besides the above discussions, other following indicators show how the topmost influential authorities of the Myanmar government and its society, including the political and religious institutions, functioned as instrumental factors to implement the genocide against Rohingya. For instance, the public statement of the former President Thein Sein, in July 2012, suggesting, “the last resort to this issue is to hand in the Rohingya who sneaked in to UNHCR to stay in the refugee camps” (Human Rights Council, 39th Session, 28 September 2018); whereas another statement came from one of the Myanmar’s most admired Buddhist religious monks, Sitagu Sayadaw in October 2017. In his speech, Sayadaw influenced the Myanmar’s security forces, especially the military, to kill Rohingyas; he even asks the Myanmar government, that if the military kills Rohingyas, to forgive them and to provide them the freedom to commit mass murder of Rohingyas (Walton, November 6, 2018). Another factor to identify the genocidal intent is of Myanmar’s top military institutional authority such as the Tatmadaw’s Commander-in-­ Chief, Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing, and his role to commit the genocide against Rohingya. Since 2011, Hlaing made many public speeches and statements where he specifically mentions the case of Rohingya and denied the existence of Rohingya identity in the Myanmar

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Constitution as a citizen. Additionally, he labels and tags the Rohingya community as “illegal Bengali immigrants,” “terrorists,” and “extremists,” that’s how he emphasized Tatmadaw Operations in Rakhine State is important for Myanmar and denied that there was any wrongdoings done by the security forces to implement the successful “clearance operations” there. He calls on Myanmar’s other “ethnic community” to take action against Rohingya community, which he mentioned as “patriotic action” for all Myanmar citizens. Additionally, at the beginning of “clearance operations” in Rakhine State against Rohingya, he indicates Rohingya as “Bengali problem” which was an “unfinished job.” However, Myanmar government is taking it seriously to resolve the issue (BBC, 17 September 2017). Nevertheless, by taking the above-mentioned statements as fact-­ based background, it is very evident to understand the context of the situation and how this genocide against Rohingya community has happened and orchestrated by the key figure of the Myanmar authority to implement their ultranationalist and hateful agenda in Rakhine State of Myanmar. Accordingly, the third indicator identified that ‘genocidal intent’ would relate to the government’s policies and plans, which means that they may change the demography. In the context of ‘operation clearance’ at Rakhine State, Myanmar government policy and plan were very clear to reduce the Rohingya population size or totally destroy the ethnic and religious identity of the Rohingya community there. Additionally, for changing the demography in Rakhine State, Myanmar government made several legislations for Rohingya ethnic group such as restricting marriages and births. Under the policy of “NaTaLa village model” in 1990s, Rohingya people required government permission for buying land and any new resettlement in Rakhine State (Amnesty International, 2004), even, after the “clearance operation” in 2017 clearly shows other ethnic groups from Myanmar were relocated in Rakhine State where Rohingyas resided before. Additionally, Myanmar government initiated development and reconstruction project in Rakhine State, especially at the place where Rohingya people once lived. However, by taking the former Yugoslavia case as an example which is “the existence of a plan to create an ethnically homogenous state, along with evidence of an intent to exclude non-­ members by violence, and evidence that the targeted group could not lay claim as to any specific territory, was found to support an inference that this plan of exclusion contemplated the destruction of the non-member ethnic groups (ICTY, July 11, 1996)”. Accordingly, the current Rohingya crisis in Rakhine State has had similar intent as in the case of the former

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Yugoslavia, such as the intention of Myanmar government to reduce or destroy the Rohingya identity from Rakhine State. Organized plan and policy by Myanmar authorities to destroy the Rohingya identity from Rakhine State is the fourth indicator that as stated is crime of genocide. ICTY indicated that some number of facts are crucial to identify any case as “organising evidencing a plan for destruction” such as the systematically killing by the specific “types of weapons and methods employed by the attackers were consistent across attacks and that the attackers employed a consistent modus operandi across those attacks” (ICTY, August 2, 2001a; ICTR, May 21, 1999c; ICTY, December 14, 1999; ICTR, May 21, 1999c), which undeniably occurred in the case of Rohingya particularly in the August 2017 operation by Myanmar security forces; for instances, security forces used types of weapons for systematic killing, the coordination between other ethnic group in Rakhine State and security forces, and also the timing of the operations. Nonetheless, the constitution of Myanmar allows Tatmadaw to nominate 25% of the members of the parliament, including the defense, the border, and home affairs ministries, with a huge veto power for all “constitutional changes,” which provides a massive control power to Tatmadaw over political and military decisions of Myanmar. (Fisher, 2016). The 2016 Operation also shows that the Tatmadaw soldiers, although perpetrators of crimes committed against civilians, benefitted from impunity (Barany, 2016). On August 25, 2017, the ARSA attacks was responded to within hours by the Myanmar’s armed forces. In the region a month before their installation process, the armed forces were established in the Rohingya area, homes were disarmed from sharp tools that can be used as a weapon. Contrary to the disarming of Rohingya community, ethnic Rakhine militias and groups were armed by state. This operation was made in chain-­ command from top to bottom, where whole army was involved in an organized plan (International Crisis Group, 2017). A fifth group of evidence as to intent summons extreme violence of the acts and operations against the Rohingya (ICTY, July 5, 2001c). For example, pregnant women and babies were not spared to “wipe out a group in its entirety,” extent of bodily injuries, targeting women and girls for rape and sexual violence (ICTR, September 2, 1998b; ICTR, April 28, 2005). Bite marks and permanent scars were a constant reminder to survivors as a kind of branding. Even without these reminders, rape and sexual violence are stages for destruction of a group: “the destruction of the spirit, of the will to live, and of life itself” or “while inflicting acute

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suffering on its members in the process (Barany, 2016). Considering the evidence, factor in contextual basis the underlying acts conclude that they were committed with genocidal intent (HRC, September 2018, p. 363). Forced Migration As determined by UN Human Rights Council patterns of serious human rights violations and abuses were seen in Rakhine, Kachin, and Shan States, besides grave violations of international humanitarian law (HRC, September 17, 2018). As a result of persecution of the Rohingya people, Myanmar produced “the third largest refugee population in the region and the fourth largest in the world in 2018,” with most refugees accommodated in Bangladesh (International Organization for Migration, 2018, p. 73). Forced migration under international law is “a general term that refers to the movements of refugees,8 migrants, and internally displaced people9 (those displaced by conflicts within their country of origin) as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or development projects.”10 Between 1978 and 2017, the human rights violations against the Rohingya community have affected forced migration to neighboring countries, such as Bangladesh. One of the important points to note is the forced migration pattern is created for years. The government tends to 8  1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, defines a refugee as a person residing outside his or her country of nationality, who is unable or unwilling to return because of a “well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a political social group, or political opinion.” Those recognized as refugees have a clear international legal status and are afforded the protection of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 9  The United Nations report, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement uses the definition: “Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.” Both terms are different from Asylum seekers, which are people who have moved across international borders in search of protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention, but whose claim for refugee status has not yet been determined. 10  For the definition Columbia University, Forced Migration Learning Module, (Available from: http://www.columbia.edu/itc/hs/pubhealth/modules/forcedMigration/definitions.html)

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make the case to be recognized as the pattern of ‘gradual displacement’, as in regions of current conflict and the ceasefire areas (Jolliffe, 2014). On the other hand, another reason is the economic pressure imposed on Rohingyas and coercive measures applied within years, which caused largescale poverty, rising inflation, and decreasing incomes as in the rest of Burma, which forced people to leave as individuals or as family groups. The violence against Rohingyas caused one of the largest effects of displacement in recent memory. The displacement prompted a civilian crisis in Myanmar; following the crisis, neighboring countries like Malaysia has hosted large number of refugees, the number of which was over 120,000 in 2018.11 Besides Bangladesh, the Rohingya community have sought asylum in other countries in the region, including Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and India (Morris, November 11, 2017). Systematic discrimination, exclusion, and violence strategies and acts of Myanmar against Rohingya have caused Muslims to flee in massive numbers (Lewa, October 8, 2003); such as in “1978 (200,000), 1991–1992 (250,000), 2012 (100,000), 2015–2016 (tens of thousands), and since late August 2017 (613,000)” (Tan, 2017). Refugees in Bangladesh constitute more than one-third of the Cox’s Bazar district’s population, in the Chittagong Division of Bangladesh. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), nearly 671,000 refugees arrived in Cox’s Bazar since August 2017 (UNDP, November 2018). Starting from August 2017, until July 2019, the number of Rohingya refugees, mostly women and children, fleeing to Bangladesh has reached over 742,000 (UNDP, November 2018). According to the same report, this district had already 213,000 Rohingya Muslims from Rakhine State. For the first time, in UNHCR’s 2017 and 2018 data, the Rohingya people who recently settled as refugee in south Bangladesh, and IDPs in Rakhine State, Myanmar, were included as stateless, “in light of the size of this population and that they are in fact stateless as well as displaced”. The settled people in two countries, respectively, are “1st and 3rd biggest

11  Word Migration Report notes that there has been an increase in displacement in the subregion due to violence, systemic persecution, and marginalization. Migration and migrants: Regional dimensions and developments, p.76 (Available from: https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2020.pdf)

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stateless people” in 2018 “around 906,000 stateless people in Bangladesh and 620,000 in Myanmar” (International Migration Organisation, 2020). Forced Labor Forced labor, whether paid or unpaid, is breaching of Forced or Compulsory Labor (No. 29 International Labour Organization [ILO] Convention in this regard). The Myanmar government consented to this Convention in 1955. Forced labor also infringes the right, protected under Article 23 (3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to “just and favourable remuneration.”12 Myanmar joined the International Labour Organization (ILO) in 1952 and has ratified 24 conventions, including three fundamental conventions and 21 technical conventions. Although Myanmar ratified the 1930 dated Forced Labour Convention in 1955, the ILO pointed out its concerns on the Myanmar government for many years. More than half a century later, forced labor by the armed forces has become a state practice and Myanmar is far from achieving full compliance with this Convention. After the 2016 dated report, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein declared that one of the severe violations against Myanmar’s Muslim Rohingya minority is forced labor and sexual violence (UN News, June 20, 2016). Although it is difficult to qualify the acts committed against Rohingyas under just one category and creating typologies since the displacement of Rohingyas is caused by a series of human rights violations and compelling measures enforced by the authorities not only limited to forced labor, and land confiscation, forced agricultural practices, and extortion left Rohingyas economically dependent and destitute and that constitute serious human rights violations (Bosson, 2016. Extensive forced labor in Myanmar has developed as a state practice, enforced by the security forces which take civilians especially in ethnic minorities for forced labor duties. Within years all policies adopted by 12  “Myanmar was one of the first United Nations member states to adopt the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in April 1948,” and was one of the states to vote and voted in favour for UDHR. In 2009, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon at the end of his two-day visit to the country stated that “unfortunately, that commitment has not been matched indeed,” and “Myanmar’s human rights record remains a matter of grave concern.” https://news. un.org/en/story/2009/07/305612-myanmars-human-rights-record-matter-graveconcern-says-ban

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government created a cumulative effect, by reducing economic resource bases for families, resulting in the decrease of income, collapse of the household economy, and leaving Rohingyas with the only option left—of leaving home. The ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions (the Committee of Expert’s report) stated from the report on Myanmar of September 17, 201813 that forced labor by the security forces continues, especially in Kachin and Shan States, plus ethnic Rakhine. On January 16, 2018, Decent Work Country Programme (DWCP) by the National Tripartite Dialogue Forum initiated the “Action Plan for the Elimination of Forced Labour” (ILO, February, 2019). Myanmar and the ILO signed another memorandum of understanding on January 22, 2018 and agreed upon eliminating all forms of forced labor for 2018.

Conclusion It is essential to take serious steps to prevent human rights violations in the country and to solve the problems in Myanmar. Although it seems difficult to reach an international consensus, the UN needs to draw a road map, to take effective action against the unlawful acts committed which continues and constitute violations of Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law rules and is against the framework of international law and diplomacy rules. In this way, it will be possible for Rohingya Muslims, who have been living in Arakan province (current Rakhine State) for centuries and who are locals of the region, to be freed from being the most oppressed and persecuted people in the world. All steps taken to solve the problem, all calls to Myanmar, have been inconclusive. The government has not responded positively to international cooperation. It has adopted a systematic rejection policy by refusing to bring those responsible in front of justice and left them to continue illegal actions. Some states and regional organizations openly supported the Myanmar government and remained silent against the human rights violations, making the situation even more serious. In the last ten-year period, the number of violence and oppression against the Rohingyas has also increased. 13  In March 2017, “the United Nations Human Rights Council established a Fact-Finding Mission to establish the facts and circumstances of the alleged recent human rights violations by military and security forces, and abuses, in Myanmar. The mandate of the IIFFMM has ended in September 2019, following the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar handed over its evidence to the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM).”

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On the other hand, the international community’s interest and awareness, especially the UN, have increased. It seems necessary that states, nongovernmental organizations, and academic circles prepare various solutions to stop human rights violations and organize various campaigns in order to help people in Rakhine State and those who are still in concentration camps. However, to solve the current problem, although the international community’s attitude in this direction is positive for the solution of the problems, it is not considered sufficient to obtain favorable and effective results in the shortest term. On the other hand, the International Court of Justice has initiated the process on international ground, on January 23, 2020, by rejecting the arguments claimed by Myanmar’s de facto leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and ruled that “Myanmar must take action to protect Rohingya Muslims, who have been killed and driven from their homes in what the country’s accusers call a campaign of genocide” (ICJ, January 23, 2020a). Gambia also underlined that “the prohibition of genocide has the character of a peremptory norm and the obligations under the Convention are owed erga omnes and erga omnes partes, The Gambia has, in particular, made clear to Myanmar that its actions constitute a clear violation of its obligations under the Convention.”14 As to the “Risk of Irreparable Harm and Urgency,” the Court concluded that Myanmar should “take all measures within its power” to restrain their army or anyone from trying to fulfill genocidal laws contrary to the Rohingyas, whom the mentioned addressed “real and imminent risk” (ICJ, 2007). That verdict is the first international judicial decision toward Myanmar over the cruel treatment of Rohingyas by their armed forces. The court does not have execution powers; however, any Security Council members may call for an action to make Myanmar establish peace and social order in Rakhine State. Some of its five permanent members, which includes Myanmar’s alliance, China, can veto action by the Security Council. Human Rights groups, on the other hand, insisted that Aung San Suu Kyi will not implement the measures without pressure. Hannum (January 14  “Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, pp. 45–47, paras. 85–88 (citing Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I)”, pp. 110–111, para. 161).

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29, 2020) indicates in his analysis that ICJ’s interim steps imposed between 1951 and 2002 were not implemented except in one 1 case out of 11. Myanmar’s orders are one of these orders in the past. However, declining to accept the international court’s measures would only massively increase criticism and hinder Myanmar’s search for economic growth. (Hannum, January 29, 2020). On the other hand, in the past, international pressure, bad national branding, and economic sanctions have not stopped Myanmar to commit violence against the Rohingya ethnic minority in Rakhine State. And an armed involvement as a solution would be a disaster, as repeatedly seen in the examples of Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and Bosnia. However, if ICJ achieves the implementation of the measures to shield the Rohingya community, this will mitigate the problems of the 600,000 Rohingya in Myanmar. It might also decrease the risks for those refugees who want to come back. Probably, one can claim that “law is the worst form of international justice, except for all the others.” (Hannum, 2020).

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of the Muslim Community in Myanmar, OIC Doc. OIC/CFM46/2019/ MM/RES/FINAL (1–2 March 2019), available at https://www.oicoci.org/ docdown/?docID=4447&refID=1250, para. 11(a). ICJ. (2020a, January 23). Order, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar), General List No. 178. Available at: icj-­cij.org/en/decisions/all/2020/2020/desc ICJ. (2020b, January 23). ICJ Ruling-International Pressure Needed To Force Burma To Comply. Available at: https://burmacampaign.org.uk/ icj-­ruling-­international-­pressure-­needed-­to-­force-­burma-­to-­comply/ ICTR. (1998a, September 2). Prosecutor v Akayesu, No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, para. 728. ICTR. (1998b, September 2). Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, para. 121. ICTR. (1999a, May 21). Prosecutor v Kayishema and Ruzindana, ICTR-95-1-T, Trial Judgment, para. 535. ICTR. (1999b, May 21). Prosecutor v Kayishema and Ruzindana, ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, para. 109. ICTR. (1999c, May 21). Prosecutor v Kayishema, ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, paras. 93, 289, 534–535, 537. ICTR. (2001a, June 1). Prosecutor v Kayishema and Ruzindana, ICTR-95-1-A, Judgment, para. 148. ICTR. (2001b, June 7). Prosecutor v Bagilishema, ICTR-95-1A-T, Judgment, para. 63. ICTR. (2001c, June 7). Prosecutor v Bagilishema, ICTR-95-1A-T, Judgment, para. 65. ICTR. (2001d, June 1). Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, ICTR-95-1-A, Judgment, para. 159: “Explicit manifestations of criminal intent are, for obvious reasons, often rare in the context of criminal trials”. ICTR. (2004a, February 25). Prosecutor v. Ntagerura et  al., ICTR-99-46-T, Judgment, para. 664. ICTR. (2004b, December 13). Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, ICTR-96-10-A and ICTR-96-17-A, Judgment, paras. 360–364. ICTR. (2005, April 28). Prosecutor v Muhimana, ICTR-95-1B-T, Judgment, para. 496. ICTR. (2009, February 27). Prosecutor v. Rukundo, ICTR-2001-70-T, Judgment, paras. 261–262. ICTR. (2012, May 8). Prosecutor v. Hategekimana, -00-55A-A, Judgment, para. 133. ICTY. (1996, July 11). Prosecutor v Karadzic, IT-95-5/IT-18-1-R-61, Review of the Indictments Pursuant to Rule of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, para. 94. ICTY. (1999, December 14). Prosecutor v Jelisic, IT-95-10-T, Judgment, para. 88.

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ICTY. (2001a, August 2). Prosecutor v Krstic, IT-98-33-T, Judgment, para. 547. ICTY. (2001b, July 5). Prosecutor v Jelisic, IT-95-10-A, Judgment, para. 48. ICTY. (2001c, July 5). Prosecutor v Jelisic, IT-95-10-A, Judgment, 5 July 2001, para. 47. ICTY. (2004a, April 19). The ICTY rejected this requirement, considering that it does not form part of customary international law: ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstic, IT-98-33-A, Judgment, para. 224. ICTY. (2004b, December 1). Prosecutor v Brdjanin, IT-99-36-T, Judgment, para. 970. ICTY. (2006, Mar 22). Prosecutor v. M. Stakić, IT-97-24, Appeals Chamber, at para. 20, Available at: www.icty.org ICTY. (2015, January 30). Prosecutor v. Popovic et al., IT-05-88-A, Judgment, para. 468. ICTY. (2016a, March 24). Prosecutor v. Karadzic, IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment, paras. 550, 2592. ICTY. (2016b, March 24). Prosecutor v. Karadzic, IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment, para. 2592. ILO. (2019, February). The Committee of Experts examined Myanmar’s application of ILO Convention No. 29 concerning forced labour, p.1. Available at: h t t p s : / / w w w. i l o . o r g / y a n g o n / p u b l i c a t i o n s / W C M S _ 6 7 7 5 9 1 / lang%2D%2Den/index.htm International Criminal Court. (2011). Elements of Crimes (The Hague), art. 6(a), para. 4. Available at: https://www.icc-­cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/336923D8-­ A6AD-­40EC-­AD7B-­45BF9DE73D56/0/ElementsOfCrimesEng.pdf International Crisis Group. (2013, October 1). The dark side of transition: Violence against Muslims in Myanmar, Report 251, Asia. Available at: https:// www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-­east-­asia/myanmar/dark-­side-­transition­violence-­against-­muslims-­myanmar. International Crisis Group. (2017, December 7). Myanmar’s Rohingya crisis enters a dangerous new phase, Report 292, Asia. Available at: https://www. crisisgroup.org/asia/south-­e ast-­asia/myanmar/292-­myanmars-­r ohingya­crisis-­enters-­dangerous-­new-­phase. International Migration Organisation. (2020). World Migration Report 2020. International Organization for Migration. (2018). World Migration Report 2018, p. 73. Islam, M. N., & Rahman H. (2018). “The humanitarian question of Rohingya Muslim refugee crisis beyond the foreign policy of Bangladesh and Myanmar: Forced migration, identity linkage and demographic assessment of their histori̇ cal exclusion and statelessness”. In Haluk Selvi, Ibrahim Şirin, Yusuf Adigüzel, Murat Lehimler, Ali Yeşildal, Raşit Fidan, Hasan Yilmaz, Hayriye Sözer and

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Tan, V. (2017, May 3). Over 168,000 Rohingya likely fled Myanmar since 2012 – UNHCR report. Available at: https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/ 2017/5/590990ff4/168000-­r ohingya-­l ikely-­f led-­m yanmar-­s ince-­2 012-­ unhcr-­report.html The Conversation. (2020, January 21). Rohingya genocide case: why it will be hard for Myanmar to comply with ICJ’s orders. Accessed on March 22, 2020. Available at: https://theconversation.com/rohingya-­genocide-­case-­why-­it-­ will-­be-­hard-­for-­myanmar-­to-­comply-­with-­icjs-­orders-­129170, para. 2. The Guardian. (2019, November 14). Myanmar's Aung San Suu Kyi faces first legal action over Rohingya crisis. Accessed on March 23, 2020. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/14/myanmars-­ aung-­san-­suu-­kyi-­faces-­first-­legal-­action-­over-­rohingya-­crisis UN. (1948, December 9). Article II, Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide approved and proposed for signature and ratification or accession by General Assembly resolution 260 A (III) of 9 December 1948. Entry into force in 12 January 1951, in accordance with article XIII. Available at: https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/ atrocity-­crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20 Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf. UN News. (2016, June 20). Myanmar must address ‘serious’ human rights violations against minorities – UN rights chief. Available at: https://news.un.org/ en/stor y/2016/06/532522-­m yanmar-­m ust-­a ddress-­s erious-­h uman­rights-­violations-­against-­minorities-­un UNDP. (2018, November). The impact of large-scale forced displacement on Rohingya refugees and host communities in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. Yale MacMillan Centre, Programme on refugees, forced displacement and humanitarian responses, p.1, and UNDP “Impacts of the Rohingya refugee influx on host communities”. Policy Briefs. Available at: https://www.undp.org/content/dam/bangladesh/docs/Publications/Pub-­2 019/Impacts%20of%20 the%20Rohingya%20Refigee%20Influx%20on%20Host%20Communities.pdf. Walton, M.  J. (2018, November 6). Religion and violence in Myanmar: Sitaya Sayadaw’s case for mass killing. Foreign Affairs. Available at: https://www. foreignaf fairs.com/ar ticles/burma-­m yanmar/2017-­1 1-­0 6/religion-­ and-­violence-­myanmar. War is Boring. (2018, November 2). Facebook Let Myanmar Perpetrate Genocide: A timeline for horror. Accessed on February 3, 2020. Available at: https:// warisboring.com/facebook-­let-­myanmar-­perpetrate-­genocide/ Word Migration Report notes that there has been an increase in displacement in the subregion due to violence, systemic persecution and marginalisation.

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Migration and migrants: Regional dimensions and developments. Available from: https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2020.pdf. Zarni, M., & Natalie Brinham, N. (2017). Reworking the colonial- Era Indian Peril: Myanmar’s state-directed persecution of Rohingyas and other Muslims. Brown Journal of World Affairs, xxiv(1), 53. (2017–2018). Available at: https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/brownj wa24&div=8&id=&page=

CHAPTER 3

Forced Migration and Human Trafficking: In the Context of Rohingya Refugees in South Asia Md. Sajid Khan and Nurefşan Arslan

Introduction “I’m so sorry, mom and dad... My journey abroad doesn’t succeed,” “Mom, I love you and dad very much. I’m dying because I can’t breathe... Mom, I’m so sorry.”

These were the last massages of 26-year-old Vietnamese Pham Thi Tra My, who lost her life in a shipping container in southeast England last year. There were 10 teenagers among the 39 death, of whom 2 were only 15 years of age (Aljazeera, 2019). Across the world, there are hundreds and

Md. S. Khan (*) Department of Social Work, Hacettepe University, Ankara, Turkey N. Arslan Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Ankara University, Turkey and Expert, Turkish Red Crescent (Türk Kızılay), Ankara, Turkey © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 K. Bülbül et al. (eds.), Rohingya Refugee Crisis in Myanmar, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6464-9_3

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thousands of similar stories of victims like Pham, who are alluringly becoming the victim of human trafficking. The crime of human trafficking is seen as one of the fastest-growing threats by many regional and international governments. This global crime is most lucrative after crimes related to drugs and arms. Almost every country has experienced and been impaired by this global organized crime. The different methodologies in collecting data and the confidentiality of the victims make it difficult to estimate the prevalence and exact number of trafficked persons. However, according to the International Labor Organization (ILO), it is estimated that more than 40 million people are engaged in this modern-day slavery (ILO, 2017). Although trafficking is seen as a global concern by many states and organizations, very few studies are centered on the migration and refugee aspects of human trafficking. This international crime not only prevents social and economic developments but also causes various security concerns for governments, civic bodies, and individuals. Most importantly, it spreads corruption and violence in the community, which causes harm to and threatens international society. Hence, it is not only an issue of human safety but also a matter of global security. The present chapter is an attempt to highlight the relationships and effects of migration and refugees in human trafficking in South Asia. This chapter addresses the ongoing refugee crisis and human trafficking in South Asian Association of Regional Corporation (SAARC) countries, which are one of the most vulnerable states for human trafficking.

The Concept of Human Trafficking Human trafficking is a global issue and often considered as the modern-­ day slavery. Human trafficking is not a new phenomenon but has been existing since the late 1900s. The concept of human trafficking is also a concept of human security. It is a crime that victimizes many people around the world, particularly those from developing and underdeveloped countries. Over the last decade, the global crime of human trafficking has increased. Global estimation of the profit earned from forced labor and human trafficking is more than $150 billion a year (ILO, 2014). Asia Pacific alone accounts for a profit of more than $15 billion (FATF Report, 2018).

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Human trafficking is also often mistaken for “human smuggling,” which it is not. Human trafficking means forcibly and deceptively transferring people for exploitation or sexual abuse, whereas smuggling involves the assisted illegal crossing of borders by any person for gaining any benefits (Skrivankova, 2007). Human smuggling is highly practiced in Westerns countries to gain better life opportunities, whereas, human trafficking is often seen as an eastern phenomenon where there is comparably less economic growth and rapid population growth. However, this does not infer that human trafficking is not a problem in Western countries. Article 3 of the Palermo Convention, UN’s Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, defines human trafficking as follows: Trafficking in Persons as the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices like slavery, servitude or the removal of organs. (United Nations, 2003)

In the context of South Asia, according to the major intra-governmental organization SAARC, in its convention on “Preventing and Combating the Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution,” trafficking “means the moving, selling or buying of women and children for prostitution within and outside a country for monetary or other considerations with or without the consent of the person subjected to trafficking” (SAARC, 2005). According to the Palermo convention, there are three major elements of human trafficking: action, means, and purpose. Action refers to the activity by which traffickers get their potential victims, for instance recruitment, transfer, and harboring of the victims. Means refers to the coercive ways (force, threat, bribe, and torture) that keep the victim under control of the traffickers. And finally, purpose refers to the work made to do with those victims such as sexual exploitation, forced labor, begging, and so on (United Nations, 2019) (see Fig. 3.1).

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Fig. 3.1  Elements of human trafficking. (Source: Prepared by the author)

Action

Human Trafficking Purpose

Means

Methodology This study is based on primary as well as secondary data, which are collected in two parts. The first part is based on analytical and descriptive approaches. The various statistics, reports, research articles, journals, and books are referred to analyze the issue of refugee and human trafficking in South Asia. These literature and data were used to explain the current situations, laws, and policies in various South Asian states. In the second part, authors conducted joint interviews to gain inputs from various Rohingya refugees living in the UK, Canada, the US, and refugee camps of Bangladesh. All the interviews were conducted using online video conferencing App (using Zoom). The researchers used semi-structured questions about refugees’ situation and human trafficking of Rohingya refugees specifically in Bangladesh and other South Asian countries. The interviews were recorded, and, further, transcripts were prepared for analysis. As pointed out by the 2009 report of UNODC on human trafficking, much of the cross-border trafficking activity was between countries of the same general region, which means the neighboring countries (UNODC, 2009, p.  11). Therefore, focusing more on the regional disparities, this chapter will examine the severe issue of human trafficking in South Asian region, which has not been given adequate intention. This chapter will also highlight the laws and policies of the South Asian countries for combating human trafficking. The major focus of this chapter is to investigate the migration approach of the human trafficking. It also concentrates on

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collecting information regarding the various efforts of government and nongovernmental institutions to stop cross-border trafficking in the region. The various state-based laws, legislative measures, and roles of intergovernmental and nongovernmental agencies are analyzed to take the so-called humanity crime into serious consideration. Hence, the purpose of this chapter is to investigate the cases of human trafficking with many perspectives in South Asia region through the conceptual framework.

Human Trafficking: A Deep-Rooted Problem in South Asia There may be some disputes regarding the geoposition of South Asia. Hence, this research considers World Bank’s definition of South Asia, which apparently includes all members of South Asian Association of Regional Corporation (SAARC) (the World Bank, 2019). South Asia, which is also termed as “southern Asia,” is the home of one-fourth of the world population. This region includes eight countries, namely India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, and Maldives. The current humanitarian crisis in South Asia has become an opening to the increase in the trafficking in the region. It is estimated that more than 150,000 people are affected by human trafficking in this region, mostly women and children (Florino, 2018). Globalization and rapid economic growth have brought many positive and negative changes in the South Asian region. It has also caused social, political, demographic, and environmental changes in the region, which have made trafficking different and unique in character. The demand for cheap labor in the area has influenced this alleged transnational organized crime of human trafficking. The women are trafficked for prostitution and men for forced labor (Rahaman, 2015, Kumar 2015). Almost all the eight countries in the region are exacerbated by human trafficking. Many of these countries work as sources, transit, or destination for the trafficking. On the other hand, socioeconomic problems such as poverty and lack of opportunities push poor people to migrate to the neighboring countries illegally, and they get trafficked in that process (see Fig. 3.2). For example, according to the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific (ESCAP), the girls from Bangladesh and Nepal are trafficked to India for forced marriage (Shamim, 2010). Generally, people who are poor, marginalized, and excluded from the opportunities, and

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Fig. 3.2  Human trafficking approaches in South Asia. (Source: Prepared by the author)

Sexual Exploitation Forced Labour

Human Security Human Trafficking Approaches

Organ removal

Migration Others

countries that are under conflict, are primary targets by traffickers (Skrivankova, 2007)). In this region, trafficking is not only a cross-border crime, but many victims are trafficked within the various parts of their country. Studies highlight that trafficking in South Asia is mainly for sexual exploitation and forced labor. However, there is also evidence that South Asian human trafficking has been primarily subjugated to two approaches: prostitution approach and migration approach (Uddin, 2014). According to other experts, South Asian trafficking is not only an issue of prostitution or migration but also an issue of human security (Kumar, 2015). For years, India, which is economically performing better in the region, is the primary destination country for the traffickers. The neighboring countries which are poorer and have structural disparities, like Nepal and Bangladesh, are source for trafficking men and women for cheap labor as well as prostitution and sex work. Interestingly, there are also cases of the so-called Consensual Trafficking from Nepal and parts of India, where many poor parents sell their sons or daughters in exchange of money. However, this type of trafficking is considered as illegal and a criminal act.

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Refugee Crisis: A Ravage to Human Trafficking in South Asia Immigrants and refugees are often the soft targets of this systematic crime. This transnational crime affects dominantly the countries that are struggling with the refugee or migrant problems. When it comes to human trafficking and illegal migration flaw, the Asia and the Pacific region is the most vulnerable geographic region in the world. According to the 2016 Global Slavery Index by Walk Free, around 25 million persons are stuck in modern slavery in the Asia and the Pacific region. This statistic accounts for 62% of the estimated total worldwide (Khidhir, 2019). The ILO (2005) also estimates that around 2.45 million persons are trafficked for forced labor worldwide, out of which 1.36 million (55%) are in the Asia and the Pacific region. Among these, around 45% are children (A Global Alliance Against Forced Labor, 2005). UNHCR in its Global Focus report (2020) pointed out that the number of people of concern in the Asia and the Pacific region was increasing at an alarming rate. They had projected that in 2020 there would be 9.1 million people of concern in the region, which was 11% of the global figure. Furthermore, in the UNHCR’s 2020 planning figure, Asia-Pacific combined accounted for 4.1 million (46%) refugees, 2.4 million (26%) internally displaced persons (IDPs), 1.7 million (18%) stateless persons, 183,000 asylum seekers, and other concern persons 161,000 (2%). However, only 608,000 refugees and IDPs managed to return to their homeland. The data further divides South Asia in the subregions of India, Sri Lanka, and Nepal and projects the persons in concern in these three countries. The projected number of people of concern in the subregions in 2020 was approximately 258,000 people, with UNHCR aiding some 54,000 refugees, asylum seekers, and returnees.

Rohingya Refugee and Human Trafficking in South Asia In South Asia, countries like Afghanistan and Myanmar are the primary source of refugees in the region. The decade-old political crisis in Afghanistan has forced millions to migrate. Afghanistan was the major refugee source country until 2011 when Arakan of Myanmar became a significant party to refugee diffusion. The major neighboring countries,

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which are hosting these refugees, are Pakistan (1.4 million afghans), Iran (1 million afghans), Bangladesh (90,000 Rohingyas), and India (40,000 Rohingyas and 11,000 Afghans) (UNHCR, 2020a). However, the internally displaced persons in the region are estimated to be 2 million in Afghanistan and 128,000 in Rakhine of Myanmar (UNHCR, 2020b). Except for Afghanistan (which signed in 2005), no other nations (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal Bhutan, and Maldives) ratify the Geneva Refugee Convention of 1951 and its protocol of 1967. Yet, this region is home of the world’s significant number of refugees. It is estimated that this region has nearly 3.2 million refugees, mostly from the neighboring countries (Ahmed, 2018). Since 2013, the number of people sold from Nepal into India as victims of trafficking has increased by 500% in four years (De Pablo & Zurita, 2019). Myanmar, which is a part of Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), is also the observer member of SAARC and shares border with India and Bangladesh. The ongoing civil conflict in Arakan (Rakhine) has led many to migrate and take shelter in the neighboring states. Since 2017, the conflicts in Rakhine state of Myanmar worsened. This followed a large refugee influx of Rohingyas into Cox’s Bazar region, about 914,000(OCHA, 2019). The mass movement resulted in a severe humanitarian crisis in the area. Under these severe circumstances, “refugees become more vulnerable to human trafficking.” Most of the time, during this journey of seeking refuge, migrants are at a greater risk of getting trapped by traffickers. It is reported that majority of the Rohingyas are trafficked to South East Asian nations such as Thailand and Malaysia, but a significant number are also trafficked and forced into South Asian countries as well. One of the interviewees mentioned that “they feel really unsafe. Most of the women and the girls are that they are feeling unsafe in the camp. That is the reason they are taking the boat to the Malaysia as is to get into the safe heaven. So the human trafficker always looks for this vulnerable community, they want to convince that these people that you will have the good job, you will have the good earning if you go to the Malaysia. This is the way they are convinced the people who are looking for the better safety” (Respondent 4, 40: 25 mint.). Since all the South Asian countries (SAARC countries) share land borders with each other, it becomes easy to move to and from these countries legally or illegally. Trafficking occurs between typical migrations routes such as from Bangladesh to Nepal or within the region as South Asia to

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South-East Asia or to other locations. It is reported by GAATW and UN ESCAP that 300,000 women from Bangladesh have been sold to India and 200,000 to Pakistan. Moreover, 200,000 women from Nepal have been abused sexually and forced to work in India. Of these abused women, one-fifth are not more than 16 years of age (ILO, 2006). Adding to this, there are also reports of trafficking from the refugee camps and shelter homes of these refugees. The condition of camps and the fear of no future in these camps lead refugees to escape, which ultimately makes them more vulnerable for human trafficking. The camps in Bangladesh are becoming a primary source for identifying and trafficking of children and women for sexual slavery (Karim, 2019). Considering all this, the Rohingya refugees are under a great risk of getting trapped by the traffickers. In April 2020, 396 people were barred from being at sea, and most of them were the Rohingya people. Also, approximately 350 persons were trafficked from Cox’s Bazar area. According to the IPS news, each month there are around six trips, which include trips for human trafficking, to Malaysia alone. About 1500 Rohingyas were victims of trafficking (Islam, 2020). In this concern, one of the Rohingya interviewees from the US stated, “There are some human traffickers, bad elements, there are some people doing illegal trading of contraband, material. So, refuges become often a big security issue for them. And you saw that a boat floating off the coast of Bangladesh in international water, because human traffickers are recruiting people taking money and promising that they will go take them to Malaysia and can land Malaysia and Thailand and came back. So, there is already human trafficking issue going to grow” (Respondent 3, 16:05 mint.). There are also researches and articles on why Rohingya people are taking risks with their lives. Caleb Quinley considered this issue in the New Humanitarian journal. People prefer to take boat journeys while being trafficked. According to the study, 59% of people preferred to take dangerous route on boats between 2018 and 2019 (Quinley, 2020). Our second interviewee, who was born in Bangladesh Refugee camp and is a Rohingya activist in the UK, mentions, “People would risk not freedom Actually, let me rephrase that people would risk the livelihood, people would risk going to jail over going into sea, people would rather be preferred to be stranded on the sea, than stay on land. Why is this because they want to get a better prospect of life. They want to go out and do well

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go to Malaysia go to Australia. And because they have no other rules because they get bored, they have been helpless. They become succumb to these human trafficking” (Respondent 2, 21: 05 mint.). According to a report, about 1700 Rohingya refugees have been held in the custody of Thai authorities in last 17 years (Human Rights Watch, 2013). Moreover, in 2017 Thailand administration punished 62 persons who were trafficking Rohingya refugees including women and girls.

Age and Gender Perspective As reported by ILO (2017), out of 40 million trafficked person 71% accounts for women and girls only (ILO & Walk Free, 2017). The figures also show that 79% of trafficking is done for sexual exploitation and 21% for other purposes. These inconsistencies of numbers could be because cases of sexual trafficking tend to be reported more than forced labor, organ removal, child begging, and so on. However, there is no doubt that women and girls are the most vulnerable and susceptive targets for human trafficking. The practice of bondage labor and forced marriage, demand of human organs, and very high demand of girls in commercial sex industries are some of the major factor of trafficking women and girls in South Asia. By the end of January 2019, among all the refugees and asylum seekers in the Asia and the Pacific, 48% were below 18 years of age (UNHCR, Global Focus, 2020).

Government’s Response of South Asian Countries India India, by far, is the most preferred nation for the traffickers in South Asia. The Government of India is blamed for not upholding the minimum standard for eliminating trafficking. The US Department of States in its annual Trafficking in Persons report also put India in Tier 2 category for doing least to combat this illicit crime. However, India claims making significant efforts to prevent and to safeguard against human trafficking. In this respect, India has signed the UN Convention on Transitional Organised Crime (UNTOC) and its three supplementary protocols in 2011 (UNODC, 2020). It has also ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on 10 April 1979.

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To stop illegal migration, India had, by 2018, granted asylum to 195,891 migrants (Macrotrends, 2020). India has also maintained many domestic laws to protect the victims and punish the traffickers; some of them are “The Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 (ITPA) renamed in 1986, Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976, Protection of Children from Sexual offences (POCSO) Act, 2012, Action Against Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation of Children.” A recent bill, the “Trafficking of Persons (Prevention, Protection, and Rehabilitation) Bill,” which was passed in July 2018 by the lower house of India, claims to protect the victims and control human trafficking in India (Simanti Dasgupta, 2018). This bill classifies specific purposes of trafficking as “aggravated” forms of trafficking. These include trafficking for forced labor, bearing children, begging, and inducing early sexual maturity. Aggravated trafficking attracts a more severe punishment (PRS India, 2019). But critics say that this bill may further become a tool to harass legal sex workers. Additionally, the vast dimension of India and the large-­ scale crime of trafficking committed here make these efforts inadequate and unreliable. Reports state that India needs to increase the prosecution and conviction rates, and more efforts should be put into identifying the victims (refworld, 2018). Pakistan Pakistan at present is hosting world’s second largest refugee population. The country is also making efforts to eliminate human trafficking in the region. The human trafficking laws passed by Government of Pakistan include sexual exploitation and forced labor. However, the government has not succeeded in eliminating human trafficking. Not enough prosecutions are being upheld by the authorities; for example, Punjab is the only province that reports convictions for forced labor. In case of prostitution, the human traffickers are sentenced to 25 years in Pakistan, under Sections 371A and 371B. Section 366A provides punishment of up to 10 years for selling girls. Moreover, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) also offer their assistance to the government by providing information about the victims to police officers (U.S. Departmant of State).

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Bangladesh Bangladesh, like India, also is a signatory of the Prevention and Suppression of Human Trafficking Act, 2012. The region tries its best to eliminate the humanitarian crisis of human trafficking. For example, those Rohingya refugees who have fallen victim to human trafficking receive protection from the government. But still the country’s efforts are not adequate to decrease the rates of human trafficking crime. In 2017, only one person was sentenced. This serious problem was taken into consideration by the government very late. Also, the protection and prevention services are not doing enough for the victims of human trafficking in the country. Because of these inadequate realities, the state remained a Tier 2 country, according to the US report of 2018. Bangladesh recorded 778 cases in 2017, out of whom 496 were under investigation and 196 faced charges. The number of investigated cases in 2016 was 290, out of which 122 were for sexual exploitation and 168 referred to labor cases. Moreover, approximately 700,000 refugees from Rohingya arrived in Bangladesh from Burma. Half of these refugees were women and children. The Bangladesh authorities have not adequately reported total number of prosecuted traffickers (United States Department of State, 2018a). According to the Jahirul Islam, as compared to previous studies, humanitarian crisis in this region has experienced 61% increase. The authorities claim that especially in the borderlines there is an increase in human trafficking (Islam, 2018). Admitting it as a humanitarian crime, the Bangladesh government signed an agreement in 2019 with the UN to join the global fight against human trafficking. Reports suggest that after the adoption of this UN protocol, there is a significant decrease in human trafficking in this country. Nepal On 14 May 1991, Nepal acceded to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and to International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. One of the main problems in Nepal is that the government has not brought into force clear laws concerning exploitation and prostitution. Victims generally are vulnerable to exploitation because the penalties for humiliating humanity are not clear yet. Also, there is a lack of humanitarian services. Moreover, the weak prosecutions have led the government to launch another National

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Action Plan for combating human trafficking of women and children. The action plan included forced labor and sexual abuse. In addition to the action plans implemented by the government, there are also stakeholders such as nongovernmental organizations. One of the comments about how the government works with societies is that there are not enough implementations of the policies (Aronowitz, 2014). In 2017, the Nepalese government joined the international initiative on the global humanitarian concern that effects every nation (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2017). This Global Action to Prevent and Address Trafficking in Persons and the Smuggling of Migrants is encouraged by UNODC and the European Union (EU). Referring to these efforts, the representative of Nepal Ms. Radhika Aryal called the phenomenon as “internal, external and cross-border in nature.” Moreover, she said that the ongoing crime is bringing injustice and brutality to the nations (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2017). Sri Lanka Sri Lanka is also one of the states that take severe precautions against illegal human acts. The country acceded to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment on 3 January 1994, and also to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on 11 June 1980 (Taylor, 2020). Sri Lankan government seeks ways to strengthen the national task force, enhance the institutions to counter this global crime, and find relevant skills in coordination with the governmental agencies. With respect to this, the British High Commission commented on the coordination of combatting human trafficking in the region. “Human trafficking devastates communities. We are working with UNODC and others to better understand the problem across Asia and to develop strong legal, policy and law enforcement responses,” she stated in a meeting (UNODC, 2017). Afghanistan This country has become a source, a transit as well as a destination country for human trafficking. US Agency gives support to Afghanistan government to combat human trafficking. This joint program aims to strengthen the awareness of the global phenomenon and work for the capacity to empower the institutions to effectively prevent regional trafficking. Within

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the training agenda, 2400 officials are educated to fight against global crime. Also, there is an improvement in various academic levels , such as in publishing of annual reports and different kinds of papers. Around 20 million Afghan civilians received messages of trafficking in persons. Also, there is a TIP in Crisis Working Group, which supports the government in need of helping victims of trafficking (USAID, 2019). In 2017, the Afghan government passed a law relating to human trafficking. Also, the Afghan law on the global crime increased the response to human trafficking. Dr. Abdul Basir Anwar, the then justice minister of Afghanistan, said that by bringing an effective society which deals with trafficking will help resolve the humanitarian crisis (IOM, 2018). Maldives The Maldives acceded to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment on 20 April 2004, and to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on 19 September 2006, one of the treaties under United Nations. Maldives is a Tier 2 country which has difficulty in meeting the effective standards in the fight against human trafficking. Around 100,000 known and 60,000 undocumented migrant workers stay in different working sectors. In this country, there is a system that screens Bangladeshi refugees who are forced to work. The immigration authorities follow the system to decrease the number of migrant workers in the borders. Yet the government cannot succeed enough in identifying the victims; therefore, the region is accepted as a Tier 2 country (United States Department of State, 2018c). Bhutan The country is accepted as a Tier 2 country and has child protection departments that provide shelter to people, including women victims. Most of the victims of trafficking in Bhutan are forced to work and are sexually abused. The forced labors include especially young girls and children coming into the country from abroad. The Bhutan government has not joined the UN TIP Protocol, which is essential to combat the crime (United States Department of State, 2018b).

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The Collective Approach of SAARC, BIMSTEC, and BRICS In fighting with the humanitarian crisis around the globe, sustainable international cooperation is very crucial for the striving countries. This cooperation leads the union of states in South Asia to play a vital role in protecting the civilians’ rights and managing the refugees. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) The main purpose of SAARC is to settle “deeper Integration for Peace and Prosperity” (Islam, 2015). The aim of this cooperation is to supply an environment for the citizens of South Asia to facilitate welfare and improve the economic growth in the regions. To address and battle the issue of human trafficking at regional levels, all eight SAARC nations signed the convention on “Prevention and Combating Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution.” Considering the humanitarian agenda of the SAARC, the region hosts around three million refugees. Therefore, the cooperation seeks ways to solve the humanitarian crisis by taking precautions and including action plans relevant to the SAARC members. Relating to the Rohingyas as regional dimension, and considering the mass refugee influx in South Asia, highly effects the economic and social life of residents. The role of the SAARC is to solve the complexity of the phenomenon and find potential regional cooperation (Ahmed, 2018). For instance, in 2017 a total of 389,000 Rohingya refugees crossed the Bangladesh border during August and September. Therefore, it is obvious that there are also unregistered Rohingya refugees in the borders of Bangladesh, which may lead to social crisis locally (UNHCR). Moreover, influx of Rohingya refugees is not only a regional problem but also has an international dimension. These stateless people crossed the border from Myanmar, which is a member of the ASEAN. These local and interlocal cases make the dimension of stateless people crucial for cooperation via SAARC (Ahmed, 2018).

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The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) This union includes partner countries as Bangladesh, Nepal Myanmar, Bhutan, India, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. This initiative was established in 1997 (Bi India Bureau, 2019). This cooperation also highlights the importance of management of illegal migration flow. To highlight this issue, all the members came together in BIMSTEC Coastal Security Workshop, on 20 November 2019, to bring light to humanitarian problems such as human trafficking. During the workshop, human trafficking was regarded as a threat of national security (Siddiqui, 2019). BRICS BRICS is an international cooperation for economic, political, and regional improvement which consists of five member countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. These member states conduct serious services for the civilians (Amiel, 2019). For example, the union brings up new solutions to combat human trafficking in the region. The authorities of the members of BRICS joined in a ministerial meeting to express commitments to prevent human trafficking and illegal migration in Sochi. During the meeting, the declaration’s role was to have a dialogue on the issue of migration policies and to set up relationship between transnational migration and need to discuss the challenges in the field. The BRICS members shared the resolutions on migration issues and deal with the partners (Press Trust of India, 2015). The Role of Civil Society and NGOs in Combating Rohingya Human Trafficking in South Asia The recently recognized epidemic of human trafficking has gained attention and raised consciousness on national and international humanitarian platforms. These platforms, which play a significant role in eradicating the vulnerability of innocent victims, supplying help, and implementing various developments, are the civil societies and NGOs. The civil societies help to address a relevant capacity in victim identification, cooperation, and support. Partnership with civil societies at the local and international levels facilitates the governments and international actors to cooperate and coordinate the cases concerning the exploitation of human dignity. For

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such cases, the National Referral Mechanism provides these efforts to be implemented (Sun-Suon, 2013). South Asian countries have many NGOs which provide technical and training assistance to decrease the rates of human trafficking. These nongovernmental organizations encourage local and international authorities to urgently respond to the criminal justice problem. Estimates show that there is a wide-ranging trafficking of women and girls, who are smuggled from Bangladesh, in India, Bahrain, and Kuwait. In recent years, approximately half a million victims from Bangladesh were trafficked, while 200,000 Nepali women and girls were exploited sexually in India’s trafficking sector (UNICEF, 2004). Civil societies that assist mainly the trafficked victims provide help and are involved in raising public awareness to control the recent draft changes in numbers of trafficked persons. However, being deprived of adequate sources and services the civil societies face several problems and challenges in combatting the modern slavery. The challenges include a lack of local strategy by the NGOs to fight against trafficking. Moreover, only a small number of societies provide safe return or repatriation to the victims. One research uncovered that out of 250 trafficking-focused organizations only 10 are active in repatriation (Yousaf). The first interviewee, one of the Rohingya activists from Bangladesh refugee camp, also criticized work of NGOs on human trafficking “I do not believe the NGO doing properly about the Trafficking issue. I believe government can do something about the trafficking issue and the protection issue. Government should take every part of the protection issue. It should not be handled by NGO, government must be handled that protection issue” (Respondent 1, 32: 20 mint.) However, there are some other organizations that play a vital role and have effective practices that particularly reach the victims. These organizations include Child Line India Foundation, the Nepal Human Rights Commission, Pakistan’s Insar Burney Welfare Trust, Sri Lanka’s Centre for Women’s Research (CENWOR), the Bangladesh Counter Trafficking Thematic Group, and South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). According to the statements of Faisal Yousaf, who is a donor reporting officer for UNHCR Tanzania’s Resource, these organizations have active instruments that provide local and intuitional frameworks for regional response and cooperation. As a vital element of aiding the victims, the civil societies produce reports on the issue especially through SAARC, like the one already active in Nepal (Yousaf). In some parts of the

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world, the NGOs cooperate with the state agency to protect the civilians. For instance, in Nepal the state allows civil societies to set up checkpoints at the border crossings with India. Since several people cross the border due to different reasons, this procedure by the NGO’s controls the illegal acts. The nongovernmental organizations work with specialists to identify the girls who are potential victims of human trafficking (UNODC). Moreover, as the civil societies are useful and effective in preventing human trafficking, they get involved in numerous activities to raise public awareness. Taking these issues into consideration, International Federation Terre Des Hommes published a handbook on preventing human trafficking. This guidebook was written with the help of Mike Dottridge, who spent 15 years focusing on trafficking and visited South East Asia. Having experienced a few cases related to the global crime led the author to share and contribute the ideas in the book (Dottridge, 2007). There are various nongovernmental organizations that work to fight against already increasing human trafficking in this region. One of the main NGOs is called “MOAS.” Migrant Offshore Aid Station (MOAS) was founded by Catrambone family in 2013. Since then, the society has been shifting humanitarian operations focusing on trafficking of Rohingya people. As for Rohingya refugees who were victims of human trafficking, the society set up two aid centers and supplied 40 tons of aid (MOAS, 2020). Another important migration agency that works for the victims is IOM. IOM protects the vulnerable population against trafficking in the region. It responds to Rohingya refugees with the help of 500 Bangladeshi employees (May, 2017).

Conclusion It can be seen that all the states in the South Asia are affected by migration and human trafficking. In this, predominantly women and children have long been exploited for labor or sexual abuse. The influx of migrants puts a lot of extra pressure on these countries, which are already facing various other issue like population explosion, slow economic growth, corruption, poverty, structural disparities, discrimination of minorities, environmental problems, and so on. Most of the anti-trafficking intervention by the governments, NGOs, INGOs, and other donor agencies is basically cantered on supply/demand nexus of trafficking, and stresses on promoting safe migration. As pointed out by Ms. Joy Ngozi Ezeilo (2011), special

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rapporteur on South Asia and Pacific: “There must be a coordinated effort at the regional level to tackle human Trafficking.” Human right-centric approach should be emplaced to deal with the victims of trafficking. Corruption and weak law enforcement further escalate the issue of trafficking. To bring the victims to safety, the region of South Asia also needs to promote awareness about trafficking and successfully enact a strong relevant legislation. There is also a need of special and transparent policies for the refugees and migrants in the region. Change in the attitudes of the people toward migrants is utmost need in the world and in South Asia in particular. Becoming a party to the Global Compact for Migration can open ways for safe and protected migration in South Asia.

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CHAPTER 4

Myanmar Government’s Rohingya Policies and Politics Asif Bin Ali

Introduction The thematic focus of this chapter is on the ethnic and communal dimension of the Rohingya conflict with regard to the Myanmar government’s Rohingya policy and politics in the post–military regime era. Moreover, this study aims to map the underlying causes and dimensions driving the Myanmar state’s policy and politics, including institutional constraints. Moreover, the topic, the Myanmar government’s Rohingya policy, and the politics are both interesting and important for its geopolitical motive as well as the ethnic-communal dimension. Myanmar is a linking point between South Asia and South-East Asia. In addition, Myanmar’s location in the Andaman Sea makes this country an important strategic location between two neighboring countries, namely India and China. Moreover, Myanmar’s neighboring country is Bangladesh, a Muslimmajority country. Given its geographical location, Myanmar’s stability is important in maintaining peace in South Asia and South-East Asia region.

A. B. Ali (*) Department of Media & Communication, Independent University, Bangladesh, Dhaka, Bangladesh © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 K. Bülbül et al. (eds.), Rohingya Refugee Crisis in Myanmar, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6464-9_4

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More importantly, Myanmar’s Rohingya policy and politics may consequently influence the ongoing radical phenomena inspired by radical Islam and subsequently disrupt regional peace and stability. In addition, this topic has ethnic and religious dimensions, and evidence shows that Myanmar has adopted a different approach to handling the Rohingya crisis compared to other ethnic conflicts such as Kachin separatism. While Myanmar’s newly established democratic setup took a balancing position between the interest of the dominant Bamar ethnicity and other ethnic minority groups such as Kachin, it deliberately denied recognizing Rohingya conflict as an ethnic problem, identifying them as “illegal migrants” and framed it as “Muslim problem” (OHCHR, 2018). Moreover, ultranationalist Buddhist activists used Islamophobia to intensify the crisis and gain profit out of electoral politics. In sum, these dimensions make Nay Pyi Taw’s Rohingya politics and policy unique and interesting to study with scholarly treatment. After describing the relevance of this study, we now move on to discuss the contribution of this study. This chapter fits within the border of Myanmar studies concerning Rohingya conflict and Islamophobia. It contributes to academic discussions in the fields of identity politics, nationalism, and communal violence. To resume, the central theme of this chapter is the Myanmar government’s policy and politics toward the Rohingyas between 2010 and 2020. Followed by the 2008 Myanmar Constitution, Nay Pyi Taw experienced a brief period of civilian government during this period; hence, this time is important to study. The end date is chosen because the military takeover overthrew the democratic setup in February 2021. With regard to the problem statement, this chapter is structured following five main sections; therefore, proceed as follows: Firstly, this presents a literature review by looking at the existing literature concerning the Rohingya conflict’s ethnic and communal dimension and government policies. Secondly, it discusses the research design applied for this study. Moreover, it provides the details of the observational and analytical approaches. Thirdly, this chapter moves on to discuss a detailed account of Myanmar’s policy and politics, describing the role and the activities of the legislature and executive branch response to communal and ethnic conflicts. In addition, this section focuses on the Myanmar government’s actions during and after communal riots, which had happened from 2012 to 2020 in the Northern Rakhine state. Fourthly, the discussion section takes a step back from the descriptive findings to discuss relations between events, segments of data, context, and the situation related to the

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literature reviewed before reflecting on the policy significance. Finally, this chapter concludes with a discussion on some shortcomings of this study, followed by some suggestions for future research. Background and Research Question Having described the relevance and theme of this study now, this section presents a brief context of the contemporary Rohingya conflict and presents research questions. Rohingya Muslims are living in Myanmar’s Northern Rakhine state under a “dehumanizing apartheid regime”. They have continuously faced indiscriminate persecution and organized violence in 1978, 1992, 2012, 2015, and 2016 (UNHCR, 2018; OHCHR, 2018; MSF, 2017; Lee, 2014; HRW, 2012, 2013). In 2017, there were fresh attacks on Rohingya Muslims. By August 2018, over 723,000 Rohingya refugees had fled to neighboring Bangladesh (UNHCR, 2018; OHCHR, 2018). The United Nations (UN), considering the intensity of the 2017 Rohingya crisis, called it a “textbook example” of ethnic cleansing (Venkatachalam, 2017). Some scholars argued that the current Rohingya crisis is primarily a consequence of historical circumstances (Ware and Laoutides, 2018; Kipgen, 2013). However, this view can be contested with other groups of scholars who hold this view that the conflict is historical and contemporary infused by Buddhist nationalism and Islamophobia (Ali & Ahmed, 2019; Win & Kean, 2017). Myanmar (former name Burma) introduced a democratic system following the independence from Britain in 1948. Unlike today, Rohingya had full citizenship at that time. They had played a proactive role in Burmese society and participated in nation-building (Win & Kean, 2017). Moreover, the Burma Broadcasting Service (BBS), the state-run radio, aired a program in the Rohingya language (Lee, 2014, p. 325). The situation had dramatically changed by the time the Burmese military junta took over the country and ruled it from 1962 to 2010 (Ali & Ahmed 2019; Win & Kean, 2017). The military regime, aided by ultranationalist Buddhist monks, propagated that the Rohingyas Muslims are “illegal Bengali migrants” (OHCHR, 2018; Win & Kean 2017; Lee, 2014). This view has been manifested in government policy terms, even in the democratic setup. These policies were made to strip away Rohingya Muslim’s civil, political, and economic rights (Win & Kean, 2017; Rogers, 2012; Lee, 2014).

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Myanmar had adopted a multiparty system in 2010 following the 2008 Constitution (Rogers, 2012; Lee, 2014). However, this newly established quasi-civil government in Nay Pyi Taw had a little different view with regard to the Rohingya crisis (Lee, 2014; Brinham, 2012). For instance, Myanmar President Thein Sein delivered a speech in July 2012. He had declared that there is no solution to the Rakhine state’s problem other than sending “illegal Bengali migrants” (read Rohingya) to a third country or containing them in United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) administrated camp (Lee, 2014). Therefore, this is not surprising that the 2012 and 2017 Rohingya persecution happened under the quasi-civil government watch, and those violent attacks should not be viewed in isolation but with regard to the Nay Pyi Taw’s policies and politics. Hence, this study asks one pertinent question: What are the Myanmar government’s significant policies and politics toward the Rohingyas between 2010 and 2020? In that respect, it would be interesting to investigate three sub-questions: (i) why have they made the policy that they have made, (ii) how are those policies enacted, and (iii) how often have they been enacted?

Literature Review This section particularly addresses the reliability problem with scholarships addressing Myanmar’s domestic politics published within and presents a comprehensive, concise, and critical review of some relevant research works concerning Myanmar’s Rohingya policies and politics, ethnic cleansing, and ethnic identity politics. This review has three subsections: (i) Rohingya Conflict’s Ethnic and Communal Dimensions; (ii) Myanmar’s Journey to Democracy; (iii) Ethnic and Religious Representation in the Democratic Arrangement. Overall, this review section seeks to answer what we already know concerning this topic from previous research, that is, which gaps exist in existing research about this topic and how this chapter fits in relation to these previous academic discussions. Moreover, this review does not focus on articles concerning the Rohingyas persecution, as many scholarships have established that (see Ali & Ahmed, 2019; Ware & Laoutides, 2018; Kipgen, 2013), but it focuses on scholarships that address the Myanmar government’s domestic policies and politics toward Rohingyas.

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It is difficult to assess Myanmar’s domestic politics due to the literature’s limitations and unreliability. Since the 1962 military coup, state censorship on publication has contributed significantly to this problem (Steinberg, 2012; Lee 2014, p. 322). Although in 2012 the quasi-civilian government had promised to allow freedom from state censorship to local newspapers, it has not been effectively executed. Moreover, Nay Pyi Taw had established political control over the academic works and publications as all academic and nonacademic productions need to be cleared by the censorship board before being published since 1988 (Steinberg, 2012). This widespread censorship had allowed the Nay Pyi Taw to rewrite history by idealizing the army’s role. Therefore, foreign scholarly research is important to understand and assess Myanmar’s domestic politics despite certain drawbacks (Lee, 2014; Steinberg, 2012). Moreover, Myanmar studies also rely on newspaper reports and analyses published in neighboring countries such as Bangladesh, India, and Thailand (Lee, 2014, p.  322). These countries have more press freedom and high content reliability compared to Myanmar. The Human Rights Watch (HRW) has published two comprehensive reports in 2012 and 2013. These reports could be described as documents of Rohingya persecution history. The HRW (2012, 2013) documents also identified cases of random and arbitrary imprisonment, involuntary work, rape, torture, and exploitations. These descriptions have been endorsed by the Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF, 2017). Altogether these documents (UNHCR, 2018; OHCHR, 2018; MSF, 2017; HRW, 2012, 2013) describe the government’s policy to restrict Rohingya Muslim’s fundamental rights, including liberty, self-determination, free movement, schooling, marriage, and work. However, there is a problem regarding getting details about the domestic policy and politics of the Myanmar government for their censorship and isolationist approach. Hence, this section reviews not only academic work but also works drafted and produced by aid and human rights groups. Rohingya Conflict’s Ethnic and Communal Dimension Violent ethnic conflicts and communal riots are not new in Myanmar (Win & Kean 2017; Lee, 2014). Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts are mainly non-­ Bamar ethnic minority’s armed struggle to achieve greater political autonomy and rights. Meanwhile, communal conflict is mainly between Bamar Buddhists and those Rohingya Muslims considered as South Asian and

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Chinese migrants by the Myanmar state (Cheesman, 2017). Myanmar’s central region’s conflicts are primarily ethnic, while Northern Rakhine state’s conflict has religious and ethnic dimensions (Lee, 2014). The underlying causes of these conflicts can be traced back to the British colonial policy of free migration (Ware & Laoutides, 2018; Kipgen, 2013; Taylor, 2009, p. 177; Yegar, 1972). This policy attracted migrants from the Indian subcontinent and China to Myanmar, previously known as Burma. These migrations had led to create hostilities and tension between the local and the migrant groups and triggered extended violent riots. Similarly, these conflicts had also continued periodically in post-­ independent Burma on religious and communal lines (Win & Kean, 2017, p. 420). However, ethnic and religious insurrections are treated otherwise by the Myanmar government and media (Taylor, 2009). Rakhine state, home of migrants from South Asia, has land and sea borders with Bangladesh. It has two primary ethnic and religious groups (Lee, 2014). They are Buddhist Arakanese, also known as Rakhines, and Rohingya Muslims. Rohingya ethnic community is the majority group in the Northern Rakhine state, and Rakhine Buddhists are the minority ethnic-­religious group. Rakhine Muslims, who want to be identified as Rohingyas, do not have citizenship rights. They cannot own land legally and cannot leave the state without permission (Win & Kean, 2017; Lee, 2014; Rakhine Inquiry Commission 2012, pp.  58–59). Win and Kean (2017) argue that Rakhine Muslim’s aspiration to be identified as Rohingya ethnic community has been denied by the union government and the majority Bamar community. The Thein Sein government insisted on identifying this group as “Bengali”. Myanmar’s official narrative is that these people, demanding to be identified as Rohingyas, have recently migrated from Bangladesh (Win & Kean, 2017, pp.  422–423; Kipgen, 2013, p. 300). In contrast to the Rohingya ethnic identification claim, not all Muslims living across Myanmar demanded to be identified as separate ethnic groups (Win & Kean, 2017). Hence, there are different policies for non-Rakhine Muslims who are living across Myanmar. These Muslims have received official identification as Bamar Muslims with citizen rights (Win & Kean, 2017). Nevertheless, officially Myanmar identifies Rohingyas as “illegal Bengali immigrants” from Bangladesh (Kipgen, 2013, p. 300), and recognizes Rohingya conflict as a communal conflict, not an ethnic conflict (OHCHR, 2018). Hence, the Myanmar state follows a different set of policies to deal with the crisis.

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Buddhist Arakanese always finds themselves in conflict with the Muslim Rohingyas in the Rakhine state (Kipgen, 2013, p. 300). As an ethnic group Arakanese demanded independence from Myanmar. They also consider Rakhine Muslims as “Bengali” intruders from neighboring Bangladesh. This view has been endorsed by the military government (Kipgen, 2013). The government’s deliberate campaigns pushed more than two million Rohingya Muslims across the boundaries into neighboring Bangladesh in 1978 and 1991 (Lee, 2014). By enacting the 1982 National Citizenship Law, the government identified 135 national, ethnic groups but excluded Rohingya Muslims from the list (Lay, 2009). Consequently, civil rights that Rakhine Muslims had enjoyed before the coup were eroded (Win & Kean, 2017; Lee, 2014). Because of these policies, Rohingyas, Myanmar’s most illiterate and backward ethnic community, are jobless and homeless (Lay, 2009, p.  58; Lee, 2014, p.  326). The ultranationalist Buddhists have capitalized on this Rohingya image. Myanmar’s Journey to Democracy Some scholars are optimistic regarding Myanmar’s relatively new democratic setup, constitution, and legislature (Win & Kean, 2017; Cheesman, 2017; Egreteau, 2014; Williams, 2014; Taylor, 2009). Some scholars mainly focused on the refugee crisis and democratic transition (Win & Kean, 2017; Cheesman, 2017). However, they have given less focus to link this optimism for democracy with the complicated Rohingya crisis and the recent rise of ultranationalism in Myanmar (Cheesman, 2017). Myanmar has been through a remarkable change in terms of politics and economy under the military-backed civilian government since 2010 (Cheesman, 2017; Egreteau, 2014; Williams, 2014). The most critical transition was the journey from direct military rule to a quasi-civilian government. This journey started with making a constitution in 2008, followed by establishing the national legislature in 2011 (Cheesman, 2017; Egreteau, 2014; Williams, 2014). In this new democratic setup, both the constitution and the legislature have played an important role in checking and balancing the executive authority and forming policies (Win & Kean, 2017). This transition process had been tested by ethnic and communal violence and periodical riots between Rakhine Buddhists (Arakanese) and Rohingyas in the Rakhine state. Overall, the national legislation played a prominent role in the reform process (Win & Kean, 2017) but not

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adequate to tackle ethnic conflicts with the communal dimension, particularly in the Rakhine state. It has also been observed that on several occasions legislatures themselves contributed to the communal outbreak against Rohingyas with their actions (Win & Kean, 2017, p. 414). Having described Myanmar’s journey from military rule to civilian government, now we move on to discuss some scholarships (Hlaing, 2012; Lee, 2014) that have studied Myanmar’s democratic setup, nature, strength, and limitation. It is essential to understand the role of Myanmar’s legislature and the relationships between the executive branch and the legislative branch to address Nay Pyi Taw’s Rohingya policies and politics. Myanmar’s legislative assembly is known as the Pydaungsu Hluttaw (the Assembly of the Union). The 2008 Myanmar Constitution established this multiparty assembly on January 31, 2011 (Win & Kean, 2017, p.  414). However, the Pydaungsu Hluttaw has two houses, namely Amyotha Hluttaw (House of Nationalities/the upper house/224 seats) and the Pyithu Hluttaw (House of Representatives/the lower house/440 seats) (Win & Kean, 2017). There was no assembly in Myanmar since the 1962 military takeover (Lee, 2014). Moreover, the military regime was in power since September 1988. Pydaungsu Hluttaw was established to ensure military influence in the legislature as they wanted to maintain their power even in the democratic setup (Win & Kean, 2017; Lee, 2014). Similarly, the 2008 National Constitution favors the military openly as it allows them to appoint 25% unelected representatives in both houses of the legislature (Lee, 2014; Williams, 2014). It provides excessive influence and power to the hand of the executive. This has also ensured a firm control of the government over Pydaungsu Hluttaw. However, despite these drawbacks, the Pydaungsu Hluttaw has exerted some form of autonomy in policymaking (Win & Kean, 2017). The question is how essential Pydaungsu Hluttaw is to balance contesting ethnic interests in multiethnic and multireligious Myanmar. For instance, the Karen National Union was fighting for autonomy in Myanmar since 1949. Myanmar state has faced armed opposition not only by the Karen but also by Kachin, Shan, Chin, and Wa (Rogers, 2012; Lee, 2014). In 2016, Myanmar had 50 ethnic armed groups, of which 20 groups are relatively stronger and 30 groups are small. Altogether they have collected tens of thousands of armed members (Win & Kean, 2017, p. 419). These groups were mainly fighting against the dominant political and cultural interest of the majority Bamar ethnicity. Considering these

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facts, Farrelly (2014, p. 252) argues that the 2008 National Constitution attempted to balance the ethnic minority’s political interest. Hence, the Pydaungsu Hluttaw is essential to resolve ethnic conflicts (Win & Kean, 2017, p. 419). This balancing approach is also evident in the Pydaungsu Hluttaw formation, where duties and responsibilities are being outlined in the constitution. Moreover, Myanmar has 14 major administrative provinces and states. All these major administrative blocks have their regional assembly, namely Region Hluttaw. Seven of them are dominated by the minority group. Though the Region Hluttaw has given some legislative power, it is a weaker institution than the union-level legislature (Win & Kean, 2017, pp. 419–420). The Amyotha Hluttaw has an equal number of legislatures as the Bamar dominant provinces, and this could be an example of balancing interest between ethnic majority Bamar and other ethnic minority interests (Farrelly, 2014). Some scholars studied (Mezey, 1983; Barkan, 2009) the role of legislatures and emerging democracies. However, the role of legislatures in conflict management in Myanmar has received less scholarly attention. Win and Kean (2017) and Chit focus on Myanmar’s specific case, and they argue that legislature is important as a symbol of democracy and could successfully accommodate conflicts in a political system. Furthermore, they state that the legislature could be considered an important milestone of Myanmar’s road to democracy. However, the presence of legislature in Myanmar does not necessarily indicate that this country is a democratic country (Win & Kean, 2017, p. 414). It is imperative to observe how Myanmar’s legislature functions and to whom it serves. Previous studies (Mezey, 1983; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006; Barkan, 2009) have shown that the legislature’s function varies significantly in democracies and semi-democracies. Win and Kean (2017) identifies Myanmar as a semi-democratic country, and in this type of country, as Mezey (1983) and Barkan (2009) argue, the legislature often serves to mobilize cooperation, prevent rebellion within the ruling block, and provide a platform for distributing state profit. Similarly, Gandhi and Przeworski (2006, p.  21) argue that while seeking to secure legitimacy and authority, a semi-democratic country’s legislatures serve the ruling class’s interest. Another role of the legislature is accommodating conflicts. Gandhi and Przeworski (2006, pp.  21–24) argue that legislature, in an ideal situation, institutionalizes and accommodates conflicts that may produce unrest, cause instability, and promote violence in the wider

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community. Similarly, lawmakers are responsible for presenting the demand of their constituents inside the house. Moreover, they will be judged on their performance at the election. Therefore, it is likely that they would be more receptive to public sentiment and view than a bureaucracy. O’Brien et al. (2008) argue that legislatures, both directly and indirectly, can play a constructive role by deploying legislative tools. Similarly, legislatures can contribute to conflict prevention by providing space for inclusive dialogue in the lawmaking process and can promote a culture of cooperation among lawmakers. Finally, it may carry out its check and balance role to make the government more accountable. In contrast to that, some scholars hold a more pessimistic view and argue that in conflict resolution the legislative role is minimal. Moreover, it possibly exacerbates conflict and hatred (Smilov & Kolarova, 2006). Nationalism and majoritarianism often trap the legislature. As Smilov and Kolarova (2006) observed, in a conflict-prone country the legislature is a forum for identity politics. Similarly, majoritarianism allows the legislature to be ruled by the majority, and often these bodies become the source of conflict provocation. Besides these contested views, some scholars argue that legislatures can provide space to voice an opinion in favor of victims of conflicts and minority groups, regardless of their competency (Freeman, 2004). In contrast, empirical evidence in favor of these consensuses is also mixed. Notably, in Australia, the legislative assembly played a vital role in the “reconciliation process with aboriginal people” (Freeman, 2004, p. 13). In contrast to that, the legislative body played a proactive role in escalating the conflict in Lebanon civil war (Win & Kean, 2017, p. 414). To get back to the point, in both cases, the legislature provided an advantage to the majority while left the minority in a vulnerable situation. Win and Kean (2017) examine how Myanmar’s newly formed legislature responded to communal violence in the first term from January 2011 to January 2016 by critically exploring the role of speakers, institutional constraints, and public pressure to adopt legislation policies. Focusing on the Myanmar state’s action with regard to 2012 and 2014 communal conflict in the northern Rakhine state, they have argued that, despite some relative success to mitigate ethnic conflict in some areas, the legislature has failed to react proactively to stop violence against the Muslims in the Rakhine state. In short, what has been established so far is that Myanmar is a semi-­ democratic or quasi-democratic country. The classical understanding of the legislature is that the legislative would represent public sentiment and

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opinion. The legislature of a semi-democratic country would be serving ruling elites. Moreover, it can be argued, Myanmar’s ruling elites and the public are both influenced by ultranationalist Buddhist activism, and the legislature would not function as a beacon of hope for the persecuted minority communities but an accommodation place of majoritarianism in the cost of minority interest. Ethnic and Religious Representation in the Democratic Arrangement Ethnic Burmans, also known as Bamars, constitute 65% of the country’s population (Myanmar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012). Bamar is the dominant ethnicity. They are mostly Theravada Buddhists (Steinberg, 2010). The remaining population is divided among several ethnic groups. Most of these ethnic groups, recently or previously, demanded independence. Only 4% of the country’s population are Muslims, and 4% are Christians. However, the Economist (2007, p. 48) and the US government (CIA) reports claim that Myanmar’s statistics on the Muslim population are an almost-certainly underrepresented number. Myanmar’s 4.5% population is ethnic Rakhine, also identified as Arakanese. They are predominantly Buddhists, like Bamar, but they separately identify themselves from the Bamar ethnicity. On the other hand, Rakhine state is dominated by two major religious and ethnic groups. Rakhines, who are Buddhists and Muslims, want to be identified as Rohingyas ethnicity. It is estimated that Rakhine’s Rohingya population was approximately one million (Brinham, 2012; Kipgen, 2013). There is no real number of the Rohingya population because Nay Pyi Taw does not consider them citizens; therefore, they were not included in the national survey conducted in 1983 (Kipgen, 2013). There is no doubt that there is a significant reliability crisis of Myanmar government data regarding the Rohingya population. Nonetheless, they are useful because they estimate the size of ethnic groups living in Myanmar. Considering population dimension, Egreteau (2014, p. 91) has taken the approach of looking at the lawmaker’s profile, explaining the situation better. Up to 2016, Myanmar’s lawmakers are primarily men in their mid-50s. The majority of the lawmakers belong to Bamar ethnic community, while they are predominantly Buddhists. Having attained university education in Myanmar, they are often involved with business or come from education and/or military service. Majority of the lawmakers are from the Bamar community. Some lawmakers come from ethnic

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minority groups because the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) recruited many leaders from ethnic minority communities. In addition, with 2 minor Bamar parties, 13 ethnic parties had secured onesixth seats in Pydaungsu Hluttaw (Win & Kean, 2017, p.  419). These lawmakers had relatively allowed ethnic grievances to be accommodated in the Pydaungsu Hluttaw through debates and votes. Then why have Rohingyas’ grievances not been accommodated? Myanmar’s constitution does not ensure just representation of all ethnic groups based on the number of populations. Electoral laws and constitutional arrangements only favor ethnic communities that are recognized as minority communities (Lee, 2014). Rohingyas are not a recognized ethnic minority. They are mostly identified as “Rakhine Muslims” or “illegal Bengalis”. More importantly, a serious imbalance can be observed in terms of lawmakers’ ethnic as well as religious orientation in the first and the second legislature (Lee, 2014). For instance, in the first legislative assembly majority of members were from the Bamar ethnicity, who are predominantly Buddhists (Win & Kean, 2017, p. 420). In sum, in the first post-electoral system, the majority of the lawmakers were Buddhists, while ethnically majority members were from the Bamar ethnicity. In addition to this, Christians were overrepresented in relation to the total population, where Muslims were underrepresented. Similar was the case with the second legislation as well. Moreover, lawmakers were less interested in discussing policy concerning the communal clash (Win & Kean, 2017, p. 420). Win and Kean (2017), unlike Lee (2014), argue that limited freedom and democracy had some positive results in Myanmar state policy. For example, ethnic lawmakers helped reduce hostilities regarding the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). Moreover, the government had launched a television channel that aired in minority languages. Similarly, the state had allowed teaching ethnic language in state-run schools as an extracurricular activity. It has passed the “Race and Religion Protection Laws” in 2014, which mandates forming an ethnic affairs ministry. However, Amnesty International (AI) (2018) and the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) (2015) have criticized this law for setting out the potential for discrimination on religious grounds. Overall achievements on the ethnic issue in the legislature are marginal compared to the actions and interventions by the executive branch. For instance, the executive branch led the peacebuilding process with the ethnic minorities only, while lawmakers have played minimal roles (Win & Kean, 2017, p 407).

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So, in summary, what has been established about Myanmar’s ethnic and religious identity conflict issue is that it is complex. The above-reviewed scholarships have attempted to understand this interplay. To conclude, the Arakanese and Rohingya conflict in the Northern Rakhine state of Myanmar has ethnic and communal dimensions (Win & Kean, 2017; Lee, 2014; Steinberg 2012). Political relationships between the Buddhist and Muslim communities are central to understanding Myanmar’s government policy and politics. Moreover, Myanmar has made a journey from military government to a quasi-civilian system of democratic government (Lee, 2014, p. 322). This has brought significant change in Myanmar’s approach to solve ethnic conflict with other ethnic minorities (Win & Kean, 2017), while the Rohingya conflict has been overlooked for its religious and ethnic dimension.

Methodology Epistemologically, this study takes a constructivist approach followed by qualitative methodology and connecting analysis of textual data. In this open-ended exploratory design, purposively selected and sampled qualitative (interpretive) textual content have been used. This design is appropriate because prediction can neither be generated nor be confirmed from the reviewed literature. Therefore, a general theory to understand the context of the events should be formulated instead of testing a theory. Reports compiled and disseminated by the Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2012, 2013), Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) (2017), Office of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) (2018), and the fact-finding report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) (2018) have been analyzed for this chapter. Firstly, this chapter “categorized” the textual content used as data for this study and, secondly, applied “connecting strategies” to understand and explain the specific events concerning the Rohingya crisis and the Nay Pyi Taw’s policies instead of developing a general theory. Therefore, for analyzing, this study has applied narrative structure and contextual relationship. Moreover, during the time of reading textual contents, capturing analytical thinking, and stimulating analytic insights about the content, regular “memos” (Maxwell, 2005, pp.  97–99) were documented and used while categorizing and analyzing data. In the data analysis process, firstly, textual data have been organized into broader categories and themes. By taking a descriptive approach

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(Maxwell, 2005, pp. 97–99), this chapter has used “substantive categories” developed inductively through a close “open coding” of the textual data. Categories are taken from textual content’s own words and concepts based on a description of what is going on in Myanmar concerning Rohingya crisis. They are generally called “emic” categories. In addition to that, this study has used these categories as section headings to present findings and analysis. This approach could be used to develop a more general theory of what is going on instead of depending on the theory while it is important because many concepts and ideas may not fit into the existing organizational or theoretical categories. Hence, with a substantial quantity of data, “substantive categories” were effectively made to fit those concepts and ideas in a descriptive essay (Maxwell, 2005, pp. 97–99). This study is based on the “connecting analysis” approach (Maxwell, 2005, pp. 97–99) that attempts to identify relationships among the different elements of the text dealing with the Rohingya crisis and the Myanmar government’s policies. Instead of looking for similarities in those textual data, the focus has been on the relationship that connects textual data segments and events within a context into a coherent whole. Although this approach effectively understands specific situations (Maxwell, 2005, pp.  97–99), such as the Myanmar government’s Rohingya policies and politics, it cannot develop a more general theory of what is going on in Myanmar regarding the Rohingya crisis.

Myanmar Government’s Rohingya Policy and Politics This section presents the Myanmar government’s Rohingya policy and politics by providing event-specific examples. Moreover, it argues that inspired by Islamophobia, ethnic Bamars accused Muslims of extremism, while Muslims accused Bamars and Arakanese Buddhists of ultranationalism. These contesting narratives have dominated electoral politics of Myanmar. Subsequently, there were significant policies targeting Rohingya Muslims from 2010 to 2015, which contributed to the 2012 and 2017 violence against Rohingyas. This section provides a brief description of the 2012 bill to amend the 1982 National Citizenship Law, which removed the Temporary Registration Card (TRC) validity, also known as White Card holders’ citizenship rights. Furthermore, it provides a short account of the political consequences of this policy as, in 2014, the Election Commission (EC) ordered all political parties to suspend party members with “White Cards”.

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Likewise, it also discusses the 2014 referendum to amend the 2008 National Constitution, which had revoked “White Card” holders’ voting rights. More importantly, this section presents the political context of ultranationalist Buddhist monk Ashin Wirathu’s anti-Muslim propaganda and formation of MaBaTha to pressure the government to pass four laws (Amyosaun Ubade) concerning interfaith marriage, conversation, polygamy, and population control. Revoking White Card Holders’ Citizen Rights A USDP lawmaker, in 2012, proposed amending the 1982 Citizenship Law. Despite being a controversial law, this provides full citizenship to the “national races”. The ethnic community that had settled in Myanmar before 1824 are recognized as “national races”. The year has been marked as British had occupied Myanmar in that year. This amendment sparked an intense debate, and it has never been discussed again in Pydaungsu Hluttaw’s five-year term. Besides that, a violent conflict erupted in the Rakhine state, and in the second half of 2012 the violence was at its peak (Win & Kean, 2017, p. 423). Considering the Rakhine conflict, speakers had sensibly stage-managed the debates. This time, there was a positive degree of receptiveness from the legislature, but this debate did not appeal to public attention in the absence of media reporting. It happened because state media had given little coverage to this debate. The Rakhine Nationalities Development Party (RNDP), an ethnic Rakhine party, led by Aye Maung, in 2013 submitted an amendment draft (OHCHR, 2018). This bill suggested eliminating the rights of naturalized and associated citizens of Myanmar. People who had the Temporary Registration Card (TRC) were considered as naturalized and associate citizens. This card was also called the “White Card”. This card was issued and distributed among Rakhine Muslims by the former military regime of the early 1990s. Rohingyas, who had documents confirming their citizenship, received this card (OHCHR, 2018). The RNDP was not satisfied with this card for Rohingyas. Therefore, they deliberately targeted Rakhine Muslims while drafting bills. The debate regarding this bill has become a substantial source of communal tension and violence in the Rakhine state (OHCHR, 2018). However, despite several debates, this bill was passed in September 2014, and White Card holders’ civil rights were snatched (UNHCR, 2018).

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Banishing White Card Holders from Political Parties Following the 2014 amendment, the Union Election Commission (UEC) issued an order to expel “White Card” holders from all political parties. The NLD expelled 8000 “White Card” holder party leaders. However, some members were reaccepted once they received citizenship papers. This bill, as intended by the RND, had caused a substantial effect on Muslim-controlled parties. For instance, one small Muslim party expelled 1000 members (Win & Kean, 2017). The RND also presented modifications to eliminate the “White Card” holders’ voting rights (OHCHR, 2018; UNHCR, 2018). The 2008 National Constitution Amendments: Canceling Voting Rights There was another bill submitted to the legislature in November 2014. This bill was regarding holding a referendum to pass amendments to the 2008 Constitution. Though the draft bill offered rights to provisional citizens to vote, the NLD proposed removing this provision. The lawmakers had settled to delete the provision. The bill was sent to President Thein Sein for signing. Instead of signing this bill, the president sent it back with a recommendation to reinstate “White Card” holders’ voting rights. In a surprise move, with the support of the military lawmakers, the president’s recommendation was accepted by the legislature. Subsequently, ultranationalists organized protests in the Rakhine state as well as in the capital Nay Pyi Taw and Yangon. With the public support, Rakhine lawmakers led the movement in the legislature to cancel “While Card” completely (UNHCR, 2018; OHCHR, 2018; MSF, 2017). On February 11, 2015, a black day for Rohingya Muslims, the president officially announced that from May 31 White Card would be unveiled. Five days later, on February 16, Myanmar Constitutional Tribunal (MCT) removed a temporary card holder’s citizenship. Though this amendment was overwhelmingly condemned by the international community, with this formal verdict by the MCT, White Card holders lost their voting rights and became stateless overnight (UNHCR, 2018; OHCHR, 2018; MSF, 2017). This amendment targeted Rakhine Muslims (UNHCR, 2018; OHCHR, 2018; MSF, 2017), and the consequence of this policy was far-­ reaching and devastating for them. Rohingyas, with White Card, lost their

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citizenship with their political rights. The UEC refused to approve most Muslim candidates’ applications to contest, even including one sitting lawmaker. Likewise, they had lost their political influence in the November 2015 election. Besides, there was strong public support for this amendment. Myanmar justified this action because the legislature represents the people’s voice, and people supported this. Nevertheless, it is also a fact that the legislature has failed to balance popular sentiment with both Myanmar’s enduring interest and international demand (Lee, 2014). State Verification Program Rakhine Muslims received White Cards before the 2010 election to vote. Now they felt betrayed and even more isolated (Win & Kean, 2017, p. 427). Because of revoking of citizenship and voting rights, Rohingyas lost their only channel in the legislature through which they could air their concerns and work for their interest within the legal framework. However, the Thein Sein government had launched a fast-track verification program in 2014 for those who had lost their citizenship but could provide acceptable proof (UNHCR, 2018; OHCHR, 2018; MSF, 2017; HRW, 2012, 2013). There was severe public opposition to the program as well, and, consequently, it was suspended for some time. The NLD government, shortly after taking office, restarted the program in three Rakhine townships. Eligible individuals would receive a temporary identity document, and by clearing the full assessment procedure, they could receive naturalized or associate citizenship (UNHCR, 2018). However, there are numerous difficulties for the Muslims to regain citizenship through this course. The government announced that citizenship applicants could not identify themselves as “Rohingya”. Nay Pyi Taw considered “Rohingya” identity as “emotive” and “politicized” (Win & Kean, 2017, p. 427). However, applicants were allowed to identify themselves as “Muslims in Rakhine”. Ultranationalists organized a public protest in Rakhine and Yangon and condemned the “Muslim in Rakhine” identity as they wanted to identify Rohingya Muslims as illegal “Bengali” (UNHCR, 2018; OHCHR, 2018; MSF, 2017; HRW, 2012, 2013). The military government has provided the White Card and the right to vote for Rohingyas to serve their political interest. It did little to solve the identity issue of the Rohingya Muslims. This also led to resentment and increased tension in the Rakhine state. On the other hand, Rakhine Buddhists can launch large public protests, unlike Rakhine Muslims. These

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protests broadly influenced the legislature and government to enact policies. Ultimately, the government did not offer any lasting resolution to end the Rohingya conflict. Moreover, the government had rejected political rights to vote and participate in state-building to nearly eight million people (UNHCR, 2018; OHCHR, 2018; MSF, 2017; HRW, 2012, 2013). “Amyosaun Ubade”: Four Major Laws The second major package to strengthen the already-existing communal division emerged in 2013. This time political vehicles were different. It was led by the ultranationalist Buddhist monk Ashin Wirathu (UNHCR, 2018; OHCHR, 2018; MSF, 2017; HRW, 2012, 2013). He released a plan regarding interfaith marriage, which proposed the religious conversion of a non-Buddhist man to Buddhism. As per this plan, if a non-­ Buddhist man wanted to marry a Buddhist woman, he needed to convert to Buddhism. Despite criticism from human rights advocates (UNHCR, 2018; OHCHR, 2018; MSF, 2017; HRW, 2012, 2013), this plan received widespread support from many groups in Myanmar. Ashin Wirathu received widespread support from other ultranationalist monks. He had established a body identified as MaBaTha. This group proposed four laws concerning interfaith marriage, religious conversion, polygamy, and population control (Lee, 2014). These four-law proposals are collectively known as “Amyosaun Ubade”, addressing “race and religion”. MaBaTha body had submitted these proposals to the government in 2013. Islamophobia was the driving force of these monks, and, most importantly, following a nationalist line of argument, they had presented their proposal to the public as an act to save the future of Buddhism and the Bamar race from alleged Muslim expansion. These Buddhist monks had created public pressure over the government, and President Thein Sein had forwarded a note to parliament speaker Shawr Mann to consider the plan as a bill in the parliament. However, it was a sensitive issue, and, therefore, the speaker had invited several party leaders for a closed-door assembly. Neither USDP nor NLD commented on the proposed bill considering the public support for it. Instead of opposing, political parties had asked the government to rewrite the bill. The regime had formulated a committee and assigned them to prepare the Religious Conversion Law and Population Control Law. Similarly, the Union Supreme Court had been assigned to draft the Interfaith Marriage Law and Monogamy Law. All the bills were finally

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presented in the parliament on December 1, 2014. The legislature passed all four bills in 2015, and were enacted by the president immediately (UNHCR, 2018; OHCHR, 2018; MSF, 2017; HRW, 2012, 2013). Some scholars argue that these laws are less radical than the original draft proposed by MaBaTha (Win & Kean, 2017). The parliament has seemingly addressed MaBaTha-led ultranationalist Buddhist Bamars’ concern to avoid further tension and violence. The other side of this argument is that these laws have directly contributed to communal conflicts (UNHCR, 2018; OHCHR, 2018; MSF, 2017). Furthermore, there is compelling evidence that these laws were enacted to target Muslims, particularly Rohingyas, with public support. AI and ICJ (2015) had condemned these laws as discriminatory and warned the Myanmar government regarding further outbreaks and human rights violations. The Second Wave of Ethnic Cleansing and Repatriation Myanmar military had started its second wave of ethnic cleansing operation on August 25, 2017 (Catrambone, 2019). More than 700,000 Rohingya had escaped to Bangladesh. Since then, Myanmar is under pressure from the international community to support Rohingyas’ repatriation (UNHCR, 2018; OHCHR, 2018; MSF, 2017; HRW, 2018). Myanmar government is supposed to ensure a “safe condition” for “dignified and voluntary” return. Myanmar has agreed to take back over 77,000 individuals in two years. To receive Rohingyas from Bangladesh, Myanmar has built two reception centers and a provisional site near the Myanmar Bangladesh border line (ABC, 2018). However, the returning process is still uncertain (Quadir & Nebehay, 2018). Moreover, in December 2019 the ICJ heard arguments presented by Gambia and Myanmar with regard to violence against Rohingya Muslims. Against the Gambian request, the ICJ ordered the Myanmar government to do everything to protect Rohingyas from future atrocities and asked to submit semiannual reports regarding the government’s actions (Fink, 2020). However, Myanmar was supposed to have an election by the end of 2020. Nevertheless, the situation had changed as the military seized power by overthrowing the government on February 1, 2021. This had made the situation worse for Rohingyas as Myanmar was at the brink of civil war. In the coming days, identity politics will play a significant role in Myanmar’s domestic politics. Moreover, military rule would push Myanmar further away from introducing inclusive policies.

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Discussion The policies mentioned above and political events show that ultranationalists influenced lawmakers and the government to enact policies as per their demand. Although the NLD has handled the pressure better than its predecessors (Win & Kean, 2017; Cheesman, 2017), it is not enough. In the electoral system, ultranationalist groups such as MaBaTha were proactive in deceiving and influencing politicians to pass laws and policies followed by ultranationalist and anti-Muslim agendas. In the presence of such an ultranationalist movement, neither lawmakers nor the government could afford to be seen as pro-Muslims (Lee, 2014). Similarly, there will be members who would use a communal line to gain advantages in electoral politics. For instance, in the 2015 election the USDP and NLD took advantage of race and religion-related issues and conflicts (Lee, 2014). Moreover, the NLD accused the USDP of exploiting communal conflicts between Buddhists and Muslims to target their candidates during the election campaign. Besides notable ultranationalist activists, Bamar Buddhist monks and MaBaTha members attended party rallies (Win & Kean, 2017; Cheesman, 2017). More often, individual candidates adopted this strategy to support four laws to “save” the “nation and religion” rather than the party. To counter USDP’s focus on issues concerning Islam, the NLD abstained from supporting any Muslim candidates in the election (Win & Kean, 2017; Cheesman, 2017). For instance, Aung San Suu Kyi, the former leader of Myanmar, had received different labeling from home and abroad (Lee, 2014). While the international community accused Suu Kyi of not acting responsibly to the violence led by the ultranationalists against Rohingya Muslims (Lee, 2014), she was domestically accused by USDP members of being pro-Muslim for her very few statements (Win & Kean, 2017). Moreover, ultranationalists had accused her of not doing enough in favor of the nation. In summary, public sentiment aroused by the communal violence fueled by the ultranationalist movement made it politically risky for politicians even for Suu Kyi to be neutral to form policy considering human rights (Win & Kean, 2017; Cheesman, 2017; Lee, 2014). In such a dire political condition, it is difficult for the Myanmar government to do anything that could support the Muslim community. Those who have tried to play a responsible role in reducing tension have been labeled as pro-Muslim. It is a tremendous personal and political risk for them. For instance, during the Meiktila riot NLD lawmaker Win Htein

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tried to save a madrasa from Buddhist mobs. He has been given the nickname “Hajji” and declared a “Muslim lover” by some of the angry constituents (Win & Kean, 2017, p. 431). Similarly, an NLD lawmaker was enforced to apologize for criticizing the draft Interfaith Marriage Law in 2013. NLD official Htin Lin Oo was accused of insulting Buddhism by the ultranationalists and was given 2 years prison sentence. Neither NLD nor Suu Kyi issued any public statement, and he has been stripped of his party position (Win & Kean, 2017, p. 431). Myanmar’s newly democratic government and all political parties rely upon electoral support. They have to be mindful that Myanmar’s 65% population is ethnic Bamar compared to 4.5% Muslims (Lee, 2014). This figure demonstrates why the civilian government continued the military government’s policy of persecuting Rohingyas because they could not afford to lose the support of ethnic Bamars and Arakanese Buddhists in the election. Their silence is political pragmatism considering electoral politics. This political pragmatism should not essentially be considered as a wonder but a reality. Furthermore, many Rakhines consider that a large number of the Muslim populations in Rakhine state is an existential threat to the Rakhine Buddhists. The RNDP’s agenda is to promote this belief (OHCHR, 2018) that Rakhine Buddhists will be displaced by the Muslims coming from Bangladesh. Therefore, RNDP’s “raison d’etre” was to reduce the Muslim population (OHCHR, 2018). Moreover, Rohingya history has been significantly distorted and reconstructed to accommodate the military and ultranationalist views (Lee, 2014, p. 326). Rohingya, as a community, is unpopular among Buddhist Bamars. Buddhist ethnic Arakanese also considered them as the enemy. This negative attitude toward the Rohingya community has made it challenging for the civilian government and the NLD to support the Rohingya cause. Because any support to Rohingya means opposing the ultranationalist group’s interest, this majoritarianism is one of the most critical constraints of Myanmar’s domestic electoral politics. Therefore, there was no explicit statement in support of Muslims in Rakhine during the violent communal outbreak in Rakhine state from 2012 to 2020 (UNHCR, 2018; OHCHR, 2018; MSF, 2017; HRW, 2012, 2013). During this time, the NLD only emphasized establishing the rule of law. The anti-Rohingya Muslim sentiment and attitudes have developed over decades because of British colonial policy and Myanmar’s military junta’s linear approach to reconstruct history to fit nationalist narratives.

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Moreover, Buddhist hatred of Muslims, mainly Rohingya Muslims, will be growing across Myanmar. It is most unlikely that any elected government would support Rohingyas’ cause by risking the political cost. Political pragmatism, an electoral system where ultranationalists play a crucial role, will not contribute to resolving the conflict between Muslim Rohingyas in Buddhist Arakanese in the Rakhine state. Furthermore, the government has presented its action as simply supporting the popular will (Lee, 2014, p. 330). In sum, it is also most likely that Myanmar’s leadership would not recognize the Rohingya crisis as an ethnic conflict (UNHCR, 2018; OHCHR, 2018; MSF, 2017; HRW, 2012, 2013). In the post-2010 period, many Myanmar leaders, members of “88 generation”, were activists. They had joined in the 1988 protest to overthrow army rule (Gyi, 2013). These political leaders are primarily Bamars as well as Buddhists. They have lived most of their lives under the repressive military regime. Very recently, they received limited access to international media. They believed in a unified Buddhist nation. As a result, they are overwhelmingly unsupportive of the Rohingya cause. In contrast to that, Rohingyas had supported the cause of the democratic movement and the NLD. The post-2010 democratic setup has not been able to materialize Rakhine Muslims’ demands and aspirations. Stateless and politically isolated, Rohingya Muslims are now persecuted by the Myanmar state and Rakhine Buddhist extremists (UNHCR, 2018; OHCHR, 2018; MSF, 2017; HRW, 2012, 2013). Besides, they are unwelcomed in Bangladesh, Thailand, and India. The recent development of the Rohingya crisis may push this community to reject a democratic approach by adopting more radical actions, such as armed conflict. This would leave Myanmar in a precarious political position by destabilizing domestic politics and eventually disrupting regional peace and stability.

Conclusion This chapter mentioned in the beginning that it is interested in Myanmar government’s Rohingya policies and politics. In addition, it aimed to look at the religious and ethnic dimensions of the conflict. By examining and analyzing content stated above, this research’s key findings are that the Myanmar government did not recognize Rohingyas conflict’s ethnic dimension (UNHCR, 2018; OHCHR, 2018; MSF, 2017; HRW, 2012, 2013); therefore, its policy to balance ethnic minority’s interest with

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Bamar ethnicity’s interest has not been applied to solve Rohingya conflict. Similarly, it also identifies that the Myanmar government has given relative attention to solving ethnic violence rather than communal conflicts. For instance, Myanmar has a committee on peace and ethnic minority affairs, giving no attention to communal conflicts. Moreover, Myanmar has no legislative ad hoc committee to discuss and take policy to address communal conflict (Win & Kean, 2017). This study also finds that Myanmar’s legislature and the executive branch falls under the majority of Buddhist Bamar influence and was unsuccessful to make any policies and pass any laws to effectively prevent future communal and ethnic violence. It also identifies that the legislature, under public pressure, enacted laws with government approval to exclude Muslims from their political rights and addressed the Buddhist ultranationalist concern. Although the legislature was able to slow down the MaBaTha anti-Rohingya Muslim approach during the proposed draft laws, it was not enough (Win & Kean, 2017). The legislation was unable to stop laws targeting Rohingya Muslim rights. Finally, this study concludes that Myanmar as a new democratic system has no history of communal conflict management. Moreover, how the Hluttaw responded to communal conflict is not surprising. Myanmar’s new democratic setup successfully established autonomy, and was relatively ineffective as a peacebuilder to stop Rohingya persecution. As a result, there is less possibility that the current arrangements could resolve the underlying causes of communal and ethnic conflicts between Rohingyas and Buddhists in the Rakhine state (Lee, 2014). Likewise, the government has taken a partisan approach to responding to the communal and ethnic tension in the Rakhine state, and was relatively inefficient or unwilling to stop violent outbreaks (Win & Kean, 2017). Peacebuilding through promoting intercommunity trust has been ignored, and the ultranationalist group has exploited the newly formed democratic arrangement and electoral system. Although the findings are limited as this research had limited access to articles published in Myanmar, this study is still very informative because of its descriptive, constructive approach based on the content published internationally. To resume, this chapter can comment conclusively about the topic examined that Myanmar’s Rohingya policy is dehumanizing and apartheid. Bamar Buddhist lawmakers comprise lion’s share majority in the legislative and executive branches, and without a proper checks and balances Myanmar would remain in the hand of ultranationalist extremist politics.

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This study suggests that identifying the ethnic dimension of the Rohingya conflict and the inclusion of more minority representatives, prominent representatives from Muslim minority groups in the legislature and executive branches would facilitate inclusive views within the state apparatus. This can possibly help the Myanmar government to respond otherwise to future communal violence and ethnic conflicts. There are no ways to achieve peace without introducing meaningful changes and reforms in the Myanmar electoral system. If the Myanmar government wants a peaceful upcoming and would like to deal Rohingya crisis otherwise, it should form and implement nonpartisan policies in a coordinated, institutionalized manner.

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Fink, C. (2020, February 01). Myanmar: Trials and Tribulations Facing genocide charges in the international arena, Myanmar’s domestic politics are set to heat up in 2020, too. The Diplomat. Retrieved from https://thediplomat. com/2020/01/myanmar-­trials-­and-­tribulations/ Freeman, M. (2004). “Reconciliation in times of transition: The role of parliaments and inter-parliamentary bodies.” 110th Assembly of the Inter-­Parliamentary Union. Mexico City. Gandhi, J., & Przeworski, A. (2006). Cooperation, cooptation, and rebellion under dictatorships. Economics and Politics, 18(1), 1–26. Gyi, K.  K. (2013). Little change in NLD as old guard stands firm. Mizzima. Accessed April 31, 2020. http://archive-­2.mizzima.com/news/inside-­ burma/9031-­little-­change-­in-­nld-­as-­old-­guardstands-­firm.html Hlaing, K. Y. (2012). Understanding recent political changes in Myanmar. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 3, 197–216. HRW (Human Rights Watch). (2012). The government could have stopped this: Sectarian violence and ensuing abuses in Burma’s Arakan state. Human Rights Watch. Accessed April 31, 2020. Available at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/ default/files/reports/burma0812webwcover.pdf HRW (Human Rights Watch). (2013). All you can do is pray: Crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing of Rohingya Muslims in Burma’s Arakan State. Human Rights Watch. Accessed April 31, 2020. Available at: http://www.hrw. org/sites/default/files/reports/burma0413webwcover_0.pdf HRW. (2018). World Report 2018: Bangladesh. (Online) https://www.google. com/search?q=HRW+(2018)%2C&oq=HRW+(2018)%2C&aqs=chrome..69 i57j0i22i30j0i10i22i30.607j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 Joint statement by Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists. (2015, 3 March). Myanmar: Parliament must reject discriminatory ‘race and religion’ laws. Kipgen, N. (2013). Conflict in Rakhine State in Myanmar: Rohingya Muslims’ conundrum. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 33(2), 298–310. Lay, K. (2009). Burma fuels the Rohingya tragedy. Far Eastern Economic Review, 172(2), 57–59. Lee, R. (2014). A politician, not an icon: Aung san Suu Kyi’s silence on Myanmar’s Muslim Rohingya. Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, 25(3), 321–333. Maxwell, J. A. (2005). Qualitative research design. SAGE Publication. Mezey, M. (1983). The functions of legislatures in the third world. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 8(4), 511–550. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2012). About Myanmar: population. Accessed May 2, 2020. Available at http://www.mofa.gov.mm/aboutmyanmar/population.html

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MSF (Médecins Sans Frontières). (2017). Factsheet on the Rohingya in Bangladesh. Accessed on March 31, 2020. Available at http://www.msf.org. au/uploads/media/rohingyas_0407_03.pdf O’Brien, M., Stapenhurst, R., & Niall, J. (Eds.). (2008). Parliaments as peacebuilders in conflict-affected countries. World Bank. OHCHR. (2018). Human Rights Report 2018. (online) https://www.ohchr. org/Documents/Publications/OHCHRreport2018.pdf Quadir, S., & Nebehay, S. (2018, April 11). Bangladesh, UNHCR to ink preliminary plan on Rohingya repatriation. Thomson Reuters. Available at: https://www. reuters.com/article/us-­m yanmar-­r ohingya-­b angladesh-­u n/bangladesh-­ unhcr-­to-­ink-­preliminary-­plan-­on-­rohingya-­repatriation-­idUSKBN1HI2QR. Rakhine Inquiry Commission. (2012). Final report of inquiry commission on sectarian violence in Rakhine State. Inquiry Commission on Sectarian Violence in Rakhine State. Rogers, B. (2012). Burma: A nation at the crossroads. Random House. Smilov, D., & Kolarova, R. (2006). Parliaments in conflict and post-conflict situations: Lessons learned from Eastern Europe and the CIS. In K. Kinzelbach & E.  Cole (Eds.), Democratising security in transition states (pp.  38–57). United Nations Development Programme and Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. Steinberg, D. (2010). Burma/Myanmar what everyone needs to know. Oxford University Press. Steinberg, D. (2012). Foreword. In A. Selth, v–vii (Ed.), Burma (Myanmar) since the 1988 uprising: a select bibliography. Brisbane: Griffith University. Accessed April 2, 2020. Available at http://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_ file/0008/459593/Burma-­Bibliography-­for-­web.pdf Taylor, R. (2009). The state in Myanmar. National University of Singapore. UNHCR. (2018). Synthesis of Rohingya Response Evaluations of IOM, UNICEF and UNHCR. (online). https://www.unhcr.org/5e453ea64.pdf Venkatachalam, K. S. (2017, December 02). Can China solve the Rohingya Crisis? The Diplomat. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/can-­china-­ solve-­the-­rohingya-­crisis/ Ware, A., & Laoutides, C. (2018). Myanmar’s ‘Rohingya’ conflict. Oxford University Press. Williams, D. (2014). What’s so bad about Burma’s 2008 constitution? A guide for the perplexed. In M. Crouch & T. Lindsey (Eds.), Law, society and transition in Myanmar (pp. 117–139). Hart Publishing. Win, C., & Kean, T. (2017). Communal conflict in Myanmar: The legislature’s response, 2012–2015. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 47(3), 413–439. Yegar, M. (1972). The Muslims of Burma: A study of a minority group. Harrassowitz.

CHAPTER 5

Regime’s Interests in Hosting Refugees: Bangladesh’s Response to the Rohingya Sariful Islam

Introduction The highly appreciated response of Bangladesh to the Rohingya refugees in 2017, amidst anti-refugee sentiment across the world, is not new for the country, but a continuation of policies formulated a long time ago. Bangladesh has been providing shelter to Rohingya refugees since the 1970s, and its governments have claimed this response to be “humanitarian.” However, Bangladesh has also pursued restrictive policies in treating the Rohingya at the border and inside the country. This chapter analyzes the political interest of the political parties—particularly parties in power— in hosting or not hosting Rohingya. With such analysis it problematizes the claim of the response of Bangladesh government as pure “humanitarian.” The significance of political parties in power is examined in some of the literature on the Global South. However, of the two key studies, Milner’s (2009) research on Africa does not provide an in-depth analysis, and de Andrade and Marcolini (2002) only examine policy change due to the

S. Islam (*) Department of International Relations, South Asian University, New Delhi, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 K. Bülbül et al. (eds.), Rohingya Refugee Crisis in Myanmar, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6464-9_5

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transition of dictatorships into democratic governments. In the South Asian context, this linkage of the state’s response with the ruling party has not yet been adequately explored. This study, hence, would address this aspect particularly while presenting the government response as constructed. Therefore, this chapter addresses the questions: In what ways have interests of the key political parties featured in the “humanitarian” refugee policy of successive government(s) in Bangladesh? The following discussion is divided into four sections. The first section presents theoretical and research methodology employed in this study. The second section briefly analyzes the influence of the Rohingya refugees on the domestic politics of Bangladesh. The existing literature on the Rohingya in Bangladesh has not paid much attention to the possibility that political parties seek to gain politically from their response to the persecuted community. The third section briefly analyzes the tradition of personality-driven party politics in Bangladesh, and its reflection on the government. It highlights the significance of the party chief in framing the principles and goals of the party. The last section chronologically presents the response to the Rohingya refugee crisis during three regimes—Ziaur Rahman regime (1978), Khaleda Zia regime (1991–1992), and Sheikh Hasina regime (2017). It begins with an examination of the role of the Ziaur Rahman-led government in centering Islam in the everyday politics of Bangladesh, and the ways in which this shaped his response to the Rohingya refugees. Subsequently, the response of the Khaleda Zia-led government, which followed in the footsteps of Zia, is discussed. Finally, the contradictory approach adopted by the Sheikh Hasina-led government is interrogated. This highlights the shift of Awami League (AL) from secular to pro-Islam stance and other relevant domestic political developments, which led the AL-led government to give shelter to the Rohingya refugees.

Section One Theoretical Framework  ritical Social Constructivism C The response of Bangladesh may be explained through constructivism which argues that “social reality is constructed.” Among the different strands, critical social constructivism is particularly valuable in this case, as

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it delineates how an actor produces/presents a situation or an issue as “humanitarian,” which then allows the actor to take action in a particular manner. This theory does not take the dominant terms in international relations such as “state,” “identity,” “interest,” and “(in) security” as given; rather, it sees them as “culturally constructed.” These concepts are understood to be “culturally constructed” as they are produced in and out of “the context within which people give meanings to their actions and experiences and make sense of their lives” (Tomlinson, 1991, p. 7, cited in Weldes et al., 1999, p. 1). The state tends to enjoy a privileged position in producing narratives and their interpretation, and pursues actions that align with the discourse that are thus produced (Weldes et al., 1999). Statist discourses or narratives, Weldes et al. (1999, pp. 17–18) claim, become dominant as state officials and state apparatus have “institution power,” “constitutional legitimacy,” and they are the representatives who speak for “us” [citizens]. This study looks at how the different governments of Bangladesh present the Rohingya refugee issue and devise and implement policies that make sense in that context. To operationalize the basic tenet of critical constructivism, that is, “reality” is “culturally constructed,” this study examines how key state actors appropriate certain ways of framing the Rohingya refugee issue; they make the discourse of “humanitarian” as well as “restrictive” measures acceptable through their discourse producing power. It also looks at how political parties, especially those in power, justify their government’s stance, which is influenced by the party’s political interests. As the focus is on such political elites, this study also draws on relevant insights from elite theory, as discussed briefly below. Elite Theory The basic underpinning of the elite theory is that the elites always want to be in power. This study employs a narrow concept of the elite, which conceives of the elite as “a smaller group”, which possesses the governing power or “a class of political rulers” (Lopez, 2013, p.  2). Woleola J. Ekundayo rightly points out, “The political elite always excel in the ability to secure power and rule” (Ekundayo, 2017, p. 1). This study considers ruling political party/parties or whoever holds power as the top-level elite, and this elite aims to be in power. Any major decision on a domestic or foreign issue is based on calculations aiming to sustain and continue the regime. While it may not necessarily have been the decisive factor, political

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considerations of the regime would have factored into the decision to provide shelter to the Rohingya refugees. Research Methodology This study has applied discourse analysis as research method. Discourse analysis informs the ways of producing/reproducing social, political, and cultural representation and dominance and thus the construction of “commonsense knowledge” (Das, 2015, p. 22). Specifically, “discourse productivity” has been applied in this study. Discourse productivity is the second one of studying discourses among the three ways suggested by Jennifer Milliken (1999, pp. 229–230). Discourse productivity explains how some meanings become accepted or normal; in other words, how “common sense” or “truth” is generated through some authorized speakers or actors and institutions. It also demarcates what could be the befitting actions or response in line with this constructed “reality” (Milliken, 1999, pp. 229, 236). Discourse productivity informs how “social reality” or “truth” or “common sense” gets produced, who the actors and the audiences for the produced “social reality” or “commonsense” are, and what is the action or response of the actors to the produced “social reality.” This study acknowledges that “humanitarian” cause is discursively constructed by the dominant state actors. Laqua says, “While responding to a great suffering, humanitarian causes require a public—and they are therefore constructed through speeches, appeals and reports” (2014, pp. 177–178). The data for this research has been collected from both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include both interviews and documents. The study has generated data from semi-structured interviews of politicians, academicians, journalists, former diplomats, and security expert. They have been interviewed to obtain a detailed understanding of the pertinent issues. In addition, the researcher has conducted a field visit to the refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar in March 2019 and interviewed some members of the local host community. These interviews were aimed to identify and assess the factors that drive them to accept Rohingya. It is important to understand local sentiments as these play a part in the political calculations of parties, and the refugee policy or response of a country, more broadly. All interviews have been recorded with permission while one interviewee has responded to written questions by email correspondence. Information from 11 interviewees has been complied for this study. Their names and

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information have been published here as they have given consent to the researcher to do so. As part of this study, archival research of relevant stories published in news media in 1978, 1991–1992, 2012, 2016, 2017, and 2018 has been carried out. The news reports offer a glimpse into the facts of the event as well as the presentation of “facts” in relation to the prevalent discourse at that time. Secondary sources include scholarly books and journal articles, and media reports on Bangladesh’s refugee policies, political parties’ stance on the Rohingya, and foreign policy of Bangladesh.

Section Two The Rohingya Refugees and Domestic Politics of Bangladesh At first glance, with its focus on the “humanitarian” motive, the case of Bangladesh appears to be different. Most of those interviewed for this research do not see any significant impact of the Rohingya refugees on the domestic politics of Bangladesh. Delwar Hossain1 (Personal communication, February 17, 2019) comments that political considerations have not been a key factor in political parties’ support to providing shelter to the Rohingya. According to Hossain, the historical, humanitarian, and other considerations have led to successive governments’ positive response to the Rohingya. While Hossain downplays the “political consideration” factor, Afsan Chowdhury2 (Personal communication, February 15, 2019), finds the influence of the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh’s domestic politics to be “zero.” He comments that nobody considers the Rohingya refugees in casting their vote. Chowdhury maintains that the Rohingya “do not play the smallest possible role [in the domestic politics of Bangladesh]. It has no political impact.” (Personal communication, February 15, 2019). Security expert Major General A.N.M.  Muniruzzaman3 (Personal communication, March 2, 2019) contends that it is very surprising that refugee policies have not been a domestic political issue in Bangladesh, 1  Delwar Hossain is a professor at the Department of International Relations at the University of Dhaka, Bangladesh. 2  Afsan Chowdhury is a senior Bangladeshi journalist, academician, and political analyst. 3  Major General A.N.M. Muniruzzaman is the president of Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies (BIPSS), Dhaka, Bangladesh.

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unlike other countries wherein the presence of even a few thousand refugees have caused domestic discontent, particularly in recent decades. In contrast to other countries, according to him, the presence of one million plus Rohingya did not become an issue during the 2018 election in Bangladesh or come up as a cause for concern in any national discourse. Haroon Habib4 also does not see any “major impact” of the Rohingya refugees on the domestic politics of Bangladesh, even though he sees them as “a burden on Bangladesh’s economy and society” (Personal communication, March 5, 2019). On the 2017 influx, he comments, “…as of now, the political parties, in general, have no points to score out of the crisis” but fears that, a lingering crisis could lead to changes in the present situation (Personal communication, March 5, 2019). Here, he takes note of the political interest of local radical Islamist and their political mentors and suggest that “some of them may like to see the crisis prolonged due to their political interests” (Habib, Personal communication, March 5, 2019). Some of the interviewees, however, point to the ways in which the Rohingya refugee issue has featured in domestic politics. Hassan Shahriar5 observes that this issue has mattered at the local level, if not as much at the national level. He says, Rohingya issue is not that important in our politics. It is just not a big issue…It may be for Chittagong area but not for the whole country. If you go to Rangpur and other places, people do not even bother about it. (Shahriar, Personal communication, February 16, 2019)

Second, the interviewees consider the use of the Rohingya issue as a point of contention between the two main political parties, Bangladesh Awami League (AL) and Bangladesh Nationalist party (BNP). Munshi Faiz Ahmad6 (Personal communication, March 4, 2019) observes that there is no substantial difference among major political parties on this issue. According to him, “The opposition political parties do not question the government’s decision to allow these people to come in, and its subsequent 4  Haroon Habib is a senior journalist, author, and a former Bangladesh correspondent at The Hindu. 5  Hassan Shahriar was a former executive editor at the Daily Ittefaq and a former International President Emeritus of the Toronto-based Commonwealth Journalists Association (CJA). 6  Munshi Faiz Ahmad is former ambassador of Bangladesh to China [2007–2012] and the chairman at the Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), Dhaka.

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handling of the situation” (Ahmad, Personal communication, March 4, 2019). M.  Humayun Kabir7 (Personal communication, February 27, 2019) echoes Ahmad’s observation and notes that the two major political parties hold similar positions on the issue of “quick and safe return” of the Rohingya to Myanmar. For instance, the positive response of the AL-led government in 2017 is not very different from the BNP’s stance. However, the latter blamed the former for failing to pressurize Myanmar to take back its nationals. Time and again, since the start of the crisis in 2017, BNP has blamed the government for not doing enough to mitigate the miserable condition of the Rohingya. This blame game is common between the two major political parties, particularly when the refugees are alleged to have done something wrong. For instance, Dipu Moni, Foreign Minister during AL regime (2009–2013) accused the previous BNP-Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (BJI) led government of having issued passports to the Rohingya due to their “special motive” (BNP gave passports, 2011). Kiragu, E., Rosi, A.L., and Morris, T. have noted that “the principal political parties have tended to vie with each other in arguing for tough refugee and asylum politics” (Kiragu et al., 2011, p. 2). Further they claim that local politicians induce anti-­ Rohingya resentment among the locals (Kiragu et al., 2011). In these ways, the Rohingya issue can be understood to be part of the domestic politics of Bangladesh. Political considerations play a part in Bangladesh’s response to the Rohingya refugees, as will be discussed further below. So, irrespective of the similarities that he notes between the policies of the two political parties, Kabir (Personal communication, February 27, 2019) suggests that the Rohingya issue can be used by the parties for their political objectives. He says, “It is possible that this [Rohingya refugee] issue or international appreciation [for positive response to the Rohingya] was used domestically to promote certain political objectives” (Kabir, Personal communication, February 27, 2019). Having drawn attention to the influence of the refugee issue on domestic politics, particularly in relation to the political parties, the following sections analyze the interests of ruling parties vis-à-vis their response to the Rohingya refugees. But, before this, the next section draws out the personality-driven party politics that is characteristic of Bangladesh, to the extent that the interests of the party chief are intimately linked to 7  M. Humayn Kabir is former ambassador of Bangladesh to the USA [2007–2009] and vice president of Bangladesh Enterprise Institute, Dhaka.

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that of the party, which is then reflected in government’s decisions, when the party is in power.

Section Three Personality, Parties, and Regimes in Bangladesh Like most postcolonial countries, Bangladesh emerged through a liberation struggle led by a widely accepted political vanguard. For Bangladesh, the vanguard was AL (Chopra, 2000) led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The inception of AL preceded the birth of Bangladesh. Through his indomitable leadership, from the language movement in 1952 to the Liberation War in 1971, Sheikh Mujib became “a symbol of Bengali nationalism and the hero of East Bengal’s struggle for autonomy” (Umar, 2017, pp. 353–354). Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, AL, and the Liberation War of Bangladesh were intertwined with each other, at least in the minds of the leaders and supporters of AL. The enormous fame of Mujibur Rahman provided him an overwhelming authority to decide both party and country affairs, and a new ideology called “Mujibism” emerged (Riaz, 2016). The era of Mujibur Rahman (1972–1975) has been described as “authoritarian populism” (Riaz, 2016) and “civilian autocracy” (van Schendel, 2009, p. 181). No Bangladeshi leader since then can claim to enjoy the kind of popularity and authority commanded by Mujibur Rahman. However, this discussion does signpost the significance of leaders in Bangladesh’s party politics. As of June 2019, Bangladesh has 43 registered political parties (BEC, n.d.); this number excludes BJI, which has been banned from contesting elections since 2014 (Jamaat-e-Islami stripped, 2018; Islam, Onder & Nyadera, 2020; Islam, Bingol & Nyadera, 2020). Along with the broader principles, individual-ism drives political parties in Bangladesh. The discussion here will focus only on the two major political parties—AL and Bangladesh Nationalist Party-BNP—as one or the other of them led the government during the times of the three key periods of the Rohingya refugee crisis. “Mujibism” gave birth to a one-party system in Bangladesh in February 1975. Soon after, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was brutally killed in a coup on August 15, 1975. Senior AL leaders such as Dr. Kamal Hossain brought Sheikh Hasina into party leadership in 1981, electing her as the president while she was in exile in India (Ahsan, 2018; “Sheikh Hasina:

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Growth-Oriented,” 2018). After returning home in May 1981, she took charge of the party and worked side by side with the BNP against the military ruler Hossain Muhammad Ershad. In the meantime, she had established her rule over the party; dissent was not welcome. Those who disagreed left the party, including Dr. Kamal Hossain who left to form another party (Ahsan, 2018). Under Hasina’s leadership, AL formed the second democratically elected government in 1996, after the restoration of democracy in 1990. It lost the next general elections held in 2001, but returned to power in 2009. Since then, her influence in the party and on government matters has significantly increased. She has sidelined reformist politicians such as senior leaders Tofail Ahmed and Amir Hossain Amu (“Mukul Bose back,” 2017; Ruhin, 2007), and is understood, as per AL general secretary Obaidul Quader, to be the one for whom there is “no alternative” in the party (“Awami League has,” 2019). Her rule, particularly after the controversial one-sided election in 2014, has been censured in the international media. According to Ahsan (2012), Sheikh Hasina has created a culture of “unchallenged authority” both in her party and in the administration of the state. Her role in policy formulation is thus decisive, democratic norms notwithstanding. BNP emerged as a political alternative to AL, but was also afflicted with the culture of personality-based politics. It was established by military ruler turned politician Ziaur Rahman. Soon after the assassination of Mujibur Rahman, Ziaur Rahman became the Chief Martial Law Administrator in November 1976, and later president of the country in 1977 (Baxter, 1997). He continued as the president after winning a referendum on May 30, 1977, and two elections subsequently, until his assassination in 1981. Ziaur Rahman had formed BNP in order to grab power under the guise of democracy (Riaz, 2016). Though the party included politicians, businessmen, and bureaucrats in its central executive committee, Ziaur Rahman himself took all major decisions in his capacity as the party chairman, usually in consultation with the bureaucrat members of the party (Islam, 1984, p. 564). After his assassination, his wife Khaleda Zia took charge of the party in 1983, and fought against Ershad for the restoration of democracy (BNP, 2015). After the 1973 Sheikh Mujib-led government, hers was the first democratic government that came into power in 1991. Khaleda Zia has been the unopposed chairperson of the party since 1984, but is considered to be more democratic than her husband (Islam cited in Kollol, 2013). However, the legacy of Ziaur Rahman has continued. Attempts to reform the party or sideline Khaleda Zia have

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been dealt with firmly; reformists have been sacked in 1984 and 2008. At the time of writing, the party is in a leadership crisis, as Khaleda Zia has been in jail for corruption case and her son Tarique Rahman, senior vice chairperson of the party, has been in exile in London since 2008. Along with outlining the historical evolution of the two main political parties, the discussion above has also sought to highlight the culture of personality-based politics that permeates party politics in Bangladesh. The significance of Mujibur Rahman for AL and Ziaur Rahman for BNP are particularly relevant here; the parties’ election manifestos and campaigns still bear the resonance of both political figures. To a large extent, Sheikh Hasina carries forward this legacy. Thus, the personal image becomes the party image in Bangladesh. It may thus be argued that it becomes difficult to separate the interests and views of the party chief from that of the party, including when they are in power (Islam & Hossain, 2020).

Section Four Regime Interests and Responses to the Rohingya Refugees  eligion in Politics and Ziaur Rahman’s Regime: Interpreting R Bangladesh’s Response to the Rohingya in 1978 The personal worldview of Zia has had an impact on the governance of Bangladesh. He brought several radical changes in domestic and foreign affairs of the country. His domestic and international policies were largely influenced by religion, and that led his regime to respond to the Rohingya refugees positively. The assertion of Muslim identity in Bangladesh is not new. The contestation between ethnic Bengali-ness and Muslim-ness has been widely noted even before the partition of the subcontinent into India and Pakistan in 1947 (Riaz, 2016). While Bengali nationalism formed the basis of the founding of Bangladesh, the resurgence of Muslim identity came to the forefront within a few years of the Liberation War of 1971, with Major General Ziaur Rahman becoming the President of Bangladesh in April 1977. The state machinery played a significant role in reasserting the majority Muslim identity, and made this a de-facto identity of the state. In order to make the Muslim majority identity “normal,” three initiatives were taken by the Ziaur Rahman regime (1977–1981). These were bringing changes in the principles of the constitution, asking people

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to follow Islamic code of behavior, and bridging brotherly relations with the Muslim countries. Ziaur Rahman inserted the words “absolute trust and faith in Almighty Allah,” replacing the secular principle in the original constitution (Anisuzzaman, 2000; Majumder, 2016; Shehabuddin, 2016; Uddin, 2006; Islam). Sarah Tasnim Shehabuddin (2016) writes that the aim was to prioritize the Muslim identity of the majority Bangladeshis, and the country’s identity turned from “secular” to “pro-Islamic.” President Ziaur Rahman called “for strict adherence to the ideals of Islam” by the people (“Adhere strictly to,” 1978, p. 1). Addressing an Islamic Conference, the first of its kind, sponsored by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and held near Dhaka, Ziaur Rahman said, “To be a real Muslim we must follow the life of our beloved Prophet Hazrat Muhammad [peace be upon him] in every sphere of our day-to-day life” (“Adhere strictly to,” 1978, p. 1). The insertion of Islamic overtone in the constitution or the call for following Islamic codes in everyday life was not aimed to appease just the domestic Muslim majority but also the Muslim countries. Within two and a half years of being in power, Ziaur Rahman had already become successful in (re)establishing relations with the Muslim countries which had suspended relations after the 1971 partition. Saudi Arabia emerged as one of the major donor countries to Bangladesh during Ziaur Rahman’s regime (Prodhan, 2011). This brief narrative of state-sponsored “Islamization” during the Ziaur Rahman regime brings to light the role of religion in domestic politics of Bangladesh, and its implication for the country’s international relations. It also shows the ways in which the regime in power “normalized” the Muslim identity over the initial secular identity of Bangladesh. Secular and liberal commentators in Bangladesh and beyond blame Ziaur Rahman for the country’s orientation towards Islam (Anisuzzaman, 2000; Majumder, 2016; Uddin, 2006). He was able to (re)produce the Muslim majority identity of Bangladesh through his everyday statements, legal actions, and foreign policies. Consequently, the ideological underpinning and worldview of his political party, when in power, came to impact upon Bangladesh’s policies—domestic and international. The Rohingya issue came to the forefront in the late 1970s. Initially, the Ziaur Rahman-led government had pushed back 8000 refugees. But it could not do so later, as the number of refugees increased and the influx got widespread attention in the media. The government portrayed the Rohingya situation as “humanitarian.” A strong official protest note to

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Myanmar stated that, “the Bangladesh Government has been obliged to provide the basic needs of the refugees solely on humanitarian grounds” (“Eviction a human rights,” 1978, p. 1). Higher-ups in the government repeatedly articulated the Rohingya situation as “humanitarian.” Ziaur Rahman said, “…Burmese nationals were temporarily sheltered in Bangladesh on purely humanitarian grounds” (“Geopolitical situation needs,” 1978, p.  1). To present it as a “humanitarian” issue, the state actors highlighted the suffering of the Rohingya people. At the same time, Ziaur Rahman had consciously brought religion into politics for sustaining his regime (Anisuzzaman, 2000; Hashmi, 2006; Riaz, 2016). With its policy of showing solidarity with the Muslim Ummah, the support that the Ziaur Rahman regime came to provide the Rohingya in 1978 was not unexpected. The calls to stand with their fellow religious brothers came from both senior state functionaries as well as domestic constituencies, with each side presumably positively reinforcing the sentiments of the other. In his message sent to the attendees of the Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Islamic Nations in Dakar, Ziaur Rahman said, “the Muslims of the world would move forward in unison and concert to safeguard their legitimate interests and rights and also to serve the cause of peace and progress in the true spirit of Islam” (“Dakar Conference,” 1978, p. 5). At the same conference, in line with President Ziaur Rahman, his foreign minister, urged the Muslim world to act “in accordance with the true spirit of Islamic brotherhood” at the time of deepening crisis in the Middle East and for the Rohingya (“Dakar Conference,” 1978, p. 5). President Ziaur Rahman’s framing of Bangladesh as a “Muslim” country, at home and abroad, created an obligation for his government to stand with the Rohingya. Conversely, while the government did not take much credit for the “humanitarian” response, its actions came to serve an important political purpose of the regime. At the time when the Rohingya crisis was unfolding, Ziaur Rahman’s political legitimacy appeared to be threatened by coups and potential Indian intervention. It is reported that the military had to withstand approximately ten serious attempts to revolt, during the period November 1975 to October 1977 (Codron, 2007; Rashiduzzaman, 1978). The success of violent coup in 1981, in which President Ziaur Rahman was assassinated, lends credence to this argument. In light of such constant risks of being overthrown, the Ziaur Rahman regime would not have wanted to give an opportunity to the opposition political parties or other forces to create chaos using any issue. While the government is

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likely to have responded positively to the Rohingya on grounds of Muslim solidarity, the support that it received from the people for its actions made it easier for the government to help the Rohingya and strengthen the regime’s legitimacy in the process. Julfiker Ali Manik8 (Personal communication, March 1, 2019) suggests, “The military [Ziaur Rahman’s regime] used Islam for its political interest [to be in power], it also capitalized on the Rohingya issue for the same.” Finally, however, the regime also vocalized its concerns about the consequences of hosting the huge number of refugees on the economy and security of the country. By demonstrating their commitment to sending back the refugees to their home, the government presented the situation as temporary and as one that would not harm the interests of its own people, thereby stemming any domestic concerns about the refugees.  ollowing in the Footsteps of Ziaur Rahman: Sheltering Rohingya F during Khaleda Zia’s Regime in 1991–1992 The second influx of the Rohingya refugees also received a positive response from the BNP-led government, under the leadership of Ziaur Rahman’s wife Khaleda Zia. Unlike late President Ziaur Rahman, Khaleda Zia did not have any concerns regarding political legitimacy as she came to power through a democratic election. However, following her party’s founding principles, she continued to maintain BNP’s relations with Islamist forces and Muslim countries. At the fifth convocation of the Islamic Center for Technical and Vocational Training and Research, which was established with OIC funding during Ziaur Rahman’s regime, Khaleda proclaimed, “My government will endeavor to further improve our close ties and bond of friendship with the Islamic world” (“Govt will work,” 1991, p. 1). She reiterated the same in a meeting with the visiting Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki Khaleda more than a week later saying, “Bangladesh would continue with Shaheed President Ziaur Rahman’s policy of forging unity among Muslim Ummah for the all-­ round socio-economic progress of Islamic countries” (“Dhaka to work,” 1991, p. 1; “Zia’s policy for Muslim,” 1991, p. 1). She again emphasized “the importance of safeguarding the individual and collective interests of Muslim Ummah” in her speech at OIC Summit in December 1991 (“Khaleda address plenary,” 1991, p. 1). Such statements from Khaleda 8  Julfikar Ali Manik is a former chief of correspondents at the Daily Star and Bangladesh correspondent at the New York Times.

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Zia established her commitment to follow the path of Ziaur Rahman which entailed providing patronage to Islam, the majority religion in Bangladesh, and maintaining strong relations with fellow Muslims. As the Khaleda Zia regime followed the path of Ziaur Rahman in relation to both domestic and foreign policy, it was expected that they would show sympathy to the Rohingya refugees. Under Khaleda Zia’s leadership, the Rohingya refugees were not prevented from entering Bangladesh. She also continued the policy of repatriating the refugees within a short time. Notably, the foreign minister was A.S.M. Mustafizur Rahman, who was the home minister in Ziaur Rahman-led government in 1978, when the first Rohingya influx happened (“Mustafiz to visit,” 1991, p.  1). The government made it clear that they would draw on their experiences in 1978 to respond to the refugee issue, and so the Bangladesh government responded positively to the Rohingya refugees for the second time. However, there were also some differences in their response. Initially, Khaleda Zia’s government wanted to handle the issue bilaterally. Though the government was continuing Ziaur Rahman’s policy of working for the Muslim Ummah, the lack of media reports on the subject suggests that Khaleda Zia did not bring up the Rohingya issue at the plenary session of OIC held in December 1991. Publicly, the government neither expressed its concern nor categorized the issue as “humanitarian” at this time. It sought to solve the problem peacefully even when Myanmar deployed a massive number of soldiers with heavy arms at the borders (“Bangladesh also steps,” 1991) and its security forces attacked Bangladesh border posts (“Killing of BDR,” 1991; “BDR man killed,” 1991). This happened at least on two occasions, with the first one taking place on December 21, 1991. The government termed the first attack as an “isolated one” (“Killing of BDR,” 1991, pp. 1, 10). After this attack, an editorial in The Daily Star cautioned against further attacks and noted, “we can hardly remain silent over it” (“Spell it out,” 1991, p. 4). Realizing that its bilateral diplomatic efforts were not yielding any fruitful results and the scale of refugee influx was increasing day by day, the government started to change its policy. The pressure from domestic forces was also growing. The opposition parties, including AL (“AL protests Myanmar army,” 1991; “AL protest Myanmar military,” 1991) and BJI (“Influx of Arakan,” 1992) expressed their concerns, and accused the government of failing to handle the issue and protecting the country’s borders. By the end of December 1991, several hundred Rohingya

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refugees staged a demonstration demanding their early return (“BurmaBangladesh Flag,” 1991). Until mid-February 1992, Khaleda Zia government had rarely referred to the Rohingya situation as “humanitarian.” But, following these developments, government narratives of the refugee issue as both a “humanitarian” concern as well as a “burden” on Bangladesh began to surface by early 1992. This framing of the Rohingya issue as “humanitarian” happened with senior government functionaries narrating the pitiful condition of the Rohingya, and characterizing Myanmar’s treatment of the community as “inhumane and barbaric” (Bakht, 1992, p. 1). This helped to make a case for supporting the Rohingya who had to flee their homeland due to such extreme threats. The State Minister for Relief and Rehabilitation Lutfur Rahman Khan termed the situation that the Rohingya was facing as “painful,” and commented that the evicted refugees were living in “total uncertainty” (Bakht, 1992, p. 1). After her visit to the refugee camps in March 1992, Prime Minister Khaleda Zia said, “It was pathetic to see that even the children were passing their days under the open sky” (“Army atrocities continue,” 1992, p. 3). Along with continuous media reporting on the plight of the Rohingya, such statements from the regime helped to present its “humanitarian” response as a duty of the government. The precedent for this “obligatory duty” had been set by the Ziaur Rahman regime (“Concern over influx,” 1978, p. 14). This continuity in policies was highlighted by the statements of Khaleda’s Foreign Minister Mustafizur Rahman, including in a statement made at the parliament on January 15, 1992, “The problem of refugees with Myanmar is not a new one. [The] same situation arose in 1978 when BNP was in power […] It was amicably settled through a peaceful negotiation with the Myanmar [g]overnment” (“Rohingyas to be sent,” 1992, p. 10). From November to December 1991, the number of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh was no more than 50,000. The government did not seem to very anxious, especially as it was engaging diplomatically with Myanmar to find a solution to deal with the crisis. But, its efforts were in vain as the influx continued for another three to four months. The government was unable to adequately meet the growing demands for shelter, emergency services, and other kinds of support; and, it was apparent that repatriation was unlikely to start in the near future. Therefore, the government appealed for massive international assistance in mid-February in 1992 (Hossain, 1992b, February 16; “UNHCR team arrives,” 1992), and

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began to highlight the “humanitarian” aspect of the issue. In its appeal, Bangladesh noted, “The problem is mounting and is gradually going beyond the government’s control because of the limited resources of the country” (Bari, 1992; “UNHCR team arrives,” 1992, p. 1). It is notable that the government did not initially frame the Rohingya issue as a “humanitarian” concern. Based on the discussion above, it can be said that inflow of fewer number of Rohingya refugees and the hope for an immediate solution to the problem played a role in not framing the issue as “humanitarian” from November 1991 to January 1992. But, as noted above, framing of the Rohingya issue as “humanitarian” started to happen in mid-February 1992. Based on the discussion here, five possible rationales for providing shelter to the Rohingya refugees by the Khaleda Zia regime can be presented. First, as Manik (Personal communication, March 1, 2019) observes, the Rohingya were provided shelter in 1978 as well as in 1991–1992 due to their religious identity; BNP, the political party founded by Ziaur Rahman, overwhelmingly followed his policy of using Islam for political purposes, even when he was no longer at the helm. Second, the regime was threatened with political instability, as Islamist forces took to the streets on several occasions on the Rohingya issue. Third, there was no opposition from any political party publicly on the issue of entry of the Rohingya, even though AL (Hossain, 1992a, February 7, pp. 1, 12) and Communist Party of Bangladesh (CPB) suspected the Rohingya’s involvement in insurgency training inside Bangladesh. Fourth, it became important to characterize the refugees as “humanitarian” as the number of refugees was increasing. The government sought attention and assistance from the international community. Fifth, even though a section of the Muslim majority was in favor of supporting the Rohingya refugees, the latter’s presence had already started to cause environmental damage (Hossain, 1992c, March 22, pp. 1, 12; “Influx of Arakan,” 1992, pp. 1, 10) and put pressure on the local economy (“Influx of Arakan,” 1992, pp.  1, 10; 1000 refugees coming, 1992, p.  1; “Rohingyas adding burden,” 1992, p. 9). The “humanitarian” framing may have been intended to prevent the “hospitality” of the local community from turning into “hostility.” Along with the “humanitarian” narrative, the government also built on the “burden” narrative. On several occasions, the government pointed out to the international community that the refugees were posing a huge burden on Bangladesh. Khaleda Zia is reported to have told a visiting UNHCR official that “the huge influx of Myanmar refugees has created serious

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problems for Bangladesh” (“Massive world aid,” 1992, p. 1). In a meeting with President George Bush during her visit to the United States, Khaleda Zia commented that the refugees had imposed an “immense humanitarian burden” on Bangladesh (“Bush pledges support,” 1992, p. 1). The “burden” narrative, however, was not aimed to obstruct the entry of the people at this time and remained subservient to the “humanitarian” one, as the regime was mindful of possible repercussions. Some Muslims groups are reported to have marched on the streets condemning the atrocities against the Rohingya in Rakhine (see “Call to liberate,” 1992; “Burma’s atrocities against,” 1992). At a conference on the Rohingya issue held in Dhaka in January 1992, Islamist scholars and leaders reiterated the need to extend strong support to the Rohingya people in “re-­ liberating” Rakhine (“Call to liberate,” 1992, p.  10). They said, “the Muslims of Bangladesh cannot remain silent on the issue of atrocities carried out on the Rohingya Muslims by the Myanmar authorities” (“Call to liberate,” 1992, p.  10). The regime would have been fearful that any restrictive measure taken by them could antagonize the Muslim majority, particularly the Islamist political forces. Against this domestic backdrop, it becomes apparent that the regime used the “burden” argument mainly to seek international assistance. However, when the local sentiment towards the Rohingya appeared to turn gradually from “hospitality” to “hostility” and the regime did not want to accept any more refugees, the Khaleda regime changed its stance. In 1994, the Bangladesh government announced that it would not consider the newly arrived Rohingya as refugees, and categorized them as “economic migrants” instead (USBCIS, 2001).  dopting Contradictory Measures: Interpreting the Response A of the Sheikh Hasina’s Regime Prior to 2017, the AL-led government maintained restrictive policies toward the Rohingya refugees. For instance, it is reported that Border Guards Bangladesh (BGB) sent back 2400 Rohingya in 2012, with more than 1280 made to return during June–August 2012 (“10 Rohingyas arrested,” 2012). The government generally prioritized its bilateral relations with Myanmar, and considered the Rohingya issue to be a domestic matter of Myanmar. Delwar Hossain notes, “Awami League was more interested in maintaining the strategic importance of Bangladesh-Myanmar relations” (Hossain, Personal communication, February 17, 2019). According to him, AL believes that other parties, particularly BNP, “used

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the religious factor in the Rohingya issue to build their relations with the Muslim countries, and so, gained some political mileages from this” (Hossain, Personal communication, February 17, 2019). Muhammad Faruk Khan9 (Personal communication, February 24, 2019) as well shared this opinion, claiming that the stance of other political parties, namely BNP-Jammat or even Jatiya Party, on the Rohingya issue was not “humanitarian” but political in nature. However, AL’s “humanitarian” response in 2017 also involved some political calculations, including in relation to the use of religion in politics. Further analysis of the government’s refugee policy along these lines needs to be prefaced with a brief outline of the changes in AL’s traditional stance on the role of religion in politics, under Sheikh Hasina’s leadership. The AL returned to power following the 2008 general elections; in 2010, their government brought back the principle of “secularism”10 into the constitution (“Secularism back,” 2010). However, it retained Islam as the state religion of Bangladesh, as was proclaimed by Zia’s successor General H.M. Ershad in 1988 (Anisuzzaman, 2000; Majumder, 2016). The contradiction is surprising but not unexpected as the sentiments of the majority, in this case Muslim majority, matter for the political parties. Nonetheless, this return of “secularism” displeased a section of people, particularly the supporters and followers of the rightist political parties and organizations, including BJI and Hefazat-e-Islam, and center-right BNP.  Around the same time, the AL government put on trial some 83 political and Islamist leaders, mostly from BJI but also a few from BNP, for their alleged involvement in crimes against humanity in the 1971 Liberation War, as collaborators of the Pakistani military. Since the start of 9  Muhammad Faruk Khan is the chairman of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs. He is a senior AL politician. 10  The concept of secularism in Bangladesh differs from the Western formulation. The Bengali word for secularism is dharmaniropekshata, which means religious neutrality. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founding father of the nation, sought to propagate an understanding of secularism that did not entail absence of religion. Advocating this notion of secularism to his fellow citizens, he said “You are a Mussalmaan, you perform your religious rites. There is no irreligiousness on the soil of Bangladesh but there is secularism” (cited in Rahman, 2013, p.  145). Rahman (2013) describes Mujibur Rahman’s secularism as non-communal. The constitution of Bangladesh adopted in 1972 did not prioritize any religion. During the military regimes of Ziaur Rahman and Hussain Muhammad Ershad, however, this secular nature of the Bangladeshi constitution was rescinded. Though the Sheikh Hasina-led AL government resuscitated the principle of secularism in the constitution in 2010, it has retained Islam as the state religion.

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the trial in March 2010 till August 2018, 52 individuals were sentenced to death and some others were sentenced for life (Shaon, 2018a). The ­country was deeply divided, during and following the judgments. On one side, the supporters of capital punishment coalesced around the 2013 Shahbag Movement (Shaon, 2018a), and provided the government with the political leverage to continue with the trials. On the other side, there were counter-protests by the radical Islamist political parties and groups across the country. Those who participated in the Shahbag Movement were termed as “atheists,” and some bloggers associated with the movement were subsequently killed by “Islamist militants.” Against the Shahbag Movement, Hefazat-e-Islam—a tightly knit coalition of several Islamic political parties and groups (Mustafa, 2013)—staged a massive demonstration with a strength of reportedly more than 500,000 protesters and, among others, demanded the reinstatement of the phrase “absolute trust and faith in Almighty Allah” in the constitution and the imposition of a sort of Shariah law in the country (Ahmed & Levs, 2013, para. 12). In this domestic political environment, the AL-government gradually started to make compromises, so as not to appear anti-Islamic. It showed leniency toward Hefazat-e-Islam. This change in dynamics became evident when Hefazat-e-Islam organized a large public meeting to express gratitude to Sheikh Hasina for the government’s decision to give postgraduate-­equivalent status to Dawra-e-Hadith (Takmil), the degree awarded by Hefazat-run madrasas (Shaon, 2018b). Hefazat proclaimed Sheikh Hasina as Qawmi Janani (Mother of Qawmi Madrasa students). They wished her victory in the December 2018 election, which she did subsequently win. Chakravertty (2018) has termed this pro-Hefazat turn on the part of Sheikh Hasina’s as political expediency. Internationally as well, Hasina made efforts to appear “pro-Islamic.” Soon after coming to power, Sheikh Hasina made her first foreign trip to Saudi Arabia, where she performed Umrah and held a bilateral meeting with King Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz. Her government made special efforts to improve relations with the Gulf States of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar, and Bahrain (Karim, 2010). It would not be an exaggeration to suggest that Bangladesh’s relationship with Saudi Arabia has been the strongest during the regime of this AL government. In 2017, the Sheikh Hasina-led government successfully convinced Saudi Arabia to provide funding for the establishment of more than 500 model mosques across Bangladesh (Abedin, 2017). In a show of brotherly support, Bangladesh agreed to send 1800 troops to Saudi Arabia for a

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demining mission along civil war-torn Yemen border. While the proposed deployment is for a noncombative mission, Bangladesh has not ruled out the possibility of sending its soldiers to protect the holy cities of Mecca and Medina if these come under any threat (Chowdhury, 2019; “Military cooperation: Dhaka,” 2019). These relations with Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries have been nurtured with the aims to both appear “pro-Islam” as well as to create job opportunities for Bangladeshis, as majority of Bangladeshi migrants stay in Middle Eastern countries. Thus, at domestic as well as international levels, the Sheikh Hasina government has sought to appear “pro-Islam,” like its main competitor BNP, with the aim to appease the large Muslim majority of the country in order to gain their support to stay in power. Returning to the discussion on refugee policy, in 1994, as has been noted earlier, Bangladesh adopted a policy to not recognize any new entrants as refugees, and to discourage the entry of the Rohingya into the country. With the formation of Sheikh Hasina-led AL government in 2009, this policy began to be followed more strictly. Her regime focused on the problems that were allegedly created due to the presence of the Rohingya. Along with reinitiating efforts to send the Rohingya back (see “Myanmar to take,” 2009; “Speed up Rohingya,” 2009), the AL regime pursued a strict no-entry policy and started a crackdown on the new illegal entrants in early 2009 (see, “26 Rohingyas pushed,” 2009; “49 Rohingyas intruders,” 2009; “18 Rohingyas arrested,” 2009; “28 Rohingyas arrested,” 2009; “Police arrest 14,” 2009; “Border sees push-ins,” 2009; “Four Rohingyas arrested,” 2011) and this continued over the subsequent years. Under instructions from senior government functionaries, border forces and the police carried out raids—sometimes jointly—in Cox’s Bazar and Bandarban to identify and detain new illegal entrants, and to push them back to Myanmar. It was reported that the Myanmar border force received the Rohingya sent by the Bangladesh border force, but later pushed them back into Bangladesh (“Border sees push-ins,” 2009). Bangladesh increased its military presence and patrolling along the borders, in the wake of provocative action of Myanmar gathering—with the intention to send into Bangladesh—10,000 Rohingya, and their deployment of a huge number of troops with heavy weapons (Azad & Hussain, 2009). The crackdown is reported to have turned violent and attracted media attention, though the government denied that it had carried out such a drive.

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The restrictive measures taken by the AL government at this time tend to be attributed to security and economic concerns in much of the literature. However, the regime’s political interest also played a role. The official stance of AL is to stop the “intrusion” of the Rohingya from Myanmar. The party’s constitution states that AL, “has continued its efforts to stop Rohingya ‘intrusion’ from Myanmar, and has engaged at bilateral and international levels to repatriate them” (Mahmud & Islam, 2016, p.47). Local AL politicians included this commitment in their campaigns at the time of the 2008 general election (Sengupta, 2018, p. 31). The political interest was to gain the support of local people, who had turned somewhat hostile toward the Rohingya due to their long stay (Uddin, 2012). Local political elites incited protest against the Rohingya, and sought their repatriation (Kiragu et al., 2011). Generally, Cox’s Bazar, where a large population of the Rohingya is hosted, was regarded as the stronghold of BNP-BJI.  The table below shows the electoral results for the period 1991–2008. It is notable that AL had most success in Cox’s Bazar-4; this is where the two-official refugee camps—Kutupalong in Ukhiya and Nayapara in Teknaf—are located. This constituency hosts a high number of Rohingya, as it is close to the Myanmar border. The AL leader who won the elections in 1996 and 2008 is Abdur Rahman Bodi who presents himself as anti-Rohingya (see Table 5.1). It may be argued that the Rohingya were putting pressure on the local economy, and had caused disruptions in law and order (Zahirul Alam,11 Personal communication, March 11, 2019; Ahmed, 2014; Rahman, Table 5.1  Parliament elections results of four constituencies of Cox’s Bazar from 1991 to 2008 Constituency name

1991

1996

2001

2008

Cox’s Bazar-1 Cox’s Bazar-2 Cox’s Bazar-3 Cox’s Bazar-4

BJI Other AL BNP

BNP BNP BNP AL

BNP BNP BNP BNP

BNP BJI BNP AL

amarMP, 2021

11  Zahirul Alam is a 29-years-old Bangladeshi who works as a security guard at a refugee camp in Balukhali, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh.

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2010) but the political regime—at the national and local levels—did make use of this situation for advancing their interests. As noted earlier, local politicians are reported to have helped the Rohingya to get enlisted in the voters list and to get national identity cards.12 AL has blamed BNP-BJI for being pro-Rohingya for their political gain. The local people believe that due to the support that the Rohingya have received from BNP, in terms of allowing the refugees to enter Bangladesh and then helping them to get into the system, the Rohingya think of BNP as their true “sympathizer.” Sengupta notes, “After the Awami League was voted into power [in 2009], the influx of the Rohingya was combated with harsh measures” (Sengupta, 2018, p. 31). In the wake of the scale and intensity of their stringent measures, the AL regime faced criticisms at home and abroad. In order to address this, the AL-led government strengthened the narratives of the Rohingya as a “burden” and “security concern.” The Rohingya were presented as being responsible for the increase in local crimes, deterioration of law and order situation, corrosion of sociocultural values, destruction of forests and natural resources, hikes in commodity prices, and lowering down of workers’ wages. Allegations of local people and media reports helped the regime’s efforts to implement more restrictive measures such as placing restrictions on the activities of international agencies. Even though the local host communities were the first to extend support to the Rohingya, the government’s discourse gained currency among them as they had been the ones most adversely affected by the lengthy presence of the refugees (Gain, 1992; Uddin, 2012). From 2012 onwards, the discourse on Rohingya propagated by the government intensified. In 2012, Bangladesh twice thwarted the attempts of a large number of Rohingya. This created a political debate in Bangladesh since BNP and BJI urged the government to open the border. International pressure and 12  During the 2018 general election, local AL and BNP leaders accused each other of “using” Rohingya refugees for their political gains (“Apprehension remains over,” 2018). The allegations of enrolling the Rohingya in the Bangladeshi voter list and getting them national identity card is not new. The Election Commission of Bangladesh (ECB) had dropped 45,866 Rohingyas’ names from the voter list of Cox’s Bazar district in 2010 (“45,866 Rohingyas off,” 2010, 5th August) and 17,000 in 2013 (“17,000 Rohingyas off,” 2016). The Sheikh Hasina government has taken strong measures to stop the Rohingya from getting enlisted in Bangladeshi voter lists and collecting national identity cards. These efforts were bolstered after the 2017 influx, with the ECB taking special measures to prevent the Rohingya from enrolling in voter lists (Alamgir, 2019; Irani, 2019).

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criticism mounted on Bangladesh for the same. This only led the AL regime to present its position with more determination, while circulating the kind of narratives presented above. Foreign Minister Dipu Moni said, “Bangladesh is a densely populated country, and the Rohingya have impact on our society, law, and order, and environment. Considering all aspects, it will create serious problems for us…We are not interested in more people coming to Bangladesh” (“Riot in Rakhine,” 2012, para. 11). She added, “We’re already burdened with thousands of Rohingya refugees staying in Bangladesh and we don’t [want to take the Rohingya] anymore” (Ahmed, 2012, para. 4). A day later, The Daily Star reported that Dipu Moni had said the following at the parliament, “For the sake of its national security, Bangladesh will not allow any Rohingya in” (“Myanmar claims ‘Jamaat Link’,” 2012, para. 3). The “burden” narrative was also reproduced, with Moni saying, “We have allowed many Rohingya to live in our country and we do not want to add to our problems by allowing more of them in” (“Dhaka sticks to,” 2012, para. 8). Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina added to this. In defense of her policy to not allow the Rohingya into the country in 2012, she said, “Bangladesh is already a[n] over-populated country. We cannot bear this burden [of Rohingya refugees]” (Al Jazeera, 2012). Thus, the AL regime depicted the Rohingya as “trouble makers,” “economic migrants,” and “burden” for Bangladesh, and Bangladesh as incapable, poor, and faced with many problems of its own. On several occasions, foreign ministry officials and the prime minister disassociated themselves from the Rohingya issue and asked the international community to talk to or put pressure on Myanmar instead of Bangladesh (“Ask Myanmar to,” 2012). In an interview, Sheikh Hasina said, “It is up to their government…It is not the Bangladesh people’s responsibility, right?” (Al Jazeera, 2012). In 2017, however, the response of the AL-led government changed. Due to open border and porous border, the significantly larger number of refugees, and the religious sentiments of the majority have contributed to bring change in the policy of AL (Islam, 2019). In addition, political calculations also played a role. This is examined below, following a discussion on the how the government leaders reframed the Rohingya issue in line with the change in their policy. The memory of the 1971 Liberation War and the suffering of the Rohingya were the key factors that influenced the humanitarian response of Bangladesh in 2017 (Islam, 2019). The two were placed together

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before the people of Bangladesh. The memory of 1971 is a fundamental part of the history of Bangladesh (van Schendel, 2009), and using that to discuss the Rohingya issue helped change the tide. This reference first came from Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, with other ministers and AL leaders following suit. During her visit to the refugees living in Cox’s Bazar on September 12, 2017, Sheikh Hasina said, “The people in this area, especially the youth, may not recall the Liberation War but we the elderly people still remember it. So we expect you to look after them” (“Stop atrocities,” 2017, para. 27). Such messages as well as knowledge about the Rohingya refugees sought to invoke a sense of moral obligation to support the Rohingya among those who had grown hostile. Sheikh Hasina herself pointed out the miserable situation of the Rohingya: “Still, the fire is burning there…people can[no]t find their family members…the bodies of infants and women are floating on the Naf River…We can’t tolerate such activities” (“Stop atrocities,” 2017, para. 5). Highlighting such atrocities against the Rohingya, she seemed to suggest that they were facing the kind of situation that the people of Bangladesh did in 1971; “they”—the Rohingya—were like “us”—the people of Bangladesh. Sheikh Hasina announced that Bangladesh would “extend all kinds of support... till the time they don’t return to their country” (“Stop atrocities,” 2017, para. 18), and “if necessary, we [the people of Bangladesh] will eat one meal a day and share another meal with these distressed people. After all, we are human beings and we stand for mankind” (Bangladesh PM: If necessary, 2017, para. 4). At a more personal level, she shared her own experience of being a refugee. Sheikh Hasina said, “I can feel their pain because I and my younger sister were refugees for six years after my father, the Father of the Nation of Bangladesh, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and almost all members of my family were assassinated in 1975” (UNGA, 2017, p.  42). This show of solidarity had not been apparent in 2012; in 2017, the Rohingya were one with the people of Bangladesh because of their shared humanity. From the refugee camps to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA, 2017, p. 42), Sheikh Hasina made references to the pitiful state of the Rohingya and linked their circumstances to the memory of 1971 and her own personal experience. With the narratives centering on the suffering of the Rohingya and the memory of 1971, the AL government successfully campaigned to portray the refugee issue as “humanitarian”. This allowed the government to act differently from their “restrictive” stance in 2012. As the situation was considered “humanitarian” by the

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government, the narratives of “economic burden” and “security concern” became silent at least for some months. Tracing the evolution of AL-led government’s position on the Rohingya refugees, it becomes apparent that the party’s political calculations have played a part; and, as the regime in power, they had the resources necessary to shape the discourse to align with their interests. While the party’s official stance favors restrictive measures toward the Rohingya, the AL-led government could not go against the sentiments of Muslims and other communities of Bangladesh who condemned the atrocities committed against the Rohingya in Myanmar and urged the citizens and government of Bangladesh to help these people. The regime in power did not just aim to make political gains at the domestic level, but internationally as well. In spite of being a poor country, Bangladesh has hosted one million refugees, in contrast to the anti-refugee stance evident in most parts of the world. For this, the regime in power expects credit and admiration and certainly no criticism about its other domestic actions. Amidst the celebration of its “humanitarian” response to the Rohingya, the AL regime conducted a controversial general election in December 2018. The election was boycotted by the BNP-led alliance just a few hours after voting began, with a number of BNP leaders accusing the AL regime of not allowing their candidates, allies, and supporters to vote, of throwing out the alliance’s polling agents, and of rigging the votes. Except for comments from a few Western countries, these allegations did not draw any international attention. Mainly, the US criticized the AL regime for unfairness during the election (“US criticizes Bangladesh,” 2019), and others such as the UK and EU urged the government to investigate the allegations (“US, EU ask Bangladesh,” 2019; “UK for credible,” 2019). Besides them, all influential countries and international organizations refrained from criticizing Sheikh Hasina; instead, they continued to appreciate her for her “humanitarian” response. Julfikar Ali Manik (Personal communication, March 1, 2019) sees AL’s “humanitarian” response as a political card that it has used to counter international pressure and criticism regarding domestic issues. He says, the international community is “thinking [that] you are feeding, sheltering so many Rohingya, this is a tremendous job. Forget about the elections” (Manik, Personal communication, March 1, 2019). An interviewee who wished to maintain anonymity noted, “the government has carried out a fully forged election in the guise of its humanitarian response to the Rohingya.” The alleged rigging notwithstanding, AL appeared performed

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well in the elections. As Sabuj Sen13 points out, the AL regime has benefited in two ways from its “humanitarian” response, …The Muslim majority shows a positive attitude to the government because it has sheltered Rohingya. This had an impacted on the election results … In another way, the government has managed to get the powerful states on its side, as it has listened to them on the Rohingya issues. (Sen, Personal communication, March 11, 2019)

Similar views were reflected in the interviews with Manik highlighting especially the building of a positive international and domestic image of Sheikh Hasina. She has achieved worldwide attention and admiration. Channel 4, the British television channel, deemed her “Mother of Humanity” (“Government launches,” 2018). Hasina has received two international awards, the 2018 IPS International Achievement Award and the 2018 Special Distinction Award for Leadership. In its reports on these awards, The Daily Star wrote that she has been given the awards “for her humanitarian and responsible policy in hosting the Rohingya and for her far-sighted leadership over the Rohingya issue” (“PM receives 2,” 2018, para. 1). Hasina occupied 26th position in the Forbes magazine’s list of World’s 100 Most Powerful Women in 2018. Though this was not the first time for her to be listed in Forbes, the 2018 profile description the US magazine reads, “In 2017, [Sheikh Hasina] Wajed provided aid to Rohingya Muslim refugees fleeing Myanmar, allotting 2000 acres of land in Bangladesh for the refugees…Now she is working on the safe repatriation of Rohingya to Myanmar, saying that Bangladesh can’t bear the burden of permanent shelter” (Forbes, 2018). Thus, both AL and Hasina appear to have benefited from their “humanitarian” response to the plight of the Rohingya refugees. This response was a move away from their earlier restrictive measures. As demonstrated here, this change in policy was underpinned by changes in the AL-led government’s narratives about the Rohingya issue; from presenting them as a “security concern” and “burden” on the country’s economy in 2012, they moved on to recognize the nature of the refugees’ difficult circumstances and its resonance with the Bangladeshi people’s memory of the 1971 Liberation War.

 Sabuj Sen is a local high school teacher at Ukhiya, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh.

13

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Conclusion This chapter has contended that analysis of Bangladesh’s response to the Rohingya refugees needs to take into account the interests of the ruling political party. The argument holds over a period of time. In 1978, Ziaur Rahman provided shelter to the Rohingya refugees for sustaining his regime, by appeasing the Muslim majority of Bangladesh and obtaining support from Muslim countries. His response to the Rohingya refugees is seen as solidarity with Muslim brothers. As he reoriented the role of Islam in Bangladeshi politics and state affairs, providing shelter to the Rohingya was a demonstration of his commitment of standing with a member of Ummah in their time of need. His legacy was carried forward by his party BNP, which was in power during the second influx in 1991–1992. The prime minister at the time was none other than his wife and party chief Khaleda Zia. BNP too, under Khaleda Zia’s leadership, had to consider the stability of its regime, as Islamist forces took to the streets on the Rohingya issue on several occasions. In the final case discussed here, the AL government’s decision to move from “restrictive” policies to opening its border to the Rohingya in 2017 came as a surprise. However, this turnaround helped the government to reach out to domestic constituencies as well as the international community that were critical, among others, of its handling of domestic matters such as the work of the International Crimes Tribunal. The change in policy was also just in time to gain political mileage for the upcoming general election in 2018. Thus, the response of the AL-led government, under the leadership of Sheikh Hasina, to the Rohingya refugees can also be considered as one that was calculated to benefit the regime in power. All three regimes did not face much difficulty in responding positively to the Rohingya, as there was support—domestic and international—for such a policy. However, the pursuit of power and political legitimacy appears to have played a part, in different ways, in their “humanitarian response” (eventually, if not immediately). This suggests that the “humanitarian” response was not “fully benign” but “calculated,” and entailed political cost-benefit calculation on the part of all three regimes discussed here. The governments’ creation and perpetuation of particular narratives to lend credence to their policies, and their power to do so, was also examined in this chapter.

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Appendix: Questionnaire for Interview Section 1: For Diplomats/NGO Officials/Journalists/ Academicians/Locals Bangladesh’s Response to Rohingya (a) How do you see Bangladesh’s government response to the Rohingya refugees? (b) What are the consistent and/or changing aspects of Bangladesh’s policies on hosting the Rohingya since the 1970s? Factors Influencing Government Decisions (c) Why has Bangladesh been providing shelter to the Rohingya refugees in spite of having a poor economy and security concerns relating to refugees? (Follow-up option: How similar and/or different is this rationale from that of other countries in the Global South that host refugees?) (d) What are the key factors underlying Bangladesh’s refugee policies, specifically hosting Rohingya refugees? (Follow-up question: Do the factors remain the same in all three major influx of Rohingyas, particularly in 1978, 1991–1992, and 2017?) (e) Bangladesh allowed the Rohingya without any hesitation in 1978 but was initially reluctant in subsequent years, specifically in 1991–1992 and 2017. Why is this so? (f) Why did Bangladesh officially not allow the Rohingya from 2012 to 2016? (g) Has the government’s refugee policy been used to serve larger foreign policy goals of Bangladesh? If yes, please explain? Political Parties Interest (h) What kind of impact have changes in the government—in terms of the political party in power—had on national policies regarding the Rohingya refugees? (i) Have the political parties used the issue of Rohingya refugees to score points in the domestic arena? If so, how?

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(j) Has the Rohingya refugee issue impacted on domestic politics of Bangladesh? If yes, how so?

Section 2: For Politicians ( a) What is your party’s stance in providing shelter to the Rohingyas? (b) Has your party’s stance always remained the same? If so, why? If not, why not? (c) Why did your political party decide to allow the Rohingyas to enter even though Bangladesh is a country with limited economic resources and has had security concerns related to refugees? (Follow-up question: this has been popularly characterized as a “humanitarian” response—do you agree with this characterization? Why or why not?) ( d) Do you think that this decision aligns with the party’s interest as well? (e) In what ways is your party different from the other major political party (Awami League vs BNP) regarding hosting Rohingyas? (f) How has the Rohingya refugee issue impacted upon the domestic politics of Bangladesh? (g) Has the decision of hosting the Rohingya benefited or harmed Bangladesh in the international arena? Please explain your response. (h) Are you in favor of or against providing shelter to the Rohingya? Why?

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Hossain, F. (1992c, March 22). Rohingyas causing destruction of forests. The Daily Star. pp. 1, 12. Influx of Arakan Muslims: Cox’s Bazar faces serious problems. (1992, January 4). The Bangladesh Observer. pp. 1, 10. Irani, B. (2019, April 19). EC forms committee to prevent Rohingyas from enrolling in voter list. Dhaka Tribune. Retrieved from: https://www. dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/election/2019/04/19/ec-­forms-­committee-­to-­prevent­rohingyas-­from-­enrolling-­in-­voter-­list Islam, S. S. (1984). The state in Bangladesh under Zia (1975–81). Asian Survey, 24(5), 556–573. Retrieved from: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2644413 Islam, S. (2019). Hosting Rohingya Refugees: Explaining the factors influencing Bangladesh’s “humanitarian” response [MPhil Thesis]. Department of International Relations, South Asian University, New Delhi, India. Islam, M. N., & Hossain, M. (2020). Islam, Governance, and Political Culture in Bangladesh. In Farazmand A. (Eds.), Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance. Springer, Cham. https://doi. org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_4037-1 Islam, M. N., Bingöl Y., & Nyadera, I. N. (2020). Political and Administrative Culture in Turkey’s AK Party, Tunisian An-Nahada, and Bangladesh Jamat-e Islam. In Farazmand A. (Eds.), Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance. Springer, Cham. https://doi. org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_4028-1 Islam, M. N., Önder, M., & Nyadera, İ. N. (2020). Islam, Politics and Bangladesh: A Qualitative Content Analysis on the Democratic and Political Culture of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (BJI). Adam Academy Journal of Social Sciences, 10 (2), 291–318. Retrieved from https://dergipark.org.tr/en/pub/adamakademi/issue/59367/783781 Jamaat-e-Islami stripped of right to contest in Bangladesh elections. (2018, October 29). Bdnews24.com. Retrieved from: https://bdnews24.com/politics/2018/10/29/jamaat-­e-­islami-­stripped-­of-­r egistration-­to-­do-politics-­ in-­bangladesh Karim, R. (2010, January 6). Govt smartly pursuing thaw in thorny ties. The Daily Star. Retrieved from: http://archive.thedailystar.net/suppliments/2010/01/ al_oneyear/3_smartly.htm Khaleda address plenary session of OIC Summit: Islamic Ummah must face challenges of new era. (1991, December 11). The Daily Star. p. 1. Killing of BDR jawan protested. (1991, December 23). The Bangladesh Observer. pp. 1, 10. Kiragu, E., Rosi, A. L., & Morris, T. (2011). States of denial: A review of UNHCR’s response to the protracted situation of stateless Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. UNHCR. Retrieved from: https://www.unhcr.org/4ee754c19.pdf

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Kollol, K. (2013, September 6). What change has BNP brought in politics in 35 years [Translated from Bangla]. BBC. Retrieved from: https://www.bbc.com/ bengali/news/2013/09/130906_mh_bnp_35th-­anniversary Laqua, D. (2014). Inside the humanitarian cloud: Causes and motivations to help friends and strangers. Journal of Modern European History, 12(2), 175–185. Retrieved from: https://www.jstor.org/stable/26266128 Lopez, M. (2013). Elite theory. Sociopedia.isa. Retrieved from: www.sagepub. net/isa/resources/pdf/elitetheory.pdf Mahmud, H., & Islam, A. (2016). The constitution and the rules of Bangladesh Awami league. Bangladesh Awami League. Retrieved from: http://publication.albd.org/declaration-­and-­constitution-­2016/#p=98 Majumder, S. (2016). Secularism and annti-secularism. In A. Riaz & M. S. Rahman (Eds.), Routledge handbook of contemporary Bangladesh. Routledge. Massive world aid for Refugees needed: PM. (1992, March 6). The Daily Star. pp. 1, 12. Military cooperation: Dhaka Riyadh sign MoU. (2019, February 15). The Daily Star. Retrieved from: https://www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/news/military-­ cooperation-­dhaka-­riyadh-­sign-­mou-­1702504 Milliken, J. (1999). The study of discourse in international relations: A critique of research and methods. Euorpean Journal of International Relations, 5(2), 225–254. Retrieved from: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/ 10.1177/1354066199005002003 Milner, J. (2009). Refugees, the state and the politics of asylum in Africa. Palgrave Macmillan. Mukul Bose back in Awami League leadership. (2017, January 31). Bdnews24.com. Retrieved from: https://bdnews24.com/politics/2017/01/31/mukul-­bose-­ back-­in-­awami-­league-­leadership Mustafa, S. (2013, May 6). Hefazat-e-Islam: Islamist coalition. BBC. Retrieved from: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-­asia-­22424708 Mustafiz to visit Rangoon to talk Rohingya issue. (1991, November 4th). The Bangladesh Observer. p. 1. Myanmar claims ‘Jamaat Link’: Dipu Moni tells JS. (2012, June 15). The Daily Star. Retrieved from: https://www.thedailystar.net/news-­detail-­238432 Myanmar to take back 9,000 Rohingyas soon. (2009, December 29). The Daily Star. Retrieved from: https://www.thedailystar.net/news-­detail-­119694 PM receives 2 Int’l awards for hosting Rohingyas. (2018, September 29). The Daily Star. Retrieved from: https://www.thedailystar.net/rohingya-­crisis/ news/bangladesh-­pm-­sheikh-­hasina-­r eceives-­two-­un-­international-­awards-­ hosting-­rohingyas-­1639951 Police arrest 14 Rohingyas for infiltration. (2009, October 1). The Daily Star. Retrieved from: https://www.thedailystar.net/news-­detail-­107882 Prodhan, Z. H. (2011). Foreign policy and Bangladesh. Ittadi Grantho Prokash.

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Rahman, U. (2010). The Rohingya refugee: A security dilemma for Bangladesh. Journal of Immigrants & Refugee Studies, 8(2), 233–239. https://doi. org/10.1080/1556294100379213 Rahman, M.  S. (2013). Bangladesh: State, nation and Tagore. In I.  Ahmed, M.  Dubey, & V.  Sikri (Eds.), Contemporarising Tagore and the world. The University Press Limited. Rashiduzzaman, M. (1978). Bangladesh in 1977: Dilemmas of the military rulers. Asian Survey, 18(2), 126–134. Retrieved from: https://www.jstor.org/ stable/2643306 Riaz, A. (2016). Bangladesh: A political history since Independence. I.B. Tauris & Ltd. Riot in Rakhine state: No more refugees. (2012, June 13). The Daily Star. Retrieved from: https://www.thedailystar.net/news-­detail-­238074 Rohingyas adding burden on our economy. (1992, February 6). The Daily Star. p. 9. Rohingyas to be sent back peacefully. (1992, January 16). The Bangladesh Observer. p. 1, 10. Ruhin, O. H. (2007, June 24). Hasina, Amu trades blames. New Age. Retrieved from: https://web.archive.org/web/20080410121924/http://www.newagebd.com/2007/jun/24/front.html van Schendel, W. (2009). A history of Bangladesh. Cambridge University Press. Secularism back. (2010, October 5). The Daily Star. Retrieved from: https:// www.thedailystar.net/news-­detail-­157212 Sengupta, S. (2018). Stateless, floating people: The Rohingya at sea. In S. B. R. Chaudhury & R. Samaddar (Eds.), The Rohingya in South Asia: People without a state. Routledge. Shaon, A. I. (2018a). Eight years of war crimes trials. Dhaka Tribune. Retrieved from: https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/war-­c rimes/2018/08/18/ eight-­years-­of-­war-­crimes-­trials Shaon, A. I. (2018b). Qawmi leaders back Sheikh Hasina for another term. Dhaka Tribune. Retrieved from: https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/ dhaka/2018/11/04/qawmi-­l eaders-­w ant-­t o-­s ee-­s heikh-­h asina-­i n-­ power-­again Shehabuddin, S. T. (2016). Bangladeshi politics since independence. In A. Riaz & M.  S. Rahman (Eds.), Routledge handbook of contemporary Bangladesh. Routledge. Sheikh Hasina: Growth-oriented ‘Iron Lady’ for some, ‘authoritarian’ for others. (2018, December 31). Business Insider. Retrieved from: https://www.business-­ standard.com/article/pti-­stories/sheikh-­hasina-­growth-­oriented-­iron-­lady-­ for-­some-­authoritarian-­for-­others-­118123100419_1.html Speed up Rohingya repatriation: Myanmar urged. (2009, December 30). The Daily Star. Retrieved from: https://www.thedailystar.net/news-­detail-­119845 Spell it out to Yangon. (1991, December 24). The Daily Star. p. 4.

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Stop atrocities. (2017, September 13). The Daily Star. Retrieved from: https:// www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/stop-­atrocities-­1461100 Uddin, S. M. (2006). Constructing Bangladesh: Religion, ethnicity, and language in an Islamic nation. The University of North Carolina Press. Uddin, N. (2012). Of hosting and hurting: Crises in co-existence with Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. In N.  Uddin (Ed.), To host or to hurt: Counter-­ narratives on Rohingya refugees issue in Bangladesh. Dhaka. UK for credible resolution of complaints on Bangladesh polls irregularities. (2019, January 2). The Daily Star. Retrieved from: https://www.thedailystar.net/ bangladesh-­national-­election-­2018/united-­kingdom-­for-­transparent-­resolution­complaints-­on-­election-­irregularities-­1681912 Umar, B. (2017). The emergence of Bangladesh: Rise of Bengali nationalism (Vol. II). Foundation Books. UNGA-United Nations General Assembly. (2017, September 21). Official records of the 14th plenary meeting of the seventy-second session of the General Assembly. A/72/PV.14. Available from: https://undocs.org/en/A/72/PV.14 UNHCR team arrives today: Dhaka’s appeal to UN for relief to Rohingyas. (1992, February 16). The Bangladesh Observer. pp. 1, 10. US criticizes Bangladesh for ‘lopsided’ elections in human rights report. (2019, March 15). Bdnews24.com. Retrieved from: https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2019/03/15/us-­criticises-­bangladesh-­for-­lopsided-­elections-­in-­human-­ rights-­report US, EU ask Bangladesh to investigate reports of election irregularities but promise support. (2019, January 2). Bdnews24.com. Retrieved from: https://bdnews24. com/bangladesh/2019/01/02/us-­eu-­ask-­bangladesh-­to-­investigate-­reports-­ of-­election-­irregularities-­but-­promise-­support USBCIS-United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services. (2001). Bangladesh: Information on the situation of Rohingya refugees. Retrieved from: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3deccb113.html Weldes, J., Laffey, M., Gusteron, H., et  al. (1999). Introduction: Constructing insecurity. In J. Weldes, M. Laffey, H. Gusteron, et al. (Eds.), Culture of insecurity: States, communities, and the production of danger. University of Minnesota Press. Zia’s policy for Muslim unity to continue: PM. (1991, November 10). The Daily Star. pp. 1, 12. 10 Rohingyas arrested, 3 sent back. (2012, August 4). The Daily Star. Retrieved from: https://www.thedailystar.net/news-­detail-­244756 1000 Refugees coming daily: Rohingyas creating pressure on country’s resources. (1992, February 26). The Bangladesh Observer. pp. 111. 17000 Rohingyas off updated voters list. (2016, January 16). Bdnews24.com. Retrieved from: https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2013/01/16/17000­rohingyas-­off-­updated-­voters-­list

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18 Rohingyas arrested. (2009, July 16). The Daily Star. Retrieved from: https:// www.thedailystar.net/news-­detail-­97281 26 Rohingyas pushed back to Myanmar. (2009, February 10). The Daily Star. Retrieved from: https://www.thedailystar.net/news-­detail-­75224 28 Rohingyas arrested in Bandarban. (2009, July 23). The Daily Star. Retrieved from: https://www.thedailystar.net/news-­detail-­98351 45,866 Rohingyas off voter list. (2010, August 5). The Daily Star. Retrieved from: https://www.thedailystar.net/news-­detail-­149475 49 Rohingyas intruders held at Teknaf. (2009, May 21). The Daily Star. Retrieved from: https://www.thedailystar.net/news-­detail-­89153

CHAPTER 6

Questioning the Crisis of “Rohingya Muslim” Ethnic Minority Beyond the Foreign Policy of Bangladesh and Myanmar Md. Nazmul Islam and Md. Habibur Rahman

Introduction Bangladesh and Myanmar are two independent states of South Asia and Southeast Asia. These days South Asia and Southeast Asia’s peace and stability deteriorate due to the Rohingya refugee crisis, especially between Bangladesh and Myanmar. Bangladesh was praised for their laudable enterprises to aid Rohingya refugees in the Chottogram division on humanitarian grounds (Riaz, 2017; BBC, February 2018; Banik, 2015; Ministry of Information, 2008; Islam & Rahman, 2018). The present

Md. N. Islam (*) Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Ankara, Turkey Md. H. Rahman Department of Public Administration, Dr. Wazed Research and Training Institute, Begum Rokeya University, Rangpur, Bangladesh © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 K. Bülbül et al. (eds.), Rohingya Refugee Crisis in Myanmar, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6464-9_6

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horrors and “Clearance Operation” have been operated by the Myanmar military against the Muslim minority in the Rakhine state for some causal factors. The Myanmar authority endorsed the recent crackdown against Rohingya ethnic minority groups for attacking its security forces on August 25, 2017 (Islam & Rahman, 2018). Therefore, Rohingya refugees’ influx has increased, with an estimated 655,000 people having been pushed across the border between Myanmar and Bangladesh in the shortest possible time in the history of human civilization, to escape torture, discrimination and security forces’ indiscriminate attacks (Khin, 2018; Reuters, September 21, 2017d; Islam & Rahman, 2018). The Rohingya people have been confronted with decades of religious discrimination and repression under the successive governments of Myanmar. According to the Citizenship Law of 1982, they are the largest stateless populations in the world. Many Rohingya people have been killed and assaulted sexually during the recent outrages by the Myanmar armies in the Rakhine state of Myanmar. Myanmar army denies this accusation and that of massacre of Rohingya Muslims from the beginning of the Rohingya problem. Nonetheless, in 2018, seven soldiers of Myanmar were penalized to ten years in prison with hard work for participating and playing an active role in the killing of ten Rohingya men, which showed the reality of this disaster and how Myanmar’s military uses their strength to spread vulnerability and violence (the Guardian, April 10, 2018b; Islam & Rahman, 2018). A research organization named the Ontario International Development Agency (OIDA) highlighted more than 23,962 Rohingya people killed by the Myanmar armies. Moreover, it reported more than 17,718 Rohingya women and girls who the Myanmar army and police systematically raped. This incident added a new dimension, and was of great concern as an ethnic massacre (Daily Sabah, 2018; Islam & Rahman, 2018). Religion never permits torture and crime against humanity; however, some Buddhists of Myanmar misinterpreted their religion. Generally, bloodshed on any religion’s name is not permitted (Islam & Rahman, 2018). However, some misguided people are provoked by the misinterpretation of their so-called religious values. They are far from the teaching and follow their religion. They never try to realize the contextual truth and philosophy of religion. Some violent groups are committing fanatic acts in the name of the following religions: Judaism, Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, Sikhism and Islam (Jonayed, 2012; Islam & Rahman, 2018). Some extreme Buddhists of Myanmar collectively attack

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Rohingyas in the name of their religion. They are spreading hatred and violence among the communities. But the philosophy of Buddhism does not support their activities. The TIME reports about “The Face of Buddhist Terror” on July 1, 2013, highlighted the monks who were provoking fanaticism and ferocity, usually against Muslim minority groups in the Rakhine state. U Wirathu1 (the Burmese bin Laden), a spiritual leader, propagated to Buddhist people for eliminating Muslim minority groups’ business and communities from Myanmar (Time, 2013; Islam & Rahman, 2018). The sufferings of Rohingya refugees know no bounds after the recent crackdown against them as they are facing many problems in economic, political and social sectors. The recent operation was executed by the Myanmar authority for fulfilling their circuitous motivation in the Rakhine state. The Rakhine authorities want to serve their trade, tourism and project interests by annihilating Rohingya communities. A news agency reports that Rohingya Muslims’ departure started in 2017 after the militant groups invaded police posts and subsequently killed 12 members of the Myanmar security forces (BBC, September 19, 2017a; Islam & Rahman, 2018). On the other hand, according to Bangladesh’s former foreign minister A. H. Mahmood Ali, 3000 Rohingya Muslims were killed following an army operation in the Rakhine state in 2017. He disclosed his reports to the media in October 2017 (The Daily Star, October 10, 2017a; Islam & Rahman, 2018). The Human Rights Watch found that the Myanmar security forces steadily raped and assaulted women and girls during the military operation on villages. It published this report on November 16, 2017. This report was prepared based on 52 interviews with female Rohingya girls together with 29 survivors of rape, who had fled to Bangladesh. Rape survivors were from 19 isolated villages of Myanmar’s Rakhine state, mostly from northern Buthiduang and Maungdaw townships (HRW, 2017; Islam & Rahman, 2018). The international community, international institutions and organizations, foreign states, individuals and other rights groups condemned Myanmar’s military operations for gross violation of human rights, as well as domestic and international civil and political rights. Unfortunately, the Burmese army and the Myanmar government rejected all these serious allegations (Islam & Rahman, 2018). However, members from Myanmar military forces had recently confessed 1  U Wirathu is regarded as the Burmese bin Laden for his violent activities against non-­ Burmese ethnic groups including Muslim community.

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for the first time that its soldiers had been engaged in unlawful butchery and violence against Rohingya Muslim minorities in the Rakhine state (BBC, September 20, 2017b). This means that these security forces have grossly violated the human rights as well as citizenship rights of Rohingyas. Rohingya people have been steadily migrating from Myanmar to Bangladesh as they are deprived of their civil and political rights in their motherland. On the other hand, these ethnic groups have been deprived of their fundamental and human rights by their state authority and security forces. There were about 800,000 Rohingya Muslim minority groups that were living in Myanmar. The number decreases as they face persecution and become victims of inhumane carnages being carried out by the Myanmar security forces in the Western Burmese state of Rakhine. The UN has highlighted that the Rohingya minority groups are stateless and the world’s most neglected and oppressed groups. They were denied their citizenship rights by the Myanmar government, and are being treated as citizens of Bangladesh trespassing illegally in Myanmar. As a result, the influxes of Rohingya people into Bangladesh are increasing, as they are not welcomed in their own state (Phillips, 2003; Islam & Rahman, 2018). The bilateral agreement signed between Bangladesh and Myanmar did not ensure a sustainable resolution to regional and international stakeholders’ negligent role. Nevertheless, Bangladesh’s recent humanitarian step is generating some problems because of its limited resources and dense population. In accordance with the 1992/1993 repatriation pact, the Bangladesh government has already come up with a new repatriation agreement with Myanmar. However, this initiative did not bring a sustainable solution to the prevailing human-made disaster (Islam & Rahman, 2018). The human rights agencies and respective arbitrators feel that it does not offer a solution for the Rohingyas (Banik, 2015; Liton, 2017; Islam & Rahman, 2018).

Necessities and Justifications of the Study These days different types of conflict and violence generate in the name of nationalism and ethnicity in various parts of the world. Taras and Ganguly (2002) mentioned that nationalism, ethnicity and religion are among the most potent political weapons in today’s world. Nationalism, ethnicity and religion are categorically driving tools to destabilize peace, harmony and security among the communities in some cases. However, Brown (1993) argued, the recent spreading of democracy accelerated the number of

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bloody ethnic conflicts in Eastern Europe and other parts of the world. The recent crackdown in Myanmar reminds the world of humanity’s descending history and seems to be following the same trend. Some domestic retrospective laws systematically deny Rohingya ethnic minority groups’ legal rights, generating many adverse outcomes. The 1982 citizenship act was directly affected by the stateless ethnic minority groups. They were also denied participating in the Myanmar national census in 2015 because most of them were Muslims. Many observers labelled these August 2017 problems as ethnic cleansing and genocide undertaken by ruthless military operations (Riaz, 2017). The United Nations (UN) said that it is a textbook example of “ethnic cleansing” (Safi, September 11, 2017; UN, September 11, 2017b). The UN Special Advisor “Adama Dieng” considered that crimes against humanity or genocide were committed against Rohingya ethnic minority groups in Rakhine state. He outlined some proposals to address the problems immediately (UN, March 12, 2018). Additionally, the recent report of the “United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission” states that the Rohingya crisis “undoubtedly amounts to the gravest crimes under international law”. The report indicates the Tatmadaw assisted in committing genocide and committed crimes against humanity in the north of the Rakhine state. This report also contains the names of senior personnel, named by General Min Aung Hlaing. As one of Myanmar’s top military generals, he was asked to investigate and prosecute culprits of the genocide in the north of the Rakhine state, as the genocidal activities and strategies of the Myanmar military have raised many questions. This fact-finding mission uncovered some incidents, including murder, imprisonment, enslavement, persecution, different types of sexual violence, sexual slavery, rape and torture in Kachin, Shan and the Rakhine states by the Tatmadaw (Myanmar army). This report urged the perpetrators to be caught and indicted by the justice system (OHCHR, August 27, 2018). International stakeholders in Myanmar are deeply involved in preserving their economic and diplomatic interests, and thus are turning a blind eye to the Rohingya catastrophe. Some countries have even supported the Myanmar authority without taking into consideration the persecution of the Rohingyas. They are choosing to overlook this compassionate international emergency for their own strategic and trade interests. The rise of extremist Buddhist nationalist groups in Myanmar has worsened the conditions compared to past years. Two of the UN Security Council’s permanent members, China and Russia, vetoed in favor of Myanmar on the

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Rohingya predicament in 2016 and 2017–18, respectively. India, another regional superpower with nuclear capabilities, has maintained good relations with Myanmar to diminish Chinese hegemony. The Indian prime minister visited Myanmar on September 5, 2017, in order to accelerate national interests without considering the current regional calamity. Meanwhile, the Indian government had decided to expatriate 40,000 Rohingya people from the country. Some states had even assisted Myanmar by supplying military equipment (Wilkes, 2017). Israel paid no heed to the international embargo as they supplied weapons to Myanmar. Pakistan also pushed ahead to provide F-16 Jets to Myanmar in February 2017 (Yavuz, 2017; Lazaroff, 2019). Some influential countries have maintained triangular2 relations with Myanmar and Bangladesh to preserve their national and geographical interests. The US secretary of state met with civilian and military leaders of Myanmar on November 15, 2017, and urged for an immediate neutral enquiry into the reports of human rights violations against the Rohingya Muslims by Myanmar security forces. He reminded everyone that the US is committed to initiating a formative action on the Rakhine Rohingya calamity at the UN Security Council and General Assembly’s Third Committee (Tillerson, November 15, 2017; Beech, 2017; Slodkowski, 2017). Douma (2003) argued that the geopolitical location has increased the importance of the Rakhine state as it sits at the crossroads of China, Laos, Burma (Myanmar) and India, while Chaturvedi (2012) showed that both the Myanmar security forces and Buddhist communities have tortured the Rohingya ethnic minority groups and treated them as outsiders. Although these ethnic groups have been living in the same country for many years, they have had to fight for their rights for decades and thus have grown accustomed to being subjected to gross human rights violations. The communal conflict started between Rakhine Buddhists and ethnic Rohingya communities in May–June 2012 after riots in the Rakhine state. Aung San Suu Kyi addressed the Buddhist community’s issue, resulting in the loss of her neutrality and credibility. Countries of the world as well as the peace-loving citizens condemned the silent approach of Suu Kyi during this crisis of the Rohingya refugees. The international community and donor countries were astonished by Aung San Suu Kyi’s silence and one-sided democratic behavior. The spiritual leader of Tibetan Buddhism, Dalai Lama, had requested his fellow 2

 Triangular indicates the relation among Bangladesh, Myanmar and other states.

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Nobel peace laureate, Suu Kyi, to reduce this human-made disaster and qualm fears of a mass exodus (Dorje, September 11, 2017). Moreover, it is alleged that Suu Kyi is lagging in the election process and is losing the Burmese people’s support. Some national, international media and news reporters have faced retrospective litigations and similar nuisance from the Myanmar authority for covering violence and sexual harassment issues toward Rohingya people on their media network. Lowell Dittmer (2008) states that human rights violations such as extrajudicial killings, rape, forced labor and forced relocations continue in the ethnic minority areas, especially eastern Burma. These types of tortures are common phenomena for the Rohingya people in their very own country. Reuters reports (2017) that the Buddhist villagers and Myanmar security forces systematically executed ten Rohingya men in Myanmar’s Rakhine state on September 2, 2018. This news agency unlocked the carnage and other information on the incidents. Two of Reuters’ journalists were arrested by Myanmar police during the reporting of this incident. Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo were penalized with a sentence of seven years in prison in the name of violating the state’s Officials Secrets Act. The respective observers and reporters protested for their unconditional release as per Human Rights and International Laws (the Guardian, September 3, 2018a). Recently, they were released after spending 500 days in jail (Reuters, May 7, 2019). The ethnic and minority groups of Bangladesh and Myanmar are often treated differently, as one lives peacefully while the other groups are forced to migrate to another country. To understand Rohingya Muslims’ massive crisis, we must look upon the ethnic status of Rohingyas in Myanmar. There is an academic ambiguity in this regard, that is, whether the Rohingya catastrophe is an ethnic problem or a religious one. Sometimes it is even compared with a benevolent disaster. Habib (2011) argued that ethnicity is an essential aspect of human life. Ethnic identity is one of the major drivers of continuing instability especially in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) of Bangladesh, a home to 12 different ethnic groups (Ahmed, 2001). Some of these groups had migrated from Arakan, the current Rakhine state of Myanmar and other parts of the world. The influxes of Rohingya refugees have created additional pressure and tension in this area.

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Literature Reviews Scholars like Chaturvedi (2012), Steinberg (2012) and Phillips (2003) have research works on ethnic conflict and Rohingya refugees. Many studies and research works have been accomplished on the Rohingya crisis; however, this study prioritized the foreign policy of Bangladesh and Myanmar regarding the Rohingya refugee crisis and amicable solutions to the problems. The researchers have already pinpointed some limitations and drawbacks after assessing literature in this field. The current study has endeavoured to fulfil a new value in academic research and respective fields. Azad and Jasmin (2013) explored the sustainable resolution of the protracted refugee problems between Bangladesh and Myanmar. They found that the host and asylum country, that is, Bangladesh, faces some constraints like financial and physical resource limitations for the Rohingya communities, whereas international donor agencies have supported enormously to assist the vulnerable ethnic minority groups of Myanmar. They brought up in different light suggestions and effective resolutions followed by UN Refugee Agency. They also highlighted the perspective of the world’s well-concerned states and also their diplomatic initiatives. But they did not highlight proper grounds to address the problems of Rohingyas and the foreign policy of the two states regarding them. Rahman (2015) justified the Rohingya vulnerability as an ethno-­ political conflict. His study is based on qualitative methodology with reference to secondary sources. He assessed that 43% of the Rohingya people are living their lives in refugees shelters and 87% of them are deprived of fundamental needs. He investigated the root causes of ethnic conflict and evaluated the humanitarian vulnerability of the Rohingyas. He found that the Rohingya communities are living in miserable conditions and are deprived of their fundamental needs and human rights. Zawacki (2013) identifies three distinct terms and factors, including “nationality and discrimination”, “stateless and displacement” and “the principle of accountability to defend”, in defining Rohingya problems. He thought that these characteristics are the primary causes of Rohingya problems. Some scholars have assessed the Rohingya refugee crisis in order to find out a sustainable solution. Wolf (2017) evaluated the Rohingya communities as the most persecuted groups for the historical trajectory followed by political and economic factors shaping the issue of religious conflict in his working paper. He assessed that the conflict situations had

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been prolonged for the states’ internal security patterns and international and regional factors. Saha (2001) assessed the criteria of the repatriation process between Bangladesh and Myanmar and the role of the United Nations and the international stakeholders. He found that Bangladesh and Myanmar did not sign the UN Convention on the Status of Refugees, which prolongs the nature of conflict and Rohingya crisis. His study’s findings highlighted that Bangladesh showed positive attitude toward Rohingya repatriation to Myanmar, whereas Myanmar was reluctant on this matter. He urged that voluntary repatriation could be a sustainable solution to this protracted conflict. Some researchers argued that soft diplomacy and inactive response to the crisis are responsible for turning this conflict into a prolonged issue. Riaz (2017) and Islam and Rahman (2018) appraised that Bangladesh have been carrying the responsibility of taking care of Rohingya refugees since 1978. Though an agreement was signed to repatriate 200,000 refugees in 1979 under the UN’s supervision, thousands have moved to Bangladesh after the beginning of the communal riots. On the other hand, almost 500,000 Rohingya people had stayed in Bangladesh, and many of them lived in poor conditions near the Bangladesh-Myanmar border. Primarily, Bangladesh considered Myanmar’s demand against the operation on militancy that was started in August 2017. Later, Bangladesh proposed a joint military operation on the border, while Myanmar disagreed. Myanmar propagates to engage in war as its helicopters have crossed Bangladesh’s air space. Genesis of the Rohingya Problem It is argued that the Burmese policy is the latent and direct cause of the Rohingya catastrophe in this region, and all political parties of Myanmar sustain this policy for their political interest. The Myanmar military-backed government adopted many domestic policies to continue their influence without the constitution’s turmoil (Islam & Rahman, 2018). Chaturvedi (2012) evaluated that the situation has deteriorated further and subsequent takeover of General Ne Win’s state power since the 1962 military coup. The Burmese policy of Ne Win directly affected ethnic minorities. Additionally, Steinberg (2012) clarified that the civilian government (1948–62) also formulated the same policy by stressing its strong Buddhist traditions as the religion is followed by 88% of the population.

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Consequently, this was the transference of the Burman majority Buddhist’s primordial value into the population. U Nu was elected in 1960 based on Buddhist religious mandate and supported Buddhism as the state religion. The multiethnic societies were divided into many parts to adhere to the election manifesto (Islam & Rahman, 2018). The Politics of Rohingya Crisis and Its Question Some researchers assessed that the 1982 Citizenship Act directly affected Rohingya people as they did not regain citizenship for a second time. Phillips (2003) calculated that the military junta implemented dual policies over its citizens. Firstly, it initiated some plans and operations regarding their communal interest. The military junta launched “Operation Nagamin (Dragon King)” to investigate Burma’s illegal immigrants in 1977. Therefore, more than 200,000 Rohingyas migrated to Bangladesh in the 1990s because of the military operation and religious affliction. Anterior Dictator General Ne Win formulated the “Burmese Citizenship Act” in 1982 to cancel the identity of ethnic minority groups. Although this law officially recognized limited numbers of ethnic minority groups, the Rohingya ethnic groups were refused their citizenship rights. This act mentioned that an immigrant who was colonized before independence of Myanmar will be counted as a legal foreigner. The ethnic minority groups who were unable to substantiate their immigration status were declared illegal immigrants in Myanmar. These initiatives were defective and dangerous for an ethnic community, because of which minority groups had no civil and political rights. They systematically lost their official citizenship status. After violence broke out in 2012, the military and Buddhist leaders successfully divided the nation based on communal feelings prevalent among the ethnic groups of Myanmar. Recently, Myanmar rejected UN resolution over Rohingya citizenship appeal (McPherson & Lewis, 2018; Islam & Rahman, 2018). All the military governments of Myanmar have adopted the same policies toward the Rohingya minority. Consequently, it prevails even today (Islam & Rahman, 2018). Ethnic Communities in Myanmar Myanmar is a multiethnic society. Communal conflict hampers peaceful coexistence among ethnic groups of Myanmar. According to Steinberg (2012), many minorities groups are living in Myanmar, as ethnic minority

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groups comprise one-third of the total population. He mentioned that the government identified 135 ethnic groups that were contradictory to current facts, data and information. There are some current active insurrections among the ethnic groups, who are struggling for their fundamental and human rights. They challenged the central government’s rules and policies at the regional level for autonomy. Burmese, security forces and non-Burmese often engage in communal conflict to terrorize and pressurize other groups in Myanmar (Islam & Rahman, 2018). Communal Riots in Rakhine State Some army personnel of Myanmar were directly involved in communal riots and violence in the Rakhine state toward Rohingya refugees. These Muslim minorities have been persecuted by the military personnel and Burmese community over decades. Communal riots occurred in the Rakhine state between the ethnic Rohingyas and Rakhainese Buddhists between May and June 2012 (HRW, 2013; Islam & Rahman, 2018). The recent trend of violence has already attached a new dimension in the history of Myanmar communal conflict. The recent violence broke out when Rohingya militants attacked government forces on August 25, 2017. The Myanmar military set off a “Clearance operation” against militant groups and unarmed Rohingya minority groups. Consequently, hundreds of thousands of Rohingya were forced to escape from their homes in northern Rakhine state and seek shelter in the neighboring Bangladesh (Reuters, September 21, 2017c; Khin, 2018; Islam & Rahman, 2018). These researches have focused basically on the causes of Rohingya conflict, refugee crisis, international migration, regional security concerns and other relevant factors of Rohingya ethnic communities. Moreover, the present study provides an outline to examine the interests of foreign countries in the Rakhine state and explore the role of Myanmar in this emergency. However, this chapter endeavors to answer the Rohingya refugee crisis beyond Bangladesh and Myanmar’s foreign policy. This study has been accomplished using a qualitative methodology to compensate for a shortage of time, resources and geographical distance. This study utilized secondary data and information which we collected from various publications like international daily newspapers, including those from the US, the UK, Turkey, Bangladesh and Myanmar. The theoretical discussion was followed by the relationship among the ethnic groups and conflict and the Rohingya refugee emergency approaches. To prepare the conceptual

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analysis and interpretation of data and information, we used the previous works of literature and distant views of international institutions such as the United Nations, Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the Human Rights Watch and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Most of the literature, documents, case studies, notes and observations interpreted were collected from the published news of the daily newspaper since the recent crisis on the Rohingya community in 2017 and 2018. After the Cold War between the US and USSR (Russia), social constructivism played a vital role in understanding ethnicity and politics of ethnicity (Joireman, 2003). Ethnicity and nationalism are complementary parts of the same coin as they are connected. Generally, personal identity differentiates on region, religion, language, custom and race. The terms “identity” and “ethnicity” have some differences in their usage in academic literature and general understanding of human being. People use these two terms for their own interests and ethnic points of view. Ethnicity is a crucial segment of political identity. Ethnicity is considered as the politics of belonging. It is comprised of memories, culture and a sense of solidarity. Economic and political oppression is often considered as a critical factor in identity choice. Nationalism has caused political deterioration, and thus politics of exclusion. For example, people of diverse ethnic backgrounds are suffering from various forms of discrimination in many parts of the world. Ethnic struggle often happens because economic development echoes a pattern and ethnic conflict. Nationalism appears before the nation. Nationalism maneuvers ethnicity. An ethnic group must be mobilized politically before it becomes a nation, and political mobilization drives them through a collective objective of recognition. Ethnic cleansing is an undertaking by an elite ethnic group wherein they bombard a minority ethnic group with violence and carnage with a hope that the particular members of that minority ethnic group abandon their homes and leave the place, thereby making the area ethnically homogeneous and under the control of a single elite ethnic group (Joireman, 2003). Primordialism Primordialism is an epistemological basis for analyzing the ethnic conflict, which prioritizes the natural characteristics of ethnic groups. Aborigine is one of the first theoretical discussions of this study for analyzing and scrutinizing ethnic conflict. Polarization played a vital role in Myanmar ethnic

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conflict. Primordialism is one of the pertinent theories of ethnic conflict regarding Myanmar’s Rohingya crisis between Bangladesh and Myanmar (Sundar & Sundar, 2014). The researchers argued the theory of primordial concept to identify the Rohingya refugee crisis as an ethnic identity crisis and to relate this study’s methodology. Taras and Ganguly (2002) argued that ethnic identity is considered as bestowed and supernatural affairs, whereas ethnic scholars found that ethnic groups think they are members of a kinship, groups and neighborhood. Consequently, they are committed to partaking in something special with the other members for specific common objectives and cultural syndromes. Blood connection and kinship are determinant factors of priomordialism of ethnic conflicts. Ethnicity is closely connected with blood ties or kinship. Scholars argued that the foundation of ethnic identity is deeply involved with the historical descent of family ties. The recent ethnic conflict and Rohingya refugee emergency are categorized as a primordial’s view, for instance the Burmese policy being treated negatively for the non-­ Burmese people. On the other hand, the Rwandan genocide incidents happened for the exact cause in 1994. A person’s ethnic identity cannot be amended because it is fixed by birth. The emergence of ethnic cleansing and ethnic politics occurred after the end of the Cold War. The world community and ordinary people observed the ugly face of ethnic conflicts in Bosnia and Rwanda. A vast number of people were killed in the name of ethnicity and political factors. Primordial matter argued that ethnic identification and nationalism are not new phenomena; instead, they are rooted in both human biology and historical aspects of the distant past. The abovementioned characteristics and qualities have some understanding about ethnic conflict. The researchers of indigenous studies and primordial analyzed that the ethnic conflicts have augmented dramatically after the end of the Cold War to create new ethnic groups and nationalist causes. The origin of ethnic issue has turned into sources of conflict. The origins of the ethnic groups are closely connected with the original history. Day by day, the ethnic issue has turned into sources of conflict. Primordialists have argued that ethnic identities remain associated for the time being with the ethnic identities of the parent, and are not changeable. Ethnicity is like sex or age. Primordial scholars like Joireman (2003) have argued that ethnic sentiment, or ethnocentrism, is a natural, inborn quality of human society. Darwin’s theory of “survival of the fittest” is a determinant factor in ethnic group identification (Joireman, 2003).

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Instrumentalism Instrumentalism is another epistemology approach that assists in exploring ethnic conflict and its causes. This approach is a determinant factor in analyzing communal groups’ conflict in Myanmar (Sundar & Sundar, 2014). Taras and Ganguly (2002) refer that ethnicity is an essential apparatus used by individuals, groups or elites to achieve larger, characteristically essential goals. Ethnic groups try to obtain their collective interests for many reasons. Therefore, politicized ethnicity is the creation of elites who draw upon their interests. On the other hand, they wish to represent for protecting their well-being or achieve political and economic amenities for the groups’ interests and themselves. Consequently, conflict occurs among the groups for diversified incompatible goals. Some people confront each other because of the instrumental point of view, without considering human beings’ natural setting. Instrumentalists think that ethnicity is undependable. It is focused on the goal of ethnic groups. They have analyzed the Rwanda genocide as an instrumental view that had a different interpretation. After obtaining Rwanda’s independence in 1962, the power of the state transformed to indigenous people Hutus. However, the peaceful transition of power was blocked by minority group Tutsi, who wanted to hold onto power as they had governed the country during colonial administration. In the aftermath, they engaged in civil war, and many Tutsi fled to the neighboring countries Congo and Uganda as refugees. The Hutu seized power of government and remained in power until 1994. They controlled the armed Tutsi opposition movements from the early 1990s onward. Basically, violence happened in 1973 because of the institutional and political discrimination by the Hutu administration. Many Tutsi left Rwanda owing to the off-putting quotas and violent incidents in Rwanda. The local governments and community members of Hutu people killed 800,000 Tutsi Rwanda in 1994. The Hutus indigenous people committed acts of genocidal violence to control Rwanda and retain power (Joireman, 2003). These two abovementioned epistemological discussions have some rational foundations to analyze the ethnic and indigenous conflict among the people. The main epistemology approaches in the quest for analyzing the causes of ethnic conflict included the two causes stereotypically. Brown (1993) argues that, firstly, some conflicts demand the occurrence of a miscellaneous indigenous public within a solo state. He mentions the contributory factor as being an indigenous conflict based on the scuffle

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between different administrative influences and eminence groups. Secondly, he describes that some ethnic conflicts oblige a position in which at least one group feels aggrieved. Some people find the current distribution of power among the ethnic groups making up the state as unfortunate, or sometimes they feel that the ethnic groups are being victimized. It is difficult to differentiate their grievances based on legal and political perspectives. Subsequently, there is a possibility for violence and conflict among the groups. This theory replicates the situation of the Rakhine state.3 The emergence of Rohingya people have been debated over the decades within and outside of Myanmar. The forename Rohingya is derived from Rohang, or Rohan. The names presented to those who lived in the Arakan state throughout the ninth and tenth centuries. On the other hand, the Rakhine community is the ethnic majority, including a Hindu and a Mongol hinterland (Aljazeera, April, 18, 2018; the Advisory Commission Rakhine State, 2017). The Advisory Commission on Rakhine State (2017) states that the Muslim ethnic community lived in the Rakhine state before the Burmese annexation. In the aftermath, during colonial times, the Muslim community’s population rate had increased under British administration. The Rakhine people had lived peacefully together for decades with Buddhist and Muslim communities. However, the peaceful coexistence and cooperation of these groups were hampered by communal tension and armed mayhems since the mid-­nineteenth century. Panglong agreement is the root cause of the ethnic conflict of Myanmar. Panglong agreement was signed in 1947 to form a common identity among the ethnic groups. However, the agreement is the main debatable and critical issue for the ethnic community. General Aung San, the founding father of Myanmar, formulated the critical Panglong agreement in 1947, which was an identical and debatable factor for ethnic minority groups. The Myanmar authority called on some ethnic minority groups, for example Shan, Kachin and Chin, to codify some rules and policies regarding their future governance and status. Although the Rohingya and some other communities were not invited to the conferences, they had contributed to the country’s independence (Chaturvedi, 2012). Therefore,

3  See More: The situation of Rakhine state is one of the case studies of these abovementioned epistemology approaches as Rohingya people have been deprived of their indigenous rights; they feel aggrieved because of the identity crisis and power-sharing crisis in their country (www.cfr.org, www.bbc.com, and www.hrw.org).

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they face many problems owing to misrepresentation in the Panglong agreement and the conferences.

Foreign Countries’ Interest in Rakhine State China and India have some economic and political interests in the Rakhine state of Myanmar. To understand how Myanmar can carry out this massacre on the Rohingya people, it is imperative to comprehend the geostrategic position of Myanmar, and that’s why powerful regional countries still support this heinous act that the Myanmar government commits. Some foreign states have many geostrategic and business interests in Myanmar. They are investing their currency and resources for fostering their economic development and regional connectivity where China and India are the main stakeholders. Both countries are competing to show their best hands of friendship to Myanmar for their national interests. Therefore, Myanmar gets economic, political and diplomatic support from these two states. Myanmar maintains a twin military and strategic relation with China and India for its national interests. The Sino-Myanmar military cooperation is a concerning factor for India due to geopolitics and national interests. Both countries want to utilize their regional powers in order to influence their hegemony on the neighboring countries for their strategic interests. Moreover, Myanmar is the world’s tenth biggest gas reserve country, with gas reserves of approximately more than 90 trillion cubic feet. Because of its geostrategic importance, the world and the powerful regional states try to manipulate Myanmar’s domestic politics, to implement strategic and economic projects in the country for their national and geographical interests (Shivananda, 2011). Myanmar’s Military Cooperation with India for Pursuing National Interests India follows soft policies to build up warm relations with Myanmar through regional connectivity and bilateral agreements. Myanmar is not a diplomatic center for India to gain favor from, whereas it is an economic hub for China. Slowly but steadily, India has found the importance of Myanmar for enhancing its economic cooperation with Southeast Asia. India is trying to maintain good relations with Myanmar in regional cooperation and association like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

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(ASEAN). On the other hand, India and Myanmar are both members of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and the Mekong Ganga Cooperation to foster geopolitics and economic interests. India upholds superior associations with Myanmar as it situates at the tri-intersection of South Asia, Southeast Asia and East Asia (Shivananda, 2011). Moreover, Bangladesh is also a member of BIMSTEC, where none of them are working to address the prolonged crisis that destabilizes this region’s peace and security. India’s Geopolitical Interest Beyond Rohingya Crisis India is a close ally of Bangladesh, wherein they have some trade and strategic interests in Myanmar. The Advisory Commission on Rakhine State (2017) reports that Rakhine is a business hub for the investors because of its natural resources and infrastructure. Some expensive business projects are running in this region for the economic interests of tycoons. India and Myanmar are working jointly to interlock Mizoram state (Northeast part of India) to the Bay of Bengal through Chin and the Rakhine state. Therefore, they have started the “Kaladan Multi-Modal Transport Transit Projects” to realize their dream projects. The projects’ benefits are beneficial and of economic interests to both sides, including a new jetty in “Sittwe”, an inland water transport corridor to “Paletwa” in the Southern Chin state of Myanmar as a highway from “Paletwa” to the Indian frontier. Therefore, India is maintaining good diplomatic relations with Myanmar for protecting their domestic and external interests. Myanmar’s Strategic Cooperation with China Over the Decades China is maintaining two types of relations with Myanmar, economic and military cooperation. China usually vetoes the UN-imposed economic and diplomatic sanctions in favor of Myanmar because it serves its regional interest and is the route country of connectivity in the Indian Ocean. Additionally, the Chinese government has implemented at least 62 projects in Myanmar, including that of hydro, oil, gas and mining (Shivananda, 2011).

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China’s National Interest Beyond Regional Problems China is a strong ally of Myanmar, and it has a massive investment in Myanmar. A Chinese-led corporate trust installed some economic projects in “Kyawpyuh” town of Myanmar, including the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in this region. Moreover, the Chinese took some other initiatives to set up a terminal of an oil and gas pipeline in “Madae Island to Yunnan in Chine”. This terminal usually collects gas from the Rakhine coast and then supplies oil to another site as an international oil tanker (Rakhine Commission, 2017). The Myanmar authorities did not care about the local people’s interests while planning this project. Because the Advisory Commission on the Rakhine State (2017) reports that the oil and gas pipeline construction caused indicatory local problem inseparable from land seizures, there are some other hurdles, including insufficient amends for damages, environmental deterioration and an inflow of immigrants despite increased employment advantages for local people. However, based on the fact, it is easy to conclude why China is playing the most influential role in international politics. Besides, China has vetoed against the UN Security Council in favor of Myanmar (Reuters, March 18, 2017b).4

Myanmar Steps in Rohingya Crisis Civilian Government First Initiative for Resolving Crisis The first civilian government declared to form a commission in order to address the ethnic conflict in Myanmar. The officially recognized ethnic communities and Rohingya Muslim minorities do not have equal rights in their own country. Although some Rohingya Muslim people were systematically the Union Parliament members, they lost their candidacy and voting rights in the 2015 general election. Moreover, in this election, even 4  The United Nations was instituted in 1945, and has six organs. The United Nations Security Council is one of them. Maintaining international peace and security is the basic responsibility of this organ. The 15 members of the United Nations Security Council sat together in order to discuss the issue of the Rakhine state, military and security forces operations against Rohingya people on March 17, 2017. However unfortunately, this initiative was vetoed by China as well as backed by Russia. Moreover, the UK initiated to pass the following resolution on humanitarian access to all the affected and concerned areas for new violence (Reuters, 2017b).

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the “National League for Democracy” did not nominate any Muslim candidate. They don’t have any bargaining, expression and assembly power in the national politics since 2015. State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi committed to forming a national commission to resolute Rohingya predicament in the Rakhine state. Myanmar took some initiatives to drive international communities’ attention to atrocities, persecution, rape, genocide, forceful expulsion and other forms of violence against Rohingya communities. The first step of civilian government was forming the advisory committee of the Rakhine state in 2016 (Islam & Rahman, 2018). Formation of the Advisory Commission on the Rakhine State, 2017 Year 2017 was a landmark year for Myanmar as it formed a commission for the ethnic communities to ensure peace and security in the country. The Advisory Commission on the Rakhine State (ACRS) was presided by Kofi Annan, the former secretary-general to the UN. The commission included some members at the request of Aung San Suu Kyi in September 2016. It submitted its report to the government of Myanmar in August 2017. The commission was composed of six national members of Myanmar and three international members (Rakhine Commission, 2017). Moreover, the Myanmar government agreed to fund the project (Islam & Rahman, 2018).  ecommendations of ACRS in Resolving Identity Crisis R The ACRC proposed some recommendations to resolve the ethnic identity crisis in Myanmar. The ACRS (2017) recommended some proposals to the Myanmar government in resolving the identity crisis of the Rohingya community: (a) Ensuring verified citizens all kinds of benefits, rights and freedoms associated with citizenship law; (b) Establishing a clear strategy and time frame for the citizenship verification process; (c) Clarifying the status of those whose citizenship application is not accepted; (d) Elucidating residency rights and provide associated documentation, which is a common practice around the world; and (e) Accepting any allegation regarding the ongoing verification processes, and these steps should be resolved expeditiously by a

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­ overnment authority independent of the institutions (Islam & g Rahman, 2018).  ecommendation of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, 2017 R The experts and members of the commission suggested some counsels for the Rakhine state of Myanmar for reducing conflict among the ethnic groups. The ACRS (2017) recommended some proposals to the Myanmar government in resolving the Rohingya crisis. For example, the Governments of Myanmar and Bangladesh should simplify refugees’ voluntary entry from Bangladesh to Myanmar through combined verification based on international standards and by involving international stakeholders. The Government of Myanmar should establish a safe and secure environment for the refugees who return from Bangladesh and rebuild their houses, which the security forces and others had destroyed. The commission takes note of the “Joint Trade Commission” work and encourages both governments to increase their bilateral trade rapidly. Myanmar and Bangladesh’s governments could actively encourage more exchanges between civil society, think tanks, academics and the private sector to promote mutual understanding and cooperation. The Myanmar government should address the crisis and apprise the neighboring states regarding the Rakhine state situation and permit a complete and clear discussion of the topic in the regional forum and seminars. The respective Joint Commission should address some issues such as trade promotion, industrial infrastructural projects, people-to-people contact, documentation of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), voluntary return of refugees, combating human trafficking and drug smuggling, and security cooperation to combat violent extremism (Islam & Rahman, 2018).  riticism of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, 2017 C This commission utilized neither the term “citizens” nor “Rohingyas”, who were addressed as Muslims or the Muslim Community in Rakhine (Rakhine Commission, 2017). Therefore, this commission avoided Rohingya community’s identity, and the commission limited itself to serving the demand of the Myanmar government. Moreover, the commission was not instructed to examine specific alleged human rights violations and other forms of structural violence. Therefore, it has already marked the violence as an institutional and structural issue (Rakhine Commission, 2017; Islam & Rahman, 2018). It is a questionable and concerning issue to international peacemaker about the neutrality of this commission. The

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proposals and recommendations do not resolve the crisis permanently. This report used the Rohingyas as Muslims based on the irreligiousness contrary to the UN Charter, the international and Humanitarian Law. This commission is a blueprint of the Myanmar government and has served the Myanmar interests; for instance, the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State (2017) states that irregular migration from Myanmar as well as Bangladesh has a destabilizing effect on the region. However, even though Bangladesh is one of the sufferer countries of this prolonged crisis, there was no representative from Bangladesh side in this commission. It is a biased report, to some extent, since there was no incident wherein the Bangladesh government had forcefully expelled its Buddhist communities of Bangladesh to Myanmar. They are living in Bangladesh peacefully and did not cross the border to Myanmar (Islam & Rahman, 2018).o

Bangladesh and Myanmar’s Policy in Addressing Rohingya Crisis Bangladesh and Myanmar have some common problems and unstable incidents since the birth as an independent state. Bangladesh obtained its emancipation from Pakistan in 1971, while Myanmar achieved its independence from Britain in 1948. Bangladesh officially began its diplomatic relation with Myanmar on January 13, 1972 (MOFA, 2019; Islam & Rahman, 2018; Myanmarembassydhaka, N.D.). Both countries have some differences in socioeconomic, political, cultural and religious sectors. Bangladesh is a secular but a Muslim majority, and democratic, country, whereas Myanmar is directly dominated by Buddhist religion and a military-backed government (pseudo-democratic and newly civilian democratic government). In comparison with Bangladesh, Myanmar has had many years of experience with dictators and undemocratic government. In Myanmar, after 26 years, the first civilian democratic government came to power since the 1990s, but the military has the upper hand and is the central controller in governing because of some prerogative constitutional powers in the constitution. The military-backed government often considers the civilian government as a weak government. The military authorities led their operations against Rohingyas for political gains. They did not wholly succeed in expelling the Rohingya communities to Bangladesh before the 1990s.

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Nonetheless, after the inception of democracy in Bangladesh, the civilian government did not have a strong foreign policy to repatriate Rohingya refugees because of their weak stand and negotiation. Bangladesh is importing more products to than exporting from Myanmar. Moreover, it is in the interest of the Bangladesh government to import Myanmar products. It has some incompatible issues with Myanmar, such as border disputes, illegal drug and human trafficking, and illegal migration. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) published, on March 14, 2012, its judgment on the dispute concerning delimitation of the maritime boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal (ITLOS, 2012; Islam & Rahman, 2018). Sharif Bhuiyan (2012) said that the Bangladesh government claimed complete victory over Myanmar and India, though the outcome of this verdict was one where neither party had a complete victory or a total defeat as per law (Bhuiyan, April 17, 2012; Islam & Rahman, 2018). Foreign Policy of Bangladesh The common philosophy of Bangladesh is to show malice to none and friendship to all. The nation-states are making friends with other states and maintaining diplomatic relations through idealism and realism policies (Levy & Thompson, 2010; Islam & Rahman, 2018; Islam, 2017; Islam & Hossain, 2020). However, the fact is clear to all; geographic locations manipulate a country’s foreign policy, including its area, economic and trade volume, political and military strengths, and nuclear capabilities (Nye, 2006; Nye, 2011). Every state wants to preserve its national interests (Levy & Thompson, 2010). The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh states that the state shall base its international relations on the principles of respect of national sovereignty and equality, noninterference in the internal affairs of other states, peaceful settlement of international disputes, and respect for international law and the principles enunciated in the UN Charter (MINLAW, 2010; Islam & Rahman, 2018; Nyadera & Islam, 2020; Islam & Hossain, 2020). Foreign Policy of Myanmar Foreign policy has changed over ages, as there is no permanent friend and enemy in international politics. Article 41 of the Republic of Myanmar’s Constitution clearly states that the union maintained neutral and

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nonaligned foreign policy with a view to international peace with other states. Side by side, Myanmar continued friendly relations and peaceful coexistence with other nation-states. The president is the executive head of Myanmar (Article, 199). The president has absolute right to build up a good relationship with foreign countries and cut off diplomatic relation in some cases with the consent of the “Pyidaungsu Hluttaw” (the lower of the parliament) for breaching any diplomatic norms (Article, 206). The constitution gives the president the power to ratify or reject the international, regional or bilateral treaties with permission of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw. Sometimes she/he does not take the lower parliament’s permission in cancelling or approving foreign relations with other states (article, 209, Ministry of Information, September, 2008; Islam & Rahman, 2018). Moreover, Myanmar maintained a strong relationship with Russia, China and India for strategic and military security. The Myanmar army dominates the foreign policy of Myanmar as they have privileges and prerogative powers accorded to them by the constitution. Myanmar military still holds 25% seats in the parliament’s upper and lower houses without a direct election (Robertson, 2015; Islam & Rahman, 2018). The foreign policy of Myanmar has changed over time, as well as domestic politics with regime changes for serving the national interest of the states. The State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) has reshaped the country’s foreign policy as well as renamed Burma as the Union of Myanmar after the military coup in 1988. Myanmar developed its diplomatic relation with China in AD 802 during the Tang Dynasty. The current relation of Myanmar with China was established in 1949, after Myanmar achieved its independence in 1948. Both countries consider themselves eternal friends and close allies in this region owing to their own interests and ideological factors, especially the Sino-Myanmar relationship (Than, 2003). Myanmar always tries to maintain its national interests through strategic foreign policy over the Rohingya crisis. The domestic and international relations have been supported by its close ally China as the country backed Myanmar in the UN over the Rohingya issue. Moreover, these two states have faced common problems like the issues concerning Uighur people in China and Rohingyas in the Rakhine state of Myanmar. Therefore, China supported Myanmar for some domestic factor too. Both countries have prioritized their relations for “Belt and Road Initiative” and geographical and economic interests (Park, 2020). However, Myanmar is reluctant to resolve the Rohingya crisis in the near future. This discussion has provided an understanding into the power and

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privileges of the Myanmar military, as accorded by their constitution, which has given them the unquestionable power to commit this violence on Rohingya people (Islam & Rahman, 2018). Bangladesh Initiatives in Managing Rohingya Crisis Bangladesh has already taken its friendly and humanitarian approach to address the problems for the ethnic Rohingya refugees. Bangladesh did not agree to shelter Myanmar Rohingya citizens in Cox’s Bazar in the August 2017’s incident due to previous refugee pressure. Later, the Bangladesh government decided to provide asylum to Rohingya refugees on compassionate and religious grounds and due to international pressure. The prime minister of Bangladesh presented some proposals in resolving the Rohingya calamity at the 72nd Session of the UN General Assembly (GA). She said that Bangladesh sheltered more than 800,000 compulsorily displaced Rohingya people from Myanmar. The situation again aggravated due to the recent acts of brutalities and human rights violations by the Myanmar military in the Rakhine state. Therefore, hundreds of thousands of Rohingyas fled to Bangladesh. Bangladeshi people were shocked to learn that Myanmar authorities were laying land mines along their stretch of border to restrict the Rohingyas from returning. The country sheltered the Rohingyas on humanitarian grounds. Hence, the prime minister of Bangladesh urged that they must return to their country in safety, security and human dignity. At the same time, she also condemned all kinds of terrorism and violent extremism. She highlighted some crucial proposals and demanded the UN and the international community to initiate immediate and effective measures for a permanent and sustainable solution to this protracted Rohingya disaster (Islam & Rahman, 2018). Subsequently, she proposed the following steps for resolving the crisis. Firstly, Myanmar should halt all kinds of violence and practices of ethnic cleansing instantly in the Rakhine state. Secondly, the secretary-general of the UN should send a fact-finding mission to Myanmar for initiating proper steps regarding the current situation in Rakhine state. Thirdly, a safe zone could be established inside Myanmar under the UN mandate and principles. Fourthly, the Myanmar government should ensure all compulsory displaced Rohingyas’ durable return from Bangladesh to their homeland. And finally, instantaneously execute the pro-Rohingya recommendations of Kofi Annan Commission Report (ACRS, 2017) without

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avoiding any proposal (UN, September 22, 2017a; Islam & Rahman, 2018). Moreover, some righteous groups and arbitrators have disagreed with the Bangladesh prime minister’s proposal of safe zones. Repatriation Pact Between Bangladesh and Myanmar Government Bangladesh and Myanmar have already signed some agreements and pacts; however, these have not addressed the problems peacefully. Bangladesh signed a deal with Myanmar without considering its future outcome and prompt effectiveness of the Rohingya catastrophe. The two governments signed a pact faced with a burgeoning humanitarian emergency acceding that the repatriation process of the Rohingya to Myanmar on November 25, 2017, began within two months (TRT World, January 16, 2018; Islam & Rahman, 2018). Some critic argued that Bangladesh did not offer strong arguments in the meeting for recognizing the sheltered refugees in Bangladesh as Rohingya people. Myanmar retained the upper hand by omitting the term “Rohingya” in this pact. This is one of the significant, vital loopholes of this agreement. Moreover, Myanmar did not fulfill its commitment to repatriate the Rohingya refugees on time (Islam & Rahman, 2018). Temporary and Ineffective Agreement Between Myanmar and Bangladesh Some international thinkers and policymakers argued that the bilateral agreement between Bangladesh and Myanmar did not address the problem sustainably and was defective. Amnesty International (2018) reports that the repatriation process of Rohingyas to Myanmar was illegal and premature due to the absence of a peaceful environment. On the other hand, the Myanmar government set up a temporary refugee camp at “Taungpyoleiwei” in the northwestern Rakhine state for the Rohingyas to return overland from Bangladesh (The Daily Star, December 29, 2017a; The Daily Star, December 28, 2017b; Molla, 2019; Chandan, 2019; Islam & Rahman, 2018). Myanmar responded rapidly to signing the bilateral agreement with Bangladesh to avoid international pressure. The foreign ministry and the Bangladesh government did not comprehend the diplomatic hoax of Myanmar. Moreover, Bangladesh failed to fix the exact time frame of Rohingya repatriation, add their identity as Rohingya, and engage the powerful

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countries regarding this humanitarian crisis. Therefore, it is difficult now for Bangladesh to convince the world communities to pressurize Myanmar in resolving the catastrophe as it has already confined the crisis within two states by signing a bilateral repatriation pact, like the 1972 Simla Agreement of India and Pakistan over Kashmir conflict. On the other hand, Myanmar has already proven that it did not commit to resolving the crisis immediately, for the repatriation process was negligent by not fixing a time frame. Moreover, Myanmar is continuing its carnage against Rohingya communities (Islam & Rahman, 2018). Strategic Pressure on Triangular Partners for Resolving Rohingya Crisis Multiparty and international development partners can resolve this crisis, and Bangladesh needs to propose such a formula to address the crisis. It is difficult for small and developing states to pressurize world superpowers and powerful nuclear countries regarding their survival. Nevertheless, powerful regional states such as China and India often forget the peaceful resolution of a conflict. The world community can work together to secure the world by discouraging the creation of another Palestine or Kashmir conflict, North and South Korea conflict, and Cuba missile crisis in the Asian region. These two states are playing partial roles in this region for their economic and geostrategic interests. The European Union (EU) proposed that China and Russia’s role is essential in resolving the Rohingya crisis (New Age, October 19, 2017a; Islam & Rahman, 2018). Guidelines and Steps for Bangladesh to Pressurize Influential Partners Bangladesh needs to work with its close allies more effectively than ever before for a sustainable resolution to the Rohingya problem. Russia, China and India have made many contributions and have economic and strategic interests in Bangladesh, as they are investing in many strategic and development projects. These countries have some geostrategic interests in so many sectors in Bangladesh. They are investing not only in Myanmar but also in Bangladesh. They have lots of common interests in both countries. Therefore, morally they cannot offer unreasonable support to Myanmar’s brutal action against unarmed Rohingya communities (BBC, 2018; Islam & Rahman, 2018). Bangladesh needs to remember that there is no

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permanent friend or enemy in international politics. It is changing over time as per the states’ interests (Levy & Thompson, 2010; Islam & Rahman, 2018). Tactful Enterprise and Political Maneuver of Bangladesh to Resolve Rohingya Crisis Bangladesh needs to utilize its geographic and strategic power in order to influence the world communities. Geographically, Bangladesh situates in a strategic area and hence plays an influential role in South Asia. This region is one of the most critical tools and hub of exercise power. Regional and international powers, especially China and India, have considerable interests in Bangladesh’s domestic politics, which is under the shadow of international politics. In so many indicators, it can be argued that Bangladesh is a hub of power politics for the stakeholders. Bangladesh’s domestic politics and its foreign relations are monitored by regional and international politics. There is a foreign power implication and hegemony on Bangladesh politics. Therefore, because of its geostrategic interests, it easily formed some allies during the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971. India, Russia, some states and nations supported Bangladesh’s independence, whereas Pakistan got support from the US, China and some other states. Bangladesh diverted its foreign policies for the necessity of time and regime changes after getting independence, as well as since the 1990s. Myanmar and its nationals did not play an active and positive role during Bangladesh Liberation War. Most importantly, U Thant, former secretary-general of the UN and a citizen of Myanmar, did not take a decisive role to resolve this triangular conflict among India, Pakistan and Bangladesh (Islam & Rahman, 2018). Limitations of Bangladesh Foreign Policy in Resolving Rohingya Crisis Bangladesh failed to utilize its close foreign allies, international institutions, organizations and partners to tackle the catastrophe more efficiently at the primary level. Most of the international community condemned the Myanmar atrocities and enhanced their support to Bangladesh. Bangladesh failed in convincing the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), UN and close allies to play a decisive role at the international level. One of the members of the Bangladesh House of the Nation criticized the food

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minister for importing rice from Myanmar during the emergency. On the other hand, one of the prominent lawmakers and politicians of Bangladesh, Nazmul Haque Prodhan, questioned the food minister in the parliament, saying that when the country was experiencing a severe crisis due to the Rohingya influx, the food minister still went to Myanmar to import rice from there. Did the minister get a special discount? Subsequently, the former food minister Quamrul Islam replied that the government would import rice from Myanmar considering the low price, adding that “trade” and “diplomatic efforts” would continue simultaneously with the neighboring country (New Age, 2017b; Islam & Rahman, 2018). Diplomatically, Bangladesh is lagging in tackling this issue with Myanmar. Bangladesh did not halt trade relations with Myanmar even as Myanmar inflicted humanitarian predicament and economic crisis on it (Islam & Rahman, 2018; Islam, 2017).

Conclusion To resolve the Rohingya crisis, the Bangladesh government could initiate robust diplomacy and necessary steps to get support from international donor agencies and influential regional and international stakeholders. Moreover, they could visit neighboring and developed states to gain diplomatic assistance to deal with the problems correctly and to persuade Myanmar to ensure regional stability. Since the US, the UK, France, EU, Muslim states and other powerful countries cooperated with the Bangladesh government by providing economic and diplomatic support to resolve the philanthropic emergency of Rohingya refugees, they showed their support to Bangladesh in this regard as well. The international community condemned the recent atrocities of Myanmar and the military coup in 2021, and they also took some retaliatory measures against the Myanmar government and its nationals. However, the ministry of foreign affairs and the Bangladesh government failed to initiate robust diplomacy to tackle the Rohingya catastrophe strategically. Still, Myanmar has continued its atrocities against Rohingya ethnic minority groups; however, the time is not over yet. In this stated case, the Chinese proposal on November 20, 2017, was praiseworthy, and it backed Myanmar in every UN Security Council proposal. Bangladesh needs to build up a warm relationship and regular contact to develop a new resolution, especially with Russia, China and India to repatriate all Rohingyas to Myanmar, even as other UNSC permanent member states are committed to extend all kinds

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of support to end this human-made disaster. It should be remembered that this is a regional catastrophe, and it should be resolved by supporting regional powers, including China, India and Pakistan. Bangladesh needs to convince the five permanent member states and Europe to adopt an innovative sustainable declaration under the banner of UNSC to resolve the predicament without delay. If the UN Security Council fails to do the effective action, then Bangladesh needs to apply the Uniting for Peace Resolution 377A (V) to resolve the Rohingya crisis. Therefore, all member states of the United Nations, including Russia, China and India, are legally bound to obey the resolution. Moreover, Bangladesh can take help from the OIC to resolve the crisis immediately. This study has tried to shed some light on the differences of these two countries having geographical, religious and political dissimilarities, though they share the same border. The prime minister exercises the executive power in Bangladesh, whereas the president is the executive head of Myanmar. Moreover, military personnel have the upper hand in Myanmar as they have some privileges in the constitution. The parliamentary system of Bangladesh comprises a unicameral parliament. On the other hand, a bicameral parliament exists in Myanmar. Therefore, there are many differences between these two states in domestic and international relations. Strategically, Bangladesh is one of the most important partners of Russia, China, India and the US; in that way, Bangladesh can seek support from powerful countries, especially Russia, China and the US, including regional power India to resolve the emergency. Without their cordial support, it is difficult to resolve the crisis amicably. It is identified that these countries have lots of interests and influence on Myanmar and its government. Therefore, Bangladesh can address this catastrophe to revitalize the repatriation agreement by involving the Muslim world, like OIC, Arab League and Turkey, the UN, as well as the powerful and influential countries. For a long-term basis, Myanmar authority should remember that the coercive method is destabilizing the whole region and keeping the conflict regenerated for a long time. The nature of the Rohingya predicament has already turned it into a protracted disaster. The clash between mainstream Buddhists and Rohingya people undermines peaceful coexistence and harmony among the groups and nations in South Asia and Southeast Asia. The regional and international community should maintain regional stability and world peace and security. Finally, yet importantly, time is set now to take valiant and effective measures from all regional, economic and

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international bodies to address this crisis, which would affect the development and peaceful process in the region (Islam & Rahman, 2018). The study’s findings revealed that the Rohingya crisis had been created systematically for serving the interests of Myanmar authorities without considering the fundamental and human rights of Rohingya minority people. Military coup, retrospective citizenship law against minority people, constitutional privileges for the military people, communal riots, irrational formation of Advisory Commission on Rakhine State 2017 and the Panglong agreement are some factors that are disadvantageous for the Rohingya Muslim minorities and cannot resolve their problems amicably. The study’s theoretical framework followed by primordial and instrumental theories supported some arguments about Rohingya Muslim communities’ current crisis. Historically, China is a close ally of Myanmar, and helps Myanmar diplomatically, politically, economically and in other sectors to continue their domestic and international interests. On the other hand, the UN cannot address this problem adequately, because of the veto power practices and five permanent members’ power politics. Moreover, the crisis is continuing over many decades due to political differences, military maneuvers and foreign policies limitations of the two countries. Their foreign policies often alter the domestic and international factors and regional politics. Therefore, the crisis has already turned into a protracted nature of conflict. Accordingly, it has been argued that Bangladesh did not take a firm step to address the crisis peacefully and effectively. Both countries need to modify their foreign policies and repatriation agreements and immediately address this crisis for the sake of their respective nations and regional and international peace, security and stability.

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Wolf, S. O. (2017, September). Genocide, exodus and exploitation for jihad: The urgent need to address the Rohingya crisis. In South Asia Democratic Forum (SADF) Working Paper (No. 6). Yavuz, M.F. (2017, September 11). Israel supplies arms while Myanmar kills Rohingyas. Retrieved on February 24, 2020 from https://www.dailysabah. com/op-­e d/2017/09/11/israel-­s upplies-­a rms-­w hile-­m yanmar-­k ills-­ rohingyas Zawacki, B. (2013). Defining Myanmar’s “Rohingya problem”. Human Rights Brief, 20(3), 2.

CHAPTER 7

Are Refugees a Blessing or a Curse: An Analysis of Economic Impact of Rohingya Refugees on Bangladesh since the Exodus Md. Ishtiaq Ahmed Talukder

Introduction The primary doctrines of economics are the allocation and utilization of limited resources, and world politicians seem to comprehend this fundamental idea of economics pretty well. Inevitably, ‘natural resource-based political conflicts’ are observed in the developing and the transition countries in this twenty-first century (Suleri et  al., 2010, p.  1). There is no doubt that the world has finite resources, but it is argued that “the quantity of renewable resources (such as land) sets a finite limit to the flow of output (such as food) that can be sustained” (Lecomber, 1979, p. 7). As a result, drivers like scarcity of different sorts of resources contribute to conflict within a nation and among nations (Nie, 2003, p.  307). The

Md. I. A. Talukder (*) Department of Security Strategies and Management, Institute of Security Sciences, Turkish National Police Academy, Ankara, Turkey Department of Criminology and Police Science, Mawlana Bhashani Science and Technology University, Tangail, Bangladesh © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 K. Bülbül et al. (eds.), Rohingya Refugee Crisis in Myanmar, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6464-9_7

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nature of conflict over environmental resources is manifold and thus has been continued by politicians in the name of saving one nation in history. Preliminary research indicates that “scarcities of critical environmental resources—especially cropland, freshwater, and forests—contribute to violence in many parts of the world. These environmental scarcities usually do not cause wars among countries, but they can generate severe social stresses within countries, stimulate subnational insurgencies, ethnic clashes, and urban unrest” (Homer-Dixon, 2010, p. 12). A modern-day example of conflict over environmental resources would be Myanmar, where hundreds of thousands of people got persecuted because the government did not accept them as one of their own and named them ‘illegal Bengali immigrants’ (Chamie, 2016). This particular group, Rohingya, has been trying to escape torture and mass murder since 2017, which was committed by the Myanmar military forces (Hazis, 2018). This particular ethnic group has selected their closest neighboring country Bangladesh, which is a lower-middle-income country with a large number of population (“The World Bank: Bangladesh,” 2019), to escape from the government persecution. The Rohingya is an ethnic group of Myanmar, has been fleeing to many countries around it, but about 1.1 million of them have entered only Bangladesh until 2018 (Department of Immigration and Passports, 2018), and the number is still increasing. The key reason for their forced migration is the “development—of the region by confiscation of land for natural resource extraction and infrastructure construction” (Sahana et al., 2019, p. 45). With an increase in the number of international migration in the last 50 years, the pattern of migration is also found to be complex and dominated by the impact of globalization, which is a ‘technological and political process’ (Czaika & de Haas, 2014, p. 284). The effects of globalization significantly influence political decision and international relations, especially when it involves financial benefit (Collinson, 2009). This particular case has been observed within the Chinese venture when it initiated the Belt and Road Initiative program, and the Myanmar government seemed to lean on to China while the rest of the world was condemning its brutal attitude toward Rohingya (Singh, 2018, p. ix). The reason is transparent as water, as China wanted to build its only ‘China-South Asia energy connectivity’ using a pipeline, ‘the Myanmar China pipeline’, and the particular pipeline was supposed to be constructed through the Arakan state where the Rohingya resided (Rahman, 2014, pp. 50–51).

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The Myanmar government had conducted similar atrocities with the Rohingya Muslim before, and they continuously denied their citizenship and rights along with that. The presence of the Rohingya ethnic communities (about 205,000) has been observed in most of the areas of Cox’s Bazar, as they have entered there at different points of time until 2017 (Khatun, 2017). Since the recent exodus, the total number of Rohingya refugees has crossed a million this time. This chapter, therefore, tries to understand the economic condition of Bangladesh as a consequence of the Rohingya exodus and the international help Rohingya brought with it.

Methods of the Study Migration has emerged as a powerful force in the last few decades (Massey et al., 1993, p. 431). People have been migrating to different places for many reasons, but to get a secure life has been the key one. The number of migration has increased every year until 2019 as the estimated number is 272 million, which is ‘an increase of 51 million since 2010’ (United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs, 2019). The sudden exodus of Rohingya into Bangladesh has been one of the major world issues since 2017, and it is an immense responsibility for the country. Bangladesh is an overpopulated country living in a harsh situation that requires continuous international support and monitoring. Studying economic concepts is not an easy task and analyzing them without proper mathematical technique could make it more difficult. However, the study has applied economic indicators such as GDP, GNI, GDP growth rates, and economic forecasts to examine and illustrate the impact of the Rohingya exodus on the Bangladesh economy. The financial information used in this study is presented and explained in general terms. The method of the study involved literature reviews and statistical analysis of reports published in the local media, which were focused mainly on the economic issues of Bangladesh and Rohingya migrants in the last couple of years. Additionally, world reports have been supplemented with the findings to state the impact of Rohingya in Bangladesh economy, whether it is positive or negative. This study, therefore, has used secondary data gathered from government economic reviews, international reports, journal articles, newspaper articles, and online websites. The author has extracted the necessary data and information to portray an overall picture of Bangladesh. The aim is to comprehend the impact of and the contribution of migration to the Bangladesh economy.

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Economic Status of Bangladesh Until 2017 Bangladesh is a fast-growing country in Southeast Asia with steady growth in its GDP of 6.5% and prospering with a record-high national growth of 7.24% for the 2017 fiscal year (Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 2017, p.  1). Though it achieved its independence about 48 years ago, in terms of growth and development, it is still behind countries like Vietnam and Malaysia as they are leading Asia with their economic success. However, in terms of GDP growth rate until 2017, Bangladesh remained pretty much at the top position (Bangladesh 7.3%, India 7.2%, Pakistan 5.2%, and Sri Lanka 3.4%) among South Asian countries (“Bangladesh,” 2019). After the devastating nine-month war in 1971, it had to start from scratch, but now it is leading its predecessors in terms of growth and prosperity. Bangladesh has achieved tremendous progress in the economy in the last decades. The main strength is its large number of population, which makes it the eighth biggest country in the world in terms of population (“Total Population by Country 2019,” 2019). It has converted this large population into human power which has helped its ready-made garments factories to grow faster than the other Asian countries. Its cheap labor market and stable democratic nature have attracted investors from different parts of the world, which let it grow even in this highly competitive world. The garment sector and the microcredit institutions are also known for their contribution to women empowerment through economic development and social upliftment (Khan et al., 2013). While Bangladesh was preparing for its journey to its economic goals, it got hit several times with both natural and human-made calamities. Among the recent events, the Rohingya exodus remains notable as Bangladesh had to open its door for hundreds of thousands of Rohingyas who escaped violent atrocities of the Myanmar government in 1978, 1991–1992, and again in 2016 (World Food Programme, 2020, p.  2). The recent 2017 exodus, however, has created a significant impact, especially in the coastal region where both the local hosting communities and the government have become startled by the extent of the rising situation (Alam, 2018). On the other hand, while Bangladesh showed continuous endeavor to make its population productive by providing them with the necessary training, corruption, especially in the banking sector, undermined its effort significantly. Even then, Bangladesh has continued to project an

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effective developing economy after all the negative events that occurred in recent times. The fiscal years before 2017 show that the country has successfully maintained its progress, which had a growth of 6.1% in 2014, 7.1% in 2016, and 7.9% in 2018; according to Asian Development Bank it has a projected growth of 8.1% after 2019 (“Bangladesh,” 2019). Just before the entrance of a large number of Rohingya ethnic group in the country, the GDP growth rate was 7.28% in the 2016/17 fiscal year (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 2019). According to the provisional report published by Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (2019), Bangladesh has achieved tremendous progress in the industrial sector, such as manufacturing and construction sectors which have a sectoral growth rate of GDP at the constant price of 10.97 and 8.77, respectively. The other notable sector that has contributed to the growth is the service sector. It includes hotel and restaurant 7.13, transport and communications 6.76, education 11.35, and health and social works 7.63 (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 2019). The Rohingya influx began soon after August 2017, which amounted to a million at the end of the year. Within a short period of time resolving such a colossal crisis was challenging, but the Bangladesh government has successfully tackled it with instant support for shelter, food, and medicine with the help of international organizations and donor countries like Canada, the US, and the EU (Zaman, 2019). In order to understand the actual development of Bangladesh before the Rohingya exodus, essential economic indicators from two different fiscal years have been presented in the next paragraph, published on the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics and finance ministry’s website. The estimated population size in 2017 according to the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (2019) was about 164 million; with a high growth rate, it managed to ensure a stable exchange rate of around 82 BD Taka per 1 US$, earned a significant rise in the per capita GDP from US$ 1385 (2015–16) to US$ 1675 (2017–18). Lastly, the per capita Gross National Income increased from US$ 1465 for F/Y 2015–16 to US$ 1751 for F/Y 2017–18 (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2019). Bangladesh, in association with the UN, has designed its sustainable development goals (SDGs) and planned to achieve it by 2030; it has already attained 92.2% access to electricity and about 89% literacy rate within the age 15–24  years (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2019, p. 5).

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The country is rising and working continuously to be a middle-income country within a few years. But it still has a significant number of population to feed, who are below the poverty line and need to employ young people in the job field. This indicates that Bangladesh may become a model for a twenty-first-century developing country, but it is not sufficiently strong enough to support about a million refugees. Where half of them are child refugees (55%); only women and girls constitute 52% of the total refugees (UNICEF, 2019). And on top of that, most of the refugee camps have been built in the coastal region near the border of Myanmar, which are also characterized for their remoteness and for the low-income people who happen to suffer natural calamities a lot.

Economic Condition of Bangladesh After 2017 Rohingya Exodus Environmental resources, especially energy, has been one of the essential deciding factors of globalization and world peace. Nations have been fighting over these limited resources for centuries; the future will not be much different. Therefore, it is anticipated that “ethnic clashes arising from population migration and deepened social cleavages due to environmental scarcity” will increase regional tension (Homer-Dixon, 2010, p. 5). Myanmar is a country of many ethnic groups; the Rohingya is the only Muslim ethnic group residing in the Arakan state for hundreds of years who have been denied citizenship by the military government (Sahana et al., 2019, p. 45). Myanmar’s internal political conflict and military intervention on its government both have created the ground for forced migration which had initiated from its inception (South, 2007). As a result, to escape from torture and for a better life, the Rohingya migrated to neighboring countries, and after 2005 about 400,000 Rohingya illegally entered Bangladesh and were roaming around Cox’s Bazar, Bandarban, Khagrachari, and Rangamati (Palma & Azad, 2009). After the renewed level of torture and mass murder since August 2017, another 800,000 Rohingya arrived in Bangladesh, making the number higher than a million, who came under dire need of life assistance and support for their existence (Laszlo, 2018). Due to the closest distance from the Myanmar border, they came and started tenting into the only coastal region of the country with the world’s largest sea beach and also “a great source of

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income through tourism, is now at risk” (Yilmaz & Talukder, 2019, p. 114). A sudden large influx of refugees into an already overpopulated country could only create an enormous challenge which can best be described in the following text: When forced migrants arrive in large numbers in a poor region, they place enormous strain on public services and infrastructure and on the public purse, and they can also severely fray the social and political fabric, leading to deterioration of the investment climate. (Dadush & Niebuhr, 2016, p. 1)

Tackling a huge number of the population, where half of them are children, is a troubling thing for the country for which the former finance minister had feared that the refugee will destroy the economy (Harmachi, 2017). Even after all the speculation and fear, Bangladesh maintained its steady growth and is forecasted to be the leader in the Southeast Asian region for the 2020 GDP growth rate (Bangladesh 8%, India 7.2%, Nepal and Maldives 6.3%, Bhutan 6%, and Sri Lanka 3.5%) (“Bangladesh,” 2019). Even though, with such tremendous growth in the GPD worth US$ 221.415 billion (“The World Bank: Bangladesh,” 2019), it would require at least US$ 1 billion a year (Ovi, 2017), which is equal to 3.5% of the government’s revenue to support a large number of the refugees (Laszlo, 2018). The Rohingya influx has also contributed to the loss in the tourism sector at Cox’s Bazar pretty badly (Dey, 2017), as the leaders of the tourism business have claimed that they were under 40% reservation even if it was in the picking season (Special Correspondent, 2017). Additionally, the sudden influx has also created a price hike for the shortage of foods and supply in the region (Rashid, 2019). Though, it was observed that most of the hotels were full of delegates and representatives from about 100 national and international NGOs who were there for aid and assistance of the Rohingya (Zaman, 2019). Additionally, refugees who came immediately after the Myanmar massacre into the land needed to look for their sustenance, for which they went to the local wage market and agreed to work at cheap cost, ended in creating dissatisfaction with the local laborers (Hasan, 2017). Moreover, they have negatively impacted the local environment as they took over the local forest areas for shelter and firewood (Mahmud, 2017). However, in the meantime, it is expected that the increase in immigration creates a surplus in the labor market which

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eventually increases production and GDP as well (Mohapatra et  al., 2010, p. 6). However, in this critical moment, Bangladesh was not left alone in managing this large number of refugees and addressing the host communities within the rising problem. International organizations like United Nations (UN), World Food Programme (WFP), UNICEF, EU, and other individual countries like Germany, Canada, and America have come forward and helped the crisis population with funds, support, and services. For example, to support the food, sanitation, education, health, and environment the actions of WFP have notably contributed to lessening the burden of the hosting country as well as the foreign investment into the country will surely contribute to the growth of the national economy. WFP only for the food assistance program for the refugees spends US$ 5 million every month of which 15% of the products are purchased from the local market which is a direct contribution to the local economy. Apart from the refugees, the local hosting community is getting tremendous support from WFP (World Food Programme, 2020) such as: • 20,000 participants were reached with the livelihoods activities. • Women groups have saved BDT 41,550,000 (USD 490,000/0.5 million) in different bank accounts through forming 816 self-help groups which they used for starting their own business. • 721 participants are benefiting from disability inclusion activities. • Continued literacy improvement activities in Ukhiya and Kutubdia for 47,000 children in 146 schools. • Continued regular school feeding in Ukhiya, Kutubdia, Pekua, and Moheshkhali for 140,000 students in 488 government schools. • To help rebuild the local forest environment WFP has planted more than 250,000 of trees in 22 different areas of the refugee camps. How about the real economy in Bangladesh after the 2017 Rohingya exodus? Bangladesh has been doing good for the last half of the decade since 2015 as it kick-started its GDP higher and got into the competition with the neighboring country as well as started big-budget development projects such as building a US$ 3.868 billion multipurpose bridge with its own fund (“Padma Multipurpose Bridge Project,” n.d.). The pace of the development growth Bangladesh has earned over the last few years has helped it outrun all kinds of hurdles in front of it, which includes, also to some extent, the sudden influx of Rohingya Muslims from Myanmar. The

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country even has crossed the Asian Development Bank’s 2019 projected GDP growth, 8.1% and real GDP growth turned out 7.86% right after the arrival in 2018 and got to 8.15% in 2019 (see tables from Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 2019). Bangladesh was having a growth rate of an all-time high in 2019, which if continued forecasted to be 8% for the F/Y 2020 (“Bangladesh,” 2019). All these prospects and development even pushed the country a little higher to score its per capita GDP and GNI US$ 1828 and US$ 1909 respectively for the F/Y 2018–19 (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2019). The sectoral share growth rate of GDP shows some significant change in its air transport and health and social services sectors which can be explained with the arrival of a large number of foreign delegates, journalists, and personnel who came here to support the refugees and cover their stories. Therefore, it seems that the economic situation of Bangladesh is quite strong as it was before the Rohingya exodus, and also, it remains successful in maintaining the growth while managing a large number of refugees since 2017.

Future of Bangladesh with Rohingya According to their development milestone, the Bangladesh government planned to become “a middle-income country by 2021 and a developed country by 2041” (Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 2017, p.  5). The numbers and statistics also support the effort of the country to achieve the goal. But it had never accepted a large number of refugees within such a short period and thus ‘resulted in the creation of the largest ever refugee camp’ (Ware & Laoutides, 2019). In order to address this large humanitarian catastrophic situation, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) declared the “2017 Humanitarian Response Plan” (HRP) (“Rohingya Refugee Crisis,” 2017). But fund allocation, preparation, and human resources placement as well as planning with concerned authority surely would take time which means the delay of response. As a result, the government had to take direct initiative with its own budget and rush for the help of devastated refugees, especially for the first half of FY 2018 and FY 2018–2019 (Crabtree, 2010). Bangladesh government as an immediate response had planned and created residential facilities for about 100,000 as well as to save its only coastal touristic zone (Kallol, 2017).

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The initial plan to support the Rohingya refugees needed about US$ 434 million for the first six months period; started in 2017, it was supposed to be provided by UN OCHA (Islam, 2018). This support aimed at the refugees who were coming at the first hand, and also the local hosting communities who opened their arms toward their help. While the initial response package came to an end with about 70% of the fund invested and lags in allocating additional budget for the upcoming months, the authorities, as well as policymakers, were worried (Khatun, 2017). According to the estimates of Policy Research Institute (PRI) and South Asian Network on Economic Modelling (SANEM) about US$ 1 billion per year was necessary, while the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD) on the other hand provided an estimate which showed the government would need US$ 882 million for a period up to June 2018 (Khatun, 2017). According to CPD (“Dhaka Tribune,” 2018a), the scenario-based cost estimation shows that the core cost for refugee management can exceed US$ 400 million even for one year (until February 2019). To support the life of Rohingyas both in Myanmar and in Bangladesh, Canada provided about $68 million as well as provided another $2 million to the UN Women to provide gender-responsive humanitarian services to the Rohingyas in Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh (“Canada’s Response to the Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar and Bangladesh,” 2017). After the completion of two fiscal years, the UN has urged in March 2020 to the world leaders for US$ 877 to support some 855,000 Rohingya and 444,000 Bangladeshi communities (Dujarric, 2020). Germany has also come forward with $16.3 million help for the Rohingya in 2020 (Brunnersum, 2020). Additionally, UNICEF has also been doing a great job in addressing a large number of children who constitute more than half of the refugees and also children of the local hosting communities; though they have also urged for funding to continue providing with nutrition, health, hygiene, education, and protection services (Funding requirements US$152.51 million, Received US$ 56.16 million and Funding gap 44%) (UNICEF, 2019). Despite all the support and services from different parties in this situation, the biggest challenge here is the repatriation of the refugees back to their country. Keeping the repatriation issue in hand, there are resource constraints for the hosting countries which might refrain them to provide the refugees with access to normal services and broader rights “for fear of encouraging them to stay longer, or even permanently” (Newland, 2019, p. 12). In this aspect, the real economic challenges for the hosting country

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are the increased job competition, low level of wages, and a large amount of budget it has to spend for the growing number of refugee population (Mohapatra, et al., 2010). As a result, the migrants who have lost almost every valuable asset have had to end up in such condition where job opportunities may be absent and being unable to go back to their own country and face the harsh situation in the hosting country (Dadush & Niebuhr, 2016, p. 2). Managing many refugees is not just an easy task but also an immense financial burden for both the hosting country and the international donor agencies. Within such a confusing situation, repatriation agreement within the countries added another challenge. In this case, Bangladesh and Myanmar have reached such a position where if Bangladesh accepts the condition of Myanmar, the repatriation process will not be solved by 2025 (“Dhaka Tribune,” 2018b). International Monetary Fund considering the situation has expressed their concern: “slow progress in resolving the Rohingya refugee crisis could add to social tensions as well as spending pressures, and donor support will remain essential.” (International Monetary Fund, 2019)

Conclusion With the current pace of development in communication technology and human consumptions, materialist world politics has turned into a global competition of resource allocation and management. The continuous exploration for and conflict over natural resources have eventually changed human nature and world politics. Ethnic clashes, wars between countries, even urban unrest can be harmful to economic development, but politicians do not see things similarly. Therefore, migration remains the only option for the population who suffered different forms of discriminations. But migration costs both the originating and receiving countries a great deal, which in most cases, discourages the policymakers to act properly. The last 20 years’ experience portrays only one thing in this regard: migration is difficult to manage and impossible without the help and support of the international community. The sudden exodus of the Rohingya Muslim minority is just a result of denied rights and privileges and ethnic cleansing committed by Myanmar over the last few decades. The Myanmar military government has orchestrated oppression, inhumane torture, mass murder, and forced them to

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leave their homes and belongings behind and escape for their lives. They chose neighboring countries, where Bangladesh has been their number one destination since the early inception of their migration. As a Muslim majority country, Bangladesh has opened its door to the Rohingya refugees and since then hosted more than a million of them. With a steady growth rate in its GDP, the Bangladesh government has done tremendous development, which helped it increase its status in the international arena and is close to becoming a middle-income country within a few years. The Rohingya influx has badly affected its population and also its income-generating sectors such as tourism. Nevertheless, strong support from the UN and its sister organizations and their contributions have enabled it to manage a large number of refugees and support the local hosting communities who have dedicated themselves toward the refugees’ well-being since the exodus. The international support and investment also contributed to maintaining its course to achieve a higher growth rate which has recorded a historic high. Therefore, after two years of Rohingya influx, it may be early, but can be said that Rohingya refugees are not a curse to the country. However, the international community should strongly condemn Myanmar for its atrocities and make them responsible for their action and immediately start the process to take back people from different parts of the world.

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Brunnersum, M. S.-J. V. (2020, February 26). Germany pledges 15 million euros to Rohingya cause [News]. Retrieved March 21, 2020, from Deutsche Welle (www.dw.com) website: https://www.dw.com/en/germany-­pledges-­15­million-­euros-­to-­rohingya-­cause/a-­52539710 Canada’s response to the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar and Bangladesh. (2017, May 29). Retrieved March 19, 2020, from GAC website: https://www.international.gc.ca/world-­monde/issues_development-­enjeux_developpement/ response_conflict-­reponse_conflits/crisis-­crises/myanmar.aspx?lang=eng Chamie, J. (2016). International migration. Great Decisions, 35–50. http://www. jstor.org/stable/44214820 Collinson, S. (2009). The Political Economy of Migration Processes: An Agenda for Migration Research and Analysis. IMI Working Paper Series (Vol. 12). CPD: Rohingya crisis affecting Bangladesh society, economy adversely. (2018a, May 14). Retrieved March 22, 2020, from Dhaka Tribune website: https:// www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2018/05/14/cpd-­r ohingya-­c risis-­ affecting-­bangladesh-­society-­economy-­adversely CPD: Rohingya crisis affecting Bangladesh society, economy adversely. (2018b, May 14). Retrieved March 22, 2020, from Dhaka Tribune website: https://www. dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2018/05/14/cpd-­rohingya-­crisis-­affecting-­ bangladesh-­society-­economy-­adversely Crabtree, K. (2010). Economic challenges and coping mechanisms in protracted displacement: A case study of the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. Journal of Muslim Mental Health, 5(1), 41–58. https://doi. org/10.1080/15564901003610073 Czaika, M., & de Haas, H. (2014). The globalization of migration: Has the world become more migratory? International Migration Review, 48(2), 283–323. https://doi.org/10.1111/imre.12095 Dadush, U., & Niebuhr, M. (2016). The Economic Impact of Forced Migration (No. RP-16/03). OCP Policy Center. Retrieved from OCP Policy Center website: https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/04/22/economic-­impact-­ of-­forced-­migration-­pub-­63421 Department of Immigration and Passports, B. (2018, June 5). “Myanmar National’s Registration” Daily Report—Date: 04/06/2018 [Government]. Retrieved April 13, 2019, from Www.dip.gov.bd website: http://www.dip.gov. bd/site/news/ Dey, S. (2017). Adverse Rohingya impacts on Bangladeshi economy and its solutions. American Journal of Trade and Policy, 4(3 (2017): 12th Issue), 129–132. Dujarric, S. (2020, March 3). Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General [Organisation]. Retrieved March 20, 2020, from United Nations|Meetings Coverage and Press Releases website: https://www. un.org/press/en/2020/db200303.doc.htm Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. (2017). Voluntary National Review (VNR) [Government]. Bangladesh.

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Harmachi, A.  R. (2017, October 15). “Myanmar will destroy Bangladesh’s economy with Rohingya crisis: Muhith” [Online News]. Retrieved August 4, 2019, from Bdnews24.com website: https://m.bdnews24.com/en/detail/ wb-­imf/1408057 Hasan, K. (2017, December 11). ‘Locals unhappy about losing labour market to Rohingyas.’ Retrieved April 10, 2019, from Dhaka Tribune website: https:// www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/nation/2017/12/11/locals-­labour-­ market-­rohingyas/ Hazis, F.  S. (2018). Malaysia in 2017. Southeast Asian Affairs, 201–218. JSTOR. Retrieved from JSTOR. Homer-Dixon, T.  F. (2010). Environment, scarcity, and violence. Princeton University Press. International Monetary Fund. (2019). International Monetary Fund Country Report|Bangladesh (No. IMF Country Report No. 19/299). Washington, D.C. Retrieved from https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/BGD#countrydata Islam, A. (2018). Economic and Social Impact of the Rohingya Crisis [Institutional]. ULAB, Dhaka: Center for Enterprise Society, ULAB. Retrieved from Center for Enterprise Society, ULAB website: https://webcache.googleusercontent. com/search?q=cache:ORugsAndy8wJ:https://ces.ulab.edu.bd/wp-­content/ uploads/sites/18/2015/07/ULAB_CES_Current_Event_Analysis_ Rohingya-­Jan-­2018.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=tr Kallol, A. S. (2017, November 10). Doing the math on the Rohingya crisis. Retrieved April 12, 2019, from Dhaka Tribune website: https://www.dhakatribune. com/uncategorized/2017/11/10/doing-­the-­math-­on-­the-­rohingya-­crisis Khan, T. H., Islam, M. E., Talukder, M. I. A., & Khan, M. B. U. (2013). Micro credit-women empowerment nexus explored: A study on the women of selected rural areas in Natore District, Bangladesh. Research on Humanities and Social Sciences, 3(3), 110–120. Khatun, Dr. F. (2017, November). Implications of the Rohingya Crisis for Bangladesh. Organisational Presentation presented at the A dialogue on “Addressing Rohingya Crisis: Options for Bangladesh” at CPD, Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD). Laszlo, E.  L. (2018). The impact of refugees on host countries: A case study of Bangladesh under the Rohingya influx (Master’s Thesis, Aalborg University). Aalborg University, Denmark. Retrieved from https://projekter.aau.dk/projekter/files/281553531/Thesis.pdf Lecomber, R. (1979). The adequacy of natural resources. In R. Lecomber (Ed.), The economics of natural resources (pp.  7–37). Macmillan Education UK. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-­1-­349-­86151-­4_2 Mahmud, T. (2017, October 21). Rohingya influx: 15-year-old forestation project destroyed in 57 days. Retrieved April 10, 2019, from Dhaka Tribune website: https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2017/10/21/rohingya-­ influx-­15-­year-­old-­forestation-­project-­destroyed-­57-­days/

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Massey, D., Arango, J., Hugo, G., Kouaouci, A., Pellegrino, A., & Taylor, J. (1993). Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal. Population and Development Review, 19(3), 431–466. https://doi. org/10.2307/2938462 Mohapatra, S., Ratha, D., & Scheja, E. (2010). Impact of Migration on Economic and Social Development: A review of evidence and emerging issues. Migration and Remittances Unit, World Bank, for the Civil Society Days of the Global Forum on Migration and Development 2010. Newland, K. (2019). Migration, development, and global governance: From crisis toward consolidation. Migrationpolicy.Org. Retrieved from https://www. migrationpolicy.org/research/migration-­development-­global-­governance-­ crisis-­consolidation Nie, M. (2003). Drivers of natural resource-based political conflict. Policy Sciences, 36(3/4), 307–341. https://doi.org/10.1023/ B:OLIC.0000017484.35981.b6 Ovi, I.  H. (2017, September 14). How much does it cost to house Rohingya refugees? [Online News Portal]. Retrieved April 9, 2019, from Dhaka Tribune website: https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2017/09/13/ cost-­house-­rohingya-­refugees/ Padma Multipurpose Bridge Project [Government of Bangladesh]. (n.d.). Retrieved March 22, 2020, from Padma Multipurpose Bridge Project|Bangladesh Bridge Authority website: http://padmabridge.gov. bd/fund.php Palma, P., & Azad, M.  A. K. (2009, February 11). Rohingya trouble in jobs abroad. The Daily Star. Retrieved from https://www.thedailystar.net/ news-­detail-­112441 Rahman, K. (2014). China and SAARC: Connectivity—Need for an enabling environment. Policy Perspectives, 11(1), 47–56. https://doi.org/10.13169/ polipers.11.1.0047 Rashid, H.-U. (2019, April 4). রোহিঙ্গাদের কারণে খাদ্য নিরাপত্তাহীনতায় ভুগছেন স্থানীয়রা- The locals are sufferring for food security due to Rohingyas [Online News Portal]. Retrieved April 6, 2019, from DW.COM website: https://p.dw.com/p/3GFDR Rohingya Refugee Crisis. (2017, September 21). Retrieved April 12, 2019, from UNOCHA website: https://www.unocha.org/rohingya-­refugee-­crisis Sahana, M., Jahangir, S., & Anisuzzaman, M. (2019). Forced migration and the expatriation of the Rohingya: A demographic assessment of their historical exclusions and statelessness. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 39(1), 44–60. https://doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2019.1587952 Singh, D. (2018). Introduction. Southeast Asian Affairs, vii–xvi. In Singh, D., & Cook, M. (Eds.). Southeast Asian Affairs 2018. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing.

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South, A. (2007). Burma: The changing nature of displacement crises [RSC Working Paper Series]. Oxford, UK: Refugee Studies Centre, QEH, University of Oxford, UK.  Retrieved from Refugee Studies Centre, QEH, University of Oxford, UK website: https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/publications/ burma-­the-­changing-­nature-­of-­displacement-­crises Special Correspondent. (2017, November 14). Cox’s Bazar tourism sector faces serious setback. The Daily New Nation. Retrieved from http://thedailynewnation.com/news/154542/coxs-­bazar-­tourism-­sector-­faces-­serious-­ setback.html Suleri, A., Shahbaz, B., & Khwaja, M.  Z. (2010). The central issue: Natural resources: Blessing or curse (pp. 1–2). Sustainable Development Policy Institute, JSTOR.  Retrieved from Sustainable Development Policy Institute website: www.jstor.org/stable/resrep00598.3 The World Bank: Bangladesh [Organisation]. (2019). Retrieved August 4, 2019, from The World Bank website: https://data.worldbank.org/country/ bangladesh Total Population by Country 2019 [Organisation]. (2019). Retrieved April 10, 2019, from World Population Review website: http://worldpopulationreview. com/countries/ UNICEF. (2019). UNICEF humanitarian situation report (Rohingya influx) (No. 52). Bangladesh. Retrieved from https://www.unicef.org/appeals/files/ UNICEF_Bangladesh_Humanitarian_SitRep_Mid_Year_2019.pdf United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs. (2019). Population facts (Organizational Facts No. 2019/4). Retrieved from https://www. un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/populationfacts/docs/MigrationStock2019_PopFacts_2019-­04.pdf Ware, A., & Laoutides, C. (2019). Myanmar’s ‘Rohingya’ conflict: Misconceptions and complexity. Asian Affairs, 50(1), 60–79. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 03068374.2019.1567102 World Food Programme. (2020). WFP in Cox’s Bazar Information Booklet|World Food Programme. Bangladesh. Retrieved from https://www.wfp.org/publications/wfp-­coxs-­bazar-­information-­booklet Yilmaz, M. L., & Talukder, M. I. A. (2019). Economic impact of Rohingya exodus on Bangladesh. Liberal Düşünce Dergisi (Journal of Leberal Thinking), 111–129. https://doi.org/10.36484/liberal.592964 Zaman, M. (2019, January 19). Rohingya crisis: Issues and challenges that have emerged. Retrieved March 21, 2020, from The Daily Star website: https:// www.thedailystar.net/opinion/human-­rights/news/rohingya-crisis-­issues-­ and-­challenges-­have-­emerged-­1689490

CHAPTER 8

Rohingya Beyond the Refugees: India’s Policy and Realpolitik for the World’s ‘Most Persecuted Refugees’ Vedat Işikhan and Md. Sajid Khan

Introduction Currently, almost every continent is familiar and affected by the international refugee exodus. Countries around the globe are acting either as the source or hosting nation for refugees. Since the beginning of 2011, there is an unprecedented increase in the global number of refugees. The global forcibly displaced persons increased to 70.8 million, compared with 68.5 million in 2017 (UNHCR, 2019a). Out of 70.8 million displaced people worldwide, an estimated 16.2 million people were displaced in 2017 only. Interestingly, 57% of these refugees are from three countries (Syria 6.7 million, South Sudan 2.3 million, Afghanistan 2.7 million), whereas some of the significant host countries are developing and under developing countries such as Turkey 3.7 million, Pakistan 1.4 million, Uganda 1.4 million, Sudan 1.1 million, Germany 1.1 million, Lebanon 998,900,

V. Işikhan • Md. S. Khan (*) Department of Social Work, Hacettepe University, Ankara, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 K. Bülbül et al. (eds.), Rohingya Refugee Crisis in Myanmar, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6464-9_8

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Islamic Rep. of Iran 979,400, Bangladesh 932,200, (UNHCR, Global Trends, 2019a). Places like Syria and Afghanistan have been continuing to be the biggest source of refugees until the end of 2017, but a considerable number of people are also going through force migration from the Southeast Asian country called Myanmar (Burma1). In the current South and Southeast Asian neighborhood, after Afghanistan, the ethnic Muslim of Rohingya is the newest part of the regional refugee crisis. According to the reports since conflict began in August 2017, nearly 70,000 have fled their homes in the northern Rakhine province of Myanmar for neighboring Bangladesh (BBC, 2018). According to the experts, the attack on Myanmar’s military posts by the “Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army” (ARSA), which resulted in the killing of 12 officers, is the prime event that forced this ethnic Muslim minority of Myanmar known as the ‘Rohingya’ to escape targeted violent attacks by Myanmar government authorities. This key humanitarian crisis in the state of Rakhine uprooted hundreds and thousands of Muslim Rohingyas and forced them to migrate to the neighboring country to seek protection from violence and persecution. The United Nations has already criticized the military offense in Rakhine, which impelled the migration, as a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing.” The Human Rights Watch has expressed serious concerns and published a report with subtitle “Crimes Against Humanity and ‘Ethnic Cleansing’ of Rohingya Muslims in Burma’s Arakan State” (HRW, 2013). The Rohingya Muslim refugees, which are also considered as the most persecuted refugees by the United Nations, are dispersed in the nearby countries escaping the persecution at home. According to reports, Bangladesh is hosting more than 900,000 Rohingya (UNHCR, 2018), Pakistan 55,000 (The New  York Times, 2017), and India 18,800 (UNHCR, 2019b) Rohingya refugees. However, the unofficial data in these countries are much higher than the UNHCR. The governmental figures are “Bangladesh: 1.2 million, Pakistan: 500,000, Saudi Arabia: 200,000, Malaysia: 150,000, India: 40,000, UAE: 10,000, Thailand: 5000, Indonesia: 1000. In Myanmar, there are approximately one million Rohingya and 120,000 more live as IDPs within Rakhine state” (Aljazeera, UNHCR). 1  “In 1989, ruling military government changed Burma to Myanmar. The city of Rangoon also became Yangon.” https://theculturetrip.com/asia/myanmar/articles/ burma- v-myanmar-why-the-country-is-known-by-two-names/

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Methodological and Theoretical Framework The chapter is a systematic analysis of the available literature on Rohingya refugees in India. The data for the study includes various governmental and nongovernmental reports, research articles, UNHCR reports, and various news reports that are shown in the national and international channels in India. The Indian government’s statements, more especially the parliamentary question answers on Rohingya issues are also included in the analysis of the study. The study analyses the macro theory of migration that says ‘Political intolerance and prosecution of the people whose status quo is under question could work as a push factor for the migration of the people’. The said theory further explains that people prefer to go to closer countries because of cultural, political, and climatic reason than choosing the location that is away from their nation. It is uncommon to see refugees moving long distance to settle in a place with which they have little acquaintance (Hagen-­ Zanker, 2008). This theory seems appropriate as we look into the patterns of influx among Syrian, Sudanese, and Rohingya refugees who fled and get sheltered in their neighborhood countries. The reference from the theory of ‘Realism’ or ‘Political realism’ is taken to analyze the situation of the Rohingya refugees in India. The approach of realism is predominantly applied to study the international politics and international relations and is often used in the world of policy making. Realistic thinkers closely describe an image of world politics held by the practitioner of the statecraft. In a wider sense the theory assumes that the driving force behind all nations is their own internal interest (Ike & Eze, 2013). As per the realists, “leaders are faced with endless limitations and few opportunities for cooperation. Thus, they can do little to escape the reality of power politics. For a realist, facing the reality of one’s predicament is not pessimism—it is prudence. The realist account of international relations, stresses that the possibility of peaceful change, or in fact any type of change, is limited. For a leader to rely on such an ideal outcome would be folly” (Trachtenberg, 2010). Wendt also supported that notion of practicing realism in international politics and stated that the national interest is common and predefined: “all states seek to preserve their political autonomy and their territorial integrity” (Wendt, 2007).

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History of Refugees and Refugee Laws in India India, with its diverse and multicultural ethos, is home to many religions and ethnicities. India is also the home to thousands of immigrants who took refuge in different periods. The history of migration is as old as India’s struggle for independence. When India got independence from the British colonial rule, it experienced huge in and out movement of people. ‘The Great Divide’2 contributed in shaping the way for one of the greatest human migrations in the history of Asia. The exchange of more than 15 million people between Hindu-majority India and Muslim-­ majority Pakistan is a historical event of migration studies (Dalrymple, 2015). Therefore, to understand the present Rohingya refugee crisis from an Indian perspective, it is important to introspect the refugee history, laws, and policies of India toward refugees and asylum seekers. Post-independence, India followed a democratic ‘open door’3 policy for the people under conflict and violence. India, on different occasions, has welcomed considerable number of refugees into its land through the same policy. Over time, different people migrated to India such as Tibetans who came in 1959; Bangladeshis who came in 1971; Chakmas in 1963; Sri Lankan Tamils in 1983 and 1989, and again in 1995; Afghans in 1980s. During the year 2011–2015, Some 1200 Pakistani Hindu immigrants also took refuge in India (BBC News, 2015). India in some way is successful in socially integrating these refugees. The Tibetan refugees in various parts of India could be one of the examples for this integration process. On the other side, if we look at the mechanism and laws for refugees and asylum seekers, India has a very complicated and uncertain policy framework. The largest democracy of the world is neither a signatory to Geneva Convention (1951) nor to its 1967 protocol (Forced Migration review, 2018) and therefore, even the refugee agencies such as UNHCR are functioning with a limited mandate in the country. However, India ratifies the principle of non-refoulement as it is signatory to various other 2  ‘The Great Divide’ taken from William Dalrymple’s article in The New Yorker titled ‘The Great Divide: The violent legacy of Indian Partition’, published on 25 June 2015. https:// www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/06/29/the- great-divide-books-dalrymple 3  Antonio Guterres, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees says India, which has opened its doors for refugees and asylum seekers has set an example for other countries to emulate. January 4, 2013: Retrieved from https://www.unhcr.org.in/index. php?option=com_news&view=detail&id=35&Itemid=117

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international conventions. Some of these conventions are “1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the 1963 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,” and “1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).” Not to mention that India is also party to “Universal Declaration on Human Rights 1948 (UDHR).” On January 26, 2021, India celebrated 72 years of the inception of its constitution, yet, there is no comprehensive refugee act or policy to deal with the refugees and asylum seekers. The government of India administers refugees with “Foreigners Act (1946)” and the “Registration of Foreigners Act (1939).” All arrival and departure of refugees are governed under these old colonial acts. However, UNHCR with its limited mandate, conducts registration and determination of refugee status to support those refugees who are not extended any direct assistance by the government. There is no specific law or legislation to determine the status of asylum seekers or refugees in India. Even, the newly formed Citizenship (Amendment) Act4 of 2003 which is (now Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019) also fails to make any difference between refugees and their special circumstances and other foreigners or illegal immigrants. Although, CAA is considered as great reformative step in protecting and resettling refugees coming from neighboring countries, it is also criticized and rejected by many due to its selection of specific countries and specific religious groups from those countries. It has become a controversial issue because of excluding Muslim immigrants including the Rohingya. The issue is discussed more widely in the later part of this chapter.

Rohingyas in India The latest added chapter of refugees in India is the ethnic Muslim Rohingyas from Myanmar. Presently, the governments as well as NGOs have no authentic statistics on presence of Rohingyas in India. In a government affidavit to the apex court, without mentioning any details and demography, it is specified that there are approximately 43,000 Rohingyas in the country. The UNHCR has registered 17,500 Rohingyas and asylum seekers till 2018, which is done through their partner NGOs in different states of India (Amin, 2018, p. 45). 4  The Citizenship (Amendment) Bill, 2003, Retrieved from http://164.100.47.4/billstexts/rsbilltexts/AsIntroduced/XXXIX_2003.pdf

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According to one of the many organizations formed by the Rohingya people in India which is named as Rohingya Human Rights initiative (ROHRIngya), the figure of Rohingya refugees ranges from 18,000 to 20,000 (Amin, 2018). Interestingly, the figure of UNHCR and the ROHRIngya are somehow close to each other while the government’s numbers are far higher. According to Hindu Policy Report (2018) there could be many reasons behind giving high figures by the government. One possible reason could be, apart from Rohingya, government is counting some other ethnic minorities like Chin and Karen who arrived in India in different periods of time. The other and more conceivable cause for this situation could be the idea of representing this number as a strain on local resources and ‘threat to security’ (Amin, 2018, p. 46).

Government Policy on Rohingya Refugees To understand the present stance of the Indian government on Rohingyas, it is equally important to know the historical and political relationship of India with Myanmar. Myanmar, being a buffer state between India and China, has always got a chance to play a significant role in geopolitics of South and Southeast Asia (Singh, 2007). Of course, the arrival of refugees from Myanmar is not something new for India. During 1988 India wholeheartedly welcomed many refugees from Myanmar (Nitesh, 2014). The Indian government has dealt ambiguously with Myanmar and its internal affairs. Under the previous government (UPA I and II) India avoided commenting on the internal affairs of Myanmar such as military rule and conflict between Rakhine’s Buddhist and Rohingya Muslims. The Indian former foreign minister Pranab Mukherjee, while defending the Burmese policy, said that “we have strategic and economic interests to protect in Burma. It is up to the Burmese people to struggle for democracy” (Bhaumik, 2007). Moreover, in 2012, the then external affairs minister Salman Khurshid, visited Rakhine state and declared relief package of U.S$ 1 million for Myanmar.5 Therefore, it can be inferred that under the previous government there was not much involvement of Indian diplomacy for Rohingya and Myanmar. However, it should also be noted that

5  See “Ministry of External Affairs: Annual Report 2012–2013, Government of India, p. 8, http://www.mea.gov.in /Uploads /Publication Docs/21385_Annual_Report_20122013_English.pdf”

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the current violence and crisis of Rohingya become worse in the after years of UPA government more specially after the year 2017. Things started to change in Indian politics and policies toward Myanmar in general and Rohingya in particular from the reshuffle of government of India. Things got swiftly changed from May 2014, when BJP-led NDA formed the new government. The ruling government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, due to its political undertakings since 2014 and its strategic relation with neighboring countries especially with Myanmar and Bangladesh, took a long time to take a call on the Rohingya refugee crisis (YHOME, 2018). The current government which is in its second term of governance from 2019, cleared its stance only when the then minister of state, Mr. Kiren Rijiju, confirmed reports of deportation of some Rohingya immigrants. While answering the question the minister stated that exercising the power of section 3(2) (c) of the Foreigners Act, 1946, the government has declared Rohingyas as ‘illegal immigrant’ and a threat to the national security (Question No. 2615 Rajya Sabha August 9, 2017).6 Consequently, New Delhi finds it risky to have more Rohingyas in their land. In order to deport these immigrants from India, the government has also filed a counter affidavit7 in the supreme court of India. However, this dissimilar treatment of Rohingya refugees compared to the refugees coming earlier to India is highly criticized by the right-wing groups in India and by the UNHCR. There could be a combination of factors for not accommodating Rohingya refugees and treating them as an illegal immigrant in India. Some of them are listed below. 1. Overpowering the Chinese Influence in the Region With the ongoing shift of power from West to East, India and China are in the tussle to become the next superpower. Acknowledging the geopolitical and economic profits from Myanmar, India is intensively focused on its ‘Act East’ policy. India’s isolation policies of 1980 have already  The RAJYA SABHA UNSTARRED QUESTION NO. 2615. Retrieved From h t t p s : / / m h a . g o v. i n / M H A 1 / P a r 2 0 1 7 / p d f s / p a r 2 0 1 7 - p d f s / r s - 0 9 0 8 2 0 1 7 -­ English/2615.pdf 7  Retrieved from https://indianexpress.com/article/india/rohingya-deportation-centreto-file-affidavit-in-sc-on-sept-18-says- rajnath-singh/ 6

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made China a key strategic and economic partner of Myanmar. Though Myanmar has never openly disclosed its relationship with China it is an undeclared truth that Chinese influence is growing much in the eastern region. Democracy in Myanmar has brought an opportunity for India to enlarge its policy and strategies for Myanmar. Time to time, India is working to subordinate the Chinese influence in the region. 2. The Accusation on Rohingya for Terrorism and Anti-Social Activities The Indian intelligence service has accused Rohingya refugees for engaging in cross-border terror activities in the region. It is alleged that the Rohingya refugees are working with the pro Pakistani extremist groups in Indian states of Jammu and Kashmir (Chaudhury, 2018). In January 2020, the Indian daily, Times of India, published news claiming that the Pakistani Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) is training 40 Rohingyas in Cox’s Bazar, to do terror activities in India. The report also claims that Pakistan is funding this training by sending money via Saudi Arabia and Malaysia (Times of India, 2020b). Even the ex-director general of Indian Border Security Force, K.K. Sharma, in a statement accused Rohingyas to be associated and linked with the terror organizations and could be a threat for country (The Economic Times, 2018). Henceforth, the Indian government keeping the border security concerns on the top do not want to provide shelter to Rohingyas. 3. India’s Economic Interest in Myanmar Indian’s economic relations with Myanmar have seen colonial and postcolonial ups and downs. Myanmar is significant to India due to its Act East policy and it is the only Southeast Asian country with which India shares land border. For India, Myanmar is also gateway to the East and Southeast Asian countries. India seeks to improve not only security, trade, and connectivity issues with Myanmar but also it expands its religious and cultural ties with this Buddhist majority country. Analysts say that India’s economic influence in Myanmar continues to remain below potential. Although the two countries’ trade has doubled since 2008, it is tiny when compared to trade between China and Myanmar. Furthermore, the availability of oil and gas and other natural resources fascinates India toward this region. India is engaged in Shwe Gas near

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Rakhine State. India is also planning to build cross-border pipelines for its energy interest. “India also has a connectivity interest to link its landlocked north-eastern region with the Bay of Bengal through Rakhine State under a joint project with Myanmar that includes development of port at Sittwe, inland waterway in the Kaladan River, and road construction to connect it with India’s Northeast” (Kamdar, 2018). India also seems more supportive toward Myanmar government (wether its military government or civil government) due to its special economic zone projects and the transport project which will link Sittwe port to India’s Kolkata seaport. These projects have long term benefits for India against its major rival in the region which is China. 4. India’s Strategic Interest for North-Eastern States India’s lenient approach toward Myanmar is deep-rooted in its own security needs and geopolitical compulsions. Myanmar shares a 1640 km long land and maritime boundary with India. Many northeastern states such as Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, Assam, and Arunachal Pradesh share border with Myanmar. India, for various reasons, is dependent on Myanmar’s help to combat insurgent groups in its northeastern states. India hopes that socioeconomic and infrastructure development in the northeast will also help restrain the insurgencies, thereby curtailing its domestic security threats. These infrastructural developments could also help in linking India’s northeast to the Indian mainland. Now at this point of time, when military has taken over the civilian government, India must maintain a balance approach to handle its relationship with Myanmar. India wants to play safe to protect its ongoing and future strategic and economic projects in Myanmar. New Delhi is doubtful that any favor or intervention for Rohingyas can lead to the disappointment of Myanmar’s current power holders (military government) and would directly or indirectly adversely affect all its strategic interests. 5. The Rise of Islamophobia in India With the increase in Islamophobia in Europe and elsewhere, there is also an unprecedented increase in the hatred and crime against Muslims in India (Mander, 2018). Indian ministry of home affairs while answering to a question in Lok Sabha, conferred that the number of communal incidents in the country increased in the years 2015–2017 (Lok Sabha,

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unstarred question No. 590). According to the initial finding in the case of ‘Asifa’ (eight-year-old girl who was abducted, gang-raped, and murdered), the primary motive was to scare the Bakarwal community (Muslim Gujjar) and keep them away from Kathua (Hindu dominant) village. Besides this, continuous failure of the institution in safeguarding the Indian minorities, especially Muslim minority, is at large (Apoorvanand, 2018). There are number of incidents where Muslims were singled out and suffered hatred and violence from various groups. The increasing incident of mob lynching in the name of cow vigilantism8 and issues like Love jihad,9 clearly indicates that there is an increase in Islamophobia and hate against Muslims in many states of India. There is also an increase in the number of registered protests in india. The nationwide campaigns such as ‘Not in My Name’10 and ‘No place for Islamophobia’ also show that this community is affected severely under the current government. Considering these situations of Indian politics and the Muslim identity of newly arrived Rohingya refugees, it could be believed that these refugees may not get social and political acceptance in the country. The government can easily pronounce them terrorist. The case of Jammu and Kashmir could be taken as an example where, in 2018, a ruling party member and the speaker of the legislative assembly alleged Rohingya refugees as attackers on an army camp in Sunjuwan (Swarajaya, 2018). 6. Balancing Between Bangladesh and Myanmar: India Playing Safe Since the conflict began in 2017, New Delhi remains muted on the issue. Though there were major allegations of genocide against Myanmar by a UN commission, India chose to avoid criticizing Myanmar in public statements and forums (Choudhury, 2018). During the first bilateral visit of Narendra Modi, the Indian prime minister made no mention on 8  According to Manash Firaq Bhattacharjee, they are India’s so-called “cow protection gangs” displaying antithetical qualities to the ones they attribute to their sacred animal. Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/cow-vigilantism-­ undermining-­rule-law-india- 190102143126368.html 9  “Love Jihad” or Romeo Jihad is a term used to describe alleged campaigns under which Muslim men target women of non-Muslim communities for conversion to Islam by feigning love https://www.youthkiawaaz.com/2014/09/politics-love-jihaddamaging-secular-fabric-country/ 10  Retrieved from https://indianexpress.com/article/what-is/what-is-the-not-in-my-nameprotest-lynching- junaid-khan-4725668/

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Rohingya crisis. Interestingly, the prime minister applauded the measures taken by the Myanmar government for peace and national reconciliation and also highly praised the on-going peace process of the government of Myanmar (External Affairs, 2017). Furthermore, the prime minister of India, during his speech, did not mention anything about Rohingya whereas PM Modi offered condolence for the security forces killed by Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army. He said that, “we (India) are partners in your concerns over the loss of lives of security forces and innocent people due to the extremist violence in Rakhine State” (Wire, 2017). But being the key strategic and security partner of Bangladesh and Myanmar, India just cannot remain silent on this ongoing crisis in the neighborhood. The unpleasantness shown by Bangladesh and the international pressure on India cannot be ignored while planning strategies and policies for Rohingya refugees. As a regional actor, India is trying to play safe by providing limited material assistance to Bangladesh under the ‘operation Insaniyet’11 (operation Humanitarian). On September 14, 2017, the office of the home affairs, on behalf of government of India released a statement assuring assistance to Bangladesh in this humanitarian crisis (India, 2017). India dispatched 7000 tons of relief assistance for Bangladeshi Rohingyas which it followed by “$25 million help to Myanmar to build the necessary infrastructure to rehabilitate Rohingyas in the troubled Rakhine State (Bose, 2018).” Furthermore, during the visit of the Indian president, Ramnath Kovind, in December 2018 “India expressed its support for the agreements reached between Myanmar and Bangladesh for the repatriation of the verified displaced persons from Rakhine State and underlined its readiness to continue to assist in addressing this complex issue” (Choudhury, 2018). Currently, India is working in parallel in finding the resolution to this current crisis. New Delhi is trying to convince Myanmar that the Rohingya crisis could only be resolved if these migrants safely return to their home in Myanmar (Yhome, 2018). 7. The Muslim Ethnicity and Identity of Rohingya Many believe that the BJP-led NDA is quite harsh and seems less interested in solving the Rohingya crisis. In 2017 when minister of state for 11  “Operation Insaniyet – Humanitarian assistance to Bangladesh on account of influx of refugees: MEA, India” September 14, 2017

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home affairs Kiren Rijiju called the UNHCR registration for refugees ‘irrelevant’ and identified all Rohingya as illegal immigrants. Moreover, in the former state of Jammu and Kashmir (now divided into two separate union territories with the abolition of Article 370) a PIL (public interest litigation) was filed by Hunar Gupta, (advocate and member of the BJP legal cell and Sunil Sethi, the chief spokesperson of the BJP) calling for the deportation of all Rohingyas, accusing them to be a threat to national security (Lotha, 2019). One of the possible reasons for this treatment of Rohingya refugees could be the ideology of the ruling party, which is often considered as the Hindu majoritarian. The fact that most of the Rohingyas are ethnic Muslims and may affect the vote bank politics in the state of residence is also a fear for the government. On the other hand, the government also argues that among these refugees there are also sympathizers and members of terrorist groups which are operated by ISI, Pakistan. In addition to this, many see the issues of Rohingya in the light of Hindutva12 forces dealing with minorities in India. The current government’s attitude toward minorities of its own country are under question. The government has many hostile policies for its minorities groups and refugees in India. This is also exhibited in the 52 pages BJP manifesto, specifically stating that “India shall remain a natural home for persecuted Hindus and they shall be welcomed to seek refuge here” (BJP Manifesto, 2014).13 8. Citizenship Amendment Act, NRC, and Refugees in India In the absence of any national framework on refugees the government has passed various legislations on a timely basis to protect the refugees and to profile the illegal immigrants. The illegal immigrants are an issue for the Indian government since long. The UPA government in 2012 stated that, there are more than 15 million illegal immigrants from Bangladesh alone. The controversial Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA, 2019), which has become a law now, sparked a massive protest in the whole of India. It has started a completely different debate on the policies and laws toward 12  “The Hindutva” is an ideology seeking to establish the hegemony of Hindus and the Hindu way of life. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, originally Hindutva is the state or quality of being Hindu; ‘Hinduness’. In later use, it defines Hindutva as an ideology seeking to establish the hegemony of Hindus and the Hindu way of life. 13  “BJP Election manifesto 2014 Page no. 40”, Retrieved from https://www.bjp.org/ images/pdf_2014/full_manifesto_english_07.04.2014.pdf

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refugees in India. The bill, which is still facing backlash and massive protest in India, brings amendments in the 1955 Citizenship Act, and makes illegal migrants of “Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi, and Christian communities from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan eligible for Indian citizenship (Today, 2018).” The Act is the first of its kind which gives fast track citizenship to the minority refugees from three neighboring countries (Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan). However, critics say that the word minority is intentionally not mentioned in the Act (ministry of Justice, 2019). From a refugee perspective, it looks very decent and a great initiative to integrate the refugees in the country. However, on the other hand, it is also exclusive and discriminating in nature due to its self-­ selective idea of a refugee. It is said that more than 600,000 refugees staying in India have already been made stateless by this act. Suhas Chakma, coordinator for National Campaign Against Torture (NCAT), stated that “any person who entered India without valid documents or overstayed after May 30, 2003, are defined as illegal immigrants under the Citizenship Act of 2003, they and their descendants are ineligible for Indian citizenship, and shall remain forever stateless and remain liable for deportation” (The Hindu, 2019). Meanwhile, according to the government this law will help in stopping infiltration of illegal immigrants from various neighboring countries. It also says that the bill is misinterpreted for political gains by the opposition parties. Hence, the government is doing a massive outreach program to explain about the Act and the necessity to do the NRC. According to the news reports, Rohingya are also told to stay away from joining any of the rallies or protest against the CAA. There are more than 13 Indian states that have already denied the implementations of NRC and CAA. The EU has already passed resolution against the CAA law. The United States has also criticized the bill. The UN Geneva convention has also called the bill discriminating in nature and against human rights. UN Commissioner for Human Rights has also filed a petition against the CAA in the apex court of India.

The Role of NGOs and International Agencies Unlike the government approach, the civil societies and human rights organizations in India seem to have full support for Rohingyas in India. These organizations are advocating for sending refugees to their homeland with peace and dignity. The main organization which provides aid

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and identity to Rohingya refugees in India is UNHCR office in Delhi. There are 18,000 Rohingyas under the mandate of UNHCR India. Apart from UNHCR, various other national and international partner NGOs are also working to provide aid to Rohingyas such as Save the Children, Salamah Educational, Health and Welfare Trust Hyderabad, Zakat Foundation of India, and Human Rights Law Network (Amin, 2018). Khalsa Aid which was one of the first few organizations which reached Bangladesh border to provide food and water to the refugees arrived in Bangladesh. Also, a Mumbai-based NGO, Red Crescent Society of India (RCSI) sent 200 tons of humanitarian aid to Bangladesh for Rohingya refugees. According to some religious organizations working in Hyderabad, during the holy month of Ramadhan, Muslims contributed their zakat money to help the Rohingya refugees. According to the Hindu Policy Report (2018), there are many Indian NGOs working to provide food, rescue, shelter, and rehabilitation to the refugees in India but in the case of Rohingya refugees, it is difficult to provide enough assistance as the community is dispersed in different states like Delhi, Jammu & Kashmir, Hyderabad, West Bengal, Rajasthan, and so on. (Amin, 2018).

Forthcoming Challenges for Rohingya Refugees in India The future of Rohingyas, due to present government policies and the lack of any comprehensive refugee law in India, seems unwelcoming and jeopardized. They are declared as ‘illegal refugees’14 and are not entitled to have any welfare benefits or even struggle to obtain basic services in India. According to report by Reuters, Indian Rohingya migrants are facing hatred, fear, and poverty (Das, 2018). The denial of any refugee status and further branding them as a grave threat to national security by the government makes them more vulnerable in the country. It forced them to rethink their decision of staying for longer duration in India. According to Das (2018), the central government is not providing any ID to these immigrants and further directing to the state to notify in case any of the Rohingya have access to documents from India including Aadhaar (Unique ID no.) and voter cards. The 14  “On July 31, 2018, the Union Government stated that the Rohingya Muslims residing in India are considered as illegal migrants and not refugees”. https://www.newsclick.in/ india- counting-Rohingya-terms-them-illegal-migrants-not-refugees”

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nonexistence of valid identity proof puts them under constant suspicion and makes them face harassment in some states. For instance, according to Das, “the Anti-Rohingya sentiments and campaign in Jammu region of India, is so ugly that Jammu’s chamber of commerce & industry threatened to launch an “identify and kill movement” against Rohingya settlers” (Das, 2018). Furthermore, the absence of any ID or documents deprives them of having any decent job in India. According to Hujjat Islam, a Rohingya, who fled to Bangladesh in 2002 and later moved to India, pointed that “As refugee, finding jobs and homes are huge problems, we don’t have money, or documents, so we are forced to stay where we can, and do any job available” (Chandran, 2018). Only limited identity cards given by UNHCR help them to “prevent harassment, arbitrary arrests, detention, and deportation.” But only 18,800 Rohingya refugees and asylum-seekers have access to those identification cards.15 However, the Indian government estimated about 40,000 Rohingyas existing in the country. Which means, there are many Rohingyas residing in the country without having any legal identification card? This is a threat for them and their future stay in India. In addition, the Rohingya and Rohingya issue was also underlined for political benefits in the general elections in May 2019. The hatred and hostility were deliberately unfolded by the political parties to win the election. Amit Shah, the former president of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party and the current home minister, gently hinting at Rohingya migrants said that, “Elect us back next year and the BJP will not allow a single one of them to stay in this country” (Das, 2018). The BJP ministers in Kashmir are already asking for deportation of Rohingya refugees, since they cannot get citizenship under any of these laws (Times of India, 2020a). Keeping these kinds of views, and the present Indian geopolitics on refugees, the future dream of Rohingyas seems under great risk. Moreover, after the enactment of “Citizenship Amendment Act (2019)” and forthcoming National Registration of Citizens (NRC), the condition of Rohingyas may further become abysmal.

15  “UNHCR issues identity cards to the registered refugees and documents to asylum-­ seekers, which helps them prevent arbitrary arrests, detention, and deportation. Currently 18,000 people are given those cards.” http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2018/oct/07/unhcrsays-­18000-rohingyas-currently-living-in-india- 1882349.html

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Myanmar’s Coup d’état and India’s Reaction On February 1, 2021, a school teacher inadvertently becomes viral on social media. This time it was not her daily acrobatics workouts that were trending but the accidents happening behind her. It was a scene of the so-­ called coup d’état, by the Myanmar army, which again hijacked and took control over the democratically elected government of Myanmar. Although, this is not something surprising for the people of Myanmar as they have lived more than 50 years under the army regime since they got independence in 1947. It was the extreme global pressure; putting sanctions by many Western countries that bent Myanmar army to bring reforms in 2010 and shifted the country toward democracy. However, many say this experiment with democracy was not successful as it was a partial democratic system where the army enjoys 25% of the parliamentary seats and always restricts any constitutional changes. Hence, sooner or later, event like this coup was already expected by many. What troubled here is that the timing and motive behind this coup are puzzling more as the military was getting support from the defector leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who defended her country and army against the possible genocide of Rohingya in the International Court of Justice (The New York Times, 2019). This not only tarnished her fame and persona as a democratic leader but also, drew international criticism for her silence as a Nobel laureate. This coup not only exposes the notion that there was always a tussle for power between the democratically elected Suu Kyi government and the former ruler, Tatmadaw. It also manifested that the impact of the military on the local society and politics is beyond imagination. We could also see many unusual and unexpected things occurring in the coming future. At this juncture, India’s position has become graver toward Myanmar. New Delhi is under a great dilemma of political values and geopolitical Interest. On one side there are Indian democratic values, which favor supporting the democratically elected Suu Kyi government, but on the other, it has a great interest in continuing the ongoing multimillion-dollar projects in Myanmar which may get delayed or stopped if the Myanmar army gets upset with India. The army can also jeopardize by not cooperating in the northeast border areas where it jointly works against insurgents. Consequently, the Indian government has soft heartedly criticized the military coup and taken note of the current situation, whereas it seems to be not favoring any sanction on Myanmar by the US as reimposing sanctions may push Myanmar and the current ruling Junta close to China for

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the economic and political support. Interestingly, India is also giving shelter to more than 20 police and high-ranking Myanmar army officers who disabled Junta and escaped to India. All these changing actions show how significant is Myanmar in terms of security, trade, connectivity, and also for India’s Act East policy.

Conclusion and Recommendation “A leader’s primary concern is to promote national security. In order to successfully perform this task, the leader needs to be alert and cope effectively with internal as well as external threats to his rule; he needs to be a lion and a fox. Power (the Lion) and deception (the Fox) are crucial tools for the conduct of foreign policy.” Niccolò Machiavelli: The Prince (1532).

Indian government has the right to defend its geopolitical issues and security concerns. It may also adopt the hardest and rigorous policies to tackle its national interest. But this justification is not adequate to keep thousands of deprived people from taking refuge. India, with a long history of humanitarianism, has never promoted this kind of values, exclusively for its neighboring countries. For instance, during the Tamil crisis in Sri Lanka, where thousands of Tamils were deprived from citizenship and forced to migrate to India, the then Indian government worked actively and signed various pacts like Sirimavo–Shastri Pact (1964) with the Sri Lankan government to protect these immigrants. This unlikely political reflection toward Rohingya also seems against India’s commitments to democratic credentials and its proud humanitarian heritage. Today, with its current regional reputation, more strong diplomacy, and economic influence, India could do more to alleviate this crisis. As Sahoo (2017) pointed out that “being both a close neighbor to Myanmar and a responsible regional actor, India could and should play a more balanced role and take on greater responsibility in preventing the violence from spiraling out of control, as well as proactively addressing refugee issues” (Sahoo, 2017). In fact, due to various other reasons, the West and the United Nations have done very little for Rohingya refugees. India must expand its role in protecting and resettling these persecuted minorities. It must work together with the different regional intergovernmental organizations and geopolitical unions such as “Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC),” “South Asian

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Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC),” and “Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)” for the peaceful resolution of the crisis. India is engaging with both ASEAN and BIMSTEC for Rohingya crisis, a combination of both bilateral and regional involvement and coordination may prove better and effective in producing concrete results. Any diplomatic rows within these groups can also jeopardize and delay the return and settlement of the Rohingya refugees. Besides this, India should consider that the insensitive approach to Rohingya can also increase the radicalization of these refugees and India will be the first to face the consequences of any terror activities spreading from radicalization of these Rohingyas. The government, nongovernment, and civil society organizations that are working with Rohingyas must make a combined and intensive effort to provide humanitarian assistance. Indeed, after the February 2021 coup and the declaration of one-year emergency which obviously is going to be extended beyond a year, have restricted India and Myanmar in bringing quick solutions to the Rohingya refugee crisis. Furthermore, intent of the army has also been questioned in the manner of dealing with the Rohingya ethnic minority as Tatmadaw has been accused of violence and atrocity on Rohingyas, for which they are already facing international criticism and the case is in the ICJ. The mastermind of this 2021 coup, General Min Aung Hlaing is the same person who was blamed for the genocide of Rohingya refugees in 2017. Even many Rohingya activists are of the opinion that this coup will further give power to the army for torturing Rohingyas who are still in Myanmar. At this crucial time India needs to be very vigilant and should keep an eye on whatever is happening in the neighborhood. India is also needed to balance between the democratic values and political interests which again is a major characteristic of realism. Back in India, to avoid any future disputes on refugee and asylum seekers, India requires a comprehensive refugee law. As Dutta, argues “India is home to the largest number of refugees in South Asia, yet it does not have a specific legal framework to deal with the problem” (Dutta, 2017). Rohingya crisis is an opportunity to put in place a law which can regulate and safeguard the flow of migration and can determine the status of refugees. Other legal framework can also be developed to act against illegal trespassing or illegal immigrants. However, till then, India must regulate the refugee issues under the international laws and human rights conventions so that the decision about refugees may not depend on the moral values or on the mercy of any political party.

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References Amin, M. (2018). ‘Nobody’s children, owners of nothing’: Analyzing the Indian State’s policy response to the Rohingya refugee crisis. The Hindu Centre for Politics and Public Policy. Apoorvanand. (2018, May 3). How India’s institutions are failing Muslims. Retrieved from Al Jazeera: https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/ india-institutions-failing-muslims-180502100321517.html BBC. (2018, April 24). Myanmar Rohingya: What you need to know about the crisis. India. BBC News. (2015, October 28). Why Pakistani Hindus leave their homes for India. Retrieved from BBC News: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-­asia-­india-­ 34645370 Bhaumik, S. (2007, September 26). Explaining India’s silence over Burma. Retrieved from BBC News: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7013975.stm Bose, P. R. (2018, February 23). Rohingya refugees: India looking at a long-term solution. Retrieved from The Hindu: https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/ economy/policy/rohingya-refugees-india-looking-at-a-long-term-solution/ article22838513.ece Chandran, R. (2018, May 11). Poverty and politics trip up urban refugees in India. New Delhi: Reuter. Chaudhury, D.  R. (2018, July 12). Rohingya terrorists linked to pro-Pak terror groups in Jammu & Kashmir. Retrieved from The Econimic Time: https://m. economictimes.com/news/defence/rohingya-­terrorists-­linked-­to-­pro-­pak-­ terror-­groups-­in-­jammu-­kashmir/articleshow/55046910.cms Choudhury, A. (2018, December 20). India continues to play safe with Myanmar over the Rohingya issue. New Delhi. Dalrymple, W. (2015, June 29). The Great Divide: The violent legacy of Indian Partition. Retrieved from The Cultural Dairy: https://www.newyorker.com/ magazine/2015/06/29/the-great-divide-books-Dalrymple Das, K. N. (2018, October 7). India’s Rohingya refugees struggle with hatred, fear as first group is expelled. Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/ article/us-myanmar-rohingya-india-insight/indias-rohingya-refugees-strugglewith-hatred-fear-as-first-group-is-expelled- idUSKCN1MH04P Dutta, P. K. (2017, 18 September). What is Rohingya crisis and why India needs to have a concrete refugee policy and a law. New Delhi. External Affairs, I. (2017, September 06). India-Myanmar Joint Statement. Nay Pyi Taw. Forced Migration review. (2018). Non-signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention. Retrieved from Forced Migration review: https://www.fmreview.org/ non-­signatories

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Foreigner Act 1946. (1946, November 23). Retrieved from https://legislative. gov.in/sites/default/files/A1946-31.pdf Hagen-Zanker, J. (2008). Why do people migrate? A review of theoretical literature. Maastricht Graduate School of Governance. HRW. (2013). All you can do is pray. Human Right Watch. Ike, N. M., & Eze, U. T. (2013). Liberalism and realism: A matrix for political economy. International Journal of Business and Management Review, 1(4), 12–25. India, M. (2017, September 14). Operation Insaniyet – Humanitarian assistance to Bangladesh on account of influx of refugees. New Delhi. Kamdar, B. (2018, October 04). Indian refugee policy and the Rohingyas. New Delhi. Lotha, L. (2019, February 21). Refugee crisis/India’s growing religious intolerance leaves Rohingya fearing. Mander, H. (2018, July 20). India: No country for Muslims. Delhi. Manifesto, B. (2014). Manifesto. In Election Manifesto 2014. Bhartiya Janata Party. Ministry of Justice. (2019). The Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019. The Gazette of India. Nitesh, R. (2014, April 10). Chin: 8000 refugees seek safe haven in India. Retrieved from Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization: https://unpo.org/ article/17034?id=17034 Registration of Foreigners Act. (1939, April 08). Retrieved from https://www. mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/The_Registration_of_Foreigners_Act_1939.pdf Sahoo, N. (2017). India’s Rohingyas Realpolitik. In Carnegie endowment for international peace (pp. 2–3). Carnegie: Carnegie’s Rising Democracies Network. Singh, Y. (2007). India’s Myanmar policy; A dilemma between realism and idealismipcs. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies. Swarajaya. (2018, February 10). Sunjwan terror attack: J&K speaker says illegal Rohingya camp nearby led to attack on army base. Retrieved from Swarajya Staff: https://swarajyamag.com/insta/sunjwan-­terror-­attack-­jk-­speaker-­says-­illegal-­ rohingya-­camp-­nearby-­led-­to-­attack-­on-­army-­base The Economic Times. (2018, July 13). 36,000 Rohingyas in India; Terror links cannot be ruled out: BSF. Retrieved from The Economic Times: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/36000-­rohingyas-­in-­india-­terror-­ links-­cannot-­be-­ruled-­out-­bsf/articleshow/61850981.cms?from=mdr The Hindu. (2019, March 19). CAA has made 6 lakh refugees forever stateless, says rights group. Retrieved from The Hindu: https://www.thehindu.com/news/ national/other-­states/caa-­has-­made-­6-­lakh-­r efugees-­forever-­stateless-­says-­ rights-­group/article31103492.ece The New  York Times. (2017, September 12). Far from Myanmar violence, Rohingya in Pakistan are seething. Retrieved from The New  York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/12/world/asia/rohingya-­pakistan-­ myanmar-­violence.html

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The New York Times. (2019, December 11). Aung San Suu Kyi defends Myanmar against Rohingya genocide accusations’ Retrieve From The New  York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/11/world/asia/aung-­s an-­s uu-­k yi-­ rohingya-­myanmar-­genocide-­hague.html Times of India. (2020a, January 4). Next move on deportation of Rohingya refugees: Union ministe. Retrieved from TOI: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ india/next-­move-­on-­deportation-­of-­rohingya-­refugees-­union-­minister/articleshow/73095649.cms Times of India. (2020b, January 10). Intel: ISI funding training of 40 Rohingyas in Bangladesh. Retrieved from Times of India: https://timesofindia.indiatimes. com/india/intel-­isi-­funding-­training-­of-­40-­rohingyas-­in-­bangladesh/articleshow/73180548.cms Today, I. (2018, October 22). What is the Citizenship (Amendment) Bill 2016? Delhi. Trachtenberg, M. (2010). The question of realism: Routledge, 159. UNHCR. (2018, November 23). Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh switch to environmentally friendly LPG. Retrieved from UNHCR: https://www.unhcr. org/news/briefing/2018/11/5bf7c79d4/rohingya-refugee-camps-bangladesh-switch-environmentally-friendly-lpg.html UNHCR. (2019a). Global Trends. UNHCR. Retrieve from https://www.unhcr. org/figures-­at-­a-­glance.html UNHCR. (2019b). UNHCR seeking clarification from India over returns of Rohingya. Retrieved from https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2019/1/5c2f2a374/ unhcr-seeking-clarification-india-returns-rohingya.html Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is what States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics. International Organization 46(2), 391–425. Wire, T. (2017, September 06). In Suu Kyi meeting, Modi shares ‘concern’ over extremist violence by Rohingya Outfit. New Delhi. Yhome, K. (2018, July). Examining India’s stance on the Rohingya crisis. ORF issue brief, p. 3.

CHAPTER 9

Rohingya Refugee and Foreign Policy: China’s Policy and Interests in Rakhine State Faisal Mahmood, Md. Nazmul Islam, and Md. Sajid Khan

Introduction China is playing a proactive role in mediating the refugee crises in Bangladesh. The situation has aroused after the Burmese army (Tatmadaw) with the help of “ultra-nationalist Buddhists” (Routray, 2018) launched brutal clearance operation against the local Muslim Rohingya population of the Rakhine state. This military operation was the retaliatory follow-up of the attacks by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), a Rohingya

F. Mahmood (*) Department of Political Science, Aligarh Muslim University (AMU), Aligarh, India Md. N. Islam Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Ankara, Turkey Md. S. Khan Department of Social Work, Hacettepe University, Ankara, Turkey © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 K. Bülbül et al. (eds.), Rohingya Refugee Crisis in Myanmar, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6464-9_9

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armed group, on police posts. The Tatmadaw brutality forced millions of Rohingya to flee to Bangladesh. Gross violation of human rights sparked excoriation of government by the international community, particularly from the West, Organization of Islamic Conference countries (OIC), the United Nations, and other human rights organizations. In the Human Rights Council’s 36th session opening statement, the then United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein called the issue a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing.” On September 28, 2017, while briefing to the first open meeting of the Security Council on Rohingya crisis, the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres called the situation “world’s fastest developing refugee emergency and a humanitarian and human rights nightmare” (United Nations Security Council, 2017). “The United States and the United Kingdom have ended most cooperation with Burma’s military over accusations of human rights abuses” (Joy, 2018). The United States imposed sanctions on the Myanmar military in 2018, accusing them of “ethnic cleansing” during the crackdown (Matt Spetalnick, 2018). The state counselor of Myanmar, Aung San Suu Kyi, who once emerged as an icon of democracy and human rights in her struggle against military rule in the country, continues to shock the world with her silence over gross violation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims. In November 2018, Amnesty International withdrew its highest honor, the Ambassador of Conscience Award, from ‘the Lady’ for the “shameful betrayal of the values she once stood for” (Ellis-Petersen, 2018). While citing “profound disappointment” (Ellis-Petersen, 2018) in her, the Secretary-General of Amnesty, Kumi Naidoo, in her statement regarding the withdrawal of the award wrote to Suu Kyi that “you no longer represent a symbol of hope, courage, and the undying defense of human rights” (Amnesty International, 2018). At the International Court of Justice in December 2019, she rejected genocide allegations filed in a lawsuit by Gambia (BBC, 2020), even “she dismissed international criticism of her handling of the crisis, accusing critics of fueling resentment between Buddhists and Muslims in the country” (Albert & Maizland, 2020). Despite all this pressure, support of neighboring China made ground for Myanmar to remain noncompliant. While positioning itself as the mediator to solve the crisis, China echoed the line of government of Myanmar and protected it on international platforms. On September 28, 2018, China voted against the UNHRC motion advocated for

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establishing a panel to inquire about possible genocide in Myanmar (Routray, 2018). The situation of Myanmar has become more complicated for the Rohingya since the military took over the power of the country in February 2021, as General Min Aung Hlaing, who led the military crackdown in 2017, is now the ruler of the country after the coup. Since Myanmar’s first coup in 1962, every military regime has left deep scars for Rohingya. The 1962 coup under the leadership of General Ne Win founded persecution of minorities. Under this regime of General Ne Win, Rohingya saw the 1978 “King Dragon Operation” of the military to cast them out from the country. Despite having centuries of history in Myanmar, their citizenship was denied, and they were exposed to gross human rights violations. The second military takeover continued the brutality on Rohingya (Ellis-­Petersen & Rahman, 2021). This military rule of General Than Shwe launched “Operation Clean Nation” in 1991 and forcibly expelled more than 250,000 Rohingya to Bangladesh (Mansor, 2018). Similarly, the quasi-civilian government of 2012, led by Thein Sein worsened the situation by uprooting more than 200,000 Rohingya from Rakhine to the displacement camps, where they are still living without having primary healthcare and education facilities (Ellis-Petersen & Rahman, 2021).

Existing Literatures and Debates on China-Myanmar Engagement and Relations The cooperation, engagement, and bilateral relations between China and Myanmar have caught the attention of scholars who have raised pertinent questions about what reasons influenced China to make a strategic collaboration with Myanmar and how China sees the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar. Chinese interests in Myanmar have attracted the attention of several scholars and with that numerous narratives broadly divided into economic, political, military, and historical aspects. Covering more than 1380 miles of China’s land border, Myanmar plays a crucial role in Chinese diplomacy and is a strategically important region for China in Southeast Asia. The relationship between the two neighbors is well written in history. The country visits and exchange of letters between the two were frequent in the postcolonial period, as accounted by Tin Maung Maung Than (2003), who further reveals that the ‘substantial’ and ‘commercial’

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connections between China and Myanmar were well established in the eighteenth century, which continued throughout the British rule. After gaining independence in 1948, Myanmar embraced Chinese establishments in its territory. Myanmar always remains of vital importance for China in terms of security issues. In the postindependence developments in bilateral relations, both the countries use a specific term ‘Paukphaw’ for their relationship—a Myanmar term, which means brotherly or friendly—which originated in 1954 during Myanmar’s Prime Minister U Nu’s visit to China. Nevertheless, the bilateral relationship between the two was challenging to maintain in many instances. Due to the long-drawn-out border disputes in the Kachin area and Wa district, the Chinese troops entered the Wa district in 1956 and remain entrenched. This issue resolved with U Nu’s Beijing visit in 1965, as noted by Tin Maung Maung Than (2003). K. Yhome (2019) discusses that China’s support to the Communist Party of Burma—that was indulged in power battle against the Myanmar government—has developed a rift with Myanmar. Instead of showing a breach in five principles of peaceful coexistence, which includes mutual respect for the integrity and sovereignty and mutual nonaggression, the government remained silent and calm during this event and tackled the situation by “utilising internal resources to employ social, psychological, and military means” (Than, 2003, p. 192). Research in this area reveals that the political, diplomatic, and security ties between them reached a new top in the late 1980s. The 1988 event has cemented the Sino-Myanmar relationship. This year, the totalitarian regime in Myanmar brutally suppressed pro-democracy protests resulting in thousands of deaths. In the aftermath, as Toshihiro Kudo (2008) mentioned, the United States, Canada, Britain, European Union, and Japan stopped the official development assistance and weapon embargoes and imposed political sanctions against Myanmar. He further adds that facing international isolation, Myanmar had China as the only option to receive aids from, which strengthened its economic ties with China and diplomatic and political relations. Besides the economic interests, China sees deep-rooted strategic interests in Myanmar; many of them are connected with Rakhine too. Toshihiro Kudo (2012) suggested three primary strategic interests of China in Myanmar:

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(i) energy procurement and energy security including the transportation of crude oil and natural gas through the pipelines across Myanmar and the construction of hydroelectric power plants. Some of those projects are under progress; (ii) access to the Indian Ocean by using Myanmar as a ‘land bridge’ for the acquisition of trading routes; (iii) border trade and security in border areas. This chapter’s central thesis is to find out possible motives of China behind playing as the peacebuilder in the Rakhine crisis through a sharp analysis of the patterns of its responses toward the situation. However, much of literature can be found on Sino-Myanmar relations; this chapter, based on secondary data, further tries to link China’s interests in Rakhine province in particular, which is vital in terms of understanding its moves toward the settlement of the situation that has arrived after the outbreak of ethnic conflicts in the province.

Mainstream International Relations (IR) Theories and the Rohingya Issue in China-Myanmar’s Engagement China’s foreign policy plays an essential role in developing the discipline of international relations, both with its new approaches to foreign policy studies and its connection with other social sciences. The most important feature of the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) in handling the problems in international relations is its multifactorial approach. In today’s foreign policy studies, it has become necessary to examine different dimensions of cases at different levels, for example the case of “Rohingya Issue” and China’s interest in Myanmar, and how these interests make China to be one-sided policy maker on behalf of Myanmar government in regional level and international level. This situation made it necessary to act on different variables and use more than one analysis level in terms of FPA. As the three levels of analysis (individual, state, system) show the root cause of a multilevel approach of China toward Myanmar, which is the diversity of factors that affect the decision-maker and, therefore, the foreign policy itself. It is seen that among the problems of international relations, the most severe criticisms are brought to the rational choice theory. FPA, which focuses on the decision-­making approach, maintains that decision-makers ultimately

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determine state behavior. The main features that differentiate the decision-­ making approach from traditional methods in international relations are the study of sub-state units, a process-oriented analysis, not a result, an emphasis on internal factors, focus on subjectivity, scientific, and understanding of rationality. But rationality in decision making is read through the psychological states of individuals. In the criticisms about this model, the mental environment in which decisions are made is filled with perceptual prejudices and cognitive warnings, and foreign policymaking in such an environment creates significant distortions. FPA theorists who deepened this criticism, discussed the view of being a unitary actor in foreign policy. It is stated that this approach does not fully explain the order of relationality and importance between different levels of structure, process, and actors. Another criticism is that in the decision-making approach, more than one decision is made simultaneously, but there is no examination of the interaction of these decisions. It is also criticized that the conditions and factors are considered stationary, and that time and change are not included in the analysis (Islam & Cansu, 2021). Until the end of the Cold War, realist arguments on the theoretical foundations of Chinese foreign interests and international relations were close to classical realism but have changed as a result of the end of bipolarity. Thereby, a new realist paradigm on Asian, especially Chinese international relations, views the end of bipolarity causes more instability, and the end of the Cold War could lead to decompression of conflicts. As Kenneth Waltz (1979) emphasizes, the international system’s anarchic structure causes states to utilize self-help strategies to survive. These strategies lead states’ behavior become unrestricted. Hence, Waltz’s (1979) neorealism asserts China will also compete for power, territory, and resources and defend its interests in order to survive as the other states in this anarchic atmosphere (Acharya, 2014); likewise, it has been approached in the Chinese cooperation process with Pakistan, Myanmar, Bangladesh, and so on by utilizing China’s existing resources in that specific country such as in Myanmar. In accordingly, Mearsheimer’s (2006) offensive realism sees an inevitable tendency of rising powers toward expansionism that he foresees an inevitable confrontation between the status quo power (US) and its rising power challenger (China) from the “power transition theory” perspective. According to Mearsheimer, the “mightiest states attempt to establish hegemony in their region of the world while making sure that no rival great power dominates another region” (Mearsheimer, 2006, p. 160). Accordingly, Mearsheimer (2001, 2006) believes that as a rising power

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China will seek to dominate and have no other way to secure its national interests unless it displaces the existing hegemon US’ global leadership. In his study, to protect its national interests, China will continue militarization to have a US policy stance. At the end US will have no any other choice except the confrontation with China if it wants to maintain its hegemony. Mearsheimer’s (2010) aspect of China’s rise and assertion of an inevitable war between US and China is mainly based on security issues than nonmilitaristic aspect that it shows constructivism, offensive realism emphasizes one direction of China’s rise like neorealism and Constructivism, where the issue of cooperation and engagement of China with Myanmar, derives another perspective of power and control issue in the theory of international relations. Realist theories explain China’s rise through its growing military might, defense, and economic interests, whatever it is in Myanmar, Pakistan, or any African countries (Islam & Cansu, 2020), as what John Mearsheimer’s realist concerns that “China will eventually be seduced by the opportunity to overtake US hegemony and that China will not accept a subordinate role and thus support a multipolar world in order to free itself from US unilateralism” (Mearsheimer, 2010, p. 387). To sum up, most realist scholars argued that rising China would disrupt the international system. Hence, considering the power transitions and its causes, realists paint a dark picture of Asia’s post-Cold War order and foresee the rising China will pose a challenge to the existing order characterized by global American hegemony and disrupt world order with its economic and military capabilities and for the interest of their defense and trade, China-Myanmar cooperation and engagement process will be another dimension to reach to that point. Nevertheless, in neoclassical realism, which incorporates national policies of states with analysis of resources or capacity in the international system and claims to explain the China’s foreign policy, which has emerged as a new version within the realist international relations theories. In the realist school, the “power balance theory” conflicts is used as a new assumption to explain the states’ foreign policy actions. Neoclassical realists recognize that power is of primary importance in determining foreign policy. They define power as the capacity of states to influence other states or the resources they can use for this purpose. Structuralist realism in the realist school exploits very few variables while explaining the facts that repeat themselves in the international system. In contrast, as a foreign policy theory, neoclassical realism claims to explain the foreign policies of states, not the recurring facts in international relations. At the point of

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analyzing the states’ foreign policies, it includes the national political elements of the states in the analysis and the distribution of resources or capacity in the international system and includes more variables. Neoclassical theory treats international politics as a two-variable process. In this context, capacity distribution of China in the global system is accepted as an independent variable, and foreign policy actions of China is considered as dependent variables. Thus, while neoclassical realism explains the foreign policies of China, the capacity distribution in the international system is the independent variable; the national policies of states are included in the analysis as an intrusive variable, as it has been obvious in the case of China-Myanmar relations and China’s interests in the Rakhine state and why China ignored the massive catastrophe and humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state by Myanmar government toward Rohingya community. In order to understand China and Myanmar’s foreign policy action, it is necessary to have comprehensive knowledge about that state. It is essential to create a set of crucial factors in foreign policy analysis and be expressed analytically. Otherwise, neoclassical realism will not explain foreign policy but a proposition in which researchers try to construct various approaches with numerous assumptions. Accordingly, liberal paradigms of Asia’s international relations particularly emphasizes the important role of interdependence as a force for China’s peaceful rise in the world through their Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) approach. They claim this deepening interdependency and its durable impacts on national and international politics are crucial in making China’s rise peaceful. Like realism, liberalism also has its own tragic and optimist vision of the rise of China. The tragic parts of this theory emphasize societies’ domestic preferences and reflect the states’ foreign policies. They express that to change the status quo, the Chinese government may engage in activities that could contradict China’s political regime and the liberal international order. Some analysts believe that the increasing dissatisfactions and economic demands from the new middle class may force China into an inevitable conflict with the world’s other states and companies which could end with hardline policies. Besides theorists claim rising nationalism, fragility of China’s domestic governance, and domestic political unrest may derail China’s peaceful rise and engagement with other states, where Myanmar will not be an exception in this case. However, the optimists expect mainly two assumptions that the interests stemming from both inside and outside of China are not tending to conflict and besides those are cooperative interests rather than conflictual ones, which makes

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China to support Myanmar government’s interests rather than to look at Rohingya community’s crisis, as Keller and Rawski (2007) and Shambaugh (2004) argued that the economic expansion of China will provide better interaction and a web of non-state cooperative interests and foreign policies. Besides, some analysts predict that the liberalization of China’s domestic politics will have an “inside-out” spillover effect that would lead to a more cooperative Chinese foreign policy (Wei & Liu, 2006). One of the leading Chinese constructivist scholars, Qin (2010), clarifies China’s rise with its distinction regarding norms and values “based upon the Chinese way of thinking, Chinese dialectics, and Chinese understanding of human society” (Qin 2010, p. 131). Qin (2010) claims China can introduce its understanding of norms and values and may try to revise the international system again with regards to its own norms and values to make its rise peaceful within the international culture that China constructs; in doing so, it can be recognized the current approach that China seems to make a strong relationship with Myanmar where the issue of Rohingya community crisis is secondary.

Sino-Bangladesh Ties Versus Sino-Myanmar Relations The Rohingya refugees who fled from Myanmar have created upheaval in Bangladesh. The situation of unrest has brought both the countries on a face-to-face stage and China in the middle. Having its strategic and trade interests in both countries, China has to play a crucial role in resolving the crisis while keeping its ambitions in mind. Sino-Bangladesh Ties: The ‘All-Weather Friendship’ China was against the creation of independent Bangladesh, so, supported Pakistan during the Bangladesh liberation movement in 1971 and even vetoed against its entry into the United Nations. The relationship between both countries remained adversarial until the assassination of Shaikh Mujiburrahman in a military overthrow in 1975. Bhattacharjee (2018) pointed out that the first military ruler of Bangladesh, General Ziaur Rahman’s visit to China in 1977, marked a significant transition for the Sino-Bangladesh relationship, which was later termed as “all-weather friendship.” The enhancement of Sino-Bangladesh friendship—covering trade, defense, power, manufacturing, education, and agriculture—fulfil both countries’ mutual interests.

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Defense ties are pivotal in the Sino-Bangladesh relationship. Bangladesh is an importer of many military equipment from China, including tanks, missile launchers, fighter aircraft, several weapons systems, and two Ming class submarines in a recent purchase (Bhattacharjee, 2018). Following Pakistan, Bangladesh is the second-largest importer of arms from China in the world (Yesmin, 2018) and acquires 20% of the total sale of Chinese weapons, even at a low price (Anwar, 2019). Kapila (2003) pointed out that Sino-Bangladesh defense ties decorated further in 2002 with the signing of the “Defense Cooperation Agreement,” the first such type of agreement ever signed by Bangladesh. Both countries obtain their mutual economic interests in each other. China sees Bangladesh as a big market of 160 million strength. On the other hand, Bangladesh needs more massive infrastructure investments of China in its territory, which are critical to meet its aims to be a developed country by 2040 and a middle-income country by 2021, as Yesmin (2018) mentioned. In 2015, 34% of the total import of Bangladesh was from China. In 2016, the bilateral annual trade rose to more than 10 billion dollars, which was 900 million dollars in 2000. However, the trade balance favors China as import by Bangladesh in 2015–16 was worth 9 billion dollars compared to the little amount of export to China worth 800 million dollars (Haque & Hasib, 2016). These numbers made China the top trading partner of Bangladesh, acquiring the position that India had held for 40 years (Anwar, 2019). Bilateral economic and development cooperation ties reached a new high during Xi Jinping’s two-day visit to Bangladesh in 2016, which was reported by Chinese media as a diplomatic “milestone” of “historical significance” (Parmar, 2016). Both countries established a strategic partnership of cooperation. Around 21 agreements and MoUs involving Chinese funding close to 40 billion dollars for implementing mega infrastructure projects in Bangladesh were signed during this visit (Bhaumik, 2016). As mentioned by Paul (2016), China promised Bangladesh to provide massive loans of 24 billion dollars’ worth. Bhattacharjee (2018) noted that the other significant projects that are being implemented with Chinese investments include a power plant in Payra river worth 1.9 billion dollars, a power grid network strengthening project worth 1.32 billion dollars, and the Padma Bridge rail link worth 3.3 billion dollars. Bangladesh also officially joined China’s massive Belt and Road Initiative during Xi’s visit, observing it as an opportunity to attain development goals.

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Bangladesh’s geographical location makes it strategically significant for China as the good relationship with Bangladesh “gives it a presence in a major country in South Asia” (Bhattacharjee, 2018), which is close to another big power in the region, that is, India. Sino-Myanmar Relationship: The ‘Paukphaw’ Friendship The historical evidence suggests that the pre-independent Myanmar shared a friendly past with its neighbor China, bordered on its north and northeast. After regaining independence in 1948, Myanmar deepened commercial connections with China and welcomed Chinese investments on its land (Kudo, 2008). Myanmar reserves the term ‘paukphaw’(fraternal) only for China to give special consideration to their relationship. In the exceptional relationship with China, Myanmar became the “first” nonsocialist country to welcome the birth of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), a year after its independence in 1948, to resolve its border issues with China in 1960, and finally in the same year, to sign a treaty of friendship and mutual nonaggression with China (Kraus & Fan, n.d.). All this helped the newly established and relatively weak People’s Republic of China make diplomatic connections with its neighbors and secure peace at borders, as mentioned in the International Crisis Group’s (ICG) Asia Report N°305 (2020). The Sino-Myanmar relationship has been guiding by the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence signed in 1954, which constitutes mutual respect for sovereignty, integrity, and equality and nonaggression and noninterference in internal matters. Despite all the above-mentioned normative and cultural connections, the Sino-Myanmar relationship got turbulent sometimes. The military regime of General Ne Win, who came into power in 1962, caused a fall in friendly Sino-Myanmar relations. Ne Win’s ban on cross-border trade and targeted xenophobia forced hundreds of thousands of South Asian and Chinese migrants, including 100,000 Sino-Burmese, to leave Myanmar (Crisis Group, 2020). Than (2003) mentioned that the friendly relationship between Myanmar and China fell lowest when Chairman Mao’s “Cultural Revolution” got spread to Myanmar’s overseas Chinese community in mid-1967 and turned into anti-Chinese riots, erupting in Yangon in June of 1967, which caused a considerable loss of Chinese lives and property. The events of 1988 and 1989 have enormously contributed to the good Sino-Myanmar bilateral relationship. In 1988, the totalitarian regime

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in Myanmar brutally suppressed pro-democracy protests, which resulted in thousands of deaths, and in 1989, the Chinese army’s Tiananmen massacre brought both countries closer as they faced international isolation, Yhome (2019) discussed. He further noted that Sino-Myanmar relations faced a problematic period again when Myanmar had democratized and initiated political reforms in 2011. In post-2016 developments of relationship with Myanmar, China strategically builds relations with Aung San Suu Kyi, a pro-democracy face and enormously popular in the Western world. It was a massive victory for China as she could become a problem for China because of her close ties with Western countries and India. As mentioned in the ICG’s Report of 2002, China invited Suu Kyi months before the election of 2015 and provided her high-class hospitality that was generally reserved for the visiting head of states. The military crackdown in Rakhine state in 2017 has created opportunities for both countries to provide support to each other. While isolation facing Myanmar needed an ally who can effectively shield it from international denunciation, China has its prolonged interests in Myanmar, which we will discuss next.

China’s Response to the Rohingya Refugee Crisis Bangladesh is providing refuge to an estimated 1.1 million Rohingya refugees. This gesture of Bangladesh is praiseworthy at a time when walls and closed borders and deportation of refugees are in trends of world politics (Habib, 2019). China has provided humanitarian assistance to help Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. In September 2017, China sent 150 tons of aid for refugees, including about 2000 tents and 3000 blankets. China exhibited its diplomatic inclination toward Myanmar in this case too. In the official statement of that delivery, released by the foreign ministry of China, officials carefully nowhere mentioned Rohingya—a term the Myanmar government refuses to use. Instead of using the word ‘Rohingya refugee’, they used ‘displaced people’ in the official statement (Gao, 2017). While on a trip to Bangladesh and Myanmar in November 2017, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi proposed a consensus and discussion-­ based three-point plan to resolve the Rohingya refugee problem. The first phase is “to effect a ceasefire on the ground, to return to stability and order, so the people can enjoy the peace and no longer be forced to flee” (Lee, 2017); the second stage includes the process of repatriation of

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refugees; and the third point calls “the international community to help develop Rakhine” (Zhou, 2017). In June 2018, China arranged a meeting with both parties in Beijing. In the meeting, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi with Minister for the Office of the State Counsellor U Kyaw Tint Swe of Myanmar and Bangladesh’s Foreign Minister A. H. Mahmood Ali reached a four-point solution of the Rohingya issue, which basically was the elaborated redo of the previous ‘three-points plan’. The proposed four-points were to “immediately improve the situation in Rakhine State through stopping violence-­ repatriation-­development; the priority at this stage is to repatriate refugees to Myanmar from Bangladesh, and take concrete measures to realise the repatriation; based on the two countries’ wishes, China is willing to assist in resettling them, which includes emergency assistance and reconstruction; boost cooperation in developing the border areas between Myanmar and Bangladesh, and improve the living standards of locals” (Hongliang, 2018). To rebuild Rakhine, China sent shipping containers to Rakhine as the quick arrangement of housing for repatriated Rohingya refugees, but due to the safety and security concerns, the process of repatriation had gone nowhere, and only “a total of 397 Rohingya have voluntarily returned independently of bilateral agreement procedures established between Myanmar and Bangladeshi governments” (Khine, 2019). Wang Yi held another informal meeting with U Kyaw Tint Swe and A. H. Mahmood Ali in the United Nations headquarters. The Secretary-­ General of the United Nations was present in the meeting at the invitation. The meeting reached a three-point consensus—first, both the parties agreed to solve the issue through consultation in a friendly way; second, Bangladesh said it is prepared to repatriate the first group of refugee and Myanmar said it is ready to receive them; and third, both the parties agreed to hold a joint working group to prepare plan and timetable to repatriate the first group of refugees (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People’s Republic of China, 2018). Even though the return of Rohingya refugees has not crossed a significant number and yet to be adequately started, General Min Aung Hlaing, the new junta chief, in his address on February 8, 2021 promised that the Rohingya refugees would continue to be repatriated from Bangladesh to the Rakhine state (AFP, 2021). The civilian rule in Myanmar provided no relief to the Rohingya, and Aung San Suu Kyi notoriously defended the military crackdown on the Rohingya minority at the Hague; Rohingya are

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still having more faith in a resolution through the democratic process than the one by the military. Ellis-Petersen and Rahman (2021) quoted Hossain Ahammad, a Rohingya who lives in Balukhali refugee camp, Cox’s Bazar, with his family, who said, “Still, there was a hope that through a democratic process the justice would be meted out to us. Now, after the military takeover, we cannot hope for anything good for our community in our home country.” Nay San Lwin, a Rohingya activist, called pro-democracy Burmese protesters to get together against the junta chief at International Criminal Court (ICC) to prosecute him for the crimes against the Rohingya, as he found this as a way to fight with “the common enemy,” and to reinforce the regime’s isolation. On the other part, solidarity with the people of Myanmar will help end discrimination against them and bolster their fight for justice (Gunia, 2021).

China’s Interest in the Rakhine State of Myanmar China’s foremost reason to play as the mediator in the Rohingya issue is its economic interests in the region. Rakhine has wide-ranging economic relevance for China. China sees Rakhine as the roadway to reach the Indian Ocean. In its ambition for greater access over the Indian Ocean, China invested in two controversial projects in the region—Kyaukpyu Special Economic Zone, and gas and oil pipeline that crosses Rakhine from Yunnan of China—both linked with the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (Joy, 2018). “The Belt and Road Initiative includes a plan for Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor, which is intended to run from China to Bangladesh and India, right through northern Rakhine State” (Anthony Ware, 2018, p. 159). The mega investments served resentments in local communities as they are largely excluded from the planning and executing such projects. The local Rakhine community accused the government of exploiting its natural resources without giving the local communities their fair share. The profit derived from their land “tends to be shared between government and foreign companies” (Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, 2017). Instead of increasing employment opportunities for locals, a large number of foreign employees rushed into the Rakhine, which resulted in increased social problems, such as prostitution and violence against women (Joy, 2018). Despite local opposition, China suggested to Burma that economic development is the best way for a government to secure stability and legitimacy while glossing over power dynamics between the Burmese, Rakhine,

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and Rohingya groups. Even though China has provided 68% of total arms imported by Myanmar between 2013 and 2017, with a combat aircraft deal (ongoing in 2017), the instability in the neighborhood and its connectivity with the Indian Ocean invited China to be positioned itself in the peace process. On the other hand, the lack of alternatives makes Myanmar reliant on Chinese investments. With the help of all these investments and Myanmar’s “search for allies” (Routray, 2018) to defend itself from international pressure, China succeeds in interjecting into the politics of Myanmar. “China has proved an indispensable ally for Myanmar, using its seat on the United Nations Security Council to shield the country from some of the international censures as it entrenches economic interests there” (Reed, 2020). China’s support in protecting Myanmar from charges of violation of human rights and genocide compelled Myanmar to speed up its big infrastructure projects. During the two-day Myanmar visit of President Xi Jinping on January 17, 2020, both countries signed dozens of deals covering trade and infrastructure, with Myanmar agreeing to speed up implementation (McPherson & Ruma Paul, 2020). This visit came after Gambia filed a suit against Myanmar in the International Court of Justice for alleged violation of provisions of the Genocide Convention (Human Rights Watch, 2020). Beijing’s take on the crises can also be seen as the competition of leadership in the nearby region. With its location between rival India and Southeast Asia, the western province of Myanmar has strategic benefits for China. Also, China’s engagement in the peace process rules out the risks of the United Nations and the Western world’s active role in the adjoining areas. Having the reason, as mentioned earlier, in mind, China shielded Myanmar in the United Nations. China refused in Security Council to negotiate on a potential resolution. References to statelessness and citizenship for the Rohingya and a UN fact-finding mission were removed, while the request for a special adviser on Burma was weakened. Refusing to endorse an UN-led investigation into the crisis also ensures that a coordinated, Western-led action does not occur on China’s doorstep (Joy, 2018). Following the 2021 coup d’etat in Myanmar, Beijing again staunchly protected Myanmar from condemnation in the Security Council and blocked the Council from reaching a joint statement on February 2, 2021 (“Myanmar Coup: China Blocks UN Condemnation as Protest Grows,” 2021). In response to the first statement on the coup by the Security Council on February 4, which nowhere in it calls the situation a ‘coup’,

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China released a separate statement that the Council is willing for “dialogue and reconciliation in accordance with the will and interests of the people of Myanmar” and called itself Myanmar’s ‘friendly neighbor’ (Strangio, 2021). However, the relations with the past military regimes of Myanmar were not very beneficial for China; Beijing sees the coup as favorable to meet its economic interest. International condemnation of the military coup, especially from the West, left Myanmar in a pariah-like condition, but on the other hand, it has created a more valuable market for Chinese business with less competition. Isolated Myanmar is getting Chinese assistance at different levels, such as economic, technical, and backing at the international platforms. “The more isolated Myanmar becomes, the better for Chinese exploitation” (MClaughlin, 2021). China’s Proposals to Resolve the Rohingya Refugee Crisis China proposed three fundamental proposals for resolving the Rohingya refugee crisis, persecution in Myanmar, and challenges for Bangladesh. The first proposal includes a safe environment for the villagers and ethnics who are residing in the Rakhine state through ceasefire, followingly in the second proposal, China emphasized on the dialogue where Bangladesh and Myanmar may sit and talk on this crisis for finding a feasible solution of repatriation of Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh to Myanmar. In that case, the international community should help both parties reach an agreement to facilitate the resolution of this crisis. In the third proposal, China encourages development and progress in the Rakhine state, which may help eradicate the root problem of the Rohingya refugee crisis. As China identified, scarcity of resources and poverty in the Rakhine state is the overwhelming problem for the Rohingya refugee crisis. If the area is developed, they will find peace there (Hongliang, July 3, 2018). However, China’s second proposal is more feasible for Rohingyas. Both countries, Bangladesh and Myanmar, are working on finding a solution for refugee repatriation, reception, and verification. Again, it must be followed that the Chinese proposal will be under process if the Myanmar army and their civilian government take it seriously; otherwise, it will be time-consuming, even it is very obvious that “Myanmar government would require billions of dollars to adequately resettle the returning refugees,” and till then the international community should generously contribute for the rehabilitation of Rohingya refugees both in Bangladesh and Myanmar (Venkatachalam, December 2, 2017).

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Conclusion From the earlier discussion on China’s role in the Rohingya conflict, one can analyze the following observations. China’s intervention in the Rohingya crisis is clearly determined by economic interest. The geographical position of Myanmar, particularly of Rakhine, makes it essential for China to convert its grand projects into reality. In the events after the outbreak of the crisis, China’s echoing, backing, and shielding Myanmar’s government on the global stage and revved up infrastructure deals between the two indicates that China has intervened in the peace process to achieve broader geopolitical aims. By projecting the conflict as a result of economic underdevelopment and suggesting economic stability and development as a solution to the problem, China has created a winwin situation for itself. During all the attempts to deal with the refugee solutions, China could be seen praising the Myanmar government’s line. China has cleverly interpreted this approach into its adherence to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence that uphold sovereignty and noninterference in other countries’ affairs. By sticking to this policy, China cast itself away from publicly criticizing Myanmar on gross violation of human rights of Rohingya.

References Acharya, A. (2014). Thinking theoretically about Asian IR. In D. Shambaugh & M.  Yahuda (Eds.), International relations of Asia (Second ed., pp.  59–89). Rowman & Littlefield. Advisory Commission on Rakhine State. (2017). Towards a peaceful, fair and prosperous future for the people of Rakhine: Final report of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State. Retrieved from http://www.rakhinecommission.org/app/ uploads/2017/08/FinalReport_Eng.pdf AFP. (2021). Myanmar coup leader: Rohingyas to be repatriated to Rakhine state. Dhaka Tribune. https://www.dhakatribune.com/world/2021/02/09/myanmar-­coup-­ leader-­rohingyas-­to-­be-­repatriated-­to-­rakhine-­state Albert, E., & Maizland, L. (2020). The Rohingya crisis. Council on foreign relations. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/rohingya-crisis Amid humanitarian and human rights nightmare’ in Myanmar, Secretary-General urges full access for aid, safe return of displaced Rohingya, end to military operations. (2017). Retrieved December 4, 2019, from United Nations Security Council website: https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc13012.doc.htm

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Amnesty International withdraws human rights award from Aung San Suu Kyi. (2018). Retrieved from Amnesty International website: https://www.amnesty. org/en/latest/news/2018/11/amnesty-­w ithdraws-­a ward-­f rom-­a ung-­ san-­suu-­kyi/ An important three-point consensus reached at an informal meeting among China, Myanmar and Bangladesh. (2018). Retrieved from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People’s Republic of China website: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ zxxx_662805/t1601107.shtml Anthony Ware, C.  L. (2018). Myanmar’s “Rohingya” conflict. Oxford University Press. Anwar, A. (2019). How Bangladesh is benefiting from the China-India rivalry. The Diplomat. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/how-­ bangladesh-­is-­benefiting-­from-­the-­china-­india-­rivalry/ Bhattacharjee, J. (2018). Decoding China-Bangladesh relationship. Retrieved May 28, 2020, from Observer Research Foundation website: https://www.orfonline. org/expert-­speak/41935-­decoding-­china-­bangladesh-­relationship/?amp Bhaumik, S. (2016). What Bangladesh hopes to gain from milestone visit by China’s Xi Jinping. This Week in Asia. Retrieved from https://www.scmp. com/week-­asia/geopolitics/article/2027789/what-­bangladesh-­hopes-­gain-­ milestone-­visit-­chinas-­xi-­jinping China’s changed policy on Rohingya refugees. (2019). Retrieved December 17, 2019, from Frontline website: https://frontline.thehindu.com/world-­affairs/ article28882711.ece Ellis-Petersen, H. (2018, November 23). From peace icon to pariah: Aung San Suu Kyi’s fall from grace. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian. com/world/2018/nov/23/aung-­san-­suu-­kyi-­fall-­from-­grace-­myanmar Ellis-Petersen, H., & Rahman, S.  A. (2021). We cannot hope for anything good: Myanmar coup sparks despair for Rohingya. The Guardian. https://www. theguardian.com/global-­development/2021/feb/14/we-­cannot-­hope-­for-­ anything-­good-­myanmar-­coup-­sparks-­despair-­for-­rohingya Gao, C. (2017, October 2). China aids Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh while backing Myanmar government. The Diplomat. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/china-­aids-­rohingya-­refugees-­in-­bangladesh-­while-­ backing-­myanmar-­government/ Gunia, A. (2021). Rohingya activists seek support among Burmese. Time. https:// time.com/5936604/myanmar-­coup-­rohingya/?amp=true Habib, H. (2019). China’s changed policy on Rohingya refugees. Frontline. https:// frontline.thehindu.com/world-affairs/article28882711.ece Haque, S., & Hasib, N.  I. (2016). Chinese President Xi Jinping in Bangladesh on ‘historic’ state visit. BD News24. Retrieved from https://bdnews24.com/ bangladesh/2016/10/14/chinese-­president-­xi-­jinping-­in-­bangladesh-­on-­ historic-­state-­visit

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Hongliang, G. (2018, July 3). China’s proposals drive Rohingya crisis solution. Global Times. Retrieved from http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/ 1109289.shtml ICG. (2020). Commerce and conflict: Navigating Myanmar’s China relationship. . Islam, M.  N., & Cansu, E.  E. (2020). BRI, CPEC, and Pakistan: A qualitative content analysis on China’s grand strategies. International Journal on World Peace, Xxxvii(3), 43–71. Islam, M. N., & Cansu, E. E. (2021). Strategic competition, economic diplomacy and trade warfare: Re-conceptualizing the “cold war” in the case of recent China-USA trade war. Journal of Globalization Studies, 12(2), 79–100. Adrienne Joy. (2018). Understanding China’s response to the Rakhine crisis. Kapila, S. (2003). Bangladesh-China defence cooperation agreements strategic implications: An analysis. Retrieved May 28, 2020, from South Asia Analysis Group website: southasiaanalysis.org/paper582 Keller, W. W., & Rawski, T. G. (2007). China’s rise and the balance of influence in Asia (the security continuum). University of Pittsburgh Press. Khine, M. A. (2019, November 1). 46 Rohingya return to Myanmar’s Rakhine state. The Irrawaddy. Retrieved from https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/ burma/46-­rohingya-­return-­myanmars-­rakhine-­state.html Kraus, C., & Fan, H. (n.d.). Reassessing China-Myanmar relations during the cold war. In Cold War International History Project. Retrieved from https://www. wilsoncenter.org/publication/reassessing-­china-­myanmar-­relations-­during-­ the-­cold-­war Kudo, T. (2008). Myanmar’s economic relations with China: Who benefits and who pays? In M.  Skidmore & T.  Wilson (Eds.), Dictatorship disorder and decline in Myanmar (pp. 87–109). Canberra: ANU E Press. Kudo, T. (2012). China’s policy toward Myanmar: Challenges and prospects. IDE-­ Jetro Working Paper. Lee, Y. (2017, November 20). China draws three-stage path for Myanmar, Bangladesh to resolve Rohingya crisis. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www. reuters.com/article/us-­myanmar-­rohingya/china-­draws-­three-­stage-­path-­for-­ myanmar-­bangladesh-­to-­resolve-­rohingya-­crisis-­idUSKBN1DK0AL Mansor, H. (2018). Rohingya photo exhibition launched at Mansion House Dublin. https://www.haikalmansor.com/rohingya-­photo-­e xhibition-­l aunched-­a t-­ mansion-­house-­dublin/ Matt Spetalnick, D. B. (2018, August 17). U.S. imposes sanctions on Myanmar military over Rohingya crackdown. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www. reuters.com/article/us-­m yanmar-­r ohingya-­u sa/us-­i mposes-­sanctions-­on-­ myanmar-­military-­over-­rohingya-­crackdown-­idUSKBN1L21KL MClaughlin, T. (2021). China is the Myanmar coup’s ‘biggest loser.’ The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2021/02/what-­ myanmars-­coup-­means-­china/618101/

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McPherson, P., & Ruma Paul, S. N. (2020, January 20). China struggles in new diplomatic role, trying to return Rohingya to Myanmar. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-­myanmar-­rohingya-­china-­insight/ china-­s truggles-­i n-­n ew-­d iplomatic-­r ole-­t r ying-­t o-­r eturn-­r ohingya-­t o-­ myanmar-­idUSKBN1ZJ0SY Mearsheimer, J. H. (2001). The tragedy of great power politics. W.W. Norton. Mearsheimer, J.  J. (2006). China’s Unpeaceful rise. Current History, 105(690), 160–162. Mearsheimer, J. (2010). The gathering storm: China’s challenge to US power in Asia. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 3, 381–396. Myanmar coup: China blocks UN condemnation as protest grows. (2021). BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-­asia-­55913947 Myanmar Rohingya: what you need to know about the crisis. (2020). BBC. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-­asia-­41566561 Parmar, T. (2016). China’s President Xi Jinping makes “historic visit” to Bangladesh. Time. Retrieved from https://time.com/4530974/bangladesh-­ xi-­jinping-­visit-­china/ Paul, R. (2016). China signs deals worth billions with Bangladesh as Xi visits. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-­bangladesh-­ china-­idUSKCN12D34M?il=0 Qin, Y. (2010). International society as a process: Institutions, identities, and China’s peaceful rise. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 3(2), 129–125. Reed, J. (2020, January 18). China and Myanmar sign off on belt and road projects. The Financial Times. Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/ a5265114-­39d1-­11ea-­a01a-­bae547046735 Routray, B. P. (2018). Myanmar versus the Rohingya: the China factor. Retrieved December 4, 2019, from Mantraya website: https://mantraya.org/analysis-­ myanmar-­versus-­the-­rohingya-­the-­china-­factor/ Shambaugh, J. (2004). The effect of fixed exchange rates on monetary policy. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(1), 301–352. Strangio, S. (2021). UN Security Council condemns military takeover in Myanmar. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/un-­security-­council-­ condemns-­military-­takeover-­in-­myanmar/ Than, T. M. M. (2003). Myanmar and China. In Southeast Asian Affairs 2003 (pp. 189–210). ISEAS Publishing. Venkatachalam, K. S. (2017, December 2). Can China solve the Rohingya crisis?. The Diplomat. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/can-­china-­ solve-­the-­rohingya-­crisis/ Waltz, K. N. (1979). Theory of international politics. Reading, Mass: AddisonWesley Pub. Co.

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Wei, Y., & Liu, X. (2006). Productivity spillovers from R&D, exports and FDI in China’s manufacturing sector. Journal of International Business Studies, 37, 544–557. World court rules against Myanmar on Rohingya. (2020). Retrieved from Human Rights Watch website: https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/01/23/world-­courtrules-­against-­myanmar-­rohingya Yesmin, S. (2018). The changing dynamics of China- Bangladesh relations. The Daily Star. Retrieved from https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/global-­ affairs/news/the-­changing-­dynamics-­china-­bangladesh-­relations-­1658695 Yhome, K. (2019). Understanding China’s Response to Ethnic Conflicts in Myanmar, ORF Occasional Paper No. 188. Retrieved from https://www.orfonline.org/research/understanding-­c hinas-­r esponse-­t o-­e thnic-­c onflicts-­i n-­ myanmar-­49759/ Zhou, L. (2017, November 19). China lays out three-point plan to ease Rohingya crisis. South China Morning Post. Retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/ news/china/diplomacy-­defence/article/2120607/china-­lays-­out-­three-­point-­ plan-­ease-­rohingya-­crisis

CHAPTER 10

Turkey as a “Humanitarian Actor”: Assistance to Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh and Myanmar Nurefşan Arslan, Md. Nazmul Islam, Lutfun Nahar, and Esra Eymen Cansu

Introduction Since 1990, the Turkish government has been discussing the Rohingya refugee crisis with the Bangladesh administration. Many organizations from Turkey, including the government, have been implementing activities in Bangladesh to assist Rohingya people. The authorities have carried various projects such as education, health, community centers supplying food packages, and people in the region. Many Turkish policymakers such as Turkish former Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım, First Lady Emine

N. Arslan Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Ankara University, Turkey and Turkish Red Crescent (Türk Kızılay), Ankara, Turkey Md. N. Islam (*) Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Ankara Yildirim Beyaizt University, Ankara, Turkey © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 K. Bülbül et al. (eds.), Rohingya Refugee Crisis in Myanmar, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6464-9_10

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Erdoğan, Former Deputy Prime Minister Numan Kurtulmuş, Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu went to Cox’s Bazar, which is located in the Bangladesh refugee zone and visited the buildings made for refugees. They observed the living conditions in the camp zones. Turkey is also among the leading countries in assisting Rohingya refugees; however, not all the Turkish Rohingya refugee projects in Arakan (current state of Rakhine) are allowed to be implemented. Only the World Food Program, the Red Cross Society have permission to organize humanitarian assistance. Some of the projects based on humanitarian assistance have been suspended by the local authorities (Anadolu Agency, December 15, 2018c). Turkish authorities have taken action plans to eliminate the humanitarian crisis; President Erdoğan made many official calls considering the Rohingya refugee crisis, emphasizing that the international humanitarian agenda is blind and deaf to Rohingya Muslims. President Erdoğan paid an official visit to Suu Kyi, the Myanmar leader, and clarified the ongoing violation of Rohingya people’s human rights, stressing that this crime caused Turkey’s severe concern. President Erdoğan stressed about the people in Arakan at the UN General Assembly and addressed that the world has not made a positive assessment of Rohingya Muslims’ humanitarian crisis (Mahmud, 2017; Yeni Safak, September 04, 2017). Turkey has proposed several solutions and taken crucial steps to rescue the Rohingya Muslims and the Bangladesh government in the United Nations, the G20, MIKTA (a middle-power grouping consisting of Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and Australia), the OIC, and various organizations from different countries (Hürriyet Daily News, November 17, 2018a). In 2017, Emine Erdoğan, the first lady, with the group including Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavusoğlu and Family and Social Policy Minister Fatma Betül Sayan Kaya paid a visit to the Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh (Hürriyet Daily News, September 7, 2017). As it widely recognized that the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), The Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (Turkish: L. Nahar Department of Islami Economics and Finance, Sakarya University, Ankara, Turkey E. E. Cansu Department of International Relations, Ankara Social Science University (ASBU), Ankara, Turkey

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Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlıg ̆ı) also abbreviated as AFAD, the Turkish Red Crescent, the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), and other Turkish nongovernmental organizations operated refugee camps, educational opportunities, dormitories for orphans, and a variety of facilities for the vulnerable in the region (Daily Sabah, August 22, 2018), although assistance to the Rohingya community is not an unusual case for Turkey based on its public and humanitarian diplomacy.

Existing Debates on Turkish Humanitarian Aid and Humanitarian Assistance Turkish government’s humanitarian policy caught the particular attention of researches who have questioned the variety of global crises worldwide. Humanitarian assistance plays a vital role for both governmental and non-­ state actors (Mehmetçik, 2019). There have been several written academic articles by scholars from historical, social, cultural, and economic aspects. In the article “The Shape and Sustainability of Turkey’s Booming Humanitarian Assistance,” Blinder (2014) finds several crucial points to discuss the rising powers as leaders on the international humanitarian assistance agenda, mentioning all as “emerging donors.” The scholar gives samples from Turkey’s critical role in Somalia and Syria, the state inevitably gives efforts to eliminate crisis in the region, by recognizing Somalia and Syria are not developed countries with their low income, poor economic institutions. Turkey’s humanitarian assistance brought a different aspect to civil society. The following aspects discuss the sustainability of ongoing aids at all levels by actors of domestic dynamics, such as Turkey’s current government, the Turkish Red Crescent Society, and nongovernmental organizations (Blinder, 2014). Accordingly, the Development of Assistance Report of the Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Turkish Operation and Coordination Agency (2017) emphasizes expanding the capacity of humanitarian aid and effectively responding to the needs with the professional institutions’ help. (TIKA, 2017) Some researchers, such as Meliha Benli Altunışık (2019), argue whether specific institutions or organizations or parties have any impact on humanitarian development. In his article “Turkey’s Humanitarian Diplomacy: The AKP Model,” Altunışık (2019) assessed Turkey’s humanitarian assistance, which is motivated not only by the professional institutions but also by the NGOs and by the political parties (Altunışık, 2019). Besides, the

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state hosts more than four million Syrians (TIKA 2017, p. 13). Keyman and Sazak (2014) evaluate the humanitarian agenda’s various aspects that were significant arguments to describe humanitarian assistance dynamics (Keyman & Sazak, 2014). To understand the existing discussions on humanitarian policy, Mehmetçik (2017) argued on Turkey’s NGO’s contributions to making Turkey’s foreign policy. In his article “Humanitarian NGOs: Motivations, Challenges and Contributions to Turkish Foreign Policy,” Mehmetçik (2019) shows how nongovernmental organizations are one of the major motivations to manage the humanitarian crisis in foreign countries. Mehmetçik (2019) added that foreign aid is an influential factor of soft power for countries to develop influence over societies and governments Dal et al. (2014). The scholar identifies that the principles for the humanitarian assistance differ from one state to another. In his view, the leading motivation for aid efforts derives from Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), Turkish Diyanet Vakfi, Turkish Red Crescent (Turk Kızılay) (Mehmetçik, 2019). Some other scholars, such as Özerdem (2016), Mehmetçik (2019), and Acehan (2015) questioned why there is a need for humanitarian assistance, how to manage the crisis from various aspects within the historical period, and what sort of news there are in the field. As Acehan (2015) argued, how Turkish Red Crescent has been attempting to extend the mobilization capacity to reach various locations and has been working on improving the Ottoman and Turkish diaspora with humanitarian assistance (Acehan, 2015). For further analysis, Özerdem (2016) identified Turkey has a key role in the humanitarian field in recent years which expanded significantly with its budgets, changed rapidly, and adapted its system to the modern world. From the historical perspective of World War II, the states needed urgent cooperation for foreign aid. Amounts in the humanitarian assistance increased rapidly, and many institutions financed and backed for humanity, such as the Turkish Red Crescent, which had been active in the field since 1878. In his study “Evaluation of Turkey’s Development Assistance Policy in Ensuring the Global Partnership for Development,” Eyilik (2019) illustrated aid and development assistance which was 59,827 million dollars in 2009, has increased by an average of more than 15 times as of 2017. Turkey continues to transform its concerns and improve its humanitarian assistance policy with its huge human resource experience, effective policies, and accountability mechanism. The Turkish role for Rohingya is an outstanding model as a humanitarian assistance tool.

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Theoretical Approach of Turkish Humanitarian Aid for Rohingya Wendt (1994) argues the world wide system developes with a network of relations. Hence, intersubjective mainly focuses on leading the behavior feature unlike the material structures. Social-constructivist approaches claim that any of the state’s strategy which is applied for the foreign countries does not get valued by material, yet seriously by material issues as thoughts, characteristics, and beliefs. And indeed, the unprecedented Turkish engagement with Rohingya refugees through humanitarian aid could be an excellent example for this argument. The prehistorical roots of Rohingya and the Ottoman Empire shared a deep historical connection. Historians agreed that the Kingdom of Arakan, current Rakhine, has strong relations with Turkey and the Ottoman Empire. Perhaps that confirms the existence of cultural similarity and the similarity of Muslim identity and values. Though it seems that the immaterial factors argument resembles when there is a different identity, the actor would favour or put all of its efforts into their identity friend. But when the identities are similar the material factors are stronger and important than the immaterial factors. Again, it could take an example as Rohingya Muslim’s case in Arakan (Rakhine) state. Wendt states, “interests presuppose identities because an actor cannot know what it wants until it knows who it is” (Wendt 1999, p. 231), which consecutively depends on their bileteral cooperations. (Jepperson et al., 1996, p. 59). However, constructivist analyses consider identities as a crucial matter, because it provides the fundamental for benefits. “Actors do not have a ‘portfolio’ of interests that they carry around independent of social context; instead, they define their interests in the process of defining situations” (Wendt, 1999, p. 398). But, if actors’ identities are the fundamental for the benefits, then in which cases are they owning these identities? And most importantly, what will be the description of ‘self’ and ‘other’? With the purpose of describing identity construction, Wendt claims that there is a difference between company and public identities of countries. In this case, “Corporate identity refers to the intrinsic, self-organising qualities that constitute actor individuality” (Wendt 1994, p. 385). That sort of identity is produced from four main points: (1) physical safety, (2) liability in interactions, (3) acknowledgment as a performer, and (4) financial growth (Wendt, 1994, p. 385). How each country contents

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explains those relation benefits that, “depends on how it defines the self concerning the other, which is a function of social identities at both domestic and systemic levels of analysis” (Wendt, 1994, p. 385). A social identity or (role identity) is defined as “a set of meanings that an actor attributes itself while taking perception of others, that is, a social object” (Wendt, 1994, p. 385). Actors own both a relationship identity and few social identities. Thanks to their social identities, people know how to determine their relationship dynamics and where they are in certain situations. According to Wendt, the benefits and identities of performers occur merely in a collaborative operation. In a word, constructivism concerns international relations as norm-governed and state interests as constructed through a fluid and cooperative progression of identity formation which leads to “particular norms coming to be seen as appropriate, that is genuinely embedded in belief systems rather than adhered to for merely instrumental reasons.” (Youngs, 2001, p. 6). The ‘Turkish Humanitarian Aid Policy’ toward Rohingya somehow resembles the constructive perspective, which argues that each state’s foreign policy is determined by its identity and the ideas built up through interactions with other states and community.

Glimpses of Turkish Relations with Bangladesh and Myanmar Before describing the Turkish humanitarian role for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh and Myanmar, it is very much important to look upon and understand the Turkish deep historical, political, diplomatic, and economic relations with this region, especially with Bangladesh and Myanmar, what are the reasons that influenced Turkey to assist Rohingya community who are in the vulnerable situation. Relations with Bangladesh  istorical and Diplomatic Relations H The formal relations between the Bangladesh government and Turkey were started by an formal tour by Bangladeshi President Ziaur Rahman to Turkey in 1976. Ambassador in Dhaka has been active since the year 1976, while the diplomatic operational side of Bangladesh in Ankara started to be active in bilateral and multilateral relations since 1981 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, Updated 2011). Turkey and

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Bangladesh citizens’ relations have a deep history starting from the Ottoman Empire’s to recent rule dating before Bangladesh’s foundation. In the time of the First World War (1914–1918) and the Turkish War of Liberation dating back between 1919 and 1922, Bengali people assisted Turkey. Kazi Nazrul Islam, the poet of Bangladesh, is known to write a poem for Turkey’s founder Mostofa Kamal Ataturk. The poem is called “Kamal Pasha” written in 1921 (Alom, May 23, 2014). Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the national father of Bangladesh, was also admiring Turkey’s founder during his struggle for Bangladesh’s independence (Ahmed, January 10, 2017). Following the beginning of the official relations, the two states established strong relations and became diplomatic partners. Hussein Muhammad Ershad was Chief Executive of Martial Law (CMLA) in 1983 and also had served as president before that year. He asked Turkish administration to launch an airbase in Bangladesh. With the help of this airbase Bangladesh would be more in a safe region. Yet, the Turkish administration regretted it, and the decision could not be implemented. This act proves that the two states have very close relations (Milliyet, November 21, 1983). Later on, the diplomatic visits were held by Turkey, such as President Abdullah Gül and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the year 2010. While the upcoming year, Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was a pioneer in building deeper relations such as initiating the movement of Turkey-Bangladesh business council besides improving a program for developing the relations (Turkish News, November 15, 2010). Since 2012, both-sided cooperation generated in many areas, including social, economic, and technical projects. Besides, Turkish government’s response to the humanitarian crisis of Rohingya continued to serve as a role model. A number of projects had been implemented to eliminate the humanitarian crisis in the region (Islam, 2020a, 2020b, 2020c; Islam & Cansu, 2018). Economic Relations The bilateral cooperation of the two states has been promising an intensive economic growth. However, the economic rise is a mixed picture. In recent years, the economic cooperation of Turkey and Bangladesh has increased. However, the economic relation in the last ten years hovered at approximately $1 billion. For the year 2018, The Turkish Statistical Institute claims that the economic growth achieved $858 million (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2019). Moreover, the textile industry increased the

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economic relations because the carpets being exported from Turkey are the main reason for the trade (Islam, 2020a). As Table 10.1 shows, the picture and general view of economic and trade relations of Turkey-­ Bangladesh between 2015 and 2019. Meanwhile, Table 10.2 shows, since 2010 Bangladesh has emerged as Turkey’s second-largest trading partner in South Asia after India. Turkish government has a mission to support the economic cooperation between the two states for $2 billion in 2020 (Hürriyet Daily News, November 23, 2018b). Turkey and Bangladesh were the pioneers to sign the economic agreement (FTA) in 2012 to increase bilateral trade rates; however, the agreement’s confirmation was suspended because Eurupean Union disapproved it. (Mirdha, June 28, 2018). Followingly, Ankara’s humanitarian and development support to Dhaka was $13 million between 2004 and 2014 (TIKA, 2015). Until today, which dates back to 2012, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) operated an office in Dhaka, mainly covering schooling, hospitals, and training programs. Also, Turkey assisted the region by supplying ships built by Turkish engineers. Likewise, people to people relations made the trade easier (Islam, 2020a). For example, 1979 Bangladeshi tourists arrived in Turkey in the first ten months of 2018 (Hürriyet Daily News, November 30, 2018c). Relations with Myanmar During the Balkan Wars, which dates back to 1912, Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar gave Ottoman soldiers significant support. Consideringly, in 1870, the grand vizier of the Ava sultan, a resident of Myanmar, wrote a letter to communicate with Ottoman Empire. In the Turkish-Greek War, Table 10.1  Export, import, and trade volume (million $) between Turkey and Bangladesh Year

Export

Import

Volume

Balance

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020/3 months

200 264 294 373 427.1 96.6

996 881 737 484 508.6 173.2

1.196 1.145 1.032 857 935.8 269.6

−796 −617 −443 −111 −81.5 −76.6

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (2020); Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020); Islam (2017) Table prepared by the authors

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Table 10.2  Turkey’s commerce with Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan from the year of 1980 ($ million)

Bangladesh India Pakistan

2010

2018

2019

2020 (3 months)

1015 4016 998

858 8657 793

936 7.802 865

269 1605 244

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (2019); Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020) Table prepared by the authors

dating back to 1897, people in Myanmar who were Muslims supported the Ottoman Empire financially. Also, the Muslim people from Myanmar donated considerable amount of money for the Hejaz Railway. After receiving the supports, the Ottoman Empire sent an appreciation letter including Hejaz railway medals to Myanmar. The Muslim people of Myanmar frequently sent humanitarian aid to the Ottoman administration in war times, including financial assistance and medical materials. Historians address that in those times, Myanmar was called “Burma.” Muslims were organising the financial aid to send to Turkey with the help of the Ottoman embassies and banks of Ottomans and Europe. For example, Ibrahim Ali Molla and Abdurrahman Effendi sent 800 English liras (British pounds) to Ottoman consulate in Rangoon. Moreover, Ibrahim Molla Abdurrahman Efendi and Cemal Effendi delivered 3000 English liras (British pounds). The other humanitarian support came from Mandalay Muslims located in Burma, who delivered an aid package to send to Ottoman. People from Moulmein province also collected money. Although Muslims in Burma were financially destitute and were very few in numbers, they collected money to help the Ottoman regardless (TR Dergisi, 2019). However, apart from the Turkish deep historical relations with Myanmar Muslims, 1958 was the year in which Turkish and Myanmar bilateral relations were launched. The time when Myanmar embassy launched its diplomatic relations on March 9, 2012, the Turkish embassy in Bangkok had been operating in Myanmar. There is no Myanmar embassy in Turkish Republic. The Myanmarese embassy in Cairo is accredited to Turkey. After the embassy’s opening in Myanmar, Ahmet Davutoğlu, then in his office as minister of foreign affairs, paid a visit to Myanmar two times in 2012 and 2013. Turkish Foreign Minister, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, made a diplomatic meeting in Myanmar on June 12–14, 2016. Foreign Minister

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Çavuşoğlu is the first OIC foreign minister visiting Myanmar from the time new government’s formation in Myanmar following the elections in October 2015 (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Updated, 2011). There is the other dimension of historical relations between Turkey and Myanmar. When the First World War began, Turkish soldiers were caught by the British soldiers. And the graves of these two soldiers are still in Myanmar. And Myanmar was colonized by British army during those times. One of these graves was taken to Thayet and the other one to Meikhtile which is going to be reconstructed in the upcoming years (Anadolu Agency, 2016). In more details: in the First World War, around 13,000 soldiers from the Ottoman Empire were captured by the United Kingdom and were sent to Burma (Myanmar). More than 2000 people from the army were dead because of the harsh war conditions in Thayet city in Myanmar. The rest of the Turkish captives were buried at the same time. It is also narrated that there had been various graves of Turkish soldiers. Some were war graves in the camps named Meiktila bolar, “Munklon and Şivebo.” The epigraph of the martyrdom is still existing, but it is hard to read the inscription. The Turkish government was informed the first news considering the Turkish soldier’s graveyards in Myanmar arrived from the Indian embassy in 1961 (Chowdury, 2018). The ambassador of India confirmed that 221 tombstones belonged to the armies from Turkey. Afterwards, the Turkish ambassador of New Delhi found 760 graves belonging to Turkish war prisoners in Mekthla in 1964, however in the Second World War, when the conflicts happened between Japan and the UK, it was recorded as the graves were eradicated. After cooperation establishing with Myanmar, the Turkish ambassador found 100 people from the Turkish army’s graveyard in Shewoba, while the other 100 Turkish soldiers graveyard in Aungban, Myanmar (Anadolu Agency, December 23, 2018b). Following this fact, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs supported the restoration after carrying out frequent diplomatic calls. By operating intense studies in Myanmar, it is significant to say that there may be other Turkish martyrs near the region (Anadolu Agency, June 14, 2016; Chowdury, 2018). Another dimension to read the TurkeyMyanmar relations is that Turkish Airlines have started direct flights from Istanbul to Yangon. Currently, Turkey gives attention to the condition of the Muslims in Myanmar, especially in Rohingya. Turkey has been deeply observing the issues in Rakhine region of Myanmar since 2012 and has expressed her sincere worry concerning the current calamity, which directly affects the local residents, and which has led by this time to the evacuation of

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approximately 730,000 Rohingyas to Bangladesh. Turkey played a vital function in all appropriate international forums to bring the international community’s concern to the humanitarian dilemma in Myanmar and Bangladesh. Turkey has always had a constructive contribution to the situation of Rohingyas with an effort on the humanitarian aspect of the concerning situation. As a result Turkey keeps its relationship with the stakeholders of Myanmar with the intention of supporting a solution to the enduring problem of the humanitarian calamity. As a stakeholder of Myanmar, Turkey keeps on giving humanitarian and advancement aid to people who are desperate in Myanmar. Turkey has also been in touch with worldwide organizations such as UNICEF, UNHCR, and IOM on humanitarian assistance projects. According to a Turkish government statement, Erdogan is the first leader who achived to take consent and permission for humanitarian assistance to go to Myanmar. At the peak of the violence, the Burmese government had blocked all UN aid toward the Rohingyas. Turkey’s Official Development Assistance in Myanmar is valued at 61.26 million USD between the years of 2004 and 2013 in total (TIKA, 2014). Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency has been involved in various projects such as support for “Lifesaving Measures for Childbirth” project, medicine, and medical device aid, grant for hospital devices and beds, construction of an orphanage, computer laboratory, library, road, power line, Turkish cemetery, and temporary shelter in order to contribute to the development of Myanmar since 2012.

Contributions of the Turkish Government Organizations The Turkish governmental organizations, agencies, and NGOs such as TIKA, AFAD, Turkish Health Ministry, Turkish Diyanet Vakfi, Turkish Foreign Ministry, Turkish President, Turkish Migration Management Department, Turkish Universities Assistance, YTB, TRT played an important role in assistance to Rohingya. Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) TIKA started its activities in Myanmar within the Turkish embassy in 2012, and the Myanmar office was opened in 2016. TIKA proposed its projects in the fields of agriculture, education, health, vocational training,

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drinking water supply, and humanitarian aid for all people in need, regardless of whether they are Muslim, Buddhist, or other ethnicities. TIKA has provided a total of $14 million in financial aid to Myanmar during the past five years. Permanent home construction has started in seven different districts with the Myanmar government’s approval to meet the Muslim community’s accommodation needs living in very harsh conditions in the Rakhine region. In this project, the construction of 1500 bamboo houses were completed and delivered to the needy people of approximately 30,000 Muslims. TIKA also protected the Turkish historical heritage in the region besides the humanitarian aid (TIKA, 2020). Continuing its field activities since the beginning of the crisis, TIKA tries to facilitate asylum seekers’ lives in coordination with the other aid organizations. The hot food is distributed to 25,000 people at the Moynergona/Bagguna distribution point. Rohingya Muslims have benefited from over 7 million food deliveries from TIKA (TIKA, 2018). Till 2018, delivering hot food to nearly 10 million people, TIKA offers dry food packages to 250,000 people, hygiene packages to 100,000 people, Ramadan packs to 50,000 people, blankets to 50,000 people, solar panels and lighting units to 1500 households. Also, materials, which in general, used in the kitchen are delivered to the Rohingya residents in the refugee camps. Besides, 50,000 people affected by the flood disaster in the region were given a food package. Food aid was also provided to 30,000 local people living in the area where the Rohingya Muslims are settled. Thirty schools were completed in cooperation with TIKA and UNICEF.  The number of schools planned to be completed is 100. Also, TIKA established a playground where approximately 5000 children can play in a day. Additionally, TIKA established the field hospitals, including the camp health facilities with six ambulances in the region. Rohingya Muslims are the majority in places where Kutupalong expansion areas Modha Chara Channel steel bridge construction work continues. Data made by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Bangladesh Refugee Assistance and Repatriation Commission claim that, as of August 31, 2018, there are 891,878 Rohingya Muslims where 33,956 are registered and 857,922 are counted. 55% of the Rohingya refugees are children (TIKA, 2018). However, a report stated by the TIKA evaluates that TIKA carried out the aid activities in the fields of education, health, emergency aid, water, and sanitation, construction for 750,000 Rohingya Muslims. TIKA became the only international institution allowed to bring humanitarian aid to Rakhine State. TIKA brought

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150 tons of humanitarian aid for Rohingya Muslims from August 25 to September 15, 2018. Moreover, 10 tons of humanitarian aid materials were also given directly to those in need by helicopters. Within the scope of the second phase of humanitarian aid in Rakhine State, TIKA distributed 1500 food parcels to approximately 10,000 Rohingya Muslims in Rathidaung (TIKA, 2017). Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) Followingly the TIKA’s humanitarian role, the Turkish governmental institution, AFAD, launched the “EXIT TO ARAKAN” campaign with the help of Turk Kızılay (Turkish Red Crescent) and Diyanet Vakfi (Turkish Religious Foundation). In this context, establishing a refugee camp with a 100,000 people capacity has come to the schedule of AFAD. TIKA and Turk Kizilay’s food distributions were also coordinated by AFAD in the region (Tokcan, 2019). AFAD continues to assist Rohingya Muslims that ran from the massacres in Myanmar and struggle to survive in camps in Bangladesh. AFAD delivered humanitarian aid to 6500 families for ten days during Ramadan in 2019 and delivered 2000 food boxes to those in need. Thus, the donations to the “Save Arakan” campaign became iftar for the Rohingya people. In further addition, AFAD delivered 235,000 humanitarian packages in one year with food aid to 235,000 Rohingya refugees (AFAD, 2019). AFAD is also leading for arranging the official meetings in the international arena. From temporary housing to food, clothing, and cleaning materials, when the persecution peaked, AFAD helped 190,000 Rohingya people in about a year and a half. AFAD provided 217,000 health and treatment services in a year at Umut Sahra Hospital with the help of ministry of health of Turkey (AFAD, 2019). For the Rohingya community, AFAD and the Turkish Ministry of Health opened the Turkish hospital for emergency in Bangladesh in 2018, which gives hope to Rohingya refugees. More than 180,000 patients were examined in the hospital, and 1215 patients were admitted in 2018. In the hospital, there are 24 personnel working in 8 polyclinics, which have examined more than 180,000 patients and performed 1215 surgeries to date. In 2018, 106 babies were born in the hospital (AFAD, 2019). AFAD’s aid to the people of Rohingya continued to increase. For Rohingya refugees who fled to Bangladesh due to the humanitarian crisis in August of 2017, AFAD opened a representative office in Cox’s Bazar. AFAD

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Humanitarian Aid Teams affiliated with the representatives are constantly working in the field. It works to meet Rohingya refugees’ needs, including shelter, nutrition, hygiene, and drinking water (AFAD, 2019). Turkish Ministry of Health The Turkish Field Hospital, which the Ministry of Health established in Bangladesh, is operating in coordination with the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD). This hospital plays a vital role to meet the health services for Rohingya refugees who escaped from the massacres in Myanmar. The field hospital was opened by AFAD in February 2018 and served approximately 1000 patients each day. In the 50-bed field hospital, there are pediatric outpatient clinics and newborn units and female and male wards (Yenişafak, 2019). Turkish Diyanet (Religious Affairs) Foundation Arakanese Muslims have been struggling to survive under pressure for tens of years and were being displaced after the attacks that started in 2012, and are still suffering greatly. Turkish Diyanet Foundation (TDV) was prepared and arranged a significant part of the conducted aids to the Rohingya Muslims who escaped from Myanmar to Bangladesh. In this aid, 150,000 people benefited from food outfit so far. Besides, various religion-based assistance was delivered, such as constructing a new mosque in the region. TDV also provided bamboo material and craft assistance to 500 tents to set up tents and build two mosques. One of the most important services delivered by the foundation can be stated as the efforts to ensure the camps’ hygiene conditions. Till 2017, TDV distributed 11,258 food packages, 12,750 winter packages, 4000 clothing packages to Rohingya refugees and made eight showers, 11 toilets and 6 tube-wells (Anadolu Ajansı, 2017; Diyanet, 2017). Besides, during Ramadan in 2017, meat was delivered to the Rohingya refugees in need. Additionally, TDV also provided 500 tents and built two mosques in the refugee camps (Çam, 2017). Within this framework, the Turkish Religious Affairs Foundation (TDV), launched an awareness campaign to end the new type of coronavirus (COVID-19) in the Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh (Kamaruzzaman, 2021).

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Turkish President’s Instrumental Role On August 25, 2017, since the conflicts started, the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has made action plans by organizing a meeting with Muslim leaders in the international field to eliminate the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar. During the meeting, which was held on August 31, 2017, President Erdogan gave a speech to the Muslim world leaders to encourage them to raise their voice for Rohingya Muslims. He emphasized that serious steps were needed to be taken to stop the Myanmar government’s violence toward Rohingyas. Concerning the tragedy of the Rohingya Muslims in the region, President Erdogan called for a solution to this humanitarian crisis, which he also encountered during meetings with UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and Bangladesh President Abdul Hamid. President Erdogan also talked with Myanmar’s State Counsellor, Aung San Suu Kyi, where he emphasized that the crisis must be resolved through dialogue and cooperation (Geylan and Girit, 2017). Table  10.3 shows some examples of how Erdogan’s instrumental role brought the Rohingya issue on the global agenda and helped find the resolution for the Rohingya refugee crisis. Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs The ministry of foreign affairs is working to help the Rohingya community in Bangladesh and Myanmar. Ministry of foreign affairs struggles to establish trade deals to create additional financial resources for the Myanmar people. The former foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, visited Myanmar on August 8–10, 2012, where Myanmar President Thein Sein received him and met with Foreign Minister Wunna Maung Lwin. In addition to bilateral relations, the Turkish foreign minister also discussed the Rohingya issues with Myanmar. Turkey became the first country that sent humanitarian aid with UN office’s permission to Myanmar, especially in the Rakhine State (MFA, 2012). Humanitarian Support by the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) Apart from the nongovernmental organizations, Turkey’s foreign aid is also supported by Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) that mostly operates educational facilities for international students,

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Table 10.3  Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s instrumental role for the Rohingya people No. Title

Date

Description

1

September 26, 2017

“Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Monday accused the security forces in Myanmar of waging a ‘Buddhist terror’ against the Rohingya Muslim minority in the country, hundreds of thousands of whom have fled to neighbouring Bangladesh.”a “Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is trying to position himself as the ‘Islamic champion’ of the global Muslims’ rights. After any calamity falling on Muslims anywhere in the world, Erdogan emerges as the ‘rescuer’. The Rohingya crisis is a fresh case in point.”b “First Lady Emine Erdoğan penned an article for CNN International, titled ‘The world cannot ignore the plight of Rohingya Muslims’, about her visit to Bangladesh on the 7th of September to draw attention to the humanitarian tragedy in Myanmar and to deliver aid to Rohingya Muslims who had taken refuge in Bangladesh.”c “Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan urged Muslim countries to ‘use every means available’ to stop the ‘cruelty’ perpetrated against Myanmar’s Rohingya. As he said, ‘we want to work with the governments of Myanmar and Bangladesh to prevent the humanitarian plight in the region’, he told the opening session of an Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) summit in the Kazakh capital Astana.”d “There is a genocide there,” Erdoğane

2

“Turkish President Recep Erdogan Accuses Myanmar of ‘Buddhist Terror’ Against Rohingya” “Erdogan uses Rohingya crisis to try to be a global Muslim leader”

September 23, 2017

3

“First Lady Erdoğan: “Humanity Must not Fail the Rohingya Muslims”

September 19, 2017

4

“Erdogan to Muslim countries: ‘Use every means available’ to stop ‘cruelty’ against Rohingya”

September 10, 2017

5

“Erdoğan accuses Myanmar of ‘genocide’ as thousands of Rohingya flee to Bangladesh”

September 2, 2017

(continued)

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Table 10.3  (continued) No. Title

Date

6

“We won’t Leave Rohingya Muslims Alone”

September 1, 2017

7

“President Erdoğan calls on Muslim countries’ leaders to act on Rohingya Muslims”

Description

President Erdoğan said: “As the OIC term president, I have been making phone calls for the last 3 days to heads of state regarding Rakhine. I have also called the UN Secretary General. I have spoken with them and urged sensitivity. The UN General Assembly will convene starting from September 19. We will raise this issue there in a much more different manner and exclaim this cruelty to the entire world from the UN General Assembly.”f August 31, “Erdoğan talked on the phone with Mauritanian 2017 President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, Pakistani President Mamnoon Hussain, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and Qatari Amir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, urging them to help find a solution to the violence against the Rohingya.”g

Table prepared by the authors a   https://www.ndtv.com/world-­news/turkish-­president-­recep-­erdogan-­accuses-­myanmar-­of-­buddhist-­ terror-­against-­rohingya-­1754946

  https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/news/11011-­e rdogan-­u ses-­r ohingya-­c risis-­t ry-­b e-­g lobal-­ muslim-­leader

b

  https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/83530/emine-­erdogan-­insanlik-­rohingya-­muslumanlarina-­ sirtini-­donmemeli

c

d

  https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170910-­erdogan-­urges-­muslim-­countries-­to-­help-­rohingya/

  https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/02/erdogan-­a ccuses-­m yanmar-­o f-­g enocide-­ against-­rohingya

e

  https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/83330/we-­wont-­leave-­rohingya-­muslims-­alone

f

  https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/president-­erdogan-­calls-­on-­muslim-­countries-­leaders-­to-­act-­on-­ rohingya-­muslims-­117421 g

including for Rohingya students in Turkish universities. YTB offers scholarships to 180 countries. These educational, humanitarian, and developmental aids are for not only the Muslims but also for other nations and believers. For instance, students from around the world are able to apply for the scholarship programs. Many students come from Europe, Africa, North America, and Asia (YTB, 2019). Lectures, training sessions, and cultural events encourage the institution to develop the content of the programs. Regarding Rohingya students’ case in Turkey, YTB provided several organizations and educational training sessions for their development.

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One of the examples of these facilities is the “Rohingya Media Training Program.” In the course of the program, students attend lessons such as on social media. Moreover, they share experiences with media experts and listen to the specialists of Rohingya and Turkish institutions. Media education was given to 20 Rohingya students from 12 countries experienced in media and active in nongovernmental organizations (Anadolu Agency, April 22, 2019). Apart from the training, former Turkish deputy prime minister, Hakan Cavusoglu, once said in 2017, “Turkey will provide university scholarship to 53 Rohingya Muslim students for studying communication, law, politics and human rights at Turkish universities” under the scholarship scheme of Turkiye Burslar, YTB (Avundukluoglu & Ozturk, February 10, 2017). Since 1992, Myanmar has 71 students who have benefited from the scholarship opportunities in Turkey. For the 2018–2019 academic year, 22 scholarships have been provided for Myanmar students in Turkey. Academic Assistance for Rohingya Refugees Turkish universities developed scholarships programs for college-age students in emergency need areas to support their academic activities. Besides, students can turn back to Bangladesh right after they complete their education in Turkey. In that way, they can contribute to their community’s development and change. The following Table  10.4 portrays Rohingya students studying in Turkish universities, facilitated either by government or nongovernmental scholarship in Turkey. The data finds that 32 students are getting academic assistance or scholarship in Turkish universities. The data was collected from the Rohingya community in Turkey, and the source has been used as anonymous. TRT and TRT World TRT has broadcasted various news and performed programs regarding the massacres in Myanmar. 613,000 Arakanese Muslims, who have been escaping from the attacks that have continued since August 25 in Arakan, have fled to Bangladesh. This tragedy is announced to the world by TRT. As the Myanmar administration is torturing the Rohingya Muslims and many countries in the world refuse to hear refugees’ voices, Turkey has been one of Rohingya Muslims’ biggest supporters (TRT Haber, 2020). Since the “ethnic cleansing” started, Turkish media, especially

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Table 10.4  Turkey’s academic assistance for Rohingya students in Turkish universities No.

University

City

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. Total

Abant Izzet Baysal University Ankara Yildrim Beyazit University Bursa Uludag University Erciyed University Gaziantep University Hacı Bektaş Veli University Izmir Katip Çelebi University Karabük University Konya Teknik University Necemettin Erbakan University Sakarya University Selçuk University Siirt University Sivas Cumhuriyet University Süleyman Demirel University

Bolu Ankara Bursa Kayseri Gaziantep Nevşehir Izmir Karabük Konya Konya Sakarya Konya Şiir Sivas Isparta

Number of Rohingya students 2 3 3 2 1 1 1 2 1 5 2 2 3 1 3 32

Data collected and table prepared by the authors

TRT World, covered the whole incident and broadcasted the actual events and genocide by the Myanmar government.

Contributions of Turkish Nongovernmental Organizations NGOs are strengthening their organization and enhancing their human and financial resources to handle the social responsibilities where administrations face difficulties in accessing needy people. Some NGOs are operational not only in their own country but also to play an international role. They are engaged deeply in international humanitarian activities. During the last decade in Turkey, mainly in the neo-Ottoman hinterland countries, a growing number of NGOs are carrying out humanitarian activities. Turk Kizilayi/Turkish Red Crescent Community Turkish Red Crescent Society distributes aid to thousands of people in camps where Rohingya Muslims live each day. The Turkish Red Crescent

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team distributes food and hygiene packages in particular, brings elderly patients to the hospital, and for the relief materials. The Turkish Red Crescent, which has been operating in the region for about five years, has distributed 37,427 emergency food packages, 19,744 as standard food packages, 16,155 hygiene packages, and 5000 blankets for Rohingya people living in various camps in Bangladesh. Aid packages are prepared to meet the monthly need of each family. Besides, the Turkish Red Crescent team assists those who are unable to take the distributed materials to their shelters in the camp (Kızılay, 2017). IHH IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation distributes blankets, sweaters, and shawls to more than 30,000 Arakan Muslims who migrated to Bangladesh. The IHH campaign, which was carried out with the slogan of “A Warm Goodness” was one of the biggest humanitarian activity held in the region (IHH, 2019). IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation has been working in Arakan since 1996. However, as the massacre and crisis augmented in 2017, IHH improved their emergency aiding activities for food, water, hygiene, clothing, health, shelter, rehabilitation, and winter materials. Aiding activities continue without any differentiation for Rohingya people living in Bangladesh, Myanmar, and India (IHH, 2018). Yardimeli Association (Vakfı) Yardimeli Association, which is one of the active international humanitarian aid associations in Turkey, has been carrying out activities in Arakan (Rakhine State) for a long time. These activities are coordinated by volunteering teams in the field and operated by the official office in Bangladesh. In the recent massacre assaults, thousands of Rohingya people who fled to the border with Bangladesh received food aid with the help of Yardimeli Vakfi. It is organized to provide the needs of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh by their teams in the field. A report from Yardimeli Association showed that they have planned to make tents and homes in the refugee camp in Bangladesh. Moreover, there is a training complex which has the capacity of 1000-persons in the Cox’s Bazar region of Bangladesh. The local area of Yardımeli Association is the closest point to the Arakan region. In this complex, mostly from Arakan, orphans are getting education, accommodation, and food services (Yardimeli Association, 2020).

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Arakan Platform In the Arakan Platform, nongovernmental organizations implement aid campaigns by creating an international platform to help Muslims in Myanmar and Bangladesh. Intellectuals, bureaucrats, academicians, diplomats, and volunteers from different parts of Turkey unite to help Rohingya Muslim refugees. This platform works as a civil society organization in Turkey that organizes regular meetings and communication with other civil society organizations in Turkey to find out the possibility to help the Rohingya community. The Arakan Platform has organised several internal meetings with the Rohingya diaspora and Rohingya activists. Together with YTB, TRT, and Turkish universities, this platform organized several meetings and conferences for the Rohingya community (Alaca and Ozcan, April 22, 2019), as Anadolu Agency stated that “Rohingya journalists are being trained by state broadcaster TRT with cooperation of Arakan Platform and Turkish Foreign Ministry” (February 20, 2018a). Deniz Feneri/The Lighthouse Association The Lighthouse Association serves food to people who escaped from Rakhine State. This association has distributed emergency aid to two of the official camps affiliated to the UN officials and three unofficial camps to meet their needs. In the first place, Deniz Feneri served food to more than 1500 families and distributed about 40 tons of food packs such as rice, flour, red lentils, milk powder, oil, salt, sugar, and other regional foods. In addition, the zakat and alms, which the donors granted for the refugees of Arakan, were delivered to needy people via food tickets (Feneri, 2020). Nongovernmental Media (AK Newspaper, Daily Sabah, Haber Turk, Kon TV, Natural TV) Media channels that broadcast news regarding Rohingya can be listed as Daily Sabah, Haber Turk, Kon TV, and Natural TV. The news is informing the international community regarding the up to date events that occurred in Myanmar. Besides, Daily Sabah announced English based news that can reach a broader community throughout the world as well as TRT and other news channels. Natural TV is another Turkish channel that

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disseminated the Rohingya refugee crisis issue (Natural Civilization, Natural TV, November 19, 2019).

Conclusion The international actors provided their humanitarian effort to eliminate the stream of crisis. Turkey’s humanitarian assistance diplomacy allows proactive, dynamic, and concrete solutions through its governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders such as TIKA, AFAD, Turk Kızılay, Diyanet, Göç Idaresi, Foreign Ministry, and Turkish media. Turkey enrolled in significant positions in the flow of time through its “humanitarian diplomacy” and its multidimensional cooperation, which has brought the issue of Rohingya Muslims on the humanitarian agenda. This act implies that the Turkish government is a stream actor in the humanitarian field and is a pioneer in awakening the awareness of refugees’ and minorities’ rights. Turkey’s approach involved a responsible and reliable concern to make the world safer. Following the year 2016, Turkey became the most generous country to give donations to suffering regions. Behind this success, there is a good management of community organizations, governmental institutions, nongovernmental organizations, institutions abroad, and stakeholders. Owing to these elements, Turkey offers a successful model for the humanitarian assistance field. The emerging global humanitarian crisis leads to more demand for humanitarian assistance and more donors, especially in the case of Rohingya. Turkey, as a “humanitarian state,” reinforces the capacity of the assistance model through the relevant institutions. Ascending on the values of refugees’ rights, social integration, and dignity, Turkish foreign aid policy improves living conditions of people in need of help. Overall, Turkey in cooperation with international institutions played a multidimensional, peacebuilding, and reliable role in the humanitarian agenda.

References Acehan, I. (2015). Ottoman Immigrants and the Formation of Turkish Red Crescent Societies in the United States. Center for Strategic Reseacrh. Retrieved from http://sam.gov.tr/ottoman-­immigrants-­and-­the-­formation-­of-­turkish­red-­crescent-­societies-­in-­the-­united-­states/ AFAD. (2019). International humanitarian aid annual report. Available at https:// en.afad.gov.tr/kurumlar/en.afad/e_Library/Books/Insani-Yardim-2019ING-V14.pdf (Accessed: 24.12.2021)

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CHAPTER 11

Representation of Rohingya Refugees in the Bangladeshi Media: A Content Analysis Mobassera Jahan Fatima and Aytül Tamer Torun

Introduction It was the last week of August in 2017 when the world acknowledged the horrific humanitarian crisis caused by massive violence which had taken place in one of the Southeastern Asian countries—Myanmar (formerly ‘Burma’). The crisis broke out when an insurgent group attacked the border posts of Myanmar’s military on August 25, 2017 (Ahmed, 2017). Following this attack, the Myanmar military cracked down on Rohingyas in the country’s northern part of the Rakhine State. Due to the massive brutality and violence of the Myanmar army, more than 74,000 people

M. J. Fatima (*) Faculty of Communication, Department of Journalism, Ankara University, Ankara, Turkey Migration Research Foundation (GAV), Ankara, Turkey A. T. Torun Faculty of Communication, Department of Journalism, Ankara Haci Bayram Veli University, Ankara, Turkey © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 K. Bülbül et al. (eds.), Rohingya Refugee Crisis in Myanmar, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6464-9_11

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have been forced to flee to the neighboring country Bangladesh to seek protection and safety (European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations  – European Commission, 2019). It is better to know that Bangladesh and the Rakhine State of Myanmar is partitioned by the Naf River—an international river bordering southeastern Bangladesh and western Myanmar, which is used as a pathway to enter Bangladesh by the Rohingyas. The scheme of refugee determination in Bangladesh is not in effect and it does not become a signatory to the United Nations (UN) 1951 Convention on Refugees or the Protocol on Refugee Status in 1967. However, because of its involvement with major human rights groups and as a member of the UNHCR Executive Committee since 1995, it is bound to provide legitimate recourse to refugees and asylum seekers within its borders (Nahar, 2019, p. 119). Although, before the 2017 passages, Bangladesh already sheltered hundreds and thousands of Rohingya refugees. Later, the chief of the UN Human Rights Council Zeid Raad al-Hussein defined this exodus as a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing” (UN News, 2017). Besides, on January 23, 2020, the UN’s International Court of Justice (ICJ) ordered Myanmar to take measures for protecting the Rohingya community from genocide (Bowcott & Ratcliffe, 2020). During this period, the media played an important role to catch global attention toward this issue. Not only various international media but also all Bangladeshi media treated this issue with utmost importance. Through this chapter, we attempt to examine the role of Bangladeshi media in the presentations of the Rohingya issue.

Literature Review Since the Rohingya crisis erupted, a plethora of researches have been conducted regarding this issue. Researchers have tried to identify different perspectives and frames to shed light on this issue. Some of these are identity crisis (Hossain & Hosain, 2019), citizenship issue, economic and political rivalry between China and USA (Ismail, 2018), ethnic cleansing (Abdelkader, 2014), xenophobia, racism against the Muslim minority (Goraya & Mazhar, 2016), Islamophobia, rising of extreme nationalism (Ibrahim, 2016), the refugee crisis (Rahman et  al., 2018), and so on. Besides those types of academic works, in this chapter, we aim to focus on those researches which especially worked with Rohingyas representation in media, both national and international.

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Rahman, Anusara, Chanthamith et  al. (2018) worked to identify the ethnicity of the Rohingya Muslims which is one of the most prevailing buzzwords used by Myanmar to persecute Rohingyas. Through an extensive literature review from different academic resources, for example books, journal articles, newspaper articles, and so on and based on the fieldwork at Rohingya refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar, the author refuted the claim of the Myanmar government that Rohingyas are not the legitimate residents of Myanmar. It is revealed in the research that Rohingyas started living in Myanmar thousands of years ago and are inseparable from their history and culture for their role and involvement in building present-­ day Myanmar. This study also discusses the responses of the different regional countries and international alliance groups (e.g., United Nations, Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], etc.) regarding this so-­ called ethnic cleansing. Ismail (2018) argues that there is not only economic intent behind the response of the two dominion countries—China and the United States (US)—to the Rohingya humanitarian crisis issue but also political grounds that can be defined as “soft power rivalry” spiked by these two countries. On one side, China is seeking to keep control over the oil and natural gas pipelines which pass via Myanmar’s Rakhine State, where Rohingyas live in majority, to China’s Yunnan province. Moreover, China is intending to strengthen its political power in this region by investing in the Kyaukpyu port of the Rakhine State along the Bay of Bengal. On the contrary, the US is trying to enervate China’s influence in this region under the disguise of spreading and supporting democracy and thus remaining moderate on the Rohingya crisis issue. The author concludes that the rivalry of both superpowers will be existent since they aim to act according to their own national interests rather than considering the actual scenario. In his book Ibrahim (2016) proclaims that Myanmar stands in the vicinity of genocide as the oppression and discrimination executed against the Rohingyas can be inferred as noticeably intentional by the state since the early 1960s. Though it was supposed that the relative end of the military government would assist in improving the overall miserable condition of the Rohingyas by ensuring the legal citizenship status and providing related facilities, the situation continued to deteriorate day by day. Through extensive analysis and discussion, this book not only brings out the real scenario of the Rohingyas in Myanmar to the limelight but also shows the connection of the crisis with the history and continuing political extension. The writer also remarked that three entities namely, the international

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community, the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the civil society of Myanmar can work fruitfully to reach a solution regarding this issue. For this purpose, it emphasizes the need of the entities to have more discussions and making effective proposals to pressurize Myanmar for ensuring fundamental human rights for all of its citizens. Afzal (2016) focused on the representation of the dealings of the Rohingya conundrum by the Burmese government and its portraiture in the mainstream English language newspapers in the Western media (The Guardian from Britain, The New York Times from the USA) and the non-­ Western media (The Nation from Pakistan). In addition, the theoretical concepts behind media structure were explored in this article in the sense of neurocognitive contexts and their effect on decision-making by individuals and groups (Afzal, 2016, p. 96). It also examined how researches into the Rohingya Muslim crisis also fits into the idea that emotions are used to capture attention, influence attitudes, and affect behavior in news stories such as selected editorials from Pakistani, UK, and United States newspapers. Afzal (2016, p. 96) reported that framing methods were used by the newspapers to make readers sympathetic toward the Rohingya minority and to seek attention to the global crisis. On the other hand, Isti’anah (2018, pp.  20–21) conducted another media research where she focuses on the textual structures of the headlines by applying Halliday’s Systemic Functional Grammar supported by Eggins. On the contrary, Afzal (2016) observed both the surface structures and linguistic features applied in the headlines by using Van Dijk’s theory of news and discourse though both works with newspaper headlines had different sample newspapers. Isti’anah (2018) used research data from two different newspapers—Mmtimes from Myanmar and The Nation from Bangladesh. Though both newspapers used topical theme in their headlines, the ideologies that came out from different theme features in the headlines are not same. Research findings showed that Myanmar newspaper headlines cover the Rohingya issue by blowing up the good deeds by the Myanmar government while Bangladesh newspaper headlines show the actions are done by Rohingyas to save themselves (Isti’anah, 2018, p. 18). Further investigation by the Corpus-assisted discourse analysis (CADS) method was done by the CAGAPE (2018) to understand the coverage (schema) that Rohingya received from the media and particularly the New York Times. The study finds and obtains word frequency in the corporate news (NOW), a corpus created by Brigham Young University’s Mark

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Davies. In addition, through this study, he tries to determine whether the Rohingya lexis, as stated in the New York Times, supports and influences the phrasal schema (CAGAPE, 2018, p. 8). The sample selection and analytical process of this study have also made this work different from Afzal (2016) and Isti’anah (2018). CAGAPE (2018) used articles and op-eds related to the Rohingya issue as data samples while previous works focused only on news headlines. However, the limitation of this research is to confine its scope to the New York Times alone. According to him, the New York Times could portray the Rohingya in the best possible light except for lack of a misrepresentation (CAGAPE, 2018, p. 20). Nahar (2019) examined The Daily Star newspaper, one of the popular English newspapers in Bangladesh, by using Corpus-assisted discourse analysis (CADS) methods. To identify representation categories and related discourses, the software of corpus analysis AntConc 3.5.7 and Van Leeuwen (1996, 2008) explores the social-semantic network model, collocations, and concordances of principal terms. The Daily Star, as found in the critical human rights theory of Mutua (2001), used the savage-victim-­ savior (SVS) frame to build major social actors in the crisis such as Rohingya, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. The deplorable situation of Rohingya is viewed as a humanitarian issue wherein the sufferings of the Rohingya is focused to highlight them as victims. Bangladesh is represented in positive image for Rohingya shelter process, while Myanmar is represented in negative image for Rohingya abuse process. In parallel, the repatriation of the Rohingyas is an important subject of debate. In our chapter, we try to examine five Bangladeshi newspapers—both in Bengali and English—by employing the content analysis method. Moreover, in our study, we tried to analyze the theme of the Rohingya related content published in 2017 in the Bangladeshi newspapers only for a month. After that, we examined the tone of those contents. In addition, we not only analyzed news, editorial, and post-editorial headlines but also examined the body of the contents by which we were able to understand the crisis more deeply and got more clear ideas about the sample newspapers’ policies. This chapter has four main objectives: 1. To figure out how Bangladeshi media select the theme in their headlines regarding the Rohingya crisis, 2. To find out the differences and similarities of different media in the way of the representation of the same news item with respect to their ideological perspectives,

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3. To figure out how Bangladeshi media represent the Rohingyas and Rohingya crisis, 4. To figure out the tones of the news content regarding the Rohingya crisis.

Research Method This research is carried out with the qualitative content analysis method, based on secondary data, following the historical research approach. For this purpose, at first, we had selected five national dailies, both Bengali and English-language. During the selection process, we tried to prefer dailies from different publisher companies or media houses to be able to examine different views in the same context. Those selected dailies are Dainik Kaler Kantho, Dainik Ittefaq, Dainik Jugantor, The Daily Star, and Dhaka Tribune. Besides, all of the sample newspapers have online archive access. After that, the limit of the contents has been fixed to one month, from August 28, 2017 to September 28, 2017. Here, contents include news, editorials, and post-editorials related to the ‘Rohingya crisis’. However, during the scanning process, we have found too much content related to the issue. Therefore, we selected some sample texts according to their importance. Besides, the Rohingya crisis has been examined based on the historical context of the Rohingya issue, and its impact on Bangladesh-­ Myanmar historical relationships. For this purpose, a literature review has been conducted to understand the keywords and get a basic knowledge from previous studies related to these topics. Moreover, reactions, criticisms, and evaluations on the issue have been analyzed based on the news, editorial, and post-editorial columns. Thereafter, attempts were made to find out the focal point of the content. Finally, the tone of the content, for example, positive, negative, or neutral attitudes toward the Rohingyas, has been listed through the content. Most importantly, a neutral trend has been found, after the analysis of the contents.

Bangladeshi Media Media plays vital role in the history and politics of Bangladesh. While Bangladesh was just at the beginning of being an independent country, there were only a few newspapers, TV stations, and radio stations in the country. However, today there are many radio stations, online news portals, news agencies, local and national newspapers, TV channels, local

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radio and FM radio (Fatima, 2019). Following Chowdhury (2019), the magnitude of the Bangladeshi media explosion has been increasing since the nineties. On the other hand, according to Azad (2018), media elements in Bangladesh have experienced rapid changes over the past year and a half due to the emergence of satellite television and the spread of the internet. Currently, faster internet services direct people, especially the young generation, to ever-increasing online news services and social media. Now, most daily newspapers and major weekly newspapers have online versions. Many readers, both at home and abroad, can read newspapers and magazines from there via various websites on the internet. Therefore, according to the statement of Bangladesh information minister given in the national parliament on January 11, 2018, there are 45 private TV channels in the country, except for four government TV channels (BBC News Bengali, 2018). On the other hand, the information minister of Bangladesh also announced that there are 3025 registered print media in the country (BBC News Bengali, 2018). Also, according to the Dhaka Tribune report published on February 4, 2020, a total of 1277 daily newspapers are available in Bangladesh. Among them 218 newspapers are national Bangla dailies, 293 newspapers are regional Bangla dailies, and 40 others are English dailies (Dhaka Tribune, 2020). Though most of these newspapers are published from every administrative district in Bangladesh, the main publishing center is located in the capital, Dhaka. According to the latest data from the Department of Film and Broadcasting (DFP), the agency that distributes government advertisements, published on January 1, 2020, at least 297 local newspapers are published outside the capital (DFP, 2020). On the other hand, there are various estimates about the current circulation number of newspapers in Bangladesh. Following the DFP data, Daily Prothom Alo and Bangladesh Protidin are the top two Bengali newspapers, while together they get approximately one million copies of circulation through the country. According to the list provided by the Department of Film and Broadcasting (DFP) website, Bangladesh Protidin is in the highest daily circulation with 553,300 copies and Daily Prothom Alo is second with 501,800 copies (DFP, 2020). Although, in terms of quality and reliability, Prothom Alo is seen at a higher level than Bangladesh Protidin. However, according to the media researchers of Bangladesh, people prefer to buy Bangladesh Protidin because they can purchase Bangladesh Protidin with half the price of Prothom Alo. Also, Bangladesh Protidin has wider coverage rather than Prothom Alo. Another important point is that, apart from a few names,

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English newspapers have very little circulation in Bangladesh. According to the ‘DFP English Newspaper Chart’ published on January 1, 2020, the number of daily newspapers in English is 33 and among the English dailies, The Daily Star has the largest circulation of 44,814 (DFP, 2020).

A Brief History of Rohingyas The Rohingyas, holding the South Asian spring, dwelt in ‘Arakan’—an independent kingdom, currently familiar as ‘Rakhine State’ in modern-day Myanmar (Dhaka Tribune, 2017)—in the eighth century. According to Goraya and Mazhar (2016, p.  27), merchants (both Arab and Turkish) used to come here during the reign of Caliph Haroon Al Rasheed (fifth Caliph of the Abbasid Caliphate). Moreover, in the ninth century, the Arab merchants came to Burma while very few historians claim that they came in the eighth century. Thereafter, between the ninth and fourteenth century, the Rohingya came in close connection with Arab merchants and a significant number of them adopted Islam as their religion (Dhaka Tribune, 2017). However, the Burma King Bodawpaya outplayed Arakan in 1784 and hundreds of thousands of refugees absconded to Bengal (in modern-day part of Bangladesh especially in Chattogram area). Besides, from 1824 to 1942, Burma (nowadays known as Myanmar) was captured by Britain and included in British India’s province (Goraya and Mazhar, 2016, p. 31). Afterward, Japan had invaded Burma in 1942 and drove away the British. As the British fell back, Burmese nationalists attacked Rohingyas whom they thought had benefited from British colonial rule (Goraya and Mazhar, 2016, p.  29). On January 4, 1948, Burma became independent from British colonial rule (Ibrahim, 2016, p.  50). But restlessness escalated between the government of just-born Burma and Rohingyas, many of whom aspired to unite with Muslim-majority Pakistan (Dhaka Tribune, 2017). According to Abdelkader (2014), following the military coup in 1962, the Burmese army recurrently contravened human rights including killing, raping, and torturing toward the Rohingya Muslim community. Some other examples of transgression against the Rohingya Muslims included the denial of citizenship, service, and entrance to school for the children. In 1977, aimed at Rohingya expulsion, Burmese military junta conducted the “Operation Nagamin,” or “Dragon King,” which targeted the illegitimate population according to their statements (Haque, 2018,

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p. 22). However, this census marked Rohingyas as illegal (Human Rights Watch [HRW], 2000). Ibrahim (2016, p. 68) states that in Rakhine, this was interpreted as a license to the Buddhist community and the army for attacks on Rohingya communities, and during 1978 over 200,000 Rohingyas escaped to the neighboring country, Bangladesh. Meanwhile, in the same year, Bangladesh impelled an UN-brokered agreement with Burma for the repatriation of refugees, following which maximum of these Rohingya went back to Burma (Dhaka Tribune, 2017). According to Cagape (2018), in 1982, a newish immigration law was reformulated which termed the people who migrated during British regime as illicit immigrants. Due to the ethnic classifications used in 1948 (when they were not identified as one of the core ethnic groups living in independent Burma), the Rohingyas were denied their citizenship (Ibrahim, 2016, p. 67). Ibrahim (2016, p. 68) states that again in 1991, over 250,000 Rohingyas fled to Bangladesh because of forced labor, rape, and religious persecution by the Myanmar army, though they claimed that it was an attempt to maintain order in Rakhine. Just after, between 1992 and 1997, following another repatriation deal, approximately 230,000 Rohingyas came back to Arakan, currently familiar as Rakhine State (Dhaka Tribune, 2017). Afzal (2016, p.  90) states that during 2012, a high scale communal violence between Rohingyas and Rakhine Buddhists killed almost 100 people, primarily Rohingyas. Again in 2016, Rohingya rivalry group Harakah al-Yaqin ambushed border security posts and killed nine police officers (Haque, 2018, p.  25). Therefore, more than 25,000 people escaped from Rakhine to Bangladesh, because of the atrocities by Myanmar’s army like killing, rape, arson, and so on (Timeline: Who are, 2017). On the other hand, at the end of August 2017, another military abolition caused a new wave of Rohingyas toward Bangladesh (BBC News, 2020). More than 100 people were assassinated within a week of surging encounter within the Myanmar soldiers and the “Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA)” previously named as Harakah al-Yaqin (Burma: Ensure Aid, 2017). On the contrary, the Myanmar army claimed that the fight was against Rohingya rivalry group and denied attack on civilians. Unfortunately, Myanmar’s familiar human rights icon and leader Aung San Suu Kyi, also often refuted the accusation of genocide against Myanmar army (BBC News, 2020).

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Collection of Data and Analysis Process In this work, the research data consists of five dailies including two English language newspapers and three Bengali language newspapers published from Bangladesh. News, editorial, and post-editorial samples have been collected from The Daily Star (English language newspaper), Dhaka Tribune (English language newspaper), Dainik Kaler Kantho (Bengali language newspaper), Dainik Ittefaq (Bengali language newspaper), and Dainik Jugantor (Bengali language newspaper), some mainstream newspapers of Bangladesh which disseminated news and views about the Rohingya issue in 2017. The specific preference for the five separate newspapers from the distinct publishing houses of Bangladesh was meant to investigate the Rohingya conundrum portraiture by the orthodox media in Bangladesh. It aims to investigate the narration of the Rohingya issues through the news, editorials, and post-editorials of Bangladeshi newspapers. In this chapter content analysis method has been used to interpret the newspaper text, the widely used qualitative research approach to reveal a new idea or information by examining the media. According to Silverman (2016, p. 159), content analysis is considered to be a familiar method of textual investigation specifically in the area of mass communication. This method is found to be reliable in investigating numerous trends and distinct patterns in such types of documents like the newspaper news, editorials, and post-editorials (Stemler, 2001).

Profile of the Sample Newspapers The Daily Star The Daily Star is one of the most popular national English-language broadsheet daily in Bangladesh. According to the latest information provided by the Department of Film and Publication (DFP), which is the responsible authority for newspaper advertisement distribution from Bangladesh Government, The Daily Star is considered to be the most circulated English-language newspaper accompanied by 44,814 circulation (DFP, 2020) (see Table 11.1). It started its journey under the direction of Syed Mohammed Ali on January 14, 1991 (The Daily Star, 2020) (see Table  11.1). The publishing company of this newspaper is Mediaworld Limited which is also a partner of the Transcom Group (Transcom Ltd) (see Table 11.1). The Transcom Group was established by Latifur Rahman.

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Table 11.1  Considered newspapers’ profile Name of the considered newspaper

Publishing Publisher/Editor date and year

Circulation Slogan

The Daily Star

January 14, 1991

44,814

Your right to know

The Dhaka Tribune Dainik Ittefaq

April 13, 2013 December 24, 1953

40,600

The news you want. No more, no less N/A

Dainik Jugantor

February 1, 2000

Dainik Kaler Kantho

January 10, 2010

Mediaworld Limited/Mahfuz Anam 2A Media Limited/ Kazi Anis Ahmed Ittefaq Publication Limited/ Tasmima Hossain Jamuna Group Limited/ Saiful Alam East-West Media Group/Imdadul Haq Milan

290,200

290,200

290,200

Sotyer Sondhane Nirbheek (fearless in searching for the truth) Angshik Noy Puro Sotto (full truth, not partial)

Source: Created by the authors

Also, it owns another popular Bengali newspaper in Bangladesh named Prothom Alo (Corporate Bangladesh). According to The Daily Star, the uniqueness of this newspaper lies in its nonpartisan position (The Daily Star, 2020). The current editor of The Daily Star is Mahfuz Anam (The Daily Star, 2020) and the slogan is “Your Right To Know” (see Table 11.1). The newspaper has published a printed edition as well as an online edition too. Its readers are from inside and outside of Bangladesh. The Dhaka Tribune The Dhaka Tribune, another national English-language broadsheet daily which was launched on April 13, 2013 (Dhaka Tribune, 2013) (see Table 11.1). The founding editor of the newspaper is Zafar Sobhan while Kazi Anis Ahmed is the publisher. It is published from Dhaka and is owned by 2A Media Limited, a sister company of Awami League leader Kazi Nabil Ahmed’s Gemcon Group (Dhaka Tribune, 2013). They own Bangla Tribune and the literary journal Bengal Lights too (K Anis Ahmed’s nove, 2013). It defines its publication policy as economically and socially liberal. The slogan of the newspaper is “The news you want. No more, no less”

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(see Table 11.1). In February 2020, as information minister of Bangladesh Hasan Mahmud told in the parliament, among the English dailies published from Dhaka, Dhaka Tribune ranked as the topmost circulated English daily newspaper in Bangladesh (Dhaka Tribune, 2020). According to the data published on January 1, 2020 by the Department of Film and Publication Ministry of Bangladesh, the latest circulation of the Dhaka Tribune newspaper is 40,600 (DFP, 2020) (see Table 11.1). Dainik Ittefaq Dainik Ittefaq is one of the pioneer Bengali daily newspapers in Bangladesh (Salam, 2015). The newspaper which started publishing on December 24, 1953, is a publication of Ittefaq Publication Limited (Islam, 2014) (see Table  11.1). The founder of the newspaper is Mawlana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhasani and its founder-editor is Tofazzal Hossen Manik Mia (E-paper Dainik Ittefaq, 2020). The current editor of the newspaper is Tasmima Hossain (The Daily Sun, 2019) (see Table 11.1). Dainik Ittefaq is still among the most popular newspapers in Bangladesh. According to the DFP information, Dainik Ittefaq has a circulation of 290,200 copies (DFP, 2020) (see Table 11.1). Besides printed publications, it has digital broadcasting and online access. Moreover, an online English version is also available. This newspaper had a significant contribution in the establishment of Bangladesh and in the ascent of nationalist feelings (Islam, 2014). For this reason, Dainik Ittefaq represents nationalism in view. However, it is a newspaper that seems to change its views against the government from time to time according to sociopolitical situations (Fatima, 2019, p. 141). For example, although the newspaper started its publication as a spokesperson of the Muslim League during its establishment, it occasionally used to criticize the West Pakistan government (Islam, 2014). Therefore, in 1971, the government of Pakistan burned the office of the Dainik Ittefaq as it supported Bangladesh’s War of Independence (Yusuf, 2015). But this newspaper has a moderate view toward the current power (left-wing) (Fatima, 2019, p. 141). It does not hold any specific slogan like others (see Table 11.1). Dainik Jugantor Dainik Jugantor is a publication of Jamuna Group Limited. Jamuna Group Limited began its journey in 1974 by Jamuna Electric Manufacturing Co. Ltd. It started its business life in 1975 and became a leading

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manufacturing company of electrical accessories and fittings in Bangladesh (Jamuna Group, Company Profile). Jamuna Group Limited has two media organs, one is the Bengali daily newspaper Dainik Jugantor, and the other is Jamuna TV, which is a 24-hour news channel. Dainik Jugantor inaugurated broadcasting on February 1, 2000, with the slogan “Sotyer Sondhane Nirbheek” which means “Fearless in searching for the truth” (see Table 11.1). The newspaper’s editor-in-chief is Saiful Alam (see Table 11.1) and the publisher is Salma Islam. The newspaper is also placed among the top five Bengali daily newspapers in terms of circulation with a sales figure of 290,200 copies (DFP, 2020) (see Table 11.1). Dainik Kaler Kantho In Bangladesh, Dainik Kaler Kantho is considered to be one of the most liked Bengali newspapers. It is a company of East-West Media Group which is a business wing of leading business holding group Bashundhara Group in Bangladesh (Bashundhara Group, Corporate Profile). The group has five more media organs in addition to the Dainik Kaler Kantho, namely the most circulated Bengali newspaper Bangladesh Pratidin (DFP, 2020), Daily Sun (English-language newspaper), News24 (a news-based TV channel), Radio Capital (FM Radio), and Banglanews24 (one of the popular online news portal in Bangladesh) (Bashundhara Group, Corporate Profile). Abed Khan, one of the prominent journalists in Bangladesh, was the founder editor of Dainik Kaler Kantho. The daily started its journey on January 10, 2010 (The Daily Sun, 2016) (see Table  11.1). Currently, Imdadul Haq Milan, also a novelist from Bangladesh, is acting as the editor of the Dainik Kaler Kantho (see Table 11.1). Maynal Hossain Chowdhury is the publisher of the newspaper on behalf of East West Media Group Limited. With 290,200 copies of circulation, it is also one of the topmost circulated daily newspapers in Bangladesh (DFP, 2020) (see Table 11.1). Finally, newspaper policies are not constant at all in Bangladesh as they are supposed to continuously change their policies according to the political situation, although some of them have individual news policies. In general, all of the sample newspapers’ policies are pro-government, leftist, and nationalist.

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Findings and Discussion General Discussion During the scanning process, we examined approximately 1400 contents related to the Rohingya issue. Though considered newspapers published most of the news from August 28 to September 28, 2017 regarding the Rohingya crisis, however, due to Eid-ul-Fitar, one of the biggest religious festivals for Muslims, Daily Kaler Kantha, Jugantor, and Ittefaq postponed publications for three days, dating from September 2 to 4, 2017. Moreover, the Daily Star, which is an English newspaper, added one more day with the aforementioned dates for vacation. On the other hand, being an online daily, the Dhaka Tribune continued its publication in a regular fashion during this festival. In our analysis process, we found that among the subjected newspapers, Dainik Kaler Kantho published most of the news contents regarding Rohingya issue and daily Dhaka Tribune, Dainik Ittefaq, The Daily Star, and Dainik Jugantor comes in this row respectively. Though all of the news reports adopted neutral tone in their presentations of the Rohingya crisis, there were different tones in some of the editorials and post-editorials from the beginning week of the exodus to the last week of September 2017. However, most of the editorial and post-editorial columns focused on the humanitarian crisis of the Rohingya people. Another important fact is all the newspapers tried to give special treatment to the women, children, and elderly people and published a significant number of special reports about them. For instance, there were stories about the pregnant woman who gave birth to her child without any one’s help, the rape victims of Myanmar army, the mothers who lost their children during the exodus period, the mother whose infant was shot dead and thrown to the fire alive by the army, the female who was gang-raped by the Myanmar army and was living traumatized. On the other hand, there was a great quantity of soft news where misery and poor conditions of Rohingyas in the Bangladesh border and camp were represented in a very touchy way. Especially the Dainik Kaler Kantho, the Daily Dhaka Tribune, and the Dainik Ittefaq had published regular soft news where real conditions of the Rohingya camps were presented. In those reports the focus was on shelter problems, pure water

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crisis, food shortages, insufficient sanitation facilities, and health services for especially the Rohingya women. Some selective headlines from the Dainik Kaler Kantho newspaper, where we will be able to get an idea about the representation of Rohingya crisis in Bangladeshi Media: “Pressure to open border for Rohingyas” (Mehedi Hasan, August 30, 2017) “Rohingyas are in dire sanitation crisis” (Nupour Deb, September 28, 2017)

Some editorial headlines from the Dainik Kaler Kantho newspaper are included here: “Fear of dire consequences  (September 14, 2017)

bring

order

to

Rohingya

camps”

“Rohingyas are still coming - Myanmar needs to stop torture immediately” (September 28, 2017)

Here is a selective headline from the Daily Dhaka Tribune newspaper: “Assault on Rohingyas: Brutality ‘breaks’ all previous records” (Abdul Aziz, August 30th, 2017)

Some selective editorial and post-editorial headlines from the Daily Dhaka Tribune regarding the Rohingya crisis: “Villains of circumstance” (Rubaiyat Kabir – August 30, 2017) “Averting a catastrophe” (Tribune Editorial, September 7, 2017)

Some sample editorial headlines from the Daily Star newspaper: “Apartheid in our August 30, 2017)

neighbourhood”

“Stop genocide, in the name of September 13, 2017)

(Muhammad

Buddha”

Nurul

Huda,

(Nizamuddin Ahmed,

“What hope is there for Rohingya women and children” (Nazmul Ahasan, September 23, 2017)

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Most importantly, all of the newspapers gave this issue the utmost importance. For example, in our scanning process, we found that on some days first, third, editorial, post-editorial, and last pages of the newspapers were fully covered by news, views, pictures, and cartoons related to Rohingya crisis. Besides, all the newspapers covered special stories, exclusive stories (for example, interview with ARSA leaders) and byline stories about the sufferings of Rohingya. Discussion on the Themes After examining all the considered newspaper contents, we found abundant themes related to the Rohingya crisis in 2017 where some themes were common. These are humanitarian crisis, the atrocity of Myanmar army, labeling as Rohingyas instead of refugees, diplomatic negotiation for a reasonable solution, repatriation of Rohingyas, condemnation of Aung San Suu Kyi and Myanmar government, violence in Rakhine, nobody’s people, pressure on Myanmar, seeking of international actors’ attention for reasonable solutions of Rohingya crisis (UN, USA, European Union UNHCR, OIC), condemning international actors for their silence, praised Bangladesh government for sheltering Rohingyas, sufferings of Rohingyas (women, children, and elderly), exodus of Rohingyas, boarder security, push in-push back, burden for Bangladesh, illegal entrance, about ARSA, ethnic cleansing, genocide, role of regional actors (China, Russia, India), Muslim countries (Indonesia, Maldives, and Turkey) support to Bangladesh, no man’s land, safe zone, human trafficker, international pressure against Myanmar, local’s anxiety regarding Rohingya influx, not only Muslims but also Hindus are coming, turmoil in border, insurgency, Rohingya camp (shelter, food, health, drinking water, sanitation, etc. crisis), Rohingya registration, the helplessness of Rohingyas, persecution, the role of Saudi Arabia, relief from China, Saudi Arabia, India, US, Indonesia, Turkey. All these themes are shown in a table (see Table 11.2) here. However, the top five common themes of the newspapers are humanitarian crisis, the atrocity of Myanmar, labeling as Rohingyas instead of refugees, diplomatic negotiation for a reasonable solution, and repatriation of Rohingyas as shown in Fig. 11.1.

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Table 11.2  Most common themes regarding the Rohingya crisis in 2017 among the considered newspapers Name of the newspapers

Most common themes regarding the Rohingya crisis in 2017

Kaler Kantho, Ittefaq, Jugantor, Dhaka Tribune, Daily Star

Humanitarian crisis The atrocity of Myanmar army Labeling as Rohingyas instead of refugees Diplomatic negotiation for a reasonable solution Repatriation of Rohingyas Condemn Aung San Suu Kyi and Myanmar government Violence in Rakhine Nobody’s people Urge to put pressure on Myanmar Seek international actors’ attention for reasonable solutions of Rohingya crisis (UN, USA, European Union, UNHCR, OIC) Condemn international actors for their silence Sufferings of Rohingyas (women, children, and elderly) Exodus of Rohingyas Boarder security Push in- push back Burden for Bangladesh Illegal entrance Ethnic cleansing Genocide ARSA Role of regional actors (China, Russia, India) Muslim countries’ (Indonesia, Maldives, and Turkey) support to Bangladesh No man’s land Praised Bangladesh government for sheltering Rohingyas Safe zone Human trafficker International pressure against Myanmar Local’s anxiety regarding Rohingya influx Not only Muslims but also Hindus are coming Turmoil in border Insurgency Rohingya camp (shelter, food, health, drinking water, sanitation, etc. crisis) Rohingya registration Helplessness of Rohingyas Role of Saudi Arabia Relief from China, Saudi Arabia, India, US, Indonesia, Turkey…

Source: Created by the authors

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humanitarian crisis

repatriation of Rohingyas

the atrocity of Myanmar army

diplomatic negotiation for a reasonable solution

labelling as Rohingyas instead of Refugees

Fig. 11.1  Top five themes regarding the Rohingya crisis in 2017 among the scanned newspapers. (Source: Created by the authors)

Top Five Themes “Humanitarian Crisis” Humanitarian Crisis is the primary theme of this research finding. Through the analyzing process, our focus was to figure out the themes of the news contents rather than word frequency. As a result, though in word frequency ‘Rohingyas’ was the top-most word among the considered contents in the thematic content analysis process, ‘humanitarian crises’ was the most highlighted theme in our study. From the beginning of the influx, Bangladeshi media represented the Rohingya issue as a crisis, more specifically, as a humanitarian crisis. Undoubtedly, new Rohingya exodus in 2017 was a big challenge for the Bangladesh government as it is already one of the overpopulated countries of the world. Besides, Bangladesh was not capable enough to manage this flow of illegal migrant people toward the border. Moreover, in the last week of August 2017, there was a push in-push back game between Bangladesh and Myanmar border guards

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where thousands of poor Rohingyas including children and women were the victims. Consequently, a humanitarian crisis arose near the Bangladesh-­ Myanmar close border areas, especially at Cox’s Bazar where two countries are separated by the Naf River, which Rohingyas used as a path to enter Bangladesh border. Also, without international funds and cooperation, it was impossible for Bangladesh to feed and shelter this influx of Rohingyas. This is a very important reason for highlighting this issue as a humanitarian crisis. However, there was tremendous pressure on the Bangladesh government to open the border for those helpless people. In this circumstance, Bangladeshi media played a very significant role to cover this issue. The media of Bangladesh not only published humanitarian stories but also urged international actors’ attention through the news, editorial, and post-editorial columns to create pressure on Myanmar to solve this crisis. As a result, it had a deep impact on the Bangladeshi people and political affiliations too. There are some sample headlines from the Daily Star and The Daily Dhaka Tribune newspaper where humanitarian crisis of Rohingya people were highlighted: “Nobody’s people” (August 28, 2017, The Daily Star) “Hungry faces everywhere” (September 6, 2017, The Daily Star) “It’s genocide” (September 22, 2017, The Daily Star) “Panic-stricken Rohingyas stranded in no-man’s land” (Abdul Aziz, August 28, 2017), The Daily Dhaka Tribune

Kazi Anis Ahmed, publisher of the Dhaka Tribune and Bangla Tribune newspapers, wrote a post-editorial column regarding the Rohingya issue where humanitarian views toward the Rohingyas were highlighted, which published on September 9, 2017, titled “We are all Rohingya.” Here, we would share some sample discussion from his writings. Ahmed addressed that currently, we are face to face with a new situation. The Myanmar army looked to be determined to kill the Rohingyas “as many as it can.” In this contrast, Bangladeshi’s public opinion is changing to help those people who are fleeing from imminent death. Besides, the message for “a new approach” was received from the very top when the Prime Minister of Bangladesh called for “humane” border treatment. Thus, the Rohingyas are permitted daily to enter Bangladesh by “the thousands,” even when a

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certain number of refugees are sometimes pushed back by border guards. He said that he did not “see housing them as a burden” anymore, severally when the whole world has abandoned the Rohingyas. He stressed that it would be a privilege for us, rather, because playing the savior role is not a daily issue. He also added that it is the saintliest of tasks and the biggest “test of our humanity”. … Besides, Ahmed claimed that the government and the Myanmar people chose the Rohingyas as “nothing.” Therefore, we have to give shelter to the Rohingyas. We have to help them avoid the cruelest fates: nothing becomes. Nobody deserves to become nothing, no matter how cruel or indifferent the world is (September 9, 2017- The Daily Dhaka Tribune).

“The Atrocity of Myanmar Army” The atrocity of Myanmar army is the second most important theme in this study. Our research finding showed that during the exodus, because of the Myanmar army’s atrocity, not only Rohingya Muslim minorities were forced to flee from Rakhine but also some Hindu minorities were forced to flee from Buddhist majority country Myanmar. Ironically, the Myanmar army did all the brutality and torturing in the name of self-defense against ARSA militants. But they burned villages of innocent poor Rohingyas, gang-raped their women, even killed the infants in front of their mothers, and most importantly pushed Rohingyas to Bangladesh border intentionally. Besides, they set ground mines in their border to prevent Rohingyas from coming back to their villages. Most of the news, editorials, and post-editorials columns strongly condemn Myanmar army’s misdeeds against helpless Rohingya people. Besides, through the news contents media focused on the necessity of taking legal actions against Myanmar in International Criminal Court (ICC) regarding Myanmar army’s persecution against Rohingya Muslim minorities in the Rakhine State of Myanmar. Interestingly, while the Myanmar army was portrayed as brutal and immoral, the Bangladesh army was portrayed as humanitarian and kind as they distributed reliefs among the Rohingyas. The atrocity of Myanmar army was shown in all the considered newspapers. Here are some examples of those news headlines from different newspapers: “Even a baby wasn’t spared (August 29, 2017),” The Daily Star

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“They torched our houses and shot at us as we fled” (Anwar Hussain, August 29, 2017)”, The Daily Dhaka Tribune “Rohingya Hindu women share horror tales (Manik Miazee - September 20, 2017),” The Daily Dhaka Tribune “I saw Myanmar army gang-rape my daughter” (Tribune Desk September 21, 2017), The Daily Dhaka Tribune “Rakhine state is still on fire” (September 16, 2017), Dainik Jugantor “Intermittently fired in Rakhine, Rohingyas heading towards the border” (August 28, 2017), Dainik Kaler Kantho “Mass rape of women to chase Rohingya” (September 25, 2017), Dainik Ittefaq

“Labeling as Rohingyas Instead of Refugees” In the scanning process, we found very little negative narratives toward the Rohingyas, rather all of the contents used balanced language while describing their sufferings. Apart from these findings, most of the Bangladeshi media were aware of the Rohingya identity instead of refugee. However, in some news contents, refugee and illegal migrant concepts were misused. Most importantly, there was good coverage of news contents regarding the unwillingness of the Bangladesh government to give the refugee status to Rohingyas. Also, we found in our analysis process that most of the time all the subjected news contents represented Rohingyas as victims, helpless, poor, Muslim minorities, and so on. Besides, Bangladeshi media used the words ethnic cleansing and genocide to represent the persecutions toward the Rohingya people. On the other hand, sometimes Rohingyas were represented as a burden for Bangladesh economy and a potential threat of unrest in the border area of Bangladesh by illegal activities. For example, through the news contents, media showed concern about border security of Bangladesh, especially for the probabilities of the unwanted entrance of the terrorist groups, the exodus impact on the economy of Bangladesh, rise in drug trafficking, human trafficking, and smuggling in the border areas of the Cox’s Bazar. Moreover, our findings also support previous researches related to the presentation of Rohingyas in the media. For example, Nahar (2019)

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exclaimed in her research that the Rohingyas were represented as a victim in Bangladeshi media. On the other hand, some columnists showed sympathy to the Rohingyas as Bangladesh also experienced exodus in the liberation war of 1971 when millions of people fled to India to save their life. Furthermore, media also focused on the immoral attitudes of the local traffickers and dishonest persons who victimized Rohingyas by using their helplessness. Regarding this discourse, we want to share some discussions from Rubaiyat Kabir who is an editorial assistant of the newspaper Dhaka Tribune. In his post-editorial column, which was published on August 30, 2017, Kabir wrote that, “I doubt anyone would disagree when I say that there is nothing ‘eye of the beholder’ about what the Rohingya are going through in their own homeland right now. With the way the Myanmar army is cracking down on the hapless minority group, their actions can be called nothing short of an ethnic cleansing … No one ever chooses to be radicalized, it’s only when the chirps are down that picking up a gun and raising hell starts to make more sense than waiting for the world to finally say ‘enough is enough’. And we, Bangladesh, were supposed to be a part of that collective…they face ­becoming the villains because of circumstances they had no part in influencing…” (August 30, 2017, The Daily Dhaka Tribune)

A further example of the headline of a post-editorial column where their attitude toward Rohingyas was presented by Bangladesh media is: “Where is the end of this cruelty towards Rohingyas?” (August 31, 2017, Dainik Ittefaq)

Here is another example of the title of the news that highlighted Rohingyas as a burden for Bangladesh: “Rohingya influx may hurt Bangladesh economy” (Husain & Ovi, September 28, 2017, The Daily Dhaka Tribune). According to their report, If the newly arrived Rohingyas from the Rakhine state in Myanmar are not repatriated as early as possible, economists and professionals have alerted that it will adversely affect the economy of Bangladesh. Local food and transport prices will be higher, food grain shortages and reduced tourism will have a negative effect, as will the pressure on the natural resources and different social issues. (Husain & Ovi, 2017)

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Another example of news headline where Rohingyas were highlighted as a concern is: “Rohingya crisis: A concern for the region” (Mahfuz Anam, editor of the Daily Star, September 9, 2017)

“Diplomatic Negotiation for a Reasonable Solution” Diplomatic negotiation for a reasonable solution is another important theme that we found from our analysis. From the beginning of the crisis, Bangladesh always emphasized on negotiation with Myanmar. As a result, Bangladesh government continuously urged for world attention to create pressure on Myanmar to stop persecution against Rohingyas and solve this crisis. However, Myanmar was unwilling to sit at the discussion table and negotiate about this problem. It made this situation worse. Thousands of Rohingyas fled to Bangladesh where many of them lost their lives. Through the scanning process, we found that all of the Bangladeshi media highlighted this issue too. There were a lot of criticisms against regional actors’ roles like India and China’s role regarding the Rohingya crisis in Bangladeshi media. Also, there were criticisms against the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and United Nations (UN) for their inactive roles to solve this issue. They also asserted that Bangladesh will not be able to handle this crisis itself unless the other countries of the world come forward to find a solution for this crisis. Most of the columns strongly emphasized on the reasonable solution of this issue and made a ‘safe zone’ for the Rohingyas. On the other hand, some columnists strongly criticized international and regional actors for their silence and failure to create enough pressure on Myanmar to stop this ethnic cleansing. They also termed it as a ‘systematic genocide’ like Rwanda. Some others also blamed Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi for her silence and irresponsible comments regarding this issue. Although she earned her Nobel prize for ‘peace’, she remained silent when atrocities were carried out by Myanmar army in her own country. Here are some sample newspaper headlines regarding this discussion: “Suu Kyi’s party and army united against the Rohingya hatred” (September 16, 2017, Dainik Jugantor)

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“Suu Kyi slams ‘fake info’ on Rakhine unrest” (September 7, 2017, The Daily Star) “Myanmar, Suu Kyi keep drawing condemnations” (September 10, 2017, The Daily Star) “Rohingyas need UN or OIC-run ‘safe zone’” (September 11, 2017, The Daily Star)

“Repatriation of Rohingyas” Repatriation of Rohingyas is our fifth most important theme in this study. Though Bangladeshi media treated this issue as a humanitarian crisis and gave every possible treatment to represent them positively, however, Rohingya repatriation was also an important issue in the media. We found a lot of news content where this issue was given utmost importance. Besides, some columnist exclaimed that since Bangladesh is not responsible for this ethnic cleansing, she is not responsible to carry this burden and Myanmar has to take back their citizens. They also emphasized on strong monitoring of Rohingyas who entered Bangladesh, ensuring their registration process, and providing them adequate food, water supplies, shelter facilities, proper health and sanitation services, and so on. However, Bangladesh was always in a positive attitude to create a ‘safe zone’ for the Rohingyas while Myanmar government showed their unwillingness to take back Rohingyas most of the time. Most of the media focused that as Myanmar is the place where Rohingyas lived in year by year, Myanmar should take them back and ensure their safety and security. Some sample headlines regarding this discussion from The Daily Star and Dainik Ittefaq newspaper shown below: “Rohingya refugees’ burden for the country” (September 6, 2017, The Daily Star) “Take back all Rohingyas” (September 12, 2017, The Daily Star) “Myanmar has to solve the Rohingya problem” (September 25, 2017, Dainik Ittefaq)

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Conclusion Rohingya refugees are the present days’ most vulnerable ethnic community of Myanmar who are forced to live stateless due to the persecution of Myanmar. Being the neighboring country of Myanmar and having a close border with the Rakhine State from where most of the Rohingyas came from, a huge proportion of the Rohingyas are living in Kutupalong Rohingya camp of Bangladesh. Consequently, the crisis brought the attention of the media of Bangladesh to a great extent. However, all of the considered newspapers were almost similar in news tones, themes, headlines, and news treatment although the number of news content had some variations. There were some days when the first page and last page, the two most important pages of the newspaper, were fully invaded by Rohingya related news with eye-catching photos and cartoons. Besides, when the atrocity of Myanmar army started on August 25, 2017, a great number of Rohingyas were trying to enter into Bangladesh through the border. But Bangladesh was rigid to open her border. In those circumstances, the journalists and media personnel from different media tried their best to portray the issue as a humanitarian crisis nationally and internationally. As a result, after a short time, the Bangladesh government announced opening their border and Rohingya exodus toward Bangladesh began. A good number of soft stories were covered by the journalists which directly or indirectly made some emotional impact on the people and the policymakers of Bangladesh and the world. We found a significant number of editorials and post-editorials where Rohingyas were highlighted as vulnerable and helpless people who needed shelter, food, healthcare, proper sanitation facilities, drinking water, and safety. Although most of the considered newspapers were pro-government, leftist, and nationalist, only a small number of editorials and post-editorials highlighted Rohingyas as a burden on Bangladesh. Moreover, all the columnists wanted a reasonable solution for this issue, urged regional and international actors’ attention, and wanted quick repatriation of Rohingyas to their homeland. From our analysis we found that Bangladeshi media successfully balanced the news contents and its tones regarding the Rohingya crisis in 2017. Also, Bangladeshi media responsibly covered this crisis and represented Rohingyas with the utmost sensitivity. The limitations of this research are leaving some contents due to shortage of time and technical problems. Another limitation is to confine our

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research content only for one month. However, as we worked with a notable number of contents and analyzed their themes and tones from most popular Bangladeshi newspapers, it will help future researchers who have interests in Bangladeshi media, roles of Bangladeshi media regarding the Rohingya crisis, and representation of Rohingyas in Bangladeshi media. Moreover, there are scopes for the researchers who want to make a comparison between ‘refugees and illegal migrants’ representations in different media of the various hosting countries.

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CHAPTER 12

Unfolding Rohingya Refugee Crisis Through Mass Media: A Thematic Analysis of Indian Print and Electronic Media Kanika Walia and Serdar Öztürk

Introduction The Rohingya refugee crisis of Myanmar (Burma) is not a new phenomenon; instead, it is a long, slowly developed crisis on the surface of Asia. The Rohingya Muslim ethnic group of Rakhine has a long history of facing horrendous abuse and persecution in Myanmar, which has witnessed many waves of migration to neighboring countries, especially in Bangladesh. The Rohingyas of Myanmar are an ethnic and linguistic minority residing in the state of Rakhine (formally known as Arakan). The Myanmar government does not consider this ethnic group as its citizens. It treats them as “Illegal Bengali Immigrant,” and therefore, they are not an enlisted ethnicity in the citizenship act of 1982. Although this community has gone through many waves of migration, especially in 1978, 1992, 2012, and 2016, however, the reemergence of debate on Rohingya

K. Walia (*) • S. Öztürk Department of Radio, Television and Cinema, Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University, Ankara, Turkey © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 K. Bülbül et al. (eds.), Rohingya Refugee Crisis in Myanmar, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6464-9_12

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popped up since August 2017, when the Myanmar army began its major crackdown in the Rohingya villages of Rakhine. According to the reports, the army’s first crackdown started in October 2016 to January 2017 after the attack on a Myanmar police post by the terror group ARSA (Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army). It is reported that after the second phase of the crackdown, which started in August 2017, hundreds of Rohingyas were dead and thousands were displaced. More than 742,000 Rohingyas took shelter in Bangladesh, 40,000  in India, 5000  in Thailand, 150,000  in Malaysia. In fact, the United Nations has also expressed grave concern for the world’s most persecuted minorities, and subsequently, the United Nations Commission for Human Rights (UNCHR) has observed and called this conflict as “a textbook example of “ethnic cleansing.” In the contemporary world of media studies, the social media platform plays a crucial role in disseminating and publicizing the information. Additionally, its worldwide significance in shaping society as well as political agendas cannot be overlooked. The Rohingya is one of such issue which needs attention from global as well as regional leaders of Asia. For example, in case of Rohingya, the issue got global attention when BBC reported news about Rohingya situations inside the refugee camps in Bangladesh. Since then, global media houses such as CNN, The Washington Post, Aljazeera, and other news agencies were constantly covering and highlighting the Rohingya issue in the global networks, making this matter more prevalent and known to the world. In a similar fashion, the Indian media and dailies have also given space to news and reports related to the Rohingya people. The study highlights some of the selective mass media’s reporting and presentation of the Rohingya issue in their dailies/channel.

A Brief Background of the Crisis According to the Berlie, who did studies on the current Muslim community of Rohingyas, argue that these communities are mainly present in three states of Arakan which are Maungdaw, Buthidaung, and Rathedaung (Leitich, 2014, p.  15). Over the last three decades, the crisis of ethnic Muslims of Rakhine has not only affected South and Southeast Asia but has put a significant impression on the USA, Canada, the United Kingdom, and other European countries, which have presence of significant Rohingya diasporas now. In Asia, after Afghanistan, this crisis has

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become a major humanitarian crisis in the region. The origin of this crisis is deep-rooted in the precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial politics and history of Myanmar. Historically, the present-day Arakan, which is a province in Myanmar, was a state in itself in the past. (The Stateless Rohingya, 2018). Through history, this region has been ruled by Hindu, Muslim, and Buddhist monarchs one after another. Over the years, the region has gone through various demographic and territorial changes as a land. There is still debate on the Rohingya status as a migrant or indigenous people in Arakan, which needs to be clarified, but this is accepted as a fact that Muslims were present in the Arakan region for more than hundreds of years (Leitich, 2014). It is also argued by many Burmese and non-Burmese scholars that Muslims and Islam were introduced to the Arakan region in the eighth century through the Arab traders. It is also argued that the Burmese occupied the Arakan region in 1784. The Muslims and Burmese then had a long history of cohesive existence in the region until the British and Japanese occupation. Leitich (2014) believes that during the Japanese occupation (1942–1945), the rift started between Muslims, loyal to the British, and Buddhist supporting Japanese (Leitich, 2014, p.  3). After the postindependence, the conflict between Buddhists and Muslims got broadened. In the 1960s, when the Myanmar army (Tatmaday) took over the control of the democratic government to a totalitarian regime, the situation for minorities become bad and for Rohingya worse. The then government drafted a law for Burmese citizenship. The bill was based on the ethnicity and indigenousness of the people and to promote the Burmese cultural hegemony and Buddhism as the primary religion in Myanmar (Leitich, 2014). Later the bill was passed in 1982, and it excluded the Rohingya Muslim ethnic group from Burmese citizenship. Even at the time of the 2015 landmark election, the Rohingya was not allowed to vote, and since then, the Rohingya minority community has faced many waves of violence and conflicts and forced to leave Myanmar. Since the recent violence broke in August 2017, more than 742,000 Rohingyas have crossed the Myanmar border and reached Bangladesh (UNHCR, 2019). The unofficial data from Bangladesh claims that there are more than 1.2 million Rohingyas in Bangladesh camps. The reports also claim that many refugees die during the journey or become victim of trafficking. (Ahmed, 2020).

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Methodological Framework The study is based on the thematic analysis methods (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The thematic analysis as argued by Braun and Clarke, is the foundation method for qualitative research. This approach is considered a simple process, consisting of gathering all relevant news and articles within the specific time period pertaining to the research study (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The reporting and coverage of two prominent Indian mass media, which includes one national news channel, New Delhi Television (NDTV – English) and one English News daily, The Times of India, on the issue of Rohingya are examined for this study. This is done to see the balanced approach of print media and electronic media in India. The data is collected from the official website of these news agencies and also from its media archives. The timeline August 1, 2017 to December 1, 2019 was taken for collecting data. The researcher closely examined the data to identify common themes—topics, ideas, and patterns of meaning that come up repeatedly in both the media houses. Firstly, for the study various research articles, reports, and books were referred to know the background and history of Rohingya crisis. After some primary literature review five keywords were identified to collect the data on the Rohingya issues in Indian media. Using these different keywords such as Rohingya refugees, Myanmar refugee, Burma refugee, Bangladesh refugee, and Rohingya Muslims on the search engines of both the agencies’ websites, 1022 news articles were collected as data corpus. Furthermore, 322 redundant news were removed as they were irrelevant or invalid pages and due to the fact that some keywords generated same news article. In the next step, some 140 more news were removed as they did not fall within the time frame of our study (August 2017 to December 2019). After the completion of this step, the remaining 560 news (54.79% of the total) were taken as our data set for the analysis (see Table  12.1 and Fig. 12.1).

Generating Codes and Identifying Themes To generate the possible themes, the data set was read and reread several times. Then it was categorized into codes. Braun and Clarke (2006) argue that these codes highlight exciting features of the articles and are mapped to meaningful groups that describe the semantic content of these features

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Table 12.1  Identified themes Sr. no

Themes

NDTV

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

Rohingya Rohingya Muslim Rohingya refugees Security & concerns Illegal immigrant Deport Violence/genocide/persecution/atrocities Ethnic cleansing Humanitarian Protection Hate Terror & terrorist Trafficking Bangladesh India Myanmar Total headline

288 13 31 10 4 22 36 1 1 1 2 8 1 86 44 153 380

Major Headlines of the both media Myanmar India Bangladesh Trafficking Terror & Terrorist Hate

Protection Humanitarian Ethnic Cleansing Violence/ Genocide / Persecution / Atrocities Deport illegal Immigrant Security & concerns Rohingya refugees Rohingya Muslim Rohingya The Times of India

Fig. 12.1  Representation of themes in both media

NDTV

Time of India 133 07 42 4 1 15 1 0 1 0 0 2 2 29 24 24 180

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(Braun & Clarke, 2006). Further, using each news article, we generated single, or sometimes multiple codes, which later were converted as new themes, and some themes were merged together to make the new single themes. We also considered the fact that the semantic context should not intersect while choosing the themes. There was a total of 16 themes, and these themes were further categorized after a brainstorming discussion of these themes and their significance; they were categorized into six major themes for the analysis. The theme such as ‘Rohingya,’ ‘Rohingya refugee,’ and ‘Rohingya Muslims’ (Themes 1, 2, and 3) are combined to make it one theme. Later themes like ‘Security concerns’, ‘illegal Immigrant’, ‘Deport’, ‘Terror & Terrorist’ (Themes 4, 5, 6, and 12) are merged and made into another theme as it is believed that all these themes are interrelated to each other and affect each other in some way. Themes like ‘Violence/Genocide/Persecution/ Atrocities’, ‘Hate’, and ‘Ethnic Cleansing’ (Themes 7, 8, and 11) are also merged, citing the same reason. The ‘Humanitarian’ and ‘Protection’ (Themes 9, 10) are also combined as the two themes are related to assistance to Rohingya. Bangladesh, India, and Myanmar (Themes 14, 15, and 16) are also joined to see the relationship, cooperation, and interest of these three countries. Trafficking (Theme 13) which did not get much space and headlines in these two media, is analyzed separately (see Table 12.2). Table 12.2  Regrouping of the themes Sr no. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

Main themes

Regrouped themes

Rohingya Rohingya Muslim Rohingya refugees Security & concerns Illegal immigrant Deport Violence/genocide/persecution/ atrocities Ethnic cleansing Humanitarian Protection Hate Terror & terrorist Trafficking Bangladesh India Myanmar

Rohingya Muslim refugee

Security issue and deportation

Crime against Rohingyas

Assistance Crime against Rohingyas Security issue and deportation Trafficking Cooperation & interest

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Limitation of the Study Due to language and time restrictions, the research is conducted in a limited time frame, with limited number of media house and focusing only on English language media. Therefore, it may have not covered other news and information given on other channels or dailies in India. The study carries data from August 2017 till April 2020 therefore, it also does not cover the latest news and updates from April 2020 onward.

Indian Mass Media India, the second populous country in the world, has a considerable number of communication tools like electronic newspapers, news channels, magazines, and internet-based websites. Although the social and electronic media are extensively in use, a significant number of population also follows the print media. The popularity of Indian newspapers and channels are based on region and the language that it uses. More than 1000 Hindi dailies, with a circulation of about 80 million and 250 English-language newspapers, with a circulation of 40 million, are published in India. The prominent Hindi newspapers are Dainik Jagran, Dainik Bhaskar, Amar Ujala, Navbharat Times, Hindustan Dainik, Prabhat Khabar, Rajasthan Patrika, and Nai Dunia. The Times of India, The Telegraph, The Hindu, The Hindustan time, and so on are the major English dailies. Brief profiles of sampled media houses. The Times of India (TOI) Since the publication of its first edition in 1838, ‘The Times of India’ is one of the oldest and popular English daily published till now. It is part of The Times Group that is owned by the Bennett, Coleman & Co. Ltd. In 1992, its publication was ranked as one of the six best newspapers in the world by the BBC. Apart from being the third largest newspaper in India by circulation it is also the world’s largest selling English newspaper. According to 2012 Brand Trust Report, this newspaper ranked 88th in India’s trusted brands. It was launched as a semi-weekly edition by R.N.D. Velkar, a reformist leader. It became a daily in 1850. The earlier name was ‘The Bombay Times and Journal of Commerce’ and was renamed The Times of India after a merger with other dailies. As of June 2019, the newspaper had 2,640,770 circulation daily.

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New Delhi Television (NDTV) New Delhi Television (NDTV) which is one of the pioneer television media company was founded by journalist Radhika Roy in 1988. Initially, it was a content provider for India’s national channel Doordarshan. Later on, it started producing its own program such as “The World This Week” which was nominated for India’s five best television programs since independence. NDTV is now an internet company with the flagship website – ndtv.com. It has many channels such as NDTV 24 × 7 (English), NDTV India (Hindi), and India’s first ever two-in-one channel NDTV Profit-­ NDTV Prime (Business and Infotainment). One of the biggest achievements of NDTV is that in 2014 and 2015 NDTV was rated the Most Trusted Brand across all forms of media in India, including newspapers, radio, web sites, and television. As per ‘The Independent Nationwide survey of 90,000 + households’ by Hansa Research, NDTV 24 × 7 has the highest viewership amongst all English news channels. In the 2014 parliamentary election, the official website NDTV.com created record hit of 13 million one day (NDTV, 2018).

Analyzing Major Themes The Times of India  heme 1: Rohingya Muslim Refugees T Out of 180 sampled news, The Times of India has used Rohingya and related terms more than 133 times as headlines. The daily while using Rohingya as headlines also uses words such as ‘Muslim’ to show the ethnicity of the community. This is very significant as many Rohingya organizations and experts are complaining that news agencies hesitate to use the Rohingya term intentionally. Instead, they use terms like ‘illegal immigrants’ and stateless to hide Rohingya’s real identity. On August 15, 2017 (ten days before the major conflict in Rakhine), the newspaper published an article on Antonio Guterres, (head of United Nations) concerned about India’s plans of deporting Rohingya. The headline reads as “UN chief concerned about India’s plans to deport Rohingya refugees” (The Times of India, 2017a). Since August 2017, when the influx of Rohingya was very high, The Times of India regularly followed

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and published news about the Rohingya issue. Generally, the approach of this daily seems to be more sympathetic and balanced toward Rohingya refugees. It has not only focused on the Rohingya issue from the Indian political perspective but also often mentioned the humanitarian approach to the crisis. The daily also published various Rohingya eyewitness’s statement and stories of atrocities and persecution in Myanmar. Over time it also reported about the Indian government’s stance and treatment of Rohingya in various parts of India. The daily mentioned about various Indian states leaders’ comments supporting or opposing Rohingya refugees in India. Some of the key headlines under this theme are: “63 feared dead in shipwreck involving Rohingya Muslims” (September 29, 2017) “All Rohingya refugees in India are not terrorists: Mamata Banerjee” (September 18, 2017) “SC asks Centre to file comprehensive report on amenities to Rohingya refugees” (April 9, 2018) “Assam Launches crackdown against Rohingya Muslim” (February 23, 2019)

 heme 2: Security Issue and Deportation T Since the beginning of the crisis, India has clarified its stand on Rohingya and considered them as illegal immigrants. In 2017, the minister of state for home, Mr. Kiren Rijiju announced in the parliament that the Rohingya enter illegally and will be deported to Myanmar. The government has already given advisory to the states to identify the Rohingya so that they can be deported to Myanmar. In September 2017, the newspaper reported that the government of India is planning to file an affidavit on Rohingyas in the supreme court of India on September 18. The article mentioned that the Rohingyas are declared as a threat to national security since they might have links to terror groups (The Times of India, 2017b). In September 2019, the daily reported news regarding the union minister of state for home who shows concern over 6000 Rohingya in the state of Telangana, which is in the middle of India. The article reported his statement on the issue as “If there

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are more Rohingyas in border states, it is understood but an area in the middle of India, having the second-largest number of Rohingya in the country is a cause of concern” (The Times of India, 2019). In recent time (January 2020), The Times of India also published an intelligence report stating that Pakistani ISI is funding 40 Rohingyas in Bangladesh to use them for terror attacks in India. (IANS, 2020). In the recent news development, many ministers from the ruling party are demanding a probe against Rohingya refugees who claim to get access to Aadhaar card (unique identification card) and other documents. Some of the key headlines under this theme are: “Rohingya are not refugees but illegal migrants, says Ranjith Singh” (September 21, 2017) “Illegal Rohingya migrants will be sent back, says Rijiju” (August 1, 2018) “1st batch of 7 Rohingya to be deported to Myanmar today” (October 3, 2018) “India deports five Rohingya, UN angry” (January 6, 2019) “No Rohingya immigrant deported in last three years: Government” (December 20, 2017)

 heme 3: Crime Against Rohingyas T Among all selected sample data for this daily, none of the news headlines use words like violence, genocide, atrocities, persecution. This could be possible because of selecting data from a restricted timeline, or the newspaper has used other words to define these themes. However, inside the various articles and reports, these words are frequently used to show the situation and crime committed against Rohingyas in Myanmar. Interestingly, the term “ethnic cleansing” was frequently used in many of the headlines of the daily (Agarwal, 2017). It also reported several news of the United Nations and other Islamic countries, calling the Rohingya crisis as a form of ‘Ethnic Cleansing’. In 2018, the daily published a special report on the ‘World’s refugee day’ quoting a statement from one of the Rohingya refugee Abdullah who was appealingly quoted as “Treat me for who I am, not what I was born to be”… I wasn’t the one who chose to take birth in the Rohingya family of Myanmar. Anyone, even Suu Kyi (De

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facto leader of Myanmar Aung San Suu Kyi), could have been born in a family such as ours if it was Allah’s will” (Singh, 2018). On the same day, the daily published similar news under the heading “Lesser known facts about Refugees and World Refugee Day,” where it described the Rohingya refugees in general and world refugees in particular. These kind of statements and news in fact helps in generating sympathy and support systems for the refugee community from the host community. Key headlines under this theme: “Declare ethnic cleansing of Rohingya Muslims a form of ‘Buddhist terrorism; Dargah Aala Hazrat clerics appeal to UNHRC” (September 14, 2017) “On World Refugee Day, Rohingya refugees in Delhi recall their days in Myanmar” (June 20, 2018) “Lesser known facts about Refugees and World Refugee Day” (June 20, 2018)

 heme 4: Assistance T Since 2017 the government of India is assisting and helping Bangladesh in managing the Rohingya refugee crisis. Over time, India has sent many consignments and relief package for the Rohingya refugees. The TOI highlighted ‘Operation Insaniyet’ which was started in 2017. It mentioned the first and second humanitarian assistance, which was sent by New Delhi to Dhaka in 2017 and 2018, respectively. Apart from this, the daily also reported the protection issue where the government provides long-term visas to 486 Myanmar citizens (Rohingyas). (The Times of India, 2017c). It also highlights the work of various INGOs and local NGOs in helping Rohingya refugees in Delhi and other parts of India. More especially, it mentioned about the Khalsa Aid, which was providing free food to Rohingyas in Bangladesh border areas. Key headlines under this theme: “India to send relief materials for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh” (September 13, 2017) “India for multi-dimensional approach to Rohingya issue” (September 16, 2017) “Sikh group starts langar for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh” (September 14, 2017)

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“486 Rohingyas in India on long-term visa, 40,000 residing illegally: Rijiju” (December 27, 2017)

 heme 5: Trafficking T Human trafficking is one of the evilest crimes in the world. In refugee-like situations, immigrants often become more vulnerable to this organized crime. Concerning Rohingya refugees and human trafficking, the Times of India shared stories of two Rohingya girls (Razia and Amina) who were smuggled to Chennai, India from Bangladesh. The headline reads as “Saved from trafficking, but no home to go back to.” In a similar incident, it reported about the 12 Rohingya girls rescued by the Mizoram police in India. Interestingly, the daily also said about the recent MoU signed between India and Myanmar on ‘Cooperation for Prevention of Trafficking in Persons; Rescue, Recovery, Repatriation, and Re-Integration of Victims of Trafficking’ (PTI, 2020). Major headlines under this theme: “Mizoram Police rescue twelve Rohingya, whiff of trafficking” (May 7, 2019) “Chennai: Saved from trafficking, but no home to go back to” (October 3, 2019)

 heme 6: Cooperation and Interest T The three neighboring countries, namely Myanmar, Bangladesh, and India seem to be inevitably involved in this Rohingya crisis. India—a close friend and strategic partner of both the countries—is in a crucial position. According to the Times of India report, over the years Bangladesh has given shelter to thousands of refugees, but with the increase in the population of these refugees, it is becoming harder for Bangladesh to manage these people. Although countries like India, Turkey, Canada, the US, UK, and other European nations are contributing to the existing problem, no long-term solution is available till now. Since 2017 the three countries, especially Bangladesh, are working actively at various international platforms to bring a solution to the problem but the year 2019 seems to be a year of cooperation and talk between these three countries. On August 7, 2019, the newspaper reported India’s home minister’s talk with his Bangladeshi counterpart. It says that India gives assurance to Bangladesh for the repatriation of Myanmar citizen. Interestingly the daily uses

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Myanmar citizens to address Rohingya Muslim refugees. In a similar way on August 16, 2019, the news of Bangladeshi attempt to repatriate Rohingya was also published. The report claims that the government of Bangladesh has sent 22,000 names, of which only 3450 were verified by the Myanmar government. The UN Refugee Agency was also assisting Bangladesh in surveying the ‘Intentions regarding repatriation’ of these refugees. However, the slow repatriation process and the diplomatic issue further restricted these repatriations. In December 2019, the newspaper highlighted the cancelation of various bilateral meetings between Indian and Bangladeshi diplomats which would have helped in resolving the Rohingya crisis. The New Delhi Television (NDTV)  heme 1: Rohingya Muslim Refugees T Interestingly, similar to The Time of India (on the same day of August 10, 2017), The news channel NDTV reported very significant information about the parliamentary report on the Rohingya issue, which stated that the number of Rohingya illegal refugees has increased to four times high in two years (Sharma, 2017). The channel in its news article quoted the government data, which is 40,000 Rohingyas in 2017. However, in the same year, only 18,000 Rohingya refugees were registered under UNHCR, India (UNHCR, 2017). Again, similar to the Time of India, this electronic media uses Rohingya, Rohingya refugees, Rohingya Muslim, Rohingya crisis, and so on to denote the Myanmar refugee crisis. Still, interestingly, in one place, it also uses the term ‘Arakan refugee’, which is the formal name of Rakhine State. The words such as Rohingya militant and Rohingya insurgents are also noted in the sample (Agence France Presse, 2017a).  heme 2: Security Issue and Deportation T The security issue is also seen as priority news for this channel. The channel, on one hand, highlighted the claim of the Indian Border Security Force regarding the prevalence of terror suspects among Rohingya refugees entering India. On the other hand, it also reported how the Indian government considered Rohingyas as an issue which “undermines India’s security.” (Tikku, 2017). The channel also reported the deportation of

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seven Rohingya refugees to Myanmar, which brings a strong criticism of the Indian government from the United Nations and Antonio Guterres. It also reported similar deportation of 90 Rohingyas from Bangladesh to Myanmar (AFP, 2017). On September 16, 2017, the NDTV journalist and news anchor Srinivasan Jain presented his groundbreaking investigation on the government claims of Rohingya links with the terror group. According to this multicity investigation, little evidence is found of terrorist connections or greater criminality of Rohingyas (Jain et al., 2017). The investigation also highlights that many of the Indian police officers and agencies accepted that there is no primary law and order complains or threats from the Rohingya community in their regions. Major headlines of the channel: “36,000 Rohingya In India, Terror Links Cannot Be Ruled Out: Border Security Force” (September 29, 2017) “Antonio Guterres Backs UN Concern on India's Deportation of Rohingya” (October 6, 2018) “Foreign Media on Security Concerns Over Rohingyas in Nations Like India” “UN Expert Voices Fears as Government Plans to Deport 7 Rohingyas” (November 3, 2018) “Rohingyas A Terror Threat? NDTV Finds Little Evidence of Government Claim” (September 16, 2017)

 heme 3: Crime Against Rohingyas T The crime against Rohingya has been given much more priority in the channel. In some very early reporting of the channel (September 2017), it published an article under the headline ‘Why Are the Rohingya Fleeing Myanmar?’, where it explained the kingdom of Arakan (current Rakhine area) and how this whole crisis got started. The channel uses the term ‘genocide’ for more than 17 times in the sampled data. News such as the role of Myanmar army in the genocide and the silence of Aung San Su Kyi on the violence against Rohingya are also given major headlines. It also constantly reported the ongoing dispute of Rohingya refugees in the International Court of Justice (ICJ), The Hague.

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Key headlines on this theme: “US Calls Myanmar Moves Against Rohingya ‘Ethnic Cleansing’” (November 23, 2017) “Myanmar Faces Lawsuit for Alleged Genocide at International Court of Justice” (November 11, 2019) “Nobel Laureate Suu Kyi At UN Court to Defend Myanmar In Rohingya Genocide Hearing” (December 10, 2019) “Nearly 100 Rohingya Face Jail in Myanmar As Hague Hears Genocide Case” (December 11, 2019) “Aung San Suu Kyi Slammed For ‘Silence’ Over Myanmar Genocide Claims” (December 14, 2019) “Army Committed War Crimes, Not Genocide Against Rohingya: Myanmar Probe” (January 21, 2020)

 heme 4: Assistance T Under the assistance theme, the channel reported India’s support to Bangladesh through sending relief material. It has stated various human rights reports and views on the need to support Bangladesh on the Rohingya crisis. The news of UN Secretary-General requesting India to support Bangladesh was published as headlines. In the same report, India is advised to play as the role of “honest broker” to solve this conflict. It also published various statistics on the situation of the Rohingyas in Bangladesh camps. The channel also gives mention to the request of Bangladesh to India for support (September 2017). Key headlines under this theme are: “Taking Up Rohingya Issue on Humanitarian Ground: Human Rights Body Chief” (September 21, 2017) “India Should Support Bangladesh On Rohingya Crisis: UN Secretary General” (October 3, 2018) “Bangladesh Seeks India’s Support on Rohingya Crisis” (September 11, 2017) “India Sends Relief Materials for Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh” (September 4, 2017)

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 heme 5: Trafficking T Not much has been reported about the trafficking of Rohingya refugees in India, whereas it mentions news about human trafficking in Rohingya camps in Bangladesh. In September 2018, the channel reported news of the arrest of a couple that was alleged to be the mastermind in trafficking four Rohingya refugees across Indian states. “UP Couple, Alleged Mastermind in Rohingya Trafficking Arrested in Manipur” (September 19, 2018)

 heme 6: Cooperation and Interest T The Indian government humanitarian assistance is reported in the channel, but it also mentioned the Bangladeshi PM Hasina’s statement of taking back the Rohingya by Myanmar (Agence France Presse, 2017b). Similarly, on September 15, 2017, the channel reported a statement from the minister of external affairs Sushma Swaraj on putting pressure on Myanmar to take back Rohingya refugees (PTI, 2017). It also highlighted that the three countries need diplomatic efforts to solve this crisis rather than just humanitarian assistance. The channel also showed news about the Rohingya repatriation agreement between Myanmar and Bangladesh on November 23, 2017, which later on was not implemented. Key headlines under this theme: “Myanmar, Bangladesh To Ink Rohingya Return Deal Amid Concern Over Army’s Role” “Bangladesh PM Sheikh Hasina Says Myanmar Must Take Back Rohingya” (September 2017) “India Pushing Myanmar To Take Back Rohingya Refugees, Says Sushma Swaraj” (September 5, 2017) “Bangladesh Ready (November 15, 2018)

to

Begin

Rohingya

Repatriation

Process”

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Discussions on Finding In the contemporary world of media studies, mass media platforms play a crucial role in disseminating and publicizing the information. Additionally, its worldwide significance in shaping society as well as political agendas cannot be overlooked. In the current study, both the Times of India and The NDTV channel, while addressing the Rohingya issue, used terms such as Rohingya, Rohingya Muslim, Rohingya refugees, and Rohingya minority. The frequent use of these terms naturally shows their news policy that they identify these people as an integral part of Myanmar and the Rakhine region. Whereas the Myanmar government itself refuses to use the ‘Rohingya’ word and calls them ‘Bengali Immigrant’. This approach of media reporting also coincides with the Indian government’s approach toward Rohingya refugee who sees it as a humanitarian crisis. As pointed out by American philosopher and linguist, Noam Chomsky, “the coverage of media organizations due to the political, economic and ideological cause, tends to support the home government’s foreign policy interest.” (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). Looking at the way of reporting of Times of India and NDTV, both create a sense of empathy toward Rohingya and address the Rohingya issue more on a humanitarian way rather than a political crisis. These media have also used a balanced approach to avoid any fake or controversies problem. Comparatively, within the study’s time frame, NDTV published more news and headlines concerning Rohingya than the Times of India. The primary focus of the Times of India seems to be highlighting the Rohingya crisis as a humanitarian crisis. Although both media reported and represented various stories of Rohingyas to highlight the suffering of Rohingyas back in Myanmar but especially the edition of Rohingya stories on World Refugee Day by Times of India seems more prevalent and impactful for the readers. The daily also quoted various statements by Rohingya refugees about the living conditions and struggles in Myanmar. One of those quotes read as “Life isn’t easy in Mewat camps, but few Rohingya want to return home.” The two significant quotes that can be taken from the same story read as: “How can I ever forget how they forced us to run, leaving behind our homes, families and dignity?”

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“We had five buildings, acres of land and multiple cars back home. Our living came from rentals, without shedding sweat. Here we don’t even get work on many days, making survival quite difficult.” (TNN, 2018)

Likewise, NDTV also shared some empathetic headline which is mostly related to child refugees, one from which reads: “At Delhi Slum, Rohingya Pin Hopes on Education for A Better Life” (Dwivedi, 2019), and the other one is “Orphaned Brothers Escaped A Massacre. Now They Have to Survive A Refugee Camp.” Although the second story is unrelated to Indian Rohingya, this has a widespread impact on the reader’s opinions. In the recent development these mass media are also focusing on the situation of Rohingya during COVID-19 pandemic. Overcrowded camps and low healthcare facilities are making these people more vulnerable to the highly contagious disease. Both media also emphasized that India is helping through humanitarian assistance but not doing much in the diplomatic level due to its regional policies and politics toward Myanmar, whereas Myanmar is continuously ignoring the issue and denying any persecution or violence against Rohingyas. On several occasions, the prime minister of Bangladesh Sheikh Hasina has sought India’s support to solve the Rohingya crisis (Indrani Bagchi, 2019a). The cancelation of the various visits in 2019 by Bangladeshi minister including the foreign minister due to anti CAA and NRC protest in India, also stopped the further dialogue on Rohingya refugee issue (Indrani Bagchi, 2019b).

Conclusion The Rohingya refugee crisis is diplomatic as well as a strategic issue for South Asia in general, and India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar, in particular. Since the beginning of the August conflict in Rakhine, the Indian media, especially the electronic and print media, have published hundreds and thousands of news and articles about Rohingya. The tools of mass media helped in bringing real issues and problems in front of these governments. The current chapter attempted to evaluate and analyze the reporting of Rohingya refugees in both print and electronic media of India. In this regard, various news and reporting of India’s two major mass media, namely The Times of India and NDTV, one print and one electronic media respectively, is carefully analyzed using thematic analysis methodology. The study identified that the Indian media shows a humanitarian approach toward portraying the Rohingya crisis. It also shows how the

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various identified themes are presented in print and electronic media. The study suggests that although the media has a soft approach toward Rohingya crisis and addresses them as Rohingya refugee but the government of India seems to be hard due to security and law and order threat from these immigrants. The government also considers them as illegal immigrants who need to be deported to Myanmar after identification. Although the study is done with limited media agencies and under a specific time frame, it has produced come significant credible findings of the representation of Rohingya in Indian media. More extensive studies and research is further needed to understand the role of media in shaping the opinion and policies for Rohingya refugees in India. Moreover, an analysis of social media tools such as Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, and Instagram, is also essential to understand the influence of social media in the life of Rohingyas staying in India. Looking at the solution of the issue, the study suggested that India which seems concerned about the Rohingya issue, needs to play a critically important role in the two source and destination countries of Rohingya refugees, which are Myanmar and Bangladesh respectively. While maintaining its strong relations with both Myanmar and Bangladesh for its economic, strategic, and security importance, it needs to play a mediator role in solving the conflict. Bangladesh and India, which are two great allies and major actors in managing the Rohingya crisis, should increase the pressure on Myanmar to get a concerted solution of the issue. It should also include the other stakeholders of the subject such as Rohingya refugees, Myanmar Buddhist leaders, China, Malaysia, INGOs, and local NGOs for the reliable and permanent solution of the problem.

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PTI. (2020, Febuary 27). PM Modi holds talks with Myanmar President; India, Myanmar sign 10 packs. Accessed 05 10, 2020. https://timesofindia.indiatimes. com/india/pm-­modi-­holds-­talks-­with-­myanmar-­president-­india-­myanmar-­ sign-­10-­pacts/articleshow/74338439.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_ medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst Sharma, N. (2017, August 10). Rohingya population shot up four-fold in 2 yrs to 40,000, parliament told. Accessed 05 05, 2020. https://www.ndtv.com/india-­ news/40-­000-­rohingyas-­living-­illegally-­in-­india-­says-­government-­1735673 Singh, M. (2018, June 20). On World Refugee Day, Rohingya refugees in Delhi recall their days in Myanmar. Accessed 05 06, 2020. https://timesofindia. indiatimes.com/city/delhi/on-­world-­refugee-­day-­rohingya-­refugees-­in-­delhi-­ recall-­their-­days-­in-­myanmar/articleshow/64666474.cms The Stateless Rohingya. (2018). “A short historical background of Arakan.” Accessed 04 20, 2020. https://www.thestateless.com/arakan The Times of India. (2017a, August 15). UN chief concerned about India’s plans to deport Rohingya refugees. Accessed 05 05, 2020. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/un-­chief-­concerned-­about-­indias-­plans-­to-­deport-­rohingya-­ refugees/articleshow/60069837.cms The Times of India. (2017b, September 15). Centre to file affidavit on Rohingyas in SC on Monday: Rajnath. Accessed 05 05, 2020. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/centre-­t o-­f ile-­a ffidavit-­o n-­r ohingyas-­i n-­s c-­o n-­m onday-­ rajnath/articleshow/60528318.cms The Times of India. (2017c, December 27). 486 Rohingyas in India on long-term visa, 40,000 residing illegally: Rijiju. Accessed 05 10, 2020. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/486-­rohingyas-­in-­india-­on-­long-­term-­visa-­40000-­ residing-­illegally-­rijiju/articleshow/62273043.cms The Times of India. (2019, September 27). 6,000 Rohingyas in Telangana a cause for concern: Kishan Reddy. Accessed 05 05, 2020. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/hyderabad/6k-­r ohingyas-­in-­t-­a-­cause-­for-­concern-­kishan-­ reddy/articleshow/71318958.cms Tikku, A. (2017, September 06). Share concern about ‘extremist violence’, PM Modi tells Myanmar’s Aung San Suu Kyi. Accessed 05 05, 2020. https://www.ndtv. com/india-­news/at-­meeting-­with-­aung-­san-­suu-­kyi-­pm-­modi-­tells-­myanmar-­ india-­shares-­your-­concern-­on-­extremist-­violen-­1746932 TNN. (2018, October 5). Life isn’t easy in Mewat camps but few Rohingya want to return Home. Accessed 05 09, 2020. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ city/gurgaon/life-­i snt-­e asy-­i n-­m ewat-­c amps-­b ut-­f ew-­r ohingya-­w ant-­t o-­ return-­home/articleshow/66078119.cms UNHCR. (2019). Rohingya emergency. Accessed 05 6, 2020. https://www.unhcr. org/rohingya-­emergency.html%20UNHCR

CHAPTER 13

Position of Responsibility: International Response to the Rohingya Refugee Crisis – The Case of Western Countries Gershon Dagba and Israel Nyaburi Nyadera

Introduction The term Rohingya has become a common word among mainstream global media. Rohingya refers to a minority Muslim Arakanese living in the mountainous northern territory of Rakhine State that is somewhat detached from the rest of Myanmar (Sohel, 2017; Islam, 2019). Though the Rohingyas have lived in Myanmar for many years, they are not officially recognized as part of 140 ethnic groups in the country (Nurul, 2006). Seekins (2006, p. 382) indicated that about 1.4 million Rohingyas resided in Arakan though they have faced persistent systematic persecutions. Studies had found that the emergence of the Rohingya group dates back to 1979 when Francis Buchanan indicated that the Burma Empire

G. Dagba Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Accra, Ghana I. N. Nyadera (*) Department of Government and Public Administration, University of Macau, Macau, China © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 K. Bülbül et al. (eds.), Rohingya Refugee Crisis in Myanmar, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6464-9_13

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was characterized by three dialects, originating from the Hindu nation. One of these dialects was the one spoken by the Mohammedans, who have lived in the Arakan for a long time and became known as the Rooinga (Dutta, 2020; Buchanan, 2003, p.  55). According to Charney (2005), ‘Rohingya’ is a clear derivation from the word ‘Rooinga’. Andrew Selth also opined that at least 4% of Burmese ethnic groups are Muslims, which is equivalent to well over 2 million people. Others, however, estimate that the figure is as high as 20%, or well over 11 million Muslims (Selth, 2013). Thus, it is clear that there is a political dimension to the Rohingya issue. Moshe Yegar (1972, p. 2) observed that by the ninth century, the first Muslim seafarers had arrived in Burma. Despite its location on the perimeter of a major trade route, Burma experienced a flurry of shipping activities, which eventually led to Muslims settlement. As a result, Yegar indicated that the Rohingyas’ origin may be traced back to Arab and Persian traders. Myint-U (2020, p.  2) gave a succinct account of the Arakans in understanding the history of the Rohingyas. From 1824–6 and 1852–3, the Burmese fought the British, which resulted in a decisive victory for the British in both wars. During the first war, Manipur, Tennasserim, Arakan, and the Assam, surrendered to Calcutta. The rest of the Indian Ocean, however, was taken during the Second World War. In addition, the remaining Burmese heartland, designated as ‘Upper Burma’ or ‘Ava’ by the British, remained under the jurisdiction of the weakened Burmese kingdom, together with the surrounding Shan principalities. Bodawpaya assumed the throne of Ava (Upper Burmese) in 1782, at the age of 37, and governed the kingdom until his death in 1817. Bodawpaya first annexed Arakan in the Burmese kingdom after succeeding to the throne. The small Arakan kingdom situated near the Bay of Bengal was a haven protected from the Irrawaddy Valley and the Arakan Yoma by mammoth mountains. The Indian Ocean influences, especially from Bengal and beyond, had a strong impact on Arakan. This area was a principal center for Indian Ocean trade and in particular an area for piracy. With a significant number of Muslims, though not very many, they have Brahmanical influences; Theravada Buddhism was the main religion (Myint-U, 2020). After invading Arakan, the Burmese occupied the capital, Mrohaung, in early 1785. Therefore, it is clear that the lineage of Rohingyas or the Muslim minority in Arakan can be traced to earlier Burma when they lived in the country for centuries.

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How then did the Rohingyas come to be called the ‘illegal immigrant’ today in Myanmar? The Burmese citizenship law of 1982 states that a Rohingya can become a Burmese citizen if his or her ancestors were in the country before 1823. However, the government claims that the Rohingyas are descendants of Chittagong district and they are of Bengali origin, in present-day eastern Bangladesh. The government accuses them of having crossed the border to settle in the Arakan when Britain annexed the territory in 1824–6. Thus, according to the citizenship law, they are not legitimate Burmese ethnic nationality (Islam, 2019). However, a study by Donald M. Seekins mentions that there exists a substantial volume of literature that proves Rohingya Muslims thrived in the kingdom of Arakan for many centuries before the advent of the British (Seekins, 2006, p. 291). It is, therefore, evident that the 1982 citizenship law was adopted to exclude the Rohingyas systematically. It is also critical to understand Burma’s citizen requirements. Section 11 of the Burmese 1947 constitution requires the use of both the place of birth and a blood test in determining an individual’s citizenship. Any person whose parents are of the Burmese indigenous race is a natural-born Burmese citizen. A person is also a natural-born Burmese citizen if at least one of his or her grandparents is of indigenous descent. Furthermore, a person is a natural-born Burmese citizen if he or she is born in Burma and both parents were union citizens at the time the constitution was drafted (Maung, 1959, p. 94). In terms of religious freedom, the Burmese constitution of 1947 recognizes Buddhism as the faith practiced by the vast majority of union people. The constitution lists Hinduism, Animism, Christianity, and Islam as faiths practiced by some union residents (Haque, 2017). There is a clear indication that the constitution recognizes Islam, including even Rohingya Muslims as citizens of Burma (Islam, 2019). However, the Rohingyas continue to encounter various forms of deadly discrimination since 1962 (Sohel, 2017). According to Selth (2013), despite the fact that complete rights for Muslims were guaranteed in the 1947 Burma constitution, in 1960 the military regime enlisted Buddhism as religion of the state. The regime that emerged after the coup perceived the presence of Muslims as the exploitation of Burma by foreigners and equated them to colonial rule. Muslims were not allowed in the public sector including serving in the security affairs. Several madrassas were shuttered, a number of mosques were reduced, and several Muslim graves were demolished. In 2002, the Human Rights Watch report indicated that the Burma government ordered the destruction of mosques by the

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military (Egreteau, 2011). Some mosques and Islamic schools were converted for use as administrative offices of the government (Lowenstein, 2015). The government barred Muslims from renovating or repairing the mosques (Sohel, 2017). Thus, since the 1990s, the Burma government issue orders for the attack on Rohingya Muslims. For instance, in 2001, around 28 mosques and Islamic schools came under Buddhist mobs’ attacks. The state security has also locked up and demolished Islamic schools and mosques, arrested and tortured students and teachers of Islam, beaten Rohingyas at prayers and prohibited their activities (Ragland, 1994). Coupled with the adoption of the 1982 citizenship law, is the politics of labeling and derogatory languages against the Rohingyas. Thus, the Myanmar government systematically excluded and oppressed the Rohingyas. The minority Rohingya Muslims were labeled as threat to Myanmar by the Ma Ba Tha monks who suggested the curtailing of their political and civil rights by Myanmar authorities (Mizzima, 2015; Lee, 2016). Fisher (2015) indicated that Mandalay monk Ashin Wirathu utilized online platforms regularly to make denigrating pronouncements and spread false stories about Muslims, labeling them as rapists and mad dogs. Those who went contrary to Wirathu’s view became the target of his persecution and invectives. Yanghee Lee, a UN envoy, who stood to the defense of the Rohingya Muslim minority’s rights, was labeled as a prostitute. In a 2013 interview with Time Magazine, Ashin Wirathu claimed that the Muslim minorities were reproducing so quickly, taking over Burmese women, and even raping them in some instance. He labeled the Rohingyas as ‘Bengalis’ and ‘propaganda-spreading’ and claimed they are taking over their lands permanently for their generations to come. In effect, the government and political leaders labeled the Rohingyas as ‘illegal immigrants’ and the enemies of the state of Myanmar. In a typical ‘divide and rule’, strategy, the Arakanese Buddhists were enlisted by the military regimes to attack Rohingya communities, and the Arakanese Buddhists occupied these lands after evicting the Muslims (Seekins, 2006, p. 383). Over the last 50 decades, the Myanmar military has committed several atrocities against the Rohingyas, and these came to be called the “Rohingya Genocides.” These military operations include genocide of 1962, genocide of 1978, genocide of 1992, genocide of 2012, genocide of 2016, and genocide of 2017. These genocides saw wanton and sporadic killing of the Rohingyas and many people seeking refuge in neighboring countries. Myanmar’s treatment of the Rohingya Muslim minority was

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labeled by the UN as a “textbook example” of ethnic cleansing. The next section presents an extensive review of the literature regarding global response to crisis such as the above.

Literature Review Various regimes, particularly military regimes have not desisted from persecuting the Rohingya Muslim minority in Myanmar (Hossain et  al., 2018). This continual deadly discriminations against the Rohingyas since 1962, has put Myanmar’s human rights performance at an extremely low record. In 2010 alone, the country performed very low on the human development, scoring 0.451, placed at 132nd out of 169 countries evaluated by the UNDP (Sidhu, 2020). Myanmar was ranked 174th out of 178 nations assessed for press freedom in the 2010 Freedom Index (Andrews & Htun, 2017), whereas the country was placed 133rd out of 153 countries evaluated in the 2011 Global Peace Index. Myanmar remains at the bottom of the Global Peace Index due to decades of internal armed conflict, human rights abuses, and militarism (Vision of Humanity, 2011; Sidhu, 2020). Transparency International (TI) ranked Myanmar the top five most corrupt countries in the world in 2018, ranking 177th, just ahead of Somalia (TI, 2018). According to the Minority Rights Group, Myanmar is one where ethnic minorities are severely under threat. Moreover, Myanmar was rated as “the worst of the worst” by Freedom House in its Freedom in the World 2010 report for its wide range of human rights abuses (Allchin, 2010). In most cases, these rankings and index bring the world’s attention to the abysmal human rights violations in such countries. Countries and international bodies respond in several ways to human rights violations in various countries of the world. There have been various forms of human rights violations in world history. There is or has been humanitarian crisis in countries such as Somalia, Libya, Syria, Palestine, Cambodia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Myanmar, among others. In most cases, countries and international agencies employ several techniques in an attempt to promote peace in these countries. Some of these conventional techniques employed include open condemnation, aid, imposing arms embargo, hosting refugees, sponsoring resolutions at the UN, supporting peace agreements, sending peacekeepers, deploying troops, among others. Human rights violations going on in various countries have openly been condemned by various countries and international agencies. Jones

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(1995) indicated that during the 1990–4 Rwanda genocide, world leaders and international organizations such as the UN strongly condemned the atrocities committed against the Tutsi by the Hutu ethnic group. Also, during the Libyan crisis, the government faced a barrage of condemnations for its use of violence in response to the uprising. The Arab League, European Union, US, Russia, and many other international actors strongly condemned the Libyan government (Blanchard, 2011). As indicated by Sidhu (2020), as a result of strong international criticisms and condemnations, the UNHCR, was involved in the signing of a memorandum of understanding between Burma and Bangladesh for repatriation of the Rohingyas (Parnini, 2013). The first memorandum of understanding for the repatriation of the Rohingyas was signed in 1992 between Bangladesh and Myanmar, which allowed limited involvement of the UNHCR. However, the first agreement received international condemnation, and thus, in May 1993, another memorandum of understanding was signed between the two countries, which allowed the involvement of UNHCR.  Also, the Algerian foreign ministry released a statement condemning human rights violations against the Rohingyas.1 The Egyptian foreign ministry also published a statement denouncing the killing and displacement of the Rohingya Muslim minorities “and urging a lasting settlement to the conflict.”2 Similarly, the annexed Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula in 2014, resulted in months of tension between the two nations. This Russian aggression received global backlash and condemnations. John Kerry, the US Secretary of State, explicitly criticized Russia’s “incredible act of aggression.”3 Thus, condemnation has been an essential technique for handling global crisis. Crisis such as that meted out to the Rohingya Muslim minority in Myanmar attract humanitarian assistance from the various countries and international agencies. Sidhu (2020) noted that countries and organizations, apart from condemning human rights violations, also provide humanitarian assistance to people fleeing discrimination and aggression during the crisis. For example, through the UNHCR, “the European 1  https://sudhorizons.dz/en/featured-news/featured/21384-violence-in-burma-algeria-calls-for-urgent-protection-of-rohingya retrieved on May 12, 2020 2  https://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/117480?lang=en-us&lang=en-us retrieved on May 12, 2020 3  https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-usa-kerry/kerry-condemnsrussias-incredible-act-of-aggression-in-ukraine-idUSBREA210DG20140302

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Union provided funds for humanitarian assistance to the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh” (Sidhu, 2020). Fargues and Fandrich (2012) indicated that the European Union (EU) continued to provide a plethora of humanitarian assistance to Syria’s growing refugee crisis. This humanitarian support includes providing food, water, and shelter, protection, and granting refugee status to those affected by the Syrian crisis. Similarly, Western (2002) noted that the UN and other NGOs were embroiled in the Somalian and Bosnia crisis and provided humanitarian assistance to the vulnerable and defenseless in the early 1990s. The Somalian crisis, in particular, saw 300,000 people dead and approximately 4.5 million Somalis on the brink of starvation. In Bosnia, nearly 100,000 were dead and close to 1 million have been displaced from their homes by June 1992. Given the severity of these two cases, humanitarian assistance was necessary to minimize the casualties. Another humanitarian assistance worthy of mention is that rendered during the Libyan crisis. The US government and its allies provided various forms of assistance to thousands who fled Libya and settled them temporarily in neighboring Tunisia and Egyptian border transit camps. The UN also negotiated an agreement with the Libyan government to supply medical reliefs and food to people in Misurata (Blanchard, 2011). Countries and international bodies, in the bid to find solutions to humanitarian crisis adopt resolutions compelling targeted countries to abide by certain conditionalities. Resolutions of such nature were adopted in managing the Rohingya crisis and several other crises in world history. In 2011, the UN Security Council unanimously introduced Resolution 1970, imposing an arms embargo on Libya, placing travel and targeted financial sanctions on Qadhafi and certain individuals. The Resolution also prevented third parties from the use of force. However, due to the ongoing escalation of the crises and the debate over further actions led to the passage of Resolution 1973 on March 17. This Resolution empowers member states to take all necessary steps to defend civilian regions under assault in Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, while also prohibiting any form of foreign invading force from entering Libyan territory (Blanchard, 2011). Also, the EU has been supportive of several recurrent UN resolutions condemning the Assad government’s use of violence and brutalities in the country’s crisis (Fargues & Fandrich, 2012). On February 28, 2018, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2401, which called for a nationwide ceasefire in Syria for 30 days. Similarly, during the 2014 Russian Federations’ aggression toward the sovereignty and territorial

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integrity of Ukraine, the Georgian parliament unanimously adopted a resolution in support of Ukraine. The resolution indicated that the deployment of Russian troops in Ukraine amounts to a gross violation of international agreements, condemned and called on the Russian Federation to withdraw all military units from Ukraine.4 Countries, especially those of the West, accept people fleeing humanitarian crisis into their countries. The Myanmar genocide and several other humanitarian crises such as witnessed in Syria, Somalia, Bosnia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, resulted in the exodus of citizens into neighboring countries as refugees. In most instances, these refugees are not welcomed in other countries; hence they set up temporary camps at the borders of transit. Countries in Europe and the US have over the years accepted and granted refugee status to these immigrants. Momin (2017) indicated that during the 2013 refugee crisis in Europe, Germany accepted about 326,900 refugees fleeing from Syria in 2015. It was expected that Germany would further open its borders to another 300,000 Syrian refugees in 2016 (Momin, 2017). During the same period, countries such as Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Romania were not receptive to accepting refugees. Eventually, the EU adopted a quota plan for the redistribution of 120,000 refugees into the various member states (Momin, 2017). Also, Momin (2017) indicated that the US accepted around 12,000 Syrian refugees though proposals to accept further refugees continue to receive mixed public reactions and administrative decisions. The photo of Aylan Kurdi, the Syrian boy (aged three) who was found in the Turkish shore, generated domestic reactions in Canada in 2015. Even the radical right-­ wing Bloc Quebecois party supported the Conservative party’s commitment in resettling 10,000 Syrian refugees in Canada (Carlier, 2016). International organizations and countries impose sanctions on governments to compel them to abide by certain spelt out conditionalities necessary to stop a humanitarian crisis. In most cases, countries such as the US and international organizations like the UN and EU sanction other countries engaged in violations of any forms. For example, in 2014, when the Russian Federation annexed the Crimean Peninsula of Ukraine, it engendered a plethora of sanctions imposed on Russia. The EU imposed the following sanctions on Russia: blacklisting of some Russian politicians and corporations, diplomatic, cultural, and sports sanctions, flight ban, 4  http://www.tabula.ge/en/story/80828-georgian-parliament-adopts-resolutionon-supporting-ukraine

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embargoes on specific commodities, visa bans, financial sanctions, and arms embargo. The US, Canada, and other countries such as Montenegro, Albania, Iceland, New Zealand, Australia, and Japan joined in aligning the EU sanctions against Russia. However, Russia reacted by imposing embargo on imports from any region or country that had imposed sanctions against Russia (Bukhari et  al., 2015). Kiernan (1992) found that what led to the quicker peace negotiations in Cambodia was the isolation of Phnom Penh regime and the embargoes on the country by the UN. All Western countries refused diplomatic relations, aid, and trade with the only anti-genocide faction while supporting its enemies. In the US Defense Authorization Law, the US adds a bevy of sanctions and new compliance requirements for Syria for its continued use of violence against its people.5 Thus, sanction is one of the effective methods adopted against countries or governments engaged in gross human rights violations. The study observes that though Western countries predominantly respond to global humanitarian crisis, there are also cases were non-­ Western countries and organizations come to the frontline of humanitarian crisis such as the Rohingya crisis. For instance, since the start of the Rohingya crisis, authorities in neighboring Bangladesh do not only push the refugees back, but the country has hosted Rohingya refugees during the first and second wave of Rohingya refugee crisis in 1978 and 1991 respectively (Sidhu, 2020). Even today, Bangladesh continues to provide refugee camps to Rohingya Muslim minority fleeing from Myanmar. Similarly, Thailand, located at the eastern front of Myanmar, has also been home to the Rohingyas. In the early 1990s, the Rohingya problem drew the attention of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the regional community, and it was strongly condemned by the community. Malaysian foreign minister delivered a sharply worded remark on the topic in March 1992. He observed that the acts of Burmese forces have burdened neighboring nations and may destabilize regional security and thus, the Rohingya issue can no longer be considered a local matter in Burma. (Sidhu & Parnini, 2020). Other foreign ministries of the ASEAN community condemned the actions of the Burmese military. Organizations such as the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) have also made effort to resolve the Rohingya issues. The OIC approved a resolution in June 2000 severely criticizing the Myanmar coup regime for its ongoing 5  https://brief.kharon.com/updates/us-adds-bevy-of-sanctions-in-defenseauthorization-law/

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violations of the Rohingyas’ rights. The OIC releases annual statements on the situation and urges the international community to help in resolving the problem. Thus, both Western and non-Western countries respond in various ways to resolve the humanitarian crisis of the world (Ten Veen, 2005, pp. 20–21).

Case of Western Countries Several Western countries have responded to the brutalities and deadly discrimination being faced by the Rohingya Muslim minority in Myanmar. The US, Canada, European countries through the EU have contributed in diverse ways in finding lasting solutions to the Rohingya crises. The US has, in most instances, sponsored resolutions at the UN against the Myanmar government. As discussed in the literature review, these Western countries adopted several techniques in response to the Rohingya crisis. These include imposing sanctions, issuing press statements condemning violence against the Rohingyas, placing military embargoes, hosting Rohingya refugees from Myanmar, among others. To begin with, it is important to note that the US has been one of the critics of Myanmar’s treatment of the Rohingya Muslim minorities. Since 1988, the US continues to condemn the abysmal human rights violations of the Rohingyas by the Myanmar juntas (Sidhu, 2020). In September 2017, the US vice president (VP) condemned in uncertain terms the terrible slavery against the Rohingya Muslim minorities. He observed that the horrors of the brutality and its casualties have stunned Americans and good people all around the world. As a result, the scenario has the potential to sow seeds of animosity and turmoil that may easily destabilize the region for decades to come and endanger the peace of everyone.”6 Like the US, the EU continues to monitor developments regarding the Rohingya crisis and often condemns the abysmal treatment of the Rohingya Muslims by Myanmar’s juntas (Sidhu, 2020). In the aftermath of the brutalities that characterized the peaceful protests in 1998, the EU joined the US in issuing strongly worded statements on the incessant violations and abuse of the rights of the Rohingya Muslim minorities. Western countries continue to impose various forms of sanctions on Myanmar for its use of violence against the Rohingya Muslim minorities. 6  https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/us-vp-condemns-terrible-savagery-againstrohingya-muslims retrieved on May 13, 2020

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The US has imposed the most extensive sanctions on Myanmar. The US’ most extensive sanctions started in the aftermath of the 1988 peaceful demonstration in which the Myanmar regime unleashed brutalities on the peaceful protestors. The US suspended all aid to Myanmar, which is even in effect up to today. Since 1992, the position of US ambassador to Myanmar is yet to be filled. The US sanctions also included a complete ban on all new financial investments targeted against the top politicians of the Myanmar regime. These sanctions were mainly targeted at achieving two purposes. The first purpose is to pressurize the Myanmar regime to desist from abusing the rights of the Muslim minorities and to improve its human rights record. The second purpose is for the Myanmar regime to take the necessary steps toward the direction of democratizing the country (Deutz, 1991). In 1991, most European countries imposed several sanctions on Myanmar in response to the regime’s use of violence against the 1988 peaceful demonstrators. Just like the US, most European countries suspended aids to Myanmar. In 1991, the then European community—the precursor of the EU—suspended defense cooperations and imposed an arms embargo on Myanmar. In October 1996, the EU adopted a union policy of ‘EU Common Position on Myanmar’ which imposed further sanctions on the Myanmar regime. These sanctions included a visa ban on all top officials of Myanmar and the suspension of all diplomatic visits to Myanmar. In April 2000, the EU further strengthened its common position on slapping additional sanctions against the Myanmar regime. Prominent among the further sanctions imposed included an asset freeze of high-level Myanmar officials (Ganesan, 2013). The Canadian government has also been imposing sanctions on the Myanmar government for its continued violations of the rights of the Muslim minorities. The Special Economic Measures (Burma) Regulations came into effect on December 13, 2007, in rejoinder to Myanmar’s egregious violation of the rights of the Rohingya Muslim minority. The regulation imposed a freeze on the assets of high-level officials of Myanmar and the prohibition of certain categories of transactions, dealings, and services relating to assets of designated persons, wherever situated. Also, the regulations included an embargo on transacting of arms. The embargo comprises prohibition of the exportation and importation of arms and related materials to and from Myanmar. The restrictions also included transmitting technical data linked to armaments or military actions, as well as materials related to such activities. The final aspect of the prohibition

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concerns financial services relating to military activities or arms and related materials. Due to some level of improvement in the developments in Myanmar in 2010, the Canadian government suspended most of the prohibitions in 2012, especially those relating to financial services, investment, exports, and imports.7 Major General Maung Soe of Myanmar was sanctioned by Canada in February 2018 for his involvement and ruthless crackdown on Rohingyas in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. The sanctions included the application of transaction restrictions, effectively freezing his individual assets in Canada and making him ineligible to enter Canada under the immigration rules.8 Apart from condemning the humanitarian crisis and imposing sanctions on the Myanmar regimes, Western countries continue to provide humanitarian assistance to the Rohingyas. According to Sidhu and Parnini (2020), the US has been giving humanitarian assistance to the Rohingya Muslim minorities since 1991. For example, Eric P. Schwartz, assistant secretary of the Bureau of Population and Migration in the United States, revealed that the United States allocated approximately US$23 million to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the UNHCR. The United States also contributed $1.28 million to different NGOs that were giving humanitarian aid to Bangladeshi refugees (Routray, 2011). During the visit, Eric P. Schwartz also stated that Myanmar’s heinous breaches of human rights do not allow for their safe return, and that the US is opposed to the forceful expulsion of these refugees (Kipgen, 2014). In May 2018, the United States pledged an extra US$44 million in aid to support the immediate needs of individuals affected by violence and conflict in Myanmar, as well as Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. This aid increases the total US support for displaced people in and out of Burma to approximately $300 million in 2017.9 Thus, the US keeps providing chunk of humanitarian assistance to the embattled Rohingya Muslim minorities. The European Union has also provided humanitarian support to the persecuted Rohingya Muslim communities in a number of ways. Since 1991, when the first wave of Rohingya refugees fled to Bangladesh, the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Department (ECHO) has 7  https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/sanctions/myanmar.aspx?lang=eng retrieved on May 13, 2020 8  https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/myanmar-general-sanctions-canada-1.4539003 retrieved on May 13, 2020 9  https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/may-15-2018-united-statesannounces-humanitarian-assistance-rohingya-burma-bangladesh retrieved on May 13, 2020

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allotted about US$54 million to the UNHCR to help in providing humanitarian aid to the Rohingyas. The UNHCR was able to persuade the Bangladesh government to improve the living circumstances of the Rohingyas in the two largest refugee camps of Kutupalong and Nayapara as a result the European Union’s persuasion and support. Between 1997 and 2004, the EU contributed around €56.4 million in humanitarian aid to Myanmar’s displaced people. As a result of this allocation, humanitarian aid to Myanmar’s internally displaced people (IDPs) and refugees were extended. (Nachrin, 2020). In addition, the European Union provided around 4 million euros in humanitarian aid in 2007, more than double the sum allocated in 2006–2007. Between 2007 and 2018, it is estimated that the European Union provided some €87 million to fund sanitation, water, shelter, basic healthcare, nutrition, psychological support, protection, and disaster risk reduction, including €36 million in 2018. During this period, there was mass exodus of the Rohingyas to neighboring countries and this called for the attention of the international community to come to their aid. In August 2017, about 700,000 Rohingyas fled to neighboring countries. Even during the previous year, around 87,000 refugees have already fled across the border into Bangladesh.10 This called for humanitarian assistance for the Rohingyas and the host communities in the Rakhine State to address some of their urgent needs. Thus, the European Union and other Western countries such as the US have been providing humanitarian assistance through the UN and other NGOs. The Canadian government continues to help to mitigate the Rohingya refugee crisis through the provision of humanitarian assistance. The Canadian humanitarian assistance focuses on addressing the needs of especially displaced women and girls through its Feminist International Assistance Policy. As almost every woman and girl in the camps and settlements encounter sexual and gender-based violence, Canadian assistance advances additional programming to deliver services that ensure the welfare of women and girls. In 2017, before the monsoon season, Canada allocated $8.15 million for emergency preparedness and assistance for the Rohingyas and host communities. Also, another $12.5 million was allotted to the Myanmar Crisis Relief Fund to help charities between August and November 2017. So far, since the beginning of 2017, Canada has

10  https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/rohingya_en.pdf retrieved on May 13, 2020

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provided a total of $45.9 million for humanitarian assistance in Myanmar and Bangladesh.11 Western countries have also been at the forefront of hosting some Rohingya refugees though a chunk of the Rohingyas has fled to neighboring Asian countries. In 2010, the US settled about 800 Rohingya refugees in the country (Zawacki, 2013). Also, in 2015, the US admitted another some 4071 Rohingya refugees into the country. In the following year, another 3000 Rohingya refugees reached the US though the number has reduced drastically; since President Trump assumed office, about 593 Rohingya refugees were admitted in 2019.12 According to the data released by the Rohingya Solidarity Organization, Western countries such as the US, Canada, Australia, and the EU have admitted some number of Rohingya refugees into their countries. The data estimates that about 5000 Rohingya refugees have been admitted in Australia. Also, about 5000 refugees have been admitted to the EU.  Canada is hosting about 1100 Rohingya refugees. In 2017, Canada made clear its position to welcome Rohingya refugees when the conditions in the region permit their resettlements. Canada continues to collaborate with host countries to issue exit permit from the government of Bangladesh.13 Western countries have championed several resolutions demanding the Myanmar government to respect certain demands. For example, in October 2010, US Congressman Christoper Smith proposed a resolution in the US House of Representatives demanding that the Myanmar junta urgently grant “full and equal citizenship” to the Rohingya Muslim minorities and lift all restrictions on them, including access to education. He also urged Myanmar’s military regime to stop assaulting ethnic and religious minorities’ rights, which he described as a crime against humanity. The resolution further encouraged the Bangladesh government to collaborate with the UNHCR for the protection of all Rohingya refugees. Christopher Smith submitted this resolution following a meeting with Maung Tun Khin, president of the Burmese Rohingya Organization 11  https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/response_conflict-reponse_conflits/crisis-crises/strat-rohingya.aspx?lang=eng retrieved on May 14, 2020 12  https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/22/us/rohingya-refugees-us.html retrieved on May 14, 2020 13  https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/response_conflict-reponse_conflits/crisis-crises/strat-rohingya.aspx?lang=eng retrieved on May 14, 2020

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United Kingdom (BROUK), organized by Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW) (Mahmood et al., 2017). In a related development, in 2019, the European Parliament adopted a resolution urging the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to impose a comprehensive arms restriction on Myanmar. The resolution also implored the UNSC to sanction those natural and legal individuals who appear to have orchestrated heinous human rights violations. In the resolution titled “Myanmar, notably the situation of the Rohingya” the European Parliament reiterated its strong condemnation of the ongoing and long-­ lasting human rights violations in Myanmar, which according to the Office of the UN OHCHR, is a violation of human rights and could lead to genocide, orchestrated against the country’s Muslim minorities by Myanmar’s armed forces. The resolution also commended the Bangladesh government and its people for their efforts in providing refuge and security to the Rohingya refugees. The Bangladeshi side was urged to fully respect the principle of non-refoulement because forcing the Rohingyas back to Myanmar will endanger their lives.14 The posture of the leader of Myanmar is not helping to find lasting solutions to the violations against the Rohingyas. Aung San Suu Kyi once hailed as a champion in the fight for democracy has been accused of perpetrating gross human rights violations by not speaking out about the violence against the Muslim minorities. This resulted in many Western institutions stripping of many honors and awards Suu Kyi won for her role in the fight for democracy in Myanmar. In 2017 alone, the de facto leader of Myanmar was stripped of seven awards. A portrait of Aung San Suu Kyi was changed on the wall of St. Hugh’s College at the University of Oxford. However, the college claimed that the removal of the portrait is not linked to her role in human rights violations in Myanmar. In addition, the city councils of Glasgow and Sheffield withdrew the honors they bestowed on Suu Kyi. Also similar step was taken by the presidency of the London School of Economics. In late November, the Oxford city council stripped her of the freedom award. In December of same year, Dublin’s city council stripped her of her Freedom of the City when musician Bob Geldof demanded that his honor be returned in protest of Suu Kyi’s behavior. The actions by these institutions were emulated by other Western 14  https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/rohingya-crisis/2019/09/20/ rohingya-crisis-european-parliament-adopts-resolution-to-impose-arms-embargoagainst-myanmar

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institutions such as the Newcastle city council, the Canadian Museum for Human Rights in Winnipeg, the city of London, and the University of Bristol. However, several organizations refused to rescind previous honors bestowed on Suu Kyi. The Norwegian Nobel Institute refused to revoke her 1991 Nobel Peace Prize. Also, the University of Oxford has not withdrawn Suu Kyi’s honorary degree, which she was awarded in 2002.15 In March 2018, the US Holocaust museum stripped Suu Kyi of its top award because of her failure to condemn and stop military attacks on the Rohingya Muslim minorities in Myanmar.16 In September 2018, the Canadian Parliament also voted to revoke Suu Kyi’s honorary citizenship as a result of her failure to stop the persecution of Muslim minorities in her country.17

Western Countries’ Response to the 2021 Coup in Myanmar As the question over Rohingya people’s treatment gained momentum internationally, including a preliminary ruling by the International Court of Justice, trouble was brewing back at home. On February 1, 2021, the military arrested top government officials, including president Win Myint and Aung Suu Kyi. The latter seen as a close ally of the military or at least a defender of the military actions against the Rohingya as well as other government officials have since been detained in what is increasingly becoming a bloody coup following the killing and arrest of several civilians protesting against the coup. While the coup has left a big dilemma on the country’s political future, focus has shifted to how the international community will handle the crisis. The European Union and the United States, seen as agents of promoting democracy across the world, will now have to respond to a regime whose military officials have been at the center of depriving the Rohingya people their freedoms, rights, and liberties. Western countries’ dilemma became bare on the fifth day after the coup when the newly appointed foreign minister invited diplomats for a virtual meeting. Countries were divided over whether to attend the meeting or 15  https://coconuts.co/yangon/news/aung-san-suu-kyi-stripped-least-9-awards-year/ retrieved on May 13, 2020 retrieved on May 13, 2020 16  https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-myanmar-award-idUSKCN1GJ2U0 retrieved on May 13, 2020 17  https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-45647073 retrieved on May 13, 2020

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not since it would be seen as legitimizing the senior General Min Aung Hlaing led-junta government. Most governments sent deputies and lower-­ ranking diplomats with some opting to switch their cameras off during the virtual meeting while some openly condemned the coup. Away from the virtual meeting theatrics, formal positions had to be taken with massive condemnation of the coup being witnessed from the West. The Biden administration has not only condemned the coup but issued sanctions to officers involved in the overthrow. In addition, the new US secretary of state Antony Blinken contacted Japan and China, two countries with close ties to Myanmar asking them to put more pressure on the military regime to step down. The United Kingdom condemned the coup and called for the immediate release of all the people illegally detained. European Union Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Josep Borrell (chief of foreign policy) were swift to condemn the coup while member states from the smallest to the biggest condemned the action. Foreign ministers and leaders of Luxembourg, France, Spain, Denmark, Belgium, Germany, and others issued statements condemning the coup. New Zealand declared that it had suspended all ties with Myanmar terming the military government as illegitimate. Despite the continued condemnation and criticism of the coup, there is very little optimism over the impact of such diplomatic responses. The military has continued to use excessive force against civilians and infringing on freedom of information by shutting down the internet. Perhaps, the military has become bold and undeterred by international reactions to its illegal activities since it sustained for a long period of time the crackdown and even genocide of the Rohingya people without any serious repercussions.

Discussion and Conclusion This study discusses the genealogy of the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar and the responses from Western countries. From the extant literature, there is enough evidence to prove that the Rohingya Muslim minorities lived in the northern Rakhine State of Myanmar for centuries. However, since 1962, the Rohingyas have been the subject of continual persecution and discrimination by successive Myanmar juntas. The introduction of Citizenship Law of 1982 was a clear attempt to deny the Rohingya Muslim minorities citizenship of Myanmar. During the various military operations against the Rohingyas, which the UN described as a “textbook example” of ethnic cleansing, the Rohingyas fled across the borders to neighboring

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countries. Currently, Bangladesh hosts the largest refugee camps for the Rohingya Muslim minorities. Some Rohingya refugees are being hosted in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Indonesia, Malaysia, India, among others. The UNHCR and many other non-governmental organizations have been monitoring and coordinating the refugee crisis between Myanmar and Bangladesh. The UN Human Rights Council created the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (IIFFMM) in April 2017 to examine accusations of human rights abuses by the military and security forces. In August 2018, this Mission issued preliminary summary findings, which were followed by a comprehensive 444-page report in September. The Myanmar authorities’ “clearance operations,” which included indiscriminate maiming and death, constant sexual assault, and widespread devastation of Rohingya communities, were labeled as a “human rights catastrophe” in the report. Among other suggestions, the fact-finding team recommended that the UN Security Council report the matter to the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Becker, 2018). Despite the fact that Myanmar is not a signatory to the Rome Statute of the ICC, a Pre-­ Trial Chamber of the ICC determined that the ICC had jurisdiction over the alleged expulsion of Rohingyas from Myanmar to Bangladesh, as well as perhaps additional crimes. However, the Security Council could not pass a resolution on the crisis due to China’s veto.18 Thus, the other four permanent Western countries gave their support to the resolution. Meanwhile, the UN Human Rights Council reacted by dispatching a team to Myanmar to gather and secure evidence of international law violations. As chair of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) ad hoc ministerial committee on accountability, the Gambia petitioned the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against Myanmar on the prevention of genocide in relation to the Rohingyas in November 2019. A day before the hearing, Canada and the Netherlands released a joint statement declaring their willingness to collectively pursue all possibilities for supporting and assisting the Gambia before the International Court of Justice.19 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) pronounced its judgment on the 18  https://www.rohingya.ca/international-court-of-justice-and-rohingya-issue/ retrieved on May 17, 2020 19  https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/rohingya-crisis/2019/12/29/rohingyagenocide-case-against-myanmar-west-s-failure-to-support-the-gambia-surprising-if-notshocking retrieved on May 17, 2020

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Gambia’s request for temporary measures on January 23, 2020. The Court unanimously stated that the Republic of Myanmar should take all preventive measures to avoid the commission of all acts relating to genocide and human rights violations. The Court also required the government to take measures to ensure that it does not support the military or any irregular armed units to commit any crime relating to the above. The government shall also take all necessary precautions to avoid the destruction and protection of evidence in connection with the accusation of actions covered by Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Finally, the government is required to submit to the Court a report on all steps taken to carry out this Order within four months of the day the Order is issued, and every six months afterwards until the final judgment on the matter is issued. The Rohingya diaspora and several Rohingya organizations in Western countries have been very instrumental in finding a lasting solution to the crisis. Some of these groups include the Canadian Rohingya Development Initiative (CRDI) in Canada, The European Rohingya Council in the Netherlands, the Burmese Rohingya Organization in the UK, and the Global Rohingya Diaspora. Over the past two decades, the Rohingya diaspora members have relentlessly campaigned for the recognition of their rights and sufferings.20 Many studies have revealed how the Rohingya diaspora relied on technology to advance their agenda. Recently, the Rohingya took to social media to raise the attention of the international community using the hashtag #StopRohingyaGenocide. Also, around 100 social media activists from the Global Rohingya diaspora demonstrated in front of the ICJ in The Hague. These advocacy groups have urged international human rights organizations to support the conclusions of the IIFFMM study, which said that the Rohingyas “remain at significant risk of genocide.”21 Through the UNHCR referral procedure, Canada became the first Western country to accept Rohingya refugees from Cox’s Bazar refugee camps in 2006. The Rohingya communities established several organizations to advocate relentlessly to the Canadian government to endorse the IIMMFF report’s findings. On September 2, 2018, the House of Commons unanimously 20  https://www.hoteldealsphuket.com/phukettraveltips/rohingya-diaspora-transnational-identity-in-the-digital-age/ retrieved May 17, 2020 21  https://www.hoteldealsphuket.com/phukettraveltips/rohingya-diaspora-transnational-identity-in-the-digital-age/ retrieved May 17, 2020

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approved the findings of the report. Moreover, the Canadian government also committed $300,000,000 over the next three years in humanitarian response and work toward a lasting solution to the situation. The Rohingya communities’ activism, awareness raising, and lobbying resulted in the Canadian government’s symbolic decision to remove Suu Kyi’s honorary citizenship. In another case, Tun Khin, head of the Rohingya Organization in the United Kingdom, successfully persuaded Twitter officials in May 2019 to deactivate the account of Myanmar’s military leader, Min Aung Hlaing.22 The Rohingya diaspora continues to work toward finding peace for all Rohingyas living in Myanmar and beyond. The EU ought to channel its efforts through ASEAN, with its nuanced approach in handling sensitive issue with the Myanmar government. The Association countries have been in talks with the Myanmar government to contain and moderate violence against the Rohingya Muslim minorities. The EU’s advocacy for compromise and security-to-all aligns with the quest for peace and reconciliation inspired and promoted by ASEAN. Thus, the EU and ASEAN can join forces to persuade the Myanmar government to act lawfully in its approach toward the Rohingyas. As an advocate for rule of law, human rights, and well-being, the EU could be helped by the ASEAN, which knows how to approach the Myanmar government, to advance its values. Despite the international community’s notice and criticism of the Rohingya situation, there has been considerable reluctance to address the issue. It appears that the country’s ethnic minorities and proponents of democracy are well-linked to transnational advocacy groups. However, Sindu (2020) indicated that Rohingyas still lack such transnational connections. Robinne (2016) observed that what likely aggravates the issue is that even supporters of democratic dispensation in Myanmar, whether from within or abroad, appear to have kept a distance from the Rohingya problem. Also, no Rohingya political group is a member or party to the several pro-democracy organizations that operate from outside Myanmar. Thus, it stands to reason that should the democratic movements advance the cause of the Rohingya Muslim minorities, they in turn risk losing the support of the majority of the Buddhist population in the northern Rakhine State of Myanmar. This study argues that Western countries

22  https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/global-rohingya-diaspora-lifelines-bangladeshand-myanmar retrieved on May 17, 2020

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should focus their attention on instilling in the Rohingyas Muslim minorities democratic values. Moreover, Western countries should focus attention on increasing the education of the Rohingyas. The Rohingyas live in what is considered the poorest state in an impoverished country, with no access to education, contrary to the Myanmar’s government claim that the country has a literacy rate of 90% (Yoshikawa & Teff, 2011, p. 1). According to ALTEAN-­ Burma (2006, p.  5), a study conducted in the Rohingya camps in Bangladesh found that just 12% of the Rohingyas could read and write. Thus, the EU and other Western countries could only promote democratic values more easily among literate and educated people. This study, argues that if attention is not directed at providing education to more Rohingyas, these refugee kids could grow into adults and will be easy to be employed by some evil people to perpetrate crimes.

References Allchin, J. (2010). Burma freedom is ‘worst of the worst’. Democratic Voice of Burma. ALTEAN-Burma. (2006). Rohingya and muslims in Arakan state: Slow-Burning Genocide. Bangkok: ALTEANBurma. Andrews, T. G., & Htun, K. T. (2017). Corruption in Myanmar: Insights from business and education. In Marie dela Rama & Chris Rowley (Eds.), The changing face of corruption in the Asia Pacific (pp. 233–242). Elsevier. Becker, M. A. (2018). The situation of the Rohingya: Is there a role for the international court of justice? EJIL: Talk. Blanchard, C. M. (2011, April). Libya: Unrest and US policy. Library of Congress Washington DC Congressional Research Service. Buchanan, F. (2003). A comparative vocabulary of some of the languages spoken in the Burma empire. SOAS Bulletin of Burma Research, 1(1), 40–57. Bukhari, A. H. S., Memon, A. P., & Shah, Z. H. (2015). Ukranian crisis & the Russian sanctions. The Government-Annual Research Journal of Political Science, 3(03), 14–33. Carlier, M. (2016). Explaining differences in the Canadian and American response to the Syrian refugee crisis. Virginia Policy Review, 9(2), 56–74. Charney, M. W. (2005). Buddhism in Arakan: Theories and historiography of the religious basis of ethnonyms. Paper originally presented at the Workshop, “The Forgotten Kingdom of Arakan: A Public Seminar on the People of Present Day Arakan State of Myanmar.” Deutz, A. M. (1991). United States human rights policy towards Burma, 1988–91. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 13(2), 164.

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CHAPTER 14

INGO and NGO Strategies for Social Cohesion: The Case of Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh Aghna Shujat, Md. Sajid Khan, and Md. Nazmul Islam

Introduction Since August 2017 the Rohingya crisis has emerged as one of the significant crises in the Asian subcontinent. More than 742,000 ethnic Muslim Rohingya refugees have crossed the Myanmar border and took shelter in Bangladesh refugees camps. (UNHCR, 2019). The other South Asian countries Like India, Pakistan, and Southeast countries like Thailand, A. Shujat Centre for Early Childhood Development and Research Scholar, Jamia Millia Islamia University, New Delhi, India Md. S. Khan (*) Migration Research and Application Center, Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Ankara, Turkey Department of Social Work, Hacettepe University, Ankara, Turkey Md. N. Islam Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Ankara, Turkey © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 K. Bülbül et al. (eds.), Rohingya Refugee Crisis in Myanmar, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6464-9_14

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Malaysia have also shared a significant number of Rohingya refugees. Many Rohingyas are also settled in Western countries where they arrived well before 2017 violence in the state of Rakhine (former Arakan). Many international agencies such as Human Rights Watch and United Nations blame Myanmar government for the atrocities on this religious minority. Zeid Ra‘ad al-Hussein, the head of United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) called it as a textbook example of “ethnic cleansing” in the Human Rights Council in Geneva. As mentioned in the the 1982 citizenship law of Myanmar, the Rohingyas are not indigenous to Myanmar and therefore they are not entitled to the citizenship of the state. In the current scenario the Myanmar government is defending these blames in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague. (UN News, 2017). Failing to see any short-term solution of this issue, the neighboring governments and the nongovernment organizations are focusing on minimizing the suffering of these refugees, which are considered as the world’s most persecuted minorities by the UN. The chapter explores how at various levels international and local NGOs are supporting Rohingya refugees in the Bangladesh. The study also focuses on the significant issue of social cohesion among these refugees in the host countries. As it is argued that social cohesion is an essential part of policies, strategies, and programs to deal with the people who are in extensive need of humanitarian assistance. Social cohesion is not considered as a work of state government alone, but it is the responsibility of each and every one including nongovernmental organizations, international civil societies, media, and the local people. All these stakeholders are required and play an important role in providing support to refugees to adapt to cultural traditions and creating a public consciousness that recognizes the many commonalities shared between diverse groups.

A Brief Understanding of Social Cohesion Social cohesion is considered as a situation of exploration, review, and research since the late nineteenth century; it has likewise pulled considering a legitimate concern for universal associations, governments, and strategy creators for the 1980–90 as significant levels of social cohesion have related to positive results. A research study conducted  by Chan et  al. (2006) elaborated it to a great extent as social cohesion is an inspiration

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which is easily adaptable to permit the twisting and obligatory indulged in political activities (Chan et al., 2006; Bernard, 1999). These specific difficulties with respect to the estimation of social cohesion between individuals helped the establishment of social cohesion and built up bonds among people (Manole, 2012). Also, few researchers distinguished absenteeism of social cohesion as a decrease in solid conventional relational securities that existed inside social structures which were supplanted with free, objective, associational securities in industrialized social orders (Beumer, 2010; Giddens, 2009). Furthermore, an American researcher Talcott Parsons additionally investigated the idea of social cohesion yet with the opinion of split standards and qualities that empower individuals to distinguish and seek after much shared objectives (Kearns & Forrest, 2000; Berman & Phillips, 2003). A considerable lot of the components of this early hypothetical work keep on advising current reasoning and practice identified with social cohesion. For a few, social cohesion depicts a connection that presents between individual residents as well as inside private general gatherings, particularly in settings described by ethnic heterogeneity (Bruhn, 2009; Van Beuningen & Schmeets, 2013). These definitions focus on the attributes and advantages of enrolling inside little gatherings (Norton & Haan, 2013). For other people it is the nature of these associations among people and the gatherings to which they have a place that issues (Marc et al., 2013). Further, Maxwell (1996) comprehended that social cohesion additionally includes that “it is about to empower individuals and make them able to share difficulties and they are individuals from a similar community”. In addition, Pervaiz, Chaudhary, and Staveren (2013, p.  5) for instance characterize social cohesion as a network which works to put the general public together in one thread. Various research studies have registered social cohesion as an open and growing society dealt with great support and with a sort of cooperation that provides full support for people to live a peaceful life. However, others contend for a meaning of social cohesion that the two features first the limit of a general public to seek after it  own welfare  and second  decreasing imbalances and advancing incorporation among various  groups  (Council of Europe, 2007). These definitions are regularly practice oriented and connected to implementable projects and strategies, especially by governments and worldwide givers and NGOs. Almost ten years ago, The United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (2010)

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has likewise also taken social cohesion within the setting of its work. The UNDP has corroborated two measurements for defining social cohesion species in this list; first one is to eradicate disparities and social rejection. Another is reinforcing social relations, collaborations, and relations. Notably, the UNDP likewise alerts against the hazard that durable gatherings can really “present genuine dangers to the security of others,” especially when these gatherings are restrictive or in strife with each other. A similar research study conducted by Ndinga-Kanga (2017) substantiated to identify key pointers for peace building and cohesion and to mobilize general people about their rights. Defining Social Cohesion Various scholars have attempted to distinguish the term that adequately clarifies the term social cohesion as a power or the glue that holds a society together and enables its individual to peacefully coexist and develop. The term social cohesion has been utilized to portray this power. Social cohesion conveys various undertones, contingent upon setting, character, culture, social, and political elements. “A cohesive society works towards the well-being of all of its members, minimising disparities and avoiding marginalisation. It entails three major dimensions: fostering cohesion by building networks of relationships, trust and identity between different groups; fighting discrimination, exclusion and excessive inequalities; and enabling upward social mobility.” (OECD, 2011)

The Council of Europe (2010) characterizes social cohesion as “a capacity of a cutting-edge society to guarantee the long haul prosperity of every one of its individuals, including even-handed access to accessible assets regards for human pride concerning decent variety, individual and aggregate self-governance and mindful interest”. By examining this definition obviously cohesion is confined in a top-down viewpoint that spotlights on the task of the state in making a social-world of politics in which residents can convey what needs be and appreciate the administrations and a superior personal satisfaction. In this situation, it is totally ignored the generative procedures that the diverse nearby substances and the various on-screen characters could enact or more, every one of the outcomes that this procedure could bring about framing comprehensive or restrictive durable forms.

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Pauline (1998) of the Canadian Policy Research Network presented social cohesion as an accessible collaboration, activity, and a center for arrangements for adequate needs as, “This definition similar to a great part of the work and thinking on social cohesion is basically engaged at the network level has a significant bearing on the limit of social orders to arrange answers for their issues, and to propel aggregate interests.” According to the UN, “a cohesive society is one where all groups have a sense of belonging, participation, recognition and legitimacy. Such societies are not necessarily demographically homogenous. Rather by respecting diversity they harness the potential residing in their societal diversity (in terms of ideas, opinions, skills etc.).1” UNDP defines social cohesion as the state of a society’s convergence or the common bonds that unify different people and groups that share space or territory. It comes about when people come and interact with each other based on a common set of political, economic, and social institutions.2 Social cohesion is the condition of a general public’s union or the regular bond that bring together various individuals and gatherings that offer space or region. It comes about when individuals get tied up with and connect with one another, depending on a typical arrangement of political, monetary, and social organizations. The World Development Report (2012) depicts social cohesion as a blend of securities and society network and a level of duty to advancing the benefit of everyone. It suggests a lot of acknowledged standards, regulations, consideration, and the value (Norton & Haan, 2013).

Methodology This chapter puts focus to produce original and valued research work on the issue of social cohesion and Rohingya refugee in Bangladesh. Several research studies have strong and enough evidences related to the vulnerable situation of Rohingya refugees in camps as well as in the other host countries. The study highlights steps and initiatives of international NGOs and local NGOs that are creating a bridge to cover up the gap between refugees and government policies and helping in producing strategies for 1  Retrieved from https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/news/policy/perspectives-on-social-cohesion.html 2  https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/egms/docs/2014/LarsenDevelopmentin socialcohesion.pdf

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social cohesion. A systematic literature review, that is, articles, reports, and research work related to Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh was conducted. Purposefully, the authors tried to collect latest research work and related it with the various definitions and studies conducted by well-known sociologists around the globe. The major objectives of this chapter are: . To provide a systematic literature review of social cohesion, 1 2. To describe social cohesion as a multidimensional concept, 3. To elaborate INGO and NGO strategies for the social cohesion of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh.

Literature Review on Social Cohesion and Rohingya Refugee Social cohesion is a tool that binds society together with fundamental rights, harmony, majority rule government, and advancement. It is the nature and set of connections among people and group in a specific domain and among people, group, and the organizations that oversee them in a specific situation. It has four parts, to be specific, social connections, connectedness, direction toward the benefit of all, and balance and rights. Keys to social cohesion are regard for human rights, regard for assorted variety, and individual duty. The presence of social cohesion does not really imply that contention is altogether missing, however that networks have the ability to viably oversee strife and that they can “expand on their shared traits” and along these lines “address struggle in a proactive and positive methodology.” To depict the social cohesion setting, the study presents discoveries as indicated by five key segments of social cohesion: Part 1: ‘Equity and Rights’ available yearnings and encounters of well-­ being and poise after the transition to Bangladesh, Part 2: ‘Connectedness’ examines the feeling of shared character and belongings and impression of one another, Part 3: ‘Social Relationships’ talks about the current ties and view of host-­ displaced person relations, Part 4: ‘Direction toward the Common Good’ portrays existing practices for solidarity and backing.

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In Part 5 ‘Arrangements’ present impermanent and solid arrangements predicted by hosts and evacuees, and close with proposals for programming and backing UNDP (UNDP & SFCG, 2015). An activist named Emile Durkheim briefly explains this as an establishment of general appeal and characterized as a bond made by unwaveringness and agreement between the people. It is about reinforcing social relations, shared qualities, and a typical premise of identifying with the world, clinging to a typical personality and a feeling of having a place, just as trust among society individuals (Jenson, 1998). Green and Janmaat (2011) recognize the following challenges in which the idea of social cohesion is utilized. First is the standardization to deal with social cohesion; second is to distinguish an objective to erase a few worries about how targeted such an examination is and disregards the potential reactions to a profoundly durable society. Thirdly, social insularity and backwardness and last one financial sclerosis. Further, they added that utilizing the term social cohesion to distinguish a lot of attractive outcome, for example, trust, resistance, contribution on the network attributes that are not constantly connected and do not plainly distinguish a system for the investigation of social cohesion; characterizing social cohesion through its determinants and additionally through its outcomes that can be personal satisfaction and monetary development. Chan et al. (2006) distinguish initial primary ways to deal with social cohesion: firstly starting from human science and social research and one that has its underlying foundations in the political talk, secondly alluding to both the inspection that characterize social cohesion through a methods end approach and to more extensive research that does not attempt to set one meaning of social cohesion yet rather considers the estimation of pluralist definitions relevant to the extent of the program and strategy report that tends to it.

Social Cohesion and Rohingya Refugees Since Bangladesh is not a signatory to 1951 Geneva Convention, the future of Rohingya refugees seems uncertain in the country. This has also created a sense of fear among Rohingyas for further deportation or forced repatriation. Over time, the government of Bangladesh (GOB) seems extremely generous and supported and hosted thousands of Rohingyas but on the other hand it has avoided any form of assimilation of local

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Table 14.1  Historical Rohingya refugee influx and repatriation in Bangladesh (1977–2019) Year

Number of refugee migration

Remark

1977–78 1991–92 1993 2019

200,000 250,000 1000 910,908

Repatriation of 180,000 by 1978–79 Repatriating of 230,000 by 1993–97 Repatriation of 800 by 1998–99 As of May 31, 2019, no repatriation

Currently people in need are 1.3 million (Including 330,000 people in host community) Source: Situation Report Rohingya Refugee Crisis, Inter Sector Coordination Group, March 2019

integration of these refugees. Previously, the GOB has repatriated Rohingya refugees to Myanmar in various years (see Table 14.1). But unlike previous years, after the 2017 conflict in Myanmar, the repatriation of Rohingya refugees does not seem to happen at any time soon in the future. Bangladesh authorities do not give much access to life outside camp for these refugees who are staying in large numbers in the overcrowded camps in Cox’s Bazar. Since Bangladesh has gone through many waves of Rohingya refugees, its authority believes, any long-term integration or assimilation plan may hinder the repatriation or plan of sending them back to Myanmar (their ancestral home). In search of durable solutions, and to have long-term harmony among the refugees and host community, the INGOs and local NGOs have a major role to play. Many INGOs, NGOs, and civil society are working to pressurize the government to provide educational right to Rohingya refugees since this community is seen as illiterate and unwilling to obey rules.

INGO and NGO Strategies for Social Cohesion of Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh According to UNICEF, “1.2 million people need humanitarian assistance (UNICEF, 2019a). Several UN partner organisations and approximately 130 local, national and international voluntary organisations are working in Bangladesh and India and providing concrete support to the Government for life-sustaining assistance, refugees required much more than basic

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support for survival; they need their rights, security and dignity. Many want to return, but fear further violence in their own country, Myanmar.”3 With NGOs and state contribution, UNHCR has become the most prominent and compelling agency for the welfare of displaced people’s lives. UNHCR is serving not just as the guard to provide refugee cards and resettlement, yet additionally as the most prominent supplier of financial assistance, occupation, insurance and well-being support. UNHCR has given insurance related help to Rohingyas and different outcasts for a particular duration. UNHCR registers new  refugees and other needy under its command, and as of late has concentrated on enrolling haven searchers in migration confinement and looking for their discharge. A few thousand people were discharged from movement detainment in 2015. Notwithstanding, money-related and other asset limitations limit the degree and nature of help UNHCR can give; endeavors empower more noteworthy government, network and common society support for the exiles and the building limit inside displaced person networks is a progressing, long haul process. As it is already mentioned above that Rohingya are the most persecuted minority in the world. In both countries, Bangladesh and India, much has not been done on government level for the welfare of this most vulnerable community. Additionally, the various government departments only provided the guidelines for dealing with and response to this huge humanitarian crisis, although many developmental agencies, including the World Bank, joined hands for the welfare of this persecuted minority. The World Bank donated USD 480 million (The World Bank, 2018). The purpose of this grant was to ensure the health, education, and protection of refugees. Similarly, Asian Development Bank announced a grant of USD 200 million for stabilizing the situation in host countries. The European Union also came forward for the mapping of ongoing efforts (UNICEF, 2019b). UNICEF also prepares a list of cross cutting sector for providing the fast and adequate services to the persecuted refugees. Simultaneously projects were designed accordingly to provide the utmost benefits for the needy.

 Retrieved from https://www.helvetas.org/en/switzerland/how-you-can-help/followus/media/press-releases/61-NGOs-call-for-action-to-ensure-the-rights-security-and-dignity-of-Rohingya-refugees_pressrelease_5584 3

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The core cutting sectors were Protection, Health, Food Security & Nutrition, Education, Wash, and livelihood to name a few. Protection In protection major focus was on providing full security to avoid any gender-­based violence and violation of child rights. On the other hand, the main objective was to advocate the rights of refugee and to ensure that they are getting full services as it is mentioned in the mandate of refugee rights. Simultaneously organizations were trying to enhance the social cohesion among local people and refugees. Various protection partners scaled up their projects and tried to identify the issues. Education Education is considered as a fundamental right and it is a foremost need for youth. A chance to structure and execute joint youth and training projects can additionally reinforce ties between the two, and expand on the normal acknowledgment for instruction as a need. Training is an extremely touchy inquiry in this emergency with Rohingya displaced people who have been denied a legitimate access to instruction in Burma and the government of Bangladesh that is likewise hesitant to offer them an entrance to formal instruction in Bangladesh and to any sort of confirmation, particularly in Bangla language. A casual learning system in English, Burmese, and utilizing the oral Rohingya language, has in any case been as of late received by the education sector in concurrence with the government of Bangladesh. However, in the recent development, due to the efforts and pressure from many international organizations and the fear of lost generation, the Bangladesh government has granted the access to education to the Rohingya children. The current plan will follow the Myanmar curriculum for teaching children from 11 to 13 years of age (Ahmed, 2020). UNICEF’s humanitarian response in Bangladesh is aligned with the 2020 Joint Response Plan and the 2019 Humanitarian Response and Recovery Plan. In 2020, UNICEF prioritized several welfare programs, including education as one of the core aspects. Currently 293,750 children are accessing quality education.4 4

 https://www.unicef.org/appeals/bangladesh.html#17

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For inclusive education a learning competency framework was designed by UNICEF. For implementing this framework local teachers were recruited and trained on content, pedagogy, and assessments (UNICEF, 2019b). Conditions for Well-Being and Respect Fundamental rights, access to essential needs, equivalent status, and confidence are earnest needs, even while the quest for strong arrangement proceeds. For Rohingya any arrangement must empower them to “live unreservedly like the others” or have equivalent rights, status, and opportunities. At the center of their yearnings is to be completely perceived as a person with equivalent human rights. UNHCR focuses on activities to improve better relations among refugee and host countries in both India and Bangladesh. Further, they identified that challenging rejection and segregation must be a need. To react to this, a network-based methodology and steady commitment to social cohesion were basically developed. For example, displaying significant bunch relations and diverse exercises that advance comprehension among the host and displaced people. For eradicating any conflicts between the displaced people and local people, supply of basic necessities was ensured, for example, water must be overseen through better frameworks and procedures. UNICEF’s well-being duties were explicit and upheld the segment-­ wide responsibilities. From the beginning, counteractive action through inoculation was distinguished as a key need. Beginning with an enormous inoculation crusade, of October 2017, the UNICEF well-being methodology had refined three center territories: 1. An essential spotlight on preventive administrations, including giving vaccination and supporting the planned exertion on the intense watery looseness of the bowels; 2. Intercession in corrective administrations, setting up static well-being focuses to give fundamental thing wellbeing administrations; and 3. Proceeded to help to well-being frameworks considering reinforcing, referral, care, and specific infant care for supporting information assortment and investigation about accessibility of basic needs of all (UNICEF, 2018).

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WASH Program The WASH program system was principally determined by the goal to quickly convey administrations at scale in a race against several diseases that were grooming inside the Rohingya’s camps. In an assessment UNICEF found that there is a need for regular intervention for improving the health, hygiene, and sanitation in those particular areas. The assessment found that the way toward building up the WASH program and segment systems pushed ahead at key minutes. The driving force for UNICEF’s program system additionally originated from the division, given the size of different groups conveying WASH administrations, and the significance that UNICEF be viewed as playing a position of authority (UNICEF, 2018). The NGO Solidarities International, financed by the (European Union) EU Humanitarian Aid Department gave the water tank here and facilitated its utilization. It was a major improvement for displaced people. Save the Children Fund (SCF) an international organization also implementing its project related to health, child right, and education in Bangladesh for more than 50 years. With regards to Rohingya SCF put emphasis on the rights of children, significantly on those that were in an emergency situation and were at the risk of trafficking. Although Rohingya were fleeing to Bangladesh for a decade, but SCF started its initiatives, particularly for Rohingyas, in 2018. SCF started its program from Cox’s Bazar and distributed hygiene kits to refugees (Save the Children, 2018). Livelihood Living is the main choice as the Rohingyas have nowhere else to go. Be that as it may, if the Rohingyas’ needs are still not met for what reason is it so essential to concentrate likewise on neighborhood networks? “The circumstance we are managing here is that we had an exceptionally enormous inundation of populace of displaced people landing here, to the degree that now in certain zones we have twice the same number of outcasts as local people. Unavoidably this appearance of an enormous populace has made a great deal of weight on neighbourhood assets, water, kindling and, all the more for the most part, on the nearby economy. So because the state of affairs becomes extended it's rather more vital to create positive that humanitarian programs address each community therefore as to not create division and even probably resentment.” (European Commission, 2017)

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Rohingyas in majority were fleeing and settled down in the impecunious countries of the world Aid organizations have honed their ways to help refugees once they mark entries from the Burmese facet of the watercourse Naf. They are barely able to fulfill their very basic needs through some livelihood programs run by partners.5 The European commissioner said, “We have to be compelled to persuade the Union of Burma government that we tend to name human rights. It’s not a spiritual conflict; it’s not a spiritual issue. It’s simply human rights, elementary rights of a person, for any creature. I accept as true with UN executive Guterres that perhaps the sole description of this case is ethnic cleansing” (European Commission, 2017). Action Against Hunger’s country director in Bangladesh, Nipin Ganga Dharan, said, “we are working at absolute maximum capacity, and with the utmost urgency, to meet the immediate survival needs of refugees and avert a humanitarian catastrophe. We are deeply committed to helping restore the dignity of these traumatized people.”6 The task “money for work” places choices into training. It is a method for producing transient pay open doors for exiles and the host network. In one part of the refugee camp named Jadimura camp they used to cooperate on waste, pathways, and bamboo spans. Every laborer gets at least five dollars per day. United Purpose, an NGO, started programs for strengthening social cohesion between the local people and Rohingya refugees living in Bangladesh. In the beginning a six-month intervention project was started and further it was extended for two years. The whole project was funded by IOM (International Organization for Migration) and this project creates a network of passionate community mobilizers to reduce conflict through citizen engagement, specifically youth engagement, building community resilience through restoration of the environment and livelihood opportunities (United Purpose, 2018). Food and Nutrition The Aga Khan Foundation appointed 15 personnel for handling the foods for refuges. These people accompanied by some Rohingya volunteers were responsible to prepare approximately 50,000 meals per day. This prepared food was distributed among the camp and to the makeshift settlements 5 6

 https://www.unicef.org/appeals/bangladesh.html#17  https://www.actionagainsthunger.org/story/rohingya-refugee-crisis-bangladesh

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around it. “Refugees received khichri (a mixture of lentils and rice) as a hot meals every day. It’s considered as very nutritious and prepared with the financial support from  govt of Bangladesh” says Suchismita Roy of Aga Khan Foundation (AKF). Along with food 70,000 liters of water was also supplied to the refugee camps where refugees do not have any supply of water. They may not need to rush here and there with holding buckets in their hands (Roy, 2015). Health Medicines Sans Frontiers (MSF) are working in both countries for more than 30 years. MSF also joined hands in providing the health services to these persecuted minorities. A per the report 2000 medical personnel were appointed to ensure the health aspects of refugees. These personnel were providing treatment for dehydration, diarrhea diseases, and physical injuries. Along with physical health, mental health also played a crucial role in an individual’s life. Action Against Hunger, an international organization, has taken an initiative for providing hot, cooked meals and water for patients who have no food. Additionally, it is also arranging counseling sessions for those who had gone through severe mental trauma and stress.7 Mutual Support/Solidarity and Support After about two years, connections are presently being formed among hosts and refugees. Becoming more acquainted with one another has been key in framing nearer ties with common regard. A closer connection shows the way they communicate in the social and financial circles. Apart from the undeniable conventional market trades between the gatherings, casual communications happen too. Hosts and exiles share family, work, and care work, assets and products, loan and obtain things and give endowments to each other. Half of displaced people has in like manner revealed giving each other blessings such as nourishment, products, and different things. These models are manners by which they form interpersonal organizations to address their essential needs. Such practices boost their capacity to act naturally dependent as a system and a push to ensure the emergency together (Fonseca et al., 2019).

7

 https://www.msf.org/rohingya-refugee-crisis-depth

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Programs for Social Cohesion at a Glance Initiatives by UNITED PURPOSE, an NGO for Promoting Social Cohesion For promoting social cohesion between the host community and migrant community several community engagement programs were implemented, that is, youth engagement programs, training on resolving conflict issues, community-based quarrels management meetings, holding sports, arts, and cultural activities to build trust and cohesion, to name a few. Furthermore, several activities were designed for promoting social cohesion and resilience through disaster risk reduction and strengthened livelihoods, namely, engaging youths in various training programs for enhancing their skills of livelihood, training to women to support smallscale entrepreneurship, support for migrated communities in poultry, agriculture, and fish farming, special skills trainings to people with disabilities, and so on. (United Purpose, 2018). The Joint Response 2019 Under the initiative of the Government of Bangladesh, and gratitude to the endeavors for the Rohingyas, Bangladeshi host community and humanitarian partners and generous help from the worldwide, critical advances have been made against the Joint Response Programme (JRP) three vital targets: to convey insurance; provide life-saving assistance; and encourage social cohesion. Rohingya refugees have gotten security and protection inside the camps. Almost eight out of ten displaced people consider that their day to day in the camps have improved since 2018, reflecting on some key accomplishments in fortifying services, development, and increased supply of liquid petroleum gas (LPG) as an option in contrast to wood for cooking fuel, and the enhancement of basic framework, for example, new fecal sludge treatment facilities. At the end of June 2019, approximately 380,000 Rohingyas had additionally been verified through the government of Bangladesh and UNHCR joint enrolment program which is on target for culmination before the year is over. All Rohingyas above the age of 12 years received biometric recognizable proof cards, which will improve their access to help and security programs by various INGOs and NGOs. Huge endeavors have likewise been embraced for storm and tornado readiness and reaction (Relief web, 2019).

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Provision of Cash Voucher to Build Self-Reliance A program was started by World Food Programme in 2019 to provide cash vouchers to Rohingya refugees for coping with vulnerability and indebtedness. Money vouchers likewise can possibly have beneficial outcomes in the host community, including community goods dealers and local traders (World Food Programme, 2019).

Conclusion The Bangladesh government seems to plan a longer stay of Rohingya refugees without assimilating or integrating them with the local communities. The government sees the need to put rules and laws for social cohesion which further can ease the social tension among hosts and refugees. The recent removal of educational restriction could be seen as one of those positive instances. But it does not mean these refugees are going to enjoy full rights or can have more opportunities outside the camps. In this situation, the presence of various INGOs and NGOs will definitely support and reduce the burden of the Bangladesh government, which is fighting with economic challenges, corruption issue, and the population explosion. The various UN and other humanitarian agencies are fulfilling elementary and sometimes secondary needs of the refugees. But looking at the current situation of overcrowded camps and increased demands of the refugees, these organizations may not be sufficient for these refugees in the future. Like many other refugee crises, the Rohingya refugees also got much sympathy and support in the initial days of their arrival in Bangladesh but now there is an increase in the negative attitude toward these refugees in Bangladesh. This could also be seen in other parts of the world where Rohingya refugees migrated. More studies are needed to be conducted to understand the issue of social cohesion among refugee and host communities.

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UNICEF. (2018). Evaluation of UNICEF’s response to the Rohingya refugee crisis in Bangladesh (Vol. 2). Annexes. https://www.unicef.org/evaldatabase/files/ VolumeII-­Annexes_Evaluation_of_UNICEFs_Response_to_the_Rohingya_ Refugee_Crisis_in_Bangladesh_EO2018003.pdf UNICEF. (2019a). Joint response plan for Rohingya humanitarian crisis. https:// reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2019%20JRP%20for%20 Rohingya%20Humanitarian%20Crisis%20%28February%202019%29.compressed_0.pdf UNICEF. (2019b). Beyond survival Rohingya refugee children in Bangladesh want to learn. https://www.unicef.org.au/Upload/UNICEF/Media/ AboutUs/Publications/UNICEF-­Rohingya-­ChildAlert-­2019.pdf United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP). (2010). Evaluation of UNDP contribution to disaster prevention and recovery. https://www.oecd.org/ derec/undp/47871337.pdf United Purpose. (2018). Strengthening social cohesion among host communities and Rohingya refugees. Retrieved From: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/570d5f2220c647767aea3ec5/t/5da44eebae38d1 6041a3d284/1571049195528/BNG+social+cohesion+Rohingya.pdf Van Beuningen, J., & Schmeets, H. (2013). Developing a social capital index for the Netherlands. Social Indicators Research, 113(3), 859–886. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/24719540 World Bank. (2012). World Development Report 2013: Jobs. Washington, DC. World Bank. Available at https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/ handle/10986/11843 World Bank. (2018, June 28). World Bank announces support for Bangladesh to help Rohingya. Retrieved from The World Bank: https://www.worldbank. org/en/news/press-­release/2018/06/28/world-­bank-­announces-­support-­for­bangladesh-­to-­help-­rohingya World Food Programme. (2019). Refugee influx emergency vulnerability assessment – REVA 2018. Retrieved from: https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/ WFP-­0000106095/download/?iframe

CHAPTER 15

Identity and Humanitarian-Based Approach: Resolution and Resolving the Rohingya Refugee Crisis Sanjida Parveen and Mehebub Sahana

Introduction We seem to live in an era of “unprecedented mass displacement,” (Betts et  al., 2013) with several crises surfacing every single day (Blocher & Gulati, 2016; Legomsky, 1999). The number of displaced Rohingyas rose to 70.8 million in 2018, (UNHCR, 2019). International law categorizes those people escaping torture and persecution in their native places and seeking shelter in other countries as refugees (Zimmermann et al., 2011). Having no destination and being the “world’s least wanted” (Dummett, 2010) they wander in search of basic necessities of life either to be rejected or persecuted and seldom accepted by other countries. The Muslim community, namely Rohingya, primarily a resident of the Rakhine State

S. Parveen Department of English , Aligarh Muslim university, Aligarh, India M. Sahana (*) School of Environment, Education and Development, The University of Manchester, Manchester, UK © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 K. Bülbül et al. (eds.), Rohingya Refugee Crisis in Myanmar, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6464-9_15

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(formerly called Arakan) of Myanmar, has been considered to be one of the most persecuted minorities of the world. In spite of being quite a large population they are deprived of their right as citizens of Myanmar (Perlez, 2014) Former president of Myanmar has insisted upon deporting the illegal residents of Bangladesh (Hodal, 2012). The Buddhists, as well as the majority of people living in Rakhine, speak Burmese, which is their mother tongue except for the Rohingya Muslims whose mother tongue is Bengali (Lixing & Rahman, 2010; Rahman, 2010). Therefore, they are not only an ethnic and religious minority but also a linguistic minority of both the Rakhine State and Myanmar. Much before the arrival of Mughals in India between the eighth and ninth centuries, Islam proliferated along the coast of river Meghna to the Rakhine State (Huq & Karim, 1935). The Rohingyas are supposedly influenced by Arab, Turk, Moorish, Persian, Moghul, Pathan, and Bengali soldiers and migrants (Ahmed, 2009). Historically they flourished and enriched themselves under the Mughal rule. Fearing the consequences of 1784 annexation of Arakan within the Buddhist kingdom of Burma from the Muslim kingdoms, several Rohingyas fled to Cox’s Bazar of Bangladesh. 1800 onward, Burma was an Indian province colonized by the British. The British lived in Burma until World War II when they were forced to retreat by the Japanese invasion, also compelling the Rohingyas to migrate to East Bengal (present Bangladesh) (Pittaway, 2008). The period between 1800 and the World War II was quintessential in the formulation of the Rohingya Muslim identity, which was dismantled completely by the 1948 liberation of Burma. Following these several political incidents and shifts of power escalated the plight of the Rohingyas. The 1962 military insurgency in Burma worsened the condition of Rohingyas, and the 1982 Burmese Citizenship Act took away their citizenship rights, making them homeless and erasing their origin of being. The military coup was designed to maintain the Burmese national solidarity by resisting minority splitting (Alam, 2019; Haji Ahmad & Crouch, 1985; Tan, 2009). Besides being a global geopolitical strife, the Rohingya crisis is a quest for humanity and identity. In the absence of any kind of government assistance, they undertook the hurdle of dispersion and migration (forced in this case) to different countries. Bangladesh being the nearest to the Rakhine State, registered the largest possible exodus in the postcolonial period in several waves, the first being

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in 1978 (Banglapedia, 2006) and still continuing to date. Although away from the direct abuses of Burmese military they are vulnerable and prone to annihilation. Being denied of their basic rights as a human being their only hope is constant international intervention from UN and other NGOs. There have been several attempts at recuperating the refugees post the UN mediation on Bangladesh and Myanmar, but the conflict remains unresolved with several refugees “awaiting repatriation” (Moni, 2009). The origin of the conflict owes its source from Myanmar’s own sense of insecurity over the international border it shares with Bangladesh. The government of Myanmar calls it the “most vulnerable frontier” as it has been an area of constant influx (Steinberg, 2013). This has sparked the wrath of Myanmar government as it sees the Rohingyas as illegal Bengali-­ speaking immigrants of Bangladesh and therefore owe no claim to their land (Steinberg, 2013) and therefore punishing them by disregarding them as Myanmar citizens. Although there have been initiatives to restore their citizenship due to U.S intervention, the processes have been resisted by the xenophobic and Islamophobic attitudes of the Buddhist nationals (Kyaw, 2016). The Rohingyas themselves refuse participation owing to the program’s categorizing them as Bengalis (Lim, 2015). To add to their further misery, the government of Bangladesh also refused to recognize them and considers their settlement at Cox’s Bazar as a hindrance in the path of flourishing the tourist industry development and national progress (Pittaway, 2008). Forced migration in the current times is a major global issue that has immense sociopolitical significance. The Rohingya crisis owing to their forced migration is a result of their marginalization, denial, and deprivation as human beings. The present work highlights the root cause of the crisis focusing on the historical transformation commencing from the colonial periods charting a trajectory of demographic changes of the Rohingya community. Rohingya crisis is one of the major refugee crises of the world as it deals with the world’s largest forced exodus of a community. However so far, no such research has been dedicated to the formulation and execution of recommendations of international bodies. Scanty attention has been given to the framing of an overall integrated resolution thereby creating a void. The chapter aims to make up for this void by proposing some long-term and short-term resolution as a means to mitigate the conflict through a humanitarian-based approach.

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The Historical Background and Recent Political Transformation of the Rohingya Crisis In the preceding century, the Rohingyas experienced multiple political shifts such as a colonial rule, the Japanese occupation, independence, military insurgency, flawed parliamentary democracy, and absolute dictatorship. They had to encounter some uprisings, some examples being the 1988 popular one (Gravers, 2014). So, in a way, Rohingya as a land has always been politically unstable owing to its shift in the hands of power. The historical events have led to the present-day crisis effacing them, eventually resulting in the constant persecution of the Rohingya Muslims (Lintner, 1990; Ullah, 2011). The British Colonial Period (1824–1948) The British exerted complete political dominance during the colonial rule, which may be seen as the root cause for nationalist movement across different communities (Edney, 2009). The Rohingya crises emerged as a consequence of the vilification of the Rohingya Muslims during the colonial rule (Prasse-Freeman, 2017). The Second World War changed the situation all the more. It aggravated the existing tensions between the Burmese and some of the minorities (Kachin and Kachen). Of all the other minorities, the Rohingyas, who allied with the forces against the Japanese, were worst hit owing to their defeat. These culminated in the following consequences. It brought an end to the colonial era, followed by Burmese nationalism, and the subsequent identification of Rohingyas as Others. (Miller & Commager, 2001). In addition to the World War II, the ensuing Japanese invasion had ginormous impacts upon Burmese society. The present day Rohingya crisis owes several factors to the colonial period. (Cheesman, 2017). The British for administrative ease mapped Burma in such a manner that it encouraged ethnic segregation (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). The British policies encouraged the Bengali residents of the adjacent areas to migrate into the then fertile valleys of Arakan to work as farm laborers (Chan, 2005). This policy did not accord any status to those laborers. Some critics are of the view that in the census conducted during the British rule, the Muslim groups were listed as Indian race or assimilated Burmese race. Rather the systems classifying indigenous/national and aliens’ populations on the basis of race or nationalism ensured the subsequent

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racialization of citizenship. The Rakhine was indignant toward alien immigration for some reason. The Burmese saw the Rohingyas as a propagator of anti-Burmese sentiment and, therefore, an imminent threat to their nationalism (Carey, 1994). This led to the unification of Burmese against the Rohingyas and the consequential intercommunal violence in 1938 and 1944. The colonial experience left Myanmar in a pool of political turbulences and irresolvable debates (Lieberman, 1978). The British rule can, therefore, be seen as the point of initiation of discord, which brewed deep-­ rooted apathy among the Burmese majority for the Rohingya Muslims and having prolonged manifestations of hatred and violence up to the present. The Socialist Republic (1962–1988) and The Union of Myanmar (1988–2005) The military coup on March 2, 1962 marked the beginning of complexities in Myanmar (Lieberman, 1987; Steinberg, 2019). This coup seemed to ensure that minority secession would not pull apart the unity of Burma (bin Haji Ahmad & Crouch, 1985; Tan, 2009). The policies undertaken by the military government with regard to the Rohingya Muslims had deleterious effects on them. Thus, the military transformed a liberal democratic regime into an authoritarian system (Moscotti, 1977). Therefore, the Socialist Republic deplored the status of the Rohingya rendering them stateless by confiscating their former citizenship rights completely. The years following 1988 saw pro-democracy demonstrations in Myanmar, and there were several instances of the forced exodus of the Rohingya Muslims seeking shelter in neighboring country Bangladesh (Cheung, 2012). In spite of initial reception, they were made vulnerable by limiting the time period of refuge. When Bangladesh reported the matter to the Security Council, The State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) agreed to take them back (Lewa, 2001) on the basis of a mutual statement signed with Bangladesh. In 2008 a constitution providing recognition for certain ethnic groups of Myanmar was published by the government. But it did not clearly account for the status of the Rohingya Muslims. Political Reformation in Myanmar (2011–2015) The year 2012 saw drastic displacement of people from Southeast Myanmar to the Rakhine State owing to the communal violence (TBBC, 2012)

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between Rohingyas and the Buddhists. The process of displacement claimed lives of several Rohingyas (Robinson, 2016). As a result, this triggered a series of hateful reactions toward Muslims, both Rohingyas and non-Rohingyas, across the country led by Buddhists. The social media worsened the situation by ventilating Islamophobic content resulting in rabid anti-Muslim sentiment across the nation. Myanmar has been through numerous political upheavals in the modern era from the military regime to single-party rule. The Republic of the Union of Myanmar constituted in 2008 paved way for foundation of several government institutions (Lidauer, 2014). In 2010 the military rule got substituted by civilian democracy with the help of election process. This was succeeded by major political reforms in the succeeding years (2011–2015). This affected the Rohingyas intensifying ethnic tensions surrounding them and their eventual exclusion from the state institutions. Although citizens of Myanmar, the Rohingyas were not given franchise rights and were thus politically marginalized as ethnic minority. The Rohingyas were excluded from the list of indigenous ethnic races though they could apply for citizenship provided they could prove their residence for two generations in Rakhine State (Jones, 1948) (see Fig. 15.1). The Civilian Rule (2015–2020) In 2015 the then government brought changes in the laws related to religion and race implicitly keeping the Rohingyas in mind. Hereafter, the laws were made more stringent making it impossible for them to escape the human rights violations (Miles, 2015). An official report accounted for burgeoning “ghettoization, sporadic massacres, and restrictions on movement” of Rohingya Muslims. The crises perpetuated from 2016 to 2017 when the Myanmar government retaliated the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) attacks with illegal “ethnic cleansing” by means of arson, extra judicial killings and gang rapes (Lone, 2017; Alam, 2019). This furthered more exodus to Bangladesh apprehending the ‘seige mentality’ of the Rakhine. The Recent Decade (2021–Present) On February 1, 2021, another coup dislodged the civilian rule imposing another military rule. After a landslide victory in the previous election this incident is seen as a ‘symbol of failed democracy’ (Gunia, 2021). However,

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Fig. 15.1  Location of Rakhine State in the apex of Bay of Bengal and its interlinking position between Myanmar and Bangladesh. (Map prepared by the authors)

it unleashes yet another truth that democracy was only a façade, the real lions being the military. This might not be taken as an emancipatory possibility for the Rohingyas. Rather it has made Rohingyas more vulnerable along with other persecuted ethnic minorities. The fate of the Rohingyas rests mostly on the change in the military structure.

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Representation of Rohingya Muslim and Their Identity Crisis The Rakhine State is situated on the west coast of Bay of Bengal. Rakhine, formerly known as Arakan, was ruled by many kingdoms for centuries. At present, it is a state within Myanmar with its capital in Sittwe (formerly Akyab). This state is presently made up of five districts—namely, Sittwe, Mrauk-U, Maungdaw, Kyaukphyu, and Thandwe—and two dominant ethnic groups—the Rohingya Muslims and the Rakhine people (Sahana et al., 2019). In 2007 the population of the Rakhine State was around 3.7 million. According to the Government of Myanmar  (2011) reports, around 1 million Rohingya people inhabit the Rakhine State. The Myanmar census report (2015) estimated the Arakan population to be around 2 million in 1983 and around 3.1 million in 2014. It, however, did not include 1.09 million non-enumerated population and showed only 2.09 million population for 2014. The deliberate exclusion of the Muslim population by the government was motivated to render the Rohingya Muslims stateless (Sahana et al., 2019). Compared to the other states of Myanmar, the Rakhine State itself comprises 35.6% of the Muslim population making it the largest Muslim populated state in Myanmar. Several stateless Rohingya Muslims dispersed to different countries mostly Southeast Asian countries in fear of their lives. Around 10,000 migrated to UAE, 40,000 migrated to India, 5000 to Thailand, and 1000 to Indonesia. The largest exodus population was found in Muslim majority countries like Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Bangladesh with 150,000, 200,000, 350,000, and 863,000 migrations, respectively (UNHCR, 2016; IOM, 2017) (see Fig. 15.2). According to the UNCHR data in between the years 1991–2016, 4.9 million Rohingya population has been given the status of refugee. The year 1991 recorded a steep rise in the migration of Rohingyas which dropped down starkly in the consecutive years but rose again in 2006 due to the political shift of powers and amendments in the citizenship laws (see Fig. 15.3). However, the years 2016–17 recorded the highest number of migrations owing to the inhuman treatment of the ARSA. Bangladesh encountered the highest number of migrations of the Rohingya Muslims owing to the shortest roadway from the Rakhine State. Among the 11 identified refugee camps in Bangladesh 2 are UNCHR registered refugee camps while the remaining 9 are unregistered. The Kutupulang is reported to be the largest refugee camp of the Rohingya

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Fig. 15.2  Number of Rohingya refugees from Rakhine to neighboring countries for last two decades. (Adopted from Sahana et al., 2019)

Number of Refugees

350000 300000 250000 200000 150000 100000 50000 0 1991

1996

2001

2006

2011

2016

Year

Fig. 15.3  Number of UNCHR refugees during 1991 to 2017 from Myanmar to the different countries in the world. (Data Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNCHR] for 1991–2016 and Inter Sector Coordination Group [ISCG] for 2017)

Muslims with a population of 500,000 approximately. Other important refugee camps Hakimpara, Jamtoli, and Maynagori are recorded to have around 100,000 refugees. The Nayapara RC and Nayapara extension have around 70,000 refugees (see Fig. 15.4). All these have compelled one to

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Fig. 15.4  Number of  registered and other Rohingya Refugee camps in Bangladesh and total number of refugees as the UNHCR, ISCG report up to September 2018. (Map prepared by the authors)

think of a number of issues concerning the Rohingyas. The refugee camps are concentrated in nature and distributed within a very short area. They have hardly any access to basic human facilities such as health and hygiene. There is limited provision for education. They also have no proper means

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of livelihood and live in unhealthy ghettos without clear objectives for a better future. Hereby arises the need to apply the humanitarian approach to account for their problems and conditions.

Stereotypical Representation of Muslims: Where the Rohingyas Stand? Rohingya Muslims are facing the worst possible instance of existential crisis in the contemporary time. Besides being tortured and humiliated the Rohingyas are denied their rights as human beings. Throughout the world there are several events vilifying and terrorizing the Muslim communities. Those living as minorities in non-Muslim communities are exposed to imminent threats. The threats include systematic and categoric ‘othering’ of Muslims, demonizing and ostracizing them. In case of the Rohingyas the situation seems even more bleak owing to their loss of citizenship and practically being in no-man’s-land. Consistently rejected and facing denial from all ends their right to life seems a utopia. The apathy toward them as a community stems from the deep-rooted intolerance toward the Muslim community that dominates the world view. No matter how innocuous they be they are viewed as potential threats by the Burmese nationals endangering culture and humanity. Their very presence jeopardizes the national security and hence Myanmar justifies all military actions as preemptive move to check them. In such circumstances it is indispensable to look at the crisis critically and offer a solution without being partisan.

Humanitarian-Based Approach and Reclaiming the Identity Crisis The present-day crises have urged international intervention and several humanitarian resolutions in order to safeguard the Rohingya Muslims from perishing and sustain them in the best possible way. The humanitarian approach adopted to mitigate the Rohingya crises involved NGOs and UN. Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan headed a commission that aimed to resolve the Rohingya conflict by ensuring a safe zone for them at first. It also pressed Myanmar to refrain from all kinds of military violence. UN Secretary Council appreciated the decision of Myanmar government to establish “the Union Enterprise Mechanism for Humanitarian Assistance, Resettlement, and Development in Rakhine.” The body

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established aimed at developing the Rakhine State by permitting participation of local and international organizations. It is intended that the resolutions taken by the Security Council would reach the target receiver. The initial strategy should comprise of fact-finding missions to make an overall assessment of the needs and drawbacks of the Rohingya migrants.

UN Resolution and Resolving the Rohingya Crisis UN General Assembly, along with other international bodies, have ample scope to intervene in order to bring an end to the violence toward the Rohingya by resettling the scattered refugees and installing peacekeepers. The General Assembly can make an appeal to the secretary-general to assign a special envoy. The UN General Assembly has condemned abusive actions such as rape, torture, arson, arbitrary arrests, and death in detention as an infringement of human rights and passed a resolution with a majority to safeguard the Rohingya Muslims and all other minorities from such brutalities. Although the resolution passed cannot be enforced legally upon any nation yet, it can be considered to be a major world reflection. However, it did not go well with U Hau Do Suan, Myanmar’s ambassador to the United Nations. He condemned the “double standards” of the resolution, and questioned its selective and discriminatory approach. He contended that the resolution failed to account for the complex situation and was not holistic in approach. However, the UN resolution brought to focus the constant infiltration of Rohingya Muslims to Bangladesh, which recorded 7.4 lakhs migration only in the year 2017. The resolution demanded the urgent stopping of all kinds of inhuman military actions toward the Rohingya Muslims besides ensuring punishment for violating human rights. Although the resolution pressurized the government to facilitate safe and dignified repatriation of all refugees including the Rohingya Muslims, they declined to retreat to their former places twice. Although the 2017 exodus of Rohingya Muslims to Bangladesh was appalling it did happen for the first time. The former forced migrations though small were noteworthy. Besides the Rohingyas have traveled to Bangladesh on other pretexts such as getting medical check-ups or education and stayed back forever as well. With the signing of MOU between UNCHR and Bangladesh, there were attempts at repatriation of around 2.3 lakh Rohingyas in Myanmar. However, the process was enormously flawed affecting the repatriates immensely (United Nations Human Rights Council (2018). Nonetheless it garnered prompt media attention toward

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the Rohingya crises and swift actions from the UN making it different from all previous attempts at repatriation.

Country Positions on the Rohingya Crisis Countries such as China and Russia have spoken in favor of the government of Myanmar and are reluctant to consider the killings as genocide. Rather they prioritize the sovereignty of the nation and recommend dialogic diplomacy over international intervention. It is interesting to note that the similarity in their attitude might be an impact of their communist ideology. Rather they insist on the international communities’ support for the actions of the Myanmar government, which can be seen as being partial to Myanmar and being insensitive to the world’s greatest refugee crisis in the present times (United Nations Security Council, 2018). On the other hand, countries such as the United States approves of humanitarian resolution necessitating immediate actions against the perpetrators. The stand taken by the United States seems ambiguous since on one hand it unequivocally slams the perpetuation of violence against the Rohingyas while it does not clearly criticize the actions of the government. Therefore, her take on justice and the means to achieve it is baffling (United Nations Security Council, 2018). The United Kingdom along with countries such as Sweden and France however staunchly recommended humanitarian access for addressing the Rohingya crisis. UK vouches for full humanitarian access guaranteeing safe retreat of the Rohingya refugees. In addition to this, France proposed the punishment for the perpetrators to be conducted by the International Criminal Court (ICC). Rather to make the resolution unbiased, France proposed interventions from independent international institutions aiming to achieve justice and reconciliation. Last but not the least, she advises the recommendations to be enforcing enough, so much so that the Rohingyas are granted citizenship of Myanmar (Imseis, 2019). Japan’s priorities lie with enactment of urgent humanitarian intervention assuring the safe return of the Rohingyas. However, she clearly wants the Security Council to refrain from use of provocative vocabulary and insists upon diplomatic dialogue. Countries such as Egypt has recommended for a strong resolution urging the government of Myanmar to take initiative toward the well-being of the Rohingya minorities. Their right to return must be restored and granted citizenship of Myanmar (United Nations Security Council, 2018). Whereas, Ethiopia favors the

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middle path which can be achieved through negotiations. She recommends the cessation of military actions preferring diplomacy over interventions. Bolivia also advocates similar measures to resolve the crisis effacing the Rohingya Muslims. She urges to investigate all issues of human rights infringement while respecting the dignity of a sovereign nation (United Nations Security Council, 2018).

Possible Options to Solve the Rohingya Crisis Looking at the Rohingya crisis it is evident that there may be several probable solutions to address it. Safe and sustainable repatriation may be suitable and preferable solution for the Rohingya crisis for the distant future. UN can bring together all the different regional institutions such as ASEAN, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and political developers in Myanmar to a single table for a suitable discussion for providing a justifiable situation under humanitarian situation (Miller & Straehle, 2019). Many Rohingya refugees in different countries are still willing to return home while many are unwilling to return. Many Rohingya refugees agree to return to Myanmar with some specific commitment and demands such as socioeconomical and physical protection and human rights, complete Myanmar citizenship with civil status (Parashar & Alam, 2019), and also return with safety and dignity to their village and regions (Schnabel & Huang, 2019). To fulfill all those demands, only humanitarian approach is not sufficient. Long-Term Solutions To solve this problem, there is a dire need for adequate political commitment from the Myanmar government. The present study has identified a few possible options which can be of immense help to UN and other international authorities to redress the grievances of the Rohingyas and also relieve Bangladesh of the burden: 1. The UN should improve access to formal education for the Rohingya refugees scattered in different countries, which can help them to cope with this situation and contribute to the workforce. There should be provision for work rights and other services provided by the government within the refugee status (Landry & Huang, 2019).

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2. Another important probable solution is to promote the third country resettlement and regional responsibility sharing. Resettlement entails huge expenses but it is a benefitable approach and UN and UNHCR should promote these resettlement strategies. It has been observed that several Rohingyas have benefited out of their resettlement from Malaysia to U.S, Canada, New Zealand, and Japan in the preceding decade. (Ferrie, 2018; Waters, 2019). 3. There should be an encouragement for self-participation of the Rohingyas for the formulation of resolution and diplomatic missions. In the MoU renewal process between UNHCR and the Myanmar Government, “the UN agencies have not even consulted the Rohingyas, the survivors of genocide” (The Daily Star, 2019). It is important to engage the Rohingya, especially women, for the policymaking prospect (Quinley, 2019). 4. The United Nations, UNHCR, and other international communities cannot avoid and overlook the violation of human rights, genocide of the Rohingya, loss of their property, life, and other essentials. UN should not minimize the crime against the humanity endured by the Rohingya in favor of financial or other support by Myanmar’s armed forces and other foreign companies. The negligence of the Myanmar government is unquestionable; they should be made culpable under international law (United Nations, 2019). 5. Immediate initiatives must be taken for reparations and restitution for the losses of Rohingya. Any form of violence, be it gendered violence or those inflicted upon ethnic groups, religious minorities, or sexual minorities, by agents of governments must also be regarded as punishable crime. 6. The Rohingya Muslims have been a victim of the worst form of ‘crime against humanity’. Evidences based on the brutalities of Myanmar soldiers such as burning houses and raping women collected by the Refugee International (RI) point toward an instance of ethnic cleansing. Moreover, crimes should by no means be pushed under the carpet and should be brought to light to facilitate punishment of perpetrators. 7. Even after massive exodus, approximately several thousand Rohingya Muslims are still residing in Myanmar with limited freedom and restricted movement. Besides restoring the displaced Rohingyas,

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there should also be attempts at barring any kind of persecution of the remaining ones. Several international organizations have also been unable to access the northern part of Rakhine State to carry out the necessary fact-finding missions. UN must also consistently urge for humanitarian access to put an end to any kind of ‘crime against humanity’ toward any minority community. 8. Rohingya refugees residing in Bangladesh are vulnerable and there is utmost need to safeguard them from perils of annihilation. Although safe from direct military abuses, they are prone to several risks such as natural hazards. Despite providing basic amenities the Bangladesh government refuses to confer them the refugee status and rather insists on their movement to the Bhashan Char. 9. Although the government of Myanmar has signed an MOU with UN expressing its inclination to retrieve and repatriate the Rohingyas safely, they have not spelled out anything in specific with regards to granting them citizenship. This problematizes the MOU in its failure to account for the root cause of the crisis and therefore perpetuates the conflict identity crises among the Rohingya Muslims. 10. By far, no steps have been taken to hold those accountable for the crimes committed against the Rohingyas. This is integral for resolving the Rohingya crises. Accountability would foster a sense of justice in the minds of the Rohingya Muslims and will also act as a deterrent to future crimes in Myanmar.

Short-Term Solutions These probable solutions may intend to achieve long-term effects; however, the short-term resolutions should not be completely overlooked. The greater attention is given toward the safe repatriation of the Rohingyas which is time-consuming and a difficult solution. Besides attention must also be given to some short-term resolutions which also have a humanitarian approach to them. 1. They must be given access to digital platform whereby they can update their status by themselves without being dependent on others. They

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must be made competent enough to create their own portals to share their own narratives and experiences. 2. There must be campaigns and workshops to make themselves aware of their human rights and other basic amenities such as health and education. Besides, the host countries must also provide temporary facilities for education and health of the Rohingya refugees so as so not to deprive them of their human rights. 3. There must be some online courses to be conducted by international organizations such as UNHCR that would encourage voluntary participants from different countries for enhancing the living standards of the Rohingyas. 4. There must be generation of employment so as to encourage the Rohingyas to make their own living. For this there must be planning and initiation of skill-development programs for them. 5. Scattered in different countries and deprived of their citizenship rights they should be able to register themselves on an international virtual portal through which they can remain connected with their estranged families.

Conclusion The Rohingya crisis is not a product of recent times but has its roots in a long history. Therefore, the conflict is perpetuating and coming to a solution is not an easy task and is quite time-consuming. There is no denial that the military plays an integral role in the Myanmar government and the recent coup (February 2021) testifies the fact. The present chapter takes into consideration the role and the strategy of different government authorities along with the resolution of United Nations, civil society, and human rights communities. Many believe that the humanitarian approach is the ultimate solution to refugees’ crisis but according to Sadako Ogata, “There are no humanitarian solutions to humanitarian crises. Only political solutions.” So, the ultimate solution of Rohingya crisis can be possible by integrating the human rights-based solutions along with the political solutions. The powerful nations having international repute can force Myanmar to conduct the potential return process of the Rohingya refugees in a feasible and sustainable way. We have no idea what would be the probable future for Rohingya refugees if they remain stateless. On humanitarian grounds, the international communities have expressed solidarity

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for the Rohingya and Bangladesh continuously. Regional powers like China can exercise leadership instead of extending limited support. In this case Bangladesh plays a vital role by engaging with international organizations and NGOs. The present move is directed at extending continued support to the Rohingyas and Bangladesh with humanitarian assistance besides encouraging diplomatic dialogue. The present crisis with its humanitarian dimension can be coped with the aid of strategic planning, sound leadership, creative diplomacy, and advocacy. In addition to this the international goodwill and all machineries are working in favor of the Rohingya crisis. Consolidating and facilitating international political goodwill accompanied by continuous pressure from international bodies and Rohingyas and undeterred commitment of UN will lead to favorable humane solutions. In order to make the resolution a success, there is a need to address the source and cause of the conflict. The incorporation of the Rohingyas within Myanmar must ensure the granting of basic citizenship rights to them by the government of Myanmar. The unrestrained liberty enjoyed by the military of Myanmar must also be booked for offenses committed against Rohingyas. Establishing a new government in a democratic manner must ensure holistic participation of Rohingyas as citizens of Myanmar. If this cannot be done by national authorities of Myanmar the international authorities must intervene. Bangladesh government must also make the UN agencies accessible to the refugees residing in Bangladesh in order to facilitate means to recuperate them with the assistance of international donors. Exactly which solution would be most appropriate for resolving the Rohingya crisis remains unknown. Whatever be it, the motive must be to ensure that they are accorded their deserving rights as human beings. Dialogue and discussions became crucial to understand their predicaments. It becomes essential to empathize with them and make attempts to apply the therapeutic measure to relieve them of the trauma. What happened cannot be undone but those guilty of the crime against humanity must be tried so as to ensure that justice still prevails. The resolution must be an exemplary one to set a reminder so that no one can get away by committing the world’s most heinous crimes or any other inhumanity against any human being or community.

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Gunia A. (2021). Rohingya activists are hoping that the coup in Myanmar will be a turning point for their struggle, Time https://time.com/5936604/ myanmar-­coup-­rohingya/ bin Haji Ahmad, Z., & Crouch, H. A. (1985). Military-civilian relations in South-­ East Asia. Oxford University Press. Hodal, K. (2012). Trapped inside Burma’s refugee camps, the Rohingya people call for recognition. The Guardian, 20. Huq, M.  E., & Karim, A. (1935). Bengali literature in the court of Arakan, 1600-1700AD. IOM. (2017). The International Organization for Migration (IOM): Gaining power in the forced migration regime. (2017). (Accessed 28 October 2018). Imseis, A. (2019, January 18). United Nations general assembly resolution A/ RES/72/240. The Palestine Yearbook of International Law Online, 20(1), 410–415. Jones, J. M. (1948). British nationality act, 1948. British Year Book of International Law, 25, 158. Kyaw, N.  N. (2016). Islamophobia in Buddhist Myanmar: The 969 movement and anti-Muslim violence. In Islam and the state in Myanmar: Muslim-Buddhist relations and the politics of belonging (pp. 183–210). Landry, R., & Huang, C. (2019). Moving beyond the emergency: A whole of society approach to the refugee response in Bangladesh, Centre for Global Development/ International Rescue Committee Report available at: http://www.worldbank. org/en/news/loans-­credits/2019/03/07/bangladesh-­emergency-­multi­sector-­rohingya-­crisis-­response-­project Legomsky, S. H. (1999). An asylum seeker’s bill of rights in a non-utopian world. Georgetown Immigration Law Journal, 14, 619. Lewa, C. (2001). The Rohingya: Forced migration and statelessness. Paper submitted to the Centre of Refugee Studies, Jadavpur University, Calcutta. Lidauer, M. (2014). Towards a new state in Myanmar? In M. Gravers & F. Ytzen (Eds.), Burma/Myanmar – Where now? (pp. 72–85). NIAS Press. Lieberman, V.  B. (1978). Ethnic politics in eighteenth-century Burma. Modern Asian Studies, 12(3), 455–482. Lieberman, V. B. (1987). Reinterpreting Burmese history. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 29(1), 162–194. Lim, A. C. H. (2015). The 2015 refugee boat crisis in Southeast Asia: Humanitarian and security implications–analysis. Eurasia Review, 18, 1–12. Lintner, B. (1990). Outrage: Burma’s struggle for democracy (p. 120). White Lotus. Lixing, D., & Rahman, U. (2010). The Rohingya refugees: A security dilemma for Bangladesh [J]. South Asian Studies, 4, 34–56. Lone, W. (2017). “Myanmar rejects allegations of human rights abuses against Rohingya”. Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-­myanmar-­rohingya/ myanmar-­r ejectsallegations-­o f-­h uman-­r ights-­a buses-­a gainst-­r ohingyaidUSKBN1AM0DU

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Miles, T. (2015, May, 8). Bay of Bengal people-smuggling doubles in 2015: UNHCR. Reuters. Miller, D.  L., & Commager, H.  S. (2001). The story of world war II (p.  704). Simon & Schuster. Miller, D., & Straehle, C. (Eds.). (2019). The political philosophy of refuge. Cambridge University Press. Moni, D. 2009. “A statement of Bangladesh Foreign Minister”. Retrieved from http://www.mofa.gov.bd/index.php?option=com_wrapper&Itemid=552 [Google Scholar]. Moscotti, A. D. (1977). Burma’s constitution and elections of 1974: A source book (Vol. 5). Institute of Southeast Asian. Parashar, A., & Alam, J. (2019). The national laws of Myanmar: Making of statelessness for the Rohingya. International Migration, 57(1), 94–108. Perlez, J. (2014). Rise in bigotry fuels massacre inside Myanmar. New York Times, A1. Pittaway, E. (2008). The Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh: A failure of the international protection regime. (pp. 83–106) In Protracted Displacement in Asia No Place to Call HomeEdited By Howard Adelman, ISBN 9781315602752, Published by Routledge. Prasse-Freeman, E. (2017). The Rohingya crisis. Anthropology Today, 33(6), 1–2. Quinley, J. (2019). The Rohingya diaspora is crucial to achieving justice in Myanmar op-ed in TIME magazine by John Quinley III, Human Rights Specialist at Fortify Rights, available at: https://time.com/5529321/ rohingya-­myanmar-­genocide-­fortify-­rights-­diaspora/ Rahman, U. (2010). The Rohingya refugee: A security dilemma for Bangladesh. Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies, 8(2), 233–239. Robinson, G. (2016). Rakhine violence concerns Myanmar leader, 23 October 2016, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/52c04896-­20b4-­11e2-­9f2e-­00144feab dc0.html#axzz4L2kKVmgd Sahana, M., Jahangir, S., & Anisujjaman, M. D. (2019). Forced migration and the expatriation of the Rohingya: A demographic assessment of their historical exclusions and statelessness. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 39(1), 44–60. Schnabel, L., & Huang, C. (2019) Removing barriers and closing gaps: Improving sexual and reproductive health and rights for Rohingya refugees and host communities link https://www.cgdev.org/publication/removing-­barriers-­and-­ closing-­gaps-­improving-­sexual-­and-­reproductive-­health-­and-­rights Steinberg, D. (2013). Burma/Myanmar: What everyone needs to know®. Oxford University Press. Steinberg, D. I. (2019). Burma’s road toward development: Growth and ideology under military rule. Routledge. Tan, A. T. (Ed.). (2009). A handbook of terrorism and insurgency in Southeast Asia. Edward Elgar Publishing.

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CHAPTER 16

Looking at the Past, Moving to the Future: Stories from the Spectacle of Rohingyas Kudret Bülbül, Md. Nazmul Islam, and Md. Sajid Khan

Introduction Over the decades the world has witnessed many genocides, pogroms, and ethnic conflicts. Many assume the ongoing infamous Rohingya crisis of Myanmar is one of those genocidal conflicts in nature. The UN has already declared it as a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing.” The Rohingyas are declared stateless in their home country Myanmar, but they are also treated as illegal immigrants in many South and Southeast Asian countries.

K. Bülbül The Presidency of Foreign Relations and Protocol, The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM), Ankara, Turkey Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Ankara, Turkey Md. N. Islam (*) Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Ankara, Turkey Md. S. Khan Department of Social Work, Hacettepe University, Ankara, Turkey © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 K. Bülbül et al. (eds.), Rohingya Refugee Crisis in Myanmar, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6464-9_16

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With the February 1st military coup, which has dissolved the elected government one more time, the Rohingya issue has taken a surprise and unexpected turn. Before 2021, this ongoing ethnic conflict had already added a significant heft to the current humanitarian and political crisis worldwide. The world’s most persecuted ethnic community of Rakhine (former Arakan), which includes Muslims who are a minority in Myanmar and minority in the state of Rakhine, had allegedly faced horrendous abuses and oppression by the army and Buddhist extremist group. After this coup, experts fear that the crime against them and another ethnic group may rise. Myanmar’s de facto leader, the state counsellor, a Nobel Peace Laureate and an advocate of nonviolence Aung San Suu Kyi, (who is under the detention of army now) has not only denied these claims but defended Myanmar army in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague. It is assumed that her action to support Myanmar army could be due to political interest or out of patriotism. Nevertheless, Suu Kyi has faced backlash for maintaining constant silence on the persecution of Muslim ethnic Rohingya since the outbreak started. In the recent years, the Myanmar army and the government has been criticized for this hostility and crime against this ethnic minority. However, not much has been done to stop the killing and persecution of these people which has led many waves of migration from the Rakhine State to various parts of the world. Since 2016, many of them fled to the neighboring South Asia and Southeast Asian countries such as Bangladesh, India, Thailand, and Malaysia. Few hundred Rohingyas also reached Western countries such as UK, USA, Canada, and Germany. Most of these refugees arrived there before the beginning of 2012 violence. Some of these exiled Rohingyas are actively working as Rohingya diaspora and established Rohingya organization in European countries, Middle East, USA, and Canada. These people mainly include former Rohingya politicians, activists, and former Muslim Rohingya ministers, and Rohingya students studying abroad. As of the year 2021, it seems that the Myanmar government’s position is exceptive and unwilling in solving the issue of Rohingya refugees who claim Myanmar to be their ancestral land. The recent February coup gave a clearer picture that there is no short-term solution and justice for the Rohingya ethnic minorities in Myanmar. On the other hand, there is a sense of fear and distress in the migrants as well as Rohingyas living in Myanmar for their safety and protection from further persecution and killing. Hence, the repatriation of Rohingyas from various countries to Myanmar seems a distant dream.

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Moreover, Rohingya refugees’ difficulties follow them from their source country to transit country and finally to host countries. The Rohingya IDPs in the concentration camps of Myanmar are also in constant anxiety and fear about their future. The Rohingya refugees in various Bangladeshi refugee camps share no different feeling than those IDPs. “I have lived in the camp, eight years. My parents have lived in the camp for 18 years. My grandma is still in the camp for 30 years. For 30 years, she has been a refugee. Is this going to continue till 100 years 200 years or is it going to get sorted out?” (Sirajul; 4:55).

It is true that these refugees are staying in the camps since decades. Apart from Bangladesh, they also migrated to nearby countries such as Malaysia, Thailand, India, Pakistan, and so on. The Rohingya refugees are not getting same treatment in these countries. They may have changed their country, name, and identity, but many believe that their problems are not changed. They still have no citizenship, no facilities for getting educated, no rights, and face hate and other community discrimination. The current chapter attempts to explore the problems and difficulties that Rohingya refugees are facing in their host country. This chapter highlights the problem, concerns, demands, and future prospects of Rohingya by analyzing the stories and experiences of various Rohingya activists who are staying in different countries.

Methods of the Study and Data Collection Techniques This study is a thematic analysis which is aimed at finding out the Rohingyas’ current problems, responses from Myanmar, Bangladesh, regional and international responses with the short and long-term solutions of Rohingya refugee crisis, where it has been identified the future of Rohingya people and Rohingya refugees in around the world. For this study, the semi-structured interview has been applied to get reliable data, where Rohingya leaders and activists were taken as a sample for proceeding with this study. As McCracken (1988) noted, interviews are among the most difficult and meaningful methods of assessment in the study as they attempt to explain the interpretations of fundamental themes for getting the story behind the experiences of the participants. By clarifying this motion, Kvale (1996) opined that by taking responses and in-depth

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information from the interviewees, researchers explain the main aims of the study, and in doing so, “build a conversation” (p. 283) with the participants regarding the specific themes of the study as the main purpose within a prearranged outline, which is the interview guideline (Questionnaire). Semi-structured interview, which Patton (1990) considered as the most useful method, has been conducted for this study to “minimise the imposition of predetermined responses when gathering data” (Patton, 1990, p. 295; Kalin et al., 2008). The interviews were conducted with the Rohingya leaders and activists between January and May 2020. Since the interviews were conducted in 2020, recent events such as the February 2021 coup and ongoing emergency in Myanmar were not discussed with the respondents. However, the editors try to address such issue through own research work. For this study, non-probability purposive sampling has been preferred, allowing the interviewers to choose the interviewees for semi-structured interviews, based on their experiences and expertise. Purposive sampling, also called judgment sampling, is a nonrandom method of research where a researcher can decide the number of participants for the study, who can contribute and are interested in providing the data and information, which could be related to the main purpose of the research (Bernard, 2002). It has been argued that in certain knowledge of culture, some people know more than the average person (Campbell, 1955; Kalin et  al., 2008; Tremblay, 1957; Zelditch, 1962), which is what Bernard (2002) articulated that to talk to a specialist rather than a random individual is much more practical to learn the exact knowledge in that specific area. According to Karmel and Jain (1987), in applied field information analysis, purposive sampling is much more efficient than random sampling, followingly, this method is especially useful, realistic than randomization of sampling when there is not enough funds, time, and other resources in finding authentic information (Campbell, 1955; Karmel & Jain, 1987; Seidler, 1974; Snedecor, 1939; Topp et al., 2004). Following the above-mentioned analysis, under nine thematic areas, including major problems of Rohingya, Bangladesh’s response, Myanmar government’s response, INGOs’ and NGOs’ responses, global community’s response, role of media, future of Rohingya, and finally, short and long-term solution, we approach to the 26 Rohingya diaspora leaders, specialists, and activists who themselves are Rohingya and are actively working for the basic human and humanitarian rights of Rohingya, justice for Rohingya, and resolution of Rohingya refugee crisis. The following

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table shows the Rohingya diaspora organizations worldwide, to whom we approached for the interviews (see Table 16.1). Table 16.1  Rohingya diaspora organizations No.

Rohingya diaspora organization

Place/location

1 2 3 4

Arakan Rohingya Union (ARU) Rohingya Culture Center (RCC) Rohingya National League (RNL) Arakan Institute for Peace and Development (AIPD) The Rohingya American Society (RAS) Los Angeles Rohingya Society (LARS) Burmese Rohingya Community of Wisconsin (BRCW) RW Welfare Society-RWWS Canadian Rohingya Development Initiative (CRDI) Rohingya Human Rights Network Burmese Rohingya Organization UK (BROUK) Arakan Rohingya National Organization (ARNO) British Rohingya Community (BRC) European Rohingya Council (ERC) Forces of Renewal South East Asia (FORSEA) Free Rohingya Coalition Rohingya Organization Norway (RON) Burmese Rohingya Community in Australia (BRCA) Arakan Rohingya Students Union, Turkey (ARSUTR) Rohingya Action Ireland (RAI) Burmese Rohingya Association- Japan (BRAJ) Rohingya Youth Union of India (RYUIND) Rohingya Women Development Network (RWDN) Myanmar Ethnic Human Right Organization in Malaysia Rohingya Organization Indonesia (ROI) Arakan Rohingya Society for Peace and Human Rights (ARSPH) Rohingya Peace Network of Thailand (RPNT) Rohingya F.C Thailand (RFCT) Burmese Rohingya Community Georgia (BRCG) Rohingya Youth Association (RYA)

USA USA USA USA

5 6 7

8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

Table prepared and collected by the authors

USA USA USA USA Canada Canada UK UK UK UK UK Germany Norway Australia Turkey Ireland Japan India Malaysia Malaysia Indonesia Bangladesh Thailand Thailand Georgia Bangladesh

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However, only 12 participants and representatives from the Rohingya diaspora organizations agreed to contribute in this study. These are the participants mostly exiled in different countries or residing in different continent of the world, such as the USA, Canada, Europe (Germany, Netherlands), UK, Turkey, Malaysia, Pakistan, India, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, and Bangladesh. Table 16.2 mentions the interviewees’ name, their position and designation, including the organization and location of the organization. Table 16.2  Interviewees’ list details No. Individual’s name

Designation

Organization name

Place/ location

1

U Shwe Maung MP

3

Prof. Dr. Wakar Uddin Tun Khin

4

Dr. Hla Kyaw

5

6

Shaukhat Kyaw Soe Founder and Aung Ali (aka) MSK Executive Director Jilani Ro Nay San Lwin Co-Founder

President, Arakan Institute for Peace and Development (AIPO) Arakan Rohingya Union (ARU) Burmese Rohingya Organization UK (BROUK) The European Rohingya Council (ERC) The Rohingya American Society (RAS)

USA

2

Member of Burmese parliament (2011–2015) Director General

Germany

7

Ibrahim Dobashi

8

Sirajul Islam

9

Maung Nu (Mohamed Noor) Khin Maung Win (Anwar) Saifullah Khalid Khin Maung (Mohammed Rafi) Aung Naing SHWE (Abdu Shukkur)

Free Rohingya Coalition (FRC) European Rohingya Council (ERC) British Rohingya Community (BRC) Rohingya National League (RNL) LA Rohingya Society – Rohingya Youth Association Arakan Rohingya Students Union, Turkey (ARSUTR)

Pakistan Bangladesh

10 11 12 13

President

Chairman

Co-Founder and Assistant Secretary Spokesperson Executive Director President Rohingya historian President President

Table prepared and organized by the authors

USA UK

UK USA

UK UK USA USA

Turkey

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For conducting the interview, we sent them an email separately with the specific questionnaires and invitation letter, and upon their response we scheduled the interview. Most of our interviews were taken through the popular “ZOOM” program. The questions for the interview are as follows: –– –– –– –– –– –– –– –– –– –– ––

What are the major problems of Rohingya refugees? How do you evaluate the international response on Rohingya crisis? How do you see Myanmar’s response on the Rohingya crisis? How do you see Bangladesh’s response on the Rohingya crisis? What is the role of your organization/NGO in supporting Rohingya? Do you think Rohingya refugees should go back to Myanmar? Do you think that Rohingya refugees should have work permission wherever they are? What is your thought on the future of Rohingya refugees? Any suggestion for the global community for Rohingya issue? Do you see any short and long-term solution for Rohingya refugee crisis? Any suggestions/recommendations on the issue of Rohingya refugees?

We took the interviewees’ proper permission and consent before their participation in the study. Eight interviews have been recorded with permission while five interviewees have responded to written questions by email correspondence; accordingly, we used their names and information as they have given consent to us to do so. However, the study is done on Rohingya refugees who are working in various capacities for the Rohingya rights organizations. This could be seen as an advantage as well as disadvantage for the study. There are many non-Rohingya experts or organizations who are not included in the study. The authors also do not verify and take responsibility for the statement and claims made against the Myanmar movement or army.

Introduction of Themes The Rohingya refugee crisis is one of the major ongoing humanitarian as well as political crisis for the world in general and Asia in particular. To highlight the previous as well as the current problems and potential solutions to these problems, various themes were identified and analyzed by

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the authors. These themes were identified after reviewing various literature and brainstorming sessions by the authors. Due to various security, economic, political, and strategic reasons these refugees are entertained differently in countries. Many also claim that due to the increase in the size of these refugees in Bangladesh refugee camps and elsewhere these refugees are facing multiple issues (see Fig. 16.1). Since Bangladesh is a small country and if 100,000 people will come all of a sudden, for few days or months, they may be treated as guests, but it will be really hard to sustain them for a very long period. Similar thing happens in countries like Malaysia, India, and Pakistan. But after their number started increasing and with the spread of Coronavirus the hate also started to spread.

Major Problems of Rohingya “Rohingya Refugee problem has multiple layers. The issue is humanitarian as well as Political” said Prof. Dr. Waker Uddin, who is professor and director of Arakan Rohingya Union (ARU), USA. Mentioning about world’s most overcrowded camps—Rohingya camps in Bangladesh (40,000 people per square kilometer)—he shows his concerns for refugees during COVID-19 pandemic. He also mentioned about issues such as lack of healthcare, sanitation, and water crisis. The absence of doctors and other medical facilities also make people more vulnerable and at risk in this

Fig. 16.1  Top Rohingya host countries. (Figure prepared by the authors. Source: Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) and Anadolu Agency, September 9, 2019)

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pandemic. Due to limited resources and increasing population these difficulties are increasing every day. He also mentions the issue of human trafficking as, “some human traffickers, bad elements, there are some people doing illegal trading of contraband, material. Human traffickers are recruiting people taking money and promising that they will take them to Malaysia and Thailand.” (Prof. Dr. Wakar Uddin, 12:36).

Similarly, Khin Moung, a Rohingya youth leader from the Bangladeshi Rohingya camps, highlights that, “In the both side, Myanmar and the Bangladesh our major problem is education issue, health issue and the security issue. You know, we’re already passing three years in Bangladesh. Still, no formal education is given to people.” (Camp refugee: Khin Maung; 24:41).

Talking about the recent problems of Rohingya refugees, Mr. Shaukhat Kyaw Soe Aung Ali (aka) MSK Jilani, founder and executive director, the Rohingya American Society, USA defines Rohingya problems in similar way stating, “Hopelessness of uncertain repatriation in the near future, constant fear of pandemic Coronavirus infection and insufficient humanitarian services, lack of food, medicine, shelter, drinking water, toiletries as well as educational facilities for children and youths, human trafficking and Rohingya refugee boat dilemma, violence and insecurity in refugee camps by miscreants and Robbers”

According to Hla Kyaw, chairman of European Rohingya Council, residing in the UK: “Like any other refugee anywhere in the world, the major problems are lack of access to formal education, healthcare, livelihood; and safety and security in the camps. Human dignity is partially or fully compromised. Lack of hope to return back to homeland is especially devastating.” (Hla Kyaw, 2020).

Taking about Rohingya problem inside Myanmar and outside of it, Tun Khin, president of Burmese Rohingya Organization UK (BROUK) said that:

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“One major problem first thing is we have no protection in our own country. There is no movement. There is restriction of movement, there is restriction on human medical aid and humanitarian aid. That is one problem. Another problem is outside Rohingya are not allowed to return to their country because they’re not safe. No Government have restoring citizenship. This is one of the big barriers.” (Tun Khin, 4:17)

However, U Shwe Maung MP, who was a member of Burmese parliament (2011–2015) expressed that there are two key problems that Rohingya people are facing: “one is their religion (being Muslim) and second is the ethnicity” as MP Maung portrayed the independence of Myanmar and its correlation with religion, for example, “first government of Myanmar after independence from the British, they try a lot set up a religion-based country, which is Buddhism. Unfortunately, they fail. although they failed but it looks, they have not given up yet. So, then again, in Arakan state, (Rakhine) they are dreaming of a kind of modern Buddhist nation.” (Shwe Moung; 15:20)

Religious Issue Asked whether Rohingya problem is an ethnic or religious problem, Mr. Tun Khin, the president of BROUK, responded as: “It is quite mixed. Rohingya are facing persecution genocide because of they are Muslim. They are minority because of politics. All these things with well connected. If Rohingya’s are not Muslim (Najibullah- we seek refugee from the god), they wouldn’t do that, honestly.” (Tun Khin, 5:24)”

To the one similar kind of question Prof. Waker answered: “Rohingya issue is an issue of religion. They (Myanmar Government) say it’s not a religious issue because they don’t want a war with Muslim Ummah or Muslim community to speak out. It is a religious issue an ethnic issue… They want to get rid of these ethnic groups. The Rohingya issue is an issue that Myanmar government do with their propaganda. There are false ­campaigns. They claim that this Rohingya peoples are not ethnic minority of Myanmar.” (Prof. Waker; 6: 15)

Opposing all these false campaigns, Prof. Waker further asserted that:

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“They (Rohingya) have been at the Myanmar for many, many, decades. They’re given citizenship, they are giving NRC and they are voting, they are in parliamentarians. There were 49 Rohingya parliamentarians, so these are the ethnic minority group in Rakhine State Arakan. But they are claiming that these people are illegal immigrants coming from nearby countries like Bangladesh, maybe India maybe other countries. They mainly see, they are from Bangladesh. So, they’re saying Bengalis illegally entering Myanmar as illegal immigrants, but they know the fact, they know the truth, but this doesn’t matter to them. They are twisting this and fabricating this. They are making a reason despite the fact that they have allowed Rohingya to vote in national elections, the parliaments they still say that these are illegal immigrants because that’s protects, they can use to conduct this genocide and elimination of the population.” (Prof. Wakar Uddin, 7:40)

Education According to the reports of Amnesty International there are more than half million refugees’ children who are at the risk of ‘lost generation’ in Bangladesh refugee camps. (Amnesty International, 2018). The need for the right to formal education seems always to be the priority for most of the Rohingya activists and experts within the Rohingya camp and outside it. After 2012 Sittwe violence, Myanmar imposed various bans on the education of the Rohingyas in universities giving reason “Keeping the peace” (Joniad, 2019). During the personal interview with one of our Rohingya refugee, Mr. Sirajul Islam, who is studying in one of the reputed universities of UK, he stated that: “The Rohingya have been persecuted so much because of our lack of education. They stopped us from going to university, they stop us from going to high school, even when we came to primary school, even that education was allowed. We weren’t given the same equal opportunity as the rest of the Rakhine children.” (Sirazul; 26: 05).

Rohingya refugees such as Maung Nu, the executive director of Rohingya National League, USA, also shared similar view that the major problems of Rohingya refugee are “high rate of illiteracy and lack of leadership.” According to Chris Lewa, from an advocacy group based in Thailand, “It is part of an ‘ethnic cleansing package’ of restrictions and oppression to compel them to leave,” (Joshua Carroll, 2014).

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But outside Myanmar the Rohingya educational problems have not got much attention from the host countries. For example, in one of the biggest refugee camps of Rohingya no formal education is provided to the children. However, there are some community-based or NGO-based learning centers and madrasas (school for Islamic teaching). The major focus of these schools is teaching English, Burmese, and Quran. These schools are often overcrowded and lack proper teaching staff. “All the NGOs Learning Center or the temporary Learning center run without any syllabus. If anyone does not have syllabus how can they get the formal education every university every school has a specific syllabus to complete within the appropriate time. In the camp there is no syllabus.” (Khin Maung; 28:50).

He also emphasized the use of Burmese syllabus for the Rohingya education in Bangladesh. “Another thing we are already advocating to the government and NGOs that they should ensure our Burmese syllabus because today or tomorrow we must go back to our country. Our mother, our brother or sister must be used to learning system in the refugee camp. That’s why Myanmar syllabus and Myanmar curriculum must be taught in the camp.” (Khin Moung – 29: 02).

As per the recent reports from Bangladesh, the government has taken decision to give education to Rohingya refugees in the camp and they have proposed to use Myanmar curriculum and syllabus for the education. (The Guardian, June 29, 2020). Healthcare As mentioned above by many interviewees the healthcare system for the Rohingyas needs much more attention from the host countries. In many countries Rohingya are not given basic healthcare facilities as they are considered as illegal immigrant. Looking at the healthcare system inside Bangladeshi camp Mr. Muong said, “There is no help for medical assistant, there is no the qualified doctor and qualified medical facility in the camp as my personal experience.” (Khin Maung; 25:00). The refugees need doctors and health centers for long-term diseases such as diabetes, cancer, and

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others (Khin Moung). As Prof Waker pointed out that even at the time of Corona pandemic there are not enough facilities for the isolation and treatment of the people which are at a very high risk due to overcrowded camps. Security Concerns On the side Rohingya refugees feel insecure in Myanmar and anxious for their own security in the homeland and camps which is clearly expressed by many of our interviewees such as “How can we go back to a country where they’ve killed my grandparents that killed my nephew that killed my family? Without thinking they’re going to kill me next.” (Sirajul; 16:17). On the other hand, the same Rohingya community is often blamed to be associated with terror groups such as ARSA (Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, formally known as Harkatul al Yakin) and AR (Arakan Army). According to reports the groups often have clashes with the Myanmar army and police. Not to forget that Myanmar government started its massive crackdown in 2016 after the attack on the Myanmar police stations. Many countries such as India express serious concerns about Rohingya refugees’ links with terror groups. Furthermore, in the current situation there is a significant number of children in the camps who are hopeless and desperate. The opportunity to further radicalize more Rohingyas seems much easier for these terror groups. As mentioned by M.S.K. Jilani, “current most of the 420,000 Rohingya children will become teenagers and adults who may become hopeless and instrumentals of violent groups in Arakan and ultimately more bloodshed and instability in Arakan state.”

Freedom of Movement The freedom of movement outside the camp is restricted in Bangladesh. In other countries also, only the people registered under UNHCR are given identity card to travel within the states. There are also numerous cases from Bangladesh, India, and Malaysia where Rohingya refugees were arrested for traveling within the states. Sirajul Islam explained this as “For many of us, we have never left the camp we weren’t allowed to. All we saw every single day was the same bamboo sticks, the same shops, the same toilet the same open sewage system.” (Sirajul; 8; 20)

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He also mentioned that even in Myanmar the Rohingya ethnic group had certain travel restrictions and this kind of restriction in other countries may bring those bad memories back to the people. “They (My parents) weren’t allowed to go out the village they were born in. They were not allowed to travel anywhere for this experience, to continue into a different community into a different country. I think it brings back a lot of memories for people.” (Sirajul: 14: 07)

Hate, Racism, and Discrimination The Rohingyas face hate, racism, and discrimination both inside their own country (Myanmar) and in their host country too. Many of interviewees in this study claimed that Myanmar government and army uses a systematic propaganda against Rohingya minority to turn them against their own people. “So, the systematic propaganda that they used since the 1940s until now has slowly turned every single community against our people (Rohingya). They were made to believe that we didn't belong there. They were made to believe that we were illegal immigrants coming from Bangladesh taking over their own country. They use Islamophobic fears. And this was done by really famous monk Wirathu too. Although, it shocks people because Buddhism is the most peaceful religion on Earth, if you practice it properly, but this Monk, he has a tremendous following. He says that we are like a plague, Islam is like a plague. Muslims are literally the worst people on earth. These are his words. And he used these words, to turn our neighbors against us. And that’s when the biggest persecution started and that’s when our neighbors our Rakhine people wouldn’t help us and even, they joined in with the military, and after, they were done with the Rohingya people, they started on the Rakhine people themselves.” (Sirajul; 34; 55)

Talking about hate and discrimination in the host country, Sirajul mentioned, “There’s a small minority of violent of the Bangladeshi community who have negative thoughts towards Rohingya people. They’re coming in and taking our country, the community and taking our jobs, and these are filled by xenophobic thoughts. And this is a small minority I’d like to emphasise because the rest of the majority have been brilliant towards us.” (Sirajul: 16: 25)

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Prof Waker Uddin in a similar way, pointed out that, “hate speech by the government officials and monks, putting fear in the people and saying that these people are national security threat. They are just putting fear inside the people and propaganda. They are saying that this is Islamization of Rakhine State, they are going to grow and swallow you. There will be no Buddhism left and Islam is going to be grow and overcome you. then from Rakhine State and it will go beyond and it will go to Burma, Myanmar and it will be threatening, it will be a major threat to Buddhist religion. These are all pretext, they know for a fact that only nearly 4 million people 3.5 or 4 million people, how much threat they can be to a country of 60 million buddhist.” (Prof. Dr. Waker Uddin, 8:28).

Bangladesh’s Response Bangladesh is a country which is associated with this whole crisis from its beginning. In Myanmar the Rohingya ethnic group refugees are often considered as illegal Bengali immigrants who fled from Bangladesh to Myanmar in the past and got settled there. Since 1978 Bangladesh is constantly at the receiving end of waves of Rohingya refugees. The respondent has a mix reaction about the support that Bangladesh provides to Rohingya refugees. “Bangladesh government accepted our people to provide temporary shelter. We’re really thankful because a million people is not a joke. Bangladesh is very highly densely populated country, a small country compared to their population. Even this million people are living in the district of Cox’s Bazar, also they have their population, we don't know how long it will last, because in every country in every situation, they have their national interest.” (U Schwe Maung, 14:13)

According to Sirajul Islam, who was born in Bangladesh refugee camp, “we’re really, really grateful to Bangladesh. Without Bangladesh, I wouldn’t have had a place to be born into, I wouldn’t have had that land to be born into. And this is the same for over 1 billion Rohingyas. Without Bangladesh, we would have nowhere to go through. So, we are really, really grateful to shake a sinner and hug government and the Bangladeshi people for giving us a place to stay” … (Sirajul 13: 15)

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Another Rohingya expert stated that, “Bangladesh’s response on the Rohingya crisis is immensely helpful and positive. They are doing all the best they can do for Rohingya refugees locally and internationally with the cooperation of UNHCR and World donor countries.” (M.S.K. Jilani)

On the other hand, people criticized Bangladesh for keeping their refugees in a very dirty, difficult, and highly overpopulated camps with no freedom of movement. “the first-time refugee went from Myanmar to Bangladesh in 1978. After 7 years or less than 7 years of Bangladesh independence. At that time Bangladesh was very poor in condition but Bangladesh government have the heart that is why they host more than 3 lacs (300,000) Rohingya people. Bangladesh cannot do anything because Bangladesh has beginning of the independent country. At that time our country ruled by the military. The President or the Prime Minister of Bangladesh put pressure against the Myanmar. And, crucially Myanmar government want to take back all the survivor in 1978. But Myanmar government had the plan to destroy all but they failed. They started new policy, as you know, 1982 citizenship law they introduced to deny the Rohingya citizenship.” (Khin Maung; 16:30)

Myanmar’s Response The role and response of Myanmar is not only criticized by the Rohingya experts and refugees but also it is criticized by many countries around the world. On behalf of OIC (Organization of Islamic Conference), the Gambia registered a case of genocide case against in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against Myanmar. The case is still ongoing in the ICJ and the current coup has made it more complicated as the ruling class military is one of the alleged culprits in this case. So even the decision of ICJ may not put much pressure on Myanmar. The army through Suu Kyi, has already systematically denied any such form of genocide intended and Aung San Suu Kyi (de facto leader) argued that “if war crimes have been committed by members of Myanmar’s defence services, they will be prosecuted through our military justice system” (Council on Foreign Relations, June 23, 2020). However, my survivors and eyewitnesses accuse Suu Kyi of lying to the world. One of those eyewitnesses during our interview mentioned that,

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“I myself, I witness together with my father, how the joint military police and immigration officer conducted this operation. They invited the families to submit their families, ID cards, national registration cards, that they were appointed for the next day, when they show up on the next day for the scrutiny. There ask again, please give us your document. But people said, we have already submitted the documents yesterday, how can we give you again. But the officer denied that and said Rohingya people are lying. They don't have any document, and then they’re cheated. So, based on that baseless charges people were arrested. Whatever people do, either they could prove they have document or not. And finally, Rohingya people fled to the Bangladesh but because of international pressure, the President Ne Win accepted again a Rohingya refugee, although they set up refugee for the repatriation, they denial for the basic fundamental rights so that is happening as of today. Whatever is said in the newspaper and news conference, the ultimate goal of that “nagami operation” by Myanmar army was to expel Rohingya people from their motherland and to seize their valuable document and national registration card, their birth certificates and NOC documents.” (U Shwe Maung MP, 09:52).

Prof. Dr. Wakar expressed it as, “Myanmar responses have been not good, non-existence. At least in 1978 refugee crisis, Myanmar government took back refugees, a significant number, not all of them. They took two batch and then have them go back to their original homes, right in 1978, and 1992, repatriation. Similar thing happened. They were able to return to their original homes, not going to camps and other things. But this is not happened in 2017. The refugee crisis now it is the refugee crisis Myanmar government. It has signed an (MOU) memorandum of understanding with government of Bangladesh in late 2017. For safe, dignified and voluntary Return of the refugees to their original homes in their Arakan Rakhine State. Now repatriation by Myanmar government is putting twist. They are asking Bangladesh government to give the list of refugee’s batches of refugees returning and Myanmar government is screening. The list is currently not giving, approving all the refugees that name whose names are in the list. There’s one thing second thing is that Myanmar government went ahead and built some camps. That one camp in a mountain North can accommodate 30,000 refugees. So why do they need to move from one country another country to one camp to another camp. Then Rohingya will go to go back to Myanmar and go to the camps. It is to their original homes, and Myanmar government has not done anything. No preparation, no conducive conditions to return for refugees. To go back to original homes condition has to be conducive, I mean ground condition in

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Rakhine State…. There they are restrict their movement. How about their citizenship? Are they going to go back Myanmar like a stateless people, their citizenship issue has to be addressed their homes, their security, their human rights all has to come together.”

Maung Nu expressed Myanmar response as: “It is too hard to say that Myanmar ever has taken any step honestly in order to solve the Rohingya crisis. Whatever Myanmar has been doing are just either show off or to decrease the inadequate international pressure. If Myanmar wished to response to on the Rohingya crisis, today, the vast majority of the Rohingya refugees would have returned to Myanmar and the suffering of the Rohingya who are yet inside their country have touched to an end.” (Maung Nu, executive director Rohingya National League, USA.)

While M.S.K. Jilani stated that, “Myanmar Government still refuses its act of genocide, torture and inhuman treatment of Rohingyas, Myanmar Government failed to stop violence against the Rohingyas in Arakan and also unwilling to call back all forcibly displaced Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh back to home making unjustifiable conditions of documents verification and NVC.” (M.S.K. Jilani)

Saifullah Khalid, one of the Pakistani Rohingya and historian, says that, “I think, Burma has Prepared a very long-term Plan for Ethnic Cleansing of the Rohingya People and I think they are almost successful in that. The first thing they did is to take education from us (Rohingya) so that they cannot express the world what is happening to them.” (Khalid; 15; 30)

Many of the Rohingya refugees say that they want to return to their ancestral homeland (Arakan) but not without proper security and citizenship. Upon the repatriation process from Bangladesh to Myanmar, Prof. Dr. Wakar Uddin explained it in this way: Of course, they want to return to Burma, Myanmar, their own country. Repatriation is something that that needs to be done. And there’s an issue now are refugees, but they cannot go back to their country, your homeland.” (Prof. Dr. Wakar Uddin, 17:00)

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International Community’s Response Although the Rohingya community did not get much support in South Asia, except few neighboring countries, but the issue is raised in various international platforms by many countries and human rights organizations. Prof. Dr. Wakar Uddin while mentioning international support to Rohingya and Rohingya movement stated: “International response to Rohingya issue is tremendous. We are very fortunate that we got wide support from many communities, not only United Nation, UNHCR, UNDP, that these are organisation that helping Rohingya and then the International Red Cross and Red Crescent, and mainly NGOs from Turkey, many NGOs and some other countries as well. United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia also King Salman Foundation has been very active, including with the Muslim World League. So international response is quite high. But I think, you know, tremendous support we’re getting but I think the much more needs to be done especially in terms of support for preparing preparation for in case of outbreak contingency plan for the refugees to save them to treat them and to protect them. Right now. They are well protected Bangladesh government has doing very good job, to their capacity. you know Bangladesh as own his own problem with natural resources, limited resources. It’s not a rich country, right? It is a developing country is, is doing very well will very affluent we’re now becoming affluent, economically becoming stronger, but yet with the tremendous population, big size population and limited resources, there’s so much Bangladesh can do only. So, they are international community need to step in and work with the government of Bangladesh to assist refugees and you know, to for their protection and for their well physical wellbeing. And now also international community is with Bangladesh in their support for repatriation, but repatriation is lacking, seriously lacking from Myanmar side, that’s why people cannot return because of the Myanmar is not doing what they should be doing. So international NGOs are there. There are a lot of NGOs, support NGOs and Bangladesh government also can support them and giving them more NGOs for permission to work there.” (Dr. Wakar Uddin, 17:44).

U Shwe Maung who thanks the international community for the humanitarian response that it gives to Rohingya crisis but also expresses concern over failing to solve the political problem, said that: “as of today, international committees fail to tackle the political problem, but at the same time, I need to thank international community because of

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their generosity. Have feed a million refugees in Bangladesh, which is extremely important for the Rohingya people. But that is that is not our core problem. Our core problem is the political issue. The Rohingya are in danger and problem because of the religion and their ethnicity. So, whatever international community has done, I appreciate, but it’s not enough. They need to do more so that our all refugees could go back to their ancestral land and have normal lives. We want our people to go back to their land, to the soil of Arakan, our motherland. But in that sense, I think international community has not responded enough. UN has been doing enough, but mostly in humanitarian sector, but we need a sustainable political solution.” (U Shwe Maung, 27:00)

Similar reply came from Tun Khin, the President of BROUK, as he says, “International community’s lip service is strong, not practical action. I’ve been working for advocacy for 15 years now. I’m working as a President Burmese Rohingya Organisation and human rights activists, I did many campaigns including campaign for her (Aung San Su Kyi) relief, this lady, brutal lady in 2008, 2009 and 2010, but she denied us. We have seen the Security Council sat down many times after 2017 crisis. UN High Commissioner officer shame the textbook example of ethnic cleansing. And United States Holocaust Museum is saying, this is a genocide and many countries, legal groups are saying, it is genocide. Queen Mary University in London, they are saying, it is genocide, but nothing action not serious action at all. We’re very fed up international community not doing enough. Anyhow, as we are working on them, we need to work but they are not doing enough. Like many countries, they talk a lot US, UK, EU and other countries. Look at the Gambia small country, they bring the issue at ICJ where the other countries gone. They’re not really taking enough. They do like lip service, not much action.” (Tun Khin, 05:56)

However, Tun Khin differently praises Turkey and Bangladesh for their acts, especially the speeches of Turkish president, and the visits of Turkish foreign minister, Turkish first lady, and several ministers and parliament members brought the attention of the international community to the Rohingya crisis. Mr. Khin stated that, “Individual countries are very good when I mentioned about like Turkey, Turkey being on the first time do everything for Rohingya. Turkish president, the first-time mentioned genocide on going in Arakan, when the crisis happened. We all appreciate and we’re very grateful Turkish response all the

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time. I believe that Turkey should do more. By supporting humanitarian, more humanitarian aid by supporting pressure to oversee members of a state, by supporting persuading Bangladesh, to find out more is a region when you're talking about regional issues. Many people are going by both these days. So, Turkey should lobby other countries are, should come up and kind of mid density meeting needed to priests rescue these people. So, these kinds of things are more needed from Turkey or kind of frontline. They are supporting us, for a dirty show winner. And Bangladesh given humanitarian support, you know, government and public given us a shelter, we will never forget it. But I'm talking about some powerful countries, they talk a lot, they do nothing. Especially like US, UK and EU, that's thing. So, and they try to blame others. So that's another issue.” (Tun Khin, 07:58)

He also praised the Gambia for its courage in bringing Myanmar to the International Court of Justice. He said that, “We will never forget what Gambia did for the Rohingya people. So that’s showing that Burmese military cannot go with impunity that’s showing that the world is not forgotten as the world is doing something. But that’s showing that military they must face justice one day, even though not now. So, this is very strong message (10:20). With the Gambia now, Canada Netherland is joining them, how other countries, they said they are supporting us. We are not beggars. We have our life. We have our culture; we have our civilisation. We want to live dignity, safety, with our rights. We are manageable minority. So, we do need don’t need only humanitarian aid. It’s not about the military and it is not a solution. Solution is a political solution because it is a political issue. Get them their rights back, force them, push them, bring them the justice. That’s all.” (Tun Khin, 15:57).

In a similar notion Saifullah Khalid from Pakistan observed that, “There is no Country either Muslim or non-Muslim in the world that has focused on the root cause of Rohingya Problem. The only country I can See is Turkey. for Example, there is no country in the world which is working on the fundamental issue and root cause of Rohingya Such as Education and scholarship.” (Khalid: 20; 30)

Whereas Sirajul Islam expresses distress for bringing Rohingya issue to international level so late, as he said:

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“We haven’t been given our place in the world until 2017. People say that the Rohingya issue started in 2017. But it didn’t. It started in almost 70 to 80 years ago, in 1940s, that’s when it started” (Sirajul; 26:38). He further criticized that “the international community has had a chance to step in to help our people Long, long time ago. My parents moved to Bangladesh to Bangladesh in 1992. People moved in 1982. Does another wave of movement in 2010 in 2012? And then finally in 2017, people decided to act to why has it taken over 700,000 people getting killed, over a million people getting displaced, for the international community to finally Speak up.” (Sirajul: 28:05)

Maung Nu, executive director, Rohingya National League, USA, also expressed similar discontent while criticizing international response: “We evaluate the international response on Rohingya crisis as weak, late and inadequate. I meant, the international community should have responded when the government of Myanmar started massacring in a way that was strong, adequate and in due time. Instead of doing so at the beginning of the crisis, the international community was reluctant to blame Myanmar and some countries like China, Russia and so forth were supporting Myanmar. The international community increased raising their voice after Myanmar has destroyed the Rohingya community almost completely and sent almost third-fourth of whole population (though the data on international media and observer says less than third fourth , they were not aware of about those who were sent into exile without creating a noticeable crisis inside Arakan of Myanmar) into exile. In case of the international response on Rohingya crisis, Turkey is exceptional because the president of Turkey was the first to response the Rohingya crisis. He has urged the government of Bangladesh to open the border and to give refuge to Rohingya who are seeking refuge and gave words of bearing the cost of refugees who will be living in Bangladesh.” (Maung Nu, executive director, Rohingya National League, USA.)

In a short statement, Hla Kyaw, the chairman of European Rohingya Council (ERC) also shared the same dissatisfaction that, “International response to Rohingya crisis is extremely not satisfying. There is absolutely no support from international community to help the Rohingya back to homeland. There are certainly humanitarian supports to the refugee. However, those humanitarian supports are not adequate.” (Hla Kyaw; European Rohingya Council)

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Future of Rohingya It can be said that Rohingya refugees are living in between two great difficulties which can be termed as statelessness and illegal immigrant. Myanmar seems unwilling to provide citizenship rights to the Rohingyas and the host countries will also not encourage these refugees for getting legal right in the country. In the light of current coup and emergency it may take much longer period to get these rights under the Junta administration. Asked about the future of Rohingyas, our interviewee said: “Arakan is our Motherland, so we need to go back. We have history with Rakhine people, we have history with the Rohingya people. If we go back last 300 to 400 years, we have a lot of historical evidence that Rakhine and Rohingya work together live together, they help each other. So, because of Myanmar military government, since independent, we two brothers were victims of rule and divided policy. Now top leaders are aware of that situation. This is why, they stop calling our people Bengali, because around 2012 even until 2016 and 2017, they widely use it illegal immigrant Bengali. Now, they step up a little bit, they're using a mostly Muslim. Maybe in the very near future, they may recognise the Rohingya as Rohingya. I have my own organisation, that name is “Arakan Institute for peace and development” that Arakan, what I mean is the peace and development, is not only for Rohingya, not only for Rakhine, for the both community as well as other minority groups, we need to understand this land is not for one religion, not for one nationality, not for one race, we need to respect that we need to implement this multicultural, multi-religion and interfaith. I understand because Rohingya are very weakened situation. Rakhine people are not, they become stronger than ever. Therefore, I think, our Rohingya people must be stronger than ever. We have a lot of tremendous international support, Rohingya have a lot of vision, a lot of leadership, a lot of policy. So, this is time for the Rohingya to implement one Rohingya, one system, one policy that will make us stronger. Because, when people are divided, it is universally true that they are never strong, when we all Rohingya become on the same page and in the same boat, our strength will be significant. So, by that time with the help of supportive international community, we will be able to live on our motherland. It may take maybe 10 years, maybe 20 years, maybe I will not be able to see with my eye, maybe in my children, my grandchildren, etc. But we will do it. We’ll move forward. I see this possibility. It’s very possible.” (U Shwe Maung)

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Another interviewee, Tun Khin, expresses more concerns about the young generation of Rohingya and stated that: “It is important we have to move forward to bring up our young generation and future human resources are very important, and that it is important we need to work with coordination is important and we need to do much more. Bring up young generation people and respecting the older generation, what they have done and will by respecting the young generation by bringing our young generation to empower. Without empowerment, there is no such thing we have seen that some NGOs are working these days. They have nothing to do with Rohingya issue. They can help us but they cannot dominate our voice. What we want, we want justice. We want our full citizenship right. We want to return our native land with our right with safety and dignity. And we want to go back our native taught. So Rohingya voice should be loud whenever we speak. We have seen that sometimes Rohingya voice are neglected, see one example of MOU- Memorandum of Understanding, when memorandum of understanding is when Burmese Government signed in with a MOU with UNDP. And UNHCR, but they didn't sit down with us, Rohingya around guess are the most important that sign in MOU for the Rohingya. Representative Rohingya, and Rohingya’s voice should be respected. Rohingya points should be there when they talk. A young generation is very important for the long run.” (Tun Khin, 13:43)

M.S.K. Jilani mentions that, “The future of the Rohingya Refugees is very dark and dangerous. The more Myanmar Government plays the dirty game not to accept Rohingyas with due recognition of their ethnic based citizenship and full guarantee of their safety and security, the Rohingya refugees will be not willing to go to Myanmar on voluntary basis, they would have uncertain future.” (M.S.K. Jilani)

Lastly, the young Rohingya activist, Sirajul Islam, expresses: “We want to be recognised, as a state, we want to be recognised as a people. We don’t want people’s self-sympathy. We don't want people’s charity; we don’t want people’s pity. We want them to give us opportunities, so we can build lives ourselves.” (Sirajul: 33: 10)

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The Role of Media Many studies and reports claim that state media and social media such as Facebook and Twitter play a major role in provoking violence (CBS News, 2018; Lee, 2019). On the other hand, some media such as the BBC, TRT World, CNN, and Aljazeera, constantly reported news related to atrocities and violence against Rohingya. We have also seen some biased and fake news about the Rohingya issues. One of our interviewee highlights that: “Media’s are doing quite okay. They are highlighting the issue but international community, the government they are not doing much enough. I mean media bill quite a lot for like highlighting the issue. I believe that they need to do much more, they are doing it but it’s not enough.” (Tun Khin, 11:52)

Similar views are shared by U Shwe Maung who stated that: “I think this is very crystal clear. Inside Myanmar as of now, the local media looks as the anti-Rohingya, but not worse as a 2012, to 2016 and 2017. Now a little bit control. The Radio Free Asia, Burmese section, Voice of America, Burmese section and BBC Burmese, these media’s use our name, which is our identity. When this three media mentioned our name Rohingya, Burmese people are quite upset, but in this time is not so, the emotional upset as before, because now people has a lot of problem international pressure in the meantime, wherever Big problem is a global problem of this COVID-19.” (U Shwe Maung)

Short-Term and Long-Term Solution Looking at the present development of the Rohingya crisis, the Rohingyas and their problems will take longer time to be sorted. We asked our interviewees about the short- and long-term plans for Rohingya refugees. And how some of these plans can be successfully achieved. Following are the major plans suggested by the interviewees: “There’s two option. for example, long term solution is we have to get our citizenship. The short term. We, if we’re living in the Bangladesh camp First, we have to get our education facilities.” (Khin Maung; 54:54)

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“In short term solution, the most important thing, the refugee needs to be able to have first, food security and second, the education. Education is a must. In the long term, we need to have a better system, how we will live, and how we will tackle all issues. And how would our leaders and activists in diaspora and leaders and activists inside the member work together. Although they have different organisation, I have no objection at all for having more organisation. But the most important thing is everyone have same direction. And same policy with different organisations.” (U Shwe Maung) “For the short term, I think we need to provide humanitarian aid to Rakhine State and provide a kind of proper shelter to Bangladesh who are centrally providing, secondly providing education to Children. Thirdly, providing humanitarian and medical aid and others in Rakhine State. And for the longer, ongoing Rohingya risk must restore government boundaries to full citizenship rights. Rolling yes should get justice. We want to get our want to return our homeland with this dignity, safety, and story, our full citizenship rights.” (Tun Khin, 12:40)

Accordingly, Prof. Dr. Wakar Uddin said: “Short term solution is to sustain the population, the short term we need to save the population. Let’s go to humanitarian issue, providing them adequate supplies, adequate humanitarian supplies, medical and all that. So, the people that are sick get sick or people have to starve to death. The short-­ term solution is humanitarian and Long-Term solution is political. The long-term solution is that they returned to Myanmar. And why should the refugee want to go back, if nothing is guaranteed, their safety is not guaranteed. Their security is not guaranteed. They don’t have place to go, they don’t have a home. And they don't have any right. They will be in a cage and open sky prison. And they will not have any citizenship status, like they will be treated as a stateless, another refugee like another refugee. So, that’s why, refugees are saying that the refugees do not want to stay in Bangladesh for one more minute. They want to go back right now. But why should they go back to a place that there’s no security, there’s no safety, there’s no place to go. There’s no home and no rights and other things. They’re simply saying that okay, this is our country. Myanmar is our country. We are the native people of our country. We are the citizen of Burma, Rakhine State, and we want to go back to our home country, home villages. With all the rights we have this, that they are not asking too much. They’re asking for the basic rights, basic rights that they had before. It’s not something that they are asking for new. This is what they had before the independence of Myanmar.” (Prof. Dr. Wakar Uddin, 26:40)

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“Especially what I want is a win-win solution. In our Arakan Motherland, there are two major population. We Rohingya and Rakhine. So, we don’t want to set up a nation only for Rohingya. We want peaceful coexistence, living side-by-side with Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslim with the multicultural multi-religion diverse environment so that we could enjoy we all human beings could enjoy. So, on our motherland, that is our main objective.” (U Shwe Maung) “Well, I can say for long term solution, it will need much more time, because some of the Rohingya people are settled on foreign country like a European country, … let’s suppose our Rohingya people get our citizenship of Myanmar. At that time, some of the people will not come to our own country because some of the people become millionaires, they have their own job, own business. These types of people will not come back to our country, but some people will go to Myanmar who are facing a financial problem. But the government will not give the citizenship as very easily and very quickly until the pressure of international government.” (Aung Naing SHWE – 134:08)

The need to educate the community and specially to the young generation was also highlighted by many of the interviewees, as pointed out below by Maung Nu, executive director Rohingya National League, USA: “The short-term solution is that the international community should admit the Rohingya students to different university across the world and to provide formal education centers under the supervision of well-educated Rohingyas inside the camp in order to advance the Rohingya children. The long-term solution is to pressurise Myanmar in a way it takes back all Rohingya refugees by declaring the acceptance of the ethnic name Rohingya and granting all the rights they deserve being an indigenous ethnic group of Myanmar.” (Maung Nu, executive director, Rohingya National League, USA)

M.S.K. Jilani along with his statement proposed four major suggestions for the short- and long-term plan for Rohingyas. He mentioned that: “As the solution of the Rohingya refugee case is in the hands of Myanmar government, it must solve its problem with the cooperation of neighboring countries with the help of world powers. In case of failure to comply by Myanmar government to follow up ICJ's provisional measure of 4 ruling orders, R2P or Safe Zone is the only option to accommodate all forcibly

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displaced Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh and elsewhere under UN Supervision.” (M.S.K. Jilani)

Short-term solutions proposed by Shaukhat Kyaw Soe Aung Ali (aka) M.S.K. Jilani are as follows: 1. Restoration of hope among the Rohingya refugees and instilling the desire to live in all circumstances, confronting all hardships and odds. 2. Provide enough food, medicines, and all other necessary life sustaining materials to Rohingya refugees so that they do not get involved in any violence and crimes or become Yaba drug carriers for the struggle for survival. 3. Empower the Rohingya refugee community with education, lectures, and meetings so they know their rights and the 30 articles of Universal Declaration of Human Rights, so that they live peacefully in the camps and be conscious to respect the rules and regulations of the host countries. 4. Restore internet in refugee camps so that they can communicate with their family members and relatives living scattered all over the world, including Myanmar as well, so that they are fully aware of current Coronavirus pandemic update, information and guidelines, in time. Finally, in a very short statement Hla Kyaw said that, “Short-term solution lies in the successful repatriation of refugees. Long-term solution lies in successful rebuilding of the community (Hla Kyaw – E. R Council).

Suggestions and Recommendations “International Community will have to continue to engage in this issue from multiple fronts. Like, we have been doing like international community, many countries all the ways 57 member countries, United States, Canada, and many, many European countries UK and others doing it United Nations, you know, that’s the issue. It the issue need to be brought in security council time and again. Now, Turkey is bringing it to the United Nations Security Council. It has to continue at the international level in the United Nations and General Assembly every year, there has to be a resolution coming. Humanitarian Council in Geneva, it have to sustain that effort. OIC Council of Foreign Ministers, every year the Rohingya issues the top agenda. Always it comes to the foreign minister. US Congress passing reso-

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lutions, the State Department heavily engaged and also Canadian government. International Community on that, so, what we need to do is coordinate a lot of activities that are not coordinated. So, we have to come into much stronger force with concerted effort from international community, which is political issue. In the political issue also, pressure has to be much more exerted on Myanmar government to take back these people without dragging the fear feed and without screening people and rejecting some people, allow a proven some people, that has to stop. Myanmar government has just extended its agreement with UNDP and UNHCR. There was a memorandum this and yesterday, they have extended that memorandum agreement. So now we’re going to see how is going to work whether Myanmar government is going to be serious in implementing this agreement they signed with UNDP and UNHCR in Rakhine State. So that international community must do things like that. To address humanitarian issue and political issue, political issue is pressure on the government not just to give their rights basic rights with friendship and security but also the peace in the in the state of Arakan state and communal harmony, peaceful co-­ existence. Myanmar government has the obligation to bring the peace in the area, it is fighting war. Now, Myanmar is fighting with ethnic rebel groups. No good is groups, working groups. So, Myanmar government has to be pressured to stop this kind of military operation in Rakhine State. And then, of course, their Rohingya citizenship, 1980, do citizenship law has to be revoked repeal that citizenship law, which is a major hinder, major obstacle for Rohingya citizenship, bonafide citizenship. Now one government cannot be asked to stop doing NVC-National Verification Process that’s not going to help and now naturalisation, what to who to naturalise. Rohingya people are not from somewhere else you have to naturalise. These are your people, you let them to vote. They have a parliament member as I said parliamentarians and behind Rohingya people has contributed in Myanmar to the country’s economically, politically, socially, in so many respects. So, now you want to naturalise them, you have to stop that. They have NRC cards, give them the cards back, national citizenship card, natural registration card. They have white cards that they voted with, give them back. These are the thing you Myanmar government can do incrementally step by step, first NRCS and then white cards and then they have form 10s and using the font and they can issue that the cards. These kinds of things, international community need to tremendous pressure on the Myanmar government to address the political issues now. Myanmar government said there’s no Rohingya. They don’t accept the term. There’s the term that Rohingya give a citizenship, in early 60s and 50s. The Rohingya were the term, broadcasting as an ethnic minority program in Myanmar government’s broadcast in government service. Now you say you there’s no Rohingya. You have to

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recognise the name Rohingya as an ethnic group, which is the reality you cannot simply brush off say that these people don’t exist yet. This name doesn’t exist yet. Myanmar government has to be put under tremendous pressure to accept the origin or name of Rohingya to get the real true name of Rohingya. And that’s part of the ethnic minority groups in Myanmar. So, these kinds of things should be done.” (Prof. Dr. Wakar Uddin, 29:58)

Mr. Maung Nu suggested on the issue of Rohingya refugees. They are: 1. The international community should help the Bangladesh government in order to handle a vast majority of Rohingya refugees in an overpopulated country. 2. The international community should approach the Bangladesh government and needs to press the government to allow the Rohingya educated people to be able to do job in INGO/NGO. 3. The international community should seek the permission for the Rohingya students to be able to study in government universities of Bangladesh. 4. The global community needs to press on China and Russia to stop supporting Myanmar in Rohingya case anymore. 5. The UN stance on Rohingya issue should be made stronger than ever by the global community in order to save the Rohingyas from genocide in future. 6. The UN should take effective steps to put an end to the suffering of Rohingya community. There is also some suggestion from Mr. Shaukhat Kyaw Soe Aung Ali (aka) M.S.K.  Jilani, founder and executive director, The Rohingya American Society, USA. 1. The world community, UN, USC, ICJ, ICC, US, EU, ASEAN, OIC, and international NGOs should take more aggressive diplomatic actions against Myanmar government to stop genocide of Rohingyas immediately until Myanmar government and its brutal military forces confess they are guilty of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity and solve the Rohingya problems without any pretext under UN supervision and with full respect to international laws and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

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2. Bangladesh, China, and India as well as ASEAN countries should understand that Rohingya refugee crisis is a global concern and a matter of global issue; it is not a humanitarian issue, but, a political one, so they must persuade and exert strong pressure on Myanmar to root out all obstacles for Rohingyas and restore their rights and call back all its citizens in Bangladesh unconditionally with dignity and honor. 3. The world must provide help and assistance continuously to the governments of Bangladesh and Myanmar in support of the speedy solution and repatriation of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh and other countries. 4. Myanmar government must be pressured to show its willingness to settle and solve Rohingya crisis by dismantling all IDP camps in Arakan and letting the Rohingyas to move and build their houses in their original places, remove travel restrictions, and allow the Rohingyas freedom of movement and right to work freely for their survival. 5. Myanmar government must create a neutral team for investigation and reconciliation under a commission comprising Rakhine and Rohingya representatives to bring peace and harmony in Arakan, Myanmar, so the two communities can start a new era of progress and development in the region.

Conclusion Like the conflicts faced in the past, one can assume that the Rohingya issue has to wait for years to resolve as it has been seen that there are many claimed genocidal conflicts and violence in the past which are still not recognized or met with justice in the international court. The study highlights that although going back to Myanmar is a dream for many of the Rohingya refugees, all of these will work only if Myanmar and other stakeholders assure this community’s rights and security, which seems almost impossible under the current circumstances. The military government has shown aggression in the past toward Rohingyas, and it may again become a significant threat for the resettlement and resolution of Rohingya issues. Moreover, the Rohingyas in the Bangladesh refugee camps and elsewhere are going through some major problems of education, health, and security. The community is also facing a major backlash in many host countries where they are considered illegal infiltrators or immigrants and face force

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repatriation. In some countries they are mostly dependent on UN agencies or nongovernment organizations and are denied any help or even basic human rights by the government. Myanmar’s political, economic, and strategic interest also stops many superpowers of the world to either supporting the Myanmar or acting slowly against it. The so-called insufficient action from the international community also makes the Rohingya community worried about their future. Many Rohingya experts believe that delay in getting a tangible solution to Rohingya problem will increase identity crisis among Rohingyas and increase the risk of further radicalization of this persecuted community. Along with the fast-track solution, the Rohingya community demands for education and basic human rights are the topmost priority. More significantly, international pressure is created on Bangladesh, which is a major Rohingya host country, to fulfill the educational need of Rohingya children. As stated by one of the Rohingya experts, “a community is only as good as his education. Without an education, a community could not function. In today’s age community would be extinct.” The study also finds that many Rohingyas are applauding the generosity and humanitarian work of Bangladesh for its long-term support to the Rohingya community but this country is also criticized for not taking strong steps to protect and safeguard from human trafficking and other forms of crime against Rohingyas. Many experts also criticize the shutting down of internet and other communication tools and restricting the community’s free movement. Many show concerns about the community living in dirty and overcrowded camps during these time of COVID-19 pandemic. “We are facing discrimination around everywhere but we are not demanding Political, right? We’re not demanding the citizenship, right? We need Human and Social Rights” (Khin Maung; 60: 02). Finally, the authors of this chapter share and agree with the combine views of M.S.J. Jilani that the Rohingya crisis is not an internal matter of Myanmar; it is a global humanitarian and political crisis, particularly a serious regional security matter of ASEAN countries. So, the UN and UNSC must act immediately to stop genocide against Rohingyas by the Myanmar government and its brutal forces before it is too late. It is the moral obligation of the international community to save the Rohingyas by all available means.

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References Amnesty International. (2018). Asia and pacific Migration. Accessed 05 04, 2020. https://www.amnesty.org/en/get-­i nvolved/take-­a ction/empower­rohingya-­children-­with-­education/ Bernard, H. R. (2002). Research methods in anthropology: Qualitative and quantitative approaches (3rd ed.). Alta Mira Press. Campbell, D.  T. (1955). The informant in quantitative research. The American Journal of Sociology, 60, 339–342. Carroll, J. (2014, August 4). Myanmar’s Rohingya deprived of education. Aljazeera. Accessed on March 02, 2020. Available at https://www. aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/08/myanmar-­r ohingya-­d eprived-­ education-­201484105134827695.html?xif=) Council on Foreign Relations. (January 23, 2020). The Rohingya Crisis. Accessed on November 10, 2020. Available at https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/ rohingya-crisis CBSN 2018 Original; weaponising social media; the Rohingya crisis Accessed Date May 05, 2020 Available at https://www.cbsnews.com/news/rohingya-­ refugee-­crisis-­myanmar-­weaponizing-­social-­media-­main/ Joniad, J. N. (2019). We, the Rohingya youth, demand our right to an education. 31 December. Accessed 05 04, 2020. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/rohingya-­youth-­demand-­education-­191229095213580.html?xif=) Kalin, I., Bulbul, K., & Ozipek, B.B. (2008). Aşk ile Nefret Arasında Türkiye’de Toplumun Batı Algısı (Western Perceptions in Turkey between Love and Hate). Ankara: SETA Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfi (Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research, SETA). Available at https://www.setav.org/ask-­i le-­n efret-­a rasinda-­t urkiyede-­t oplumun-­ bati-­algisi-­3/ Karmel, T. S., & Jain, M. (1987). Comparison of purposive and random sampling schemes for estimating capital expenditure. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 82, 52–57. Kvale, S. (1996). Inter views: An introduction to qualitative research interviewing. Sage Publications. Lee, R. (2019). Extreme speech in Myanmar: The role of state media in the Rohingya forced migration crisis. International Journal of Communication, 13(2019), 3203–3224. McCracken, G. (1988). The long interview. Sage. Patton, M.  Q. (1990). Qualitative evaluation and research methods. Sage Publications. Rohingya Solidarity Organization-RSO. (2019, September 9). INFOGRAPHIC-­ Top Rohingya-hosting countries. Anadolu Agency. Available at https:// www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-­p acific/infographic-­t op-­r ohingya-­h osting-­ countries/1563674 (08.03.2021).

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Seidler, J. (1974). On using informants: A technique for collecting quantitative data and controlling measurement error in organisation analysis. American Sociological Review, 39, 816–831. Snedecor, G. W. (1939). Design of sampling experiments in the social sciences. Journal of Farm Economics, 21, 846–855. The Guardian. (June 29, 2020). Cox’s Bazar refugee camps: where social distancing is impossible. Accessed on October 29, 2020. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2020/jun/29/ not-fit-for-a-human-coronavirus-in-coxs-bazarrefugee-camps Topp, L., Barker, B., & Degenhardt, L. (2004). The external validity of results derived from ecstasy users recruited using purposive sampling strategies. Drug and Alcohol Dependence, 73, 33–40. Tremblay, M.-A. (1957). The key informant technique: A nonethnographic application. American Anthropologist, 59, 699–701. Zelditch, M., Jr. (1962). Some methodological problems of field studies. The American Journal of Sociology, 67, 566–576.

Index1

A Abdurrahman Effendi, 241 Academic, 146, 154 Accountability, 142 Accusation, 136 Address, 140, 142, 160, 163, 164 Administration, 149 Adopted Islam, 268 Advisory, 155, 164 Afghanistan, 51, 189, 190, 201 Against, 136–140, 143, 145, 153, 155, 160, 162, 164 Agency, 141, 142 Agreement, 138, 143, 149, 159 AKP Government, 235 Akyab, 364 Aljazeera, 292 Amar Ujala, 297 Amicable, 142 Amyosaun Ubade, 85, 88–89 Amyotha Hluttaw, 78, 79 Analysis, 146

Ankara, 238, 240 Annan, 158 Another, 141, 148, 152, 160 Arab(s), 2, 6, 7, 9–11, 9n6, 358 Arab traders, 2, 6, 8, 9 Arakan, 2–16, 2n2, 8n6, 21, 36, 53, 54, 234, 237, 250, 252, 253, 268, 269, 291–293, 303, 304, 358, 360, 364 Arakanese Muslims, 244–247, 250 Arakan Platform, 253 Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), 190, 199, 292, 362 Army(ies), 136, 137 ARSA militants, 280 Article, 160, 161 Asia, 135, 161, 192, 206 Assembly, 140 Association, 151 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 54, 61, 150 Asylum, 142, 158

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 K. Bülbül et al. (eds.), Rohingya Refugee Crisis in Myanmar, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6464-9

413

414 

INDEX

Ataturk, 239 Atrocities, 162 Atrocity of Myanmar army, 276, 277, 280–281 Attention, 262, 264, 276, 277, 279, 283, 285 Aung San Suu Kyi, 140, 301 Authority, 136, 138, 139, 141, 155, 163, 164 Awami League, 102, 105, 113, 118, 125 B Background, 146 Bamar ethnicity, 72, 78, 81, 82, 93 Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, 239 Bangladesh, xxi, 50, 51, 54, 55, 60, 62–64, 71, 73, 75–77, 89, 91, 92, 97–125, 101n1, 101n3, 102n4, 102n6, 103n7, 109n8, 114n10, 117n11, 118n12, 122n13, 135–164, 190, 195, 199–203, 233, 234, 238–241, 243, 245–247, 250, 252, 253, 262, 264–270, 272–278, 280–285, 291–293, 296, 300–306, 308, 309, 337, 338, 342–346 Bangladesh border, 274, 279, 280 Bangladesh economy, 281, 282 Bangladeshi media, 262, 265–267, 278, 281, 283–286 Bangladeshi people, 279 Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), 104 Bay of Bengal, 197, 205 Behavior, 140 Belongingness, 347 Belt and Road, 174 Belt and Road Initiative, 218, 224 Bengal, 3, 6, 7, 10–12, 16, 156

Bengali, 358–360 Bengali Immigrant, 307 Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), 151 Between, 135, 136, 140, 143, 146, 147, 149, 154, 156, 159, 163 Beyond, 145, 152 Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP), 195, 199, 200, 203 Bhashan Char, 372 Bhutan, 51, 54, 62 Bilateral, 138, 150, 159, 160 Birth, 274 Bloodshed, 136 Bloody, 139 Bodily harm, 26 Border, 136, 143, 163 Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS), 62 British, 85, 358, 360, 361 British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 292, 297 British Colonial Period, 360–361 British rule, 269 Buddha, 275 Buddhist, xxi, 2, 4, 6, 9, 11, 13, 72, 73, 77, 80–83, 85, 88, 90–93, 358, 359, 362 Buddhist Arakanese, 76, 92 Buddhist majority, 280 Buddhists, 136, 137, 141, 143, 144, 149, 155, 163, 293 Burma, 73, 76, 144, 157, 314, 315, 321, 324, 358, 360, 361 Burmese, 137, 143, 145, 147, 149, 293 Burmese nationalists, 268 Burned villages, 280 Business, 137, 150, 151 Butchery, 138 Buthidaung, 292

 INDEX 

C Cable News Network (CNN), 292 Calamity, 140, 158 Caliphs, 9 Camp, 159 Capital, 4, 5, 8n6 Carnages, 138 Catastrophe, 139, 141, 143, 275 Challenges, 202–203 Chapter, 145 Children, 268, 274–277, 279 China, 140, 157, 160–163, 194–196, 262, 263, 276, 277, 283, 309 Chinese, 140, 162 Chinese migrants, 75 Chittagong, 2, 5–7, 9n6, 10, 11, 141 Chomsky, Noam, 307 Christians, 81, 82 Citizenship, 73, 76, 84–87, 136, 138, 139, 291, 293 Citizenship (Amendment) Act (CAA), 193, 200, 201, 203 Citizenship rights, 358, 361, 373, 374 Civil, 138, 148 Civilian, 143 Civilisation, 136 Cleansing, 139 Clearance, 136, 145 Clearance operations, 25, 26, 29–31 Cohesive society, 340, 341 Cold War, 216 Colonial, 149 Commercial, 2, 6–8, 10, 11, 15 Commission, 158, 164 Common, 147, 153, 155–157, 160 Communal, 143, 148, 149 Communal conflict, 75, 76, 80, 89, 90, 93 Communal outbreak, 78, 91 Community, 137, 138, 140, 142, 144–149, 152–155, 158, 160–164, 291–293, 301, 304

415

Conflict, 146, 147, 152, 154 Connectivity, 150, 151 Constitution, 143 Constructivism, 98–99 Constructivist approach, 83 Contextual evidence, 27 Convention, 143 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 193 Cooperation, 154, 161, 296, 302–303, 306 Council, 140, 162, 163 Country, 139–142, 145, 148, 150, 155, 157, 158, 160, 162, 164 Cox’s Bazar, 158, 234, 263, 281, 331, 358, 359 Crime against Rohingya, 304 Crimes, 139 Crisis, 135, 139–141, 143, 145, 147, 151, 153, 154, 157, 160, 163, 164, 317–322, 324, 325, 328–331 Cruelty towards Rohingyas, 282 Cultural Revolution, 221 D Daily Dhaka Tribune, 274, 275, 279–282 Daily Star, 265, 266, 268, 270–271, 274, 275, 277, 279, 280, 283, 284 Dainik Ittefaq, 266, 270–272, 274, 281, 282, 284 Dainik Jagran, 297 Dainik Kaler Kantho, 266, 270, 271, 273–275, 281 Darwinian, 147 Data, 146 Democracy, 138, 153, 196 Democratic, 140

416 

INDEX

Deport, 296 Deprived, 138, 142 Destabilize, 138, 163 Development, 150, 160 Dhaka, 238, 240 Dictator, 144 Dignity, 158 Diplomatic, 142, 150, 159, 162 Diplomatic negotiation, 283 Disaster, 136, 138, 141 Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD), 235, 243, 245, 246 Discourse analysis, 100 Discrimination, 136, 146 Domestic, 139, 150, 157, 161, 163 Doordarshan, 298 Drug trafficking, 281 Dynasty, 4, 5, 10, 11 E East Bengal, 358 Eastern, 141 Economic, 137, 142, 146, 151, 152, 156, 157, 160, 162 Economic Interest, 196–197 Education, 345–348 Efficient, 161 Election, 144, 157 Election Commission (EC), 84 Embargo, 140, 317, 319, 321–323 Emergency, 139, 149 English newspaper, 297 Environmental, 152 Epistemological, 146, 148 Ethnic, 135–164, 291–293 Ethnic cleansing, 190, 292, 300, 305 Ethnic groups, 76, 77, 81, 82 Ethnicity, 141, 146 Ethnic minorities, 72, 75, 79, 81–83, 92, 93, 194

Europe, 139 European commissioner, 349 European Union (EU), 276, 277 Example, 139, 154 Exclusive stories, 276 Executive, 163 Exodus, 177 Expatriate, 140 External, 151 Extremist, 139 Extremist groups, 196 F Fact-Finding, 139, 158 Factors, 136, 146, 150, 157 Fake info, 284 Findings, 143, 164 Fire, 274, 281 First World War, 239, 242 Food & Nutrition, 349–350 Food shortages, 275 Forced labour, 19–38 Force migration, 190 Forced migration, 19–38 Forces, 136–138, 140, 145 Forcibly displaced, 189 Foreign, 135–164 Foreigners Act, 193, 195 Foreign Policy, 211–227 Foreign Policy Association (FPA), 215, 216 Fundamental, 138, 145 Fund and cooperation, 279 G Gang-raped, 274, 280 Genealogy, 329 General, 140, 143, 149, 158 Geneva Convention, 343 Genocidal intent, 24, 27–33

 INDEX 

Genocide, 19–38, 139, 153, 212, 213, 225, 296, 304, 331 Geographical, 140, 145, 150, 157, 163 Global media, 292 Government of Bangladesh, 343 Government of India, 193, 299, 301 Governments, 136–138, 140, 143, 148, 150, 151, 155, 156, 158, 159, 162, 163, 338, 339 Gross, 137, 138, 140 Gross National Income, 177 Groups, 136–142, 144–149, 154, 159, 162, 163 Growth rate, 181 Gül, Abdullah (President), 239 H Harassment, 141 Harmony, 342, 344 Hasina, Sheikh (Prime Minister), 98, 104, 106, 113–123, 114n10, 118n12, 239 Hate, 296 Headlines, 298–302, 304, 305, 307 Health, 345, 346, 350 Hegemony, 140, 150, 161 Helplessness, 276, 277, 282 Hindu minorities, 280 Historical, 147, 164 History, 136, 139, 147 Hope, 275 Hosting, 97, 109, 122, 124, 125 Human, 136, 138, 140, 142, 145–148, 154, 156 Humane, 283 Humanitarian, 97–101, 107, 108, 110–114, 119–123, 125, 135, 138, 142, 162, 296, 299, 305, 307, 308, 338, 344–346, 348, 349, 351, 352

417

Humanitarian assistance, 234–236, 243, 318, 367 Humanitarian Based Approach, 357–374 Humanitarian crisis, 234, 236, 239, 242, 245, 247, 254, 261, 263, 274, 276, 278, 284, 285 Humanitarian policy, 235, 236 Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH), 252 Humanitarian resolutions, 367 Humanity, 136, 139 Human right(s), 65, 264, 265, 268, 269 Human Rights Watch (HRW), 56, 73, 75, 83, 87–89, 91, 92, 190 Human smuggling, 49 Human trafficking, 48–53, 55–61, 63–65, 281 Hydro, 151 I Ibrahim Ali Molla, 241 Idealism, 156 Identity, 141, 144, 149, 153, 154, 159 Identity crises, 372 Ideological, 157 Illegal, 156 Illegal Bengali, 291 Illegal Bengali migrants, 73, 74 Illegal immigrant(s), 195, 269 Illegal migrant, 278, 281 Immediately, 275 Immigration, 144 Importance, 140, 150 Incompatible, 156 Independent, 135, 139 India, 140, 157, 160, 189–206, 268, 276, 277, 282, 283 India and China's role, 283

418 

INDEX

Indian, 140 Indian Mass Media, 297 Indian media, 292, 294, 308, 309 Indian province, 358 Indigenous, 147, 148 Indonesia, 276, 277 Infants, 280 Influxes, 136, 138, 141, 162 Information, 145, 146 Infrastructure, 151, 154 Institutions, 137, 154, 161 Instrumentalism, 148 Insurgency, 276, 277 Intercommunity, 93 Interests, 137, 139, 140, 143, 144, 148, 150–152, 155, 157, 160 Interfaith marriage, 85, 88 Internal, 143 Internal affairs, 194 International, 139–143, 145, 146, 152, 162–164 International agencies, 201–202 International and regional actors, 283 International border, 359 International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), 82, 89 International community, 369, 371, 373 International Court of Justice (ICJ), 304, 338 International crime, 48 International Criminal Court (ICC), 264, 280, 369 International humanitarian agenda, 234 International Labor Organization (ILO), 48, 53, 55, 56 International law, 357 International relations, 215–218 Islam, 1–16, 358 Islamophobia, 197, 198

J Japanese, 293 Japanese invasion, 358, 360 Joint, 143 Journalists, 141 Jugantor, 266, 270–274, 277, 281, 283 Junta, 144, 322 K Kachin, 22, 33, 36 Kachin Independence Army, 82 Kamal Pasha, 239 Kashmir, 203 Kazi Nazrul Islam, 239 Killed, 136, 137, 148 Kingdom, 1–16 Kofi, 158 Kutupalong, 325 Kutupalong Rohingya camp, 285 Kyaukphyu, 364 Kyi, 141 L Language, 146 Laureate, 141 Laws, 144 League, 163 Legislature, 72, 77–82, 85–89, 93, 94 Liberation, 161 Liberation war of 1971, 282 Limitations, 142, 164 Livelihood, 348–350 Local traffickers, 282 Long-term Solutions, 370–372 M MaBaTha, 85, 88–90, 93 Majoritarianism, 80, 81, 91

 INDEX 

Maldives, 51, 54, 60, 276, 277 Marayu, 4 Massacre, 136, 150 Mass exodus, 325 Mass media, 291–309 Massive exodus, 371 Maungdaw, 292, 364 Measures, 24, 25, 34, 35, 37, 38 Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), 73, 75, 83, 86–89, 91, 92 Media, 291–309 Meghna to the Rakhine state, 358 Members, 137, 139, 152–154, 161–164 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), 302 Mental harm, 24, 26 Methodology, 145, 147 Migration, 48, 50, 52–54, 62, 64, 65, 145, 155, 156, 190–192, 291 Military, 136, 137, 139, 140, 143, 145, 150, 151, 158 Minister, 137, 140 Minority, 21, 22, 30, 35, 38, 136, 190, 198, 200, 291–293, 307 Mission, 139 Modus operandi, 27, 32 Moorish, 358 Most persecuted minorities, 338 Mother, 274 Mughal rule, 358 Mughals in India, 358 Muhammad, 6, 8, 8n6, 9 Muslim countries, 276, 277 Muslim kingdoms, 358 Muslim Rohingyas, 190, 193 Muslim(s), xxi, 2, 2n1, 3, 6, 7, 9–13, 10n7, 15, 16, 76, 80–84, 86–94, 261, 263, 268, 274, 276, 277, 293, 298, 301, 303 Muslims in Rakhine, 87

419

Myanmar, 2, 2n1, 3, 8n6, 11, 16, 53, 54, 61, 62, 135–164, 190, 193–199, 204–206, 212–219, 221–227, 234, 238, 240–247, 250–253, 261–266, 268, 269, 274–278, 280–285, 291–293, 296, 299–304, 306–309, 313, 315–318, 320–333, 337, 338, 344, 345, 358, 359, 361–365, 367–374 Myanmar army, 285 Myanmar citizens, 359 Myanmar’s Rohingya politics and policy, 72 N Naf river, 279 Naramitlha, 2, 11, 12 National, 140, 141, 150, 157 National interest, 191 Nationalism, 138, 147, 360, 361 Nationalist, 139, 147 Nationality, 142 National League for Democracy (NLD), 86–88, 90–92 National Registration of Citizens (NRC), 201, 203, 308 National survey, 81 Nations, 146, 161, 163 Nay Pyi Taw, 72, 75, 86 Neighboring, 150, 154, 162 Neighbourhood, 275 Nepal, 51, 53–55, 58, 59, 62–64 New Delhi Television (NDTV), 294, 298, 303–308 News, 292, 294, 296–301, 303–308 News channels, 297, 298 1982, 136, 139, 144 1994, 147, 148 1993, 138, 148 1992, 138

420 

INDEX

1978, 143 1979, 143 1972, 160 1962, 148 Nobel, 141 Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, 283 Nobody's people, 279 No-man’s land, 279 Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 62–64, 193, 202, 301, 309, 337–352 Non-refoulement, 192 North, 139 Northern, 137, 145 Northern Rakhine state, 75–76, 80, 83 Nuclear, 140, 156, 160 O Objectives, 146, 147 Ocean, 151 Of, 135–164 Office of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), 73–75, 83, 85–89, 91, 92 Official, 144, 152 Open border, 275 Open door, 192 Operation Nagamin, 268 Operation(s), 137, 316, 329 Oppression, 146 Order, 142, 152, 161 Organization, 48, 57, 59, 63, 64 Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), 146, 161, 163, 234 Organized crime, 48 Other, 137–139, 141, 143, 145, 147–149, 151–154, 156, 157, 159–164 Ottoman, 236, 237, 239–242 Ottoman Empire, 237, 239–242

P Pakistan, 51, 54, 55, 57, 63, 140, 155, 160, 161, 163 Palermo convention, 49 Panic, 279 Parliament, 163 Pathan, 358 Peace, 135, 141, 163, 164 Peacefully, 149, 159, 164 Peacemaker, 154 People, 136–138, 140–144, 146–149, 152, 154, 157–159, 163, 164 Permanent, 139, 156, 158, 161–164 Persecuted minorities, 358 Persecution, 138, 139, 153, 190, 269, 276, 280, 283, 285, 296, 299, 357, 360, 372 Persian, 358 Philanthropic, 162 Philosophy, 137, 156 Police, 136, 137, 141 Policy, 135–164 Political, 137, 138, 142–144, 146–150, 155, 156, 164 Political Reformation in Myanmar (2011–2015), 361 Political significance, 359 Politics, 152, 153, 161, 164, 293 Polygamy, 85, 88 Population, 138, 145, 149 Population control, 85, 88 Power, 148, 149, 155, 157, 163, 164 Powerful, 159, 160 Prabhat Khabar, 297 Prerogative, 155, 157 President, 157, 163 Pressure on Myanmar, 276, 277, 283 Prime, 140, 163 Primordialism, 147 Primordialist, 147 Problem, 137, 142, 150, 152, 162 Projected growth, 177

 INDEX 

Projects, 160 Proposals, 139, 162 Protection, 345, 346 Protection of Children from Sexual offences (POCSO), 57 Protracted, 142, 143, 158, 163, 164 Pure water, 274 Push back, 276, 277 Push in, 277 Pyithu Hluttaw, 78 Q Qualitative, 145 Qualitative research, 294 Quasi-civilian rule, 77 R Race and Religion Protection Laws, 82 Rahman, Ziaur (Bangladeshi President), 98, 105–113, 114n10, 123, 238 Rakhine, 1, 2n1, 2n2, 15, 20–24, 27–34, 36–38, 136–141, 145–146, 151, 152, 157–159, 164, 190, 194, 197, 199, 261, 263, 268, 269, 276, 277, 280, 281, 284, 285, 291, 292, 298, 303, 304, 307, 308 Rakhine Nationalities Development Party (RNDP), 85, 91 Rakhine state, 357, 358, 361, 363, 364, 368, 372 Rakhine unrest, 284 Rape, 137, 141, 153 Rathedaung, 292 Realism, 156, 191, 206 Reasonable solution, 276, 277, 283–285 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, 239, 247–249 Refugee exodus, 189

421

Refugee Laws, 202–203 Refugee policy, 98, 100, 114, 116, 124 Refugee(s), 97–104, 110, 111, 114, 116, 117, 117n11, 120, 121, 124, 125, 135–137, 143, 145, 154, 158, 159, 162, 233–254, 319 Refugee status to Rohingyas, 281 Regime, 98, 99, 103, 106–113, 115–119, 121–123 Region, 143, 146, 151, 152, 160, 161 Regional, 140, 143, 145, 150, 151, 154, 160–164 Regional Cooperation, 61 Registration, 276, 277, 284 Relations, 140, 161–163 Relationship, 145, 157, 162 Religion, 136–138 Religious, 136, 141, 144, 163 Repatriate, 143 Repatriation, 138, 143, 159, 160, 163, 164, 182, 183, 265, 269, 276, 277, 284, 285, 359, 368–370, 372 Reports, 137, 159 Research, 136, 145 Researchers, 144, 147 Resolution(s), 138, 142, 144, 160, 162, 163, 319, 320, 322 Resource-based political conflicts, 173 Resources, 138, 142, 145, 150, 151 Restrictive, 97, 99, 113, 116, 118, 120–123 Retrospective, 139, 141, 164 Return, 159 Rights, 139–142, 144, 145, 152, 154, 157, 158, 164 Riots, 143, 145, 164 Rohingya community, 357, 359 Rohingya crisis, 294, 303, 307, 309, 358–363, 367–370, 372–374

422 

INDEX

Rohingya diaspora, 292, 331 Rohingya exodus, 278, 285 Rohingya hatred, 283 Rohingya identity, 74, 87 Rohingya Muslim(s), 73, 75–77, 84, 86, 87, 89–93, 291, 293, 294, 296, 299, 301, 303, 307 Rohingya refugee(s), 73, 190–192, 194–196, 198–200, 202, 203, 206, 233, 234, 244, 250–251, 291–309, 337–352 Rohingya(s), 1–16, 2n1, 2n2, 9n6, 19–38, 97–125, 118n12, 135–164, 189–206, 211–213, 215, 218, 219, 222–227, 233–254, 262–266, 268–269, 274–286, 313–319, 321, 322, 324–326, 328–333, 337–352 Rohingyas instead of Refugees, 276, 277, 281–283 ROHRIngya, 194 Ruhmi, 8, 8n6 Russia, 139, 146, 162, 276, 277 Rwandan, 147 S Safe zone, 276, 277, 283, 284 Sanitation, 275–277, 284, 285 Satellite television, 267 Saudi Arabia, 276, 277 Save the Children Fund, 348 Savior, 265 Secretary, 140, 161 Security, 136, 138–140, 143, 145, 151, 158, 163, 164 Security & concerns, 296 Security Council, 361, 368, 369 Security issue, 299–300, 303 Self-defense, 280 Semantic context, 296 September, 136, 138, 141, 145, 149, 157, 159

Sexual, 139, 141 Sexually, 136 Shah, 11–14 Sino-Bangladesh Ties, 219–221 Sino-Myanmar, 150, 157 Sittwe, 364 Smuggling, 281 Social, 137, 146 Social cohesion, 337–352 Social identity, 238 Socialist Republic (1962–1988), 361 Solution, 138, 143 South, 135, 160 South Asia, 48, 50–54, 56, 61, 64, 65, 71, 76, 240 South Asian, 337 The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), 48, 49, 51, 54, 61, 63 Southeast, 135, 163 South-East Asia, 71 Southeast Asian, 190, 196, 206 South eastern, 337 Special, 139, 162 Special stories, 276 Sri Lanka, 51, 53, 54, 59, 62, 63 Stability, 135 Stakeholder(s), 138, 139, 143, 150, 154, 161, 162 State censorship, 74–75 Stateless, 136, 138, 139, 142 State(s), 135–146, 150, 156–163 Still coming, 275 Stop genocide, 275 Stop torture, 275 Strategic, 139, 157, 160 Struggle, 146 Sufferings, 276, 277, 281 Sufis, 13, 15 Sultan, 7, 12, 14 Sultanate, 10, 12, 14, 16 Superpower, 140 Sustainable, 138, 143

 INDEX 

Swaraj, Sushma, 306 sympathy, 282 Syria, 189, 190 Systematically, 136, 139, 141, 144, 164 T Terror, 137 Terror & Terrorist, 296 Terrorist, 281 Textbook, 139 Textile, 239 Thandwe, 370 Thein Sein, 74, 76, 86–88 Thematic Analysis, 291–309 Themes, 294–296, 298–306 Theoretical, 145, 146 Theory(ies), 147, 149 Thousands of Rohingyas influx to Bangladesh, 283 Threat, 281 Time, 136, 138, 147, 153, 163 The Times of India (TOI), 294, 298–302, 308 Torture(s), 136, 141 Tourism, 137 Tourism business, 179 Trade, 2, 6, 8, 11, 15, 137, 156, 162 Traditions, 143 Traumatized, 274 Triangular, 140 TRT World, 251 Truth, 136 Turk, 358 Turkey, 276, 277 Turkish Airlines, 242 Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA), 234–236, 240, 243–245, 254 Turkish Foreign Minister, 241 Turkish Health Ministry, 243

423

Turkish President, 243, 247–249 Two, 135, 139, 141, 142, 146, 148, 151, 157, 159, 160 2018, 135–137, 144, 153, 157, 158 2015, 135, 139, 142, 152, 153, 157 2017, 137, 139–143, 145, 146, 149, 151–155, 158–160, 162 2016, 140, 153 U Ultranationalism, 77 Ultra-nationalist Buddhists, 77, 85, 88 UN ESCAP, 55 U.N General Assembly (UNGA), 368 Union, 156, 157 Union of Myanmar (1988–2005), 361 United, 139, 146 United Nations Children’s fund (UNICEF), 344–348 United Nations Commission for Human Rights (UNCHR), 292 United Nations Convention on Transitional Organised Crime (UNTOC), 56 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 339–341, 343 United Nations High Commission for Refugee (UNHCR), 53, 54, 63, 189–195, 200, 202, 203, 276, 277, 337, 345, 347, 351 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 50, 56, 59 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 162, 163 United Nations (UN), 139, 140, 142, 143, 146, 151–153, 161–164, 190, 192n3, 205, 234, 243, 247, 253, 262, 283, 338, 341, 344, 349, 352

424 

INDEX

United Progressive Alliance (UPA), 194, 195, 200 UNITED PURPOSE, 351 United State of America (USA), 140, 145, 161, 262, 264, 276, 277 Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR), 193 Upper, 155, 157, 159, 163 V Victimized Rohingyas, 282 Violation(s), 140, 141, 212, 225, 317, 318, 320–323, 327, 330, 331 Violence, 136–139, 141, 144, 145, 148, 149, 153, 154, 158, 261, 269, 276, 277, 293, 296, 304, 308 Voluntary, 143, 154 Vulnerability, 136, 142 Vulnerable, 142 W War, 161 The Washington Post, 292 WASH program, 348

Weapons, 138, 140 Were, 136–139, 141, 144, 146, 149, 152, 154, 158 Western, 138 Western countries, 321, 322, 324, 326, 329–332 Western media, 264 White Card, 84–87 Wirathu, Ashin, 85, 88 Women, 49, 51, 54–56, 58–60, 63, 64, 274–277, 279–281 World, 136, 138–140, 142, 146, 153, 159, 163 World Bank, 51, 345 World Food Programme (WFP), 180 World's refugee day, 300 Y Yangon, 86, 87 Yardimeli Association (Vakfı), 252 Z Zia, Khaleda, 98, 105, 109–113, 123 Zone, 159