Rivals in Arms: The Rise of UK-France Defence Relations in the Twenty-First Century 9780228004974

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RIVALS IN ARMS

Human Dimensions in Foreign Policy, Military Studies, and Security Studies Series editors: Stéphanie A.H. Bélanger, Pierre Jolicoeur, and Stéfanie von Hlatky

Books published in the Human Dimensions in Foreign Policy, Military Studies, and Security Studies series offer fresh perspectives on foreign affairs and global governance. Titles in the series illuminate critical issues of global security in the twenty-first century and emphasize the human dimensions of war such as the health and well-being of soldiers, the factors that influence operational effectiveness, the civil-military relations and decisions on the use of force, as well as the ethical, moral, and legal ramifications of ongoing conflicts and wars. Foreign policy is also analyzed both in terms of its impact on human rights and the role the public plays in shaping policy directions. With a strong focus on definitions of security, the series encourages discussion of contemporary security challenges and welcomes works that focus on issues including human security, violent conflict, terrorism, military cooperation, and foreign and defence policy. This series is published in collaboration with Queen’s University and the Royal Military College of Canada with the Centre for International and Defence Policy, the Canadian Institute for Military and Veteran Health Research, and the Centre for Security, Armed Forces, and Society. 1 Going to War? Trends in Military Interventions Edited by Stéfanie von Hlatky and H. Christian Breede 2 Bombs, Bullets, and Politicians France’s Response to Terrorism Christophe Chowanietz 3 War Memories Commemoration, Recollections, and Writings on War Edited by Stéphanie A.H. Bélanger and Renée Dickason 4 Disarmament under International Law John Kierulf

5 Contract Workers, Risk, and the War in Iraq Sierra Leonean Labor Migrants at US Military Bases Kevin J.A. Thomas 6 Violence and Militants From Ottoman Rebellions to Jihadist Organizations Baris Cayli 7 Frontline Justice The Evolution and Reform of Summary Trials in the Canadian Armed Forces Pascal Lévesque 8 Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism Assessing Domestic and International Strategies Edited by Stéfanie von Hlatky 9 Transhumanizing War Performance Enhancement and the Implications for Policy, Society, and the Soldier Edited by H. Christian Breede, Stéphanie A.H. Bélanger, and Stéfanie von Hlatky 10 Coping with Geopolitical Decline The United States in European Perspective Edited by Frédéric Mérand 11 Rivals in Arms The Rise of UK-France Defence Relations in the Twenty-First Century Alice Pannier

RIVALS IN ARMS The Rise of UK-France Defence Relations in the Twenty-First Century

A L I C E PA N N I E R

McGill-Queen’s University Press Montreal & Kingston • London • Chicago

© McGill-Queen’s University Press 2020 isbn isbn isbn isbn

978-0-2280-0355-7 978-0-2280-0356-4 978-0-2280-0497-4 978-0-2280-0498-1

(cloth) (paper) (ep df ) (ep ub )

Legal deposit fourth quarter 2020 Bibliothèque nationale du Québec Printed in Canada on acid-free paper that is 100% ancient forest free (100% post-consumer recycled), processed chlorine free

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Title: Rivals in arms : the rise of UK-France defence relations in the twenty-first century / Alice Pannier. Names: Pannier, Alice, 1988– author. Series: Human dimensions in foreign policy, military studies, and security studies ; 11. Description: Series statement: Human dimensions in foreign policy, military studies, and security studies ; 11 | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: Canadiana (print) 20200277723 | Canadiana (ebook) 20200277855 | ISBN 9780228003564 (softcover) | IS BN 9780228003557 (cloth) | I SB N 9780228004974 (eP df ) | ISBN 9780228004981 (eP U B ) Subjects: l cs h: France—Military relations—Great Britain. | l c sh : Great Britain Military relations—France. Classification: l cc ua700 .p 36 2020 | ddc 355/.033041—dc23

This book was typeset in 10.5/13 Sabon.

To all my friends and mentors (often the same)

Contents

Figures and Tables Foreword

xi

xiii

Acknowledgments

xix

Introduction 3 1 Bilateral Relationships and Euro-Atlantic Security

14

2 Managing Bilateral Relationships: Analytical Framework

43

3 Deploying Military Force 70 4 Developing Joint Military Capacity 101 5 Integrating Defence Industries

129

6 Adaptation and Learning in the Bilateral Relationship Conclusion: The UK and France from Lancaster House to Brexit

183

Annex: Affiliations of Interviewees 205 Notes

209

Index

263

160

Figures and Tables

f ig u r es 1.1 4.1

Cooperation governance structures cjef command architecture 115

40

ta b l es 5.1 5.2 6.1

Main armament projects that could be traded against the Sea Venom/anl 151 The search for balance in armament cooperation 157 Cooperation challenges and adaptation strategies 162

Foreword

Any observer of European international politics will be aware of two paradoxes: first, that while bilateral relations between governments are what stitch the system together, they are rarely subjected to detailed analysis or scholarly scrutiny; second, more particularly, that the two most significant powers of the region, France and the United Kingdom, are locked into a bilateral relationship which is at once interdependent, friendly, and deeply uneasy. Alice Pannier’s innovative study, rich in empirical detail and theoretical insight, is therefore much to be welcomed. It throws light on both the general phenomenon of bilateralism and the critical defence dimension of the entente between London and Paris. It is generally presumed that any two states which talk of their “special relationship” will take each other’s concerns into account before focusing on others or on the wider system. But that does not lead sentiment to prevail over interests. It simply means that the understanding of shared interests sets a limit on the willingness to allow differences to escalate. On the other hand, even close allies take a transactional approach to specific arrangements which affect their foreign policy or their domestic stakeholders. No one gives presents in this business. Yet a fascinating question arises when states not only talk the talk of cooperation but also move to institutionalise it, as has happened since the Lancaster House agreements of 2010 between Britain and France: does institutionalisation lead to a convergence in the definition of interests to the point where it becomes difficult to act separately? This certainly happened after the Entente

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Cordiale of 1904, when structured if secretive military conversations effectively committed the UK to come to France’s aid in the event of a war with Germany. Dr Pannier’s study shows that rather than any tendency towards “diffuse reciprocity” which would steadily deepen cooperation between the two partners, the norm is still that of seeking a quid pro quo at any given negotiating table. Bargains are not driven so hard as to produce constant breakdowns of trust, nor is there an insouciance about any possible deterioration in the relationship, but it is clearly true that such hopes as exist that France and the UK might be developing a closeness on defence equivalent to that between France and Germany on European integration, are premature. This is despite the logic deriving from the two countries’ parallel trajectories, as upper-middle-range powers coping with the loss of empire and ever-greater pressures on their resources. Prima facie, it would seem inevitable that these two nuclear powers, still permanent members of the un Security Council and head and shoulders above any other European state in terms of foreign policy ambition, should want to rise above parochial concerns so as to scale up their influence – the same argument, indeed, on which the external actions of the eu itself rest. It might be faute de mieux but London and Paris do tend to see international relations through the same optic. They understand the difference between their roles and those of the US, China, and even Russia. They realise that history is moving against their privileged positions, and against Europe more generally, leading them to act whenever possible to promote not only a rule-based international system, but one where key flashpoints for conflict are defused and where any tendencies towards hegemony can be constrained. They are conservative powers, with a Burkean approach to change in the international system. In practice the logic of convergence is trumped by history and by the complexities of domestic systems, political, economic, and social. The foreign policy establishments may understand each other very well, observing long-established norms of competitive collaboration, but they can no longer take an acquiescent hinterland for granted. It is clear that, despite Brexit, France and the UK will wish to continue their cooperation on security and defence matters. Indeed, their

Foreword

xv

bilateral relationship might actually become closer, given the British need for partners and the continued lack of interest in Rome and Berlin in becoming a major security player. Yet at the same time they are vulnerable to shocks like that which the House of Commons inflicted on David Cameron in 2013 (and by extension on François Hollande) when he sought to join France in bombing the Assad regime after its use of chemical weapons. Even more fundamental are the rejections of orthodox politics represented by the election of Donald Trump, and in this context by the British vote in 2016, confirmed in the general election of 2019, to leave the eu . One result of Brexit is bound to be a greater disconnect in foreign policy, where the purposes for which defence capabilities exist in the first place are set. France knows that British diplomats (and most politicians) had no wish to opt out of the eu ’s system of diplomatic coordination, which has some real advantages and very few constraints. But it will have to do so, and France is unlikely to damage the Common Foreign and Security Policy in order to give London special privileges. The idea sometimes canvassed of a European Security Council to include Britain is not out of the question but would require a legal and political revolution inside the eu . Moreover, whereas at Saint-Malo in 1998 Franco-British cooperation served to kick-start a new phase of Europeanisation on matters of security and defence, that conjunction is no longer possible. This is one manifestation of a point well made by Alice Pannier, namely that no bilateral relationship can be abstracted, politically or analytically, from the wider context in which it exists. Here that means not only France’s continuing commitment to the European Union, and Britain’s probable drift towards increased dependence on the United States. It also points to the nato membership of both states and their vital interests in the stability of Europe in its widest sense, including the eastern and Mediterranean neighbourhoods. Thus a kind of variable geometry is at work shaping the two states’ relationship. Some geopolitical and institutional factors draw them together; others act to draw them apart. This explains both why the Lancaster House accords are important and likely to last, and why they show no signs of evolving into an ever-closer union on defence matters.

xvi

Foreword

In terms of the specific areas of cooperation Dr Pannier’s book comes up with the intriguing finding that Franco-British bilateralism seems to work best in the area which is also the most secret and sensitive, that of nuclear weapons. Despite the nuclear issue being at the heart of concerns about status and sovereign independence, it seems that the relatively small number of experts who manage the discussions reduces the complexity of interactions, while the existence of clear red lines on vital national interests tends to inhibit bureaucratic games-playing. In contrast, where the economics of defence is concerned the relationship is subject to the same competing incentives as exist in eu trade policy: while it makes sense to pool resources, even close partners remain fierce competitors for markets, contracts, and inward investment. The two sides are bound to be wary of each other over any proposal for joint procurement, as demonstrated by the dismal story of attempts to integrate operations from aircraft carriers. The sheer size of military-industrial bureaucracy in the modern state can sometimes lead one to forget that “defence” also entails the shedding of blood, of foes and of one’s own forces. Britain and France are still prone to war-fighting, at times in harness, as the case study in this book of the Libyan intervention of 2011 reminds us. They are the only Europeans willing and able to risk taking such a high profile – and indeed, seeking the prestige which comes from it. Whether the Libyan operation can be judged a success depends on the timeframe and criteria employed. But to the extent that it was, it is clear from Dr Pannier’s account that success was achieved almost in spite of Franco-British cooperation, not because of it. Differing objectives, rules of engagement, and attitudes toward nato participation caused problems throughout. It is perhaps no surprise that France subsequently went into Mali alone, although equally revealing that it has become more dependent on allied support as the “small war” has evolved into a long-running campaign. In Syria and Iraq, London and Paris have also committed air power and special forces, but they have been overshadowed by the sheer complexity of events and by the role of the United States. This too has hardly been a textbook example of bilateral coordination in the deployment of force.

Foreword

xvii

Despite these evident difficulties, France and the United Kingdom are doomed to cooperate in defence over the coming years. Whatever progress the eu makes with a Common Defence Policy, and assuming (against the odds) that the UK manages to resuscitate a national global role for itself after Brexit, the two countries are unlikely to diverge too far in their fundamental strategic needs. If nothing else their shared nuclear status places them in a unique position as European powers. Their relative lack of size and resources compared to the big continental states will also continue to drive them together. Yet such macro factors in themselves are far from guaranteeing the progressive development of common policies and practices which Lancaster House seemed to have presaged. As Alice Pannier shows through her meticulous research and careful analysis, institutions are one thing and politics quite another. Christopher Hill Emeritus Professor of International Relations Department of Politics and International Studies University of Cambridge

Acknowledgments

This book is the result of countless encounters and debates, and much support from many individuals and institutions since its inception. In its early stages, this project received financial support from the French and British ministries of defence. This facilitated my access to actors in the French and British defence communities to conduct fieldwork on which much of this book is based. I thus want to start by thanking the hundred or so individuals who have offered me their time and insights, through interviews and by allowing me to observe meetings and military exercises. Of course, any errors that may remain in this book are my sole responsibility. For the genesis of my interest in UK-French defence affairs which ultimately resulted in this book, dating back to 2010, I am grateful to the team at the Security Studies Centre at the French Institute for International Relations (ifri ) at the time, and in particular to Corentin Brustlein, Etienne de Durand, Marc Hecker, Aline Leboeuf, and Elie Tenenbaum. As I started my academic research on the subject, I greatly benefited from the intellectual stimulation and guidance of Michel Dobry at the Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, and then from Frédéric Ramel and William Philpott, my PhD supervisors at Sciences Po and King’s College London, respectively. I am also grateful to the Institute for Strategic Studies (irsem ), in Paris, for providing a vital platform for exchange with researchers and defence officials, both during my doctorate and later as a post-doctoral fellow. For their comments on my work, I want to thank Thierry Balzacq, Jean Joana,

xx

Acknowledgments

Ulrich Krotz, Frédéric Mérand, and Delphine Placidi-Frot. During a stay at Cambridge University, I met Christopher Hill, who shared my fascination with France and Britain and was later to become my colleague at Johns Hopkins; I thank him for agreeing to write a foreword to this book. At the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, I received both feedback and the support of colleagues, in particular Lisel Hintz, as well as Evgeny Finkel, Erik Jones, Silvia Merler, Jaehan Park, Henry Tugendhat, and participants in the Kissinger Center research workshop. Over the years many individuals have been involved in reading and discussing this book. I could not have completed this project without the unwavering support of my family and help of Alice Baillat, Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, Samuel Faure, Alexander Lanoszka, Mélissa Levaillant, Hugo Meijer, Olivier Schmitt, Emma Soubrier, and Claire Yorke. Finally, I want to thank Jacqueline Mason and her team at McGill-Queen’s University Press for her enthusiasm for this project and her efficient work that allowed it to be completed in the best possible conditions.

RIVALS IN ARMS

Introduction

On 8 April 1904, only four years after the Fashoda incident in which the two countries almost came to war over imperial territories, France and Britain signed a bilateral accord to settle colonial matters and engage in mutual support against growing German power. This came to seal the Entente Cordiale, based on which the UK and France then entered the First World War and fought side by side to defeat the Triple Alliance. Building on nearly a century of bilateral military ties, at a summit in London on 30 October 1995, British prime minister John Major and French president Jacques Chirac for the first time declared that “the vital interests of one [of the two countries] could not be threatened without the vital interests of the other equally being at risk.”1 This commitment – which implicitly refers to a shared understanding on nuclear deterrence – is included in every single declaration coming out of the two countries’ regular bilateral summits. On 2 November 2010, Prime Minister David Cameron and President Nicolas Sarkozy announced in London the signing of two noticeably ambitious bilateral treaties, known as the Lancaster House treaties. First, the Defence and Security Cooperation Treaty, in which the two heads of state and government agreed to develop ties between their countries’ armed forces (including for jointly conducting high-intensity military operations); to share and pool military capabilities including through mutual interdependences; and to engage in industrial and technological cooperation and even integration.2 They also signed a treaty for collaboration on technologies

4

Rivals in Arms

associated with nuclear stockpile stewardship and test simulations.3 Surprisingly, the decision to sign the treaties occurred in a context where the two countries were already cooperating on most of those areas within the eu and nato , or through the bilateral relationships that they maintain with other chosen partners, namely Germany and the United States. How did France and the UK get where they are? From the 1956 Suez Crisis to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, it is often argued that the UK-France defence relationship has been difficult to maintain. The two countries have been called “sweet enemies,”4 and their relationship has been considered one of constant “rivalry and cooperation.”5 Yet, since the Entente Cordiale of 1904, France and the UK have stuck together on security affairs. Even more, their defence and security relationship has been maintained, politically nurtured, and gradually expanded to cover areas of the highest sensitivity, including nuclear deterrence. And since the Lancaster House treaties of 2010, the two countries have taken further steps to broaden, deepen, and institutionalize their relationship. The bilateral relationship between the UK and France has thus become increasingly “special.” This raises four questions of scholarly as well as political relevance that guide this book: Why have France and the UK recently enhanced their bilateral defence relationship? How have they since channeled their cooperation in the most sovereign and sensitive areas of their statecraft? Over the last decade, has the reinforcement of the partnership had effects on the two countries’ definition of their national defence policies and interests, and on the relationships that they maintain with their other partners? And in that context, how is the British withdrawal from the eu affecting – and likely to affect – the UK and France’s special relationship? Historically, the UK and France together have “changed the world”6 through their colonial empires, and their subsequent diplomatic and military activism. Indeed, the UK-France relationship matters just as much today for international and transatlantic security. France and the UK are the two biggest players in the defence realm in Europe, due to their defence budgets, possession of nuclear weapons, post-colonial links, territorial possessions and military bases across the globe, and interventionist postures: they are unique

Introduction

5

security actors in Europe. They are also both members of most international organizations, notably nato , the un Security Council, and, before “Brexit,” the eu . Assessing the state of the relationship, both through its evolution and its current challenges, is of utmost importance for grasping contemporary international security dynamics. Now, the relationship between France and the UK, while it has its particularities, is not an isolated case in international relations. It is indeed a case where, to use the words of Helen Wallace, the two countries have come to “put their bilateral dealings on a privileged basis”7 in defence and security matters. This book explores the evolutions and the day-to-day management of the UK-France “special” relationship in defence in the twenty-first century, in a way that informs our understanding of other cases of such relationships, in Europe and across the globe. Some readers could oppose this endeavour right away and argue that France and the UK do not have a special relationship, because they compete as much as they cooperate on the world stage, or because the term is already “taken.”8 “Special relationship” has indeed become a term with particular connotations, a political label used to refer to the US-UK or the US-Israel relationship. Nonetheless, there are good reasons to argue in favour of using it to talk about France and the UK, as I argue further in the next chapter. First, “special relationship” is a useful analytical category to set certain bilateral relationships aside from the whole of bilateral relations in the international system. Second, officials of France or the UK occasionally do refer to their dealings as “special” (in French, the term “privilégié(e)” is more common). Indeed, how could two countries that lead military interventions together, cooperate in intelligence, exchange about nuclear deterrence, integrate their missile industry, not be said to have a “special” relationship? Illustratively, a 1988 book co-authored by defence officials, academics, and think tankers of both countries starts with the following sentence: “If relations between two countries can be described as special, it would certainly be appropriate so to describe the relations between France and Great Britain.”9 More recently, in March 2019, the British director general strategy and international at the Ministry of Defence tweeted, after meeting with general officers of the French Ministry of

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Armed Forces: “we agreed that what made our partnership special in Europe was a shared commitment to expeditionary ops. [sic] as well as full spectrum of deterrence.”10 The goal in this book is not to try and demonstrate the specialness of the UK-France relationship, but instead to enhance our understanding of how such privileged relationships between states are implemented in practice. In the book’s case study chapters, I analyze the conduct of cooperation in key areas of France-UK defence and security relations. I study how they work to develop, equip, and employ their military capabilities together. As France and the UK embarked on a military intervention in Libya to stop the violence against civilians in 2011, how did they coordinate their effort? Was their cooperation as smooth as their political communication during the campaign suggested? Then, as the two countries have tried to better prepare themselves to face future interventions abroad, what has it taken for them to develop a binational, non-permanent military force, with its own structures, doctrines, and procedures? Finally, why would countries pursue the cross-border integration of their defence industries, thus creating mutual dependences in strategic sectors? What have been the opportunities and obstacles created by such a decision? In addressing these questions, I highlight the substance and the growing institutionalization of the relationship between the UK and France, while also explaining its limitations and interrogating its resilience, in particular in the context of the crisis posed by the UK’s exit from the eu . More generally, in this book I derive insights concerning how states negotiate their cooperation in the most sovereign and sensitive areas of statecraft, whether they learn from experience to make their cooperation more effective and resilient, and how they navigate the tensions between the multiple special bilateral relationships that they maintain. This endeavour requires a detailed analysis of the conduct of the relationship at more than just the level of heads of state and government, as is often the focus in diplomatic history. Nor do I simply study the formal institutional features of the relationship, as is often done in international relations. Instead, this book considers the dense variety of activities, actors, and interests that make up the flesh of a relationship. Only in this way can we uncover the

Introduction

7

often-overshadowed bureaucratic and political dynamics at the heart of how such relationships are maintained. To do so, I rely on extensive fieldwork and original data of various natures: 122 interviews conducted between 2012 and 2019 with government representatives, military officers, diplomats, members of Parliament, industrialists, policy advisers, and experts in France, the UK, Brussels, and Washington, dc ; the observation of bilateral meetings as well as military exercises; and a range of institutional documents. Through this grounded analysis of the UK-French case, Rivals in Arms debunks some myths both about so-called special relationships, and about the conduct of defence affairs between states. Using a vast amount of original empirical data and an innovative analytical framework, this study addresses contemporary defence relations between France and the UK in the twenty-first century, offering a novel understanding of why “special relationships” prosper, fluctuate, or compete. Overall, I propose that such relationships must be understood as lasting relations of cooperation. Through case studies and an analytical framework that borrows from negotiation theories and institutionalist approaches to international relations, I show that special relationships are characterized by a tension between partners’ systematic negotiation and bargaining to defend their national interests or practices, and their readiness or ability undertake the adaptations, learning, and processes of mutual transformation necessary to sustain the relationship.

t he a r g u m e n t : b u il d ing and navi gati ng s p e c ia l r e l ati ons hi ps Although they are quite distinct from most bilateral relations in the international system, cases of special relationships are not rare. It is both necessary and possible to get a more general understanding of how they work, with attention to daily realities and specific experiences of cooperation, negotiations, and crises between two partners. For that, it is essential to look at the reality of cooperation behind official discourses. Only by doing so can we understand why a relationship moves forward in certain areas and not others, or fluctuates at given times, without coming to idiosyncratic conclusions.

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Rivals in Arms

Special bilateral relationships are, at the core, durable relations of international cooperation: they are underpinned by common narratives and symbols, processes and procedures, and precedents both negative and positive. It is this latter point, relating to actual experiences of cooperation and their effects, that the literature tends to overlook, not least because of the amount of data necessary for such analyses. Indeed, international relations scholars either focus on relationships and their formal institutional underpinnings, disregarding the dynamics of cooperation, or they study cooperation in specific issue-areas or on specific projects. Now, studying relationships through the lens of cooperation dynamics, including with attention to working-level actors, can shed light on the bargaining, negotiations, and achievements that form part of the relationship. Conversely, studying specific cooperative endeavours between two states without attention to the wider context of the relationship would only show half of the picture. Indeed, each specific experience of cooperation is gradually folded into the relationship, becomes a constitutive element of it, and affects the subsequent state of affairs between two given states. It is therefore necessary to study a relationship over time and across different sectors, actors, and levels. Overall, this book offers a novel understanding of how special bilateral relationships work, how experiences of cooperation transform bilateral relationships in practice, and the limits to these transformations. More specifically, I make the following set of general arguments. First, on the challenges of cooperation in special relationships. The emergence and management of special relationships are neither obvious nor automatic. Such relationships are, at the core, durable relations of cooperation. States engage in special relationships because they value the strategic proximity, the shared interests, and more generally the perceived similarity they have with select countries. On the other hand, leaders expect to achieve specific outcomes via cooperation, and bilateral cooperation with these select partners seems more appealing than cumbersome multilateral engagement. Nonetheless, in practice, the maintenance of this sustained cooperation is challenged by the need for the partners to, at any given time:

Introduction

1 2 3 4

9

construct common interests; coordinate between their governments; share costs and gains fairly; and manage relations with third parties.

The maintenance of cooperation despite these challenges results from a purposeful effort both to engage in the relationship and to adapt to sustain it, even if it is difficult and sometimes fails to produce the expected results. Second, on adaptation and resilience-building in special relationships. What distinguishes special relationships from other bilateral relations is the intention of governments to overcome the aforementioned challenges to cooperation, because there exist few, if any, alternatives for governments to choose among. This, however, requires adaptation. Because such bilateral links are supported politically, actors at the working and decision-making levels muddle through and adapt their objectives and practices to maintain cooperation. Examples of adaptation strategies include issue-linkage and the negotiation of trade-offs to accommodate the partners’ diverging priorities; the scaling down of objectives to keep a given project afloat; or the negotiation of legal arrangements to facilitate cross-border dealings. Then, through processes of repeated cooperation, relationships evolve, expand in breadth and density, and become increasingly self-sustaining: there is an exponential tendency in bilateral relationships. Interorganizational links and governance structures are progressively enhanced, while transnational non-state actors and elite networks form a safety net against political ruptures. Third, on the limits to special relationships. While special relationships are particular, substantive, and meaningful, they also involve bargaining, competition, and, sometimes, failed adjustments. The choice to maintain the relationship is constantly weighed against the efforts it requires. An approach rooted in cooperation and negotiation theories allows me to highlight that there are two main limitations to how much special relationships affect states’ policies and interests. Firstly, states struggle to give up ineffective cooperation practices, as states only relinquish national interests when they can obtain trade-offs or side-payments. Secondly, states face recurring

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Rivals in Arms

dilemmas and competition between their various special relationships: states can indeed maintain several of those relationships, but these tend to be mutually exclusive rather than mutually reinforcing. Through a combination of this analytical framework, and the study of contemporary UK-France defence relations, I make the following more specific arguments. I argue that the 2010 Lancaster House treaties have had a transformative effect on the bilateral relationship, while not altering the fundamental logics of day-to-day cooperation between the two states. The treaties have had the noticeable effect of multiplying, diversifying, and increasing the political relevance of bilateral defence links across the board. France and the UK, on the backs of the treaties, teamed up to lead a diplomatic effort and later a military intervention in Libya (chapter 3); innovated to develop a non-permanent military force to bring their militaries closer and prepare for high-intensity interventions in the future (chapter 4); and endeavoured to integrate their defence industries in the strategic sector of missile technologies (chapter 5). In their practice of cooperation, however, the two countries struggle to coordinate their defence and political apparatuses, and continue to pursue their domestically defined interests (after these are, themselves, debated nationally). In reality, they accommodate cooperation with their privileged partner only through painful negotiations and tradeoffs. Nonetheless, I demonstrate that the enhancement of cooperation does alter the relationship: over a short decade, the framework treaty has quickly come to constitute a common symbol, a landmark agreement that spells out several ambitions that must be fulfilled. Relatedly, I observe that experiences of cooperation under the treaty have created a growing network of actors who have a stake in the relationship. These actors – both official and private, and located at the political-strategic as well as the working level – constitute an interest group that pushes for the maintenance or even expansion of cooperation. This interest group, together with greater formal institutionalization of the partnership, has the potential to act as a safety net and make the relationship resilient to major political changes, which the post-2016 Brexit negotiation period illustrates. Fourthly, UK-French cooperation has been maintained over the years even when its effectiveness has been doubted, because of the

Introduction

11

specific value that the two countries find in each other. Both France and the UK display particular strategic features that justify pursuing cooperation despite some challenges in the process. Now, while special relationships are rare, they are not unique, and alternative relationships exist for both France and the UK. And it appears that the two countries do not redefine their national interests in a way that favours the relationship when they have satisfactory alternatives. The constant shadow of the political weight of the Franco-German “couple,” and of Anglo-American defence industrial and intelligence links (the “Special Relationship” with capital letters), both affect the strength of the UK-French relationship. It is indeed a telling example that Angus Lapsley of the British mod referred to what made “our [the UK-French] partnership special in Europe.”11 In reality, there is a constant back-and-forth among bilateral relationships, which more often than not are in competition. Finally, this book addresses how the prospect of the British exit from the European Union affects the bilateral defence relationship. Following the June 2016 Brexit vote, the French and British heads of state and government reaffirmed the importance of the bilateral defence and security relationship. Overall, the years of Brexit negotiations were a period of political reassurance about the future of defence relations, both at the level of the UK and France, and between the UK and the eu more broadly. However, the political process in the UK for adopting the withdrawal agreement took time, and by 2020 France and the UK were approaching the tenth anniversary of the Lancaster House treaties in a context of continued political instability and diplomatic tensions associated with Brexit. Good political intentions were thus soon put to the test. In the book’s concluding chapter, I use the analytical framework developed in this book to shed light on the state of the relationship since 2016, explain how exactly Brexit affects the partnership, and envisage prospects for UK-French relations in the longer term. I argue that in the short term, the Brexit process has changed the incentives of the two governments, and especially the French, by making alternative partners, such as Germany, more appealing. In other words, Brexit reinforces a trend in UK-French relations, namely the constant risk of defection of one or the other partner towards other allies. In the longer term,

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Brexit risks creating new hurdles that so far have not greatly affected France and the UK. Some of these hurdles – legal, institutional – can be coped with through further adaptation of the bilateral relationship. But most seriously, if the UK was to remain completely outside of European institutions, drifting away and adopting a foreign, defence, and security policy based on a redefined set of values – or if it was to fully disengage from international affairs – then France and the UK would lose the common strategic outlooks that have led the two countries to consider their national interests as intertwined, and has made their efforts at cooperating worthwhile.

o u t l in e o f t he book The book is organized as follows. In chapter 1, I explain why international security dynamics, in particular in the Euro-Atlantic area, cannot be understood without paying attention to the effects of specific bilateral relationships between allies. I then proceed to define how I approach “special relationships,” with the goal of demystifying the notion. Then, I move on to introduce the UK-France relationship, explaining how the two countries, over the course of a century, have moved from the limited arrangements of the Entente Cordiale to the wide-ranging and ambitious treaties of Lancaster House, thereby building increasingly close cooperation, including in the most sensitive domains of their statecraft. Chapter 2 then presents the book’s analytical framework. Though a synthesis of arguments found in a heterogenous literature on international cooperation and negotiations, I identify the key factors that affect the conduct of cooperation in special relationships. These factors then structure the analysis in the following chapters. I start with the identification of what I call the challenges of cooperation, and then set out my arguments related to adaptation and resilience-building processes in cooperative relationships. Finally, I introduce the case study chapters, explaining the case selection and data gathering processes. In the next three chapters, I examine case studies in the UK-French defence relationship in various domains under the 2010 Lancaster House treaties, namely the joint deployment of military force, the

Introduction

13

development of bilateral military capacity, and cross-border defence industrial integration. Chapter 3 covers joint military interventions, with an analysis of the Libya campaign of 2011. I review the diplomatic and military engagement of France and the UK and their cooperation – and its limits – during and after the conflict. In chapter 4, I examine how the UK and France have sought to develop joint military capacity, especially around the project of the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (cjef ). Then, chapter 5 analyzes the UK-French plan for the integration of their defence industry, and the design of common weapon programs, with a study of the missile sector. In each case study, I highlight the challenges that the two countries have faced while cooperating, and how they have mitigated those challenges to maintain their cooperation. In chapter 6, I analyze in a transversal fashion how these experiences of cooperation have affected the nature of the UK-French relationship since 2010. In particular, I ask whether those experiences have made the partnership more effective and resilient. I explain how experiences of cooperation come to transform the relationship, as ad hoc, short-term adaptations give way to longer-term sui generis institutionalization processes. I identify the reinforcement of transnational links and the emergence bilateral narratives and symbols, and highlight unexpected trends, including limits to institutionalization processes and the persistence of certain uncooperative behaviours. In the concluding chapter, I summarize the findings of the book in a cross-case fashion and synthesize the mechanisms of special relationships: the challenges of relationship management, adaptation processes, and resilience-building strategies. I contrast these case study findings with some insights on another area of cooperation between the UK and France: nuclear deterrence. I then assess the two countries’ response to the British decision to leave the European Union, and evaluate how Brexit might affect UK-French relations in the future.

1

Bilateral Relationships and Euro-Atlantic Security

Bilateral relationships need to be placed back at the center of the analysis of international relations. It is striking that ir scholarship has been chiefly concerned with multilateral cooperation, rather than bilateral cooperation and relations. Arguably, this is in part because the development of ir as a discipline has coincided with the spread of international regimes and organizations in the second half of the twentieth century.1 More precisely, as the international system became more “cooperative” after the Second World War,2 definitions of international cooperation moved away from realist conceptions that distinguished cooperation and conflict in a binary fashion, to cover the more complex array of substantive cooperative activities observable empirically, from the development of international law to supranational regional integration. Such cooperative endeavours, by definition, encompass more than two states. This has resulted in a relative neglect of bilateral relationships in contemporary ir scholarship. In this chapter, I first explain why a close look at “special” bilateral relationships is both necessary and relevant for understanding security dynamics in the Euro-Atlantic area, as well as in any other region of the world. I then move on to define more specifically what special relationships are and how they differ from regular bilateral relations in the international system. Finally, I introduce the UK-France defence and security relationship, explaining how the two countries have moved from a limited defensive alliance in the early twentieth century, to the ambitious treaties of Lancaster House in

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which they committed to building closer and closer cooperation, including in the most sensitive domains of their statecraft.

bi l at e r a l r e l at io n s h ips i n i nternati onal r e l at io n s : to o o b v i ous to matter? Bilateral relations are the founding element of international relations, or, as Thomas Gomart has suggested, “the basic form of the diplomatic game.”3 The centrality of bilateral relations can be assessed from historical, strategic, and numerical angles. First, from a historical perspective.4 The use of diplomatic relations between states through official missions began in the seventeenth century among European monarchies, the equivalent of what may be called “traditional diplomacy” or “old diplomacy.” Scholars have explored the central role of bilateral relations in diplomacy through their strategic role in promoting national interests and structuring international negotiations. Through foreign affairs ministries, embassies, and consulates, bilateral diplomacy indeed remains the best tool for pursuing a state’s interests, whether through trade and investments, by promoting a country’s image and culture, or in communicating with the diaspora. Furthermore, bilateral cooperation is an important phase for engaging in international negotiations: mutual interests are, first, developed on a bilateral level to build coalitions and more effectively highlight those interests in multilateral negotiations. Bilateral relationships thus tend to be favoured when actors perceive them as a tactical advantage, as Manon-Nour Tannous has shown.5 Similarly, Bertrand Badie suggests that the closer one gets to a bilateral setting the closer one inevitably gets to concrete interests, by opposition to normative considerations that characterize multilateralism.6 Thus, bilateral relations are often approached as a strategic interaction, a power struggle where the actors are driven by their own interests rather than by a desire to be inclusive. The challenge in bilateral relations is then to succeed in pursuing those interests through cooperation, without undermining one’s sovereignty and freedom of action.7 Due to the central role they have played historically and strategically, bilateral relations are also at the heart of international relations

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from a numerical standpoint. Although multilateral relations have become increasingly diverse and intense since the second half of the twentieth century (particularly as of the 1990s), and have received growing attention from scholars of international relations, bilateral relations remain to this day the favoured format for international agreements. From 1990 to 1999, the United Nations recorded the signing of over 5,000 bilateral treaties, covering the fields of economics and finance, politics and the military, and so on.8 Today, trade agreements such as the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (ceta ) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (ttip ) (the United Kingdom’s exit from the eu ), as well as increasingly fragile major military alliances, appear to confirm the “crisis” of multilateralism identified by Newman, Thakur, and Timan in 2006, and a relative reinforcement of bilateralism within the international system.9 While multilateralism was on the rise in the second half of the twentieth century, current global trends challenge the assumption that that form of cooperation had become the norm in the contemporary international system. In fact, bilateral relationships have never been replaced by multilateralism: they have been and remain the foundation of international relations and as such they deserve specific scrutiny. As Rixen explains, states move within both bilateral and multilateral settings contingently, depending on time and problem configurations, and on policy areas.10 So, the relevance of bilateral relationships in the contemporary international system is indubitable, including in regions replete with multilateral institutions such as Europe. Yet, exactly how cooperation is actually worked out in the context of those relationships – according to what logics, and with what mechanisms – is a question that has not received much scholarly attention. Indeed, bilateralism in international security is often treated as not unilateralism or not multilateralism, rather than as an object of direct inquiry. As Brandon Kinne notes, the multiplication of bilateral defence agreements mirrors “a similar trend toward bilateralism in economic relations,” but, unlike the latter, the phenomenon in areas of high politics has remained “largely ignored” in ir literature.11 It is indeed striking that the literature on cooperation in ir has been dealing chiefly with multilateral forms

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of cooperation:12 authors interested in international security or the world order have focused on multilateral governance and regimes, international organizations, and security communities; and multilateralism has especially been a key topic for international negotiations scholars.13 All together, multilateralism has been extensively studied and theorized, which is partly attributable to the fact that the development of ir as a discipline coincided with the development of multilateralism in the international system.

h ow b il at e r a l r e l ati ons hi ps shape r e g io n a l s e c u r i ty dynami cs Reflecting this general trend in ir , the issue of security cooperation in the Western world has been approached chiefly through a multilateral lens. Multiple volumes have addressed the evolution of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (nato ) and the transatlantic relationship between the eu and the US,14 multinational military coalitions and operations,15 the development of the eu ’s foreign, security, and defence policies,16 or the role of the European Defence Agency for collaborative procurement,17 to name just the most popular topics. This focus overlooks the fact that the transatlantic relationship is, in parallel if not primarily, composed of (differentiated) bilateral relations between the US and key European states, most notably the three major European powers (the UK, Germany, and France), as well as small and medium European states. Within Europe itself, the focus of practitioners and scholars alike has been on eu integration, relations among eu members states as a whole, or the eu ’s central institutions, to the detriment of bilateral relations.18 Meijer and Wyss argue that the scholarly attention to multilateral military cooperation frameworks constitutes a bias that hides the empirical reality whereby, even in Europe, security and defence policies are conducted chiefly on a national basis, and cooperation occurs chiefly in bilateral settings.19 Using a network analysis, Brandon Kinne also recently highlighted the structuring effects, and even the rise over the past two decades, of bilateral rather than multilateral security cooperation across the globe. Illustratively, the number of bilateral defence and security agreements has increased “dramatically” in the

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past decades, with 2,000 such agreements signed around the world between 1980 and 2010, and an especially dramatic rise since the mid-1990s.20 Indeed, the structuration of the international system around bilateral relationships is – perhaps counterintuitively – especially observable in areas of “high politics” and among liberal regimes. In defence and security, the rationale for maintaining intricate bilateral relationships is double: it is about jointly pursuing shared strategic interests but also cooperating more effectively than when dealing with a vast number of partners. The “rise” of bilateralism which is thought to occur even among Western countries has indeed partly been attributed to discontent with the ineffectiveness of cumbersome multilateral settings.21 In Europe, major examples include cooperation between the UK and France, but also Franco-German bilateralism, institutionalized with the 1963 Elysée Treaty and its 1988 Additional Protocol, and more recently with the 2019 Aachen Treaty. Smaller European countries are also very much involved in close bilateral relations; for instance, Belgium and the Netherlands, which share an integrated naval command; Germany and the Netherlands, which have common rapid deployable land headquarters; or Finland and Sweden, which in 2015 upgraded their bilateral cooperation on training and plan to set up joint units as a common response to Russia’s behaviour. Today, in the context of the British withdrawal from the eu , bilateral agreements are gaining even more centrality in the regional defence and security architecture of Europe. The UK government under Theresa May’s premiership pledged that it would continue to play “a major role in providing for European security and defence … through strengthened bilateral relationships.”22 Beyond Europe, the American president Donald Trump has also, since his election, favoured bilateralism over multilateralism, both in his discourses and his policy choices.23 Efforts by individual European states to renovate and/or reinforce their bilateral links with the US in the context of the uncertainty created by Trump’s foreign and defence policy positions further testify to the enduring relevance and centrality of bilateral security relationships. It would be wrong to assume a disconnect between regional-level and bilateral cooperation in security. Instead, there is an

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interdependence between the two levels, which the next chapters explore: bilateral relationships structure regional organizations and cooperation dynamics, and regional cooperation frameworks in turn affect the propensity of states to cooperate bilaterally. For example, Brandon Kinne has showed that “states are more likely to create bilateral agreements if they share agreements with common third parties.”24 Similarly, Ulrich Krotz and Joachim Schild have proposed the concept of “embedded bilateralism,”25 which refers to the intertwining of Franco-German relations within the multilateral European institutional level, which shapes and is shaped by their bilateral interactions. Krotz and Schild view the interaction between bilateral and regional as a fruitful two-way relationship. For most authors, membership to regional or multilateral institutions and the presence of other partners are thought to foster cooperation. The interaction between bilateral and regional security dynamics applies strikingly to the US-UK relationship, too. The relationship was “the basis of the Western alliance during [the Second World War] and the Cold War [and] played an essential part in bringing stability to the evolving post-1945 international order,”26 as well as in the subsistence of nato since the end of the Cold War. The US-UK relationship thus is, for instance, a key factor in explaining Europe’s participation in twenty-first-century “out-of-area” conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.27 Improved bilateral relations between the US and Germany and the US and France in the mid-2000s similarly explain the continuation and even enhancement of those countries’ involvement in the nato mission in Afghanistan.28 That being said, there is not necessarily a positive interdependence between bilateral cooperation and regional organizations, as this book further analyzes. Membership to the same international or regional organizations does not necessarily foster good bilateral relations. At one extreme, conflictual bilateral relations may have the effect of blocking multilateral efforts: the abysmal relations between Greece and Turkey regarding the island of Cyprus continue to test the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance and the partnership between the eu and Turkey. Without falling into the extreme case bias, this book explores the positive as well as the negative consequences of regional embeddedness for special relationships.

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Finally, one has to consider the network dynamics between those bilateral relationships that structure the international security architecture. Arguably, states develop particularly strong bilateral links in security because of the uncommon degree of shared strategic interests and political closeness that they have with only specific countries. However, states are not exclusive in their relationships: at any given time, they may be engaged in many such bilateral relations. Sometimes, these bilateral links converge. We can for instance identify triangular configurations, where three states act in concert: the US, the UK, and France form the “P3” at the United Nations Security Council, while France, Germany, and the UK constitute the “E3” group within the Europe. States in such triangles will tend to coordinate their diplomatic positions before engaging in multilateral negotiations or engage in joint international initiatives. However, triangles are ultimately the result of bilateral links, which may not all be of equal significance. In case of disagreement at the trilateral level, one axis may take precedence over the other. More importantly, one aspect that has been particularly overlooked is the possibility of competition among the various bilateral security and defence relations that states maintain: Do common bilateral ties with a third country always foster cooperation between partners, as suggested by Kinne, or do states sometimes have to arbitrate what relationship to favour in one area or another? If so, what drives this choice? In this chapter and the following, this book further explores the potentially negative effects of shared ties on bilateral cooperation.

d e f in in g a n d d e mysti fyi ng s p e c ia l r e l at i ons hi ps Because of their structuring effects between the national and the global, bilateral relationships can usefully be conceived as a general intermediate category for studying international relations. Now, not all bilateral relations are equal: some matter more than others. According to Helen Wallace, bilateral relations between governments may come in at least three distinct forms.29 At the first level, two governments engage in a dialogue merely because there are transactions between their two countries that directly or indirectly involve

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the governments. On a second level, two states may be “condemned to consult and to cooperate” because transactions between the two countries are so high in volume and complexity that their governments are obliged to show explicit consideration in their bilateral relations. It may be due to geographical proximity, to the volume of goods and services exchanged, to the number of individuals living in the other country, or to the two countries belonging to the same international organization. Finally, on a third level, Wallace argues that some relationships are deemed “special,” where “two governments put their bilateral dealings on a privileged basis.”30 In this section, I review existing conceptualizations of bilateral relationships and propose a definition of special relationships that permits us to set these empirical cases aside from the great number and diversity of bilateral relations in the international system.

Varieties of Bilateral Relationships Richard Neustadt made a strong statement about the ontology of bilateral relations when he wrote that “to impose a framework of bilateralism on the subject matter is to risk adopting a straightjacket which may distort the evidence and the analysis,” given that “reality is not bilateral.”31 He further added: “policy-makers do not necessarily view their relationships with interlocutors from other governments in this way.”32 This is true enough: not all bilateral relations have a “degree of self-consciousness,”33 to use Helen Wallace’s words, that makes them worthy of scrutiny. In fact, it is not enough to distinguish bilateral relationships from other forms of international engagement in a purely formal manner. In the same way that, as Ruggie argues, one must distinguish between “nominal” and “qualitative” multilateralism – Diebold speaks of “formal” and “substantive” multilateralism34 – so must one distinguish between nominal bilateral relations and substantive relationships. Some bilateral relations indeed are not only “conscious,” but also lasting and meaningful, which distinguishes them from other bilateral relationships. Aside from “special relationships,” a concept that I further define in the next section, multiple terms have been developed to grasp the ontology of substantive bilateral relationships.

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These conceptualizations vary depending on whether the emphasis is placed on elites’ perceptions and beliefs, potentially leading to a shared sense of belonging (in constructivist writings), or on the types of cooperative arrangements between states (in rationalistfunctionalist approaches to institutions). From a constructivist angle, Brigitte Vassort-Rousset has developed the notion of the “couple,” which is a “more or less united” relationship “involved in processes of transformation, conflict and regulation.”35 Vassort-Rousset’s couples can be “cooperative or hostile” and they are usually both, as she argues: “the nature of all bilateral interstate relationship … is indeed nuanced and multidimensional.”36 Methodologically, Vassort-Rousset insists on exploring elites and societies’ beliefs and identity and their possible transformation. This is indeed an important aspect when investigating change and resilience in bilateral relationships. However, by being too wide-ranging, Vassort-Rousset’s conception arguably loses explanatory power; in a sense, the “couple” is a metaphor rather than a concept. By contrast, Oran Young has proposed the concept of the “bilateral regime” when looking at US-Canada environmental cooperation. Young’s analysis is interesting as it points to factors that are both material and non-material, notably the nature of the problem (including the interests at stake), the institutional arrangements of the regime, and the socio-political setting in which cooperation takes place.37 In that sense, his analysis is grounded in cooperation and negotiation theories, which I also argue form a useful basis from which to grasp the reality of interstate relations. Young does not, however, provide a clear definition of bilateral regimes, other than a “regulatory agreement.”38 Besides, Young’s distinctions between problems that are “difficult or easy to solve,” and his focus on “variance in the performance of the regimes,” eventually results in a litany of criteria that are hardly applicable to cases where states cooperate in circumstances without clearly framed problems requiring regulation or compliance mechanisms. Combining constructivism and institutionalism, Ulrich Krotz proposes the notion of “regularized intergovernmentalism,” which comprises practices, procedures, and social meanings. In his 2011 book Flying Tiger, using a case study of a helicopter program

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developed between France and Germany, Krotz examines the way “specific types of institutionalization and construction between states affect the national interests and security policies of the states involved.”39 Krotz analyzes how, over an extended period of time, the relations between France and Germany shaped these two countries’ interests, and, in turn, the development of the collaborative weapon program. The effect of the relationship is exemplified when a state makes decisions for the sake of the bilateral relation that are contrary to what domestic political considerations would dictate and/or when joint positions are agreed upon ahead of international negotiations.40 Indeed, such bilateral relationships, according to constructivist and institutionalist scholars, matter because they are thought to have “consequences in terms of the interests pursued by governments.”41 While Franco-German bilateralism assumes a degree of mutual influence and convergence, in their subsequent book Shaping Europe, Krotz and Schild are nonetheless unable to account for France and Germany’s failure to converge and cooperate effectively on defence and security issues, despite their strongly institutionalized relationship.42

Special Relationships: A Definition What these various conceptualizations indicate is that substantive and lasting bilateral relationships between two given states involve a mixture of conflict and cooperation, and can be located along a “spectrum of habitual relations running from intimacy towards hostility,” as Neustadt puts it.43 Special relationships are thought to be at one end of Neustadt’s spectrum, as a form of ideal-type that displays some particular features. It is true that the US-UK relationship has some very specific features. This includes, for instance, “preferential treatment accorded to US and British working-level diplomats in one another’s capitals,” whereby diplomats in either country can freely walk around the host country’s ministry of defence and foreign affairs.44 Nonetheless, Neustadt himself, in his exploration of the US-UK relationship during the Suez and Skybolt crises, argues that “‘it would be wrong … to assume that London’s links to Washington in 1956 and 1962 were altogether different from the links of

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other governments with comparable status and accustomed friendship.”45 The spectrum is thus very much a continuum. There exists a very rich literature on special relationships, and my goal here is not to thoroughly review existing scholarship, as others have already undertaken this task.46 Here, my goal is merely to set the boundaries of the universe of empirical cases that might fall into the category “special relationship,” rather than seek to grasp or demonstrate the unique essence of such relationships. In fact, special relationships exist in all shapes and forms. While in common parlance, and especially from a British perspective, the term “special relationship” has been confined to referring to US-UK relations, there is “a bewildering variety” of alleged cases to be found.47 As Xu and Rees report, “US Presidents have acknowledged 29 special relationships between their country and other states.”48 “Special relationship” is thus not as exclusive a term as it may at first appear. Illustratively, special relationships vary in their degree of symmetry. For example, the Anglo-American relationship is characterized by “a radical asymmetry of power,”49 due to America’s “hegemonic”50 status. For this reason, it is usually studied from the point of view of the UK, with attention to the management of its dependence on the US and its search for leverage within the relationship. This ingrained power asymmetry is an empirical feature of all special bilateral relations with the US. Yet substantive, strategic bilateral relationships come in many different power configurations – some of them rather equal, as is the case with France and the UK, or France and Germany. Moreover, special relationships can be more or less formally institutionalized. While the relations between France and Germany are framed by the 1963 Elysée Treaty, which among other things set up regular summits and a ministerial council, the relationship between the US and the UK – like that between the US and France – is conducted in a much more ad hoc fashion, without an overarching institutional framework, due not least to the different scales of their state apparatuses. Additionally, special relationships are characterized by the support of interest groups that seek to uphold the relationship.51 Some of them are private organizations dedicated to defending particular interests within the state decision-making process.52 Others are public, and some are “parapublic,” to use

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Krotz’s words. Parapublic activities are cross-border activities that escape the state-society or public-private distinctions, because they “do not autonomously originate in private society,” and “are largely state-financed or -organized.”53 Such activities and actors include youth exchange, town twinning, and public institutes. Finally, states can also sustain their relationship by involving members of parliaments. Indeed, diplomats are far from being the only actors involved in bilateral relations, and even parliamentarians are now “essential allies of diplomats, making lobbying a significant part of their job,”54 especially through parliamentary “friendship groups.” Finally, there is a consensus in the literature around the importance of public discourses, representations, and labels (including the label of “special relationship” itself) that emphasize the shared identity, values, and history of the two partners. Special relationships possess particular diplomatic importance and it is not uncommon to read about governmental decisions being made for the sake of a relationship when domestic interests would apparently have advised otherwise, including in cases of non-asymmetrical partnerships.55 But this claim is not enough to indicate what sets them apart. Special relationships are neither just for decoration nor altruistic, but they serve a set of purposes.56 This usefulness is found in areas of high politics, and especially in areas of great sensitivity. Illustratively, Dumbrell concludes his study of Anglo-American relations by suggesting that the “specialness” of the relationship “resided primarily in military and intelligence cooperation.”57 Dobson and Marsh similarly argue that that relationship is “functionally ‘special’” because of the domains of defence on which the two countries cooperate, including nuclear relations, intelligence, and security.58 Churchill’s “Sinews of Peace” speech back in 1946 had already placed an emphasis on the military relationship, ranging from exchanges between military advisers, to the acquisition of the same weapon systems, to common training of military officers and the joint use of military facilities.59 Rather than seeking to demonstrate the “specialness” of the France-UK relationship in comparison with other relationships, I use “special relationships” as an empirical category within which certain types of bilateral relationships fall, according to some common features. Given the diversity of forms of special relationships, I argue

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here that what sets special relationships apart is not so much a matter of form as one of content – that is to say, what special partners cooperate on. Generally speaking, I propose that what distinguishes special relationships from other friendly bilateral relationships is that states engage in intense cooperation in the most sensitive areas of their statecraft, which can include the integration of military forces, cooperation on strategic weapons programs, the sharing of military intelligence, joint diplomatic initiatives and leadership in military interventions, and even cooperation in nuclear deterrence. This, in turn, leads to a second characteristic of special relationships: the existence of a limited number of alternatives. For the purpose of this book, I define special relationships as cooperative relationships between two countries based on dense historical, societal, and economic ties, the perception of common security interests, and a politically upheld sense of shared purpose, in areas of high politics. It follows logically that states do not engage with one another in such sensitive areas without expecting some benefit from it. Indeed, special relationships, like other sustained relationships in the international system, are at the core relations of cooperation, which supposes “a situation where parties agree to work together to produce new gains for each of the participants unavailable to them by unilateral action, at some cost.”60 Haugevik similarly suggests that special relationships can be approached “analytically as particular instances of cooperative inter-state relations.”61 However, she remains focused on the discursive components of relationships, such as general intentions and policy formulations, and the institutional features and processes, such as the number of official visits. She does not explore what it is that two given governments seek to achieve by engaging in such cooperation, and how such goals are pursued in practice, by states’ bureaucracies, militaries, or defence industries. As I show in the next chapter, there is a dire need within ir scholarship to enhance our understanding, not only of special relationships per se, but of the mechanisms of bilateral cooperation in general. This effort, in turn, can shed further light on special relationships. This book’s core task is thus unpacking how such intense bilateral cooperative relationships are conducted in practice in the area of

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defence and security, and more specifically unpacking how states navigate the opportunities and constraints that their bonds impose on them in the most sovereign and sensitive areas of their statecraft. Building on the other conceptualizations of bilateral relationships presented in the previous section, a study of special relationships should pay attention to the presence of both cooperative outlooks and conflictual interests, assess the establishment of regulatory arrangements aiming at facilitating cooperation for joint problem solving, and identify potential dynamics of mutual transformation, as well as the evolution of the political, symbolic, and narrative underpinnings of the relationship. The analytical framework that I propose in the next chapter can be applied to other cases of bilateral relationships, even those that are not necessarily considered “special,” as it draws on general literature from theories of negotiation and theories of cooperation. What is notable in this set of empirical cases, as I have mentioned, is that there exist few (if any) alternatives for states to choose from to pursue their identified objectives in areas of defence and security.

t h e u k - f r a n c e r e l ati onshi p i n the t we n t y- f irs t c e n t u ry: overcomi ng ri valry It is impossible to give a specific birth date to any special relationship, as these are built over time. Unlike a couple of individuals who meet on a memorable day and eventually decide to sign a contract of marriage, states are constantly interacting in a number of policy areas, and may gradually come to deepen or widen their cooperation; they may cooperate more on certain policy areas than others; and they may face periods when political support wanes significantly, while cooperation continues with the same intensity at the working level. This was the case, for example, in Franco-American relations around the 2003 Iraq invasion: while the diplomatic row was at an all-time high between the two governments, their cooperation was simultaneously reinforced in intelligence sharing in the context of the “war against terrorism” and the intervention in Afghanistan.62 There exist symbolic turning points or critical junctures in any relationship, where the latter is qualitatively enhanced, for instance,

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with the signing of an ambitious treaty, as in the UK-France case. Yet it would be foolish to assume that the nature of the relationship changes radically once a treaty is signed. Instead, we can assume that the relationship may evolve, gradually, but only on the basis of what was there previously. In chapters 3 to 6, through the use of case studies and cross-case analysis, I trace the evolution of the UK-France relationship over the decade following the Lancaster House treaties of 2010. But where did the 2010 rapprochement originate from? Without going over the history of UK-France relations throughout the twentieth century, as these have been studied elsewhere,63 I will focus here on factors contributing to the rapprochement which developed in particular over the two decades following the end of the Cold War: de facto strategic proximity between Western Europe’s two major military powers; a history of ad hoc cooperation across the board of defence and security; and a political window of opportunity facilitated by changes in government in 2008–10.

Europe’s Strategic Twins Contemporary defence and security relations between France and the UK build on a century of bilateral links in all areas of defence, underpinned by a distinct narrative of strategic similarity which also subtends the most recent UK-French rapprochement. Indeed, the resemblances between the two countries make the UK-French case almost an ideal type when it comes to uncovering the rationales of special relationships. Jolyon Howorth argued that “Britain and France, which alone among the eu Member States share a serious imperial past, an interventionist military culture and ongoing global ambitions, are condemned to act as partners.”64 Christopher Hill similarly explains that France and the UK share an “anomalous position” in Europe and globally, due to a combination of international activism and an increasingly “undermined … capacity to exert international leadership.”65 These similarities are taken to stem from their colonial past, their membership to multinational organizations, their possession of nuclear weapons, and their bellicose behaviour. This is not a mere scholarly argument. Already in November 1944, Charles de Gaulle

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suggested to Winston Churchill that “whatever the differences in the wartime experiences of their two countries, when faced with the new reality of a bipolar world dominated by two superpowers, they henceforth shared objective strategic comparability, and probably identical interests.”66 Due to their colonial history, exceptional institutional memberships, and ambitious strategic objectives, France and the UK have both been committed to state-of-the art, full-spectrum expeditionary forces. This has led them to display higher defence spending than other European countries. Illustratively, the UK and France together in 2010 accounted for about 40 per cent of Europe’s defence spending; nearly 50 per cent of equipment spending; and 60 per cent of research and technology spending.67 These facts have been used to nurture a narrative that twins France and Britain as international powers. The narrative of strategic similarity, supported by the governments of the two countries, links objective similarity with a necessary convergence of views and interests, which in turn is thought to form a logical basis for cooperation. This strategic closeness can be identified in the two countries’ defence and security white papers over time, linking structural similarities, shared interests, and the necessity of cooperation.68 The decision to sign ambitious cooperation treaties in 2010 thus partly stemmed from political leaders’ desire to crystallize and build on this uncommon strategic similarity. As the former UK national security adviser, Sir Peter Ricketts, declared in an interview: “For me, the defining characteristic of the 2010 treaties signed by Britain and France is recognising similarity: we both have similar strategic thinking, similar capabilities and a similar willingness to commit our armed forces when necessary to defend our interests.”69 What is more, confirming the argument that bilateral relationships structure international security dynamics, the UK and France together have played a key role in developing Europe’s role in security and defence over the years, especially in the 1990s and 2000s. In the context of the conflicts in the Balkans, France and the UK together with Germany brought about the creation of the intergovernmental organization occa r (Organization for Joint Armament Cooperation) in 1996 to foster cross-border armament programs. Prime Minister Tony Blair and President Jacques Chirac then famously signed the Saint-Malo

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declaration, a document aimed at institutionalizing defence cooperation at the European level. Despite being a declaration with no legal provision and with diverging underlying intents, especially regarding the respective roles of the eu and nato , it created a shift in European defence cooperation. Indeed, there resulted from Saint-Malo a number of regional initiatives, promoted or supported by Britain and France: the European Defence and Security Policy (esdp , now the Common Security and Defence Policy [csdp ]), set up in 1999; the “Helsinki Headline Goal” for European capability development; the 2003 European Security Strategy; the creation of the European Defence Agency (eda ) in 2004; and the “eu Battlegroups” concept for rapid force deployment. Illustratively, the first eu autonomous operation (Operation Artemis) was deployed in Congo in 2003 stemming from the “thinking in London and Paris on the value-added of [csdp ] for Africa.”70 The shared role of the UK and France as drivers was such that, according to Schnapper, “without that firm intention, the European defence identity could not have developed the way it has since the beginning of the 2000s.”71

A History of Ad Hoc Bilateral Cooperation The UK and France share a number of characteristics, in terms of their history as colonial powers, their membership to international organizations including the un Security Council, their possession of nuclear weapons, and their interventionist records. Where there were stark differences, strategic convergence has occurred especially since the end of the Cold War; the UK and France have gradually adopted positions vis-à-vis strategic partnerships (US, nato , eu ) that have made their preferences compatible, though not fully aligned. Since the 1990s, convergence of strategic postures can be said to result from shared characteristics of France and the UK – which led them to confront similar strategic problems – as well as from their cooperation, both within multilateral frameworks and bilaterally in an ad hoc fashion. joint military interventions and diplomatic alignment

If, until the late 1980s, Franco-British cooperation in military interventions was virtually non-existent,72 the 1990s and 2000s provided

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many situations where France and the UK participated in military operations that brought them strategically and militarily closer together. In fact, bilateral cooperation between French and British troops was stronger during the Bosnian war than in the following fifteen years. Throughout the Bosnian crisis, there was “permanent consultation” at the strategic level. In 1995, the un military commander, Général Janvier, was French, and a British officer led the Rapid Reaction Force (rrf ), which was itself a largely Franco-British initiative that also included Dutch forces.73 Despite disagreements on the force’s mandate,74 former ambassador to France Michael Jay explains that “a French officer subordinated to a British officer was able to exercise command of the Duke of Wellington’s Own regiment,” which illustrated the “synergy of approaches,” the “community of experiences,” and the “symbiosis” between French and British forces at the time.75 In June 1996 at the French national institute for defence studies, then-president Chirac declared that Franco-British military cooperation was an “asset” gained in Bosnia and a good illustration of Europeans’ “potential.”76 The intervention in Kosovo in 1999 also contributed to a military rapprochement. Despite remaining outside of the Alliance’s integrated structures, the French government did not oppose nato ’s involvement. In fact, as the events unfolded, there was no specificity in the French policy during Operation Allied Force, and France behaved as a reliable ally for nato .77 As a result of France and the UK’s participation, the wars in the Balkans had significant impacts on both countries’ postures towards the security architecture of the European continent and on their security relations. For the UK, the wars in Yugoslavia created new links with European – and especially French – armed forces. In London, the crises contributed to raising awareness about a community of strategic interests with European partners.78 In Paris, these crises seemed to convince Jacques Chirac (in office from 1995 to 2007) that the only way for France was to work in an Atlantic framework.79 The long participation in the war in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2013 confirmed and engraved these new or renewed strategic links between the two countries, and between them and their nato allies. Even though their armed forces were not operating in an integrated

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fashion on other theaters, military chiefs in the two countries felt a need to exchange and build on their common experiences, especially in the context of the surge in Afghanistan, from 2008 onwards.80 Military deployments aside, when it comes to dealing with international security issues more generally, France and the UK have been almost systematically aligned since the 1990s. Indeed, France and the UK “initiate 80% of the texts adopted by the Security Council.”81 A 2010 report from the French Senate affirmed: “the two countries have a concordance of views on all major questions (Afghanistan, fight against terrorism, support for Pakistan, fight against piracy, Kosovo, Middle-East, Iran, drc , Georgia…).”82 This indicates that the crisis over the invasion of Iraq in 2003, on which the French and British governments stood poles apart, was the exception rather than the rule. Instead, for the hundredth anniversary of the Entente Cordiale, renewed cooperation on counter-terrorism, and more generally on tackling world instability, was presented as a shared priority and the bilateral way forward.83 Indeed, the 9/11 terrorist attacks led to a rapprochement in the intelligence and counter-terrorism domain, especially after 2004.84 It was revealed, for example, that a secret anti-terrorist intelligence cell called “Alliance Base” existed in Paris from 2002 to 2010, involving agents from the US, the UK, Germany, Canada, and Australia.85 military doctrines, training, and exercises

While cooperation between the French and British armed forces has existed since the beginning of the twentieth century,86 Hugh Beach argues that at least up to the 1990s, because of France’s situation in nato, cooperation on joint planning, training, and doctrine at an alliance level was “relatively low-key.”87 Instead, France’s unusual position in nato fostered bilateral links with those countries cooperating with French forces. Indeed, a 1991 House of Commons Defence Committee report underlined that “France’s withdrawal from nato ’s integrated military structure in 1966 has meant that defence cooperation has come to depend to a far greater extent than with our other allies on bilateral arrangements.”88 These arrangements were numerous, although, according to the report, “relatively unknown and perhaps undervalued.”89 The report listed a number of military-to-military

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cooperation areas, including exchange of personnel (twenty-nine as of 1991), common training and military exercises (eleven between March 1990 and March 1991), and exchange of information, all of which was supervised by “staff talks” and completed by “less formal contacts between the services” through visits.90 A document produced by the British mod in September 2000 took a similar look at bilateral activities and indicated the slightly more institutionalized nature of cooperation in the 1990s.91 Indeed, more agreements were signed between military services during that decade. A twinning agreement between the Royal Marines (3 Commando Brigade) and the French Troupes de Marines (9 dima ) was signed in 1995;92 there was another between the Field Army and the Force d’action rapide in 1996;93 and more followed. Letters of intent for further cooperation between the single services were agreed to in the 1994–97 period. The number of personnel exchange and exercises grew over the 1990s (“some 140–150 bilateral exercises each year [ranging] from very small exercises such as an exchange of officers to large scale combined joint exercises”94). The Franco-British EuroAir Group was created in 1995 and extended to other countries in 1998 (it became the European Air Group95). Finally, a “mutual logistics support agreement” was signed in 1999 to enhance cooperation in operations.96 defence industry and arms procurement

Britain and France conducted a number of bilateral armament programs in the 1960s and 1970s, including the Gazelle, Puma, and Lynx helicopters and the Jaguar fighter jet. The missile sector was also a focus for cooperation, with the Martel missile in the 1960s, the Milan in the 1970s, and the fam anti-air system in the 1990s.97 While the 1980s did not witness any significant Franco-British armament collaboration, the 1990s indicated a certain convergence between the British and French armament policies “as much as regards the need to optimize resources as regards the need to foster competition and to preserve competitive industrial bases.”98 Indeed, the 1990s prompted new incentives for European countries to cooperate in armaments. The United States proceeded to a restructuring of its defence industry that led to the emergence of large industrial groups, and transatlantic

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competition became a challenge for smaller European companies. Besides, the end of the Cold War led to an overall decrease in defence budgets in Western Europe, including the budget allocated to defence procurement. European joint ventures were created as a result, including, between the British and French companies, between Dassault, Aerospatiale-Matra, and Thompson-csf . As a 2000 mod briefing on Anglo-French defence cooperation explains, “collaborative programs provide[d] a solid base for closer links between the defence industries of France and the UK,” with joint ventures.99 The briefing adds: “Cross-border collaboration between companies complements traditional intergovernmental arrangements,” especially in the missile sector,100 which will be covered in great detail in chapter 5. Since 1990, the institutional frameworks for UK-French cooperation in armaments has rested on the Anglo-French Defence Research Group, which explores cooperation avenues in R&T and innovation, and coordinates working groups (fourteen as of 1996) on various aspects of defence research and development, in the conventional and nuclear domains.101 Beyond that, a first institutionalization of Franco-British armament cooperation was decided with the creation of the High-Level Working Group (hlwg ), announced at the bilateral summit in June 2006. The hlwg was an initiative of Denis Ranque, then ceo of Thales, to bring the two governments and the national industries together to discuss possibilities for cooperation in the capability domain, identify barriers to cooperation, exchange information, encourage the opening of markets, and potentially sponsor common programs.102 Since 2006, the hlwg has met three to four times per year, including with industry representatives when necessary.103 nuclear deterrence

From the early days of the two countries’ nuclear deterrents until the 1990s, French-British attempts at cooperation in the nuclear arena had been misaligned and had produced little. There was a first attempt at cooperation at de Gaulle’s initiative in 1962, but the United Kingdom chose to acquire Polaris missile systems from the United States.104 Franco-British collaboration only really started in the 1990s, under the Mitterrand and Major governments, with the establishment of the Franco-British Joint Commission on Nuclear

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Policy and Doctrine in November 1992, made public in July 1993, and later known simply as the Joint Nuclear Commission.105 Under the commission, ten officials would meet three times a year – more often for those members of the “supporting group” – and discuss nuclear policies, doctrine, disarmament, and non-proliferation.106 As Tertrais explains, the commission was initially modest in size and ambition.107 The exchanges centered on comparing approaches to deterrence, nuclear doctrines and concepts, anti-missile defence, arms control, and non-proliferation.108 Its work showed, according to Malcolm Rifkind (then secretary of state for defence), that “there are [were] no differences between France and the United Kingdom on the fundamental nuclear issues,” or at least none that were “insurmountable.”109 The commission increasingly dealt with central and concrete issues, as it led to “thorough exchanges on crisis management and principles for nuclear planning (including through the informal consideration of fictitious scenarios), as well as the drafting of common policy papers.”110 In addition, the Anglo-French Defence Research Group has dealt with nuclear matters in the more technical fields of nuclear, biological, and chemical defence, energetic materials, nuclear blast effects, and directed energy technology.111 The Franco-British rapprochement in the nuclear field was further upheld politically in 1995, following President Clinton’s nuclear test ban. That year, Major was one of the few to support Chirac during the French nuclear tests.112 The same year, the two heads of state and government signed a common declaration, known as the Chequers Declaration, which read: We do not see situations arising in which the vital interests of either France or the United Kingdom could be threatened without the vital interests of the other also being threatened. We have decided to pursue and deepen nuclear co-operation between our two countries. Our aim is mutually to strengthen deterrence, while retaining the independence of our nuclear forces. The deepening of co-operation between the two European members of the North Atlantic Alliance who are nuclear powers will therefore strengthen the European contribution to overall deterrence.113

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The first sentence of this excerpt of the Chequers Declaration has since been included in all summit declarations, and it has underpinned further nuclear cooperation. The “vital interests” refer to those interests protected by the possession of weapons of last resort; they should thus be understood only in the context of nuclear deterrence. More recently, in 2008, the two countries developed further arrangements, including the ability to “buy time” in each other’s hydrodynamic facilities to conduct tests on technologies such as propellers and submarine maneuvering models, based on yearly agreements.114 This cooperation, however, has to exclude elements that are subject to American technology cooperation, for example nuclear propulsion. Such cooperation has been identified as useful for benchmarking and for sharing best practices – for example, on safety issues, on acquisitions, or in accidents, such as the collision between French and British submarines in February 2009.115

Rationales for Enhancing the Bilateral Relationship in 2010 The idea that France and the UK could institutionalize their defence and security partnership under a formal treaty for reasons “both necessary and desirable” is not new, as it was put forward in 1988 by Yves Boyer and John Roper – the former a French think tank analyst and the latter a British member of Parliament.116 Then, for the centenary of the Entente Cordiale in 2004, numerous scholarly publications and official declarations assessed the state of the bilateral relationship, underlining the strategic proximity between the two countries and calling for a reinforcement of bilateral links in the twenty-first century.117 Until 2010, however, bilateral relations between France and the UK in defence and security had been little if at all institutionalized. Indeed, unlike the Franco-German relationship, which has since 1963 been framed by the Elysée Treaty, the Franco-British partnership had remained unambitious and little institutionalized throughout the twentieth century. The relationship in defence and security was conducted in an ad hoc manner or institutionalized only in certain sectors, with for example the Joint Nuclear Commission or the High-Level Working Group.

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Three main motives led to the decision by the British and French governments to sign the Lancaster House treaties in 2010. The first motive for enhancing bilateral cooperation was economic constraints. Both French and British defence spending – while remaining the highest in Europe – decreased gradually between the end of the Cold War and the 2010s, and suffered from the 2008 financial crisis. Illustratively, the British Strategic Defence and Security Review of 2010 envisaged an overall budget decrease of 8 per cent between 2011 and 2014.118 In this context, the idea was put forward that bilateral cooperation would lead to savings, by maximizing training and support resources, sharing infrastructures, pooling capabilities, building joint equipment, and rationalizing industrial sectors.119 Overall, the objective was to “halt the progressive decline of [France and the UK’s] military capabilities and the strategic downgrading that could follow” for both countries on the international stage.120 Given that overarching objective, the teams in the two countries’ defence ministries suggested that their governments should pursue “quantifiable objectives in the strategic and budgetary domains.”121 In the view of many observers, the economic argument has been so central in the assessment of the bilateral treaty that the agreement has been coined the “Entente frugale.”122 The second argument was that France and Britain’s relationships with their traditionally favoured partners were losing vitality. France’s political investment in Franco-German defence and security cooperation since Reunification had not translated into greater operational or strategic convergence with Germany. The countries’ defence doctrines and military means had been growing apart, leading to a questioning of the very value of the partnership.123 The Anglo-American “special relationship,” for its part, appeared increasingly constraining for British governments over the course of the 2000s. Britain’s support for the long and heavy engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq did not translate into influence on Washington’s political or strategic decisions. The relationship needed a reassessment, at the same time that the Obama administration was turning its eyes toward Asia and away from Europe.124 Then, at the European level, the evolution of

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the regional security architecture dissatisfied both Britain and France. The former had been disengaging since the end of Blair’s premiership, lowering its contributions and blocking any new institutional development, while the latter had seen its wish to build a wide-ranging, autonomous European policy unfulfilled. Third was the important nuclear dimension of the relationship. The 2010 rapprochement between the two countries was in fact primarily based on discussions about cooperation in the nuclear domain: as a former adviser to the Elysée explained, “the nuclear treaty is the causal event [le fait générateur] of the cooperation” agreed upon in 2010.125 Towards the end of the 2000s, France and the UK turned to each other when debates on nuclear disarmament surfaced both in Britain and at the global level, and fear rose that the UK would not be able to maintain its nuclear deterrent, or would diminish its salience, for reasons both political and budgetary. Already in December 2006, a report by the British mod identified ways to reduce the cost of the maintenance of nuclear deterrence, including for instance stopping continuous submarine deployments.126 Then, on a speech in April 2009, Barack Obama stated “clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons,” adding that the US would “reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, and urge others to do the same.”127 Shortly after, in the UK, the April 2010 general election was the occasion of a debate on the renewal of the Trident missiles that carry British nuclear warheads. In their campaign manifesto, the Liberal Democrats – who subsequently formed a coalition government with the Conservatives – put forward other alternatives for nuclear deterrence that would be less costly.128 In this context, there was fear in France that its sole nuclear partner in Europe would eventually not remain so, and the French nuclear establishment thus approached its partner with a view to cooperating as a way to maintain the status quo.129 In the nuclear domain, too, there were opportunities to create savings by sharing the cost of building, and by using and maintaining the infrastructure necessary for the testing and stewardship of nuclear warheads, among other things.130

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The Lancaster House Treaties and the Summit Declaration These various factors created a momentum that French president Nicolas Sarkozy and British prime minister David Cameron seized as they moved forward with drafting an ambitious bilateral defence and security treaty over the summer 2010. On the one hand, their decision built on bottom-up calls for greater bilateral cooperation coming from military headquarters, the ministries of defence’s policy departments, and nuclear departments,131 who all proposed avenues for cooperation in their respective domains. On the other hand, the decision was facilitated by the good relationship and close political visions of Nicolas Sarkozy and David Cameron. Already before Cameron’s coming to power in the 2010 election, Sarkozy had engaged with Cameron’s Shadow Cabinet, especially through Shadow Defence Secretary Liam Fox in early 2010.132 Overall, there was an agreement that the objectives of creating industrial and strategic interdependences between the two countries would be the “ultimate step” in the Franco-British partnership, which would require “a very strong convergence of our interests and an unambiguous political agreement” in the form of “a legally and politically binding treaty signed between our two countries during a summit.”133 The treaty drafting was monitored by the executive, but included input from the defence administrations and, in France, from the Senate, who produced in July 2010 a report aimed at informing the executive of the state of bilateral defence relations and prospects and supporting the idea of more cooperation.134 The agreements signed on 2 November 2010 comprised two treaties, a letter of intent signed by the two defence ministers, and a summit declaration. The first treaty is the Defence and Security Cooperation Treaty and the second is the Treaty relating to Joint Radiographic/Hydrodynamics Facilities. The Defence and Security Treaty is officially referred to as “overarching” treaty, with the other treaty being “a subordinate Treaty.”135 The framework treaty sets out the broad objectives of bilateral cooperation in all areas of conventional defence. It is very ambitious, based on the rationale put forward by a member of David Cameron’s cabinet office: “if

High Level Working Group (hlwg ) Minister for Defence Equipment and Support (UK) Directeur Général de l’Armement (FR) [six meetings per year]

Joint Letter of Intent Chief of the Defence Staff (UK) Chef d’état-major des armées (FR) [two meetings per year]

Figure 1.1 | Cooperation governance structures

hlwg – Plenary With the industry [two meetings per year]

Capabilities

Operations and training

Joint Nuclear Commission Ministry of Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK) Ministère des Armées and des Affaires Étrangères (FR)

Nuclear

As of 2018 Defence Ministerial Council Secretary of State for Defence (UK) Ministre des armées (FR) [three meetings per year]

Senior Level Group National Security Adviser (UK) Diplomatic adviser and Chef d’état-major particulier (FR) [two meetings per year]

Summit UK Prime Minister/French President

As of 2018 Strategic Dialogue on Cyber Threats FR and UK government and agencies [one meeting per year]

Cyber

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we are able to cooperate on nuclear matters, then there is nothing in defence we cannot cooperate on.”136 Thus, among other things, the two countries undertook to address strategic challenges together, promote peace and security, improve the effectiveness and interoperability of their armed forces, and preserve a robust and competitive defence, industrial, and technological base. The treaty thus makes general provisions for the two countries to deploy together on operations, develop military activities such as training and exercises and joint capabilities, exchange personnel and information on defence political orientation and procurement, jointly procure military equipment, and facilitate cross-border defence industrial cooperation. In comparison, the nuclear cooperation treaty is a more technical and precise document. It provides for significant enhancements of bilateral cooperation through the exchange of (classified) information related to nuclear weapons, the building of a shared infrastructure for the simulation of nuclear testing, and technology development. The Defence and Security Treaty designates the French president and the British prime minister heads of the relationship. Together with their security and diplomatic advisers, they form the Senior Level Group (slg ), which defines the priorities of cooperation and oversees its implementation. The already-existing High-Level Working Group would oversee cooperation on armaments, procurement, and the defence industry, while the chiefs of the defence staff would oversee cooperation between the armed forces, with implementation structures to be defined later on. France and the UK respectively adapted their bureaucratic structures and resources to cope with more bilateral activity: following the treaty, the UK mod created a team called “International Policy France” in November 2011, while France expanded the size of its defence section at the embassy in London. Figure 1.1 shows the basic organization of UK-French defence cooperation in 2011. It evolved slightly over time, in particular with the setting up in 2018 of a Defence Ministerial Council that enhanced the role of the two defence ministers (cf. chapter 6). Finally, the summit declaration accompanying the treaties presented a “package of joint defence initiatives” to be undertaken by the UK and France, including a dozen collaborative armament programs. For the armed forces, the main project announced was

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the development of the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (cjef , analyzed in chapter 4) as a channel for “greater interoperability and coherence in military doctrine, training and equipment requirements.”137 On top of this, a good share of the declaration concerned capability and industrial projects: it included a plan for an “integrated carrier strike group” to “create opportunities for UK and French aircraft to operate off carriers from both countries,” and it announced possible collaboration on drones (Unmanned Combat Air Systems [ucas ] and Medium Altitude Long Endurance drones [male ]), the development of a maritime mine countermeasure system, a “10-year strategic plan for the British and French Complex Weapons sector,” and the development of various complex weapons programs (as analyzed in chapter 5) – as well as the exploration of possible future cooperation on satellite communications and nuclear submarine technologies.

2

Managing Bilateral Relationships: Analytical Framework

Whatever political object we are dealing with – whether state diplomacy or domestic party-systems – we know that bilateral settings function according to “rules” different from multilateral ones.1 The existing literature, however, does not propose a satisfactory explanation of how these rules differ. As I explained in the previous chapter, despite the centrality of bilateral relations in international politics, existing ir scholarship has surprisingly focused on the multilateral level of cooperation between states. The existence of a rich literature means that we are well informed about the mechanisms of such cooperation: multilateralism encourages participants to relinquish the pursuit of specific interests in favour of a rough sharing of costs and benefits among the parties and over time2; it is efficient as it permits addressing common problems with adapted instruments, while achieving economies of scale3; and it fosters common behavioural norms and principles, thus ensuring its own continuation.4 Those mechanisms are thought to be reinforced when cooperation is institutionalized – that is to say, when cooperation takes place on the basis of sectorial international regimes, often backed by international organizations. Alongside its main characteristics, the challenges of multilateralism are also well known and devoid of major debate. Firstly, multilateralism is thought to be costly, and the cost of coordinating policies tends to increase with the number of participants.5 Indeed, one of multilateralism’s “functional deficiencies” is that it supposes high transaction costs, involves protracted negotiations, and requires a large qualified staff.6 Secondly, sharing the costs of cooperation is

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a challenge, not least due to states’ tendency to freeride: overall, the central problem of multilateralism is thought to be that “high levels of participation make enforcement difficult unless the agreement is shallow enough to appeal to the most reluctant states.”7 By contrast, when it comes to bilateral cooperation, the arguments expressed in the more limited and patchy literature are less consensual. For instance, some authors consider negotiation costs to be lower in bilateral settings, while others view multilateralism as more economical.8 Some have written that bilateral diplomacy better fits the spontaneous expression of states’ national interests, while others argue that multilateral negotiations suppose a greater degree of unpredictability, because bilateralism avoids contingent adaptations to the positions of others.9 Another dispute concerns the durability of bilateral agreements, with some arguing that “strategies to reduce the number of players in a game generally … increase the likelihood and robustness of cooperation,”10 and others contending that although an initial agreement is harder to strike, “multilateral arrangements” may “enhance their durability and adaptability.”11 Finally, while some authors present the choice for bilateralism as mostly ad hoc or case specific,12 others present it as a systematic foreign policy orientation close to unilateralism, and thus as opposed to a more cooperative multilateralism.13 To add to the confusion, as I have explained in the previous chapter, some forms of bilateral relations – like special relationships – are the most durable cooperative endeavours in the international system, and are even thought to affect states’ definitions of their interests and policy orientations. While not providing a ready-made set of answers about the functioning of cooperation in close bilateral relationships, the existing scholarship helps identify the factors and tendencies shaping the dynamics of cooperation between states. As such, it forms a basis for elaborating an analytical framework that we can use to structure the analysis of cooperation in bilateral relationships. The evident complexity and diversity of bilateral relations encourage us to look for mechanisms and trends rather than rules, and to acknowledge the importance of contextual factors. In approaching bilateralism, the goal here is to understand what makes cooperation “work,” and what affects governments’ ability to implement their decision to cooperate.

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Effective cooperation occurs when a commonly expressed will (a decision to cooperate), is followed by cooperation towards that stated aim (implementation), even when there are challenges in the process and the eventual output ends up not being identical to the initial statement. In my understanding, a mere decision to cooperate does not constitute cooperation. The notion of effective cooperation does not necessarily lead us, however, to pay particular attention to the efficiency or efficacy of the process or outcome; there might be effective cooperation even though the outcome does not appear as optimal. In the following pages, I build on arguments in the existing literature to elaborate a single framework comprising four analytical dimensions. The first thing this framework allows us to do is to highlight the challenges that states face when seeking, effectively, to cooperate. Overall, I argue that bilateralism is characterized by specific challenges that differ from those of multilateralism. Those challenges are inherent in the cooperation process, however, and they shape the outcome of any cooperation initiative. This state of affairs allows for effective cooperation to occur through adaptation, but the result is that cooperation – even with the smallest number of partners in the most propitious context – is never optimal. The second thing revealed by the framework is that the challenges of cooperation serve as signposts for assessing states’ longer-term adaptation and learning processes in bilateral cooperation contexts. In particular, I argue that actors develop coping mechanisms and learn from experiences of cooperation, which then changes the way they manage their cooperation; however, those adaptations do not always go in the directions suggested by the existing literature on cooperation and institutionalization processes. Both elements of the framework – the challenges of cooperation, and adaptation and learning processes – structure the analysis of the book’s case studies, which I introduce in the final section of this chapter.

t he c h a l l e n g e s o f b il ateral cooperati on The bulk of this book deals with the cooperation process in special relationships. It is therefore fundamental to uncover not only the factors that influence states’ ability to cooperate bilaterally, but also the way in which states adapt to those challenges as they try to reach their

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goals. Before moving on to introduce the first analytical dimension, a word on methodology is in order. Because of a lack of dialogue across the literature, explanations of what makes or breaks cooperation have been partial and have tended towards mono-causality. This framework, on the contrary, has its first added value in the fact that it synthesizes commonalities drawn from various strands of the literature. Illustratively, the literature on special relationships opposes those who argue that “special” links come about for reasons of shared beliefs, values and identities, or interests and needs. In other words, the literature is divided between, on the one hand, the “school of sentiments” – or theoretical arguments emphasizing ideas and identities – and, on the other hand, the “school of interests” – or the literature emphasizing the need-addressing functions of cooperation in such relationships.14 These debates echo broader discussions within ir about the sources and mechanisms of cooperation between states. Like other scholars, I propose to exit these unhelpful dichotomies, which are sometimes misplaced and often unproductive.15 The combination of several theoretical traditions, in particular functionalism (or institutionalism), intergovernmentalism, and constructivism – in an approach that qualifies as “solidified,” “weak,” or “modernist” constructivism16 – produces a richer and more accurate account of the reality of international politics. The second added value of the framework is to extract from a patchy literature arguments about the specific functioning of bilateral cooperation.

Constructing Common Interests determinant 1: states must agree, domestically and between them, on common interests to be pursued in cooperation.

The first challenge to effective cooperation concerns states’ ability to identify common interests on the basis of which they will carry out joint activities. That common interests are a necessary starting point for cooperation to emerge in the international system is self-evident and widely acknowledged in the literature across schools of thought.17 At the same time, cooperation is not equivalent to harmony and

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“can only take place in situations that contain a mixture of conflicting and complementary interests.”18 As Touval and Zartman have argued, “cooperation is dependent on there being conflict to overcome.”19 Conflict, in this context, is understood as perceptions of incompatibilities in the parties’ preferences. More precisely, actors normally seeking to cooperate negotiate in “mixed motives situations” where they “share common and conflicting interests and thus strive to identify agreements that reflect or upgrade the common interests without necessarily overcoming all conflicts of interests.”20 The process through which these interests are defined and negotiated both at the domestic level and at the bilateral level thus conditions the ability of states to cooperate, as in Putnam’s famous two-level game.21 Now, most of the time, actors within and around states’ governments pursue diverse ideational and material objectives which can lead them to compete to promote policy options. The “state interest” that results from this competition cannot be pre-conceived. It follows that, in most circumstances, public declarations cannot be taken as conveying a unique, well-defined and stable state interest, but rather a circumstantial preference. What is more, repeated interactions among governments representatives can make their beliefs and interests converge, and thereby incline them to more cooperation – but not necessarily. Interactions can also set negative precedents, which might lead to a redefinition of actors’ interests away from cooperation. Typically, a bilateral treaty (as well as other forms of binding or non-binding international agreement) defines the baseline for the shared interests that motivate states to cooperate. The understanding of those interests or objectives can be more or less tacit, or even not publicly disclosed. Either way, this initial understanding, or baseline, is followed by an implementation phase, and this is when incompatibilities in the more specific and concrete preferences of governments can surface. Indeed, international cooperation agreements, such as treaties, memoranda of understanding, or common declarations, are ambiguous regarding the signatories’ actual objectives. Ambiguity is necessary to reach an initial agreement, to the extent that such agreements produce “an illusion of accord when little agreement actually exists.”22 Gynaviski thus argues that misperceptions and misunderstandings can in certain conditions be

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conductive to the emergence of cooperation.23 At the domestic level, too, Palier explains that decisions are made on the basis of “ambiguous consensus”: to understand how a public policy measure got adopted one must analyze how the decision aggregates divergent or even contradictory interests, and acknowledge that its content is polysemic.24 As a result, much of the negotiation process necessary for implementing cooperation in fact occurs downstream, as Spector nicely put it: “Getting it done is not always thought of as a set of negotiating activities. It is often viewed as a bureaucratic task to administer the implementation of negotiated solutions. But many of the decisions that must be made at both the national and international levels still must be negotiated – among parliamentarians, between national and local officials, between government agencies and domestic stakeholders, and between national agencies and international or regional-level agencies.”25 In other words, agreements to cooperate are always under-defined: international agreements lay out general objectives and mention only points of consensus. As such, they “provide a cooperative base for future negotiations.”26 Thus, in the implementation phase, unexpected and unresolved problems tend to appear, requiring recursive negotiations that can lead to bilateral disagreements. What is more, because states are complex machineries and the objectives they pursue potentially have multiple implications, disagreements also occur at the domestic level. While ambiguity is an underlying cause or even a constitutive element of international agreements, during that post-agreement period, states are faced with bilateral or domestic disagreements about the interpretation of decisions, or various domestic actors may have competing agendas.27 Furthermore, what constitutes “domestic” actors, for example in the context of cross-border industrial integration? As I suggested in the previous chapter, special relationships tend to be characterized by the presence of interest groups, or other (semi-)private actors with a transnational, cooperative agenda. Indeed, the actors involved in negotiating the relationship include non-state actors as well as bureaucratic actors, all of which can and do maintain cross-border relationships with actors in the other country, and they can jointly influence outcomes at the national

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political level.28 Constructing common interests is both a vertical and a horizontal process. Overall, because they must be negotiated both nationally and bilaterally, common interests can be said to be constructed: they are neither exogenous nor purely endogenous, and they are the object of debates and renegotiations both within states (among public actors in the government and administrations, together with private actors such as experts and industrial sectors), and through intergovernmental and transnational interactions. A first challenge in maintaining relationships thus occurs when there is a lack of harmony between or within the states concerned when it comes to the interests that they can jointly pursue.

Coordinating between Governments determinant 2: states must arrange governance and implementation structures to facilitate the coordination and supervision of their activities and unify their practices.

A second difficulty in the management of cooperation concerns the practicalities of the coordination between state apparatuses. Just as their actual objectives are ambiguous, when they engage in bilateral relationships and agree to conduct a particular set of policy programs, governments tend to overlook the organizational aspects involved. Indeed, even treaties are general frameworks that “almost never accurately [indicate]” or are “ambiguous” as regards “the parties’ activities and working relations.”29 William Zartman similarly affirms that “initial agreements are usually vague about implementation requirements.”30 A first problem for effective cooperation thus consists in designing implementation structure and processes. Now, in bilateral contexts, unlike in multilateral ones, there exist no overarching organizations. As Richard Neustadt puts it: Because allies are governments, each is a more or less complex arena for internal bargaining among the bureaucratic elements and political personalities who collectively comprise its working apparatus. Its action is the product of their interaction. They

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bargain not at random but according to the processes, conforming to the prerequisites, responsive to the pressures of their own political system … It follows that relationships between allies are something like relationships between two great American departments, say Defense and State, except that there is no Supreme Court like the White House to adjudicate their differences or overcome them.31 Therefore, states engaged in bilateral cooperation must coordinate their activities based on those of their respective national institutions, which display differences in their organizational functioning, methods, cultures, and practices. In particular, state administrations display distinct standard operating procedures (also known as sop s), or routine ways of doing things, which tend to make them rigid and resistant to change.32 In the domains of defence and security, these distinctions concern decision-making processes before and during military interventions, military doctrines and rules of engagement, arms procurement procedures, industrial contract specifications, and so on. They also include more mundane aspects such as the conduct of meetings, communication channels for routine decision-making and implementation, meeting attendance, or the format of internal documents. A challenge then stems from the need to adopt certain bilateral sop s and to decide whether these will be based on the sop s of one of the states, a fusion of the two countries’ practices, or sui generis procedures. Bilateral relationships can be institutionalized in a way that seeks to reproduce the stabilizing power of (international) organizations, to circumvent the challenge identified by Neustadt. The most advanced degree of institutionalization of bilateral relations is what Krotz – referring to Franco-German bilateralism – calls “regularized intergovernmentalism.” This consists of “standardized practices, and patterns and rhythms of dealing with one another.”33 Krotz and Schild explain that the Elysée Treaty between France and Germany “defines processes … rather than outcomes,” which is “arguably the key to its perseverance and tenacity in frequently turbulent world circumstances and changing political contexts.”34 However, most interstate relationships do not have the same degree

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of institutionalization as the Franco-German partnership, or at least not across the spectrum of their bilateral dealings. One of the most prominent and lasting bilateral diplomatic and security relationships – that between the UK and the US – relies on multiple cooperation channels that are not centralized or coordinated. Such cooperation arrangements must thus rely more on individuals who can pursue divergent agendas (cf. above), who lack competence, or who exercise undue gatekeeping. Bilateral cooperation is indeed usually devoid of standard operating procedures, and unlike when international organizations exist, there is no body able to exercise power, provide legal and political stability, and ensure that one partner will not have a short-term incentive to cheat.35 What is more, the absence of formal structures in bilateral relations has an impact on the extent to which informal links – which are also structuring – can be developed. Aside from the lack of formal governance structures and its consequences in terms of possibilities for control and coordination, bilateral intergovernmental cooperation can be expected to provide few opportunities for developing informal links. The plurality of national stakeholders, as well as the regularity of change in government and in bureaucratic staff, limits socialization and hence learning, and also limits the development of common principles of conduct, habits, and shared norms, which, according to constructivist authors, are conducive to the sustainment of cooperation.36 A challenge in bilateral settings, then, is due to a lack of permanent cooperation structures and hierarchical oversight, and to the undetermined and unstable nature of coordination mechanisms.

Sharing Costs and Gains Fairly determinant 3: states must agree on a fair distribution of the costs and gains resulting from their cooperation.

A third challenge for the maintenance of a special relationship is the need to distribute fairly the costs and gains associated with cooperative endeavours. Institutionalist and rationalist scholars, more than others, emphasize the particular importance of the (perceived)

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payoff structure, and the expectation of rewards, reciprocity, gains, benefits, or returns in fostering cooperative strategies for the “players” involved.37 Indeed, special relationships are not devoid of distributional and bargaining problems. While it is accepted that multilateral cooperation functions according to the principle of diffuse reciprocity, the principle thought dominating bilateral cooperation is that of balance. Now, the principle of balance can be debated. What is being balanced – the type or the value of investments and rewards? How is balance achieved – systematically and precisely, or overall and roughly? The realist-inspired literature on bilateral cooperation argues that dyads are the typical theater of relative-gain approaches, where each party first seeks to get away better off than the other. However, as Ruggie notes, “bilateral balancing need not imply equality; it simply means establishing a mutually acceptable balance between the parties, however that is determined in practice.”38 There is arguably a broad range of “acceptability,” hence the need to consider the (inter)subjectivity of the relationship, as well as the process through which interests are constructed, both individual and in common, as this affects the perception of the payoff structure. While some expect bilateral cooperation to rely on systematic quid pro quos, as I explained earlier, scholars of special relationships indicate that bilateral relationships can possess a significant symbolic dimension and even lead to the alteration of “national interests” in favour of the relationship. The degree of institutionalization of the partnership can thus, in principle, alter the payoff structure. Another point is the timing of cost and gain distribution. According to Zartman and Touval, “the key to cooperation is reciprocity, that is, an insurance of similar beneficial return behavior in the future.”39 However, Ruggie argues that “bilateralism … is premised on specific reciprocity, the simultaneous balancing of specific quid pro quos by each party with every other at all times.”40 This corresponds to “balanced reciprocity,” defined by Keohane as the practice whereby there is “simultaneous direct exchange of equally valued goods”41 in which “the exchange is balanced at every moment.”42 Here again, the degree of institutionalization of the partnership in principle affects how necessary simultaneous exchanges are

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perceived as being.43 Special relationships are thought to permit or even require non-simultaneous exchanges and diffuse reciprocity. Wallace indeed argues: “A vigorous special relationship requires … a long-term time-scale for results, and a capacity to define broadly the balance-sheet of the relationship … a special relationship presumes a global appraisal of the aggregates.”44 At the same time, relations between countries that are “rough analogues in terms of broad political and cultural attributes, economic character, resources endowment, size and so on” lead to “assumptions of approximate equivalence and parity.”45 Wallace suggests that “a symmetrical relationship may be more difficult to manage and maintain, since the boundary between partnership and rivalry may be more easily crossed. Its maintenance requires a mutually acceptable reciprocity in the consequences of interdependence.”46 Morin and Gagné similarly argue that “power equality tends to lead to a static condition under which participants get stuck in disagreements and conflicts.”47 Now, the material conditions of the power balance matter only to a certain extent in the perception of fairness: state A may display relatively more important structural power than state B, but if it thinks that the latter is less committed to the relationship, it will still fear exploitation. Indeed, this book shows that when they engage in bilateral relationships, both parties expect an equivalent political investment from the other. Structural symmetry between the parties matters less than the perceptions that actors have of the power balance and of the strength and durability of the relationship. How pairs of states navigate between the optimal “long-term scale for results” and the search for “mutually acceptable reciprocity” requires more scrutiny, as Wallace did not investigate these arguments further. It follows that – just like the definition of the interests pursued by states, or the development of social links between their governments – the payoff structure cannot be conceived in purely objective or rationalist terms.48 This has consequences for the management of relationships. Firstly, the impact of subjectivity upon the payoff structure makes it so that the evaluation of costs and gains varies across actors (within and between states) and across time. Besides, preferences are not based solely on material or ideational considerations, but rather on both, meaning that the payoff structure can be difficult for actors

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to evaluate. Secondly, in a cooperative relationship, the political value assigned to a relationship affects the perceived balance: if one side perceives that it is more committed to the relationship than the other party, it will fear exploitation. Thirdly, changes in context or domestic conditions means that governments’ commitment – and the perception of this commitment by the other party – fluctuates, thus creating uncertainty and altering calculations. Overall, a key way in which states maintain special relationships is by moving away from a tendency to pursue systematic or balanced reciprocity, toward a more global or diffuse reciprocity. This is rendered even more difficult by the two challenges previously mentioned: as coordination among stakeholders is limited, and as national preferences are debated, states can never be certain of the other’s accountability and reliability, or that the perceptions of the payoff structure are shared.

Managing External Connections determinant 4: states must find common grounds for dealing with third parties, whether other individual allies or the multilateral forums in which they both participate.

The last challenge to states’ pursuit of bilateral cooperation concerns the way that they manage relations to third parties, be they other individual states or international organizations. The idea that “extra-dyadic” relations could have a negative impact on bilateral endeavours has been suggested by some, but it has not been analyzed fully. For example, Zartman and Touval suggest a first problem facing bilateral action, which is one of legitimacy: “how to legitimize it to those outside, whether those rejecting the action or those not invited to join it?”49 Although they mention this dimension as critical, they do not demonstrate how it might influence cooperation in practice. Spector and Zartman raise another issue that relates to the presence of other, competing international agreements (they look specifically at regimes).50 However, they do not further develop that point. Looking at bilateral relations in particular, Wallace also points out that in a network of relationships, any bilateral relationship is “affected

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by the relationships of each government with other partners … and by the operations of relevant multilateral fora.”51 Wallace further suggests that when they are “special,” bilateral relationships may have “an exclusive character which prevents an equally intense relationship with [another] partner.” Kahn and Zald similarly argue that the presence of alternatives can limit the degree of interdependence between the parties.52 Again, this external dimension is identified as salient, yet it has not been thoroughly studied. Building on the arguments just mentioned, I show in this book the various constraining effects of “embeddedness” – or its negative counterpart, entanglement – on the emergence of effective bilateral cooperation. The first factor is the presence of another close partner, which tends to have a strong impact on national policy-making. Existing political links limit the ability of governments and administrations to invest even symbolically in a new bilateral relationship. What is more, maintaining significant levels of activities with a partner requires an amount of human and budgetary resources that are then not available for developing other bilateral partnerships. In turn, if one partner perceives that the other side does have a potential alternative, there can be the fear of a reorientation and thus a reluctance to commit to the relationship. The second dimension is multilateral entanglement. Membership to international institutions, whether multilateral or regional, can foster bilateral cooperation (by providing opportunities to collaborate and shared sets of norms and standards53), but it can also impede it due to disagreements over preferred multilateral forums and policies, constraints from multilateral regulations, or changes in memberships. Overall, I argue that shared membership to international organizations and the presence of other bilateral alliances in which states are embedded can create tensions and competition that constrain the emergence of strong bilateral links between partners.

ada p tat io n a n d in s t i tuti onali zati on dy n a m ic s in b il at e r al relati onshi ps It follows from the previous section that cooperation – even in contexts of special relationships – is not automatic but instead needs to

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be managed in order to thrive. For various reasons, international institutions are the primary form of such management. Firstly, institutions foster cooperation by facilitating coordination. In their most formalized version, institutions as organizations “[bind] people together in a long-term, multilevel game … [they] increase the number and importance of future interactions and thereby promote the emergence of cooperation among groups too large to interact individually.”54 More precisely, in the management of intergovernmental affairs, institutions are deemed to “provide information, reduce transaction costs, make commitments more credible, establish focal points for coordination, and in general facilitate the operation of reciprocity.”55 In their most elaborate form, international organizations are bureaucracies that are at least partly autonomous from states. Other institutions (and actually most of them) are less formal, and are better understood as conventions that emerge spontaneously and end up shaping expectations of states’ behaviour (e.g., the convention of state sovereignty).56 Secondly, institutions foster cooperation by altering actors’ incentives. Actors face the temptation to defect to reap short-term benefits, and they know their partners are similarly tempted; therefore, there is often a conflict between short-term and long-term interests. Cook, Hardin, and Levi explain the mechanisms of these incentives: “we may … know for sure that the other party has interests that conflict with our own. If we cooperate in all such cases, we do so because we believe our partners have incentives to behave consistently with our interests. These incentives, however, are built into the social structure; they are not inherent in our personal trust relations.”57 Put differently, institutions are thought to reduce uncertainty by binding actors’ interests within the institution.58 As such, institutions are considered as “alternative[s] to trust” that permit cooperation, especially when they are constraining, like organizations.59 Actors’ incentives to cooperate also depend on the payoff structure, which institutions help alter. Institutions indeed facilitate deals by broadening the horizon of possible deals (i.e., through issue linkages60), and by lengthening the “shadow of the future” (i.e., ensuring long-term benefits for short-term cooperative moves).61 Finally, institutions help manage cooperation by stabilizing “practices and expectations.”62 March and Olsen have defined an

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institution “in a general way … as a relatively stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behavior for specific groups of actors in specific situations.”63 In a similar vein, Douglas North and Paul Pierson have noted that “established institutions generate powerful inducements that reinforce their own stability and further development.”64 In other words, cooperation via an institution reinforces that institution: institutionalization is a self-reinforcing dynamic. One should be wary, however, of the risk of circular reasoning when studying the effects of institutionalized cooperation on institutionalized cooperation. For that matter, an analysis of processes and the evolution of cooperation through time should be able to uncover causal mechanisms. Overall, institutions should allow for the mitigation of those challenges of cooperation that I introduced in the previous section, as the latter have to do with issues of diverging preferences, lack of coordination mechanisms, payoff distribution, and the interference of external actors. This, however, raises several questions, to which this book provides original answers. Firstly, how institutionalized – formally or informally – must an institution be to foster cooperation? In bilateral settings there rarely are such things as permanent organizations (although there can be co-managed facilities); as I have explained above, most of the dealings are done via direct government-to-government coordination. This raises the more general question of what institution-like characteristics can exist in bilateral contexts. Krotz has showed that “regularized intergovernmentalism” à la the Franco-German relationship should “generate higher degrees of stability  and permanence of contacts and communication between the states involved,” and should “standardize practices, and patterns and rhythms of dealing with one another.”65 Then, “high degrees of intensification in regularized intergovernmental contacts might, in turn, affect the organization and orientation of the foreign policy.”66 However, I have noted in the previous chapter that not all bilateral relationships are formally organized in the same way as Franco-German cooperation: other modes of bilateral functioning exist, whose mechanisms need to be uncovered. I argue that institutional forms are sui generis, and that only by understanding the kinds of experiences two states have had, and what specific

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problems they have had to jointly address, can we understand why their institutions take one shape or another. A second question that arises is: how long does it take for collections of practices, rules, and patterns of activities – that is, institutions – to emerge and stabilize, thereby defining actors’ behaviours in the present and future? To answer this question requires looking at the processes of institutionalization, of which we know little when it comes to bilateral settings. Because interstate institutions are studied in contexts in which they already exist, or at a macro level over periods of several decades, we actually know little about how processes of institutionalization develop, how they affect the conduct of cooperation in the short term, and how practices solidify to give shape to one type of interstate institution or another. We do know that cooperation is generally understood as a learning, evolutionary process. The process leading to the development of cooperation mechanisms is not straightforward but rather consists of a succession of experimentations and adjustments. These, in turn, also affect the beliefs and interests of the actors involved, through the drawing of lessons.67 Keohane argues that “each act of cooperation or discord affects the beliefs, rules and practices that form the context of future actions. Each act must therefore be interpreted as embedded within a chain of such acts and their successive cognitive and institutional residues.”68 Considering the case of bilateral trade relations, Morin and Gagne similarly argue that “bilateralism gives negotiators the possibility to draw lessons from past experiences and adjust their models for subsequent negotiations.” They add: “negotiators cannot only draw lessons from their own experience but also from that of others … Under the hypothesis of ongoing adaptation, successive waves of bilateralism can be conceived as an evolutionary process under which negotiators are in a collective learning position, ensuring the continuous flexibility of the regime.”69 Attention to lesson-learning is even more relevant in bilateral relations between states or entities that “have lengthy histories and [where] many lessons have been (mis)learned.”70 So, understanding the link between cooperation and institutions requires us not to analyze isolated events but instead to observe evolutions over time, and across sectors or “deals.” As a matter of fact, most studies of institutions and institutionalization take a long-term

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approach and assume that only a longitudinal study – usually over several decades – can legitimately examine the link between institutions and actors’ behaviour. Indeed, Stephen Barley and Pamela Tolbert explain: “To investigate how patterns of interaction lead to the emergence of new institutions is … a formidable task … historical or archival material will rarely contain the detailed data necessary for documenting the link between everyday actions and the creation of an institution. Thus, it is likely that most investigations seeking to link actions and institutions will focus on the processes by which existing institutions are maintained and modified. … Institutionalisation … is a continuous process whose operation can be observed only through time.”71 In contrast to common approaches, I argue that the close-up observation of cooperation processes as they develop shows how the short-term adaptations necessary to manage cooperation in specific instances lead to learning and to the eventual stabilization of practices. With the close-up view I take in the next chapters, I identify how specific experiences impact the subsequent conduct of cooperation, while also considering the effects of the memories of past experiences. In so doing, I can identify the intended and unintended effects of specific experiences of cooperation on the processes that gradually transform the conduct of cooperation. Indeed, bilateral modes of functioning can change shape after five, ten, or twenty years, as interactions and exchanges intensify and new experiences are encountered. In the rest of this book, I identify a dual process: on the one hand, short-term ad hoc adaptation strategies that result from specific cooperation experiences, and, on the other hand, resilience-building processes whereby the short-term strategies become institutionalized as regular practices in the management of the relationship. Thirdly, there is the question of whether said institutionalization permits addressing the challenges of cooperation, and thus whether it makes cooperation more effective. There is an assumption in the literature, not only that institutions foster cooperation, but that cooperation also creates or reinforces institutions, and that there is a positive evolutive relationship between cooperation and institutions. From a rationalist perspective, authors have claimed that by offering

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proven mechanisms, institutions “save the costs of reinvention of the wheels of cooperation each time.”72 From an institutionalist perspective, Michael E. Smith has analyzed specifically the processes by which international cooperation in foreign policy becomes institutionalized, and “the reciprocal links between institutional development and the propensity of states to cooperate.”73 In Smith’s view, institutionalization processes have occurred when “an informal, extra-legal, ad hoc, improvised system gradually foster[s] the achievement of cooperative outcomes and progressively enhance[s] its own procedures to improve the prospects for those outcomes.”74 Smith explains that the institutionalization of cooperation occurs in sequence: an institutionalized framework (a policy, a procedure) is set up; elements of this institutional framework foster cooperation-inducing behaviours; and outcomes encourage debates and reforms on institutions.75 In a more recent work, Smith considered “experiential institutional learning” in the context of the eu csdp .76 Experiential learning is defined as a “deliberate, organized, and proactive process to reform csdp processes and institutional structures on a regular basis in light of practical operational experiences.”77 The added value of this concept is that it captures learning mechanisms that result from specific operational experiences that are brought into the institution to shape how responsibilities, rules, and resources are defined. As such, it opens up the possibility of accounting for negative experiences and the limitations on effective change at the eu level. However, as often when studying institutionalization mechanisms, the argument supposes the existence of a dedicated international organization and is thus hardly applicable in the bilateral context. Overall, we would expect from institutionalist arguments to see emerge: · The development of shared narratives, symbols and norms; · An increased density of links, through the development of an organization or other forms of coordination mechanisms for managing cooperation; · The harmonization of ways of doing things among participating actors, and stabilization of said practices;

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· A redefinition or re-negotiation of interests in a way that favours cooperation, and evolution of actors’ beliefs and behaviours in favour of cooperation; · A movement from practices of specific reciprocity to diffuse reciprocity; · The shielding of the relationship in the face of political changes; and · A preference for the partner in the face of potential alternatives. By contrast, the inductive approach that I take to the evolution of cooperation leads me to challenge this deterministic argument about the evolution of cooperation: the practices that become the norm in a cooperative relationship are not necessarily those that are the most effective or the most conducive to the maintenance of cooperation over time. More precisely, I identify dual trends in the learning process in UK-France cooperation. The first trend is one that confirms existing arguments on institutionalization dynamics and resilience-building in bilateral partnerships. Formal as well as informal links between actors in public institutions can constitute a safety net which insulates the relationship “from domestic and international vicissitudes and oscillations.”78 In this book I show that, indeed, links between defence organizations, executive branches, and parliaments tend to grow exponentially, as an increasing number of connections are needed to carry out all the activities resulting from cooperation. Besides, transnational networks that transcend official-private and national boundaries tend to emerge or get reinforced as a result of these activities. Such networks qualify as policy networks, issue networks, or advocacy coalitions79; they are composed of official actors and interest groups, including professional associations and firms, but also ngo s, academics, and experts. Interest groups are bound to form “loosely coordinated coalitions” if they are to exert influence on policy.80 While private actors communicate their message through the media, testimonies before parliaments, or meetings with political leaders behind closed doors, experts use their authoritative knowledge to supply governments with information and

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construct the cognitive frame around a policy issue.81 In the case of bilateral relations, these actors are mobilized in favour of the pursuit of the relationship. This finding confirms an argument found in the special relationship literature about the presence of interest groups who lobby in favour of maintaining good relations with the target country.82 In the UK-France case, this resilience-building effort is particularly noticeable since the British decision to leave the European Union. The second trend is in contrast with existing arguments. Ad hoc, short-term adaptations and lessons learned during cooperation processes tend to lead to a reproduction of the same mechanisms, rather than indicating a change towards the most rational arrangements (as suggested by the literature). Actors do adapt to address coordination problems in ways that tend to make cooperation more effective; for example, by reinforcing the links between national administrations and multiplying points of contact. In other areas, however, government actors involved in bilateral cooperation tend to reproduce practices even when these keep the relationship fragile. An approach drawing from negotiation theories provides important insights into the coexistence of bargaining and problem solving, as well as the pursuit of mutual interests in the face of the ongoing possibility of defection.83 In particular, in this book I show that payoff problems and third-party issues are dealt with in manners that do not match hypotheses from the literature on institutionalization processes. Special relationships, like other cooperative endeavours, are subject to the risks of bargaining, and the shadow of exit strategies. UK-France cooperation has been maintained over the years, even when its effectiveness has been cast into doubt, because of the specific value that the two countries find in each other; nonetheless, the two countries only redefine their national interests in a way that favours the relationship when they do not have satisfactory alternatives. If they fail to negotiate quid pro quos, governments turn to other special partners with which they maintain simultaneous relationships. In the UK-France case, this is illustrated by the persistence of US-UK intelligence and industrial links, and of the Franco-German

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“couple.” I also show that, surprisingly, embeddedness within international organizations is not conducive to cooperation when the parties cannot agree on their preferred multilateral forums for joint action (nato and the eu illustrate this in the case of France and the UK), or when there are changes in membership to such organizations (as illustrated by Brexit). Why does cooperation sometimes fail? This book is concerned with understanding the mechanisms that make effective cooperation possible. Its case studies thus cover cases that do not qualify as failures. However, the determinants that I have presented in this chapter can shed light on the causes of failure, when cooperation was envisaged and eventually abandoned. The parties may find, when looking at the details, that their objectives are not at all compatible. When that is the case, the absence of trade-off or payback opportunities – where one party agrees to cooperate on something based on the preferences of the other party, with the insurance that they will (at a later stage) cooperate on an item of value to them – may make cooperation fall apart. Similarly, shortages in human resources, or lack of common membership to some international organizations that provide proxy structure and norms for bilateral cooperation, may make coordination problems insuperable. Failure to find a common ground on the distribution of gains and costs – due to a persistent asymmetry, or, again, the absence of possible trade-offs or paybacks – may also lead to projects being abandoned. Finally, the existence or emergence of alternatives, or changes in the international organizational and legal context, may render the embeddedness of the partnership more constraining. Again, changes occurring during the cooperation process in both the domestic and international contexts affect the way cooperation plays out. This includes changes in government, and the resulting political and diplomatic reorientations may lead previously agreeing parties to put cooperation on hold, or to turn to other preferred partners, thus leading to lasting divergences in which not only specific projects but the whole bilateral partnership might suffer. All these aspects help explain why, in a given case, actors are unable to adapt to the challenges of cooperation to make it effective.

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t h r e e c as e s o f c ooperati on: c as e s e l e c t io n and data As I set out in the introduction, while it is far from being an isolated case in international relations, the UK-France relationship is an ideal case for studying the management of a special relationship. In fact, the two countries display all the conditions that are considered to be conducive to effective cooperation. They are well-established liberal democracies; they are neighbours that share countless strategic interests; and they have fought many wars together in the past century and until today. The two countries also share a membership to most international organizations, notably nato , the un Security Council, and, before Brexit, the eu . Thus, France and the UK make a perfect case for investigating the mechanisms of special relationships and questioning widely held assumptions about facilitating structural factors. In this book, the study of the UK-France defence relationship revolves around the analysis of their cooperation in three areas covered by the 2010 Lancaster House treaties: (1) deploying military force, (2) developing joint military capacity, and (3) integrating defence industries. Within each area, I examine one case of joint initiative, which serves as a thread for examining cooperation and adaptation processes in the period of 2010–18. Chapter 3 covers joint military interventions, with an analysis of the Libya campaign of 2011. I review the diplomatic and military engagement of France and the UK in Libya, and their cooperation and its limits during the conflict. In chapter 4, I examine how the UK and France have sought to develop joint military capacity and study the implementation of the project of the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (cjef ) announced at the Lancaster House summit. Then, chapter 5 analyzes the UK-French plan for the integration of their defence industry, and the design of common weapon programs, with a study of the missile sector. With a view to tracing the cooperation process in various sectors as consistently as possible, I selected cases matching three criteria: they are cases for which it was possible to access sufficient and similar amounts of data as per the grounded method that I employ;

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they are cases of effective cooperation that structures the relationship (i.e., not cases where a desire to cooperate was announced but not implemented); and they are cases that take place within the same timeframe. Other case studies would have been possible, but for various reasons did not meet these criteria. Firstly, the cases studied cover sectors considered part of conventional defence and security, whereas cases of cooperation in the nuclear or intelligence domains would have created too many hurdles to gather sufficient data to allow in-depth case studies. The first two criteria – presence of effective cooperation and a workable timeframe – also limited the cases that could be considered. During the period between 2010 and 2016, when most of the data was gathered, there was only one case of major military intervention involving a significant level of bilateral cooperation – the Libya campaign. Since the November 2010 treaties, plans to develop common military capacity have centered around the development of the cjef . The latter thus became the logical focus for studying effective cooperation in that sector. When it comes to defence industries and weapon procurement, the One Complex Weapons Initiative, which aims at integrating the two countries in the missile sector, is one of the projects that made the most progress over the period studied and was initially supposed to serve as a model for other industrial sectors. None of the cases is an outright failure or success for the two countries: in all three instances, there has been effective cooperation that has produced joint outputs, but there have also been periods of tension when cooperation was being questioned, when the outcome became uncertain, and there were indeed episodes of near-failure. Hence, each case is suitable for addressing the following questions and testing the usefulness of the analytical framework: why, how, and to what extent was cooperation maintained, and with what effects on the relationship? In each case study chapter, I first review the empirical developments by looking at interactions and processes across the levels of policy-making, with an emphasis on the working level, which is where the complexity of international relations lies. Then, the conclusion reviews those empirical developments and makes sense of the cooperation process using the four analytical dimensions presented earlier in this chapter. The longer-term effects

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of each specific experience of cooperation on adaptation, learning, and resilience-building processes are then analyzed in a cross-case fashion in chapter 6.

The Value of Cross-Sector Analysis The choice of studying the relationship through cases of bilateral cooperation in different areas of defence is heuristic for three reasons. Firstly, the analysis of three synchronic instances of cooperation allows us to take out contextual modifiers of outcomes, thus avoiding the types of difficulties that scholars face when doing international comparisons. The focus can then really be on the phenomenon of cooperation itself, which contributes to the theory-building process. Indeed, each case is able to validate hypotheses on the phenomenon of bilateral cooperation and contribute to generalization. Indeed, as George and Bennett argue, “building-block” or “no variance” studies of several cases are useful when they make it possible to “identify alternative causal paths to similar outcomes.”84 In other words, similarity in outcome – insofar as in all instances there is effective, yet never optimal or straightforward cooperation – allows me to show the various processes leading to that outcome. The combination of the four analytical dimensions with process-tracing and comparison is what permits us to understand the relative impact of each determinant, the processes by which the challenges shape the outcome of cooperation, and, in turn, the effect of each experience of cooperation on the bilateral partnership. Secondly, the analysis of cooperation between the two same states, but in different sectors of defence policy, departs from the area-specific and fragmented arguments that dominate the field. Indeed, the study of defence policies and cooperation has been segmented into a variety of sub-sectors and empirical objects. In studies of military operations, for instance, the empirical focus has been on large multilateral interventions that have involved the United States as a dominant participant (e.g., in the Gulf, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan),85 or on the development and failures of common eu crisis-management operations.86 The focus, in this literature, tends to be on power dynamics among allies, and the effectiveness of institutional settings in fostering

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cooperation. In the literature that addresses cooperation between armed forces, analyses have been concerned chiefly with the integration of forces, or cooperation in the battlefield, with sociological or historical approaches. Authors underline the importance of shared norms, practices, and identities as defining the degree of integration of forces.87 Finally, scholars have been interested in armaments cooperation, resulting in a variety of accounts of the development and vicissitudes of multinational weapon programs. A central focus has then been placed on domestic politics and the interactions among domestic actors, between domestic politics and international politics, and between public and private actors.88 What a cross-sector approach allows for is the shedding of light on the same phenomena across the board, showing both differences among “types” of defence cooperation initiatives, similarities and trends across domains, and the interrelation between cooperation sectors. It is very enlightening to see, for instance, how cooperation between France and the UK during the Libya operations affected their cooperation in the development of their combined force, and vice versa. Furthermore, some types of guided weapons used during the Libya campaign were manufactured by the Franco-British company mbda , which the two countries were then endeavouring to integrate further. In turn, the types of arms that the countries procure will determine the degree of interoperability that their armed forces will be able to reach. There is thus an interlinking of all these aspects of defence policies and cooperation. Finally, the Brexit vote took place after most of the developments analyzed in the case study chapters occurred. This has several advantages. For one thing, it allows me to analyze what cooperation looks like under normal circumstances. Second, it provides an opportunity to examine the consequences of critical contextual changes, whose effects can be analytically isolated from usual cooperation practices. Third, the cross-sector analysis allows me to make policy-relevant assessments of whether and why exactly certain domains of cooperation – in this case, industrial integration – will be more affected by the UK’s exit from the eu than others. Finally, beyond the UK-France case, this political shock and its effects on the relationship serve to draw lessons for other cases of special relationships, in particular when it comes to the sturdiness of resilience-building mechanisms.

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Data There is very limited publicly available data on the topic of contemporary Franco-British relations in defence because of its novelty and the sensitive character of defence matters. Indeed, with any research concerned with security and defence policy comes the challenge of data access.89 However, with the novelty of the object of analysis – or indeed, its ongoing nature – comes the great opportunity of direct access to participants. In 1965 Richard Neustadt noted in his study of US-UK relations during the Suez and Skybolt crises that the limited information left on record in military and diplomatic organizations could not be more trusted than the memories of participants.90 In this book, to compensate for the lack of literature or public sources, significant new empirical data had to be produced through fieldwork, and in particular, elite interviews. Much of the data used in this research was gathered through semi-structured elite interviews. A total of 122 interviews were conducted between 2012 and 2019. The interviews aimed at understanding a great number of actors’ positions and interactions, their perceptions, and the way these actors shaped policy decisions and their implementation. The interview sample includes a vast number of high-ranking and top-ranking military officers, civil servants, diplomats, top-level political advisers, industrialists, members of Parliament, and one former secretary of state, as well as a small number of consultants, researchers, and journalists. The interviews took place in France, the UK, Brussels, and Washington, dc . Anonymity was guaranteed to all the interviewees, except for public figures such as elected representatives, top-level appointees, journalists, and researchers. The full list of interviewees’ affiliations is provided in annex 1. Secondly, I was able to observe bilateral dealings within the French and British ministries of defence through (participant) observation on various occasions. This proved an invaluable source of information that permitted me to not rely solely on actors’ discourses. Indeed, Heidi Hardt showed that defence organizations communicate publicly in a biased fashion: “showcasing success increases the organization’s prestige, perceived legitimacy and prospects for

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future funding. In contrast, strategic errors put these in jeopardy.”91 Bearing this in mind, when studying defence issues, one should try to get as close to actual events as possible. I worked as a desk officer at the French Ministry of Defence’s army bilateral cooperation desk in the summer of 2011. This proved invaluable for understanding the organizational processes behind the daily management of bilateral military relations between allies. In the following years, I also had the opportunity to observe bilateral meetings in the two ministries: a two-day workshop organized by the Direction générale de l'armement (dga , the French arms procurement agency), which focused on capabilities and armament projects, as well as wider policy and governance issues (October 2012, in Paris); two “Steering Group” preparation meetings of high-ranking military officers, as part of the development of the cjef (March and April 2014 in Northwood); and the launch day and vip Day of the military exercise Griffin Rise (June 2015, at the Mont Valérien Fortress outside Paris). Aside from interviews and observation, the book makes use of a wide array of other original primary data. Some are documents produced by defence institutions. Many of these are public and available online; others are unpublished, unclassified internal documents, including drafts, briefing notes, letters, internal announcements, and presentation slides which were shared with me during interviews. Finally, I also attended several high-level, closed events related to Franco-British defence cooperation: a series of closed events organized by a consortium of French and British think tanks, the “fruk Defence Forum” (between 2011 and 2013), and the annual Defence Conference of the Franco-British Council (in March 2015 and November 2016).

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Deploying Military Force

Four months after signing the Lancaster House agreements, France and Britain engaged in a military intervention in Libya to counter the repression of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi against civilians. The intervention started on 19 March 2011 and finished with the death of the Libyan dictator on 23 October 2011. The operations gathered wide international support – at least initially – and involved a variety of actors, including France, the UK, the United States, neighbouring countries, and regional and international organizations. France and the UK were the main actors in the diplomatic and military campaign, along with the United States. Their joint engagement appeared to be consistent with their commitment in the Lancaster House Treaty to: build a long-term mutually beneficial partnership in defence and security with the aims of … deploying together into theatres in which both Parties have agreed to be engaged, in operations conducted under the auspices of the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation or the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy or in a coalition or bilateral framework, as well as supporting, as agreed on a case by case basis, one Party when it is engaged in operations in which the other Party is not part.1 The Libya campaign was the first case of “post-Lancaster House” operational cooperation for the two partners. It was also the first

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such bilateral diplomatic and military enterprise since the wars in Yugoslavia. As such, it proved a major test for the newly institutionalized partnership, both in terms of the partners’ political alignment and their ability to act together militarily. In this chapter, I start by reviewing how events unfolded prior to and during the intervention. I then analyze these developments to highlight the mechanisms through which France and the UK managed the constraints on their cooperation and muddled through to carry out this joint endeavour. The case study illustrates how the absence of common military structures and doctrines, and more importantly disagreements on how to deal with the usa , the eu , and nato in managing the crisis affected the extent of cooperation between the two countries.

g at h e r in g s u p p o rt for a mi li tary i n t e rv e n t io n in l ib ya : di plomati c moves The popular contestation started on Tuesday, 15 February in Benghazi. Government forces, under the authority of authoritarian ruler Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, were reported to have killed six civilians that day during a demonstration, which prompted a wider rebellion. Several states and international organizations quickly denounced Gaddafi’s government’s repression of the protests. On 21 February, the eu and its member states, un Secretary General Ban-Ki Moon, and the US president condemned the repression and called for an end to violence. The Libyan ambassador to the United Nations abandoned the regime and called for the imposition of a no-fly zone (nfz ). On the following day, the Organisation of Islamic Conference (oic ) also condemned the repression, fearing a humanitarian disaster. The League of Arab States suspended Libya’s membership, and the African Union also denounced the inappropriate use of force. In other words, there was a wide and rapid consensus for reprobating the behaviour of Muammar Gaddafi. On 22 February, European and other countries started evacuating their nationals. President Nicolas Sarkozy and Prime Minister Cameron were the main proponents of action, first economic and diplomatic and later military, against the Gaddafi regime. They reacted early to the crisis

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and maintained the pressure on both the Libyan government and on their other allies. On 23 February, Nicolas Sarkozy called for economic and financial relations with Libya to be suspended, with the enforcement of a maritime embargo and the freezing of regime assets. Sarkozy had the support of the UK and Germany, but other eu countries such as Italy and Cyprus were reluctant to move, given their strong economic ties with the regime.2 On 24 February, US president Barack Obama gave his first speech on the situation in Libya, condemning the regime’s violence.3 At the same time, British and French diplomats started working together on a un resolution to condemn the Gaddafi regime and call for international sanctions. Using its well-established diplomatic influence at the United Nations, and as it was chairing the un Security Council at the time, the UK “quickly imposed itself as the ‘penholder’ or ‘lead country’ on Libya — that is, the Council member who takes it upon itself to draft resolutions and suggest a course of action.”4 Along with French representatives, they drafted a resolution, which, after approval from the United States, European partners, and later Russia and China, they submitted to the Security Council on 25 February. The resolution proposed economic sanctions as well as provisions for an enquiry via the International Criminal Court on the regime’s acts of violence. For Pouliot and Adler-Nissen, the proponents of the resolution used it to “build momentum” on the Libya case while being convinced that it would not be enough.5 un Resolution 1970 was passed on 26 February 2011. While the two main players indeed built diplomatic “momentum” and Libya was on top of the agenda at the un , during the following two weeks they stepped forward and backward as domestic and international debates developed. From the onset of the crisis, French and British political leaders were “the most vocal proponents of taking action against Gaddafi,”6 but there were some internal divisions within their governments. In Britain, France, and the US, most defence officials were reluctant to launch a major military mission.7 The heads of state and government of France and the UK took the lead. David Cameron announced to the Parliament on 28 February, amidst an intensification of the strikes against the population in Misrata, that he had asked the military to consider options for an intervention with

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Britain’s allies, and he started calling for a no-fly zone.8 On 2 March, Cameron encouraged his government to “team up with French officials” to design proposals for an eu response to the events, with a view to an emergency eu summit that the British and French scheduled for 11 March.9 In France, much attention was initially devoted to governmental quagmires: the discussions on Libya coincided with a governmental crisis that ended in the resignation of the minister for foreign affairs, Michèle Alliot-Marie.10 Then came international politics: François Fillon, head of the French government, and the new minister for foreign affairs, Alain Juppé, both expressed doubts about the idea of an nfz whose implementation would necessitate nato involvement. Indeed, on 25 February, a North Atlantic Council gathering of nato members had been dealing with the possible involvement of the Alliance in case of intervention, but the French “did not see the point” of nato ’s involvement.11 They thought it would make matters worse. Alain Juppé explained on 3 March: “we must think twice about a military intervention. I do not know how the public opinion in Arab countries would react if it saw nato forces land on a territory in the southern Mediterranean. This could prove extremely counterproductive.”12 Thus, the French government’s skepticism was less about the idea of military intervention, and more about the means. For the French government, there were two main points to settle: nato ’s involvement was the big issue, and any military action would require un backing. The initial diplomatic moves by France and Britain quickly began to look like an insufficient response to Gaddafi’s aggressions against the Libyan population. French and British diplomats then together started to work on a new draft of un resolution to set the stage for a military intervention. For Chivvis, “this joint Franco-British pressure was essential in generating diplomatic momentum for intervention.”13 However, the intervention itself could not happen until France and the UK were rallied by several other countries, particularly the United States, European partners, and Arab countries. In the case of the latter, things accelerated during the second week of March, when the Gulf Cooperation Council issued calls for the unsc to take the measures necessary to protect the Libyan people (including through a no-fly zone) and was followed by the

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Organisation of Islamic Conference and the League of Arab States.14 At that point, British and French diplomats used their complementary ties with third countries to gather the widest support possible for a un resolution and a no-fly zone.15 Then, European partners. On 10 March Sarkozy and Cameron sent a joint letter to the president of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, calling for the eu and its member states to support a no-fly zone. The letter stated France and Britain’s shared position and objectives on Libya16: their aims were to ally with partners in Europe, the Arab world, and Africa to push Gaddafi out of power, to support the National Transition Council as a valid interlocutor, to carry on planning for “all possible contingencies” including a no-fly zone “or other options against air attacks,” and to support humanitarian action, the icc prosecution, and the enforcement of the arms embargo. However, France and the UK were constrained in their initiative by the attitude of their allies. Several nato and partner nations, namely Italy, Germany, Turkey, and Russia, were initially blocking calls for international (including military) reaction. Ankara was uneasy with the idea of having a nato operation south of the Mediterranean and would rather not have the French leading it, given the bad state of Turkish-French relations at the time.17 The Italian government, for its part, was initially opposed to sanctions against the Gaddafi regime, given strong commercial ties with Libya as part of a “reconciliation pact” signed in 2008.18 As for Germany, foreign affairs minister Guido Westerwelle presented the risk of collateral damage leading to civilian casualties as the main determinant of Germany’s refusal to intervene.19 One consequence of this discord was that the European Union was unable to provide a significant response and act as a political entity in the crisis. Notably, eu High Representative for Foreign Affairs Catherine Ashton refused to recognize the National Transitional Council (ntc ), and eu member states rejected plans for a no-fly zone during the eu summit initiated by Britain and France on 11 March. Finally, and even more decisive, was the involvement of the United States. The US administration was also initially divided. Obama appeared publicly very reluctant. During the build-up to the

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intervention, it was Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and not the president, who managed diplomatic relations and discussions with allied countries and other key international actors such as the Arab League. It is only after Clinton’s encounter with representatives of the ntc in Paris that Washington committed to the un resolution in the final line of its drafting.20 Resolution 1973 was presented to the Council and adopted on 17 March, with five abstentions (Germany, Russia, China, India, and Brazil) and no vote against. unscr 1973 could only pass with a careful wording that combined unsc members’ conflicting preferences and prevented a Chinese and/or Russian veto. The resolution authorized “all necessary measures… to protect civilians… while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.”21 Both the nature of the measures and the extent of the protection of civilians could be discussed and interpreted. Yet, despite the vagueness of the objective, a coalition of countries willing to intervene quickly formed around the P3 (France, UK, and US) and Canada, and a nato meeting was planned for the following day.22

n e g o t iat in g t h e c o m m a n d of the operati on Appropriate command and control arrangements shall be agreed by both Parties for all bilateral deployments or operations. Article 5, para 3 of the Treaty of Cooperation in defence and security between France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Only two days after Resolution 1973 was passed, a small coalition composed of Britain, France, and the United States launched the first strikes against Libyan armed forces on Saturday 19 March. On 31 March, the national campaigns came under nato command based in Naples. These two weeks were characterized by intense discussions and negotiations on the political, strategic, and tactical command of operations over Libya. While British and French diplomats had been working together on the un resolution to authorize international action – including by military means – exchanges over military planning were much less successful.

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Debates and Misunderstandings on Command and Control Arrangements The main debate was whether the intervention would take the shape of a “coalition of the willing” led by the French and British, or if a nato operation would be launched. On the British side, Foreign Affairs Secretary William Hague announced as early as 7  March that nato had been tasked with drafting contingency plans for the establishment of a no-fly zone.23 This had been agreed between Cameron and Obama on 8 March.24 Now, the French were uneasy with the idea of resorting to nato : Alain Juppé stated at the Assemblée Nationale on the same day that the Atlantic Alliance was “not the appropriate organization” to conduct an operation against the Gaddafi regime.25 Sarkozy favoured leading a coalition with the British, with strong eu involvement, and certainly not nato .26 Due to lack of support from other member states and inadequacy to engage in high-intensity operations, the eu option was soon taken off the table.27 Instead, there were “talks about UK and France leading an operation.”28 Joint Franco-British strikes was the “ideal format” for Sarkozy, as it would provide “a chance to cement [the Franco-British] relationship in practice and demonstrate the continued relevance of both powers in the international scene.”29 A UK-French military command would require shared political commitments and concrete arrangements – not least, headquarters.30 Only four months after the signing of the Lancaster House treaties, there were no “Franco-British tools” yet, and thus the implementation of a joint command appeared very complex.31 When it became clear that the US would participate in the intervention, on 16 March, the French sent a general to Ramstein air base (Germany), where the US Air Force in Europe (usafe ) and nato ’s Allied Air Command are located, to liaise with the Americans.32 Yet in parallel, they sent (“four-star”) General Hendel, chief of staff of the French Air Force Command,33 to the Permanent Joint Headquarters (pjhq ) in Northwood (UK) to explore the possibility of joint bilateral planning and command. This was apparently an initiative from the French side – it seems from Sarkozy himself34 – that did not accord with ongoing British plans: “The French wanted to send a

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four-star general to Northwood to do the planning of the operation. And they did. But we on the British side wanted to plan the operation with the US, as it is what we usually do. So, the French four-star was there, but he could not be part of the planning … because of the restrictions on intelligence sharing.”35 Notin similarly recounts that the French general arrived at Northwood on 18 March only to witness, with resentment, that the British had already planned everything with the Americans.36 The French perceptions of what was doable did not match actual British preferences, which were for nato planning and command to ensure Washington’s support.37 These opposing perspectives led to some misunderstandings on how to go about planning command and control (C2), and testimonies reflect that confusion, exemplified by the tale from the British deputy commander air operations: “Apparently the chief of the air staff and his counterpart agreed on having air C2 in Lyon and operational command at Northwood. There was the idea, especially on the Sarkozy side, to go without the Americans. … I personally never heard about Lyon. I didn’t even know my counterpart in Lyon. I had sent an officer to Ramstein to find out what was happening there and eventually I went to Ramstein.”38 Near Lyon, at Mont-Verdun, is where the French National Air Operations Command (Centre National des Opérations Aériennes) is located. It was argued that Mont-Verdun had the resources to be turned into operational headquarters if required; the equivalent British option (hq Air Command in High Wycombe) was also considered.39 It is unclear whether a Franco-British command would have had the necessary infrastructures to ensure the coordination of a multinational operation. According to the then-UK chief of the defence staff, David Richards, a bilateral command was undoable: “We did not have the capacities to set up a command and control structure, deal with air defence, and sustain the campaign. We did not think it was doable. Guillaud [the cema ] gave Sarkozy advice that we could do that … This was for political reasons.”40 Eventually, more interviewees confirmed that with the Americans in, it made complete sense to organize command in Ramstein. That argument became even stronger when the eventual size of the coalition was assessed: other countries that provided air assets included Italy, Spain,

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Norway, Denmark, Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. Besides, some European partners did not want a French or a Franco-British command. This was especially the case for Italy and Turkey: Italy had set an “ultimatum” that nato had to lead the operation if Italy was to lend its military bases.41 The Turkish government, for its part, refused to let the French exercise command and control,42 and “chafed at France assuming the posture of ‘enforcer of the un Security Council.’”43 Eventually, two experienced British diplomats, including soonto-be ambassador to France Peter Ricketts, “helped shepherd the negotiations to persuade France that a nato -led operation would work much more smoothly than an Anglo-French one alone.”44 Nonetheless, from a French perspective, the British secret planning with the US and the push for nato appeared as first ambiguous and eventually unilateral: while there were still debates between Paris and London about the resort to nato , the British were supporting operational planning inside nato and thus created the conditions of a transfer to nato .45 The feeling on the French side was thus that eventually, while there was supposed to be negotiation, “the British and the Americans imposed nato .”46

Tensions around the First Strikes The first strikes saw the culmination of tensions between the two partners. The military campaign to enforce un Resolution 1973 started on the afternoon of Saturday 19 March. At 4:45 p.m. gmt (5:45 p.m. French time), the French air force launched the first airstrikes against armoured vehicles of Gaddafi’s forces that were progressing quickly towards the rebel stronghold of Benghazi. Later in the evening, the British and the Americans together fired around 110 submarine-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles47 (of which only seven are reported to have been British strikes48). At 12:00 p.m. gmt that same day, Nicolas Sarkozy had convened in Paris a “summit for the Libyan people” gathering the top representatives of the un, nato, the eu, and most states that had agreed to take part in the coalition. At 2:45 p.m. gmt , as the meeting finished, Sarkozy announced live on French television: “Our aircraft are already pre-

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venting air attacks on the city. Other French aircraft stand ready to intervene against any armoured vehicles that threaten unarmed civilians.”49 In other words, the French planes had taken off from French air bases in the morning and early afternoon, while the meeting was taking place. There are competing accounts as to whether that French move was coordinated – or rather, the extent of the coordination. On some accounts, the French acted purely unilaterally, or at least stroke earlier than planned. A report by the Royal Aeronautical Society denounces “the first attack mission” as “a unilateral national action.”50 A parliamentary report similarly states: “We are particularly concerned at the apparent decision of the French Government to commence air operations without consulting allies.”51 At the British air command, I was told: “We didn’t know, we were not told [that the French would strike early]. For us that was quite a shock.”52 Hilary Clinton indeed writes in her memoirs that “before the official meeting even began, Sarkozy … confided [to her and David Cameron] that French warplanes were already headed towards Libya.”53 In fact, in this line of interpretation, what had been planned was that the French would go first and launch airstrikes against mobile targets, while the British and Americans would initiative submarine-launched strikes against fixed targets at dusk; unilateralism was simply a matter of acting earlier than planned. On another interpretation that has been put forward, the responsibility for uncoordinated action on the first day might be reversed, such that it was the British who let the French down. According to that version, France’s unilateralism would in fact reflect the Royal Air Force’s refusal to participate in the mission along with French Rafale aircraft. A rusi report argues: “the launch of the operation had in fact been planned until the very last moment as a joint Franco-British initial air strike ….”54 The failure to conduct the joint raid would then be for two reasons: the British lacked intelligence that would ensure that the risks were not too high for engaging British military assets before Gaddafi’s air defence was down; and the British lacked the operational experience for conducting such long-distance raids.55 Another argument is made by Notin: the fact that the British and the Americans were able to strike jointly in

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the evening of 19 March implies “that British and American commands planned the operation together. Given the total number [of Tomahawks] launched, 48 hours were probably necessary” to plan it.56 Yet according to the same author, during this period the French were still aiming for a joint UK-French operation. In that sense, it seems that the French retaliated after having been fooled by their British (and American) allies: the French general sent to Ramstein supposedly “treated himself with a nice revenge” by announcing to his British hosts on 19 March that French strikes were imminent.57

From Coalition to NATO Operation and Back When the first strikes occurred on 19 March and throughout the first two weeks of operations, nato was not ready to take command of the whole intervention.58 nato managed the maritime blockade from 22 March onwards, and then the air operations from 31 March onwards. In the meantime, the operations were conducted by a coalition in which the United States, Britain, and France were the three main participants. A North Atlantic Council meeting took place on the day after un Resolution 1973, and it was decided that nato would command the enforcement of a maritime blockade.59 The naval component of nato , Operation Unified Protector, started on 22 March to form a blockade outside Libya.60 Operational command was in Naples, which is where the nato Joint Force Command and the Maritime Component Command are located. Other non-kinetic missions and elements had been deployed since February for evacuation operations, with the participation of numerous European and non-European countries. In parallel, from 19 March, there were four national air operations coordinated at a US air base in Ramstein (Germany): Odyssey Dawn for the United States, Ellamy for the United Kingdom, Harmattan for France, and Mobile for the smaller Canadian operation. All had their own chains of command. The British command was in the pjhq at Northwood and the French one was at the Centre National des Opérations Aériennes at Mont-Verdun air base. Cooperation was confined to the coordination of national planning, command, and strikes.61 The Americans gave the coalition the means to conduct

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the operations by offering access to their headquarters, by ensuring coordination, and by providing most of the intelligence.62 They were de facto in charge of commanding the air wing of the coalition63: it was General Carter Ham, head of US Africa Command (africom ), who ensured coordination, and the tactical joint task force was led by Admiral Samuel Locklear aboard uss Mount Whitney.64 The coordination of operations was done at Ramstein because it is the location of the US africom . Some assets from the US Europe Command (eucom ) were also used. For the first two or three days of operations, the Americans were doing deconfliction of national missions, centralizing information on targets, military assets, and ongoing missions to avoid collisions and to institute a common language (radio frequencies, indications, names of sectors).65 For fourteen days, the British air marshall Greg Bagwell, deputy air operations commander, and the French general Patrick Charaix, deputy commander of air defence and air operations, worked together with Lieutenant General Frank Gorenc, commander Third Air Force for US eucom , and Maj Gen Margaret Woodward, commander of the US Air Force branch for africom . Woodward was the operational commander for Operation Odyssey Dawn until its transfer to nato . The British and French had liaison officers on board the uss Mount Whitney as well as military representatives in Ramstein to liaise with the national chains of operational command, which did facilitate coordination.66 Common Air Task Orders started to be issued around 22 March, as the strategic objectives became clearer.67 However, one French officer pointed out that even with a common ato there were issues with compatibility of systems (such as software): as a result, a lot of the coordination and information sharing had to be done “beyond all rules” from person to person.68 The same was true in the national command centres where liaison officers are permanently in place: at the French operations planning and command centre (Centre de planification et de conduite des opérations [cpco ]) it was “complicated … because the UK had access to Two-Eye documents from the US and France had no access to these documents … I had to choose when I thought it was relevant to share some information I had with the French that they could not access,” a British liaison officer explained.69 At Ramstein,

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according to a French officer who was on site, “the good trilateral integration was facilitated by the participants’ identities, as several of them had taken part in Exercise Austere Challenge a year earlier. So, it was individuals who knew each other.”70 This was indeed the case for General Charaix, Lt Gen Gorenc, and Maj Gen Woodward.71 In other words, before command was transferred to nato under Operation Unified Protector, the coordination of the national operations of coalition countries relied heavily on American assets on the one hand, and individual knowledge and skills on the other. the handing over to nato

This configuration and the cooperation dynamics in place during the first phase changed with the prospect of a partial withdrawal of the United States and the handing-over of the operation command to nato on 31 March. While the coalition operation had found ad hoc modus operandi, which, according to interviewees and to the literature, proved satisfactory and efficient, several factors led to the command of operations being transferred to nato . The door to nato, which had been closed by the French and the Turks, opened. The Ankara government, who had reacted very badly to not having been invited to the Paris conference by Sarkozy on 19 March, finally accepted nato ’s involvement on 25 March, after several days of lobbying by Western capitals and nato representatives.72 The transfer of part of the air component command to Izmir in Turkey – even though it was eventually moved to Poggio Renatico in Italy – might have constituted the final push to unlock the Turkish position. Once Ankara had freed the way, it became difficult for Paris to refuse the Alliance’s authority. However, the phrasing of the handing over of command reflects an uneasy compromise for the French government, which, as I explained, was displeased at nato’ s involvement in the first place. On 22 March, during an Alliance meeting, there was a row between nato Secretary General Rasmussen and French and German representatives as Rasmussen criticized the two countries’ opposition to the nato mission – so much so that the two representatives walked out of the meeting room.73 A compromise was finally reached with Paris: nato would perform the military command, like for any allied operation, but the

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“political leadership” would be in the hand of an ad hoc creation, the Libya Contact Group. The consensus was on the surface: a communiqué from the French presidency mentioned discussions with Barack Obama on the “support role” to be played by nato , while the US administration mentioned the Alliance’s “key role.”74 It was thus a loose consensus that permitted the acceptation of nato ’s military management of the operation and the Contact Group’s political management of the intervention. The latter was fully established during a London conference on 29 March that gathered the heads of state and government of participating countries. A consequence of the Contact Group’s existence was that, unlike the usual inter-ally negotiations making their way through nato bodies such as the nac , “most of the decision-making … took place in capitals of the participating powers, especially those contributing with striking missions.”75 Indeed, as the American lieutenant general Ralph Jodice (commander of the nato component in Izmir) noted, all nato members would have been unable to overtly agree on a strategic objective to the mission, such as overthrowing the Gaddafi regime.76 It was thus France and Britain who ensured the political leadership of the campaign, even more so as the US quickly withdrew from the diplomatic frontline. A second factor leading to the handing over to nato was the need to facilitate the inclusion of numerous participating countries. Indeed altogether, eighteen countries provided air or maritime assets and thirty-four nations provided other forms of support.77 All these countries were represented at the Combined Force Air Command. Yet the coalition did not possess “the ability to generate forces from participatory nations or other potential partner states”78 and it could not fill gaps in command and control capabilities. The challenge of continuing as a non-nato coalition became insuperable once the US announced their imminent disengagement from operations. The US government indeed quickly disengaged from the campaign both militarily and politically (though it remained central for support functions79), just like President Obama had announced at the dawn of the intervention on 18 March.80 nato was officially tasked with the command and control of Operation Unified Protector (oup ) on 31 March. The command structure

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that had been put in place in Ramstein changed as a result. There was one single chain of command, with the operational command for the naval mission at the Joint Force Command Naples, and the command and control for the air component located at the Combined Air Operation Centre in Poggio Renatico (both in Italy). This is not to say that all the ongoing national operations ceased and that all missions were assigned to and commanded by nato . Britain, France, the US, and other intervening countries continued to conduct their own operations. The French, for instance, gave nato operational control but maintained command over their aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, their submarines, helicopters, and Special Forces.81 The transition to a nato operation was not an entirely smooth process, either from the perspective of the whole coalition or that of the UK and France. Firstly, the operation commander had to be designated. Both the British and the French “attempted to place one of their own officers in charge,” which prompted tensions between the two and also met with Turkish objection.82 As a compromise, the Allies opted for a neutral commander, in this instance French Canadian lieutenant general Charles Bouchard, then deputy commander of the jfc Naples.83 The commander of Joint Force Command Naples, Admiral Samuel Locklear III, and the supreme allied commander Europe, Admiral James Stavridis, were both Americans.84 At the lower levels, too, the teams changed; it was not the same individuals as those who had commanded the first two weeks: all the fourteen people who had commanded the beginning of the operation “disappeared.”85 Besides, since the headquarters were in Italy, there were proportionally more Italians and less British and French on site as the transition took place. There were no British at all in Poggio Renatico or Izmir (where part of the air command was initially conducted) and the French had only one general in Poggio Renatico.86 Secondly, while nato provided infrastructures and standard operating procedures, the process was also much heavier and slower than what had been experienced during the two weeks in Ramstein. nato had no ready-made contingency plan for an operation,87 some assets (such as Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) were missing in the headquarters, and the nato centres were “understaffed and inexperienced.”88 The consequence, in the words of a French

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officer, was that “it screwed up [the operation] for two weeks. It was not the same countries and honestly there was not the same operational level … In Italy they were all on holiday, and they dragged their feet.”89 As another French officer explained with a little disdain: “nato … is a peacetime alliance …. You need time to wake up the structure in times of crisis … especially in the south of Europe, if you see what I mean.”90 On the other hand, the French maintenance of national operational command also slowed down processes, as it complicated the chain of command for strike missions involving French assets. Decisions made by the command in Naples that concerned the French forces were systematically transferred to Paris, where they had to be validated to be executed, which had the inconvenient consequence of considerably lengthening the period between the identification of a target and the reaction, thus causing certain targets to be lost.91 Thirdly, things were made even more complex with the participation of non-nato countries. Qatar and the uae had joined the coalition to provide the operation with a non-Western political justification, and as such they were included in the operational command through modified nato instruments.92 They did conduct some sorties, but they did not strike and they were not involved in any strategic mission. Their position further constrained the nato mission: those countries would identify dynamic targets during reconnaissance operations but oftentimes the targets were lost by the time the French or British took over and undertook strike missions.93

t he c o n t in uat io n o f t h e campai gn: joi nt l e ade rs h ip a n d o p e r at io nal bri dge-bui ldi ng The operations against the Gaddafi regime employed maritime and air assets based on naval platforms or air bases in Italy, France, Greece, Malta, or Cyprus, as well as a limited number of Special Forces operating secretly on Libyan ground. Aside from the US, France, and Britain, other countries that provided air assets included Italy, Spain, Norway, Denmark, Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, the uae , and Qatar. Many of the intervening countries conducted only defensive missions aimed at ensuring the coalition

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supremacy in the airspace without necessarily involving air strikes. Offensive sorties (that include strikes) represented between a third and half of the sorties.94 Before the operation was transferred to nato , the US carried out most of sorties and air strikes: in the first ten days, 75 per cent of the munitions launched were American. The US mobilized eighty-two combat aircraft (including for “Suppression of Enemy Air Defence,” air superiority, close air-support, and bombing).95 After 31 March, the US removed their combat aircraft but continued to support the operation with intelligence and refueling capacity. For their part, the UK and France had around twenty and thirty fighter aircraft respectively,96 as well as five and sixteen combat helicopters respectively. Other non-combat air assets that the two countries mobilized included air-refueling capabilities, awacs aircraft, and intelligence and surveillance aircraft like the British Sentinel.97 Unified Protector was a joint operation, and thus many of the aircraft were deployed from maritime platforms. Indeed, France and Britain deployed a great number of ships (frigates, destroyers, mine-hunters, amphibious ships) and submarines, as well as, for the British, two (helicopter) landing platforms, and for the French, one aircraft carrier (until August) and two helicopter carriers. It has been reported that “the majority of effective strike power has been provided by the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle” on the one hand, and “quietly” by American platforms on the other.98 The absence of an aircraft carrier thus was a comparative limitation for the British,99 as they had to conduct longer-distance, land-based missions. The helicopter platforms were first mobilized in May, when the joint Franco-British airmobile mission was launched. For that mission, the British mobilized five Apache helicopters and the French altogether twenty helicopters (Gazelle, Tiger, and Puma).100 Aside from these traditional assets, France and Britain, like other participating countries, resorted to Special Forces missions as well as Unmanned Air Systems (uas ).101 British and French air forces each contributed about a fifth of the total number of air strikes102 apart from the helicopter mission in May-June where 90 per cent of the strikes were French.103 Cooperation between France and the UK during the Libya campaign was effective when it came to their diplomatic endeavours

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towards the un , the US, and the eu . The difficulties arose when dealing with the realities of contemporary military operations planning, command, and conduct, namely strong UK-US links, French reluctance vis-à-vis nato , and different national doctrines and rules of engagements. Given the sensitivity of special operations and difficulty of access to sources, the effectiveness of cooperation can only really be assessed when it comes to the political-diplomatic level, and conventional operations.

Political-Level Cooperation The shape of the British and French political leadership was not consistent but instead changed over the course of the campaign: there were moments of unilateral British or French leadership, moments of bilateral teaming, and moments of trilateral concord with the United States. France, Britain, and the US all exerted leadership “in the corridors,” sometimes in a non-concerted manner. There were several occasions prior to and during the campaign when French and British political actions were uncoordinated, or even mischievous – as was exemplified by the UK’s secret planning with the Americans, and the French decision to strike early on 19 March. These initial tensions, along with the two countries’ competition for operational command, “continued to dog the enterprise throughout the first four months of the operation.”104 One other instance was Britain’s ambivalence towards, if not attempted sabotage of, an eu humanitarian mission in April, eufor Libya. London imposed two conditions on the eu mission that led it to never being launched: the British wanted to integrate Turkey into the mission (they were already planning a trilateral medical assistance mission with Ankara and Washington), and demanded that the deployment of the eu mission be authorized by un mandate through the ocha , while simultaneously blocking this mandate at the un .105 Despite some tensions, France and the UK showcased their common political-diplomatic involvement throughout the campaign. The Libya Contact Group was set up during a meeting in London. It was a French initiative stemming from the government’s position on nato,106 but its structure is said to have been conceived in London.107

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Participants were representatives from nato , the eu , the un , the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Conference, and the Gulf Cooperation Council and some of their member states. The following Contact Group meetings took place in Doha, Rome, Abu Dhabi, and Istanbul. Paris hosted the first summit on the situation in Libya on 19 March and then another conference for the “New Libya” later in the campaign on 1 September 2011. Yet it has been reported that despite ostensibly sharing the leadership of the Contact Group, political coordination between Paris and London remained poor: Sarkozy is said to have taken David Cameron by surprise when he announced a call for an emergency meeting of the Contact Group on 22 August.108 Nonetheless, Cameron and Sarkozy visited Libya together to give a speech celebrating the liberation of Benghazi on 15 September, one month before the end of the intervention.109 On that day, after the coalition defeated Gaddafi forces in Benghazi (and one month before Gaddafi’s death), Cameron and Sarkozy, with their foreign affairs ministers, organized a visit to Tripoli and Benghazi where they addressed a crowd of Libyan civilians. A video shows the two heads of state and government together holding hands with the leader of the ntc in an orchestrated photo op, with a cheering crowd. A former analyst from the French mod explains the “impetus” of Paris and London in Libya: “the determination jointly displayed at the Paris conference on 19 March, five months after the Lancaster House summit, made it clear that the renewed bilateral dynamic between France and the United Kingdom was indeed concrete. The willingness of both countries to act, including bilaterally if they failed to bring about a coalition of volunteers behind them, had the effect of forcing Washington to overcome its initial reluctance and commit itself.”110 The then-British minister for the armed forces, Nick Harvey, made similar remarks in an interview with the House of Commons Defence Committee in October 2011: “We are pleased to have demonstrated the ability of the UK and France to act together in a leading role in the way that we have, which is encouraging for the future. nato allies and the US will have been encouraged by that, too. On the back of the treaties that we signed with France last year, this was a very significant achievement in improving our interoperability and working relations with France.”111

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On both sides of the channel the developments and actions in Libya were thus framed in the context of the Lancaster House treaties, perceived by decision-makers as prompting them to undertake common actions both politically and militarily. In turn, the experience gained in Libya served as a baseline for their ensuing work in trying to improve their cooperation (see chapter 6). Things differed in post-Gaddafi Libya, where cooperation was strictly confined to limited areas of common interests, namely countering Islamist militias after 2014, but no joint political-diplomatic effort was undertaken.

Bridge-Building between Military Apparatuses The degree of cooperation between British and French military forces also evolved over the course of the campaign but was never equivalent to integration: there was a “juxtaposition” of national forces, including under nato Unified Protector and during joint airmobile missions in May–June 2011. In fact, most of the Anglo-French operational cooperation in Libya amounted to communication and coordination, or bridge-building. These bridges were of two kinds: some resulted from pre-existing links between the two armed forces, and others consisted of ad hoc reinforcements of coordination mechanisms necessary to manage the intervention. Given the UK and France’s history of military cooperation through regular exercises and exchange of personnel, during the Libya campaign a good part of the exchanges built on normal day-to-day activities between the two countries’ armed forces. Without making operational cooperation completely smooth, these structured exchanges facilitated the creation of bridges during the crisis. Illustratively, many of the air and naval assets that France and Britain deployed for the campaign were originally meant to participate in joint military exercises. Indeed, after the Lancaster House treaty was signed, the armed forces were asked to make plans for developing joint training. In February, the two navies were side by side in the Mediterranean: “a rapid reaction force from the Royal Navy, the Response force task group … was conducting exercise ‘Cougar 11’ together with vessels from the French Charles de Gaulle task group”112 off the coasts of Cyprus. Their elements were re-tasked to conduct operations in Libya. As for

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the air forces, in December 2010–January 2011, while “Libya was already looming,”113 an exercise was planned for March: “Northern Mistral 11” was supposed to simulate a long-distance raid from France to the south of the Mediterranean. The exercise was meant to start on 21 March 2011 from Nancy air base, where some forty aviators from the raf had been sent.114 It was eventually postponed due to live operations over Libya, where benefit was gained from “all the hard work that went into the preparation in areas such as mission and logistics planning.”115 The benefits were particularly felt during the first two weeks of operations, before nato took over. Another important link between French and British military forces occurred via the liaison and exchange officers mentioned earlier. On the one hand, French and British national representatives were posted in an ad hoc fashion in the multinational structures: they were at Ramstein and on board the uss Mount Whitney during the first phase of the operation; there were legal advisers, political advisers, and national intelligence cells at Naples; and there were national “red card holders” at Poggio Renatico. On the other hand, exchange officers were also involved in both air forces as part of a longer-term program of pilot training: a French pilot flew on a British Tornado at II ac Squadron at Marham (UK), and a British pilot flew on Mirage 2000 at Air Base 133 in Nancy (France).116 There was one liaison officer at the cpco joint command centre in Paris and one at the British Air Command in High Wycombe. Later in the campaign, there was also an exchange of liaison officers on board the helicopter strike groups command ships.117 While some bridges were indeed in place, several issues limited the extent of cooperation. First, liaison and exchange officers lacked access to protected areas and information. Added to this were technological incompatibilities of communication systems, to the extent that “information had to be passed manually from one network system to another.”118 What is more, there was a lack of liaison personnel and it proved difficult to depart from the normal number of personnel exchanges to manage the crisis situation. Illustratively, while the British wanted to expand their presence at the French cpco by positioning a second liaison officer, they were unable to find a suitable candidate that spoke French.

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A second major limit to Franco-British coordination in Libya had to do with information sharing. France and the UK had little information of their own and there were constraints on its diffusion. The UK-US “special relationship” rests significantly on intelligence ties, which take an institutional form (links between intelligence agencies), a human form (exchange of personnel, shared experiences), and a technological form (especially for “Signals Intelligence” [sigint ]). Now, because the British are neither the producers nor the sole possessors of the intelligence they use, they are limited in how they can use such intelligence for targeting, or for sharing information with others.119 Christina Goulter also argued that the difficulty of sharing information also came from habits and practices, and, in the UK case, from the fact that British militaries had become accustomed to working and sharing information chiefly with the US, not nato as a whole.120 In the French case, the dependence on American intelligence is less fundamental given that the French possess their own satellites. As a result, France was “one of the few other partners,” outside the United States “able to provide … the use of national space imagery and human intelligence.”121 All in all, UK-French intelligence exchanges were limited by the absence of national intelligence-gathering platforms and of qualified nato personnel,122 as well as by the amount of “Five Eyes” material that the French were “prevented from seeing,” which “effectively stymied coordinated planning and operations.”123 In return, some French strategic intelligence was unavailable to the British.124 Besides, when they did share information during the campaign, it was in the form of “assessments … the results of analyses,” rather than raw material.125 Yet it appears that within a few years, the UK and France, together with the US among others, managed to continue their cooperation in areas where they identified common interests: they conducted special operations against Islamist militias, which involved overcoming blockages to intelligence sharing. Indeed, chapter 6 shows how cooperation on intelligence sharing had become a priority for cooperation after the 2011 intervention. It also illustrates that while intelligence exchanges between armed forces can sometimes be limited on the ground for conventional operations, there is a richer tradition of exchanges between intelligence agencies, notably between France and the US, and in the context of the rise of the Islamic State.

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Joint Operational Conduct At the beginning of April, when the US withdrew to a support role, the coalition’s air power was greatly diminished.126 This coincided with a counter-offensive of pro-Gaddafi forces who managed to retake Brega, a town on the road to Tripoli, on 7 April.127 In the following days, consensus spread among the international community around the recognition of the ntc as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people and more countries, starting with Italy, decided to take military action against Gaddafi forces.128 However, it soon appeared that air power alone was insufficient to reach certain critical tactical effects. As the coalition faced a stalemate, the need for an operational breakthrough became more pressing,129 and once the Libyan defences were in large part destroyed, coalition forces could get closer to the Libyan coast to launch the helicopter mission. Three significant differences between British and French approaches to airmobile assets in this campaign limited the extent of their effective cooperation. The first difference had to do with speed of preparation and deployment. The helicopter mission was planned in just a few days, but it took three weeks until the airmobile mission was effectively launched. In the second week of May, a colonel from the French land force command (Commandement des forces terrestres in Lille) was sent to the cpco to get a first briefing on the possibilities for using airmobile assets; and the planning started around 12 May.130 The French airmobile forces embarked on the landing helicopter dock Tonnerre on 16 May. According to this high-ranking officer, the following days were dedicated to preparing the first raid, coordinating with the British, and arguing with nato representatives about command and rules of engagement. President Sarkozy himself was getting impatient: “But what the hell are they doing?! What the hell is Cameron doing!”131 he is reported to have said. On 23 May, the press spread the word about the imminence of a joint UK-French helicopter mission, which was confirmed on 24 May by French defence minister Gérard Longuet. On 27 May David Cameron confirmed the sending of helicopters to Libya.132 The helicopters served to conduct precision strike missions against pro-Gaddafi military installations, vehicles, and command posts to help the rebels “unlock Brega.”133

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Then there was the matter of command and control. The French helicopters had an autonomous national command on board the bpc Tonnerre, while the British submitted the command of their mission to the nato air operation center in Naples. In other words, the British proceeded using deliberate targeting where the air command center designates the targets, while the French proceeded using cockpit delegation where no authorization is needed for target identification and strikes.134 For the French, it was unthinkable to subordinate their helicopters to the nato command. Given that the French airmobile forces are a land force component (French Army light aviation, Aviation légère de l’armée de Terre) their use requires the autonomy of the commander at the tactical level. At Poggio Renatico, nato accused the French of refusing to adapt and of acting irresponsibly by believing that they could intervene autonomously without coordinating with the coalition.135 Because the French did not include their helicopters under nato command, there was no joint air tasking order and thus cooperation was limited to coordination of national missions. Thirdly, there were differences in rules of engagement. The British and French practices were very different, with the French rules of engagement being “very loose, very flexible,”136 and the British mentality being “risk averse.”137 British risk aversion could in this case be explained by the fact that Apache helicopters were embarked on naval platforms for the first time, were “not adapted for sea basing,” and “were operated under a limited emergency clearance”: there was thus both an absence of prior training and procedural constraints.138 As a result, during the raids, the French with their light Gazelle helicopters were flying deep into Libyan territory and close to the ground, while the British were at 2,000 feet and nearer to the coast. Eventually, after the first joint raid, there was a decoupling of the missions and a de-synchronization of effects given that the two forces were operating in different zones.139 The helicopter strikes helped support the rebels’ progress towards Misrata in mid-July. From the point of view of strategic outcomes, British and French helicopters made “key contributions” to the nato operations until late that summer.140 However, it was not a combined operation in which the British and the French had equivalent roles.

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Throughout the intervention until October 2011, the French carried out 90 per cent of the coalition’s helicopter attack missions.

Discrete Operations in Post-Gaddafi Libya nato operations ended on 31 October 2011, shortly after the capture and killing of Gaddafi by the Libyan ntc forces on 20 October. As had been provided for in Resolution 1973, no international force was deployed for peacekeeping, monitoring, or political reform, as Libyans were called to “take their future firmly and safely into their own hands.”141 In fact, the countries of the International Contact Groups – just like the other international actors that supported action against the Gaddafi regime, such as the African Union – had spelled out no “exit strategy” for post-Gaddafi Libya.142 The United Nations Support Mission for Libya (unsmil ) was established in September 2011 by un Security Council Resolution 2009 (2011) at the request of the Libyan authorities, in order to “support the country’s new transitional authorities in their post-conflict efforts.”143 Despite the un mission, it quickly appeared that the demise of the Libyan dictator’s regime would lead to the emergence of regional and tribal rivalries. Militias indeed formed and contested the legitimacy of the central government. Elections were held in June 2012 with a good turnout, but some federalist representatives in the east refused to take part in the parliament and pushed for decentralization, partly fuelled by a desire to maintain access oil fields.144 The central government was basically ineffective, and the opposition between regions became militarized. By mid-2014, it turned into a civil war, in which General Khalifa Haftar and his Libyan National Army in the east of Libya opposed the un -recognized Government of National Accord. To this was added a fight against Islamist groups who, as early as mid-2012, took advantage of the chaos and the central government’s inability to maintain the monopoly over the use of force.145 On 11 September 2012, the Benghazi-based Ansar al-Sharia Brigade conducted an attack against the US consulate which killed the ambassador. Ansar al-Sharia progressively lost ground against the rising Islamic State (is ) who initiated a series of attacks starting in 2014, among them

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the Corinthian hotel attack that killed one French citizen. By spring 2016, the number of is fighters in Libya was estimated at 6,000.146 The Europeans stepped up their involvement in post-Gaddafi Libya in 2014. eu Special Envoy (who became un Special Representative) Bernardino Leon was sent to Libya to carve out the “National Agreement,” which was signed in December 2015 with the support of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain.147 The agreement ultimately failed to create a single government for Libya, leading the Europeans to rethink their strategy. In 2015, European media started talking increasingly about the possible need for a new military intervention in Libya against is . However, based on Resolution 2259, such an intervention could only occur at the request of the Libyan government, which did not occur. There was consensus among Europeans against an unrequested military intervention and in favour of maintaining un leadership. However, “more divergences existed on concrete military support for the different Libyan factions.”148 Indeed, while the UK and Italy officially supported the un -recognized Presidency Council, France provided key support to Haftar.149 An article published in Le Monde in February 2016 revealed that the special forces, intelligence services, and air forces of the US, the UK, and France had been conducting joint missions against is , it seems at least since mid-2015.150 This was later confirmed by the Middle East Eye, which revealed leaked tapes “suggesting the existence of an international operations center” that has served to coordinate the strikes helping General Khalifa Haftar in his fight against Islamist militias. The tapes revealed the participation of US, UK, French, but also Italian and Arabic (probably Jordanian) air forces.151 This cooperation occurred in parallel with other counter-terrorism operations then conducted in Mali and the Sahel, and in the Levant (see chapter 6).

c o n c l u s io n : u k - f r a nce cooperati on a n d t h e l ib ya interventi on Constructing Common Interests Clearly, in Libya in 2011, there was a broad consensus on what the two governments wanted to achieve: while the two un resolutions

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provided no objective outcomes, nor criteria for judging success in meeting them,152 the UK and France were two of those who agreed. Initial domestic debates about the suitability of a no-fly zone were quickly settled among ministers and military chiefs, and both governments came up with the same position supporting the nfz . Given the size of the coalition, and the caution of several governments within it, toppling the regime could not be proclaimed as the mission’s objective;153 but then again, after some reluctance by parts of their governments and defence administrations, the French and the British decision-makers agreed that targeting regime assets and command centres, and ultimately possibly Gaddafi himself, was legitimate if there was a threat to civilians. Things differed in post-Gaddafi Libya, where cooperation was strictly confined to limited areas of common interests (namely countering Islamist militias after 2014); no joint political-diplomatic effort was undertaken. Britain and France thus agreed on the ends, at least during the military campaign. However, their preferences concerning the means of the campaign diverged, especially on the matter of the command structure, the role of third countries (especially the US), and the resort to one or another multilateral framework. The main bone of contention was the role of nato . To accommodate British and French preferences, a compromise was found where nato would be used for command and control, but the political leadership would be assumed by a coalition led by France and the UK with the inclusion of Arab leaders. Even then, disagreements on the preferred degree and form for managing the campaign were present throughout: the French adopted a coalition posture with coordinated national actions while the British opted for an alliance approach with a centralized nato command. These disagreements on the means of the international intervention limited their political and military cooperation before and during the campaign, whether we think, on the one hand, of the British “secret” planning with the Americans and their torpedoing of an eu humanitarian intervention, or, on the other hand, of the French strikes on 19 March, their unilateral recognition of the ntc , and their Contact Group initiative. All the developments were indications of underlying divergences that were either not identified or not communicated when the two countries embarked on

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their diplomatic and military journey. Overall, in the Libya case, differences in the objectives pursued by the two parties thus were very much interlinked with external dynamics in shaping the outcome of their joint military endeavour.

Coordinating between Governments According to a former adviser to the Elysée, when the Libya crisis erupted, interactions between the British and the French heads of state and government were “fluid”: as it happened shortly after the Lancaster House treaty was signed, there was an enthusiastic reaction on both sides to approach the situation jointly.154 However, a detailed case study shows that there were no stable communication channels between the two mod s or between the heads of state and government, and that there were no “Franco-British tools,”155 institutional or military, to activate so as to implement a common action. The two countries followed different military doctrines and adopted distinct rules of engagement. The Libya campaign also illustrated the way differences in national political systems could affect the extent of cooperation. Following the entry into war, the French did not face the same legal constraints as the British: the French had “looser” rules of engagement and less political oversight over the use of air or airmobile assets.156 Instead of being able to have a bilateral command and to conduct raids together, cooperation was thus limited to the coordination of national missions. Coordination was partly facilitated by prior or ongoing day-today cooperation between the military establishments: some officers already knew each other, some ships were navigating in the same waters, and some liaison and exchange officers were in place in the headquarters in London and Paris. Based on this, the first few days of the operation created opportunities for flexible and efficient crisis management. The ensuing nato operation, however, was characterized by heaviness and slowness, which led many analysts to conclude that Libya demonstrated how ad hoc coalitions “could indeed respond with remarkable speed and successfully conduct an operation,”157 in contrast with “the limits of multilateralism.”158 For General De Langlois, in the case of military interventions, urgent

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action is better conceived within a small group, as consensus is more easily reached, but international organizations have added value when it comes to maintaining an intervention over time. Indeed, first US infrastructures and then the multilateral nato organization were used as proxies for providing organizational and capability elements that were necessary for an intervention which could not have been conducted by Britain and France alone.

Sharing Costs and Gains Fairly During the Libya operations, the gains associated with UK-French cooperation were chiefly symbolic and related to the subjective and non-measurable gains of prestige.159 As Jense puts it, Libya was a conflict where “reputation was at stake,”160 or as the former British chief of the defence staff said, it was about “sharing the glory.”161 The challenge, then, was the temptation to pursue those symbolic gains on one’s own. The narrative on France’s unilateral undertaking affirms that it illustrated France’s swift military abilities: “On 19 March, the French air force entered first and alone into the Libyan sky, thus demonstrating both a good reactivity and a capacity to act autonomously, and thus proving that it is indeed one of the finest air forces in the world.”162 Speaking of those same early strikes, General Richards considered Libya “a lot of grand-standing … The French struck without telling us – they were four hours early – because they wanted to be the first on TV.”163 This case study shows that the symbolic nature of gains in a military undertaking can fuel a competitive rather than cooperative mindset among participating actors. Commenting about the 19 March strikes, another interviewee exemplified how a competitive calculus characterized UK-French cooperation during the operations: “there is a sound competition between us. It’s like in a football game: there has to be one who scores first.”164 The same spirit of competition commanded bilateral exchanges of information: during Libya, intelligence sharing was based on quid pro quos, with one piece of information being traded against another – “it’s barter!” an interviewee affirmed.165 According to another interviewee, there was even a “contest” during Libya to find out who would have the “best intelligence.”166

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In other words, the fact that gains are symbolic and non-measurable does not preclude tit-for-tat strategies: the 19 March events can be interpreted as a case of the latter, which amounts to cooperating on the first move, but after the other party makes the second move, responding to it in kind. Here, the French thought to cooperate with the British on the first move (military planning), which was followed by a perceived defection (UK secret planning with the US), to which the French responded with a unilateral move (striking alone and early) whose potential benefits were purely reputational.

Managing External Connections and Third Parties The factor that most shaped and limited cooperation between France and the UK in Libya was their management of external dynamics. From the first diplomatic moves to their management of post-Gaddafi Libya, the notion of entanglement helps to make sense of France and Britain’s inability to agree on a military command, their difficulties in sharing information, and more generally decision-makers’ conception of how they should go about pursuing what they regard as the national interest. For one, politically and militarily, it was impossible for Britain and France to intervene alone: British and French diplomats had to secure a vote for a un resolution, getting the support of local and regional actors, getting Italy and Turkey to participate in order to be able to use their military bases, and keeping the United States in to maintain access to their logistics and intelligence assets. Then, the role of nato was obviously of significance. While the Alliance eventually created opportunities for structuring the operation, it also lay at the heart of the initial political-diplomatic fight between British and French executives and military chiefs. Even more important was the role played by the United States. In Libya it seemed clear that the British military and decision-makers’ default setting was to team up with the Americans, and in this light, the first strikes on 19 March appear to be important beyond the mere symbol. As Alastair Cameron puts it: “this sort of deep [Tomahawk] strike alongside the US also clearly signals where the UK’s closest military affinities still lie.”167 I also mentioned the restrictions on intelligence sharing stemming from the UK’s links with the US. The French thus similarly

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concluded that “Libya on the one hand illustrated the potential usefulness of the [Franco-British] cjef , but on the other hand it illustrated the limits of the gain: the British have only communicated bilaterally.”168 The UK and France were strongly involved militarily in the campaign and maintained common political and diplomatic leadership throughout. Yet, instead of thriving on the multilateral “net” underpinning the campaign, all aspects related to the participation of other states or the involvement of international organizations (except the un ) impeded cooperation between them. Given France and Britain’s incapacity to conduct autonomous high-intensity operations, cooperating with the Americans while affirming UK-French leadership was the only way to obtain the shared symbolic gains associated with the intervention. In this sense, the embeddedness of the Franco-British partnership in a network of bilateral relations and multilateral institutions proved useful once the challenge was overcome. And eventually, as chapter 6 shows, this “trilaterality” in turn became a defining feature of operational cooperation between France and the UK, as lessons from Libya were gradually learned and led to some adaptations to accommodate this state of affairs.

4

Developing Joint Military Capacity Britain and France are not about to form a joint rapid deployment force for Third World intervention. That would make very little sense, given the disparate nature of their out-of-area interests and commitments. Jonathan Alford, “The Prospects for Military Cooperation Outside Europe”1

Military exercises and doctrinal and personnel exchanges between French and British armed forces have existed for several decades in an ad hoc fashion, as I explained in chapter 1. Until the Lancaster House treaties, cooperation in this area pursued the long-term and vague goal of interoperability between the armed forces, without a precise or overarching project. In contrast with this state of affairs, the treaties provided for the “strengthening” of cooperation between the armed forces, as specified in Article 2 of the Lancaster House treaty, with greater ambitions. These included “the conduct of joint exercises and other training activities; joint work on military doctrine and exchange of military personnel; [and] close co-operation in contributing to and pooling forces and capabilities for military operations and employment of forces.”2 France and the UK announced the ambitious project that came to be known as the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (cjef ) in the 2010 summit declaration. The declaration read: “We will develop a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force suitable for a wide range of scenarios, up to and including high intensity operations. It will involve all three Services: there will be a land component comprised of formations

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at national brigade level, maritime and air components with their associated Headquarters, and logistics and support functions.”3 The cjef quickly became the flagship project of cooperation between the British and French armed forces: it has been included in each joint declaration and has mobilized dozens of actors on both sides of the Channel. However, interestingly, it was originally a mere side effect of the 2010 treaties negotiations, which had mostly focused on nuclear deterrence and industrial integration. Indeed, the heads of state and government on both sides then wanted to sign a broader defence agreement, and they had decided to widen the scope of negotiations and the possible outcomes: “We expanded the topics of discussions, the aspirations … This is how the Lancaster agreements were born, because we needed to find a facade for the other agreements [i.e., the nuclear agreements].”4 Therefore, defence staffs were asked to produce “an ambitious program to reinforce cooperation.”5 But consultations with military staff did not produce many ideas, outside of armament projects and technical cooperation on nuclear stockpile stewardship. One problem was that the military staffs were given only a few days to come up with ideas ahead of a high-level meeting on 16 June 2010; one officer at the French Army cooperation unit explained that they had to “draft something on the back of an envelope” while being away on business.6 Consequently, it appeared at a UK-France meeting at the Elysée in late July that there was “not much” for the decision-makers “to get [their] teeth into”7 when it came to other areas of military cooperation. It is at that moment that the idea of the non-permanent bilateral joint force made its way from the top down, stemming from a French idea of a mixed Franco-British unit8 and somehow “falling on the head” of the armed forces.9 The Combined Joint Expeditionary Force, it was announced, would achieve full operational capability (foc ) in 2016. Since it was an ambitious, overarching enterprise, the implementation of this cooperation project was supposed to build a capacity of joint operational planning, command, and control with the alignment of concepts and doctrines – which involved the conduct of joint training and exercises, the interoperability of forces equipment, the compatibility of communication and information systems, and the sharing of classified information.

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This chapter illustrates the determining role of bureaucracies, governance, and implementation structures for managing bilateral cooperation projects. The multiplicity of stakeholders, the unsettled nature of the organization of cooperation, and the absence of clear lines of control affected the two countries’ ability to converge on their preferences, and to define their objectives and then implement them. Now, I show in this chapter that this lack of governance eventually allowed the project, despite some obvious flaws and a completion date postponed to 2020, to be carried out – thanks to the leeway that the weak governance provided in terms of the actual objectives of cooperation and how they were to be pursued.

o r g a n iz in g c ooperati on b e t w e e n t h e d e f e n ce mi ni stri es Players in the Development of the CJEF Based on the November 2010 treaty and the summit declaration’s objectives and governance principles, on 2 February 2011 the British chief of the defence staff (cds ) and the French Chef d’état-major des Armées (cema ) signed a joint procedural document acknowledging that they were responsible for the whole of bilateral military cooperation and that they must federate single services’ activities to ensure the coherence of all their joint activities. Supervision modalities included setting up the Steering Committee, composed of the vice chief of defence staff (vcds ) and the Major Général des Armées (mga ). The cema and cds also announced their objectives for 2011: elaborating the cjef Concept of Employment (conemp ) as well as its specificities by service. Yearly, the Steering Committee’s main aims would be to assess the progress made by the working groups, express recommendations, and define priorities for the following year. The cema and the cds would also supervise the drafting of the yearly progress report submitted to the ministers and the Senior Level Group ahead of bilateral summits. On each side of the Channel, a Secretariat was tasked with ensuring the transfer of information between the top level and the

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working level, composed of officers and civil servants in the military headquarters.10 The Secretariats also maintain a directory of those involved in cjef activities and ensure knowledge management functions.11 The cjef Secretariat is only one of the tasks carried out by officers who have other responsibilities: it is not a permanent body. In France, it has been located at the “International Organization” office of the defence staff (ema /oi ). In the UK, the “North Atlantic and European policy” office at the Ministry of Defence initially carried out the task, before the International Policy France team (ip France) was created in 2012.12 The composition of the Secretariat consisted of six military officers, three on each side, including two exchange officers on each side.13 A gradually growing network of liaison officers (lo s) and exchange officers (eo s) supported the bilateral work on the cjef . One difficulty has been to find matching positions and human resources to fill these positions synchronically.14 Initially, the work on the cjef involved only a small number of actors: the first working-level meeting gathered only six participants.15 Two joint working groups (wg s) were created in early 2011, to deal with operations and interoperability, and concepts and doctrine. Ad hoc working groups would be set up as necessary. While joint-level working-groups were a novelty, at the level of the single services, working groups developed based on pre-existing bilateral cooperation. The level of cooperation before Lancaster House varied across the three services: the two navies already had strong connections, with around fifteen working groups meeting once or twice a year.16 The main change from 2011 onwards was thus that their work would have to connect with the joint level as well as the work done in the other services.17 By 2013, working groups had multiplied and the overall number of high-ranking officers involved in the cjef climbed to about a hundred individuals.18 Illustratively, in September 2013, there were six main joint working groups, as well as thirteen joint sub-working groups. The wg s covered: Combat Service Support, which includes medical support and logistics; Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (c4isr ), which includes a sub-group specifically on Command and Control (C2); Operations, including targeting and non-conventional weapons;

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Plans and Policy, which includes Strategic Communication; Training and Exercise; and Special Forces.19

Military Cooperation without a Pilot? Membership of wg s, and in fact their very existence, reflected the flexibility of the organization of cooperation, but also the impossibility of achieving a rational governance structure. Over the course of the development of the cjef , many working groups were created, some terminated, some put on hold before resuming activities as the project evolved. Because of this flexibility, organization charts were often inaccurate. Commenting on an organization chart presenting the overall architecture of the cjef project, a working group participant wondered: “how much of this actually happens?”20 He pointed out that some meetings were ad hoc, that some wg s no longer met, and that charts could not really picture the relationship between working groups at the single-services level and those at the joint level. Working group membership also represented the organizational differences that exist between the British and French defence administrations, with the French Ministry of Defence characterized by an overwhelmingly military, pyramidal organization based on the centralization of authority, and a British mod that is matrix-based, with greater cross-department collaboration, dissolved authority, and consensus-based decision-making. Because of these differences, when it came to setting up working groups, the two administrations found it difficult to identify counterparts, and quite often there was no equivalence between the positions of wg members. A significant consequence of this absence of equivalence is that there is a multiplicity of actors at the negotiating table and a great need for compromise.21 The situation whereby the bilateral military relationship functions with the lightest and least bureaucratic structure possible22 is a result of a desire, especially on the British side, to avoid replicating the Franco-German “white elephant”23 and preventing the establishment of permanent cooperation structures. However, it has not been without problems. First, the development of the cjef was characterized by an absence of direct lines of control and supervision, with a diffusion of responsibilities across several collective and individual actors

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endowed with implementation and/or decision-making capacity. As a result, implementation was often left at the discretion of local actors, including military chiefs who might have different priorities. In the case of the cjef , the military chiefs were the gatekeepers, able both to create inertia24 and to launch initiatives.25 In addition, reliance on military chiefs causes problems when those chiefs are preoccupied with national matters, as well as when they change, retire, and so on. As a result, several high-level meetings were postponed over the course of the development of cjef .26 Second, because it was not their primary role, the officers in charge of the cjef development in the military staff headquarters had a variety of other responsibilities and tasks to carry out. As a result, working group members did not always engage actively in the bilateral cooperation, and regular pushes from the top were necessary to “remind them of the importance of cooperation.”27 Third, the cjef Secretariat member could not really act upon dayto-day problems given that they did not have the necessary mandate or military rank.28 As a result, implementation was not necessarily fast or easy implemented, and no actors could enforce decisions. Finally, the UK prime minister’s and the French president’s good relationship has been considered key to progress, so much so that working-level actors thought that “if Sarkozy and Cameron get on well, things move on”29 or that “ultimately … it’s communication between Hollande [the French president] and Cameron that drives cooperation.”30 This has made cooperation progress dependent on the hazards of national elections and government reshufflings. As the same time, working-level actors felt that having politically endorsed cooperation framed by a treaty forced them to move forward, structured the bilateral dialogue, and provided legitimacy to their activities.31 Fourth, limitations to information sharing and access constrained day-to-day cooperation. The matter especially concerned liaison and exchange officers, who are posted in regiments or military headquarters and who, to carry out their duty, need to access the partner’s computing system and the information it contains. Now, the empirical data points to the fact that unnecessary restrictions prevented officers’ access to protected information and areas, and thus limited

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their ability to collaborate. The French were particularly aware of this problem because, due to the Five Eyes, France suffers restrictions while the British do have access to French information.32

d e f in in g a c o m m o n objecti ve: r e c u r r in g n e g oti ati ons Once the cooperation structures were set up, the task remained for the actors involved to deal with the more precise objectives of their cooperation. They had to specify the common intent by agreeing on the purpose and size of the combined force, to define the shape of the force and to settle its relation to third parties. The processes for developing the force comprised a mixture of top-level road maps, bottom-up propositions, and feedback reports. Military exercises, which started in 2011, served to test the procedures thus developed. The characteristics of the joint force are the result of a compromise between the ministerial level, which defined the main principles including “maximum force levels” based on available resources, and the chiefs of defence staff who defined the level of ambition, including the “minimum force levels” required to carry out successful operations.33 The level of ambition (loa ) sets out the size, nature, and working mechanism of the force. The working groups, who produced the concepts of employment (conemp s) for the force, then worked under this loa .

Initial Characteristics of the CJEF As I mentioned, the initial plan for the cjef was decided “haphazardly”34 by the French and British heads of state and government, without much consultation with the armed forces. Indeed, in the 2 November 2010 declaration, only the cjef really came from the top, more precisely from what became the Senior Level Group.35 The cjef was thus defined within a short timeframe, and, as it could rely on no pre-existing force model, and its design had to be original. The summit declaration was also one of general intent, rather than a detailed force concept. One thing that was clear from the beginning was that the force would be non-permanent. Illustratively, the letter

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of intent of the two defence ministers specified that the bilateral force would be composed of “elements belonging to national forces conducting operations side by side.”36 For their part, the two chiefs of the defence staff intended to have a permanent combat capacity to conduct coordinated and coherent force projection operations.37 To be permanently available, the force would rely on existing national high readiness units. Secondly, the force would focus on projection operations including in contexts of high-intensity conflicts, and so it should be able to “conduct offensive and defensive operations on land, in the air and at sea wherever UK and French national security interests are aligned.”38 The cjef was conceived as a first-entry force: a force dedicated to intervening first into a theatre of operations before handing over the continuation of the operation and the stabilization to another force. Still, the cjef would not necessarily intervene alone. On the contrary, as the 2012 summit declaration read, it should be available for “bilateral, nato , European Union, United Nations or other operations.”39 In other words, being able to participate in multinational operations was a necessary condition for the cjef. In terms of its configuration, the cjef should be able to be self-sufficient: it should have its own Command and Control (C2) elements as well as logistics and support elements, including medical support. Capability-wise, this requires having a maritime task group based on one or more capital ships (i.e., aircraft or helicopter carrier and/or landing platforms for amphibious missions), and an air wing capable of controlling the skies, conducting reconnaissance operations and imposing air supremacy.40 The land component, for its part, would involve at least two battlegroups.

Agreeing on the Level of Ambition The objective that was announced in public declarations or joint documents hid some disagreements that required multiple rounds of negotiations. The first element of divergence, which was quickly settled, concerned the overall scale of the force. The French initially proposed a force at brigade level, or even division level, while the British had a lower level of ambition and proposed cooperation at

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battlegroup level.41 The 2010 declaration announced a land component comprising formations at the national brigade level.42 Brigades on both sides of the Channel are of different sizes (3,000 to 5,000 men in the UK; 6,000 to 7,000 men in France), so this would have required specification too. Eventually, military leaders opted for “battlegroups,” the smaller option. Like brigades, battlegroups are imprecise in terms of size. Indeed, battlegroups are functional units that can range from 2,000 to 5,000 men. In other words, battlegroups are characterized by their functions (including, for example, fire and support for an expeditionary air wing) rather than by their size.43 With one battlegroup from each nation deployed, the total size of the cjef would then be, at a maximum, 10,000 men. This represents a small force, considering that French strategic documents envisage that the country should be able to deploy 15,000 land forces alone for a major ground operation.44 There were two main reasons for divergences on the level of ambition. One argument was that the British were more constrained by a tight budget45 and in the middle of a “massive transformation” of the mod .46 They were thus compelled to go for the smaller, simpler option. The second reason was that there were divergences on the overall intent and ambition regarding the bilateral military cooperation. Some in France defended a “heavier” option, like a binational brigade.47 The British, on the contrary, did not want anything permanent and defended the idea that the cjef should be clearly different from the eu Battlegroups or the Franco-German Brigade.48 Illustratively, the soon-to-become British defence secretary Liam Fox affirmed in February 2010 that “double or even triple hatting the same forces do not produce any increased capability and may ultimately create competition for the same resources.”49 Rather than assigning regiments to the cjef , it was thus more about building links between units around a project that was to be both small and cheap.50 That being said, the divergence in the scale of ambitions was stronger at the outset. Right after the treaties, there was a “post-Lancaster euphoria” in France that led to making greater plans. Eventually, the French, too, wanted the cjef project to cost nothing to implement.51 These points of debate on the level of ambition also reflected broader divergences relating to what each side was pursuing when

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they got involved in the bilateral endeavour. It appears that the British were pursuing cooperation to complement national shortages, while the French approached cooperation as a strategic “power multiplier.”52 In a report of the House of Commons Defence Committee drawing lessons from the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review, one of the main lines of enquiry was how the UK could reduce its military capability gaps. Military partnerships with allies, including cooperation with French armed forces, were put forward as a major way of filling holes in the range of capabilities available to British armed forces. The British rationale was evident in military chiefs’ comments during a House of Commons enquiry in 2011, where they explained that cooperation should “help reduce [the UK’s] medium term capability pertivations,” and, over the long term, “bring efficiencies and increased capabilities … in equipment procurement, training and logistics.”53 This argument was mostly coming from political actors, and while military chiefs acknowledged it, they did not necessarily support this rationale. French actors did not use the same rhetoric about filling gaps through cooperation as they conceived of cooperation as additive or multiplying, rather than integrative. Illustratively, the French 2013 defence white paper stated that “France’s numerous strategic partnerships and its defence partnership agreements with several countries confirm its influential status in the world. These agreements are power multipliers for the furtherance of global peace and stability.”54 The working level shared that view, to the point where they displayed “almost commemorative enthusiasm” about the bilateral cooperation, and where they perceived the British to be, in contrast, “interest-driven.”55

Scenarios for Possible Deployments Other concerns related to the future engagement of the combined force. While there was bilateral agreement on the kinds of operations the cjef could be used for (“crisis management,” “protection of shared interests,” “non-enduring peace enforcement,” “humanitarian”56), all the actors involved in cjef development acknowledged that there existed few scenarios where the cjef would be the most suitable force for a deployment. The perception from the

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working level was that military cooperation worked well, both during training and operations, but there were many doubts as to whether there would be a political alignment and will to go on military operations together. These doubts stemmed, firstly, from diverging assessments of strategic priorities (mostly, zones considered of strategic interests). Operations could be envisaged in the Balkans or the Middle East,57 yet on the French side, many feared British indifference to West Africa, or the Central African Republic, where French interests lay.58 Secondly, the likelihood of a strictly bilateral first entry was scarce: while the British and French might converge on the Sahel, the Horn of Africa (the area where cjef training scenarios were taking place) or the Middle East, there existed “few if any opportunities for a Suez-like expedition involving France and the UK alone.”59 All together, actors reckoned that the cjef had “little chances to ever materialize”60 and that there was a risk that it would become like the eu Battlegroups or the nato Response Force – that is to say, never activated.61 Despite these doubts, official declarations maintained a façade of consensus and presented the cjef project in the most general wording possible. This vagueness served several purposes: one was flexibility (the force had to be adaptable); the second related to classification (“the more you say, the less you can share it”); and the third had to do with commitment, because both nations were undergoing restructuring and budget cuts and so they were to commit for fear of not being able to meet those objectives.62 In other instances, vagueness at the working level could also be a way of managing unrealistic expectations from political decision-makers, as those charged with implementation knew that they could not actually achieve the financial savings expected – or at least communicated – by the political level. During a 2014 Steering Group Light meeting that I attended, two officers, one French and one British, discussed the policy to adopt for “Strategic Communication” around the cjef . A participant argued: “We should avoid talking about costs and financial savings because that adds more questions, and talk of resources instead, ‘shared resources’… So, tangible results: ‘savings in capability and resource terms’… Nice and vague!”63

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de sig n in g a jo in t f o rc e: archi tectural i n n ovat io n a n d n o r m ati ve borrowi ng Just like the level of ambition, mission set, and Concept of Employment, the cjef architecture and processes evolved as the project became more precise. The cjef was an innovative project, an original sort of binational force, and as a result, the architecture and activation processes set up were sui generis. Should the cjef be used, its activation would rest on a bilateral political and military decision: a common decision to intervene would be followed by a definition of the end-state and of the shape of the force, and finally by the generation of forces. Each phase would involve actors at different hierarchical levels, whose cooperation follows different modalities: the strategic level concerned with the national or multinational objective of the intervention, the operational level concerned with planning campaign and major operations, and the tactical level that would deal with activities (battles and engagement).64

NATO Norms as a Basis for Bilateral Work France and the UK are members of nato , and – until the UK’s effective withdrawal – the eu , two organizations involved in carrying out multinational operations. Initially, when the French and British mods had to define the rules they would follow for their combined deployments, they had to agree on whether these would be “nato rules, eu rules, or new rules of [their] own.”65 The French proposed combining elements of nato , eu , and national doctrines, but the British were unsurprisingly skeptical of eu doctrines, although those are mostly nato content anyway.66 Moreover, setting up new norms from the start would have been painstaking and would have limited the cjef ’s interoperability with other allies; so, using nato as a basis was logical.67 The cjef “User Guide” therefore specifies that “wherever possible and relevant for the projected operation and forces, cjef operations will adhere to already-agreed nato doctrinal principles and standard procedures.”68 The French and British doctrine centres presented it as “a practical solution to enable bilateral interoperability.”69

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The common nato doctrinal references are the “Allied Joint Publications” that underpin things such as joint operational planning, the conduct of joint operations, or guidance for coalition building. nato doctrines are, however, not necessarily suited for a force like the cjef , notably because they are defined for permanent and multilateral structures, rather than ad hoc and bilateral formations.70 A tailored doctrine for cjef Command and Control thus appeared necessary. Besides, nato doctrines are also incomplete. For instance, nato had nothing on logistics that the British and French could use for the cjef .71 What is more, nato members do not thoroughly implement nato TTPs, not least because they consider them cumbersome.72 Finally, France and the UK, unlike some other nato member states such as Spain or Germany, are not among the Alliance members who follow nato doctrine the most closely. The UK, for its part, follows mostly American doctrine rather than nato doctrine. Now, nato doctrine is made up of approximately 70 per cent American doctrine, but also 30 per cent of doctrine produced by other Alliance members.73 A significant part of the work has thus been to identify how much of the doctrine France and the UK rely on is doctrine that they actually have in common with each other. In the cjef User Guide, a table listed over several pages AngloFrench “doctrinal commonality and divergence,”74 with some operational environments, especially the maritime domain, being more convergent than others. In case of divergence, the cjef would use nato procedures until France and the UK agreed on an alternative. For training and exercises, nato procedures and scenarios also serve as a basis. nato exercises provided necessary training opportunity for the bilateral force. Finally, while France and the UK would use nato communication and information systems (cis ) and procedures, they ran the risk that, if nato or the US did not approve a specific UK-French undertaking, these systems may not be available for a given deployment, thus pointing to a possible negative strategic consequence of using “ready-made” Alliance processes. Then, the teams agreed that following activation, the architecture and command processes of the cjef would follow nato ’s “Lead Nation” concept, where one nation assumes responsibility for the planning and execution of an operation. Roles and staffing would be

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assigned accordingly, on the “non-doctrinal” basis of 70 per cent of staffing from the Lead Nation and 30 per cent of augmentees from the Supporting Nation. The minority nation would adapt to the leader’s directions.75 Consequently, the force commander would be from the Lead Nation, and assisted by a deputy force commander from the Supporting Nation. Training of the cjef elements followed the Lead Nation logic. Thus, for instance, the 2015 interim validation exercise was “French led,” so the French provided command and hq , and in 2016, for the final validation exercise, it was the reverse.76

Command Architecture: Adapting to Changing Objectives and Lowering Ambitions The political decision-making processes for the use of military force are different in France and in the UK, as the intervention in Libya illustrated. These differences had to be considered for developing the bilateral force, as activating the cjef requires a common decision based on a “Franco-British political-military analysis” of a crisis. In France, the Elysée is at the centre of decision-making, with direct link to the cema and then the cpco . In the UK, there is a cross-government and multi-agency approach to military campaigns.77 Because of these stark differences, cooperation at that level was  difficult, and work on the cjef instead focused on the operational level and the “Combined Joint Task Force” (cjtf ).78 It is worth noting that the cjef training plan excluded the political level, despite potentially problematic differences in decision-making processes having been identified early on. The command architecture is that which links political decision-makers to the Combined Joint Task Force deployed on the ground. Figure 4.1 provides an illustration of the structure. In case of an international crisis the French and British planning staff would propose options in terms of the end state, strategic objectives, and narrative.79 Then, upon activation of the cjef , the chiefs of the defence staffs would designate the Lead Nation, the operation commander, the force commander, the command and control structure, and the location of the headquarters, and would scope the logistics

pjhq

mod

National Security Council

UK

endorsement

Chief of Joint Operations

Chief of Defence Staff

Adapted from a diagram by Joint Force Command and emia-fe, “The Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (cjef) & Exercise Griffin Rise 2015,” presentation slides, no date. Components

Concept of operation and operational plan (operational)

cjtf hq

Concept of operation and operational plan (strategic)

Strategic Planning Directive

Crisis Contingency Team Operations and Planning Group

cema

endorsement

Opérations

cpco Sous-chef

cpco

Conseil restreint

FR

Figure 4.1 | cjef command architecture

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operations. These decisions would be transmitted to a “Crisis Contingency Team” (cct ), set up either at the UK mod or the French cpco. It was initially envisaged that the cct would oversee an “Operational Headquarters” (ohq ) to provide operational direction to the Combined Joint Task Force deployable headquarters. In 2014, as the overall level of ambition for the force was scaled down, the ohq became a looser “Operations and Planning Group” (opg ). The opg would involve ten to forty staffers depending on the operational phase (planning, conduct, handover), and would be co-chaired by the two national operation commanders. The name and shape of the Operations and Planning Group remained unsettled until late in the development of the cjef , which echoed more general, recurring reviews of the cjef level of ambition and mission set. However, vagueness in a way became a self-reinforcing characteristic of work on the cjef . Illustratively, the pjhq and cpco, which were central for settling the command issue, only got involved in the cjef in the summer of 2013,80 and there was no training of the cct until February 2015. Thus, their role and structure within the cjef was unclear, which postponed their involvement. Besides, by the time the initial Validation of Concept exercise took place in June 2015, the Crisis Contingency Team and the planning group trained separately but never together, while they were supposed to form part of the same decision-making structure. The wg s soon identified the absence of training at the strategic level as a blind spot, as it ignored whether France and the UK would be able to jointly decide on an intervention and produce a common end state, despite the forces at the operational level having developed common processes for implementing strategic-level decisions. At the in-theatre operational level, the setting up of a Combined Joint Task Force Headquarter (cjtfhq ) necessitated most of the bilateral training. Indeed, the cjtfhq , a deployable and scalable headquarters, is the only truly integrated element of the cjef , following the “fully integrated nato command organization model.”81 The headquarters would produce operational plans, coordinate orders for each phase of the campaign, permit cooperation between the different cjef components (land, maritime, support…), assume operational control, coordinate with partners and the host nation,

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determine logistics requirements, and establish communication networks. While nations would retain operational command, they would delegate operational control to the cjtf . Finally, at the tactical level, the national forces would not be mixed. In other words, single services would not undergo any innovation in the functioning of their cooperation, except that they would enjoy a greater level of interoperability as they would operate side by side. While the difficulties of integrating armed forces – especially land forces – at the tactical level are well known, there was some disappointment at the limited ambition displayed with the cjef : navies, for instance, have already been sailing side by side for decades with exchanges at the tactical level.82

Political Guidelines and Military Realities While some disagreements on the development of the cjef occurred “horizontally,” between France and the UK, other sets of issues reflected different perspectives between political decision-makers on the one hand, and the working level in the defence ministries on the other hand. One of the main misunderstandings between political and military actors was whether the latter were producing a “capability” or a “concept.” Initially, the cjef was to have “Full Operational Capability” (foc ) by 2016.83 Full Operational Capability is a term used in nato parlance, and it is preceded by a phase of Initial Operational Capability (ioc ).84 The announcement of the cjef as a “capability” at the beginning came from the political level, because they needed to put forward “something tangible.”85 However, in 2012 the term “concept” replaced that of “capability” and the objective became “Full Validation of Concept” (fvoc ). The interim phase then became ivoc , for “Initial Validation of Concept.” While there is a similarity in the acronyms, there is in fact a difference in nature between a capability (or operational capacity) and a concept. A capability means having assigned forces (e.g., a permanent multinational corps or hq ), which does not reflect the fact that the cjef is, in fact, merely “books of procedures.”86 If the terms were set out in 2011, the cjef working groups discussed the concrete output for several years thereafter. At a meeting

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held in March 2014, more than three years after launching the cjef project, participants acknowledged that the stated political “ultimate objective” of being able to conduct combined joint operations still needed clarification.87 Similarly, during the following bilateral meeting, a whole session focused on discussing the “concept versus capability debate.”88 The central question was how to satisfy the political level’s desire and translate it into a military reality. One example of this is that while the British and French working levels were jointly producing road maps and task matrixes, it was unclear to them what they were “measuring”: “Interoperability, capability, likelihood of mission success?” Technically, both French and British forces were already able to conduct nationally the types of missions that they were now being asked to conduct bilaterally at the same level of efficiency. Eventually, the teams concluded that what they were producing was “a concept by 2016 that will then offer a capability,”89 or “a concept to produce capability at short notice.”90 The development of the cjef in fact comes down to a five-year negotiation between the French and British governments, but also a negotiation between those governments and their respective armed forces. Indeed, the armed forces thought that the Concept of Employment, with small forces envisaged to match the constraints coming from the top level, did not match the types of missions envisaged by the top level itself. A high-ranking British military officer argued: “The single Services, on both sides of the Channel, have analyzed [the matter] and their conclusion, which is pretty universal is, revise the conemp  to incorporate larger forces or scale down the mission set Level of Ambition.”91

val i dat in g t h e jo in t f o rce: pendi ng i ssues The Validation Process cjef procedures were developed over the period from 2011 to 2016, although post-“validation” work and training was still planned until 2020 for the force to be able to conduct high-intensity operations. The initial five-year cjef development plan revolved around a series of military exercises that served as milestones. These aimed

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at identifying lacunae in the interoperability of French and British armed forces, at fostering bilateral social links, and at testing newly developed processes and doctrines. The exercises were of two kinds: regular exercises, and exercises aimed at validating force concepts. The exercises started in June 2011 with Exercise Flandres, involving the two land forces, and finished with Exercise Griffin Strike in April of 2016, which involved all services and validated the final concept of the cjef .92 Aside from the major live exercises (livex ), there were numerous limited training exercises and visits between specific regiments that served the same purposes. Exercising is the only way to make sure that when an international crisis does occur, France and the UK would be able to launch planning and operational conduct together in a smooth way across hierarchical levels.93 More precisely, during the cjef development, exercises were opportunities to confront the different modes of functioning of the French and British commands, to develop common operational procedures, and to improve the interoperability of the resources necessary for a combined operation.94 Training together allowed French and British militaries to gradually move from parallel interactions to integration, with learning processes: “For the cjef air component, there are things that we can now do easily, [and] others where it is not easy yet, but it is doable quickly, like setting up a [Joint Force Air Command].”95 While the armed forces made progress during exercises, unresolved issues were also more evident – including during validation exercises. Exercise Griffin Rise for the Initial Validation of Concept of the cjef occurred in June 2015. It took place over four sites, three in France and a fourth on board the British ship hms Ocean. It involved more than a thousand British and French military and civilian staff, with a ratio of 60 per cent French players to 40 per cent British players, consistent with the fact that France was the Lead Nation of the simulated operation. The joint force headquarter was located at the Mont Valérien Fortress outside Paris. The scenario for the exercise was adapted from the scenario planned for the nato exercise Trident Juncture in October 2015, picturing a conflict in the Horn of Africa with the cjef intervening as a first-entry force in a high-intensity conflict, for ninety days, before nato ’s takeover.96

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Griffin Rise tested headquarters procedures (theatre-level headquarters and tactical-level headquarters), while the interactions of the troops at the tactical level were tested later during Exercise Griffin Strike in April 2016. During Griffin Rise, the players used nato ’s standards for doctrine and a “mixing of both cultural approaches” for the more general functioning.97 The result was “hybrid planning” based on pooled national practices and experiences.98 Fewer French military staff participated than expected, because of Operation Sentinelle launched after the terrorist attacks in Paris in January 2015. The number of participants thus had to be decreased from 800 to 500 and some positions were reduced to a minimum. The priorities during the exercise were communication systems, C2, information exchange, logistics, and relations with other government departments (foreign affairs, development, and so on). There remained differences in doctrines, for instance concerning the evacuation of the wounded, the management of prisoners, and, more importantly, intelligence exchange and information networks, which were still “red areas.”99 Nonetheless, it was declared during the vip day that concluded the exercise that “the requirement of our ivoc [had] been achieved.” Three main areas of further work were identified before Full Validation of Concept could be declared in 2016 following Exercise Griffin Strike: the ability of Paris and London to declare a common strategic end state, the sharing of strategic and operational intelligence, and the capacity to “absorb disagreements on rules of engagement and targeting,” as these created tensions and limited the added value of bilateral cooperation.100 A year after Exercise Griffin Rise, the validation of the force was declared during exercise Griffin Strike, which took place in Wales in April 2016. The exercise took place in April 2016 at the same time as the multilateral Exercise Joint Warrior 16.1 (pre-existing British commitments with nato and other partners meant that the same resources were required for both exercises).101 It involved around 5,000 British and French militaries, ten warships, forty aircraft, and twenty armored vehicles over two weeks, and centered on the amphibious group.102 Despite political representatives validating the cjef on that occasion, obstacles remained: technical ones, dealing with communication systems,103 and political ones, concerning

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intelligence sharing.104 Yet the exercise did not integrate those problematic areas.105 What is more, at the 2018 bilateral summit two years after the validation of the force concept, President Macron and Prime Minister May acknowledged that the cjef was, in fact, only available “for operations up to peace enforcement.”106 They indicated that more work was necessary for the force to be able to conduct “crisis management operation involving early entry in a potentially hostile territory at range,” this time by 2020.

The Role of Third Countries The matter of the relation of the cjef to third parties – partner countries, or international organizations – posed unresolved difficulties. In fact, in the early negotiations about the broad design of the cjef , disagreements over its relation to the eu or nato were so stark that the problem was simply “swept under the carpet.”107 Just like the case of strategic-level training mentioned earlier, however, British and French military authorities eventually had to address the question of the international dimension of the cjef . Both parties agreed on the purpose of the new force in a context where various frameworks for conducting multinational operations already existed. In a way, the question of third countries, notably the United States, was at the heart of France and the UK’s wish to develop their own force: “The aim of the cjef [was] to give the UK and France a tool to act bilaterally, if the US does not want to intervene,”108 a British interviewee argued. The goal was also to exercise influence jointly within regional security organizations, and more specifically to be “in a position of strength to negotiate with institutions like nato or the eu , by having a more or less credible alternative, or at least to be able to initiate something and to hold ‘just long enough,’”109 a French officer explained. Disagreements, however, soon surfaced over the question of whether the cjef could be open to other partners. Indeed, the various documents that the British and French agreed on stated that the cjef could eventually be open to other countries. The Concept of Employment drafted in 2014 indicated that the cjef should be able to incorporate other coalition partners where the operational and

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political circumstances demand it, with partners subscribing to the cjef concept and working under a UK-French chain of command. However, it was unclear what that meant and which countries they had in mind. As explained in the previous sections, the cjef would rely on available national high readiness and very high readiness forces, but this potentially created new problems. In France, things were quite straightforward: the 2013 defence white paper developed the new concept of “Echelon National d’Urgence” (translated as “National Emergency Force”) with the creation of an “immediate reaction joint force” (“Force Interarmées d’Intervention Immediate”) of 2,300 troops, that could intervene within seven days over a radius of 3,000 km from the national territory or a foreign base.110 These would be the forces mobilized in a cjef deployment. On the British side, the troops deployed would be those of the Joint Expeditionary Force (jef ), announced in December 2012. Operational since 2018, the jef is an integrated joint force intended to be “the core of the UK’s contribution to any military action, whether nato , coalition or independent.”111 Now, unlike the French enu , the UK jef includes forces from other countries. Indeed, when the thenchief of the defence staff David Richards announced the jef project in 2013, he explained that it would be “genuinely synergistic” with contributions from allies who had been operating under British command in Afghanistan.112 The UK signed a letter of intent with Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, and Norway in September 2014.113 In turn, Richards explained that these partners would “play key roles within the British element of the cjef.”114 In other words, with the jef, a UK battlegroup deployed to cooperate with French forces at the tactical level could include foreign forces.115 From a British perspective, that would not preclude cooperation with the French at the more strategic level.116 The idea of integrating other countries into British expeditionary forces came from David Richards himself, who said he thought they were “missing a trick” by not letting other countries in.117 Yet this move was done without coordinating with the French. Richards consulted his counterpart Guillaud only afterwards and suggested that they should do the same on the French side with partners of their own choosing.118 An adviser at the Cabinet Office reported, however,

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that while the Elysée might have been in favour of opening the cjef , the French defence staff was not.119 French military officers said that France had no ironclad stance on the question, but that they wanted to maintain the initial idea which was to be able to react quickly and bilaterally at the political level.120 At some point, the French had proposed adding other nations, such as Italy or Spain, but they were considered not sufficiently strategically relevant.121 Besides, in France there was the idea that the British approach of “cooperation as sets of bricks” made the whole thing more complex.122 A French interviewee reckoned that eventually the British decided to develop the jef because the French had refused to open the cjef .123 The question of the cjef ’s relation to third countries echoed that of its relation to nato : “is it a tool for nato , or a complement to nato?” a high-ranking British military officer wondered.124 According to some, the British would have hoped to simply “do it within nato.”125 The rationale was that the procedures used were nato ones anyway and that most of the UK and France’s shared interests lay within nato ; there was thus little that would be strictly UK-French in nature.126 In that view, there was “no contradiction” between bilateral and multilateral.127 On the French side, however, there was fear that the cjef could become strictly “a nato force.”128 The nato Wales Summit in September 2014 exemplified UK-French disharmony on the matter. In the summit declaration, the British decided to make a direct link between the UK jef and nato, endorsing the new nato concept of “Framework Nation.”129 Yet this came at a moment when the French and British had failed to speak with one voice about the cjef in the preparation of the nato summit. First, the announcement of jef with the UK as Framework Nation created panic on the French side due to a lack of consultation.130 Then, there was no coordination on how to communicate about the cjef in the summit declaration. The French suggested that the cjef was an initiative connected to nato , to which the British agreed. However, the two countries failed to convince their Alliance partners on the concrete shape of the force and on whether it qualified as a Framework Nation project.131 The nato summit revealed that despite four years of work on their common project, France and the UK were incapable of producing a

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clear, unified definition of their bilateral force and its relation to the Alliance. Eventually, the cjef was alluded to in the nato summit declaration, but with few details and without even mentioning the two countries involved. The declaration read: “Two Allies have announced their intention to establish a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force, to be delivered from 2016 and to be available for the full spectrum of operations, including at high intensity.”132 This wording is reminiscent of the initial announcement of the cjef made at the November 2010 bilateral summit, which, as this whole section has showed, was also vague, and hid many doubts and disagreements.

co n c l u s io n : u k - f r a n c e cooperati on a n d t h e jo in t f o rce project Constructing Common Interests In the cjef case, the bureaucratic mechanisms of cooperation were set up before the precise objectives were defined. The role of the working groups and supervision structure was actually to come up with a common project. An analysis of the definition, development, and validation of the cjef shows that disagreements on this actual intent emerged both between the French and British sides – what we can call horizontal divergences – and between the various layers of actors involved in the project design and implementation – what I call vertical divergences. Horizontally, divergences concerned the overall dimensions of the bilateral force, its relation to third countries, the approach to cooperation – whether it was a complement to national gaps or a power multiplier – and French and British geo-strategic priorities. It was thus mostly a matter of distinct political ambitions. Vertically, the negotiations opposed working-level (military) actors on the one hand, and political decision-makers on the others. Areas of disagreement concerned the nature of the bilateral force, its command structure, and the overall coherence of the project, notably when it came to matching ends and means, which thus had more to do with feasibility problems. Despite the absence of a collective understanding, both horizontally and vertically, on the variety of issues identified, the cjef was

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eventually “validated.” A handicap to this validation should have been the persistent vagueness of the intent, identifiable in the wording of official declarations and bilateral documents. Yet instead, vagueness became an actual feature of the cjef , in many ways. Firstly, there was vagueness in terms of scenarios for the use of the cjef , the force’s relation to third parties, or the way the force would operate at the strategic level. These pressing issues were “swept under the carpet,” as an interviewee noted. In other words, the cjef in large part constituted a moving target and some key issues remained unsettled at validation. In a way, vagueness of intent also constituted a strategy, both at the working level and at the political level. For the political level, it was a way to ensure that the announced bilateral project would indeed be validated, to communicate positively to various audiences. For the working level, it was a way out of the mismatch between a big political intent, constrained military resources, and practical interoperability problems. Thus, vagueness is both a consequence of those various disagreements and the very source of the cjef ’s existence.

Coordinating between Governments One of the characteristics at the heart of UK-French cooperation in the context of the Lancaster House treaties has been the lightness of governance structures. In the cjef case, illustratively, none of the “structures” are permanent and their memberships, mandates, and interrelations are constantly evolving, under the occasional supervision and guidance of military chiefs and the political level. Like in the Libya case, nato did offer a set of unifying practices, and it provides resources (doctrines, multinational exercises) for the conduct of bilateral cooperation. However, there remain many differences in practice, which the working level experiences acutely. Due to the wide-ranging nature of the project, negotiations on the cjef involved a plurality of actors, which led to a constant search for compromise among those actors, not unlike what occurs in multilateral cooperation settings. Then, the organizational structure remained unsettled throughout the project overall. This reflected the undefined nature of the project and created confusion about

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the objective, and it also created doubt as to which structures were indeed active, and which existed only on paper. Moreover, there was an absence of clear lines of control and supervision, and a diffusion of responsibilities across several collective and individual actors endowed with implementation and/or decision-making. The Secretariat could not act upon day-to-day problems given that they did not have the necessary mandate or rank. As a result, implementing or enforcing decisions was neither fast nor easy. UK-France defence cooperation rests a lot on political decisionmakers. This “ultimate” political supervision had two negative consequences. The first was the tendency to make decisions that could not be implemented, because they are too removed from military realities. This explains much of the vertical disagreements mentioned above. However, top-down dynamics are necessary to initiate impulses, such as for information sharing, which require a political decision. Yet I showed that raising issues from the bottom up to inform others about implementation difficulties was not evident, as military actors were reluctant to suggest their incapacity to “deliver” orders. The second negative consequence of supervision from the national heads of states and government was that there was not enough political engagement: “at the summits they say there is political engagement, but we don’t see it at the level of the minister of defence, and senior leaders have other priorities, and they change priorities regularly.”133 At the same time, all these elements point to the fact that, like the definition of common interests, coordination arrangements were a crucial factor shaping the cjef project: the lack of formal structures and strict supervision permitted the cjef to be, eventually, validated. Firstly, the absence of permanent or even settled structures provided cjef actors with flexibility and the capacity to adapt to the shifting nature of the project. As a British officer argued, commenting on the impossibility of agreeing on a definitive organization chart for the cooperation structure: “changes in structure show that we are adapting to needs.”134 Secondly, the heterarchical nature of the cooperation setting made it so that the cjef relied significantly on informal channels of communication and collaboration: this made it motivating for participants, who therefore have tended to get more

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involved in the work. Thus, those responsible for the cjef development embraced this quality of flexibility, adaptability, and creativity, to the point that it became a characteristic intrinsic to the cjef , and a major axis for collective learning, as I explore in chapter 6.

Sharing Costs and Gains Fairly The issue of gain and cost distribution constrained cooperation on the cjef in a limited manner. For one, the tendency to pursue a systematic balance between the two partners engaged in cooperation is not reflected in the design of the cjef command structure. Indeed, the bilateral force was developed according to the “Lead Nation” concept, where one country takes command of the operation and the other provides the deputy commander and augmentees. The Lead Nation concept is borrowed from nato : a multilateral arrangement. Thus, in the present case, borrowing the functioning of multilateralism became a way to circumvent the tendency inherent to bilateralism to pursue 50/50 arrangements that can be dysfunctional. But more importantly, the question of the payoff was also hardly salient because the cjef did not produce significant savings or material gains. The actors involved in the cjef development nonetheless pursued balance in the efforts put toward providing resources and facilities for cjef development activities, and especially training activities. Typically, in that case, balance is about numbers: how many personnel are going to be exchanged, or how many soldiers will be able to train in the partner’s facilities. However, actors in one area of cooperation may not perceive the trade-offs made in another. For instance, if the French Army lent training infrastructures to the British Army, and the French Navy went to train in Scotland in exchange, the French would perceive that they were losing even though overall the deal was fair.135 Moreover, an issue was that exchanges – whether lending infrastructure or sending officers to the other side of the Channel – should occur simultaneously in order to be perceived as fair. In the same fashion, there was throughout the project a constant search for equivalence in working group and Secretariat membership – in the numbers of staff involved, their positions, and ranks – and for the organization and command of exercises, with a systematic alternation in terms of

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the location and Lead Nation. One explanation put forward during a cjef meeting was that in bilateral settings, actors tend to be “more demanding than for multilateral cooperation,”136 in the sense that they expect more from their partner.

Managing External Connections and Third Parties For a good part of the cjef project, embeddedness in other partnerships and multilateral organizations appeared not so much as a problem but as an opportunity. Aside from the normative basis of standards and doctrines, France and the UK also used nato exercises as opportunities for bilateral training, thus accommodating resource constraints. Additionally, multilateral exercises were supposed to be a means of articulating the cjef with multilateral frameworks. Now, accommodating this international dimension into Franco-British military cooperation did prove challenging in several manners. Training opportunities also required a prioritization of partnerships, given that training using national French or British infrastructures makes them unavailable for bilateral training with other partners, European or otherwise. Outside the question of available resources, the positive effects of embeddedness in terms of having a common normative basis from which to work were counterbalanced by starker tensions over the Franco-British partnership’s relation to third countries. Firstly, intelligence exchange remained an obstacle because of the existence of the “Five Eyes” community. Secondly, the question of integrating third parties was present from the start. However, the French and the British do not have the same military partners in Europe. Traditionally, France has turned towards Italy, Spain, Germany, or Belgium, while the UK mod has close links with the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and the Baltic states. While the actors working on the cjef acknowledged that France and the UK needed to engage their partners in their communication and eventually in cjef deployments, how this would be done was still undefined in 2016, at the time of cjef validation. That may change going forward thanks to projects like the European Intervention Initiative, which bring together all these countries (see chapter 6).

5

Integrating Defence Industries This is a strategic and long-term approach to how we do business with France under the Lancaster House Treaty; it is not simply a traditional cooperation on a military project with a start and an end. It is a major change which is truly something new and different. Clive Neville, team leader for “Complex Weapons International Cooperation and Strategy” at de&s at the mod 1

mbda is the main missile manufacturing company in Europe. The group was set up in December 2001 from the fusion of the British Matra BAe Dynamics (37.5 per cent), the French eads -Aerospatiale Matra Missiles (37.5 per cent), and the Italo-British Alenia Marconi Systems (25 per cent). mbda stakeholders are Airbus (formerly eads) and bae , with 37.5 per cent of the shares each, and Leonardo (formerly Finmeccanica), with 25 per cent of the shares. The German company lfk was also taken over in June 2005. Within the mbda group, the French and British branches are the two largest. Lower defence budgets have direct consequences for defence industrial sectors – like missile manufacturers – that are fully dependent on state procurement. The Tony Blair government noted in the December 2005 Defence Industrial Strategy white paper that British investment in the missile sector was about to drop by 40 per cent over the following five years.2 In parallel, in France, the industrialist mbda identified after 2005 a downward curve of French investments in the sector, which would go from more than 200 million euros per year in 2008–10 to 120 million in 2012 and down to 40 million in 2013.3

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As a result of this changing landscape for the missile sector, the French and British branches of mbda were the first to merge part of their management functions in 2006. This resulted in the creation of joint management offices with the ultimate goal of moving towards the consolidation of European sites by types of activities, and to lead to the creation of technological “Centres of Excellence.”4 That same year, political announcements started to herald changes in procurement practices to further cooperation in the sector. Prime Minister Tony Blair and President Jacques Chirac declared their wish to “explore the potential for adapting transfer regulations with the aim of improving the efficiency of our missile industry.”5 At the March 2008 bilateral summit, President Sarkozy and Prime Minister Brown announced their wish to pursue “a joint industrial strategy for complex weapons working towards future concepts and technologies for common programs,” with the aim of “making more effective use of our respective industrial capabilities and skills to deliver our military requirements for weapons, particularly where these are common.”6 The announcement for a joint strategy coincided with the beginning of the financial crisis, which added more tension to an industrial sector fully dependent on state subsidies. The use of the phrase “joint industrial strategy” suggested that the two heads of state and government were willing to go much further than mere ad hoc cooperation and adopt a formalized longer-term partnership between themselves and with the industry; as such, it was a critical step towards the negotiation of the Lancaster House treaties. The role of the industry was indeed fundamental in the treaty negotiation process and its outcomes. Some meetings were held in the spring of 2010 between the French dga (Directorate General for Armaments), the British Defence Equipment and Support (de&s ), and mbda . Joint work on the “One Complex Weapons” project then took place over the summer. The industrialist mbda ended up holding the pen and writing the whole of paragraph 18 of the November 2010 political declaration, concerning cross-border industrial integration, which read: We have reached an agreement on a 10-year strategic plan for the British and French Complex Weapons sector, where we

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will work towards a single European prime contractor and the achievement of efficiency savings of up to 30% … We plan to launch a series of Complex Weapons projects in 2011 (development of the anti-surface missile fasgw(h) /anl , assessment of enhancements to the Scalp/Storm Shadow cruise missiles, and a joint technology roadmap for short range air defence technologies). Co-operation in this industrial sector will serve as a test case for initiatives in other industrial sectors.7 This chapter reviews the first years of the joint industrial strategy, from the 2010 treaty and declaration to the Brexit negotiation period. It covers bilateral negotiations around the first joint program launched as part of this initiative, the fasgw(h) /anl anti-ship missile – which later came to be known as Sea Venom/anl 8 – and the implementation of cross-border Centres of Excellence for missile-related technologies.

i n t e g r at in g n at io n a l defence i ndustri es : b u il d in g o n p o l icy convergence The ambitious project of industrial integration, called “One Complex Weapons,” builds on the prior convergence of French and British industrial strategies in the sector. The UK and France both implemented a partnership approach with this industrial sector, which became even more relevant as financial difficulties arose in the 2000s. Facing a decrease in demand and a rise in international competition, the British government announced a “support strategy” for the missile sector in 2006 and created a new kind of government-industry “collaborative partnership” with the Team Complex Weapons (tcw ) initiative.9 The initiative aimed at guaranteeing to the industry a portfolio of programs as part of an integrated industrial sector with a new, global approach to the relation between the Ministry of Defence and the industry.10 The goal was chiefly national: “This arrangement was intended to maintain sovereign industrial capabilities by providing a predictable requirements roadmap.”11 Predictability would allow for the reuse of the same components

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across weapon programs to limit development costs. Team Complex Weapons is chaired by the mod , via Defence Equipment and Support (de&s ) along with mbda UK. The “Team” also involves other, second-tier, British industrial actors: Thales UK, Roxel, and QinetiQ. In 2010 the British government signed an agreement for a portfolio of six projects of an overall value of £4 billion over ten years, which should save up to £1.2 billion through modularity and the reuse of components and technologies from one program to another.12 Beyond the estimated savings, the “mixed” team exemplifies a new “philosophy of partnership” with suppliers. This enhanced control and protection of the defence industry’s activities brought British practices closer to those of the French “filière missile.” Indeed, according to a French dga officer, the mod “has managed to make the liberals [in the British government] admit that competition does not necessarily offer ‘best value for money’ in the particular case of the defence industry.”13 The French equivalent to Team Complex Weapons, “filière missiles” (literally “missile sector”), functions according to the same principles but in a less formalized manner: “we have a partnership without saying it: the filière missiles is a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ … we do not have a contract.”14 Conceptually, like in Britain, it rests on the idea that “missiles are considered a strategic priority … they are part of the sovereign domain … in the sense that we have control of the product and we know its content.”15 Antoine Bouvier pointed to the Assemblée nationale: “We have in France this culture of relations of partnership with the industry; the United Kingdom, which did not have it, has adopted it, which allows our two countries to engage in a dialogue on the basis of a common understanding of industrial and defence issues.”16 There was thus a convergence of practices of procurement and industrial support between France and the UK in the missile sector. Indeed, the overt support to national industrial “champions” implied in the “filière missiles” is rather typical of French state-industry relations in other defence sectors. By contrast, in Britain, the tcw approach is quite original given that, beyond the legal aspects, support for the idea of the free market and fair competition prevented the government from designing industrial strategies. During the negotiations around the Lancaster House treaties, mbda indeed proposed a ten-year plan, from 2010 to 2020.17 The

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plan promised savings (“efficiencies”) of up to 30 per cent, which by 203518 would be done in the following manner: 10 per cent cuts by conducting more programs in cooperation; 10 per cent cuts by rationalizing the industrial base beyond mbda through the Centres of Excellence (Thales and Sagem retain some missile activities that are in duplication with mbda ’s); and 10 per cent via savings done within mbda , through the principle of “modularity and reuse” across programs,19 the suppression of duplication, and some job cuts.20 The “Centres of Excellence” (coe ) initiative, on the model of Airbus,21 was at the heart of the implementation of the One Complex Weapons initiative. The coe s are the emblem of the long-term or even permanent nature of the bilateral partnership,22 of the two countries’ agreement to “mutual dependence,” and thus of their “mutual trust.”23 There are three types of Centres of Excellence: national centres, federated centres, and specialized centres. The first would maintain strictly national competences that are “at the heart of sovereignty”24 and for which no cooperation is possible. These are, for example, nuclear and stealth technologies. The federated centres would include national resources that can be shared and structured with a single, unified management. Finally, the specialized centres suppose the abandonment of certain national capacities and, thus, specialization and interdependence. A total of twelve Centres of Excellence will replace the current functioning of the sector, four in each category, with two in the UK and two in France each time. A manager at mbda FR opined that having such a dividing-up of competence means that the French and the British would “have each other by the short hairs,”25 thus underlining the entanglement to which the two sides committed with the advancement of the sector’s integration.

t e s t in g in t e g r at io n in the mi s si le s ector: t h e s e a v e n o m / a nl program Finding an agreement to launch a common weapon program was key to giving substance to the One Complex Weapons initiative, and more generally to demonstrating the concrete outputs of the Lancaster House treaties. In this context, the Sea Venom/anl

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program gained importance as the first possible bilateral armament program that could play that dual role. However, despite an initial announcement on both sides of the Channel in favour of the program, the Sea Venom/anl became the object of intense debates in France and it took time and negotiations before it could be launched. On this issue, the industrial lobby and intergovernmental pressures pushed in the same direction, encouraging the French government to launch the program despite internal opposition.

A “Test Case” for UK-French Industrial Cooperation France and the UK first announced their intent to cooperate on the Sea Venom/anl program in 2008. To launch the Sea Venom/anl , France would have to join an ongoing British assessment-phase activity, but the program could eventually constitute a significant element of the bilateral strategy under development. In January 2009, the two governments signed a formal statement of intent for the Sea Venom/anl program, and restated their ambition at the July 2009 summit.26 The signing of a twenty-seven-month contract with the industry for the assessment phase took place in April 2009.27 The €56 million contract was jointly funded by the two governments and the work was shared between the French and UK industries.28 The first year was dedicated to making French and British weapon requirements (weight, range) match,29 so as to evaluate the technological feasibility of the program.30 By September 2010, the industry expected a contract for the demonstration and manufacture phase.31 In this context, the 2010 treaty created a momentum around the Sea Venom/anl program, as the latter became part of the main bilateral projects announced at the summit. The reasons that the small program acquired this centrality are threefold. Firstly, the Sea Venom/anl constituted a necessary step toward pursuing One Complex Weapons, especially for implementing the Centres of Excellence concept. Thus, the importance of the program lay in its repercussions for the whole sector, as four Centres of Excellence would be created during its production. As a representative of the mbda group explained: “We need that there be effective cooperation, otherwise, mbda and all that, it’s just hot air! We must make

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One mbda concrete, launch the Centres of Excellence … For us, the anl it is not for industrial business or for export, but for developing One mbda .”32 The other mbda program awaiting validation for cooperation was the renewal of the scalp /Storm Shadow. However, because the scalp was not a new program, it could not participate in the implementation of rationalization and specialization which required starting a program “from scratch.”33 Secondly, there was at the time no other bilateral program that could be launched immediately, in the missile sector but also in other domains of armament cooperation. The missile sector actually presented “only a few possibilities” for bilateral programs to be managed by mbda in the short term: the renovation of scalp / Storm Shadow (but it was small project), and, more importantly, the fc /asw (Future Cruise/Anti-Ship Weapon, but it was planned for later, in the 2020s). When it came to other industrial sectors, several programs were under consideration after the 2010 summit. These included Maritime Mine Countermeasures (mmcm ): an unmanned underwater vehicle, for which a competition for a prototype development was placed with the occa r in May 2011, and a joint UK-French program team was created in early 2012.34 There were also several plans for cooperation on drones. The first project was the possible acquisition by France of the British Watchkeeper, a tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (uav s). An evaluation of the system started in 2012.35 The second drone project concerned the development of Medium Altitude Long Endurance (male ) uav s, with a memorandum of understanding involving bae and Dassault signed in February 2011.36 Finally, there were announcements for launching a common demonstration program for a Future Combat Air System (fcas ) involving the two same companies.37 All those projects were under study by one side or the other or both, so that by 2012, the Sea Venom/anl was “the closest to an effective launch,” as the assessment phase had been successfully completed.38 For these two reasons, the Sea Venom/anl was “more than a mere missile”;39 it served both to “materialize Franco-British cooperation” and guaranteed that One mbda ’s integration would go under way, and as such, it was “a small program that [underpinned] huge stakes.”40 Then, the third factor that led to the program acquiring

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centrality was urgency on the British side. The anti-ship missile program was a top priority for the Royal Navy who needed to replace an existing capability at the earliest opportunity.41 In 2011, the British were already risking a capability gap, as they had planned to replace their program by 2015.42 By late 2012, early 2013, the British government announced that, should the French not decide shortly on the Sea Venom/anl , they would have to run the program nationally.43 On the French side, however, the project would create a new capability that the Marine Nationale had been doing without since 1992.44 There was a need to rebuild that capability for the future, but no urgency, and the horizon was around 2020.45

A Too Political Weapon Program: Domestic Opposition in France A joint program office, headed by a dga officer, was set up at de&s in late 2011 to manage the Sea Venom/anl. However, it was not until April 2013 that the French government confirmed it would be launched. Indeed, despite the program becoming central and even emblematic for UK-French armament cooperation, it took two years before the French government decided to give it the green light. Several domestic constraints put cooperation at risk. The first argument against the Sea Venom/anl concerned the diverging capability requirements and specifications between Britain and France. There were technical debates between experts of the dga and de&s to reach an agreement between 2009 and 2011.46 One of the issues was that the British needed a “heavy” missile while French needed a “light” one – hence the names “Future Anti-Surface Guided Weapon (Heavy)” in the UK (the initial name of the Sea Venom) and antinavire lèger (anl , i.e., “light anti-ship”) in France. Worse, many argued that there was in fact no capability requirement at all on the French side: “We don’t have a need, the anl will not replace an existing capacity … We don’t even know on which helicopter we will put them!” a French dga officer told us.47 Because of these doubts, the French were in no hurry to launch the anti-ship missile program – their earliest need would not be before 202048 or even 2026.49

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The second argument concerned the relative priority of this capability for French forces. The anti-ship missile was only one possible new program for the French armed forces among others, and it was being discussed in a period of budgetary constraints. Thus, the Navy supported the program, but the other services did not,50 and the defence staff, who are in charge of defining the requirement of the three services, had other priorities.51 The context of budgetary reductions made the issue of prioritization even more salient. A dga officer involved in the program told us he thought “the project was a bit of a scandal in a dearth period, while we were shutting down regiments.”52 Besides, the project was considered mostly political in the defence administrations. Despite this perception, at the “FR-UK Cooperation Symposium” organized by the dga in October 2012, the participants considered One Complex Weapons to be the main industrial subject. Both French and British mod actors perceived the project as particularly important at the political level: all French participants, and three in four British participants, thought so. However, only half the French participants gave it consideration personally, and the same number thought it was successful.53 An mbda representative told us that in the military hq s the missile had been renamed “store and forget” – a reference to the phrase “fire and forget” used in military parlance to qualify certain types of guided munitions.54 Aside from the military requirements and working-level priorities, there was the question of political timing. The British became increasingly concerned with a prompt launch of the program in the beginning of 2012. At the February 2012 bilateral summit, David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy had announced that they expected to “sign a contract and an mou in the coming months for the development and manufacture of the fasgw /anl .”55 The British government had asked that negotiations be concluded by 31 March 2012.56 Yet on the French side, the period coincided with an electoral campaign, as the presidential election was taking place at the beginning of May 2012. During the campaign, François Hollande announced that he wanted “to pursue the effort at deepening the Franco-British relationship that engaged at Saint-Malo, and that has

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continued in the past months.”57 Nonetheless, the election resulted in political wavering as Franco-British cooperation was no longer a central topic; there was thus a “political freeze” before and after the election.58 The change in government in May with Hollande’s victory was followed by a revision of the 2008 French white paper on defence and a defence budget bill (Loi de programmation militaire). Hollande decided to “stop all military development spending until a new White Paper … was published and debated.”59 This happened right when the British, still awaiting a response, were attempting to put the Sea Venom/anl back on the table. Consequently, no progress could be made at the working level by the teams involved in the program during the year 2012. Because of those various arguments, giving the program the green light would be a political message. Yet, the election and the revision of the Livre blanc was also an occasion for the French to ponder their strategic and political-diplomatic priorities, and in the first months of the new presidency the government leaned towards Germany instead. On 14 June 2012, François Hollande signed with Angela Merkel a letter of intent for enhancing bilateral defence cooperation – including, in the armaments field, a statement of intent regarding male uav s (on which cooperation was already in consideration with the British).60 In November 2012, the French government announced its wish to “revive European defence,”61 despite this going against the prior convergence of views between Paris and London on the matter. The agreement with Germany was followed by an announcement by UK defence secretary Peter Luff that military ties with Paris were currently “in drift.”62 In the same period the British also made decisions detrimental to UK-French cooperation. There had been several failed attempts at collaboration on aircraft carriers at the beginning of the 2000s, and by 2010, there were no more plans for integrated aircraft carriers. There remained options for sharing the use of platforms. The British had initially opted for a Short Take-Off, Vertical Landing (stovl, or “B”) version of the American Joint Strike Fighter f-35 combat aircraft; for their part, the French were using “cats and traps” (“C” equivalent) kinds of aircraft. However, in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review published a couple of weeks before the Lancaster House

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treaties, the British government announced that they would switch to the “C” version, thus “allowing France and the UK to share the expensive task of maintaining uninterrupted carrier capability” by having two national carriers with similar aircraft interchangeable in their capabilities.63 The sharing of aircraft carriers was thus one of the main bilateral projects announced in November 2010 by Cameron and Sarkozy. In April 2012, however, the British government reverted to the initial decision to go for the “B” version, for reasons to do with the estimated £1.8bn it would take to adapt the previously designed carrier platforms to the “C” version.64 Some in France thus saw the refusal to launch the Sea Venom/anl as “a way of settling scores visà-vis the British who had made their choice on the aircraft carrier.”65

Lobbying Strategies, Intergovernmental Push, and the French Decision on the Program It is in this context – the opposition of defence actors and the reassessment of the UK-French defence partnership – that the Hollande government made a favourable decision on the Sea Venom/ anl in March 2013. The decision was facilitated by (1) the convergence of the industry’s priorities with parliamentary support and government-to-government pressures, and (2) the prospect of compensations. industrial lobbying

When it appeared that there was little chance for the program to actually be conducted, the industrialists tried to push the project forward in the French Parliament and in the media. Antoine Bouvier, the (French) ceo of mbda , was extremely active publicly: he participated in several auditions at the Assemblée nationale between 2011 and 2013. The atmosphere was particularly propitious for mbda to get a voice at the Assemblée, as the Finance Committee was charged with producing a report on cooperative armament programs.66 Right after the report was completed, the Defence Committee also engaged with the industrialist while preparing the 2014–19 Loi de programmation militaire (lpm ). Bouvier was auditioned in 2011, then twice in 2013 and again in 2014. In every instance, he insisted on the importance of

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UK-French cooperation both for industrial rationalization and for the future of the bilateral defence cooperation, underlining that the missile sector was the only one specifically mentioned in the 2010 summit declaration.67 He thus thought to position his company at the heart of UK-French armament collaboration. Later he went on to add that “the crumbling down of engineering offices [was], for [him], a major worry: if decisions on programs are not made in the coming weeks, I don’t see how we could continue this cooperation.”68 Antoine Bouvier also spoke countless times to the French economic press, which was quite receptive to the company’s communication69 Notably, in an article published in Jane’s after a year’s delay of the Sea Venom/anl decision, the ceo of mbda expanded on the possible political consequences of a French “no-go” for the bilateral relationship beyond the case of mbda : “A positive French decision will be a strong confirmation of the willingness to pursue this UK-French co-operation (while) the administration has been briefed about the consequences of a negative decision.” If the French government did not launch it, he added, “we would have to reassess the parameters, the substance and the level of ambition of this co-operation between France and the UK.”70 Industrial lobbying participated in the definition of bilateral economic and political interests attached to the Sea Venom/anl program, thus facilitating the emergence of cooperation. This was well summarized by the following interviewee, involved in the negotiations on the Sea Venom/anl : “it is the interest of industrial policy and the Franco-British interest – especially the latter – that have allowed this program to survive.”71 The actor added that “the fact that [mbda ] is a Franco-British company was fundamental,” as “they have very high-level political anchoring and they have the capability to get ideas across to the two governments through their own channels”72 and help them reach convergence. the role of french and british members of parliament

Other lobbying activities were undertaken by French and British members of Parliament (mp s). The involvement of mp s in the Sea Venom/anl decision was double: they were identified as targets of influence and as a transmission belt by those who supported

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the program, and they also personally supported it. mp s are not often involved in strategic decisions of defence policies, especially in France: decision-making circuits are usually very short, circumscribed at the top of the executive.73 Moreover, the Commission nationale de la défense et des forces armées (i.e., the defence committee of the Assemblée nationale, hereafter referred to as the defence commission) is perceived even by its members as being isolated from the other committees and as having limited influence “on the outside”; but it is usually close to the defence minister and it consensually supports the “defence effort.”74 At the bilateral level, bilateral parliamentary working groups are thought to be “incomparably less important than the official governmental channels in shaping the substance of relations” between European capitals, unless they are members of specialist committees – in which case they can influence the making of policy.75 Those who were in favour of the program thus turned to mp s to move the matter forward. It is standard for the members of the defence commission to pay close attention to defence industrial matters, and this is especially true during periods when the Loi de programmation militaire is being revised.76 Indeed, we find that the second largest group auditioned by the defence commission after military chiefs (the defence chief and services chiefs) is composed of defence industrialists. The various auditions of Antoine Bouvier confirm that for mbda , the defence commission was a necessary interlocutor for putting its interests forward. mps were also a target for actors within the defence administration. While the military chiefs did not support the Sea Venom/anl (save for the navy staff), the dga team overseeing UK-French cooperation (at the Direction de la stratégie [ds]) did. In keeping with its bureaucratic objectives, the team supported bilateral cooperation more broadly. Already prior to the treaty, in early 2010 the team had engaged in a strategic communication (stratcom) initiative targeting Conservative British mps to raise their awareness and argue in favour of Franco-British cooperation.77 Speaking in early 2012, this dga officer thought that it was “now up to the British to do the same in the other direction with the [French] Socialists” and persuade the next French government to continue cooperating with the UK .78

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In turn, the mp s also took on the mission of defending the bilateral cooperation and the Sea Venom/anl program. Several mp s on both sides of the Channel have been involved since 2010 in a “Parliamentary Working Group on UK-French Defence Cooperation” and they were thus “stakeholders of this cooperation,” which seemed to “motivate” them.79 The working group consists of regular informal gatherings between mp s of defence committees of the lower and upper chambers of each country. During meetings, members of Parliament discussed current affairs as well as salient operational and/or industrial topics: information exchange on industrial matters, updates on budgetary decisions, and more.80 Cooperation on the Sea Venom/anl was the subject of bilateral parliamentary talks. Patricia Adam, head of the French defence commission, explained that there were discussions in November 2012 with representatives of the French and British mod s, mbda UK, and the British equivalent to the dga on the topic of the Sea Venom/anl because French mp s “knew it was important for the British.”81 These talks occurred in parallel with those which the minister Le Drian was having with his counterpart. While the arguments coming out of industry and the media were chiefly economic, mp s resorted to a political-diplomatic argument to lobby in favour of the Sea Venom/ anl. François Cornut-Gentille, a conservative French mp , justified his commitment in favour of the program by citing the strategic importance of the UK and the “eminently political” nature of the project, countering the dga ’s argument that it was “a thing of the industrial lobbies.”82 The mp s’ lobbying strategy was not limited to speeches. Cornut-Gentille tried to pass an amendment to the 2013 budget bill to unlock 10 million euros, a symbolic but necessary amount to initiate the Sea Venom/anl and to have it included in the military budget bill. Cornut-Gentille was then a member of the finance commission and had been for ten years a member of the defence commission. During the October 2012 discussion of the amendment as part of ongoing work on the budget bill, the arguments in favour of the amendment underlined the strategic importance of collaborating with European partners, the small number of projects then under development, and the risk that the British would turn back on their

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American collaborators if the program was not launched.83 Indeed, French mp François Cornut-Gentille believed that “the United States did not remain inert in the face of the Franco-British agreement. To maintain an ally they might have neglected, US military officials are multiplying offers of cooperation with their British counterparts. Thus, during bilateral meetings in June 2011, Admiral Roughead of the US Navy proposed closer cooperation with the Royal Navy on anti-submarine warfare, naval drones, and the training of British naval pilots on US aircraft carriers.”84 Cornut-Gentille’s amendment suggested reorganizing some of the current defence spending to divert budget from the credits allocated to defence diplomacy and the “grande ecole” Polytechnique.85 This proposal faced opposition from the finance commission and was eventually rejected. The arguments against it underlined the fact that the Sea Venom/anl was not a priority for French armed forces (with an operational need not before 2020 it was considered “totally premature”86); pointed to the current uncertainty surrounding the French defence budget given that the work on the Livre blanc – the defence white paper – was ongoing; and raised the fear of British unreliability. The latter argument was illustrated by the case of failed collaboration on aircraft carriers in the 2000s. A final stated argument was that the members of the finance commission disapproved of the idea of using Ecole Polytechnique’s credit to launch the program. A separate argument, not overtly expressed in the debates, was also possibly political. Among the four members of the finance commission who expressed their opinions during the discussion of the amendment, the three who opposed it were all from the majority socialist party. On the contrary, Cornut-Gentille and his supporter in the commission were from the ump conservative party. This contradicted an affirmation found in the literature that defence is a politically consensual matter in France. Cornut-Gentille indeed thought that Lancaster House was perceived by the Socialists as being “Sarkozy’s treaty,” and it thus received less support from that side of the political spectrum.87 On that perspective, it is unsurprising that the period of uncertainty around the Sea Venom/anl program started with the Socialists’ coming into power in May 2012.

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intergovernmental pressures and the french decision

To break the deadlock, in November 2012 the British government offered the French a deal: they would fund the whole of the first part of the production to “kick-start” the project and leave the French time to find appropriate budgetary resources.88 Were the French to refuse that offer, it would “[undermine] the 2010 defence treaty between the two nations,”89 journalists argued. Nonetheless, after that deal was proposed the French still did not make a decision, and so the British continued applying “gentle, firm and unrelenting pressure to help France make the right decision for the long term,” according to a British defence official.90 However, as mentioned above, there were still oppositions at the ema and in Le Drian’s cabinet. In this context, the challenge was for the British to find the right governmental intermediary. Sir Peter Ricketts, then the ambassador to France who used to be national security adviser, worked with the Chef d’état-major particulier, General Puga (i.e., the Elysée), as on the British side Lancaster House matters were dealt with in the prime ministerial cabinet. However, on the French side, the change in power in 2012 had also led to a reshuffling of responsibilities, and President Hollande had “handed over” treaty matters to his defence minister Le Drian, which created a discrepancy between the two sides of the Channel.91 Due to this mismatch, the affair had to gradually climb up the hierarchical ladder in France. The British offer was followed by a series of three letters from the British to the French. First, a “three-star” general sent a letter in December 2012 to his counterpart at the dga . Then, in January 2013, Philip Hammond sent a letter to Jean-Yves Le Drian pushing the deadline for the French decision to the end of February. The letter also stated that the bilateral relationship forged through the 2010 Lancaster House agreement would be badly damaged without the program.92 The French defence minister then rejected responsibility for the decision, arguing that it was “for the Elysée to decide.”93 On 26 February 2013, Prime Minister Cameron addressed a letter directly to President Hollande, asking for a swift decision, and recalling the importance of the Sea Venom/anl and the need of the Royal Navy.94 The letter was accompanied with a threat, expressed in the press in March 2013, that “without imminent French support,” the

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British would “move ahead with fasgw(h) as a UK-only initiative.”95 This gradual governmental pressure seems to have been an effective leverage: on 8 April 2013, Hollande addressed a letter to Cameron stating that he “[wanted] the project to be launched.”96 The letter also made references to the importance of UK-French cooperation.

i m p l e m e n t in g t h e b il ateral s trategy: t r a d e - o f f s a n d practi cali ti es Once the decision to launch the Sea Venom/anl was announced, the activities of the program team were able to restart in June 2013, alongside bilateral work on the industrial contract that was eventually signed in March 2014. In the meantime, negotiations took place at two levels: at the level of the program itself, since the development and manufacture contract had to be agreed, and at the level of the cooperation sector, since trade-offs were to compensate for the French “effort” on the Sea Venom/anl . At first sight, it indeed seemed that the French had done the British a favour by agreeing to launch a program against French interests. When examining post-agreement negotiations, however, we find that those interests, even if poorly defined, were not forgotten.

The Industrial Contract and the Practicalities of Cross-Border Integration Work on the Sea Venom/anl development and manufacture contract started in October 2013.97 The British Ministry of Defence eventually signed the contract with mbda in the name of the British and French governments in March 2014. The topics of negotiation included procurement contract clauses, prices, specifications, and quantities.98 Because of the mismatch in calendars mentioned earlier, the two countries’ missiles will not enter in service simultaneously. The less pressing French need also meant that France would eventually acquire fewer, if any, missiles than the British.99 Most of the negotiations centred on the contract specifications. Despite the convergence of their industrial strategies, the two countries do nurture different relationships with the defence industry that

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are reflected in their contractual practices. These had to be negotiated in order for a joint contract for the Sea Venom/anl to be signed. Because it was part of the package of the UK Team Complex Weapons initiative, the contract was to be signed by the British government, but it had to have characteristics that suited French needs and contractual practices too. France normally uses fixed-price contracts: they are signed with a performance obligation (“obligation de résultat”) for the industry; technological risks are estimated at the outset and are included in the (usually higher) initial prices; and the contracts involve a full insurance for the client (the state).100 As well, the client can modify its requirement during the process and control the industry’s activities as development and production progress. The ability to control the development of industrial programs is reinforced by the fact that the dga is composed of armament engineers (Jean Joana calls it a “technico-scientific and administrative agency”101) who can “talk of technical subjects”102 with the industry. For its part, the British Defence Equipment and Support (de&s ) negotiates contracts with the industry that are flexible in a technical, financial, and calendar perspective, with a greater sharing of costs and benefits between the state and the industry than in the French case.103 The question of the flexibility and level of control of the contract was thus at the heart of the negotiation. mbda UK’s initial contract proposal corresponded to British contractual practices, with “a weak commitment from the supplier and no risk provision.”104 The French team then negotiated for one year to include penalty clauses in the contract, which was difficult because it required changing mbda UK’s working methods.105 Eventually, the Sea Venom contract formed an annex to the UK Team Complex Weapons global contract and served to modify the contract’s clauses. The Sea Venom contract introduces milestones evaluations and the possibility to exit the program if it does not match French needs.106 This situation leads an mbda representative to conclude that the contract is a two-speed one: taken globally, the Sea Venom/anl is a “success,” but in the details, it is “a monster.”107 The industry thus regrets that “the two contracting interfaces act in a less coordinated manner [than the industry does] and on the basis of a legal framework that is not harmonised or compatible.”108

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The implementation phase gave way to different types of difficulties at the working level, starting with the governance of the joint industrial strategy. Despite having a unified European industrial sector around mbda , the group itself had a legal form and internal organization that remain permeated with national logics, with the existence of four national branches, mbda FR under French law, mbda UK under British law, mbda lfk (mbda Germany) under German law, and mbda it under Italian law. Until the decision to form One mbda , each maintained its development, production, and integration capacities in the country where it was established.109 Denis Ballet, member of the executive committee and direction of operations of mbda , explains that “historical legacy still weighs on the group’s different branches. [There are] processes that are specific to each country.”110 Thus, at the time of writing, there exist no binational teams within mbda (outside of the top-level management that is binational). According to a dga representative this was because several issues would arise, including “a lack of proximity, language, [and] different norms used in the two companies.”111 Another interviewee also pointed out that there was the necessity of maintaining an ability to take on programs nationally when needed, thus limiting the degree of integration actually pursued.112 Other legal and technical constraints affected the implementation of the Sea Venom/anl program and the One Complex Weapons Strategy. For instance, actors involved in cross-Channel armament cooperation need authorization for exchanging sensitive information: participants in a cooperation program must rely on specific technical agreements, in order to access national classified information. There are also constraints for transferring material. Simplifying procedures to trade arms-related products requires having a global license so as to avoid going through a time-consuming and heavy authorization process: “Le Plessis-Robinson [mbda France] is 500 kilometres away from Stevenage [mbda UK] but it’s a tall order to work; it takes three months to send something to England … The problem is that arms trade is prohibited unless you have an authorization [from the export control committee]. So, it is difficult to integrate. mbda manages multinational activities: management activities are okay, but procedures are long and difficult, there are

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all the confidential elements … The climate is difficult … There is political will, but then at the lower level law applies.”113 Global licenses were agreed on in an Intergovernmental Agreement (iga ), which was eventually signed in September 2015 and came into force in 2016.114 From an industrial perspective, the Lancaster House treaty was a framework for an iga that should allow for the lifting of legal barriers.115 The iga aims to facilitate the transfer of defence-related products between the parties for the implementation of the Centres of Excellence, by committing to granting global licenses without constraints and on a reciprocal and equivalent basis. In addition, the parties undertake to ease the exchange of information, including classified information, for the purpose of such cooperation. The iga thus provides a “legally-binding mechanism to protect the national interests” of the two governments, while assisting mbda in making “the industrial changes necessary” to implement the Centre of Excellence initiative.116 The iga notably guarantees security of supply and covers transfers and exports of technologies. With the iga, governments are committed to limiting restrictions on information sharing, and, as much as possible, to replacing “French eyes only” or “UK eyes only” documents with “UK/French eyes only” documents.117 However, limitations on information sharing are in part linked to property rights when the information results from cooperation with a third country. Thus, information exchange is also an issue because the UK possesses US systems.118 Indeed, the two countries are unable to share knowledge that was gathered through cooperation with other partners.119

n e g o t iat in g t h e wo r kshare, or the p e rs is t e n c e o f j u s t e r e t o u r practi ces The whole point of integrating the industrial sector was to overcome difficulties such as those linked to workshare demands that lead to inefficiencies and maintain duplications. However, this section shows that arguments for juste retour and balance were put forward in the defence administrations and by the governments. Juste retour is the idea that each nation should benefit from a workshare proportionate

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to its financial engagements in the program, in terms of acquisition of technical competences, level of activity, or number of jobs, which would not permit rationalizing and optimizing resources.120 The problem was experienced in the missile sector among others, as of the reasons for the failure of the trilateral Trigat program involving France, Germany, and the United Kingdom in the 1980s–90s was “an excessive division of workshare.”121 Despite the stated objective of changing practices in the organization of production lines, once the decision was made to launch the program, the same national reflexes could be identified in the negotiation of the missile’s development and production. The stakes related to the creation of the Centres of Excellence worsened the need for juste retour: the workshare for the program had to respect the principle of the Centres of Excellence, as it would be a test for the first four centres (two on each side of the Channel). As such, the Sea Venom would form the first stage of the implementation of “mutual dependence” via technological specialization.122 The development and production of the missile was eventually split equally between the two parties as both parties intended to get the most from it for their respective industry. The resulting division did not match the industrial reality because more industrial competences and capacities were located in France compared to the UK. For instance, the French branch has a larger staff: 5,000 personnel, compared to 3,000 in Britain.123 From a technological perspective, the stakes differed too: while the French goal was to maintain existing industrial capacities, the British goal was to further develop its missile industry.124 The equal distribution between the two sides of the Channel was thus a political decision. The need for balanced cooperation was felt not only within the defence administration, but also supported by governments, as is evident following a speech by Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian to the staff of mbda France: “I will see to it that there is a global balance in the Franco-British missile industry that we want to forge together. To do so, I will also pay attention to the promotion of French assets, in mbda France just like in the other French industries of the sector.”125 Based on this logic of balance, the sharing of costs between France and the UK eventually was 50/50, with room to manoeuvre from 48 to 52 per cent on workshare.126 In terms of the content of workshare,

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the aim was to show that, when they are implemented, the six Centres of Excellence in France will be equivalent to the six in Britain.127 This estimated value and equivalence of the centres is both quantitative and qualitative: it includes the amounts of orders and numbers of employees, but also the type of technology that each party will maintain or develop, with some being standard mechanics and others considered “noble.”128 Eventually, the first Centres of Excellence were split so that each country maintained or developed one “noble” and one “standard” technology (actuators for flight controls and data links for the British, and test equipment and weapon controller for the French129).

Trade-offs across Programs and Sectors: Ambiguity on Reciprocity The first consequence of the Sea Venom/anl decision was that the French expressed a desire to obtain compensation. Indeed, despite an erratic decision-making process, it soon appeared that the French decision on the program was not made for free. The stakes of the program had been raised by both sides. The British had “made such a noise” about the Sea Venom/anl that “the French eventually had to do it.”130 Meanwhile, the French had played on the political nature and the cost of the decision: when the British took the decision, the French strategy was to show the British what an expensive decision it was.131 French mp Patricia Adam summarized the situation: “In the end, if we entered that program, it would be to make Lancaster progress. In return, the British should support us on questions that are priorities for France.”132 The trade-off was perceived as going beyond the contract and workshare arrangements for the Sea Venom/anl program. In fact, as a senior British civil servant admitted, “you can’t have it perfectly balanced for each program”;133 the whole point of their cooperation in complex weapons was to have a bilateral portfolio of programs that permitted “balance in principle, but balance through time.”134 In the missile sector, an interviewee explained that the aim was to have “a ten-year balance.”135 While it was clear that the French were expecting compensation for this decision, it was not clear exactly what they expected in

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Table 5.1 | Main armament projects that could be traded against the Sea Venom/anl Program

Situation in 2012–2013

scalp/Storm Shadow Project announced in official declarations in Missile Upgrade

2008, 2009, 2010, and 2012 mou for joint project team to occur in 2014

Maritime Mine Countermeasures

Competition for a prototype development placed with the occar in May 2011 Joint UK-French team created in April 2012 October 2012: Companies shortlisted for designing prototypes

Future Combat Air System (fcas )

July 2012: Preparation Phase studies involving

bae and Dassault

Watchkeeper uav

Summer 2012: The French agree on evaluation of British uav system October 2013: UK Army loans Watchkeeper to French land forces

male uav

February 2011: mou involving bae and Dassault May 2013: French government announces intent to buy American Reaper uav s off the shelf; bilateral cooperation is cancelled

return. Indeed, interviews revealed that there was ambiguity, if not ignorance, as to what exactly they wanted from the British. There were a variety of programs within and outside of the missile sector under consideration during the decisive period between the spring of 2012 and the spring of 2013 that could be potential candidates for a trade-off (see table 5.1). In the missile sector, there were few, if any, other programs that France and Britain could launch at the same time as or right after the

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Sea Venom/anl . Several interviewees mentioned the scalp Upgrade as a “quid pro quo.”136 The scalp Upgrade was a project much smaller than the Sea Venom/anl but very symbolic, as those missiles were Franco-British, and the next step of the renovation would be the joint manufacturing of the next generation of future cruise missiles.137 However, the memorandum of understanding (mou ) for the scalp/Storm Shadow Upgrade was still being negotiated in 2014138 and it was also prohibitively uncertain. It did not seem strategic to the French to “invest now” in the Sea Venom/anl and “be rewarded in 5 years” with another program.139 Others thought that the scalp Upgrade could not be considered as a compensation, given that it could not be developed without the prior development of the Sea Venom/anl , anyway.140 In other sectors, one candidate was Maritime Mine Countermeasures (mmcm ). For some in France, these corresponded to the required “payback,”141 and some on the British side indeed put forward mmcm as the British response to the French effort. It seemed especially suited, as both were programs for the naval forces.142 But other branches of the armed forces were also interested in benefiting from the trade-off: the French Army, for example, was trying to push for the sale of infantry fighting vehicles (vbci , for Véhicule blindé de combat d’infanterie) to the UK.143 Finally, others mentioned jointly developing a Future Combat Air System, fcas . That program, however, required a major political decision and budgetary investment.144 Why were there different versions of what was expected in return for the Sea Venom/anl ? Firstly, it was due to a lack of prior thinking on the French side: considerations about compensations were made only once the government had already agreed to launch the missile program. Secondly, it stemmed from the impossibility of having two strictly equivalent armament programs: the program scales and stages of development vary greatly. Furthermore, the value of each program tended to be subjectively assessed, depending on whether the program was considered “symbolic.” As a result, there could be multiple interpretations of the best quid pro quo. The interview below summarizes the French approach to that quid pro quo:

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The deal must be of the same scale. We committed on the anl , there must be British compensations. Q. What are these compensations? Cooperation on the future of combat aviation was announced in 2010, but it does not progress, there are changing interests … On the anl , in the end at some point we said ‘go’ without compensation, but France has a lot of expectations. Q. What are these expectations? Mine countermeasures? The anl and mmcm , it is not the same level. Q. But the anl is not the same level as a combat aircraft … It depends what stage we are talking about. The fcas , today, it is an assessment, it is research, we identify requirements … We are in an upstream phase. For France, the compensation is the fcas , but we expressed it too late, naively: ‘OK for the anl . Oh, by the way, it would be nice, if…!’145 This interview confirms the idea that requirements for compensation partly depend on the perceived value of each workable alternative. Arms have a perceived value, based on subjective costs, which renders negotiations on trade-offs difficult. It is difficult especially because the price of equipment is not estimated solely according to its intrinsic monetary value but also with regard to the decisionmaker’s personal estimations, as well as the perceived wider social and political impacts of the program. Also, in the interview quoted above it appears that the value is not absolute but relative, as the actor mentions programs of different “scales” or “levels” whose value can be evaluated when putting them in relation to one another. An official request for a compensation took place in December 2013, when President Hollande sent a letter to his counterpart about the fcas , similarly to what Prime Minister Cameron had done previously with the Sea Venom/anl .146 The quid pro quo was confirmed at the following summit, on 31 January 2014. Alongside the confirmation of the imminent signing of a missile contract, the summit declarations included announcements on two projects that were French priorities: the fcas and mmcm . At the summit, David Cameron and François Hollande announced a two-year Feasibility

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Phase contract for the fcas worth £120 million, to be conducted by a group of six firms led by Dassault and bae (who had already been working together on Preparation Phase studies since 2012).147 The two mou s on Sea Venom/anl and fcas were purposefully signed simultaneously, because “the French government would not have signed for the anl without a decision on the fcas .”148 The summit declaration itself took place at the British Royal Air Force base of Brize Norton, in front of a mock-up of the fcas . The mou for the contract was signed in July 2014 at the Farnborough Airshow,149 and the contract itself was placed in October. Concerning the Mine Countermeasures, the heads of state and government announced an agreement to “commit to a design stage,” and they “empowered occa r to place by the end of 2014 a two-year contract worth around £10  M each,” adding that “a decision whether to proceed to manufacture [would] be made by 2016.”150 Eventually, the Sea Venom/anl program moved forward, with the first successful test firings taking place in January 2017, and a second successful test in April 2018.151 However, these tests took place in the shadow of the 2016 Brexit vote, which cast doubts on the continuation of cooperation in combat aviation and the fcas program, thus upsetting the trade-off that had been seemingly agreed. I discuss this further in the last chapter of this book.

co n c l u s io n : u k - f r a n c e cooperati on an d d e f e n c e in du s t r i al i ntegrati on Constructing Common Interests As France and the UK set out to implement the One Complex Weapons Initiative, their diverging interests surfaced. This was despite successive French and British governments having expressed a common intent regarding the missile sector and having jointly defined a strategy for its integration and rationalization. Divergences in calendars and requirements quickly appeared, as well as, on the French side, opposition to cooperation in the defence administration and cabinet. Its opponents in the defence administration questioned the utility of the Sea Venom/anl compared to more pressing

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procurement priorities. This case study thus indicates that domestic disagreements around interest-definitions can be a strong impediment to international cooperation. Nonetheless, this case showed that certain actors pursued a bilateral agenda, and pushed for a bilateral “Franco-British interest” embodied in the industrial project. To allow progress on the Sea Venom/anl program, the transnational firm mbda and some political actors actively pursued this bilateral interest. The program received the support of a wider network of mod staff, elected members of Parliament, and experts in both countries. Meanwhile, part of the administration and government opposed it. mbda is a binational actor that has the organizational and economic resources to push for the pursuit of its interest by influencing political decisions in favour of cooperation; and members of Parliament across the Channel put forward cooperation with Britain as matching France’s national strategic interests. This case illustrates the multiple sorts of “interests” that coexist, and the possible convergence or divergence of those interests: cooperative, national, and private interests can oppose or align, but they are not fixed, and they are debated within the domestic sphere as well as transnationally. In that sense, the stakes of international cooperation in this case shifted dividing lines for defining one’s position on the program. The existence of the Lancaster House treaties added another layer in the framing of the decision, given that the program represented one of the few opportunities to show the treaty’s concrete outcomes. However, the French cooperative move was not simply out of consideration for “the Franco-British interest”; rather, when looking at intergovernmental negotiations on the Sea Venom/ anl and post-agreement implementation stages, I showed that the “difficult” French decision was followed by a strict attention to balance and retribution.

Coordinating between Governments From the design of the bilateral strategy for the complex weapons sector to the decision on the Sea Venom/anl and the implementation of this decision, all stages of this case study were affected

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by coordination challenges. At the same time, the presence of a cross-border firm meant that some form of transnational structure existed to underpin cooperation. At the political level, armament cooperation was confronted with national agendas and electoral and budgetary cycles. National electoral cycles slowed down cooperative processes because they were followed by reviews of budgets and diplomatic postures; and major decisions were postponed, both before and after elections. Bilateral summits tend to act as accelerators that help secure bilateral agreement, and in this case that tendency was reinforced by the timing constraints of out-ofphase electoral cycles. The reliance on summits for making decisions is a sign of the weakness of the institutionalization of the bilateral defence relationship. Indeed, while summits encourage the announcement of cooperation projects, after the summits, implementation is often left in limbo because of waning political support and a lack of bilateral structures for carrying out the projects. In the field of armament, there exist some elements of a non-permanent bilateral structure between France and the UK: there were contacts between international cooperation teams in the procurement agencies and embassies, the hlwg , the slg , the summit, and the newly created “committee” for managing ocw . Permanent interactions take place only between exchange or liaison officers and their hosts, or within the joint program team. The national procurement agencies maintained their own contractual practices and working methods, which eventually led to a “monster” of an arrangement rather than to harmonized practices. In this context, the industry stands out as a structuring actor for bilateral cooperation. During the decision-making process on the Sea Venom/anl , the fact that the company mbda is binational was critical for its ability to influence the two governments.152 When it is completed, it is hoped that industrial integration that will constitute a “point of no return” and uphold Franco-British “mutual dependence.”153 Besides, the firm enjoys a kind of permanence that public administrations tend to lack because of fast rotation of personnel, especially in the UK at de&s . In that sense, the industry is more permanent and consistent.

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Table 5.2 | The search for balance in armament cooperation Level of cooperation

Topic of negotiation

program level

Workshare

Sea Venom/anl

industrial sector

Centres of Excellence

Complex weapons

cooperation area

Trade-offs across programs

Armament

bilateral defence relation

Overall balance

Lancaster House treaty

Sharing Costs and Gains Fairly It is the negotiations around the payoff structure that really shaped cooperation between the two countries over the period covered in this case study. Cooperating with the British on the Sea Venom/anl despite domestic opposition at first appeared as a purely diplomatic move, yet when that decision was made, there was a demand on program workshare and for equilibrium in the rationalization of the sector, as well as a request for compensation in the form of another program that was a priority for the French. In other words, at all levels, the French adopted a trading-off perspective in their negotiations with the British, from the program level to the overall defence relationship (see table 5.2). At the program level, the stakes were in the negotiation of the contract, both in terms of its form – because of diverging contractual practices – and its content – the program development and production stages. On both sides of the Channel, demands for advantageous workshare played a major part in determining who would do what.

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Despite the existence of a long-term and cross-program perspective on Franco-British armament cooperation, and despite there being asymmetries in the industrial capacities between the two sides of the Channel, the parties negotiated along the traditional lines of “juste retour” and agreed on a 50/50 workshare on the program, even though it meant not having an optimal organization of production. In this context, 50/50 was the negotiated solution so that neither party would feel fooled. At the level of the industrial sector as a whole, the negotiation on the Centres of Excellence and the “necessity to show that the six [centres] in France are equivalent to the six in Britain,”154 are another instance; I showed that equivalence was not strictly conceived in quantitative terms, but involved an important qualitative dimension, given that some technologies are deemed “noble” while others are not. The same tendency to seek equality is visible at the level of the whole area of cooperation: armaments. While the Sea Venom/ anl contract was being negotiated, the French pursued compensation in the form of another program being launched. There was no clearly designed issue linkage as the request was formulated, and specified, in a second phase of the negotiations. Yet the French eventually managed to use the January 2014 summit announcements as leverage to obtain hasty recompense. This ambiguity on reciprocity highlights the fact that various understandings of domestic interests coexist, leading national priorities to be constantly debated and re-evaluated. This case study also points to the question of time and the effect of memories on bilateral cooperation negotiations. More precisely, the approach towards compensation was influenced by past experiences and failures of cooperation between the parties. This is reflected in interviews arguing that “refusing to launch the Sea Venom/anl was also a means of settling scores with the British, who had made their decision on the aircraft carrier” and defected a few months earlier.155 An important dimension is thus reciprocity’s timing.

Managing External Connections and Third Parties Finally, external dynamics also affected the extent to which the British and French were able to cooperate in the missile sector. External political ties, diplomatic orientations, legal rules and regulations,

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and constraints on the sharing of information and technologies due to relations with third countries all impacted the evolution of UK-French cooperation in armaments. Firstly, France and the UK are unable to cooperate on the whole of the missile sector or on the entirety of specific missile programs – eventually integration will cover maximum 80 per cent of it – partly because there are technologies that both states want to maintain nationally, but also because there are programs and technologies that have been elaborated in cooperation with other countries and cannot be shared. This is notably the case for Anglo-American technologies, which need to be compartmentalized from those developed with the French.156 Secondly, changes in government tend to entail diplomatic reorientations, including through announcements on new armament cooperation priorities. This was illustrated in 2012 around the presidential election in France. While Hollande’s 2012 announcements with Germany did not concern the missile sector, Franco-German intents and the British declaration about the US illustrate the fact that a decision to cooperate with a partner country on a capability project can always be reversed in favour of another partner. Fear of reorientation was also illustrated in the expectation that the British might have a discrete “plan B” for transatlantic cooperation on future combat drones. This state of affairs affects the cognitive background of British and French negotiators and decision-makers on any cooperation program and goes some way toward explaining why there is a search for simultaneous trade-offs, or systematic balance. But changes in external dynamics can be much more radical than mere changes of majority party, as the Brexit negotiations illustrate. After 2016 and the British vote to leave the European Union, this dimension has become a key factor affecting France and the UK’s ability to cooperate in the defence industrial sector. The effects of Brexit on the management of cooperation are dealt with in the final chapter and the conclusion.

6

Adaptation and Learning in the Bilateral Relationship

c h a l l e n g e s a n d a daptati on i n u k - f r a n c e d e f e n c e cooperati on We have seen in the previous chapters that implementing the pledges made in the Lancaster House treaties has not been straightforward or effortless. While the two countries have effectively maintained their cooperation, it has been the result of constant adjustments and renegotiations, and the outcome has never been one of complete or optimal success. Yet, somehow the two states have maintained their cooperation despite the difficulty of constructing common interests, coordinating between governments, agreeing on the fair distribution of costs and benefits, and managing their relations with third parties. I have shown that cooperation between France and the UK has required constant short-term adaptations, or coping strategies. This observation raises several questions. How do various specific experiences of cooperation affect the overall relationship? Do shortterm adaptations and coping mechanisms lead to long-term learning processes that make cooperation more effective and the relationship more resilient? Do these adaptations durably shape the way the two countries cooperate? In other words, do we witness an institutionalization of cooperation practices, based on specific experiences? As I synthesize in the table below, some adaptations have consisted in de facto limits on the extent of cooperation, whether in breadth or in depth – in other words, refocusing joint efforts in areas and in ways that accommodate France and the UK’s conflicting

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interests. Most adaptations, however, consist in developing coping mechanisms for the areas where cooperation is maintained: developing innovative forms of governance and coordination mechanisms; taking advantage of the norms, procedures, and tools developed by multilateral organizations to streamline bilateral work; or striking ad hoc quid pro quo agreements. In the manner in which they shape the outcome of bilateral endeavours, those challenges are integral (rather than opposed) to cooperation processes. In this chapter, I show how ad hoc adaptations (summarized in the table), developed based on specific experiences, are repeated and even expanded over time to become longer lasting ways of cooperating. The existing literature assumes that learning and institutionalization processes necessarily go in the direction of more and not less cooperation. Because they result from “experiential learning,” to quote Smith,1 rather than from rationalized grand design, I show that learning goes both ways. It fosters resilience, in a way that is consistent with existing arguments, but also normalizes practices that are more unexpected, and are not necessarily conducive to more effective bilateral cooperation.

r e in f o rc in g c o operati on: dy n a m ic s o f r e s il ience-bui ldi ng As I explained in chapter 1, institutions are thought to “save the costs of reinvention of the wheels of cooperation each time” by offering proven mechanisms.2 These mechanisms should address the very challenges that I identify as structuring factors for the management of privileged relationships: common interests, intergovernmental coordination, the payoff structure, and the role of third parties. Institutions, as collections of practices, include shared narratives, governance arrangements, norms for negotiating and bargaining, and the insulation and stabilization of institutionalized relationships – all of which are thought to further help cooperation. In the following sections, I show that the UK-France case partly confirms institutionalist arguments. Over a period of ten years, we see the emergence of new shared narratives, accompanied by new symbols and historical landmarks. There is also a much greater density of

Table 6.1 | Cooperation challenges and adaptation strategies Challenge

Manifestation

Adaptation strategies

Constructing common interests

• Mismatch between political and working-level intents, and among domestic groups • Contradiction between the “cooperation interest” and “domestic interests” • Different hierarchies of priorities and strategic outlooks

• Cooperation limited to certain areas and/or objective scaled down • Discursive frames and official narratives used strategically to maintain cooperation • Transnational network of actors engage in lobbying strategies

Coordinating between governments

• Lack of communication channels, and coordination or enforcement mechanisms • Divergences in methods, processes, resources, and legislations • Multiplicity of actors, staff turnover, and loss of knowledge

• Working level exploits leeway in defining and implementing objectives • Reliance on the norms and structures provided by multilateral institutions (structuration by proxy) • Reliance on individuals’ expertise and experience

Sharing costs and gains fairly

• Relative-gain approach to cooperation at all levels (specific activities, cooperation sector, across sector) • Demands for synchronic reciprocity

• Systematic 50/50 arrangements • Ad hoc quid pro quos and trade-offs (issue linkage)

Managing external connections

• Divergences about multilateral forums and alliances • Disputes on the openness of the military partnership and different preferred partners

• Hybrid bilateral/multilateral normative or procedural arrangements • Cooperation limited to areas not involving third parties

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transnational links and governance structures, and an increasing routinization of cooperation between the two defence communities.

The Development of Shared Narratives The meanings and baselines of normality vary from one relationship to the other. The Franco-British narrative revolves around notions of relevance and efficiency of cooperation, and the legitimacy of the UK-French partnership. The relevance of the relationship stems from the unique strategic characteristics of the two countries, as I mentioned in the first chapter. The following quote from French defence minister Michèle Alliot-Marie in 2004 exemplifies this relevance: “France and the United Kingdom are subject to the same duties and responsibilities conferred by our status as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and by being nuclear powers; we also have our history as colonial powers. In this context, our two countries are a rarity in Europe in having a tradition of engagement everywhere in the world in the service of peace.”3 The joint declaration following the 2018 bilateral summit indicates that this is a persistent narrative: This, the 35th UK-France Summit, underlines the uniquely close relationship between our nations, two of the world’s oldest and greatest democracies … We meet in the year that marks one hundred years since the end of the First World War, when our troops fought side-by-side in defence of our shared belief in freedom and resistance against aggression. As global, outward looking nations we remain committed to defending our people and upholding our values as liberal democracies in the face of any threat, whether at home or abroad.4 Aside from these general historical characteristics, since 2010, UK-French narratives have clearly evolved to become rooted in the Lancaster House treaties, which function as a “top-level reference.”5 The context of the treaties has thus given meaning to each of the bilateral activities conducted since 2010. The 2018 summit declaration forcefully reads: “The Lancaster House Treaty is the bedrock of

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our relationship.”6 Already, within just a couple of years, the Lancaster House treaty had become the discursive basis of the bilateral relationship. Under the treaty’s umbrella, joint narratives are developed for diplomatic purposes, to communicate with third parties. Indeed, one goal for further establishing the military partnership was to provide a joint discourse towards third parties to “demonstrate to nato , and more widely the un and eu that the UK and France are leading by example.”7 British and French officers responsible for stratcom thus developed “a media plan” towards having a clear, “binational strategic narrative” destined for “the wider international environment, [and] other partners.”8 Joint declarations signed at summits or pronounced during bilateral exercises exemplify the purpose of these stratcom initiatives. The cjef in particular became the spearhead of the UK-French military relation, and as such, the success of cooperation on the cjef became tied to the success of the treaties themselves, as the following testimony illustrates: “my fear is that, if we intervene [militarily] with other countries and we don’t use the cjef , we would go back to the classic situation where everyone does things on their side, it would be a real shame. It would be very bad for the image of Lancaster if we don’t use the cjef .”9 The cjef ’s main purpose was precisely to give flesh to the treaty, hence the importance of image. Throughout the cjef development process, exercises served as windows for political communication as they shed light on the progress of bilateral cooperation. While Anglo-French cooperation on the cjef did not receive much media coverage over the years of its development, it was only during exercises that it did.10 Media coverage partly resulted from initiatives by military attachés in the embassies, who for each military exercise sought press attention “to show the physical realization of the bilateral summit.”11 For its part, the content of the bilateral communication emphasizes the efficiency and the military relevance of what France and the UK do together. Interestingly, the whole UK-French narrative of efficiency and relevance has been constructed at least in part against the perceived inefficiency of Franco-German defence cooperation, which is heavy on institutions, ambitious in scale but limited in output. With its permanent Security and Defence Commission created

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in 1982 and further extended into a Defence Security Council, three permanent working groups, a binational brigade, a joint helicopter training school, and an extensive officers’ exchange program,12 Franco-German cooperation is, in the view of many French and British military officers, a “usine à gaz” (i.e., “white elephant”), to which Franco-British cooperation (with “the lightness” of its structures) would be “the antithesis.”13 Already, the 2010 joint declaration signed alongside the treaties by President Sarkozy and Prime Minister Cameron read: “We want to enable our forces to operate together, to maximize our capabilities and to obtain greater value for money from our investment in defence.”14 This narrative differs significantly from the Franco-German relationship, framed around notions of post-war reconciliation, the preservation of Western cultural heritage, and the understanding that the relationship is the cradle of European integration.15 The working-level actors also resort to the narrative of relevance and efficiency to qualify the work done on the cjef . During a cjef validation exercise, for example, it was affirmed that “with the ability to obtain rapid consensus and shared clarity of vision, the cjef can be employed with bilateral responsiveness and speed. It guarantees an optimal and resource efficient adaptation of a robust military force.”16 Similarly, after the final validation exercise in April 2016, British secretary of state for defence Michael Fallon stated that “the cjef is not a paper tiger; it will allow us to act with agility and speed.”17 Just like the cjef project, the Libya campaign became a baseline for a common narrative. During and after the campaign, a bilateral discourse emerged that put an emphasis on the two countries’ joint leadership and military success. In these instances, the official tone was cooperative rather than competitive, contrasting with other instances that emphasized national rather than common achievements: officials underlined the success of the diplomatic and military effort, minimizing the more disputable outcomes of the intervention. On 15 September 2011, after the coalition defeated Gaddafi forces in Benghazi (and one month before Gaddafi’s death), Cameron and Sarkozy, with their foreign affairs ministers, organized a visit to Tripoli and Benghazi where they addressed a crowd of Libyan civilians. A video shows the two heads of state and government

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together holding hands with the leader of the ntc in a staged media event, with a cheering crowd.18 At the following summit in February 2012, the heads of state and government declared: “Last year, we have seen our bilateral agreements on security and defence put to the test. We met today on the first anniversary of the Libyan uprising. Our cooperation in Libya has been a defining moment – and one on which we will continue to build in the future.”19 French and British authorities interpreted the Libya campaign in light of the ongoing building of the defence partnership and conceived of the intervention as an experience justifying further cooperation. Already in July 2011, a Senior Level Group communiqué read that during the first meeting of officials since the signing of the Lancaster House treaty, “the parties … reviewed their close partnership on Libya and the lessons to be learned from that.”20 Later that year, in November 2011, they added: “The successful outcome of Operation Unified Protector in Libya bolstered our partnership and further demonstrated the relevance of the numerous projects announced at our summit last year.”21 Only in internal documents and off-the-record conversations are any problems mentioned. As explained in chapter 4, those problems, and the exhaustive “lessons identified/lessons learned” processes following the intervention, informed the subsequent stages of the cjef concept’s development, for instance when it came to capability shortcomings and limits to intelligence sharing.

The Densification of Organizational Links and Elite Networks The three case studies of this book illustrate how the challenge of coordinating between governments affects the maintenance of cooperation between France and the UK, making it unstable and subject to political shifts. As a response to those challenges, over the course of nearly a decade of cooperation under the Lancaster House treaties, we observe the emergence of a cross-Channel influence network that is formed on the basis of exchanges between public, private, and non-governmental actors concerned by the defence policies of the two countries and advocating for its maintenance and further development. These were particularly observable around defence procurement and industrial integration, as chapter 5 illustrated.

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These actors do have a national affiliation, whether on the legal, economic, or cultural level; yet, in the context of this cooperation, their objectives, their resources, and their networks transcend the Franco-British state border and thus they become cross-Channel actors. As such, the network transcends hierarchies and organizational affiliations, including public/private affiliations. links between french and british governments

Bureaucratic actors view institutionalization as rendering cooperation “independent of political cycles,”22 or “a-political.”23 In the view of some, this was eventually achieved through the densification of exchanges and the multiplication of actors involved in cooperation. Illustratively, a military adviser in the Cabinet Office argued: “it is unquestionably different [since the Lancaster House treaty]. There is a momentum around military-to-military cooperation: we have reached such a mass that it has become self-sustaining almost regardless of the politics.”24 Over the years, organizational links between the two countries’ defence communities indeed grew and became routinized. There was progress in terms of the number of French and British officers attending training courses in the other country’s military academies.25 By 2016 there were fifty exchange officers from each country swapping positions every year, which is more than between France and Germany.26 An exchange at the level of general officer was also agreed to in 2016: a French officer became second-in-command of the UK’s 1st Division, and a British officer took up an equivalent role in the French Army.27 At the political-strategic level, too, exchanges became denser than what existed prior to the Lancaster House treaties, with regular meetings between defence ministers and very regular contact between the heads of international security in the mod s – every other day, in cases of international crises.28 Aside from the multiplication of points of contact, shared experiences of cooperation play a foundational role in developing links between defence organizations. Wide-ranging and long-term projects like the cjef are one way of creating such links, but shared ad hoc experiences also form the basis on which UK and French actors have come to build stronger social connections. Here, too, the Libya

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operations played a special role. First, the intervention helped “connect the pipes” between the defence ministries, only four months after the signing of the treaties. Indeed, before Libya, French and British military “didn’t know each other at all, in terms of organizations and functioning.”29 Libya had the effect of forcing actors to get in touch. Thus, one consequence was that afterwards everyone knew their counterpart on the other side of the Channel.30 Second, the Libya experience shaped the perception of the Franco-British defence relationship in the French and British mod s. It did so through a triple process: the military intervention permitted the development of interpersonal links between French and British mod actors, it legitimized the military partnership in their eyes, and it instilled some collective memories that actors internalized, whereby Anglo-French cooperation came to seem more normal. This was true at the working level and at the top of the mod s, as military chiefs “went from general awareness to contacts several times a week.”31 The campaign also served to give the strategic partnership a new kind of legitimacy, as it showed that France and the UK were “able to do things together.”32 This in turn helped to overcome the inertia found in some parts of the two defence organizations, which were reluctant to change their practices and to engage fully in cooperation.33 Through the interorganizational links created, and because of the newly perceived legitimacy of the partnership, military staffs now see the Libya intervention as having accelerated the implementation of the treaty provisions in a way that would have been less effective had personal links not been developed during the crisis. As an indication of effective learning, the British and French governments decided after the Brexit vote to more formally institutionalize the links between the defence and security organizations on both sides of the Channel. The heads of state and government decided at the 2018 summit to set up a Defence Ministerial Council that would “meet regularly (envisaged as three meetings a year) to provide strategic oversight and direction of the bilateral defence relationship. This will be supported by an enhanced defence policy dialogue.”34 The summit also saw the first meeting between the heads of five intelligence services: the mi5 , the mi6 , and the gchq for the UK, and the dgse and dgsi for France. This was a first, consistent

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with the previous bilateral summit’s pledge to enhance cooperation on counter-terrorism; it also showed that more transnational links would be created as cooperation expands to new areas. joint initiatives by the parliaments

Links between the parliaments of the two countries are also expanding. As I explained in chapter 5, a parliamentary working group on UK-French Defence Cooperation was set up after the 2010 treaty. Its work continued in the following decade. Members of the working group met twice a year to coordinate their scrutiny of the implementation of the treaties and conduct joint hearings.35 The working group gathers members of the defence and foreign affairs committees of the two chambers of the two countries. In February 2018, the chairmen of the defence committees of the two lower chambers decided to launch a joint enquiry into the Future Cruise/Anti-Ship Weapon program (fc /asw ).36 This missile program would be a more structuring one than the smaller Sea Venom (fasgw -h /anl ) or the renovation of the scalp/Storm Shadow. It is also of greater strategic importance, as it is a heavy missile that deals with “the possibility of a confrontation on the high seas” and aims to provide “a deep strike ability that can penetrate and neutralize air defences and hit long-distance targets.”37 The report of the joint enquiry explains that “fc /asw program was chosen by both Committees as the subject of this joint inquiry due to its importance to the ‘One Complex Weapons Initiative’ that has, itself, been at the heart of UK-France defence cooperation.”38 The enquiry identified several issues blocking progress toward the design and development phase of the program in 2020,39 and then production in 2024. These include the convergence of the two countries’ requirements and calendars, as well as “the interoperability of fc/asw with other platforms, including those built by other allies.”40 Indeed, the UK would then use the f-35 fighter designed by the US company Lockheed Martin, and many American systems were available for the UK to purchase. As a result, there was fear at mbda that the US arms lobby could have encouraged the enquiry with a view to discredit the fc /asw project.41 Tellingly, Lockheed Martin and fellow US company Raytheon contributed to the enquiry, advertising their programs.

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By contrast, the UK parliament presented the joint enquiry as seeking to “demonstrate, and reinforce, the bilateral defence relations” between the two countries.42 In the words of the British defence attaché in Paris, this constituted a “positive move … confirming the commitment of both nations to the [fc /asw ] program,” and the first two meetings were characterized by “much positive chat about maintaining the privileged UK-FR [sic] relationship in defence.”43 Eventually, the report following the enquiry recommended that UK-French cooperation on the fc /asw continue towards the design and production phases on the basis that, “should the fc /asw programme not proceed after the concept phase concludes in 2020, either for technological or cost reasons, there could be significant consequences for UK-French cooperation and to the unique industrial partnership and skills bases that have emerged in both countries via mbda [which] has been one of the pillars of the Lancaster House agreement.”44 Whatever the outcome of this program in the long run, the episode confirms the hypothesis of a reinforcement of the Franco-British elite support network, as well as the sui generis nature of institutional arrangement in bilateral cooperation: it was the first time in history that a House of Commons Select Committee took evidence jointly with a committee from a non-UK parliament.45 transnational networks and (semi)private actors

As is already clear from the above, the support network that lobbies in favour of the maintenance or the expansion of UK-France defence cooperation is not composed solely of actors from the two countries’ governments, but also of actors from the private sector. In fact, a British diplomat suggested that “governments need to be driven from the outside by the industry, think tanks, etc.” and encouraged to “deliver results.”46 Over the decade following the Lancaster House treaties, links intensified among the respective defence communities, combining officials, experts, and industrialists who have been particularly interested in promoting cooperation in armaments. The industry financially supported initiatives by think tanks and the Franco-British Council (fbc ) to positively influence the development of Franco-British armament cooperation. Activities from think tanks to support UK-French defence cooperation developed

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right after the signing of the treaties. They organized a series of cross-Channel discussions.47 Most were closed events that gathered French and British officials as well as industrialists, put together by consortia of think tanks, starting in 2011. Another initiative, the “fruk Forum,” was put in place in 2012: five French and British think tanks set up a “forum dedicated to Franco-British defence and security cooperation.”48 During a series of meetings followed by reports, the think tanks sought to “determine the criteria for success” of this cooperation.49 The fruk Forum participated in creating an atmosphere favourable to Franco-British defence cooperation within the French and British defence communities by providing arguments in its support and by ensuring a certain monitoring of the implementation of all cooperation projects. However, its activities ceased in 2014 due to lack of funding. In parallel to the consortium of think tanks, the fbc , a framework for bilateral exchanges mixing officials, economic actors, and researchers, has since 2010 held the yearly “Franco-British Defence Conference,” gathering experts, industrialists, military officers, diplomats, and top-level decision-makers (including ministers). The fbc in a non-governmental body which receives funding from both governments (including the two ministries of defence), as well as from foundations, other institutional actors, and private companies, including arms manufacturers: bae , Thales, and especially mbda .50 The contextual change caused by the Brexit vote in June 2016 was a new occasion for the elites of both countries to launch initiatives advocating a reinforcement of bilateral links. In 2017, King’s College London’s Policy Institute, in collaboration with the French Institut Montaigne, established a task force on “the future of Anglo-French defence cooperation post-Brexit.” It was led by Lord Robertson, former secretary-general of nato , on the British side, and Bernard Cazeneuve, former prime minister of France, on the French side. The task force, which included figures from government, industry, the armed forces, and academia published a report in November 2018. The report lamented that “UK-France cooperation has … never been so valuable, yet it also has never been so fragile,”51 and suggested reinforcing the strategic dialogue by creating an annual UK-France defence and security council supplemented by a structured dialogue between

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the foreign affairs ministries and the intelligence agencies, operationalizing the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force, and moving forward with cooperation on capabilities, including future combat aircraft.

u n e xp e c t e d t r e n d s : sys t emati c reci proci ty a n d in t e r n at io nali zati on Institutionalization and learning processes do not always produce the effects that we would expect from the literature on institutions and institutionalization processes. In other words, the adaptation strategies adopted by states do not necessarily or automatically enhance their propensity to collaborate or strengthen the bilateral relationship – that is, increase its resilience. As I explain in the following pages, first, I find no instance of diffuse reciprocity, which is thought to characterize institutionalized relationships and to foster long-term cooperation. Instead, France and the UK have, quite paradoxically, gradually institutionalized a practice of systematic quid pro quos, or specific reciprocity, that tends to hinder their ability to strike agreements over the next steps. Second, while we would expect the institutionalized nature of cooperation to reinforce the partnership and shield it vis-à-vis external actors, in most areas we instead witness a de facto internationalization of the partnership – most notably through trilateral cooperation with the United States – rather than a reinforcement of the bilateral link.

The Persistence of Systematic Reciprocity As Keohane notes, “by engaging successfully in specific reciprocity over a period of time, governments may create suitable conditions for the operation of diffuse reciprocity. For specific reciprocity to become institutionalized, much less to lead to diffuse reciprocity, exchanges must take place sequentially rather than simultaneously. Both game theory and social exchange theory stress that reliance on simultaneous exchange alone provides an unsatisfactory basis for long-term relationships.”52 Now, what we observe in the UK-French case is a trend where systematic reciprocity becomes the norm for bilateral exchanges, despite the existence of an institutional

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framework that should permit short-term concessions allowing for the emergence of diffuse reciprocity. This trend is noticeable in every sector of cooperation, but it is especially salient in armaments cooperation, due to the importance of the economic dimension, and thus of the payoff structure, in that domain. The treaty made provision for “the Parties [to share] equitably all costs and benefits incurred as a result of their involvement in the totality of co-operation undertaken under [the] Treaty.”53 It did not create obligations for strict or synchronous reciprocity. In practice, however, the same logic of systematic balance instead became the modus operandi of the relationship. Chapter 5 illustrated that cooperation in armaments around the One mbda project had been conducted with a systematic attention to balance, or reciprocity. The experience of negotiating the industrial integration initiated a new approach to negotiations and bargaining in the context of the treaty, starting with France developing an actual strategy of reciprocity. When the decision on the Sea Venom/anl was made, compensation was perceived (or at least presented) as implicit and negotiable. It did not constitute, it seemed, an actual negotiation strategy decided ex ante. Yet, based on that experience, the French eventually felt they had managed to obtain compensation, with the agreements on the fcas and mmcm feasibility studies announced at the following summit. By the beginning of 2014, this trading approach was thus being consciously pursued by the French on other cooperation projects. Illustratively, the British mod and Thales were hoping to sell Watchkeeper uav s, used by the British Army, to French land forces. Aside from the economic benefit for Thales UK, the aim was to create a common equipment basis for further collaboration between the armed forces (in line with the development of the cjef ). In the same manner, a British decision to acquire the French vbci would enhance the interoperability of their land forces.54 Hence, when the British suggested an exchange between Watchkeeper and vbci , the French “jumped at the chance” and “made a lot of noise in the press” about the possible Watchkeeper-vbci deal.55 Using the media was a means to increase the pressure on the British. Indeed, Laurent Collet-Billon, the head of the dga , briefed the French economic press, as the following excerpt illustrates:

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After numerous failures between London and Paris in terms of armament cooperation, the [head of the dga ] Laurent ColletBillon today takes all necessary precautions so that France will not be tricked once more by Great Britain on the British tactical uav Watchkeeper. Indeed, the failure of cooperation between London and Paris on aircraft carriers … has made a lasting impression … So, Laurent Collet-Billon explained that the buying of Watchkeeper drones would depend on a firm order of French [vbci ] … Paris seems to have adopted the give-and-take approach with the British.56 Another journalist similarly stated: If [the project to buy a dozen Watchkeeper drones] succeeds, it will not be without compensation, in the form of London buying … vbci armored infantry vehicles. Jean-Yves Le Drian indeed seems to have considered that the scales of Lancaster House were not even. At least when it comes to armament programs. France has accepted investing 400 million in a future helicopter-borne missile [the Sea Venom/anl ] upon request from the British, while its own need for it was not as blatant.57 The British, too, were wary of that aspect. They repeatedly felt that the strength of the French policy vis-à-vis its industry meant that the UK was losing in negotiations: “The UK’s defence industrial partnership with France is unbalanced and could lead to British companies losing out in their dealings with French counterparts,” a British eads representative told members of Parliament already in May 2012.58 Then, in February 2013 a representative of the same company explained to the House of Commons Defence Committee that there was a perception that France was not opening its defence market to British firms, contrary to what the parties had agreed in the Lancaster House treaties. He testified: “The bilateral agreement with France is supposed to be just that, two-way. But there is no evidence that France is opening up its defence market to UK based companies, yet the UK actively encourage French companies to go after UK domestic defence contracts.”59 What followed was a global

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review of negotiation strategies. A British civil servant at de&s explained in an interview in 2014: “The French are better strategically at cooperation … They are also better at negotiating across defence programs: they won’t engage on a program if they don’t have guarantees on another. They trade at the overarching level. But the UK is picking up to that as well.”60 This last point suggests a British adaptation to the French strategy after learning from past experience. mbda advertised in early 2016 that France and the UK had developed a policy of “cross-procurement” at the level of the missile sector, but also more generally had instigated “a new form of international cooperation, with countries acquiring weapons on a global approach.”61 The 2016 summit declaration also mentioned that the two countries would have “a portfolio approach” to future acquisitions.62 In other words, trade-offs across programs quickly became a common negotiation strategy for the French and the British. However, as I have explained, these trade-offs in practice had to occur simultaneously for a deal to be brokered. The same attention to synchronous and equivalent exchanges applies to the other areas of cooperation, as we observed in the case studies, whether it was about personnel or information exchanges (for instance). As a further indication of the durability of this trend, the governments agreed on a similar trade-off at the 2018 bilateral summit, in the operational area. The announcement was that France would contribute to the UK-led battlegroup in Estonia in 2019 as part of nato ’s Enhanced Forward Presence. The United Kingdom, for its part, decided to deploy three Chinook heavy lift helicopters to Mali to provide logistical support to the French-led Operation Barkhane.63 While the simultaneity of those decisions might have appeared potentially fortuitous, French president Emmanuel Macron explained at the summit press conference: “When Great Britain puts the three Chinooks in contribution on the Barkhane force, it is an important gesture because it is indeed under a French command, and France decides to put in 2019 its troops under British military command in the framework of nato .”64 He added that this was a sign that the relationship was, indeed, “not unbalanced.” While it may appear that the bilateral partnership has been thriving thanks to a norm of systematic reciprocity, in practice this has

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constrained and limited the cooperation between the two countries, as trade-offs are not always possible. This is especially true for cooperation in armaments, where the number of projects is limited and the need for financial investment is high. At the working level, the approach to negotiations taken by decision-makers appears as a problematic strategy, as the practice of “give-and-take” risks “blocking” cooperation; instead, decision-makers thought the two countries should “concentrate on each individual case” and “its legal and financial feasibility.”65 Actors put forward alternatives to systematic balancing, suggesting for example that they opt for “balance through time” and “across the defence sectors” in the framework of the treaty.66 With this approach, there would be several projects to cooperate on, and the parties would not have to negotiate an inefficient arrangement each time. This trend in UK-French bilateralism towards a persistence of systematic reciprocity has important implications for how we understand cooperation dynamics and learning processes. While decision-makers may indeed learn from experiences of cooperation (or cooperation failures), how this learning affects subsequent cooperation does not necessarily foster more cooperation. What learning does, however, is significantly – and potentially durably – transform decision-makers’ approach to the negotiation of cooperation.

The Internationalization of the Partnership We would expect from the literature on institutions and bilateralism that the gradual reinforcement of the relationship would come together with a shielding of that relationship from external interferences.67 Instead, what we see in the UK-French case is an internationalization of their bilateralism. While bilaterality is preserved in certain domains and/or on certain projects – the cjef , One mbda – cooperation is also and increasingly open to partners, especially in the operational domain. This internationalization built on the Libya experience and then the military intervention in Mali, but also resulted from the UK’s exit from the eu . These experiences resulted in increased trilateral cooperation with the United States, and in the development of “minilateral” cooperation among small groups of European countries – including the UK – around the European Intervention Initiative (Ei2).

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I showed in chapter 3 that the main difficulty for France and the UK’s cooperation in the Libya campaign had been their diverging approaches to cooperating with the US and their engagement with nato. Lessons were drawn from the Libya operations, and later confirmed in the Mali/Sahel operations – which France initiated in January 201368 – and during the evolution of the Syrian civil war after 2013. Better coordination among allies – not only between the UK and France, but also with the US and with other European partners – was necessary for addressing international security crises and launching military operations when deemed appropriate. The lesson-learning process that led the UK and France to boost trilateral military cooperation with the US started during the Libya campaign, and resulted from the identification of two factors. First, analyses of the conduct of the Libya intervention emphasized the “key enablers” that had been lacking during the operations.69 French and British national operational analyses all praised the success of airpower at achieving strategic effects, combined with naval aviation and the decisive role played by light aircraft,70 but they pointed to capability gaps. Despite the UK and France ensuring the political leadership of the campaign, the US carried out most of sorties and air strikes, and, even after removing combat aircraft after 31 March, continued to support the operation with intelligence and refueling capacity.71 As a result of this lesson, at the summit following the Libyan campaign, Nicolas Sarkozy and David Cameron announced that after “an analysis of lessons identified, [they had] decided to prioritize [their] joint work in the key areas of: command and control; information systems; intelligence, surveillance, targeting and reconnaissance; and precision munitions.”72 Secondly, the French acknowledged the strength of the military relationship between the UK and the United States, which had resulted in misunderstandings on both sides of the Channel in the early days of the campaign. A former analyst of the French Ministry of Defence argued: The Libya crisis showed the strong reticence of the British to break away from nato and American frameworks, especially in terms of planning … In this context, the first lessons of the British

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engagement in Libya confirm the pertinence of the concept of the Franco-British Combined Joint Expeditionary Force as it has been envisaged in the Letter of Intent … That being, the rise of such a force cannot obscure the question of the frameworks for the use of the force and the corresponding means of planning.73 Importantly, the effect of these divergences worsened with the inability of the two governments to communicate in a “frank and honest” manner and clarify their intentions, which compromised their ability to align in the early days of the intervention.74 In parallel to and following the Libya operations, the UK and France thus sought to build on their experience in Libya not only by reinforcing their bilateral cooperation (including through the cjef project, which seemed further legitimized), but also by developing their trilateral cooperation with the United States. The goal was to “facilitate coordination during crises before interventions”75 between French, British, and US forces, including the US Air Force. In March 2012, the chiefs of the air staff of the three countries published a joint paper in the specialized magazine Jane’s where they declared that “in the aftermath of 2011 Libya operations [they had] been analyzing the role our air forces played in the operation before nato assumed the lead,” and indicated that they had “already engaged in a series of trilateral strategic exercises to guide and focus future collaboration, all in close co-ordination with nato Transformation.”76 The Trilateral Strategic Initiative (tsi ) had initially started in October 2010, before Libya. It consisted of integrating British and a small number of French pilots into the US Air Force’s Strategic Studies Group.77 The operations in Libya strengthened the case for more coordination between the air forces of the three countries, causing an extension of the project.78 The three chiefs of the air staff thus engaged more actively in trilateral work during the Libya campaign in June 2011, with a view to “develop, improve and implement policies processes and technology” that, among other things, would permit the three air forces to “rapidly and effectively share sensitive mission command information.”79 The Trilateral Study Group is a non-permanent group composed of nine officers who meet regularly, talk on the phone, and organize

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workshops and exercises. The officers “advocate for the trilateral spirit of commitment, define common interests and advise chiefs on trilateral issues.”80 The Trilateral Strategic Initiative has continued since 2011, with a letter of intent signed by the chiefs of staff of the three air forces, and a charter defining intentions and objectives signed in 2013.81 The initiative includes trilateral military exercises, including a counter air and strike scenario that took place in Virginia in December 2015. The exercise was the first of its kind involving three countries.82 The perceived advantage of the tsi is the flexibility provided to participating officers to choose the topics they work on, and to promote an agenda to improve cooperation “without the cumbersome bureaucracy commonly associated with a formal alliance or coalition.”83 Despite this organizational lightness, the tsi is a long-term initiative under the responsibility of a steering group. There is no equivalent to the tsi between the other services, but cooperation is also increasingly being developed in the air-naval field: military exercises involving French and American aircraft carriers took place in the Gulf in January 2014, and cooperation has developed in the context of the fight against isis .84 The following year, a British frigate was integrated into the French carrier strike group to ensure anti-submarine defence during Operation Chammal in the Levant, under US operational control.85 This was the first time a British ship had been fully integrated with French carrier strike group and took the place of a missing ship in a real operation.86 In 2018, the three navies further collaborated to conduct free passage missions in the South China Sea.87 The political-strategic level also experienced progress in trilateral coordination ahead of interventions, at least until the Trump presidency. Already, in the summer of 2013, coordination ahead of a possible intervention in response to the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime in Syria was much more effective than in Libya. There were then, according to a senior British mod official, “daily phone calls” on the matter between the French director of strategic affairs the British director general for security policy and their US counterpart,88 as well as between the three countries’ air operations centers, as a “lesson learned from Libya and Mali.”89 This coordination also occurred at the operational level, with the three countries

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exchanging strikes plans, which constitute “the top level of what two countries can share.”90 The strategic and political coordination required for carrying out Special Operations in Libya after 2014, or the actual joint strikes against chemical weapons stockpiles in spring 2018, are a further illustration of the effectiveness of learning and the direction of change. Not only was operational cooperation further developed with the United States, it is also being developed with Europeans. The Mali and Central African Republic experiences – both French-led interventions – reminded France that other European partners matter, due to the support they bring to French forces on the ground. For instance, in 2018 Spain provided a third of the tactical airlift to French forces in the Sahel for Operation Barkhane.91 The United States, while providing support to French operations, has not been keen to get much more involved on the ground since Libya. The French government also sought to avoid replicating the misunderstandings, European reluctances, and eventual French strategic isolation that characterized the initial phase of the operations in Mali, and the whole of the intervention in the Central African Republic, from 2013 onwards. Overall, the Macron government realized the need to develop operationally focused cooperation with European countries, including through better coordination ahead of interventions. Macron first proposed the concept of European Intervention Initiative (Ei2) in his Sorbonne speech in September 2017, where he outlined his general vision for the future of Europe. France then worked for a year to get (initially) eight chosen European partners on board for its Ei2 project, conducted outside nato and eu frameworks. The goal is to foster exchanges among the most “willing and able” Europeans on strategic foresight, scenario planning, lessons learned and doctrine.92 The Ei2 is a gathering of willing and able European nations that aims to further their military interoperability and preparedness, based on a shared strategic picture and, it is hoped, eventually a shared strategic culture.93 France, the UK, Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain signed the letter of intent for the Ei2 on 25 June 2018. Finland, Norway, Italy, and Sweden joined in 2019.94 With a small Secretariat in Paris, the Ei2 is in the first instance of “opening up the

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French military” to European partners by sharing intelligence “based on reciprocal effort.”95 Initially, the focus is thus likely to be on French priorities in Africa, but the Ei2 group can in principle deal with any topics the participants want to discuss, and help them prepare collectively for any type of mission, whether at the higher end of the military spectrum or the lower end – such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, or non-combatant evacuation operations.96 How does this initiative relate to the France-UK relationship? Firstly, the Ei2 aims to anchor the British in European military cooperation and readiness in the context of Brexit: the British were indeed the first that France contacted when the project started to get defined.97 Emmanuel Macron and Theresa May declared at their 2018 summit: “We stress the need to further develop the emergence of a shared strategic culture between European States. France and the UK, thanks to their robust common expeditionary experience, have agreed that their bilateral defence relationship would contribute to the development of the European Intervention Initiative.”98 A French government representative further argued that a Franco-British leadership within the European initiative was indeed possible.99 More interestingly, the Ei2 does not replace or supplant the cjef , but builds on the lessons drawn from the cjef experience. From a French perspective, the head of international affairs at the French defence staff explained that the cjef , expected to be fully operational in 2020, is “the best of what we could do,” and that there was “a lot to learn about what we have done with the British” for the Ei2.100 A representative of the French presidency similarly affirmed that “the cjef is of course a template for the Ei2.”101 This indicates not only that learning takes place within a Franco-British context, but also that lessons learned during an ad hoc cooperation project within a bilateral setting could help improve ways of doing cooperation in other settings, including multilateral (or minilateral102) ones.

c o n c l u si on Nearly a decade after the signing of the bilateral treaties, the findings highlight the coexistence of two sets of trends in the evolution of defence cooperation between the UK and France. The first set of

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trends indicates an institutionalization process that fosters cooperation, by facilitating coordination and stabilizing practices. Through adaptation and learning, these changes positively affect bilateral partnership. This confirms the assumption that cooperation is a self-reinforcing process to which institutions contribute. I identify several changes that confirm this hypothesis. One is a much greater density of links, and a partial routinization of cooperation between the two defence administrations. The fact is that institutionalization gets reinforced by the multiplication of shared experiences and memories of successes. In addition, I also observe a relative expansion of governance structures. Also confirming expectations about institutionalization processes, we witness – just short of a decade since the Lancaster House agreements – that the bilateral partnership is increasingly upheld by common narratives, accompanied by new visual symbols and historical landmarks. All these elements create an increasingly dense net that contributes to resilience in the face of changes, as a plurality of actors develop a stake in the partnership and defend interests that are tied to its maintenance. The second set of trends, however, indicates an evolution of cooperation that does not correspond to an ideal-typical institutionalized relationship. For example, each partner systematically asks for compensation for any move made in favour of the other. This first appeared as a French negotiation strategy and became established as a bilateral mode of functioning. Thus, while we would have expected, in the context of an institutionalized relationship, constructive equity, or diffuse reciprocity – and while principles such as “overall balance” or “balance over time” exist in the context of the treaty – cooperation occurs almost exclusively through ad hoc exchanges. What is more, we would expect the institutionalized nature of cooperation to reinforce or even shield the partnership vis-à-vis external actors. However, the question of the partnership’s relation to other countries and multilateral organisations was not solved in either case study. And in this chapter I showed that, when the question of third parties was addressed, it led to an internationalization of the partnership, and not to a reinforcement of the bilateral link, as we would have been expected.

conclusion

The UK and France from Lancaster House to Brexit

s u m m a ry o f t h e fi ndi ngs The Challenges of Bilateral Cooperation Negotiation, bargaining, and muddling through are at the heart of bilateral cooperation processes, including in the context of the close, substantive defence relationships that we call special relationships. The case studies in this book have illustrated that, firstly, it is necessary for states at all stages to (re)negotiate a common interest, even after a general intent has been jointly expressed. This can sometimes lead bilateral cooperation up to the verge of failure, or significantly curtail its scope. The existence of written statements, even at various hierarchical levels (heads of state and government, military chiefs, working level), never guarantees that there is indeed agreement, if only because actors can make strategic use of vagueness to hide disagreements, thus allowing the planned cooperation to go ahead. Secondly, the case studies illustrate that states coordinate their collaborative activities based on the activities of their respective national institutions, with their inherently different priorities and functioning, their resource constraints, and so on. In other words, cooperation between two states is devoid of structures that can channel common action. Because of a lack of implementation ability and blurred lines of accountability, cooperation appears unstable and the parties perceive each other as unreliable.

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Thirdly, the case studies indicate that bilateral cooperation indeed leads to relative-gain mindset with a search for specific reciprocity, or “the simultaneous balancing of specific quid-proquos by each party at all times.”1 While we could have expected that a treaty would be perceived as providing a form of guarantee about the future of cooperation – Axelrod’s “shadow of the future”2 – that was not enough to reassure the governments about the prospect of future rewards. What the context of the treaty did create, however, is a “portfolio” approach to cooperation where decision-makers can weigh the balance of exchanges on a broader scale, by considering the whole of their cooperative activities. Fourthly, the existence of strongly institutionalized (or more special) relationships with other individual partners – here, the US and Germany – does affect governments’ preferences and their definition of their country’s interests. Such elephants in the room limit the extent to which two countries can cooperate, due to some intelligence or technology being unreleasable, or some resources being already allocated towards other partners. I have also showed that the multilateral level could interfere with the bilateral level, when countries disagree on the role that should be played by the international organizations of which they are members. In the present case, the link between the UK-France bilateral relation and nato and the eu was debated, without being clearly solved in either case, well before 2016 and the Brexit vote.

Adaptation and Institutionalization Dynamics In cases where the convergence of interests is strong enough for cooperation to be maintained despite inevitable obstacles, each case study in this book illustrates how the two countries have adapted to those challenges, maintaining and even enhancing their cooperation. Indeed, in each of the cases studied, France and the UK manage to maintain their cooperation by successfully constructing common interests. This occurs not because of a de facto harmony of interest, but through the redefinition of their common objectives by (1) downscaling their ambition and (2) adapting the narratives surrounding their cooperation to maintain a façade of agreement. The

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case studies show the diversity of adaptation strategies from one experience of cooperation to another: in their joint military intervention, agreeing on the role of allies, nato , and the eu was especially critical for the maintenance of cooperation. The development of joint military capacities, on the other hand, has been chiefly conditioned by their ability to coordinate the activities of their armed forces, which requires finding common procedures, working methods, and doctrines. To do that, France and the UK develop creative and flexible governance mechanisms and rely on the norms and procedures provided by nato as a baseline for their common endeavour. Finally, when it comes to defence industrial integration, the negotiation of fair cost and gain distribution is a particularly salient issue. In this case, France and the UK develop two habits: systematic 50/50 arrangements, and trade-offs or issue linkage. Studying relationships in the making, through direct access to actors and processes, including via observation, provides a close-up view of cooperation and adaptation processes in a manner much more detailed than archival work would allow. It allows me to identify what mechanisms governments develop as they seek to build on successive experiences and to make cooperation sustainable. I show in this book that, through repeated enforcement, formerly ad hoc adaptation strategies become structuring characteristics, or constitutive elements, of a given partnership. Confirming institutionalist arguments, this book shows that just short of a decade since the Lancaster House agreements, the bilateral relationship has gotten increasingly upheld by new shared narratives. There is also a much greater density of transnational links and governance structures, and an increasing routinization of cooperation between the two defence communities. In that sense, institutionalization gets reinforced by the multiplication of shared experiences and memories. Additionally, the support of societal actors translates into the emergence or reinforcement of transnational networks involving public, private, and semi-private actors who engage actively in support of the bilateral partnership. All these elements create an increasingly dense net that guarantees the partial resilience of the partnership in the face of changes, as a plurality of actors develop a stake in the partnership and defend interests that are tied to its maintenance.

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Now, I have showed that learning processes do not always produce the effects that we would expect from the literature on institutions and institutionalization. In other words, the adaptation strategies that I identify in this book do not necessarily or automatically enhance the propensity of states to collaborate or strengthen the bilateral relationship – that is, increase its resilience. For one thing, I find no instance of diffuse reciprocity, which is thought to characterize institutionalized relationships and to foster long-term cooperation. Instead, France and the UK have, quite paradoxically, gradually institutionalized a practice of systematic quid pro quos, or specific reciprocity, that tends to hinder their ability to strike agreements concerning the next steps. What is more, we would expect the institutionalized nature of cooperation to reinforce the partnership and shield it vis-à-vis external actors, but, on the contrary, in most areas we witness a de facto internationalization of the partnership (often through trilateral cooperation with the United States), rather than a reinforcement of the bilateral link. Overall, what this study shows is that governments seek to reorient their preferences in a way that permits cooperation with a special partner, but they will only do so if no better alternative exists.

Bilateralism and Multilateralism: Differences and Commonalities The statements about bilateralism in this book lend themselves to a fruitful comparison with scholarship on multilateralism, which, as I explained in chapter 1, dominates ir discussions on cooperation. One difference confirmed by this research is that diffuse reciprocity is not a common practice in bilateralism,3 even in special relationships. Quid pro quos and specific reciprocity are the norms. Yet even when considering multilateralism, in the realms of security and defence it is hard to argue that states which belong to a multinational military alliance or a collective security organization relinquish their “particularistic interests and situational exigencies”4 for the sake of multilateral principles. Even in multilateral contexts, trade-offs must be agreed to and bargains must be struck among some, if not all, of the individual states involved.5

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Many of the arguments in the multilateralism literature are in fact arguments about cooperation dynamics more generally. Take the claim that multilateralism is based on shared norms and principles embodied in practices that structure social interactions.6 The same can be said for bilateralism, even though these norms are different in nature (systematic reciprocity being a case in point), and are usually less explicit or formalized than in multilateral settings. As in multilateralism, the densification of links through the reinforcement of bilateral cooperation also creates a “self-fulfilling practice,”7 whereby the more that actors cooperate, the more they are willing to cooperate. Furthermore, I have highlighted just how negative experiences affect cooperation dynamics. This suggests that one should not be naïve about the self-reinforcing tendency in cooperation, which has been a tendency of both multilateralism and European integration scholars.8 Finally, it is wrong to suggests that bilateralism stands “in opposition to”9 multilateralism. This book shows that the two are deeply connected: bilateralism affects multilateral endeavours and is affected by it, and in both directions the effects can be positive as well as negative. Given this interdependence, it is more accurate to talk of “complex bilateralism” (with reference to “complex multilateralism”), “embedded bilateralism,”10 or “bi-multilateralism.”11 In addition, this book shows that bilateralism, just like multilateralism, relies on transnational, non-state actors, who pursue their interests within that framework.

e x t e n d in g t h e a r g u m ent: lessons from c o o p e r at io n in t h e nuclear domai n The analytical framework I developed in this book can usefully be applied to other cases of bilateral cooperation. In particular, in the UK-France case, an analysis thus structured allows us to shed light on cooperation in the nuclear domain. Alongside the conventional “framework” treaty of Cooperation in Defence and Security, whose implementation I have covered in the previous chapters of this book, in 2010 France and the UK signed a second treaty for cooperation in the field of nuclear deterrence. The bilateral treaty for cooperation in the nuclear domain provided for the construction of

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radiographic-hydrodynamic facilities as part of the Teutates project. The program has two components. On the one hand, there is a radiographic and hydrodynamic installation built and operated jointly in France (the “epure ” project, for “Expérimentations de physique utilisant la radiographie éclair”12). On the other hand, a joint Technology Development Center (tdc ) is being built in the United Kingdom. The two components have progressed well since 2010, even if on the British side, delays have been caused by the difficulty of estimating the costs associated with this “unique” and nascent program.13 The tdc , located within the Atomic Weapons Establishment (awe ) in Aldermaston where joint teams work, has been operational since 2014.14 The delays concern the epure program. The installation is under construction on the site of the Directorate of Military Applications of the Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique (cea /dam ) of Valduc, and will ultimately include three radiographic axes. If the first French radiographic machine has been operational since 2014, the second and third axes – the first built by the British and the second built cooperatively – will be completed in 2022.15 Thus, despite delays, Franco-British achievements in the nuclear domain since 2010 have been largely in line with initial expectations. The tone is positive when one refers to official declarations at bilateral summits. In 2012, cooperation “on a joint facility at Valduc” was considered “successful”; the 2014 summit reported “excellent progress,” with the approval of national investments in the Teutates program and further areas of cooperation were identified, including working together on the development of energetic materials for the future and a plan to conduct joint research at their respective laser facilities (awe Orion and the cea/dam Laser mégajoule). As another sign of the good health of UK-France cooperation in the nuclear domain, the two governments announced in 2018 that they would “develop the Joint Nuclear Commission for our strategic discussion on nuclear deterrence policy; nuclear proliferation; and nuclear disarmament.”16 Considering that nuclear deterrence is an extremely sensitive domain at the heart of national sovereignty, is it possible that UK-French cooperation in that area could be more effective than in the conventional domains? While the data implied in this area

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of cooperation makes it too sensitive for conducting a detailed case study, frequently knowledgeable interviewees referred to the nuclear domain as a point of comparison to cooperation in the conventional domains. These remarks converged to make a surprising argument: Franco-British cooperation in the former domain appears to be easier and more evident than in the latter. “In the nuclear domains, things work well,” summarized a high-ranking French military officer posted at the Elysée.17 The British air attaché in Paris confirmed that the teams had been doing “remarkable work” and that cooperation in that domain was “the jewel of the crown.”18 Here again, the framework of the challenges of bilateral cooperation that I have developed in this book is useful for making sense of this counterintuitive idea, and for contrasting the trends identified in the conventional sector with those found in the nuclear domain. In the conventional domain, the treaty was negotiated in a short time (between June and October 2010), in a process involving many actors on both sides of the Channel (defence staffs, strategy directorates, parliaments, acquisition agencies, the defence industry, etc.), and producing a synthesis of the various proposals. At the same time, the executive proposed some projects, including cjef , in a more top-down approach. These proposals were then included in the joint declaration signed at the summit rather than in the treaty itself (the text of which is rather vague), and non-binding memorandums of understanding and letters of intent were signed. The case studies in chapters 3, 4, and 5 showed that the implementation of cooperation in the conventional domains suffered through numerous renegotiations. Yet in the nuclear domain, bilateral negotiations took place from 2008 onwards, and the 2010 treaty represents the culmination of much more detailed bilateral work. In other words, the risks of blockage at the time of implementation were ruled out by considering ahead of time the possible issues related to the cooperation project. In addition, these negotiations involved a much narrower number of players on both sides of the Channel, mainly nuclear engineers. These professionals, who are presented as part of the same “community,”19 appear to have been at the origin of the cooperation proposals included in the treaty, in an approach that was more bottom-up. Therefore, the content of the Nuclear Cooperation

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Treaty was more in line with what it was desirable and feasible for both parties to implement. The second challenge of cooperation relates to the difficulty of coordinating cooperation between governments and bureaucracies. While the multiplicity of actors involved in cooperation in the conventional domain has made it more complex, in the nuclear domain, we again note the small number of actors involved – around twenty people – and the homogeneity of their professional profiles.20 A mod representative sums up the distinction between the conventional and nuclear worlds: “We are grappling with interdependence, and the nuclear treaty is the clearest example of this, but it is much more difficult in the conventional military. Nuclear is a very small community. When we talk about conventional power, we talk about the tribes of the three services, and put together with the other three services, it looks like a tea party.”21 In addition, the implementation of cooperation in this area is characterized by “permanent political control and a very short loop to the Elysée,” coupled with a lack of public discussion on the subject,22 which, according to several stakeholders interviewed, also explains why things are going well in the nuclear domain. The third challenge concerns the distribution of the costs and benefits associated with cooperation. In the conventional domain, costs and gains were not estimated in advance, and were the subject of ad hoc negotiations. This is particularly problematic when the value of some actions is subjective or generally difficult to grasp. By contrast, in the nuclear domain, the gains were clearly assessed and easily estimated ahead of time.23 Prior to the Lancaster House treaties, financial gains were already achieved through the mutual leasing of national test infrastructures. A de&s officer explained: “For facility sharing there is a symmetric relationship in the submarine domain: each country has a need and something to offer, so we have a twin arrangement,” and “each nation buys time in the other’s facilities.”24 In the same way, a French representative asserted that “what works on the British side is where they have interests and where they can save money. And in the nuclear domain, we share the costs, so they save money.”25 Trends also differ when it comes to the partnership’s relations with different partners. In the conventional domain, the potential

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problems related to the bilateral defence relationship with other key actors – US, eu , nato , other individual European partners – were “swept under the carpet” during the 2010 negotiations.26 Again, the issue seems to have been addressed in the nuclear domain in a way that limits conflicts at the time of implementation. In fact, the agreement of the United States was necessary for the emergence of Franco-British nuclear cooperation, as the British had to consult with the Americans before they could engage on the epure program with the French. While the US-Britain relationship remains “a glass ceiling” for Franco-British cooperation, the upstream negotiation of this issue made it possible to isolate areas where it was possible to cooperate in a purely bilateral way.27 The treaty also provides for the possible participation of other states in the Franco-British program, while Article 13 of the UK-French treaty protects the “rights and obligations of each Party under other defence and security agreements” – including, therefore, that between the UK and the US.28 The facilities, too, are conceived so that research and simulation activities can be conducted without risks of leaks, especially of information pertaining to third parties.29 As for the European partners, the absence of other nuclear powers on the continent and the less public dimension of cooperation have limited the problems witnessed in the conventional domain. This has also meant that Brexit has not affected cooperation in the nuclear domain. This brief overview reveals a paradox: while the nuclear domain, extremely sensitive and directly related to the idea of national sovereignty, has proven the soundness of the bilateral partnership, its conventional counterpart, though ostensibly more simple, is confronted with more challenges during implementation. The anticipation of difficulties in negotiations upstream of signing the treaties (e.g., considering the detailed objectives, the costs and benefits generated, and the place of third parties), as well as the restricted dimension of cooperation, seem like the best explanations for the success of cooperation in the nuclear domain. From this perspective, it is not so much the area of cooperation that is decisive for the effectiveness of the cooperation, but rather the ability of actors to consider and anticipate the challenges of implementation.

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u k-f r a n c e r e l at io n s duri ng the brexi t n e g o t iat io n s : a ta l e of two trends As it becomes effective, what will be the effects of the UK’s withdrawal from the eu on the bilateral defence relation between the UK and France? How have both the negotiation process between the UK and the eu and the prospect of the UK’s future non-membership affected the bilateral relationship thus far, and what can we expect in the future? There are few if any precedents from which to draw analogies that would help us forecast the effects of that change. The defence journalist Giovanni de Briganti has drawn a parallel between Brexit and France’s withdrawal from nato ’s integrated structures in 1966. This precedent, Briganti argues, reflects “a strong streak of national individualism” and “the refusal to submit national interests to collective decisions” on both sides of the Channel, which in turn could create a feeling of understanding and solidarity in France, and would make a case for stronger bilateral links.30 Indeed, as I mentioned in chapter 1, France’s withdrawal from nato ’s integrated structures had led it to “depend to a far greater extent than … other allies on bilateral arrangements” in defence.31 The analogy is otherwise unsatisfactory, given the different areas, scope, and institutional arrangements for cooperation that come with eu membership, and given that France, while withdrawing from the integrated structure of nato , had not left the organization altogether. Looking closely at the 2016–19 period in UK-France relations, we see that Brexit both reinforces the case for UK-France links in defence and security, and at the same time magnifies the difficulties that the two countries have faced in the last decade when enhancing their bilateral cooperation.

Political Reassurance In the wake of the Brexit vote of June 2016, French and British heads of state and government restated the importance of their bilateral relation in defence and security: overall, the years of the Brexit negotiations were a time of political reassurance about the future of the relationship. Various factors pointed towards a maintenance, or

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even a newly recovered centrality, of the Anglo-French partnership. Firstly, the bilateral partnership was unaffected by the debates prior to the June vote. The possible consequences of a withdrawal from the eu were not addressed in public declarations, and Brexit was considered on the French side to be very unlikely.32 While the partnership slowed down – as bilateral relations usually do when national votes get near – before the 2015 elections and during the referendum campaign, the two countries were also expanding their cooperation to new areas, especially in the counter-terrorism domain. Indeed, the March 2016 summit announced, in addition to the €2 billion pledge for the Future Combat Air System, increased collaboration on intelligence, policing, radicalization, border control, and arms control.33 Secondly, going back to the origins and functioning of the partnership, we find that in its design and in its effects, Franco-British defence cooperation is de-correlated from eu affairs. Operational cooperation uses nato rather than eu norms; nuclear cooperation is clearly a state matter; and the contribution of this partnership to the wider eu was never clearly spelled out and did not have obviously foreseeable effects. It has even been argued that the AngloFrench partnership is so “pragmatic” as to be “politics-proof”: it would “weather any cabinet reshuffles, elections, or other changes in political circumstances in either country.”34 Thirdly, after the vote to leave the European Union, both capitals insisted that the partnership would be preserved, or even reinforced. As early as 24 June 2016, François Hollande declared: “France, for itself and for Great Britain will continue to work with this great friend of a country … our close relations in the defence field will be preserved.”35 In July, Theresa May confirmed during her visit in Paris: “The intelligence and security co-operation between our countries is something that will always endure – even after Britain has left the European Union … That means, in addition to our growing co-operation on counter-terrorism, we will strengthen the wider strategic defence partnership between our two countries.”36 When he took office in May 2017, Emmanuel Macron stated the importance of the bilateral defence relationship. He declared in January 2018: “[there are] two things that nothing can change, be it a vote or a political decision: our history and our geography. These place

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us together before a common destiny … We have decided not to stop the bilateral relationship, because it is strategic, because it is historic, because it is strong, and so we continue it on all [the topics which we are currently working on].”37 After June 2016, several bilateral agreements seemed to confirm that bilateral activities were not being called into question: the intergovernmental agreement for the implementation of One Complex Weapons that had been signed in 2015 was ratified by the Assemblée nationale in October 2016,38 a contract for the fc /asw missile program was announced in March 2017, and the French-led European Intervention Initiative, which includes the UK and builds on the cjef lessons, was launched in June 2018. Furthermore, as I indicated in chapter 6, the Brexit vote was followed by a reinforcement of the institutional features of the relationship, with the announcement in January 2018 of a new Defence Ministerial Council, an enhanced defence policy dialogue, and meetings between the heads of the two national intelligence services. A French diplomat explained that the creation of the council vote was indeed conceived of as “a means to ward off bad luck with regards to the consequences of Brexit.”39

Uncertainty and Altered Incentives It would be wrong, however, to assume from those reassuring discourses that no negative effects were observable in the years following the June 2016 vote – even though, again, the phenomenon must be understood within the broader political dynamics and changes in Britain and in France. It is in the field of armaments that the negative effects of Brexit are the most likely. This is not least because it is an economic sector, and as such its companies respond, in part, to financial and regulatory incentives which Brexit is likely to alter. industrial integration in the missile sector

The Brexit vote cast significant doubts on the political and financial feasibility of the One Complex Weapons project, although the extent of the problems would depend largely on the type of future relationship ultimately negotiated between the UK and the eu , which remains unknown at the time of writing. Like other public and private actors

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with interests in the UK, the company set up a working group to consider the consequences of Brexit. Its conclusion was that Brexit poses some problems in terms of the robustness of the Intergovernmental Agreement and both countries’ capacity to implement it.40 Once Brexit becomes effective, the legal framework of the iga may have to be revised because the common ground of European law, which partly underpins the agreement, would disappear. The iga refers to eu definitions of “defence-related products” provided by the Directive 2009/43/EC, which simplifies intra-community transfers of such products. However, given that the European regulations have become national law in both France and the UK, the disappearance of this overarching normative framework would not affect their cooperation in practice, unless one or the two parties decided to denounce the agreement. Indeed, the goal of the iga was precisely to create a bilateral legal framework to underpin the global licenses granted between the two countries to permit the seamless transfer of equipment and technology between the French and British branches of mbda . In other words, mbda benefits from an agreement that protects it, while other companies with cross-border activities, such as Airbus, Thales, and Safran, do not. Despite the existence of the iga, mbda representatives, like other companies, were concerned by non-tariff barriers, including border checks (which would induce additional administrative work and delays) and workers’ mobility.41 Beyond that, the greatest risks associated with Brexit were economic and politico-strategic. Firstly, between 2016 and 2019, Brexit presented the risk of a loss of value of the British pound, which would affect the country’s defence spending, especially in the event of “no deal,” which for a time looked possible.42 Another issue for the company, located on the territory of both France and the UK and controlled at 37.5 per cent by bae Systems, relates to access to eu funding for research and development. Indeed, concomitantly with the Brexit negotiation process, eu member states moved forward with initiatives to enhance the eu ’s role in defence, including by creating a fund for cross-border defence r&d and multinational procurement (European Defence Industrial Development Program [edidp ] and European Defence Fund [edf ]) among eu member states, and launching capability, training and

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operational projects under the umbrella of Permanent Structured Cooperation (pesco ). So far, in the Brexit negotiations, the UK has been considered as a regular (future) third country, like the United States. This de facto excludes British companies like bae Systems – partly controlled by non-associated third country entities – and the UK-based branch of mbda , from being eligible for eu financial support.43 France’s negotiating position for the edf and edidp eligibility criteria was among the harshest of eu member states, as it aimed to preserve the eu defence and technological industrial base from international competition, especially from the United States.44 In a sense, France’s position on the Brexit negotiations, whether directly on the withdrawal agreement itself, or indirectly in arguing for restrictive eligibility criteria for eu funding, mirrored the British government’s position on Brexit, which was characterized by numerous red lines, including the end of free movement of people for eu citizens.45 The other fear in the years following the Brexit vote was of renewed British interest in cooperation with the US. The parliamentary inquiry and report that I mentioned in chapter 6 was clearly a way to signal the risks that hang over the One Complex Weapons initiative because of Brexit, and to try and commit the two governments to finding arrangements to maintain cooperation in the long term. It was clear from the inquiry that many US systems were available to the UK for purchase, as alternatives to UK-French industrial cooperation. To the extent that maintaining a national defence industry by developing its own systems rather than acquiring offthe-shelf, foreign-made systems requires public investment from the British government, the greater pre-eminence of the US alternative eventually also relates to the financial risks associated with Brexit, as off-the-shelf equipment tends to be cheaper than that which is nationally produced. the future of combat aviation

This book has illustrated cases where UK-French cooperation, while proving challenging, has been chosen as the preferred route. That has not been the case for all the projects announced in 2010, especially in

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the armaments sector. Financial constraints, differences in preferences and requirements, or the existence of alternatives are key reasons for a cooperation project to be abandoned altogether. Since 2016, Brexit has proven to exacerbate exactly those risks, which are all exemplified in the case of the future of combat aviation. Given the strategic and symbolic importance of combat aircraft, the Future Combat Air System (fcas ) became, like the One Complex Weapons initiative, one the flagship projects of Lancaster House, as France and the UK had announced at the 2010 bilateral summit their intention to collaborate in that domain (see chapter 5). In 2014, they announced a feasibility study contract for the fcas , involving Dassault and bae . The program was to be reconducted some time in 2017, with a capability expected by the 2030s. At the March 2016 summit, France and the UK announced their intent to invest 2 billion euros in 2017.46 Yet, at the following summit in January 2018, the two governments merely announced that they would assess the conclusions of the feasibility study before making decisions on future plans. Shortly after, Dassault teamed up with Germany’s Airbus to work on a manned version of a fighter jet as part of a bigger project, a “system of systems” that would also include unmanned systems.47 For its part, the British government signed a twelve-month national contract with bae Systems to continue work on a future combat air system named Tempest,48 and in July 2018 it published a national strategy for the future of combat aviation that did not mention France once.49 In the meantime, a presidential election had taken place in France in May 2017, and in the UK, Theresa May (with a weak coalition government from June 2017 to July 2019) had engaged in the negotiation of the withdrawal agreement with the eu . The ceo of Dassault declared in the press that “British reasons” had caused cooperation to be put on hold, because “they [had] not managed to find the money, or [had] other priorities” due to the “strong turbulences” caused by Brexit.50 Despite reassurances at the head-of-state level, UK-French cooperation took a “catastrophic” turn because of Brexit: Gavin Williamson, the UK defence minister under Theresa May, “froze” relations and refused to sign any document with his counterpart, due to the “pollution” caused by the Brexit negotiations.51

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Yet, when it comes to the fcas , the effects of Brexit were mostly indirect: like a contextual change, it altered the incentives faced by France and the UK and brought to the fore the challenges that had until then not been considered deal breakers. Differences in requirements and calendars had been identified for a few years, and cooperation had not been progressing as hoped since around 2014.52 For instance, while the French had a need in the relatively short term to replace the Dassault-built “4th generation” Rafale fighter jets, the UK was only just receiving its long-awaited “5th generation” f-35 s. More importantly perhaps, Brexit made existing alternatives look more appealing. Already in 2014, the continuation of the program was uncertain because the Americans were sending “discreet signals” to the British, for instance on the x 47, a combat drone at demonstrator phase which constituted a “plan B” for the UK.53 On the French side, only two months after taking office in May 2017, Emmanuel Macron and the German chancellor Angela Merkel announced their intention to develop a European combat air system under the leadership of the two countries.54 This came together with the preparation of the French Defence and National Security Review, published in October 2017, in which the UK appears listed after Germany in the order of priorities, contrary to the two previous French defence white papers. While the decision to turn to the Germans is partly political (“Is it possible to work on the future of combat aviation without the Germans?” a French armaments engineer wondered55), it was also economic. While Brexit cast doubt on the UK’s financial means, France was also financially constrained and “only Germany has the money to make major next-generation armaments projects feasible,” as Politico’s Paul Taylor summarized.56 Overall, while the effects are indirect and based on anticipating changes rather than actual changes, a representative of the British defence industry thought it was “not a coincidence” that the fcas had been called into question after the Brexit vote. Although cooperation had not been progressing as expected prior to the referendum, the uncertainty about the UK’s future and the French announcement of cooperation with Germany were both presented as “windows of opportunity” to put an unsuccessful cooperation to a halt.57

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l ookin g a h e a d : p ro s p e c t s for the uk-france r e l at io n s h ip a f ter brexi t While it is still too early to tell if cooperation on the fcas project is dead for good, the suspension of cooperation in the sector exemplifies the problems of bilateral cooperation, which Brexit only magnifies. The analytical framework I have presented in this book makes it possible to identify the sources of the problems faced by the UK and France during the negotiation period, and the likely trends in the longer term when the UK leaves the eu . Firstly, the bedrock of the France-UK defence and security relationship has stemmed from their shared strategic outlooks and capacity as major military powers. Now, despite the positive political discourses that I highlighted earlier, the Brexit process has shaded all bilateral dealings with uncertainty about the UK’s future status, economic health, and political-strategic orientations, thereby making it even harder to make bets about future bilateral cooperation. In the short term, the defence, foreign, and security orientations of the UK have remained aligned on the major dossiers that emerged in the 2016–19 period, whether it is Russia, Iran, or Syria; and France and the UK have together deployed forces and capabilities in the Sahel and in Estonia. Now, the UK has meanwhile been caught up in the enormous task that Brexit represents; indeed it has been qualified by the Whitehall cabinet secretary as “the biggest, most complex challenge facing the civil service in our peacetime history.”58 Combined with “deep cuts” in the budget of the Foreign Commonwealth Office since the 2000s, the UK has thus been less of a leading diplomatic force over that period.59 Besides, the successive British governments, under the premierships of Theresa May and then Boris Johnson, have had difficulties spelling out what the UK’s post-Brexit foreign, defence, and security policy could look like.60 On a more general level, Brexit represents two opposing political visions: one where the UK seeks to chart its own individual course (“Global Britain”61), and one where France constructs its interest and future within the project of regional integration.62 Indeed, France under the Macron government has put a forceful emphasis on European defence and taken a hard line on Brexit to preserve the

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unity and cohesion of the eu . Macron declared in 2018: “France wants to maintain a strong, privileged relationship with London, but not at the cost of the dissolution of the European Union.”63 These two distinct political choices vis-à-vis European integration exacerbated well-known historical differences between France and the UK, which had seemed to diminish over the decade prior. Nonetheless, the perspective of the tenth anniversary of the Lancaster House treaties in November 2020 provides a welcome window for the two countries’ defence communities to focus on exactly those areas where they remain willing to work together in the new circumstances, and should allow for new bilateral projects to be launched. New themes, like cyber-defence, space strategy, artificial intelligence, and hybrid threats, have become more prominent over the past decade and provide new avenues for bilateral work, while further efforts to integrate the two countries’ armed forces could be a way to ensure the UK’s durable “anchoring” on the European continent.64 In the longer run, the UK, once out of the eu , will likely not be participating in eu meetings or projects in the areas of defence, security, and foreign policy. If no alternative arrangements are made (such as creating a “European security council”65), this will limit the possibility of a convergence of preferences between the two countries at the political-strategic level, as well as in their procurement choices, and rarefy opportunities for identifying common avenues for cooperation. At the time of writing, Brexit is not yet in effect, and the “future relationship” between the UK and the eu is not yet negotiated. The matters of the Franco-British border and the status of Northern Ireland still must be specified, and there remains a risk of political instability and even social unrest in the UK. Some have warned that Brexit would trigger a new Scottish referendum, with consequences for the UK’s armed forces and nuclear deterrent.66 Even with an orderly Brexit, a strategic drift is possible over the long term. The need for the UK to negotiate trade deals with major powers across the globe – including the US, China, and to a lesser extent Russia – could come at some political cost. The UK indeed risks being subject to greater dependence on those countries as a result, which could affect its foreign policy orientations.67 As I have shown in this book, bilateral relationships are only secondary to

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– and therefore determined by – national interests, which on both sides have been redefined by Brexit. Despite the goodwill in both countries to maintain the defence and security relationship, there are nonetheless many aspects related to Brexit that could lead France and the UK to quite simply not share a common vision for their defence and security, diminishing their incentives to find common grounds and causing the partnership to stagnate. What is more, as I have argued, it is not enough for countries to choose to work together based on their identified shared interests. The other dimensions of bilateral cooperation must be considered, as they will be key to allowing France and the UK to effectively continue down the path of reinforcing their special relationship after Brexit. For one, Brexit poses a new set of challenges for the UK and France’s coordination of their bilateral activities. As I have illustrated in this book, political support, especially through top-down “pushes” during bilateral summits, is necessary for launching significant new projects and maintaining the momentum at the working level. To take one example, a first problem in the short term stemmed from political changes and even instability in the UK following the rejection of Theresa May’s Brexit deal and her replacement by Boris Johnson, who in the summer and fall of 2019 threatened to leave the eu without a deal. In the longer term, the UK being out of the eu will limit opportunities for using eu institutions and norms as proxies for bilateral work. Although nato is the main basis, and the two countries remain members of the un Security Council where they cooperate intensively, the eu does provide unique regulatory or operational tools in areas like arms transfers, economic sanctions, police cooperation, and information sharing, or civil-military crisis management. And if the projects for eu defence move forward as planned, pesco , the edidp , and the European Defence Agency will coordinate procurement needs and cycles among eu member states. With the UK outside of the eu , existing difficulties concerning different timetables and requirements may take even more precedence in UK-France dealings. The case of the UK’s participation in the eu ’s satellite program Galileo is an example of the way in which cooperation can end abruptly due to a lack of a technical agreement covering the exchange of classified information.68

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In the event of persistent goodwill on both sides, the UK could obtain a degree of access to those eu policies. In 2017, the UK’s white paper on UK-eu relations in foreign, defence, and development policies post-Brexit proposed such close links. The text suggested the UK’s “unconditional” commitment to Europe’s security and the May government’s desire to establish a “deep and special partnership with the eu.”69 The chief eu negotiator Michel Barnier indicated in February 2018: “We hope that this future relationship [with the UK] will be an ambitious one! And we want security, defence and foreign policy as key components of it.”70 However, at the time of writing it was still undecided what status or access the UK would have vis-à-vis the eu ’s defence and foreign policy post-Brexit, and Boris Johnson has proven to be – discursively at least – less keen for the UK to get involved in the csdp .71 Other non-eu frameworks will arguably play a significant role in helping France and the UK coordinate their positions and activities in a multilateral context, including of course nato , but also the “E3” diplomatic format (France, Germany, UK) and the “quad” format (France, Germany, UK, US).72 In an op-ed published during the 2019 European Parliament elections, President Macron also suggested putting together a “European security council” including the eu as well as the UK, which could be framed by a “defence and security treaty.”73 Brexit should not affect the way that France and the UK go about sharing the gains and costs of their cooperation, and the two countries are likely to continue following a logic of systematic reciprocity. Nonetheless, if the regulatory, budgetary, and strategic uncertainty that characterizes the Brexit negotiation period continues, this will limit the ability of France and the UK to make bets committing the two countries in the longer term. It makes it even more unlikely that France and the UK will develop a practice of diffuse reciprocity, thought to be conducive to the maintenance of cooperation. What is more, if the two countries have fewer projects together as a result of the UK not participating in the eu ’s defence initiatives, trade-offs – which are the common practice in the UK-French relationship – will be harder to broker. Finally, regardless of what types of “future relationship” and trade agreements end up being negotiated, the UK will seek to preserve

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its special relationship with Washington. This will move France and the UK apart if the broader Europe-US relationship continues to deteriorate. London could be tempted to pursue its global agenda independently from or in competition with France; Paris will likely push for even more eu integration, and more cooperation with Berlin as the two indeed seem to be positively correlated. Nonetheless, the strategic proximity between France and the UK will not be equaled with any other European partner, and, even for the UK, it is functionally distinct from the link with Washington. The nuclear domain provides some lessons the two countries should build upon when they design future agreements for their bilateral cooperation.

Annex

a f f il iat io n s o f intervi ewees Note: several interviewees held the same functions, and sometimes several interviews were conducted with the same actors, but the affiliation is presented only once. Interviews were conducted between 2012 and 2019. The affiliations are those at the time of the interview.

British Interviewees Air Command, deputy commander Air Staff Army Staff, Interoperability British Aerospace (bae ) British Embassy in Paris, air attaché British Embassy in Paris, armament attaché British Embassy in Paris, defence attaché British Embassy in Paris, naval attaché British Embassy in Washington Defence Equipment and Support (de&s ) de&s, Complex Weapons International Cooperation and Strategy de&s, Future business and integration de&s, International relations de&s, Mine countermeasures and hydrographic capability de&s, One Complex Weapons de&s, Team Complex Weapons

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de&s, Unmanned Air Systems Defence Staff, chief (former) Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (dcdc ) Foreign and Commonwealth Office (fco ), International Security and South East Europe fco, Security policy, eu and nato General Staff, International team General Staff, Liaison officer hmg Cabinet Office, adviser Joint Force Command, Joint Warfare mbda UK, adviser Ministry of Defence (mod ), International Policy France, Capabilities mod, International Policy France, European Bilateral Relations and eu Exit (ebrx ) mod, International Policy France, Head mod, International Policy France, Military cooperation mod, International Policy France, Policy mod, Security Policy, director National Security Council, adviser Naval Staff, exchange officer Permanent Joint Headquarter (pjhq ), Joint Forces Headquarter (jfhq ) pjhq, Intelligence Secretary of state for defence (former) Thales UK United Kingdom’s Joint Delegation to nato , adviser United Kingdom’s Joint Delegation to nato , defence counsellor French Interviewees: Airbus Ambassade de France à Londres, Attaché d’Armement Ambassade de France à Londres, Attaché d’Armement Adjoint Ambassade de France à Londres, Attaché de Défense Ambassade de France à Londres, Attaché de Défense Adjoint – Air Ambassade de France à Londres, Attaché de Défense Adjoint – Marine

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Ambassade de France à Londres, Attaché de Défense Adjoint – Terre Ambassade de France à Londres, Chancellerie Ambassade de France à Washington, Attaché de Défense Assemblée nationale, Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, member Assemblée nationale, Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, president Centre Interarmées de Concepts, de Doctrines et d’Emploi des forces (cicde ) Commission Européenne, Task Force Article 50 Direction Générale de l’Armement (dga ) dga, Direction de la Stratégie (ds), Service des Affaires Industrielles et de l’Intelligence Économique dga, ds, Coopération Européenne et Développement Elysée (former adviser) Elysée, État-major Particulier (emp) État-major des armées (ema ), Centre de Planification et de Conduite des Operations (cpco ) ema, Division Euroatlantique ema, Emploi ema, Organisations Internationales État-major de l’armée de l’Air (emaa ) État-major de l’armée de Terre (emat ) emat , Cellule de Coopération Bilatérale Independent consultant in the defence sector Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Centre for security studies Les Echos, Journalist mbda , adviser mbda , Business development mbda , Industrial policy and supply chain management mbda , Secretary General Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires Etrangères, Affaires Stratégiques (asd ) Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires Etrangères, Direction de l’Union Européenne (due ) Ministère de la Défense, Direction des Affaires Stratégiques (das )

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Ministère des Armées, Direction Générale des Relations internationales et stratégiques (dgris ) nato, Defence Policy Section nato, Private Office of the Secretary General Représentation Permanente de la France auprès de l’otan Représentation Permanente de la France auprès de l’otan , Deputy Permanent Representative Représentation Permanente de la France auprès de l’otan , Political and media adviser Représentation Permanente de la France auprès de l’ue Sénat, Commission des affaires étrangères, de la défense et des forces armées, vice-president

Notes

i nt roduct i o n 1 J. Major, “Joint Press Conference with President Chirac,” London, 29–30 October 1995, http://www.johnmajorarchive.org.uk/1990-1997/ mr-majors-joint-press-conference-with-president-chirac-30-october-1995/. 2 Treaty for Defence and Security Cooperation, London, 2 November 2010, hereafter referred to as “Lancaster House treaty” or “the treaty.” 3 Treaty between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic relating to Joint Radiographic/ Hydrodynamics Facilities, London, 2 November 2010, hereafter referred to as “nuclear cooperation treaty.” 4 R. Tombs and I. Tombs, That Sweet Enemy: Britain and France; The History of a Love-Hate Relationship (London: Pimlico, 2007). 5 A. Sharp and G. Stone, eds, Anglo-French Relations in the Twentieth Century: Rivalry and Cooperation (London: Routledge, 2000). 6 R. Tombs, “The Franco-British Relationship: Past, Present, Future,” Briefings for Brexit, Blog, 4 June 2018, available at https://briefingsforbrexit.com/the-franco-british-relationship-past-present-future/. 7 H. Wallace, “The Conduct of Bilateral Relations by Governments,” in Partners and Rivals in Europe: Britain, France and Germany, edited by R. Morgan and C. Bray (Aldershot: Gower Publishing, 1986), 136–7. 8 The second argument was put forward in a personal communication, Defence Strategy Directorate, French Ministry of Armed Forces, Paris, January 2019. 9 Y. Boyer, P. Lellouche, and J. Roper, eds, Franco-British Defence Cooperation: A New Entente Cordiale? (London: Routledge/Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1988), xi.

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10 Angus Lapsley (@AngusLapsleyFCO): “Thoroughly enjoyed meeting @chem_fr today to debate the common challenges facing UK and France in defence. Agreed that what made our partnership special in Europe was a shared commitment to expeditionary ops. as well as full spectrum of deterrence. @UKDefenceFrance,” Twitter, 7 March 2019, https://twitter. com/AngusLapsleyFCO/status/1103766795276746752. 11 Ibid. Emphasis added.

c ha p t e r o n e 1 M. Smith, “The European Union and the United States of America: The Politics of ‘Bi-Multilateral’ Negotiations,” in European Union Negotiations: Processes, Networks and Institutions, edited by O. Elgström and C. Jönsson (New York: Routledge, 2005), 170. 2 M.-C. Smouts, The New International Relations: Theory and Practice (London: Hurst and Company, 2001), 74; W. Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law (London: Stevens and Sons, 1964), 60–2. 3 T. Gomart, “La relation bilatérale: Un genre de l’histoire des relations internationales,” Matériaux pour l’histoire de notre temps, no. 65–66 (2002): 65. 4 A. Pannier, “Bilateral Relations,” in Global Diplomacy: An Introduction to Theory and Practice, edited by T. Balzacq, F. Charillon, and F. Ramel (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), 19–33. 5 M.-N. Tannous, Chirac, Assad et les autres: Les relations franco-syriennes depuis 1946 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2017). 6 B. Badie, “La promotion des droits de l’homme passe par le renforcement du jeu multilatéral,” Le Monde, 19 December 2007. 7 G. Devin, “Paroles de diplomates: Comment les négociations multilatérales changent la diplomatie,” in Négociations internationales, edited by F. Petiteville and D. Placidi-Frot (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2013), 93–4. 8 T. Rixen, “Bilateralism or Multilateralism? The Political Economy of Avoiding International Double Taxation,” European Journal of International Relations 16, no. 4 (2010): 590. 9 E. Newman et al., Multilateralism under Challenge? Power, International Order and Structural Change (New York: United Nations University Press, 2006). 10 Rixen, “Bilateralism or Multilateralism,” 607. 11 B.J. Kinne, “Defence Cooperation Agreements and the Emergence of a Global Security Network,” International Organization 72, no. 4 (2018): 799–837.

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12 Scholarly publications dedicated to multilateralism have included major theorists – including for example Robert Keohane, John Gerard Ruggie, or Lisa Martin – and a vast number of edited volumes. R.O. Keohane, “Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research,” International Journal 45, no. 4 (1990): 731–64; J.G. Ruggie, ed., Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); J.G. Ruggie, “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution,” International Organization 46, no. 3 (1992): 561–98; L. Martin, “Interests, Power, and Multilateralism,” International Organization 46, no. 4 (1992): 765–92; S. Touval and W. Zartman, “Introduction: Return to the Theories of Cooperation,” in International Cooperation: The Extents and Limits of Multilateralism, edited by S. Touval and W. Zartman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1–11; E. Newman, R. Thakur, and J. Timan, eds, Multilateralism under Challenge? Power, International Order and Structural Change (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2006). 13 For example, B. Spector and W. Zartman, eds, Getting It Done: PostAgreement Negotiation and International Regimes (Washington, dc : United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003). 14 Among the most recent, see S. Rynning, nato in Afghanistan: The Liberal Disconnect (Palo Alto, ca : Stanford University Press, 2012); A. Michta and P.S. Hilde, eds, The Future of nato : Regional Defence and Global Security (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2014); S. Sloan, Defence of the West: nato , the European Union, and the Transatlantic Bargain (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016); S. Johnston, How nato Adapts: Strategy and Organization in the Atlantic Alliance since 1950 (Baltimore, md : Johns Hopkins University Press, 2017); H. Hardt, nato ’s Lessons in Crisis: Institutional Memory in International Organizations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). 15 Among the most recent, see S. Von Hlatky, American Allies in Times of War: The Great Asymmetry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); S. Kreps, Coalitions of Convenience: United States Military Interventions after the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); D.P. Auerswald and S. Saideman, nato in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone (Princeton, nj : Princeton University Press, 2014); G.A. Mattox and S. Grenier, eds, Coalition Challenges in Afghanistan: The Politics of Alliance (Palo Alto, ca : Stanford University Press, 2015); O. Schmitt, Allies that Count: Junior Partners in Coalition Warfare (Washington, dc : Georgetown University Press, 2018); P. Weitsman,

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18 19 20 21

22 23

24 25

26

Notes to pages 17–19

Waging War: Alliances, Coalitions, and Institutions of Interstate Violence (Palo Alto, ca : Stanford University Press, 2014). To name just a few of the most recent, P.M. Norheim-Martinsen, The European Union and Military Force: Governance and Strategy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); J. Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave, 2014); M. E. Smith, Europe’s Common Security and Defence Policy Capacity-Building, Experiential Learning, and Institutional Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); K. Engberg, The eu and Military Operations: A Comparative Analysis (London: Routledge, 2015). N. Karampekios and I. Oikonomou, eds, The European Defence Agency: Arming Europe (London: Routledge, 2015); K. Schilde, The Political Economy of European Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018). J. Smith and M. Tsatsas, The New Bilateralism: The UK’s Relations within the eu (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2002), 2. H. Meijer and M. Wyss, “Upside Down: Reframing European Defence Studies,” Cooperation and Conflict 54, no. 3 (2018): 313–34. Kinne, “Defence Cooperation Agreements.” E. Newman et al., Multilateralism under Challenge; A. Sundberg and T. Ahman, “The Two of Us: Bilateral and Regional Defence Cooperation in Europe,” Swedish Defence Research Agency, foi Memo 4149, October 2012; A. Mattelaer, “The Resurgence of Bilateral Diplomacy in Europe,” Egmont Paper no. 104, Egmont Royal Institute, Brussels, January 2019. hm Government, “Foreign Policy, Defence and Development: A Future Partnership Paper,” September 2017, 2. On bilateralism in Donald Trump’s foreign policy, see for instance D. Keohane, “Trump’s Troubling Bilateralism,” Carnegie Europe, 20 January 2017, http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/67748; D. Stokes and K. Waterman, “Trump’s Bilateralism and US Power in East Asia,” The Diplomat, 9 August 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/ trumps-bilateralism-and-us-power-in-east-asia/. B.J. Kinne, “Network Dynamics and the Evolution of International Cooperation,” American Political Science Review 107, no. 4 (2013): 766. U. Krotz and J. Schild, Shaping Europe: France, Germany and Embedded Bilateralism from the Elysee Treaty to Twenty-First Century Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). B.J.C. McKercher, Britain, America, and the Special Relationship since 1941 (London: Routledge, 2017), 44.

Notes to pages 19–23

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27 J. Wither, “An Endangered Partnership: The Anglo-American Defence Relationship in the Early Twenty-First Century,” European Security 15, no. 1 (2006): 45–65; L. Freedman, “Defence,” in Blair’s Britain: 1997–2007, edited by A. Seldon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 615–32; A. Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11 (London: Routledge), 2010. 28 S. Sloan, Defence of the West: nato , the European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), 202–3. 29 H. Wallace, “The Conduct of Bilateral Relations by Governments,” in Partners and Rivals in Western Europe: Britain, France and Germany, edited by R. Morgan and C. Bray (Aldershot: Gower Publishing, 1986), 136–55. 30 Wallace, “The Conduct of Bilateral Relations by Governments,” 136–7. 31 R. Neustadt, Alliance Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), 5. 32 Ibid. 33 Wallace, “The Conduct of Bilateral Relations by Governments,” 136. 34 Ruggie, “Multilateralism,” 566. 35 B. Vassort-Rousset, “Couples interétatiques: L’intérêt national revisité,” Arès 22, no. 57 (2006): 9. See also B. Vassort-Rousset, ed., Building Sustainable International Couples in International Relations: A Strategy towards Peaceful Cooperation (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 36 U. Krotz, Flying Tiger: International Relations Theory and the Politics of Advanced Weapons Production (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 15. 37 The notion has also been put forward by Cole, who suggests that FrancoGerman friendship works like a quasi-regime that entails unwritten behavioural norms, whereby leaders attempt to reach agreement “where possible, even against their initial preferences.” A. Cole, Franco-German Relations (London/New York: Longman, 2001), 150. 38 O. Young, “North American Resource Regimes: Institutionalized Cooperation in Canadian-American Relations,” Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 15, no. 1 (1998): 53. See also O. Young, ed., The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes: Causal Connections and Behavioral Mechanisms (Cambridge, ma : mit Press, 1999). 39 Krotz, Flying Tiger, 4–5.

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Notes to pages 23–5

40 Krotz and Schild, Shaping Europe, 14. Similar points have been made about France and Germany, and the UK and the US in Cole, FrancoGerman Relations; D. Reynolds, “A ‘Special Relationship’? America, Britain and the International Order since the Second World War,” International Affairs 62, no. 1 (1986): 1–20. 41 Wallace, “The Conduct of Bilateral Relations by Governments,” 136. 42 Krotz and Schild, Shaping Europe, chapter 9. 43 Neustadt, Alliance Politics, 4. 44 K. Haugevik, Special Relationships in World Politics: Inter-state Friendship and Diplomacy after the Second World War (New York: Routledge, 2018), 108. 45 Neustadt, Alliance Politics, 4 46 For the most recent and thorough analysis of existing scholarship, see Haugevik, Special Relationships, 12–13. 47 A. Danchev, “On Specialness,” International Affairs 72, no. 4 (1996): 744. Reflecting this diversity of cases, see for example D. Fineman, A Special Relationship: The United States and Military Government in Thailand, 1947–1958 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997); M.H. Hunt, The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and China to 1914 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); L.G. Feldman, The Special Relationship between West Germany and Israel (Boston, ma : Allen and Unwin, 1984); B. Reich, The United States and Israel: Influence in the Special Relationship (New York: Praeger, 1984). 48 R. Xu and W. Rees, “Comparing the Anglo-American and Israeli-American Special Relationships in the Obama Era: An Alliance Persistence Perspective,” Journal of Strategic Studies 41, no. 4 (2018): 494–518. 49 J. Dumbrell, A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations from the Cold War to Iraq, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 19. 50 S. Tate, A Special Relationship? British Foreign Policy in the Era of American Hegemony (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012). 51 R.O. Freedman, ed., Israel and the United States: Six Decades of US-Israeli Relations (Boulder, co : Westview Press, 2012); J. Mearsheimer and S. Walt, The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy (London: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007); U. Krotz, “Parapublic Underpinnings of International Relations: The Franco-German Construction of Europeanization of a Particular Kind,” European Journal of International Relations 13, no. 3 (2007): 385–417. 52 Morin and Paquin, Foreign Policy Analysis, 189. 53 Krotz and Schild, Shaping Europe, 32.

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54 A. Rozental and A. Buenrostro, “Bilateral Diplomacy,” in The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy, edited by A. F. Cooper, J. Heine, and R. Thakur (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 230. 55 For examples of defence procurement choices, see for instance D. Spar, “Co-developing the fsx Fighter: The Domestic Calculus of International Co-operation,” International Journal 47, no. 2 (1992): 265–92. See also Krotz, Flying Tiger. 56 R. Neustadt, “Hearing on Conduct of National Security Policy, before the Subcommittee on National Security and International Orientation,” 1965, 11. 57 Dumbrell, Special Relationship, 272. 58 A.P. Dobson and S. Marsh, eds, Anglo American Relations: Contemporary Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 2013), 264. 59 Cited in Haugevik, Special Relationships, 108. 60 Touval and Zartman, “Introduction,” 1. 61 Haugevik, Special Relationships in World Politics, 20. 62 G.-H. Soutou, “Three Rifts, Two Reconciliations: Franco-American Relations during the Fifth Republic,” in The Atlantic Alliance under Stress: US-European Relations after Iraq, edited by D. Andrews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 102–27. 63 A. Sharp and G. Stone, eds, Anglo-French Relations in the Twentieth Century: Rivalry and Cooperation (London: Routledge, 2000); L. Bonnaud, ed., France-Angleterre: Un siècle d’Entente cordiale, 1904–2004: Deux Nations, Un seul but? (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2004); A. Capet, Britain, France and the Entente Cordiale since 1904 (London: Palgrave McMillan, 2007); R. Mayne, D. Johnson and R. Tombs, eds, Cross-Channel Currents: 100 Years of the Entente Cordiale (London: Taylor and Francis, 2004; rusi Journal, special section on “Entente Cordiale – The Centenary,” 149, no. 2, April 2004. 64 J. Howorth, “The Euro-Atlantic Dilemma: France, Britain, and the esdp ,” Journal of Transatlantic Studies 3, no. 1 (2005): 39–54. Emphasis added. 65 C. Hill, “Powers of a Kind: The Anomalous Position of France and the United Kingdom in World Politics,” International Affairs 92, no. 2 (2016), 395. 66 J. Howorth, “European Security Institutions 1945–2010: The Weaknesses and Strengths of ‘Brusselization,’” in The Routledge Handbook of European Security, edited by S. Biscop and R. Whitman (London: Routledge, 2012), 5. Emphasis added. 67 G. Anderson and M. Bell, “Bridging the English Channel: The Outlook for Anglo-French Defence Co-Operation,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 11 October 2010.

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Notes to pages 29–32

68 E.g., “The UK and France are active members of nato , the eu and the un Security Council, are Nuclear Weapon States, and have similar national security interests. Our Armed Forces are of comparable size and capability and it is clear that France remains one of the UK’s main strategic partners.” hm Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm7948, October 2010, 60. 69 Sir Peter Ricketts in C. Chick, “The fbc in conversation with Sir Peter Ricketts, British Ambassador to France,” Franco-British Council, November 2015, http://www.francobritishdefence.org/data/files/Defence/ Final_P.Ricketts_nov_2015.pdf (last accessed 30 November 2015). 70 F. Mérand, European Defence Policy: Beyond the Nation State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 125. 71 P. Schnapper, “Le Royaume-Uni et l’Europe: Toujours un malentendu?,” Hérodote 2010/2, no. 137 (2010): 137. 72 M. Duval, “The Prospects for Military Cooperation Outside Europe: A French View,” in Y. Boyer, P. Lellouche and J. Roper, eds., Franco-British Defence Cooperation: A New Entente Cordiale? (London: Routledge, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1988), 67. 73 T. Dodd, “War and Peacekeeping in the Former Yugoslavia,” House of Commons Library, Research Paper 95/100, 12 October 1995, 9–10 and 14. 74 Ibid, 14. 75 M. Jay, “France et Royaume-Uni: Des relations riches et diversifiées,” Défense nationale, no. 53 (1997): 6. 76 J. Chirac, “Discours devant l’Institut des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale (ihedn ),” Paris, 8 June 1996, http://www.jacqueschirac-asso.fr/ fr/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/IHEDN-8-06-96.pdf. 77 T. Tardy, “La France, l’Europe et la Guerre du Kosovo,” Regards sur l’actualité, no. 257 (2000): 4. 78 F. De La Serre and H. Wallace, “Les relations franco-britanniques dans l’Europe de l’après-Guerre froide,” ceri , Sciences Po, Les études du ceri , no. 1, April 1995, 15. 79 M. Vaïsse, La Puissance ou l’influence? La France dans le monde depuis 1958 (Paris: Fayard, 2009), 215. 80 Interview no. 21, High-ranking British military officer, exchange officer, April 2012. 81 J. De Rohan and D. Reiner, “La coopération bilatérale de défense entre la France et le Royaume-Uni,” French Senate, Report no. 658 (2009–2010), July 2010, 14. 82 Ibid., 13.

Notes to pages 32–4

217

83 See for instance, M. Alliot-Marie, “From Entente Cordiale to Strategic Partnership,” rusi Journal 149, no. 2 (2004), 36–8. 84 Vaïsse, La Puissance ou l’influence?, 225. 85 D. Priest, “Help from France in Key Covert Operations,” Washington Post, 3 July 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 2005/07/02/AR2005070201361_pf.html; D. Servenay, “Terrorisme: Pourquoi Alliance Base a Fermé à Paris,” Rue89, 24 May 2010, http:// rue89.nouvelobs.com/2010/05/24/terrorisme-fermeture-dalliance-base-aparis-152349. 86 W. Philpott, “The Making of the Military Entente, 1904–1914: France, the British Army, and the Prospect of War,” The English Historical Review 128, no. 534 (2013): 1155–85. 87 H. Beach, “Cooperation between Conventional Forces in Europe: A British View,” in Boyer, Lellouche, and Roper, Franco-British Defence Cooperation, 48. 88 House of Commons Defence Committee, Anglo-French Defence Cooperation, First Report, Session 1991–1992 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1991), v. 89 Ibid. 90 Ibid, 1–3. 91 UK Ministry of Defence, “UK-French Bilateral Defence Cooperation,” Verbatim, 6 September 2000, http://www.defense-aerospace.com/ article-view/verbatim/16218/uk-mod-on-anglo_french-defensecooperation.html. 92 Ibid. 93 Jay, “France et Royaume-Uni,” 7. 94 UK Ministry of Defence, “UK-French Bilateral Defence Cooperation.” 95 European Air Group, “History,” no date, http://www.euroairgroup.org/ about-eag/history/ (last accessed 14 December 2019). 96 UK Ministry of Defence, “UK-French Bilateral Defence Cooperation.” 97 House of Commons Defence Committee, Anglo-French Defence Cooperation, viii–xix. 98 Jay, “France et Royaume-Uni,” 10. 99 UK Ministry of Defence, “UK-French Bilateral Defence Cooperation.” 100 Ibid. 101 House of Commons Defence Committee, Anglo-French Defence Cooperation, 6 and House of Commons, “Anglo-French Cooperation,” in UK Parliament, Bound Volume Hansard – Written Answers, Volume 281, 8 July 1996, Column 27, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199596/ cmhansrd/vo960708/text/60708w08.htm#60708w08.html_sbhd5.

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Notes to pages 34–7

102 Interviews no. 20, senior British civil servant, mod , April 2012; no. 15, French armament engineer, dga , February 2012. 103 French Embassy in London, “Defence Procurement Attaché,” 20 August 2015, http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Defence-Procurement-Attache. 104 Duval, “The Prospects for Military Cooperation Outside Europe,” 78. 105 M. Butcher, O. Nassauer, and S. Young, “Nuclear Futures: Western European Options for Nuclear Risk Reduction,” basic-bits , Research Report 98.5, December 1998, para 4.3. 106 J. Howorth, “France,” in The European Union and National Defence Policy, edited by J. Howorth and A. Menon (London: Routledge, 1997), 31. 107 B. Tertrais, “Entente Nucléaire: Options for UK-French Nuclear Cooperation,” basic Trident Commission Discussion Paper no. 3, June 2012. 108 Butcher, Nassauer, and Young, “Nuclear Futures,” para 4.4. 109 M. Rifkind, “UK Defence Strategy: A Continuing Role for Nuclear Weapons?” UK Ministry of Defence, 16 November 1993, cited in ibid. 110 Tertrais, “Entente Nucléaire,” 10. 111 Butcher, Nassauer, and Young, “Nuclear Futures,” para 4.5. 112 Ibid., para 4.3. 113 Ibid. 114 Interview no. 54, Senior British civil servant, de&s , February 2014. 115 Ibid. 116 Y. Boyer and J. Roper, “Conclusion,” in Boyer, Lellouche and Roper, Franco-British Defence Cooperation, 181. 117 F. Crouzet, “L’Entente cordiale: Réalités et mythes d’un siècle de relations franco-britanniques,” Études Anglaises 57, no. 3 (2004): 312; rusi Journal 149, no. 2 (2004); Les Champs de Mars 15/1 (2004); Bonnaud, FranceAngleterre; Capet, Britain, France; Mayne, Johnson, and Tombs, CrossChannel Currents. 118 C. Mölling and S.-C. Brune, The Impact of the Financial Crisis on European Defence (Brussels: European Parliament, 2011), 37. 119 Interview no. 61, Former analyst, Direction des Affaires Stratégiques (das ), Ministère de la Défense, April 2014. 120 Ibid. 121 Ibid. 122 Financial Times, “Entente Frugale,” 4 November 2010, 10. Nicolas Sarkozy and David Cameron themselves later used the economic argument in their joint declaration on 2 November 2010: “We want to enable our forces to operate together, to maximise our capabilities and to obtain greater value for money from our investment in defence’. D. Cameron and

Notes to pages 37–9

123 124

125

126 127

128 129

130 131

132

133

219

N. Sarkozy, “Declaration on Defence and Security Cooperation,” London, 2 November 2010, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-francesummit-2010-declaration-on-defence-and-security-co-operation. A. Sauder, “Les changements de la politique de défense française et la coopération franco-allemande,” Politique Etrangère 61, no. 3 (1996): 583. Freedman, “Defence,” 628; J. Wither, “An Endangered Partnership: The Anglo-American Defence Relationship in the Early Twenty-First Century,” European Security 15, no. 1 (2006): 51–2; L. Aronsson, “Strategic Considerations for the Anglo-American Alliance,” in M. Clarke and M. Codner, A Question of Security: The British Defence Review in an Age of Austerity (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 80. Interview no. 61, Former analyst, Direction des Affaires Stratégiques (das ), Ministère de la Défense, April 2014; and no. 69, Former adviser to the Elysée, September 2014. UK Ministry of Defence, The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent, Cm 6694, December 2006, 26. United Nations Security Council, “Historic Summit of Security Council Pledges Support for Progress on Stalled Efforts to End Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” Meetings Coverage, SC97/46, 24 September 2009, http://www.un.org/press/en/2009/sc9746.doc.htm. Federal Party of the Liberal Democrats, “Liberal Democrat Manifesto 2010,” (2010), 65 M. Bell, “France Seeks UK Collaboration,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 22 February 2010. The same argument is found in J. Borger and R. Norton-Taylor, “France Offers to Join Forces with UK’s Nuclear Submarine Fleet,” Guardian, 19 March 2010. Interviews no. 50, Thales UK representative, February 2014, and no. 69, Former adviser to the Elysée, September 2014. In 2017, President Macron changed the name of the French Ministry of Defence (“ministère de la Défense”) into the Ministry for the Armed Forces (“ministère des Armées”). For the sake of simplicity and consistency, I will refer throughout this book to the French Ministry of Defence in the text, and ministère de la Défense in endnotes, save for the most recent publications or when referring to specific individuals’ affiliations under the new name. Multiple interviews at the French General Staff, dga , Elysée, mbda , and interview no. 56, former secretary of state for defence Liam Fox, March 2014. Interview no. 61, Former analyst, Direction des Affaires Stratégiques (das ), ministère de la Défense, April 2014.

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Notes to pages 39–44

134 De Rohan and Reiner, “La coopération bilatérale de défense.” 135 UK Ministry of Defence, “UK-France Defence Co-operation Treaty Announced,” 2 November 2010, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ uk-france-defence-co-operation-treaty-announced--2. Henceforth the second treaty will be referred to as “nuclear cooperation treaty.” 136 Interview no. 42, High-ranking British military officer, hmg Cabinet Office, December 2013. 137 Cameron and Sarkozy, “Declaration on Defence and Security Cooperation,” London, 2 November 2010, para 8.

c h a p t e r t wo 1 K. Cook, R. Hardin, and M. Levi, Cooperation without Trust? (New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 2005), 55. 2 J.G. Ruggie, “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution,” International Organization 46, no. 3 (1992): 571; R.O. Keohane, “Reciprocity in International Relations,” International Organization 40, no. 1 (1986): 4. 3 S. Touval, “Negotiated Cooperation and Its Alternatives,” in International Cooperation: The Extents and Limits of Multilateralism, edited by S. Touval and W. Zartman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 78–91; R.O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, 2nd ed. (Princeton, nj : Princeton University Press, 2005). 4 J. Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton, nj : Princeton University Press, 2001); Keohane, After Hegemony; S. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, ny : Cornell University Press, 1983). 5 K. Hartley and D. Braddon, “Collaborative Projects and the Number of Partner Nations,” Defence and Peace Economics 25, no. 6 (2014): 535–48. 6 Touval, “Negotiated Cooperation and Its Alternatives,” 85. 7 A. Thompson and D. Verdier, “Multilateralism, Bilateralism and Regime Design,” International Studies Quarterly 58 (2014): 16. 8 B. Simmons, “From Unilateralism to Bilateralism: Challenges for the Multilateral Trade System,” in Multilateralism under Challenge? Power, International Order and Structural Change, edited by E. Newman, R. Thakur, and J. Timan (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2006), 441–59 and 453; Touval, “Negotiated Cooperation and Its Alternatives,” 85.

Notes to pages 44–7

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9 G. Devin, “Paroles de diplomates: Comment les négociations multilatérales changent la diplomatie,” in Négociations internationales, edited by F. Petiteville and D. Placidi-Frot (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2013), 85. 10 K. Oye, “Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategy,” World Politics 38, no. 1 (1985): 21. Emphasis added. 11 Ruggie, “Multilateralism,” 594. 12 Oye, “Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy,” 4. Bilateral negotiations are also presented in Devin as “more occasional, conducted from day to day, according to ad hoc collaboration practices.” Devin, “Paroles de Diplomates,” 85. See also Keohane, “Reciprocity,” 4. 13 On the United States, see for instance J. Gupta, “Environmental Multilateralism under Challenge?,” in Multilateralism under Challenge, edited by Newman, Thakur, and Timan, 289–307; in Asia, see for instance J. Ravenhill, “The New Bilateralism in the Asia Pacific,” The Third World Quarterly 24, no. 2 (2003): 299–317. 14 A. Dobson and S. Marsh, Anglo-American Relations: Contemporary Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2013), 3. 15 A. Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem,” International Organization, 342; J. Checkel, “International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the Rationalist-Constructivist Divide,” European Journal of International Relations 3, no. 4 (1997): 473–95; J. Fearon and A. Wendt, “Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View,” in Handbook of International Relations, edited by W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse, and B. Simmons (London: Sage, 2002), 53; R. Sil and P. Katzenstein, “Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics: Reconfiguring Problems and Mechanisms across Research Traditions,” World Politics 8, no. 2 (2010): 411. 16 C.O. Meyer and E. Strickmann, “Solidifying Constructivism: How Material and Ideational Factors Interact in European Defence,” Journal of Common Market Studies 49, no. 1 (2011): 61–81; G. Sorensen, “The Case for Combining Material Forces and Ideas in the Study of ir ,” European Journal of International Relations 14 (2008): 5–32. 17 One distinction is that constructivists speak of interests, and rationalists of preferences. In daily parlance, and in some of the literature, one can also refer to goals or objectives. 18 R. Axelrod and R.O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” World Politics 38, no. 1 (1985): 226. 19 S. Touval and W. Zartman, “Introduction: Return to the Theories of Cooperation,” in Touval and Zartman, International Cooperation, 3.

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Notes to pages 47–51

20 T. Hopmann, “Synthesising Rational and Constructivist Perspectives on Negotiated Cooperation,” in Touval and Zartman, International Cooperation, 96. 21 R. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42, no. 3 (1988): 427–60. 22 Touval, “Negotiated Cooperation and Its Alternatives,” 84. 23 E. Gynaviski, Constructive Illusions: Misperceiving the Origins of International Cooperation (Ithaca, ny : Cornell University Press, 2014). 24 B. Palier, “Gouverner le changement des politiques de protection sociale,” in Être gouverné: Études en l’honneur de Jean Leca, edited by P. Favre, Y. Schemeil, and P. Hayward (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2003), 176. 25 B. Spector, “Deconstructing the Negotiations of Regime Dynamics,” in Getting It Done: Post-Agreement Negotiation and International Regimes, edited by B. Spector and W. Zartman (Washington, dc : United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003), 56. 26 Touval, “Negotiated Cooperation and Its Alternatives,” 84. 27 R. Kahn and M. Zald, Organizations and Nation States: New Perspectives on Conflict and Cooperation (San Francisco, ca : Jossey-Bass, 1990), 86. 28 A. Moravcsik, “Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining” in Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, edited by B. Evans, H.K. Jacobson, and R.D. Putnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 3–42. 29 Kahn and Zald, Organizations and Nation States, 28 and 42. 30 Spector, “Deconstructing the Negotiations,” 56. 31 R. Neustadt, Hearings on the Conduct of National Security Policy: Statement before the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations (Washington, dc : US Government Printing Office, 1965), 10–11. 32 G. Allison and P. Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999), chapter 3. 33 U. Krotz, “Regularized Intergovernmentalism: France-Germany and Beyond (1963–2009),” Foreign Policy Analysis 6, no. 2 (2010): 154. 34 Ibid., 56. 35 Cook, Hardin, and Levi, Cooperation without Trust, 55–8. 36 J. Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework,” International Organization 59, no. 4 (2005): 804.

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37 H. Haftendorn, R.O. Keohane, C.A. Wallander, Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 5. 38 Ruggie, “Multilateralism,” 572. Emphasis added. 39 Touval and Zartman, “Introduction,” 6. Emphasis added. 40 Ruggie, “Multilateralism,” 572. 41 Keohane, After Hegemony, 129. 42 Keohane, “Reciprocity,” 4. 43 R.O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder, co : Westview, 1989), 11; Keohane, After Hegemony, 129–30. 44 H. Wallace, “The Conduct of Bilateral Relations by Governments,” in Partners and Rivals in Western Europe: Britain, France and Germany, edited by R. Morgan and C. Bray (Aldershot: Gower Publishing, 1986), 138–9. Emphasis added. 45 Ibid., 137. 46 Ibid. 47 J.-F. Morin and G. Gagné, “What Can Best Explain the Prevalence of Bilateralism in the Investment Regime?” International Journal of Political Economy 36, no. 1 (2007): 55. 48 Axelrod and Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy,” 229. 49 Touval and Zartman, “Introduction,” 8. Emphasis added. 50 Zartman, “Negotiating the Rapids: The Dynamics of Regime Formation,” in Spector and Zartman, Getting It Done, 29. 51 Wallace, “The Conduct of Bilateral Relations by Governments,” 137. 52 Kahn and Zald, Organizations and Nation States, 36. 53 M. Smith, “The European Union and the United States of America: The Politics of ‘Bi-Multilateral’ Negotiations,” in European Union Negotiations: Processes, Networks and Institutions, edited by O. Elgström and C. Jönsson (New York: Routledge, 2005), 175. 54 R. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 131. 55 R.O. Keohane and L. Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” International Security 20, no. 1 (1995): 41–2. 56 Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, 4. 57 Cook, Hardin and Levi, Cooperation without Trust, 3. 58 E.g., J.G. Stein, “International Cooperation and Loss Avoidance: Framing the Problem,” International Journal 47 (1992): 202–34.

224 59 60 61 62 63 64

65 66 67 68 69 70 71

72 73 74 75 76 77 78

79

80

81

Notes to pages 56–62

Cook, Hardin, and Levi, Cooperation without Trust, 3. Oye, “Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy,” 17. Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation. Keohane, After Hegemony, 56. Emphasis added. J.G. March and J. Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders,” International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 948. D.C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 95, cited in P. Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence and the Study of Politics,” American Political Science Review 94, no. 2 (2000): 255. Krotz, “Regularized Intergovernmentalism,” 154. Ibid. M.E. Smith, Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalisation of Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 17. Keohane, After Hegemony, 56. Morin and Gagné, “Bilateralism in the Investment Regime,” 68. Smith, “The European Union and the United States of America,” 170. S. Barley and P.S. Tolbert, “Institutionalization and Structuration: Studying Links between Action and Institution,” Organization Studies 18, no. 1 (1997): 100. Touval, “Negotiated Cooperation and Its Alternatives,” 80. Smith, Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy, 17. Ibid., 17. Ibid., 18. Smith, Europe’s Common Security and Defence Policy. Ibid., 274. U. Krotz and J. Schild, Shaping Europe: France, Germany and Embedded Bilateralism from the Elysee Treaty to Twenty-First Century Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 31. P. Le Gales and M. Thatcher, Les réseaux de politique publique: Débat autour des Policy Networks (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1995); D. Marsh and R.A. Rhodes, Policy Networks in British Government (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992); A. Sabatier and H.C. Jenkins-Smith, eds., Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach (Boulder, co : Westview Press, 1993). J.-F. Morin, “The Two-Level Game of Transnational Networks: The Case of the Access to Medicines Campaign,” International Interactions 36, no. 4 (2010): 309–34. Morin and Paquin, Foreign Policy Analysis, 189 and 196.

Notes to pages 62–7

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82 E.g., J. Mearsheimer and S.M. Walt, “Is it Love or the Lobby? Explaining America’s Special Relationship with Israel,” Security Studies 18, no. 1 (2009): 58–78. 83 Michael Smith made a similar point in “The European Union and the United States of America,” 168. 84 A.L. George and A. Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, ma : mit Press, 2004), 69 and 76. 85 E.g., D.P. Auerswald and S. Saideman, nato in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone (Princeton, nj : Princeton University Press, 2014); S. Kreps, Coalitions of Convenience: United States Military Interventions after the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); O. Schmitt, Allies that Count: Junior Partners in Coalition Warfare (Washington, dc : Georgetown University Press, 2018); S. Von Hlatky, American Allies in Times of War: The Great Asymmetry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); P. Weitsman, Waging War: Alliances, Coalitions, and Institutions of Interstate Violence (Palo Alto, ca: Stanford University Press, 2014). 86 For example, M. Norheim-Martinsen, The European Union and Military Force: Governance and Strategy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); M.E. Smith, Europe’s Common Security and Defence Policy Capacity-Building, Experiential Learning, and Institutional Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); K. Engberg, The eu and Military Operations: A Comparative Analysis (London: Routledge, 2015); B. Giegerich, European Military Crisis Management: Connecting Ambition and Reality (London: Routledge, 2008). 87 D. Resteigne, Le Militaire en opérations multinationales: Regards croisés en Afghanistan, en Bosnie, au Liban (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2012); F. Mérand, European Defence Policy: Beyond the Nation-State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); J. Soeters and P. Manigart, Military Cooperation in Multinational Peace Operations: Managing Cultural Diversity and Crisis Response (New York: Routledge, 2008). 88 M. De Vore, “The Arms Collaboration Dilemma: Between Principal-Agent Dynamics and Collective Action Problems,” Security Studies 20, no. 4 (2011): 624–62; Hartley and Braddon, “Collaborative Projects”; A. Moravcsik, “Armament among Allies: European Weapons Collaboration, 1975–1985,” in Evans, Jacobson and Putnam, Double-Edged Diplomacy, 128–68; A. Thiem, “Conditions of Intergovernmental Armaments Cooperation in Western Europe, 1996–2006,” European Political Science Review 3, no. 1 (2011): 1–33.

226

Notes to pages 68–73

89 See J. Soeters, M. Shields, and S. Rietjens, Routledge Handbook of Research Methods in Military Studies (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014). 90 “The telephone and copying machine combine to falsify the files as sources of historical reconstruction. One may leave no record, while the other makes so many that few men entrust their own full thoughts on paper … Were a student made to choose, God forbid, between the files and the memories of participants, he would do well to take the latter.” R. Neustadt, Alliance Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), 7. 91 H. Hardt, “How nato Remembers: Explaining Institutional Memory in nato Crisis Management,” European Security 26, no. 1 (2016): 124.

c h a p t e r t h re e 1 Article 1 of the Treaty of Cooperation in Defence and Security between France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 2 E. O’Brien and A. Sinclair, The Libyan War: A Diplomatic History (New York: New York University Center on International Cooperation, 2011), 7–8. 3 J.-C. Notin, La Vérité sur notre guerre en Libye (Paris: Fayard, 2012), 33. 4 Ministry of Defence, “Libya: Operation ellamy : Background Briefing,” no date. Available from http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov. uk/20121026065214/www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/FactSheets/ MilitaryOperations/LibyaOperationEllamyBackgroundBriefing.htm (accessed 15 October 2013). See also R. Adler-Nissen and V. Pouliot, “Power in Practice: Negotiating the International Intervention in Libya,” European Journal of International Relations 20, no. 4 (2014): 10. 5 Adler-Nissen and Pouliot, “Power in Practice,” 12. 6 J. Gertler, “Operation Odyssey Dawn (Libya): Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 28 March 2011, 16. 7 J. Michaels, “Able but Not Willing: A Critical Assessment of nato ’s Libya Intervention,” in The nato Intervention in Libya: Lessons Learned from the Campaign, edited by K. Engelbrekt, M. Mohlin, and C. Wagnsson (New York: Routledge, 2014), 18–20. 8 B. Smith, “The Security Council’s ‘No-Fly Zone’ Resolution on Libya,” House of Commons Library, SI/IA/5911, 18 March 2011, 2; O’Brien and Sinclair, Libyan War, 9. 9 O’Brien and Sinclair, Libyan War, 9. 10 After less than four months in office, Alliot-Marie was accused of

Notes to pages 73–6

11 12 13 14 15

16

17

18 19 20

21 22

23

227

providing an inadequate response to the popular uprisings in Tunisia, when she offered France’s support to train Tunisian police forces to crowd management. She was also facing various personal scandals. R. Bacqué, “mam et pom , Couple encombrant,” Le Monde, 28 February 2011. Notin, La Vérité, 35. Alain Juppé, quoted in N. Nougayrède, “Paris n’exclut pas une interdiction de survol de la Libye,” Le Monde, 3 March 2011. C.S. Chivvis, Toppling Qaddafi: Libya and the Limits of Liberal Intervention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 35. O’Brien and Sinclair, Libyan War, 9–10. A. Cameron, “The Channel Axis: France, the UK and nato ,” in Short War, Long Shadow: The Political and Military Legacies of the 2011 Libyan Campaign, edited by A. Johnson and S. Mueen (London: rusi Whitehall Report, 2012), 19. D. Cameron and N. Sarkozy, “Letter from David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy to Herman Van Rompuy,” 10 March 2011. https://www. theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/10/libya-middleeast. Michaels, “Able but Not Willing”; Council on Foreign Relations, “Libya’s Strains on nato ,” 4 April 2011, https://www.cfr.org/interview/ libyas-strains-nato. The International Institute for Security Studies, “War in Libya: Europe’s Confused Response,” Strategic Comment 17, no. 18 (2011): 2. D. Göler and M. Jopp, “L’Allemagne, la Libye et L’Union Européenne,” Politique Etrangère, no. 2 (2011): 421–2. Michaels, “Able but Not Willing,” 20; M. Kandel, “Leading from Behind: Le Nouvel interventionnisme américain? Barack Obama et la crise Libyenne,” in Réflexions sur la crise libyenne, edited by P. Razoux (Paris: irsem , 2013), 29. United Nations Security Council, “Security Council Resolution 1973,” S/RES/1973(2011), 17 March 2011, §4. Le Monde, “Le Conseil de Sécurité approuve le recours à la force en Libye,” 18 March 2011, http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2011/03/17/ le-conseil-de-securite-approuve-le-recours-a-la-force-en-libye_1494951_ 3212.html. House of Commons, “Oral Answers to Questions: Libya and the Middle East,” Daily Hansard – Debate, 7 March 2011, Column 643, http:// www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm110307/ debtext/110307-0001.htm#11030711000002.

228

Notes to pages 76–8

24 Chivvis, Toppling Qaddafi, 39. 25 Assemblée nationale, Compte Rendu Intégral, XIIIème Legislature, Session Ordinaire de 2010–2011, 22 March 2011. http://www.assembleenationale.fr/13/cri/2010-2011/20110144.as. 26 Alder-Nissen and Pouliot, “Power in Practice,” 17. 27 For an overview of the eu ’s limitations, see the International Institute for Security Studies, “War in Libya.” 28 Interview no. 40, Top-ranking British military officer, Air Command, December 2013. 29 Chivvis, Toppling Qaddafi, 37. 30 Interview no. 37, High-ranking French military officer, ema , December 2013. 31 Interview no. 69, Former adviser to the Elysée, September 2014. 32 J.-M. Tanguy, Harmattan: Récits et révélations (Paris: Nimrod, 2012), 33. 33 Commandant des Forces Aériennes (cfa ). 34 Interview no. 69, Former adviser to the Elysée, September 2014. 35 Interview no. 33, High-ranking British military officer, mod , October 2013. 36 Notin, La Vérité, 192. 37 Interview no. 61, Former analyst, Direction des Affaires Stratégiques (das ), Ministère de la Défense, April 2014. 38 Interview no. 40, Top-ranking British military officer, Air Command, December 2013. 39 Cameron, “Channel Axis,” 21. 40 Interview no. 63, former chief of the defence staff David Richards, April 2014. 41 M. Lindström and K. Zetterlund, “Setting the Stage for the Military Intervention in Libya: Decisions Made and their Implication for the eu and nato ,” foi , Report no. 3498, October 2012, 55. 42 A. Nygren, “Executing Strategy From the Air,” in nato Intervention in Libya, edited by Engelbrekt, Mohlin, and Wagnsson, 112. 43 S. Flanagan, “Libya: Managing the Fragile Coalition,” csis Commentary, 24 March 2011, http://csis.org/publication/ libya-managing-fragile-coalition. 44 P. Wintour and N. Watt, “David Cameron’s Libyan War: Why the pm Felt Gaddafi Had to Be Stopped,” Guardian, 2 October 2011, http://www. theguardian.com/politics/2011/oct/02/david-cameron-libyan-war-analysis. 45 Interview no. 61, Former analyst, Direction des Affaires Stratégiques (das ), Ministère de la Défense, April 2014.

Notes to pages 78–81

229

46 Interview no. 38, High-ranking French military officer, Elysée, December 2013. 47 Nygren, “Executing Strategy from the Air,” 113. 48 P. Gros, “De Odyssey Dawn à Unified Protector: Bilan transitoire, perspectives et premiers enseignements de l’engagement en Libye,” Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Note no. 04/11, April 2011, 7. 49 Embassy of France in the United States, “Paris Summit for the Support of the Libyan People – Statement by Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the Republic,” 19 March 2011, https://uk.ambafrance.org/ President-Sarkozy-urges-Gaddafi-to. 50 Royal Aeronautical Society, “Lessons Offered from the Libya Air Campaign,” Specialist Paper, July 2012, 5. 51 House of Commons Defence Committee, “Operations in Libya,” 9th Report of Session 2010–2012, hc 950 (Vol. I), February 2012, 38. 52 Interview no. 40, Top-ranking British military officer, Air Command, December 2013. 53 H. Clinton, Hard Choices (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2014), 373. 54 Cameron, “Channel Axis,” 20. 55 Interview with a high-ranking French military officer, defence staff, London, April 2014. 56 Notin, La Vérité, 190. 57 Ibid., 192. 58 Interview no. 61, Former analyst, Direction des Affaires Stratégiques (das ), Ministère de la Défense, April 2014. 59 Interview no. 33, High-ranking British military officer, mod , October 2013. 60 Nygren, “Executing Strategy from the Air,” 112. 61 Interview no. 40, Top-ranking British military officer, Air Command, December 2013. 62 Interview no. 61, Former analyst, Direction des Affaires Stratégiques (das ), Ministère de la Défense, April 2014. 63 S. Grouard, “Avis fait au nom de la Commission de la Défense nationale et des forces armées sur le Projet de Loi de Finances pour 2013 (N° 235) Tome VI: Défense, préparation et emploi des Forces: Air,” Assemblée nationale, no. 256, 10 October 2012, 36. 64 House of Commons Defence Committee, “Operations in Libya (Vol.I),” 35; C. Wollert, “Naval Assets, Not Just a Tool for War,” in nato Intervention in Libya, edited by Engelbrekt, Mohlin, and Wagnsson, 137. 65 Notin, La Vérité, 197.

230

Notes to pages 81–4

66 P. Weitsman, Waging War: Alliances, Coalitions, and Institutions of Interstate Violence (Palo Alto, ca : Stanford University Press, 2014), 166. 67 Interview no. 40, Top-ranking British military officer, Air Command, December 2013 and interview no. 62, High-ranking French military officer, exchange officer, April 2014. 68 Interview no. 62, High-ranking French military officer, exchange officer, April 2014. 69 Interview no. 19, High-ranking British military officer, liaison officer, March 2012. 70 Interview no. 62, High-ranking French military officer, exchange officer, April 2014. 71 M.W. Kometer and S.E. Wright, “Winning in Libya: By Design or Default,” ifri , Focus Stratégique, no. 41, January 2013, 15. 72 D. Charter and R. Watson, “Libya: France Accepts Compromise as Alliance Begins Naval Operation to Enforce Arms Embargo,” Times, 25 March 2011. 73 Michaels, “Able but Not Willing,” 24. 74 J.-J. Mevel, “L’otan hérite d’un ‘rôle clé’ dans les opérations en Libye,” Le Figaro, 23 March 2011. 75 Lindström and Zetterlund, “Setting the Stage,” 18. 76 J. Tirpak, “nato ’s lessons from Libya,” Air Force Magazine, 28 May 2013, https://www.airforcemag.com/article/0613libya/. 77 Royal Aeronautical Society, “Lessons Offered,” 3. 78 D.P. Auerswald and S. Saideman, nato in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone (Princeton, nj : Princeton University Press, 2014), 197. 79 Cameron, “Channel Axis,” 22. 80 B. Obama, “Remarks by the President on the Situation in Libya,” White House Office of the Press Secretary, 18 March 2011, http:// www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/18/remarks-presidentsituation-libya. 81 Interview no. 37, High-ranking French military officer, ema , December 2013. 82 Michaels, “Able but Not Willing,” 24. 83 Ibid. 84 M Lindström and Zetterlund, “Setting the Stage,” 46. 85 Interview no. 40, Top-ranking British military officer, Air Command, December 2013. 86 M. Clarke et al., “Accidental Heroes: Britain, France, and the Libya Operation,” rusi , Campaign Report, September 2011, 7.

Notes to pages 84–7

231

87 Royal Aeronautical Society, “Lessons Offered”; Tirpak, “nato ’s Lessons from Libya.” 88 Kometer and Wright, “Winning in Libya,” 17 and 8. 89 Interview no. 62, High-ranking French military officer, Exchange officer, April 2014. 90 Interview no. 38, High-ranking French military officer, emp, December 2013. 91 T. Harrois, “Royaume-Uni et Union Européenne à l’heure de la ‘guerre humanitaire’: Construction d’une nouvelle politique étrangère et de défense?” (Masters diss., Ecole Normale Supérieure de Lyon, 2012), 100. See also Tanguy, Harmattan, 57. 92 Interview no. 62, High-ranking French military officer, exchange officer, April 2014. 93 Harrois, “Royaume-Uni et Union Européenne,” 101. 94 Gros, “De Odyssey Dawn à Unified Protector,” 8. 95 Johnson and Mueen, Short War, ix–x. 96 Comparing the estimates in Johnson and Mueen (Short War) and Gros (“De Odyssey Dawn à Unified Protector”), the total number of French combat aircraft at the peak of the missions varies between twenty-seven and thirty-eight; for the UK the number is twenty-two in both estimates. 97 On the British isr contribution, see C. Goulter, “The British Experience: Operation Ellamy,” in Precision and Purpose: Air Power in the Libyan Civil War, edited by K. Mueller (Santa Monica, ca : Rand Corporation, 2015), 177. 98 House of Commons Defence Committee, “Operations in Libya,” 9th Report of Session 2010–2012, hc 950, Vol. 2, February 2012, 48. 99 House of Commons Defence Committee, “Operations in Libya,” Vol. 1, 9. 100 Johnson and Mueen, Short War, ix–x; House of Commons Defence Committee, “Operations in Libya,” Vol. 1, 45. 101A. Gilli, “Procurement Lessons from the War in Libya,” rusi Defence Systems 15, no. 2, 2013. 102 House of Commons Defence Committee, “Operations in Libya,” Vol. 1, 107; J. Drape, “Building Partnership Capacity: Operation Harmattan and Beyond,” Air and Space Power Journal 26, no. 5, 2012, 68. 103 Drape, “Building Partnership Capacity,” 68. 104 M. Clarke, “The Making of Britain’s Strategy,” in Short War, edited by Johnson and Mueen, 9. 105 Interview no. 61, Former analyst, Direction des Affaires Stratégiques (das ), Ministère de la Défense, April 2014. 106 Lindström and Zetterlund, “Setting the Stage,” 18.

232

Notes to pages 87–92

107 hmg Prime Minister’s Office, “Libya Crisis: National Security Adviser’s Review of Central Coordination and Lessons Learned,” 30 November 2011, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/libya-crisisnational-security-advisers-view-of-central-coordination-andessons-learned. 108 H. Samuel and J. Kirkup, “Libya: France Leaves David Cameron Struggling to Regain Initiative,” Telegraph, 22 August 2011. 109 Public Sénat, “Discours de Nicolas Sarkozy, David Cameron et Moustapha Abdeljalil à Benghazi,” video, 15 September 2011, https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=0bhtPbkbKCA. 110 Interview no. 61, Former analyst, Direction des Affaires Stratégiques (das ), Ministère de la Défense, April 2014. 111 House of Commons Defence Committee, “Operations in Libya,” vol. 2, 118. 112 Wollert, “Naval Assets,” 135. 113 Interview no. 62, High-ranking French military officer, exchange officer, April 2014. 114 Notin, La Vérité, 138. 115 Interview no. 61, Former analyst, Direction des Affaires Stratégiques (das ), Ministère de la Défense, April 2014. 116 Air Actualités, “Focus: Ciel dégagé sur la coopération franco-britannique,” no. 647, December–January 2012, 44–5. 117 Interview no. 39, High-ranking French military officer, ema , December 2013. 118 Weitsman, Waging War, 171. 119 M. Urban, UK Eyes Alpha: The Inside Story of British Intelligence (London: Faber and Faber, 1997), 57. 120 “Britain … had disinvested in its support for nato for nearly a decade and found it challenging to operate with partners other than the United States. This was particularly true in relation to intelligence sharing.” Goulter, “British Experience,” 154. 121 C. Grand, “The French Experience: Sarkozy’s War?” in Precision and Purpose, edited by K. Mueller, 199. 122 Goulter, “British Experience,” 166. 123 A.M. Britton, “The Origins, Utility and Strategic Implications of the 2010 Anglo-French Security and Defence Treaty” (mp hil diss., University of Cambridge, 2014), 55–6. 124 Ibid. 125 Ibid. 126 O’Brien and Sinclair, Libyan War, 14. 127 Clarke et al., “Accidental Heroes,” 2.

Notes to pages 92–4

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128 O’Brien and Sinclair, Libyan War, 16. 129 Interview no. 69, Former adviser to the Elysée, September 2014. 130 Ibid. The rest of the paragraph is based on the interview with this officer directly involved in the mission. 131 “Mais qu’est-ce qu’ils foutent?! Qu’est-ce qu’il fout, Cameron?” 132 Clarke et al., “Accidental Heroes,” 2; D. McElroy, J. Kirkup and T. Harding, “Libya: British Attack Helicopters to Be Deployed,” Telegraph, 23 May 2011. 133 Interview no. 39, High-ranking French military officer, ema , December 2013. 134 Ibid. See also R. Szternberg, “Les Enseignement de l’intervention en Libye de 2011 sur la stratégie aérienne et sur la doctrine d’emploi des moyens aériens français” (Masters diss., Institut d’Etudes Politiques d’Aix-enProvence, 2012), 172. 135 Notin, La Vérité, 376–7. 136 Interviews no. 9, High-ranking British military officer, mod , February 2012, and no. 33, High-ranking British military officer, mod , October 2013. 137 Interview no. 39, High-ranking French military officer, ema , December 2013. 138 UK Ministry of Defence, “Joint Doctrine Publication: UK air and space doctrine (jdp 0-30),” July 2013, §4–9. 139 “Il n’y avait pas de synchronisation des effets puisqu’on était sur deux zones différentes, sur ordre de Naples. Donc il n’y avait pas de coopération.” Interview no. 39, High-ranking French military officer, ema , December 2013. 140 C. Pocock, “Attack Helicopters Boost nato Air Ops over Libya,” Ain Online, 18 July 2011, http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/aindefense-perspective/2011-07-18/attack-helicopters-boost-nato-air-opsover-libya. 141 nato , “nato Secretary General Statement on End of Libya Mission,” press release, 28 October 2011, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/ news_80052.htm. 142 C. Moore, after the Fall of Gaddafi: The Role of the International Community in Stabilising a Fractured Libya,” accord , Conflict Trends no. 1, 11 April 2015, 51. 143 un Support Mission to Libya, “Mandate,” no date, https://unsmil.unmissions.org/mandate (accessed 9 December 2019). 144 Ibid.; A. Gallet, “Les Enjeux du chaos libyen,” Politique Etrangère 2 (2015) : 104.

234

Notes to pages 94–8

145 M. DeVore, “Exploiting Anarchy: Violent Entrepreneurs and the Collapse of Libya’s Post-Qadhafi Settlement,” Mediterranean Politics 19, no. 3 (2014): 463–70. 146 C. Chivvis, “Countering the Islamic State in Libya,” Survival 58, no. 4 (2016): 113. 147 M. Toaldo, “Europe: Carving Out a New Role” in Foreign Actors in Libya’s Crisis, edited by K. Merzan and A. Varvelli (Milan: Ledizioni LediPublishing/Atlantic Council/ISPI, 2017), 59. 148 Ibid. 149 J. Lunn, “Libya’s Civil War: Haftar the Strongman?” House of Commons Library, March 2017; J. Harchaoui, “How France Is Making Libya Worse: Macron Is Strengthening Haftar,” Foreign Affairs, 21 September 2017. 150 N. Guibert, “La Guerre secrète de la France en Libye,” Le Monde, 24 February 2016. 151 K. El-Bar, “Leaked Tapes Expose Western Support for Renegade Libyan General,” Middle East Eye, 29 July 2016, http://www.middleeasteye.net/ news/revealed-leaked-tapes-expose-western-support-renegade-libyangeneral-185825787; R. Donaghy, “Britain and Jordan’s Secret War in Libya,” Middle East Eye, 25 March 2016, http://www.middleeasteye.net/ news/revealed-britain-and-jordan-s-secret-war-libya-147374304. 152 Kometer and Wright, “Winning in Libya,” 13. 153 N. Nougayrède, “Derrière la protection des civils, l’objectif inavoué d’un changement de régime,” Le Monde, 22 March 2011. 154 Interview no. 69, Former adviser to the Elysée, September 2014. 155 Ibid. 156 Ibid. and no. 39, High-ranking French military officer, ema , December 2013. 157 E. Quintana, “The War from the Air,” in Short War, edited by Johnson and Mueen, 31. 158 M. De Langlois, “Les opérations en Libye: Le rôle de l’ue et de L’otan ” in Razoux, Réflexions sur la crise libyenne, 26. 159 There were possibly hopes for other indirect gains such as arms exports (via the display of certain high-end military capabilities) or cheap oil contracts (by making deals with post-Gaddafi leaders), but these can only be assumed. 160 R.B. Jense, “Managing Perceptions: Strategic Communication and the Story of Success in Libya,” in Engelbrekt, Mohlin, and Wagnsson, nato Intervention in Libya, 179. 161 Interview no. 63, former chief of the defence staff David Richards, April 2014.

Notes to pages 98–102

235

162 Grouard, “Avis,” 43. Emphasis added. 163 Interview no. 63, former chief of the defence staff David Richards, April 2014. 164 “Certaines choses sont importantes pour la France … pouvoir monter une disponibilité des moyens militaires … c’est une motivation pour les armées … Il y a une saine concurrence entre nous. C’est comme dans un match de foot, il faut qu’il en ait un qui marque le premier.” Interview no. 26, High-ranking French military officer, ema , April 2013. 165 “C’est du troc!” Interview no. 38, High-ranking French military officer, emp , December 2013. 166 Interview no. 61, Former analyst, Direction des Affaires Stratégiques (das ), Ministère de la Défense, April 2014. 167 Cameron, “Channel Axis,” 20. 168 Interview no. 61, Former analyst, Direction des Affaires Stratégiques (das ), Ministère de la Défense, April 2014.

c ha p t e r f o u r 1 Jonathan Alford, “The Prospects for Military Cooperation Outside Europe: A British View,” in Franco-British Defence Cooperation: A New Entente Cordiale? edited by Y. Boyer, P. Lellouche, and J. Roper (London: Routledge, 1989), 92. 2 Article 2 of the Treaty of Cooperation in Defence and Security between France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, London, 2 November 2010. 3 D. Cameron and N. Sarkozy, “Declaration on Defence and Security Cooperation,” London, 2 November 2010, https://www.gov.uk/ government/news/uk-france-summit-2010-declaration-on-defenceand-security-co-operation. 4 Interview no. 61, Former analyst, Direction des Affaires Stratégiques (das ), ministère de la Défense, April 2014. 5 Interview no. 2, High-ranking French military officer, emat , January 2012. 6 Ibid. 7 Interview no. 61, Former analyst, Direction des Affaires Stratégiques (das ), ministère de la Défense, April 2014. 8 Ibid. 9 Interview no. 4, High-ranking French armament engineer, dga , February 2012.

236

Notes to pages 104–6

10 Interview no. 3, High-ranking French military officer, ema , February 2012. 11 Ibid. 12 UK Ministry of Defence, “Establishment of International Policy France (ip France),” Defence Instructions and Notices, unpublished, dated November 2011. 13 Interview no. 47, High-ranking British military officer, Joint Force Command, February 2014; Ministère de la Défense and UK Ministry of Defence, cjef Secretariat, “cjef Newsletter Edition 3,” dated July 2014, unpublished, 5. 14 The following remark is illustrative: “We have to ensure that there is a certain balance. On the A400M [transport aircraft], typically … if we do such an exchange [of pilots], it must take place the same year. We are not going to say ‘OK, we have one British pilot coming and in four years’ time a French one will go’!” Interview no. 5, High-ranking French military officer, ema , February 2012. 15 Observation of Exercise Griffin Rise vip Day, Mont Valérien Fortress, 16 June 2015. 16 Interview no. 14, High-ranking French military officer, ema , February 2012. On the bilateral relations between the navies in a historical perspective, see A. Sheldon-Duplaix, “Franco-British Relations at Sea and Overseas,” Naval War College Review 64, no.1 (2011): 79–94. 17 Ibid, 84. 18 Interview no. 27, High-ranking British military officer, exchange officer, May 2013. 19 Observation of the Steering Group Light meeting, Joint Force Command, 1–3 April 2014. 20 Interview no. 41, High-ranking British military officer, Joint Force Command, December 2013. 21 Ibid. 22 C. Chick, “fbc 2011 Annual Defence Conference report,” Franco-British Council, 31 March 2011, 2. Emphasis added. 23 Interview no. 15, French armament engineer, dga , February 2012. 24 Interview no. 3, High-ranking French military officer, ema , February 2012. 25 Interview no. 2, High-ranking French military officer, emat , January 2012. 26 Interview no. 48, High-ranking British military officer, Joint Force Command, February 2014.

Notes to pages 106–9

237

27 Interview no. 14, High-ranking French military officer, ema , February 2012. 28 Interview no. 47, High-ranking British military officer, Joint Force Command, February 2014. 29 Interview no. 41, High-ranking British military officer, Joint Force Command, December 2013. 30 Interview no. 35, Senior British civil servant, mod , November 2013. 31 Interview no. 5, High-ranking French military officer, ema , February 2012; interview no. 72, High-ranking French military officer, nato , October 2014. 32 Interview no. 72, High-ranking French military officer, nato , October 2014. 33 cjef Secretariat, “cjef Newsletter Edition 4,” dated January 2015, unpublished, 1. Emphases added. 34 Interview no. 27, High-ranking British military officer, exchange officer, May 2013. 35 Interview no. 4, High-ranking French armament engineer, dga , February 2012. 36 H. Morin and L. Fox, “Lettre d’intention entre le ministre de la Défense de la République Française et le Secrétaire d’Etat à la Défense du RoyaumeUni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord concernant l’intensification de la coopération bilatérale au niveau interarmées et des armées,” signed in London on 2 November 2010, unpublished. 37 Adm. E. Guillaud and Gen. Sir D. Richards, “Lettre conjointe du Chef d’état-major des Armées et du Chief of Defence Staff,” dated 2 February 2011, unpublished. 38 cicde and dcdc , “Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (cjef ) User Guide,” 20 November 2012, §103. 39 D. Cameron and N. Sarkozy, “UK-France Declaration on Security and Defence,” Paris, 17 February 2012, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ uk-france-declaration-on-security-and-defence. 40 cicde and dcdc , “User Guide,” §103. 41 Interview no. 1, Top-ranking French military officer, ema , January 2012. 42 Cameron and Sarkozy, “Declaration on Defence and Security Cooperation.” 43 Interview no. 47, High-ranking British military officer, Joint Force Command, February 2014. 44 Ministère de la Défense, Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale (Paris: Direction de l’information légale et administrative, 2013), 90–2.

238

Notes to pages 109–12

45 Interview no. 1, Top-ranking French military officer, ema , January 2012. 46 Interview no. 18, High-ranking British military officer, mod , March 2012. 47 Interview no. 56, Former secretary of state for defence Liam Fox, March 2014. 48 Interview no. 39, High-ranking French military officer, ema , December 2013. 49 L. Fox, “Speech: The eu Should Only Act When nato Cannot,” London, 11 February 2010, https://conservative-speeches.sayit.mysociety.org/ speech/601535. 50 Interview no. 48, High-ranking British military officer, Joint Force Command, February 2014. 51 Interview no. 66, High-ranking French military officer, ema , May 2014. 52 Ministère de la Défense, Livre blanc, 15. 53 House of Commons Defence Committee, “The Strategic Defence and Security Review and the National Security Strategy,” Sixth Report of Session 2010–12, August 3, 2011, Ev. 137–40. 54 Ministère de la Défense, Livre blanc, 15. 55 Interview no. 61, Former analyst, Direction des Affaires Stratégiques (das ), ministère de la Défense, April 2014. 56 Observation of the Steering Group Light Workshop meeting, Joint Force Command, 4 March 2014. 57 Interviews no. 38, High-ranking French military officer, emp , December 2013; no. 27, High-ranking British military officer, exchange officer, May 2013. 58 Interviews no. 38, High-ranking French military officer, emp , December 2013; no. 58, French diplomat, French Embassy in London, March 2014; no. 72, High-ranking French military officer, nato , October 2014. 59 Interview no. 62, High-ranking French military officer, Exchange officer, April 2014. 60 Ibid. 61 Interview no. 57, High-ranking French military officer, Exchange officer, March 2014. 62 Interview no. 47, High-ranking British military officer, Joint Force Command, February 2014. 63 Observation of the Steering Group Light meeting, Joint Force Command, 1-3 April 2014. 64 As presented to the participants to Exercise Griffin Rise, Phase III, Execution Plenary meeting, Mont Valérien Fortress, 3 June 2015. 65 Interview no. 40, Top-ranking British military officer, Air Command, December 2013.

Notes to pages 112–18

239

66 Interview no. 99, High-ranking British military officer, Development Concepts and Doctrine Centre (dcdc ), May 2017. 67 Interviews no. 40, Top-ranking British military officer, Air Command, December 2013; no. 24, High-ranking French military officer, ema , April 2013. 68 cicde and dcdc , “User Guide,” §301. 69 Ibid. 70 Interview no. 24, High-ranking French military officer, ema , April 2013. 71 Ibid. 72 cicde and dcdc , “User Guide,” §301e. 73 Interview no. 48, High-ranking British military officer, Joint Force Command, February 2014. 74 cicde and dcdc , “User Guide,” annex. 75 Interview no. 39, High-ranking French military officer, ema , December 2013. 76 Interview no. 41, High-ranking British military officer, Joint Force Command, December 2013. 77 cicde and dcdc , “User Guide,” §2-2. 78 Interview no. 41, High-ranking British military officer, Joint Force Command, December 2013. 79 cicde and dcdc , “User guide,” §223. 80 Interview no. 48, High-ranking British military officer, Joint Force Command, February 2014. 81 Etat-major interarmées de force et d’entraînement (emia-fe ), “Présentation exercice Griffin Rise (gr ),” briefing note, 2 March 2015. 82 French participants at Steering Group Light workshop, Observation no. 2, Steering Group Light workshop, Joint Force Command, 4 March 2014. 83 cicde and dcdc , “User Guide.” 84 Ibid. 85 British military officer at the Steering Group Light workshop, Joint Force Command, 4 March 2014. 86 Interview no. 66, High-ranking French military officer, ema , May 2014. 87 High-ranking British military officer during the Steering Group Light Workshop meeting, Joint Force Command, 4 March 2014. 88 Observation of the Steering Group Light meeting, Joint Force Command, 1–3 April 2014. 89 British officer during the observation of the Steering Group Light meeting, Joint Force Command, 1–3 April 2014. 90 French officer during the observation of the Steering Group Light meeting. 91 Email conversation with a high-ranking British military officer, Joint Force Command, 5 February 2014. Emphasis in original.

240

Notes to pages 119–21

92 Exercises are of different kinds. Some involve single services and some are joint; some are bilateral and some multilateral; some are “live exercises” (livex ) – i.e., involving actual equipment (ships, tanks, aircraft) and military forces on the ground – while others are computer-based and aimed at testing command structures and procedures (called “command post exercises” [cpx ]). 93 Interview no. 64, High-ranking French military officer, ema , May 2014. 94 rp Defence, “Titanium Falcon 2013, un exemple de coopération franco-britannique,”25 May 2013, http://rpdefense.over-blog.com/titaniumfalcon-2013-un-exemple-de-coop%C3%A9ration-franco-britannique. 95 Interview no. 64, High-ranking French military officer, ema , May 2014. 96 emia-fe , “Présentation exercice Griffin Rise.” 97 Observation of Exercise Griffin Rise Phase III Execution Plenary meeting, Mont Valérien Fortress, 3 June 2015. 98 Observation of Exercise Griffin Rise vip Day, Mont Valérien Fortress, 16 June 2015. 99 Ibid. 100 Ibid. 101 British participant during the Steering Group Light Workshop meeting, Joint Force Command, 4 March 2014. 102 Ministère de la Défense, “Dossier de Presse: Exercice Griffin Strike 2016,” press kit, 20 April 2016, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/salle-de-presse/ dossiers-de-presse/dp-griffin-strike#.VxeVXooFVYY.twitter. 103 On the specifics of cis interoperability issues in the cjef , see G. Pernin et. al., Targeted Interoperability: New Imperative for Multinational Operations (Rand : Santa Monica, 2019), 51. 104 A. Barluet, “La France et la Grande-Bretagne testent leur corps expéditionnaire,” Le Figaro, 23 April 2016, 6. 105 N. Guibert, “Une étape majeure pour la force expéditionnaire franco-britannique,” Le Monde, 22 April 2016, http://www.lemonde.fr/international/ article/2016/04/22/une-etape-majeure-pour-la-force-expeditionnairefranco-britannique_4907058_3210.html. 106 E. Macron and T. May, “United Kingdom-France Summit Communiqué,” Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 18 January 2018, para 15. 107 Interview no. 61, Former analyst, Direction des Affaires Stratégiques (das ), ministère de la Défense, April 2014. 108 Interview no. 33, High-ranking British military officer, mod , October 2013. 109 Interview no. 5, High-ranking French military officer, ema , February 2012.

Notes to pages 122–3

241

110 Ministère de la Défense, Livre blanc, 91. 111 D. Richards, “UK Joint Expeditionary Force (jef ): Speech at the Royal United Services Institute,” London, 17 December 2012, https://www.gov. uk/government/speeches/chief-of-the-defence-staff-general-sir-davidrichards-speech-to-the-royal-united-services-institute-rusi-17december-2012. 112 Richards, “UK Joint Expeditionary Force,” and Interview no. 41, Highranking British military officer, Joint Force Command, December 2013. 113 Ministry of Defence, “International partners sign joint expeditionary force agreement,” 5 September 2014, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ international-partners-sign-joint-expeditionary-force-agreement. 114 Richards, “UK Joint Expeditionary Force.” 115 Interview no. 42, High-ranking British military officer, hmg Cabinet Office, December 2013. 116 Ibid. 117 Interview no. 63, former chief of the defence staff David Richards, April 2014. Richards was already chief of the defence staff in November 2010 during the Franco-British rapprochement. 118 Ibid. 119 Interview no. 42, High-ranking British military officer, Cabinet Office, December 2013. 120 Interview no. 66, High-ranking French military officer, ema , May 2014. 121 Interview no. 41, High-ranking British military officer, Joint Force Command, December 2013. 122 Interview no. 70, French diplomat, due , September 2014. 123 Interview no. 72, High-ranking French military officer, nato , October 2014 124 Interview no. 33, High-ranking British military officer, mod , October 2013. 125 Interview no. 40, Top-ranking British military officer, Air Command, December 2013. 126 Interview no. 42, High-ranking British military officer, hmg Cabinet Office, December 2013; interview no. 40, Top-ranking British military officer, Air Command, December 2013. 127 Interview no. 42, High-ranking British military officer, hmg Cabinet Office, December 2013. 128 Interview no. 66, High-ranking French military officer, ema , May 2014. 129 nato , “Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales,” 5 September 2014, §67, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_ texts_112964.htm.

242

Notes to pages 123–31

Interview no. 71, French diplomat, nato , October 2014. Ibid. nato , “Declaration,” §68. Interview no. 48, High-ranking British military officer, Joint Force Command, February 2014. 134 Ibid. 135 Interview no. 3, High-ranking French military officer, ema , February 2012. 136 French officer during the Steering Group Light Meeting, Joint Force Command, 1–3 April 2014.

130 131 132 133

c ha p t e r f i ve 1 Clive Neville, team leader for “Complex Weapons International Cooperation and Strategy” at de&s at the mod , cited in UK Ministry of Defence, desider , no. 103, January 2017, 24. 2 Ministry of Defence, Defence Industrial Strategy: Defence White Paper, Cm 6697, December 2005, 102. 3 Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, “Audition de M. Antoine Bouvier, président-directeur général de mbda , sur la coopération franco-britannique et la filière missile,” Assemblée nationale, XIIIth législature, Compte rendu no. 39, 18 May 2011, 4. 4 H. Masson, “La réorganisation de l’industrie de défense britannique,” Fondation pour la recherche stratégique, Recherches et documents no. 5/2008, December 2007, 63. 5 T. Blair and J. Chirac, “Franco-British Summit: Declaration on Security and Defence,” Paris, 9 June 2006. 6 G. Brown and N. Sarkozy, “Joint UK-France Summit Declaration,” London, 27 March 2008. 7 D. Cameron and N. Sarkozy, “Declaration on Defence and Security Cooperation,” London, 2 November 2010. 8 For the sake of simplicity, I refer to the program’s name Sea Venom/anl , which is how it has been referred to in the most recent UK-French official documents. 9 Think Defence, “UK Complex (Guided) Weapons – Reference,” 10 April 2013, https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/uk-complex-weapons/. 10 Commission de la Défense nationale et des forces armées, “Audition de M. Antoine Bouvier,” 5. 11 Think Defence, “UK Complex Weapons.”

Notes to pages 132–5

243

12 S. Wadey, “Progressing Team Complex Weapons,” rusi Defence Systems, June 2010, 90–1. 13 Interview no. 15, French armament engineer, dga , February 2012. 14 Interview no. 83, mbda Group General Secretariat, May 2015. 15 Ibid. 16 Commission de la Défense nationale et des forces armées, “Audition de M. Antoine Bouvier,” 5. 17 O. Martin, “‘One mbda ’ – Une piste vers un partage de souveraineté,” Presentation at Euro Défense conference, Paris, 6 May 2011. 18 Interview no. 46, British civil servant, de&s , February 2014. 19 Interview no. 83, mbda Group General Secretariat, May 2015. 20 G. Lecompte-Boinet, “mbda , presque un airbus des missiles,” L’Usine Nouvelle, 12 May 2011. 21 Ibid. 22 “With the specialization of different parts of the missile in each country it will become increasingly hard to back out of the partnership and be able to build your own missile. And when the next missile has to be replaced France and Britain will probably no longer have the capability to replace it on their own.” C. Hoyos, “mbda Missile ‘Turning Point’ for European Defence Cooperation,” Financial Times, 11 March 2014. 23 A. Ruello, “Missiles: mbda de plus en plus franco-britannique,” Les Echos, 22 July 2015. 24 Interview no. 80, mbda France representative, November 2014. 25 Ibid. 26 G. Brown and N. Sarkozy, “Déclaration franco-britannique sur la défense et la sécurité,” Evian, 6 July 2009. 27 Naval Technology, “fasgw (h )/anl Anti-Ship Missile, United Kingdom,” no date, http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/fasgw-h-anl-anti-shipmissile/ (accessed 4 November 2019); R. Scott, “mbda reveals fasgw / anl configuration,” Jane’s, 5 July 2010. 28 D. Richardson, “UK and France Launch Assessment Phase of fasgw /anl Anti-Ship Missile,” Jane’s, October 5, 2009. 29 Interview no. 81, mbda France representative, November 2014. 30 Interview no. 52, High-ranking French armament engineer, exchange officer, February 2014. 31 Defense Industry Daily, “Light Naval Strike: mbda ’s Sea Venom/anl Missile,” last updated 19 December 2018, http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/light-naval-strike-mbdas-fasgw-h-anl-missile-012879. 32 Interview no. 83, mbda Group General Secretariat, May 2015.

244

Notes to pages 135–7

33 Interview no. 68, Alain Ruello, journalist at Les Echos, September 2014. 34 ihs Global Limited, “Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Procurement, France,” 19 March 2013. 35 D. Cameron and N. Sarkozy, “UK-France Declaration on Security and Defence,” Paris, 17 February 2012. 36 D. Donald, “Paris 2011: bae and Dassault Team up for Telemos,” ain Online, 19 June 2011, http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/2011-06-19/paris-2011-bae-and-dassault-team-telemos. Memorandums of understanding are not binding. 37 Cameron and Sarkozy, “UK-France Declaration.” 38 Ambassade de France à Londres, “Réponse au questionnaire à l’attention de l’Attaché de Défense et de l’Attaché d’Armement auprès de l’ambassade de France à Londres, préalable à leur audition le 23 mai 2013 sur ‘La conduite des programmes d’armement en coopération’ par la Mission d’évaluation et de contrôle de la Commission des finances de l’Assemblée nationale,” 21 May 2013 (unpublished), 2–4. 39 Les Echos, “Trois projets d’armement ambitieux portés par le traité de Lancaster House,” 13 August 2013. 40 Interview no. 79, mbda France representative, November 2014. 41 Richardson, “UK and France Launch Assessment Phase of fasgw /anl Anti-Ship Missile.” 42 Defense Industry Daily, “Light Naval Strike”; A. Chutter and P. Tran, “U.K. Offers France New Deal to Kick-Start Missile Project,” Defense News, 11 November 2012. 43 R. Hewson, “Anti-Ship Missile Decision Is Crucial for Anglo-French Relations,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 21 March 2013. 44 Interview no. 79, mbda France representative, November 2014. 45 Interview no. 32, High-ranking French armament engineer, dga , October 2013. 46 Interview no. 81, mbda France representative, November 2014. 47 Interview no. 52, High-ranking French armament engineer, exchange officer, February 2014 and no. 32, High-ranking French armament engineer, dga , October 2013. 48 Defense Industry Daily, “Light Naval Strike.” 49 Interview no. 81, mbda France representative, November 2014. 50 Interview no. 79, mbda France representative, November 2014. 51 Interview no. 30, French Senator Daniel Reiner, September 2013. 52 Interview no. 32, High-ranking French armament engineer, dga , October 2013.

Notes to pages 137–40

245

53 Observation during the Franco-British Symposium, Laboratoire Technicoopérationnel, dga , Malakoff, 9–10 October 2012. 54 Interview no. 83, mbda Group General Secretatiat, May 2015. 55 Cameron and Sarkozy, “UK-France Declaration on Security and Defence.” 56 National Audit Office, “Ministry of Defence: The Major Projects Report 2012,” hc 684-I s-Session 2012–13, 10 January 2013, 45. 57 F. Hollande, “Grand discours sur la défense nationale,” Paris, 11 March 2012. 58 Interview no. 81, mbda France representative, November 2014. 59 Hewson, “Anti-Ship Missile Decision.” 60 G. Anderson and C. Caffrey, “France and Germany Sign Wide-Ranging Defence Co-operation Agreement,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 15 June 2012. 61 M. Cabirol, “Comment Paris va prendre l’initiative de relancer l’Europe de la défense,” La Tribune, 12 November 2012,  http://www.latribune.fr/entreprises-finance/industrie/aeronautiquedefense/20121111trib000730199/comment-paris-va-prendre-l-initiativede-relancer-l-europe-de-la-defense.html. 62 T. Valasek, “Is the Franco-British Defence Treaty in Trouble?” Centre for European Reform, 27 July 2012, http://www.cer.org.uk/publications/ archive/bulletin-article/2012/franco-british-defence-treaty-trouble. 63 C. Hoyos, “Aircraft Carriers Will Not Be Reconfigured for French,” Financial Times, 16 April 2012. 64 Ibid. 65 Interview no. 85, independent consultant in the defence sector, September 2015. 66 Commission des finances, de l’économie générale et du contrôle budgétaire, “Mission d’évaluation et de contrôle: La conduite des programmes d’armement en cooperation,” Assemblée nationale, XIVth Legislature, Compte rendu no. 41, 6 June 2013. 67 Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, “Audition de M. Antoine Bouvier,” 4. 68 Ibid., 12. 69 Lecompte-Boinet, “mbda ”; M. Cabirol, “Défense: les paris industriels de mbda dans les mains du gouvernement,” La Tribune, 20 February 2013; A. Ruello, “Missiles: mbda s’impatiente pour un projet-phare francobritannique,” Les Echos, 18 October 2012. 70 Hewson, “Anti-Ship Missile Decision Is Crucial for Anglo-French Relations.” 71 Interview no. 32, High-ranking French armament engineer, dga , October 2013.

246

Notes to pages 140–4

72 Ibid. 73 M. Foucault and B. Irondelle, “Dynamique parlementaire de la politique de défense: Une comparaison franco-britannique,” Revue Internationale de Politique Comparée 16, no. 3 (2009): 469. 74 Interview no. 29, French Member of Parliament François Cornut-Gentille, June 2013. 75 R. Morgan, “Communication Between Political Elites,” in Partners and Rivals in Western Europe: Britain, France and Germany, edited by R. Morgan and C. Bray (Aldershot: Gower Publishing, 1986), 123–4. 76 B. Irondelle, O. Rozenberg, et al., “Evolution du contrôle parlementaire des forces armées en Europe,” irsem , Etude de l’irsem no. 22, 2012, 49. 77 Interview no. 4, High-ranking French armament engineer, dga , February 2012. 78 Ibid. 79 Ibid. 80 Interviews no. 30, French senator Daniel Reiner, September 2013; no. 31, French member of Parliament Patricia Adam, September 2013. 81 Interview no. 31, French member of Parliament Patricia Adam, September 2013. 82 Interview no. 29, French member of Parliament François Cornut-Gentille, June 2013. 83 F. Cornut-Gentille in C. Eckert, “Rapport fait au nom de la Commission des Finances, de l’économie générale et du contrôle budgétaire sur le Projet de loi de finances pour 2013 (no. 235),” Assemblée nationale, XIVth legislature, no. 251, October 10, 2012, 87. 84 F. Cornut-Gentille, “Avis présenté au nom de la Commission de la Défense nationale et des forces armeées sur le Projet de loi de finances pour 2012, tome VII Défense: Équipement des forces, dissuasion,” Assemblée nationale, XIIIème Législature, Avis no. 3809, 25 October 2011, 105. 85 Eckert, “Rapport,” 86–7. 86 P.-A. Muet cited in Eckert, “Rapport,” 88. 87 Interview no. 29, French Member of Parliament François Cornut-Gentille, June 2013. 88 Chutter and Tran, “U.K. Offers France New Deal.” 89 Ibid. 90 British defence official cited in Chutter and Tran, “U.K. Offers France New Deal.” 91 Interview no. 35, Senior British civil servant, mod , November 2013. 92 Interview no. 25, French armament engineer, dga , April 2013.

Notes to pages 144–8 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114

115 116

247

Ibid. I was able to view the letter during an interview. Hewson, “Anti-Ship Missile Decision.” François Hollande wrote: “Je souhaite que le projet puisse être lancé.” I was able to view the letter during an interview. Interview no. 81, mbda France representative, November 2014. Interview no. 52, High-ranking French armament engineer, exchange officer, February 2014. Ibid. Interview no. 81, mbda France representative, November 2014. J. Joana, “Armée et industrie de défense: Cousinage nécessaire et liaisons incestueuses,” Pouvoirs 2, no. 125 (2008): 45. Interview no. 25, French armament engineer, dga , April 2013. Interview no. 81, mbda France representative, November 2014. Ibid. Interview no. 52, High-ranking French armament engineer, exchange officer, February 2014. Ibid. Interview no. 81, mbda France representative, November 2014. Cited in Cornut-Gentille, “Avis,” 107. Masson, “La réorganisation de l’industrie,” 63. Lecompte-Boinet, “mbda .” Interview no. 25, French armament engineer, dga , April 2013. Ibid. Interview no. 80, mbda France representative, November 2014. Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Government of the French Republic, “Agreement Concerning Centres of Excellence Implemented as Part of the ‘One Complex Weapons’ Sector Strategy,” signed in Paris, 24 September 2015, https:// assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ attachment_data/file/485935/CS_FranceNo.1_2015_Cm_9169_Comp_ Weap_WEB.pdf. Interview no. 80, mbda France representative, November 2014. Secretary of State for Defence, “Explanatory Memorandum on the Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the French Republic concerning Centres of Excellence implemented as part of the ‘One Complex Weapons’ Sector Strategy,” 16 December 2015, https://www.gov. uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/485950/EM_ France_1.2015_Comp_Weap.pdf.

248

Notes to pages 148–52

117 Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Government of the French Republic, “Agreement Concerning Centres of Excellence,” Article 7. 118 Interview no. 46, British civil servant, de&s , February 2014. 119 Interview no. 55, British civil servant, de&s , February 2014. 120 J.-P. Hébert and J. Hamiot, Histoire de la coopération européenne dans l’armement (Paris: CNRS éditions, 2004), 178. 121 Interview no. 80, mbda France representative, November 2014. 122 Ibid. 123 Interview no. 83, mbda Group General Secretariat, May 2015. 124 Interview no. 25, French armament engineer, dga , April 2013. 125 J.-Y. Le Drian, “Discours pour la visite de mbda ,” Bourges, 10 June 2013, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/211195/2344666/file/ Discours%20MinDef%20-%20100607%20-%20mbda .pdf. 126 Interview no. 81, mbda France representative, November 2014. 127 Interview no. 80, mbda France representative, November 2014. 128 Ibid. 129 hm Government, “Joint Complex Weapons Agreement with France as UK and French Relations Deepen,” 3 November 2015, https://www.gov.uk/ government/news/joint-complex-weapons-agreement-with-franceas-uk-and-french-relations-deepen. 130 Interview no. 35, Senior British civil servant, mod , November 2013. 131 Interview no. 32, High-ranking French armament engineer, dga , October 2013. 132 Interview no. 31, French member of Parliament Patricia Adam, September 2013. 133 Interview no. 43, Senior British civil servant, de&s , January 2014. 134 Interview no. 44, mbda UK representative, February 2014. 135 Ibid. 136 Interview no. 35, Senior British civil servant, mod , November 2013. 137 Interview no. 28, High-ranking French armament engineer, dga , June 2013. 138 Interview no. 85, independent consultant in the defence sector, September 2015. 139 Ibid. 140 Interview no. 30, French senator Daniel Reiner, September 2013. 141 Interview no. 28, High-ranking French armament engineer, dga , June 2013. 142 British Navy officer at the cjef Steering Group Light Workshop meeting, Northwood, 4 March 2014.

Notes to pages 152–9

249

143 Interview no. 38, High-ranking French military officer, emp , December 2013. 144 Interview no. 28, High-ranking French armament engineer, dga , June 2013. 145 Interview no. 36, High-ranking French armament engineer, dga , November 2013. 146 Interview no. 59, High-ranking French armament engineer, dga , March 2014. 147 D. Cameron and F. Hollande, “France-UK Summit: Declaration on Security and Defence,” Brize Norton, 31 January 2014. 148 Interview no. 52, High-ranking French armament engineer, exchange officer, February 2014. 149 A. Parker and M. Stothard, “Anglo-French Military Drone Comes Closer to Reality,” Financial Times, 15 July 2014. 150 Cameron and Hollande, “France-UK Summit,” 2014. The fifteen-month definition and design phase contract was eventually awarded to Thales Underwater Systems to work together with bae Systems together with second-tier participants. It was announced in April 2014 and signed in March 2015. See occa r, “mmcm Program integrated into occa r and mmcm contract awarded,” 27 March 2015, https://www.occar.int/mmcmprogramme-integrated-occar-and-mmcm-contract-awarded? redirect=/programmes/mmcm%23news; Thales, “Thales wins French-UK mine countermeasures contract,” 27 March 2015, https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/worldwide/press-release/thales-wins-french-uk-minecountermeasures-contract. 151 G. Allison, “Sea Venom Missile Successfully Completes Second Development Firing Test,” UK Defence Journal, 14 June 2018, https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/sea-venom-missile-successfullycompletes-second-development-firing-test/. The program later encountered technical delays, however, and the expected date for initial operating capability was moved from October 2020 to January 2022. R. Scott, “mbda completes first Sea Venom/anl qualification firing,” Jane’s Missiles & Rockets, 7 March 2020. 152 Interview no. 32, High-ranking French armament engineer, dga , October 2013. 153 Hoyos, “mbda Missile.” 154 Interview no. 80, mbda France representative, November 2014. 155 Interview no. 85, independent consultant in the defence sector, September 2015. 156 Interviews no. 55, British civil servant, de&s , February 2014; no. 54, Senior British civil servant, de&s , February 2014.

250

Notes to pages 161–5

chapter six 1 M. E. Smith, Europe’s Common Security and Defence Policy CapacityBuilding, Experiential Learning, and Institutional Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). 2 S. Touval, “Negotiated Cooperation and its Alternatives,” in International Cooperation: The Extents and Limits of Multilateralism, edited by S. Touval and W. Zartman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 80. 3 M. Alliot-Marie, “From Entente Cordiale to Strategic Partnership,” rusi Journal 149, no. 2 (2004): 36. Emphasis added. 4 E. Macron and T. May, “United Kingdom-France Summit Communiqué,” Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 18 January 2018. 5 cjef Secretariat, “cjef Newsletter Edition 4,” January 2015. 6 Macron and May, “United Kingdom-France Summit Communiqué.” 7 Royal Navy, “nato General Visits Joint French and British Exercise,” 11 June 2015, http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/ news/2015/june/11/150611-nato-general-visits-joint-french-andbritish-exercise. 8 Observation no. 3, Steering Group Light, Joint Force Command, 1–3 April 2014. 9 Interview no. 62, High-ranking French exchange officer, mod , April 2014. Emphasis added. 10 And then, only in specialized press and websites and think tank publications. 11 Interview no. 6, High-ranking French military officer, liaison officer, February 2012. 12 See U. Krotz, “Structure as Process: The Regularized Intergovernmentalism of Franco-German Bilateralism,” Program for the Study of Germany and Europe, Working Paper 02.3, Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge ma , 2002, 14–15. 13 Interview no. 15, French armament engineer, dga , February 2012. 14 D. Cameron and N. Sarkozy, “Declaration on Defence and Security Cooperation,” London, 2 November 2010, https://www.gov.uk/ government/news/uk-france-summit-2010-declaration-on-defenceand-security-co-operation. Emphasis added. 15 U. Krotz and J. Schild, Shaping Europe: France, Germany and Embedded Bilateralism from the Elysee Treaty to Twenty-First Century Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 80ff. 16 Etat-major interarmées de force et d’entraînement (emia-fe ), “Présentation exercice Griffin Rise (gr ),” briefing note, unpublished, dated March 2, 2015. Emphasis added.

Notes to pages 165–9

251

17 M. Fallon cited in A. Barluet, “La France et la Grande-Bretagne testent leur corps expéditionnaire,” Le Figaro, 23 April 2016. 18 Public Sénat, “Sarkozy: Discours à Benghazi avec David Cameron,” video, 15 September 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0bhtPbkbKCA. 19 D. Cameron and N. Sarkozy, “UK-France Declaration on Security and Defence,” Paris, 17 February 2012, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ uk-france-declaration-on-security-and-defence. Emphasis added. 20 hmg Cabinet Office and Présidence de la République, “Joint Anglo-French Communiqué,” Paris, 8 July 2011, https://www.gov.uk/ government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/61338/ anglo-french-communique.pdf. 21 hmg Cabinet Office and Présidence de la République, “Treaty on Defence and Security Cooperation/Meeting of the Senior Level Group – Joint Franco-British Communiqué,” London, 9 November 2011, http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Joint-Anglo-French-communique. 22 Major Général des Armées Gen. G. Maire cited in C. Chick, “2015 fbc Annual Defence Conference Report,” 8 September 2015. 23 Interview no. 1, Top-ranking French military officer, ema , January 2012. 24 Interview no. 42, High-ranking British military officer, Cabinet Office, December 2013. 25 Ibid. 26 Interview no. 87, High-ranking French military officer, dgris , August 2016. 27 M. Odell, “French General Given Top UK Army Job,” Financial Times, 8 February 2016. 28 Interview no. 95, Former Director Security Policy, mod , April 2017. 29 Interview no. 3, High-ranking French military officer, ema , February 2012. 30 Interview no. 15, French armament engineer, dga , February 2012. 31 Interview no. 18, High-ranking British military officer, mod , March 2012. 32 Interview no. 1, Top-ranking French military officer, ema , January 2012. 33 Interview no. 3, High-ranking French military officer, ema , February 2012. 34 E. Macron and T. May, “United Kingdom-France Summit Communiqué: Annex on Security and Defence,” Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 18 January 2018. 35 House of Commons Defence Committee, “Future Anti-Ship Missile Systems: Joint Inquiry with the Assemblée Nationale’s Standing Committee on National Defence and the Armed Forces,” Thirteenth Report of Session 2017–19, hc 1071, 12 December 2018, 9.

252

Notes to pages 169–72

36 The Future Cruise/Anti-Ship Weapon (fc /asw ) program is known in French as futur missile anti-navires/futur missile de croisière (fman /fmc ). 37 House of Commons Defence Committee, “Future Anti-Ship Missile Systems,” 5. 38 Ibid., 10. 39 After a preliminary study contracted with mbda , which ran from 2011 to 2014, a contract was announced at the Summit in Amiens on 28 March 2017 to launch a concept phase that would run until 2020. 40 House of Commons Defence Committee, “Future Anti-Ship Missile Systems,” 26. 41 Interview no. 120, Representative of mbda , June 2018. 42 House of Commons Defence Committee, “Future Anti-Ship Missile Systems Inquiry Launched with French Defence Committee,” 23 May 2018, https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/ commons-select/defence-committee/news-parliament-2017/anti-shipmissile-systems-inquiry-launch-17-19/. 43 Written personal communication with the British defence attaché in Paris, July 2018. 44 House of Commons Defence Committee, “Future Anti-Ship Missile Systems,” 42–3. 45 House of Commons Defence Committee and Commission de la Défense Nationale et des Forces Armées, “Oral Evidence: Future Anti-Ship Missile System – Joint Inquiry,” hc 1071, 11 July 2018. 46 British diplomat during a “FR-UK Defence Forum” workshop, ifri , Paris, March 2011. 47 Interview no. 67, Etienne De Durand, ifri , July 2014. 48 ifri , rusi , Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Chatham House and cer , “Le Forum de Défense fruk ,” memo, unpublished, no date. 49 Ibid. 50 The three companies were indicated as sponsors in 2016. In 2019, the fbc website listed only mbda as supporting the fbc Defence Conference. Franco-British Council, “Defence Conference,” no date, http://www.francobritishcouncil.org.uk/sponsors.php (last access 2 January 2020). 51 The Policy Institute at King’s College London and Institut Montaigne, “The UK-France Defence and Security Relationship: How to Improve Cooperation,” November 2018, https://www.kcl.ac.uk/policy-institute/ assets/uk-france-defence-and-security.pdf. 52 R.O. Keohane, “Reciprocity in International Relations,” International Organization 40, no. 1 (1986): 21.

Notes to pages 173–5

253

53 Treaty between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic for Defence and Security Cooperation, Article 10 (“Costs and benefits”), §1. 54 D. Cameron and F. Hollande, “France-UK Summit: Declaration on Security and Defence,” Brize Norton, 31 January 2014, https://www.gov. uk/government/publications/uk-france-summit-2014-agreements. 55 Interview no. 59, High-ranking French armament engineer, dga , March 2014. 56 M. Cabirol, “Armement: Comment la France négocie désormais avec la Grande-Bretagne,” La Tribune, 19 February 2014, http://www. latribune.fr/entreprises-finance/industrie/aeronautique-defense/ 20140218trib000816010/armement-comment-la-france-negociedesormais-avec-la-grande-bretagne.html. Emphasis added. pa2 /cvf stands for “Porte-Avion 2/Carrier Vessel Future”; it refers to the initial plan of jointly built platforms. 57 A. Ruello, “Blindés contre drones: Le donnant-donnant de Paris vis-à-vis de Londres,” Les Echos, 18 February 2014, http://www.lesechos. fr/18/02/2014/lesechos.fr/0203324771357_blindes-contre-drones---ledonnant-donnant-de-paris-vis-a-vis-de-londres.htm. 58 M. Bell, “UK Has Defaulted to Following French Strategy in Bilateral Project, Says eads ,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 10 May 2012. 59 House of Commons Defence Committee, “Defence Acquisition,” Seventh Report of Session 2012–2013, hc 9, 5 February 2013, 28. 60 Interview no. 51, British civil servant, de&s , February 2014. 61 P. Tran, “mbda : France, UK Agree on ‘Cross-Procurement’ Policy,” Defense News, 17 March 2016, https://www.defensenews.com/ land/2016/03/17/mbda-france-uk-agree-on-cross-procurement-policy/. 62 D. Cameron and F. Hollande, “UK-France Summit: Annex on Security and Defence,” Amiens, 3 March 2016, https://www.gov.uk/government/ publications/uk-france-summit-2016-documents. 63 Macron and May, “United Kingdom-France Summit Communiqué.” 64 Emmanuel Macron said: “Lorsque la Grande-Bretagne met les trois Chinook en contribution sur la force Barkhane, c’est un geste important parce que c’est en effet sous un commandement français, et la France elle décide mettre en 2019 ses troupes sous commandement militaire britannique dans le cadre de l’otan . Ce n’est pas déséquilibré.” E. Macron and T. May, press conference, Sandhurst, video, 18 January 2018, https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2018/01/18/ conference-de-presse-avec-theresa-may-a-sandhurst-pour-le-35-sommetfranco-britannique.

254

Notes to pages 176–9

65 Interview no. 59, High-ranking French armament engineer, dga , March 2014. 66 Interview no. 44, mbda UK representative, February 2014. 67 Krotz and Schild, Shaping Europe; H. Wallace, “The Conduct of Bilateral Relations by Governments,” in Partners and Rivals in Western Europe: Britain, France and Germany, edited by R. Morgan and C. Bray, 137 (Aldershot: Gower Publishing, 1986). 68 For a detailed account of the initial phases of the operations in Mali and the Sahel, see C. Chivvis, The French War on Al Qaida in Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 69 House of Commons Defence Committee, “Operations in Libya,” 9th Report of Session 2010–2012, hc 950 (Vol.I), February 2012, 107–8. 70 Royal Aeronautical Society, “Lessons Offered from the Libya Air Campaign,” Specialist Paper, July 2012, 5, http://aerosociety.com/Assets/ Docs/Publications/SpecialistPapers/LibyaSpecialistPaperFinal.pdf; Centre d’études stratégiques aérospatiales, “L’armée de l’air à l’épreuve des opérations en Libye: Retour d’expérience et perspectives,” conference, ministère de la Défense, Paris, 6 December 2011. 71 In the first ten days, 75 per cent of the munitions launched were American munitions. “Table of Military Assets” in Short War, Long Shadow: The Political and Military Legacies of the 2011 Libyan Campaign, edited by A. Johnson and S. Mueen (London: rusi Whitehall Report, 2012), ix–x. 72 D. Cameron and N. Sarkozy, “Joint Declaration at the Summit,” Paris, 17 February 2012. 73 Interview no. 61, Former analyst, Direction des Affaires Stratégiques (das ), Ministère de la Défense, April 2014. 74 Interview no. 62, High-ranking French exchange officer, mod , April 2014. 75 Ibid. 76 N. Schwartz, S. Dalton, and J.-P. Palomeros, “Opinion: Libyan Air Ops Showcase French, UK, US Partnership,” Jane’s Weekly, 12 March 2012. 77 M. Delaporte, “The Trilateral Strategic Initiative: An Allied Air Force Model,” Breaking Defense, 21 November 2013, http://breakingdefense. com/2013/11/the-trilateral-strategic-initiative-an-allied-air-force-model/. 78 Interview no. 62, High-ranking French exchange officer, mod , April 2014. 79 J. Drape, “Building Partnership Capacity: Operation Harmattan and Beyond,” Air and Space Power Journal 26, no. 5 (2012): 83–4. 80 A. Lyle, “US, French, British Generals Outline Trilateral Strategic Initiative Evolution,” US Air Force, 15 September 2015, http://www.af.mil/News/

Notes to pages 179–81

81

82

83 84

85 86 87

88 89 90 91

92 93

94

95

255

ArticleDisplay/tabid/223/Article/617288/us-french-british-generalsoutline-trilateral-strategic-initiative-evolution.aspx. A. Adamson and P. Goldfein, “The Trilateral Strategic Initiative: A Primer for Developing Airpower Cooperation,” Air and Space Power Journal 30, no. 4 (2016): 74. K. Green and B. Cummings, “US Partners with French, UK Forces for Trilateral Exercise in Hampton Roads,” Wavy TV 10, video, 15 December 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lZxdRaRQZe0. Adamson and Goldfein, “The Trilateral Strategic Initiative,” 74. S.A. Jackson, “US, French Naval Aviators Cross Skies, Decks Together,” US Navy, 20 January 2014, http://www.navy.mil/submit/display. asp?story_id=78694. A. Barluet, “Contre-amiral Chaperon: ‘L’engagement de la France à partir du Golfe est un signal,” Le Figaro, 23 February 2015. Interview no. 89, Top-ranking French military officer, Centre de Planification et de Conduite des Opérations (cpco ), December 2016. Naval Today, “France, UK Announce South China Sea Freedom of Navigation Operations,” 6 June 2018, https://navaltoday.com/2018/06/06/ france-uk-announce-south-china-sea-freedom-of-navigation-operations/. Interview no. 35, Senior British civil servant, mod , November 2013. Ibid. and interview no. 94, Former British Deputy Commander Operations, April 2017. Interview no. 57, High-ranking French military officer, exchange officer, March 2014. As part of Operation Barkhane, as an extension of Operation Serval in Mali, 4,000 French troops were deployed in Mali, Chad, Niger, Ivory Coast, and Burkina Faso, operating across the entire southern Sahara region. Briefing by a representative of the French government at the German Marshall Fund, Paris, June 2018. csis, “Global Leaders Forum: H.E. Florence Parly, Minister for the Armed Forces of France,” 20 October 2017, https://www.csis.org/events/ global-leaders-forum-he-florence-parly-minister-armed-forces-france. The letter of intent is available at https://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/dgris/ international-action/ei2/ei2. See also O.-R. Bel, “Can Macron’s European Intervention Initiative Make the Europeans Battle Ready?” War on the Rocks, 2 October 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/10/can-macronseuropean-intervention-initiative-make-the-europeans-battle-ready. Briefing by a representative of the French government at the German Marshall Fund, Paris, June 2018.

256

Notes to pages 181–7

96 Briefing by Gen. Bertrand Toujouse, Head of Euro-Atlantic Affairs, Etat-major des Armées (ema ), ministère des Armées, at the Center for a New American Security, Washington, dc , 3 October 2018. 97 Interview no. 100, Brig. Robert Thomson, defence attaché, British Embassy in Paris, May 2017. 98 Macron and May, “United Kingdom-France Summit Communiqué,” §22. 99 Briefing by Gen. Bertrand Toujouse. 100 Ibid. 101 Briefing by a representative of the French government at the German Marshall Fund, Paris, June 2018. 102 We can arbitrarily set the boundaries of “minilateralism” between two and a dozen participants, although arguably, the intention of a limited number of participants is more useful for setting the boundaries. See A. Pannier, “Le minilatéralisme: Une nouvelle forme de coopération de défense,” Politique Etrangère 1 (2015): 38.

c onc l usio n 1 Cf. J.G. Ruggie, “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution,” International Organization 46, no. 3 (1992): 572. Emphasis added. 2 R. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 125. 3 Ruggie, “Multilateralism,” 571. 4 Ibid. 5 M. Albaret and D. Placidi-Frot “The Equivocal Couple in Multilateralism: Dyads in the un ,” in Building Sustainable International Couples in International Relations: A Strategy towards Peaceful Cooperation, edited by B. Vassort-Rousset (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 44–66. 6 V. Pouliot, “Multilateralism as an End in Itself,” International Studies Perspectives 12, no. 1 (2011): 21–2. 7 Ibid. 8 J. Smith and M. Tsatsas, The New Bilateralism: The UK’s Relations within the eu (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2002), 2. 9 Pouliot, “Multilateralism,” 19. 10 U. Krotz and J. Schild, Shaping Europe: France, Germany and Embedded Bilateralism from the Elysée Treaty to Twenty-First Century Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 11 M. Smith, “The European Union and the United States of America: The Politics of ‘Bi-Multilateral’ Negotiations,” in European Union

Notes to pages 188–90

12 13

14

15

16

17 18 19 20 21

257

Negotiations: Processes, Networks and Institutions, edited by O. Elgström and C. Jönsson (New York: Routledge, 2005). That is to say, X-ray radiography used in the simulation of nuclear blast effects for the design of nuclear weapons. S. Lovegrove, “Accounting Officer Assessment for the teutates Programme,” Ministry of Defence, 4 February 2019, https:// assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ uploads/attachment_data/file/778596/20190212_Accounting_ Officer_Assessment_for_the_TEUTATES_programme_MSU_4.2.4.6Min_DP-Penny_Young.pdf. Ministry of Defence, “The United Kingdom’s Future Nuclear Deterrent: 2016 Update to Parliament,” no date, 4, https://assets.publishing.service. gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/579315/ The_Future_Nuclear_Deterrent_-_2016_Update_to_Parliament.pdf. The construction of the British storage and assembly facilities at Valduc is more than two years behind schedule. The facilities were completed in 2018 and 2019 respectively, instead of 2016. Likewise, the second axis of the epure installation was to be completed in 2019, but its entry into service has been postponed to 2022, which means that the last two axes will enter service simultaneously. Ministry of Defence, “ 2016 Update to Parliament,” article 4 ; Ministry of Defence, “The United Kingdom’s Future Nuclear Deterrent : 2018 Update to Parliament,” no date, 4, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ uploads/attachment_data/file/767326/2018_Nuclear_Deterrent_Update_ to_Parliament.pdf; X. Pintat, J. Lorgeoux, A. Trillard, P. Allizard and C. Haut, “La nécessaire modernisation de la dissuasion nucléaire,” Report No.560 (2016-2017), Commission des affaires étrangères, de la défense et des forces armées, 23 May 2017, 55-56, https://www.senat.fr/rap/r16-560/ r16-560_mono.html. E. Macron and T. May, “United Kingdom-France Summit Communiqué: Annex on Security and Defence,” Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 18 January 2018, §7. “Dans le nucléaire, ça se passe bien.” Interview no. 38, High-ranking French military officer, Elysée, December 2013. Interview no. 90, Air attaché, British Embassy in Paris, April 2017. Interview no. 50, Thales UK representative, February 2014. Interview no. 42, High-ranking British military officer, Cabinet Office, December 2013. Interview no. 13, British civil servant, mod , February 2012.

258

Notes to pages 190–4

22 Interviews no. 29, French member of Parliament François Cornut-Gentille, June 2013, and no. 38, High-ranking French military officer, Elysée, December 2013. 23 E. Buckley, “Saving the Franco-British Defence Pact,” Europe’s World, 22 January 2014, https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/ saving-the-franco-british-defence-pact/. 24 Interview no. 54, Senior British civil servant, de&s , February 2014. 25 Interview no. 38, High-ranking French military officer, Elysée, December 2013. 26 Interview no. 61, French official, former analyst at the Strategy Directorate, French Ministry of Defense, April 2014. 27 Tertrais, “Entente Nucléaire,” 14. 28 Treaty between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic relating to Joint Radiographic/ Hydrodynamics Facilities, London, 2 November 2010, art. 9. 29 M. Harries, “Britain and France as Nuclear Partners,” Survival 54, no. 1 (2012): 14. 30 G. De Briganti, “Brexit Could Reinforce UK-French Defense Ties,” Defense Aerospace, 27 June 2016, http://www.defense-aerospace.com/ articles-view/feature/5/175028/brexit-could-reinforce-uk_french-defenseties.html. 31 House of Commons Defense Committee, “Anglo-French Defence Cooperation,” v. 32 Interview no. 87, High-ranking French military officer, dgris , August 2016. 33 D. Cameron and F. Hollande, “UK-France Summit: Annex on Security and Defence” and “UK-France Summit: Annex on Counter-Terrorism,” Amiens, 3 March 2016. 34 B. Tigner and B. Gomis, “Brexit Tests European Security Cooperation,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 8 July 2016. 35 F. Hollande, “Déclaration suite au référendum britannique,” 24 June 2016, https://co.ambafrance.org/. Declaration-de-Francois-Hollande-suite-au-referendum-britannique. 36 T. May, “pm Statement in Paris,” 2 July 2016, https://www.gov.uk/ government/speeches/pm-statement-in-paris-21-july-2016. 37 E. Macron and T. May, press conference, Sandhurst, video, 18 January 2018, https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2018/01/18/ conference-de-presse-avec-theresa-may-a-sandhurst-pour-le-35-sommetfranco-britannique.

Notes to pages 194–7

259

38 Direction Générale de l’Armement, “Nouvelles étapes pour la coopération franco-britannique d’armement,” 17 November 2016, https://www. defense.gouv.fr/english/salle-de-presse/communiques/communiques-duministere-des-armees/cp-dga-nouvelles-etapes-pour-la-cooperation-francobritannique-d-armement. 39 Interview no. 121, French diplomat, ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires Etrangères, January 2019. 40 Interview no. 120, mbda representative, June 2018. 41 Interviews no. 109, Airbus representative, May 2018; no. 120, mbda representative, June 2018. 42 J. De Lyon and S. Dhingra, “UK Economy since Brexit Vote: Slower Growth, Lower Productivity, Weaker Pound,” LSE Brexit Blog, 21 March 2019, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2019/03/21/economicperformance-since-the-brexit-vote-slowed-gdp-growth-lower-productivitydepreciated-pound/; S. Chatterjee, “Rising No-Deal Brexit Fears Pile Pressure on Pound,” Reuters, 21 March 2019, https://www.reuters.com/ article/uk-britain-sterling/rising-no-deal-brexit-fears-pile-pressure-onpound-idUSKCN1R20SE. 43 European Parliament Legislative Resolution of 18 April 2019 on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing the European Defence Fund (COM(2018)0476 – C8-0268/2018 – 2018/0254(COD)), P8_TA-PROV(2019)0430. 44 B. Lippert, N. von Ondarza, and V. Perthes, eds., “European Strategic Autonomy: Actors, Issues, Conflicts of Interests,” swp , Research Paper 2019/rp 04, March 2019, 14. 45 T. May, “The Government’s Negotiating Objectives for Exiting the eu ,” speech, London, 17 January 2017, https://www.gov.uk/government/ speeches/the-governments-negotiating-objectives-for-exiting-the-eupm-speech. 46 Cameron and Hollande, “UK-France Summit: Annex on Security and Defence,” 2016. 47 Euractive, “Airbus, Dassault to Team up for New Fighter Jet Project,” 26 April 2018, online, https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-andsecurity/news/airbus-dassault-to-team-up-for-new-fighter-jet-project (accessed 4 November 2019). In February 2019, Airbus and Dassault Aviation signed a two-year joint concept study contract for Future Combat Air System awarded by the French and German governments. Dassault Aviation and Airbus, “Airbus and Dassault Aviation Sign Joint Concept Study Contract for Future Combat Air System,” press release,

260

48

49

50

51 52

53 54

55 56

57 58

Notes to pages 197–9

6 February 2019, https://www.airbus.com/newsroom/press-releases/ en/2019/02/airbus-and-dassault-aviation-sign-joint-concept-studycontract-f.html#media-list-document-document-all_ml_0. D. Perry, “Bae Systems Has Been Awarded a 12-Month Single-Source Contract by the UK to Continue Work on a Future Combat Air System,” FlightGlobal.com, 3 July 2018, https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/ uk-gives-bae-systems-12-month-contract-for-fcas-work-449913/. A. Chuter, “Excluded from Cooperative Plans in Europe, UK Sets Groundwork for Future Fighters,” Defense News, 25 June 2018, online, https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/ farnborough/2018/06/25/excluded-from-cooperative-plans-in-europe-uksets-groundwork-for-future-fighters/; UK Ministry of Defence, Combat Air Strategy: An Ambitious Vision for the Future, 2018. P. Tran, “UK Was the One to Put the Brakes on Drone Demo Project, Industry Says,” Defense News, 13 April 2018, https://www.defensenews. com/global/europe/2018/04/12/uk-was-the-one-to-put-the-brakes-on-dronedemo-project-industry-says. Interview no. 122, Top-ranking French military officer, ema , October 2019. Multiple interviews, including interviews no. 87, High-ranking French military officer, dgris , August 2016; no. 98, High-ranking French armament engineer, dga , May 2017; no. 113, Representative of the British defence industry, May 2018; no. 117, High-ranking British military officer, mod , June 2018; no. 119, British civil servant, de&s , June 2018. Interview no. 77, High-ranking French armament engineer, dga , October 2014. Conseil franco-allemand de défense et de sécurité, “Relevé des conclusions,” Paris, 13 July 2017, https://www.france-allemagne.fr/IMG/pdf/ fiche-cfads.pdf. Interview no. 98, High-ranking French armament engineer, dga , May 2017. P. Taylor, “Emmanuel Macron’s Coalition of the Willing,” Politico, 2 May 2018, https://www.politico.eu/article/emmanuel-macronseu-defense-army-coalition-of-the-willing-military-cooperation/. Interviews no. 113, Representative of the British defence industry, May 2018; no. 119, British civil servant, de&s , June 2018. National Audit Office, “Capability in the Civil Service,” press release, 24 March 2017, https://www.nao.org.uk/press-release/capability-in-thecivil-service/.

Notes to pages 199–202

261

59 S. Bloomfield, “An Island Apart: The Inside Story of How the Foreign Office Is Failing to Prepare for Brexit,” Prospect Magazine, 15 October 2018. 60 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, “Global Britain,” Sixth Report of Session 2017–19, hc 780, 6 March 2018; O. Daddow, “Brexit and Britain’s Role in the World,” in The Routledge Handbook of Brexit Politics, edited by P. Diamond, P. Nedergaard, B. Rosamond (London: Routledge, 2018), 208–22; C. Hill, The Future of British Foreign Policy: Security and Diplomacy in a World After Brexit (London: Polity, 2019); A. Glencross and D. McCourt, “Living Up to a New Role in the World: The Challenges of ‘Global Britain,’” Orbis 62, no. 4 (2018): 582–97. 61 bbc , “Theresa May Calls for ‘Truly Global Britain,’” 2 October 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/av/uk-politics-37535867/ theresa-may-calls-for-truly-global-britain. 62 E. Macron, “Discours pour une Europe souveraine, unie et démocratique,” Paris, 26 September 2017, https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/ 2017/09/26/initiative-pour-l-europe-discours-d-emmanuel-macronpour-une-europe-souveraine-unie-democratique. 63 E. Macron, “Discours à la conférence des Ambassadeurs,” Paris, 27 August 2018, https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2018/08/27/ discours-du-president-de-la-republique-a-la-conference-des-ambassadeurs. 64 Interview no. 122, Top-ranking French military officer, ema , October 2019. 65 See for instance D. Whineray, “How Transatlantic Foreign Policy Cooperation Could Evolve after Brexit,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/ files/08-19-19-Whineray_Brexit.pdf. 66 M. Chalmers and W. Walker, “Will Scotland Sink the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent?,” Washington Quarterly 36, no. 3 (2013): 107–22. 67 See for instance F. Godement and A. Stanzel, “China and Brexit: What’s in It for Us?” ecfr , China Analysis, September 2016. 68 S. Besch, “A Hitchhiker’s Guide to Galileo and Brexit,” cer Insight, Centre for European Reform, 3 May 2018. 69 hm Government, Foreign Policy, Defence and Development: A Future Partnership Paper, September 2017, 22. 70 M. Barnier, “Speech at the Berlin Security Conference,” 29 November 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ SPEECH_17_5021. 71 D. Boffey, “Boris Johnson Seeking to Rewrite eu Defence Pledges,” Guardian, 5 September 2019.

262

Notes to page 202

72 M. Chalmers, “UK Foreign and Security Policy after Brexit,” rusi , briefing paper, January 2017. 73 E. Macron, “Pour une Renaissance européenne,” 4 March 2019, https:// www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2019/03/04/pour-une-renaissanceeuropeenne.

Index

adaptation: and Brexit, 12; and cjef development, 126, 165; and effective cooperation, 45, 62; and institutionalization, 55–63, 184–6; and learning processes, 160–2, 172, 175, 182; strategies in bilateral relations 9, 59, 162, 172, 184. See also learning Aerospatiale-Matra, 34 Afghanistan, 19, 27, 31–2, 37, 66, 122 Africa Command (africom , US), 81 Airbus, 129, 133, 195, 197, 206 air command: and cjef development, 119; French, 76–7, 80; interviewee affiliations, 205, 207; nato , 76, 83–4; role in Libya, 77–93; UK, 77, 79, 90, 93 aircraft: and cjef development, 108; cooperation on, 153, 172, 197; and interoperability, 138, 179; in intervention in Libya, 78–80, 86, 177. See also aircraft carrier; F-35; Future Combat Air

System (fcas ); Jaguar; Mirage 2000; Rafale; Tornado; trilateral cooperation: trilateral strategic initiative (tsi ) aircraft carrier: failed UK-France cooperation on, 138–9, 143, 158, 174; in fight against the Islamic State, 179; in intervention in Libya, 84, 86; in South China Sea, 179; and trilateral UK-USFrance cooperation, 179; and UK-US cooperation, 143 air force: British, 154; French, 78, 98; interviewee affiliations, 205–8; and trilateral UK-USFrance cooperation, 178; US, 76, 81, 178. See also trilateral cooperation: trilateral strategic initiative (tsi ) airmobile forces, 86, 89, 92–3, 97. See also Gazelle (helicopter) airpower. See aircraft Aldermaston, 188 alliance: during the First World War, 3; as historical evolutions,

264

Index

14, 16; institutional arrangements, 179, 186; during the Second World War, 19. See also North Atlantic Treaty Organization (nato ) Alliance Base, 32 Alliot-Marie, Michèle, 73, 163 ambassador. See embassy ambiguity: in international agreements, 47–9; in UK-France relations, 78, 150–1, 158 America. See United States Anglo-American relations. See UK-US relations Anglo-French Defence Research Group, 34–5 Anti-navire léger (missile). See Sea Venom/anl Arab League, 75, 88 armament. See procurement armed forces. See air force; army; navy; Special Operations Forces arms export. See export army: and cjef development, 109, 117, 119, 127, 167; in intervention in Libya, 92; interviewee affiliations, 205–8; and joint procurement, 151–2, 173; in the treaty drafting process, 102; and UK-France cooperation in the 1990s, 33 Ashton, Catherine, 74 Assemblée nationale (France), 132, 139, 141, 194; Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, 141–2, 207; Commission

des finances, 142–3, 207; interviewee affiliations, 207 asymmetry, 24, 63. See also reciprocity Atlantic Alliance. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization (nato ) Atomic Weapons Establishment (awe ), 188 Australia, 32

bae , 171, 196–7; cooperation with Dassault, 135, 151, 154, 197; interviewee affiliation, 205; and mbda, 129, 195. See also Future Combat Air System (fcas ) Balkans, 29, 31, 111 bargaining, 7, 49, 52, 63, 161, 173 Barnier, Michel, 202 battlegroups (European Union), 30, 109, 111 Belgium, 18, 78, 85, 128, 180 beliefs, 22, 46–7, 58, 61 benefits. See gains Benghazi, 71, 78, 88, 94, 165 bilateral diplomacy, 15 bilateralism: complex, 187; Franco-German, 18, 23, 50; in International Relations Theory, 16, 21, 44–5, 52, 58; and multilateralism, 44, 176, 186–7; rise of, 16, 18. See also embeddedness bilateral regime, 22 bilateral summit. See UK-France summit

Index bilateral treaty (general), 16, 47 Blair, Tony, 29, 129, 130 Bosnia, 31 Brega, 92 Brexit: EU-UK future relationship, 200, 202–3; long-term effects on bilateral relations, 11–12, 62, 199–203; negotiation period, 10, 131, 191–8; and research methodology, 67; short-term effects on bilateral relations, 11–12, 63, 154, 159, 168, 171, 176, 181 Brown, Gordon, 130 budgets, 34, 37, 111, 142–3, 199 bureaucracy: and actors’ interests, 141, 167; and cjef development, 105–6, 124; and decision-making, 48; and implementation, 49–51; structure, 41 Cameron, David: and bilateral cooperation projects, 127, 139, 144–5, 153, 165, 177; and intervention in Libya, 71–4, 76, 79, 88, 92, 165; and the Lancaster House treaty negotiations, 39 Canada, 22, 32, 75, 78, 85 Cazeneuve, Bernard, 171 Central African Republic, 111, 180 Centre de planification et de conduite des opérations (cpco , France), 81, 90, 92, 114–16; interviewee affiliation, 207 challenges of cooperation: adaptation to, 160–2; and book

265

findings, 183–4; theoretical framework, 45–63 Charles de Gaulle (ship). See aircraft carrier Chef d’état-major des armées (cema , France). See chief of the defence staff Chequers Declaration, 35–6 chief of the defence staff: and bilateral cooperation, 41, 108, 115; in France, 40, 77, 103, 114–15; interviewee affiliation, 206; in UK, 40, 77, 103, 115, 122 Chirac, Jacques, 3, 29, 31, 35, 130 Churchill, Winston, 25, 29 classified information, 41, 102, 147–8, 201. See also intelligence sharing Clinton, Hilary, 75, 79 coalition: and cjef development, 113, 121–2; and intervention in Libya, 76–8, 80–96; as military arrangement (general), 70, 179; as political alliance in UK, 38, 197 Cold War, 19; end of, 19, 28, 30, 34, 37 Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (cjef ), 101–28; in the 2010 declaration, 42; as a choice of case study, 64–5; data gathering on, 69; and institutionalization processes, 164–5, 167, 181 command and control arrangements: and cjef development, 102, 104, 108, 113–14; and

266

Index

intervention in Libya, 76–8, 83–4, 93, 96, 177 Commissariat à l’énergie atomique (cea ), 188 Common Security and Defence Policy (csdp ), 30, 70, 202 communication and information systems (cis ), 90, 102, 113, 117, 120 complex weapons, 129–59; in the 2010 declaration, 42; as a choice of case study, 65; and Brexit, 194–7. See also Future Cruise/ Anti-Ship Weapon (fc/asw ); Martel; mbda ; Milan (missile system); Sea Venom/anl Congo, 30 Conservative Party (UK), 141 constructivism, 22–3, 46, 51 Contact Group (Libya), 83, 87–8, 96 convergence: in defence industry, 131–2, 145; institutionalization and, 155, 169, 184; role of private actors, 140; strategic, between France and the UK, 30, 33, 37–9, 200 cooperation. See effective cooperation Cornut-Gentille, François, 142–3 cost: of cooperation, 26, 43, 52, 109; distribution, 127, 185; of military equipment, 38, 170 counter-terrorism, 32, 95, 169, 193 couple metaphor, 22 Cyprus, 19, 72, 85, 89

Dassault: cooperation with Airbus, 197; cooperation with bae , 135, 151, 154, 197; Rafale, 198. See also Future Combat Air System (fcas ) defence acquisitions. See procurement Defence and National Security Review (France), 198 defence budgets. See budgets Defence Equipment and Support (de&s , UK), 129–30, 132, 136, 146, 156; interviewee affiliation, 205–6 defence industry, 129–59; and Brexit, 196–8; state-industry relations in the missile sector, 132, 145; UK-France cooperation before 2010, 33–4. See also lobbying defence minister: in France, 39–41, 107–8, 141, 144, 149; in UK, 39–41, 107–8, 165; and UK-French relations, 39–41, 126, 167–9, 197. See also Defence Ministerial Council Defence Ministerial Council (UK-France), 40–1, 168, 194 defence staff: in France, 104, 137, 144, 181; interviewee affiliations, 205–7 defence white paper, 29. See also Defence and National Security Review (France); Livre blanc (France); Strategic Defence and Security Review (UK)

Index de Gaulle, Charles, 28, 34. See also aircraft carrier Denmark, 78, 85, 122, 128, 180 diplomats: and bilateral relations, 23, 25, 171; as interviewees, 205–8; and Libya crisis, 72–5, 78, 99 Direction générale de l’armement (dga , France): and complex weapons 130–7, 141–2, 144, 146–7; and French negotiation strategy, 173–4; interviewee affiliations, 207; research methodology, 69 directive on intra-community transfers of defence products (EU), 195 discourse. See narrative doctrine: and cjef development, 42, 102, 104, 112–13, 119–20; cooperation before 2010, 32–3; nuclear, 35; and European intervention initiative, 180; and intervention in Libya, 71, 87, 97. See also North Atlantic Treaty Organization (nato ) drone. See Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (uav ) E3 (diplomacy), 20, 202 effective cooperation (definition), 45; as case studies, 64–5. See also challenges of cooperation elections: European Parliament, 202; general (UK), 38–9, 193; impact on cooperation, 106, 156,

267

193; presidential (France), 137–8, 159, 197 Elysée (interviewee affiliation), 207. See also presidency (France) Elysée treaty. See Franco-German relations embassy, 15, 41, 78, 144, 156, 164; interviewee affiliation, 205–7 embeddedness, 19, 55, 63, 100, 128, 187 Entente Cordiale, 3–4, 12, 32, 36 equipment. See procurement Estonia, 122, 175, 180, 199 État-major des Armées (ema , France). See defence staff European Commission, 207 European Council, 74 European Defence Agency (eda ), 17, 30, 201 European Defence and Security Policy (esdp ). See Common Security and Defence Policy (csdp ) European Defence Fund (edf ), 195–6 European Defence Industrial Development Program (edidp ), 195–6, 201 European Intervention Initiative (Ei2), 128, 176, 180–1, 194 European Parliament. See elections European Union (EU): and arms procurement, 195–6; divergent views on, 30, 63, 112, 121, 184–5, 191, 200; Emmanuel Macron and, 200, 203;

268

Index

interviewee affiliation, 205–8; and Libya crisis, 72–4, 76, 78, 87–8, 95–6; as a security actor, 17–18, 66; and UK-France relations, 4, 63, 71, 108, 112, 164, 193. See also battlegroups; Brexit; Common Security and Defence Policy (csdp ) Europe Command (eucom , US), 81 exchange officer, 90, 97, 104, 106, 167; interviewee affiliations, 206–7 experts. See private actors; transnational network export, 135, 147–8

f-35, 138, 169, 198 fairness, 51, 127, 132, 160, 185 fasgw-h. See Sea Venom/anl fighter jet. See aircraft Fillon, François, 73 First World War, 3, 163 Five Eyes, 91, 107, 128 foreign affairs ministry: and diplomacy (general), 15, 23; and Libya crisis, 76, 88, 165; and UK-France relations, 120, 173. See also diplomats Fox, Liam, 39, 109 Framework Nation concept (nato ), 123 Franco-American relations, 19, 24, 27, 91. See also trilateral cooperation Franco-British Council (fbc ), 170–1

Franco-German brigade, 109 Franco-German relations: divergences in strategic cultures, 37; institutional features, 18, 23–4, 36, 50, 167; political importance, 23, 128, 138, 159, 184, 198 fruk Forum, 171 Future Combat Air System (fcas ), 135, 151–4, 172, 193, 196–8 Future Cruise/Anti-Ship Weapon (fc/asw ), 135, 169–70, 194 Gaddafi, Muammar, 70–6; death, 165; military forces, 83, 88, 92 gains: and fairness, 9, 51–4, 63, 98–9, 127–8, 157–8, 202; as rationale for cooperation, 26, 190; relative, 52, 162, 184; symbolic, 98–9. See also reciprocity Gazelle (helicopter), 33, 86, 93 Germany: and European security, 17–20, 29, 32, 202; and Libya crisis, 72, 74–5, 95; missile industry, 147, 149; participation in the European intervention initiative, 180; US military bases in, 76, 80. See also Franco-German relations governance: adaptation of, 161, 184–5; in bilateral relations (general), 49–51; and cjef development, 103, 105, 125; of industrial cooperation, 147; in UK-France relations, 39–41 Greece, 19, 85 Guillaud, Edouard, 77, 122

Index Gulf Cooperation Council, 73, 88 Gulf War, 66 Haftar, Khalifa, 94–5 Hague, William, 76 helicopter. See airmobile forces; Gazelle; Lynx; Puma High-Level Working Group (hlwg ), 34, 40, 156 Hollande, François, 137–44, 153, 193 House of Commons, 32, 88, 110, 170, 174 industry. See defence industry information sharing, 81, 91, 106, 148, 201 institutionalism, 22–3, 46, 51–2, 60, 161, 185 institutionalization: in political science, 55–63; in UK-French case, 160–82. See also adaptation; governance; learning institutions (general), 56–61. See also adaptation; European Union; governance; institutionalization; international organizations; learning; multilateralism; North Atlantic Treaty Organization (nato ) intelligence sharing: after 9/11, 27, 32; as an impediment to UK-France cooperation, 91, 98, 120–1, 128, 166; improvements in, 168–9, 181, 193–4; in intervention in Libya, 77, 81; in special relationships (general),

269

26; in UK-US relations, 11, 25, 62, 91 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance assets: and cjef development, 104; and intervention in Libya, 84, 86, 177 interest group, 10, 24, 48, 61–2. See also transnational network intergovernmental agreement (iga ), 148, 194–5 international organizations: and bilateral relations, 21, 54–5, 63–4, 98, 121; as institutions, 43, 50–1, 56 interoperability: and cjef development, 104–5, 112–14, 117–19; and procurement choices, 138–9, 169, 173 interviews. See methodology Iran, 32, 199 Iraq (2003 invasion of), 4, 19, 27, 32, 37 Islamic State, 91–4, 179 issue linkage, 9, 56–8, 162, 185 Italy: and European intervention initiative (Ei2), 180; and Libya crisis, 72–8, 82–5, 92, 95; military relations with France, 123, 128 Jaguar (aircraft), 33 Johnson, Boris, 199–202 Joint Expeditionary Force (jef ), 122–3 Joint Nuclear Commission, 34–6, 40, 188 Juppé, Alain, 73, 76

270

Index

Kosovo, 31–2 Lancaster House treaties: defence and security cooperation treaty, 39–41, 64, 75, 101; negotiations, 39, 130, 132, 190–1; nuclear cooperation treaty, 39–41, 187–91; origins, 28–38; practical effects, 41–2, 101, 133, 166–72; symbolic or political effects, 89, 109, 138–9, 155, 163–6, 174 land forces. See army language barriers, 147 Latvia, 122 learning, 160–82; and cjef development, 119, 127; and cooperation, 58–9, and institutions, 51, 60–1. See also adaptation; institutionalization; lessons learned Le Drian, Jean-Yves, 142, 144, 149, 174 lessons learned, 62, 166, 180–1 letter of intent: European Intervention Initiative, 180; France and Germany, 138; France and UK, 39–40, 178; on the Joint Expeditionary Force, 122; on the Trilateral strategic initiative, 179 Levant, 95, 179 liaison officer, 81, 90, 97, 104, 106, 156 Liberal Democratic Party (UK), 38 Libya (military intervention), 70–100; Contact Group, 83, 87; eufor, 87; post-Gaddafi, 89,

94–5. See also learning; lessons learned Lithuania, 122 Livre blanc (France), 138, 143. See also Defence and National Security Review lobbying, 25, 139–45, 162. See also defence industry; private actors; transnational network Lockheed Martin, 169 Loi de programmation militaire (France), 138–41. See also budgets; procurement Longuet, Gérard, 92 Luff, Peter, 138 Lynx (helicopter), 33 Macron, Emmanuel, 121, 175, 180–1, 193, 198–202 Major, John, 3, 34–5 Major Général des Armées (mga ), 103 Mali, 175–80 Malta, 85 Marine Nationale. See navy Maritime Mine Countermeasures (mmcm ), 135, 151–3, 173 Martel (missile system), 33 May, Theresa, 18, 121, 181, 193, 197, 199–201 mbda, 129–59; and the treaty negotiations, 67 media, 139–42, 164, 166, 173 Medium Altitude Long Endurance (male ) uav . See Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (uav )

Index Memorandum of Understanding (mou ), 135–7, 151–4 methodology, 46, 64–9 Middle East, 32 Milan (missile system), 33 military exercise. See Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (cjef ) minilateral cooperation, 176 minister for the armed forces (France) See defence minister ministry of defence (general): France, 105; UK, 105 Mirage 2000 (aircraft), 90 missiles. See complex weapons Mitterrand, François, 34 multilateralism: and bilateralism, 15–18, 45, 186–7; characteristics of, 43–4, 97–8. See also bilateralism; institutions; international organizations narrative, 27–9, 163–6 navy: British, 89, 136, 143–4; French, 127, 137, 141; US, 143 negotiation: strategy, 175, 185; theories, 22, 27, 44, 48, 61–2. See also bargaining; gains; reciprocity; trade-off Netherlands, 18, 78, 85, 122, 128, 180 network. See communication and information systems (cis ); transnational network 9/11 terrorist attacks, 32 no-fly zone (nfz ), 71–6 norms: and bilateralism, 112–14,

271

162, 185–7, 201; emergence of, 60; in institutions or organizations, 147, 161; and multilateralism, 43, 55, 187 North Atlantic Council (nac ), 73, 80 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (nato ): bilateral relations within (general), 17–20; and cjef development, 108, 112–14, 116–17, 119–24, 193; France’s situation in, 31–2, 192; and intervention in Libya, 70–100; interviewee affiliation, 205–8; UK-France relations within, 30–1, 123–4, 164, 175, 177–8, 180, 184–5 Norway, 78, 85, 122, 128, 180 nuclear deterrence, 3–5, 26, 34–6, 38–41, 188–91. See also Lancaster House treaties Obama, Barack, 37–8, 72–4, 76, 83 observation. See methodology occar (Organization for Joint Armament Cooperation), 29, 135, 151, 154 ocha. See United Nations One Complex Weapons. See complex weapons Operation Artemis (European Union), 30 Operation Barkhane (France), 175, 180 Operation Chammal (France), 179 Operation Ellamy (UK), 80–2

272

Index

Operation Harmattan (France), 80–2 Operation Odyssey Dawn (United States), 80–2 Operation Sentinelle (France), 120 Operation Serval (France). See Mali Operation Unified Protector (nato ), 70–100 organization chart, 40, 105–7. See also governance Organization of Islamic Conference, 88 P3. See trilateral cooperation Parliament: and bilateral relations (general), 25, 48, 61; European, 202; French, 139–43, 155; UK, 78; and UK-French defence relations, 142, 169–70, 196 Portugal, 180 practices: best, 36; and institutions or institutionalization, 56–62, 160–8; practical effects on cooperation, 91–3, 125, 130–2, 146, 148–9, 156–7; as ways of doing, 22, 49–51 presidency (France), 41, 102, 106, 114, 123, 144, 189–90 press. See media prime minister (UK), 39–41, 106, 144–5 principles. See norms private actors, 48–9. See also transnational network procurement: cooperation after the treaties, 129–59, 169–70, 173–6; cooperation before the treaties,

33–4; and state-industry relations, 130–2, 145–50. See also aircraft; complex weapons; Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (uav ) Puma (helicopter), 33, 86 Qatar, 78, 85 quid pro quo: in cooperation theory, 51–4; in UK-France defence relations, 98, 152–3, 172–6, 186. See also reciprocity Rafale (aircraft). See Dassault Rasmussen, Anders Fogh, 82 rationalism, 22, 51, 53, 59 Raytheon, 169 realism, 14, 52 reciprocity: in bilateralism and multilateralism, 51–4, 186–7; and institutions, 56, 61; as practice in UK-France relations, 172–6, 184, 202; and timing, 158, 162; and UK-France cooperation in armament, 150–4. See also gains resilience, 22, 59, 61–2, 161–72, 186. See also institutionalization rewards. See gains; reciprocity Richards, David, 77, 98, 122 Ricketts, Peter, 28, 79, 144 Robertson, George, 171 Royal Air Force (raf , UK). See air force Royal Navy (UK). See navy Russia, 72–5, 199–200 Sahel, 99, 111, 177, 180, 199

Index Saint-Malo declaration, 29–30, 137 Sarkozy, Nicolas: and intervention in Libya, 71–9, 82, 88, 177; and the Lancaster House treaty negotiations, 39–42, 130, 143, 165; and UK-France cooperation in armament, 137–9 satellites, 42, 91, 201 scalp/Storm Shadow (missile program), 131, 135, 152, 169. See also complex weapons Sea Venom/anl (missile program), 129–59, 169–70, 173–6 Second World War, 14, 19, 28 secretary of state for defence (UK). See defence minister Senior Level Group (slg ), 39–41, 103, 107, 166 Socialist Party (France), 141–3 South China Sea, 179 Spain, 77, 85, 95, 123, 128, 180 Special Operations Forces, 84–7, 91, 95, 105, 180 special relationship: definition, 20–7; effect on state preferences (general), 46, 51–4; role of interest groups in, 62; UK-France relations as, 4–11, 181–3, 201–2. See also UK-US relations Standard Operating Procedures (sop ), 50–1, 84 Strategic Communication (stratcom ), 105, 111, 141, 164 Strategic Defence and Security Review (UK), 37, 110, 138 submarine: in intervention in Libya,

273

78–9, 84, 86; UK-France cooperation on, 36, 38, 42, 179, 190 Suez crisis, 4, 23, 111 summit declaration (UK-France): of 1995 (Chequers), 3, 36; of 2006 (Paris), 34; of 2008 (London), 130; of 2009 (Evian), 134; of 2010 (London), 3, 39–42, 88, 101, 134–5, 140; of 2012 (Paris), 108, 137, 166, 177, 188; of 2014 (Brize Norton), 153–4, 158, 188, 197; of 2016 (Amiens), 175, 193, 197; of 2018 (Sandhurst), 121, 163–4, 168–9, 175, 181, 197 Sweden, 18, 78, 85, 180 symbol: importance in bilateral relations (general), 27, 52–5, 60; in UK-France case, 98–100, 152, 161. See also narrative; norms Syria, 177, 179, 199 technical agreement, 147–8, 201 Teutates project, 188. See also nuclear deterrence Thales, 34, 132–3, 173, 195, 206 think tanks, 69, 170–1, 207. See also transnational network; private actors third country, 9, 19, 54–55; and bilateral cooperation, 99–100, 121–4, 128, 148, 158; Brexit and UK as, 194–6, 199–203; and internationalization of the partnership, 162, 176–81; and nuclear cooperation, 191. See also bilateralism; Brexit; embeddedness

274

Index

Thompson-csf , 34 Tomahawk (missile), 78, 80, 99 Tornado (aircraft), 90 trade-off, 63, 145–54, 157–8, 161, 172–6, 202. See also reciprocity transnational network, 48–9, 61, 104, 155–6, 161–2, 166–72, 185 treaty. See bilateral treaty (general); Lancaster House treaties trilateral cooperation: between France, Germany, and UK, 20, 29; between France, UK, and US in Libya, 75, 82, 87, 95, 100; Trilateral Strategic Initiative, 176–81 Tripoli, 88, 92, 165 Trump, Donald J., 18, 179 trust, 56, 133 Turkey, 19, 74, 78, 82–4, 87 2015 terrorist attacks in France, 120 2008 financial crisis, 37, 129–30

(military intervention); Obama, Barack; UK-US relations Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (uav ), 42, 135, 151–2, 159, 173–4. See also bae ; Dassault; Future Combat Air System (fcas ); procurement; Thales US Air Force in Europe (usaff ), 76 uss Mount Whitney (ship), 81, 90 US-UK relations. See UK-US relations

UK-France summit (general), 24, 40, 103, 126, 156, 163–6, 189, 201 UK-US relations, 23–5, 37, 87, 91, 159 Union pour un mouvement populaire (ump , France), 143 United Arab Emirates, 78 United Nations (UN): France and UK role in, 30, 70, 108, 163–4; and intervention in Libya, 70–8, 87–8, 94–5 United States (US). See FrancoAmerican relations; Libya

Yugoslavia, 31, 71

Watchkeeper (uav system). See Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (uav ) weapon program. See procurement Williamson, Gavin, 197 working groups, 34, 103–7. See also Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (cjef ); Parliament