Revolution and Society in Greek Sicily and Southern Italy 3515059598, 9783515059596

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Shlomo Berger

Revolution and Society in Greek Sicily and Southern Italy Historia Einzelschriften 71

Franz Steiner Verlag Stuttgart

SHLOMO BERGER

REVOLUTION ANDSOCIETY

INGREEK SICILY ANDSOUTHERN ITALY

CIP-Titelaufnahme derDeutschen Bibliothek Berger, Selomo: Revolution andsociety inGreek Sicily andSouthern Italy / Shlomo Berger. –Stuttgart: Steiner, 1992 (Historia: Einzelschriften; H.71) Zugl.: Jerusalem, Hebrew Univ., Diss., 1987 8 05959– 515– ISBN3– NE:Historia / Einzelschriften

Jede Verwertung des Werkes außerhalb der Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist unzulässig undstrafbar. Dies gilt insbesondere fürÜbersetzung, Nachdruck, Mikroverfilmung odervergleichbare Verfahren sowie fürdieSpeicherung inDatenverarbeitungsanlagen. © 1992 by Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GmbH, Sitz Stuttgart. Druck: Druckerei Peter Proff, Eurasburg. Printed in Germany

CONTENTS Acknowledgements

7

Introduction

9

Part I: Stasis in Sicily andSouthern Italy: Case Studies

1 Acragas 2 Catane 3 Croton 4 Cumae 5 Gela 6 Leontinoi 7 Locri Epizephyrii

8 Megara Hyblaea

9 Metapontum

10 Pithecoussai 11 Rhegion

12 Selinus 13 Sybaris/Thurii 14 Syracuse 15 Taras

16Zancle/Messana Part II: The Constituents of Stasis: Systematic Analysis

1 Causes of Stasis 2 Social, Political andEconomic Structures 3 Greeks, Natives andForeigners 4 Violence andthe Armed Forces 5 The Stasis in Process

15 15 18 19

22 23 25 27 27 28

28

29 30

31 34 52

54 57 57 62 74 88 93

Conclusion

106

Bibliography

110

6

Contents

1 List of Staseis 2 Non-Civic Interference

116 116 117

4 Exile 5 “Class Conflict”

120 121

Tables

3 Mercenaries 6 Metabole

7 Ethnic Struggle

8 Economic

Factors

119

121 122

122

ACKNOLEDGEMENTS This book is the revised version of a Ph. D. thesis submitted to the Hebrew University ofJerusalem in 1987. Prof. David Asheri served asmythesis advisor, Prof. Moshe Amitandthelate Prof. Menahem Stern weremyexaminers. AmitandAsheri also readthepresent manuscript andmademanyuseful suggestions. I would like to express my gratitude to them for all their help and support. Prof. Hans-Joachim Gehrke (Freiburg imBreisgau) readthemanuscript, commented onit andoffered his help in theprocess of completing thebook. Prof. L. deBlois (Nijmegen) read the manuscript and discussed it with me. Dr. H. Cotton (Jerusalem) andDr. J. Price (Middlebury, Vermont) shared with me their scholarly knowledge and offered a friendly hand when necessary. Dr. D. Niederland and R. Lemm dedicated many hours, helping meinvarious ways. Prof. K.Raaflaub guided methrough thelastphase and suggested useful changes. Dr. Loren J. Samons II assisted in preparing the manuscript for publication, James Kennelly in reading the proofs. All deserve my deepest thanks.

I would like to dedicate this book to myparents. June 1991

Shlomo Berger

INTRODUCTION In 415 B. C. Alcibiades tried to persuade the Athenian demos to sail to Sicily. Among hisarguments infavor of suchanexpedition, soThucydides tells us,wasthe The Sicilian cities have swollen populations made up of all sorts of following: “ mixtures, andthere areconstant changes andrearrangements inthecitizen body ... Noone has adequate armor for his ownperson, or a proper establishment on land. Eachmanspends histimetrying togetfromthepublic whatever hethinks hecanget, either byclever speeches orbyopensedition ... Thechances arethattheywillmake separate agreements withusassoonaswecome forward withattractive suggestions, 1 especially if they are, asweunderstand thecase, in a state of violent party strife.” Alcibiades’words are echoed by modern scholars. M. I. Finley suggests the thefailure oftheSicilian Greeks tomakea success ofthe following asareason for“ behavior wasprofoundly influenced anddisturbed by : life ” Their “ of way city-state thefact that they lived in analien environment. TheCarthaginians, Etruscans and others wereoutside buttoonearathand; theSicels, Sicans andElymians wereonthe island itself and,inthecaseofSyracuse atleast, within their ownterritorial sphere ... Thenthere wasthepeculiar heritage ofthefirst tyrants which Alcibiades hadstressed. ToomanySicilian Greeks wereuprooted, sometimes morethanonce, andthere were toomanymercenaries. Tofunction properly asanindependent self-governing body, thecity-state hadtohave a strong sense of community andhadtomaintain a delicate , between therichandthepoor. These andthe“many” few” equilibrium between the“ 2 the Sicilian cities failed to achieve.” Two factors prominently influencing the history of the Sicilian andsouthern Italian city-states emerge from historical evidence as well as from contemporary research. Onederives fromtheunique geographical, social andethnic characteristics of Sicily. The other is the unstable organization of the polis itself, which was manifested in stasis. The analysis anddiscussion of these twofactors will be the subject of this book. Revolution andcivil strife wereendemic totheGreek polis. Manyhistorians and philosophers in antiquity, Plato andAristotle among them, devoted a substantial portion oftheir worktotheproblem ofstasis which wastheoutcome oftheideological andsocial structure ofthecity-state. Thedevelopment ofthepolis anditspolitics were bound upwithcivil strife andevenaccommodated ittoadegree, atirregular intervals, as can be found in the Athenaion Politeia, where the history of the Athenian constitution isperiodicized according tostasis. Stasis wassuchanintegral feature of life in the polis that it notonly survived the collapse of the “classical”polis, but also resurfaced in the Hellenistic andRoman polis. 1

2

Thuc. 6.17.2– 4. Finley (1979) 48; seealso Westlake (1958).

10

Introduction

Stasis canbedefined asinternal warbetween local groups of citizens (politai). Other urban residents, namely foreigners andslaves, mayalsohaveparticipated inthe struggles butplayed only a subsidiary role. This can be partially explained by issues raised intimes of crisis, suchascontrol of thecity, themanner of election topublic offices orthebest approach todealing withsocial andeconomic problems. Forthe student ofcivil strife, ananalysis ofthese issues serves asanexcellent vantage point from which to examine the structure of the polis as a whole. Civil strife wasfound all over theGreek world. It radiated from its hubin the Aegean totheperiphery intheso-called colonial world, which originated intheeighth century whena Greek colonizing movement swept thecoasts of theMediterranean. Thecolonies werefounded aspoleis;they remained Greek inculture andoutlook as well asintheir social andpolitical structure. Thusit is notsurprising tofind stasis in these poleis as well.This is not to deny the colonial world credit for its own contribution. Wherever theysettled, thecolonists cameintocontact withnon-Greeks andthese encounters hadfar-reaching consequences. The gradual opening of the colonies tolocal influences madetheSicilian andsouthern Italian poleis anamalgam of cultural traditions, asFinley suggests. It is thusnecessary totreat “colonial”stasis asarising fromcultural cross-fertilization, that is, both asa Greek phenomenon and asanexpression of particular, local conditions: a mutual influence often overlooked inmodern aswell asin ancient accounts. Thesituation is particularly interesting in Sicily andsouthern Italy because oftheimportance ofthese regions andtherelatively abundant documentation preserved about them. In recent years, the phenomenon of stasis in general has received growing attention, butnostudy deals particularly withstasis inSicily andsouthern Italy, which hasitsownspecific characteristics. Thepresent study attempts tofill thatgap.A.Fuks (1974) initiated thepresent waveof stasis studies. Regarding thePeloponnesian War asa turning point inthehistory of stasis, hedealt mainly with stasis from thefourth century onward. Until that war, inFuks’opinion, theissues which precipitated stasis wereof a purely political nature. Thewarengendered social andeconomic upheaval, andcivil strife thereafter became anexpression of thegrowing polarization between therich andthe poor. Fuks supported his arguments by stressing thepredominance of social and economic issues in fourth century accounts. A careful reading of Thucydides shows, however, thatevenhewasnotoblivious tosuchmotives, although hepreferred toemphasize thepolitical ones. Moreover, Fuksmakes nogeographical distinction in his study of stasis buttreats the Greek world as a monolith. A. Lintott (1982), whosurprisingly shows nofamiliarity withFuks’work, gives thefirst English description of stasis fromthearchaic through theclassical period. Hisconclusions are notdissimilar to Fuks’. E. Ruschenbusch (1979) suggests newdirections in thestudy of stasis. Hetries tode-emphasize theimportance ofcivil strife, claiming thatitwasallbutnon-existent in small poleis (with 450–1250 citizens) because they were sofirmly controlled by local aristocracies that only the intervention of a foreign force might lead to stasis. Ruschenbusch, however, thereby ignores therole of thepolis’structure in political unrest. Nevertheless, his emphasis on the “ small” , “typical”polis is the guiding principle of H.-J. Gehrke’s book (1985), the most detailed study of stasis to date.

Introduction

11

Gehrke excludes from his discussion Athens andSparta as atypical, theWest as unique. His approach –to examine stasis systematically as a political phenomenon, a typeorgenus ofpolitical interaction inthepolis –is notunlike theoneadopted in thepresent study. Gehrke’sviews arereiterated inhisrecent study ofthe“Greek Third World”(1987). The basic semantic analysis of the term stasis is provided by B. Loenen (1953).3 The present book is based on detailed case-studies (Part One), which were necessitated by the fragmentary nature of the evidence. The first section, then, consists of compressed accounts of all staseis discussed in thebook. In the second part, stasis is examined according to the guidelines delineated above: within the framework of theGreek polis intheWest, andasa socio-political phenomenon inthe Greek world in general. When Greek immigration to Sicily andsouthern Italy began in the middle of the eighth century thenewcolonies weremodelled after thepolis inthemother-cities. To whatextent thepolis already wasestablished asthenewpolitical andsocial unit is questionable. Moreover, the theory that the polis evolved directly from the former tribal, pre-state community ispresently suspect.4 TheGreek colonists, then, imported a system which still hadtobeworked out.They left behind, however, manytraditions which determined the order of the mother-cities. Thus the newfoundations were established according totwobasic principles: acommodation tothenewconditions in theregion ontheonehand, andorganizing thepolis’institutions ina rational way onthe other. As the meager epigraphical material shows, thelocal institutions in the western poleis corresponded at least in name to those in themotherland. Inpart two, then, I shall examine howsocial andpolitical institutions developed inthepolis ofthe West, andtowhatextent this development differs fromtheGreek archetype. Stasis canserve usasanindication of these differences. Stasis is a genus containing many species.5 It is defined bytime (it hasa proper date andduration) andspace (the confines of thepolis). Rooted in a feeling of relative deprivation it aimsata change inthepolis’organization thatwould recognize a new order inallareas oflife oratleast replace thepolis’leadership. If “ revolution” , inthe opinion of contemporary social scientists, denotes a specific, unique, violent and

3 4 5

Seealso Heuss (1973); Berve (1967) ontyranny; Seibert (1979) onexile. Bourriot (1976); Roussel (1976). Evidently thehistorical andsociological models developed bymodern scholars onthephenomenonofrevolution cannot beapplied easily toancient Greek realities. Infact, towhatextent they areapplicable tomodern societies isdoubtful aswell. See,forinstance, Stone (1966) andAya (1979) whodiscuss manyimportant theories. Evenif defined as“miniature internal wars” (I.F. Stone, TheTrial of Socrates, NewYork 1988, 11)or“ coupd’état” , which is onlyonefacet of stasis, thedifferences between revolution inmodern history andancient stasis arestriking. Nevertheless, onecanprofit fromsuchdiscussions whenexploring theinfinite problems related to any revolutionary act. A case in point is Eckstein (1965), whose definitions of what he calls “internal war” anditsphases assisted meinsection 2.5. It should bementioned, however, thatthe applicability of Eckstein’s theory is questioned byStone (1966) 169– 70.

12

Introduction

complete event,6 stasis, bycontrast, encompasses a widerange of possible phenomena: gathering, faction, civil disorder, rebellion, riot andrevolution.7 Theefforts of a citizen orgroup ofcitizens toforce change are, theoretically at least, notexclusively political bynature. It is true, however, thatmanystaseis were indeed political since their aimwasthecomplete restructuring of thecity’s regime. Thereasons for stasis aretobefound within thevery structure of thepolis. Thecitystate, of itself, possessed no bureaucracy; the power was in the hands of the elected officials or with the assembly. Thus citizens whodesired change tried to establish control overtheassembly andpublic offices byanymeans andwithanypower attheir ; society” disposal. Furthermore, there wasnoreal distinction between “state”and“ social groups andpolitical factions often coincided. Intheir struggle political factions rarely pursued abstract principles, butrather advanced theconcrete, material interests of their class orgroup. Social factors aswell asthereal possibility of material profit orloss intensified thepolitical conflicts anddeepened thedesire forcomplete change. Stasis, then, originates inandis carried outwithin theconfines of thepolis, even within thelocal assembly itself, andis notnecessarily violent.8 Departure fromlegal means depends onthecourse of stasis, asis asserted inNewman’sdefinition of stasis: to stasiazein occurs when a number of citizens of a state form themselves into a “ faction fortheattainment ofsomepolitical endbylegal andillegal means. Apolitical party is assumed to pursue its endbylegal means only, whereas those involved in 9Thedividing stasis areprepared tocarry outits aimsbyillegal means if necessary.” line between thetwochannels is atbest unclear. Thechange resulting fromstasis manifests itself inmetabole,10 butnotexclusively. Certain changes according to Aristotle can take place within a regime, for example from moderate to extreme democracy, or from one type of aristocracy to another. Aristotle (Pol. 1301a 14) addsthat metabolai occur also without stasis. But theexamples heoffers forsuchcases cannonetheless beinterpreted astheoutcome of stasis. Clearly, themost serious problems facing theinvestigator of stasis in Sicily and southern Italy arethose regarding the sources which are fewandfragmentary. No single complete narrative source forSicilian history exists. Among theextant sources is a first century history written byDiodorus of Agyrium.11 Patriotic zeal ledhimto dedicate inordinate space to local history, but his weaknesses as a historian are obvious; writing, as he did, about events that occurred at least three hundred years earlier, hemustbeconsidered a secondary source atbest. Thequality of hisnarrative corresponds closely tothequality of hissources. Ontheonehand, forSicilian history herelied ongoodauthorities suchasPhilistus of Syracuse andTimaeus of Tauromenium, sothatwehavesomewhat better descriptions ofcertain periods oflocal history.

6 7

8 9 10 11

3. Eisenstadt (1978) 2– 36. Mustacchio (1972) 17– ButseeWheeler (1952) 49. Newman (1902) IV 284; seealso Mustacchio (1972) 97– 128; Loenen (1953). Ryffel (1948); Newman (1902) I 522. Schwartz, “ Diodorus” (38), RE5 (1905) 663– 704; Hornblower (1981); Rawson (1985) 215– 32; on Diodorus andSicily see Meister (1967).

Introduction

13

Ontheother hand, mostoftheother historians henames assources wrote inthefourth ofhistory, whose aimwas rhetorical school” century andlater. Theybelonged tothe“ to present the reader with exempla, appropriate subjects to serve as inspirational models for generations to come. Most of the later, Hellenistic historians were influenced also by the Platonic andAristotelian critique of politics, especially of tyranny. These influences were sopervasive thatthese historians composed uniform descriptions of events, institutions and personalities at the expense of the actual diversity of Greek history.12 All other sources for theperiod under study, while complementary, areproblematical. Theyrange fromhistorical works suchasthose ofHerodotus andThucydides andphilosophical treatises suchasAristotle’s works tothegeographical literature of Strabo andPausanias. Fragments of lost works, like those cited in thecollection of Jacoby, havevalue aswell. Taken asawhole, however, theyprovide merescraps of information which must be carefully scrutinized. Unfortunately, the epigraphical material of the Greek West is poor, andinformation gleaned from archaeological finds is marginal to our subject.

12

141. Fornara (1983) 91–

PART I STASIS IN SICILY ANDSOUTHERN ITALY: CASE STUDIES 1 ACRAGAS

(1) Acragas wasfounded in580,1andwithin tenyears experienced itsfirst stasis.2 Aristotle, in hisPolitics, only mentions howPhalaris made useof his minor public office to seize power. According toPolyaenus, whowrote late inthesecond century C.E., Phalaris hadbeenappointed telones ortaxcollector andwascharged withthe construction of a temple dedicated toZeus.3 Ononeparticular occasion heinformed thelocal citizens thatmoney andmaterials forthetemple hadbeenstolen. Heasked foradditional funds andcalled fortheapprehension andprosecution of theperpetrators. Shocked by his allegations, the Acragantines complied. However, while they werecelebrating theThesmophoria, Phalaris distributed armstoprisoners, mercenaries andstrangers andturned onthecitizens, killing mostof themintheprocess, and seizing control of thecity. Although Polyaenus’description is not very reliable, being a late and doubtful source, it contains certain elements that may well reflect conditions in archaic Acragas. Ten years after its foundation, the newpolis hadnot yet completed its organization phase. During these years thecolonists probably encountered local nonGreek peoples. Their presence obstructed theprocess of colonization andPhalaris used them for his ends.4 Wartime hadgenerated the need for a “strong leader.” Phalaris’actions fall into an easily recognizable stratagem also used by other power-seekers. Heheld public office, the obvious starting point for anywould-be tyrant. He took advantage of the feast of the Thesmophoria,5 slaughtered the citizens and became guardian of their wives and children.6 Finally, he collected all the weapons from thecitizens’homes to safeguard hisrule.7.

1

Onthecolonization of Acragas andits history:

2

Sources: Arist. Pol. 1310 b 28; Polyaenus 5.1– 2. The date is 570 BC, thethird year of the fiftysecond olympiad according toEusebius, Chronicon. Seealso VanCompernolle (1960) 398– 9. Thearchaeological excavations havenotrevealed a temple fromthis early period; DeWaele

3 4

5 6

7

(1971).

(1971) 103– 104.

Dunbabin (1948); Bérard (1957);

DeWaele

Polyaenus 5.1.3– 4 describes a further warbetween Phalaris andtheSicans. Seealso Schol. Pind. Olymp. 2.15 a, b, c. OntheSicans, Schulten, “ Sikaner” 2460. , RE II A.2 (1923) 2459– Compare withXen.Hell. 5.2.29.

48. (1977) 21– SeealsoDunbabin (1948) 316.

Asheri

Stasis inSicily andSouthern Italy: Case studies

16

(2) After a reign of sixteen years8 Phalaris wasremoved; nodefinitive accounts exist regarding hisdownfall.9 Somesources claim thattheEmmenidai, anaristocratic family, mounted acoupagainst him.Thistradition glorifies thearistocratic ethos and tells of various efforts to oust himduring his reign. In one of these accounts two women conspired against him,werecaptured andlater confessed their intentions. In a similar account twolovers, Melanippus andChariton, didthe same.10 Astonished bytheir confessions, Phalaris released them. Within theframework ofthelovers’tale, anoracle foreshadows thetyrant’s fate.11 In another account a vague “democratic” tradition probably influenced bypost-Platonic historiography claims that thedemos participated in the coup.12 Virtually nothing isknown about thenewregime which replaced thetyrant apart the wearers of the from twonames, Alcamenes andAlcandros, andthe epithet “ purple”which was ascribed to the new aristocracy and indicates their relative

or multitudo

wealth.13

(3) After

sixty years

a newtyrant, Theron, sonof Ainesidamos, rose topower

(488/7). His story as told by Polyaenus is typical.14 Theron hada private mercenary

army. Having financial difficulties, hewasunable topayhismercenaries. Heapproachedthelocal population andproposed, inreturn forapredetermined sumof money, to complete the construction of the temple dedicated to Athena. The unsuspecting citizens accepted theoffer. Theron, however, usedthemoney topayhismercenaries who subsequently showed their gratitude by helping him seize control of the city. Theron descended from theEmmenidai, thearistocratic family which hadbeen oneofthefounding families ofAcragas andhadpossibly played aroleinthedownfall of Phalaris. His brother, Xenocrates, hadwona chariot race inDelphi in490 which wascommemorated byPindar in the Sixth Pythian Ode. The family’s prominence evidently played a significant role in the coup.15 Although Theron was eulogized by Diodorus andcalled king (monarchos) by Herodotus and Timaeus,16 little can be verified about thenature ofhisreign which, however, appears tohavebeena period of growing prosperity accentuated by building projects such as those found in the “ valley of the Temples”.17

8 VanCompernolle (1960) 375 n. 7; Dunbabin (1948) 316 n. 8. 9 Sources: Heraclid. Pont. FHGII F 37; id., F65 Wehrli; Hieron. Rhod. F34 Wehrli; Diod. 9.30; Cic. Off.2.5.26; Val.Max.3.3. ext. 2; Plut. Amat. 760c; id.,Praec. ger. resp. 821e; Ael. V.H.2.4; Athenaeus 13.602a; Eusebius Praep. Ev.5.35.2– 3; Iambi. Vit.Pyth. 221; Jacoby, FGrH577F3; Suidas s.v. Phalaris, anabolé; Schol. Pind. Olymp. 2.68a, b, d and82d. 10 Cf. Aristoxenos F31Wehrli. 4; II no.327; Fontenrose (1978) 44– 11 Parke andWormell (1956) 123 I – 57, 297. 12 Ananti-Phalaris tradition canalready bedetected during thereign ofTheron, sonofAinesidamos 472), a member oftheEmmenid family. Pindar, being invited topraise Theron’s victories, (488– attacks Phalaris andthe notorious bull in his first Pythian ode. 13 Dunbabin (1948) 322– 3; Berve (1967) 131– 2; DeWaele (1971) 107– 8. 14 Polyaenus 6.51; seealsoDiod. 10.28.3. Accordingly, Dunbabin (1948) 413 tends todatethecoup oneyearearlier (489). ButseeDeWaele (1971) 109n.553.Theyear488isdetermined byDiod. 11.53 whosays that Theron died (in472/1) after ruling for 16 years. 15 OnTheron’s position inthecity, DeWaele (1971) 167; Buongiovanni (1985). 16 Hdt. 7. 165; FGrH 566 F93b. 17 Diod. 11.25.3; DeWaele (1971).

Acragas

17

(4) Theron’s death marked the endof the local tyranny.18 Thrasydaeus, his son, inherited the throne in 472/1 and decided to wage war on Syracuse. The treaty between thecities, sealed byintermarriage between theruling families, wasundermined.19 Hieron, the Deinomenid tyrant of Syracuse, confronted the Acragantine tyrant, defeated himandsparked off arevolution inthecity. Thisincident wasoneof a series of suchincidents related totheongoing struggle between thetwoGreek cities for supremacy ontheisland. TheAcragantines, angered bythedefeat, forced Thrasydaeus toleave. Hesetout formainland Greece where hewasexecuted inMegara. Meanwhile ademocracy was established in his home city. These events reflect anoverall movement to rid Sicily of tyrannies: Acragas removed the mercenaries who had supported the tyrants, recalled the exiles andfought nearby Sicel towns.20 Local tradition emphasizes the role andmission of Empedocles, the famed philosopher of Acragas, whoset upits . Thistradition is doubtful, however, forit theThousand” removing “ “ equal regime” appears thatEmpedocles would, atthattime, havebeentooyoung forsuchaventure.21 Inanycase, it seems thateither a moderate aristocracy ora democracy replaced the tyranny. Diodorus’description underscores theanti-tyrannical elements oftheregime andjustifies its label as a democracy.22 (5) The subsequent history of stasis in the city is linked with the struggle for supremacy between Syracuse andtheCarthaginians in thewestern regions of Sicily. The first known stasis dates from the Peloponnesian War in 413. Thucydides promentions thecity, saying thatitwasinvolved ina state ofrevolution andthatthe“ Syracusan” faction waseventually expelled.23 TheAthenians, previously barred from crossing Acragantine territory, could regard therevolution as a great success, given their disadvantageous position in Sicily during the expedition. (6) The antagonistic relationship between Acragas and Syracuse was also a central theme in the stasis of 394. This wasthe year when Dionysius the Elder was defeated in the Sicel townof Tauromenion. Asa result, theAcragantine population as well as the Messanians drove out his supporters, reintroduced eleutheria or freedom andbroke the treaty with Syracuse.24 Apparently there hadalso been a “neutral”group which tried to re-establish thecity’s independent position in Sicily. Acragas’status, after its destruction by the Carthaginians in 406 and subsequent reconstruction, wasfinally decided by Dionysius the Elder andthe Carthaginians. 18 Diod. 11.53.2–5. Hieron hadanambivalent relationship withTheron. Hieron’sbrother, Polyzalos, married Gelon’s widow, Damarete, andprobably hoped to seize power in Syracuse. In 476 the twobrothers quarrelled andPolyzalos found refuge in Acragas. Damarete wasTheron’s daughter (and Thrasydaeus’sister). Hieron planned to march against Acragas, butchanged his mindand revealed to Theron details of a plot against himin Himera, then under Acragantine control. Consequently, thefriendship between thecities resumed. See Diod. 11.48.5– 8. 20 Diod. 11.68, 76.4– 6 (koinon dogma); FGrH 577 F 1; Asheri (1980) 148. 21 Diog. Laert. 8.66; see also De Waele (1971) 169– 72. 22 Busolt, Griechische Geschichte III 1,69; Berve (1967) 597; Wentker (1956) 25.

19

23 24

Thuc. 7.46, 50; Bruno Sunseri (1982). Diod. 14.88.5.

18

Stasis inSicily andSouthern Italy: Case studies

The“neutrals”capitalized onthefailure oftheSyracusan tyrant andthefact thatthe warwith thePunic enemy hadbeen temporarily suspended in order to carry outa successful stasis. (7)Thetworemaining cases of stasis datefromtheperiod ofAgathocles’tyranny 289) andare linked to changes in the city’s relationship with the in Syracuse (317– local “superpower” , Syracuse. After Agathocles’rise to power, Syracusan exiles asked theAcragantines towagewaragainst thetyrant (314 B.C.). TheAcragantines didnottrust their ownleadership andregime, thenature of which is notknown, and asked for another leader fromGreece. Timoleon hadserved asanexample of what theymight expect fromsuchanimported leader. However, thenewman,theSpartan Acrotatus, proved less honest then Timoleon andused hisposition to increase his personal fortune. When the enraged Acragantines tried to stone himhe fled and returned toSparta. Nothing, however, is known about thenature of theregime inthe city either before orafter this incident.25 (8) A fewyears later, in 307, after a defeat at the hands of the Syracusans, opposition developed toward thecommander of thearmy, Xenodocus. Hehadbeen elected general in order to organize a Sicilian coalition against Syracuse. Hewas motivated by the fact that Agathocles campaigned in Africa andhoped to undermine hisrule inSyracuse andother regions of Sicily. Xenodocus managed to form a new alliance among Sicilian cities (such asGela, Leontinoi andCamarina) aswellasSicel towns (such asEnna) butwasunsuccessful inmatching thesuperior Syracusan army in the field. He was pardoned for his first failure but not for his second. The Acragantines accused himofnottaking advantage ofthefavorable circumstances. He then fled to Gela which wasgoverned by friends, so as to avoid a trial in Acragas.26

2 CATANE Catane wasfounded bysettlers fromSicilian Naxos in729.Together withNaxos, itsmother city, andLeontinoi, itformed theChalcidian triangle, which dominated the fertile Symaethus valley. During thearchaic period thecitywasrenowned foritslawgiver, Charondas. Gradually the city lost its autonomy to powerful Syracuse which wasinvolved in the only stasis at Catane mentioned in the sources.27 In 476 Hieron, the Syracusan tyrant, overpowered Catane. He removed its citizens toLeontinoi andrepopulated thecity withloyal mercenaries andother Doric settlers. He also expanded the city’s chora at the Sicels’expense. The city was

renamed Aetna.28

25 Diod. 19. 70–1; De Waele (1971) 138– 9. 26 Diod. 20.31.2– 4, 56.1– 2, 62.2– 5. 27 Basic bibliography: Dunbabin (1948); Bérard (1957). 28 Diod. 11.49.1– 4.

Croton

19

(9) Hieron died in 468, andeleven months later his successor Thrasybulus was removed. By 466, the local tyranny was replaced by a civic regime; a general movement tooverthrow tyranny ontheisland began, andCatane wasnoexception.29 Itmaybeassumed thatthestasis tookplace after 466aspartofthegeneral movement andnotimmediately after Hieron’s death.30 The former citizens returned to Catane from Leontinoi, expelled Hieron’s settlers anddesecrated his tomb in the city; Hieron’s settlers moved toanearby site andfounded another Aetna while theoriginal city wasagain called Catane. The“ oldcitizens”wereassisted bySyracusans, whowerethemselves antityrannical andfeared thatHieron’s settlers might turnagainst Syracuse. Ontheother hand, theCatanians werehelped also bytheSicels, whohadbeenremoved in476fromthe expanded Catanian chora. Atthispoint a newleader, Ducetius, emerged, andCatane washisfirst test-case. Indeed, after theexpulsion of Hieron’s mercenaries, theSicels 476 borders.32 were allowed to reclaim their land31 and Catane returned to its pre–

3 CROTON Croton wasfounded in710 bysettlers fromAchaea. Although thecity hada good harbor which served theGreeks sailing toItaly, itwasless successful thanprosperous Sybaris. Furthermore, in themiddle of the sixth century Croton suffered a defeat at the hands of Locri, which weakened herposition for some time. When the Pythagoreans arrived the picture changed. Croton then defeated Sybaris and became an important power in southern Italy. The expulsion of the Pythagoreans, however, as well as conflicts with local peoples heralded herdecline during the second half of the fifth century.33 (10) Thefirst recorded stasis concerned therule of thePythagorean aristocracy. In510, after Croton defeated Sybaris, thePythagoreans refused toaccept thedemos’ proposal for the distribution of the conquered land. The demos rebelled under the leadership of Cylon34, an aristocrat who harbored a personal grudge against the Pythagoreans since theyrefused to admit himto their ranks.35

29 30

Diod. 11.76; Strabo 6.2.3. 461, andSicilian history in general, is unclear. It is evident, Diodorus’chronology for466– however, that the stasis is connected with the overall movement to overthrow tyrannies in the sameyears. Cf.Syracuse, note 187below. OnDucetius seePart Two,section 3 below.

31 32 Asheri (1980) 147. 33 Basic bibliography: Dunbabin (1948); Bérard (1957). 9. OnCylon, Minar (1942) 69– 34 Ontheregime seeSartori (1974) 707– 70; Dunbabin (1948) 366. 35 Sources: Aristoxenos, F18Wehrli; Dicaearchus, F34 Wehrli; Polyb. 2.3, 9.1– 3; Diod. 10.11.1; 17;Porph. Vit.Pyth. 53– Diog. Laert. 8.1.39; Justin. 20.4.14– 57; Iambi. Vit.Pyth. 248f. Onthe 37; Minar (1942) 50– sources, Delatte (1921) 205– 3; vonFritz (1940) 33– 67.

20

Stasis inSicily andSouthern Italy: Case studies

Thepresence ofPythagoreans inthecityprovoked constant skirmishes astheold ) felt it waslosing itsgriponthecity. Theevents of 510 TheThousand” aristocracy (“ brought the struggle to a head. If thePythagoreans were to control newterritory, it would have signaled a further decline in thepower of theoldaristocracy.36 Mention ofthedemos asafactor intheevents seems anachronistic, unless anyadversary ofthe . Theoldaristocracy momentarily triumphed demos” Pythagoreans canbe seen as “ with the flight of Pythagoras to Metapontum.37 (11) It is notknown exactly when the Pythagoreans regained control. A tyrant named Cleinias is reported byDionysius of Halicarnassus.38 Twopossible dates are suggested for his ascendency topower, 49439 and453.40 If thefirst date is accepted, wemustassume thatthePythagoreans returned topower atalater date, after 494.The second date (453) is connected withthefinal expulsion of thePythagoreans. Cleinias took advantage of theturmoil caused bytheexpulsion andseized power inthecity. Inthiscasethereturn ofthePythagoreans topower after 510isconnected withanother event not mentioned in the sources.41 Cleinias conducted the coup using the usual stratagem. He chose exiles andfreed slaves to help him in his scheme andthen murdered aristocrats anddenied thecitizens freedom (eleutheria).42 (12) The second expulsion of thePythagoreans is connected with the general expulsion of thesectfromvarious cities insouthern Italy. Itprobably started inCroton where their adversaries burned down the house of Milo who had hosted the Pythagorean leaders. Only twomensurvived thefire. Theopposition spread toother cities in theregion andanoverall fight withlocal aristocracies ensued, asthey were perceived asmainly Pythagorean. It wasstopped only through Achaean mediation.43 Theevents took place in the440’s, although theexact date cannot be determined.44 4. Asheri (1966) 83– 4; Minar (1942) 71;Dunbabin (1948) 366; Vatai (1983) 51– 5. SeealsoWalbank, Commentary, I 222– 4 onthetendency Justin. 20.4.17; Minar (1942) 133– toconnect events concerning thePythagoreans totheir master’s life. 38 Dion. Hal. Ant.Rom. 20.7. 39 494 B.C.: the story is located before that of Anaxilas’coup, which is dated to 493. 40 453/2 B.C.: theexpulsion of thePythagoreans; seebelow. 41 Minar (1942) 72. 9; Bicknell (1976). 42 Berve (1967) 158– 4; Diog. Laert.8.1.39; Plut. de Gen. Soc. 43 Sources: Aristoxenos, F18 Wehrli; Polyb. 2.39.1– 7; Iambi. Vit. Pyth. 262f. b; Justin. 20.4.14– 583a– 44 Thechronological problem is divided into twoissues: thedate of theevents inCroton andthedate of theevents intheother cities. Therefoundations of Sybaris, in453 and446, andthesubsequent foundation ofThurii, in444/3, mayhintatdomestic problems inCroton. In453Croton interfered in the process and dismantled the new foundation; it did not intervene in the following foundations. Later, moreover, Croton signed atreaty withThurii. Thusitislogical toassume that 443) there weresomechanges inthecity, suchastheremoval of between these twodates (453– the Pythagoreans andmaybe also the rise of the tyrant Cleinias to power. Further, Aristoxenos tells thatLysis (then ayoung man)whowasoneofthetwosurvivors fromthefireinMilo’shouse, came to Greece to become Epaminondas’tutor. It is possible then to date the events to the440’s 4;Minar (1942) 48;vonFritz (1940) 69– 70.Itismore asshown byWalbank, Commentary, I 222– difficult to combine theevents in Croton with those in theother cities. Polybius says that the Achaeans were invited to serve asthepeace-maker in theregion. Since Achaea became an aristocracy in417(Thuc. 5.82), themediation mustbedated toanearlier period; Achaea was chosen because it wasdemocratic andthelocal cities fought against aristocracies. Moreover, the 36 37

Croton

21

Thenature ofPythagorean ruleintheother cities isunclear. Incontrast toCroton, it appears thatnoPythagorean aristocracy existed inthose cities.45 Instead, within the ranks oflocal aristocracies there wereanumber ofmembers ofthePythagorean sect, whopropagated their master’s philosophy.46 In this light, it is possible to understand

thewidespread opposition toaristocracies invarious cities which, however, cannot be exclusively defined as democratic.47 As in Croton, the opposition was also composed of aristocrats whosought toeliminate thePythagoreans. Therole of the demos could have been only subsidiary. Furthermore, little is known about the character of the new regimes. The center of Pythagoreanism was transferred to Tarentum. (13) Croton surfaces again withitsfinal stasis in317.48 Thelocal aristocrats were Six expelled fromthecity bythedemocrats because of their ties to theSyracusan “ Hundred”andlodged inThurii. Thewarbetween thetwoparties continued fortwo years. After thedemocratic regime signed a treaty withtheBruttians, theexiles who had attempted to force their way into the city were attacked violently. They were repelled androuted bydemocratic forces headed byParon andMandamus. The struggle between the parties reveals two basic features: first of all, the , whowerealso SixHundred” connection between thearistocracy andtheSyracusan “ Agathocles’foes.49 Secondly, great pressure wasexerted bynon-Greek peoples, especially by Bruttians, on the Greeks.50 In the end, Mandamus followed the example of previous Greeks, seizing power inthecity andbecoming its tyrant until Agathocles conquered thecity in 295 andremoved him.51

45 46 47 48

49 50

51

peace-making process musthaveoccurred evenbefore 427. Plutarch relates thatnobody knew where Lysis wasliving after the fire. Hewasdiscovered in Greece by Gorgias, whoheaded the Leontine mission toAthens, in427, toplead hiscity’s needs against Syracusan aggression. Onthe other hand, thenegotiations tookplace after 444/3, since thecities thatreceived theAchaean mediation enthusiastically wereCroton, Caulonia andSybaris. ItmustbethenewSybaris onthe Traeis (orThurii?), butnotthecitywhich wasfounded in446anddestroyed oneortwoyears later. Nowit is reasonable to assume that Achaea didnotengage in overseas politics after the Peloponnesian Warbroke out.Thus, thepossible dateofhermediation isbetween 444/3– 432.The gapbetween thisdateandthedateofthecoupinCroton isnotsubstantial. VonFritz (1940) 96. Theanti-Pythagoreans werelabelled the“Cyloneioi” ,which stresses theimportance oftheleader within the faction. Minar (1942) 79; Polybius’description must be suspected. What he means by democracy is different from whatexisted twocenturies earlier. 4. The date cannot be fixed positively since it is connected to the chronology of Diod. 19.10.3– Agathocles’coup, which is obscure as well (no. 59 below). Agathocles tried to topple the aristocracy inCroton (the oneconnected withthestasis) inapproximately 320(Diod. 19.4.1). Thus thedemocracy wasformed only later. The Syracusan “ Six Hundred”were expelled in 317 (Agathocles’coup), after which they could cooperate with the Crotonian aristocrats in Thurii. Apparently, Agathocles could notbutsupport the democrats. Diod. 19.10.3; Diodorus claims that he describes a struggle between the classes in theprevious book(book 18), buttheaccount doesnotappear there. However, it mayserve asevidence that thestruggle actually occurred. The Crotonians called the Syracusans in 322 to help them against the Bruttians. In this war Agathocles established his military fame (Diod. 19.3.3). OntheItalian peoples andtheGreeks, Chiranky (1982). Diod. 21, F 4.

22

Stasis

inSicily andSouthern Italy: Case studies

4 CUMAE Cumae wasfounded inapproximately 750 ontheremains of anOscan settlement dating back to the twelfth century. During the archaic period, it served as a center for the transfer of Hellenic culture to Etruria and northern Italy and had enjoyed prosperity. It declined in the fifth century, surrendering to the Samnites who conquered it in 421.52 (14) During the last quarter of the sixth century, while the city prospered, it suffered frominternal unrest. In524 Aristodemos wassenttofight theEtruscans and wonthe day.53 The demos wanted to honor himbutthe aristocracy refused. Instead they honored an aristocratic cavalry commander. Aristodemos thus became the . After twenty years,54 another request foraidwasreceived protector of thedemos” “ fromtheAricians. Thearistocracy, seizing theopportunity toridthemselves of their foe, sentthemAristodemos along withanarmycomposed of theworst of thedemos andusing unseaworthy vessels. Aristodemos knewof thearistocratic conspiracy but wasnevertheless successful. With thehelp of funds received from the Aricians, he financed a large mercenary force. The glorious victor, along with his supporters, made his way back to the city. Before entering the gates he assembled the soldiers, exposed the aristocracy’s conspiracy andsolicited their assistance incaseoffuture trouble. Healsometsecretly with the “lower elements”of his forces to discuss a possible coup. Once inside the city, Aristodemos reported to the council on the events of his campaign. While delivering his speech, his supporters took all thestrategic points of the city, slaughtered aristocrats in the agora, entered the council house to kill Aristodemos’ audience and sent others into exile. The following morning, an assembly wasconvened. Aristodemos wasappointed general with full power (strategos autokrator), andinreturn promised thedemos a redistribution of theland, the cancellation ofdebts, freedom of speech (isegoria), andliberty (eleutheria). Finally, hecollected all theweapons from thehomes of thecitizens “ forthesake of thesecurity of the citizens in the process of redistribution of the land” . His mercenaries were awarded landafter murdering theformer owners. Hethengavethemthewives of the deceased to marry,55 andsent the young aristocrats to the countryside to engage in . “women’s work” Thedescription of thecoup hasall theelements common to tyrannies:56 Aristodemos’military appointment, hisquarrel with the aristocracy andsubsequent championing of the demos. As the coup occurred too early to show the extent of the influence the demos had in any Greek city, its appearance in Cumae has been

52 Basic bibliography: Frederiksen (1985). 8; Plut. Virt. Mul. 261. 53 Sources: Dion. Hal.Ant.Rom. 7.3– 54 Oneshould notethegapoftwenty years between thebeginning ofthequarrel andthecoup; it seems dubious. See Alföldi (1963) 71; Stadter (1965) 119. 3. 55 Asheri (1977) 22– 72; Stadter (1965) 118– 20; Frederiksen 56 On the sources: Cozzoli (1956); Alföldi (1963) 56– (1985) 95– 8.

Gela

23

interpreted either asa manifestation of thehoplite reform,57 oras thepolarization of the relations between the Greek aristocracy and the local, primarily non-Greek demos.58 It is impossible, however, to determine the nature of the coup, as theterms usedin thesources arevague andexhibit a later rhetorical influence onhistoriography.59 Essentially, Aristodemos attempted touproot thearistocracy andreplace it with hissupporters. Allreforms, including theredistribution of landshould beviewed in this light.60 491/90). Mostof this time, hehad (15) Aristodemos ruled forfourteen years (504– to fight against anopposition composed of exiled aristocrats whohadgathered in Capua andraided theCumaean chora undermining hiscontrol overthose areas.61 The egress ofyoung aristocrats fromthecitytojoinexiles inCapua marked thebeginning of open defiance against the tyrant.62 After outmanoeuvering the tyrant’s army, opposition forces entered thecityduring anocturnal feast andadvanced swiftly tothe homeof thetyrant. Astheinhabitants andguards were drunk, they hadeasy access tothehouse andmurdered thetyrant andhissupporters. Anassembly wasconvened thenextmorning during which thereturn of thepatrios politeia63 wasannounced and armswere laid aside signaling anendto thecoup. This account, related by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, differs from that of Plutarch64 who alleged that the coup was carried out by the tyrant’s wife assisted by another, anonymous, woman. Thecircumstances aresimilar, butwedonotknowwhy theopposition started anopenwaragainst thetyrant. Furthermore, wehavenoclue astothenature of thepatrios politeia. Clearly thetyrant hadalienated himself from themajority of thecitizens of Cumae anddepended heavily onhismercenaries. The coup, therefore, waseasily accomplished.

5 GELA (16) Gela was founded in 689/8 by settlers from Rhodes, Crete andTelos.65 Its first stasis probably sprang from its heterogeneous nature.66 The date of the stasis

55; Lepore (1970) 54– 5; seealso Arist. Pol. 1305b30. 57 Welwei (1971) 44– 44. 58 Combat-Fournoux (1957) 7– 59 Thearistocracy is termed: hoi entelei, dynatoi, presbyteroi, aristokratia; thedemos: plethos, penestatoi, demos. Further, according toDionysius, Aristodemos wastrained intheartofrhetoric, a necessary quality for every fourth century politician. 60 Asheri (1966) 83; id.(1969) 14;Lepore (1970) 46– 7. 8. 61 Pallottino (1956) 84– 62 Sources: Dion. Hal.Ant.Rom. 7.10–11; Plut. Virt. Mul. 261e– 262d. 3. 63 Berve (1967) 160– 64 Cozzoli (1965); Stadter (1965) 118– 20. 65 Basic bibliography: Dunbabin (1948); Bérard (1957). 66 Source: Hdt. 7.153; thedescription shows thatheusedanti-Deinomenid sources after thefall of that group in 461, which hecould have acquired during his travel to Thurii. Thedescription of Telines as effeminate is interesting.

24

Stasis inSicily andSouthern Italy: Case studies

cannot befirmly established; it mayhaveoccurred between 625 and575.67 Herodotus recounts that asa result of thestasis, which hedoesnotdescribe indetail, a group of citizens left the city andmoved to a Sican town named Mactorion. Telines, a local citizen anda member of theDeinomenidai entrusted with the cult of Demeter and Core, brought about a reconciliation andledthem back to thecity. It may be assumed that if the family which exercised the priesthood of the chthonic cultserved asaconciliator, thestasis wasconnected withadispute involving land distribution among several groups in the city.68 It may further be surmised although notproved, that groups wereformed according to theplace of origin of the settlers. Nothing is known about Mactorion, which mayhave been the Sican town mentioned by Philistus.69 (17) Attheendofthesixth century thelocal aristocracy lostpolitical power inthe city, anoccurrence which wasrepeated inother cities ontheisland. Cleandros seized power in505 (?) andbecame tyrant.70 Perhaps Dorieus’campaign inthewestern part of Sicily, which initiated a newwaveofcolonization andthusaffected theGreeks on theisland, also influenced events inGela.71 (18) WhenCleandros wasmurdered in498/7 bya local citizen called Sabyllos, his brother Hippocrates replaced him.72 It is not known who Sabyllos was, and with which group, if any,hewasaffiliated. Itseems, however, thatthelocal aristocracy had tried to regain control. Hippocrates had to appoint Gelon as commander of the cavalry; Gelon was a member of the Deinomenid family, which hadfigured prominently inthefirst stasis of thecity.73 Hisappointment wasmadeinorder toplacate the aristocracy and the population in general.

Herodotus doesnotprovide anydate. Telines wasadescendant (apogonos) ofa settler fromTelos, whoparticipated inthefoundation ofGela. Since weknow, ontheother hand, thenameofGelon’s father (Deinomenes) andgrandfather (Molossos), Telines mustbeatleast thefourth generation before the ageof the Syracusan tyrant Gelon assisted Hippocrates in hiscoup in498/7, rose to power inGelain492/1 andmoved toSyracuse in485.Thestasis, then, could havetaken place 575. See Schol. Pind. Olymp. 6.158a; Pyth. 2.27b,c; Lindische Tempelchronik F between 625– 403. 28,33; seealso Dunbabin (1948) 64; VanCompernolle (1960) 383– 35.The 3; Kestman (1970) 407–10;Orlandini (1966) 8– 68 Onreligious aspects: White (1964) 262–

67

basic treatment is bySchubring (1873). 69 OnMactorion, Philistus FGrH556F3: Mactorion wasfounded byMomnon(?) andwasa ktisis,

70

71

72

73

which mayreflect theresult of thestasis. Mactorion is notmentioned anywhere else. Dunbabin (1948) 113; Kestman (1970) 410; Orlandini (1961) 45– 9. Arist. Pol. 1316a37. Wemayonly guess at thedates of Cleandros’tyranny inconnection with events inGelainthefirst decade ofthefifth century. Pausanias tells thatGelon rose topower in thecityin491(seebelow note74).Hippocrates diedjustbefore inHybla, in491.Herosetopower, taking into account his military campaigns, in 498. Cleandros probably rose to power after Dorieus’failure in510/9. See Dunbabin (1948) 376– 77. 7, 380– 1. Dunbabin (1948) 376– Hdt. 7. 154; Timaeus FGrH 566 F18. 8; Brown (1958) 62; Berve (1967) 137– Dunbabin (1948) 377– 8.

Leontinoi

25

(19) When Hippocrates waskilled near the Sicel town of Hybla in 492/1, Gelon seized power in Gela.74 He appointed himself guardian of the infant regent but nevertheless hadto face opposition from the local citizens. The aristocracy sawan opportunity forapossible return topower.75 Gelon, however, triumphed andbecame founder of the great Deinomenid tyranny in Gela andlater in Syracuse. (20) Thelastknown stasis inGelawasconceived andexecuted byDionysius the etat in406/ Elder, theSyracusan tyrant, interestingly enough during hisowncoupd’ 5.76Dionysius wassenttoGela after theCarthaginian advance toeastern Sicily after theGreek defeat inAcragas caused alarm. Whenhearrived inthecity, hefound that thedemos andthearistocracy wereengaged ina stasis. Thecity teemed withexiles from western Sicily andSpartan forces whohadjoined the Greeks to fight the Punic enemy. Thedemos tookadvantage ofthechaos toattack thearistocracy andinvolved Dionysius, already known asprostates toudemou, in the events. In the assembly, Dionysius attacked thearistocracy andlater putthemontrial. Someofthe“ rich” were found guilty, executed and their property confiscated. With these gains he paid his mercenaries, ensuring their loyalty. Hecould also afford to paythe salaries of the Spartan contingent. TheGeloan demos passed adecree extolling the“ Liberator” , and wordofwhathadtranspired wasquickly relayed toSyracuse, where Dionysius would capitalize on it.77

6 LEONTINOI Leontinoi, a colony of Naxos, the first city in Sicily, was founded in 728.78 Located on some of the most fertile land on the island, it prospered early. Its development wasinfluenced bythepresence ofnearby Sicel towns, anditsexpansion coincided with the rise of tyranny in the city, the first in Sicily, in the late seventh century.79

(21) Polyaenus recounts a common stratagem: in the midst of a warbetween Leontinoi andMegara-Hyblaea, Panaetius sensed dissatisfaction among theranks of . Hemarshalled thearmybefore thecity gates and theLeontine infantry, the“poor” selected the ablest peltasts andcharioteers, whothen turned on their leaders and

74 Hdt. 7. 154; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7.15; Plut. Mor. 551f. The date, 491/90, is confirmed by Pausanias 6.9,whodescribes achariot dedicated byGelon inOlympia. Hesaysthere thatitcannot be thetyrant Gelon whoruled Syracuse (!) from491/90. Diodorus dates Gelon’s rise topower in Syracuse to485 (Diod. 11.38.7). Hedescribes Hippocrates’death inHybla in 10.28; thepassage is located between events taking place in492/1 and488. It seems thatPausanias confused the facts, andGelon rosetopower inGelaatanearlier datethanSyracuse, in491/90. 962; Dunbabin (1948) 440; Berve (1967) 140; Waters , RE7.1. (1910) 946– 75 See, Ziegler, “Gela” (1971) 39. 76 Diod. 13.93.2– 3; compare with Dionysius theElder’s coup (no. 48). 1. 77 Stroheker (1958) 40–

78 Basic bibliography: Dunbabin (1948); Bérard (1957). 79 Foranarchaeological survey, Princeton Encyclopedia ofAncient Sites s.v. “Leontinoi” .

Stasis in Sicily andSouthern Italy: Case studies

26

massacred them. The peltasts turned to the city swiftly, captured it andinstalled their newleader Panaetius as tyrant. According to Aristotle’s brief account, Panaetius removed anoligarchic regime anduseddemagogia in hiscoup.80 There seemtobesomeanachronisms inPolyaenus’description. Hementions, for instance, peltasts whoareofThracian origin, buttheir existence is suggested inGreek literature onlyfromthemiddle of thefifth century onwards.81 Moreover, hementions charioteers butnothoplites. Itmaybeassumed thatpart of thedemos wasnon-Greek since Leontinoi hadconquered neighboring Sicel towns during that period.82 This would explain therift between thepurely Greek aristocracy andthemixed demos which reflects theprocess of Hellenization.83 (22) After theCongress of Gela in424, which sanctioned thestatus quoamong theGreek cities of Sicily, another stasis occurred.84 TheLeontines hadgranted citizenship to newsettlers andthe demos demanded a redistribution of land, a move rejected by the aristocracy. The aristocracy instead made an agreement with the Syracusans. According totheterms ofthetreaty, theymoved toSyracuse andreceived local citizenship while thedemos wasexpelled fromthecity. Leontinoi wasthusdismantled andits territory became a Syracusan outpost. Peace achieved asaconsequence oftheCongress ofGelahadbrought anewwave of immigrants to theisland andtoLeontinoi. Asthecities, like Leontinoi, hadnever beenoverpopulated, these immigrants werewelcome. Butthedemos apparently tried to usethe situation in order to bring about a radically newland distribution.85 The aristocracy, whowould have been theprincipal victim of such a move, preferred to submit todemocratic Syracuse rather thanacquiesce tothedemos’request.86 Syracuse, for itspart, hadnothing to fear from theLeontine aristocracy. Although thepolis wasdismantled,87 the sources reveal that its territory wasnot vacated; a number of its citizens continued to occupy zones of thecity andfought against Syracuse.88 Further evidence suggests that other exiled Leontines moved to Euboia onmainland Greece.89

9; Polyaenus 5.47; thedate: Eusebius, Chronicon; Van 80 Sources: Arist. Pol. 1310b29, 1316a34– 4. Compernolle (1960) 373– 81 OCD2, 797; RugeLammert, “Peltastai” 406; Snodgrass (1967) 78f. , RE 19. 1 (1937) 403– 82 Rizza (1957) and(1962). 8.After acentury, another tyrant, Ainesidamos, ismentioned in 83 SeealsoRoebuck (1980) 1927–

84

Pausanias 5.22.7. Nothing moreis known about him. Thuc. 5.4.1; theevent ismentioned among those of422. Itmaybeassumed thatthestasis took place after theCongress of Gela in424 (Thuc. 4.65.1– 2) andbefore theevents of 422, when Thucydides describes anAthenian embassy approaching Leontine exiles. Compare with the contradictory descriptions in Diod. 12.54.7 and12.83.1. Weshould prefer thecontemporary Thucydidean account, which is echoed inthesecond testimony of Diodorus.

85 Asheri (1966) 41. 86 Grote, History of Greece IV 411, n.4. 87 Dreher (1986).

88 89

Seibert

5. (1979) 243–

Franke (1966).

Locri Epizephyrii

/ Megara Hyblaea

27

7 LOCRI EPIZEPHYRII (23) In346Dionysius theYounger returned toSyracuse andseized power inthe city forthesecond time. Heleft Locri, where hehadbeen inexile fortenyears.90 It is notclear, however, whether heleft voluntarily orwasdriven outbya stasis. Upon hisdeparture, thecrucial moment forourdiscussion, thelocal population revolted. Theydestroyed thecitadel, reintroduced eleutheria andcaptured Dionysius’wifeand children whom they tortured andlater executed. The pleas of Dionysius andthe Tarantines tospare their lives fellondeafears. Taras wasevenattacked because ithad interfered in local affairs.91 Dionysius theYounger, thesonof a Locrian woman Doris whomhisfather had wedfor political reasons, presumably enjoyed a privileged relationship withLocri. Thus, whenforced to leave Ortygia in 355, hewasable tomove toLocri andeven become its tyrant. But governing the Italian city didnotprevent himfrom taking interest in Syracusan politics. Infact, hissonApollocrates remained in Ortygia until 354 andthrough himDionysius continued to threaten Dion’s position in the city. Later, in 351, Dionysius entered into a warwith Syracuse over the occupation of Rhegion (Diod. 16.45.9). Anarchy in his home city didnot escape his notice andin 346heforced hiswayinto thecity andseized power. Atthispoint, theLocrians were able toremove thetyrannical regime andgainindependence from Syracuse.92

8 MEGARA HYBLAEA (24) Thehistory ofMegara Hyblaea wasalways connected withthatofSyracuse, andSyracuse in fact brought about its destruction.93 Herodotus tells us that Gelon stormed thecity after thewell-to-do hadinitiated a waragainst Syracuse.94 Theycould notholdoutandwereforced tosurrender. However, theywerepardoned anddeported toSyracuse, where theybecame citizens. Thedemos which hadnotparticipated inthe warwassold into slavery outside Sicily, as Gelon didnotrelish theprospect of living amongst them. Polyaenus95 says that Gelon hadwanted to weaken the city or even destroy it. To thisendheinvited Dorians tosettle inMegara andheavily fined thecity’sleaders. The Megarian leader, Diognetus, tried topassthefine onthecitizens whorefused topay; instead, they turned the city over to Gelon.96 Clearly there was a rift between the “ rich”or the aristocracy andthe demos, between the leadership andthecivic body, andthis mayhave played some role in the

90 Seealso inSyracuse, no.56; onLocri seeDunbabin (1948), Bérard (1957). 91 Strabo 6.1.8 (259); Justin. 21.3.9.

92 Meloni (1951). 93 Basic bibliography: Vallet, Villard andAuberson (1983). 94 Hdt. 7.156.2.

95 Polyaenus 1.27.3. 96 Thecitywasdestroyed in483, 245 years after itsfoundation. SeeThuc. 6.4; Dover, Commentary, adloc.

28

Stasis inSicily andSouthern Italy: Case studies

events. There is, however, nodirect evidence of a stasis. Furthermore, aninscription fromOlympia which mentions Megara andMegarians andwhich wasconnected with theevents hasbeenshown tocomefromSelinus.97 Consequently, there is noevidence of Megarian exiles asa result of a stasis. Theemphasis musttherefore beplaced on thepredominant role of Gelon whohadinitiated events.

9 METAPONTUM (25) Onlyonestasis isreported tohavetaken place inthisItalian city.98 Itoccurred in413, andismentioned inpassing byThucydides, whomerely saysthatMetapontum (andThurii) supported theAthenian invasion of Sicily as a consequence of internal

conflict.99 A few chapters earlier,100 he also mentions the fact that the city provided theAthenians withtwoships and300javelin-throwers. Twoyears earlier, however, theyrefused theAthenians entry to their harbor.101 It is evident, therefore, that there were twofactions (anti- andpro-Athenian) at odds in the city, but this should not automatically be associated with the change from aristocracy to democracy. It is logical, however, toassume thata democratic regime wasinpower by413, andthat a stasis occurred, conducted bytheanti-Athenians whomayhavebeenaristocratic.102

10 PITHECOUSSAI (26) Pithecoussai wasthefirst Greek colony intheWest103 andits location is the of much debate.104 The history of the colony was brief. In 700 the Greeks abandoned the site after anearthquake andmoved to a newlocation onthecoast, subject

namely Cumae.105 700), thecity underwent a stasis During the short period of its existence (750– which Strabo mentions briefly.106 Herelates that asa consequence of a stasis, some citizens left thecity. Thecauses of thestasis areunknown andmayreflect either the ethnic differences between settlers from Chalcis andEretria or the results of the Lelantine warbetween these cities in themotherland.107 Thestasis mayalso reflect

97 Asheri (1979); see n.1 for previous bibliography. 98 Basic bibliography: Bérard (1957). 99 Thuc. 7.57.11; Dover, Commentary, adloc. 100 Thuc. 7.33.5. 101 Diod. 13.3.4. 102 Berger (1990). 103 OnPithecoussai: Ridgeway (1981). 104 Graham, CAHIII2 3, 97– 103. 105 Dunbabin (1948) 6. 106 Strabo 5.4.9. 107 Forrest, CAHIII23, 308– 9; Murray (1980) 75– 7; Parke andWormell (1956) 49– 82.

Rhegion

29

certain divisions within the local citizenry; divisions, for instance, between social groups based ontheir respective professions, suchasmerchants versus landowners.108 There is, however, no definitive explanation.

11 RHEGION Rhegion wasfounded bysettlers fromChalcis andZancle in720. Its foundation signaled theculmination ofGreek rule onthestraits of Messana. During thearchaic period it had been a Chalcidian city, but waves of settlers, primarily from the Peloponnese, altered thecharacter of thepolis.109 (27) Thefirst change wasinitiated byAnaxilas, whoseized power inthecity in 494/3.110 Although nothing is known about the actual stasis itself, we are able to reconstruct thecircumstances. Ethnically, Rhegion wascomposed ofChalcidians and Messenians; Anaxilas wasof Messenian origin andapparently stressed this fact for political reasons.111 Hecould then topple the Chalcidian aristocracy which assumed power from the early period of colonization. The aristocracy wasknown as “ The , andwasbased ontimocratic principles; thesystem wasadopted probably Thousand” from theCatanian constitution of Charondas. After seizing Zancle, andimmediately after heassumed power, Anaxilas populated thecity withDorian settlers; mostof themwereMessenians andthusthecity’s name waschanged to Messana as well. Thus, he also destroyed the Chalcidian aristocracy of Zancle, which had strong relations with the Rhegine Chalcidian aristocracy during the earlier period.112 In this way he strengthened his position in Rhegion andbegan to shape hisown“empire” . (28) In 461, however, Anaxilas’sons were removed.113 The stasis against them should be seen as part of the general effort to eliminate tyranny in Sicily;114 its consequences werefelt alsointheItalian city, which wasabsorbed inSicilian affairs. Nodetails areknown about theevents except thatMessana regained itsindependence andwasrenamed Zancle for a short period. Apparently the Chalcidian aristocracy also returned to power in Rhegion.

4; Buchner (1966) 3– 108 Cook (1962) 113– 14; Klein (1972) 34– 9; Murredu (1972) 407– 9.

109 Basic bibliography: Vallet (1958). 110 Sources: Arist. Pol. 1316a34– 7; Heraclid. Pont. FHG2, 219; Justin. 4.2.4; Dion. Hal.Ant.Rom. 19.4; thedateofthestasis: Anaxilas diedin476/5 after ruling 18years (Diod. 11.48). 111 Thedistinction between thegroups is madeclear inoursources: Hdt.7.164; Thuc. 6.4.6; Strabo 6.257; Pausanias 4.26.3. Seealso Kiechle (1959) 119– 23; Graham (1964) 17– 9; Asheri (1983) 32; onnumismatic aspects, Robinson (1946). 112 Ontherelations between Zancle andRhegion before Anaxilas: Dunbabin (1948) 386– 8; Vallet (1958) 373– 9. 113 Diod. 11.76.5; see also Justin. 4.3.1– 3; De Sensi Sestito (1981) 50–1; Vallet (1958) 376. 114 Diod. 11.76.4– 6.

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(29) A third stasis in425 thrust Rhegion into a period of internal conflict.115 The Locrians took advantage of the situation andattacked thecity with theassistance of Rhegine exiles whohadfound refuge inLocri. These mayhavebeenDorians whohad beenexiled inaprevious (andunknown) disturbance; Chalcidian Rhegion atthattime . Locri, ontheother supported Athens, which tookaclose interest in“western affairs” hand, wasa long standing adversary of Rhegion andhadconcluded analliance with Doric Syracuse.116 Moreover, a year earlier, in426, Athens usedRhegion asthebase from which tolaunch anattack onLocri.117 Theoutcome of thestasis is notknown, butit appears thattheattitude toward Athens changed tooneofneutrality; Locri itself signed anaccord withAthens in422118 butbecame neutral in 415.119

12 SELINUS Selinus, located onthe southern shore of western Sicily, a region controlled by Carthage, wasfounded in 628 as a colony of Megara Hyblaea. This geographical factor affected the history of the city with reference to foreign as well as domestic policies.120 Twostaseis arementioned inaccounts of local history andbothdatefrom the end of the sixth century. (30) Polyaenus121 recounts howa citizen, Theron sonof Miltiades, proposed to hisfellow citizens thathewould gather thecorpses ofSelinuntines rotting beyond the city’sgates after adefeat atthehands oftheCarthaginians. Heenlisted theaidofthree hundred slaves, butinstead offulfilling thetask, he“ liberated” theslaves andsecured their cooperation in hiscoup. Intheevening hereturned withthemtothecity, killed off potential adversaries andsecured hisposition as the newtyrant.122 (31) Herodotus refers briefly toanother stasis.123 Euryleon, a general inDorieus’ armycaptured thecity in507/6.124 It wasnotlong before hebecame theobject of a local conspiracy. Hesought refuge atthealtar dedicated toZeusintheagora butwas murdered there.125

3; for interference of Pythagoreans in Rhegion see also Iambi. Vit. Pyth. 251; 115 Thuc. 4.1.1– 6. Plut. De Gen. Soc. 583a, b; Minar (1942) 84– 116 Oldfather, “Lokroi” , RE13.2 (1927) 1363. 117 ML 63. 118 Thuc. 5.5.3. 119 Thuc. 6.44. 120 Basic bibliography: Hulos & Fugères (1910); Dunbabin (1948); Bérard (1957).

121 Polyaenus 1.28.2. 122 Thestasis’dateisunknown. Itshould beconnected withtheother stasis described below. Seealso Selinus” , RE2A.2 (1923) 1266– 1308. Seealso, Plut. Ap.Lac. 217f. = Lyc. 20. Inboth Ziegler, “ it is reported thatking Araus of Sparta (309– 265), while visiting Selinus, readaninscription in which a fight against tyranny wasmentioned. 123 Hdt. 5.46. 53. 124 OnDorieus, Asheri, CAHIV2751– 125 Dunbabin (1948) 353– 4.

Sybaris/Thurii

31

Fromtheexamination ofbothaccounts fewconclusions canbedrawn. Inthefirst stasis, warwiththeCarthaginians influenced thecourse ofevents.126 Thesecond stasis was an offshoot of Dorieus’campaign in western Sicily, which also wasmounted against the local Phoenicians. However, Selinus sided with Carthage in 480 at Himera,127 illustrating shifts between pro-andanti-Punic elements among thecitizenry. Aninscription from Olympia dating from thesameperiod mentions Selinuntine exiles inMegara Hyblaea.128 Since Megara wasdestroyed in483, theexiles arrived there earlier, probably asa result of oneof these twostaseis.

13 SYBARIS-THURII Sybaris wasestablished in720 byAchaeans andTroizenians. Thecityprospered theArchaic period because of its fertile land andstrong commercial ties to Etruria. In510, it wasdestroyed after a defeat atthehands of Croton. Sybarite exiles attempted to rebuild it, but they didnot succeed until 446. A further stasis resulted in the foundation of a newcity named Thurii, as well as a newSybaris on the River Traeis. Thurii flourished briefly asanAthenian colony buteventually hadtoyield to Rome after a series of conflicts with local inhabitants.129 (32) The first known stasis in Sybaris occurred shortly after its foundation.130 The Achaeans, whomadeupthemajority inthecity, expelled theTroizenians. According to Aristotle, a curse wasplaced ontheremaining citizens.131 Thecauses of the stasis areunknown, butitisconjectured thataquarrel overthedistribution ofpower among thefirst settlers precipitated events.132 Thenumerically stronger group forced outthe minority. during

126 OnCarthage andSicily: Warington (1969); Hans (1983); Huss (1985). 127 Diod. 11.21.4– 5. 128 Asheri (1979). 129 Basic bibliography: Dunbabin (1948); Bérard (1957). See also Philippson, “Sybaris” , RE 4A I (1931) 1002– 1011; id., “ Thourioi” , RE6AI (1936) 646– 652. 130 Thedateisunknown. Sybaris wascolonized circa 725.Itmaybeassumed thatafter ashort while the rift between the groups surfaced. It is further assumed that the settlers from Troizen, who worshipped Poseidon, were involved later (circa 700) in founding the city of Poseidonia. However, Poseidonia wasrefounded in600onanother site, andthissuggests another possible date for thestasis. See Strabo 5.4.13; Dunbabin (1948) 25– 26, Bérard (1957) 231– 4; ZancaniMantuoro (1950) 65– 84; Castagnoli (1975) 71–4. See also Van Compernolle (1960) 238– 41;

52. Sartori (1960) 149– 131 Arist. Pol. 1303a25– 31;seeNewman (1902) IV309;Contogiorgis (1978) 184– 88.Solinus 2.10, mentions theTroizenians inSybaris, butnotthestasis. FGrH 555 F10 refers to Sybaris while Myskelos wasengaged in founding Croton. 132 TheTroizenians were synoikoi, which implies equal status for both groups andhints at thefact that they shared the act of foundation.

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(33) The other stasis in Sybaris is connected with its eventual destruction.133 Before 511134 Telys persuaded the local demos to ban the rich from the city and confiscate their property. Then, with thedemos’assistance, heseized power in the city. Theexiles sought refuge in Croton. Whennegotiations between thetwocities failed, a warflared upwhich resulted inSybaris’annihilation. Relations between thecities seem to have exerted aninfluence onthegeneral course of events. Telys hadexpelled a Crotonian from Sybaris whohadcourted his daughter;135 he wasalso thefocus of accusations on the part of Pythagoras whoalleged that Telys hadpersecuted hisfollowers in Sybaris.136 It maybeassumed, therefore, that theconflict in Sybaris involved pro- andanti-Pythagorean aristocrats. Nothing further canbeascertained concerning Telys,137 butwithin a short timehewasremoved and the city destroyed.138 (34) Thecity’s fate didnotimprove during itsreestablishment in446/5. Itwasnot longbefore a newstasis broke outbetween the“ citizens oldSybarites”andthe“new” from the motherland.139 The Sybarites hadappropriated important public offices for themselves, given their wives the prominent priesthoods, andparceled out the best land among their families. The “new”citizens objected and rebelled, and then murdered manyoftheSybarites, while others weresentintoexile. Newsettlers from Greece wereinvited andthecolony wasrefounded asThurii. Lessons learnt fromthe previous experience led to the equal distribution of land andthe formation of a democracy twoyears later, in 444/3.140 Despite thefact thatthe“ Sybarites perceived themselves asthearistocracy old” of the newcity andviewed newsettlers as the demos,141 the demos comprised the majority of thecitizens andenjoyed Athenian support. Asa result of Periclean panhellenic policy,142 thenewsettlers were able to acquire reinforcements from Athens in their revolt against the Sybarites. Consequently it maybe assumed that Athens exerted a definitive influence in theorganization of thenewcity.143

133 Diod. 12.9.2. 134 Thedateofthestasis is notclear. Diodorus combines itwiththedestruction ofSybaris andit therefore musthaveoccurred a short while before 511. 135 Hdt. 5.47. 136 Iambi. Vit.Pyth. 177. Compare with 133.

137 DeSensi Sestito (1983).

138 Hdt.5.44 calls himkingandtyrant (see Ferrill [1978] 389); Heraclid. Pont. F49 Wehrli, explains thattheSybarites removed himbecause hewasa tyrant. Itseems, however, thatHeraclides was influenced herebya later anti-tyrannical tradition. Croton played a decisive role intheaffairs. 139 Sources: Arist. Pol. 1303a31; Strabo 6.1.13; Diod. 12.11.1– 3. Modern bibliography: Ehrenberg (1948); Accame (1955); Rutter (1973); Wick (1976); Guzzo (1976). Numismatic evidence: Kraay (1958). 140 Asheri (1966) 14; Moggi (1987). 141 “ TheNew” = prosgraphentes. 142 Kagan (1966) ch. 9; Andrewes (1978). 143 See especially Ehrenberg (1948).

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(35) In 434 after an interval of tenyears, a stasis broke outin the city.144 The citizens were divided onthequestions of whowastoberegarded asthefounder of thecity andwhich polis wasto beconsidered mother-city. TheAthenians145 wanted to claim this last particular honor since they hadprovided mostof thesettlers. The Peloponnesians argued that since theyhadsenta comparable number of settlers, the honor ought to be theirs. After a prolonged dispute, the Thurians applied to the Delphic oracle andthePythia proclaimed Apollo asthefounder withDelphi asthe mother-city.146 TheThurians assented to theoracle andthe stasis ended. The presence of pro- and anti-Athenian factions within the city reflects the dichotomy intheGreek world prior totheout-break of thePeloponnesian War147 and underscores a critical issue inthefoundation of anycolony: theneedtoestablish an official history of the foundation as well as the need to ritualize it in the cult of the founder.148 The acceptance of theresolutions of theDelphic oracle bytheThurians mirrored thedecline of Athenian influence inthecity, butnotits elimination, ascan be seen in the city’s subsequent history.149 37) Whenthe Athenian generals Demosthenes andEurymedon arrived in (36– Thurii in413, theydiscovered thattheanti-Athenians hadbeenexpelled fromthecity in the wake of a stasis.150 A positive attitude on the part of the Thurians toward the Athenians already was evident in 415, andit can be assumed that the city was democratic.151 WhenAthens lost thebattle against Syracuse in Sicily a fewmonths later, thetide turned andthepro-Athenians were banished from thecity.152 With the return of theexiles anaristocracy wasfounded anda fleet wassent totheaidof the Spartans.153

(38) Twofurther undated staseis arementioned byAristotle which could belong to the period after 413.154 In the first case,155 Aristotle recounts howthe demos, which hadmilitary training, triumphed over the aristocracy which hadappropriated land unlawfully. The demos redistributed theland,156 decreased thecensus forpublic office

144 Diod. 12.35.

145 It is interesting to note that the arguments are put in the mouths of the Athenians and Peloponnesians andnotinthemouths of thelocals. 146 Onthecult of thefounder, generally andinthis case, Malkin (1987). 147 Athens reaffirmed herconnections with Rhegion andLeontinoi (ML63, 64) andsought to dominate theroute tothewestatCorcyra (which a yearearlier fought against Corinth). SeeThuc.

1.44.1; Diod. 12.54.2– 3. 148 Malkin (1987). 149 Gianelli (1927); Berger (1990). 150 Thuc. 7.33.5, 57.11; Dover, Commentary, adloc. 151 Diod. 13.3.4. Later in414 Thurii rejected Gylippus’approaches as well: Thuc. 6.104.2. 152 Dion. Hal.Lysias 1; [Plut.] Vit. Orat. 835e. Thestasis broke outwhenCallias wasarchon, 413/

12.Lysias theorator wasoneoftheexiles. SeeDover (1968) 42– 3.

153 Thuc. 8.35.1; Sartori (1974) 746– 8. 154 See Berger (1990). 155 Arist. Pol. 1307a27. 156 Asheri (1966) 69; Sartori (1974) 733– 4.

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Stasis inSicily andSouthern Italy: Casestudies

andaugmented thenumber ofpositions. Ademocracy wasthenorganized. Thisis the first time that anaristocratic regime is mentioned in anysource, butit is impossible to date its foundation. (39) In the second example cited byAristotle,157 young Thurians, buttressed by thedemos andthegarrison, called forachange inthelawwhich governed therotation of generals. According tothelaw,Thurians could only serve asstrategos atfive-year intervals. Thecivic authorities, being heldincontempt,158 agreed tothedemand inthe hope that theremainder of theconstitution would remain untouched. Their efforts were, however, unsuccessful. The minor alteration resulted in metabole and the young formed a dynasteia, a narrow, military oligarchy. The rigid rotation law had been designed toprevent thegenerals frominterfering inlocal politics, butwhether a democracy canbeinferred from this fact is debatable.159 Aristotle uses theincident to illustrate a dynamic present in aristocratic regimes. All other circumstances surrounding the event areuncertain.

14 SYRACUSE Syracuse, the largest and most important city in the West, was founded by Corinthian settlers in 733. The best documented city in our sources, its staseis constitute one-third of all those recorded in the Greek West. The repercussions of these local staseis were not limited to the city itself, but reverberated throughout Sicily. An examination of its many revolutions may serve as a cornerstone to an investigation of Sicilian andItalian history.160 (40) The first recorded stasis dates approximately from 650.161 The Myletidai, a local clan,162 were forced to leave thecity after a stasis andjoined inthefoundation of Himera (649/8).163 The circumstances which ledto the clan’s banishment are not known. A plausible explanation is that it reflects a struggle within the local aristocracy. However, the nature of this struggle cannot be determined.164 It could also reflect events occurring in the mother-city: the fall of the Bacchiadai andthe Corinthian naval defeat against its colony, Corcyra.165 Changes within the local aristocracy increased the power of the Gamoroi andgave rise to a newlanded aristocracy.166

157 Arist. Pol. 1307b9. 3. 158 Kataphronesis: Contogiorgis (1978) 182– 159 See n. 154.

160 Basic bibliography: Dunbabin (1948); Bérard (1957); Finley (19792), which is a history of Sicily

butinwhich Syracuse is dominant. 161 Thuc. 6.5.1; Dover, Commentary, adloc. 162 OntheMyletidai see also Strabo 6.26; Freeman (1891) I 411–12; Ziegler, “Mylai”(3), RE 16. I (1933) 1038– 1044; Dunbabin (1948) 56 n. 5. 60; VanCompernolle & DeWever (1967) 504–10. 163 Bérard (1957) 257– 164 It mayreflect a division among ethnic groups, which originated during thefoundation of thecity. 78; Strabo 6.2.4. Seeforexample, Ps.Scymnos 277– 165 Dunbabin (1948) 56; Forrest, CAHIII2, 3. 166 This is the theory put forward by Hüttl (1929) 43– 56. See also Roebuck (1980) 1924, who

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(41) A second stasis, which occurred during thearchaic period, is notdated inthe andit involved alove ancient times” sources.167 Aristotle declares thatit happened in“

quarrel between twoyoung aristocrats. Allegedly, oneseduced theother’s lover and thedeceived, being offended, took revenge bydishonoring the seducer’s wife. This altercation provoked astasis inthecitywhich resulted inametabole. Theerotike aitia, however, masks a more fundamental rift within thearistocracy. Again, wehave no clue as to its nature. If the stasis took place in the late seventh or sixth century, it may have been a consequence of Syracusan expansion evident in the foundation of Casmenai andAcrai,168 theconsolidation of Syracusan rule over a vastchora andthe evolution of the city into a commercial center. This stasis cannot be linked to the overthrow of the Gamoroi as some suggest,169 which would completely contradict Herodotus’testimony.170 Furthermore, Aristotle would certainly not have failed to mention the rise of democracy, hadit happened. There is another obscure story dating from the archaic period. A citizen named Agathocles, charged with thebuilding of thetemple of Athena, wasaccused of fraud, tried by the authorities (the Gamoroi) andfound guilty.171 Although this tale reflects a certain tension within theruling class, there is nomoreevidence about theactual events. (42) Theregime of theGamoroi ended in491/90.172 They wereexpelled fromthe city bythe demos andtheKyllirioi, theGamoroi’s serfs, andwent to Casmenai. A democratic regime wasestablished in Syracuse inthecourse of these events.173 The circumstances disclose aninteresting aspect of the social structure. The Gamoroi weretheruling, landed aristocracy174 whohadbeeninpower foroverahundred years, exercising firm control over the city.175 Their land was cultivated by serfs, the

connects the stasis with the following, undated one (see below). The causes, according to Roebuck, stemfromtheunequal distribution of landandother problems withregard toSyracuse’s owncolonization (Acrai andCasmenai). 167 Arist. Pol. 1303b20; Plut. Praec. Ger.Reip. 825c. 168 Dunbabin (1948) 56– 7,109–110. 169 Busolt, GrG. 22.785, n.2; Newman (1902), ad.loc. 170 See below. 171 Diod. 8.11. 172 Thestasis broke outbefore 485, theyear Gelon came to power in Syracuse (Diod. 11.38.7). Pausanias 6.9 dates Gelon’s rise to power to 491. But it seems that he mistakenly placed it in Syracuse while, infact, Gelon rosetopower in491inGela(seealsoGela, no.19). Gelon then came topower after thedeath of Hippocrates inHybla, in491 (Diod. 10.28). Justbefore hisdeath, Hippocrates putSyracuse under siege. Syracuse wasinturmoil andseemed tobeaneasytarget totheGeloan tyrant, buthehadtoaccept aCorinthian mediation andendthesiege. Hethenmoved toHybla, where hedied. Wemayassume thattheturmoil inSyracuse resulted, inanyevent, in a stasis around 490. 173 Hdt.7.155; Arist. Pol. 1302b25; Arist. F. 586R; Timaeus FGrH566 FB; Diod. 10.28; Dion. Hal. Ant.Rom. 6.32; Suidas s.v. Kallykurioi; Hesychios s.v. Kyllirioi; Photius s.v. Kyllirioi. 174 Drögemüller (1969) 38– 9. 175 Marmor Parium, FGH239, § 36. Thedate of Sappho’s arrival in Syracuse, where theGamoroi wereinpower, isreconstructed.

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Kyllirioi, probably members of the indigenous population of the Syracusan chora, whohadbeen reduced to slavery during theageof colonization.176 Attached to the land andunder protection (pelatai –Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 6.32), their status was compared to that of the helots andthe Thessalian penestai (Arist. F. 586 R). The , served asa buffer between demos, which canbedefined only asa “middle group” theGamoroi andtheKyllirioi. Thelast twogroups, however, hada direct connection witheach other, which thedemos didnotshare.177 Although theGamoroi werenumerically inferior andconsequently lostthebattle, theywerestrong enough totrouble theyoung democracy atadistance fromCasmenai, where they sat in exile.178 Aristotle describes theclimate of the newdemocracy as chaotic. The Kyllirioi received local citizenship and replaced the Gamoroi who disappeared from history as a distinct group.179 Hence, the number of citizens increased considerably. Nevertheless, infive years thedemocracy collapsed andthe demos recalled Gelon from Gela, whoin turn, recalled the Gamoroi. There is no evidence concerning theexpulsion of members from other groups.180 Gelon wasthefounder of a great dynasty of tyrants in Syracuse, theDeinomenidai. But, asAristotle concluded, tyrannies are shortlived (Pol. 1315b 34). In 466, the last Deinomenid, Thrasybulus, wasremoved. (43) Thrasybulus hadreplaced hisbrother, Hieron, astyrant in467. Hispolicies were harsh: heexecuted manycitizens, banished others (confiscating their property) andemployed a growing armyof mercenaries against thealienated citizenry. As Thrasybulus rose to power,181 he also hadto come to terms with problems created during thereigns of previous tyrants: theenfranchisement of foreigners in general andmercenaries in particular, relations with the“ empire”in Sicily andthe overthrow of the tyranny in Acragas in 472/1, which hadbeen preceded by a war between thecities.182 Hisreliance onmercenaries generated civic opposition, which included aristocrats whohaduntil thensupported thetyranny. Induecourse a stasis broke out.183 The tyrant attempted to quell the struggle but his efforts were rebuffed byanangry crowd andhewasforced totakerefuge inhiscitadel inOrtygia. Thetwo opposing sides sought allpossible aid.Thrasybulus called onhisSicilian allies aswell as mercenaries whohadbeen settled byHieron in Catane. The Syracusans, who 11. 176 Dunbabin (1948) 110– 177 Frolov (1982). 178 SEGVI.27 = XII. 407: theinscription wasfound inMonte Casale, which hasbeenidentified with Casmenai. It is dated, paleographically, to the beginning of the fifth century, andGamoroi are mentioned inthetext. However, onemustnotexclude thepossibility thatthere werealsolocal Casmenian Gamoroi, thecity being a colony ofSyracuse. If theSyracusan Gamoroi areindeed thementioned group, it is interesting to note that theinscription deals with ateleia andenktasis. It mayhintattheremoval oftheGamoroi asa group andtheir acceptance enbloc inCasmenai. 179 Photius calls thecivic bodypoliteuma; compare withAristotle (n.167). 180 Bruno Sunseri (1980) 295– 305. 181 Arist. Pol. 1315b38; Thrasybulus ruled foreleven months altogether. Thus thestasis broke out in466/5 (Diod. 11.67.1). Seealso thediscussion inBarrett (1973) 29– 31. 182 Compare withevents inAcragas, 472/1 (no.4). 183 Arist. Pol. 1312b9; Diod. 11.67.5– 68.7.

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37

controlled the other neighborhoods in the city, courted the Geloans, Acragantines, Selinuntines andtheHimeraeians. Inaddition, they sentemissaries to Sicel towns in the hinterland to seek aid, which they in fact received. Thus, a localized stasis developed into a broad struggle against tyranny. In theensuing battle, Thrasybulus hadtoadmit defeat, butwaspermitted toleave thecity withhismercenaries forLocri ontheItalian mainland. Aristotle mentions, furthermore, that thetyrant’s ownfamily participated in the coup, evincing their displeasure withThrasybulus whohadcorrupted Hieron’s son, the legitimate heir, in order to seize power for himself. After his removal, it was decided to eliminate tyranny altogether. Theinterference of other Sicilians intheaffair attests toa movement awayfrom tyranny on the island. This movement eventually became more powerful than the network of intermarriages among the tyrants’dynasties.184 The cooperation of the Sicels is of particular importance. Their willingness to assist marks thebeginning of a local movement of Sicels under theleadership of Ducetius.185 Thetactical component ofthestasis isalsoofinterest. Thetyrant wasentrenched inOrtygia fromwhich heruled thecity; thecitizens wereincontrol of other parts of thecity. It wasvery difficult to penetrate the fortified citadel, butfrom within it the tyrant could easily influence the life of the Syracusan citizens. This explains the willingness of the citizens to allow Thrasybulus to pass freely to Italy,186 a pattern which re-emerges in local history. The newregime wasdemocratic anda newcult to Zeus Eleutherios, Zeus the Liberator, wasestablished. Diodorus styles itademocracy, although Aristotle defines it as a politeia (Pol. 1304a27). In anycase, thebasic character of theregime was considered anti-tyrannical. Theactofestablishing a democracy, however, initiated a contest over the establishment of the newarrangements in the city, rather than mitigating their difficulties. (44) Although the chronology187 is not clear it may be supposed that the 461).188 After the democracy wasestablished over thecourse of several years (466– festivities wereover, theSyracusan assembly convened todiscuss thenature of the

184 Finley (1979) 47.

185 Seebelow inPartII.3; ontheSicels intheSyracusan chora: DiVita(1956); Adamesteanu (1962). 186 Hüttl (1929) 65f. 187 Diodorus dates thebeginning of theevents to463 (11.71.1) andtheir conclusion to461(11.75.1). Fromhisnarrative, however, wemayinfer thattheevents tookplace ataformer date, ashort while after theoverthrow ofthetyranny in466. Infact, onecandetect a change inthesources heused between 11.72.1 and72.2, andthismayexplain thechange ofthedates aswell. If wedatethe events to466orimmediately afterwards, there istoolonga gapbefore concluding thestasis in

461. But it is hopeless to redate theevents; exact Sicilian datings for the period in Diodorus are notavailable. Anyreader candetect thepattern ofsubsuming events inSicily fromseveral years within a given year, as in the years 466/5, 463, 461, 459/8, 454/3. As to the sixties, one should notealsothatprolonged warsensued between Greeks andlocal non-Greeks: FGrH577F1.See 1. also Barrett (1973) 30– 188 Sources: Arist. Pol. 1303a– b2; Diod. 11.72.2– 73, 76.1– 2.

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newbody-politic andthepublic offices. It wasdecided togive access topublic office , enrolled under Gelon and Hieron, were old citizens” . “Newcitizens” only to “ considered unworthy andtheir loyalty toSyracuse wasquestioned. Itis notsurprising newcitizens”revolted; manywere enfranchised mercenaries andthey led that the“ . They occupied the citadel, Ortygia, and old citizens” the struggle against the “ neighboring Achradina. In contrast to Thrasybulus, however, they hadnoexternal the“ Six support, andwereforced tosurrender tothenewcivic body. Anelite corps – –wonpraise for thevictory, as well as a large sumof money. The same Hundred” technique employed by both Thrasybulus and the mercenaries led to different consequences. Events also show that the overthrow of the tyranny had a social as well as a political context which engendered aresponse tothe“social revolution” forced bythe old” Deinomenids.189 Thebasic dichotomy laybetween the“ and“new” citizens. This is not to say that individually they were homogeneous groups. The “old”comprised allcitizens before Gelon’s rise topower. It wasa bizarre coalition of ex-Gamoroi,190 citizens which included demos and ex-Kyllirioi who fought against the “new” enfranchised aristocrats from Euboea, Megara Hyblaea andCamarina, as well as enfranchised mercenaries, some of whom were non-Greek. was Theexpress aimof the“ oldcitizens”toreduce thecivic rights of the“new” in fundamental contradiction to theprinciples of a democratic regime andserves to illustrate theextent of aristocratic influence in thepost-tyrannical polis. Infact, the old”citizens smacks of aristocracy itself. It is also possible that the definition of “ “ old”wanted to expel the “new” from the city altogether but, fearing the strength of the ex-mercenaries, they decided to behave more moderately. The struggle which ensued after theassembly’s decision attests totheex-mercenaries’power.191 Theconflict anddecisions made in Syracuse are all connected with theKoinon Dogma or “ General Settlement”of the Greek cities on the island in 461. The agreement called forthebanishment ofallmercenaries fromthecities, their relocation in Messana, the recall of all exiled “old”citizens, andthe return of all their property. The agreement wasnotimplemented easily dueto conflicting interests which existed in nearly every city, andin this respect Syracuse wasno exception. (45) In 454/3192 a “violent andinsolent”citizen named Tyndarides organized manyofthelocal poor, gavethemmoney andemployed themashispersonal guards in aneffort to become tyrant. After hisplot wasuncovered, hewasputontrial and sentenced to death. While hewasimprisoned, thepoor attacked hisguards andinthe 189 Diod. 11.86.3; see also Arist. F 137R; Strabo 6.17.8. 190 Wentker (1956) 51– 3, claims that theGamoroi returned topower. Rizzo (1970) ch. 1, suggests ) wasthenucleus of thenewaristocracy, the chariestatoi. See Six Hundred” theelite corps (the “ 90. also Lintott (1982) 189– 191 Diodorus mentions seven thousand mercenaries, whoremained in the city after the coup. Together withtherestof thecivic population itmusthavebeenoneof thelargest cities ofthe Greek world at that time. Compare with the figures in Ruschenbusch (1979) 1– 17. 192 Thechronological problem discussed inn. 187, isrelevant tothis case aswell. It is likely that the events mentioned under 454/3 wereinfactspread overseveral years. However, thedateofthe stasis itself canbefixed tothisparticular year.

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, whoappeared onthe bestof thecitizens” midst of theturmoil, thechariestatoi, the“ scene to defend the guards, slewTyndarides as well as his bodyguards.193 . Manypeople Thisevent isalsorelated totheresults ofthe“General Settlement” whowereenrolled intheregisters ofcitizens (politographia) demanded landorother property, buttherights of someclaims weredisputed.194 Tyndarides madeovertures ) while thearistocracy, owners tothedissatisfied (referred toinDiodorus as“thepoor” of the property, stood in opposition. The rift between the groups resulted in the introduction ofpetalismos, a short-lived local brand of ostracism,195 inwhich ballots were drawn uponolive leaves; exile wasfor five years. The aristocracy decided to retire from public life so as not to expose themselves to the threat of exile. Consequently, according toDiodorus, thecity wasmismanaged andthedemos had to repeal the law andrecall the aristocracy. This case demonstrates the pervasive power of the aristocracy andits effect on the “ democratic”regime in Syracuse. Although democratic institutions probably were introduced, they were nevertheless overrun by aristocratic influence. After these events there isalapse intheaccounts of staseis inSyracuse foraforty year period. During this time Syracuse continued to expand its dominion over new areas of Sicily, combating Greeks andSicels alike; democratic Syracuse adopted the policies ofDeinomenid Syracuse. Syracuse eventually achieved pre-eminence among the Greeks in the West.196 Moreover, the warforced upon her by the Athenians exhibited her standing among theGreeks in general. Polyaenus describes a slave revolt in the city during the Athenian expedition which is not mentioned by Thucydides. Inanycase, it is doubtful whether it hadanyconnection withthecivic bodyandthecitizens. Hermocrates is again portrayed asthegreat savior of thecity.197 (46) The triumph over the Athenians, however, resulted in stasis in the city. Aristotle recounts that the demos, whohadcontributed to thevictory, demanded a share in thegovernance of thepolis. It wasthey whohadsucceeded in transforming theregime fromapoliteia toademocracy.198 Diodorus relates howDiodes, leader of thedemos, persuaded themtoalter theconstitution; nomothetai were tobeelected, charged with thecomposition of a newconstitution, andpublic offices were to be filled bylot. Thenewregime became a “radical” democracy.199 Hermocrates, thewarhero, hadbeensenttoassist theSpartans intheAegean.200 Thelocal aristocracy201 which appeared euphoric, didnotnotice that a large portion 5. 193 Diod. 11.86.4– 194 Arist. F 137R; Pausanias 6.17.8; Asheri (1980) 155. 195 Diod. 11.87; seealsoHesychios s.v.Petalismos; Pollux 8.19; Berve (1967) 188– 9; Berger (1989). 74; Asheri, CAHV2(forthcoming). 196 SeeFinley (1979) 58– 197 Polyaenus 1.43.1. 198 Arist. Pol. 1304a27. 199 Diod. 13.35; onDiodes, Manni (1979) 220– 30. 200 Thuc. 8.26.1; onHermocrates: FGrH 566 F102a; Westlake (1958); Grosso (1966); Hinrichs (1981); Sordi (1981).

201 Thegrowth inaristocratic power canbeshown inthereduction inthenumber of generals from fifteen to three during the Athenian expedition: Thuc. 6.72.9– 2. See also Lintott (1982) 73.1– 90. 189–

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of thedemos hadbeenpoliticized while serving in themilitary. Attheendof thewar, theydemanded areward. Election bylot, because ofitsimmediate effects, musthave wounded thearistocracy severely. Little is known about other enactments,202 butit can be assumed that they followed the Athenian model,203 even though Athens itself was on its wayto anoligarchic coup. (47) Themetabole didnotalter Hermocrates’position asnaval commander for some time. It wasnotuntil 409 that hewasremoved fromoffice after a defeat of the Syracusan navy.204 Hedidnotaccept hisremoval passively, butwithmoney acquired from the Persian satrap Pharnabazus,205 he hired a mercenary army with which he returned to Sicily in 409/8.206 Hewasnotreceived byhiscity andleft for Selinus in western Sicily which became hisbase forconducting military campaigns against the Punic cities, Motya andPanormus. Heexpected renewed fameasaSicilian “national” leader and, on the weight of his reputation, to be able to force his wayback into Syracuse. Ayearearlier, Diocles hadsuffered a heavy defeat bytheCarthaginians at Himera.207 Hermocrates tried to exploit thedefeat to promote himself andsent the corpses Diocles had left on the battlefield to Syracuse. But although Diocles was banished from thecity, Hermocrates still didnotwinacceptance. With thehelp of friends in thecity, Hermocrates made a final attempt to seize power in Syracuse in 408/7.208 Heswiftly marched to thecity at theinvitation of his friends,209 whotook charge of the gates to Achradina through which heentered. While waiting fortheremainder ofhisforces whoweremoving moreslowly, theSyracusans (who hadheard about theimpending coup) caught upwith him. In thebattle which followed thelocal demos defeated hisforces, murdered himandslew many of his army. Thustheleaders of thetwoopposing factions, Hermocrates andDiocles, were both eliminated.210 One survivor feigned death on the battlefield –Dionysius the Elder.

202 Twomorereforms areattached toDiocles’newregime: oneconcerned thetransfer fromgenerals toarchons oftheright topreside overanassembly. Itisbased onadifference between Thuc. 6.41.1 (whosays thatthegenerals presided overtheassembly) andDiod. 13.92 (which recounts the

archons whofined Dionysius the Elder for illegal proposals in 406). See Hüttl (1929) 86. The second reform wastheincrease ofthenumber ofgenerals fromthree toten.Thucydides (n.201) mentions thereduction tothree generals; Plat. Ep.8.354d, mentions thedismissal oftengenerals justbefore Dionysius’risetopower. SeeHüttl (1929) 77.Wemayalsoconclude, inthesameway, thatthegenerals werestill elected andnotselected bylot,ascanbededuced fromDiod. 13.11.5. Allthese examples arenevertheless circumstantial. 203 SeeBerger (1989). 204 Xen. Hell. 1.1.27. 205 Diod. 13.63.2. 206 Diod. 13.63.5– 6. 207 Diod. 13.61. 208 Diod. 13.75. 209 hoiphiloi: probably anaristocratic group inSyracuse. SeeFrolov (1973) 89– 93. 210 Anewgeneration ofleaders arose onbothsides ofthepolitical arena: thearistocratic Daphnaeus (Arist. Pol. 1305a26; Polyaenus 5.7) andDaemarchus, whoreplaced Hermocrates in409/8 as commander ofthefleet intheAegean. Hewas,presumably, aleader ofthe“ extreme democrats” (Thuc. 8.85.3; Hell. 1.1.29). Seealso Westlake (1958) 197– 200; Lintott (1982) 194– 5.

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(48) Within two years Dionysius began his climb to tyranny.211 His story is illustrative, containing elements present in most coups carried out by would-be tyrants. Later historians portray himasanevil character andanunscrupulous tyrant. Critical opinion ranges from outright condemnation to admiration of hiscunning.212 The renewal of the Carthaginian attack in 406 resulted in Syracuse being inundated withrefugees fromthewestern regions oftheisland, whohadspearheaded theGreek effort inthebattle. Theyhadarrived inSyracuse blaming thelocal generals for their defeat. Dionysius, whowas the secretary213 of the local generals’board, attacked thegenerals in theassembly anddemanded their punishment. Whenfined by thearchontes for such illegal proposals, he wasdefended byPhilistus,214 a staunch supporter of tyranny whoalsopaidDionysius’fine. Repeating hisattack, hesucceededin forcing the removal of the generals andappointing replacements, including himself. Hethenturned onhisnewcolleagues, accused themof disloyalty andrefused tocooperate withthem. ThusDionysius, whopresented himself asaprotector ofthe demos (prostates toudemou) became anenemy of thearistocracy. Furthermore, he usedtheCarthaginian threat asapretext torecall exiles withaviewtobenefitting from their support later. Meanwhile, theGeloans sent another request forhelpagainst thePunic enemy. Dionysius wassent andincited a stasis inGela,215 which thedemos won.Inthis way, heobtained additional funds forhissoldiers. TheGeloans, inturn, sentemissaries to Syracuse to praise his support for them. Back in the city, he renewed his attacks on the generals. This time, the demos responded by dismissing his colleagues and appointing himas a sole general with full power (strategos autokrator). His appointmentassole general legitimized hisposition inthecity. Nevertheless, Dionysius systematically continued to tighten his grip. Bycreating a false emergency, hetransferred thearmytonearby Leontinoi and there received consent torecruit a bodyguard. Bypaying off other units, hereceived their support as well. These forces became hisprivate army, andwith their backing hereturned toSyracuse, captured Ortygia (which became hiscitadel) andmurdered

211 Although Dionysius theElder is oneof thebest known tyrants of theGreek world, thedate of his coupisnotcertain. Several dates aresuggested inthesources; theyrange from408to403.The first, from the Marmor Parium # 62, is totally discordant with the other dates and may be disregarded. Ontheother extreme, under theyear404/3, Xenophon describes thefallofGelaand Camarina and the transfer of the cavalry to Catane, events that followed the stasis. Thus the possible dates range from406– 404;Xen.Hell. 1.5.4 dates thefall ofAcragas, which precedes the stasis, to407/6; soalsoTimaeus FGrH566F 105.Theyear406/5 issuggested byDiod. 13.80.1; Dion. Hall. Ant.Rom. 7.1.5. Justin. 5.8.7 gives 405/4 as thedate of Dionysius’expulsion. Inview of thepossible dating error involving theAthenian archon year, wemaysetthecoupin405.

212 Onthesources: Saunders (1981) 395– 411, which includes references totheprevious bibliography.

213 Grammateus: a purely bureaucratic position, butgoodenough forsubversive actions. Compare with Phalaris’position as tax-collector (no.1). 214 OnPhilistus, Laqueur, “Philistus”(3),RE 19(1938) 2409– 2429; Zoepffel (1965). 215 Seethestasis inGela(no.20).

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leaders of the aristocratic and popular factions. He then married Hermocrates’ daughter in order to connect himself with aristocratic circles. In this wayDionysius became tyrant. Ananalysis ofthiscoupreveals three basic features: first ofall,ittookplace while Syracuse wasthreatened bytheCarthaginians, giving Dionysius grounds to undermine the Syracusan generals’position as well as providing a sense of urgency.216 Secondly, Dionysius employed allthelegal means available inorder tobeappointed general with full power, a post which would enable himto implement anydecision he desired, anda post that wason theverge of illegality.217 Further, during this stage he also succeeded in manipulating most groups in the city. Initially supported by aristocrats,218 he waslater labelled as protector of the demos. Hethen initiated the return of exiles219 whowould later showhimtheir gratitude, andfinally received the support of foreigners like the Geloans. Once in power, he deserted everyone and TheFriends”whowerepersonally connected tohimand created a newaristocracy, “ dwelt withhimin Ortygia.220 Thirdly, there wastheillegal andlast stage of hiscoup, which includes all his activities after his appointment as general with full power. He was thus able to strengthen his control over the city by building a private army, recruiting a bodyguard andinitiating theso-called “ social revolution.”221Thecompletetransformation ofthecityrequired moretime, however, asDionysius hadtograpple with two alarming staseis against him. (49) Thefirst took place in405.222 TheSyracusan cavalry interpreted Dionysius’ defeat bytheCarthaginians in Gela thesameyearas a turning point intheir efforts to overthrow the tyranny. HisItalian mercenaries deserted himandreturned home; thecavalry unsuccessfully tried tomurder himonhiswayback toSyracuse. Asthey werenotable tooverwhelm hisremaining bodyguards, theyhurried back toSyracuse inorder toblock hisaccess, captured Ortygia, looted thecitadel andtortured hiswife. All of these actions andespecially this last one, served to intensify the solidarity among therebels whoknewhowenraged thetyrant would become. WhenDionysius realized whatwashappening heimmediately wentinpursuit of therebels inorder toprevent themfromgaining control of thecity. Finding thecity gates barred, he burned them down, rushed to the agora andin the ensuing battle defeated the disorganized cavalry. In the confusion and chaos which followed, he broke into the homes of his opponents, murdered some andexiled others while confiscating their property. Thecavalry thenretired to Aetna.223

216 Compare withDiod. 14.45.5, 64.3– 5, 75.3. Seealso partII.3. 217 On strategos autokrator, Scheele (1934) 38– 45; Hüttl (1929) 101; Stroheker (1958) 4.

218 Philistus (seen.214); Hipparinus, whoshared withhimthepostofstrategos autokrator. Hewas alsoDion’sfather: Plat. Ep.8.353b3; Arist. Pol.1306a2; Plut.Dion 3.2;Polyaenus 5.2.3. Seealso Stroheker (1958) 39 n. 39; Berve (1967) 18f. 219 Frolov (1973) 99; Stroheker (1958) 40. 220 Seebelow. 221 SeeFrolov (1973) 89– 93. 222 Sources: Xen. Hell. 2.3.5; Diod. 13.112– 113; Plut. Dion 3.1– 2. 223 Stroheker (1958) 47.

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The renewal of the Punic attack andtheir march on Gela occasioned another stasis. This time Dionysius wasonthedefensive. Opposition haddeveloped within the cavalry which can be identified with certain factions of the local aristocracy. The “social revolution”which followed Dionysius’own coup was not yet over; but Dionysius usedthisstasis toextend therevolution byintroducing newprograms. With the termination of the stasis, he distributed land to his friends (hoi philoi) and to officials whohadserved him,andoffered thedemos theremaining lots. Hegavehis friends houses in Ortygia andgranted thedemos houses inother parts of thecity. He liberated slaves andoffered them, as well as the mercenaries, local citizenship. Naturally, all of these groups became his supporters.224 (50) All this activity became the foundation of the “Great Revolt”one year later.225 While Dionysius wasengaged ina warontheSicel townofHerbessos,226 the armyrebelled. Thesoldiers, citizens of Syracuse, blamed eachother fornotassisting in the revolt of the cavalry. The commanders of the contingent tried to calm the agitation, but the soldiers killed one of them, Doriscus, whohadtried to silence a soldier, andproclaimed a stasis. The cavalry was subsequently summoned from Aetna. Dionysius immediately returned toSyracuse andestablished himself inOrtygia with his supporters. The Syracusan army obstructed all approaches to the city and summoned the navies of Rhegion andMessana to block maritime access as well. Meanwhile thetyrant’s mercenaries were offered citizenship inexchange fordesertion. Dionysius desperately wanted toflee, butPhilistus managed topersuade himto fight to the end. Together they developed the following stratagem. Dionysius would announce his willingness to leave thecity while he would secretly send for reinforcements ofmercenaries fromCampania. TheSyracusans, thusplacated, dispersed the army; the cavalry returned to Aetna. While everyone wasengaged in theharvest, Dionysius, with thehelp of hisnewmercenaries, wasable to crush thelocal forces. These events demonstrate theincreased alienation of thetyrant fromthepeople of Syracuse, which wasmirrored inthecomposition of therespective armies; theone comprising citizens, andtheother composed largely of mercenaries. Asboth sides sought external assistance, the stasis also acquired “ international”dimensions. The Syracusans hadtaken advantage of thefact thatDionysius wasabsorbed inwar,and according to Diodorus, this fact is the key to understanding the events. Dionysius, following historical precedent, orchestrated his affairs from the citadel in Ortygia.227 Heconferred withhisnewaristocracy, “ TheFriends” , towhich hewasrelated, while theresolve of theSyracusans waned. Manyhadtoreturn totheharvest228 since they could notafford torisk their economic standing. Already outsiders in Syracuse, the cavalry returned toAetna where theynowheldproperty. Dionysius hadonlytocollect 224 Id., 53, 154f. 225 The year is 404; the sources: Philistus FGH 556 F 115; Isoc. 6.44– 45; Timaeus FGH 566 F59; 10.4,70.3; Livius 24.22.8; Ael. V.H.4.8; Plut. Cato Maior 24. Diod. 14.7– 226 Thelocation is unknown. There weretwocities withthisname, oneintheAcragantine andthe other intheSyracusan chora. SeeZiegler, “ Herbessos” (2),RE 13.1 (1912) 530– 531. 227 Cf. theevents that followed 466 (nos. 43, 44, 45). 228 Seealso Polyaenus 5.2.14.

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arms from thecitizens’homes in order toprevent another coup. After this revolt he wasfirmly in control of the city.229 Two other features of this stasis should be mentioned. First, the Spartans intervened infavor of Dionysius, andtheSyracusans hada Corinthian asoneof their leaders.230 Both represent thebroad scope of thestasis inthecity. Second, a saying attributed toPhilistus wastobecome acatch-phrase inGreek literature. Whenoneof the“Friends”suggested thattyranny waslike a shroud, heresponded thatitwasbetter to be dragged around the city by a horse than to flee from tyranny on a saddled mount.231

(51) The last recorded attempt at a revolt against Dionysius dates from 396.232 During a Carthaginian siege, Dionysius andhisbrother Leptines werebusyescorting convoys of foodtothecity. While theywere away, theSyracusan armycaptured five ships laden withprovisions, entered into battle with the Carthaginians andcaptured theflagship ofthePunic navy. Ontheir return tothecity thecitizens discussed among themselves their status asslaves ofatyrant. Itwastheright moment torebel. Warwith the Carthaginians wasraging andthey hadweapons in their hands. Intheassembly Dionysius congratulated hissubjects ontheir success. Butwhen themeeting ended anaristocrat, amember ofthecavalry named Theodorus, requested permission to speak andrailed against thetyrant, arguing infavor of giving liberty to the Syracusans. This speech, central toanti-Dionysian literature, is usually attributed toTimaeus, the anti-tyrannical Sicilian historian.233 The speech is, of course, not authentic; nevertheless itmaywellportray theatmosphere inthecity. Twothemes emerge inthe speech: thenature of thewarwith Carthage, andtheevils of Dionysius. According tothespeaker, there would benoessential difference between being under Punic or Dionysian rule. Theformer would infact bemore liberal since it would notinterfere withthecity’s autonomy. Second, heargued, Dionysius usedthewartomaintain and strengthen his grip on his subjects; the Syracusans did not attempt to get rid of Dionysius because they were intimidated bythePunic foe. Themoment wasripe to rebel; it was“God’s Providence” , in thewords of Theodorus. But the Syracusans did notuse theopportunity toridthemselves of this tyrant whowould neither endthewar norachieve a decisive victory for fear of losing his tyranny. TheSyracusans requested theaidof a Spartan captain present in theassembly. Whenhe asserted that hehadonly come to fight thePunic enemy, they remained 229 OnDionysius’regime: Frolov (1975) and(1976). 230 Hermias ofMethymna FGrH558F1;Ael.V.H.4.8. Seealsopart II.3.

231 For instance, Procop. Bell. Pers. 1.24.37. 70.3. Diod. 14.96, mentions another quarrel between dionysius andtheSyracusan 232 Diod. 14.64.1– army in 392. Thesoldiers wanted toattack thePunic forces, encamped near Agyrium, while Dionysius refused to enter into battle. Thesoldiers deserted him, butin response the tyrant liberated slaves. However, after reaching anagreement withMago, hehanded overtheslaves to their former masters. Stroheker (1958) 82claims therebelling soldiers wereSyracusan citizens. But from the terms of thepact with Mago, according to which Tauromenion wasgiven to Dionysius’mercenaries, itcanbededuced thattherebels weremercenaries, whowanted tofight

inthefirst place hoping toenjoy larger sumsof money andbooty. This incident hadnoeffect on Syracuse. 18; Saunders (1981) 401– 233 Stroheker (1958) 16– 8.

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docile. Dionysius, followed byhis bodyguard, dispersed thecitizens. To court local favor healso distributed money andgave lavish banquets. (52) Dionysius diedin367. Hewassucceeded byhisson,Dionysius theYounger, whose rule wasweak. In 357, civil warbroke outwhich ledto theoverthrow of the Dionysian dynasty.234 The coup was initiated and carried out by Dion, son of Hipparinus whohadaided Dionysius theElder in 406. As thetyrant’s advisor, with close ties to the dynasty as a result of his marriage to Dionysius’daughter, Dion harbored aspirations to replace Dionysius theElder himself. In 361 Dion moved to Greece after the second visit of Plato hadproven to be a failure.235 Hethen decided to overthrow hisrival, Dionysius theYounger, andafter fouryears of preparation hereturned withanarmytoaccomplish hismission in357. Since butafewSyracusans joined him,heemployed mercenaries andsupporters from the Platonic Academy whohailed hisjourney as a mission against tyranny.236 Dionlanded inHeracleia Minoa andfromthere hemarched onSyracuse. Onhis wayhewasgreeted byGreek inhabitants fromvarious cities andthepopulation ofthe Syracusan chora. Dionysius’mercenaries fledtoLeontinoi where theyheldproperty. The local demos attacked Dionysius’supporters while the latter lay in wait for Dion near thestraits of Messana. Dionwasimmediately elected asgeneral withfullpower (strategos autokrator) but failed to capture Ortygia where Dionysius had taken refuge with his loyal mercenaries. Thecitywasdivided intwo.FromOrtygia, thetyrant tried toresolve the situation through negotiation with Dion andthe Syracusans. The latter, however, refused andconstructed a wallinorder toshutoff allcommunication withthecitadel. Thenegotiations between Dion andDionysius nevertheless proved harmful. Dion’s established tiestothetyrant’sfamily andthefactthatDion’s wifeandchildren resided inOrtygia generated suspicion onthepart of thedemos. Theysought another leader andchose Heracleides, Dion’s companion, whohadjust arrived from Greece with reinforcements. Thepropaganda against Dionmounted; hewasaccused of being a tyrant andof depriving theSyracusans oftheir liberty while hismercenaries wereviewed asidlers. Withthenaval victory ofHeracleides andthelocal citizens’navyoverPhilistus, the breach widened. WhenDionysius managed toescape fromOrtygia toLocri, a second stasis broke out (355). The sources are divided as to its origin. Some claim it was initiated byHeracleides, thecommander of thefleet whohadfailed to capture the tyrant, while others hold that it wasdirected against Dion, whohadbeen unsuccessful in his attempts to capture Ortygia. It appears that there was an additional element which ledto thestasis, namely thestruggle over theappointment of bothleaders to thepost of strategos autocrator. Whentheleaders of thedemos proposed a motion

234 Sources: Plat. Ep.7,8; Arist. Pol. 1312a4, a30,a39– b19; Dem.Lep. 162; Aeneas Tacticus 31.31; Theopompos FGrH 115F 194; Timaeus FGrH566F 1,2;Nepos, Dion; Cic.deOrat. 3.139; Diod. 20; Plut. Dion; Plut. Comp. Dion-Brutus; Ael. V.H.3.1.7; Justin. 21.2; Polyaenus 5.2.7– 16.9– 8. XXIX; Voit (1954/5) 171– Onthesources: Porter (1952) XXVIII– 92; Berve (1956) ch.7; Geiger (1981) 85– 104; id.(1985) 58– 62. 235 Probably still asDionysius’envoy: Lintott (1982) 207 with n.42. 76. 236 Marasco (1982) 152–

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calling forlandredistribution237 andexcluded Dionfromthenewcollege of generals, halting thepayment of hismercenaries, heleft withhis mercenaries for Leontinoi. Dionysius’departure hadnot, however, resulted in thefall of Ortygia into the hands of theSyracusans. Thecitadel remained securely in thehands of Dionysius’ mercenaries whocontinued toharass thecitizens. Asa result, thelocal citizens were compelled to recall Dion and his followers. Dion was re-elected as strategos autokrator, butfailed tobring about Heracleides’dismissal asnavycommander. The Spartans were also involved inthecontinuing conflict between thetwo. Finally, the mercenaries, headed by Apollocrates, Dionysius’son, were expelled from Ortygia. Dion then arranged for the removal of Heracleides from his post andwent on to consider thecity’s newconstitution. Intheassembly Heracleides mounted a counterattack, accusing Dion of failing to include thecitizenry in theprocess of installing the newconstitution. Dion, unnerved byhisopponent’s assault, agreed toHeracleides’ murder, anextreme move which Dion himself found difficult tojustify. Hesubsequently retired from public life to Ortygia where he was murdered by his friend Callippus in 354.238 By357, Syracuse wasinturmoil andthedisintegration ofthe“social revolution” was apparent. The city teemed with mercenaries and large sectors of the local population were involved in the enfranchisement schemes of the tyrants. The , didnotenjoy popular support, while Dionysius the Friend” aristocracy, thetyrant’s “ Younger didnothave thesupport of hisfather’s chief advisors andsupporters, Dion andHeracleides. It wasonly a matter of time before theoutbreak of a stasis.239 Thefact remains, however, that thetyrant wasuntroubled fornine years. Even withthesupport oftheAcademy, fewexiled Syracusans cared toinvolve themselves “ themission” inanyventure tooverthrow thetyranny. Theorganization ofthecoup– –proved a lengthy and difficult task. Twofactors hadtobereckoned with. Thefirst concerned thedivision of thecity. Dionysius’firm hold on Ortygia hampered Dion considerably. It would be nearly three years before Ortygia fell. During this time the Syracusans endured continual fighting and political manipulation at the hands of the tyrant and his commanders which Dionwasunable toneutralize. Thesecond wastheantipathy between Dionand Heracleides.240 Despite the fact that they had jointly initiated the mission, their personal animosity wasintense. Whatresulted wastheelection of Heracleides as leader of thedemos withDionasrepresentative of thearistocracy. Therift between the two was further reflected in the divisions within the military.241 Dion was supported byhis loyal mercenaries while Heracleides wassupported bythenavy, which wascomposed of local citizens. The allegiance of the Syracusans was a

237 Fuks (1968) versus Asheri (1966) 90. 238 Onthe“second strategia”(i.e., Dion’s ruleafter thebreak withHeracleides), Westlake (1946) 258f.; Berve (1956) 101f.

239 Stroheker (1958) 147f.; De Blois (1978) 113– 18. 240 On the relations between the two protagonists: Aeneas Tacticus 31.31; Bengtson (1962) 460; 6; onHeraclides, Orth(1979) 51– Lehmann (1970) 401– 64;Porter (1952) 92– 6; Westlake (1946) 5. See also Plat. Ep. 7.350d4– 254– e5, criticizing thequarrel between thetwo. 241 Christien (1975); Parke (1933) 119.

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function of military needs. Withevery victory at seaHeracleides’power increased, while Dionwascourted witheachassault fromDionysius’mercenaries. Furthermore, the Spartans intervened in the struggle between thetwoantagonists. They formerly hadfound animportant allyinSyracuse andtheDionysian family andintheaftermath of the battle of Leuctra, this connection became more significant.242 IntheendDiondidnotsucceed informing thenewconstitution. Since thesources donotdetail anyprogram hewanted toinitiate, theconnection between hisprogram andtheAcademy andPlatonic ideals remains enigmatic.243 54) In 354 Dion wasmurdered by Callippus, an Athenian whohadjoined (53– Dion’s expedition in357244 andwhoappeared tobe sucha loyal supporter thatDion ignored his ownwife’s premonitions.245 Callippus took advantage of Dion’s retreat fromthepublic eyeandsentoneofhismercenaries tohishometostabhimtodeath, while other mercenaries stood guard outside thehouse. Callippus then seized power in thecity andwasproclaimed thenewtyrant.246 During hisbrief rule, which lasted , only thirteen months,247 heresisted another stasis directly ledby “Dion’s Friends” whomayhave constituted anaristocratic faction in the city. Callippus hada large mercenary army andwasable temporarily to preserve his tyranny.248 (55) Callippus wassucceeded byHipparinus whohadsailed fromLeontinoi and unseated himin 353/2. Nofurther information is available concerning this man,his rule or supporters. Presumably, hewasbacked by“Dion’s Friends”whohadfled to Leontinoi a year earlier. Hewasremoved by Nissaeus in 351.249 (56) Information concerning Nissaeus is even more sketchy.250 We know only that he wasremoved by Dionysius the Younger, who hadleft Locri in 347/6.251 It appears that Dionysius took advantage of the fact that Syracuse was in turmoil and that reigns of tyrants were short-lived. Heforced himself onthecity withthe aidof hismercenaries and“enslaved” itforthesecond time. Onceagain anumber ofaristocratic families fled to Leontinoi.252 (57) In Leontinoi the aristocracy metHicetas, who, accompanied by a large mercenary army, leftLeontinoi in345/4 toattack Dionysius. Hesetupcampnearthe Olympieion in the southern section of Syracuse butbecause of a lack of supplies he was forced to retreat. Dionysius hoped to exploit the situation and crush the 242 See part II.3.

243 DeBlois (1978) 118– 31; id.(1979) 268– 83; Sprute (1972); Finley (1968) ch.6. 244 Athenaeus 508f.; Diog. Laert. 3.46; Dem.36.53; [Dem.] 50.47– 52; Stähelin, K allippos”(1)RE 10.2 (1919) 1664– 1666. “ 245 Westlake (1983) 163– 5. 246 Sources: Plat. Ep.7.333e– 334c; Arist. Rhet. 1317a18; Nepos, Dion 8.1; Diod. 16.31.7; Val. Max. 3.8. ext. 5; Plut. Dion 54; deVit. Pud. 530c; deSer. Num.Vind. 553d; Reg. etImp.Apo. 176f.; Athenaeus 500f.

247 For a slightly different date, FGrH 255 § 1: 355/4– 354/3. 248 Diod. 16.36.5; Plut. Dion 57.5, 58.4– 6; Tim. 1.2; Westlake (1983) 163– 4. 249 Diod. 16.36.5; Plut. Dion 58; Polyaenus 5.4; Westlake (1983) 166. 250 Westlake (1983) 167 withn.25. 251 Sources: Strabo 6.1.8; Plut. Tim. 1.4; Justin. 21.3.9–10.Cf. thecase inLocri (no. 23). 252 Westlake (1983) 168.

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opposition, but in the battle which ensued he was defeated and Hicetas captured Syracuse. Dionysius retreated once more to his stronghold in Ortygia.253 Hicetas, whohadstrong personal ties toDion, became theguardian ofDion’s wife andsister after thelatter’s death.254 During hismovetoLeontinoi forunknown reasons hewasaided bytheSyracusan aristocracy andmayhave served asthelocal tyrant.255 While there, theexiled aristocracy of Syracuse continued to support him. (58) During hisstayinLeontinoi, Hicetas andthearistocracy sent anemissary to Corinth requesting a newleader for Syracuse, which wasafter all hercolony. The mother-city complied with therequest anddelegated Timoleon.256 While Timoleon wasorganizing his mission, recruiting mercenaries andpreparing for the voyage, Hicetas moved against Dionysius, andwhenTimoleon eventually arrived atSyracuse, hediscovered the city torn byrival factions. Hicetas hadunsuccessfully tried to haltTimoleon’s advance onthecitybyafutile march against himinAdranon, aSicel town. He hadalso employed his allies, the Carthaginians, in an effort to prevent Timoleon from landing ontheisland in thefirst place. Thesources which detail thestruggle inthecity arecontradictory.257 Three men viedforpower: Timoleon, Hicetas andDionysius, whowasentrenched inOrtygia. At somepoint, Dionysius gave intoTimoleon butit is notclear whether this took place before or after the latter’s arrival at Syracuse.258 Hicetas andTimoleon tried then to outmaneuver eachother, butinthefinal clash Hicetas wasdefeated andretreated to Leontinoi. Timoleon didnotrepeat Dion’s blunders butcaptured Ortygia, demolished the citadel andreintroduced democracy.259 Timoleon wasanoutsider. Hisarrival in Syracuse wasviewed as a Corinthian plot. But even if he had been officially delegated by Corinth, his activities on the island were dictated by his own aspirations and decisions.260 In the interest of propaganda, it wasuseful topresent theaffair asa Corinthian mission.261 Furthermore, Timoleon aswell ashisrivals hadtheir ownmilitary forces: Timoleon andDionysius ledmercenary armies while Hicetas wassupported byCarthage, which sawanopportunity to advance her influence in Sicily. In a bold move, Hicetas allowed the Carthaginians to enter the Great Harbor in Syracuse; but in the end they retired, leaving Hicetas to confront Timoleon alone.262

253 254 255 256 257

Diod. 16.68,1; Plut. Tim. 9.2. See also Plut. Tim. 2.3, 9.7; Dion 2.3. Plut. Tim. 33.2; Dion 58.4. 70. Westlake (1983) 168– Sources: Diod. 16.66– 69.6, 70.1– 6; Nepos, Timoleon; Plut. Timoleon; FGrH 255 F4.

Hammond (1938) 137– 151; Talbert (1971) 22– 38, 97–110. 258 Plutarch claims thatDionysius theYounger surrendered toTimoleon twelve years after Dion’s campaign, thatistosayin345/4; ayearlater, heoverpowered Hicetas (344/3). Diodorus saysthat Timoleon captured thecity in344/3, butOrtygia, andDionysius, gaveina yearlater, in343/2. Theanonymous chronographer (n.256) dates theevents, andDionysius’transfer toCorinth, to

101; Talbert (n.257); Bicknell (1984). 343/2. See Westlake (1952) ch.3; Sordi (1961) 96– 259 Westlake (1942) 293– 305; Talbert (1971) 130– 42; Connor (1985). 260 Westlake (1949) 265– 75. 261 Graham (1964) 144– 5; Pritchett (1971) II 94– 6. Seealso Westlake (1938) 65– 74; Talbert (1971) ch. 1. 262 Westlake (1952) ch.4.

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. In Syracuse, he revival of Greek Sicily” Timoleon’s triumph inaugurated the“ arranged for a newconstitution, that of a moderate democracy. At this juncture Timoleon finally acted in conjunction with local citizens. From there, heremoved tyrannies from other Greek cities on the island and arranged for a colonizing movement in order to strengthen the Greek presence in Sicily.263 Timoleon diedin336andwithin afewyears thecitywasdivided oncemore. The little thatis known about whatsubsequently transpired is found inDiodorus’narrative under the year 317, where he describes the coup attributed to Agathocles, the 317.264 protagonist of the events of 325– (59) Agathocles arrived in Syracuse in 340 accompanied by his parents, just before thebattle between Timoleon andtheCarthaginians ontheRiver Crimisus. He enjoyed thepatronage ofalocal aristocrat, Damas, whose wifeheeventually married, finding entry tothelocal aristocracy.265 After achieving a brilliant victory against the Bruttians, hetried toseize power inthecity forthefirst time. Heaccused Sossistratus, SixHundred”,266oftrying tobecome atyrant; amember ofthelocal aristocracy, the“ but he failed to support his allegations. He then hadto leave the city for Italy where heintervened inthelocal affairs ofCroton andTarentum. InRhegion, asa supporter of theregime in power, hefought successfully against the Syracusan “Six-Hundred”, headed by Sossistratos andHeracleides. Soon after he returned to Syracuse, and Six Hundred” . another stasis broke outwithSyracusan democrats pitted against the“ This resulted in theinvitation bythe Syracusans of yet another Corinthian, Acestorides, to take command of thecity. Agathocles wasperceived as a threat to thecity by the newleader. Hewasexiled, butwaslater reinstated through themediation of Six Hunthe Carthaginians whoeffected a reconciliation between him andthe “ .267 dred”

After receiving information about rebels neartheSicel townofHerbita, Agathocles was given permission to build an army. He used this opportunity to recall all the mercenaries whohadfought withhiminprevious years andtorecruit sympathizers fromMorgantina andother Sicel towns inthehinterland aswellas“poor” Syracusans whowanted to“avenge”themselves onthearistocracy. Onenight heassembled his forces in theTimoleonteum, a shrine dedicated to Timoleon. There Agathocles also summoned Paesarchus andDiocles, the leaders of the“ Six Hundred” . During thisunofficial assembly, Agathocles delivered a speech accusing the“ Six

Hundred” of persecuting

263

Talbert

himasProtector of theDemos (prostates toudemou). The

(1971) passim.

264 Thedates preceding Agathocles’coupareonlysuggestive; theyareconjectured onthebasis of

thepossible duration of hisactivities. SeeConsolo-Langher (1976) 386 withn.17. Thesources: Timaeus FGrH 566 F124b; Marmor Parium, FGrH 239 B 12; Diod. 19.1– 9; Justin. 22.1; 8.Onthesources: Berve (1952) ch.1;Consolo-Langher (1976); Kebrick (1977) Polyaenus 5.3.7– 79; Meister, CAHVII2 1, 384 note. 68– 265 Tillyard (1908) 39– 4. 40; Berve (1952) 23– 266 Consolo-Langher (1969/70) 107– 43. 267 Thecity wasthena “democracy” . It isremarkable that Agathocles andthe“ Six Hundred”could reside in thecity side by side.

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crowd became incensed andinitiated a two-day massacre of thearistocracy. Many were killed, others were exiled andtheir property confiscated. In the assembly which gathered in the wake of the attack, Agathocles boasted that it was he who had reestablished freedom (eleutheria) inthefaceofpossible tyranny. Herequested areturn to “private life”nowthat thedanger wasover. Hewasskilfull in manipulating the demos, which sought his services,268 andhe accepted on the condition that he be declared general with full power, strategos autokrator.269 With the pretence that he didnotwanttoparticipate intheevil deeds ofothers, hebecame tyrant ofSyracuse, promising to redistribute the land andcancel debts. Thenarrative of thecoupreveals apicture of instability: fourchanges ofregime (metabole), a civil war and an amnesty promoted by the Carthaginians.270 The aristocracy is pitted against the demos, the rich against the poor, the established citizens versus new and Greeks from different cities against non-Greeks, while Agathocles’allegiance shifts fromthearistocracy tothedemos. Itisdoubtful whether any regime would have been stable enough to be labeled clearly as either an aristocracy or a democracy. From their places of exile, the continual assaults of expatriates intensified the anarchy.271 Thedescription of thecoupandthesteps leading uptoit arefamiliar. Agathocles wanted to undermine theeconomic andpolitical foundations of thearistocracy. He employed all the legal means at hisdisposal anddidnotrefrain from using violence to achieve hisendwhennecessary. (60) In 310, while Agathocles was campaigning in Africa, aristocratic exiles attempted tooverthrow hisregime, assisted byHamilcar, commander of theCarthaginian forces whohadbesieged Syracuse.272 Theevidence is meagre, butit appears that theexiles hadsupporters within thecity. A mannamed Diognetus presented the assembly with the proposal that they turn the city over to the Carthaginians. The Syracusans wereshocked, butAntandros, Agathocles’brother whowasincharge, removed himandthus forestalled a stasis. (61) The exiles’struggle against the tyrant in fact began as soon as herose to power.273 In315 and313, Agathocles waged waragainst Messana andtried toridthe city of Syracusan exiles who had sought refuge there. These exiles later aligned themselves with another Syracusan called Deinocrates, whohadorganized oppositionagainst thetyrant. Hehadbeenpardoned during Agathocles’coupandhadlater gone into exile for reasons we do not know. Deinocrates together with the exiles joined theCarthaginians andwaspossibly involved intheattempted coupof 310. In

268 They were associated with bloody crimes, as Diodorus recalls. 5; Berve (1952); Diesner (1958) 931– 8. 269 Scheele (1934) 51– 3; onTimaeus’hostile attitude towards Agathocles, Consolo-Langher (1976). 270 Tillyard (1908) 50– 62. 271 Seibert (1979) 1.258– IV; Cavallaro (1977) 58– 9 (ontheauthor of thepapyrus). Thedate, 310, 272 P. Oxy.24.2399, col. II– is fixed by Diod. 20.15.1–16.5, whodescribes theevents butnottheparticular stasis discussed here. See Huss (1980) 69– 70; Berger (1988). 273 Diod. 19.103, 20.5.3, 12,57,3.7, 77, 79, 89– 90; all theevidence should beconnected also with theprevious stasis. SeeBerger (n.272); seealsoConsolo-Langher (1979).

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thewakeofitsfailure, heorganized another army. In307,whenAgathocles wasready to give uphistyranny inSyracuse andrule overThermai andCephalodium, Deinocrates refused toaccept theresignation of thetyrant, whomheintended eventually to crush. Agathocles, though, regained his military power after returning from Africa anddefeated first Acragas’andlater Deinocrates’forces. Thetide turned against Deinocrates, but Agathocles, to the astonishment of everyone, appointed him as his military commander.274

Thefact that thewaragainst Agathocles wasmainly waged outside Syracusan territory is hereofprime importance. Thegoalof theexiles wastoeventually dissolve and,thus, bring about thetyrant’sremoval. Onlyonce, in310, theSyracusan “empire” didthey actually take action within the city. They later tried to take advantage of Agathocles’absence during hisAfrican campaign buthisreturn ended their efforts. Fromthen onAgathocles ruled inrelative tranquility. (62) Agathocles’quiet rule wasnotreflected in hisdemise. Theappointment of his son, whobore the same name, as heir instead of his grandson, Archegetus, precipitated the tyrant’s assassination.275 In 289, while Archegetus wasin Aetna, he enlisted the aid of his grandfather’s slave, Menon.276 When Agathocles the Younger arrived toreplace Archegetus asthearmy’s commander inAetna, hewasmurdered. Atthesame time, Agathocles thetyrant wasslain byMenon, whoputpoison in his freedom” toothpaste. From hisdeathbed, fully aware of theconspiracy, hebestowed “ onthe Syracusans andcalled onthem to avenge his death. They democracy” and“ responded byseizing hisproperty andshattering all hisimages inthecity. Theydid not, however, support hisassassins, whohadtotake flight.277 Menon andArchegetus subsequently quarreled witheachother; Menon killed Archegetus, appropriated his mercenaries andattempted to reach Syracuse. (63) A year later, in 288, the local citizens decided to banthe enfranchised mercenaries fromelection topublic office. Both sides were onthebrink of opencivil , whohaddrawn upa treaty according to warandwere stopped only bythe“Elders” which the mercenaries hadto depart from the city andSicily at a specified date after selling all their property. The mercenaries, whocomplied with the agreement except forthefinal clause, remained inSicily, captured Messana andwerelater known asthe Mamertini.278

405. 274 Meister, CAMVIII2 1, 390, 393, 400– 275 Diod. 21.16 (289 B.C.); Justin. 23.24.5. 276 Menon wasa Segestan, enslaved after hiscitywascaptured byAgathocles; Diod. 20.71. 277 Justinus (n. 275) has a somewhat different story. However, it does not contradict Diodorus’ narrative. He relates that while Agathocles was lying on his deathbed suffering from a nerve disease, his sonandgrandson began the warof inheritance. Justinus, nevertheless, is mainly interested in Agathocles’third wife, Theoxenis. See Berve (1952) 74– 6. 278 Diod. 21. 18, whorecords theevents after describing theCarthaginian interference, which stopped Menon fromassuming power inthecity. It maybeconjectured thatthestasis tookplace a year later, in288.

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It seems thatthestasis broke outduring thereorganization ofthecivic bodyafter the death of Agathocles. As in earlier periods (466) the mercenaries279 were too powerful to be completely vanquished, butthe process didlead to their banishment, while they were required to sell all their property in order to eliminate anyclaim on ortoascertain thereasons why thecity. Itisnotpossible toidentify either the“Elders” themercenaries cooperated withthem. 65) Twoadditional staseis occurred tenyears later in279 (?). Atyrant named (64– Hicetas wasremoved byToinon. Hicetas hadbeeninpower fornineyears, fromthe timehehadbeenappointed general ofthearmy, which opposed Menon, theslave and assassin of Agathocles.280 Toinon wasunable to manage thewhole city byhimself. He took command of Ortygia and divided the territory with Sossistratus (the Syracusan whowastyrant inAcragas) whoadministered other parts of thecity. The twoquarreled continuously andin 277 decided to enlist Pyrrhus, whohadhimself ruled thecity for a while.281 Pyrrhus waseventually replaced byHieron the Second in275/4, thelast tyrant of Greek Syracuse. (66) Hieron’s career began with a military uprising organized with Artemidorus’ help.282 Thetwohadbeenchosen asnewcommanders283 of thearmynear Margena ) in the city, Hieron was Friends” (an unknown site). With the help of supporters (“ smuggled in, overcame his opponents andwaschosen general. Because he was successful, theSyracusans confirmed hisappointment. Since theother generals were constantly at each other’s throats, he strengthened his control considerably by marrying Philistis, thedaughter of Leptines, animportant leader inthecity. In 270 (?) he allowed his rebellious army of mercenaries to be slaughtered in battle, andfilled their depleted ranks withnewloyal forces. Finally, in269 hebecame kingafter a war with Messana.284

33. 279 Onthemercenaries, Hüttl (1929) 134; Berve (1967) 458; Vallone (1955) 29– 280 Diod. 22.2.1, 7.2; seealsoHead, HN2,no.183(acoinwiththenameHicetas). Theyearofthestasis canonlybeconjectured. Hicetas wasnominated general ofthearmy, inorder tofight Menon, in 288. Hemayhaveusedhispostlater inorder toseize power. Heruled fornine years andwas removed inapproximately 279. 281 Diod. 22.7.6; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 20.8; Plut. Pyrrh. 23. See also Polyaenus 5.37, whogives another account of Sossistratus. Hebanished Agathocles’supporters from thecity, murdered someof themandconfiscated their property. Thisisarather tootypical story anddoesnotcoincide 1175. with the other sources. See also Geier, “Sossistratos”(5), RE 3A, I (1927) 1174– 9;Pausanias 6.12.2; Cass. Dio(Zon.) 8.6.15. Onthesources, DeSensi Sestito 282 Sources: Polyb. 1.8– 11. (1977) 9– 283 The title is archontes (!). 284 Thedateoftheevents isunclear. Pausanias placed itinthesecond yearofthe126th Olympiad, i.e. 275/4. Polybius says that it happened “ a little while”before the conquest of Messana bythe Mamertini, dated to 270/69; in 7.8.4, hesays that Hieron died(in215) after ruling for fifty-four years, i.e., 270. Butthisdoesnotreflect thegapbetween hisrisetopower andbeing named king, which followed a waragainst Messana. Thus, wemayassume thatheseized power in275/4 and 104;Walbank, Commentary, 1.51– wascrowned in270/69. SeeRizzo (1971) 97– 54,2.41; Berve 9; Lenschau, “Hieron”(13), RE8.2 (1913) 1503– (1959) 8– 1511.

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Hieron’s career is typical: axenos of Pyrrhus,285 hebecame a successful military commander.286 Having seized power, hemarried thedaughter of a prominent citizen, thereby gaining entry into thearistocracy, while maintaining amercenary army.287 He wasalso supported bythecitizens inthearmy288 andlater bythearistocracy, despite

thefactthatLeptines hadbeenconsidered protector ofthedemos. Onceinpower, he wasabletoarrange hisaffairs andsolidify hiscontrol until heeventually became king. Byitsverylength, hisruleoffifty-four years gives credence tothehistorians’positive accounts of his reign.289 He is remembered as a leader whobrought prosperity to Syracuse anprolonged its independence for another half a century. 15 TARAS (67) The Spartan colony of Taras wasfounded in 706 byparthenioi, whowere illegitimate children of Helots and Spartan women begotten during the second Messenian War.290 Spartan influence is evident both in its constitution and from archaeological findings. Itremained anaristocracy until theonlyrecorded stasis inits history, which, according to Aristotle,291 occurred as a result of a disastrous war against theIapygians in473.292 Herelates thatalarge segment of thearistocracy was killed during thewar, asaresult, ademocracy emerged, replacing theformer politeia. Although Aristotle alludes to a metabole caused by the disintegration of the symmetria, theproportion between classes,293 it canbeassumed thatthechange was accompanied bya stasis. Thearistocracy didnotvoluntarily surrender itsposition in thecity. Moreover, thenewdemocracy appears tohavebeenmoderate.294 There was a balance between elected offices to which only qualified citizens, andthus mainly aristocrats, could aspire, andklerotai:295 fixed public posts opentoeverybody, thatis to say, the demos (the “fishermen”).296 This metabole, therefore, was not very remarkable.297

285 Justin. 23.4. 286 According toDeSensi Sestito, it is apronunciamento –a military coup. 4; DeSensi Sestito (1977) 11– 287 Griffith (1932) 203– 12. 288 Polybius, infact, speaks ofarmies, haidynameis. 289 DeSensi Sestito (1977) 16– 23. 290 Basic bibliography: Wuilleumier (1939). 291 Arist. Pol. 1303a3– 6. 292 Myketos, theRhegine tyrant, came to therescue of thecity in473: Diod. 11.52. The stasis took place a shortwhile afterward. See also Cordano (1974– 76) 203– 6. 293 Arist. Pol. 1301b26. 294 Themoderation isexplained bySpartan influence onthecity: Wuilleumier (1939) 56– 7; Moretti (1979) 36– 9; Drews (1983) 36– 8. 295 Arist. Pol. 1320b11– 14. 296 Arist. Pol. 1291b23. 297 Berger (1989).

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16 ZANCLE-MESSANA Zancle wasfounded in 725 by settlers from Chalcis andItalian Cumae.298 The history of this city is somewhat better preserved than that of other cities, andits archaeological documentation is better. Its first known stasis, however, dates from 461. The city’s primary importance lies in its geography: along with Rhegion, it dominated the straits of Messana. (68) Thefirst stasis deals withtheexpulsion of theAnaxiladai andis related to thegeneral movement inSicily tooverthrow tyrannies.299 Messana wasconquered by theRhegine tyrant, Anaxilas, shortly after hehadseized power in his owncity in empire” , andpopulated it withnewcitizens 493.300 Heincorporated thecityinto his“ thus introducing aDorian element into its name Zancle Messana,301 from to changing anoriginally Chalcidian city. These actions conjoined withhisefforts tooutmaneuver Hippocrates, theGeloan tyrant whowasalso trying to control Zancle.302 Thesituation in461wasextremely complicated. Ontheonehand, thecity was inhabited by enfranchised citizens of different ethnic origins such as Zancleians, Samians, Milesians, Messenians andother Dorians.303 Ontheother hand, theKoinon Dogma or“ General Settlement”,304which hadbeenadopted after theexpulsion ofthe tyrannies in Sicily, called for theelimination of all mercenaries andtherecall of all former citizens andexiles to their respective cities. Messana wasdesignated asthe newcity for mercenaries whohadbeen removed from the various cities, thereby aggravating itsweakness. Messana, liberated fromRhegine control, wasreferred to once more as a Chalcidian city andwasrenamed Zancle for a short time.305 (69) ThePeloponnesian Warpolarized therelations between factions within the cities intheWestandbetween themandtheAthenians andtheSpartans. Messana, no longer called Zancle, revolted against theAthenians in 425 andjoined theDorian pro-Syracusan”faction seized power. After alliance on the island.306 In the city the “ theCongress of Gela, in424,307 a stasis broke out.308 Unable tokeepcontrol over the city, the ruling faction invited the assistance of the Locrians who subsequently

298 Basic bibliography: Vallet (1958). 299 Diod. 11.76.5. 300 Compare with the coup of Anaxilas in Rhegion (no. 27). 301 See below. 302 Dunbabin (1948) 388. 55; Asheri (1980) 149. 6; DeSensi-Sestito (1981) 38– 303 Hdt. 6.23; Thuc. 6.5– 6. 304 Koinon dogma: Diod. 11.76.4– 20. See also De Sensi-Sestito (1981) 46. 305 On the numismatic evidence, Robinson (1946) 13– Diodorus uses both names: first, theZancleians removed theAnaxiladai, butthemercenaries moved to Messana. Myketos ruled, in 471, in Zancle but Pausanias 5.36.5, insists that he considered himself a Messanian. Compare with SEG XI. 1221; XXVIII.431. 306 Thuc 4.4.1. 2. 307 Thuc. 4.65.1– 308 Thuc. 5.5.1; seeDover, Commentary, adloc.Thedateofthestasis isbetween 424(theCongress ofGela) and422, theyearinwhich Thucydides mentions it.Theoccasion isPhaiax’s mission to the West exploring opportunities for Athens.

Zancle/Messana

55

conquered the city and then withdrew when threatened by a revolt of their own colonies in Italy.309 Messana, on the other hand, remained loyal to Syracuse and refused to grant a harbor to the Athenians in 415.310 (70) Later in 415, another stasis broke out.311 The Athenians again wanted a harbor for their ships inMessana. Their allies in thecity promised assistance,312 but pro-Syracusan” Alcibiades, already an exile,313 disclosed their intentions to the “ pro-Athenians” weremassacred andthearmed presence faction.314 Inretaliation, the“ of the “pro-Syracusans”in the assembly putan endto anyresolution to accept Athenians into the city. pro-Athenians”with new Obviously the Athenian expedition presented the “ opportunities. They probably were Chalcidians who developed pro-Athenian feelingsduring thewar,confronting theDorian supporters of Syracuse. Thelatter hadthe upper hand because they were better organized and could rely on local Sicilian support, which the Chalcidians lacked. (71) Ethnic animosities continued toplay a role inthecity’s internal politics and staseis. In399, Chalcidian Rhegion succeeded inpersuading theMessanian generals to unite in a waragainst Dionysius theElder. Without theconsent of the assembly they ledthe army to thecity limits, buthaving arrived there, a citizen named Laomedon convinced thesoldiers that there wasnoreason tofight Dionysius who,heclaimed, posed noharmtothecity. Furthermore, heargued thatthere hadbeennodecision on thepart of theassembly towagewar.Thesoldiers, thusconvinced, rebelled against their generals, left the battlefield andreturned home.315 Fear of Dionysius’power and his plans to invade Italy motivated Rhegine activity.316 Both Messanian and Rhegine generals probably belonged to the local aristocracy andwere Chalcidians as well.317 The Messanian demos,318 onthe other hand, wasimpressed byDionysius’propaganda which presented himas“ protector of . Thereaction ofthedemos onthisoccasion wascompletely different from thedemos” itsreaction in404 whenthey senta navel force toassist therevolt of theSyracusans against Dionysius.319 Thus, Dionysius and the local demos this time emerged victorious.

309 Thuc. 5.5.3; cf. events inRhegion, no.29. 310 Thuc. 6.5.20. 311 Thuc. 6.74.1; Plut. Alc. 22.1. 71. 312 Losada (1972) 66– 5. 313 Westlake (1968) 224– 314 Ontheidentification of thegroups seeDover, Commentary, adloc. 5. 315 Diod. 14.40.4– 316 There werealso Syracusan exiles inRhegion, Diod. 14.40.1– 3. 4. 44, 53– 317 Costabile (1978) 37– 318 Onaristocracy anddemos in thecity see Raccuia (1981) 15– 32. 319 Diod. 14.8.2.

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Stasis in Sicily andSouthern Italy: Case studies

(72) The struggle over the control of the straits wasnotyet over. Five years later,

in394, theMessanians exploited Dionysius’defeat inTauromenion inorder toexpel , reintroduce eleutheria andbreak off the treaty with Syrathe “pro-Dionysians” cuse.320 These events parallel those inAcragas. The battle between Dionysius andRhegion took place again at Messana. The Rhegines tried tocapture thecity withanarmyheaded bya Syracusan exile named Heloris. Theyalso attempted toresettle Naxians andCatanians, bothChalcidians, in

nearby Mylai, showing their firm resolve against the Syracusan tyrant.321 But the Messanians, withtheassistance of Dionysius’mercenaries, expelled thenewsettlers fromMylai immediately afterwards.322 Dionysius thenattacked Tauromenion onlyto find that a stasis hadbroken out in Messana. Apparently, Dionysius could not establish anyfirm support in the city andencountered opposition throughout the first decade ofthefourth century. Whenherebuilt Messana after it hadbeendestroyed by the Carthaginians in 396,323 he settled there Dorians from Medma,324 Locri325 and Messanians fromNaupactus andZacynthus. Butit proved of noavail tohimin394. However, in 393 Dionysius wasonce more allied to Messana as theCarthaginians reopened their attack onthenorthern shore of Sicily.326 In 388, thecity aided himin his invasion of Italy.327 The stasis of 394, then, proved unsuccessful.

1231; Messana” 320 Diod. 14.88.5; E.Meyer (GdA, 1.112 n.2)andPhilippson (“ , RE16[1931] 1214– see also Stroheker [1958] 211 n.10) claim that the stasis took place in Tyndaris andnot in Messana. Messana wasattacked in393(ayearafter thestasis) byCarthage because itwasfriendly withtheSyracusan tyrant. Itisnotlogical then, theyclaim, thatin394Messana rebelled against Dionysius. Thus the rebellion must have occurred in Tyndaris, which was settled by proDionysian settlers in396.Theyhadbeenbrought byDionysius tosettle Messana inthesameyear, butbeing unsatisfied, theyleftforanother location, Tyndaris (Diod. 14.78.5). These arguments, however, are not convincing. The transformation from friendship to animosity could be very quick indeed, as shown in the case of Rhegion and Dionysius the Elder (Diod. 14.90.4– 7). Messana, moreover, wasfartooimportant tobedeserted byDionysius, evenifitscitizens revolted , RE7A.2(1948) 1776– 1790, ayearearlier. SeeMosley (1974). Interestingly, Ziegler, “Tyndaris” doesnotmention thestasis inhisentry. 321 Diod. 14.78.5. 88.4. 322 Diod. 14.87– 323 Diod. 14.78.5. 324 OnLocri andits colonies, Dunbabin (1948) 163– 70. 325 Theconnection between Dionysius andLocri wasimportant. Hemarried Doris, a local woman, in398(Diod. 14.64). Thecityassisted himwithhisItalian aspirations; Stroheker (1958) 111– 3.

326 327

Polyaenus 5.2.18, records another interference reflects his efforts to gain control in Italy. Diod. 14.90. 1. Diod. 14. 103; Stroheker (1958) 80–

by Dionysius in Rhegine

affairs, which also

PART II

THE CONSTITUENTS OF STASIS: SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS 1 CAUSES OF STASIS Theultimate goal of every stasis is theacquisition of power, that is, theability to exercise decisive influence over thefundamental institutions of a city, to control the city’s policies through these institutions. This phenomenon hasbeen described by center”of power –persons excluded from the scholars as aneffort to conquer the“ inner circle ofthedecision-making process attempted toforce their wayintothatcore which dominated andsymbolized political power andfrom which all functions and tasks radiated.1 The case of theGreek polis presents a variation of thedescribed phenomenon since its citizens were more politically astute than those of most other ancient communities andless likely tofeel themselves totally isolated orontheperiphery. Citizens primarily struggled to acquire better positions within the city’s centers of power. Furthermore, theGreeks hadraised ideological expression andsymbolization ofpower struggles toahighlevel while itappears that, within agiven city, arelatively small number ofcitizens wereuninterested inachieving participation inpolitical life. Thegoal of stasis, therefore, wasnotsomuchparticipation inthelife of thecity, as control over thepolis. Inthis, Athens cannot serve asa paradigm, since hersize and unique development setherapart fromother cities. InAthens there werecitizens who willingly retired from public business.2 The central aim of stasis, therefore, waspolitical. The prerequisites for the introduction of change within a city, whether within thepolitical, social oreconomic spheres, wereachieved through appropriation ofthecenters ofpower. Sicilian affairs provide a special field forinvestigation since tyranny wassucha widespread formof government ontheisland.3 Theopening phase of a tyrannical coupd’étatinvarious cities wasmarked byan important feature which mayreveal apossible foundation forexplaining somestaseis, namely, the “ revolutionary rhetoric” . Aristotle (Pol. 1310b30) claims that it was through the skillful use of rhetoric that Dionysius the Elder andPanaetius rose to power (ekdemagogias).4 Tothese menwemayaddPhalaris, Aristodemos of Cumae,

1 2 3

4

Eisenstadt (1978) 36– 39. 99; Finley (1983) 97– 85,97– Ibid. 84– 101; Carter (1986). Andrewes (1956) 128– 163, 221– 282, 441– 42; Berve (1967) 128– 475. Nos.21, 48: all numbers refer tocases ascited intable 1 onpp.116f.

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The Constituents of Stasis: Systematic Analysis

Telys the Sybarite andAgathocles, as the most famous examples.5 Later sources focused on the social elements within revolutionary rhetoric, reflecting trends in

historiography from thefourth century onward.6 Thestruggle between thedemos andthearistocracy wasa socio-economic model of prime importance. Tyrants usually took thepartof thedemos or at least claimed 7–tried torepresent popular sentiments. Aristocracies –formidable “power groups” to block thepolitical pathof tyrants. It wasexpedient, therefore, for tyrants to present themselves aschampions of thedemos. Moreover, it appears thatduring their rise to power they usually attempted to liquidate local elites and thus extirpate future opposition. A newelite wasthenfostered which received its power directly from the tyrant. Theprocess of polarization described in thevarious sorces enabled thefuture tyrants to achieve a special andalmost sacrosanct status. Aristodemos of Cumae provides a goodexample. Hispower wasrooted intheability toproject himself asthe demos’ champion (prostates tou demou).8 On the other hand, the demos had to acquiesce tofuture tyrants andoffer themsupport, since thecitizens themselves often werealso implicated inmanyillegal acts, including murder, thathadbeeninstigated by the future tyrants. Agathocles serves as a perfect example.9 An“unholy pact”was formed between himandtheSyracusan demos through which they supported all his illicit acts while Agathocles placated themwithpromises of landredistribution and cancellation of debts. Obviously, inmanycases, these reforms were notforthcoming fromthetyrant whonevertheless distributed boons tohisfriends. Dionysius theElder gave the best land to his supporters; therest wasleft to the Syracusan demos.10 ) The decline of aristocratic power (especially of “aristocracies of first settlers” coincided withthestabilization, expansion andprosperity of thecities, andexplains old tyranny”in the middle of the sixth century.11 Aristotle the rise to power of the “ declares (Pol. 1316a35) that this phenomenon occurred in nearly all the cities of Sicily. The events follow the pattern set in the mother-cities fifty years earlier.12 The , however, was marked by different characteristics. The new tyranny” age of the “ didnotcreate newelites; andthenew aristocracies of first settlers” assault onthe“ ruling groups were unable to consolidate their power. Thecities were shaken and lacked a recognizable social order while political instability became rampant.13 Tyrants werethereby helped intheir efforts toachieve power while merecircumstancesplayed a role which overwhelmed deeply rooted aristocratic traditions. Political exigencies brought about some strange coalitions which were often unstable,14 and thedichotomy, demos vs.aristocracy, became a slogan.

5 Nos. 1, 14, 33, 59.

6 SeeIntroduction. 7 Onthestructure ofaristocracies seesection 2.

8 No. 14. 9 No.59. 10 Nos.49, 50. 11 Seesection 2.

12 See n. 3.

13 DeBlois (1978); seesection 2 below. 14 No.44.

Causes of Stasis

59

Evidence fortheopening stages ofanti-tyrannical stasis during which civic (nontyrannical) regimes were established is meagre andobscure. Since these revolts usually relied onclandestine planning, their background canonlybereconstructed in light oftheoutcome ofthestasis. Speed wasapparently animportant element inthese plots. Periods of heavy pressure during which thetyrant revealed hisbasic weakness could bolster the revolutionaries in their fight. External warfare, which influenced bothsides, wasacommon stratagem aswill beshown later.15 Since thetyrant, ashead ofstate, wascharged withthewelfare ofthecity, therevolutionaries could exploit real problems in order to undermine his position. Patriotism, in most cases, played an inconsequential role.16 Since the establishment of a civic regime wasthe obvious goal of stasis, the revolutionaries tried to foster the notion that they represented the antithesis of tyranny. If tyranny wasslavery, the newregime represented liberty andfreedom. democracy” , Therefore, a cult of Zeus Eleutherios wastheir hallmark.17 The word“ moreover, came to meantheopposite of tyranny. Such political semantics reflected a wide range of expectations. Aristocratic groups, victimized bytyranny, tried toturntheclock back andreappropriate their old rights andprivileges. Ofprime importance wastheredistribution of land. Theevents that followed thedownfall of tyranny during thesixties of thefifth century manifest thisdevelopment clearly.18 Theorigin ofrhetoric, moreover, hasbeenattributed tothe manylawsuits tried before theSyracusan courts inthewakeof thetyranny.19 Mostof thecases dealt withtheproblems ofreclaiming lostproperty. Onecanfurther assume that individuals involved in such litigation also desired to regain their social and political status. Indeed, themostimportant issue in a Greek city wastherearrangementof thecitizens’list (politographia), which provided thebasis forlandandother claims within theterritory of thepolis. Thetyrannies intheWestwerenoted fortheir enormous enfranchisements, which hadintroduced great changes inthecivic body, increasing the importance of politographia as reliable documentary evidence of citizenship; all themoresosince traditions incolonial society weremorerecent and less well preserved thaninmainland Greece.20 Problems relating tothestructure ofthecivic bodynotconnected withtherise and fall of tyrannies also contributed to the development of staseis. The history of the fourth foundation of Sybaris in about 446, and that of Thurii two years later, demonstrate these problems. In 446, some of the citizens refused to agree to the suggested distribution of public offices, religious priesthoods andland.21 In 434, a stasis broke out in Thurii which centered on the critical issue of whowould be

15 Seesection 4.

16 17 18 19

20 21

Chroust (1954); Losada (1971); see also section 3. Raaflaub (1985) 125– 49; see also section 5. Nos. 44, 45; Asheri (1980). Arist. F. 137R; Hinks (1940). SeeKiessling, P olitographein” , RE21.2 (1952) 1403. “ No.34.

TheConstituents of Stasis: Systematic Analysis

60

declared founder of thecity andwhich city wasto be considered its mother-city.22 These were the most basic issues for any colony. They emphasize yet again the importance of politographia on the one hand, and the lack of firmly established

traditions ontheother hand.23 Itappears, therefore, thatproblems relating tothestructure ofthecivic bodywere at the root of revolutions in Sicily andSouthern Italy. The colonial polis usually was small andunstable; there wasnoadequate mechanism toorganize thelife of thecity anddirect itssubsequent development. Issues related totheintegration ofnewcitizens andthedistribution ofpublic offices werecentral, andrepeatedly endangered thevery foundation of thepolis’structure. Since thecities hadnodeveloped orlong-standing tradition of social order, thecitizens wereconstantly attempting changes related tothe overall structure of thepolis. Fluidity wasa fact of life; tyrants intensified it through theuseof forced resettlement. Aristotle (Pol. 1303a28) cites ethnic tensions asanadditional factor contributing to revolution in colonial society. It appears that revolutionary acts were highlighted and intensified by ethnicity. When Thucydides refers to the Myletidai and the foundation of Himera, heunderscores theethnic differences between theMyletidai (whose origins were Doric) andthe Chalcidic Zancleians. Furthermore, when he describes the coalitions on the island prior to the Athenian invasion, he identifies which Sicilian cities were Ionic andwhich Doric. Healso elaborates ontheextraordinary case of Camarina, which wasslow tojoin with Syracuse despite thefact that it wasDoric andSyracuse washermother-city.24 Thefactors cited above contributed aswell toproblems of theinner structure of thecolonial polis, andemphasize thelong-standing, deep-seated causes of revolutions. Such long-term causes, however, were usually accompanied byevents which actually precipitated therevolt,25 themostimportant of which wasanexternal war. A variety of causes operated here: the instability of the colonial polis, the paramount role of the citizen-soldier, a tendency to resort to violence andthe availability of weapons.26 Thus, discontent within a local army could easily flare into revolution.27 Outright provocation served as another excuse for revolution even though usually theoutbreak oftherevolt canbetraced toother causes. Theexpulsion ofthe Pythagoreans in the middle of the fifth century wassparked when Milo’s house, where members ofthesecthadgathered, wasburned down. Animosity directed atthe Pythagoreans waswide-spread. Thefire in Croton precipitated other cases of arson in places inhabited by Pythagoreans in Southern Italy.28 The rise and fall of the Acragantine generals attheendofthefourth century wasalsotheresult ofprovocation

22 23 24 25 26 27 28

No.35. See also nos. 45, 63. Thuc. 7.57– 58 (onthealliances); 6. 76– 88 (onthedebate inCamarina).

Eckstein (1965) 140– 43. See section 4.

Nos.49, 50, 66, 71. No.12.

Causes of Stasis

61

which hadroots in other causes.29 In these cases, however, thepresence of military forces is central since they had the power not only to promote policy, but also to accelerate change within thecity. Purely spontaneous acts were rare, although they

didplay anauxiliary role inthecourse of several revolutions.30 The opening phase of a stasis set the stage for its subsequent development. The aims were generally political anddirected toward theseizure of power in thecity. Accordingly, tactics were chosen so as to achieve the overall goal. The instability of thepolis andtheexistence of long-term tyranny canbeconsidered crucial preconditions for stasis in the poleis of Sicily andSouthern Italy.

29 Nos. 7, 8. 30 Nos. 6, 7, 52; ontherole of thedemos, Legon (1965) 174– 80.

TheConstituents of Stasis: Systematic Analysis

62

2 SOCIAL, POLITICAL ANDECONOMIC STRUCTURES 2.1. Society

Thecolonial aristocracy hasbeendescribed inmodern literature asthe“aristocracy of first settlers” .1A ruling class, a social elite, emerged naturally from the population of thedeveloping city, for nocity’s administration canbecarried outon a contingency basis, evenina democracy.2 Whomade upthese first Sicilian aristocracies? There were twomajor components. Thefirst came from themother-cities, which, whensending outcolonies, also designated their leaders who, together with their families, constituted the nucleus of theruling class. But, secondly, in addition to these designated leaders, there were other people whoachieved elevated status andwere elected topublic offices in the newcities, reflecting specific local developments. Thusthenewaristocracies evolved in waysother thanthose anticipated bythemother-cities andincluded people other than theoriginally intended leaders.3 Among the issues to be decided in the colony, the most important was the distribution of land.4 Mostcolonies werefounded witha viewtoward theacquisition offertile landfortheestablishment ofanagricultural baseforthecommunity. Even if theinitial distribution of landwasequal, within a short timeproprietorship became concentrated in the hands of a few families, whobecame the “aristocracy of first

settlers” ; theothers formed thedemos. These families, which thought of themselves asthenucleus of the settlement, first” . Theyespecially resisted demands of new claimed certain rights forbeing the“ immigrants, whowere admitted into thecity butgiven less fertile land andfewer rights inthelocal political structures. These immigrants joined theranks ofthedemos as well. Since rivalry between aristocracy and demos (and among aristocratic families) for a better position in the cities’hierarchies wasparamount, aristocratic families invented genealogies reaching backtothebeginning ofthecolonial era,often to the mother-city, in order tojustify their claim for superiority. The history of the polis andtheprivate histories of aristocratic families ranparallel toeachother. These private aristocratic histories became sacrosanct byvirtue ofthefactthatthese families also controlled thecults andreligious rituals of thecity.5 Thearistocratic values the families stressed were those common for the archaic period in ancient Greece: superiority ofbirth, behaviour andeducation; theexcellence oftheindividual, proved andreaffirmed through competition andwar.6

1

2 3

4 5 6

See Whibley (1896) 115– 16; Arnheim (1977) 51– 54. The basic treatment of colonization is Graham CAHIII2.2, chs. 37, 38. Onelites inAthens seeOber(1989). Graham (1971) insists that the colonies’ background should be viewed according to the circumstances inthenewcity’s location rather thaninthepresupposed plans of themother-cities. See also Graham (1964) 218– 23. Asheri (1966). No. 16.

Donlan (1980), especially ch.2; Starr (1986)

30.

Social, Political andEconomic Structures

63

Yet thefamilies’claims to superiority were notunimpeachable. Since thepolis wasanimported institution inSicily, evenif ina rudimentary stage,7 thegenealogies the could not exceed the bounds of the commonly known local histories, i.e., “ . Inthemother-cities aristocratic families established blood foundation oftheapoikia” lines with heroes andinvented genealogies dating back to mythical periods which could notbeeffectively questioned.8 Suchgenealogies could notformanintegral part oflocal Sicilian history unless thishistory wasregarded asanextension ofthehistory of themainland. Therefore, local aristocratic claims tohonor often lacked a “ring of authenticity”andwere subject tocriticism. Fewfamilies could retain their status for a longperiod of time andleave their privileged position totheir children; thusthey could notcreate a cohesive aristocratic class. Themost important local cult wasthe cult of thefounder (oecist), which wasconnected tothehistorical event of thecity’s

in a given year.9 Aslong asthecities continued to growsteadily andbegan to found their own colonies, aristocratic families became richer. They tried to protect their rights and monopolies; within theconfines of thepolis theycould dominate thedistribution of foundation

power andaccess topublic offices. Thisdomination served thefamilies byextending their influence and enhancing their status in the competition with each other in the city. Thus, they resisted outsiders andfought among themselves for better positions within the newhierarchies formed in the polis. The defeated parties hadto leave the city, asinthecaseoftheMyletidai inSyracuse; theyjoined anewfoundation inorder to attempt a newbeginning, a newcompetition.10 As tyrants rose to power in the middle of the sixth century, the aristocratic families faced farmorethreatening challenges. Thetyrants, whousually camefrom the ranks of aristocracies andrepresented a newform of old aristocratic values, namely honor andglory, were ruthless andready to act immediately against any perceived threat to their aspirations andpositions. Using their military power as well as the polis’institutions, the tyrants, in fact, completed theprocess of developing the polis’system; they broke upthemonopolies which the aristocratic families tried to a character based build through public offices, giving theoffices another character – onthepolis ingeneral andnotonaristocratic values.11 Theyalsochanged thestructure ofthearistocracies. After seizing power, according toapopular account, sometyrants would slaughter all male aristocrats, handing their widows over to the tyrant’s mercenaries whothen became respectable citizens, inheriting theland andthestatus

7 SeeMurray (1990), andIntroduction withn.4. 8

9

Autochthonic feelings should be taken into account. In Sicily andsouthern Italy nosuch claims wereputforward. Inthecourse oftimethecultbecame central inlocal history; belonging tothefamily oftheoecist hadanaristocratic value andcarried political importance. Butevenif theoecist himself was connected to themother-city andhadimportance in the“ oldworld”as well, his family’s status wasbased onhisposition inthecolony. Ontheoecist, seeMalkin (1987); Leschhorn (1984).

10 No.40; thecompetition among thearistocratic families inthepolis before thesixth century and thesubsequent instability isdescribed byStahl (1987) 77– 105. TheAthenian case canserve as aparadigm forother cities aswell.

11 Stahl (1987) esp. 138ff.

The Constituents of Stasis: Systematic Analysis

64

aristocrats andbecoming even more loyal to the tyrant.12 Gelon of Syracuse usedhispower to transfer entire aristocracies fromonecity to another and mixpopulations together, primarily in Syracuse.13 Thetyrants were also renowned fortheir “social revolutions”which guaranteed mobility within the civic body andenabled them to promote their favorites as new citizens orevenasaristocrats. Theoldaristocracies eventually losttheir ability, based onclaims of superiority, to effectively exercise control over thecities, andthe “ariwere forever vanquished. However, belonging to such a stocracies of first settlers” family of “ first settlers” remained a source ofhonor aswellasof somepolitical utility throughout the history of the Greek presence in the West. Competition withtyrants madeeconomic power thebasis forthenewaristocratic families. Landwasstill ofprimary importance, andtheveryrichfamilies could often survive theupheaval inthecities since every citizen wasinfluenced bytheir wealth. These families maintained a “bourgeois”ethos, that of money and prosperity, justified later byaristocratic ideals. Thefact thatsupporting a tyrant became another road to aristocratic status opened thecompetition to rich non-aristocrats as well. Thedefinition of thedemos is clearly related inversely tothatof thearistocracy. Simply put, a citizen whowasnot an aristocrat belonged to the demos, which was divided into sub-groups: individuals whohadsome money andproperty (i.e., small ) andthepoor –thelower class” landowners, artisans –middle class” . Although all “ “ didnotentail equal rights. ascitizens, citizenship belonged to thecivic community Once a distinction between demos andaristocracy wasmade, the standing of an individual within the demos was defined according to land tenure.14 The demos had fewindependent economic channels through which theycould free themselves from local aristocracies since agriculture continued to be the predominant enterprise in Sicily andSouthern Italy. Attempts toformdemocracies failed forthesamereasons. In491, whentheGamoroi were banished from Syracuse, thenewly formed democracy could notholdoutforlong andthedemos finally hadtoinvite Gelon fromGela to assume the management of the city.15 Again, in 453, the Syracusans tried to introduce local ostracism, thepetalismos, but failed. The aristocrats retired from public life, but since the city wasmismanaged during their absence,16 they hadto be recalled, a blowtotheaspiration of thedemos which haddared toactindependently.17 Themobility forced oncitizens bythetyrants, however, provided thedemos with amajor opportunity. Following therise oftyrants thedemos often wasliberated from economic obligations to the aristocracy through redistribution of land, houses and property andcancellation of debts.18 Moreover, thedemos could benefit simply from

of the former

12 13

14

Asheri (1977).

36. (1982/3); Starr (1986) 34– Since thestruggle between landowners Seibert

andlandless wassoimportant (seealsobelow) itcanbe of thedemos aswell.

assumed that it occurred among members

15 No.42. 16 No.45; theinterpretation of“mismanagement”as aristocratic biasof Diodorus’source should notconceal thefact thatthedemos hadtogivein. 17 Asheri (1980); Berger (1989). 18 Asheri (1966); id. (1969).

Social, Political andEconomic Structures

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the chaos in the city following a tyrannical coup. The change wasnot total, butnew avenues for advancement were opened up, which ordinarily would have remained closed. Ultimately, instability affected both the relationship between the classes and those between thepopulation andthe tyrant. Oneexample mayclarify the picture. In 357 Dion returned to Syracuse andwas welcomed by the local demos which also appointed himas general with full power. Within a short time, thedemos became disappointed in himandelected another leader, Heracleides. BothDion andHeracleides, however, were known to be inleague both withthetyrants of theDionysian TheTyrant’sFriends” , whohelped the dynasty andmembers ofthelocal aristocracy, “ Dion’s tyrants rule the city. Dion was later supported by aristocrats known as “ Friends” , anironic title since Dionhimself tried tooustDionysius theYounger and . Heisalso saidtohavefavored anaristocratic constitution. Heracleides, his“Friends” once an aristocrat anda friend of the tyrant, became in turn the champion of the demos.19Evidently, there were families which supported thetyrants andbelonged to the“Friends”butlater supported Dion. In fact, after 357 there wasnoaristocracy as such, butrather families andother groups which competed for a better social and political position. These groups joined forces and formed coalitions for tactical reasons despite former animosities andsupposedly clashing viewpoints. Three typical divisions in the colonial polis, other than that between demos and aristocracy, tended simultaneously to become more exacerbated in times of crisis. The first division was between “old”and “new”citizens, a schism common in aristocracy of first settlers” . The old colonial society andexemplified by the term “ citizens defined their position in the city as superior to that of newcomers, i.e., immigrants andnewly enfranchised, andthereby guarded special rights andprivileges. Thepresence of mercenaries intheWestespecially threatened thestatus of the established citizens, for mercenaries could demand and receive citizenship after military service. Thus the distinction was essential for the “old”citizens. The citizens, moreover, to someextent obliterated and“new” old” distinction between “ other differences; inparticular, itcutthrough theusual economic andsocial divisions. The second division concerns ethnic groups whose existence according to Aristotle (Pol. 1303a25) became one of the major causes of revolution. All his examples aredrawn fromcolonial society. Aslongasthecity’sinstitutions functioned smoothly, ethnic differences could be overlooked. They gained importance with the outbreak of stasis andweresometimes evenexploited asapretext. Again, theethnic division transcended anysocio-economic groupings.20 Thethird division is between citizens andgroups outside thecivic body. Clearly, the population in its totality andnotjust the citizens determined the course of daily life within the polis. Outsiders included not only visiting foreigners but also permanent, free andslave non-citizen population. Notice forexample, theKyllirioi,

19 No.52. 20 Ontheimportance of ethnicity seeWill (1956), whominimizes itsrole, andAlty (1982), who shows its central place. See also table 7.

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The Constituents of Stasis: Systematic Analysis

whotook part in the overthrow of the Gamoroi.21 The participation of metoikoi in coups, although notdocumented, canbesafely assumed. Theinstitution of metoikia served a two-fold purpose within the immigrant community: it provided a legal framework to control the entry andactivities of foreigners andenabled them to achieve desired legal status, andit supplied a mechanism for the process of enfranchisement.22 Even during uncontrolled tyrannical enfranchisement, metoikia could play an important role by instilling a sense of order in a volatile situation.

2.2. Politics

The institutional and constitutional frameworks of the poleis in Sicily and southern Italy wereasinfluenced bytheinstability ofsocial structures asbythespread of tyranny. Every city possessed certain typical political andadministrative institutions: anassembly, a council andpublic offices. Since themodel of thepolis itself was already imported bytheoriginal settlers, thebasic form wassimilar to that of the poleis of themainland. Thetitles usedtodesignate these institutions were thesame as those employed within the Greek world in general, although because of local circumstances poleis in theWest developed in their ownunique fashion. The local polis is, in fact, a goodtest-case for thedevelopment of thepolis structure, since it was not affected by the structure of the previous “pre-polis”communities. Regional development aswellasrational construction ofthesystem hadagreater impact onthe structure andoperation of theinstitutions.22a In their accounts of tyrants and tyrants’activities within the polis, the sources combine allthepossible characteristics of thevarious regimes inorder topresent the reader withascomplete aviewaspossible oftheforces against which thetyrant pitted himself. But these generalizing tendencies must be disregarded andtheindividual institutions analyzed separately inorder todetermine howthey actually functioned. The assembly

The assembly, ekklesia, demos or halia, wasthe largest institution within the Greek polis. Initially, it served asageneral gathering ofthecitizens, although inmost cities the citizens represented in the assembly constituted a fraction of the total population. This fact hadprobably greater importance in the Sicilian and Southern Italian poleis, since these were immigrant communities. The immigrant sought incorporation into the civic body andacquisition of land, as well as a role in the government of thestate. Although it is logical toassume thatthese cities weremore liberal in their policies towards immigrants, at least at certain times, theprocess of 21 No.42. 22 Whitehead (1984). 22a See,forinstance, thecaseofMegara Hyblaea, where theagora andtemples werebuilt according to a rational plan andfollowed thepattern of a polis: Finley (1979) 28– 9; Malkin (1987).

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wasnotautomatic.23 Still, theassembly, astherepresentative body, was oneofthefewinstitutions towhich theimmigrant musthavehadaccess, andwithin which hecould exercise influence fromthemoment hebecame a citizen. Tyrants introduced still another variation onthetheme bytheforced enfranchise-

incorporation

ment of large numbers of their supporters. The transfer of populations by the Deinomenidai to Syracuse andother cities resulted in theaddition of entire aristocracies to the local citizenry. Having full political rights in their newcity, these enfranchised citizens could help the tyrant by creating a block of supporters in the assembly. Aslongasthetyrant wasinpower, theposition of thenewly enfranchised wassecure, andtheassembly wasinanycase relatively unimportant. Butas soonas and“new” developed within thecivic hewastoppled, a polarization between “old” body.24 The assembly became thebattlefield where vital issues could be decided and to which everyone hadaccess. Themostimportant characteristics of theassembly were its predominance, the regularity of its gathering andthe sovereignty of its decisions. In the West, some of the assemblies metirregularly andwere convened only to resolve specific issues. Such sessions were used to endow the decrees andactions of the tyrants with a measure of legitimacy. Infact, anassembly inanyformcould dothis, andsince the military wascomposed ofcitizens, decisions madewithin theassembly ofthemilitary could theoretically begranted thebinding force of anassembly evenif theconvocation didnotoccur in thecity’s territory.25

The Council

thepresence ofanactive boule asa central institution within thepolis mentioned, as in the events in Cumae in 504, such references are exceptional. Evenin theCumaean case thecouncil mayhave been aninvention of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, a late source, andnota real institution of thelate sixth century. Butexistence of a small, effective boule which worked intandem withthe assembly wascommon intheGreek polis, andwemayassume thatdespite infrequent evidence inthesources, thecouncil wasaregular feature intheSicilian andsouthern Italian poleis. Theboule wasa favorite instrument of aristocrats because they could control it andbecause it hadaristocratic roots. Manyexamples of aristocratic bodies which mayhavefunctioned asaboule areidentified intheWestbyanumerical title: theThousand”inRhegion, Acragas andCroton; “theSixHundred” “ inSyracuse; “the Hundred” inLocri Epizephirioi.26 It cannot beconfirmed, however, thatthese bodies established aboule inevery city. Inseveral cases, theyappear identical either withthe civic bodyitself, orwiththeruling class. It isdifficult, however, toidentify themwith formal institutions as such since these bodies reflect, rather, informal arrangements Although

is occasionally

23 See, forinstance, no.22.

24 Seeabove.

25 Seebelow sections 4 and5. 26 Nos.4, 10,27, 59; onLocri, Polyb. 12.5.6– 9.

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TheConstituents of Stasis: Systematic Analysis

created byaristocratic families through which theyattempted toenhance thefamilies’ ownposition in thecity.27 The lack of epigraphical sources is regretable. From the few inscriptions which accepted by survived inEntella, all of which begin with thecommon Greek formula “ thepeople andthecouncil”,27aitispossible toconclude thatthecity hadaboule. Since Entella wasnothellenized until after itscapture byDionysius theElder’s Campanian mercenaries during thelate fifth century, theinscriptions musthave beenmodelled on other Greek inscriptions already cut on the island. These exemplars did not survive; butthe common useof the formula obviously suggests theexistence of a boule inmany, if notall Greek cities in Sicily. Whether or nottheboule wasactive in the ordinary day-to-day functioning of thecities is another matter. Theabsence ofevidence forcouncils within tyrannical regimes ismoreexpected andeasier to explain. Thetyrant’s council wascomposed primarily of friends and , ashasbeen shown in or“theFriends” supporters, referred to asthe“tyrant’s party” the case of Dionysius the Elder.28 The “Friends”would fulfill the tasks normally alloted tothecouncil evenif theyhadnoconnection atalltothelocal assembly. They were “nominated”bythetyrants, whoserved as thelink between the assembly and hiscouncil. Thetyrant stood attheapex of this hierarchical triangle. In times of crisis thecouncil lost its power andtheassembly assumed a more active role, since all decisions were channelled through it and legitimized by it. In Syracuse the college of generals, as holders of public office, usually served as a council for the city and reported directly to the assembly, as it did during the Peloponnesian Warandduring Dionysius theElder’s coup.29

Public offices

Thepublic offices enumerated inthevarious sources arenotessentially different from those found in any other Greek polis: archon and strategos, hipparchoi, nomothetai andgrammateus. However, local needs dictated differences intheoffices’ daily operation. Sometimes offices co-existed which theoretically donotbelong to the same type of regime. This wasthecase in Thurii, were strategoi andsymbouloi worked side by side.30 The changes in the presidency of the Syracusan assembly during thePeleponnesian Waralso points to theinstitutions’peculiar natures.31

27 Seealso Consolo-Langher (1969/70). 24. Seealso below section 3. 27a SEGXXX, 1117– 28 No.50. 29 Thegenerals presiding overtheassembly: Thuc. 6.41.1; onDionysius’coup, no.48. Seealso Syracuse, partI, n.202above. 30 No.39; Berger (1989); id.(1990). 31 Seeno.29.

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Constitutions

Howcanwecategorize thevarieties ofconstitutions intheWest? Tyranny cannot bedescribed asa single typeofregime. However, since inSicily it wassowidespread, it inevitably and continuously affected all aspects of life. Thus the other forms of regimes, democracy andaristocracy, were deeply influenced byintervening tyran-

nies. Anoverall examination ofconstitutions, therefore, cannot ignore tyrants ortreat tyranny as a transitional regime. The information in the sources is again scarce. A democracy, for example, was a form of government in which every citizen hadthetheoretical right to participate intheassembly andholdpublic office. Election bylotwaslater introduced inAthens and other cities in an effort to eliminate the possibility that only a minority of the citizens would serve inthese offices andthusdominate other institutions inthecity. According to this standard description, Syracuse wasa democracy for a short period in the fifth century, after 412. This is the only documented democratic regime in Sicily. In all other cases, the only reports wehave are that a democracy hadbeen formed andthenremoved.32In manycases these weredemocracies innameonlyand many of these regimes had to deal with the transition from tyrannical to civic regimes.33 Thepattern in all cases wassimilar: with theintroduction of democracy, eleutheria or freedom wasrestored to thecitizens. Often a cult to Zeus Eleutherios , norwasdemocracy isonomia wasestablished. Buteleutheria wasnot“democracy” or equal rights. In thecase of Syracuse, wemayconclude that in 466 a moderate democracy wasformed in which the aristocracy played a leading role. Aristotle, in fact, calls it apoliteia. Obviously, anyreplacement of a tyrannical regime wasseen to first andforemost asa democracy, a civic regime thatpromised togive “freedom” thelocal citizens butnotisonomia in most cases. Diodorus andothers describe theevents in Sicily andsouthern Italy inpolarized terms, that is, tyranny versus democracy; their attitude towards tyranny is negative andisbased onPlatonic andAristotelian theories.34 Thusnearly every anti-tyrannical regime isdescribed asa democracy, which isofcourse totally anachronistic anddoes notreflect the reality of Sicily in the fifth andfourth centuries. Thucydides does not shed much light onthepicture since hisinterests didnotlie in Sicilian history as such. Moreover, the terminology he employed wascommon in theGreek world, andhe perhaps assumed that theAthenian example wasrepresentative, andthat hisreader would perceive local differences if there were any. We must assume then that democracies existed in the West in different forms, ranging from moderate to extreme, butprecisely howthey functioned remains unknown. Aristocratic regimes suffered a similar fate. Understandably, aristocracies were predominant during the colonial, archaic period. As in mainland Greece, their collapse began during thesixth century andtheywerereplaced bytyrannical regimes. Aristocratic regimes disappear inthesources almost completely after thisperiod. This

32 Seealso no.67. 33 Nos.4, 28, 43, 44, 52, 58, 68. 34 SeeIntroduction.

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strange phenomenon can be explained by the dichotomy between tyranny and democracy as portrayed in oursources. That aristocratic regimes didexist after the sixth century canbedemonstrated incase studies,35 butthese regimes werenotdeeply rooted. Thearistocracy wasa composite class andas suchwasinherently unstable. In sum,wecancreate anoverall picture of theregimes described: thecolonial period wascharacterized by aristocratic regimes common to the Greek world in general. The power of the aristocracy faded in the middle of the sixth century as tyrannical regimes emerged anddominated theWest (except for short intervals) up to the Roman conquest. Tyrannies were replaced bycivic regimes usually labeled . During thefifth century Athens served asaparadigm fordemocracy, democracies” “ andSyracuse andother cities adopted democratic regimes which were essentially anti-tyrannical. Thiscontinued during thefourth century, whenalternations between tyranny anddemocracy were common. Every city hadits aristocratic families, but these weretooweaktoimpose themselves onthecities andcounterbalance thepower of the tyrants. In the later Hellenistic sources they are presented mainly as antityrannical as well.

2.3. Economic Factors Twoprominent facts areessential tounderstanding theeconomic background of stasis intheSicilian andsouthern Italian cities. First, these cities wereGreek poleis andthus their economic situation is described in thesources in connection with the inherent dichotomy between aristocracy anddemos, rich andpoor.36 Second, the cities alsohadextensive contact withother cultures andmarkets intheregion, ascan be demonstrated from archaeological finds.37 Within theGreek polis theissues of land, its distribution, andto a lesser extent thecancellation ofdebts, wereessential –andthemostfrequently cited –precursors of staseis.38 IntheWest, these issues appear tobebasically political.39 Thepolis was theoriginal formof thecolonization movement andoneof thepolis’basic preoccupations wasdevising andimplementing amethod forlanddistribution.40 Asexplained earlier, from the start the process usually resulted in the formation of a local aristocracy anddemos. Asthepolis continued togrowandabsorb newcitizens, new claims for land were putforward. But even vacant land in the polis wasoften not distributed in anegalitarian manner, even if additional territory hadbeen acquired through conquest, as in thecase of Croton.41 35 Seetable 6.

36 SeeFuks (1974); Lintott (1982); Gehrke (1985).

37

38

39

Finley (1979) passim, withbibliography; seealso thevarious volumes of Kokalos for archeological reports. Table 8. Oneconomy andpolititics, see Austin/Vidal-Naquet (1977) ch. 1.

40 Asheri (1966). 41 No. 10; see also Lepore (1973).

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A sort of political dependence thus developed between the landowners and landless citizens. Theagricultural day-worker looked tothelandowners, whousually also enjoyed prominent political status in thecity. In manycases there wasnoreal difference between thecity’s policies andthepolitics of thelanded class.42 Efforts on thepartof thedemos toobtain land, aswell asrestraints exercised onthearistocracy, canthusbeinterpreted asa general effort torestructure thepolicy of thecity andto undermine thearistocracy’sholdonpolitics. Theslogans usedbypolitical contenders calling forredistribution of landandcancellation of debts were inmostcases mere exercises inrhetoric.43 Often theslogans didnotreally represent egalitarian distribution, ascanbe shown in Syracuse after thefall of theDeinomenids or in themore extreme cases of tyrannical regimes, such as that of Dionysius theElder.44 It is important to note that even if land changed hands, its cultivation apparently continued uninterrupted. It wasstasis itself which could cause harm, aswasthecase inSyracuse in404 orafter thedeath ofDionin354, whena cycle of staseis plagued thecity. Fourth-century authors tendtolayspecial emphasis onlandaccording tothe perspective of their owntimes, while their ideal of thepolis consisted of a community of landowners whoformed thebackbone of thecity. Theeconomic factor wasthus connected in the sources with thepolitical ideal.45 In addition to agriculture, trade and commerce were important to the local economies andmustbediscussed withregard tothefree access Greeks hadtolocal, non-Greek markets in Sicily, Italy andbeyond. In commercial activity, the poleis werenotconfined toa Greek enclave. Onthecontrary, theywererespectable trading partners andsince theyintroduced a higher standard of goods theycould dominate a large section of thelocal markets.46 Therealm oftrade wasnotadversely affected by political instability or racial differences andrivalries. Punic merchants resided in Syracuse in 399, after andbefore military clashes between Syracuse andCarthage.47 Thepicture becomes evenclearer inthewestern region ofSicily. Selinus andAcragas hadpermanent commercial ties with North Africa which enhanced their economic prosperity andaffected their relations withtheGreeks ontheeastern coast of Sicily.48 TheItalian Greeks, being less united andpowerful thantheir Sicilian counterparts, were involved evenmoredeeply intheregional economic life of southern Italy and Etruria.49 It is evident, then, that commercial activity contributed substantially to the poleis’prosperity. Thecitizens wereabletoobtain goods fromawiderange ofmarkets andintroduce theminthelocal, Greek ones. 42 43 44 45 46 47

Democracy presents aproblem since theoretically itfavors egalitarianism.

Inpractice, however,

thedifference withother regimes is a matter ofproportion: howmuchpower didthedifferent groups have inthecity. SeeOber(1989). Fuks (1968) versus Asheri (1966) 90. Nos. 43, 44, 45, 48. Fuks (1972). Dunbabin (1948) is still the basic study. Diod. 14.45.

48 DeWaele (1971); Hans(1983). 49 Frederiksen (1985).

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Itis,however, impossible toconclude thattrade andcommerce created aseparate . One can safely assume that many commercial class” commercial or trading “ enterprises were initiated by the landowning aristocracies; proprietorship of land remained animportant component oftheir fortunes. Thisistruealsoofsmall artisans, forinstance, whopossessed ordesired a small share of land. Within acity aspopulous asSyracuse, a newgroup like thedemos banausikos could emerge. People fromthis group wereconscripted into thenavyin413 andhired byDionysius theElder tobuild the wall of Epipolai.50 Still, the events that transpired in the great revolt of 404 show howagriculture remained central in thelocal economy. The availability of manpower was another important economic factor in the West. Plutarch’sdescription ofevents inSyracuse following thedeath ofDionandup 343) provides a grim picture of a city deserted by its to Timoleon’s victory (354– inhabitants. The Syracusan agora lay abandoned; thecitizens sought safety in the hinterland. Civic life wasvirtually suspended. This happened inother cities aswell: somewereoccupied bybarbarians, mixed populations andjobless, frustrated mercenaries.51 Even if Plutarch’s description is exaggerated it points to thefact that during atleast oneperiod inthefourth century themostpressing problem wasnotthatofland, but rather the lack of cultivators, that is, citizens. Theneedfornewsettlers wasnotpeculiar tothefourth century; it is documented in the early fifth century as well.52 After Gelon moved to Syracuse in 485 he transplanted thearistocracies of Sicilian Euboia, Camarina andMegara Hyblaea to Syracuse, thus redirecting their energies andcapital for hisownpurposes. Enfranchised as newSyracusans under a “benevolent”tyrant, these people hada vested interest in his success andcontinuous prosperity. It is apparent then that although theWest wasconsidered a prosperous region, voluntary immigration wasnot a popular option in the motherland.53 Tyrants thus frequently chose to uproot local Greek populations as well as to incorporate nonGreeks andother natives inthepolis. If Polyaenus iscorrect, Phalaris tookthiscourse already by the middle of the sixth century. Such transfers nevertheless served the cause of Hellenization, andin turn that of trade andcommerce.54 Slavery, another source ofmanpower, is mentioned occasionally inoursources. Except fortheKyllirioi, theGamoroi’s serfs inSyracuse, little is known of slaves in thecity. Polyaenus’mention of a slave revolt during thePeloponnesian Waris highly suspect in light of Thucydides’silence about such an important event.55 Diodorus mentions thatthere weremanyPunic slaves inAcragas after theCarthaginian defeat inHimera in480. Theywereemployed inbuilding thetemples of whatlater cameto 50 DeSteCroix (1981) 191– 92. 51

52

No. 58. Seibert

(1982/3).

53 Itisimportant todistinguish between thefavorable image ofSicily, asreflected inthesources, andthefact thatwehavenoevidence forsubstantial immigration totheWestafter theageof colonization.

54 Sjöqvist (1973). 55 Polyaenus 1.43.1.

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beknown asthevalley ofthetemples.56 Other slaves arementioned inSelinus, Croton andCumae, butwecannot assess their contribution to thelocal economy.57 Access to a wide range of markets in Sicily, Italy andNorth-Africa enabled the Greeks toovercome basic shortages infoodandother supplies, andtheycould finance

imports withrevenues from the goods they exported. The fact that theGreek polis was notself-sufficient (contrary totherecommendations bytheoretical writers) andthus always looked to other markets, demonstrates howfortunate theGreeks in Sicily were.58 The frequency andvolume of exchange turned the West into one common market forbothgoods andmanpower. Mercenaries were nottheonlymanpower for sale. Greek artisans, forexample, wenttoworkforlocal, non-Greek markets andthus provided for thewelfare of their families while contributing to theeconomy of the polis. Aseconomic factors instasis, landandtrade gaverise todifferent revolutionary tactics andproduced opposite results. Land is of prime importance because it is connected to thepolis’structure andideology. Thus in cases whenland became an issue, stasis was confined within the polis’territory. Trade, on the other hand, provided theopposing parties with access to economic andother means outside the polis, which eventually came into play intheir inner struggles. Butincontrast to land, trade is hardly mentioned in connection with stasis. When it is mentioned, it is connected with food or wheat, i.e., the issue of land.59

58

Waele (1971) passim. Nos. 11, 15, 31. Purcell (1990) shows hownumerous theopportunities wereandtheextent ofrelations between

59

No.51.

56

57

De

Greeks andnon-Greeks.

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The Constituents of Stasis: Systematic Analysis

3 GREEKS, NATIVES ANDFOREIGNERS

A unique feature of Greek colonization of Sicily and southern Italy is the relationship between theGreeks andboththenative peoples, their newneighbors, and the non-Greeks outside the immediate sphere whohadvested interests in the new oldworld”continued because the Greek environment. Atthesametime, ties tothe“ motherland maintained aninterest inthewestern Greeks. Sicily andsouthern Italy, asa frontier zone,1 functioned asa meeting place forGreeks andbarbarians. Bythe very act of colonization, the boundaries of Greek culture expanded, although the borders could notbeexactly defined. Borders were opentotheexchange of goods, culture andcommunication in every area of human activity. We may speak of a structure ofever-widening circles, within which thelife ofthelocal polis wasplayed out. Thefirst circle included thecity’s urban territory, thenextcircle consisted of the chora, then theGreek-Sicel towns andSicel villages. Theouter circle encompassed theforeign powers aswell astheGreeks from themotherland. The Greeks were characterized by their liberal attitudes. Although always residing inpoleis, theydidnotlive inHellenic enclaves, butrather wereexposed to newideas andanxious to export their ownculture, a phenomenon which will be described below. The sources, however, are extremely problematic in this regard since they donotspecifically describe these connections. They tend to describe the non-Greeks generally as barbarians, Sicels, Sicans or Italians. Nevertheless, the connections cannot bedenied. Thearchaeological evidence is more explicit andcan beusedtodrawconclusions withregard totheprocess of Hellenization aswell asto thedepth of its influence. Theweakness of archaeology lies, however, in its more ample documentation of economic rather than political andsocial phenomena.2 Thecolonizing Greeks of theeighth century didnotcome to a terra incognita. Evenif theinformation contained intales about thelanding ofTrojan exiles inSicily, later known astheElymians,3 isdoubtful, archaeological evidence demonstrates that commercial links already existed between Greece andSicily during the Mycenean age.4Although these links mayhavebeeninterrupted later, colonization waspreceded by another wave of commercial ties. Greeks hadtrading interests in Etruria; and Pithecoussai andCumae werethefirst sites of colonization inthewest, although we cannot besurewhytheywerechosen.5 During thesecond waveof colonization inthe late eighth century, theGreeks came into direct contact with native peoples. The Naxians andthe Syracusans expelled theSicels from thesites of these future Greek cities. On the other hand, Thucydides tells howthe king of the settlement later to be known as Megara Hyblaea, named Hyblon, received theGreeks andallotted them land for a colony. Acragas hadto fight for its place in southwestern Sicily against the 1 2 3

4 5

See“Frontier, Geographical andSocial Aspects”inEncyclopedia ofSocial Science (NewYork 505. 1931) vol. 6, 503– Sjöqvist (1973); Boardman (1980); see also thevolumes of Kokalos. Thuc. 6.2.3. Bernabó Brea (1957). Seeforinstance Cook(1962); Ridgway (1981).

Greeks, Natives andForeigners

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Sicans at the start of the sixth century, a pattern which wasrepeated throughout the colonizing period. Theresponses to locals ranged from friendly acceptance to bitter animosity, with thelatter being more widespread. Thelack of a uniform response reflects a certain ambivalence. TheGreeks didnotwanttoeliminate thenatives but wereeager toseize their landandsettle onthesiteofformer villages. Thenatives were thendriven intotheinterior while theGreeks occupied thecoasts. Topographical and geographical considerations directed thisdevelopment; theseaandtheconnection to themotherland held special importance.6 TheGreeks werenotsatisfied onlywiththenewsites butwentontoconquer land inneighboring regions. Thelocal chorai emerged asaresult of this. While theinitial aimofexpansion wastofindfertile agricultural land, territorial expansion later served to widen political control. This occurred in Gela during thefirst generation of the colony whenthefounder himself engaged inwarwith Sican centers such asOmphake andconquered land along theriver Gelas in thehinterland. TheChalcidian settlements intheeastern partoftheisland dominated theSymaethus river valley, themost fertile landinSicily. Cumae hadanextensive chora inCampania andSyracuse took control of the southeastern corner of Sicily, spreading over the fertile valleys of the Heloros andAnapus rivers.7 ManySicel towns andvillages located throughout thisareasubmitted toSyracusancontrol andentered into permanent relations with thecity orhercolonies inthe region, Acrai andCasmenai. Themother-city benefited asaresult ofitsconsolidation of power in the area. Apparently a special kind of dependence characterized the colonies’connections withSyracuse, a relationship notfound between other mothercities andcolonies.8 TheSyracusan influence waspervasive. Cemeteries which have beenexcavated intheSyracusan chora reveal either a distinctive Greek character or betray traces of Hellenization.9 Native settlements as well as mixed cities adopted Greek principles of urban planning. Themostimpressive example is Morgantina, a cityofmixed Greek andSicel population, located deepintheSicilian hinterland. The factthatMorgantina mayhavebeenaChalcidian rather thanaDoric settlement does not affect the question of its Hellenization.10 In the Syracusan chora, part of the population wasreduced to thestatus of serfs, as wasthecase with theKyllirioi who incollaboration with thelocal demos revolted in 491 against theGamoroi, thelanded aristocracy of thecity. It should benoted thatinoursources theKyllirioi areequated withtheHelots of Sparta andthePenestai of Thessaly. Acomprehensive understanding of theprocess of acculturation orHellenization lies beyond the capacity of our sources. It is possible, however, to examine the outcome of the process. Agriculture forged vital connections. The fusion of local

6

Graham (1964) and(1971).

7 See for Syracuse: Di Vita (1956), 8 9

10

Adamesteanu (1962); Gela: Orlandini (1961), (1962); Leontinoi: Rizza (1962); Cumae: Frederiksen (1985). Seealso Lepore (1973). 93. Graham (1964) 92– Themostimportant study is still Dunbabin (1948). Seealso Adamesteanu (1962). Sjöqvist (1973) 28– 35, 45– 47; Bell (1986).

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divinities of agriculture andfertility withtheGreek chthonic wasfundamental.11 The cult of Demeter came to occupy a prominent position among the Sicilian divinities. Thus, we find that Telines was able to end a stasis in Gela by virtue of the fact that hisfamily, theDeinomenids, controlled thelocal cult of Demeter. Through this cult theDeinomenids were also able to further their position inthecity.12 On the other hand, the Greeks adopted local cults, such as the cult of the Palici, which evolved into a Sicilian cult;13 the shrine served as a sanctuary for runaway slaves andwasthe nucleus of the second-century slave revolt.14 It hadbeen used earlier, inthefifth century, bytheSicilian leader Ducetius forpolitical purposes.15 The Greeks, however, transformed thePalici into thesonsofZeus. It is interesting tonote that theshrine wasreverenced byslaves andmembers of thelower classes, aswere

thechthonic gods. All in all, Greeks met the natives in various settings; in mixed cities (like Morgantina), in Sicel towns where Greek artisans were invited to work forthelocal market, and in the Greek poleis themselves. This wide range corresponds to the different degrees of contact, fromcasual ties to actually living together andsharing the same fate.16 The case of Ducetius, whowas active during the middle of the fifth century, serves to clarify the nature of the whole process. Ducetius came from a Sicel aristocratic family andserved astheleader of theso-called national Sicel revolt.17 The events underscore theduality of Sicel existence in Sicily even after Hellenization is understood to have been completed.18 Already in 466 Ducetius had cooperated with the Syracusans in removing Hieron’s settlers from Catane. The old citizens returned to the city: the Greeks to the original Catane andthe Sicels to thechora which hadbeenconquered byHieron ten years earlier in 476.19 According to Diodorus, seven years after theCatanian affair, in 459, theSicel leader haddestroyed Morgantina andfounded another city in order to display his power andcommand over the hinterland. Six years later, in 453, Ducetius formed theleague of theSicels who“belonged tothesameethnos” . Forits capital heselected thecity of Palice because of its shrine. Hethenfreed theslaves, the Sicels, from their Greek masters. He distributed land that he hadjust conquered among his supporters andfounded more newcities. In 451, Ducetius launched two military expeditions: to the east, where he captured thecityofAetna heldbyHieron’smercenaries after theyhadleftCatane, and

11 12 13 14

15

16 17

White (1964).

No. 16.

123; Croon (1952). Ziegler, “ Palikoi” , RE 18.2 (1949) 100– Finley (1979) 137– 47. Seebelow. Sjöqvist (1973). Theonly source to deal with Ducetius is Diodorus 11.76.3, 78.5, 83.6, 91.1,12.8, 29.1; theonly modern treatment isbyCroon (1952). Seeforinstance Dunbabin (1948) passim; Finley (1979) 23– 4, 63– 4.

18 19 No.9.

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tothewest, where heseized thetownof Motion which hadbeenunder Acragantine control. Syracuse andAcragas decided tomarch against himbutweredefeated inthe

first battle. Acragas blamed Syracuse forthedefeat andtheSyracusan general Bolkon wasexecuted after being convicted of treachery. Inthesecond battle, however, the cities were successful. Ducetius could notwithstand thecombined forces a second time. Hisarmydispersed among theSicel towns andhehimself fled(of allplaces) to Syracuse, begging forsanctuary before thealtar ofZeusintheagora. TheSyracusans were split over the issue of his punishment but the “best of citizens”prevailed and managed to spare hislife having himbanished to Corinth. In446,Ducetius violated theterms ofhisrelease andreturned toSicily. Heargued that the didso only with the knowledge andconsent of the Delphic oracle in order to found a colony on the northern shore of the island in Cale Acte. Greeks from the mainland andSicels joined in this adventure. The Acragantines were furious with Syracuse, butweredefeated inthebattle thatensued between thecities. ButDucetius could no longer rally his forces as he hadin the past and he died immediately afterwards in440. Syracuse tooktheopportunity toexpand itspower andcontrol over the island andother Sicel sites weakened by his death. Ducetius consolidated his power during the sixties andfifties as tyrannies in Sicily weretoppled infavor ofdemocracies. These newregimes, which settled their mercenaries inMessana, wereweak. Furthermore, manyofthecities focused ontheir owninternal affairs anddidnot become involved in foreign policy. Sicels whohad taken part in fighting the tyrannies returned home to be recruited by Ducetius along withother jobless mercenaries. Onthewhole, democratic regimes weremorelenient with regard to the Sicel movement. Ducetius took advantage of this fact, built uphis forces andlocal influence andinvaded thechorai of Syracuse andAcragas, which werepopulated largely bySicels. Ina future uprising against thehegemonous cities, he hoped to become a mighty leader. The slogan he promulgated, as might be freedom from the Greek” . Nevertheless, the exact nature of the expected, was“ alternative system Ducetius envisioned is unknown since it wasnever implemented. Ducetius’activities areinstructive. All hisactions –therecruitment of anarmy, the organization of the league of the Sicels, the foundation of cities, his escape to Syracuse, hisexile in Corinth andreturn totheisland tofound a city withtheconsent of theoracle –reveal a profoundly Greek influence. Obviously hespoke Greek and was familiar with Greek religion andcustoms as well as with the nature of Greek politics. Hewasprobably descended froma Hellenized family, butemphasized his Sicel roots inaneffort toachieve political advantage inSicily. Thenational cause was expedient in his fight against theoverpowering Greek political domination of the island. Diodorus’ownattitude is revealing as well. Although he describes the Sicel league asa league of the“ ethnos” , aracepitted against theGreek race, heexpresses no surprise at the fact that Ducetius found refuge in Syracuse and was exiled to Corinth. This lack of discomfort maybeexplained bythefact that Diodorus resided within a multifarious empire consisting of varied populations andraces. He wasa Greek, speaking theHellenic language, living in Sicily under Roman rule.

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Theethnic relations under Greek influence areconnected alsotostasis. Inhislife ofTimoleon, Plutarch refers toa stasis which tookplace intheSicel townofAdranon in344, bringing Timoleon hisfirst victory overhisrival Hicetas. Diodorus describes another stasis which took place inEnna, another Sicel town, in 403. The stasis was instigated byDionysius the Elder whohoped to capture the city for himself.20 He offered alocal citizen, Aimnetus, assistance inseizing power, butassoonasAimnetus wasincommand herefused entry tohisbenefactor Dionysius. TheSyracusan tyrant appealed tothelocal demos andpersuaded themtoactagainst thenewleader. They gavetheir consent andrevolted. Attheir request, Dionysius entered thecity, captured Aimnetus andhanded himovertothedemos asameans ofshowing hisphilanthropia. Diodorus sawnoneedtodistinguish Sicel staseis fromGreek andinthiscaseusedthe

conventional vocabulary: tyrannos, demos, tarache. Evidently, Adranon andEnna werepartof theGreek sphere. Themostconvincing evidence forstasis inHellenized towns comes fromnewly discovered inscriptions inEntella, a city inwestern Sicily captured byDionysius the Elder’s mercenaries in404.21Campanian inorigin, themercenaries murdered thelocal population andbecame its new, respectable citizens. The date of theinscriptions is questionable; suggestions range fromthelate fourth century through thethird.22 All of the inscriptions, which are in Greek andfollow Greek epigrahical conventions, contain honorary decrees made by local assemblies andothers involved with the synoikismos of thecity. Oneinscription fromaneighboring city, Nakona, documents aneffort to enda stasis andis thus of special interest. Again, theform andstyle are purely Greek. Thus we may conclude that the inscriptions testify to the completion of Hellenization in both cities by the end of the fourth century. TheGreek worddiaphora, meaning quarrel, is euphemistically employed inthe inscription from Nakona perhaps inorder todownplay theseverity of thecrisis. The incident wassupposedly notarevolt, butrather merely a quarrel which wasresolved in the following manner. From a group of thirty citizens from each of the rival factions, twodelegates, onefrom each group, were selected along with three neutral citizens, thusforming groups offive, theadelphoi hairetoi, “ Then elected brothers.” similar groups derived from all the citizens were formed, through whoma reconciliation andconclusion to the stasis were ultimately reached. In addition, all citizens wererequired topass a dokimasia forreasons notstated intheinscription. Although manyof thespecifics of thestasis remain unknown, theinscription obviously reveals the Greek character of this city in western Sicily. Thus, when the Romans conquered the island, they saw Entella as Greek, at least culturally. The Greeks were notthe only people to carve out spheres of influence in the region. The most important power in the West, next to the Greeks, was Carthage, whose history of intervention in Sicilian affairs coincided with theGreek presence.

20 Diod. 14.14.6. 21 Diod. 14.9.9. 22 SEGXXX, 1117– 1124; XXXII (summary of thecurrent literature).

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Relations between thetwopowers wereestablished early inmanyareas.23 Fromthe lastdecade of thesixth century Carthage became apermanent force ontheisland and also played a role in the stasis within Greek cities.24 Therise of tyrannies with their aggressive foreign policies compelled theCarthaginians to protect their interests in Sicily. They took advantage of staseis by exploiting the willingness of Greeks to accept anyassistance fortactical ends. TheGreek attitude towards theCarthaginians wasthusambivalent: their quasi-official policy ofanti-Punic propaganda contradictedtheir practice of expedient cooperation. TheCarthaginian threat toSyracuse wasaknown andaccepted fact. Thesources tendtoemphasize itsinfluence ontheinternal politics of theGreek polis aswell as its obvious effects on foreign policy. The reign of Dionysius the Elder, in which the wasa constant factor, presents uswithilluminating exam“Carthaginian question” ples.25 TheCarthaginians created thesituation inwhich Dionysius could rise topower, andtheymayhavebeendetested forthis. TheSyracusans nursed apermanent hope thatwarwiththePunic enemy fromNorth Africa would provide themwithweapons touselater against Dionysius. Diodorus, inhisfourteenth book, laysoutthereasons whythe Syracusans agreed to fight Carthage in 398.26 First of all, Carthage was despised because it hadaided Dionysius’rise to power. Secondly, the Syracusans hoped that Dionysius would treat themwell since theyknewhefeared a coup asa consequence of the war. Thirdly, they hoped to arm themselves for war and immediately afterwards toturnonthetyrant. Thebasic mistrust between thetyrant and his subjects is obvious, and both sides were aware of the opportunities and dangers that warwith Carthage would create. Similar concepts also appear in the speech delivered byTheodorus before theSyracusan assembly in396, inwhich he attempted to incite the locals to a stasis in order to topple thetyrant.27 Contemporary rhetoric, then, demonstrates the practical value in alliances perceived inthestruggle between Greeks andCarthaginians. Boththetyrant andthe Syracusans could exploit these opportunities. Butrhetoric touches ononlyoneaspect of the problem, i.e., the existence of an overall conflict between Greeks and Phoenicians. The accounts overlook the daily realities, the ordinary connections between private individuals andgroups, Greek andPunic. It is not surprising, then, tofindthatindaily contact, thedogmatic vehemence ofrhetoric yielded topractical, material considerations. Thewaragainst Carthage hadalready served theSyracusan Hermocrates, the heroofthevictory overtheAthenians in413,whose strategy wasconsistent withthe anti-Punic rhetoric andwasbased primarily onthehatred andfear of thePunic foe.

23 OnCarthage, seeWarmington (1964), Huss(1985); onCarthage andtheGreeks inSicily, see Hans(1983). Seealso Moscati (1968) 195– 205, Tusa (1982), Figueira (1984), Whittaker (1974) and(1979); andAnello (1986).

24 SeeTable 2.

25

26 27

Stroheker (1958) passim. Diod. 14.45.3. No.51; Saunders (1981).

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His activity, moreover, demonstrates the large geographical effect of stasis, as this onetook place outside Syracusan territory.28 Inlater periods, thetiesbetween Greeks andCarthaginians weremoreproductive andpositive. Dion, forinstance, landed nearHeracleia Minoa in357andwasassisted, according to Plutarch, bytheCarthaginian commander assigned to theplace.29 Two interesting points emerge fromthis episode. First, thecommander wasDion’sxenos, which means thattheynotonlykneweachother butalsohadmetregularly. Secondly, thecommander waspresumably aGreek mercenary intheservice of Carthage.30 Furthermore, Dion’s partner, Heracleides, fled Syracuse to Greece in 361 through a region then under Carthaginian protection,31 anexample of thenetwork established between Greeks andCarthaginians belying theofficial animosity between thetwo.In another case, Deinocrates32 adopted the strategy of not opposing the tyranny of Agathocles in the city, but facing him in the chora or beyond, where the tyrant’s regime could beharmed moreeffectively. Whenhefailed totopple thetyrant in311, he decided to call in Carthaginian support. His mercenaries merged with the Carthaginian military andDeinocrates wasappointed captain of thePunic cavalry. Clearly, Deinocrates wasjudged worthy of sucha highpostbecause hehaddelivered the Carthaginians a valuable prize without a battle, namely, control over large sections ofSicily. In310, theCarthaginians instigated adisturbance inSyracuse with thehelpofalocal citizen, loyal tothem. Presumably Deinocrates supported thiseffort as

well.33

But it was Hicetas who was the most daring of all.34 In the struggle against formidable foes like Dionysius theYounger andTimoleon, heinvited a Punic army, headed by Mago, to enter the great harbor of Syracuse where he wasencamped. Unlike his fellow citizen Deinocrates, Hicetas didnotkeep his Carthaginian allies outside thecity, butrather allowed themtotakeholdofastrategic section inside. Only political andtactical considerations compelled Magotoretreat fromSyracuse. Even then, thedifference between rhetoric andaction wasremarkable. Inhistreatment of thestaseis of theGreek cities inIonia during thefifth century, J.M. Balcer makes aninteresting observation.35 Thestruggle between thedemos and the aristocracy usually resulted in a division of the city. Theasty, the center, was generally controlled by the democrats who ran the machinery of state. Their supporters were primarily city dwellers. The domain of the aristocracy lay in the chora where they owned extensive tracts of land. In times of crisis, this division became more pronounced. The aristocrats continued living in the chora while maintaining control oversomeinstitutions within thecity; theycould also create their 28 Seealso below andSection 5.

29 No.52. 30 Seebelow. 31 Plat. Ep. 7, 348. 32 No.61. 33 No.60. 34 Nos.57, 58. 35 Balcer (1979).

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owninstitutions parallel to butindependent fromtheonescontrolled bythedemocrats. Since theIonian aristocrats were also anti-Athenian, they were in contact with their Persian neighbors andenlisted their help to getridof the Athenians. Thus, the city became thefrontier between Athens andPersia, andtheboundary lines between the two powers were determined by the outcome of the stasis. When aristocrats controlled thecity, thePersians could movewestwards at their invitation; thesame thing happened also whenthearistocrats firmly controlled thechora. Aslongasthe democrats, with Athenian help, hadtheupper hand, theborder receded eastward. In anexamination of thePunic example in Sicily, onefinds a repetition of the same pattern. As can be deduced from the cases above, Carthaginian control, especially overareas connected toSyracuse, wasadirect consequence ofinterference inSyracusan stasis. Usually, theCarthaginians wereinvited byoneof therival parties, in this case not necessarily aristocratic. The total instability of the social structure madeit practical foreveryone to seek Punic support. Thecontinuous internal struggles in Syracuse opened thedoor to Carthaginian interference despite sustained anti-Punic propaganda, at least from the time of Dionysius theElder. While theauthors ofthePlatonic Seventh Epistle called forwar against thewestern barbarians inorder tofortify theGreek presence ontheisland, the reality of the “barbarian presence”wasdifferent. Thefact that Carthaginian merchants lived inSyracuse before 398, theyear theywerebanished asa prelude tothe ensuing war, bears witness totheir close mutual relationship. TheCarthaginians, it is respectable”enough to be called upon to true, were barbarians, but they were “ mediate between Agathocles andthe aristocratic “ Six Hundred” , or between Syracuse andAcragas in 314, whenthelocals were troubled by a stasis.36 TheItalian scenario is muchmorecomplex andtheevidence meagre. Etruscans dominated the scene until the fifth century. As their power declined, other Italian peoples came in closer contact with the Greeks. The sketchy evidence presents an overall picture notdifferent inessence fromthatof therelations between Greeks and Carthaginians inSicily. Itispossible todetect theexistence ofclose relations between Greeks andnon-Greeks in the extensive territories of the chorai. The case of Cumae andthe rise andfall of its tyrant Aristodemos (504– 491) is instructive.37 The pivotal factor was the Etruscans.38 Very little is known about Etruscan expansion insouthern Italy, buttheyapparently arrived inCampania during theseventh century; their massive presence canbedetected from thesixth century. Politically, theyhadnocentral authority; noEtruscan regent presided overCampania, butpreeminent Etruscan families were introduced into the local aristocracies and came to dominate them later. The Etruscans, moreover, didnot interfere with the process of Hellenization of Greek cities in the region. Onthe contrary, they even adopted elements of the imported culture. Nofriction arose between Greeks and Etruscans during thefirst stage of theoccupation of Campania as each consolidated 36 Nos.6, 59. 37 Nos. 14, 15. 38 Frederiksen (1985); d’Agostino (1990).

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their respective chorai sidebyside. However, bythetimethisprocess wascompleted inthemiddle ofthesixth century, Campania asaunitwasswept intoregional disputes.

In524, Etruscans, Daunians andUmbrians attacked Greek Cumae. Aristodemos won his laurels in this war, initiating theevents which ledto his rise to power. TheEtruscan attack onCumae wasa local initiative andcannot beviewed asthe beginning of an ethnic struggle in southern Italy. The existence of immigration

legends regarding the Volscans andSamnites, andthe fact that the Etruscan king of Rome did not participate in Campanian affairs, attest to the pluralistic nature of Campania. TheEtruscans were only oneof manypowers, albeit animportant one. Thus, the rise of Aristodemos is connected with opportunities latent in a volatile regional situation. Moreover, since there were noracial barriers, coalitions of every sort could be formed: Aristodemos accepted Arician mercenaries into his military; Cumae sheltered Tarquinius; local exiles hired Etruscan mercenaries to counter the tyranny of Aristodemos. Intwoother cases, atTarentum andCroton, thedemos overcame thearistocracy. InTarentum, ademocracy replaced apoliteia after manyaristocrats perished inawar withtheIapygians.39 Atreaty enacted between theCrotonian demos andtheBruttians enabled the former to wage a waragainst theexiled Crotonian aristocracy.40 These territorial wars were continuous, andthey affected theinner structure of theGreek cities. Thesituation oftheGreeks insouthern Italy wasworse thaninSicily because of thepresence of manystrong opposing ethnic groups whoattempted to settle and prosper intheregion. TheGreeks, whowerenever unified, encountered increasingly strong resistence. Theemergence ofRomeasaregional power inthefourth century added tothepressure andaffected thedomestic equilibrium inthecities. Intheend, theGreek cities hadto submit to Roman rule. The intervention of Greeks from the mainland, “ The East” , was completely different innature since themainland Hellenes belonged tothesameculture andlived inthesame type of political community, thepolis. TheGreeks whocame fromafar to participate in local affairs didso at the invitation of the local Greeks whoregarded themainland astheir “center” . TheGreeks whohadbeeninvited hadaclear concept ofSicily asawealthy andpowerful island whose fortunes could beredirected totheir ownpurposes onthemainland. Indeed, theinvolvement ofGreeks fromthemainland waspervasive andcanbenoted intwenty percent of all cases of stasis. Syracuse, as might beexpected, comprised half of these cases.41 These staseis alltook place after 440 with the exeption of Selinus in 507,42 which may be explained by the gradual movement towards openness within the Greek world at that time andthe rise of international interests among theleading cities onthemainland. Sparta andSpartans participated in forty-five percent of thedocumented cases.43

39 No.67. 40 No. 13.

41 SeeTable 2. 42

No.30.

43 SeeTable 2.

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Itisimportant tonotetheappearance ofSpartans rather thanSparta assuch. Some Spartans represented official policy andacted onbehalf oftheir city, butothers acted independently. During the Great Revolt against Dionysius the Elder,44 the Spartan Aristus appeared inSyracuse. Hisostensible aimwastoassist theSyracusans, buthe carried onsecret negotiations withDionysius inorder to gain thesympathies of the powerful tyrant to bolster Spartan interests. Subsequently, he betrayed the Syracusan rebels’leader. Inanother example, in396,Theodorus addressed theassembly inthepresence of Pharacidas, another Spartan.45 Although Pharacidas didnottake uptherevolutionary banner, it is notknown whether he acted on behalf of his city. In connection with Dion’s affairs, twoother names appear: Pharax andGaisylos. Pharax46 sought a life of wealth andease in Sicily; Gaisylos said that hewassent from Sparta to assume hegemony over the Sicilians, andheplayed animportant role in the reconciliation between DionandHeracleides.47 In314, theAcragantines needed a leader andsince thelocal-leaders weremistrusted, Acrotatus, aSpartan, wasenlisted.48 Afewmonths later, when it became clear that his intent was to enjoy himself and that he had embezzled from thelocal treasury, hewasremoved fromoffice andfled thecity. Twoimportant features canbenoted here: first, thatSparta courted western allies especially attheconclusion of thePeloponnesian war.49 Powerful allies werefound in Syracuse andin the person of Dionysius the Elder; andboth connections were further justified by a common Doric background. The Spartans sent contingents to assist Syracuse in her wars against Carthage in 406 and 396. This aid was a continuation of arelationship which stemmed fromtheAthenian expedition toSicily, andSparta could notfail to see howmuchthe Syracusan victory hadcontributed to herown. Thehegemony of Syracuse in Sicily, which increased during thereign of Dionysius, wasa manifestation ofhowDoric elements dominated theIonic. Thisfact could notbe overlooked, even if during his declining years, Dionysius also tried to approach Athens.50 Secondly, themovement of individual Spartans westwards was related to theproblems andchanges occurring in Sparta at theendof thePeloponnesian War.51 The primary cause wasthe Spartan generals’unwillingness to divest themselves ofriches acquired through command outside thecity. Suchgenerals, who were in demand for their military expertise, tended to offer themselves as skilled mercenary officers rather than return to Sparta. Corinth, Syracuse’s mother-city anditself Doric, played a role inevents inSicily aswell. Itwastobeexpected thatshewould intervene intheaffairs ofhercolony. The principal event relates toTimoleon’s activities during aperiod ofcrisis whenthevery 44 45 46 47 48

49

No.50. No.51.

Ehrenberg, “Pharax”(5), RE 19.2 (1938) 1817. Nothing more is known about Gaisylos. No.6; Niese, “Akrotatus”(1), RE1.1 (1893) 1207. OnSparta after thePeloponnesian War,seeDavid (1981).

50 Tod, GHI, II nos. 108, 133. 3. 51 David (1981) ch. 1–

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of Syracuse wasinjeopardy.52 Other cases of Corinthian intervention are documented, although twoseemtohavebeenoverlooked byA.J. Graham.53 Although theyareofrelatively minor importance, theycomplement ourgeneral argument. The first deals withNicoteles, aCorinthian, whowastheSyracusan rebels’leader andwas betrayed by the Spartan Aristus during the Great Revolt in 404. The only other fact weknow about himis that he wasa drunkard. The second concerns Acestorides, another leader imported by Syracuse prior to the rise of Agathocles and who eventually banished thefuture leader.54 These examples ofrequests forleadership madetothemother-city imply atleast asentimental connection. While official relations werenever formalized, Corinth was always seen asa source of aidandmoral support. Theodorus, inhis speech of 396, recommended thatif hisefforts tooustDionysius were successful, Corinth could fill theleadership vacuum. Although thesuggestion wasnever puttothetest, itreflected a deferential posture toward themother-city. Therole ofother mainland cities inSicilian affairs wasrelatively small. Athens provides acase inpoint, atleast initially, since shedidnotparticipate inthecolonial movement andhadnocolonies which could provide herwithnatural links totheWest. On the other hand, Athens, after rising to the status of world power during the fifth century, moved closer toSicily andsouthern Italy, where shealsofounded thecolony Thurii.55 In addition, when it suited her interests, Athens intervened in the internal affairs of thewestern cities andcaused domestic upheaval. TheAthenians wanted to useMessana, forexample, asa harbor fortheir navy. Therecently exiled Alcibiades informed thepro-Syracusan faction of theplan andcaused a stasis.56 Pro-Athenian attitudes were at the heart of twostaseis which occurred in Thurii in 413, andare connected moreover totheoutcome oftheAthenian expedition toSicily.57 Anunusual case is Callippus, anAthenian whomurdered Dionandbecame Syracuse’s tyrant for oneyear. Hejoined Dionin357intheexpedition totopple thetyranny ofDionysius theYounger andthen emerged himself as Syracuse’s tyrant.58 The interference of neighboring cities in the staseis of other cities was as important as the interference by distant ones.59 Such interference was connected usually to a specific crisis which threatened Sicilian order. This pattern reflects the depth of the relations among the Greek cities andthe impact of events in one city on the others. During thefifth century, twoseries of events caused separate chain-reactions of staseis. One stemmed from the overthrow of tyrannies, mainly during the sixties: Acragas (472/1), Syracuse (466), Catane (465), Rhegion and Messana (461),60 in existence

52 No.58. 46. 53 Graham (1964) 142– 54 No.59. 55 Kagan (1966) ch. 9. 56 No70. 57 Nos. 36, 37. 58 No.53. 59 Losada (1972); Ruschenbusch (1979). 60 Nos.4, 9, 28,43, 44, 68.

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which Syracuse served as anobvious catalyst. The disintegration of the Syracusan Deinomenid “ empire”wasa pre-condition for theestablishment of democracies in other cities aswellasthereturn ofexiles totheir homecities. Thesecond isconnected tothePeloponnesian War.Athens’presence caused upheaval inalmost allthecities, which eventually ledsomepoleis tointervene intheaffairs ofothers: Syracuse, Locri andAthens in Messana (424, 415), Locri andAthens inRhegion (425), Syracuse in Leontinoi (424), Syracuse in Thurii (413).61 13 provoked social probObviously, theAthenian expeditions in 425 and415– lemsinthecities aswell aslocal Sicilian rivalries. Thepreviously insignificant notion of ethnic origin began toplay animportant role andthecities formed Chalcidian and Doric alliances, thus enmeshing themselves more closely in the conflicts of the mainland.62 Theseverity ofthecrisis canbeshown bythefact thatthecities called for a Sicilian conference to clear upthe problems of the Greeks andtheir allies, the Congress of Gela.63 Later, the tyrants Dionysius the Elder andAgathocles initiated similar chainreactions. Despite their Syracusan origins, bothpossessed abroader Sicilian outlook, which hadrepercussions in other cities as well. These cities in turn took a growing interest ininternal Syracusan affairs astheyimpacted ontheir ownlives andfortunes. Theageof Dionysius theElder is theageof Syracusan expansion, which actually began with thecoupwhich brought himtopower andtook place inthree locations: Syracuse, GelaandLeontinoi. While inGela, Dionysius wasparty toa separate local stasis in the city.64 Two years later, Rhegion andMessana sent a fleet to help the insurgents against him. These cities later became the focal point for Dionysius’ attempts topave hisroute to Italy. Staseis broke outtwice in Messana, in 399 and 394.65 Agathocles’reign is evenmore conspicuous inits Sicilian overtones. First of all, this wasa period during which aninternal warwasraging in Syracuse (325– 317), concluding with theAgathoclean coup. During these eight years, Agathocles, despite thefact thathewasinexile, wasnotidle butintervened intheaffairs of manyGreek andnon-Greek cities in Sicily andSouthern Italy. In fact, Diodorus mentions that Agathocles appealed morethanother tyrants totheother Sicilians.66 After heassumed power, his attitudes didnotchange. Opponents of his tyranny concentrated their activity outside theconfines of Syracusan territory, inorder toundermine Agathocles’ power in his“empire” rather thanmeethimface toface. Thus, thewaragainst him haditsrepercussions inother Sicilian cities. InAcragas, Syracusan exiles encouraged the locals to invite a newleader to thecity from Sparta, which resulted in a stasis against this leader later in 314. In307, another stasis broke outin thesamecity asa consequence of a failure onthe battlefield against Agathocles.67

61 62 63 64 65 66 67

No.22, 29, 36, 37, 46, 69, 70. See section 2 above. 64. Thuc. 4.59– No.20. Nos. 71, 72. No.59. Nos. 7, 8.

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Thethemes of patriotism, betrayal andtheindividual’s relationship to thepolis arefundamental to ourdiscussion.68 Authors such asThucydides, Aeneas Tacticus andAristotle all emphasize the fact that political life in the Greek polis suffered from theeffects of thepolarization of theclasses anddisputes among factions. In many cases, concern forthegeneral welfare of thepolis wasnolonger paramount butwas superseded bythedemands ofdifferent classes andpolitical factions. Thus, activities of fifth columns appear regularly andAeneas wrote extensive descriptions of howa city under siege might defend itself against internal subversion. Another institution common to most of the cities, but that relates primarily to aristocracies, isxenia.69Thewidespread network ofxenic relations among prominent aristocracies often mitigated against thesmooth functioning of thepolis. This was common throughout the Greek world andtraces can be found within the western poleis aswell. Differences between themainland andtheWestcanbedetected within thestructure of thearistocracies themselves.70 TheSicilian aristocracies, evenmore unstable thanthose onthemainland, hadgreater needforinternational connections. Furthermore, theweaker thestructure of thepolis, themoreavidly social ties were nurtured. However, these relations suffered fromthefactthataristocracies werenever rooted intheir owncities andthuscould notactonanytraditional authority except the purely economic; andxenia wasnotmerely economic. Anexample of well-known andimpressive connections among local dignitaries can be found in the accounts of intermarriage between tyrants’families at the beginning of thefifth century: theDeinomenids from Syracuse, theEmmenids from Acragas andtheAnaxilads from Rhegion-Messana.71 Although these families were inpower foronly arelatively short period of time, thespeed withwhich they forged marital connections points tohowdeeply theneedforalliance among thearistocrats wasfelt. Andalthough these families represented three of the most powerful cities of the island during theperiod, they still found it expedient to form permanent bonds.

Ethnicity alsoplayed arole inthese aristocratic relations. These three major families were Doric, a fact which probably enhanced theformation of these ties.72 The introduction of “strangers”into staseis is therefore connected with the willingness ofcitizens, especially important citizens, toshoulder responsibility inthe city. The extent to which strangers participated depended on whether they were Greeks from the mainland, local native peoples, Carthaginians or Etruscans. Those wholived inafrontier zonecommonly exploited allexisting possibilities. Thus, while theofficial policy defined Carthaginians as enemies of theGreeks, inreality there wereclose tiesofvarious sorts. Incontrast totheEast, where thecapital ofthePersian territorial empire wasnotdirectly threatened bytheGreeks, intheWesttheGreeks were close to thePunic center andpressed territorial claims.

68

69

70

Chroust (1954); Losada (1972). Herman (1987). Seesection 2 above.

71 Finley (1979) 47. 72 Onethnicity, seesection 2.

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Connections withGreeks fromthemainland poseother problems because offilial connections andacommon culture ontheonehand, andbecause ofdifferent outlooks engendered bygeographical distance ontheother. Buttheir tiestoacommon pastwas reason enough tomaintain therelationship. Thus, Sicily andsouthern Italy served as a meeting-place fortheGreek “East”andthePunic “West” , affirming theexistence of a larger Mediterranean system of relations andcommunication.

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4 VIOLENCE ANDTHE ARMED FORCES Eventhough modern scholars insist thatrevolution necessarily involves armed conflict andviolence, stasis intheGreek sense wasnotalways violent.1 It is truethat violence, sometimes inextreme forms, wasanintegral part of most staseis, butthe presence of violence itself wasnot a requirement for stasis. The use of violence depended on the extent to which the participants were willing to carry the struggle. Since theGreeks didnotknowhowto treat defeated parties other than forcing them into exile,2 a party wasmore likely to resort to violence in order to secure victory. Furthermore, the use of violence was allied with the “brinksmanship”policy of revolutionaries. Theshift fromlegal toillegal acts waseasy, andviolence facilitated theprocess.3 Violence, which wasusedfirst of all toeliminate enemies, wasemployed as a tool toachieve other goals aswell: theconfiscation of property, forced exile, thegathering of weapons from citizens, redistribution of land andthetactical military actions in a stasis. Theapplication ofviolence inthese cases often escalated intowarswhich were carried on,asin thecase of Timoleon, bymore thantwomilitary forces.4 Thetactics of “war” varied, fromhoplite clashes which hadtotake place onplains, presumably outside thecities, to skirmishes intheagora orintheliving quarters of thecities. This last instance is characterized not by specific tactics or maneuvers, but by overall tarache or disturbances. In such cases, citizens whowere notinvolved in direct combat could gethurt. Thedangers tothepopulation could reach extremes, asinthe case of Syracuse after thedeath of Dionin 354, whenthecity entered into a period

ofrecurring coups andmostof thepopulation left thecityforthehinterland, while the

city itself became a battleground. Like mainland Greece, Sicily andsouthern Italy were confronted with external war. Thucydides underscores the link between the external war andinternal conflicts.5 Asin thecase of Dionysius theElder, theexternal conflict served as a good excuse andstarting point fortheinception of a coup. It waseasier to move from war to stasis thantoinitiate a stasis inpeace-time. Themilitary wasalways armed and could be used for both military goals; the city was in a state of emergency and the

takeover could bequickly achieved. Thisconnection between external warandstasis continually repeats itself in various cases discussed above. The soldier-citizens bearing their ownweapons were powerful.6 Usually, they kept their weapons in their ownhome andwere thus always prepared to appear fullyarmed intheagora inmoments of crisis. Thecrisis could stemfrommilitary invasion orinternal stasis, which werenotalways clearly distinguished fromeachother asboth could be manipulated for political ends. The availability of weapons and their

1

Cf. Wheeler (1954); see also Introduction.

3 4

The best example is no. 49: the torture of Dionysius the Elder’s wife by the rebellious cavalry. No.58.

6

Thuc. 3.82.2. Garlan (1976).

2 SeeTable 4; exile is mentioned infifty percent of thecases. Seealsosection 5.

5

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andtheArmed Forces

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widespread distribution among thecitizens ledtotheir frequent use. Paradoxically, andclearly anexception to standard practice within the polis, tyrants confiscated weapons from thecitizens inorder toremove a threat to their ownrule. In moments offoreign crisis (asdetermined bythetyrant), thearmswould beredistributed. Astate of warbecame, then, a desirable condition foranti-tyrannical groups whosought to overthrow existing tyrannies byexploiting of the availability of armaments.7 Theupper classes enjoyed a better position within thelocal armies because of their economic andsocial prerogatives. Theycould purchase their ownweapons, had superior training andordinarily served as officers in military units. However, these advantages were neutralized as tyrants rose to power, especially during the fourth century. The tyrants took care to appoint loyal supporters as officers. Some of the generals as well as other officers were mercenaries, andthey often took over the aristocracy’s traditional strongholds.8 The political implications of the military nature of the polis are evident in its social structure aswell. Aristotle points outthattheSyracusan revolution of 412 was a result of the demos’desire to translate their contribution to the victory over the Athenians intopolitical advantage. Asa class, theysought moreactive participation in thecity’s affairs, anddemanded andachieved radical democracy. This military element intheconflict between demos andaristocracy repeats itself also inThurii and Messana.9 The“soldiers’assembly”is another important feature of themilitary’s strength. Since the armies were composed of citizens, in moments of crisis their gatherings became a general assembly which could make binding legal decisions for the city. Again, thestory of thestasis inMessana serves asa goodexample, while another can be found in thegathering of themilitary inLeontinoi during Dionysius theElder’s coup.10 Inanalleged crisis, Agathocles gathered thedemos intheTimoleonteum and usedthis nocturnal gathering toincite arevolution.11 Aristodemos called anassembly of hissoldiers before thecity gates ashereturned fromamilitary expedition andused these forces for the subsequent coup.12 This assembly included notonly citizens but also mercenaries, someof whomwerenon-Greek. Thefact thatthey werelater enfranchised as Aristodemos rose to power underscores the assembly’s importance. The introduction of mercenaries as a formidable military force substantially altered the military picture andwaspart of a general movement toward the use of mercenary forces within theGreek world.13 Theappearance of mercenaries resulted ina widening gulf between thecitizen andhispolis. Since citizens were less inclined toenroll inthearmyandparticipate inthecity’s military campaigns, thefield wasleft opentohired soldiers. Afar-reaching transformation occurred within the“classical”

7 No.48; seealsosection 3.

8 9 10 11 12 13

Nos. 14, 15, 49, 50, 59, 60, 72. Nos. 38, 46, 71. Nos. 48, 71.

No.59. No. 14.

Garlan (1976) 93– 103; Villard (1981).

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Analysis

polis, namely theseparation between military andcivic functions. Atthesametime, mercenaries became increasingly dissatisfied withsalaries alone anddemanded more rights within thepolis’territory. This development, which dates to thefourth century, wasevident intheWestalready during thefifth century, if notearlier, andconnected withtherise of tyranny andgrowing social andpolitical instability. Furthermore, the tyrants didnoteliminate thecitizen armies. Twoarmies co-existed sidebyside, aphenomenon evident in the events which followed the collapse of the Deinomenid dynasty in Syracuse in the 460s. Significantly, theuseofmercenaries appears intwenty outof twenty seven cases of stasis inSyracuse, making it themostsalient feature oftheevent.14 Thatit appears lessfrequently inother cities isperhaps aconsequence of thepaucity ofoursources. Theinvolvement of mercenaries mayhave been more substantial even if it wasnot manifested asclearly asinSyracuse. Twocomplementary factors arefundamental toanydescription ofthisphenomenon:thescarcity ofGreeks, andtheavailability ofmercenaries. TheGreek population in Sicily andsouthern Italy wasso sparse that thevarious poleis could notperform their military functions exclusively with existing manpower. Anurgent appeal for supplementary military personnel wasmadeinorder tofill theneed. Furthermore, the Carthaginians posed a threat to the cities from the beginning of the fifth century and especially during thefourth, andthecities needed large contingents, trained andready for action, todefend against this threat. Themercenaries thus served asanauxiliary force, andthepower theyexerted fluctuated according tothefrequency of their use. The tyrants augmented the ranks of the mercenaries by employing them as body guards aswell, sothatmercenaries served thetyrants bothpersonally andwithin the military framework ofthecity. Phalaris, inthemiddle ofthesixth century, hada Sican bodyguard as didTheron, the sonof Ainesidamos, whofollowed himas tyrant at the start of thefifth century.15 During the same period, Anaxilas also employed mercenaries toserve hisownneeds aswell asthose of thecity.16 Themostfamous case was thatof theDeinomenids in Syracuse. According toDiodorus, tenthousand mercenaries werein thecity ontheeveof theDeinomenids’defeat in466.17 The second factor wasthe wide availability of mercenaries. Markets for their services werenumerous. During thefourth century, asaconsequence of theeconomic upheaval caused by the Peloponnesian War,18 there were many Greeks offering themselves as mercenaries. In the West, there were important local non-Greek markets aswell.19 Native inhabitants wereinfact thefirst tobehired. If Polyaenus can be trusted, Phalaris, as mentioned, hadalready hired Sicans in the sixth century. In time, manyothers wereengaged andincorporated into thearmies of theGreek cities.

14 SeeTable 3.

15 16 17 18

19

Nos. 1, 3.

No.27. Nos.43, 44.

Parke (1933) ch. 6, 9. Ibid., ch.8; Griffith (1932)

2. ch.8,1–

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AnItalian market opened upfrom the sixth century onward as well. Etruscans, Samnites, Campanians andevenGauls fromthenorth ofthepeninsula could befound everywhere serving as mercenaries.20 The ease with which they could be engaged probably resulted ina lower price fortheir services, reflecting thelawof supply and demand. Whendemands for salary increases werevoiced, theGreeks simply hired newmenandattempted togetridofthose whohadsought anincrease bysending them offtobekilled atbattle. Inasingle bloody stroke, issues related tofinance andloyalty could thusberesolved. Hieron II isknown tohaveacted insucha manner andothers followed hislead.21 Themarkets formercenaries wereusedbyGreeks andCarthaginians alike22; just asCarthaginians andnatives served Greeks, soGreeks also served Carthaginians.23 Sicily, then, proved an extensive and lucrative market. Mercenaries also solved specific problems. The Campanians, for example, known for their expertise as cavalry men, filled animportant gapin the hopliteorientated Greek military system. EventheAthenians called fortheir assistance inthe campaign against Syracuse.24 ButtheCampanians were also later incorporated into local armies as hoplites andbodyguards to thetyrants, thus becoming animportant source of infantry manpower intheWest. Besides assisting in the solution to problems, the mercenaries also created difficulties within theGreek cities in sofar astheir aspirations exceeded concerns about salary. Theymadedemands ontheir employers, boththetyrants andthecities, for benefits such asland, theright to settle within thecities as residents, andfinally citizenship itself. They sought bothrecognition andprivileges within theterritory of the polis they claimed to defend. The demand for citizenship wasunderstandable; along with this status came the enjoyment of certain rights usually preserved for a minority of the city’s population, a measure of stability, andthe opportunity for a Greek”life;25 all this wasseen asa logical reward formilitary service. Theprocess “ wasoften facilitated bytyrants whosupported their mercenaries’aspirations, hoping formore stable relations withthemasloyal supporters. Aristodemos, Dionysius the Elder andothers replaced aristocrats withmercenaries inthearmyandinthepolis for essentially thesamereasons. Thecities ascivic organizations also madeovertures to mercenaries. In461, the Sicilian cities decided to gather all mercenaries in Messana, where local citizenship wasawarded them. This action wasa clear signal thatresettlement inMessana was considered thebestsolution toapressing problem, anditconsequently legitimized the status of the mercenaries within the Greek community on the island.26 In 356/5, the Syracusans offered citizenship to Dion’s mercenaries so as to avoid paying their salaries. Thistime, themercenaries remained loyal toDionandaccompanied himto 20 Ibid. 21 No.66. 22 Griffith (1932) 209. 23 Nos.52, 57, 61.

24 Frederiksen (1968). 25 Thiswas,infact, a means ofHellenization. 26 Itwasthemostimportant clause ofthe“General Settlement”of461.Seenos.4,9,28,44,45,68.

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Leontinoi.27 In both instances, the Greek civic bodies were suspicious of the mercenaries’intentions. By granting them citizenship, they hoped to ensure their loyalty, eventhough mostwerenotoriginally Greek. TobeGreek wastolive within a polis andadapt to the Greek model of political life andGreek culture in general. The mercenaries’ bargaining position was strong since the cities’need for supplementary military force onlyincreased withthepassage oftime. Thus, onecould earn a living in this profession, andlater claim specific rights. Outof necessity, the cities wereforced, albeit reluctantly, tomakeconcessions. Oncethemercenaries were recognized asGreeks andhadwontheir rights, it wasdifficult toreverse thecourse of events, as the Syracusans learned in 466. Within thecity, themercenaries were ready to serve anycause or party which offered remuneration. Agoodexample canbeseenintheevents which followed the death ofDionin354, whenmostofthebattles werefought bythemercenaries. Asthe citizens fled to the hinterland, the city’s center became the battlefield, where Timoleon’s mercenaries pitted themselves against those of his rivals, Hicetas and Dionysius the Younger. Only when his hold on thecity wasconsolidated in 344, did the citizens return.28 The so-called “barbarization of thepolis”wasthemost puzzling effect of the mercenary phenomenon. ThePlatonic Seventh Epistle calls fora colonization of the island in order to circumvent theneed for non-Greek mercenaries, especially Punic ones. Butevenif thepolis wasaGreek institution, andtheGreeks wanted tosharpen the distinction between themselves andthe barbarians, the western polis wasnever ethnically purely Greek. Fromearly onintheir history, thewestern Greeks hadmixed with the local peoples in all aspects, including intermarriage. Moreover, the Greeks were initiators of the process, eagerly recruiting manpower from the Sicilian and Italian peoples. In this waythey served asagents of a higher culture, advancing the Hellenization of the barbarians rather than themselves suffering a barbarization. . Theparticipation of merceWhenRomeconquered Sicily, theisland was“Greek” naries hadserved as a major conduit for Hellenization.29

27 No.52.SeealsotheCampanian mercenaries whocaptured Entella, PartII.3above. Dionysius the Elder offered Leontinoi, in 396, as an appropriate substitute mercenaries gladly accepted hisoffer: Diod. 14.78.

28 No.58. 29 Seesection 3.

for delayed salaries, andthe

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5 THE STASIS INPROCESS

Tounderstand thebackground of local revolutions, wemustalso investigate the revolutionary act itself by analysing those elements of struggle determined by the structure of the Sicilian and southern Italian polis (as described in the previous sections) andderiving from the announced revolutionary goal. The events of any stasis haveaninner logic; every stasis unfolds according toastandard pattern towhich the revolutionaries’ actions and details in each particular instance conform. The picture which will emerge will be that of the “ . Sicilian and southern Italian stasis” 5.1. Channels of Action Theinstitutions of thecity served as themost important tools for carrying outa stasis because of the special nature of thepolis andthedeveloped political consciousness of its citizens. Stasis, as mentioned, wasnot necessarily violent. Its victories could also be wonwithin the existing system. Furthermore, the city’s institutions provided anideal setting forthegermination of stasis. Andthetask of therevolutionaries wasfacilitated by the generally unstable nature of thecity’s institutions. Power could easily be wrested from oneparty andpassed into the hands of another. Themostimportant institution intheexecution of stasis wastheassembly, which contained thelargest number ofcitizens.1 Thiswasparticularly important because in the assembly revolutionaries could conduct a stasis while preserving existing ordinances. For example, Syracusans’efforts in 466 and288 to eliminate enfranchised mercenaries, or atleast toreduce their civic rights were initiated in theassembly.2 In both attempts, the Syracusans first tried to pass a resolution which would have cloaked the stasis in legality. The stasis turned violent only when the threatened citizens sought topreserve their status bytaking uparms. Numerous examples illustrate theuseoftheassembly asarevolutionary tool. It waswithin the assembly that the transfer to extreme democracy in Syracuse took place in 412, as well as Dionysius’rise to power six years later.3 In 396, Theodorus tried to stir upa revolt against Dionysius theElder whenhedelivered a speech in an assembly convened bythetyrant himself.4 Theinternal warwhich ensued after the return of Dion in 357 from mainland Greece is styled by A. Fuks as a revolution carried out“while observing ordinary constitutional procedures” .5Agathocles also used the assembly in 317 to counter his personal adversaries andlater to legitimize hisnewly established tyranny.6 Afewyears later in310, hewasfaced withthesame

1

2 3 4 5 6

Seesection 2.

Nos. 44, 63. Nos. 46, 48.

No.51. No. 52; Fuks (1974) 120. No.59.

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situation Dionysius theElder hadmetin396, whentheCarthaginians incited a local citizen to deliver a revolutionary speech to the assembly.7 Variations on the same pattern can be detected in the smaller cities as well. In Messana, the pro-Syracusan faction, after slaughtering their opponents, used the assembly toundercut theimplementation ofaresolution accepting theAthenians into their city (415).8 In399, ontheother hand, thedecision of theMessanian generals to start another war against Dionysius the Elder without the consent of the assembly incited another stasis.9 Dionysius leda popular stasis in Gela through the assembly in 406, exploiting thedemos’numerical superiority over thearistocracy.10 A similar stasis wasledbyTelys from Sybaris in 511.11 InThurii wefind tworevolutions, one in434andtheother inanunknown date, forwhich theassembly served asthearena.12 Thepattern repeats itself inAcragas andCumae inthelate sixth andfourth centuries.13 In some cases, not only citizens but also “strangers”whodwelled in the city played anactive role in theaffairs for a variety of reasons.14 It must be remembered that the Greek polis lacked anyform of bureaucracy. By controlling theassembly, which possessed thehighest political authority, therevolutionaries wereabletocontrol mostimportant resources ofthepolis. Furthermore, the . Apolis’ assembly served astheonlytruly effective means of“masscommunication” political mechanism andcommunication media were combined inthe assembly. Incases of tyrannical coups, theassembly served asa particularly useful means tomobilize themasses. Especially important werelower classes which constituted a nominal majority ofthecitizens andputtheelites atanumerical disadvantage. Indeed, the use of the assembly by future tyrants as well as leaders of democratic coups was widespread, since leaders of such coups sought thelargest common denominator, both practically andideologically. Within the assembly, it waspossible to meet the resistence of local aristocracies through legal channels since theleverage of theupper class rested oneconomic andsocial influence rather thanonthecity’s institutions. Among public offices, themostimportant wasthatof “general withfull power” , strategos autokrator.15 Thiswastheoffice mostcoveted byaspiring tyrants andcould bewonthrough theassembly. Theorigins of theoffice areunknown, butit wasnot confined to Sicily or in anyrespect extraordinary. It wasnot a civil office, if it is possible todistinguish between thecivic andthemilitary intheGreek polis. InAthens, generals nominated fortheSicilian expedition wereelected tothisposition, reflecting theimportance theAthenians hadassigned totheexpedition andtheir awareness of the difficult problems which could arise in distant, hostile lands –problems which

7 No.60; Berger (1988). 8 No.70.

9 10 11 12. 13

No.71. No.20. No. 33. Nos. 35, 39. Nos. 6, 7, 14.

14 Seesection 3 andbelow.

15 Scheele (1934).

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could require the intervention of a person with absolute authority.16 Later sources, suchasthose describing thecoups of Dionysius theElder, Agathocles andAristodemosofCumae, reveal other aspects ofthepost. Thefuture tyrants received theoffice from the assembly in order to manage thecity during a crisis. The office, instead of being connected with military expeditions conducted far from the city’s borders within a specific time, wasrather anexecutive position. Hence, political considerations inthese cases outweighed thepurely military nature of theAthenian example. Thesources present aninteresting legal dilemma. Future tyrants, asgenerals withfull power, could actwithin theframework oftheconstitution andreceive legitimation for virtually all their deeds, or rather misdeeds. It is almost impossible to draw the line between whatwassanctioned through election bytheassembly andwhatexceeded legal limits. Furthermore, it wasimpossible todistinguish between thereal power of the tyrant, with which he could in anyevent seize power, andthe legal authority as strategos autokrator. Thelate sources areinerror intheir description of theoffice as merely a means of acquiring tyrannical power, ruling outanyquestion of legality.17 Theuseof both legal andillegal means inthecourse of stasis deserves special attention. This combination resulted when, in a contest of brinksmanship, parties sought their goals, oreventemporary gains, through whatever means possible. Legal channels werepreferable, butwhenthese failed, violence wasemployed inorder to achieve the desired results. The events in Syracuse in 466 andlater serve as an example.18 Theenfranchised mercenaries usedviolence whenitbecame clear thatthe motion toreduce their civic rights would be approved in theassembly. Thelegality of Dionysius theElder’s coup, inwhich hetried tomanipulate thesystem, remains completely ambiguous as the story in Diodorus emphasizes.19 The tyrant first tried legal means andlater turned toillegal methods. Buteventheuseoflegal means were ingeneral equivocal, asemerges fromDiodorus’narrative of theSyracusan tyrants.20 Whenaspirants employed military power –armed citizens andmercenaries –stasis turned into war.

5.2. The Topography of Stasis Since eachcity occupied a certain territory, each stasis hadspatial andtopographical dimensions aswell. Despite thefact thatGreek philosophers attached predominant importance totheconcept of citizenship, theterritorial factor in stasis cannot beignored.21 It canbeassumed that the“ordinary”Greek wasmuchmore attuned to

16 Thuc. 6.8.2. 17 ThecaseofAgathocles (no.59)isinteresting. Berve (1953) isinclined toassert animportant role for Agathocles’legitimate postion inthecity. Butsee thecriticism of Diesner (1958). 18 Nos. 43, 44. 19 No.48. 20 Nos. 52, 59, 60, 66. 21 Is the Greek polis a “city” , “state”or a “town” ? Apparently it consists of all these three dimensions; some scholars tend to focus onthe idea of citizenship (like Ehrenberg [1960]

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his polis as an actual space. Howthe notion of territory wasactually defined in the polis, however, is notclear. It is often difficult todetermine theexact boundaries of the polis. The horoi (boundary stones) which defined the city’s frontier did not necessarily represent any Greek “international”agreement.22 Landowners in the remote districts of the city kept watch over their land and thus protected the city’s frontiers, sometimes with the help of a special garrison. In light of the fact that stasis took place, sometimes inside, sometimes outside the city limits, the topographical dimension of stasis presents a structural problem inwhich bothcausation ofstasis and its tactics areintermingled. It is obvious that thespace occupied bythecity served asthearena of revolution. The action took place within theliving quarters, thedwellings occupied bythe tyrants, thetemene (sacred land), theagora andthechora. Since Sicilian andsouthern Italian evidence is concentrated mainly in Syracuse, that is the city weshall treat.23 Topographically, the most important section of the city was the peninsula, Ortygia: anisland connected artificially tothemainland. Thiswasnotonlytheplace occupied bythefirst settlers, butalso the site of theprevious Sicel settlement. Ortygia waswell constructed andheavily fortified. Anancient temple stood initscenter and . Within thepeninsula possessed animportant source of water, the A rethusa Spring” “ incritical moments they itsimpregnable walls, thetyrants constructed their castle and could seal off Ortygia fromother section of Syracuse. Fromtheramparts, thetyrants could handle the affairs of the city without actually being present there. Ortygia also hada small, independent harbor thatcould beusedif themainportwasshutofffrom the tyrants. The events surrounding Dion’s affairs serve as a good illustration. Dion was unable to capture Ortygia despite numerous attempts, and this failure proved disastrous. Dionysius theYounger took advantage of thesituation anddestabilized Dion’s newregime byexerting pressure onhimfromOrtygia. It would bemore than three years before Ortygia wasfree from tyrannical pressure.24 Other Syracusan neighborhoods were located on the mainland across from Ortygia. Achradina, the site of thelocal agora, wastheclosest, probably thecenter of thearchaic cityprior toitsexpansion. Plutarch, inhisTimoleon, claims thatithadbeen abandoned before the Corinthian general’s arrival (in 344) because thecity wasin a constant state of stasis. Wemayassume thatAchradina served asthebattlefield for the quarreling parties because it wasthe center andprobably contained important public buildings.

102), others emphasize therole of theterritory (see Osborne [1985] 6– 88– 10; [1987] 13– 26). Furthermore, oneshould distinguish between the“ great” and“small”poleis. Onthe“Greek Third World”see Gehrke (1987). See also Kolb (1984). Seealso Osborne (1987) 50– 52. Drögemüller (1967).

22 23 24 No.52.

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Inthedirection oftheAnapus River tothesouth ofthecity werethelatifundia of thewealthy aristocracy. Thiswasthefertile landofSyracuse. Onewould expect that these were the targets of political campaigns for the redistribution of land. Here, sheltered within their latifundia, therich could notonly escape the troubles of the city’s center butalso moreeasily safeguard their property. Themajority oftheother inhabitants lived tothenorth andnortheast of Ortygia ) or inTyche, a neighborhood NewPolis” andAchradina, either in theNeapolis (“ dating from the time of Dionysius the Elder. Here begins the hilly section of the city, anditislessfertile foragriculture. Achradina, then, served asboththemeeting point andboundary between the segments of thelocal population as well asbetween the population andthegovernment, beit tyrannical orcivic. Although located outside thecity’s fortifications, thechora, asinanyGreek polis, wasconsidered anintegral part ofthecity. Itwasoccupied principally byfarmers and small landowners who served as the core of the local citizen military force. When Dionysius the Elder promised to leave the city after the Great Revolt in 404, the citizen-soldiers dispersed andreturned to their homes in thechora for theharvest. Dionysius took advantage of the situation in order to recapture his throne.25 The connection between thecity (asty) andthechora canbefurther shown intherevolt against the Gamoroi in 491, whentheentire population of the chora, including the serfs, the Kyllirioi, revolted against the aristocratic regime.26 When differences between city andchora occurred, theeffects werefelt intheeconomic andsocial as well asinthepolitical realm. Aristodemos of Cumae banished theyoung aristocrats tothechora inorder toremove themfromthecenter ofaction andthusfrompolitics.27 Conversely, the opposition to Agathocles preferred to undermine his position by destroying hisgriponthechora rather thanengage incombat withhismilitary orstir upthecity’center, which remained untouched bytheevents formostof theperiod.28 A study of the interplay between city andchora mayillustrate the two-fold nature of its use. The existence of vast chorai, as in Syracuse and Cumae,29 points to a polis in addition to its citizens –another, non-civic population of free Sicel comprised of – orother non-Greek inhabitants, andserfs. Inthecase of Syracuse, thebackground to thefoundation of hercolonies, Casmenai andAcrai, is notclear aswell.30 Evidently, theKyllirioi joined thestasis against theGamoroi in491; andtheGamoroi presumablyfound refuge inCasmenai. Although evidence of similar occurrences is thin, one maysuspect these were not the only cases. Moreover, when a stasis disrupted the functioning of the city’s institutions and everyday life of the urban centers, the distinction between citizens and non-citizens blurred. Revolutionaries took full advantage ofthechaos which followed. Theentire population ofagiven city, astyand 25 26 27 28 29

30

No.50. No.42. No. 15. No.61. See section 3.

93. Graham (1964) 92–

98

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chora, could then serve as a manpower reserve for all sorts of activity, especially violent ones. Thenumber ofparticipants ina stasis thuscould beaugmented substantially. The citizens, indeed, took theprincipal role in the opening andconcluding stages of stasis, which were conducted primarily within the framework of civic institutions suchastheassembly. But, aslongasthecombat continued, it absorbed other non-civic sectors of thepopulation, whohoped towinfavours fromthevictors. Moreover, thecity-dwellers could notavoid involvement since combat occurred on their doorsteps. A stasis, almost like a ritual, wastherefore attended byanaudience ranging frompassive spectators toactive participants. Dionysius theElder’s extended period of tyranny marked a change inthecourse of Sicilian history. The world of the local Greek polis experienced the effects of Dionysius’territorial empire, an experience beginning in the East only with the conquests of Alexander theGreat. Dionysius, whopresided over mostof Sicily at various times, occupied Italian soilaswell, asheconquered landinsouthern Italy and founded colonies along theAdriatic.31 Syracuse became thedominant force onthe island andin Italy. It enjoyed military superiority though it did not harm the local cities’autonomy. Thesituation canbecompared tothatoftheHellenistic monarchies intheEast, where reigning tyrants orkings exerted military power within adesignated region but did not exercise direct control over the cities within their spheres of influence.32 Inmostcases, thetyrant concluded agreements withthecities enhancing hispower in a particular region. Theresult of this kindof empire wastwofold. First, all known staseis in Sicily during the fourth century are linked to Syracuse in some way.33 Traces of this 61. Theparamount connection canbe found already in theevents of theyears 466– importance of Syracuse during the fourth century as leader of theGreeks in theWest is clearly represented in the sources.34 Second, the staseis in Syracuse itself spread outwards from the city’s territory. Many segments of staseis took place in areas outside of Syracuse’s direct control. JustasLeontinoi served asanimportant gathering place forrevolutionaries, other cities werelater usedforthesamepurpose: Messana, Rhegion, Acragas. Thecase of Deinocrates andthe opposition to Agathocles is anobvious example.35 Revolutionaries contacted other Greeks, hired mercenaries throughout Sicily andsouthern Italy andengaged thenative peoples andtheCarthaginians. Thefact thatthere werealso mixed Greek-native cities inthehinterland, madeallof Sicily thearena of Syracusan stasis.

31 Stroheker (1958) 111– 29; Chiranky (1982). 32 Jones (1940) ch.6.

33 SeeTable 2.

34 Berger (1991). 35 No.61.

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Factors

Stasis occurs within a specific span of time and thus temporal dimensions constitute a critical factor intheanalysis of thephenomenon. Evenif it is sometimes impossible todetermine theduration oftheorganizational phase, theactual execution of stasis often canbemeasured intime. Thetermstasis canrefer either toaverybrief revolutionary actoraprolonged civil war.According tothechronology ofDiodorus’ account, the stasis instigated by Dion in 357 lasted for three years andcan be subdivided into several independent staseis.36 Ontheother hand, whenthecavalry revolted against Dionysius theElder in405, thestasis lasted only onedayandone night.37 Diodorus tends to emphasize the speed of the action in this example. It is evident that there aredifferences between thetwocases, andtime is animportant factor. The chosen tactics differ, as does the extent of the participation of the citizens in each case. The duration of the staseis also affected the functioning of the polis. Theprincipal problem thatapolis hadtoovercome during astasis wasthatoffood supply. It seems, prima facie, that severe problems didnotoccur if a stasis wasable to continue for years. Daily work in the fields went on, interrupted only for short periods without damage tothecrops.38 Goods continued tobeoffered inthemarkets ona more or less regular basis; there is nodirect evidence of starvation caused by interruption of agriculture because of stasis. Thestarvation which didoccur wasmore theresult ofblockades, a tactical measure, suchasinthecaseofHicetas’blockade of Ortygia, where the mercenaries of Dionysius the Younger and Timoleon were encamped in 344.39 Moreover, the Syracusan population in thecity didnotsuffer at all because Ortygia wasseparated fromtheother sections of thecity. Geographical considerations are important here as well. Since the stasis was generally confined to one location, other parts of the territory were free from disruption andlife could continue normally. Theabundance orscarcity of foodwas connected to the rhythm of the seasons. Just as food supply affected war, as Thucydides asserts, soit affected stasis aswell. Again, wemustrefer totheevents of theGreat Revolt of 404 against Dionysius andtheimportance of theharvest onthe outcome; it lasted longer than the cavalry revolt a year earlier. Additional food supplies could also be obtained from neighboring cities in Sicily. It canbeassumed thatwhenmercenaries wereintroduced into thelocal armies andbegan playing a substantial role instaseis thecitizens werereleased toengage in their private business. Thelatter werethenmainly required fortheactivity within the assembly, or other institutions, to which only they had access. Stasis, at that point, could be held at any time during the year.

36 No.52; Fuks (1968). 37 No.49.

38 No.52andcf. no.50. 39 No.58. Seealso no.51.

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Analysis

A stasis which occurred within the confines of the assembly did not last long. Action apparently tookplace during daylight hours andeverybody returned homeat dusk. During thenight, thescene wasmainly oneof illegal, violent activity: attacks ontyrants, aristocrats oranyother special target. In Cumae, theopposition selected thenight hours of a certain feast as thebest time torushinto thecity andslay thetyrant andhiscoterie in thepalace.40 Agathocles convened his supporters andthedemos under thecover of darkness toinaugurate revolution, andhethenlet thedemos have their waywiththearistocracy fortwosuccessive days.41 Nocturnal activities hadso to speak, a dark side. Prolonged disturbances led thepopulation of Syracuse to flee the city for the safety of thehinterland. Extensive periods of unrest also stemmed from themilitary organization of theparties. Infact ina number of cases, twoarmies confronted each other inanhoplite battle. Although thebattle lasted onlyoneday,theorganization and deployment of hoplite units wastime-consuming,42 andthis lengthened theduration ofthestasis, asinthecaseofDion, Timoleon andothers. Theneedtoachieve military superiority andwin a military victory transformed the tactics of stasis to those of warfare, which hadits ownrequirements. Participation of “strangers” could also prolong a stasis.43 Forging alliances with people fromother cities took time, butcould beof vital importance, asit wasinthe case ofDionysius theElder, whowaited forarecruitment of Campanian mercenaries in 404. Since hewasable to outwit his subjects, whoreturned home for theharvest, hewontimeandretained histhrone.44 Inother cases, whenexiles needed thehelpof supporters inside thecity, time wasagain a decisive factor.45

5.4. Stasis: TheConcluding Phase Finally, we mayexamine howa stasis ends. Some aspects of stasis already mentioned cannowbediscussed in greater detail because of their particular importance in this stage of revolution, during which the city returned to the rhythm of ordinary life.

Formalities

Thefirst important element to bediscussed is the setof ceremonies bywhich a stasis wasformally ended. Life inthepolis could notreturn tonormal after thetriumph of oneof theparties involved in military –andoften violent –acts, without a final symbolic event which would allow the victors to introduce a new order. The 40 No. 15. 41 No.59.Seealso no.30. 42 Ontraining hoplites, seeAnderson (1979) 89– 93.

43 Seesection 3. 44 No.49. 45 Nos.47, 66.

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assembly, which figured soprominently inthefirst phase of thestasis, wasthebest location toannounce andcelebrate theconclusion of thestruggle. Since theassembly contained alarge cross-section ofthepopulation ofthepolis, itwasalsothebestforum in which to communicate the changes in the status quo. Inmostcases, theassembly simply approved thechangeover andlegitimized the newregime. Inmanycases, theassembly sanctioned retroactively theprior activities of therevolutionaries. A formal vote in theassembly acknowledged the stasis as a legitimate actwithaplace intheofficial history of thepolis. Past, present andfuture werethenritually interwoven, andthestasis wasseenasapoint inthelinear progress of thecity’s history. The assembly officially confirmed public offices such as that of strategos autokrator. Particularly attheconclusion of a stasis, it gavefinal authorization tothis office as well the as distribution of all other public offices. In this way, the assembly dramatized therestoration of order andtheachievement of homonoia.46 Anyexpressionof public order haditsritualization. Insomecases theannouncement wasmade thatpatrios politeia hadbeenrestored.47 Inothers, thedeclaration thateleutheria had beenreintroduced. Tyrants simply proclaimed that theenemies of thecity, particularly of the demos, had been removed forever.48 Symbols of power were then consecrated inareligious ceremony. Newcults werecreated forthehappy occasion; the cult of Zeus Eleutherios, Zeus the Liberator, was the most common.49 Such ceremonies occurred in nearly all cities: Syracuse, Cumae, Messana, Thurii and Gela.50

Incases of“pure”metabole, formalities wereevenmoreimportant, since a new constitution wasintroduced. Furthermore, suchformalities were far more necessary incivic regimes thanintyrannies since these regimes stressed thelegality ofthestasis asa foundation fortheneworder. Tyrants, however, didnotomittheformalities, as it waspartof their strategy andintheir bestinterest touseeffectively alllegal means athandto acquire andconsolidate power. Ritual, therefore, should beregarded not as a superficial game but as a neccessary precursor for change within the legal framework of the city.

Elimination of Power Groups Ritualization, nevertheless, wasnotenough toensure thetransfer ofpower. Other steps wereneeded toeliminate existing power groups andformnewones. Inthecase of stasis, it is not possible to pinpoint the method by which power changed hands. Erratic, impulsive action andchance events were therule in many cases. However, some elements recur andthus canbe systematized.

46

Zwicker, “ Homonoia” , RE 8 (1913) 2265– 2268. 47 Fuks (1953); Ruschenbusch (1958); Finley (1971); Walters (1976). 48 Aristodemos (No. 14); Agathocles (no. 59). 49 No.43; Berger (1989); onthecultseeRaaflaub (1985) 125– 149. 50 Nos. 14, 20, 35, 52, 58, 59, 62, 66, 72.

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The most important technique employed for eliminating

power groups

at the

close of a stasis wasthat of exile. Infifty percent of thecases of stasis thedefeated were exiled.51 In the wake of a stasis, both sides were left with deep feelings of animosity. The victors didnotwantto andindeed could notreorganize thepolis as long as the opposition remained in thecity. Thecontinuous presence of thelosing party symbolized continuity with the past while the victors wanted to emphasize the element ofchange. Thevanquished, ontheother hand, preferred exile toremaining under the thumb of a regime they distrusted in a polis which no longer held their views.52 Theexile ortheseparation fromthepolis ofthevanquished often suited both parties. Aristocrats didnot distinguish between their private life andtheir political activities. Thestate, which represented thepolitical machine, could notbeseparated fromsocial alliances. Further, amnestia wasrareinGreek practice; whenitdidoccur,

itwaswidely written about, asinthecaseofAthens in403andtheamnestia granted byAlexander theGreat in324.53 Inmostcases, amnestia could notbeimplemented. In this respect the Greeks in the West did not differ from their brothers on the mainland. Despite the fact that thevanquished initially preferred exile, they would soon afterwards often attempt to return to the city andregain lost power. This pattern repeats itself inabout a third of thecases.54 Thereturn ofexiles sparked another stasis, andsothecycle continued. Thisis whathappened inSyracuse after Dion’s death in 354.Insuchachain ofevents, there wereeventually morethantwogroups within and outside the city which sought control. The possibility of achieving stability in such cases wasremote without outside intervention, suchasthatprovided byTimoleon in

this case.

The sources contain fewinstances of exiles leaving Sicily, andthose whodid leave usually wenttomainland Greece. Leontine exiles canbefound inEuboia after 424.55 Pythagorean exiles fled to Greece after the uprising against their school in the middle of the fifth century.56 Among the Syracusans, Dion andHeracleides are the mostfamous, theformer connected toPlato’s academy.57 Mostother exiles remained in Sicily or crossed to southern Italy. During the colonizing period exiles were especially welcome asfounders of newcities: Troizenians from Sybaris assisted in thefoundation of Poseidonia,58 exiles fromPithecoussai wentonto found Cumae,59 Mactorion wassettled byretired Geloans,60 andtheSyracusan Myletidai joined the Zancleians inthefoundation of Himera.61 During thefifth century, theSybarites tried 51 See Table 4; Seibert (1979); Gehrke (1985) 214– 34. 52 Cf. Alcibiades’speech, Thuc. 6.92.4. 53 Athens, 403/2: Bengtson, Staatsverträge II, no.213; Alexander’s act: Tod,GHIII, nos.201, 202.

54 SeeTable 4.

55 56 57 58 59 60 61

No.22. No. 12. No.52. No.32. No.26. No.16. No.40

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to rebuild their city for the fifth time on the river Traeis,62 and Syracusan exiles regularly wenttoneighboring Leontinoi.63 Ontheother hand, members ofthedemos of cities like Leontinoi andMegara Hyblaea were soldinto slavery.64 Exile ledto encounters suchasthose withtheSicels andCarthaginians. Mactorion, where theGeloans moved, wasa Sicel village. TheCatanians werepleased to jointheSicels, headed byDucetius, inorder toreturn totheir homecity.65 Others hired mercenaries forthesamepurpose. Exile, then, brought Greeks intocontacts withnonGreeks, andtheinferior position of the exiles at home facilitated these connections. While exile served asadirect andswift waytoeliminate theopposition, punitive measures wereoften employed aswell. Those inexile owned property within thecity limits, andcontinued ownership of property constituted anactual presence. It was common practice toconfiscate theproperty ofthose inexile, since their defeat implied theloss of their civic rights within thepolis.66 From a legal point of view, it wasthe polis which appropriated theproperty. Themanner inwhich property wasconfiscated took a variety of forms. Sometimes the demos was permitted to loot the homes of exiles before anofficial policy waspromulgated, as in the case of Agathocles in 317. WhenPetalismos wasintroduced, asit wasinSyracuse, theexiled didnotlose their right to their property, just as the ostracized in Athens.67 Confiscation ofproperty inSicily wasalsoimportant totherise of tyrants. Local dictators like Aristodemos, Dionysius theElder andAgathocles, personally appropriated the exiles’possessions, which were then distributed among the tyrants’ supporters according towhim. A significant number of these supporters consisted of foreigners, often non-Greek, whoserved as the tyrant’s coterie. Popular accounts describe howthese foreigners were usually enfranchised andmarried to aristocratic women whose husbands weremurdered orexiled soastoassure thelegitimization of theprocess. These men,provided witheconomic resources andsocial status, became strong supporters of the tyrant.68 Needless to say, the assembly always provided formal consent. Theconfiscation ofproperty is associated also withredistribution of land, andto alesser degree withthecancellation ofdebts. Obviously, inanydiscussion ofproperty landisparamount since itwasthebasic formofwealth. Howitwasparceled outcould affect the distribution of power with all the attendant social andpolitical ramifications. Although egalitarian distributions were always promised in theheat of stasis, they were seldom putinto practice. Dionysius the Elder is the only person whose 62 No.34. 63 Berger (1991). 64 Nos.22,24; there is,however, nodirect evidence fortheenfranchisement ofexiles inother cities.

Theycould, nevertheless, liveintheir hostcities asmetoikoi, orasforeigners ofsomeother status. See,forinstance, Inschr. v.Olympia V,no.22(onSelinuntine exiles returning fromMegara), and

probably SEGXII, 407(ontheGamoroi inCasmenai). 65 No.9; seealso section 3. 51. 66 Asheri (1966) 43– 67 If, indeed, Diodorus canbetrusted: no.45.

68

Asheri

(1977).

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104

redistribution scheme appears to follow some notion of equity. First, his supporters received their share, followed by the Syracusan demos. Still, his plan was not egalitarian.69 Continuing cycles of exile andreturn intensified the problem; it was almost impossible to subdivide the land satisfactorily. In fact, the many lawsuits involving theredistribution of landareresponsible forthedevelopment of theartof rhetoric in Syracuse. Houses werealsoreal property andinthecase ofDionysius theElder andDion are specifically mentioned.70 Houses, oikiai, were important both because of their intrinsic value andbecause they represented concretely andsymbolically the link between thehouseowner andthecity. Thus, in 288, whenthe Syracusans wanted to getridof theenfranchised mercenaries, they allowed them to take their belongings andsell all their property in thecity, thus circumventing anyfuture claims.71 Murder of course wasthemost effective wayto eliminate the enemy. In many cases, it wassimply a consequence of theuseof violence during the stasis. During a stasis’last stage murder served to supplement other measures. Dionysius theElder and Agathocles allowed the demos to slaughter the aristocrats, thus assuring the demos’later support asaccomplices inthecrime. Killing wasalsopermissible when citizens refused to surrender weapons atthetyrant’s command.72 InMessana, in415, thepro-Syracusans murdered pro-Athenians, a majority group in theassembly, and thus were able to block the acceptance of Athenians into the city.73 The murder of Dionysius theElder’s wife created solidarity among theinsurgents.74

Formation of NewPower Groups Here, weshall examine civic andtyrannical regimes. In civic –non-tyrannical, regimes, there werealways groups ofpeople whosought democratic oraristocratic – a better position within thecity’s political or social hierarchy. The difference between democracy andaristocracy wasbased ondifferent points of departure. Aristocracies, as social elites enjoying economic superiority, attempted to monopolize political power. They justified this monopoly with symbols of historical and moral force. Democracies tried to enlist the citizenry in order to increase the number of their supporters in the assembly. In the West, the elites’power wasdiminished by the fact that manyof thenewcitizens camefromthelower classes andwereimmigrants. Intyrannical regimes thetyrant was, bydefinition, thecenter of theestablished order, andheinitiated all actions. Mostof thetyrants were surrounded bygroups of individuals forming the tyrant’s party, known (as we have seen) in the case of

69 70 71 72 73

No.50; Gehrke (1985) 210– 14, 234– 6. Table

8.

No.63. Nos. 1, 14, 50, 59.

No.70.

74 Seealsosection 4.

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. These supporters literally encircled thetyrant TheFriends” Dionysius theElder as“ andpromoted hispolicies. Theyresided withhiminOrtygia andserved ashisprivycouncil, sharing his life andfate.75 Furthermore, tyrants often tried to establish ties withimportant aristocratic families inthecity through intermarriage. Dionysius, for example, wedthedaughter of thefamous Hermocrates; Agathocles andHieron the Second also contracted advantageous unions.76 Intermarriage among the tyrannical dynasties followed.77 Finally, thecivic apparatus ofthestate wasusedtocomplement private resources andconnections aslong asit served thetyrant’s cause. Legitimization of the tyrant’s activities through the assembly was important since it facilitated andstrengthened public andprivate alliances. Another difference between civic andtyrannical regimes canbedetected inthe useof themilitary forces. Tyrants relied more onmercenaries andless onthecivic armies. It wasespecially important inthecase of bodyguards thatthesoldiers feel a personal obligation to their chief. Butcivic forces continued toexist, andthere was notyrant whocould exclude hissubjects froma large army; citizens wereemployed whenever external dangers arose. Tyrants wereclever enough torealize thedangers in creating a formidable compound power group, either element of which, thecivic division orthemercenaries, could turnagainst him.Moreover, hecould notcount on the fact that both divisions would never merge. Thus, in contrast to the accepted practice ofthepolis, thetyrant collected weapons fromthehomes ofcitizens inorder to stave off threats to his regime. Mediation

This constituted another means of reconciling differences between groups. The examples inthesources reflect Greek life intheWest. Themostcommon course of action wastoapply tothemother-city forintervention. WhenthePythagoreans were routed from southern Italy in themiddle of thefifth century they approached Achaea, a unimportant city but still Sybaris’andCroton’s mother-city.78 Delphi, with her special role in colonization andreligion, wasanother obvious choice, as in thecase ofThurii in434, whenthestasis revolved around thedetermination ofthefounder of thecity andthemother-city.79 Carthage wasalso called upontomediate disputes by virtue of her influence in theregion, as in the case of Agathocles.80 Finally, “ The Elders” could always beconsulted, astheywereinSyracuse inthearchaic period and in the third century.81

75 76 77 78 79 80 81

No.50. Nos. 48, 59, 66. See section 3, no.71. No.12. No.35. No.59. Nos.41, 63.

CONCLUSION Theevidence documents onaverage onestasis inoneofthecities of Sicily and southern Italy every seven years. This fact should not surprise us. Aneven greater frequency appears inH.J. Gehrke’sanalysis ofstasis inother parts oftheGreek world. This assertion is further confirmed bytheparticular nature of thehistory of stasis in theWest. First, thefactthatoursources, despite their fragmentary condition, should nonetheless relate so much information about staseis is remarkable. Second, most staseis areconcentrated intwocenturies, thefifth andthefourth; onlyabout a seventh of all cases belongs tothearchaic period. Buteveninthis earlier period there were probably morecases of stasis thanthelimited sources document. Thesignificance of stasis asa phenomenon, therefore, cannot beoverestimated. One theme has dominated our study: the common pattern andthe particular circumstances inGreek history. Stasis is a general Greek phenomenon; andstasis in its full complexity canbe investigated only bydistinguishing thedifferent ways in which itdeveloped inspecific regions. TheSicilian andsouthern Italian caseisspecial in three areas: theperipheral nature of the local polis andthedevelopment of its domestic structure, theintensive connections witha non-Greek world and,third, the predominance of tyranny as a form of government. WhentheGreeks arrived during theeighth century intheWest, theyimported the idea of thepolis. The settlers participated in theprocess of working outthe system which wasaninnovation intheAegean world itself. Theoretically, theoutcome was notdifferent; thepolis intheAegean andthepolis intheWesthadsimilar institutions. But the lack of long standing traditions as well as the need to accomodate to a new region, which served also as the border of the Greek world, dictated another development. Thesocial andpolitical structure of thepolis hadtobecreated almost ex nihilo andthus always remained more fragile; a sense of thelack of deeproots always existed among theGreek inhabitants. IfintheAegean stasis served theprocess of consolidating thepolis’structure, in theWest it wastheother wayround: stasis emerged because the polis wasnever fully developed andits structure changed regularly. Thus the poleis remained always peripheral to the Hellenic center in the Aegean. Inhabiting anddefining theborders of theGreek world, the Sicilian andsouthern Italian settlers came into contact with non-Greek peoples from the first day of colonization. Since thesettlers lived farremoved fromwhattheythemselves considered as their centers, they tended to nurture such relations. Whether these connections developed outof necessity orchoice, theworld of theGreek settlers widened. Themeeting withnewpeoples andtheaccess tonewmarkets further intensified social instability. First, theconstant shortage ofmanpower resulted inaccepting non-Greeks asinhabitants andascitizens inthevarious poleis. Then, mercenaries served inalmost all military forces of theGreek cities, civic andtyrannical alike. The Carthaginian challenge created a permanent needforsoldiers.

108

Conclusion

Noweven though Hellenization waswidespread, all these non-Greeks contributedtotheformation of a different Greek identity andanother structure forthepolis. Thepoleis layopentooutsiders, whowere eager tojoin these communities. They

looked for channels of mobility within the polis and stasis served as one of the important channels. Participation in revolutions included then all elements of the polis’population: Greeks andnon-Greeks, citizens andnon-citizens. Thepoleis ofthe Aegean were never confronted with sucha massive influx of non-Greeks into their communities. Tyrants played adecisive roleintheprocess. Since theytended tomanipulate the institutionalized political system, tyrants could easily address themselves tothenonGreeks andoffer appropriate remuneration for these people’s support. Thetyrants then affected the course of stasis in two ways: by destroying the polis’regular decision-making mechanism and by resorting to foreigners in cases of domestic problems. Consequently, civic regimes had to deal with the effects of tyrannical regimes suchasuncontrolled enfranchisement, redistribution ofproperty andappropriation of public offices. Being divided itself, thecivic bodyresorted in theendto thesamemethods asthetyrants. These three characteristics of Sicilian and southern Italian revolutions reappear intheseventh andsixth centuries aswell asin thethird century. Phalaris andHieron II disregarded thepolis institutions andhired non-Greek mercenaries; the first took advantage of hiscity’s organizational problems tenyears after it wasfounded; the second lived already in anepoch inwhich almost nobody could distinguish between Greeks andnon-Greeks. Thefactthatstasis narratives makeupamajor portion ofthehistory oftheGreek Westenables ustodescribe thephenomenon diachronically, andlocate stasis within thecontext of local history. Thefirst period, between 750 and550, is theageduring which themajority of the Greek colonies were founded andstaseis arose as a consequence of organizational problems. In three cities, Pithecoussai, Sybaris andAcragas, staseis occurred immediately after their respective foundations. Thedivision of power wastheprimary issue andgroups were formed on the basis of ethnic origin, a fact pointed out by Aristotle. Redistribution of landandpolitical power among themembers of thenew elites served asa pretext inother cases. Thisagonemerges invarious cities, suchas thecaseoftheMyletidai inSyracuse andinGela, where afaction retired toMactorion. Theconflict could notbutleadtotyranny, thehallmark ofthenextperiod. Twocases which illustrate themultifaceted nature of staseis arethose of Phalaris of Acragas and Panaetius of Leontinoi. Colonies, however, continued to befounded after this date. So,whenSybaris wasrepopulated in446, someof theproblems attending colonization reappeared. Mostcolonies reached maturity around 550, having existed foratleast a hundred years. Thethird oreventhefourth generation of settlers hadcomeintopower andthe cities already hadhistories of their own.Economically successful, thecities extended beyond thelimits of their chorai andsetupcolonies of their own, thus widening the scope of theGreek presence ontheisland andproviding moreopportunities forthe settlers. Newmethods ofgovernance hadtobecreated tofitthenewsituation, andthe

Conclusion

109

motherland served as the model. Immediately after it hadestablished a foothold on themainland, tyranny surfaced intheWest. Thetyrants intheWestcameintopower atthesametime asaristocratic control overthepolis reached itszenith. Theyreplaced theoldelites andtransported thecities into thenewphase ofGreek existence inthe region. Tyranny wasuniversal. Aristotle would haveusbelieve thatitwaswoven intothe fabric of everyday life in every city. Asmight be expected, a neworder wasbeing shaped. Although tyrants continued to come from theranks of thearistocracy –and cherish aristocratic ideals –the structures of local aristocracies changed. The ambitious tyrants werehungry forconquest andeager tofoster their positions through . Thetrend began withHippocrates ofGelaandcontinued through empires” building “ his successors, as well as in other dynasties in Rhegion andAcragas. Therace for power demanded money andmanpower not available to the aristocratic families; other forces joined thecause of thetyrants. Another innovation which originated on the mainland andcaused substantial upheaval in theWest wasPythagoreanism. Pythagoras began to gather disciples in Croton at the same time tyranny wasintroduced andchanged thecity’s regime. His teachings, political andotherwise, stirred updivision as they spread throughout the cities of southern Italy. Theruling elites felt their superiority threatened. It would be nearly a century before thepower of thePythagoreans’followers wasrestrained. Thesixties of thefifth century ushered ina newepoch. M.I. Finley rightly called it a “democratic interlude” , during which the demise of tyranny was universal. Obviously, given the geographical proximity andcultural connections among the cities, a “domino effect”wasatwork. Thestasis which forced theremoval of tyrants reveal the fundamental problems which were caused by tyrants andwhich would occupy theWest forthenext twocenturies: social instability andtheinterference of non-Greek peoples in Greek affairs. Democracy could function for a while since it broadened the body politic. This wasan age of relative openess, during which the demos asa definite group gained a central share inpolitical power. But, theincrease in the number of people andgroups involved in local politics further intensified the instability of the social structure in the cities. The victory over the Athenians reasserted Syracuse’s position as leader of the Greeks in the West but it also proved a test of the democracy’s strength in the city. Syracuse as well as other cities pushed their resources to the limit andwere further challenged by threats from within. These pressures, augmented by the defeat at the hands of theCarthaginians in409, presented opportunities toambitious persons. The NewTyranny”thus came into being. “ Tyrants become arecurrent feature insubsequent history, replacing civic regimes or supplanting other tyrannies. In fact, until the Romans overpowered the island, tyranny wasthemostcommon formofgovernment. Intworespects tyrannies adopted features emerging later in theEast aswell. TheSyracusan tyrants began to shape a territorial empire, andacted in a fashion which could earn themthetitle “ Hellenistic monarchs” . During theprocess of decline, a rift steadily grew between Sicily andsouthern Italy on the one hand and Greece on the other. Although the ties were never

110

Conclusion

completely severed, local developments no longer corresponded to events in the Aegean. Indifference to Alexander the Great is the perfect example; Carthage emerged asthethreatening rival of theGreeks. InItaly, thedecline wasevenmore drastic as the Greek cities already started to succumb one by one to local peoples in thefifth andearly fourth centuries. By thistime theSicilian andsouthern Italian poleis wereoccupied withproblems different fromthose ofpoleis of theAegean, andstaseis reflected these problems.

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TABLES Table

1: List of Staseis

CITY Acragas

NUMBER

1

2 3

4

Catane Croton

Cumae

Gela

5 6 7 8 9

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

20 Leontinoi

Locri Ep. Megara Hyb. Metapontum Pithecoussai Rhegion

Selinus Sybaris/Thurii

Syracuse

21

22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42

DATE

PAGE

570 550 488 472 413 394

15 16 16 17 17 17 18 18 19 19

314 307

466

510 494 440 317 504

491 600 505 498 491 406 608 422 346 483 413 8 cent. 493 461 425 508 505 720 511 446 434 413 413

? ? 650

491

20 20 21 22 23 23 24 24 25 25 25 26 27 27 28 28 29 29 30 30 30 31 32 32 33 33 33 33 34 34 35 35 ?

118 CITY

Taras Zancle/Messana

Tables

NUMBER

DATE

PAGE

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72

467 466 453 412 408 405 405 404 396 357 354 353 352 346 345 343 317 310 305 289 288 279 278 275 473 461 424 415 399 394

36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 47 47 47 47 47 48 49 50 50 51 51 52 52 52 53 54 54 55 55 56

Table 2: Non-Civic Interference

a. Syracuse NUMBER

42 43 44 47

48 49 50 51 52

LOCAL CITIES

MOTHERLAND

Kyllirioi Sicels Sicels

**

Carthage/ Persia Carthage Carthage

Gela Rhegion/Messana

NONGREEKS

Sparta/Corinth Sparta Sparta/Academy

Carthage Carthage

119

Tables

NUMBER

53 57 58

LOCAL CITIES

MOTHERLAND

NONGREEKS

Athens (Callippus)

Rhegion

Corinth

Carthage Carthage/

Sicels

59

Corinth

Carthage/

Sicels

60 61 65

**

Carthage Carthage Pyrrhus

Catane, Gela, Acragas, Selinus, Himera, Messana, Rhegion

b. Other cities Acragas

1 4 6 7

8

Sicans Syracuse

Syracuse Syracuse

Sparta

Carthage Carthage

Catane

9

Sicels

Syracuse

Croton

12 13

Achaea Bruttians

Cumae

14

Etruscans/ Aricians Etruscans/ Italians

15 Gela

16

20

Sicans Syracuse

Sparta

Carthage

Leontinoi

22

Syracuse

Megara

24

Syracuse

Rhegion

29

Locri

Selinus

30 31

Sparta

Carthage

Syb/Thurii

33 35 36

Croton Athens/Delphi/Sparta Athens

Taras

67

Iapygians

120

Tables

LOCAL CITIES

NUMBER

NONGREEKS

MOTHERLAND

Messana

69 70 71 72

Table

Syracuse/Locri

Athens

Rhegion Rhegion

3:

Mercenaries

CITY

Acragas

NUMBER

1

Sicans

3

4 Catane Croton Cumae

NONGREEK

GREEK

9

Himeraeians

yes

Sicels

13 14

Italians Campanians; Etruscans; Aricians

15

Rhegion Syracuse

28 43 44 47 48

49 50 52 53 54

?

Dorians

?

Sicels ?

yes Spartans Greeks

andother

yes: Sicels, Italians, Campanians

yes

Sicels

yes

55

56 57

yes(inPunic service)

58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 Zancle-Messana

68

Sicels, Italians

? ? ?

Mamértini

Sicels

yes

=

“ General Settlement” , mostly non-Greek. ?

121

Tables

Table 4: Exile CITY Acragas

Catane

Gela

NUMBER

2

4

7 8 9

16

Leontinoi Megara

22 24

Zancle

68

Croton

10 11 12 13 14 15

EVENT aristocrats return to the city (?). return of exiles according to thekoinon dogma.

interference

ofSyracusan exiles.

return of Chalcidian settlers. group ofcitizens retire toMactorion.

exiles from the city in Euboia. aristocracy moves toSyracuse; demos sold into slavery. return of exiles according to the koinon dogma.

Cumae

Pithecoussai Rhegion

Syb.-Thurii

Syracuse

26 28 29 32 33

exile of Pythagoras. return ofexiles withCleinias. removal

ofPythagoreans.

exiles dwelling inThurii attack thecity. exile of the aristocracy. return ofthearistocracy.

?

of Chalcidians. exiles dwelling in Locri attack the city. exile oftheTroizenians. exile of the aristocacy; they move to return

Croton.

34 36 37

exile of the “old” Sybarites. exile ofanti-Athenians. exile of pro-Atheinas.

40 42 44

exile of the Myletidai. exile of the Gamoroi. return of exiles according

to thekoinon

dogma.

56 57

exile ofenfranchised mercenaries. Hermocrates’return fromexile. Dionysius forces a decision toaccept exiles back. exile of thecavalry. return of the cavalry; exile of more citizens. exile of Dionysius theYounger; return of Dion. exile ofaristocracy toLeontinoi. theexile Hipparinos returns fromLeontionoitobecome tyrant. return of Dionysius theYounger. return of Hicetas fromLeontinoi to seize

58

power. return ofaristocrats withTimoleon

47 48 49 50

52 54

55

=

Leontinoi.

from

122

Tables

CITY

NUMBER

EVENT

59

a sequence ofexile andreturn ofAgathoc-

lesandhisrivals upto317. exiles useDiognetus tostir upa coup. thewaroftheexiles, headed byDeinocrates,against Agathocles. exile ofenfranchised mercenaries.

60 61

63

Table 5: “ Class Conflict” Demos

vs.Aristocracy

Poor vs. Rich

Leontinoi Megara Hyblaea Zancle

20 22 24 71

Croton Cumae Thurii

13 14 33, 38

33

Syracuse

42, 46, 48, 52

45, 59

FROM...

TO...

Gela

Table

6: Metabole

NUMBER

2 3

4 14 15 17 21 27

28

31 33 37 38 42 43 46 48 52 53

58 59

tyranny

aristocracy

(?)

tyranny

aristocracy tyranny

democracy (aristocracy?)

aristocracy

tyranny

tyranny

aristocracy

aristocracy aristocracy aristocracy

tyranny tyranny tyranny

tyranny

democracy (aristocracy?)

?

aristocracy democracy aristocracy aristocracy tyranny

democracy (polity) democracy tyranny democracy tyranny democracy

tyranny tyranny

aristocracy democracy democracy democracy (polity) democracy (extreme) tyranny democracy tyranny democracy tyranny

123

Tables

NUMBER

FROM...

TO...

62 66 67 68

tyranny democracy polity tyranny

democracy tyranny democracy democracy

Table

7: Ethnic

diferences

9

Catane

16

Gela Pithecoussai Rhegion

Sy.-Thurii Zancle

26 27 28

29 32 35 68 69 70 71

Table

=

8: Economic

Syracuse

Gela

Dorians vs. Chalcidians. Dorians fromdifferent locations. Chalcidians vs.Euboians. Messenians vs.Chalcidians. Messenians, Chalcidians andother Dorians. Dorians vs.Chalcidians. Achaeans vs.Troizenians. Ionians vs.Dorians. Different ethnic groups, including nonGreeks. Chalcidians vs.Dorians.

Factors LAND

PROPERTY

44 45 49 52 59

44 45 49

Leontinoi

22

Croton Cumae Syb.-Thurii

10 14

33 (?) 34 38

52

DEBTS

59

20

33

14

INDEX Acestorides 49; 84 Achaea 19; 20; 21 n. 44; 31; 105 97 Achradina 38; 40; 96– 18; 25; 36; 37; 51; 56; 60; 67; 71; Acragas 15–

72; 74; 77; 81; 83; 84; 85; 94; 98; 108; 109

Acrai 35; 75; 97 Acrotatus 18; 83 Adranon 48; 78 Aeneas Tacticus 86 Aetna 19; 42; 43; 51; 76 52; Agathocles, tyrant of Syracuse 18; 21; 49–

58; 80; 81; 84; 85; 89; 93; 95; 97; 98; 100; 103; 104; 105

Agathocles, sonof tyrant 51 Agathocles, politician 6 cent. 35 Agyrium 12; 44 n. 232 Aimnetus 78 Ainesidamos 26 n. 83 Alcamenes 16 Alcandros 16 Alcibiades 9; 55; 84 Alexander theGreat 98; 102; 110 Anaxilas 20 n. 39; 29; 54; 90 Anaxiladai 29; 54; 86 Antandros 50 Apollocrates 27; 46 Archegetus 51 Aricians 22; 82 82; 89; 91; 95; 23; 57; 58; 81– Aristodemos 22–

97; 103 12; 13; 15; 26; 31; 33; 34; 35; 36; 37; 39; 53; 57; 58; 60; 65; 69; 82; 89; 108; 109 Aristus 86 Aristotle

Artemidorus 52 Athens 11; 17; 21 n. 44; 26 n. 84; 28; 30; 32;

33; 39; 54; 55; 57; 69; 70; 81; 83; 84; 85; 94; 102; 103

Bacchaidai 34 Bolkon 77 Bruttians

21; 49; 82

CaleActe 77 Callippus 46; 47; 84 Camarina 18; 38; 60; 72

82; 91; 92; 100 Campania 43; 68; 75; 81– Capua 23 Casmenai 35; 36; 75; 97 19; 29; 36; 56; 76; 84; 103 Catane 18– Caulonia 21 n.44 Cephalodium 51 Chalcidian/s 18; 29; 30; 54; 55; 56; 60; 75; 85

Chalcis 28; 29; 54 Chariton 16

Charondas 18; 29 Charthage (Carthaginians)

9; 17;25; 30; 31;40; 81; 41; 42; 44; 48; 49; 50; 56; 71; 72; 78– 83; 86; 90; 91; 94; 98; 103; 105; 107; 109; 110

Cleandros 24 Cleinias 20 Corcyra 33 n. 147; 34 Corinth 33n. 147; 34; 35 n. 172; 44; 48; 49; 77;

84 83–

Crete 23 21; 31; 32; 49; 67; 70; 73; 82; 103; Croton 19–

109

28; 54; 67; 73; 74; 81– 82; 94; 97; 100; 101; 102;

23; Cumae 22– Cylon 19

Damarate 17 n. 19 Daemarchus 40 n.210 Damas 49 Daphnaeus 40 n.210 Daunians 82 51; 80; 98 Deinocrates 50– Deinomenidai 17; 23 n. 66; 24; 25; 36; 38; 39;

67; 71; 76; 85; 90

Delphi 16; 33; 105 demagogia 26; 57 76 Demeter, cult of 24; 75– Demosthenes 33 Diocles, politician 5 cent. 39;40 Diodes, leader of„ SixHundred“49 Diodorus 12; 16; 17; 19 n. 30; 21 n. 49; 25 n.

74; 32n. 134; 37; 39; 43; 48 n.258; 49; 51 n. 277; 64 n. 16; 69; 72; 76; 77; 78; 79; 85; 90; 95; 99; 103n.67

Diognetus, politician Megra Hyblaea

27

126

Index

Diognetus, agitator

4 cent. 50

Dion 27; 45– 47; 48; 65; 71; 72; 80; 83; 84; 88; 91; 92; 93; 96; 99; 100; 102; 104 45; 55; 56; Dionysius theElder 17; 25; 40; 41–

57; 58; 68; 71; 72; 78; 79; 81; 83; 84; 85; 88; 89; 91; 92 n.27; 93; 94; 95; 97; 98; 99; 100; 103; 104; 105

Dionysius the Younger 27; 45– 47; 48; 65; 80;

84; 92; 96; 99

Dionysius of Halicarnassus 20; 23; 67 Dorians –Doric 18; 27; 29; 30; 54; 55; 56; 60;

75; 83; 85; 86

Dorieus 24; 30; 31 Doris 27; 56 n. 325 Doriscus 43 Ducetius 19; 37; 76– 78; 103

17; 20; 22; 27; 44; 45; 50; 51; 56; 59; 69; 101 Elymians 9; 74 Emmenidai 16; 86 eleutheria (Liberty)

Empedocles

Enna 18; 78

17

Entella 68; 78 Epaminondas 20 n.44 Eretria 28 Etruria 22; 31; 71; 74 82; 86; 91 Etruscans 9; 22; 81– Euboia 26; 102 Euboia, Sicilian 38; 72 Euryleon 30 Eurymedon 33

Exile / Exiles 11n.3; 18;20; 21; 22; 23; 26; 27;

28; 30; 31; 32; 36; 39; 41; 42; 48; 50; 56; 103 85; 88; 102–

Friends (hoiphiloi)

105 68; 104–

40; 42; 43; 47; 52; 58; 65;

Gaisylos 83 Gamoroi 34; 35; 36; 38; 64; 66; 72; 75; 97 Gauls 91

25; 27; 35 n. 172; 37; 41; 42; 43; Gela 18; 23– 64; 85; 94; 101; 102; 108 Gelon 17 n. 19; 24; 25; 28; 35 n. 172; 36; 38;

64; 72; 75; 76

Gorgias 21 n.44 Gylippus 33 n. 151 Hamilcar 50 Hellenization Heloris 56

78; 81; 91; 92 26; 68; 72; 74; 75–

Helots 36; 53; 76 Heracleia Minoa 45; 80 47; 65; 80; 83; 102 Heracleides 45– Heracleides, leader „ SixHundred“49 Heracleides Ponticus 32n. 138 Herbita 49 Herbessos 43 Hermocrates 39; 40; 42; 79; 105 Herodotus 13; 16; 24; 27; 30; 35 48, 78; 80; 92; 99 Hicetas, tyrant 4 cent. 47– Hicetas, tyrant 3 cent. 52 Hieron I 17; 18; 19; 36; 37; 38; 76 53; 91; 105; 108 Hieron II 52– Himera 31; 34; 37; 40; 60; 72; 102 Hipparinus, father of Dion 42 n.218; 45 Hipparinus, tyrant 47 Hippocrates 24; 25; 35 n. 172; 54; 109 homonoia 101 Hundred, the 67 Hybla 24 n. 70; 25; 35 n. 172; 79

Iapygians 53; 82 isegoria 22 isonomia 69 Iustinus 51 n. 277

Kyllirioi

35; 36; 38; 65; 72; 75; 97

Laomedon Leontinoi

55

26; 33 n. 147; 41; 18; 21 n. 44; 25– 45; 46; 47; 48; 85; 89; 92; 98; 102; 103; 108 Leptines, brother ofDionysius theElder 44 Leptines, father in lawof Hieron II 52 Locri Epizephirii 19;27; 30; 37; 45; 47; 54; 56; 67; 85 Lysias 33n. 152 Lysis 20 n. 44 Mactorion 24; 102; 103; 108 Mago 44 n.232; 80

Mamertini 51; 52 n. 284 Mandamus 21 Margena 52 Medma 56 Melanippus 16 mercenaries 15; 16; 17; 21; 25; 29; 36; 37; 38;

40; 42; 43; 45; 46; 47; 48; 49; 51; 52; 53; 54; 63; 65; 68; 72; 73; 77; 78; 80; 88; 92; 98; 104; 107; 108 89– Metapontum 20; 28 Megara

17

127

Index

Megara Hyblaea

28; 30; 31; 38; 72; 74; 25; 27–

103 Menon 51; 52 Messana see: Zancle-Messana

Messenians 29; 54 Milesians 54

22; 25; 41; 46; 49; 53; 56; 58; 65

Milo 20; 60

Molossos 24 n.67 Morgantina 49; 75; 76 Motion 77 Motya 40 Myketos 53 n. 292; 54 n. 305 Mylai 56 Myletidai 34; 60; 63; 102; 108 Myskelos 31 n. 131 Nakona 78 Naupactus 56 Naxoa 18;25; 56; 74 neapolis, neighborhood Nissaeus 47

of Syracuse 97

Oecist (Founder) 33; 60; 63; 75; 105 Olympia 25 n.74; 26; 28; 31 Omphake 75 Ortygia 27; 36; 37; 38; 41; 42; 43; 45; 46; 48;

96; 99; 105 22

Oscans

Paesarchus

49

Palici 76; 77

Pausanias 13; 25 n. 74; 35 n. 172; 52 n. 284 Phalaris 15; 16; 57; 72; 90; 108 Panaetius 25; 26; 57; 108 Panormus 40 Paron 21 patrios politela 23; 101 Penestai 36; 75 Persia 81; 86 petalismos 39; 64; 103 Pharacidas 83 Pharax 83 Pharnabazus 40 Philistis 52 Philistus 12; 41; 43; 44; 45 Phoenicians 31; 79 Pindarus 16 29; 74; 102; 108 Pithecoussai 28– Plato 45; 102 Plutarchus 21 n.44; 23; 48 n. 258; 72; 78; 80;

96

Polyaenus

Polybius 20 n.44; 21 n.47; 52 n.284; 53n.288 politographia 39; 59; 60 Polyzalos 17 n. 19 Poseidonia 31 n. 30; 102 prostates tou demou (protector of the demos)

15; 16; 25; 26; 27; 30; 39; 72; 90

Pyrrhus 52; 53 Pythagoras 32; 109 Pythagoreans 19; 20; 21; 30; 60; 102; 105; 109

56; 30; 33 n. 147; 43; 49; 54– 27; 29– 67; 84; 85; 86; 98; 109 Rhodes 23 Rome 31; 82; 92; 109

Rhegion

Sabyllos 24 Samians 54 Samnites 22; 81; 92 78; 31; 37; 40; 71; 73; 74; 76– Selinus 28; 30–

98; 97; 103 9; 15n.4; 24; 75; 90 76; 103 9; 17; 19; 25; 26; 37; 39; 49; 75– SixHundred, the 38; 49; 67; 81 Sossistratus, leader „ Six Hundred“49 Sossistratus, tyrant of Acragas 52 83; Sparta 11;25; 33; 39; 44; 46; 47; 53; 54; 82– 84 Strabo 13; 28 strategos autokrator 22; 41; 42; 45; 46; 47; 49; 95; 101 50; 68; 94– 32; 59; 94; 102; 103; Sybaris 19; 20 n. 44; 31– 105; 108 Syracuse 9; 17; 18; 21; 25; 26; 27; 30; 34– 53; 54; 55; 56; 59; 60; 63; 64; 65; 67; 68; 69; 70; 71; 72; 74; 75; 76; 77; 80; 81; 82; 83; 98; 99; 84; 85; 88; 90; 91; 92; 93; 95; 96– 100; 101; 102; 103; 104; 105; 109 Sicans Sicels

Taras-Tarentum 21; 27; 49; 53; 82 Tarquinius Superbus 82 Tauromenion 17;44 n. 232; 56 Telines 23 n. 66; 24; 76

Telos 23; 24 n. 67 Telys 32; 58; 94 Thermai 51

Theodorus 44; 79; 84; 93 Theoxenis 51 n. 277 Theron, sonofAinesidamos 16; 17;90 Theron, sonof Miltiades 30 Thessaly 36; 75 thesmophoria 15 Thousand, the 17; 20; 29; 67

128

Index

Thracians 26 37; 38 Thrasybulus 19; 36– Thrasydaeus 17 Thucydides 9; 10; 13; 17; 26 n. 84; 28; 39; 60;

69; 72; 86; 88; 89 34; 59; 68; 20 n.44; 21; 23 n.66; 28; 32– 84; 85; 89; 94; 101; 105 Timaeus 12; 16; 44 49; 72; 78; 80; 83; 88; 92; 99; Timoleon 18;48–

Tyndaris

56 n. 320

Umbrians

82

Volscans

85

Thurii

100; 102

Toinon 52 Troizen 31; 102 tyche, neighborhood 39 Tyndarides 38–

Xenocrates Xenodocus

16 18

Zancle-Messana

17; 28; 29; 43; 50; 51; 52;

56; 60; 77; 84; 85; 89; 91; 94; 98; 101; 54–

of Syracuse 97

104

Zancthus 56 ZeusEleutherios

37; 59; 69; 77; 101

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5 5387– MaximusAugustus. Herrschaftspropaganda inder zeitgenössischen Überlieferung. 1990. 320S., kt. DM76,1 5568– 65. Marinus A.Wes: Michael Rostovtzeff, Historian in Exile. Russian Roots in an American Context. 1990. XXXI, 106 S., Frontispiz u. 13 Fot. auf 12 Taf. i. Anh., kt. DM46,– 5664– 5 66. Edward Dabrowa: Legio XFretensis. AProsopographical Study ofitsOfficers (I-III Centuries A.D.). 1992. Ca. 120 S., kt., ca. DM58,5 5809– 67. Angelika Mette-Dittmann: Die Ehegesetze desAugustus. Eine Untersuchung imRahmen der Gesellschaftspolitik des Princeps. 1991. 220 S., kt. DM68,1 5876– 68. RalfUrban: DerKönigsfrieden von387/86 v. Chr.Vorgeschichte, Zustandekommen, Ergebnis undpolitische Umsetzung. 1991. 203 S., kt., DM66,5924– 5 69. Stefan Link: Landverteilung undsozialer Frieden imarchaischen Griechenland. 1991. 5954– 189 S., kt. DM64,– 7 70. Sigrid Mratschek-Halfmann: Divites et

64. Thomas Grünewald: Constantinus

Praepotentes. 1992. Ca. 350 S., kt., ca. DM 5973– 126,– 3 71. Shiomo Berger: Revolution andSociety in Greek Sicily andSouthern Italy. 1992. 123S., kt., DM58,-

5959– 8

72. Stefan Rebenich: Hieronymus und sein Kreis. Prosographische undsozialgeschichtlicheUntersuchungen. 1992. Ca.300 S., kt.,ca.

DM126,–

6086– 3

73. Klaus Tausend: Amphiktyonie undSymma-

chie. Formen zwischenstaatlicher Beziehungenimarchaischen Griechenland. 1992. VIII, 273 S., kt., DM120,– 6137– 1 74. William T.Loomis: TheSpartan WarFund: IGV 1,1 and a NewFragment. 1992. 84 S., 17 Taf., kt., DM58,6147– 9 75. KarlStrobel: DasImperium Romanum im‚3. Jahrhundert‘. Modell einer historischen Krise? 1992. Ca. 320 S., kt. ca. DM78,– 5662– 9 76. Christopher Tuplin: The Failings of Empire: AReading of Xenophon. 1992. Ca. 300 S., kt. 5912– ca. DM126,– 1

5240–2

59. Lukas Thommen: Das Volkstribunat der

späten Römischen Republik. 1988. 287 S., kt. DM66,5187–2 60. Heinz E. Herzig / Regula Frei-Stolba, Hrsg.:

Labor omnibus unus. Gerold Walser zum70. Geburtstag dargebracht vonFreunden, Kolle-

gen und Schülern. 1989. XVI, 278 S., kt. DM 90,4393–4 Preisänderungen vorbehalten

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