Revolution and Counterrevolution in Central America and the Caribbean 0865315507, 9780865315501
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Revolution and Counterrevolution in Central America and the Caribbean
Also of Interest ^Revolution in Central America3
edited by Stanford Central America
Action Network
*The End and the Beginning: The Nicaraguan Revolution3 *The New Cuban Presence in the Caribbean3
John A.
edited by Barry B.
Booth
Levine
*Latin America3 Its Problems and Its Promise: A Multidisciplinary Introduction3 edited by Jan Knippers Black *Latin American Foreign Policies: Global and Regional Dimensions3 edited by Elizabeth G.
Ferris and Jennie K.
*FOREIGN POLICY on Latin Amervca3 Foreign Policy
1970-19803
Lincoln edited by the
staff of
*The Caribbean Challenge: U.S. Policy in a Volatile Region3 H.
edited by
Michael Erisman
*From Dependency to Development: Strategies to Overcome Underdevelopment and Inequality3 edited by Heraldo Munoz *Latin America Nations in World Politics3 Joseph S.
edited by Heraldo Munoz and
Tulchin
Political Change in Central America: Internal and External Dimensions3 edited by Wolf Grabendorff,
Heinrich-W.
Krumwiede,
and Jorg Todt
Colossus Challenged: A Struggle for Caribbean Influence3 H.
Michael Erisman and John D.
edited by
Martz
PROFILES OF CONTEMPORARY LATIN AMERICA:
*Cuba: Dilemmas of a Revolution3
Juan M.
del Aguila
*The Dominican Republic: A Caribbean Crucible3 Howard J. Wiarda and Michael J.
Kryzanek
*Mexico: Paradoxes of Stability and Change3
Daniel Levy and Gabriel
Szekely
Honduras: Caudillo Politics and Military Rulers3 James A. Morris Nicaragua: The Land of Sandino3
Thomas
*Available in hardcover and paperback.
w.
Walker
Westview Special Studies on Latin America and the Caribbean Revolution and Counterrevolution in Central America and the Caribbean edited by Donald E. Schulz and Douglas H. Graham A detailed revolution the
in Central
research of
authors causes
give of
examination of
an
America
special
stability
and
Roman Catholic
and
a
oligarchy,
socioeconomic
looks The
troubled
Donald
is
to
Soviet,
the
the
and
reform;
employed
the
politics
to
the
The
Honduras,
Costa
and U.S.
of
the
the problems
subsistence; chapters,
situations
Rica,
and
a
in
El
and Jamaica,
dimensions policies
changing
the military and
thematic
assess
the
sector;
concluding chapter explores prospects
of
the
toward for
crisis
the
the
region.
future
of
area.
E.
Schulz
University of
professor
of
business
international
Cuban,
crisis;
influence
the
is
Tampa.
assistant professor He
is
coeditor
ical Participation in Communist Systems Policy Toward Southeast Asia3 1954-1969 is
economic
Following
Nicaragua,
devoted
at Mexican,
editors'
this
focus
Guatemala,
section
current
church;
revolutionary opposition.
Salvador,
the
the
the
scholars.
on
traditional
the
country-by-country
team of noted
book draws
the
of
the
this
counter-
instability--in particular,
role
instituting
Caribbean,
and
structural
States;
the
revolution
and
United
to
of
institutional
the
of
and the
attention
of
forces,
roots
interdisciplinary
role
security
the
of
agricultural
(1981) (1970). and
Jan
S.
Adams)
and
author
Douglas
director of
the
Latin
rick)
Population and Economic Development in Brazil1800 to the
Present
(1979).
is
coauthor
for
Graham
Ohio
He
Center
H.
PolitCommunist
Studies,
University.
Undergraduate
of
at
of
Studies
State
the
(with
science
American
of
program at
economics
of political
International
(with Thomas W.
Mer-
V
Revolution and Counterrevolution in Central America and the Caribbean edited by Donald E. Schulz and Douglas H. Graham
Westview Press / Boulder and London
Westview Special Studies on Latin America and the Caribbean
All
rights
mitted
in
reserved. any
No part of this publication may be
form or by
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recording,
or
permission
in writing
from the publisher.
Copyright
Published 5500
©
in
1984
1984
in the United
Library of Congress ISBN:
0-86531-550-7
ISBN:
0-86531-551-5
Composition
10
9
for
7
Boulder,
and
States
Colorado
80301;
Frederick A.
84-50988
(pbk.)
4
3
2
system,
of America by Westview Press,
Catalog Card Number:
5
retrieval
including without
Inc.
editors
in the United States of America
6
reproduced or trans-
or mechanical,
storage
this book was provided by the
and bound
8
information
by Westview Press,
Central Avenue,
Printed
any
electronic
1
Praeger,
Inc., Publisher
Contents Preface
xiii
PART
1.
1
Ten Theories in Reality, Donald (1)
(2)
Structural and Institutional and Instability
Search of E. Schulz
Sources
Central
of
Stability
American
The Theory of Economic Development: petitive Exclusion and Rural-Urban Underemployment Demographic Theory: The Population
3 Com-
Explosion (3) Psychoeconomic Theory: Relative Deprivation, Rising Expectations, and Economic Crisis. . ,(4) The Theory of Political Development: J Structural Petrification and Political Decay (5) Elites and Interest Groups: Liberation '-J Theologians, Reactionary Despots, and Revolutionary Zealots ..... (6) The Theory of Process: Reform, Repression, and the Dialectic of Revolution (7) The Domino Theory: Foreign Communist Aggression or Mutual Escalation?. \(8) Theories of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism: Is Nicaragua "Another Cuba"?.*’"'. (9) The United States as a Destabilizing Force: The Strategy of Conflict and the Politics of Counterproductivity (10) The Quagmire Thesis: The Internationalization and Regionalization of Conflict . . The United States and Central America: On Illusions, Realities, and No-Win Situations Notes
Vll
4 8 12
21
23 27 35 39
44 51 55 57
VI11
2 The
United
States
and
the
Historical
Perspective,
The
States
United
and
Caribbean
Thomas
the
L.
Basin
in
Karnes.
Caribbean
...
Basin
65
in
the
Nineteenth
Century
67
The
Era
of
Imperialism
69
The
Era
of
Hegemony
80 86 88
Conclusion Notes
3 Autumn The
of
the
Oligarchs,
Paul
Heath
Hoeffel
.
.
93 95
Antecedents
Independence The
Century
of
The
Challenge
The
Modern
91
the of
Oligarchs:
the
Period:
1880-1980
....
Depression
Imposing
96
100
the
Impossible,
1944-84
102
New Structures
105
The
108
Turning
Point
113 115
Conclusion Notes
x 4 Revolution
and
Counterrevolution
American Church, The
in
the
Central
Penny Lernoux
117
Women
120
The Awakening
121
The
124
Investigation
Revolution
and
the
Church
125
El Salvador ) Nicaragua
127 132 141 152
^Guatemala
Notes 5 The
Economic
cline
in
Dimensions
Central
of
America
Douglas H.
Graham
Historical
Legacy
Instability
and
the
and
De-
Caribbean,
157 and
Important
Regional
157
Contrasts The
Empirical and
The
Change
of
Growth 161
and
Policy
Response:
Evidence 165
Needs
and
forms
Dimension
Conclusions:
and
Foreign Notes
Decades
Issues
Basic
Summary
Two
Decline
Economic and
Record:
the
Aid
and
Agriculture
Domestic
Limitations
of
Policy
.
.
.
171
Re-
Extensive
177 182
IX
PART
2.
Stability
and
6
El
Salvador:
Revolution
in
the
Living
Structural
Instability:
Museum,
and
Country
Focus
Counterrevolution
Donald
Petrification
A
E.
and
Schulz
the
189
Crisis
of
"Development": The Socioeconomic Dimension. Structural Petrification and the Crisis of
190
"Development": The Political Structural Petrification and the
194
Revolution: Living The
The
Dimension. . Dialectic of
Disintegration
of
.
the
Museum
Politics
of
201
Reform
and
the
Structure
of
Counterrevolution Repression with Reform The
Opposition:
The
205 211
Struggle
for
Unity
and
Power
The
"Final
Offensive":
The
Reagan
Administration
the of On
Strategy
of
Prelude and
Conflict
to El
Showdown. Salvador:
and
the
.
Escalation
Politics 225
and
the
"Dance
of
Cert-
ification" On
Strategy:
Military
The
The
Guillermo Fear
and
231 Elections
Disintegration
Power:
Decline
Loathing
The
Politics
The
Future
234
and and
the Fall
Struggle of
for
Jose
Garcia
position.
.
.
of
in
239 the
Revolutionary
Op-
.
243
Escalation
245 254
Notes
263
Guatemala:
The
Terrorism,
Gordon
The
Origins L.
Socioeconomic
and
Development
of
State
Bowen
Context
269 of
Guatemalan
Politics Revolution The
Revolution
270
from
Formation State,
Above,
of
the
1944-54
273
Counterrevolutionary
1954-66 from
Guatemalan The
275
Below: Style,
Counterinsurgency 1966-70
Institutionalization
of
280
State
Terrorism,
1970-84 State
Terrorism
the Notes
215 221
On
Counterproductivity
Strategy:
.
1980s
283 and
American
Foreign
Policy
in 294 297
X
8 The Revolution in Nicaragua: of
History,
John A.
Through
a
Booth
Frontier 301
Insurrection and Revolution Origins of the Somoza Dynasty
302 302
Socioeconomic Change and the Rise of Opposition The Insurrection Sandinista Nicaragua: The New Political Order The Revolutionary Government
304 306 . 308 308
Public Policy Culture Economic Policy Domestic Policy Problems
310 312
313 315
Socioeconomic Policy and the Working Classes The Role of the Private Sector ) Political Opposition and Pluralism Foreign Affairs Prospects Notes
9 Honduras: Bastion Mark B. Rosenberg
of
315 318 320 325 328
329
Stability or Quagmire?
331
The Regional Setting The Return to Civilian Government in Honduras U.S. Policy and Stabilization Through Mili-
332 . 334
tarization United States Policy and Military Relations The Refugee Situation
336
Quagmire Notes
10 Fear
of
or
Honduran
Civil-
339 343
Sideshow?
346
343 Adjusting:
Policies in Costa Gonzalez-Vega
The Rica
Social
Costs
in
1970s,
the
of
Economic
Claudio
351
The Nature of the Shocks Structural Background Gradual Stagnation Protectionism and Rigidity Factor Prices and Employment Equity and the Size of the Public
352
353 354 355 357 Sector.
Terms-of-Trade Instability Policy Responses Postponing the Adjustment Impoverishment: Paralysis Political Costs Notes Statistical
The
Annex
Social
.
.
.
359
362 364 366 Costs
of
Policy 368 369 370
373
XI
11
Jamaica:
From Manley
to
Seaga,
The Parties and Ideology The Policy Differences JLP Policies and Impact Public Opinion Reactions Conclusion Notes
PART
3.
The
12
Mexican
International
Policy
Caribbean,
M.
the
Stone
.
.
.
385
387 392 403 411
JLP
415 449
Dimensions
Toward
Dennis
to
Carl
Central
of
the
America
Crisis
and
the
Hanratty
423
Critical Determinants in the Formulation of Mexican Foreign Policy 424 Mexican Policy Toward Cuba, 1960-64 ...... 427 Foreign Policy Shifts Under Luis Echeverria . . 429 The Lopez Portillo Government: The Quest for a Central American and Caribbean Policy . . 431 Conclusion Notes
13 Soviet Robert
and Prospects
the
Future
....
442
445
and S.
for
Cuban
Policy
in
the
Caribbean
Basin,
447
Leiken
The Geopoliticization of the Caribbean. .... 448 The Evolution of Soviet Policy 451 The Sovietization of Cuba 456 The Soviet Union and Cuba in Central America. . 458 Nicaragua 458 El Salvador 460 Cuba in the Caribbean 461 Reaction to Cuban-Soviet Expansionism 464 Soviet-Cuban Reaction to the U.S. Counteroffensive ........ 469 Conclusion 472 Notes 473
14 Reagan's the
Central
Making,
Wayne
American S.
Smith
Policy:
Disaster
in 479
The Situation as of January 1981 479 The Reagan Administration's Perceptions .... 483 The Administration's Initial Approach 485 Renewed Emphasis on Human Rights and Social Reforms 489 . . .And a Lowering of Rhetoric 490 Continuity of Basic Approach 492 Nicaragua 495
xii
15
Conclusions Notes
496 499
Postscript: Toward a New Central American Policy, Donald E. Schulz
501
El Salvador: The "Zimbabwe Option" Nicaragua and Cuba: The Strategy of Coexistence Conclusions Notes
List of Abbreviations About the Authors Index
503 510 515 517
519 522 524
Preface Americans are a fashionable people. They exchanqe crises like last year's old clothes, responding to
tneir the
latest
catchy
slogans
"window so
political
of
as
"domino
But well
vulnerability,"
the
up
as
solely
crisis
in
a
in
as
the It
"another
"supply-side
terms
realistic and
ordinary
as
of
by
such
Vietnam,"
economics,"
and
either
of
turmoil.
the
the
and
frame
reference.
truths;
at
engaging This
that
any
current crisis
radical—have
worst, in
book
is
crisis in
the
to
its
be
to
on
as
military, be
understood
causation
interests
this time,
region it
is
failed
to
or
foreign
they
have
seriously two
Basin
an
of
extra-
effec-
necessary
or
an
to
is
partial
distorted
reality
perception. The
treatment far
too
military and
of
in
first
nature.
complex
political a
range
career of
is
the to
dimensions.
historians, diverse
adequate
offered
assumptions.
economists, a
in
provide
multidisciplinary
together
provide
as
cannot
selective
political
journalists,
attempt
in
comprehensive
Caribbean
brought
be
ideologies——conservative,
have
based
must
reduced tists,
they
U.S.
best,
wholesale
we
have
At
reasonably
It
same
standard
liberal,
cannot
all of these interrelated facets considered if we are to have any manner
that
well
domestic
pursuing At
Basin
multidimensional—social
as
constructive
recognize of
is
current.
Rather, must be
chance
Caribbean
political
well
intervention. of the problem tive
in
slogan.
economic,
historical
an
theory,"
infatuated
on.
summed
by
advertisements,
The be
Thus,
scien-
diplomat
in
professional
perspectives. Beyond this, however, we have also tried to be multi-ideological. No single Weltanschauung holds the
key
to
radicalism significant from
truth; all
conservatism,
contain
provide
the
ordinarily
important
limitations.
representatives volume lacking
of
with in
liberalism,
By all a
insights,
soliciting three
comprehensiveness
x 111
as
well
as
contributions
schools,
mono-ideological
and
we
hope
and
to
diversity
interpretations.
XIV
Stated another way/ our contributors tend to complement each other not only by concentrating on different problems but also by focusing on similar problems in different ways. The text is divided into three sections. In the first of these/ we deal with the structural and institutional sources of stability and instability—the changing roles of historical actors (the United States, the Roman Catholic Church, the oligarchy, and the military), the rise of new political forces (the middle class, proletariat, and peasantry), and the impact of the international economic system (especially the economic shocks experienced by the region in recent years). Some of these factors are dealt with at chapter length, others through subsections. In addition, a number of distinct theories and concepts (e.g., the theories of economic and political development, "competitive exclusion," the "population explosion," the "domino theory," the "dialectic of revolution") have been advanced in the academic and popular literature in an attempt to explain the sources and dynamics of change. These will be examined at length in an introductory overview chapter by one of the editors. The second section will employ a country focus. Here the primary emphasis will be on Central America— namely, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Costa Rica. Of the Caribbean island-states, only Jamaica, the most sophisticated, advanced, and instructive of the British Commonwealth countries, will be at least briefly treated in other chapters. The focus, in short, will be on the most important countries—in particular, those that have undergone, are currently undergoing, or are likely to undergo revolutionary turmoil. The Central American focus is justified in no more complex terms than that is where most of the action is . The third section deals with the international dimension of the crisis. We have chosen to concentrate on the crucial outside actors: the United States, the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Mexico. The U.S. role, in particular, is decisive. If, as is argued explicitly in the chapters by Schulz and implicitly by several other contributors, the United States has become a major destabilizing force in Central America, one fears for the future. A short postscript by Schulz suggests a possible alternative, but without much optimism that the necessary changes in policy will be adopted. For convenience, the term American will be used interchangeably with the United States throughout the text, even though, obviously, all of the hemisphere could claim the name American. Due to the limitations of our word-processing system, we were not able to insert diacritical marks such
XV
as accents and the like. We hope that the reader is not inconvenienced by their omission. Finally/ a note of thanks should be extended to all those who made this work possible. The Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology of The Ohio State University provided staff and facilities for the preparation of the final manuscript. The University of Tampa granted Donald Schulz a generous sum of money through its Faculty Development Program for the editing and indexing. Barbara Lee and Phyllis Seidel did the typing. Jill Loar was responsible for getting the material onto the word processor. Mrs. Lee coordinated the preparation of the manuscript and did much of the proofreading. These ladies are to be commended for their efforts and patience in putting up with all the frustrations that accompanied the assembling of this work.
Donald E. Sohulz Douglas H. Graham
v
Part 1 Structural and Institutional Sources of Stability and Instability
1 Ten Theories in Search of Central American Reality Donald E. Schulz
If hell, as Thomas Hobbes once said, is truth seen late, then the recent belated discovery of Central
too
America
by
engaging
the
United
a
quagmire
in
understood guessed.
and
whose
Prior
areas
of
State
Department
the
the
to
exception
of
under
rule
the
wracks
El
Rumors
of
in
will How
attempts gical
to
Central
set or
interrelated
years,
"is
adequate
grasp
and
a
is
number an
of the
some the
full
of
attempt Some
will
Honduras. in
interbrushfire
to
Colombia,
support
of
their
nightmare.
Only
become
a
reality.
developments?
as
As
so
settings,
much
as
they
Procrustean
reveal. ideolo-
perception
theories to
have
been
others Viron
as
of of
handle
to
presented
as
links This
an
introduc-
explana-
and
the
in
once
these
flawed
complexity
arguments
a
Vaky
else.")-*-
seriously
and
provide
prominent
3
spread
truth.
everything are
in
selective
exclusive,
most
strife
Honduras,
great
Cuba
into
("Everything,"
part
Although to
obscure
of
Mexico
ultimate
force-fit
to
and
from
these
military Civil
conversation a
of
notable
somnolent
southern
politicized
realities.
web.
examine
tions.
in
mutually
remarked,
the
the
organized,
States
in
few
backwater
the
exiles,
specter
casualty
forth
tion
and
highly
often
are
first
American
will
the
Reductionism
recent
monocausal
in
explain
The
been
States
by
threatens
cafe
isthmus
only
and
possibility
understand
happens
molds. In
have
to
phenomena
abound.
dominate
the
whether
one
(with
changed.
United
The
be
obscure
and
dimly
granted
regionalization--of
United
tell is
has
of
revolution,
perennially
sanctuaries
clients—remains
frequently Complex
and
yet
for An
Guatemala
war
only
oligarchies
that
the
as
region
seemed
by
from
sweeping the
respective
the
Tegucigalpa.
violence
time
and
impending
nationalization drawing
public.
all
equipped
Nicaragua
of
more
traditional
Today
attack
and
the
can
are
hazards
Nicaraguan
Counterrevolutionary
and
Managua
taken
Rica)
Salvador
Honduras.
trained,
1978-79
system,
of
dictatorships. to
and
the
origins
dimensions
were
Costa
suggests
whose
the
world
international
States
none
Central
are
4
American crisis, together, viewed critically, they provide a reasonably comprehensive, multidimensional frame for
of
reference,
the
(1)
THE
THEORY
EXCLUSION
is
and
the
the
(CBI). sals
In
for
exports
(1)
the
a
the
tax
training
would
on
advantage
the
trade
and
be
key
twelve in
the of
in
the
enterprise
and
investment and Among
prohibit
American
Rather, to
to
of
would
limiting
the
of
confiscatory
commodities.
would
allowed
entrepreneurs.
imposing or
whereby
assistance
legislation
businesses
propo-
appropriation
spirit
Technical
from
of
long-
investing
the
Basin
a
concentrated
proposed
the
generating
conaccess
to
"magic
of
self-
growth.
program
itself
exports another
plan. much
of
the
strongly
of
that
standing
the
5
this
both
were
economic
growth
is
tionary
discontent
even
it
down"
not
cure
on
the
States
for
it
United were
and
excluded
for
effort.
dubious
poverty
spawns:
of dutyfrom
Progress.
rationale
associated
the
distributed
to
the
Alliance
problems
that
percent
ill-fated
based a
no
spirit,
earlier,
modest—87
(textiles)
was
impetus,
technical
guite
entered
percent
Clearly,
is
was
already
projects,
the mic
be
the
tne
"trickle
1982
to
Yet
if
of
Initiative
period
firms
provided
markets
Caribbean
foster
a
be
become
provided
unveiled
would
be
U.S.
sustaining
and
"help
would
program.
marketplace" The
which
governments
Caribbean
free
the
things,
ditions
to
of
FY
Basin
primarily
for
U.S.
supplemental
is
arrangement
countries for
again
example
president
duty-free
political life in both acade-
and
Caribbean
free-trade
States
take
of
recipient
striking
consisting
affected
much
portions other
program
a
sector to
reemerged
the
incentives
(3)
million,
necessary
A
1982,
one-way
United
and
private
have
COMPETITIVE
recent U.S. discredited
administration's
from
region,
the
world"
February
(2) $350
implications
UNDEREMPLOYMENT
curiosities of and ideas long
development
enter
policy
DEVELOPMENT:
RURAL-URBAN
fasnionaole.
Reagan
range
significant
ECONOMIC
AND
"real
politically by
OF
One of the how theories
mia
with
future.
smacked
Notwithwith
the
two
proposition
and
the
Create
equitably,
revolu-
wealth
some
that
and,
will
masses.^
Unfortunately, the theory fails to take into account fundamentally exploitative nature of the socioeconoand political structures plaguing most Central
American wealth
countries.
generated
in
It
is
highly
flowing
disproportionately
riches,
power,
and
icebeig;
equally
poorer:
Newly
status.
important,
generated
not
simply
a
question
inegalitarian to
those
That the
wealth
is poor and
who
societies already
only
part
have the
of
of
often
promise
have the grown thereof
5
have whetted the appetites inspiring them not only to economic their The
less
powerful
consequence
theory the
resources,
into
has
also
to
and
more
impoverished
been
the
encroach
conversion
process
of
deepened
through
into
part
conversion coffee
of of
or
other
coffee,
as
in
the
country to Economic of
led
subsistence
set
to
country,
in
motion
reinforced the
a and
progressive
of the rural population. Nicaragua, during the century, and
this
private
involved
lands
the
into
dispossession
of
holdings
were
bought
up,
consolidated
into
larger
units.
cotton,
sugar,
1950s
and
began
additional
of
"trickle-down"
which
attendant
small
coinmodities
many
the
otherwise
Subsequently,
and
communal
and
peasants,
"grabbed,"
exclusion,"
nineteenth
latifundios
numerous
4
large segments Guatemala, and
Indian
those
countrymen.
of
economies,
inequalities
the
on
transformation
agro-export
existing
immiseration of In El Salvador, latter
the
"competitive
powerful, of their own
economics.
Although the specifics vary from general pattern is fairly clear:
agricultural
and use
but
"trickle-up"
"development,"
and
of the rich make better
1960s,
to
lands
as
challenge were
the
dominance
converted
to
of
those
crops. The
social
Salvador,
there
arrangements later),
as
landless harvest grew
(from
12
55,000
to
meet
Over
50
percent
unemployed
the
The
more
the
in
rise
1960
to
a
too
parcelling
to
out
generation), declined largest land
2.1
from
holdings
their
18.6
to
percent
2.2 were
to
losing
a
the
and
26
1979,
force
family.
was of
agriof
increased
subdivision
from of
of
number
living
generation
total
hectares.
their
Even
their
and to
farmland
Conversely,
increased of
Only
enough
average
the
the
percent.
percent
to
redistribution
holdings
million
1975.
year.
subsistence
farms
in
modernization
proportion
16.2
of
2.75
the
(reflecting
existing
while
from
1964
provide
547,572 of
the
the
and
peasants
access
labor
"qualitative
farms
364,879
of
of
temporary
cultivate
had
El
decade
to
percent
needs
a
landless
households
Guatemala,
to
41
two-thirds
misery.Between
from
to
of
In
colono
17,000
to
agricultural
rural
small
to
in
resorted
number
subsistence than
Similarly, gave
in
rural
of
1960
mechanization
percent
land
in
formidable:
decrease
increasingly
and
of
were
dramatic
crops.
percent
culture
a
planters
their
6
was
workers
from
about
consequences
as
acreage
the total peasant in
the
1970s, the area devoted to export agriculture swelled 45 percent. Rural unemployment grew accordingly. In 1960s
agricultural
while
the
rural
Currently, forced the cane
by
some
on
population 500,000
poverty
Pacific the
employment
and
grew
expanded
men,
women,
tenancy
Coast
to
large
estates,
.1
harvest
percent
by and
2.6
the
great
year,
percent.
children
arrangements coffee,
per
by the
to
cotton, majority
are
migrate and at
to
sugar no
more
o
than
the
minimum
wage
of
$3.20
a
day.
In
spite
remarkable
agricultural-export
performance,
production
failed
with
The
has
result
expectancy
to
keep
been
among
pace
increasing
the
rural
a
domestic
population
populace
food
growth.
malnutrition.
Indian
of
(Life
is
only
49
6
years.)
In Nicaragua, too, land lerated, most notably in the sistence
farmers
attendant 1950s
rise
alone,
peasants After
reflection wages
small
reaching
(The and
the
income
farms
figure, civil
the
began
coffee, to
cotton,
Between
produced
a
tion
impact
the
39
elsewhere, simple
the
thereby
Honduras, acres
turn,
32
same
1977
of
percent
rural
the
in
a
time,
through
work.
climbed
largely
the
real
poor
land
seizures,
Association
of
large
capitalist bility
of
to
for
agricultural
that
experience
a
wealth,
control
or
anywhere
lands
and
1970s:
real
the
the
1960s
which
countries
in
least
devastating
the
region.
panacea
what for
of the
the
and
early
impact were
of
the
crisis
expanding
the
availa-
surplus
combination 1970s,
of
did in
with
these
not
their
incomes,
degrees
affecting
or many
Salvadorans." these Costa
less Rica,
the continued growth of the small-holders Thus,
competitive
most
54,000
8
1970s.
industrialization? social
of
declines
and
wire,
had
continuing
a crucial point. Moreover, conditions were mirrored in
in
the
livelihoods
Guatemalans,
was
And
in
overall
where land reform, colonization, and of the banana industry absorbed many displaced
some
early
deterioration their
barbed
the
practices.
"In
Hondurans
menAs
through
families
most
the
to
southern
added
the
late
of
with
In
such
(not
holdings).
whose
absorbed
over
land
expanded
opportunities
approaching
Nicaraguans,
This is exclusionary
new
land
rural
sharp,
ejido
estates
reform programs
meant
exclusion
often
sector
time
competitive ocupante
through
first
property-
peasants
two
holdings
the
forms
generations.
employment
agrarian
rates
enclosing
the
of
in
and
haciendas
access
until
1965,
decrease
colonizable
force
factors
of
the least developed country of commercial agriculture—
communal
and
instance,
their
Nevertheless,
a
is
cattle — for
national
plots
for
to
1952
on
denying these
and
disrupt
percent
expedient
worked
rural
in
180,000
plantation
and
the
anger
Honduras, expansion
seriously
holding.
at
In
some
the
Workers.'
mainly
the
1977
an
In
unemployment
At
their
forced
course,
war.)
formation
Meanwhile, in the region, the
labor
of
declined.
strikes,
in
had
in
with
unemployment.
seasonal
percent
expressed
Rural
urban
into
was accewhere sub-
displaced,
agricultural
increasingly and
and
production
16
latter of
increasingly
rural
mid-1960s,
steadily, 1979.
in
growing
from
the
were
concentration Pacific zone,
the
exclusion
politically Clearly,
spawned
by
two
it
stable was
in
not
agricultural
7
modernization. Modern machinery imported. A was
enriched,
rising
middle
excluded. one
American
a
certain
class.
Since
relatively about
and
few out
The
jobs
were
every
market 9
obtain
vast
employment.
in
6
percent.
in
El
Indeed,
manufacturing
active
majority/
as
population
a
was By
people
between
built and expensive of the population
co-opted
created.
five
manufacturing sector grew 1971, while the number of only
number
industrialization
of
labor
factories were small minority
1970
into
the
however/
were
capital-intensive/ one
estimate/
only
entering
the
Central
and
was
able
Salvador,
1975
for
instance,
to
the
by 24 percent between 1961 and people it employed increased by the
number
percentage
actually
of
of
workers
the
declined.
employed
economically
The
ranks
of
the
marginally employed mushroomed. Forty-two urban jobs paid below the official poverty
percent of level; about
quarter
under-
of
the
workforce
was
unemployed
or
a
19
employed . - -
In short, industrial expansion was fundamentally incapable of absorbing the growing urban workforce being created
by
rapid
underemployed growth
population
immigrants
potential
in
the
growth
from
the
Central
and
the
influx
countryside.
American
of
The
Common
Market
was limited, while the high-cost industries created benind the Common Market tariff barriers were unable compete light were
in
the
more
manufactured restricted
countries
too
advantage,
goods.
by
far
rapidly
market
nology.
This
from
and
set
Thus,
industrial
producing
growing)
growing
their
for
of
policies wrong
these
comparative
(i.e.,
errors
more
slowly
high-cost
reinforced
deepened socioeconomic polarization way for the political crises of the
for
opportunities
moving
inappropriate,
policy
market
employment
prospective
the
with
world
to
tech-
and
and helped late 1970s
pave the and early
1980s . Will these
the
Caribbean
conditions,
exacerbating intended best.
to
In
programs
the
or
Basin
will
very
1960s,
like
the
intensify
socioeconomic
ameliorate?
the
it
Initiative
The
Central
Alliance
the
is
American
alleviate
crisis
conditions
outlook
for
(CBI)
by
that
problematic,
leaders
Progress
(its
for
create
basic
a
raising
domestic mass
could
be
would
thus
of
of
country
market
living
generated
labor,
power
structural
continue rather
their after
political
for
their
standards through to
than
own.
reforms:
the
serve as
when
It an
Development,
unnecessary
country,
became
part
of
instability,
rather
than
a
products demand
Market.
Workers
as
wielding as
Common the
external
economy
consumers
at
idealistic
industrial
Common
the
was
it
cheap
problem
solution
to
to by
sources
economic
occurred
the
is
embraced
rhetoric notwithstanding) and the Central American Market partly because they were thought to obviate need
it
in of it.
8
The central issue lias scarcely changed. reform has been truncated in El Salvador and dering
in
program
Honduras.
in
El
In
Peten
Guatemala,
has
been
the
land
subverted
by
Agrarian is flouncolonization
the
rush
speculators and generals to acquire properties value has escalated due to the exploitation of nickel does
deposits
not
in
the
region.
guarantee
the
kind
At
of
the
same
efficient,
of
whose oil and
time,
the
CBI
labor-intensive
industrialization, capable of competing on the world ^n^nket, that will be necessary to cope with the critical problem
of
unemployment.
investments intensive, when,
plants
rather
indeed,
urgently
it
the
and
than is
needs.
moreover, down
in
The
equipment
the
well
line.
of
latter
lead
Finally,
U.S.
to by
that
an
credit
favors
labor-intensive,
Large-scale
could
provision
new
capital-
investments,
the
region
economic its
most
penetration,
anti-American
placing
for
backlash
emphasis
on
industrialization and neglecting agriculture, the CBI is likely to intensify the crises in food production, urban migration, tion would moving
to
and unemployment. accelerate at the restrict
The the
result.could countries of
(2)
DEMOGRAPHIC Paddock:
immigration
pressures time that
into
be the bottling—up their origin.
THEORY:
What
Westcott:
The very
is
THE
going
Salvador
is
Even
if
it
this
is
a
to
social
happen
production
losing growth
which
is
tensions
in
Salvador?
to by
battle
States.11
EXPLOSION
in
striving
succeeds,
population
of
United
POPULATION
now
agricultural
the
for emigraCongress is
increase 3
percent.
is
doubtful,
because
probably
the
over
4
percent. Paddock:
Yes,
Westcott:
major
latter the
As
be
of
about
of
of an
going
you
course,
pin
to
happen?
me
down
obvious.
like
There
is
still,
the
conventional
the
former.
most over
disaster
it
going
explosion.i2
and
El
densely 3.4
tended
Salvador
populated
with
a
rate
percent
years, (see
wisdom
it
was
Tables
Paddock:
a
must
double
all
its
are
stress
the
classic
mainland
country
of
year widely
1.1
"One
was
to
and draws
population and
a
doubling
regarded 1.2). back
In
as the
in
consternation, wondering how a nation, any nation, keep from sinking into complete anarchy when, just stand
that,
population growth? Clearly, both to the Central American dilemma.
twenty
Paddock
is
if
Hemisphere,
averaging
demographic words
to
the
what
Well,
is,
over
Western
growth time
.
it
recently,
example: in
.
Land usage or contrioutors
Until the
.
but
can to
facilities—power
a
9
TABLE Population
in
El
Four
1.1
Central
Salvador
American
Guatemala
Countries
4.9
7.0
3.2
Density*3
590
190
2.9
3.0
3.4
Rate
Growth0
of
Sources:
In
d
A
Oxford
Development
per
cautionary
statistics tion, people turns
be
to
be
and
as of
not El
the the
all
entered amount
soil#
See
Central
potable
the
next
of
one
land the
takes
under
actual
better
off
William America
_
f 97 9 ) #
into
cultivanumber
"underpopulated"
Salvador. Press,
for
when
and
much
in
here#
Thus#
that
Stanford "University
housing#
be
agriculture#
Survival
facilities—in
(1979)
misleading.
in
"overpopulated"
supply#
(Oxford:
1982") .
mile
should
factors
engaged
Scarcity
1982
(1970-80)
fertility
out
Press,
square
note
can
such
the
Report
(1979)
percentages
account
3.4
World
inhabitants In
40
America Bank#
millions
G
3.2
Tnomas P• Anderson# Politics in Central (New York: Praeger,“1982)# pr“3T“WorTd University
a
Nicaragua
CL
Populationa
00
Honduras
Honduras
than
Durham# (Stanford:
pp."i02-110 .
water#
schools#
nineteen
years.
medical
misery"
the 1950s onward# El Salvador's "parabola of steadily worsened, as population growth per-
sistently
outran
beyond
the
"carrying
depleted. steadily of
The
were
authority sistence and
may
Food of
such
.
As
agriculture
capacity"
of
the
capita In
land
an
base
attempt
to
more
given
over
crops#
conclude .
are
has be
food
that
"the
virtually
expected
currently
withstand land#
to
to
already
more
the
to
cultivated
cultivation. be
sub-
absolute the on The
amount
marginal
devoted in
were
crops
one
decline
will
soils
leading its
marginal#
expanded
increase
and
area
food
reached
being
permanent
land#
for
cultivation,
crops .
supply.
under to
crops
cannot
per
decreased.
acreage
lands
food
of
near
maximum future.
slopes
which
productivity
destroyed
within
10
TABLE El
Salvador:
1.2
Population
Growth
Year
Population
1920
1/165,000
—
1950
1,855,917
1.3
1961
2,510,984
2.8
1971
3,554,648
3.4
1977
4,205,000b
3.1
2000
9,427,100c
3.4
8,332,600c
3.0
7,730/400°
2.7
6,954,100°
2.4
Source:
El
Salvador:
CWashington,
Rate
Demographic D.C.:
of
Growth
Issues and Prospects Bank, 1979) , pp. 1,
World
35 . a
In
percentages.
^Estimated by applying a 1971 census population. c
percent
Estimates based rate, 1970-2000.
on
a
Meanwhile/
the
sorghum/
crop
few
years.
deteriorated, well The
in
such
rapid
already
as
in
for
a
became and
evidence
demographic
consequences: capacity
probable
conditions/
deforestation
widely
This
the
3.1
growth
Decreasing survival.
range
that an
the had
access
of
quality
rate
the
of
grew
of
the
1940S/ social to
land
Malnutrition
to
the
growth
rural
diets
relatively
important
erosion in
growth
human
food.
countryside/
continued and
apace.
political
led
to
a
reduced
flourished.
Peasants and agricultural laborers increasingly migrated to the San Salvador Metropolitan Area, where they swelled the
ranks
of
the the
vated
all
of
care,
and
other
unemployed problems social
of
and
underemployed
housing,
services
and
education,
already
strained
aggramedical by
the
11
TABLE Population
Growth
1.3
in
the
Metropolitan
1950
uted
the
Meanwhile, for
between
the
tens was
El
the
stage
of
into
some
socioeconomic
way
for
of
land
set
and
for
conditions
political
question
remains:
Malthusian
causes
of
resource
study
of
the
Durham
clearly
production 1960s
was
cultural
to
its
in
essence,
food
of
of
that
pretty
fertile
export
at
the
been
in
all
of
paving
the
the
relative non-
a
careful William
the
1950s
and
agriculture
In
fact,
total
abreast in
food
export out
production
to
for
been
agri-
with
shortages.
lost
the
were
of
much
have
war"
forcible
who
In
competition
land
crops
futbol
population-food
increases
the
country
problem,
the
growing
in
the
already
scarcity?
"consistently
crops
expanses of
face
crops
export
production food
the
left
vis-a-vis
limits:
Large
world.
1970s.
has
consequence
kept
growth.
occurred
a
the
developed
physical
production
population
fitable
simply
the
aggravating
Salvadoran
that
in
for
were
pressures
established
imbalance not
expanding
Large
population
contrib-
11
1969
land,
What
of
stress
Salvadorans
of
importance statistical
the
that
unrest
Among
employment.
Honduras--and native
1.3).
rate
peasants and
130,000
their
the
the
of
Table
homicide
thousands
search
(see
psychosocial
national
Salvador
back
The
resulting
of
in
repatriatation driven
564,967
52).
highest
Honduras Thus
p.
industrialization
things, to
1971
El Salvador: Demographic Issues and Prospects (Washington, D.C.: World Bank,
toward
other
Area
352,299
1979,
push
Salvador
1961
213,363
Source:
San
In
more
land.
converted
expense
of
pro.
.
.
to
the
domestic
x^roduct ion. "
More the
specifically, effects
factor)
have
population the
land
been
growth
agricultural
these 7.41
of
people, hectares
Durham
the
concentration
greater .
calculated
.
.
than
for
population
a of
hypothetical
shrank
to
an
(the
the
50.8
of
land of
rapid
percent
Salvador.
1892
average
distribution
effects
full El
that
.38
base
of
For of
hectare
12
or
less
by
1971--a
availability. larger a
than
ratio
of
trend sion
toward was
an
1.34:1
It also
is
important was
for
a
studies
population
growth
of
El
remained at
least,
1.1.)
is
precision
the
extent
early
socioeconomic One
can
land
seem
violence
Finally, wars
have
lation
off
to
is
for
experienced increase
Salvadorans, homelands, countries
the
here,
Rica.
highly
into
to
resources employment
(housing,
shifts
and
factor
these
lands.
(3)
in
PSYCHOECONOMIC
by
problems,
social
AND
. . . [W]e know that social injustice . .
automatic.
potent
force the
the
factor.
or
fraud
more
subtle
these locus
civil of
popu-
implications,
not
yet
is
not
here
thousands have in
natural
of fled
their
the
them
in
the
Over 80,000 have thus Honduras, and 14,000 to tens
of
thousands
of
unassimilated
already
plagued
severely
educational and
may
and
well
by
strain
local
facilities, become
political
RELATIVE
ECONOMIC
late
increasing
pressures
will
etc.)
THEORY:
not
have
of
and
and
or
the
is
that
in
of
countries,
spreading
EXPECTATIONS,
not
alienated,
of
objective
aggravating
flow
with
of
Nicaraguans
while
Table
revolutionary of
issue
population
in
pressure.
that
The
health,
noted
important
Hundreds
opportunities,
major
for
note
carry
continued
socioeconomic
Honduras,
exclusion
more
victims
countries
these
the
population
origin
politicized,
foreigners severe
The
of
too,
through
countries of their destination. far flocked to Mexico, 40,000 to Costa
surpassed
densities
case
rebellion
since
Although
insurgencies
been
were
Guatemalans, their
their the
candidates
migration.
Honduras,
competitive
lands
that
alleviating of
in
thesis
countries
translation
have
insurgencies.
but
Durham
and
three
that
important
those
the
calculate
important
growth--shifts
one.
to
into
of
secondary
impossible
their
forces
created
especially
by
explo-
is
which
who
population
conducted.
1970s,
The
likely
it
change
as
is
may
those
impersonal
that
misleading,
hypothesize
more
than
all
stimulated
concentration
would and
it
1980s.
pushed
figured
issue.
been
the
conditions
merely
Peasants
in
a
Nicaragua,
in
rather
growth
but
(However,
case,
and
land
more.^
whether
not
rates
any
1970s
say
have
In
population
in
The
crucial
to
lower.
this
or
factor,
more
Salvador
far
. ,
Guatemala,
comparable those
.
dynamics
dynamics
concentration.
difficult
holds
.
in
was not so much rapid population growth scarcity as it was the simultaneous
land
Distribution
decrease
Distributional
population
In short/ it created land
that
19.5-fold
a
unrest
DEPRIVATION,
to
RISING
CRISIS
revolutions . . . are caused . [b]ut by revolutionaries.
13
and
revolutionaries
forces; So
they
are
says
Jeane
socioeconomic motivations and
often
years,
people*
people
and
of
are
with
Kirkpatrick.18 political
social
as
integrated
theory
mental
psychological
and
classic
that
human
drives
self
that,
(e.g.,
esteem)
in
turn,
Sometimes
this
sometimes the
it
or
internal
is
chosen
war.
is
misperceptions), fear
of
frustration,
and
the
Yet, objective absolute be
the
world's
most
abjectly
turmoil
are
often
growth.
.
."20
.
those
or
the
it
is
the
basic,
collective
.
.
where
the
desires,
entitled
to,
on
and
the
of
the
greater
Thus, by
a
be
political
"revolution
economic which
the
growth
desires
and
and
satisfied.
considerable
of
root
nations
the has
for
terms
the
rebellions
in
itself
economic
population,
and
the added]
what
that in
expec-
they
are
perceived other, is the The larger the
frequently
mass
rise is
with
revolt.
are of
would
are
people's
expectations,"
spread
frustration
circumstances are the socioeconomic
for
of
participants
of
their
"Were
rebel
been
between
and
expectations
This
greater
nations
and
in
potential
the
and
greater the
who
gap
hand,
rising
another
(and
well as noted:
the
circumstances and capabilities, on the generator of revolutionary discontent. gap,
of
aggression;
[Tjhose there
beliefs
one
or
the
poorest
condition
violence.The
tations,
source
conspiracy,
deprivation,
alone
and
poor,
instigating
organiza-
translated
In short, it is "discontent arising from perception of relative deprivation" [emphases "is
etc.);
opportunities,
however,
of
violence.
poor .
form
19
poverty
revolt.
the
be
is a subjective as As John Booth has or
in
violence
amount
of
security, behavior.
perceptions
gains, the
basic
tensions
turmoil,
of
of
general,
political
in
of
mode
intensity
deprivation
constantly
seldom
the
of
the
one
greater
deprivation phenomenon.
rebellion,
form
function In
the
greater
magnitude
the
anticipated
retribution.
the the
in a
of
addiction,
to
in
explanation
individuals
wrongly,
an
Rooted
aggressive
drug
the
environ-
shelter,
occasionally,
Whether
largely
this
internalized
them
construct
linking
food,
the
support Over
satisfaction
through
or
shape
behavior.
theory,
against
rightly
action
to
for
is
deprivation;
political
who to
violence
(suicide,
directed
perceived,
help
frustration-induced
released
violence
those
attempted
the
need
to
social
realistically,
rebellion.
factors
aggression
is
resented
into
have
to
the
lead
are
self-inflicted tions
for
political
obstructions
More
and
frustration—aggression
holds and
of
not
circumstances
catalysts
scientists
are
guns."
revolutionaries
serve
Tliey
preceded
often
borne
of
communications,
faster
enough
to
discontent.
than
they
in
can
create But
if
such
accompanied or followed by a decline in well-being of a substantial portion of
the
resultant
skyrocketing
relative
14
deprivation (RD) could set in that may tear society apart. who
have
not
experienced
socioeconomic between
hardship
traditionally
emerging
unpleasant
The effects
most of
rising
will
reality
relative
levels
deprivation
in
various
Central
in
Central
Roots
of
Rebellion."
evidence
interests
of
Nicaraguan, large
major and
part, and
of
examines
trends
this
complex turn,
hard
opinions
By
in
well
gross a
in
year;
per
sixteen-fold.“ people
cumstances, for
those
however,
who these
of
a
form
states, strong
circumstanin
the
Salvador,
and
Guatemala
three
decades
products
income wealth
considerably. or
began
hoped to
growing
American to
grew
than
such
almost
to.
After
OPEC
oil
average
change
in
(1963-72)
the to
consumer 12.3
parable
figures
And
other
the
increases
(see
price
percent
for
three Table
instance,
Costa
index
rose
from
.7
(1973-79)
per
annum.
Rica
2.6
and
countries 1.4).
the
As
were
experienced a
and
1973,
decade.
for
rose
inevitable
oil prices throughout
Guatemala,
5
cir-
embargo and the subsequent rapid rise in to an inflationary spiral that continued In
the
1980s.
created,
were
The
the
exports
being Under
erode.
and
economies
more
doubled; was
RD
Honduras.
prior
(GNPs)
union
perceptions,
for
Central
In
behavior.
differences
and
more
politi-
of
part Rica
and
political
aggressive
fairly
expectations
gains
the
disturbances,
Costa
benefited
a
increasing
Clearly,
rising
draw
the
capita
profited
to
to
measures,
national
income,
related
El
the
unemploy-
deprivation.
substantive
in
he
wages,
national
in
exclu-
preceding
however,
services
elements
In
economic
the
significant
Nicaragua,
in
real
of
to
competitive
this,
psychological
that
economic
of
unavailable,
traditional
percent some
on
and
increasing
the
prices,
forms
rapid
mid-1970s,
leading
discussed
human
that
nature
other
quiescence
performed Annual
and
made
account
relative
the are
data is
is
in
on
industrial
demonstrations,
turmoil
of
by
percentage
assembles
mobilization.
the
Beyond
disadvantaged
organization,
levels
a
of
is
Salvadoran,
mass
wrought
consumer
trends
of
case
product
expenditures
these
Although
a
the
and
research
contention
since
the
Explaining
his
standards
and
pressures
as
portrait
cization
tial
in
his
populations,
chapter.
employment
government
and
was
population
of
anger,
hardship
sections ment,
segments
and
Socio-economic
nevertheless
living
Guatemalan
this and
he
support
the
"Toward
Although
especially
frustration,
inequality sion
to
study,
America:
data,
change,
undermined
growing
Booth's
incomplete
seriously
the
compare
Crisis
socioeconomic
and
gap
to
Regional
substantial
the
attempt
is
by
as
growing
widens.
countries
limited
RD
expectations
American Political
expectations,
increase
modest
ambitious
motion aggressive behavior Moreover, even among those
led the
annual percent The
12.2
com-
percent.
similar
consequence,
real
wages
15
TABLE 1.4 Percent Change in Consumer Prices,
Year
Costa Rica
El Salvador
Guatemala
1963-79
Honduras
Nicaragua
1963
3.0
.9
.1
2.9
.8
1964
3.3
1.8
-0.2
4.6
9.6
1965
-0.7
0
-0.7
3.2
3.9
1966
0.2
-0.9
.6
.2
3.9
1967
1.1
1.8
.5
1.2
1.6
1968
4.0
1.8
1.8
2.6
3.1
1969
2.8
0
2.2
1.8
0
1970
4.6
2.6
2.4
2.9
5.9
1971
3.1
.3
-0.5
3.1
5.6
1972
4.6
1.7
.5
3.4
3.3a
1973
15.2
6.4
14.4
4.7
16.8a
1974
30.1
16.9
15.9
12.9
20.5a
1975
17.4
19.1
13.1
8.1
1.8
1976
3.5
7.0
10.7
5.0
2.9
1977
4.2
11.9
12.6
8.6
11.4
1978
6.0
13.3
7.9
5.7
4.6
1979
9.2
15.9
11.5
8.8
48.5
Source:
James W. Wilkie and Stephen Haber, eds. , Statistical University of Abstract of Latin America (Los Angeles: California Latin American Center Publications, 1981), Tables 2605 , 2608, 2609, 2611, 2613.
^Estimates based on Central Bank or other data. See John Booth, The End and the Beginning: The Nicaraguan Revolution (Boulder, Colo.:
Westview Press,
1982),
p.
79.
16
sharply
declined.
recovered plunge
In
somewhat
downward.
El
Salvador
around By
1976,
1977,
1973
levels
in
the
former
from
19o7
levels
in
the
latter.
erosion
was
1977.
In
decline
steady—.over
contrast,
(29
had and
more
quickly
shot
s
words:
up
while
relative
13
1973
among
by
deprivation
and
Nicaraguan,
29 in
percent Guatemala,
1972
1974,
over
upon
by
and a
1978
wages
figures.
suggests
declining
Salvadoran,
steeo
And in Costa 1975, they
1973
strongly
based
their
experienced
1977
contrast
they
percent
than
between
Honduras
percent
"This
12
Meanwhile,
percent
between
continued fallen
recovered their 1973 level. sharp drop between 1974 and
Booth
incomes
though
percent)
had more than Rica, after a
32
Nicaragua,
then
they
from
and
and
In
that real
Guatemalan
workers probably intensified in the middle and late 1970s, in Costa Rica and in Honduras the workers' recovery
of
their
purchasing
.
.
unemployment. Salvador of
the
late
The
and
1970s. 1971
unemployment from
.
unemployment percent
in
In
former, or
percent
in
1978.
1978.
remained
low
4.6
lower
business
classes
between
stable,
percent
sectors.
landlessness
and
major factors but of lesser At
the
same
position
of
the
large and
As disputes
and
lesser people and
in
some
and
a
peasants
to
redress
labor
Figure
movement
4.4
and were
real as
wages,
percentages
deterioration countries
discontent it
in
of
the
except
growing
not
lead
it
did
produce
social, effort
their
the
1.1). stepped
up
to
and
new
economic
mobilize
grievances.
number in
had
did
movements,
of
(see
from
both.
part
rose
9.4
extent, Honduras (see Table were losing in relative
Although
declined,
and Rican
rising
on
all
political,
wages
and
increasing
data
of
as
6.9
landowning
serious
frustration guerrilla
3.6
lower
landownership
forms
real
suppressed
a
from
contrast,
Costa
compensation
class
consequences.
organization workers
to a some
absolutely,
to
strategies
employee
the
Guatemala, and Nicaragua, Honduras and Costa Rica.
available
working
resulting
behavioral directly
the
percent by
placed within the of wealth away from
seen, of
El
1978.
large
have
suggest
Rica and, Clearly, The
we
in
25
in
concentration
and
income
some
the
in El Salvador, significance in
national
terms,
As
time,
unemployment,
Costa .5).
toward
in
Meanwhile, and
25
rose
significantly
Again, these patterns must be reader context of a growing shift the
about
20
fluctuating
acute
underemployed
joblessness
to
to
growing
latter,
stable,
1976
the
was
diminishing
particularly
unemployed
Honduras
1971
was
by
the
to
in
comparatively percent
was
In
in
problem
Nicaragua.
workforce
percent
reinforced
upon
.
capacity.3 were
based
likely
earning
trends
deprivation
.
feelings
These
of
power
defused
of
industrial
Nicaragua, its
the
long-
organizational
17
TABLE 1.5 Real Working Class Wage Indices
Year
Costa Rica
El Salvador3
Guatemala^
Honduras0
Nicaragua^
1963
80
90
-
-
92
1967
-
105
112
—
137
1970
96
96
113
—
121
1971
107
94
115
-
119
1972
103
98
115
96
114
1973
100
100
100
100
100
1974
108
92
91
71
100
1975
91
90
84
82
106
1976
103
95
81
94
106
1977
113
88
78
88
97
1978
—
87
-
103
Source :
—
John A. Booth, "Toward Explaining Regional Crisis in Central America: The Socio-economic and Political Roots of Rebellion" (paper presented to the 44th International Congress of Americanists, Manchester, England, September 6-10, 1982). Based on Wilkie and Haber, eds., Statistical Abstract, Tables 1400, 1401, 1402, 1403, and consumer price-index data in Table 1.4 of this chapter. Values of indices represent an unweighted average of wages in manufacturing, construction, transport, storage and communication, and agriculture, corrected for consumer price changes.
a
Includes agriculture (mean for men and women), manufacturing, and construction only. ^Includes wages
in manufacturing only.
c
in manufacturing and construction only.
Includes wages
^Includes wages in manufacturing,
transportation,
and construction.
18
FIGURE 1.1
Costa Rica,
El Salvador,
Disputes:
Guatemala
COSTA RICA 123 Real Wage Index (1973=
105
100)
100
20
115
w W
5
85 -I
0 1972
Real Wage Index (1973=
100 95
100) 90 85
120 Real Wage Index (1973=
110 100
100) 90 80 70
Source:
10
Disputes (N)
D
95
105
15
Industrial
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
80 60
Industrial
40
Disputes (N)
20 0
250 200 150
Industrial Disputes (N)
100 50
0
John A. Booth, "Toward Explaining Regional Crisis in Central America: The Socio-economic and Political Roots of
Rebellion" (paper presented to the 44th International Congress of Americanists, Manchester, England, September 6-10, 1982). D = Industrial Disputes W = Real Wage Index = - T _ Z’T”!!'-_
19
efforts: Strikes and work stoppages proliferated. Catholic priests and social workers organized the rural and urban poor into community self-help groups; peasant unions began to gain momentum. Moreover, as many small businesses and commercial jobs were wiped out by the 1972 Managua earthquake and inflation eroded middle-class living standards, unionization and strike actions spread to white-collar employees. The beneficiaries of the economic growth of the 1960s now began to join the disadvantaged in protesting their economic decline. Even the bourgeoisie--increasingly disturbed by the Somoza regime's corruption and the growing political and labor unrest--began to desert the dynasty and call for reforms. Similarly, in El Salvador, industrial conflicts rose dramatically in 1974 as real wages plunged, ebbed in 1975-76 as wages momentarily improved, then escalated rapidly in 1977-78 as wages dropped once again. In the process, labor organizations grew in size and militance. Illegal peasant unions aggressively pressed for land reforms and higher agricultural wages. Christian base communities organized the poor in urban and rural areas. By the late 1970s, mass organizations, mobilizing tens of thousands of disenchanted peasants, workers, teachers, students, and professionals, were rapidly radicalizing the Salvadoran political scene. Between 1977 and 1979, these groups engaged in widespread civil disobedience, demonstrations, and takeovers of government buildings, churches, and foreign embassies in order to dramatize their demands. Guatemala, too, experienced a marked growth of labor and peasant unrest, though mobilization there lagged somewhat behind developments in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Again, a sharp decline in real wages spurred unionization and gave rise to a substantial increase in industrial disputes in 1973-74. Moreover, in 1976, a devastating earthquake caused severe damage to lowerclass housing and led slumdwellers to form confederations that pressed the government for assistance and initiated a transport strike in 1978. Here, too, Catholic religious workers played a major role in rural areas in mobilizing the traditionally passive and fatalistic Indian masses into cooperatives and other bodies through which they could assert themselves in pursuit of their economic interests. By the latter part of the decade, the Indians were organizing politically as well. In 1978, a Committee for Peasant Unity was formed that two years later led a successful strike for higher wages by some 75,000 sugar cane workers. After years of suppression, the labor movement burst forth in 1978 with over 200 industrial disputes. In short, there is substantial evidence that growing relative socioeconomic deprivation led to a dramatic increase in lower-class mobilization and politicization
20
in
the
1970s.
It
insurgencies.
did
not
Though
nil
three
countries/
these
nascent
only
threats. one
element
sufficient initial
labor
of
Costa
was
by In
to
a
the
In
large
social
international considerable the
Rica,
coffee
large
lost
outbreak
and
it
and
(see
Table
product As
interrelated: oil
imports
of
and
much 1974 to
Hence,
the
international price of coffee exports, which in combination borrowing
at
afford. pounded
by
investors transfer to
The a
for
wealth
from to
growing the
impose
to
guerrilla
economic
Salvadoran,
of
more and
their
sabotage
Guatemalan,
earning
and
Table that,
the
reform
power
1.5)/ since
late
in
In 1982, the
chapter
and, the
in
the
1970s,
this in
and
in
part,
price
of
the
other Central American to increased overseas these
countries
moreover,
foreign
secure
havens.
austerity
In
could comas to response
governments
measures
as
the
of
the
Meanwhile,
aggravated (more
sought
lenders,
debts.
was
capital
chaos
other
stringent
renegotiating
of
the
and
discontent
land
multiple
and led
high
peasants
movement,
political
IMF
though
considerably. in all five of
crisis,
outflow
democratic
decline
rates
financial
massive
their
forced
price
interest
fleeing
pressures
were
high
a
masses
Honduras,
increase
by
the
societies. by
note
were
1979
to
higher
modest
in
lower
largely
generated
considered
accompanied
a
(see
turmoil
causes
down
free
of
winning
among
a
was
much
was
American
for
by
necessary
The
was
the the
forms
were
in
of
union
well
countries
1.6).
was
not
but
country
other
filtered
occurred
revolutionary
American
but
was
into
it/
Again,
militance
Central
powerful
1973
is
neither
economic conditions have worsened gross national products decreased Central
required
defined
This
prosperity
recovery
between
of
in
the
relatively
Finally,
he
necessary
success
prices.
and
proletariat's
here
disturbance
wealth
mobilization
the
had
of
former,
was
system
contained
simmered
transformed
Honduras?
strikes,
proletariat's
was it
and
Although
the
this
welfare
within
Rica
unprecedented
part,
wars
would
be
revolution.
levels
In
Costa
degree
full-scale
process.
striking.
the
we
equation—a
mobilizations,
turmoil,
diffused
as
for
what
elsewhere.
wages.
have
a
mass
catalysts
RD, the
condition
guerrilla would
in
contrast
than
in
other
create
movements
stage
And from
Thus
itself
low-level
before major
in
the
recently)
decline
Nicaraguan
economies. The
upshot
deprivation,
has
growing
continuing spread are elements of a The
economic
been
rapidly
frustration
escalating and
socioeconomic
discontent,
and
of political violence. Clearly, self-perpetuating process in all
crisis
has
structured
RD
into
the
there this.
these
societies in such a way as to reinforce the revolutionary conditions this deprivation helped create in the first place.
In
turn,
political
violence
has
worsened
the
21
TABLE Decline
in
National
Growth
of
Product,
1.6
Central
1977-82
American
(In
Gross
percentages)
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
8.9
6.3
4.9
.6
-3.6
-5.9
Guatemala
6.8
5.0
4.7
3.5
1.0
-3.5
El
6.1
3.9
-1.5
-9.6
-9.5
-1.0
Honduras
8.7
7.0
6.6
2.6
0.3
-1.4
Nicaragua
0.9
-5 .4
-25.9
10.0
9.0
-2.5
Costa
Rica
Salvador
Sources:
Statistics World Bank, sources
compiled by Douglas H. Graham and Interamerican Development
and
(1983).
Economic
See
Report
Chapter
5,
of
Table
the 5.1
President in
economic situation by deterring investments, capital flight, and otherwise disrupting the needed
to
advanced and so
foster in
Costa that
growth
rising of
In RD
because
it
a
were which
an
has
is
than
in
come
full
important opposition
1950s-1970s
impacted
sectors raison growth
But
was
too, and
possibility
the
d'etre
Honduras circle,
factor to
more
in
the
the
work
in
be
a
especially a
of
were
which
the
are
satisfaction;
absolute
terms,
become
position
erodes
vis-a-vis
Mancur
others,
that
of
in
turn
force.^7
when
beyond
more
their
no
longer
systems
Olson
though
portion
margina-
respects,
whetted
anguished
and
economic
other As
disruptive
substantial
destabilizing
expectations
of
force,
terms
there
on
STRUCTURAL
destabilizing pursued in Central
inequalities
disruptive.
can
was
negatively
heightening
of
emerging.
appetites
become
it
text.
stimulating stability
process
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: AND POLITICAL DECAY
the
populace,
winners,
Guatemala
growth often leads to kind of "development"
during
had
The
this
regime.
America
lizing
and
Nicaragua,
has
THE THEORY OF PETRIFICATION
the
growth.
counterrevolutionary
Economic results. The
of
Salvador
Rica.
Sandinista
(4)
El
economic
from Bahk
also, has
that in
argued,
por
SOme,
any
gaining
in
relative
rapidly
advancing
22
neighbors. Perhaps most important in American context/ economic growth and gave
rise
middle the
to
new
socioeconomic
class
and
urban
first
time
structures question
of
began the
became
of
On
one
these
new
actors,
thus
evolution
through
the
how
At
on
the
that
those
hand,
particular,
proletariats—that
demands
Qrder.
respond.
groups—in
rural
making
Old
one
the
and
the Central industrialization
point,
could
initiating "creation
a
the
and
to
society." repression, paralyzing sources of The
social
other,
effect
or destroying opposition. decay,
is
the
case. living
all
political
of
museums"
dinosaurs
current
Central
societies mode
the
by
potential development
that,
without
produce
America
is
a
little
would
classic
more
governed have
and
the
to
were
rule
in
with
tends
polities
of
change
political being
political
and coherent these new
change and
co-opt
institutions
respond
deny
modernization
petrified
whose
to
suggestion
these
economic could
between
disintegration.
Most
and
they
seeking
socio-economic
political
cal
in
the
distinction
political former,
promote On
to
of
sufficiently adaptable, complex, autonomous to absorb and to order the participation of groups
critical
would
attempt
process
of
for
political
structures
they
a
than
by
politi-
been
more
appropriate to the nineteenth century than the 1970s. The traditional rules of the political game permitted change, which
but
did
elites.
only
not New
to
and
down.
a
Under
by
was
labor
unions,
rural
and
political
were could
by
began
economic
Catholic
parties,
in
to
behavior
base
and
the
break
development,
elite-challenging
cooperatives,
opposition
they
of
capability.
co-optation
in
arena
29
power
that
established
the
principle
generated
rise
of
to
provided
basic
however,
sense— namely,
position
elites,
significant
marked
limited
admitted
this
pressures
there
munities,
the
were
recognized
1970s, a
very
threaten
abide
demonstrate 1960s
a
actors
reciprocally willing
in
by
com-
other
organi-
zations representing the growing and increasingly politicized middle and lower classes. The threat posed by these groups cannot be overstated: Civilian oolitical parties of
the
endangered political
the
threatened (by their agrarian reform) the oligarchs adapting
and to
military's
arena.
Labor
and
inputs
industrialists. (or
petrification, reinforced by violence, effectively denied was
a
access
to
monumental
numbers
of
the
the
co-ops
Rather
demonstrations
of
capability) with structural reforms, Central elites and institutions remained inflexible.
forces
dominance
rural
demands for higher wages and economic base of both traditional
modernizing
these
traditional
unions
of
politically
power
American Structural
official and semi-official these newly emerging social
political
crisis
than
system.
The
legitimacy,
with
alienated
consequence growing
choosing
to
opt
out
23
of the system and pursue change structures and strategies. In
El
Salvador/
continuismo Salvadoran of
the
halting was
Two
presidential
Duarte, the
was
years
later, Efrain
balloting vative
only
in Rios be
were
continued
political
that the
one
in
handing
of
conservatives of
the
in
1974,
with
(This
Somoza
during
refused after
to
unrest,
of
term
was
to
his
stable.
a
under
late
(This sign
of As
minimal.
1970s
Democratic
elections
repression
has
been
overlooked
poorest,
least
America.
Such
and
this
is
kind
changes
witnessed
of in
and
rewriting president
last
until
principle" in
a
temporary
as
power, since
and
to when
he
he
was,
1980s.
remain
chronic
golpes,
in
of in
late
may
be
which
are
developed has
1981.
Government Finally,
is
the
country
occurred
in
has
destabilizing
Salvador,
attributed
Honduran elites. the mid-1970s.
Honduras
massively
In
that of "business as guerrilla activity has
that
as
labor
relatively
the
fact
major
full-scale
restrained.
El
office,
liberals
comparatively
development
the
of
quiescence
held
economically
produce
to
early
on the part implemented
were
of
Though
in
experience
would
instability than of this writing,
to a greater flexibility A modest land reform was
decided
the
pressure,
violence,
Honduras
part,
had
reemerge
months
would
notwithstanding
In
ensuring
president.)
countries
the
thus
enough.
scheduled
mounting
conser-
subsequent
"matter
the
both
continuing
to
desperate
government
in
him
formally become
not
and
won.
military.)
triumvirate
enabled
neighboring
usual.")30
often
a
in
including
amendment
last
these
massive
contrast, a
a
to
"constitutional"
insurgencies
been
the
resign
all, Each
less
and
from
win
more
Somoza
was
arrangement,
"power"
the
Anastasio him
to
by
fraud,
had
day,
military
elections by
next
of
Democrat-
centrist
flagrant
victory
expedient
candidate
power
1972
Jose
the
proceeded
presidency
constitution,
1981.
by
forbade
political over
from
domination
the
constitution
tortuous
barred
Nicaragua,
term
a
who
marked
simple
Christian
around
the
apparent
returns;
a
Montt,
in
candidate,
government
(Subsequent
countries
in
the
Thus,
the
election
rallied
to
by
alternative
Nicaragua, the
reform
Guatemala,
colleagues.
Meanwhile,
of
that
coalition
officer,
elections,
annulled
broadcast
and
blatant.
Democratic
announced
backed
Guatemala/
especially
Christian
Napoleon it
was
through
Guatemala,
Central
yet
to
socioeconomic and
Nicaragua.
(5)
ELITES AND INTEREST GROUPS; LIBERATION THEOLOGIANS, REACTIONARY DESPOTS, AND REVOLUTIONARY ZEALOTS
Still elites and
another focus of attention has been on interest groups in conflict. Here one
the must
24
stress the importance of leadership and organization. Revolutions are rarely made spontaneously, through mass uprisings. Most frequently, disenchanted elements from the bourgeoisie or petit bourgeoisie become declasse and provide the intellectual, inspirational, and organizational guidance necessary to mobilize traditionally fatalistic and passive lower classes behind the revolutionary cause. This is not, of course, to suggest that leaders do not sometimes emerge from the peasantry and proletariat Salvador Cayetano Carpio is an example but tnat these are the exceptions, the rule. Indeed, Gabriel Zaid has gone so
obvious rather than far as to
argue that the Salvadoran conflict is essentially a struggle between elites: "Those on top cannot agree on how to treat those on the bottom: This is the conflict, in which those on the bottom are both subject and victims. ^ There is much truth in Zaid's remark, though like most generalizations about the Central American tragedy, it should not be pushed too far. It is too easy for partisans
(or
cynics)
to
reduce
the
issues
to
a mere
struggle for power in which one side or the other (or both) terrorizes and manipulates the populace for its ends. Although such interpretations may capture an
own
essential part of these conflicts, they often oversimplify a more complex reality. Neither revolutionary nor counterrevolutionary coalitions are monolithic, and in the cases of El Salvador and Nicaragua, they encompass a wide variety of political opinions. (In the former, for .instance, social democrats coexist uneasily with Marxist—Leninists and Christian Democrats with fascists.) Motives are diverse and often mixed: Some play the game for power or spoils; others pursue the communist utopia; still others believe in democracy and/or social reform. Moreover, if violence is widely employed by both sides, it is equally true that hundreds of thousands of Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Nicaraguans align them— selves with one camp or the other voluntarily, sometimes with fervor. Contrary to assertions by the Reagan administration, the Salvadoran and Guatemalan guerrillas are not without popular support. Nor, for that matter/ are the regimes they are fighting—which is one reason they have not yet been overthrown. It has often been argued that these revolutions are largely the products of the rise of modernizing groups and
their
challenge
to
the
bourgeoisies, middle—class student movements have all
traditional
order.
Industrial
Christian Democrats, labor and played significant roles.32
Just as important, however, have been the changes that have occurred within the traditional establishment—most notably, within the Roman Catholic Church. The 1960s witnessed a veritable revolution in the Church. Whereas previously it had almost everywhere been
25
allied with existing regimes/ Vatican II (1962-65)/ strongly influenced by the social encyclicals of Pope John
XXIII/
behavior. convened
Thus, their
Medellin/ major
and
clergy
the the
would
seek
to
Christian In
1968/
the
make
in
what of
the of
deep
divisions
"consciousness-raising"
passivity and of
control. spilled
profound
disappeared, where
Moreover, over
into
Unions
were
formed
as
poor
organized
the
face
of
the
subsistence military, roots and of
wages.
assassinated, the
And which
what
it
was
culture
sector
primary
objective
privilege. roles them
and
of
others
to
share
or
private
in
an
populist tion
of
spheres." to
masses
to
^
too the
by
with
share
of
the
is
best
the
of
newly
making
of
emerging
public
makes allowing public
the
1930s
nationalist the
rulers, ones,
the
illustrated
of
the
in
promoted
rational
agri-
whose
of
in
arose
just
and
of
which
whether
has
of
advisability
coalition
with
officers
function,
have
to
Baloyra
monopoly
arbitrary
in
system
alliance
checking
nature the
an
historical
might
were
late. elite
victory
power
Dozens
sought
"preservation
the
grass-
preachers
the
functions
the
their
violence:
conflict?
and
this
to
military
a
which
that
and
The
coalition's demands
of
into
been
prevent
democracy rules
was
in
of
and
coalition
little
waged,
the
lay
areas
sectors:
effects
threat
in
quickly
oligarchy
despotism":
these
alliances,
arbitrary the
came
3
attempt
it
legitimacy
in
major
and
of
entrepreneurial
the
in
interests
massive
the
and
unemployment,
major
of
participating
social
their
that
their
actions
hundreds
includes
the
question
a
capitalists
This
on
fatalism
accurately)
nature
has
effect
and
the
with
before
"reactionary
note
exercised
reactionary
reformers
to
within
activities
decisions
rampant
turn,
and
the
enough
debilitating
(quite
the
monster
these
termed
as
brought
demonstrations
In
nuns
has
and
responded
and
base).
strikes
constituted
interests,
through
previously
defend
the
poor"
political
to
the
that
on,
the
Lernoux
began
in
mili-
and
exclusion,"
movement
behead
peasants had
for de
markedly; for
point
changes is
of
economic
and
perceiving
priests
as
increasingly
"competitive
Penny
II)
"one
oppressed
socializing
religious
the
the
it
(CELAM
church,
this
and
bishops
meeting
of
educational
rose
they
a
option
these
responsibility
lives
of
purposes,
Self-esteem
accepting their
a
alliance From
doctrine
called
century,"
text.
the
had
been
(comunidades
Church.
membership.
has
rights
this
our
both
Conference
"preferential
the
comunidades
American
the
communities
For
Latin
elites." a
4
in
33
defend
Chapter
shift
Episcopal
events
rich
the
marked
centuries-old
base
described
a
Second
political
tary,
in
Colombia/
"shattered
an,()
produced
evolu-
replacing
and 3
allowing
latter. ^
by
sectors:
its
or
The
reaction
to
26
This is not merely a question of whether the government should not bend too much in the direction of unions/ spend too much on welfare/ conduct public policy in demagogic terms to attract votes, or try to push taxes beyond reasonable limits. This is normally the complaint agenda of 1oya1 conservatives who accept the suffrage and are willing to use the power of the private sector to defend themselves and countervail the power of the mass electorate, acting through responsible institutions. The dominant actors of the reactionary coalitions of Central America do not believe in the suffrage, ... in paying taxes, ... in acting through responsible institutions when they perceive defeat. Their basic premise is that the government should exist to protect them from other social groups in order to continue to accumulate capital without the restraints created by labor unions, competition, and government regulation. In short, they demand j:°deference system.
to
their
version
More specifically, the "core reactionary coalition" include:
of
the
elements"
capitalist
of
the
the largest agricultural planters who monopolize the control of the sectoral associations, cattle ranchers, large merchants with linkages to agricultural interests, financiers and bankers whose main creditors or "factors" are engaged in the export trade and in real estate speculation, former government officials and retired military officers who have embezzled public resources, and individuals connected to the repression of opposition elements either in an official or in a paramilitary capacity. These are the elements who have the most to lose from any transition to democracy. Though they have not always directly controlled the government, they have until recently exercised at least veto power in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala. Although original oligarchies have splintered, the industrial bourgeoisies that emerged never gained enough leverage to successfully challenge the older groups. Thus, they remained peripheral, rather than core actors in the "living museum. The capitalist state was maintained unreformed." Whenever a democratic transition appeared to be paving the way for a more enlightened version of capitalism, the core reactionaries blocked the process through hysterical campaigns, threats to repatriate capital, conspiracies and, in the case of Guatemala
27
a generation ago revolution . 37
and
of
El
Salvador
today,
counter-
The precise nature of the coalition varied from country to country. In Nicaragua, it was much smaller and less stable than elsewhere. The inability or unwillingness of other economic elites to challenge the political hegemony of the Somoza clan relegated them to a subordinate position in what was essentially a personalistic and patrimonial form of despotism. There, as well as in El Salvador, the military served as a junior partner and guarantor of the oligarchy. In Salvador, however, the power of the officers was greater: They dominated the political arena through their "official" party and their control of the presidency. From time to time, modernizing elements even introduced modest reforms in the face of oligarchical opposition. None of this, however, fundamentally changed the system. When an "agrarian transformation" was attempted in the mid-1970s, the oligarchy still had enough influence to effect, in league with the most conservative elements in the military, a reactionary restoration (albeit an unstable and temporary one). y But it was in Guatemala that the ideal of reactionary despotism came closest to finding its real-world counterpart. There the military became the senior partner in the ruling coalition. Whereas in El Salvador officers were comparatively discrete in their corruption, their Guatemalan counterparts used gangster-lihe violence and rampant illegality to enrich themselves. The decade of the 1970s witnessed the creation of a materialistic "order of the samurai" in which the most influential military leaders also became the economic leaders of the country. In the process, numerous fortunes were made, as officers seized lands and manipulated "development" projects in the Northern Transversal Strip and the Peten. Dozens of military-dominated, semi-autonomous state institutions were set up, as the army invaded spheres of activity
traditionally
reserved
for
civilians.
Given the above alignment of reformist and reactionary elites and interest groups and the fundamental incompatibility of their values and interests, it should not be surprising that growing mobilization of the masses would be met with large scale and often indiscriminate repression. In the process, the Central American militaries, traditional guardians of stability, would themselves
(6)
become major
sources
THE THEORY OF PROCESS: DIALECTIC OF REVOLUTION
of
destabilization.
REFORM,
Central American societies structural reforms. Yet, it is
REPRESSION,
are sorely in quite another
AND
THE
need of matter to
28
argue as is often done in both government and academic circles that such programs are the key to peaceful change. Revolutions, it is said, can be avoided, if only we can win the "hearts and minds" of the people through agrarian reform and other measures, thus undercutting the guerrillas'
appeal
to
the
masses.
The evidence to date is far from reassuring. The experience of countries like Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador suggests that attempts to introduce such change into highly rigid, violence-prone political systems are as likely as not to have repressive and destabilizing consequences. Clearly, it is not enough to appreciate the socioeconomic and political preconditions of revolution; there is also a dynamic element involved. Revolution is a process involving an extended sequence actions and reactions, a "dialectic" of threat and retaliation: Thus, pressures for reform (for the most part, nonviolent ones) give rise to resistance (often
of
violent) on the part of those supporting the status quo. Conservative obstruction and repression, in turn, radicalize the proponents of reform, who increasingly opt out of the system, frequently to seek power through the barrel of a gun. The portrait is one of selfintensifying
and
mutually
destructive
violence:
Revolutionary terror heightens counterrevolutionary repression, which further radicalizes the opposition, driving a growing number of moderates and uncommitted into the arms of the extreme left. The dialectic continues, gaining a life of its own, increasingly polarizing society until one side is able to muster enough effective coercion to disable or destroy the other. Within the context of the previously-discussed theories, this process may be terms of the stages indicated
viewed schematically in Table 1.7.
in
Although tnis model, like all ideal types, oversimplifies a more complex and subtle reality, something of this nature has clearly taken place: "As the political spectrum broadened and the impact of new ideologies and^ the labor movement . . . began to be felt, the far right introduced the strategy of polarization."40 The handmaiden of polarization was terror. By attempting to destroy or paralyze the opposition through indiscriminate violence, these regimes enormously increased relative deprivation (defined here in political terms) as they transformed themselves into direct threats to their citizens' security. The consequences were predictable: Reform movements were turned into full-scale insurrections . In Nicaragua, the process developed to its logical conclusion, with one side decisively triumphing over the other. The origins may be traced back to the earthquake that devastated Managua in 1972. In response to the rampant
corruption
that
followed,
both
moderates
and
d
•H r-l
CO
CO
>
to d •rl o to d o d d 03 (0 d > •rl (0 54 O 44
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5-c
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The Dialectic of Revolution
to d •H X
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163
a tourist-affluent society with a very small population base compared to the other countries in the region. It has been difficult to include Cuba in this framework with any systematic cross country statistical comparisons. In part, the difficulty lies in the unavailability of data; in part, in a different economic accounting framework that makes inter-country economic comparisons difficult or misleading. Moreover, frequent revisions of past time series create doubt and uncertainty about these various series. Five generalizations, however, can be about the performance of the Cuban economy
safely made in the last
two decades. First, in terms of per capita income, Cuba clearly belongs in the upper half of Table 5.1. It was already in this position prior to Castro's revolutionary era. Second, the decade of the 1960s saw a decline in income growth associated with the various stages of radical restructuring of economic policy and social and political mobilization. The economic stagnation produced by the Sino-Guevarist policies changed in the early 1970s when the unproductive economic experiments, emphasizing moral over material work incentives, was altered. To overcome the institutional instability that led to the economic decline of the 1960s, the revolution was consolidated in the early 1970s under Soviet guidelines and control. This restructuring of economic policies with substantially increased Soviet economic aid and technicians, more stable planning methods, and better management of state activity also contributed to the improvement in income growth along with the rise in sugar prices in
in world
markets
from
1970
Third, by the latter half sugar prices, the droughts,
to
1975.^
of the decade, the decline the poor agricultural
harvests, and the resource drain of the African campaigns took their toll, with the economy experiencing low growth, poor foreign exchange earnings, and increased foreign indebtedness to non-Soviet sources. Fourth, in terms of basic needs (public health and education), the current Cuban regime clearly has improved the access of important basic services to a wide range of the population. In addition, it has carried out a substantial leveling of economic assets through the confiscation of most private feature that and economic
property in the early 1960s. A final merits comment is the continuing monoculture dependency associated with the present
pattern of development. Following the failure of the Sino-Guevarist policies promoting economic diversification in the 1960s, sugar returned to predominate in
the
export portfolio; Soviet trade exercises a preponderant role in both exports and imports; and, in per capita terms, Cuba very likely receives more foreign aid (in this case from Soviet sources) than any country in world, regardless of source. Beyond these points,
the
164
generalizations/ particularly in a comparable intercountry sense/ are difficult to develop; thus the remainder of the article will focus on the performance and patterns of economic growth of the other countries in the region. Several important features stand out in the process of generalizing the growth records for these countries in the recent past: (1) The decade of the 1960s (Table 5.1, column 3) registered a much more impressive growth record than did the 1970s (column 4), reflecting the initial success of the import substitution industrialization strategy in the early years of the respective regional common markets; (2) eight of the countries recorded lower rates of growth in the 1970s than in the 1960s and five (Barbados, Jamaica, Panama, Nicaragua, and Guyana) experienced sharp declines; (3) the decline of the 1970s has continued into the early 1980s with an even more pronounced spread of economic stagnation among all countries, reflecting the world recession (columns 10 and 11) and political insurrection (for El Salvador and Nicaragua); and finally, (4) the countries of the basin area experienced more severe declines in economic growth than did the rest of Latin America during the 1970s. This last point is driven home when one looks at the relative snare of total a 3 a JO < > a 3 3 3 0 3 O 3 d 3 MO 3 0 3 d Q >T 3 O *r4 TO 0 3 3 3 C 3 C3 3 05 a Cd 00 3 3 d cd 3 d 3 -J 3 3 23 O a a d r4 ■H o •H 3 0 3 3 3 TO 3 3 •U 3 d 3 d d O d *—H 3 cd a a 3 •H O 3 CN 4J “3 0 a a r 1 S-i CU CN rH a -d • 0 d • 3 cd 3 UH 0 rH 3 /'“N rH cd 3 d 3 *H cd U rH 3 t-H cn 3 CN A 00 3 Cn d CO > a 00 > 045 d HH Os 3 cd Os 3 Ox Os r—1 i—U
Armed
program
basic
conflict high
Reformists*, 1960s, lai
the
revolution.
the
the
political
only
into
armed
officers
c
young
the
in
training
and
grudging 1 y>- under
Accordingly,
the
group,
young
that
violent
elements
of
One a
acquaint
economic,
brought
conservative
cabinet,
organized
convinced
could
views
the
M»ilitarX-Yout-h..
to
social, away
and
factionalism.
around
military
Council
giving
involvement — that
ret^rjas- -etfranated
the
changes
Under
the were
to- justify
political
squads,
Colonel
toward
people
Righjt-w ing~ t--e-r-r-ori sm' anb^oppos i t ion- ho
roposed death
160
radicalized
arose
assault
spXi-ntered
the
as'cT s±_.
their
of
forces.
[s^^each
Arnerican
half-truth.
itself
soon
demonstra-
politics
_____and ___ U.S.
the a
were
security disposed
gradually
of
.reme
the
seized.
.u-
of
these
with
the
already-existing
slan
es ca1 at ion
had
filled
expected,
the
were
extremes.
an
were
were
of
ministries
c.ounbarer.e.volutionary- viole-nce.
successive
f tom
the
popular
government
As
those
chance
And so the undermine
best
a
streets
clashes with
government
first
oy elements
I—firrsli’A^ek--^4r©ri^^^t^least
killed
the
for
reigned.
confrontation right.
the
of
junta.38
by
tions.
actions of
In short, repression was purposeiui provocation and violence"
Day
the
Militant
revolutionary
speeded
the
set
up
ensure were
coinmanders
a
Permanent
that
not
"could
the
proclaimed
subverted. not
be
In
208
trusted . preceding
. . , days,
necessary,
carried must be
would
have
his undersecretary, criticism for being and
pressure
the taint monitored
to
be
of corruption from carefully and, if
weeded
out.
Both
Garcia
Nicolas Carranza, came under heavy reactionary obstructions to progress,
quickly
arose
£eur~thelt“N^emova 1 •
Then there were the Cjsfeanderthals^ Just as a n o c r a tic Tec tor* Tia» 03 •H AJ CO •H
S-i 03 d
O 00 O' AJ r—1 d o rH *M •H Ctf S-i a o
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>
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•
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rH
CM
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03
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03
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co
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a O' H Pi 0) w Pi SM
220
03 O O X
03 d 03 X 03 X /—N
/^s CO w o CO H > -, d 03 d O •d x d id o > CD X
c 03
•d d X 0) 4-1 o d X O u s
•
0&
CO X 3—' 03 d O x d ED
X O
• 03
00
/-\ CO CO 3D 4-1 Ed O s_/ d o •d 4-1 03 d 03 X 03 X X a' 4-4 •H d
03 d o •d d ED d 03 d O 03 03 > r—i 03 CO
• o i-H
X? a' 4-1 d d ED
in X •H d d a 03 CO
d\ 03 d 4-1 id d 03 4-1 d 03 4-1 d d 0) 03 o > d 4-i 03 O 03 X EnO J_> w d 03 d d CJ 03 d > d d 0) d e
d o •d d ED -2
4-1 /^N o d 03 pJ o *X d X d d d3 d
ED i iKI ■! n
n -I-
of
Though
Secretary
Secretary
evidence
the
of
of
such
a of
^
Salvadoran hurried State
State
high
William
William
T
_
command
•
might
headed and
found
remained.
be by
former
no At
a
been
long
had
five
the
ed
(As of this writing, three years later, no one has orought to trial, much less convicted, though the has
in
.
that
government
complicity
when
there followed.
Salvadoran
high-level
Bowdler
Rodgers
doubts
for
quite another H l lhgc.
investigation
involvement,
was
.
thing
cover—up
guardsmen
223
suspected
of
eventually that
they
into
the
the
killings
brought were
to
mere
possible
officials
was
attempted
to
in
justice,
the
hirelings.
No
involvement
ever engage
a
they
of
the
five
would
be
Julio
Valle
Espinosa,
he
had
had
who
had
by
another
reorganization;
wag, now
elevated
moderate The
regime's
civilian
Gutierrez,
came the
the
leftist
and
was
Meanwhile, erated. his
suddenly his
back
and
the
DiGiovanni,
a
s'
CIA
from
opposition
disregarded.
to
(tie_ was
that
the
fast,
to
followed
This
was
demonstrate
lav
elsewhere.
of
of on
the
the a
arrested
who
had
junta,
armed
the
and
been
enjoyed
forces aild
sett1 e -
prolif-
moving and
previous to
Salvador
spring,
least
brandishing
transition
seizure
of
power
disowned
by
that
the
same time, Cleto and supporter Of
Reagan
now
suspicions
at
as
exiled.)
golpe
credence
promptly
peace
Guatemala
appeared,
a
that
and
member
At the oftu.ee r
the
testified
to
power
between
also
Guard
advocml^^QiL-Xftfo.Qfl
activities
former
August
Democrat,_„Duarte,
right-wing
lending
case
designatiqn.of. Colone1
custody
military.
message
public
a
such
the
consequently
discussions
of
from
U.S?'.''' president-elect, >urported
the
forth
resurfaced, of
Real
D'Aubuisson,
release
done,
designed
subsequently
anti-government
backing
in
in
presidency.
Maiano,
rumors
Roberto
stealthily since
of
beyond
charge
commanders-in-chief
participation
mehtrr^^lMajano
be
conservative
removal
for
press
National
Christian
junta
(1)
to
superiors.)
gesture,
with
families
Moreover,
There
control.
most
vic^^jrrgsTdent (2)
the
symbolic
tip-off
and
to
victims'
61
to
Tfoe
remain and
kidnapping,
by
image.
will
are
officers
anything
in
they
investigation
the
former
the
had
full
lawyer
sergeant
something
the
a
a
ordered
salvage
primarily
that
if
suspicion
When
dangerous.
the
been
Clearly,
told
witnessed
told
been
abduction
were
Even
senior
Salvadoran
inquiry,
private
of
conducted.
an
1982,
custody.
tacit
the a
team
that
should
be
Reagan
spokesmen.) Relations between the transition team and Ambassador White now deteriorated sharply, with the latter
accusing
authority moderate
and the
immediate was
had
of
to
threat to
a
the from
White's
managed
rapidly
Reaganauts
striking
solution
But lett
the
of
blow
at
his
those
seeking
a
crisis. the
restore for
1
"heavy
right
problems.
preparing
undermining
a
was
E yen
at
least
military
only
more
the
most
ominous
th e
temporaryunity showdown-,
and
JJX-
Novlember,"
the five guerrilla organizations (including the FARN, which rejoined the DRU) forced a—sj^higXh command, the~diLi^htmtinsIarti. National Liberation Front (FMLN) . The?
Nicaraguan
weapons
now
straining later
reached
the
materials. charge
arms
connection
unprecedented
capacity
The
State
that
was
some
of
the
resumed;
the
proportions,
guerrillas
to
flow
of
severely
absorb
these
DepartrafiLhi^^ '200. tons
of
arms
were
delivered
in
224
the the
weeks truth
prior to the January Offensive. Whatever be of the numbers—and they are open to serious
debate—it was
is
clear
essential
short
run.
terms
of
No
the
one
popular
Salvadoran these
if
that
rebels
knew
oeen
foreign
victorious
in
the
insurgents
were
Or
the
withstand
the
high
for
the
worst.
any
doubts
whether
their
stakes
that
assault.
military the
aid
had
four
human
been
reorganization
Duaxte,
economic
that
reform the
even
rights
advisers/ of
was
January the
of
economic
days
was
and
later/
Loans
bringing
the 5th
resumed.
U.S.
beginning murder
Hammer
and
Salvadoran
of
a
two
Mark
after of
amounting
aid
of
for
1980
process
American
Pearlman,
Institute
of
a
priori^>w i ng
jujitji«__a^id^bh e—-edrevation
granted/
Michael
list
U.S.
Nine
in
Given
were
=
the
This
the
president
of
were
mill ion.
not
suspended.
assistance
to . ^b5.5. injillion t Q—5 0
churchwomen,
the
involved/
secondary concern in the administration's / -“they .wsre- - now- di sp e 11 e d . On^ th%jrnurder_ of .jthe
assistance
be
weaponry.
and
prepared
Had^ there
to
strong
or
could
uncertainties
were
how
support
military
Washington
substantial
land
and
Agrarian
Transformation, Jose Rodolfo Viera, could reverse. On January 14, four days after the start of the guerrillas' Final^ Offensive," 1981
military
Sales
the
Carter
assistance—$5
credits
and
$420,000
administration million
in
in
Training
resumed
Foreign Funds.
Military On
January 17, special executive powers were invoked $5 million in emergency lethal military aid. The day,
an
additional
$5
million
in
military
FY
to send next
assistance,
iu^iftg three advisory teams, was approved. (In October 1982, two former corporals confessed having
killed
of
well-connected
two
tial
businessman.
ruled of
that
the
there
officers
principals occurred dent
Hammer,
of
the
As
for
hopes,
to
the to
trial.
By
not
on
and
This had
no
had
years
of
of
given
a
build
one
other
time
rulinqs presi-
public
television.) offensive, all.
it
There
was
Reports
of
for
weeks,
all
proportion
Nicaragua.
to
bring
these
this
sides.
circulating
replay
two
by
after
out
judges two
the
to
orders
influen-
time,
had
all
expectations
was
an to
guerrilla on
the
evidence"
national
"final"
been
and
Significantly,
Assembly,
self-deception had
this
D'Aubuisson,
so
on
Salvadoran
"insufficient
long-awaited
be
fears,
Gandxnistas
Two
officers
assault
reality.
matter.
Roberto
the
considerable imminent
was
Viera
officers
Constituent
to
out
No
and
military
disappeared.
after
testimony turned
had
Pearlman,
an
blowinq to
The
their
forces
for
the general insurrection; the Salvadoran insurgents were trying to achieve the same results in less than half that me.
n
heir
administration appreciate the and
their
own
rush
to
with a extent economic
present
the
incoming
Reagan
fait accompli, th^y--#errl7^d"'tcd' to which the government repression sabotage
had
eroded
their
popular
225
support.
To
make
organizational Salvador
matters
and
worse,
communications
the
final
call
commandeered
radio
several
went
unheard.
largely
arrests;
lack
military
retaliation.
half
shops
the
government spite and
of
the
in
of
reports
and
weapons
widespread
15,
some
jobs.)
market,
made
exposed
and
the
a
by
to
about
Finally,
in
countries
guerrillas
disadvantage. shortages
on
20,000
communist the
San
weakened
January
their
from
black
serious
suggested
arms
on
by
offensive,
remained
closed,
off
In
the
strikers
so,
plagued
strike,
before
left
was
problems.
unions
capital
walked
FMLN
general
days
(Even
the
influx a
a
Key
international at
for
protection
workers
the
remained modern
of
the
and
Battlefield a
mixture
of
arms.^2
obsolete
In perspective, the January Offensive, though an embarrassing political defeat for the FMLN-FDR, was no worse
than
valuable
a
were
as
a
a
rethink
their a
of
with
new
and
to
coordinate
their
established
credi-
few
was
forced
to
withdraw
order
to
protect
in
time,
last
as
to
only
more
gained
and
this
strongholds
situation,
insurgents
Relatively
countryside
only
rural
with
army
significance
apparent
their
later
the
basis
force. the
The
learned
nationwide And
of
The
become
They
military
areas
cities. into
on
suffered.
large
stalemate.
experience.
activities bility
military
to
factor
the
rest,
from the
would
guerrillas regroup,
appear
formidable
casualties
faded
and
again
some
months
strategy.
THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND EL SALVADOR: STRATEGY OF CONFLICT AND THE POLITICS OF
ON
THE
COUNTERPRODUCTIVITY The quintessence of incompetence lies not in the inability to effectuate one's intentions (ineffectuality, after
all,
is
often
a
product
control),
but
rather
precisely
the
opposite
by
one's
rather
interests
than
in
having of
and
of
what
values.
impotence,
is
the
forces
beyond
an
effect
that
is
intended
our is
and
required
Counterproductivity, cardinal
sin
in
foreign
policy. LanuarJa"”new^"HTftrri:ni'g'r r ation- came
In power that
in
Wash irxqton-r-^rrrre-d'-'WTth
defined
mi litary tionsT
the
terms A
released,
armed
of
States
the
necessary
to
stop
by
was
the
to
the
State
flow
a
with to
the
whatever
the
so 1 u-
"textbook
Central that
War
was.._^pon case
powers
Alexander,Haig
announced
source"
arms
military
communist
IianT^uLThaH^^ Clark,
"go
War
"Whites--.Paper"
aggression
Hi^^^plTtyT^^TITIam would
problem primarily■in -Gold
RHa-b the _crisis
Secretary
Soviets
a---pr ^conc^l-ved--dootrine
for _Co_ld
Department
charging
t hrough.jCuba." the
and cal led
State
or'l'n'dlrect that
Salvadoran
into
:
claimed
America. United means
guerrillas.
were
226
ITnr3f>r 1 y
i «
especially aiid
np>\y
pnl icy
Was
a
world— clear
belie f
the
communist~~woFldr~nee^e message: _^NQ longer
forceful
characterized
JQ^L
vacillation
and
icy
be
weakness rather, of the
resoluti on~a
Reagan _g^ye~mgient. El
Salvador
dramatize
this
provided
change.
a
convenient
Herwei
r, i QTL_ at
already
on
minimum
the
run.
overtures
for
ignored.
Military
dramatically
a
r isk
in
and
an
to
The
guerrillas
repeated
were
opposition
the
violence
would
economic
aid
would
stepped
effort
to
apply
the
twice
de
up
grace.
fhff
months as
be
mi 11 ton- in--new economic
train
D«uxJuag_-t4^-^br-st^four than
be
coup
to provide $25 $63 million in
-saihy^more the -i n
communist
eost....
ancT i: j 'f t y - six’ advisers
a-rm^d.di-airces .
war"
end
P-la-ns- -we-re now announced military aid. along with a&slAtance
against
or
Accordingly,
dialogue
to
rL little
whe-gg^nTg~~tme--eould^J^_drawn ag-g-y^o-r.
opportunity
much
ga]
of
an
1981, - the
weaponry
as
communist nations ’’had allegedly supplied the rebels innnfK w ~ m:ThTrmTairuarv Qf fensiveh TTrXvately, '.o
administration
sources
revealed
wiii._a^--mi-t-itary
victory
in
The human infinite. The
capacity for self-deception is virtually gross overestimates of guerrilla strength
that
had
prevailed
replaced
by
warnings
that
with
the
resources
long
held
number
gross
an
latter
the
Salvadoran
including a
4,000
have
main
strategy
at
force
the
more
of
the
land
sponsors,
strengthen
policy
hostage
that
had
interest
along
with
an
to
the to
The
would and
in
indeed,
attendant
winning
one At
out-
because the
time,
men,
elements, the,
have
must
17,000
upshot
a
ratio
would
be
a
bloodshed,
Christian
Democratic
peaceful would
right, its
of
estimated
the
beyond
that
to
over
neanderthal the
of
theorists
prolong
its
forces
hope
ten
now
Pentagon
police
about one
were
of
surprise.
support
four
reform
U.S.
forces,
of
guerrillas.)
undermine
fighting;
and
that
no
and
roughly
numbered
than
conflict
no
by
advantage
military
spite
had
army
days. ^^
autumn
(Military
conventional
force
ninety
previous Army
hand.
administrative
little
the
Salvadoran
insurgent
the
only
a
during
to
underestimates—in
the
that
sixty
and
place
control—forces
resolution seek
its
intensification
of
early
the
of
the
expansion,
American
involvement. In
retrospect,
administration r-e-piijsian
of
witnessed^ a
the
and-RraTvmioran
the
January
months
golden
Reagan
opportunity
Offensive
governments " in
of
what
had
lost,
placed
wouTd
the
prove
to
• The U.S.
be
a
rar^ posit,ion of bargaining strength vis-a-vis the gue r r i_tl a s . Washington's new hard line suggested that the
military
advantage
Salvadorw__but—against t-hia-vifrtirrridation
would
be
Nicaragua
clearly
pressed and
Cuba
hacT'an- impact.
not as No
only well.
longer
0 A
o -M u o 54 4-> Cb] 0 -H Q
c c
1
• • T3
03 U •H 03
0 •rH
c O
U Cn CM •
0 0 D
CO p04 1—1
04 p04 1—1
O CO 04 rH
i—1 co 04 1—1
CM CO 04 rH
Q 00 CO 04 rH
A A 5 • 0 0 0 U 0 3 cn c P0 1 4-1 H 40 o o 40 u 3 0 rH 0 40 A 54 0 04 0 03 rH CLI •• 0 0 4-> 0 23
0
0 0 0 4J 0 C *H 4-> 0 0 54 0 C •H E •H rH 0 54 Or Q
0 rH 3 0 EH
C *H 0 0 0 E 0 0 0 JC EH
0 0 u 54 3 O CO
375 TABLE
10.3
Costa Rica: Proportions of Gross Domestic Product for Selected Sectors of Economic Activity, 1950-82 (percentages).
Year
Agr i cult.
Manuf ac t.
Central Gov't.
Other
Exports
Imports
Nominal Terms 19 5 5 1960 19 6 5 19 7 0
38.3 26.0 23 .5 22.5
13 .3 14.2 26.8 18.3
7.7 9 .0 9.7 10.6
40.7 50.8 50 .0 48 .6
25 .0 21 .4 22.8 28.2
26 .0 26.2 33.3 35 .0
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983a
19.4 20.3 20 .4 21 .9 20 .4 18 .5 17 .8 23 .0 24 .7 23.3
20.3 20 .4 19.7 99 .0 18 .8 13.3 13 .6 18 .9 20.3 19 .9
11 .9 12.4 13 .0 12.9 14 .0 15 .0 15.2 13 .4 11.7 13.1
48 .4 46.9 46.9 46 .2 46 .3 48.2 48 .4 44 .7 43.3 43.7
33.5 30 .4 29 .4 31.1 28 .4 26 .9 26.5 43.3 43.3 34.5
43 .3 38.7 35.3 36.5 36.2 37 .3 36.3 48.2 39.2 35 .4
n. a. n. a. 25 .0 34.2 37 .9 36 .4 36.4 36.1 37 .4 36.3 34 .9 39.7 39.2 33 .9
n. a. n. a. 30 .9 39.6 37 .9 34 .4 37 .8 43 .5 44 .0 43.1 41.3 31.1 23.3 24.1
Rea 1 19 5 7 1960 19 6 5 19 70 1974 1975 19 7 b 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 b
a b
24 .4 25.2 22 .9 24.1 21 .0 21.2 20.2 19.0 19 .0 18.2 18 .0 19.3 20.2 21 .0
14.1 13 .8 16.7 18 .6 21 .0 21.2 21.3 22 .0 22 .4 22 .0 22 .0 22.4 20 .9 20 .4
12.1 11 .3 10 .8 9.9 10.2 10.3 10.1 9.8 9 .7 9.7 10 .0 10 .4 11.2 11.1
te rmsa 49 .4 49 .7 49 .6 47 .4 47 .8 47 .3 48 .4 49.2 43 .9 50.1 50 .0 47 .9 47.7 47 .5
In 1966 prices. Preliminary estimates
Sources:
The
same
as
in Table
10.1.
376
1
jQ 0 ■ro
U 0 4-1
U 33 C 0 E 3>4 4J 33 O 0 C r—| _Q c a E 03 J 1 w c 44 D
•H
-P c
4->
0
U
•
03 •
03 i
03 •
c
c
• •
c
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rganization
:ive organizations, organi za t
intelligence
vision
a
A
modified
anti-Soviet
Direct
and
leir Soviet patrons. In dozen delegations of party doz
Is
also
imports
of
than
were
providing
Cuba's
political
lines
women's
were
year.
more
unions,
of
estimated
1973, 3,
to
Soviets
exports.
internal
long and
percent
total
billion
the
and
was
came
Vassily
Cuban
party
guidance. purged
under
Petrovich
The
of
the of
leaders
all
DGI,
the
suspected
direct
super29
the
KGB.
In January 1969, the Soviets announced that they had reequipped the Cuban Armed Forces.31 The first Russian naval and
squadron
stopped
at
the
island
in
July
of
by
1972, Soviet warships had visited Cuba 3 2 times. The Soviets were now establishing a
naval navy today
presence and is
in
through
the
Caribbean
extended
available
to
the
satellite
tracking
gathering
installations,
flights,
and
the
ship
by
visits.
Soviets
stations, the
servicing
of
building for
Cuban docking
electronic refueling
up
that
year
ten significant the
Cuban
territory facilities,
intelligenceof
submarines
reconnaissance at
Cienfuegos.
458
One purpose of Moscow’s upgrading of the Cuban military arsenal in the 1970s was to prepare a "rapid deployment force" with legitimacy in the Third World. Troops from a small Third World country with a comparatively unspoiled revolutionary image could do much in Africa that Soviet troops could not. Angola was represented as an independent Cuban initiative for the sake of "proletarian solidarity/" but Moscow's role in Africa became more conspicuous after this initial success. Subsequently, Cuban activities in Africa and the Middle East have been coordinated in an integral package involving other Soviet bloc participants. The institutionalization of Soviet—Cuban ties signifies a new kind of neocolonial structural dependency for Cuba. Although this relationship is not necessarily irreversible (nor was it intentional on Cuba's part), in a period in which many Latin American countries achieved a degree of political and economic independence unprecedented in their histories, Cuba, the "first liberated territory of Latin America," was compelled by the errors of its leaders and the policies of the superpowers to march in a different direction from other Latin American countries.
THE SOVIET UNION AND CUBA IN CENTRAL AMERICA While the Soviets remained safely in the background, the Cuban champions of "anti-imperialism" have taken the risks that "international solidarity" in Central America requires. As earlier indicated, the revolutionary movements were not created by Havana or Moscow, but are an inevitable product of Central America's backward, repressive, dependent, and oligarchical societies. As instability mounted in the 1970s, Cuba and the Soviet Union were presented with new opportunities to spread their influence.
NICARAGUA Leaders of the small Sandinista movement went to Cuba in the 1960s for refuge and military training. In 1978, perceiving the domestic and regional isolation of the Somoza regime, the Cubans began to intervene significantly. In the summer of that year, they mediated differences among the Sandinista factions and, in March 1979, helped to achieve the latter's unification. They provided contacts with international arms dealers and supplied some weapons themselves, often through the good offices of neighboring countries. As the 1979 uprising approached, Havana increased direct arms supplies, organized and armed an internationalist brigade to fight
459
alongside the FSLN guerrillas, and dispatched military specialists to the field to coordinate efforts. In the spring of 1979, Cuban military advisers from the Department of Special Operations accompanied FSLN forces into battle while maintaining radio communications with Havana. These advisers, led by Julian Lopez Diaz, a covert action expert who became ambassador to Nicaragua, remained in Nicaragua after the Sandinistas took power. Within a week they were joined by several dozen additional Cuban military, security, and intelligence personnel. Key military advisory and intelligence positions were awarded to Cubans. This situation finally led Panama's General Torrijos to withdraw Panamanian military advisers in 1980 and to offer "friendly warnings" against overreliance on Cuba. Intelligence sources estimated Cuban military and security personnel to have reached 2,000 by the spring of 1983. Emphasis on quantitative estimates obscures the more important consideration—the qualitative predominance of Cuban personnel in central advisory posts. The Soviet bloc effort in Nicaragua has begun to assume the features of a now familiar division of labor employed in places like Ethiopia and Afghanistan, in which the Cubans (aided by the Soviets) mainly attend to military affairs, the East Germans attend to security and intelligence matters, and the Bulgarians concentrate on economics.^ The Bulgarians recently provided a $140 million credit over three years for the development of a deep water port at El Bluff on Nicaragua's Atlantic coast (capable of handling 28,000-metric-ton oceangoing ships), as well as hydroelectric, agricultural, and industrial projects.35 Fifty Soviet and thirty-five East German advisers are stationed in Nicaragua on security missions according to the U.S. State Department.^ In March 1980, the FSLN signed a mutual support agreement with the Soviet Communist Party. A series of military accords soon followed. To date the Soviets have supplied fifty T-54 and T-55 tanks, several heavy tank ferries providing water-crossing capacity, one thousand military trucks, plus BM-21 mobile multiple rocket launchers, MI-8 helicopters, AK-47 rifles, AN-2 aircraft, armored personnel carriers, 122mm howitzers, and 152mm guns.^ The Soviets have sent technicians to instruct the Nicaraguans in the use of these weapons. Nicaraguan pilots and mechanics have been sent to Bulgaria for training.^8 There is evidence that the Nicaraguans have -qade preparations for the arrival of Soviet MiG fighters. However, these plans appear to have been altered in the face of warnings from Washington. The Soviet Union has demonstrated a willingness to assist with long-term development projects but not to be a lender of last resort in crises. Facing a serious
460
foreign exchange Ortega travelled an
economic
deficit, Nicaraguan Head of State Daniel to Moscow in May 1982. He returned with
and
technical
cooperation
agreement
million on very favorable terms for the hydroelectric plant, technical training 400-bed
hospital
complete
with
11
for
$50
construction centers, and
of a
a
doctors.40
Soviet
However, no foreign exchange assistance was forthcoming. An additional $100 million credit has been extended for the
purchase
station
for
permitting to
be
a
Soviet
Soviet
41
by
establishing and
a
This economic
With
transition national
but
the a
mid-1970s
the
promoting
the
Instead,
the
for
construction and
military,
security,
not
not
in
Moscow's
evolving
Soviet that
to
to
a
had
of
be
a
of
the
new
"the
from
of
the
directly
non-capitalist become
a
inter-
part
factor
on
"peaceful
authorities
under on
Soviet
forces
abandonment
aid
the
current
long-term
correlation
"material ceased
sustaining
in
basis.
only
assert
factor
in
Nicaragua
line,
transition
interested
Sur
in
also
to
del
political,
consequent
has
main
seem
day-to-day
general
conditions states
technicians
"changed
began
socialist
a
Soviets Juan
presence
reflects
and as
on
expected
San
Soviets
the
the
is
of
spheres—but
problems
world-scale" the
in
economy
strategy.
port
Soviet The
long-term
policy
Moscow
city
ascendency
Nicaraguan
with
for
the
receiving
satellites
Finally,
2
intelligence
A
mid-1933.
numerous
maintenance.
gaining
machinery.
communications
drydock
with
farm
telecommunications
direct
operable
donated and
of
path."
political,
mi1itary—strategic, and moral influence of the states of the socialist community.43 In Africa and Southeast Asia, the
Soviet
with
Union,
subordinate
often bloc
dominate
political
emerging
Third
tenance West. have
EL
of
the
Soviet been
countries sector
Cuban
consistent
with
this
allies,
has
structures while
and
actions
has
played
a
more
and
of
of
counsel
labor
sought
to
newly
recommending
economic
links in
mainwith
the
Nicaragua
policy.
direct
insurgency than in Nicaragua. to establish a support network neighboring communist supplies These
countries
parties.
acquisition
and
and
division
SALVADOR Cuba
and
complex
military
private and
a
members
and
World
via
and
for
Ethiopia, air
"final
were and
routes,
1980,
of
were
often
groups
Havana
considerable
offensive"
collected
in
the
Salvadoran
It has used its influence for the insurgents in
solidarity
During
delivery
the
supplies
via
role
of
and
local
assisted
January
1981.
Eastern
Europe,
delivered
through
surface,
via
Nicaragua.
the
military
in
44
in
Vietnam, sea,
461
Clearly such a complex clandestine operation could not occur without Soviet approval. On June 2, 1980, Shafik Handal, secretary general of the Salvadoran Communist Party (PCS) , met with Mikhail Kudachkin, deputy chief of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, who suggested that Handal travel to Vietnam to acquire arms and offered to pay for the trip. Handal also requested that the thirty students sent by the PCS for study in Moscow receive military training. Six weeks later, upon returning from Vietnam, Handal met with Karen Brutents, chief of the Latin American section, and was told that the Soviet leadership would transport the now promised Vietnamese arms,^ Moscow kept its involvement indirect but saw that Handal did not return from the East empty-handed. The Cubans played a role in the unification of the rebel factions, achieved in meetings in Havana in December 1979 and May 1980. Havana expanded its logistic role and began to assist in tactical planning of insurgent military operations, including the January 1981 "final offensive".46 A similar pattern developed in Guatemala. Once again the Cubans played a role in uniting the deeply divided revolutionary groups. Once formal unity was achieved, Havana expanded military assistance and training programs, reportedly coordinating arms shipments from Nicaragua through Honduras. The U.S. State Department has charged that M-16 rifles captured from the Guatemalan guerrillas have been traced to those left by U.S. forces in Vietnam, thus indicating a Cuban and Soviet role.4'
CUBA
IN
THE
CARIBBEAN
In the latter 1970s, a Cuban political offensive unfolded, aimed at gaining a foothold in one after another of the Eastern Caribbean islands. This campaign made use of Cuban cultural exports and "solidarity brigades" of teachers, doctors, engineers, and advisers to local political groups. Havana's intelligence network was fed by local sympathizers who added color to Cuban propaganda, making it far more effective than the staid Soviet variety. These methods have created a public image of Cuba and its Soviet-bloc allies as revolutionaries in joint struggle against western imperialism. Havana's task was facilitated by the middle—class character of many of the new nationalist regimes that came to power in the Caribbean during this period. While espousing revolutionary goals, most of these parties achieved power by decidedly unrevolutionary means, lacking the ties to the labor and peasant movements
462
enjoyed by the populists they succeeded. Given their narrow popular base and a shortage of resources with which to fulfill electoral and revolutionary promises/ their identification with Cuba became vital for maintaining power. Although Cuba can supply neither the model nor the resources for long-run development/ it can furnish/ in Anthony Maingot's wordS/ a veneer of "revolutionary legitimacy while at the same time providing the arms/ intelligence/ and training essential for grabbing power and keeping it." As these new regimes expand tneir public sectors/ the Cuban connection becomes "a smokescreen covering up deficiencies and incompetence of all kinds. In exchange/ the Cubans achieve influence within security and political apparati. Havana's Caribbean efforts in the late 1970s focused on reinforcing the left wing of Jamaica's Peoples National Party (PNP) , while simultaneously supporting the new Workers' Party. After the PNP defeat in the 1981 elections, Grenada became the focus of Cuban attention. Many of the leaders of the New Jewel Movement/ which seized power in March 1979/ hard upon the return of its leader/ Maurice Bishop/ from a visit to Cuba/ were middle—class intellectuals educated in England and the United States. Havana uniformed/ armed/ and trained a Grenadan army of 20,000 and kept it in military zones declared off limits to the local population. With a total population of only 110,000, Grenada probably has the highest ratio of troops to civilians of any country in^ the world. According to Washington, the Cubans have 600 civilian and 30 military personnel on the island.50 The most tumultuous issue underlying U.S.-Grenadan relations has been the construction of an airport with a 9,800-foot runway at Port Salines by more than 300 Cuban construction workers using Soviet equipment. The Grenadan government argues that the airport is needed to handle jetliners for its tourist industry and that many Caribbean islands have built similar facilities. Nonetheless, the airport will accommodate any aircraft in the Soviet—Cuban arsenal and would extend the combat radius of Cuban MiGs to northern South America. Aside from providing the Cubans with an excellent staging area ^ opera t ions in the northern tier of South America, it would solve the problem of obtaining secure re fueling stops for military flights to Africa. According to the Reagan administration, the Cubans have also built a batallion-sized military camp in Calivigny, Grenada. The camp reportedly contains barracks, administration buildings, vehicle storage sheds, support buildings, and a training area with a Soviet-style obstacle course, which could supplement air and naval facilities presently under construction.51 The Soviets, who established an embassy in St. °eorge's and provided TASS News Service to the island.
463 extended a $7.5 million credit line to Grenada for the construction of a satellite-tracking station. Radio Free Grenada stopped broadcasting BBC's "World News from London" following a newscast quoting from a U.S. State Department human rights report on Grenada. The Soviets have provided an additional $4.5 million in economic aid for the island's agricultural sector.52 The military rulers of Surinam, led by Lieutenant Colonel Desi Bouterse, came to power via a coup d'etat in February 1980, overthrowing the democratically elected government of Henck Arron. Leftists within the junta sought to overcome their narrow base of popular support by initially strengthening ties with Cuba and Grenada. When this action proved even more unpopular, Bouterse appointed pro-Dutch, pro-U.S. Hendrik Chin-A-Sen as president and jailed the leftists, without abandoning his nationalist economic policy. Following Bouterse's visit to Grenada in the summer of 1981, his policies began to shift leftward. He ousted Chin-A-Sen in February 1982. The freedoms of the press, of speech, and of assembly in groups larger than three people were curtailed and strict government censorship was imposed. In December 1982, fifteen prominent democratic opposition leaders were arrested and later assassinated, further narrowing Bouterse's base support. Bouterse looked more and more to the newly formed Revolutionary People's Front (composed of two tiny leftist parties: the Libyan-style Union of Progressive Workers and Farmers and the pro-Cuban Revolutionary People's Party, led by the architect of the 1980 overtures to Havana, Sargeant Major Badrisen Sital) and to the increasingly divided army for support. During this period, Surinam's relations with Cuba, Grenada, and Nicaragua grew intimate. Cuba established a trade mission in 1981, opened a diplomatic mission (later upgraded to an embassy) in early 1982, and reached a sugar-rice agreement in the summer of 1982. As an indication of the importance that Cuba places on Surinam, Osvaldo Cardenas, former director of the CaribbeanCentral American section of the Cuban Communist Party's Americas Department, was named ambassador. Official, cultural, and sports exchanges have proliferated in recent months. In the spring of 1982 Bouterse reportedly made a secret visit to Cuba and held discussions with Castro. The Venezuelan Christian Democratic Party has charged that Soviet and Cuban soldiers are organizing a civil guard inside Surinam. Former vice-premier Andre Haakmat alleges that Havana has organized an internal security force for Bouterse.53 Though these allegations have not been confirmed, Havana radio praised Bouterse's crackdown on democratic rights, claiming that it had saved Surinam from elements seeking to turn the country
464
over to "imperialists and transnational corporations. 1,54 Bouterse is depending on Grenadan, Cuban, and Nicaraguan advisers for help in his new economic and political strategy, which focuses on continuing the nationalization of the economy and building mass organizations to correct the three years of "upside-down revolution." Until and unless Bouterse develops a popular base and an effective program, the Cuban connection will serve him as it does the Caribbean middle-class revolutionaries. Given an opportunity to expand its influence, Havana has thus far proven obliging.
REACTION
TO
CUBAN-SOVIET
EXPANSIONISM
Two distinct policy lines have emerged among those seeking to contain Soviet-Cuban influence in the Caribbean Basin. The first, practiced by many Latin American countries, a number of European governments, the Socialist International, and other international bodies, competes with Havana and Moscow while accepting the legitimacy of movements (even revolutionary ones) for social change in the region. Diplomatic recognition, political support, economic aid, and military assistance are extended to revolutionary governments. Opposition to Cuban and Soviet alignment is urged within an overall context of cooperation. This policy opposes intervention by either superpower (or their proxies) in the internal affairs of the Basin countries, or isolation of those favorably disposed to Cuba or the USSR. In contrast, the Reagan administration tends to identify revolutionary movements and anti-U.S. policies with Soviet, Cuban, and Nicaraguan intervention. It seeks to "reward friends and punish enemies" by withdrawing or extending recognition, cutting off or reinstating bilateral and multilateral aid, and supplying military assistance to pro-U.S. governments and counterrevolutionaries. Brazil’s policy toward Surinam provides an example of the first policy. Following the execution of the Surinamese opposition leaders, the Netherlands and the United States terminated all economic assistance. Brazil continued its aid programs with the express purpose of containing Cuban influence" and maintaining Surinamese ties with the West. Concerned that western isolation of Surinam would offer greater scope for the Cubans, General Dianilo Venturini, special diplomatic assistant to President Figueiredo, stated "it would be bad for a neighboring country to become the ally of nations that could bring problems to Brazil."56 ^uban expansionism has strained the friendly relations carefully cultivated during the 1970s. Between 1977 and 1981, Havana's relations with Colombia, Chile,
465
Costa Rica/ Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela have soured. In the spring of 1980, the Cubans began providing the Colombian guerrilla organization M-19 with training and help in its unification efforts with other leftist groups in the country, leading the government to break relations with Havana in March of the following year. In May 1981, Cuba attacked Costa Rica in the United Nations for its criticism of Havana's human rights violations, leading San Jose to sever diplomatic relations. Ecuador and Peru both withdrew their ambassadors from Havana in 1980, following Cuban violations of their embassy rights during the refugee exodus to the United States. By early 1981, many patriotic Latin Americans began speaking out against excessive Cuban involvement in Nicaragua. Both the late General Omar Torrijos of Panama and ex-President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela voiced strong criticisms. Most of the democratic parties in the region, including leading Latin American members of the Socialist International and the Christian Democratic World Federation, have followed suit. In 1979, Torrijos started loosening the close ties built with Cuba during the 1970s. Panamanian teachers, students, and popular organizations staged a massive strike in October 1979 against the Ministry of Education, following its proposal to introduce Cuban books and advisers into the school system. Torrijos cancelled pending commercial agreements with the Soviet Union and began criticizing Castro's leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement. Shortly before his death in the spring of 1981, he criticized Cuba for its interference in Central America. The present Panamanian government has continued Torrijos' policy. In an effort to deny the U.S. pretexts for delaying transfer of the Panama Canal, the government has warned Cuba to step down from its activist role in the region even as it has reaffirmed its diplomatic links with Havana. In 1981, Venezuelan Foreign Minister Jose Alberto Zambrano declared that "Cuban actions in Central America and the Caribbean region are part of the global strategy of the Soviet Union.Alarmed by Soviet and Cuban efforts to penetrate the region and by prospects of superpower confrontation, Venezuela sought to forge a common "Latin American strategy" against outside intervention, tightening diplomatic relations with Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. Caracas also opposed increased U.S. military deployments in the Caribbean, consistent with its goal of converting the Basin into "a zone of peace, not a strategic target of the big powers.'0 In the aftermath of the Falklands (Malvinas) conflict, Venezuela has softened its stand toward Cuba at the same time it has sought to distance itself from the United States. State visits were resumed and the Cuban embassy in Caracas was recently reopened. In June 1932
466
the new foreign minister, Jose Rodriguez, referred to "a climate of rapprochement positive towards Nicaragua," and President Luis Herrera Campins appeared at the revolution's anniversary celebrations the following month in Managua. ^ A major if generally unappreciated source of resistance to Soviet-Cuban hegemonism is located within the revolutionary movement itself. This is nowhere more the case than in El Salvador. Four of the five constituent groups of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) arose originally as dissident offs from the pro-Soviet Salvadoran Communist Party. The three main guerrilla groups in El Salvador are the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), and the Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN). The FPL split from the Salvadoran Communist Party in 1970 after a long and bitter struggle against positions supported by the Soviet Union but opposed by Cuba. Subsequently, however, the FPL, while remaining suspicious of the USSR, adopted positions congruent with that of Moscow, especially on internationa1 questions. It is also the grouping closest to the position of the Cubans and the Sandinistas. The ERP began as a Maoist split from the PCS and was highly influenced by the Cultural Revolution and the works of North Korea's Kim il-Sung. In 1975, its military commission tried and executed the group's leading intellectual, Roque Dalton, on suspicion of being a "Soviet-Cuban and CIA double agent." Dalton supporters subsequently left the ERP to form the FARN. In 1961, the ERP and FARN grew close once again. Within the FMLN a "two—line struggle" between the positions of the ERP and the FARN, on the one hand, and those of the FPL, on the other, became increasingly evident. The FPL supports a strategy of "protracted people's war." Although the term is Maoist, the FPL conception bears little resemblance to the Chinese theory of united fronts with middle sectors, flexible tactics, and broad international alliances. The FPL adheres narrowly to a concept of "worker—peasant alliance versus the bourgeoisie" and seems to envision an inevitable direct confrontation with the United States in which its chief ^1ii^s wouid be Cuba and the Soviet Union. It agreed to support the FMLN-FDR proposals for negotiated settlement only after its intransigence had rendered it totally isolated. The FARN, which has provided the political leadership for the FARN/ERP alliance, like the Terceristas in Nicaragua, counterposes insurrection to protracted war. It favors broad alliances with the middle sectors, including elements in the military officers' camps. Recent diplomatic exposure and the evolution of the Nicaraguan Revolution have reinforced
467
its Maoist heritage of suspicion toward the Soviet Union and Cuba. The FARM has been critical of the Sandinistas' failure to preserve the broad alliances of the prerevolutionary period and to integrate the masses organically into the revolutionary process. It is also critical of their failure to pursue consistently a policy of nonalignment. The overt Cuban presence in Nicaragua has caused problems for the FMLN-FDR as a whole and is another source of criticism in the FARN-ERP. The FPL/ on the other hand/ maintains close relations with the Sandinista National Directorate/ especially with former members of the Protracted Popular War (GPP) faction led by Tomas Borge and Bayardo Arce. There have been several reports of tensions between the FSLN and the FARN in Managua. Recently the Cubans have been courting the ERP/ which has remained independent of them up to now. This situation represents a danger to the political independence of the FMLN/ though it is worth noting that the Cubans have quarrelled with the FPL over the latter's reluctance to support negotiations. In any event/ if the war drags on/ Cuban influence over the ERP and ERP triumphalism are likely to increase. Although Salvador is the most graphic case of the division in the Central American left between its nonaligned and its pro-Soviet wings/ this split has also been manifest elsewhere. The original Tercerista tendency in Nicaragua envisioned a non-aligned course in which the country would become equidistant from the two superpowers. Tercerism believed in the maximum use of international conditions/ in broad alliances within the country/ and in a phased revolutionary process in which the mixed economy and pluralistic democracy would survive for generations. These positions did not prevail within the National Directorate; eventually the Tercerist tendency split and one of its leaders/ Eden Pastora (Comandante Cero); left the country along with many of his followers from the Southern Front. Pastora commenced military operations against the Sandinista government in April 1983. A line similar to that of the FPL in El Salvador and associated with the GPP in Nicaragua seems to be prevailing. However/ the old factional groupings are giving way to those conditioned by the current struggle among the Sandinistas. In Guatemala the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) is an independent/ Tercerista-type organization/ whereas the Popular Guerrilla Army (EGP) is Cuban oriented. The Revolutionary Organization of the Armed People (ORPA) stands somewhere between the two orientations just mentioned/ whereas the Guatemalan Workers' Party (PGT) is associated with Moscow. In Costa Rica/ in the summer of 1982/ the electoral front called "Pueblo Unido" split twice over the issues of broad alliances and the Soviet
468
Union.
Eric
Movement for
of
Ardon, the
the
leader
People
separating
from
party,
is
that
Soviet
Union. "60
(MRP),
of
stated
Vanguardia
"they
are
the
that
Popular,
permanently
Current administration tions. The struggle in the
Revolutionary a
major
the
reason
pro-Moscow
aligned
policy disdains Caribbean Basin
with
the
such distincis between
"democracy" and "totalitarianism" tout court, a superpower conflict in which one must choose his side. Reliable
allies
are
U.S.-aligned
pursuing
independent
policies
regimes;
are
countries
distrusted.
The
Reagan
administration has rejected Mexican and French efforts toward a negotiated solution in El Salvador and, to date, has
been
those and
publicly
of
the
Contadora
Colombia) Under
likewise
supportive
to
but
Group
(Mexico,
obstructive
Venezuela,
a
regional
settlement.
congressional
pressure
the
offered
reach
privately
public
support
for
been
at
designated Thus
the
as
service
and
the
Cuba
equipped
has
and
"political
become
dropped,
U.S.
officials
Nations Ihe pointing island
the
on
held
is
primarily
armed
El
Salvador
target
insurgents
of
the
difficulties,
two
start
occasions,
discussions. Daniel
Council talks
1981-82, Within
Uni ted
military. and
who
seek
to
Reagan
regional
Havana
began
making
the
high-level March to
Cuban
Cuban
1983,
inform
and
Castro
the
United
government
was
immediately."61
and
three
Nations,
In
Ortega
that
Havana's
insurgents,
Nicaragua. at
that
United States rejected to increased shipments
in
American
a
Nicaragua's
to
(sometimes
Seeking to divert attention from its region and suffering from domestic
and
Security
'willing
and spoken on such gestures
overtures to the United States in November for negotiations. Previous preconditions
were
authorized
policy
trained
has
government.
political
conciliatory 1481, asking
a
has
and
Sandinista
counteroffensive. activities in the economic
of
"two-tracked")
administration
Honduras topple
the
Panama,
administration
settlements," provided economic assistance, behalf of "political reform." Nonetheless, have
of
the Cuban of Soviet
activity
the
on
increasing
weeks
of
Washington
restricted U.S. tourist visits, to the island from Miami.
overtures, weapons to
behalf Cuban
Ortega's tightened
and
cut
of
the
Central
presence
in
announcement the
regular
embargo, flights
Perceiving Cuban economic weakness and recent concern over the Soviets’ inability to underwrite the island's
economy,
the
Reagan
administration
has
used
U.S.
leverage to tighten the economic vise. Heavy borrowing from western banks and falling world sugar prices left Cuba
unable
1982. billion
The
to
Cubans
debt
short-term
meet
to
its
debt
requested
service a
requirements
rescheduling
Europe
and
Japan,
liabilities
due
in
with
September
$1.1 of
of
in
their
billion 1982.
$3-4 in
For
its
469
long-term debt/ Havana requested postponement of repayment for ten years with a three-year grace period. Interest payments and bank transaction fees would be paid on current terms.^2 Administration officials sought to dissuade Cuba's creditors from leniency/ urging that rescheduling be tied to changes in Castro's foreign policy in Central America and Africa. Soviet infusions of foreign exchange did not materialize/ igniting speculation that Cuban-Soviet relations were cooling. These rumors were somewhat doused when Castro travelled to Moscow for Brezhnev's funeral and met with Andropov on November 16/ 1982. One administration official stated that "the fact the meeting did happen and the very fact that a picture of Castro and Andropov together was released to the West is a Soviet way of saying/ especially to the Reagan administration/ 'Castro is still our boy.' "63 u.S. policymakers are convinced that when the Cubans feel less isolated and vulnerable/ they will revert to their traditional aggressive posture.
SOVIET-CUBAN
REACTION
TO
THE U.S.
COUNTEROFFENSIVE
A number of factors have influenced the Soviet decision not to confront the American counteroffensive directly. Domestic economic problems and the succession crisis have absorbed much of the Soviet leadership's attention and undermined its unity. Soviet passivity in the Falklands and the Lebanese crises suggests that Moscow is overextended and preoccupied with Afghanistan and Eastern Europe. Moscow's diplomatic efforts have focused on its "peace offensive" in Europe; its credibility would be impaired by aggressive behavior in the Western Hemisphere. By early 1982/ the Soviets and Cubans were anxious to appear as peacemakers in the Caribbean Basin. But their temporary lowering of sights seems to be a tactical retrenchment rather than a strategic withdrawal. The heavy optimism of the 1979-81 period/ which "marked the beginning of a qualitatively new stage in the development of the Latin American peoples' struggle against imperialism and oligarchy/" has given way to a more guarded Soviet view of revolutionary possibilities in Central America.^4 Current Soviet accounts emphasize the ebb and flow of country-specific situations rather than an overall regional upsurge. Yet the work of expanding Soviet and Cuban influence goes on, not only through lowprofile penetrations of security and military channels of friendly Basin countries but also through long-range academic and cultural programs intended to form pro-Soviet political and technological elites. Above all/ Moscow seeks to capitalize on the renewed image of
470
U.S. interventionism. viable at present and is
too
taxing/
themselves
for
Moscow offensive' U.S. to
both
Central
peace
peace
and
increasingly The
Reagan
with
Its
naturally
suppress combat The "big
U.S.
such
policy of
for
in
the
emanates
emphasize
U.S.
created
as
MATO
the
the
the
in
Hemisphere
global
counteroffensive:
was
as
the 65
traitors. to
the
an
inventions
for of
of
developing The
Latin
U.S.
Soviets
American
policy
portray
one
to
American
Union."
Soviets
reac-
return
66
that
of
era.
the
views
its
growing.
finally
and
a
in
armies
approach.
Soviet
The
is
and
danger
and
distinct
their
as
Soviet
problems
conflict
conflicts
policy
to
pre—Vietnam
for
allies.
Western
policy
the
the
disregard
well
with
from
a
creation
"shattered
that
the
tension of
threat
policy:
renegades
Malvinas
resurgent
revolutionary
shown
the
aggressive
propaganda
as
the
Britain
countries nations,
the
new
^reat
imperialist
of
the
movements/
various
to
foreign
has
a
revitalized
where
foreign
diplomacy"
expression support
view
of
a
training
liberation
training
Soviets stick
the
see
to
include
the
of
counter-
principal
solutions
countries
regimes,
the
American
military
relations tionary
aspect
analysts
defensively
for
U.S.
counterposed
administration
preference plans
one
constitutes
belligerent
aid
positioning
aggressive
America/
Soviet
are
advances.
"the
stability
reacting
Moscow
future
that
offensive.
movements
and
emphasizes
"militarism"
world
Havana
possible
now in
If military escalation is not significant long-term economic
U.S.
aspect
of
a
The present masters of the White House apparently hope to settle their affairs as well as possible and attain
political
successes
precisely
under
the
conditions of conflicts/ tensions, military clashes and confrontations. This is how they are acting in the the In attempt
Middle
is
how
they
America,
regain
U.S.
hegemony
policy
by
is
its
act
in
suppressing
as
an
national
movements.
disposal
military the
to
depicted
After proclaiming Central America a 1 own vital interests, the U.S. has at
try
Atlantic.
Central
liberation
and^this 67
South
to
Bast
to
control
Reagan
over
political,
this
administration's
strategy
which
national
liberation
Guatemala,
retain
the
includes
sphere of its used every means
the
region.
economic, At
policy
.
the
.
.
suppression
struggles
destabilization
in of
El .
basis
lies of
.
of
a
the
Salvador .
and
and
Nicaragua,
471
and the institution of other measures of a preventative nature to keep the liberation movement from developing in depth and breadth.^8 Moscow views nonmilitary and multilateral aspects of U.S. policy as links to the broader militaristic strategy. The Caribbean Basin Initiative is bellicose due to its "discriminatory character" toward Cuba/ Nicaragua/ and Grenada.^ It seeks to foster dependency and discord among "friendly nations.The Central American Democratic Community is an effort to enlist noncombatant nations/ particularly Honduras and Costa Rica/ in the legitimizing of intervention/ and to bolster the Salvadoran government by overcoming its diplomatic isolation.7 ^ Soviet advice to revolutionaries in the region/ particularly in Honduras and Costa Rica/ is now much more cautious: "The main objective for progressive forces is the effective frustration of the plans to turn Honduras into the stronghold of a crusade against democracy in Central America."7^ in Costa Rica/ the principal task is to prevent that country from becoming a "bridgehead for attack on neighboring Nicaragua."7^ Guatemala is seen as the hinge of Central America: a victory for revolutionary forces there will have an even greater impact on the region than a victory in either Nicaragua or El Salvador; "there is not much doubt that Guatemala is on the brink of massive social upheaval" and "the revolutionaries' present strategy has to be peoples' war." But this strategy is represented as a reaction to oligarchic repression orchestrated by the United States/ rather than the result of popular initiative and momentum. "The Guatemalan people had no other choice but armed struggle for their freedom and rights/ that there was no alternative to exercising their legal right to
rebel. " 7 ^ For all the Soviet criticism of U.S. policy/ no big boost in direct Soviet aid to the socialist governments or revolutionary movements appears to be forthcoming. Even before Washington's efforts to destabilize Nicaragua increased/ there had been growing concern in Managua over Soviet willingness and capacity to assist the Sandinista's program of socialist construction. As we saw in May 1982/ Daniel Ortega set out for Moscow with high hopes of obtaining emergency currency relief to meet Nicaragua's balance-of-payments crisis. He came home with the developmental assistance mentioned earlier/ but without badly needed foreign exchange. Moscow appears to be prudently limiting its commitment of military hardware to the region as well. In the summer and fall of 1982/ Nicaragua sought to purchase Soviet MiGs to bolster its air force. Moscow has not been forthcoming. In the summer of 1982 the Central
472
Committee of the Soviet Communist Party reportedly distributed a secret letter to fraternal parties and fronts/ placing priority on the Soviet peace campaign in Western Europe. In the wake of Moscow's abandonment of the PLO/ Central American leftists were increasingly dubious of Soviet commitment in a crunch.
CONCLUSION The countries of the Caribbean Basin are experiencing a double-edged crisis: an internal economic/ social/ and political crisis and a crisis of external hegemony. The Soviet Union, primarily via its Cuban allies, seeks to fish in these troubled waters. Moscow's immediate objective is not to establish pro-Soviet regimes but to weaken its chief global adversary. It has tuned its tactics to the evolving situation-emphasizing "unity of the left" or broad united fronts as dictated by local conditions and Washington's response. ^Geographical distance and its own internal and external contradictions place limits on Moscow's freedom of action in the Caribbean Basin. Cuban willingness to cooperate with Moscow compensates to some extent for geography./ Moreover, proximity to a superpower breeds powerful opposition to it. Recent history in Afghanistan, Poland, and China, as well as in the Caribbean Basin, attests to the growing obsolescence of "spheres of influence." The Reagan administration has stressed the security danger in the United States' "backyard." "Backyardism," as a policy approach, seems to represent the American equivalent of the Brezhnev Doctrine of "limited sovereignty" for the Eastern Bloc,/'' Hence, those countries with the bad luck to live in the neighborhood of a superpower are condemned by geographic fatality to cede some of the prerogatives of sovereignty to their powerful neighbor. Backyardism has not been welcomed by the countries of the American backyard. Mexico, Venezuela, Panama, the Dominican Republic, and others have opposed U.S. policies even as they have sought other ways to impede Soviet penetration. They wish to see the Basin escape the domination of the two superpowers and to avoid becoming an arena of confrontation between the superpowers. Thus, to date the Latin American and U.S. resistance to Soviet inroads have worked in opposition to one another. Latin American countries perceive a considerable component of resurgent U.S. hegemonism in their American position. Looking to history, they continue to fear their near and mighty neighbor more than distant Moscow. This presents a historic challenge for Washington: Can it forego the
presumptions of viable national
hegemony in the security policy
interests of a more in the Caribbean Basin?
NOTES The author wishes to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Lawrence Thomas in preparing this article. 1. The Caribbean Basin is a geopolitical concept that links the economically and politically diverse nations located in and around the Caribbean Sea. It includes Central America; the Commonwealth Caribbean; other island nations; Mexico/ Colombia, Venezuela, Surinam, and Guyana. 2. G. Karstag, "Concerning the Development of the Revolutionary Process in Latin America," Latinskaya Amerika, 1 (January-February 1972), Joint Publications Research Service [hereafter JPRS] Translation No. 55481 (Arlington, Virginia, 1972), p. 71. 3. R. Ulyanovsky, "0 Stranakh Sotsialisticheskoi Orientatsi," Kommunist, 11 (July 1979), p. 74. 4. Rents charged to peasants tripled or quadrupled during the 1960s. According to the Secretariat of Central American Integration, by the early 1970s, 70 percent of the region's rural holdings were "minifundia" of less than 10 acres. At the same time, 6 percent of rural holdings constituted more than 70 percent of the total arable land. See Clark Reynolds, "Fissures in the Volcano? Central American Economic Prospects," in Latin America and the World Economy; A Changing International Order, ed. Joseph Grunwald (Beverly Hills; Sage Publishers, 1981), pp. 203-204. 5. William R. Cline and Enrique Delgado (eds.), Economic Integration in Central America (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978), pp. 196, 198, 323-327. 6. W. Marvin Will, "The Struggle for Influence and Survival; The United States-Microstate Caribbean Interface," in Colossus Challenged: The Struggle for Caribbean Influence, eds. H. Michael Erisman and John D. Martz (Boulder, Colo.; Westview Press, 1982), p. 202. 7. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Testimony of Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, Chief of Naval Operations, "Report of the Subcommittee on Sea Power and Strategic and Critical Materials of the House Committee on Armed Services in Fiscal Year 1980 and 1981," Military Posture (Washington, D.C., 1980 and 1981), p. 4. 8. Sergei Gorshkov, Naval Power in Soviet Policy (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1979T^ pp. 11-12. 9. V. Vasileyev, "The United States' 'New Approach' to Latin America," International Affairs, 6 (June 1971), p. 48 .
474
10. M. A. Oborotova, "Foreign Political Conditions of Revolutionary Development," Latinskaya Amerika, 7 (July 1932), JPRS Translation No. 31359, USSR Report, Political and Sociological Affairs No. 1312, Latinskaya Amerika Special Issue on Central American Revolutionary Process (Arlington, Va., September 27, 1932), p. 75. 11. Boris Ponomarev, "Sovmestnaya bor'ba rabochevo i national' no—osvobozhditel'nogo dvishenii protiv imperia1isma, za sotsial' nii progress" Kommunist, 16 (November 1980), p. 41. ' 12. United Nations Commission on Trade and Development, UNCTAD V, TD/24, Supplement 2 (Manila, May 1979), p. 18 (Table 3), based on Soviet national foreign trade handbooks. 13. Granma Weekly Review (August 20, 1967). 14. Karstag, "Concerning the Development," p. 71. 15. J. Kobol, "Concerning Some Peculiarities of the Evolution of the Armies of the Latin American Continent," Latinskaya Amerika, 4 (1971), JPRS Translation (Arlington, Va.). 16. V. Bushuyev, "New Trends in Latin American Armed Forces" Krasnaya Zvezda (October 3, 1972), in JPRS Translation No. 57347 (Arlington, Va., 1972, October 26, 197 2 ) , pp. 4-5. 17. Cf. V. Morozov, International Economic Organization of Socialist States (MoscOW: Novosti, — 1973), p. 15. 18. Oscar Arevalo, "Reactionary Intrigues Notwithstanding," interview in New Times, 31 (Moscow, July 1977 ) , p. 11. 19. Nikolai Leonov, "Nicaragua: Experiencia de una Revolucion Victoriosa," America Latina, 3 (1980), p. 37; Sergei Mikoyan, "Las Particularidades de la Revolucion en Nicaragua y sus Tareas Desde El Punto de Vista de la Teoria y la Practica de Movimiento Liberador," America Latina, 3 (1980), pp. 102-103. 20. Boris Koval, "La Revolucion: Largo Proceso riis torico, America Latina, 3 (1980), pp. 76 — 79; Sergei Mikoyan, "La Creatividad Revolucionaria Abre el Camino Hacia la Victoria," America Latina, 2 (1980), p. 5. 21. Karstag, "Concerning the Development," p. 77. 22. B. Koval, "La Revolucion," pp. 79-80; Sergei Mikoyan, "Las Particularidades de la Revolucion," p. 101. 23. Ilya Bimov, "El Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional: Fuerza Decisiva en la Lucha," America Latina, 3 (1930), p. 32. 24. M. S. Chumakova, "Nicaragua Viewed One Year After the Revolution," Latinskaya Amerika, 26 (July 1980); JPRS Translation No. 76700 (Arlington, Va., October 27, 1980), p. 32. 25. Alvaro Ramirez, "Nicaragua: From Armed Struggle to Construction," World Marxist Review, Vol. 23, No. 1 (January 1980), pp. 52-54; see also R. Ulyanovsky, "O
475
Stranakh Sotsia1isticheskoi Orientatsi," pp. 114-123; and Boris Ponomarev/ "The Cause of Freedom and Socialism is Invincible/" World Marxist Review/ Vol. 24/ No. 1 (January 19 81T"/ pp. 17-19. 26. S. Mikoyan/ "Las Particularidades de la Revolucion en Nicaragua/" p. 106; see also K. Maidanik, "La Unidad: Un Problema Clave/" America Latina/ 3 (1980), p. 44. ~ ~~ ~~ 27. Victor Volokii, as quoted in A. Sujostat, "Etapa Actual de la Lucha Revolucionaria de Liberacion," America Latina, 1 (1977), p. 5. 28. William E. Ratliff, Castroism and Communism in Latin America 1959-1976 (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, Hoover Policy Study 19, November 1976 ) , p. 44. 29. Granma Weekly Review (July 30, 1967); C.f. Jorge Dominguez^ ''The Armed Forces and Foreign Relations, " in Cole Blasier and Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Cuba in the World (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1979) , p. 59. 30. Robert Moss, "Soviet Ambitions in Latin America," in The Southern Oceans and the Security of the Free World, id! Patrick Wall (London: Spacey International,
1977),
p.
195.
31. Krasnaya Zvezda (January 1, 1969), cited in Leon Goure and Morris Rothenberg, Soviet Penetration of Latin America (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 197 5) , p. 3 . 32. Krasnaya Zvezda (December 2, 1969), cited in Goure and Rothenberg, Soviet Penetration, p. 31; James D. Theberge, Russia in the Caribbean, Part 2 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1973), Table 7, pp. 103-105. 33. Washington Post (June 19, 1983); U.S., Congress, Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, Statement of Thomas 0. Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (April 12, 1983). 34. Washington Post (June 19, 1983), p. 1A. 35. Financial Times (London, March 17, 1983). 36. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Statement of Thomas O. Enders (April 12, 1983), p. 2. 37. See "Soviet Inroads into Latin America," Remarks of Nestor D. Sanchez, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-American Affairs, before the Defense Forum for National Educators (March 9, 1983), Washington, D.C.; Diario de las Americas (April 25 and June 6, 1981); Washington Post (June 2~, 1981, July 29, November 19, and December 15, 1982); Providence Journal (June 9, 1981); Le Monde (July 21, 1981). 38. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Statement of Thomas 0. Enders (April 12, 1983), p. 1. 39. Washington Post (July 29, 1982 and June 19, 1983 ) .
476
40. Foreign Broadcast Information Service [hereafter FBIS]: Latin America (May 11/ 1982) , pi P-8. 41. Miami Herald (November 28, 1982). 42. FBIS Latin America (March 16, 1983), p. 1-8. 43. N. I. Gavtilov and G. B. Starushenko, eds, , Africa: Problems of Socialist Orientation (Moscow: Nauka, 1976), pp. 10-11. 44. U.S., Department of State, Communist Interference in El Salvador, Special Report No. 80 (February 23, 1981); U.S., Department of State, Cuba's Renewed Support for Violence, Special Report No. 90 (December 14, 1981) , p. 3 . 45. Department of State, Communist Interference in El Salvador, Document E. 46. Department of State, Cuba's Renewed Support for Violence, p. 18. 47. Ibid., pp. 7-8; FBIS Latin America (August 4, 1981) , p. 8. 48. Anthony P. Maingot, "Cuba and the Commonwealth Caribbean: Playing the Cuban Card," in Caribbean Review, Vol. IX, No. 1 (Winter 1980), pp. 48-49. ‘ 49. Diario de las Americas (July 22, 1981). 50. U.S., Department of Defense, "Recent Developments in Central America and the Caribbean" (1982). 51. Washington Post (February 24, 1983). 52. FBIS Latin America (March 15, 1932), p. 58. 53. Miami Herald (December 14, 1932); Diario de las Americas (February 1, 1983). 54. FBIS Latin America (March 1, 1983), p. Q4; New York Times (January 28, 1983). 55. Latin American Regional Report: Caribbean (February 25 , 1983) , p. 1. 56. New York Times (June 12, 1933). 57. El Nacional (Caracas) (March 1, 1981). 5S. FBIS Latin America (March 18, 1981), p. L3-4. 59. Washington Post (August 1, 1982). 60. La Nacion (San Jose) (August 3, 1932). 61. Granma Weekly Review (April 4, 1982). 62. Miami Herald (September 1, 1982). 63. Miami Herald (December 7, 1982). 64. M. F. Gornov, "Latin America: More Intense Struggle Against Imperialism and Oligarchy and for Democracy and Social Progress," in Latinskaya Amerika, 7 (July 1982), JPRS Translation No. 81859, p. 39. 65. Ibid, p. 17. 66. V. Dmitriyev, "The Crisis of Imperialists' Colonial Policy in Latin America," International Affairs, 10 (October 1982 ), p. 39. 67. Gornov, "Latin America," p. 12. 68. Ibid, p. 14. 69. Izvestia (July 17, 1982). 70. A. Glinkin and P. Yakovlev, "Latin America in the Global Strategy of Imperialism," MEMO, 10 (1982), p. 77.
477 71. M. L. Mishina, "Central American Democratic Community," Latinskaya Amerika, 7 (July 1982), JPRS Translation No. 81859, p. 47. 72. A. V. Kuz'mischev, "Political Situation in Honduras," Latinskaya Amerika, 7 (July 1982), JPRS Translation No. 81859, p. 47. 73. Alexander Trushin, "There Should Not Be More Policemen Than Teachers," New Times, 23 (June 1982)/ pp. 24-25. 74. N. S. Leonev, "Guatemala's Worries and Hopes," Latinskaya Amerika, 7 (July 1982), JPRS Translation No. 81859, pp. 30, 32.
14 Reagan's Central American Policy: Disaster in the Making Wayne S. Smith
Foreign strong suit/ clumsy and
policy is not the Reagan as illustrated by, among
handling
the
of
deterioration
relationship
with
(President
Reagan
communists
are
Yugoslavs/
among
as
the
"the
it
questioned—by allies
States
is
supports allies
of
its
do
as
of
in
This to
the
what
thing tion's
lacking
can
SITUATION
tion to
AS
it to
been
say
OF
that as
our
JANUARY
in
the
nature
to
blame
its
problems
on
to
its
most
America, most
the
sharply and
by
United
government Its or
European
most
hardly
senior
an
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of
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have
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Mexico,
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America. it
all
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major
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left
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adversaries
1982,
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Canada,
analyzes
U.S.
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do
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Central
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Nicaragua, I
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Pezzullo,
to
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United
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U.S.
governments.
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not;
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Chinese
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history is
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administration's
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former "The
the is
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U.S.
single
Reagan that
As
ambassapositive
administra-
it
is
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our
1
friends."
1981 politics on
its
successors.
479
for
one
administra-
predecessors The
Reagan
and
then
adminis-
480
tration is no exception. It jeered at Garter's "weak-kneed" approach and complained of the mess it had inherited in Central America. A review of the situation at the time Reagan took office/ however/ indicates the situation has worsened/ not improved, since January 1981. In El Salvador, American policy was at last beginning to have an impact on what had long been a dreadful situation. For over a century, the military and oligarchy had run the country as they wished. Anyone who protested was exiled or murdered. In 1932, the armed forces slaughtered some 30,000 striking peasants. By the early 1970s, however, there were signs of change. Salvadorans placed their hopes in the 1972 presidential elections, which were supposed to be free and honest. But when it became clear that the coalition ticket of Christian Democrat Jose Napoleon Duarte and Social Democrat Guillermo Ungo was winning, the military stopped the vote count and declared Colonel Arturo Molina the^ winner. The country was thrown into turmoil, which had subsided little by the 1977 elections. These too were fraudulent, and the military installed General Carlos Humberto Romero in the presidency. His rule was particularly harsh and unenlightened. Violence escalated. Political order steadily deteriorated. There was no question as to who was responsible: the military. Some hope for a moderate solution appeared in October 1979 as progressive-minded younger officers led by Colonel Adolfo Arnoldo Majano overthrew Romero and formed a new government with civilian participation. The regime indicated its intention to push for reforms and to curb the repressive practices of the security forces. Before the year was out, however, conservative officers had emasculated the new government. Most of its civilian members, including Guillermo Ungo, resigned. Eventually, Majano himself was driven into exile. Salvadorans who up until then had held out some hopes for a democratic solution gave them up. The opposition began to coalesce and increasingly to embrace armed struggle. The civil war began in earnest. It was not dreamed up in Moscow; rather, it was the direct result of the fierce resistance of the military to change. If Carter administration policy in El Salvador is to be criticized, it should be for not having taken a resolute stand in support of the progressive government in late 1979. Had the U.S. Embassy in December 1979 made it clear to the Salvadoran military that the junta had Washing ton's full support and that any attempts to undermine it would meet with strong U.S. opprobrium, that might have made the difference. The junta might have been respected and the civil war avoided. Even given this initial error, with the arrival of Ambassador Robert White in March 1980, American policy
481
began to get on track. As implemented by White, its central thrust was to emphasize to the Salvadoran government and military that, in order to win popular support, they should move ahead vigorously with socioeconomic reforms and curb the excesses of the security forces. Jose Napoleon Duarte, who had joined the junta after its other civilian members had left, was entirely receptive to such views. Indeed, they coincided with his own. The problem was that, when all was said and done, it was still the military, not Duarte, who controlled the situation. Right-wing death squads remained active. Even so, the more popular, democratic tone of the government, and of U.S. policy, was beginning to have some credibility with the Salvadoran people, thus bolstering the position of both the Duarte junta and the United States, which backed it. When the guerrillas launched their all-out' offensive in January 1981, the Salvadoran government, which at that point was receiving no U.S. mi1itary assistance, was able quickly to defeat it. This record stands in marked contrast to the government's poor showing during the guerrillas' offensive of February-March 1983. Privately, spokesmen for the Reagan administration have tried to explain away this contrast by claiming the insurgents are now better armed. Secretary of State Shultz, indeed, attributed the new offensive to an upsurge in the flow of arms coming from the Soviet Union through Cuba and Nicaragua. But neither assertion bears up to careful scrutiny. Contradicting Shultz, American diplomats and military and intelligence officers in El Salvador were quoted as saying that external support seemed a minor factor. There was no evidence of any increase in outside assistance; on the contrary, the guerrillas were doing very well with arms captured from government troops.^ Furthermore, after the hoopla the administration made over arms shipments from the Eastern Bloc in its February 1981 "White Paper" on El Salvador, it was inconsistent to claim two years later that the guerrillas had not been well armed in 1981. The military situation had indeed worsened, but external factors had little to do with it. In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas had been in power some eighteen months when Reagan took office. There, as in El Salvador, the Carter administration's principal fault had been its early indecisiveness. The Somoza regime was falling of its own weight. Short of propping it up with bayonets, the United States could not have maintained it in power—nor should the United States have wished to do so. Its interests lay in encouraging a rapid transition and filling the vacuum with the most responsible elements possible. A more resolute stance in favor of Somoza's departure in 1978 might have included the Sandinistas, but they need not have been the central force. By summer
432
1979/ however/ the situation had little if any chance of blocking
polarized/ and them from sole
there
was
possession of power. Again/ the Carter administration tried to make the best of a situation it had initially handled poorly. Even the most perfunctory analysis will suggest that the most logical course of action would have been to attempt through diplomatic and economic persuasion to encourage pluralism and moderation. If the United States were not going to remove the Sandinistas from power (and that was an even more unwarranted option in 1979 than it is today)/ the only sensible alternative was to try to use its influence with them. After all, the United States had considerable leverage, including economic, to bring to bear. Its situation was by no means impossible. Even the Sandinistas expressed interest in a constructive relationship; most other sectors of Nicaraguan were even more emphatic on this score.
society
There were many frustrations. It took over a year and a debilitating debate to get the economic assistance package through Congress. Meanwhile, the civil war in El Salvador had broken out in full, and it was clear that the Nicaraguans were giving some degree of support to the guerrillas there. The Sandinistas, moreover, were hardly dedicated democrats. They had their own revolutionary program to carry out and were not worried about due process for those who got in their way. And, of course, Cuban influence was a matter of concern. Even so, the U.S. policy of patient diplomacy was not without impact, and it still seemed to offer the best hope of eventually returning the situation to a more normal course. For one thing, there were still democratic elements within the Nicaraguan government with whom the United States could work—men such as Arturo Cruz, Alfonso Robelo, Eden Pastora, and Alfredo Cesar. The democratic opposition was virtually unanimous in encouraging the United States to continue its policy of Patient engagement. In January 1981, for example, a wide range of non-Sandinista Nicaraguans expressed concern to Ambassador Pezzullo over the impending cutoff of U.S. economic assistance. Catholics, democratic politicians, and leaders of the private sector (COSEP) all warned that such a step would only make matters worse. It would undercut democratic forces working to maintain pluralism and a mixed economy and would deprive the United States of the only instrument through which it could play an effective
role.
In
Pezzullo's
own words:
We were not unaware of the radical tendencies within the Sandinista government, but it was misleading as well as damaging to our interests to label the whole structure Marxist/Leninist and to There were moderate forces within
treat it as such. it which wished to
483
retain a democratic framework. Between the radicals and the moderates there was still/ as of early 1981, a dialogue. It was very much in our interests to see that dialogue maintained. Taking an overtly hostile position against the Nicaraguan government could only excite xenophobic fears within Nicaragua, thus almost assuring that the internal dialogue would be broken off. We did and it was.3 As the Reagan administration came to office, more ove r , th e Nicaraguans and Cubans, largely in recognit ion of the f the Salvado ra n guerri1 la of f e nsi ve, " an i nterest in discussi on Unit ed s ta te pol i t ical sol u t i ons to the Amer ica n con The Sandinis ta s appear to acce ded / at part, to our de mands tha t cros s-b o rder to th e insurg en t s,^ thus i tha t th e y at ns ide rable va lu e to a re la with th e Uni ted States--in other words, that the United States e n joy ed considerable leverage with them. The mome nt w as e specially propitious for negotiations. The Unit ed S ta te s appeared to be in an excellent position to ba rg a in from a position of strength. Unfortunately, this adva n tag e wa s squandered.
THE
REAGAN
ADMINISTRATION'S
PERCEPTIONS
The Reagan administration came to office with a great deal of ideological baggage pointing it away from negotiated solutions. The new president had long espoused a simplistic "we-or-they" approach to the socialist countries and during the campaign had been particularly insistent on taking stern measures against Cuba and Nicaragua. Much of the administration's initial reaction, moreover, was based on a report written by the so-called Santa Fe Committee in 1980. This study projected the problem starkly in terms of East-West conflict. The Americas were under attack; they were threatened by a brutal extracontinental power, the Soviet Union, which was operating through its Cuban surrogate. It was up to the United States to remedy the situation through a series of political and military measures. Regional security arrangements were to be strengthened, the Rio Treaty revitalized, and bilateral military assistance stepped up. Technical and psychological assistance were to be offered to all countries of the hemisphere in the "struggle against terrorism." Nowhere in the report was there any favorable mention of agrarian reform; nor were there recommendations for other sociostructural changes or the promotion of human rights. On the contrary, the study recommended that the United States "stop targeting its
484
allies" with an inequitably applied human rights program. There was no suggestion that the Salvadoran or Guatemalan governments should halt the atrocities of their security forces. Why should there be? In the view of the Santa Fe Committee, the problem was one of external aggression, not internal conflict and social injustice. As for Cuba, the report punitive” measures be taken, Radio Free Cuba (an idea the
urged that "frankly including the opening of a administration took up as
Radio Marti). If these steps did not complete the job, its authors urged that a "war of national liberation" be launched against the Castro regime. by
The those
views of of Jeane
the Santa Fe Kirkpatrick,
Committee were reinforced who was shortly to become
ambassador to the United Nations and to whom President Reagan frequently turned, and still turns, for advice on Latin American policy. In an article published in January 1981, she too stressed the Soviet threat to this hemisphere and charged the Carter administration having given more attention to democratic change American security and with being more interested
with than in
to
bringing about agrarian reform than elections in El Salvador. The administration, she complained, seemed to believe events were shaped by social "forces" rather than by men. This vengeance
was a after
theme Kirkpatrick embellished with taking office. Speaking to the
a
Conservative Political Action Conference in March 1981, she acknowledged that poverty, illiteracy, and unequal distribution of wealth are prevalent in Central America, and noted that some people would therefore have us believe the problems in that region have to do with social injustice. But, she went on, these conditions have existed throughout Central America's history, and one cannot explain a short-range problem by reference a permanent condition." Revolutions, she declared, are
to
caused "not by social injustice" but "by revolutionaries, and revolutionaries are people. They are not social forces, they are people with guns. Revolutions are caused by violence and terrorism. . . . Tom Paine and Patrick Henry would have been puzzled by her reasoning, which reduces all revolutionaries to the status of "terrorists" and suggests that, in addressing today's turmoil in Central America, one would do better to emphasize military options than agrarian reform. To she knew of carried out
stress the point, she stated elsewhere that "no country which has ever successfully reforms while fighting a civil war."9
It was against the background of such advice that the Reagan administration began to formulate its confrontational strategy in Central America. Its analysis of events also fostered such an approach. The Salvadoran guerrillas
had
just
suffered
a
severe
setback
and
during
485
1981
agreed
Cuba
and
talk. as
The of
had
an
grasp.
halted
the
just
and
would
Republican
campaign
the
humiliated.
This communism America, tough a in
the
order
him
as
to
Russians, that
we
our
can
"We
turn
nibbled
to
death
Whatever had
its
as
basis
ha ve
to
pref e ren ce s th e
on
pref e ren ce s minds e t not
which
bl ew
November
clear.
Not
ambas sad or s , having
been
kind to
of
said
to
get-
implement to
hard-line An
on
believe approach
aide
quoted
everyone—the
move
the
we
can
win,
decisively
world
or
we
and
will
the
Carter
States
be
administra-
should
not
States
on
might
but
its
to
a
for
clear.
reforms
helped
America
integrity Carter's
make
given
Reagan
Rather,
pragmatic
the
be
the
be
philosophical
respect
sharply
transition
of
defeating
terrorism
human seat
nature
given
priority.
1981,
the
suggesting
is
Cold
War
administration
did
its
just
the
those
transition after
criticized
team,
the
American
lly Robert White in El Salvador, for energetic in promoting human rights and
promotion
internal
Haiq
and
espec too
Subsequently,
back
the
surprisingly,
ons,
of
a
(the
that),
repressive
and
entral
The
took
The
perpetuating
emphasis.
reforms. both.
for
triumph.^
a
United
and
rlier,
elec
push
ousted
at
reported
must
always
ghts
1930
to
victory:
World—that
in
them,
alism
through
decided
such
APPROACH
the or
ght
that
with
resolve.
failings,
human
c on t in u e
We
INITIAL
ith
de s cribed
accomplish
wished
take
Third
United
pi
U.S.
Soviets.
that
i nd i vidua 1
empha sis
to
around
other
deal
for
without
State
demonstrate
the
the
Th
govern-
attractive, for if tracks in Central
was
American
bolstering
dicta tor s h i ps.
of
by
understood
perceived
Haig
had
things
ADMINISTRATION'S
tion
of
validate
successful.
to
Salvadoran
hinted
short-term
to
must
allies,
be
already
overtures victory
Sandinistas
administration
demonstrate
quickly
THE
tend
States
saying:
the
these
to
easy
military
Secretary
Secretary
United
might
and
willingness
an
offensive
it
platform
a
that
the
was especially stopped in its
the
basis.
if
defeated,
would
policies
all/
a
preconditions.
read
administration
Reagan
approach could be that
global
that
be
promised
concluded
political
guerrillas Cubans
apparently
what
the
without
indicating
guerrilla
think
Accordingly,
have
also
After
uncompromising
to
dialogue
were
weakness
assistance/ aid.
a
administration
within
ment
begin
Nicaragua
signs
was
to
State that
would
At
a
the a
would
The
Central press
Haig more.
American
carried in
the
on
this El
downgrading
confirmed less
that
attention:
Reforms
external
briefing
guerrillas
for
receive
receive
time.
Department the
called
Secretary
rights
for of
team
also
rather
than
struggle
was
February
13,
to
the
Salvador
extreme "did
not
of
486
represent a native insurgency"—that is, they were directed from Moscow. The same month/ the "White Paper" claimed the conflict had become a "textbook case of indirect armed aggression by communist powers through Cuba.1,12 In the face of this "communist aggression/" Secretary Haig announced that the United States must draw a line. The turmoil in Central America was a challenge emanating from Moscow; it was a challenge that the United States had to take up and win. What to do? First/ the administration threatened Cuba. The Castro regime had already indicated an interest in discussions about/ and political solutions in/ Central America/ but never mind. The administration did not wish to explore that avenue. It had come to office vowing to get tough and it was determined to do just that/ even if there were no objective reason to do so. It was not interested in discussions or negotiations of any kind. Rather/ Secretary Haig threatened military action. Speaking on February 27, he declared that "Cuban activity has reached a peak that is no longer acceptable in this hemisphere. ... El Salvador is a problem emanating first and foremost from Cuba ... it is our intention to deal with this matter at its source. Haig did not spell out how this might be done— whether by blockade/ surgical air strikes/ invasions/ or some other method. He simply noted that no option was excluded. Though his aim was clearly to intimidate/ it is a mystery why he expected to succeed. The Cubans/ after all/ had played David to our Goliath for years. They had seen it all before--threats/ exile raids/ clandestine radio stations, and so forth. They had not been intimidated in the past and were not likely to be so now.
As the portent of things to come, the clamps were taken off of Cuban exile paramilitary activity. In obvious violation of U.S. neutrality laws (and of the administration's position against terrorism), Alpha-66 and other exile organizations reopened training camps in Florida and openly stated that the purpose was to prepare their members for raids against Cuba. This was not an idle threat. Raids were carried out. They caused no real damage, and the raiders invariably were captured by the Cuban authorities. In the final analysis, such activities caused far more harm to U.S. credibility than they did to Cuba's infrastructure or morale. The administration, however, neither took any measures to curb them nor issued any statements to suggest it did not condone them. A confrontational approach was also taken with Nicaragua. The Reagan administration came to office determined to get rid of the Sandinista government. There was never any intention of negotiating with it or
487
available
to
pi oma tic 1 eve ra ge s t i ta tes I n an app eara on s C ornmi t tee i n Marc an des tine ope ra t i on a w a r " was thu s la unch en in of f i ce le ss tha
Nica ragua. 14 the new government had months. Not surprisingly, m V iew of i ts mo re bel intentions, the Reagan a mi nis tra t i on wa s move all by the fact that Nic ra gua had at le as t pa acceded to U.S. demands. Economic E con omi c assistance ass is ta nee was cut off th e secre t wa r procee see. In these efforts, Washington showed little political acumen, picking as allies the Somocista guardsmen exiled in Honduras. This was a colossal blunder. Not only was the United States thus identified with the Somocistas and "a return to the past," but the fact that Managua was threatened by a Somocista/CIA operation subsequently made it difficult for more democratic opponents to raise the banner against the radical Sandinista commanders. As Eden Pastora (the legendary Comandante Cero) commented to me in December 1982: With the fatherland under attack from the hated Somocista counterrevolutionaries, should we true revolutionaries lift our hands against the radicals in Managua, we might be perceived as betraying the nation, or even become identified with the Somocistas. Hence, because of Reagan’s stupid secret war, I feel my hands to be tied. I can only sit and wait for some change in the situation. From almost any perspective, then, the secret war was counterproductive to U.S. interests. Very little thought, apparently, had been given to its objectives and consequences. The fact that it might well touch off a step-by-step escalation leading to a full-scale regional war seemed to daunt American policymakers not at all, probably because no one had thought that far ahead. And as for objectives, the administration could give no sensible explanation. After word of these activities leaked to the surface in late 1982, official spokesmen first told Congress that their purpose was simply to interdict arms coming across Honduras from Nicaragua bound for El Salvador—an explanation that many legislators considered an insult to their intelligence. Honduras, after all, is friendly territory. Assuming the United States had sufficient information to make interdiction possible--for example, routes and schedules--!t would have had no need for a paramilitary force or a secret army to perform the task. It could have simply called on the Honduran military or police. They have
483
cooperated with similar efforts in the past and would have been only too pleased to have continued to do so. The secret war was not confined to operations in Honduras. Training camps for Nicaraguan exiles were also opened in Florida. This was hardly consistent with U.S. demands for a halt in subversive activities in the hemisphere. As the New York Times pointed out: The Reagan administration accuses Nicaragua of violating international law by permitting a flow of arms to left-wing comrades in El Salvador, but the administration scuppers its case when it indulges the training of exile armies in Florida--an illegal and provocative act that justifies alarm in Nicaragua. Hector Fabian, a Cuban-born leader of one such private army, puts the legal point frankly: "Under the Carter and Nixon administrations, what we were doing was a crime. With the Reagan administration, no one has bothered us for 10 months." And its not just training. The forthright Nr. Fabian says that at least 100 Nicaraguan exiles have returned to their country revolutionary junta.^ In El Salvador, the Reagan military assistance in the form and armaments. Clearly, it was
to
fight
against
its
administration stepped up of training, advisers, after a military victory.
Even though the guerrillas had offered to talk, it encouraged the Salvadoran government to turn aside any suggestion of ending the conflict through negotiations, first by insisting that the insurgents were making unreasonable demands, then by arguing that the March elections rendered negotiations unnecessary: If the armed opposition wished to participate, they had but lay down their weapons and do so.
1982 to
Many observers, including the Mexican government, pointed out that conditions did not exist for elections. Historically, few civil wars have been ended by having one side convoke elections while refusing to discuss with the other conditions for the latter's participation. The administration was warned that under the circumstances, elections were likely to be truncated, inconclusive, and even counterproductive. They were. They produced a government considerably more fragmented than the Duarteled junta and one generally further to the right. As predicted, the vote solved nothing. Despite the fact that it is the poorest of the Central American countries, Honduras had remained aloof from the turmoil around it. The military there had never been as repressive as its counterparts in El Salvador and Guatemala; nor was there as great a disparity in wealth. Moreover, democratic elections had been held in 1981, and in early 1982 power was turned over to a civilian govern-
489
ment headed by Roberto Suazo Cordova. At the time Reagan administration took office/ there were high for Honduras. It was not embattled/ and democracy to have an excellent chance of taking root.
the hopes seemed
Honduras' chances are not so bright today. By involving Honduras in the war against Nicaragua, the Reagan administration has endangered it: Honduras may now very well become a target for retaliatory actions from the Sandinistas. The possibilities of a regional war are greater than they have been in decades. Further, the logistics and backroom deals necessitated by the secret war have ineluctably strengthened the military hardliners vis-a-vis the civilians,
hand thus
of
diminishing the prospects for survival of Honduran democracy. Finally, in Guatemala, the Reagan administration chose to ignore the brutal nature of the Lucas Garcia and Rios Montt governments. Appalling human rights violations were simply glossed over. As in El Salvador, the situation was portrayed in terms of East-West conflict. Nothing could have been more absurd, but President Reagan was led to the conclusion that Rios Montt was a fine fellow who had been given a "bum rap" by the media. The administration has consistently pushed to resume assistance, despite the staggering atrocities of Montt1s regime.
RENEWED
EMPHASIS
ON
HUMAN
RIGHTS
AND
SOCIAL
military Rios
REFORMS...
Having initially denigrated Carter's emphasis on human rights and social reforms, the Reagan administration was quickly forced to trim its sails. For one thing, it came to realize that the American people attach considerable importance to the promotion of human rights and that its disavowal of this commitment was not only bad politics but it also deprived its own policies of any higher moral purpose. For another, it became clear that the governments of the region desperately needed and expected economic assistance. Unless there was promise of such help, their willingness to cooperate with the United States would be greatly diminished. And so the administration reversed itself. Having previously made light of human rights, it now began insisting that it was as interested in their promotion as any previous government. In addition, new attention was given to economic development. President Reagan launched his Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). Having claimed at one time that poverty and social injustice had nothing to do with revolutionary turmoil, Ambassador Kirkpatrick evolved to the point of urging, in February 1983, a Marshall Plan for Latin America. But this was too little too late. The economic assistance provided by the CBI
490
was less than $400 million (only some 15 percent of what the Soviet Union provides to a single country, Cuba, every year). As of April 1983, the guts of the CBI, its trade and tariff preferences, remain bogged down in Congress. As for the greater attention shown for human rights, this emphasis appears to have been for appearances' sake only. Certainly, the administration did nothing to advance the cause anywhere. It criticized leftist regimes but was unwilling to take any action to improve the situation. In Cuba, for example, it refused to honor a prior commitment to process for entry some 1,500-2,000 former political prisoners. In El Salvador it continued to certify progress in human rights even when it knew there had been none. No one has yet been tried for the murders of any of the Americans in that country—all of whom were assassinated by government security forces or allied death squads. Some 3,000 Salvadorans, including hundreds of women and children, were slaughtered in 1982, most of them at the hands of semi-official death squads and the security forces. Not a single person has been brought to trial for this slaughter. Nor has the administration effectively used the leverage given it by the certification process. In late 1982, the U.S. ambassador in San Salvador, Deane Hinton, did publicly warn the right against repeated human rights violations. But the White House immediately pulled the rug out from under him by, in effect, disavowing his speech. The conclusion drawn by the far right was inevitable; No attention need be paid to such admonitions. Indeed, the right is convinced that the Reagan administration is so totally committed in El Salvador that it could not disengage even if it wanted to. No matter what the barbarities committed there, the rightists believe the administration will continue to support them and will automatically certify, every six months, that there has been improvement in the human rights situation. They are probably right.
...AND
A
LOWERING
OF
RHETORIC
Though it reasserted an interest in human rights and reforms, the administration did not alter its basic approach toward Central America or Cuba. In both cases, that approach remained confrontational. Washington did, however, lower its voice, largely because the hard realities of the situation began to call into question the efficacy of harsh rhetoric. Belatedly, the administration appears to have realized that Castro would not be intimidated by anything short of a full-scale invasion—and despite all its fire and brimstone, it had no intention of going that far.
491
One can threaten just so long. After a given point/ the threats are seen to be empty and damage the initiator more than the recipient. By the end of 1981, the Reagan administration had passed that point with respect to Cuba. At the same time, the administration was under considerable pressure from Congress and allies of the United States (especially Mexico) to open negotiations with Cuba. Its response was predictable. To turn aside these pressures, it sought to give the impression of a willingness to talk when in fact none existed. In December 1981, Secretary Haig, who was visiting Mexico City, bowed to the insistence of his hosts and talked to Cuban Vice-President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. Nothing came of this, or was intended to. Haig simply reiterated well-known U.S. positions. The Cubans, however, believed that at least the ice had been broken and that more substantive discussions might follow. To improve the atmosphere for those talks, in late December 1981 they informed the United States through diplomatic channels that they had suspended arms shipments to Nicaragua. Given the intense interest it had earlier evidenced need i n this flow and the fact that it had no dence to the contrary (as it privately admitted), the administraminis t ration's failure to show is ge s ture was incomprehensible. It neither explored the possibilipossi b ilities thus implied nor even acknowledged the overture. r ture • In March 1982, General Vernon Walters was sent secretly to Havana to talk to Castro. This tia ti ve was less spontaneous and far more cynical than Haig's Haig' s reluctant agreement to meet Rodriguez. Tl ters' visit did nothing more than enumerate the issues in disagreement between the two sides--Central ral America, the return of the excludables dumped on the United Unite d States State s during the Mariel boatlift, and so on—< nd in dica ted that these would have to be addressed before there could be any improvement in relations. The Cubans agreed and indicated th< i r wi 11ingne ss to address these matters, though they note< tha t while bilateral issues could be negotiated, tl e war in El Th< Cuba ns were Salvador could only be discussed. frankly puzzled by the Walters' mission, but they concluded that its purpose had been to establish an agenda for discussions. They were still awaiting some t i on as to wh en the fir s t rou of these talks would be held when the Uni ted State ce d new measu res aga ins t Cuba U .S. tourism to the is land a la teral f ishi ng agre erne nt. T ■ administration justified these measures to other governments by noting that it had tried to talk to the Cubans. It had sent General Walters to Havana (a fact it had carefully leaked only days after his return). Walters had found their
492
position so aggressive and unbending that it was clear dialogue would lead nowhere. It is difficult to see the Walters' visit as anything more than a diversionary tactic. Having sidestepped what might have been constructive discussions/ the administration settled back into a policy similar to that pursued by many of its predecessors: encouraging allies to deny credit to Havana/ stepping up propaganda efforts/ and limiting travel and other contacts between the two countries. Having backed away from threatening to "take it to the source/" the administration had no new ideas
to offer. On El Salvador/ too/ propaganda had to be toned down. For several weeks after the inauguration/ Secretary Haig seemed to breathe fire in that direction almost on a daily basis. Conservative journalists were encouraged to focus on the test of wills shaping up between the United States and the Soviet Union in Central America. Predictably/ President Reagan at one point suggested that those who disagreed with his policy in El Salvador were being "manipulated by the communists. It began to appear that the United States was on the way back to McCarthyism, if not on the way to World War III. As this strategy diverted attention from other impor tant problems/ such as the economy/ the administration decided it had overplayed its hand. Accordingly, in a rather bizarre episode, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State John Bushnel1 was instructed to warn the media that they were making too much of El Salvador. When that raised eyebrows, Bushnell was publicly rebuked by the White House--thereby indicating that the carrying out of questionable instructions too enthusiastically can be risky business.
CONTINUITY
OF
BASIC
a
APPROACH
As earlier suggested, however, the central thrust of the U.S. approach in El Salvador remained the same as before. Negotiated solutions were ruled out; military assistance was key. Elections were held in March 1982, but the armed opposition refused to participate, taking the position that there could be no meaningful balloting until adequate conditions had been brought about through negotiations. With right-wing death squads still operating with impunity, the refusal of the left to participate was understandable. The elections were supposed to give the new Salvadoran government legitimacy, thus strengthening its hand to end the violence. But this was an illusion. The vote solved nothing. Nevertheless, for the remainder of the year the State Department seemed to bask in the illusion
that
the
elections
had
turned
a
corner
for
the
493
United States. Corridor talk had it that the large voter turnout indicated a lack of support for the guerrillas? popular support now might be expected to gravitate toward the new government. The United States would be able to build democracy in CJI Salvador. Convinced that they were winning the war/ both the Salvadoran government and the Reagan administration rejected out of hand an October 1982 FMLN/FDR proposal for discussions without preconditions or prior commitments. Washington also rebuffed Mexican peace proposals and a Mexican—Venezuelan offer to play a mediation role. This behavior was obtuse/ for one of the keys to the Central American problem—which is regional in nature is to engage the other governments of the area in a diplomatic process aimed at ending the fighting and bringing about an equitable settlement. The administration's optimism was short-lived. By March 1983, its Salvador policy was in tatters and it was oeating a tactical retreat. As more objective observers had warned, the elections had complicated rather than improved tne situation. Divisions within the army had been heightened, as pointed up by the revolt of Colonel Sigifredo Ochoa in early 1983. And the temporary capture by FMLW guerrillas of Berlin, a major city, underlined the fact that the government's position was deteriorating militarily. The administration's response was Pavlovian. It blamed the problem on Cuba and the Soviet Union and called on Congress to provide drastically increased military and economic assistance. Secretary Shultz claimed that external support for the guerrillas had increased. As usual, no hard evidence was produced to back up these assertions. Indeed, it could not be produced, since the administration did not have such evidence. For his part President Reagan, on March 10th, gave one of his worst speeches ever on El Salvador. To hear him tell it, turmoil in Central America was simply the product of Moscow's global strategic plans. The Soviets, he said, wanted to tie down U.S. forces on the southern border of the United States, thus limiting the American capacity to act in more distant places such as Western Europe and the Persian Gulf. ’He went on: The Communist agenda ... is to exploit human suffering in Central America to strike at the heart of the Western Hemisphere. By preventing reforms and instilling their own brand of totalitarianism, they can threaten freedom and peace and weaken our national security. ... We have been slow to understand that the defense of the Caribbean and Central America against Marxist-Leninist takeover is vital to our national security.-*-^
494
Noting the Salvadoran Catholic hierarchy's call for negotiations and a peaceful solution, both Secretary Shultz and Vice-President Bush expressed irritation that churchmen should thus play into the hands of the communists. But all this backfired. The administration had cried wolf too many times. Its arguments were unconvincing and seemed to lead toward an ever-expanding commitment. The stridency with which it pushed its case, moreover, alienated many who had previously gone along with the policy. Typical was the reaction of Republican Senator Dave Durenberger of Minnesota. In a letter to the president on March 3, 1983, he complained: The administration has managed to convey an image of hostility, arrogance, and naivete which is crippling its policy and eroding its support. ... As the government of El Salvador loses its political cohesion, and as the situation increasingly becomes one of . . . stalemate, senior officials of your administration are falling back on the kind of comments which led so many people to question our goals in the first place. I find it astonishing that the Secretary of State and the Vice President have so little understanding of what is at stake . . . and the role which the Catholic Church can play in advancing the enunciated goals of the administration. I find it outrageous that they would suggest that the Church would bolster the ends of Marxism. . . . A willingness to talk does not mean a willingness to commit suicide. If there is any danger in offering to meet unconditionally, it is far less than the danger of continuing to seek a military victory. . . . That is why I have decided to seek legislation linking any further military assistance to El Salvador on a presidential certification that unconditiona1 negotiations among the parties to the conflict are either underway or are impossible because the insurgents have imposed prior conditions. In tion of ground.
the face of such strong and widespread repudiaits policies, the administration began to shift Testifying before the Congress on March 16,
Secretary Shultz stressed the role of socioeconomic assistance in the new U.S. game plan for El Salvador. Having previously opposed negotiations of any kind with the armed opposition, he came around to saying that, although this was a matter for the Salvadorans themselves to decide, the United States would help in any way it could to bring about negotiations that would enable all persuasions
to
participate
in
a
democratic
process.20
495
There was, however/ reformulation of policy. need
for
negotiations/
continued
to
military something other
could
side
to
to
dead
since/
end/
already vote
about
As the
as
preceded
bringing of
December
emphasized
not
of
assistance
and
conditions
to
The
final
tration
at
some
it
has
The
failure
has
in
tion
satisfactory
Such
an
view
of
cannot
be
to
point
commiting
to
a
had in
aimed
the
U.S.
and
any
at
suspicious
Central military
to
to
be
attach
more
in
should
1981
not
would
yet
might
troops
or
the
the
for
a
be
solu-
aglimmering.
rescue
the
then,
of
stalemate
record,
have
wake
that
happened.
still
the
hope
go
situation
will
American
any
in
the
Since
adminis-
negotiating
late
in
What
the
the
very
Should
sides
written.
explore
until
came
The
it
the
elections.
of
even
administration's
where
lead
FMLN/FDR
for
guerrillas,
optimistic.
only
process
offensive.
all
diplomacy the
that
waited
has
pressured
increasingly
yet
stalemate.
to
the
participate
limit
seriously
the
eventuality
imaginative
has
is
guerrilla a
to
if
kinds.
moment
of
not
mishandling
all
point
been
the
involvement
already
favor
noted,
Congress,
that
presidential
could
conditions
however,
the
for
with
even
it
This would
moving
of
optimum
of
conflict broken
either
it
denouement
option, game.
was
Thus/
the
actions
convinced
negotiating
1983/
aid
clear,
the
a
direct
remains
In
that
any basic service to
ahead
elections
date
already
adequate
crisis,
from
the
administration's
American
seemed
1983.
by
April
pressed
participate.
advance
balloting
It
still
gained
not
to suggest paying lip
administration’s
them.
and be
did
Salvadorans
the
preclude
support
little While
Energetic the
situation.
however,
may
yet
painful
and
one
deteriorate choice
accepting
of
military
defeat.
NICARAGUA With respect to Nicaragua, the administration did even bother to tone down its rhetoric. It did,
not
however,
go
through
willingness
to
Enders
visited
things
over
neither
standard
negotiate. Managua
with
side
its
the
ploy
Assistant
in
August
up
on
the
feigning
Secretary
1981,
Sandinistas.
followed
of
a
of
State
ostensibly
Nothing
proposals
came set
to
of
talk
this;
forth.
Nevertheless, in spring 1982, the United States presented a number of new proposals, supposedly with a view to encouraging responded away. to
a
a
negotiating
positively,
The
offered
to
conditions.
however,
administration
Nicaraguan
diplomatic
discuss And
all
process. did
When
the
Washington not
quickly
bother
to
of
August
13,
outstanding
issues
without
although
note
even
Nicaraguans
it
had
made
a
major
backed respond
which issue
of
496
the possible Nicaraguan acquisition of MiG aircraft/ when the Sandinistas announced in December that they would forego adding such planes to their inventory, Washington did not respond in any way, not even to the point of describing this conciliatory move as a positive development. This was a mistake. The Nicaraguan announcement had been intended to provide some breathing room and to stimulate negotiations. When it became obvious that the United States had no intention of entering into such discussions, the basis for Nicaraguan inhibitions disappeared. Meanwhile, Washington had pressed ahead with the secret war against the Sandinistas. By April 1983, this effort had reached alarming proportions. CIA-backed Nicaraguan guerrillas, many of them former Somocista guardsmen, were operating inside Nicaragua. President Reagan did not even deny the support of the United States. He merely insisted that the operation's purpose was not to overthrow the Sandinistas; rather, it was simply to harass them and interdict arms bound for El Salvador.^ This fooled no one. The guerrillas had already been interviewed by the Washington Post and had made their purpose crystal clear: to overthrow the Managua government.^ This course, in addition to being of dubious legality and inconsistent with American values, seemed certain to bring about dangerously heightened tensions. Cuba could not be expected to stand idly by. On the contrary, the chances were high that thousands of additional Cuban military advisers would be sent to Nicaragua. And the Sandinistas might decide to acquire the MiG aircraft after all. If that happened, Washington also could be expected to escalate. No one in the administration seemed worried about the sequence of events that might be touched off by U.S. actions or concerned lest it lead eventually to a superpower confrontation. Their whole approach toward Central America was characterized by extreme insouciance.
CONCLUSIONS Far from political and military victories at this juncture, the administration's policies have produced only military stalemate and escalating political problems. Nor does the administration give any sign of changing course. If it holds to the policies of its first two years, it may well alienate the entire region. The administration's principal sin of commission has been to portray and address the situation in Central America as if it were, first and foremost, a battleground of East-West conflict, and as if the violence there resulted primarily from Soviet/Cuban aggression. A more
497 realistic appraisal is that the conflict is essentially internal in nature. With the Old Order having collapsed in Nicaragua, and in the process of collapsing in El Salvador and Guatemala, the struggle is to decide who ^iii fill the vacuum. Cuba, of course, hopes to turn the situation to its advantage. It sympathizes with the more radical elements and has provided limited support and advice—first to the Sandinistas and then to the guerrillas in El Salvador. But this aid has never been the central factor in the equation. Somoza would have been overthrown in Nicaragua and a civil war would be raging in El Salvador even if Cuba did not exist and Moscow were still ruled by the czars. To be sure, many of the FMLN guerrillas are Marxists. But that fact does not translate the situation into an East-West conflict. To suggest that it does so is to deal with shadows rather than substance. It is also to take the problem out of context, with unfortunate consequences in terms of how the United States should address it. The U.S. challenge in central America is far mo re complex and requires subtleties of approach beyond the unsophisticated "good-guys-versus-communists" attitude adopted by Mr. Reagan. Such an attitude diverts attention from what should be the principal concern of the United States in the area: economic development coupled with socioeconomic reforms. It also discourages negotiations, which are the key to reducing tensions, providing security guarantees, and finding internal solutions satisfactory to all sides. The East-West context insisted upon by the administration also makes it extremely difficult to appeal to and/or deal with the many noncommunist components of the opposition—whether in El Salvador or Guatemala. If the United States treats the situation as a case of Soviet/ Cuban aggression, it will tend to view all those in opposition to regimes it backs as Soviet/Cuban allies. Such a position would cut off the United States from the moderate, democratic elements that constitute its natural partners. On the other side of the coin, addressing the situation in an East-West context encourages a skewed perception of the repressive governments that, by oppressing and neglecting the welfare of their people, have done more than anyone to bring on today's revolutionary turmoil. Rather than seeing them as the agents of instability, the Reagan administration tends to view them as valued allies in a common struggle against the communists. Thus does the United States become overly identified with repressive regimes, while they believe they have a blank check from Washington. The United States thereby tends to perpetuate, rather than to alleviate, the very causes of the instability that so concern it. As Ambassador Pezzullo has summed it up:
498
By identifying Cuban/Soviet subversion as the cause of the Central American turmoil/ we shield the abusive factions from taking responsibility for their failures/ and we lessen the pressure on them to change. At the same time/ we give the Cubans and Soviets more cre.dit than they deserve among a populace unhappy with the status quo and pressing for change. We repeat the historical error of positioning ourselves/ the most change-oriented society on the globe/ as seemingly defending the status quo. Taking the situation out of context and addressing it as if there were some immediate communist threat to the vital security of the United States may push the situation in precisely that direction—that is; it may become a self-fulfilling prophecy. A harsh and inflexibly confrontational attitude toward the Sandinistas and the opposition in El Salvador and Guatemala further polarizes the situation in those countries in ways unfavorable to U.S. interests. It drives them in a more radical direction--exactly the opposite of what the United States wishes to see happen. There is/ moreover/ a glaring inconsistency between the administration's description of the situation and its limited response—an inconsistency that suggests it does not believe its own rhetoric. In the same March 10, 1983 speech in which he reaffirmed that what we face in Central America is a direct threat to U.S. security emanating from Moscow and Havana, President Reagan also excluded the possibility of sending American troops to fight there. One might ask: If Mr. Reagan believed that our vital security were really threatened, how could he rule out any measure necessary to protect it? Certainly, it would be imprudent to do so. One must conclude, therefore, that either he does not believe what he is saying or that he takes American security too lightly. The same inconsistency is apparent in U.S. policy throughout the region and results in a situation in which the United States all too often adopts the worst alternatives possible. For example, the administration claims that Cuba is the source of U.S. problems in Central America, but after months of empty and demeaning bluster, it dropped its threat to "go to the source." The measures it has taken against Havana are not effective and resolute. They will not force Castro to do anything; such measures simply irritate the Cubans and rule out any possibility of securing through diplomatic engagement what such halfway punitive measures cannot hope to achieve. In the same way, the secret war in Nicaragua does not get rid of the radical Sandinista commanders, but merely eliminates the possibility of the United States
499 having any constructive influence with them throuqh diplomatic means. In El Salvador, also, while effectively ruling out military victory by excluding the possibility of committing U.S. troops, the administration has refused to explore negotiated alternatives. The result of all this is a region-wide situation in which Washington eschews diplomacy but also fails to take the resolute action that would be indicated if U.S. security were really threatened; the United States has the benefits of neither the one nor the other. However one analyzes it, the Reagan administration deserves the strongest criticism for its handling of the Central American imbroglio. If it takes at face value its own description of the problem—a threat to U.S. security originating in Moscow and Havana——then it deserves reprimand for not taking resolute action to ensure that security and to contain the problem rather than allowing it to fester indefinitely. If, on the other hand, the administration's alarmist i_iast— West explanation has been a matter of exaggerating for effect in order to make the situation fit its own preconceived Cold War mindset, then it is guilty of having misled the American people, squandering diplomatic opportunities, and needlessly leading the United States toward an extremely dangerous, even explosive, situation. Whether the one way or the other, the Reagan administration's Central American policies clearly have not served the national interest.
NOTES 1. Lawrence Pezzullo quoted at an Aspen Institute conference in January 1983. 2. New York Times (March 7, 1983); Washington Post (February 21 , 1983 ) . 3. As stated to the author by Ambassador Pezzullo. 4. See Wayne S. Smith, "Dateline Havana: Myopic Diplomacy," Foreign Policy, 48 (Fall 1982), pp. 160-161. 5. The statement issued by the State Department on April 2, 1981 acknowledged that there had been movement in the right direction. The United States, it said, had "no hard evidence of arms trafficking within the last few weeks, and propaganda and other support activities have been curtailed." 6. See L. Francis Bouchey, Roger Fontaine, David C. Jordan, Lt. General Gordon Sumner, and Lewis Tambs, "A New Inter-American Policy for the Eighties" (Washington, D.C.: Council for Inter-American Security, 1980). 7. Jeane Kirkpatrick, "U.S. Security and Latin America," Commentary (January 1981), pp. 29-40.
500
8. See the text of Kirkpatrick’s speech before the conference, March 21, 1981. 9. U.S. News & World Report (March 2, 1981). 10. Mew York Times (March 4, 1982). 11. U.S. News & World Report (April 6, 1981). 12. Transcript of the State Department's noon briefing for February 13, 1981; U.S., Department of State, "Communist Interference in El Salvador" (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Public Affairs, February 23, 1981), p. 8. 13. As reported by USICA diplomatic correspondent Marie Koening on February 28, 1981. 14. Washington Post (April 3, 1983). 15. New York Times (December 28, 1981). 16. The administration was careful to exclude the author, then Chief of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, from these talks. Presumably it did not want any witnesses. I subsequently received read-outs, however, from several reliable sources as to what had transpired. Their descriptions were roughly consistent with an account given by General Walters himself. See Miami Herald (January 8, 1983). 17. Washington Post (March 29, 1981). 18. Text of President Reagan's speech of March 10, 1983 . 19. Text of Senator Durenberger's letter of March 3, 1983 . 20. New York Times (March 17, 1983). 21. Washington Post (April 17, 1983). 22. Washington Post (April 15, 1983). 23. Ibid. (March 20, 1983).
15 Postscript: Toward a New Central American Policy Donald E. Schulz
Any attempt at policy prescription in a volume such as this must deal with a basic dilemma, If/ on the one hand/ an editor tries to forge a consensus/ he may be left with the lowest common denominator of what his diverse contributors can agree on. All too often/ this effort leads to a watered-down prescription/ largely inadequate for dealing with the problems faced. On the other hand/ if he addresses the issues squarely/ seeking what he believes to be the best policies for the particular dilemmas at hand, then he is likely to abandon consensus. Not all of the contributors will agree with the analysis and recommendations in this chapter. Most, I suspect, would support the basic thrust, while disagreeing on certain specifics. Some may reject the whole package. Readers can make up their own minds as to the wisdom or bias of what follows. I have earlier argued that U.S. policy has been profoundly counterproductive. By supporting those elements—especially the Central American militaries——that have been primary causes of revolutionary turmoil and by seeking to spread that turmoil to Nicaragua, Washington has become a major destabilizing force. The end result may be a region far more hostile to the United States and vulnerable to Soviet/Cuban influence than ever before. (Nor would the damage be limited to Central America. One could make the same statement about Latin America as a whole. Anti-U.S. elements would have a field day.) In the process, moreover, the United States may once again destabilize itself. Those who advocate the strategy of conflict underestimate the domestic ramifications of an indecisive struggle of protracted duration. Although a U.S. military intervention would be unlikely to entail as many casualties as did the Vietnam conflict, it would not have to be nearly that destructive to regenerate major domestic unrest. This country has not yet recovered from the wounds of that earlier unfortunate
501
502
involvement. Even a comparatively modest engagement would resurrect painful memories and provoke vigorous resistance within both Congress and the public at large. In turn/ the heavier the resistance/ the less likely that the given war could be prosecuted effectively. What would be the. effect of such a failure on U.S. credibility elsewhere? The advocates of conflict like to argue that the United States will no longer be taken seriously in other parts of the world if it does not hold the line in Central America. After all/ if Americans are not willing to defend their own backyard/ where will they use their military power? Yet/ the "lessons" of the region/ like Vietnam/ are not quite so simple. How credible would U.S. commitments be if the United States once again demonstrated that it is too rigid to reevaluate a disasterous course of action? A wise president will not confuse U.S. manhood with intervent ion. My concerns are twofold: that American policy be both effective and constructive. There is a moral dimension here that must not be ignored or distorted for partisan purposes. Like many other Great Powers/ the United States has all too often trodden heavily among its neighbors. The tendency to manipulate and use small countries for its own purposes/ without regard for the damage to them/ characterizes Washington's policy toward Central America today just as surely as it did in Cambodia and Vietnam a decade ago. What will be the implications for Honduras of the U.S.-promoted militarization? Of the carefully nurtured hostility with Nicaragua? It takes little foresight to envision the undermining of the fragile Honduran democracy and the spread of war to that heretofore relatively peaceful land. What about the arming of the Nicaragua contras? They have already become a state within a state. If they are unable to return to their native country/ one anticipates serio u s proble m s f or th e i r current hos ts. Th e contras may th ems el v e s bee ome a ma jor destab i1izing f o rce u ra s. a t of N ica rag ua 7 L e t u s assume f or the s ak e th a t U.S • po 1 i cy su cce eds and th e Sandi n i s tas own ♦ Wha t th en 7 N o twi thstanding P resid e n t s er t io ns / not a 11 o f th e contras are fre e do m fighters. T hi s i s e s pec ia lly t rue of the Somocista s / for whom powe sp oil S / a nd re ven g e ar e primary mo tiva t i on s. Civil War II would be another bloodbath/ one that would not cease with the defeat of the current government but which could go on for some time as the Somocistas slaked their thirst for revenge against a helpless populace. Nor would the fighting be likely to end. The Sandinistas would continue the struggle in guerrilla fashion. There would almost certainly be a falling out of victors. It is difficult to imagine elements more incompatible than
503 tne Somocistas and the followers of Eden Pastora. The only thing that unites these two factions of the opposition is their antipathy for the Sandinistas. When that glue evaporates/ their alliance of convenience would crumble. Then we could look forward to Civil War III. One could go on at some length with similar questions about El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Guatemala, but the point should be clear enough: These are not the kinds of fates that anyone with any regard for the wellbeing of the Central American people would want to promote. My basic thesis is that the United States should seek to minimize, rather than maximize, the bloodshed and the risks negotiated solutions to Such solutions need not
thereof by seriously seeking the region's major conflicts. exclude an important element of
coercion. Nicaragua, Cuba, and the Soviet Union are destabilizing forces, and U.S. power should be used to discourage their adventures. The United States should not delude itself, however, by seeking foreign scapegoats i-or what are essentially domestic problems. These' revolutions will not go away. Even if crushed, they will reemerge time and again, as long as those in positions of authority have no regard for their countrymen, hold them in contempt, and seek only their own power and enrichment.
EL
SALVADOR:
THE
"ZIMBABWE
OPTION"
In November 1980, a mysterious, unsigned manuscript, purportedly a State Department "dissent paper" reflecting the views of analysts not only in State but also in the DOD, NSC, and CIA, began circulating within Washington cll cleS/
-' raising the possibility of a Zimbabwe—type settlement to the Salvadoran conflict. Just as the British intervened in Zimbabwe, so, the argument went, there was an opportunity for the United States to play a similar role in El Salvador.1 what was needed, however, was a clear recognition on the part of the "regionally dominant power" (i.e., the United States) that a new status quo was emerging—that an important segment of Salvadoran
opinion
supported
not
the
junta
but
rather
Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR), a broad alliance of moderate to radical left organizations uniting most the opposition. Washington's willingness to recognize
the of
el frente as "a legitimate and representative force" — though not the only one—"in Salvadoran politics" might be the necessary first step toward a negotiated solution to
the
conflict.
Now, this was not the first time that been floated to "allow the left to come in cold." Unfortunately, for both strategic political
reasons,
the
option
was
never
a proposal had from the and domestic
given
serious
504
cons ide rat ion . Wi th cri t iTci sm and di ss en The resu It was a kind of con t inu ed to suppo rt and the le f t grew st of a CO nse rva tive, a murder of the f ren te leaders seized at the Externado San Jose Hi gh Sch ool i n November : 1980 seemed to bury once an< for all th e i dea o f a negotiated settlement of the conf lie t. Ye t, app ea ran ce Ironically, the Reagan administration may now have an opportunity to pursue the "Zimbabwe option" much more effectively than would any conceivable Democratic administration. Certainly, it has been—and still is—in a much better position to take the controversial measures that will be necessary to foster regional peace and stability. The obvious model here is that of the Nixon presidency: Precisely because of his long-standing reputation as a staunch conservative and anti-communist, Mr. Nixon found it much easier to pursue detente with China and the Soviet Union than Hubert Humphrey would have.- So too Mr. Reagan. Who, after all, would be better able to convince this conservative Congress to accept such a settlement and provide substantive aid to the regime, whatever its ideological complexion, that emerges out of it? A t the same time, who would be better equipped to persuade the Cubans, Nicaraguans, and Salvadoran guer r i 11 as to negotia t, and negotiate seriously? Reagan has cl ea rly f rig htene Castro and the Sandinistas, as can be s ee n by the recent ipate of conciliatory proposals f rom tho se quarters. f he plays his cards right, he may very w el 1 be able to get their cooperation in settling reg i onal CO nflicts in ways that do not jeopardize U.S. secu ri ty • If such co cooperation is to come about, however, i t w il 1 req uire a deg degree of sophistication and flexibility on the part of Wa lington that has not yet been in evid en ce • It is not enough to employ the stick alone; one mu s t al so have a carrot to offer. F inally, who wou Id be better suited than Mr. Reagan to p er suade the recal citrant Salvadoran military that the Unit ed S tat es is real really serious about a settlement? Wash in gt on has the me s to exert such pressure through i ts ec on omi c and mili ry aid. It should accordingly indi ca te in the stron st possible terms that it will not suppor t, or even pass ely accept, a right-wing coup, T he Sa lvado ran govern nt and military should be informed that the United States will expect them to enter into serious negotiations with the opposition. Arrangements should be made for a cease-fire, to be followed by the formation of a transitional coalition government, including the left. The armed forces would be restricted
505 to their barracks and the guerrillas to their base camps. An^international constabulary would be introduced to maintain
order
and
prepare
the
way
for
internationally
supervised elections in which all political organizations could participate a la Zimbabwe, with the United States committed people would
to
support
might
choose.
be
formed, forces,
from
sides.
For to
this
adopt
a
problems.
emphasis
on
be
important, forces,
who
work,
the
United
strategy
Gleijeses
of
power
on
so
has
reform
is
out
of
grossly
first
that
the
have
to
for
be
the
behalf
of
rights
leaders
ignored
with
that
disabused
of
this
way
be
through
would
action (at
would
least
across
by
in
in
a
no
the
a
have
short
manner
leave
run),
that
appropriate
the
negotiations also cut off One option"
would
original refuse down to
Zimbabwe
to
might
a
leftist
use
of for
United
States,
for of
trust the
the
A
instance, it
annihilation. or
goodwill
proposed
on
moving
on
are a
victory.
By
the (So
the
same
Needless either
elections,
the
being in
to
a
say,
very
the
for
abandoned
the by
constrained is
the
by
any
all-out little
side.
Regardless
of
losers
might
resort
well
role
a
If
desperate,
are
necessary
dominant
there
well
chips
token, a
and
the
is
conceivable.
out
known
period,
was
is
lash
be
"Zimbabwe
bloodbath
and
point
do.
might
when
secure
feel
This
the
preparation
longer
effective defenseless
in
were
be
to
aid.
government it
have
it
whatever
the
to
can
and
get
right
do
and
threats
specified
cave
in
and
on
that
undertaken
shot. The
elite,
of
never
surface,
long
many
let
will
efforts
will
should
after the
too
could
that
no
toward
Salvadoran
military
calculating
felt
source
credibility
would
reforms
fairly
might
moderation
"real
government
it
States
negotiations
power.
right,
war
will
countrymen.
the
direct
of
the
settlement.)
transitional
seizure
need
a
cooperate,
prevent the
that,
seem
Washington
FflLN in
admit
those
own
pleas
most
words
begun, it will, economic aid.
may
from
security
.
leaders
and
mere
United
.
the
convinced
The
the
.
U.S.
suspension
that
have
and
pusillanimous
These
Simultaneously, unless
made.
Washington's
means
will Most
step."
vis—a—vis
notion.
its
The United States will have its Salvadoran ally to ensure
are
impunity.
with
itself
is
have the
3
administration's
human
s
changes
force,
their
and
essential
reestablished
Reagan
country oe
desired
to
military
side,
This will not be easy. exert strong pressure on
to
will
conflict,
military
elements
States
respects.
abused
the
and
approach
military
the
apparatus
undesirable
disassociate
government
a
of
crucial
must
argued,
the
and
Salvadoran
government
most
certain and
have
As its
in
both
the
security
multidimensional
Washington
both
new
the
The
in
a
of
confrontation
modified
sectors,
to
flexible,
region’s to
of
purged
plan
outcome
Finally,
composed
guerrilla both
whatever
who
won to
506
force. The concept cal precedent in El On United there tial
the
States an
matter/
long
making but
such
recent
is
a
hard
At with
a
in
pressure
cooker
concerned.
And
has
if
the
be it
until
demonstrated
a
should
States
determination the
proffered.
If
could
that
failed
still
Thus/
the
spokesmen
their
for
a
the
death
of
apparent
triumph
prolonged
popular the FMLN
Forces/^ ever
to
take
political Salvador
of
part
have
in
long
United
States/
unable
to
impose
and
the
their
Sandinistas
own
out are
revolutions
Salvador.
Once
involvements recommended recently/
the
became a
have
Nicaragua.
Venezuela/ services the
United
mere
to
opinion/
dividing
consolidating then
such
success.
the and
the
hard-line Liberation willing than
the
such
a
of
to
initial
the
and
of
of
the
regional
(Mexico/
offered is
their ripe.
negotiations rather
opposition/ Salvadoran modest
Host
Salvadoran
some
time
El
military
international
a
in
conflict.
group
El
jeopardize
back
take
in
Castro
to
settlement/
have
the
pulled the
and
solution
adventures
the
the
that
frustration.
proposed
Salvadoran will
Nicaraguans
number
short/
be
the
Panama)—have
position
negotiations
a
Contadora
ameliorating the
to
well
and
pressuring
order
In
treats
achieve for
to
in
mediators.
tactic
they
troops/
Carpio
in
their
Finally/
notably/
States
opportunity a
negotiate
Colombia/
as
of
the
conflict.
willing
settlement
taken
weight
in
longer
apparent/
to
actors—most
them
branch
the
military
engaging
danger
guerrillas off
no
by
political
they
at
a
in
of
the
been
so
indicated
concerned
have
lash
might
The
Both
might
combat
negotiations.
concur.
It
doing
of the Popular too7 seem more
Cubans
Salvador/
aid.
trick/
over
ending
the
the
repeatedly
a
administra-
to
Cayetano
war faction guerrillas/
the
olive
route
the
all
the
resolution
moderates
for
that
off such
spurn
electoral
be
blows
provide
with
a
gradually
Reagan
do
now
Nicaraguan
continue
intervene
FDR
a
military
to
insurgents
preferable. desire
massive
is
successful/
to
this
may
will
attacks
the
willingness
with
for
certain
past/
on
victory
devastating
means
poten-
guerrillas'
finally
if
the
is
the
itself
the
are
lid
that
only
has
offensives
Even
the
necessary.
With
the
In
government
of
histori-
decisions
military
inordinately is
its
a
Not
Salvador
spite
no
argued
that
nationwide
successful.
future
El
prospects of
has
juncture.
major
no
indicate
United
more
by
Salvadoran
being
In
altogether.
would
be
controversial
within
series
also
Washington
successes/
intensity
resolution be
could
in
^nd
best/
opposition
critical
Several
building
the
it
resolution.
off.
scenario/
could
a
conditions
ncecssary.
tion
at
battlefield
way
would
hand/
administration
for
favor
other
of a loyal Salvador.
and
If as
an
than
as
domestic
and government/
chance
for
507 By the same token/ the indefinite nature of the conflict gives the United States a major opportunity to induce the Salvadoran regime to engage in serious negotiations. aid/ then
If Washington continues to provide military it will bolster those elements in the armed
forces who maintain that the United ever deeper into the conflict and a
States can be drawn military victory won.
Incentives to find a peaceful solution will be removed wholesale. In contrast, if Washington makes it very clear that it is serious about such a settlement and backs up its words with actions of the kind described above, then illusions of a military victory will be undermined and the incentives for a compromise solution immeasurably enhanced. As for the danger that a withdrawal of U.S. aid will unleash a spasm of violence on the part of the extreme right, I believe it to be exaggerated. Salvador is already experiencing a reign of terror. How much worse could things get? The truth of the matter is that the military does not like to fight very much. Morale is low, and a cutoff of aid would probably
further weaken
dominant
motives
of
the
desire
Salvadoran
for
combat.
officers
tend
The
to
be
personal aggrandizement and loyalty to their military institution. As Gleijeses has pointed out, both "require not defiance, but acquiescence to U.S. will."^ It is time to test the political waters to ascertain whether a "Zimbabwe option" is feasible. Before issuing any ultimatums, however, the United States must find out whether
international
support
exists
for
such
a
strategy.
Again, this should be a multilateral effort. Those noncommunist countries that have been critical of American policy should be sounded out with regard to such issues ao providing troops for an international peacekeeping force. (U.S. soldiers would most assuredly not be involved in such an undertaking.) If such tangible is not available, then of course the feasibility of
aid the
entire enterprise would be called into serious question. Similarly, the United States must ascertain whether there are elements in the current Salvadoran regime whose cooperation could be secured. The most likely candidates would come from the Christian Democratic Party and, especially, the remnants of the reformist faction of the military. Although the young officers who led the October 1979 golpe—Majano, Guerra y Guerra, and others— have been driven into exile, the vast majority of their colleagues are still in the armed forces, relegated to desk jobs and other positions of noninfluence. Efforts should be made, as part of the proposed military reform, to bring back Majano and the other leaders and to open the ranks of the senior officers to this crucial source of fresh blood. It is perhaps not yet too late to resurrect
the
young
officers
as
a
political
force
and
508
save their vision which it has been In very
the
well
heading take
final
be
off
an
settlement/ far
and
a
of
the
best the
is
likely
the
would
predict
emerge is
one
political
from of
American
of
will
not
disappear.
politics.
should
be
to
and
without
dangers
giving
their
arms:
share
of
so
that
Their
power in
in
for
possibility peaceful
they
that
pay
That/
after
is
way
no
office.
your all/
of
it
gain
majority.
seems
certainly
be
a
based
broadly to
the
(It the
well
necessarily inevitably
be be
other
hand/
the
polarization
human done
lay be
down
granted
a
government/
participating. to
organize
allow
power
the
the
opposition.
As
will
for
and
the
through
the
inherent
in
the
struggle
cessation solutions
be—would
not
terms of
the
a
be
to
the
States the
the
merciful.
more likely
and
opposition nor
would
not
would
it
(Much/ On
greater
the
radicalization military the
the of
strength country's potentials
heightened—not both
in
the
and
anti-American
the
is
waits
hostilities.
of
right
would
States.
bloodshed/
formal
which
government
dictate
be
the
behavior.)
becomes/
of
to
guerrillas;
and
emergence
Democrats/
United
will
the
say
could
almost
independent
United
prevail/
would
there
elec-
party
government
Such
the
time/
one
either
Social
ability
same in
a
guerrillas'
the
the
by
the
At
cost
such
While
proposed
any
to
Washington's
future.
the
leaning
chances.
about.
anticipates
populace
their
that
politics
FMLN.
fighting the
your
the
win
other
to
on
take
impossible
the
longer
of
so
is
hostile
depend
might
to
would
One
dominated
would intense
you
Democrats/
fact/
military
come
the
electoral
be
must
is
latter/
as
after
one
be
to
is
U.S.
the
to
the
democracy
government/
Christian
mention
may
Coalition
groups/
grows/
in
permitted
unlikely
necessary.
If
as
who
highly
from
the
be
and
what
representatives
more
have
the The
from
cannot
transitional
short/
money/ is
left.
probable.) include
will
the
away
incentive
into
conflict
where
presumably
must
left
knowing
tions/ a
an
confidence
In
the
one/ This
they
would
too;
battle
less.
proposed
have
that
means.
You
or
the
candidates/
campaign
far
insurgents
might
which
the
not
Marxist.
Such
Accordingly/
political
Specifically/
they
process
are
the
shift
is
to
cannot/
certain:
thing
the
One
for
one
into
choice/
government
But
of
withdrawal
troops.
It
may fails
FMLM
of
costs
agonizing
the
to
negotiated
humiliating
of
it
the
essence arena
If
bringing
the
military
a
a
fate
has
be
for
objective
States
might
struggle very
power
an
process.
risks
for
the
option"
disaster.
combat
nature
this
process.
United
face
between
the
the
the
policy to
from
"Zimbabwe
opportunity
road/ of
renovation
the
chance
of
commitment
course/
That
it
down
analysis/
impending
advantage
too
of national consigned.
to
during
and
Should
victors—whoever
they
509
Sof
too,
States' tion of
best
and
for
at
and
quite
willingness wartime. in
of
of
in
in
trade
and
can
be
Neither
the
which
favor
regardless
of
the
regime
that
emerges
Finally, Perhaps
the
military
and
guerrilla
both.
The
position, within said,
forces, dint
and
however, require
willingness the
worst
the
its
possible.
El
that They
recent
guerrillas imbroglio anxious
could
this
to
might lost
are FMLN
them
Cubans
to
them
this
make
their
into
at
the
States
political
asylum
to
into
a
exile.
a
well
be
the with
the war be
on
are
their to
foster
sweeten
the
Salvadoran and
contribution
undesirables
at
power—sharing
would
could
do
as
might
get
time
of
Popular
who
regional
same
to
regarded
that
This
ranks run,
influence
fear
a
United
proceed
the
and
the
short
of
probably
The
then
sake
substantive and
the
within
prospect.
a
settlement
(in
Both
on
willing
the
use
Salvador
just
be
be
FMLN.
their
commanders,
could
cannot
cleanse
increasingly
for
matter.
draw
avoid
security.
offering who
and
might
opportunity own
they
other
to
in
assistance,
conditional
a
changes
same
economic
struggle
Washington
on
to
political
power
sacrifice
Nicaraguans
aid
insurgents
the
of
of
withhold
such the
is
order.
strong
or
with
quantities
Forces;
for
that
government
fairly
relationship
leverage
make
press
the
elements
The
least)
arrangement.
both
worst
its
creation
forces.
ultra—militants
to
of
to
armed
The
willing
composed
grant
the
the
the
to
large
by
be
ability
this.
liability
will the
be
and
internal
of
in
all, aid
will
of
of
of
aid,
as
issue
task
States area's
States
U.S.
a
some
of
on
the
nor
the
long
(After
in
its
of
complexion
be
offenders.
Liberation
key
United
stacked
will
for
could
are
States
Salvadoran
Washington
dependent
purged
economic
Nevertheless, will
is
cards
the
distinct
as
United
Salvador.
difficult
United
the
be
a
As
in
Salvador.6
capable
aid.
ideological
El
at
States
the
the
establishment,
by
military
there
most
new
in
will
of
avoided,
in
is
United
donor
El
the
than follow
in
with
potential
opportunities
would
are
paper"
training
Caribbean
Cubans
in
their
and
more
that
competing
peace.
in
all
of
"dissent
mainly
the
that
Soviet
involvement
and
displacing
too,
and
military
and
open
conflict
of
influence
equipment
would
America
of
lies
military
armed
its
limiting
Cuban
United
throughout
aforementioned the
game
government, trade.)
and
influence
partner a
out/
terms
regionalization in
the
Soviets
conditions
interested
costs
the
internationaliza-
maintaining
developments
the
disadvantage
playing
As
U.S.
contrast,
major
while
Central
escalation
under
conflict
provide
regionalization By
Salvadoran
their
Few
Cuba
the
points
to
be
the
Moscow.
rightly
may
preventing
acceptable
expanding
for
of
option"
of
America,
region
Havana
"Zimbabwe
chance
spread
central
the
the
a their
the
both
pot
by
sides,
510
This solution would not; of course/ solve the problem of creating a new military establishment/ but would
help.
units
would
the
best
Integration be
of
coexistence new
future
and
the
and
difficult Some
may
for
In
(four
necessary
slow
government
circumstances.
government
authority.
in
a
of
be can
be
the
meantime
or
to
required
five
elected
maintain
country
to
an
at
of
can
for a
even
years
the
under
institutional until
establish
the
its
foreseeable
minimum)/
international
ensure
unpredictable
form
and
guerrilla
process
several
and
years/
and
it
it
will
be
peacekeeping
that
this
exceedingly
arrangement
does
not
come
force
delicate
apart
at
the
seams.
NICARAGUA
AND
CUBA:
THE
One-dimensional
perceptions
often
counterproductive
that/
surely/
American office
is
a
revolutionary of
the
"outside"
The
has
become
the
Sandinistas U.S.
fully
cease clear
and
foreign
aggressor
in
the
use
of
to
it
have
a
they
must
be
It
deter
is
him
into
for
the
the
product and
the
sought to an attempt
to
recently/
it
intends
to
oust
can.
force
but
backfire.
order
was
More
administration if
came
Nicaragua/
aggressions.
policy/
they
It
Cuba/
States/
Central
Washington has and Managua in
altogether/
threat
lest
that
United
explanation
Salvador:
especially
their
the
administration
El
forces/
one-dimensional/
recent
turmoil
them
in
its
ideological
in
to
For
ready-made
get
The
of
COEXISTENCE
lead
Reagan
Soviet Union. Since thenr threaten and punish Havana to
OF
policies.
lesson
experience.
with
STRATEGY
one
legitimate employed
thing
from
to
place care-
threaten
violence/
but
an
if/
once he ceases his objectionable behavior/ the threat continues to intensify/ the deterrent effect tends to a ie counterproductive
poi n t
(In reporter
the
Nicaragua was
that
aftermath
asked in "we
Nicaragua/ Grenada: assistance
Castro
the
but We
we
lack
to
really
U .S.
i n vas ion
ho'
far
C uba
w ould
o
a
t
do
would
ev ery th ing the and
Those
options." ability of
same air
are
of
to
be a
see
G re nadax
support inva sion. H is
sim i la r
face
naval
Grenada.
have any other fidence in the
w ill
likely
the
try the
are
o
event
would
C uba ns
d Sta tes II borders." o «
without
returns
inc rea si ngly inef fee ti ve and jm to a CO rner z the Sa nd inistas
the "revolution
dim inishing
of
possible
problem
means
the
to
facts:
as
reply
f or in
send We
a
direct do
not
He went on to voice his conthe Nicaraguan people to defend
themselves.^) Some statements
observers that
Cuba
have
concluded
would
remain
from on
the
this
and
similar
sidelines
in
the
511
event
of
dubious are
such
attack.
In
interpretation.
already
about
an
a
some
third
personnel.
It
to
whom
is
in
the
invasion.
Certainly,
6,000
they
to
be
that
would
were
not
can
in
this
is
fact
that
or
they
there
security
would
accompany best
remain
an
uninvolved
perhaps
a
Nicaragua,
military
that
comments
the
Cubans
unlikely
fighting
Castro's
judgment,
overlooks
appear
highly
uninvolved Grenada.
It
5,000
of
my
in
be
interpreted as (1) a statement of fact and (2) an attempt to avoid giving the Reagan administration any pretext for an
invasion.
form It
of
is
and
That
immediate
very
other
and
Latin
Nicaragua arms.
aid
could
troop
likely,
indirect
training
Cuba
send
direct
aid
is
in
reinforcements
however,
that
not
various
kinds
in
of
delayed
be
forthcoming—including
the
equipping
of
"volunteers"
and
American
countries
struggle
to
along
would
go
be
with
on
from
Cuba
smuggled a
into
continuing
indefinitely
the
doubt.
would
clandestinely,
The
not
in
flow
of
guerrilla
fashion.) Though time to is in a
changes—if
bility
is
wise
Castro very
and
states
a
enough
he
to
of
pact:
do
threaten
us."
would
and
withdraw
closed would
agree
The
down.
their
guerrillas
and
negotiated
settlement
regional
believe This
use
security
that
support the
military of
from
against
is
threaten CIA
bomb
the
the
is
needed
is
if
the
Nicaraguan
Sandinistas
and
aid
to
the
influence
to
help
agreements,
including
you
Hondurans
would
conflict.
a
United
Nicaragua
that
United it
you
the
and
Reagan
credi-
leverage——if
off
the
his
would
What
still
indeed
provides
it. not
has
he
call
their
is
necessary
hence
fear
of
will
Simultaneously,
terminate
Reagan
specifically,
war"
there
the
More
military
"secret
effect
considerable "We
to
late,
Sandinistas;
advantage
security
contras.
the
Nicaragua. take
States
into
chooses.
They
source
very
in El Salvador, Ronald than any conceivable
put
so
and
mutual
to
growing
to
high.
invade
with
not
is
president
frightened Cuba
hour
avert disaster. As far better position
Democratic policy
the
be Cubans
Salvadoran A
bring
about
complex
a
of
mutual
nonaggression pledges, would be fashioned, which would: (1) bar, or at least severely limit, the shipment of weapons,
ammunition,
Nicaragua, period
of
foreign or
El four
Salvador, years
military
others)
immediate
in
Central
halving
of
followed
remainder,
to
side Rican
of
the
Honduras, and
if
all by
completed
be
peacekeeping
and
Rica
and
over
zones
a
by
force
that
(2)
and
withdrawal period
and
be
for
of
a
ban
Cuban,
provide
military
would
policed
Costa
(U.S., (3)
gradual
Nicaraguan-Honduran to
into
possible);
foreign
the
equipment
training
America;
Demilitarized
borders,
national
be
military
(longer,
bases
personnel, months.
and
Soviet,
for
an
police of
the
eighteen
created
on
each
Nicaraguan-Costa
units would
of be
the
same
engaged
interin
El
512
Salvador. Finally/ the Sandinistas would agree to some of their domestic controls—for example, by releasing press
political
freedom,
groups and
some
more
liberty
holding
United foreign
aid.
As
with
include
would the
in
whether would
contras
in
them
to
the
teeth,
easy
to
get
those
can
other
the
government, vent
the
token,
weapons war
one,
on
Sandinistas
buildup,
willing
arms
and
find
armed it
their
not and
to
to
the
Having
so
use
the
any
of
to
Israeli
him By
in
regime.
want
help
advisers.
object
is
cooperation
may
to
that
Sandinista
the
Alvarez
be
might
of
it
Similarly,
prevent
the
like
but
run
not
and
many
would
who
may
to
sure
military
might
restrictions
the
or
against be
are
agenda.
States
General
Honduran
for
own
back
States
parties.
the
their
the
relations
agreements,
cooperate.
causes,
return,
One
generals
United
guerrilla
major
terminate
have the
United
proposal.
bellicose to
In
there
interest
their
commercial
option,"
greater
and
pursue
1985.
security
willing
Honduras
continuing
Nor
be
in
full
this
the
the
country
a
restore
parties
and
elections
with
Guatemala
doubtful
organize
"Zimbabwe
problems
permitting
opposition
to
national
States
potential
allowing
prisoners,
ease
circum-
the
number
same
of
provisions. Nevertheless, this
sort
avoided.
will
be
Both
the
understand
this,
3
interest. The
The
incentives
considerable: Salvador,
(including
of
growth
that
a
Nicaraguans
for
position.
By
maximize
they
security
should
out
of
desires
United using
States the
to
U.S.
trade
are
to
doldrums improved
carrot
as
well
as
and
States. aid
in
inter-
the
fuel
the
mass
bargaining stick,
influence
interests
kind
standards.
the
its
it.
the
fulfill
strong
increasing
on
United
living
a
U.S.
to
their
El
and
pull
and
regime
to
are
in
opposition
in
promote
allies the
is
leverage,
up
cooperation
with
they
the
seem
them
themselves,
its for
take
of
be
indicated
for need
to
now
their
if
enable
is
for
American
agencies)
would
effectively
of
war
repeatedly
relations
especially,
arrangement
Cubans
Nicaraguan-Cuban
lifting
its
some
wider
and
have
States
economic
and
the
more
if
economy
short,
can
necessary
United
lending
expectations In
that
power-sharing
the
Nicaraguan of
is
and
Sandinistas,
national
guess
increased
restoration The
my
in
it the
Nicaragua
itself . What States
is
must
being make
strategy
of
conflict
that
early into facto United
trap
its
has
serious
years. of to
simply
here
so
There
isolate because
that is
for has
no
the
United
substitute the
too
a
strategy
pursued
Castro's
itself the
that
to
vigorously
Washington
assuming
is
attempt
coexistence
been
enemies.
States
government
a
peaceful
Reagan the
suggested
of
during
easily
the
fallen
friends
are
ipso
rational
reason
for
the
from
Sandinista
latter
the is
"Marxist"
or
513 revolutionary" or because it maintains good relations with Havana. If Washington is concerned about Nicaragua becoming "another Cuba/" then it would be well advised to use its economic and diplomatic resources—especially its economic aid—to promote American values and interests in that country. That opportunity still exists. As in El Salvador, the Soviets and Cubans would be at a distinct disadvantage. They cannot effectively compete in terms of economic aid, and the United States would have foreclosed mi1itary competition through the mutual security treaty. Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that Nicaragua is not your conventional Soviet-bloc, totalitarian system. The Sandinistas' commitment to "pluralism," though increasingly strained by the growing tensions between revolutionary and counterrevolutionary sectors, has not yet been completely abandoned. Private enterprise continues to play a major role in the government's economic program. Independent political parties and interest groups still exist and publish their views in La Prensa. Though human rights violations occur, these are for the most part the overreactions of a jittery state security system struggling to combat armed guerrilla attacks and sabotage. Certainly, personal security is incomparably greater in Nicaragua than in, say, El Salvador or Guatemala. In sum, if the United States is really interested in promoting freedom and human rights in Nicaragua, it should begin by reevaluating current policy, for the strategy of conflict has placed those values in serious jeopardy. Pluralism cannot flourish under a state of siege. Human rights abuses will continue as long as the country is under attack; indeed, they may be expected to grow worse, as U.S./Honduran/contra pressure intensifies. They are in large part a consequence of American policy. Moreover, as long as the United States continues to wage 1i / economic, and political war against the Sandinistas, it will effectively lock Nicaragua into the Cuban/Soviet embrace. The Reagan administration has made the Soviet bloc penetration of that nation far too easy. It is time, once again, to open Nicaragua to political competition from the United States. A change of strategy need not lead to a withdrawal into isolationism. Rather, constructive engagement—the continuation of the search for hemispheric security through a balanced mix of economic, military, and diplomatic leverage—would reorient American involvement along more effective, more constructive, and less hazardous lines. Finally, a word about Cuba. For almost a quarter century, the Castro regime and the United States have been locked in a fundamentally pathological relationship, a veritable dialectic of hostility, marked by "mutual fear, suspicion, defensiveness, and aggression. Time and
514
again, provocation and threat have bred retaliation, reinforcing existing antagonisms and leading to an ongoing
process
effect,
has
out
worst,
the
of
muta.1
chronically most
destructiveness. behaved
in
destructive
such
Each
a
way
tendencies
side,
as
in
to
in
bring
the
other. break
It is time that both sides out of this deadlock. It
there
is
an
separating
ongoing Cuba
structure
and
disappear
in
matter
differences
of
the
the
years
domestic
political
cause
hostility.
of
of
playing
external
David
threat
leadership. too
often
forming
the
presidents toward being have
Goliath,
unite
Cubans
willing
by
"soft"
on
intense,
to
groups
demonstrated
rallying
Cuban-Americans
None
of
ideas the
these
and
time
to
States
time,
Clearly, its
factors
policies
United
the
will in
Fidel
be
in
States
a
the
has
various
U.S.
initiatives important
appearance
Castro,
as of
overnight.
be
to
was
success
strategy compete
old
of
continue
Reagan's
to
an
all
per-
citizens
away
of
by
alienating
the
must
career
trap
their
about
his
made
States
the
international
will
United
United
continue
the
the
revolutionary
President go
served
his
giving
behind
ideology;
around
Many
will
has
a
in
conflict. Cuban
with
those
marketplace;
provocative equipped
to
of
from
self. protect
interests.
back
For
precisely
and
re-evaluate
Central
American
dangers
of
have
The
issues
United
gain
by
one
make
the
numerous of
say,
effort,
possible.
The
hostility
has
this
in
has
these if
then same
of
demonstrated,
calling
that
is
ready
the
for
too,
to
Cubans
talks
on
nego-
have
the
entire
the
two
to
and
everything
course
lose
Where is
no
and
they
countries. would
unwilling
progress
pattern
hostility
signs,
between
Washington
the
symbiosis
and
signals.
sterile
the
destructive
years,
nothing
stand
clearly are
as
to
for,
situation
several
needs
policy,
mutually
contention
but
feeding
so
Washington
There
feelers,
States
can
Cuban
this
past
exploring
an
its
prohibitive.
Over
issued
reason,
crisis
understands
tiate. range
this
continuing
become
Castro
no
by
and
to
specter
avoid or
merely
also
all,
into
feelings
recently
have
Similarly,
communism.
negative
not
unlikely
the
constrained
need
political
fall
is
is
using
the
role.)
felt the
to
that
interest
after
our
assigned
Cuba
domestic
to
have
This
considerations
to
to
incompatibility
national
Castro,
a serious effort not be easy, for
States
ahead.
(Unfortunately,
been
of
United
in
made will
will
lead,
even
will
to to
be
continue,
destructiveness,
with
destruc-
tiveness . In States
the will
illusions
process
of
reevaluation,
be
to
shed
and
Cuban
policy.
actor
in
a
able inject Too
morality
a
new
often, play,
some
of
element it
has
casting
perhaps, its
of
the
United
long-standing
realism
into
behaved
as
if
itself
in
the
it
its was
role
an of
515
Good saving the world from the Cuban Devil. Reality is not so reassuring. While Cuba is hardly a benign force on the international scene/ neither is the United States/ as the latter's record in countries like Guatemala/ Iran, Vietnam/ and Chile amply demonstrates. So far as anybody knows, the Cubans have never plotted to assassinate a U.S. president or tried to contaminate American livestock with swine fever. The CIA/ however/ has engaged in such activities against Cuba.^^ Perhaps/ too/ the United States will eventually come to recognize Fidel not as a single-minded purveyor of anarchy, committed to the elimination of the U.S. presence everywhere in the Third World, but as a more complex figure, capable of serving as a force for moderation and stability as well as revolutionary change. (The Cubans have been a stabilizing element in Angola and Ethiopia, though the United States has been loath to admit it. ^ Early on, they encouraged the Sandinistas to retain a mixed economy and a nonaligned foreign policy and to court U.S. aid and foreign investment. As previously noted, moreover, they have for some time been advising the Salvadoran guerrillas to seek a political solution to the civil war in that country.) Cuban and U.S. interests are not everywhere incompatible; there are, in fact, significant areas of commonality. The stability of Central America has now become one of them. If Washington can work with Castro on this issue— and it should make a major effort to do just that—then it can at last begin the long overdue task of allowing Cuba to come in from the cold.
CONCLUSIONS Clearly, U.S. actions cannot be limited to El Salvador or Nicaragua. The United States needs a truly regional policy. In neighboring Guatemala, political violence and human rights violations have built to Salvadoran proportions, and for essentially the same reasons. In the words of the "dissent paper," U.S. support for a negotiated settlement in El Salvador would "serve notice to the Guatemalan hardliners that their time has run out. The chances for a less radical and less traumatic transition . . . will be greatly improved. ^^ At the same time, I should make very clear that I am not speaking here of a wholesale rejection of right-wing governments. Far from it; the United States must be ready to support a wide range of regimes, from conservatives to Marxists and authoritarians to democrats--providing such regimes can maintain some semblance of order and legitimacy and refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of their neighbors. This might well mean, for instance, major increases in economic aid to conservative, authoritarian Honduras,^
516
as well as democratic Costa Rica and Marxist Nicaragua, providing they adhere to the criteria just stated. In short, a "realistic" Latin American policy will have to recognize and accept diversity, even as it attempts to promote stable governments capable of effectuating sorely needed reforms. (Put another way, either the United States learns to live with the left, or it will face a future of chronic military interventions to prevent such regimes from coming to power or, once there, surviving.) One last note on economic aid. In the past, Washington has all too often displayed a tendency te n de ncy to "throw money" at socioeconomic problems. T h e rece n t Kissinger Commission report is a case in po i n t . U nder present circumstances, an $8 billion aid Pi a n for the region is wildly unrealistic. Not only is s it i t unlikely unli kely pass Congress, but, even if it does, such measures me as ures can can no more than hold off a total collapse in Central America. Under conditions of civil war, economic
to do
development is simply not feasible. Massive capital flight and guerrilla sabotage will continue to undermine any such program. Indeed, even in peaceful Costa Rica, the vast majority of all social welfare funds is eaten up by the bureaucracy. Notions of a regional "Marshall Plan" ignore the critical cultural, economic, and political differences between Western Europe and Central America. In the former, the task was to reconstruct previously advanced economies; in the latter, such economies will have to be built from the ground up. Moreover, Europeans had a long tradition of education, science, technology, and discipline to work with; Central Americans do not. What one does find in excess in Central America, however, are corruption and violence. Unless these tendencies are tamed, the United States will be pouring its aid down the proverbial rat hole. In short, the prerequisites for any effective largescale economic assistance program for the region are a restoration of political financial accounting and
stability and an improvement administrative procedures.
in
Neither of these requirements is likely to be achieved in the absence of peace. Accordingly, economic aid should be part and parcel of a comprehensive strategy designed to restore regional peace in the short run. On the most basic level, this aid can be used to maximize U.S. bargaining leverage with governments of various ideological persuasions. Only when those regimes demonstrate a willingness to make concrete commitments peace should the U.S. economic spigot be opened.
to
What is the likelihood of such policy change? In my judgment, the odds that the Reagan administration will adopt such measures are virtually nil. The president and his key advisers are simply too rigid, too locked into an anti-communist frame of reference, too wed to their particular vision of the primacy of military
517 £ OVCQ.
Nor
president policy
is
None
willing
to of
Salvador
are
natives.
No
all
only
of
the
in
the
tackle
critical
clear
that
degree,
major
the
issue
one
in
not
in
but
to
be
kind, They
their
own
They
burned
Carter
from
candidates
head-on.
ambiguity.
wants
Democratic anything.
Democratic
president,
veiled
a
change
may
Reagan has
be
statements offer
been
no
politically
on
El
alterby
being
specific. Moreover,
instituted, And of
at
fundamentally
differed
policy.
too
it
would
the
mood
massive
necessary
to
that all
then
there may
will
well
or
its If
direction
hardly
economic
aid
is
poorly,
States
is
is
favorable
aid
that
stability
a
major
The but
itself
influence
it
be
do
in
United
is
repertoire.
deprives
furthering
the
long-run
Economic
it
change
limited. to
would to
the
kind
be
the
region.
there is a basic fact of life involved sooner Washington comes to terms with it
well
America.
in
restore
policy
tool
a of
Congress
increase
better:
foreign
if
power
in
Nevertheless, here, and the the
even
the
in
United
if
of
it
an
such
not
exercise
others
who
will
in
ways
that
the
refuses
its
U.S.
may
to
essential
use
use
means
as
it
at
of
Central
influence,
exercise
are
in
States
regions
does
so
tool
theirs,
threatening
then
and
to
they
U.S.
interests.
NOTES 1. Central
Anonymous, "Dissent Paper on El Salvador and America" (mimeo). The authenticity of this
document
(though,
significantly,
been
challenged
by
from
authorized
dissent
remain
To
Robbins,
quote
substance)
officials.
channels;
Foreign
El
3. Piero Salvador,"
p.
1050. 4.
William
"Oligarchs
Salvador,"
its
It
author
did or
has
not
come
authors
I
say
LeoGrande
Officers:
Affairs,
"apparent"
58,
5
Carpio
pledging
to
because
settled.
organization
Cayetano
follow
Gleijeses,
6.
"Dissent
7.
Granma
8.
See,
and
The
Carla
Crisis
(Summer
Carpio's "The
Weekly of
p.
Workers for
Anne
in
El
1930),
p.
1103.
has
1983,
the
not a
in
yet
new
Salvador
Movement
emerged,
line.
Power
Sharing,"
p.
1057.
21.
Review
Books,
issue
itself
radical
Case
Paper,"
the
November
calling
especially,
Review
In
Revolutionary
5.
York
and
M.
Gleijeses, "The Case for Power Sharing Foreign Affairs, LXI, 5 (Summer 1983),
definitively
guerrilla
New
its
unknown.
2.
been
department
not
(November
James 30,
Chace, 19
6, "The
(December
1983). Endless 3,
War,"
1983).
518
9. Donald E. Schulz/ "The Strategy of Conflict and the Politics of Counterproductivity/" Qrbis, 25/ 3 (Fall 1981)/ p. 680. 10. Washington Post (January 9, 1977): Donald E. Schulz / "Kennedy and The Cuban Connection/" Foreign Policy/ 26 (Spring 1977). 11. See, especially/ Schulz, "The Strategy of Conflict. " 12. "Dissent Paper," p. 22. 13. Honduras, of course, has an elected civilian president. But real power resides in the military, especially in General Alvarez. Suazo Cordova is essentially a figurehead.
Abbreviations AID ANDES ANEP AP APP ARDE ARENA
Agency for International Development Asociacion Nacional de Ecuadores Salvadorenos National Association of Private Enterprise Productive Alliance People's Property Area Alianza Revolucionaria Democratica Nationalist Republican Alliance
BPR
Popular Revolutionary
CACM CBI CDN CMEA CONDEGA CONFER CONFREGUA COSEP CPSU CR
GUC CUS
Central American Common Market Caribbean Basin Initiative Coordinadora Democratica Nicaraguense Council on Mutual Economic Assistance Central American Defense Council Confederation of Religious Orders Guatemalan Conference of Religious Orders Superior Council of Private Enterprise Communist Party of the Soviet Union Revolutionary Coordinating Committee of the Masses Sandinista Workers' Central Christian Democratic Nicaraguan Workers Council Committee for Peasant Unity Council for Union Unity (AFL-CIO affiliated)
UN DOS
Joint National Directorate Department of State
DRF DRU
Democratic Revolutionary Front (also to as FDR) Unified Revolutionary Directorate
EGP EPS ERP ESI EXMIBAL
Popular Guerrilla Army Sandinista Popular Army People's Revolutionary Army Export Substitution Industrialization Exploraciones y Explotaciones Minerales-Isabel
CST CTN
519
Bloc
referred
520
F AO FAPU FAR FARM FAS FDN FDR FECCAS FMLN FMS FPL FSLN FUSEP
Broad Opposition Front Unified Popular Action Front Revolutionary Armed Forces Armed Forces of National Resistance Sandinista Air Force Fuerzas Democraticas Nicaraguenses Democratic Revolutionary Front (also referred to as DRF) Christian Federation of Salvadoran Peasants Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front Foreign Military Sales Popular Liberation Forces Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (Sandinista National Liberation Front) National Police Force of Honduras
IMET INCO INTA ISI ISTA
International Military Education and Training International Nickel Company National Institute of Agrarian Transformation Import Substitution Industrialization Salvadoran Institute of Agrarian Transformation
JLP
Jamaica
LNI LP-23
La Nacion Internacional Popular Leagues--28th of
MAP MDN MLN MPL MRP
Military Assistance Program Nicaraguan Democratic Movement National Liberation Movement Popular Liberation Movement Revolutionary Movement of the People
OAS ORDEN ORPA
Organization of American States Democratic Nationalist Organization Revolutionary Organization of the Armed People (People in Arms)
PACs PCD PCN PCS PDC PDCH PGT PNP PPSC PR PSCN
Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil Democratic Conservative Party Party of National Conciliation Salvadoran Communist Party Christian Democratic Party Christian Democratic Party of Honduras Guatemalan Workers' Party People's National Party Popular Social Christian Party Revolutionary Party Revolutionary Party of Democratic Unity Social Christian Party
RD
Relative Deprivation
PRUD
Labour Party
February
521
SELAM
Latin
American Episcopal
ECS EDEL UDN EFCO UNO URNG
Union Comunal Salvadorena Democratic Liberation Uni on Democratic Nationalist Un ion United Fruit Company National Opposition Union Guatemalan National Revol utionary Union
Conference
About the Authors JOHN A. BOOTH is associate professor of political science at the University of Texas at San Antonio. He is author of The End and The Beginning: The Nicaraguan Revolution and coeditor of Political Participation in Latin America and has published articles in the Latin American Research Review and other scholarly journals. GORDON L. BOWEN is assistant professor of political science at Mary Baldwin College. He has published articles in Armed Forces and Society and Latin American Perspectives and is currently working on a book on Guatemala. CLAUDIO GONZALEZ-VEGA is professor of agricultural economics at Ohio State University and professor of economics at the University of Costa Rica. He has published widely in economic and development journals, including the American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Savings and Development, and Development Digest, as well as chapters in Money and Finance in Economic Growth (edited by Ronald McKinnon) and Uses and Abuses of Rural Financial Markets (edited by D. Adams et al. ) . He has served as consultant to the World Bank, the InterAmerican Development Bank, and the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. DOUGLAS H. GRAHAM is professor of agricultural economics and director of the Latin American Studies program at the Undergraduate Center for International Studies at Ohio State University. He is coauthor of Population and Economic Development in Brazil and coeditor of Why Cheap Credit Undermines Rural Development and has published articles in the Latin American Research Review, Economic Development and Cultural Change, and other scholarly journals. DENNIS HANRATTY is a Latin American analyst with a political risk assessment firm. He has conducted extensive field research in Mexico for his Ph.D. dissertation on "Change and Conflict in the Mexican Catholic Church" and has presented papers before the
522
523 Southern Political Science Association and the International Studies Association Annual Meetings. PAUL HEATH HOEPFEL is a veteran Latin American correspondent/ whose best-known publications on the Salvadoran oligarchy and the "disappeared" in Argentina have appeared in the New York Times Magazine. THOMAS L. KARNES is professor of history at Arizona State University. He is author of both Tropical Enterprise Standard Fruit and Steamship Company in Latin America and The Failure of Union: Central America/ 1824-1960 and is editor of Readings in the Latin American Policy of the United States" ROBERT S. LEIKEN is an Adjunct Senior Fellow and Director of the Soviet-Latin American Project at Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies. He is currently Senior Associate with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace at Washington/ D.C. He is author of Soviet Strategy in Latin America and has published articles in Foreign Policy and the Washington Quarterly. PENNY LERNOUX is a veteran Latin American correspondent and author of Cry of the People. She is a frequent contributor to The Nation and other journals. MARK B. ROSENBERG is director of the Latin American and Caribbean Center at Florida International University. He has published articles in the Latin American Research Review, the Hispanic American Historical Review/ and Caribbean Review. DONALD E. .SCHULZ is assistant professor of pol i t ical science at the University of Tampa. He is lead editor of Political Participation in Communist Systems and author of articles in Foreign Policy/ Qrbis, and Newsweek. WAYNE S. SMITH is a Senior Associate with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. As a former foreign service officer and head of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana/ he resigned from the State Department in 1982 in protest of the Reagan administration's Cuban and Central American policies. His best known publication is "Dateline Havana: Myopic Diplomacy/" in Foreign Policy. CARL STONE is a reader in political economy at the University of the West Indies in Jamaica. He is author of Democracy and Clientelism in Jamaica and coeditor of The Newer Caribbean: Decolonization/ Democracy/ and Development and has contributed articles to the Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, the Latin American Research Review, Economic Development and Cultural Change, Comparative Studies in Society and History, and many other journals. ~
Index "Active penetration," 275 Act of Havana (1940), 82 Afghanistan, 53, 450, 472 AFL-CIO (American Federation of
wages, 6, 175, 176 See also under individual
Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations). See Council for Union Unity Agency for International Development, U.S. (AID), 190, 191, 228, 279, 280, 282, 293, 296, 319, 320 Public Safety program, 281, 283, 286 Regional Telecommunications Center, 283, 287 Agrarian reform, 6, 8, 28, 180. See also under individual countries Agriculture, 8, 171, 173-174 (tables), 175-176, 180, 182 capitalists, 25, 26, 197 domestic, 160, 179 exports, 5, 6, 11, 42, 97, 106-107, 160, 164, 173 (table), 186(nl8), 272, 448 imports, 173(table), 175, 178, 182, 186(nl8) labor force, 5, 6, 171, 173(table), 175, 176 labor unions, 31 mechanization, 5, 6-7 production, 173(table), 175, 176, 180, 181 subsidies, 178, 179 transformation, 5, 192, 202 unemployment, 5, 6
countries Aguilares (El Salvador), 128, 203 Ahuachapan Province (El Salvador), 100 AID. See Agency for International Development AIFLD. See American Institute for Free Labor Development Alamilla, Genaro, 139 Alas, Jose Inocencio, 127, 128 Alcaldes, 93 Alejos, Roberto, 104-105 Alexander, Carlton, 408 Alianza Revolucionaria Democratica (ARDE) (Nicaragua), 320-321 Allende, Salvador, 123, 126, 138, 430, 431, 443 Alliance for Progress (1961), 7, 56, 57 (n3), 65, 105, 198, 272, 278, 304 Alta Verapaz Department (Guatemala), 110, 286, 290 Aluminum, 405, 408, 410, 418 Alvarez, Eduardo, 131 Alvarez Cordova, Enrique, 110, 217-218, 222 Alvarez Martinez, Gustavo, 35, 50, 334-335, 339, 340, 341, 342, 345, 512 American Chamber of Commerce, 107, 109, 246 American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), American Tobacco Company, Americas Watch, 34
524
106 70
525
Amigos del Pais (Guatemala), 114 Amnesty International, 34, 118, 149, 232, 269, 283, 288, 289, 293, 312 Amparo, 309-310, 319, 321, 323 Anaya Montes, Melida, 244, 245, 256 Andean Group, 307 Anderson, Charles, 189 ANDES. See Asociacion Nacional de Ecuadores Salvadorenos Andino, Mario, 205, 211 Andropov, Yuri, 469 ANEP. See National Association of Private Enterprise Angola, 458, 515 Anil. See Indigo AP. See Productive Alliance Aparicio, Pedro Arnoldo, 131 APP. See People's Property Area Arana Osorio, Carlos, 109, 149, 281, 283 Araujo, Arturo, 195 Arbenz, Jacobo, 33, 45, 83, 104, 105, 109, 141, 273,. 274, 275, 277, 278, 426 Arce, Bayardo, 467 ARDE. See Alianza Revolucionaria
400 (table), 404 (table) Balaguer, Joaquin, 85 Balance of payments, 161, 167, 171 177. See also under individual countries Ball, George, 261, 279 Baloyra, Enrique, 25 Bananas, 6, 87, 160. See also under Costa Rica; Guatemala; Honduras Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association, 110 Bank of Jamaica, 395 Bank of Mexico, 443
Democratica Ardon, Eric, 468 ARENA. See Nationalist Republican
Barbados, 157 agriculture, 173(table) and basic needs, 172 (table)
Alliance Arevalo, Juan Jose, 33, 104, 273, 278, 279 Argentina, 46, 54, 81, 82, 114, 167, 204, 315, 338, 360, 438, 452, 453, 454, 455. See also Falkland Islands; under Guatemala; United States Arias Caldera, Jose, 140 Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN) (1979) (El Salvador), 216-217, 218, 219-220(table), 221, 223, 466, 467 Arron, Henck, 463 Asociacion Cafetalera (1929) (El Salvador), 100 Asociacion Nacional de Ecuadores Salvadorenos (ANDES), 199, 205 Assassinations, 25, 30, 31, 204, 205
Association of Rural Workers (1977) (Nicaragua), 6 Atlantic Narrows, 450 Authoritarianism, 42-43, 262
39,
40-41,
Authoritarian socialism, Avala, Gregorio, 144 Avalos, Jose, 212 Aycinena family, 97 Azores, 451
171
Backyardism, 472 Baggio, Sebastiano, 131, 139, Bahamas, 397(table), 399,
148
economy, 164, 171 foreign debt, 169, 170 (table), 171 GDP, 168(table), 170(table), 404(table) GNP, 162(table) government, 397(table) income, per capita, 161 inflation, 166 (table), 171, 399, 400 (table) population, 162(table), 172(table) private and public sectors, 168(table) tourism, 163 See also San Jose Agreement Barclays Bank (Jamaica), 395 Barrera, Benjamin, 131 Barricada (Managua), 245, 311, 324 Base communities, 19, 22, 25, 31, 118, 121, 122-124, 128, 130, 132, 133, 142, 143, 146, 147, 148, 202
526
Basic needs, 163, 171, 172(table), 269. See also under individual countries Batista, Fulgencio, 42 Bauxite, 160, 396, 403, 408, 418 Bay of Pigs invasion (1961), 84, 105, 277, 428 Bazzaglia, Rogelio ("Marcelo"), 244 BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation), 463 Beef. See under Costa Rica; Guatemala; Nicaragua Belize, 50, 125, 157, 325. See also under Mexico; United States Bell, John, 279 Berlin (El Salvador), 32, 242 Bethlehem Steel (U.S. company), 70 "Big Pine" military maneuvers (1983), 326 "Big Stick" policy, 44, 250, 470 Bipartisan commission on Central American policy (U.S.), 251, 516 Bishop, Maurice, 462 Black market. See under Central America; Jamaica Boland Amendment (1982), 248 Boland-Zablocki bill, 248 Bolivia, 438, 453, 454 Bonker, Don, 296 Booth, John A., 13, 14 Borge Martinez, Tomas, 139, 308, 310, 467 Borgonovo, Mauricio, 204 Bosch, Juan, 84, 85 Bourgeoisie, 24, 91, 113, 202. See also Industrial bourgeoisie; under Costa Rica; Jamaica; Nicaragua Bouterse, Desi, 463, 464 Bowdler, William, 222, 333 BPR. See Popular Revolutionary Bloc Brazil, 84, 114, 121, 122, 123, 127, 167, 204, 315, 455, 464. See also under Guatemala; Nicaragua Brezhnev, Leonid, 469 Brezhnev Doctrine, 252, Brigade 2506, 45
472
British Honduras,
68.
Belize Broad Opposition Front
See also (FAO)
(Nicaragua), 306, 307 Brujo, El. See Martinez, Maximiliano Hernandez Brutents, Karen, 461 Bryan-Chamorro Treaty (1916), Bulgaria, 217, 218, 459 Bunau-Varilla, Philippe, 72 Bush, George, 494
77
Bushnell, John, 492 Bustamente, Jorge, 235, 236 Bustillo, Juan Rafael, 243 "Butcher of Zacapa." See Arana Osorio, Carlos Cabanas (El Salvador), 214 Cabot, John Moors, 274 Caceres, Ramon, 75 Cacao, 164, 192 CACM. See Central American Common Market Calante (Guatemala), 292 Calivigny (Grenada), 462 Campesinos, 41, 106, 111, 191, 228, 273. See also Peasants Canada, 415 (table) Canadian religious delegation, 117 Cancun (Mexico) meeting (1981), 431, 445 Capital-intensive industry, 7, 8, 42, 58(nlO), 103, 193, 304, 448 Capitalism, 25, 26, 105, 316, 387. See also Dependent capitalism Capital transfers, 181 Carazo Odio, Rodrigo, 339, 365-366, 367, 368 Carballo, Bismark, 140 Cardenas, Lazaro, 425, 427, 428, 430 Cardenas, Osvaldo, 463 Caribbean, 4, 66, 162 (table), 164. See also Caribbean Basin; Commonwealth Caribbean; individual countries; under Cuba; Mexico; United States Caribbean Basin, 66, 157, 177, 448, 449-450 defined, 473(nl) English-speaking, 157-159, 171, 175, 176, 396, 397(table).
527
Caribbean Basin (cont.) English-speaking (cont.) See also Commonwealth Caribbean 161,
maritime shipping, 450, 451 Spanish heritage, 157-158, 171 See also under Soviet Union; United States Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) (1981), 4, 7, 8, 159, 409, 471, 489-490 Economic Support Funds, 296 Caribbean Group for Cooperation in Economic Development, 404 Carpio, Salvador Cayetano, 244-245, 258, 506 Carranza, Nicolas, 208 Carranza, Venustiano, 424 Carrera, Rafael, 95, 96, 101 Carter, Jimmy, 86, 114, 214, 306, 307, 485 Casariego, Mario, 141, 148 Casaroli, Agostino, 139 Castaneda, Jorge, 433, 437, 439, 441 Castaneda Castro, Salvador, 196-197 Castaneda de Leon, Oliverio, 289 Castillo Armas, Carlos, 45, 55, 56, 83, 105, 275, 276 Castro, Fidel, 37, 41, 42, 43, 45, 51-52, 84, 428, 434, 435, 445, 456, 469, 504, 510, 514, 515 Catholic Church, 19, 24-25, 31, 32, 41, 44, 105-106, 126, Inquisition, 93 as landowner, 95,
96
radicalization of, 111, 121-122, 127, 201-202 tithes, 94 See also Base communities; Martyrs;
under individual
Initiative
449
East-West context. See United States, and communism economy, 448-449 education, 103, 171, 172(table) net national product, 332(table) trade, 160 universities, 103 See also Agriculture; Caribbean Basin; Economic development; individual countries; under Cuba; Mexico; Soviet Union; United States Central American Common Market (CACM), 7, 105, 190, 198, 304, 353, 354, 357, 367 Central American Court of Justice, 80 Central American Defense Council (CONDECA), 52, 54, 259 Central American Democratic Community (1982), 233, 441, 471 Central American Episcopal
326,
Secretariat, 141 Central American Republic. See under Nicaragua Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Chile, 126 and Cuba, 105, 515 and El Salvador, 244 and Guatemala, 33 , 45, 55, 104, 109, 141, 275, 276, 277 and Honduras, 54 and Iran, 83, 84 and Nicaragua, 46 54, 139, 234, 253, 313, 326, 487, 496, 511 Cerros de San Pedro (El Salvador), 230 Cervantes Arceo, Hipolito, 145, 146 i—1
Nicaragua, caudillismo Cayetano Carpio, Salvador, 24 CBI. See Caribbean Basin
Cambodianization of, 54 colonial, 93-96 and communism, 105, 126,
LO
countries Catorce familias, las. See Fourteen families Cattle, 6, 103 Caudillo, 35, 104. See also
Episcopal Conference Central America, 3-4, 7, 13-14, 20, 21-22, 157, 162 (table), 176, 448 black market, 255
**
160,
Nicaraguense Cedulas, 237 CELAM. See Latin American
00
intra-regional trade, 164
CBS News, 326 CDN. See Coordinadora Democratica
528
Cesar, Alfredo, 482 Chajul (Guatemala), 286, 291 Chalatenango (El Salvador), 119, 214, 230 Chamber of Industries (Costa Rica), 367 Chamorro, Pedro Joaquin, 30, 306 Chamorro Coronel, Edgar, 261 Chamorro Rappacioli, Fernando, 320 Chancellor, John, 276 Chapin, Frederic, 293 Charles V (Holy Roman Emperor), 94 Chase Manhattan Bank, 408 Chavez y Gonzalez, Luis, 127, 129 Cheek, James, 221 Chiapas (Mexico), 439-440, 444 Chichicastenango (Guatemala), 291, 292 Chihuahua (Mexico), 80 Chile, 81, 121, 123, 126, 127, 138, 315, 430-431, 438, 453, 464 Chimaltenango (Guatemala), 147, 292 Chin-A-Sen, Henrik, 463 Chinchontepec Volcano (El Salvador), 230 Chontales (Nicaragua), 30 Christian Democratic Nicaraguan Workers (CTN), 321 Christian Democratic Party Chile, 138, 139 El Salvador (PDC), 23, 24, 31, 48, 56, 107, 110, 113, 195, 198, 199, 200, 201, 206, 208, 212, 215, 216, 217, 226, 227, 228, 234, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 480, 507, 508 Guatemala (PDC), 23, 33, 110, 280 of Honduras (PDCH), 342 Nicaragua, 304 Venezuela, 139, 463 Christian Democratic World Federation, 465 Christian Federation of Salvadoran Peasants (FECCAS), 128, 202 Chuabajito (Guatemala), 291 Church of the Word, 292 Chusma, 108
CIA.
See Central Intelligence
Agency CIDA. See Comite Interamericano de Desarrollo Agricola Cienfuegos (Cuba), 457 Clark, William, 225, 248 Clarke, Maura, 117, 118, 119, 120-121,
124
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty (1850), Client states, 44, 45, 86 CMEA. See Council on Mutual
68
Economic Assistance Coca Cola (U.S. company), 287 Cochineal, 97 CODESA (Costa Rican investment corporation), 361 Coffee, 5, 6, 92, 96, 160, 164, 177, 178 prices, 20, 100, 102, 103, 192, 193 See also under Costa Rica; El Salvador; Guatemala; Nicaragua Colom Argueta, Manuel, 289 Colombia, 25, 72, 92, 123, 127, 138, 139, 167, 407, 438, 455, 464, 465. See also Contadora Group Colomoncagua refugee camp (Honduras), 343, 344, 345 Colon (Panama), 73 Colones Costa Rican, 353, 366, 367-368, 371(n2) Salvadoran, 191, 203 Colono, 5, 193 Columbus, Christopher, 68, 73, 331 "Comandante Ana Maria." See Anaya Montes, Melida Comandante Cero. See Pastora Gomez, Eden Comayagua (Honduras), 337 Comitan (Guatemala), 145 Comite de Unidad Campesina. See Committee for Peasant Unity Comite Interamericano de Desarrollo Agricola (CIDA), 107 Committee for Peasant Unity (CUC) (Guatemala), 19, 143, 290, 291 Committee of National Defense Against Communism (Guatemala), 276
529
Commonwealth Caribbean, 159, 176, 184(nl3), 397(table), 448 Communal compounds, 194 Communism, 40. See also individual countries "Communitarianism," 228 "Competitive exclusion," 5, 6, 192 Comunidades de base. See Base communities CONDECA. See Central American Defense Council Confederation of Religious Orders (CONFER), 139 CONFER. See Confederation of Religious Orders CONFREGUA. See Guatemalan Conference of Religious Orders
Conquistadores, 93 Consejo Superior de la Empressa Privata. See Superior Council of Private Enterprise Conservative Party
(Nicaragua),
303 Conservative Political Action Conference (1981), 484 Conservatives (El Salvador), 207 Constitutionalist Liberal Movement (Nicaragua), 321 Consumerism, 7, 104. See also Jamaica, consumer goods Contadora Group, 251, 468, 506 Continuismo, 23 Contra base camps (Honduras), 50, 52, 54, 234, 252, 261, 318, 334, 346 Coolidge, Calvin, 77, 81 Cooperatives. See Rural cooperatives Coordinadora Democratica
Nicaraguense (CDN), 321, 323, 324 Cordero Lanza, Andres, 138, 139 Corollaries. See Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine Corruption, 181 COSEP. See Superior Council of Private Enterprise Costa Rica, 3, 14, 125 aggregate demand,
364
agriculture, 353, 354,
173(table), 355, 369,
175,
375(table), 377(table) balance of payments, 356, 366, 367, 382(table) bananas, 353 banking, 361 and basic needs, 172(table), 359, 370 beef, 353 birth rate, 172(table) bourgeoisie, 102 bureaucracy, 360 coffee, 101, 351, 352, 355, 363, 364, 365, 369 consumer price index, 14, 15(table), 380-381(table) coup (1917), 102 currency. See Colanes, Costa Rican death rate, 172(table), 360 democracy, 351, 369, 370 domestic market, 353, 357 economy, 167, 168(table), 177, 178, 351-352, 353-369, 370, 373-383(tables) education, 172 (table), 272, 351, 359, 360 exports, 354, 363, 364, 365, 366, 369, 374-375(tables), 378-379(table) factor prices, 357, 359, 362 farms, 174 (table), 176 foreign debt, 169, 170(table), 171, 315, 352, 360, 364, 365, 366, 369-369, 382(table) foreign trade, 170(table), 353, 354, 363 GDP, 168(table), 170(table), 353-354, 355, 358, 361, 365, 366, 368, 373-375(tables), 380-381 (table), 404 (table) GNI, 364, 373 (table) GNP, 21(table), 162(table), 373(table) government, 92, 327, 356-357, 360-361, 365-366, 367-368, 375(table), 383(table) and Great Britain, 68 health care, 359, 360 and immigration, 12, 50 imports, 353-354, 356, 365, 369, 374-375(tables), 378-379(table)
530
Costa Rica (cont.) income, per capita, 161, 368 income distribution, 351, 366, 368 industrial disputes, 18(fig.), 20
industrialization,
354,
356,
369, 375 (table), 377 (table) inflation, 165, 166(table), 171, 351, 362, 364, 366, 367, 400 (table) infrastructure, 360 international terms-of-trade, 359, 362-363, 364, 365, 378-379(table) labor force, 357, 358, 359, 376-377(tables) land,
net national product, 332(table) and Nicaragua, 50, 52-53, 104, 307, 325, 326, 327, 433, 441 politics, 352, 357, 359, 369, 370, 467-468 population, 162 (table), 172(table), 376(table) private sector, 168 (table), 358, 359, 360, 362, 376-377(tables) public sector, 168(table), 358-362, 376-377(tables), 383(table) rural, 6, 16 social welfare system, 20, 357, 359-361 sugar, 353 taxation, 358 unemployment, 16, 351, 356, 358, 359, 362, 376(table) wages, 16, 17(table), 18(fig.), 20, 357, 358, 359, 365, 378-379(table) wholesale price index, 364, 366, 380-381(table) See also San Jose Agreement; under Cuba; El Salvador; Mexico; Soviet Union; United States 5,
6,
103,
314
(Guatemala),
286,
Council for Union Unity (Nicaragua), 321
291 (CUS)
Council on Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), 457 Counterrevolution, 21, 24, 27, 28, 29(table). See also under individual countries Counterrevolutionary exiles, 3, 39, 84, 111, 317, 319, 486, 488, 502 Coups. See Golpes; under individual countries Coya (Guatemala), 291 Cozumel (Mexico) meeting (1979), 434, 435 CPSU.
176
life expectancy, 172(table), 360 middle class, 102, 351 military, 102 nationalization in, 361
Cotton,
Cotzal
CR.
See Soviet Union, Communist Party of the
See Revolutionary Coordinating Committee of the Masses
Credit, 8, 105, 167, 168(table), 179, 315, 319, 361, 363, 364 Criollo, 95, 96, 97, 98 Crowder, Enoch, 72 Cruz, Arturo, 482 CST. See Sandinista Workers' Central CTN.
See Christian Democratic Nicaraguan Workers
Cuba and Africa, 454, 458, 515 authoritarian, 40, 41 and basic needs, 163 and Caribbean, 461-462, 464 and Central America, 3, 51, 55, 331, 483, 498, 509 and Chile, 464 and Colombia, 464, 465 Communist Party, 388, 463 and Costa Rica, 37, 465 and domino theory, 35 economy, 163-164, 468 and Ecuador, 465 and El Salvador, 48, 217, 218, 238, 244, 460, 461, 466, 497, 511, 515 exiles, 486 first president. See Estrada Palma, Tomas foreign debt, 468-469 GNP, 162(table) and Grenada, 462 and Guatemala, 277, 467
531
Cuba (cont.) and human rights,
Death squads. 41,
465
intelligence service (DGI), July 26 movement, 452, 454
457
life expectancy, 360 military, 457, 458 and Nicaragua, 37, 38, 44, 51-52, 54, 63(n76), 231, 260, 307, 458-459, 465, 467, 491, 496, 497, 510-511 nickel, 457 and Panama, 465 and Peru, 465 population, 162(table) refugees, 41, 419 socioeconomic change. 42 and Soviet Union, 43, 45, 52, 163, 428, 436, 447 452, 456-458, 468, 469 472, 490 sugar, 70, 103, 163, 457, 468 and Surinam, 463-464 and Venezuela, 436, 442, 463, 465 See also under Jamaica; Mexico; United States Cuban-Americans, 514 Cuban-Soviet Intergovernmental Economic, Scientific, and Technical Co-operation Commission (1970), 457 "Cuba's Renewed Support for Violence in the Hemisphere" (U.S. White Paper, 1982), 231 CUC.
See Committee for Peasant Unity CUS. See Council for Union Unity Customs union (1963), 355 Czechoslovakia, 40, 53, 218, 275, 456 Dada, Hector, 212, 213 Daily Gleaner (Kingston), 404 Daily News (Kingston), 391 Dalton, Roque, 216, 256, 466 D'Aubuisson, Roberto ("Major Bob") , 113 , 114, 125, 208, 212, 214-215, 223, 224, 227, 237, 239, 240, 241, 243, 266(n52) Death lists. See under Guatemala
See under El
Salvador; Guatemala Deaver, Michael, 114 Declaration of Caracas (1945), 425 Declaration of San Jose (1960), 428 Decree 900 (Guatemala), 274 Deforestation, 10, 191 Degenhardt, Johannes Joachim, 145 De la Madrid Hurtado, Miguel, 443, 445 Del Monte (U.S. company), 284 Demilitarized zones, 511 Democracy, 26, 92, 125, 258, 262, 334. See also under individual countries Democratic Conservative Party (PCD) (Nicaragua), 321 Democratic Front (1980) (El Salvador), 219-220 (table) Democratic Liberation Union (UDEL) (1974) (Nicaragua), 30, 306 Democratic Nationalist Organization (ORDEN) (El Salvador), 108, 130, 203, 204, 208, 209, 214, 238 Democratic Nationalist Union (UDN) (1969) (El Salvador), 212, 219-220(table) Democratic Party Mexico, 437 U.S., 250-251 Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR) (1980) (El Salvador), 110, 217-218, 219-220(table), 221, 222, 225, 227, 228, 233, 235, 238, 244, 246, 247, 251, 257, 258, 438, 467, 493, 495, 503, 504, 505 Democratic socialism, 171 Denaux, Willbrord, 129 Dependency theory, 296 Dependent capitalism, 449 Deprivation, 13, 20. See also Relative deprivation Derechizacion, 239 Desaparecidos, 210 D'Escoto, Miguel, 133 De Sola, Heriberto, 106 De Sola, Orlando, 106, 107 De Sola family, 106, 115(nl)
532
Despotism,
27
Destabilization, 21-22, 23, 27, 44, 45, 48, 50, 83, 310, 313, 326, 471, 501, 503 Detente, 452, 504 Development Decade era, 272 DGI. See Cuba, intelligence service Diaz, Adolfo, 77 Diaz, Porfirio, 424 Diaz Ordaz, Gustavo, 429, 430, 432 Dictatorships. See Military dictatorships Dieseldorf family, 110 DiGiovanni, Cleto, 223 "Divine mobs" (Nicaragua), 322 DN. See Joint National Directorate Dollar Diplomacy, 65, 77 Domestic markets, 7, 167. See also under individual countries Dominguez, Jorge I., 72 Dominican nuns, 142 Dominican Republic (1809, 1844), 45, 68, 159 agriculture, 173(table) and basic needs, 172(table) economy, 165, 168 (table), 171 exports, 165 foreign debt, 169, 170(table), 171 GDP, 168(table), 170(table), 404(table) GNP, 162(table) income, per capita, 161, 165 inflation, 166(table), 171, 399, 400(table) population, 162(table), 172(table) private and public sectors, 168(table) See also under United States Domino theory, 35-36, 39, 53, 54, 205 Donovan, Jean, 117, 118, 120, 124 Dorticos, Osvaldo, 457 DRU. See Unified Revolutionary Directorate Drug trade, 407 Duarte, Jose Napoleon, 23, 107, 108, 110, 113, 200, 212,
223, 224, 227, 228, 231, 235, 338, 438, 480, 481 Duenas family. 106, 115 (nl), 190 Dulles, Allen, 274 Dulles, John Foster, 105, 274 Durenberger, Dave, 494 Durham, William H., 11-12 Earthquakes, 19. See also under Guatemala; Managua East Asian economic model, 160, 161 Eastern Europe, 40, 44, 325 East Germany, 38, 217, 218, 249, 325, 459 Echeverria, Luis, 430-431, 443, 444 Economic development, 5, 7, 21-22, 157-182, 448. See also Agriculture; Industrialization Ecuador, 453, 465 Edgar, Robert, 134 EGP. See Popular Guerrilla Army Eisenhower, 85 Ejido land,
Dwight D.,
83,
84,
6,
98,
192,
94,
96,
426 El Arbolito (Guatemala), 291 El Bluff (Nicaragua), 459 Elites, 22, 23-24, 25, 105 entrepreneurial, 108
25-26,
27,
financial, 26, 108 military, 23, 25, 26, 27, 108 political, 26, 189 technocratic, 102, 103-104 See also Conquistadores Criollo; under individual El El El El El
El
countries Mozote (El Salvador), 230 Paraiso-Danli area (Honduras), 345 Peten (Guatemala), 8, 27, 290 Porvenir (Honduras), 345 Quiche Department (Guatemala), 110, 142, 144, 286, 290, 291, 292, 293 Salvador, 3 agrarian reform, 8, 12, 27, 56, 106, 107, 111, 127, 200, 201, 202-203, 213, 226, 228-229, 231, 233, 239, 241, 255
533
El Salvador
(cont.)
agricultural production,
8,
i
CO 00
V.
9-10, 11, 173(table), 176, 181, 191, 192, 193, 229 arms, 37 •39, 48, 56, 204, 217, 218, 221, 223-224, 225 226, 232, 242, 249, 252, 253, 255, 262, 338, 460, 461, 481, 487 Assembly , 198 , 199, 200, 239, 240, 241, 442 authoritarian , 41 and basic needs, 172(table), 191, 194 birth rate, 172(table) capital. See San Salvador and Catholic Church, 117-118, 119, 120, 123, 124, 125, 127-132, 201-202, 203-204, 214, 232, 494. See also Martyrs Chamber of Commerce, 107 Civic Guard, 100 Civil Military Directorate, 198 class system, 190, 199, 215 coffee, 98, 99, 100, 102, 106, 107, 189, 192, 193, 195, 196, 197 and communism, 101, 107, 108, 111, 208.
119, 209.
128, 195, 198, See also Salvadoran
Communist Party consumer price index, 15(table) and Costa Rica, 199, 246 cotton, 103, 107, 193 counterrevolution, 27, 207, 246 coup (1979), 92, 113, 205, 239, 507 currency. See Colones, Salvadoran death rate, 172(table), 191 death squads, 31, 41, 108, 111, 113, 119, 203, 204, 207, 209-210, 213, 230, 235, 239, 490, 492 economy, 21, 164, 168(table), 171, 189-190, 197, 198, 203, 204-205, 227-228 education, 172(table), 190-191, 272 election (1982), 235-239, 240(table)
elites, 24, 26, 27, 47, 98, 99, 100-101, 102, 103, 106, 107, 108, 110-112, 113, 114, 127, 189—190, 194, 196, 197, 200, 201, 204, 211 farms, 174(table), 176, 191 foreign debt, 170(table) foreign trade, 110(table), 213 GDP, 168(table), 170(table) GNP, 21(table), 91, 162(table), 227 government, 31-32, 56, 91, 110, 126, 195-197, 198,
101,
199-200, 201, 203, 204, 205-215, 222-223, 227, 228, 231, 239, 257, 480 and Guatemala, 114 guerrillas, 20, 24, 31, 32, 35, 36, 37-38, 39, 46-47, 48, 51, 56, 107, 127, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206-207, 213-214, 215-221, 222, 223, 224-225, 226, 229-230, 231, 232, 233, 238-239, 242, 244-245, 246, 247, 252, 253, 256-258, 259, 260, 346, 466-467, 481, 493. See also Contra base camps homicide rate, 11 and Honduras, 11, 35, 50, 109, 191, 199, 259, 333, 339, 343, 346 housing, 194, 197, 203 human rights, 32, 47, 56, 125, 204, 210, 211, 222, 232-233, 241, 246-247, 267(n76) income, per capita, 191, 205 income distribution, 190, 192 Indians, 98, 192, 195 industrial disputes, 18 (fig.), 19 industrialization, 11, 106, 190, 193, 197, inflation, 166(table) and Japan, 103
103, 198
Junta, 198, 205-206, 210-211, 227, 480, 481 kidnappings, 107, 118, 246 labor force, 7, 98, 99, 103, 176, 192, 193-194 labor movement, 19, 31, 106, 107, 130, 190, 197, 198-199,
201,
203,
221
534
El Salvador (cont.) land, 98-99, 100, 176, 179, 191, 202, 213, 231,
174(table), 192, 193, 233, 241
life expectancy, 172(tablq), 191 malnutrition, 10, 191 massacre (1932), 96, 100, 101,
i—1
00
CO
192, 195, 196 massacre (1974), 202 massacre (1980), 212, 214 middle class, 103, 107 , 108, 110, 194, 197, 198 migration, 191 military, 27, 32, 33, 50, 92, 101, 108-109, 110, 112, 118, 119, 124, 125, 189, 195, 196, 197, 200, 201, 203, 207-208, 209-211, 212, 213-214, 226, 229, 230 231, 238, 242-243, 254-255, 259, 480 National Guard, 108, 113, 128, 202, 205, 208, 209, 213, 214, 222, 223, 230 nationalization in, 213 National Police, 205, 208, 209 net national product, 332(table) Pacific lowlands, 193 peasants, 5, 6, 16 , 96 , 99 100, 106, 107, 108, 128 129, 130, 190, 195, 196 197, 201, 202, 204, 213 238, 241 politics, 23 , 24, 26, 27, 113-114, 189, 190, 194-195, 196-197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 212, 236-237, 238, 503, 508 population, 8-9, 10(table), 11-12, 98, 162(table), 172(table), 191 poverty line, 191, 194 private sector, 168(table), 189, 196, 197, 203, 227, 228 public sector, 168(table) racism, 99, 106 refugees, 41, 119, 130, 199. See also Honduras, refugees in revolution, 31, 36, 91, 195, 203,
215-221
Revolution of 1948, 197, 198, 201 rural, 5, 6, 10, 11-12, 16, 19, 98-99, 106, 108, 175, 190, 191, 193, 195, 238 rural police force, 99 socioeconomic change, 14, 25, 28, 190, 194, 195, 197, 200 strikes, 199 sugar, 107, 193 technocrats, 189 Treasury Police, 208, 209 underemployment, 16, 194 unemployment, 7, 10-11, 16, 192, 193, 194, 195, 205 urban, 7, 10-11, 19, 103, 193-194, 198-199, 205 U.S. citizens killed in, 233, 246. See also Hammer, Michael; Maryknoll order; Pearlman, Mark and Vietnam, 36, 37, 217, 218 wages, 16, 17 (table), 18(fig.), 19, 192, 193, 195, 203, 228 See also under Cuba; Mexico; Nicaragua; Soviet Union; United States El Salvador Freedom Foundation, 111, 114 Enders, Thomas, 47, 247-248, 495 Energy crisis, 164, 169, 177, 352. See also Oil, embargo Entrepreneurial-military coalition, 25-26, 27 Entrepreneurial skills, 160 EPS (Sandinista Popular Army). See Nicaragua, Army Erosion, 10, 191 ERP. See People's Revolutionary Army Escalon family, 106 Escuadrones, 209 ESI. See Export substitution industrialization Espanola, 68, 80. See also Dominican Republic; Haiti Esquivel, Julia, 142 Essequibo region (Guyana), 442 Estrada, Genaro, 425 Estrada Doctrine (1930), 425, 431 Estrada Palma, Tomas, 71 Ethiopia, 218, 515 European Social Democrats, 233
535
Exiles.
See Counterrevolu-
tionary exiles; Exchange rate,
178,
FECCAS.
Refugees 182,
of Salvadoran Peasants Federal Bureau of
186 (nl8) EXMIBAL.
(FBI),
See Exploraciones y
Federal
Explotaciones MineralesIzabal (EXMIBAL),
284-285
124
Republic of Germany,
(Mexico), Fiallos,
325,
20,
(U.S.),
178.
282
See also
(ESI),
161
Joao,
Fincas,
99,
97,
136
464
174(table).
Salvador,
See
farms
Flores Reyes,
Gerardo,
Florida,
See also Miami
FMLN.
for Eye death squad (Guatemala),
209
(Paris),
also El
Export substitution industrialization
Le
Figueiredo,
under Agriculture; individual countries
439
Ricardo,
Figaro,
Export-Import Bank
Eye
U.S.,
Federation of Agricultural Workers
Minerales-Izabal
14,
Investigation
415 (table)
Exploraciones y Explotaciones
Exports,
See Christian Federation
488.
145
See Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front
281
FMS.
See United States,
Foreign
Military Sales Fabian,
Hector,
488
Fagoth,
Steadman,
Falkland Islands, 444, FAO.
465,
"Foco"
136, 65,
137 325,
442,
470
FAR.
Carlos,
Fonseca,
Gulf of,
Food production, Ford,
Gerald,
See Revolutionary Armed
Ford,
Ita,
Forces
121, Agustin,
100,
112,
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front 219-220 (table),
32,
48,
223,
396, 215,
119,
120,
124 87,
97,
98,
103,
181 20,
21,
205,
227-228
161,
163,
169,
516
170(table),
171,
177,
178.
235,
238,
See also under individual
239,
242,
244,
246,
247,
countries
251,
256,
257,
258,
259,
Foreign trade,
438,
466,
493,
495,
505,
506,
508,
509
Farms.
Salvador),
169-172,
179.
countries Fortune's
(FPL)
216,
See Fincas
500,
109
"Forum for Peace and Democracy"
217,
219-220(table)
(1982),
442
Fourteen families,
99,
190,
217
Fourth Anti-Imperialist Front,
See Armed Forces of
FPL.
Air Force
261
See Farabundo Marti People's Liberation Forces;
(Sandinista Air Force). See Nicaragua,
167,
See also under individual
National Resistance
FDR.
118,
233,
218,
FDN.
175
232,
(El
FBI.
123,
Foreign debt,
225,
9,
230,
Liberation Forces
FAS
231
85
117,
outflow,
(FMLN)
Farabundo Marti People's
FARN.
68,
8,
Foreign capital,
195
Salvador),
325
430
Front
(El
454
Food and Agriculture Organization,
See Unified Popular Action
Farabundo Marti,
452,
Fonseca,
See Broad Opposition Front
FAPU.
strategy,
Popular
Liberation Forces France,
68,
73,
76,
78,
97,
233.
See Federal Bureau of
See also under Guatemala;
Investigation
Mexico;
Nicaragua
See Fuerzas Democraticas
Franja
(Guatemala),
Nicaraguenses
Frank,
Andre Gunder,
See Democratic Revolu-
Free-trade zones,
tionary Front
Frei,
Eduardo,
138
110
106
271
536
Frente Armada Democratica
178, 179, 181, 360-361, 365-366, 367-368, 395-396,
(Nicaragua), 320 Frente Revolucionario Sandinista, 320 Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional. See Sandinista National Liberation Front Frustration-aggression theory, 13-14 FSLN. See Sandinista National Liberation Front Fuentes Mohr, Alberto, 289 Fuerzas Armadas Democraticas Nicaraguenses, 320 Fuerzas Democraticas Nicaraguenses (FDN), 321, 326, 327, 328 FUSEP. See Honduras, National Police Force "Fusiles y frijoles." See Selfdefense program "Futbol war" (1969), 11, 109, 191, 199 Galvez, Carlos, 145 Garcia, Jose Guillermo, 113, 118, 119, 124, 207, 208, 210, 214, 221, 239, 212-242, 243 Garcia Granados family, 103 Garcia Turcios, Abraham, 345 GDP. See Gross domestic product General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 445 General Electric (U.S. company), 97 Gerarda, Emmanuele, 131 Gerardi, Juan, 142, 144, 148 German Democratic Republic. See East Germany Germany, 74, 78, 87, 97, 98, 302. See also East Germany; Federal Republic of Germany Glassman, Jon, 36 Gleijeses, Piero, 507 GNI. See Gross national income GNP. See Gross national product Golazon Airport (Honduras), 337 Golpes (d'estado), 23, 102, 195. See also individual countries, coup Gonzalez-Vega, Claudio, 167 Good Neighbor Policy (1934), 45, 65, 81-82, 85, 86 Goodyear (U.S. company), 284 Government policy intervention,
GPP.
397(table), 401, 411 See Protracted Popular War
Gracias a Dios Department (Honduras), 344 Grafico, El (Guatemala City), 289 Granados Garcia, Raul, 109, 110 Granaja (Honduras), 343 Grande, Rutilio, 128, 129, 132, 203 Grant, Ulysses S., 68, 74 Great Britain, 65, 68-69, 74, 75, 97, 98, 158, 159, 415(table), 424. See also Falkland Islands Great Depression (1929), 100, 102, 192 Grenada, 397 (table), 419, 448, 462-463 Gross domestic product (GDP), 164, 167. See also under individual countries Gross national income (GNI), 364 Gross national product (GNP), 14, 20, 21(table), 162(table). See also under individual countries Guam, 70 Guantanamo Bay base, U.S. (Cuba), 71, 78, 435 Guardia Nacional. See El Salvador, rural police force; Nicaragua, National Guard Guatemala, 3 agrarian reform, 8, 27, 104, 105, 107, 274-275, 277, 282 agriculture, 173(table), 175, 176, 181, 270, 272-273 and Argentina, 287 arms, 275, 278, 287 Army Bank, 109, 284 authoritarian, 41, 279 bananas, 98, 272, 274 and basic needs, 172(table), 271-272, 273 beef, 272, 273 birth rate, 172 (table) and Brazil, 287 capital. See Guatemala City and Catholic Church, 94, 95, 96, 121, 126, 127, 141-149, 274. See also Martyrs
537
Guatemala (cont.) classes, 115(n2), 271 coffee, 96, 97, 98, 102, 272, 274 colonial, 93-96 and communism, 105, 148, 276, 426
277,
278,
280,
275-276, 281, 283, 286, 287-291, 293-296 and Great Britain, 68
275,
282,
conservatives, 95-96 consumer price index, 14, 15 (table) cotton, 103, 272, 273 counterrevolution, 26-27, 39, 41, 109, 110, 280, 281, 282, 286, 287, 290, 292 coup (1954), 126, 141 coup (1960), 277 coup (1982), 289 death lists, 33 death rate, 172(table), 271, 272 death squads, 33, 34, 41, 56, 109, 281, 284, 285-286, 288, 289, 290, 292 democracy, 273, 279 diet, 272 disease, 271 earthquake (1976), 19, 286 economy, 21, 112, 168(table), 171, 269, 270-271, 277, 286 education, 142, 143, 172 (table), 272 elites, 26, 27, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102-103, 104, 108, 109, 112-113, 114, 115, 273, 275, 276-277, 278, 279, 280 energy consumption, 270 exports, 270 farms, 174(table), 176, 272 foreign control in, 112 foreign debt, 169, 170 (table), 171 foreign investment in, 284-285 foreign trade, 170(table) and France, 287 GDP, 168(table), 170(table), 270 Germans in, 98 GNP, 21 (table),
91,
162(table), 270, 285 government, 33-34, 91, 92, 96, 109, 110, 126, 270, 273-274,
guerrillas, 20, 24, 33, 34, 112, 115, 127, 148, 278, 280, 281, 282-283, 287, 290, 296 and Honduras, 104. See also Honduras, refugees in human rights, 112, 114, 126, 269, 270, 287, 293, 294, 296, 489, 515 income, per capita, 161, 271, 272 Indians, 6, 19, 34, 41, 92, 95-96, 102, 112, 114, 115, 141-142, 143-144, 146, 148, 149, 272, 273, 283, 290, 291, 292 industrial disputes, 19
18 (fig.),
industrialization, 112, 270 inflation, 166 (table), 171, 273 infrastructure, 274 and Israel, 253, 287 and Japan, 103 journalists, 289 labor force, 103, 176, 270-271, 273 labor movement, 19, 106, 273-274, 275, 286, 287, 288-289 land, 96-97, 104, 105, 179,
290
liberals, 95, 96, 143 life expectancy, 172(table), 272 life expectancy, Indian, 6 malnutrition, 6, 269, 271, 272 massacres, 142, 144-146, 149 and Mexico, 145, 432, 435, 438, 439, 440, 444, 445 middle class, 103, 104, 112, 272 military, 27 , 33, 34, 50, 91, 105, 109, 110, 112-•113, 142, 144, 146, 149, 275-276, 277, 278, 279-280, 281, 283-284, 285, 287, 288, 291-293, 294, 295, 296 national police detective corps, 34, 291 net national product, 332 (table) and Nicaragua, 54, 104, 325, 512 nickel, 8, 284-285
538
Guatemala (cont.) Northern Transversal Strip, 27, 284 October Revolution (19441954), 104 oil, 8, 275, 284, 290 peasants, 5-6, 16, 19, 99, 105, 106, 273, 282, 286, 288, 290 politics, 23, 26, 27, 33, 104-105, 114, 273-274, 277, 278, 280-281, 289, 290 population, 9(table), 12 115(n2), 162(table), 172(table) poverty line, 271 private and public sectors, 168(table), 285 racism, 271, 273 refugees, 41, 145, 146, 292, 293, 440, 444 and Romania, 287 rural, 5-6, 16, 19, 34, 99, 106, 271-272, 273, 282-283, 286, 288, 291, 292 socioeconomic change, 14, 23, 28, 270, 286 and Spain, 287 strikes, 33 subsistence farm families, 107, 272 sugar, 272 and Sweden, 287 and UN, 275 underdevelopment, 271 unemployment, 270-271 urban, 34, 103, 283, 286 U.S. residents in, 109 wages, 16, 17(table), 18(fig.), 19, 271, 273 Western Highlands, 271-272, 273 See also under Cuba; El Salvador; Soviet Union; United States Guatemala City (Guatemala), 104, 111 Guatemalan Conference of Religious Orders (CONFREGUA), 145 Guatemalan Episcopal
95,
Conference, 142 Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (URNG), 290,
295-296 Guatemalan Workers' Party (PGT), 274, 279, 290, 467 Guazapa Volcano (El Salvador), 230 Guerrilla Army of the Poor. See Popular Guerrilla Army Guerrilla movement, 16, 20, 23, 28, 45, 127, 261 economic sabotage, 20, 32, 224, 230, 342, 516 See also under individual countries Guevara, Che, 452, 454, 456 Gunboat Diplomacy, 45 Gutierrez, Gustavo, 131 Gutierrez, Jaime Abdul, 205-206, 212, 215, 223 Guyana, 161-171, 172-173(tables), 177, 178, 397(table), 419, 442 Haakmat, Andre, 463 Hacienda economy, 158, 160, 177, 192 Haciendas, 6 Haig, Alexander M., Jr., 124, 125, 136, 225, 231, 247, 441, 485, 486, 491, 492 Haiti (1804), 68, 73, 78, 161, 162(table), 166(table), 167, 168(table), 169, 170 (table), 171, 172-173 (tables) , 175. See also under United States Hammer, Michael, 224 Handal, Shafik, 218, 461 Hannah Mining (company), 284 Hawaii, 70 Hay, John, 74 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty (1903), 72, 73 Hegemony, 45, 55, 66, 80-87, 88, 449, 470, 472, 473 Helvetia finca (Guatemala), 277 Henriques, Maria Magdelena, 222 Herrera, Manuel, 97 Herrera Campins, Luis, 442, 466 Heureaux, Ulises, 74 Higglers, 394, 397, 399 Hinton, Deane R., 47, 48, 153 (nl4), 235, 246-247, 248, 267(n73), 490 Honduras, 3, 14, 261 agrarian reform, 8, 20 agriculture, 173 (table), 176
539
Honduras (cont.) Air Force, 337 arms traffic, 38, 440, 512 bananas, 98 and basic needs, 172 (table) birth rate, 172(table) borders, 38, 331, 333, 347 capital. See Tegucigalpa and Catholic Church, 342-343 Congress, 342 consumer price index, 15 (table) counterrevolution, 39 death rate, 172(table) democracy, 334, 342, 346, 488, 489 economy, 23, 168(table), 171 education, 172(table) elites, 102, 332, 333 farms, 174(table) foreign debt, 169, 170(table), 171 GDP, 168(table), 170(table) GNP, 21 (table), 162(table) government, 23, 34-35, 49-50, 92, 126, 334-335, 336, 340, 342, 343, 488-489 guerrillas, 34, 35, 50, 52, 340, 342 human rights, 50, 339, 340 and immigration, 12 industrial disputes, 21 industrialization, 7 inflation, 166 (table), 171 and Israel, 253, 512 labor force, 176 labor movement, 20, 340 life expectancy, 172(table) military, 34, 35, 49-50, 231, 334, 336, 338, 339, 340, 342, 344-345, 346, 347, 488 Mosquito Coast, 68 National Police Force (FUSEP), 334 net national product. 332 ( table) . Nicaragua 3 r 35, 39, 41, 46, 50, 52 -53, 54, 104, 136, 137, 140, 231,, 252, 261, 310, 323, 326,. 327, 335, 339, 341, 347,. 440-441, 489, 511, 512 Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries in, 318, 320, 321, 326, 327, 328, 338, 343, I
345-346, 347, 436, 440, 502 peasants, 6, 16, 20 politics, 102, 334, 335, 336, 342 population, 9 (table), 12, 98, 162(table), 172(table) private and public sectors, 168(table) refugees in, 343-346 rural, 6, 16, 175 unemployment, 16 university. See National University wages, 16, 17 (table), 20 See also Contra base camps; San Jose Agreement; under El Salvador; Guatemala; Soviet Union; United States Hoover, Herbert, 81 Huehuetenango Department (Guatemala), 110, 286, 291, 292, 294 Huerta, Victoriano, 80 Hull, Cordell, 81 Human capital, 160, 175, 176, 180-181 Human rights, 39, 46, 48, 87, 114, 134, 221, 224, 232, 257, 269, 288, 463, 483, 484, 485, 489, 490, 494, 505. See also under individual countries Humphrey, Hubert, 504 Hungary, 40, 53, 217, 218
241,
Ibarguen family, 97 Identification cards. See Cedulas "Illegal colony" (San Salvador), 194 Ilopango Air Force Base (El Salvador), 38, 249 raid (1982), 230, 232 IMET. See United States, International Military Education and Training IMF. See International Monetary Fund Imperialist Era (1898-1934), 44-45, 66, 69-80 Import substitution, 102, 353, 403, 410, 412, 417 Import substitution industrialization (ISI), 160, 161, 164,
165,
178,
354,
355,
540
ISI
(cont.) 362, 366, 370, 393 INCO. See International Nickel Company Income distribution, 161, 179, per capita, 14, 161
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. Rio Treaty Interest rates, 178, 361 272
redistribution, 105 See also Wages; under individual countries Incompetence, 225 Independent Liberal Party (Nicaragua), 321 Indian Laws (16th century), 94 Indian Ocean, 451 Indigo, 94-95, 97, 192 Industrial bourgeoisie, 24. See also El Salvador, industrial disputes/industrialization Industrial disputes, 16, 18(fig.), 19 Industrialization, 6-7, 22, 104, 161, 177, 180 labor force, 7, 8, 160 unemployment, 8, 10-11 See also under individual countries Inflation, 14, 161, 165-167, 171, 177, 179. See also under individual countries Instability, 7, 21 Institute on Latin America (Moscow), 451 Institute on Religion and Democracy (U.S.), 138 Institutional Revolutionary Party (Mexico), 426 Insurrection, 28, 126-127 INTA. See National Institute of Agrarian Transformation Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (OAS), 288, 313 Inter-American Conference 1933, 81 1948, 83 Inter-American Defense Board (OAS), 429, 433 Inter-American Development Bank, 204 Inter-American Peacekeeping Force (OAS), 429, 433. See also Peacekeeping forces
See
International Harvester (U.S. company), 70 International Labor Organization, 271 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 20, 104, 169. See also under Jamaica International Nickel Company (INCO), 284, 285 International terms-of-trade. See under Costa Rica Iran. See under United States Isabella II (queen of Spain), 74 ISI. See Import substitution industrialization Israel, 54, 252, 253, 325, 512 ISTA. See Salvadoran Institute of Agrarian Transformation Ixcan (Guatemala), 286 Izabal Department (Guatemala), 110, 295. See also ZacapaIzabal counterinsurgency campaign Jackson, Jamaica,
Henry, 157
251
agriculture, 173 (table), 386, 394, 395, 400, 405, 406, 408, 418 balance of payments, 390, 393, 403, 408 and basic needs, 172(table) black market, 399, 402 bourgeoisie, 389-390, 392, 396, 402, 405, 417 budget, 393, 394 (table), 398, 403, 410 capital. See Kingston capitalism. See Jamaica Labour Party and communism, 415, 416, 417 consumer goods, 393-395, 399, 400, 406, 407, 409, 417, 418 and Cuba, 385, 388, 391, 411, 415, 419, 462 divestment, 410 drug trade, 407 economy, 164, 165, 167, 168(table), 171, 177, 178, 385, 386, 389, 390-391, 392-411, 416
541
Jamaica (cont.) elites, 396 exports, 403, 405, 407, 408, 418 and foreign assistance public opinion, 415(table) foreign debt, 167, 170 (table), 393, 399, 400, 403, 404-405, 417 foreign investment in, 393, 407, 408, 409, 418 foreign trade, 170 (table), 407- 408, 410 GDP, 167, 168 (table), 393, 399, 404(table), 405 GNP, 162(table) government, 385, 386, 389, 392-411, 416-419 grey market, 407 and IMF, 389, 390, 398-399, 402, 403, 404, 415, 416, 417 imports, 393, 394, 399-400, 401, 406, 407, 410 income, per capita, 161, 165 inflation, 166(table), 399, 400(table), 406 infrastructure, 418 labor force, 395, 397,
401,
408- 409, 417 labor movement, 387, 390, 395, 402, 406, 417 land, 389, 390, 400
403,
sugar,
390,
taxation,
395,
387,
415
410
unemployment, 395, 399, 408, 418 urban, 401, 406 wages, 395, 398, 400, 402, 406, 410 See also San Jose Agreement; under United States Jamaica Broadcasting Corporation, 391 Jamaica Labour Party (JLP), 385, 386, 387, 388, 391-392, 399, 401-416, 417, 418 January Offensive (1981)
(El
Salvador), 224, 225, 226, 229, 481 Japan. See under El Salvador; Guatemala; Nicaragua Jehovah's Witnesses, 139, 143-144 Jesuits, 128, 142, 145, 153 (n24), 203, 204 JLP. See Jamaica Labour Party John Paul II (pope), 140, 141, 142, 311, 444 Johnson, Andrew, 74 Johnson, Lyndon B., 83, John XXIII (pope), 25
84,
Joint National Directorate 392,
migration, 391 nationalization in, 391, 395-396 newspapers, 391, 404 peasants, 394, 395 politics, 385, 386-392, 396, 401, 412-416, 417 population, 162(table), 172(table), 391 private sector, 168(table), 389-390, 396-397, 398, 399, 400, 405, 406, 410, 418 public sector, 168(table), 397, 398, 399, 405, 406, 410, 417 racism, 396 rent control, 409 rural, 401 socialism. See People's National Party socioeconomic change, 392-411 strikes, 407 subsidies, 400, 401
85 (DN)
(Nicaragua), 308-309, 313, 319, 328, 467 Joint ventures, 112, 284, 435, 436 Jovel, Ernesto, 217 Juventud Militar. See Military Youth Kazel,
Dorothy,
117,
118,
120,
124 Kekchi Indians, 290 Kennedy, John F., 83, 84, 85 Keynes, John Maynard, 104, 400 Keynesian theories, 392, 393 KGB (Soviet Security Committee), 457 Khmer Rouge, 347 Khrushchev, Nikita, 452 Kim il-Sung, 466 Kingston (Jamaica), 394 Kinzer, Stephen, 45 Kirkpatrick, Jeane, 13, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 248, 252, 484, 489 Kissinger, Henry, 251
542
Kissinger Commission. See Bipartisan commission on Central American policy Klee, Karl, 97 Kudachkin, Mikhail, 461 v Labor-intensive industrialization, 8, 103 Labor unions, 22, 24, 25. See also individual countries, labor movement La Cayetana (El Salvador), 202 La Ceiba (Honduras), 337 Lading, 95, 283, 289 La Lodoza (Honduras), 345 Land holdings, 12, 16, 174(table), 176, 180. See also Ejido land; Haciendas; Latifundios; Qcupante land; individual countries, land "Land to the Tiller" program (El Salvador), 213, 229, 241 Langley, Lester D., 72 Las Casas, Bartolome de, 94 Las Trojes (Honduras), 345 Latifundios, 5, 189 Latin American Episcopal Conference (CELAM), 138, 139 II (1968), 25, 105, 122, 123, 138, 143, 201 III (1979), 123, 131 Latinskaya Amerika, 451 La Trinitaria (Mexico), 444 Laugerud, Kjell, 283 La Virtud (Honduras), 343 Law for the Defense and Guarantee of Public Order (1977) (El Salvador), 204, 205 Legitimacy, 22-23, 194 Lempa River, 343 Lemus, Jose Maria, 197-198 Lenin, V. I., 215 LeoGrande, William, 30, 36, 45 Lernoux, Penny, 25, 202, 288 Liberal Nationalist Party (Nicaragua), 303, 307 Liberal Party (Honduras), 102, 334, 335 "Liberation Army" (Guatemala), 275 Lieb, Justinian, 138 Llach family, 106
Lodge, Henry Cabot, 274 Long, Clarence, 251, 294 Lopez, Carlos, 118, 124 Lopez, Efrain, 119, 120 Lopez, Ruben, 134 Lopez Arellano, Oswaldo, 339 Lopez Diaz, Julian, 459 Lopez Mateos, Adolfo, 428 Lopez Portillo, Jose, 431, 432-433, 434-437, 438, 440, 441, 442, 444, 445 Lopez Trujillo, Alfonso, 138-139 LP-28. See Popular Leagues-28th of February Lucas Garcia, Fernando Romeo, 33, 92, 109, 110, 286, 287, 290, 489 Luhan, J. Michael, 291 Luis, Chico, 132 Macalbaj
(Guatemala),
292
Macroeconomic policy performance, 171, 270 Madero, Francisco, 427 Mafia-bourgeoisie, 113 Magana, Alvaro, 240, 243, 246 Magana family, 106 Magoon, Charles, 71 Mahan, Alfred, 70 Maingot, Anthony P., 462 Majano, Adolfo Arnoldo, 205, 207, 212, 214, 215, 221, 223, 480, 507 "Major Bob." See D'Aubuisson, Roberto Malnutrition. See under El Salvador; Guatemala Malvinas. See Falkland Islands Managua (Nicaragua), 135-136 earthquake (1972), 19, 28, 135, 304 Manifest Destiny, 66, 69 Manley, Michael, 385, 386, 388, 411, 413 Mano Blanca death squad (Guatemala) 109, 281, 285 Manufactured export strategy, 161 MAP. See United States, Military Assistance Program Mariel boatlift, 491 Marijuana, 407 Marist Brothers, 145-146 Marroquin Rojas, Clemente, 282 Marti, Jose, 72
543
Martinez, Maximiliano Hernandez (El Brujo), 96, 100-101, 195, 196 Martinez Verdugo, Arnaldo, 43 7Martyrs, 150-152 (table) Marxists-Leninists Cuba, 428 El Salvador, 24, 215, 256, 258 Guatemala, 282 Jamaica, 388 Nicaragua, 43, 133, 135, 320, 325, 327 Maryknoll order (El Salvador), 117, 118, 119, 121, 124-125, 129, 144, 222-223 Masaya (Nicaragua), 30, 140 Matagalpa (Nicaragua), 30 Matanza. See El Salvador, massacre Mater et Magistra, 201 Mathias, Charles McC., Jr., 251 Mauricio Borgonovo Anti-Communist Brigade (El Salvador), 119 Maximillian (emperor of Mexico), 424 Mayorga, Roman, 205, 210, 211, 217 MDN. See Nicaraguan Democratic Movement Medellin (Colombia), 25 Documents (1968), 122, 123, 138. See also Latin American Episcopal Conference, II Medrana, Jose "Chele," 208 Mejia Victores, Oscar Humberto, 34, 294 Menchu, Vicente, 148 Menchu Tun, Rigoberta, 148 Mendez Arceo, Sergio (bishop of Cuernavaca), 437 Mendez Montenegro, Julio, 280, 281, 282 Menendez, Andres, 196 Mesa Grande (Honduras) refugee camp, 343, 344 Mesones. See Communal compounds Mexican-American War (18461848), 424 Mexican College of Lawyers, 439 Mexican Commission on Aid to Refugees, 440 Mexico, 157 and Belize, 432 and Caribbean,
435,
445
Catholic Church, 437 and Central America, 54,
423,
431-432, 435, 443-444, 445 and Central American immigration, 12, 41, 293, 440, and Chile, 430-431, 443 and communism, 428, 429
444
Communist Party, 437 and Costa Rica, 444. See also San Jose Agreement and Cuba, 427-429, 430, 434-436, 444, 445 currency. See Peso domestic market, 167 and Dominican Republic, 438. See also San Jose Agreement economy, 443, 445 and El Salvador, 233, 435, 436, 437, 438-439, 488 foreign debt, 315 foreign policy, 424-445 and France, 424, 438, 439, 442, 445 Global Development Plan, 432 and Great Britain, 424 and Honduras, 438. See also San Jose Agreement and human rights, 433, 434 independence (1821), 424 Indians, 440 labor movement, 426, 439 land, 426, 427 and OAS, 425, 426, 428-429, 430, 433-434, 443 oil, 54, 425, 427, 430, 432, 435, 439-440, 444 oil spill (1979), 445 one-party system, 44, 426 Revolution (1910), 92, 424, 427, 435 rural, 427 security, 250, 425, 444 and Soviet Union, 452, 453, 455 and Spain, 424 and UN, 426, 430, 432 urban, 435, 438, 442, 444 and Venezuela, 435, 438, 442, 444 See also Contadora Group; under Guatemala; Nicaragua; United States Mexico City (Mexico) massacre (1971), 430 Miami (Fla.), Ill, 389
544
Middle class, 22, 24, 105, 160. See also under individual countries Migration, 11, 12, 41. See also Urban migration Mikulski, Barbara, 134 Militarization, 49, 50, 332-333, 336, 342, 346, 502 Military dictatorships, 3, 33, 42, 44, 258 Military Youth (El Salvador), 205, 207, 210 MIR. See Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria Mirskii, G., 453 Misurasata (Nicaraguan Indian federation), 137 MLN. See National Liberation MNR.
Movement See National Revolutionary
Movement Mocoron (Honduras), 344, 345 Mole St. Nicolas (Haiti), 78 Molina, Arturo, 200, 480 Molina, Raul, 204 Monge, Luis, 246 Monimbo barrio (Masaya, Nicaragua), 30 Monroe, James, 87 Monroe Doctrine (1823), 65, 68, 69, 74, 82, 84 Morales Bermudez, Francisco, 453 Morales Ehrlich, Jose Antonio, 212 Moran, Francisco, 208, 209 Moravian church (Nicaragua), 137, 312, 313 Morazan, Francisco, 95 Morazan (El Salvador), 32, 214, 230, 242 Mormons, 139, 143 Mosquitia region (Honduras), 344 Mosquito Indians, 41, 136-138, 140, 312, 313, 320, 338, 344, 345 Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) (Chile), 453 MPL. See Popular Liberation Movement MRP. See Revolutionary Movement of the People MR-13. See Revolutionary Movement-13th of November
Multinational corporations, 70, 97, 105, 109, 270, 274, 280, 284, 285, 295, 297, 314, 357, 403, 408 Mutual Military Assistance Agreement
(1954),
337
NAACP. See National Association for the Advancement of Colored People Namibia, 325 National Agrarian Reform Congress (El Salvador), 200 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), 81 National Association of Private Enterprise (ANEP), 107, 202 National Financial Institute for Agricultural Lands (El Salvador), 241 National Institute of Agrarian Transformation (INTA) (Guatemala), 109 Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) (El Salvador), 113, 237, 239, 240, 241 National Liberation Movement (MLN) (Guatemala), 114, 149, 281, 294 National Opposition Union (UNO) (El Salvador), 200 National Palace (Managua), 30, 306 National Party (Honduras), 102, 334, 335, 341, 342 National Patriotic Front (Nicaragua), 307 National Peasants' Confederation (Mexico), 439 National Reconstruction Junta (Nicaragua), 307, 309, 315, 319, 434 National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) (El Salvador), 205, 219-220(table) National Security task force "working paper," 251-252 National University (Honduras), 340, 342 National Workers' Union (El Salvador), 196 NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization
545 NBC News,
276
Neanderthals (El Salvador), 208, 226, 239 Nebaj (Guatemala), 286, 291 Negroponte, John D., 234, 335, 340 Netherlands, 325, 464 New International Economic Order, 391 New Jewel Movement 462 Newsweek, 234 New York Times,
(Grenada),
252,
Nicaragua agrarian reform,
253,
488
313-314,
agriculture, 173(table), 308, 314 Air Force (FAS), 310
317 302,
anti-Sandinista nationalists, 49. See also Somocistas and Argentina, 325 arms, 52, 63 (n78), 305 (table) , 327, 459, 491, Army (EPS), 310
496
Atlantic Zone, 312 authoritarian, 41 and basic needs, 172(table), 315, 318 beef, 314 birth rate, 172(table) bourgeoisie, 19, and Brazil, 325
304,
319
bureaucracy, 309, 316 canal proposal, 75, 76, 77, 302 capital. See Managua capitalism, 316, 319 and Catholic Church, 41, 126, 127, 132-141, 311, 322. See also Martyrs caudillismo, 302 as Central American Republic, 302 class system, 301, 315-316, 318, 320 coffee, 302, 314 and communism. See MarxistsLeninists,
Nicaragua
community-action programs, 135-136 conservatives, 302, 303 constitution, 23 consumer price index, 15(table)
contra invasion (1983), 318, 321 cotton, 314, 317 Council of State, 309, 321, 323, 324 counterrevolution, 21, 46, 56, 136, 137, 140, 234, 248, 253, 312, 318, 320-321, 328 488, 511. See also Honduras Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries in; Somocistas death rate, 172(table) earthquake. See under Managua economy, 43, 164, 168 (table), 171, 304-306, 313-315, 319-320 education, 136, 172(table), 272, 312, 313, 315 elites, 26, 27, 30, 43, 101, 301, 302, 304, 306, 318 and El Salvador, 36-37, 38-39, 54, 199, 218, 221, 231, 238, 244, 245, 249, 253, 436, 467, 506, 511. See also Contra base camps exiles, 39 farms, 174(table) foreign debt, 170 (table), 315, 317 foreign policy, 325, 327 foreign trade, 170(table) and France, 325 GDP, 168(table), 170(table) general strikes, 30, 31 and Germany, 302, 325, 459 GNP, 21 (table), 162(table), 305(table), 313, 314 government, 126, 303-304 307 guerrillas, 20, 31, 53, 303. See also Sandini National Liberation Front guerrillas, anti-Sandinista, 46 49, 51, 56. See also Contra base camps; Honduras, Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries in; Somocistas housing, 315 human rights, 30, 41, 133, 136, 137, 139, 310-312, 322, 328, 513 independence
(1823),
302
134,
546
Nicaragua (cont.) Indians, 30. See also Mosquito Indians industrial disputes, 19 industrialization, 304, 31,4 inflation, 19, 166(table) infrastructure, 302, 308, 314 and Israel, 325 and Japan, 302 labor force, 302 labor movement, 16, 19, 303, 304, 306, 311, 316-317, 318, 319, 321, 322, 323 land, 304 liberals, 302, 303 life expectancy, 172(table) literacy campaign, 135, 312 and Mexico, 135, 303, 307, 325, 432-434, 435, 436, 440, 441, 444 middle class, 19 militarism, 302 military, 317, 322, 327 Mosquito Coast, 68 National Guard, 30, 31, 77, 92, 101, 112, 126, 132, 134, 135, 138, 303, 306, 307, 308. See also Somocistas nationalization in, 313, 314, 316 and Netherlands, 325 net national product, 332(table) newspapers. See Barricade; Nuevo Diario, El; Prensa, La~ Pacific Zone, 6 peasants, 30, 136, 304, 317 politics, 23, 24, 26, 28, 30, 135, 302, 303, 306, 307, 311-312, 320-325 population, 9(table), 12, 31, 162(table), 172(table) private sector, 168(table), 314, 318-320 public sector, 168(table), 313 refugees, 41, 50, 132, 313. See also Honduras, refugees in reign of terror, 30, 31, 306, 307 revolution (1978-1979), 3, 6, 30-31, 91, 132-133, 301, 306-307, 308, 454. See also
Sandinista National Liberation Front rice, 314 rural, 5, 6, 16, 19, 136, 302, 304 Sandinista government, 21, 36-37, 39, 41, 42, 43-44, 46, 48-49, 51, 52, 55, 92, 132, 133-137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 252, 253, 259, 260-261, 308-328, 434, 512 socioeconomic change, 14, 23, 28, 42, 304, 312-320 and Soviet Union, 43, 44, 52, 231, 325, 327, 455, 459-460, 471 and Spain, 325 sugar, 317 Supreme Court of Justice, 309 and Sweden, 325 taxation, 315, 317, 322 totalitarian, 49, 231, 321 underemployment, 16 unemployment, 6, 16, 304, 305(table), 317 urban, 6, 19, 302, 304 U.S. fact-finding mission in, 134-135 U.S. Marine occupation of (1912-1933), 77, 101, 302-303 and Venezuela, 466 wages, 16, 17(table), 136, 304, 305(table), 315, 316, 317 women, 312 See also under Costa Rica; Cuba; Guatemala; Honduras; Panama; United States Nicaraguan Democratic Force, 261 Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (MDN), 311, 319, 320, 321 Nicaraguan Socialist Party, 455 Nicaraguan Workers Council, 321 Nickel. See under Cuba; Guatemala Nixon, Richard M., 55, 85, 504 Non-Aligned Movement, 325, 391 Nonintervention principle. See Mexico, foreign policy North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 450, 470 North-South discussions, 431 Nueva Segovia region 345
(Nicaragua),
547
Nuevo Diario, El (Managua), Numar (company), 284 Nunez Tellez, Carlos, 309 Nutting, Wallace, 231
324
OAS.
See Organization of American States Obando y Bravo, Miguel (archbishop of Managua), 43, 133, 134, 138, 140 Ochoa Perez, Sigifredo, 243, 493 Ocupante land, 6 Oduber, Daniel, 365 Oil embargo, 14, 304, 352, 363 imports, 20 See also under Guatemala; Trinidad-Tobago Olemca (company), 284 Oligarchy, 3, 25, 27, 42, 56, 91-93, 96-115, 196 Olopa (Guatemala), 291 Olson, Mancur, 21 OPEC. See Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Open market economies, 157, 159, 167, 169, 177, 351, 386, 403, 404 (table) Operation Pineapple (El Salvador), 214 Opportunists (El Salvador), 208 ORDEN. See Democratic Nationalist Organization "Order of the samurai," 27, 295 Organization of American States (OAS), 45, 84, 253, 296, 307, 312, 341, 425-426, 428 Foreign Ministers meeting (1962), 428 Foreign Ministers meeting (1964), 429 See also Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 14, 304 Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA) (Guatemala), 290, 467 Orientacion (Salvadoran diocesan newspaper), 129, 130, 132 ORPA. See Organization of the People in Arms
Ortega Saavedra,
Daniel,
49,
252,
253, 309, 327, 460, 468, 471 Ortega Saavedra, Humberto, 53, 308 Ortiz Maldonado, Patricio, 294 Osorio, Oscar, 197 Ostend Manifesto, 68 Pacem in Terris, 201 PACs. See Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil Paddock, Elizabeth and William, 8 "Padre Francisco." See Rother, Stanley Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 252, 325, 472 Palmeroa Air Academy (Honduras), 337 Panama, 54, 126, 157 agriculture, 173(table) and basic needs, 172(table) economy, 164, 167, 168(table), 171 foreign debt, 170(table), 171 GDP, 168(table), 170(table) GNP, 162(table) income, per capita, 161 inflation, 166(table), 171 and Nicaragua, 307, 325, 459 population, 162(table), 172(table) private and public sectors, 167, 168(table) railroad (1855), 69, 76, 86 See also Contadora Group; San Jose Agreement; under Cuba; United States Panama Canal, 54, 73, 85, 86, 450, 465. See also under Soviet Union Panama Canal Treaty (1979), 86 Panama City (Panama), 73 Pan American meeting (1928), 81 Panzos (Guatemala), 290 Paraguay, 438 Paredes, Carlos, 119 Parraxtut (Guatemala), 293 Parties Law (Nicaragua), 323, 324, 328 Party of National Conciliation (PCN) (El Salvador), 198, 199, 200, 203, 237, 240 Party of the Salvadoran Revolution (PRS), 216, 219-220(table)
548
Pastora Gomez, Eden, 50, 320, 321, 467, 482, 487, 503 Pastry War (1838), 424 Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil (PACs) (Guatemala), 292-293 Paz Barnica, Edgardo, 341 Paz Garcia, Policarpo, 335 PCD. See Democratic Conservative PCN.
Party See Party of National
Conciliation PCS. See Salvadoran Communist Party PDC. See Christian Democratic Party, El Salvador/ Guatemala PDCH. See Christian Democratic Party, of Honduras Peace Corps (U.S.), 286, 291 Peaceful coexistence, 452 Peacekeeping forces, 45, 507, 510, 511 Pearlman, Mark, 224 Peasants, 5-6, 16, 24, 25, 103, 193. See also under individual countries Peasant unions. See Politicization of disadvantaged elements; individual countries, peasants/labor movement Pellecer, Luis, 142, 146 People's National Party (PNP) (Jamaica), 385, 386, 387, 388-391, 392, 393, 395, 396, 397, 398-399, 401, 402, 403, 411, 418-419, 462 and public opinion poll, 412-413, 414(table), 415, 416 People's Property Area (APP) (Nicaragua), 313, 314 People's Republic of China (PRC), 325, 466, 472, 479, 504 People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) (El Salvador), 206, 216, 217, 218, 466, 467 Peralta, Enrique, 281, 284
278,
279,
280,
Perez, Carlos Andres, 465 Perkins, Whitney T., 72 Permanent Commission on Human Rights (Nicaragua), 139
Permanent Conference of Political Parties of Latin America, 325 Permanent Council of the Armed Forces (El Salvador), 207 Permanent Court of Arbitration (The Hague), 74 Perquin (El Salvador), 230 Pershing, John, 80 Peru, 453, 454, 465 Peso (Mexican), 443 Petrovich, Vassily, 457 Peurifoy, John, 275 Pezzullo, Lawrence, 222, 326, 479, 482, 497 PGT. See Guatemalan Workers' Party Philippines, 70 Piette, Carol, 119, 121 Pinochet, Augusto, 454 Plantation economy, 158, 160, 177, 271 Platt Amendment (U.S.) (1901), 72, 78, 87 P.L. 480 (U.S.), 175, 406 PLO. See Palestine Liberation
71,
Organization Pluralism, 171, 322, 323, 482, 513 PNP. See People's National Party Poland, 40, 217, 315, 472 Polarization strategy, 28 Political development, 22, 180 Political-military fronts, 452, 454 Political parties, 22, 24. See also individual countries, labor movement/politics; specific party names Political prisoners. See Desaparecidos Political violence, 20-21, 24, 28, 29(table), 269-270. See also individual countries, death squads/government/ human rights/military Politicization of disadvantaged elements, 14, 16, 19-20, 22, 24, 25, 190, 202, 274, 275 Pontifical Commission for Latin America, 148 "Popular Church," 132, 139, 140, 141
549
Popular Guerrilla Army
(EGP)
(Guatemala), 290, 291, 295, 467 Popular Leagues-28th of February (LP-28) (El Salvador), 203, 206, 212, 216, 219-220(table) Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) (El Salvador), 208, 238,
Protectionism, 160, 161, 167 182, 353, 354, 355-357, 366, 367, 370, 401, 445 Protestants, 139, 140, 292, 311, 312 Protracted Popular War (GPP) (Nicaragua), 467 PRS. See Party of the Salvadoran
244, 245, 256, 258, 466, 506, 509 Popular Liberation Movement (MPL) (El Salvador), 212,
Revolution PRTC. See Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers PRUD. See Revolutionary Party of
219-220(table) Popular Revolutionary Bloc (BPR) (El Salvador), 203, 205, 206, 212, 216, 219-220 (table) Popular Social Christian Party (PPSC) (Nicaragua), 321, 323 Popular Unity coalition (Chile),
Democratic Unity PSCN. See Social Christian Party Public sector, 161, 167-169, 177, 179, 180. See also under
453 Populorum Progressio, 201 Portiriato, 424 Port Salines (Grenada), 462 Poverty, 42, 43, 175, 179, 191 PPSC. See Popular Social Christian Party PR. See Revolutionary Party Prensa, La (Managua), 30, 41 43, 134, 306, 311, 322, 323, 513 Prensa Grafica, La (San Salvador), 235 Prensa Latina (Cuban news agency), 277 Press Law (Nicaragua), 311, 321, 322, 323, 324, 328 Prinzapolka (Nicaragua), 137 Private sector, 161, 167-169, 180. See also under individual countries Privatization, 94-95 Proceso, 444 Productive Alliance (AP) (El Salvador), 107, 110, 111 Program of Energy Cooperation for the Countries of Central America and the Caribbean. See San Jose Agreement Proletariats, 20, 22, 24, 103, 197, 198-199, 202 Property rights. See Amparo Prosterman, Roy, 213
individual countries Pueblo Unido (Costa Rica), 467 Puente de Oro (El Salvador), 230 Puerto Lempira (Honduras), 345 Puerto Rico, 70, 325 Quakers, 149 Quevado y Quevado, Pedro, Quinonez family, 106 Racism.
287
See under El Salvador;
Guatemala; Jamaica Radicalization, 28, 29(table). See also under Catholic Church Radio Free Cuba. See Radio Marti Radio Free Grenada, 463 Radio Havana, 277 Radio Jamaica, 391 Radio Marti, 484 Ramirez, Juan Jose, 129 RD. See Relative deprivation Reactionary coalitions, 26-27 Reactionary despotism, 25, 197, 201, 239 Reagan, Ronald, 46, 49, 56, 114, 233, 234, 247, 249-250, 251, 253, 254, 310, 326, 335, 338, 409, 415, 479, 484, 489, 492, 493, 496, 498, 504, 511, 516 Red Cross, 290, 293 Reform. See Structural reform Reformists (El Salvador), 207 Refugees, 54. See also under Cuba; El Salvador; Guatemala; Nicaragua Regalado Duenas, Ernesto, 107 Regalado family, 106, 115 (nl), 190
550
Relative deprivation (RD), 13-14, 20, 21, 28, 29(table) Remington (U.S. company), 97 Repression. See Authoritarianism; Totalitarianism Revelo, Marco Rene, 131 Revolution, 12-13, 20, 24, 448, 484, stages,
503 28, 29(table)
See also under individual countries Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) (Guatemala), 282, 290, 467 Revolutionary Coordinating Committee of the Masses (CR) (El Salvador), 212, 217, 219-220(table) Revolutionary Movement of the People (MRP) (Costa Rica), 468 Revolutionary Movement-13th of November (MR-13) (Guatemala), 282 Revolutionary Organization of the Armed People. See Organization of the People in Arms Revolutionary Party (PR) (Guatemala), 280, 281, 289 Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (PRTC) (El Salvador), 218, 219-220(table) Revolutionary Party of Democratic Unity (PRUD) (El Salvador), 197 Revolutionary People's Front (Surinam), 463 Revolutionary People's Party (Surinam), 463 Rice. See under Nicaragua Richard, Pablo, 126 Rieckelman, Marie, 117 Rio Coco, 344 Rios Montt, Efrain, 23, 34, 96, 110, 112, 114, 149, 289, 292, 293, 294, 296, 489 Rios Montt, Mario, 145, 149 Rio Treaty (1947), 82-83, 426, 483 Rising expectations, 13, 14, 29(table), 195 Rivera,
Julio,
198
Rivera y Damas, Arturo, 129, 131, 132 Robelo Callejas, Alfonso, 309, 311, 320, 482 Rockefeller, David, 408 Rodgers, William, 222 Rodistas (Honduras), 335 Rodriguez, Carlos Rafael, 457, 491 Rodriguez, Jose, 466 Rodriguez, Nicolas, 128 Romania. See under Guatemala Romero, Carlos Humberto, 31, 92, 203, 205, 217, 480 Romero, Oscar (archbishop of San Salvador), 110, 111, 113, 118, 119, 125, 127, 129-132, 138, 148, 204, 206, 214, 437 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 81-82, 425 Roosevelt, Theodore, 70, 71, 72, 74-75, 77, 78, 80, 87, 250 Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine (1904), 65, 74, 75 Root, Elihu, 70 Roper, Melinda, 125 Rossi, Agnelo, 122 Rother, Stanley, 146-148 Rubelsanto (Guatemala), 290 Ruiz, Henry, 308 Ruiz Garcia, Samuel (bishop of San Cristobal las Casas), 145, 146, 437 Rural cooperatives, 22, 33, 201, 213, 228, 229, 273, 286 Rural pacification program (El Salvador), 213 Sacred Heart missionaries,
142
St. George's (Grenada), 462 Salavaria family, 115(nl) Salvadoran Communist Party (PCS), 198, 216, 217, 218, 219-200(table), 461, 466 Salvadoran Court of Accounts, 229 Salvadoran Human Rights Commission, 222, 267 (n76) Salvadoran Institute of Agrarian Transformation (ISTA) (1975), 202, 213, 224, 240, 267 (n71) Sam, Vilbrun Guillaume, 79 Samoa, 7 0
228,
551
Sanchez Hernandez, Fidel, 199, 200, 338 Sandinista Air Force (FAS). See Nicaragua, Air Force Sandinista Defense Committees, 139, 140 Sandinista government. See under Nicaragua Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) (Nicaragua), 30-31, 126, 133, 301, 303, 304, 306, 307, 455 Tercerista wing, 306, 466, 467 See also Nicaragua, Sandinista government Sandinista Popular Army (EPS). See Nicaragua, Army Sandinista Popular Militia, 310 Sandinista Workers' Central (CST), 316-317 Sandino, Augusto Cesar, 77, 101, 303, 325 Sandoval Alarcon, Mario, 114, 281, 285 San Jose Agreement (1980), 435, 439, 445 San Juan Comalapa (Guatemala), 291 San Juan del Sur (Nicaragua), 460 San Juan River, 441 San Martin Jilotepeque (Guatemala), 149 San Mateo Ixtatan (Guatemala), 291 San Miguel (El Salvador), 198, 200, 236 San Pedro Perulapan (El Salvador), 204 San Pedro Sula (Honduras), 334, 340 businessmen's association, 340 San Salvador (El Salvador), 111, 198, 199 barracks, 200 housing, 194 Metropolitan Area, 10, 11(table) voters, 200, 236 San Sebastian Lamoa (Guatemala), 291 Sansirisay (Guatemala), 149 Santa Ana (El Salvador), 198, 236
Santa Fe Committee
(1980),
483, 484 Santa Maria (Honduras),
345
Santiago Atitlan (Guatemala), 146 Santo Domingo. See Dominican Republic San Vicente (El Salvador), 230 Savings, 167, 169, 361, 365, 383(table), 399 Scheut religious order (Belgian), 145 Schlaefer, Salvador, 140 Schlesinger, Stephen, 45 Seaga, Edward, 385, 386, 392, 404, 407, 408, 409, 413, 415, 418 Secret Anti-Communist Army (Guatemala), 286 Secret societies, 33, 276 Secret war (1981), 487, 488, 496, 498-499, 511 Segovia (Nicaragua), 30 Self-defense program (Guatemala), 34, 114, 292 Self-help groups (Nicaragua), 19 Sepulveda Amor, Bernardo, 443-444 Seventh Day Adventists, 139 Shanty towns, 194 Sherwood, Fred, 109, 276 Shultz, George, 38, 481, 493, 494 Sihanouk, Norodom, 347 Singer (U.S. company), 97 Sino-Guevarist policies, 163 Sital, Badrisen, 463 Skinner, George Ure, 97 Slave trade, 94, 158 Soccer War. See "Futbol war" Social Christian Party (PSCN) (Nicaragua), 138, 139, 321 Social Democratic party (El Salvador), 24, 107, 217, 480, 508. See also National Revolutionary Movement Social Democratic Party (Nicaragua), 323 Socialism, 171, 316, 388, 392, 419, 449, 451, 452 Socialist Democratic party (Guatemala), 289 Socialist International, 325, 464, 465
552
Socialist Workers' Party (Mexico), 437 Socioeconomic change, 14, 20, 22, 23, 29(table), 269. See also under individual — countries Sol Castellanos, Jorge, 100 Solidarity (Polish trade union), 40 Solola (Guatemala), 291 Somocistas, 49, 56, 136, 137, 260, 262, 317, 319, 320, 321, 338, 436, 487, 496, Somoza Debayle, Anastasio , 23, 45, 83, 92, 112 , 133 , 303 306, 307, 433, 481, 497 Somoza Debayle, Luis, 303-304 Somoza Garcia, Anastasio, 77, 101, 104, 303 Somoza family, 27, 92, 126, 301, 303, 304 Sonsonate Province (El Salvador), 100 Sorghum, 10 South America, 125-127, 452. See also Soviet Union, and Latin America Southern Front, 467 Soviet Union and Africa, 458 and Caribbean Basin, 447, 449, 450, 462-463, 464, 469, 472 and Central America, 36, 53, 55, 252, 331, 447-448, 449, 451, 469, 472, 498, 509 Communist Party of the (CPSU), 453, 459, 461, 471-472 and Costa Rica, 467-468, 471 and domino theory, 35 and Eastern Europe, 44 and El Salvador, 36, 37, 38, 217, 218, 249, 461, 466, 471, 481 and Grenada, 462-463 and Guatemala, 467, 471 and Honduras, 471 and Jamaica, 415(table) and Latin America, 452-456, 472 military buildup, 450 naval exercises, 451 and Panama Canal, 450 peace offensive, 450, 469, 472
and Poland,
40
See also Afghanistan; under Cuba; Mexico,* Nicaragua; United States Spain, 67, 68, 69, 70, 73, 74, 93-95. See also under Guatemala; Mexico; Nicaragua State terrorism. See Political violence State Trading Corporation (Jamaica), 395, 400, 402, 409 Stimson, Henry, 77 Stone, Carl, 165 Stone, Richard B., 114, 251 Structural reform, 27-28, 182, 190, 194, 195, 201, 483 Studds, Gerry, 134 Student movements, 24, 107, 202 Suazo Cordova, Roberto, 49, 327, 340, 341, 342, 343, 489 Suchlicki, Jaime, 72 Sugar, 5, 19, 70, 78, 103, 160, 164, 165, 178, 182, 317, 353, 390 Sullivan and Cromwell (law firm), 274 Sumpul River, 343 Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP) (Nicaragua), 319, 321, 482 Surinam, 463-464 Survil, Bernard, 129 Sweden. See under Guatemala; Nicaragua Taft, William Howard, 75, 77-78 Taiwan, 325 Tass News Service (Soviet), 462 Teachers union. See Asociacion Nacional de Ecuadores Salvadorenos Technocrats, 389. See also Elites, technocratic; El Salvador, technocrats Technology, 7, 270 Tegucigalpa (Honduras), 59(n30), 342 Teller Amendment (1898), 70 Tello, Manuel, 429 Tercerista wing. See under Sandinista National Liberation Front Textiles, 4, 103, 182
553
Time, 281 Tinoco Granados,
Unified Popular Action Front Federico,
102
Tirado, Victor, 328 Tlateloco (Mexico) massacre (1968), 430, 446(n5) Torres Arias, Leonidas, 342 Torrijos, Omar, 85, 459, 465 Torruella, Roberto, 132 Totalitarianism, 39-40, 41-43, 44, 49 Tourism, 160, 163, 175 "Toward Explaining Regional Crisis in Central America: Socio-economic and Political Roots of Rebellion" (Booth), 14 Transformacion Agraria, 203 Treaty of Paris (1898), 71 "Trickle-down" theory, 4-5, 192 "Trickle-up" economics, 5, 192 Trinidad-Tobago agriculture, 173(table) and basic needs, 172(table) economy, 161, 162(table), 166(table), 167, 168(table), 170(table), 171 government, 397(table) oil, 161, 164, 169 population, 162(table), 172(table) Trotskyites (Nicaragua), 316 Trujillo, Rafael, 84 Truman, Harry, 83 Tugurios. See Shanty towns Turbas divinas. See "Divine mobs" "Twelve, the," 30 Ubico, Jorge, 102, 104, 105 UCS. See Union Comunal Salvadorena UDEL. See Democratic Liberation Union UDN. See Democratic Nationalist Union UFCO. See United Fruit Company Underemployment, 7. See also under individual countries Unemployment. See under Agriculture; Industrialization; individual countries Ungo, Guillermo, 205, 210, 211, 217, 227, 246, 480 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 440
(FAPU) (El Salvador), 203, 206, 212, 216, 219-220(table) Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU) (El Salvador), 218, 221, 223 Unified Socialist Party of Mexico, 440 Union Comunal Salvadorena (UCS), 213, 228 Union of Progressive Workers and Farmers (Surinam), 463 Union of Rural Workers (El Salvador), 202 Union of Telephone Workers (Mexico), 439 Union Sandinista de Mosquitos, Sumus, and Ramas, 320 Unitarian Universalist Service Committee, 134 United Brands (U.S. company), 284 United Fruit Company (UFCO) (U.S.), 70, 83, 98, 104, 274, 284 United Nations (UN), 275, 296, 343, 344, 345, 428, 468 Charter, 426 See also under Mexico United Nations Human Rights Commission, 232 United People's Movement (Nicaragua), 307 United States and Argentina, 444, 470 and Belize, 49 and Cambodia, 347 and Caribbean, 65-88, 159, 160, 182, 276 and Caribbean Basin, 449-450, 451, 468, 472-473. See also Caribbean Basin Initiative Catholic Church, 131 and Central America, 3, 8, 44-45, 50, 51, 55-57, 95, 126, 159, 160, 182, 251, 252, 253, 260-263, 269-270, 276, 280, 332, 339, 461, 470-471, 479-499, 501-502, 516-517 and Chile, 138, 453, 454 and communism, 35, 38, 48, 55, 88, 105, 143, 224-225, 248, 275, 295, 479, 482, 485, 486, 492, 493, 497-498, 499, 510,
512-513
554
United States (cont.) and Costa Rica, 49, 50, 252, 516 and Cuba, 38, 43, 45, 46, 53, 55, 67-68, 69-72, 84, 87, 88, 221, 226-227, 233, 249, 252, 254, 262, 435, 456, 468, 469, 483, 484, 485, 486, 490, 491-492, 496, 504, 513-515 Defense Intelligence Agency, 217 and Dominican Republic, 73-75, 81, 84-85, 87, 88, 276, 429 of 1890s, 69 and El Salvador, 33, 38, 46-48, 51, 55, 56, 57, 108, 118, 124, 125, 204, 205, 207, 211, 213, 214, 221-222, 224, 225-229, 231-232, 233-235, 236, 239-240, 241, 242, 243, 245-257, 258, 259-260, 261, 262, 275, 336, 338, 466, 468, 480-481, 484-485, 486, 488, 490, 492-495, 499. See also "Zimbabwe option" foreign investment, 87, 97, 98, 112 Foreign Military Sales (FMS), 336 GNP, 162 (table) and Grenada, 462, 510 and Guatemala, 33, 45, 48, 55, 83, 104-105, 109, 112, 114, 143, 204, 252, 269, 274-278, 279-280, 281-282, 283-284, 286-287, 292, 293, 294-297 489, 512, 515 and Haiti, 78-79, 88 and Honduras, 35, 49- 50, 234, 248, 252, 275, 326 , 331, 333, 334, 335, 336 -343, 346, 347-348, 440, 468, 487-488, 489, 502, 515 and immigration. 8, 41 inflation, 166(table) International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, 336-337 and Iran, 83, 84 and Israel, 252 and Jamaica, 385, 391, 402 404, 406, 407, 408, 409 411, 415, 416, 417-418
liberal democratic foreign policy criticism, 43, 45, 250, 484, 489 life expectancy, 360 and Mexico, 67, 68, 79-80, 81, 233, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 430, 433, 434, 435, 438, 439, 441, 442-443, 444-445, 491, 493 Military Assistance Program (MAP), 279, 281, 282, 283, 287. See also Militarization and military intervention, 501-502 and Nicaragua, 3, 30, 38, 39, 44, 45-46, 48-49, 53-54, 56, 57, 75-78, 134, 139, 221, 226-227, 233, 234, 248, 252, 253, 259, 260, 261, 262, 275, 302-303, 305 (table), 306, 307, 312-313, 315, 317, 319, 320, 321, 323, 325, 326, 327, 328, 336, 338, 436, 468, 471, 481-483, 485, 486-487, 495-496, 498-499, 502, 504, 511-513, 516. See also Secret war and Panama, 72-73, 85-86, 87, 88 337, 465 population, 162(table) security, 87, 88, 250, 294, 326, 472, 498, 499, 504 and Soviet Union, 46, 52, 55, 83, 248, 249, 254, 451-452, 469, 471, 483, 493, 496, 504 State Department White Paper (1981), 35-36, 223, 225, 481, 486 State Department White Paper (1982), 231-232 and Surinam, 464 and Venezuela, 442, 465, 493 and Vietnam, 47, 51, 57, 261 See also Human rights University of Central America (Nicaragua), 228 Center for Documentation and Information, 236, 237, 267(n73, 76) UNO. See National Opposition Union Urban migration, 8, 10, 41 URNG.
See Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union
555
Ursuline nun. See Kazel, Dorothy Uruguay, 360, 452, 453 U.S. Bishops Conference, 125 U.S. Information Agency, 140 U.S. National Council of Churches, 139, 293 Uspantan (Guatemala), 291 Usulatan Department (El Salvador), 32 Usumacinta River, 146 Vagrancy laws, 99 Vaky, Viron P., 3, 336 Valdiviesco, Antonio, 126 Valle Espinosa, Julio, 223 Vanderbilt, Cornelius, 69, 76 Vanguardia Popular (Costa Rica), 468 Vatican II (1962-1965), 25, 105, 122, 143, 201 Vekemans, Roger, 139 Venezuela, 74, 139, 157, 327, 415(table), 441-442, 453, 455, 465-466. See also Contadora Group; San Jose Agreement; under Cuba Venturini, Dianilo, 464 Vera Cruz (Mexico), 80, 424 Verapaz Province (Guatemala), 98 "Vicente Menchu" Christian Indian column, 148 Viera, Jose Rodolfo, 224, 267 (n71) Vietnam. See under El Salvador; United States Vigilante bands, 33, 108, 276 Villagran Kramer, Francisco, 289 Villalobos, Joaquin, 206, 216 Violence, 13, 269-270. See also Political violence Volcanos (El Salvador), 190, 191, 230 Wages, 14, 16, 17(table), 18 (figs.), 19. See also under individual countries Walker, William, 69, 76, 302 Walters, Vernon, 491-492 Warsaw Pact nations, 327, Washington, Geroge, 65 Washington Letter on the Caribbean, 409 Washington Post, 496
450
Washington Times, 140 Watchful Waiting era, 65 Webber, John, 281 Western Europe, 450, 472 West Germany. See Federal Republic of Germany Wheelock Roma, Jaime, 309, 313 White, Alistair, 193 White, Robert, 113, 118, 124, 153(nl4), 222, 223, 247, 266(n52), 480-481, 485 White Hand. See Mano Blanca death squad White Warriors Union (El Salvador), 203, 208, 212 Wilkinson (company), 97 Wilson, Henry Lane, 424 Wilson, Woodrow, 79, 80, 81 Windward Passage, 78 Woods, William, 144 Workers' Party of Jamaica, 462 World Bank, 272, 402, 404, 416-417 World Energy Plan proposal (1979), 432 Wright, John, 103 Xesic
(Guatemala),
Yalpemech farm
292
(Guatemala),
110
Ydigoras Fuentes, Miguel, 276, 277, 278, 281 YSAX (Salvadoran Catholic radio station), 130 Yugoslavia, 40, 479 Zacapa (Guatemala), 282, 295 Zacapa-Izabal (Guatemala) counterinsurgency campaign (1966-1968), 33, 281, 282 Zacualpa (Guatemala), 292 Zaid, Gabriel, 24 Zambrano, Jose Alberto, 465 Zamora, Mario, 212 Zamora, Ruben, 217 Zapata, Emiliano, 427 Zelaya, Jose Santos, 76, 302 Zelaya (Nicaragua), 30, 137, 306 "Zimbabwe option," 503-510 Zuniga Augustinas, Ricardo, 335
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