Revival of Japanese Militarism? 9789814380065

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The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

Established as an autonomous corporation in May, 1968, the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies is a regional research centre for scholars and other specialists concerned with modern Southeast Asia. The Institute's research interest is focussed on the many-faceted problems of modernization and social change in Southeast Asia. The Institute is governed by a 24-member Board of Trustees on which are represented the University of Singapore and Nanyang University, appointees from the Government, as well as representative;:, from a broad (ange of professional and civic organizations and groups. A ten-man Executive Committee oversees day-to-day operations; it is ex officio chaired by the director, the Institute's chief academic and administrative officer.

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Revival of Japanese Militarism?

by

Tatsumi Okabe

Occasional Paper No. 22 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Price: $3.00

Okabe:

Revival of Japanese Militarism? Ertat.a

L

p . 11, para " 3, line 7: "(t.he Pacifi c Switzerland Syndrome) should appear after "Japanese people" on line 9.

2 o p . 19, para. 1, line 6: "the close proximity" should read "the enormous asymmetry ,. " 3. p. 25, para. 3, line 10:

insert "less" before "unlikely."

FOREWORD Japan's massive economic involvement in Southeast Asia and her increasing military build-up at home, coupled with the memories of the Japanese Occupation, have generated considerable speculation and excitement but little worthwhile analysis or understanding of the overall issues involved in either the existing or likely future role of Japan in Southeast Asian affairs. A question that keeps cropping up in any discussion of Japanese-Southe ast Asian relations is that concerning Japanese re-armament and its implications for Southeast Asia. In the article that follows, Professor Tatsumi Okabe attempts to put the whole matter of the revival of Japanese militarism into its proper perspective. Let's hope his analysis will help to clarify the issues involved. In the meantime, while wishing Professor Tatsumi Okabe all the best, it is clearly understood that responsibility for facts and opinions expressed in the work that follows rests exclusively with Professor Okabe, and his interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or policy of the Institute itself or its supporters. 1 July 1974

Kernial Singh Sandhu Director

Introduction During the past few years, with the growth of Japanese economic interests in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, there has appeared a new fear of the revival of Japanese militarism. About 1970, voices of caution about the revival were ~aised by China, the United States of America, the Soviet Union, as well as by Southeast Asian nations. The fears in Southeast Asia seemed especlally strong and persistent. This is emotionally understandable, but the basic problem is, the extent to which the fears can be justified on realistic In other grounds. This is the subject of this paper. words, the writer would like to examine how probable the revival of Japanese militarism is, how probable it is that Japan might send naval vessels and troops to Southeast Asia in order to protect its economic interests in this part of the world. At the outset, it is necessary to give a tentative In the argument to follow, it definition of militarism. means "a tendency in a nation which places highest priority on military values and on war preparations, to the extent that the nation does not hesitate to take military actions abroad in order to protect its overseas interests." Japan in pre-war days apparently had this tendency, and "Revival" this can be aptly called "Japanese militarism." tendency this of reappearance a of Japanese militarism means However, it does not necessarily mean the exact in Japan. pre-war policies and activities in a dramatically of replica In operational terms, especially with different situation. Asia, a revived Japanese militarism Southeast reference to would mean such activities as: occupation of territories; military intervention in civil wars (Vietnam type); largescale military assistance to proxies of Japan; and a naval presence such as patrols, demonstrations ("gunboat diplomacy") and convoys, against the will of the nations con~erned . These activities could be implemented by Japan alone, or in joint efforts with others, possibly with some or all of the "Big Three" (USA, USSR, and CPR). There can be other possible military, but non-militaristic For example, participation in the United functions of Japan. Nations Forces (emergency or standing) ; participation in multilateral treaties such as one to guarantee the neutrality of Southeast Asia; conclusion of a non-controversia l (that is, widely accepted in the region) bilateral or multilateral security treaty such as the Five Power Defense Arrangements;

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1 limited military assistance for maintaining stability. These possibilities are excluded from our definition of "militarism," though we shall touch upon their probabilities later. It is important to note that in our definition, militarism is a tendency, that is, a product of choices and conditions. The definition is different from other definitions such as During the climax of its the one by the Chinese leaders. criticism of Japanese militarism, the Chinese leaders used to argue that militarism as a superstructure became necessary and inevi~able on the economic base of monopoly capitalism According to them, it is not a tendency, but a of Japan. The Chinese leaders themselves, however, necessity. Because, apparently do not believe in this definition. after the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with Japan, the Chinese leaders not only stopped attacking the revival of Japanese militarism, but tried to have friendly relations with Japanese "monopoly capitalists." This is, according to their official definition, tantamount to helping to revive Japanese militarism. The writer does not believe that militarism is necessary In his view, or inevitable at a certain stage of capitalism. accelerating some when only being militarism comes into conditions exist. There are four such accelerating conditions for the They are: emergence of militarism. 1. Domestic needs; 2. Spiritual preparations; 3. Large-scale armament; and 4. International environment. Japan in pre-war days had all these four conditions. of militarism in Japan will become possible only revival The

1

In this operational definition, the standards by whidl we differentiate

militaristic and non-militaristic activities are the degree of their size and desirability as seen by Southeast Asians. 2 A typical exarrple was an editorial in the People 's Daily of 3 Septerrber 1970, titled, "Dadao Fuhuode Ri.ben Junguozhuyi," (.Dc:Mn with revived Japanese militarism).

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when these conditions arise in the contemporary period. The writer's conclusion is that none of the accelerating conditions exist to permit its revival in the contemporary Even moderate non-militaristic functions by period. Japanese military capabilities would be difficult to Let us now turn to a closer examination of implement . these conditions. Domest1c Needs Most emphasis has been placed on domestic needs in arguments about the revival of Japanese militarism. Generally speaking, there could be three possible needs They are: which could promote external military expansion. (l) the need for markets, resources, profits and other economic interests; (2} the need for political unification; and (3) the need for diverting internal unrest to external In pre-war Japan, all these three needs existed, problems. and they promoted the emergence of Japanese militarism. In post-war Japan, the situation has changed dramatically. First, it is true that high economic dependence on overseas markets and materials has remained one of the basic traits of the Japanese economy from pre-war days. This is the factor most emphasized by Marxist arguments such as China's about the revival of Japanese militarism. But, two conditions obstruct the linking of this trait with (a) changes in the These two conditions are: militarism. international environment in military terms, which will be discussed later in detail; and (b) the fact that Japanese dependence on other nations 1s now global in extent. Any economic-oriented militarism presupposes some Japanese experience in the 1930's type of bloc formation . was a case in point. At that time, Japan tried to form a Co-Prosperity Sphere in East and Southeast Asia in an In the effort to guarantee resource-supply and markets . post-war period, however, no bloc is possible for Japan, Undue because of the world-wide dependence of its economy. emphasis on one region would damage Japanese interests in It is disadvantageous for Japan to concentrate other areas. on Southeast Asia, espec1ally slnce the share of the egion in Japan's trade has decreased in the last decade . y forming an economic bloc in Asia therefore, the If Japan is to resort Japanese economy would suffer much. to military means, Japanese economic interests could be guaranteed only by world dominat1on which is sheer nonsense for any nation, much more for a nation with such a vulnerable economy as Japan.

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Also, the meaninglessness of the notorious argument about the Straits of Malacca being Japan's lifeline is clear If the Straits of Malacca is important for from the above. Japan, so are the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, the South and East China Seas, and also the Pacific Ocean and even the Atlantic Ocean perhaps, because Japan's dependence is global . A military guarantee of safe passage along all these Utilization of alternative sea routes is simply impossible. . routes with higher costs is the most realistic response to If the Straits of Malacca any interference to safe passage. happens to be closed, the Lombok Strait will be utilized with the slightly higher cost caused by the two or three days longer voyage. Here, the lessons of the closure of the Suez Canal after 1967 should be remembered. No European Besides, the nation has tried to reopen it by coercion. higher cost of transportation is a relatively minor problem in an age of oil crisis when oil price has been easily doubled or trebled. Japan is now importing 350 million tons of crude oil and iron ore annually. This means that by using 100,000 If other ton vessels, 10 such ships are needed every day. necessary resources and goods to support the Japanese economy are counted, the figure will be tens or hundreds Even a first rate navy would find of such vessels daily. it impossible to convoy the fleet in order to guarantee safe passage. The vulnerability and high external dependence of the Japanese economy, is therefore, not an accelerating condition for Japanese militarism, on the contrary it is a major condition to hinder its emergence. Second, the need for political unification is not The need was very very ~mportant in contemporary Japan. important during the process of nation-building in pre-war Chauvinistic nationalism which ended up in Japan. militaristic expansion was utilized for national integration. In the post-war period, however, the Japanese found was nationally well-integrated enough for all Japan that practical purposes. At the same time, Japan is politically and ideologically divided enough to make it very difficult Most Japanese are very to promote further integration. sensitive about, and antipathetic to being forced to having a distaste'ful memory_ of the enforced U.l'lj..fy, Because of its unification from above in the pre-war days. high .homogeneity in race, culture, and language, Japan is actually already well unified, especially as seen from the This homogeneity and unification have been outside. strengthened by the spread of television networks and the

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accompanying standardization of life styles. The higher standard of living has also promoted unification. Under the circumstances, it is neither necessary nor possible to strengthen unification of the nation by any political means, much less by means of militarism. Third, the need to divert social unrest does not have much meaning. Naturally, there are quite a lot of sources of social unrest in post-war Japan. But, the situation is Rural areas drastically different from the pre-war period. were one of the major sources of unrest in pre-war Japan. There was severe exploitation under unequal land-ownership, over-population, and bad harvests among other things . Poverty and misery in the rural areas were major motivations In the post-war for advocates of militaristic expansion. period, however, owing to land reform, higher oroductivity and the economic boom, rural areas have now become beneficiaries of the present regime, and have produced wealthy but uneducated, travellers abroad known under the name of "Nokyo ... There is, therefore, no motivation for militarism in the rural areas today. Bigger sources of unrest in present day Japan are the urban middle and lower classes and alienated students, but, they are generally more leftist than the government, and critical of Japan's economic expansion abroad as well as of the Self-Defense Force. They tend to demand the raising of the welfare standard of the masses by reducing the military budget < Most of them hold the attitude which the writer calls the "Pacific Switzerland Syndrome." They tend to believe in the desirability and possibility of making Japan a small, quiet, harmless, and peace-loving nation engaged in nonmilitary and non-political activities only. The syndrome It derives from the bitter experiences of defeat in war. which 1947 of was strengthened by the "Pacifist Constitution" forbids armaments, and by the appeal of General McArthur, the Supreme Commander of the occupation forces in Japan , who said that Japan should become a "Switze r land in the Pacific." It was American policy up to 1949 to weaken and pacify Japan . The policy appealed to the Japanese people As a result, many Japanese who were dazed by their defeat. i n the Pacific. Switzerland a Japan making at aim began to This psychological state has lingered on to the present day, long after the revision of American policy in Asia. The image is illusory in the sense that an industrialized country with a population of 100 million can never become a

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Switzerland . The gap between image and reality has been widened by the rapid economic development of Japan which had made the nation an "Economic Giant." As a result, there appeared two different types of "big nation consciousness" to narrow the gap. The first is a traditional reaction of pride and demands a bigger say in world affairs in proport1on to the power of the nation. This type may be called "traditional big nation consciousness