Rethinking (in)Security in the European Union : The Migration-Identity-Security Nexus [1 ed.] 9781527550728, 9781527549036

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Rethinking (In)Security in the European Union

Rethinking (In)Security in the European Union: The Migration-IdentitySecurity Nexus By

Claudia Anamaria Iov

Rethinking (In)Security in the European Union: The Migration-Identity-Security Nexus By Claudia Anamaria Iov This book first published 2020 Cambridge Scholars Publishing Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2020 by Claudia Anamaria Iov All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-5275-4903-8 ISBN (13): 978-1-5275-4903-6

To my family, Mom and Dad, I could never have done this without your love, faith and constant support. Thank you for teaching me to believe in myself, in God and to follow my dreams! Claudiu, I know, beyond the shadow of a doubt, that I am your favourite sister. Granny, grandpa, your memory is a treasure I hold in my heart. I'll miss you forever!

CONTENTS

List of Abbreviations ................................................................................... x Introduction ................................................................................................. 1 Chapter One ............................................................................................... 15 Broadening the Concept of “Security”: Concepts, New Schools, Criticism and Research Perspectives 1.1. The Historical Evolution of Security Studies................................ 17 1.2. What Security means and how (In)Security affects the (Inter)National Agenda............................................................. 21 1.3. Securitization, Desecuritization and Societal Security: Analysis of a Conceptual (R)Evolution .......................................... 25 1.4. The Second Generation of Securitization Theorists and the Paris School of Security Studies ............................................................. 36 1.5. The French School of Geopolitics: The Role of Representations in the Security Analysis.................................................................. 45 1.6. Europe in the Age of Societal Security ......................................... 55 1.7. Conclusions – Towards a “New” Age of Security in Europe?...... 60 Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 63 Migration – Identity – Security Nexus on the European Union’s Security Agenda 2.1. Migration and the (In)Security Policies in the EU ........................ 67 2.2. Identity and the Construction of Migration (In)Security............... 86 2.3. Conclusions................................................................................. 101 Chapter Three .......................................................................................... 104 Yesterday’s Roma – European Pioneers of Tomorrow. Migrants, Transnational Minority or European Citizens? 3.1. Minority, Identity, Imagology – Definition and Dilemmas: A Brief Critical Insight ................................................................. 106 3.2. Roma vs. Gypsy. Aroma or Essence of the Identity Construction Process ......................................................................................... 112 3.3. The History of Yesterday’s Roma – the Starting Point of Today’s Roma European Destiny............................................................... 120 3.4. Conclusion .................................................................................. 149

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Chapter Four ............................................................................................ 150 “L’affaire des Roms” in the European Union: Between European Legislation and Member States Concern 4.1. International Legislation and Political Instruments in the Field of Minorities ................................................................................. 152 4.2. The Roma Destiny in the European Union at the Conjunction of Insecurity with Public Policies ................................................. 160 4.3. The Situation in Central Eastern Europe–Towards a Social Inclusion Policy? .......................................................................... 168 4.4. „Les Roms Boucs Emissaires Ideaux de l’Europe Occidentale”How Did We Get Here? ............................................................... 180 4.5. Conclusions................................................................................. 192 Chapter Five ............................................................................................ 194 The Romanian Roma’s Situation in France (2007-12) : The Instrumentalization of the Roma Issue Between Political Stake and Social Matter ..................................................................................... 199 5.1. The Immigration Phenomenon in France: Evolution, Impact and Public Policies ....................................................................... 199 5.2. L’Affaire des Roms Roumains en France ................................... 213 5.3. The Roma in Lyon: Between Systematic Evictions and Social Integration (2007-12) ................................................................... 232 5.4. Conclusions................................................................................. 255 Chapter Six .............................................................................................. 257 Where Are Today’s Roma Heading : A New Model of Integration? List of Maps............................................................................................. 262 Appendix A ............................................................................................. 263 Migratory Behaviour Determined by Economic Reasons in the Late 90s Appendix B.............................................................................................. 264 Good Practices in Romanian Roma Communities-Project Description Appendix C.............................................................................................. 272 Minimum and Maximum Estimated Number of Roma in Different European Countries

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Appendix D ............................................................................................. 274 Photos of Pata Rât Colony, taken by Claudia Anamaria Iov Appendix E .............................................................................................. 276 Photos from Tinca, send by Monica Suciu, CEO, Ruhama Foundation

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CAF CC INSEE NAR IFG EC EP EU GMI HLM HRD OP MdM NGO OFII OSCE PHARE SGST WRC

Caisses d’Allocations Familiales County Council L’Institute National de Statistiqueet des Études Économiques National Agency for Roma French Institute of Geopolitics European Commission European Parliament European Union Guaranteed Minimum Income Habitation a loyer modique (social housing) The Human Resources Development Operational Program Medecins du Monde Non-governmental Organization Office Français de l’Immigration et de l’Integration Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies Second Generation of Securitization Theorists World Romani Congress

INTRODUCTION

Motto: I have a dream that one day this nation will rise up, live out the true meaning of its creed: we hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal … I have a dream that my four little children will one day love in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character. I have a dream … (Martin Luther King, August 28, 19631)

Following the end of the Cold War, the state ceased to be the only security actor, given that non-military issues began to gain ground on the international agenda. Security was no longer exclusively identified with military issues and the use of force. New problems, determined by changes in the international arena – such as interethnic relations, migration, the economy, cultural identity, and the environment – gained ground against traditional security challenges. In this context, the migration-identitysecurity triumvirate imposed on the international agenda a modern approach to the political-security relationship, with direct consequences on the European integration process (in which the EU plays the role of desecuritization actor). In the context of globalization, the migration-security relationship takes on new dimensions with ample reverberations in the economic, political, social, demographic, and societal fields. East-west migration and ethnic minority movement became greater and highly mediatized due to unfortunate events between the immigrant and the majority population within destination countries (for example the Mailat case in Italy, the situation of the Roma in France 2010–12, Northern Ireland 2009, Hungarians in southern Austria, Turks in Germany, 1

Martin Luther King, “I have a dream” speech, 1963. With regards to this speech, after more than fifty years we can note that the situation has improved to a rather small extent, the differences continuing to be a reason for suspicion and stigma in society. We still have countries where women walk behind men; and the fear of immigrants and foreigners acquires new meanings against the economic crisis in various parts of the world, the Roma being perceived as citizens of a lower importance because they do not have a state of their own, a recognized leader to protect their rights. See: http://www.archives.gov/press/exhibits/dream-speech.pdf.

2

Introduction

and the refugee crisis). Policymakers have used these incidents in their struggle for power and financial resources, turning the migration (legal and illegal), refugees, and asylum seekers’ issue into a meta-issue, a game of power with comprehensive economic, social, and societal reverberations. Common threats are rearranged in “a spiral of insecurity” which culminates with the “image of the immigrant,” perceived as “a nexus of all fears.”2 In the twenty-first century, with immigration beginning to be seen as a combination of threats to the physical security of the state and societal identity, it has been firmly incorporated into a “security continuum.”3 Up until the end of the twentieth century, migration had been perceived as part of internal politics, being underrepresented in the international political discourse. Following the September 11, 2001 terror attacks in the United States, the minority issue became a priority on the European agenda, prompting a new way to approach security with a focus on the issues related to society: migration, demography, interethnic conflicts, culture, environment, and economic development. After the 2001 attacks and their aftermaths in Europe (for example, Madrid 2004, London 2005 and 2017, Oslo 2011, Paris 2015, Nice 2016, and Brussels 20164), the securitization of migration was achieved at an accelerated pace, being connected to certain recurrent themes on the international agenda: organized crime, illegal activities, terrorism, and threats to identity and economic development. Security specialists strive to create an artificial connection between different activity sectors and uncontrolled migration to justify the need for state intervention. The disappearance of the external enemy (military threat) determined the need for inventing an enemy within the society (e.g. the immigrant, the terrorist), which is more difficult to identify and fought under asymmetric confrontation conditions of low intensity, and with great reverberations in international security. Amid the economic crisis and political instability, this situation generated an efficient political instrument – “the fear of immigrants.” In political discourses, through amalgamation and contextualization, themes such as immigration, foreigners, and asylum seekers are identified as the cause of several internal socioeconomic and security-related issues in an attempt to cover the policymakers’ failure in identifying viable measures for the economic, social, or political problems. 2

Claudia Arădău, “Migration: the Spiral of (In)Security,” Rubikon E-Journal 3 (March 2001), 3. 3 Ibid., 1. 4 According to Europol, 205 terrorist attacks (that were stopped, failed, or completed) took place in Europe in 2017, an increase from 142 in 2016.

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The new dynamic of the European integration process, following the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, has determined the Eurosceptics to express their apprehension regarding the enlargement of the EU towards Eastern Europe (2004–7), perceived as a threat to the “Western identity.”5 In this context, “culture becomes a security policy”6 (especially within the EU), imposing the societal security issue on the extended security agenda. Security has always been the goal behind the integration process, which is why the European theorists’ propensity for a diversified security agenda, with a focus on the issues affecting existence and development, is understandable. The European integration process in this case worked as a security system, leading to a resetting of the role of the state in terms of identity and cooperation. Within the greater debate of enlargement versus European integration in recent years, European identity and security are at the heart of the European integration process. Security has always been the purpose of the European integration process, in the states’ attempt to correct the mistakes of the twentieth century, while identity was the element that revolutionized the causality relationship migration-(in)security, conferring it flexibility and referential value, at both subnational and supranational levels, determining the emergence of a transdisciplinary research agenda. Building the Europe of tomorrow cannot however be achieved without getting a consensus regarding the international migration and its effects on the medium and long-term security, social cohesion, welfare state, and identity within EU. A numerically significant minority but also European citizens, the estimated ten to twelve million Roma scattered all over the European countries have definitively assessed themselves in the public and political agenda of Western Europe in the debate regarding European enlargement versus integration. The fall of Communist regimes in Central Eastern Europe and the violent attacks during the transition period led many Roma to seek asylum in Western European states. After the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, their mobility was further enhanced, this time as EU citizens. Even so, high-profile cases, like Italy (2008) or France (2010– 12), provide evidence of increased tensions within host communities and heightened levels of general intolerance towards migrant populations.7 5

Branka Panic, “Societal Security – Security and Identity,” Western Balkans Security Observer 13 (April–June 2009): 33. 6 Ole Waever, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” in On Security, edited by Ronnie D. Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 68. 7 Laura Cashman and E. Butler, “Romani Mobilities in the Context of the New EU - what Could or Should the EU be Doing?” Romani Mobilities in Europe:

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Introduction

Since the 2007 enlargement, however, the Roma are more clearly than ever a subject of EU policy. Although there is still concern about the Roma as immigrants, they are now primarily viewed as Europe’s largest transnational minority (the largest visible minority) faced with the problem of socioeconomic exclusion – a problem that, according to the emerging consensus (of different origin and destination states), the EU should help to address. The desire to solve the Roma issue has become a priority on the European agenda, given that following the Grenoble speech and the launch of the “fight against illegal immigration” the discourses and debates on social exclusion, discrimination, and the violation of rights and liberties, together with images of excavators demolishing illegal camps and women with children in their arms, kept making headlines around the world. The Roma issue in France can be analysed due to its complexity, its stakeholders, and the social and political stakes that surround it, but also because the subject is apparently an exotic one – unique, in fact, and extremely useful for understanding the process of social integration in a multicultural society. Migration is a phenomenon that cannot be fully controlled, and the “zero migration,”8 at least among the Roma population, is neither a feasible nor desirable project. From a historical point of view, the control over the immigration phenomenon is practically impossible in a European Union based on the free movement of persons, goods, products, and services, European identity, and economic single-market liberalization, all of which requires friendly borders. The fact that l’affaire des roms is so easily associated with France’s security agenda through discursive practice, given that it is primarily a socioeconomic issue, shows the vulnerability of this ethnic group. Amid the election battle, in a time of economic crisis with extensive social and identity reverberations, through the contextualization of the events at Grenoble and Saint-Aignan (2010), President Sarkozy brought the “immigration file” on the French security agenda up for discussion again, an important aspect being the visibility of illegal Roma camps. The problem of Romanian Roma in France has held the attention of the two states since the 1990s, however the large number of voluntary repatriations and excessive coverage of expulsions in the last five years turned this issue into a European scandal under the presidency of Sarkozy, Multidisciplinary Perspectives, International Conference, Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, January 14–15, 2010, p. 7. 8 Ibid., 5.

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who, through politico-electoral instrumentalization, raised it to a “national program level”9 (of identity securitization). After France managed to resolve the situation of the slums (created by the immigrants who came after the Second World War), it did not expect to end up dealing with the illegal Roma camps (after actively supporting Romania’s EU accession). The failure of multiculturalism management in the welfare state, amid economic recession, must force analysts to rethink the European integration issue on new socioeconomic-identity grounds, in the context of an ongoing process of enlargement to southeastern countries (see the case of Croatia). This book is the result of a series of studies devoted to assessing the consequences of migration through the perspective of the migrationidentity-(in)security causality with a focus on the Roma issue in France. The consequences of migration are analysed on two levels: the political stake (instrumentalized by policymakers in the public discourse to win over electoral capital) and social issues (with a focus on coherent social integration programs, our case study being the Romanian Roma population of France). The central questions that this work tries to answer are: How did the Roma transform themselves from unwanted immigrants into the most visible minority within the EU? What are the effects of the Roma issue instrumentalization between political stake and social issue in France between 2007 and 2012 in the fight against illegal migration launched by President Sarkozy to obtain a new mandate? Respectively, does the situation in the Hexagon translate as l’affaire des roms or l’affaire rom? (This last question can be extrapolated to the entire European Union, in the light of recent events and hesitations of policymakers in formulating a coherent political framework.) The Roma issue has been studied for some time, as it has been arousing interest and curiosity about the lifestyle, traditions, and culture of the minority ever since their arrival in Europe. The novelty of contemporary studies on the Roma is given by the transdisciplinary (i.e. interdisciplinary) approach of this issue and the substantial engagement of researchers and Roma leaders in the Roma identity-construction process. Surpassing the 9

Laura Mitran and Aurelia Alexa, “CRONOLOGIE: Problema romilor dintre România úi FranĠa, în atenĠia Europei de la repatrierile din 2010,” Mediafax, September 12, 2012 [TIMELINE: The Roma issue between Romania and France, in Europe’s attention at the 2010 repatriations], https://www.mediafax.ro/politic /cronologie-problema-romilor-dintre-romania-si-franta-in-atentia-europei-de-larepatrierile-din-2010-10062359.

6

Introduction

sociological, anthropological, or ethnographic approaches, we find ourselves on the grounds of the geopolitical analysis of the Roma issue. Being a complex research that harmoniously combines history with international relations and geopolitical analysis, the analysis of the subject area is transdisciplinary, and the approach is multifaceted, with a focus on causality, the actors involved, and the potential scenarios for solving the Roma issue in the EU member states in terms of social inclusion. This research aims to demonstrate the fact that, in the context of the new European agenda on security and the European Agenda on Migration, following the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, immigrants in general, and the Roma in particular, have found themselves trapped in a spiral of insecurity through which migration has been raised to the level of metaproblem, and they have become scapegoats to various degrees. To prove this hypothesis there are two levels of analysis: a general one, in the European Union, in which our attention is on how the migrationidentity-(in)security relationship appears on the extended EU security agenda; and a particular one focusing on the Roma issue and the manner in which it appears in the spiral of insecurity, analysing several case studies, with special attention to the case of France. In the case of France, our attention is drawn to the manner in which the Roma issue is used nationally as a campaign theme, while locally the public authorities (for example in Lyon), concurrently with the actions of eviction and expulsion, seek and experiment with (away from the media) various solutions to achieve the social inclusion of the Roma, in both the host and especially the origin state. It is argued in this book that migration in general, and the Roma issue in particular, in the context of the enlargement versus EU integration debate, reflect a broader political discussion on the EU’s identity and social policy. The lack of a common social policy, the democratic deficit, and the failure of the recent reform process emphasize the existence of an identity crisis in the EU. The socioeconomic and security dimension of the “Roms dossier” is a case that may encourage policymakers in Brussels to rethink the EU’s social responsibilities towards its citizens, thus giving up the ambiguous attitude regarding migration. In order to address potential criticism of this book, I must mention that it addresses the migration-identity-(in)security relationship from the perspective of internal mobility between the EU member states, focusing on the Roma mobility after Romania’s and Bulgaria’s accession (2007), and does not involve an exhaustive analysis of the immigration phenomenon within the EU, which also comprises the migration from tertiary states. The analysis only briefly touches, in the first two chapters,

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on the immigration phenomenon issue in the context of the EU’s extended security approach. Concerning identity, the analysis is focused on the “Roma identity political project” in the context of the European identity construction amid the enlargement versus integration debate, in which an important role is played by the effects of the economic crisis on the welfare state. Identity innovates the migration-insecurity causality relation, conferring it flexibility and referential value both at subnational and supranational levels, giving rise to a transdisciplinary research agenda. Within the “(in)security spiral,”10 identity has a dual role – the cause and effect of migration and (in)security. The book is structured in two parts with five chapters. The first part comprises three chapters and analyses the EU’s extended security approach, focusing on the interdependence relationship migration-identity(in)security. In the context of the changes which accompanied the end of the Cold War, such as the collapse of Communism and the onset of new regional conflicts (see the Western Balkans), the purpose of the first chapter is to emphasize the (r)evolution of security as it appears after moving the centre of analysis from the traditional (politico-military) security to the modern, individual-oriented security, where the concept of identity, in the broad sense of the word, plays an essential role. Our attention is drawn to the new perception of “security” as it appears in the interpretation of the Copenhagen and Paris schools. The first chapter focuses on the new analytical framework of “security,” a brief overview of the French geopolitical analysis, and the societal security sector, respectively the tackling of securitization as an act of speech by the theorists of the Copenhagen School and the criticism of its main objectors – the Second Generation of Securitization Theorists and the Paris School. The chapter is intended to formulate an opinion on the new analytical framework of security, certain research concepts and instruments with which we will work throughout our analysis. The formulation of an exhaustive answer to the simple question of “what is security?” proved to be practically impossible given that theorists report on it differently, in terms of both objective (real) and subjective (social construct) dimensions, depending on the purpose of the research. For the present analysis its subjective nature is important, in the context of the migration-identity-security nexus. The second chapter analyses the migration-identity-security interdependence relationship with a focus on its effects on the European 10

Paul Roe, “The Interstate Security Dilemma,” in Claudia Arădău, “Migration: the Spiral of (In)Security,” Rubikon E-Journal 3 (March 2001), 5.

8

Introduction

integration process. This nexus will be reviewed under a triple aspect of its effects on: security, the welfare state, and identity construction within the EU. This analysis aims at demonstrating that the migration security goes beyond Weaver’s discursive practices, being an integral part of a complex construct called by Claudia Arădău the “security continuum.”11 In this analysis, migration must be understood and regarded as a spill-over effect, bringing together previous sectors that were studied separately. In the current context, marked by an economic crisis, migration has been elevated to the level of meta-issue,12 the boundaries between threats to internal and external politics becoming more ambiguous. The EU’s integration capacity was put to the test regarding the last two waves of accession, with states that presented a considerable number of Roma population living in precarious conditions (we refer to the enlargements of 2004 and 2007 – this analysis does not tackle the case of Croatia, which joined in 2013, as the effects of this accession will only be seen in about seven to ten years). These two enlargements were different from the previous ones, both in terms of the large number of solicitants, historic past, population size, or conflicts between the minority and majority populations. In this context, the questions are: what type of stability and security is suitable for such a union, and how important is the political identity project against economic liberalization, given that, after the Maastricht Treaty, the primarily economic European Community entered the path of a political union? It is interesting to see the way in which the European integration process works as a security system, determining a relocation of the state’s role in terms of identity and sovereignty within the same system. Security has always been the purpose behind the European integration process, in an attempt by the states to avoid repeating the mistakes of the twentieth century. This chapter aims to provide a better understanding of the manner in which the migration-identity-security-triumvirate imposed on the European agenda a modern approach of the politics-security relationship, and the way in which it influenced the European integration process (in which the EU plays the role of desecuritization actor), and at the same time the detection of a way to address the consequences arising from this triumvirate.

11

Arădău, “Migration: the Spiral of (In)Security,” 5. Dider Bigo, “Migration and Security,” in Controlling a New Migration World, edited by Virginie Guiraudon and Christian Joppke (London: Routledge, 2001), 121–2. 12

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In the third chapter our attention is retained by the elements comprising the Roma identity – the history, culture, and traditions – in an attempt to separate the myth and folklore from the historical reality. The analysis is not intended to be exhaustive, as it instead reviews key moments and controversial issues in the Roma history and culture which, in time, caused real disputes between the Roma activists/leaders (the constructivist approach) and researchers (the deconstructionist approach). Gradually, our attention is retained by the first certifications on the Roma presence in Europe, the importance and role of nomadism in the history of this group, and the role of the Roma organizations in the shaping and international assertion of the Roma identity project. The second part of the book contains the following two chapters and is dedicated to the analysis of the situation of the Roma in several EU states, using the instruments and theories discussed in the chapters of the first part of the book, with a special focus on the situation of the Roma in France. In the fourth chapter, we illustrate and analyse the relation of interdependence between two components – identity and security – focusing on international legislation, the potential interethnic conflict, and the way in which different aspects of the legislative approach regarding human rights and the protection of national and ethnic minorities influenced the relation between state (majority) and minority (the Roma population, considered here as a non-popular minority) in several Central and Southeastern EU countries. The research questions are related to the impact of the accession criteria on policies for the Roma population: how did the accession process influence the legislation on minorities in general, and the relation between state (majority) and the minority (the Roma population) in particular? Was there any important change in the process of social integration made by these countries due to joining the EU? What was the impact of Roma migration (coming from the new EU countries) on the countries of Western Europe? How did the Western countries react? One can imagine that the constraints (conditionality) imposed by EU on the candidate countries from Central and Southeastern Europe, in our case in the field of the minorities issue, are the “sticks,” and the financial stimuli (pre-accession funds, European Social Fund) the “carrots.” With regards to the Western European states, our attention will be drawn to the manner in which they managed to cope with the waves of Roma immigrants from the new member states. Measures taken vary from state to state, depending on the extent of the phenomenon, the immigrationsecurity relationship, and the effects on the majority populationimmigrants relation and its media coverage.

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Introduction

The fifth chapter analyses the Romanian Roma’s situation in France between 2007 and 2012. Our purpose is to complete a complex analysis of the situation in the context of the new European security agenda and the European Agenda on Migration, transcending the strictly theoretical framework of the spiral of insecurity, with a focus on the povertymigration-security relationship (through social integration). The question that arises here is whether social integration should be encouraged/supported within the host or origin state. Our main objective is to achieve a coherent outline to facilitate the understanding of the characteristics individualizing the Roma’s situation in various illegal camps in France, their relationships with the majority population and NGOs, as well as their future prospects between repatriation/expulsion and social integration. The conclusions chapter summarizes the main results obtained in the analysis and draws new lines for research, potential scenarios to solve the Roma issue (taking into consideration the actors involved), the extent of the phenomenon, and the severity of this ethnic group’s representatives’ situation both in the states of origin and the destination. The book belongs to a constructivist approach with a dynamic perspective on the social and societal, where the actors and the system structure are inter-connected, so our interest is retained by the manner in which the theorists from the Copenhagen and Paris schools develop an analytical framework for the understanding and explanation of the interdependence relationship between migration, identity, and security. In order to achieve the targeted research objective, the project is based on a series of scientific research techniques and methods that are specific to political sciences, international law, international relations, and sociology. Although we are using methods/instruments that other researchers are also familiar with and we analyse a “trendy” issue for both France and the EU, based on our own expertise, contextualization, and analysis, we are certain that the results will be as expected. As with Kuhn’s theory, in which “the ducks existing in the researchers’ world before the revolution, are rabbits after it,”13 the Roma who were initially considered a minor social issue have become, in the context of freedom of movement, an illegal migration phenomenon, visible through excessive media coverage, and a matter of security with ample political reverberations. 13

Thomas Samuel Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 122.

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Th. Kuhn - “Paradigm Shift”

The subject under consideration demands a multidisciplinary and multileveled approach. Without a complex approach involving political, economic, cultural, ideological, historical, psychological, and geographical implications, a complex geopolitical analysis of the Roma situation in the EU cannot be achieved. The multiplicity of events also entails a brief diachronic analysis, following the thread of eviction, repatriation, and expulsion actions of the Romanian Roma in France from 2007 to 2012, with a focus on the main moments of tension, the actions of the actors involved, the media echo and the main measures taken to address the situation, and the efficiency of social-inclusion programs or the extent to which they produce sustainable changes within the community, as well as within the relations with the majority. Achieving the stated research objectives implies the use of qualitative techniques, such as the case study, the questionnaire, and the interview, applied to the actors involved in the Roma issue (Roma ethnics, profile organizations, community facilitators, Romanian and French experts), which are necessary to confer a unique character to our approach. There will also be quantitatively interpreted statistical data, given that a part of our research focused on the analysis of a total of 758 articles on the situation of the Roma (originating from Romania and Bulgaria) in four French newspapers (Le Monde, Le Figaro, Libération, and Le Parisien)

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Introduction

monitored over a period of three years, in the months of August to October of 2010, 2011, and 2012. The case study demanded field research in the Roma communities in both France (Paris, Lyon) and Romania (the counties of Cluj and Bihor). Due to the fact that a part of the research was performed in a foreign state, without previous contacts with the respective authorities, one of the methods used was observation. Due to the reluctance of the Roma community representatives to talk about their situation we opted for the non-participative form of analysis, the activity being mostly based on exterior observation without engagement. For optimum results, we combined this method with open interviews and the application of questionnaires in the context of a previous analysis of statistical data, current legislation, and the media and literature in the field. Fortunately, speaking the Romanian (as well as French) language, we did not encounter difficulties in communicating with them, nor with the NGOs and local authority representatives. A constraint in this research was however imposed by the Roma’s reluctance to provide accurate information about their situation and constant mobility, which required a permanent extension of the research area and the group. We also encountered difficulties due to the lack of openness of the local authorities (Lyon) to provide information on the local Roma community and the problems they are facing. The conclusions of the case study are the result of the findings and information obtained from the field research (in France and Romania), combined with a prior documentation on the current French legislation, statistics, and press analyses. The series of interviews with representatives of the Roma community and the local public authorities and NGOs, both in France and Romania, proved to be of utmost importance. The ten unstructured interviews with Romanian Roma from the Grand Lyon community – five from Paris, and two from St. Etienne – give a special note of authenticity to the depiction of the living conditions, social organization, relation with the majority population and public institutions, and the marginal economic activities of the Roma community in the host state, as well as the impulses that lead them towards the West. The painting is harmoniously completed with the information obtained from the representatives of the Roma communities in the northwest region (about seventy representatives, comprising local leaders, experts, and Roma mediators within municipalities) with regards to the living conditions, access to employment and accommodation, the relations with the majority population, labour market opportunities, the “Western mirage,” and the manner in which the public institutions and

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NGOs are actively and consistently involved in solving the issues the Roma are dealing with on a daily basis. The representatives of the local public authorities (Lyon, Tinca, Huedin, Zalău, and Mirúid) provided us with an official view on the Roma community problem management, while the representatives of profile NGOs (Sălaj County Centre Association for Education, Development and Social Economy Sălaj, Millennium Social Alternatives, the Ruhama Foundation, Dobrogea Association – the Second World War Deportees League, the Social Services Consultancy and Training in the Social Field Association, the Karma Pro Rromi Association, Medecin du Monde, or La Voix des Roms) made a summary of the main social-inclusion projects and programs. Questions regarding the Roma history and culture were the theme of an unstructured interview applied to a sample of ninety-five people from academia, the state administration, the private sector, and social-protection specialists in Romania. Their answers can be found in chapter three of this paper. The field research and the personal expertise and experience within the Romanian Roma communities play an important role in this project, mainly in demonstrating the research hypotheses. The previous experience in the Roma communities in Region 6 Northwest of the last ten years (with the projects Together for a Better Life and “Social Entrepreneurship, a Chance for Roma Communities”) and its transfer to the present paper give this research a note of authenticity. This book is the published version of a PhD thesis, the product of scientific research conducted during doctoral studies in Romania and France, combined with the experience and expertise gained in the activities developed over the last ten years in Romanian Roma communities. The personal documentation and research effort was carefully supervised and enforced by guidance, advice, and scientific support, which is why I address this to those people who have supported, guided, and coordinated me in this effort. Special consideration goes to the scientific coordinators of the paper, Professor Barbara Loyer (Paris 8 Vincennes-Saint-Denis University), and Professor Adrian Liviu Ivan, and Professor Lucian Nastasă-Kovacs (Babeú-Bolyai University), who were by my side as the original, rather simple idea took shape and turned into a comprehensive, transdisciplinary approach. I would also like to thank the board of teachers from the Department of International Studies and Contemporary History (Babeú-Bolyai University) and the French Institute of Geopolitics (Paris 8 University), who contributed to the theoretical training during my doctoral studies.

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Introduction

A series of acknowledgements goes to my colleagues at the Institut Français de Géopolitique, the local public-authority representatives, profile organizations partners, friends, and collaborators who have expressed openness towards this subject, provided prompt responses to my requests in a clear and objective manner, and shared their vast experience and expertise. My consideration also goes to the Roma organizations, experts in the Roma issues, community facilitators, the communities themselves, and the local Roma leaders who have made a considerable effort to submit the required information in a concise and objective manner. The responsibility for any error in analysing or interpreting the data is entirely my own. Last but not least, I am very thankful to my family who have supported me throughout the entire scientific endeavour, especially my mother who offered me understanding and moral support during watershed moments in the research. I close this short introduction by saying that the element of novelty that this book proposes is the multidisciplinary and multileveled approach to the Roma issue in the EU’s extended security agenda, harmoniously combining the international relations analysis with a geopolitical approach.

CHAPTER ONE BROADENING THE CONCEPT OF “SECURITY”: CONCEPTS, NEW SCHOOLS, CRITICISM, AND RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES

Traditionally, throughout their entire history, people have been preoccupied with ensuring security (be it physical existence, providing a food source, or elements of identity), which is why Maslow’s Pyramid places this need, in terms of importance, immediately after the physiological needs. Despite its age, “security” is an ambiguous and “contested concept,”14 a kaleidoscope of referent objects, practices, actors, and instruments, being non-reductive to a basic sense or fixed linguistic forms. Thus, the term “security” resembles an “umbrella term” through which a small group of actors (generally the international policymakers) justifies the need for certain exceptional political measures and programs. The end of the Cold War resulted in moving the centre of gravity of the scientific discourse from “peace” towards “security” and “cooperation to achieve security” in terms of a complex analysis which implies a multifaceted approach of the term as compared to the traditional approach (realism15), which emphasized the military (politico-military) threats to the 14 The idea appears in Barry Buzan’s People, State and Fear (London: Harvester Whaetsheaf, 1991), 7, in English as “contested.” Epistemologically, in English, the meaning of the term is much richer (meaning challenged, disputed, questioned), and is unfortunately lost with its (poor) translation into Romanian. 15 Realism is a traditional approach of international relations that appeared in the 1940s. The states were the main actors in the international arena, the other types of organizations/actors (international organizations, private actors) being considered irrelevant, and of negligible importance. The state maintained a monopoly over legitimate violence, ensuring security for its citizens. Relations between actors were based on the famous “power balance” and the protection of the “national interest,” i.e. maintaining the integrity of the territory, political institutions, and culture. For an exhaustive analysis of this theory see: Hans J. Morgenthau, Politica intre natiuni. Lupta pentru putere si lupta pentru pace [Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Power and the Struggle for Peace] (Iasi: Polirom Publishing

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scientific discourse. The evolution from peace to security (in the broad sense of the term) shows a new manner of relating to the events in the international arena, given the fact that peace requires the lack of an armed conflict, while security requires the lack of threats16 (with a series of tones specific to the security sector). We are thus witnessing a process of this domain’s enlargement and intersection with others, such as the economic, social, cultural, or environmental ones. Globalization gave rise to an important debate among the international relations theorists on the research and analysis area concerning the security studies,17 in which the non-military threats (economic collapse, migration, demographic changes, natural disasters, environmental matters, and limited natural resources18) have drawn the attention of researchers and practitioners as part of the “extended security agenda.”19 Giddens is one of the analysts who notes the importance of globalization on the extension of the security agenda as “the exacerbation of worldwide social relations House, 2007); Kenneth N. Waltz, Omul, Statul si Razboiul [The Man, the State and the War] (Iasi: The European Institute, 2001); Kenneth Waltz, Teoria politicii internationale [Theory of International Politics] (Iasi: Polirom Publishing House, 2006); Jean-Jaques Roche, Théories des relations internationals (Paris: Montchrestien, 2001); Stefano Guzzini, Realism si relatii internationale [Realism and International Relations] (Iasi: European Institute Publishing House, 2000); Martin Griffiths, Steven C. Roach, and M. Scott Solomon, Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations (London and New York: Routledge, 2009); Edward A. Kolodziej, Securitatea si relatiile internationale [Security and International Relations] (Iasi: Polirom PH, 2007); Peter Houghn, Understanding Global Security (London and New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2004). 16 Radu-Sebastian Ungureanu, Conceptul De Securitate [The Concept of Security], in Manualul de relatii internationale [Book of International Relations], edited by Andrei Miroiu and Radu-Sebastian Ungureanu, (Bucharest: Polirom Publishing House, 2006), 180. 17 Branka Panic, “Societal Security – Security and Identity,” Western Balkans Security Observer 13 (April–June 2009), 29. 18 For details regarding the first papers announcing the widening of the research area in the security studies domain see Ken Booth, “Security and Emancipation,” Review of International Studies 17, no. 4 (1991): 313–26; Barry Buzan, “Is International Security Possible?” in New Thinking About Strategy and International Security, edited by Ken Booth (London: Harper Collins, 1991), 31–5; Jessica Mathews Tuchman, “Redefining Security,” Foreign Affairs 68, no. 2 (1989): 162– 77; Richard, H. Ullman, “Redefining Security,” International Security 8, no. 1 (1983): 129–53. 19 Paul Roe, “The Societal Dimension of Global Security,” in Global Security and International Political Economy Vol. I, edited by Pinar Bilgin, Paul D. Williams, et al., Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems (EOLSS), 113–32.

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17

[caused by] the events in a part of the world [to be] influenced by events occurring in very remote areas.”20 In the context of these changes (accompanying the end of the Cold War, the collapse of Communism, and the onset of new regional conflicts, such as those in the Western Balkans), the research purpose is to emphasize the (r)evolution of security as it appears after moving the analysis centre from the traditional (politico-military) security to the modern, individual-oriented security, where the concept of identity, in the broad sense of the word, plays an essential role. The chapter focuses on the new analytical framework of security, a brief overview of the societal security sector, the tackling of securitization as a “speech act” by the theorists of the Copenhagen School, and the criticism of its main objectors – the Second Generation of Securitization Theorists and the Paris School. This first chapter is intended to formulate an opinion on the new analytical framework of security and explain certain research concepts and instruments with which we will work throughout our analysis.

1.1. The Historical Evolution of Security Studies Security studies, “an Anglo-American invention,”21 appeared following the Second World War under two different names: Strategic Studies in England and National Security Studies in America. The history of security studies has often been divided into four periods of development depending on the attention they raised for ideologists and their relevance in the interpretation of events in the international arena. During the first period (1918–55, also known as “a period with little interest in security studies”22), security studies was not considered a separate sub-discipline of the international relations. In this period, the term “security” was perceived as a multifaceted and multidisciplinary issue that required the competition of international law, international organizations, and political theory to promote democracy and disarmament23 in the international arena. Among the theorists analysing

20

Anthony Giddens, ConsecinĠele modernităĠii [Consequences of Modernity] (Bucharest: Univers Publishing House, 2000), 64. 21 Paul D. Williams (ed.), Security Studies: an Introduction (London and New York, Routledge, 2008), 2. 22 Pernille Rieker, “Security, Integration and Identity Change,” Working Paper, No. 611, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI): Oslo, December 2000, p. 6. 23 Ibid.

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the economic and psychological aspects of the war, J. Hertz, A. Wolfers, and Q. Wright stand out. The second period, known as the “golden age” (1955–85), when “the civilian strategists enjoyed relatively strong connections with the Western governments and their foreign and security policies,”24 coincided with the creation of an independent security discipline. The topics that dominated this period’s research were nuclear disarmament and its related issues (limited war, and combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, for example the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty – SALT I and SALT II). During this period, the security concerns were based on political realism centred on the “four Ss” (states, strategy, the status quo, and science).25 We notice that, in this period, the hard security issues were still on the front page of international concern due to the political relevance they had for the actors at the forefront of the bipolar system, which resulted in an infusion of funds towards the theoretical studies in this area, leading to the appearance of several prestigious journals. In his paper Understanding Global Security, Peter Hough perfectly sums up the role of the security studies in this period with the statement that: “Security Studies became the military arm of International Relations.”26 The situation was about to change with the assertion and enforcement of the economic agendas (especially after the oil crises of 1973 and 1979) and the environmental ones in the international relations, and more and more theorists who denied the limitation of the research/interest area in security studies. Among these voices we can mention Barry Buzan with People, States and Fear: an Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (first edition in 1983, reissued in 1991 with a much greater impact), Robert Keohane with Neorealism and its Critics (1986), Arthur Westing with “The Military Sector Vis-à-vis the Environment,” Jessica Matthews Tuchman with “Redefining Security,” and Richard, H. Ullman with “Redefining Security.” This contestation of the narrow

24 John Garnett (ed.), Theories of Peace and Security (London: Macmillan, 1970); Dan Dungaciu, “Securitate, Relatii Internationale si Studii de Securitate” [“Security, International Relations and Security Studies”], Revista de StiinĠe Politice RelaĠii Internationale [Political Sciences International Relations Journal] IX, no. 4 (2012): 6. 25 Dungaciu, “Securitate, Relatii Internationale si Studii de Securitate,” 6; Peter Houghn, Understanding Global Security (London and New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2004), 4. 26 Houghn, Understanding Global Security, 4.

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meaning regarding the concept of security during the “golden age” marks the third development phase of security studies (1985–95).27 The number of objectors increased with the number of themes inserted into the security agenda (migration, regional interethnic conflicts, crossborder criminality, and cultural, economic, and religious security) and with the growing number and visibility of international actors (those others than the states, namely NGOs, multinational corporations, international organizations, and even the individual), but especially due to the emergence of the new European schools of security (Aberystwyth, Copenhagen, and Paris), which bring together researchers willing to create analytical frameworks adapted to the new security threats. The emergence of several schools of security in Europe challenged the “American leadership”28 to a high extent in this field, the competition between them resulting in a dynamic approach to security studies from a socioconstructivist29 perspective, as a counterweight to the realist/neorealist approach, as is well observed by M. C. Williams in Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and World Politics: “over the past decade, the field of security studies has become one of the most dynamic and contested areas in International Relations … it has become, perhaps, the primary forum in which broadly social constructivist approaches have challenged traditional – largely Realist and non-Realist theories on their ‘home turf’, [where] some of the most vibrant new approaches to the analysis of international politics are being developed, and … in which some of the most engaged theoretical debates are taking place.”30 The need for a broader approach and a much wider vision in the security studies field (in the context of new international challenges, other than those in the bipolar system period) was also shown in the UN 2003 Report of the Commission on Human Security, “Human Security Now,” which states that: “The state continues to have the primary responsibility for security. But as security challenges become more complex and various, and new 27

Pernille Rieker, “Security, Integration and Identity Change,” 2. Ole Wæver, “Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: New 'Schools' in Security Theory and their Origins between Core and Periphery,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, March 17–20, 2004, p. 2. 29 Constructivism is a structural theory of the international system which postulates that the state is the main unit of analysis; the key structures in the states’ system are inter-subjective and not material; and that the state’s identity and interests are founded by these key structures and not as a result of internal policies. 30 Michael C. Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and World Politics,” in International Studies Quarterly 47 (2003): 511. 28

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actors attempt to play a role, we need a shift in the paradigm. The focus must broaden from the state to the security of people – to human security.”31 The last and current period of security studies (from 1995) is the “profound and extended” security studies period. Although new, they have reunited an important group of guidelines (critical studies, the Copenhagen School, the sociological work of Didier Bigo et al., the Second Generation of Securitization Theorists, and the radical postmodernists of feminist theory), as well as a series of theorists who have made a career in the security studies field (Buzan, Weaver, de Wilde, Huysman, Williams, McSweeney, Krause, Smith, Arădău, Roe, van Munster, Dillon, Bigo, and Balzacq32). Their place, role, and contribution to developing the securitystudies field represent our further concern in this chapter. 31

Suzanne H. Risley, “The Sociology of Security: Sociological Approaches to Contemporary and Historical Securitization,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Montreal Convention Center, Montreal, Quebec, Canada Online, 2006, p. 27; For the role that the concept of human security plays in addressing the wider approach on security see also Mary Kaldor’s Securitatea Umana: Reflectii asupra Globalizarii si Interventiei [Human Security: Reflections on Globalization and Intervention] (Cluj-Napoca: CA Publishing, 2010). 32 Jef Huysmans, “Security! What do you mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier,” European Journal of International Relations 4, no. 2 (1998): 226–55; Ole Wæ ver, “What is Security? The Securityness of Security,” in European Security 2000, edited by Birthe Hansen (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Political Studies Press, 1996); Ole Wæ ver, Integration as Security: European International Identity and American Domestic Discipline, working paper 27 (Copenhagen: COPRI, 1997); Keith Krause and Michael W. Williams, Critical Security Studies (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997); Michael W. Williams, “Identity and the Politics of Security,” European Journal of International Relations 4, no. 2 (1998): 204–25; Jef Huysmans, “Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe,” European Journal of International Relations 4, no. 4 (1998): 479–506; Steve Smith, “The Increasing Insecurity of Security Studies: Conceptualizing Security in the Last Twenty Years,” in Critical Reflections on Security and Change, edited by Stuart Croft and Terry Terriff (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 72–101; Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, “Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods,” Mershon International Studies Review 40, supplement 2 (1996): 229– 54; Keith Krause, “Critical Theory and Security Studies: the Research Programme of ‘Critical Security Studies’,” Cooperation and Conflict 33, no. 3 (1998): 298– 333; Michael, Dillon, Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought (London: Routledge, 1996); Michael Dillon, “Virtual Security: a Life Science of (Dis)Order,” Millennium 32, no. 3 (2003): 531–58; Paul

Broadening the Concept of “Security”

21

Before proceeding to analyse the main security schools, we will provide some answers to the simple question which attracts continued interest and puzzlement from the security researchers – what is security?

1.2. What Security Means and How (In)Security Affects the (Inter)National Agenda The question of what security is opens many articles in this field, being accompanied by feverish attempts by certain scholars to capture the essence of this concept. The term derives from the Latin sine cura, which means “without solicitude; careless; free from cares, untroubled; quiet; easy.” Thus, security is defined as “freedom from concern; unconcern; composure; freedom from danger; safety.”33 In 1952 Arnold Wolfers introduced its double dimension, defining it objectively as “the absence of threats to acquired values,” and subjectively as “the absence of fearing such values would be attacked.”34 The term’s ambiguity is “a quality and not a disadvantage”35 as it forced the theorists’ imagination beyond the previous research limits, thus giving rise to new patterns of security analysis.

1.2.1 What is Security? The answer to this question does not represent a final/end point in the research, but is rather a starting point in the contemporary security analysis whose research inquiries diversify, becoming: “What needs to be secured? Which threats must the referent object be secured against?” The theorist who reported the announced the failure of traditional interpretations of security in the post-Cold War world and who opened the perspective of a new debate is Buzan in People, States and Fear: an

Roe, “Actor, Audience(s) and Emergency Measures: Securitization and the UK’s Decision to Invade Iraq,” Security Dialogue 39, no. 6 (2008): 615–35. 33 Michael Dillon, Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought (London: Routledge, 1996), 125. 34 Arnold Wolfers, “National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol,” Political Science Quarterly 67, no. 4 (1952): 485. 35 Radu-ùerban Ungureanu, Securitate, Suveranitate, úi InstituĠii InternaĠionale, Crizele din Europa de Sud-Est în anii ’90 [Security, Sovereignty and International Institutions: Southeastern European Crises of the 1990s] (Iaúi: Polirom PH, 2011), 16.

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Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era,36 in which he argued in favour of an extended interpretation of security with five major interdependent intervention sectors: military, political, societal, economic, and environmental, facilitating a cross-sectorial approach, their separation taking place for analytical purposes only. The book had a major impact on the evolution of security studies (it may even be implied that it determined the “(r)evolution of security,” changing the reference model of the field, which is why it attracted so much criticism). In a 1991 analysis, Ken Booth wrote about this volume that “it is the most complete and comprehensive theoretical analysis of the concept of security in the international relations literature until today and, since its publication, the rest of us have continued to write its footnotes.”37 The importance of this question lies not in its definition of “the free market of security concepts,”38 but rather in the contextualization of this concept with contributions from research fields such as history, geography, sociology, criminology, or law, whose relevance in the security analysis has long been ignored. If security has long been reduced to the status of an issue/problem in international relations, with an epistemological confusion frequently appearing between “security,” “raison d’etat,” and “national interest”39 after the enlargement of the meaning, it became a powerful political construct which Spivak called “one cannot want”40 – dynamic, difficult to manage, and requiring careful use, otherwise risking everything becoming security. The concept of “security” is a label, an “umbrella term” that combines the traditional military form, the classic idea of raison d’etat, and the extended contemporary approach (with the new security sectors: political, economic, societal, and environmental41), in what Buzan, Weaver, and de 36

Barry Buzan, People, State and Fear: an Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991). 37 Ken Booth, “Security and Emancipation,” Review of International Studies 17, no. 4 (1991): 313–26. 38 Thierry Balzacq, Tugba Basaran, Didier Bigo, Emanuel-Pierre Guittet, and Christian Olsson, “Security Practices,” International Studies Encyclopedia Online (Denmark: Robert A. Blackwell Publishing, 2010), 2, http://www.open.ac.uk/researchprojects/iccm/files/iccm/olsson-christianpublication7.pdf. 39 Ibid. 40 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, The Spivak Reader: Selected Works of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (New York and London: Routledge, 1996). 41 Josefina Echavarría Alvarez, “Re-thinking (In)Security Discourses from a Critical Perspective,” Asteriskos Journal of International and Peace Studies vol. 1/2 (Galizan Institute of International Security and Peace Studies, 2006), 62.

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Wilde called a new security analysis framework.42 Within the extended security agenda: military security refers to security on two levels of the armed offensive and the defensive ability of the states as well as a state’s perceptions on the intentions of the other and vice versa. The political security refers to the organizational stability of the states, systems of government and the ideologies that ensure legitimacy. The economic security refers to the access to resources, finances and necessary markets to sustain acceptable living conditions, but also to the state’s power. The societal security refers to the sustainability of the traditional linguistic patterns, culture and religion, national identity and traditions within acceptable evolution conditions. The environmental security refers to the preservation of the local and global biosphere as a primary support system which all human activities depend on.43

In the same paper, the authors admit that, for them, security refers to survival/existence, “when a problem is presented as a threat to the referent object,”44 which can take different forms: territory, survival, and society. In a globalized world, security understood as a zero-sum game with the states as the only actors was replaced by the modern concept of security, which, besides the military sector, also comprises the economic, political, and environmental ones. In the same train of thought, in New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-first Century, Buzan provides a possible definition for the concept of security that goes beyond the military sector, focusing on issues that refer to the level of collective identities and “actions taken to defend such identities defined according to their own citizens”45: “Security is taken to be about the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change, which they see as hostile. The bottom line of security is survival, but it also reasonably includes a substantial range of concerns about the conditions of existence … and the urgency of the ‘security’ label (which identifies threats as significant enough to warrant emergency action and exceptional

42 Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, and Jaap de Wilde, Securitatea, un nou cadru de analiză [Security: a New Framework for Analysis] (Cluj-Napoca: CA Publishing, 2010). 43 Ibid., 22. 44 Ibid., 41. 45 Ibid., 172.

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measures including the use of force), and becomes part of the everyday uncertainties of life is one of the difficulties of the concept.”46 The term supports as many interpretations and definitions as actors, referent objects, conceptual delimitations, and contextualization with other research fields that are carried out by theorists in their analyticaldemonstrative approach with a focus on the security practices models. In this context, Poerksen in Plastic Words defines “security” as “an all you can fit term,”47 and is not wrong because theorists have failed to formulate the definition that encompasses the essence of this ever-changing and adapting term. The preliminary conclusion following this brief analysis of the question of what is security is that formulating a comprehensive answer is practically impossible given the fact that theorists relate to it differently as an objective (real) or subjective (social construct) dimension, depending on their purpose or orientation. For this research, the essential aspect is the subjective nature of security in the context of the migration-identitysecurity nexus. As we can see, at the end of the twentieth and beginning of the twentyfirst centuries, in academia, researchers started to develop new research instruments for the analysis of the extended security agenda in Europe. One of the most important contributions to this theorization came from a group of researchers (Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, Jaap de Wilde, Morten Kelstrup, Egbert Jahn, Pierre Lemaitre, and Elzbieta Tromer48), associates 46

Barry Buzan, “New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-first Century International Affairs,” Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944– 67, no. 3 (1991): 432–3. 47 Uwe Poerksen, Plastic Words: the Tyranny of a Modular Language (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995). 48 At the end of the twentieth century, the research group at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute distinguished itself with a series of papers that announced the need and opportunity created by the new international context, regarding the extension of the research area in the security studies field through a series of research projects, of which we can mention: Ole Weaver, Pierre Lemaitre, and Elzbieta Tromer (eds.), European Polyphony: Perspectives beyond East-West Confrontation (London: Macmillan, 1989); Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre, Elzbieta Tromer, and Ole Wæver, The European Security Order Recast: Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era (London: Pinter Publisher, 1990); Barry Buzan, Jaap de Wilde, and Ole Wæver, Security: a New Framework for Analysis (London and Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998). Their previous guidelines (the neorealism of Buzan, the liberalism of Lemaitre, de Wilde, and Kelstrup, and the post-structuralism of Weaver) are one of the first aspects that attracted criticism to this group of researchers and what would later become

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25

of the Copenhagen Research Institute (COPRI),49 who laid the foundation of what is called the Copenhagen School of Security Studies. One of the merits of this school is that “it left a mark at the highest level of world politics,”50 and as a result, at the Rome Summit in 1991, NATO decreed that “security now has five dimensions: military, societal, economic, political and environmental … the Copenhagen School not only influences the interpretation manner of the theorists with regard to the concept of security; it has also had an impact upon the policies formulating community.”51

1.3. Securitization, Desecuritization, and Societal Security: Analysis of a Conceptual (R)Evolution The emergence of the Copenhagen School was necessary, and at the same time determined by political, socioeconomic, and military changes in the international arena, particularly in Europe in the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first centuries (the two world wars, the Cold War and new regional conflicts, the emergence of the EU and the new non-state actors, and the transfer of interest from military security to societal security), which facilitated its appearance simultaneously with the extension of the classic security-analysis framework. The difference between the traditional approach of security and the new analysis framework resides in the fact that the former “underlines the competing characteristics of interstate relations and stability, while the [latter] emphasizes cooperation among security actors including states.”52 (through Bill McSweeney’s labelling in “Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School”) the Copenhagen School. 49 Matti Jutila, “Desecuritizing Minority Rights: Against Determinism,” Security Dialogue 37, no. 2 (2006): 167. 50 Dan Dungaciu, “Securitate, Relatii Internationale si Studii de Securitate” [“Security, International Relations and Security Studies”], Revista de StiinĠe Politice RelaĠii Internationale [Political Sciences International Relations Journal] IX, no. 4 (2012): 12. 51 Tim Bird and Stuart Croft, “ùcoala de la Copenhaga úi Securitatea Europeană” [“The Copenhagen School and European Security”], in Studii de securitate [Security Studies], edited by Veaceslav Berbeca, Tim Bird and Stuart Croft (Bucharest: Cavallioti PH, 2005), 7–8. 52 Kim Seongjin, “Concept of Societal Security and Migration Issues in Central Asia and Russia,” Central Asian Migration and International Cooperation (CAMMIC) Working Papers No. 2, Center for Far Eastern Studies, University of Toyama, Japan, June 4, 2008, p. 5, http://www3.u-toyama.ac.jp/cfes/horie/ CAMMIC-J/Publications_files/CAMMIC-WP2.pdf.

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Along with this school, in Europe there are at least two more, namely the Aberystwyth School (also known as Critical Security Studies) and the Paris School (for the analytical purposes of this book we will refer to two Paris schools: the one that focuses on the sociological analysis of security, inspired by the work of Bordieu, Bigo, and Balzacq; and, for the geopolitical analysis, the French School of Geopolitics, inspired by the work of Yves Lacoste).53 Besides the representatives of these two established schools, another series of theorists asserted themselves through relevant interventions in developing the new framework for security analysis, without being affiliated to any of these schools (they were grouped in what is known as the Second Generation of Securitization Theorists). The first step taken by the theorists of the Copenhagen School, in order to rearrange security studies on new research bases, was to extend the security agenda by adding the economic, political, societal, and environmental security sectors. The model is supple and sufficiently fine to include issues that were ignored for too long: poverty, migration, human trafficking, environmental risks, economics, and political threats.54 In a globalized world there is a real concern for societal security, namely the preservation of the identity, linguistic, cultural, and religious traits of an ethnic group against external and foreign influences. The next step aimed for the opening of the “security complex regarding security and sectors other than the military and political and actors other than the states.”55 The third step was the introduction to security analysis in 1995 of Weaver’s theory concerning securitization as a speech act. Thus, according to Weaver, security is not something real and objective, but something that refers to the utterance itself, namely the speech act. Of these new research directions suggested by the Copenhagen School, the 53 The novelties that these schools asserted themselves with in the security studies field, challenging the American leadership to a high extent, were the analysis concepts they proposed: the Aberystwyth School offered the extension and emancipation of security studies and the threats as a social concept; the Copenhagen School brought to the fore the security sectors, securitization as an act of speech, the actors who securitize and the objects of reference, and the theory of the security complex and constellations; while the Paris School of security analysed praxis over discourse, the importance of audience and context, and security agencies. 54 Seongjin, “Concept of Societal Security and Migration Issues,” 5. 55 Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde, Securitatea, un nou cadru, 33. Within the same work the authors define the regional security complex as “a group of states whose major security perceptions and preoccupations are so interconnected that their international security problems cannot be analyzed or solved independently” (27).

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matters of societal security and securitization as a speech act are of real interest for the present research, with a focus on the interdependence relationship between migration-identity-security and the anti-Roma campaigns in France. Buzan’s theory (from People, States and Fear) can be added to this regarding the redefinition of the concept of “threat,” by making a connection (some would say conceptual distinction) between “threats” and “vulnerabilities.” This distinction is essential in drawing two coordinates of this case study, namely the analysis of the Romanian Roma in France between political stake and social issue.

1.3.1. Securitization as a “Speech Act” The concept of securitization (or securization), borrowed from the banking system, has been adapted to the international-relations field, but requires a contextualization from an interdisciplinary perspective in order to make the connection with criminology and sociology, which analyse fear, risk, violence, and insecurity as processes.56 In “Securitization and Desecuritization,” Weaver promotes the idea that security represents “a speech act,”57 meaning that security is not something real and objective, but that it refers to speech itself. What, then, is security? With the help of language theory, we can regard “security” as a speech act. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real – the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise). By uttering “security,” a state representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.58 The central idea of this book is built around the question: What truly makes an issue become a security issue? (a question we will try to answer in this analysis). In the initial analysis of security as a speech act,59 the powerlegitimacy-security relationship had a central role – a relationship which privileged the state (represented by its institutions, especially by the government, the legitimate voice of the state) as an actor of security. In this first phase, the influence of Buzan’s neorealist background can be felt.

56

Balzacq et al., “Security Practices,” 2. Ole Waever, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” 46–86. 58 Ibid., 55. 59 The idea of security as a speech act was first promoted by Weaver in his 1989 paper “Security the Speech Act: Analyzing the Politics of a Word,” Working Paper no. 19. 57

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In a further analysis (Buzan and Weaver in 2003,60 this time a constructivist approach), the securitization theory as a speech act blends with Buzan’s security sectors theory, resulting in a: “discursive process through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat.”61 The purpose of Weaver’s theory is to build a “neo-conventional security analysis (which) sticks to the traditional core of the concept of security (existential threats, survival), but is undogmatic as to both sectors (not only military) and referent objects (not only states).”62 In the book Security: a New Framework for Analysis, Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde develop the security issue, which they define as “the movement that takes politics beyond the rules of the game and the issue’s framework, either as a special kind of politics, or above politics, [which is the reason why] securitization can [also] be regarded as an extreme version of political orientation.”63 Security is an ethical-political process (a political process is also a political option, which is why politics and ethics are not separate64), impossible to predict before a decision is taken.65 On the other hand, it opposes the political orientation as it implies the removal of an issue from the common-politics field (of debate and argumentation) and its primary approach by politicians (decision makers) without further discussions and debates, prior to any other issues.66 It is often a tactic to divert attention from other issues (for example the securitization of the Roma’s situation in France prior to the completion concerning the pension reform). Basically, the security discourse must not explicitly contain in its statement the word “security” to produce the desired effect. Presenting an issue as a potential existential threat (by appealing to dramatization) and obtaining the support of the audience are sufficient to achieve the securitization of a referent object. The role of intention is crucial in this theory. If Buzan argues that threats justify extraordinary measures, Weaver 60 Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver, Regions and Power: the Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 61 Ibid., 491. 62 Waever, “What is Security? The Securityness of Security,” 110. 63 Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde, Securitatea, un nou cadru, 44 64 Michel Foucault, Lhermeneutique du sujet (Paris: Gallimard, 2001). 65 *** C.a.s.e. Collective II: Critical Approaches to Security: resistance, emancipation, tactics, 11. 66 Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde, Securitatea, un nou cadru, 45.

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strives and even more explicitly states that the whole logic around which the concept of security was built consists in the strategic actors’ intentionality.67 Theoretically, in the public space, the discourse may be included in one of the three phases (moments) referred to by Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde in Security: a New Framework For Analysis, namely: x Non-politicized (when a particular issue is not publicly debated and there are no explicit policies for it) x Politicized (the issue is part of the public agenda and resources have been allocated for its solving) x Securitized (the issue is presented as an existential threat which requires exceptional measures outside the political procedure norms).68 In the last twenty years, discourse analysis has been frequently used as an analytical concept. The analysis of discourse is important for the understanding of the manner in which an event or issue is defined, interpreted, and then included on the security agenda. The first function of discourse of/on security is to identify a possible threat which can be real or potential, given that the new security agenda has diversified the intervention sectors, being practically impossible for us to objectively acknowledge all the threats to the state, society, individual, or environment. The meaning of threats and danger is therefore subject to the interpretations of the actor who securitizes. Under these conditions, the security discourses must be understood as a constant reproduction of the threats to the state/society (in terms of identity), and not as an answer of the state to a situation of insecurity: “Each age and society re-creates its ‘Others.’ Far from being a static thing, then, identity of Self or of Other is a much worked-over historical, social, intellectual and political process that takes place as a contest involving individuals and institutions in all societies.”69 The power of a discourse lies not only in the wording but also in the material and social effects as well as the practices it determines, as “discourse is merely spoken words, but a notion of signification which concerns not merely how it is that certain signifiers come to mean what 67

Weaver, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” 63. Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde, Securitatea, un nou cadru, 44. 69 E. W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 2003), 331; Echavarría Alvarez, “Re-thinking (In)Security Discourses,” 75. 68

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they mean, but how certain discursive forms articulate objects and subjects in their intelligibility.”70 On the other hand, Neumann takes a critical stand towards the importance given by the Copenhagen School theorists to discourse as a speech act. He argues that, sometimes, theorists tend to emphasize the text and spoken word over the discourse-meaning threshold, leading to its abstraction.71 The attention to this theory is retained by the cultural process of securitization by which the actors build, through discourse, certain issues as threats to security. Weaver argues (based on John Austin’s speech act theory in How To Do Things With Words) that security and the threats are not objective issues, but processes that are built through discourse and dramatization. The theory of securitization as a speech act is not a psychological theory of right or wrong perceptions. Thus, “security is a practice, a specific way of framing an issue. Security discourse is characterized by dramatizing an issue as having absolute priority. Something is presented as an absolute threat.”72 Buzan and Weaver borrow from the parents of the speech act theory (namely John Austin, whose work was continued by the American professor John R. Searle) the language perspective used to perform actions (and not designate certain things). The three elements making up the speech act in Austin’s theory73 – the locutionary act (utterance), the illocutionary force (making an assertion loaded with a certain force), and the perlocutionary effect (the effect/reply from the audience) – are taken by Weaver in the securitization theory. The securitization theory is an analytical tool that describes the manner in which threats are socially constructed.74 Dramatization has an important role in the securitization theory as a speech act as it allows the actor (through language tricks) to present an 70

Judith Butler, “For a Careful Reading,” in Feminist Contentions: a Philosophical Exchange, edited by S. Benhabib et. al. (New York: Routledge, 1995), 138. 71 Iver B. Neumann, Mening, Materialitet, Makt: En innføring i diskursanalyse (Oslo: Fagbokforlaget, 2001), 80. 72 Wæver, “What is Security?” 108. 73 For details on John Austin’s speech act theory see John Austin, How To Do Things With Words (Oxford: Clarendon, 1962); John R. Searle, Speech Acts: an Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970). 74 Philipp, Kluefers, “Security Through Repertoires and Positions: Towards a Socio-pragmatist Framing of Securitization Discourses,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the Bisa-Isa Joint International Conference “Diversity in the Discipline: Tension or Opportunity in Responding to Global,” Old Town district of Edinburgh, Scotland, p. 3.

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issue as a major problem, thus imposing the need for exceptional measures to be taken: “when talking about security, a representative … declares an emergency, assuming the right to use any necessary means to block the development of the threat.”75 In this context, a successful securitization consists of three components76: x identifying the existential threats to a referent object x emergency actions/exceptional measures that follow x the use of such measures even in violation of normal procedures Securitization is intersubjective and constructed socially (constructivism characteristics which mark the difference between security in a classic sense and the contemporary approach) as the actors who securitize have “different thresholds in defining the threat”77 (if the French state considers the influx of migrants as a zero priority on the security agenda, for the Romanian state, which is not so attractive from an immigration point of view, the “brain drain” issue towards Western Europe or the gold exploitation at Roúia Montană represents a threat). The securitization theory as a speech act and the post-structuralist concepts have been successfully applied to a series of referent objects covering a wide range of analysis, from identity (Weaver, Buzan) to crossnational criminality and human trafficking (Stritzel, Emmers78) and religion (Lautsen, Weaver79). An important element is the actor’s position in relation to the issue they securitize in a particular context, as their actions (taking the politics outside the game rules) draw certain consequences both for the actor securitizing it and for the audience (for example the war against terrorism). For a securitization to be successful, it must be accepted by an audience.

75

Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde, Securitatea, un nou cadru, 42. Ibid., 47. 77 Ibid., 52. 78 H. Stritzel, “Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond,” European Journal of International Relations 13, no. 3 (2007): 357–83; R. Emmers, “ASEAN and the Securitization of Transnational Crime in Southeast Asia,” The Pacific Review 16, no. 3 (2003): 419–38. 79 C. B Laustsen and O. Waever, “In Defence of Religion: Sacred Referent Objects for Securitization,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 29, no. 3 (2000): 705–39. 76

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The securitization and acceptance of securitization by an audience always represent an act, a political choice with short, medium, or longterm effects. “The meaning does not lie in what people consciously think that the concept means, but in the manner they prefer to use it.”80 The securitization of certain sectors can be achieved only through the desecuritization of others, which implies that an issue is “more important than others and should have absolute priority.”81 The natural questions that arise from this selection of sectors to be securitized, and respectively desecuritized, are: Who makes this sector selection? What is the algorithm of this selection? The process is subjective as it relates to the way in which the actor who securitizes refers to a threat that becomes a security issue due to the manner in which they present it and not necessarily because it actually is a real threat. There is thus a “confrontation between the objective security – where danger and threats are measurable, real, immediate – and the subjective security – built through discourse and dramatization.” The first function of the discourse is to identify danger which can be the effect of an interpretation and not the acknowledgement of a real threat, as danger “is not a thing that exists independently of those to whom it may become a threat … [it is] an effect of interpretation.”82 The multitude of hazards to which we are exposed (which makes it practically impossible to acknowledge all the issues that threaten us) turns the threats into interpretative social constructs, meaning that an issue is perceived as a threat only if interpreted as such throughout the discourse. Acknowledging the arbitrary nature of the threat construct and accepting the possibility for critical interrogation represent the great contribution of the securitization theory to security studies,83 a field of analysis that, in Weaver’s view, seeks to explain: “who securitizes on what issues (threats), for whom (referent object), why, with what results, and not least, under what conditions.”84 The answer to this question is the key 80

Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde, Securitatea, un nou cadru, 45. Ibid. 82 D. Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 1–2; Echavarría Alvarez, “Re-thinking (In)Security Discourses from a Critical Perspective,” 74. 83 Horia Bărbulescu, Securitizare societală úi Comunitate politică în Uniunea Europeană. O analiză a expulzării romilor din FranĠa [Societal Securitization and Political Community in the European Union: an Analysis of Roma Expulsion from France], doctoral dissertation, SNSPA, 2011, p. 10. 84 Wæver, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” 48. 81

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to understanding the new framework for security analysis proposed by the Copenhagen School’s theorists. In the classic security theory things were much simpler, the state being the main security actor and the system being represented by a sum of states. In the modern theory, borders have become much more porous, the security sectors have diversified, and a difference between actors and referent objects of security can hardly be made, given that “actors will seek to turn anything into a referent object.”85 Moreover, when constructing the securitization theory as a speech act, the use of the term “security” is not compulsory (although sometimes the success of securitization depends on its use). However, the rhetoric that comprises it indicates an existential threat that requires exceptional measures. The centre of the answers to these questions (which also appear in Security: a New Framework for Analysis) is the security actor, with their motivations, legitimacy, and mobilizing capacity. The term “symbolic capital”86 of the securitizing actor also appears in the foreground, and is that which determines the intensity and “weight” of an actor’s voice. Based on this, the voice hierarchy in the securitization process is achieved. Thus, there are leading voices (that enjoy prominence and recognition in the public and political life) and marginalized voices. This hierarchy is one of the elements that Bigo refers to when criticizing the Copenhagen School. For the securitization theory, the issue of precisely specifying the actor who can securitize is sometimes problematic, first of all because there are many actors, which raises the issues of who can take up this role, and who draws the boundary between actors and referent objects.87 Secondly, there isn’t a sole actor monopolizing securitization anymore (as the state did in the realist theory, which held a monopoly over violence) as we have so many types of actors in international relations in the constructivist approach (for example, the Pope acting in the name of the worldwide Catholic Church). Most often, this role is played by the “political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobby and pressure groups,”88 as well as NGOs, multinational companies, and even security experts who do not act 85

Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde, Securitatea, un nou cadru, 60. Claudia Arădău, “Migration: the Spiral of (In)Security,” 2. 87 In Securitatea, un nou cadru de analiza, Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde define the securitizing actors as those “who securitize issues by declaring a thing – a referent object – as existentially threatened,” while referent objects refer to “things that are considered to be threatened existentially and have a legitimate demand to survive” (60). 88 Ibid., 65. 86

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in the name of their own security but on behalf of referent objects, such as the nation, communities of various sizes, survival, sovereignty, civilization, or identity. For example, the state or the actor acting on behalf of the state (the government, politicians, or even officials) does not act for personal security but on behalf of the nation, of identity, which is why its discourse follows certain composition rules. Thirdly, there is the tendency of the modern framework for security analysis to bring the process closer to the individual and towards the human security, which is why any group or unit is divided into “subdivisions and individuals,”89 which hinders the general image and analytical coherence. For the security act to be successful, it must be accepted by an audience, meaning that an audience accepts that something (well-defined through discourse) represents a threat to a common value. In Security: a New Framework for Analysis, the authors pose the rhetorical question: “When does an argument of a certain rhetoric and semiotic structure reach a sufficiently great enough effect to determine the audience tolerate the violation of rules that would be otherwise followed?”90 The possible answer is: “When the threat is visible, and almost imminent.” Such were the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which triggered the “war against terrorism,” an act that initially enjoyed the full participation of the audience. Another example is the issue of illegal and uncontrolled migration, the situation of the Roma in the EU (after Romania and Bulgaria entered the EU in 2007), and the absence of a real inclusion of the newcomers (the situation of the Turks in Germany, “the European refugee crisis” 2015–16). These events gave rise to heated debates in the sense of Carl Schmitt’s “friend vs. enemy” theory (for example, Hungary’s prime minister, Viktor Orbán’s “hate speeches” against refugees, Marine Le Pen’s presidential campaign discourses against Muslims and refugees, or Nicolas Sarkozy’s speech at Grenoble in 2010), which go beyond the common political framework. According to the scale and extent of the threat, securitization can be institutionalized or ad hoc depending on the intensity, scale, and duration of the issue that is presented as an existential threat. The triumvirate of the securitization process (the actor, the referent object, and the audience) is completed by three facilitating conditions (inspired by John Austin’s “felicity conditions”91 theory), namely:

89

Ibid., 66. Ibid., 46. 91 John Austin, How to do Things with Words. 90

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x internal exigencies of the speech act or “the security grammar,”92 which refer to the discourse structure (the existence of an existential threat, of the point of no return and of a possible solution), and the linguistic tricks specific to each security sector to persuade the audience x the securitizing actor’s social capital, with reference to the authority position of the actor in relation to the audience x the features of the alleged threat (it is more likely for an issue to receive a security label if certain objects that can be considered threatening – such as tanks, bombs, and organized crime – are mentioned in the discourse93) Weaver and the Copenhagen School found that, although securitization is a complex process, it has certain limitations (also related to context and audience) and excludes certain categories, even when pretending to do otherwise. It is more difficult for the individuals themselves to be securitization actors as they lack the legitimacy, image capital, and necessary authority, even if the theory states that anyone can be an actor of securitization. Furthermore, more securitization does not eliminate threats (on the contrary, it leads to a security dilemma94), which is why the longterm solution suggested by Weaver is desecuritization.

1.3.2. Desecuritization: a viable solution? Desecuritization must be a long-term option, as it implies moving the issues from the threat-defence sphere back to the common public sphere,95 in normal political disputes. It does not deny the existence of certain issues, which through argumentation may be perceived as threats, but chooses to analyse them in the common public sphere, meaning that cultural issues should keep to the cultural field and economic issues should be solved within the economic field, using models and specialists in this field and not in the threat-security one. In this way, the Schmittian state of exception theory can be avoided and the issues returned to the normalpolicies field. 92

Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde, Securitatea, un nou cadru, 56. Ibid., 56. 94 The security dilemma, a concept introduced by John Hertz, consists of the fact that the attempts to ensure security for an actor generate a state of insecurity for others, who in turn seek to ensure their own security. Fear and mistrust between the actors of a system underlie this dilemma. 95 Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde, Securitatea, un nou cadru, 51. 93

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On the other hand, more securitization does not suggest fewer threats or less insecurity, which is why the natural option is desecuritization (as also occurred with the European integration, using the Monnet method,96 which is seen as a possible security system against the horrors of the past). As we will argue in the following chapters, there is a trend in the contemporary European security context of recognizing the European Union as a desecuritization actor in several security sectors.97 In the spirit of the Copenhagen School, if we can talk about the European continent in the sense of a security complex, then the EU can be “a tightly coupled security community.”98 Security has always been the goal behind the integration process, which is why the European theorists’ propensity for a diversified security agenda, focusing on the issues affecting existence and development, is understandable. This issue, along with the migration-identity-security triumvirate, will be the focus of analysis in the next chapter, while we continue our analysis of the concept of security with the main objectors of the securitization theory, namely the Second Generation of Securitization Theorists (SGST). Among these we can mention Jef Huysmans, Matt McDonald, Bill McSweeney, Paul Roe, Mark Salter, and Holger Stritzel, together with the representatives of the Paris School, Thierry Balzacq, Michel Foucault, and Didier Bigo.

1.4. The Second Generation of Securitization Theorists and the Paris School of Security Studies In 1949, in “Stare Decisis,” William O. Douglas wrote that “[the] search for a static security – in the law or elsewhere – is misguided. The fact is that security can only be achieved through constant change, through the wise discarding of old ideas that have outlived their usefulness, and through the adapting of others to current facts.”99 By analogy, the truth of these words can also be proved over the years in the field of security 96

Ole Wæver, “Insécurité, Identité: une dialectique sans fin,” in Entre Union et Nations: L’État en Europe, edited by Anne-Marie Le Gloannec (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1998), 88–137. 97 Pernille Rieker, “Security, Integration and Identity Change,” Working Paper, Nr. 611, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI): Oslo, December, 2000, 10–11. 98 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 57. 99 William Douglas, “Stare Decisis,” Columbia Law Review 49, no. 6 (1949): 735, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1119147.

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studies. Nothing is static and everything is dynamic in security studies, which is why the Copenhagen School was also forced to adapt to a new generation of researchers who promoted a “socio-pragmatic” approach to security. This new generation was made up of the objectors of the securitization theory as a speech act in the sense given by the Copenhagen School.

1.4.1. Second generation of securitization theorists Since its appearance in the analysis framework of security studies (and maybe due to its novelty and notoriety), the concept of securitization has attracted substantial criticism from theorists, such that Andrew Moravscik ended up asking, rhetorically, “If there was something rotten in the state of Denmark,”100 making direct reference to the new concepts raised by the Copenhagen School theorists. From an ethical perspective, Eriksen believes that the term is morally ambivalent, further forcing the idea to “the limits of political irresponsibility,”101 “comprising several dubious hypotheses”102 (with regards to the formulation of the concept of securitization). Rens van Munster believes that “from a normative perspective, the risk management logic is preferable to the exception logic” postulated by the theory of securitization as a speech act, as it is able to “achieve securitization of the society under normal, peaceful political conditions.”103 From a sociological perspective, Bill McSweeney believes that this theory is “inconceivable.”104 Along with Roe, Salter, Huysmans, and McDonald, he suggests a socio-pragmatic105 interpretation of this theory.

100

Andrew Moravscik, “Is Something Rotten in the State of Denmark?: Constructivism and European Integration,” Journal of European Public Policy 6, no. 4 (1999): 669–81. 101 Johan Eriksson, “Observers or Advocates?: On the Political Role of Security Analysts,” Cooperation and Conflict 34, no. 3 (1999): 311–33. 102 Olav F. Knudsen, “Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization,” Security Dialogue 33, no. 2 (2001): 358, http://sdi.sagepub.com/content/32/3/355.full.pdf+html. 103 Rens van Munster, “Logics of Security: the Copenhagen School, Risk Management and the War on Terror,” Political Science Publications 10 (2005): 10–11. 104 Bill McSweeney, “Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School,” Review of International Studies 22, no. 1 (1996): 81–93; Bill McSweeny, “Durkheim and the Copenhagen School: a Response to Buzan and Weaver,” Review of International Studies 24, no. 1 (1998): 137–40; Bill McSweeny,

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McSweeney criticizes the Copenhagen School for the use of the term “identity” in an almost static-positivist manner,106 especially in the societal sector framework, both for the actor who securitizes and for the audience. Identity is not a given, an object: “[collective identity] is not ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered,” it is a discursive phenomenon, a process, an “identity discourse on the part of political leaders, intellectuals and countless others, who engage in the process of constructing, negotiating and affirming a response to the demand … for a collective image.”107 If, for the Copenhagen School’s theorists, the role of the audience ended with the acceptance of the existential threat, for the Second Generation of Securitization Theorists the role of the audience is more complex. First of all, this is not homogenous and the issues of whether there is only one audience or several in a process of securitization, and whether the audience has an active or passive role, who determines its role, and when its role ends are raised. Thus comes to the foreground Paul Roe’s idea concerning the formal or moral support of the audience for the actor. From this point of view, the audience must accept both the existence of an existential threat, as well as the measures suggested by the securitizing actor, and respectively the consequences of their application. Returning with an example to the abovementioned situations – if Americans initially supported “the war against terrorism,” as it unfolded they noticed the financial and human costs involved and the lack of visible results, and as a consequence stopped being so sympathetic. The same situation is true as regards the anti-Roma campaign in France – if, at Grenoble in 2010, the French people supported the program launched by President Sarkozy, when seeing the financial costs the Roma repatriation involved – and which they paid for from their own pockets, without any visible results – the public support for these actions started to decrease, the issue being shifted to other levels of analysis such as the one regarding the home country or the community level. The same could be seen with the 2015–16 refugee crisis in the EU and the quotas imposed on the member states, and with the 2016 Brexit referendum in the UK and the complications that followed it. This requires the actor’s constant reformulations of existential threats for the reconfirmation of the

Security, Identity and Interests: a Sociology of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 105 Kluefers, “Security Through Repertoires and Positions,” 4. 106 McSweeney, “Identity and Security,” 93. 107 Ibid., 90.

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audience’s support: “given that this represents an existential threat, this is what I suggest to do.”108 Regarding the securitizing actors, Lene Hansen believes that if security is a speech act then it “is deeply implicated in the production of silence.”109 The criticism aims at the selection of actors who can secure, depending on the image capital and the power they own. This leads to the marginalization or silencing of certain voices (second-class actors that usually originate in the civil society) which do not benefit from a great impact with the audience. The silence that Hansen is talking about is also extended to the securitization actor-audience relationship, in the sense that, after obtaining formal support from the audience, the actor ignores the criticism and denial of the “marginal voices,” which challenges the way in which security is constructed.110 According to McDonald and Hansen, if the Copenhagen School theorists paid more attention to the civil society (as a securitizing actor) then they would overcome the intersubjective analysis framework, heading towards a socio-pragmatic one in which the context111/environment plays a determinant role. The theorist who prioritized the role of the context/environment in his criticism of the Copenhagen School was Michael Williams,112 who argued that the images (visual representations) are in fact at the centre of the securitization construct. He questions the ability of a theory based solely on the act of speech to address the security issues of an era in which the media (and especially television) has already assumed the role of main communication tool, and concurrently of the opinion shaper. The new communication technologies have changed the relative power of the social forces, and more importantly influenced the social epistemology transformation.113 Given that the media is an essential power in the state, the current security environment is replete with such examples. The images of the attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, images of the demolition of illegal Roma camps in France 2010–13, images of the 108

Paul, Roe, “Actor, Audience(s) and Emergency Measures: Securitization and the UK’s Decision to Invade Iraq,” Security Dialogue 39, no. 6 (2008): 622. 109 Lene Hansen, “The Little Mermaid’s Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School,” Millennium 29, no. 2 (2000): 306. 110 Matt McDonald, “Securitisation and the Construction of Security,” European Journal of International Relations 14, no. 4 (2008). 111 Ibid. 112 Michael C. Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies.” 113 Ronald J. Dielbert, Parchment, Printing and Hypermedia: Communication in World Order Transformation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 33.

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Prophet Mohammed in the Danish press in 2005, the 2011 Arab Spring, images of refugees coming to Europe, the shocking images of a three-yearold drowned Syrian boy and the fence along Hungary’s border, or images of global-warming effects bring into discussion the role of visual representations as forms of security. Within these examples, the language is doubled by the images, causing a much greater impact on the audience (the image of the drowned Syrian boy became the definition of an ongoing war that killed over 560,000 Syrians, according to the UN Envoy for Syria). What is the contribution of images to the process of securitization/desecuritization? What is the difference between the impact of images and the impact of words upon the audience?114 These are just a few of the questions that Williams submits to the supporters of the theory of securitization as a speech act. Through them, he draws attention to the fact that, in contemporary society, the security policies are dependent on the image’s rhetoric, and securitization is an incomplete process without the participation of the media. The media plays a double role as opinion shaper and communication channel between the actor who securitizes and the audience. An interdependence relationship is thus created of actormedia-securitization. This relationship has been fully exploited by the French authorities in the fight against the Roma and Muslims. Williams’s contribution to the development of the security analysis framework lies in prioritizing the para-linguistic115 variables in the process of securitization, in the context of adapting the theory to the contemporary society’s transformations and the audience’s diversification. On the other hand, the limits of his theory are given by the ambiguity of the meaning of images, which is why it is more difficult to control the message they are conveying, causing the risk of it being distorted. The Paris School theorists (Balzacq,116 Bigo,117 and Foucault) adopt the same socio-pragmatic logic criticism, as for them the language in the theory of securitization is surpassed by the para-linguistic elements, and the role of context and the audience. 114

Michael C. Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies,” 527. Ibid., 525–8. 116 Thierry, Balzacq, “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context,” European Journal of International Relations 11, no. 2 (2005): 171–201. 117 Didier Bigo, “Security and Immigration: Towards a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease,” Alternatives 27, no. 1 (2002): 63–92; Didier Bigo and R. B. J. Walker, “Security and Migration,” Special Section of Alternatives 27, no. 1 (2002): 1–92. 115

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1.4.2. The Paris School or the sociologic model of securitization The securitization theory’s sociologic approach is more complex than the purely linguistic one preferred by the Copenhagen School, where observing the rules of text construction surpasses the role of context or the relationship securitizing actor-audience. In the Copenhagen School’s version, the audience has a purely formal role as a message receiver, but in the sociologic version (as with the Second Generation of Securitization Theorists) the support of the audience can be formal or moral. The major difference between the two schools is indicated by the fact that, for the Paris theorists, securitization does not necessarily imply the application of exceptional measures.118 For Balzacq, securitization implies a fortunate combination between the text’s symbolic strength as “an articulated assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artefacts (metaphors, policy tools, image repertoires analogies, stereotypes, emotions, etc.),” and the actor’s legitimacy, who “works to prompt an audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thoughts, and intuitions), about the critical vulnerability of a referent object, that concurs with the securitizing actor’s reasons for choices and actions, by investigating the referent subject with such an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion that a customized policy must be undertaken immediately to block its development.”119 In the paper “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context,” Balzacq considers securitization as the “strategic (pragmatic) practice that occurs within, and as part of, a configuration of circumstances, including the context, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction.”120 Hence, one can observe the evolution from the speech act that causes effects solely through utterance to securitization as an argumentative process which highlights the interdependent relationship between discourse, in its textual form, the actor’s legitimacy, context, and the audience. The combination of text – “knowledge of the concept acquired through language” – and meaning – “cultural meaning, knowledge gained through 118

Thierry Balzacq, “Constructivism and Securitization Studies,” in Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Victor Mauer, The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2010), 56–72. 119 Thierry Balzacq, “A Theory of Securitization: Origins, Core Assumptions, and Variants,” in Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve, edited by T. Balzacq (London: Routledge, 2011), 3. 120 Balzacq, “The Three Faces of Securitization,” 172.

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previous interactions and current situations”121 – to achieve securitization involves an interdependent language-culture relationship, which Stritzel and Schmittchen122 take into discussion. Balzacq believes that the role of the audience in Weaver’s securitization theory is underappreciated due to the overwhelming influence of Austin’s theory regarding language theorization.123 For a securitization discourse to produce the desired effect, its elements must be in perfect harmony, namely the discourse artefacts should resonate with the audience’s expectations and the context in which it is delivered. It has been noted that it is easier to persuade the audience to accept a certain discourse within appropriate sociopolitical circumstances, for example the economic crisis and the state welfare’s bankruptcy which created the favourable context for politicians (as actors) to use uncontrolled migration in order to gain election capital (see the case of electoral campaigns in France 2011, Germany 2013, and the 2016 Brexit campaign built around the migration issue). The idea that synchronization (the discourse-socio-political context) within securitization is crucial for its success has been introduced. Hence, Lipschutz rhetorically asks: Why is a particular time considered appropriate to apply a securitization strategy? Why does an actor receive support to take such an initiative only at a certain time and not another?124 The answer is always the same – the synchronization discourse-socio-political context helps the audience to find and adhere more easily to the ideas promoted by the actor who securitizes. The audience’s vulnerability and danger proximity foster a greater willingness towards the securitization strategies. In the sociological approach, the discursive elements are combined with the non-discursive ones – including gestures, knowhow, and technologies – as social interactions are not only governed by rules but also rule-generators.125 In this model (which is a tributary of Bourdieu’s theory on the symbolic use of language) the discursive and non-discursive practices are equally important. Although they may have different logics, they can 121

Balzacq, “A Theory of Securitization,” 11. Holger Stritzel and Dirk Schmittchen, “Securitization Theory: Rogue States in US and German Discourse,” in Securitization, Culture and Power: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve, edited by Thierry Balzacq (London: Routledge, 2011), 184. 123 Matt McDonald, “Securitisation and the Construction,” 578. 124 Ronnie D. Lipschutz, “On Security,” in On Security, edited by Ronnie D. Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press. 1995), 8. 125 Balzacq et al., “Security Practices,” 3. 122

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produce the same effects.126 According to Bourdieu’s theory, observing the grammar rules in the writing of a discourse is not enough to produce a meaning, as the interactions of the securitization-audience are primarily symbolic power relations. The sociologic securitization model thus involves a persuasive and rational argumentative process, placed in a favourable sociopolitical conjuncture. Bigo is the representative who contested Weaver for leaving the nondiscursive practices on the side lines and emphasizing the importance of the discursive ones. Bigo took the term “symbolic capital,” also used by Weaver, and gave it his own interpretation by interconnecting the actor’s authority with a special type of knowledge/power.127 As the state is no longer the only voice in the security field, an open competition between the potential actors of securitization appears. These actors are situated at different political, public, or economic levels and enjoy different degrees of recognition. We are thus witnessing a competition between actors to gain legitimacy and weight128 in front of the audience to become the most important discourse. Another element introduced by Bigo is the “practice of securitization.” Taken by Balzacq and turned into a “securitization instrument,” it is defined as “a social and technical device embodying a specific threat image through which public action is configured in order to address a security issue.”129 These instruments, by their intrinsic qualities, deliver to the audience the idea that their issues are a threat to security. If Weaver clearly defines securitization as a speech act, Bigo’s pioneering work doesn’t focus on a clear definition of what represents the “securitization practices.” For Bigo, the unit of analysis is represented by the security specialist whose practice and expertise are as important as any other form of discourse within Weaver’s theory. Bigo determines a shift in the centre of security analysis from the political agent to the security specialist (police officers, custom agents, gendarmerie, special services, cross-national networks, bureaucrats, and technocrats). These actors, who enjoy symbolic capital have the ability to

126

Ibid. Arădău, “Migration: the Spiral of (In)Security,” 2. 128 Ibid. 129 Thierry Balzacq, “The Policy Tools of Securitization: Information Exchange, EU Foreign and Interior Policies,” Journal of Common Market Studies 46, no. 1 (2008): 79. 127

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produce “power/knowledge”130 and put together threats from different sectors, are the true “security specialists.”131 This also leads to a diversification in the security agenda through the fusion of the internal and external security fields132 against globalization. By externalizing the internal threats, new existential threats appear as a result of interconnecting threats from various sectors (for example, the economic crisis, unemployment, and immigration with organized crime). The same idea also emerges from Huysman’s theory based on the construction of power/knowledge: “Security agencies, such as the police, do not develop purely reactive policies triggered by terrorism, drugs or migrations, for example. The knowledge they produce and the technologies they deploy also fabricate the threat.”133 This analysis thus proves that the construction of a problem as a security issue needs the participation of several institutions and agencies that enjoy a significant capacity to produce knowledge. The diversification of actors of securitization also entails the diversification of the methods by which they make their voices heard and create a path in becoming “the most important discourse.” Insecurity is in this context the product of security discourses and practices.134 In conclusion, we can state that the sociological version of the securitization theory emphasizes the contextualization of the security analysis and puts less stress on the role of language in the sense of Austin’s theory. This theory determines a shift in the securitization analysis centre from language to context, audience, security practices, and power relations. In the same French scientific manifestation area, together with the Paris School of Security, an important role, in the analysis of the new security environment in Europe, is played by the French School of Geopolitics.

130

The term “power/knowledge” was initially introduced by Foucault in his analysis of security. 131 Arădău, “Migration: the Spiral of (In)Security,” 2. 132 Weaver, “Aberystwyth, Paris,” 9. 133 Jef Huysmans, “Desecuritization and the Aesthetics of Terrorism in Political Realism,” in Millennium 27, no. 3 (1998): 572. 134 Ibid.

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1.5. The French School of Geopolitics: the Role of Representations in the Security Analysis The term “geopolitcs” was coined recently. It appeared in the twentieth century, at the intersection between power and territory, in the paper by Rudolf Kjellén, a Swedish jurist, “L’Etatcommeforme de vie” (1916), where he defines it as: “The science that studies the state as a geographic organism, as it manifests in space.”135 Another precursor of geopolitics is Friedrich Ratzel, who, although he preferred the term “political geography,”136 indisputably left a mark upon this domain at a methodological level by introducing new research instruments, but also at the epistemological one. Under the influence of Darwinism and the biologist’s theses, he was the scientific exponent of the idea of the peoples’ geographic determinism, and the state as a spatial creation (for details see the books Geographie politique [1897] and Etat et sol [1896]). Ratzel also emphasizes the role of “geographic representations, of religious and national ideas on the becoming of a state,” an idea that, in the area of French geopolitics, was developed by Yves Lacoste.137 Although the term geopolitics is a neologism, its concerns have a long history, being identified in the book The Art of War by Sun Tzu. The twentieth century came to consecrate these concerns in an organized framework through the schools of geopolitics,138 which soon began to compete with each other. 135 Aymeric Chauprade and Francois Thual, DicĠionar de Geopolitică, State, concepte, autori [Dictionary of Geopolitics, States, Concepts, Authors] (Bucharest: Corint, 2003), 503. 136 For details on the concept of “political geography” see Peter J. Taylor, Political Geography (London: Longman, 1989). 137 Chauprade and Thual, DicĠionar de Geopolitică, 515. 138 Among the great representatives of these schools of geopolitics, whose theories have influenced and continue to influence the international relation analyses, besides Yves Lacoste and Rudolf Kjellén, there are Karl Haushofer (the theory of the organic relationship between territory and its population, formerly applied to the geopolitics of Germany-Lebensraum), Alain Labrousse (geopolitical conflicts caused by the drug mafia), Michel Foucher (the geopolitical and geostrategic function of state borders, in direct relation to the problem of alterity), Halford Mackinder (the theory on the geographic pivot of history-heartland), Friedrich Ratzel, Nicholas Spykman (the theory on Rimland), and Francois Thual (who, following the path opened by Lacoste, focuses on the geographic and identityrelated component of geopolitics), to name only a few. For details on the precursors of geopolitics see also Hans Weigert, Generals and Geographers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942); Yves Lacoste and Bas Vidal, “Viva Vidal,”

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In the book Géopolitique, la longue histoire d’aujourd’hui, Yves Lacoste defined geopolitics as “power rivalries where the stake is the influence upon territories and the populations inhabiting them.”139 In the preamble of Dictionnaire de Geopolitique, the same author defines it as “a new political and cultural phenomenon of enhanced importance, with emphasis on the power rivalries over territories, which, in terms of a brief freedom of speech (total or limited), through conflicting representations, promotes political debates among citizens.”140 In the Herodote Magazine, as well as in Yves Lacoste’s analysis (the theorist who refundamentalized French geopolitics thirty years after its disappearance by introducing two new key concepts of territoriality and representation141), Geopolitics is both a research method and an object study. For our research, in the case of the identity-migration-security relationship, representations play an essential role in identifying the symbolic territory (in the sense of Western civilization’s values and welfare), which needs to be protected against the influx of immigrants, hence the idea of the West under siege. The refundamentalization of geopolitics finds expression in the Herodote magazine (since 1976), whose every issue draws new research directions to the geopolitical analysis, as well as the book Dictionnaire de Geopolitique, about which the author himself states in the preamble that it is a construction, “a bridge to overcome an obstacle. What obstacles? … the violence with which, in many countries of the world and especially in Europe today, very different geopolitical ideas are opposed to each other.”142 Hérodote 16 (1979): 73–96; P. Lorot, Histoire de la Géopolitique (Paris: Economica, 1995); Ionel Nicu Sava, Scoalageopoliticagermana [The German School of Geopolitics] (Bucharest: Info-Team Publishing House, 1997); Nicholas Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics: the United States and the Balance of Power (New York: Harcourt, 1942). 139 “[L]es rivalités de pouvoirsoud’influencesur des territoires et les populations qui y vivent.” Yves Lacoste, Géopolitique, la longue histoire d’aujourd’hui (Paris: Larousse, 2006), 8. 140 “[La géopolitique] doivent être considérés comme phénomène politique et culturel nouveau, d’importance croissante, les rivalités de pouvoirsur des territoires qui, à la condition qu’il y ait plus ou moins de liberté d’expression, suscitent, par la diffusion de leurs représentations contradictoires, des débats politiques entre citoyens.” Yves Lacoste, Dictionnaire de Geopolitique (Paris: Flammarion, 1995), 20. 141 Chauprade and Thual, DicĠionar de Geopolitică, 504. 142 Yves Lacoste, Dictionnaire de, 1. Original French text: “un pont pour franchir un obstacle. Quels obstacles? … la violence avec laquelle, dans de nombreaux

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Yves Lacoste and the team from Herodote, starting with Béatrice Giblin who took over the magazine and founded the French Institute of Geopolitics in 2002, have worked hard in France to (re)define geopolitics, from the historical analysis of the evolution of the term to its obscurity during the Nazi period and the conditions of its recurrence in the French press and the academic world. The research activity of the French Institute of Geopolitics is extensive and innovative thanks to the large number of specialists and PhD students working there (between the 1960s and 1970s), especially on European issues. The Institute’s activity is adapting to the changes and requirements of the digital era, allotting significant resources to the cybersecurity research and its mapping. In the same French area, Michel Foucher considers that geopolitics is “a global method of geographical analysis of the concrete socio-political situations envisaged in so far as they are localized, and the usual representations which describe them.”143 For Karl Haushofer, geopolitics is and has to be the state’s geographic conscience.144 The competition in terms of idea/theories between the schools of geopolitics in different states is beneficial for the development and consolidation of this field, given that controversy is directly proportional to the extent of interest and fascination it raises in researchers. Despite the large number of schools of geopolitics, with regards to the competition in terms of research methods, one thing is common – its capacity for synthesis by including a large number of other disciplines within the analysis. The geopolitical analysis is undoubtedly transdisciplinary, appealing to history, geography, culture, religion, sociology, ideology, economy, statistics, or politics to obtain a complete and complex picture of an event or conflict. Similarly to the term “security,” “geopolitics”145 is also an “umbrella term” which raises many questions and controversies, lacking a universally accepted exhaustive definition, subject to transformation and adaptation in the changes occurring in the international arena. In these circumstances, when asking what geopolitics is, the answers vary, ranging from science, research method, discipline, and branch of political science pays du monde et notamment en Europe aujourd’hui, des idees geopolitiques tres diverses s’opposent entre ells.” 143 Ibid., 10–11. Original French text: “une methode globale d’annalyse geographique des situations sociopolitique concretes envisagees en tant qu’elle sont localisees, et des representations habituelle qui les decrivent.” 144 Ibid., 10. 145 For details see Hervé Coutau-Bégarie and Martin Motte, Approches de la géopolitique. De l’Antiquité au XXIe siècle (Paris: Economica, 2013).

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to path of knowledge or theory. For the French Institute of Geopolitics (Paris), it is a research method. In a globalized, interdependent, and dependent on modern technology world (especially the Internet), we cannot reject any of these variants as false, as we cannot be categorical in considering only one as true. The option for one or several of these variants must be tempered by context, actors, research objectives, impact, and influences from other areas of research. Thus, do we refer to geopolitics in the singular or plural form? The answer to this question is neither a simple nor convenient one, given that there are several schools of geopolitics (or at least representatives with different and contradictory opinions) in the European states and beyond, which is why we talk about the French, Anglo-Saxon, German, and Romanian schools of geopolitics, for example, each of these claiming a certain tradition, history, and theory. Geopolitics rebounded after 1990 (following a period of stagnation due to the Nazi deviation) and has since not only developed but also conquered new European states. Besides the schools with traditions – the American (represented among others by Z. Brzezinski and S. Huntington – “the clash of civilizations”), French, German, and Anglo-Saxon schools – concerns in this domain become more obvious in other states as well, through certain specialized publications, such as Italy (Limes magazine), Greece (Geoplitika magazine),146 and Romania. In a special issue of Herodote (“The Geopolitics of Geopolitics”), Philippe Subra (a member of the French Institute of Geopolitics) raises and answers the question: “La Géopolitique, une ou plurielle?” by bringing it to the forefront of the international reality, understanding the territory147 and gradations regarding the internal and external geopolitics. With globalization, the difference between the internal and external geopolitics has a purely analytical purpose, given that the conflicts and events within a state have the same effects and reverberations at the international level (for example the Syrian Dossier, Kosovo’s selfproclamation of independence, the Arab Spring, the terrorist attacks in the

146 Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, “Critica Geopoliticii” [“Geopolitics Criticism”], Impact Strategic [Strategic Impact] 2, no. 19 (Bucharest: Universitatea NaĠională de Apărare “Carol I” Publishing House, 2006), 23, https://cssas.unap.ro/ro/pdf_publicatii/is19.pdf. 147 Philippe Subra, “La Geopolitique, une ou plurielle? Place, enjeux et outils d’une geopolitique locale,” Hérodote 3, no. 146–7 (2012): 45–70, https://www.cairn.info/revue-herodote-2012-3-page-45.htm?contenu=article.

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USA and their aftermath in Europe, and the actions against the immigrants and refugees in host states). An important role in this process is played by the media (the so-called CNN effect) and the Internet (especially through the social-media networks like Facebook or Twitter). The most accessible means of communication allowing coverage of a local or global event or conflict are those that have significantly contributed to the blurring of boundaries between the internal and external geopolitics, thus leading researchers to think on a macro scale, but act on a micro one. Concerning the geopolitical analysis, the media and the Internet led to the appearance of a “street effect” (the active involvement of the audience), otherwise known as debates, or discussions at the civil-society level as a whole or at the individual level. Undoubtedly, we are facing an ample fund movement (or as Béatrice Giblin named it in the title of an article from the same issue of Herodote, “La Géopolitique, un raisonnement geographique d’avant-garde”148 [“Geopolitics, an avant-garde geographical reasoning”]), determined by the need for a global explanation regarding the events in the international arena. The geopolitical analysis can also be applied to isolated, local, and regional events, of small reach but whose effects can be perceived internationally, for example Kosovo’s proclamation of independence, or the uncertain situation in Syria which led to a European refugee crisis. In this context, one of the geopolitics research directions refers to providing a comprehensive (extensive) analysis and explanation framework for the phenomena and events taking place internationally, while also defining the positive or negative orientations. “Why geopolitics and not geography?” seems to be the obvious question on the lips of all the objectors of this science. “Why ‘geo’ and not something else?” This leads us to make a direct connection between territory and politics. It is thus clear that we are facing an epistemological and theoretical uncertainty, which will not be solved as long as each school of geopolitics is convinced of the validity of its theories. The term “geography” resembles a clear, precise, and limited analysis, with a focus on physical factors (relief, water, climate) and human factors (distribution of population, density, economy, language, religion), although at the end of the nineteenth century this discipline was in full development and the first geopolitical scientists (who either used this term or not) were fundamentally geographers, such as Ratzel, Kjellén, and Mackinder. 148

Beatrice Giblin, “La Geopolitique, un raisonnement geographique d’avantgarde,” Hérodote 3, no. 146–7, (2012): 3–13, https://www.cairn.info/revueherodote-2012-3-page-3.html.

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Geopolitics, on the other hand (a term of media resonance), requires a complex and subtle analysis, focused on the actors’ positions (at the expense of the physical factors), in which the elements intertwine and influence one another (the economic influences, the political and population dissemination, migration and cultural development), and in some cases lead to new outbreaks of armed conflict – any of which have the possibility to be both cause and effect in a specific context. Another possible explanation resides in the fact that, from the 1950s and up until about 1975, the term geopolitics (also as a research method or science) fell into obscurity due to the Nazi deviation (which absorbed some of the instruments/theories of geopolitics’ precursors and used them to justify their actions, for example Lebensraum [The Living Space] conceived by Ratzel, taken by the Nazis and interpreted in a racist manner). Following this silent period, a comeback and rebranding of geopolitics was necessary (which occurred in the early 1980s, as expected). Starting with this period, a series of factors appeared at the international level, determining but also facilitating the return to geopolitics, the most important of which was the theory void, analysis, and research methods to meet the changes occurring globally. This led to an influx of neologisms that begin with the “geo-” prefix, and which reappear in the global research plan (from America to Europe) as it goes beyond the case of geopolitics, and we can refer here to geo-strategy, geo-economics, geo-culture, geo-marketing, and geo-sociology, for example. This explosion proved not only the existence of a fertile area of research but also the existence of a significant number of events to which analyses can be applied. A second possible explanation is closely related to the internationalization process of events. We are witnessing an enlargement of the international system(s) given that, due to the communication infrastructure (road, maritime, and aerial, as well as the role of the media and the Internet), the international arena has transformed into a unique planetary ensemble. Events and conflicts are no longer disparate and isolated but an integral part of this unique ensemble, because, inevitably through the effects, the power of the example of the actors involved will influence, in the long term, the evolution in other parts of the world (for example, the Arab Spring, the oil crises of the 1970s, the territorial fragmentation of the former Yugoslavia, the measures taken to control the number of immigrants, and refugees). Geopolitics thus becomes the natural response to the challenge of the world analysis as a whole (global contextualization), providing new research instruments and new researchers, and concurrently

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appealing to transdisciplinarity, as mentioned above, to obtain a complete and complex picture of events. These changes give rise to an entire chain of questions regarding the epistemology of geopolitics, some of which seem emblematic for its development, respectively: Is any geography political and geopolitical? What role do maps have? For whom are the graphical representations made, and how can we be sure that their message will be correctly understood by the target audience? How do we select the target audience? Do we have a single audience or more? These are only a few of the questions that an analyst should consider when performing a geopolitical analysis. Appearing here, as in the case of the role played by images in the securitization act (instruments that will be extensively analysed in chapter two), is the question referring to the control capacity exercised by the geographer or political scientist upon the manner in which the map, and respectively the information transmitted through it, reaches the target audience. Who do we address these “peaceful weapons” to?149 The audience segmentation is performed by the actor who de/securitizes (be it the state, policymakers, the civil society, the press, or minority groups) according to the reaction they want to obtain (support, repudiation, insurgence, conflict settling). The communication channel is equally important, being strongly connected to creating the desired impact, from a local/regional level through exposures, to a global level through the Internet and the media. According to Lacoste’s theory, geopolitics studies “the powers’ rivalries where the stakes are fundamentally the territories.”150 The stake of these territories surpasses their physical existence and natural resources, their importance residing in their symbolic force (the cradle of civilization, and their cultural, religious, political, or ethnic value). These symbols equally determine, in different contexts, the actors’ behaviour in the international arena (for example, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the dispute between Greece and Macedonia [FYROM] regarding the latter’s name, Europe under the immigrants’ siege, and the refugee crisis in the EU which led to the emergence of the immigrant/refugee phobia). By means of the proposed analysis method, Lacoste emphasizes the complexity and diversity of the geopolitical issues,151 which in a 149 Barbara Loyer, “Les crises géopolitiques et leurcartographie,” Hérodote 3, no. 146–7 (2012): 90–107. 150 Chauprade and Thual, DicĠionar de Geopolitică, 504. 151 Lacoste, Dictionnaire de, 2.

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globalized world can no longer be analysed and explained by appeal to general, superficial causality, like the East-West, North-South, or farmersindustrialists types of conflict. The economic development, the technological revolution, the media, and the internationalization of internal events and conflicts caused the geopolitization of a series of events that were previously studied individually, at local, regional, and national levels, without broad contextualization, such as immigration, conflicts between the majority population and the minorities, electoral behaviour, conflicts between political parties, and religious conflicts. Nowadays, any element/event (sewage network, housing organization, cultural manifestations, ethnic composition of a block/neighbourhood, etc.) no matter how insignificant, can become a pretext for a conflict. The power rivalries research method in which the stakes are fundamentally territories (or the idea of “symbolic” territory) comprises spatial analysis, analysis of geopolitical representations, and the analysis of the actors involved. The spatial analysis is performed at various ranges or “levels of analysis.” The research starts from the analysis of the issues in small territories, thus allowing the understanding of the territory’s features and the manner in which the matter under review came to be. A contextualization of the issue also occurs simultaneously to observe how it is studied in larger territories. The maps made in this book, with the help of the French Institute of Geopolitics cartographers, come under this analysis for a better understanding of the manner in which the minority issue in general, and the Roma issue in particular, have an impact on the majority community they come into contact with. Maps accompany words and images in the securitization/desecuritization process, with a primordial role in the spatial placement of the event/conflict at different levels of analysis through cartography (for example, the diatopes/superposition method that is successfully applied by the French Institute of Geopolitics Researchers). At present, the dramatization part (which is performed better through images and photographs) loses ground to cartography, which becomes an analysis instrument increasingly used not only by researchers but also by policymakers when wanting to convince the audience. Thus, we encounter a problem as maps are intended to be demonstrative, but when they exceed the scientific analytical framework and head towards the political-economic plan, we must question their degree of subjectivity, namely: What is the interest of the actor who made the map? Who does it address? What is meant to be shown/argued/proved through it? The map comprises the fears, phobias, and obsessions of a political, minority, or

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researcher group who sometimes sacrifice the factual reality to achieve their purpose (minimalization/exaggeration/amplification of causes, conflicts, events, and effects). Borders, minorities, and conflicts (including wars) are the most commonly mapped issues. The map in geopolitics represents the equivalent of the word in literature. The role of the map ranges from an instrument of knowledge to one of disguising propaganda. As in the case of the word or the images, these can become the subject of propaganda (political, electoral), camouflaging the intentions of the geopolitical actors or exaggerating threats to install panic and chaos, which then allow a greater ease for action so that policymakers can take the measures they consider necessary (the hysteria created by the war against terrorism, global warming, the nuclear accident at FukushimaDaiichi in 2011, the immigrant waves, the refugee crisis in 2015, etc.). Thus, the question of who maps address is not only legitimate but also necessary in a geopolitical analysis to draw the line between analysis and politics (i.e. between pedagogy and propaganda). Maps, just like images, pictures, and discourse, have a mobilizing effect on the audience as they tell a story with causes, main characters, and effects. The second important element of the geopolitical analysis is the analysis of representations. A geopolitical representation is a geopolitical opinion conflicting with another on the subject of a territory. In the Dictionary of Geopolitics Preamble, Lacoste defines geopolitical representations as “filled with value … whose objective characteristics are not easy to establish … The only scientific way to approach any geopolitical problem is by using divergent, contradictory, more or less antagonistic representations.”152 Geopolitical representations can be classified according to the levels of spatial analysis locally, regionally, nationally, or internationally. This classification allows the analyst to take into consideration the effects of a conflict/event/issue at different levels of analysis, thus creating an objective and comprehensive representation.153 In our research, this analysis is applied to the conflicts associated with the presence of the Roma in Lyon, with a detailed description of the socialinclusion solutions in localities of the origin state, with a focus on the local 152

Ibid., 27. Original French text: “chargées de valeur, plus ou moin partielles et plus ou moins consciemment partiale de situation réelles dont les caractéristiques objectives ne sont pas facile à établir … La seule façon scientifique d’aborder quelque problème géopolitique que ce soit est de poser d’entrée de jeu, comme principe fondamental, qu’il est exprimé par des représentations divergentes, contradictoires, et plus ou moins antagonistes.” 153 Ibid., 28.

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and national challenges of the process of identifying a viable global solution to the problem. Representations (which derive from the verb to draw, to represent graphically) in geopolitics and the discourse in the case of securitization as a speech act are par excellence theatre acts in which an important role is played by the effect of dramatizing the situation. Lacoste prefers the term “representation” to the detriment of “collective ideology.”154 For him, representations are determinants of the geopolitical behaviour, which are equally as important as the space, economic, or strategic interests.155 In the paper “Vive la nation” and articles in the Herodote “The Geopolitics of Geopolitics” issue, he insists upon the national phenomenon (the specific characteristics of each nation) together with the importance of the territory, the power, and the state in the geopolitical analysis. In the same paper, Lacoste draws attention to the effects of globalization upon the nation which must also be preserved in a multicultural world, a benchmark of geopolitical analysis. Regarding the theme of our research, in the following chapters we will address the importance of the identity construct and the manner in which (starting from Smith’s definition of the nation) it feels threatened by the groups of immigrants (in the sense of destabilizing elements). Third, geopolitical analysis should highlight the actors involved in studying these problems, their current activity, the motivations and interests behind their actions/initiatives, and how these initiatives/actions change depending on the wider political context. This is a very practical method of analysis by which general and abstract concepts find their application in specific cases of analysis. In the present research this analysis is presented in the study situation of the Roma in Lyon. The research instruments introduced by Lacoste were quickly adopted by an impressive number of researchers and used in their analyses or proved within other research (especially those considering geopolitics as determinist thinking). It is premature to draw conclusions at this moment since the security studies field is in development and contestation, which is why this section of the book brings into discussion the necessity of assuming the porous borders and fluidity of this academic field in Europe in the context of the interdependent migration-identity-security relationship. The new dynamic of the European integration process, after the Maastricht Treaty, has prompted the Eurosceptics to express their apprehension about the 154 155

Chauprade and Thual, DicĠionar de Geopolitică, 505. Ibid.

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enlargement of the EU towards Eastern Europe (2004–7), perceived as a threat to the “Western identity.”156 In this context, “culture becomes a security policy”157 (especially within the EU), imposing the societal security issue on the extended security agenda.

1.6. Europe in the Age of Societal Security Societal security asserted itself on the European security agenda in the early 1990s as a reaction to the effects of the end of the Cold War and the fall of Communism. In a geographical area in which state borders were drawn, the state security, in terms of territorial integrity, is no longer an emergency. However, the identity of society becomes a priority in the context of freedom of movement within the EU. The European integration project, the emergence of the community level, and the increasing importance of the regional level led to a cooling of “the traditional political relation state-society”158 in Western Europe. In Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans area, the fall of Communism created a surge in nationalism against the ethnic groups’ desire to represent a majority in their own state and not a minority in a foreign one. If in the Western Balkans the interethnic conflicts led to a territorial fragmentation, completed in 2008 with Kosovo’s independence (and, from a geopolitical point of view, the region is still capable of producing such surprises), in Eastern Europe, nationalism led to numerous conflicts between the majority population and the national minorities (see the case of Transylvania). As a modern concept, adapted to new European realities, “societal security” appeared in 1993 in Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe.159 The authors argue that since the end of the Cold War and the fall of Communism, the non-military threats (migration, demography, interethnic conflicts, natural disasters, religious conflicts) gained ground against military ones. The paper promotes the reconceptualization of the 156

Panic, “Societal Security,” 33. Weaver, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” 68. 158 Paul Roe, “The Societal Dimension,” 114. 159 Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, and Pierre Lemaitre, Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (London: Pinter, 1993); Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: an Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (1983 first edition, and then reissued in 1991). In this paper, the author assumes a state-centric position which will be widely criticized. Societal security is characterized as a state’s ability to preserve its customs, culture, language, traditions, and identity and to ensure the population’s existence. 157

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state-societal security duality, based on survival. If the state perceives survival as real security – population, resources, political system, the inviolability of borders – for the societal society, the threats regard identity. This means that the state and the “societal frontiers”160 are two distinct things which rarely overlap in the logic of the modern security. In the 1990s this first paper opened the specialized literature on societal and human security, addressing issues such as uncontrolled migration, interethnic conflict, demographic changes, and religious identity.161 Among these issues, our scientific undertaking will focus on the societal security analysis as a source of subnational instability in the context of migration within the EU. The emergence and consolidation of community policies led to a change of the discourse on societal security, which thus exceeds the state. This approach is based on a few research questions: What is societal security and what are the threats against it? What are the mechanisms by which society defends against them? Who speaks on behalf of the society? The referent object is society as a whole, or the individuals? In the paper Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, the societal security is defined as “the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats … it is about the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and customs.”162 Paul Roe defined the concept as “particularly effective for understanding the security concerns of multi-ethnic states: the relation between the regime (majority group) and the country’s minority groups.”163 These definitions are based on the Schmittian logic (friend versus enemy, us versus the others) as the object that needs to be secured achieves this status only in relation with “the other” (immigrant), who represents an existential threat. Thus, societal 160

Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde, Securitatea, un nou cadru, 171. Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, “Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods,” Mershon International Studies Review 40, no. 2 (1996): 229–54; Bill McSweeney, “Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School,” Review of International Studies 22 (1996): 81–93; Edward Newman, “Human Security and Constructivism,” International Studies Perspectives 2, no. 3 (2001): 239–51; Matt McDonald, “Human Security and the Construction of Security,” Global Society 16, no. 3 (2002): 277–95; Christopher Rudolph, “Security and the Political Economy of International Migration,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 4 (2003): 603–20. 162 Weaver et al., Identity, Migration, 25. 163 Paul Roe, “Societal Security,” in Contemporary Security Studies, edited by Alan Collins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 179. 161

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security is a process through which society is reinforced “vis-à-vis the other.”164 In his book Imagined Communities,165 Benedict Anderson explains the way in which identity is constructed, based on the relationship “us-the others.” This registers that the actors in the construction of identity (in the spirit of the Copenhagen School we could say that they secure identity) are not only the states, as an important role is also played by the non-state actors (cultural and social, who sometimes share a common agenda with the state). The centre of this security sector is represented by the intent driving the actor who securitizes. The conclusion of these definitions is that societies perceive threats in identity terms (“identity security”166), in connection with a “symbolic territory” (which here plays the role of a cradle of civilization and culture for the society in question). The symbolic territory is an invention of narrations, stories, and myths that speak of “who we are,” “our role in the world,” and “elements that define and are a threat to us.”167 Ensuring a security climate in the context of freedom of movement within the EU and increase of the East-West migration can only be achieved through an effective management of the immigrant flows according to the degree of risk they involve for the economic, political, or identity development of the EU. Huysmans examines three possible strategies, subsequently undertaken by Roe,168 for the solving of the migration issue: the objectivist strategy (in which people are persuaded that migration is indeed a security issue – “the migrant is dangerous”169); the constructive strategy (securitization is a social construct); and the deconstructive strategy170 (migration is removed from the emergency policies agenda). Of these strategies Huysmans 164

Bezen Balamir Coskun, Analysing Desecuritisation: the Case of the IsraeliPalestinian Peace Education and Water Management (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011), 12. 165 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991). 166 Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde, Securitatea, un nou cadru, 172. 167 Erik Ringmar, “On the Ontological Status of the State,” European Journal of International Relations 2, no. 4 (1996): 455. 168 Jef Huysmans, “Migrants as a Security Problem: Dangers of ‘Securitizing’ Societal Issues,” in Migration and European Integration: Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion, edited by Robert Miles and Dietrich Thranhardt (London: Pinter, 1995), 53–72; Paul Roe, “Securitization of Minority Rights: Conditions of Desecuritization,” Security Dialogue 35, no. 3 (2004): 279–94. 169 Huysmans, “Migrants as a Security Problem,” 65. 170 Ibid., 67.

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prefers deconstruction,171 which takes the migrant outside the “security drama,” depicting their multiple identities (the multiple identity issue will be analysed in the third chapter) within common politics. Huysmans’s neoliberal perspective is also shared by Bigo in “Security and Immigration,” which addresses the migration issue and its security. In the spirit of Foucault’s panoptic theory in Discipline and Punish, Bigo proposes the change of the panopticon vision (in which all individuals are potential subjects for analysis) with a Banopticon one, which is more selective and in which only certain groups are accused (events in their past or their nature determine a degree of risk in their future actions).172 The Banopticon vision brings to the fore of analysis the stereotypes issue, through which certain groups, perceived as a potential threat, are turned into scapegoats, even if they haven’t broken the law, solely based on certain previous behaviours or history. In a Europe under economic crisis and a European Union under identity crisis, the Roma continue to be the ideal scapegoats,173 highlighting the lack of real social integration measures, together with the institutions’ inability to defend the underlying principles of the union, and to ensure a security climate for economic, political, and social development. The referent objects of the societal security (clans, minorities, civilizations, religions, tribes, etc.) are defined as “groups that carry along the subjects’ loyalties and devotion to a form and an extent that can create a strong social argument according to which the idea of ‘us’ is threatened.”174 Based on the existence of a super-national European identity, it is necessary to distinguish between national security and societal security. The process of European integration raised culture to the rank of security 171

Matti, “Desecuritizing Minority Right,” 169. Bigo, “Security and Immigration,” 81. 173 The scapegoat theory is a social psychological term that relates to prejudice. According to this theory, people may be prejudiced towards a group in order to vent their anger. In essence, they use the group they dislike as their target for all of their anger. Nowadays, the theory is extended to groups of different people considered unwanted in the society, such as the Jews during Fascism, black slaves for Americans, Roma in Europe, or lesbians and homosexuals. In the World Book Encyclopedia (1960, 145), the theory appears as originating in western studies, referring to one of the two goats received by the high priest of Jerusalem on Yom Kippur (the Day of Atonement). One goat was sacrificed to the Lord, while the other was used as a scapegoat to carry the sins outside the community. The priest had to touch the animal in an attempt to transfer the sins to it and thus cleanse them by sending it into the desert. 174 Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde, Securitatea, un nou cadru, 176. 172

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policy, favouring cooperation and social inclusion at the expense of societal insecurity, defined by Buzan as a threat to the community’s identity.175 Minorities become a threat only when the majority and minority representatives try to promote identities that cannot coexist within the same territory. The situation is similar with the immigrants who are seen as a threat to the culture, civilization, and social system of the host state. An important role in the outlining of these images is played by the media, which “significantly contributes in defining the situations”176 in a dual role of opinion shaper and actor-audience communication channel. The societal security exacerbation can become dangerous from a political point of view as it favours the appearance of “the societal security dilemma.” This phenomenon emerges when perceptions of the others turn into images of the enemy. In this context, the societal desecuritization is a rather ambiguous and difficult-to-achieve process, as it requires the reconstruction of identity on new grounds, so that the different identity stories do not contain elements of threat to other groups/identities. The reference to existential identity threats differs from case to case, depending on the “way in which identity is constructed”177 and its relation to the state. For example, in Eastern Europe, where identity has a special relationship with the territory and history, societal desecuritization is a virtually impossible task. In such situations, the answer comes from the law and security specialists. In the book Security: a New Framework for Security Analysis, the authors exemplify the three most common threats to societal security: migration, horizontal competition, and vertical competition.178 To fulfil the purpose of this research, in the next chapters we will deal with two of them, namely migration (the cause and effect of insecurity, taking as a starting point the Schmittian political mindset) and vertical competition (social inclusion of the Roma in the context of the extended project of European integration, with a focus on the situation in France).

175

Ibid., 172. Ibid. 177 Ibid., 178. 178 Ibid., 174. 176

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1.7. Conclusions: Towards a “New” Age of Security in Europe? The purpose of this first chapter was to formulate a point of view on the new framework for security analysis and assess the research concepts and instruments with which we operate throughout our analysis. In our study, we tried to highlight the (r)evolution in security that occurred after the shift in the centre of analysis from the traditional security (politicomilitary) to the modern, individual-oriented security. In the first phase, our attention was drawn to the new perception of “security” as it appears in the interpretation of the Copenhagen and Paris schools, with a focus on the security practices. The formulation of an exhaustive answer to the simple question of What is Security? proved to be practically impossible given that theorists report on it differently, in terms of both objective (real) and subjective (social construct) dimensions, depending on the purpose of research. For the present paper its subjective nature is important, in the context of the migration-identity-security nexus. The emergence of the Copenhagen School was necessary and at the same time determined by the political, socioeconomic, and military changes that took place in the early twentieth century and beginning of the twenty-first century in Europe. After the end of the Cold War the state ceased to be the only actor of securitization, given that the non-military issues started to gain ground on the international agendas. Security no longer identified itself exclusively with the military and use of forcerelated issues. New problems, determined by the changes in the international arena, such as interethnic relations, migrations, cultural identity, the environment, and the economy gained ground against traditional challenges that were less and less present in the extended security agenda. First of all, we have noticed that the Copenhagen School theorists expanded the European security agenda by adding the economic, political, societal, and environmental security sectors. Issues that have been previously ignored by theorists, such as poverty, migration, human trafficking, environmental risks, and economic and political threats were also included. In a globalized world, there is a real interest in societal security for the preservation of identity, linguistic, cultural, and religious traits of an ethnic group against foreign, external influences. Identity is both a source of conflicts and their effects. The next step aimed at opening the security complex theory to sectors other than the military and political and to actors other than the states. The third step was represented by the introduction in 1995 of Weaver’s theory

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in the security analysis regarding securitization as a speech act. Thus, according to Weaver, security is not something real and objective, but something that refers to the utterance itself, namely the act of speech. Among these new directions of research promoted by the Copenhagen School, the issue of societal security and securitization as a speech act are of real interest for the present research paper, emphasizing the interdependent relationship between migration-identity-security, with a focus on the anti-Roma campaigns in France. Since the advent of the securitization theory within the framework for analysis on security studies (and perhaps due to its novelty and notoriety), it has managed to attract substantial criticism from theorists, so that Andrew Moravscik asked if there was “something rotten in the state of Denmark,”179 making direct reference to the Copenhagen School theorists’ activity. The theorists who addressed the securitization theory in its initial formulation attempted to adapt it to the international realities, a stronger contextualization, a diversification of the previously marginalized actors, and the adaptation of the discourse depending on the audience, focusing on the role of practices and the media in the securitization process. The objectors of this theory asked themselves if the theory “of securitization as a speech act” is capable of responding to the security dynamics in a world where political communication is dependent on the media. Nowadays, the media is a central element of the security action. Since the Gulf War to the war in the Western Balkans, and since the September 11, 2001 events to the Arab Spring, the media has proved that there is an interdependent relationship between the act of securitization and the modern means of communication (a partnership relation180 which will be detailed in the second chapter of this paper). It is premature to draw conclusions since the security studies field is still developing, which is why it is more appropriate for this part of the work to bring into discussion the necessity of assuming the porous borders and fluidity of this academic field in Europe, in the context of the migration-identity-security interdependence. The new dynamic of the European integration process, following the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, has determined the Eurosceptics to express their apprehension regarding the enlargement of the EU towards Eastern Europe (2004–7), perceived as a threat to the “Western identity.”181 In this context, “culture becomes a security policy”182 179

Andrew Moravscik, “Is Something Rotten in the State of Denmark?” Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies,” 524. 181 Panic, “Societal Security,” 33. 180

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(especially within the EU), imposing the societal security issue on the extended security agenda. Security has always been the goal behind the integration process, which is why the European theorists’ propensity for a diversified security agenda, with a focus on the issues affecting existence and development, is understandable. This issue, along with the migrationidentity-security triumvirate, will be the focus of analysis in the next chapter.

182

Weaver, “Securitization and Desecuritzation,” 68.

CHAPTER TWO THE MIGRATION-IDENTITY-SECURITY NEXUS ON THE EUROPEAN UNION’S SECURITY AGENDA

The end of the Cold War also meant a reduction of wars in their traditional form, being rapidly replaced by other types of conflict (economic, religious, cultural, identity, or environmental) that hold the attention of researchers at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The evanescence of an imminent military danger prompted the state to seek or invent a new threat to society that would legitimize its role of protector. The external enemy became an internal one in the person of the immigrant, the refugee, the “other,” the “foreigner” who, according to Bigo, is pervasive and more difficult to refute: “The new enemy [namely the emigrant] is not clearly identifiable nor associable to a particular state … and, therefore, potentially omnipresent, transnational and already infiltrated.”183 Facing this new threat, the place of armed intervention is taken by political and social intervention. Up until the end of the twentieth century, migration had been perceived as part of internal politics, being underrepresented in the international political discourse. Following the September 11, 2001 events, the minority issue became a priority on the European agenda, prompting a new way to approach security with a focus on the issues related to society: migrations, demography, interethnic conflicts, culture, the environment, economic development, etc. In the article “European Identity and Migration Policies,” Huysmans argues that migration was placed in a logic of security, being

183

Didier Bigo, “The European Internal Security Field: Stakes and Rivalries in a Newly Developing Area of Police Intervention,” in Policing Across National Boundaries, edited by Malcolm Anderson and Monica den Boer (London: Pinter, 1994), 166.

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perceived at a discursive level as a triple threat to the welfare state, public order, and the community’s (in terms of nation) cultural identity.184 At the beginning of the twenty-first century, international statistics showed that one in thirty-five people is an immigrant, which means that if all of them occupied a well-defined territory they would form the sixth country in the world in terms of population.185 The migration phenomenon is currently ever more present in Europe, and the issue of illegal migration is omnipresent on the international agenda. In the post-2001 context the conceptual framework of security started to be applied to a series of issues pertaining to the individual and society: migration, environment, health, culture, demography, etc. Present in public, political, press, and statistics-related discourses, the phenomenon of immigration and its effects upon security and European integration could not go unnoticed by academia. The specialized literature is rich in papers that analyse the security aspects of migration (whether referring to legal migration or asylum seekers), with a particular focus on human and societal security, starting with the Copenhagen School representatives and continuing with its objectors.186 184

Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration,” Journal of Common Market Studies 38, no. 5 (2000): 751–77. 185 Alexandra Sarcinschi, MigraĠie úi Securitate [Migration and Security] (Bucharest: Universitatea NaĠională de Apărare “Carol I” Publishing House, 2008), 5, https://cssas.unap.ro/ro/pdf_studii/migratie_si_securitate.pdf. 186 For details also see papers: Barry Buzan, People, State and Fear: an Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991); Jef Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU (London: Routledge, 2006); Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration,” Journal of Common Market Studies 38, no. 5 (2000): 751–77; Didier Bigo, “L’Europe de la sécurité intérieure: penser autrement la sécurité,” in Entre Union et nations. L’Etat en Europe, edited by Anne-Marie Le Gloannec (Paris: Presses de Sciences politiques, 1998); Didier Bigo, “Europe passoire et Europe forteresse: La sécurisation/humanitarisation de l’immigration,” in Immigration et racisme en Europe, edited by A. Rea (Bruxelles: Complexe, 1998); Didier Bigo, “L’immigration à la croisée des chemins sécuritaires,” Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales 14, no. 1 (1998): 25–46; Didier Bigo, “Migration and Security,” in Controlling a New Migration World, edited by Virginie Guiraudon and Christian Joppke (London: Routledge, 2001); Sergio Carrera, “Integration as a Process of Inclusion for Migrants? The Case of Long-Term Residents in the EU,” Belgium: Center for European Politics Studies working document, no. 219, March 2005; Paul Roe, “Securitization and Minority Rights: Conditions of Desecuritization,” Security Dialogue 35, no. 3 (2004): 279–94; Edward Newman, “Human Security and Constructivism,” International Studies Perspectives 2, no. 3 (2001): 239–51; Keith Krause and

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It can be said that the last decade in the history of European migration is under professional mobility auspices for the engagement of benefits on the labour market. Migration is, however, responsible for eighty-five percent of Europe’s demographic development187 in the context of an acute ageing process of the population in developed states (which is at the same time an attraction for immigrants). The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the migration-identitysecurity interdependence relationship with a focus on its effects on the European integration process. This nexus will be reviewed under a triple aspect of its effects on security, the welfare state, and identity construction within the EU. This analysis aims to demonstrate that the migration security goes beyond Weaver’s discursive practices, being an integral part of a complex construct called by Claudia Arădău the security continuum. In this analysis, migration must be understood and regarded as a spill-over effect, bringing together previous analysis sectors that were studied separately. In the current context, marked by an economic crisis, migration has been elevated to the level of a meta-issue,188 the boundaries between threats to internal and external politics becoming more ambiguous. The analysis refers to the migration-identity-security relationship, but does not require an exhaustive analysis of the migration phenomenon in the EU (which includes both the immigrants in the member states and those in the third-party states). Our analysis framework will only be applied to the migration between the EU member states with a focus on the Roma population, which has the power to bring forward, in the public debate, Europe’s twentieth-century xenophobic and racist attitudes within a larger debate on enlargement versus European integration. The EU’s integration capacity was put to the test regarding the last two waves of accession, with states that presented a considerable number of Michael C. Williams, “Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods,” Mershon International Studies Review 40, no. 2 (1996): 229–54; Myron Weiner, The Global Migration Crisis: Challenge to States and to Human Rights (New York: Harper Collins, 1995); Gwendolyn Sasse, “Securitisation or Securing Rights? Exploring the Conceptual Foundations of Policies towards Migrants and Minorities in Europe,” Journal of Common Market Studies 43, no. 4 (2005): 673– 93; Christopher Rudolph, “Security and the Political Economy of International Migration,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 4 (2003): 603–20. 187 Cristina Elena Bobu, Politica UE în domeniul migraĠiei – mai multe faĠete ale aceleiaúi dileme [EU Policy in the Migration Field – Several Aspects of the Same Dilemma], Sfera Politicii, no. 137 (2009), http://revistasferapoliticii.ro/sfera/137/art14-bobu.html. 188 Dider Bigo, “Migration and Security,” 121–2.

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Roma population living in precarious conditions (we refer to the enlargements of 2004 and 2007 – our analysis does not tackle the case of Croatia). These two enlargements were different from the previous ones, both in terms of the large number of solicitants, the historic past, the population size, or conflicts between the minority and majority populations. In this context the question is what type of stability and security is suitable for such unions? How important is the political identity project against economic liberalization, given that, after the Maastricht Treaty, the primarily economic European Community entered the path of a political union? Is it interesting that the European integration process works as a security system, determining a relocation of the state’s role in terms of identity and sovereignty within the same system? Security has always been the purpose behind the European integration process, in an attempt of the states to avoid repeating the mistakes of the twentieth century. This chapter is divided into three parts, each addressing a component of the insecurity spiral created by the migration-identity-security triumvirate. First of all, we will analyse the migration-security relationship within the extended security agenda, and our attention will be retained by the identity-security relationship in which security is the purpose behind the European integration process. The migration-identity-security relationship is to be analysed from a double perspective of identity and migration, as both the cause and effect of insecurity. As discussed in the previous chapter, the second generation of securitization theorists and representatives of the Paris School emphasized the role of images and the media in the securitization process, which is why, in the last part of this chapter, our attention will be retained by the role of the media in the society, within the securitization/desecuritization process. From the fourth power in the state (with the role of fine analyst of the state’s institutions’ activities), the media becomes, under the auspices of the constructivist theory, a partner in the securitization process. This chapter aims to provide a better understanding of the manner in which the migration-identity-security-triumvirate imposed on the European agenda a modern approach of the politics-security relationship, of the way in which it influenced the European integration process (in which the EU plays the role of desecuritization actor), and at the same time the detection of a way to address the consequences arising from this triumvirate.

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2.1. Migration and the (In)Security Policies in the EU The relation between migration (either legal or illegal) and security is undoubtedly one of the main topics on the European agenda and the transatlantic relations. At the end of the twentieth century, during the lectures at the College de France, Michel Foucault warned that “there is no legal age, disciplinary age and then a security age.”189 Europe has a long tradition regarding migration, however, only recently, with the accession of the Eastern European states to the EU, has it begun to be regarded as a potential threat to both the national security (by the host state) and the international stability (if we take as reference the European Union.) Since 2001 (after the beginning of “the war against terrorism”), an increase in representation incidence and the association of immigrants and asylum requesters with issues related to terrorism, organized crime, threats to national identity, or sovereignty can be observed. Their visibility is determined by their great number, and the majority population’s or host state’s inability to integrate them. An important role is also played by the subjective nature of the two concepts of security and migration and their construction, taking into account the interest of the actor who securitizes: “migration, security and the linkage between the two of them are inherently subjective concepts … [which depend on the interest of the one who] is defining the terms and who benefits by defining the terms in a given way.”190 In the context of globalization, the migration-security relationship takes on new dimensions with ample reverberations in the economic, political, social, demographic, and societal fields. Globalization draws a new era which rises on the ruins of the Cold War period, and feeds on a worldwide economy turning global under the pressure of massive technology, telecommunication, and cross-continental transport development. Globalization wears down the boundaries between the external and internal politics, between economy and security,191 identity and security, and politics and culture. Thus, within the current security environment, the globalization of risks and threats has determined the shift of the accent from the state’s security (the realist theory) to the community’s security, 189 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory and Population: Lectures at the College de France 1977–1978 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 8. 190 Nazli Choucri, “Migration and Security: Some Key Linkages,” Journal of International Affairs 56, no.1 (2002): 98. 191 Cristian Troncotă, NeliniЮtile insecurităаii [Concerns of Insecurity] (Bucharest: Tritonic PH., 2005), 15-–16.

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and implicitly the individual’s security (the constructivist theory and the human security). Migration has an impact on all aspects of security as they are identified by Barry Buzan et al. in Security: a New Framework for Analysis. Referring to the security issue in Europe, the authors state that it “manifests powerful dynamics of regionalization in the societal sector [and] the issue of minorities and the nation [causes] a constellation of multileveled identities; the fate of European integration and hence of security [being] widely determined by the fate of this constellation, in which panic reactions will be generated”192 among all actors involved. The same authors consider that migration “is easier over a short distance,” and “the competing ideas of who we are will often have a regional character.”193 The EU has a complex legislative framework, which is dynamic in keeping national and ethnic minority rights, a true European regime for minorities’ protection194 consisting of a series of normative acts such as: The Copenhagen Criteria (1993), the Maastricht Treaty (1993), the Amsterdam Treaty (1999), the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of December 7, 2000 (whose compulsory legal value is granted full effect through the Lisbon Treaty text), the Treaty of Nice (2003), Recommendation 1753 (2006),195 and the Lisbon Treaty (2006),196 to name only a few. In this context, the role of the European Union (as a regional economic, political, and desecuritization actor) is to guarantee the “right to diversity” and the “right to solidarity,” tying competition to justice, efficiency to generosity, and respect for diversity to equal opportunities on the labour market, while ensuring access to services. Besides the EU, an important role in managing the migration-security relationship is played

192

Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde, Securitatea, un noucadru, 188–9. Ibid., 180. 194 Adrian Ivan, “Extinderea UE spre Europa Centrală. Logici úi condiĠionări. Studiu de caz-România” [“EU expansion towards Central Europe: Logics and Stipulations. Case Study – Romania”], in Romania pe calea integrării europene [Romania on the Way of European Integration], edited by Simion Costea (Iaúi: Institutul European, 2007), 23–57. 195 In Recommendation 1753, the term “nation and minority” acquired new meanings, trying to overcome the ethno-cultural and national frameworks for a definition of a more capacious European nation. 196 The (Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice, and Lisbon) treaties deal with the issue of national and ethnic minorities’ protection from the “subsidiary principle” perspective. For details see the European Union’s website: www.europa.eu.en. 193

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by other international actors with responsibilities in this field, such as the UN, NATO, OSCE, and the Council of Europe. Migration has long been a barometer of geopolitics, from displacements caused by war to asylum seekers and seasonal workers.197 Over time, due to changes in the international arena, the discourse on the mobility of geopolitics has changed drastically. Cartography, geography, and the media played an important role in changing the nature of modern warfare. Actually, the new framework for security analysis has also left its mark on the geopolitical analysis. Geopolitics198 is not what it used to be as the areas are different,199 the number of actors has increased, the boundaries between internal and external politics became more porous, the analysed issues now surpass the national framework, and their effects are directly related to the European security agenda. “New themes are marking policies, such as: violence, minority issues, mobility, etc., more than the remonstrance and defense of geographic areas and borders. Socio-politics [now accompanies] geopolitics.”200 In the new paradigm on mobility, geography outlines the analysis directions at the intersection between social sciences, humanities, and understanding mobility.201 Since the 1990s, geopolitics has been accompanied by geo-economics and sociopolitics, as the security agenda expanded and the research domains related to it multiplied. The geopolitics-migration relationship within the EU remains a highly debatable domain due to the richness of events, multitude of actors, and models of critical analysis. Due to new technologies, maps allow for the mapping of events and situations with surprising speed. In contemporary

197

Jennifer Hyndman, “The Geopolitics of Migration and Mobility,” Geopolitics 17, no. 2 (2012): 243, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14650045.2011.569321. 198 The term “geopolitics” was coined recently. It appeared in the twentieth century at the crossroads between power and territory. In Géopolitique, la longue histoire d’aujourd’hui, Lacoste defines geopolitics as “les rivalités de pouvoirs ou d’influence sur des territoires et les populations qui y vivent.” Territory and space are highly important in a geopolitical analysis. 199 J. P. Liegeois, Romii în Europa [Roma in Europe] (Bucharest: Monitorul Oficial, 2008), 262. 200 Ibid. 201 Alison Blunt, “Cultural Geographies of Migration: Mobility, Transnationality and Diaspora,” Progress in Human Geography 31, no. 5 (2007): 685, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0309132507078945?journalCode=p hgb.

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geopolitical conflicts, the crisis mapping serves, like anonymous photographs or videos, as communication to mobilize the public opinion.202 The theorist who reset the fundamentals of the French geopolitics, thirty years after its disappearance, introducing two new key concepts of territoriality and representation,203 is Lacoste. In the analysis of the migration-identity-security relationship, both concepts introduced by Lacoste prove to be helpful. An important role within the analysis is played by resizing the symbolic territories, which beyond the physical existence are carriers of identity meaning (cradle of civilization), which is why protecting them is essential for the society representatives (see, for example, the interethnic conflicts in the Western Balkans or the Kurds). The representations theory meets the constructivist paradigm on security and identity, in the sense that, according to Lacoste, these are the determinants of the geopolitical actors’ behaviour. The stakes and ambitions of the geopolitical actor determine their action, an identical situation with the actor who securitizes. With regards to the geopolitical analysis, G. O. Tuathail proposes an analysis framework called the “grammar of geopolitics” (based on Kenneth Burke’s dramaturgical analysis), addressing five key questions: what? (the act itself); when? (the place); who? (the actor/s); how? (the strategy); and why? (the purpose).204 The geopolitical analysis on the migration-identity-(in)security relationship will be further achieved by taking into consideration this analysis framework to identify the red wire of migration securitization activity within the EU and its implications on the social cohesion, welfare state, and identity.

2.1.1. Rethinking (in)security in the European Union: Societal Security and Migration Issues Migration is not a new phenomenon, emerging with the states and simultaneously developing with them. Nowadays, the East-West, SouthNorth migration has intensified and diversified against the economic development and necessity for a cheap labour force, as presented below. The EU enlargement (especially the waves of 2004 and 2007) has led to “the increase of migratory influxes from East to West, especially from 202

Loyer, “Les crises géopolitiques et leurcartographie,” http://www.cairn.info/revue-herodote-2012-3-page-90.html 203 Chauprade and Thual, DicĠionar de Geopolitică, 504. 204 G. Ó Tuathail, “Theorizing Practical Geopolitical Reasoning: the Case of the United States’ Response to the War in Bosnia,” Political Geography 21, no. 5 (2002): 601–28.

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Central and Eastern Europe, but also Central Asia and Africa, towards the West.”205 The frequency of immigrant waves in the EU states depends on a series of factors, among which are: the accession of new members (determining an explosion in the number of immigrants willing to take advantage of the benefits offered by being an EU member state), seasonal labour demand (in the summer and autumn there is an increased number of seasonal economic immigrants), and the effects of economic recession (the economic crisis determined a part of the economic immigrants to return to their states of origin or change the destination state in search of another workplace, as shown in Fig. 2.2 below).

205

Sarcinschi, MigraĠie úi Securitate, 5.

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Fig. 2.1. Number of immigrants in the European states per thousand inhabitants (2011)

Eurostat, Statistics Explained, main page. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Main_Page.

Source: Eurostat206

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207

Ibid.

Source: Eurostat207

Fig. 2.2. Share of return migrants at EU level (%) (2011)

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The East-West migration and the ethnic minorities’ movement became greater and highly mediatized due to unfortunate events between the immigrant and the majority population within destination countries (for example the Mailat case in Italy, the situation of the Roma in France 2010–13, Northern Ireland 2009, Hungarians in southern Austria, Turks in Germany, and refugees in Hungary, Italy, and Greece). Policymakers have used these incidents in their struggle for power and financial resources, turning the migration (legal and illegal), refugees, and asylum seekers’ issue into a meta-issue, a game of power with comprehensive economic, social, and societal reverberations. Fig. 2.3. Migration-Identity-Insecurity interdependence

Fig. 2.3 above displays the migration-identity-insecurity interdependence relationship in the EU, migration and identity being both causes and potential effects of the situation of insecurity. There are several levels of analysis in the migration-security relationship, but the two we will present in our analysis present migration in a first instance as a result of insecurity (mainly military, but also economic), while the second level presents migration as a source of insecurity (political, economic, military, or societal).208 The effects of this relationship, regardless of the level of analysis, are perceived (on political, economic, social, and societal levels) by all the actors involved, namely the immigrants, the majority population, the state of origin, the destination state, the media, international organizations, and interested social actors. Migration itself is not an insecurity phenomenon, however uncontrolled and illegal migration has destabilizing effects on the international security system. In the face of such danger, being unable to unilaterally stop the migratory influx, the state delegates certain political powers to the supranational level, particularly towards the European Commission and 208

Sarcinschi, MigraĠie úi Securitate, 11.

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the European Parliament. As we will observe in the case of the Roma in France, the French state assumed the role of securitization actor, while the EU, through its institutions, assumed that of desecuritization actor. The confrontation, based on the legitimacy of the intervention, takes place between the French national interest and the basic principles of European integration, which have always aimed at ensuring a secure environment in Europe. Migration as a result of insecurity is a phenomenon that mainly occurs in moments of tension, following military conflicts that involve waves of refugees to neighbouring or triumphant states (for example, the first and second world wars, the Holocaust, the war in the Western Balkans, and the 2015–17 refugee crisis in the EU), or with political regime changes, such as the fall of Communism or the Arab Spring, which led to an increase in migration towards the developed and economically stable states. Migration as a source of insecurity is a recent phenomenon in the EU. It appeared in the 1970s, and became far more visible after the Cold War and the collapse of Communism, and also after 9/11. On the EU security agenda it became a priority, first of all after 9/11, and then after the last two waves of enlargement to Central Eastern Europe, and more recently after the 2015–17 refugee crisis. Nowadays, against the intensification of the economic crisis, we are witnessing a new wave of economic migration (especially labour) from the states of Central and Eastern Europe (which are more highly affected by this phenomenon, for example the case of Romania) to the developed ones in Western Europe. The immigrants have turned from invited workers (for the reconstruction of European economies affected by the Second World War) into unwanted, second-class citizens, a burden on the welfare state of the social system, strongly affected by the economic crisis. This wave gave rise to what is called the “fear of immigrants,” a powerful tool in the hands of policymakers in times of economic crisis or as an election campaign theme (see the case of the presidential campaign in France in 2012, or the parliamentary election campaign in Germany, 2013, Viktor Orbán’s hate discourses against refugees, or Marine Le Pen’s campaign discourses in the 2017 presidential election). Common threats are rearranged in “a spiral of insecurity,” which culminates with the “image of the immigrant,” perceived as “a nexus of all fears.”209 Only in the twenty-first century (after the 2001 terrorists attacks), when immigration began to be seen as a combination of threats to the physical 209

Arădău, “Migration: the Spiral of (In)Security,” 3.

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security of the state and social identity, has it firmly become incorporated into a “security continuum.”210 After the 2001 terrorist attacks in the US and their aftermath in Europe, the securitization of migration was achieved at an accelerated pace, being connected to certain recurrent themes on the international agenda, such as organized crime, illegal activities, terrorism, threats to identity, and economic development. Security specialists strive to create an artificial connection between different activity sectors and uncontrolled migrations to justify the need for state intervention. The disappearance of the external enemy determined the invention of an enemy within the society (the immigrant, the terrorist), more difficult to identify and fought under asymmetric confrontation conditions of low intensity, and with great reverberations in international security. Hence, in the public discourse (of securitization), the migrant is presented as a threat to the internal labour market, the public order, cultural identity, economic development, and solidarity. Huysmans argues that, in this context, migration is perceived as a threat to Western society: “Migration is identified as being one of the main factors weakening national tradition and societal homogeneity. It is reified as an internal and external danger for the survival of the national community or western civilization.”211 The same author considers that a neutral position in this matter is not possible, the two probable options being pro or against. In such conditions, supporting the immigration phenomenon is perceived as a threat to Western society’s values: “This discourse excludes migrants from the normal fabric of society, not just as aliens but as aliens who are dangerous to the reproduction of the social fabric. The discourse frames the key question about the future of the political community as one of a choice for or against migration. But it is not a free choice because a choice for migration is represented as a choice against (the survival of) the political community.”212 This positioning, which is based on Carl Schmitt’s theory of friend versus enemy, condemns the immigrant to remain as the source of insecurity, “the other,” and the stranger. The former boundaries between the internal and external politics become ambiguous and the enemy or the previously well-defined threat is replaced by an infinity of dangerous beings/situations, causing Dillon to state that, “Nothing is integrally safe and everything is integrally dangerous in this composite of (dis)order. There can, for example, be no single or simple state of emergency, no secure differentiation of self from other or friend 210

Ibid., 1. Huysmans, “The European Union,” 758. 212 Ibid. 211

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from enemy, every self is an emergent self, every assemblage an emergent assemblage.”213 Migration, as a source of insecurity, is a leitmotiv during the crisis period (particularly economically, which draws the limits of the welfare status) in the discourse of policymakers who justify their failure by finding “scapegoats” in the others, especially the immigrants. The discourse reproduces the political myth that a homogenous national community or Western civilization existed in the past and can be re-established through the exclusion of those migrants who are identified as cultural aliens.214 This is the case of the Roma who, although not a threat to the continent’s security, as long as their socioeconomic integration causes no major unbalances within the states they reside in, with effects on the social and national security, are used as “scapegoats” in a series of violent events, like organized crime (particularly crimes against the person and personal property), street violence, and improvised dwellings on the outskirts of large cities (see the Mailat case in Italy in 2008, Northern Ireland in 2009, and France in 2010–13). The contextualization of these events in the economic crisis effects (the crisis of jobs, long-term unemployment, the housing crisis, and the suppression of social benefits), ostensibly presented by the media, gives rise to a real insecurity spiral. The effect of this media attention was “the transformation of a social issue into a problem of national security,” as is evident in the 2011 Grenoble Speech of Nicolas Sarkozy, France’s former president: “We must abolish the illegal Roma camps. These are areas where there is no right and that cannot be tolerated in France.”215 Moreover, this situation was also used to distract the French citizens’ attention from other far more real social, economic, and political problems of France at that time, namely the reformation of the pension system, the job crisis, or the Bettencourt corruption scandal.216 The securitization process of the Roma issue in France allows a multifaceted approach to the migration issue in the EU from the perspective of all the actors involved: the state of origin (social and economic issues determining migration), the transit states, the host state (national, identity, welfare status security), the media, the 213

Michael, Dillon, “Virtual Security: a Life Science of (Dis)Order,” Millennium 32, no. 3 (2003): 531–58. 214 Huysmans, “The European Union,” 758. 215 For more details see the speech on the presidential website. 216 “Scandal in FranĠa: puterea spionează ziariútii” [“Scandal in France: the Power is Spying on the Journalists”], Evenimentul zilei (September 1, 2011), http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/scandal-in-franta-puterea-spioneaza-ziaristii943976.html.

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immigrants (social, economic and identity issues), the majority population in the host state, the civil society, and the EU as a desecuritization actor (see Fig. 2.4 below). .

Fig. 2.4. The immigration phenomenon: the actors involved

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This complex network and the implications of migration in a European Union that aims to become a political project demonstrate the intricacy of this phenomenon as a study object for academia and a politico-social concern for policymakers. From a historical point of view, control over the immigration phenomenon is practically impossible in a European Union based on the free movement of persons, goods, products and services, European identity, and economic/single market liberalization, which require friendly borders. Within the EU, there is a constant concern for the regularization of international migration, given that it influences decisively the economic development (through migration of the cheap labour force and that of “brain/intelligence”), while total control over this phenomenon (in the sense of “zero migration”) is unwanted and unattainable for economic and social development. The enhancement of the cross-border cooperation and the creation of a European monitoring and control network (like the Clubs of Berne and Wien, EUROPOL, FRONTEX, and the GROTIUS programme) led Bigo to speak of “a police archipelago” mobilized by the EU to ensure a secure environment within the union. Unfortunately, this excessive securitization does not entail more security but draws attention to the immigration phenomenon, in terms of increased illegal immigration, institutional incapacity, and excessive securitization, leading to the idea of a “Fortress Europe.” The exacerbation of the migration phenomenon in the EU, particularly following the accession of Central and Eastern European states, has triggered xenophobia and intolerance, causing a sociological perspective on the migration security policy, in “a Western Europe under siege”217 from immigrants. The siege is defined in terms of a threat to social cohesion, the welfare state, and identity – issues discussed below.

217

Virginie Mamadouh, “The Scaling of the ‘Invasion’: a Geopolitics of Immigration Narratives in France and The Netherlands,” Geopolitics 17, no. 2 (2012): 392, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14650045.2011.578268.

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2.1.2. “Western Europe under siege”: Migration and the welfare state218 The idea of Western Europe being under siege (which has led to the emergence of phrases such as “Citadel Europe” or “Fortress Europe”219 as a measure of protection and preservation of Western culture against immigrants) appears in the discourses regarding the need for a common supranational (communitarian) security strategy to solve the illegal and uncontrolled migration issue. From a geopolitical point of view, these phrases are representations (in the sense of geopolitical representations) embraced by left-leaning EU politicians. We are not facing a confrontation in the classic sense of the word, with armed forces, teams of allies, strategies, and fortresses, but a much more flexible form, adapted to the extended security agenda, with border controls, customs agents, security systems, or monitoring European agencies on the one hand, and immigrants on the other. We are witnessing a disproportionate confrontation between the Western European states and the immigrants (mainly from Central and Eastern Europe following the two enlargement waves) in terms of territory (in the sense of national identity) and power. The force of this so-called “war against the immigrants” varies from one state to another, depending on the attractiveness it exerts upon immigrants in terms of economic opportunities. The reunion of the Western states under a sole phrase indicates the idea of a common destiny within the European Union,220 facing a common problem – the uncontrolled migration from the Eastern, Southeastern, and third-party European states. The unity facing this challenge underlines the 218

The welfare state is a recent concept in Western studies. It designates a state in which power is used in an effort to guarantee a minimum income to individuals and families (regardless of the labour market or their properties’ value) by limiting insecurity through support of the individuals and families to meet certain social contingencies (e.g. sickness, unemployment, old age) that would otherwise lead to personal or familial crises, providing all citizens with the highest possible standards within an accepted range of social services. The essence of the welfare state consists of a guarantee of certain minimum standards protected by the government to each citizen with regards to housing, health, and education. For details see: P. Alcock, A. Erskine, and M. May, Social Policy (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003); J. Baldock, N. Manning, and S. Vickerstaff, Social Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); C. Pierson, and M. Castles, The Welfare State Reader (Cambridge: Polity, 2000); L. Pop (ed.), DicĠionar de politicisociale [Dictionary of Social Policies] (Bucharest: Expert Publishing House, 2002). 219 Virginie Mamadouh, “The Scaling of the ‘Invasion’,” 392. 220 Ibid.

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need for concerted actions from the EU institutions, expected to find a solution for controlling illegal migration while protecting the fundamental freedoms of the union. In this project, the European institutions, especially the European Commission and the European Parliament, play the roles of desecuritization actors. Completing the national action level with the supranational one indicates the definitive shift of migration-related issues from low politics to high politics in the security agenda (certain theorists may even indicate the level of smart politics). The idea of a Europe under siege appeared at the beginning of the 1990s due to the increased asylum applications (especially from states of the former Yugoslavia, against the outbreak of a new regional politicalidentity conflict) and the number of immigrants coming from the former Communist states. According to statistics, between 1945 and 2000, Western Europe received over fifty million immigrants.221 The destination states vary according to the economic and social amenities, such as France, Germany (an important number of Romanian immigrants were recorded in the period immediately after the fall of Communism, which led in the 1990s to the conclusion of certain voluntary repatriation agreements), the Netherlands, and the northern states. The migration driven by the end of the Cold War, the fall of Communism, and the outbreak of ethnic-political conflicts in the Western Balkans led to the emergence of “bridgeheads” that were constantly fed new waves of immigrants, giving rise to a “chain of immigration” which became impossible to control at a national level, requiring the origin and host states’ concerted intervention within the legal international institutional framework created under the umbrella of the European Union. In the medium and long term, the uncontrolled migration has had an impact on the ethnic composition of the population, culture and public order, and social, economic, and societal security. Regarding the borders, migration also affects the states’ ability to control their own borders, making necessary a concerted intervention at European level. In the context of globalization, security can no longer be ensured nationally as “violence tends to cross over [national] borders … through terrorism, organized crime and extremist ideologies.”222 At present, “wars no longer 221

Ionel Nicu Sava, Teoria úi practica securităĠii [Theory and Practice of Security] Universitatea din Bucureúti, Facultatea de Sociologie úi AsistenĠă Socială [University of Bucharest, Faculty of Sociology and Social Work] (Bucharest, 2007), 55. 222 Mary Kaldor, Securitatea umană – ReflecĠii asupra Globalizării úi IntervenĠiei [Human Security – Reflections on Globalization and Intervention] (Cluj-Napoca: CA Publishing, 2010), 231.

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have clearly-defined frontiers,”223 having a tendency to expand at a regional level through refugees and immigrants, or their effects. The same happens with migration, which causes faster regional effects than in the case of long-distance migration, which is why in the EU nowadays the states are more concerned about the economic effects of the East-West migration within the union than the migration from the third-party states in Africa or Asia (even though the latter has a higher percentage than the former in different Western countries). Amid the economic crisis, the states in Western Europe are increasingly concerned about the economic effects of the immigration phenomenon (a situation requiring contextualization according to the extent of it in each state), which are much more visible with the East-West migration marked by economic causes, well-defined in time and with a recurrent effect. In contrast, migration from other continents primarily raises issues of societal security (see the case of the Turks in Germany, and refugees of the Syrian Civil War). Another challenge from the non-EU European states is represented by asylum seekers. In order to limit the number of asylum applications (which in some cases reached record numbers – for example, in 1992 over seven hundred thousand Bosnians applied for asylum in the EU12224), according to the Dublin Convention of 1990 it was agreed that if an asylum seeker’s application is refused by an EU member state it cannot be accepted by another one. This restriction shows a clear trend of the Western European states in reducing the waves of asylum seekers who were perceived as being rather attracted to the Western economic welfare.225 Gradually, the number of asylum seekers has significantly decreased (as the number of conflicts diminished in Europe, especially in the Western Balkans), but their place has quickly been taken by the citizens of the new EU member states in Eastern Europe (economic immigrants, also known in the Romanian popular parlance as “Romanian strawberry pickers”). In this situation, the EU has an ambivalent position – on the one hand it supports freedom of movement within the union (as a response to pronounced ageing and economic development stimulation) and fights to eliminate all forms of racism and xenophobia (see the activity of the Fundamental Rights Agency, the successor of the European Monitoring 223

Ibid., 223. S. Collinson, “Visa Requirements, Carrier Sanctions, ‘Safe Third Countries’ and ‘Readmission’: the Development of an Asylum ‘Buffer Zone’ in Europe,” Transactions 21, no. 1 (2006): 76–90; Mamadouh, “The Scaling of the ‘Invasion’,” 392. 225 Mamadouh, “The Scaling of the ‘Invasion’,” 392. 224

Eurostat, Statistics Explained, main page: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained.

226

Source: Eurostat226

Fig. 2.5. Share of foreigners in the resident populations – January 1, 2012 (%)

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Centre for Racism and Xenophobia), and on the other hand are the agencies that are assuring the climate of security and border management: the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX), the European Defence Agency (EDA), the European Police Office (EUROPOL), and the European Police College (CEPOL). Also, the EU maintains transitory measures for Romanian and Bulgarian workers and imposes increasingly complex requests for the Schengen accession (see the cases of Romania and Bulgaria, whose accession was again postponed in 2019). The response to this ambivalent policy of the EU is that migration in general, and uncontrolled and illegal migration in particular, are major challenges to the welfare state of Western Europe, which was strongly affected by the economic crisis. The welfare state crisis emphasizes the EU’s inconsistent policy on immigration. The immigrants are perceived as people attracted to the Western welfare dream/mirage, and, through extrapolation, migration is described as a threat to social cohesion. Against the prolonged economic crisis, the welfare (security) society has turned into a society of risk and insecurity, while the welfare state became a state that manages risk, an actor of securitization. Unemployment is an example of a transnational threat affecting both underdeveloped (uncontrolled migration leading to depopulation) and developed states (through the increased number of immigrants). This phenomenon leads to the emergence of “mass unemployment” in several states, which favours the appearance and development of organized crime or terrorism. The free movement of people endangers national identity and the solidarity that motivate the citizens to be part of social-protection systems. Within the EU, freedom of movement and security are not in opposition, but are complimentary, the former only being achieved in optimum security conditions, while an optimum climate of security intensifies the movement of persons, goods, and capital. Regarding uncontrolled migration, the states have taken different measures depending on the extent and severity of the problem. For example, Germany introduced a citizenship test, while states like BadenWürttemberg pleaded for the need to test Muslim immigrants, regarding gender equality, domestic violence, forced marriage, homosexuality, and freedom of speech. In Germany, in June 2010, Peter Trapp of the German Christian-Democrats suggested that potential immigrants should be

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subjected to IQ tests.227 It is interesting to observe that these measure were only taken for certain categories of immigrants who represent a burden to the German social system (it is not a secret that Germany is facing severe social integration issues concerning the Turkish immigrants, whose number was getting close to three million in 2016, and we refer here only to those who are legally settled). The rejecting attitude towards immigrants is selective of those who add value to society and economy (“brain drain” migration), and to the detriment of those representing a burden on the social system. Along with poverty, economic, and moral crises, these realities indicate the limits of the welfare state (once again after the oil crises of the 1970s), and bring to the fore the question of whether, in the twenty-first century, we can still speak of a Western welfare-state model (after the liberal model proposed by J. M. Keynes and W. H. Beveridge) when poverty is on an upward trend and there are fewer social benefits. In the current context, against economic contradictions, we can talk about a welfare state as “an empty shell,” in which the blind spot of social politics is represented by a lack of coordination and ad hoc measures, which only increase uncertainty and help to develop a climate of insecurity. The foundation of the Europe of tomorrow cannot be achieved without reaching a consensus regarding international migration and its effects in the medium and long term. The EU member states (attractive to immigrants due to the socialprotection system and the economic opportunities) are constantly concerned with the improvement of legislation on migration. We can name here several situations, like Germany (whose case was presented above) and Denmark, where learning the Danish language is compulsory when obtaining citizenship, while in Spain and France the laws allow the immediate expulsion of illegal immigrants, and Italy, where in 2002 a new law regarding migration stipulated fingerprint identification for all non-EU citizens who wished to remain in the country. The Council of Europe set a target at Lisbon on March 23–24, 2000, according to which, “the EU economy [will become] the most competitive and dynamic in the world, characterized by a sustainable growth, more and

227

Agnes Czajka and Annie Rebekah Gardner, “The ‘Age of Security?’ Foucault, Frontex and the Governance of European Migration,” All Academic Research (2012), 5, http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/4/9/9/2/6/pages 499266/p499266-3.php.

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higher quality employment and an enhanced social cohesion,”228 which implies the need for contextualization and gradation in the manner of relating to the immigration phenomenon, both as a threat to security and as a solution to the pronounced ageing of the Western states’ populations, as well as a solution to the effects of economic recession (the draining of unqualified labour forces and overqualified people, sharing good practices, and international pilot programs). UN statistics show that, in order to keep three active persons for a retired one and fill the vacant jobs, the European Union will have to “import” annually, between 2015 and 2040, about 6.1 million people. If this proportion is maintained, by 2050 approximately forty percent of the European population will be made up of immigrants and “their first generation descendants.”229 Beyond the effects migration has upon security and the welfare state, the “immigrants’ siege” upon Western Europe is perceived as a threat to social cohesion and identity (and, at the same time, the European identity). These are issues that will be analysed later in this book.

2.2. Identity and the Construction of Migration (In)Security The complex dynamics between the states and the immigrant influxes have led to the ongoing transformation of identity and security structures. Identity, the binding element of migration and security, is often interpreted as a source and, at the same time, an effect of conflict. The Copenhagen School theorists have developed a comprehensive analysis framework for grasping the significance of the identity-security causality relationship, under the name of societal security sector, in which the main role is played by Weaver’s theory regarding securitization as a speech act. With societal security, the protection of identity is seen as a priority issue of security, in terms of survival.230 Identity innovates the migration-insecurity causality relation, conferring it flexibility and referential value both at sub and supranational levels, 228

Concluziile PreúedinĠiei Consiliul European de la Lisabona, 23 úi 24 martie 2000 [Presidency Conclusions, Council of Europe in Lisbon, March 23 and 24, 2000], https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ro/european-council/conclusions/1993-2003. 229 Călin Sinescu and Liliana Trofin, “Impactul migraĠieia supra contextului internaĠional actual” [“The Impact of Migration upon the Current International Context”], Sfera Politicii 137 (2009), http://www.sferapoliticii.ro/sfera/137/art03sinescu.html. 230 Panic, “Societal Security,” 33.

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giving rise to a transdisciplinary research agenda. Within the “(in)security spiral” (a concept by Claudia Arădău from the “spiral model” used by Jervis to explain the interstate security dilemma231), identity has a dual role in the cause and effect of migration and (in)security. In this subchapter, our attention is retained by the actual and potential political, social, and security implications arising from the transformation of identity into a referent object of security, while identifying ways to address these consequences at the national or European levels, depending on the actors involved.

2.2.1. Identity, European Citizenship, and Migration in the European Union The need to examine the identity-security relationship has been conditioned by a series of political events in the internal arena in recent years, starting with the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US and their subsequent aftermath in Europe. The threats of terrorism and organized crime have aggravated fears of immigration, while the prospect of Turkey and other Western Balkans states’ accession to the EU (with serious issues in interethnic relations or a large number of Muslims, such as those from Albania) highlighted the importance of identity securitization and led to the permanent employment of identity in the migration-security logic. In The Culture of National Security,232 Peter Katzenstein addresses the culture-security relationship in his approach to demonstrating that cultural identity is a component of national interest together with the elements related to the state’s physical existence. The threat to society can be either physical or existential, in terms of identity (in the sense of societal security). Identity is a source of the sense and experience of individuals,233 which cannot be defined unless related to the others, which individualizes and gives meaning to the existence of a group, independent of its size or history. Identity is not a given, it is a social process, an intersubjective 231

Paul Roe, “The Interstate Security Dilemma”; Arădău, “Migration: the Spiral of (In)Security,” 5. 232 Peter Katzenstein, The Culture of National security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 23–5. 233 Yannis A. Stivachtis, “International Migration and the Politics of Identity and Security,” Journal of Humanities and Social Science 2, no. 1 (2008): 7, https://docplayer.net/21449066-International-migration-and-the-politics-ofidentity-and-security.html.

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construct based on lived history, culture, and the common language whose first word is “we,” the second “us,” and the third “them”234 (in the sense of the others). The identity-security relationship brings to the fore the multipleidentities issue (that an individual acquires during their existence, some being more pronounced than others). From a liberal perspective, the only fundamental identity is derived from the nexus to the human race, while all the other, secondary, identities (which are no-less important) derive from free will or are tributaries of the relationship with other individuals (acquired identity, in the sense of alterity). In another train of thought, for constructivists, identity is constructed and is an ongoing process and not a given “exogenously to the human nature or internal policies systems.”235 The merit of constructivism is to reify identity as a referent object of security, creating a truly vicious circle, with societal security in its centre: “one obvious line of defensive response is to strengthen societal identity. This can be done by using cultural means to reinforce societal cohesion and distinctiveness and to ensure that the society reproduces itself effectively.”236 Under these conditions, the solution suggested by Charlotte Epstein to replace the term “identity” with “identification”237 is much more valuable and useful for the study of international relations and security in general, as well as for the analysis of the identity-migration-security relationship in particular, with a focus on the Roma issue in the EU. In the case of the Roma, the identity-alterity relationship, the way in which they identify themselves and are identified by the majority population, represent the focus of this chapter. The way in which certain immigrant communities are perceived as a threat to the host society’s identity is connected to the way in which the nation is self-defined, based on the two theories of A. Smith regarding national identity, deriving from the ethnic (Eastern) or Western theories (also known as the civic model of nation).238

234

Manuel Castells, The Power of Identity (London: Blackwell, 2004), 56. Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” American Political Science Review 88 (1994): 385. 236 Weaver et al., Identity, Migration, 191. 237 Charlotte Epstein, “Who speaks? Discourse, the Subject and the Study of Identity in International Politics,” European Journal of International Relations 17, no. 2 (2011): 327–50. 238 A. Smith, National Identity (London: Penguin, 1991). 235

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Starting from Benedict Anderson’s theory, according to whom nations are abstract, “imagined communities,”239 the threats addressed to them are also social constructs, which can take a variety of forms depending on the actor performing securitization and the audience. Thus, in the case of the civic nation model, societal securitization action involves the reference to the existential threat regarding the “symbolic territory,”240 which in the identity-migration relationship refers to the cradle of society/culture/identity. The notion of “territoriality” (to be understood as symbolic, as it may not coincide with the national state’s territory) also appears, being introduced by Anthony Downs, comprising a series of issues and threats that must be solved by “security professionals.”241 The securitization of migration implies protecting the “homeland” against disturbing identity factors, and desecuritization can be achieved only by changing the actor’s discourse on the immigrant threat and relocating the “symbolic territories.”242 Changing the discourse about immigrants consists in their removal from among the final enemies and their inclusion among the common citizens, being us/one of us, confronting common issues. Given that migration cannot be stopped (and “zero migration” is neither a feasible nor desirable project, as it may have disastrous effects on the economy), border control is an illusory project243 and the threat to society is perpetual and inevitable.244 The securitization of migration transforms “the imagined community” (in terms of identity) into a waterproof construction whose purpose is selfpreservation. Securitization makes identity changes practically impossible,245 which has major effects on the immigrants-majority population relationship. This relationship is also influenced by the perception of the latter for the former, given that the greater the cultural differences, the more reluctant they will be, and the more they will lean towards identity securitization. This situation is found in Western Europe, which considers the Eastern European immigrants more acceptable than those from Africa or Asia246 (although opinions about larger groups of Eastern European 239

Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991). 240 Arădău, “Migration: the Spiral of (In)Security,” 3. 241 Bigo, “Security and Immigration.” 242 Arădău, “Migration: the Spiral of (In)Security,” 6. 243 Ibid., 5. 244 Ibid. 245 Ibid. 246 Stivachtis, “International Migration,” 4.

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immigrants – such as Polish plumbers, Romanian and Bulgarian strawberry pickers, and Roma beggars – of Western Europe were different in each case) (for details see Appendix A: Migratory Behaviour Determined by Economic Reasons in the Late 1990s). Thus, the issue of who is or is not one of “us” is raised in similar identity or cultural terms (see the German initiatives related to the Turkish immigrants, or the enactment of the law of July 2010 by the French Parliament, which prohibited [with one vote against and one abstention from the left-wing parties, the Greens, the Socialist Party, and the French Communist Party] the use of the burqa and niqab in public247). This referent model “us”-“us,” “us”-“them” is an intersubjective one (specific to the Schmittian logic of friend-enemy), as what represents a cultural affinity with a group can represent an ideological, cultural, or social threat with another. Another difficulty in the identity-security relationship is represented, beyond the manner in which immigrants are perceived in terms of identity by the majority population, by the way in which immigrants decide to behave within the host state, if they are willing to integrate socially, and if they refuse to interfere with and follow the rules (e.g. the Turkish immigrants in Germany or the Muslims in France). The social construct of identity always takes place in a context marked by power relations,248 which is why the national and immigrant identity will clash only if the latter is strong and supported, as in the case of national minorities, by a “mother state”249 near the host state. The idea of territoriality reappears in relation to the immigration and identity phenomenon, referring to the idea that short-distance migration is easier than long-distance, and cultural impulses can be easily propagated in neighbouring areas, rather than in remote ones.250 Security is closely related to collective identity (seen as an intersubjective construct), which is why security has different meanings within different societies (depending on how they relate to the term of nation/national identity according to A. Smith). “Different societies present different vulnerabilities, depending on how their identity is

247

Mamadouh, “The Scaling of the Invasion,” 391. Stivachtis, “International Migration,” 5. 249 Adrian L. Ivan and Claudia AnamariaIov, “National and Ethnic Minorities in Central Europe and the EU Integration Process: Theories and Considerations,” in Applied Social Science: Administration and Management, edited by P. L. Runcan, G. RaĠă, and C. Goian (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013), 205–12. 250 Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde, Securitatea, un noucadru,” 180. 248

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constructed.”251 If identity is based on “distance and isolation,” as in Finland, even a small number of immigrants will be perceived as a threat to identity. In France, where “the nation is closely related to the state,” vulnerability towards a political and social integration process is much greater than in the case of nations that have an experience “in operating independently from the state and having several political levels simultaneously” (such as Germany).252 For example, an ethnically homogeneous society will confer a greater value on preserving the political and cultural identity than a heterogeneous one, which will consider the immigrant influx as an existential threat requiring the need for societal securitization. The securitization of identity does not automatically imply a state of security for the host state’s society, but rather leads to the emergence and supply of a state of insecurity (the dilemma of societal security). One possible answer to this state of insecurity is the multiculturalism policy promoted by the EU institutions (as the desecuritization actor), starting from its motto “unity in diversity!” (where diversity refers to the identities of the various member states, which are replenished, as a corollary, by the European identity/European citizenship). Interculturality provides us with an interesting lesson of “transnational philosophy.”253 In the case of the European Union, the Roma are the centre of a multicultural project “that the member states strive to manage.”254 Multiculturalism, as a fundamental principle of the EU, brings to the fore the union’s role as migration desecuritization actor (given that the free movement of persons, goods, services, and capital underlie the EU construction). An important part is taken by the report on European identity-national identity, both bringing into discussion the issue of the image of the community. The European identity political project of building European citizenship gives coherence to the project of founding the “United States of Europe,”255 in order to complete the four fundamental liberties underlying the union. Among the four, our attention will be drawn to one of them, namely the free movement of persons and its

251

Ibid., 178. Ibid., 178–9. 253 Liegeois, Romii în Europa, 262. 254 Ibid. 255 Adrian Ivan, Sub zodia “Statelor Unite ale Europei”: De la idea europeană la ComunităĠile Economice Europene [Under the Sign of the “United States of Europe”: From the European Idea to the European Economic Communities] (Cluj-Napoca: C&A Publishing, 2009). 252

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relation to the process of constructing the European identity in the context of the identity-security report.

2.2.2. Free movement of persons and European citizenship in the identity-security report Any citizen of the European Union has the right to move and reside freely on the territory of the Member States. (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 45)

The free movement of persons is one of the four liberties of the internal market and community policies of the European Union.256 This right guarantees the citizens of the union the right to move and settle wherever they want in the territory of the member states, but to really be to their advantage it must be accompanied by an appropriate level of security and justice. The free movement of persons is a fundamental objective contained in the Treaty of Rome provisions,257 which underlie the creation of the common market. The essence of this liberty consists of eliminating discriminations between citizens of the member state in which they are located or operate and the citizens of the other member states, staying and working in its territory.258 The free movement of persons and the abolition of border controls is a sine qua non for the internal market. Since its inception, with the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the meaning of the concept has evolved and adapted to the requirements imposed by the evolution of the European Community towards the European Union. In the first phase, the individual was considered an economic agent, service provider, or employee. Subsequently, the economic perception acquired an extended meaning in relation to the idea of union citizen, irrespective of the economic activity or other distinctions of nationality. The Single European Act of 1987 revised the Treaty of Rome and stated the traits of an ideal internal market made up of an “area without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of goods, persons, services 256

Aurel Ciobanu-Dordea and Elena Simina Tănăsescu (eds.), Libera Circulatie A Persoanelor, În Cadrul Proiectului “Campanie De Informare A Functionarilor Publici Privind Continutul Acquis-Ului Comunitar” [The Free Movement of Persons, Within the Project “Information Campaign for the Public Servants Regarding the Community Acquis Content”] (Bucureúti: Centrul de Resurse Juridice, 2002), 13. 257 For details see the Treaty of Rome, 1957. 258 Ciobanu-Dordea and Simina Tănăsescu, Libera Circulatie, 15.

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and capital is ensured.”259 All treaties have subsequently taken and inserted the provisions regarding the free movement of persons into their text, relating to the idea of the union citizen, as part of the EU’s political identity project. Citizenship has undoubtedly become the watchword of European integration in recent years, together with the proclaimed ideal of an “ever closer union,”260 given that the union is facing real issues in terms of solving the democratic deficit, against continuing to extend to the detriment of the integration of the current members, and an increase in migration from Eastern European states towards the West, amid economic recession. The idea of European citizenship, which comes in addition to the nation citizenship, occurs simultaneously with the transformation of the community into the European Union, which marks the evolution from an economic community to a potential political construction. The Treaty of Nice comprises the following formulation: “Citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship,” which, through the Treaty of Lisbon, was replaced by: “Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship,”261 after giving rise to interesting debates regarding the difference between national and European identity, in the wider context of the enlargement versus integration debate and resolution of the union’s democratic deficit. This change from “complement” to “add” emphasizes the difference between national and European citizenship, which, in this construction, is an empty social shell (as the union has neither a common social policy, such as the common agricultural policy, nor an institution to issue passports that say “European citizen”), an artificial creation, and the effect of an excess of zeal within the European political identity project. European citizenship very much resembles a cosmopolitan form, whose background continues to be a national one. We have here a contradiction of terms, which in reality means that the citizens of the European Union first feel like citizens of the member state, and European citizens second. We are again facing an issue of perception and reference to the symbolic territory and imagined community, which in the case of the European citizenship has 4,324,782 km2 and 508 million inhabitants 259

For details see the Single European Act, 1987. Ibid., 7. 261 Peter F Wagner, “A Finger for Berlusconi: Italy's Anti-immigration/Anti-crime measures, Romanian Realities, and the Poverty of European Citizenship,” (2009), 5, http://aei.pitt.edu/33157/1/wagner._f._peter.pdf. 260

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(after Croatia’s accession in 2013), with as many systems of values, cultures, and traditions. The moment when the traditional representatives of the Western nations, such as the Germans, French, English, or Spanish, will first identify themselves as European citizens and only after as citizens of their own states will be interesting to observe. The situation is reversed with the citizens of the states that joined the EU within the last waves (Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, and the Baltic states, which strongly state their connection to the “great European family”), or with certain ethnic groups, such as the Roma who, through their lifestyle, are the real expression of the European citizen enjoying the free movement of persons and the right to settle in the other member states. The European identity/citizenship aims at creating the impression of unity within the union by erasing all differences (especially economic ones) between the citizens of a construction with over five hundred million inhabitants, in which all nations are in fact minorities, when considered within the entire population. Nevertheless, as long as the Western societal securitization discourse appeals to the myth of the existence of a Western homogeneous civilization, which is nowadays put on trial by the waves of immigrants from the Eastern European states and other continents (especially those belonging to a different culture), the European identity project is not viable. As long as the EU’s eastward enlargement was perceived as a threat to the national security and the fear of immigrants from the Eastern states is still present on the Western societal security agenda, the homogeneous European citizenship is illusory. As we now say, from an economic point of view, of a Europe with two or even more gears in the political European project, we refer to an exclusive and restrictive European identity of the twenty-first century,262 also with two gears: the Western European citizens and the other, secondclass citizens. In the context of this reality, multiculturalism, the diversity rhetoric, and the idea of Europe as a peaceful and prosperous home actually comprise the veil drawn over its painful history, and its violent and xenophobic past. The securitization of these mistakes aims to avoid the horrors of the past when relating to groups that belong “to second-class citizens” of the union, who nowadays take advantage of the benefits of a member state, creating a spiral of insecurity263 in Western civilization.

262

Susana Martinez Guillem, “European Identity: Across Which Lines? Defining Europe Through Public Discourses on the Roma,” Journal of International and Intercultural Communication 4, no. 1 (2011): 23–41. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17513057.2010.533788. 263 For details see Arădău, “Migration: the Spiral of (In)Security.”

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This spiral is fuelled by the political discourses, news, and television broadcasts that constantly transmit images of terrorist acts, criminals, forced evictions, adobe houses, poorly dressed children, and mothers begging for support from the audience within the securitization process. The reinforcement of information with images, combined with the majority population’s experience with the immigrants, turns the latter into an existential threat.264 In this context, M. C. Williams wonders: What is the role of images in the securitization/desecuritization process? What is the impact of images upon the audience as compared to the impact of words on readers or listeners?265 To these we can add: How can this impact be measured? And what is the effect of images on the migrationidentity-(in)security relationship in the EU in general, and on the Roma issue in particular? We will try to answer these questions in the following section.

2.2.3. The role of the media in the construction of migration (in)security The analysis of discourse and images is extremely important for understanding the way in which asylum and immigration-related issues have been defined, interpreted, and inserted into the political and European security agenda. The purpose of this subchapter is to draw attention to the manner in which immigrants are associated, through defamatory discourses, with criminals, terrorists, or the “non-white” threat. Similar metaphors also include the images of immigrants resembling floods, tsunamis, and other natural disasters, which “Fortress Europe” takes measures to stop. The term “invasion” doesn’t necessarily need to be used in the text because, as with the term “security,” an allusion to its imminence266 is sufficient to make securitization necessary. A large number of analyses have argued and a series of security events prove daily that the media is a central element of the securitization action. From the Gulf War to the conflict in the Balkans, and from the 9/11 events to the Arab Spring and the recent refugee crisis in the EU, the media has 264

Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies,” 526. Ibid. 266 See, for example, Enoch Powell’s “Rivers of Blood” speech during the Conservative Association meeting, April 20, 1968, later republished in The Telegraph (November 6, 2007). http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/3643823/Enoch-Powells-Rivers-of-Bloodspeech.html. 265

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proved that there is an interdependence between the securitization act and the contemporary media communications267 (a partnership relation). If the media is not the securitization actor, it is the communication channel between the securitization actor and the audience. Through its role in shaping and constructing reality, the media transfers its own meaning and interpretation of the initial securitization discourse so that the message received by the audience through the media can be different from the original, depending on the latter’s attributed interpretation. We are thus witnessing a rearrangement of the media’s role in the society, within the securitization process. From the fourth power in the state (with the role of analyst of the state institutions’ activity) it becomes, under the auspices of the constructivist theory, a partner of the state in the securitization process, given that the government becomes part of the media process. We have here a win-win situation (some theorists would even call it “mutual exploitation”), through which the media has changed the appearance of modern (in)security (by what Williams calls an incomplete securitization process, lacking the competition of broadcast communication and images268), while the policymakers or the government (as state representatives) find a powerful ally in the societal securitization process (the discourse backed up by images makes the audience much more receptive and cooperative). Theorists such as M. C. Williams, E. Balabanova, T. Balzacq, J. Huysmans, and F. Moller269 argue that the process of securitization/desecuritization (especially desecuritization in the societal field) is, in the contemporary society, incomplete without the input of images and visual representations. If we briefly review the events in the international arena, we will notice that only with the securitization of Islam, in the aggressive advertising of images in which it was invoked as a justification or excuse on all television and Internet channels (starting with 9/11, Madrid 2004, London 2005, the murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004, the manifestation of Islamic religion and dress code in public, Islamic Holidays and mosques, or the scandal of Danish cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed in 2005), has a solidarity of the audience with the securitization actor been 267

Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies,” 524. Ibid. 269 Ibid.; Frank Moller, “Photographic Interventions in Post-9/11 Security Policy,” Security Dialogue 38, no. 2 (2007): 179–96; Ekaterina Balabanova, Media, Wars and Politics: Comparing the Incomparable in Western and Eastern Europe (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2007); Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity; Balzacq, “The Three Faces of Securitization.” 268

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determined (both in matters of discourse and the actions taken by it and the resulting effects – see just the worldwide support received by the US in the “war against terrorism”). The physical presence of the “Islamic threat” within the society led to a higher receptivity of the audience, as compared with the potential threat. The situation is similar to the “war” of the states in Western Europe against the Roma immigrants, where the broadcast images and television shows (blatantly promoting the illegal actions, adobe dwellings, misery, dirty children, and begging women) turned this situation from an internal social issue (of the host state) into an internationalized issue, with extensive economic, political, social, and identity-related reverberations in the European Union. As a source of social identity, the media exerts its influence by portraying individuals or groups in a certain manner, using metaphors, comparisons, and nicknames, emphasizing certain actions taken by them, and thus having an important role in the shaping of interethnic relations. Since identity “includes the identification and hetero-identification game,” the role of the media within the contemporary society is to create a favourable context for identity events. In the majority populationimmigrants/minorities relationship, the media is an active source of stereotypes. For the Roma, the stereotype is induced by the emphasis of conflict situations. The analysis of the security and the media’s field of action shows that the political elites, journalists, and experts work closely to transmit the information or manipulate the audience through it. The degree of mutual manipulation of the political and media domains makes securitization a complex process that cannot be understood only through the theory of securitization as a speech act or the reductionist lens. In the process of securitization, the media is not only an observer and an actor-audience communication channel, but also plays a complex role, being a participant and even “catalyst of international crises.”270 The drama and the exceptional and controversial character of securitization are elements that draw the attention of journalists, which is why it enjoys intense media coverage. The media is looking for the exceptional, the sensational, which is why the actor’s legitimacy and authority to exercise legitimate violence and the effects of securitization inevitably attract the attention of journalists. However, the media is not the one establishing the importance of the topics – the audience does this, in terms of rating, or in

270

Balabanova, Media, Wars and Politics, 1.

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the case of journalism the circulation of newspapers or visualizations and comments, when referring to online media. When referring to the topics on the Romanian and Bulgarian Roma ethnics in France, the media (four French newspapers: Le Monde, Le Figaro, Libération, and Le Parisien, monitored over a period of three years, in the months of August to October, 2010–12) is not just a message bearer and opinion shaper, but also guilty of reproducing and maintaining a pejorative image of them within the society. The interest of the media in this subject (if we strictly refer to the Roma’s situation in France), with a great editorial space together with the political shows and debates, can be explained by: the high extent of the Roma immigration phenomenon in this state, their visibility within the society, the numerous election debates regarding financially expensive expulsions or repatriations, and the great number of actors involved and their official positions (the host and origin state, the EU institutions, the media, the immigrants, the majority population, and the profile NGOs). A series of titles (over seven hundred) released in August to October between 2010 and 2012 in the four newspapers clearly demonstrates the cultural clichés, prejudices, and negative attitudes towards them, in the context of the explosion in the number of expulsions and demolitions of improvised dwellings: Le Figaro: “Expulsions de Roms: ‘inutile,’ Roms: Castro dénonce un ‘holocauste’” (2010); “Un camp de Romsévacué à Evry” (2012); Le Monde: “Claude Guéant veut rapatrier les mineurs roumains délinquants” (2011); Le Parisien: “Roms: les expulsions dénoncées, Les Romsciblés par une circulaire de l'intérieur sur démantèlement campements illicites” (2010); Libération: “Guéant, expulsions et élucubrations” (2011); “Une cinquantaine de Roms expulsés d'un squat à Lyon” (2012).

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Fig. 2.5. Frequency of articles on the “Roma issue”271 comparative overview in four journals over 758 articles (August to October, 2010–12)

Le Monde 17%

Le Parisien 37%

Liberation 24% Le Figaro 22% The general attitude of the press towards immigrants (and illegal immigration in the Hexagon) is negative, sometimes even xenophobic, translated through biased articles and images with negative connotations that reinforce and give rise to new prejudices. The text is accompanied by suggestive images of demolished illegal camps, barefoot children, acts of violence, rebellious women, and families in the street with luggage. Fig. 2.6. Presentation of the Roma issue in four French newspapers over 758 articles (August to October 2010–12)

neutral attitude

positive attitude

negative attitude 0

271

20

40

60

80

100

In the text for France case study our research refers only at the situation of Roms coming from Romania and Bulgaria.

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The words used regularly with a negative attitude are: illegal camp, begging, dirty, lazy, organized crime network, trafficking, insalubrity, violence, situations of illegality, child exploitation, evacuations, and expelled. For positive attitudes we found only a few words on the topics of social integration, poverty, or the attitudes of NGOs/the EU against expulsions, illiteracy, and transnational initiatives. We considered a neutral attitude in the articles on socioeconomic problems of the Roma in the EU, clarifying different cultural, historical, legislative, or social issues on the Roma, marginalization, and limited access to work and housing. As shown in Fig. 2.6, the vast majority of articles in which the Roma were the main focus had negative connotations, whether regarding expulsions, voluntary repatriations, or demolitions of illegal improvised dwellings. The period of July to October is of maximum impoertance concerning evacuations and the demolition of illegal camps. An increase in the number of illegal camps demolished and the expulsion of people in illegal situations can be observed amid the presidential election preparations, also used to distract attention from corruption scandals or unfulfilled reforms. In these situations, the Roma are ideal scapegoats. Among the terms used to characterize the Roma in the analysed articles, the dominant feature is represented by aggressiveness and a disposition for illegal activities. Unfortunately, the fate and image of the Roma are no better in their state of origin (strictly referring here to Romania) where, according to Etnobarometru-Relati interetnice in Romania272 [Ethnobarometer-Interethnic Relations in Romania], undertaken by the Interethnic Relations Research Centre in Timiúoara in 2000, 38.8 percent of Romanians and 40.7 percent of Hungarians responded that “they would not accept them in the country,”273 which shows a high degree of intolerance, stemming from ignorance, lack of cultural knowledge, and negative experiences or conflicts. The impact of newspaper articles is amplified by the images broadcast on television, the news, or talk shows discussing terrorist acts, organized crime, embezzlement, insalubrity, violence, and economic recession, all based on illegal migration and the large number of immigrants considered a burden (economicall, politically, and concerning identity) for the French state. The manner in which the Roma situation and the “media coverage 272

Irina Culic, Istvan Horvath, and Cristina RaĠ, “Modelul românesc al relaĠiilor interetnice reflectat în Etnobarometrul,” in RelaĠii interetnice în România Postcomunistă, edited by Lucian Năstasă and Levente Salat (Cluj-Napoca: CRDE, 2000), 253–343. 273 Ibid.

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war” of the French authorities is advertised will also be addressed for analysis in the case study associated with this research. Through the media, people around the world can witness or take part in various forms of insecurity. The media is thus a substitute of reality, making it visible and meaningful for the audience which doesn’t experience the state of insecurity directly. Through the media, the securitizing actor can reach the audience directly, and through the manipulation of the dramatic content, backed up by images, obtain their support. It was found on different occasions that the audience is much more receptive and easily persuaded when the existential threat seems closer and more tangible, and this becomes possible through the media with a more diverse audience. With the securitization of an transnational phenomenon (e.g. terrorism, illegal migration, organized crime, environmental hazards, and the refugee crisis) the target audience is not only highly numerous but also dispersed over a very large area, which is why the securitizing actor requires the participation of the media to reach it. The same role is played by the media in desecuritization. Through the television broadcasts and reality shows, true stories and narrations about immigrants (seen as us and not as enemies, in the Schmittian logic) can reach the audience. Given that the technological revolution has changed the face of modern warfare and the relative ratio of social forces, the media’s performance is to be transformed from an instrument of control over political activities into an integral part of the political process, with a greater impact in the public opinion-shaping process through the promoted themes.

2.3. Conclusions The purpose of this chapter targeted the analysis of the way in which security has evolved after the end of the Cold War, in the context of increased population movements from the East and third-party states towards the West and the assessment of effects upon social cohesion, the welfare state, and identity within the EU. The complex dynamics between the states and immigrant influxes led to an ongoing transformation of identity and security structures. In this chapter, our attention has been drawn to the current and potential political, social, and security implications arising from the transformation of identity into a referent object of security, concurrently with the identification of ways to address these consequences at a national or community level, depending on the actors involved.

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Following 9/11, the minority issue became a priority on the European security agenda, determining a new manner of approaching it with a focus on the society-related issues of migration, demography, interethnic conflict, culture, environment, and economic development. The analysis of the migration-identity-security relationship placed migration into a logic of security, perceived discursively as a triple threat to the welfare state, public order, and the community’s cultural identity (with France as an exception, referring to political identity). The analysis focused on demonstrating that migration goes beyond Weaver’s discursive practices, being an integral part of a complex construct, named by Claudia Arădău as the “security continuum.” In this context, migration has been elevated to the level of a meta-issue,274 understood and regarded as a spill-over effect, bringing together previous analysis sectors that were studied separately and actors from different fields (from policymakers to civil society and the media) with the hope of identifying viable solutions tailored to the migration-identity-(in)security causality relation in the EU. Given that immigration cannot be stopped (and “zero migration” is neither feasible nor desirable as it may have disastrous effects on the economy and social development), and border control is illusory,275 the threat to society is perpetual and inevitable.276 The EU’s integration ability was put to the test with the last two waves of accession in states with a significant number of Roma populations living in precarious conditions. These two enlargements were different from the previous ones both through the large number of applicants, history, and size of the population and the conflicts between the majority and minority populations. The European integration process in this case worked as a security system, determining a relocation of the state’s role in terms of identity and sovereignty. The European identity and citizenship have been at the centre of the integration process in recent years, within the wider debate on enlargement versus European integration. This debate has brought to the fore the democratic deficit the union “suffers from,” and to which the Treaty of Lisbon attempted to provide a solution adapted to the new requirements and challenges on the European agenda. Security has always been the purpose behind the European integration process, in an attempt of the states to securitize the mistakes of the twentieth century. Since the beginning of the 1960s, the European Community has been subjected to a series of transformations, and after the 274

Bigo, “Migration and Security,” 121–2. Arădău, “Migration: the Spiral of (In)Security,” 5. 276 Ibid. 275

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Maastricht Treaty the primarily economic community fell on the track of a political union in an attempt to become the “United States of Europe.”277 Building the Europe of tomorrow cannot be achieved without a consensus regarding international migration and its medium or long-term effects on security, social cohesion, the welfare state, and identity in the EU. In this context, the EU member states (attractive to immigrants due to the social-protection system or economic opportunities) have shown a constant concern in perfecting the legislation on migration. Identity innovates the migration-insecurity-causality relationship, conferring it flexibility and referential value both at sub and supranational levels, giving rise to a transdisciplinary research agenda. In the context in which identity plays an important role in the modern security agenda in general, and within the migration-security-causality relationship in particular, in the next chapter our attention will be on the construction process of the “Roma identity political project,” together with a brief overview of the Roma history and culture elements.

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Ivan, Sub zodia “Statelor Unite.”

CHAPTER THREE YESTERDAY’S ROMA – EUROPEAN PIONEERS OF TOMORROW: MIGRANTS, TRANSNATIONAL MINORITY, OR EUROPEAN CITIZENS?278

These poor distressful souls predicting treasures Carry nothing but the future.279

A numerically significant minority as well as European citizens, an estimated twelve million Roma280 are scattered all over the European countries have definitively assessed themselves in the public and political agenda of Western Europe in the debate regarding European enlargement versus integration. This debate brought into discussion “the Roma identity construction matter” under a triple aspect of the academics (Roma and non-Roma scholars), the European institutions, and the media. This process caught the attention of Roma leaders and forced a reply which, although not coherent or uniform, indicates the emergence and development of an identity political project’s “germs.” “The Roma identity project,” which is currently at a crossroads between ethnic identity, “non-territorial ethno-national group,”281 and European identity, provides us with the opportunity of an interdisciplinary 278

Parts of this chapter were published as “Istoria romilor din Romania la bilant – Incluziunea socială úi ‘proiectul identitar rom’,” in Un centenar úi mai multe teme pentru acasă, edited by Adrian Cioroianu (Bucureúti: Polirom, 2018), 217–34. 279 Seventeenth-century inscription by the French engraver Jacques Callot, on a piece representing the Roma. 280 The relative numbers were presented by international organizations and European institutions such as the Council of Europe, Open Society Institute, OSCE, and the European Commission, based on certain studies and research on the census results. 281 Zoltan Barany, The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality and Ethnopolitics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 205.

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analysis of the Roma history and culture. In the same context, the political stake of the identity project gives the Roma organizations the chance for an international career, as a political interface of the Roma communities in relation to the international actors (whether organizations or institutions, NGOs, or corporations). Without a complex approach involving political, economic, cultural, ideological, historical, psychological, and geographical implications, a complex geopolitical analysis of this ethnic group cannot be achieved. The Roma’s ethnic identity is complex, so it is illusory to believe that by emphasizing one aspect of this group over another, and by emphasizing certain actors’ or events’ importance over others, we will be able to access the privacy of their culture or better understand their social interaction – the “we” or “they,” the “Roma,” the gadje. Without a general framework, without the overall elements, we cannot gain access to this ethnic group’s private identity and its social, economic, and political manifestations. Starting with Emmanuelle Pons’s statement that the Roma’s situation282 cannot be understood without a historical analysis283 (that captures the dynamics of the social processes and the identity construction stages), we consider it essential to include this chapter in our scientific approach. The brief review of certain elements regarding the Roma history and culture also proves to be useful in the context of an article published in the French newspaper Libération,284 which reveals a series of French-society stereotypes about Roma (nomads by nature, scattered throughout Europe, slum dwellers, thieves) obtained from a survey commissioned by the National Consultative Commission for Human Rights. The results of this survey show that even to date there are a lot of things (some of them basic) still unknown when we talk about the Roma. This analysis is not intended to be exhaustive, as it rather reviews key moments and controversial issues in the Roma history and culture which in time caused real disputes between Roma activists and leaders (the constructivist approach) and researchers (the deconstructionist approach).

282

In the text the author refers to the Roma’s situation in Romania, but the statement can be generalized to the Roma people, regardless of their residence country. The term “Roma situations” refers to their contemporary social status, at both national and international levels. 283 Emmanuelle Pons, ğiganii din România-o minoritate în tranziĠie [Gypsies in Romania: a Transition Minority] (Bucharest: Compania Publishing House, 1999). 284 Cordelia Bonal, “Non, les roms ne sont pas nomads … et autres clichés,” Libération (August 22, 2012), http://www.liberation.fr/societe/2012/08/22/non-lesroms-ne-sont-pas-nomades-et-autres-cliches840988.

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There is a certain enthusiasm in exploring the “Roma issue” in the specialty literature, focusing on the negative aspects of the Roma’s existence (such as poverty, illiteracy, marginalization, limited access to work and housing, and embezzlement), because most often these themes disguise political agendas or are the subject of (non)governmental organizations that investigate specific topics, with immediate effects. Therefore, we consider the diachronic analysis on the Roma’s historical key moments to be essential, from the theories regarding their origins, the successive migration waves, the marginalization history, and the social and political organization to the emergence and development of the Roma identity consciousness to draw the “red thread” of the events that have undoubtedly and irreversibly affected their lifestyle, and social, political, and economic organization, as well as their relations with the majority institutions and populations they came into contact with. Before proceeding to the analysis of the Roma identity-construction process, we shall make a brief critical analysis of the terms to be used.

3.1. Minority, Identity, Imagology – Definition and Dilemmas: a Brief Critical Insight The reference literature has an impressive number of definitions for “minority,” “ethnic/national minorities,” “ethnic group,” “identity,” “ethnicity,” and “cultural minority.” There is no common universal definition accepted for these concepts in international documents or legislation. In this chapter, our attention is drawn to clarifying the terms used in the analysis of Roma identity construction, the international legislation regarding minorities being the subject of another research chapter. The difference highlighted by we–the others, the leitmotif of political speeches, was a mobilizing element within the European society at the end of the twentieth century, marked by numerous ethnic conflicts that changed not only the face of Europe, but also imposed the necessity of a new world order where social security plays a privileged role. The delimitation we–them highlights an essential process, namely ethnicity. The term “ethnic” comes from the Greek word ethnos, which refers to “a wide range of situations in which a group of people live and act together,” now translated through the “people”285 concept. It is a relatively 285

Daniela Târnovschi, “Identitatea romilor. Construct istoric úi mediatic” [“Roma Identity: a Historical and Media Construct”], in Interculturalitate. Cercetări úi Perspective Româneúti [Interculturalism. Romanian Research and Perspectives],

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new term used in the social sciences,286 which had a similar evolution to the identity concept, going from an essentialist/static conception (ethnicity is a reality, a permanent, unique fact of life handed down from generation to generation) to a constructivist/dynamic conception (ethnicity is a dynamic process in constant formation and transformation due to interaction). Continuing with the essentialist conception, Cornell and Hartmann define the ethnic group as: “a group of people that stands out through the common culture, typically including language, religion or other behavioral or belief patterns.”287 According to Barth’s theory,288 the key element of ethnicity is not the common origin or history of the group (those elements related to the past, the objective reality which cannot be changed), but the awareness of belonging to a group (current subjective elements which explore the future of an ethnic group). For Barth, “the focus of investigation [is] the ethnic boundary that defines the group and not the cultural content within it.”289 In the light of this interpretation, it is difficult for the Roma to determine who is “in” and who is “out,” to what extent the representatives of the group assume their ethnic affiliation, and if a simple assumption is enough. If an individual does not (publicly) assume their participation in a group for various reasons, such as discrimination, taking Roma as an example, but following the Romanipen and its laws, and knowing the Romani language, then is this individual inside or outside the group? Who are those who draw the lines between “us” and the “others”? In this context, cultural traits become effects of the awareness and responsible assumption process regarding the “ethnic identity.” Max Weber defined ethnic groups as: “human groups which support a subjective belief in a common origin due to physical and traditional

edited by Rudolf Poledna, Francis Ruegg, and Călin Rus (Cluj-Napoca: Cluj University Press Publishing House, 2002), 113. 286 Curiously, the term “ethnicity” first appears in the Oxford Dictionary in 1972, but is missing from the dictionary’s shorter version of 1982. 287 Stephen E. Cornell and Douglas Hartmann, Ethnicity and Race: Making Identities in a Changing World (London: Pine Forge Press, 1998), 17. 288 Fredrik Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: the Social Organization of Cultural Difference (Bergan and Boston: Universitetsforlag, Little, Brown & Co, 1969). 289 Ibid., 15.

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similarities or both, or due to the collective memory regarding colonization or migration.”290 In Dictionnaire de Geopolitique, professor Yves Lacoste argues that the expression “ethnic minorities,” used less and less often within European states, is being replaced by national minority or nationalities.291 National minorities can be found in various geopolitical situations, such as being included in the state where they live (the case of Hungarians in Transylvania, Vojvodina, and southern Slovakia) or belonging to a stateless group, present in several states292 (such as the Kurds and the Roma). In 1950 the UN Commission on Human Rights rejected the proposal for a single definition of “minority,” saying that “it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the Commission to reach a general agreement on a definition that would be universally applicable.”293 In the 1970s, the Special Rapporteur of the Committee on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities within the UN, Francesco Capotorti, defined minority as: “a numerically inferior group to the rest of the population of a state, having a non-dominant position, whose members, citizens of that state, possess ethnic, religious or linguistic features that differ from the rest of the population and show, even if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity with preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language.”294 Another definition that belongs to the dynamic perspective of the identity analysis is given by another member of the same Subcommittee on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, within the UN, J. Deschênes: “A group of citizens constituting a numerical minority and a non-dominant position in that state, with ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics which differ from those of the majority population, having a group solidarity that is mainly motivated by a collective desire to survive, and whose main objectives are transposed into the desire for equality with the majority both in rights and in practice.”295 The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Mr. Max van der Stoel, in his speech at the opening of the OSCE Seminar in Warsaw in 290

Max Weber, Economy and Society, vol. I (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 389. 291 Yves Lacoste, Dictionaire de, 1031. 292 Ibid., 1032. 293 United Nation Document E/CN 4/689, Para. 245. 294 Gaetano Pentassuglia, Minorities in International Law (Strasbourg Cedex: Council of Europe Publishing House, 2002), 57. 295 Ibid., 58.

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1994, referring to the issue of “minority” said that he thinks that he can recognize minorities if he sees them: “First of all, a minority is a group with linguistic, ethnic or cultural characteristics, which distinguish it from the majority. Secondly, a minority is a group which usually not only seeks to maintain its identity, but also tries to give stronger expression to that identity.”296 One of the basic needs of the individual within the society is to define their affiliation to a certain group, be it cultural, religious, economic, professional, political, ethnic, or social. In this context, Andrei Marga talks about the individual who throughout their existence experiences “multiple identities.”297 Of these identities, one is “lived more intensely”298 when an external factor (most often represented by the majority group or even the state, through its institutions) takes action to impose an opposite identity. In Romania, the state took such actions during the Communist period by applying the PCR program “Integration of Gypsies” (1977–83), conducted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This program sought the forced assimilation of the Roma into the majority population (the homogenization of the Romanian society, the so-called “Romanization” activity of the Roma habitat), namely the denial of their affiliation to a minority ethnic group. With reference to this policy, Emmanuelle Pons concluded that “the integration policy concerning [the gypsies] was not deliberately targeting assimilation, as it happens with an intentional denationalization of an ethnic group. The gypsy issue was only addressed in terms of social progress … In fact, by striving to level the differences and encourage social mobility, the Communist policy also erased the ethnic specificity of certain groups, especially that of gypsies.”299 The paradox with the Roma is that the common elements (objective criteria) that make up the traditional Western model of ethnic identity – that is, language, religion, origin, territory, and common historical events – do not define the Roma identity construction, which is based on other, more subjective criteria, such as culture, customs, traditions (Romanipen), and historical events.

296

Declaration of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Mr. Max van der Stoel. 297 Andrei Marga, “IdentităĠi multiple úi construcĠia identităĠii-cazul romilor europeni” [“Multiple Identities and the Construction of Identity – the European Gypsies Issue”], in Punctul critic [The Critical Point] 5 (December 2011): 22. 298 Ibid. 299 Emmanuelle Pons, ğiganii din România, 29–30.

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Anthony D. Smith talks about the common traits of an ethnic group, such as: language, religion, “the common myth of origin,”300 historical sequences, common culture, laws, lifestyle, and physical territory (in a symbolic manner, as sacred), but most importantly, “a sense of belonging and an active solidarity.”301 Elsewhere, Smith defines ethnic groups as “a type of cultural collectivity … which highlights the role of the origin myths and historical memory and which identifies itself by one or several cultural differences such as religion, customs, language or institutions.”302 In the light of these elements and from an anachronistic perspective, the Roma identity is very visible, dynamic, and powerful as it is in a continuous process of (re)construction and affirmation. In sociology and anthropology, the concept of identity emerged in the 1950s. At the time, it referred particularly to cultural identity. Identity is “a mental construction, developed on historical and social grounds, a set of data that a person identifies itself as belonging to a group, through psychological reasons.”303 In his introductory study304 John R. Gilles deals with the notion of identity from a past-time perspective, which appeals to the collective memory, personalities, and values that have marked the group’s history, establishing an interdependence relationship between identity and memory. This explanation is part of the essentialist perspective on identity, which considers that identity is something natural, real, and permanent, to be preserved and passed down to the next generations, that exists within all the members of a community who understand and accept these essential features unitedly.305 For essentialists, the fundamental role is 300

Anthony, D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1986), 24. 301 Ibid., 25. 302 Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (London: Penguin, 1991), 20. 303 Mariana, Buceanu, Gelu Duminica, et al, Manual Integrat Incluziunea grupurilor vulnerabile prin centre comunitare-elaborat în cadrul proiectului Centre comunitare de resurse: Instrumente strategice în procesul de îmbunătăаire a situaаiei grupurilor vulnerabile din mediul rural [Integrated Manual. Inclusion of Vulnerable Groups in Community Centers – Developed Within the Project Community Resource Centre: Strategic Tools in the Process of Improving the Situation of Groups in Rural Areas], Human Resources Development Operational Sectorial Programme 2007–13, Invest in People. HRDOSP/ 83/5.2/S/55695, (Bucharest, 2011), 56. 304 John R. Gilles, Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). 305 Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, “Beyond Identity,” Theory and Society 29, no. 1 (2000): 1–47.

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played by the diachronic dimension of social relations (origin, history, language, name, religion, culture), while the individual has a secondary, passive role, their only responsibility being to acquire the traits of the group they were born into. In opposition, constructivists consider the identity as a social construct, and hence a contextual, multiple, and fluid representation,306 which is founded on interaction with the others, a game of self-identifications and hetero-identifications. Alongside the diachronic axis, constructivists also consider important the role played by the synchronic axis and the subjective dimension. The acceptance of ethnic affiliation is a determinant both within the group and the relations with the other groups belonging to the society they interact with. The other’s identity construction process is accomplished by their interacting/socializing, an important role in this process being played by the media which is not only a source of information but also an active source of social identity (stereotypes), “portraying individuals and groups in a certain manner.”307 With the Roma people, the media can be considered guilty of the reproduction and dissemination of prejudices and stereotypes (gypsy offender, beggar, unemployed, dirty, deviant-kleptomaniac behavioural patterns), which created and maintained a pejorative image among the people. The way we look at ourselves and others and the way others look at us are the subject of a recent discipline, namely imagology. Starting from this subject, we can define imagology as “the study of national stereotypes, obtained by self- or hetero-identification.”308 In D. H. Pageaux’s view, the image can be compared with a symbolic, “secondary language.”309 Imagology does not resume the making of an inventory of images, a collection of wrong caricatures representing a people or a minority group, but analyses and interprets them according to the dichotomy of identity versus alterity (internal definition versus external definition). If we take for example the numerous names given to Roma across history (e.g. gypsies, kalo, Manush, Sinti, antiganoi, Egyptians, Roma), J. P. Liegeois 306

HoraĠiu Rusu, Schimbare socială úi identitate socio-culturală [Social Change and Socio-cultural Identity] (Iaúi: Institutul European PH., 2008). 307 Daniela Tarnovschi, 122. 308 L. M. Iacob, “Imagologia úi ipostazele alterităĠii: străini, minoritari, excluúi” [“Imagology and Hypostases of Alterity: Foreigners, Minority, Outcasts”], in Minoritari, Marginali, Excluúi [Minorities, Marginalized, Outcasts], edited by A. Neculau and G. Ferreol (Iaúi: Polirom Publishing House, 1996), 40. 309 Daniel. H. Pageaux, Les Ailes des Mots: Critique literaire et poetique de la creation (Paris: L’Harmattan PH, 1994).

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claims that they do not relate “to a reality, [but to] the crooked image of the reality [or] a misunderstood image of reality in itself,”310 and if we base our analysis on this reality, “we will have as many ethnicity definitions as there are Roma groups and subgroups because each individual will declare itself to be an authentic Rom.”311 Such concerns also exist at the EU level,312 an example being the campaign launched by the Romanian Government, through PHARE funds, Stop Prejudices about the Roma Ethnicity! (SPRE),313 drawing attention to the racism that is present at both national and international levels. In this game of images and projections about the others within the EU, the main victims were the Roma, whose image relates to the eroded folklore or the clichés etched into the collective memory, so that after 1989 they became scapegoats for various economic, political, and social issues. We are currently witnessing a process of Roma identity (re)construction, starting from the constructivist conception in which an important role is played by the subjective nature of images with and about Roma. A first controversial issue concerning the Roma identity construction is related to the different languages’ terminologies when it comes to them or the name used by the community representatives when they self-identify in relation to the majority population, otherwise known as the R(r)om versus Gypsy debate.

3.2. Roma versus Gypsy: Aroma or Essence of the Identity-Construction Process One of the constant preoccupations of gypsiologists is the eternal debate about the ethnonyms used to designate the representatives of this ethnic group. As shown in the introduction to this research, this book uses

310

Jean P. Liegeois, Mutation Tsigane la revolution bohemienne (Bruxelles: Edition Complexe S.P.R.L DPI, 1976), 14. 311 Ibid. 312 Such actions (exhibitions, rallies, scientific manifestations, workshops) were also organized by other EU member states and international organizations fighting for minority rights, sharing the same message – stop prejudices! Moreover, the EU motto that was first launched in 2000 is “Unity in Diversity.” Germany’s campaign was much more specific, the Berlin Museum hosting in 1994 an exhibition that was suggestively entitled The Scottish Kilt and the Tyrolese Trousers – European Neighbours in Symbols and Clichés. 313 More information on the website http://sperorg.blogspot.ro.

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the ethnonym “Rom”314 for this ethnic group, but not before making a brief review of this debate315 by pointing out the important arguments that support the researchers’ option for one name or another. We will be analysing the rom versus gypsy debate from the triple perspective of researchers, Roma leaders, and the Roma community. The analyses undertaken by sociologists, linguists, and historians on the subject follows a deconstructionist approach in an attempt to discover what lies behind these “umbrella terms” and to not demonstrate the validity of using one term over another. The debate around the two terms offered the chance for a diachronic and analytical approach to the Roma identity-construction process, highlighting the moments (especially dramatic) that have marked their evolution from the status of social lepers (slaves) to European citizens with equal rights (a European minority). From the emergence of the first migratory waves and throughout their European history, the Roma have benefitted from a wide range of assigned ethnonyms present in historical, administrative, and political documents, but also through the contact with the majority population, most of them having a pejorative connotation. In a first phase, these were due to the fact that they were different, and this ignorance usually inspires fear and rejection, which can escalate to prejudice and, as a result, lead to the appearance of stereotypes (the last instance of these manifestations being xenophobia, according to Fig. 3.1 below).

314

A number of researchers opt for the spelling “Roma” or “Romani” in Romanian, with a double “r” to emphasize the nasal pronunciation of the word in various dialects of the Romani language, or, as some researchers would say, to avoid confusion, in both Romanian and other languages, with similar words such as Roma (the capital of Italy), Romans (inhabitants of the former Roman Empire), rum (a beverage), and ROM (read only memory), for instance. 315 For a detailed analysis of this debate, see István Horváth and Lucian Nastasă (eds.), Rom sau ğigan: dilemele unui etnonim în spaĠiul românesc [Rom or Gypsy: the Dilemmas of an Ethnonym in Romania] (Cluj-Napoca: Institute for Research on National Minorities Issues PH., 2012).

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Fig. 3.1. The escalation of negative representations regarding Roma people

Our analysis starts from the definition given by D. Kenrick of the term “Rom” in the Historical Dictionary of the Gypsies (Romanies), where: “Rom [is] the name used to describe oneself by most ethnic gypsies in their own language. The etymology is unclear, but the term may come from the ancient Indian word dom whose original meaning was ‘man’.”316 Starting from the first documented attestation of their presence in Europe, (athinganoi, 1068 BCE), and the fact that they didn’t then call themselves “Roma,” a series of “umbrella terms”317 have been assigned to them, 316

Donald Kenrick, Historical Dictionary of the Gypsies (Romanies) Second Edition, Historical Dictionaries of Peoples and Cultures, No.7 (Lanham, Maryland, Toronto, and Plymouth: Scarecrow Press, 2007), 215. 317 Petre Matei, “Romi sau ğigani? Etnonimele-istoria unei neînĠelegeri” [“Roma or Gypsies? Ethnonyms – History of a Misunderstanding”], in István Horváth and Lucian Nastasă (eds.), Rom sau ğigan: dilemele unui etnonim în spaĠiul românesc [Rom or Gypsy: the Dilemmas of an Ethnonym in Romania] (Cluj-Napoca: Institute for Research on National Minorities Issues PH, 2012), 15.

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which in time have set into the common language, creating: Zingari in Italy, bohemiens or tsiganes in France, zigeuner in Germany, Ġigane in Russia, gitanos in Spain, and gypsies in England. Since the end of the eighteenth century when the endonym “Rom” with its derivate “Romani”318 became common, and especially after the 1990s when the “Roma issue” was permanently asserted on the European agenda, these names, considered pejoratives, have been replaced with others. Thus, the replacements are: Sinti (Roma and Sinti) in the German-speaking areas, Roma in Eastern and Southeastern Europe, Romanichal in Northern Europe (Romanisael in England, with the derivates Romani people, Roma, and travellers), and Kalo/e in the Iberian Peninsula. Regarding the matter of official documents, the EU institutions and the international organizations with responsibility for human rights use the term Roma, with its derivate Romani people,319 but without the intention to minimize the specificity of each group or transforming them into a “melting pot” for the Roma groups spread across the European continent and beyond its borders. This measure is purely bureaucratic, hence the exceptions the Askali group (Balkan Egyptians) and Tinkers (quinqui). Due to assigned denominations (acquired) according to practiced professions (in Romania, the miners’ case), but also to a higher mobility, various groups have crossed the European borders, which is why a precise geographical representation of their distribution is impossible, hence the option for the mapping of the main groups and exceptions. In Romania’s northwest region (Cluj, Sălaj, and Satu-Mare County), according to a survey conducted in six communities presenting a significant number of Roma, on a sample of seventy-eight people aged between eighteen and fifty-two, 67.2 percent of respondents identified themselves as Gypsies (using this term within the family, the community, and relationships with other groups), 29.1 percent used the term Roma, while 3.6 percent used both terms without giving either any importance, 318

Lucian Nastasă, “Convergente úi disparităĠi în definirea unei identităĠi etnoculturale. DenominaĠie úi imagistică în epoca emancipării (secolul XIX)” [“Convergences and Disparities in Defining an Ethno-cultural Identity: Denomination and Imaging in the Emancipation era (Twentieth Century)”], in István Horváth and Lucian Nastasă (eds.), Rom sau ğigan: dilemele unui etnonim în spaĠiul românesc [Rom or Gypsy: the Dilemmas of an Ethnonym in Romania] (Cluj-Napoca: Institute for Research on National Minorities Issues PH, 2012), 94. 319 Until the 1990s, the EU used the term “Gypsy.” Then, with the development and assertion of Roma organizations in the international arena and the Roma leaders’ interest in the unifying project, it was replaced with “Roma” and the derivate “Romani.”

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Fig. 3.2. The Roma Political Identity Project, from migration to transnational minority

and 0.1 percent considered themselves neither Roma nor Gypsies (for them, belonging to a kind – Baiesi [Boyash], Gabori, etc. – was much more important than these umbrella terms). As with other ethnic groups, the Roma must also be allowed to use the endonym they want and that they can identify with. A similar situation exists with the Saami people in the Scandinavian countries who were until recently known as Lapps (meaning “little men”), or the Inuit in the US and

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Canada, known under the pejorative exonym of Eskimos320 (meaning “raw meat eaters”). For the leaders (especially in politics) who want to demonstrate that the term “Rom” is an artificial and recent construct (invented after 1989321), researchers have identified a series of elements showing the “respectable age”322 of this term and its use in parallel with that of “gypsy.” In England, in the pages of the Journal of the Gypsy Lore Society, the ethnonym romany/romanly was frequently used for this group and for their language, Romani,323 given that in both the name of the association (Gypsy Lore Society) and the journal (Journal of the Gypsy Lore Society, later changed to Romani Studies) the term “Gypsy” is used. The same situation exists with F. Liszt’s work “Des Bohemiens et leur musique en Hongrie” (1859), where the title contains the denomination of “Bohemiens,” while one of the chapters is entitled “Rommys et Magyars” and in various parts of the work the terms “rommy,” “Bohemiens,” and “cygan”324 are used in parallel. Another example is represented by the nineteenth and twentieth-century writings of M. Kogălniceanu, Octav Lecca, Martin Block, and Ion Chelcea, for example, then the International Committee of Gypsies325 (1967), which organized the First International Roma Congress (1971), or the use of these denominations in parallel in official documents belonging to international organizations and institutions until the homogenization of the international discourse. In this context, can the replacement of a name change a people’s history of hundreds of years? When did the “dethronement” of the term “gypsy” in favour of “Rom” happen? An important role is played by the meaning of the word in various languages: if, in English slang, “to gyp” means “to steal,” in Polish cyganis means “to lie,” “to cheat”; while in Bulgarian tsiganin is synonymous with “dirty,” “false,” “lazy,” “criminal.”326

320

Nicolae Gheorghe, Ian Hancock, amd Marcel Cortiade, “‘Rromi’ sau ‘Ġigani’ [“‘Roma’ or ‘Gypsies’: a Few Comments about the Roma People Ethnonym”], Etudes Tsiganes 1 (1995). 321 Petre Matei, “Romi sau ğigani?” 32. 322 Ibid. 323 Nastasă, “Convergente úi disparităĠi,” 100. 324 Ibid., 99. 325 It later changed its name to the International Roma Committee. 326 Liegeois, Romii în Europa, 141.

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In an article from Romanothan, “Why Rom and not Gypsy?” (2009), Delia Mădălina Grigore,327 a Roma activist, argues in favour of using the term “Rom” at the expense of “gypsy,” because: In the Romani language, the word “gypsy” does not exist. The term has nothing to do with self-identification in the Romani language spoken by the Roma people, but it rather is a profoundly pejorative word used by alterity/non-Roma to insult the Roma. The wrong and unscientific term “gypsy” is unfortunately sometimes assumed by some Roma, especially by those who do not speak Romani out of ignorance, but also by certain Roma who do speak Romani [s.n.], as a form of “captatio benevolentiae,” to please the non-Rom speaker. The term “gypsy” comes from the medium Greek language, from “athinganos/athinganoy,” the meanings of the word being: “pagan,” “heretic,” “untouchable” or “impure.”328

The author uses the term “Rom” because “gypsy” does not refer to ethnic affiliation, but strictly to the religious belonging to a group considered heretical, which subsequently, during slavery (in Romania), designated a person “outside the social hierarchy.”329 We encounter a similar situation in French where there are four denominations for this ethnic group, none of which is able to cover it completely. “Voyageurs” refers to a lifestyle (nomadism), “Roms” to their cultural affiliation, while “Tsiganes” is a term that lies at the interface between the idealist representations of freedom, music, dance, and stereotypes like parasites, delinquency, and poverty. The neutral term “Gens du voyage” (mass noun) refers to the individual as part of a community330 (a term used primarily in administration). This situation resembles the one in Germany, where in administration the phrase “Sinti und Roma” is used. In a pejorative way, they are also called “zigeuner” in the society. The first two waves of immigrants claim to be “Sinti,” while the groups arriving in the last two waves (of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries) are called “Roma.” The conclusion is that a single ethnonym is not capable of covering everybody, or even being accepted unanimously by all the Roma groups in 327

Delia Mădălina Grigore is a Roma activist who, since 2004, has been chairperson of the Roma Centre AMARE RROMENTZA, is vice-president of the ARTISRROMA Association, and since 2002 has been university lecturer at the Department of Indianistic – Romani Language and Literature, Department of Oriental Languages, the Faculty of Foreign Languages and Literatures, Bucharest University. 328 Delia Grigore, “De ce rrom úi nu Ġigan” [“Why Rom and not Gypsy”], Romanothan (March 4, 2009). 329 Ibid. 330 Patrick Williams, “Sans territoire fixe,” Projet 6, no. 295 (2006): 11–17.

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a single country, its generalization across an entire continent thus being much less probable. These few examples prove that the Roma are not a monolithic group, and their uniqueness resides in the small differences that exist from one group to another. Regarding the use of these ethnonyms within the society, the situation changes depending on the community’s development level and its geographic location, rural versus urban or Eastern Europe versus Western Europe. While in Eastern Europe there is an obvious interest in the use of the ethnonym “Rom,” precisely to clear the pejorative term “gypsy” from the collective memory, the situation in Western Europe is more nuanced, the denominations here diversifying from sinti/e and kalo/e, to romanichal, the term “Rom” mainly being used with its basic meaning in the Romani language, referring to “husband.” The situation is complicated if we look at the results of surveys and studies carried out in communities by various specialized organizations or institutions. In Romania in 2009, following an IMAS study, at the demand of the National Agency for the Roma (NAR), sixty-six percent of respondents identified themselves as “gypsies,” thirty percent as “Roma,” and the remaining four percent did not know331 or refused to answer. The situation is similar with other countries. The natural question, starting from these results, is whether, in the unifying process (one name, one people, one history), the Roma leaders and organizations take into account the desire of the community as it is expressed in censuses or surveys. Is the group’s desire the same as the leaders’ agenda? Are the political projects more important than the group’s interests? The EU’s unifying discourse regarding the Roma people (in facilitating the political and economic agenda) provides a starting point for the Roma activists, creating a “niche”332 that allows for speculation. In this context, the Roma elites strive to create a unifying history that can underlie the Roma identity-construction process. This is a “top-down” process, imposed by the Roma leaders and the international Roma communities’ institutions, which however lacks real support for its implementation at a community level, at the “grassroots.” To turn it into a “bottom-up” process, it is necessary to guide actions towards the Roma community as a whole, through cultural and educational programs focusing on the Roma’s unifying history and the Romanipen as community products imposed on the political and public agenda of activists and organizations. If the Roma leaders’ discourse is built around the legitimacy of using the ethnonym 331 332

Petre Matei, “Romi sau ğigani?” 28. Ibid., 24.

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“Rom” to the detriment of “gypsy,” historians, sociologists, and ethnologists provide numerous positive examples of using the term “gypsy”: gypsy music, the romantic depiction of the gypsy woman, gypsy clothing, and dancing. In this “war” of the declarations to demonstrate the legitimacy of using one term to the detriment of another by appealing to its age, connotations, and geographical distribution, an important role is played by the media through the obsessively promoted negative images. The television keeps the individual in the guilty seat,333 exaggerating to generate news, especially in times of crisis (economic or political), when is it necessary to identify scapegoats. The role of the media will be thoroughly analysed in the chapter on the expulsion of Romanian Roma citizens from France. The Rom versus Gypsy debate is only part of the Roma identity (re)construction process, next to which an important role is played by this people’s recovery of history, with a focus on the major events that have influenced their further development and determined their current situation.

3.3. The History of Yesterday’s Roma: the Starting Point of Today’s Roma’s European Destiny A minority with a distorted image composed of social representations and prejudices related to an eroded folklore or the simplifying distinction act, Roma “are at least as real as the Dutch,”334 even if they do not have a national or symbolic territory, religion, or common confession; namely, a part of those traits which, under a traditional analysis, define ethnic minorities. The lack of certain elements from the classic definition of ethnic minorities does not make the Roma less real in comparison to other minority ethnic groups, but it individualizes them, making the Romani/gypsystudies domain tributary cross-disciplinary and interdisciplinary. The keyword in defining the Roma ethnic group remains “culture,” comprising the value system and traditions developed against a historical background, in different economic, political, and social contexts that marked their evolution in the international arena. Regarding the changes which Europe went through after the fall of Communism, the elimination 333

Liegeois, Romii în Europa, 183. Thomas Acton, “Modernity, Culture and ‘Gypsies’: is there a Meta-Scientific Method for Understanding the Representation of ‘Gypsies’? And do the Dutch really Exist?” in The Role of the Romanies Images and Counter-Images of ‘Gypsies’/ Romanies in European Cultures, edited by Nicholas Saul and Susan Tebbutt (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2004), 98.

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of the visas, and the former Communist states joining the EU, it was natural for the Roma ethnic and cultural identity to converge towards a transnational type of identity that could better meet the needs of a minority of about twelve million inhabitants, with a legacy of centuries of marginalization and understatement, spread across Europe (also with a notable presence in North America and Latin America). Despite those who challenge their cultural existence, J. P. Liegeois considers that the: Roma have been in flagrant denial for centuries: if there were no culture, then why this constant struggle to stay who you are and to evolve towards something you want to be, when “integration” or “assimilation” would be an easy solution. If there weren’t an identity that was stronger than the differences induced by dispersion and used for self-classification within an organized society, then what’s the point of this worldwide similarity between groups and families, this strong sense of affiliation to a whole and this common struggle with the same priorities?335

In the same vein, Nicolae Gheorghe336 emphasizes that the Roma are a “multicultural people,” dispersed across several areas, under different names, with differences in regard to the Romani mother tongue (at present, it is estimated that there are between seventeen and thirty dialects) and religious affiliation, but who share common subjective elements of unity: historical episodes of marginalization and persecution, the awareness of the difference we/Roma – others/gadje, lifestyle, and the Romanipen. The attempt to outline a methodological analysis framework applicable to the national identities as well as the (trans)national (in our case, the Roma group) is not easily achieved, and implies an articulated approach that goes beyond the ethnic issues, focusing its attention on history and culture. The Roma identity is difficult to define objectively as it is mainly based on subjective criteria, having a multitude of expression methods and an acute sense of affiliation with a distinct community. Following the same interpretive line, Vintilă Mihăilescu’s conclusion is emblematic: “identity is not a permanent concern! … [and] if we cannot talk about a purity and continuity of the ethnicity from origins to the present day, we can discuss an exchange about the permanent presence of certain myths regarding the common origin and continuity over time,

335

Liegeois, Romii în Europa, 86. Nicolae Gheorghe was the founder of Romani CRISS (1993), vice-president of the International Union of Roma, and consultant on Roma and Sinti issues at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

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within any type of collective ethnic identity.”337 This analysis guides us towards the idea of multiple identities and the dynamics of the identityconstruction process. Therefore, we will address below some essential features that define the Roma minority, starting from the simple but controversial question that allows multiple perspectives of analysis, and which researchers have still not found an answer to: “Who are the Roma?”

3.3.1. Who are the Roma?338 Between myth and scientific debate The answers to this question were drawn from several research domains, following certain linguistic, historical, political, cultural, and economic analyses, each emphasizing a certain aspect. A possible answer pertaining to the history domain comes from Donald Kenrick, namely that, “Roma are a people living in Europe and other areas and who are believed to originate in India. Most Roma still speak one of the several Romani language dialects.”339 Henriette Asseo notes that: “The truth is that over the centuries, Roma have never been one people, united by a common written tradition.”340 She draws attention to a trap, also signalled by some 337

Vintilă Mihăilescu, Antropologie. Cinci introduceri [Anthropology: Five Introductions] (Iaúi: Polirom PH., 2007), 228. 338 The question was addressed during an unstructured interview with a sample of people from the academic field, the state administration, the private sector, and experts in social protection in Romania. Their answers show the experience with Roma communities or the lack of direct contact with them, in which case their answers were influenced by the media and the theoretical information accumulated through the educational process. When asked “Who are the Roma?” the answers ranged from elements of culture and the majority population’s manner of rapport with them: “on the one hand, they are an ethnic/national minority (depends on how you look at it), entitled to promote and protect their specific rights … culture, traditions, language … on the other hand, the Roma represent a disadvantaged, but independent category with young people, old people, women, etc. … There are two components here … The negative, reactive component that targets discrimination in various forms – segregation, intolerance, violence in both directions – and the proactive part that includes policies, strategies and affirmative measures that must ensure equality in opportunities, equal access to goods and services, etc. …” (AVC), to elements that relate to their organization within the society to protect their identity: “In Romania they are an ethnic minority having representatives in the Romanian Parliament, in the Governmental structures and the public institution called the National Agency for the Roma” (BM). 339 Donald Kenrick, Rromii: din India la Mediterana-MigraĠia Rromilor [Roma: from India to the Mediterranean-Roma Migration], translation from English by Laura Lotreanu (Bucharest: Alternative PH., 1998), 9. 340 Ibid., 7.

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Roma leaders, in which, throughout history, several researchers have fallen and failed, considering the Roma a monolithic group, when in reality they are “extremely diverse, with multiple subgroups based on language, history, religion and professions,”341 ranging between an ethnic minority and a (trans)national identity. The Roma identity project is based on a number of elements, namely the origin myth, the migration to Europe theories, the different groups of Roma (proving that they are not monolithic, but sharing different common cultural elements), the Romanipen, the Samudaripen, and more recently a coherent international organization (with NGOs, congresses, meetings, programmatic documents, and inclusive policies) in the international arena, making obvious their intent to permanently mark the transition from immigrants to transnational minority or ethnic minority. In the identity construction process, “the common myth of origin” plays an essential role as it is part of the collective memory, focusing on the external component – the individual or the group that identifies itself with the stories and legends told by others about them and their ancestors. “The legends about the Roma’s origins aroused the non-Roma researchers’ interest and gave rise to tales full of romance and emotions, rather than accuracy.”342 Their different appearance, nomadic lifestyle, and exotic clothing and professions gave birth to some bizarre hypotheses regarding their origin, most of them with a religious inspiration. Inspired by the Bible, the legends talk about the Roma as being “descendants of Ishmael, son of Hagar and Avram, who was marginalized by his father in favour of Isaac and compelled to wandering,”343 or doomed to nomadism because they had sheltered the Virgin Mary with Baby Jesus, or punished for having stolen the clothes of Jesus when he was on the cross.344 Other hypotheses present them as “survivors of a prehistoric race” (e.g. the Druids or the Nubians), that they were characters in Herodotus’s books, inhabitants of the centre of the earth,345 that they 341

D. Ringold, M. A. Oestein, and E. Wilkens (eds.), Roma in an Expanding Europe: Breaking the Poverty Cycle (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005), 3. 342 Jean P. Liegeois, Mutation Tsigane, 17. 343 Deborah Epstein Nord, Gypsies & the British Imagination, 1807–1930 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 20. 344 Ibid. 345 ROMANINET, Curs multimedia de limba romani pentru Promovarea diversităĠii lingvistice úi ImbunătăĠirea dialogului social: Raport privind populaĠia romă [Romani Language Multimedia Course to Promote Linguistic Diversity and Improve Social Dialog: Report on the Roma Population], Instituto de Enseñanza Secundaria Ribeira do Louro (Spain), Asesoramiento, Tecnología e Investigación

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came from the city of Singara (Mesopotamia – from here the denomination of cingaros), or that they were a population at the periphery of the European society that paint their faces and use a concocted jargon.346 The conclusion of these legends regarding the Roma origin prove that the interest in these foreigners was born and maintained by the exoticism and mystery that surrounds their origin and existence. The differences (in culture, lifestyle, practices, religion, and clothing) were those that would soon lead to their rejection and marginalization within the European society. The road to Europe and the reasons for leaving India are full of legends and fantastic stories, specific to the romantic literature, which complement the picture of a people that: suddenly appeared one day [without anyone knowing] from where they came. They swept over our continent without the desire to conquer it, but also without asking for permission. They didn’t want to rule but neither to obey. They didn’t want to give anything, nor receive anything. They didn’t testify from what African or Asian places they were coming, neither what made them seek other worlds under heaven. They didn’t bring along any memories, nor fostered any hope …347

The literature348 records a first migratory wave that went towards Persia in 431–0 BCE, a period of prosperity for the Empire ruled by Bahram Gur, who decided to reduce his subjects’ working hours by half and allow them to relax with music and drinking. Marcel Courthiade links the Roma departure from India to the invasion of Mahmud Ghazi, an Afghan warrior, on December 21, 1018 CE.349 Other legends record, among the migration reasons, the search for a better life in well-developed

S. L. (Spain), Fundación Secretariado Gitano (Spain), “ETHNOTOLERANCE” (Bulgary), Secretariado Diocesano de Lisboa da Obra Pastoral dos Ciganos (Portugal), Grup Scolar Industrial Victor Jinga (Romania), SC CONCEPT CONSULTING SRL (România), University of Manchester (United Kingdom), 2, http://www.romaninet.com/ROMANINET_Linguistic_report_ru.pdf. 346 Ibid. 347 Nicolae Criúan, ğiganii-mit úi realitate [Gypsie: Myth and Reality] (Bucharest: Albatros PH., 1999), 9. 348 Among those recording this legend are D. Kenrick with his paper Rromii: din India la Mediterană [Roma: from India to the Mediterranean] (18–19), Henriette Asseo, and Gheorghe Sarău. 349 Delia Grigore and Gheorghe Sarău, Istorie úi tradiĠii rome [Roma History and Traditions] (Bucharest: SalvaĠi Copiii PH., 2006), 10.

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Persia or the numerous armed confrontations350 that made it necessary for them to seek other territories where they could practice their professions. G. Potra considers that the Roma left India because of “Manu’s harsh laws,”351 and that, regardless of their arrival point, they were considered and treated as the “filth of human society.”352 According to J. P. Liegeois, the Roma left India in 1000 CE, migrating westward across Persia, Armenia, and the Byzantine Empire as nomadic tribes in search of work, finally reaching Europe. Other researchers talk about two groups of Roma which reached Europe following different paths: one entering through the Central Asia steppes and around the north of the Black Sea, and the other passing through the North of Africa, into the Iberian Peninsula.353 A third version presents a trifurcation of the migratory groups in the Eastern part of the Byzantine Empire, producing three groups: “dom,” “lom,” and “Rom.” Kenrick argues his theory regarding the migration from India towards Europe by making use of the possible historic events that determined the Roma to leave Asia, respectively “the black plague [that] reached Constantinople in 1347, secondly, in 1390, when the Turks defeated the Greeks in Asia and finally, ten years later, the battle at Alepp that marked the Mongol advance.”354

350

D. Kenrick and G. Puxon, in The Destiny of Europe’s Gypsies (London: Sussex University Press, 1972), 7, rewrite the legend picked up by Ali Ceauúen about the reasons for the Roma migration from India: “We had a great emperor, a Rom. [He] was our Padishah. All the Roma people lived together then in a country [called] Sindh … Everyone was doing well. Our emperor’s name was Maramengro Dev. He had two more brothers. Their names were Rromano and Singan. All well and good, except for a great war. Caused by the Muslims. The soldiers destroyed the Roma’s country … All the Roma fled their country … The three brothers guided their people on faraway roads. Some went to Arabia, some to Armenia and others to Byzantium. In all the three countries, they became poor.” 351 George Potra, ContribuĠii la istoricul Ġiganilor din România [Contributions to the History of the Gypsies in Romania] (Bucharest: Curtea Veche PH., 2001), 17. 352 Buceanu et al., Manual IntegratIncluziunea, 56. 353 Kenrick, Historical Dictionary of the Gypsies, 46. 354 Ibid., 10.

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Fig. 3.3. The main Roma groups in Europe – Roma migration theories (Roma branches)

There are many gaps and conflicting sources of information regarding the Roma’s Indian origin and arrival in Europe, which is why Kenrick considers that describing “the Roma’s remote history is like trying to complete a puzzle, given that some parts are missing and the box also contains pieces of other puzzles. We have no complete image of the final puzzle.”355 Linguistic studies356 have provided most of the information regarding this period of Roma history (origin, the time interval from when they left India and the re-enactment of the journey to Europe), analysing the loan words from Armenian, Persian, and Greek into the various Romani dialects. Another controversial moment in the Roma’s early history is the historical evidence of their presence in Europe. Besides the common myth of origin, the sharing of a history (or of certain common historical sequences) defines a population in terms of experimental temporal 355

Kenrick, Historical Dictionary of the Gypsies, 46. Franc Miklosic’s (in German also known as Franz von Miklosich) study is also one of the linguistic studies worth mentioning – Uber die Mundarten und Wanderunger der Zigeuner Europas (1872–80).

356

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succession,357 while representing the grounds of the identity-construction process. The first reference evidence regarding the presence of the “Atsincans” (the Georgian version of the Greek form Athinganoi358) appears in a hagiographic manuscript belonging to a Georgian monk, dating from 1068 CE at the Iviron Monastery on Mount Athos. According to these notes, in “1054 [CE] many Athinganoi arrived at Constantinople359 in Asia Minor, who were part of a heretical sect, renowned for their skills as fortune tellers and wizards.”360 Note that the first reference to the Roma is marked by stigmatizing elements in appealing to their alleged origin (the “foreigners” of Asia Minor, different in their appearance and clothing) and identifying them as part of a “heretical sect”361 – because they were not Christians, they were labelled as such within the society. The marginalization and rejection of the European populations were due, on the one hand, to the historical conditions in which they arrived in Europe in a time of religious ferment (as they were pagans) and the plague epidemic, which led to a change in the perception of foreigners and their being held responsible for the spread of this pandemic. On the other hand, we have the traditional European society’s reaction (whose known space was limited to the home village or town) to the contact with an exotic, pagan, nomadic population with different physical traits, colourful clothing, and different customs and beliefs, that practiced magic and witchcraft, that was lacking the professions specific to a sedentary population, were divided into tribes, and that spoke a language the others didn’t understand. The normal reaction towards those who “threatened” their natural order (the limited universe of the home village or town) within the society was rejection, as they were neither open to knowing 357

Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, 25. Angus Fraser, ğiganii [Gypsies] (Bucharest: Humanitas PH., 1998), 52. 359 The legend says that Emperor Constantine IX Manomachos asked the Athinganoi (renowned for their occult practices and magic) to help him get rid of the wild animals in the palace gardens. The wild animals died after eating the cursed meat prepared by the Athinganoi. 360 Tsiganes et Voyageurs. Donnees socio-culturelles. Donnees socio-politiques (Strasbourg: Conseil de l’Europe, 1985), 13–14. 361 The Roma leaders and researchers (especially those supporting the constructivist theory of the Roma’s ethnic identity) denied the term Athinganoi, from which the denominations “gypsies,” “Zigeuner,” and “Zingari” derived, considering that it refers to religion and not ethnicity. The identification of these foreign groups by their religious affiliation is justified for the year 1054 CE in a Europe dominated by religion, where all the events/phenomena were interpreted according to religious dogma. 358

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them nor capable of integrating with them. “And thus is created the dark and repulsive image of a nomad, whose soul is as black as his skin color and who is forever condemned before a frightened society.”362 The historians’ writings have also contributed to the shaping of this rejection, crystalizing a stereotypical image of the Roma migratory waves. Such a negative example that sets into the local communities’ consciousness and then becomes a general rule of the entire society is represented by Sebastien Munster’s Universal Cosmography of the World, in which the Roma are described as “ugly, black, baked in the sun people … [who] eat like pigs,”363 with similar examples in Spanish, French, and Italian literature. Since they didn’t call themselves “Roma” as they advanced in Europe, the peoples they came into contact with gave them different names, depending on their appearance, customs, and tribe leaders, or the fact that they were pagans. Thus, they appear in the official documents as “Cingarije” in Serbia, “Bohemiens” in France, “Ciganos” in Portugal, “Zingari” in Italy, “Siganyer” in Norway, and “Zingari”364 in Malta, with each migration wave in Europe producing further terms up to the present day. For instance, there are five recognized large groups of Roma in the Western Ballans and two exceptions: Quinqui and Ashkali.

362

Liegeois, Romii în Europa, 94. Ibid. 364 All these variations come from the Greek word Athinganos, meaning untouchable, impure, and pagan, and implying caution. 363

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Fig. 3.4. The Roma – a population previously rooted in Europe

Fig. 3.4 above represents the reasoning about the territory and its relationship with the Roma population, its appearance in Europe, the original nomadism, its causes, and its directions of movement. Analysing

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the map, we notice that the Roma’s current situation in Europe is the result of their extended existence here. Although a series of discourses launch the idea that the Roma are nomads, the geopolitical analysis shows us that, starting from the sixteenth century, there is a process of sedentariness (forced or voluntary) and, at the EU level, we are currently referring to the Roma’s mobility (and not their migration) as European citizens, and respectively their transnational European minority. In arguing this position, from a local analysis perspective, the policymakers point out the existence of illegal camps and social-inclusion issues to promote and spread the idea that the Roma are alien to the European culture (which is completely untrue), and the plea to the Roma’s past history brings counterarguments in this respect. We can speak of cultural differences (which turns them into a visible minority within the society), but in this aspect a significant percentage are well-integrated socially (and even assimilated), not using their language or dress code. We see (analysing the first Roma historical documentation) that the first wave of Roma that reached Europe in the fourteenth century in the Balkan Peninsula continued to spread, migrating towards Central Europe, the Iberian Peninsula, and the Scandinavian countries, in the sixteenth century reaching Russia, and Siberia in 1721. The reasons why the Roma continued their migration from one European area to another are manifold, ranging from lifestyle practices and trades which made travelling necessary, moving from interdictions, interstate military conflicts, pandemics, and the migration from the rural to the urban areas in search of a better life. Concerning this first wave, the anonymous Chronicle of Bologna,365 July 18, 1422, remains a first-hand document attesting to the Roma presence and distribution in Europe. 365

“A duke named Andre arrived at Bologna from Egypt, with women, children and men from his country, and there were about one hundred people. Rejecting the Christian faith, the duke was banished by the Hungarian King from his lands. As a result, he told the king that he wished to turn to the Christian faith and was baptized with many others, about 4,000 of his people. Those who did not want to be baptized were killed. After the Hungarian king captured and re-baptized them, he ordered them to wander into the world for seven years and address the Pope in Rome. Then, they could return. When they arrived in Bologna, it had already been five years and more than half of them were dead. It seems that they had a decree from the Hungarian king, who was also an Emperor, which allowed them, during these seven years, to steal from whatever place they went, without being punished. Arriving at Bologna, they settled inside and outside the Galluera gate and slept under porticoes, except for the duke, who was living at the king’s inn. They stayed in Bologna for fifteen days. Lots of people went to see them, for the duke’s wife, who was said to have known how to read the destiny, to predict the future, to guess

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The deportation and expulsions from France, Portugal, England, and Spain pushed the “gypsy migration” towards Africa and America366 during the seventeenth century. The first migration wave was followed by others (from the sixteenth until the nineteenth centuries), alongside the beginning of a settling process, initially in the rural areas where the Roma could practice some of their traditional trades (blacksmithing, craftsmanship, seasonal agricultural work), and eventually in the urban areas. In the Balkans, during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, they represented the “administrative, military and economic system of the Empire.”367 Aside from the size of these migration waves, it is important to observe their effects on the migrators and the European society as a whole (this time we will refer to authorities and institutions, as presented in the citizens’ reaction above). Considered intruders within the societies that the state and church tried to organize and control, the Roma rapidly drew dislike and rejection, which took various forms, from residence or professional practice prohibition, crossroads placards with suggestive images and messages, to prison, deportation, or the death penalty, all within those “pagan (gypsy)368 hunts” (organized in Switzerland,369 Holland, and Jutland). In France the Bohemians’ situation was similar and they were forbidden to use this name, while the penalties varied from exile and galley slavery for men, to hospitalization and head shaving for women and children. In Wallachia and Moldavia370 they experienced slavery until the nineteenth century, also known as social leprosy, this being different from

the present and a woman’s number of children, qualities and other things. She told the truth about many things.” Liegeois, Romii în Europa, 17. 366 Ibid., 19. 367 Ibid., 19. 368 Ibid., 97. 369 Decision no. 13 of Berne, in 1727, proposed as punishment: “the cutting off an ear of both men and women, gypsies over the age of 15, if they are caught for the first time … but if the same people were caught for the second time, they would receive the death penalty.” Liegeois, Romii în Europa, 98. 370 An important element is the fact that the Roma were free people when they arrived in Wallachia, Moldavia, and Transylvania, then became slaves in the former two as noted by Petre PetcuĠ: “Upon arrival in Wallachia, the Roma were free people who left the Balkan Peninsula … there was a time when they could move freely and settle wherever they wanted, in Wallachia and in Moldavia, after which they were enslaved … [and in Transylvania] the Roma were not slaves … Roma slaves were only found in the Făgaraú land, which was temporarily ruled by

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the other forms of servitude like serfdom, rumânia (Wallachia), or vecinia (Moldavia). The slaves were not considered human beings but objects that could be weighted, sold, or bought. The masters’ abuses of the slaves371 were usual practices in those times, becoming recurrent themes in the 1848 literature, together with the romantic image of the Roma: V. Alecsandri, “The History of a Penny and a Dime”, C. Bolliac, “A Letter,” “The Daughter of the Master and the Daughter of the Gypsy,” and “The Sold Gypsy,” Ion Agârbiceanu, “The Pharaohs,” M. Sadoveanu, “The Well Among the Poplars,” M. Eliade “With the Gypsy Girls,” and V. Voiculescu “Sakuntala.” According to Basil, the ruler of Moldavia’s Code, there are references regarding the treatments and punishments372 the slaves were subjected to. The Roma emancipation (1856) occurred in the context of the enlightened influences brought by the Romanian intellectuals who had studied within the major European universities and were conquered by the Western European liberal ideals. Under the influence of the Enlightenment, the first preoccupations for the Roma history and the ethnic identity-construction process appeared. With the abolition of Wallachian lords.” See Istoria úi tradiĠiile minorităĠii romani [The History and Traditions of the Romani Minority] (Bucharest, Sigma PH., 2005), 44. 371 Among the abuses we can mention are: child selling, parents’ separation from children, spouses’ separation, masters’ sexual abuses of girls, child labour, violence, and torture. During the speech “Dezrobirea Ġiganilor, útergerea privilegiilor boiereúti, emanciparea Ġăranilor” [“The Gypsy Manumission, the Annulment of the Landlords’ Privileges, the Peasant Emancipation”], at the Solemn Assembly of the Romanian Academy celebrating twenty-five years since its founding, on April 1–3, 1891, M. Kogălniceanu recalled some of the ill treatment applied to the slaves in Wallachia, referring to the scenes witnessed on the streets in Iaúi: “when I was younger, I saw in the streets of Iaúi human beings wearing chains on their hands or legs, some even bearing iron horns hanging on their foreheads and tied with strings around the neck. Cruel beatings, condemnation to starvation and smoke, detainment in private prisons, thrown naked in the snow or frozen rivers, alas the fate of the forlorn gypsies! Then the disregard for the family sanctity and ties. The woman, taken away from her man, the girl kidnapped from her parents, the children snatched from their mothers and scattered and separated from one another, and sold like cattle to distinguished customers, in the four corners of Romania. Neither humanity, nor religion, not even the civil law could protect these miserable beings; it was a great, outrageous show …,” to justify the emergency for the abolition of such a denigrating practice concerning the human condition. 372 Cathy O’Grady and Daniela Tarnovschi, “Minoritatile din Europa de Sud-Est Romii din România” [“Minorities in Southeastern Europe – Roma in Romania”], Center for Documentation and Information on Minorities in South-Eastern Europe (CEDIMR-SE), 4, http://www.policy.hu/flora/romii.htm.

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slavery there came a new wave of migrations from the Romanian lands towards Western Europe and America. What are the reasons behind this systematic rejection? If the Catholic Church (mainly in Italy during the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries) rejected them because of their lifestyle (as nomads and pagans) and the practice of witchcraft and magic, the actions taken by the state’s authorities were preventive, as is evident from this statement from a magistrate of Strasbourg at the beginning of the nineteenth century: “I have no information for crimes against these individuals, but the situation is of such nature that they should necessarily be tempted to commit them, if they had the chance … They cannot be other than dangerous.”373 The climax of these rejections was during the interwar period, when they were confined to prisons or put into internment camps (Dachau, AuschwitzBirkenau, and Buchenwald in Germany and Russia). See for example the testimonial of a Rom from ConstanĠa, whose family was deported to Russia: In the autumn of 1941, around September, a group of gendarmes came and took all the Gypsies in the village of Plopeni, county of ConstanĠa. It happened late at night. Without telling us why or where they were taking us, we were boarded into trucks and taken to the gendarmerie headquarters in ConstanĠa. Here, we were held for about 3–4 days, during which many other gypsies were brought from all over Dobrogea, after which we were all taken by trucks to the railway depot in ConstanĠa. They boarded us in animal wagons, ignoring all children, women or families. The night we were picked up by the gendarmes, my mother and father were not able to take anything from the house (as every gypsy family had a few gold coins and many other things). After we boarded the wagons, the train started to move and 5–6 days later, it stopped somewhere on a field, and the Romanian gendarmes that were escorting us told us we could get off. They opened the wagon doors and many gypsies got off, hoping they would escape. They started to run, but then the gendarmes opened fire with their machine guns and killed dozens if not hundreds of gypsies. Our family, actually our kin, for all of them were living in Plopeni, did not get off, as my grandmother managed to take a gold necklace from the house and bribed a Romanian soldier who told us not to. That’s how we escaped the Romanian soldiers’ bullets. The train moved again and after a day on the road, we were detained on a field, near Coronica, county of Oceakov. From the field we were taken on foot for about 5 km to some barns where we were told that we would be remain until the end of the war. The living conditions there were awful, the fed us raw corn or potatoes. We stayed in Coronica approx. 2 years, after which we were moved to other 373

Liegeois, Romii în Europa, 99.

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Chapter Three establishments such as Nicolaev Asinova, near Savran, Grigorovca Tighina, Tiraspol. We returned to Romania in late 1945. I must mention, that while we were in the Russian camps, many gypsies had died, women were dishonoured by the security Romanian soldiers. When we returned to Romania, there was nothing left from my family’s household.374

Due to the impact of the Holocaust (in Romani – Projamos, Samudaripen) on the public opinion and international actors, through the magnitude and cruelty of the actions, the Roma leaders use it in their mobilizing speeches as a benchmark to exemplify the atrocities that the Roma were subjected to (on their way towards modernization and building the group identity) and “to instill a sense of guilt in the European and national societies.”375 At the opposite side of the rejection is the Roma incarceration, namely the forced and usually violent integration into the society by denying all of the group’s characteristics and adopting a new lifestyle imposed by the state (such actions could be seen in Romania during Communism). The Imperial Ordinance Preamble submitted by Charles III in 1783 perfectly summarizes this policy: “I declare that all those who are called Gitanos or entitle themselves as such, are neither through their origin, nor through nature and do not come from any bad root. Given this, I order that each and every one of them should stop using the language, clothing or wandering lifestyle they followed until now.”376 The choice of actions taken to the extreme (total rejection – incarceration by total denial of cultural, social, and economic differences) reveals a weakness of the state in relation to the migratory groups of Roma, seen as ideologist disturbers and potential threats to the social organization. A state that wanted to be powerful, and capable of controlling and overpowering its citizen, reveals its weaknesses through its inability to assimilate a group of nomads “like no other. It has no land, no history, no religion and no code whatsoever … [for which] authority, law, rule, principles, duty, obligation are unacceptable notions and concepts.”377 374

Interview with Mr. Mielu Irimia, Sinaia, August 25, 2013. Marian Zăloagă, “Între imagistică, cercetarea istoriografică úi politică.TradiĠii moderne úi paradigme postmoderne în enunĠarea etnicităĠii Ġiganului/romului” [“Between Imagery, Historiographical Research and Politics: Modern Traditions and Postmodern Paradigms in Stating the Gypsy/Rom’s Ethnicity”], in Rom sau ğigan: dilemele unui etnonim în spaĠiul românesc [Rom or Gypsy: the Dilemmas of an Ethnonym in Romania], edited by István Horváth and Lucian Nastasă (ClujNapoca: Institute for Research on National Minorities Issues PH, 2012), 128. 376 Liegeois, Romii în Europa, 109. 377 Criúan, ğiganii-mit úi realitate, 28. 375

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Such an example is the assimilation policy initiated during the Communist period. In Romania, under the pretext of creating a homogenous Romanian society and the unique model of the socialist worker, the Communist Party covered the desire to eliminate ethnic minorities, mainly the Roma, who were considered foreign elements characterized by a culture of underdevelopment and poverty,378 trying to Romanize them. In Czechoslovakia, beginning in April 1958, the Communist Party launched the gypsy assimilation policy through a document entitled “The Gypsy Issue.” The author of the study considered the complete assimilation of the gypsies379 “as the only way they can recover their cultural and social retrogression, because according to its research they alone are not capable to adapt to the requirements of the new socialist society.” The cruelty of the actions taken against the Roma was justified by the state through the creation of distorted images of the Roma (e.g. disease carriers, nomads, social misfits, plague of society), which were then generalized for the entire group. One of the Roma communities’ answers to this persecution was the practice of nomadism, or travelling.380 Nomadism (which, contrary to subjective and superficial beliefs, is not an element of social misfits) had been practiced in various historical periods and has remained so until now, with a double purpose: circumstantial and structural. From the Roma identity construction point of view, nomadism has a double role of identification (the Roma community assumes a tradition, which differentiates it in relation to the majority population) and hetero-identification (stereotype, a negative image381 among the majority population which considers this practice suspicious): “Nomadism, as a condemnable

378

Pons, ğiganii din România, 28. Hana, Šebková, “Camarade tsigane!” Communications 55 (1992): 187–94, http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/comm_05888018_1992_num_55_1_1843. 380 Due to the nomadic lifestyle and improvised housing (carts, caravans), the Roma have, over the years, drawn the suspicion and criticism from the majority population, for which the dwelling is a place of inviolable reference, an element reinforcing the status in society. 381 The negative perceptions regarding nomadism appeared with the first migratory wave in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, when the groups of nomads settled at the outskirts of towns near forests, places that according to the local folklore were sinister and mystical, ruled by evil spirits, where wild animals lived and witchcraft was practiced. 379

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lifestyle and manifestation of the asocial, has been maintained for centuries as a trait of marginality.”382 The circumstantial nomadism had external causes, events “produced by others: the exclusion or, conversely, the confinement (slavery, prison, various prohibitions),”383 elements that led to the appearance and development of flexibility (the ability to adapt to different conditions) within the Roma community. Delia Grigore considers travelling “an existential alternative, under conditions of marginalization and exclusion.”384 Nomadism was often “a survival strategy,”385 both in terms of preserving ethnic identity against the assimilation policies, and from an economic point of view, travelling being a necessity in most traditional professions practiced by the Roma. This led to the structural nomadism, practiced for economic reasons, due to traditional professions (trade, seasonal work, bear trainers, witchcraft, artisans, silversmiths, horse salesmen, musicians), and for social reasons (the desire to meet with other Roma groups, reuniting families, social organization, facilitating socialization for marriage purposes, and, more recently, attending religious events – especially among the Roma Pentecostal386 movement). The UK is currently one of the few European countries (as well as France with the “gens du voyage”) where an overwhelming traditional Roma population maintains the itinerant387 lifestyle, organized in caravans, with long periods of camping in order to trade, practice certain seasonal work, and facilitate the children’s access to education. “Nomadism, like sedentariness, is the circumstantial manner of exploiting the available resources, conditioned by flexibility, the fundamental engine of the Roma society.”388

382

Bronislav Geremek, “Marginalul” [“The Marginal”], in Omul Medieval [The Medieval Man], edited by J.le Goff (Iaúi: Poliron PH., 1999), 320. 383 Grigore and Sarău, Istorie úi tradiĠii rome, 34. 384 Liegeois, Romii în Europa, 22. 385 Ibid. 386 Details about the “Roma Pentecostal movement” in Régis Laurent, “Les Missions Tsiganes Itinérantes (MTI): Un service de prestation sociale totale ou une nouvelle frontière?” E-migrinter-Rroms et Gens du voyage, no. 6 (2010) (revue en ligne) ISSN: 1961-9685, p. 65–72, http://www.mshs.univ-poitiers.fr/migrinter/emigrinter/201006/e-migrinter2010_06_002.pdf. 387 ROMANINET, 13. 388 Alain Reynolds, Tsiganes: Identite, Evolution (Paris: Syros Alternatives, 1984), 85.

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The extent and consequences of the new Roma migratory waves in the 1960s, and the 1990s after the fall of Communism (“the third wave”389), have converted the “Roma issue” from a European preoccupation into a transatlantic one due to the significant number of Roma emigrating to America, especially North America. The reasons for these migration waves diversify due to the events that took place in the international arena in this period: the alteration in the states’ borders after the two world wars (the disappearance of the empires, the emergence of national states, territorial reorganizations); deportations during the Second World War; the economic changes that led to migration from the rural to the urban areas or even from Eastern Europe to Western Europe or the United States (the famine in Ireland from the middle of the nineteenth century pushed them to emigrate to the US), in search of greater gains by diversifying the market and clients. During the migration period, the Roma’s status varied significantly from one state to another, or depending on the political or military context that determined their travelling actions, the manner in which they travelled (individually or in groups, some being nomads, others refugees, asylum solicitants, stateless, and with temporary residence), but also due to the emergence of the first forms of organization in the Roma community (initially at a local level, then national and international) for the protection of the ethnic identity and cultural promotion (associations, publications, and NGOs).

389

The first Roma migration wave occurred from their appearance in Europe until the end of the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth centuries when they reached the distant Siberia and were also found on other continents. A second great wave occurred at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, mostly due to manumission but also the geopolitical changes happening on the European continent, especially as a consequence of the First World War and the empires’ dissolution. The third great migratory wave also occurred in the context of some major geopolitical changes in twentieth-century Europe, respectively the Second World War, the Holocaust, and then the fall of Communism and the new political world order. At present, following the two expansion waves of the EU (2004 and 2007) towards the former Communist states, we have witnessed a new migratory Roma wave, important not only through its magnitude but also its European visibility at political, economic, and media levels.

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3.3.2. Leaders, Roma organizations, and the “identity political project” Regarding the Roma identity construction, the element capable of uniting and giving meaning to ethnic affiliation is not the distant past, but the homogenization of the elites’ discourse based on the negative-relative criteria which presents the Roma community in comparison with the majority population, emphasizing the elements that differentiate them from the others (a systematically marginalized community with subsistence economic practices and a limited access to resources and services). The first appearance of the Roma leaders (appointed or selfproclaimed) at the top of certain organized groups must be sought during the migration period. The fifteenth and sixteenth-century documents record the presence of nomad groups led by counts, warlords, dukes, and lords in various parts of Europe. These leaders represented the interface between the migratory group and the local authorities in terms of residence and camping space, including some financial or material benefits. “The self-proclaimed kings’ Utopia” is another common aspect among the traditional Roma groups. This phenomenon is not new, even if it increased, at least in Romania, after the fall of Communism, when the media started promoting the events and activities organized by King Ion Cioabă390 (then by his follower Florin Tănase Cioabă391) or Emperor Iulian Rădulescu.392

390

Ion Cioabă was a Roma leader in Romania until 1989, then the self-proclaimed “international king of the Roma” from 1992, who participated in the first and third world Romani congresses (London 1971 and Gottingen 1981). Since 1980, according to certain documents of the NCSSA, he collaborated with the Securitate, and after the fall of Communism was part of the first post-revolutionary law (until May 20, 1990), together with other two Roma: Nicolae Bobu and Szomantz Petre, the latter withdrawing before elections, being replaced by Octavian Stoica. He died from a heart attack in 1997. 391 Florin Tănase Cioabă was the son of Ion Cioabă, who after the death of his father in 1997 inherited the title of “king of the gypsies everywhere.” Between 1996 and 2000 he was a county counsellor in Sibiu. He was a Roma leader, actively involved in preserving the Roma traditions and culture (including early age marriage, for example the marriage of his twelve-year-old daughter Ana-Maria Cioabă in 2003, which drew the attention of the international press not only to the family but also the traditional practices that are still maintained by the coppersmith community in Romania), as well as the Gypsy Court, the “Kris” for the settlement of disputes in the community. He was elected president of the IRU at the Eighth

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The roots of this myth should be sought at the dawn of the Roma migration to Europe, when the presence of certain nomad groups’ leaders, lords, dukes, warlords, and kings imposed an attitude of respect from their peers. The importance of this phenomenon is not negligible, and neither are their requests in the twentieth century, when in countries like France or Germany coronation festivities (symbolic activities) occurred. In the context of the identity political project, the presence of a “king” (who wanted international recognition by being crowned in the presence of other heads of the state), together with the claim of a territory for the founding of a state where the Roma could settle, drew the attention of the international public opinion and media to the problems this group deals with. The interwar period – a gloomy page in Roma history, marked by right-wing extremism, which culminated with the deportations of the 1940s – represents the beginning of the structured movement for Roma emancipation, with the founding of the first associations and publications. The Second World War and the Holocaust slowed this process, but it resumed in the 1950s with a “boom” in Roma associations all over Europe, and since then the number and variety of activity domains have been in continuous growth. Nowadays, the impressive number of Roma organizations in the international public space (no European country is without Roma organizations or organizations advocating for their rights) led to a decrease in the credibility of their goal and actions. Simultaneously with the emergence of Roma organizations, the events organized by them at an international level multiplied (in 1971 the first World Romani Congress took place in London). But let’s go back to the beginning of the Roma organization on the Romanian territory. In the 1930s there was a Roma integration process, focusing on those elements (nomadism, education, religion, and history) that were considered controversial in the group identity construction process. In 1926 the first local Roma organization Clabor was founded in Făgăraú. The first newspaper, Gypsy Nation, also appeared in the same period. In March 1933 the General Association of Gypsies in Romania was created in World Romani Congress held in Romania, Sibiu, in 2013. He died on August 18, 2013. 392 Iulian Rădulescu became the self-proclaimed “Emperor of Roma everywhere” in 1993. In the spirit of the self-proclaimed Roma kings of the twentieth century, who requested land for the foundation of a gypsy state, a symbolic territory, he too issued a decree to create the first Roma State in Târgu-Jiu, a symbolic territory. The Romanian authorities did not respond to this request.

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Bucharest393 by Călinic I. Popp-ùerbănoiu. The association program addressed the problems of the Roma in an integrated manner, ranging from adult literacy, helping poor students with books and food,394 actions for the recovery and spread of books on Roma history and culture, the founding of kindergartens, schools, universities, museums, libraries, hospitals, hostels, cafeterias, workshops where the Roma could work, newspapers, the colonization of all nomadic Roma, and the establishment of a supreme council of the elders to resolve various Roma disputes (similar to the Kris).395 One of the members of this association, G. A. Lăzurică, left the organization and created the General Union of Roma in Romania (GURR), whose media tool between 1934 and 1941 was The Voice of Roma in Bucharest and O Rom in Craiova (September to October 1934). The union was placed under the protection of the Patriarch of Romania,396 which was also one of its main contributors. The social and educational actions,397 speeches on history and religion from an integrative perspective,398 were all meant to fight the stereotype of a heretic Roma and recover their history. The Voice of Roma newspaper’s mission was to support the Roma identity construction project by advocating their history, replacing the word “gypsy” with “Rom” and making the distinction between slavery and marginalization, and the Roma’s development and reconstruction present, as shown in an article from the first issue of the newspaper: “The emancipation and revival of all Roma in Romania, in the social, cultural, moral, economic and spiritual domain … The time for the emancipation and revival of the Roma people has come.”399 393

Liegeois, Romii în Europa, 188. Mariana Buceanu, Gelu Duminică, Manual Integrat Incluziunea grupurilor, 66. 395 Ibid. 396 Ibid. 397 The association’s mission targeted youth education, the improvement of young talents, the foundation of schools, cafeterias, cooperatives, the promotion of Christian values, the control of begging, cohabitation, the organization of conferences, and publishing books on Roma history. 398 Florin Manole, “Perspective Istorice Comparate” [“Comparative Historical Perspectives”], in Rom sau ğigan: dilemele unui etnonim în spaĠiul românesc [Rom or Gypsy: the Dilemmas of an Ethnonym in Romania], edited by István Horváth and Lucian Nastasă (Cluj-Napoca: Institute for Research on National Minorities Issues PH, 2012), 147. 399 “FraĠi Romi” [“Roma Brothers”], in Glasul Romilor [The Voice of Roma], year I, no. 1, November 1–15, 1934, p. 1; Manole, “Perspective Istorice Comparate,” 147. 394

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In 1948 the association was officially dissolved and the Roma associations and profile publications’ activity was suspended until after the fall of Communism. In the same period, Roma organizations, commissions, counsels, publications, and unions were also founded in other European states, from Russia to the UK, Spain, and Ireland.400 The magnitude of this phenomenon shows a systematization of the Roma movement towards achieving an identity-construction project, with the international affirmation and recognition of Roma as a minority and the assertion on the European political agenda. For this and for a greater visibility at a European level, starting from 1971, world romani congresses were organized periodically (see Fig. 3.1 for details). These congresses were preceded by the founding in 1967 of the International Gypsy Committee (later, after the first congress, the International Roma Committee), which represented the bond and catalyst for the international actions of various local and national Roma organizations. The organization of the First World Romani Congress in London, April 8–12, 1971 and the international reunion of a considerable number of Roma organizations were first steps in the Roma identity political project, proving that in spite of being spread across all the states of Europe, bearing different names, and lacking a common language or religion, the Roma had the same goal – to be recognized in the international arena as a powerful ethnic minority, a force able to organize and defend its own interests in relation to the national and international institutions. The first congress was held under the slogan “The Roma people have the right to seek their own path to progress,”401 united in a single political project, even if the Roma community is not monolithic and each group scattered across Europe and the world is proud of its particular characteristics that individualize it in the community, taken as a whole. Similar to the formal elements of the European political project, visual Roma identity elements are adopted internationally, namely the anthem “Gelem, Gelem”402 (“We Walk, We Walk”) and the Romani flag. Also, the delegates rejected the terms “zigeuner, gypsie, gypsy” and decided on 400

For details about the organizations founded, and the divisions and unions made during this period in various European states, see “Roma Organizations” in Liegeois, Romii în Europa. 401 Liegeois, Romii în Europa, 193. 402 “Gelem, Gelem” is song written for a Serbian folklore melody, officially launched in 1967 on the soundtrack of the Yugoslavian film I Even Met Happy Gypsies.

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the term “Rom,” both designating the organizations in the official documents and in the relation with other institutions to refer to the ethnics of this group. The five courses of action, drawn up by the five commissions created during the congress (culture, education, linguistic problems, the study of war crimes with a focus on the Holocaust, and social problems), mark a prioritization of the problem the Roma community deals with at an international level to develop action strategies in partnership with other international organizations such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and the EU (the European Community at the time). Through the thematic, geographic area of the participants and the problematization, this first congress “levelled the path towards lobby and negotiation in the Romani issue with and within the European community.”403 For the first time, the concept of nation was discussed at the Roma elite level in addition to its traditional elements, and the features that individualized the Romani nation concept were also addressed. The common origin, the Holocaust experience, and the social status within various European communities offered the Roma diaspora a sense of belonging to a Romani nation. For various Roma leaders, the idea of a Romani nation became a benchmark in the political activism, a broader (international) political framework that could address the Roma issues. In the same train of thought, the Roma intellectuals took this idea, arguing in favour of a “nonterritorial,” “transnational,” or “truly European” people404 in an attempt to draw the attention of the European academia (and implicitly the political environment) to the difficult and questionable situation faced by the Roma ethnics. The success, full media coverage, and significant number of participants at the First World Roma Congress galvanized the leaders and imposed the continuation of this activity at an international level, and on April 8–11, 1978 at Geneva the second World Romani Congress took place. Following this, the International Roma Committee became the Romani Union (also known as the International Roma Union), an organization that would “carry out actions at the United Nations Economic and Social Council”405 to achieve the objectives set by the participants.

403

Nicolae Gheorghe and Andrezej Mirga, “Rromii in secolul XXI: Document de lucrupentru o politicapublica” [“Roma in the Twenty-first Century: Work Document for a Public Policy”], Rromathan Studii despre rromi [Rromathan Studies on Roma] 1, no. 2 (1997): 12. 404 Ibid., 12. 405 Ibid., 194.

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The main point of discussion at the third World Congress was the Roma Holocaust and its effects and consequences, possibly because the event took place in Gottingen, Germany, on May 16–20, 1981. The fourth Congress, April 8–11, 1990, was held in an Eastern European country for the first time, and the former Communist countries also sent delegates. The congress marked the entry into a new stage of international Roma community organization with the enlargement towards new organizations in the former Communist states, which in addition to a considerable number of delegates brought into discussion the problems Roma were facing in Central and Eastern European countries, after a long period in which the Communist Party had denied their existence as a minority, with a history and a culture. The status of the Roma organization internationally at the end of the twentieth century was consolidated not only as a result of individual actions, but also due to the initiation of a collaboration with other international institutions active in the human and minority rights domain, such as the UN, the EU, or the OSCE. The capacity for international organization, the setting of common policies, and the enhanced visibility of lobbying made the International Roma Union a discussion partner viable for the drawing up of common courses of action for the Roma in politics. In 1992 the European Council, through the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, recognized the Romani language as a non-territorial language, together with Yiddish. Another important moment for the Romani movement in Europe was represented by the Brussels Declaration in 1996, when the Roma were identified as a truly European minority. The two courses of action at the fifth World Romani Congress in Prague in 2000 were: the establishment of the International Romani Union Roma Parliament,406 but most importantly the official launch of the identity political project – a non-territorial Romani nation. This moment marks the transformation of the desideratum into reality, the Roma identity project turning into a transnational action with political stakes in which NGOs represented the first aspect. The favourable international context and Roma visibility due to a new migration wave (the consequence of the fall of Communism) put pressure on the Roma organizations, forcing a common and coherent reply to compensate for the lack of experience in the European games of power.

406

Ibid., 195.

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Since the beginning of the Roma movement at an international level, the international organizations and European Roma forums have played the most important role in the introduction of Roma issues to the European agenda, showing sensitivity, coherence, and vision, unlike the national community leaders and policymakers. In the context of increased attention from the international actors, the next two world romani congresses were organized at Lanciano, Italy, in 2004 and Zagreb in October 2008. On April 7–8, 2013 the Eighth World Romani Congress was organized in Sibiu, Romania by Florin Cioabă. In the context of the European Romanian Roma situation, the organization of this international event, with more than thirty-five countries (including representatives from India, Australia, and the US) was a good opportunity to reconsider the Roma situation at the international level with a special focus on social integration. The magnitude, topics covered, number of participants, and full media coverage transformed these congresses into a benchmark for the Roma NGOs throughout Europe and beyond. After the fall of Communism, the activity of the Roma NGOs in Eastern and Southeastern Europe intensified, extending towards previously unexplored fields of intervention. The Roma women’s movement took shape in this period, and with the occasion of the international meetings presented the Roma women’s status on the labour market and their access to services and education, suggesting integrated plans of action for the improvement of the situation. The democratic system created the general context necessary for the emergence, development, and diversification of the Roma organizations in the former Communist states, favouring a broad approach of wide political, social, economic, and security action on the problems that the Roma community were dealing with, at the end of a century marked by extreme action against them, from deportation to assimilation. The leaders’ reply was prompt and generalized, identifying the need for the significant presence of Roma organizations in the national and international public space, through not only cultural manifestations, international meetings, and the publication of newsletters, but also the presence at the negotiation table, in the work committees, with the need identification and development of public policies in the fields of education and culture.

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The emergence and development of the Roma NGOs also represent a “protection mechanism”407 against the majority populations and show a growth in the international Roma movement. Although we cannot talk about a concerted position of the Roma NGOs in Europe, as each has its own agenda and dynamics, the visibility and work done by these cause a transformation of the “Roma issue” on the European actors’ agenda. In Romania, from 1990 until today, the number of the Roma NGOs and those which focus their activity on improving the Roma situation is over one hundred, among which are: the Pro-Europe Roma Party Association408 (founded in 1990, currently with a representative in the Romanian Parliament, Mr. Nicolae Păun); the Together Agency; the Amare Romentza Center, Sastipen; the Florists’ Association, and the Association of the Roma craftsmen in Romania.409 The power of these organizations does not reside in their large number only, but also in the work performed nationally and internationally for the improvement of the Roma situation by promoting the culture and traditions, facilitating the access to resources and education, and by supporting the “identity political project.” With the increasing number of NGOs the addressed issues also diversified, and the exchange of good practices determined an integrated approach to the identity political project in a hostile international context due to the imposition of the “Roma issue” on the European public agenda at the beginning of the twenty-first century as a political stake in the enlargement versus European integration debate context. The great number of NGOs has also led to the diversification of their actions, with a clear propensity for the non-violent forms, appealing in terms of content, and with immediate effects (of awareness) for the majority-minority relationship but also the state institutions levels. In this category fall cultural and artistic activities (aiming to promote culture and traditions, in order to facilitate their acknowledgement among the majority population) such as music, dancing, poetry, painting, and acting. These 407

Liegeois, Romii în Europa, 200. Registered under the Act no. 12/1924: Legea Asociatiilor si Fundatiilor [The Association and Foundation Law], the Roma Party is not a political party, but an NGO, which, during general-election periods, is compared to one. 409 A complete list of the Roma associations in every European country is not available. Making one would imply a great number of actors and require continuous updating given that the number of Roma NGOs is constantly growing, while some remain only on paper and other older ones have concluded their activity. A list of the Roma organizations in the EU member states can be found in ROMANITET, 29–44. 408

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activities that generally inspire appreciation and value of the majority populations (that Roma come into contact with) have raised the Roma art to a level of information, acknowledgement, and acceptance. The political action carried out by the Roma NGOs and political leaders is sustained by the cultural and artistic action in a favourable context created by the “Internet effect,” thus allowing for the dissemination of Roma initiatives worldwide. The development and diversification of the Roma organizations’ actions (in various fields, from the economic to the political, cultural, and educational) show a real tendency to adapt to the environment in which they develop and also a constructive response to the interactions with the majority populations. Given the marginalization, exclusion, and discrimination conditions, the Roma leaders and organizations are the ones standing up and proposing constructive solutions by means of the elements that identify and at the same time differentiate the Roma population within the society – culture and customs. The political manifestations of the Roma leaders, the position regarding cases of discrimination, “make way to a declared and assumed Roma identity,”410 which, in the current European political-identity context, mark the assumption of the existence and development of the Roma identity project at a transnational level. The Roma visibility in Europe is not due to their impressive number at a European level (about twelve million), but their image which is either connected to the eroded folklore (the romantic image of the gypsy girl, the caravans, the nomadic myth) or the customs and traditions that individualize them within the society (the music, clothes, the Kris, their traditional professions, and the memory of important moments in life).

3.3.3. Roma customs and traditions “A gypsy is the road: he lives the same life anywhere in the world … for the Roma, music is the life … we cannot talk about their history without music, as there are two things that define the Gypsies: music and rejection. The music is them. Rejection is the others.”411 Starting from this short but meaningful description of the Roma’s life made by Tony Gatlif during an interview about the film Latcho Drom, as well as the context of a distorted image about Roma in Europe (see Cordelia Bonal’s article in the Libération), a short review of the main elements that make up the 410 411

Liegeois, Romii în Europa, 204. Ibid., 74.

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Romanipen412 and mark the important moments in the life of the Roma (the Romani spirit – tradition, law, culture, and customs) are considered important for our approach. The Romani culture is organized around the opposition pure versus impure (Ujo versus Mahrime) with a double dimension of spiritual and physical, in which the former is the cause and effect of complying with the latter. This duality is reflected in reference to the human body (the upper side is pure, the head representing “luck” and “honour,”413 and from the waist down is the impure side, which is why it is always covered), also extending to the traditional costume that cannot be composed of a single piece and especially the key moments marking the traditional Roma family’s existence: birth, marriage, baptism, and death. At the centre of the traditional Roma social life is the family (the fundamental value of the Roma culture), in the sense of social solidarity within the group – the community family.414 A community family’s stability is given by the solidarity between its members and respect for the role of each individual. The man is the head of the family and defender of its reputation. The woman, the “conservative element,”415 is characterized by the education of the new generations and the preservation of traditions. An important element that strengthens the family, restating its prestige and morality, is the birth of the first child (the bride’s virginity being equally important). In Portugal, the first child marks the man’s recognition by the community, the consolidation of his status, but also the getting away of the daughter-in-law from the mother-in-law’s strict control.416 There is no strict control exercised upon the child, but rather a group control that allows them to develop a personal initiative as an integrating part for the social family’s activities and decisions. In the traditional communities there is an interdependent bond between the community family (in terms of social cohesion), the group’s security (provided through the perpetuation of values and traditions), and the children’s education.

412

Romanipen – the system of norms and fundamental values for the intra-ethnic identity, enshrined within the traditional rural communities (and less in the urban areas, where, due to cohabitation with the majority population, certain customs have been lost to others taken from the majority). This system of values is neither taught nor learnt, but inherited. 413 Grigore and Sarău, Istorie úi tradiĠii rome, 39. 414 Ibid., 39. 415 Liegeois, Romii în Europa, 63. 416 ROMANITET, 14.

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The family is based on two fundamental values: phralipe, referring to mutual help and collective responsibility within the society, and pakiv, meaning honour, trust, and reconciliation417 that ensures the group’s social cohesion. This cohesion is also maintained through the Kris (“stabor,” or the traditional court), which aims to amicably resolve conflicts by conciliating the parties involved and compensating the injured party. In Romania there are over five hundred “krisnuators”418 who make the Roma law, including Florin Motoi, the president of the Kris Roma European Association, and Dorin Cioabă, who founded a Kris vis-à-vis his palace in Sibiu. The element that individualizes the Roma and made them known in the world is music. Besides the fact that it is the oldest traditional profession, practiced since the Roma’s ancestors were still in India, music is also the bearer of traditions, and the Roma’s element of worldwide assertion. Unlike other traditional Roma crafts (bone and fur processing, horse trading, and bear training), which also named the Roma lineages that did not have a market after economic development, music recorded an upward trend, making the fiddlers popular around the world. Gypsy music is the expression of folklore, carrying life stories; experiences that mark the Roma’s existence from love to hate and from birth to death. The rhythm, melody, and original interpretation of “Gypsy music” left a mark on other music genres such as jazz, bolero, and flamenco, or influenced great composers such as Franz Liszt or Johannes Brahms.419 Django Reinhardt established Gypsy jazz on the European cultural stage. The uniqueness of the music is also due to the Romani language in which it is sung and the folk-music influences of the countries that the Roma have passed through or settled in. Beyond the positive values of the Roma culture, in the majority population’s culture we can find the distorted image of the “Gypsy,” consisting of words of wisdom, sayings, and proverbs whose main actors are the Roma thieves – noisy, immoral, and dirty people who cheat, are asocial, and do not work.420 In times of economic and political crisis, from the collective imagination, they become scapegoats, while the myth of the nomadic, restraint-free, and adventurous life remains in the song lyrics and romantic literature.

417

Grigore and Sarău, Istorie úi tradiĠii rome, 43. Pârvu, “The Gypsy Kris: ‘Ai greúit, ai marcat banu’!” [“You Made a Mistake, You Lost the Cash!”], Evenimentul Zilei [The Daily Event], August 14, 2010. 419 ROMANITET, 27. 420 Liegeois, Romii în Europa, 141. 418

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3.4. Conclusion In the twenty-first century, with the formal entry of the Roma issue on the European political agenda, the number of international organizations of the Roma has increased considerably, but so has the number of problems the community has to deal with. In a globalized world where change has become synonymous with existence, the Roma organizations and international actors have realized the necessity of collaboration, security partnerships, and development. In a full process of “political ethnogenesis” of group identity, the Roma organizations found the necessary resources to deal with their own destiny, initiating dialogue and consultations with the EU states and international organizations, formulating coherent responses to the attacks from the media. The presence of the “Roma issue” on the EU agenda draws not only the attention of the media and the Roma leaders, but also reactions (of empathy or negative) from the member states, and following the “snowball effect” these are replicated and multiplied from one state to another due to the economic and social insecurity marking the beginning of the twentyfirst century. The dilemma that the Roma community must find an answer to now is how to “earn equality (in terms of rights) and still remain different”421 (in terms of culture) in a globalized world where identity borders are more and more porous. The visibility of the Roma issue imposed an integrated response from the international community, which we can generally find in the international law for minorities and in the documents targeting the Roma issue in particular. The analysis of the normative acts concerning the minorities after the Second World War and their situation in different origin and host EU countries is the focus of the next chapter’s analysis.

421

Gheorghe and Mirga, “Rromii in secolul XXI,” 19.

CHAPTER FOUR “L’AFFAIRE DES ROMS” IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: BETWEEN EUROPEAN LEGISLATION AND MEMBER STATES’ CONCERN422

By continuing the enlargement process in 2004 (ten new states) and 2007 with Romania and Bulgaria, the European Union integrated twelve new European states, economies, and cultures, many of them with Communist experiences and problems of minorities. Then, as now, issues like cultural identity, nationalism, autonomy, the relation between majority and minorities, and the relation between international actors, the state, and minorities, represent a problem of security for the European Union in general, and for the member countries in particular. In this chapter we intend to illustrate and analyse the relation of interdependence between two components: identity and security, focusing on international legislation, potential interethnic conflict, and the way in which different aspects of the legislative approach regarding human rights and the protection of national and ethnic minorities influence the relation between the state (majority) and minority (the Roma population, considered here as a non-popular minority) in several Central and Southeastern EU countries. The research questions are related to the impact of the accession criteria on policies for Roma population: How did the accession process influence the legislation on minorities, in general, and the relation between the state (majority) and the minority (considered here as the Roma population) in particular? Were there any important changes in the process of social integration made by these countries due to the fact that they

Parts of this chapter were published as “The Roma minority-the prospects and limits of EU’s Social Policy, what could or should the EU be doing?” in Ethnicity and Intercultural Dialogue at the European Union Eastern Border (Editia revizuita)edited by Mircea Brie, Ioan Horga, Sorin ùipoú (United Kingdom: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013), 498-506. 422

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joined the EU? What was the impact of Roma migration (coming from the new EU countries) on the countries of Western Europe? How did the Western countries react? How did the Roma transform themselves from unwanted immigrants into the most visible minority within the EU? The first part of the research focuses on the international legislation on minorities. Simultaneously, our attention is drawn to the examples given by several Central and Southeastern European countries on the grounds of minority legislation. In this context, the Copenhagen criteria of national minority protection as a condition for candidate states from Central Eastern Europe represent an opportunity for redrawing the political approach towards the Roma issue in this region, implementing new policies before and mostly after they joined the European Union. One can imagine that the constraints (conditionality) imposed by EU on the candidate countries from Central and Southeastern Europe, in our case in the minorities issue, are the “sticks,” and the financial stimuli (preaccession funds, European Social Fund) the “carrots.”423 With regards to the Western European states our attention is drawn to the manner in which they cope with the waves of Roma immigrants from the new member states. Measures taken vary from state to state, depending on the extent of the phenomenon, the immigration-security relationship, the effects on the majority population-immigrants relationship, and media coverage. The states taken into discussion in our analysis are those in which the number of Romanian immigrants (regardless of ethnicity) is large, namely Spain and Italy, the situation in France representing the focus of the subsequent chapter. Our attention will be retained by the manner in which the Romanians’ migration in general and the Roma’s in particular (before and after 2007) was found in the policymakers’ activity (whether we refer to the measures taken by them or the instrumentalization of the phenomenon within election campaigns), and last but not least the way in which it was reflected in the press. The purpose of this analysis among these states is to establish the overall action framework in the EU regarding the management of the Roma issue, considering the origin or host states. If, for the origin states, the main concern is to develop programs and projects to foster the social inclusion of Roma (transnational cooperation or mainly EU-financed programs), in the host states the visibility of the “Roma issue” was an election campaign theme particularly – a “breaking news” subject during 423

The stick and carrot theory is a policy of offering a combination of rewards and punishment to induce behaviour.

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tense moments for the government (in response to the public’s complaints, by identifying them with scapegoats in times of crisis or scandals), or a pretext for the extreme right to manifest in the public space and gain supporters among the population bothered by the visibility (illegal camps/squats), media coverage, and effects of this situation, against the economic crisis and its effects.

4.1. International Legislation and Political Instruments in the Field of Minorities The historical root for international-minority protection goes back to the seventeenth century when the European sovereigns attempted to protect the religious minorities, as religious conflicts became more widespread in many parts of Europe (for example the Treaty of Westphalia 1648, the Treaty of Vienna 1606, and the Treaty of Paris 1763). But only in the nineteenth century, with the rise of nationalism, did the protection of minorities become subject to different multilateral treaties and a real concern for Europe (the starting point was the Final Act from the Congress of Vienna 1815). After the Second World War, the number of normative acts referring to minorities increased, as did the number of conflict situations in different parts of the world and the international actors to tackle them. We can name here some well-known documents like: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights elaborated by the UN in 1948; the Helsinki Final Act (1975); the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (1992); the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (1992); the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1995, Strasbourg); the European Convention on Nationality (November 1977); the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (December 2000); and the Recommendation 1735 (2006). Article 2 from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that: Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set for this declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion or other opinion, national and social origin, property, birth or any other status.424

424

For more details see the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1984), http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/html.

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One of the international actors involved in tackling minority issues is the Council of Europe. The council aims at combatting discrimination, but does not have direct instruments to force the member states to adopt the European norms on the protection of minorities. Protocol No. 12 of the Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted in Rome in 2000, states in Art. 1 that: [T]he enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.425

Thirty-seven states signed this protocol, but in nineteen cases the signing wasn’t followed by ratification.426 Another actor is the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) that illustrates the idea of a pan-European security,427 covering with its member states a great part of Europe. In 1990 the states participating in the OSCE Copenhagen Conference elaborated a document that condemns “racial and ethnic hatred, antiSemitism, xenophobia and discrimination,” including the particular problem of the Roma (para. 40).428 This commitment was renewed several times on different occasions, such as the Geneva Report on National Minorities or the Moscow Conference, both in 1991. The 1999 Istanbul Summit declaration states that: we will reinforce our efforts to ensure that Roma and Sinti are able to play a full and equal part in our societies and to eradicate discrimination against them.429

425

Protocol No. 12 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/177.htm. 426 More information about signatory countries on the Council of Europe home page: chart of signatures and ratifications of Treaty 177, Protocol No. 12 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=177&CM =&DF=&CL=ENG. 427 Victor-Yves Ghebali, L’OSCE dans l’Europe post-communiste. Vers une identité paneuropéenne de securité (Bruxelles: Etablissement Emile Bruylant, 1996). 428 Council of Europe: Commissioner for Human Rights, Recent Migration of Roma in Europe, December 10, 2008, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a703c2a2.html. 429 Ibid.

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In 1992, at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (in Helsinki), an instrument to prevent conflicts was created, which was totally oriented towards minorities – the High Commissioner on National Minorities. The High Commissioner role provides early warnings and takes appropriate early actions to prevent ethnic tensions from developing into ethnic conflicts.430 His office is located in Hague. One of the most important European actors in the minorities issue is the European Union. With some small exceptions, the concern for the protection of minorities was almost absent from the European Community’s agenda until the Maastricht Treaty (1993). Article 151 from the treaty (formerly Article 128) states that one of the community’s roles is to contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the member states while respecting their national and regional diversity (para. 1). Furthermore, the Amsterdam Treaty (1999) inserted a new article (Article 13), which stated that, in certain conditions, the council can take appropriate actions to combat discrimination based on religion, racial, or ethnic origin. Why this concern for the minority issue just now? As stated in chapter two, after the fall of the Communist regime in different parts of Europe (Central Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans) a lot of tension and many ethnic conflicts have arisen. Minority issues became not only a problem of stability but also one of security in Europe. For the first time, the “ethnic identity (minorities)-security” relationship was top of the European agenda. In many cases, but especially in the Western Balkans, the EU assumed a leading role in creating instruments and institutions for solving ethnic conflicts in order to establish security and create a background for economic development in the region (the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe431 1999 can be mentioned here). “The security is, in the end, the state of normality that facilitates the society’s development, progress and evolution.”432 The two institutions in the EU that have shown, by their nature and purpose, a real interest in the issue of minorities in general, and that of the Roma in particular, are the European Parliament and the European Commission. The tandem has proved successful over the years by establishing an overall action framework and imposing certain intervention 430

See the High Commissioner Mandate on the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe website, http://www.osce.org/hcnm/43201.html. 431 For more information about the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe see the Stability Pact webpage. 432 Adrian Cămărăúan, “Migration and Security-Economic and Societal Dimensions,” in Analele UniversităĠii din Oradea, Seria RelaĠii InternaĠionale úi Studii Europene IV (2012): 139.

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lines, combining the EP resolutions with the commission’s engagement in Roma education and integration programs, funded by community capital433 (the PHARE program, HRD OP, or multiannual programs for the Central and Eastern European states). If the initial concerns mainly aimed at the education and preservation of cultural elements (see Resolution 19/C/153/3 of May 22, 1989, regarding the Roma children and travellers’ education), subsequently, the intervention agenda has extended towards other levels such as dwellings, access to services and the labour market, poverty, and discrimination. With the EU enlargement towards the Central and Eastern European states, as well as the intensification of Roma migration (and, after 2007, mobility) towards the Western states and its visibility in the society and the media, a relocation of the Roma issue was determined on the union’s security agenda, in the modern sense of the term, establishing an interdependent relationship between the social and economic situation of this ethnic group and the security environment. By drawing an imaginary line between the events that occur in this period in the international arena, the need for increased attention in the EU mobility-security relationship can be observed. Security analysts, by relating the opening of borders with the need for some compensatory measures of security, have managed to introduce the immigration phenomenon into a “security continuum,” next to threats such as organized, cross-border crime and, more recently, terrorism. The establishment of a free-movement area within Europe (through the Schengen Agreement,434 signed in 1985 and implemented from March 1995) represented the decisive moment for strengthening the relationship between migration and security in the EU beyond the political discourses, campaign slogans, and summit conclusions. The migration-security relationship moved into the public space, materialized in official documents, budget lines, and conditionality for the candidate states (see the Copenhagen Criteria regarding the protection of human and minority rights). The Copenhagen Council (1993) stated the three conditions any European country has to fulfil in order to become a member of the European Union,435 among which respect for human rights and minority 433

Liegeois, Romii în Europa, 208. For details on the Schengen Aquis see The European Council webpage. 435 The European Council in Copenhagen (1993) established a set of accession criteria (known as the Copenhagen Criteria), such as: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities; the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the union; 434

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protection plays an important role. The emergence of the Copenhagen Criteria for the states wishing to join the EU is not random, but determined, on one hand, by the violent events in the European arena (with an ethnic substrate), such as the so-called wars of secession/succession in Yugoslavia which begin in 1991 and brought to the fore the various ethnic groups’ desire to represent a majority in their own state rather than being a minority in a foreign one. On the other hand, we have the violent incidents between the majority population and minorities within the former Communist states in Central and Eastern Europe, such as the incidents between the Austrians and Hungarians in southern Austria, between Romanians and Hungarians in Transylvania, and between Romanians and Roma, to name only a few. Since 1990 (from 1990 to 1995 over fifty cases of violence appeared in the press and were recorded by international organizations), we can name the famous case at Hădăreni, Mureú county, of September 20, 1993 (the day Romania became a member of the Council of Europe) when eighteen Roma houses were destroyed by the locals and an estimated 170 Roma were forced to flee the village, according to the 1994 report by Helsinki Watch.436 The EU response to these violent events that threatened to destabilize the fragile balance of security and stability in Europe was prompt, offering these states the prospect of accession to the “European family” in exchange for solving the internal problems and employment on the path of democracy, stability, and economic development. In 1999, Finland, the EU presidency holder at the time, requested the improvement of the Roma situation as one of the accession criteria of the candidate states.437 The distortion of this necessary and noble initiative by policymakers and the media would transform the Roma social integration issue into the “European Union integration issue,”438 and the Roma into an obstacle to accession. Thus, through a game of unfavourable circumstances, the Roma end up being responsible, in the case of a potential failure in the negotiations with the EU, changing from victims of abuse and marginalization into scapegoats. Perhaps this is also why, in this period, the attention of the EU institutions was focused on the minorities’ issue in general, and of the and the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union. 436 For details on this case and other violent incidents in Romania between Romanians or Hungarians and Roma see Helsinki Watch, “Lynch Law: Violence Against Roma in Romania,” Human Rights Watch/Helsinki 6, no. 17 (1994). 437 Liegeois, Romii în Europa, 241. 438 Ibid.

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Roma in particular, within the candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe. The evidence is represented by the numerous directives and measures taken, together with the initiatives of distinguished personalities of the European public life, such as Vaclav Havel, Gunter Grass, and Walter Schwimmer, who considered that the Roma’s situation and how they are treated are direct indicators and tests of the democracy level within a state.439 The European Parliament’s resolutions increase and the fields of action diversify, while the number of actors involved in the solving of the Roma issue grows. The place of short-term, chaotic national intervention strategies to reduce the effects and visibility of the issue is intended to be replaced with a coherent action strategy, concentrated at a European level (while the Roma are shifting from immigrants to a European minority). A first moment in the fight against the discrimination and marginalization of the Roma in the EU is represented by the EP’s Resolution Regarding the Roma issue in the EU, September 25, 1995, which admits that the “Roma are transnational people experiencing social problems.” The importance of the resolution resides in the two important relations it creates. The first is related to the Roma identity construction project in the sense that the Resolution recognizes the transnational character and destiny of the Roma ethnics. This first relation draws the second conclusion, namely the transnational character of the issues the Roma are facing, which is why their solution involves the setting of new courses of action at the EU level, which would subsequently be applied by all member states. In 2000, the EU adopted two directives for promoting minority protection, namely: Directive 2000/43 (known as the Racial Directive,440 the cornerstone of the legislation to combat discrimination) provides for equal treatment on the grounds of racial and ethnic origin, and Directive 2000/78, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion or beliefs, disability, age, or sexual orientation, as regards employment or occupation and membership of the organization, so that Directive 2004/38/EC (also known in common parlance as the Citizens Directive), regarding the right to free movement and residence in the member states for the union’s 439

Ibid., 225. In order to transpose the directive, the Romanian Government adopted Ordinance 137/2000 on preventing and sanctioning all forms of discrimination on August 31, 2000. The ordinance was published in the Official Romanian Gazette, Part I, no. 781 on September 2, 2000 and was approved with amendments by Law no. 48/2002, published in Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, no. 69 of January 31, 2002.

440

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citizens and their families, was adopted in 2004. The latter reinforces one of the most important rights underlying the EU – the right for the free movement of persons (analysed in the previous chapters) – but also keeps it dependent on the immigrants’ financial independence. The right to residence for citizens and their families (for a period exceeding three months) is conditioned by the financial resources of daily life within the host state and the contribution to health insurance. As a counterpoint to this, the directive stipulated for the citizens who have lived for five years within a host state (without a discontinuity of more than two years) to receive the right to permanent residence. However, the most important provision for our research is the one referring to the security of residence – in other words the protection of immigrants against expulsions. According to this directive, expulsions can only be made in exceptional situations (for reasons such as public safety and national security, rather ambiguously defined and susceptible to broad political interpretation) after a careful examination of each file separately, arbitrary expulsions thus being banned. The economic reasons, the failure to integrate newcomers, expired documents, fear of immigrants, and cultural differences are not “solid” reasons for expulsion. We will note, however, in chapter five that precisely this ambiguous expression concerning the exceptional situations is the one that allowed the French political class, especially during election campaigns, as well as precampaign and political crisis periods (such as the corruption scandals, the pension reform, or the lack of a coherent response to the economic crisis), to resort to identifying scapegoats in the Roma, who become subject to these exceptional security measures. This directive, through the manner of reference to immigrants, comes, on the other hand, to reinforce the idea of European citizens (and implicitly European citizenship) by replacing the previous fragmented approaches regarding the immigrant categories (political, economic, asylum seekers, etc.) with a single one, meaning that at the EU level there are not several problems regarding migration but a single multifaceted one, which is why an integrated approach to the migration phenomenon is required to solve it. The feverish activity of the EP in the fight against discrimination and intolerance since 2000 has been materialized as a long list of resolutions, of which we mention here: the EP Resolution on the Roma issue in the EU of April 28, 2005; the EP Resolution of June 1, 2006 on the situation of Roma women in the EU; the EP Resolution of November 15, 2007 on the application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of free movement and residence in the territory of member states for the union citizens and the

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members of their families; the EP Resolution of January 31, 2008 on a European Strategy regarding the Roma; the EP Resolution of July 10, 2008 on the census of the Roma in Italy, based on the ethnic nexus criterion; the EP Resolution of March 11, 2009 on the social situation of the Roma and the improvement of their access to the EU labour market; the European Parliament Resolution of September 9, 2010 on the situation of the Roma and the free movement within the European Union; and the EP Resolution of March 9, 2011 on the EU strategy on Roma inclusion. As can be observed, the text of these resolutions covers all the aspects of the Roma’s life, from access to education, culture, services, gender equality, access to the labour market, the free movement of persons, and social inclusion. An important moment in the legislative fight against discrimination is represented by the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in 2000 that prohibits direct discrimination and sustains diversity in two articles: Art. 21 and Art. 22. Art. 21. Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited. Art. 22. The Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity.

The Lisbon Treaty “the most recent document that refers to the right of persons belonging to minorities,”441 introduced the Charter of Fundamental Rights into European primary law, providing new solidarity mechanisms and ensuring the better protection of European citizens and minorities. When the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in December 2009 the charter was given binding legal effect equal to the treaties. Article 1 from the same treaty refers to the respect of human rights and for the first time to persons belonging to minorities, and not minorities in general: The union is established on the values of respecting human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of the law, and on the respect of human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. (Lisbon Treaty, 2009, Article 1a)

441

Ivan Adrian-Liviu and Claudia Anamaria Iov, “Minorities Issue in Central European Countries Before and after their Accession to the European Union,” Analele UniversităĠii din Oradea, Seria RelaĠii InternaĠionale úi Studii Europene IV (2012): 127.

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Using these documents and many others as a starting point, a lot of specific documents, initiatives, and instruments targeting the Roma population were formulated to foster the process of social integration for this non-popular minority in four cross-cutting fields, namely: healthcare, housing, access to education, and employment. Among this, the most important are: the Millennium Development Goals (2000); the European Network on Social Inclusion and Roma under the Structural Funds (EU Roma); the 2005 Plan of Priority Measures for European Integration; the Joint Inclusion Memorandum (JIM) 2005–10; the Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005–15; and the Europe 2020 Strategy. In the context of the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements and the increased Roma mobility that followed, the EU should be the natural choice to lead policy developments to tackle the anti-Roma sentiment and discrimination.442 Over the last decade, the EU has increasingly tied its security interests to the promotion of human and minority rights and the fight against discrimination. Objectors to this discourse also appeared in this period, explaining that the EU is not equipped to cope effectively with the minority rights issue, immigrants’ security, and social security, and therefore these aspects should be left to the member states or European institutes’ latitude, namely the Council of Europe, the UN, and the OSCE. Migration is not a phenomenon that can be fully controlled and “zero migration”443 among the Roma population is neither a feasible nor a desired project. The debate over the Roma migration security dimension within the European Union brings up a larger issue of EU identity in the context of enlargement versus integration. The failure in the union’s reform process in the last decade emphasizes an identity crisis as well as a democratic deficit. The Roma migration issue, their socioeconomic problems, and their social integration are cases that can potentially force the European policymakers to rethink the social and security EU agendas.

4.2. The Roma Destiny in the European Union at the Conjunction of Insecurity with Public Policies Activists and researchers (gypsyologists) have argued that, given the Roma’s visibility, their increased mobility after the EU enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe correlated with the marginalization and discrimination phenomenon, and the EU should take leadership in this 442 443

Cashman and Butler “Romani mobilities,” 5. Ibid.

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problem and firmly intervene where the states’ public policies, cultural, economic, or social integration programs failed to provide the expected results. In this context, the following questions arise: Is the European Union a sufficiently powerful regional actor to solve the Roma interethnic and security issue? Are we talking about “a Roma issue” or the Roma problem/s in EU? In this situation, some other questions arise: Who decides on the severity or extent of the Roma issue in the state? And should this responsibility be undertaken by policymakers, who would thus act as securitization actors? The ease with which the Roma migration issue is associated with the EU’s security problems, when in fact this is mainly a social problem, points out the vulnerability of this ethnicity. In a period of economic crisis, with ample social reverberations, the Roma minority has been used as a “scapegoat” by the French government (confronted with an pronounced internal crisis, large street protests, and a wave of discontent caused by the unpopular measures taken in the fight against the economic crisis) to “restore the state authority”444 and prove the efficiency of the French administration against illegal migration. Moreover, this situation has been used to distract the attention of the French citizens from the real social, economic, and political problems of France, namely the reforming of the pension system, the recovery from recession, and the Bettencourt corruption scandal.445 These circumstances gave rise to an efficient political phenomenon, especially in times of economic crisis and political instability – “the fear of immigrants.” Topics such as migration, refugees, or foreigners are identified in the political discourses as the cause of several internal problems or as an excuse for the failure of some governments in finding coherent solutions to economic, social, or political issues. In many speeches and discourses, migration has been identified as one of the main factors weakening national tradition, with effects on the societal security. The Roma issue in France is analysed due to the complexity, stakeholders, and social and political stakes that surround it, but also because the subject is apparently an exotic one – unique in fact, and extremely useful for understanding the process of social integration in a 444

Katrin Bennhold and Stephen Castle, “EU Calls France’s Roma Expulsions a ‘Disgrace’,” New York Times (September 14), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/15/world/europe/15roma.html. 445 “Scandal in FranĠa: puterea spionează ziariútii” [“Scandal in France: the Power Spies on the Journalists”] in Evenimentul Zilei (September 1, 2011), http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/scandal-in-franta-puterea-spioneaza-ziaristii943976.html.

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multicultural society. The freedom and beauty of nomadic life are tales and myths, and the brutal reality means poverty, discrimination, stereotypes, and social exclusion.446 Often, social-inclusion initiatives and coherent policies remain plans on paper only, while money is spent on posters, workshops, and speeches about positive discrimination and multiculturalism. The actual means of intervention, in the light of the recent events from Italy (2007) and France (2010–13), are the brutal force, the excavator, or statements with a political taste.447 With a population in Europe estimated at twelve million, the Roma population can be found everywhere on the old continent, but they have no “homeland.”448 The greatest number live in Central Eastern Europe in countries like Romania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Hungary. According to official sources, in these four countries their numbers are: ™ Romania (2011 census): 621.573 (3.3 percent), other sources claim up to 1.8–2.3 million. ™ Slovakia (2011 census): 105,738 persons counted as Roma (Romani449), around two percent of the population. Other sources claim up to ten percent of Slovakian (520,000 people) may be Roma. They are the second largest ethnic minority in Slovakia after Hungarians. ™ Hungary (2011 census): 315,583, but according to estimates from Open Society Budapest, the actual number of Roma in Hungary is around 700,000, and therefore about fifty percent of Gypsies still refuse to identify themselves. ™ Bulgaria (2011 census): 325,343 (4.4 percent), but the overall number of the Gypsies is estimated at 500,000. The Roma are the third largest ethnic group in Bulgaria. The reasons for the differences between the minimum and maximum number of Roma in various states (especially Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, Serbia, or Bulgaria) are given for different reasons, for instance: 446

Oana Marinescu, “Spirala nociva a urii impotriva romilor” [“Harmful Spiral of Hatred Against Roma”], Adevarul (August 24, 2010), http://www.adevarul.ro/international/foreign_policy/Spirala_nociva_a_urii _impotriva_romilor_0_322168341.html. 447 Ibid. 448Arno Tanner, “The Roma of Eastern Europe: Still Searching for Inclusion,” (May 2005), Migration Policy Institute, http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=308. 449 Before 1991 the Romani were not recognized as a separate ethnic group.

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x the high level of discrimination450 x the high level of mobility that is hindering their review process x a strong demographic growth of the Roma population, which makes a definitive survey of their number practically impossible x socioeconomic elements with deep historical roots, for example a late entry onto the track of European modernization (in the case of Romania the late abolition of slavery and effects of Communism) Even though the numbers are higher in these countries, the Roma population is facing problems in almost all EU countries – if they are not social problems they are economic, cultural, or educational issues, discrimination on the labour market, and access to public services. Because of the higher number in these four countries the problems are more visible than in others that are far more developed (like Germany, the UK, Poland, and Spain). To make matters even more complex, a number of European states – including EU member states such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, and Poland – have become countries of both migrant origin and emigration for Roma. Roma from the Czech Republic, for example, continue to migrate particularly to the UK, while Roma from Romania and Slovakia – also EU member states – migrate to, among other places, the Czech Republic.451 The Roma that have exercised their right to free movement under European law by migrating to other parts of Europe are faced with difficulties in accessing national-health systems, public housing, and the labour market. There is a culture of open hostility and discrimination towards the Roma and they are often singled out. Being politically disorganized and lacking political representation, they do not have a strong lobby. The European Union Minorities and Discrimination survey reported that forty-seven percent of Roma maintained that they had been a victim of ethnically-based discrimination in the past twelve months, and thirty-two 450

In Romania, in the 2011 Population Census, a large part of the Roma declared themselves Hungarians or Romanians in Transylvania or Turkish in ConstanĠei. A similar situation exists in the neighbouring state, Bulgaria, where they declare themselves Romanians, Albanians, or Turkish. In Romania, the only counties where the number of Roma exceeds six percent are Mureú (8.8 percent), Călăraúi (8.1 percent), Sălaj (6.9 percent), and úiBihor (6.1 percent), while at the opposite pole the county with the lowest number of Roma is Botoúani (1.1 percent). 451 Claude Cahn and Elspeth Guild, “Recent Migration of Roma in Europe,” Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) High Commissioner on National Minorities (2010), 17, http://www.osce.org/hcnm/78034.

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percent said they were victims of crime, making it clear that the Roma need assistance and support.452 Few measures for integration have been forthcoming, and often the solution is to send them back to their country of origin, as happened in France and Italy. This is not a solution, but being a vulnerable transnational minority, less visible in cases of human-rights violations, without the help of embassies or national states, they are an easy target in the problem of illegal immigration. From case to case, the Roma minority is being used as a political stake, a scapegoat in security problems (especially societal security), or a means of attracting millions of euros from the EU for developing projects on social integration. In these conditions they have limited access to education, healthcare, public services, housing, and the labour market, which is why their life expectancy is lower (ten years less than the majority according to the European Union Minorities and Discrimination survey), they have lower levels of educational attainment, and unemployment rates about three times the average. In this situation they are pursuing informal economic activities for survival, including begging and petty crime. When we refer to the Roma minority we need to talk about the economic cost of their social exclusion. The long tradition of discrimination, indignity, and stigma associated with the Roma population is translated into economic losses at millions of euros annually in productivity and fiscal contributions to the governments. The challenges posed by the economic and fiscal cost of Roma exclusion are particularly acute in light of the declining and ageing populations.453 For example, in Romania between 2000 and 2025 the national population is expected to decline by as much as ten percent, while experiencing a substantial increase in the proportion of elderly people (aged over sixty-five). The Roma population represents a sizeable share of the working-age population in many European countries, and this share will continue to increase given the relatively younger age profile of the Roma community. As such, substantially increasing the participation and

452

European Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Data in Focus Report 1: the Roma,” (2009): 9–12, http://romaplatform.net/files/DISCUSSION%20PAPER%20ON%20THE%20TER RITORIAL_ASPECTS_EXTREME_POVERTY_DRAWING_EUROPEAN_EXT REME_POVERTY_MAP.pdf. 453 World Bank, From Red to Gray: the “Third Transition” of Aging Populations in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (2007), 3.

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productivity of Roma is an economic necessity for everyone.454 Full economic participation will not be achieved if the current status quo is maintained. Apart from barriers such as labour-market discrimination, the most important problem is the lack of education (only one in six working age Roma from EU member states has the necessary education skill level455). The potential gains of social inclusion far exceed the necessary investment costs of the process of education and training. According to recent research by the World Bank, for instance, full Roma integration on the labour market could bring economic benefits estimated to be around 0.5 billion euros annually for some countries,456 especially those with important numbers of Roma, such as Romania, Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic. In this regard, it is very interesting to see what the European Union is doing to solve the situation, taking into consideration the discrimination problem and the social integration solution for educational, economic, and social programmes.

4.2.1. What is being done? Is the EU in the leading role? The Roma problem needs a complex action plan, which is why it has both national and European dimensions, involving the national stakeholders, NGOs, and EU institutions like the European Commission, the European Parliament, the EU Council, the Committee of the Regions, and the European Social and Economic Committee. For more than a decade, the EU institutions have been regularly calling on member states and candidate countries to improve the social and economic integration of Roma. Since 2000 a lot of national integration strategies, international integration and mobility programs, and action plans have been proposed in order to solve the Roma migration issue followed by social integration. Little has been achieved so far, but there are some programs and actions taken by the EU that deserve to be mentioned here. The initial steps have been done, and now it’s time to consolidate and diversify. 454

Joost De Laat, “Economic Costs of Roma Exclusion,” Human Development Economics, Europe and Central Asia, World Bank (2010), 2. 455 For details about the economic costs of Roma exclusion see the analysis made by the World Bank, “Economic Costs of Roma Exclusion” (2010) and the estimations of economic cost and the opportunity to integrate the Roma on the labour market if they complete their studies. 456 De Laat, “Economic Costs of Roma Exclusion,” 4.

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The EU Roma integration program covers four crucial areas: access to education, employment, healthcare, and housing. The Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005–15 (a Pan-European initiative) is a commitment of twelve countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Spain), the Roma civil society, and international partners (the World Bank, the Council of Europe, the European Roma International Office, the World Health Organization, and the European Roma and Traveller Forum457) to improve the socioeconomic status and social inclusion of Roma. The program represents an effort to combat discrimination and to close the gap in welfare and living conditions between the Roma and the nonRoma in order to break the discrimination and exclusion circle. Over the decade, the aim of the actors involved is to significantly reduce the socioeconomic disparities that divide the Roma from the majority. The intervention areas are: education, health, employment, and housing, and fighting poverty, discrimination, and gender inequality.458 The instruments used are inspired by the European “working style” in the programming documents: the Terms of Reference and the National Plans of Actions.459 Romania was the first country to secure the decade presidency between 2005 and 2006. If we are talking about National Action Plans, it is worth mentioning Spain and the ACCEDER Program, managed by the Fundación Secretariado Gitano, which has been very successful in providing training and securing work contracts for beneficiaries. In 2007 the National Agency for Roma (Romania) decided to adjust the ACCEDER Program to the needs of the Romanian Roma population. Following the ACCEDER pattern, in 2008 the agency won a social inclusion project for Roma minority called “Together on the Labour Market” [“Impreuna pe piata muncii”]. Through this project, 250 Roma people were trained and inserted onto the Romanian labour market. At national level we have the National Anti-poverty and Social Inclusion Plan, elaborated and developed under the coordination of the Governmental Anti-poverty and Promotion of Social Inclusion Commission and endorsed by G.D. 829/2002. It is a complex document conceived to 457

For further information see also the Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005–15 website, Roma Decade. 458 Mariea Ionescu and Sorin Cace, Politici publice pentru romi. Evoluаii Юi perspective [Public Policies for Roma. Developments and Prospects] (Bucure‫܈‬ti: Editura Expert, 2006), 73. 459 Decade for Roma Inclusion (2007), 34.

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anticipate the Lisbon Agenda, and a program of social construction for a European society. Its entire chapter fourteen is dedicated to the reduction of poverty and social inclusion of Roma.460 The European Network on Social Inclusion and Roma under the Structural Funds (EURoma) is a European network established as a result of the “Transnational Cooperation on Roma Community and Social Exclusion” working seminar held in Madrid in June 2007. Its aim is to promote the use of structural funds in order to foster the social integration of the Roma minority. The network is based on three institutional pillars: the management committee, working groups (on education, employment, and social inclusion), and the technical secretariat461 (managed by Fundación Secretariado Gitano, Spain). The European Network on Social Inclusion and Roma under the Structural Funds (EU Roma) provides the opportunity for joining forces at all levels (EU, national, regional) and with all stakeholders, including the Roma leaders, to address one of the most serious social challenges in Europe – putting an end to the exclusion of the Roma. EU funding alone can certainly not solve the situation of Roma, but the commission recalls that up to 26.5 billion euros of EU funding are currently programmed to support member states’ efforts in the field of social inclusion, including the Roma.462 This is a commitment made by European governments to improve the socioeconomic status and increase the social integration of the Roma. This action brings together Roma civil society, governments, intergovernmental organizations and NGOs, and European institutions. The EU’s Europe 2020 Strategy for a new growth path – smart, sustainable, and inclusive growth – leaves no room for the persistent economic and social marginalization of what constitutes Europe’s largest minority. The Europe 2020 Strategy sets a headline target of seventy-five percent of the population aged twenty to sixty-four to be employed (on average, the employment rate in the EU amounts to 68.8 percent).463 “The current context of crisis, which is not only a financial and economic crisis, but also a political, social, mental, and even ideological 460

Ibid., 61. For more information about the European Network on Social Inclusion and Roma under the Structural Funds see the EURoma website. 462 COM (2011), Annex 3, Draft Joint Employment Report. 2011, 13. See also the Labour Force Survey, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&langua ge=en&pcode=t2020_10. 463 Ibid., 11. 461

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crisis, shows the need to strengthen the dialogue”464 between minorities and the majority. Some Central and Eastern Europe states, influenced by the process of integration in NATO and the EU, introduced the European norms on protection of national minorities in their constitutions. Relevant examples in this respect are Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria. In these countries, the attitude towards minorities has different and positive forms of manifestation (affirmative policies, hard to imagine in the former Communist regimes). They made concessions regarding the cultural and religious autonomy, and in Romania and Slovakia the Hungarian minority have governed together with the majority. Moreover, in Romania, Law 68/1992 states that national minority organizations that participated in the elections for the House of Commons and Senate, but didn’t have their candidate elected, are assigned a deputy mandate. This is not the case for the Hungarian minority in Romania, however, as this law gives the Roma the opportunity to have their voices heard directly in the House of Commons through their deputy.

4.3. The Situation in Central Eastern Europe: Towards a Social-Inclusion Policy? In Central Eastern Europe the Roma situation is different from country to country, being directly related to the number of Roma ethnics, the relation with the majority, the economic development of the country, the social politics, and the institutions and instruments created to stimulate their social integration. Like other minorities, they are not a monolith – they have success and failure stories, rich and poor families, wellintegrated persons, and others who are not suited for social life. After Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007, many European voices said that the amount of ethnic incidents, child exploitation, prostitution, and illegal trafficking in the EU countries grew due to the fact that an important number of Roma ethnics coming from these two countries were free to move and establish themselves throughout the EU member states. The civil society and mass media contribute to the denigration of the Roma community image, both internally and externally, and so the issue seems to become a key one again. 464

Mircea Brie, “Ethnicity, Religion and Intercultural Dialogue in the European Border Space,” in Mircea Brie, Ioan Horga, and Sorin ùipoú, Ethnicity, Confession and Intercultural Dialogue at the European Union’s East Border (Editura UniversităĠii din Oradea/Editura UniversităĠii din Debrecen, supliment Eurolimes, Oradea/Debrecen, 2011), 12.

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According to the census of 2011 in Romania, the number of those who declared themselves Roma was 621,573 (3.3 percent),465 with approximately 84,000 more than those who assumed their ethnicity in the 2012 census (535,140), being the second largest minority after the Hungarians (1,238 million). Fig. 4.1. The ethnic structure in Romania according to the 2011 Census

The Ethnic structure in Romania according to the 2011 Census Romanians Hungarians

88.90%

Roms 6.50% 3.30% 0.80%

0.20% 0.30%

Germans Ucrainians Others

Source: Results of the 2011 Census466

465

Raluca Florescu, “2002/2011 CENSUS: The Roma Community, Almost the Only One Growing. Romanians Drop Dramatically,” Evenimentul Zilei [The Daily Event] (February 2, 2012). 466 National Institute of Statistics, 2011 Population and Housing Census http://www.recensamantromania.ro/en/.

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Fig. 4.2. Roma minority in Romania, 2002 and 2011Census Results

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Sources: Romania roma 2002.png and RROMI 2011 JUD.png

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A first conclusion after a comparative view of the two maps is that, in terms of regional concentration of the Roma communities, the situation did not change from 2002 to 2011. We can observe a significant number of Roma (over five percent) in counties around the capital (Călăraúi with over eight percent, and DâmboviĠa, IalomiĠa, and Giurgiu), in Dolj county, and the Central Region, with the highest percentage of Roma being registered in Mureú county, while in the northwest region the three counties with a percentage exceeding five percent are Satu Mare, Sălaj, and Bihor. It is not accidental that these counties are also confronted with a difficult socioeconomic situation: in terms of investment, Giurgiu is the poorest county in Romania, in terms of beneficiaries of guaranteed minimum income (GMI) (it is known that a large number of beneficiaries are Roma) a clear leader is Dolj county with 11,353 beneficiaries in October 2011, while in Mureú county their number reached 4,730 in the same month.467 In these counties and others (with a Roma percentage between four and five percent, such as Buzău or MehedinĠi) there are large agricultural areas, a significant part of the population being engaged in subsistence (underperforming) agriculture, which feeds chronic poverty. Approximately sixty percent of the Roma living in Bulgaria are unemployed, and in Romania the percentage drops slightly under fifty percent, according to a comparative study conducted by the Soros Foundation between the levels of social inclusion of the Roma in Romania, Bulgaria, Spain, and Italy.468 With regards to the Roma mobility degree in these counties towards Western European states (especially Spain, Italy, the UK, and France), the leader is DâmboviĠa county, but the others also record a significant number of Roma who have left in search of a better life. The second conclusion refers to the less significant increase in the number of Roma from 2002 until 2011, but also the significant difference as compared to the figures presented by the Research Institute for Quality of Life (2000) of about 1,580,000469 Roma (based on both auto and hetero-

467

For details see the analysis conducted by the Money.ro website, “Unde sunt cei mai mulĠi copii săraci în acte din România.” 468 For details see the comparative analysis by Daniela Târnovschi (ed.), Romii din România, Bulgaria, Italia úi Spania, între incluziune socială úi migraĠie, Studiu Comparativ [Roma in Romania, Bulgaria, Italy and Spain, Between Social Inclusion and Migration, Comparative Study] (Bucharest: Soros Foundation Romania, 2012). 469 Daniela Tarnovschi, “Identitatea romilor. Construct istoric úi mediatic,” in Interculturalitate. Cercetări úi Perspective Româneúti, edited by Rudolf Poledna,

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identification and supported by the Roma NGOs with field research) that can be substantiated through either a massive migration towards Western Europe with the EU accession, a decrease in birth rates among ethnics, or the fact that there is a tendency of denial regarding the ethnic status due to discrimination. It is no coincidence that in the early 1990s a large part of these counties – namely Mureú (Hădăreni, Valea Largă ), Satu-Mare (Acîú, Mihăieni, Racsa), Giurgiu (Ogrezeni, Gaiseni, Bâcu), and DâmboviĠa (Balteni)470 – recorded a series of violent actions against Roma, with unannounced raids, justifying the need to prevent the Roma from committing antisocial acts.471 The situation is similar in the neighbouring states – Hungary and Bulgaria – as well, where there is no locality without at least one Roma family, as is apparent from the maps on the spread of the Roma in Fig. 4.3 below, based on the 2001 census results.

Francis Ruegg, and Călin Rus (Cluj-Napoca: Ed Presa Universitară Clujeană, 2002), 114. 470 O’Grady and Târnovschi, “Minoritatile din Europa de Sud-Est,” 23–5. 471 Ibid., 24.

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Fig. 1.3. Roma minority in Bulgaria, 2001 Census Results

Source: Romani people in Bulgaria472

472

http://www.wikiwand.com/en/Romani_people_in_Bulgaria

“L’affaire des Roms” in the European Union Fig. 4.4. Roma minority in Hungary, 2001 Census Results

Source: Hungary Roma 2001473

473

Roma in Hungary (census 2001), http://commons.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Hungary_roma_2001_(average).png http://ro.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fi%C8%99ier:Humgary_roma_2001,png.

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In certain contexts the Romanian authorities (as in Bulgaria) and Roma NGOs at national and local levels have a certain interest in presenting a higher number of Roma than in the official documents, because the availability of European funds depends on the number of Roma ethnics and their socioeconomic situation. The danger is that some actors (local or national) may take advantage of this uncertain situation about the real number of Roma inhabitants. Also, there is the problem of assuming the identity of belonging to a certain ethnic group (both in Romania and Bulgaria, the Roma ethnics are a non-popular group). That’s why, in the 2011 Romanian census, many Roma ethnics declared themselves Romanians or Hungarians. Until 2001 little had been done by the Romanian institutions about the “Roma issue,” and all the actions were taken after strong lobbying from the Roma NGOs or at the recommendation of international organizations (the EU, the Council of Europe, and the OSCE). In this period (2001), Romania was the head of the list regarding the NGOs concerning human and minority rights due to the racist statements of Vadim Tudor, the former president of the Great Romania Party, who in 1998, exploiting the grievances of the majority population towards the Roma, presented a tenpoint election program which aimed at the Roma criminals’ expulsion in the states that defended their rights474 and criticized their situation in Romania. After Romania engaged with becoming a member of NATO and the EU, the situation changed and the concern for Roma social inclusion became visible. On April 25, 2001, the Strategy of the Government of Romania for Improving the Condition of Roma 2001–10 was adopted by Governmental Ordinance. The strategy proposed a comprehensive approach to addressing the problems and challenges faced by the Roma minority in eleven main areas of action (social security, education, health, children’s protection, culture public administration, justice, economics, public order, communication, and civic participation) until 2010. On December 14, 2011, the Strategy of the Government of Romania for the Inclusion of the Romanian Citizens Belonging to the Roma Minority 2012–20475 was adopted. The strategy continued the measures taken by the Strategy of the Government of Romania for Improving the Condition of Roma 2001–10, 474

O’Grady and Târnovschi, “Minoritatile din Europa de Sud-Est,” 23. See the whole document online: Strategy of the Government of Romania for the inclusion of the Romanian citizens belonging to Roma minority for the period 2012–2020, http://www.anr.gov.ro/docs /Strategie_EN.pdf.

475

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and aimed at fully benefitting from the good practices obtained and the experience gained. Among the examples of good practice regarding the Roma’s inclusion and facilitation of access to quality services, two projects are worth mentioning that meet two of the most severe issues the Roma are dealing with in Romania – housing and illiteracy. It is about building houses in Nuúfalău village, Sălaj county (Social Housing Building in Nuúfalău), and national education through the publishing of Romani textbooks (Roma ABC, Arithmetic – ABC Book)476 (for details see Appendix B: Good Practices in Romanian Roma Communities – Project Description). In 2004, by another Governmental Ordinance (no.78/ October 7, 2004), the National Agency for Roma477 was founded, a governmental structure that represents the Roma at the national level. The agency plays an important role in implementing educational and social projects for the Roma, mostly funded by the European Social Fund and the Human Resources Development Operational Program (HRD OP). The projects478 mostly target issues like education, employment, qualifications, social inclusion, gender equality, and better access to social and health services. According to information released by the Managing Authority of HRD OP, 102 projects are being implemented in Romania, funded by the European Social Fund for vulnerable groups (including Roma ethics), costing a total of 250 million euros. Even so, little has changed in the Roma communities as a result of investments in human resources, which are very difficult to quantify in the short term. Investing in the human resource cannot be quantified as investing in agriculture or infrastructure as the results are not immediate. It takes at least five years for the first results to be truly visible, which is why some researchers consider these programs useless and inefficient because they do not produce immediate changes in the Roma communities. 476

Best practices of Roma projects in Central and Eastern Europe, edited by the members of the International Editing Group, KONTURS (Gyongyos, 2003), 66– 72, http://www.pdcs.sk/files//file/Publikacie/AJ%20publications/best_practices_englis h.pdf. 477 See more about the National Agency for the Roma online: http://www.anr.gov.ro. 478 Examples of projects: “Together for a Better Society,” “Together on the Labor Market,” “School – a Chance for Everyone,” “Education – a Chance for a Better Future!” “Education for Roma Children – the Key to a Stable Job,” “Equality Through Difference: Roma Women’s Access to the Labor Market,” “Participation of Vulnerable Groups in the Social Economy” – see more on the National Agency for the Roma website: http://www.anr.gov.ro/html/Proiecte.html.

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In order to enhance the minority participation in the national political life, in the Parliament of Romania seats are reserved for minorities if their parties do not reach the electoral threshold of five percent (Slovenia has the same policy). The Roma minority is represented in the Romanian Parliament by deputy Nicolae Păun.479 Hungary is far more advanced in this respect, having developed a minority self-government system that guarantees the minorities wideranging participation in the local and national affairs that affect them. In Hungary, the Roma are the largest minority (at 315,583 – according to the Open Society Institute in Budapest their real number is over 700,000). In the last few years, the Soros Foundation, the Open Society Institute, and other organizations of this type initiated programmes regarding the social integration and access to education, culture, medical, and social-quality services. Romania was the first country to hold the Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005–15, from July 1, 2005 to June 30, 2006. During the first year, the state members of the decade adopted the most important documents and developed instruments for action like the Terms of Reference, National Plans for Action, intervention groups in different areas, and mechanisms and instruments for evaluation processes. Not much was done during the first year for improving the situation of Roma in their social integration, but a background action plan was drawn. Much more expectations were put on Bulgaria, the country that followed in the presidency between July 1, 2006 and June 30, 2007. Neither of them acquired notable successes in proposing or implementing a sustainable policy for Roma social integration. Many voices said that this was due to the short period of presidency, while others said it was due to the inconsistency of policies (every country had its own vision, background, priorities, and Roma problems). Hungary followed Bulgaria in the presidency of the Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005–15 between July 1, 2007 and June 30, 2008. The Hungarian presidency480 focused on enhancing the intergovernmental cooperation 479

Nicolae Păun is a Romani-Romanian politician. He is the president of the Party of the Roma, and has held the one reserved seat for Romani people in the Romanian Chamber of Deputies since 2000. Since then, he has also been the president of the Committee for Human Rights, Religious Affairs, and National Minorities in the Chamber of Deputies. In 1990 he was one of the founding members of the Roma Party Pro-Europe. In 1994 he was elected president of this party. 480 There are more details on the Program of the Hungarian Presidency on the Roma Decade website.

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through workshops and international campaigns, also tackling new topics like corporate social responsibility (CSR) and anti-segregation policies in the fields of education and housing. The Hungarian presidency did not manage to change the European perception of Roma ethnics, especially after the Mailat case in Italy (2007). Another Central Eastern country with an important Roma minority (the second largest after the Slovakians) is the Czech Republic. According to the 2011 census, 13,150 assumed the Roma ethnicity here, while the European Roma Rights Centre estimates the size of the population to be between 250,000 and 300,000. The Czech Republic, like all countries in Central Europe, faced many difficulties related to the integration of this community and ensuring effective dialogue between the majority and the Roma minority. The Roma issue in the Czech Republic is not a new subject on the agenda of the government in Prague since the existence of Czechoslovakia, where the Roma were seen as social pariahs. Both Slovakia and the Czech Republic tried to get rid of this inconvenience. According to a survey conducted by the Institute of public opinion (STEM) on a target group of 2,056 Czechs in September and October,481 Czechs consider the Roma a community unable to adapt to the mainstream of society. Furthermore, they seem to destroy and pollute the environment, are violent, and represent a source of crime. As STEM puts it, these results suggest that the Czechs perceive the Roma as “foreigners rather than fellow citizens.”482 Serious barriers also arise when it comes to legal employment for Roma. In addition to the limits imposed by the relatively low level of education and training, there is a strong prejudice in terms of employment and workplace treatment for Roma. The majority of them live in insalubrious dwellings, often in separate areas at the outskirts of the urban centres, with a minimum level of infrastructure and in an environment that often affects their health. Furthermore, they consider that the medical staff are frequently insensitive to their different attitudes and cultural traditions. Without an integrated program to tackle all these problems and barriers of communication between the majority and the minority, the potential conflictual situation will continue to exist, and if real measures are not taken could get even worse. 481

Maria Cocu‫܊‬i, “Cehii consideră minoritatea rromă o sursă de criminalitate” [“The Czechs Consider the Roma Minority a Source of Crime”], Ziarul România Liberă (October 10, 2010), http://www.romanialibera.ro/actualitate/mapamond/cehii-considera-minoritatearoma-o-sursa-de-criminalitate-209226.html. 482 Ibid.

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The Czech Republic held the presidency of the Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005–15 between July 1, 2010 and June 30, 2011 in a moment of great tension for the Roma population in the EU after the Mailat case in Italy and Silvio Berlusconi’s election campaign policy of the expulsion of tens of thousands of Roma back to Romania and the former Yugoslavian states, combined with Sarkozy’s expulsion policy of 2009 (of around ten thousand Romanian and Bulgarian Roma) and 2010 (around 8,500). Both actions were justified by the national governments as necessary for security reasons. Sarkozy’s staff identified the illegal Roma camps from Paris, Grenoble, and Lyon as sources of illegal trafficking, prostitution, exploitation of children (forcing them to beg), drugs, and crime. Even though the EU (through the voice of Viviane Reding, vice-president of the European Commission, Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights, and Citizenship), international organizations, and the Roma civil society reacted and asked France to stop the expulsions, Sarkozy went through with his actions as “a strategy to improve his ratings and to bolster his position for the next election” (which he lost in to Francois Hollande in 2012). The Czech mission wasn’t simple – it had to tackle all these problems and also those with the Roma ethnics from its own territory. One of their priority areas was in this case to present the Roma minority positively in the media and thus promote Roma social integration.483 Their actions didn’t have the expected success as the expulsions continued under President Hollande, while in other Western European countries the situation continued to be as bad as before, if not even worse.

4.4. “Les Roms Boucs Emissaires Ideaux de l’Europe Occidentale”484: How Did We Get Here? “The Roma issue”485 appeared in the international arena as a threat to the European geopolitical stability due to the successive migration waves of the economic, political, and social-effects driven repatriation agreements 483

See also the Program of the Czech Presidency on the Roma Decade website. Translation: “The Roma – ideal scapegoats for Western Europe.” 485 The “Roma issue or problem” – the terms used are not the most positive and neither are their translations in Romanian, pointing out from the start the existence of failure, a problematic situation requiring resolution. The frequent use of this phrase led to the emergence and dissemination of an international stereotype regarding the Roma, according to which they are perceived as a disturbing and problematic factor within the society, requiring increased attention, policies, and programs for social integration. 484

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and financial support, professional and social reinsertion programs, and international treaties for human and minority rights, and especially the great number of actors involved in addressing this situation: the origin state, reception states, international profile organizations, and Roma community leaders. A recent topic in countries with a significant number of Roma, especially after the last extension wave of the EU towards Romania and Bulgaria, is the fear/phobia of the gypsy invasion from the East in the developed states of the EU, as part of a greater issue, namely “the fear of immigrants” which has become a widespread phenomenon within Western Europe and elsewhere. This problem worsened due to the economic crisis, and the most vulnerable of the immigrants became scapegoats because those states did not manage the economic crisis effects correctly or they were turned into election campaign themes, being closely connected to the national security issue (see the 2012 election in France). This theme has become a subject of great interest on the agenda of several international organizations, such as the EU, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The issue has two dimensions: the current situation, for which resolution policies and programs are formulated and implemented, and potential problems due to an increased visibility and enhanced Roma migration from the Eastern and Southeastern European countries (especially Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and the states in the Western Balkans) towards the developed countries of Western Europe, which are still facing the prolonged effects of the economic crisis and its social and political consequences. The issue of the Roma migrants can be found on the agenda of several governments in Central and Western Europe, being instrumented in terms of societal security.486 Even today, the answer to the questions of how many Roma are in Europe and what their numbers are in various states are challenges with real political, economic, organizational, and identity implications. As the official authorities want to present smaller numbers of Roma ethnics (usually based on census results), the Roma organizations and institutions advocating for their rights present higher numbers (linking the census results with hetero-identification), while in some countries (e.g. France, Spain, and Portugal) it is prohibited by the constitution to collect data on ethnic origin. For our approach, we choose to present the official census 486

Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver, Regions and Powers: the Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 491.

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data and the maximum estimated Roma numbers in different European states (for details see Appendix C: Minimum and Maximum Estimated Numbers of Roma in Different European Countries). Fig. 4.5. The visibility of the Roma issue in Europe – between the state-NGOs’ “battle of numbers,” migration, and expulsions

A first conclusion to be drawn from Fig. 4.5 is that, from a geopolitical point of view, the Roma are stuck in a “battle of the figures” triggered by the main political actors (supporting the official figures obtained in the census) and NGO representatives (maximal estimate), based on their own political or public agendas. The Roma community is hence found at the intersection of these two actors, and has a double role as subject and actor.

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Another conclusion refers to the relationship between the Romanian and Bulgarian Roma’s main destinations and the places where conflicts with the majority population and illegal camp evictions were recorded, which made the international media headlines from 2007, with reference to Italy, France, Spain, and Germany. In another train of thought, the Roma numbers in Europe are important for the shaping of an overview with economic and social implications, but also for drawing lines of coherent political action at the EU level. In Romania, according to the 2011 census, the number of those who declared themselves Roma was 619,000 people (3.2 percent),487 an increase of 83,860 from the 2002 census (535,140), being the second largest minority after Hungarians (1,238,000) (see map of ethnic Roma in Romania, census results 2002–11). The insignificant increase in their number but also the great difference in the figures released by the Research Institute for Quality of Life (2000) of about 1,580,000488 (based on both self and hetero-identification and supported by the Roma NGOs within field research) can be supported by a massive migration towards Western Europe, with the EU adherence, or by a decrease in the ethnics’ birth rates, or the fact that there is a tendency for ethnic affiliation denial due to discrimination. A similar situation is also encountered in the neighbouring countries of Hungary or Bulgaria (where there is no locality without at least one Roma family). In countries like France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, where the census does not collect data on ethnicity and culture, the minimal and maximal estimations are equally different. The situation gets complicated in France due to the administrative compromise, using the phrase “Roms et gens du voyage,” a group that still varies between three and four hundred thousand people, among which the Roma (referring here to the Roma immigrants who came after the fall of Communism, especially from Central and Eastern European countries) represent only fifteen to twenty thousand. Concerning these states, an analysis of the evolution of the Roma number in the last decade highlights significant “boom” moments in their number and visibility: 2004–5 (after the eastward enlargement with ten new states, including Slovakia – a state with a large number of Roma who, after the

487

Raluca Florescu, “CENSUS 2002/2011: the Roma Community is Almost the Only One to Have Increased. The Romanians Drop Dramatically,” Evenimentul Zilei (The Daily Event) (February 2, 2012), http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/recensamant-20022011-comunitatea-roma-aproapesingura-care-a-crescut-romanii-scad-dram-96458.html. 488 Daniela Tarnovschi, 114.

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EU accession, took the road to Western Europe) and 2007–8 (after the accession of Romania and Bulgaria). Thus, if in 2003 the Institute for Applied Sociology in Spain presented the figure 435,629489 Roma, nowadays, the maximal estimation is 800,000, while in Italy the number of Roma has tripled since the 1990s, reaching 140,000 due to massive immigration (legal and especially illegal) from states such as the former Yugoslavia or Romania. According to international institutions and the field tests of the last five years, the Roma in Romania have chosen as destination states Spain (35%), France, and Italy (12%), while the Roma in Bulgaria have chosen Greece and Germany (22%), followed closely by Spain (20%). Italy, Spain, and France are the three states considered (according to statistics) favourite destinations of the Roma in Romania in the last decade (see map of the Romanian and Bulgarian Roma main host countries). Although the three states have rich histories of immigration, only after the last enlargement waves of the EU and in the context of the economic crisis effects did the immigrant issue become a socioeconomic societal problem included on the security agenda of these states. In Spain they have a six hundred-year history, but this does not mean that these olvidados490 enjoy a privileged situation, when only through the Constitution of 1970 were they acknowledged as citizens, being guaranteed fundamental rights. Currently, in the province of Andalusia (the clear leader in terms of number of Roma, part of the Kale group) their number exceeds forty percent (one third of the total number of Roma in Spain, the largest concentrations being in cities like Madrid, Catalonia, and Valencia, ten percent of the total population), followed by Murcia. City-wise, Madrid, Barcelona, Seville, Granada, Valencia, and Zaragoza491 are among the leading ones. Over time, they were the subject of numerous persecution and marginalization campaigns, sometimes raised to the level of state policies (for details see chapter three on the history of yesterday’s Roma – the starting point of today’s Roma identity construction). The history of Romanian Roma mobility in Spain started in the 1990s, recording three important moments related to the history of democratization and Romania’s accession negotiations with the EU. 489

ROMANITET, 9. Open Society Institute, The Situation of Roma in Spain, Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Minority Protection (Budapest, 2002), 286, http://web.archive.org/web/20071201172552; http://www.eumap.org/reports/2002/eu/international/sections/spain/2002_m_spain. pdf. 491 Ibid., 286. 490

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The first notable presence of the Roma in Romania dates back to the 1990s (more exactly 1990–3), against the precarious economic conditions in the state, the uncertainty of the democratization process, as well as the numerous previously reviewed violent incidents with the majority population. Thus, it is not a surprise that the first Roma groups (dispersed through the entire Spanish territory) are political asylum seekers. The removal of visas for the Romanian citizens (implicitly for the Roma) when visiting the states in the Schengen area in 2002,492 as part of the EU enlargement process, led to a new mobility wave towards Spain and vice versa. It was the ideal moment for the Romanian citizens of Roma origin who left for Spain illegally in the 1990s to return home and retrace the journey under legal terms. We can therefore witness a systematization of migration, concurrently with a concentration of Roma families within large cities such as Madrid or Barcelona. The authorities’ concern for their situation simultaneously increased as the media made its presence in the society more familiar, through stories and videos depicting their squalid living conditions and survival practices of begging, peddling, or small acts of theft. In 2005 in Spain, seventy-five percent of Roma worked in services, especially trading and entertainment, eleven percent in construction, five percent in industry, and nine percent in agriculture.493 The need to develop certain measures to achieve social inclusion (given that, in 2005, approximately seventy-two percent of the Roma in Spain had not completed their primary studies and 18.4 percent were illiterate, which makes their inclusion on the labour market practically impossible) led to the emergence of the ACCEDER Program (A Gateway to Social Inclusion and Equal Opportunities for the Roma Population494), implemented by the Fondacion Secretariado Gitano. The main goal of this program is to promote equal opportunities for Roma to access the labour

492 Óscar López-Catalán and Meritxell Sàez-Sellarés, “Mobilitate forĠată, poziĠii marginale si accesul la drepturile fundamentale. MigranĠii romi úi politicile locale din Zona Metropolitană Barcelona” [“Forced Mobility, Marginal Positions and Access to Fundamental Rights: Roma Migrants and Local Policies in the Barcelona Metropolitan Area”], in Spectrum: cercetări sociale despre romi [Spectrum: Social Research on Roma], edited by Toma Stefánia and Fosztó László (Cluj-Napoca: Editura Institutului pentru Studierea Problemelor MinorităĠilor NaĠionale [Institute for Research on National Minority Issues Study Publishing House]: Kriterion, 2010), 243. 493 See more on the Minority Rights Group International website. 494 See more on the ACCEDER A Gate to Social Inclusion and Equality of Opportunities for the Roma Population program website.

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market.495 So far, this program is the most viable solution for achieving social integration of the Roma in the destination states, given the fact that the program has also been multiplied and implemented in Romania by the National Agency for the Roma, unfortunately without managing to obtain results equal to those in Spain. The last important point is represented by the situation following Romania’s and Bulgaria’s accession to the EU in the 2007–8 interval, when a new “boom” of Roma migration was recorded (in the case of Barcelona, the main origin localities in Romania are ğăndărei, IalomiĠa county, and Murgeni, Vaslui county).496 Their immigration was in the family, pursuing the family reunification within the host state, evidenced by the empty dwellings and the stories of the elderly who were left behind. Fortunately for the Spanish, the status of EU membership offered the Roma from Romania and Bulgaria the possibility to opt for any of the other twenty-five EU member states as a destination. And this is how it actually happened – the Roma immigration phenomenon diversified in terms of host states so that, at present, there is no EU state without at least one family of ethnic Roma from Romania. Of the states in which the Roma are most visible we can mention France, Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, and Italy,497 the latter being frequently mentioned in discourses on the issue of immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe after the Mailat case in 2007 or the Maroni Census (also known in common parlance as the “Census of Shame”498). The examples can continue with the case of May 2008 when illegal Roma camps around cities like Milan, Napoli, and Rome were attacked by angry locals, groups of neo-Nazis, and Camorra gangs, following the allegations of a young Italian woman that a Rom woman had tried to abduct her child,499 or the incident in Turin (2011, Vallette suburbia) when a Roma camp was burned

495

For details see the Activities Report 2007 of the Project, on the ACCEDER Program website. 496 López-Catalán and Sàez-Sellarés, “Mobilitate forĠată,” 244. 497 Similar to Spain, Italy also has a rich and extensive history regarding the Roma, from the beginning of the fifteenth century. Of the approximately one hundred and forty thousand Roma living in Italy, about seventy thousand have citizenship and own an Italian passport, about fifty thousand are descendants of the first Roma groups that settled on the Italian territory six centuries ago, and only about thirty to forty thousand are the result of the last migration waves that followed the Second World War, among which only about ten thousand have Romania as their origin state. 498 Martinez Guillem, “European Identity,” 24. 499 Ibid., 23.

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down after a sixteen-year-old Italian girl falsely claimed that she was raped by Roma men there. In figures, the tense relationship between the majority population and the Roma ethnics is transposed onto the fact that sixty-eight percent of Italians wish to see the approximately 140,000 Roma (whether Italian citizens or not) expelled from Italy.500 In fact, the situation is much more nuanced given the attacks of extremist gangs, with Molotov cocktails, the demolition of illegal camps, poverty, misery, censuses, and Mussolini-like fingerprinting501 (recalling the Manifesto of Race), or themes for the election campaign like “the protagonists in security and organized crimerelated controversies.”502 Unlike Spain, in Italy the Roma issue has been much more present and covered by the media both during the election campaign and in securitization discourses when policymakers wanted to obtain public support for the implementation of actions such as the Maroni Census of 2008 (which actually continues and complicates an action taken by Rome City Hall in 2005 to photograph those living in illegal camps). The action of the Italian Minister of the Interior Roberto Maroni targets the fingerprinting and photographing of all citizens living in illegal camps on the Italian territory as a crime-prevention measure. The administrative argument was that this measure would help in the Roma integration process by facilitating their access to education and the labour market,503 once introduced to the information database, concurrently with expelling those who are illegally living in the Italian territory. This action did not go unnoticed in Europe, the reactions of condemnation from the international press and organizations for human-rights protection (UNICEF and Amnesty International) being prompt in spite of the Italian minister continuing to argue that the census was perfectly legal given that it didn’t address the representatives of a “sole ethnicity,” but rather tried to understand the situation on a part of the population that couldn’t be obtained otherwise. Nationally, the opposition representatives considered this censes as shaming, a “racial” act, while the representatives of the Hebrew community wondered, rhetorically, “why not use a yellow star?” (with reference to Mussolini’s racial laws of 1938).

500

Tom Kington, “68% of Italians want Roma Expelled – Poll,” The Guardian (May 17, 2008), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/may/17/italy. 501 Peter Popham, “Plight of the Roma, Echoes of Mussolini,” Independent (June 27, 2008), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/plight-of-the-romaechoes-of-mussolini-855436.html. 502 Martinez Guillem, “European Identity,” 31. 503 Ibid., 24.

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How did this situation actually occur in Italy? The answer is based on the snowball theory, from a build-up of frustrations within the society regarding the impressive number of immigrants amid an economic recession and a populist rhetoric of the parties in power that were desperately seeking a scapegoat for the disastrous state of the Italian economy affected by the economic crisis and the numerous corruption and sex scandals involving Silvio Berlusconi. The demagogy (“nomads are animals”504) and fantastic stories about the Roma, their culture, and their specific peculiar practices (cannibalism, abduction, and murder of children in various pagan rituals) were the decisive elements in the securitization process that determined public support for this initiative, simultaneously making it part of the process. To persuade the population of the necessity for this action, its initiators also appeal to the media (talk shows, reportages, statistics) and in the Corriere della Sera, published Sunday, June 29, 2008, the results of a televised survey suggest that this measure (referring to the census) was supported by eighty percent of Italian citizens. The success of this action is partly due to the “silent complicity” of the Italian population and the participation of the media, and partly the ambiguous and inconsistent reaction of the EU. If, at first, the EU institutions, especially the EP and the Commission, harshly criticized Minister Maroni’s action, requesting disambiguation as it violated the European norms on antidiscrimination and respect for fundamental rights – notably Directive 43/2000 (which prohibits treatment by ethnicity), as well as European Directive 38/2004 on free movement which prohibits systematic controls of European citizens, thus risking referral to the European Court of Justice – the outcome of this case was less predictable. The same situation reappeared in the case of France a few years later, in reference to the systematic expulsion of the Roma. On September 4, 2008, after considering the report submitted by the Italian government, the European Commission declared that the fingerprinting of the Roma living in camps had no discrimination value and was in accordance with EU legislation. This decision was based on the fact that the census sheet did not include or request ethnic or religious data, the sole purpose being to identify people in a state of illegality who otherwise could not be detected. Based on the conclusions of Jacques Barrot, the European commissioner for justice, Maroni stated that the hype around this project, the insults, and the condemnations of the public opinion were unjustified. He concluded: “Justice has been done!” Indeed, it depends to whom he referred when he 504

Ibid., 32.

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spoke these words – voters and party members, those concerned by the measure and their supporters, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Romania, or the profile NGOs, profoundly outraged by such an action in the twentyfirst century, in a European Union based on multiculturalism and freedom of movement. Unfortunately, this event (on which we have concentrated due to the echoes it produced and the inconsistent reactions from the EU institutions) is not an isolated one, representing only the beginning of a long series of discriminatory actions against the Roma community within the EU, including not only fingerprinting actions but also pamphlet shows, provoking discourses with an air of an election campaign and the demolitions of illegal camps and expulsions. These actions found continuation in Sarkozy’s France from 2010 with the launch of the fight against crime and illegal immigrants, with a special focus on the illegal Roma camps (the situation is extensively analysed in chapter five). But let us return, after this brief analysis, to the causes determining the Roma to leave their origin state and go abroad. Besides the previously presented economic reasons, the Roma migration waves are also based on other factors (discrimination, marginalization, limited access to services, housing, and education, and the lack of identity documents) that not only caused them to leave their origin state, but also denied their membership of this ethnic group, actions with long-term negative effects for the current political Roma identity project. After an online questionnaire (124 people, comprising sixty-four Romanians and sixty Roma), the results in Fig. 4.6 below show a high degree of intolerance of most respondents towards this minority, an attitude based on the distorted images created by the media and policymakers and the stereotype within the society based on the simplifying diversity factor.

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Fig. 4.6. Romanians’ degree of intolerance towards the Roma (%)

80 60 40 20 0 would want would not would not them out of want them want them the country at their as work place neighbors

would not accept them in their family

In the same survey, when answering the question “What are the main reasons that determined you to leave Romania in the last five years?” the responses of the Roma ethnics can be summarized in Fig. 4.7 below. Fig. 4.7. Romanian Roma’s four most important Emigration causes

Emigration causes 8.3 19.6

24.9

poverty 47.2

lack of constant income discrimination lack of decent hausing condition

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Another problem is represented by the numerous, exotic, visible (especially in the media), and problematic migration waves following the 1990s, which left the old, twentieth-century Roma waves behind, being less visible and problematic (their social integration was achieved partially or even completely in various states of Western Europe, France being an example concerning the first Roma waves coming from the former Yugoslavian states). Hence, there is a risk that when counting the Roma in Europe the accent may fall mostly on the latter, with lower attention paid to the already integrated previous waves, such as the Manush, Sinti, and Kalo. This is the situation nowadays, as when the politicians are talking about the Roma issue in the EU they are mainly referring to Roma from Romania and Bulgaria. The analysis of the figures presented by various organizations and institutions at the end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first centuries highlights the importance of the Roma issue from two points of view: quantitatively, the Roma are important due to their number and visibility (the battle of the numbers), and quantitatively, by their inferior socioeconomic status in the society and due to a high mobility. As a result of military conflicts from the 1950s to the 1960s, the Roma migration in Europe recorded “successive rebirths,”505 and thus we are witnessing new migratory waves, especially from the Southeast European countries that were strongly affected economically after the Second World War. Hence, groups of Roma emigrated from Yugoslavia towards Italy (from the 1960s), then towards the Netherlands and, starting from the 1980s, towards Germany and France, searching for work. After the fall of the Communist regime, working abroad became a lifestyle for thousands of Roma who tried their luck in Spain, Italy, France, and Portugal, with a significant number opting for Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, and Greece. These successive waves did not go without answer in the international arena, the voluntary readmission agreements signed by Romania with Germany and France at the beginning of the 1990s aiming at the repatriation of a significant number of Roma who started becoming visible and unwanted within the developed societies. Statistics show that the number of Roma in Europe between 2002 and 2007 tripled from 2,100,000 to 6,200,000. After the EU enlargement in 2007 towards Romania and Bulgaria, a new wave of Roma ethnics “rushed” into the developed states in Western Europe in search of a better life, but the magnitude of the event and their visibility in the media, against the background of the economic and identity crisis of the EU, quickly turned 505

ROMANITET, 6.

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them into a serious problem on the European social and economic agenda, with extensive reverberations in the fields of politics and culture. The Roma visibility in Europe is not due to their impressive number at the European level (about twelve million), but their image which is either connected to the eroded folklore (the romantic image of the gypsy girl, the caravans, and the nomadic myth), or the customs and traditions that individualize them within the society (the music, clothes, the Kris, their traditional professions, and the focus on important moments in life which were presented in chapter three). Migration (especially Roma migration) is considered as a strategic matter for Europe, meaning that it can have an impact on the economy, stability, and security. Even so, migration cannot be fully controlled and zero migration/mobility within the Roma population is neither feasible nor desirable in the European Union member states. In spite of some progress achieved both in the member states and at EU level over the past years, little has changed in the day-to-day situation of most of the Roma. According to the commission’s Roma Task Force findings, strong and proportionate measures are still not yet in place to tackle the social and economic problems of a large part of the EU’s Roma population. For over a decade, the EU institutions have been regularly calling on member states and candidate countries to improve the social and economic integration of the Roma. Now is the time to change good intentions into concrete actions.

4.5. Conclusions The evolution of the public policies in the field of national minorities evolved in parallel with the EU enlargement process towards Central and Southeastern Europe. The appearance of policies concerning national minorities in Central and Southeastern Europe has been influenced by the international legislation in this field and by states’ desire to join NATO and the EU. By adopting the international legislation and formulating their own policies on minority issues, the countries from Central and Southeastern Europe proved that they have the power and will to move on from the Communist period and become real democracies. Being such a complex issue, the minority problem requires a comprehensive approach, integrated measures, international expertise, and transfer and cooperation between local, national, and international actors. The problem needs to be tackled “bottom-up,” with a special role designated for the minority civil society. The challenge is to put another base on the relation between majority and minority, especial when it

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comes to non-popular minorities like the Roma ethnics. The challenge is to overcome the barrier between “us” and “them” and to tackle the social integration process “at the grassroots.” The social integration process of the Roma minority is advanced in all Central and Southeastern Europe countries, and especially the ones with an important number of Roma ethnics (Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary), but there are still many things left to be done as the process is very complex, covering different areas from housing to culture and employment. Meanwhile, the host states in Western Europe are still struggling to find a solution to either foster social integration for Roma (at national or EU levels) or convince them to return to their origin countries. We will further analyse the way in which France tried to address this phenomenon between 2007 and 2012 and describe the French national and transnational strategies for solving the Roma issue, from expulsions to social integration programs.

CHAPTER FIVE THE ROMANIAN ROMA’S SITUATION IN FRANCE (2007–12): THE INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF THE ROMA ISSUE BETWEEN POLITICAL STAKE AND SOCIAL MATTER506

The purpose of this research is to demonstrate the fact that, in the context of the European security agenda and the globalization process, immigrants in general and the Roma in particular found themselves trapped in a spiral of insecurity through which migration has been raised to the level of meta-problem, and they have become scapegoats, to various degrees, of this transformation’s consequences. Up to this point in the research we have seen that following the end of the Cold War the state ceased to be the only security actor, given that the non-military issues began to gain ground on the international agendas. Security was no longer exclusively identified with military issues and the use of force. New problems, determined by the changes in the international arena, such as the interethnic relations, migrations, cultural identity, the environment, and the economy, gained ground against the traditional security challenges. In this context, the migration-identity-security triumvirate imposed on the international agenda a modern approach to the political-security relationship, with direct consequences on the European integration process (in which the EU plays the role of desecuritization actor). The European integration process in this case worked as a security system, leading to a resetting of the role of the state in terms of identity and sovereignty. Within the greater debate of enlargement versus Parts of this chapter were published as “The “frontiers” of Roma’s social integration in the EU. Case study: The Roma issue(s) in France”, Eurolimes - The Social Frontiers of Europe, No.17, edited by Mircea Brie, Klara Czimbre, MuchaLeszko Bogumila (Oradea: Oradea University Press, 2014), 135-45. 506

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European integration in recent years, European identity and citizenship have been at the heart of the European integration process. Security has always been the purpose behind the European integration process, in the states’ attempt to repair the mistakes of the twentieth century. Identity was the element that revolutionized the causality of the migration-insecurity relationship, conferring it flexibility and referential value at both sub and supranational levels, determining the emergence of a transdisciplinary research agenda. Building the Europe of tomorrow, however, cannot be achieved without a consensus with regards to the international migration and its effects in the medium and long-term upon security, social cohesion, the welfare state, and identity within EU. In this context, the EU member states (attractive to immigrants due to the social-protection system and economic opportunities) have shown a constant concern for improving the legislation on migration. Regarding the situation of the Roma in the EU member states our attention is first caught by the situation of the Roma ethnics in a few (origin) states in Central and Eastern Europe, and then by the measures taken by two of Western Europe’s states, namely Italy and Spain, against the waves of Romanian Roma immigrants (especially after Romania’s accession to the EU), with an emphasis on the extent of the phenomenon, the migration-security and majority population-immigrants relationships, and the coverage in the media. The purpose of this chapter is to complete a complex analysis of the situation in the context of the European security agenda, transcending the strictly theoretical framework of the spiral of insecurity, with a focus on the poverty-migration-security relationship (through social integration). The question that arises here is – can social integration be supported, and must it be encouraged within the host or the origin state? We have chosen the period 2007–12 to analyse the Romanian Roma’s situation in France, a relatively extensive period of analysis, for three reasons: x to make a comprehensive analysis of the manner in which the Roma immigration developed in France after Romania’s accession to the EU (in terms of numbers, extent, effects, and visibility in the media) x to make a meaningful analysis of the manner in which the French policymakers chose to instrumentalize this issue, ranging from political stake to social issue, in different national and international contexts marked by the economic crisis and its reverberations in the

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French economic and political domains, respectively the presidential campaign x to draw relevant conclusions regarding the future directions of action (and research), in terms of national or European social integration through transnational/bilateral projects based on the collaboration between the origin and host states In another train of thought, it takes a minimum of five to ten years to reach a conclusion with regards to the effect on the freedom of movement for the citizens of the most recent states to have joined the EU, as well as measure their mobility impact upon the host states. Our main objective is to achieve a coherent analysis507 to facilitate the understanding of the characteristics individualizing the Roma’s situation in various illegal camps in France, their relationships with the majority population, the profile NGOs, as well as their future prospects between repatriation/expulsion and social integration. Although we are using methods/instruments that other researchers are also familiar with and analysing a “trendy” issue in France and the EU, based on our own expertise, contextualization, and analysis, we are certain that the results will be as expected. As with Kuhn’s theory in which “the ducks existing in the researchers’ world before the revolution are rabbits after it,”508 the Roma who were initially considered a minor social issue have become, in the context of freedom of movement, an illegal migration phenomenon, visible through excessive media coverage, and a matter of security with important political reverberations. With the initial observation it is necessary to specify the limits of the case study as a research method within social sciences to obtain comprehensive conclusions. From the perspective of management, the case study represents a detailed and complex analysis of an entity, event, or structure, performed to identify the factors that cause its success or failure. A case study demonstrates the manner in which an issue/problem is identified, the actors involved, its effects, and the solution decided upon, indicating future research directions. On the other hand, the issue under 507

I have used the term “coherent” and not “exhaustive” analysis because this research does not represent an endpoint, but instead emphasizes the intermediate results of the research conducted over the last ten years in Romania (The Northwest Region, 2007–17) and six months in France, particularly in the southern Rhones-Alpes region. 508 Thomas Samuel Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 122.

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review, namely the Romanian Roma situation in France between political stake and social matter, lends itself to such an analysis method as this case study, together with the application of questionnaires, a semi-structured interview, and the non-participative observation method. This chapter has three main sections and one for the conclusions and testimonies of certain Roma living in France and some NGOs representatives working to integrate them, while formulating some future directions of intervention and research. The first section is devoted to a brief history of the immigration phenomenon in France following the Second World War, with an emphasis on evolution, the impact on the French society, and policies applied to reduce and control it. In the second section our attention will be drawn to the situation of the Roma in the Hexagon, with a focus on the last waves from Romania and Bulgaria, to broadly establish the lines for the general analysis framework, namely the societal security operated by the French authorities and the international reaction to these actions. These actions reached their height in the summer and autumn of 2010 (the triggering element being the speech of President Nicolas Sarkozy at Grenoble). For political and electoral reasons, amid an amalgamation of isolated events between the majority population and immigrants from different parts of the state, while also exploiting the French electorate’s state of discontent with the constant increase in the number and visibility of immigrants, through a securitization discourse, the president turned the issue of the immigrants in the Hexagon into a meta-problem. In this part of the analysis, our interest is retained by the manner in which the Roma ethnics became an integral part of the societal securitization process and the program of exceptional measures (especially expulsions and evictions) implemented by the French policymakers. The last part of the study is devoted to the situation of the Roma in the Rhône-Alpes region, specifically the situation of the Romanian Roma in Grand Lyon between 2007 and 2012, from evictions and voluntary repatriation to coherent measures of social integration, both locally and through transnational cooperation with the authorities of the origin state. (Here, our attention will be on the bilateral project initiated by Lyon together with Tinca, Bihor county, in Romania to boost the social reintegration of the Roma.) At this stage, it is worth stopping to look at the methods used to obtain the data and information on the situation of the Roma in Lyon, with a focus on the qualitative and quantitative research. The first method used – also determined by the fact that the research is performed in a foreign state, without previous contact with the respective authorities – is observation. Due to the reluctance of the Roma community

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representatives to talk about their situation (beyond the general information that they usually provided to press representatives regarding the poor economic situation in Romania, the lack of dwellings, and poverty) we opted for the non-participative form of analysis, the activity being mostly based on exterior observation without engagement. To access the communities we resorted to help from the local profile organizations and Pentecostal organizations (which in most cases help them with food and shelter). Making use of the snowball technique and asking them to introduce us to others (while diversifying the areas of observation from Roma camps to markets, churches near tourist destinations, and schools), we managed to create a group of people to analyse the Roma issue in Lyon, our attention being mainly retained by a large group from Tinca village, Bihor county. The relationship was maintained to a greater extent with the representatives of the organizations, as keeping in contact with the people within the community was rather difficult under circumstances of high mobility due to evictions and expulsions. For the best results we combined this method with open interviews and the application of questionnaires in the context of a previous analysis of statistical data, current legislation, the media, and the literature in the field. Fortunately, speaking Romanian (as well as French), we did not encounter difficulties in communicating with them, nor with the NGOs and local authority representatives. A constraint in this research was imposed by the Roma’s reluctance to provide accurate information about their situation (especially regarding Romania and the reasons why they are there) and their constant mobility, which required a permanent extension of the research area and the group. We also encountered difficulties due to the lack of openness of the local authorities of Lyon in providing information on the local Roma community’s situation (i.e. their housing situation, number, access to medical services, education, etc.), the economic reasons that led to some evictions, the local social inclusion strategy, and previous and ongoing projects. There are at least two explanations for this reluctance of the authorities: the secrecy of certain information and the lack of accurate information on this matter. Another limitation is time, given that the field research (non-participative observation, unstructured interviews, and questionnaire application in the Lyon area) was carried out over a period of three weeks, being supplemented with information on the Romanian Roma’s situation in other areas of France, namely Ile de France (Seine Saint Dennis) and St. Etienne, and the extensive experience in working with the Roma communities in Romania. In these circumstances, the conclusions of the case study are the result of the findings and information

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obtained from the field research (in France and Romania) combined with prior documentation on the current French legislation, statistics, and press analyses.

5.1. The Immigration Phenomenon in France: Evolution, Impact and Public Policies France is, next to Italy and Spain, one of the Western European states with an extensive history and tradition in terms of immigration, comprising seasonal workers, students, asylum seekers, family reunification actions, and an important percentage of illegal immigrants, called in the French legislation sans papier. This tradition has determined fierce debates over the years on the subject of immigration, national identity, social integration, and repatriation, together with extensive anti-immigrant protests and demonstrations. The immigration situation in today’s France is strongly influenced by two factors: the legacy of colonialism and a long tradition of recruiting foreign workers509 in order to integrate them into the French labour market or to compensate for demographic shortages, especially after the Second World War. When performing a brief retrospective analysis, a steady increase (starting with the period following the Second World War) can be observed in the number of immigrants, which had obvious consequences at the French society level. If, from an economic point of view, immigration had long been regarded as “a success story” (especially after the population decline determined by the wars of 1870–1, the first and second world wars, and the economic growth of the 1950s and 1960s), from a political point of view it became (particularly amid economic recessions like the Great Depression, oil crises, and the current economic crisis) “the root of social problems.”510 The need for a labour force forced France to conclude recruitment agreements with other European states, such as Italy (in 1904, 1916, and 1919), Belgium (in 1906), Poland (in 1906), and Czechoslovakia (in 1920). The approximately 2.7 million immigrants, representing 6.6 percent of the total population, propelled France, in the 1930s, to second place in the world, after America, in terms of immigration in absolute numbers.511 The same situation is also recorded after the Second World War and especially during the “economic boom” period (1950–60) when, together 509

More details on Focus Migration-France. Ibid. 511 Ibid. 510

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with a significant number of workers from European states (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Russia, Belgium, and Poland), many immigrants from Algeria appeared (as a consequence of the war of 1954–62, based on the Evian Agreements and independence of 1962). If, in 1962, the number of Algerians in the Hexagon was 350,000, twenty years later this number doubled, reaching 800,000512 in 1982, amid constant immigration and the family reunification phenomenon. The first (official) data on the number of foreigners in France dates to the census of 1851, but the concerns of the authorities regarding the regulation and control of the immigration phenomenon appeared only after the Second World War due to the effects generated by the oil crisis of 1973, the integration of a significant number of women into the labour market, and the effects of long-term unemployment. All this prompted the Hexagon authorities to suspend all foreign-worker recruitment programs, in line with other European states in 1974. This measure proved ineffective in the long term because a large part of the workers who came earlier had settled and now submitted requests for family reunification, this practice thus turning into an effective channel (as well as being important from a numerical point of view) of immigration. From the 1980s immigration became a political issue in France amid the emergence (and constant enlargement) of slums on the outskirts of large cities, due to the great number of foreign workers and their families and first generation of their children, in the context of a poor socialhousing program. The difficult cohabitation and visibility in the society, along with the enlargement of poor and overly-crowded slums, created favourable conditions for the intervention of state authorities based on the anti-immigration public (political) discourse. An action which subsequently became a trademark of the transformation of the immigration phenomenon into a political issue is represented by the action of the Communist mayor of Vitry-sur-Sein Paul Marcieca on December 24, 1980 to suspend the construction of accommodations for three hundred workers from Mali, using a bulldozer.513 The Communist mayor’s action could easily have been considered a local incident if it weren’t also supported by the party and developed as a national social concern by the Communist leader Georges Marchais, who believed that:

512

Kimberly Hamilton, Patrick Simon, and Clara Veniard, “The Challenge of French Diversity,” Migration Policy Institute (November 2004), http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=266. 513 Mamadouh, “The Scaling of the ‘Invasion’,” 385.

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Due to the presence of nearly four and a half million immigrant workers and members of their families in France, the continuation of immigration poses serious issues nowadays. We must face them and quickly take the necessary measures. An alarming level has been reached. This is why we say: we must put an end to immigration, otherwise we would have to send new workers into unemployment. I will make it clear: we must put an end to the legal and illegal immigration. We must solve the major problem of immigration within the local French community. They can be found crammed into what can only be called ghettos, workers and families with different traditions, languages and lifestyles. All these create tension and sometimes even clashes between the immigrants from different countries. All these make the relations with the French difficult. When the concentration becomes very important, the housing crisis worsens. The social housing cannot cope with it and many French families are not granted access. The welfare expenses necessary for the immigrant families plunged into misery become unbearable for the municipal budgets.514

The contents of this letter and the party’s position regarding immigrants and the threats their presence in France causes (related to housing, urbanism, and social, economic, and intercultural factors) led to the transformation of this issue into a political concern. Amid the emergence of anti-immigrant feelings among the population, the right-wing parties (such as the National Front, led by Jean Marie Le Pen) started to gain significant ground among voters by launching an anti-immigration agenda based on the housing issue, connected with the lack of employment, due to the second oil crisis of 1979. In this context, immigrant became the social enemy of the French individual as it steals their work (source of income) 514

Lettre de Georges Marchais, secrétaire général du PC, reproduite dans “L’Humanité,” 6 janvier 1981: “En raison de la présence en France de près de quatre millions et demi de travailleurs immigrés et de membres de leur familles, la poursuite de l’immigration pose aujourd’hui de graves problèmes. Il faut les regarder en face et prendre rapidement les mesures indispensables. La cote d’alerte est atteinte. C’est pourquoi nous disons : il faut arrêter l’immigration, sous peine de jeter de nouveaux travailleurs au chômage. Je précise bien: il faut stopper l’immigration officielle et clandestine. Il faut résoudre l’important problème posé dans la vie locale française par l’immigration. Se trouvent entassés dans ce qu’il faut bien appeler des ghettos, des travailleurs et des familles aux traditions, aux langues, aux façons de vivre différentes. Cela crée des tensions, et parfois des heurts entre immigrés des divers pays. Cela rend difficiles leurs relations avec les Français. Quand la concentration devient très important, la crise du logement s’aggrave. Les HLM font cruellement défaut et de nombreuses familles françaises ne peuvent y accéder. Les charges d’aide sociale nécessaires pour les familles immigrés plongées dans la misère deviennent insupportables pour les budgets des communes.” http://ripostelaique.com/Immigration-de-travail-de.html.

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and takes advantage of the welfare state (a matter already discussed in chapter two). Thus, due to the political electoral stake, a problem that is especially visible around the large cities became a national concern with great economic, social, and cultural reverberations (the newcomers were much too different in terms of religion and culture, with a darker skin colour, to be able to integrate, being the official position of the anti-immigration supporters in the public debate). The development of this issue to a national level proved, as we will see in the case of the migration in the coming decades, that the threshold of tolerance (seuil de tolerance)515 has been reached in the French territory in terms of migration, and that the economic benefits of this can no longer cover the required social and security costs. The politicization of the immigration phenomenon of the 1980s, through its transformation into a social and cultural issue, next to the economic and security implications, paved the way to election-campaign themes for the right-wing parties and the candidates in the presidential race, starting with Francois Mitterrand and ending with Francois Hollande in 2012. The social issue of the 1970s developed by 2000 (based on the snowball theory and the events in the international arena) into a socioeconomic cultural issue in which the immigrants’ different religious elements have often been described as problematic516 in terms of security and integration (see the reference to Islamism). These differences also came to be reflected in the legislation on immigration regulation. In 1991 the former right-wing president of the republic, Valery Giscard d’Estaing, used the term “invasion”517 in an intervention in the newspaper Le Monde, referring to both the great number of immigrants in France and especially their visibility within the society in relation to the majority French population. In another intervention in 1998 the former Gaullist Prime Minister Édouard Balladur brought into discussion the idea of introducing “national preferences”518 regarding immigrants. Both ideas were repeated over a decade of French political discourse. The idea of immigration control resumed in the Immigration and Integration Law of 07/25/2006, about which Sarkozy, then minister of the interior, said that “selective immigration … is the expression of France’s sovereignty. It is the right of our country, like all the great democracies of the world, to 515

Mamadouh, “The Scaling of the ‘Invasion’,” 385. Ibid., 389. 517 Ibid. 518 Ibid. 516

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choose which foreigners it allows to reside on our territory.”519 The idea of an invasion of immigrants was transformed into an insecurity leitmotif (at the national level) in various states of Western Europe as “Europe under siege” or “fear of immigrants” (both analysed in the previous chapters). The immigrant selection phenomenon (in the sense of a preference of some over others) can also be easily observed in the higher degree of acceptance (in the sense of openness) regarding the Central and Eastern Europe immigrants to the detriment of the Muslim or Asian ones, due to cultural and religious similarities (an issue already discussed in chapter two). In 1993, Minister of the Interior Charles Pasqua launched the idea of “zero migration,” and through the “Pasqua laws” an attempt was made to limit the number of immigrants by prohibiting foreign students from taking jobs in France and increasing the waiting periods for family reunification from one year to two years,520 which gave rise to violent reactions from the immigrants, culminating in a group of African and Chinese immigrants taking over a church in Paris in 1996521 to draw the attention of the public opinion and the policymakers to their situation. The event did not go unnoticed. Ten thousand people mobilized for sans papier in Paris in 1996, and during 1996 and 1997 the protests continued, determining the centre-left government led by Lionel Jospin to withdraw several amendments of the Pasqua laws, especially those discouraging the concentration of quality human capital in France. The “much disputed Lebre Law”522 is also included in the same manner of immigrant discouragement (and control over the illegal immigration phenomenon). Through it, police forces acquire greater power and freedom of action to control the immigration phenomenon. Under this law, Article 3 provides that police officers have the right to conduct inspections of cars within a radius of twenty kilometres from the border, while Article 10523 provides that identity-card checks can be performed around construction sites, both actions aiming to control illegal immigration and fight undeclared work. It is thus implied that immigrants, by their nature, tend to commit unlawful deeds, so the police force and policymakers are obliged to take measures to prevent such deviant 519

Kara Murphy, “France’s New Law: Control Immigration Flows, Court the Highly Skilled,” Migration Policy Institute (November 2006), http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=486. 520 Hamilton, Simon, and Veniard, “The Challenge of French Diversity.” 521 Focus Migration-France. 522 Arădău, “Migration: the Spiral of (In)Security,” 4. 523 Ibid.

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behaviours in the French society, as they may have consequences for the society and economy. In terms of numbers, the situation of immigrants in the Hexagon continued its ascending trend, also being favoured by family reunification actions (approximately seventy percent of requests), professional training reasons, and labour-force migration, as is evident from the research conducted by the National Institute for Demographic Studies in France,524 analysing the 1994–2003 period. Fig. 5.1. Migration to France by reason for entry (2004) (percentage of total migration)

524

The National Institute for Demographic Studies, France.

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Source: OECD (2006); International Migration Outlook, Migration Policy Institute (September 27, 2013)

Starting with the second conservative government led by Jean-Pierre Raffarin (June 17, 2002 to March 31, 2004), the trend for a restrictive immigration policy becomes more and more obvious, culminating on June 30, 2006 (when the government was led by Dominique de Villepin, Sarkozy being minister of the interior) with the enactment of the new Immigration Law (Loi relative à l’immigration et à l’intégration). This law had four main objectives: recruiting skilled workers, facilitating foreign students’ stay, tightening the rules on family reunification, and limiting access to residence and citizenship.525 This law was widely criticized by human-rights organizations and left-wing parties on the grounds that it would prioritize the economic benefits of immigration to the detriment of the people (in a state where family reunification is the main form of immigration), arguing that the term “selective immigration” is in fact synonymous with “disposable immigration.” As a reaction to these accusations, the right wing took a stand through Sarkozy, who claimed that this law intended to attract what was best for France and not those people who were “not wanted anywhere else.”526 The same position was also confirmed by the Minister of Town and Country Planning Christian Estorsi, who considered that: “After 30 years of renunciation and blindness in front of the crucial challenge of immigration, after 30 years of uncertainty and non-chance, the moment

525

For details see the text of the law, Loi relative à l'immigration, à l'intégration et à la nationalité, Loi no. 2011-672 du 16 juin 2011 parue au JO n° 139 du 17 juin 2011, on the Senat webpage. 526 Focus Migration-France.

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has come to act!”527 The idea of a selective migration system was also supported in 2012 by Manuel Valls, referring to the case of the Roma in France, stating that: “Nowadays, we cannot afford to receive all these populations (referring here to the Roma) who are often the damned of the Earth, who are pursued in their country, who are discriminated … [France did its duty] in terms of asylum, in terms of integration, but the message is clear: determination.”528 A new stage in the French history of immigration was marked by the enlargement of the European Union towards the states in Central and Eastern Europe in 2004 and 2007, which created new waves of immigrants (for example the “Polish plumbers” who, in 2005, due to the invalidation of the referendum on the European Constitution, were presented by the media as the Eastern competition/threat on the labour market529), and with them new problems of integration both into the society and on the labour market, in the context of economic recession. The idea of “waves of immigrants” is a geopolitical representation, creating the impression of an invasion (in the modern sense of the word), with medium and long-term economic, social, and cultural effects in the host society. Precisely because it is a vague construction (with no concrete figure of support, the migration process being difficult to account for due to the large percentage of illegal migration), it was, and still is, used by right-wing parties (i.e. the National Front) in populist discourses to win electoral capital (see the 1995 presidential-campaign pamphlets, when Le Pen proposed expelling “a total of three million non-Europeans from France” using “humane and dignified methods” as a measure in the fight against uncontrolled migration). This representation, which gives the impression of uncontrolled waves of immigrants, causes panic in the communities, making them more receptive to a potential (societal) securitization action against the newcomers. In France, the regions with the highest number of immigrants in 2004– 5 were, according to Fig. 5.2 below, the Ile de France, Alsace, and Provence-Alpes-Côte-d’Azure regions.

527

Murphy, “France's New Law.” Paul Ciocoiu, “The French Minister of the Interior, about the Roma: France Cannot Receive All the Dirt in Europe,” Ziarul Evenimentul Zilei [The Daily Event Newspaper], http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/Ministrul-francez-de-Interne-referitorla-romi-Frana-nu-poate-primi-toat-mizeria-din-E-1000254/pagina-comentarii// toate-comentariile.html. 529 Focus Migration-France. 528

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Fig. 5.2. Concentration of immigrants in French regions (2004–5)

Source: France métropolitaine; INSEE, enquêtes annuelles de recensement de 2004 et 2005530

Thus, amid a wave of discontent from the French population towards a new influx of immigrants (especially the ones from the latest EU members – see the results of a survey conducted by the French polling agency BVA and commissioned by TV channel i-Télé and the daily newspaper Le Parisien in 2013, according to which seventy-seven percent of the population in the Hexagon agrees with Minister Manuel Valls’s statements that the Roma immigrants are inherently “different” and “will have to return to Bulgaria and Romania,” while only twenty-two percent disagree with this idea, considering that he “should not stigmatise a segment of the

530

Catherine Borrel, “Enquêtes annuelles de recensement 2004 et 2005, Près de 5 millions d’immigrés à la mi-2004,” Cellule Statistiques et études sur l’immigration, Insee, Nr. 1098, Aout 2006, 3.

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population”531), the anti-immigration platform still continues to be a major election-campaign theme. For this, see the results obtained by the National Front candidate Jean Marie Le Pen during the presidential elections of 2002 and those obtained by his daughter Marine Le Pen in 2012. In 2002, Jean Marie Le Pen got seventeen percent of the vote in the first round, and was able to improve his result532 in the runoff by exploiting this election theme (with a focus on the threat to the French national identity and security that came from the Muslims, in the context of the recent attacks in the US). The effort was not enough to convince the majority of voters, who gave a trust of confidence to the ring-wing candidate, Jacques Chirac (eighty-two percent). In the 2012 campaign, Marine Le Pen used the conflict between “the nation and its unity”533 as an election platform, based on the conflicting representations between what is “truly French” (the borders, the territory) and the threats to identity,534 with a focus on the threat of “Islamization” of the French society due to a significant number of Islamic immigrants settled in compact neighbourhoods, with a different religion and dress code, visible in the society (elements that make their social integration difficult). In France, the Muslim issue is much more complex as it involves various levels of analysis, in that on the one hand we have the issue of Muslim immigrants’ integration (of the newcomers who have a certain status), and on the other the issue of those who either embraced this religion (French converts) or are representatives of the second or third generation of Muslims (i.e. French citizens). At a local analysis level these differences are of utmost importance (in terms of immigrants-majority population relations, access to services, and social organization), while at the national level there is a sole general issue requiring viable solutions, and that is the social inclusion of Muslims. This offensive discourse seduced a large part of the French electorate, as shown by the 17.9 percent of votes in 2012 (representing the best score that a National Front representative has obtained in a presidential election race). At the beginning of 2013, according to L’Institute national de statistique et des études économiques (INSEE), in the Hexagon there

531 AFP, “Majority of French Believe Roma Should Leave France,” France 24 (September 28, 2013), http://www.france24.com/en/20130928-77-france-romamanuel-valls-romania-bulgaria-immigration-integration-assimilation. 532 Mamadouh, “The Scaling of the ‘Invasion’,” 390. 533 Giblin, “La Geopolitique,” 9. 534 Ibid., 10.

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were 63,703,191535 citizens. According to the same institute, at regional level, the immigrants are concentrated in the urban areas. The explanation of this fact resides in three main reasons: employment opportunities (a large part are economic immigrants seeking for a job), access to higher education (the second form of immigration in France after family reunification is represented by migration due to educational reasons, where between 2001 and 2003 the number of foreign students increased by fifty percent536), and the fact that large cities are a mosaic of populations, which is why the differences (cultural, religious) are more easily accepted as opposed to the small, traditional communities, which are much more reticent to accept changes and differences. Of course there are exceptions, especially among Roma citizens for whom the main motivation in choosing a destination is the possibility of financial gain and not representing a visible target for eviction or expulsion actions (we will address this issue in the following pages), as concluded from Dorina Lacatos’s statement: “même moi ici qu'à Paris. La police ne nous contrôle pas autant”537 [“here, less than in Paris, police controls are not that common”]. Around forty percent of immigrants are living in the Ile de France region. Other important regions are Rhône-Alpes (Lyon) and ProvenceAlpes-Côte d’Azur (Marseille). Depending on the state of origin, forty-two percent of the immigrants come from Africa (thirty percent from Maghreb, twelve percent from Sub-Saharan Africa), thirty-eight percent from Europe (mainly from Portugal, Italy, and Spain), fourteen percent from Asia, and only five percent from America and Oceania.538 What is truly interesting about these numbers is the fact that, after the Second World War, approximately seventy-nine percent of the immigrants came from European states, while starting from the 1970s their number has decreased constantly, with the number of immigrants whose states of origin are further away from France increasing, a clear leader being Africa (1962: 2.4 percent, 2005: 13.9 percent, 2010: 42 percent).

535

Vanessa Bellamy and Catherine Beaumel, “Bilan démographique 2012, La population croît, mais plus modérément, division Enquêtes et études démographiques,” INSEE 1429 (Janvier 2013): 1. 536 Kara Murphy, “France's New Law.” 537 “Comment les Roms voient la France et leur avenir,” Le Monde (October 5, 2013), http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2013/10/05/comment-les-roms-voientla-france-et-leur-avenir_3490507_3224.html. 538 Répartition des immigrés par pays de naissance, Recensement 2010, INSEE (October 2011).

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5.1.1. Immigrants, foreigners, gens du voyage: Roma-conceptual delimitations According to an administrative delimitation, in France there are several categories of citizens. To avoid confusion, a brief overview of the main terms used in the analysis is essential. In an INSEE document, immigrants are defined as “a person born in another state, who now lives in France.”539 French citizens born abroad and currently living in France do not fall into this category. As a counterbalance to this, certain immigrants can become French citizens, while others remain in the category of foreigners. Foreigners and immigrants do not always overlap – an immigrant is not necessarily a foreigner and vice versa, as certain foreigners are born in France (especially minors).540 Interestingly, according to the French legislation, the quality of immigrant is permanent, even with the passing of years, in that a person obtains French citizenship yet remains an integral part of the immigrant category. The country you were born in and not the nationality you were born with is the one defining the geographic origin of an immigrant.541 Claudia Arădău considers that, in this manner, the immigrant is condemned to permanently remain in “the other” category542 (perpetual alterity), a source of insecurity and suspicion, and never be one of us.543 We can thus consider that their integration is never complete, at least from a legal point of view. Unlike immigrants, the foreigner category refers to “the people living in France, but do not have French citizenship, the ones that have other citizenship or those who have none (stateless).”544 Unlike the immigrant, the foreigner loses this quality when they become a French citizen – “française par acquisition.”545 Who are the “gens du voyage”? The term is an administrative one, put into circulation through two decrees in 1972, referring to the law of January 3, 1969 which governs the right of homeless people to move in order to bear movement activities. We are dealing with an administrative neologism, which takes no singular, and is thus meant to designate a category of people. Individually it is lost and identifies itself only within 539

Recensement de la population 2006, INSEE, 2. Ibid. 541 Ibid. 542 Arădău, “Migration: the Spiral of (In)Security,” 4. 543 Ibid. 544 Recensement de la population, 2006, 1. 545 Ibid. 540

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the group – its identity does not matter anymore, it exists only by reference to the group it belongs to.546 According to the Herrison Report in 2007, three categories of gens du voyage can be identified in France: “nomad gens du voyage, semisedentary gens du voyage who travel across short distances and limited in terms of time and the gens du voyage who have become sedentary.”547 According to the same report, at the end of the 1980s a new category emerged – the Roma – who “do not belong to the gens du voyage category, because according to the law of January 3rd 1969, they should have a ‘titre de circulation,’ but they don’t.” The Roma are also not included under the Besson Law of July 5, 2000. According to this report, the Roma are part of the foreigners’ category: “national residents of the European Union (especially from Romania and Bulgaria).”548 They are part of the immigrant category due to economic reasons (poverty, lack of employment, housing) or social and cultural reasons. The gens du voyage are French citizens, while the Roma are not. In an analysis of four French newspapers (Le Figaro, Le Monde, La Republique, and Libération) on 240 articles from the period 2002–12 by Céline Bergeon and Marion Salin,549 the two terms – gens du voyage and Roma – are assimilated to different issues the French society and administration are dealing with, hence the administrative differences between them. The main concern with the gens du voyage is related to the camping areas (or rather the lack of such areas), while in the case of the Roma the main issues are related to the visibility within the society, and the clichés regarding their lifestyle: language, dress code, begging,

546

Jean-Pierre Liégeois, “Rejets éternels: les collectivités locales face aux Tsiganes et aux nomads,” E-migrinter-Rroms et Gens du voyage 6 (2010) (revue en ligne): 26, http://www.mshs.univ-poitiers.fr/migrinter/e-migrinter/201006/e-mig rinter2010_06_002.pdf. 547 Pierre Hérisson [Sénateur, Président de la Commission Nationale Consultative des Gens du Voyage Gens du voyage], “Pour un statut proche du Droit commun,” Parlementaire en Mission, Rapport au Premier Ministre, Julliet (2011): 4–5, http://www.agv35.fr/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Rapport-GdV-P-HERISSONjuillet-2011-Version-finale.pdf. 548 Ibid., 1. 549 Céline Bergeon and Marion Salin, “Se dire Manouche, Rom, Gitan? Processusd’identification des populations Rroms: au-delà des pratiquesspatiales,” E-migrinter-Rroms et Gens du voyage 6 (2010) (revue en ligne): 31. http://www.mshs.univ-poitiers.fr/migrinter/e-migrinter/201006/emigrinter2010_06_002.pdf.

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expulsion, illegal camps, poverty, marginalization, police raids, violent incidents, and fires.550 A first conclusion to this conceptual delimitation with an administrative role is that we have two main groups: French citizens (or citizens who can acquire French citizenship in time, the result targeting their social integration), and citizens who live in France yet cannot obtain citizenship, and even if they do will remain in the immigrant category. For our analysis we are interested in this latter category, particularly the Roma group. In a circular letter of the minister of the interior dated December 22, 2006, which states the new status of the Romanian and Bulgarian citizens starting from January 1, 2007 within the EU and its member states, it is underlined that: “the integration of these countries does not mean the ipso facto recognition of an unconditional right to stay for their citizens, the exercise of this right is based on the satisfaction of a number of criteria.”551 Indeed, by the end of 2013, Romanian and Bulgarian nationals were subject to the transitional arrangements552 on the free movement of workers (an arrangement previously applied to the states joining in 2004). This singular phrase of the circular letter summarizes the European reality, namely that the accession to the EU does not automatically mean integration within this community, hence the actual enlargement versus integration debate within the EU. Within this debate, the Roma issue has the ability to revolutionize the national and international securitization efforts with a focus on establishing a coherent European framework for social inclusion, which can afterwards be transferred to the states in national strategies meant for the improvement of living conditions within the Roma community.

550

Ibid. “[L]’integration de ces pays a l’Union ne signifie pas la reconnaissance ipso facto au profit de leurs ressortissants d’un droit inconditionnel au sejour, l’exercise de ce droit reposant sur la satisfaction d’un certain nombre de criteres.” “Circulaire du 22 decembre 2006, Sejour et eloignement des ressortissants roumains et bulgares,” Minister de L’Interieur et de L’Amenagement du Territoire, Paris, p. 2, http://www.romeurope.org/IMG/pdf/Circulaire_du_22_decembre_2006_Sejour_et _eloignement_des_ressortissants_roumains_et_bulgares.pdf. 552 The states that imposed restrictions on the free movement of the Romanian labour force are: Germany, the UK, Ireland, France, Austria, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Luxemburg, Netherlands, and Malta. These transitional arrangements limit the labour market to 150 professions with recruitment difficulties, after the issuance of a work permit and payment of a fee to the French Office for Immigration and Integration (OFII) by the employer. Their suspension depends on a simple decision by the government, as already occurred in Italy and Ireland. 551

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To meet these policies, in 2013 the French government “loosened” the transitional measures program restricting Romanian and Bulgarian access to the labour market, meaning that that the fee that had to be paid at the Office for Immigration and Integration (between 850 and 2,500 euros) was suspended, and the list of the 150 professions was extended. But until the complete suspension of these restrictions, they represented obstacles in the labour-market integration, with consequences for the social-integration process. Given the historical significance in terms of the immigration in France and the conceptual administrative delimitations, we will further analyse the Roma situation in the Hexagon, our attention being particularly retained by the manner in which their situation changed after 2007, but especially after the Grenoble speech (2010) and the circular letter of August 5, in terms of visibility and living conditions.

5.2. L’Affaire des Roms Roumains en France If we search for the exact moment when the “l’affaire des roms” actually began in France, it is possible to encounter difficulties as there is no specific date or at least not one that can be pinpointed and accepted unanimously. Over time, there were several successive waves of Roma immigrants who temporarily settled in France, drawing the attention of the French authorities and the media through their visibility and size, mainly opting for the large cities (Paris, Lyon, Marseille, Lille, Saint-Étienne, and Nantes) as can easily be observed from Fig 5.3 below. As a first observation, if we refer to the main immigrant areas in France mentioned in the first part of this chapter, we observe that the main concentrations of Roma were also created in these regions, namely the Îlede-France, Provence-Alpes-Côte-d’Azure, and Nord-Pas-de-Calais regions. The reasons for this overlap are the same as the underlying emigration in general: x the economic mirage of developed cities offers diversified income opportunities (from the practice of street commerce, car cleaning at intersections, selling newspapers, collecting scrap metal, to begging) x the cultural diversity of large cities (in kaleidoscope-type communities, cultural, religious, and clothing differences are less visible and more easily accepted than in small, closed communities)

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x direct transportation connection from Romania to these places, by bus, plane, or train x spatial-geographic reasons (the probability of finding a camping site, in squares, parks, abandoned buildings, and warehouses in industrial areas, or near train stations and under bridges) Fig. 5.3. Roma concentration in France related to immigrant areas: places and estimated number

According to the figures presented by authorities (and NGOs), the number of the Roma in France has been quite stable for the last twenty years, ranging between fifteen and twenty thousand. The differences between the maximum and minimum values in the major cities are in the tens or hundreds, mainly determined by their high mobility, significant number of evictions, and repatriations.

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Where is their visibility in political discourses and the media? The myth about the massive Romanian and Bulgarian Roma migration towards France starting with 2007 is far from the truth, at least from the image created in the political discourses and the media, in the context of the fight against insecurity and illegal immigration. A simple comparison of statistical data made by Romeurope on the migration of Romanian and Bulgarian citizens between Spain, Italy, and France in 2007 reveals that the Hexagon is in third place with 36,000, while the number is 843,000 in Spain and 659,000 in Italy.553 Why then is a group of fifteen to twenty thousand Roma, among the three to four hundred thousand immigrants in the Hexagon, so visible? Unlike other immigrants living and working illegally in France, whose visibility in the press is only due to sporadic advocacy actions, the Roma visibility is caused by their lifestyle and economic activity. Without a stable residence, occupying vacant land on the outskirts of large urban areas, always subject to evictions and repatriations, they can hardly go unnoticed. Economically, the activities they perform, from begging, to street commerce (selling newspapers, washing windshields, playing music on public transport), mainly in the centre of the city554 and tourist spots, makes them visible in French society. If, in small towns and villages, such cases are rare, in large places like Lyon, Paris, Lille, and Marseilles these activities conjugated with the violence and drama of illegal camp evictions, making the headlines in newspapers and regularly being mentioned in local and national news. The visibility and abjectness of this situation bother the French political actors and society in general,555 but, at the same time, open the perspective for a multifaceted analysis of broad socioeconomic, identity, and security inspiration that goes beyond prejudice, myth, and political stakes. Enrolling in the new European security agenda and the enlargement versus European integration debate, this situation reinstates the question on the need and opportunity to achieve a common social policy on the EU agenda (following the common agricultural policy model).

553

Collectif National Droits de l’Homme Romeurope, Rapport Sur la situation des Roms migrants en France 2009–2010 (September 2010), FranĠa, 18, http://www.romeurope.org/IMG/Rapport%20Romeurope%202009-2010.pdf. 554 Camille Chaix, Les associations de solidarité avec les Roms migrants en France: des representations collectives à l’action associative (Memoire, Université Pierre Mendès France Institutd’Etudes Politiques de Grenoble, 2007–8), 13, http://www.romeurope.org/IMG/pdf/memoire_de_Camille_Chaix.pdf. 555 Ibid., 14.

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On the other hand, the quantification of the phenomenon is very difficult in the absence of official data (accurate and complete statistics), as observed in the first part of this chapter regarding the Muslims. An important role here is played by the large share of illegal migration and the constant change in the camping areas before even being registered by profile associations, to which is added the lack of identity documents for the children born in the host state. What is very clear is the fact that this issue has become extremely visible and has escalated with President Sarkozy’s Grenoble speech, and since then (based on the “snowball” theory) has become ubiquitous in the political discourse, and especially in election campaigns. 5.2.1. Characteristics of the Roma migration from Romania to France The problem of Romanian Roma in France has held the attention of the two states since the 1990s (from the first readmission agreements). However, the large number of voluntary repatriations and excessive coverage of expulsions in the last five years have turned this issue into a European scandal under the presidency of Sarkozy who, through politicoelectoral instrumentalization, raised it to a “national program level”556 (of identity securitization). In an article in The Guardian, it is stated that Sarkozy “rounded up Roma, introduced France’s fifth immigration law in seven years, banned Muslim women wearing the niqab in public places and launched a national debate on what it means to be French,”557 but nevertheless the Roma card proved inefficient for securing a new term in the 2012 presidential elections, which he lost to Hollande. Nobody denies the existence of a problem with the Roma, not only in France but also in the states of origin, as well as their destinations (a matter already discussed in the previous chapter), but beyond the daily reality it is subject to certain conflicting representations from the actors 556

Laura Mitran and Aurelia Alexa, “CRONOLOGIE: Problema romilor dintre România úi FranĠa, în atenĠia Europei de la repatrierile din 2010” [“TIMELINE: The Roma Issue Between Romania and France, in Europe’s Attention at the 2010 Repatriations”], Mediafax (2010), http://www.mediafax.ro/politic/cronologieproblema-romilor-dintre-romania-si-franta-in-atentia-europei-de-la-repatrieriledin-2010-10062359. 557 Angelique Chrisafis, “Immigration: France sees Tensions Rise Five Years on from Paris Riots,” The Guardian (November 16, 2010), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/16/france-racism-immigrationsarkozy.

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involved. On the one hand, the problem is represented by the Roma population itself. Through their lifestyle, dress code, history, visibility in the society, ubiquity in the media (discussed in chapter three), and association with organized crime, this is an undesired population within developed civilized societies. On the other hand, we have the policymakers and local authorities whose representation ranges from political stake to social issue depending on the political moment and the extent of the situation. Thirdly, we have the profile associations (NGOs) to which this situation only shows the weakness of the social, economic, and political systems for creating a coherent socioeconomic framework that favours the social inclusion of these disadvantaged groups. At the European level the situation is represented at the limit of the EU’s indecision, split between ensuring freedom of movement for its citizens and the inability to create a European socioeconomic framework to stimulate social inclusion with visible results. The problem that Sarkozy faced and also handed down to Hollande is not the Roma issue, and not even the immigrant issue as a whole, as these are only parts of a much more complex and unmanageable picture represented by the “problem of the French society in terms of its own make-up,”558 i.e. the problem of the proper management of multiculturalism (diversity) in all its aspects – the visibility of differences in terms of culture, religion, dress code; the social and economic marginalization of immigrants in suburbs; equal opportunities on the labour market; and access to housing and quality social services. When Angela Merkel admitted that multiculturalism had “utterly failed”559 in Germany, the French state model that officially lacks minorities (and where it’s against the law to classify people according to their ethnic origin) became a viable model of multiculturalism, although this theory showed its limitations in its practical application, especially in 2000. The paradox of this situation consists in the fact that in a state where ethnicity does not represent a defining element for society when discussing a topic in the press (usually of negative connotations and with a direct impact upon the French society), the mentioning of the protagonists’ ethnicity is futile. If the identifier is citizenship, why is their ethnicity highlighted? (see the text of the circular letter of August 5, 2010). In the press analysis and we can see that in over ninety percent of the monitored French articles, journalists state that the people expelled or evicted are Roma, and only 5.7 percent mention anything about ethnicity. The preliminary conclusion of this 558 559

Ibid. Ibid.

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interpretation can thus be that the Roma issue in the Hexagon is, above all, a matter of socioeconomic security and of managing multiculturalism. How did we get here? The answer is not a simple one, as the roots of this current situation can be found in the extensive French immigration history, and several economic and social factors have contributed to its development due to the prolonged effects of the economic recession in the context of the new extended European security agenda. The great number of national and international actors involved shows the complexity of the Roma issue that goes beyond national borders both through visibility and effects. The migration of Romanian Roma after the fall of Communism and especially after Romania’s accession to the EU is a phenomenon whose consequences are difficult to estimate by the national and community authorities. Moreover, the current form of emigration of the Roma from Romania to Western European states presents the characteristics of a new form of migration, situated at the border between the old nomadism, closely related with the practice of traditional crafts and seasonal work, and the modern phenomenon of definitive emigration (determined by improved socioeconomic conditions or the degree of discrimination in the state of origin). In the case of the Roma, the primary cause of the decision to emigrate is “the necessity to satisfy fundamental biological needs”560 (at the base of Maslow’s Pyramid) rather than “the considerations of a vague racial discrimination,”561 given that, in a survey conducted by the Romanian National Institute for Opinion and Marketing Studies (INSOMAR), on the commission of the National Council for Combating Discrimination, August 1–24, 2009, forty-eight percent of respondents consider the Roma a disgrace to Romania, while fifty-six percent state that they feel uncomfortable around these people.562 Much more serious is the fact that this reality is also well known within the Roma community (hence the large number of incidents between the majority and minorities), which is 560 Felician Velimirovici, “Reprezentări ale romilor români în FranĠa, 12 martie 2012” [“Representations of the Romanian Roma in France, March 12, 2012”], Liga oamenilor de cultură bonĠideni (2012), http://ligaoamenilordeculturabontideni.blogspot.fr/2012/03/reprezentari-alemigratiei-romilor.html. 561 Ibid. 562 The survey was conducted on a sample of 1,201 people, using the opinion survey technique, based on a questionnaire performed face to face at the residence of the interviewees. For details see Results and Interpretation of the Discrimination Phenomenon survey online on the website of the Romanian National Council for Combating Discrimination.

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why the rejection and marginalization within the communities of the host states is not something new for them, but rather an internationalization of a de facto situation. “I was discriminated in our country as well (Romania) and I was living at the outskirts of the village in a single-room accommodation, with no electricity or water supply. I was unemployed, collected scrap metal and the children were begging around churches. Here (in France) it’s better” (C. F., a Romanian Rom from Tinca, Bihor country, in Lyon). In most cases, migration is seasonal and temporary, with successive returning sequences (in the same place or another) largely determined by the nature of the economic activity performed (most often unqualified, illegal work and begging), by the relationship with the local public authorities (generally quantified in the number of evictions and relocation solutions provided), but also by the degree of involvement of profile associations activating in a certain area (“Associations are very good to us, bringing us food, giving us clothes, blankets, milk powder for the children and medicines. They don’t give us money, but we get it from begging. The French are more generous than Romanians,” Laura – a Romanian Roma from St. Etienne). An essential characteristic of the Roma migration is the replication of the lifestyle of the state of origin in the host state, so we rarely see families living in isolation. Most cases involve a large group, consisting of at least fifteen to twenty members, who either came from the community in the origin state or are relatives or united around the same religious values. The phenomenon is not singular or specific to France, as we also encounter the same large-group immigration with the Roma in Spain or Italy (for example, in Barcelona the Roma mainly originate from the townships of ğăndărei and Murgeni563). Isolation is not part of the Roma lifestyle because the daily life in the host state also implies the sharing of responsibilities. Let’s take for example the situation of the Roma communities in Lyon, where some of the women (especially the pregnant ones or those with little children) beg, others go to markets to get food, the older children sell newspapers and the men are the ones dealing with small 563

Óscar López Catalán and Meritxell Sàez Sellarés, “Mobilitate forĠată, poziĠii marginale si accesul la drepturile fundamentale. MigranĠii romi úi politicile locale din Zona Metropolitană Barcelona” [“Forced Mobility, Marginal Positions and Access to Fundamental Rights. The Roma Migrants and Local Policies in the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona”], în TOMA Stefánia, FOSZTÓ László, Spectrum: cercetări sociale despre romi [Spectrum: Social Research on Roma] (Cluj-Napoca: The National Institute for Research on National Minorities Publishing House: Kriterion, 2010), 244.

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trade (in train stations and at intersections), collecting scrap metal, while also ensuring the camp’s security. Perhaps the most striking activity performed by the Roma (and other immigrants) in the host but also origin states is begging. From the outside this activity is seen as a lifestyle, a choice of this community. This representation is based on the history, myths, and preconceptions related to this group (as slackers and loafers, being scam-oriented). On a closer look we notice that this practice is in fact a last resort within a system that offers no chance to those without a complete education situation on the labour market, and the illiteracy rate among the Roma is above average. According to a World Bank study (2008), in Romania, at the level of secondary education, only thirty-six percent of the Roma aged between fifteen and eighteen study, while Romanians in the same age group represent roughly seventy-nine percent. Again, in Romania, around sixtysix percent of the Roma live on less than $4.30 per day, while twenty-one percent live on less than $2.15 per day. Also, the unemployment rate among Roma is twenty-six percent higher than the male average, the Roma employees having fifty-five percent lower incomes than the majority population.564 On the other hand, the transitional measures in the host state, applied to Romanians and Bulgarians, make it more difficult for them to find a job. Another problem is represented by the knowledge of the French language. Most Roma do not speak it and this represents a barrier to their integration on the labour market but also their social integration. The associations propose optional French language courses, but unfortunately few actually take them (also because of the constant campsite change due to evictions), which is interpreted by policymakers and the society as a lack of real desire for integration. Therefore, inactivity or begging within a society that values lucrative activity turns them into “society outcasts,” a burden on the welfare state, making social inclusion not just difficult, but impossible. The economic record also includes the matter of using the money made by the Roma through work or begging in France. The motivation of the Roma going abroad is mainly economic, namely the production of income, which is then sent to the family in Romania, so investments are made in the Romanian economy. This matter is frowned upon by the French authorities and does not fall in line with what is imposed by the phenomenon of selective migration, namely to provide the French state with a profit. From the French local authorities’ point of view they represent a burden on the French social system, without any real economic 564Joostde

Laat, “Economic Costs of Roma Exclusion,” 2.

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benefits, so it’s no surprise when begging becomes a topic of entertainment shows or when various TV channels and newspapers565 make documentaries about the “palaces built in Romania, with the money made in the host states.” In terms of housing, illegal camps are generally made up of caravans, tents, and makeshift shacks, built on the spot with materials found at hand, along secondary roads, train stations, marginal land, and under bridges. It is also worth mentioning that among the Romanian Roma families currently living in France only a quarter are out of the country for the first time, most of them already with experience in terms of temporary migration in other states such as Italy, Spain, and Germany. Of the interview respondents (both in Île-de-France and Southern France), a significant percentage reported that they arrived in France after several rounds of temporary and seasonal migration to other states. This is also the case of Irina and her family (Aiud, Alba county) who had lived in Valence (Rhône-Alpes region) for almost two years. Before arriving there they spent a few years in Italy, moving from city to city, constantly being evicted, until being forced by an organized crime network to beg with the threat of being beaten, starved, and subjected to torture. They barely managed to escape. The poor living conditions in Romania and the birth of the children led them to try their luck in France. With the help of the Les Sarments Church, her husband found a job on a construction site and the children were educated. A key characteristic of the Roma who chose small towns or villages as destinations is the acceptance of the neo-Protestant cult in order to facilitate social integration. The Pentecostal phenomenon is widespread among the Roma in the Hexagon (the same phenomenon being widespread within communities in Romania, especially in Transylvania). They are able to find support in Pentecostalism, a bond, a testimony of reality facing an identity crisis. The Pentecostal discourse talks about the transformation/conversion into a new person – “the good gypsy”566 – which is different from the previous “bad” one. Through its message, this 565

See Rebecca Camber, “Gipsy Pickpockets’ Palaces: the Mansions Built by Romanian Family of Thieves who Robbed Train Passengers while They Slept,” The Daily Mail (February 24, 2012), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article2106131/Pickpockets-palaces-The-Romanian-mansions-built-targeting-UKcommuters.html. 566 Julia Peyron, “Le pentecôtisme: nouveau facteur de mobilité pour lespopulations tsiganes?” E-migrinter-Rroms et Gens du voyage 6 (2010) (revue en ligne): 76, http://www.mshs.univ-poitiers.fr/migrinter/e-migrinter/201006/e-migrinter2010_ 06_002.pdf.

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religion is perceived as one providing positive social visibility, and for the Roma who are constantly marginalized due to their negative image567 this is a chance to escape the vicious circle of stigma. The story of the Romanian Roma in France is quite old, with successive stages of development, in close conjunction with the events in the international arena, which both France and Romania are an integral part of. According to the Romeurope report of 2009–11, the first large group of Romanian Roma settled in the Hexagon in Nanterre (2002) on marginal land with no water supply or electricity, in deplorable conditions.568 Truly at the forefront of the European politics and also on the first page of the newspapers, after the Grenoble speech, the management of the Roma issue in the Hexagon became more important (through its prioritization within the political discourse and actions of eviction, repatriation and expulsion, included in the selective migration system direction imposed by the new Immigration Law of 2006). In 2010 Nicolas Sarkozy (whose popularity was in freefall) used the Roma issue in an attempt to raise electoral capital and get votes from the extreme right-wing to win a second term. He turned a social issue into a national security problem in one of his harshest discourses at Grenoble on July 30, 2010. Through the Internet and the media, what should have been a matter of internal French policy rapidly became an amalgam of contradictory declarations, a cheap media spectacle of illegal camps being demolished by bulldozers, a battle of the numbers of expelled people, of aircrafts full of repatriated Roma, which didn’t go unnoticed by the policymakers or in public opinion. In just a few weeks the international position towards these actions was heard through loud press statements that made the headlines of the newspapers, making direct references to the racism and xenophobia in Europe’s history, including in the British newspaper The Times which even made reference to the Gestapo (“Sarkozy Sparks Memories of Gestapo as he Rounds up Roma for Expulsion”569). On the other hand, what can be observed is the way this conflict started and then escalated so that it achieved international attention, both in its extremity and through its consequences. 567

Ibid. Collectif National Droits de l’Homme Romeurope, Rapport Sur la situation des Roms migrants en France 2009–2010 (September 2010), FranĠa, 18, http://www.romeurope.org/IMG/Rapport%20Romeurope%202009-2010.pdf. 569 For details see The Times (August 17, 2010). 568

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5.2.2. How did we get here? From the Grenoble speech to the figures of expelled Roma On the night of July 16–17, 2010 a young Frenchman from a “gens du voyage” family, Luigi Duquenet, aged twenty-two, was shot and killed by a French gendarme near Saint-Aignan (central France). In response to this incident, fifty people (armed with axes and some wearing balaclavas) attacked the police station of Saint-Aignan and torched six cars on July 18 in protest. Several soldiers and two helicopters were sent to the area to restore order. On the same evening in Grenoble, the citizens of the Villeneuve district witnessed another tragedy resulting in the death of one of the thieves from Uriage Casino, who was trying to hide in this neighbourhood on the outskirts of the city. This incident was also followed by protest actions which required military intervention. The reaction of the president was prompt. On July 21 Sarkozy announced the ministerial meeting on the “gens du voyage et Roms” theme and pronounced the “Declaration sur la securite” (“Declaration on Security”) as a result of the recent events. After the ministerial meeting on the situation of “gens du voyage et Roms” of July 28, the Minister of the Interior Brice Hortefeux announced the eradication of half of the approximately six hundred illegal camps of the “gens du voyage”570 within three months, “the quasi-immediate expulsion” from Bulgaria and Romania of the “Roma who committed offenses against the public order or fraud,”571 while also exchanging police between Romania and France for the better management of the situation. On July 30, 2013, with the appointment of the new Prefect of Grenoble (former head of the border police), Sarkozy gave a second speech through which he transformed the Saint-Aignon and Grenoble issues (in which French citizens were involved) into a problem of illegal immigration (with a focus on the illegal Roma camps). The central focus of this discourse

570

In this first statement made by the minister of the interior there is a contradiction in terms, as the measures to be taken also address the Roma (originating in Romania and Bulgaria) who, according to the French law, are not part of the “gens du voyage” category, but the “Roma” or, for a clearer conceptual delimitation, “migrant Roma,” as explained earlier in this chapter. 571 “Roms: du fait divers a la dispute diplomatique, Comment la mort tragique d'un Gitan dans le Loir-et-Cher a-t-elle abouti à un différend diplomatique à l'échelle de l'Europe?” Le Monde (September 14, 2010). http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2010/09/14/roms-du-fait-divers-a-la-disputediplomatique_1411153_3224.html.

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was to create an indisputable causality between immigrants and national insecurity. The discourse began with an account of the actions carried out during his term in the fight against crime572 so that it moved to announcing a complex program of measures against illegal immigration and security insurance. He announced the need for a concrete legal reform, being harsh with those committing illegal acts (for example, any individual threatening the life of a police office or involved in actions against the public-order forces would have their citizenship withdrawn), concurrently launching a fight against crime (“This is a war we decided to start against traffickers and criminals”573). These measures were primarily designed to exploit, for electoral purposes, the powerful emotional fund created by recent events, rather than provide relevance to ensure security or fight illegal migration. An important role in this project was played by the illegal Roma camps issue: “I have asked the Minister of the Interior to stop the construction of new illegal Roma settlements. These are areas of lawlessness that cannot be tolerated in France. We do not seek to stigmatize the Roma … The Besson law enabled us to make notable progresses with regard to the camping areas available for them.”574 Here, the confusion between the legislation to be applied to the “gens du voyage” and that for the “Roma” is total, as with the statement of Hortefeux on July 28, 2010. The 2000 Besson Law he speaks of (Loi n° 2000-614 du 5 juillet 2000 relative à l'accueil et à l'habitat des gens du voyage575) strictly refers to the “gens du voyage” – the “Roma” category is not included. A close analysis of the situation of the Roma in Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, or any other state in Central and Eastern Europe would have pointed out that they had been sedentary for many years. In the same speech, the president identified the main causes that led to the escalation of the situation of insecurity, namely the “fifty years of 572

Carrère Violaine, “Confisquer le débat démocratique,” Plein droit 1 (88) (2011): 12. http://www.cairn.info/revue-plein-droit-2011-1-page-10.htm. 573 “C'est donc une guerre que nous avons décidé d'engager contre les trafiquants et les délinquants,” Discours de M. le Président de la République à Grenoble -Prise de fonction du nouveau préfet, July 30, 2010. 574 Ibid.: “j'ai demandé au ministre de l'Intérieur de mettre un terme aux implantations sauvages de campements de Roms. Ce sont des zones de non-droit qu'on ne peut pas tolérer en France. Il ne s'agit pas de stigmatiser les Roms … Nous avons fait depuis la loi Besson de grands progrès pour les aires mises à leur disposition.” 575 Loi n° 2000-614 du 5 juillet 2000 relative à l'accueil et à l'habitat des gens du voyage. See the whole text of the law on Legifrance.gouv.fr. http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000583573.

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insufficiently regulated immigration [that] led to a failure of the integration process. We are so proud of our integration system. Maybe this should be a wakeup call? … to successfully implement a process of integration, it is imperative to control the migration influx … I shall not repeat Michel Rocard’s famous words, with which I can identify myself: ‘France cannot accommodate all the misery in the world!’ I am just saying this is a clear observation.”576 Thus, we conclude that according to the president’s perception, the present situation is a direct consequence of a much too permissive immigration law (especially with those committing crimes), which no longer corresponds to the realities of today’s French society. What is curious in this historical analysis of the president is his amnesia. When taking a closer look at the French political spectrum of the last fifty years we notice the following things: that the president tends to forget that, in this period, the right-wing parties (his colleagues) were leading over the left-wing ones,577 and more importantly that he himself was minister of the interior in two legislatures (from May to March 2004, and from June 2005 to March 2007), and thus the promoter of two important reforms in terms of immigration. Should we thus understand that the president actually criticized the lack of efficiency of his own measures in the fight against illegal migration? The solution to this situation was proposed further along in Sarkozy’s discourse: “Until the end of September, we will continue to demolish all the illegal camps that are subject to a legal decree. With the cases where the decree has not been pronounced yet, we will take measures to expedite the legal proceedings. Within three months, half of these illegal settlements will have disappeared from the French territory.”578 On a first analysis of this discourse – the manner in which it is written, and the hypotheses, structure, and weak points in the terms of the 576

“[Les] 50 années d'immigration insuffisamment régulée qui ont abouti à un échec de l'intégration. Nous sommes si fiers de notre système d'intégration. Peutêtre faut-il se réveiller? … Pour réussir ce processus d'intégration, il faut impérativement maîtriser le flux migratoire … Je ne reprendrai pas la célèbre phrase de Michel Rocard dans laquelle je me retrouve: “La France ne peut accueillir toute la misère du monde.” Je dis simplement, c'est un constat lucide.” 577 Violaine, “Confisquer le débat démocratique,” 12. 578 Ibid. “Nous allons procéder d'ici fin septembre au démantèlement de l'ensemble des camps qui font l'objet d'une décision de justice. Là où cette décision de justice n'a pas encore été prise, nous engagerons des démarches pour qu'elle intervienne le plus rapidement possible. Dans les trois mois, la moitié de ces implantations sauvages auront disparu du territoire français.”

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legislation, migration, and insecurity it tackles – we can say that it contains the three components necessary for a successful securitization, identifying the threats to the French society as immigrants (Roma and travellers). The discourse proceeds to identify exceptional measures to protect security (in both a classic sense and that of societal security), respectively the eradication of illegal camps, expulsions, citizenship withdrawal, and a “selective migration system.” Finally, by appealing to the citizens’ solidary (using the plural form of the first-person pronoun – “nous réformions,” “nous assumions,” “nous engagions”579 – a commitment and an assumed complicity are suggested in this fight against crime both by the president, in his quality of state representative, and by the French citizens), he legitimizes the use of exceptional measures to solve the complex immigration, multiculturalism, and social integration issues in the Hexagon (an additional police force, quasi-immediate expulsions, and citizenship withdrawal being only a few of them). Using verbs of motion, assuming a collective guilt (which refers to the entire political class of the last fifty years) in terms of immigration and launching new temporarily well-defined directions of action,580 supported by concrete figures, leads us to think about a presidential campaign agenda and not a prefect appointment discourse, given that the situation in Grenoble is barely a topic in this, because the target audience is represented by all the French citizens and not just those present at the event. By contextualizing the events in Grenoble and Saint-Aignan, the president again brings into discussion the migration dossier on the French security agenda in an attempt to play this card in his future election campaign. The immigration dossier does not represent a new French public debate, and the element of surprise was the “secret” circular letter (whose existence was openly denied by the representatives of the French government until its issuing to the press at the beginning of September 2010), which provided precise instructions on how eviction and repatriation actions should develop. The circular letter of August 5, 2010 established the number of targeted illegal camps to be demolished (at least one hundred per month, so a total of three hundred was reached within

579

English translation: “We are reforming,” “we are assuming,” “we are committing.” 580 “La guerre que j'ai décidé d'engagercontre les trafiquants, contre les voyous, cette guerre-làvaut pour plusieursannées. Elle dépasse de beaucoup la situation d'un gouvernement, d'unemajoritéou d’un parti.”

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three months) and emphasized the prioritization of those occupied by the Roma.581 The novelty of this speech consists in achieving a connection between migration and insecurity (migration as a source of insecurity, a matter already analysed in the second chapter), which brought Sarkozy criticism from both the international level and French opposition. The actions that received the greatest media coverage after this speech were the extensive cases of evictions and repatriations, which went around the world thanks to the Internet and the media. The harsh internal and international reactions to the stigmatization of an ethnic group were immediate. The EU condemned this policy towards the Roma through the voice of Viviane Reding, commissioner for justice and citizens’ rights, who stated that: “Discrimination on the base of ethnic origin or race has no place in Europe. It is incompatible with the values on which the European Union is founded.”582 Visibly disturbed by the concealment of the circular letter of August 5, 2010, Reding described the action as “a disgrace,” and threatened to trigger infringement procedures against France: “It is a situation that I thought Europe would never witness after the Second World War.”583 Subsequently, due to interpretations of this statement, she apologized, saying that “she regrets the interpretations that divert the attention from the problem to be solved,” adding that “in no case did she mean to establish a parallel between the Second World War and the current French government.”584 On the France Info radio station, the President of Gisti Stéphane Maugendre wondered rhetorically, referring to the circular letter of August 5 (but at the same time addressing the French authorities), if someone could “imagine a directive explicitly naming Jews or Arabs?”585 In this situation, how was it possible to create a document aimed at an ethnic group? The explanations are numerous and can be customized according to the historical moment and state concerned, but ultimately converge towards the same thing – the existence of discrimination towards this group, both in the origin and host states, the lack of a coherent, united, and 581

Sergio Carrera and Anaïs Faure Atger, “L’affaire des Roms: A Challenge to the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice,” in Liberty and Security in Europe (September 2010), 5. 582 “EU’s Reding loses patience with France on Roma,” Euractiv (September 14, 2010), http://ancheteonline.ro/2010/09/ce-va-sanctiona-franta-pentru-expulzareatiganilor.html. 583 Laura Mitran and Aurelia Alexa, “CRONOLOGIE.” 584 Ibid. 585 Bennhold and Castle, “EU Calls France’s Roma Expulsions.”

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authorized voice to represent the group in the relations with the majority populations, and the lack of unity within this community. Although there is a series of NGOs, forums, and personalities who fight to defend their rights, the lack of coordination in their actions and lack of solidarity within the group are the two missing elements which lead to the occurrence of such situations that put them at the centre of attention – the lack of solidarity and absence of a mother state. In the Romanian press (Adevărul, Ziarul Financiar, and Evenimentul Zilei), these actions were classified as a waste of money with no results. On August 27, the UN Committee Against Racial Discrimination publicly appealed to France to “avoid” collective Roma expulsions.586 At the national level, these measures sparked criticism from the left-wing parties but also indignation from a significant number of organizations campaigning for human rights. Their actions resulted in an extensive protest on September 4, 2010, attended by around 77–100,000 people denouncing the “xenophobic policy”587 of the government. Against these actions and after the press coverage of the circular letter of August 5, its text was modified, the direct reference to the illegal Roma camps588 being replaced with the words “regardless of their occupants.” At the end of August, Eric Besson, from the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Solidarity Development, announced in a press conference the efficiency of the measures taken by presenting the balance sheet of the total number of evicted illegal camps and repatriated citizens – 979 Romanian and Bulgarian citizens “in a situation of illegality,” of which 828 were cases of voluntary repatriation and 151 forced.589 In the same speech it is stated that, since the beginning of 2010, 8,328 Romanian and Bulgarian citizens590 had been repatriated (is it highly important to note that this time the term “Roma” is not used, only Romanian and Bulgarian citizens, the change in the discourse occurring in the context of internal and international reactions after the Grenoble speech).

586

“Roms: du fait divers a la dispute diplomatique,” Le Monde (September 14, 2010). 587 Ibid. 588 Carrera and Faure Atger, “L’affaire des Roms,” 5. 589 Discourse Eric Besson, Ministre de l’immigration, de l’intégration, de l’identiténationale et du développementsolidaire, Press Conference, August 30, 2010, regarding the eviction of illegal camps, Paris, August 30, 2010, p.1, http://www.france.cz/IMG/pdf/Discours_BESSON_30082010.pdf. 590 Ibid., 2.

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It is worth stopping our analysis to look at these repatriations, which were not a novelty in 2010, having been carried out since the beginning of 2007 when France developed an extensive procedure called “humanitarian repatriations”591 (based on the circular letter of December 7, 2007). This policy was the responsibility of the Ministry of Immigration, and consisted of providing financial help of three hundred euros for an adult and one hundred for each child in exchange for their return to their origin states.592 According to statistics, after the first year of implementation, the measure proved to be efficient given that, in 2007, the French Ministry of the Interior reported 1,600 repatriated Romanian citizens, at the end of 2008 their number being of 8,740 and in 2009 approaching 10,000. The French authorities continued to be concerned about the number of repatriations in 2011, so in June, the Minister of the Interior, Claude Guéant, declared that the new immigration law “should allow the rapid increase in the annual number of repatriations”593 of illegal immigrants, the objective for that year being twenty-eight thousand departures. In terms of actual effectiveness (cost-benefit), this measure proved to be disastrous, an unnecessary waste of money, as a significant percentage of those repatriated returned to France in a few weeks (the quality of being EU citizens guarantees the freedom of movement and a three-month residence in the territory of EU member states). This trend was also present among the Romanian Roma in Lyon, as well as in Paris, which unanimously gave the same answer: “Even if they evict us, I’m not going back to Romania! And if they expel us, I’m back in two weeks.”594 Like an election campaign strategy (in which the battle of numbers could tilt the balance in favour of a candidate), this policy can be very good, but as a long-term policy it is inefficient given that managing diversity in today’s society requires accurate, coherent, feasible, and transparent socioeconomic policies that are the result of extensive consultations with all the interested political and non-governmental actors. The novelty of this repatriation policy is given by the visibility and extent the phenomenon recorded in the media and at the level of international institutions and partner states within the EU (positioning themselves, according to their own issue with Roma immigrants, into for 591

Carrera and Faure Atger, “L’affaire des Roms,” 5. This was not the only policy of this kind in France. Besides this, the French authorities also applied a policy of “voluntary repatriation assistance,” which addressed only the nationals of the states outside the EU, offering two thousand euros for an adult and between five hundred and one thousand euros for a child. 593 Mitran and Alexa, “CRONOLOGIE.” 594 Excerpt from the interview with C. F. Paris, September 17, 2012. 592

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and against sides). The visibility of the phenomenon was constantly fed by the images depicting demolished camps, women with babies in their arms, and an impressive mobilization of the police forces, who were seen around the world (via the Internet). On the other hand, the French and Romanian authorities’ declarations in the media, the EU position, and the biased responses and replies did nothing but attract unnecessary attention to a phenomenon that was already “enjoying” increased attention. The constant presentation of the impressive number of expelled people and demolished illegal camps aims to validate to the public the efficiency of the solution applied in the fight against illegal immigration. In this media show, an important place was taken by the annual accounts of expulsions, the battle of the numbers having a legitimizing role in these actions’ effectiveness, which is why the annual number increased proportionally with the performance of the previous year, as seen in Fig. 5.4 below. Fig. 5.4. The number of illegal immigrants sans papier repatriated from France between 2009–12

The Number of illegal immigrants sans papier repatriated from France between 2009-12 40000 35000 30000 25000 20000 15000 10000 5000 0 2009

2010

2011

2012

Source: French Ministry of Immigration

The data used in Fig. 5.4 is that officially provided by the Ministry of Immigration each year on the account of repatriation actions (usually in late August or early September). The account is made at this time of year as the greatest number of repatriations occur mostly in July to September.

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The analysis shows us how, in just four years, the number of repatriated people in situations of illegality has doubled. Curiously, however, despite these official numbers, the number of immigrants in France has remained constant over the last decade (according to the same statistics made by INSEE). This means that the repatriation phenomenon is intensely contested by the large number of immigrants still arriving in France (which is, by definition, an attractive destination state for emigrants). In the context of the more extensive enlargement versus European integration debate, the idea of “the French social integration model crisis” is also evoked by Sarkozy in his speech at Grenoble, when considering integration: “What has happened is not a social problem, but a fraud, an attack on the values, which are already endangered. We must put an end to these actions.”595 The speech shows that, in the light of recent violent events, the social integration policy is primarily translated through the fight against illegal immigration, followed by the fight against discrimination. The problem is much more complex and closely related to the history of the French state in terms of migration, and legislative changes and their effects (matters already addressed at the beginning of this chapter). The migration-insecurity causality connection created by Sarkozy brings to the forefront of the new European security agenda the issue of diversity management and intensification of the social inclusion process. The failure of multiculturalism management in the welfare state, amid economic recession, forces analysts to rethink the European integration issue on new socioeconomic-identity grounds in the context of an ongoing process of enlargement. By summarizing the president’s speech at Grenoble and the strategies adopted for the implementation of these actions we can observe that there are three basic lines of action: the demolition of illegal settlements in France, the simplification of the expulsion procedure, due to disturbance of the public order and national security, and the intensification of cooperation with authorities in the origin states for the repatriation of the citizens and their social integration in the society of origin. Based on these three lines of action, our attention will now be on the manner in which the Grenoble speech affected the situation of the Romanian Roma in Lyon.

595

“Discours de M. le Président de la République à Grenoble”: “Ce n'est pas un problème social, ce qui s'est passé, c'est un problème de truands, ce sont des valeurs qui sont en train de disparaître. Il faut marquer un coup d'arrêt.”

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5.3. The Roma in Lyon: Between Systematic Evictions and Social Integration (2007–12) At the beginning of 2011 the French media reported that, despite the repatriation measures, the number of Roma remained stable (at twelve to fifteen thousand), the only visible change being the degradation of their living conditions. We will further analyse the manner in which the three lines of action suggested by Sarkozy took effect on the Roma community in the Lyon conurbation (Grand Lyon). Our analysis is divided into two parts, the former focusing on the main Roma camps (emergence, organization, evictions), the latter on the social integration projects for the Romanian Roma. We have chosen Lyon as an example for various reasons, first of all because it is the second largest conurbation after Paris – an economically developed city and hence an attractive location for immigrants. On the other hand, according to the Lyon City Hall statistics (and the NGO’s information), approximately forty percent of the Romanian Roma in Lyon come from the town of Tinca (Bihor county, northwest Romania), a wellknown area (from the perspective of the Roma community), which allowed us to better analyse both the reasons determining them to leave as well as the social inclusion trans/national projects that Romania, the NGOs, and France conduct for their benefit. With regards to the manner of representation of the Roma community in Lyon, our attention is on the two actors involved: the community itself, and the actions of the local authorities, in partnership with associations in the area. From a geographical point of view, Lyon is located in the RhonesAlpes region (the capital of the region and Rhones District), and its suburbs form the second largest conurbation after Paris, with an estimated population in 2010 of 1,551,228. Of these, according to the same estimates, six to eight hundred inhabitants are Roma, ninety percent coming from Romania and ten percent from the former Yugoslavia (Albania, Montenegro, and Kosovo). Regarding the number of Roma, the estimates vary according to sources (local institutions and NGO estimations) and periods, given that, due to evictions and expulsions, they were subjected to constant mobility. The figures for 2013, provided by Medecins du Monde (MdM), mention about one thousand Roma, given that M. Valls announced three thousand repatriated Roma at the beginning of the year, of which around one thousand were in the Lyon area. These figures prove that the number of those repatriated was quickly filled by newcomers or families evicted from other areas.

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5.3.1. The Roma community in Lyon: characteristics The Roma families in the Lyon area have been there since 1993–4. If, in the first phase, families mostly came from former Yugoslavia, and less from Romania, after 2007 the situation changed and the number of Romanian Roma became overwhelming. During the field research our attention mainly focused on the Roma living in poor conditions (in illegal camps), being forced to use marginal economic strategies to survive, and subjects of eviction or repatriation, where possible. Nevertheless, we were also introduced to some Roma who were employed (especially men) in construction or various storehouses. The phenomena of begging and trade in the centre of the city or tourist areas are also part of the subsistence strategies category (an element that was also observed with communities in Île-de-France), being the appanage of women and children. At the same time, the geographic dissemination of the camps takes after the pattern of those observed in Île-de-France, so by extension we consider that it is also specific to other conurbations. The largest camps were built in the suburbs (the townships of Pierre-Benite, Villeurbane, Gerland, Saint-Priest, and Venissieux), especially in the industrial areas because they were less visible to the local authorities and police force, and because they found vacant land for camping and easy access to the places of scrap collection (their main occupation). The propensity for these marginal areas is also justified by the fact that they can find here the necessary materials for the construction (improvisation) of dwellings (shelters built of recycled materials). In these areas, the established camps may comprise up to four hundred people, as with the one built in Villeurbanne (La Soie) or in Saint-Priest (approximately 180 people), evicted in August 2012, or the camp in the Pierre Benite township (approximately fifty people), evicted in September 2010. In the central areas of Lyon, the groups are much smaller so as not to draw attention to themselves, but also because evictions there are much more frequent (for example, the squat in the Part Dieu train station or Montesquieu Street). As shown in Fig. 5.5 below, the large Roma communities (gathered in camps) are located in the suburbs of Lyon, and within the city are squats (housing a maximum of ten to thirty people). The large number of evictions has influenced the groups in terms of dispersal (successive evictions made it necessary for them to find new camping places and squats) and the insecurity of the makeshift or improvised housing (successive demolitions imply the building of dwellings from scratch, on the new campsite, and finding materials to do so).

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Fig. 5.5. Romanian Roma in Grand Lyon: between ghettoization and systematic expulsions (2007–12)

The Roma are confronted (both in the origin and destination states) with the same problems that all people face when in a precarious situation – poor accommodation, limited access to social and medical services, a low degree of education, and limited access to the labour market. In these circumstances, what are these people’s alternatives to begging, social assistance, marginal practices, or scams? During the field research, in discussions with various Roma people (forty-six people from Romania), I asked them to identify, from a list of institutions and people, who they felt most discriminated by, both in Romania and in France. The results were as follows. To the question “In relation to which of the following institutions/people did you feel discriminated in Romania?” the answers were as depicted in Fig. 5.6 below.

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Fig. 5.6. In relation to which of the following institutions/people did you feel discriminated in Romania?

60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Police

Medical Personal Neighbors Potential Stuff from social Employer/s services (city hall)

NGO's

For France, the situation is as depicted in Fig. 5.7 below. Fig. 5.7. In relation to which of the following institutions/people did you feel discriminated in France?

80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Police

Medical Personal Neighbors Potential Stuff from social Employer/s services (city hall)

NGO's

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With an analysis of the data in the two figures we can observe a similarity regarding the degree of discrimination from the local authorities, while significant support, both in Romania and in France, is found with the NGOs. The very low value for the relation with potential employers in France is due to the fact that there is a very small number of those called in for an interview (due to a lack of qualifications, the unknown foreign language, the provision of activities at the limit of legality, and limitations imposed by transitional measures). The rejection of the neighbours has the highest value within the Hexagon. The question here refers to how the residents feel about the emergence of squats in the central areas of the cities and the manner in which the Roma ethnics see this rejection. When identifying the main issues faced by the host state, according to five aspects (language, housing, lack of employment, rejection of the majority population, and the police), they almost unanimously indicated the lack of a camping/housing area, followed closely (74.5 percent) by difficulties due to the inability to speak the French language. A fire on the night of May 12–13, 2013 in a disused factory located in the eighth arrondissement of Lyon, in which three Romanians died (originating from Bihor county, ùoimi township), brought into focus the poor living conditions in the Roma camps in France. Internationally, this unfortunate incident restored the Roma’s issue regarding access to housing on the European agenda (in both the origin and host states). A European Parliament resolution in March 2011 asked the commission to adopt a EU strategy on Roma inclusion and underlined the importance of developing monitoring indicators, soliciting at the same time the extension of the Laeken indicators to the smallest statistical administrative units.596 One of the main problems is overcrowding, followed closely by the lack of connection to the drinking-water, sewage, and electricity networks. Regarding the geographical position, these settlements are generally segregated within the community, being situated on vacant land (near landfills), as with the Roma community in Pata-Rât (Cluj county) or the situation in Huedin (Cetatea Veche), as well as the semi-deghettoization process in Huedin (some of the Roma ethnics moved into houses [“palaces”] on Horea Street), which can be seen in Figs. 5.8 and 5.9 below.

596

CondiĠiile de viaĠă ale romilor: LocuinĠe inadecvate úi sănătatea, Rezumat, FundaĠia Europeană pentru îmbunătăĠirea condiĠiilor de viaĠă úi de muncă [The European Foundation of Improvement of Living and Working Conditions of the Roma: Inadequate Housing and Health, Summary] (2012), p. 1.

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Fig. 5.8. The Roma ethnic ghettoization/semi-deghettoization process: comparative perspectives of Pata-Rât and Cetatea Veche, Cluj county

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Fig. 5.9. The Roma community from Huedin-CetateaVeche, Cluj county

The choice of these two colonies is not random, as they present characteristics that we have also seen in the (illegal) camps in Lyon, which is why we will make a brief presentation of their characteristics (being two well-known colonies). First of all, both colonies comprise only Roma people, as also happens with the camps in the Hexagon, bringing into discussion the ethnic groups phenomenon. As one can also observe in both figures, there are two major communities (of about 1,500 people in Pata Rât and about 150 in Cetatea Veche), founded over ten to fifteen years by the successive settlement of families. From the perspective of urban planning, both colonies are positioned on the outskirts of the city, on vacant land – in these cases by a landfill. The landfill is an integral part of these communities’ lives as a source of construction material for housing and a source of income, given that over sixty percent of the community representatives earn their living exploiting recycled material and scrap. On the other hand, the position by the landfill is a real source of danger to these ethnics, presenting serious health issues

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due to waste (some toxic), an unbearable smell, dogs, crows, and a large number of rats (see also Appendix D: Photos of the Pata Rât Colony). In terms of housing, the huts (about two metres tall and three to four metres wide – not too spacious to be heated), consisting mostly of one room, are built of plank, recycled materials, and tar, and are covered with nylon and tar. When it rains the water seeps into the walls, the ground becoming marshy and rather impassable during the rainy winter seasons. The dwellings have no connection to water or electricity. This position, outside the cities, raises new issues and disadvantages for personal development, access to education, and employment due to the limited access to public transportation, school units, decent employment, and public-health services. Under these circumstances, the access to decent employment is a real obstacle course. On the one hand, the population concentration in a given area (street, neighbourhood, building) has effects on the consolidation of relations within the group, but at the same time it has irreversible effects on the social integration process, primarily due to the limited contact with the majority population. One of the elements that stuns and constantly draws the attention of the media and French society in general is the poverty in these camps. After France managed to resolve the situation of the slums (created by the immigrants who came after the Second World War), it did not expect to end up dealing with the illegal Roma camps. Following repeated evictions (which started in 2005 in Puisoz, Venissieux), the number of Roma in Grand Lyon did not diminish, but their living conditions worsened, particularly in terms of housing, with direct effects on their health. According to the Mayor of Venissieux Andre Gerin: “the unworthy living conditions of these people … are worse than those of dogs. Nowadays, it’s the state’s and the government’s responsibility to seize this question of European, human, social and economic dimensions.”597 According to Medecins du Monde, the direct effect of successive evictions was the dissemination of the Roma community in as many areas of Grand Lyon as possible: “the concentration in already overcrowded and unsanitary camps, along with the emergence of new

597 “Le maire de Vénissieux prend la defense des Roms,” Le Monde (Novermber 10, 2007): “les conditions de vie indignes de ces populations, qui sont pires que celles des chiens. Aujourd’hui, c’est la responsabilité de l’Etat et du gouvernement de s’emparer de cette question aux dimensions européennes, humaines, sociales et économiques.” http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2007/08/27/le-maire-devenissieux-prend-la-defense-des-roms_948129_3224.html.

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squats.”598 In these camps, living conditions are squalid: “Most of them are located on vacant land (in makeshift huts, trailers, tents) in former factories, abandoned buildings, under bridges, near the railroad (the most popular, as well as a visible example being the squat near the Part Dieu train station, evicted in 2010) with no access to drinking water or electricity … We have identified over 1,000 Roma in the Grand Lyon area, of whom most are in an illegal situation, living in constant uncertainty from one day to another. The most curious thing heard from them is the fact that regardless of the situation, they do not want to return to Romania.”599 During the research, but especially during interviews, I noticed the authorities’ and various association representatives’ tendency to submit numbers when referring to the Roma. In the circumstances of high mobility, systematic evictions, and constant return actions, it is difficult, not to say practically impossible, to keep track and record the number of Roma. A member of the ANDATU Program tells us that in the last five years she has been evicted seven times: “We came here to work, in Romania we cannot make a living, we don’t have a house anymore. What to do there? Here, the children go to school and we have more opportunities to earn some money. In the last years, we have moved seven times, if I remember correctly. In some of the places [here referring to squats] we couldn’t stay more than a few days because the neighbours called the police to evict us. We also stayed in churches and abandoned buildings.”600 These evictions have long-term effects upon social relationships within the community. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the Roma do not live in isolation but by reproducing the extended family or a community from the state of origin. Following evictions, most of them are ordered to leave the host country immediately, while others accept humanitarian aid and some receive temporary accommodation in churches and gyms, join other camps in the same area, or travel to other regions, and thus the connection is lost. Since 2005 the Roma camps in Grand Lyon have been subject to systematic evictions, concurrently with combining the number of Roma with other immigrant waves, mainly from Romania (Tinca village, Bihor county, and the town of Segarcea, Dolj), after the EU accession. The eviction and repatriation actions intensified after the Grenoble speech, continuing under the presidency of Françoise Hollande, but at the same 598

Interview with Theresa Nandagobalou, Medecins du Monde, December 12, 2012. 599 Ibid. 600 Interview with a member of the ANDATU program, Mary A., October 23, 2012.

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time there was a boost and diversification in the Roma social-integration actions, both within the French society and also in the state of origin through transnational projects. Before moving on to the social-inclusion projects, it is worth making an analysis of the main eviction and repatriation actions that held the front pages of newspapers, with a focus on their effect on the Roma community, profile associations, local authorities, and transnational relations between the origin and destination states. On the other hand, the main activities of Roma social integration coordinated by different mayors weren’t so present in the newspapers. A possible explanation of this is that they did not want to create the prerequisites for new Roma groups to come and settle.

5.3.2. Grand Lyon: Roma eviction actions 2007–12. “Où est l’avenir des Roms?”601 As can be observed in Fig. 5.5, none of them have escaped the systematic eviction actions after 2005. The Puisoz land in Parilly-Venissieux was the first place to be evicted in this area, in 2005, subsequently becoming subject to systematic evictions. Approximately three hundred Roma (women, men, and children) settled on this land, originating in the former Yugoslavian states, as well as Romania. In August 28, 2007 the new camp founded on the same land, comprising approximately 350 Roma (most of them from Romania, who arrived after the state’s accession to the EU), was subjected to another eviction, the result of a ruling of the High Court in Lyon, the land purchased by the Auchan Estate (2009), the first beneficiary being Leroy Merlin, followed by Ikea and a new residential area of apartments, offices, and shops. Shortly after 5.30 am the camp was surrounded by police who came to ensure that the action took place peacefully. The people, who had been previously informed, were already prepared and had their belongings packed, given that 225 individuals accepted the voluntary repatriation602 procedure to Oradea, Romania. Sixty residents chose to leave the camp the previous day, heading to other camps or squats. Their huts were then demolished and the site cleared.

601

English translation: “Where is the future of Roma?” “D’expulsion en expulsion: l’exode rom (Vénissieux).” See more online: Les Bidonvilles Roms Overblog.

602

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“The expulsion occurred in good conditions. This is a positive fact, given that illegal camps are actually dangerous places,”603 said André Gachet, the ALPIL director (Association for Integration and Accomodation in Lyon, Association lyonnaise pour l’insertion par le logement604). The eviction and repatriation of the Romanian citizens became more difficult after 2007, as they enjoy certain procedural guarantees (according to EU Directive 38/2004 [the Citizens’ Directive] against expulsions, namely the right to free movement). One of the evictions with an echo both in the press and among the Roma communities, with important consequences in terms of relocation, access to medical services, practice of subsistence activities, and education, is that of August 1, 2007 in La Soie, Villeurbanne (approximately three hundred Roma settled on this land on September 1, 2006). Following this action, around 150 Roma accepted to return to Romania “in exchange for 153 euros for an adult, 46 euros for a child and a bus ticket.”605 The majority, however, dispersed to other camps in Lyon (for example Vaulx en Velin or the squat on Paul Bert street), or sought new campsites in Lyon (the emergence of squats in the Part Dieu train station or Montesquieu Street standing as proof of this). The reasons given for evacuation by the Rhones Prefecture were (in accordance to the current law, applicable from January 1, 2007 for Romanians and Bulgarians as well) that they exceeded the three-month period and had to prove the existence of a stable income, and respectively that they represented a burden for the local social services. In the afternoon of that day, during a press conference, the Prefect of Rhone Jacques Gerault stated that a case of tuberculosis had been identified in the evicted camp, which is why this action was required. He concluded by saying that: “We intend to do the same in other camps in the city.”606 The eviction actions also continued in the following period, but a second important point took place after the Grenoble speech. The first evicted illegal camp was in Saint-Étienne, comprising one hundred Roma on land belonging to the municipality, on August 6, 2010. For Grand Lyon, on September 24, 2010 fifty Roma were evicted from vacant land in the Pierre Benite township, so that on November 3, 2010 a group of fifty603 “Expulsion dans la dignité au bidonville de Vénissieux,” 20 Minutes, August 28, 2007, “L’expulsion s’est passée dans de bonnes conditions. C’est toujours un acte positif, car le bidonville reste un lieu dangereux.” http://www.20minutes.fr/lyon/176930-expulsion-dignite-bidonville-venissieux. 604 For details see the Action pour l’insertion par le logement (Alpil) website. 605 Interview with a member of ANDATU. 606 Les Bidonvilles Roms Overblog.

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two Roma, who were settled in front of the Part Dieu train station in the centre of Lyon, were evicted. Facing the interpellations of the humanrights associations and the intervention of the church, the mayor defended himself behind the political outline set by the president and the prime minister regarding the illegal immigration in France, namely “zero tolerance.” The arguments used by the mayor’s office and the prefecture included the assurance of public order, security, and health threats. In a press conference of November 2011, the Prefect Jean-François Carenco said: “I am not a monster who ‘hunts’ the Roma. It is wrong to write, as some have done, that I am destroying the Roma’s caravans,”607 given that, since 2005, the citizens of Lyon, the human-rights associations, the media, and the international public opinion had witnessed the systematic evictions. To support their perspective and the legitimacy of their actions in front of the voters (the audience), the prefecture representative insisted upon the fact that these eviction actions were compensated by actions for the social integration of the Roma with a legal situation, launched in a partnership with profile organizations: "There are of course ongoing squat evictions and illegal camps (September 11, 2011 – disused factory – Lyon, September 20, 2011– humanitarian aid in Lyon, August 14, 2012 – Montesquiex Street, Lyon, August 26, 2012 – Saint Jerme Street, Lyon), but there is also ANDATU.”608 ANDATU, together with the transnational programs initiated by the City Hall of Lyon, represent the local initiatives for the social inclusion of the Roma community, both within the French society and especially in the state of origin, given that for the elected officials of the area “la place des Roms est en Roumanie”609 [“the Roma place is in Romania”].

5.3.3. “La solution des Roms n’est pas en France”610: the social inclusion of the Roma in France or Romania? The Grenoble speech, the circular letter of August 5, 2010, the systematic expulsion actions, the governmental circular letter of August 26, 2012, and the fire on the night of May 12–13, 2013 at a disused factory 607

Delphine Roucaute, “Roms: à Lyon, l'attitude ‘schizophrène’ des autorités,” Le Monde (May 23, 2013): “Je ne suis pas un monstre qui pourchasse les Roms. Il est faux d'écrire, comme certains l'ont fait, que je détruis les caravanes des Roms.” http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2013/05/23/roms-a-lyon-l-attitudeschizophrene-des-autorites_3411784_3224.html. 608 Ibid. “Il y a certes les expulsions de squat … mais il y a aussi Andatu.” 609 Ibid. 610 English translation: “The Roma solution is not in France.”

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in Lyon brought to French policymakers’ attention the issue of migration from the EU member states in the broader context of migration(in)security-social integration. Amid the continuation of systematic evictions (without any purpose, only a sterile battle of numbers and press releases), rarely followed by the provision of temporary accommodation, the French authorities also launched in parallel (in collaboration with associations) social integration actions for the Roma. The circular letter of August 2012 (signed by six ministers: Circulaire Interministerielle Nor Intk1233053C du 26/08/2012 relative à l’anticipation et à l’accompagnement des opérations d’évacuation des campements illicites) represents a starting point for such actions, drawing a few lines of action in the ongoing illegal camp eviction process. The circular letter presented in detail the steps and measures to be taken by the authorities before and after evicting a camp, in order to be in accordance with the current law, but failed to mention the instruments and means required to implement the activities under it. “The circular letter provides a moral point of view, but no means to achieve its goals. There have never been so many expulsions since the investiture of the new government,”611 according to Olivier Brachet, vice-president of housing in Grand Lyon. Brachet continued the analysis of this circular letter, making reference to the manner in which the local authorities and civil society relate to it. If, for the urban community in Grand Lyon and human-rights associations, it represents “fière d'être responsible,”612 for the local officials it translates into “la place des Roms est en Roumanie.”613 Depending on the two representations at the level of the society and policymakers, which also mark the two lines of action regarding the Roma in Grand Lyon, we will further present the two major projects initiated to ensure the general framework necessary for the social integration of the Roma in Lyon, but also in Romania. 5.3.3.1. ANDATU, or “We are not leaving France”! ANDATU614 represents a first for Lyon. In other cities, like Lille, Orly (Valde Marne), Nantes, in Saint-Dennis-Aubervilliers (2007), and Montreuil (2010), there are already those “village d’insertion,” namely MOUS in 611

Roucaute, “Roms,”: “La circulaire donne un point de vue moral, mais aucun moyen pour parvenir à ses fins. Il n’y a jamais eu autant d'expulsions que depuis l’arrivée du nouveau gouvernement.” 612 Ibid. 613 Ibid. 614 “Andatu” means “for you” in the Romani language.

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Montreuil, addressing the people in the former illegal camps who worked hard and had the chance to enter legally. In 2011 the authorities in Lyon launched an initiative to achieve a device that could follow the logic of the integration process615 (entering legally in terms of documents, housing, counselling, vocational training, and insertion into the labour market) called ANDATU. The project was launched in partnership with the Refugee Forum,616 an association responsible for the implementation of the measure program, from the selection of beneficiaries, development of counselling activities, training, and insertion into the labour market, to the monitoring of the beneficiaries’ evolution. The aim of this project is the social integration of the Roma in Grand Lyon, also being the largest initiative of its kind in the Rhone Department. Similarly to the ACCEDER Program in Spain, this also concerns the welfare of the Roma population in Grand Lyon by promoting their social inclusion and integration into the labour market. The cost of such a project amounts to one million euros per year (nine euros per day per person), half of which is provided by European funds and half by Grand Lyon and the French state. The program is much less expensive than the repatriation program in exchange for financial aid (300 euros/adult and 100 euros/child), given that as recently as 2012, 7,300 Romanians benefitted from this program, but their number in the Hexagon still did not decrease and their problems were left unsolved. The program developed under a contract (between the beneficiary, the prefecture, and the forum) through which the beneficiary undertakes to respect the requirement of the program, participate in activities, and avoid committing crimes. The agreement is valid for one year, with another sole renewal possibility. Why such a temporal limitation? Being a program that targets the Roma’s integration into legality by obtaining residence cards, skill development, and a better knowledge of the French language (one of the social inclusion impediments), it creates new opportunities for them on the French labour market, transforming them from a burden on the French state into employees. On average, the program for counselling, training, and insertion into the labour market lasts for one to two years, hence the temporal limitation, after which their place is taken by other families, the 615

In chapter four I mentioned such an initiative launched in Spain by Secretariado Gitano, with state funding and EU grants. 616 The Refugee Forum was founded in 1982 in Lyon following the initiative of several associations, as the Comite Rhodanien d’accueil des refugies et des defence des droitsd’asile (CRARDDA), with a clear mandate of housing and protecting refugees. See more details online on ForumRefugies.org.

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previous beneficiaries becoming examples of good practice, and a guarantor of this program’s success. The program addresses a relatively limited number of individuals (four hundred in its first phase), as compared to the number of Roma living in the Lyon conurbation. Initially, a selection of the beneficiaries was made based on geographic criteria, the fortunate ones being the families in the squat in Gerland,617 so that in the second phase, the selection of the beneficiaries, becomes the responsibility of associations. Their profile was first determined by the seniority in France: “repere depuis long temps sur le territoire.”618 Jean Francois Ploquin (president of the Refugee Forum) considered that besides this criterion, an important place was also taken by the people’s desire to integrate (voluntary enrolment in the program), the history of evictions from various squats or camps without being relocated, and the fact that children need to be educated. The entry into this social inclusion program also implies consent for the participation in Frenchlanguage courses and the practice of activities developed by the forum. The benefits of those selected consist in the procurement of a residence permit, which allows them access social support (for example, family allowances [CAF]) and have unrestricted access to the labour market, while the representatives of the forum assist them in finding emergency shelter, social accommodation, and support in finding employment.619 Undoubtedly, the most important benefit of this program is the residence permit (the beneficiaries’ business card), given that its procurement is conditioned by a continuous presence in France for five years or filling a job, and these beneficiaries receive it without any proof of employment. With such an extensive list of benefits it’s not surprising that, immediately after announcing the beneficiaries, the first objectors appeared. They questioned the way in which this selection was made, as well as the small number of beneficiaries. Aurélie Neveu, coordinator of Medecins du Monde, also questioned the selection criteria formulated by the prefecture “There is great injustice in this program: how do you think they react when the person/family in the tent next door is selected, and

617

Delphine Roucaute, “A Lyon, uncontrat d’integration reserve a quatre cents Roms,” Le Monde (May 23, 2013), http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2013/05/23/a-lyon-un-contrat-d-integrationreserve-a-quatre-cents-roms_3414805_3224.html. 618 Ibid. 619 Ibid.

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they are not and still have to continue to live in the streets/squats?”620 Jean Philippe (MRAP) considers that this “mauvais programme n’ayant aucune base juridique.”621 Its challenge comes from not only the civil society but also the Roma community (those not subject to it), provided that in the Lyon conurbation the number of Roma is approximately one thousand people, and there are only four hundred beneficiaries in this project. Among these beneficiaries is the family of Aramis Nistor who, thanks to this program, found a job at Foyer Notre Dame des Sans abri, and together with his wife and daughter now lives in an apartment in ADOMA.622 “It’s the chance of our lives!”623 said Aramis, referring to this action and the chance for social integration ensured by it. On the other hand, those who sued the prefecture following eviction to obtain access to emergency shelter, or those who abused the humanitarian aid for repatriation have been excluded from this program. This has caused complaints and accusations from the Roma community in the Lyon conurbation. From a legal perspective, the program is criticized in the circular letter of August 26, 2012, provided that the evictions in Grand Lyon are rarely followed by relocation solutions (emergency shelters). The paradox of this project is in the fact that it has been a subject of interest for an administration performing these systematic evictions in recent years as a solution to the illegal Roma camps in its territory. All this criticism (which has proven to be constructive in the end) brings to the forefront of public debate a pilot program that is not yet fully formed, but which responds to the needs of the Roma community representatives in the Lyon conurbation in terms of accommodation and access to the labour market, providing a viable alternative to illegal camps. This situation is very well summarized by Damien Malard’s question: “Mais s’il n’y avait pas Andatu, y aurait-ilautre chose?”624 [“Is there something else apart from ANDATU?”]. 620

Ibid. “Il y a un grande injustice dans ce programme: comment croyez-vous qu’on reagit, quand c’est la personne de la tente d’a cote qui est choisie et qu’on doit rester dans un squat?” 621 Ibid. 622 Laurent Burlet, “Andatu” l’opaqueprogrammed’intégration des Roms, Rue 89 Lyon, May 3, 2013, http://www.rue89lyon.fr/2013/05/03/andatu-lopaque-program me-dintegration-des-roms. 623 Discrètement, le préfet du Rhône régulariseunecentaine de Roms, Laurent Burlet, Rue 89 Lyon, April 25, 2012, http://www.rue89lyon.fr/2012/04/25/a-lyonle-prefet-regularise-et-reloge-une-centaine-de-roms. 624 Roucaute, “A Lyon.”

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The benefits of applying this program will only become visible in 2020, when the first five generations of beneficiaries will emerge from it. Depending on their evolution, the recorded progresses, and the accumulated knowledge, a preliminary conclusion regarding the opportunity and feasibility of such projects within the Lyon community will be drawn. Alongside this initiative, we also find others that come to meet the local or departmental authorities’ strategies in improving the Roma’s social-inclusion activities with European or national funding. We can mention here the EUROCITIES Network (the “Roma Inclusion” workgroup), the Open Society Foundation funding line for a better management of European funds to promote social inclusion, ROMED (intercultural mediation for the Roma), and the URBACT Roma-Net project. Despite these interesting projects and programs, our attention will be further retained by another paradoxical initiative taken by the authorities in Lyon (to invest in the Roma integration in Romania, in a community in Bihor), to be able to meet the policy of “the future of Roma in Romania and not in France.” These projects propose a new European approach to the Roma issue, starting from the idea of transnational collaboration and the exchange of good practices (a highly developed policy with remarkable results at EU level). The project launched by the Lyon conurbation for the Town Hall in Tinca (Bihor county, Romania) is part of the same register, and we will further analyse it as an example of good practice in approaching the Roma issue in a realist, integrated manner, having real chances of success regarding the current concern about the social integration of the Roma at EU level. 5.3.3.2. The Multifunctional Centre in Tinca: a transnational initiative for the social integration of the Roma in the state of origin The Tinca township (comprising the villages of Tinca, Gurbediu, Râpa, and Belfir úi Girisu-Negru) is situated in the south of Bihor county, in the northwestern region of Romania, about 40 km from Oradea. According to the 2002 census, the township had a population of 7,446 inhabitants, of which 1,150 were Roma (self-declared), so that in 2011 the number of the population reached 7,793, with a share of 14.92 percent Roma. The community is concentrated in four streets within the township: Criúului Street, Arany Janos Street, Prahovei Street, and the newly built Primăverii Street, as seen in Fig. 5.10 below.

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Fig. 5.10. Roma national and transnational social integration projects, Tinca, Bihor county

The opportunity and the need for a transnational project arose from an analysis conducted by the authorities in Grand Lyon, which concluded that approximately forty percent of the Roma in this township chose Lyon as an emigration destination, to which some returned several times. At county level, most Roma choose to emigrate to Lyon or the cities in southern France. The reasons for this are easy to understand, although the township has developed both economically and as a tourist attraction (see the Tinca thermae), the Roma community is largely assisted socially (the town hall registered 320 families benefitting from Guaranteed Minimal Income, according to the local expert for Roma, Fekete Alin Gheorghe625), with five persons showing as employed (in 2012). In the 1990s a 625

Excerpt from the interview with Alin Gheorghe Fekete, February 9, 2013.

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significant number of them were present in the local economic activities at the calf and pig farms, or devoting themselves to trading horses and feathers. Currently, a significant part are seasonal workers in Hungary (especially with melons) and unqualified workers at the local construction materials storehouse, but most of them have left for France. The poor economic situation is reflected in their dwellings and everyday lives, which is why, over time, they have been subject to several projects, such as the Polyclinic (the community benefits from free services) and the Family-type House A and B (initiated by the Romanian Association Relief), Family-type House Belfir (the Kolping Belfir Association), and the Day Care Centre for children (initiated by the Ruhama Foundation), while the Evangelical Church opened a primary school for grades one to four, with teaching in the Romani language (see the Tinca map). The town hall allotted land for the enlargement of the Roma neighbourhoods (see the Primăverii neighbourhood) and created the water and sanitation infrastructure, and allotted more land (on Victoria Street – see the map of Tinca and photos in Appendix E), together with a connection to utilities for the launch of the project with Grand Lyon. In this context, integrated by social and educational intervention, in 2010 the city hall in Lyon (amid a failure to collaborate with another community in Dolj county that had an equally significant number of Roma in the Lyon conurbation) opened the premises of a cross-border collaboration with the public administration in Tinca. Its aim was to increase the life quality of the Roma community members so that they would return to their state of origin, thus finding a solution to the constant Tinca-Lyon migration issue and the illegal camps flourishing within the Lyon conurbation since 2007. The project targets a decentralized cooperation between Romania and France to promote social inclusion and raise awareness in the public opinion in Romania and Lyon about the problems that the Roma community is dealing with. The novelty of this project is in its association and implementation manner, based on “decentralized cooperation.” The focus is on the activities for community development and not a humanitarian approach. “We are bound with Bihor by this common issue of the Roma’s migration, for which we need to find common solutions,”626 said Vice-Mayor of Lyon Julien Lefarriere. In this regard, the local council of Tinca, the county council of Bihor, and the urban community of Lyon signed a cooperation agreement valid 626

“The French bother the Gypsies in Bihor,” Adevărul Magazine (March 26, 2001), http://adevarul.ro/international/europa/francezii--fac-baie-tiganilor--bihor1_50ac92537c42d5a6638612aa/index.html.

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for a period of three years (2011–13). The transnational cooperation actions aimed at two areas of intervention, namely the improvement of housing conditions (connecting a part of the community to the electricity supply) and the increase of access to facilities and services for the members of the local community by building a multifunctional centre.627 The connection to energy for sixty Roma families living on Arany Janos Street was achieved starting on November 1, 2011, and in 2013 the town hall at Tinca continued this project by connecting another fifty families. In 2011 two NGOs joined this consortium: the Ville en Transition Association628 in France and the Ruhama Foundation629 in Oradea. The Villes en Transtition Association serves as operator of the Grand Lyon administration in Romania, and the Ruhama Foundation was invited to this consortium for its knowhow in the organization of the social services to be hosted by the Multifunctional Centre.630 Simon Virlogeaux (from the Cities in Transition Association) was delegated by the Lyon conurbation to bring this project to life. According to an interview, a first visit was made to the Tinca community in March 2011 to mobilize all partners in order to determine the best course of action.631 627

Excerpt from the presentation of the Tinca Multifunctional Centre made by Monica Suciu, CEO, Ruhama Foundation, November 9, 2013. 628 For details about the object of the mission and activities of the Villes en Transition Association, see villesentransition.net. 629 The Ruhama Foundation works to improve the life quality of people and local communities at social risk. The foundation acts at a local community level, creating integrated intervention models to solve certain types of problems the assumed target group are dealing with, along with models they promote as viable solutions for partnerships with public authorities and private organizations, thus managing to expand the geographical area and the number of its beneficiaries. The interventions of the Ruhama Foundation aim at contributing to a purpose provided by the social assistance law in Romania, namely “to promote, respect and guarantee the rights of the beneficiaries to an independent, fulfilled and dignified life, as well as to facilitate their participation in the social, economic, political and cultural one.” The target groups of the organization are: Roma at risk of social exclusion, disadvantaged people on the labour market, and physically dependent people, like the elderly. Excerpt from the presentation of the Tinca Multifunctional Centre made by Monica Suciu, CEO, Ruhama Foundation, November 9, 2013. Details on ruhama.ro. 630 Excerpt from the presentation of the Tinca Multifunctional Centre made by Monica Suciu, CEO, Ruhama Foundation, November 9, 2013. 631 Development projects initiated by Lyon for the Roma in Tinca, Financiarul.ro (October 20, 2011), http://www.financiarul.ro/2011/10/20/proiecte-de-dezvoltareinitiate-de-lyon-pentru-romii-din-tinca.

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Following field research, the pressing issues that the community was dealing with (besides the lack of employment) were identified, specifically to find out how to meet them. A first problem identified when analysing the situation in Lyon, as well as in other states, is the scarcity of the dwellings (due to the small land areas and a lack of utilities): “We are ten souls in that little house … We will return to France because it’s better there!”632 What draws them to Lyon? The answer of a woman who has already taken this trip several times is eloquent: “It’s good and there is food.”633 The interruption of studies and lack of qualifications (in accordance with the market demand) are the main barriers to labour market integration. Another issue is the poor hygiene among children, which is why some of them are not allowed at schools, although there are special places allotted to them. The centre will be equipped with a public bath, having a laundry room and dryer, and access to drinking water will be free for the entire community. Tinca Multifunctional Centre is inspired by the Telechiu Multifunctional Centre model, built in 2009, within the A Good Start project (AGS), a pilot initiative of the Roma Education Fund, Budapest, implemented in sixteen localities of four states – Slovakia, Hungary, Macedonia, and Romania – over a period of twenty-two months, with financial support from the European Commission. The major impacts of this project in Telechiu are: the increase in the daily participation of Roma children in education and early care services, from seven children a day to forty-five; the increase in the number of groups offering education and early care from two groups (one group teaching in Romanian, attended by only nine Roma children a day, and another group teaching in Hungarian attended by two Roma children a day, in 2009) to three groups in 2012 and a children and parents club-type group, with a daily attendance of over forty-five children a day. Following this model, the Multifunctional Centre in Tinca also seeks to reunite several social services to address the issues regarding the insufficient social integration of the Roma people. The following types of social services and activities addressing the Roma community will be operating within the Tinca Multifunctional Centre: (1) the children and parents’ clubs, early education activities; (2) counselling and vocational service for young people and adults; 632

Half a million euros for the Gypsies in Tinca, ClickMania (September 21, 2013), http://www.clickromania.co.uk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1 737&Itemid=12:testset. 633 Ibid.

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(3) public bath/laundry room/dryer room.634 Moreover, from a financial perspective, this is the largest direct investment made by a French urban community in Romania at 491,600 euros, divided as follows: 176,600 contribution in kind and 315,000 direct funding to build the centre. The sustainability of the centre will be possible only through the opening and diversification of the program’s activities towards economic ones (creating new jobs, social economy, social entrepreneurship, etc.), its multiplication in other communities or even at a regional level, and the submission for funding (national authorities or the European Commission – the European Social Fund) of project applications in partnership with the local or county public authorities. This is not the only project that the French authorities intend to start in Romania. The plan of action is extensive and applies to all the counties containing localities with significant numbers of Roma who have emigrated into the Hexagon (such as Alba, Timiú, Dolj, Bihor, and MehedinĠi). Their goal is to obtain control over the migration influxes from Romania to France by improving living standards in the state of origin through social-inclusion programs. At the signing of the cooperation agreement with the county council of Dolj, the Vice-President of Dolj Country Council LaurenĠiu Iovanovici brought clarification regarding the beneficiary communities, the implementation phases, and the activities of this project, namely the opportunity and necessity of such a project for the Roma community: The economic reinsertion aids provided by OFII will be granted in support of a gainful economic activity for the people belonging to families that make up the target group of the project and consist of: an aid for the economic project preparation, a training program tailored to the project, financial aid for launching an economic project, and for the project’s application and monitoring for one year. Today’s agreement is signed for a period of two years, with possibilities for subsequent re-evaluation and reprinting depending on the experiment’s success – a success that is equally expected by all the signatories of the agreement, who are aware that the social and economic integration of the Roma in Europe is our mutual responsibility. This agreement represents the transposition of the framework-agreement at a local level, signed in September 2012 between the French Office for Immigration and Integration, the Ministry of Labour, Family and Social Protection and the Ministry of Administration and 634

Excerpt from the presentation of the Tinca Multifunctional Centre made by Monica Suciu, CEO, Ruhama Foundation (September 11, 2013).

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Chapter Five Interior in Romania regarding the implementation process of an experimental program for the reintegration of Romanian Roma families who voluntarily return from France to the origin localities. This agreement provides for a number of 20 families that are currently in Nantes to be materially supported by OFII throughout the repatriation process to where they reside in Dolj county. The beneficiary families will be identified by OFII and the selection criteria will take into account the illegal residence situation in France or poverty. Moreover, the project has started from a previous experience concerning the reintegration of some Roma families, including two families from the Vârtop635 and UrzicuĠa villages. The success of the economic and social reinsertion process within the Romanian communities created the premises of the pilot project. After the work-related visit in France, at the invitation of the Mayor of Nantes, we had the chance to find that some Roma families have integrated into the French community, follow the rules and laws of the French state, have jobs and their children attend schools. The problem is with the rest, namely those in a situation of illegality in Nantes, living in extreme poverty. The Nantes Metropole community will provide the funding for development programs at a local and territorial level, based on the principle of decentralized cooperation, through agreements with the local communities in SălcuĠa and Vârtop. In SălcuĠa, a rehabilitation project of the School in the Mârza village will be implemented, a school where only Roma children go, and in Vârtop a project targeting the construction of locker rooms for the football team will be launched at the stadium.636

Over the last three years the French authorities in Lyon have developed a program to determine that the Roma leave the French territory in exchange for three hundred euros and the promise to receive animals worth 6,660 euros for the opening of micro-farms in the The First Farm program. Thus, hundreds of Roma left the Hexagon territory to become part of this program that was successfully implemented in Timiú county. The program was successful but failed to address the entire Roma issue in Lyon. For such initiatives to achieve the desired effects in the future, their coordination and a diversification of the proposed actions are necessary, taking into account the specificity of the area and the skills of the Roma community (agricultural activities, the selective collection of plastic

635

In Vârtop, the beneficiary family received help in working ten hectares of land with modern machinery and in capitalizing the products obtained. 636 Ana-Maria Constantinescu, “Francezii îi finanĠează pe cei care vin acasă” [“The French Finance Those Who Come Home”], Special Edition (September 12, 2013), http://www.editie.ro/articole/social/francezii-ii-finanteaza-pe-cei-care-vinacasa.html.

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bottles, capitalization of traditional products, or a fruit and herb collection centre). In the same interview, Simon Virlogeux concluded on a realistic and well-anchored note about the reality of the Roma migration phenomenon that: “We hope that this project will achieve its established objectives, namely to support the municipality to come to the aid of the Roma, but this will not solve the migration issue oscillating between Tinca and Grand Lyon. It is part of the solution. We will get to know each other better and then the Roma issue will also progress.”637 In this conclusion, what should be noted are the two lines of action of the French authorities in Tinca, namely the decentralized cooperation with the local authorities and the prospect of extending this cooperation to other areas, in order to achieve, through an integrated approach, the social inclusion of the Roma in the host state.

5.4. Conclusions The purpose of this chapter was to analyse the manner in which the Roma issue was instrumentalized in the Hexagon between 2007 and 2012, in the context of the new European security agenda and according to the politico-economic situation, both as political stake and social problem, with a focus on the poverty-migration-security relationship. The question that triggered our analysis was whether social integration can be supported or must be encouraged within the host or the origin state. Initially considered a minor social issue amid the freedom of movement, the illegal migration phenomenon, visibility, and excessive media coverage, the Roma turned into a security issue with extensive political reverberations. Based on the conflicting representations existing in French society they have turned into “social pariahs,” engaged in organized crime activities, which is why the settlement of “l’affaire des roms” became a priority in the fight against illegal immigration. This issue became highly visible and escalated with President Sarkozy’s Grenoble speech, and ever since (based on the “snowball” theory) it has been ubiquitous in the political discourse, especially in that of the election campaign. The migration-insecurity causality relation created by Sarkozy brings the management of diversity and intensification of the social inclusion process to the forefront of the new European security agenda. The Lyon case emphasizes, on the one hand, the failure of multiculturalism in the 637

Development projects initiated by Lyon for the Roma in Tinca: Financiarul.ro.

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welfare state, amid economic recession, causing the demolition of illegal Roma settlements in France, and respectively the continuation of the expulsion procedure on the grounds of disturbance of the public order and national security, and on the other forces analysts (and policymakers) to reconsider the social integration issue on new socioeconomic-identity grounds (within the origin or host-state society). The two projects (ANDATU and the multifunctional centre) are examples of good practice in the integrated approach of the Roma’s social inclusion, starting from the problems they are dealing with in both the origin and host states. The social inclusion program, ANDATU, punctually responds to the needs of the Roma community in the Lyon conurbation in terms of documents, access to accommodation, professional training, and access to employment, providing a viable alternative to illegal migration and the emergence of illegal squats and camps in the host state. On the other hand, the novelty of the Lyon-Bihor (Tinca) Transnational pilot project is given by the manner of association and implementation of the project (decentralized cooperation), with a focus on the community-facilitation activities (in which the Roma community is actively involved) and not on a humanitarian endeavour. The benefits of applying such programs will only be visible in 2014 to 2015 when the first generation of beneficiaries will begin to implement the experiences and knowledge gained from these projects. Depending on their evolution, the progress recorded, and the professional and personal development, a preliminary conclusion regarding the opportunity and viability of this type of projects for the Roma community will be obtained. The integrative efforts of the origin and host states must find expression at an international level within a coherent legal and theoretical framework that creates optimal project-implementation conditions, benefitting from the necessary material resources.

CHAPTER SIX WHERE ARE TODAY’S ROMA HEADING: A NEW MODEL OF INTEGRATION?

Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the US, the minority issue became a priority on the European security agenda, determining a new manner of approaching it, with a focus on the societyrelated issues: migration, demography, interethnic conflicts, culture, the environment, and economic development. The analysis of the migrationidentity-security relationship placed migration in a logic of security, perceived discursively as a triple threat to the welfare state, public order, and the community’s cultural identity (France can be named here as an exception, talking about its political identity). The EU’s integration ability was put to the test with the last two waves of accession of states with a significant number of Roma populations living in precarious conditions. These two enlargements were different from the previous ones through the large number of applicants, history, and size of the population and the conflicts between the majority and the minority populations. Since the beginning of the 1960s the European Community has been subjected to a series of transformations, and after the Maastricht Treaty the primarily economic community fell on the track of a political union in an attempt to become the “United States of Europe.”638 Building the Europe of tomorrow cannot be achieved without a consensus regarding international migration and its medium or long-term effects on security, social cohesion, the welfare state, and identity in the EU. The purpose of this research was to demonstrate the fact that, in the context of the new European security agenda following September 11, 2001, immigrants, in general, found themselves trapped in a spiral of insecurity through which migration has been raised to the level of metaproblem, and they have become scapegoats, to various degrees, of this transformation’s consequences. The consequences of Roma mobility 638

Ivan, Sub zodia “Statelor Unite.”

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within the EU were analysed on two levels: political stake (instrumentalized by policymakers in the public discourse to win over electoral capital), and social issues (with a focus on the hesitations of policymakers to draw coherent social-integration programs). To prove this hypothesis we resorted to two levels of analysis: a general one, in the European Union, in which our attention was retained by how the migration-identity-(in)security relationship appears on the extended EU security agenda, and a particular one, with a focus on the Roma issue and the manner in which it appears in the spiral of insecurity, analysing several case studies, with special attention to the case of France. Through the research we have seen that, following the end of the Cold War, the state ceased to be the only security actor, given that the nonmilitary issues began to gain ground on the international agendas. Security was no longer exclusively identified with military issues and the use of force. New problems, determined by the changes in the international arena, such as the interethnic relations, migrations, cultural identity, the environment, and the economy, gained ground against the traditional security challenges. First of all, we noted that the Copenhagen School theorists expanded the European security agenda by adding the economic, political, societal, and environmental security sectors. Issues that have been previously ignored by theorists, such as poverty, migration, human trafficking, environmental risks, and economic and political threats, were also included. In a globalized world there is a real interest in societal security, and for the preservation of identity and the linguistic, cultural, and religious traits of an ethnic group against foreign, external influences. Identity is both a source of conflicts and an effect of them. Among these new directions of research promoted by the Copenhagen School, the issues of societal security and securitization as a speech act are of real interest for the present research, emphasizing the interdependence relationship between migration-identity-security, with a focus on the antiRoma campaigns in France. In this context, the migration-identity-security triumvirate imposed on the international agenda a modern approach to the political-security relationship, with direct consequences on the European integration process. The Roma, who were initially considered a minor social issue, have become, in the context of freedom of movement, an increased illegal migration phenomenon, visible through excessive media coverage, and a matter of socioeconomic and societal security with big political reverberations.

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The problem of the Romanian Roma in France is not a new one, having been in the attention of the two states since the 1990s. However, the large number of voluntary repatriations and excessive coverage of expulsions in the last ten years have turned this issue into a European scandal under the Presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy who, through politicoelectoral instrumentalization, raised it to a “national program level.”639 The visibility of the illegal camps and squats and the marginal economic strategies (begging, petty theft) turned them into “social outcasts,” a burden on the welfare state, making social inclusion not just difficult but actually impossible. On the other hand, this situation opens the perspective of a multifaceted analysis, of broad socioeconomic, identity, and security inspiration that goes beyond prejudice, myth, and political stake inactivity or practice within a society that values lucrative activity. Concurrently, with regards to the same issue, the EU should define its position and act accordingly by intervening where national policies failed in solving an issue that, since 2007, has been transcending national borders through its extent and effects. This situation gives the union the opportunity to reassert itself in the international arena as a powerful regional political actor, and a promoter of human and minority rights and social inclusion. The migration-insecurity causality relation created by Sarkozy at the Grenoble speech brought the management of diversity and intensification of the social-inclusion process to the forefront of the European security agenda. The Lyon case emphasized, on the one hand, the failure of multiculturalism in the welfare state, amid economic recession, causing the demolition of illegal Roma settlements in France, and respectively the continuation of the expulsion procedure on the grounds of disturbance of the public order and national security, and on the other hand forced analysts (and policymakers) to reconsider the social integration issue on new socioeconomic-identity grounds (within the origin or host state society). The two projects (ANDATU and the multifunctional centre) are examples of good practice in the integrated approach of the Roma’s social inclusion, starting from the problems they are dealing with in both the origin and host states. The social-inclusion program ANDATU punctually responds to the needs of the Roma community in the Lyon conurbation in terms of documents, access to accommodation, professional training, and access to employment, providing a viable alternative to illegal migration and the emergence of illegal squats and camps in the host state. On the 639

Mitran and Alexa, “CRONOLOGIE,” http://www.mediafax.ro/politic/cronologie-problema-romilor-dintre-romania-sifranta-in-atentia-europei-de-la-repatrierile-din-2010-10062359.

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other hand, the novelty of the Lyon-Bihor (Tinca) Transnational pilot project is given by the manner of association and implementation of the project (decentralized cooperation), with a focus on the community facilitation activities and not on humanitarian endeavour. The integrative efforts of the origin and host states must find expression at an international level within a coherent legal and theoretical framework that creates optimal project-implementation conditions, benefitting from the necessary material resources. The EU must take the lead and intervene in this issue by creating and implementing a coherent European legal framework (including discussing the opportunity to launch a common social policy) to facilitate the practice of social-inclusion initiatives for the disadvantaged groups. The scenarios, cooperation projects, and social-inclusion programs must be tailored to the problem complexity and be able to respond to the general issue – namely, given the EU institutions and the origin and host states’ policymakers’ manner of relating to the Roma issue, can we speak of a “Roma issue” or the “issues of the Roma” within the EU? The answer to this question is not a simple one, and neither is the positioning towards it. So far, through the actions performed, declarations, laws, and position taking, the EU institutions have left the impression of vacillations with regards to the Roma. The positioning cannot be strict, on one side or another, as, being a complex, multifaceted, multileveled, and analysable issue, the situation is a blend between the two coordinates. On the one hand, amid the democratic deficit and semi-failure of multiculturalism in the EU, we cannot skip relating to the Roma’s situation in terms of identity, while the visibility of the poor socioeconomic situation the Roma are dealing with in most states, either of origin or host, cannot but emphasize the necessity of a social-inclusion policy within the EU as a response to the “issues of the Roma.” The complexity and ambiguity of this issue creates the premises for a repositioning in the national policymakers’ socioeconomic-identity terms regarding this situation, concurrently with the need to draw new directions of action in terms of social policy at the EU level. Within the EU, freedom of movement and security are not in opposition but complimentary, the former only achievable in optimum security conditions, while an optimum climate of security intensified the movement of persons, goods, and capital. Within the greater debate of enlargement versus European integration in recent years, European identity and security have been at the heart of the European integration process. Security has always been the purpose behind this, in the states’ attempt to secure the mistakes of the twentieth century, while identity was

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the element that revolutionized the migration-(in)security causality relationship, conferring it flexibility and referential value, both at sub and supranational levels. Against the prolonged economic crisis, the welfare (security) society has turned into a society of risk and insecurity, while the welfare state became a state that manages risk, and an actor of securitization. In this case, what is to be done? Being such a complex issue, the migration problem in general and the Roma issue in particular require a comprehensive approach, integrated measures, international expertise transfer, and cooperation between local, national, and international actors. The problem needs to be tackled from the bottom-up, with a special role for the civil society. There is a need to put another base on the relation between majority and minority groups, especial when it comes to unpopular minorities like the Roma ethnics. The challenge is to overcome the barrier between “us” and “them,” and to tackle the social-integration process “at the grassroots.” The socialintegration process of the Roma is advanced in all Central and Southeastern Europe countries, and especially those with an important number of Roma ethnics (Romania, Bulgaria, or Hungary), but there are still many things left to be done as the process is multifaceted, covering different areas, from housing to culture, education, and employment. It will be interesting to see the role that the EU will assume in this process in the years to come.

LIST OF MAPS

Fig. 3.2. The Roma Political Identity Project, from migration to transnational minority .................................................................... 116 Fig. 3.3. The main Roma groups in Europe – Roma migration theories (Roma branches) ................................................................................ 126 Fig. 3.4. The Roma – a population previously rooted in Europe ............. 129 Fig. 4.2. Roma minority in Romania, 2002 Census Results .................... 170 Fig. 4.2. Roma minority in Romania, 2011 Census Results .................... 171 Fig. 4.3. Roma minority in Bulgaria, 2001 Census Results ..................... 174 Fig. 4.4. Roma minority in Hungary, 2001 Census Results..................... 175 Fig. 4.5. The visibility of Roma issue in Europe: between the stateNGO’s „battle of numbers”, migration and expulsions ..................... 182 Fig. 5.2. Concentration of immigrants in French Regions (2004-5) ........ 207 Fig. 5.3. Roma concentration in France related to immigrant areas: places and estimated number ............................................................. 214 Fig. 5.5. Romanian Roma in Grand Lyon: between ghettoization and systematic expulsions (2007–12) ....................................................... 234 Fig. 5.8. The Roma ethnic ghettoization/semi-deghettoization process: comparative perspectives of Pata-Rât and Cetatea Veche, Cluj County................................................................................................ 237 Fig. 5.9. The Roma community from Huedin-CetateaVeche, Cluj County................................................................................................ 238 Fig. 5.10. Roma national and transnational social integration projects,Tinca,Bihor County .............................................................. 249

APPENDIX A MIGRATORY BEHAVIOUR DETERMINED BY ECONOMIC REASONS IN THE LATE 90S

Source: Tito Boeri, Herbert Brücker The Impact of Eastern Enlargement on Employment and Labour Markets, European Integration Consortium, Report on behalf of the Employment and Social Affaires, Directorate General of the European Commission, Berlin and Milan, 2000, p.54.

APPENDIX B GOOD PRACTICES IN ROMANIAN ROMA COMMUNITIES-PROJECT DESCRIPTION

1. SOCIAL HOUSING BUILDING IN NUSFALÃU “The project was developed in Nusfalau, Salaj County, in the North Western Transylvania (Development Region 6, at the NUTS II level). The locality is 110 km from Cluj-Napoca, the biggest urban centre of the region. The Roma community lives at the periphery of the town and is concentrated in three residential districts: Brazilia (325 Roma households), Bacos (66 Roma households) and Garii (26 Roma households), in the railway station neighbourhood. TARGET GROUP According to the March 2002 Census the average of the total Roma population living in Salaj County is 57,318 inhabitants, representing 5.1% of total population of the county (248,407 inhabitants). The Hungarian population influenced the Roma minority living in Transylvania, which is, in this historical region, less nomadic than in other Romanian regions. The Roma NGOs in Western Romania have developed well lately, providing a good representation of the Roma interests toward the local authorities. The Brazilia neighbourhood was a colony during the Austro-Hungarian regime and this was the place where the plague-infested were “isolated”. Gradually the Roma brick makers hired by the Baron Bamfi, the landowner, settled in the area. Later on, Baron Bamfi donated the land to the Roma people. The religions of the Roma minority are Baptist, Christian Orthodox and Protestant. The community is lead by a gypsy baron called “bulibaoa”, named Victor Kallay. The languages spoken are Hungarian and Romany. Although their Romanian is deficient, the Roma children are not easily accepted in Hungarian primary schools.

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Generally the school attendance is good however it is motivated by the parent’s receipt of payments, which are based upon the children’s attendance record. The majority of the Roma inhabitants work on a seasonal basis for other members of the local population (Hungarians and Romanians) and the wages are insufficient for families with many children (the case in most of the households). The houses are generally one-room types, inherited from three generations, determining overcrowding and insanitary conditions. LOCAL CIRCUMSTANCES The lack of jobs and a regular income, the reduced degree of education and of social assistance together with the results of the local elections has worsened the problems of the community and created discontent and tensions among the Roma population and the local authorities. The Land Fund Law was not applied to the Roma minority in Nuofalau and no social support is provided because the local budget has no funds and / or because the Roma population does not contribute to it. The project developed by “Impreuna” Agency for Roma the community of Nusfalau, aimed to increase the capability on local financial structure and generate a new one, on social housing construction. Another important issue of the local circumstances was the establishment of the Local Roma Association in Nuofalau. President of this association is Mr. Victor Kallay. The social housing project was not the only one in Nuofalau. Another is the Community Centre building, aimed to provide an appropriate shelter to large groups of beneficiaries and activities (i.e. pre-primary education, vocational activities, health education, cultural events, social reinsertion discussions), which was also developed and involves almost the same participants, but for dealing with other problems of the Roma minority. After a difficult start, at the beginning of 1999, the discussions were focused on the utilisation of the bricks produced by the Roma workers and the purchasing of an animal farm for local ownership. But soon it was understood that the main priority is the building of social houses for the Roma minority, as a foundation for the local development with the dedicated participation of all the involved institutions, organisations and individuals. In this respect, after obtaining an agreement between the Local Roma Association and the local authorities, the agreed project aimed to construct 10 social houses with local workforce and locally made bricks.

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The project was proposed to the May 1999 meeting of the County Council of Salaj, where it was adopted, given the necessary approvals and established the project contributions of each participants. STEPS OF THE PROJECT Main steps in this project after the obtaining of the agreement were as follows: ·

· ·

·

· · ·

Purchasing of the land for social housing construction (as previously mentioned, the money coming from the profit of selling the bricks produced in 1998 for this operation was supported by the Local Roma Association in Nuofalau); The production of 250, 000 bricks for the construction of 10 social houses with local workforce; Establishment of the criteria for allowing these houses, with an agreement between the Roma communities’ members and the Local Roma Association. This was a three month process. The criteria were: active involvement and voluntary work; large families with many children; own contribution with bricks; support for another two households from community (not able to produce the necessary bricks, i.e. a widow with 4 children and a family with physical handicap members); The signing of the contract with a Roma construction firm from Slobozia (in the south-east of Romania), which accepted the hiring another 18 local Roma workers (June 1999) during the construction works All the construction permits were approved with the support of the Prefecture of Salaj County; The completion to 80% of 6 houses fir the first phase, at the end of August 1999. The project was completed at the end of 1999. The owner of the social houses is the Local Roma Association.

RESULTS, OUTCOMES Despite the small number of houses against the huge demand and necessity, this project was the first one with a nationally accepted recognition. Among its outcomes, the most important ones are:

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Support and participation of the Roma community (through association but also through individuals); Creation of about 100 local workplaces for Roma people and establishment of a local business (for production of bricks for housing); Introduction of own contribution (money) and participation (work); Affordability for houses for poor member of the community; raising the self-esteem of Roma people and the possibility of continuation without external support.

EVALUATION Lessons learnt: the necessity to work in partnership with the local authorities; the necessity to act as a unified group, both for the identification of needs and priorities and for applying common decisions, and the possibilities for finding new local resources. Finally the relatively quick results generated a basis for further continuation. The most relevant element of the project was the working method –the creation of a sustainable partnership between the Roma association and the authorities at local and county level. After a difficult start, the reliability of the participants builds trust for continuing the process after the project ending. The project was judged by the media as being a national first with regards the participation and the project results. The financial support provided by the MATRA program of the Netherlands was decisive in the project start. A column in a local paper stated: “The local councillors feel ashamed because their problems are solved by Bucharest and foreign efforts. The mayor did not have a positive attitude in the beginning” As mentioned, the first phase of the project of convincing the local authorities to support the process and the establishment of the Local Roma Association was the main difficulty for the social housing construction process. A participative planning activity was the key answer in this case, involving communication and continuous participation, as well as the clear and transparent management of all the operations from the local authorities, the Local Roma Association and the “Impreuna” Agency, apart from the external financial support.

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POLICY IMPACT OF THE PROGRAM The problems related to housing are well known in Romania, not only for the Roma minority, but also for an important share of the population. Regarding this issue and the Roma population, their special conditions demand special attention. In this respect, the Strategy provisions include special measures for speeding-up the process and improving the efficiency and efficacy of the programs. The Nusfalau social housing project represents a role model of participation and results. Subsequently a number of relatively similar developments were replicated in other localities, such as Deva, Hunedoara County, Traianu, Ialomita County, Cetate, and Bistrita County. The Roma NGO sector participates with experts in these programs but also as an independent driving force, by identifying, supporting and promoting this type of project, providing training and knowledge for Roma communities in need”. 2. ROMA ABC, ARITHMETIC – ABC BOOK “The target group of the project represents the Roma communities in areas with an increased percentage of Roma pupils: Mangalia, Caracal, Coltau, Cluj, Slobozia, Iasi, Bacau, Bucharest and a large area of Maramures County. Beneficiaries are estimated to be about 1000 Roma pupils, 50 teachers and Roma communities where the Romany language is taught. TARGET GROUP The project does not cover a single region but a number of localities with compact Roma communities and an important number of Roma pupils. It is considered that despite a relatively easy access to education corresponding to the minority needs, the institutional system is not responding satisfactorily to these needs. As the target group is Roma children of school age, the project aim is to initiate and support the editing of two school manuals: trilingual arithmetic (Romanian, Romany and Hungarian languages) for the second grade of the elementary school and the trilingual Roma ABC Book, for the first grade of the elementary school. In last few years, the school system in Romania allowed the publication of alternative manuals. It is of crucial importance that the Roma children learn the key elements to able to participate, later on, in a

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more normal and decent way than is currently the life of their communities. Learning the mentioned key elements from trilingual manuals will give them supplementary tools to understand mix communities’ behaviour and problems, and also will allow them to better understand the Romany culture and traditions. LOCAL CIRCUMSTANCES The initiator of this project, the Phoenix Foundation from Bucharest and Baia Mare (Maramureo County), has, as its mission, the support of school activities, professional and educational training of children, pupils and young persons, as well the support of activities regarding the development and modernisation of education institutions. This project objective was to support the learning of the mother language, a better communication between the pupil and the teacher who does not speak Romany but speaks only Romanian or Hungarian (in certain areas of Transylvania) and, lastly, the preservation of community traditions and other particular aspects. Concerning the arithmetic part, the aim of the project is also to distribute the manuals in the country, if they are requested, and to promote them during national and international workshops. There is also another objective regarding the arithmetic part: most of Roma children do not have the patience to learn all the sophisticated operations, so the approach tried to develop logical thinking. In this perspective, the project co-ordinators tried to ensure that the instructors respect some tradition of language cultivation, of logical observance and, finally, to use problems and exercises put in the context of traditional craft, using examples from the life of spoon-makers (lingurari), coppersmiths (caldarari), silk traders (matasari) etc. Maintenance and improvement of the mother language and identity topics cannot be done without the direct participation of the Ministry of Education and Research together with the local administration and schools in order to ensure, in the future, funds for the study of the Roma pupils in the Romanian education system. In this respect, an important aspect was the obtaining of County School Inspectorate decisions stipulating that the Romany language can be a study discipline in localities where this is considered useful. A major role for identification and promotion of these localities reverts to the local experts in Roma problems in the Mayor’s Offices and Prefectures. It is the same situation for the Roma Ministry Commission within the Ministry of Education and Research.

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STEPS OF THE PROJECT The main activities in the project were: ·

·

· ·

Identification and adaptation of manuals’ contents to the specific particularities of children. For this purpose, several options of themes have been tested in order to obtain feedback from the future beneficiaries. Identification and listing of localities where manuals could be successfully used, according to the willingness of the Roma pupils and the existence of competent teachers to teach in the Romany language. Editing of the manuals (provision of 1.000 school manuals for Roma pupils). Selection of participants and organization of the first national competition of Romany as mother language.

RESULTS AND OUTCOMES The main results of the project refer to the elaboration, printing and distribution of the two manuals in various Roma communities and the issuing of a ministerial order by the Ministry of Education and Research (35/1999), stipulating that Roma children can study their mother language if the parents agree and if there is a minimum number of 7 pupils per study group. It is estimated that it has improved the communication between the pupils benefiting from these manuals and their teachers. This successful project owes its results to a large consultation process with the participants, mainly experts and leaders of the Roma communities, without whom all this editing and distributing effort would not achieve to inform and prepare the young Roma children for life. The selection of this project is related to the approach for reaching its fundamental purpose of influencing the decision process in the competent institutions in the field of education regarding school Roma population. This effort will be continued through a partnership with the Ministry of Education and Research in the framework of the Strategy. A possible danger is of the isolation of certain communities instead of spreading the information beyond the Roma communities’ frontiers. Another relevant aspect is that the process covered very large and different regions populated by Roma communities with the support of the national network of culture and education inspectorates.

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EVALUATION The purpose of determining some structural changes in the educational system for Roma children implied the involvement of decision making organisations at the central level (the Ministry of Education and Research) and county inspectorates. These activities were started with difficulty and the results are only visible in time. The reaction capacity of some public institutions is weak in many cases and the activities undertaken in collaboration with civil society representatives are also difficult to develop. Finally, the Ministry was not able to supply any funding for this project because they do not have such money available and this aspect was covered by the Soros foundation that allowed the distribution of the manuals free of charge. POLICY IMPACT OF THE PROGRAM Overall, these kinds of project also have an important lobby side through the influence over the national policies with regard to the education of the Roma children. Similar projects were developed since this ABC -one by the “Ethnic Federation of the Roma” from Mangalia; the “Association of gypsy women – For our children”, Timiooara; the “Humanitarian Foundation for the Protection” and “Support of Orphan, Poor or Abandoned Minor Children-Philip Center”. Source: Best practices of Roma projects in Central and Eastern Europe, Edited by the members of the International Editing Group, KONTURS Ltd., Gyongyos, 2003, pp.66-72.

APPENDIX C MINIMUM AND MAXIMUM ESTIMATED NUMBER OF ROMA IN DIFFERENT EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 2010-2012 Country

Minimum estimated number of Roma/Country

Turkey Romania Spain Bulgaria Russia Hungary Serbia Slovakia France

500.000 619.000 700.000 650.000 600.000 500.000 400.000 350.000 310.000

Czech Republic Ukraine Greece Macedonia

225.000 200.000 175.000 105.000

Maximum estimated number of Roma/Country 2.700.000 1.800.000 800.000 800.000 720.000 600.000 600.000 500.000 400.000 (Roms et gens du voyage) 300.000 225.000 300.000 300.000

England Italy

100.000 120.000

300.000 140.000

Germany Albania Moldavia

100.000 100.000 20.000

140.000 120.000 84.300

Bosnia and Herzegovina Portugal Sweden

40.000

80.000

37.500 17.500

50.000 45.000

Poland

32.500

45.000

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35.000

40.000

Croatia Austria Ireland

35.000 22.500 30.000

40.000 37.200 35.500

Belgium Holland

12.500 22.500

35.000 35.000

Kosovo Montenegro Byelorussia

20.000 20.000 15.000

30.000 24.000 17.000

Latvia Finland

4.500 10.000

12.000 12.000

Slovenia Denmark Norway

8.500 4.000 4.000

10.000 5.500 5.000

Lithuania Estonia Cyprus

3.300 1.250 1.200

4.000 1.500 1.500

Luxembourg

100

150

Source: Council of Europe, European Commission, Open Society Institute.

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APPENDIX D PHOTOS OF PATA RÂT COLONY, 2011-2012

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APPENDIX E PHOTOS FROM TINCA, SEND BY MONICA SUCIU, CEO, RUHAMA FOUNDATION, 2012

The School

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Appendix E

The Electrification project (Arany Janos street)

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